United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Federal Financial Management, Government 

Information, and International Security, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

COOPERATIVE 

THREAT REDUCTION

DOD Needs More 

Reliable Data to 

Better Estimate the 

Cost and Schedule of 

the Shchuch’ye 

Facility 

May 2006 

 

GAO-06-692 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 2006

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

DOD Needs More Reliable Data to Better 

Estimate the Cost and Schedule of the 

Shchuch’ye Facility 

Highlights of GAO-06-692, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal 

Financial Management, Government 

Information and International Security, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

Until destroyed, Russia’s stockpile 

of chemical weapons remains a 

proliferation threat, vulnerable to 

theft and diversion. Since 1992,

Congress has authorized the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to

provide more than $1 billion for the

Cooperative Threat Reduction 

(CTR) program to help the Russian 

Federation construct a chemical

weapons destruction facility

(CWDF) at Shchuch’ye to eliminate 

about 14 percent of its stockpile.

Over the past several years, DOD

has faced numerous challenges that 

have increased the estimated cost

of the facility from about $750

million to more than $1 billion and 

delayed the facility’s operation 

from 2006 until 2009. DOD has 

attributed the increase cost and 

schedule to a variety of factors. In 

this report, we (1) assess the

facility’s progress, schedule, and 

cost and (2) review the status of

Russia’s efforts to destroy all of its 

chemical weapons. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the

Secretary of Defense direct the

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

and the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers to (1) ensure that the

EVM system contains valid and 

reliable data, (2) set aside a portion 

of the contractor’s award fee until

the EVM system produces reliable 

data, and (3) require the contractor

to perform an integrated baseline

review (IBR) after awarding the 

contract for completing Building

101. DOD concurred with our 

recommendation. 

Although DOD has made visible progress over the past 2 years in 

constructing the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, it 

continues to face numerous challenges that threaten the project’s schedule 

and cost. Primarily, key buildings on the site have fallen behind schedule 

due to difficulties working with Russian subcontractors. Such delays have 

been costing DOD more than $3 million per month since October 2005 and 

will continue until the award of a crucial subcontract, possibly in June 2006. 

Uncertain progress of Russian construction on the site, unpredictable 

Russian regulatory requirements, and various technical issues, such as

testing the facility, could cause further schedule delays and increase costs.

Also, DOD lacks a reliable earned value management (EVM) system to 

record, predict, and monitor the project’s progress. DOD allocated $6.7 

million to the project’s contractor in September 2004 to establish an EVM 

system and expected to have a validated EVM system in place by March 

2005. DOD cannot use the current EVM system to assess the final schedule 

and cost for completing the Shchuch’ye facility because it contains flawed 

and unreliable data. In addition, the contractor has not yet conducted an IBR 

of the Shchuch’ye project. 

Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether the Russian government can 

destroy its entire chemical weapons stockpile by the Chemical Weapons 

Convention (CWC) extended deadline of 2012. As of March 2006, Russia had 

destroyed about 3 percent of its 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons at 

two completed destruction facilities. To eliminate the remainder of its 

chemical weapons over the next six years, the Russian government must 

construct and operate five additional destruction facilities, including 

Shchuch’ye. The Russian government has indicated that it will need 

continued international assistance to destroy the remaining stockpile. 

Site Map of the Planned Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility at Shchuch’ye

Source: DOD.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-692.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Construction Has Progressed, but Project Is behind Schedule and 

Faces Substantial Challenges 7 

Russia Has Developed a Destruction Plan and Increased Funding 

but May Not Meet Its Destruction Deadlines 22 

Conclusion 26

Recommendations for Executive Action 27 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 29 

Appendix II Lack of Reliable EVM Data Limits DOD’s Ability to 

Estimate Schedule and Cost for Constructing the 

CWDF 31 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 35 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 38 

Tables 

Table 1: Schedule for Russian CWDFs 23 

Table 2: International Assistance for Russian Destruction, as of 

April 2006 25 

Table 3: Examples of Accounting System Errors Understating the 

Variance at Completion from January 2006 Report 32 

Figures 

Figure 1: Russian Chemical Weapons Stockpile 5 

Figure 2: Completed Firehouse at Shchuch’ye, November 2005 8 

Figure 3: Administration/Cafeteria Building under Construction, 

November 2005 9 

Page i GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Figure 4: Construction Progress on Building 101 in November 2003 

and November 2005 10 

Figure 5: U.S. Construction Status of Key Structures at Shchuch’ye, 

March 2006 11 

Figure 6: Status of Key CWDF Milestones, as of May 2006 13 

Abbreviations 

CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction 

CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 

CWDF chemical weapons destruction facility 

DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency 

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

EVM Earned Value Management 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

IBR integrated baseline review

RFP Requests for Proposal 

Rostekhnadzor Federal Service for Ecological, 

Technological, and Nuclear Oversight 

VAT value added tax 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

May 31, 2006

The Honorable Tom Coburn 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 

 Government Information, and International Security 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Tom Coburn 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 

 Government Information, and International Security 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Russia possesses the world’s largest declared chemical weapons stockpile. 

Since 1992, Congress has authorized the Department of Defense (DOD),

through its Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to provide the 

Russian Federation more than $1 billion to eliminate these weapons. The 

majority of these funds support the construction of a chemical weapons 

destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuch’ye, Russia. The facility is designed 

to destroy about 14 percent of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile. In 

1999, DOD estimated that the destruction facility would cost about $750 

million and could begin destroying chemical weapons in 2006. However, 

by 2003, DOD determined that the facility would cost more than $1 billion 

and would not be operational until 2009. DOD has attributed the increased 

cost and schedule to a variety of risk factors, including changing 

requirements and congressional restrictions on construction funding. 

Russia possesses the world’s largest declared chemical weapons stockpile. 

Since 1992, Congress has authorized the Department of Defense (DOD),

through its Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to provide the 

Russian Federation more than $1 billion to eliminate these weapons. The 

majority of these funds support the construction of a chemical weapons 

destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuch’ye, Russia. The facility is designed 

to destroy about 14 percent of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile. In 

1999, DOD estimated that the destruction facility would cost about $750 

million and could begin destroying chemical weapons in 2006. However, 

by 2003, DOD determined that the facility would cost more than $1 billion 

and would not be operational until 2009. DOD has attributed the increased 

cost and schedule to a variety of risk factors, including changing 

requirements and congressional restrictions on construction funding. 

In this report, we (1) assess the facility’s progress, schedule, and cost and 

(2) review the status of Russia’s efforts to destroy all its chemical 

weapons. To assess the progress of the facility, we obtained information 

from U.S. government officials and representatives of Parsons Global 

Services, Inc., (Parsons) the contractor managing the construction at 

Shchuch’ye. We also collected and analyzed DOD and contractor 

documents and met with relevant officials. Furthermore, we analyzed the

reliability of Parsons’ Earned Value Management (EVM) system data for 

the facility. A DOD-required management tool, an EVM system measures 

performance by comparing the value of work accomplished with work 

scheduled and thereby provides early warning of schedule delays and cost 

overruns. To obtain information on Russia’s chemical weapons 

destruction efforts, we met with Russian government and international 

donor officials and reviewed copies of pertinent documents, including the 

Russian chemical weapons destruction plan. We performed our work from

June 2005 through May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

In this report, we (1) assess the facility’s progress, schedule, and cost and 

(2) review the status of Russia’s efforts to destroy all its chemical 

weapons. To assess the progress of the facility, we obtained information 

from U.S. government officials and representatives of Parsons Global 

Services, Inc., (Parsons) the contractor managing the construction at 

Shchuch’ye. We also collected and analyzed DOD and contractor 

documents and met with relevant officials. Furthermore, we analyzed the

reliability of Parsons’ Earned Value Management (EVM) system data for 

the facility. A DOD-required management tool, an EVM system measures 

performance by comparing the value of work accomplished with work 

scheduled and thereby provides early warning of schedule delays and cost 

overruns. To obtain information on Russia’s chemical weapons 

destruction efforts, we met with Russian government and international 

donor officials and reviewed copies of pertinent documents, including the 

Russian chemical weapons destruction plan. We performed our work from

June 2005 through May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

Page 1 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
government auditing standards. (See app. 1 for details on our scope and 

methodology.) 

Since our last visit to the site in November 2003, DOD and Parsons have 

made progress in constructing the CWDF at Shchuch’ye. For example, 

several buildings are at or near completion, including the fire station, 

housing complex, and warehouse. However, DOD faces substantial 

challenges that could threaten the project’s cost and schedule. First, the 

construction of key buildings is behind schedule. The construction of the 

main destruction building is delayed due to subcontractor bids that were 

incomplete or excessively high. The control building is behind schedule 

because a major Russian subcontractor went bankrupt. As of February 

2006, DOD estimated that the construction of the entire CWDF was about 

40 percent complete, compared with the more than 52 percent scheduled 

for completion at that time. Second, uncertain progress of Russian 

construction of utilities (electricity, water, and gas) required to operate the 

facility could delay the destruction process. Third, a new Russian 

regulatory agency has levied additional and unplanned safety and 

administrative requirements on the project. In addition, potential 

difficulties in implementing the next critical step—systemization—in 

which all of the facility’s components (destruction, electrical, water, etc.) 

are tested to ensure interoperability and performance—could impact cost 

and schedule. While DOD estimates that it will turn over the Shchuch’ye 

facility to the Russian government in December 2009, such an estimate 

appears optimistic given the construction and other unknown delays DOD 

may encounter. Furthermore, the EVM system that Parsons is using to 

record, predict, and monitor progress contains flawed and unreliable data. 

Our analysis revealed serious discrepancies in the data, such as improper 

calculations and accounting errors. For example, we found that from 

September 2005 through January 2006 Parsons’ EVM reports did not 

capture almost $29 million in actual costs for the CWDF project. In 

addition, we found that DOD and Parsons have not yet conducted an 

integrated baseline review (IBR) for the Shchuch’ye project. 

Results in Brief 

To improve DOD’s efforts to accurately measure progress on the 

Shchuch’ye project and estimate its final completion date and cost, we are 

recommending that the Secretary of Defense ensure that Parsons’ EVM 

system contains valid, reliable data and that it reflects actual cost and 

schedule conditions. Until Parsons’ system produces reliable EVM data, 

we are also recommending that the Secretary of Defense withhold a 

portion of Parsons’ award fee. Finally, we are recommending that the 

Page 2 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Secretary of Defense require Parsons to perform an IBR of the Shchuch’ye 

project once the contract for completing Building 101 has been awarded. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation regarding the improvement of 

Parsons’ EVM system data and provided technical comments that we 

incorporated where appropriate. The Department of State did not provide 

comments. 

In addition to the Shchuch’ye project, the Russian government has 

ambitious plans to eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile. Since 2002, 

Russia has destroyed about 3 percent of its declared 40,000 metric tons of 

chemical weapons at two completed destruction facilities. To eliminate 

the remaining stockpile and meet the Chemical Weapons Convention 

(CWC) extended deadline of 2012, the Russian government will have to 

destroy about 38,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. The Russian 

government’s destruction plan to eliminate all chemical weapons by 2012 

may be unrealistic as it depends on the construction of seven destruction 

facilities—two have been built, two are under construction, and three have 

not been started. Furthermore, the Russian government’s priority is to 

destroy nerve agents contained in large munitions, because destroying the 

larger-sized munitions first would allow Russia to meet its CWC 

destruction deadlines faster. Accordingly, the destruction of smaller 

munitions at Shchuch’ye may become less of a priority for the Russian 

government. In addition, the Russian government has indicated that it will 

need continued international assistance to destroy the remaining 

stockpile. Its destruction plan estimates that about $5.6 billion is needed to 

eliminate the entire Russian stockpile. Since 2002, international donors, 

including the United States, have committed almost $2 billion for Russian 

chemical weapons destruction efforts. 

Russia possesses the world’s largest declared chemical weapons stockpile, 

which is stored at seven sites across the country (see fig. 1). When 

declared in 1998, the Russian stockpile included 32,500 metric tons of 

nerve agents and 7,500 metric tons of blister agents.

1

 As of March 2006, 

Russia had destroyed about 1,158 metric tons of blister agents, about 3 

percent of its stockpile. Under the CWC, Russia must destroy all of its 

Background 

 1

Nerve agents affect the transmission of nerve impulses in the nervous system. Nerve 

agents are easily dispersed and highly toxic when absorbed through the skin or via 

respiration. Blister agents, which can be lethal if inhaled, generally cause burns on contact 

with skin. The blister agents include mustard gas and lewisite.

Page 3 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
chemical weapons by the extended deadline of 2012.2

 The CWC is a 

multilateral arms control treaty that bans the development, production, 

stockpiling, transfer, and use of chemical weapons and requires the 

destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks. Until destroyed, 

chemical weapons remain a proliferation threat. 

 2

The CWC requires the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks and production

facilities by 2007 with a possible extension to 2012. 

Page 4 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Figure 1: Russian Chemical Weapons Stockpile

In 1992, the United States agreed to assist the Russian government in 

eliminating its chemical weapons stockpile. The United States has 

committed to fund the design, construction, equipment acquisition and 

installation, systems integration, training, and start-up of the Shchuch’ye 

facility. When completed, the facility will house about 100 buildings and 

structures, including the destruction buildings where chemical munitions 

Sources: DOD (data); Nova Development and Map Resources (images). 

Chemical weapons storage facility

Destruction facility completed or under construction

Gorniy

Maradykovskiy

R U S S I A

Leonidovka

Kambarka

Kizner Shchuch'ye

Pochep

Moscow

Page 5 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
are destroyed; the administration building where the destruction process 

is controlled; and support buildings such as the boiler house, which 

provides heat to the entire facility. As originally planned, the facility’s 

construction was expected to begin in March 2001 and to be completed in 

2005. However, a 2-year congressional freeze on funding postponed the 

start of construction until March 2003. 

DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) manages the 

implementation of the CTR program. To construct the Shchuch’ye facility, 

DTRA—-through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the contract manager 

for the project—has contracted with Parsons, which in turn subcontracts 

the design and construction work to Russian contractors. Contracts are 

executed, managed, and reviewed in accordance with DOD and Federal 

Acquisition Regulations (FAR). Subcontractors submit bids in response to 

Requests for Proposal (RFP) issued by Parsons. Parsons then awards the 

subcontract on the basis of safety records, past performance, quality of 

work, price, and other factors. After awarding these contracts, Parsons 

works with the subcontractors to conduct technical evaluations of the 

schedule and cost of the work. CTR assistance will finance the 

construction of all buildings and structures on site, except for one. The 

Russian Federation has agreed to fund the construction of a second 

destruction building (Building 101A) nearly identical to Building 101, the 

U.S. funded destruction structure. Russia is also funding the construction 

of utilities (gas, electricity, water) needed to operate the facility and to 

support the local community. 

Since 1992, Congress has passed 27 laws addressing the CTR program.3

The legislation includes various DOD requirements for CTR funding, 

conditions on CTR expenditures, and mandates to report on the 

implementation of the CTR program. Some legislative provisions apply to

the entire CTR program; others are directed at the Shchuch’ye project, 

including a requirement for a presidential certification that the project is in

the U.S. national security interest.4

 The President’s certification authority

and the waiver of a prior prohibition on funding chemical weapons 

 3

For a summary of the legislation, see appendix II of GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: 

DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain, GA0-

05-329 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005). Since publication of that report, Congress has 

passed two laws containing measures addressing CTR. Pub. L. 109-103, Div A (The National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006) and Pub. L. 139-148, Div A (The 

Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006). 

4

Pub. L. 108-375, sec. 1303 (amending Pub. L. 108-136, sec. 1306). 

Page 6 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
destruction in Russia expire on December 31, 2006.

5

 In addition, Congress 

has conditioned funding for the Shchuch’ye facility on the Secretary of 

Defense’s certification that, among other conditions, Russia has allocated 

at least $25 million to eliminating its chemical weapons and has developed 

a practical plan for destroying its chemical weapons stockpile.6

Since our last visit to the Shchuch’ye site in 2003, we found that Parsons 

and DOD had made progress in constructing the facility. Several support 

buildings such as the fire station, worker housing, and warehouse had 

been completed; and many of the other structures, including the 

administration/cafeteria building, the processing building, and storage 

buildings were well under construction. However, key buildings had fallen

behind schedule, affecting the facility’s overall cost and schedule. 

Uncertain progress of Russian construction at the facility and on its 

infrastructure, an unpredictable Russian operating environment, and 

assorted technical issues could continue to impact the project’s cost and 

schedule. Furthermore, the failure of Parsons to develop and implement a 

usable EVM system has limited DOD’s efforts to oversee project schedule 

and cost. 

During our visit to the Shchuch’ye site in November 2005, we observed 

substantial construction progress compared with our visit in November 

2003. In 2003, the site consisted mainly of concrete foundations for the 

destruction buildings, with only the specialist camp7

 and warehouse under 

construction. By 2005, however, the support structures of many buildings 

had been built, and several buildings were at or near completion, including

Construction Has 

Progressed, but 

Project Is behind 

Schedule and Faces 

Substantial 

Challenges 

DOD Has Made Progress 

but Is Experiencing Delays 

 5

See Pub. L. 106-65, sec. 1305. 

6

See Pub. L. 107-107, sec. 1308. The Secretary of Defense must certify that there has been 

(1) information provided by Russia, that the United States assesses to be full and accurate, 

regarding the size of the chemical weapons stockpile of Russia; (2) a demonstrated annual 

commitment by Russia to allocate at least $25 million to chemical weapons elimination; (3) 

development by Russia of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve agents; (4) 

enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all nerve agents at a single

site; (5) an agreement by Russia to destroy or convert its chemical weapons production

facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk; and (6) a demonstrated commitment from 

the international community to fund and build infrastructure needed to support and 

operate the facility. 

7

The specialist camp is the building to house contractors working on site. 

Page 7 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
the specialist camp, warehouse, gas rescue station,8

 and fire station. (Fig. 2 

shows the completed fire station.) 

Figure 2: Completed Firehouse at Shchuch’ye, November 2005 

Source: GAO.

Also under construction were the boiler house and the 

administration/cafeteria building, seen in figure 3.

 8

The gas rescue station will serve as a training center and equipment depot for dealing with 

hazardous materials on site. 

Page 8 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Figure 3: Administration/Cafeteria Building under Construction, November 2005 

Source: GAO.

The concrete outer shells of Building 101 and the administration/control 

building had been completed. While Building 101 was still open to the 

elements and contained no inner walls, Russian subcontractors were 

installing outlets and control panels inside the drywall of the 

administration building. (See fig. 4 for a comparison of the construction 

work completed on Building 101 in November 2003 and November 2005.) 

We also observed piping and wiring being installed above ground for site 

wide electrical, heat, and water utilities. 

Page 9 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Figure 4: Construction Progress on Building 101 in November 2003 (left) and November 2005 (right) 

Source: GAO.

Despite such progress, the CWDF project has not met scheduled 

milestones, primarily because of a delay in awarding the contract for the 

completion of the CTR-funded destruction building (Building 101), 

pictured in figure 4. In January 2005, DOD estimated that the CWDF would 

cost $1.039 billion and be transferred to the Russian Federation by July 

2009. However, in March 2006, DOD officials stated that they were unable 

to estimate when the entire facility will be completed and at what cost 

until they award a contract for the completion of Building 101. As of 

February 2006, DOD estimated that the construction of the entire CWDF 

was about 40 percent complete, compared with the more than 52 percent

scheduled for completion at that time. As indicated in figure 5, the 

construction of certain key structures is behind schedule, including the 

destruction building (Building 101), the control building (administration 

building), the boiler house, and the water circulation building. 

Page 10 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Figure 5: U.S. Construction Status of Key Structures at Shchuch’ye, March 2006 

Frame

Foundation

Balance

76.2%

100%

0%

100%

0%

67.2%

Frame

Foundation

Balance

100%

100%

0%

100%

0%

77.4%

Piles and 

pile caps

Balance

32.8%

0% 0%

38.6%

69%

59.7%

65.5%

46.2%

44.9%

28.7%

11.5%

71.6%

Structural and 

finishing works

Mechanical

Electrical and 

Communications

systems

Technological

100% 99.1%

100% 99.8%

34.9% 34.8% 100% 100%

67.0% 42.8%

78.7% 67.2%

98.8% 95.9%

on hold on hold

53.5% 48.6%

Administration buildinga

Bituminization 

building

Chemical gas

storage

Waste storage 

area

Boiler house 

area

Site-wide 

underground 

utilities, waste 

water, electrical 

distribution

Administration 

areaa

Water treatment 

areaa

Water 

circulation

Transformer 

substation

Laboratory building

Fire station 

area

Gas rescue 

area

Russian 

destruction 

building

(Building 101 A)

Destruction building

(Building 101)

Source: DOD.

Building or project Percentage scheduled Percentage completed

a

Building schedule modified by Parsons to reflect longer timelines. 

Building 101 is on the “critical path”, that is, delays in finishing the building 

will prolong construction on other parts of the Shchuch’ye facility. 

Although the exterior shell of Building 101 is on schedule, the award of the 

construction contract for the remainder of Building 101 is behind 

Page 11 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
schedule. Parsons had planned to award the subcontract for the balance of

the building in June 2005, but it may not be awarded until summer 2006. 

Since October 2005, Parsons has incurred costs for personnel salaries, 

rent, and transportation of more than $3 million per month, which will 

continue until the subcontract is awarded. Where possible, Parsons has 

reduced or delayed recruitment of personnel planned for management of 

Building 101. Construction activity is still ongoing at other buildings 

throughout the site. 

The delay in awarding the contract for the remainder of Building 101 has 

impacted the overall schedule for completing the facility’s construction. As 

part of its program management, DOD estimates dates for key project 

milestones at Shchuch’ye. These include a milestone schedule with 

objective (ideal) completion dates, threshold (latest acceptable) dates, and 

estimated completion dates for key activities. As of May 2006, however, 

DOD does not expect to meet key milestone dates for the CWDF. 

According to this schedule (as shown in fig. 6), construction of the facility 

will be delayed by about 1 year, testing using simulated nerve agent will 

begin some 15 months later than planned, and live agent demonstration 

will be delayed by about 8 months. While DOD estimates that it will turn 

over the Shchuch’ye facility to the Russian government in December 2009,

such an estimate appears optimistic given the construction and other 

unknown delays that DOD may encounter in testing the facility with 

simulated and live nerve agent. DOD officials stated that these milestones 

may slip even further. 

Page 12 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Figure 6: Status of Key CWDF Milestones, as of May 2006 

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Objective

Threshold

Estimate

Construction 

complete

(end of physical 

construction)

Transfer 

responsibility 

(Russian 

Federation takes

control of facility) 

Begin simulant 

demonstration 

(operate facility 

using simulated 

nerve agent) 

Begin agent 

demonstration 

(operate facility 

using live nerve 

agent) 

Aug.

July July

May Aug.

May Mar. Nov.

Sept. July Dec.

Source: DOD.

Feb.

Shchuch’ye CWDF 

Delayed Due to Difficulties 

Working with Russian 

Subcontractors 

The delays in constructing key buildings at the CWDF result from 

problems Parsons and DOD have had with Russian subcontractors, 

including the bankruptcy of one major subcontractor, problems in 

soliciting adequate bids, and difficulty maintaining a competitive-bidding

process. 

First, the 2005 bankruptcy of the Russian construction subcontractor 

Magnitostroy delayed construction of key buildings. This company was 

cited during the initial source selection process during 2000 to 2001 for its 

technical abilities, logistical capability, competitive pricing, and financial 

responsibility and was the first construction subcontractor to work on the 

Shchuch’ye project. According to DOD and Parsons officials, Magnitostroy 

enjoyed the strong support of the Russian government. However, it was 

discovered in 2005 that a senior executive embezzled millions of dollars 

from the company in 2003. As a result, the company was unable to afford

sufficient labor to complete its work at the site, according to DOD and 

Parsons officials. The most serious delay involved the construction of the 

administration building—the command building that will control the 

Page 13 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
destruction process. Although scheduled to be complete at the time of our 

visit in November 2005, construction of the administration building was 

only about 36 percent complete. By January 2006, Parsons had assumed 

direct responsibility for the construction of the building and had divided 

most of the remaining work among Magnitostroy’s subcontractors. 

Similarly at that time, two other Magnitostroy buildings were behind 

schedule, requiring Parsons to extend their completion dates. Given these

delays, Parsons has not provided Magnitostroy with RFPs on any new 

construction packages. 

Second, DOD and Parsons officials stated that Russian subcontractors had 

not provided detailed cost and scheduling information in their bids. 

Although Parsons cited incomplete bids as the cause of the delay, DOD 

criticized Parsons for a “lack of urgency” in resolving the Building 101 bid 

issue. Parsons had particular difficulty soliciting adequate bids on the 

construction package for the work remaining on Building 101.

9

 This 

construction package will complete the building’s physical structure and 

install the equipment and processing systems needed to destroy the 

chemical munitions. According to DOD and Parsons officials, it is the 

largest, most complex construction package of the CWDF project. After 

Magnitostroy’s bankruptcy, two other contractors, Spetztroy and 

Stroytransgaz, bid on the remaining Building 101 construction package. 

According to DOD officials, their bids arrived after the June 2005 deadline 

and did not include adequate cost and schedule data. Despite a deadline 

extension, neither subcontractor submitted a complete bid until the end of 

December 2005. At that time, only Spetzstroy submitted a responsive bid. 

Its bid price, however, was $239 million over DOD’s budget. 

Third, the small pool of approved Russian subcontractors has made it 

difficult to maintain a competitive-bidding process. According to DOD, the 

subcontractors for the CWDF are selected through a series of joint 

selection committees. The Russian government develops a list of approved

companies that Parsons and a joint commission comprising DOD and 

Russian government officials examine. In the initial round of 

subcontractor selections in 2000 to 2001, Magnitostroy was the first CWDF 

subcontractor chosen. A second round of selections in 2003 added four 

more subcontractors: Promstroy, Spetztroy, Stroyprogress, and 

Stroytransgaz. According to DOD officials, before Magnitostroy’s 2005 

 9

Construction packages are “mini contracts” for completing specific tasks associated with 

buildings and infrastructure that are awarded to subcontractors on a competitive basis. 

Page 14 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
bankruptcy, Magnitostroy, Stroytransgaz, and Spetztroy were the only 

subcontractors that were capable of completing larger construction 

efforts. The small number of Russian contractors discouraged effective 

competition and limited the number of construction packages that could 

be awarded.

In March 2005, DOD requested that the Russian Federation expand the 

subcontractor pool to ensure completion of the Shchuch’ye facility on 

time and within budget. The Russian government added one small 

specialty subcontractor, Vneshstrojimport, but did not restart the selection 

process to find a replacement for Magnitostroy. In December 2005, 

Stroytransgaz withdrew from competition, and the sole remaining 

contractor, Spetztroy, submitted a bid for $310 million to complete 

Building 101. However, DOD had budgeted only $71 million for the 

construction package. To reconcile the cost difference, DOD paid for an 

independent cost analysis that validated the original Parsons estimate of 

$56 million. Parsons and DOD also sought the assistance of the Russian 

government to negotiate with Spetzstroy to lower its bid. When

negotiations failed to produce a compromise, Parsons canceled the RFP 

for the balance of Building 101 on March 2, 2006. 

In March 2006, DOD resubmitted a request for more subcontractors and 

provided the Russian government with a list of five potential companies, 

three of which were added to the pool. In April 2006, Parsons issued a new 

RFP for the remainder of Building 101. According to DOD officials, 

Parsons has and will continue to conduct weekly meetings with the 

bidders and make personnel available for questions and clarifications 

regarding the RFP. 

Cost and Schedule Subject 

to Uncertain Progress of 

Russian Construction, an 

Unpredictable Russian 

Operating Environment, 

and System Testing Issues 

The cost and schedule of the Shchuch’ye facility are subject to continuous 

risks. The Russian Federation’s uncertain progress in completing work on 

Building 101A and required utilities could delay the final system testing for 

the CWDF. The Russian government’s failure to complete promised social 

infrastructure could generate local opposition to the CWDF. DOD and 

Parsons must also operate in an unpredictable Russian environment with 

changing legal and technical requirements that could directly affect 

schedule and cost. 

Russian Federation progress in completing Building 101A, as well as the 

industrial and social infrastructure surrounding the CWDF, remains 

uncertain. According to DOD officials, the Russian government’s method 

of construction scheduling contains few itemized tasks, making it difficult

Uncertain Russian Progress in 

Completing Facility and 

Infrastructure 

Page 15 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
to accurately gauge construction progress and uncover issues that could 

cause delays. Although DOD and Parsons monitor Russian Federation 

construction progress through monthly progress reports and project site 

visits, the Russian government has not always followed jointly agreed 

upon schedules. DOD and Parsons officials remain concerned that 

systemization timelines could be affected if both destruction buildings are 

not completed at the same time. Furthermore, Russian progress in 

constructing utilities for the CWDF and the local community has produced 

mixed results. For instance, we observed that the Russian government has 

installed only one of three power lines needed to operate the CWDF. 

According to Parsons and DOD officials, although the Russian government 

completed the new water line to the CWDF and the town of Shchuch’ye in

2004, the more water the CWDF uses, the less the town has available. This 

may lead to a competition for water when the facility begins consuming 

substantially more water when testing of the facility’s systems begins, and

during operation. Furthermore, when the Russian government constructed 

a new gas line to the CWDF and through the town of Shchuch’ye, it did not 

connect the line to local homes as promised. A local Shchuch’ye official 

stated that most local residents cannot afford to pay for connection to the 

main gas line and expressed concerns that the Russian government will 

not fulfill its obligations to the local population. To allay public concerns 

that may impact the CWDF, DOD uses public outreach offices to conduct

opinion polls and educate the local populace on the CWDF.10

DOD and Parsons must contend with an unpredictable Russian business 

environment that can affect cost and schedule through unexpected 

changes in Russian legal, technical, and administrative requirements.11

New regulatory requirements have impacted the CWDF; in one case,

stopping work on a building until it could be redesigned to comply with 

new Russian electrical codes. In November 2005, a new Russian regulatory

agency—-the Federal Service for Ecological, Technological and Nuclear 

Oversight (Rostekhnadzor)—-performed a surprise audit at the 

Shchuch’ye CWDF. The agency cited Parsons with noncompliance in

several areas, including environmental and industrial safety reviews, 

permits, licenses, and certifications. While Parsons and DOD officials were 

not aware of these requirements, they agreed to implement corrective 

Russia’s Operating 

Environment Is Unpredictable 

 10The public outreach offices are located in Shchuch’ye, Chelyabinsk, and Kurgan. 

11According to its agreement with DOD, the Russian government must identify and obtain 

all legal permits, licenses, and certifications required to design, construct, equip, 

commission, and operate the Shchuch’ye CWDF. 

Page 16 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
actions. As of March 2006, Parsons had resolved 82 percent of the 

Rostekhnadzor audit findings and was working to mitigate the remainder.

DOD continues to negotiate with Rostekhnadzor to meet the requirements 

of Russian law and is working with the Russian government to identify 

feasible solutions. Additionally, Parsons has contracted with consultants 

that specialize in helping companies conform to Russian fire, ecological, 

and industrial safety regulations at the local and national levels. 

Furthermore, DOD and Parsons must review new technical requirements 

raised by Russian government officials. According to DOD officials, some 

new requirement requests are justified as they relate to the operation of 

the CWDF, while most others are attempts to transfer cost and risk from 

Russia to the United States. For example, as a result of code and space

deficiencies, DOD accepted the Russian requirement for an additional 

laboratory building on site, construction of which will increase the 

project’s cost by an additional $12 million. However, DOD officials have 

resisted approving Russian requests that they believe are unnecessary or 

that fall within Russian responsibilities at the site. DOD refused to allow 

the Russian government to incorporate a new machine into the 

destruction process, which would have required significant redesign and

testing of the process, and led to schedule delays and increased project 

costs. 

Russian requirements for long-term visas and value added tax (VAT) 

exemptions for equipment have affected cost and schedule. The Russian 

government provides most DOD and Parsons personnel with only 6-month 

visas, requiring workers to temporarily leave the country while their visas 

are reissued. One DOD official estimated that transportation costs 

associated with this practice totaled approximately $3 million as of 

November 2005. However, DOD officials have noticed improvement in 

how quickly the Russian Federation processes visas. In addition, when the 

Russian government reorganized in early 2004, the office in charge of 

Russian customs was dissolved, leaving no agency able to approve the 

VAT exemptions for more than 6 months. During that time, all equipment 

shipped from the United States was halted, causing a 3-month slip in the 

CWDF construction schedule. In late 2004, the Russian Federation 

eventually reestablished a new VAT office, and equipment delivery was 

resumed. Since that time, DOD has encountered no VAT-related delays. 

Issues associated with the testing of the CWDF’s utilities and automated 

destruction system (systemization) could further delay the schedule and 

increase costs. DOD officials identified systemization of the CWDF as the 

next major challenge after resolving the bid issue for Building 101.

Testing Issues Could Delay 

Destruction Process 

Page 17 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Systemization consists of a series of tests to ensure the safety, function, 

and interoperability of the CWDF internal systems—i.e., water, gas, 

electric, heat, and the chemical munitions destruction process. Such 

testing could be delayed if either destruction building (101 or 101A) or 

essential utilities are not completed on time. The automated destruction 

process is complex, involving the drilling, draining, and decontamination 

of various sizes and types of munitions, and the neutralization of the nerve 

agent they contain. Ensuring that this system works and interfaces 

properly with the rest of the facility will require the testing and calibrating 

of roughly 1,000 different processes, according to a DOD official. DOD 

officials noted that U.S. experiences with destroying chemical weapons 

found that systemization often encounters difficulties and delays and has 

the potential to increase costs. Furthermore, DOD and Parsons must 

compete the systemization contract between two Russian subcontractors, 

Redkino and Giprosintez, selected by the Russian government. Given 

previous difficulties working with subcontractors, Parsons may 

experience delays in obtaining adequate and reasonably priced bids. 

DOD is attempting to mitigate systemization risk by exploring options to

test the CWDF’s systems using Russian rather than U.S. methods. 

Although the Shchuch’ye facility is a Russian design, it is currently 

planned to undergo testing procedures similar to those DOD uses in the 

United States. According to DOD officials, Russian systemization methods 

are less involved than U.S. processes, which must adhere to stringent 

environmental and operating regulations and can take 16 to 18 months to 

complete. The Russian government, however, systemized its CWDF at 

Kambarka within 6 to 9 months. While DOD officials caution that each 

CWDF is unique, given the types of munitions to be destroyed, they have 

begun exploring whether Russian methods may allow for streamlining and 

compression of the systemization schedule at Shchuch’ye, while still 

maintaining acceptable safety levels. Parsons and its subcontractors are 

also testing the automated destruction system equipment before it is 

installed in Building 101. 

Page 18 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
DOD policy and guidance12 require the use of EVM to measure program 

performance. EVM uses contractor reported data to provide program 

managers and others with timely information on a contractor’s ability to 

perform work within estimated cost and schedule. It does so by examining 

variances reported in contractor performance reports between actual cost 

and time of performing work tasks and the budgeted or estimated cost and 

time. In September 2004, DOD modified its contract with Parsons, 

allocating about $6.7 million and requiring the company to apply EVM to 

the Shchuch’ye project. Parsons was expected to have a validated EVM 

system by March 2005.13 As of April 2006, Parsons had not developed an

EVM system that provided useful and accurate data to CWDF program 

managers. In addition, our analysis found that the project’s EVM data are 

unreliable and inaccurate. According to DOD officials, these problems 

stem in part from Parsons’ outdated accounting system. EVM guidance 

states that surveillance14 of an EVM system should occur over the life of 

the contract. DOD has not yet conducted an IBR15 for the Shchuch’ye 

project and does not plan to do so until after Parsons awards the 

subcontract to complete Building 101, possibly in June 2006. 

In December 2005 a Parsons’ self-evaluation16 stated that the EVM system 

for the CWDF was “fully implemented.” In contrast, DOD characterized 

Parsons’ EVM implementation as a “management failure,” citing a lack of 

experienced and qualified Parsons staff. DOD withheld approximately 

EVM System Has Not Been 

Effectively Implemented 

and Contains Flawed Data 

Parsons’ EVM System Is Not 

Yet Useful to DOD Managers 

 12Defense Contract Management Agency, Department of Defense Earned Value 

Management Implementation Guide, (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 7, 2005). See also DOD 

Memorandum: Revision to DOD Earned Value Management Policy, (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 7, 2005). 

13According to DOD, a validated EVM system was not required at the time the Parsons 

contract was awarded. A modified EVM system, implemented in September 1998, was 

maintained and used until December 2004. 

14Surveillance is the process of reviewing the health of the EVM system process. The 

purpose of surveillance is to focus on using an EVM system effectively to manage cost, 

schedule, and technical performance. An effective surveillance process ensures that the 

key elements of the process are maintained over time. 

15An IBR verifies the technical content of the baseline. It also ensures that contractor 

personnel understand and have been adequately trained to collect EVM data. The review 

also verifies the accuracy of the related budget and schedule to ensure that risks have been

properly identified, and it also assesses whether the contractor meets the program’s 

objectives. 

16Award fee contracts allow government agencies to adjust the amount of fee paid to 

contractors based on the contractor’s performance. Parsons is required to do a self 

assessment of its performance at the end of each award fee evaluation period. 

Page 19 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
$162,000 of Parsons’ award fee due to concerns over the EVM system. In 

March 2006, DOD officials stated that at that point in implementation, 

EVM was not yet a usable tool in managing the Shchuch’ye project. DOD 

officials stated that Parsons needs to demonstrate that it incorporates 

EVM into project management rather than simply fulfilling a contractual 

requirement. DOD expects Parsons to use EVM to estimate cost and 

schedule impacts and their causes and, most importantly, to help eliminate 

or mitigate identified risks. 

Parsons’ EVM staff stated that they underestimated the effort needed to 

incorporate EVM data into the system, train staff, and develop EVM 

procedures. Parsons officials were also surprised by the number of manhours required to accomplish these tasks, citing a high level of staff 

turnover as contributing to the problem. According to the officials, 

working in a remote and isolated area caused many of the non-Russian 

employees to leave the program rather than extend beyond their initial 

tour of duty.

Based on our review of Parsons’ monthly EVM data for September 2005 

through January 2006, we found that the data are inaccurate and 

unreliable and that Parsons is exercising poor quality control over its EVM 

data. Specifically, we discovered numerous instances where data were not 

added properly for scheduled work; Parsons’ EVM reports, therefore, did 

not accurately capture data needed by project management to make 

informed decisions about the Shchuch’ye facility. For example, we found 

that from September 2005 through January 2006, Parsons’ EVM reports 

contained addition errors that did not capture almost $29 million in actual 

costs for the CWDF project. Such cost omissions and other errors may 

cause DOD and Parsons project officials to overestimate the amount of 

project funding available. 

Parsons’ EVM Data Are 

Inaccurate and Unreliable 

Moreover, we found several instances where the accounting data were not

allocated to the correct cost accounts, causing large cost over-runs and 

under-runs. This problem occurred because the accounting data were 

placed in the wrong account or Parsons’ accounting system was unable to

track costs at all levels of detail within EVM. A Parsons official stated that 

the company was taking measures to identify these inaccuracies and 

allocate the accounting data to the proper cost accounts. These problems, 

however, have led to numerous accounting errors in the EVM reports. 

Such mistakes underestimate the true cost of the CWDF project by 

ignoring cost variances that have already occurred. Cost variances 

compare the earned value of the completed work with the actual cost of 

the work performed. Until Parsons fixes its accounting system, manual 

Page 20 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
adjustments will have to be made monthly to ensure that costs are 

properly aligned with the correct budget. Such continuous adjustments 

mean that the system is consistently reflecting an inaccurate status of the 

project for Parsons and DOD managers. (For specific examples of our 

findings regarding Parsons’ EVM data, see app. II.) 

EVM guidance states that surveillance of an EVM system should occur 

over the life of the contract to guarantee the validity of the performance 

data provided to the U.S. government. Initial surveillance activities involve 

performing an IBR of a project within 6 months of awarding a contract and 

as needed throughout the life of a project. DOD and Parsons have not yet

conducted an IBR for the Shchuch’ye project. Program managers are 

expected to use EVM reports that have been validated by an IBR. Without 

verifying the baseline, monthly EVM reporting, which tracks project work 

against a set budget and schedule, is neither meaningful nor valid. Parsons 

and DOD officials explained that while an IBR has been discussed, one 

will not be conducted until Parsons awards a contract for completing 

Building 101. DOD officials estimate that the award process for this 

contract may not be completed until summer 2006, approximately a year

later than planned. According to Parsons, as of January 2006, about $66 

million of scheduled work has not been completed as planned, due to the 

delay in awarding the subcontract for the balance of Building 101. DOD 

officials stated that while they recognize the importance of conducting 

surveillance over an EVM system, they currently are focused on the 

immediate need of establishing a usable EVM system on which to perform 

surveillance. 

Furthermore, DOD requires all EVM systems to undergo a compliance 

audit or “validation” conducted by the Defense Contract Management 

Agency (DCMA) with assistance from the Defense Contract Audit Agency

(DCAA). DCAA found that Parsons’ accounting process was inadequate. A 

DCAA official on the validation team stated that Parsons is relying on an 

outdated accounting system that has difficulty capturing actual costs for 

the Shchuch’ye project and placing them into appropriate cost categories. 

The DCAA official stated that Parsons management should have 

discovered such accounting errors before the EVM report was released to

DOD. DCAA therefore questioned whether Parsons can generate correct 

accounting data and recommended that Parsons update its accounting 

system. As of April 2006, DCMA and DCAA had not yet validated Parsons’ 

EVM system. (For more information regarding DCMA and DCAA’s 

assessments of Parsons’ EVM system see app. II.) 

Page 21 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Russia Has Developed 

a Destruction Plan 

and Increased 

Funding but May Not 

Meet Its Destruction 

Deadlines 

Since our report in March 2004,17 the Russian government has approved a 

plan to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and has begun financing 

significantly more of its own destruction activities. However, as of April 

2006, the Russian government’s progress in destroying its chemical 

weapons stockpile has been limited, and the Russian government’s 

destruction plan may be overly ambitious and reliant on international 

assistance. 

Russia Has Developed a 

Destruction Plan That May 

Prove Overly Ambitious 

We reported in early 2004 that Russia’s lack of a credible chemical 

weapons destruction (CWD) plan had hindered destruction activities. 

However, in October 2005, the Russian government approved a plan for 

destroying its entire chemical weapons stockpile by the CWC-established 

deadline of 2012.

18 The October 2005 plan calls for using seven destruction 

facilities to eliminate the entire chemical weapons stockpile. Destruction 

of the chemical weapons stockpile at Gorniy was completed in December 

2005. As of March 2006, only the facility at Kambarka is operational. The 

plan outlines the construction of the remaining five sites, including 

Shchuch’ye, where nerve agent is to be eliminated. 

According to the Russian plan, the blister agents stored at Gorniy and 

Kambarka were to be destroyed first. In December 2005, the Russian 

government completed its destruction efforts at Gorniy and began 

destroying chemical weapons at Kambarka. In accordance with the plan,

destruction will next be focused on nerve agents. The storage sites near 

Leonidovka, Maradykovskiy, and Pochep house large nerve-agent 

munitions, while those near Shchuch’ye and Kizner store smaller 

munitions. Table 1 depicts the schedule for Russian chemical weapons 

destruction facilities. 

 17GAO, Nonproliferation: Delays in Implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention 

Raise Concerns About Proliferation, GAO-04-361 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004). 

18The Government of the Russian Federation Resolution, No. 639 (Oct. 24, 2005). On 

Amendments to the Federal Target-Oriented Program, “Chemical Weapons Stockpiles 

Destruction in the Russian Federation.” 

Page 22 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Table 1: Schedule for Russian CWDFs 

Russian destruction

facility site 

Actual or 

estimated date of

operation

Actual or estimated

completion date for 

destroying

weapons

Type of chemical 

weapons

Quantity of agent 

to be destroyed

(metric tons)

Amount of

declared

stockpile

 (metric tons)

Gorniy December 2002 December 2005 Bulk blister 0 1,120

Kambarka December 2005 2010 Bulk blister 6,347 6,360

Maradykovskiy 2006 2012 Large nerve

munitions 

6,960 6,960

Shchuch’ye 2008 2012 Small nerve

munitions 

5,440 5,440

Leonidovka 2008 2012 Large nerve

munitions 

6,960 6,960

Pochep 2008 2012 Large nerve

munitions 

7,520 7,520

Kizner 2009 2012 Small nerve

munitions 

5,640 5,640

Sources: GAO analysis of Russian government and DOD data. 

While the Russian plan indicates that the CWDF at Shchuch’ye will be 

operational by 2008, DOD estimates that the facility may not be 

operational until 2009. Furthermore, the Russian government’s priority is 

to destroy nerve agents contained in large munitions, because destroying

the larger-sized munitions first would allow Russia to meet its CWC 

destruction deadlines faster. Accordingly, the destruction of smaller 

munitions at Shchuch’ye19 may become less of a priority for the Russian 

government.

However, the Russian government’s destruction plan to eliminate all 

chemical weapons by 2012 may be unrealistic. It depends on the 

construction of seven facilities, but only two have been built, two are 

under construction, and three have not been started. Although the CWDF 

at Maradykovskiy may be operational in mid-2006, the Shchuch’ye facility 

is still under construction, and only minimal work has begun at the three 

remaining sites of Kizner, Leonidovka, and Pochep. According to its CWC 

destruction schedule, Russia must eliminate 20 percent of its chemical 

weapons stockpile by April 2007. As of March 2006, it had eliminated 

about 3 percent at Gorniy and Kambarka. Between April 2007 and April 

 19The nerve agents to be destroyed at the Shchuch’ye CWDF are stored at the Planovy 

arsenal located about 10 miles away. 

Page 23 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
2012, Russia must eliminate the remainder of its chemical weapons 

stockpile (about 80 percent) at five destruction facilities that have yet to 

be completed. It will be extremely difficult for the Russian government to 

complete and operate the last three facilities by its proposed schedule and 

meet its CWC commitment to destroy all stockpiles at these sites by the 

extended deadline of April 2012. 

Similarly, as of April 2006, DOD announced that the United States will not 

be able to meet the CWC extended destruction deadline of 2012. DOD 

estimates indicate that about 66 percent of the U.S. declared chemical 

weapons stockpile will be destroyed by April 2012. As of March 2006, the 

United States had destroyed about 36 percent of its declared stockpile. In 

the United States, DOD had five operating chemical weapons destruction 

facilities as of March 2006, and two additional facilities were being 

designed.20

Russia Has Significantly 

Increased Funding, but 

Destruction Efforts Need 

International Assistance 

According to the Russian destruction plan, the estimated cost for 

eliminating the entire Russian chemical weapons stockpile is more than 

160 billion rubles—about $5.6 billion.

Over the past 6 years, Russia has substantially increased its annual funding

for its chemical weapons destruction efforts. In 2000, the Russian 

government spent about $16 million for chemical weapons destruction. By 

2005, it had spent almost $400 million. For 2006, the Russian government 

plans to spend more than $640 million. For chemical weapons elimination 

at Shchuch’ye, the Russian government has budgeted about $144 million 

since fiscal year 2000. Russian funding at the site supports construction of 

one of the two destruction buildings (Building 101A), as well as the 

industrial and social infrastructure (utilities, roads, schools, etc.) needed 

to support the facility’s operations. 

The Russian government will need continued international assistance to 

complete destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile. The United 

States, Canada, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and other donors have 

committed almost $2 billion in assistance, with the United States 

 20The U.S. facilities operational as of March 2006 include Umatilla, Ore.; Newport, Ind.; 

Deseret, Utah; Pine Bluff, Ark.; and Anniston, Ala. The facilities at Blue Grass, Ky.; and 

Pueblo, Colo., remain in the design phase. In February 2006, the facility at Edgewood, Md., 

began closing procedures. As of November 2003, all chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll 

were destroyed and the destruction facility dismantled. 

Page 24 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
committing the largest amount, about $1.039 billion. The Russian 

government estimates it will need about $5.6 billion to eliminate its entire 

stockpile. All U.S. assistance for destroying Russian chemical weapons is 

being provided to the CWDF at Shchuch’ye.21 As of March 2006, other 

international donors, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, are also 

providing significant assistance to Shchuch’ye to help fund the Russian 

destruction building (Building 101A) and the infrastructure needed to 

support the facility’s operation.22 Although Italy is providing some funding 

for Shchuch’ye infrastructure, most of its contributions are committed to 

the construction of the CWDF at Pochep. Russia has been relying on 

German assistance to destroy its stockpile of blister agents at the Gorniy 

and Kambarka destruction facilities. Table 2 describes the commitments 

and types of assistance provided by international donors. 

Table 2: International Assistance for Russian Destruction, as of April 2006 

International donors

Committed funding for

Russian destruction

(U.S. dollars)a

Areas to receive 

international assistance Types of projects being funded

Belgium $100,000 Shchuch’ye To be determined 

Canada 89,150,537 Shchuch’ye Industrial infrastructure, railway, and equipment for 

Building 101A 

Czech Republic 232,458 Shchuch’ye Industrial infrastructure (electrical substations) 

Denmark 117, 970 Various locations Public outreach efforts 

European Union 14,156,452 Gorniy, Kambarka, and 

Shchuch’ye 

Equipment at Gorniy and Kambarka, and industrial 

infrastructure at Shchuch’ye (electrical substation) 

Finland 871,771 Gorniy and other locations Equipment at Gorniy and public outreach efforts 

France 7,077,976 Shchuch’ye Environmental surveys and other projects to be 

determined 

Germany 233,573,198 Gorniy and Kambarka Equipment for the construction and operation of 

both facilities 

Ireland 94,376 Shchuch’ye To be determined 

Italy 439,660,257 Shchuch’ye and Pochep Infrastructure (gas pipeline) at Schuch’ye and the 

construction of the Pochep CWDF

Netherlands 9,028,325 Shchuch’ye Equipment for Building 101A 

 21In addition to funds for destroying Russian chemical weapons, other CTR assistance is

being provided to help eliminate former Russian chemical weapons production facilities at 

Volgograd and Novocheboksarsk. 

22The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, in conjunction with the Russian 

Federation, formed a working group in November 2003 to coordinate all international 

assistance to the Shchuch’ye site. 

Page 25 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
International donors

Committed funding for

Russian destruction

(U.S. dollars)a

Areas to receive 

international assistance Types of projects being funded

New Zealand 1,158,433 Shchuch’ye Industrial infrastructure (electrical substation)

Norway 3,250,969 Shchuch’ye Industrial Infrastructure (electrical substation) and 

other projects to be determined 

Nuclear Threat Initiative 1,000,000 Shchuch’ye Infrastructure (railway bridge)

Sweden 952,988 Shchuch’ye To be determined 

Switzerland 6,984,707 Kambarka, Shchuch’ye, 

and other locations 

Sanitary and hygiene monitoring system at 

Shchuch’ye, equipment at Kambarka, and public 

outreach efforts 

United Kingdom 141,196,728 Shchuch’ye and other 

locations 

Industrial infrastructure, equipment for Building 

101A, and public outreach efforts 

United States 1,039,200,000 Shchuch’ye Construction of the destruction facility 

Total $1,987,807,145

Sources: GAO analysis of data from DOD, State, and international donors. 

a

Donor commitments converted from foreign currencies to U.S. dollars using the annual 2005 

exchange rate. 

To facilitate additional international contributions, the Russian 

government has provided potential donors a list of CWDF projects 

requiring assistance. Primarily, assistance is needed for the construction 

of the destruction facilities at Kizner, Leonikovka, and Pochep, as well as 

related infrastructure support. The Russian government is also seeking 

international funding to support operations at the Kambarka and 

Maradykovskiy facilities. 

Until destroyed, Russia’s stockpile of chemical weapons—especially nerve 

agents contained in small munitions, such as those stored at Shchuch’ye—

remain a proliferation threat, vulnerable to diversion and theft. Since 1992,

the United States has been providing CTR assistance for the CWDF at 

Shchuch’ye to help reduce the threats posed by these weapons. Originally 

designed as a pilot facility to “jump start” Russian chemical weapons 

destruction efforts, Shchuch’ye may no longer be a priority for the Russian 

government. Delays in implementing the Shchuch’ye project over the past 

14 years led the Russian government to begin destruction efforts at other 

sites. Disagreements between the United States and Russia over the types 

of munitions to destroy and how to destroy them, negotiations to resolve 

outstanding issues, restrictions on U.S. funding, and difficulties with 

Russian subcontractors, among other factors, have delayed the 

Shchuch’ye facility’s completion and increased its costs. Although 

progress has been made on the physical construction of the facility over 

Conclusion 

Page 26 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
the past 3 years, DOD continues to encounter numerous challenges that 

affect the completion of the Shchuch’ye CWDF. Furthermore, DOD 

currently cannot reliably estimate when the Shchuch’ye facility will be 

completed and at what cost. Parsons’ EVM system, implemented to help 

manage the schedule and cost of the Shchuch’ye project, contains 

unreliable and inaccurate data; thus, DOD cannot use it as a management 

tool. Even with significant international assistance at Shchuch’ye and 

other destruction facility sites, the Russian government will likely fail to

destroy its entire chemical weapons stockpile by the CWC extended 

deadline of 2012. 

Unreliable EVM data limit DOD’s efforts to accurately measure progress 

on the Shchuch’ye project and estimate its final completion date and cost.

As such, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct DTRA, in 

conjunction with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to take the following 

three actions: 

• ensure that Parsons’ EVM system contains valid, reliable data and that the 

system reflects actual cost and schedule conditions; 

• withhold a portion of Parsons’ award fee until the EVM system produces 

reliable data; and 

• require Parsons to perform an IBR after awarding the contract for 

completing Building 101. 

DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced 

in appendix III. DOD concurred with our recommendation that DTRA in 

conjunction with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ensure that Parsons’ 

EVM system contains valid, reliable data and reflects actual cost and 

schedule conditions, and require that Parsons perform an IBR after 

awarding the contract for completing Building 101. DOD partially 

concurred with our recommendation that a portion of Parsons’ award fee 

be withheld until the EVM system produces reliable data. DOD stated that 

it had withheld a portion of Parson’s award fee in a previous period. DOD 

further noted that an award fee must be based on the merits of the 

contractor’s performance and until the performance period is completed, 

it cannot prejudge Parsons’ performance and predetermine the 

withholding of award fees based on our recommendation. DOD also 

provided technical comments, which we have incorporated where 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 27 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
appropriate. The Department of State was provided a draft of this report 

but did not provide comments. 

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and 

State and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies

available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Joseph A. Christoff 

Director, International Affairs and Trade 

Page 28 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the progress of the Shchuch’ye facility, we collected and 

analyzed Department of Defense (DOD) and Parsons Global Services, Inc. 

(Parsons) contractor documents and met with relevant officials. 

Specifically, we met with officials from the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

(CTR) Policy Office, the office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

Within DTRA, we obtained information from the Director of the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate, as well as the program and 

project managers, for chemical weapons elimination. We also met with 

officials from the Threat Reduction Support Center in Springfield, Virginia. 

In addition, we met with officials from the DTRA office and the Chemical

Weapons Destruction Support Office in Moscow. 

We traveled to the Russian Federation to observe construction of the CTRfunded chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. At 

Shchuch’ye and Chelyabinsk, we met with personnel from Parsons and the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In Moscow, we met with Russian 

government officials at the Federal Agency for Industry, the Ministry of 

Foreign Affairs, the Duma, and the Accounts Chamber of the Russian 

Federation. We also analyzed the reliability of the earned value 

management (EVM) data for the Shchuch’ye project. Specifically, we 

examined Parsons’ EVM reports for a 5-month period from, September 

2005 to January 2006, to assess the Shchuch’ye destruction facility’s cost 

and schedule. We checked the EVM data to see if there were any 

mathematical errors or inconsistencies that would lead to the data being 

unreliable. We interviewed officials from the Defense Contract 

Management Agency (DCMA), the Defense Contract Audit Agency

(DCAA), and Parsons officials to better understand the anomalies in 

Parsons’ EVM data and determine what outside surveillance was being 

done to ensure the validity of the EVM data. We also used a data collection 

instrument to obtain detailed information from DOD on the Shchuch’ye 

project, including the contract, program management activities, 

independent cost estimates, risk analysis, and award fees. 

To obtain information on Russian elimination efforts and international 

donor assistance for Russian chemical weapons destruction, we met with

U.S., Russian, and international donor officials and obtained copies of 

pertinent documents, including the Russian chemical weapons destruction 

plan. We obtained information from officials in the Bureau of European 

and Eurasian Affairs and the Bureau of International Security and 

Nonproliferation at the Department of State. At DOD, we met with officials 

and acquired documents from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Page 29 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy. In Moscow, we obtained 

information from Russian government officials at the Accounts Chamber, 

the Federal Agency for Industry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 

Duma. At Shchuch’ye, we spoke with a local government official involved 

with public outreach efforts. We obtained data from the U.S., Russian, 

British, Canadian, and German governments as well as the G-8 Global 

Partnership on the assistance committed and provided for Russian 

chemical weapons destruction efforts. To assess the reliability of these 

data, we corroborated other nations’ data wherever possible, comparing 

and cross-checking documents and information. We interviewed officials 

from the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the 

Russian Federation. We determined that data on funding and assistance 

provided for Russian chemical weapons destruction were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. We also determined that data on

the status of Russian and U.S. chemical weapons elimination were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

The information on Russian law in this report does not reflect our 

independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary 

sources. We performed our work from June 2005 through May 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 30 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix II: La

Limits

and C

ck of Reliable EVM Data 

 DOD’s Ability to Estimate Schedule 

ost for Constructing the CWDF 

Page 31 GAO-06-692

Appendix II: Lack of Reliable EVM Data 

Limits DOD’s Ability to Estimate Schedule 

and Cost for Constructing the CWDF 

Measuring and reporting progress against cost and schedule commitments 

is vital to effective program management. To measure program 

performance, DOD requires the use of EVM, a concept that has been used 

by DOD since the 1960s for measuring program performance. Through 

EVM, program offices can determine a contractor’s ability to perform 

work within cost and schedule estimates by examining variances between 

the actual and estimated costs and time to perform work tasks. EVM offers 

many benefits when done properly and serves as a means to measure 

performance and identify deviations from planned activities, allowing 

program managers to mitigate risks. Based on our analysis of Parsons’ 

EVM data, and the findings of DCMA and DCAA, the data are inaccurate 

and unreliable. Without reliable schedule and cost estimates, DTRA has 

limited means to accurately assess when the Shchuch’ye facility will be 

completed and at what cost. 

In reviewing Parsons’ monthly EVM data for September 2005 through 

January 2006, we discovered numerous instances of data not adding 

properly for scheduled work. Further, Parsons’ EVM reports are not 

capturing all of the data needed by project management to make informed 

decisions about the Shchuch’ye facility. Such errors may cause DOD and 

Parsons project officials to overestimate the amount of funding available 

to cover future risks, such as the systemization of the Shchuch’ye facility. 

Moreover, we found several instances where the accounting data were not

allocated to the correct cost accounts causing large cost over-runs and 

under-runs. In these cases, the accounting data were placed in the wrong 

account, or Parsons’ accounting system was unable to track costs at the 

level of detail EVM requires. Parsons officials stated that measures are 

being taken to identify these inaccuracies and allocate the accounting data 

to the proper cost accounts. These problems, however, have led to 

numerous accounting errors in Parsons’ EVM reports. 

Furthermore, in reviewing Parsons’ EVM reporting data, we found several 

errors that a Parsons’ official attributes to the company’s accounting 

system. For instance, current EVM period data are not accurate due to 

historical data corruption, numerous mistakes in accounting accruals, and 

manual budget adjustments. Such mistakes underestimate the true cost of

the CWDF project by ignoring cost variances that have already occurred.

For example, the Moscow project management task was budgeted at a 

cost of $100,000. According to the January 2006 EVM report, the work has 

been completed but the actual cost was $2.6 million, resulting in an 

overrun of approximately $2.5 million. The EVM report, however, fails to

capture the expected $2.5 million overrun. Such data are misleading and 

GAO’s Analysis Reveals 

Parsons’ EVM Data are 

Unreliable and Require 

Surveillance 

CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix II: Lack of Reliable EVM Data 

Limits DOD’s Ability to Estimate Schedule 

and Cost for Constructing the CWDF 

skew the project’s overall performance. As indicated in table 3, this is just 

one example of accounting system errors. In the case of the Moscow 

project management task, Parsons officials explained that this error 

occurred because the budget for this account was misaligned and, 

therefore, caused a false cost variance. Parsons officials stated they would 

be issuing an internal change order to correct this mistake. 

Table 3: Examples of Accounting System Errors Understating the Variance at Completion from January 2006 Report 

Dollars in millions 

Work 

scheduled

Work 

performed

Actual 

costs

Budget at

completion

Estimate at 

completion 

GAO analysis of

variance at 

completion 

understated by

Design task (27); task 

management $2.1 $2.1 $5.5 $2.1 $2.1 $3.4

Design task (27); 

project management, 

Moscow $0.1 $0.1 $2.6 $0.1 $0.1 $2.5

Design task (27); 

construction

packages $9.4 $9.0 $20.2 $9.9 $9.9 $10.3

Source: GAO analysis of Parsons data. 

Until Parsons’ management updates the company’s accounting system, 

these types of manual adjustments will have to be made through monthly 

change orders to ensure that costs are properly aligned with the correct 

budget. Such continuous adjustments do not allow the EVM system to 

provide timely and accurate information to Parsons and DOD managers. 

In addition, DOD guidance and best practices require program managers 

to conduct an integrated baseline review (IBR) as needed to ensure that 

the baseline for tracking cost, technical information, and schedule status 

reflects (1) all tasks in the statement of work, (2) adequate resources in 

terms of staff and materials to complete the tasks, and (3) integration of 

the tasks into a well-defined schedule. Program managers are required to

use EVM reports that have been validated by an IBR. Without verifying the 

baseline, monthly EVM reporting—which tracks project work against a set 

budget and schedule—is insufficient and invalid.

Parsons and DOD officials explained that while an IBR has been 

discussed, one will not be conducted until the contract for completing 

Building 101 has been awarded. DOD officials estimate that the contractaward process may not be completed until June 2006, resulting in a 1 year 

Page 32 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix II: Lack of Reliable EVM Data 

Limits DOD’s Ability to Estimate Schedule 

and Cost for Constructing the CWDF 

delay. Such a delay not only prevents Parsons from holding an IBR, but it

also jeopardizes DOD’s ability to accurately estimate the cost and schedule 

to complete the CWDF program. Until the costs have been negotiated for 

building the remainder of Building 101, it is unclear whether the CWDF at 

Shchuch’ye will be completed on time and within budget. DTRA officials 

explained that if the costs for this effort exceed the original estimate, they 

will have to cover the shortfall using management reserve funds. Using 

management reserve funds for construction leaves less contingency

funding available to complete and test the Shchuch’ye facility.

DCMA and DCAA Have 

Concerns with Parsons’ 

EVM Implementation 

Until December 2004, DTRA was using EVM data from a simplified 

Parsons EVM process. In September 2004, DTRA directed Parsons to 

implement a complete EVM system that was capable of being validated by

DCMA. Although Parsons’ EVM validation was originally scheduled for 

March 2005, Parsons was unable to meet this deadline and requested a 

series of extensions. In September 2005, DCMA officials visited the 

Shchuch’ye site for a program assistance visit and then returned in midNovember 2005 to conduct the formal validation review, 8 months later 

than planned. 

DOD requires all EVM systems to go through a compliance audit or 

“validation” conducted by DCMA, with assistance from DCAA. The 

evaluation team looks for proof that the system meets the 32 criteria1

 for a 

good EVM system, as well as 2 to 3 months of reliable EVM data. While the 

DCMA official who led the validation team saw much improvement in 

Parsons’ EVM system from September to November 2005, he stipulated 

that an EVM compliance audit only tests whether the contractor has a 

good, capable EVM system and knows how to use it. A compliance audit 

does not identify whether the system is used properly, the data are 

reliable, or the products of the system are read and acted upon by 

management. The DCMA official stated that continual surveillance of 

Parsons’ EVM system would be necessary to ensure these actions were 

occurring. According to the official, DCMA does not expect to perform 

surveillance for the Shchuch’ye project. 

 1

The American National Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance guidance 

identifies 32 criteria that reliable EVM systems should meet. The criteria are organized into

five categories: organization, planning and budgeting; accounting; analysis; and revisions 

and data maintenance. 

Page 33 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix II: Lack of Reliable EVM Data 

Limits DOD’s Ability to Estimate Schedule 

and Cost for Constructing the CWDF 

DCAA also participated in Parsons’ EVM validation and produced a 

corrective action report stating that its EVM accounting process was 

inadequate. Specifically, Parsons did not provide adequate documentation

that direct costs of almost $300,000 were based on accurate and reliable 

accounting data. The source of the accounting data used by Parsons may 

be unreliable, causing actual costs for September 2005 to be significantly

understated. For September 2005, Parsons subtracted almost $1 million 

without providing sufficient data that the adjustment was reasonable and 

allowable. A DCAA official stated that these findings are the result of 

Parsons’ reliance on an outdated accounting system that has difficulty 

capturing actual costs for the Shchuch’ye project into a proper cost ledger. 

The official noted that the software Parsons uses to query the accounting 

system and pull data into the EVM reports also caused errors. DCAA was 

also concerned with Parsons’ ability to apply effective EVM data quality 

control. According to DCAA officials, Parsons’ management should have 

discovered such accounting errors before the EVM report was released to

DOD. DCAA therefore questioned whether Parsons can generate correct 

accounting data and recommended that Parsons update its accounting 

system. 

Page 34 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 35 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 36 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 37 GAO-06-692 CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 38 GAO-06-692

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov 

In addition to the individual named above, Muriel Forster (Assistant 

Director), Jerome Brown, Lynn Cothern, Jennifer Echard, David Hancock, 

Beth Hoffman León, and Karen Richey contributed to this report. Joanna 

Chan, Martin DeAlteriis, Mark Dowling, Jennifer Mills, and Jena Sinkfield 

also provided assistance.

CTR Assistance to Shchuch'ye

Acknowledgments 

(320363) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER