COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bumgardner 

WILLIAM HALLER COINER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1848-97-2 JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III 

 JUNE 9, 1998 

VICKIE ANNE COINER 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY 

William R. Shelton, Judge 

 (Richard M. Bing; Richard M. Bing, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting 

on brief. 

 (Joseph E. Blackburn, Jr.; Joseph E. 

Blackburn; White, Blackburn & Conte, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on 

brief. 

 By final decree entered July 1, 1997, the circuit court 

granted Vickie Anne Coiner a divorce on the grounds of 

constructive desertion. It granted Mrs. Coiner child support and 

spousal support and decreed equitable distribution of the marital 

property. Mr. Coiner appeals arguing that the trial court erred 

by imputing income to him but not to his wife, by valuing the 

marital assets as of the date of the depositions, by not giving 

him credit for mortgage payments made during separation, and by 

failing to consider the tax consequences when distributing his 

IRA. Finding that the court did not err, we affirm. 

 Mr. Coiner was employed as president of the Virginia Retail 

Merchants Association. In June 1996 he voluntarily resigned his 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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position though it was at the insistence of the board of 

directors. Employees had filed sexual harassment charges against 

him. While there was conflicting evidence whether Mrs. Coiner 

had a role in having Mr. Coiner dismissed, the court resolved 

these in her favor. 

 Both parties agree that the standard of review on the issue 

of imputing income is one of abuse of discretion. See Steinberg 

v. Steinberg, 11 Va. App. 323, 329, 398 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1990). 

The wife having prevailed, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to her. In doing so, we find evidence from which the 

trial court could find that the husband voluntarily put his job 

at risk by improper conduct toward employees. Accordingly, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in imputing income to Mr. 

Coiner. 

 Mrs. Coiner had not worked for five years before the 

separation. Upon separating she moved to Hampton and secured 

employment as a school nurse. Though this job might have paid 

her less that what she earned in 1991 when last employed in 

Richmond, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

found that she was not underemployed. She had custody of her two 

school-aged children, and the position she took allowed her 

schedule and their schedules to coincide. Mr. Coiner presented 

no evidence that positions were available in Hampton that offered 

the salary she had received in Richmond in 1991. It was not an 

abuse of discretion to decline to impute income to her. 

 Mr. Coiner objects to valuing assets as of the date the 
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depositions were taken because Mrs. Coiner had completely 

depleted her IRA by then. Code § 20-107.3 establishes the date 

of the evidentiary hearing as the date at which to determine 

value. It sets the date at a point that will provide the most 

current and accurate information while it avoids inequitable 

results. See Gaynor v. Hird, 11 Va. App. 588, 593, 400 S.E.2d 

788, 790-91 (1991). While Mr. Coiner contends the evidence shows 

that Mrs. Coiner wasted the asset, other evidence showed that she 

expended it for necessary living expenses. The evidence did not 

show as a matter of law that inequitable results would result 

from using the date of the hearing. Accordingly, the court did 

not abuse its discretion in using that date. 

 Mr. Coiner argues that the court erred in denying him credit 

for mortgage payments made during separation. The husband never 

presented evidence of the amount that these payments curtailed 

the principal. During the period for which he claims a credit, 

he had the use and possession of the marital home and resided in 

it. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a 

credit for the mortgage payments. 

 Finally, Mr. Coiner argues that the trial court erred in not 

considering the tax consequences of distributing his IRA. The 

decree distributed the entire IRA to him and did not mandate any 

early withdrawal. It also shows that the trial court did 

consider all factors set forth in Code § 20-107.3(E) when 

decreeing equitable distribution. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Affirmed.