THE UNITED STATE

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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IBUS M RI VICTORIA

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Cover

This perspective aerial view of Newport,

Rhode Island, drawn and published by

Galt & Hoy of New York, circa 1878, is

found in the American Memory Online

Map Collections: 1500–2003, of the

Library of Congress Geography and Map

Division, Washington, D.C. The map

may be viewed at hdl.loc.gov/loc.gmd/

g3774n.pm008790
Global War Game

Second Series

1984–1988

Robert H. Gile

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

686 Cushing Road

Newport, Rhode Island
Naval War College

Newport, Rhode Island

Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Newport Paper Number Twenty

2004

President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Ronald A. Route, U.S. Navy

Provost, Naval War College

Professor James F. Giblin, Jr.

Acting Dean of Naval Warfare Studies

Professor Kenneth H. Watman

Naval War College Press

Editor: Professor Peter Dombrowski

Managing Editor: Pelham G. Boyer

Telephone: 401.841.2236

Fax: 401.841.3579

DSN exchange: 948

E-mail: press@nwc.navy.mil

Web: http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press

Printed in the United States of America

The Newport Papers are extended research projects that the

Naval War College Press Editor, the Dean of Naval Warfare

Studies, and the President of the Naval War College

consider of particular interest to policy makers, scholars,

and analysts.

The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and do

not necessarily reflect those of the Naval War College, the

Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.

Correspondence concerning the Newport Papers may be

addressed to the Dean of Naval Warfare Studies. To request

additional copies or subscription consideration, please direct

inquiries to the President, Code 32A, Naval War College,

686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841-1207.

© 2004 Robert H. Gile

ISSN 1544-6824
I wish to express my deep appreciation to Orville “Bud” Hay, former Director 

Advanced Concepts, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College. He no

advised, read, and commented on this paper, but he provided me with access to t

sources I needed to write it. Bud has been the guiding genius of the Global Game

which the London Times of 13 February 2003 referred to as “a series long seen a

apogee of military war gaming.” It is my distinct pleasure to have been associated 

him since 1983, to have worked with him in eighteen Globals, and to have collabo

with him in writing the first volume of Global history.
Fundamentally, this type of worldwide tabletop game has obvious potential for further

development. Such a summer project could evolve into a popular and productive annual exercise.

–Hugh Nott, with reference to the 1979 Global War Gam
Contents

Foreword 

Note to the Reader 

Executive Summary 

Review of the First Global War Game Series (1979–1983) 

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND GLOBAL WAR GAME SERIES 

Game Architecture 

THE 1984 GLOBAL WAR GAME 

Introduction 

Scenario 

Political Objectives and Military Strategy 

Blue Objectives 

Blue Strategy 

Red Objectives 

Red Strategy 

The Central Front 

Norway 

Balkans 

The Atlantic 

The Mediterranean and Southwestern TVD 

The Far East 

Insights 

THE 1985, 1986, AND 1987 GLOBAL WAR GAMES 

Scenario—The Road to War 

Key Events on the Road to War, October–November 1990 

Political Objectives and Military Strategy 

Blue 

Red 
The Atlantic 49

The Mediterranean 58

The Far East 61

THE CAMPAIGNS ON THE FLANKS 69

Overview 69

North Norway 71

Denmark and the Baltic Approaches 73

Southern Europe 78

Balkans 80

THE 1988 GLOBAL WAR GAME 85

Introduction 85

Game Objectives 86

Political Objectives Overview 86

Blue Strategy and Operational Planning Overview 88

Global 1988—Scenario One 89

The View from Blue 90

The View from Red 93

Global 1988—Scenario Two 94

The View from Blue 95

The View from Red 97

Global 1988—Scenario Three 98

The View from Blue 99

The View from Red 102

The Negotiating Process 103

Blue/NATO 103

Red/Warsaw Pact 103

Negotiations to D+64 103

Negotiations in Global 1988 106

Introduction 106

Red-Dominant Scenario 107

Blue-Dominant Scenario 109

Stalemate Scenario 110
Introduction 

Authorities and Controls 

Industrial Base 

Economy 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

Introduction 

Chemical Weapons Use (to D+64) 

Status of Nuclear Forces (to D+64) 

Nuclear Considerations (to D+64) 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: GWG ’88 

Week One—Red-Dominant Scenario 

Week Two—Blue-Dominant Scenario 

Week Three—Stalemate Scenario 

Summary 

The War in Space 

Conclusions 

Chronologies 

Partial List of Participating Organizations 

Glossary 

Abbreviations 

Platforms and Weapons 

About the Author 

Titles in the Series 

Foreword

The Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island, is justifiably famous in nation

curity and naval circles across the globe for being on the cutting edge of war gam

and it has been for over a century. From the famous games that helped set the sta

the island-hopping campaign across the Pacific in World War II to a recent series 

ploring military options for U.S. homeland defense, the College’s war games hav

it among the ranks of the world’s premier gaming facilities. The history of the N

War College’s war-gaming efforts for the past two decades, a particularly critical 

riod, is only now being acknowledged and analyzed.

Captain Robert H. Gile (U.S. Navy, Ret.) has in this Newport Paper provided a se

for the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, and indeed, practitioners and historian

gaming around the world. This is the second in a series of monographs synthesiz

the primary sources to provide a concise, chronological summary and analysis of t

prestigious Global War Games, hosted in Newport from 1984 until after the fall of 

Soviet Union. The first monograph (coauthored with Bud Hay) was Global War G

The First Five Years, published as Newport Paper 4 in 1993; it is available electronic

Adobe Acrobat and in limited paper copies. Planning and research is under way to 

plete the history of the Global series. Captain Gile’s invaluable effort captures the m

ods, techniques, assumptions, analysis, results, and the all-important “take-aways” 

widely known game series, important today for the history of war gaming but even 

so at the time, as a vital contribution to the thinking and strategy of the U.S. Navy, 

other U.S. services, and its alliance counterparts in the later stages of the Cold War

This Newport Paper, Global War Game: Second Series, 1984-1988, recounts a uniq

interesting and challenging period in the Naval War College’s engagement with n

and national strategies through the war-gaming process. The games examined th

ity of the United States to sustain conventional warfare with the Soviet Union un

mobilization of the nation’s resources could be achieved. Through a sustained se

quential and interlocking games, the Global process identified a number of impo

and controversial findings. For instance, as the following pages will show, these g

pointed to the importance of offensive action, including maritime operations; th

ity of “Blue” (the West, broadly speaking) to win without resorting to nuclear we

and the extensive planning necessary to conduct high-intensity combat over a le

period.
period during which Global games would take place in the shadow of superpower conflict. As we look forward to the third and final installation of Captain Gile’s narrative

we can already see, in the present work, the first signs of the impact of the changing

geopolitical environment on the Global series and the Naval War College’s dynamic ap

proach to war gaming.

PETER DOMBROWSKI

Editor, Naval War College Press

August 2004
Note to the Reader

This report deals with practical issues and major themes identified during the se

Global War Game (GWG) Series. Its focus is on various general topics, specific fo

employment issues, and discrete game events. Because of the interplay of themes 

issues among several theaters, some repetition is necessary to provide a more com

discussion.

The Global War Game was conceived in 1978 to build a structure to explore war

fighting issues in a larger perspective than the tactical view prevalent in the Navy 

that time. These games constitute a research project that ranges from policy thro

strategy to operations (campaigns). It was and is an opportunity to investigate id

and concepts that may vary from current policy or strategic “wisdom.” With the 

standing that game simulations were but an approximation of the behavior of go

ments in global war, the scenarios should be considered as a context for issues to 

explored.

The first game (1979) had a distinctly naval focus, but the series quickly evolved, 

vious necessity, into a much broader military and political forum. Throughout th

series, GWG was utilized as a test bed or crucible for an emerging maritime strate

brief summary of these initial games and an overview of some of the major issue

amined in them is included in this volume for those who do not have access to G

War Game: The First Five Years (Newport Paper Number 4.) While the first series 

volved several different geographical areas to confront current, real-world events 

test a specific concept, the second series picked up where the first terminated, wi

major war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the War

Pact (WP). It was a natural extension of the first series, designed for the purpose 

ploring issues that would arise in waging protracted warfare in the decade of the 

Effort has been made throughout this paper to preserve the terminology that wa

use when the games were conducted and to relate faithfully actual strategies purs

and campaigns implemented as well as the rationale behind them. Thus, while so

the terminology may seem archaic and some of the operations ill-advised, it is n

sary to look at these efforts as a learning experience that reflects how our thinkin

about global war, our concepts, and our practices matured during the series.

Executive Summary

The second Global War Game Series was played at the Naval War College for thr

weeks each summer of the years 1984–1988. The issues that were pervasive throu

can be summarized as follows:

What are the political, war fighting, logistical, and mobilization factors that det

the United States/NATO capability to sustain conventional against the Soviet U

Warsaw Pact until the full military, industrial and personnel resources of the “f

world” can be mobilized to secure victory? and

How best can US/NATO maritime superiority be translated into strategic lever

useful in bringing the conflict to a successful conclusion?

The first game of the series, GWG ’84, was a stand-alone game designed to test n

gaming concepts and to ensure realistic orders of battle. The 1985, 1986, and 198

games consisted of one continuous game, with the two latter games picking up w

its predecessor had terminated. In game play, war broke out on 10 November 199

hostilities were played out to D+65, or 14 January 1991. As one of the purposes o

series was to ascertain the contours of protracted conventional war, use of nuclea

weapons was not permitted, although “off line” excursions into the possible resu

ramifications of such use did take place. The final game of the series, in 1988, wa

signed to study war termination. This was a planning, seminar-type game in form

without any actual moves occurring.

The games of the series involved about 600 participants (at any given time) from 

100 government departments, agencies, military commands, educational and res

facilities, and business and industry. Foreign military and civilian representatives 

Canada and the United Kingdom played.

Principal findings of the series can be summarized as follows:

• A NATO/Warsaw Pact war would be difficult to start but virtually impossible t

conclude on a negotiated basis.
by Red.

• Although contemplation of nuclear use tends to change for both sides with time and

circumstance, early escalation by Blue is probably unnecessary and unwise.

• The huge material expenditures involved in waging modern, conventional war

require pre-planning of resource management and industrial mobilization.

• Offensive use of military forces is critical in throwing Red off timeline and, at sea,

creating strategic options and protecting SLOCs.

• Although maritime success is critical to Blue conduct of the war, translation of that

success into negotiating leverage is elusive.

• Regardless of Blue policy preference/strategy, a NATO/Warsaw Pact war in which

alliances remain firm and nuclear weapons are not used will probably become

protracted.

Assuming continued domestic support and alliance cohesion, the validity of the Blue

strategy of protracted, conventional war rested on two conditions that these games

called into question:

• The ability of Blue to generate or to accure from other sources the equipment

necessary to sustain the conflict until industrial mobilization occurred was

problematic,

• There was a distinct possibility that the very success of the Blue strategy would drive

Red to some form of nuclear escalation.
Review of the First Global War Game Series

(1979–1983)

A Review of War Gaming

One common distinction made among war games is between educational (or tra

and research games.1

In educational games, the concern is with simulating warfar

ations in which players can exercise decision-making skills. Research games, in co

trast, though they frequently have instructional value, are designed to generate in

into military problems; designers and controllers attempt to inject as much reali

possible, given the inherent limitations of the medium. The Global War Game se

was of the research category, and one of the premier examples of that type.

Educational war games are typically “one-sided”—that is, only one side compris

players, acting freely. In such games the control cell “plays” the opposition, usual

scripted fashion, at least at the outset. The bounds of scenario probability comm

become elastic in such games, as control cells—gaming-center staff members wh

ulate game flow, devise and issue “intelligence” disclosures, and respond to the g

sponsor, the entity that requested that the game be played and set its objectives—

move-outcome assessments so as to confront confront with the desired challenge

Other games are “two-sided,” in which both opposing sides are staffed by players

ing autonomously and mediated by the control cell, which analyzes the interactio

the opposing decisions for each “move” (below) of the two sides and chooses am

the plausible outcomes those that best serve the game’s objectives. A variant, of w

the Global Game was a highly elaborated exemplar, is the “multisided” game, in 

some of the player cells may act as “neutrals.”

War games can also classified in terms of time—that is, of how “real” time (mon

the case of the Global game) is compressed into the actual, physical period availa

the players (two or three weeks in the Global series). Conventional games (such 

Global games of the its first and second series) proceed in discrete stages, known 

“moves.” In each of these steps, players (or groups of players, in the Global case)
gence” provided by the control cell, and within the scenario framework—and then report to the controllers their intentions (political initiatives, diplomatic announcements

and démarches, force movements and dispositions, combat orders, etc.) for the next

specified period of time. Generally, moves cover short periods of time for tactical-level

games and much longer increments for operational and strategic-level ones (the Globa

case). There are also games that employ “moving game clocks” and confront players

with continuously changing situations to which they must respond. Operational games

tend to be limited to the tactical level, due to the necessarily limited spans of time they

can accommodate.

All war games, of whatever kind or technological sophistication, share a basic conceptual hierarchy, of which the most fundamental dimension relates to physical location

and movement.

Even complex operations, including their logistical flows, can be simulated in with

physical markers or computer symbols. The value of the outcomes at higher dimensions of any war game depends on how realistically forces are played. If tactics or capabilities are used that would be impossible in the real world, any resulting assessments

will be invalid. The next dimension is assessment of outcomes—what “happens” as

forces (or political enties) confront or otherwise deal with each other. Some outcomes

can be reduced to a roll of the dice, others to complex software algorithms, and yet oth

ers (certainly at the strategic level) the judgment of human umpires. Here again, fidelity to real-world phenomena is necessary in order to prevent distortions at the

dimension of player decisions. Skewed assessments can lead to faulty analysis and to

decisions that yield no useful insights.

The topmost dimension is the analysis of player decisions. Frequently it is not the deci

sions themselves that are of most interest to a sponsor but, for example, the courses of

action that seemed possible to the players, the constraints they perceived, or the effect

of the “fog of war” or uncertainty—induced by deliberate ambiguity or lacunae in the

information disclosed by the control cell. Typically players are typically provided not

actual, precise, and complete outcome assessments—the “ground truth,” known only t

the control cell—but only those elements (or indications of them) that might realistically be observable, given the capabilities being gamed. Research games do not often

deal with this dimension, because of its indeterminate and unpredictable nature; the

Global War Game series, for which such indeterminacy was of the essence, was a notable exception.

The annual Global War Game (GWG) in Newport, Rhode Island, was, until its final iterations early in the present century, a multisided, conventionally organized, research
U.S. national security community. Throughout its history it represented “an opp

nity to investigate ideas and concepts that may vary from current strategy or pol

wisdom.” From its inception in 1978, the game series confronted defining issues. 

seen in the previous study of which the present work is a continuation, the Glob

ries constituted a “test bed or crucible for an emerging maritime strategy,” a stra

that was to be the U.S. Navy’s fundamental concept of global warfare until the di

tion of the Soviet Union.2

Series Development

The 1979 Global War Game was the first of a five-year series that reintroduced a 

cept largely neglected since the 1930s, when the Orange War Plans were gamed a

Naval War College. These first five games played out five Blue/Red scenarios with 

levels postulated for the respective sides in the year 1985. Each game was a separ

tity with no direct tie-in to the previous or succeeding game. Although scenarios 

not necessarily relate to each other, issues identified in one game were incorpora

into those that followed. This, in effect, created a “series” through the establishm

a longitudinal approach that promoted the examination of problems over time, 

ferent circumstances, and permitted detailed study in the intervals between gam

This game-study-game cycle, which evolved during the first GWG series, was to b

come a most important aspect of the second series. Issues raised in one year’s ga

could be researched during the intervening eleven months and the results incorp

into the next game. This process was greatly facilitated by the presence of Army a

Force officers at the Naval War College. Their work, along with that of their Navy 

Marine Corps contemporaries, often in inter-service combinations, contributed 

portantly to both game development and the attainment of game objectives.

The first game was held in the summer of 1979 at the Naval War College under t

sponsorship of the Center for Advanced Research. It was structured as an experim

concept with limited personnel and material resources. Scenarios and strategies 

priate to worldwide conflict were developed, and, because of the experimental na

of the undertaking, a manual, chart-type game format was selected. Some 50 off

(mostly NWC students) and a half-dozen senior defense officials played. Initially

was concern as to whether this level of participation was sufficient to properly ex

a simulation that was global in scope. GWG ’79 was in fact more successful than 

pected. It was also evident, however, that a more thorough examination of globa

flict was required and that the effort needed to be populated by more senior play

and experts.
both in terms of personnel and the level of sophistication. Midway through the first se

ries, the GWG had become a complex operation involving over two hundred participants from all the military services, several intelligence organizations, numerous

government departments and agencies as well as representatives from academia and in

dustry. Experts were employed to ensure game fidelity in such areas as logistics, advanced technology and command, control and communications (C3).

Each game of the first series stressed strategy and maneuver. Standard data values and

models for weapons systems and sensors were utilized to determine the outcome of

specific force interactions.

As is suggested by its name, the Global War Game is a large operation, and by 1983 required many players and controllers. These participants were organized into six primary teams and several supporting tables. Primary cells were:

Blue and Red National Command Authority (NCA)/Supreme High Command (VGK)

Blue and Red Commanders in Chief (CINCs)/Theater Commanders (TVD)

Blue and Red players on the game floor.

Supporting tables covered such subjects as logistics, weather, intelligence and political/

military decisions by nations not allied with Blue or Red.

The Global War Game is a hybrid. It includes aspects of a research game, a logistics

game and an operational game. Both manual and automated gaming systems have

been employed. As later games grew larger and more complex, there was a shift toward

increasing reliance on computer-based systems. Whereas GWG 1979 was essentially a

manual game, GWG ’83 incorporated the new Naval Warfare Gaming System (NWGS)

the U.S. Army War College’s Theater and Corps Operations and Planning Simulation

(TACOPS) and number of smaller models used to perform functions such as battle

damage assessment (BDA). Some inputs for the game itself, such as logistics plans,

were generated by computer runs made prior to the start on the game.

Game Scenarios 1979–1983

1979

The scenario for the first Global War Game was set in 1985. Consistent with concerns

over the security of oil supplies that were prevalent in 1979, the area of initial conflict

between Blue and Red was Southwest Asia. An insurgency was in progress in Saudi

Arabia, and international tension was high along that nation’s northern border. Blue

supported Saudi Arabia by sending a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division along with

a contingent of airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and an F-15
Ocean to proceed around Africa and join the Atlantic Fleet. Worldwide defensive 

sures included the forward positioning of additional maritime patrol (VP) squad

and the movement of two CVBGs from the East Coast to positions in the North 

tic. As the crisis mounted, Red mobilized on 11 July and Blue did the same a wee

Red increased naval deployments in the Norwegian Sea and the Mediterranean. C

cerns over the survivability of CVBGs led Blue to withdraw them from the Medi

nean to join with the two CVBGs that had recently left the East Coast and were t

located north of the Azores.

Hostilities began with the invasion of Saudi Arabia by four Iraqi divisions and on

airborne division. Simultaneously, an attack was launched by the Warsaw Pact on 

Central Front (map 1). Worldwide, Blue and Red naval forces engaged in a series 

tense battles. Red sought to isolate Blue and its allies with a diplomatic offensive. F

Japan, Pakistan, and Algeria were offered incentives to remain neutral. Israel was gua

teed security from her Arab neighbors and an uninterrupted supply of oil in return f

neutrality. The Red invasion of Saudi Arabia could not be contained by indigenous f

and by in-theater Blue reinforcements. Therefore, Blue was compelled to withdraw t

Withdrawal of the CVBGs from the Mediterranean proved to be a political and m

tary disaster. Red was able to overwhelm the remaining regional Blue forces. Dep

Red Soviet naval aviation/long range aviation (SNA/LRA) aircraft struck Blue an

lied bases throughout the area with deadly effectiveness. The Naval Air Station,

Sigonella, shelled by Red surface units and bombed by Red aircraft, was rendered 

tally unusable. Malta fell by the evening of the war’s first day. Red land-based air 

riority turned the central and eastern Mediterranean into a veritable Red lake.

Politically, the NATO southern flank unraveled as Greece and Turkey were forced 

of the war and Italy lay open to attack.

In the Atlantic, convoy operations were implemented, and two French CVBGs au

mented the Blue forces that escorted shipping to Europe. A two CVBG force gain

control of the Norwegian Sea, although the effort resulted in the loss of the USS

Vinson.

An anti-SSBN campaign grew out of an overall Blue ASW effort. Red felt the nee

respond to the depletion of part of its strategic nuclear reserve caused by this

anti-SSBN campaign and did so by launching tactical nuclear weapons strikes ag

the Blue CVBGs. An SNA/LRA raid was launched from Luanda against Blue forc

the Atlantic and a second attack, out of Vladivostok, was directed against the two 

CVBGs in the Pacific. These resulted in the loss of the USS Kitty Hawk battle gro

(BG) in the South Atlantic and the USS Nimitz BG in the Pacific. Blue had some
difficulty in selecting a suitable Red target for retaliation, finally settled on a Red

anti-carrier warfare (ACW) group in the Norwegian Sea. No other use of nuclear

weapons occurred.

Due to the heavy commitment of Red forces to the Mediterranean theater, Blue elected

to divert the four-carrier battle force (CVBF) from a planned re-entry into the Mediterranean to support of the Central Front. The land war in Europe was nationalized

(pre-scripted) rather than played out in detail, and this allowed the players to extend

their timelines beyond the first few days of war. The script postulated that NATO had

North

Sea Baltic

Sea

France

Switzerland Liechtenstein

Italy

Austria

Czech Republic

Poland

Netherlands

Belgium

Luxembourg

6° 14°

48°

52°

Rhine

Schleswig-Holstein

Kiel

Canal

Denmark

Elbe

Elbe

Weser

Bremerhaven

Frankfurt

Fulda

Bonn Giessen

Amsterdam

Rotterdam Arnhem

Magdeburg

Wittenberge

Munich

Innsbruck

Salzburg

Karlsruhe Ansbach

Strasbourg

Luneville

Verdun

Berlin

Danube

Danube Regensburg

FRG

(West Germany)

Augsburg

Ingolstadt

Nürnberg

Leipzig

Wolfsburg

Stendal

Essen

Mannheim

Paderborn

Kassel

Gottingen

Siegen

Braunschweig

Main

Esbjerg

GDR

(East Germany)

Lübeck

Lübeck

Canal

Kiel

Düsseldorf

Bremen

Uelzen

Celle

Luneberg

France

Legend: ____ Inter-German border

Hamburg

Central Region
ing successful counterattacks.

As GWG ’79 ended, Red sought a cease-fire that would recognize the gains made 

Southwest Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. Blue, while also seeking a cease

refused to recognize Red gains and believed it held the advantage due to favorabl

mentum on the Central Front.

1980

The 1980 game delved into a broad range of unexplored topics. Blue was hard pr

throughout, because of the Red objective and aggressive employment of forces. H

ever, as one game participant stated: “If the object of the game was to try out str

identify key issues, undergo concentrated learning experience, and, in the end, to 

away with a much sharper focus on what global war might be like, then GWG ’80 

resounding success.”

Largely because Red set domination of Eurasia as its objective and discriminately 

nuclear and chemical weapons at the outset, this game was fundamentally about 

tion control rather than ships at sea. By its demonstrated will to use nuclear wea

coupled with Blue pessimism about the strategic balance, Red was able to force B

choose between surrender and major escalation at succeeding levels.

The 1980 game was based on elaborate, detailed scenarios which covered multip

problem areas, worldwide. Once again the setting was the year 1985, and the scen

postulated serious unrest in Eastern Europe, with the loyalty of both East Germa

Poland to the Warsaw Pact increasingly in doubt.

Oil was a major factor in this game, which cast Red as a net importer. The combi

of increased demand and the escalating crisis in Europe drove the price of gasoli

Blue to $4 per gallon. Further impacting the fuel situation was a coup in Nigeria

then aligned itself with Red.

In the Far East, the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam were at war, while in 

Asia, Red, still involved in Afghanistan, was mounting sharp border attacks again

kistan in reprisal for that nation’s provision of sanctuary for Afghan “rebels.” Ind

also begun to mobilize against Pakistan. Blue responded by sending five tactical a

(TACAIR) squadrons, the 82nd airborne division, and a Marine amphibious brig

(MAB) to Pakistan. During this game, a bright spot for Blue was that relations w

rael, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq had improved to the point that Blue could est

a major air base in the Sinai without adverse political consequences.
kistan and repositioned them in Southern Iran and Northern Saudi Arabia with the

aim of reducing the threat of confrontation with India and improving Blue ability to

protect the Gulf oil fields.

In this scenario, war resulted from a deliberate, planned decision on the part of Red.

Red leaders felt they were in a favorable military position vis-à-vis Blue, and this, coupled with increasing Warsaw Pact dissidence on the one hand and the growing need fo

oil on the other was sufficient motivation for the seizure of Eurasia. As in all these

games, a primary tenet of Red strategy was to avoid risking the homelands. Therefore,

Red did not open with nuclear weapons against Blue. Instead, the war began with a

massive conventional attack on the Central Front, against Thrace, and through Austria

Smaller attacks were mounted in Norway and Iran. Red also planned to intimidate Japan and France into neutrality, while applying enough pressure in Southwest Asia to

divert Blue. After victory in Europe, Red could then turn to the Persian Gulf and the

Far East.

The Blue/NATO political objective was the restoration of the “status quo ante bellum,”

and Blue strategy was essentially reactive. The preservation of peace was attempted,

and, once the war broke out, Blue moves were mainly in response to Red initiatives. Be

cause Blue was not confident of success on the Central Front, the minimum Blue military objective was to hold on the northern and southern flanks, the GIUK

(Greenland-Iceland–United Kingdom) gap and in the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.

Red launched the offensive only two days after Blue had begun to mobilize. In addition

to extensive conventional attacks, Red used chemical weapons against Iceland, Guam,

and the Azores. In an unusual but very effective move, Red detonated three nuclear air

bursts off the east coast of Japan in an effort to intimidate that nation into neutrality.

Once nuclear weapons were used, the Blue National Command Authority (NCA) focus

shifted from the tactical level to nuclear linkage. In the process, details such as the sensitivities of third parties, mobility problems, and even outcomes in specific theaters

quickly became secondary.

Consequently, GWG 1980 became, almost immediately, an exercise in the control of

nuclear escalation. Blue, in response to an SNA/LRA strike from Aden that destroyed a

convoy of SL-7s (high-speed container ships) in the Indian Ocean and also to the Red

nuclear salvo east of Japan, elected to launch a nuclear attack on Aden with B-52s. This

decision was partially influenced by an erroneous report that Blue units had been destroyed in the Red nuclear demonstration off Japan. The Red response was immediate

and devastating. Red aircraft utilized nuclear weapons to destroy three CVBGs in the
erable thought about a suitable target for retaliation, Blue attempted to sink two 

centered surface action groups (SAGs) in the Sea of Japan, with nuclear weapo

However, all the attacking aircraft were shot down prior to weapons release. Mean

Blue eliminated all forward deployed Yankees by conventional means.

In Europe, the war on the Central Front was not going well for Blue. Cracks had 

to show in the battle line of the northern sector and France had not transferred f

control of its army to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Arrival o

reinforcements was slowed as forces could not be flown directly to the Federal Re

of Germany (FRG). Damage to many NATO airfields further hampered the airlif

well as the ability of TACAIR to support the battle.

Blue sought a “second front” to take the pressure off the central region, but lacki

readily available forces with which to mount a challenge in other areas, Blue reco

that it would only be “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Even aggressive PRC military o

tions, it appeared, would not put enough pressure on Red soon enough to make 

difference.

The nuclear escalatory process attained a new dimension as the PRC, involved in 

ventional war with Vietnam, sided with Blue and ordered Vietnam to cease assist

Red. Vietnam refused, and the PRC responded by exploding a nuclear weapon ov

Haiphong harbor. Vietnam replied with an attack using Red-supplied nuclear we

against four targets in the PRC. In retaliation, the PRC struck Red sites with nucl

weapons, which precipitated a major nuclear strike against the PRC by Red.

The game reached temporary termination when Blue, desperately short of optio

lized the “hot line” to threaten an attack on Red at the SIOP (Single Integrated O

tions Plan) level. This induced Red to cease hostilities, although Red calculated th

but a temporary pause. The game had reached D+5.

1981

Probably the most intriguing aspect of GWG ’81 was the absence of combat on t

Central Front. The primary Red objective was the historic goal of seizing the Tur

Straits. Secondly, Red sought control of the Persian Gulf and mid-east oil. While 

and the Warsaw Pact were intact, their enthusiasm for joining this superpower co

was minimal.

As with the two previous games, the scenario was set in 1985. The principal crisi

erning events was a dispute between Red and Turkey over the interpretation of te

of the Montreux Convention, which regulates maritime passage through the Bos
escalation.

In Turkey, Red and its surrogates conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken and

disrupt the Turkish government. This took the form of a propaganda campaign and

demonstrations aimed at separating Turkey from NATO. In addition, Syria attempted

to arouse Turkey’s Sunni Moslem population. The Turkish government retaliated by

threatening strict interpretation of the terms of the Montreux Convention. Red “escalated” with over-flights of Turkey, amphibious exercises in Libya, and Warsaw Pact

force movements in the Black Sea, Bulgaria, and Romania.,

Southwest Asia was important in this scenario. Iraq moved toward the Red camp, leading to Blue concerns for the security of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As the crisis

deepened, tensions were raised by the discovery of a plan for a joint invasion of both

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by Iraq and Red.

Red commenced the war with an offensive against the secondary objective, Iran.

Long-range aviation also struck targets in Saudi Arabia. Only when this campaign was

well advanced did Red attempt to capture the Turkish Straits with an advance through

Thrace, supported by an invasion of eastern Turkey.

Blue struck back against Red facilities in the Balkans and the Crimea with conventiona

air strikes from bases at Cairo and Izmir, and with carrier air. Red retaliation, while stil

at the conventional level, was effective, as two CVs in the Mediterranean were sunk.

Blue, perceiving that the military situation was deteriorating and its options reduced to

strategic withdrawal or nuclear escalation, chose the latter and launched Tomahawk

land attack missiles-nuclear (TLAM-N) attacks on Red bases in the Trans-Caucasus,

Vladivostok, Alexandrovsk, and Petropavlovsk. Red responded immediately, firing

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at Diego Garcia and Guam, and the Nimitz

battle group was lost, also to nuclear attack. The Blue NCA released nuclear weapons to

Turkey, which promptly used them against the advancing Red forces. Red responded

with nuclear attacks on Turkish positions.

Shortly thereafter, a nuclear cease-fire was agreed to, although a conventional war continued in Turkey. All this occurred in five days.

The situation on the Central Front, though tense, never escalated to hostilities. Blue

and Turkey were essentially alone in fighting Red. Indeed, there was a degree of resentment by other NATO members over the military forces committed to this crisis by Blue

when a Red offensive into Western Europe threatened.
GWG 1982 saw two major modifications from previous games. First, this game c

menced with the war already in progress. The pre-hostilities phase, transition to 

and initial fighting were gamed at the National Defense University (NDU) in Glob

This permitted GWG ’82 to examine the contours of superpower conflict further 

war than would have been possible otherwise.

Second, 1982 was the first year in which Army and Air Force participation was fu

tegrated into the game. This adjustment to joint play provided a richer context fo

conduct of military play and the development of issues.

Again set in 1985, the scenario now shifted decisively to a European focus. As in 

ous games, unrest among the satellites was a problem for Red, particularly in Pol

where food shortages, increased food prices, and a slowdown by Solidarity precip

a crisis. Further, Red concerns about the Blue relationship with Norway emerged 

important factor. Among points at issue in this relationship were pre-positioning 

Blue rapid deployment force (RDF) equipment, fishing rights and territorial clai

the Barents Sea, mineral rights on the Svalbard continental shelf, and joint Blue, 

dian, Norwegian, and United Kingdom exercises in northern Norway.

Southwest Asia remained unsettled and a potential problem area for both Blue a

Red. Relations between Israel and Syria had continued to deteriorate, resulting in 

warfare in 1985. Red forces had intervened in Iran at the request of the post-Kho

government (that leader having been assassinated) to put down civil strife. Red r

tained a presence in Iran through a subsequent grant of port facilities in the sout

part of that nation. Saudi Arabia felt threatened by these developments, particula

following an Iranian attack on a section of an Iraqi oil pipeline. A Saudi request 

ployment of the RDF was granted.

Events in the Far East centered upon an agreement between the People’s Republi

China and Japan for joint development of a large oil field in the Bohai Bay area. 

Korea remained a threat that tended to divert Blue from other objectives.

The primary Red objective was the elimination of Blue political and military infl

in Europe through a successful invasion of the Federal Republic of Germany and 

consequent dismantling of NATO. The Red military strategy in support of this g

a conventional offensive across the north German plain to cut off the Benelux co

tries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and seize the Channel ports. 

forces would hold in the center and south, while diplomatic initiatives were mad

cure French neutrality. Red also planned to advance into northern Norway to gai

cure flank and to improve the tactical position in the event of a Blue naval initiat
tives: to anchor the southern flank while increasing options for operations in the eastern and central Mediterranean.

The initial Red offensive in Europe commenced as planned but was stalemated at the

Rhine. Similarly, the attack in Norway was checked at the Skibotn line by Norwegian

units reinforced by a USMC MAB. Red, rather than violate Swedish or Finnish neutrality to outflank this position, struck the airfields at Bodo, Evenes, and Andoya with

chemical munitions.

On the southern flank, Red did succeed in driving a corridor between Greece and Turkey. Initially, Blue had withdrawn the CVBGs from the eastern Mediterranean, but returned them as the front was stabilized to support an amphibious landing conducted

to provide reinforcements to the NATO defenders in Thrace. While Blue naval forces

suffered some loses, the exchange ratio was in their favor.

In the Atlantic, Blue established and maintained submarines in barriers from Greenland to Norway for the purpose of SLOC protection. Red sought to secure the SSBNs

by placing them in “havens” at sea or under the ice in the north Norwegian and

Barents. These Seas became an area of intense ASW conflict, with Blue doing well

against Red. Two CVBGs were sent into the North Sea to help slow the Red advance in

the FRG.

In the Far East and the Pacific, Red was on the political and military defensive. Red

SSBNs were hidden in the northern Sea of Japan and in the Sea of Okhotsk. Blue concentrated on finding and destroying them as well as major Red surface combatants.

While somewhat successful, Blue did incur heavy losses, particularly in the Sea of

Okhotsk. Blue CVBGs initially moved back into the central Pacific, a maneuver similar

to that undertaken in the Mediterranean. They subsequently were moved forward to

engage Red surface units. In the Indian Ocean, a Red combined forces attack severely

damaged both Blue carriers.

Blue adopted a forward, offensive strategy to sink the Red navy, and, though not without losses, it was successful. Red surface forces were virtually eliminated and the submarine component substantially depleted. However, the extent to which the Blue

anti-SSBN campaign altered the strategic nuclear balance was unknown and did not

play a significant role in respective NCA/VGK discussions on nuclear weapons use. Regarding the ground war on the Central Front, while Blue was able to upset the Red

timeline and deny Red a quick victory, Red was still able to occupy substantial portions

of the FRG.
of chemicals, especially in north Norway and against Iceland. Heavy use of chem

and the absence of any nuclear use was a factor that set this game apart from its 

cessors, and was significant because of contemporary “real world” discussions on 

very subject.

As the game progressed, Red sought to negotiate a cease-fire and to terminate th

However, as in previous games, Blue maintained the position that the territorial 

quo ante bellum” in Europe was prerequisite to any cease-fire. Red refused to neg

on this basis, and, at game’s end, it appeared that a long war was in prospect.

1983

The scenario for the 1983 Global War Game postulated a series of crises in geogr

cally separated parts of the world. As in 1982, however, the focus remained centr

rope and the deteriorating relationships between Red and the satellites.

One of the major Red problems lay in East Germany and Poland. Worker unrest 

lated due to government crackdowns. Riots occurred, mobs attacked police head

ters and indigenous troops sent to suppress the incipient rebellion mutinied.

Red, confused and taken by surprise, pulled troops back, leaving a power vacuum 

the eastern side of the Inter German Border (IGB). With the insurrectionists in c

in this area, talk of reunification became rampant and rumors of FRG military m

ment toward the east circulated.

Trends in the Middle East and Southwest Asia remained little changed from prev

games of this series. Israel, nearly isolated politically due to continuing occupatio

Lebanon, faced a possible invasion from Arab states led by Syria. Red had been in

volved in a massive military buildup in Syria and had stationed combat troops th

Although hostilities between Iran and Iraq had been terminated, the potential fo

stability in the Gulf remained high, as Iran maintained its policy of fostering Shi

tation throughout the region.

In the Far East, major war was in progress in Southeast Asia. Vietnam had invade

Thailand, with success. In response, and after warning Hanoi of the consequence

continuing, the PRC launched an invasion of Laos and Vietnam. Although resist

was stiff, PRC troops were at the gates of Hanoi and Haiphong when GWG ’83

commenced.

Central Europe was the focus of Red concern, as events in the German Democra

public (GDR) and Poland posed a threat to the Red “empire” and the Warsaw Pa

Red could not tolerate. Circumstances, however, forced Red to initiate hostilities 
limited of any game thus far. The goal, essentially, was to capture a significant amount

of FRG territory and thereby lessen Blue influence on the Continent by demonstrating

NATO’s inability to defend a powerful member of that alliance, and then to negotiate a

permanent solution to the “German Problem.” While an offensive in North Norway

was integral to the plan, Red had no other offensive aspirations on D-Day. As in the

previous year, Red was anxious to avoid involvement in the Far East.

Blue sought to defend conventionally on the Central Front, to gain options from naval

superiority gained through forward, aggressive attacks against all Red naval assets, and

to shift the nuclear balance through an anti-SSBN campaign. The Blue strategy to

achieve maritime supremacy was more coordinated than in previous games, and a part

of it involved amphibious landings in the Kuriles.

The Red offensive on the Central Front was hampered by the short time that had been

allowed for mobilization. Once launched, progress was relatively slow and a stalemate

developed. Red sought negotiations almost from the outset, but Blue conditioned

agreement to a cease-fire on restoration of the territorial “status quo ante-bellum” in

Europe-terms unacceptable to Red.

Red, for a variety of reasons, decided to escalate the war horizontally. One means was

to induce North Korea to move south, an endeavor in which Red was finally successful

Blue responded by supporting the ROK with forces previously detailed to the Kuriles

invasion.

In Southwest Asia, Red mounted an attack into Iran and toward the Gulf. This decision

resulted from a number of complex factors, including failure to succeed with several

political initiatives with Arab governments. Red also reasoned that control of the region’s oil supplies could be used as leverage against Blue. Blue had no effective counter

in Southwest Asia, as the CVBG in the eastern Mediterranean had been moved west to

augment Blue TACAIR on the Central Front.

For the first time in the global series, Red responded to Blue strikes on airfields in the

homeland with attacks on North America. Red lost over 20 bombers while knocking

out two distant early warning (DEW) line sites and damaging an SSBN installation in

Washington State. Red also employed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to destroy Blu

navigational space-based assets. Blue replied with Tomahawk land attack missileconventional (TLAM-C) strikes against Red launch facilities.

Consistent with previous games, Blue launched an offensive against the Red SSBN

force. The effort was relatively successful, sinking about half of that force by game end.
was discussed by both NCA/VGK, Red saw no need for them and Blue could not 

any employment that would be beneficial.

The 1983 Global War Game saw further development of the concept of prolonge

conventional war. When the game ended at D+30, the prospect was for continue

tilities as the stalemate on the Central Front had the potential to continue well in

future. In this connection, GWG-83 incorporated, for the first time, an economic

panel to evaluate industrial/mobilization issues pertinent to general war. There w

considerable activity on the diplomatic level, but negotiations foundered over Re

mands to retain its Central Front gains and Blue insistence on return to the terri

“status quo ante.”

Overview

The first five-year Global War Game series explored a broad range of significant 

A number of new concepts and ideas evolved, many of which influenced the thea

strategies for Blue and NATO forces. Others were re-examined or modified based 

the lessons learned in the games.

Fully understanding the key issues requires that the reader be aware of how gam

namics interacted with scenario events and game analysis. This overview discuss

interplay among these aspects of the game and their impact on strategy developm

While this section does provide a capsule examination of the games, the emphas

highlighting a selected number of the most significant themes and how they wer

analyzed.

The first year, the major emphasis was on naval play, and the roles of the Army a

Force were essentially pre-scripted. Very early in the series, however, it became ev

that events, particularly in Europe, could not be adequately gamed or the issues r

assessed properly without the full integration of Army and Air Force representat

both in the play of the game and in the “study” part of the “game-study-game” c

luded to above. The use of both personnel and models these services developed t

licate outcomes of combat were critical to the realism of the game and the validi

the analytical process.

As the sister services became more involved in the game, Blue forces became mor

fective. Efforts to improve inter-service cooperation were continually emphasize

a number of experiments were conducted to see how the forces of each service co

work together to achieve common objectives. At the same time, the number of g

participants, military and civilian, increased. Both these factors combined to rais

the quality and sophistication of game play.
ing forces to survive in the face of intense Red air and naval attacks was a major concern. However, as the series progressed, Blue found not only that naval forces could

operate in those forward positions, but that a more aggressive posture tended to produce greater success. True to the charter of the games, Blue experimented with a number of concepts in the deployment and use of naval forces. Throughout the series, these

forces were employed innovatively and naval strategy was characterized by a willingness to explore different ideas.

The Red gaming approach also evolved significantly. Initially, Red operated tactically in

a rigid, deterministic style, while at the levels of policy and strategy, several operations

of questionable merit were attempted. This was due in part to a combination of the

small number of players on the Red side and a limited amount of background and

knowledge for realistically representing Red. An accurate simulation of the Red strategic thought process was also hampered by the use of U.S. military personnel who

tended to “worst case” by concentrating known Blue weaknesses and ignoring the limi

tations of Red.

In order to better simulate Red, members of the intelligence and diplomatic communities were brought into the game to replicate Red thought processes and world outlook more accurately. These new participants defined Red objectives and strategy in

terms of actual intelligence estimates rather than in terms of worst-case fears. Additionally, as the contingent of Red players expanded, sufficient numbers became avail

able to allow the cell to interact fully with the game organization as opposed to being

the more traditional, limited, opposition force cell. As a result, Red play became less

dogmatic. These factors led to the formulation of Red goals that were less ambitious

but probably more representative of “real world” Red policy. For example, the scope

of Red military objectives diminished from “control of Western Europe” to a more

attainable “neutralization of the Federal Republic of Germany,” and the tendency too

escalate across the nuclear threshold diminished.

This change in the Red cell also caused a shift in the way hostilities were initiated. During the first games, Red purposefully embarked on a planned war of conquest. Red began and used conflict as a tool to gain predetermined political objectives. This, in the

1980 and 1981 games, contributed to the rapid intensification of the crisis and a swift

transition to war. While both these games involved relatively brief periods of diplomatic and military activity, Blue endeavored to negotiate its way out of crisis, on the

one hand, while trying to position forces to gain advantage should war break out, on

the other. Blue, in addition to trying to manage the confrontation with Red, had other

problems. Blue tried to give direction to a NATO alliance whose members did not
the world had totally separate concerns. While participants found these problems d

cult and occasionally frustrating, many insights were gained into factors that led to 

Both Blue and Red learned it was most unlikely that one of the two superpowers 

simply decide to go to war against the other. Both arrived at the conclusion that 

was difficult to start, and would most likely occur as a result of a number of even

largely outside the control of the eventual belligerents. Therefore, in later games, 

“road to war” changed. Red, though still initiating hostilities, did so as the result 

chain of events that pushed Red beyond the ability to avoid war. In the ’82 and ’8

games, Red faced the prospect of a rebellious Eastern Europe and felt the need to 

before things got totally out of control. This supports the premise that few ration

leaders would intentionally start World War III.

Nevertheless, Red, as the aggressor gained substantial benefit. It allowed Red to c

the theater or region that fit its plans and then mass the required units. Elsewher

generally practiced economy of force. Blue, in turn, had to concentrate forces in 

geographic area of Red attack and found it difficult with what remained to build a 

package strong enough to seriously distract Red from the main axis of attack.

Europe acted as a magnet for both Blue and Red. To Red, as a continental power, 

ern Europe was perceived as a threat and, therefore, a logical area for expansion o

litical and territorial influence. A successful Red offensive in this theater would w

or destroy Red’s primary global foe, the Blue/NATO coalition. Even the early atta

into Southwest Asia supported this goal, as control of Middle East oil would give 

enormous bargaining power.

Blue focus was also on Europe. The NATO alliance was the most important polit

military link and the maintenance of the coalition was paramount in Blue strate

Therefore, a Red offensive in Western Europe had to be countered at all costs.

The requirements of NATO decision-making had an impact on Blue policy. NAT

a defensive alliance with the goal of maintaining the political and territorial inte

of its members. It did not seek to seize territory from, or to overthrow the nation

governments of, the Warsaw Pact. Blue, as a member of NATO, adhered to that p

tion, of necessity. This led to the articulation of war aims in terms of “restoration 

the territorial status quo ante bellum.”

The alliance relationship affected Blue in another aspect. As a maritime power, B

was allied with what was, essentially, a continental coalition facing a continental 

Blue forces sought to support the European battle, they experienced the tradition

problems a maritime nation encounters fighting a continental power. Most nota
ized that to use this strength placed Blue in a classic predicament; naval forces might

not be able to win the war but a major naval defeat would significantly reduce Blue

strategic flexibility. This situation was to profoundly affect Blue strategy and was

largely responsible for the conservative mode of naval force employment in the early

games of the series. Once Blue found that its forces could successfully defend themselves, its naval deployments became increasingly aggressive.

Although more aggressive force utilization produced increased success, the fundamental problem of how best to exploit maritime advantage against a continental opponent

remained. While no definitive answers emerged from this series, the participants did gain

a far better understanding of the role and value of maritime power in a global conflict.

The maritime/continental relationship presented Blue with yet another dilemma. Blue

as a maritime power, had to operate globally, if only to protect its interests. This caused

substantial dispersal of forces, which tended to work to Red advantage. Thus, not only

was Red able, as noted above, to mass at the point of offensive; the very orientation of

Blue power worked to disperse its force even further.

Red was actually conducting two distinctly different wars in one. Within the Blue/Red

context, Red was fighting a limited war. Red did not seek to destroy Blue. Within the

context of the European theater—the Western Theater of Military Operation (TVD)—

however, Red was waging an absolute war with the object of total victory. If it could

achieve the neutralization of the FRG, this would, by Red estimation, lead to the emasculation and eventual dissolution of NATO and the concomitant reduction, if not

elimination of Blue influence on the continent.

Escalation, both vertical and horizontal, was a topic that received considerable attention during the First Global War Game Series. Although theoretical issues regarding es

calation had been studied in great detail elsewhere, these games explored the process

within a global environment and utilized interactive techniques. As the sophistication

of the games grew, year by year, knowledge and lessons learned increased proportionately. By the end of the five year series, a number of valuable insights into the range of

complexities associated with the escalation process had been developed.

During the series, vertical escalation passed through the conventional war dimension

and into the chemical and nuclear arenas. The nuclear aspect, as one might expect, attracted the most attention. Invariably, the players found that nuclear weapons’ use overshadowed all other events and turned the game into an exercise in escalation control.

Through experience in the games, both sides came to the conclusion that nuclear weapons produced little tactical advantage. Blue, while essentially equal at the strategic level,
and Red’s view of the nuclear situation were based on estimated 1985 force balance

Red also came to this conclusion, though for different reasons. Use of nuclear we

in spite of Red theater/tactical advantages, proved to be counterproductive. Red 

gone to considerable effort to build superiority in conventional arms. That advan

could be negated if the conflict escalated to the theater nuclear level, which could 

stroy the value of the territories gained as well as major Red forces. Additionally, 

clear use could put the homeland at risk, an outcome contrary to Red objectives.

Blue, however, faced a further disadvantage when contemplating nuclear escalati

and this was targeting. The vast majority of worthwhile targets for Blue were loc

within the Red continental homeland. A nuclear strike on the Red homeland wa

ceived to make escalation to the strategic nuclear level much more likely. Thus B

found it difficult to select an isolated target that did not run the risk of precipita

nuclear disaster. An attack on the homeland with conventional weapons also had 

tential strategic implications, especially when the Red paranoia regarding homel

defense was taken into consideration. The inability to determine the nature—

conventional or nuclear—of an inbound raid increased the risk of triggering a R

“launch on warning.” All of these factors combined to make a Blue “graduated re

sponse” difficult.

In contrast, Blue, as a maritime power, offered Red a number of attractive and is

targets, such as CVBGs and various island bases. Because Red believed that Blue 

symmetrical response to such attacks and that, in any event, the theater nuclear b

was in its favor, Red endeavored to use nuclear weapons to gain advantage in the 

three games. Red was not without difficulties, however. Throughout the series, R

found it difficult to formulate a counter to the Blue anti-SSBN campaign. After s

less successful efforts, Red accepted the losses as inevitable.

Chemical warfare was an area were Red was perceived to enjoy a distinct advanta

Red resources were thought to be superior, outnumbering those of Blue. When R

chose to employ chemicals, Blue again felt it lacked an adequate, symmetrical res

In fact, despite an avowed policy of nuclear retaliation for chemical attacks, Blue 

to do this on only one occasion.

The “theory” of horizontal escalation was that Blue initiatives away from the Cen

Front could either divert Red or lead to opportunities for offensive operations. B

perimented with a number of approaches, but seemed unable to influence Red o

discover any significant Warsaw Pact vulnerability. Red remained wedded to a Ce

Front focus and refused to be diverted. For Blue, not only were areas of potential 

weakness difficult to reach geographically, efforts to do so could dilute valuable
effective off the main axis of action, the availability of troops to support the primary

theater could be adversely affected. Conversely, if Blue mounted an attack with a less

favorable force ratio, effects were marginal.

While Blue did not achieve major success employing horizontal escalation strategies,

analysis did show useful trends not readily apparent at first. Blue, hoping for a respons

that would produce immediate advantage, either looked in the wrong area or missed

the initial indications of what could be significant, long-term benefits. Some of the

more important results of horizontal escalation lay in actions that Red did not take.

Blue, by positioning forces that had potential to harm Red, caused Red to maintain

higher force levels in defensive positions. This was seen frequently in the maritime and

air arenas, where Red maintained sizable forces in regions away from the primary area

of combat to counter possible Blue offensive actions. As these forces were tied down,

value for Blue ensued from their commitment for defensive purposes and their resulting non-availability for offensive efforts. Of equal significance were the instances wher

Red began a redeployment of forces to counter Blue. These actions showed the potential of achieving the desired dispersion of Red forces. However, many such redeployments were still in their initial stages at game end and did not become evident due to

the short time span of the game. As the long war issue emerged, a link to horizontal escalation appeared to offer some attractive prospects.

Red found opportunities to use this same strategy. By lunching attacks into Southwest

Asia, Red caused Blue to divert sizable forces away from other theaters. Additionally,

through the use or threatened use of surrogates, such as North Korea, Red was also abl

to tie down Blue resources.

Initially, both sides envisioned a conflict of relatively short duration. However, over the

course of the series, a number of factors became evident to indicate that Blue gained

certain advantages from a long-war policy. Most notable was the opportunity to redirect superior Blue industrial, economic, technical, and agricultural resources to the

battle. Once mobilized, these sectors placed Blue in a much more favorable position. By

contrast, Red, with a larger portion of similar resources from a smaller economy already oriented to the defense sector, could achieve less, with Blue, therefore, gaining a

relative advantage.

A key issue for Blue, then, was the ability to sustain itself and its allies through the early

and intermediate stages of conflict to permit the benefits of full mobilization to accrue

Blue must, therefore, fight a potentially stronger Red force during these stages using

only “on hand” resources. Red not only had a larger standing military force but also
duction base.

From another aspect, Blue policy made a long war almost certain. Blue doggedly 

tained a position that accepted no compromise from the negotiating condition t

quired restoration of the territorial “status quo ante bellum.” However, the stron

initial Red conventional superiority made sizeable territorial gains virtually inev

Relinquishing these gains was clearly unpalatable for Red, and tactical/theater nu

options did not appear to solve the impasse for either side. Red might achieve its 

cal objective, but could not force Blue to agree to a cessation of hostilities on Red

terms. Thus, a long war seemed in prospect.

For Blue, linking a long war strategy with horizontal escalation appeared to offer 

ble benefits. Over a longer period, many Red vulnerabilities could be exploited e

tively. For example, the Red ability to produce and distribute food, even during g

times, was marginal at best. During wartime, much of the agricultural sector, ma

power and equipment especially, would be mobilized. As he war lengthened, food 

ability would eventually drop. Food imports to augment suppies would not be an o

The extensive fishing fleet was vulnerable and would lose the freedom to operate. B

ade, combined with selective attacks against agricultural production and distributi

tems and the commercial fishing fleet would exacerbate the problems. These action

coupled with efforts to exploit the latent Red nationalities problem, had the potent

be an effective weapon. Much of the Red industrial complex was also exposed, and 

fects of its attrition would be cumulative with the agricultural shortages.

A longer war would also provide Blue the opportunity to exploit fissures in the c

siveness of the Red/Warsaw Pact coalition. Red ability to maintain alliance suppo

peared to vary with the military situation. A strong campaign with the objective 

splintering the Warsaw Pact nations could produce favorable results.

The war termination issue presented a difficult problem that was never complete

solved. Neither side was willing to budge from their respective positions in order 

hostilities. As noted above, Blue insisted on the return to a territorial “status quo 

bellum” as a pre-condition to further moves. Red, on the other hand, offered a

cease-fire in place with negotiations to follow.

Blue would not accept such art offer, believing that once a cease-fire occurred, R

would achieve a de facto legitimization of military gains, as NATO might find it 

tremely difficult to recommence hostilities if negotiations collapsed. Red, perceiv

the military situation to be clearly in its favor, found it difficult to believe that Bl

fused to enter into negotiations. The result was deadlock, as neither side was will

budge from its position.
1. This introduction to war gaming draws

largely on two articles published Naval War

College Review (Spring 2001, vol. 54, no. 2) by

members of the College’s wargaming faculty:

Robert C. Rubel, “War-Gaming Networkcentric Warfare,” pp. 61–74, and Kenneth

Watman, “Global 2000,” pp. 75–88.

2.Bud Hay and Bob Gile, Global War Game: Th

First Five Years, Newport Paper 4 (Newport,

R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1993), p. vii.

Available at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/

npapers/np4/np4.pdf. For the Maritime Strat

egy, see John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of

the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986

(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press,

2004), available at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/

npapers/np19/NP19.pdf.
Introduction to the Second Global War Game Se

The Second Global War Game Series was conducted at the Naval War College fro

1984 through 1988 to examine the nature and issues of a superpower conflict in a 

time frame. The second series built upon and extended the foundations laid by t

series (1979–1983), and the broad purposes were similar. The overarching object

was to gain insights into how naval campaigns might be conducted on a global s

the event of war between the United States (Blue) and its allies and the Soviet Un

(Red) and its allies. Specific objectives included the assessment of:

• The priorities of sequential operations.

• The adequacy and form of logistics systems to support extended, prolonged, a

diverse naval operations.

• The impact of strategy and maneuver on force effectiveness.

• The impact of political and economic factors in developing strategies and the

vulnerability of such strategies to international and regional constraints.

• The loci of nuclear thresholds in various theaters and concepts for escalation/

de-escalation.

• The pattern and processes for control of military forces at national, headquart

and tactical levels when combat activity is intensive and widespread.

A hypothesis that emerged from the first series and tended to shape Blue thinkin

about global war can be stated as follows:

• Due to Red holding the initiative, Blue seems unlikely to achieve a favorable p

to successfully terminate a short, conventional war.

• Nuclear use tends to escalate and appears counter-productive for both Blue an

• Therefore, Blue/NATO should plan to fight a protracted, conventional war.

Several other findings that emerged from the first series had substantial implicat

for the second game series. Among the most important was that while the Blue/N
strategic defensive posture could be very effective in disrupting Red timelines and thus

cause Red to revise original military objectives. Contrary to the belief then prevalent in

some quarters, a Red offensive into Western Europe would not necessarily require a

Blue/NATO nuclear response to halt that offensive short of the Channel.

The first series experience indicated that Blue/NATO naval forces would achieve dominance at sea. Indeed, as the series proceeded, it appeared that geographic areas, such as

the north Norwegian Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, previously considered fraugh

with risk for surface units, could in fact serve as vital operating areas, given proper sequence of operations and tactics. Most important, maritime dominance permitted

Blue/NATO to extend the war in time and expand the war in geographic scope.

A third point of interest dealt with war initiation and war termination. A conclusion o

the first series was not only that a set of circumstances that would precipitate a NATO/WP

war was very difficult to devise, but a negotiated settlement to such a war was virtually

impossible to attain. A basic and necessary precondition for Blue/NATO to commence

negotiations was a return to the territorial status quo ante, a position that Red rejected

out of hand. Further, Blue was generally unwilling to enter substantive negotiations

from a position of perceived military inferiority; Red, lacking any semblance of sea

control, could not force a Blue capitulation. Consequently, war termination negotiations generally stalemated.

These factors and issues from the first series led to two questions that were pervasive in

the games of the second series:

• What are the political, war-fighting, logistical, and mobilization issues that define

the Blue/NATO capability to sustain a conventional war until the full military

industrial and personnel resources of the free world can be mobilized to secure

victory?

• How best can the maritime superiority of Blue/NATO be translated into strategic

leverage useful in bringing the war to a successful conclusion?

Game Architecture

The games of the second global series were large both in terms of scope and number o

participants. Generally, over 600 players were involved at any given time. All of the

branches of the armed services were represented, as was the Coast Guard. Canada and

the United Kingdom sent military and civilian players. The breadth of the game was

also demonstrated by the numerous government departments and agencies involved.

They ranged from those one might expect, such as the Departments of State and Defense, the Central Intelligence, and the Federal Emergency Management Agencies to
of protracted conventional war was a major game objective, a large delegation of 

nomic experts and specialists in manufacturing and industrial mobilization were 

cluded. Finally, the role in the game of nations other than Blue and Red required

players with broad knowledge of the world in general as well as detailed experien

various specific geographical areas.

The game itself might be described as “three-sided,” with a “Blue” team representin

United States, a “Red” team playing the Soviet Union, and a “Green” team for all o

countries. The Blue and Red teams played on three levels: The National Command 

thority (NCA) and the Supreme High Command (VGK), the Commanders-in-C

(CINC), and Commanders of Theaters of Military Operations (TVD), and vario

corps and fleet levels for each side.

Considerable effort was devoted to ensuring the fidelity of game play. To this end

Red team was composed of individuals thoroughly familiar with Soviet politics, 

tary doctrine, and capabilities—selected from applicable government departmen

agencies, the intelligence community, and the armed services. They were tasked t

the Red order of battle as (to the best of their knowledge) the Soviet Union woul

as an American officer might.

Similarly, the Green team, composed mainly of retired State Department person

cluding some of ambassadorial rank, played both the respective allies of Blue and 

and all other nations as well. The following pages reflect not only diplomatic init

by individual states, nonaligned blocs, and nongovernmental agencies, but also d

strate that allies did not always respond in the manner that Blue and Red expecte

Another important aspect of the game involved the mobilization of the Blue eco

for a long, conventional war. Among the considerations that had to be addressed 

the cost of the war and how it would be paid for, the potential need for rationing

the control of anticipated inflation. Of prime importance was the conversion of 

ries to meet the needs of the battlefield and the concomitant problem of finding 

training the workers to operate the expanded industrial base. A group working a

vanced technology issues considered means to ameliorate the shortfall in end ite

with long lead times and also considered several “Manhattan Project”–type prop

All of this required substantial support. Computers were used extensively for for

movement and battle damage assessment, although the land table remained a ma

operation. Models already in existence, such as the Naval Warfare Gaming System

(NWGS) and the Army’s Theater and Corps Operations and Training Simulation

(TACOPS) continued to be utilized, augmented by new programs where required
Navy War College Air Model (NWCAM).

Logistics play was computer-supported, detailed, and of critical importance because of

the concern over what was referred to as the “bathtub” effect. Consumption rates for

munitions and major equipment such as aircraft and battle tanks in the intensity of

modern war were not really known. However, because the validity of the concept of

protracted conventional war depended on Blue/NATO sustainability, a large staff was

necessary to track usage at the front with a high degree of accuracy.

There were a number of other tasks requisite to the proper functioning of the game.

Battle damage assessment (BDA) was an involved process requiring separate teams to

adjudicate the results of combat in the air, on land, and at sea. An intelligence cell

monitored movements and engagements to determine what information would be

available to Blue and Red based on game events; they then provided that information.

A special weapons cell determined the effects of chemical weapons employment and was

involved in off-line deliberations when one side or the other required an appraisal of the

likely result of contemplated nuclear weapons use. A meteorological component was

on hand to brief weather, worldwide, for every day of the war. A strong effort was mad

to create an environment that would, as realistically as possible, reflect some of the domestic pressures in the conduct of the war. A congressional cell was created with retire

members of the U.S. House of Representatives reprising their former roles. They held

hearings, offered policy suggestions, and were, on occasion, critical of the administration. An innovation introduced in this series was the Global News Network (GNN).

The War College Public Affairs Office produced a morning TV show, Good Morning

Global, in network format, as well as a daily newspaper. The televised news broadcast

was delivered every morning and provided, in network format, interviews and descriptions of selected events from the previous game day. Normally, two game days were

played in one real-time day, and this medium not only kept all players informed of the

overall course of events but also became a well-used forum for the president of Blue and

the general secretary of Red to set forth their views on the war and to try to sway “global”

opinion.

Move Convention

The format of the first Global War Game was relatively simple and straightforward, bu

as the series progressed, the games became quite complex. The purpose of this section

is to lay out some aspects regarding the structure and play of the series from 1984

through 1987 that may not be familiar to all readers. While there tended to be slight

variations from game to game, the following descriptions are representative of what

took place. The 1988 game will be considered separately. This section is not intended to
be an all-inclusive, detailed explanation of game mechanics, but it should provid

sic guide to the “flow” of the game.

Once the organizational framework of the game had been established in broad out

billet structure was required. For example, how would the Blue National Comman

thority and Red Supreme High Command be staffed? (While by convention “Red” 

cated specifically the Soviet Union and “Blue” the United States, in common usage 

reference was usually to the Warsaw Pact and NATO more broadly. The color conv

in this monograph is generally in the latter, broader sense; context makes clear whe

more restrictive meaning is intended.) As has been noted above, the number of po

required expanded as the game progressed. Typically, the NCA had the following p

tions: President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of State (NA

Permanent Representative), Assistant Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Dire

Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Advisor, Deputy National Security A

sor, Director of Mobilization, and, when required, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 

(JCS), and a Press Secretary. Members of the VGK included the General Secretar

the Communist Party, Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (

Communist Parties), Chairman, Council of Ministers, Chairman, State Security 

Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services, and, when required, the Chief of t

General Staff. It was then a process of selecting specific individuals to fill key positi

CONGRESS NCA \ NSC

DOD

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

OTHER

EXECUTIVE

DEPARTMENTS

WAR

PRODUCTION

BOARD

OTHER UNIFIED AND

SPECIFIED COMMANDS

NATIONAL

DEFENSE

RESEARCH

COMMITTE

NATO DPC

(INTERNATIONAL

POLITICAL

FORUM) JOINT STAFF

STATE

SAC

CEN

MAC

SPACE

READINESS

UK

USCG

TRANSPORT

JOINT LOGISTICS

FORCE DEPLOYMENT

CINCPAC

PAC -

LOGISTICS

7TH FLEET 6TH FLEET NORTHAG

?

? I MAF /

PHIBGRU 3

3RD FLEET CENTAG

MDZ MDZ GREEN

BLUE

AAFCE

STRIKFLT

LANT

II MAF /

PHIBGRU 2

SUBMARINE

ACLANT

SACLANT SACEUR

CINCLANT CINCUKAIR AFCENT

CINCCHAN/

CINCEASTLANT AFSOUTH/

CINCUSNAVFOREUR

AFNORTH/

BALTAP

USCINCEUR

(LOGISTICS

JCS

Blue
(the President of the United States was most often played by a retired U.S. congressman)

Other organizations and military commands would be requested to select individuals to

serve in various positions. The national laboratories, for example, were requested to send

experts to staff the nuclear cell. A number of the organizations involved in providing

players to the game also took part in the financial sponsorship of the game, and these

dual contributions of manpower and money were both critically important in making

the game as successful and important as it was.

The games of the second series all ran for three weeks, although not all players were in

attendance for the entire game. Each participant “checked in” either on Sunday afternoon or early Monday morning and received an information packet that provided unclassified background information (the games were played at the SECRET level) and

their specific cell assignment. The rest of Monday morning consisted of a briefings on

general game information, such as scenario events, followed by adjournment to the assigned player cells for purposes of organization and additional briefings.

Tuesday morning saw game play begin in earnest. Players received situational briefs, in

cluding current intelligence estimates tailored to each side, Blue or Red. Because the fo

cus on the games was on planning, the perspective at various levels of command was

different. The NCA and JCS were looking out beyond 30 days and the theater CINCS,

concerned with strategic decisions, focused on the seven to 30 day timeframe.

SUPREME

HIGH COMMAND

(VGK)

GENERAL SECRETARY, CPSU

MINISTER OF DEFENSE

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES

CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY (KGB)

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF

CHIEF, MAIN OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE

CINC, GROUND FORCES

CINC, NAVY

CINC, SOVIET AIR FORCES

CINC, SRF

CHIEF, ORGANIZATION–MOBILIZATION DIRECTORATE

& CIVIC R/VGK

CHIEF, MAIN INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (GRU)

CINC, PVO

WESTERN

TVD

NAVY /

BALTIC FLEET

NAVY /

NORTHERN FLEET NAVY NAVY /

PAC FLEET

NAVY /

IO SQUADRON

ATLANTIC / ARCTIC

TVD

BLACK SEA FLT /

MED SQUADRON

GROUND

FORCES

GROUND

FORCES

AIR FORCES /

PVO

AIR FORCES /

PVO

AIR FORCES /

PVO

SOVIET

GROUND FORCES

NON-SOVIET

WARSAW PACT

FORCES

AIR FORCES /

PVO

NON-SOVIET

WARSAW PACT

NORTHWESTERN

TVD

SOUTHWESTERN

TVD

SOUTHERN

TVD

FAR EASTERN

TVD

PACIFIC OCEAN

TVD

GENERAL STAFF

Red
Campaign decisions at the fleet or regional command level were based on a three 

seven day view, and the tactical level concerned itself with the next twenty-four t

forty-eight hours. Therefore, CINCs (CINCPAC, SACEUR, etc.) and TVD comm

ers were provided with long-range guidance by the NCA or VGK. These theater c

manders forwarded their strategic intentions to the various major command cell

(CINCLANT, AFCENT, etc.) where campaign plans were drawn up, then detailed 

ders, or, in game parlance, “moves” were generated (6th Fleet, CENTAG, etc., lev

a two day planning cycle. These specified what units were to be moved and wher

targets were to be attacked, by which forces, with what weapons and when. Provi

for decoys, feints, or other special tactical procedures were included. These “mov

were in written form and presented to the umpires/controllers at 1100 and at 15

each day to be assesseds on what was called the “game floor.” The game floor was 

ally located in two places, in that the Army had a separate space for its “land tabl

A war game can be described as a “manual” game or a “computer” game, depend

how the game is run. A manual game is one where virtually all operations are pe

formed by hand. Maps of the geographic area of conflict would provide the basis 

the game, and symbols representing the various forces would be moved from pla

place in accordance with the “moves” ordered by the players. Battle damage asses

was done by rolling dice. Some of the complications of this method can be seen b

3

GAME DIRECTOR

GAME

COORDINATOR

DIRECTORATE

CONTROL GROUP

NAVY

CONTROLLERS

AIR

CONTROLLERS

LAND

CONTROLLERS

RED

CONTROLLERS SPACE / C / EW NUCLEAR

MDZ

ADMIN

MEDIA / PAO WEATHER MINE WARFARE

SCI

PAC

LANT

MED

SCI

CHEMICAL INTELLIGENCE

FUSION RED /

BLUE / GREEN

DOD LAB CELL

ADVANCED

TECHNOLOGY

TECH REPS /

SCIENCE

ADVISORS

UNDERSEAS

WARFARE

SYNDICATE

STRIKE

WARFARE

SYNDICATE

THEATER /

TACTICAL

EW

THEATER /

TACTICAL

SURVEILLANCE / C I

TECH

TRAFFIC

CONTROL

C

INTERNATIONAL

POLITICAL FORUM

GAME ANALYSIS/

GAME HISTORY

3

Control Group
considering a launch of surface-to-surface missiles. The umpire would roll the dice

once to determine the number of missiles that were actually launched successfully,

once again to determine how many of those flew properly, again to ascertain the effect

of enemy counter-measures, and once more to come up with the number which actually hit targets. This procedure was clearly unsuited to a game as complex as global.

A computer game relied substantially on those devices for all phases of the game. It had

obvious advantages in the above example for determining battle damage assessment and

was invaluable for keeping track of logistics consumption in general and ordinance expenditure in particular. (Sonobuoys were a case in point, as early games saw them utilized as if the supply was infinite.) Valuable as computers are, however, they could not

replace totally the functions performed by a human umpire or eliminate the need for

maps. For these reasons, the global game was a hybrid, incorporating features of both

the manual and computer type games.

The “game floor” consisted of a number of “tables” to resolve the engagements that occurred because of the “moves” generated in the player cells. (Figure 4 shows the game

floor schematic for the 1986 GWG) The personnel assigned to these tables, called “umpires” or “controllers,” varied considerably in number, depending on the theater and

command. All of the relevant services would be represented, so the “Pacific Strike” table would, of necessity, require several people. The “AFSOUTH Ground” and

T

R

O

U

B

L

E

S

H

O

O

T

GAME CONTROLLER FLOOR PLAN

B

D

A

L

O

G

I

S

T

I

C

S

LANT

STRIKE

LANT RED LANT

MPA

BALTIC

CINCCHAN

LANT

AMPHIBS

LANT

LOGS/MLSF

AFNORTH

GROUND

AFSOUTH

GROUND

AFNORTH/

AFSOUTH

AIR MARDEZLANT

WESTLANT

LANT SUB STRIKEFOR

SOUTH

MED MPA/SUBS

AMPHIBS

MED

RED

SUB

ASSESS

PAC

STRIKE

PAC LOGS/

MLSF/AMPHIBS

PAC

SUBS

PAC

MPA

MEDLOGS/

MLSF

PAC

AIR

PAC

LAND

7TH FLT SURF

3RD FLT

MARDEZPAC

PAC

RED

NWGS

CONTROL

LANT

NWGS

CONTROL

PAC

NWGS

CONTROL

MED

NAVOCEAN

COMDET

MINE

WARFARE

T30

T31

T32

T11

T17 T18 T19 T20 T21 T22

LANT MED

T12 T13 T14 T15 T16

T6 T7 T8 T9 T10

T5 T1 T2 T3 T4

Game Floor/Table Layout
single individual. Further, controllers from Red were present at the major tables 

The duties of the “umpires/controllers” were a key part of the game. They functi

as all of the personnel, sensors, and weapons of the command that they represen

They maintained frequent liaison with other controllers to ensure the most accu

simulation of interactions considering the commander’s directives, force disposi

EMCON policy, and environmental factors. They were also charged with defend

their command’s forces, if attacked, with all available assets, within the existing R

of Engagement (ROE.)

Combat was initiated by a Blue or Red player through the game floor controller 

received the written move ordering an attack. The defending controller would th

spond. The attack plan and target defenses were then passed to the BDA table fo

dication. Naval engagements were generally assessed by the NWAGS, which took 

consideration all of the variables involved in attack and defense, determined the 

that had been hit, how serious the damage was, and what had been sunk. NWAG

worked on a stochastic model, which was based on probabilities, random numbe

draw, and single iteration. This process did not result in the most probable outc

but one of any number of possible outcomes. Consequently, while a narrow ban

the most probable outcomes would emerge from a number of iterations over tim

uncertainty inherent in war was preserved. The battle damage assessment proce

therefore, provided random results within the realm on possibility, based on the 

estimate of real world conditions. After review by the Game Director or his repr

tative, the BDA results were forwarded to the appropriate controllers so that they 

brief the players on the outcome of the engagements.

After combat resolution results had been approved, the Blue and Red umpires/co

lers briefed their respective sides on the outcomes. These briefs were not 100% t

but presented to the players the information that would actually have been obtai

These briefs took place both in the morning and afternoon immediately followin

submission of the two-day move. The reason for briefing after move submission 

to maintain focus on the planning purpose of the game as opposed to a continua

tion to the results of battle damage assessment. Events of particular significance 

would affect the planning process, such as the loss of an aircraft carrier, would b

ported immediately to permit plan modifications as necessary.

Further, a periodic intelligence brief would also take place. The Intelligence Fusio

would review the force movements that had taken place, along with other inform

that might have been gleaned through satellite surveillance or other forms of rec

naissance, and detail this information to the respective sides.
To summarize, the game day cycle began at 0800 with the Global Network News, then a

scenario update and the weather forecast, which utilized actual weather that had occurred on the same day of the previous year. The two-day planning session commenced

at 0830, and is shown in the illustration provided from the 1986 game (figure 5), for

D+21 and D+22. During this period, the battles of D+20 were being fought and adjudicated on the game floor. The D+21 and D+22 plan was delivered to the controllers at

1100, followed by the assessment of the D+20 interactions. Planning for the D+22/23

move began at 1300 and was due at 1530. The assessment of D+21 events followed at

1600. This cycle permitted the play of two days of war for each calendar day.

The ground war in Europe was displayed on what was called the “land table.” This

consisted of a horizontally mounted map of the Central Region on which were placed

“counters” representing the various Blue and Red units then engaged or moving toward

the FLOT. The respective “moves” of land forces by Blue and Red were entered into th

Army’s TACOPS system, which determined casualties, remaining effective combat

strength of units and the resulting geographic positions of units resulting from the engagements. Another system, TACLOGS, supported TACOPS by maintaining the status

of major end items such as the loss of tanks, other armored vehicles, ammunition expenditure, etc.

TACTICAL

ATAF TF

CAMPAIGN

AFCENT/FLEET

THEATER

USCINC/SACEUR JCS/NCA

0800 SCENARIO RECAP/ADMIN/WX BRIEF ———————————————————————————>

0830 PLAN NEXT MOVE

D+21/D+22

ADJUSTMENTS TO

CAMPAIGN PLAN <———

DELIVER 7–30

DAY PLAN

LONG TERM

(30 DAY)

1000 BRIEF <———

SUPERIORS —————>

DELIVER 7-DAY

PLAN SEMINAR/BRIEFS

AS DESIRED

FOCUS

1100 DELIVER D+21/22

PLAN TO CONTROL

IN WRITING

CONTINGENCY

PLANNING

1130 ASSESSMENT [D+20] INTEL/FUSION UPDATE ——————————>

1300 PLAN NEXT MOVE

D+22/D+23

ADJUSTMENTS TO <——

CAMPAIGN PLAN

DELIVER 7–30

DAY PLAN

BRIEFS IN

ACCORDANCE

WITH PUBLISHED

DAILY AGENDA

1430 BRIEF <———

SUPERIORS —————>

DELIVER 7-DAY

PLAN SEMINAR/BRIEFS

SKED PER

CINCS DESIRE

1530 DELIVER D+22/23

PLAN TO CONTROL

IN WRITING

CONTINGENCY

PLANNING

1600 ASSESSMENT [D+21]/ INTEL/FUSION UPDATE ——————————>

Move Convention Schedule FIGHT COMBAT D+20 FIGHT COMBAT D+21
computerized systems to resolve battle damage assessment provided an excellent 

for the tracking of equipment and munitions expenditure.

The game proceeded in this cycle until the Friday of each week. Normally, the m

would be a day of war-fighting, and the afternoon given over to what was called 

“hot wash-up.” This was an opportunity for some of the senior players in the gam

address all the participants as to issues or events that had impressed them as bein

particular significance. It also allowed for interplay among the principal represen

of Blue, Green and Red, for often the perceptions of what had happened and the 

portance of events or specific decisions varied substantially. This kind of discuss

the repercussions that could flow from misperceptions were often most enlighten

informative, and cautionary. This was particularly true of “signaling,” a discrete a

that was designed to convey a concern or threat to the opponent. More often tha

these signals were totally missed or wildly misinterpreted by the desired recipien

led players to reflect that if such actions were either useless or harmful in a game 

which players shared the same language and culture, what were the likely outcom

attempts at “signaling” in the “real world”? Following the “hot-wash,” the Analys

Group would begin preparing an in-brief summary of events for new players arr

for play the following Monday. This cycle was followed for each of the three week

Overseeing and coordinating all of this activity was the Control Group. This org

tion was composed of the Game Director, other individuals selected by him, and 

sentatives from major game cells. It met prior to the start of game play, at lunch, 

again following the end of the game day. Its primary function was to ensure that 

game ran smoothly. To this end, it was important to be certain that the head of e

cell was running that cell efficiently, particularly if the person in charge had com

the game after the first week. It was also necessary to alert Battle Damage Assessm

and the Analysis Group of a planned operation that might require special oversig

Further, with a game of this size, the possibility of discontinuities was always pre

and Control, on occasion, had to resolve problems that arose from failure in gam

chanics. Typical of this would be a situation where Blue or Red made a questiona

decision without information that should have been available to them.

A large Analysis Group, staffed mainly by reserve officers, collected data on the g

Every major cell had at least one analyst present, who took notes on what occurr

This group held meetings on a schedule similar to that of the Control Group, so 

members could be informed of potentially significant events before they occurre

was important so that the responses to and perceptions of a particular initiative 

be chronicled from the Blue, Red and Green perspective. The leaders of the Anal
events in specific cells, for example the Red VGK, Blue Joint Chiefs of Staff, Green, Blu

CINCPAC, Red Southwestern TVD, etc. This served as the basis for the final game report, composed by the staff of the Game Director and War Gaming Center and then

distributed to the participating organizations and commands.

As a seminar type of planning simulation, the mechanics of the 1988 game were considerably different, although the fundamental, three-sided (Blue, Red, Green) construc

remained the same. Game time was frozen at D+75, which corresponded to 3 February

1991. The game functioned at three levels:

Instead of umpires/controllers, Theater Advisory Teams were established as part of a

Military Assessment Group to act as a source of information so that plans could be

properly formulated. These teams—there were two, one for Europe/Atlantic and another for the Pacific—also assessed the theater commander’s war plans for feasibility

and potential weakness. Traditional assessment models were available for this purpose,

and the teams provided the same services to Blue and to Red.

Other simulated organizations that were utilized on the Blue side in this game were:

The National Security Policy Group (NSPG) focused on overall national policy formulation and was comprised of the Vice President (chairman), National Security Advisor, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Director of the War Resources Board.

The Negotiators Cell was headed by the State Department, with additional membership drawn from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the CIA and NATO.

The purpose of the Inter-Agency Mobilization Group (IG/MOB) was to advise the

NSPG concerning broad issues associated with the mobilization of the nation to support the war effort. Participants included representation from the Department of Defense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department to

Energy (DOE), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). Members of other

cells, such as the NSPG and the War Resources Board, joined meetings as required.

The War Resources Board/National Defense Research Council (WRB/NDRC) addressed industrial mobilization and force structure planning issues. Its membership

GAME LEVEL GAME RESPONSIBILITY

NCA/VGK National Planning/Negotiations

JCS/General Staff National Strategic Planning

CINCs/TVD Commanders Theater/Campaign Planning
was designed to replicate the interactions that would occur between the DOD, v

federal agencies, including regulatory, and private industry.

The remainder of the cells, control, nuclear, space, environment, logistics, analy

etc. performed, essentially, as in previous games. An outline of the cells and the

inter-relationship is provided in figure 6.

The flow of activity in this game differed considerably from that of its predecesso

cause the five major game drivers, the NCA, negotiators, JCS, CINCs, and NATO 

doing different things at different times. Their respective timelines are displayed 

ures 7 through 11. These charts permit one to follow the sequence of the game. T

CINCs prepared plans for regional strategies and campaigns that were presented 

JCS. The JCS then went into the “tank” to come to a conclusion as to the course(

action they would recommend to the NCA. While this was going on, the Nationa

curity Policy Group was determining the broader aspects of national policy, nego

tions were ongoing as were discussions among the NATO allies.

All the strands of the game began to come together on Wednesday afternoon, wi

negotiators report to the NCA. Success or failure on that front laid the basis for t

fining of the Blue political position Thursday morning. The military recommend

of the JCS were available early Thursday afternoon, enabling the President to set 

to the NATO Council of Ministers the alliance options, political and military, as 

saw them. (At the same time, a session similar to the “hot wash” was taking place

GLOBAL WAR GAME 1988 — ORGANIZATION GWG ‘8

CONTROL GROUP

PAC

VGK NCA

NSPG

SPACE

CHEM

GAME DIRECTORATE

NEGOTIATE NEGOTIATE

NUC

C3

ENVIR

INTELLIGENCE

LATERAL CONTROL LATERAL CONTROL

MEDIA

IG–MOB

SVCs CINCs TECH

GAME

CONGRESS

WRB/NDRC

(PLAYERS/ASSESSORS)

INTERNATIONAL

POLITICAL

MILITARY ASSESSMENT GROUP

ANALYSIS

LOG

GS JCS

TVDs

EUR/LANT

Organization
plans and possible outcomes.) Finally, with consultations among allies complete, the

President finalized his decisions and delivered them to the “country” in a Friday morning “State of the Nation” address.

This cycle was followed for each of the three weeks of Global ’88.

NCA MON TUE WED THU FRI

0800 ADMIN/

CHECK-IN

DEVELOP

INITIAL

POL POSITION

(WITH/NEG)

INTERACT

WITH

IG/MOB

WRB,

CONGRESS,

NDRC,

ETC.

REFINE

POLITICAL

POSITION

FINALIZE

PRES.

DECISIONS 0900 GENERAL

BRIEFS 1000  STATE

OF THE

NATION

ADDRESS

1100 SCENARIO

OVERVIEW

1300 ORG/ADMIN

VISIT

SCIENCE

GAME

RCV

JCS

BRIEF 1400 REVIEW

GLOBAL

SITUATION

(WITH/NEG)

1500 RCV

NEG

BRIEF

NATO

MINISTERIAL 1600 MTG

FIGURE 7

National Command Authority Schedule

NEG MON TUE WED THU FRI

0800 ADMIN/

CHECK-IN

DEVELOP

INITIAL

POL POSITION

(WITH/NCA)

NEGOTIATION

SESSION #3

SUPPORT

NCA 

0900 GENERAL

BRIEFS 1000

NEGOTIATION

SESSION #1

MODIFY

INITIAL

POL POSI

(AS REQUIRED)

 STATE

OF THE

NATION

ADDRESS

1100 SCENARIO

OVERVIEW

1300 ORG/ADMIN

NEGOTIATION

SESSION #2

BRIEF

PREPS 

1400 REVIEW

GLOBAL

SITUATION

(WITH/NCA)

1500 BRIEF

NCA

NEGOTIATION

SESSION

(AS REQUIRED) 1600

FIGURE 8

Negotiation Time Schedule
JCS MON TUE WED THU FRI

0800 ADMIN/

CHECK-IN

DEVELOP

GLOBAL

MILITARY

PLANS &

OPTIONS



 TANK

SESSION 

0900 GENERAL

BRIEFS 1000 RCV

CINC’s

BRIEFS

BRIEF

PREPS

STATE

OF THE

NATION

ADDRES

1100 SCENARIO

OVERVIEW

1300 ORG/ADMIN  REFINE

GLOBAL

MILITARY

POSITION

BRIEF

NCA 1400 REVIEW

GLOBAL

SITUATION

1500  SUPPORT

NCA 1600

Joint Chiefs of Staff Schedule

VISIT

SCIENCE

GAME

CINCS MON TUE WED THU FRI

0800 ADMIN/

CHECK-IN

DEVELOP

REGIONAL

STRATEGIES

AND

CAMPAIGN

OPTIONS

COORD.

WITH

ALLIES

ATTEND

JCS

TANK

SESSION 0900 GENERAL

BRIEFS 1000

BRIEF

JCS

OUT BRIEF

PAC ALLIES

STATE

OF THE

NATION

ADDRES

1100 SCENARIO

OVERVIEW

1300 ORG/ADMIN 

SUPPORT

JCS

OPEN

SESSION

WITH

RED, GRN

& ASSESS.

1400

REVIEW

REGIONAL

SITUATION

1500 

1600

FIGURE 10

Commanders in Chief Schedule
NATO

MC/

DPC/NAC MON TUE WED THU FRI

0800 ADMIN/

CHECK-IN

DEVELOP

NATO

POLITICAL

POSITION

AND WAR

TERMINATION

OPTIONS

RECEIVE

MNC

BRIEFS*

REFINE

POLITICAL

POSITION 0900 GENERAL

BRIEFS 1000 COORD.

WITH

NCA

 STATE

OF THE

NATION

ADDRESS

1100 SCENARIO

OVERVIEW

1300 ORG/ADMIN 

1400

REVIEW

WAR

SITUATION

1500   NATO

MINISTERIAL

MEETING

1600

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Overview

*MNC = Ministerial Counselors
The 1984 Global War Game

Introduction

The 1984 Global War Game was the initial game of the second Global War Game 

(1984–1988). Consequently, there were some characteristics of this game that ma

unique. Aside from the overall purposes of the series stated above, this first game 

other specific objectives:

• To provide an initial estimate of the world of the 1990s that would serve as a b

for the next four games.

• To explore evolving technologies that would influence military operations in t

decade.

• To explore the nature of protracted, conventional war.

• To provide a baseline reference in such things as the respective orders of battle 

the following games in the series.

• To serve as a test bed for specific areas of interest that had emerged from the a

of the First Global War Game Series, 1979–1983.

GWG 1984 also initiated a shift in focus from the games of the first series. Those 

had been primarily operational in nature, while the games of the second series w

emphasize a planning format supported by campaign analysis and operations ga

techniques. The game book for 1984 emphasized this shift toward strategy:

The Global War Game is a research game designed to explore US global war fighting capabilit

main emphasis is placed on identifying issues that require attention in planning global strateg

ticular attention is given to where and how naval forces can make the greatest contribution to 

bined arms strategy. . . . The Global War Game (GWG) is a test bed of current strategic wisdo

forum to assess the state of what we have and design the shape of what we want.

Operational decisions continued to play a prominent part in the game. Indeed, G

as played in 1984 and successive years of this series, consisted of four complemen

games. The first aspect was that of a research game, which cut players loose from

CHAPTER ONE
aspect of the game forced players to think in terms of a global, combined-arms strategy. The operational game provided a time sequence of events that tested strategy and

confronted players with the necessity of making choices. Finally, the seminar portion o

the game presented an opportunity to develop topics of major importance in detail.

Aside from the overarching series objectives, the players in the 1984 Global War Game

were asked to do two specific tasks:

• Explore the characteristics of crisis and war in the early 1990s, and

• Increase the understanding of a long-war strategy.

Scenario

The scenario for the 1984 Global War Game postulated a world with many problems.

The crucial one, however, was the deteriorating economic situation in Poland and Eastern Europe. It envisioned a situation where, by the late 1980s, economic conditions in

Eastern Europe had worsened and worker unrest reached such levels that it hampered

government efforts to meet even normal demands for goods and services. In the spring o

1990, the disruption in Poland had grown to nationwide proportions. General strikes had

paralyzed the economy on several occasions. The government was under extreme pressure, both from its own citizens and from its Warsaw Pact allies, to restore order. Consequently, Red mobilized seven divisions; in June those units, in conjunction with the

entire Polish army, two East German divisions, and one division each from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, reimposed government control.

In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), similar discontent was augmented by a

strong peace movement. In July 1990, harsh repressive measures on the part of the gov

ernment intensified the opposition. During the third week of that month, security

forces opened fire on mass demonstrations, and 20 protesters were reported killed. Attacks on Communist Party headquarters followed in five cities, and troops sent to restore order were met with barricades. Skirmishes between government forces and

dissidents continued, and by the end of July, some GDR military units had mutinied.

As mobs began to gather in areas where Red troop garrisons were present, those forces

began to pull back to the east. By the end of July, the western GDR was in the hands of

the pro-Western rebels, while the eastern part of the country was in the hands of the

loyal East German and Red forces. The rebels in the west began to set up democratic

city councils and were in contact with both the press and officials of the government o

the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).

As August began, the GDR insurgents resisted all efforts to restore order, and some utilized the FRG as a haven from which to conduct minor but violent attacks into the
German Border (IGB) on 30 July. On 1 August (D-12), the Politburo, gravely con

cerned about the continued deterioration of stability in the GDR, mobilized gro

air, and naval forces to restore the IGB and the East German government by conv

tional military action. Blue mobilized five days later (D-7). Although neither Blu

Red had desired war, circumstances beyond the control of both precipitated a sit

in which neither believed an alternative existed.

Political Objectives and Military Strategy

Blue Objectives

The most basic of the Blue political objectives was to maintain NATO and other 

ances around the world and to protect, or restore as necessary, the territorial inte

of those allies. Blue sought to attain these primary goals without recourse to nuc

weapons. Further, Blue believed that hostilities offered the opportunity to neutra

Red influence over non-European surrogates. Indeed, achievement of these objec

could well result in the fragmentation or dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

Blue Strategy

The strategy devised by Blue to attain the political goals is best considered by geo

graphic region.

Central Europe

• Meet any Warsaw Pact attack as far forward as possible.

• Establish reserves to block penetrations and to exploit opportunities.

• Effectively use Blue air power to blunt Red air operations and to retain key

command, control, and communications (C3), air defense, and nuclear capab

• Establish and maintain local air superiority and provide air support to ground f

Atlantic and Norway

• Conduct a vigorous, forward anti-submarine warfare (ASW) campaign to qui

destroy the Red strategic nuclear reserve.

• Insert Blue/UK/Netherlands marines in North Norway to block deep Red

penetration.

• Hold aircraft carriers and additional marines in reserve for use as necessary.

• Protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and lines of communication (LO
• Destroy deployed Red naval forces.

• Provide support to NATO southern flank, if attacked.

• Conduct offensive operations in the Balkans to relieve Red pressure on the Central

Front in Germany.

Indian Ocean

• Destroy Red Indian Ocean Squadron.

• Retain USN Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) plus one SSN for regional

contingencies.

• Move the only Indian Ocean carrier battle group (CVBG) to the Pacific.

Pacific

• Conduct vigorous ASW campaign.

• Thwart any Red attacks on Japan.

• Pressure Red by threat to southern Kurile Islands.

Red Objectives

The primary political objective of Red was the neutralization of the FRG. If all or even

a substantial part of West Germany could be occupied, NATO would probably collapse

due to the Alliance’s inability to protect its most important Continental member. The

dissolution of NATO would achieve a Red political goal—the diminution or elimination of Blue influence on the Continent. Another Red objective was to keep the war

short and nonnuclear by quick attainment of military objectives to be followed by initiatives for a prompt cease-fire.

Red Strategy

Central Europe

• Restore the IGB.

• Occupy all or substantial parts of the FRG.

• Capture West German ports on the North Sea.

• Conduct an offensive into Jutland to force Denmark to capitulate and thus

fragment NATO.
• Establish air superiority over northern Norway.

• Eliminate Blue early warning capability in North Norway.

• Control coast and interior of North Norway.

• Posture nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in Atlantic and A

and protect their bastions.

• Control, if possible; otherwise, deny Blue use of Norwegian and Barents Seas.

• Position fleet submarines (SSN) for anti-SSBN operations.

Southwest Asia

• Minimize Blue capability to attack Red homeland.

• Block NATO access to Black Sea.

• Execute holding operations in Thrace and eastern Turkey.

Indian Ocean

• Deter/conduct holding operation against Iran and Iraq.

• Destroy Blue forces.

• Refrain from offensive operations to deny Blue a basing excuse.

Pacific

• Neutralize Japan and strip away Blue air defense capability.

• Attack targets in Aleutians, Alaska, and Hawaii.

• Destroy Blue forces, establish sea control, especially in the Seas of Japan and Okh

The Central Front

The war began on 16 August 1990 with a major Warsaw Pact (WP) offensive aga

NATO forces. The primary weight of the Red attack was in the Northern Army G

(NORTHAG) sector, and the advance carried 50 kilometers in the first two days 

in the first three. NATO forces attempted a counterattack against this penetration 

D+4, striking northeast from the Fulda area to try to turn the southern flank of t

Red salient. NATO air was surged in support of this offensive, and while it did se

divert some WP reinforcements, the advance across the north German Plain con

and this limited counterattack was withdrawn on D+6. NATO reserves and air p

including the use of B-52s, blunted the Red advance by D+7. In NORTHAG, the
when the Red Second Operational Echelon closed.

The Red buildup and consolidation continued on D+11, and two Polish armies pushed

into Schleswig-Holstein, cutting off Denmark from the rest of NATO. The Warsaw Pac

offensive in NORTHAG resumed on D+12. Red staged an airborne attack on

Bremerhaven as part of this renewed drive that soon carried across the Elbe.

Bremerhaven fell on D+13, while, to the south, Red commenced a thrust toward Munich.

That city fell, along with Augsburg, on D+15, and the Red advance continued on toward

Stuttgart. In NORTHAG, NATO had formed and was holding, with the aid of massive ai

support, a new defensive line anchored on the Weser River. At D+19, relative combat

power in NORTHAG was about even, and to the south, NATO reinforcements caused

Red to hold up the advance on Stuttgart.

By D+20, however, Blue was confronted with two major problems on the Central

Front. First, the Red Second Strategic Echelon had closed and begun a strong attack

that threatened Frankfurt. Second, Red units had reinforced the Polish forces in Jutland

and renewed the offensive into Denmark. The political ramifications of the fall of a

NATO member were such that the Alliance decided on an amphibious operation that

went ashore on the western side of the Danish peninsula on D+22. A marine amphibious force (MAF) and one army division, supported by five aircraft carriers (CV) and

about 250 other ships, were augmented by an assault by the 82nd Airborne Division.

The Weser line continued to hold, while, to the south, a second defensive belt contained the Red thrust on Frankfurt, although the city was within range of Red divisional artillery. On D+23 this attack had been spent, and Red terminated offensive

operations to await developments.

NATO seized the initiative with a six-division offensive toward Hamburg, which, if suc

cessful, would force the withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact forces in Jutland that were opposing the Blue beachhead. The 101st Airborne Division had been added to the

original force, but a breakout had not been achieved. This attack was to be followed by

a three-phase NATO counterattack.

• Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) was to launch 13 French divisions between

Kassel and Fulda toward Halle, to rupture Red LOCs and form a southern pincer to

cut off WP forces in North Germany.

• NORTHAG to attack in the direction of Magdeburg, forcing a breach south of

Hamburg, to form the northern pincer.

• AFCENT was also to attack toward the Oder River, with objective and direction to b

determined based on the deployment of the Red Third Strategic Echelon.
advancing to the northeast, while the NORTHAG units moved against light oppo

In conjunction with these attacks, Rangers were employed in a deep penetration 

sion against airfields in the Berlin area. Meanwhile, Red was moving up reinforce

composed of nine divisions from the Leningrad military district (MD) and 25 fr

Kiev and Caucasus MDs. By D+29, the French southern pincer had linked up in 

with two airborne divisions that had taken the city on D+27. However, the north

arm of the pincer was held up at Luneburg by stiffening Red resistance. The Jutla

beachhead was stable, but efforts at breaking out had failed. The third phase of t

NATO counteroffensive began on D+29 in the direction of Brunswick (Braunsch

for the purpose of supporting the north shoulder of the French salient. However

tral Army Group (CENTAG) was becoming concerned over increasing Red press

the French in the vicinity of Mannheim.

D+30 found the NATO counteroffensives continuing in the face of strong Red op

tion occasioned by the more rapid than expected arrival of the Third Strategic E

The French drove on beyond Halle toward Magdeburg and Leipzig and, support

their left by the CENTAG forces moving on Brunswick, crossed the inter-German 

der (IGB) into East Germany. However, the open right flank of the French penet

was coming under increasing pressure. To the north, the check at Luneburg led

NORTHAG to redefine objectives, and the northern pincer swung south on an a

Uelzen/Wolfsburg. In south Germany, the Red offensive toward Stuttgart was res

and NATO forces were suffering heavy casualties. By D+33, the NATO offensive o

tions reached their limit with a link-up of the two pincers at Celle. Mounting Re

sure, however, forced the withdrawal of the forces involved in all three phases on

D+34/35. This counterattack, however, had thrown Red off timeline and necessit

diversion of forces destined for Norway and the Balkans, leaving Red vulnerable 

both regions.

By D+35/36, the 34 divisions of the Third Strategic Echelon had restored the init

to Red, and D+37/38 found NATO on the defensive on all fronts. The first of the 

Reserve and National Guard units from the Continental United States (CONUS) 

rived in theater on D+38 and were immediately pressed into action to hold three 

saw Pact offensives aimed at Bremen, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart. The Blue conting

Jutland remained confined to their beachhead. This, then, was the situation when 

went to a seminar format at D+48 (map 2).

Norway

Red attacked Norway on D-Day, moving across the Finnmark with two motorize

divisions (MRD) and conducting an amphibious landing of a Soviet naval infant
(SNI) regiment in Porsangen Fjord. The airfield at Banak was captured, and four Norwegian early warning posts were closed. The Red advance continued toward the

Skibotn valley, slowed both by bad weather and strong resistance of combined Blue,

Norwegian, and UK forces. The Blue components—a Marine Amphibious Brigade

(MAB) and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)—had arrived in Norway between

D-9 and D-7. NATO Improved Hawk batteries and tactical air forces were able to effectively counter Red air, and Blue air strikes helped force Red to go over to the defensive

at Alta, short of their Skibotn objective.

North

Sea

Baltic

Sea

France

Switzerland Liechtenstein

Italy

Austria

Czech Republic

Poland

Netherlands

Belgium

Luxembourg

6° 14°

48°

52°

Rhine

Schleswig-Holstein

Kiel

Canal

Denmark

FRG

(West Germany) GDR

(East Germany)

Elbe

Elbe

Weser

Berlin

Leipzig

Halle

Uelzen

Kassel

Mannheim

Frankfurt

Fulda

Bonn

Hamburg

Celle

Mainz

Magdeburg

Stuttgart

Esbjerg

RED D-DAY

Wolfsburg

Kiel

Canal

BLUE D+22

Braunschweig

Luneberg

Danube

Danube

Augsburg

Munich

Legend: Approximate location of FLOT

at D+48

____ Inter-German border

Bremerhaven

RED D+13

BLUE D+26

Bremen

Hannover

BLUE D+29

BLUE D+26

RED D+20

RED D-DAY

RED D+11

The Central Front 1984 Game D+48
After the initial “shootout” in the Mediterranean, Blue naval forces were well pos

tioned. With the exception of a few submarines and numerous mines, there were 

Red forces left to oppose Blue, and the swiftness and completeness of the Blue vi

had cowed Red surrogates into neutrality. Further, Red Soviet Naval Aviation and L

Range Aviation (SNA/LRA), bereft of targeting information, chose not to comm

offensive action after D-Day. This left NATO forces free to launch a massive tacti

campaign into Bulgaria to delay or disrupt any plans Red might have for invadin

Thrace. This campaign essentially destroyed Red combat air patrol (CAP) capabi

the area, slowed the Red buildup for an invasion of Thrace, and laid the basis for 

NATO offensive of D+47. This attack involved six Greek/Turkish divisions backe

two Blue army divisions and a MAB. Red responded by shifting two divisions fro

Hungary, and the battle was continuing at game end.

The Atlantic

Red moves toward war became evident during the prehostility period of Global 

when, on D-15, 80 percent of Red submarine and maritime combatants sortied a

Black Sea Fleet surged. Between that date and D-10, Warsaw Pact fleets in the Ba

also left port. NATO took prompt advantage of this warning, and by D-Day had 16 

on station in the Norwegian, Kara, and Barents Seas. Blue also deployed other fo

areas of potential conflict as a show of force. The America, Saratoga, and Wiscons

tle Groups were tasked to cover Cuba, the Roosevelt, Coral Sea, and Lincoln Battle

Groups moved to positions south of the Iceland–United Kingdom Gap and the I

pendence steamed to join the Sixth Fleet. Between D-10 and D-5, Blue marines ar

in Norway, 10 guided missile frigates (FFG) were put on Eastern Atlantic (EASTL

patrol, and Western Atlantic (WESTLANT) amphibious ships, including the Nas

and Guam, were ordered to load out and proceed to the UK. Because of these act

D-Day found Blue naval forces well disposed, with SSNs forward, three CVBGs j

south of the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) Gap, and three others off the UK

supported by Ocean Surveillance (T-AGOS) ships had assumed ASW positions, t

four Yankees in the Atlantic were being tailed, and two converted SSBNs were on 

tion to lay CapTor minefields in the Barents. Protective minefields were in place o

Blue coast. At D-4, five Norwegian patrol submarines (SS) formed a barrier off t

North Cape and the French SSN/SSBNs were in safe haven in the Bay of Biscay.

When hostilities commenced, the converted SSBNs laid a 96-unit CapTor field in 

Barents and Mk-57 fields along expected Red SSN/SSBN transit routes. The Shet

and Faeroes were also mined, utilizing surface, subsurface, and air platforms. Th

erations used 290 mines or 80 percent of assets. The Yankees in the Atlantic were
gian, Barents, and Kara Seas, Blue SSNs sought targets in the following priorities:

SSBNs, SSNs, and surface ASW platforms. During the first week of the war, Blue sank 7

Red SSBNs, 24 SSNs, 2 SSs and nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs),

the only operational CV, and one Kiev, with another Kiev so badly damaged as to be

out of action. During this period, Blue lost ten SSNs. During the entire game, Blue SSNs

sank 19 SSBNs, 38 SSNs, 6 SSGNs, 7 SS, and 23 major surface ships at a cost of 26 SSNs.

On D-Day, Blue surface forces moved initially to sink Red AGIs and then to support

ASW operations. Intensive air operations were conducted north of the GIN Gap coordinated with surface forces. One CV was moved close to southern Norway to support

the land campaign, if necessary. Red sabotage of the Sound Surveillance System

(SOSUS) in Norway hampered the ASW effort, but the capabilities of thin line arrays

and the SQR-19 compensated. Aside from operations in support of the amphibious

operations in Jutland and an abortive Red anti-SLOC campaign (both of which will be

discussed separately), the naval war proceeded with Red forces suffering heavy attrition. By D+48, surviving Red naval units had been driven into ports of safety, and,

while this remnant did constitute a fleet in being, only one Oscar-class SSGN remained

at sea. Specific events of interest are as follows:

• D+3, Danes and Swedes mine Baltic choke points.

• D+7, UK reports initial clearing of Red SS/SSN from North Sea.

• D+8, three CVBGs south of GIN Gap release support SSNs to replace those lost.

• D+10, two CVBGs off Cuba deployed to UK, leaving Wisconsin BG in position.

• D+23/25, two SSN-launched TLAM(C) strikes against Olenegorsk petroleum, oil,

and lubricants (POL) facilities and on Murmansk.

• D+25, Blue reviews SSN patrol areas. Decision made to pull units out of Kara Sea

and reduce those operating in the Barents.

• D+30, Blue SSNs attack Red amphibious force in the vicinity of Norway’s North

Cape, sinking the majority of Red surface units involved in an attempt to outflank

Skibotn defense line.

• D+35, Red sorties 11 diesel SS against Blue CVBGs operating in North Sea.

Invincible and Hermes attacked unsuccessfully; diesel submarine threat caused Blue

considerable alarm.

• D+38, only remaining Oscar SSGN launches sole successful antiship cruise missile

(ASCM) attack of war. Invincible and Hermes damaged, but not put out of action.
campaign. Fourteen SSN/SSGNs were sortied via the Kara Sea, North Spitsberge

the Denmark Strait. Blue was caught unprepared, and Red was not detected unti

ing the Denmark Strait. Of the 14 boats involved, all were sunk by D+40, two by 

CapTor minefield in the Denmark Strait, eight by Blue SSN, and four by maritim

trol aircraft (MPA). They did, however, sink one SL-7, four Ro/Ro (fast), and fou

Ro (slow) transports.

At D+22, Blue forces conducted an amphibious landing near the FRG-Danish bo

on the western side of the Jutland Peninsula to prevent that NATO member from 

totally occupied by Warsaw Pact forces. Five CVs and 250 other ships were involv

landing a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), MPS equipment, and one infantry d

sion. The 82nd Airborne was also utilized, and the 101st Airborne put ashore lat

amphibious fleet and supporting ships were attacked by five regiments of Backfir

The attack initially concentrated on the amphibious ships and resulted in a loss o

about 25 percent of available ground strength.

Following the landing, Blue maintained substantial CV assets in the North Sea to 

vide tactical air support to NORTHAG in general and the Jutland beachhead in p

ular. This concentration attracted the attention of Red and resulted in the SS/SSG

attacks noted above. While the Blue forces were still pinned in their beachhead a

end, Red had not knocked Denmark out of either the war or the NATO Alliance, 

Red forces that might have been employed elsewhere to NATO disadvantage had 

diverted to Denmark.

At the end of the game, then, Red had been driven from the Atlantic and neighbo

seas, the SLOCs were secure, Cuba was not a factor, and Blue naval assets were as

in the land battle on the Central Front.

The Mediterranean and Southwestern TVD

Red actions prior to D-Day involved Spetsnaz operations and covert minelaying. 

ginning at D-12, Red began the insertion of Spetsnaz teams to sabotage nuclear s

sites, nuclear attack–capable airfields, and command, control, communications, 

telligence (C3I), in that order of priority. Also prior to D-Day, Red sortied eight Ro

ships with an estimated 1,000 mines per ship. One was assigned the Straits of Sic

Messina, another the Suez Canal, and the other six to the Aegean. The ship assign

the Suez was detected on D-2 and sunk in the Canal, blocking it. A Foxtrot laid 1

mines in Souda Bay and a Tango laid 12 more in Augusta Bay on D-2, neither be

detected.
“shoot-out” began. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON) ships and

submarines struck two Sixth Fleet CVBGs in the vicinity of Rhodes, sinking three ship

but leaving the CVs undamaged. The Red forces were essentially destroyed, incapacitated or forced into ports of Red surrogates. Red also launched an SNA/LRA attack

with three regiments of Black Sea Fleet (BLKSEAFLT) Backfire and one regiment of

Blinders. Red prepared for this attack with SS-22 attacks on six Turkish airfields, and

only four Backfires and six Blinders were shot down over Turkey. The attack against

Sixth Fleet was made with AS-4s; no CVs were damaged, and Red lost 36 Backfires and

nine Blinders. Blinders also hit the airfield at Souda Bay, cutting the runway for three

days. These attacks were the last air attacks launched against Sixth Fleet, as Red did not

wish to risk assets without targeting intelligence.

By D+25, NATO had completed mine-clearing operations in the Mediterranean, interred

89 of an estimated 250 Warsaw Pact merchant ships in the area when hostilities commenced, and forced the others into ports in Libya, Morocco, and Syria. The three

CVBGs now present, Independence, John F. Kennedy, and Eisenhower, became involved

in a successful air campaign against Red air assets and other targets in Bulgaria. A

number of Tomahawk land-attack missile (conventional) (TLAM(C)) attacks were

launched, the most notable being a strike on a new CV and a Slava fitting out at

Nikolayev, based on intelligence obtained from a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV). An

effort was also made to insert four SSNs into the Black Sea, but two were sunk and one

damaged by minefields.

Game’s end found NATO in control of the Mediterranean, with the CVBGs employed

in supporting an Allied ground offensive toward Bulgaria.

The Far East

While previous Global War Games had found Red essentially passive in the Pacific

Theater, it seized the initiative in 1984. Perceiving that it would be unable through diplomatic pressure and military threat to keep Japan neutral, Red launched a large-scale

air attack on Blue/Japanese air defense assets, using both aircraft and SS-22s. These attacks were so successful that Japan was left with essentially no air defense capability. An

example of this effectiveness was the D+2 attack on airfields at Chitose and Misawa,

which put both out of action for 48 hours and destroyed 85 percent of their POL

supplies.

Red also struck at Blue targets throughout the Pacific. Adak, Shemya, and Amchitka

were hit on D+1, 2, and 5. Further, key installations in Guam and Hawaii were attacked

by Red unconventional warfare forces, which were also employed against Japan. These

included high frequency direction finder (HFDF) sites and a super-high-frequency (SHF
percent of all POL, hangars, and port facilities destroyed. These “worldwide” stri

were conducted not because Red sought to expand the war, but because Red reck

it could not tolerate potential threats to its flanks and wanted to preempt them t

extent possible. Red attempted to accomplish the same goal by offering bilateral 

ties of nonbelligerency.

Red had flushed a large number of SSN/SSGN to the east of Hokkaido and the K

prior to D-Day for anti-CVBG operations. The remainder of the Red navy was re

in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk.

Blue, acting on warning given by Red deployments, surged SSNs prior to hostilities 

in a position to wage intensive ASW campaigns in the Bering Sea and the Seas of Jap

Okhotsk. Initial Red SSBN losses were heavy, but ceased after D+16 as Red drew 

maining assets back into the well-protected shallow water bastions in the northe

of Okhotsk. A Blue USN/USAF attack destroyed Red bombers, sank several smal

batants, and damaged repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.

There was a small-scale “shoot-out” in the Indian Ocean, where the Kitty Hawk b

group was en route to join the other Pacific Fleet CVBGs in the vicinity of the Ph

pines. A Charlie-class SSGN attacked the Kitty Hawk, but its missiles were shot d

by an escorting Aegis cruiser, and the Charlie was sunk by the support SSN. This 

also sank a Krivak by air-launched Harpoon and destroyed an AGI (auxiliary ves

general intelligence purposes) with gunfire. A Kara and another Krivak were dispatched in the Arabian Sea by air-launched Harpoon shortly after D-Day. Althou

these actions were the only major ones to take place in the Indian Ocean, Red did 

best to harass Blue/NATO/Japan energy supplies. Periodic bombing raids were u

taken against oil production facilities; Ras Tanurah was heavily bombed, and a d

tory anti-SLOC campaign in the Indian Ocean claimed 12 super tankers. Howev

Middle East in general and the energy situation in particular never became a ma

concern to Blue.

Blue held six CVBGs, including the Kitty Hawk, in the Philippine Sea during the 

days of the war, awaiting the destruction of Red submarines in the waters east of

Hokkaido and the Kuriles. This positioning of the CVBGs, combined with a prot

period of extremely bad weather, which hampered Blue air operations, provided 

with a “window” to invade Hokkaido. On D+11, Red initiated a large amphibiou

sault led by two SNI regiments followed by motorized infantry units transport

Ro/Ro ships. Eighteen amphibious and merchant ships were lost in this assault, a

both Kievs in the Red Pacific Fleet sustained severe damage. However, the Red fo

did get ashore and established two large salients, one on the Wakkanai peninsula 
lic of Korea (DPRK) commenced mobilization and invaded South Korea on D+15.

As the weather cleared and Blue antisubmarine operations proceeded, the CVBGs were

able to move north and pound the Red forces ashore on Hokkaido. By D+30, the five

divisions of Red troops then ashore were unable to make further progress and a decision was made to withdraw them, which was accomplished on D+32/33. Partially to

cover this withdrawal, Red launched a massive air attack on the Blue CVBGs force operating southeast of Tokyo. Red lost 182 planes in a raid that included Backfire, Badger

Bear, Foxhound, Fulcrum, Flanker, and Fencer. Blue lost 101 aircraft; several escorts

and auxiliaries were sunk; Lincoln and Midway, heavily damaged, were towed to Japanese yards for repair.

Blue planned to continue the Pacific war by invading the southern Kurile island of

Kunashir, with follow-on landings to take place on Simushir and Iturup. This decision

was taken in spite of urgent pleas from the Republic of Korea (ROK), which, while

holding its own against the North Korean invasion, wanted the CVBGs to provide additional air support. As Blue naval forces maneuvered for the attack on Kunashir, Red

launched another massive air attack on the CVBGs, now positioned east of Hokkaido.

The Ranger sustained six hits, was on fire and dead in the water. The estimated time of

repair (ETR) was 10 months; seven escorts were also sunk. Blue bombing of the

Kuriles, including a number of B-52 strikes, appeared to have neutralized any military

utility the islands might have had for Red. With Red threatening to place atomic demo

lition mines (ADM) on the islands, Blue and Japan seemed to independently reach the

conclusion that there was no military necessity to invade.

The situation on the Korean peninsula had become stalemated. Initial DPRK success in

the East had been blunted by a South Korean counterattack, and Seoul remained in ROK

possession. Little change had occurred since D+40 or so, and Blue continued to refuse ROK

requests for CVBG support. At game end, however, Red had agreed to provide MiG-21s to

Pyongyang, which appeared to threaten a shift of air superiority to the north.

The PRC had mobilized early in the war, but had taken no aggressive action against

Red. Nonetheless, Red had felt it necessary to maintain its regular defensive deployments against possible contingencies, and had not drawn down its forces employed

for that purpose.

Although these were the events of principal importance in the Pacific, there were ongo

ing submarine operations against Red forces that put to sea. Further, both the Blue air

force and naval air assets attacked the Belkin coast, and TLAM(C) missiles were utilize

in attacks on Vladivostok and Sakhalin.
The major issues of the 1984 Global War Game can be considered to fall under t

broad topics:

• Looking at longer war—out to D+60.

• Developing insights into unified global strategy.

• Implications of fighting with 1990s equipment and tactical innovations.

One of the questions of concern over the “long war” hypothesis involved the abil

Blue and NATO to successfully wage protracted, conventional war as well as the e

that Blue willingness and capability to do so would have on deterrence.

As far as the latter point is concerned, it appeared that the Blue ability to deter by

adopting a long war strategy might be scenario-dependent. While such a prospec

would give Red cause for concern, it seemed that Red, if faced with the prospect o

loss of East Germany or the unification of Germany, would choose to fight, even if 

tracted war was in prospect. Once the battle was joined, it appeared that Red, if con

fronted with limited resources and potential trouble on the flanks, would scale bac

original objectives and settle for more modest goals, such as an intact Warsaw Pact 

ance and, possibly, a demilitarized Germany. However, should Red be thrown off it

timelines and hit with a strong Blue counteroffensive, the use of weapons of mass d

struction was a very real possibility.

As the Global Game progressed in 1984, it appeared that with reasonable mobiliz

lead time and effective use of warning, Commander-in-Chief Europe/Supreme A

Commander Europe (CINCEUR/SACEUR) had stronger defensive fighting pow

many had perceived. A “flexible defense” that employed maneuver and flanking a

had succeeded in slowing Pact offensive. The air/land battle concept appeared to 

working well, and Blue (as distinct from NATO) had logistic and ordnance stock

were generally adequate. Thus, at D+48, Blue, though hard-pressed, was holding 

spite of Red’s commitment of all forces west of the Urals. Virtually all theaters ex

the border with the PRC had been stripped of Red troops, a situation deemed un

in a “real world” circumstance.

The game results tended to show that a long-war strategy did have some deterren

tures and was a valid war-fighting option for Blue/NATO. However, while succes

ecution of the strategy avoided Blue selection of the nuclear option, it did have t

effect of pushing Red in exactly that direction. Red, at game’s end, was determine

secure a cease-fire and satisfactory war termination, even if weapons of mass des

tion had to be used. If the war continued, Red saw their long-term (two to three 

situation as untenable.
tives had been recognized in the first global series as an issue of critical importance.

While maritime superiority gave Blue multiple options to put both military and political pressure on Red, there was no “Big Game Plan” to coordinate Navy, Army, and Air

Force assets for combined and joint land operations, nor was there any pre-hostilities

planning to provide for follow-on campaigns and logistical support. In the event, it ap

peared as though AFNORTH, AFCENT, and AFSOUTH were waging separate wars.

If Blue could implement an overall strategy, Red would be forced to react to it as the

initial offensive plan was upset and timelines began to slide. Without such a strategy,

both sides tended to remain in a reactive mode until Red built enough force to press

toward either original or modified objectives.

Blue had identified four major points of leverage:

• North Norway.

• Baltic Approaches.

• Western Mediterranean (Ligurian Sea).

• Eastern Mediterranean.

The western Mediterranean and the Baltic Approaches provided the opportunity for

direct support of the Central Front, while attacks from North Norway and the eastern

Mediterranean could threaten the Red homeland.

In Global ’84, Blue attempted to exploit offensive operations at three levels:

• Operational—A major double envelopment in AFCENT using NORTHAG and

CENTAG reserves.

• At the theater level, with an attempt to create pressure in the Balkans by AFSOUTH.

• By the planned use of the Strategic Reserve for invading Jutland and threatening the

Baltic coast.

If operations in North Norway to thwart the Red advance that began on D-Day were

considered, Blue/NATO was thus exercising three out of the four points of leverage

identified above.

Blue/NATO forces in North Norway were successful in halting the Red attack short of its

objective, the Skibotn Valley. However, there was no appreciable augmentation of Allied

forces in Norway after the very early stages of the war. Essentially, the CVBGs never en

tered the Norwegian Sea. Consequently, there was only a token TLAM attack on the

Kola and no buildup of force of any kind to seriously threaten the Red homeland with

attack, let alone mount a ground offensive. Red felt free to reinforce the Central Front
in North Norway had been attained.

The Blue landing in Jutland was not planned as a counteroffensive, but was initia

for the political reason of keeping Denmark from being knocked out of the war. 

Blue was never able to break out from a beachhead that became more tenuous as 

game progressed, the operation did demonstrate several potential advantages:

• A number of Red divisions were diverted from offensive operations on the Centra

• The ability to support the operation with CVBG air allowed concentration of

land-based aircraft further south.

• If adequate force levels could be attained, the Central Front campaign could b

directly supported, with the offensive continuing east along the Baltic littoral o

moving directly south against the flank of the Red advance.

The decisive victory attained by Blue in the D-Day shoot-out in the Mediterrane

opened the SLOC to Greece and Turkey and promoted regional stability, particu

among the Muslim countries in the area. Blue wanted to exploit this situation, bu

unable to do so, in part because the Alliance had no plans for an offensive in this 

ater. Therefore, both land forces and logistics sustainment were absent. While Bl

lized air and TLAM assets to attack Bulgaria and the Black Sea ports, land operat

Thrace were not begun until D+47.

While these events were taking place in Europe, Blue was endeavoring to seize th

tiative in the Northwestern Pacific with the goal of invading the Kuriles. Althoug

operation was finally shelved due to a Red threat to place ADMs on these islands 

detonate them if Blue invaded (and then accuse Blue of initiating nuclear war), a 

question arose as to whether it was better policy just to neutralize the islands rat

than occupy them.

These operations suggested that there were military criteria that should be consi

when actions about the Red periphery were contemplated and that these criteria 

applicability to air and naval as well as land operations:

• Is the leverage that may be gained from the operation worth the cost? and

• Can a large enough force package be built to exploit opportunities maritime

superiority creates?

The importance of a coherent strategy that brings all available assets into play is 

perative if a long-war strategy is to succeed. Such a strategy may not depend on a

“knockout punch,” and one probably does not exist in any event. The overarchin

strategy appeared to be to stall the Red land offensive, constitute reserve forces, an
end when one belligerent decided the price was too high and victory too far away.

Fighting with 1990s equipment and tactical innovations led to a number of valuable

insights. Some of the most important are discussed briefly below.

• Antisubmarine Warfare—The Blue submarine thin line arrays and SQR-19 appeared

to have achieved a quantum leap in Blue capability. While it had been anticipated

that Red efforts in quieting their SSNs would diminish the Blue advantage, this did

not prove to be the case. Blue did find it difficult to come to a conclusion on one

tactical issue. As Red losses mounted and Red units moved deeper into bastions, Blu

approached a point of diminishing returns. It is important to formulate parameters

as to when to reduce or suspend the anti-SSBN campaign.

• While tactical aircraft (TACAIR) attrition continued to be very high, 60 percent for

Blue and 70 percent for Red, the Blue technological advantage appeared to be

shrinking. While Blue held a 2.5-to-1 ratio at D-43, the capability of Red fourth

generation aircraft, particularly when integrated with Mainstay, was a cause for

concern. While further experience and intelligence may result in a downgrade of

current performance estimates, these airframes are clearly superior to their

immediate predecessors.

• Red utilized SS-22s with conventional warheads in their attacks on air bases in Japan

and Turkey. They proved extremely effective in the role, and both their use and

effectiveness came as a surprise to Blue.

• The possible use of chemical weapons by Red was a concern to Blue. As the outbreak

of hostilities seemed imminent, Blue pondered the question of whether or not Red

would use chemical weapons (CW) at the beginning of the war and, if so, how. Blue

considered what response to make if Red did attack with CW, the principal issue being

a perceived lack of symmetrical response due to the lack of a deep strike capability. Th

possibility of a tactical nuclear weapons (TACNUC) retaliation was discussed. Overall,

the use of weapons of mass destruction was initially unattractive to both Blue and Red

primarily because both sides feared that the response of the other side could lead to

loss of control and unintended escalation. However, by D+48, Red had determined

that massive chemical use was necessary. Red did not believe there was any significance

to the scope of their attack; that if Blue was going to respond with nuclear weapons,

they would do so regardless of the scale of chemical use by Red. Blue, on the other

hand, had decided on principle that a nuclear response would be appropriate if the use

of CW by Red was massive and devastating. It should be noted that Red decided not to

use chemical weapons against France because of fear of nuclear retaliation by the

French Independent Nuclear Force (INF).
The 1985, 1986, and 1987 Global War Game

Scenario—The Road to War

The scenario for the 1985 Global War Game was based upon possible events, wo

wide, that culminated in the outbreak of war on 20 November 1990. As with the 

game, this scenario portrayed two superpowers not totally in control of events o

allies and an evolving situation in which both Blue and Red finally found themse

a war that neither sought but which neither could avoid.

In Europe, the basic issue involved an apparent trend toward German reunificati

Dissident elements in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had established 

tacts within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and as these contacts expan

they were condemned by Red. For its part, the East German government restricte

cess to West Berlin. This caused West Germany to insist that all Germans should 

access to Berlin, and the FRG government demanded a tripartite demarche to Re

In early November, the situation worsened. On 5 November, the GDR placed fur

restrictions on the air and ground corridors to Berlin, but implementation was h

pered as some East German border guards deserted their posts and a tide of refu

began to flow westward. This action precipitated a border firefight, and the GDR 

thorities took steps to ban all Western news reporting of the border chaos. Furth

West German National Television carried reports of Red frigates (FF) ramming o

boats crowded with refugees fleeing the GDR. The NATO refugee agency was ord

into operational readiness.

Red also had troubles along the southern flank. The war in Afghanistan dragged 

with support for the rebels provided by Blue and the People’s Republic of China 

being funneled through Pakistan. Further, chaos in Iran followed the death of th

tollah Khomeini in 1985. The council that replaced him was incompetent, and n

gle faction was able to assert control. In October of 1990, the National Front for 

Liberation of Azerbaijan declared independence and requested recognition and m

tary support from Red. Red mobilized four divisions from the Transcaucasus Mi

CHAPTER TWO
public of Azerbaijan on 20 October, and invaded on 4 November with seven divisions

plus elements of an airborne division from the Odessa MD. Resistance was light, and

Red anticipated that ten days would be required to “consolidate” the situation.

Blue was having problems to its south, as well. The situation in Central America was

festering as Red vastly increased aid to the communist government of Nicaragua.

“Contra” strength and activity had continued to grow, and when Blue army engineers

were killed inside Honduras by Nicaraguan government forces attacking the “contras,”

Congress acted. A joint resolution called on the President to define the roles and missions of all Blue forces in or close to Central America within 90 days.

Red activity in Cuba was also of concern to Blue. Military aid had been increased to include Nanuchka missile corvettes and Koni-class frigates, Fulcrum aircraft and SA-6

missiles. Further, deployment visits by Red surface action groups (SAGs) and fleet submarines (SSN) had become more frequent, as had reconnaissance flights.

Elsewhere, NATO’s southern flank was in disarray. The Greek government had permitted Blue basing agreements to lapse, requiring redeployment of assets to Italy and Turkey. Red naval units had begun Greek port visits, and anti-American and anti-NATO

demonstrations had become commonplace. Athens not only reasserted Aegean claims

but also threatened “unilateral” resolution of the Cyprus problem. The situation was

exacerbated when the Blue Secretary of Defense visited Ankara at Turkey’s request.

Red intervention in Azerbaijan was of immediate concern to the Turkish government.

Further, Red and Bulgarian complicity was suspected in a wave of terrorist bombings

and the assassination of diplomats, both at home and abroad. The Turks sought Blue

aid and reassurance.

In Asia, the Blue perspective was mixed. The Secretary of State visit to the PRC had

been productive. Agreements had been reached on Blue military aid, both for domestic

purposes and for forwarding to the Afghan rebels, and a port visit to Shanghai by an

Aegis cruiser emphasized the warming of relations.

Elsewhere in the Eastern Hemisphere, things were not promising. The death of Marcos

had plunged the Philippines into chaos and virtual civil war. The economy was in

shambles and the “New People’s Army” was on the march. American military installations were being attacked or sabotaged.

On the Indian subcontinent, fear of a Pakistan nuclear program led India to attack the

Islamabad reactor facility and airfields as well. Pakistan retaliated against Indian airfields. Further, both these countries suffered from serious internal problems. Political,

economic, and social difficulties raised questions of Pakistan’s internal cohesion, while
ternal strife. India’s relationship with Red remained solid, while the PRC suppor

Pakistan.

On 10 November 1990, Blue Special Operation Forces (SOF) became engaged with R

forces in Afghanistan. Casualties were heavy on both sides. Surviving Blue personnel 

captured, tried by a field court martial, found guilty of being “mercenaries,” and exec

Key Events on the Road to War, October–November 1990

15 October National Security Council (NSC) meets and decides to call up

100,000 reserves to deter Red. Other agenda items included po

retaliation against Nicaragua, a demarche to Cuba, and the sta

Blue public opinion with regard to possible war.

16 October NATO “REFORGER” exercise begins.

1–9 November Major Red exercise in Sakhalin concludes, but a residue of the 

remains, raising concerns in Tokyo about a potential threat to

Hokkaido. Various Red air defense and Soviet Naval Infantry 

exercises take place in the Far Eastern Theater of Military Ope

tions (FETVD).

Red western military districts and Pacific military districts go 

creased combat readiness” as do Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NS

forces. Two divisions from the Leningrad MD in the Kola mob

10 November Blue receives indications that Red and NSWP are conducting 

spread mobilization. Red SSBNs leave port and ASW groups p

sea. NSWP naval units marshal under Red control. Mobile mi

units depart their garrisons and the Strategic Rocket Forces (S

to “increased combat readiness.” Moscow issues a demarche to 

way and informs Paris that a neutral France will not be attack

the event of a European war.

12 November Warsaw Pact (WP) forces in the WTVD move to a “threat of w

readiness level.

The President of Blue requests and receives from Congress a D

ration of National Emergency and orders full mobilization. N

declares a “simple alert,” and the Rapid Reinforcement Plan (R

implemented on SACEUR recommendation, with approval of 

Military Council and the DPC.

15 November NATO plan of operations (OPLAN) established.
orders naval forces to attack any intruders.

17 November Blue/NATO concludes that Red/WP forces have moved to “full combat readiness.”

18 November NATO declares “reinforced alert.”

20 November Warsaw Pact offensive begins at 0600. NATO declares “general alert.”

Political Objectives and Military Strategy

Blue

Hostilities in the 1985 Global War Game commenced on 20 November 1990, when

Red and other Warsaw Pact combined arms forces launched a massive, multifront

offensive into the FRG, and on D+3 through Austria toward Bavaria. The Red decision

to go to war against NATO in Europe culminated over a year of increasing East-West

tensions stemming mainly from political and economic difficulties within Eastern

Europe. Red anxiety over the possibility of German reunification, fueled by incidents

along the inter-German border (IGB) and in Berlin, all contributed to the Red conclusion that its fundamental security interests in Europe were at risk and that a resolution

of the crisis on terms favorable to Moscow was not likely through means short of direc

military action.

Of interest and worthy of examination are the original political objectives of Blue and

Red and how those objectives were modified and changed as the war progressed. Blue/

NATO political objectives in GWG ’85 were, essentially, the same as those cited for the

1984 game. There was, however, an expansion of Blue goals implied by the wording “to

protect Blue and Western vital interests worldwide.”

Red, on the other hand, tended toward more specificity, vowing to “Solve the ‘German

Problem’ once and for all on Red terms through demilitarization and/or neutralization

of the Federal Republic of Germany.”

In the 1986 game, Blue political objectives were enunciated in an essentially European

perspective that reflected the concerns and realities of the war in progress. By and large

consistent with prior games, they were stated as follows:

• Restoration of NATO territorial integrity and the restoration of status quo ante for

Austria, West Berlin, and Azerbaijan.

• Reduction of the status and influence of Red and the Warsaw Pact and a diminution

of Red “global reach.”
favorable nuclear balance.

The Blue strategy for achieving these goals emphasized three objectives:

• Stabilize the military situation in the central region as first priority. Use “econ

force” in other theaters, as necessary, to accomplish this.

• When the front is stabilized, bring maximum coordinated military, political,

diplomatic, and economic pressure to bear to convince Red that a nonnuclear,

negotiated settlement is in Red’s best interest.

• Blue would make clear to Red that it did not intend to challenge its territorial

integrity of Red or its political leadership.

Blue acknowledged that the success of this strategy required that Red be convinc

Blue was militarily, politically, and psychologically prepared for a protracted, con

tional war.

Red

Red political objectives were also generally consistent but tended to emphasize in

ing concern for the immediate safety of the homeland and the future security of 

and its political leadership. While Red still viewed the neutralization of the FRG 

amount, and sought to roll back Blue influence, Red did not want the war to esca

Red wished to minimize damage to the homeland and reserve military forces, to 

tain Communist Party control, and to shore up the system of political and milita

ances in Eastern Europe. Red also wanted to retain strategic and theater nuclear

deterrence and, hopefully, dominance.

Red strategy in the ongoing war rested primarily on concentrating military force

consolidate the territorial gains achieved on the Central Front. Red believed that 

could be accomplished with a force deployment that achieved sufficient concent

but retained enough strength to tie down Blue/NATO forces elsewhere and limit d

to the homeland. Red also wanted to maneuver France out of the war. In total, R

determined to:

Make Blue realize that the war in Central Europe will be so long and costly to Blue that they w

compelled to negotiate with Red to regain the FRG on terms that would be favorable to Red 

establishing order in the Eastern Bloc countries—East Germany and Poland in particular.

In summary, then, the postwar status of Germany, particularly the FRG, was cent

both Blue and Red. While substantial symmetry seemed to exist in the respective 

tives and strategies, there was a growing Red concern for the physical and politic

safety of the homeland and for the future of the “Eastern Empire.”
Blue defeat was to be defined as Red military victory in Europe and Blue being pushed off

the Continent, then Blue, with the rest of the free world at its disposal, would have a number of long-term military, political, and economic options vis-à-vis Red. If, on the other

hand, the Red Army could not deliver victory, Red faced unmitigated disaster. The “Eastern

Empire” would almost certainly be gone, and the strain of war on Red manufacturing and

agriculture would wreak such devastation on the Red economy that the primacy of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) would be under dire threat. In what represented a dramatic change in perceived conventional wisdom, it now appeared that Red

might be more likely to initiate nuclear war than Blue.

The Central Front

The size and timing of the initial WP onslaught was determined as much by the tempo

and nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military response to the

indications and warnings (I and W) of war in the central region as by the overall military readiness posture of the Pact forces. NATO forces in the European Theater had attained high states of readiness well in advance of D-Day. Indeed, NATO had conducted

its largest Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercise, and those troops, particularly the Blue III Corps, were available in theater. As a consequence, the WP decided to begin its offensive with only those forces in the Western Theater of Military

Operations (WTVD) that had attained full combat readiness. Pact forces in other areas

lagged behind in preparedness and did not begin offensive actions until several days af

ter the war started. The Pact had, however, mobilized the Second Strategic Echelon, an

the initial correlation of ground forces was about even.

At 0600, 20 November 1990, Red attacked along the length of the IGB with its First

Operational Echelon of 37 divisions. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)

military objectives were:

• To hold the Red attack as far forward as possible.

• To constitute reserves and reconstruct units as conditions permitted.

• To conduct counteroffensives to restore the territorial integrity of NATO members.

In conducting these operations, SACEUR was prohibited from attacking Red territory.

The major axis of the WP assault appeared to be against the Belgian Corps posted along

the Northern Army Group/Central Army Group (NORTHAG/CENTAG) boundary.

On D+3 (23 November), Red invaded neutral Austria in order to broaden the front

into the southern part of the FRG. On D+1, France had mobilized. Lead elements were

promptly dispatched to the FRG, as the main French units concentrated at their assem

bly areas. On 24 November (D+4), Austrian forces came under NATO command.
was stabilized in the north and center, pact forces had made gains in the south, a

ing to within 50 km of Munich. The Belgian Corps had been badly mauled, and

SACEUR planned a counterattack by the Blue III Corps in the direction of the Fu

Gap to relieve the pressure and to break up the Red salient that had been create

the NORTHAG/CENTAG boundary. The southern situation also caused SACE

concern, where it appeared that Red was about to break through. Austrian loss

been heavy and their resistance effectively broken. Red was moving on Munich w

seven divisions, and the 1st French Army was advancing to try to hold Red on a l

from Nuremberg to Stuttgart on 27 November (D+7). At the northern end of th

Polish forces had attacked into Schleswig-Holstein, but NATO was holding the li

the Kiel Canal, although Hamburg had been abandoned on 26 November (D+6)

on that date that the NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) authorized Alli

Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) to attack the Red homeland.

Air action was heavy from the start of the war, with Red concentrating on Blue a

with known or suspected nuclear assets. Blue air attacks centered on WP airfield

on battlefield air interdiction (BAI). By D+3, both sides had lost about 960 aircra

the use of eight to ten airfields. On that date, Blue shifted the bulk of its air oper

to close air support (CAS). After D+4, SACEUR made the decision to utilize all a

sets available, including aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG), to interdict the clo

Second Strategic Echelon.

On 27 November (D+7), Red fully committed the Second Operational Echelon a

achieved a major breakthrough in the vicinity of Kassel, which the Blue III Corp

tasked to contain. In the south, in spite of stubborn French resistance, the Red dr

Munich continued. On 30 November (D+10), the French 2nd Army went into lin

the 1st in the vicinity of Nuremberg. At the same time, Italian units began an adv

toward Innsbruck against battalion-strength opposition.

On 1 December (D+11), the II Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) staged an amp

ous landing at Esbjerg on the western coast of Denmark. The landing was successf

the Coral Sea was lost in an eight-regiment Badger/Blinder/Backfire Soviet Naval Av

Long-Range Aviation (SNA/LRA) raid utilizing AS-4 and AS-6 missiles launched 

range of 150 miles. In concert with this attack, Red forces crossed the Kiel Canal 

the Danish border and attempted a coordinated attack with airborne forces to de

the beachhead at Esbjerg. The Red airborne units sustained about 60 percent cas

the Blue marines stabilized their position and linked with two Danish mechanize

talions from Zealand and FRG elements that had retreated up the peninsula.
effort on 2 December (D+12) seemed to be along the Göttingen/Paderborn/Giessen/

Fulda line. The Blue III Corps counterattack against the Red salient had attained its ob

jective in relieving the pressure on the Belgian Corps, but that unit and the Netherlands Corps had to fall back as supplies were expended. As this gradual and orderly

retreat was conducted from an almost equally exhausted Red, Blue continued the III

Corps counterattack while the 8th Blue division attacked to the northeast on 5 December (D+15).

In Denmark, Red continued efforts to oust the Blue/NATO forces from the peninsula.

On 3 December (D+13), Red attempted an amphibious landing on the east coast of

Jutland. Twenty-five hundred SNI suffered 50 percent casualties, two guided missile

destroyers (DDGs) and seven amphibs were sunk, and another two DDGs and nine

amphibs were damaged. Red endeavored to suppress Blue air defense capability in

Jutland, but an offensive by II MAF reached the western part of the Danish-German bor

der on 7 December (D+17). At the southern end of the front, Italian forces entered

Innsbruck the next day.

8 December 1990 (D+18) marked the end of GWG 1985 (map 3). SACEUR saw the pe

riod 12–16 December as the next period of crisis; that was the expected closure date of

the five armies that constituted the Second Strategic Echelon. This force was augmented by Red divisions pulled out of Bulgaria. The Central Front had lapsed into a

state of relative inactivity, and SACEUR utilized the respite to reconstitute units to the

extent possible while Red awaited the arrival of the Second Echelon. The Third Strategic Echelon was moving through Poland.

The Blue III Corps counteroffensive was continuing as GWG 1986 commenced (map 4).

The objective of this attack was to wear down the Red and Polish armies north of Kassel

and, by so doing, force Red to use significant portions of the Second Strategic Echelon

as “gap fillers.” The attack succeeded in destroying seven WP divisions, but had to be

halted when the Second Echelon, delayed for four days by intensive air interdiction, finally closed.

Coincident with this counteroffensive was a deterioration of the situation on the

southern flank. The badly battered French forces, now reinforced by the 3rd French

Army, attempted to withdraw to protect their national frontier. Red massed 29 divisions between Stuttgart and the French border and attacked on 11 December (D+21).

Four divisions of the 1st French army were trapped in Stuttgart. Red forced a crossing

of the Rhine at Mannheim on D+22, and the momentum of the assault carried Red

across the Rhine and into the hills of Eifel, where terrain and Blue reinforcements

stemmed the advance. Red had conserved and reconstituted air power during the bad
weather that preceded this offensive and was thus able to support it with seven d

sions of tactical aircraft (TACAIR) for battlefield air interdiction/close air suppo

(BAI/CAS) operations. The four divisions encircled at Stuttgart had been allowe

Red to withdraw as part of their effort to detach France from the Western Allian

the east, the Italians maintained a slow advance in the direction of Munich, oppo

two Hungarian divisions.

The closure of the Second Strategic Echelon definitively restored the initiative to 

Five divisions were allotted to the southern pincer where the principal effort was 

North

Sea

Baltic

Sea

France

Switzerland Liechtenstein

Italy

Austri

Czech Repu

Pol

Netherlands

Belgium

Luxembourg

6° 14°

Rhine

Schleswig-Holstein

Kiel

Canal

Denmark

GDR

(East Germany)

Elbe

Elbe

Weser

Munich

Stuttgart

Kassel

Paderborn

Fulda

Giessen

BLUE D+11

RED D+7

Kiel

Nürnberg

Frankfurt

BLUE D+7

Innsbruck

Danube

Da

Legend: Approximate location of FLOT

at D+18

____ Inter-German border

RED D-DAY

RED D-DAY

Esbjerg

Bonn

Hamburg

Berlin

Magdeburg

Leipzig

RED D+3BLUE

Bremerhaven

RED D-DAY

FRG

(West Germany)

The Central Front 1985 Game D+18
three were retained in the center as a strategic reserve. The “opportunity” in the north

did eventuate as SACEUR rushed all available mobile reserves south to try to retrieve

the situation there.

On 16 December (D+26), a Red offensive shattered the Netherlands Corps, seriously

depleted by the early frontier battles. As the Dutch fell back, SACEUR tried but failed to

hold the line of the Weser. Remnants of the NATO force fell back behind the Ems Canal.

In an effort to counter Alliance air and to retard Blue reinforcements, Red launched

conventional missiles on NATO airfields and on Netherlands and FRG port cities.

A third Red initiative involved an attempt to destroy the Blue III Corps in the vicinity

of Siegen/Giessen. Fixed by a Red frontal attack and outflanked by Third Echelon

forces that closed on 23 December (D+33), III Corps and a United Kingdom corps

were unable to disengage. Outnumbered and facing fresh divisions from both the Second and Third Echelons, these units held the Red advance for three days before being

destroyed. This gave NATO time to forge new defensive lines in the north and center.

Thus, on 25 December (D+35), the infusion of the Third Strategic Echelon had enabled Red to attain deep penetrations at both ends of the Central Front. Red reached

the borders of Luxembourg and the Netherlands and drove on into the Benelux. On 30

December (D+40), dikes were opened and the lowlands east of Amsterdam were

flooded to slow the Red advance.

In the south, Red continued to try to turn the NATO flank in the Vosges and along the

Moselle by making a “tactical incursion” into France. Red calculated, correctly, that

France would not resort to the use of nuclear weapons unless national survival was

threatened, and Red made certain that such was not perceived as the intention. France

committed its forces to NATO command on 25 December (D+35).

By 30 December (D+40), SACEUR was defending a line running from Amsterdam

through Düsseldorf to the vicinity of Verdun. Little of the FRG remained under Alliance control, and NATO had grave concerns about possible political repercussions

should all of it be occupied by Red. On the other hand, the Red southern flank was “in

the air,” and the line on air parity ran approximately south from the Jutland Peninsula.

Consequently, NATO had superiority over the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA),

while Red held sway to the east.

As the military situation had deteriorated following the commitment of the Third

Strategic Echelon (D+33), deployment of Blue army combat units was accelerated at

the expense of sustainment forces in order to meet the threat. By 1 January 1991

(D+42), this accelerated deployment was essentially complete with the equivalent of a
reinforced corps expected to arrive on D+48. This would move the correlation o

to about 1.3 to 1.0 in favor of NATO. However, the anticipated arrival of the Fou

and Fifth Strategic Echelons, anticipated about 5 January (D+46) and 13 January

(D+54), would alter this ratio to 1.56 to 1.0 in favor of the WP.

However, on 30 December (D+40), increasing and unequal rates of aircraft attrit

caused the WTVD commander to substantially reduce the tempo of operations t

serve aircraft. This decision gave NATO control of the air over the FRG, and the 

posed CAS, BAI, and air intercept (AI) missions resulted in the heavy attrition an

North

Sea Baltic

Sea

France

Switzerland Liechtenstein

Italy

Austri

Czech Repu

Pol

Netherlands

Amsterdam

Belgium

Luxembourg

Verdun

6° 14°

Rhine

Schleswig-Holstein

Kiel

Canal

Denmark

GDR

(East Germany)

Elbe

Elbe

Weser

Mannheim

Munich

Bonn

Hamburg

Kassel

Berlin

Magdeburg

Leipzig

Kiel

Frankfurt

Giessen

Siegen

Wittenberge

Stuttgart

Karlsruhe

RED D+33

Lübeck

Lübeck

Canal

Da

Danube

Legend: Approximate location of FLOT

at D+42

____ Inter-German border

FRG

(West Germany)

RED D+22

RED D+22

Esbjerg

RED D+35

Düsseldorf

BLUE

BLUE D+40

RED D+26

Hannover

The Central Front 1986 Game D+19 to D+42
greatly assisted the NATO defense against WP forces attempting to breach the Rhine

River line.

This was the situation that confronted NATO at the commencement of GWG 1987, 2

January 1991 (D+43). SACEUR faced a decision regarding the utilization of the arriving reserves: to strengthen the defenses along the Rhine or to initiate a counteroffensive. Given NATO air superiority, the Red force concentration along the Rhine in the

vicinity of Bonn, the weariness of Red forces opposite CENTAG, and the extended and

unanchored Red southern flank, SACEUR planned a five-phase offensive:

• Attack in CENTAG to occupy territory from the Moselle to the Rhine.

• Assemble a major force (the First Allied Army) for the counterattack.

• Break through Red positions on a Frankfurt/Karlsruhe axis.

• Continue the attack toward Magdeburg and Leipzig.

• Maneuver to prevent breakout of encircled Red forces and then, if feasible, open

ground access to Berlin (see map 5).

The first phase of the operation began on 30 December (D+40) with CENTAG forces

attacking from the Moselle to attain the left bank of the Rhine. The attacking force was

composed of one Blue and one French corps, and as it advanced, AFCENT was formin

16 divisions from Blue, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom into the First Allied

Army. On 5 January (D+46), with the arrival of the Fourth Strategic Echelon delayed and

the WTVD commander concerned about the Blue advance toward the Rhine, the Supreme High Command (VGK) delegated authority to employ chemical weapons (CW).

D+48, 7 January, saw the arrival on the Rhine of lead elements of the VII Blue and

French Corps in the vicinity of Karlsruhe. Just to the north of the army group (AG)

boundary, the advance of I UK Corps toward Frankfurt, though heavily opposed,

threatened the encirclement of four Red divisions.

To the north, NATO forces were hard-pressed in holding the Rotterdam-Essen line. Efforts to break out of the Jutland Peninsula had been repulsed. SACEUR was concerned

about this lack of success because it was believed that the northern pincer was necessary to distract the Fifth Strategic Echelon.

On 8 January (D+49), Red used persistent and nonpersistent CW in Jutland, but winter weather limited its effectiveness. The CW use was an indication of lack of Red combat power, caused in part by the delay of the Fourth Strategic Echelon, which had

finally begun to arrive, albeit in a piecemeal and attrited state. Chemicals were used

again on 9 January (D+50), and while the I UK Corps was forced back across the
Rhine, the VII Blue and I French Corps continued to advance. In the confusion c

by the Red CW attack on I UK Corps, two Red divisions crossed the Rhine and b

established in what was to become known as the “Bonn pocket.”

On 11 January (D+52), Blue responded to the Red CW use with similar attacks a

WP forces along the Kiel Canal, and against two airfields in Czechoslovakia. The 

concerned about escalation, had previously withdrawn discretionary authority fr

the WTVD commander.

North

Sea Baltic

Sea

France

Switzerland Liechtenstein

Italy

Austri

Czech Repu

Pol

Netherlands

Belgium

Luxembourg

6° 14°

Rhine

Schleswig-Holstein

Kiel

Canal

Denmark

GDR

(East Germany)

Elbe

Elbe

Weser

Bremerhaven

Frankfurt

Fulda

Bonn

Amsterdam

Rotterdam

Magdeburg

Wittenberge

Munich

Innsbruck

Salzburg

Karlsruhe Ansbach

Strasbourg

Luneville

Berlin

Da

Danube

Regensburg BLUE

BLUE

FRG

(West Germany)

Main

Essen

Legend: Approximate location of FLOT

at D+64

____ Inter-German border

BLUE D+53

Leipzig

Lübeck Lübeck

Canal

Hamburg

BLUE D+40

BLUE D+40

BLUE

The Central Front 1987 Game D+43 to D+64
SWORD, on 12 January (D+53). The 16 Allied divisions massed at Luneville attacked

with VII Blue Corps to the north, I French Corps in the center, and German III Corps

to the south. The geographic objective was Magdeburg and a linkup there with forces

attacking southeast out of Jutland and the Italians moving north from the MunichSalzburg area. NORTHAG concentrated on the containment of the “Bonn pocket,”

which now had six divisions in it, as Fourth Echelon troops were fed in as they arrived.

GOLDEN SWORD made excellent progress: Fulda was reached on 13 January (D+54)

and Frankfurt taken by helicopter assault. On 15 January (D+56), a unit of the First

Allied Army crossed the IGB. Red reserves destined for the “Bonn pocket” had to be di

verted to try to stem the three-pronged NATO attack: the Italians had crossed the Danube, and I and II MAF along with the Sixth FRG Panzer were breaking out of Jutland.

On 16 January (D+57), Red concern became obvious when CW was again utilized. Three

persistent CW “barriers” were laid: along the IGB to stop the First Allied Army; near

Munich to impede the Italians; and along the Kiel Canal to slow the northern pincer. Despite these attacks, the First Allied Army was advancing 50 km per day, and the Italians,

having passed through Regensburg, were under Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT)

operational control. The Jutland attack, however, was stalled by strong Red resistance.

The Red WTVD commander recommended heavy CW use as the situation continued

to deteriorate. In addition to the progress of GOLDEN SWORD, NATO forces had seized

the initiative at the northern end of the line. Allied forces were advancing on Amsterdam, and the French were in the process of surrounding several Red divisions in the vi

cinity of Strasbourg. Red was focusing on trying to build a force to counterattack the

First Allied Army, which now took precedence over reinforcing the Bonn pocket.

By 20 January (D+61), nine Allied divisions had entered the GDR, and on 22 January,

Leipzig fell and the southern bank of the Elbe was reached. To the south, the Italians

had pushed Red out of Bavaria and entered Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Link-up with

AFCENT southern pincer had occurred near Ansbach on 19 January (D+60). The

northern pincer out of Jutland had regained the initiative and was moving on Hamburg.

D+64 (23 January) found Blue digging in along the Elbe. The Rapid Reinforcement

Plan (RRP) was complete, and no additional reinforcements could be expected.

GOLDEN SWORD had reached its culminating point and could stretch the thin line of

ground forces no further. Another vital consideration was that the Elbe represented the

limit of Blue air cover. Red was pinning its hopes on the Sixth Strategic Echelon, made

up of 23 divisions from the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations (FETVD), then

approaching the Elbe.
Commander-in-Chief Atlantic’s (CINCLANT) broad objectives at the outset of t

were to establish and maintain sea control while denying the same to Red. The fi

concern, however, was to ensure the safety of the SLOCs. Beyond that, Blue inten

mount an early and sustained antiballistic missile submarine (SSBN) campaign a

both the Yankees in the Atlantic and the bastioned “boomers” of the Northern F

Further, the Blue concept of operations went beyond maritime-based support of N

northern flank. While the importance of holding North Norway remained an im

tant goal, Blue planned to secure conditions that would permit CVBG air, in coo

tion with Tomahawk land attack missiles (conventional) (TLAM(C)), to make di

attacks on the Red homeland, particularly the Kola Peninsula area. As a part of th

“long war” strategy, it was considered important to develop strategic leverage by 

onstrating the ability both to strike Red itself and to destroy “targets that matter,

ities that would have an impact on Red ability to wage a protracted war. A necess

prerequisite to the execution of this strategy required the clearing of the Norweg

Sea, and as much of the Barents as possible, of Red surface and submarine threat

maintaining sanitization of the Norwegian littoral. Red diesel SSs were a particul

concern in this regard.

Red, on the other hand, endeavored to protect the bastioned SSBNs by geograph

cation, heavy mining, and a defense in-depth provided by surface action groups 

and SS/SSN/SSGN deployed in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. While Red did n

plan to mount a classic anti-SLOC campaign, it did utilize a Cuban-based SAG, c

destine mining, sabotage, and special operations forces to introduce uncertainty 

Blue operations and slow the flow of reinforcements to Europe. Countering thes

initiatives was one of CINCLANT’s first tasks.

The bulk of military action in the Western Atlantic (WESTLANT) took place du

the first week of the war. On D+2, a Red SAG consisting of a Kresta II guided mi

cruiser (CG), a Krivak I guided missile frigate (FFG) and a Krivak II FFG attacke

Panama Canal, closing it for one week. This force was then promptly sunk by a B

attack. The other major military threat in the hemisphere, Nicaragua-based IL-3

were taken out by Blue, and a coalition of Blue, Colombia, and Venezuela served 

preempt any attempts at aggression on the ground. A strong Blue demarche to C

had the desired effect as that country’s Foxtrot submarine (SS) remained in port

Red utilized submarines to mine the ports of New Orleans, Houston, and Galves

These efforts had minimal success, with only two merchant ships sunk out of 15

ing during the first days of the war. Both ports were closed briefly, and on D+7, R

called all but two of the SS/SSN stationed in WESTLANT.
dispatched by D+2. The actions of the first few days of the war left Red with three

cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) and eight SSNs in the Atlantic. In the Norwegian

Sea and the Barents, Blue attacked with forward-deployed SSNs against Red Northern

Fleet assets and the bastioned SSBNs. Red had deployed three SAGs, centered on

BLKCON 5, and including several Kiev aircraft carriers (CV) in the Barents Sea. Blue

found the bastions well protected and lost two SSNs on the third day of the war.

By D+7, Blue had marshaled a four-CVBG strike force consisting of America, Independence, Roosevelt, and Saratoga. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) protection was provided by the Illustrious and Invincible groups, and the Coral Sea had been ordered to

the vicinity of Jutland. On D+8, the CVBG strike force and supporting ASW groups

moved into the Norwegian Sea. This coincided with a general pullback of Red SS/SSN,

with those in the vicinity of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap mov

ing north and those in WESTLANT withdrawing to the east. A strike against the Kola

was launched on D+9, after which the Roosevelt and Saratoga headed south (belatedly)

to support the Jutland amphibious landing while the America and Independence sheltered in the Norwegian fjords.

After two weeks of war and frequent attacks, the Northern Fleet SAGs had sustained

heavy damage. Blue SSNs and P-3 Harpoon strikes had sunk one Kiev CV, two Kresta I

CGs, one Krivak FFG, and one Sovremenny destroyer (DD), and gained a 50 percent

mobility kill on a Kirov battle cruiser. This result was attained at the cost of two Blue

SSNs and six P-3s. The SAGs were attacked again on D+15 as they were attempting to

withdraw. Blue launched a coordinated attack with SSNs, carrier-based air, Tomahawk

antiship missiles (TASM), and Harpoon. The damaged Kirov was sunk, as were a second Kiev, one Krivak I, one Krivak II, one Udaloy DD, and three auxiliaries. Red lost 27

aircraft, Blue 14. Blue continued to assault the bastioned SSBNs and lost SSNs primarily in minefields that Red continually expanded and thickened and also to minefields

laid by the SAGs across transit routes in the Barents.

On D+14, the Independence was torpedoed by a Foxtrot SS in Vestfjord. Dead in the

water (DIW), the ship was taken under tow only to be hit again on D+15 by two torpedoes from two Foxtrots. As GWG ’85 ended, Independence was en route Trondheim for

shipyard repairs. This event had a strong influence on force mobility for the rest of the

war, as Commander Striking Force (COMSTRIKEFOR) could never be certain of being

free of the diesel threat.

As GWG ’86 began on D+19 (9 December), the aircraft carrier battle force (CVBF) was

in Vestfjord. Roosevelt and Saratoga had rejoined, and aircraft from the damaged Independence and Coral Sea (sunk supporting amphibious operations at Jutland) were
of the land battle. Battle force ASW suffered a loss on D+21, when Ark Royal was 

doed and departed to Bergen for shipyard repair. The battered Red SAGs, now co

dated from three to two, one with BLKCON 5 and the other a Kiev, were trying t

withdraw to the eastern Barents.

Poor weather restricted air operations for most of the first week of Global ’86. H

ever, on D+25 both SAGs were attacked by TASMs launched from the Dallas and 

dence. The BLKCON 5 SAG lost a Kirov and had two other ships damaged. A plan

air strike on the BLKCON 5 SAG, scheduled for D+27, had to be delayed because 

CVBF lacked targeting intelligence and the CVBGs remained in Vestfjord. Red ga

information about the planned departure of the Forrestal from Norfolk and orde

Akula to take station northeast of the Virginia Capes (VACAPES).

In Washington, the subject of Cuba continued to be discussed. While the D-Day de

marche by Blue had thus far been effective, concern still existed that Cuba might b

a problem. The JCS addressed the question on D+27 and laid out the following op

• Form a CVBG based on Forrestal for air strikes in support of CJTF 140.

• Put Wisconsin in the Caribbean to strike selected targets.

• Institute a blockade of Cuba.

The JCS recommendation was that no forces be diverted to Cuba.

However, on D+29, Fidel Castro delivered a two-hour speech during which he or

mobilization of Cuba’s guard and militia units, and placed the naval forces on fu

The following day, the JCS sent a message to CINCLANT declaring that Cuba wa

threat to Blue military and civilian assets in the Caribbean, Blue southeast coasta

and regional SLOCs. CINCLANT was ordered to take immediate action to neutr

military installations, forces, equipment, and naval/aircraft/military and civilian 

munications facilities. CINCLANT responded that a blockade was not feasible be

it would require a diversion of assets from the Norwegian Sea campaign. On D+

battleship (BB) Wisconsin and the Kidd were ordered to proceed at best speed an

station 50 miles south of Guantánamo. This was the start of a buildup that, by D

would include the FFGs Truett, Simpson, and Groves as well.

While the majority of military action in WESTLANT occurred during the first w

the war, Blue had worked diligently to maintain the security of the SLOCs and th

safety of the continental United States (CONUS), which were not without threat

D+16, for example, Red had attempted to bomb the Panama Canal and Kennedy 

Center with two Bear aircraft, and on D+14 the Coast Guard had captured a Red 

chant ship flying the Spanish flag that had 300 mines aboard.
units operating from Galveston to the Canadian border for ASW protection of the

coastal SLOCs. Mine countermeasure (MCM) operations were ongoing along the Q

routes, and the Coast Guard was stopping and inspecting vessels off Norfolk,

Wilmington, and Charleston. Protective minefields had been laid off Norfolk, New

York City, New Orleans, Galveston, Charleston, Morehead City, Kings Bay, and Mayport.

Hemispheric allies were providing assistance as well. On D+29, Argentina began continuous patrols of the Beagle Channel, Strait of Magellan, and Cape Horn to assure

the safety of Blue and Allied shipping. Chile also joined in, establishing a continuous

patrol of its waters at the continent’s southern tip.

On D+30, the Forrestal chopped to COMSECONDFLT to sortie on D+31 for the vicinity of the Irish Sea and further assignment. She sank in the VACAPES op-area from

multiple torpedo hits and an escorting guided missile destroyer (DDG), struck by a

single torpedo, sustained a 50 percent mobility kill. The Red SSN was destroyed by

MPA based at Patuxent River Naval Air Station.

At the time of the Forrestal sinking, both Blue and Red were reassessing their respective

submarine campaigns. While Red surface forces capable of enfilading the SLOCs appeared to have been neutralized, the Blue ASW campaign was intensifying. Submarine

Allied Commander Atlantic (SUBACLANT) assets were disposed as follows: 14 SSN

under the ice, 4 in the Barents, 13 in the Norwegian Sea, 4 in the Greenland Sea, and 5

in the GIUK gap. Seven French and Portuguese SS/SSN were postured in the Bay of

Biscay and near the coast of Portugal, seven Norwegian and three UK SS were operating in the Skagerrak. Three Canadian SS were on station south of Greenland. There

were no Red SSBN west of the line from Spitsbergen to North Cape. By D+35, Blue saw

a diminishing return from the anti-SSBN operations. The boomers that remained were

further east—around Nova Zemlya—and better protected as Red continuously

strengthened minefields. Therefore, Blue began a pullback of SSNs to form a nine-boat

barrier from Spitsbergen to North Cape.

Red was beginning to consider a limited anti-SLOC campaign, and to that end was doing a “roll call” to determine the number of general-purpose submarines that might be

dedicated to that operation. Red was also evaluating the mine situation. While Red

mines had proved successful against Blue SSN trying to penetrate the bastions, usage

was running at 300 mines per day, and supply was a problem. Inventories would be exhausted by D+36, with no remaining mines due in theater.

At D+35, Blue had gained control of the Norwegian Sea and western Baltic approaches

While COMSTRIKEFOR complained about lack of information on Red SSN/SS/SSGN

the fact was that there were extremely few in the area. Blue losses had been substantial,
Fleet units and against the Red homeland. One of the two remaining SAGs was a

tacked on D+35, and the BLKCON 5 was disabled and her aircraft reassigned to 

Northwestern Theater of Military Operations (NWTVD).

On D+36, Blue planned for a coordinated strike into the Kola Peninsula. The Blu

jective was to try to influence the strategic balance by demonstrating that Blue h

ability to attack the Red homeland. The attack was planned with the realization t

heavy losses were to be anticipated, as the DPC refusal to authorize overflight of 

land severely restricted routes on ingress/egress. Targets selected for attack includ

• Red aircraft, early warning and ground control intercept (EW/GCI) sites, com

and control facilities, and airfields.

• A nuclear power plant.

• The mining of Murmansk harbor.

The attack was elaborately planned in an effort to minimize casualties. Signals in

gence (SIGINT), obtained on D+25, indicated that Red would launch combat air 

(CAP) whenever Blue aircraft flew east of 27 degrees east longitude. Consequent

while the plan of attack called for 103 aircraft, only 32 would actually be for strik

poses. Most of the other aircraft involved would endeavor to overwhelm the Red 

fense system by penetration and feints.

Several other coincidental operations were staged to deceive and distract. One C

two DDs were stationed at 71 degrees 35 minutes north and 27 degrees 30 minut

to lure Red interceptors into a missile trap. Also, a TLAM(C) attack would suppl

an AFNORTH strike on the 77th MRD at Banak.

The attack was conducted on D+37, with aircraft launched from the America a

Roosevelt in Vestfjord and Saratoga in Andfjord. Red lost 23 aircraft (Foxhound

Flanker, Fulcrum, and Flogger), one combatant and one auxiliary sunk, and an 

field was rendered inoperable for several days. Blue lost 24 aircraft; the CG and 

DDs were targeted by an Oscar and later sunk by multiple torpedo hits while r

ing to the CVBG.

The strike on the nuclear power plant was one of the most controversial events o

game. While the plant was disabled, the damage inflicted was greater than that at

Chernobyl, and the resultant release of radioactive material precipitated massive 

matic “fallout” from neutrals and allies alike.

D+43, 2 January, marked the start of Global ’87. The positioning of the CVBGs rema

the same with Independence and Ark Royal still under repair and HMS Illustrious
CVBF as follows:

• Strategic ASW.

• Air superiority.

• Support to ground forces.

• Strategic power projection.

• Denial to Red of the use of the airfields at Alta and Banak.

The request for permission to overfly Finland was reiterated and denied by the DPC

on D+46.

As SACEUR began the counteroffensive on the Central Front, the naval war in the Baltic became more intense. After massive air attacks to defeat the Blue amphibious landings and early efforts to reinforce Jutland directly, the buildup of Blue forces on that

peninsula and the efforts by Blue to break out across the Lubeck Canal led to a fierce

struggle to control the western and central Baltic.

The main Blue effort in early January was against Warsaw Pact convoys transiting from

the eastern Baltic to support the Red units trying to contain the Blue salient south of

the Kiel Canal. NATO SSs faced increasing opposition from Red mining operations,

and surface ships were utilized extensively to keep the transit lanes clear. As Red minin

efforts intensified, FRG Tornados took over some of the interdiction efforts.

On D+50, as a result of losses to mines, Blue moved both an MCM and a fast-patrol

boat (FPB) squadron along the coast of Sweden to clear the SS transit routes. These

forces were withdrawn as Red countered by moving 40 small combatants in their direc

tion. Red left part of this force in the area for the remainder of the game to discourage

future Blue incursions. Because neither side was able to establish definitive air control

over the west-central Baltic, advantage tended to ebb and flow depending on which

side held the temporary edge in assets.

For this reason, the struggle for supremacy continued throughout Global ’87, with neither side able to fully exploit the potential geography offered. Blue would have used

area control to secure the northern flank of an eastward offensive, Red as an avenue to

supply and reinforce divisions west of Rostock. A major effort to achieve this aim led to

a three-day running battle. On D+59, Red began to sail a 30-ship convoy from

Kaliningrad to Rostock with elements of the Sixth Echelon. This convoy came under

sustained air and submarine attack from Blue/NATO forces. It limped into Rostock on

D+61, having lost ten escorts and a number of troop and supply ships.
Central Front. A success was achieved on D+54 when a Spetsnaz unit sank a mer

ship in the Miraflores locks, shutting down the Panama Canal for three weeks.

Other initiatives were not so successful, primarily because of the reluctance of Fi

Castro to do what Moscow wanted him to do. There were signs of Cuba’s lack of 

eration as far back as D+24, when both that country and Nicaragua abstained from 

request that both nations cooperate in mining the approaches to the Panama Cana

ing Red equipment and with their personnel clad in Red uniforms.

By early January (D+44), Blue suspected a Red plot to rearm at least one SSGN u

ing a Cuban base for that purpose. Blue instituted intensified MPA/ASW operati

the island, but with strict instructions not to violate Cuban air space or territoria

ters. While this anticipated operation concerned Blue, no evidence that it occurr

discovered. The fact that the operation did not come about was not for want of e

on the part of Red. Indeed, continued inaction on Castro’s part led to a plan by R

accomplish the rearming without his permission, utilizing an Air India flight to t

port conventional warheads sufficient to replace 50 percent of the SSGNs’ normal 

load out. Blue learned of this plan, and it was not attempted. Finally, a thoroughly 

trated Red suggested on D+61 that Castro consider a trip to Moscow for “consulta

an invitation that the Cuban leader felt it wise to decline.

Following the submarine “roll call” described earlier, the VGK decided to initiate 

ited anti-SLOC campaign. This decision was taken on D+44 with the following a

detailed to the operation:

• A northern Fleet Akula was dispatched to the southwestern approaches to the

English Channel (SWAPS) .

• A Sierra in the Mediterranean was to out-chop on D+47.

• A Mod Kashin in Luanda was ordered to participate as well.

The following summarizes the results of this:

• D+45—Akula sinks merchant ship in SWAPS

o Mod Kashin sinks Japanese tanker.

• D+47—Akula sunk in SWAPS

o Sierra exits Mediterranean.

• D+49—Sierra sinks four merchant ships off Spain/Portugal.

• D+50—Mod Kashin sinks two merchant ships off Angola.

• D+53—Sierra sinks merchant ship in Iberian Basin.
• D+58—Sierra sinks French SSN.

• D+60—Mod Kashin sinks two tankers.

• D+63—Sierra sinks two merchant ships.

As the game ended, the Mod Kashin was still at large, and Blue was dedicating substantial assets to an intensive ASW campaign in the Iberian Basin. The widely dispersed

sinkings had convinced Blue that several Red SSNs were still operating in that area instead of the single Sierra that was in fact responsible for the attacks.

As GWG ’87 progressed, both Blue and Red commanders gave thought to the possibility of nuclear escalation. Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic (COMSTRIKEFLTLANT) feared that Red might use

such weapons against the CVBF to gain a more favorable correlation of forces. Therefore

a request was made to the DPC for tactical nuclear release authority when there was clear

I and W of imminent Red escalation. This request was denied. Almost simultaneously, on

D+48, the NWTVD commander asked the VGK for permission to use nuclear weapons

against the CVBG. This request was also denied, as the VGK was generally satisfied with

the situation in theater, and further, was unsure of the Blue response.

The nuclear issue arose again at D+50. COMSTRIKEFLTLANT concluded that Red use

of chemical weapons had lowered the nuclear threshold and renewed the request to the

DPC for “conditional” tactical nuclear release and for permission to overfly Finland.

The nuclear request was again denied, but the long-sought over-flight permission was

granted subject to three conditions:

• The strikes be “surgical” against specific targets.

• There be no reattack until the DPC evaluated Finnish reaction.

• Finnish aircraft to be attacked only in self-defense.

However, on D+53, a planned strike into the Kola across Finnish air space was delayed

by the Blue National Command Authority (NCA) and on D+54, concerns over possibl

diplomatic repercussions led Blue higher authority to deny permission for the attack.

The nuclear issue was raised again in another context on D+57.

COMSTRIKEFLTLANT expressed concern that a mass SNA raid on the CVBF would

overwhelm the available defensive assets of fifty F-14s, and four SM-1 and seven SM-2

shooters. Believing that a three-regiment attack would succeed, that commander requested authorization to use SM-1-ER BTNs (nuclear warheads) as a “weapon of last

resort.” This request was denied.
of ground operations. At D+54, for example, the Strike Force was averaging 80 s

per day against the Red MRDs. An important adjunct of this air campaign was to 

vent Red from utilizing Norwegian airfields captured in their advance. Blue l

especially in attacks on these captured air facilities, were substantial, and on D+5

COMSTRIKEFLTLANT limited Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) to 

ties per day to conserve pilots and aircraft, A-6s in particular. That commander a

had to husband resources to provide cover and support for Operation ICE PICK, 

amphibious component was scheduled to go ashore on D+62.

Red made two significant moves to reduce the power of the strike force. The first 

these was a deception operation using the hulk of the Leonid Brezhnev (BLKCON 

a decoy to lure Blue strike air into a trap. The “trap” was baited on D+50 when th

Brezhnev was towed into a position where a Blue attack could be intercepted by R

and a Mainstay orbit was moved to attract Blue attention. Forgers flying out of t

Kola simulated air operations, and auxiliary power was provided to operate rada

generate other emissions. Towed barges were used to replicate escorts.

On D+54, Blue misidentified the decoy as the remaining Kiev SAG and decided o

SSN attack rather than air. This strike was conducted with TASM on D+56, and 

only after that that Blue began to believe they were dealing with a Red feint. The 

force remained in position at game end, ignored by Blue.

The other Red move against the CVBF was a multiregiment SNA/SAF attack spe

headed by two Backfire regiments flown into Archangel from outside the theater

Changed conditions on the Central Front led to a different perception of the CV

the VGK. On D+45, Red had gone through an elaborate deception to keep the CV

north. Three MRDs had maneuvered in the “Finnish Wedge,” and an amphibiou

embarked and put to sea to try to persuade Blue that the strike assets would be n

sary to counter a massive invasion of Norway. However, the success of GOLDEN S

caused a shift on the part of the VGK. As the Red position in Germany deteriorated

CVBF was seen as a potential strategic threat, regardless of its current tasking. On D+

the VGK ordered that plans be formulated for the destruction of the Battle Force, an

not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. The result of this order was the attack of D+

This was another of the Red multiregiment attacks flown directly against the CV

through Finnish air space. Losses in the air were heavy to both sides, but effective 

defense, coupled with terrain shielding provided by the topography of the fjords

Blue with two escorts sunk and superficial damage to several other units. Carrier 

operations continued unimpaired.
temporary closure to the long-debated question of Blue overflights of Finland.

COMSTRIKEFLTLANT had consistently believed that his force effectiveness was substantially reduced by the tactical complications imposed by the prohibition on the use

of Finnish air space. He thus had renewed his request for overflight on D+60, stating in

the process that the inability to do so was responsible for what was termed a “semistalemate.” The Red attack on D+62 led to a granting of the desired permission on

D+63, and, as the game ended, planning was underway for a combined TLAM(C) and

air strike against railroad marshalling yards and a power plant in the Kola on D+64.

Finland was to be advised of the operation when the aircraft were en route, and it was

hoped that the government would do no more than issue a mild public protest.

Discussion over the best utilization of COMSTRIKEFLTLANT CVBGs had been ongoing throughout Global. It was suggested that if both Blue and Red wanted to see the

CVBF remain in Vestfjord and environs, someone was wrong. Others observed that

“strategic ASW,” stated as the CVBF commander’s first priority for the 1987 game, did

not require three CVBGs. Orders from the NCA to use part of this force to support the

Esbjerg landing in the 1985 game were not complied with; finally two CVBGs were sen

south, but too late to provide assistance. Similarly, toward the end of GWG ’87, a request by SACEUR for one carrier to aid in averting impending disaster in the eastern

Mediterranean was rejected.

Tactically, COMSTRIKEFLTLANT was concerned about the Red submarine threat, par

ticularly diesel SSs that might be lurking along the Norwegian littoral waiting for a CV

to emerge from the protection of the fjords. Further, and as noted above, the prohibition on use of Finnish air space was viewed as preventing the full exploitation of the

CVBF strike capability. Strategically, the situation on D+56 was seen by the CVBF com

mander as follows: Red will shortly realize that Red alone cannot terminate hostilities.

It follows that Red will adopt a protracted war strategy, and, without the CVBF to the

north, Red would be able to target the UK and that such action could result in serious

limitations on Blue strategy and prospects.

The Mediterranean

AFSOUTH’s basic objective at the beginning of the war was to gain control of the

Mediterranean for Blue and to deny it to Red. The John F. Kennedy CVBG and the Iowa

SAG were initially positioned just south of the Aegean with the Eisenhower battle group

located south of Turkey. The overall plan of operations was to immediately strike all

Red units that could be attacked, to lay minefields to channel Red SS/SSN movements,

and to prepare for air and missile strikes into the southern tier of the NSWP states and

against targets in the Crimea and the Black Sea. Red planned to do what it could to
and to restrict Blue mobility. Preparations, particularly for the latter, had begun 

the start of hostilities, with clandestine mining of choke points and preparations 

close the Suez Canal. Red did achieve this objective on D-Day by sinking a merch

ship in the Canal, closing it until 2 January (D+43).

The war in the Mediterranean began with the expected D-Day “shoot-out,” and b

D+10, Red surface forces had been eliminated or driven to seek shelter in “neutr

ports. Blue success, however, had not been attained without substantial cost, par

larly from Red SS/SSN/SSGN:

• D-Day—Eisenhower, hit by three torpedoes from a Red SS, was unable to laun

aircraft for 24 hours. Ultimately the effects of this damage forced the ship into

Piraeus for non–dry dock repairs on D+27.

• D+1—Clemenceau sunk; Foch damaged and en route port after attack by Sierr

• D+2—Red sub attack on Blue amphibious group off Crete sinks LST-1179 wit

heavy loss of embarked marines; Wasp (LHD-1) put out of action and arriving

Naples for repair on D+9.

• D+3—Kennedy hit by torpedo from Foxtrot SS and put out of action for six h

• D+5—AOE Detroit sunk by Foxtrot SS.

This early damage to CV assets turned out to be most significant in two aspects:

• The loss of the Clemenceau and Foch left the western Mediterranean bereft of 

naval strike capability and a bare minimum of two operational CVs in theater

concerned CINCSOUTH because it limited ability to support planned offensiv

operations.

• When a major crisis did develop with the Red counteroffensive in the Balkans 

into Turkey in Europe, Kennedy was the only in-theater strike asset available to

CINCSOUTH, but accumulated battle damage and attrition to planes and per

severely reduced that ship’s capability.

Submarine assets aside, the major Red forces in the Mediterranean consisted of t

SAGs, one centered on a Moskva, the other on a Slava. Blue waged a running batt

with these two forces, and by D+6, they had consolidated into a single SAG that 

positioned off Libya. On that day, these forces launched an SS-N-12 missile attac

the Kennedy CVBG and the Iowa BBBG. The Kennedy was put out of action for s

hours, and the Iowa received superficial damage. Almost simultaneously, the com

Red SAG was attacked by Blue SSNs Phoenix and Newport News. While the Phoen

lost, a Slava CG and Udaloy DD were sunk, reducing the Red Eskadra to two Kar
on D+10. In spite of these successes, there was discussion of the relative merits of early

CV air strikes into the Balkans as opposed to the prompt and complete destruction of

all Red surface assets. Illustrative of this argument was the fact that a strike planned on

D+7 against the SAG off Libya had to be conducted by land-based air from Greece because of a shortage of CV-based attack aircraft.

A second operation was an ongoing offensive against Red forces in the Black Sea. On

D-Day, a Slava/Sverdlov SAG was positioned in the western Black Sea, 21 FFGs were

dispersed in seven different groups, 14 SSs were deployed, and a convoy was en route to

Bulgaria. These units came under immediate Blue/Allied attack, with a Turkish SS sink

ing a Kara CG on D+4. On D+8, the Red SAG was struck by Blue air and at a cost of 38

aircraft sank a Krivak II FFG and a Sovremenny, damaged a CG, a light frigate (FFL), a

Udaloy DD, and an AOR. On D+10, Blue attacked this SAG again and, using TASM,

sank a Slava CG and another Udaloy. A Blue air strike the following day destroyed five

of the Black Sea FFLs and a Turkish SS took out an AGI.

As Global ’85 ended, Blue objectives in the Mediterranean had been accomplished. The

Red naval forces there had been essentially eliminated, and with no ability to target the

CVBGs, Red was reluctant to commit SNA/SAF. On D+13/14, the VGK ordered the

SWTVD commander to go on the defensive and transfer all attack aircraft to the

WTVD. Then, on D+24, Red withdrew all remaining surface units from the Black Sea

while continuing submarine activity therein. From then until the Red counteroffensive

described elsewhere, activity in the Black Sea was essentially confined to an endeavor o

Allied SSs to sink their opponents and vice versa. Blue carrier-based air operated principally in support of the Greek/Turkish offensive in Bulgaria, and TLAM attacks were

launched against targets in the Crimea and against the Red space facilities at Tyuratam

The deteriorating situation on the ground in Bulgaria was a factor in the decision to

introduce Blue/NATO surface forces into the Black Sea. With the Eisenhower in Piraeus

for repairs (D+27), nineteen Blue/NATO ships began entry into the Black Sea. Three

were sunk by mines, but the remaining sixteen hugged the Bulgarian coast and proceeded toward Burgas, and preparations began for the movement of the Iowa BBBG

through the straits to bolster the Turkish army’s seaward flank.

On D+36, 200 decoy vessels—various hulks and old merchant ships—were moved

from the Sea of Marmara through the Bosporus and into the Black Sea. At the same

time, Allied forces were massing in the Aegean: the Kennedy CVBG, the Iowa BBBG,

and various French, Spanish, Italian, and Greek task groups. Although some involved

expressed extreme reluctance to hazard naval units in the Black Sea, that movement be

gan on D+40, with escorts taken from the Eisenhower BG establishing a screen with
Marmara, and the hulks and barges were placed in position five to ten nautical m

off the Black Sea coasts of Turkey and Bulgaria. On D+41, 4 Greek and 2 Turkish 

established naval gunfire support (NGFS) positions off Burgas, and the arrival o

Italian submarines raised the total of NATO SS in the Black Sea to twelve.

The Iowa entered the Black Sea on D+42 preceded by the Hawes (FFG-53), which

moved toward the central portion of that body of water operating a deception dev

simulate the Iowa. Iowa, meanwhile, took station off Burgas for NGFS missions, w

hulks to seaward to decoy missiles as well as a heavy ASW screen. A Kilo was sunk 

these forces, but a Foxtrot hidden among the hulks torpedoed Iowa. Dead in the w

Iowa was taken under tow and was halfway back to the Bosporus at the end of Glo

On 9 January (D+40), Red began to consider the prospect of targeting the Eisenh

pier side at Pireaus, and on D+43, the planning for Operation APOLLO was comp

The next day, using HUMINT for targeting, twelve SS-12 missiles were launched 

five hit the Eisenhower. The carrier, about to return to active operations, departed f

CONUS; estimated time of repair six to eight months. This left the Kennedy as th

theater strike asset available to oppose the Red counteroffensive.

From this point on to the end of Global ’87, Commander-in-Chief South

(CINCSOUTH) desperately endeavored to obtain air assets to halt the Red advan

Appeals for a CBVG from another theater failed, and while B-52s were occasion

available, the brunt of stemming the Red counteroffensive had to be borne by 

diminishing air crews and aircraft of the consolidated Kennedy and Eisenhower 

wings. Maritime success had come at a heavy cost to Blue/NATO: Clemenceau su

Foch, Eisenhower, and Iowa out of action; and Kennedy resources so depleted tha

ability to stop Red was in serious doubt. Red occupation of the Turkish Straits ap

peared likely at game’s end.

The Far East

Considering the Far East a secondary theater, Red objectives were limited. Becau

did not want a two-front war, a primary objective was not to do anything that wo

stir up historical animosities. Further, Red hoped through diplomatic and econo

means to secure the neutrality of Japan. Virtually any offensive action directed a

any forces but those of Blue would place those overarching goals at risk. The prim

of these objectives led Red to restrain the DPRK, initially at least, from attacking 

ROK. Essentially, Red objectives in the FETVD can be summarized as follows:

• Protect the Red homeland.

• Preserve the Red strategic nuclear reserve (SSBNs).
• Keep the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan from actively aiding Blue

combat or combat support operations.

Blue objectives and concerns, in a geopolitical sense, were directed toward Japan as an

active ally and as an economic center whose productive capacity could be critical in a

protracted conventional war. Indeed, there were some who argued that these two goals

were in conflict; to the extent that Japan was active in the war against Red, the more

likely that the potentially vital plants and factories would be placed at risk of attack.

Further, Blue sought for some means to “play the China card,” to involve the PRC as a

clear potential threat to Red. Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) objectives can

be outlined as follows:

• Maintain control of the Pacific Basin and the SLOCs therein.

• Maintain pressure on Red to prevent the shift of forces to Europe.

• Destroy Red forces in the Far East.

• Maintain Japanese alignment with Blue and preserve Japanese economic power.

• Influence the PRC, at a minimum, to remain uncooperative with Red.

While a stated objective was to maintain pressure on Red to prevent the transfer of

forces to Europe, there were several other initiatives undertaken that were important in

a long war perspective. The 1982 and 1983 Globals had demonstrated the difficulty of

accomplishing this by simply launching air and missile attacks against Vladivostok, the

Belkin Coast, Sakhalin, and Petropavlovsk. However, there were targets which, if effectively threatened, should give Red pause in shifting assets and, even if this was unsuccessful, place Blue in a better position to fight a protracted conventional war. For

example, there were important Red manufacturing facilities at Komsomol’sk on Amur

airframes for the fourth generation Flanker were produced there, as were Akula-class

submarines. The metal fabricating facilities at Khabarovsk were another valuable target. Further, amphibious operations against the Kurile Islands appeared valid. From a

strategic perspective, they could ease the task of attacking Red SSBNs bastioned in the

Sea of Okhotsk and pose a threat to Sakhalin; politically, a wavering Japanese government might be steadied by the promise of the Kuriles’ return. These actions in the Pacific can be viewed as a corollary to the shift in emphasis in the horizontal escalation

strategy in Europe—away from merely distracting Red and toward the development of

strategic leverage that could be critical in prosecuting a long war.

The war in the Pacific began with relatively limited activity. Red, as noted above, had littl

to gain from offensive initiatives, and Blue was in the process of marshalling forces. The
on D-Day and were en route to join the Kitty Hawk, Lincoln, Midway, and Nimitz b

groups in the Philippine Sea. Missouri and New Jersey BBBGs were also present.

The Ranger and Vinson CVBGs were not engaged by units of the Soviet Indian Ocea

Squadron (SOVINDRON) during their eastern transit. Indeed, this theater saw little 

ity during the game. On D+2 a Krivak I was sunk in the Indian Ocean by a P-3 launc

Harpoon, and on D+4, a Krivak II was sunk in the North Arabian Sea, again by a H

from a P-3. This left Red with a Juliett SSG, a Foxtrot SS, an Echo SSGN, and a Nove

SSN in theater. Red used these assets in a desultory and ineffective anti-SLOC campa

before withdrawing them for more important functions. Red also tried to interdict e

resources with a brief ground incursion into northern Iran on 11 and 12 December a

with a D+10 air strike against that country’s oil facilities by two regiments of Badger

transferred from the Crimea and staged out of Kabul. In the final analysis, Red action

Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean were neither concerted nor coordinated and, t

fore, not of lasting concern or consequence to Blue.

The position of the Japanese government tended to retard the pace of offensive oper

During the first week of hostilities, Blue conducted air operations with units based in 

against Red SAGs operating in the Sea of Japan and against Bear reconnaissance fligh

When Red protested that this was not in keeping with Japan’s professed neutrality, th

nese government condemned the Blue actions and forbade the future use of Japanes

a base for Blue attacks on Red forces. Efforts to resolve this issue were brought to a st

by the death of the Emperor.

While Blue was consolidating forces, Red spent the first week of the war putting 

units on alert except for those on the PRC border. Air assets were dispersed, SSBN

ployed to bastions in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and SSNs positioned seawa

the Kuriles. Red mining activity concentrated on the bastions, the Kurile passage

the Strait of Malacca. Operational plans were developed for air and missile strike

Japan if diplomatic measures failed to secure that nation’s neutrality.

In addition to generating the CVBF out of SNA range, CINCPAC mined the Stra

Tsushima and the Kuriles and, for defensive purposes, Guam and the approach

Tokyo Bay. The sanitation of the operating area of Red SSNs was begun as was th

anti-SSBN campaign. The results of these actions during the first week were heav

favor of Blue, with the exception of the torpedoing of the Nimitz by a Red SSN 

November (D+3). The Nimitz, DIW, was taken under tow for Hawaii and repair. 

D+6, Red again attacked the Nimitz, utilizing Bear aircraft and air-to-surface mis

One hit was obtained, and Nimitz rerouted to Guam for emergency repairs befor

ceeding to Pearl Harbor. Red lost three aircraft.
against Red air defense assets that was to continue throughout the war. Because of the

position of the government of Japan, land-based strikes had to be flown out of Korea

and losses were substantial. TLAM(C) augmented these Pacific Air Force (PACAF) attacks and the CVBG forces joined when the submarine sanitation campaign permitted

The principal targets were the airfields, over-the-horizon radar (OTHR), ground control intercept (GCI), and other facilities critical to Red air defense. Special Operations

Forces (SOF) units took part in these operations as well. Vladivostok, the Belkin Coast

Petropavlovsk, the Kuriles, and Sakhalin were the geographic areas of concentration.

While the necessity of flying out of Korea increased Blue losses as noted above, Blue

was also confronted with a very capable Red air defense. Mainstay, combined with

fourth generation interceptors, gave Red a truly formidable air defense capability. The

importance of defeating this capability lay in the fact that offensive operations in the

Kuriles and the prosecution of attacks against the Komsomol’sk and Khabarovsk facilities could not take place until they were overcome.

Early in December, CINCPAC moved the CVBGs and BBBGs north toward Japan in an effort

to draw out Red SSNs and SNA. Blue believed that most of the Red SSN threat had been elim

inated, but was aware that two of three Red SSGNs were not accounted for. Red responded

with a coordinated SSGN and SNA/SAF attack on 6 December (D+16). The Red objective wa

to eliminate as much of the Blue threat as possible with one massive strike. An Oscar SSGN

launched 32 SS-N-19 missiles at the CVBF, scoring hits on the Kitty Hawk and Lincoln; several escorts were also damaged. One hour later, the force was hit by a 10–12 regiment SNA/

SAF air-to-surface cruise missile (ASCM) attack, with the missile launchers escorted by

Flanker and Foxhound. Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) based in Japan

were able to give warning of this attack, and counter-targeting devices were used to generate

an 8 to 1 false/real target ratio. An average of 84 missiles per CV were fired, but Kitty Hawk,

hit again, was the only carrier to sustain damage. Little attrition was inflicted on the attacking

force, primarily because of the effectiveness of the escorts. The Kitty Hawk went to Osaka for

repairs, the Lincoln to Yokosuka.

Red viewed Japanese willingness to take the two CVs into port as a serious violation of

neutrality, and attacked Japan at 0730 on 16 December (D+26). SS-12s were used for

air defense suppression in strikes on Chitose, Atsugi, Misawa, and selected South Korean bases as well. Bombers struck Komatsu to destroy the F-111s based there and the

Kitty Hawk in dry dock at Osaka. That CV, hit again, was put out of action for at least

one year. Lincoln was not targeted.

Diplomatic reaction was swift. The following day the government of Japan:
forces to protect Blue forces in Japan.

• Recalled all reservists to active duty and appealed to all able-bodied Japanese t

volunteer for military service.

• Stated that Blue forces in Japan would be given permission to retaliate against 

Nor was this all. The PRC also denounced the Red attack, called up 200,000 reser

and ordered an additional five divisions to reinforce the border with Red.

The war against Red air defenses and the response by Red were mentioned above 

key factor in the Pacific campaign. From D+20 to D+30 (10 December to 20 Dec

ber), Blue lost 100 aircraft despite improved tactics and more support from Japa

From D+30 to D+40 (20 December to 30 December), Blue lost an additional 70 

Red attacks on Japan often utilized SS-12s as on D+30 when Chitose, Misawa, an

Komatsu were hit. Red air struck Chitose and Misawa on D+42, losing 83 aircraf

against 30 for Blue. Mining operations were continued by both sides through the

month of December. Blue also pressed attacks against Red SAGs off Vladivostok 

the Belkin Coast as well as continuing the ASW and anti-SSBN efforts.

The last week of Global ’86 saw renewed offensive initiatives by Blue. Efforts to r

back the Red air defense continued with strikes against the Kuriles and southern

Sakhalin and the use of SOF against early warning (EW) and GCI sites. The airfi

Iturup was a frequent target.

The Marines commenced offensive operations on 29 December, when the 1st MAB 

ducted a heliborne assault on the island of Shikotan, which was taken with the loss 

helicopters and 72 killed. The island was secured in two days, with Red losing 32 K

568 prisoners of war. As Global ’86 ended, the remainder of the 1st MAB was load

at Tomakomai for an amphibious assault on the island of Kunashir in the Kuriles, 

Blue withdrew the marines from Shikotan and turned the island over to Japan.

The commencement of Global ’87 found both Blue and Red appraising their pos

and both were influenced by events in Europe. The position of the Blue NCA had 

that when the Blue interests in the Far East were secure, then transfer of some as

the European theater would be in order. Red had in fact begun to do this as of D

when ten seasoned divisions were moved westward and replaced by a similar numb

new recruits. On D+44, the Blue NCA directed that CINCPAC transfer 48 F-16s 

F-15s from Japan and Korea and 24 aircraft of various types from Alaska to SACEU

CINCPAC objected and sought to evade the directive. CINCPAC’s intentions 

as follows:
GCI sites.

• Take out the remaining Red SAGs.

The CINC estimated that 50 percent of the Vladivostok air defense and sortie generation

capacity had been destroyed and, although losses had been heavy, wanted to pursue the

offensive. Three of the CVBGs were near the Aleutians, the other two were southeast of

Japan, and CINCPAC believed the remaining Red submarine threat was manageable.

The Red view of the situation was conditioned by the failure of the Western TVD commander to secure victory on the Central Front. As had been the case in previous games

Red sought solution to the strategic problem through horizontal escalation. Regardless

of warnings from the PRC, emphasized by the call-up of another 500,000 PLA reserves

on D+43, Red authorized an attack by the DPRK on South Korea on 5 January (D+46)

Red saw this as a no-lose situation vs. Blue, as it would force the latter to keep forces

and supplies in the Far East and might even pressure Japan out of the war. Moscow dis

counted the likelihood of offensive action by the PRC. Further, Red felt that the relentless Blue air campaign was gaining superiority.

The question of transfer of assets as directed by the NCA now became a major issue, as

CINCPAC continued to evade and allies weighed in as well. On D+47, CINCPAC

agreed to the shift of aircraft and supplies to Europe, but airlift arrangements had to be

finalized first. The Republic of Korea protested the pull-out of these aircraft and supplies, and the government of Japan expressed concern as well. D+48 found CINCPAC

informing the NCA that the transfer of aircraft would have to be delayed, because outside tanker support was required to avoid sacrificing the offensive counter-air (OCA)

campaign now showing evident signs of success. On D+49, the Blue NCA ordered

CINCPAC to use Pacific Command (PACOM) tanker assets to “swing” the aircraft to

Europe, even if it meant sacrificing the OCA campaign. CINCPAC responded that the

three CVBGs off the Aleutians were within several days of neutralizing Petropavlovsk,

promised to bring them south to aid PACAF on the Belkin Coast, and asked the JCS to

intercede with the NCA to delay the transfer of the PACAF assets. The JCS refused to

help. The issue surfaced again on D+50, with CINCPAC informing the NCA that

SACEUR had no “bed-down” facilities for the fighters to be transferred, and therefore

they would not be sent. On D+51, Allied Forces Command Europe (AFCE) agreed to

provide tankers the transfer, with an estimated time of arrival (ETA) of D+56.

While these “negotiations” were going on, the air offensive against Red continued, and

with growing success. Red endeavored to blunt this success with an attack against the

CVBF operating off the Aleutians. On D+48, a combined air and submarine attack was

launched against this force. Four regiments of Badger and Backfire made a feint to
and two supply ships were lost. There was no damage to any of the CVs, and one 

Red SSNs was sunk.

In spite of Blue progress, Red began the transfer of older aircraft to the FETVD o

D+50 in preparation for the move of fourth generation aircraft to the WTVD. Th

progress of GOLDEN SWORD required this action, although the VGK viewed the s

tion in the Far East with mounting concern. The air defenses in Kamchatka were 

by 50 percent and the Blue kill ratio had risen to four-to-one as half of the FETV

fourth generation aircraft had been sent to Europe. Of particular concern to Mo

was the effect that apparent Red impotence in the face of Blue attacks might hav

Beijing. By D+53, the General Secretary was pondering the use of tactical nuclea

weapons against the three CVBG battle force that was attacking the Belkin Coast. 

his point of view, such an attack was not escalatory. Blue did not have a comparabl

get and, Red believed, would not use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against 

Red homeland. Further, it would probably take Japan out of the war, and it would 

an unmistakable signal to the PRC as to the seriousness of Red intent. Red decided 

things play out further, but did resume SS-12 attacks on Japan, hitting Chitose and

Misawa with four weapons each on D-55. Further, Red deployed two SSGNs with c

ventional warheads to the West coast of Blue on D+61 and attacked Blue bases in A

the following day. On D+57, Blue began to reduce the air sortie rate because of the 

of assets referred to above, and by D+59 it was down to 65 percent of the levels attained 

to the “swing.” Planning continued for a helicopter-borne invasion on Uturup.

The DPRK launched an invasion of the ROK on D+62, assisted by Red aircraft. T

later attacked bases at Osan, Kunsan, and Taegu, all of which were put out of act

Blue lost 78 aircraft on the ground and 77 in the air. Red lost 99. Misawa was stru

again by SS-12s. The PRC reacted immediately, closing the Yellow Sea to Red and

DPRK ships and aircraft, and offering the use of airfields to Blue for attacks on t

DPRK. On D+64, Japan, with Komatsu, struck again by SS-12s, offered to financ

estimated $2.3 trillion for the first two years of the war.

CINCPAC proceeded with the invasion of Uturup, Operation PISTOL PETE, on D

Following that success, he began to address the Korean situation and was doing s

when the 1987 Global Game ended at D+64. The three years of continuous play 

had a result similar to other games in the Global series: CINCPAC had clearly ac

plished the mission assigned and protected the interests of Blue and its allies. Th

ticular game highlighted the potential conflict between the NCA and theater

commander and drew a very clear contrast between theater and global priorities 

prosecuting a long, conventional war.

The Campaigns on the Flanks

Overview

The first Global series had examined the concept of “horizontal escalation,” or ac

away from the Central Front, as a means to deflect the Red focus and precipitate 

persal of forces away from Germany. Referred to by one participant as the “let’s g

thump on Cuba syndrome,” most perceived the concept as more harmful to Blue 

to Red. While the games of the first series were generally too short to completely 

lyze the effects of these operations, it did appear to be a common Red tactic to p

“horizontal escalation” against Blue if the Central Front offensive bogged down.

The second Global series, while continuing these peripheral operations, saw them 

offensive initiatives that had the potential to develop strategic leverage against Re

Four geographical avenues were identified in GWG ’84:

• North Norway.

• Baltic Approaches.

• Western Mediterranean.

• Eastern Mediterranean.

While three of these four areas had seen play in previous games, Blue had then p

ceived that strategic imperatives dictated a response that was essentially defensiv

• Blue always prepared to defend North Norway against a predictable Red offen

that sought, by degrading NATO air defense and SOSUS capabilities, to facilita

control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas.

• Blue had become sensitive, particularly in the 1984 game, to the possible polit

repercussions if Denmark were occupied or forced into a separate peace, thus

breaking the political cohesion of NATO.

CHAPTER THREE
Turkish Straits would have adverse military and political consequences, especially

given the friction between Greece and Turkey.

The second global series, particularly the ’85, ’86, and ’87 games, saw the shift in Blue

approach from defense to offense. A successful offensive would not only secure the objectives that Blue required, it could also pose a threat to Red forces/homeland. Some of

the possibilities were as follows:

• While an overland offensive by Blue in North Norway appeared to have limited

prospects, could an effective joint air offensive be mounted against the Kola?

• Although political considerations required a robust defense of Denmark, could

NATO open an air corridor down the Baltic toward Leningrad? Could NATO ground

forces break out of Jutland and attack east into the GDR or thrust south into the

flank of the Warsaw Pact offensive?

• What was the potential of an attack north from Italy toward Munich? From a

military perspective, it could threaten Red LOCs; from the political, might it not

succeed in destabilizing Hungary?

• The potential rewards of a Balkan offensive also appeared attractive. Could an

invasion of Bulgaria be successful in knocking that country out of the Warsaw Pact

and thus putting pressure on even less reliable Romania? From a military

perspective, the occupation of a portion of the Western Black Sea littoral could

facilitate Blue sea and air operations against the Red homeland.

The second global series, in exploring all of these options, sought to develop answers to

questions such as the following:

• Can large enough force packages be built to exploit the opportunities maritime

superiority creates?

• Can sufficient leverage be attained or advantage gained to compensate for the cost o

offset alternative use of assets involved?

This section will examine these four campaign options as they were played out in

Global ’85, ’86, and ’87. It should be noted that the supporting naval force deployment

did not change to reflect the shift from a defensive to an offensive orientation. This led

to a game situation where a great deal was being attempted without a reallocation of

assets commensurate with a “risk/reward” type of analysis for each of the four

campaigns.

A further aspect of this shift to an offensive strategy was a conscious effort to identify

targets that matter. Previous offensive air activity, particularly in the Far East, had been
one of preventing Red from shifting forces from the FETVD to the West. A long-

strategy, on the other hand, suggested that there were key targets, the destruction 

which would impinge on the ability of an adversary to effectively carry on the wa

some point in the future—a point not necessarily within the time limitations of 

game. Consequently, care had to be exercised when making a decision that assets 

ployed in one location should be deployed somewhere else. In terms of the perip

offensive campaigns described below, it is probably best to view them as glimpse

what might be possible and as an aid to contemplating future force allocations.

North Norway

The war in Norway began on D-Day, with Red air attacks focused on NATO rada

acoustic sensors at Vardø, North Cape, and Kautokeino. The airfields at Kirkenes

Banak, and Alta were also struck. These attacks were repeated on D+1 and result

substantial degradation of NATO intelligence and aircraft basing capability. The 

three weeks of the war were characterized by air attacks by both sides, and althou

hampered by darkness and bad weather, were pressed home against heavy oppos

Indeed, the NWTVD commander had lost about 25 percent of his aircraft by D+

By D+7, Blue had assembled five CVBGs south of Iceland, and SACLANT ordere

of them into the northern fjords to support the NATO defense of North Norway

in securing control of the Norwegian Sea, and to carry the war to the Red hom

Blue B-52s were also tasked for the latter mission. Once the CVBGs were on stati

Vestfjord, and the DPC authorized attack on the Red homeland, attacks commen

Pechenga and, in cooperation with B-52s, on installations in the Kola. B-52 losse

considerable, as Blue found the Kola to be heavily defended and ingress routes re

stricted by Finnish neutrality. Red troop concentrations on the Norwegian-Red b

were also targeted. The Blue CV Independence was torpedoed in Vestfjord on D+

The Red air offensive concentrated not only on the original targets noted above, 

also included Tromsø and Andoya. This was the essential character of the war in 

north until D+18, when a Red motorized rifle division (MRD) crossed into Norw

On D+1, Red had moved the 131st MRD to the border, soon reinforced by the 45

54th MRDs. These units were joined on D+8 by the 77th MRD. The Blue 10th M

had been flown to Norway prior to D-Day, and the 2/9th had fallen in on its prepositioned equipment. On D+18, the 45th and 77th MRDs crossed into Norway 

Kirkenes.

The NWTVD commander envisioned a land campaign in North Norway as a low

operation to keep the Blue CVBGs away from the Central Front, and with brief e

tions for repair of battle damage and belated participation in the amphibious ass
lieved that their strategic objectives were best served if the CVBGs were deployed to th

north.

Both sides tended to husband their ground forces during the games of the second series. The Red offensive consisted of a slow advance with three MRDs strung out across

the Finnmark along a single road. NATO forces fell back, destroying bridges and using

small unit actions to delay the advance. NATO did not want to seriously contest the

Red advance short of prepared positions of the Tromsø-Skibotn line, and maintained

tactical flexibility with the 4,000-man Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade (CAST)

ashore at Lyngen Fjord and the UK/NL Marines (7,000 strong) embarked and positioned in fjords southeast of Andoya.

The slow advance/retreat continued, with the allies destroying the airfield at Banak on

D+27. On D+31, Red moved two MRDs from the Leningrad MD to the Finnish border

posing a threat to outflank Blue by an advance across the “Finnish Wedge.” Blue continued its gradual retreat and abandoned Alta on D+37, after destroying the airfield.

On D+42, the 77th MRD reached the Skibotn line, and, although the front stabilized,

NATO air superiority led to substantial attrition of the 77th, 45th, and 131st MRDs. At

this point, the NWTVD commander adopted an essentially defensive posture. Aside

from a multiregiment (110 aircraft) raid on Bodø and Evenes that sustained 50 percent

losses on D+47, Red had surrendered the initiative.

On D+54, NATO commenced planning for Operation ICE PICK, which was designed to

achieve the destruction of Red ground forces in North Norway. The Sixth MAB and th

UK/NL marines were to stage an amphibious assault west of Alta against the northern

Red flank. This landing was to be coordinated with a frontal attack by Norwegian

forces from the Skibotn line, augmented by the CAST brigade.

Operation ICE PICK was completely successful. By the end of D+64, when the attack went in,

the 77th MRD was surrounded, and the 131st was under heavy pressure. The end of GWG ’8

found the sixth MAB reembarking for future operations and the initiative firmly in the hands

of NATO.

Both Blue and Red could view their objectives as having been attained. Red had, with a

minimum of risk and force allocation, kept the CVBGs away from the Central Front.

Commander North Norway (COMNON), on the other hand, had stopped the Red advance, achieved air superiority, and gained the initiative. The essential question Blue

faced was not a new one: how to exploit these advantages to develop leverage against Red

A primary objective of Blue was to carry the war against the Red homeland by attacks

against targets in the Kola that “made a difference.” This proved to be both difficult and
trality, and losses in attacks were heavy. Eight B-52s were destroyed in a single ra

D+8. One of the most controversial events of the entire war occurred on D+37, w

major attack by 32 carrier aircraft struck facilities in the Kola. A Red airfield was 

out of action for several days, and, in a striking example of targeting judgment, a 

clear power plant was bombed, resulting in both the degradation of generating c

ity and the release of radiation. Twenty-four of the attacking aircraft were lost an

one escaped undamaged. Blue also used TLAM(C), but unreliability coupled wit

loss of remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) prevented accurate damage assessment. A

game end, a Red violation of Finnish air space prompted the DPC to accede to re

Blue requests, and a 72-hour window was granted to overfly Finland.

The effects of Blue attacks on the Red homeland did not appear to have had sign

military impact. While Blue control of North Norway was imperative to Blue op

tions in the Norwegian and Barents Seas and a strategic necessity to shield the U

Kingdom from Red air attack, the principal impact of offensive air operations ag

the Kola would appear to have been the tie-down of Red air assets. This may be s

cant in terms of the impact these aircraft would have had if deployed in the Balti

seemed clear that successful operations against the Kola depend on Blue ability t

down Red defenses over time, probably with TLAM(C) playing a major role prio

large carrier air/B-52 raids.

Denmark and the Baltic Approaches

The Jutland Peninsula grew as an area of Blue focus as the Global Series progress

The initial Blue concern was political: the surrender of Denmark or its occupatio

Red would demonstrate the inability of NATO to maintain political integrity. Ea

games had indicated that a Red offensive across the north German plain could n

halted before Denmark was cut off and, further, that NATO units retreating towa

peninsula combined with the indigenous forces available were inadequate to hol

line at the Kiel Canal.

Further analysis demonstrated that there would also be serious military repercus

from a Red conquest of Denmark. Possession of the Danish airfields would perm

to outflank NATO air defenses on the Central Front, facilitate strikes on the Wes

man and Benelux ports, and aid significantly in contesting air superiority over th

North Sea. Also, Norway’s centers of both government and population, located a

are to the south, would be subject to attack. The capitulation of Norway would is

both Sweden and Finland. The military consequences of this capitulation would 

loss of North Norway, and the GIN line would almost certainly revert to the GIU
defense of Denmark.

Conversely, the maintenance of the NATO position in Denmark could confer potentially important strategic advantage. At a minimum, a Blue/NATO presence in Jutland

posed a constant threat to the flank or rear of any Red advance on the Central Front. A

“best case” scenario could involve a land/amphibious offensive along the Baltic littoral

into the GDR and Poland, as well as the possibility of opening an air or air/sea corrido

up the Baltic toward Leningrad and the Red homeland.

For these reasons—political and military, defensive and offensive—the Jutland Peninsula loomed large in NATO planning. Discussions of its importance began on 21 November (D+1) and meshed with an ongoing study of how best to utilize the II MAF. At

the commencement of hostilities, the main Red thrust had been against the NORTHAG/

CENTAG boundary. The northern flank of the Red advance had been guarded, in the

main, by Polish forces, which had crossed into Schleswig-Holstein on 21 November

(D+1). On D+5, Blue abandoned Hamburg and withdrew to the line of the Kiel Canal

On this day, 25 November, it was evident that Blue forces in Jutland were not sufficient

for its defense and, a day later, the decision was made to land II MAF on the west coast

of Denmark at Esbjerg.

Red intentions were not entirely clear to Blue when this decision was made, as the option was still open to Red for a thrust by the ground forces in a southwesterly direction

However, on D+7, the Kiel Canal line was attacked, and on D+8, with 4/9th of II

MAF in the Irish Sea, movement of the MPS was begun and the air combat element

of the II MAF deployed to Sola, Norway, and Vandel, Denmark. CAS in support of

the Kiel Canal line had become the AFNORTH air priority.

On 30 November (D+10), Red intentions became clear. Although the Kiel Canal line

was quiet as the heavily attrited Polish forces awaited reinforcements, it appeared that

those reinforcements were on the verge of engagement and that an operation by Red

airborne and SNI regiments was imminent.

Red forces breached the Kiel Canal line on D+11, and 4/9th of II MAF began landing a

Esbjerg. As they came ashore, they were immediately involved in a battle with two Red

air mobile brigades that were engaged in a weather-limited helo assault on the Esbjerg

airfield. While the marines were fighting to secure the town and airfield, the amphibious force of 46 ships, including the Coral Sea battle group, was struck by an eightregiment (152 planes) SNA attack. This mixed force of Backfire/Badger/Blinder, drawn

from the Moscow Air District, augmented by aircraft redeployed from the Kola,

launched AS-4 and AS-6 missiles at a range of 150 miles, sinking 27 ships, including

the Coral Sea, and heavily damaging four others. The Blue NCA had ordered the four
to participate. (It should be noted that, while the results of this engagement rem

in effect as far as the Blue order of battle was concerned, a replay of the event sho

that proper tactics and deployment and effective use of deception and decoys wo

have held losses to about four ships. This conclusion would tend to be validated 

results of similar future engagements.)

On 3 December (D+13), Red endeavored again to flank the forces falling back fr

Kiel line with an amphibious operation designed to put 2,500 SNI ashore on eas

Jutland. Blue/NATO air inflicted 50 percent casualties on this force, sinking 2 DD

and 7 amphibs and damaging an additional DDG and 7 more amphibs. A follow

strike on D+14 resulted in the loss of two more of the Red amphibs, but at the co

10 out of the 30 attacking Tornados.

From D+15 to the end of GWG ’85, activity was essentially confined to Blue effo

build force and Red attempts to prevent it. Polish forces on the ground were foug

and had been heavily attrited, while Blue was still building combat power. Red ai

tacks were frequent, particularly efforts to mine the Baltic approaches. Blue was 

make progress along the west side of the peninsula, and while the FRG/Danish b

was reached there on D+17, Red was still 50 km north of the border in the east. A

game ended (D+18), Red was pulling out the weakest Polish units and was movi

an armored division, an MRD, airborne units, and naval infantry. The Red inten

was to fall back, fighting a delaying action utilizing prepared positions, and to co

attack when a more favorable correlation of forces was possible.

The beginning of GWG ’86 found the situation in Jutland as follows: 6/9th of II 

was engaged, as was the FRG Sixth Panzer Grenadier Division and two mechaniz

gades of the Danish army. The UK mobile force, of brigade strength, constituted 

serve. Amphibious shipping was en route Felixstowe, UK, to load the 7th MAB o

MAF, and the 5th MAB was en route, expected to arrive in theater on 13 Decemb

Both were potentially available for deployment to Jutland.

Opposing Red forces consisted of the 6th Polish Airborne at about 35 percent str

and both the 16th Polish and 20th Red armored divisions at about 65 percent.

The Blue offensive continued with massive air support. The 387 sorties flown on 

December (D+29) dislodged the 20th Red armored division, which fell back to p

pared positions near Logumkloster. On the 20th, all Danish territory was restore

Danish control, and Blue continued to advance with the II MAF, the FRG Sixth P

Grenadier and UK Brigade; massive air support continued. Red ordered up the 1

MRD and the 44th armored divisions, but Blue crossed the Kiel Canal and, by 23 

cember, held both sides of it.
on 24 December (D+35) precipitated another major Red attack. First, an Oscar SSGN,

using targeting intelligence from the beach, fired SS-N-19 missiles from a range of

200nm at the 36 ships involved in the operation. All but one missile was destroyed, but

it struck the Belleau Wood (LHA 3), causing substantial damage. The Oscar was sunk

by a P-3, which had observed the launch.

Two hours later, Red struck again with an 80-bomber raid escorted by 90 fighters and 7

jammers. This force launched 135 AS-4/AS-6 missiles, but effective defense (105 intercepted by SAM/CIWS) and extensive use of decoys limited Blue ship losses to 1 FF and

1 FFG sunk and the Whidbey Island (LSD 41) severely damaged. In the air, Red lost 15

bombers, 18 fighters, and 1 jammer; Blue lost 28 fighters.

At the front, Blue was consolidating positions in the vicinity of the Kiel Canal awaiting

the closure of I MAF. Red counterattacked at Rendsburg, held by the Danish 1st

Jutland division and the 2nd Zeeland brigade and the 1st UK brigade, using the 34th

and the 153rd MRDs. Blue, aided by heavy CAS, held on until 26 December (D+36)

when the I MAF joined up and Blue regained the initiative.

Blue resumed the offensive and was successful in crossing the Lubeck Canal and entering the GDR, but with the third Red Strategic Echelon engaged, Commander Marine

Forces Europe (COMMARFOREUR) prepared defensive positions in depth between

the Kiel and Lubeck Canals.

The closure of the Third Strategic Echelon created severe difficulties for NATO on the

Central Front, and the Blue NCA was desperate to find an offensive option to try to restore Allied morale. COMMARFOREUR preferred to move eastward along the Baltic

toward Rostock, but SACEUR decided on a thrust toward Wittenberge, 120km southeast of Lubeck and about halfway to Berlin, as the most feasible of several unattractive

options. In spite of strong opposition from the DPC and various military commanders

the I and II MAF launched the attack on 30 December and reached the outskirts of

Wittenberge, but the deployment of the Red Third Strategic Echelon required termina

tion of the offensive and a retreat to the Kiel/Lubeck Canal defensive positions.

On 4 January (D+45), eight WP divisions breached the Lubeck line and advanced toward

the Kiel Canal. The FRG Sixth Panzer Grenadiers were surrounded by four WP divisions

but managed to fight their way clear. The British Mobile Force and the Danish 1st Jutland

Brigade were destroyed in the heavy fighting between the canals. I and II MAF had assumed defensive positions in the vicinity of the Elbe River/Kiel Canal, and the 82nd Air

borne had been ordered to reinforce. One Red division had managed to cross the Kiel

Canal, but it was contained, and by 9 January (D+50) the Kiel line was secure.
scheme to draw Red forces away from the Central Front. The outline of Operatio

BAMBOO was as follows:

• Bremerhaven to be captured by air-dropped Rangers.

• I and II MAF to link up with Rangers.

• A feint at an amphibious landing in the vicinity.

• Construction of a missile trap for SNA.

• Withdrawal of all forces after 72 hours.

The land portion of this operation was never attempted, as I MAF had to be pull

of the plan to aid in holding the Kiel Canal line. The naval portion was executed

on 8 January a multiregiment Red air strike sustained moderate losses, and two B

ships were sunk.

On 8 January, Red began the use of chemical munitions. These weapons were tar

on Allied forces in Jutland. Persistent and nonpersistent types were delivered by 

bombers and SSM. While some casualties were sustained, the adverse winter wea

reduced the effect of the Red attack substantially.

The arrival of the Red Fourth and Fifth Strategic Echelons from early to mid-Jan

continued to fuel intense fighting around the Kiel Canal. Red fought desperately 

contain Blue forces, which sought to break out of the peninsula and advance tow

the southeast as the northern pincer of the SACEUR counteroffensive. While the 

sure of additional divisions tended to benefit Red, the decision to use chemical w

ons was an indication that Red did not see its conventional combat power as ade

to achieve the desired military objectives.

Red resorted to chemical use again on 9 January as bitter fighting continued. Th

rival of the 82nd Airborne reinforced the Kiel Canal defenses, and on 10 January

AFNORTH prepared to counterattack toward the Lubeck Canal. This offensive, w

began on the 11th, D+52, was vigorously opposed by Red. On D+53, four divisio

from the Fourth Strategic Echelon were diverted north to bolster Red defenses, w

renewed chemical attacks slowed the Blue advance. Red withdrew across the Elbe 

D+54 and continued to reinforce as Blue advanced slowly in bitter fighting. On 1

uary (D+55), the Red reinforcements succeeded in halting Blue at the Lubeck Ca

The next day, Red laid a persistent chemical barrier across the LOCs from the Jut

North Sea ports to the Blue forces at the Lubeck Canal. While casualties from the 

were light, the chemical barrier did have a significant impact on Blue ability to su

the front. By D+58, the combination of blocked logistics, plus the diversion of ot
in the vicinity of the Lubeck Canal. A bit to the west, however, Blue was advancing toward Hamburg as GWG ’87 concluded.

The progress of this campaign showed clearly that Red was extremely sensitive to Blue

initiatives in the Baltic. The massive air attack to disrupt the initial landing, the siphon

ing off of divisions from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Strategic Echelons, and the repeated use of chemical weapons made clear that Red was very concerned about the

development of significant Blue combat capability along the northern flank. While

Blue was not able to accomplish all that it would have desired, it did in fact maintain

the integrity of the NATO Alliance, successfully hold Jutland, and create serious problems for Red.

Potential for further development of strategic leverage would appear to depend on the

extension of air and sea control eastward up the Baltic. The use of that body of water

for offensive purposes had never played in Global, and, while naval actions were ongoing and costly, further study could develop more effective strategies that would facilitate Blue operations. The same can be said for mining, both offensive and defensive.

The question of CVBG utilization also arose, particularly with regard to the initial amphibious operation at Esbjerg. Beyond that single operation, the CVBG commander’s

concern that movement outside the fjords would expose his assets to submarine attack

tended to preclude a more flexible utilization of his forces that could have contributed

to the success of the AFNORTH offensive scheme.

Southern Europe

Although southern Europe presented the possibility for NATO forces to move north into

the flank and LOCs of a Red offensive on the Central Front, such planning had to be

conditional because of Austrian neutrality. Developments in the Second Global Series

presented players with an opportunity to examine the potential of such a campaign.

The blatant violation of Austrian neutrality by Red presented Blue/NATO with the justification to send Italian troops across the Alps, through Austria, and into the southern

FRG. Austrian troops had come under NATO command on D+4, and the Italian move

ment north was commenced in late November with the Munich-Salzburg area as the

initial destination. The force was led by four brigades of Alpini, with the heavier units

of the Italian Fourth and Fifth Corps to follow. The advance was discovered by a large

Spetsnaz contingent that Red had sent south to destroy bridges and tunnels along the

route from the Brenner Pass. This encounter, combined with heavy snowfall in the

Alps, retarded the progress of the Alpini and halted the advance of the heavier corps.

The Alpini reached Innsbruck on 1 December (D+10).
the Red offensive began to coalesce with the Italians, and this force reached the v

of Munich on D+20. On D+23, motorized units of the Fourth Italian Corps reac

Innsbruck, where they halted to replenish for the advance on Munich.

Red had been deceived as to Italian intentions and progress since the initial brus

the Spetsnaz unit, but began to react on 7 December (D+17). Two Hungarian div

that were to be part of the Red southern pincer on the Central Front were tasked 

counter the Italians in the vicinity of Munich and, shortly thereafter, Red pulled 

airborne divisions out of the strategic reserve for the same purpose. These two d

sions were airlifted to Munich on 16 December (D+26), where their landing was 

tested by the four Alpini brigades that had gained the outskirts of Munich.

Confused fighting in and around Munich persisted through the end of GWG ’85 

into the beginning of GWG ’86. In and around the southern fringes of that city, t

Alpini fought the Red airborne troops, while to the south of the city, the two Hu

ian divisions battled the Italian Fourth and Fifth Corps that were moving to link 

with their countrymen to the north. By 20 December (D+30), the Italians occup

arc from Garmisch to Salzburg, and Red was reinforcing with an additional Hun

MRD. AFSOUTH was supporting the Italians with heavy air operations, primari

CAS, but with some BAI as well. There was virtually no Red air response and, co

quently, few Blue losses.

As GWG ’86 ended, the Italian Fifth Corps on the right of the advance had pushed a 

naissance in force north and east of Munich to threaten the Red LOCs flowing south 

Regensburg-Ingolstadt line. Red was forced to call in two more divisions of the Third 

garian Army to address this potential problem. As these divisions traversed Austria a

the Danube corridor, they were subjected to destructive harassing attacks by reconsti

Austrian light units that overwhelmed personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (

LOC protection organization.

As Global ’87 commenced on 1 January (D+41), Red was practicing economy of 

operations in the Munich area, endeavoring to defend, reorganize, and reconstitu

2 January, Salzburg and Munich were recaptured by the Italians, who then launch

flanking offensive with the Fourth Corps to the west, while the Fifth pinned the o

ing Red forces. Red, however, hard-pressed by the SACEUR counterstroke in the 

region, launched a nonpersistent chemical attack to halt the Italian offensive. Th

most affected were the Italian Fourth and Sixth Armored Brigades, which suffere

percent and 75 percent casualties respectively. Both withdrew to the west and we

combined into a single unit.
into Bavaria. On 12 January (D+53), SACEUR made the decision to launch Phase

Three of Operation GOLDEN SWORD, and the Italians were ordered to move on

Magdeburg, link up with the southern pincer of GOLDEN SWORD, and thus restore a

continuous Allied line. They advanced against light opposition, and by 15 January had

put eight brigades across the Danube at Regensburg and were pushing toward

Nuremberg, protecting SACEUR’s right flank in the process.

On D+57, Red again resorted to chemical weapons use in the vicinity of Munich in an

effort to sever the Italian fighting and support elements. Casualties were low, about 2

percent, and the attack a failure because the Italians were moving north, not west as

Red believed. In spite of continuing chemical attacks, which slowed but did not stop

their advance, the Italians had, by 21 January (D+62), pushed all Red units opposing

them out of the FRG and had crossed one division into the GDR. They decisively defeated a group of Hungarian divisions inside Czechoslovakia on 23 January and

achieved a link-up with SACEUR forces at Ansbach as GWG ’87 concluded.

Balkans

The situation that developed in the Southwestern TVD perhaps most clearly illustrates

the uncertainty that Blue offensive operations can create for Red. On D-Day, Red began

the movement of five divisions from the Odessa Military District through Romania

and into Bulgaria, where they arrived on D+5. On D+4, Red reserve air units were

moved to Hungary and, on D+6, Red air in Bulgaria was bolstered by similar additions

Red made frequent attacks on air bases in Italy, with Aviano being particularly hard hit

Red air also struck support facilities at Thessaloniki, airfields in Greece and Turkey, and

the 82nd Airborne in Thrace. All this changed on D+13–14, when the VGK ordered th

redeployment of the five MRDs from the Odessa MD to the Western TVD and further

directed the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations (SWTVD) commander to go

on the defensive and transfer all attack aircraft to the WTVD.

Commander-in-Chief South (CINCSOUTH) had planned to seize the initiative as

soon as possible. NATO believed that an offensive against Red and selected members o

the Warsaw Pact could develop useful military options and exploit potential political

fault lines in the Balkans.

The “D-Day shoot-out” in the eastern Mediterranean resulted in the entire Red

Eskadra being sunk or driven into neutral ports. An important outcome was the loss by

Red of any ability to target Blue CVBGs and BBBGs in the Aegean Sea. This situation

contributed to the VGK decision to withdraw its attack aircraft, and the resulting essential immunity from air attack permitted Blue and TLAM shooters to maintain station in the Aegean. While close air support (CAS) was often a priority, the scope of
CVBG assets but also B-52s and B-1s as well. Targets ranged from bridges and ra

to the Red space station at Tyuratam. Mines were air-dropped into the Bulgarian

mountain passes to retard the progress of the five MRDs ordered to the WTVD o

D+13.

Many of the initial attacks were designed to facilitate the NATO offensive into Bu

Aircraft and TLAMs were used to suppress WP SAM defenses, degrade airfields, 

stroy command facilities and headquarters, drop bridges over the Danube betwe

mania and Bulgaria, and to destroy railheads and infrastructure in general.

Targets in the Red homeland included airfields in the Caucasus and Crimea, MR

and supply facilities, naval installations at Sevastopol, and the aforementioned sp

station struck by TLAM(C). Blue air was also utilized for mining in the vicinity o

Turkish straits and the ports of Burgas and Varna. Red surface units in the Black 

were attacked, and a SAG sustained the sinking of one Krivak II and the damaging 

FFL, DDG, and AO. Blue losses in these activities were also considerable; 38 aircraf

lost in the SAG attack noted above. By the last week of Global ’87, only one CVBG 

station (Kennedy), and the aircraft complement was so depleted that the Sixth Fleet h

tle CAS capability to respond to the rapidly deteriorating situation of the ground for

On D+15, Greek and Turkish forces began limited attacks into Bulgaria, and by D

the latter had penetrated to the vicinity of Burgas. The major NATO offensive co

menced on D+24, and Bulgarian resistance appeared to falter. Concentrated batt

air interdiction (BAI) had strained the logistics of the frontline Bulgarian units, 

the Turkish III and IV Corps in the east and Greek C and D Corps to the west ad

with heavy artillery support and Blue air superiority. On D+25, the Turkish III C

surrounded the Bulgarian 3rd MRD and 23rd Infantry Division in the vicinity o

Bogdanovo. IV Corps encircled the Bulgarian 15th Infantry near the juncture of 

Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey borders. While some Greek units closed on the Bul

2nd MRD, elements of the Greek 10th Infantry Division (ID) were pursuing the 

garian 8th MRD as it withdrew. Burgas fell on D+26, and the Turks advanced on 

as Red tried to persuade a less than enthusiastic Romania to support the faltering 

garians. The Hungarian government was also asked for assistance, but heavy loss

tained while countering the Italian thrust into Austria made Budapest reluctant 

commit reserves.

On D+27 the Bulgarian army fell back to a line running from Sofia to Varna. Th

of Bulgarian morale was indicated by the surrender of the 15th and 23rd infantr

sions on D+28 and 29. However, by D+34, the Allied offensive stalled before Sofi

Varna. Two Romanian divisions had arrived to stiffen the Bulgarians, and the Re
more than one Red division on its soil, so Red reinforcements were slowed.

A new front was opened on D+29 when Red invaded eastern Turkey. This operation

had the military objective of capturing the airfield at Erzurum. While Red hoped that

this operation would distract NATO from the Bulgarian offensive, use of the air facilities at Erzurum would permit Red to attack Incirlik from which Blue F-111s were strik

ing the Red homeland. The two-pronged Red offensive moved rapidly at first, but then

became slowed by Turkish resistance, bad weather, and difficult terrain. Horasan fell on

D+41, but the pace of the attack was so slow that Red resorted to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), utilizing nonpersistent chemicals on the Turkish 51st Division on

D+51. Red finally captured Erzurum on D+60, but the retreating Turks had rendered

the airfield unusable until D+67–70.

As the eastern offensive plodded toward Erzurum, Red was massing forces in Bulgaria

for a counterstroke against the Greeks and Turks. On D+36 the 86th MRD entered Bul

garia, and on D+38 the Kagul MRD began off-loading at Varna. While this landing was

opposed by carrier air, the retirement of the Eisenhower to Piraeus (D+27) for repair o

damage sustained earlier in the war reduced Blue effectiveness. Three Red amphibs

were sunk, and the landing of the MRD’s equipment and headquarters was delayed

Eisenhower’s escorts had joined the Iowa BBBG, and that force moved into the Sea of

Marmara on D+40. D+40 also saw the commencement of a Red advance down the

Black Sea littoral toward Burgas. Both sides resorted to heavy CAS; B-1s were used to

attack the 145th MRD. As the Red advance closed on Burgas, the Iowa BBBG entered

the Black Sea to support the Turks defending that port on D+42. Iowa was torpedoed

almost immediately by a Foxtrot, went DIW, and was taken under tow for the straits.

The principal Red counterattack was launched by six divisions on D+42. It was supported by heavy CAS and, in an effort to play on NATO political tensions, fell on the

Turks, initially sparing the Greeks. The NATO forces were holding a line Sofia-MaritsaBurgas, and both sides reinforced. The 3rd Romanian Army joined Red forces on

D+45, and the 7th MAB augmented the Turks a day later. The following day, D+47,

Red forwarded two more MRDs to bolster the front at Sofia and to ensure the free passage of Red supplies and forces through a still reluctant Romania.

The infusion of the 7th MAB stabilized the Allied center, but on D+49, Red achieved a

breakthrough west of Burgas, and the MAB was repositioned by helos to plug the gap.

Simultaneously, Red launched Operation TOLSTOY, a joint landing of two airborne and one

SNI regiments south of Burgas. The Kennedy air group opposed it and sank two amphibs

and damaged two others. While the naval beachhead was eliminated, the battle to do so diverted ground and air resources from the deteriorating situation west of Burgas.
ground nor air assets to hold the line. On D+54, just as the Eisenhower was abou

leave Piraeus to return to action, Red used HUMINT to target the ship with twel

SS-12 missiles (Operation APOLLO). Five hit, and the Eisenhower departed for CO

estimating six to eight months to make repairs.

On D+55, AFSOUTH requested permission to employ ten tactical nuclear weapo

prevent destruction of the Greek and Turkish armies and to avoid the loss of the 

This was denied, as was his request for an additional CVBG and more ground fo

SACEUR told AFSOUTH that he must hold out for another five days to keep Red 

shifting forces to the WTVD. B-52s were allocated to AFSOUTH, apparently the 

forces available. On D+57, with five more Red divisions en route from Romani

B-52s, combined with determined resistance on the ground, forestalled a Red pe

tion west of Burgas.

On D+59, Red broke though the center of the Allied line and wheeled some unit

the east to surround Burgas. However, as the SWTVD commander appeared on t

verge of victory, the WTVD commander, gravely concerned with the success of

NATO counteroffensive that had carried into the GDR, was pressing the VGK fo

transfer of five divisions from the SWTVD.

The Allied situation around Burgas became critical on D+60, with six Turkish di

trapped in the city. Plans were begun for their extraction by sea, and all available 

were assigned to halt the Red advance. Severe attrition to the Kennedy air group 

tially eliminated it as a significant factor in the Allied defense, and on D+61, Red

crossed the Turkish frontier west and south of Burgas. On D+62, the evacuation 

Burgas by sea began, hampered by Scud Attacks including a lay-down of chemic

port facilities. These operations were continuing on D+63, Red augmenting the p

tent chemical attacks with long-range artillery. The Red advance into Turkey-in-

was continuing, although with decreasing momentum, and AFSOUTH saw his p

responsibility as defense of the Turkish Straits.

While the Allied forces were hard-pressed at the end of Global ’87, there was clea

cation that offensive operations in this area had the potential for both political a

military success. With respect to the former, it seemed evident that the morale of 

non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries could be exploited. The early reverse

fered by the Bulgarians seemed to sap their will to fight, as indicated by the surre

of entire divisions. This was particularly significant because the Bulgarians were 

ing in defense of their homeland against traditional enemies.

From another perspective, the “fraternal socialist order” seemed to suffer when p

under strain. Hungary demurred in sending troops to aid their Bulgarian neighb
on Red reinforcements to their beleaguered ally.

From a military perspective, the operation also showed promise. The Red reaction to

events in the SWTVD, both in terms of reinforcement and by the opening of a “second

front” in eastern Turkey demonstrated concern not only for the situation on the

ground but for the ability of Blue to strike a wide variety of targets in the homeland

with both aircraft and TLAM(C). This first iteration of a Balkan offensive showed both

the problems and the potential of the approach to the homeland.
The 1988 Global War Game

Introduction

The essential focus of GWG ’88 was war termination; the purpose of the gam

assess how relative military, economic, and diplomatic strengths and weaknesses 

the ability of Blue, Red, and their respective allies to conclude the war on a favor

basis. The concept of the game was to spend one week concentrating on each of 

different scenarios based on possible culmination points of the strategic battle o

Central Front: Red dominant, Blue dominant, and stalemate.

A “time step” from D+64 (the end of GWG ’87) to D+75 provided the means to 

in a set of events to transition to the three scenarios used in GWG ’88. All three s

ios essentially notionalized the military situation in theaters other than the Cent

Front in Europe based on the play from Global ’87 (GWG ’87). In Korea, the DP

vasion had been thrown back and the FLOT stabilized in the vicinity of the DMZ

tary operations in North Norway had been stalled by force constraints and appal

weather. The balance of power in the Pacific remained unchanged as Blue paused 

consider further amphibious options, and Red sought forces from that region to 

west. In Thrace, Red chose not to press the apparent advantage in deference to a 

mum effort on the Central Front, and the Red salient toward Erzurum was in da

being cut off.

As with its predecessors, GWG ’88 was a three-sided game with a Blue team and 

team to represent the principal protagonists and a Green team to play other nati

and international organizations such as the United Nations, the Papacy, etc. Unli

previous games of the series, however, Global ’88 was a nonoperational, seminar

planning game. Time was frozen at D+75 and concentration was on the planning 

cess, with particular emphasis on the NCA level for determination of national go

and the conduct of negotiations, the JCS for coordination and prioritization of m

tary operations, and the CINCs for sequential campaign planning.

CHAPTER FOUR
In the military dimension, the objective of the 1988 Global War Game was to identify

and analyze the dynamics and leverage that military operations can bring to the war

termination process and what constraints or other effects negotiations have on theater

initiatives by the armed forces. This objective was pursued and studied in all three scenarios played in Global ’88. Of particular interest were the following issues considered

during game play:

• The combination and interaction of military, economic, and political instruments

that can be used to terminate a global conflict with Red while preserving the Blue

global strategic initiative.

• The combinations of regional/theater strategies that best serve the war termination

interests of Blue.

• Green (third party) diplomatic initiatives that could be beneficial to enhance the

probability of a war termination effort favorable to the West.

• The impact of logistics sustainability and industrial mobilization issues on war

termination for both Blue and Red.

• The impact of war termination on moving toward or receding from the nuclear

threshold.

Political Objectives Overview

Despite the differences in the three scenarios, Red believed that its basic goals of neutralization of the FRG and the reduction or elimination of Blue influence on the Conti

nent were within reach. Red felt generally comfortable with the military situation and

focused on a negotiation process Red believed would ratify what had been achieved in

battle. Red became very frustrated by the failure of Blue to recognize what Red saw as

“the realities of the situation.”

Blue was less dogmatic than Red in terms of objectives and had a tendency to adjust as

fortunes fluctuated on the battlefield. This was due in part to the fact that NATO was a

genuine alliance, and internal congruence among the members of the Alliance was not

always present, particularly regarding the Blue policy that stressed a global, protracted war.

When the war began, Blue objectives centered on the restoration of the territorial and

political status quo ante. Specifically, NATO fought to restore the prewar boundaries of

its members and neutrals, maintain Alliance cohesion, protect Blue and Western interests around the world, and limit the war to conventional means while eroding some

Red strategic nuclear capabilities. While there were occasional thoughts about
consistent throughout. It should be noted that Blue did not thoroughly realize th

tainment of these objectives would have far-reaching consequences. For example

restoration of the status quo ante would mean that the Red military had been in 

defeated, an outcome that would have repercussions in the Warsaw Pact particul

Further, the defeat of the Red navy would have a significant impact on Red abilit

project influence overseas, to import food, and to operate a fishing fleet. Therefo

while return to the status quo ante seemed a relatively modest war aim, the rami

tions flowing from its attainment would be profound.

In the Red-dominant scenario, Blue continued to pursue those original aims. Th

circlement of the Blue V corps and the anticipated closure of the Red Seventh Ec

prompted Blue to consider settling for less. Blue pondered several status quo ant

nus” outcomes, one example of which was a move in the Congress for Blue to wi

from Europe and adopt a “fortress America” policy. While Blue studied various p

bilities, it never found a palatable alternative to the status quo ante. Indeed, with 

parent threat to the Blue homeland and with the NATO Alliance politically unite

change was deemed essential by the NCA.

On the other hand, Blue believed that the Blue-dominant scenario presented the 

portunity for something more than a return to the status quo. Having made grea

rifices, Blue was determined to secure a military victory and to exhaust Red. Buo

the encirclement of numerous Red divisions and its access to global resources, Bl

wanted to expand objectives to the fragmentation of the Warsaw Pact. The other 

bers of NATO, however, were reluctant to agree.

In the stalemate scenario, Blue remained flexible in determining its final goals. W

the potential of the military situation to go either way, Blue alternatives were see

theory, to range from something less than the status quo ante to something more

eventually decided to seek military advantage and acknowledged that success on 

battlefield or lack thereof would be the ultimate arbiter of war aims. In general, B

leaned toward the status quo ante as its bottom line but wanted more if military 

cess made this possible at reasonable cost.

Red and Blue approached war termination from quite different perspectives. Hav

substantially achieved its military objectives, Red was anxious to terminate the w

through negotiations. Blue perceived the military situation in Europe to be disad

geous and, therefore, felt negotiations were unlikely to lead to an acceptable settl

Consequently, Blue believed it imperative to improve the military situation befor

ing in a cease-fire or going to the conference table. In all scenarios, Blue always th

in terms of “win” rather than “draw.”
Blue strategy and planning was dominated by a preoccupation with the anticipated arrival of the Seventh Strategic Echelon. While the Blue situation worldwide was favorable indeed, the status of the battle on the Central Front remained foremost in each of

the scenarios. In essence, Blue felt that losing in Europe would place Blue at a serious

disadvantage, no matter how successful elsewhere. Consequently, in each scenario, discussions took place as to the relative military value of forces deployed on the “flanks” a

opposed to their concentration on the Central Front. While many transfers of forces

were contemplated, few were actually planned.

The situation that confronted SACEUR had a number of points of similarity in each

scenario. Dominating all campaign planning, however, was the question of

sustainability. Even in the Blue-dominant scenario, logistics concerns forced Blue to re

gard its advantage as ephemeral. This factor, combined with the closure of the Seventh

Strategic Echelon, placed Blue in a situation where the window of opportunity for offensive operations was limited. This combination of factors exerted pressure on

SACEUR with regard to the negotiation process: the need to improve the military situation to enhance diplomatic bargaining power essentially required prompt offensive

action. However, because the NCA found it impossible to revise political objectives regardless of the military situation, SACEUR tended to be driven toward a recommendation for tactical nuclear use.

The result was the classical mismatch of political ends and military means. Blue could

neither retreat nor modify war aims lest NATO disintegrate, did not believe it could ne

gotiate successfully given the military situation, and appeared to lack the military

power to achieve its goals either through offensive action or at the conference table.

The Blue planning process revolved around this set of problems. As long as the NATO

Alliance was firm, there was no pressure on Blue to develop negotiating flexibility. With

nuclear use ruled out, it appeared that Blue policy of protracted conventional war was

operative, but the short-term requirements for Alliance cohesion and an offensive to

build bargaining strength ran counter to that strategy. In the final analysis, few players

were given to address the sobering issue: how to fight a war of attrition and keep that

war going until Blue industrial mobilization provided the decisive advantage in an esti

mated D+2 years?

If the nature of the situation on the Central Front could be generalized as “military” and

of “impending crisis,” that in the Pacific might be termed “political” and “long term.” If

SACEUR’s concern was immediate military success to sustain Alliance cohesion and improve its negotiating position, CINCPAC’s was restraint in conducting military initiatives

that might have adverse political consequences. Both the political and military situations
zation of PACOM military assets. Aside from reducing his offensive capabilities,

CINCPAC raised other arguments in opposition to a “swing” of forces to the west. 

gued that, given a strong Blue military presence in northeast Asia, dating from the 

World War II, a significant drawdown of Blue forces could lead various countries t

initiatives detrimental to the long-term interests of Blue. (All three weeks of game 

Global ’88 saw Japan planning a rearmament program.) Economically, CINCPAC

stressed the vital importance of the Far East industrial and financial strength to the 

war effort and to postwar recovery. From a military perspective, it was argued that 

should not be permitted to appear the dominant power in the region.

A central issue in CINCPAC planning was whether military initiatives against th

homeland and the Kuriles had a short-term effect on the war in Europe. In spite 

quent Red statements to the contrary, Red was concerned about events in the Far 

which was the second strategic priority. The question that emerged over the series 

that of Blue tying down Red military assets in the Far East. As Blue saw Red forces 

ploying from the region, Blue was never sure how much its actions really affected R

Global 1988—Scenario One

The D+64 through D+74 scripted events to attain the starting basis for the Red

dominant scenario were as follows:

The military situation on the Central Front had turned decisively against Blue.

• Utilizing extensive operational deception, the Sixth Strategic Echelon had clos

with and defeated NATO forces on the Elbe. The Blue V Corps and one FRG d

were encircled in the vicinity of Leipzig and a 600-km gap was torn in the NAT

in Bavaria.

• The NATO northern pincer, unable to make progress toward Stendal, had falle

on the Elbe-Lubeck Canal line.

• The NATO offensive north into the Netherlands had been repulsed by Red, an

NATO had failed to eliminate the Red “Bonn pocket” on the west bank of the 

• Blue was experiencing severe shortfalls in critical items such as “smart” munit

and main battle tanks. Blue held a 1.6-to-1.0 advantage in the air.

• The Seventh Strategic Echelon was moving through western Red.

Blue forces and their allies in western Europe had achieved considerable success 

GOLDEN SWORD counteroffensive, but were dealt a series of disastrous setbacks i

period from D+64 to D+75. The gains of the attack, which had carried NATO forc

into the GDR, had been eliminated. While not routed, Blue had been unable to
tional forces of AFCENT stretched from positions on the North Sea in the Netherlands

along the Rhine, and then through Bavaria to and along the Main River, then back to

the Swiss and Austrian borders. The failure of the recent counterattack to liberate the

bulk of the Netherlands left NORTHAG defending south of the Neder Rhine at Rotterdam and Arnhem. This and other recent setbacks had required the extension of

NORTHAG perimeter over hundreds of additional kilometers. The NORTHAG area of

responsibility (AOR) met that of CENTAG in the vicinity of Mainz.

Operations out of Jutland had included a four-nation counteroffensive which advanced

on Wittenberge but was then thrown back to the Elbe-Lubeck Canal line by elements

of the Sixth Strategic Echelon. The combination of remaining Danish, Norwegian, UK

and Blue units provided a sizable force capable of conducting defensive operations.

CENTAG’s primary concern was with two forward corps, the V Blue and the III FRG.

The crushing Red counterattack that reversed prior NATO gains placed both these

corps in extremis. The V Blue was encircled and on the verge of total collapse, while th

elements of the III FRG had either been destroyed or were encircled by forces of the

Sixth Strategic Echelon. The NATO right flank in CENTAG was in a state of shambles.

The View from Blue

Political. The deteriorating military situation made the NCA’s position one of extreme difficulty. On the one hand, Blue needed some kind of military success to support any negotiating position, but military advisors took the position that tactical

nuclear weapons would be required to attain the required result on the battlefield.

Congress, on the other hand, which had turned distinctly hawkish when the news from

the front was good, now supported a virtual surrender and a retreat to a vague “fortres

America” concept. Further, the NCA had to deal with NATO members who wanted the

war to end without the use of nuclear weapons and were resentful of the large Blue

commitment of forces to other theaters.

The NCA formulated the following set of Blue options and they provided the basis for

discussion at all levels of command:

1. Return to the status quo ante without use of nuclear weapons.

2. Return to the status quo ante with nuclear weapons use.

3. Preserve as much of the territory of the FRG as possible.

4. Settle for a continental defense line west of (outside) the FRG.

5. Develop a new Blue political/military order with a focus outside Europe.
tended to dismiss any tactical nuclear option for two reasons, in spite of SACEUR

orously pressed recommendation for such use. First, he believed that the time fra

which tactical nuclear weapons would have utility had passed, and second, the N

was concerned that the Red response to Blue limited use would be broad-based a

sult in Blue losing the war. The choice and implementation of the remaining opt

was, essentially, a military question.

Military. Taken on a worldwide basis, the Blue situation was favorable. Red was esse

isolated, and a massive global coalition had been constructed to support Blue/NATO

ever, Blue faced the imminent possibility of collapse of the European theater. The pro

was to sustain a viable military presence on the Continent until negotiations could te

nate the war successfully or sufficient global military and industrial mobilization occ

to overwhelm Red. While Blue retained a 1.6 to 1 air superiority, Red had regained al

territory lost to the Blue GOLDEN SWORD counteroffensive, the V Corps was surroun

and Red was moving 21 divisions of the Seventh Strategic Echelon toward the FLOT

While the Blue retreat was organized, Blue forces had not been able to establish a via

fensive line to hold Red.

SACEUR was tasked by the NCA to develop a conventional option to regain territory 

time for and provide a basis for substantive negotiations. The following alternatives w

discussed:

• Retake the Netherlands and the Ruhr (nuclear use open).

• Establish a defensive line in the FRG and then either continue a war of attrition or

negotiate a cease-fire.

• Use nuclear weapons to improve the military situation or to compel Red to withdr

prewar boundaries.

The fact of the matter was that the SACEUR analysis of the military situation did no

port the ability of Blue/NATO forces to retake any territory in Europe, nor was there 

basis for believing that Blue could win a war of attrition given the lead time required 

dustrial mobilization. The nuclear option, as noted above, appeared to have limited u

and risked Red escalation. Given these circumstances, SACEUR proposed to the NCA 

“3+” plan based on the NCA’s third option to “preserve as much of the FRG as possi

The salient features of this proposal were:

• Form a defensive line along the Rhine and thence to Munich, which, it was estim

could hold for nine to fourteen days.
that this line could be held for 30 days.

• Use deep interdiction strikes against the Red LOCs, targeting in particular the

Seventh Strategic Echelon.

In order to implement this plan, the following shifts in assets to support the Central

Front would be required:

• Transfer of the three CVBGs from the Norwegian fjords.

• All TACAIR, a total of 800+ aircraft including the CV A/C.

• The BBBG from the Caribbean.

• B-52s from the SIOP, conventionally armed.

• TLAM(C).

• Blue USMC forces deployed in Norway to bolster the Lubeck-Emden line.

While this was not entirely satisfactory, SACEUR felt it was the best that could be done

The surrounded V Corps would have to be sacrificed, and, by falling back in the center

and south, the line could be consolidated with prospects of holding out for two weeks.

The longer term was uncertain, with the speed of Blue/Japan industrial mobilization a

major determining factor.

CINCPAC viewed the situation in Asia with considerable confidence. Theater objectives

had been achieved, and the CINC sought ways to aid the global war effort in general

and make a contribution to the beleaguered Central Front in particular. The theater

commander was, to some extent, faced with a “Hobson’s Choice.” Aggressive use of assets was required lest they be “swung” to Europe. However, offensive operations faced

the problem of “attrition without replacement,” as all noncommitted forces were prior

itized for the Central Front.

CINCPAC’s objectives were:

• Wear down Red.

• Seize additional islands in the Kurile chain.

• Destroy the remainder of the Red Far Eastern Fleet.

• Support the ROK against the DPRK.

• Encourage the cooperation of the PRC against Red.

• Encourage deeper involvement of Japan.
seizure of three more islands in the Kuriles to cut the SLOCs to Petropavlovsk, facilit

ASW operations in the Sea of Okhotsk, and divert Red forces aiding the DPRK. The 

proved this plan.

CINCPAC’s major concerns were political. Japan was contemplating a more asse

role in the region, both as a military power and as a source of capital. This as wel

the possibility of a reunited Korea would have substantial impact on the relativel

ble relationships that had existed since the end of the Korean War.

The View from Red

Political. The Red perspective on the war was somewhat less complex than that 

Blue. Essentially, the VGK believed that the war had been won. All that remained 

convince Blue/NATO of this truth, but if they failed to grasp this reality, the Seve

Strategic Echelon would secure military victory.

Red, however, did have some concerns. First, while Red fortunes appeared favora

the Central Front, there were sufficient vulnerabilities and uncertainties to put p

on Red to end the war and to do it expeditiously. A key emerging problem was ag

ture. Never a strong point of the Red regime, wartime dislocations were certainly 

to impact the winter wheat harvest and probably spring planting as well. Further

so much of the national transportation assets devoted to the military logistical e

food distribution, a chronic problem in peacetime, had become exacerbated. In m

general terms, the cost of the war to the Red economy had been enormous, and t

sooner the war ended, the quicker this drain could be abated.

Among the major international uncertainties was the PRC. That nation had prov

assistance to Blue in a number of ways, particularly since the invasion of the RO

the DPRK. China’s large military potential and the historic enmity between the t

tions weighed on the VGK.

Finally, Red did not want a long war. Along with the factors noted above, Red wa

aware that the eventual mobilization of the Free World economies would doom 

militarily. Consequently, Red needed an end to the war—preferably by negotiatio

by whatever means—quickly. The problem for Red was to find a lever to bring th

about, and there was substantial frustration in the VGK over the Red inability to 

a cease-fire. Red groped for solutions; the possibility of holding the V Corps hos

instead of destroying it was discussed. However, the fact remained that while Red

might win militarily in Europe, Red could not compel a Blue capitulation, and a 

tracted war with a Blue that dominated the oceans could blockade Red and keep 

fishing fleets in port—a prospect Red did not look forward to.
objectives had been achieved, the Seventh Strategic Echelon was en route, and even

Blue tactical nuclear use was viewed as inadequate to reverse the favorable outlook on

the Central Front. Consequently, much of the General Staff thinking focused on initiatives that could facilitate negotiating success.

A major planned initiative was to try to demonstrate to Blue that their homeland was

not invulnerable and thus develop pressure from public opinion and Congress for seri

ous negotiations. Red therefore decided to launch conventional “demonstration” attacks on the Blue mainland, timed to occur just prior to a Presidential address to the

nation. One strike was to be delivered by an Akula-class submarine against military

and aerospace facilities on the West Coast. Meanwhile, Spetsnaz teams based in Cuba

were tasked to destroy railroad facilities and marine terminals in North Carolina.

Global 1988—Scenario Two

The D+64 through D+74 scripted events to attain the starting basis for the Blue dominant scenario were as follows:

The military situation on the Central Front had turned markedly in favor of Blue.

• The Sixth Strategic Echelon had failed to break the NATO line on the Elbe, and the

Blue/NATO forces were advancing on Stendal, which had been taken by NATO

airborne assault.

• The NATO northern pincer had broken though Red defenses and was advancing on

Stendal from the northwest.

• The imminent linkup of these Blue/NATO forces in Stendal would cut the LOCs to 60

Red divisions (attrited to about 32 division equivalents) between the Elbe and the Rhine

• The NATO offensive north into the Netherlands had failed to gain ground.

• NATO had, essentially, eliminated the “Bonn pocket” on the west bank of the Rhine.

• Blue maintained a 1.6-to-1.0 ratio of air superiority over the FLOT; Red was

assembling the Seventh Strategic Echelon in western Red.

The Blue military outlook on the Central Front had swung from the precarious brink

of defeat and force exhaustion of D+42 to a more positive posture of cohesion and stability because of recent military success achieved by the mutually supporting counteroffensives conducted by AFNORTH and AFCENT.

The situation in AFCENT found the NATO Alliance holding positions from the North

Sea in the Netherlands through the southern FRG to the Swiss and Austrian frontiers,

with a sizable portion of the forces maintaining a salient in the GDR. The Northern
thence to the Rhine at Arnhem, and then south along the west bank of the Rhine 

confluence with the Main at Mainz. The air campaign of the combined NATO ai

forces in the Central Region had achieved some measure of dominance over thos

the WTVD commander.

In the Jutland area of NORTHAG operations, Danish, Norwegian, UK, and Blue 

represented six divisions and approximately 18 brigade equivalents of combat po

While these forces could sustain their positions for the next few weeks, reinforce

would be required for the execution of subsequent offensive operations. In the a

CENTAG, NATO maintained a degree of air superiority over Jutland and the No

Sea. However, air defense of the area was a problem. The lack of an effective SAM 

work forced heavy reliance on all-weather interceptors, which were in short supp

The View from Blue

Political. The second scenario of the 1988 Global War Game found Blue with a 

advantage that the military believed marginal and transitory, and which the NCA 

as an opportunity to be exploited. This led to a tension that permeated the strate

planning process for the “Blue-dominant” scenario as an aggressive President dem

offensive options from a concerned military that sought to conserve territorial gain

The President focused particularly on what the world would look like after the w

told SACEUR: “You have a temporary victory on the Central Front and a strong 

tage throughout the rest of the world.” He then asked, “How can we use this situ

to our advantage?” The Presidential view of war aims had much to do with his d

for offensive operations. He wanted to end the war with all Red forces back in th

homeland, self-determination for the nations of eastern Europe, and the demilit

tion of the GDR. He did not view the military situation extant conducive to the a

ment of those ends.

The NCA gave the JCS three broad options to consider:

• Seek further military advantage by accepting high short-term risk; seek a

fundamental change in the world balance of power.

• Consolidate military dominance by accepting moderate near-term risk; maxim

diplomatic leverage to gain a Europe more Western than at the start of the wa

• Consolidate military gains to those that can be defended with minimum risk ov

long term (strategic defense); utilize protracted diplomacy to achieve status quo 

When SACEUR proposed the consolidation option combined with active defens

expedited negotiations to terminate hostilities or the alternative of withdrawal to
dent did not accept. The President rejected the SACEUR defensive recommendation

and directed him to develop an offensive option and to define his requirements.

The NCA was not unaware that risk was attendant to this position. However, the President believed that the logistical situation, coupled with a parochial perspective on the

part of the Blue theater commanders, contributed to a pessimism that prevented them

from exploiting the present advantage. Hungary had dropped out of the war and Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland appeared to be wavering. If Blue could collapse the

Red sixty-division pocket, the NCA believed dissolution of the Warsaw Pact might result. Further, the President was convinced that the logistical shortfall could be overcome by pooling free world resources toward that aim. He was so confident in this

regard that he assured an extremely skeptical SACEUR that he could count on his logistical needs being met.

Military. The SACEUR perspective was dominated by two concerns:

• The anticipated imminent arrival of the Seventh Strategic Echelon, the 27 divisions

of which would shift the initiative to Red.

• The estimate that Blue forces had 21–30 days of sustainability if maintaining an

active defense—less than that if offensive operations were to be conducted.

Other SACEUR concerns involved the sixty-division Red “pocket.” Analysis showed

that the so-called “pocket” was so large that it was in fact a series of multiple “fronts”

occupying most of the FRG. Further, air superiority existed only over NATO-occupied

territory. Air parity could be said to exist over the NSWP countries, and Blue air losses

were running at 40 percent over the Red homeland. Two-thirds of Red combat aircraft

were outside the WTVD, and the current air force superiority ratio of Blue in CENTAG

was seen as tenuous. What this meant, as far as SACEUR was concerned, was that Blue

air could not stop the Seventh Strategic Echelon, collapse the Red “pocket,” gain air superiority over the NSWP, and destroy important targets in the Red homeland.

SACEUR’s outlook, therefore, was that while all NATO territory had not been regained and access to Berlin not assured, GOLDEN SWORD had been a resounding

NATO success and had placed the Alliance in the most favorable negotiating position

it was likely to have.

SACEUR concluded that offensive operations anywhere (North Norway, Central Front

or Balkans) would endanger current positions in the other areas. Therefore the recommendation to the DPC was as follows:

• Consolidate and actively defend in all regions.
and delay the arrival of the Seventh Echelon.

• Utilize deception operations.

• Expedite negotiations.

• If negotiations break down, use nuclear weapons against the Seventh Echelon 

it arrives, or withdraw to French territory or beyond.

There appeared to be a degree of confusion regarding planning in the CINCPAC 

The Navy interpreted the NCA’s instructions to mean the continued execution o

global strategy they had been pursuing since the war started. Therefore, the theat

commander made plans to support ROK initiatives with amphibious landings in 

DPRK, with a longer range objective of threatening Vladivostok, urging Japan to 

greater responsibility for air defense, and to carry out other aggressive actions wh

and where appropriate. However, the President made it clear that what he really 

was to use global assets to win on the Central Front, and he was not interested in 

of “meaningless” activity in other theaters.

The View from Red

Political. The Red political viewpoint changed substantially during the play of t

Blue-dominant scenario. At the outset, the General Secretary was anxious to neg

He evidenced a distrust for the Red military, which he believed should have conc

the war long before D+75; yet not only was it still engaged but was fighting at a t

disadvantage as well. He ordered the General Staff to put their plans on hold for 

days while he pursued a diplomatic solution. He felt relatively comfortable doing 

based on a VGK appraisal that Blue could hold in place but do little else.

The General Secretary wished to reach a cease-fire agreement as soon as possible 

put forth a “bottom line” proposal that he thought would be acceptable to Blue. 

taken aback and frustrated by the outright rejection of his offer and by the Blue 

to even negotiate. When a subsequent diplomatic initiative designed to fragment N

was unavailing, the General Secretary resolved on a prompt military solution.

There was unanimous agreement among the VGK that hostilities must be termin

before the “long war” phase was reached. Red believed that Blue industrial capac

combined with Red isolation would doom Red to defeat. Red frustration over fai

gotiations with Blue, a sense that Blue had decided to seek a military solution, an

perceived requirement to end the war quickly led the General Secretary to declar

sixty divisions in the “pocket” a “Red vital interest” and, therefore, that Red was p

pared to use tactical nuclear weapons to preserve that army’s integrity.
Front. The current situation was seen as but a temporary tactical disadvantage, soon to

be redressed by the arrival of the Seventh Strategic Echelon supported by an additiona

350 combat aircraft drawn from other military districts. The Military Intelligence Directorate (GRU) estimates of NATO force accretions saw the possibility of a maximum

of ten new divisions in an undefined time frame. The General Staff saw no requiremen

for nuclear use.

Red concerns focused on the safe passage of the Seventh Echelon forces to the front

and the preservation of the divisions in the “pocket.” Heavy use of chemical weapons

was planned to facilitate both objectives. Initially, Blue air operational capability was to

be decreased by heavy and repeated use of CW, both persistent and nonpersistent.

Scuds were to be used as the delivery system, and Red was planning for attacks over a

fifty-day period, if necessary. Artillery would be used to pour chemicals on the northern

and southern pincers of the encircling Blue forces for at least several days. Further, Red

planned to mass forces to open the rail LOC south of Berlin. An initial force correlation

of 4 to 1 was intended for this operation, with chemical weapons utilized there as well.

Concentration on the Central Front was total. If necessary, all peripheral theaters

would be stripped of forces and aircraft to provide an Eighth Strategic Echelon. The

General Staff had identified 30–40 divisions that could be moved west from the Chinese border. Under this proposal, one Red division would remain at the PRC frontier t

act as a “trip wire,” with a Red promise of nuclear retaliation if it were attacked. The

General Secretary believed that Red war aims had been achieved and his task was to

end hostilities as rapidly as possible.

Global 1988—Scenario Three

The D+64 through D+74 scripted events to attain the starting basis for the stalemate

scenario were designed so that neither Blue nor Red had a clear military advantage.

• The Red Sixth Strategic Echelon and Blue/NATO forces along the Elbe had fought

each other to a standstill. While unit cohesion remained intact on both sides, neither

possessed offensive capability.

• The northern NATO pincer, objective Stendal, had stalled, and a weak but cohesive

defensive position had been established in the vicinity of Wittenberge.

• The NATO offensive north into the Netherlands had failed, and NORTHAG was

forced to consolidate in defensive positions along the Neder-Rhine line.

• All Red forces had been cleared from the “Bonn pocket” on the west bank of the Rhine
renewed Red offensive and to provide limited offensive air operations.

• The Seventh Strategic Echelon was assembling in western Red.

The land situation in Europe was relatively favorable to Blue because of the recen

cess achieved by the mutually supporting counteroffensives conducted by AFNO

and AFCENT. NATO forces in the Central Region were holding a stable line, and 

front from Rostock to Vienna was essentially quiet. While the WP had experienc

heavy attrition, the balance of conventional power on the ground lay with Red, o

however, by NATO air superiority.

The FLOT in AFCENT ran from the North Sea in the Netherlands along the Rhi

through Bavaria to Leipzig in the GDR, then back to the Swiss and Austrian fron

The failure of recent counterattacks in the Netherlands had left NORTHAG defe

south of the Neder-Rhine at Rotterdam to Arnhem, then south along the Rhine t

junction with CENTAG at the confluence of the Main.

The north flank was held by the small but well-entrenched elements of the I Net

lands Corps. To the right of the Dutch, the Belgian Corps, while relatively light, w

pable of defending well-prepared positions and could be relied on to deter any c

of the Neder-Rhine. Next in line, the Blue XXX Corps held a small bridgehead on 

north bank of the Neder-Rhine. It sustained heavy casualties in the unsuccessful 

tempt to liberate North Holland and, while capable of defending for the next we

ten days, would require reinforcement. Various other forces along the Rhine con

uted to defense in depth. Overall, the CENTAG posture was a relatively good one

ble of defending current positions over the coming weeks. However, any offensiv

operations would require reinforcements.

The multinational force based on Jutland and Zealand had made substantial gain

the last two weeks of the war. The XVIII Blue Corps, composed of two MEFs, on

mored, one mechanized, and one airborne division, and two heavy brigades, had 

Rostock. However, the current lines of this corps were stretched thin, and any ap

ble pressure could not be held for more than a week without reinforcements.

The View from Blue

Political. The NCA began the stalemate scenario trying to ascertain what milita

tions were available to improve the Blue negotiating position. The first issue that 

be resolved was that of sustainability of the NATO forces. The NCA believed that 

they were able to know the ramifications of the logistical situation, they would b

able to delineate offensive options and did not want to engage in immediate,
Blue posture.

The President did, however, state the Blue objectives:

• Maintain the cohesion of the NATO Alliance.

• Restore prewar boundaries.

• Fracture the Warsaw Pact and neutralize Eastern Europe.

• Advance Blue/Western vital interests worldwide and amputate Red global reach.

• Avoid the use of nuclear weapons except to:

o prevent Red victory in Europe

o counter massive Red CW use.

• Initiate full-scale Alliance economic mobilization as a part of “long-war” strategy.

The President was entirely committed to a long-war concept and worked to facilitate it

diplomatically and logistically, while trying to develop a military strategy that would

permit it to succeed. Congressional resolutions indicated solid support for the administration and the military and public opinion polls showed a majority endorsing the

President’s war aims. In the Far East, Japan and the PRC were forming a North Asia Se

curity Council, and China had agreed to provide bases to Blue for limited attacks on

Red. Global allies were pressed for military assistance in terms of men, supplies, and

the buyback of military equipment previously provided by Blue. While it appeared tha

NATO was divided on negotiating objectives, this was due in part to the reluctance of

the Blue chief executive to be specific until military options had been determined. Information provided by the Director of Central Intelligence lent credence to the validity

of the long-war policy. The Red homeland was essentially destitute of trucks, the harvest was in danger, and famine was a distinct possibility.

The question of military strategy was finally resolved in favor of an offensive. The Pres

ident had initially been opposed to this course of action, fearing it would be wasteful in

terms of supplies. He acceded only because he became convinced that a defensive strat

egy would result in military defeat.

Military. SACEUR viewed the situation in Europe with far more concern than appeared evident in the NCA and Congress. Sustainability was the central issue. A JCS as

sessment showed that NATO forces had experienced significant losses in capability,

particularly because of shortages of ammunition and major end items, such as tanks.

Air sortie generation was dependent on fuel distribution capacity, and, while ports

were open, infrastructure damage restricted the flow of POL. Significant resupply from
mated that NATO could sustain an offensive for from one to three weeks, could h

place for three to six weeks, and fight a delaying action for six to eight weeks.

It was in part because of these sustainability problems that the use of tactical nu

weapons was reviewed. SACEUR recognized that retaliatory strikes would be cos

believed that there would be a “window of opportunity” created for negotiations

proposed an offensive that envisioned the use of twenty-five 70kt nuclear weapo

planned to proceed with offensive operations even if nuclear release was not gran

SACEUR believed that even a temporary advance was better than standing on th

fensive. He requested the transfer of other assets to Europe, which raised the issu

theater priorities. CINCPAC was extremely concerned that moving the CVBGs c

lead to a questioning of Blue political and military resolve and lead to a percepti

Red was the dominant military power in the region. Similarly, SACLANT would 

cede to the movement of the three CVBGs from the Norwegian fjords because of 

priority of SLOC protection.

At the insistence of NATO, SACEUR prepared a plan for a strategic defensive dub

Operation OSTRICH. This plan was based on instructions to disregard initial mis

guidance and to select the best defensive position that would be both to the east 

France and would include a portion of the GDR. SACEUR developed the plan but 

adamant in opposition to it. In the event, SACEUR’s offensive plan was approved by 

NCA and the DPC, although both were extremely concerned about escalatory ramifi

tions. SACEUR was granted “conditional nuclear release,” but launch authority was w

held. Convinced that doing something was better than doing nothing, SACEUR was

prepared to try to close the northern and southern pincers at Stendal, with or withou

clear weapons.

CINCPAC’s fundamental objection to the “swing” of the CVBG force has been n

above. Further, CINCPAC believed that the crisis on the Central Front would be 

solved, one way or the other, before they could get there. The theater commande

also mindful that a perceived reduction in Blue interest in the Far East could lead 

unilateral initiatives on the part of other states in the region that might seriously 

plicate postwar relations. CINCPAC was very sensitive to the political, economic

military relationships that would be critical in sustaining and enhancing Blue worl

influence. It was the CINC’s position that an unquestioned Blue security commitm

during the war would be essential to regional stability and access when hostilities e

Therefore, CINCPAC proposed the following potential options for his forces:

• Consolidate and declare victory.
• Capture two more of the Kurile Islands.

• Launch an attack on the Red fishing and merchant fleets to complicate Red postwar

problems.

The View from Red

Political. The VGK viewed the situation at the outset of the “stalemate” scenario

with confidence. It believed that Red was in a position of military superiority and a

primary objective—the neutralization of the FRG—had been accomplished. As Red

forces occupied almost all of West German territory, the VGK sought to ratify military success through negotiations with Blue while keeping the military pressure on.

To this end, all military effort was to be concentrated on the Central Front at the expense of other theaters.

Red opened negotiations with Blue and was initially quite optimistic. The VGK accepted an initiative by the UN Secretary General, pressed for bilateral meetings with

France and the FRG, and tried to involve Blue in substantive negotiations. When the bi

lateral efforts failed and Blue refused to move from the initial position, Red, clearly

frustrated and feeling isolated, took the following actions:

• Withdrew all existing proposals.

• Refused to negotiate under UN auspices.

• Refused a Blue offer for a “walk in the woods.”

• Established a provisional socialist government in the occupied FRG.

• Withdrew French immunity from nuclear and chemical attack.

Red was so confident of military success that it was not seriously concerned with Blue

tactical nuclear use. The VGK agreed that as long as such use by Blue was not decisive,

Red would not retaliate.

Military. The General Staff believed that Red had a decided military advantage over

Blue. Aware of the potential for Blue to attempt a double envelopment, Red was not

concerned because of the belief that Blue lacked the staying power, even if successful, to

sustain an encirclement long enough to discomfort Red forces to the west. Further, the

closure of the Seventh Echelon and, if necessary, the mobilization of an eighth, would

unquestionably seal the military victory.

Contrary to Blue, Red had a short war, Central Front focus. Although defeated at sea

and on the defensive in other sectors, Red felt comfortable in moving whatever assets
war on the Central Front was concluded.

Again, even Blue theater nuclear use did not greatly concern Red. The General St

convinced that by the time Blue/NATO could make a nuclear decision, it would b

late because Blue would lack the conventional capability to follow up and exploit

sequently, the General Staff faced its tasking from the VGK with considerable

confidence.

The Negotiating Process

The primary focus of GWG ’88 was “to identify and analyze the dynamics and le

that military operations in all theaters can bring to a war termination negotiatio

cess and what constraints or other effects negotiations have on theater military o

tions.” The stated political objectives of the belligerents are the starting point for 

analysis of negotiations. These can be summarized as follows:

Blue/NATO

• To restore the territorial status quo ante of allies and neutrals and maintain th

cohesion of NATO.

• To protect Blue interests worldwide, but especially in the Caribbean, Latin Am

the Pacific Basin, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.

• To keep the conflict at the lowest possible level of intensity by avoiding the use o

nuclear weapons and destroying Red nuclear capabilities through conventional 

• To defeat Red conventional forces while minimizing Alliance casualties.

Red/Warsaw Pact

• To solve the “German problem” once and for all on Red terms—a demilitarize

Germany.

• To destroy or seriously weaken NATO by demonstrating the inability of the Al

to protect its most important continental member.

• To diminish or eliminate Blue influence in Europe.

• To attain these objectives while avoiding escalation to nuclear war.

Negotiations to D+64

Demands for war termination began immediately following the outbreak of host

The government of India sponsored a plea from the “nonaligned” movement for 

immediate cease-fire. Then, and as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Austria unfolded

government of Yugoslavia presented a more comprehensive proposal that called 
mediately following a cease-fire. Subsequent calls for negotiations evoked the following

Red proposal on behalf of the Warsaw Pact.

“In contrast to NATO’s apparent aim of prolonging the war, reestablishing a militarized

West German regime, and overthrowing democratically elected governments in eastern

Europe, we seek to end the fighting as soon as possible and eliminate the conditions

that gave rise to the current conflict. We seek neither the destruction of free societies

nor the occupation of territory and we are determined to make a breakthrough for

peace. Accordingly, we put forward the following proposal:

• That both sides agree to a cease-fire in place and tactical withdrawals of 5km by both

sides to assure that military incidents do not occur.

• That both sides agree to begin negotiations in Geneva at the foreign minister level

that have the following agreed central objective:

• Establishment of a West Germany and an East Germany that would be demilitarized

belonging to no military alliances and having no military forces on their territory

and no indigenous military forces beyond those required for maintaining internal

order and the security of their borders.

“If the NATO side will agree to this proposal, we are prepared to begin immediately to

implement a mutual withdrawal from western Europe and other theaters of all Pact

and NATO forces introduced since 1 November 1990 and to complete such withdrawals

within 60 days. Agreement to this proposal would also set the stage for the discussion

of further objectives:

• The abolition of all military alliances.

• The reduction of conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals to levels well

below those existing on 1 November 1990.

• The elimination of all tactical and medium-range NATO and Red nuclear weapons

from Europe and the surrounding seas.

“It should be clear from this proposal that we do not seek to impose our will on anyone. Under its terms, Germans and other peoples would resume their rightful place as

sovereign masters of their own territories. It should also be clear that if NATO seeks to

impose by military actions the withdrawal of Pact forces that we offer to carry out

peacefully, it can only be for the purpose of reimposing militarism and revanchism in

the center of our continent. This we will not tolerate.” (This proposal is quoted at

length because the language and terms are typical of the Red negotiating position

throughout this series.)
agreed to negotiate. On 15 December 1990, the President of Blue announced tha

was sending his Secretary of State to Geneva to negotiate “a return to pre-hostili

boundaries as provided for in the Yugoslav Proposal.” By 18 December the negot

had made no progress. In a hotline message to the Red General Secretary, the Pre

stated that “cease-fire in place without essential guarantees of immediate, phased 

drawal to the pre-hostilities lines” was unacceptable and that “we will never stop 

ing until the pre-war boundaries have been re-established.”

The week before Christmas, 1990, the Pope and the United Nations General Secr

proposed a 48-hour cease-fire over Christmas. This initiative was rejected by bot

sides—Red because of concern that a pause would break their offensive moment

and Blue out of fear that any halt would result in a de facto cease-fire in place.

The week following Christmas, a modalities working group consisting of represe

tives from Blue, Red, and NATO, chaired by the Secretary General of the United Na

was formed to work out the details of a phased withdrawal as a precondition for 

cease-fire. The terms of reference used by the working group were:

• A phased withdrawal of Warsaw Pact forces combined with a cease-fire.

o Withdrawal to begin within 24 hours of agreement and completed within 10–3

o The goal of withdrawal by phases to be restoration of prehostilities borders

o No flights or hostile acts to take place in or over the buffer zone to be create

part of the time-phased withdrawal.

• A commission to be formed composed of representatives of those forces in cont

o Investigate incidents reported to the commission.

o Establish “police” or specially designated units contributed by the combatan

patrol the buffer zone phased withdrawal areas.

The working group for these modalities was to assume that a cease-fire agreemen

would be agreed to and determine the procedure that would facilitate a withdraw

should the principals resolve outstanding points of disagreement, such as the po

of reinforcements. Blue proposed possible withdrawal lines, but by D+48 militar

events rendered the proposal obsolete.

As the Warsaw Pact advance stalled in the Benelux, and the NATO 1st Allied Arm

counterattack succeeded, war aims and consequently negotiating positions bec

less well defined for both Blue and Red. Escalation to chemical warfare and chan

peripheral strategies, with their theater-oriented political considerations, tended 

cloud the intentions of the opposing camps, not only in Europe but globally.
the Red leadership. After some vacillation and much discussion within the VGK, Red

surmised that the NATO attack was a last-resort effort that would have to be contained

Upon reaching this conclusion, several Red planning adjustments were made:

• A decidedly more aggressive posture in peripheral theaters.

• A delay in Central Front offensive operations until a more favorable correlation of

forces was created with the arrival of the Sixth Strategic Echelon.

By D+64, Red leaders had regained confidence in the strength of the European position

and, further, felt that implementation of pending initiatives in other theaters would en

hance the Red negotiating stance.

The Blue/NATO military position in Europe had indeed improved, and this led to a

rather euphoric mindset at D+64. The successful counteroffensive had helped to bolster Alliance morale, but the self-assessed improbability of sustaining those gains much

beyond D+70 did not translate into an impetus for timely and aggressive negotiations.

What “window of opportunity” for successful negotiations NATO might have had

while Red was trying to adjust to the reality of the success of GOLDEN SWORD was

quickly lost. However tardy, the Blue President requested a projection of the NATO

post–D+70 position in preparation for exploiting the recent military gains by reviving

what was, in essence, the earlier Yugoslav proposal.

Consequently, D+64 found both sides far from any mutual accommodation over how

to end the war. Although plagued with uncertainty over each opponent’s nuclear

threshold, particularly after both had used chemical weapons, the combatants felt that

the other was “on the ropes” and that near term events on the field battle would enhance leverage at the bargaining table. NATO was less confident than the Warsaw Pact,

but neither side was convinced that all political objectives could be realized by

diplomacy.

Negotiations in Global 1988

Introduction

Red, with its military objectives secured or apparently within reach, sought a termination of the war that would ratify Warsaw Pact military success and limit losses. From a

military perspective, Red, at D+75, was in about as favorable a position (Red-dominan

scenario) as it had been at D+46, yet had sustained substantial losses due to the inability to translate military conquest into political victory. Red in fact had become quite

frustrated trying to persuade Blue to accept what Red perceived to be inevitable.
tions. Blue viewed neutralization of the FRG as equivalent to the end of the NAT

ance and was convinced that Red would settle for nothing less. As long as the NA

Alliance remained politically united and the Blue homeland was not threatened, 

peared that Blue would continue to spurn negotiations in favor of a protracted c

tional war strategy. Blue also believed that a cease-fire in place would be the equi

of a Red victory, as Blue felt that public opinion would not countenance resump

hostilities should subsequent negotiations fail.

Both Blue and Red, then, believed that military success was the key to political vi

Red, having achieved most of the military objectives, was eager to negotiate. Blue 

the perceived military advantage of Red, both in terms of position and the closur

the Seventh Echelon, precluding any success at the bargaining table. As negotiati

showed little prospect of fruition, the focus shifted to other options. Both sides s

nuclear option as counterproductive, while conventional war, “soldiering on,” ga

Blue the prospect, however remote, of regaining parity or of attaining victory.

The crux of the matter, however, was that the minimum conditions for war termin

for both sides, or even any compromise positions that were reasonably available, w

mutually exclusive. Given this circumstance, negotiations were essentially certain t

Red-Dominant Scenario

With Red dominant on the Central Front, Blue was unable to develop a bargaini

strategy and concluded that circumstances did not provide a basis for negotiatio

Blue NCA considered five options ranging from a territorial status quo ante to a 

Blue political/military order with focus away from Europe. However, it was perce

that negotiating from a position of less than military superiority by Blue was imp

ble, and any cease-fire under such conditions was viewed as surrender. Further, a

cease-fire would give a short-term resupply advantage to Red. Blue believed that

the conditions postulated by the scenario, some substantial military achievement w

be necessary to allow successful negotiations. The major negotiating strategies for 

and indeed for Red, were played out on the battlefield and in private bilateral discu

not at the general conference table. Blue dominance in theaters other than Central E

did not appear to provide sufficient leverage for Blue to use in that theater.

Red felt that in this scenario it had achieved its war aims and sought to conclude 

tiations that would give political ratification to its military achievements. Althou

put forward a very demanding set of proposals, Red was willing to compromise, 

premise that Blue never tested. Influenced by this set of proposals and a self-perc

of a hopelessly weak negotiating position, Blue walked out.
• Dissolution of NATO.

• Restoration of prewar boundaries for FRG and GDR.

• FRG army abolished.

• Demilitarized zone in Benelux.

• Repatriation of forces.

• Return of occupied Kuriles to Red.

• Reduction in Blue nuclear forces.

• Separate negotiations with France over nuclear weapons.

The “bottom line” for Red was actually:

• A demilitarized FRG.

• Blue out of Europe (or, possibly, just Blue nuclear forces out of Europe).

• Return of the Kuriles.

The minimum criteria for a negotiated settlement developed by Blue were:

• Freedom for the FRG and Netherlands.

• Continuation of the NATO Alliance.

• Blue forces to remain on the Continent.

Negotiations did resume, with Blue under the impression that Red had accepted these

minimum conditions as a basis for negotiations. This was not the case, and the Secretary of State endeavored to sidestep the critical issue with a cease-fire proposal subject

to a number of conditions, one of which would have required Warsaw Pact forces to be

withdrawn behind prewar borders within two weeks. This was clearly unacceptable to

Red, as it left open entirely both the future status of the FRG and of Blue military

forces on the Continent.

Red sought other negotiating avenues in an effort to circumvent the impasse. Specifically, Red tried to both convince and demoralize the French with news of the Seventh Echelon and an overture to favor France by conferring nonbelligerent status.

Fortunately for NATO, France spurned the offer.

Red also failed to understand that Blue’s inability to monitor world events during a

cease-fire due to the attrition of space assets was of considerable concern, and some

sort of arrangement to facilitate a space cease-fire could have been a start for

negotiations.
victory. Although the Red negotiating strategy appeared to have substantial flexib

the minimum conditions were not acceptable to Blue. Blue, although running ou

supplies on the Central Front, rejected negotiations due to the solidarity of the N

Alliance, its long-term industrial strength, and its dominance over the other theate

the possibility of assistance from a variety of heretofore noncombatants. Blue there

made a deliberate choice to spurn negotiations in favor of a long-war strategy.

Blue-Dominant Scenario

The negotiating process in the Blue-dominant scenario was strongly influenced b

perception, shared by both sides, that the Blue advantage was short term. Red be

that the military objectives had been attained and that it was time to stop the wa

General Secretary was, therefore, serious about negotiations, but saw no reason t

modify the terms offered with the Seventh Strategic Echelon moving to the front

Given this perspective, the General Secretary presented Blue with a “bottom line

posal that contained the following points:

• A demilitarized and neutralized FRG and GDR under existing governments.

• An immediate, in-place cease-fire.

• Withdrawal of all NATO and Warsaw Pact forces from the FRG and GDR within 9

• FRG and GDR forces demobilized within 90 days.

• Withdrawal of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to prewar territories within 90 d

• FRG and GDR citizens free to decide for themselves how they wish to live, as l

political union is not an option.

The VGK proposal was in anticipation of a Blue status quo ante position, which 

in fact imply Red defeat and erode Red legitimacy. The longer term implications 

Hungarian situation, and by possible extension, the Eastern European bloc, wou

difficult enough with legitimacy intact. Therefore Red proposed what amounted 

vacuum in Central Europe.

Blue felt, as in the Red-dominant scenario, that the military situation was not fav

enough to negotiate successfully; that it could not negotiate what it had not won 

tarily. Blue went to the table reluctantly and with no position, apparently for the 

of public opinion and to lay the groundwork for strategy. In the event, Blue rejec

points of the Red proposals except those calling for a cease-fire coupled with the 

drawal of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to their prewar territories within 90 day

General Secretary received this Blue response with a certain amount of disbelief, 

cluding that Blue either had no understanding of the Red position or had no des
firm that view. Blue proposed, among other things, the payment of reparations to the

nations that had suffered economic damage as a result of Red aggression and selfdetermination for all countries, east and west alike.

As the “negotiations” proceeded, both sides endeavored to secure advantage in other

ways. Blue sought through military success in other theaters to exploit worldwide dom

inance, but Red kept the issue focused on the Central Front. Red held to its termination

objectives and stood by its proposal while making diplomatic overtures designed to

fracture NATO. France was a primary target, but neither they nor any other Alliance

members were willing to negotiate with Red. Eventually a “back channel” was opened

that allowed Red to expand the proposal to include the demilitarization of western

Czechoslovakia and the return of Austrian neutrality. This “back channel” served to

clarify positions and, had the scenario continued, could have proved beneficial.

In general, negotiations in the Blue-dominant scenario were characterized by significant perceptual mismatches. Blue was looking for leverage. NATO was considering options to terminate the war before faced with a choice of surrender, nuclear escalation,

or protracted war. Red, depending on the Seventh Strategic Echelon as the arbiter of

victory, preferred a diplomatic settlement to sustained military action. In the final

analysis, Blue was not seriously interested in negotiations because of the perception

that the military situation had to be improved before Alliance political objectives could

be successfully negotiated.

Stalemate Scenario

As in the other two scenarios, the stalemate construct was dominated by the Seventh

Strategic Echelon and the concomitant perception of Blue disadvantage. Red, as in pre

vious scenarios, believed that a negotiated settlement could prove advantageous. Red

felt it had achieved its military objectives and wanted to convert this achievement into

lasting political advantage. A confident General Secretary instructed the VGK to think

“bold ideas” and to pursue economic initiatives with special attention to the Far East.

Accordingly, the following proposal was presented to Blue:

• Immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from the FRG, GDR, and the Netherland

preparatory to:

o Permanent withdrawal of all NATO forces from FRG and the Netherlands.

o FRG and the Netherlands withdrawal from NATO.

o Restructured FRG and Netherlands armed forces for internal security only.
security of the FRG jointly with Blue forces stationed elsewhere on NATO terr

• No Blue or Red nuclear forces anywhere in Europe.

• Red forces to be withdrawn from Norway provided the following undertaking

agreed to:

o Reaffirmation that no foreign forces will be permanently based in Norway o

Denmark.

o No stockpiling of foreign military equipment to be permitted in Norway or

Denmark.

This proposal was tabled at the first negotiating session, chaired by the Secretary 

eral of the United Nations.

The Blue perspective was that Red must be convinced that the war could not be w

but was dubious that NATO military power was sufficient to accomplish this. Ho

Blue intelligence was reporting that there was political unrest in both Hungary a

land and, further, that the possibility of famine existed in the Red homeland. Th

tors, combined with Blue success everywhere except on the Central Front, led Blu

stall. Blue entered negotiations halfheartedly and sought to improve its standing 

world public opinion, to bolster Allied national will, and to maximize the potent

assistance from other countries.

Another problem that Blue had in entering negotiations was that there were con

able differences between the goals of the President and the objectives of other Al

members. The President’s initial position was no cease-fire without withdrawal t

war boundaries in Europe, neutralization of Eastern Europe, and the fracturing o

Warsaw Pact. NATO did not agree that the Warsaw Pact should be fractured, and 

were further divisions within NATO as to the approach to a cease-fire. It seemed 

ent that the Blue actions were directed toward buying time to plan global offensi

erations rather than to achieve a negotiated settlement.

The Red proposal elicited the response that it contained little to encourage Blue/

to end the war and, due to the inability of Blue/NATO to formulate a position, th

tus quo ante was put forth yet again. The Blue Congress passed a resolution calli

an eastern European “buffer zone” consisting of a neutralized Poland, Czechoslo

and Romania as well as an open corridor to Berlin as part of the FRG.

After a delay that frustrated Red, NATO finally put together a counteroffer consi

of the following:

• Acceptance of a cease-fire conditional on Red withdrawal from all NATO terri
regional arrangements.

• Discussion of postwar environment must be based on negotiating political

arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe that satisfy the aspirations and security

interests of the states concerned.

• Norway and Denmark have no intent to have permanent stationing of foreign forces

• The stockpiling of military equipment is a decision for each sovereign government.

While NATO was developing this proposal, the President of Blue was seeking the advic

of the principal negotiator. Two options were proposed:

• Reject the Red proposal.

• Begin negotiations on Central Front based on cease-fire, withdrawal of forces, and

some restrictions on stationed and indigenous troops/weapons within the region,

including Eastern Europe.

The second option seemed more pragmatic, and the Secretary of State suggested a

counterproposal based on that option. At this juncture, there was no agreement between Blue and NATO on specific counterproposals. Some distinct national views had

emerged: Norway and the Benelux wanted an immediate cease-fire; the FRG, UK, and

France wanted some measure of retribution—the status quo ante was not adequate for

them; the Italians and the Turks supported the Alliance; and the Greeks were wavering

Consequently, without a Blue/NATO position, negotiations stalled.

Red, unaware of the internal problems in formulating an allied position, again sought

to end the impasse by a diplomatic offensive. Bilateral talks were offered to several

NATO countries and overtures extended to the PRC and Japan. All of these initiatives

came to naught, and, feeling isolated internationally, Red withdrew all proposals, broke

off negotiations, and decided to seek a military solution with a goal of occupying the

FRG and establishing a provisional government in Frankfurt.
Industrial Mobilization, Logistics, and

Sustainability

Introduction

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Global ’85 both NATO and the Warsaw Pac

ducted extensive mobilization of personnel. The vast majority of the war-fightin

D+64 had been accomplished using resources immediately available to the theat

commanders and by deploying reserve assets as rapidly as possible. The very natu

this global conflict had caused massive losses in a relatively short period of time. 

sequently, national decision makers and theater commanders confronted politica

military decisions with options seriously constrained by equipment shortages an

ply problems.

The related issues of mobilization, logistics, and sustainability were critical to the a

of Blue/NATO to fight a protracted conventional war. The NCA addressed these 

with a continuing, multifaceted approach throughout the series.

Authorities and Controls

The President declared a national emergency when the war broke out, and the C

gress promptly declared war on Red and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. 

nomic controls and consumer rationing were not deemed necessary early on, an

authority for wage, price, and rent controls was not requested from the Congress

Congress also passed timely legislation amending the Defense Production Act of 

to permit closer industry-to-industry cooperation in the war effort by amelioratin

trust provisions and allowing government intervention in the economy if other m

ods of meeting defense needs failed.

Several Defense Production Act authorities were utilized to:

• Ensure the production and delivery of defense requirements ahead of commer

items.

CHAPTER FIVE
• Integrate industry leaders and experts with the government’s mobilization

management force.

• Convene industry representative committees to solve defense production problems.

• Enable emergency (streamlined) contracting and financing procedures.

Industrial Base

After the initial production surge, capacity expansion efforts were intensified. Measure

adopted included:

• Conversion of plants and the development of supporting plants.

• Financial assistance to expand prime contractor and subcontractor capacity,

particularly munitions.

• Overtures to allied and friendly nations for the provision of supplies.

• Recommendations for funding authority to activate machine tool trigger orders

across the board.

However, production capacity improvements were limited by the unavailability of

components and manpower limitations.

Economy

At D+75, Blue industry was operating at or near full-surge capacity. However, that capacity was only about 10–25 percent higher than prewar levels, and because it was

achieved at the cost of drawing down lower priority pipelines, it was not sustainable. It

was estimated that 12–30 months would be required to convert plants from peacetime

to wartime production and to expand capacity by construction of new facilities.

Two potential production problems that plagued Blue involved shipbuilding and ammunition. The former was constrained by few yards, a lack of critical resources and

materials, and skilled talent. The latter was plagued by lack of manufacturing plants,

which necessitated both prioritization and work-around. Indeed, this condition regarding ammunition was expected to worsen as short-term substitutes were depleted

before new plants came on line. Alternatives, such as the offshore building and repair of

ships, were considered as well as foreign procurement of ammunition, but some players believed that the ammunition problem could not be remedied in the short term.

Farm production levels had not diminished in spite of the labor demand; labor was

close to the full employment level with some near-term shortages anticipated. Increase

in productive capacity, combined with increased military manpower demands, would

eventually mandate occupational deferments for those with critical skills.
ing hours, would sustain the maximum level of output to D+135. The increase in 

quirements to man new production facilities coming on line in D+2 years outstr

the ability to train and provide competent personnel. Early and extensive trainin

grams were viewed as essential to alleviate some of the impact and to offset the n

for potentially scarce skills.

At D+75, the economy in general was strong and undamaged. Although the econ

expansion of the service industry had been halted as assets were shifted from the 

ian sector to government use, the average citizen had yet to feel an economic imp

from the war. Consideration was given to the implementation of wage and price 

trols, and the intent was to delay these steps as long as possible. Inflation was mo

but some consumer discontent had developed as wartime demands preempted c

production and distribution.

The Blue domestic transportation system could meet essential defense and civil m

ment requirements in both the short and the long term. The Defense Production 

Title I, DOT, established a priority control movement system to handle essential 

fense and civilian traffic before routine market goods.

Over 1,200 Blue-flag and NATO ships were supporting the sealift requirements o

war in Europe. All Blue ports were operational, and Canada made both eastern a

western ports available for ammunition out-load. Other allied nations and reliab

Third World carriers were providing adequate capacity to meet essential Blue eco

shipping needs. Air transportation was relying heavily on the use of chartered, fo

flag aircraft. Transportation capacity was adequate for military requirements in b

the short and the long term.

The outlook for providing the petroleum necessary to meet military and civilian 

did not provide a cause for concern. Foreign sources of supply had not deteriora

and alternate refinery capacity existed to meet expected growth of requirements. 

trical generation capability was limited in some parts of the country and remain

nerable to sabotage. The long lead-time required to construct these plants and th

associated transmission lines mitigated against a near-term solution. Conservatio

measures such as close management of industrial work periods and controls on 

use as required were coupled with increased levels of Canadian imports to ameli

the problem. Supplies of most raw materials were generally satisfactory and expe

to remain so as long as Blue retained access to certain key foreign suppliers.

The prospect of a long, conventional war mandated a shift in planning priorities 

ward financial requirements and the development of technological and producti

lutions for problems associated with sustainment, reconstitution, and force-level
financing of the war, 50 percent pay as you go, appeared favorable. However, the cost o

the war was going to be staggering. For example, it was estimated that reconstitution to

prewar levels would require 25 percent of GNP over a two to four-year period, and expanding to planning force levels would consume 41 percent over the same period.

Therefore, in order to avoid the financial depletion that struck Great Britain after

World War II, careful planning was essential if Blue were not to share a similar fate. No

only the pay-as-you-go plan alluded to above, but other alternatives including a luxury

tax, a national sales tax, an increase of $1.50 per gallon in the gasoline tax, and an income tax surcharge were identified and reviewed. Japan was seen as an essential partner, both from a credit management standpoint and for financial and industrial

assistance. Other non-NATO nations might be willing to reduce the overall burden, bu

there was no question that the major cost would end up being a Blue responsibility.
Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction

The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was far more frequent in the fir

Global series than in the second. Indeed, it was not until GWG ’87 when a Red ch

cal attack occurred on D+49, and nuclear weapons were not used. Red had in fac

templated earlier use of CW when the military situation in Bulgaria began to

deteriorate, but did not do so. Blue/NATO considered nuclear use on several occa

to stem the Red advance in Central Europe, but could not make a credible case th

such use would provide military or political advantage. Red was very much awar

nuclear use was under consideration by Blue and, while using all means available 

ter such use, did study targeting options for a retaliatory strike should Blue escal

Chemical Weapons Use (to D+64)

Red had initiated the use of chemical weapons on the Central Front and in easte

key. Both persistent and nonpersistent types were employed to facilitate offensiv

defensive operations. NATO forces were not well prepared to operate in a chemical 

ronment and perceived that their capacity to retaliate was limited. By D+60, the 

of chemical warfare was accepted by both sides, although unfavorable weather co

tions led to generally inconclusive results.

Status of Nuclear Forces (to D+64)

The central strategic systems of each side, including command and control, remain

sentially intact. Although Red had lost about one-half of their SSBNs, their land-b

nuclear arsenal remained undamaged. The tactical and theater systems of both sid

been substantially depleted by conventional means, but significant capabilities rem

Nuclear Considerations (to D+64)

Blue and Red were well aware that on several occasions the use of tactical nuclear w

ons had appeared to make good military sense, but political concerns combined w

uncertainty over nuclear escalation led to a decision against such use. Typical of th

CHAPTER SIX
would “limited” or “tactical” use by Blue be the signal—or excuse—for a massive riposte

by Red? As the games progressed and the perceived stakes mounted, the resort to nuclear

use seemed to come closer to a realistic option in the minds of some players.

Blue/NATO held firmly to its position that it would not initiate nuclear use unless War

saw Pact forces achieved a major breakthrough, even though there was no clear determination as to how such use would solve the problem, especially in view of the

assumed Red response. Blue considered nuclear use against the DPRK after their invasion of South Korea but rejected such use because of the expected adverse political

consequences, particularly from Japan.

Red began to consider nuclear use as a means of terminating the war. A principal Red

objective was an early end to hostilities because of a concern that the economy, and especially agriculture, would be unable to sustain a protracted (one-year-plus) conventional war. Red perceived that it had, for all practical purposes, won the war in Central

Europe based on its territorial conquests and that Blue/NATO was refusing to recognize

this reality. Some in the VGK believed that the use of nuclear weapons would so shock

public opinion that war termination would be forced upon the Western governments.

Red also considered the use of nuclear weapons to stem the Greek-Turkish invasion of

Bulgaria. Red reasoned that such use would be non-escalatory because:

• Use would be on Warsaw Pact territory and thus defensive.

• No Blue forces would be involved

• The theater was geographically isolated.

Red concluded, however, that the allied offensive was not sustainable and, therefore,

with the danger quite limited, the risk of first use was not commensurate with any obvious benefit. However, Red did believe that if the Central Front offensive bogged

down, the Balkans might be ideal for a nuclear “demonstration shot.”

In the Pacific, Red had debated the feasibility of a nuclear strike on Blue CVBGs to

eliminate some of their problems. Because Blue/NATO homelands were not involved,

Red saw such an attack as a horizontal rather than vertical escalation that would greatly

reduce the Blue conventional offensive assault on the Red Pacific rim, possibly drive Ja

pan into neutrality, and send a strong message to a potentially aggressive PRC. From

the Red perspective, Blue would not have an in-theater, symmetric retaliatory target

and would be faced with the prospect of a nuclear response in Europe or in the Red

homeland itself. Red believed that in either case, world public opinion would focus

blame on Blue for escalating the war, which might result in NATO disintegration and a

war termination decidedly favoring Red political goals.
concerns varied—contingency planning for Red nuclear employment, concern o

possible Blue/NATO use, etc., but the nuclear question was always close to the su

in VGK deliberations.

Early in the war, Red was definitely worried about a possible “penalty for success

a rapid advance by Warsaw Pact forces would lead to Blue/NATO nuclear use. Ho

as the war progressed and what Red perceived as several nuclear “gates” (e.g., cro

the Rhine) were passed without escalation, the Kremlin’s fears tended to diminis

However, Red remained wary that if Blue shared their belief that the military obj

had been essentially attained, the temptation to escalate would increase. An inter

side issue involved France and the possible use of the “force de frappe.” Early in t

war, Red tried to avoid invading France for reasons both political and military, w

French nuclear weapons a subject of discussion. Although most were more conse

tive, one Red leader quipped that perhaps the best thing that could happen from 

Red perspective would be unilateral French employment of nuclear weapons aga

Warsaw Pact forces. The logic was that, in accordance with their goal of early ter

tion, Red wanted a “war stopper” and nuclear use might very well provide it. Fur

France chose to engage in a nuclear exchange with Red, the result was a foregone 

clusion. The troubling unknown was the degree of linkage between a France-Red 

change and Blue/NATO use.

Throughout the war, Red seriously considered the employment of tactical nuclea

weapons as a viable military option. However, while Moscow struggled with the 

bility that tactical nuclear use might lead inexorably to a central systems exchang

all VGK members viewed this possibility as a major deterrent.

One issue that often arose in Red deliberations was the possibility of “decoupling

the use of tactical nuclear weapons by using them against the Blue CVBGs or ou

the Western TVD. This was a concept that had been utilized in games of the first 

and Red speculation was that Blue did not have a symmetrical response to such u

Further, and as noted above, Red believed that any Blue nuclear use would be vie

escalatory by world opinion and would redound to Blue disadvantage. In the eve

however, Red always assessed the risks as needless given the generally acceptable 

of the conventional offensive on the Central Front. Indeed, through D+64, the fi

analysis always showed that there was no point in jeopardizing the already attain

successes in Europe.

There were two other nuclear related issues that arose during the games. The firs

volved the Blue air carrier raid on the nuclear power plant located in the vicinity 

Kola. This attack was executed without consultation with either the DPC or the B
the Chernobyl accident could be taken as a valid guide, damage and casualties would

presumably be widespread and serious. Further, with the recent disastrous chemical

leak at Bophal, India in mind, the issue was raised that attacks on chemical plants also

had the potential for massive destruction. Two points emerged from these discussions:

• There was a need for a Blue/NATO targeting policy and

• Defense of similar installations in Blue and NATO countries from attack or sabotage

should not be overlooked.

A second issue concerned the destruction or capture of Blue/NATO tactical and theate

nuclear weapons based in western Europe. The early Red independent air operation

against these weapons would seem certain to have resulted in the release of radioactive

material, and this situation was not addressed in terms of its possible effects on military operations and civilian populations. Of additional concern was the possible

over-run by advancing Red forces of these same weapons. Here again, little thought ap

peared to have been given to planning for this contingency.

Weapons of Mass Destruction: GWG ’88

Week One—Red-Dominant Scenario

As might be expected, discussions of the use of tactical nuclear weapons were prominent in a scenario where Blue/NATO forces were threatened with military defeat.

Off-line simulations were utilized to provide Blue players with an analysis of several

“what ifs.” Although Blue perceived the situation as desperate, Blue players were unable

to frame a plan of nuclear use that provided a clear military advantage. While it was

conceivable that the Red offensive could be blunted with nuclear use, Blue lacked the

conventional capability to counterattack and exploit any advantage that nuclear weapons might provide. Further, off-line gaming suggested that, at this stage of the war, any

nuclear use could rapidly escalate to a central systems exchange.

Red clearly wished to avoid nuclear weapons given the enhanced prospects for success.

The two possible exceptions were the ongoing friction with the PRC, a major cause for

concern, and a contingency plan by the FETVD commander to attack the Blue CVBGs

considered most unlikely to be implemented. Curiously, the French situation continued to cause Red some concern. When Paris declared a 15-kilometer “kill zone” along

the border, Red took this threat seriously. While the Kremlin did not believe that Blue

would resort to nuclear weapons use, it did feel that French use in defense of or in retaliation to conventional attacks on France was a distinct possibility.
The primary Red concern in this scenario was the large number of troops in the 

tral Front “pocket.” This force had been designated a “national asset” by the Gen

Secretary, who had threatened nuclear use if its destruction appeared imminent. 

military planning was, however, that should Blue develop the combat power to th

collapse of the pocket, Red would use a heavy chemical attack to aid in establishi

relief corridor to the trapped forces. Massive amounts of persistent, thickened ch

weapons would be delivered by tube artillery and multiple rocket launchers to pr

the corridor flanks, and nonpersistent CW would be used on Blue forces threaten

the corridor. It was judged that Blue casualties would be minimal due to experien

gained from previous chemical attacks and good defensive posture. It was though

however, that the protective measures would have a detrimental impact on NATO

fighting ability, leaving the forces vulnerable to follow-on conventional attack. Fu

decontamination would be required.

The planned Blue response was to use persistent chemicals on the Red front-line 

sions in order to prevent Red from attaining total control. Given an excellent def

capability, Red casualties probably would have been minimal and impact on Red 

ing ability nominal.

Red planning envisioned the strong possibility of a Blue nuclear reaction to the p

posed large-scale use of chemicals. Therefore, the Red off-line planning involved 

emptive nuclear attack to reduce the risk and effectiveness of such an event. Red 

use 200 Scud-delivered, high-altitude (to minimize fallout) 10kt to 200kt weapon

against Blue C3 nodes and nuclear delivery systems. The Blue response in this of

excursion was to detonate one 350kt weapon at high altitude over Mosowka, Lith

a WP naval port without a large civilian population. Red perceived this Blue resp

as a signal and, having suffered no military damage, did not respond.

Week Three—Stalemate Scenario

The Red position at the beginning of week three was that the “stalemate” would 

last long and would quickly be resolved in the favor of Red. While the General Se

tary tried at first to seek a diplomatic solution, he abandoned negotiations altoge

when faced by Blue/NATO intransigence. While the PRC appeared restive, and w

Red appeared to be totally isolated, the VGK position toward nuclear weapons w

changed. Red was not afraid to use nuclear weapons in retaliation or if Blue was 

severely attrite the Seventh Strategic Echelon. But Red was so confident of the str

of its position that even Blue tactical nuclear use was viewed with, essentially, lac

concern. In summary, Red believed that the use of nuclear weapons by Blue wou
and that Blue knew that it did not have the combat capacity to follow up and exploit

any temporary advantage nuclear use might confer. While Red did select targets such a

troop concentrations for retaliatory strikes, Red even questioned whether the damage

Blue might inflict was even worthy of a nuclear response.

The Blue situation was one of a classic mismatch of ends and means. While the President urged the military to “be bold,” the lack of combat power and logistical support

meant that offensive operations would create an enormous drain on sustainability.

Therefore, Blue planning had to turn to consideration of tactical nuclear use. The Blue

NCA and NATO reluctantly concurred that if SACEUR’s conventional offensive failed,

then nuclear use would be authorized provided both agreed. SACEUR then planned a

campaign that involved the use of twenty-five 70kt weapons on specific military targets. It was his belief that if he were going to conduct an offensive—and he felt that wa

better than remaining on the defensive—tactical nuclear use would be essential. The

game ended without the final decision.

Summary

Military considerations aside, there were several political considerations that mitigated

against Blue first use:

• NATO Allies were opposed to options in some of the scenarios because the weapons

would be detonated on their soil.

• Red retaliation might cause the loss of positions gained in other theaters as well as

increase the possibility of Blue losing advantage at sea.

• Japanese neutrality might result.

• Separately negotiated treaties could result in dissolution of the NATO Alliance.

Each side seriously questioned the utility of nuclear weapons, as was clearly demonstrated by their failure to use them in situations that appeared to warrant that use.

Therefore, both sides tended to believe that the other would not escalate across the nuclear threshold. An example of this mindset occurred in the Blue-dominant scenario

when the Blue President ordered the destruction, by conventional means, of encircled

Red troops that the Red General Secretary had declared a “national asset” to be defended by nuclear use if their annihilation were threatened. Conversely, unaware of

how frequently and intensively Blue had debated first use, Red did not believe Blue

would resort to nuclear use unless there was profound provocation. The consideration

of nuclear use was event-driven, and both sides seemed to lack an appreciation for

what their opponent might consider critical.
The war in space was ongoing throughout the game series and had a substantial 

on Blue intelligence, reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities. Thi

an important constraint on Blue military operations. For example, by D+48, onl

limited Blue space reconnaissance capability remained. UHF SATCOM was spor

cally jammed, making it an unreliable medium 60 percent of the time. SHF SATC

channels lacking anti-jam features were effectively lost.

Red commenced an active antisatellite campaign on D-Day. Nearly all Blue LEO 

naissance satellite systems were neutralized early in the war. Blue counterattacke

space, but ran short of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons before Red ran out of replac

satellites. Blue then attacked Red space launch and antisatellite targets on the gro

using TLAM(C) and B-1 bombers.

Blue used alternative, nonspace means as a substitute for its losses. Air-breathing r

naissance platforms (SR-71, U-2, RC-135, EP-3, RPV, etc.) were particularly impor

After about D+20, both sides “stood down” from their antisatellite campaigns. R

accomplished the objective of neutralizing the Blue LEO reconnaissance threat b

sustained damage to their ASAT lasers at Sary Shagan and co-orbital ASAT launc

cilities at Tyuratam. In the face of the Red reconstruction of satellite assets, Blue 

cided to conserve its remaining antisatellite weapons for use at a critical time aga

high priority targets. Faced with the prospect of a protracted war, both sides fou

necessary to take a hard look at the availability of space systems over the long ter

Blue space warfare planners and operators had the following goals:

• Deny Red use of their space systems through such means as operational decep

attacking launch/control facilities, jamming, and other electronic countermea

• Regain superiority in space over the long term through improved ground site

security, accelerated production of satellite and antisatellite weapons, developm

of cheaper satellites, use of the shuttle, and increased space asset survivability.

After D+46, space action was at a reduced level as each side concentrated mainly 

constituting space reconnaissance assets and ASAT capabilities lost or utilized in 

opening days of hostilities. Blue particularly played a catch-up game on reconna

satellites, starting with 11 on D+43 and ending with 17 on D+64. Red was able to 

cover their losses more effectively. Starting with ready replacement units, by D+6

had 40 orbiting missions and 23 ready replacement units with associated booster a

ASAT capabilities for both Blue and Red were reduced due to successful attacks o

their launch bases. Inventories were low on both sides: Blue was down to four AS
and recommended increased ASAT production rates.

In the satellite communications area, Blue was severely hampered (FLASH priorities on

occasion being delayed up to six hours) by communication jamming in the SHF/UHF

bands. This situation was particularly acute in the European Theater. Red attacks on

ground communications stations had less effect on Blue very-low-frequency submarine

communications. Some relief from jamming was attained from Blue raids on Red jamming facilities; eight Red jamming sites were destroyed or severely damaged.

By D+64, Red had made two ASAT attempts against the Space Shuttle, neither of which

succeeded. Blue had made a decision to expend its remaining ASATs against the Red

Cosmos 929 RECON satellite and the Red Space Station, but had not yet launched.

Red had been quite successful in the war in space; Blue less so. Blue was hampered in

its recovery of space assets, partially due to the sophisticated technology integrated into

both the orbiting hardware and ground control systems. Simpler satellite designs that

could be put in orbit more quickly and were still adequate, at least as gap fillers, to pro

vide the strategic and tactical intelligence and communication required for the nearterm war effort were discussed. The judicious use of nonspace reconnaissance assets

and more conventional communication networks appeared to be the near-term

solution.

The three-scenario GWG ’88 found the situation little changed. Blue strategic warning

capabilities were intact and not in jeopardy as were its navigation and weather satellites. Satellite communications, however, were subject to intensive jamming, and nonsatellite systems were severely overloaded, extending message time from the minutes

expected for the satellite-supported system to up to ten hours. Commander-in-Chief,

Space, devised a plan to counteract Red jamming and restored communications to 75

percent of the prewar level.

A new consideration that emerged in GWG ’88 was that of preserving an imaging capa

bility to monitor a cease-fire or compliance with terms of a peace treaty. While Blue

did in fact preserve assets for this purpose, the point was raised that it might be desirable for both sides to have such capability—lest confidence be lost and war resumed as

a result. During the “Blue-dominant” scenario, Blue was confident enough to consider

negotiating a cease-fire in space.

In its approach to the space war, Blue largely neglected the space assets of other nations. In none of the three scenarios of GWG ’88 did either side feel completely comfortable with the quantity and quality of intelligence it was receiving, and Blue

especially suffered due to the loss of space intelligence collection assets. Occasionally,
indeed, Red was closer to exhausting its assets than Blue realized. Although frust

to the players, these battles were probably close to what would have been an actu

situation.

Conclusions

Summary

One of the definitions of the Global War Game was “a joint forum to test and re

national strategies and doctrine in a crisis environment.” As research games, the 

two GWG series, 1979-1988, resulted in a number of changes in the way a potent

between Blue/NATO and Red/Warsaw Pact was perceived. The following tables s

marize how effectively the “test and refine” aspect of game purpose influenced th

on some major issues.

BEFORE AFTER

Defend to avoid losing Attack to win

Concerns about survivability in D-Day

shoot-out at sea

Confidence in ability to defeat Red

Safety of SLOCs a major concern Aggressive use of SSNs relieves SLOC

pressure

Use SSNs in barrier to protect SLOCs SSNs attack to control Norwegian Sea

Red SSBNs secure in bastions Red SSBNs heavily attrited

Pessimism regarding survivability of CVs Moderate confidence in ability to use C

offensively

Keep naval surface ships out of eastern

Mediterranean

Use surface forces to control eastern

Mediterranean

Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia a major concern Considerably less so

Plan for early use of theater nuclear

weapons by Blue

No advantage to Blue from theater nuc

use

Non-Central Front battles trivial and of no

concern to Red

Non-Central Front battles interactive an

heavy

TABLE 1

Shifts In Naval Thinking

First Global Series 1979–1983

General War
The 1988 Global War Game was the last global to focus on war between the two

Superpowers.

Some Concluding Thoughts on Major Issues

Aside from the “shifts” in military and naval thinking alluded to above, the game had

substantial influence on some major issues that deserve examination in greater depth.

One of the principal benefits of the game was that it provided both the opportunity

and a forum for people with similar concerns to work and interact with each other. Although the number of participants was lower in the final game of the series (primarily

because it was a seminar planning-type evolution instead of an operational game), approximately ninety different government departments and agencies, educational and

research facilities, and various military commands participated. As noted above, there

was foreign participation as well, both on the military and civilian level. Certainly, no

other simulation, seminar, or other event existed that brought such a depth and

breadth of expertise to bear on the issue of potential superpower conflict. Clearly, the

issues raised and potential solutions to problems envisioned benefited from bringing

these people together. But the benefits extended beyond the game. Virtually all partic

ipants left the game with the business cards of individuals they had met and worked

with in Newport, with whom they could consult and advise in their “real world” jobs.

It seems beyond question that the defense planning establishment benefited from associations begun at Global.

One of the primary reasons for the existence of Global had been then CNO Admiral

Thomas B. Hayward’s concerns, expressed in 1978, that the navy did not have a clear

BEFORE AFTER

Use nuclear weapons early or lose Reason for optimism in conventional

campaign

NATO fight Red as far forward as possible NATO stresses maneuver vs positional

defense

Blue concerned about Red 4th generation air Blue deep penetration air strikes for FOFA

Naval concern for SLOC protection Naval emphasis on power projection

Little prospect for USMC employment Extensive MAF/MEF operations

AFNORTH, AFCENT, AFSOUTH fighting

separate wars

Coordinated, integrated strategy in Europe

AFSOUTH concentrates on defense of

Turkish Straits

AFSOUTH exploits offensive opportunities

Blue forces in Pacific react to Red Blue takes offensive to sink/bottle up Red

Shifts In Military Thinking

Second Global Series 1984–1988

Long War
Union. Consequently, one of the most important products of the Global War G

Series was a most significant contribution to what came to be known as “The Ma

Strategy.” That strategy might be summarized as follows:

• The war will be non-nuclear.

• A protracted war with sequential rollback operations would be planned.

• Offensive sea control operations were to be stressed.

• War termination leverage would be sought.

• Sea control was stressed to take advantage of U.S. economic mobilization.

It is evident from the contents of this paper that the GWG series contributed to a

these points in the course of its games.

There was considerable criticism of the Maritime Strategy from a number of qua

Regardless of the accuracy of that criticism, however, the value of the game as a g

to naval operations is not to be overlooked, both strategically and operationally. 

strategic level, it became clear that, despite apparent risks, a forward, offensive em

ment of naval forces not only protected the SLOCs, but paid dividends in provid

Blue with options that were not attainable through passive defense. At the opera

level, among other examples, the folly of deserting the Eastern Mediterranean wa

lesson learned very early on. That being the case, study had to be given to how c

operations could be conducted, what tactics needed to be invented, what technol

utilized or developed to facilitate such operations. Therefore, the impact of the g

on naval thinking went well beyond the Maritime Strategy per se.

Another over-arching issue that received much attention was what constituted vi

for each of the superpowers? Red was aware of its limitations and wanted a shor

followed by early negotiations. The VGK, however, was constantly frustrated by 

ability to bring about substantive talks with Blue. Further, lacking control of the 

and the air, Red found it extremely difficult to force Blue to negotiate or to surre

Red had, generally, succeeded in attaining most of its military objectives, but wit

unwilling to ratify that success at the conference table, Red faced the protracted w

that it desperately wanted to avoid.

Blue, fighting a defensive war within a defensive alliance, usually expressed its pr

war aim as the restoration of the territorial status quo ante bellum. This seemed

early games, to be a relatively modest goal. As the series progressed, however, Blu

gan to realize that achievement of that objective would probably have enormous 

cussions for Red and the Warsaw Pact. Huge losses to the Red Army, struggling
Warsaw Pact countries, both internally and externally, and, quite possibly, the primacy

of the CPSU itself. Blue felt it needed a better military situation on the Central Front

as a prerequisite to negotiations, but realized that sustainability and alliance cohesion

problems could be fatal.

While nuclear weapons were not used in the game, their influence permeated the proceedings. Real world questions, such as the likelihood and feasibility of limited nuclea

war at sea and whether or not chemical use by Red signaled nuclear use were discussed. The game itself, however, tended to raise questions regarding nuclear use that

tended to be original.

In general, Red saw no reason to contemplate first use of nuclear weapons. It was believed that Blue retaliation for such use could negate the assumed conventional superiority of the Red Army, and that further escalation would threaten the safety of the

homeland. However, the question of possible nuclear use was, for at least one General

Secretary of the CPSU, intimately connected to the issues of military success and war

termination. While previous games tended to show Red modifying military objectives

if NATO resistance took the offensive off its time-line, his belief was that, if the NATO

conventional defense was successful and the Central Front stabilized without the attainment for the Red minimum military objective, the failure of the vaunted Red Army

would:

• Threaten total collapse of the Eastern/Central European security structure, the

degradation of which had precipitated hostilities in the first place and

• Leave Red in an intolerable negotiating position vs. Blue.

As far as this General Secretary was concerned, Blue long war strategy was not the issue, the total Red security structure, internally and externally, would be threatened

with catastrophic collapse if Blue just stabilized the Central Front, let alone restored

the territorial status quo ante bellum. Thus the VGK considered the use of nuclear

weapons and asked the General Staff for a “survival strategy” utilizing them in circumstances that Blue did not anticipate.

At the time these games were conducted, it was assumed by the majority that a war in

Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union would see the use of tactical/

theater nuclear weapons in a fortnight, and that Blue defense on the Central Front required early use of them. A goal of this series was to test the concept of protracted,

conventional war, but players did have the option to go “off line” to discuss the ramifications of nuclear use. Excursions of this nature did take place, and Blue found the results unpalatable. Blue usually envisioned the use of ten to twenty weapons in the 20
based on the principal of “no first use but first decisive use” and involved retaliat

the form of several hundred weapons across the entire front. Thus, although Blu

on occasion, see possible advantage in modest nuclear use, the probable Red resp

was a most effective deterrent.

Thus, the games tended to indicate, in certain circumstances, the unexpected pos

ity that events could lead Red rather that Blue to contemplate the first use of nuc

weapons.

Just inside the door of the Conolly Hall spaces formerly occupied by the Office o

val Intelligence Detachment at the Naval War College stood a towering, cutout fi

a Soviet military officer. This was the original “ten-foot tall” Russian, whose pur

was to remind those who worked there of the dangers of “worst casing” the Red 

In spite of this, events of the late 1980s and early 1990s would appear to show th

Global “Red Team” seriously overestimated the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, p

ularly with regard to the seemingly endless parade of Red Strategic Echelons thro

against NATO forces on the Central Front.

Be that as it may, the overall series result was significant. While the first Global s

indicated that nuclear escalation worked to neither side’s advantage, the second t

to demonstrate that such escalation by NATO was not in fact necessary. Indeed, 

later events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made clear, the lessons learn

the Global War Games might have prevented nuclear catastrophe had war betwe

two alliances actually occurred.

AUGUST 1990

1 D-15 80% of Red submarines and surface combatants sortie

2 D-14

3 D-13

4 D-12 Red begins to mobilize air and ground forces

Red begins Spetsnaz operations in SWTVD/Med area

5 D-11

6 D-10 Blue marines arrive in Norway

7 D-9

8 D-8

9 D-7 Blue begins military mobilization

10 D-6

11 D-5

12 D-4

13 D-3

14 D-2 Red submarines mine anchorages at Augusta and Souda Bay

Suez Canal blocked by sinking of Red minelayer

15 D-1

16 D-Day Warsaw Pact offensive begins-concentration on NORTHAG

Red invades North Norway with 2 MRDs

Extensive and intense naval battles commence, worldwide

17 D+1 Red Spetsnaz attacks in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii

18 D+2 Red attacks on Adak, Shemya, and Amchitka

Red aircraft and SS-22s strike Chitose and Misawa

19 D+3

20 D+4 NATO counterattacks to northeast from Fulda

21 D+5 Red bombs Diego Garcia

22 D+6 NATO counterattack withdrawn after minimal success

23 D+7

24 D+8

25 D+9

26 D+10 Two CVBGs originally stationed off Cuba redeployed to UK

Red offensive reaches outskirts of Hamburg and Hanover

27 D+11 Two Polish armies invade Scheeswig-Holstein, cut off Denma

Red invades Hokkaido

28 D+12 Warsaw Pact offensive in NORTHAG resumes

29 D+13 Red forces cross Elbe River, Bremerhaven captured

Warsaw Pact begins southern offensive toward Munich

30 D+14

31 D+15 Munich and Augsburg fall, Red presses on toward Stuttgart

North Korea invades South Korea

SEPTEMBER 1990

1 D+16

2 D+17

3 D+18
Red advance on Stuttgart halted

Red Second Strategic Echelon Closes

5 D+20 Red opens strong attack on Frankfurt

Red reinforces Jutland, renews offensive into Denmark

6 D+21

7 D+22 NATO amphibious landing on western side of Jutland

Weser line holds in NORTHAG

Red drive on Frankfurt contained

8 D+23 Warsaw Pact suspends offensive to await reinforcements

TLAM C strikes by Blue against Murmansk area

9 D+24

10 D+25 Blue pulls SSNs out of Kara Sea and reduces those in Barents

11 D+26 NATO counterattack begins; French divisions attack toward Halle

NORTHAG attacks south of Hamburg toward Magdeburg

12 D+27 NATO airborne units capture Halle

13 D+28

14 D+29 French link-up with airborne in Halle

NATO northern pincer held by Red at Luneburg

Jutland beachhead stable

CENTAG attacking toward Brunswick

Red Third Strategic Echelon arriving

15 D+30 NATO offensives continue against heavy Red opposition

French cross IGB headed for Magdeburg and Leipzig

NORTHAG pincer swings south toward Celle

Red deploys 14 SSN/SSGN for anti-SLOC campaign

Blue SSNs foil Red amphibious attempt to flank Skibotn line

16 D+31

17 D+32 Massive Red attack damages LINCOLN and MIDWAY off Japan

Red begins withdrawal of Hokkaido invasion force

18 D+33 NATO northern and southern pincers meet at Celle

19 D+34

20 D+35 Red pressure causes withdrawal of all three NATO offensives

Red sorties 11 diesel SS against CVBGs operating in North Sea

21 D+36 Full closure of Third Strategic Echelon restores initiative to Red

22 D+37 Red offensives in progress toward Bremen, Frankfurt, Stuttgart

23 D+38 Red OSCAR SSGN launches only successful ASCM attack of war

24 D+39 RANGER heavily damaged by massive Red air attack off Japan

25 D+40 North Korean invasion stalled, Seoul retained by South Korea

26 D+41

27 D+42

28 D+43

29 D+44

30 D+45

OCTOBER 1990

1 D+46

2 D+47 NATO offensive commence in Thrace

3 D+48 End of GWG ’84
NOVEMBER 1990

10 D-10 Blue notes indication of widespread Red/WP mobilization

Red issues demarche to Norway; offers French neutrality

11 D-9

12 D-8 WP forces move to “threat of war” readiness level

Congress votes “State of Emergency”; mobilization ordered

NATO declares “simple alert”

NATO “Rapid Reinforcement Plan” (RRP) implemented

13 D-7

14 D-6

15 D-5

16 D-4

17 D-3 Red/WP forces at state of “full combat readiness”

18 D-2

19 D-1 NATO declares “reinforced alert”

20 D-Day Red/WP commences multi-front offensive into FRG

NATO declares “general alert”

Extensive and intensive naval battles commence worldwide

Eisenhower torpedoed in Med, operational after 24 hrs.

21 D+1 France mobilizes, lead elements sent to FRG

Clemonceau sunk, FOCH damaged by Red sub in Med

22 D+2 Red SAG attacks Panama Canal; closed for one week

23 D+3 Red/WP commences attack through Austria toward Bavaria

Kennedy torpedoed in Med, OOA for six hours

Nimitz torpedoed, in Pacific, under tow

24 D+4 Austrian forces come under NATO command

Red surface ships in Indian Ocean eliminated

25 D+5 Nimitz hit by ASCM attack, under tow to Hawaii

26 D+6 Hamburg falls to Red

Polish offensive on Denmark held at Kiel Canal

AFNORTH authorized by DPC to attack Red homeland

27 D+7 Red achieves breakthrough in vicinity of Kassel

28 D+8 Blue III Corps counterattacks to seal breakthrough

Blue four-carrier CVBG enters Norwegian Sea

29 D+9 CVBGs launch strike on Kola

30 D+10 French 1st and 2nd armies defending WP drive on Munich

Italian battalion size units advance toward Innsbruck

DECEMBER 1990

1 D+11 Blue MAF successfully ashore at Esbjerg, Denmark

Coral Sea sunk by Red air to surface missile attack

Red/WP forces cross Kiel Canal

2 D+12

3 D+13

4 D+14 Independence torpedoed in Vestfjord, taken under tow

5 D+15 Independence torpedoed again, under tow, Trondheim

Greek and Turkish units stage limited attacks in Bulgaria
Lincoln to Yokosuka , damaged in same attack

7 D+17 Italians enter Innsbruck

8 D+18 End of GWG ’85

Red invades North Norway

9 D+19 Beginning of GWG ’86

10 D+20 Italian Alpini reach outskirts of Munich

11 D+21 Red attacks between Stuttgart and French border with 29 divisions

Ark Royal torpedoed, under tow for Bergen

12 D+22 Red crosses Rhine at Mannheim

Italian mechanized units in slow advance toward Munich

13 D+23

14 D+24 Red Second Strategic Echelon Closes

Greeks and Turks commence major offensive in Bulgaria

15 D+25

16 D+26 Red offensive breaks NATO defenses, crosses Weser

Italians fighting Red/Hungarian forces in Munich

Burgas falls to the Turks

Red attacks Japan with SS-12 missiles and aircraft

Kitty Hawk hit in dry dock, OOA for one year

17 D+27 Blue/NATO begin insertion of surface ships in Black Sea

PRC sends additional five divisions to border of Red

18 D+28

19 D+29 Red invades eastern Turkey

20 D+30 Forrestal torpedoed and sunk off Norfolk

21 D+31

22 D+32

23 D+33 Red Third Strategic Echelon Closes

24 D+34 Blue III and UK Corps destroyed

Greek/Turkish offensive stalls at Sofia and Varna

25 D+35 Red offensive penetrates into Benelux and south France

French armies come under NATO command

26 D+36

27 D+37 Blue air strike into Kola damages nuclear power plant

28 D+38

29 D+39 1st MAB takes Shikotan by heliborne assault

30 D+40 SACEUR opens five-phase offensive

Dikes opened east of Amsterdam to slow Red advance

I and II MAF commence attack toward Wittenberge

31 D+41

JANUARY 1991

1 D+42 End of GWG ’86

Red launches counter attack against Turks in Bulgaria

Iowa enters Black Sea

Iowa torpedoed, taken under tow

Red offensive reaches Skibotn line in North Norway
Munich and Salzburg fall to Italians

3 D+44 Red begins limited anti-SLOC campaign

Eisenhower severely damaged in Pireaus by SS-12s

4 D+45

5 D+46 VGK authorizes use of chemical weapons by WTVD CDR

6 D+47

7 D+48

8 D+49 Red uses chemical weapons vs NATO units in Jutland

Red Fourth Strategic Echelon begins to arrive, piecemeal

9 D+50 Red uses chemical weapons vs CENTAG on Rhine

10 D+51 VGK, concerned about escalation, prohibits chem. use

11 D+52 Blue retaliates with chem. attack on two Czech airfields

12 D+53 SACEUR launches GOLDEN SWORD counteroffensive

13 D+54 Spetsnaz sinks ship in Panama lock, closes it three wks.

14 D+55

15 D+56 NATO forces break out of Jutland

Italians cross Danube

16 D+57 GOLDEN SWORD advancing 50 km/day

Red resumes chemical weapons use

Jutland breakout halted by heavy Red resistance

Italians come under AFCENT command

17 D+58 Fifth Strategic Echelon closes

18 D+59

19 D+60 Erzurum (Turkey) falls to Red

20 D+61 NATO forces cross IGB into GDR

Red forces cross into Turkey south of Burgas

21 D+62 Leipzig falls to NATO; Elbe River reached

Italians, AFCENT units link up at Ansbach

Operation ICE PICK conducted in North Norway

Multi-regiment air attack on CVBG in Vestfjord

DPRK invades South Korea

Operation PISTOL PETE, Blue invasion of Uturup

Red attacks Alaska with missiles from two SSGNs

22 D+63

23 D+64 End of GWG ’87

Partial List of Participating Organizations

Department of Commerce

Department of Defense

Department of Energy

Department of Justice

Department of Labor

Department of State

Department of Transportation

Department of the Treasury

Bureau of Mines

Bureau of Selective Service

Central Intelligence Agency

CNO Executive Panel

Defense Intelligence Agency

Federal Emergency Management Agency

General Accounting Office

Joint Chiefs of Staff

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

National Security Agency

National Security Council

World Bank

Applied Physics Laboratory

David Taylor Model Basin

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory

Naval Research Laboratory

Naval Underwater Systems Command

Sandia National Laboratory
Army School of Command and Staff

Army War College

National Defense University

Naval War College

Navy Postgraduate School

Also participating were about twenty Corporations and numerous military organizations representing joint and unified comands and all of the armed services and the

Coast Guard.
Glossary

Abbreviations

A A/C aircraft

ACE NATO Allied Command Europe

ADM atomic demolition mines

Aegis Blue USN Integrated Antiair Warfare Weapons Sy

AFCE NATO Allied Forces Command Europe

AFCENT NATO Allied Forces Central Europe

AFNORTH NATO Allied Forces Northern Europe

AFSOUTH NATO Allied Forces Southern Europe

AG NATO army group

AI air intercept

Alpini Italian Light Infantry trained and equipped 

fight in the mountains

AMPHIBS slang expression for amphibious warfare sh

AOR area of responsibility

ASAT antisatellite weapon

ASCM air-to-surface cruise missile [or]

antiship cruise missile

ASUW antisurface warfare

ASW antisubmarine warfare

AWACS Blue Airborne Warning and Control System

B BAI battlefield air interdiction

BBBG Blue battleship battle group

Benelux Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg
Boomer slang expression for ballistic missile submarine

BW biological weapon(s)/warfare

C C3 command, control, and communications

C3I command, control, communications, and

intelligence

CAP combat air patrol

CAS close air support

CAST NATO Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade

CENTAG NATO Central Army Group

CHOP change of operational control

CINCLANT Blue Commander-in-Chief Atlantic

CINCPAC Blue Commander-in-Chief Pacific

CINCSOUTH NATO Commander-in-Chief South

CIWS Close-in Weapons System

CJTF Blue Commander Joint Task Force

CNO Blue Chief of Naval Operations

COMMARFOREUR NATO Commander Marine Forces Europe

COMNON NATO Commander North Norway

COMSECONDFLT Blue Commander Second Fleet

COMSTRIKEFLTLANT NATO Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic

CONUS Continental United States

COSMOS 929 Red reconnaissance satellite

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CVBF Blue aircraft carrier battle force

CVBG Blue aircraft carrier battle group

CW chemical weapon(s)/warfare
D D-Day day on which war begins

DIW dead in the water

DMZ demilitarized zone

DOT Blue Department of Transportation

DPC NATO Defense Planning Committee

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

(North Korea)

E EASTLANT Eastern Atlantic Area

ENWGS Enhanced Naval Warfare Gaming System

Eskadra Red squadron (Russian)

ETA estimated time of arrival

ETR estimated time of repair

EW early warning [or] electronic warfare

F FEBA forward edge of battle area

FETVD Red Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations

Finnish Wedge that part of Finland north and west of the

juncture of the borders of Finland, Norway

and the USSR

FLOT forward line of troops

FRG Federal Republic of Germany (West Germa

G GCI ground control intercept

GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germa

GIN GAP ocean spaces between Greenland, Iceland,

and Norway

GIUK GAP ocean spaces between Greenland, Iceland,

and United Kingdom

GRU Red military intelligence directorate controlled

by the General Staff

H HFDF high frequency direction finding
I I and W indication and warning

ID infantry division

IGB inter-German border

INF Independent Nuclear Force (France)

J JCS Blue Joint Chiefs of Staff

K KIA killed in action

L LEO low earth orbit

LOC(s) line(s) of communication

LRA Red long-range aviation

M MAB Blue Marine Amphibious Brigade

MAC Blue Military Airlift Command

MAF Blue Marine Amphibious Force

MARDEZLANT Blue Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic

MCM mine countermeasures

MD Red military district

MERSHIP(s) slang expression for merchant ship(s)

MEF Blue Marine Expeditionary Force

MIDEASTFOR Blue USN Middle East Force

MODLOC Blue modified location—a geographic point

about which ships maneuver

MPS Blue maritime prepositioning ships

MRD Red Motorized Rifle Division

MVD Red Ministry of Internal Affairs

N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA Blue National Command Authority
NORTHAG NATO Northern Army Group

NSC Blue National Security Council

NSWP Red Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact

NWACM Navy War Air Combat Model

NWC Naval War College

NWTVD Red Northwestern Theater of Military Operatio

O OCA offensive counter air

OPLAN plan of operations

OTHR over-the-horizon radar

P PACAF Blue Pacific Air Forces (USAF)

PACOM Blue Pacific Command (headed by CINCPAC)

PLA People’s Liberation Army (PRC)

POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants

PRC People’s Republic of China

Q Q ROUTES protected shipping lanes swept for both

mines and submarines

R Rangers Blue Army unit trained for long-range reconnais

and special operations

RC-135 Blue electronic reconnaissance aircraft

Red Soviet Union

REFORGER NATO Return of Forces to Germany

REINFORCED ALERT NATO alliance mobilization step

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

S SACEUR NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SACLANT NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

SAF Red Soviet Air Forces
SAM surface-to-air missile

SHF SATCOM super-high-frequency satellite communications

SIGINT signals intelligence

SIOP Blue single integrated operational plan for

nuclear war

SLOC(s) sea line(s) of communication

SNA Red Soviet Naval Aviation

SNI Red Soviet Naval Infantry

SOF Blue special operations forces

SOSUS Blue sound surveillance system

SOVINDRON Red Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron

SOVMEDRON Red Soviet Mediterranean Sea Squadron

SPETSNAZ Red special operations forces

USSR designation: troops of special designation

SQR-19 Blue passive long-range towed sonar array

SRF Red Soviet Rocket Forces

SUBACLANT NATO Submarine Allied Commander Atlantic

SWAPS southwestern approaches (to the

English Channel)

SWTVD Red Southwestern Theater of Military Operations

T TACAIR tactical aircraft operations

TACNUC tactical nuclear weapon

TACOPS theater and corps operations and

planning simulation

TASM Blue Tomahawk antiship missile

Thin line array Blue towed passive sonar system

TVD Red theater of military operations

U UHF SATCOM ultra-high-frequency satellite communications
USA Blue U.S. Army

USAF Blue U.S. Air Force

USCG Blue U.S. Coast Guard

USMC Blue U.S. Marine Corps

USN Blue U.S. Navy

V VACAPES Virginia Capes—just seaward of Norfolk

VGK Red Supreme High Command

W WESTLANT Western Atlantic

WMD weapons of mass destruction

WP Warsaw Pact

WTVD Red Western Theater of Military Operations

Platforms and Weapons

A A-6 Blue two-seat carrier-based bomber for

CAS, interdiction, and deep strike

AGI auxiliary vessel general intelligence purpose

Akula Red fleet submarine (SSN)

AOE fast combat support ship

AS-4 Red air-to-surface missile with a range of about

185nm (Kitchen)

AS-6 Red air-to-surface missile with a range of about

185nm (Kingfish)

B B-1 Blue long-range multirole strategic bomber

B-52 Blue long-range multirole strategic bomber

Backfire Red twin-jet medium bomber and maritime

reconnaissance and attack A/C (Tu-26)

Badger Red twin-jet medium bomber and maritime

reconnaissance and attack A/C (Tu-16)
Bear Red four-turboprop long-range bomber and

maritime reconnaissance A/C (Tu-95)

Blinder Red twin-jet supersonic bomber and maritime

reconnaissance A/C (Tu-22)

BLKCON 5 Red aircraft carrier (CV) 67,000 tons

(Leonid Brezhnev)

C CA cruiser (all-gun armament)

CapTor Blue deep-water antisubmarine mine

(encapsulated Mk-46 torpedo)

CG guided missile cruiser

Charlie Red cruise missile submarine (SSGN)

CV aircraft carrier

CVN nuclear-powered aircraft carrier

D DD destroyer

DDG guided missile destroyer

E E-3 Blue airborne warning and control platform (AWACS)

Echo Red cruise missile submarine (SSGN)

F F-14 Blue twin-seat carrier-based multirole fighter

F-111 Blue twin-seat multirole attack aircraft

Fencer Red two-seat attack aircraft (Su-24)

FF frigate

FFG guided missile frigate

FFL light frigate

Flanker Red single-seat all-weather fighter with attack

capability (Su-27)

Flogger Red single-seat fighter (MiG-27)

Forger Red ship-based V/STOL aircraft (Yak-38)

Foxhound Red two-seat all-weather interceptor (MiG-31)
FPB fast patrol boat

Fulcrum Red all-weather fighter with attack

capability (MiG-29)

H Harpoon Blue medium-range antiship cruise missile

HAWK Blue land-based medium-range

surface-to-air missile

I IL-38 Red intermediate-range shore-based

ASW/maritime patrol aircraft (MAY)

J Juliett Red cruise missile submarine (SSG)

K Kara Red cruiser (CG)

USSR designation: large antisubmarine ship

Kashin and

Mod Kashin

Red guided missile destroyer (DDG)

USSR designation: large antisubmarine ship

Kiev Red VSTOL aircraft carrier (CV)

USSR designation: tactical air-capable cruis

Kilo Red submarine (SS)

Kirov Red battle cruiser

USSR designation: nuclear-powered missile c

Koni Red frigate (FF)

USSR designation: escort ship

Kresta I Red cruiser (CG)

USSR designation: missile cruiser

Kresta II Red cruiser (CG)

USSR designation: large antisubmarine ship

Krivak I & II Red guided missile frigate (FFG)

USSR designation: escort ship

Kynda Red cruiser (CG)

USSR designation: missile cruiser

L LHA amphibious assault ship (general purpose)

LHD amphibious assault ship (multipurpose)

LSD landing ship dock
M Mainstay Red early warning and control aircraft (IL-76)

MiG-21 Red single-seat fighter (Fishbed)

MK-57 Blue submarine or ship-laid moored mine

MPA Blue maritime patrol aircraft

N Nanuchka Red missile corvette

USSR designation: small missile ship

November Red submarine (SSN)

O Oscar Red cruise missile submarine (SSGN)

P P-3 Blue maritime patrol aircraft

R Ro/Ro merchant ship with vehicle roll-on, roll-off design

RPV remotely piloted vehicle

S SA-6 Red surface-to-air missile (Gainful)

Scud Red Army battlefield missile (SS-1)

Sierra Red submarine (SSN)

SL-7 Blue fast merchant ship

Slava Red cruiser (CG)

USSR designation: rocket cruiser

SM-1 Blue standard missile 1—shipboard surfaceto-air missile

SM1-ER-BTN Blue standard missile 1—extended-range

nuclear warhead

SM-2 Blue standard missile 2—shipboard surfaceto-air missile

Sovremenny Red destroyer (DD)

USSR designation: destroyer

Spetznaz Red special operations forces

USSR designation: troops of special designation

SR-71 Blue strategic reconnaissance aircraft

SS submarine (nonnuclear)
(Scaleboard)

SS-22 Red tactical surface-to-surface missile

SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarin

SSGN nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine

SSM surface-to-surface missile

SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine

SS-N-12 Red surface or subsurface launched antiship

missile (Sandbox)

SS-N-19 Red supersonic antiship cruise missile

SUBACLANT NATO Submarine Allied Commander Atlantic

Sverdlov Red cruiser (CA) USSR designation: cruiser

T T-AGOS Blue auxiliary ocean surveillance ship

(civilian manned)

TANGO Red submarine (SS)

TLAM(C) Blue Tomahawk land attack missile (convention

TLAM(N) Blue Tomahawk land attack missile (nuclear)

Tornado NATO twin-engine all-weather multipurpose

combat aircraft

U U-2 Blue high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft

Udaloy Red destroyer (DD)

USSR designation: large antisubmarine ship

Y Yankee Red ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)

About the Author

Captain Robert H. Gile was sworn into the Navy as a midshipman in the fall of 1

He attended Dartmouth College on an NROTC scholarship, and graduated with 

commission in 1956. Captain Gile served six years on active duty and twenty-fou

the Naval Reserve. During his last reserve tour, he began working with Bud Hay, 

Director of Advanced Concepts at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Captain 

affiliation with the Global War Game began in 1983, and he has been involved w

every Global since that time. He and Mr. Hay coauthored the first volume of Glo

War Game history, which was published as Newport Paper Number Four in 1993

Mr. Gile is Vice President, Investments, in the Concord, New Hampshire, office o

national brokerage company. He has served as an elected representative in the Ne

Hampshire State Legislature and as Chairman of the Board of Education in Fran

New Hampshire. He is Coach of Debate at St. Paul’s School in Concord, New Ha

shire, and President of the Debating Association of New England Independent S

Titles in the Series

“Are We Beasts?” Churchill and the Moral Question of World War II “Area Bombin

Christopher C. Harmon (December 1991).

Toward a Pax Universalis: A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy f

1990s, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (April 1992)

The “New” Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, by Horace B. Robe

Jr. (October 1992).

Global War Game: The First Five Years, by Bud Hay and Bob Gile (June 1993).

Beyond Mahan: A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century, b

Colonel Gary W. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps (August 1993).

The Burden of Trafalgar: Decisive Battle and Naval Strategic Expectations on the E

the First World War, by Jan S. Breemer (October 1993).

Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German S

by Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army (June 1994).

Physics and Metaphysics of Deterrence: The British Approach, by Myron A. Greenb

(December 1994).

A Doctrine Reader: The Navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, an

Spain, by James J. Tritten and Vice Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy (Retired)

(December 1995).

Chaos Theory: The Essentials for Military Applications, by Major Glenn E. James, 

Air Force (October 1996).

The International Legal Ramifications of United States Counter-Proliferation Strat

Problems and Prospects, by Frank Gibson Goldman (April 1997).

What Color Helmet? Reforming Security Council Peacekeeping Mandates, by Myro

Nordquist (August 1997).

Sailing New Seas, by Admiral J. Paul Reason, U.S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief, U

Atlantic Fleet, with David G. Freymann (March 1998).

Theater Ballistic Missile Defense from the Sea: Issues for the Maritime Component 

mander, by Commander Charles C. Swicker, U.S. Navy (August 1998).

International Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution Conv

during International Armed Conflict, by Dr. Sonja Ann Jozef Boelaert-Suominen

(December 2000).
marines, by Owen R. Cote, Jr. (2003).

The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs

by Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds (2003).

Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next: The Defense Industrial

Implications of Network-Centric Warfare, by Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, and

Andrew L. Ross (2003).

The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, by John B. Hattendorf

(2004).