An Analysis of First 

Responder Grant Funding

PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE 

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

Christopher Cox, Chairman 
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Page 1 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On September 11, 2001, our Nation’s first responders rose to the challenge of the most 

serious terrorist attack on the American homeland in our history. In the weeks that followed, 

Congress moved swiftly to appropriate funds to enhance the ability of our first responders to 

prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism. In the two subsequent years, Congress 

went even further, increasing terrorism preparedness grant programs for first responders more 

than 2000% over 2001 levels.1

Yet, two and one half years later, first responders across the Nation report that they have 

not yet received the vast majority of the $6.3 billion that Congress and the Administration have 

allocated in terrorism preparedness grants since 

September 11.2 In fact, roughly $5.2 billion in 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant 

money remains in the administrative pipeline, 

waiting to be used by our first responders to, among 

other things, enhance the interoperability of their 

communications, purchase protective gear and 

radiological, biological and chemical agent 

detectors, and improve training and exercises for 

responding to terrorist events.3 Under President 

Bush’s most recent budget proposal, another $2.6 

billion likely will be added to the pipeline by the end of this year.4

There also have been numerous reports suggesting that the first responder monies that 

have been received and spent to date have not necessarily gone to the first responders who need 

it most, or for projects that materially enhance our homeland security.5

At the direction of Chairman Cox and Subcommittee Chairman Shadegg, Committee 

staff undertook a review to determine: (1) whether DHS was making its terrorism preparedness 

grant funds available to States in a timely and effective manner; (2) how DHS terrorism 

preparedness grants were being allocated by States among their internal jurisdictions, and how 

quickly; (3) how these grants were being utilized by States and localities; and (4) the reasons 

for any delay in expenditures of these funds by state and local recipients. 

 To accomplish these objectives, Committee staff collected and reviewed data provided 

by the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) on Fiscal Year 2002 (FY 2002) and Fiscal Year 

2003 (FY 2003) grant programs, including the Homeland Security Grant Program and the 

Urban Area Security Initiative. This data illustrates the amount and rate at which Federal grant 
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Page 2 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

assistance has been expended. In order to understand the manner in which grant funds are 

allocated once they have been awarded by the Federal government, Committee staff also 

contacted all 50 States to discuss the method of grant distribution. To further understand the 

bureaucratic obstacles that must be overcome in order to utilize the grants, the Committee 

contacted state and local officials in 15 specific States for follow-up conversations. These States 

include: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, New 

Hampshire, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin. 

 Based on a review of the grant data and other information collected, Committee staff 

found that: 

 1. DHS awarded homeland security grant funds to States reasonably quickly, but 

without any real assessment of need or risk (except for the Urban Area Security Initiative). 

 2. Almost one-third of all States allocated money among their internal jurisdictions 

without regard to need or risk (other than population), and those that applied risk or need factors 

did not follow any standard approach to doing so. 

 3. There were no Federal terrorism preparedness standards or goals to guide 

expenditure of funds at the state and local levels, leading to numerous examples of questionable 

spending. 

 4. Only a very small portion of awarded funds has been utilized to date by state and 

local recipients. Committee staff found a myriad of explanations for this delay, but identified 

four common causes: planning to spend the grant, which often occurred late in the grant 

process, after the grant was awarded and obligated to localities; obtaining local board approval 

of grant spending; fulfilling state and local procurement regulations; and setting aside funds that 

could be used to purchase equipment while waiting for reimbursement from DHS. 

I. DHS Awards and the Federal Allocation System 

Our review of the 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program (hereinafter, SHSGP) 

and the 2003 Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program 

(hereinafter, UASI) found that DHS obligated 100% of its grant 

funds to States in a reasonable time period following receipt of 

Congressional appropriations for this purpose. For example, the FY 

2003 SHSGP appropriations were enacted in February 2003. Fifteen 

days later, ODP announced the amount each State would receive, 

and ODP awarded the grants to 96% of the States by the end of May 

2003. Similarly, the FY 2003 supplemental appropriations bill was 

enacted in April 2003. Fifteen days later, ODP announced the 

amount each State would receive, and by early July 2003, ODP had 

awarded all of that additional money to each State.6

At the time the PATRIOT Act was enacted into law 

(October 2001), total funding covered 

by this formula was 

less than $100 million per year
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Page 3 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

However, the technical obligation of these funds to States did not necessarily mean that 

the funds were available for expenditure without further conditions or review by ODP. For the 

2002 and 2003 SHSGP Part I Grants, ODP conditioned expenditure on approval of state or 

local spending plans and this delayed the effective date of availability of funds. For example, in 

FY 2002 ODP awarded California $24,831,000 on September 13, 2002, but imposed special 

conditions prohibiting expenditure or draw down of funds until detailed spending plans were 

provided. It was not until February 25, 2003, that the special conditions were lifted and the 

funds became available for draw down. For SHSGP Part II, ODP imposed no special conditions 

affecting the availability of funds for draw down and this significantly expedited the process. 

The State of California was awarded its grant on June 20, 2003, and by June 24, 2003, funds 

were available for draw down.7

With respect to method of allocation among the States, DHS followed, in part, a formula 

set by the Congress that provided each State with a guaranteed minimum amount of State 

formula grants, regardless of risk or need. Specifically, section 1014 of the USA PATRIOT 

Act (42 USCS § 3714), passed by Congress in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th

attacks, guaranteed each State 0.75% of the total amount appropriated to DHS for state 

terrorism preparedness grants, and provided smaller guaranteed amounts for certain U.S. 

territories.8 These guaranteed funds amount to almost 40% of the total funding. At the time the 

PATRIOT Act was enacted into law (October 2001), total funding 

covered by this formula was less than $100 million per year, 

providing for a guaranteed minimum of less than $1 million per 

State.9 However, due to the 20-fold increase in this program between 

Fiscal Years 2001 and 2003, roughly $800 million of the $2.06 billion 

appropriated for the state formula grants in FY 2003 was distributed 

according to this formula, giving each State a minimum of 

approximately $15 million, regardless of risk or need.10

Compared to other formula grants administered by the Federal 

government, this minimum percentage guarantee is unusually large – 

of a sampling of the largest Federal grant programs to States in FY 

2003, totaling over $200 billion, 75 percent of those funds were free 

from any minimum guarantees, and even when a minimum guarantee 

was included in a program’s formula, the guaranteed percentage was 

much lower, typically between 0.25 and 0.5 percent.11

After 40% of the State formula grants were divided and distributed as specified in the 

PATRIOT Act, ODP then apportioned the remaining 60% of such funds among the States based 

solely on population, with each State receiving an additional share of funding. For even the 

smallest State, this approach meant additional funding of $2 million on top of its guaranteed 

minimum.12 In FY 2003, the combined ODP allocation method thus resulted in each State 

receiving at least $17.5 million. In contrast, most grant programs administered by the Federal 

Almost one-third of 

our Nation’s States 

distributed their 

Federal first responder funds – totaling over $650 

million ... by formulas that did not 

account for either 

need or risk 
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Page 4 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

government that ensure minimum funding for States first allocate funds according to 

meritorious factors (such as need or risk), and only then “top off” those States that have not 

reached the guaranteed minimum level.13 By funding the entire state minimum first and then 

adding additional funding to every State based on population, the State formula grants allocate 

an even greater percentage of total funding without any real assessment of risk or need. While 

Congress mandated the state minimum, Congress did not require that the remaining 60% of the 

money be apportioned based on population; nor did Congress require that the state minimum 

serve as a base upon which additional funds would be allocated. 

The ramifications of these funding decisions are profound. The system has provided small 

counties across the country with 

relatively large awards of terrorism 

preparedness money, while major 

cities such as New York, Los 

Angeles, Washington, and Chicago 

struggle to address their needs in a 

near-constant heightened alert 

environment. For example, a rural 

county in Wyoming (population 

11,500) was awarded $546,000 in 

2003 State formula grants. By 

contrast, Jefferson County, Kentucky 

(population 693,604), which 

encompasses the city of Louisville, 

received just $237,000 more than the 

Wyoming county in 2003 – despite the fact that Jefferson County has 60 times the population, a 

significant amount of critical infrastructure, and was recently designated by DHS as a highthreat urban area for purposes of the FY 2004 UASI program.14

II. State Awards and Allocation Systems 

Under Federal law and ODP requirements, States must obligate or pass through 80% of 

the funds received under the State formula grants for use by localities within 45 days of award 

by ODP. This same requirement applies to most UASI funds. Nearly all States have met this 

requirement with respect to 2003 funding as of February 2004. However, as with ODP 

obligation percentages, these numbers can be misleading with respect to the actual availability 

of funds for expenditures by localities.15 For example, the City of Seattle only recently 

received authorization to begin spending the $30 million it had been awarded by ODP in May 

2003.16

With respect to method of allocation, many States follow the Federal government’s 

example by providing a base amount to each county, with an additional amount based on 
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Page 5 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

population. In fact, almost one-third of our Nation’s States distributed their Federal first 

responder funds – totaling over $650 million in FY 2003 – by formulas that did not account for 

either need or risk (other than population).17 These States allocated funds on a basis similar to 

the Federal government’s method. States that have adopted this latter approach include: 

Arizona, California, Kentucky, Montana, Utah, and Washington (see Appendix 1: State 

Allocation Method to Sub-Grantees). 

In Kentucky, for example, the State’s decision to allocate 2003 funds based on the 

Federal method resulted in Jefferson 

County, home to the City of Louisville 

and 25% of the entire population of 

Kentucky, receiving only 2% of the $9 

million in the first round of SHSGP 

funding, and only 3% of the $20.6 

million in the second round of 

funding.18

Some States have recognized the 

inadequacies of the Federal model and 

have incorporated threat, vulnerability, 

and risk factors into their funding 

decisions. Massachusetts, for example, decided to allocate funds based on identified threats. 

The State developed a grant process that relied on competition among grantees for the most 

compelling projects to be funded, on the theory that not all areas of the State were as equally 

vulnerable to attack. Wisconsin also incorporated need and threat factors into its funding 

formula. After the State allocated 50% of grants based on population, it partnered with local 

communities to allocate 20% based on threat, 10% on vulnerability, and 20% on need.19

Other States that have incorporated at least some threat, risk, or vulnerability factors into 

their funding formulas include Idaho, Oklahoma, Oregon, Louisiana, Iowa, New Mexico, 

Nevada, and Rhode Island. However, the risk-based approaches of the States varied widely due 

to a lack of Federal guidance and insufficient sharing of threat and vulnerability information, 

according to staff interviews. Accordingly, very few States weighted such risk factors heavily in 

their funding formulas. 

 In fact, many of the States that followed the Federal formula in FY 2003 told Committee 

staff in interviews that they plan to move towards a more threat-, vulnerability-, and risk-based 

approach for the FY 2004 allocation of first responder monies, stressing the need to distribute 

funding in a more focused and effective manner. Kentucky, for example, recognized the 

disparities in funding that were the result of its decisions on 2003 grant allocations and has 

changed its Homeland Security Grant Programs for FY 2004 to a more threat-based approach, 

reserving $5 million of its funding for high-threat areas in the State.20
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Page 6 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

III. Lack of Federal Terrorism Preparedness Goals 

Common sense suggests that a mid-size Midwestern city with a nuclear power plant to 

the north and a row of chemical facilities to the south has different (and greater) terrorism 

preparedness needs than a similarly-sized city without such critical infrastructures, or a smaller, 

rural community without any attractive terrorist targets. But, due to the lack of clear strategic 

guidance from the Federal level about the definition and objectives of terrorism preparedness, 

communities across America report that they do not know how 

best to spend their Federal grant dollars. Based on Committee 

staff interviews with state and local officials across the country, 

it is clear that there currently is no consistent methodology for 

States and localities to determine their terrorism preparedness 

needs or what their preparedness goals should be. The lack of 

target goals and guidance has resulted in terrorism preparedness 

dollars being spent on equipment or projects of only marginal 

utility to homeland security. 

For example, Committee staff interviewed an official 

from a small rural county of 49,405 people in the State of 

Washington. Its principal industries are logging and Christmas 

tree farming. In FY 2003, the county received $132,000 in 

homeland security funds. With those funds, the county 

purchased a $63,000 decontamination hazmat unit that is being 

stored in a crate in a metal warehouse across the street from the 

county sheriff’s office – an expensive item for a county that does 

not even have a Hazmat team and little, if any, critical 

infrastructure. In an interview with Committee staff, an official with the county sheriff’s 

Department wondered at the choices that were being made: “We are a small rural county, not a 

high-risk threat area. This specialized equipment will go to waste sitting on a shelf collecting 

dust.”21

The lack of preparedness goals also has led to miscommunication between States and 

localities as to what capabilities need to be funded. For example, this same county submitted a 

request for basic radios to outfit its law enforcement, but the State, purchasing on its behalf, 

instead delivered six encrypted radios worth $3,856 each, which turned out to be incompatible 

with the county’s existing radio system and could not be used. This mishap led one county 

official to comment: “This is a lot of money with no forethought. Not a lot of thought has gone 

into this and how we can best use funds for our particular type of community.”22

The lack of defined preparedness goals – combined with the breadth of the ODP 

purchasing guidelines – lead many state officials to confess that the ODP program is treated as 

a wish list. ODP guidelines include 18 general equipment categories, including protective gear, 

Based on Committee 

staff interviews with 

state and local officials 

across the country, it is 

clear that there currently is no consistent 

methodology for States 

and localities to determine their terrorism 

preparedness needs or 

what their preparedness 

goals should be 
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Page 7 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

animal-restraint devices, airplanes, boats, and medications. While flexibility is valuable and 

allows States and localities to tailor funding to meet the unique needs of their individual 

communities, flexibility in the absence of target goals for preparedness fails to guarantee that 

funds will be spent on actual needs. The lack of clear preparedness objectives led Supervisor 

Mike Thomas of Outgamie County, Wisconsin to equate the array of purchases available 

through the grant to “a Christmas list ... from a mail-order catalog.”23 An official from the 

rural county in Washington discussed above echoed these sentiments: “Some of the equipment 

on the ODP list we don’t even recognize. We think, well this looks good, maybe we’ll need it. 

We’re getting stuff we won’t use. This equipment could have gone to Seattle where the real 

threat is.”24

Other examples include the State of Missouri, which used several million of its 

homeland security dollars to purchase 13,000 chem-bio warfare suits at $400 a piece – one for 

each and every full-time law enforcement officer in the State, regardless of the type of 

community in which he or she works.25 In Colchester, Vermont (population 18,000), officials 

used $58,000 to buy a search and rescue vehicle capable of boring through concrete to search 

for victims in collapsed buildings.26 And, in Grand Forks, North Dakota (population 70,000), 

officials stocked up on biochemical suits and decontamination tents, and are considering buying 

a $175,000 bomb-detecting robot.27

Many localities also see the ODP funds as an opportunity to build up their non-terroristrelated response capabilities. In Yadkin County, North Carolina, $44,000 in homeland security 

grants were spent to purchase a state-ofthe-art mobile decontamination trailer, 

complete with warm showers, which will 

presumably be used to aid victims of 

pesticide or other chemical exposure in this 

small farming community. Yadkin 

County’s emergency services director said: 

“We are trying to get equipment that we 

could use for events that could happen at 

any time. I’m not preparing for Osama 

because I’m not sure he’s coming to 

Yadkin County.”28 In the community of 

Red Oak, Texas, the fire chief and his 

counterparts in nine neighboring towns, 

with a combined population just under 

200,000, were awarded $800,000 in antiterrorism funding. The 10-community 

district came together last November and made its spending decision. The entire award amount 

was used to purchase a rescue truck and support vehicle filled with specialized equipment. 
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Page 8 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

When asked how this new item would meet their homeland security needs, county officials 

emphasized the gap in their rescue capabilities and how this truck will aid in pulling survivors 

from wrecked vehicles, trenches, and flooding rivers.29 Likewise, $30,000 in homeland 

security dollars helped fund a defibrillator for a high school in Lake County, Tennessee. In 

discussions with Committee Staff, Lake County Mayor Macie Roberson stated that it would be 

good to have one on site for the district basketball tournament.30

The establishment of national goals or benchmarks for appropriate levels of terrorism 

preparedness for different types of communities is a critical first 

step in ensuring the effectiveness of Federal anti-terrorism grant 

funds. The Gilmore commission warned of the dangers of lacking a 

national preparedness goal in its fifth and most recent annual report 

to Congress, “Forging America’s New Normalcy.” It stated: “By 

the time clear definitions and objectives are provided many 

communities and States may have embarked on paths that are 

measurably different from those adjacent to them and potentially 

inconsistent with a national approach.”31 President Bush, in a 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive issued last December, 

has prioritized the development of a national preparedness goal, 

which “will establish measurable readiness priorities and targets.... 

It will also include readiness metrics and elements that support the 

national preparedness goal, including standards for preparedness 

assessments and strategies, and a system for assessing the Nation’s 

overall preparedness to respond.”32

IV. Lack of Advance Planning and Delays in Use of First Responder Funding 

The flow of funding from the Federal government to first responders can be likened to a 

top-heavy hourglass, with many grains of sand slowly filtering their way through a chokepoint 

to their intended destination. In a similar fashion, Congress has appropriated an abundance of 

homeland security dollars since September 11th that are very slowly finding their way through 

bureaucratic chokepoints to first responders. 

To examine exactly how many of the homeland security dollars remain in the pipeline, 

the Committee obtained data on grant expenditures for the largest first responder grant 

programs in 2003 – the DHS State Homeland Security Grant Program and the DHS Urban Area 

Security Initiative. 

In examining the DHS SHSGP grants, the Committee found that, as of April 2004, 

approximately 85% of these grant funds had not yet been drawn down by local governments 

because of various bureaucratic obstacles. (Figure 1)33

“We are trying to get 

equipment that we 

could use for events 

that could happen at 

any time. I’m not 

preparing for Osama 

because I’m not sure 

he’s coming to Yadkin County.”
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Page 9 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

FIGURE 1:

 

In interpreting this data, it is important to realize that draw down information is updated 

only when ODP actually reimburses States for completed purchases. Because of this 

accounting method, many States rightly will claim that the amount they have spent is higher 

than the amount reflected in ODP draw down data. For example, if a State has signed a 

contract to procure equipment but the equipment is on backorder, the draw down data will not 

reflect this purchase until the State submits a receipt for the equipment purchase and is 

reimbursed by ODP. While this point is valid, an examination of a select group of States also 

reveals that, even accounting for this argument, the amount of grant funds spent by recipients 

will not change significantly. 

Similarly, the Committee examined the DHS UASI grants. During FY 2003, UASI 

funding totaled $800 million – $100 million in Part I (which was obligated directly to the urban 

areas in April 2003), and $700 million in Part II ($500 million of which was not targeted 

towards any particular type of infrastructure and was obligated to the States for pass through to 

the urban areas in May 2003). Excluding the $200 million targeted for specific types of 

infrastructure, the Committee found that only 15% of the $600 million had been drawn down by 

April 2004.34

Much of this delay has resulted because UASI recipients have been conducting 

assessments, developing their spending strategies, and seeking ODP and state approval since 

the awards were announced beginning in April 2003. Thus, to date, only 18 of the 30 grantees 

under this program have spent any of the $600 million in terrorism funding that was directed to 

our highest-threat areas. In fact, New York City accounts for $82 million of the $89 million that 

has been drawn down to date. Draw downs from the remaining 17 cities have combined to total 

just $7 million.35

 2003 SHSGP Grant: Total Funds Awarded 

by ODP and Drawn Down by Recipients 

$2,066

$336

$0

$500

$1,000

$1,500

$2,000

$2,500

Amount Awarded by ODP Amount Drawn Down by

Grant Recipients

Millions of Dollars
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Page 10 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

FIGURE 2:

 Another example: of the $11 million awarded to Chicago in UASI Part I, the City has 

obligated only $2.7 million of it for specific expenditures. For Part II, an additional $30 million 

was awarded to Chicago, yet only $3.4 million has been obligated. And none of the $6.1 

obligated by Chicago has been spent to date.36 Other major cities, such as Seattle, only recently 

have obtained authorization from ODP and the State of Washington to move forward with the 

procurement process. Thus, Seattle has not yet spent any of the $30 million in 2003 UASI funds 

it received. And as spending is just now being authorized, cities will face the same 

administrative difficulties and special requirements discussed below, which will further delay 

the delivery of equipment and training to our first responders in some of our Nation’s most 

densely populated and threatened areas. 

There are a number of steps that must occur before a first responder receives a piece of 

equipment purchased with homeland security dollars. These steps are listed in the order in 

which they would occur without any advance planning: 

CONGRESS

1. Congress appropriates funds for grant programs. 

DHS

2. ODP divides these funds among States and territories and announces the award 

amounts. 

3. ODP permits States to begin spending the grant awards. 

2003 UASI Grants: Total Funds Awarded 

by ODP and Drawn Down by Recipients 

$596

$89

$0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

Amount Awarded by ODP Amount Drawn Down by

Grant Recipients

Millions of Dollars
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Page 11 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

STATE

4. States divide the grant award among jurisdictions within their States and 

announce the award amounts. 

5. States permit jurisdictions to begin spending the grant awards. 

LOCAL

6. Jurisdictions must approve the acceptance of the grant award. 

7. Jurisdictions must develop spending plans to use the grant award. 

8. Jurisdictions begin the procurement process, usually a competitive one. 

9. Jurisdictions begin purchasing items and submit receipts to ODP for 

reimbursement. 

10. ODP reimburses the jurisdiction and the expenditure is accounted for in ODP 

draw down data. 

Extensive interviews with state and local government officials revealed that no single 

step in the grant allocation process responsible for the logjam. Instead, several readily 

identifiable factors contribute to the overall delay in the actual use of first responder funding, 

the bulk of which occur during steps 5-9 of the above funding process. They are as follows: 

A. Planning to spend the grant often occurs after the grants are actually received.

Through interviews with state and local officials, Committee staff uncovered multiple 

examples of local governments that received grant awards despite lacking a plan for how they 

actually would spend the money. In these cases, 

localities waited to begin the planning process until after 

they received confirmation of the exact amount of the 

grant and permission from the State to spend it. Often 

times, a reasonable estimate of the eventual award 

amount was available months earlier, but many localities 

still waited to initiate early planning until the exact 

figures were known. In over half of the States 

interviewed, local governments had not submitted 

detailed spending plans to the States prior to the time the 

States had obligated these homeland security grants to 

the localities. These States, then, had little sense at the 

time of obligation as to how the funds would be used, 

and often required spending plans from these localities 

According to interviews 

with New York State officials, its draw down success is attributable to the 

fact that the State required its localities to provide detailed spending 

plans during the 45-day 

obligation window. 
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Page 12 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

before permitting actual draw down of funds. 

The lack of sufficient coordination among the Commonwealth of Virginia, Fairfax 

County, and the County’s localities and departments to develop spending plans is one such 

example. In August 2003, Virginia obligated State Homeland Security Grant Program Part II 

(SHSGP II) funds to Fairfax County, yet it was not until March 2004 that Fairfax County 

informed its localities and departments that, in order for the county to distribute the Federal 

funding, it would need a detailed spending proposal from them. As a result, not a single dollar 

of this grant has been spent by its localities and departments, eight months after Fairfax County 

received it.37

 Developing spending proposals late in the grant cycle is a practice that is prevalent 

across the Nation. Although the amount of SHSGP II awards to each State were announced in 

April 2003, the Commonwealth of Kentucky did not even begin receiving spending proposals 

from localities until mid-October and, as of March 2004, less than half of the total proposals 

have been submitted to the State – more than 11 months later. As a consequence, only 

$1,500,875 of $8,232,160 direct-to-county funding has been spent, and only $123,000 of 

$2,800,000 for regional response teams has been spent.38 

In Montana, detailed spending proposals have just now 

begun to be submitted in April 2004 for both 2003 

SHSGP I and II funds, which means that none of the Part 

I money ($3,196,000) or Part II money ($9,739,000) for 

equipment has been spent.39

Similarly, in Ohio, 43 percent of the State’s 

counties have not, as of March 2004, filed the required 

spending plans for their share of the 2003 State 

Homeland Security Grants. 40 In the State of 

Washington, most of the 2003 SHSGP Part I funds have 

been spent and the equipment is in first responder hands. 

But for Part II, the much larger pot of money, only 

$37,000 out of $29,917,000 has been spent, and only 15% 

of the State’s counties have submitted spending plans.41 

And in North Carolina, the State has spent less than four 

percent of its 2003 grant allotment of $51 million as of 

March 2004, mostly due to counties not submitting their 

plans or spending invoices yet. The State had given 

counties until the end of February 2004 to submit their 

final spending plans for the 2003 grants.42

In contrast, the State of Illinois took a different approach to the planning process. In 

cooperation with local governments, it developed spending proposals before receiving the ODP 

‘If it weren’t for the 

procurement obstacles, Illinois, because 

they place the planning at the front-end 

of the application 

process, would be 

able to purchase 

equipment two weeks 

after the obligation 

date. Spending is disjointed if you don’t 

plan ahead. They 

have it backwards.” 
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Page 13 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

obligation. The State looked at the President’s Budget Request and planned according to 

estimated amounts of funding. As the director of the Illinois Terrorism Task Force, said: ‘If it 

weren’t for the procurement obstacles, Illinois, because they place the planning at the front-end 

of the application process, would be able to purchase equipment two weeks after the obligation 

date. Spending is disjointed if you don’t plan ahead. They have it backwards.” Because of this 

emphasis on early planning, Illinois was not only able to obligate the funds within the 

Congressionally-mandated 45-day deadline, but also had mapped out how the funds would be 

spent.43 Similarly, Georgia has a state law that requires spending plans to be completed before 

the State can obligate funds to localities. This law requires locals to develop detailed plans at 

the front end of the application process. By contrast, many States complained about the 45-day 

deadline and fulfilled the mandate only by announcing grant awards without detailed spending 

plans that matched. 

New York’s system appears to have resulted in the most efficient draw down of funds of 

any State. As of February 2004, New York localities had spent roughly 65% of the 2003 

SHSGP money available to them, a number that is closer to 80% currently. According to 

interviews with New York State officials, its draw down success is attributable to the fact that 

the State required its localities to provide detailed spending plans during the 45-day obligation 

window.44

B. Delays in obtaining local board approval. 

In order for local governments to spend grant money, a local authority (such as a County 

Board or City Council) often must provide written approval. Committee staff interviews with 

state and local officials across the country have revealed that these internal processes for grant 

approval can slow the pace of first responder funding considerably, even after the locality 

obtains state and ODP approval of its application. 

The requirements that must be met in order to spend grant money in Fairfax, Virginia 

illustrate this type of delay. As Appendix 2: Table 1 shows, Virginia notified Fairfax County in 

August 2003 that $628,301 had been awarded to it in grant money. By November 18, 2003, 

Fairfax had submitted an application for these funds, and this application had been approved by 

the State and ODP. Yet, because of a peculiar state law that requires grant money to be 

physically transferred to local accounts before purchases can be made, Fairfax County’s board 

could not approve the grant award and authorize spending until March 8, 2004 – a delay of 

seven months.45

Other States have reported similar local impediments to achieving a more expedited 

flow of funding. New Hampshire requires towns to wait for approval for their equipment 

proposals until its annual town meetings are held in March of each year. Thus, regardless of 

when local authorities are awarded grants through regular or supplemental funding, New 

Hampshire’s local first responders cannot begin to purchase equipment until such approval is 
14 

Page 14 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

granted the following March.46 In Texas, after the budget lists are approved by the State, the 

local boards and city councils must approve them before localities are given permission to 

spend the grants, and many cities like Houston, San Antonio, and Dallas require such local 

government approval. “This can delay the process for up to three months,” one state official 

said. Wisconsin’s county processes are equally cumbersome. County boards often take up to 

four months to grant local officials permission to move forward with the procurement process.47 

In general, localities across the country have similar processes in place that can significantly 

delay the flow of first responder funding. 

C. State and local procurement rules slow the flow of funding.

Through the course of conducting interviews with officials from States and local 

governments across the country, Committee staff learned that 

state and local procurement regulations can result in significant 

delays. Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Texas, Utah and 

Washington are just a few of the States that have highlighted this 

problem. For example, even though the Commonwealth of 

Kentucky has taken the initiative to organize bidding processes 

for localities and to provide them with pre-approved equipment 

and services lists, state and local laws requiring competitive 

bidding for any purchases above $20,000 still can delay actual 

procurements by months. Some counties require that multiple 

bids be received in response to requests for proposals. Further, if 

the bid specifications are not met, the bidding process must start 

all over again. In one such case, the State organized a bidding 

process of multiple vendors to purchase a mobile command post 

worth $600,000. Although the process had been going on for 

seven months, just recently the State had to re-issue the bid 

because the specifications had not been met by the bidders.48 (See Appendix 2: Table 2) 

According to Kentucky’s Emergency Management Director, expenditure of funds has 

occurred as quickly as possible, but state and local laws governing purchases have proven to be 

a significant delay. As he summed up: “There is a process and procedure that must be gone 

through before localities can actually spend the funds, and the State has not identified funds that 

are exempt from these local rules of procedure that are in place.”49

Kentucky is not alone in encountering these obstacles. In Tennessee, as of March 2004, 

only $381,000 out of $10 million awarded in SHSGP Part I has been spent, and nothing has 

been spent of the $25 million (not including the critical infrastructure portion) awarded to the 

State in SHSGP II. State officials attribute the slow flow of funding to the procurement process. 

One state official pointed out that, after the lengthy bidding process, localities must then write a 

contract with vendors, and this process takes time.50

“There is a process 

and procedure that 

must be gone through 

before localities can 

actually spend the 

funds, and the State 

has not identified 

funds that are exempt 

from these local rules 

of procedure that are 

in place.”
15 

Page 15 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

Many States are looking to move to a centralized purchasing system to avoid at least 

some of the local procurement impediments. Yet even States that have organized equipment 

purchases for their localities have faced hurdles. In Illinois, the State purchases equipment on 

behalf of localities according to determinations made by a state-level group called the Illinois 

Terrorism Task Force. For FY2003, the State was awarded $68.8 million. The State obligated 

all of the funds within the 45-day deadline. But, of that amount, only 20% actually has been 

spent as of March 2004. Officials 

attribute much of the delay to 

procurement laws, which require a 

public bidding process, and state that 

working through the multiple bids that 

result can be time-consuming.51

Maine’s grant administrator highlighted 

a slightly different problem in the 

procurement process: “The request for 

purchases and the bidding process 

served as the greatest hurdle in getting 

the equipment into the hands of first responders. Vendors are often back-loaded given the 

number of States that are requesting the same types of equipment.” Thus, even when the 

bidding process is complete, manufacturing and inventory problems still can limit the ability of 

localities to purchase equipment.52

D. The reimbursement system limits the flow of funding.

Most States operate under a 100% reimbursement system, with no funds advanced to 

local or county agencies for expenditure. Localities, then, are required to purchase equipment 

with their own money and seek reimbursement. Some States report that the reimbursement 

scheme presents significantly more than an accounting problem for those towns that do not 

have the budgets to spend up front and seek reimbursement. Tennessee is one among many 

States that has identified the reimbursement scheme as a significant obstacle in trying to 

improve the flow of funds. “Some localities,” one state official said, “simply don’t have the 

financial capacity to cover the out-of-pocket expenditures and it takes longer for them to spend 

the money.”53

The State of Utah recognized this problem and created a solution. Although localities 

had been given permission to spend grant money as of June 4, 2003, very few funds had been 

expended four months later. Indeed, by October 1, 2003, only $7,597 of the $6,937,000 

awarded to the State in Part I of FY 2003, and none of the Part II funds, totaling $12,739,200 

had been spent. According to state officials, this delay was largely due to the inability of 

localities to pay out of their own pockets.54
16 

Page 16 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

To address this issue, the State decided to provide local governments with the option of 

an advance payment. Under this system, the localities assessed their needs, decided on 

equipment purchases, drafted the contracts, and ordered the equipment, and the State then 

forwarded the funds necessary to pay the invoices. This approach has significantly sped up the 

expenditure of funds (see Appendix 2: Table 3)). Indeed, since October 12, 2003, when the 

State implemented the Advanced Payment Purchasing Option, the total amount expended has 

risen to $2,584,676 for Part I and $5,237,093 for Part II as of March 2004.55 Maine and 

Kentucky recently have adopted similar approaches, requiring that their localities only submit 

an invoice or proof of purchase 

to qualify for reimbursement. 

CONCLUSION

It is clear from the facts 

described in this report that much 

of the $6 billion that has been 

allocated by the Federal 

government to improve the 

terrorism preparedness of our 

Nation’s first responders since 

the attacks of September 11, 

2001, has not been distributed or 

spent in a way that maximizes the homeland security benefits of such funding. The causes of 

this result include the lack of risk-based prioritization and distribution, and the lack of clear and 

measurable Federal preparedness goals or targets to guide state and local expenditures. It is 

further apparent that the vast majority of these dollars remain tied up in administrative 

bottlenecks at various levels of government, due at least in part to the lack of advance planning 

by States and localities with respect to the expenditure of these grant funds. 
17 

Page 17 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

APPENDIX 1: STATE ALLOCATION METHOD TO SUB-GRANTEES

State Base Allocation

Formula Allocation to 

SubGrantees 

Based on 

Population

Formula Allocation to SubGrantees 

Based on a 

Base Allocation + Population for the 

Remainder

Allocation to 

SubGrantees 

Based on 

Some Consideration of 

Risk/Threat

Allocation to 

Sub-Grantees 

Based on 

Some Consideration of 

Achieving Capabilities or 

Fulfilling 

Needs

Alabama X X

Alaska X X

Arizona X

Arkansas X X X

California X

Colorado X

Connecticut X

Delaware X

Florida X X X

Georgia X X

Hawaii X

Idaho X X

Illinois X

Indiana X X

Iowa X X

Kansas X X X

Kentucky X

Louisiana X X

Maine X

Maryland X X X

Massachusetts X X

Michigan X

Minnesota X X X

Mississippi X

Missouri (I) X X

Missouri (II) X X X
18 

Page 18 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

Montana X

Nebraska X

Nevada X X

New Hampshire X X

New Hampshire X X X

New Jersey (I) X X

New Jersey (II) X X

New Mexico X X X

New York X X

North Carolina X

North Dakota X

Ohio X

Oklahoma X

Oregon X X

Pennsylvania X X

Rhode Island (I) X

Rhode Island (II) X

South Carolina X X

South Dakota X

Tennessee (I) X

Tennessee (II) X X X

Texas X X X

Utah X

Vermont X X

Virginia X

Washington X

West Virginia X

Wisconsin X X X

Wyoming X

State Base Allocation

Formula Allocation to 

SubGrantees 

Based on 

Population

Formula Allocation to SubGrantees 

Based on a 

Base Allocation + Population for the 

Remainder

Allocation to 

SubGrantees 

Based on 

Some Consideration of 

Risk/Threat

Allocation to 

Sub-Grantees 

Based on 

Some Consideration of 

Achieving Capabilities or 

Fulfilling 

Needs
19 

Page 19 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

APPENDIX 2: TIMELINES THAT ILLUSTRATE THE FLOW OF FIRST 

RESPONDER FUNDING IN SELECTED COMMUNITIES

Table 1: Delays in Obtaining County Board Approval and Authorization 

Slow First Responder Funding

Timeline of State Homeland Security Grant Program Distribution for FY2003 Part I 

Virginia and Fairfax County 

February 20, 

2003 

FY 2003 appropriation signed into law. ODP allocated $566,295,000 

for SHSGP I. 

March 7, 2003 ODP releases FY 2003 SHSGP I grant application to States. 

May 7, 2003 ODP awards Virginia $7,139,201 in SHSGP I, but imposes special conditions prohibiting the expenditure or draw down of funds until detailed spending plans for equipment and training are submitted and approved by ODP. 

June 3, 2003 Virginia sends to ODP notification that it has obligated the funds to its 

localities. 

Early August Virginia notifies Fairfax County that the $628,301 had been awarded 

and requested an application. 

August 21, 2003 Fairfax County submits grant application to Virginia . 

September 26, 

2003 

Virginia approves County application and sends it on to ODP for approval. 

November 18, 

2003 

County receives letter from Virginia that ODP had approved the application. 

January 10, 2004 Funds were transferred from the Federal Office of Justice Programs 

into Virginia system. 

January 18, 2004 State sent County notification that funds were available for draw down. 

March 8, 2004 County board meets and approves the award amount and authorizes 

spending. Localities are notified that they can start spending Part I 

funds. 
20 

Page 20 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

Timeline of State Homeland Security Grant Program Distribution for FY2003 Part II 

Virginia and Fairfax County 

April 16, 2003 FY 2003 supplemental appropriation signed into law. ODP allocated $1,500,000,000 to SHSGP II. 

April 30, 2003 ODP releases FY 2003 SHSGP II grant application to States. 

June 12, 2003 ODP awards Virginia $21,353,600 and, in SHSGP II funding, but 

imposes no special conditions affecting the availability of funds for 

draw down. ODP still requires Virginia to provide budget detail 

worksheets with its categorical assistance progress report for the period ending June 30, 2003. 

July 21, 2003 Virginia obligated funds to Fairfax County. 

August 29, 2003 Virginia notified County that the $2,057,481 had been awarded to it. 

Fairfax County submits grant application to Virginia. 

January 10, 2004 Funds were transferred from the Federal Office of Justice Programs 

to Virginia. 

January 18, 2004 Virginia sent County notification that funds were available for draw 

down. 

January 20. 2004 County received letter of approval of application. Funds were sent to 

the County . 

March 8, 2004 The County Board of Supervisors approved acceptance of this 

award. 

March 10, 2003 Fairfax County sends to its localities and departments its internal 

budget guidelines for the SHSGP II monies. Although ODP issued 

no requirement for a detailed spending plan, the County imposed 

such a requirement to ensure that all agencies are getting what they 

need. For Part II, no funds have been expended to date and no 

spending plans have been submitted. 
21 

Page 21 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

Table 2: State and Local Procurement Rules Slow First Responder Funding

Timeline of the Commonwealth of Kentucky’s Purchase of a State Mobile Command Post 

with 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program Funding

DATE ACTIVITY

June 9, 2003 

 

FY2003 Part II Grant Award Document signed and returned to 

ODP State Mobile Command Post is part of budget submitted and 

approved by ODP 

June 17, 2003 

 

Request to purchase State Mobile Command post is forwarded to 

the State Finance Cabinet for review and approval to expend 

funds. 

June 19, 2003 State Finance Cabinet approves expenditure of funds. 

June 20, — October 

30 2003 

Kentucky Division of Emergency Management develops specifications for the State Mobile Command Post and develops draft solicitation for bid. Draft Solicitation is reviewed by the State Finance 

Cabinet Buyer and approved for issue. 

October 31, 2003 

 

Solicitation for Bid on the State Mobile Command Post is released 

on the web for offers from vendors. 

November 13, 2003 

 

State Finance Cabinet conducts a vendor pre-bid conference for 

three vendors who have expressed interest in the solicitation. Questions from vendors are answered and any modifications required 

are made to the solicitation. 

December 19, 2003 

 

The solicitation is closed and the State Finance Cabinet Buyer begins the process of reviewing the bids to make sure they meet the 

requirements as stated. During this period, the Buyer was activated 

for military service and did not return until after Christmas. 

February 2, 2004 

 

Agency notified of final intent to award the contract, but the final 

bid agreed to by the Finance Cabinet Buyer was over the available 

budget. Additional funds had to be approved by request from 

ODP. 

February 3, 2004 ODP approves funding adjustment. 
22 

Page 22 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

Table 3: Problems with Reimbursement Delay First Responder Funding

Timeline of the State of Utah’s Reimbursement Scheme for 2003 State Homeland Security 

Grant Program Funding

February 4 — 

March 1, 2004 

 

Funding is adjusted in state financial system and total cost is determined to change the purchase status of the equipment from a regular equipment cost to a Capital Purchase. The project is submitted 

to the State Legislative Committee on Capital Purchases for review 

and approval. 

March 24, 2004 

 

State Legislative Committee on Capital Purchases approves the 

purchase as listed. Final bid is reviewed by agency and, in light of 

technical improvements made in communications technology 

within the previous 10 months the bid is rejected as not meeting up 

to date technical capabilities. 

March 25 — April 

05, 2004 

 

Solicitation is re-written by the Kentucky Division of Emergency 

Management and will be re-submitted to the State Finance Cabinet 

when finished for new bid/review/approval cycle. 

April 1, 2003 ODP awards Utah Department of Public Safety, Comprehensive 

Emergency Management $6,937,000 in SHSGP I 

 Within a week of the award date, the State Grant Advisory Board 

meets to prioritize needs and make funding allocation decisions 

June 4, 2003 Utah sends to ODP notification that it had obligated Part I funds 

to its localities and localities are given the green light to spend. 

June 19, 2003 ODP awards Utah Department of Public Safety, Comprehensive 

Emergency Management $18,374,000 in SHSGP II 

 

June 30, 2003 

Utah sends to ODP notification that it had obligated Part II funds 

to its localities 

October 1, 2003 Only $7, 597 of Part I funds have been spent. For Part II, $0 has 

been spent. 

October 12, 2003 The state of Utah implements Advance Payment Purchasing Option 

March 8, 2004 $2, 584,676 has been spent for Part I and $5,237,093 for Part II 
23 

Page 23 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

APPENDIX 3: FEDERAL FUNDING TO PREVENT, PREPARE FOR, 

AND RESPOND TO ACTS OF TERRORISM AND OTHER 

EMERGENCIES

See Next Page 
Homeland Security 

Chairman Christopher Cox 

202-226-8417

Program 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Request Total 2001- 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Request Total 2001- 2005 2001 2002 2003 2004 200

Req

DHS Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)State Homeland Security Grant Program (administered as formula grants)

97 315.7 1,866 1694.9 700 4673.6 97 315.7 1,866 1695 700 4673.6 97 315.7 1,866 1694.9 70

Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention (administered as formula grants)

X X X 497.2 500 997.2 X X X 497.2 500 997.2 X X X 497.2 50

Citizen Corps X 25 30 39.8 50 144.8 X 25 30 39.8 50 144.8 X 25 30 39.8 50 High Threat Urban Areas 21 2.6 800 720.7 1200 2744.3 21 2.6 800 720.7 1200 2744.3 21 2.6 800 720.7 12Critical Infrastructure Protection Grants X X 200 0 200 400 X X 200 0 200 400 X X 200 0 20Other (technical assistance, training, research) 103 333.2 358.3 315.2 198.9 1308.6 103 333.2 358.3 315.2 198.9 1308.6 103 333.2 358.3 315.2 19ODP Subtotal 221 676.5 3,254 3267.8 2849 10269 221 676.5 3,254 3268 2849 10269 221 676.5 3,254 3267.8 28DHS Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R)Assistance to Firefighters Program 100 360 750 745.6 500 2455.6 100 360 750 745.6 500 2455.6 X X X X X Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG)

270 135 165 180 170 920 270 135 165 180 170 920 X X X X X 

Emergency Management Performance Account (Non-EMPG funding, such as funding for Urban 

Search and Rescue, Emergency Ops Centers, & Interoperable Communications)

345 278.1 60 60 743.1 345 278.1 60 60 743.1 X X X X X 

Metropolitan Medical Response System 17.4 21.8 50 50 0 139.2 17.4 21.8 50 50 0 139.2 17.4 21.8 50 50 0 National Disaster Medical System 7.1 33.1 33.3 34 34 141.5 7.1 33.1 33.3 34 34 141.5 X X X X X EP&R Subtotal 394.5 894.9 1276.4 1069.6 764 4399.4 395 894.9 1276 1070 764 4399.4 17.4 21.8 50 50 0 DHS Total 615.5 1571.4 4530.7 4337.4 3613 14668 616 1571.4 4531 4337 3613 14668 238 698.3 3304.3 3317.8 28Local Law Enforcement Block Grant 523 400 400 225 X 1548 X X X X X X X X X X X Byrne Memorial Formula Program 570 845.5 650.9 659 X 2725.4 X X X X X X X X X X X Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS)

1,000 1,050.40 983.7 756 97 3887.1 X X X X X X X X X X X 

Justice Assistance Grants X X X X 509 509 X X X X X X X X X X X DOJ Total 2093 2295.9 2034.6 1640 606 8669.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Bioterrorism Preparedness (State and local 

capacity)

X 940 940 934 829 3643 X X X X X X X X X X X 

Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness X 135 515 515 476 1641 X X X X X X X X X X X HHS Total 0 1,075 1,455 1,449 1,305 5284 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 GRAND TOTAL (All amounts in millions)

2708.5 4942.3 8020.3 7426.4 5524 28621 616 1571.4 4531 4337 3613 14668 238 698.3 3304.3 3317.8 28

% INCREASE IN FUNDING FOR EACH YEAR COMPARED TO 2001

82% 196% 174% 104% 155% 636% 605% 487% 193% 1286% 1292% 10

*** The data on funding is compiled from four sources: 1) Appropriations Laws (both regular and supplemental), 2) President's Budget Request for FY 05, 3) Analysis conducted by the Congressional Research Service, and 4) Documentation from 

PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELA

FEDERAL FUNDING TO PREVENT, PREPARE FOR, AND RESPOND TO ACTS OF TER

DHS (or predecessor agency) funding to enhance the ability of first responders to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism and other emergencies(EXCLUDES DOJ or HHS GRANTS)

DHS (or predecessor agency) funding tability of first responders to prevent, prrespond to acts of terrorism (EXCLUDES GRANTS FOR TRADITIONAi.e.. Emergency Management PerformanAssistance to Firefighters, National DisSystem)

Department of Justice (DOJ)

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Predecessors

Total federal funding to enhance the ability of State and local governments and first responders to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism and other emergencies
24 

Page 24 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

Endnotes: 

1. The 2000% increase that is discussed here represents the increase in grant funds from DHS (or its predecessor 

agencies) specifically to enhance the ability of first responders to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of 

terrorism. The increase is over 2000% when either 2003 or 2004 grant funding is compared to 2001 levels. 

The complete funding data is presented in Appendix 3, along with a tabulation of percent increases in funding. 

2. The $6.3 billion figure represents the sum of grant funds from DHS (or its predecessor agency) specifically to 

enhance the ability of first responders to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism from 2002 

through 2004. (2002=$365 million; 2003=$2.95 billion; 2004=$3.0 billion). The complete funding data is 

presented in Appendix 3. 

3. The $5.2 billion in the pipeline represents the sum of grant funds from DHS (or its predecessor agency) 

specifically to enhance the ability of first responders to prevent, prepare for, and respond to acts of terrorism 

that has not been drawn down to date by the recipients. This figure includes $2.2 billion in FY03 SHSGP and 

UASI funding that has not been drawn down (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 in this report), as well as $3 billion 

that was obligated in 2004 by ODP. In fact, the figure may be higher when 2002 funds are considered. 

4. As Appendix 3 shows, the FY 2005 Budget Request would allocate a total of $2.6 billion to the SHSGP and 

UASI grants. 

5. See, among others, references 20-28. 

6. The timeline for the dates on which ODP announced and awarded grants was provided by ODP to Committee 

staff. 

7. This data was provided to Committee staff by the State of California. 

8. 42 USCS § 3714. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 

Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56, October 26, 2001. 

9. As Appendix 3 shows, the funding in 2001 that was to be covered by Section 1014 of the Patriot Act was $97 

million. The formula specified by the Patriot Act would have allocated under $750,000 of these funds to each 

State. 

10. The $800 million was calculated with the following formula: ($2.066 billion in FY 2003 SHSGP I and II 

Funds) X (50 States) X (.75% per state) + (4 Territories) X (.25% per territory) X ($2.066 billion). The 

$15 million was calculated with the following formula: ($2.066 billion in FY 2003 SHSGP I and II Funds) X 

(.75% per state) 

11. This data was obtained from GAO report HEHS 99-69 and from an analysis of 20 selected formula grant 

programs that are among the largest formula grant programs administered by the Federal government. 

Following is a list of the selected grant programs with state minimums and FY 2003 funding: 

Large Formula Grant Programs State MinimumsCFDA estimated 

FY 2003 funding 

(millions)

Adoption Assistance none $1,427

Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) Block Grant 0.38% $1,639

Child Care and Development Fund none $2,100

Community Development Block Grants: State's Non-entitlement Program none $1,296

Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Dislocated Workers none $1,239

Employment Services 0.28% $850

Mass Transit Non-urbanized Area Formula Program none $235

Foster Care -Title IV-E none $4,885

Federal-Aid Highway Planning and Construction Program 0.50% $24,420

Medicaid Medical Assistance Program Title XIX none $144,887
25 

Page 25 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

Also see Tim Randsdell, Federal Formula Grants and California: Overview,, Public Policy Institute of California, 

San Francisco, California, December 2002, http://www.pppic.org/main/publication.asp?=470.

12. The $2 million in additional funding was calculated by subtracting the minimum specified by the PATRIOT Act 

from the amount of grant award for the State that received the least amount of FY 2003 SHSGP funds (Wyoming). 

13. Of the grant programs with state minimums in footnote 11, every grant program except the Workforce Investment 

Act Programs first allocates funds according to meritorious factors and only then “tops-off” those States that have 

not reached the guaranteed minimum level. 

14. This data was provided by Big Horn County, WY, and by Jefferson County, KY. 

15. This data was provided to Committee staff by ODP. 

16. This data was provided to Committee staff by the City of Seattle. 

17. The $650 million figure was calculated by adding 2003 SHSGP I and II award amounts for the States identified in 

Appendix 1 that allocate the grants based on formulas that did not account for need or risk (other than population). 

18. Allocation data was provided to Committee staff by Jefferson County, KY. 

19. State allocation data was provided to Committee staff by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State of 

Wisconsin. 

20. Allocation data was provided to Committee staff by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. 

21. This data was provided to Committee staff by an official in the Mason County Sheriff’s Department during a 

telephone interview.

22. ibid. 

23. Ed Lowe, “Outagamie Seeks Federal Homeland Security Funds: County Supervisors Criticize Ease to Get Money, 

Its Use,” The Post Crescent, March 15, 2004. 

24. This data was provided to Committee staff by an official in the Mason County Sheriff’s Department during a 

telephone interview. 

25. Alice Lipowicz, “Out in the Ozarks, a Police Chief Proudly Hangs a Chem-Bio Suit in His Office,” CQ Homeland 

Security, Local Response, April 13, 2004. 

Older Americans Act, Title III: Grants for Supportive Services and Senior 

Centers, Nutrition Services, and Disease Prevention and Health Promotion Services

0.50% $944

Older Americans Act, Title V: Senior Community Service Employment 

Program

0.50% $445

Rehabilitation Services - Vocational Rehabilitation Grants to States 0.33% $2,507

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities-State Grants 0.50% $469

Social Services Block Grant none $1,700

Title I Grants to Local Educational Agencies 0.25% $8,602

Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Adult Program 0.25% $950

Workforce Investment Act (WIA) Youth Activities 0.25% $1,001

State Children's Insurance Program (CHIP/SCHIP) none $3,115

HIV Care Formula Grants (Ryan White Program) none $999
26 

Page 26 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

26. Kate O’Beirne, “Introducing Pork-Barrel Homeland Security: A little here, a lot there...,” National Review, 

August 11, 2003. 

27. Mimi Hall, “Homeland Security Money Doesn’t Match Terror Threat: Does Zanesville, Ohio Need to Test for 

Nerve Agents while NY Struggles for Funds?” USA Today, October 29, 2003. 

28. Lisa Hoppenjans, “Terror Grants Given to Rural Communities; Questions Arise Over Allocations of 

Homeland-Security Money to Remote Counties,” Winston-Salem Journal, December 14, 2003. 

29. Alice Lipowicz, “In Small-Town Texas, a Search for a Homeland Mission,” CQ Homeland Security, Local 

Response, March 24, 2004. Committee staff notes that the community of Red Oak, Texas, is a short distance 

from the metropolitan area of Dallas, Texas, and therefore could be called upon to respond to a terrorist event 

in Dallas. However the justification given by local officials for the purchase of this particular item does not 

appear to be tied to the potential for such a coordinated regional response. 

30. Evan Jones, “Defibrillator,” The Standard Banner, February 10, 2004, and a follow-up interview by 

Committee Staff with a Lake County official. 

31. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (The Gilmore Commission), December 15, 2003, p. 5. 

32. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/ HSPD 8, December 17, 2003. 

33. This data was provided by ODP to Committee staff. 

34. ibid.

35. ibid.

36. This data was provided to Committee staff by the City of Chicago. 

37. This data was provided to Committee staff by the County of Fairfax, Virginia. 

38. This data was provided to Committee staff by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. 

39. This data was provided to Committee staff by the State of Montana. 

40. Alice Lipowicz, “The Money Trail: In Pursuit of Homeland Cash, Mayors Have Powerful Friends,” CQ 

Homeland Security, Local Response, February 20, 2004. 

41. This data was provided to Committee staff by the State of Washington. 

42. This information was provided to Committee staff by a North Carolina state official during a telephone 

interview. 

43. This information was provided to Committee staff by an Illinois state official during a telephone interview. 

44. This information was provided to Committee staff by a New York state official during a telephone interview. 

45. This information was provided to Committee staff by a Virginia state official during a telephone interview. 

46. This information was provided to Committee staff by a New Hampshire state official during a telephone 

interview. 

47. This information was provided to Committee staff by a Wisconsin state official during a telephone interview. 

48. This information was provided to Committee staff by a Kentucky state official during a telephone interview. 

49. Ibid
27 

Page 27 AN ANALYSIS OF FIRST RESPONDER GRANT FUNDING 

50. This information was provided to Committee staff by a Tennessee state official during a telephone interview. 

51. This data was provided to Committee staff by the State of Illinois. 

52. This information was provided to Committee staff by a Maine state official during a telephone interview. 

53. This information was provided to Committee staff by a Tennessee state official during a telephone interview. 

54. This data was provided to Committee staff by the State of Utah. 

55. ibid