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94–511PDF 2004

IRANIAN PROLIFERATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR

TERRORISTS, THEIR STATE SPONSORS, AND U.S.

COUNTER-PROLIFERATION POLICY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST 

AND CENTRAL ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 24, 2004

Serial No. 108–144

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairwoman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

YLEEM POBLETE, Subcommittee Staff Director 

GREGG RICKMAN, Senior Professional Staff Member 

DAVID ADAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MATT ZWEIG, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of State ........................................ 11

Paul Leventhal, Senior Advisor and Founding President, Nuclear Control 

Institute ................................................................................................................ 41

Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy 52

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

Central Asia: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 4

The Honorable John R. Bolton: Prepared statement ............................................ 14

Paul Leventhal: Prepared statement ..................................................................... 47

Michael Eisenstadt: Prepared statement ............................................................... 55

APPENDIX 

Paul Leventhal: Addendum statement received August 2004 ............................. 61

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 67

Article written by Constantine C. Menges entitled Iran’s Covert Actions in 

Iraq submitted for the record by the Honorable Dan Burton .......................... 69

(1)

IRANIAN PROLIFERATION: IMPLICATIONS 

FOR TERRORISTS, THEIR STATE SPONSORS, 

AND U.S. COUNTER-PROLIFERATION POLICY 

THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND CENTRAL ASIA, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:10 p.m., in room 

2171, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(Chair of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Good afternoon, and welcome to our hearing 

on ‘‘Iranian Proliferation: Implications for Terrorists, their State 

Sponsors, and U.S. Counter-Proliferation Policy.’’

Iran’s unconventional weapons program and its fondness for 

using terrorism as statecraft, have made this pariah State a litmus 

test for President George Bush’s war against terror. A nuclear 

Iran, combined with its deep-rooted terrorist infrastructure, is an 

Iran that must be stopped. 

Unfortunately, the Iranian regime received another pass from 

the IAEA Board last week, as the resolution adopted had no references to the U.N. Security Council or any further action to hold 

Iran accountable. 

For at least two decades, the Iranian regime has been pursuing 

a covert nuclear program. It has undertaken a number of efforts for 

the manufacture and testing of centrifuge components, including at 

facilities owned by military industrial organizations. 

Concurrently, Iran is pursuing another approach to uranium enrichment that uses lasers, a complex technology rarely used by 

even the most advanced countries, because it is not cost efficient. 

Iran has expressed interest in the purchase of up to six additional nuclear power plants and is pursuing a heavy water research 

reactor that would be well-suited for plutonium production. This 

represents yet another path to nuclear weapons, which endangers 

not only the region but also the world. 

According to the IAEA report of November of last year, the Iranian regime admitted that it had failed to report a large number 

of activities involving nuclear materials. This same report noted 

that Iran’s deceptions have dealt with the most sensitive aspects of 

the nuclear cycle. 

Further, the IAEA could not disprove that Iran’s nuclear program was not for weapons development. So within this context, IraVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
2

nian news sources were filled with statements referring to Iran’s 

right to possess nuclear weapons within the current international 

context. 

One, in particular, referenced:

‘‘[T]he natural and obvious right of the Iranian nation and no 

power, whether of government or international assemblies, has 

the right to cause any restriction or limitation on the exercise 

of this right in the field of nuclear activities by Iran.’’

Move forward to February and March of this year. The resolution 

adopted by the Board enumerated more recent Iranian breaches, 

including failing to disclose work on advanced P–2 centrifuges for 

uranium enrichment and work on Polonium 210, an element that 

could be used for nuclear explosions. Come June 1, the IAEA reports a series of unresolved issues that strike at the core of Iran’s 

efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. 

The response from the Iranian Foreign Minister and the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council was that Iran 

was to be recognized by the international community as a member 

of the nuclear club and that ‘‘this is an irreversible path.’’

The Central Intelligence Agency has warned that even intrusive 

IAEA inspections may not prevent Iran from pursuing nuclear 

weapons because Tehran could be using legitimate fuel production 

to cover up its weapons program. It is imperative that the international community join forces to deny Iran any and all avenues 

toward achieving nuclear status, including punitive measures to 

bring to a screeching halt Iran’s progress on this path. 

To reiterate, if last week’s meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is any indication, the prospects for success look dismal. The 

Board’s failure to report the Iran case to the U.N. Security Council 

sends a dangerous message to the other pariah States and potential proliferators. 

Further, given the role that certain European countries have 

played in undermining the authority of the IAEA, cutting side 

deals with the Iranians and succumbing to Iranian intimidation, 

what options does the United States have? What efforts can be undertaken to delay, deter and prevent Iran from achieving nuclear 

capabilities? Under Secretary of State John Bolton will address 

these and other critical issues. 

Nevertheless, the urgency of the Iranian threat is not limited exclusively to its nuclear intentions. As a senior DoD official underscored during a briefing in September 2002, ‘‘Iran is the full ticket.’’ They have medium- and long-range missile programs. They 

also have a chemical and biological weapons program. Most importantly, Iran remains the most active State-sponsor of terrorism in 

the world. 

As Dr. Paul Leventhal, one of the witnesses in our second panel, 

recently articulated, when you have a nation that actively supports 

terrorism and seeks nuclear weapons, you cannot rule out the possibility that it could and would collaborate with terrorists to carry 

out nuclear terrorism. 

Therefore, this hearing seeks to address not just the Iran nuclear 

threat in itself but the implications for unconventional terrorism 

among States in the region. On the first issue, it seeks to answer 

3

such questions as: Would a nuclear Iran enhance the capacity of 

the terrorist network? If Iran develops a nuclear capability, will it 

cede its other nonconventional weapons to the terrorist network? 

Further, what is the likelihood of terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological weapons? 

While there is no specific evidence or analyses asserting Iran’s 

willingness to become a routine purveyor of unconventional weapons to non-State actors, there is the example of the Karine-A. Iran 

shipped 50 tons of heavy weaponry to the Popular Front for the 

Liberation of Palestine-General Command, which is headquartered 

in Damascus with bases in Syrian-occupied Lebanon. The arsenal 

contained 107 rockets, mortars, rocket propelled grenades, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles and anti-tank missiles. 

With respect to cooperation between Iran and other terrorist nations, former CIA Director Tenet noted in his February 2004 threat 

assessment briefing to Congress:

‘‘Iran appears to be willing to supply missile-related technology 

to countries of concern and publicly advertises its artillery 

rockets and related technologies, including guidance instruments and missile propellants.’’

Certainly the interest exists on the part of terrorist groups to secure chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities. 

It has been reported for some time that al-Qaeda has been seeking these weapons. The trial of bin Laden and other al-Qaeda 

operatives for the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 

Kenya and Tanzania shed new light on this. Prosecution witnesses 

detailed their efforts to assist bin Laden in an attempt to acquire 

uranium, presumably for the development of nuclear weapons. 

On June 13 of last year, news sources reported that authorities 

in Thailand intercepted a man trying to sell radioactive material 

that could have been used to make dirty bombs. 

One may assume that these efforts are limited to al-Qaeda, but 

as some terrorism experts have affirmed, there is increasing evidence that al-Qaeda is now cooperating with Hezbollah, which enjoys backing from Iran and Syria. Hezbollah is not only based in 

Syrian-occupied Lebanon but also, according to public reports, in 

the triborder region of South America where Paraguay, Brazil and 

Argentina meet and has operational capabilities in Canada. 

Thus, when we talk about the far-reaching implications of Iran’s 

nuclear efforts, we should not and must not discuss it in a vacuum. 

It is difficult to assess how aggressively Iran would exploit its 

nuclear capability and how it would behave, but one thing is clear: 

An Iran with nuclear weapons could significantly alter the regional 

dynamics and lead to further proliferation in the region—both from 

other State-sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria, or from United 

States allies which may feel threatened. 

Mike Eisenstadt, who will also testify as part of the second 

panel, will address some of these issues. 

Iran’s nuclear capabilities would change perceptions of the military balance in the region and could pose serious challenges to the 

United States in terms of deterrence and defense. 

4

To answer questions about how this will alter the U.S. defense 

posture and military strategy in the region, DoD has provided us 

with Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Flory. 

Ultimately, at the crux of any solution to Iran’s nuclear program 

and to the implications that it bears for proliferation in the region 

is the need to deny and deprive terrorists—whether State or nonState actors—the access to the technology, the parts and the materials to develop an unconventional weapons arsenal. 

A positive first step was taken on April 28 of this year when the 

U.N. Security Council adopted a U.S. resolution that underscored 

the threat of terrorist entities acquiring, developing, dealing in, or 

using these deadly weapons and their means of delivery. 

Among other determinations, it committed all States to undertake and enforce measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, 

chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. However, as President Bush noted in his speech earlier this year at the 

National Defense University:

‘‘There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot 

be tolerated, yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action.’’

The jury is still out on the resolve and commitment of some of 

our allies. 

We must not allow our allies to deceive themselves about Iran’s 

nuclear intentions and the broadbased support that the weapons 

program enjoys throughout the government, particularly among the 

reformist clergy. 

Since Khatami’s public announcement on February 9, 2003, that 

Iran was developing its own means to produce nuclear fuel, senior 

Iranian officials have made it abundantly clear that the nuclear 

program in their eyes makes the Islamic Republic more secure, reinforcing the regime from real or perceived existential threats to 

their existence. 

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how to 

address these critical threats to U.S. national security and priorities. 

I am now pleased to yield to Congresswoman Shelley Berkley for 

her opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

Iran’s unconventional weapons program and its fondness for using terrorism as 

statecraft, have made this pariah state a litmus test of President George Bush’s war 

against terror. A nuclear Iran combined, with its deep-rooted terrorist infrastructure, is an Iran that must be stopped. 

Unfortunately, the Iranian regime received another pass from the IAEA Board 

last week, as the resolution adopted had no references to the UN Security Council 

or any further action to hold Iran accountable. 

For at least two decades, the Iranian regime has been pursuing a covert nuclear 

program. It has undertaken a number of efforts for the manufacture and testing of 

centrifuge components, including at facilities owned by military industrial organizations. 

Concurrently, Iran is pursuing another approach to uranium enrichment that uses 

lasers, a complex technology rarely used by even the most advanced countries, because it is not cost efficient. 

5

Iran has expressed interest in the purchase of up to six additional nuclear power 

plants and is pursuing a heavy water research reactor that would be well suited 

for plutonium production. This represents yet another path to nuclear weapons, 

which endangers not only the region, but also the world. 

According to the IAEA report of November of last year, the Iranian regime admitted that it had failed to report a large number of activities involving nuclear material. This same report noted that Iran’s deceptions have dealt with the most sensitive 

aspects of the nuclear cycle. 

Further, the IAEA could not disprove that Iran’s nuclear program was not for 

weapons development. 

Within this context, Iranian news sources were filled with statements referring 

to Iran’s right to possess nuclear weapons within the current international context. 

One, in particular, referenced: ‘‘the natural and obvious right of the Iranian nation, and no power, whether of government or international assemblies, has the 

right to . . . cause any restriction or limitation on the exercise of this right in the 

field of nuclear activities by Iran.’’

Move forward to February and March of this year. 

The resolution adopted by the Board enumerated more recent Iranian breaches, 

including failing to disclose work on advanced P–2 centrifuges for uranium enrichment and work on Polonium 210, an element that could be used in nuclear explosions. 

Come June 1st. The IAEA reports a series of unresolved issues that strike at the 

core of Iran’s efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. 

The response from the Iranian Foreign Minister and the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council was that Iran has to be recognized by the international community as a member of the nuclear club; that ‘‘This is an irreversible

path.’’

The Central Intelligence Agency has warned that even intrusive IAEA inspections 

may not prevent Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons because Tehran could be 

using legitimate fuel production to cover up its weapons program. 

It is imperative that the international community join forces to deny Iran any and 

all avenues toward achieving nuclear status, including punitive measures to bring 

to a screeching halt Iran’s progress on this path. 

To reiterate, if last week’s meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors is any indication, the prospects for success look grim. 

The Board’s failure to report the Iran case to the UN Security Council sends a 

dangerous message to other pariah states and potential proliferators. 

Further, given the role that certain European countries have played in undermining the authority of the IAEA, cutting side deals with the Iranians and succumbing to Iranian intimidation, what options does the U.S. have? 

What efforts can be undertaken to delay, deter and prevent Iran from achieving 

a nuclear capability? 

Undersecretary of State John Bolton will address these and other critical issues. 

Nevertheless, the urgency of the Iran threat is not limited exclusively to its nuclear intentions. As a Senior DOD official underscored during a briefing in September 2002, Iran ‘‘is the full ticket.’’

They have medium and long-range missile programs. They also have a chemical 

and biological weapons program. 

Most importantly, Iran remains the most active state-sponsor of terrorism in the 

world. 

As Dr. Paul Leventhal, one of the witnesses in our second panel, recently articulated, when you have a nation that actively supports terrorism and seeks nuclear 

weapons, you cannot rule out the possibility that it could and would collaborate 

with terrorists to carry out nuclear terrorism. 

Therefore, this hearing seeks to address, not just the Iran nuclear threat, in itself, 

but the implications for unconventional terrorism and proliferation among states in 

the region. 

On the first issue, it seeks to answer such questions as:

• Would a nuclear Iran enhance the capacity of the terrorist network?

• If Iran develops a nuclear capability, will it cede its other non-conventional 

weapons to the terrorist network?

Further, what is the likelihood of terrorist use of nuclear, radiological, chemical 

or biological weapons? 

While there is no specific evidence or analyses asserting Iran’s willingness to become a routine purveyor of unconventional weapons to non-state actors, there is the 

example of the Karine-A. 

6

Iran shipped 50 tons of heavy weaponry to the Popular Front for the Liberation 

of Palestine-General Command, which is headquartered in Damascus, with bases in 

Syrian-occupied Lebanon. The arsenal contained 107 rockets, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles, and anti-tank missiles. 

With respect to cooperation between Iran and other terrorist nations, former CIA 

Director Tenet noted in his February 2004 threat assessment briefing to Congress: 

‘‘Iran appears to be willing to supply missile-related technology to countries of concern and publicly advertises its artillery rockets and related technologies, including 

guidance instruments and missile propellants.’’

Certainly, the interest exists on the part of terrorist groups to secure chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons capabilities. 

It has been reported for some time that al-Qaeda has been seeking these weapons. 

The trial of bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives for the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, shed new light on this. Prosecution witnesses detailed their efforts to assist bin Laden in an attempt to acquire uranium, presumably for the development of nuclear weapons. 

On June 13th of last year, news sources reported that authorities in Thailand

intercepted a man trying to sell radioactive material that could have been used to 

make ‘‘dirty bombs.’’

One may assume that these efforts are limited to al-Qaeda but, as some terrorism 

experts have affirmed, there is increasing evidence that al-Qaeda is now cooperating 

with Hezbollah, which enjoys backing from Iran and Syria. 

Hezbollah is not only based in Syrian-occupied Lebanon, but also, according to 

public reports, in the ‘‘triborder’’ region of South America where Paraguay, Brazil, 

and Argentina meet, and has operational capabilities in Canada. 

Thus, when we talk about the far-reaching implications of Iran’s nuclear efforts, 

we should not and must not discuss it in a vacuum. 

It is difficult to assess how aggressively Iran would exploit its nuclear capability 

and how it would behave, but one thing is clear: an Iran with nuclear weapons could 

significantly alter the regional dynamics and lead to further proliferation in the region—both from other state-sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria, or from U.S. allies 

which may feel threatened. 

Michael Eisenstadt, who will also testify as part of the second panel, will address 

some of these issues. 

Iranian nuclear capabilities would change perceptions of the military balance in 

the region, and could pose serious challenges to the U.S. in terms of deterrence and 

defense. 

To answer questions about how this will alter the U.S. defense posture and military strategy in the region, DOD has provided us with Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense, Peter Flory. 

Ultimately, at the crux of any solution to Iran’s nuclear program and to the implications it bears for proliferation in the region, is the need to deny and deprive terrorists—whether state or non-state actors—the access to the technology, the parts, 

and the materials, to develop an unconventional weapons arsenal. 

A positive first step was taken on April 28th of this year, when the UN Security 

Council adopted a U.S. resolution that underscored the threat of terrorist entities 

acquiring, developing, dealing in, or using these deadly weapons and their means 

of delivery. 

Among other determinations, it committed all States to undertake and enforce 

measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and 

their means of delivery. 

However, as President Bush noted in his speech earlier this year at the National 

Defense University, ‘‘There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot 

be tolerated. Yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action.’’

The jury is still out on the resolve and commitment of some of our allies. 

We must not allow our allies to deceive themselves about Iran’s nuclear intentions 

and the broad-based support that the weapons program enjoys throughout the government, particularly among the ‘‘reformist’’ clergy. 

Since Khatami’s public announcement on February 9, 2003, that Iran was developing its own means to produce nuclear fuel, senior Iranian officials have made it 

abundantly clear that the nuclear program, in their eyes, makes the Islamic Republic more secure, reinforcing the regime from real or perceived existential threats to 

their existence. 

We look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how to address these critical threats to U.S. national security and priorities.

Ms. BERKLEY. I think Mr. Sherman was here first. 

7

Mr. SHERMAN. But I am not a Member of the Subcommittee, so 

I yield to you, Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I welcome the witnesses to our hearing and thank them for being 

here. 

I want to thank you, Madam Chairman, for calling this hearing 

to discuss the Iranian proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

I share my colleague’s concern regarding this issue, and I am anxious to hear from our panel of witnesses. 

Iran’s refusal to disarm and unwillingness to cooperate with the 

international community represents a significant security threat to 

the United States. Iran’s close ties with non-State entities and terrorist organizations only compound this threat. Its development of 

ballistic missile technology and successful testing of a Shahab-3 

rocket puts U.S. forces and American allies in the region, including 

Israel, at serious risk. 

Last year, it was revealed that Iran is clandestinely building uranium enrichment facilities, already possesses more than 1,000 centrifuges, has illegally imported uranium, has announced its intention to mine its own uranium and has built a heavy water production plant. 

After this was revealed, Iran signed an additional protocol allowing for inspections and reached an agreement to suspend their uranium enrichment activities. Unfortunately, this agreement was 

never carried out. Iran never stopped it’s illicit activity and is continuing to assemble parts and materials that can be used to build 

nuclear arms. We do not know the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons 

program exactly, and we do not know their involvement with other 

nations that are unfriendly to the United States or the extent of 

that involvement. Perhaps most importantly, we do not know the 

extent of Iran’s cooperation with terrorist organizations and nonState entities. 

What we do know is that Iran has close relationships with 

Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. We also know it 

has been involved in major terrorist activities in the past and that 

it has within its borders radical and fundamentalist groups. In my 

opinion and estimation, Iran continues to be and has in the past 

posed a far greater threat to this Nation than Iraq ever could. 

There are a number of areas of extreme concern and a number of 

areas that we know nothing about. 

As I said earlier, I am most anxious to hear what our witnesses 

have to offer and, specifically, to hear what steps the Administration is taking to combat this emerging threat and what resources 

we have to continue this fight. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Berkley. 

I yield to the Vice Chairman of the Subcommittee, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Madam Chair, I will be very brief because I know 

we want to get to the witnesses. 

President Bush has described Iran as being one of the three 

members of the ‘‘axis of evil,’’ along with Iraq and North Korea. 

Some people scoffed at that description, but I think we are going 

to learn things here this afternoon that are going to show just how 

accurate the President’s comments were at the time. 

8

When one mixes the potential for nuclear weapons, and a State 

that has been and continues to be involved in terrorism, it spells 

potential disaster. I want to commend the Chair for holding this 

very important hearing this afternoon. It is very timely, and I want 

to thank you for inviting Under Secretary Bolton to be here. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

As you know, I am the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on 

International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights. I 

take a great interest in these issues, and I thank you for inviting 

me to participate in these hearings. 

Some of the questions that emerge we do not need to deal with 

because the first case: Is Iran developing nuclear weapons? That is 

obvious. When will they have nuclear weapons? That is classified, 

although the answer is within a few years. And how dangerous will 

it be for Americans if they do have nuclear weapons? Well, let us 

review the situation. 

The Iranian government is today sheltering al-Qaeda operatives 

at the highest level, including the son of bin Laden, and it cooperated with al-Qaeda in killing Americans at the Khobar Towers. It 

has been identified as the number one State-sponsor of terrorism 

year after year. Its hostility is not at issue. 

What about its capacity? Well, when it has those nuclear weapons—and keep in mind, a nuclear weapon is about the size of a 

person and is quieter than most—it can be smuggled into the 

United States as easily as a person is smuggled into the United 

States, and that has happened. But we have lived through a whole 

cold war where there was hostility and capacity. 

But with the Soviet Union, we had one issue, and that was the 

Soviet Union was deterrable compared to the regime or regimes 

likely to hold sway in Tehran over the next dozen years. We could 

see instability at any time. It is an undemocratic government with 

many factions. We could see fanaticism in which the faction that 

holds power does not care whether we retaliate or believes that 

they will be met in heaven as great heroes if they are the victims 

of such retaliation. 

We will not have a deterrable nuclear power adversary. Lenin 

once commented that capitalists would sell them the rope to hang 

the capitalists. We would probably do so on credit. But, fortunately, 

the sons of Lenin were careful and were deterrable, and those 

terms do not necessarily apply to those who will hold sway in 

Tehran. So then, the final issue, the real question of these hearings 

is: What are we doing about it? What are we doing with regard to 

the Iranian nuclear program? 

Congress mandated the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, yet, time and 

time again, the Administration winks, nods, refuses to acknowledge 

that our allies’ oil companies are investing billions of dollars in the 

Iranian oil sector. And just recently, a Japanese company announced an over $2 billion investment, somehow not triggering the 

Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. You do not have to use the law if you can 

ignore the facts. 

Then, over the last 2 years, the World Bank has approved loans 

of over half a billion dollars. We voted no, as we are required to 

9

do by statute, but we did not make it an issue. And we will be 

called upon in the next few weeks to send hundreds of millions or 

billions of American tax dollars to the same World Bank that is 

sending half a billion dollars to the government that is building 

those nuclear weapons. 

Oh, and every year, for several years in a row, we import $150 

million worth of carpets and caviar that the Iranians could not sell 

anywhere else at the same price. 

So when we are asked, what are we doing regarding that Iranian 

nuclear weapons development program, what are we doing about it, 

the answer is clear: We are financing it on favorable terms. We are 

allowing, encouraging and ignoring our allies as they send money. 

We are financing and sending more money and more money to the 

World Bank as they send money to that government. And we are 

sending money directly from Americans to Iran for what are obviously unnecessary imports into this country. 

They are not deterrable. They are not careful. We are risking the 

lives of Americans on whether we can prevent that government 

from using nuclear weapons against it, smuggling them into the 

United States and telling them that they have them and might 

blow them up or just blowing them up. Be afraid, be very afraid, 

and be angry that your Government is not doing anything to stop 

it. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. No questions. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just a few thoughts before we get into the 

testimony. 

I know my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are very animated on this issue, but let us remember that this Administration, 

our Administration, inherited this problem from the last Administration which did absolutely nothing but cause the problem to get 

worse and worse. So I would just admonish the witnesses today to 

do better than the last Administration did. 

Then let us note that our colleagues on the other side of the 

aisle—in this silly political season that it is—are always stressing 

that this Administration needs to act multilaterally. And of course, 

you would think, by the statements we have heard today, that we 

are trying for unilateral action. But let us note that I am pleased 

that my colleague has noted the failure of the World Bank and 

other international institutions. And there are many of us on this 

side of the aisle that favor a strong United States policy that we 

are not afraid to enact on our own, if necessary, but lead the way 

for the free countries of the world rather than relying on the 

United Nations and the other institutions that our colleagues 

would have us rely on for our security. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman, he is attributing comments to 

us that were never made. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for his opening statement. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

10

I am looking forward to the testimony. My only admonishment 

is, be bold. If we are going to be a free people and live at peace, 

we have to do more than the last Administration did in trying to 

buy people off. And whether it is Iran or North Korea, we need to 

make sure that we are bold and we act so the next generation of 

Americans are not left with the type of inheritance that the last 

Administration has left us. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Pitts is recognized. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I would like to seek recognition. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No. Permission denied. 

Ms. BERKLEY. When I ask my questions, I am going to bring this 

up because I don’t like having my statements being mischaracterized.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for convening this important hearing today on the dangers imposed by Iran’s efforts to 

acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction. We cannot sit 

idly by waiting for confirmation that they have transferred WMDs 

to other State-sponsors of terrorism or terrorism groups. I look forward to hearing the testimony today. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. Berkeley, I would like to recognize you 

to correct the record that you believe Mr. Rohrabacher distorted. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I appreciate Mr. Rohrabacher’s remarks. 

I think I am speaking for my colleague here, neither one of us 

mentioned anything that you were talking about. We believe in a 

strong America and a strong military and to suggest that we do not 

and attributing continued blame to the last Administration is a tremendous affront to those Members that are sitting here today. I am 

sure you did not mean that, but that is the way it sounded. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

I am pleased to introduce our witnesses today. 

Under Secretary John Bolton was sworn in as Under Secretary 

of State for Arms Control and International Security on May 11, 

2001. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Bolton was Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute. He has spent many 

years in public service, having served as Assistant Secretary of 

State for International Organization Affairs from 1989 to 1993; as 

Assistant Attorney General from 1985 to 1989; as USAID Assistant 

Administrator for Program and Policy Coordination in 1982 and 

1983; and as General Counsel of U.S. Agency for International Development from 1981 to 1982. Mr. Bolton is also an attorney, having served as an associate at a Washington law firm and, from 

1993 to 1999, as a partner in another law firm locally. We thank 

you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us and being so accessible. 

Mr. Bolton will be followed by Mr. Peter Flory, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs at the Department of Defense. Mr. Flory will serve as an accompanying witness and will be available to answer questions. 

Mr. Secretary, we thank you. You are always accessible, you are 

always available to take our tough questions, and I think you will 

get a flavor of that today. 

Your full statement will be made a part of the record. 

11

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BOLTON. Madam Chairman, thank you. It is a pleasure to be 

here today. 

This is a very timely hearing, among other reasons that I will address, but just within the past few hours, we have been informed 

that Iran has announced a substantial resumption of its uranium 

enrichment program, reneging on the commitment that it made to 

the United Kingdom, Germany and France by informing them and 

the IAEA that it will begin next week the production of uranium 

centrifuge parts and equipment assembly and testing. This is yet 

another example of Iran thumbing its nose at the international 

community given that just last week the IAEA Board of Directors 

unanimously called on Iran to affirm its commitment to the three 

European countries not to do precisely that and to maintain the 

suspension of its uranium enrichment program that it previously 

committed to the Europeans. 

I want to come back to that later in the testimony, Madam 

Chairman, but it is a graphic example of the extent of the problem 

and the extent that Iran has made and continues to follow a strategic decision to seek a nuclear weapons capability. 

I want to touch briefly, and my prepared testimony does so at 

greater length, on all of Iran’s WMD efforts, biological, chemical, 

nuclear, and ballistic missiles, because all of these, the pursuit of 

all of these deadly weapons, despite Iran’s adherence to treaties 

that provide expressly to the contrary, marks Iran as a rogue 

State. And it will remain so until it completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantles all of its WMD-related programs. 

On chemical weapons, Iran clearly has a covert program to develop and stockpile these weapons. Reports by our intelligence community make that clear, including in the report that is just about 

to come out, that Iran may already have stockpiled blister, blood, 

choking and nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them, which they had previously manufactured. Iran is a 

party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, the central obligations 

of which are very straight-forward: No stockpiling, development, 

production, and no use of chemical weapons. 

Most of the State parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention 

abide by their commitments, but Iran has not. And we think it is 

time for Iran to declare the remainder of its chemical weapons program and make arrangements with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to dismantle and destroy its program. 

In respect to biological weapons, our intelligence community has 

concluded that Iran probably has an offensive biological weapons 

program. It continues to seek dual-use materials, equipment and 

expertise which can be used in that program. It has the capability, 

currently, to produce at least small quantities of BW agents and a 

limited ability to weaponize them. 

Now, BW programs are inherently easy to conceal. It is very difficult to make definitive statements about them, but I think, from 

the intelligence I have seen, that, as a policy matter, you can conclude that it would be contrary to our best interest not to assume 

that they have a program actively. Responsible members of the 

12

international community, like the United States, should act to head 

off the threats posed by programs such as Iran’s and demand 

transparency and bring suspected violators to accountability. 

Iran’s adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention and the 

1925 Protocol are all being violated by these activities. We think 

it is time for Iran to declare its program and make arrangements 

for its dismantlement. 

On ballistic missiles, Iran has a very extensive program, thanks 

to assistance from entities—including government-owned entities—

in North Korea, Russia and China, to develop a variety of liquid 

and solid propellent missiles. It is increasing the range of these 

missiles all the time, and its Shahab-3 missile is already a direct 

threat to Israel, Turkey, United States forces in the region and 

other U.S. friends and allies. Iran clearly has programs underway 

to acquire the means to produce ever more sophisticated and 

longer-range missiles. North Korea is one of the main suppliers of 

this ballistic missile equipment and technology, and foreign assistance is a significant factor in Iran’s program. 

Now, since the Congress passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 

2000, we have imposed trade sanctions involving WMD-related 

transfers to Iran 37 times. This law has been a valuable resource 

to us. We have imposed sanctions on serial proliferators from 

China, like NORINCO, CPMIEC, Zibo Chemical and others, and 

from North Korea’s Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, but we have 

also imposed sanctions on companies from Russia, Taiwan, Macedonia and Belarus. We are not reluctant to impose sanctions on 

anybody that comes within the purview of INPA. 

On nuclear weapons, we know that Iran is developing uranium 

mines, uranium conversion facilities, a massive uranium enrichment facility designed to house tens of thousands of centrifuges, 

numerous centrifuge production workshops, a heavy water production plant and a laser enrichment facility. We know that Iran has 

violated its NPT and IAEA commitments by covertly enriching uranium, by covertly producing and separating plutonium, by secretly 

converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride and by secretly 

producing uranium metal and by failing to declare any of these activities to the IAEA. 

Iran secretly procured P–1 centrifuge components from the A.Q. 

Khan nuclear proliferation network, as well as P–2 components, including the means to manufacture centrifuge components domestically, including in military workshops, and, contrary to its commitment to the IAEA and the three European governments, continues 

to produce components today. 

Now, in the testimony, Madam Chairman, I lay out at some 

length what the IAEA has done over the past year. The Chairman’s 

statement in June 2003, the September 2003 IAEA Board resolution, the November 2003 IAEA Board resolution, the March 2004 

IAEA Board resolution and the June 2004 IAEA Board resolution. 

During this entire period of time, Madam Chairman, the United 

States has believed, and has tried to persuade the other members 

of the IAEA Board, that the Iranian nuclear weapons program 

should be referred to the U.N. Security Council as a threat to international peace and security. We have not yet secured that objecVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
13

tive, but I want to assure you and the Committee, that remains our 

objective. 

I have laid out in the testimony at some length some of the specifics about Iran’s nuclear weapons program. I think it is important 

to have this on the record in a public way. I will not repeat it here, 

but I commend it to your attention because, when you see the 

breadth and scope of this program, it is easy to understand why 

we conclude that Iran has absolutely no need for this activity unless it is in aid of a nuclear weapons program. 

Now, in the course of the various resolutions that we have had 

adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors, the governments of the 

United Kingdom, France and Germany have met with Iran and 

have sought to commit the Iranians to suspending, and ultimately 

ceasing, the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities that the Iranians have sought. They reached agreement 

with Iran in October of last year to suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities. They reached a clarifying agreement with 

Iran in February of this year, in which Iran committed not to 

produce uranium centrifuges and uranium centrifuge equipment. 

Now, we have been concerned about the effect of this arrangement by the Iranians for some time and have been working with 

our three European partners to try to harmonize our policies so 

that we maintain maximum international pressure on the Government of Iran to get it to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. 

Even from the time last October when the EU–3 and the Iranians reached this deal, the Iranians have maintained publicly that 

their suspension of uranium enrichment is purely voluntary, and 

they will resume it at their discretion if the Europeans did not 

carry through on their part of the deal, as described by Iran, to 

provide Iran with highly sophisticated technical assistance. We find 

that following the IAEA Board resolution last week which, among 

other things, deplored Iran’s continued lack of cooperation and deception of the IAEA, today, as I mentioned a few moments ago, the 

Government of Iran has informed the United Kingdom, Germany 

and France that it is resuming production of uranium centrifuge 

parts. 

We believe that Iran never fully suspended this production to 

begin with, but it has today confirmed that it is reneging on the 

February agreement that it reached with the three European countries. 

They have not, at least at this point, said that they would resume actual enrichment activities, but it seems to me it is perfectly 

obvious that Iran is not producing components for uranium centrifuges to use them as knick-knacks in Iranian living rooms. This 

is an act of defiance of the IAEA Board of Governors. It is a thumb 

in the eye of the international community. We will be in close consultation with our three European allies to assess their reaction to 

this. 

I want to say again, Madam Chairman, it has been our view, it 

remains our view, Iran’s action today confirms our view, that its 

nuclear weapons program is a threat to international peace and security and should be referred to the U.N. Security Council. 

We have taken a number of other steps not confined simply to 

multilateral diplomacy to try and stop the program. The PresiVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

dent’s Proliferation Security Initiative is a robust and muscular approach not simply to export control regimes but to use military intelligence and law enforcement assets to break up the international 

trade in weapons of mass destruction. PSI has had a number of 

successes, most notably the interdiction of the ship, the BBC 

China, in October of last year. The BBC China was carrying centrifuge equipment from the A.Q. Khan network to Libya. The interdiction and exposure of that shipment was a significant factor in 

the Libyan government’s decision to give up the pursuit of nuclear 

weapons and a significant element in the exposure of the A.Q. 

Khan network. 

President Bush has gone further. You mentioned his speech at 

the National Defense University. One of the most wonkish speeches 

a President of the United States has ever given. I thought it was 

fantastic. He addressed the principal loopholes in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. He proposed dramatic programs to close those 

loopholes. And he made great progress at the Sea Island Summit 

a few weeks ago in bringing the other G–8 countries along in attempting to reach agreement on those programs. 

We are going to be continuing that work as well. But let us be 

clear: Our policy is unequivocal. We cannot let Iran, a leading 

sponsor of international terrorism, acquire the most destructive 

weapons and the means to deliver them to Europe, most of Central 

Asia and beyond. 

That is our policy, Madam Chairman. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR

ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for the opportunity to testify today before this 

Subcommittee to discuss Iran’s weapons of mass destruction (‘‘WMD’’) programs and 

what the Bush Administration is doing to stop them. 

I will cover all of Iran’s WMD programs and will provide detailed comments on 

Iran’s extensive covert nuclear weapons program. All of Iran’s WMD efforts—chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles—pose 

grave threats to international security. Iran’s pursuit of these deadly weapons, despite its adherence to treaties that ban them marks it as a rogue state, and it will 

remain so until it completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantles its WMD-related programs. 

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

We believe Iran has a covert program to develop and stockpile chemical weapons. 

The US Intelligence Community reported in its recent unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 

Advanced Conventional Munitions, also known as the ‘‘721 Report,’’ that Iran continues to seek production technology, training, and expertise that could further its 

efforts to achieve an indigenous capability to produce nerve agents. A forthcoming 

edition of the 721 report is expected to state that ‘‘Iran may have already stockpiled 

blister, blood, choking, and nerve agents—and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them—which it previously had manufactured.’’

Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (‘‘CWC’’). The CWC’s central 

obligation is simple: no stockpiling, no development, no production, and no use of 

chemical weapons. The overwhelming majority of States Parties abide by this obligation. Iran is not, and we have made this abundantly clear to the Organization 

for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Although Iran has declared a portion of 

its CW program to the OPCW. It is time for Iran to declare the remainder and make 

arrangements for its dismantlement and for the destruction of its chemical weapons. 

15

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The US Intelligence Community stated in its recent 721 Report that, ‘‘Tehran 

probably maintains an offensive BW program. Iran continued to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise. While such materials had legitimate 

uses, Iran’s biological warfare (BW) program also could have benefited from them. 

It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce small quantities of BW agents, but 

has a limited ability to weaponize them.’’ Because BW programs are easily concealed, I cannot say that the United States can prove beyond a shadow of a doubt 

that Iran has an offensive BW program. The intelligence I have seen suggests that 

this is the case, and, as a policy matter therefore, I believe we have to act on that 

assumption. The risks to international peace and security from such programs are 

too great to wait for irrefutable proof of illicit activity: responsible members of the 

international community should act to head off such threats and demand transparency and accountability from suspected violators while these threats are still 

emerging. It would be folly indeed to wait for the threat fully to mature before trying to stop it. 

Iran is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention (‘‘BWC’’) and the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 

Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Like the CWC, the central obligation of the BWC is simple: no possession, no development no production and, together with the 1925 Protocol, no use of biological weapons. The overwhelming majority of States Parties abide by these obligations. We believe Iran is not abiding 

by its BWC obligations, however, and we have made this abundantly clear to the 

parties of this treaty. It is time for Iran to declare its biological weapons program 

and make arrangements for its dismantlement. 

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Iran continues its extensive efforts to develop the means to deliver weapons of 

mass destruction. Thanks to assistance from entities—including government-owned 

entities—in North Korea, Russia, and China, Iran is developing a variety of liquidpropellant and solid-propellant ballistic missiles. Iran’s ballistic missile inventory is 

among the largest in the Middle East and includes some 1,300-km-range Shahab3 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and a few hundred short-range ballistic 

missiles (SRBMs)—including the Shahab-1 (Scud-B), Shahab-2 (Scud C), and 

Tondar-69 (CSS–8)—as well as a new solid-propellant SRBM, the Fateh-110. The 

1,300-km range Shahab-3 missile is a direct threat to Israel, Turkey, U.S. forces in 

the region, and U.S. friends and allies. 

In addition, we believe Iran has programs to develop longer-range missiles that 

will be able to strike additional targets throughout the region or that will allow Iran 

to launch missiles against Israel from locations further within Iranian territory. Finally, Iran is likely to develop IRBMs or ICBMs capable of delivering payloads to 

Western Europe or the Unites States. I want to emphasize this point: Iran is acquiring the means to produce ever more sophisticated and longer-range missiles. If they 

are successful in this endeavor, our attempts to slow the missile trade will have little effect on Iran’s already-developing indigenous missile capability. 

North Korea is one of the main suppliers of ballistic missiles, missile equipment, 

and production technology to Iran. North Korea provided Iran with the technology 

to produce the SCUD B (300 km range) and SCUD C (500 km range) missiles. In 

addition, the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile is based on the North Korean 

No Dong missile. 

Foreign assistance has been key to the development of Iran’s ballistic missile programs. Such assistance during the first half of 2003 included equipment, technology, 

and expertise and has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient 

in the production of ballistic missiles. Although Iran is not a member of the Missile 

Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a multilateral arrangement aimed at stemming 

the proliferation of ballistic missiles or the International Code of Conduct Against 

Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), Iran has engaged in substantial trade in missile technology with countries that ought to know better. 

THE U.S. RESPONSE TO BW, CW, AND MISSILE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO IRAN

Since the Bush Administration took office, we have imposed trade sanctions involving WMD-related transfers to Iran more than 50 times. The Iran Nonproliferation Act (INPA) of 2000 has been our most valuable tool in enabling the Bush Administration to punish proliferators for their illegal transfers of WMD and missile 

technology. Despite these efforts, some companies, which we brand as serial 

proliferators, continue to sell materials that could advance Iran’s WMD and missile 

16

programs. These serial proliferators include the Chinese companies NORINCO, 

CPMIEC, Zibo Chemical and others, and from North Korea, the Changgwang 

Sinyong Corporation. But we don’t just go after these serial proliferators, we go 

where the evidence leads us. In the last INPA report, we sanctioned the usual suspects from Russia, China and North Korea. But we also sanctioned companies from 

Taiwan, Macedonia and Belarus. We want any proliferators, whether a conglomerate like NORINCO or a small missile parts company from Macedonia, to understand that the U.S. will impose economic burdens and brand them as proliferators. 

It is a message we believe is getting through. 

In our efforts to halt such dangerous and destabilizing trade and punish companies and individuals for the proliferation of missile technology to Iran, the United 

States has imposed Executive Order and Missile Sanctions Law sanctions five times 

on four different entities for missile-related technology transfers to Iran since 2001. 

In addition, we have held numerous diplomatic discussions with various supplier 

nations, both MTCR members and non-MTCR members, in an effort to persuade 

them to investigate and stop Iranian efforts to procure missile-relevant items in 

their countries. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The United States strongly believes that Iran has a clandestine program to 

produce nuclear weapons, and has been warning publicly about Tehran’s weapons 

ambitions for over a decade. 

We know Iran is developing uranium mines, a uranium conversion facility 

(‘‘UCF’’), a massive uranium enrichment facility designed to house tens of thousands 

of centrifuges, numerous centrifuge productions workshops, a heavy water production plant, and a laser enrichment facility. We know that Iran has violated its NPT 

and IAEA commitments by covertly enriching uranium, by covertly producing and 

separating plutonium, by secretly converting yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride 

(‘‘UF6’’), and by secretly producing uranium metal and by failing to declare any of 

these activities to the IAEA. Iran secretly procured P–1 centrifuge components from 

the A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network, as well as P–2 components, developed 

the means to manufacture centrifuge components domestically (including in military 

workshops), and—contrary to its commitments to the IAEA and to three European 

governments—continues to produce components today. Iran has announced plans to 

‘‘hot test’’ its UCF at Esfahan, which will produce UF6, in clear violation of its 

promises to suspend all enrichment-related activity. Moreover, Iran continues with 

plans to build additional unnecessary nuclear capabilities, such as a heavy-water reactor—a facility ideally suited to produce large quantities of plutonium usable in a 

nuclear weapon, which also explains Iran’s secret experiments with reprocessing 

plutonium behind the back of the International Atomic Energy Agency (‘‘IAEA’’). 

The designs for that facility underscore the weapons intent, as do Iran’s experiments to produce polonium-210, a weapons initiator. 

The costly infrastructure to perform all of these activities goes well beyond any 

conceivable peaceful nuclear program. No comparable oil-rich nation has ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of activities—or would pursue them for nearly two decades behind a continuing cloud of secrecy and lies to IAEA inspectors and 

the international community—unless it was dead set on building nuclear weapons. 

Let me describe for you what the IAEA Board of Governors has said about Iran 

in the last year: 

June 2003

The June 19, 2003 statement by the Board of Governors ‘‘shared the concern expressed by the Director General in his report at the number of Iran’s past failures 

to report material, facilities and activities as required by its safeguards obligations,’’ 

and went on to say ‘‘the Board urged Iran promptly to rectify all safeguards problems identified in the report and resolve questions that remain open.’’

The June 2003 Board statement also encouraged Iran not to introduce nuclear 

material into centrifuges, and to cooperate fully with the Agency, including permitting the IAEA to take samples at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop involved 

with enrichment activities. 

September 2003

On September 12, 2003, the Board passed a resolution expressing concern that 

‘‘information and access were at times slow in coming and incremental, that some 

of the information was in contrast to that previously provided by Iran, and that 

there remained a number of important outstanding issues that require urgent resolution.’’ The Board noted with concern that:

17

• the Agency environmental sampling at Natanz revealed the presence of two 

types of highly enriched uranium;

• IAEA inspectors found considerable modifications had been made to the premises at the Kalaye Electric Company prior to inspections that may impact on 

the accuracy of environmental sampling;

• some of Iran’s statements of the IAEA had undergone significant and material changes, and that the number of outstanding issues had increased since 

the last report;

• despite the Board’s June 2003 statement encouraging Iran not to introduce 

nuclear material into its pilot centrifuge enrichment cascade at Natanz, Iran 

introduced such material.

The September 2003 Board resolution also expressed ‘‘grave concern that, more 

than one year after initial IAEA inquiries to Iran about undeclared activities, Iran 

has still not enabled the IAEA to provide the assurances required by Member States 

that all nuclear material in Iran is declared and submitted to Agency safeguards 

and that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in Iran,’’ and called on Iran to

• ‘‘provide accelerated cooperation and full transparency to allow the Agency to 

provide at an early date the assurances required by Member States.’’

• ‘‘ensure that there are no further failures to report material, facilities and activities that Iran is obligated to report pursuant to its safeguards agreement.’’

• ‘‘suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities, including the further introduction of nuclear material into Natanz, and, as a confidence-building measure, any reprocessing activities.’’

Finally, the Board decided that ‘‘it is essential and urgent in order to ensure IAEA 

verification of non-diversion of nuclear material that Iran remedy all failures identified by the Agency and cooperate fully with the Agency to ensure verification of compliance with Iran’s safeguards agreement by taking all necessary actions by the end 

of October 2003, including:

• Providing a full declaration of all imported material and components relevant 

to the enrichment program;

• Granting unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, for the 

Agency to whatever locations the Agency deems necessary;

• Resolving questions regarding the conclusion of Agency experts that process 

testing on gas centrifuges must have been conducted;

• Providing complete information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion 

experiments;

• Providing such other information and explanations, and taking such other 

steps as are deemed necessary by the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues 

involving nuclear materials and nuclear activities. 

November 2003

On November 26, 2003, the Board passed a resolution noting ‘‘with deep concern 

that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to 

meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to reporting of nuclear material, and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities 

where such material has been processed and stored.’’ Other provisions of the November 2003 resolution...

• . . . noted ‘‘with gravest concern, that Iran enriched uranium and separated 

plutonium in undeclared facilities, in the absence of IAEA safeguards’’ and 

‘‘with equal concern, that there has been in the past a pattern of concealment 

resulting in breaches of safeguard obligations and that the new information 

disclosed by Iran and reported by the Director General includes much more 

that is contradictory to information previously provided by Iran.’’

• . . . ’’strongly deplores Iran’s past failures and breaches of its obligation to 

comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement, as reported by the 

Director General; and urges Iran to adhere strictly to its obligations under 

its Safeguards Agreement in both letter and spirit.’’

• . . . called on Iran ‘‘to undertake and complete the taking of all necessary 

corrective measures on an urgent basis, to sustain full cooperation with the 

Agency in implementing Iran’s commitment to full disclosure and unrestricted 

access, and thus to provide the transparency and openness that are indispensable for the Agency to complete the considerable work necessary to provide 

and maintain the assurances required by Member States,’’ and decided ‘‘that, 

18

should any further serious failures come to light, the Board of Governors 

would meet immediately to consider, in the light of the circumstances and of 

advice from the Director General, all options at its disposal, in accordance 

with the IAEA Statute and Iran’s Safeguards Agreement.’’

March 2004

On March 13, 2004, the Board passed a resolution that stated ‘‘serious concern 

that the declarations made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete 

and final picture of Iran’s past and present nuclear program considered essential 

by the Board’s November 2003 resolution, in that the Agency has since uncovered 

a number of omissions—e.g., a more advanced centrifuge design than previously declared, including associated research, manufacturing and testing activities; two 

mass spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for the construction of hot cells at the Arak heavy water research reactor—which require further investigation, not least as they may point to nuclear activities not so far acknowledged by Iran.’’ The March 2004 resolution also...

• . . . noted ‘‘with equal concern that Iran has not resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment technology to its current extent, 

and that a number of other questions remain unresolved, including the 

sources of all HEU contamination in Iran; the location, extent, and nature of 

work undertaken on the basis of the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, 

extent, and purpose of activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; 

and evidence to support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments.’’

• . . . noted with concern that ‘‘Iran’s and Libya’s conversion and centrifuge 

programs share several common elements, including technology largely obtained from the same foreign sources.’’

• . . . ’’deplored that Iran, as detailed in the report of the Director General, 

omitted any reference, in its letter of 21 October 2003, which was to have provided the ‘‘full scope of Iranian nuclear activities’’ and a ‘‘complete centrifuge 

R&D chronology,’’ to its possession of P–2 centrifuge design drawings and to 

associated research, manufacturing, and mechanical testing activities—which 

the Director General describes as ‘‘a matter of serious concern, particularly 

in view of the importance and sensitivity of those activities.’’

• . . . called on Iran ‘‘to be pro-active in taking all necessary steps on an urgent basis to resolve all outstanding issues, including the issue of LEU and 

HEU contamination at the Kalaye Electric Company workshop and Natanz; 

the issue of the nature and scope of Iran’s laser isotope enrichment research; 

and the issue of the experiments on the production of polonium-210.’’

June 2004

Last week, on June 18, 2004, the Board resolution passed a resolution that ‘‘deplores . . . the fact that, overall, as indicated by the Director General’s written and 

oral reports, Iran’s cooperation has not been as full, timely, and proactive as it 

should have been, and, in particular, that Iran postponed until mid-April visits 

originally scheduled for mid-March—including visits of Agency centrifuge experts to 

a number of locations involved in Iran’s P–2 centrifuge enrichment program—resulting in some cases in a delay in the taking of environmental samples and their analysis.’’

The Board also recalled Iran’s decision to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and to permit the Agency to verify that suspension, and noted 

with concern that:

• ‘‘as detailed in the Director General’s report, this verification was delayed in 

some cases, and that the suspension is not yet comprehensive because of the 

continued production of centrifuge equipment;’’

• ‘‘Iran’s decision to proceed with the generation of UF6 is at variance with the 

Agency’s previous understanding as to the scope of Iran’s decision regarding 

suspension;’’

• ‘‘Iran has withheld 10 assembled centrifuge rotors for research activities.’’

The June 2004 resolution also...

• . . . noted ‘‘with concern that after almost two years from when Iran’s 

undeclared program came to the Agency’s knowledge a number of questions 

remain outstanding, and in particular two questions that are key to understanding the extent and nature of Iran’s enrichment program: the sources of 

19

all HEU contamination in Iran and the extent and nature of work undertaken 

on the basis of the P–2 advanced centrifuge design.’’

• . . . noted ‘‘with serious concern that important information about the P–2 

centrifuge program has often been forthcoming only after repeated requests, 

and in some cases has been incomplete and continues to lack the necessary 

clarity and also that the information provided to date relating to contamination issues has not been adequate to resolve this complex matter.’’

• . . . noted ‘‘with concern that the Agency’s investigations have revealed further serious omissions in the statements made by Iran, including in the October declaration, in particular concerning the importation of P–2 components 

form abroad and concerning laser enrichment tests, which have produced 

samples enriched up to 15%, and also that Agency experts have raised questions and doubts regarding the explanations provided by Iran concerning 

those programs.’’

• . . . called on Iran ‘‘to take all steps necessary on an urgent basis to help 

resolve all outstanding issues, especially HEU and LEU contamination . . . 

and the scope of Iran’s P–2 centrifuge program.’’

• . . . called on Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings, to refrain from production of UF6, and to reconsider the decision to start construction of a heavy water reactor.

The United States believes the time to report this issue to the Security Council 

is long overdue. We are working closely with our friends and allies to urge an IAEA 

Board of Governors resolution that declares Iran in noncompliance with its IAEA 

safeguards obligations and reports that noncompliance to the UN Security Council. 

It is not a question of ‘‘if’’, but of ‘‘when’’ the IAEA Board will report that noncompliance. We believe it must happen soon, or risk eroding an important part of the 

IAEA safeguards system, and risk sending a signal to would-be proliferators that 

there are not serious consequences for pursuing secret nuclear weapons programs. 

The United States and all of its G–8 partners were united in expressing their concern about Iran at the Sea Island Summit, stating that ‘‘[we are] deeply concerned 

that Iran’s suspension of enrichment-related activity is not yet comprehensive. We 

deplore Iran’s delays, deficiencies in cooperation, and inadequate disclosures, as detailed in IAEA Director General reports. We therefore urge Iran promptly and fully 

to comply with its commitments and all IAEA Board requirements, including ratification and full implementation of the Additional Protocol, leading to resolution of 

all outstanding issues related to its nuclear program.’’

Alarm about Iran’s nuclear weapons effort has grown at the IAEA over the last 

year. Since June 2003, the IAEA Director General has issued five damaging reports 

on Iran’s failure to adhere to the IAEA safeguards rules it is required to obey pursuant to Article III of the NPT. Every subsequent report contains language confirming 

that previous Iranian statements made to the IAEA were false or incomplete. The 

IAEA has repeatedly deplored Iran’s deception and lack of cooperation with its inspectors. In response, Iran has defiantly rejected calls by the IAEA and its members 

to come clean on its nuclear program. 

Iran has pursued two separate methods for uranium enrichment. It has established a number of workshops for the manufacture and testing of centrifuges (many 

of which are owned by military industrial organizations), a pilot enrichment facility 

designed for 1,000 centrifuges, and a large buried facility intended to house up to 

50,000 centrifuges. In parallel, Iran has pursued another program to enrich uranium with lasers. Both of these programs were not declared to IAEA inspectors who 

had visited Iran for years until an Iranian opposition group disclosed their existence. 

Iran has developed a program that would allow for the production of plutonium, 

an alternate path to nuclear weapons. Iran is building a large heavy water production plant, also covertly until disclosed by an Iranian opposition group. Its purpose 

is to supply heavy water for a research reactor that Iran plans to begin constructing 

this year. The technical characteristics of the heavy water moderated research reactor Iran plans to build are optimal for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. 

Another potential source of plutonium for weapons is the Bushehr light-water 

power reactor, which is currently under construction. That reactor is under IAEA 

safeguards and Iran and Russia are discussing an agreement to return all spent fuel 

to Russia. However, if Iran should withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty and 

renounce this agreement with Russia, according to Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear 

Control Institute, the Bushehr reactor would produce a quarter ton of plutonium per 

year which Leventhal says is enough for at least 30 nuclear bombs. 

The safeguards violations uncovered by the IAEA include:

20

• Iran’s failure to report the production of plutonium by covertly introducing 

uranium targets into the safeguarded Tehran Research Reactor and subsequently reprocessing the irradiated targets to separate the plutonium;

• the failure to report the import and use of uranium hexafluoride for testing 

centrifuges and production of enriched uranium; and

• the failure to report the use of uranium metal for laser enrichment experiments including production of enriched uranium, which, as we have recently 

learned, was enriched to up to 15%, well beyond the level needed for reactor 

fuel.

Iran has a long history of denying the IAEA full access to its nuclear program. 

The most recent example occurred in March 2004, when Iran denied IAEA inspectors access to several suspicious facilities for a month, long enough to ensure that 

the report being prepared for the June 2004 Board of Governors meeting would be 

unable to include data from inspections of these locations. 

Another unmistakable indicator of Iran’s intentions is the pattern of repeatedly 

lying to and providing false and incomplete reports to the IAEA. For example, Iran 

first denied it had enriched any uranium. Then it said it had not enriched uranium 

more than 1.2 percent. Later, when evidence of uranium enriched to 36 percent was 

found, it attributed this to contamination from imported centrifuge parts. 

Iran also denied the existence of a laser enrichment program, but backtracked 

and confessed the truth when confronted with irrefutable technical evidence from 

IAEA inspections. However, it claimed that the equipment was only able to enrich 

uranium up to 3% or slightly beyond. The June 2004 Director General’s report 

states Iran had achieved levels of enrichment of up to 15% in some samples. Iran’s 

dubious explanation for producing polonium-210, a short-lived, highly radioactive 

element used as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons, was that it was intended 

for use in nuclear batteries that could be used in satellites and deep space programs. Obviously, the IAEA does not accept that as a credible explanation for Iran’s 

experiments. 

Perhaps the most blatant instance of Iranian deception concerned concealment 

and misleading statements on its effort to acquire and build centrifuges, including 

the more advanced P–2s. Iran’s pattern of lies and shifting stories about its P–1 centrifuge work has been well documented by the IAEA and discussed in the press over 

the last year. After an initial claim of having no centrifuge program, Iran has moved 

through a dizzying variety of shifting stories, each modified upon the discovery of 

contradictory information. It had done no centrifuge work; then it admitted working 

on some centrifuges, then a lot of centrifuges. It denied foreign procurement, then 

it admitted procuring foreign designs, and then admitted procuring foreign components. It denied doing any centrifuge testing, but then admitted centrifuge testing 

with UF6. 

And all that was just with respect to P–1 centrifuges. In February 2004, the Director General reported to the IAEA Board of Governors that it had discovered evidence of the advanced P–2 design centrifuges that was omitted from Iran’s October 

2003 declaration to the IAEA. This declaration was supposed to provide the ‘‘full 

scope of Iranian nuclear activities’’ and a ‘‘complete centrifuge R&D chronology’’—

but it obviously did not. As described earlier, in response to this discovery, the 

Board of Governors passed a resolution in March 2004 that deplored Iran’s concealment of the P–2 information. 

Incredibly, this was not the final word on this story. A June 1, 2004 report by 

the IAEA Director General detailed how the last set of statements Iran made about 

its P–2 centrifuges were also incomplete and false. The IAEA explained that Iran’s 

P–2 centrifuge effort was much more extensive than it had claimed in February, and 

that Iran had acquired and attempted to acquire substantial quantities of material 

for P–2 centrifuges from abroad despite earlier official denials of such procurement. 

(Iran even had the effrontery to circulate an official document at the IAEA Board 

meeting last February denying any foreign P–2 procurement. As noted, this was 

false. The June report also made it clear that the IAEA did not believe Iran’s assertion that it started acquiring P–2 technology in 1995 but did not begin to assemble 

them until 2001 or test them until 2002. Iran also attempted to influence the June 

2004 report on this matter by not providing the IAEA with key information on it 

until 30 May 2004, which was too late to be included in the report 

Iran’s attempt to redirect attention from the P–2 issue at the IAEA Board of Governors last week by flagging a minor revision made to the Director General’s June 

1 report as a significant error. This ploy backfired, since it drew the IAEA Board’s 

attention back to the major unresolved inconsistencies in Iran’s declarations, and to 

the fact that Iran’s official position continued to be a denial of having imported P–

2 centrifuge parts until the IAEA confronted it with proof to the contrary. 

21

Other cover stories put forward by Iran for the development of a nuclear fuel cycle 

and for individual facilities are simply not credible. For example, Iran is making an 

enormous investment in facilities to mine, process, and enrich uranium, and says 

it needs to make its own reactor fuel because it cannot count on foreign supplies. 

But for at least the next decade Iran will have at most a single nuclear power reactor. In addition, Iran does not have enough indigenous uranium resources to fuel 

even one reactor over its lifetime—though it has quite enough to make several nuclear bombs. We are being asked to believe that Iran is building uranium enrichment capacity to make fuel for reactors that do not exist from uranium Iran does 

not have. 

Iran would have us believe it is building a massive uranium enrichment facility 

without having tested centrifuge machines, and building a heavy water production 

plant with no evident legitimate use for the product. The more credible explanation 

is that Iran is building the infrastructure to produce highly enriched uranium in 

centrifuges and plutonium in a heavy water moderated reactor. 

Finally, there is Iran’s claim that Iran is building massive and expensive nuclear 

fuel cycle facilities to meet future electricity needs, while preserving oil and gas for 

export. All of this strains credulity. Iran’s uranium reserves are miniscule, accounting for less than one percent of its vast oil reserves and even larger gas reserves. 

Iran’s gas reserves are the second largest in the world, and the industry estimates 

that Iran flares enough gas annually to generate electricity equivalent to the output 

of four Bushehr reactors. 

Several weeks before the November 2003 meeting of the IAEA Board, the Foreign 

Ministers of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany went to Tehran. The result 

was a public statement committing Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA and to 

suspend uranium enrichment activities, something the IAEA Board had called for 

in its June 2003 resolution. The same parties reached a further elaboration of this 

commitment in Brussels in February, prior to the March 2004 Board of Governors 

meeting. 

We are concerned that Iran’s nuclear weapons program continues secretly and in 

parallel with this engagement between Iran and the Europeans. Indeed, we believe 

that Iran is continuing to pursue a strategic decision to acquire nuclear weapons. 

The revelations in the Director General’s reports of February and June of 2004 that 

the production of centrifuge components continues in Iran and IAEA discovery of repeated Iranian deception over P–2 centrifuges despite Iran’s pledge last fall to suspend its enrichment activities and provide a full accounting of its nuclear program, 

raise serious doubts about Iran’s commitments to the Europeans. 

Repeated public statements by senior Iranian officials that the suspension of enrichment activities is only temporary and their enrichment program will resume 

once the issues with the IAEA are resolved raise further questions whether the undertakings between Iran and the Europeans are having the desired effect of turning 

Iran away from its nuclear weapons effort. Here is a sample of the statements made 

by Iranian officials about the uranium enrichment suspension through March 2004:

• In October 2003, Hasan Rowhani, the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council stated that although Iran’s enrichment suspension was to go into 

effect immediately, he said it could last for one day or one year.

• Rowhani was later more explicit that the suspension of enrichment is temporary, stating on November 29, 2003, that ‘‘a permanent suspension has 

never been an issue and will never be.’’ On March 7, 2004, he said that ‘‘there 

is nothing permanent . . . when to resume is in the hands of our system.’’

• Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said on November 2 that Iran would not ‘‘give 

up’’ enrichment ‘‘at any price.’’

Statements by Iranian officials last week on the enrichment suspension have been 

even more forceful.

• Rowani reacted angrily to last week’s Board of Governors resolution on Iran, 

saying that ‘‘Iran will reconsider its decision about suspension and will do 

some uranium activity in the coming days.’’

• Foreign Ministry spokesman Mr Hamid Reza Assefi said on June 20th that 

‘‘Iran feels itself no longer obliged to its commitments with the European 

Union trio and will revise its policies on nuclear activities and announce the 

new decisions within the coming days.’’

• Iranian President Mohamed Khatami declared that Iran was no longer bound 

by any ‘‘moral commitment’’ to continue suspending uranium enrichment, and 

could reject the IAEA decision.

22

The Iranian nuclear weapons program, compounded by the Iranian effort to develop long-range missiles, is one of the most serious nonproliferation challenges—

and challenges to the credibility of the NPT regime—we face today. It is clear that 

Iran draws from many of the same networks (including the A.Q. Khan organization) 

that supplied Libya with nuclear technology, components, and materials, including 

nuclear weapons designs. Ending Iran’s program is a priority objective of the United 

States and the international community. 

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO IRAN’S NUCLEAR WEAPON’S PROGRAM

Despite all Iran has done, it is not too late to halt and reverse Iran’s pursuit of 

nuclear weapons. The United States is using all available diplomatic tools to this 

end. We have focused special attention on Russia, the supplier of the Bushehr reactor. Following sustained high-level exchanges, initiated by President Bush, we believe that Russia now shares our concern about Iran’s nuclear activities, joins us in 

supporting the IAEA’s ongoing inspections, and backed language in the Sea Island 

Summit declaration deploring Iran’s failure to cooperate with the IAEA. 

Additionally, Russia recently joined the core group of nations participating in the 

Proliferation Security Initiative (‘‘PSI’’), a robust new tool for counter-proliferation 

launched one year ago by President Bush. PSI is designed to stop the spread of 

WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials to non-state actors and 

proliferant states such as Iran. The overwhelmingly positive response and enhanced 

awareness that PSI has fostered globally about real, practical steps that can be 

taken to defeat proliferators is a testament to the importance that countries attach 

to confronting the challenge of proliferation and developing innovative tools to combat it. More than sixty nations attended the First Anniversary PSI Meeting held 

a few weeks ago in Krakow, Poland, demonstrating the global support for the PSI 

and the recognition that the proliferation of WMD is one of the gravest threats we 

face today. 

The PSI interdiction of the ship, BBC CHINA, en route to Libya with equipment 

for its nuclear weapons program was an important element in the Libyan decision 

to dismantle its WMD programs. We continue to work with other nations under PSI 

to interdict suspect WMD shipments to states of proliferation concern such as Iran. 

This Administration is determined to reinvigorate compliance assessments of 

countries, such as Iran, that seek WMD. For example, successive administrations 

have stated that Iran was in violation of their obligations under the NPT. But the 

U.S. was not specific about the manner of violation or the consequences of these violations. After a vigorous analysis, this Administration stated at a Nonproliferation 

Treaty Review Conference meeting last April that Iran was in violation of Article 

II of the Treaty because it was seeking or receiving assistance in the manufacture 

of a nuclear weapon. 

In a speech President Bush delivered at the National Defense University on February 11, 2004, President Bush addressed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that allowed Iran and other states with covert nuclear programs to subvert their NPT obligations. Among other measures designed to prevent the spread 

of WMD, the President proposed:

• Limiting enrichment and reprocessing plants to those states that already 

have full-scale functioning plants. Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines would 

be strengthened to prevent the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to other countries.

• Creation of a Special Committee of the IAEA, made up of states in good 

standing, to ‘‘focus intensively on safeguards and ensure that nations comply 

with their international obligations.’’ This new committee would help deter, 

detect and prevent nuclear proliferation.

• Universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, and making the Additional 

Protocol a condition of nuclear supply.

• Bar countries under IAEA investigation from holding seats on the IAEA 

Board of Governors or on the new IAEA Special Committee.

The United States received strong support for these proposals at the Sea Island 

Summit. We also raised them at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting last month 

and the IAEA Board of Governors meeting last week. While we made some headway 

at the NSG and IAEA, there are still some states we need to convince and we will 

continue to work with to win the necessary international support for the President’s 

proposals. 

23

CONCLUSION

What we ask for is not much—only what is necessary to protect our security and 

to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and other WMD. All that Iran 

must do is to abide by the treaties it has signed banning weapons of mass destruction and stop its program to develop ballistic missiles. We cannot let Iran, a leading 

sponsor of international terrorism, acquire the most destructive weapons and the 

means to deliver them to Europe, most of central Asia and the Middle East, or beyond.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Did you have a hand in writing those wonderful words that he delivered? 

Mr. BOLTON. They were written by the National Security Council, the President and the speechwriter. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. To thank and reward Mr. Tancredo for not 

giving an opening statement and getting us to the first panel so 

quickly, he will be recognized first. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I appreciate the fact that you have allowed me 

to join you on this Committee today. 

Mr. Secretary, it is apparent to everyone, of course, that the Iranian government is becoming far more belligerent and 

confrontational. As I understand, there were reports last week that 

the Al-Sharq Daily in Saudi Arabia reported that Iran was amassing troops on its southern border with Iraq for battalions. Those reports, true or not, were then carried in other media here in the 

United States. 

But if those reports are accurate and, in the past, this particular 

daily, as I understand it, in Saudi Arabia has been a source of accurate information, combine that with everything that you have 

just said in terms of the nuclear program, we must assume, of 

course, that a decision has been made by the mullahs that rule 

that country that they are going to move forward aggressively in 

face of whatever opposition we might present to them. 

Now, you have to ask why? What is your opinion as to what is 

driving it? There are two things that come to my mind, and I would 

like you to comment on them. One is the dissension that appears 

in the United States, here in the Congress and in the public atlarge, about our role in Iraq. And there is a possibility that they 

see this as a sign of weakness and want to test it to see just how 

far they can push it, because, certainly, if they do have troops on 

that border, the implication is they are waiting for something to 

happen inside Iraq and will be able to take advantage of it quickly 

if it does come apart. 

The other is that something is happening internally in Iraq, that 

their own position is being threatened—that perhaps a movement 

toward the imposition of a more democratic government is gaining 

strength and that, therefore, as we have seen many times around 

the world, governments, dictatorships handle that by creating confrontation. 

Are both of those reasonable? If not, what do you think is the 

major reason behind what they are doing? 

Mr. BOLTON. You have asked a complex question. Let me see if 

I can address at least a couple of points. 

I think there is pretty broad agreement that the more hardline 

elements in the government have been increasing their power after 

the so-called elections to the moderates recently. There have been 

24

a lot of signs that the hardliners feel far more confident than they 

had before. 

One of the things that specifically, I think, is important on the 

issue of the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and longer- and 

more-accurate-range ballistic missiles is that, fundamentally, there 

has not been any disagreement that we have seen between the socalled moderates and hardliners on the importance of achieving a 

nuclear weapons capability. That is one of the reasons why, despite 

the fluctuations of what may be happening in Iraq or what may be 

happening in the internal political dynamic of Iran, which is very 

hard to read from the outside, that the continuing efforts supported 

across the political spectrum, at least in the governing class of 

Iran, remains so troubling to us. 

It is one of the issues we have raised with our European colleagues repeatedly as they look at the dynamics between the socalled hardliners and the so-called moderates. That dynamic just 

does not exist when it comes to the pursuit of nuclear weapons. It 

is one of the reasons why Iran’s persistence in this regard is so 

troubling. Because whatever the ups and downs of the internal politics of Iran might be, this pursuit of nuclear weapons goes on 

unabated. That has to be very troubling to the United States and 

its friends and allies in the region from a long-term strategic perspective. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I would like to pursue that, but I have another 

question dealing with the MEK. This organization is on the Terrorist Watch List for one reason, and it is because the Iranians 

want us to keep it there. They are afraid of the MEK and the political power that they may wield, even inside Iran. 

Recognizing what Iran is doing, do you think it still serves a purpose to keep them on that watch list? And would it not be to our 

advantage to employ the resources that they have, both in the field 

and politically outside of Iran, as a counterforce in some way or 

other? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think the MEK qualifies as a terrorist organization according to our criteria, and I think the decision was to 

apply the criteria in a consistent way and designate it as a terrorist group. But I don’t think that has inhibited us from getting 

information from them. I don’t have any inhibition about getting 

information about what is going on in Iran from whatever source 

we deem reliable. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Tancredo. 

Ms. Berkley. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Under Secretary 

Bolton, it is my understanding that the Administration has continued to waive the provisions of ILSA. Could you tell me why? Are 

we going to implement ILSA at some point? And at what point and 

what will trigger it? 

Mr. BOLTON. I spoke this morning with some of my colleagues at 

the State Department who are directly responsible for the administration of ILSA because I knew, from prior hearings on this subject, 

it was a matter of interest to Members of the Committee. 

I think the best answer I can give to that question is they believe 

they are applying the provisions of ILSA. They believe they have 

25

applied it consistently from its date of enactment in the prior Administration, and we are essentially following precisely the same 

policy that was undertaken during that Administration. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Can you cite any—how are we implementing the 

provisions of ILSA? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, the fact is that we have not granted any waivers of ILSA, and we have not deployed any sanctions of ILSA. But, 

again, the belief of those who are more directly responsible for it 

is that the provisions of ILSA have been useful to them in discouraging foreign investment. That is to say, there would have been 

more foreign investment than there has been already and that it 

has been useful in the pursuit of the objectives that the ILSA statute sets out. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Do you think the Russians are selling material 

and trading with the Iranians? 

Mr. BOLTON. Yes, they are, no question about it. 

Ms. BERKLEY. French? 

Mr. BOLTON. They are. 

Ms. BERKLEY. Then how are we using ILSA? 

Mr. BOLTON. Those charged with it have been in active discussions with those countries. Part of the mark of the effect of ILSA 

is not simply looking at the investments that have been made, but 

the much harder-to-quantify subject of investments not made. 

Ms. BERKLEY. How does one quantify those? 

Mr. BOLTON. I believe it is very difficult because there is no readily agreed-upon database, and it is the view—and it is not something I have personal experience with, but, as I said, I knew it 

would be important to try to respond to your questions on the 

point—that investors, particularly in the petroleum field in Europe 

and Japan and elsewhere, are quite aware of the views of Congress 

that have been expressed by ILSA and have been communicated to 

them in the years since the statute has been enacted. 

Ms. BERKLEY. But they continue to do what we are trying to stop 

them from doing, so why have we not implemented some sanctions? 

Isn’t that the reason that we pass these laws, to change behavior? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I certainly think there is utility in changing 

behavior, and that is why we have implemented, under the Iran 

Nonproliferation Act, as many sanctions as we have. ILSA is a different kind of statute. It involves different kinds of considerations 

and it has been applied, I think in the view of those responsible 

for it, in a manner consistent with the statute. 

Ms. BERKLEY. But you just told me they had not done it. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think I told you they had not imposed any sanctions, nor have they issued any waivers. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I see. 

You stated in your opening testimony that it is our view, the 

United States’ view, that the matter of proliferation, Iranian proliferation, should be referred to the Security Council. What is the 

Bush Administration doing to facilitate this? 

Mr. BOLTON. We have had extensive consultations over the past 

year, particularly with our major Western European allies, with 

Russia, with China, with Japan, with many of the other members 

of the IAEA Board of Governors because, to us, the existence of the 

26

clandestine Iranian nuclear weapons program is a threat to international peace and security. 

Ms. BERKLEY. If that is the case, and I believe it is, and the Russians and the Japanese and the French and our European allies 

are in the same pickle we are in, and they have the same danger 

posed to them by the Iranians, why do they continue to violate our 

wishes and continue to trade and do things with the Iranians that 

are absolutely not only against our national interests but their own 

national interests? It makes absolutely no sense to me. 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I would say, in all seriousness, I would invite 

you to come with me on our next trip we take over there, when 

Members of Congress meet with their counterparts in these Western European nations in Japan and elsewhere, to make precisely 

that point. It is something that I think will have—if the Iran matter, in particular, is not resolved—a long-term negative impact on 

the IAEA, on the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and I might say, 

on the Security Council. 

If the Security Council cannot be seized with what is in combination with terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—the most serious threat that we face to our collective national 

security—it is hard to see what the Security Council is going to address effectively. That is why I say we have been very persistent 

in our efforts, not because we have some long-term design against 

Iran that we are seeking an immediate resolution authorizing sanctions or the use of force or anything else, but because we think it 

would change the worldwide political dynamic very substantially to 

have the matter before the Security Council. 

So far, despite our efforts and the support of almost everybody 

in Congress that I can tell, we have not persuaded them. So more 

persuasion is needed. I seriously believe that, in addition to what 

you do in your legislative sphere, that your contacts with foreign 

governments in this regard can be quite important. 

Ms. BERKLEY. I have just been called down to the Floor to make 

a Floor statement, but I agree this is a very, very serious issue. I 

have spoken until I am blue in the face with our counterparts, and 

until we get serious and the Administration does do those sanctions 

which we have authorized, we are not going to get anywhere. I 

think it is time that the Administration start implementing the 

laws that this Congress has passed. 

Thank you very much for being here. I am sorry that I cannot 

hear the rest of the testimony. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Come back, and maybe we will 

be on the next round. 

Mr. Bolton, would you agree that the breaches outlined by the 

IAEA in the February and the June reports that you talked about, 

and the announcement this morning, are in violation of the Tehran 

Declaration between Iran and the European three? Is there any 

hope that our European allies will consider at least this latest announcement of manufacturing centrifuges as a red line for reporting Iran to the Security Council? Beyond referral to the Security 

Council, what other efforts are available to us that we are undertaking to prevent Iran from going nuclear? 

Mr. BOLTON. We do not have, at this point, a reaction from the 

EU–3. This literally just happened a few hours ago. Certainly, we 

27

have been in discussion with them about what should constitute a 

violation by Iran of their own red lines. I guess I cannot say at this 

point whether the reassumption of centrifuge manufacturing would 

be such a violation. I don’t think that it is sustainable for the EU–

3 not to recognize, however, that this is a substantial setback to 

the notion that Iran can be induced to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons voluntarily. 

Now, I think that the Iranians have tried to be careful in revealing this plan, to say that they continue to adhere to the additional 

protocol. I am sure they have the politics of the IAEA Board of 

Governors in mind. Let me say that the notion that a suspension 

means anything when Iran resumes the full-scale capability that it 

has of churning out centrifuge parts means that these parts are potentially useful to Iran in a massive uranium enrichment program 

which would give them a nuclear weapons capability. 

That is one of the reasons why our efforts through the Proliferation Security Initiative and through sanctions to try and restrain 

and cause damage to Iran’s external procurement activities are so 

important. We do not judge, at the moment, that Iran, left entirely 

on its own, if left entirely isolated, could sustain the nuclear weapons program it now has. So cutting off its procurement activities, 

convincing other nations to apply their export control regimes restricting and interdicting shipments important to the Iranian nuclear weapons program in international commerce, are going to be 

very important in that regard. 

We have not confined our diplomatic activities to the IAEA 

Board. Obviously, we have been in intense discussions with Russia 

and others bilaterally as well. I think that the more robust steps 

of PSI are going to be important here if diplomacy does not succeed. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. To follow up with that, do you agree that the 

fastest way for Iran to achieve nuclear status is through the NPT 

rather than outside of it? And if so, if you can elaborate on specific 

articles and provisions of the NPT that Iran has been using to continue its nuclear activities? Would some of these include Iran’s use 

of research and development justifications to continue its UF–6 

manufacturing? And do you believe this is the reason why, prior to 

last week’s IAEA Board meeting, the Iranian officials only issued 

threats about not ratifying the additional protocol rather than—

while affirming that they would stay in the NPT? 

Mr. BOLTON. This is an important question in the understanding 

of what the flaws are in the NPT and the loopholes that need to 

be addressed, some substantial ones which the President addressed 

in his NDU speech in February. 

I would say Iran is a paradigm case of a country seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability covertly while on the surface 

trying to maintain the appearance of complying with the Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Regime. Many of the activities that Iran has undertaken are not prohibited by the NPT. Many others would not be 

prohibited or they would not be in violation if they had disclosed 

these to the IAEA. And yet, when you add all of these programs 

together and see the extent of what the Iranians are up to, there 

is no question that they are getting very close to a break-out capability to have a full nuclear fuel cycle that would be completely 

28

independent of outside pressure and that they are doing this under 

the guise of a so-called peaceful program. 

This goes to the heart of the problem with the NPT, as we now 

see it. If we knew 50 years ago what we know now, the Atoms for 

Peace Program would have looked very different, as would the 

Non-Proliferation Treaty. The notion that the Iranians and others 

continually say that the Non-Proliferation Treaty gives them a 

right to a civil nuclear power program, while at the same time they 

are violating the most critical provisions of the NPT prohibiting 

them from obtaining nuclear weapons, is just logically contradictory. 

Whatever might be the case for a country that was never in the 

NPT and, therefore, never bound by any of its obligations, Iran is 

a country that has taken advantage of the provisions of the NPT 

to get assistance and technological aid and is violating it at the 

very same time. It is exactly the sort of flaw in the international 

treaty regime that this Administration has tried to address through 

things like PSI and other steps to fill those gaps. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

And Mr. Flory, one last question. The United States already has 

defense agreements with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and 

many other countries. How are we using our military-to-military 

contacts to develop multilateral efforts to contain Iran’s nuclear efforts? And what has been the response from the region? Have the 

military establishments of our United States allies in the region 

given any indication of the potential response of their countries to 

a nuclear Iran? 

Mr. FLORY. Madam Chairwoman, thank you. 

As your statement and the statements of others from the Subcommittee have already said very well and very clearly, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it will mark a dramatic change for the 

worse in the security landscape of the Persian Gulf and the broader 

Middle East. And, in particular, this will come at a time when the 

people of the region should be enjoying some respite from the removal of the hammer that has been over their head for decades in 

the form of Saddam Hussein and his government, and should be 

enjoying the benefits of having an Iraq that is at peace and does 

not seek to threaten its neighbors. 

The countries of the Gulf have been concerned about the Iranian 

threat for a number of years. We have, as you point out, relationships with them ranging from—in differing degree, different levels 

of military cooperation and political cooperation, a number of them 

were extremely helpful to us during the Operation Iraqi Freedom, 

also in Operation Enduring Freedom, for that matter. 

I think what we will do, the reaction will be to build on and use 

existing structures and existing relationships. We have now the 

Gulf Cooperation Council, which is a multilateral grouping. We are 

not a member but we work with it, and it has activities that focus 

on dealing with potential WMD threats as well as response efforts. 

The exact nature and shape of what we do is going to depend on 

what happens, and it is going to depend, like our overall posture 

there is, on the events in the region, how things go in Iraq, what 

the profile is of the development of the Iranian threat, what we see 

as the actual military threat at a given time. 

29

But suffice it to say that these countries are very focused on this 

threat. Many of them, frankly, over the last 10 years have been 

more focused on the threat from Iran, which many of them view 

as a longer-term threat to their stability than Iraq. I think many 

concluded at the time that Iraq was, to a certain degree, contained 

and that eventually Iraq was going to get settled one way or the 

other. And that has indeed happened. 

So, now, they are looking around, and while, as I mentioned earlier, while enjoying the fact that the hammer of Iraq has gone 

away, they are in fact very focused on Iran. I anticipate that this 

will continue to be a subject—the Iranian threat, the progress of 

the Iranian nuclear program—particularly after the news that 

Under Secretary Bolton gave us today about the sort of breakout 

from the diplomatic process. I anticipate that as we have militaryto-military talks in the course of the next year or so, we will hear 

a great deal about this and will be working with our friends in the 

region to come up with responses. 

Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

It is wise that we are having these hearings close to the fifth anniversary of the student uprising and the freedom efforts in Iran, 

in effect, the ‘‘Iranian Tiananmen Square.’’

I do need to respond to the comments of my friend from southern 

California, Mr. Rohrabacher, who does point out that that trade I 

complained about, the $150 million that we import from Iran, that 

did begin at the last year of the Clinton Administration. But I went 

down to the Floor and said there is blood in the caviar, and not 

even my outspoken friend from southern California has used such 

colorful language to describe his own Administration. 

But looking at the 1990s and the 1980s, yes, Ronald Reagan sent 

weapons to the Government of Iran. Yes, the first Bush Administration allowed economic contacts. Yes, Clinton was asleep and finally allowed trade. But it is one thing to sleep before September 

11th. It is another thing to keep hitting the snooze bar after September 11th. If September 11th can’t wake up a country, what can? 

The President correctly identified the ‘‘axis of evil.’’ And the two 

truly dangerous countries in the ‘‘axis of evil’’ are now several 

years more advanced in developing and building their nuclear 

weapons programs. 

But we have gone beyond any business-as-usual that the Clinton 

Administration followed. We have decided to kowtow to Tehran by 

closing down the offices of those who even voiced support for the 

MEK, one of Tehran’s more dangerous adversaries, an agency—an 

entity with a checkered past to be sure. But it was the one concession we hadn’t made to Tehran already, so we decided to make it. 

As to the $150 million of imports from Iran, Secretary Colin Powell sat in the very seat you are sitting in now in February, promised me that he would explore whether we should cut off those 

$150 million. My God, they killed our people at the Khobar Towers. 

Apparently, that isn’t enough to stop business as usual. I won’t ask 

you about the $150 million because I asked Secretary Powell. He 

30

said he would get back to me. The goods are coming in every day. 

I am sure they are at the ports today. 

As to the World Bank, we have, since the Clinton Administration, allowed a doubling and then a redoubling in the amount of 

money going. Now we are talking well over half a billion dollars in 

just a couple of years, way beyond anything Clinton ever slept 

through. 

And then, as to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. You can’t sit there 

and say there have been no waivers, because if you blind your eyes 

and cover your ears and ignore even the reports widely circulated 

in all of the world economic press about $1.8 to $1.9 billion from 

a whole consortium of Japanese oil companies, arranged, supported 

and coordinated by the Japanese government, then you don’t have 

to make a waiver. A blind man doesn’t have to make a waiver. And 

if you scourge out your own eyes, you don’t have to make a waiver. 

But some of this fault goes to the American people and the 

American press, because they seek to judge this Administration exclusively on what is happening in Iraq. And so, if you are able to 

get, at virtually the same time as we ignore this $1.8 to $1.9 billion 

dollars of investment by Japan in the Iranian oil fields, if at the 

same time—not directly linked as far as I can prove—a few hundred soldiers from Japan into Iraq, then the American people say, 

‘‘Hey, the Administration is doing its job; it is getting a few hundred Japanese soldiers into Iraq,’’ while watching the money flow 

to those who are building the nuclear weapons that would be smuggled into our cities. 

So, Mr. Secretary, is it a waiver? Or is it just self-imposed blindness that we can ignore what is reported in the economic press of 

this enormous Japanese investment by several Japanese oil companies? And does it make any sense for the Congress to pass any 

laws providing for waivers, if you are not even going to bother to 

exercise the waiver but just ignore the facts on the ground, the 

facts widely reported in the economic and the financial press, Mr. 

Secretary? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, let me just say, with respect to the sanctions 

statute that you didn’t refer to, I want to underline again that we 

have invoked the provisions of the——

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Secretary, if I could just interrupt you, because I did want to get to that. And I point out, those are sanctions 

against little tiny companies that don’t have much economic relationship with the United States. I can’t find even $100 million 

worth of business from those companies. But also, it is very easy 

for those companies in the countries in which they do business, to 

simply stick another company’s label on those very few products 

that they are sending in—or you are going to say not sending in—

sending in under another label. 

So imposing sanctions on companies that don’t have a huge economic relationship with the United States and which can easily 

just get another company in the same country to put, slap a label 

on the product or claim to own a subsidiary or claim to be a coventure in the subsidiary that produces them, that is not much of 

a sanction and certainly pales into insignificance compared to $1.8 

to $1.9 billion of Japanese investment in the Iranian oil fields. So 

perhaps you can respond to that. 

31

Mr. BOLTON. I would be delighted to. 

I think that the sanctions under the Iran Nonproliferation Act 

have had a more telling effect. I think when we sanction serial 

proliferators—including some major Chinese conglomerates, I can 

tell you that it has gotten attention at the very highest levels in 

Beijing—it has had a substantial effect. 

Now, in terms of the contentions you are making about the administration of ILSA, the impression I have is that you are disagreeing with the implementation of the provisions. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Secretary, I am disagreeing with the deliberate nonimplementation of the provisions. 

Mr. BOLTON. Now, I will finish my sentence. My impression is 

that you are disagreeing with the implementation of ILSA. But I 

have not heard in this hearing, or in other hearings, that people 

have contended that the policy that was originated in the last Administration, and which is being followed in this one, is contrary 

to the provisions of ILSA. 

So what that suggests to me is that, for you and for others who 

feel that additional sanctions pressure on Iran through ILSA-like 

statutes are required, is that you need to seek amendments to 

make more in conformity with what you want. And if you are not 

able to——

Mr. SHERMAN. No, no. Mr. Secretary, I am saying that we have 

passed a very clear law that your Administration is deliberately ignoring. You know, we can pass a law against theft, and the bank 

robber can just say, ‘‘Hey, I didn’t see the law, I didn’t see the 

money.’’

Mr. BOLTON. I can assure you that brigades of lawyers at the 

State Department——

Mr. SHERMAN. Have they ignored the $1.9 billion, or have they 

issued an opinion that somehow it is not a violation of ILSA? 

Mr. BOLTON. And these brigades of lawyers are convinced that 

we are implementing the ILSA provisions accurately. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, if they don’t——

Mr. TANCREDO. Mr. Chairman, has the gentleman’s time expired? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Why don’t you just ask that one last question? But we will let Mr. Bolton just finish the sentence before——

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me point out that it is not lawyers who say 

that ILSA doesn’t apply to the transaction. The Administration has 

issued no such legal opinion. 

But, rather, you simply have cancelled your subscription to the 

Wall Street Journal and choose to ignore the fact that the transaction is taking place. And then you can say, ‘‘Well, we are not failing to violate the law,’’ just as a law requiring a bank security officer to stop a robbery is not violated if the guy doesn’t show up for 

work or, when he does show up for work, he wears a blindfold. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. You are 4 minutes 

over your 5 minutes. And we will let Mr. Bolton answer without 

interruption, if he could. 

Mr. BOLTON. I understand Mr. Sherman’s passion at this subject, 

and I think it is directed at the same objective we are trying to 

achieve, particularly in the field of stopping Iran’s programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction. 

32

I will simply say, in an effort to be brief, that we are following 

precisely the same policy as the previous Administration. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I think both of you have made that point 

very clear. Thank you very much. 

It is a pleasure to have Mr. Rohrabacher, who is equally noncontroversial. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Madam Chairman, I just don’t know where all this energy that 

Brad is exhibiting today was all these years prior to this Administration. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Rohrabacher——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Tell me, Secretary Bolton. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Tell you about the red caviar, so don’t give 

him an opening there. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now, do you have jurisdiction over ILSA? 

Mr. BOLTON. I do not. No. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I think that says a lot. 

Let us ask a couple questions here. We really aren’t concerned 

about another country having a nuclear weapon. For example, we 

don’t worry about England having a nuclear weapon. Well, maybe 

some of us are worried about France having a nuclear weapon, but 

I won’t go into that. But, actually, isn’t the problem the fact that 

we have the regime in Iran the real problem? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think that the pursuit of nuclear weapons by Iran 

clearly extends over a long period of time. This is not something 

that the mullahs alone decided to pursue. And it is one reason why, 

as I said earlier, even if you get into the intricacies of hardliners 

versus moderates, we never saw and I don’t believe there exists, 

any fundamental disagreement within the governing religious class 

in their determination to pursue nuclear weapons. And that is why 

it is the regime as a whole, whether you call it the moderate faction or the hardline faction or the moderate-hardline faction or the 

hardline-hardline faction, they all want nuclear weapons. That is 

what is so disturbing. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, if we could get the mullahs back to the 

mosque in Iran—and a lot of young people there who would like 

to have a truly democratic government—I would contend that that 

would probably—that the people who would then take over would 

not be as committed to turning a nuclear facility into a nuclear 

weapons facility. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think if you look at the historical experience in 

other countries, and I would just think of two particularly apt ones, 

in South Africa and Ukraine, at a time when there was massive 

regime change, in the case of South Africa, the overthrow of the 

apartheid regime, the coming together of a true national multiracial government which made a decision that, among other parts of 

the baggage of the past, it was going to throw out the nuclear 

weapons program. That was an opportunity for the new Government of South Africa, who made the right decision. 

When the Soviet Union broke up and the Ukraine came into existence, they too made a determination that they would give back 

33

or destroy—give back to the Russian Federation or destroy all of 

the strategic weapons and delivery systems that they had. Again, 

the coming into power of a completely new regime in Ukraine gave 

them the same opportunity. The same may be true of Iran. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That certainly suggests that the point I am 

trying to make is that regime change in Iran may be the solution 

to the problem—rather than trying to just focus on just one activity 

of that regime. 

In terms—and let me note that, for the record here, this Administration’s commitment to the defeating of radical forces in Iraq 

and gangsters in Iraq probably is doing more to deter the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction than anything that we 

could do incrementally in other countries. So I would commend this 

Administration for that and realize that, if we do cut and run, as 

some of the nitpickers of this Administration are suggesting, that 

there will be a lot of nuclear weapons programs all over the place 

among people we don’t want to have nuclear weapons. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think the elimination of Saddam Hussein’s regime 

and the functional redirection of the scientists and the technicians 

who were part of his WMD programs are absolutely critical and the 

lesson that other governments are learning absolutely critical. I 

think that without the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, we never 

would have seen the decision by Libya to give up weapons of mass 

destruction. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think that is a good example. 

A few specific suggestions. I do agree that we could be, for example, eliminating the rugs and the pistachios and the caviar, and I 

think, probably, the money that is being made from those rugs and 

that caviar is probably going into the pockets of some corrupt 

mullah who is likely to be a supporter of their nuclear program. 

Mr. BOLTON. May I just comment on that so the record is clear 

for Mr. Sherman as well? I am sorry he has left. 

The Clinton Administration ended restrictions on those imports 

of caviar, rugs, and various kinds of nuts because the revenues 

were thought to be going to small businesses in Iran. And that was 

a very important element in their decision. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, it is always important to watch the 

nuts in Iran all right. 

So let us just end, let me end with this. I would suggest for the 

Administration, if I have any criticism of the Administration, it is 

that, when looking at the challenge of keeping nuclear weapons out 

of the hands of the mullahs in Iran, that we haven’t taken the initiative on positive approaches. For example, with Russia, I think 

that a long time ago, we could have approached Russia—and I 

think, in fact, I talked to some people in the State Department 

about this—and perhaps giving the Russians an alternative years 

ago to make their money developing a nuclear power plant in Turkey, or in another country that wouldn’t be threatening to the 

United States and the Western World. So I would hope that people 

hear that it is, maybe, not too late to do that. 

Mr. BOLTON. I think you are on target there. And I can assure 

you that President Bush raises with President Putin, at every opportunity, his concern for Russian involvement in Iran. It is a very 

high priority in the dialogue he has with President Putin. 

34

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But we can’t expect the Russians to walk 

away and just eat it when they are in such horrible economic conditions. We should have been able to give them an incentive to make 

as much money going somewhere else that wasn’t so threatening. 

And with that, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Under Secretary, is Iran truly on an irreversible path to nuclear status? And, if so, is our policy at this juncture merely to 

delay the inevitable? Or is it the policy of the United States to ensure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapons capability? And 

is this view shared by our European or other allies? 

Mr. BOLTON. Our view is that Iran is still pursuing a strategic 

decision to have a nuclear weapons capability. And I stress that because this is not something that is accidental. This goes to a core 

element of Iranian national security policy, and, therefore, judged 

in that light, I think the extent and vigor of their efforts simply 

underscores why what we have to do is change that strategic decision one way or the other. 

Our goal is not simply to delay this. Our goal is to stop it. And 

as I said in my opening remarks, as we have said in the case of 

North Korea, what we want is the complete verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear weapons program and all of 

its programs of weapons of mass destruction. 

With respect to the European allies, if I can, I think at least 

some of them do share our view that Iran is, as a matter of its fundamental strategy, pursuing nuclear weapons. But not all of them. 

And I think that disagreement, in basic analysis as to what the 

Iranians are up to, is an explanation for part of the tactical disagreement that you see as to how to handle the Iranian program. 

Mr. PITTS. Mr. Flory, would you speak to the broader regional 

and global implications of the Iranian program? 

Mr. FLORY. Sir, I touched on this earlier. The immediate regional 

implication is that Iran, which by dint of its size and population 

and support for terrorism, already casts a shadow in the region, 

will cast an even longer shadow and an even darker shadow. That 

will affect—and that is, when you combine the nuclear program 

with the aggressive development of ballistic missiles, including the 

Shahab-3, which Under Secretary Bolton mentioned earlier, which 

basically can hit any of Iran’s neighbors and countries further 

away that Iran has an animus against, such as Israel, the effects 

of this are several fold. 

One of them is it threatens U.S. allies and friends in the region, 

and it threatens U.S. forces. It gives Iran the ability to coerce countries and to deter countries from doing anything about it. Whether 

that means to deter the United States from moving into the region, 

or with a greater reach maybe in some cases, of deterring other 

countries from allowing the United States either to use forces in 

their region or to move forces into their region. So, again, it allows 

Iran to expand its regional influence considerably. 

The impact is not limited to the region, however, because Iran, 

again, as Under Secretary Bolton noted and as the Director Tenet 

testified in his threat hearing earlier this year, Iran is continuing 

35

research and development on longer-range programs and continues 

work on a space launch vehicle which, and as I once saw it described by a CIA—an unclassified CIA paper described a space 

launch vehicle as an ICBM in disguise. So—and Iran said, I think 

last year, it specifically made a statement that it intended to continue research. And, of course, if you have something that is an 

ICBM in a disguise, then you are talking about the ability to reach 

out and threaten the United States itself as well as countries, say, 

in Western Europe that are not within the ambit of the Shahab3 but that Iran may have a desire to threaten. 

And that is not even touching on another aspect of the threat. 

In the opening statements, Members talked about Iran’s support 

for terrorism, which is probably the single most consistent and implacable element of Iran’s foreign policy over the last 30 years. As 

we saw on September 11th, the ultimate precision-guided weapon 

is a human being with a pair of eyes who can put a weapon anywhere within feet or inches of where it needs to be. And, of course, 

with nuclear weapons, you don’t need that great a level of accuracy 

in the first place. 

Let me be clear. I have not seen evidence that Iran is providing 

nuclear materials or thinking of providing nuclear materials or any 

other kind of WMD to terrorists. But the fact of the matter is, in 

a post-9/11 era, where nothing is unthinkable when you look at 

what Iran is doing with terrorism now, I mean, Iran is supporting 

Ansar al-Islam and its activities inside Iraq. You have Iranian clerics exhorting Iraqis to blow themselves up like the Palestinians for 

the purpose of killing coalition forces. You have the ongoing support for terrorist groups that are fighting Israel. 

Here, you have a regime—and this goes back to an earlier question I think by Mr. Rohrabacher on the nature of the regime. The 

nature of the regime is one of the core elements here. Here we have 

a regime that has used terrorism consistently as an element of its 

policy that, prior to September 11th, I believe had killed more 

Americans—it was linked to the death of more Americans through 

terrorism than any other regime, which is now working very hard 

and has just basically ignored another stop sign in its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. You add that to ballistic missiles, you add 

that to potential terrorist threat, you have here precisely what the 

President discussed in his national security strategy: The nexus of 

terrorists and State-sponsors of terrorists and State-producers of 

weapons of mass destruction. 

So the impact of this program is—it is immediate. It is severe in 

the region. And it is potentially even greater. 

Mr. PITTS. How does the recent political instability in Iran factor 

into their pursuit of WMDs? Does Iran’s instability make their proliferation efforts more dangerous? Does it make their potential nuclear weapons more susceptible to diffusion through non-State actors? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think there is a risk whenever you have a country 

that is approaching nuclear weapons status or that has other programs like this, that instability, breakdown of the order could lead 

to the dispersion of those. I don’t think, in the nuclear weapons 

area, that that is an immediate problem. So that if there were a 

popular revolution in Iran at this point, I think that the risk of the 

36

spread of the nuclear technology would not be a factor. The closer 

they get to nuclear weapon status and if they ever achieved nuclear 

weapons themselves, that would obviously be a substantial problem. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, ma’am. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Ambassador, I wanted to ask you about the——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And, by the way, he doesn’t have anything 

to do with the ILSA applications. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I’m sorry, with what? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No, just an inside——

Mr. SCHIFF. Okay. Was this a subject of a debate earlier? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Just a little bit. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Shall we get into the Clinton Administration at this 

point? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Yeah, yeah. 

Mr. SCHIFF. You will be happy to know, Mr. Secretary, I am not 

going there. My question is about the nature of the support and the 

motivation for a nuclear program in Iran. 

It is my perception that the desire for a nuclear bomb in Iran is 

a nationalist goal, that it cuts across the spectrum. It is not just 

a goal of the conservative clerics, but a broadly-supported goal, 

even among the reformers, that this is tied into Iran’s image of 

itself as a regional power and its equation of the possession of nuclear weapons with being a regional power. Is that an accurate perception, or is there a political component in Iran that does not want 

the bomb that differs from the more-hardened conservatives in 

Iran? 

Mr. BOLTON. I think the answer to the last part of your question 

in particular is, we really have no way of knowing what the average Iranian citizen really thinks. I was saying, in responding to a 

question from Congressman Pitts, that if you had a truly popular 

revolution, as in other cases of regime change like South Africa and 

Ukraine, that might well be the opportune moment to say to the 

Iranian people, give up the quest for nuclear weapons and that you 

would have an opportunity. 

With respect to the distinctions among the current governing 

class, the so-called moderates versus the so-called hardliners, we 

have not seen any indication that there is any real difference. And 

so that is why part of our diplomacy with our European friends 

where they have said, ‘‘Well, you don’t want to do anything that 

discourages or undercuts the moderates,’’ when you talk about 

moderates among the Iranian governing class, you still talk about 

people who believe in the pursuit of nuclear weapons. So whatever 

the implications internally in Iran, we haven’t seen that that has 

had any affect in terms of diminishing their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Iran seems to be a much harder case in many respects than North Korea given that there is less economic leverage 

over Iran, and it has a broader-based ability to support itself than 

North Korea does. Is international pressure, the threat of economic 

37

sanctions, sufficient to deter a reasonably self-supporting country 

like Iran that appears bent on possessing nuclear weapons? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I think what we have right now is a longstanding series of American economic sanctions against Iran, but 

in a number of cases involving Europe, Russia, and Japan, fairly 

substantial commerce and investment so that our sanctions have 

not been as effective has they might be. 

On the other hand, I do believe that the cumulative affect of the 

sanctions we have imposed for—on transactions we have been able 

to uncover where Iran has been seeking components for its WMD 

programs have had an affect, not so much in the economic sense, 

but in the political sense. And it is one of the reasons why we have 

continued to work with Western Europe, Russia, Japan, and others 

to try to get them to help us—not leverage in the economic sense 

but leverage in the political sense—to convince the Iranians that 

it is simply not in their long-range strategic interest to continue to 

pursue nuclear weapons. 

The fact that that has not yet happened is something that allows 

Iran to slip between ourselves and our friends and allies and continue to pursue nuclear weapons. 

Mr. SCHIFF. In the broader context, I think Iran is really the 

classic illustration of the flaws with the NPT, which served us reasonably well for however many years, but now is not, I think, up 

to the task in that a country like Iran can go so far down the path 

toward nuclear energy purportedly and then make an abrupt right 

turn and then develop the bomb. 

You know, I share the view that as long as we permit, as an 

international community, nations to enrich uranium, there is no 

practical way to keep them from getting the bomb. So there has to 

be some new regimen, some new proliferation structure obtained. 

I know the President has an initiative in this area. But I want—

two questions. One is, how can we marshal the kind of international support we need where a coalition of the willing is not 

enough? You need basically a mammoth coalition. Because a small 

coalition of the unwilling can proliferate nuclear technology and expertise, it has to be very broadbased. 

How can we marshal that kind of a coalition while there are concerns around the world with our research into nuclear bunker busters? How can Russia have credibility when it is becoming increasingly reliant on its nuclear deterrent as its conventional forces 

erode? The two major nuclear powers aren’t well positioned to lead 

this charge given some of our own research and other activities. So 

how can we pursue it, is the first question. 

The second question—and is it worth it, given that we have such 

a conventional force advantage over the rest of the world, to conduct research and potential development that undermines our diplomatic effort in that respect? 

And, too, I wanted to compliment the Administration on the Secretary of Energy’s initiative, the $450 million initiative to clean out 

highly-enriched uranium around the world. I think it is enormously 

important, probably the most prevalent risk we face. And do you 

anticipate there is going to be any budgetary difficulty with OMB 

or elsewhere? What can we do to support the Secretary’s request 

in that very important initiative? 

38

Mr. BOLTON. Well, if I could address your second question first. 

I think that this is something that the President himself has been 

very supportive of. It was discussed at the Sea Island Summit. I 

really think this is something that is going to have very broad support within the Government, within the Congress. And I don’t anticipate difficulties in implementing it in terms of the reconversion 

of research reactors that currently operate on highly-enriched uranium and moving it into low-enriched uranium. 

I think the broader question of uncontrolled radiological sources 

around the world is a more troubling one and one that will have 

longer-range implications but that we are also working on. 

The fundamental point that you made at the outset about the 

risk of enrichment and reprocessing technology being too broadly 

available and therefore facilitating proliferation is something that 

the President did address in his NDU speech. He proposed a very 

sweeping and comprehensive limitation on additional transfers of 

enrichment and reprocessing technology. He gained substantial 

support, basically, for a 1-year cutoff of new transfers at the Sea 

Island Summit while we try and work out, hopefully, what will be 

a permanent set of criteria to accomplish those objectives. 

And I would tell you, Congressman, very honestly, in all the discussions I have about this issue, enrichment and reprocessing, closing the loopholes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while there is a 

certain rhetorical level internationally about research and development in terms of our nuclear arsenal, I really don’t think that that 

is a serious problem in carrying our diplomacy forward to stop the 

so-called horizontal problem of proliferation, proliferation capabilities spreading to more countries. 

I think that is an issue that, obviously, we debate here. We 

think, in the Administration, there are good reasons for it. But I 

would have to tell you, I just don’t see it as an impediment, on our 

part, to achieving these other objectives. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, may I follow up with a brief 

question? 

In the discussions you have had with our allies on this issue, you 

don’t get any pushback on the fact that we are potentially pursuing 

a new line of nuclear weapons and that impedes our ability to 

make the case to the rest of the world that they shouldn’t pursue 

them at all? You don’t get that feedback at all? 

Mr. BOLTON. As I think I said, let me be sure I am clear, the argument is raised in the discussions. But if you ask me to rate the 

seriousness of the arguments, let me give you one example. In the 

case of Canada, which has an extensive nuclear industry but does 

not currently have an enrichment and reprocessing industry, they 

are very supportive of the President’s efforts to close the loophole. 

But they don’t, at this point, favor the approach that he has taken, 

which is not to have any country that doesn’t currently possess 

that technology to acquire it, because it would mean that Canada 

can’t acquire it. 

So in the discussions we have had, that has been the issue for 

them. It is a serious issue. Other countries have serious issues, too. 

The President’s proposal is very sweeping, and it has generated a 

lot of controversy. But the controversy has been almost entirely on 

39

the economic, and in some sense the political side of things, not on 

the question of our nuclear activities. 

Mr. SCHIFF. If you had to rank in priority—let us say the two 

were not mutually incompatible but one made the other more difficult, what is the higher priority? Is it to take potentially available 

nuclear material out of circulation? Take the technology out of circulation? Take the expertise out of circulation? Or is it to pursue 

the nuclear bunker-busting capability? What would be the higher 

national security priority? 

Mr. BOLTON. Well, I guess I don’t accept the premise of the question that you can rank them one over the other. I think, in fact, 

they are in really very separate universes. And I think what the 

Administration has proposed in terms of research and development 

is very, very small compared to the extent of the project that we 

have to have to plug the loopholes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 

And I just fundamentally don’t see any reason why we can’t pursue 

both. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Do you think it makes sense, if we have a compelling conventional force advantage over all the other nations in the 

world, to be pressing in an area where other nations might be 

incentivized to develop their own nuclear capacity? 

Mr. BOLTON. Let me make two points in response to that, if I 

could. First, I think it is the inability of the current conventional 

force capability to achieve what might be achieved after a long 

process down the road of deep penetrating warheads. It is the risk 

that our conventional forces cannot neutralize the targets that 

those—that we are contemplating for those that lead us in that direction. 

But, number two, I do not believe there is any evidence for the 

proposition. I have not seen any evidence that States that are seeking a nuclear weapons capability are motivated by our research 

and development activities. I think, as you indicated in your opening question and I substantially agree with what I think the direction of that question was, that Iran’s efforts to pursue nuclear 

weapons are motivated by Iran’s own strategic circumstances. 

That is why we sometimes call it the ‘‘Persian Nuclear Weapon.’’ 

During the Shah’s time, his government was pursuing the possibility of nuclear weapons. That is a calculation, a deeply erroneous 

calculation, in my judgment, on the part of the Iranian government, but not one that has anything whatever to do with the American nuclear capability. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, may I——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. It is just——

Mr. SCHIFF. I am not going to ask any further. If I could just 

make one last observation. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are 7 minutes and 55 seconds over your 

5 minutes. But go ahead. 

Mr. SCHIFF. 30 seconds. Promising not to go into Clinton should 

have got me some——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You are right. You are recognized. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I just want to observe. I don’t disagree with the 

premise that our pursuit of a nuclear bunker-buster or other technology is unlikely to have an impact on Iran’s decision. Iran, I 

think, wants a nuclear bomb regardless of what we do. 

40

I do think it has an impact on our ability to form a broad, strong 

international coalition, that some of our potential partners in that 

coalition will be less willing if they don’t think that we are moving 

in the same direction. That is the point I would make. 

And I thank the Chair for indulging. 

Mr. BOLTON. Could I just address that? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Of course. 

Mr. BOLTON. And I would be happy to talk to you about this in 

greater length out of the hearing room. But I really do think that 

the political obstacles that we face on a variety of these fronts—

and we do face political obstacles, and we face obstacles based on 

economic self-interest as well—are far more significant and more 

difficult to overcome than the question that you have raised. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

We want to thank Under Secretary Bolton as well as Mr. Flory 

for their testimony today. And we thank you for, as I said, always 

being accessible to us. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BOLTON. Thank you. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. And now I would like to introduce the second 

and final set of panelists. 

We are thrilled to have Mr. Paul Leventhal, who founded the Nuclear Control Institute in 1981, and served as its President for 22 

years prior to transitioning to Senior Advisor in June 2002. Previously, Mr. Leventhal held senior staff positions in the United 

States Senate on nuclear power and proliferation issues. Previously, he has served as Special Council to the Senate Government Operations Committee and as Staff Director of the Senate 

Nuclear Regulations Subcommittee. 

During his tenure as Staff Director, he was responsible for the 

investigations and legislation that resulted in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, establishing stricter controls on U.S. nuclear trade to combat the spread of nuclear weapons. Mr. Leventhal 

also served as Co-Director of the Senate Special Investigation of 

the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident. 

We thank you so much for being here. It is an honor. 

He will be followed by Mr. Michael Eisenstadt, a Senior Fellow 

of the Washington Institute and a specialist in Persian Gulf and 

Arab-Israeli security affairs. Michael is widely published, focusing 

on United States strategy in the Middle East, regional security, 

nonconventional weapons, proliferation in the Near East and 

Southwest Asia and on the Armed Forces of Iraq, Iran, Syria, 

Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 

Prior to joining the Institute in 1989, Mr. Eisenstadt worked as 

a civilian military analyst with the United States Army and is a 

reserve officer in the Army. In 1991, he served in Turkey and Iraq 

as part of Operation Provide Comfort. More recently, he served at 

the United States Central Command on the Joint Staff and in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense. A great American. 

Thank you so much. And we will put both of your statements in 

their entirety in the record. And please feel free to summarize for 

us. 

Mr. Leventhal. 

41

STATEMENT OF PAUL LEVENTHAL, SENIOR ADVISOR AND 

FOUNDING PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE 

Mr. LEVENTHAL. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and Members 

of the Subcommittee. 

Let me say at the outset, in the course of my remarks, I will be 

referring to four documents, and I would very much appreciate if 

they could be made a part of the hearing record. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

Mr. LEVENTHAL. Thank you. 

I appreciate your invitation to testify today on the deeply troubling implications of Iran going nuclear. And I will concentrate my 

remarks on two aspects of the subject. First, I will address what 

impact an Iran with nuclear weapons would have on the International Nonproliferation Regime and the prospects of utilizing the 

regime to prevent Iran from achieving that goal. 

And, second, I will explore the concern that, if Iran does go nuclear, Hezbollah goes nuclear, or any of the other terrorist organizations supported by the current conservative theocratic regime, 

and the prospects for countering that threat. 

Even if a nuclear-capable Iran were not to provide its terrorist 

surrogates with nuclear weapons or the materials and the knowhow needed to build them, a nuclear-capable Iran under its present 

leadership could be an unparalleled earthquake with shock waves 

that could rattle the foundation of United States vital interests in 

the region, at home and around the world, not the least of which 

is the survival of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime itself. And 

I believe the first early-warning tremors of such a quake are now 

being felt. 

As Under Secretary of State Bolton’s excellent testimony makes 

clear, it is now apparent that Iran has been exploiting its standing 

as a non-nuclear weapons State under the terms of the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty to hide a nuclear weapons development 

program behind the civilian research and power programs that are 

permitted by the treaty. But in the absence of a smoking gun, the 

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, although highly critical of Iran’s multilayered deceptions and lack of 

cooperation, is reluctant to declare that Iran is developing nuclear 

weapons. And I believe to some extent that is based on his perception within the Board of Governors of the IAEA. And it was alluded 

to by the first panel of witnesses that our European partners who 

are prominent in the IAEA Board of Governors have a differing 

view than the United States on the best approach, the best tactical 

approach, as it was described in the first panel, dealing with Iran 

on this question and also what constitutes actual nuclear 

weaponization. 

But I also believe that the heavy burden of proof that applies to 

the head of an international organization which operates by consensus does not apply to the United States, whose vital interests 

and global commitments could be so adversely affected by an Iranian nuclear fait accompli. 

I go on in my remarks to say that we really cannot wait for proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of an Iranian bomb, and we should be 

prepared to respond to the multitude of discoveries in Iran which 

were so richly detailed in Under Secretary Bolton’s rather searing 

42

indictment of Iran. And that includes the covert plans for the production of unsafe, guarded, highly-enriched uranium and separated 

plutonium, the traces of these materials that were found, the experiments with plutonium, which is a neutral initiator used to trigger nuclear explosions, the heavy water production plant, the 

heavy water reactor that they plan to build, and laser enrichment. 

All of these in addition to the overall pattern of Iranian deceptions 

and admissions and belated admissions are clear evidence of illicit 

activities that, unless halted, will lead inevitably to bomb making. 

The problem is that the NPT, as written, and the IAEA—the 

International Atomic Energy Agency—as presently constituted, 

have difficulty in coping with a nation whose activities may bring 

it to within a screwdriver’s turn of having a bomb. There is a gray 

area that Iran is seeking to exploit between activities that are significant to developing the know-how and the materials needed to 

make nuclear weapons, which do not violate the treaty, and the actual manufacture and perhaps detonation of a nuclear weapon, 

which clearly does constitute a violation. 

And I will be discussing concisely, I hope, the treaty’s provisions 

that apply to supplies to, or activities in, a non-nuclear weapons 

State that are ostensibly peaceful but raise concerns such as those 

we now have in Iran about proliferation risk, economic or technical 

justification, and safeguards effectiveness. But I also believe it is 

important, first, to highlight a basic dilemma that bedevils all civilian nuclear activities and the Nonproliferation Regime itself, and 

that is the inextricable link between the peaceful and the military 

atom. 

And just to briefly summarize, the problem, frankly, is that all 

reactors now operate and produce plutonium, an atom bomb material, as a byproduct of fissioning uranium inside a reactor. As long 

as plutonium remains in the highly-radioactive spent fuel of these 

reactors, it is inaccessible and in a form unsuitable for making 

weapons. Once separated from spent fuel, however, in a reprocessing plant, it is in a pure form that can be applied either to the fueling of reactors or the building of bombs. 

A further problem is the widespread use of highly-enriched uranium as fuel in research reactors. Unlike low-enriched or natural 

uranium used in power reactors, which are unsuitable for use in 

bombs, highly-enriched uranium is an atom bomb material, indeed, 

the material used in the Hiroshima bomb. Plutonium is the material used in the Nagasaki bomb. 

So a fundamental flaw of the Nonproliferation Regime, especially 

as it applies to the current situation in Iran, is that it permits, indeed promotes, the use of weapons-capable nuclear fuels, separated 

plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, even though power and 

research reactors can be operated with low grades of uranium that 

are unsuitable for weapons. 

The major nuclear industrial States have been the principle culprits by making a business out of the production, use and export 

of these nonessential, dangerous and difficult-to-safeguard fuels. 

Indeed, they have set an example of legitimate use of atom bomb 

materials as civilian fuels that Iran and other proliferating States 

have exploited in their pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

43

The attempts to deal effectively with Iran at the IAEA under the 

auspices of the NPT are complicated by the importance Iran places 

on being treated equally and, in its view, fairly on a country-neutral basis that does not single out Iran on a discriminatory basis. 

Yet, the Nonproliferation Regime as it has evolved under the terms 

of the treaty is inherently discriminatory—not just nuclear weapons have and have-not States but also fissile material have and 

have-not States. 

If plutonium were abandoned as the diseconomical and dangerous fuel that it is and its prohibition of civilian applications became an international norm, then denying reprocessing and use of 

plutonium would not be exceptional. Iran’s pursuit of plutonium 

would be exceptional and an unambiguous signal of a weapons program. 

In similar fashion, if uranium enrichment services were provided 

by existing suppliers on a guaranteed basis to nations that 

forswore reprocessing and plutonium use, nations that insisted on 

developing national enrichment capacity, as Iran is now doing, also 

would be violating an international norm and clearly signaling a 

weapons program. 

So what I am laying out here is a proposition, one that is not 

now part of the Nonproliferation Regime but which I strongly suggest should be considered as a fundamental way to reform the regime so as to avoid problems in dealing with the future Irans, assuming we have a long and happy future ahead of us. 

And the proposition is this: If all excess military and civilian 

highly-enriched uranium were being blended down to ensure an 

ample supply of low-enriched fuel for power and research reactors 

and if all excess weapons and civilian plutonium were being disposed of in highly-radioactive waste instead of being stockpiled for 

use as reactor fuel, then an international norm to prohibit production and use of weapons-capable fuels could be universally applied. 

But, unfortunately, such a global exercise in making virtue out 

of necessity has not yet taken place presumably because the necessity of ridding the world of all nuclear explosive fuels in developed 

and developing countries alike is not yet seen as urgent. Some day, 

perhaps soon, I fear the urgency will be clearly seen. 

Now, President Bush ought to be given credit for taking a step 

in the right direction in his nonproliferation policy address on February 11, but by calling for no new reprocessing or enrichment facilities in countries that do not have them on a commercial scale, 

he is seeking to stop their spread to the developing world but without addressing the fuel cycle excesses that exist in the major industrial States, especially with regard to reprocessing and plutonium 

use. Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser to the first 

President Bush, makes a similar misstep in an op-ed article in today’s Washington Post, which I have submitted for the record, 

when he proposes that we cannot be effective in trying to stop the 

enrichment program in Iran without also seeking to shut down one 

that is about to start up in Brazil. And of course he is right as far 

as he goes, but he neglects to address the enormous reprocessing 

program that is about to start up in Japan to extract tens of tons 

of plutonium from spent fuel for use in fresh fuel, which I am sure 

has not escaped the attention of Iran. 

44

I would suggest and propose that the United States and Russia 

appeal to the Japanese not to start up this commercial-scale reprocessing plant and instead ensure Japan’s energy security with 

low-enriched uranium made from Russian blended-down highly-enriched uranium drawn out of Russia’s large military stocks of this 

material. And I have also submitted, for the record, an analysis 

that we did actually back in 1993—but which has since seemed to 

have gained support from other elements of the NGO community, 

specifically the Monterey Center for Nonproliferation Studies and 

the Harvard Program on Managing the Atom—whereby we projected just how many years of assured supply and energy security 

Japan would acquire if it followed this approach rather than start 

up the very large and dangerous and potentially unsafe reprocessing plant. This may well turn out to be a white elephant and not 

only diseconomical, but also one that will continue to cause much 

concern among the general population in Japan and even among 

the utility companies that would be using the fuel. 

Suffice it to say, if there were in place today a nonproliferation 

regime that prohibited the use of plutonium and highly-enriched 

uranium, Iran’s nuclear activities would be clearly seen as rising 

above a very low threshold for determining that a nuclear weapons 

program exists, and sanctions could be swiftly, universally and severely applied if such a regime prevailed. Instead, in the absence 

of such a regime, we now engage in a very dangerous cat-andmouse game with Iran that Iran apparently thinks it can win. In 

the absence of an effective and transparent nonproliferation regime, we have no choice today but to apply the rather cumbersome 

and opaque regime that we have, and I have gone into how activities that would appear to be directly related to nuclear weapons do 

not cross the red line as spelled out in the treaty. 

But imperfect as this regime may be, it is by no means impotent 

if the political will can be found to implement its provisions and 

make them stick. Perhaps the difficulty of the task before us will 

make reform of the regime a bit easier later on to prevent the 

emergence of future nuclear Irans, but such reform will likely 

prove impossible if Iran or North Korea is permitted to exploit the 

treaty’s provisions to acquire nuclear weapons. 

At this point I just want to make clear that the principal provisions of the treaty which apply to the situation in Iran today are 

article IV, which provides the assurances of supply that a non-nuclear weapon State gets under the treaty as long as it forswears 

nuclear weapons. But these assurances of supply are constrained 

by the prohibitions in the treaty that apply both to the weapons 

States and the non-weapons States not to supply or in any way to 

assist non-weapons States to acquire nuclear weapons. 

I would argue that this provision, given Iran’s current behavior, 

is sufficient to provide a legal basis for the withholding of the 

Bushehr reactor to Iran, and that is the unfinished reactor started 

in the days of the Shah that Russia now is seeking to complete. 

And I would argue that it is important to do so because this reactor 

will produce in spent fuel about a quarter ton of plutonium a 

year—equivalent to 30 nuclear weapons—if Iran should drop out of 

the treaty and forswear any arrangements that have been made 

with Russia for Iran to give up its spent fuel, and instead should 

45

decide to reprocess the fuel itself. This reactor would have a life 

span of over 30 years, and this is a long time for trying to project 

what a nation like Iran, under its present leadership, might do 

over that period of time. 

I have submitted for the record a legal analysis of the treaty that 

was done for the Nuclear Control Institute by our counsel, Eldon 

Greenberg, which explores this question of how article IV has to be 

implemented in conformity with the prohibitions with articles I and 

II. I would also point out that article III imposes safeguard conditions on Iran which Iran is now clearly violating. 

In other words, they have built covert facilities for producing 

highly-enriched uranium and for separating plutonium. They clandestinely produced outside of the reach of safeguards plutonium in 

a safeguarded research reactor. In other words, without the IAEA 

knowing it, they removed some of the plutonium to run experiments on their reprocessing plant. These are clear violations which, 

under the IAEA statute, authorizes the Board of Governors to report the matter of these violations to the Security Council. And I 

believe, and I agree strongly with Under Secretary Bolton’s position, that it is high time to bring this matter before the Security 

Council and even to be prepared to deal with Iran as a treaty violator outside of the treaty if it chooses to leave the treaty, but with 

a clear understanding of what the consequences of that would be 

for Iran in terms of isolation from the international community and 

the possibility of very strong sanctions. 

There is a view within the international community that Iran 

very much does not want to be turned into a pariah State on the 

basis of its nuclear activities, and therefore it might think several 

times before formally withdrawing from the treaty. But the threat 

of sanctions might possibly turn its head where right now it seems 

to be holding its ground within the Board of Governors of the 

IAEA. 

As to the Board of Governors of the IAEA, it should be understood this is a highly-promotional organization protecting the interests of the nuclear power industry. And with regard to France and 

Germany in particular, I think the IAEA Board is a means not to 

bring things to a head with Iran and thereby not to jeopardize the 

trade agreement that is still pending between the European Community and Iran. Therefore, I believe that the matter should come 

before the Security Council as soon as possible. 

I will conclude by simply touching upon the rather unthinkable 

issue of nuclear terrorism, which I am sure Mr. Eisenstadt will get 

into in greater detail. I will not speculate as to whether or not the 

Government of Iran will likely provide nuclear assets to Hezbollah 

and other terrorist organizations it supports and the terrorism it 

exports. 

I have submitted for the record a paper by an Iranian expatriate, 

Alireza Jafarzadeh, who at one time was the Washington representative of a dissident organization based in London, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, which was the organization 

which disclosed much of what we have learned about the covert nuclear facilities in Iran. This paper describes in some detail the extent to which Iran has sent its intelligence agents and its 

operatives into Iraq, including some of its own terrorist organizaVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
46

tions, to effectively cause instability and undermine the United 

States position in Iraq. So Iran does support not only Hezbollah 

but a number of terrorist organizations. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Can you wrap it up? 

Mr. LEVENTHAL. I will close on this note. In the mid-1980s, our 

organization organized a task force on the prevention of nuclear 

terrorism after holding an international conference on the subject, 

and this was a group of nuclear weapons designers, industrialists, 

anti- and pro-nuclear advocates, and specialists on terrorism. The 

one conclusion that it came to—that I think is applicable to the 

question today of how likely would it be that Hezbollah might go 

nuclear if Iran goes nuclear—is not to try to assess intentions, but 

to focus on capabilities. 

The real barrier is to prevent a State that supports terrorism 

and to prevent terrorist organizations from acquiring the capabilities because, really, you have no way of surmising from one day to 

another or from one year to another whether a State that supports 

terrorists or the terrorists themselves might go nuclear. 

Therefore, it is most important to deny Iran the capabilities that 

could lead to itself going nuclear or the terrorists that it supports 

and exports going nuclear. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leventhal follows:]

47

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAUL LEVENTHAL, SENIOR ADVISOR AND FOUNDING

PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE

[NOTE: The final version of this testimony can be found in the Appendix.]


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Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Eisenstadt. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT, SENIOR FELLOW, 

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. EISENSTADT. Madam Chairman, it is an honor to appear before this Committee, and I thank you for giving me this opportunity. 

I will summarize the main points of my testimony, which I am 

submitting for the record. There are four items I will touch on 

today: First, how close is Iran to obtaining the bomb; two, what are 

the implications of a nuclear Iran; third, Iran and terrorism; and 

four, what are our policy options? 

First, with regard to how close Iran is to obtaining the bomb, we 

do not know what is the bottom line. There is tremendous uncertainty regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear program. It is likely 

we are only seeing part of it. The part that we are seeing—the centerpiece program, the light water and heavy water reactor programs—are in their nascent stages, and it will be a number of 

years before elements of those programs would be able to provide 

fissile material for a weapons program. However, it is possible that 

there are parts of the program that we do not see; and, therefore, 

a definitive assessment cannot be given at this time. The intelligence community is talking at the end of the decade. I would 

point out that if North Korea becomes a source of fissile material 

or finished nuclear weapon and becomes a purveyor of nuclear 

arms or nuclear technology, the situation, Iran’s nuclear status, 

can change virtually overnight. 

In addition, the situation with regard to Iran’s nuclear status is 

likely to be characterized by ambiguity for the near future. If and 

when Iran acquires the bomb, it is not clear Iran will announce the 

fact as to a new weapon, at least initially, or that we will find out 

about that fateful step. And I would point to the case of North 

Korea, where for a long time during the 1990s, we were uncertain 

about North Korea’s actual nuclear status. It is quite likely with 

regard to Iran as well, we will be living in a nuclear gray zone or 

living with uncertainty about Iran’s nuclear status for the foreseeable future. 

What are the implications of a nuclear Iran? First of all, what 

impact will acquisition of nuclear weapons have on Iranian conduct? There are two possible models often put forward. One is the 

acquisition of nuclear weapons has tended historically to induce 

greater prudence and caution. The example that is thrown out is 

the conduct of the United States and the Soviet Union during the 

cold war. However, recent revelations in the last few years about 

the Cuban Missile Crisis and how close we were to nuclear war at 

that time have taken something of the luster off that model. 

The other possibility is that the acquisition of nuclear weapons 

will lead to an increased propensity for risk taking and/or aggression. I would point to several examples that we have seen in the 

past decade or so—Iraq’s behavior in the late 1980s as Iraq’s WMD 

programs, particularly as its chemical and biological programs, matured. We saw a tendency toward greater risk taking and foreign 

policy behavior culminating in the invasion in Kuwait. I would 

make the case that it was the growing self-confidence that Saddam 

53

Hussein derived from his maturing chemical and biological weapons program which emboldened him to act in a more aggressive 

fashion. 

We have seen North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship throughout 

the 1990s, which is due in part at least to its chemical and biological capabilities as well as its nuclear capabilities. Finally, we saw 

Pakistan’s attempt to seize Kashmir in 1999, a disputed territory 

with India, which was due in part to the greater sense of confidence it had as a result of the nuclear weapons test it conducted 

the year before. 

So it is possible as a result of Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons we will see greater terrorism and more military provocations. 

I would also say that a nuclear Iran poses a threat on another 

level. I believe that although the short-term trend lines with regard 

to political change in Iran are negative, and I refer to the recent 

modular selections, I think the long-term prospects for political 

change are good. The question is whether it will be peaceful or violent change. In the long-term there is the prospect that there will 

be violent change in Iran. And if this occurs after Iran has acquired 

nuclear weapons, one has to raise questions about the safety of its 

nuclear stockpile and possibility that people who are associated 

with the old regime might feel inclined to strike out at external enemies who they believe are behind domestic unrest if the regime 

is perceived by them to be going down the tubes. 

Second, there is the likelihood that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear 

weapons will result in greater regional proliferation, whether Iran 

declares its possession of nuclear weapons or whether it doesn’t, 

and is simply perceived by its neighbors to be a threshold for actual non-declared nuclear weapon State. It is possible that Saudi 

Arabia will try to purchase a nuclear weapon. Some of the Gulf 

States might try to leverage their petrochemical industries in order 

to produce a modest chemical weapons deterrent. Israel might try 

to reduce the ambiguity surrounding its own nuclear program in 

order to strengthen deterrence, and there are questions about how 

Egypt and Iraq might respond to an Iranian nuclear weapon. 

With regard to Iran and terrorism, the problem is really twofold: 

Iran’s direct participation in terrorism and its use of surrogates. In 

the past decade, we have seen a gradual decline in Iran’s direct involvement in terrorism and the involvement of its intelligence services in terrorism, largely because it paid a high price in the early 

1990s when its intelligence services were involved in acts of terror 

in Europe and elsewhere. As a result, it increased its support for 

surrogate organizations which have been involved in terrorism. The 

most notable of these are the Lebanese Hezbollah and its various 

affiliates, such as the Saudi Hezbollah, which was involved in the 

Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, the Palestinian group Hamas, 

Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the PFLP-GC, and most recently an organization in the West Bank and Gaza. 

Finally, there is al-Qaeda and its associates, such as Abu Musab 

Zarqawi, who has members of his organization based in Iran. He 

himself has passed through Iran from Afghanistan to Iraq after the 

fall of the Taliban, and we also know that Iran has provided safe 

haven to several senior members of al-Qaeda. Several of these 

groups have in the past expressed an interest in chemical weapons. 

54

We know Zarqawi has been pursuing ricin. Al-Qaeda has shown an 

interest in the full range of weapons of mass destruction, and the 

Palestinian Hamas has also shown an interest in chemical weapons, that organizations such as Hezbollah would seek possibly the 

acquisition of these weapons or the provision from its Iranian sponsors. 

The bottom line is you could deduce a range of reasons why Iran 

would not provide these weapons to these terrorist groups: The fear 

of retaliation, its inability to control what is done with these weapons once provided to these groups, perhaps Teheran’s belief it has 

succeeded in the past by conventional means, and so, therefore, 

why take the risk of resorting to terrorism using nonconventional 

weapons? 

However, the bottom line is we have been surprised so many 

times in so many ways with regard to trends pertaining to weapons 

of mass destruction proliferation and with regard to terrorism. The 

prospect that Iran will provide these kinds of weapons to these organizations is a risk that we cannot afford to ignore and we have 

to consider a very tangible possibility. 

With regard to our policy options, we can continue with our efforts to delay, to attempt to delay Iran’s nuclear procurement efforts, and I would not downplay the importance of these efforts. We 

have been very successful in the past. These efforts must continue. 

Paul mentioned the importance of trying to prevent the completion of Bushehr, which could be a source of fissile material. It is 

not an optimal source, but it is a viable source of fissile material. 

We have to do what we can to prevent North Korea from becoming 

a potential source or supplier of finished fissile material or finished 

nuclear weapons to Iran. Perhaps the Nuclear Security Initiative 

will provide options for doing this with regard to North Korea. 

There is the issue of preventable military action. My feeling is 

that this option has to be kept on the table even though I think 

it is not likely that we will have the necessary intelligence to pull 

off this kind of operation. But we have to go forward with the planning in the event that such intelligence does become available. 

Sanctions: Iran’s economy is its Achilles heel because of its reliance on oil income. The problem is, I don’t think there is political 

support either in the Security Council or in a framework outside 

of the Security Council for the kind of sanctions that would bite 

deep and that would hurt Iran, mainly because I am afraid to say 

that I don’t believe there are many countries who consider this is 

high-enough priority to accept economic sacrifices. And given the 

price of world oil today, the removal of 2.5 million barrels of oil 

from the world market and the impact that would have on oil 

prices, unfortunately this is not right now a viable option, although 

this is something we need to explore. 

We need to continue to encourage efforts at political change in 

Iran. We need to lay the basis for an enhanced deterrence and containment regime in the Gulf and Southwest Asia by working with 

our allies and enhancing the deterrent capability through programs 

such as the Cooperative Defense Initiative and by enhancing their 

conventional deterrent capabilities. 

At this point I will stop. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Eisenstadt follows:]

55

1Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. His recent publications include ‘‘Delay, Deter and Contain, Roll-Back: Toward a Strategy for Dealing with Iran’s Nuclear 

Ambitions,’’ in Geoff Kemp (Ed.) Iran’s Bomb: American and Iranian Perspectives, (The Nixon 

Center, 2004) and ‘‘The Challenges of U.S. Preventive Military Action,’’ in Henry Sokolski and 

Patrick Clawson (Eds.), Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (U.S. Army War College Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2004). 2 North Korea may have two bombs and is believed to be building 6–8 more from plutonium 

it recently separated from spent fuel. Glenn Kessler, ‘‘North Korea Nuclear Estimate to Rise: 

U.S. Report to Say Country has at Least 8 Bombs,’’ The Washington Post, 28 April 2004, A1, 

A16. 3The estimate of 2–3 years is that of several respected proliferation specialists. See David 

Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘‘Iran, Player or Rogue?’’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2003, 52–58, and ‘‘Iran: Breaking Out Without Quite Breaking the Rules?’’ A 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center analysis at: www.npec-web.org/projects/iranswu2.htm. 

By contrast, the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community is that if Iranian efforts to acquire 

technology to produce fissile material are successful, ‘‘Tehran will have a nuclear weapon within 

the decade.’’ Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, USN, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 11, 2003 and Senate 

Armed Services Committee, February 12, 2003, at: www.dia.mil/Public/Testimonies/

statement10.html. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL EISENSTADT,1 SENIOR FELLOW, WASHINGTON

INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

The emergence of a nuclear Iran could alter the balance of power in the Middle 

East, leading to a heightened risk of conflict, and possibly nuclear war. This raises 

several questions: How close is Iran to acquiring the bomb? What are the potential 

implications of a nuclear Iran for the U.S. and the region? And what are the prospects of Iran providing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist groups it 

supports? 

Iran’s Nuclear Timeline. Should Iran obtain fissile material from abroad, it could 

conceivably build a bomb within a year (assuming it has plans for a viable design, 

and the special materials and components—beyond fissile materiel—needed to build 

a device or weapon). If North Korea were to enter the market as a purveyor of nuclear weaponry, Iran might be able to buy a bomb even sooner.2 In the event that 

Iran’s reactor at Bushehr is finished in 2006 (as promised by the Russians), Iran 

could produce enough fissile material for its first bomb within 2–3 years. If forced 

to fall back on its gas centrifuge program for fissile material, it might not acquire 

the bomb for another 5–10 years.3 More than a decade of experience in Iraq, North 

Korea, Iran, and Libya, however, has served to highlight the unreliability of such 

estimates. 

The range of these divergent estimates, moreover, highlights the uncertainty regarding the scope and status of Iran’s nuclear program. Accordingly, Iran’s true nuclear status is likely to be characterized by ambiguity for the foreseeable future; if 

and when it acquires the bomb, it is not clear that Iran will announce the fact, or 

test a new weapon—at least initially. Because of this uncertainty, Iran’s neighbors 

and adversaries are increasingly likely, in the coming years, to see Iran as a ‘threshold’ nuclear weapons state (i.e., capable of rapidly acquiring nuclear weapons), if not 

a de facto nuclear weapons state, and to treat it with the caution and deference that 

such status merits. 

Implications of a Nuclear Iran. There are two schools of thought regarding the 

impact of nuclear weapons on the behavior of states. One argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons induces greater prudence and caution among possessor 

states, and adduces U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War as proof (though 

post-Cold War revelations concerning how close the United States and Soviet Union 

were to nuclear war during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis has diminished the appeal of this model). The other argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons (or 

more generally, weapons of mass destruction) can lead to an increased propensity 

for risk-taking. Thus, Iraq’s growing arsenal of chemical and biological weapons may 

have emboldened Saddam Hussein to pursue a more aggressive regional policy in 

1989–90 and to invade Kuwait in 1990. Similarly, the confidence that Pakistan’s 

leadership drew from the demonstration of that country’s nuclear capability in its 

May 1998 weapons test, may have emboldened it to attempt to seize a portion of 

Kashmir from India during the Kargil Crisis of May-July 1999. 

Though it is impossible to predict the impact of acquiring nuclear weapons on Iranian policy, Iranian gunboat diplomacy vis-a-vis Azerbaijan in 2001 (to halt Azeri 

effort to explore for oil in contested portions of the Caspian Sea), its repeated rebuffs 

of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its recent humiliation of 

British servicemen detained in the Shatt al-Arab, gives reason for pause. Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons might further embolden its hard-line conservative leadVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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4Douglas Frantz, ‘‘Nuclear Ring May have Aided Syria,’’ Los Angeles Times, 25 June 2004, 

at: http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgsyrianukes25jun25,0,1272020.story?coll=la-headlines-world. 5 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2003, at: http://www.state.gov/s/

ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31644.htm. 6 Amos Harel, ‘‘Hamas has Been Pursuing Chemical, Biological Terror,’’ Haaretz, 1 January 

2003. 7 Amos Harel, ‘‘Shin Bet Foils Plan to Poison Jerusalem Hospital’s Water,’’ Haaretz, 23 June 

2004. 8Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, ‘‘Israelis Intercept ‘Mega-Bomb’; Worries Grow Over 

Threat of Unconventional Attacks,’’ The Washington Post, 6 September 2002, A1. 9Secretary of State Colin Powell, Address to the UN Security Council, 5 February 2003, at: 

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/20030205–1.html; Sebastian Rotella, ‘‘A 

Road to Ansar Began in Italy’’, Los Angeles Times, 28 April 2003, A1. 

ership to bully its neighbors, stiff-arm Europe, and sponsor terrorism against Israel, 

and American interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. 

Instability and unrest in a nuclear Iran could have dire consequences for the U.S. 

and the region. Should anti-regime violence escalate to the point that it were to 

threaten the survival of the Islamic Republic (unlikely in the near term, but a possibility in the future, should popular demands for political change continue to be ignored by conservative hardliners), diehard supporters of the old order might, in a 

parting shot, lash out at perceived external enemies of the doomed regime with all 

means at their disposal (including nuclear weapons). 

An Iranian bomb is also likely to spur additional proliferation in the Middle East. 

Saudi Arabia is likely to try to purchase a nuclear weapon, perhaps from North 

Korea or Pakistan, while some of the smaller Gulf states might leverage their petrochemical industries to produce modest chemical warfare (CW) stockpiles for deterrence. Israel is likely to continue its successful policy of nuclear opacity, though it 

is likely to find ways to bolster its deterrent posture by further reducing the thin 

veneer of ambiguity regarding its nuclear status; this could cause Egypt and Syria 

to reevaluate its nuclear options—though Syria might already be traveling down 

this path.4 Finally, it could cause a post-Saddam Iraq to evaluate its nuclear options 

if and when a degree of stability returns to that country. 

Iran and Terrorism. According to the U.S. Department of State, Iran remains the 

world’s foremost state sponsor of terrorism.5 During the 1980s and early 1990s, 

members of Iran’s security services participated in terrorist operations overseas, 

particularly against anti-regime dissidents in Europe and elsewhere. Tehran, however, eventually realized that these operations isolated it internationally. Accordingly, it has become much more careful about masking its involvement in terrorism, 

providing safehaven, logistical support, funding, training, and weapons to Islamic as 

well as secular nationalist terrorist groups whose interests are aligned with its own. 

Terrorist groups that benefit from Tehran’s patronage include: 

• The Lebanese Hizballah, and its associates such as Saudi Hizballah, which 

carried out the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing.

• The Palestinian Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front 

for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP–GC) and, most recently, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, belonging to the mainstream Fatah organization of Yasser Arafat.

• Al-Qaida and its affiliates, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

A number of these groups have, in recent years, evinced a growing interest in 

WMD and in conducting mass—casualty attacks—particularly since 9/11. Hamas 

has shown an interest in chemical and, more recently, biological weapons. It has 

tried to poison Israeli water supplies and food in restaurants, investigated ways to 

disseminate cyanidal agents in public places, and assessed the potential of biological 

weapons.6 Likewise, a PIJ activist was recently arrested for planning to poison the 

water supply at a Jerusalem Hospital.7 Moreover, in recent years, there have been 

several suicide bombings in which the metal bomb fragments (screws, nails, etc.) 

were tainted with rat poison, while a number of suicide bombers have been infected 

with Hepatitis-B and AIDS, which some believe to be part of an intentional (and 

unsuccessful) effort to infect bombing victims.8

In addition to his involvement in conventional terrorism, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi 

has long shown an interest in poisons. In Afghanistan he ran a camp near Herat 

whose specialty was poisons. Following the fall of the Taliban, he spent some time 

in Iran, before establishing another camp in the village of Sargat, near Khurmal, 

in northeastern Iraq, in conjunction with the Ansar al-Islam group (which has also 

benefited from Iranian support), where members of his organization experimented 

with cyanidal compounds and ricin.9 Following the fall of the Saddam Hussein reVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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10See, for instance, his interview with Time magazine, ‘‘Conversation with Terror, 11 January 

1999, at: http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/interview/0,9754,174550,00.html. 11 Judith Miller, ‘‘Killing for the Glory of God, In a Land Far from Home,’’ The New York 

Times, 16 January 2001, A9. 12Frank Gardner, ‘‘Al-Qaeda ‘Was Making Dirty Bomb,’ ’’ BBC News at: http://

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk—news/2711645.stm. 13David Albright and Holly Higgins, ‘‘A Bomb for the Ummah,’’ The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March/April 2003, v. 59, no. 2, 49–55. 

gime, Zarqawi reportedly fled to Iran, before relocating to central Iraq, where he is 

believed to be leading the fight against coalition forces. 

Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida have intensively pursued the acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons for a number of years now, and 

bin Laden has frequently declared his interest in obtaining such means.10 Al-Qaida 

operated a camp in Afghanistan (part of the so-called Darunta Camp complex near 

Jalalabad) where it produced and tested poisons and chemical agents on animals.11

It has shown an interest in radiological weapons, and operated a lab in Herat, Afghanistan, where it tried to build one (it also sent an operative to the United States 

to detonate a so-called ‘dirty bomb’).12 Prior to the fall of the Taliban, al-Qaida was 

in contact with two Pakistani nuclear scientists formerly associated with Pakistan’s 

nuclear weapons program, seeking their assistance in acquiring chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear weapons.13

Thus, several terrorist organizations that enjoy the support of Tehran have shown 

a strong and abiding interest in WMD, but have thus far not succeeded in employing such means. A state sponsor with experience in the production and 

weaponization of WMD, such as Iran, could make a major contribution to these efforts. Thus far, there is no evidence that Tehran has provided know-how, materials, 

or actual WMD to any of these groups, although there is insufficient information 

in the open sources to speak confidently on this subject. 

Tehran enjoys a long history of collaboration with Hizballah on the most sensitive 

terrorist operations undertaken by either party (including the 1983 Marine barracks 

bombing in Beirut, a series of deadly bombings in Paris in 1986 during the IranIraq War, the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and 

the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia). For this reason, should Tehran 

consider transferring such capabilities to others, Hizballah is the most likely recipient. However, by transferring to Hizballah, in the past several years, thousands of 

artillery rockets capable of ranging all of northern Israel, it has succeeded in creating a conventional deterrent balance with Israel that has greatly constricted 

Israel’s military freedom of action vis-a-vis Hizballah as well as Iran. It is not clear 

that the transfer of WMD to Hizballah would yield significant benefits at this time. 

A convincing case can likewise be made that Tehran would think long and hard 

before providing WMD to groups with which it does not enjoy a similar degree of 

trust and confidence, and that are engaged in ongoing operations against their 

American or Israeli enemies, for fear that such a step could put Tehran at risk of 

retaliation. Conversely, the fact that Tehran has never faced military retaliation in 

response to acts of terror might lead some Iranian decision makers to believe (or 

miscalculate) that they could transfer know-how, materials, or WMD to Palestinian 

groups, or al-Qaida and its associates, with impunity. 

The bottom line is that due to the importance that Tehran has traditionally attached to maintaining deniability and creating ambiguity about its intentions and 

actions, it is likely to seek, when acting against more powerful adversaries, the ability to deliver nonconventional arms by nontraditional means (for instance, by intelligence operatives or terrorists). Because such methods offer the possibility of covert 

delivery, they are likely to become important adjuncts to more traditional delivery 

means such as missiles, and in situations in which deniability is a critical consideration, they are likely to be the delivery means of choice. The threat such a capability 

could pose for effective deterrence, is reason enough to treat such an eventuality 

with the seriousness it deserves. 

Policy Options. There is no clear-cut policy solution for dealing with the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear program. The U.S. faces difficult choices, and success 

is uncertain, at best. U.S. policy should seek: to disrupt Tehran’s activities in the 

area of proliferation and terrorism; to convince Tehran that acquiring nuclear weapons will harm, rather than enhance its security, and; to bolster the ability of the 

U.S. and its allies to deter and contain a nuclear Iran. To this end it should:

• Continue efforts to disrupt Iran’s nuclear procurement in order to delay its 

nuclear program. In particular, press Russia to avoid completing the Bushehr 

reactor, and disrupt efforts to acquire centrifuge components that it cannot 

yet produce on its own.

58

14For more on the risks and challenges of preventive action, see: Michael Eisenstadt, ‘‘The 

Challenges of U.S. Preventive Military Action,’’ in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (Eds.), 

Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 

113–128, at: www.npec-web.org/books/CheckingIran.pdf. 15For a more detailed discussion of the sanctions option, see: George Perkovich and Silvia 

Manzanero, ‘‘Plan B: Using Sanctions to End Iran’s Nuclear Program,’’ Arms Control Today, 

May 2004, at: www.armscontrol.org/act/2004—05/PerkovichManzanero.asp?print. 16For the core elements of a regime to deter and contain a nuclear Iran, see: Michael 

Eisenstadt, Deter and Contain: Dealing with a Nuclear Iran, paper prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) workshop: Contending with a Nuclear-Ready Iran, 

Washington, DC, 22–24 February 2004.

• Keep the option of preventive military action on the table as a spur to diplomacy, though the lack of accurate intelligence, the possibility of an anti-American backlash by a heretofore friendly Iranian public, and the dangers of Iranian retaliation in Iraq will limit the appeal of this option. Recognize that 

should actionable intelligence become available at some future date, preventive action might not be an unthinkable option.14

• Seek support for economic sanctions on Iran should it refuse to abandon its 

nuclear program. Iran’s oil sector accounts for 40–50% of government revenues, and 80% of its export earnings, and a ban on investment in its oil industry or the purchase of Iranian oil (sanctioned either by the UN Security 

Council, or voluntarily adopted by a broad-based ‘‘coalition of the willing’’) 

could induce Iran to reconsider its nuclear program.15 (However, gaining support for such a measure at a time when oil is $40 a barrel could prove difficult, if not impossible.) 

• Continue efforts to encourage political change in Tehran. While political 

change may not eliminate Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it might make the problem somewhat easier to manage, should a new leadership emerge that eschews terrorism and does not actively work to undermine Israeli-Palestinian 

negotiations.

• Lay the basis for an enhanced deterrence and containment regime in southwest Asia by enhancing early warning capabilities against traditional and 

nontraditional delivery platforms (aircraft, missiles, dhows, trucks), and regional air and missile defenses. Expand and deepen participation in the Cooperative Defense Initiative.

• Intensify the surveillance of Iranian embassies around the world, and encourage countries to pare back the Iranian diplomatic presence overseas beyond 

the minimum necessary to run an embassy.

• Continue global efforts to identify, and detain or expel, members of terrorist 

groups with ties to Iran. In particular, intensify efforts to disrupt fundraising 

and organizational activities of the Lebanese Hizballah and Hizballah affiliates wherever they may be.

• Clearly define U.S. ‘‘red lines’’ (in Iraq, the Gulf, and the Arab-Israeli arena) 

whose violation by Iran will prompt U.S. military action, to bolster deterrence 

and avoid a tragic miscalculation by Iran.

The emergence of a nuclear Iran should not be treated as a foregone conclusion; 

the U.S. must continue with efforts to forestall such an eventuality. At the same 

time, it must recognize that such efforts may not succeed, and commence work with 

its allies now, to lay the basis for a regional security architecture to deter and contain a nuclear Iran, and thereby mitigate the impact of a development that has the 

potential to destabilize a strategically vital region of the world.16

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. To follow up with what you were 

discussing, it is clear that many terrorist groups have received 

training in Iran. You have been talking about whether they have 

had access to nuclear or chemical technology or they were trained 

in using such weapons. To what extent are terrorist groups controlled by their State-sponsors? Is their control limited to funding? 

Is there more direct administration of these organizations by their 

State-sponsors? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I would characterize all these organizations 

that I mentioned—Hezbollah, the Palestinian groups, and al-Qaeda 

and its affiliates—as independent terrorist organizations that are 

59

constrained in many cases by State actors, and that the Lebanese 

Hezbollah is the organization which comes closest to being an extension of Iranian security services. Hezbollah is an independent 

political entity that functions within the Lebanese political context 

and does not always have identical interests with Iran, but the security apparatus of Hezbollah has a very close working relationship 

with the security apparatus of Iran, and we have seen Lebanese 

Hezbollah security people involved in terrorist operations and assassinations that had nothing to do with Hezbollah’s interests as 

an organization but served Iran’s interest. 

I would say all of these are independent actors, but the Lebanese 

Hezbollah comes closest to being an organization which sometimes 

functions in accordance with Iran’s State interests. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Seeing that major terrorist groups have specific goals and agendas, has there been a sense of coordination—

a carving out of spheres of influence—and if so, how do you believe 

this will effect the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction? Will 

they stockpile their weapons? Will one group having weapons of 

mass destruction satisfy the other groups? 

Mr. EISENSTADT. I will take the example of the Palestinians. In 

recent years, especially since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, 

Hezbollah has played a mentoring role with a number of these Palestinian organizations in order to improve their operational effectiveness and to coordinate their actions. 

Nonetheless, there remains a high degree of rivalry between the 

Palestinian groups. I am not sure that all of the Palestinian groups 

would necessarily pursue chemical weapons or have the ability to 

develop chemical weapons on their own, or would have the trust or 

the relationship with Iran that they could rely on Iran as a source 

of nonconventional weapons. But clearly there is a lot of rivalry 

and I am not sure we can talk about a division of labor or that degree of coordination between these various groups. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. Leventhal, you referred to complications in dealing effectively with Iran under NPT. How can the NPT be changed so that 

countries beyond P–5 are country-neutral and will help us with 

what our overarching goal is? And related to that, you were talking 

about a flaw that permits and promotes certain nuclear activity for 

nuclear weapons, which is one of the flaws of the NPT, if you could 

elaborate. 

Mr. LEVENTHAL. Well, I think the problem with the application 

of the NPT regime is it ultimately is a decision of the IAEA Board 

of Governors in conjunction with the Director General of the IAEA. 

They tend to be a very conservative body and they tend to be very 

protective of the image of nuclear power and extremely reluctant 

to do anything that would instill greater fear in the public about 

nuclear power. 

They are also extremely reluctant to make any sacrifices among 

themselves in terms of giving up the opportunity to use and to 

make money from the purveying of plutonium and highly-enriched 

uranium. 

I will say this, however, there has been significant progress on 

the highly-enriched uranium front where the commercial interests 

in refusing to give up that material do not run nearly as high as 

60

with plutonium. And Secretary Abraham’s initiative to cooperate 

with the IAEA in cleaning out Russian-supplied research reactors 

and converting those reactors from high-enriched uranium to lowenriched uranium is quite good. 

I would make this additional point, and it is what I stressed in 

my testimony: Unless a norm develops which says it is inappropriate and exceedingly dangerous to pursue the use of atom bomb 

materials as civilian nuclear fuels, I am afraid we are going to lose 

the fight against proliferation. 

Just in quantitative terms, nuclear power plants produce worldwide about 70 tons of new plutonium a year contained in spent 

fuel. If all of the plutonium that has been produced in spent fuel 

is ultimately separated out and put into commerce, we are talking 

about literally thousands of tons of material, and only 15 pounds 

or less is needed to make a bomb. The question is, how long will 

it take until some of that falls into the wrong hands? 

It also makes it much more difficult to restrain proliferating 

States because they say plutonium is a legitimate material. We are 

entitled under the treaty to use it, they say. The use of it does not 

necessarily signal the development of a nuclear weapon. So look at 

the disadvantage we are put in in dealing with Iran on that point. 

As I said, I think the major industrial States are the principal culprit. They could go miles toward reforming the regime and making 

it into a far more transparent and effective force for curbing proliferation, but they are not prepared to curb their own activities to 

the extent necessary to make that possible. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much. I thank both panels 

for their expert testimony. It was an honor to have both of you 

here. I am sure we might have some more questions for you that 

we would like to submit. 

In closing, I would like to underscore that through its continued 

breaches it is clear Iran has forfeited its right to any of this technology or materials, and the time is now. We must act. We must 

send the matter to the Security Council. I thank for your testimony. 

The Subcommittee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

ADDENDUM STATEMENT RECEIVED AUGUST 2004 FROM PAUL LEVENTHAL, SENIOR

ADVISOR AND FOUNDING PRESIDENT, NUCLEAR CONTROL INSTITUTE

Madam Chairwoman and members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for your invitation to testify today on the deeply troubling implications 

of Iran going nuclear. I will concentrate my remarks on two aspects of this subject. 

First, I will address Iran and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime—

specifically what impact an Iran with nuclear weapons would have on that regime, 

why the current regime has been ineffective in preventing Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and the prospects for utilizing this flawed regime to make 

sure Iran does not achieve that goal. 

Second, I will explore Iran and the threat of nuclear terrorism—specifically the 

concern that if Iran goes nuclear, Hezbollah goes nuclear (or other terrorist organizations sponsored by the current conservative theocratic regime), and the prospects 

for countering that threat. 

IRAN AND THE NPT REGIME

Even if a nuclear capable Iran were not to provide its terrorist surrogates with 

nuclear weapons or the materials and know-how needed to build them, a nuclearcapable Iran under its present leadership would be an unparalleled earthquake with 

shockwaves that could rattle the foundation of U.S. vital interests in the region, at 

home and around the world. Not the least of these interests is the survival of the 

international nuclear non-proliferation regime itself. The regime is comprised of the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the associated inspections and safeguards 

arrangements carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and 

the agreements among nuclear industrial countries to strictly control exports of 

items and materials directly applicable to developing nuclear weapons. 

The first early-warning tremors of such a quake are now being felt. As a party 

to the NPT, Iran could cause the Treaty regime great damage if it proceeds to use 

peaceful nuclear technology to develop nuclear weapons. The Indian and Pakistani 

nuclear tests did not represent a direct assault on the Treaty since (like Israel, another de facto nuclear weapon state) they are not members of the NPT. But India 

and Pakistan, by conducting nuclear tests and getting away with it, have set a terrible example that may embolden Iran to try the same. North Korea, another NPT 

party, is now weaponizing after declaring itself to have withdrawn from the Treaty, 

and poses an equally serious threat to the survival of the non-proliferation regime. 

As Under Secretary of State Bolton’s comprehensive testimony makes clear, Iran 

has been exploiting its status as a non-nuclear-weapon-state party to the NPT to 

hide a nuclear weapons development program behind civilian nuclear research and 

power activities that presumably are permitted by the Treaty. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei has been highly critical of Iran’s multi-layered deceptions 

and lack of cooperation with the Agency, but, in the absence of a ‘‘smoking gun,’’ 

he is reluctant to declare that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the 

heavy burden of proof that applies to the head of an international organization that 

operates by consensus does not apply to the United States whose vital interests and 

global commitments could be so adversely affected by an Iranian nuclear fait 

accompli. 

We cannot wait for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an Iranian bomb. The risks 

of delay are too high. We should be prepared to act on the recent discoveries of evidence of weapons-related nuclear activities that are thoroughly detailed in Under 

Secretary Bolton’s scathing indictment of Iran. These include covert Iranian plants 

for the production of unsafeguarded highly enriched uranium and separated plutoVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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nium; the traces found of these weapons-capable materials; experiments with polonium (a neutron initiator used to trigger nuclear explosions); experiments with laser 

enrichment (an unconventional technology with little commercial promise but with 

the potential to produce bomb-grade uranium with high efficiency); a heavy water 

reactor that is too small to produce significant electrical power, too large for legitimate civilian research, but ideally suited for production of weapons-grade plutonium; and the overall pattern of Iranian deceptions, omissions and belated admissions of covert nuclear activities. Together, these discoveries constitute clear evidence of illicit activities that, unless halted, will lead inevitably to bomb-making. 

How, it is logical to ask, can all of these activities be going on without being in 

clear violation of the Treaty? Iran, after all, is a nation pledged to uphold the nonweapons obligations of the NPT. The answer is that the NPT, as presently interpreted, and the IAEA, as presently constituted, simply cannot cope with a nation 

whose ostensible ‘‘civilian’’ nuclear activities can bring it to within a screwdriver’s 

turn of having the bomb. Iran is exploiting a large gray area that exists between 

those activities that are significant to developing the know-how and the materials 

needed to make nuclear weapons, but nonetheless are not seen as violating the letter of the treaty, and the actual manufacture of nuclear weapons, which does constitute a clear violation. 

At present, the Treaty’s prohibitions are not interpreted to bar supplies to, or activities in, a non-weapons state that are ostensibly peaceful but raise obvious questions, as we now have in Iran, about proliferation risk, economic or technical justification, and safeguards effectiveness. To understand why this is so, we must first 

explore the basic dilemma that bedevils all civilian nuclear activities, as well as the 

nuclear nonproliferation regime itself—the inextricable link between the peaceful 

and military atom. 

All reactors now operating produce plutonium, an atom bomb material, as a byproduct of the splitting (fission) of uranium atoms in the cores of these reactors. As 

long as this plutonium remains in the highly radioactive spent fuel of these reactors, 

it is inaccessible and in an unsuitable form for making weapons. Once separated 

from spent fuel in a reprocessing plant, however, it is in a concentrated form that 

can be applied either to the fueling of reactors or the building of bombs. A further 

problem is the widespread use of highly enriched uranium as fuel in research reactors. Unlike the low-enriched or natural uranium used in power reactors, which is 

unsuitable for use in bombs, highly enriched uranium is a concentrated atom-bomb 

material. 

A fundamental flaw of the non-proliferation regime, especially as it applies to the 

current situation in Iran, is that it permits, indeed promotes, the use of these weapons-capable nuclear fuels—separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium—even 

though power and research reactors can be operated with low grades of uranium 

that are unsuitable for weapons. The major nuclear industrial states have been the 

principal culprits by making a business out of the production, use and export of 

these non-essential, dangerous and difficult-to-safeguard fuels. They have set an example of ‘‘legitimate’’ use of atom-bomb materials as civilian fuels that Iran and 

other proliferating states, like India, Pakistan and North Korea, have exploited in 

their pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

The attempts to deal effectively with Iran at the IAEA under the terms of the 

NPT are complicated by the great importance Iran places on being treated equally 

and fairly on a ‘‘country neutral’’ basis and does not single out Iran in a discriminatory way. Yet, the non-proliferation regime as it has evolved under the terms of the 

Treaty is inherently discriminatory. Within the regime, there are not just nuclearweapon have and have-not states, but also fissile-material have and have-not states. 

If plutonium were to be abandoned as the dis-economical and dangerous fuel that 

it is—and its prohibition for civilian applications became an international norm—

then denying Iran reprocessing technology and use of plutonium would not be exceptional. Iran’s pursuit of plutonium, on the other hand, would be exceptional and an 

unambiguous signal of a nuclear weapons program. 

In similar fashion, if uranium enrichment services were provided by existing suppliers on a guaranteed basis to nations that forswear reprocessing and plutonium 

use, nations that then insisted on developing national enrichment capacity, as Iran 

is now doing, would be violating an international norm and clearly signaling a 

weapons program. 

If all excess civilian and military highly enriched uranium were being blended 

down to ensure an ample supply of low-enriched fuel for power and research reactors—and if all excess civilian and weapons plutonium were being disposed of in 

highly radioactive waste instead of being stockpiled for use as reactor fuel—then an 

international norm to prohibit production and use of weapons-capable fuels could be 

universally applied. 

63

Today, these are all incredibly big ‘‘ifs.’’ Such a global exercise in making virtue 

of out of necessity has not yet ensued, presumably because the urgency of ridding 

the world of nuclear explosive fuels, in developed and developing countries alike, is 

not yet widely recognized. I fear that someday, perhaps sooner than we wish to 

imagine, the urgency will be made demonstrably clear by a cataclysmic act of nuclear violence or, hopefully, just a close call. One must hope that common sense will 

yet intervene ahead of cataclysm. 

Indeed, some progress is now being made. Both IAEA Director General ElBaradei 

and former UN chief inspector Hans Blix are convening international assessments 

of how to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In a recent Newsweek interview, ElBaradei said, ‘‘eventually not having any 

plutonium or highly-enriched uranium is really the way to go.’’ (http://

www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5024764/site/newsweek/) 

Blix, who heads a 15-nation WMD commission, said there is ‘‘. . . a very widespread and strong feeling on my commission that one must move on with a treaty 

that will prohibit all states involved from producing highly enriched uranium or plutonium, both substances that can be used in nuclear weapons. This does not affect 

the production of low-enriched uranium which is necessary for nuclear power.’’ 

(http://www.nci.org/04nci/06/VOANews.htm) 

President Bush should be given credit for taking an important step in this direction in his non-proliferation policy address of February 11. But he limited his call 

for no new reprocessing or enrichment facilities just to those countries that do not 

now have them on a commercial scale. Thus, the President is seeking to stop their 

spread to the developing world but without addressing the fuel-cycle excesses that 

exist in the major nuclear industrial states and contribute to the appetite for reprocessing and plutonium use in Iran and elsewhere. 

Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor to the first President Bush, makes a 

similar misstep in an op-ed article in today’s Washington Post when he proposes 

that we cannot be effective in trying to stop the enrichment program in Iran without 

also seeking to shut down one that is about to start up in Brazil. (http://

www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A1027–2004Jun23?language=printer) He is 

right as far as he goes, but he neglects to address, for example, the enormous reprocessing plant that is about to start up in Japan to extract tens of tons of plutonium from spent fuel for use in fresh fuel in nuclear power reactors. Less than 15 

pounds of plutonium is sufficient for an atomic bomb. 

Safeguards to be applied in the commercial reprocessing plant now being completed at Rokkasho-mura are far from perfect and illustrate the risks of commercialization of plutonium anywhere in the world. The IAEA is supposed to be able 

to detect on a timely basis the loss of a ‘‘significant quantity’’ (8 kilograms, or about 

18 pounds) of plutonium, but statistical uncertainties in the measurements are such 

that the IAEA could not sound the alarm with its required confidence level of 95% 

and a false alarm probability of only 5% until some 246 kilograms a year (541 

pounds, or at least 30 bombs worth) goes missing, according an analysis done for 

Nuclear Control Institute by Marvin Miller of MIT. (http://www.nci.org/k-m/

mmsgrds.htm) Experts from the IAEA and EURATOM now claim on the basis of 

experiments with improved equipment that the minimum detectable loss can be 

brought down to about 50 kilograms of plutonium a year. Such an improvement has 

not been demonstrated on a commercial scale, however, and still constitutes more 

than 6 times the amount of plutonium the IAEA is supposed to be able to know is 

as missing on a timely basis. (H. Aigner et. al., ‘‘International Target Values 2000 

for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials’’) 

Japan’s reprocessing program has not escaped Iran’s attention. I raise the Japanese reprocessing plant and its large plutonium measurement uncertainties because 

Iran is widely seen to be following ‘‘the Japan model’’ as the basis for building its 

nuclear power program. As the NPT is presently interpreted, Iran is as entitled as 

Japan to be separating tons of plutonium from power reactor spent fuel. The problem is not only that plutonium makes no economic sense as a civilian fuel, but it 

cannot be safeguarded effectively against misuse for weapons. It is important, therefore, to call a halt to further production and use of plutonium (as well as HEU) before it becomes so widespread in commerce that its susceptibility to diversion by determined proliferators poses a larger and larger threat. 

Japan should help set the right example at this critical time. The United States 

and Russia can assist by offering to ensure Japan’s energy security with low-enriched uranium made from Russian blended-down, highly enriched uranium drawn 

from Russia’s large military surplus stocks. This offer would give Japan a compelling, legitimate reason for not starting up its new commercial-scale reprocessing 

plant: it can get far cheaper nuclear fuel from friendly nations, indefinitely. 

64

An analysis done by the Nuclear Control Institute in 1993 projected that Japan, 

by utilizing blended-down Russian HEU, could acquire nearly a 40-year supply of 

low-enriched, civilian fuel for all power reactors operating and under construction 

at that time, and a more than 20-year supply for all reactors projected out to 2030. 

We also projected that Japan could acquire a 50-year reserve of low-enriched uranium from Russian, U.S. and other sources at about half the projected cost of its 

reprocessing and plutonium-use program. An article exploring this proposal by me 

and then-NCI research director Steven Dolley, was published in the Princeton journal, Science and Global Security. (http://www.princeton.edu/?globsec/publications/

pdf/5—1leventhal.pdf) 

Recently, the Monterey Institute’s Center for Non-Proliferation Studies embraced 

such a plan for Japan, and Harvard University’s Managing the Atom project included the strategic uranium reserve concept in a recent presentation to Japanese 

officials of a study on the adverse economics of using plutonium. As the prohibitive 

costs, severe security risks, and bad nonproliferation example of utilizing plutonium 

become more widely recognized in Japan, I am hopeful that avoidance of a commercial-scale Japanese reprocessing program may yet be realized. 

Suffice it to say, if there were in place today a nonproliferation regime that prohibited the use of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, Iran’s current nuclear activities aimed at producing these materials would be seen clearly as rising above a very 

low threshold for determining that a nuclear weapons program exists, and sanctions 

could be swiftly, universally and severely applied. Instead, in the absence of such a 

regime, we are now engaged in a very dangerous cat-and-mouse game with Iran that 

Iran apparently thinks it can win. 

I wish to underscore that it is not necessary to negotiate a new treaty, as Hans 

Blix suggests, to achieve a universal ban on production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. What is needed is not a new treaty, but the political will to properly interpret and enforce the prohibitions contained in the existing language of the 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 

As spelled out in a legal analysis of the terms and history of the NPT by Nuclear 

Control Institute’s counsel, Eldon Greenberg, the Treaty requires that Article IV’s 

guarantee of the ‘‘inalienable right’’ of all parties to develop and use nuclear energy 

for peaceful purposes must be exercised ‘‘in conformity with’’ the broad prohibitions 

in Articles I and II on the conduct of weapons states and non-weapons states respectively. Those prohibitions include admonitions on weapons states ‘‘not in any way 

assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapons State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons . . .’’, and on non-weapons states ‘‘not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons . . . and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons . . .’’

Greenberg finds that this direct link between the NPT’s promises and its prohibitions

. . . tends to support the conclusion that Articles I, II, and IV must be read 

together in such a way that assistance or activities which are ostensibly peaceful and civilian in nature do not as a practical matter lead to proliferation of 

nuclear weapons. The NPT, in other words, can and should be read as permitting the evaluation of such factors as proliferation risk, economic or technical 

justification and safeguards effectiveness in assessing the consistency of specific 

or generic types of assistance and activities with the Treaty’s restrictions, to ensure that action is not taken in the guise of peaceful applications of nuclear energy under Article IV which is in fact violative of the prohibitions of Articles 

I and II.

Greenberg prepared his analysis for Nuclear Control Institute in 1993, in preparation for the NPT Extension Conference two years hence, and it focused on the question of whether ‘‘reprocessing and plutonium use, given the (proliferation) risks, economic and technical questions and safeguards weaknesses associated therewith,’’ 

ran afoul of the NPT. He concluded, based on these factors, that assistance to or 

indigenous activities by a non-weapons state involving plutonium ‘‘should generally 

not be subject to’’ the obligations and rights in Article IV ‘‘and should instead fall 

within the scope of the prohibitions of Articles I and II of the NPT.’’ Highly enriched 

uranium was not specifically addressed in this analysis, but the same conclusion 

could be reached on the basis of risk, technical considerations and safeguards criteria. 

There was little support at the time for the study’s conclusion that civilian production and use of weapons-capable fissile materials violated the prohibitions of the 

NPT. But events over the past decade in India, Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea, Libya 

and now Iran—not to mention the prospect of terrorists going nuclear with diverted 

or stolen fissile materials—all would seem to cry out for some hard-headed reconsidVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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eration of that proposition. I therefore submit for the record Greenberg’s analysis, 

‘‘The NPT and Plutonium: Application of NPT Prohibitions to ‘Civilian’ Nuclear 

Equipment, Technology and Materials Associated with Reprocessing and Plutonium 

Use.’’ http://www.nci.org/03NCI/12/NPTandPlutonium.pdf 

If the major nuclear industrial states were now prepared to wind down their civilian plutonium and highly enriched uranium programs, achievement of an international norm barring the production and use of these materials under the NPT 

would be relatively straightforward. Without the cooperation of these states, however, the political weight needed to drive such a bold international consensus will 

not materialize, and the present discriminatory and ineffectual regime will continue 

to prevail. 

Japan seems to hold the key. No matter how you slice it, in the final analysis 

the best hope for stopping the spread of the bomb, is a universal halt in all production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium and a universal ban on their use 

as fuels in reactors. Without such a universal norm against nuclear explosives, production and use of them will remain ‘‘legitimate’’ and a sure path to the bomb for 

nations that want it. 

In the absence of such an effective and transparent non-proliferation regime, we 

have no choice today but to apply the cumbersome and opaque regime that we have. 

Imperfect though it may be, it is by no means impotent for dealing with Iran, if 

the political will can be found to implement its provisions and make them stick. Perhaps the daunting task ahead for the world community will make reform of the regime a bit easier to help prevent the emergence of future nuclear Irans. But such 

reform will likely prove impossible if Iran (or North Korea) is permitted to exploit 

the treaty’s provisions to acquire nuclear weapons. 

The immediate question is how to impress upon Iran that its continuing pursuit 

of nuclear weapons will not be tolerated. The matter is now before the Board of Governors of the IAEA where an extended negotiation with Iran is underway. The 

longer this negotiation takes, the more time Iran has to pursue covert activities, enabling it to acquire fissile materials and the wherewithal to build and test nuclear 

weapons. In other words, time is on Iran’s side. We see in the case of North Korea 

that negotiation stalling tactics have permitted the DPRK to continue producing nuclear weapons from plutonium it produced and extracted outside of IAEA safeguards. 

For the moment, a majority of the Board, led by the ‘‘EU–3’’—France, Germany 

and Britain, are resisting U.S. efforts to bring the matter of Iran’s non-compliance 

with the NPT before the UN Security Council. Although Iran’s pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing are not per se violations of the Treaty, the use of covert facilities to produce undeclared fissile materials surely is a violation of the Treaty’s 

safeguards requirements. In such a circumstance, Article 12C of the IAEA Statute 

requires that the Board of Governors ‘‘shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.’’ 

There appears to be no room for discretion in implementing this provision. Unless 

the Board acts promptly, it will defeat the intention of the statute to report serious 

violations of the Treaty to the Security Council. 

Iran seems determined to keep the matter of its nuclear program out of the Security Council in the hope of winning concessions in the IAEA governing board and 

avoiding pariah state status. The deliberations of the IAEA board is traditionally 

dominated by commercial nuclear interests that often take precedence over proliferation concerns. A number of members of the board, including the EU–3 and 

Russia, want to sell nuclear technology to, and normalize trade with, Iran. One deal 

being discussed is to permit Russia to complete construction of the Bushehr nuclear 

power reactor in Iran in return for an agreement by Iran to send spent fuel to Russia and to forego reprocessing and enrichment. 

In view of Iran’s longstanding and persistent cheating on its Treaty obligations 

and its willingness to acknowledge clandestine nuclear activities only after they are 

revealed by dissidents, I believe this is precisely the wrong way to go. Indeed, completion of the Bushehr reactor before a highly intrusive inspection regime is established and before all fuel cycle activities are verified to be shut down, could only 

encourage Iran to pursue clandestine reprocessing. An even deeper problem may 

apply to enrichment. Iran continues to manufacture centrifuges after having pledged 

not to do so and appears embarked on a program to disperse a number small, compartmentalized, hard-to-detect enrichment plants that will make discovery and removal of all of them highly problematical. 

What might get Iran to take concerns about its weapons program seriously? 

First, even as the Board of Governors negotiates and deliberates, it should report 

Iran’s violations to the United Nations, as required, without further delay. If the 

Board decides in September, when it next takes up the Iran question, not to forVerDate Mar 21 2002 13:29 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\MECA\062404\94511.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
66

mally report Iran’s violations, the United States should submit a resolution to the 

Security Council laying out the detailed brief presented today by Undersecretary 

Bolton and asking the council to consider imposing sanctions. 

Second, the IAEA Board should fulfill the other requirements of Article 12C for 

dealing with a state that fails to remedy its non-compliance: ‘‘. . . direct curtailment or suspension of assistance . . . call for the return of materials and equipment 

made available . . . suspend any non-complying member from the privileges and 

rights of membership.’’ After all, there should be a price to be paid by Iran for secretly violating the NPT for nearly 20 years. Iran’s response to these measures will 

help to inform the Security Council as to whether more severe sanctions, including 

use of military force to destroy unlawful nuclear facilities, are warranted. 

What if such strong medicine leads Iran to follow North Korea out of the NPT? 

I believe it is better to deal with Iran as a Treaty violator outside of the NPT and 

before the Security Council than continue to allow Iran to buy time by exploiting 

the Treaty’s provisions and the IAEA’s indulgent, deliberative process. In the case 

of Iran, buying time means building bombs. Isolation, not indulgence, of Iran may 

be the most effective approach. 

There is a popular notion in certain policy circles that if Iran feels threatened, 

the hard-line clerics will be further induced to go nuclear. But it may be that unless 

they feel threatened, they will continue their nuclear weapons program on the assumption they can get away with it. Only the prospect of severe sanctions including 

possible military action could induce them to forego nuclear weapons out of fear of 

the consequences. 

The bottom-line issue is whether we continue to provide ostensible atoms for 

peace to a nation that actively sponsors terrorism, exports revolution and could put 

our own cities and the cities of our allies at risk. If we fail to get Iran to take our 

concerns seriously, we may have to face not only a nuclear Iran but a nuclear 

Hezbollah. 

IRAN AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Would a nuclear Iran sponsor nuclear terrorism? The conventional view is that 

Iran would not turn over nuclear weapons or the material and know-how for building them to a group it could not fully control. Yet, Iran’s record of not only sponsoring terrorism but of using its own intelligence units to work directly with groups 

like Hezbollah and the Jerusalem Force of the Revolutionary Guard suggests surely 

the potential for Iran providing nuclear assets to groups it can control. 

Alireza Jafarzadeh, formerly the U.S. representative of the National Council of 

Iran, the Iranian dissident group that revealed the existence of Iran’s secret uranium enrichment and heavy water plants and a number of other secret sites, attributes much of the post-war surge of violence in Iraq to an elaborate Iranian campaign to infiltrate Iraq with its intelligence agents, Hezbollah and at least a half 

dozen other Iranian-sponsored groups. He also was the first to report Iran’s involvement with the terrorists who bombed the U.S. Marines’ Khobar Towers barracks in 

Saudia Arabia in 1997, and who bombed the Jewish Community Center in Buenos 

Aires in 1993. 

In February, he reported Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had 

formed a new military special unit to run a covert nuclear program parallel to the 

civilian one being run by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The civilian program answers to IAEA inspectors, but the military program, which controls up to 

400 nuclear physicists and experts, seeks to stop the leakage of nuclear secrets and 

pursue a weapons program, according to Jafarzadeh, who now runs Strategic Policy 

Consulting Inc. in Washington. (www.spconsulting.us) In March, Tehran acknowledged the military role in its nuclear program, but insisted its work was confined 

to building centrifuges for the civilian program. 

In assessing Iran’s potential for sponsoring nuclear terrorism, one should consider 

the ‘‘Pakistan model’’—that is, the role of individual entrepreneurs within the Pakistani nuclear program, led by A.Q. Kahn, who not only established a network for 

supplying centrifuges and a weapons design to such nations as Libya, North Korea 

and Iran, but also made ‘‘philanthropic’’ visits to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban 

leadership in Afghanistan prior to the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 

September 11, 2001. Some observers believe no weapons or weapons information or 

material passed from Pakistani nuclear scientists to al-Qaeda because these scientists were not close enough to Pakistan’s weapons program to have access to such 

assets. But these observers also had believed that Pakistani nuclear weapons scientists were westernized, non-Islamist and would never pass on Pakistan’s ‘‘crown 

jewels’’ to other nations or groups—an assessment that proved dead wrong. 

67

In the mid-1980s, Nuclear Control Institute sponsored a ground-breaking assessment of the nuclear terrorism threat first by convening an international conference 

to assess the threat and then by sponsoring the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism. The world has changed in the two decades since the nuclear physicists and weapons designers, terrorism specialists, and other experts we 

assembled, examined the problem. But two conclusions reached then are especially 

applicable to assessing Iran’s potential for nuclear terrorism today. 

The first was the conclusion by a team of U.S. nuclear weapons designers that 

a terrorist group sophisticated enough acquire fissile material could put together a 

technical team capable of designing a weapon from non-classified sources, and that 

‘‘a crude implosion device could be constructed with reactor-grade plutonium or 

highly enriched uranium in metal or possibly even in oxide form.’’ (Mark et.al., ‘‘Can 

Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?,’’ 1987, www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm) In other 

words, the fissile materials Iran is now seeking to acquire could be applied by Iransponsored terrorists to making a bomb, even if Iran can be deterred for the time 

being from pursuing a dedicated, national nuclear weapons program. 

Second, the task force noted that in assessing the threat of nuclear terrorism, one 

had to examine ‘‘the essential combination of capability and will’’ that a group would 

need to go nuclear. Will, however, is rather amorphous, difficult to predict and subject to changing circumstances. Even if a group intended to build nuclear weapons, 

it would need the capability to do so to be successful. Thus, prevention of nuclear 

terrorism depends heavily on denying the adversary the capability to go nuclear. 

Iran, a frequent and persistent state sponsor of terrorism, should be regarded with 

the deepest concern as being capable of providing terrorists with such capability 

once it becomes nuclear capable itself. Iran may be the only nation with leadership 

that believes it can bring the United States down. 

It is prudent, therefore, to conclude that a nuclear Iran would pose grave national 

and sub-national threats under its present leadership and that every effort must be 

made to strengthen enforcement of the international non-proliferation regime to 

deny Iran the wherewithal to go nuclear. Thank you. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Madame Chairman, thank you for convening this important and timely hearing 

to highlight the ever growing danger posed by the Islamist extremist regime in Iran. 

While the removal of Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime in Iraq will ultimately bring 

stability and democracy to a troubled region, the actions and policies of the Government of Iran, including its support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine 

Middle East peace, and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means 

to deliver them continue to pose a dangerous threat to the region as well as the 

national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. 

With their principal rival in the Gulf, namely Saddam Hussein, gone, Tehran has 

been embolden in it efforts to assert its political and military influence to destabilize 

the Persian Gulf and export Islamist extremism around the world before democratic 

forces within Iran, inspired by the example of a free and democratic Iraq, move to 

liberate themselves from their dictatorship. The people of Iran, those residing in the 

country and abroad, are growing increasingly weary of the repression imposed upon 

them by Iran’s ruling clerics and with each new birth in Iran, the popularity and 

control of the regime is further undermined. An estimated 50 percent of Iran’s 70 

million people were born after the revolution, and the call of the clerics is falling 

on increasingly deaf ears. Iran’s youth, as we saw in early 2003, are prepared to 

take to the streets demanding good governance, accountability, and economic opportunity from Iranian hardliners. So, simply put, time is running out for the extremist 

to accomplish their goal of exporting their radical agenda. 

With the clock ticking, Iran’s hardliner leaders have sharpened their 

confrontational posture towards Iran’s neighbors and the West. Iran’s seizure of 

three British patrol boats in the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway earlier this week 

is a clear sign of Tehran’s new pattern of hostile behavior but it is not the only example. The Iranian navy has also seized several United Arab Emirate (UAE) fishing 

boats near the Qeshm and Siri islands, and Iran has engaged in recent naval disputes with Qatar, as well as revived an old territorial dispute with the UAE. 

Iran is also seeking to use covert action to undermine the emerging democracy 

in Iraq. Tehran has aggressively cultivated covert ties with Iraq’s Shiite population 

and the backing of militant groups—including the Iraqi Hezbollah, Muqtada alSadr’s Mehdi Army and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq. 

68

In April, my good friend Dr. Constantine Menges, a senior fellow with the Hudson 

Institute and former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs 

under President Reagan, issued a ‘‘white paper’’ outlining the threat posed by Iranian covert action in Iraq. I would ask Unanimous Consent to have a copy of Dr. 

Menges’ paper made a part of today’s hearing record. I urge my colleagues to read 

this document because I believe it cuts to the heart of the matter and lays bare 

Iran’s efforts to undermined initiatives aimed at bridging the multitude of ethnic, 

religious and regional rivalries in Iraq. The United States and our Coalition allies 

are moving forward with the establishment of a democratic, sovereign government 

in Iraq. So far, Iran has been unable to alter the course of events in this transition. 

But they are not retreating easily. 

Under normal circumstances, these aggressive actions by Iran would be disturbing, but in light of Iran’s accelerated development of its nuclear capability, in 

addition to the WMD it already possesses, these developments should be viewed by 

the entire international community with extreme alarm. 

In May, I led the Floor debate on House Concurrent Resolution 398, a resolution 

I was also proud to co-sponsor, condemning Iran’s continued violations of its obligations and commitments regarding its nuclear program; expressing Congress’ grave 

concern over Iran’s efforts to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons, which 

threaten not only that region, but possibly the world; and calling for a series of 

steps to be undertaken by various parties to address this threat. 

After getting caught with its hand in the cookie jar, the Iranian regime was forced 

to admit in the fall of 2002 that it had nuclear facilities that it had failed to declare 

to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). From that time onward, Iran 

has engaged in a systematic campaign of deception and manipulation to hide its 

true intentions and to keep its large-scale nuclear efforts a secret. 

With 7 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and the second largest natural 

gas reserves on the planet Iran has absolutely no need for civilian nuclear power. 

So the only reason to pursue civilian nuclear power is to use it as a shield for an 

illicit nuclear weapons program, and as the IAEA discovered for the last 18 years, 

the Iranian regime has been pursuing just that. 

It has undertaken a number of efforts for the manufacture and testing of centrifuge components, most of which, according to recent IAEA reporting, are owned 

by military industrial organizations. It has an enrichment facility designed for the 

simultaneous operation of large numbers of centrifuges, and a large, partially-underground facility at Natanz, intended to house up to 50,000 centrifuges. Concurrently, Iran is pursuing another approach to uranium enrichment which uses lasers, 

a complex technology rarely used by even the most advanced countries because it 

is not cost efficient. Iran has also expressed interest in the purchase of up to six 

additional nuclear power plants and is pursuing a heavy water research reactor at 

Arak, a type of reactor that would be well-suited for plutonium production. This represents yet another path to nuclear weapons, which endangers not only the region, 

but the world. 

The Iranian Government needs to think very, very strongly about what it is doing. 

On June 18, IAEA censured Iran, warning that it had not fully cooperated with investigation efforts into the extent of its nuclear program. The United Nations Security Council should also take up the matter and impose stringent sanctions against 

Tehran. The civilized world, must not, cannot, allow a terrorist state like Iran to 

obtain a nuclear weapons capability, and we need to do whatever is necessary to 

stop them. We must send a clear message to Iran, and to all other potential 

proliferators, that we will not tolerate this behavior, and we should not sit idly by 

as Iran threatens our Nation, our interests, and global security. 

Terrorist regimes cannot be appeased, they must be confronted. Congress and the 

Administration must work together in a spirit of bipartisan to get the IAEA investigation, inspections and disclosure regime must resume and moved our allies to do 

more to bring Iran into compliance. It should be the firm policy of the United States, 

and the world, to seek a genuine democratic government in Iran that will restore 

freedom to the Iranian people, abandon terrorism, and live in peace and security 

with the international community. 

Once again Madame Chairman, I appreciate your convening this hearing, and I 

look forward to hearing the thoughts and suggestions of our distinguished witnesses. 

69

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD BY THE HONORABLE THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

April 14, 2004

IRAN’S COVERT ACTIONS IN IRAQ

by Constantine C. Menges

On April 4 a pro-Iranian, radical Iraqi cleric called on his followers to ‘‘terrorize 

your enemy’’—meaning the U.S.—and lobbied for all Iraqis to cooperate to bring 

about a constitutional government. This led tens of thousands of the cleric’s armed 

and unarmed followers to attack U.S. and Coalition forces in four cities. This is a 

preview of the violence and turmoil that Iranian covert action could inflict in the 

coming months, a threat that has not yet been fully understood by the Bush Administration and which could be called today’s 9–11. 

Following the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, the Iranian clerical 

dictatorship has mounted a covert effort to establish an allied Shi’a Islamist extremist regime in Iraq (60 percent of Iraq is Shi’a). Iran has been preparing to do this 

for many years and has recruited political, military, and covert agent assets among 

the hundreds of thousands of Shi’a Iraqis who fled Iraq and have lived in Iran for 

years. 

The dictatorship in Iran is acting to bring about a ‘‘second Iran’’ in Iraq in five 

ways:

(1) Iran is using those Iraqi Shi’ite clerics who agree that the clergy should rule 

to build a power base from the mosques and their associated social services.

(2) Iran established the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq as a 

political movement that could win elections or take power, town by town, 

with the help of covert Iranian funds and propaganda. This organization 

also has an Iranian-trained-and-armed paramilitary group of about 30,000. 

Both the political and the armed wings of this organization began moving 

from Iran into Iraq in March 2003.

(3) Iran is working covertly with Iraqi extremist Muqtada al-Sadr to use political and coercive means, including murder, to intimidate and take over Shi 

’ite leadership in Iraq. The murders of several prominent Shi’ite clerical 

leaders who favored democracy and cooperation with the Coalition repeats 

Iran’s covert actions in post-Taliban Afghanistan, where a number of moderate Muslim clerics also were killed. It was Muqtada al Sadr who issued 

the call to violence on April 4. The next day the Coalition announced that 

an Iraqi judge had issued an arrest warrant for him for the murder of the 

respected moderate cleric, Ayatollah Al Kohei, in April 2003.

(4) Hezbollah, the Iran-supported and often directed terrorist organization, has 

moved hundreds of its cadres into Iraq. They, along with Hamas, have 

opened offices in Iraq and are now recruiting Iraqis to be foot soldiers and 

suicide killers in massive terrorist attacks on U.S. and Coalition forces. Iran 

most likely will give the order for these attacks after the planned July 1, 

2004 turnover of civil authority.

(5) Iran has spent heavily seeking to dominate radio and television broadcasting in Iraq. A survey by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty found that 

Iran is the source of 33 of 59 AM broadcasts and of 41 of 63 AM/FM/TV 

broadcasts heard in Iraq. In comparison, the U.S.-supported Iraq Media 

Network has a total of one television station, two radio stations, and one 

newspaper.

The Bush Administration must immediately act to counter Iran’s covert assets 

and action plans or risk major setbacks to its goals for Iraq. Indeed, if Iran succeeded in bringing about an anti-U.S., pro-Iranian Shi’a extremist regime in Iraq, 

the results would be a dramatic increase in the risks to the U.S. and its allies from 

terrorism and weapons of mass destruction as well as the defeat of the announced 

Bush ‘‘forward strategy for freedom’’ in the entire Middle East. 

A first step is to recognize, analyze, and understand the purposes of Iran and its 

Iraqi allies and what they have done to date. Next, there is an urgent need to work 

with moderate Shi’a leaders to build pro-democratic political parties and a broad 

pro-democratic political coalition that can withstand and overcome the pressures, coercion, and terrorism that the pro-Iranian Shi’a groups will use. This means revising the self-defeating and much too-limited efforts to aid the genuinely democratic 

Shi’a and other political parties and groups. There also needs to be an enlargement 

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of the pro-democracy Iraqi media presence and, as a corollary, a restriction of the 

pro-extremist, Iranian-funded media. 

An inescapable element of the early stages of post-dictatorship transition is that 

anti-democratic groups and media will have sources of support far greater than 

those available to moderates. 

There also is a need to move rapidly to arrest all the extremist leaders advocating 

violence and to disarm their thousands of armed followers. It is quite possible that 

many of these armed extremists would need to be detained for some time to assure 

that they will not be able to join terrorist operations against the U.S. 

The best defense against the Iranian destabilization of Iraq is to help the people 

of Iran use political means to liberate themselves from their dictatorship. Polls and 

partially open elections reveal that more than 80 percent of Iranians completely reject the extremist Shi’ite clerical regime. 

Ironically, while the United States may have difficulty defending against Iranian 

covert political action, it does have the symbolic credibility of its democratic institutions and the knowledge and experience needed to provide discreet assistance to 

help the people of Iran free themselves.

Dr. Constantine Menges, a scholar, author, and university professor, was a Hudson 

Institute senior fellow. He passed away on July 11, 2004.

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