[Cite as State v. Wilburn, 2021-Ohio-578.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 109507 

 v. : 

 

RONALD WILBURN, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 4, 2021 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-19-644827-A and CR-19-644828-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Amanda Hall, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for appellant. 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.: 

Defendant-appellant Ronald Wilburn appeals his sentence, contending 

that the law under which he was sentenced — the Reagan Tokes Law — is 

unconstitutional. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm. 
I. Background and Procedural History 

Wilburn was indicted in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-644827 on one 

count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), and one count of theft in 

violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). He was indicted in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-19-

644828 on two counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1); two 

counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2); one count of domestic 

violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A); and one count of endangering children in 

violation of R.C. 2919.22(A). 

Wilburn entered into a plea agreement with the state and pleaded guilty 

in CR-19-644827 to burglary, a second-degree felony, and to an amended count of 

aggravated assault, a fourth-degree felony, in CR-19-644828. The remaining counts 

in both cases were nolled. 

The trial court sentenced Wilburn in CR-19-644827 to a minimum term 

of two years in prison and a maximum term of three years, to be served concurrent 

with 12 months’ incarceration in CR-19-644828. The trial court overruled defense 

counsel’s objection that the Reagan Tokes Law, under which Wilburn was sentenced 

in CR-19-644827, was unconstitutional.1 This appeal followed. 

 1 The Reagan Tokes Law (S.B. 201) applies to qualifying first- and second-degree 

felonies. Thus, Wilburn’s misdemeanor offense in CR-19-644828 was not a qualifying 

offense under the law. 
II. Law and Analysis 

In his single assignment of error, Wilburn contends that the indefinite 

sentencing scheme established by the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional because 

it violates constitutional guarantees of separation of powers and due process.2 Thus, 

he asserts that his sentence in CR-19-644827 should be vacated, and the matter 

remanded for a new sentencing hearing under the pre-S.B. 201 statutes. 

The Reagan Tokes Law was enacted in 2018 and became effective on 

March 22, 2019. See R.C. 2901.011. Under the law, qualifying first- and seconddegree felonies committed on or after March 22, 2019, are subject to the imposition 

of indefinite sentences. The law specifies that these terms will consist of a minimum 

term selected by the sentencing judge from a range of terms set forth in R.C. 

2929.14(A) and a maximum term determined by formulas set forth in R.C. 

2929.144. 

The law establishes a presumptive release date at the end of the 

minimum term. R.C. 2967.271(B). The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction (“ODRC”) may rebut that presumption, however, and keep the offender 

in prison for an additional period not to exceed the maximum term imposed by the 

trial judge. R.C. 2967.271(C). In order to rebut the presumption, the ODRC must 

conduct a hearing and determine whether one or more of the following factors apply: 

(1) (a) During the offender’s incarceration, the offender committed 

institutional rule infractions that involved compromising the 

 2 Wilburn does not specify whether his challenges are based on the Ohio 

Constitution, the United States Constitution, or both. 
security of a state correctional institution, compromising the safety 

of the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or 

physical harm or the threat of physical harm to the staff of a state 

correctional institution or its inmates, or committed a violation of 

law that was not prosecuted, and the infractions or violations 

demonstrate that the offender has not been rehabilitated, [and] 

(b) The offender’s behavior while incarcerated, including, but not 

limited to the infractions and violations specified in division 

(C)(1)(a) of this section demonstrate that the offender continues to 

pose a threat to society. 

(2)Regardless of the security level in which the offender is classified at 

the time of the hearing, the offender has been placed by the 

department in extended restrictive housing at any time within the 

year preceding the date of the hearing. 

(3)At the time of the hearing, the offender is classified by the 

department as a security level three, four, or five, or at a higher 

security level. 

R.C. 2967.271(C)(1), (2), and (3). 

A party seeking constitutional review of a statute may either present a 

facial challenge to the statute as a whole or challenge the statute as applied to a 

specific set of facts. Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 

N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37. Wilburn has raised a facial challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law. 

To successfully present such a challenge, he must demonstrate that the law is 

unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 

2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 41, citing State v. Ferguson, 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 

2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 12. 

When addressing constitutional challenges we remain mindful that all 

statutes have a strong presumption of constitutionality. Arbino v. Johnson & 

Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 25. Thus, “if at 
all possible, statutes must be construed in conformity with the Ohio and the United 

States Constitutions.” State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269, 581 N.E.2d 552 

(1991). 

A. Ripeness for Review 

Wilburn contends that the portions of the Reagan Tokes Law that 

allow the ODRC to administratively extend his prison term beyond his presumptive 

minimum prison term are unconstitutional. The state argues that Wilburn has not 

yet served his minimum sentence, however, and the ODRC has not yet denied him 

release at the expiration of his minimum term of incarceration. Thus, the state 

asserts that Wilburn has not yet been subject to the possible application of the 

provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law that he challenges and, therefore, his 

constitutional challenges are not ripe for review. 

The Second, Third, and Twelfth District Courts of Appeals have 

implicitly decided that a defendant’s constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes 

Law is ripe for review by upholding the statute as constitutional without addressing 

the ripeness issue. See, e.g., State v. Leet, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28670, 2020-

Ohio-4592; State v. Hacker, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-20-01, 2020-Ohio-5048; State v. 

Guyton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-203, 2020-Ohio-3837. 

Other districts have expressly held that a defendant’s constitutional 

challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law is not ripe for review. See, e.g., State v. Ramey, 

4th Dist. Washington Nos. 20CA1 and 20CA2, 2021-Ohio-177; State v. Halfhill, 4th 

Dist. Meigs No. 20CA7, 2021-Ohio-177; State v. Cochran, 5th Dist. Licking No. 
2019CA00122, 2020-Ohio-5329; State v. Wolfe, 5th Dist. Licking No. 

2020CA00021; State v. Maddox, 6th Dist. Lucas No. CL-19-1253, 2020-Ohio-4702; 

State v. Velliquette, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1232, 2020-Ohio-4855; State v. 

Montgomery, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1202, 2020-Ohio-5552.3 These courts 

concluded that the defendants’ constitutional challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law 

were not ripe for review because the appellants had not served their minimum term 

of imprisonment and thus had not yet been subject to the application of the law. 

We find, however, that the well-reasoned dissents in Cochran and 

Wolfe offer the better analysis regarding why a defendant’s challenge to the 

constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law is indeed ripe for review, even if that 

defendant has not yet been subject to the provisions of the law that could extend the 

defendant’s presumptive minimum prison term. 

“Ripeness ‘is peculiarly a question of timing.’” State ex rel. Elyria 

Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 88, 89, 694 N.E.2d 459 (1998), quoting 

Regional Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 

(1974). Three factors guide the ripeness inquiry: ‘“(1) the likelihood that the harm 

alleged by the plaintiffs will ever come to pass; (2) whether the factual record is 

sufficiently developed to produce a fair adjudication of the merits of the parties’ 

 3 On December 28, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that a conflict exists 

between Maddox and Leet, supra; State v. Ferguson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28644, 

2020-Ohio-4153, and State v. Guyton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-203, 2020-Ohio3837, and accepted the ripeness issue for review. 12/28/20, Case Announcements #2, 

2020-Ohio-6913. 
respective claims; and (3) the hardship to the parties if judicial relief is denied at this 

stage in the proceedings.”’ Cochran at ¶ 28 (Gwin, J., dissenting); Wolfe at ¶ 44 

(Gwin, J., dissenting), both quoting Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th 

Cir.2012). 

Even when the direct application of a statute is open to a charge of 

remoteness because of a lengthy, built-in time delay before the statute takes effect, 

such as in this case, ‘“ripeness may be found as long as the statute’s operation is 

inevitable (or nearly so).”’ Cochran, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2019CA00122, 2020-

Ohio-5329 at ¶ 28 (Gwin, J., dissenting); Wolfe, 5th Dist. Licking No. 

2020CA00021, 2020-Ohio-5501 at ¶ 44 (Gwin, J., dissenting), both quoting Riva v. 

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003, 1010 (1st Cir.1995). See also 

Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 856-857 (2d Cir.1980) (if the injury is “clearly 

impending,” the plaintiffs need not await consummation of the injury to bring their 

suit). As noted in Cochran and Wolfe, it is inevitable that every defendant in the 

state of Ohio who is convicted of a first- or second-degree felony for offenses 

occurring after March 22, 2019, will be sentenced under the Reagan Tokes Law. 

Cochran at ¶ 30 (Gwin, J., dissenting); Wolfe at ¶ 46 (Gwin, J., dissenting). Further, 

[i]t is a virtual certainty that a number of those individuals, perhaps a 

significantly large number, will have the [O]DRC extend his or her 

incarceration beyond the presumed release date. This is not an abstract 

or hypothetical case; rather, it is a virtual certainty to occur. Under 

Reagan Tokes, the question is not if a defendant will be denied his or 

her presumptive release date; but rather when a defendant’s sentence 

will be extended. 

(Emphasis sic.) Cochran at id.; Wolfe at id. 
The dissenting judge in Cochran and Wolfe found that the record 

before the court in those cases was sufficiently developed to allow the court to 

produce a fair adjudication of the parties’ respective claims regarding the 

constitutionality of the statute and, further, that the hardship to the parties if judicial 

relief were denied was “real and immense.” Cochran at ¶ 33 (Gwin, J., dissenting); 

Wolfe at ¶ 49 (Gwin, J., dissenting). The judge reasoned: 

At the present time, the indigent appellant, who wishes to raise a 

constitutional challenge to the law in his or her direct appeal as of right, 

has the assistance of appointed counsel. If, for example, the appellant 

must wait for two years for the [O]DRC to extend his sentence, both the 

inmate and the courts will face a myriad of legal hurdles. First, how 

will the inmate inform the court of his or her desire to appeal the 

constitutionality of the law? Next, is the inmate entitled to appointed 

counsel to pursue such an appeal? If the inmate is not, then an 

incarcerated inmate with limited legal resources and acumen will have 

to cobble together a highly involved constitutional argument without 

the assistance of counsel and with extremely limited access to legal 

resources. It will also become evident that the DRC decision extending 

the inmate’s sentence is not part of the trial court record. In order to 

establish that the inmate’s sentence was in fact extended, will the trial 

court be required to order the [O]DRC to file its decision with the clerk 

of courts for inclusion in the trial and appellate court records? Further, 

if the law is declared unconstitutional years from now, courts will be 

inundated with writs of habeas corpus, motions and other requests for 

release or resentencing from the hundreds of inmates who were 

sentenced under the law and not permitted to appeal the 

constitutionality of the law in the inmate’s direct appeal. Finally, the 

inmate could potentially have been incarcerated perhaps years beyond 

his release date for the time it takes to decide the issue in the event the 

law is found to be unconstitutional. 

In addition, if the law is declared constitutional or unconstitutional, 

that holding will apply not just to the single inmate whose appeal is 

under consideration, but also to all inmates that have been sentenced 

under the new law. 
(Emphasis sic.) Wolfe at ¶ 49-50 (Gwin, J., dissenting); see also Cochran at ¶ 33 

(Gwin, J., dissenting). 

Finding that the defendant had clearly demonstrated hardship if the 

constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law was not addressed by the court on the 

defendant’s direct appeal, the dissent concluded that the question of the 

constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law was ripe for the court’s review. Cochran

at ¶ 34 (Gwin, J., dissenting); Wolfe at ¶ 51 (Gwin, J., dissenting). 

 We reach the same conclusion here. The record is sufficiently 

developed to allow us to fairly adjudicate the parties’ arguments regarding the 

constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. Further, Wilburn was sentenced under 

the law, and operation of the law is inevitable at the end of his minimum term of 

imprisonment. Wilburn and other defendants sentenced under the law will also 

experience “real and immense” hardship if judicial relief is denied at this stage in 

the proceedings. Accordingly, we find that Wilburn’s constitutional challenges are 

ripe for review. 

B. Separation of Powers 

“The separation-of-powers doctrine implicitly arises from our 

tripartite democratic form of government and recognizes that the executive, 

legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers 

and duties that are separate and apart from the others.” State v. Thompson, 92 Ohio 

St.3d 584, 586, 752 N.E.2d 276 (2001). 
Wilburn asserts that the indefinite sentencing portion of the Reagan 

Tokes Law violates the separation-of-powers doctrine because it impermissibly 

allows an administrative department of the executive branch to invade the province 

of the judiciary. He contends the law usurps judicial authority because under the 

law, the ODRC has the authority to extend his prison term without judicial oversight 

or involvement if he commits certain rule infractions or violations of the law. His 

argument is based upon the holdings in State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d 

132, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000), and State v. Oneal, Hamilton C.P. No. B-1903562, 2019 

WL 7670061 (Nov. 20, 2019). 

In Bray, the Ohio Supreme Court reviewed a constitutional challenge 

to former R.C. 2967.11, which allowed an executive branch parole board to impose a 

“bad time” extension on a prisoner’s original prison term for offenses that would 

constitute a crime under Ohio or federal law, regardless of whether the prisoner was 

actually prosecuted for the offense. 

The court found that the statute authorized the executive branch to 

prosecute an inmate, determine whether a crime had been committed, and impose 

punishment for the crime; in doing so, the executive branch acted as judge, 

prosecutor, and jury, which went beyond the role of the executive branch. Bray at 

135. The court stated: “In our constitutional scheme, the judicial power resides in 

the judicial branch. * * * The determination of guilt in a criminal matter and the 

sentencing of a defendant convicted of a crime are solely the province of the 
judiciary.” Id. at 136. Accordingly, the court found former R.C. 2967.11 

unconstitutional because it violated the separation-of-powers doctrine. Id. 

Relying upon the reasoning in Bray, the trial court in Oneal concluded 

the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional because it likewise cedes judicial powers 

to the executive branch. The trial court concluded that the statute impermissibly 

allows the ODRC to “conduct a hearing to determine the guilt of an alleged criminal 

offense,” and thereby “deprive the judiciary of its exclusive authority to prosecute 

criminal offenses,” in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. 

We find Wilburn’s reliance on Bray and Oneal to be misplaced 

because there is a significant difference between the imposition of bad time as 

allowed by former R.C. 2967.11 and the Reagan Tokes Law. As the Second District 

Court of Appeals stated: 

R.C. 2967.11 authorized the parole board to sentence a defendant to an 

additional prison term beyond that which had been imposed by the trial 

court. In Bray, the defendant had served the entirety of the definite 

sentence imposed by the trial court; the parole board then tacked an 

additional prison term onto the defendant’s sentence. In contrast, 

under Reagan Tokes, the executive branch cannot keep a defendant in 

prison beyond the maximum sentence imposed by the trial court. In 

short, Reagan Tokes does not allow the ODRC to lengthen a defendant’s 

sentence beyond the maximum sentence imposed by the trial court. 

We thus conclude that Bray and Oneal do not compel the conclusion 

that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. 

State v. Barnes, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28613, 2020-Ohio-4150, ¶ 36. 

Oneal did not address Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 2000-Ohio171, 733 N.E.2d 1103, decided a few months after Bray, in which the Ohio Supreme 

Court considered the constitutionality of R.C. 2967.28, Ohio’s postrelease control 
statute. The statute requires a court to impose postrelease control, but gives the 

Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) discretion in managing postrelease control and 

determining sanctions for violation of its terms. The court found that the 

postrelease control statute was “clearly distinguishable” from the bad time statute 

at issue in Bray because, unlike additional prison time under the bad time statute, 

postrelease control terms are made part of the original judicially imposed sentence. 

Woods at 512. The court also found that the delegation of powers to the executive 

branch (the APA) regarding postrelease control was no different in terms of 

separation of powers than those granted under Ohio’s system of parole, where the 

APA had “absolute discretion” over that portion of an offender’s sentence. Id. 

Finally, the court found that nothing in the Parole Board’s discretionary ability to 

impose postrelease control sanctions impeded the judiciary’s ability to impose a 

sentence. Id. Thus, the court found no violation of the separation-of-powers 

doctrine. Id. 

In later decisions, the Ohio Supreme Court has made clear that “when 

the power to sanction is delegated to the executive branch, a separation-of-powers 

problem is avoided if the sanction is originally imposed by a court and included in 

its sentence.” State v. Ferguson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28644, 2020-Ohio-4153, 

¶ 23, citing Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 

301, ¶ 18-20, citing State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 

864, ¶ 19, citing Woods at 512-513. This is precisely the scheme under the Reagan 

Tokes Law: 
A court imposes both the minimum and maximum prison terms, 

including both in its sentence. The [O]DRC then determines whether 

the offender merits more than the minimum and up to the maximum 

imposed. In terms of the separation of powers, the delegation of power 

to the [O]DRC is like the system of post-release control: “Those terms 

are part of the actual sentence, unlike bad time, where a crime 

committed while incarcerated resulted in an additional sentence not 

imposed by the court. In other words, the court imposes the full 

sentence and the [ODRC] determines whether violations merit its 

imposition.” 

Ferguson at ¶ 23, quoting Woods at 511. 

Accordingly, we hold that the Reagan Tokes Law does not violate the 

separation-of-powers doctrine. 

C. Due Process 

Wilburn next asserts, relying on Oneal, that the Reagan Tokes Law 

violates his procedural due process rights. He contends that he has a protected 

liberty interest in release from prison upon the expiration of his minimum term of 

incarceration, and that “without some framework in place to ensure that R.C. 

2967.271 hearings are conducted in a fair and consistent way, offenders will be 

deprived of due process.” 

 “When a state creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause 

requires fair procedures for its vindication — and courts will review the application 

of those constitutionally required procedures.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 

220, 131 S.Ct. 859, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011). Assuming, without deciding, that 

Wilburn has a cognizable liberty interest in his presumptive minimum term release 

date, we consider what due process procedures are required if the state is to deprive 

him of that interest. 
“Requiring a defendant to remain in prison beyond the presumptive 

minimum term is akin to the decision to grant or deny parole.” Leet, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 28670, 2020-Ohio-4592 at ¶ 17. In the context of parole 

proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has held that the required due 

process procedures are minimal. Specifically, the court has found that a prisoner 

subject to parole receives adequate due process when he is allowed an opportunity 

to be heard and is provided a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. 

Swarthout at id., citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 

442 U.S. 1, 16, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). “The Constitution,” the court 

held, “does not require more.” Id. 

The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “the fundamental requisite of 

due process of law is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.” Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 2000-Ohio-171, 733 N.E.2d 1103, 

at 513, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 

(1970). The Reagan Tokes Law provides such due process. Pursuant to R.C. 

2967.271(E): 

The [ODRC] shall provide notices of hearings to be conducted under 

division (C) or (D) of this section in the same manner, and to the same 

persons, as specified in section 2967.12 and Chapter 2930 of the 

Revised Code with respect to hearings to be conducted regarding the 

possible release on parole of an inmate. 

The Oneal court correctly found that the purpose of due process 

protections is to minimize erroneous decision making. Oneal, Hamilton C.P. No. B1903562, 2019 WL 7670061, at *5, citing Greenholtz at 8. “A hearing at which an 
inmate can appear and present statements on his behalf” — such as that provided 

by the Reagan Tokes Law — “adequately safeguards against serious risks of error 

and thus satisfies due process.” Greenholtz at 15. 

Contrary to Oneal, however, there is no due process requirement that 

the statutory scheme must give the decisionmaker a “hierarchy of misconduct” or a 

“guideline” as to “how each consideration shall be weighed” in determining whether 

an inmate’s term can be extended. The Ohio Supreme Court has observed with 

respect to decisions about an inmate’s release on parole that “for as long as parole 

has existed in Ohio, the executive branch (the APA and its predecessors) has had 

absolute discretion over that portion of an offender’s sentence.” Woods at 512. We 

find no reason to distinguish between the APA’s exercise of its discretion in 

determining whether an inmate should be released on parole and the ODRC’s 

exercise of discretion in determining whether an inmate’s minimum term of 

incarceration should be extended. 

It is also not necessary, as asserted in Oneal, that a judge must be 

involved in the release decision. As observed by the Ohio Supreme Court with 

respect to parole, “the granting and revocation of parole are matters traditionally 

handled by administrative officers.” Woods, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 514, 2000-Ohio171, 733 N.E.2d 1003. And even in the context of a parole revocation hearing, which 

requires greater due process protections, the United States Supreme Court has 

found that the decisionmaker “need not be judicial officers or lawyers.” Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 499, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The same 

reasoning applies here. 

The Oneal court also erred in finding that the ODRC will have 

“unfettered discretion” to assess the issues before it in deciding whether the 

presumption of release upon the minimum term of incarceration has been rebutted. 

R.C. 2967.271(C)(1), (2) and (3) set forth very specific factors for the ODRC to 

consider in determining whether an inmate may be imprisoned beyond his 

minimum release date, thereby limiting its discretion. 

Furthermore, inmates are given adequate notice of the conduct that 

will lead to rule infractions or restrictive housing assignments, factors that trigger 

the ODRC to extend an inmate’s minimum term of incarceration. Ohio Adm. Code 

5120-9-06 sets forth the inmate rules of conduct. Ohio Adm. Code 5120-9-08 

provides detailed disciplinary procedures for inmate rule violations, with a hearing 

before the Rules Infraction Board and notice to the inmate of the hearing and an 

opportunity to appeal the decision of the board. Ohio Adm. Code 5120-9-10 sets 

forth the procedures for when and under what circumstances an inmate may be 

placed in and/or transferred to a restrictive housing assignment. 

Because the procedures employed under the Reagan Tokes Law 

provide at a minimum for notice of a hearing at which an inmate has an opportunity 

to be heard, we hold that the law does not violate Wilburn’s right to procedural due 

process. The assignment of error is therefore overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to 

the trial court for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR