J-S03019-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

DAZON WYKIE TURNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 60 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 9, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-40-CR-0000405-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MAY 14, 2024

Appellant Dazon Wykie Turner appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury convicted him of one count of voluntary manslaughter 

and two counts of aggravated assault.1 Appellant raises challenges to the 

sufficiency of the evidence, the weight of the evidence, and the discretionary 

aspects of sentence. We affirm Appellant’s convictions, vacate the restitution 

component of the sentence, and remand for resentencing. 

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

On October 4, 2020, Wilkes-Barre City police responded to a 

domestic call at 46 Darling Street, in Wilkes-Barre City. Officer 

Oswalt and Officer Morris of the Wilkes-Barre City Police 

Department arrived at that residence and made contact with 

Jamielynn Giraldo [(Jamielynn)] and . . . Appellant. Neither party 

had any visible injuries and Jamielynn [] told the officers that she 

was waiting for her father who was on his way to pick her up from 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2503(a)(1) and 2702(a)(1), respectively. 
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that residence. The parties did not ask police for additional help 

so the officers left.

A short time later, in the early morning hours of October 5, 2020, 

police returned to the area in response to a shots fired call. 

Arriving at the location police observed two females, later 

identified as Jamielynn [] and Liliana Giraldo [(Liliana)] lying on 

the ground wounded by gunfire. A male, identified as Carlos 

Taffanelly [(Taffanelly)], was also laying on the ground 

unresponsive with a gunshot wound to his head.

At trial evidence was presented which indicated that a threatening 

verbal altercation developed between [] Appellant and Jamielynn’s 

parents, [] Taffanelly and Liliana [], outside [] Appellant’s 

residence on Darling Street. [] Taffanelly threatened [] Appellant

and Liliana [] was armed with a tool. This altercation ended when 

Jamielynn [], Liliana [] and [] Taffanelly left Darling Street in the 

car driven by [] Taffanelly. [] Appellant got in his vehicle also and 

at one point both vehicles were on River Street driving in different 

directions. Then [] Appellant made a U-Turn and began to follow 

the victims’ car. [] Appellant parked on North Street at its 

intersection with River Street while Mr. [Taffanelly’s] car was 

parked at a traffic light. [] Appellant exited his vehicle and began 

shouting a challenge to Mr. [Taffanelly] who then accelerated his 

vehicle toward [] Appellant who was standing on the sidewalk. His 

vehicle hit the curb and he exited the vehicle armed with a pipe 

and ran toward [] Appellant. [] Appellant ran to his vehicle and 

retrieved a firearm. He then shot Mr. [Taffanelly]. Jamielynn and 

Liliana [] also ran toward [] Appellant and they too were shot by 

him. [] Appellant then fled the scene in his vehicle. [] Taffanelly 

was pronounced dead. Jamielynn and Liliana [] were treated for 

their injuries and each received significant medical treatment.

[] Appellant was arrested and charged with murder of the first 

degree [and] murder of the third degree for killing [] Taffanelly 

and two (2) counts of attempted homicide and two (2) counts of 

aggravated assault for shooting and injuring Liliana [] and 

Jamielynn [].

The case proceeded to trial by jury and after several days of 

testimony the jury acquitted [] Appellant of murder in the first and 

third degree and both counts of attempted homicide. He was 

convicted of voluntary manslaughter for the killing of [] Taffanelly 

and two counts of aggravated assault for shooting Liliana and 

Jamielynn []. 
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Trial Ct. Op., 5/19/23, at 1-3 (citations omitted).

On November 9, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to consecutive 

terms of six and one-half to thirteen years’ incarceration for voluntary 

manslaughter, six and one-half to thirteen years’ incarceration for aggravated 

assault with respect to Liliana, and seven to fourteen years’ incarceration for 

aggravated assault with respect to Jamielynn. The trial court’s aggregate 

sentence is twenty to forty years’ incarceration. The trial court also ordered 

Appellant to pay $9,000 in restitution to Jamielynn Giraldo for the costs of 

Taffanelly’s funeral.2 

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of 

sentence and challenging the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied 

that motion on December 20, 2022. 

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2 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court also stated that it was ordering 

Appellant “to pay restitution” in the amount of $1,976 to the Pennsylvania 

State Police for various forensic testing and $2,600 to the Luzerne County 

Coroner’s Office. See N.T. Sentencing, 11/9/22, at 51-52. However, in its 

sentencing order, the trial court imposed these amounts as court costs. See

Sentencing Order, 405-2021, 11/9/22. The only restitution in the written 

sentencing order is the $9,000 to be paid to Taffanelly’s family for funeral 

costs. See id. 

In general, where there is a discrepancy between the written sentencing order 

and the statements at the sentencing hearing, it is the text of the sentencing 

order that controls. See Commonwealth v. Kremer, 206 A.3d 543, 548 

(Pa. Super. 2019). Therefore, the only restitution imposed as part of 

Appellant’s sentence is the $9,000 for funeral costs. See id.; see also

Sentencing Order, 405-2021, 11/9/22.
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Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises six issues on appeal:

1. Was the evidence insufficient evidence to prove voluntary 

manslaughter, aggravated assault — Liliana Giraldo, and 

aggravated assault — Jamielynn Giraldo, because the 

Commonwealth did not disprove justification or self-defense?

2. Was the evidence insufficient evidence to prove aggravated 

assault — Jamielynn Giraldo, regarding the required mental 

state of [Appellant] and proof of serious bodily injury?

3. Did the [trial] court err[] by the admission of photographs or 

images that were cumulative, inflammatory in nature, and 

unduly prejudicial to [Appellant]?

4. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in denying [Appellant’s] 

post-sentence motion seeking a new trial because the verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence?

5. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in imposing an 

aggregate sentence of not less than twenty (20) years to not 

more than forty (40) years of incarceration?

6. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in ordering the 

restitution requested by the Commonwealth without sufficient 

supporting evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (some formatting altered).3 

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3 We note that the Appellant did not include any argument in his brief in 

support of the third claim he raised in his statement of issues, i.e., the trial 

court erred in admitting photographs or images that were cumulative, 

inflammatory in nature, and unduly prejudicial. See Appellant’s Brief at 6. 

Accordingly, Appellant has waived this issue. See Commonwealth v. 

Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “an issue identified 

on appeal but not developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned and, 

therefore, waived” (citation omitted and formatting altered)). 
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Sufficiency of the Evidence: Self-Defense

In his first issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his convictions of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault with 

respect to Lillianna because he had presented a defense of justification. 

Appellant’s Brief at 28-34. Specifically, Appellant contends it was undisputed

that Taffanelly and Liliana confronted him while yelling and brandishing 

weapons, i.e., metal pipes or bars. Id. at 30-31. Appellant further asserts 

that after the original confrontation ended without violence, Taffanelly drove 

his vehicle directly towards Appellant, then missed and struck the curb. Id.

at 31. Appellant claims that Taffanelly and Liliana then exited their vehicles 

and pursued Appellant. Id. Appellant argues that he reasonably believed that 

he was in danger, and therefore he acted in self-defense when he shot 

Taffanelly and Liliana. Id. at 31-32. Appellant also asserts that he satisfied 

the duty to retreat, but Taffanelly and Liliana pursued him. Id. at 34. 

Appellant further contends that Lawrence Kansky and Liliana presented 

inconsistent testimony about the number of shots that Appellant fired. Id. at 

32. Further, Appellant suggests that bullets he fired went through Taffanelly’s 

body and struck Liliana who was behind him. Id. at 32-33.

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard 

of review is as follows: 

Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most 
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favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient 

to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the 

province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded 

to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85, 89 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted and formatting altered). 

Challenges to reliability of evidence go to the weight of the evidence, 

not sufficiency. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barkman, 295 A.3d 721, 733 

(Pa. Super. 2023) (noting that unlike weight claim, “a sufficiency claim must 

accept the credibility and reliability of all evidence that supports the verdict” 

(citation omitted)). Indeed, the “[e]xistence of inconsistencies in the 

testimony of a witness does not alone render evidence insufficient to support 

a verdict.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 

478 (Pa. Super. 2018) (reiterating that “[v]ariances in testimony . . . go to 

the credibility of the witnesses and not the sufficiency of the evidence” 

(citation omitted)). 

Under the Crimes Code, self-defense is a defense of justification, which 

is a complete defense to criminal liability. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 502, 505. We 

have explained that
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[t]he use of force against a person is justified when the actor 

believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose 

of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other 

person. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). When a defendant raises the 

issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to 

disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). 

To disprove a defendant’s claim of self-defense, the Commonwealth 

must establish at least one of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger 

of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or 

continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat 

and the retreat was possible with complete safety. It remains the 

province of the [fact-finder] to determine whether the accused’s 

belief was reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and 

whether he had no duty to retreat.

Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“To claim self-defense, the defendant must be free from fault in 

provoking or escalating the altercation that led to the offense, before the 

defendant can be excused from using deadly force.” Commonwealth v. 

Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted and emphasis 

in original). “The complainant can serve as a witness to the incident to refute 

a self-defense claim. Although the Commonwealth is required to disprove a 

claim of self-defense arising from any source beyond a reasonable doubt, a 

fact-finder is not required to believe the testimony of the defendant who raises 

the claim.” Id. (citations omitted and formatting altered). 
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Here, the trial court explained:

At trial [] Appellant raised a claim of self-defense when he testified 

that he intentionally shot Carlos Taffanelly, Liliana Giraldo, 

Jamielynn Giraldo. He testified that he shot at each of them in 

turn because he believed that they were going to attack him. It 

was undisputed that Carlos Taffanelly drove his vehicle toward the 

sidewalk where [] Appellant was standing while he shouted 

challenging him to fight. He indicated that he saw Carlos 

Taffanelly and Liliana Giraldo were both holding club type weapons 

as they pursued him. He ran from Carlos Taffanelly toward his 

own vehicle where he recovered a firearm concealed inside. He 

admitted to using that firearm to shoot all three victims and 

claimed that he did so in self-defense. 

While [] Appellant adequately raised self-defense such that we 

charged the jury with the self-defense jury instructions, the jury 

was not required to credit his testimony. Evidence was presented 

at trial that [] Appellant made a U-turn to follow and once again 

engage with [] Taffanelly at the intersection of River Street and 

North Street after the initial confrontation outside [] Appellant’s 

residence. [] Appellant acknowledged that he retreated to his 

vehicle but chose to arm himself rather than retreating to safety. 

Dr. Gary Ross, a forensic pathologist, was called as an expert 

witness by the Commonwealth testified that [] Taffanelly was shot 

six times. He testified that at least two of the bullets were fired 

into his back. Moreover, he testified that some of the gunshot 

injuries and recovered bullets exhibited features consistent with 

the shots having been fired into the victim’s body while he laid on 

the ground. This evidence, when considered in the context of a 

sufficiency challenge which grants the Commonwealth every 

favorable inference as the verdict winner, persuades us that the 

jury was presented with evidence sufficient to disprove his selfdefense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8 (citations omitted and some formatting altered). 

Based on our review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the 

trial court that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions 
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for voluntary manslaughter of Taffanelly and aggravated assault of Liliana. 

See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89. As noted by the trial court, the Commonwealth 

presented evidence that it was possible for Appellant to safely retreat because 

Appellant had returned to his vehicle before Taffanelly and Liliana had gotten 

close enough to strike Appellant. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8; see also N.T. Trial, 

8/31/22, at 313, 317, 329, 336, 352, 364-65. Therefore, the evidence is 

sufficient to establish that Appellant had the ability to retreat with complete 

safety. See McClendon, 874 A.2d at 1230. 

Further, it is undisputed that after the confrontation outside Appellant’s 

apartment building, Appellant and the victims drove onto River Street, headed 

in separate directions. See N.T. Trial, 8/31/22, at 308-09, 349, 361-62, 400. 

Appellant acknowledged that when he and the victims drove away from his 

apartment building “the confrontation was over.” See id. at 400. Appellant 

then made a U-turn on River Street and drove towards the victims’ car. See 

id. at 302, 309, 350, 362, 401. Appellant then ran a red light, parked his car, 

and got out. See id. at 302, 312-13, 349-50, 362, 401, 431. Appellant then

verbally taunted the victims. See id. at 302, 312-13, 336, 350, 421. 

Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to establish that Appellant provoked the 

use of force in a second confrontation after the victims had driven away from 

his apartment building. See Smith, 97 A.3d at 788; McClendon, 874 A.2d 

at 1230. 

Lastly, to the extent Appellant argues that Liliana’s testimony was 

inconsistent with other evidence, that claim goes to the weight of the 
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evidence, not its sufficiency. See Barkman, 295 A.3d at 733; Johnson, 180 

A.3d at 478; Lyons, 833 A.2d at 258. 

For these reasons, the Commonwealth has disproven Appellant’s claim 

of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, and Appellant is not entitled to 

relief on this claim. See McClendon, 874 A.2d 1230; see also Bullock, 948 

A.2d at 824. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence: Aggravated Assault

In his second issue, Appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction of aggravated assault with respect to Jaimelynn. 

Appellant’s Brief at 34-37. Specifically, Appellant claims that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that Appellant intended to cause serious 

bodily injury to Jaimelynn nor did it prove that Jaimelynn sustained a serious 

bodily injury. Id. Appellant contends that Jaimelynn “suffered a single 

gunshot wound to her leg,” and the Commonwealth did not present any expert 

medical testimony regarding the severity of Jaimelynn’s gunshot wound. Id.

at 35-36. Appellant also asserts that Jaimelynn’s prolonged hospitalization 

was the result of treatment errors by the hospital staff which resulted in 

complications. Id. 

Appellant further argues that where a complainant does not suffer 

serious bodily injury, the Commonwealth must prove the defendant intended 

to cause serious bodily injury. Id. at 36. Appellant asserts that the evidence 

was not sufficient to establish that he intended to cause Jaimelynn serious 
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bodily injury when he testified that he did not intend to shoot anyone prior to 

the confrontation, and he did not fire any additional shots at Jaimelynn. Id. 

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause serious 

bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 

of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1). Serious bodily injury is defined as 

“[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes 

serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the 

function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. A single gunshot 

wound to the leg that resulted in the victim being hospitalized constitutes a 

serious bodily injury. See Commonwealth v. Phillips, 410 A.2d 832, 834 

(Pa. Super. 1979). 

Additionally, we note that when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency 

of the evidence regarding serious bodily injury, “[w]hether or not the 

complainant actually suffered serious bodily harm is irrelevant . . . as an 

attempt to inflict serious harm is as punishable as if the attempt succeeds.” 

Commonwealth v. Caterino, 678 A.2d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation 

omitted). 

This Court has explained that

it is certainly understood that the firing of a gun at another is likely 

to inflict death or serious injury. Thus, when someone fires a 

handgun at another, it is assumed the intent was to inflict serious 

bodily injury or death. The shooter might miss the target, or the 

bullet might strike something between the muzzle and the 

intended target or the bullet might simply graze the intended 

victim causing only superficial injury. In these circumstances, 
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even though serious injury or death was not actually inflicted, it 

can be safely presumed the intent to inflict such injury was 

present because it is a common consequence of taking that action.

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 817 A.2d 1153, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

Here, the trial court explained

[Jaimelynn] testified that she saw the Appellant aim and fire at 

her. She was shot in her left thigh above the knee. As a result of 

that injury, she received several blood transfusions, was 

intubated, and was hospitalized for approximately one week. 

Accordingly, sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to 

sustain [its] conclusion that Jamielynn Giraldo suffered serious 

bodily injury and that the Appellant at least recklessly caused that 

injury. 

Trial Ct. Op. at 12-13 (citations omitted). 

Based on our review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the 

trial court that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for 

aggravated assault of Jamielynn. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 89. Appellant 

shot Jaimelynn once in the upper leg, which required hospitalization and blood 

transfusions. See N.T. Trial, 8/31/22, at 316, 319. This gunshot wound 

constitutes a serious bodily injury. See Phillips, 410 A.2d at 834. 

Even if we accepted Appellant’s argument that a single gunshot wound 

in the leg is not a serious bodily injury, Appellant’s conviction can be sustained 

by the circumstantial evidence that Appellant intended to cause Jaimelynn 

serious bodily injury when he fired a gun at her. See Robinson, 817 A.2d at 

1160; Caterino, 678 A.2d at 391. For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled 

to relief on this claim. 
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Weight of the Evidence

In his next issue, Appellant argues convictions were against the weight 

of the evidence because the witness testimony was contradictory. Appellant’s 

Brief at 37-40. Specifically, Appellant claims that Liliana and Jaimelynn 

testified inconsistently about the number of shots Appellant fired, the order in 

which the victims were hit, and how far each victim was from Appellant. Id.

at 39. Appellant also contends that Liliana’s account of the number of times 

she was shot is not credible and inconsistent with the physical evidence 

recovered during the investigation. Id. at 39-40. Lastly, Appellant argues

that the victims’ intentional engagement of Appellant when they had a clear 

and safe opportunity to leave the area and Appellant’s claim of self-defense 

“significantly call[s] into question” the jury’s verdict. Id. at 40. Therefore, 

Appellant concludes that the verdict should be vacated as against the weight 

of the evidence.

In reviewing a weight claim, this Court has explained:

The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder 

of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is 

not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and 

must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal 

weight with all the facts is to deny justice. 

On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury 

verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a 

weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of 

discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the 
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verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court 

may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence 

as to shock one’s sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

As this Court has repeatedly stated:

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who 

is free to believe all, none, or some of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. Resolving contradictory 

testimony and questions of credibility are matters for the finder of 

fact. It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our judgment for 

that of the trier of fact.

* * *

Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see 

the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest 

consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial 

judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict 

is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable 

reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s 

conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of 

the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest 

of justice.

Furthermore, in order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to 

the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so tenuous, 

vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the 

court.

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 311 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations 

omitted and formatting altered). 

Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim 

as follows:

Here, we do not hesitate to conclude that there was more than 

ample evidence presented at trial to enable the finder of fact to 
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reach the conclusion that [] Appellant was guilty of the crimes for 

which he was convicted. We do not believe that the jury’s verdict 

in this case would shock the conscience of a reasonable person 

who, like the jury, had an opportunity to hear the evidence 

presented at trial. Having presided over this trial, it is apparent 

to us that the jury credited the Commonwealth’s witnesses over 

the argument and evidence presented by the defense. [] 

Appellant’s allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence is without merit.

Trial Ct. Op. at 14-15. 

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in denying Appellant’s weight claim. See Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 

at 723. We note that credibility determinations and the resolution of 

conflicting evidence are exclusively within the province of the fact-finder.

Instantly, the jury as factfinder decided the facts and was entitled to believe 

all, part, or none of the trial evidence, and this Court cannot substitute its 

judgment for that of the jury if it is supported by the record. See Spence, 

290 A.3d at 311; see also Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (explaining that “a factfinder is not required to believe the testimony of the defendant who raises [a 

self-defense] claim” (citation omitted and formatting altered)). On this record

we agree with the trial court that there was ample evidence presented to the 

jury for it to conclude that Appellant did not act in self-defense primarily 

because Appellant provoked the confrontation, that it was possible for 

Appellant to safely retreat, and that Appellant intended to inflict serious bodily 

injury on the victims. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8, 12-15. Therefore, the jury’s 

verdict of guilt in this case does not shock the conscience and sense of justice 

of a reasonable person; accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his 
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weight-of-the-evidence claim. See Gonzalez, 109 A.3d at 723; see also

Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 615 A.2d 350, 361 (Pa. Super. 1992). 

Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

In his next two issues, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by imposing 

consecutive sentences resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty to forty 

years’ incarceration. Appellant’s Brief at 40-42. Secondly, Appellant contends 

that there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s restitution 

order in the amount of $9,000. Id. at 42-44. 

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant failed to raise a substantial 

question regarding consecutive sentences. Commonwealth’s Brief at 21-22. 

The Commonwealth also argues that it presented testimony to support the 

restitution order, and the Commonwealth was not required to present 

corroborating documentation where the trial court finds the testimony 

credible. Id. at 25-26. 

“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle 

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such 

claims, we must determine: 

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved 

his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of 

sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a 

substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the 

sentencing code.
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Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

omitted).

“To preserve an attack on the discretionary aspects of sentence, an 

appellant must raise his issues at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. 

Issues not presented to the sentencing court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 

1251 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d 

1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “A substantial question 

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the 

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific 

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms 

which underlie the sentencing process.” Id. at 1090-91 (citation omitted). 

Lastly, “where a defendant merely asserts that his sentence is inconsistent 

with the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying 

the sentencing scheme without explaining how or why, we cannot determine 

whether he has raised a substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Goggins,

748 A.2d 721, 727 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc). 

Here, the record reflects that Appellant preserved his sentencing claims

in a post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included the 

issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement. In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant 

argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a lengthier 
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sentence for aggravated assault of Jamielynn than for voluntary 

manslaughter, imposing consecutive sentences, and the amount of restitution 

imposed was not supported by the record. Appellant’s Brief at 27. 

We conclude that Appellant’s claim about his sentence for aggravated 

assault of Jamielynn is too vague to present a substantial question because 

Appellant does not explain why that is inconsistent with the sentencing code 

or contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process

other than bald assertions of excessiveness. See Goggins, 748 A.2d 727; 

Battles, 169 A.3d at 1090-91. 

Further, Appellant’s claim regarding consecutive sentences does not 

raise a substantial question.4 See Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 

123 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating “[a] challenge to the imposition of consecutive 

rather than concurrent sentences does not present a substantial question 

regarding the discretionary aspects of sentence. We see no reason why [a 

defendant] should be afforded a ‘volume discount’ for his crimes by having all 

sentences run concurrently” (citations and some quotation marks omitted)). 

However, we conclude that Appellant’s challenge to the evidence 

supporting the restitution order raises a substantial question for our review. 

____________________________________________

4 We note that to the extent that Appellant argues that these offenses were a 

single criminal episode, which could be considered a merger claim, his 

sentences here do not merge because they involve three separate victims. 

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480, 488 (Pa. Super. 

2020) (concluding that “[b]ecause [the defendant’s] crimes implicated 

different victims as charged and convicted, no merger results” (citations 

omitted)); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765. 
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See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pappas, 845 A.2d 829, 841-42 (Pa. Super. 

2004) (finding a substantial question where the defendant claimed that there 

was insufficient evidence of the value of the stolen property to support the 

restitution order).5 

Our standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. 

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

Restitution may be imposed only for those crimes to property or 

person where the victim suffered a loss that flows from the 

conduct that forms the basis of the crime for which the defendant 

is held criminally accountable.

In computing the amount of restitution the sentencing court 

“[s]hall consider the extent of injury suffered by the victim and 

such other matters as it deems appropriate.” 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 

1106(c)(1).” To determine the correct amount of restitution, a 

____________________________________________

5 We note that challenges to a restitution order may implicate the legality of 

the sentence, the discretionary aspects of the sentence, or both. See 

Commonwealth v. Weir, 239 A.3d 25, 37 (Pa. 2020). Indeed, challenges 

involving the trial court’s statutory authority to impose an order of restitution 

pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S § 1106 implicate the legality of the sentence. See id. 

However, when the challenge involves “the manner in which the [trial] court

exercise[d] that authority in fashioning the restitution[,]” such as determining

the amount of restitution, the challenge “implicates the discretionary aspects 

of the sentence.” Id.
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“but-for” test is used—damages which occur as a direct result of 

the crime are those which should not have occurred but for the 

defendant’s criminal conduct.

Pappas, 845 A.2d at 842 (some citations omitted and some formatting 

altered); see also Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 265-67 (Pa. 

Super. 1997) (affirming portion of the restitution order which included funeral 

expenses for the victim). 

This Court further explained:

Although restitution does not seek, by its essential nature, the 

compensation of the victim, the dollar value of the injury suffered 

by the victim as a result of the crime assists the court in 

calculating the appropriate amount of restitution. A restitution 

award must not exceed the victim’s losses. A sentencing court 

must consider the victim’s injuries, the victim’s request as 

presented by the district attorney and such other matters as the 

court deems appropriate. The court must also ensure that the 

record contains the factual basis for the appropriate amount of 

restitution. In that way, the record will support the sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Burwell, 58 A.3d 790, 794 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted); see also Pappas, 845 A.2d at 842 (explaining that “[b]ecause 

restitution is a sentence, the amount ordered must be supported by the 

record; it may not be speculative or excessive” (citations omitted)). 

This Court has held that the record supports the amount of restitution 

ordered where the victim testified about the value of the loss the victim 

suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions and the trial court found the 

victim’s testimony credible. See Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 A.2d 805, 

810 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Here, the trial court explained:
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Because the victim in this case suffered a financial loss as a direct 

result of [] Appellant’s crime, [the trial court was] required to 

Order [] Appellant to pay restitution to the victim. 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 

1106(a). At [] Appellant’s sentencing, testimony represented that 

Mr. [Taffanelly]’s funeral cost was between $9,000 and $10,000 

dollars. We found that testimony to be credible and in line with 

the court’s understanding of the cost of funerals. Accordingly, we 

ordered [] Appellant to pay restitution to the victim[s] in the sum 

of $9,000 for the cost of [] Taffanelly’s funeral.

Trial Ct. Op. at 18-19 (some citations omitted and some formatting altered). 

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s order that Appellant pay the victims $9,000 for the costs of 

Taffanelly’s funeral. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. Here, the Commonwealth 

presented the testimony of Jaimelynn at sentencing, and she stated that the 

funeral costs were “[a]round $9,000 - $10,000[.]” See N.T. Sentencing, 

11/9/22, at 37. The trial court credited Jaimelynn’s testimony, therefore, 

there is a sufficient factual basis to support the amount of restitution. See

Burwell, 58 A.3d at 794; Rush, 909 A.2d at 810. Therefore, the record 

supports the amount of the trial court’s restitution order, and Appellant is not 

entitled to relief on this claim. 

Legality of Sentence

Finally, we must address the legality of the restitution order. See

Commonwealth v. Wright, 276 A.3d 821, 827 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting 

that questions regarding the legality of the sentence questions “are not 

waivable and may be raised sua sponte on direct review by this Court”

(citation omitted and formatting altered)). Our Supreme Court stated that “a 

challenge to the sentencing court’s authority to order restitution raises a non-
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waivable legality of sentencing issue.” Weir, 239 A.3d at 37. A challenge to 

the legality of the sentence “presents a pure question of law. As such, our 

scope of review is plenary and our standard of review de novo.” Wright, 276 

A.3d at 827 (citations omitted and formatting altered). 

Section 1106 of the Crimes Code provides in relevant part, “[u]pon 

conviction for any crime wherein . . . the victim, if an individual, suffered 

personal injury directly resulting from the crime, the offender shall be 

sentenced to make restitution in addition to the punishment prescribed 

therefor.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a)(2). 

Section 1106 also provides:

(c) Mandatory restitution.—

(1) The court shall order full restitution:

(i) Regardless of the current financial resources of the 

defendant, so as to provide the victim with the fullest 

compensation for the loss. . . .

* * *

(2) At the time of sentencing the court shall specify the 

amount and method of restitution. In determining the 

amount and method of restitution, the court:

(i) Shall consider the extent of injury suffered by the victim, 

the victim’s request for restitution as presented to the 

district attorney . . . and such other matters as it deems 

appropriate.

(ii) May order restitution in a lump sum, by monthly 

installments or according to such other schedule as it 

deems just.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(1)(i), (2)(i)-(ii) (emphases added). 
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This Court has recently stated that

restitution must properly be included in a sentence. The Superior 

Court held these requirements provide the defendant with 

certainty as to his sentence, and at the same time allow for 

subsequent modification if necessary. Failure to comply with 

Section 1106(c)(2) results in an illegal sentence.

Commonwealth v. Royal, --- A.3d ---, 2024 PA Super 29, 2024 WL 678060, 

at *6 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 20, 2024) (citations omitted and formatting 

altered). 

In Royal, the trial court ordered the defendant to pay $4,568.95 in 

restitution following his conviction for six counts of retail theft. Royal, 2024 

WL 678060, at *2, *6. “However, the trial court did not specify the method

of restitution at the sentencing hearing, instead including it in the sentencing 

order.” Id. at *6 (emphasis in original). The Royal Court vacated the 

judgment of sentence, concluding that “the trial court’s failure to specify the 

method of payment at the sentencing hearing rendered that portion of [the 

defendant’s] sentence illegal[]” and remanded for resentencing for the trial 

court to reimpose restitution and specify, on the record, the method of 

payment. Id. 

Here, on this record, the trial court properly ordered Appellant to pay

$9,000 in restitution to Taffanelly’s family to compensate them for the costs 

of Taffanelly’s funeral. However, the trial court did not specify at the 

sentencing hearing nor in its written sentencing order the method of payment 

for the restitution, whether it be in a lump sum, by monthly installments, or 
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according to such other schedule as the trial court deems just. See N.T. 

Sentencing, 11/9/22, at 51-52; Sentencing Order, 405-2021, 11/9/22. 

Therefore, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court’s restitution 

order is an illegal sentence because it did not specify the method of payment 

at the sentencing hearing as required by 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(2), nor in the 

sentencing order.

6

 See Royal, 2024 WL 678060, at *6. 

For these reasons, we affirm Appellant’s convictions, affirm the 

judgment of sentence in part, and vacate the judgment of sentence as to 

restitution only. We remand for resentencing limited to the reimposition of 

$9,000.00 in restitution and an on-the-record specification of the method of 

payment. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum. 

Jurisdiction relinquished. 

____________________________________________

6 “Pennsylvania appellate courts apply the law in effect at the time of the 

appellate decision. This means that we adhere to the principle that, a party 

whose case is pending on direct appeal is entitled to the benefit of changes in 

law which occur before the judgment becomes final.” Commonwealth v. 

Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted and 

formatting altered).
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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 05/14/2024