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92–514PS 2004

NASA–DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATION

IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 18, 2004

Serial No. 108–49

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

KEN CALVERT, California

NICK SMITH, Michigan

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,

Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

VACANCY

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

ZOE LOFGREN, California

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California

VACANCY

VACANCY

VACANCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,

Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

VACANCY

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

VACANCY

VACANCY

VACANCY

BART GORDON, Tennessee

BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director

ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member

RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member

KEN MONROE Professional Staff Member

CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member

RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member

TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant

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C O N T E N T S

March 18, 2004

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee

on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ..................................................................................................................... 9

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10

Statement by Representative Nick Lampson, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 10

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11

Witnesses:

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig E. Steidle, Associate Administrator, Office of Space

Exploration Systems, National Aeronautic and Space Administration, accompanied by Ms. Karen Poniatowski, Assistant Associate Administrator,

Launch Services

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 13

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 14

Biography .......................................................................................................... 17

Major General (Ret.) Robert S. Dickman, Deputy for Military Space, Office

of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Department of Defense

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 18

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 20

Biography .......................................................................................................... 23

The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research and Engineering,

Department of Defense

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 25

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 27

Biography .......................................................................................................... 29

Mr. Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer, Space Exploration Technologies

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 30

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 32

Biography .......................................................................................................... 34

Discussion

NASA’s Policies Toward the Use of New Launch Vehicles .............................. 35

Impacts of the President’s Space Exploration Initiative on NASA’s Space

Launch Initiative .............................................................................................. 39

NASA Contribution to the National Aerospace Initiative ................................ 41

Future of Space Launch Initiative Projects ....................................................... 41

National Security Interests in Space Exploration ............................................. 42

NASA and DOD Cross-Certification of Launch Vehicles .................................. 44

Difference Between Military and Civil Spacecraft ............................................ 44

Crew Exploration Vehicle .................................................................................... 45

Cooperation in Near-Earth Objects Detection ................................................... 48

Role of Industry .................................................................................................... 49

Crew Exploration Vehicle .................................................................................... 50

Impediments to NASA–DOD Cooperation ......................................................... 50

Page

IV

National Space Transportation Policy ................................................................ 51

NASA–DOD Test Facilities ................................................................................. 52

Cross-Certification of Launch Vehicles .............................................................. 53

Review of Space Treaties Affecting DOD and Commercial Use of the Moon .. 53

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig E. Steidle, Associate Administrator, Office of Space

Exploration Systems, National Aeronautic and Space Administration ........... 56

Major General (Ret.) Robert S. Dickman, Deputy for Military Space, Office

of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Department of Defense .................... 62

The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research and Engineering,

Department of Defense ........................................................................................ 64

Mr. Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer, Space Exploration Technologies ........ 72

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Statement of Michael C. Gass, Vice President, Space Transportation, Space

Systems Company, Lockheed Martin Corporation ............................................ 76

Statement of Northrop Grumman .......................................................................... 79

Statement of Wilbur Trafton, VP and GM, Expendable Launch Systems;

President, Boeing Launch Services .................................................................... 81

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NASA–DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

COOPERATION IN SPACE TRANSPORTATION

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NASA–Department of Defense Cooperation

in Space Transportation

THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2004

1:00 P.M.–3:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

I. Purpose

The House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will hold a hearing entitled

NASA–DOD Cooperation in Space Transportation on Thursday, March 18, 2004, at

1:00 p.m. in room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building.

The Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) both depend on rockets manufactured by private sector contractors to launch payloads into orbit—payloads such as reconnaissance satellites,

weather satellites, or scientific instruments that are necessary for national security

or to carry out research in space. This hearing will explore whether better coordination between NASA and DOD in developing and purchasing rockets could increase

the reliability and lower the cost of launch vehicles. The hearing will also explore

how DOD and NASA could encourage the emergence of new, entrepreneurial companies that can launch payloads into space.

The hearing will explore the following questions:

(1) To what extent can NASA and the DOD benefit from greater cooperation

in the development and purchasing of launch vehicles?

(2) What steps is NASA taking to collaborate with the DOD in order to realize

those benefits?

(3) What areas of launch vehicle development are exclusively the role and responsibility of one agency or the other?

(4) To what extent can NASA and the DOD encourage the growth of the U.S.

domestic launch market, including emerging U.S. launch vehicle providers

who provide unique capabilities?

II. Witnesses

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig Steidle, NASA Associate Administrator for the Office

of Exploration Systems, is responsible for developing NASA’s new launch vehicles.

Prior to joining NASA, RADM Steidle was Vice Commander of Naval Air Systems

and Director of the Joint Strike Fighter Program.

Major General (Ret.) Robert Dickman, Deputy for Military Space in the Office

of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, manages the planning, programming, and

acquisition of Air Force space systems. Maj. Gen. Dickman previously commanded

the launch wing at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida.

The Honorable Ron Sega, Director of Defense Research & Engineering, is the

chief technical adviser to the Secretary of Defense for all scientific and technical

matters, basic and applied research, and advanced technology development. A veteran of two NASA Space Shuttle missions, Dr. Sega also serves as a major general

in the Air Force reserves.

Mr. Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer of Space Exploration Technologies or

SpaceX, is developing a new, privately-financed family of launch vehicles intended

to reduce the cost and increase the reliability of access to space. Previously, Mr.

Musk co-founded and was the largest shareholder of PayPal, a company that developed an internet electronic payment system that was sold for $1.5 billion in October

2002.

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III. Brief Overview

• The Department of Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA) each contract with industry to build

the rockets, or launch vehicles, needed to launch each agency’s payloads into orbit. For example, from the 1950s through the 1990s, the DOD

funded the development of the Atlas, Delta and Titan families of rockets to

lift payloads such as reconnaissance satellites of varying sizes into orbit. Used

once and then discarded, these rockets are known as expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). NASA’s Apollo program designed the Saturn rocket, which was

also expendable, to carry very heavy payloads to the Moon. In the 1970s,

NASA developed the Space Shuttle, the world’s first and only reusable launch

vehicle. (While the Space Shuttle was originally intended to be wholly reusable, the version ultimately built is only partially reusable, as the large, orange-colored external tank is used only once.) The government developed

these launch vehicles through contracts with various aerospace contractors,

the largest of which today are the Boeing Company and the Lockheed Martin

Corporation.

• The domestic launch industry has suffered economically from the recent decline in demand for commercial launches, making the costs of

these rockets more expensive. In addition to serving the government’s

launch needs, aerospace companies also serve the commercial launch market.

For example, satellite telecommunication companies purchase launches from

commercial launch vehicle providers to carry their communications satellites

into orbit. However, while the government’s demand for launch vehicles from

aerospace companies has remained steady, the private sector’s demand has

dropped precipitously in recent years (due in large part to the use of fiber optics and cellular technologies). This sharp downturn in the commercial launch

vehicle market increases the prices that commercial providers charge NASA

and the DOD. For the past decade or so, U.S. aerospace companies have also

faced increasing competition from foreign launch companies, particularly

Arianespace, which is partially owned by European governments.

• The President’s new space exploration initiative will require NASA to

use more expendable launch vehicles after 2010, which may provide

new opportunities for greater coordination with DOD. The vision for

NASA that the President announced on January 14th calls for NASA to retire

the Shuttle after assembling the International Space Station, now targeted

for completion by 2010. After that, NASA must decide whether it will develop

a new heavy-lift expendable rocket, convert the Shuttle (which is a heavy-lift

vehicle) into a configuration designed to carry only cargo, or use or modify

existing expendable launch vehicles, which are not capable of launching the

heaviest loads. The vision also calls for NASA to develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to carry humans back to the Moon as early as 2015.

Such a vehicle would most likely be lifted into orbit on an expendable launch

vehicle. Any existing rocket probably would have to be modified to be rated

as safe for humans.

• NASA and the DOD have had mixed success when collaborating on

launching payloads into orbit and on developing new technologies.

Some NASA and DOD collaborations have produced spectacular successes.

For example, in 1947 the Bell X–1 experimental vehicle (flown by Chuck

Yeager) was operated by the Air Force and designed by NASA’s predecessor

agency, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. On the other hand,

the Space Shuttle itself is an example of a collaboration that did not work

out as originally intended. Meeting both NASA and DOD requirements made

it more difficult and more costly to design, build and operate the Shuttle.

Moreover, eventually the Shuttle proved to be too risky for DOD to use. In

1986, when the entire Shuttle fleet was grounded for 32 months in the wake

of the Challenger accident, DOD was unable to launch critical national security satellites. Partly as a result, DOD stopped using the Shuttle to launch

its national security payloads and turned solely to expendable rockets.

• New entrants in the domestic launch industry have the potential to

lower costs, and increase reliability. Some relatively new companies are

beginning to produce new launch vehicles for the commercial sector and for

government. One such company, SpaceX, has said that its goal is to reduce

the cost and increase the reliability of launching payloads into space by a factor of ten. DOD awarded SpaceX a contract to launch a research satellite this

5

May on its new Falcon I rocket. NASA has been unwilling to consider making

an award to SpaceX, saying that NASA will only launch on types of rockets

that have already had at least one successful launch. However, NASA has recently announced its intent to award a contract to Kistler Aerospace Corporation to demonstrate the company’s reusable launch vehicle that someday

could carry cargo to the International Space Station. (The contract is contingent on Kistler emerging from bankruptcy.)

• The White House is preparing to update the government’s space

transportation policy, which is expected to specify the roles DOD and

NASA should play in developing future space launch systems. In 1994,

the Clinton Administration issued a National Space Transportation Policy to

delineate the roles DOD and NASA would each play in developing new space

launch vehicles. Under the 1994 policy, NASA was to concentrate on developing and demonstrating reusable vehicle technology, while the DOD would

focus exclusively on expendable launch vehicles. In 2002, the Bush Administration directed the National Security Council to review this policy due to

NASA’s failure to develop and demonstrate reusable vehicle technology and

the downturn in the commercial, expendable launch vehicle market that affected the government’s costs. The release of the Administration’s new space

transportation policy has been delayed due to the Space Shuttle Columbia ac- cident, but it is expected later this year. The new space transportation policy

is expected to reflect the Administration’s space exploration policy objectives.

IV. Issues

• What are the benefits and drawbacks of NASA and DOD cooperating

on developing and purchasing launch vehicles? Cooperation between

NASA and DOD can lead either to lower costs—or to a proliferation of requirements and higher costs, depending on the situation. Cooperation can

also either be an acknowledgement of areas where the two agencies’ needs

and missions overlap—or an improper merging of distinct missions. Congress

and the agencies need to figure out how to decide when cooperation is optimal

and when it might be harmful.

• How can the government better encourage the sustainable growth of

the domestic launch industry? Greater cooperation between NASA and

the DOD in developing and purchasing rockets might also benefit the industry by increasing demand for those rockets used by both agencies. A healthy

domestic launch industry is important for both NASA and the DOD. But

NASA has not yet decided what kinds of launch vehicles it will need for either crew or cargo after it retires the Shuttle and, as mentioned above, cooperation between the two agencies is not always appropriate.

• How can the government foster the entry of new, innovative launch

companies to meet the government’s needs? Both DOD and NASA could

benefit from the entry of new companies into the launch vehicle market, especially since such companies promise lower costs and greater reliability. However, using these companies also presents a greater level of risk to the agencies because the companies’ technology is unproven. The agencies need to balance the need to encourage emerging companies against the need to carry out

agency missions with limited risk.

V. Background

History of NASA and DOD Space Transportation Development Efforts

The DOD funded the development of the Atlas, Delta, and Titan families of ELVs

(called expendable because they can only be used once) based on ballistic missile

technology from the 1950s–60s. In the 1960s, NASA developed the small Scout rocket and the heavy-lift Saturn rockets, both of which are no longer produced. Today,

the Boeing Company manufactures the Delta family of expendable launch vehicles

and is part of the Sea Launch joint venture with the Russian/Ukrainian Zenit rocket. Lockheed Martin manufactures the Atlas, Athena, and Titan launch vehicles,

and Orbital Sciences Corporation manufactures the smaller Pegasus and Taurus

launch vehicles. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin build portions of NASA’s Space

Shuttle, and both companies own equal portions of the United Space Alliance (USA),

which manages Shuttle operations and maintenance.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, NASA and DOD worked together on an ultimately unsuccessful effort to develop a new reusable launch vehicle to replace the

Shuttle, as well as new expendable launch vehicles. These programs failed because

of a combination of technical failures and problems with funding. One unsuccessful

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effort to create a reusable vehicle was the X–30 or National Aerospace Plane project

initiated by President Reagan. The project was doomed by insurmountable technical

hurdles with hypersonic technology and was also affected by the end of the Cold

War, which made moot some of the impetus for the project. At the same time, NASA

and DOD initiated expendable launch vehicle programs. Those programs—Advanced

Launch System, National Launch System, and Spacelifter—were not sustained by

either the agencies or the Congress for long enough to fully develop any new system.

President Clinton issued a National Space Transportation Policy in 1994 that designated lead responsibility for improving expendable launch vehicles to DOD and

lead responsibility for upgrading the Space Shuttle and technology development of

new reusable launch vehicles to NASA.

The 1994 policy directed NASA to conduct research designed to demonstrate by

the year 2000 a rocket engine that could fly to orbit using only a single stage (rather

than the multiple-stage rockets that are used today). In response, NASA began two

experimental flight test programs in 1995, the X–33 (with Lockheed Martin) and X–

34 (with Orbital Sciences). Neither program was able to successfully demonstrate

a vehicle, and NASA terminated both programs in March 2001. NASA had spent

approximately $1.2 billion on the X–33 and $205 million on the X–34 by the time

the programs were canceled. Lockheed Martin said that it had spent $356 million

of its own money on the X–33.

At the same time, the 1994 policy directed the DOD to work with industry to modernize or ‘‘evolve’’ the expendable launch vehicle fleet under the Evolved Expendable

Launch Vehicle (EELV) program ‘‘to reduce costs while improving reliability, operability, responsiveness, and safety.’’ The policy also directed the U.S. Government

to meet its future launch needs by purchasing commercial launch services.

In 1995, DOD began funding the development of the latest generation of Delta

and Atlas launch vehicles through the EELV program. Under that program, DOD

has awarded contracts to Boeing valued at $1.88 billion ($500 million for development plus $1.38 billion for 19 launches) for the Delta IV, and contracts to Lockheed

Martin valued at $1.15 billion ($500 million for development plus $650 million for

nine launches) for the Atlas V. EELV contracts were awarded to both companies to

ensure that DOD would not be forced to rely on a single supplier. Each company

has spent about $1 billion of its own money on EELV development. DOD also has

a variety of other programs to develop new launch vehicles and vehicle components.

Some low-level cooperation between NASA and DOD on rocket technologies continued even under the 1994 policy, but cooperation began again in earnest around

2000. In the wake of failures in the X–33 and X–34 programs, NASA proposed the

Space Launch Initiative, under which it would cooperate with DOD on both reusable

and expendable launch technologies.

Economic Landscape for Domestic Launch Industry and Recent Developments

DOD hoped the EELV would be less expensive to purchase than previous launch

vehicles. However, that assumed a thriving commercial launch business that would

add to the demand for the new rockets. Instead, the demand for commercial

launches has plummeted. In 1999, 76 commercial payloads were launched, producing $2.3 billion in launch revenues, while in 2003 only 18 commercial payloads

representing $1.2 billion were launched. Furthermore, competition has become more

intense even as the number of launches has declined.

Today, both Boeing and Lockheed Martin are seeking to negotiate higher launch

prices with DOD and NASA, and the agencies predict that launch costs could increase by 50 percent. DOD’s efforts to keep both companies in the launch business

were complicated recently when it penalized Boeing after the company was found

to have used proprietary information from Lockheed Martin. The penalties included

losing awards for several launches and restrictions on bidding for some future

launches.

The President’s space exploration initiative announced on January 14th would

have a significant impact on the launch industry. While NASA does use expendable

launch vehicles for some of its current needs, such as Earth science satellites, NASA

uses the Space Shuttle (and Russian Soyuz vehicles) to launch humans into space

and uses the Space Shuttle and Russian vehicles for related cargo needs. Under the

President’s proposal, the Shuttle would be retired around 2010. The proposal does

not say what NASA will use to take cargo to and from the International Space Station after that time or what will be used to launch payloads to the Moon or other

locations. The President proposed developing a new vehicle, called the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), to launch humans after the Shuttle is retired, but NASA has

not yet decided what kind of rocket would lift the CEV.

As part of its FY05 budget, NASA has proposed eliminating the Space Launch Initiative as a discrete program. NASA is in the process of deciding which elements

7

of the Space Launch Initiative to retain (in other programs) as relevant to the President’s exploration proposal. For example, NASA has already decided to cancel one

joint project on advanced rocket engines and to continue a joint project to demonstrate autonomous satellite rendezvous capability.

In addition, the National Security Council is working on an inter-agency effort,

begun in 2002, to develop a new space transportation policy. The policy is expected

to be released later this year.

Emerging Commercial Launch Providers

Space Exploration Technologies (commonly referred to as SpaceX) is a privately

funded company developing a family of launch vehicles called Falcon rockets.

SpaceX has said it intends to reduce launch costs ultimately by a factor of ten. The

Falcon I launch vehicle is a small rocket priced at $6 million per launch, a significant price savings compared to other comparably-sized rockets. The first launch of

the Falcon I rocket, carrying a DOD research satellite, is scheduled for mid-2004.

In addition to Space X, other emerging launch providers include Kistler Aerospace

and Universal Space Lines. NASA recently announced that it intends to pay Kistler

Aerospace about $227 million to demonstrate that it can carry cargo to and from

the International Space Station. This contract is contingent on Kistler successfully

emerging from bankruptcy.

NASA has also requested $10 million for FY05 to buy launch services from emerging companies. However, NASA’s current launch policy forbids NASA to contract for

launch services unless the type of rocket being used has performed at least one successful flight. The policy was put in place in the mid-1990s after several rockets

failed on their maiden flights. Those rockets were made by Orbital and CTA, which

is no longer in business. The DOD does not have an analogous policy for its research

satellites, which is why it is able to use SpaceX’s new Falcon I rocket.

VI. The witnesses were asked to respond to the following questions in their

testimony before the Subcommittee:

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig Steidle, NASA Associate Administrator for the Office of Exploration Systems, was asked to address:

• Are there any specific lessons learned from past NASA–Department of Defense (DOD) joint ventures in space transportation development and operations that NASA is applying to future programs, such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle, human-rated EELV, and heavy-lift launch vehicle?

• What are the benefits and risks to NASA from increased collaboration with

the DOD in launch vehicle development and purchases to support human

space flight missions and develop the next generation launch technologies?

• What steps is NASA taking to encourage the growth of the U.S. domestic

launch market, including emerging commercial launch service providers to

support the Space Station and launch research payloads? What risks, if any,

is NASA willing to take by relying on these emerging launch providers?

Major General (Ret.) Bob Dickman, Office of the Air Force Under Secretary,

was asked to address:

• What are the benefits and risks to the Department of Defense (DOD) from

increased collaboration with NASA in launch vehicle development and purchases to support DOD missions?

• What steps is the DOD taking to ensure that it leverages the potential benefits of NASA’s investments to improve the capabilities of U.S. launch vehicles?

• What steps is the DOD taking to encourage the growth of the U.S. domestic

launch market, including emerging commercial launch service providers to

support DOD missions?

Dr. Ron Sega, Defense Research and Engineering, was asked to address:

• What is the status of the Administration’s review of U.S. space transportation

policy?

• How do NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) coordinate their broad

research portfolios for space launch vehicles? How might the DOD’s launch

and propulsion research and development activities contribute technologies to

NASA initiatives?

• How is the DOD using emerging commercial launch vehicle providers, like

SpaceX? What risks, if any, is the DOD taking by relying on these emerging

launch providers?

8

Mr. Elon Musk, Space Exploration Technologies, was asked to address:

• What are the benefits and risks for the U.S. domestic launch industry, including emerging U.S. launch vehicle providers, if NASA and the Department of

Defense (DOD) collaborated more in the development and purchases of launch

vehicles?

• What specific recommendations would you make for how NASA and the DOD

can encourage the healthy growth of the U.S. domestic launch market, especially for emerging commercial launch providers?

• What unique capabilities do emerging launch vehicle providers, like SpaceX,

provide to NASA and the DOD?

9

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I hereby call this meeting of the Space

and Aeronautics Subcommittee to order, and without objection, the

Chair will be granted authority to recess this committee at any

time. Hearing no objection.

At today’s hearing, we will examine how well NASA and the Department of Defense collaborate on the development of launch vehicle technology. Our focus will also include how NASA and the Department of Defense can do a better job in encouraging the emergence of entrepreneurial space launch companies. The President’s

recent announcement on space exploration begins a new chapter in

the American space experience. Improving the Nation’s launch capability is a critical step in achieving the President’s goal of exploring new worlds.

Early in his tenure, the President took the first step in realizing

this goal by revisiting space launch policies of the 1990s. These

policies drove a wedge between NASA and the Department of Defense where the Department of Defense was limited to improving

expendable launch vehicles in terms of design and development.

The reusables were—and that technology was to be the responsibility of NASA. Well, and I might add that this Chairman supported that compromise at the time. It seemed like the right thing

to do at the time, but compartmentalizing launch vehicle development, however, may have had unintended consequences, the unintended consequences of preventing improvements to the national

launch capability. And I believe the President’s renewed commitment for discovery and exploration will encourage a more comprehensive and cooperative spirit between NASA and the Department of Defense. As long as it does not duplicate, as long as we

are talking about not duplicating efforts, this new approach should

work to our country’s benefit.

NASA and the Department of Defense also must establish investment strategies that promote innovative ideas from the private sector. Purchasing launch services demonstrates a desire on the part

of government to adopt market-based solutions and use marketbased and private sector options. The DOD has a long history in

giving a fair shot to emerging launch providers like SpaceX. Unfortunately, NASA does not share this track record. NASA should become, hopefully, zealous in its approach to supporting space entrepreneurs. This shouldn’t just be the Department of Defense. NASA

should be encouraging entrepreneurs in the private sector. Only

then can we expect the type of contributions coming from our private industry that American industry is capable of.

Cooperation between NASA and the Department of Defense on

technology development is not new and has not always been easy.

Indeed, there are plenty of examples that suggest that such an undertaking is difficult, at best, but there are shining examples of

success as well. But let us face it, both agencies’ approaches to developing space transportation requires, in terms of their requirements, derive from very different cultures and philosophies. We

have both the NASA and the Department of Defense, two very different organizations, and bridging the gap between them is going

to take strong leadership and a lot of Congressional involvement.

As Chairman, I will vigorously support the joint NASA and Department of Defense space launch initiatives that promise signifiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
10

cant benefits, not only to NASA, not only to the Department of Defense, but significant benefits to our country as a whole.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANA ROHRABACHER

Today’s hearing will examine how well NASA and the Department of Defense collaborate on the development of launch vehicle technology. Our focus will also include how NASA and DOD can do a better job in encouraging the emergence of entrepreneurial space launch companies. The President’s recent announcement on

space exploration begins a new chapter in the American space experience. Improving the Nation’s launch capability is a critical step in achieving the President’s goal

of exploring new worlds.

Early in his tenure, the President took the first step in realizing this goal by revisiting space launch policies of the 1990s. These policies drove a wedge between

NASA and DOD, where DOD was limited to improving expendable launch vehicle

design and development of reusable launch vehicle technology was the responsibility

of NASA. Compartmentalizing launch vehicle development may well have had the

unintended consequence of preventing improvements to the national launch capability. I believe the President’s renewed commitment for discovery and exploration

will encourage a more cooperative spirit between NASA and DOD. As long as it is

not duplicative, this new approach should work to our benefit.

NASA and DOD also must establish investment strategies that promote innovative ideas from the private sector. Purchasing launch services demonstrates a desire

on the part of government to adopt market-based solutions. DOD has a long history

of giving a fair shot to emerging launch providers like SpaceX. Unfortunately, NASA

does not share this track record. NASA should also become zealous in its approach

in supporting space entrepreneurs. Only then can we expect real process in supporting industry.

Cooperation between NASA and DOD on technology development is not new and

has not always been easy. Indeed, there are plenty of examples that suggest such

an undertaking is difficult at best, but there are shining examples of success as

well. Let’s face it, both agencies’ approach to developing space transportation requirements derive from very different cultures and philosophies. Bridging this gap

is going to take strong leadership.

As Chairman, I will vigorously support joint NASA and DOD space launch initiatives that promise significant benefits to them, as well as the Nation.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Mr. Lampson, you may now proceed

with your opening statement.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is nice to be

able to join you in this particular chair for this committee. It is

going to be a pleasure working with you and on many of the initiatives that we will be facing, and I look forward to the cooperation,

not only that needs to exist between NASA and DOD, but also that

needs to exist through all levels of our House of Representatives

and our Federal Government.

And so I, too, want to welcome the witnesses today to this hearing, and I look forward to your testimony.

As I just said, the topic of the NASA–DOD cooperation on space

transportation is certainly an important one. I hope that our witnesses will be able to provide some useful insights into when such

cooperation makes sense as well as when it is, perhaps, inappropriate. So NASA and DOD have had a long history of cooperation

across a range of activities, dating back to the early years of the

space age. While there have occasionally been difficulties and tensions over the years, I believe that the Nation has benefited from

NASA–DOD cooperation.

Space transportation, however, is an area where the record has

been mixed. The National Aerospace Plane and the National

Launch System were two major joint NASA–DOD initiatives that

ultimately wound up being canceled. More recently, the two organiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
11

zations jointly funded the X–37 space test vehicle until DOD decided that it wasn’t enough of a priority to warrant its continued

participation. I hope that our witnesses will help us to understand

why these previous collaborations failed and how we can ensure

that future cooperative space transportation efforts will fare better.

Finally, I think that we need to examine the potential impact of

the President’s space exploration initiative on NASA–DOD cooperation in space transportation. While there has been some discussion

of the role that DOD’s expendable launch vehicle programs might

play in the initiative, my attention is focused on a different matter.

Specifically, in order to fund the President’s space initiative, NASA

is canceling the Space Launch Initiative, and in particular, the

Next Generation Launch Technology Program.

Advanced engine programs are also being terminated, and the

funding intended for hypersonics research and development is

being diverted to the Exploration Systems budget. Indeed, some of

these efforts were supposed to be NASA’s contribution to the joint

NASA–DOD National Aerospace Initiative that was announced

with much fanfare only a few years ago.

I am very concerned that we are eating our technological ‘‘seed

corn’’ to make the exploration initiative’s budget math work. That

doesn’t make sense to me. And that is not my definition of an ‘‘affordable’’ exploration initiative.

So clearly, we have a lot to talk about today, and I look forward

to hearing from the witnesses, and I yield back my time, Mr.

Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lampson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE NICK LAMPSON

Good afternoon. I’d like to welcome our witnesses to today’s hearing, and I look

forward to your testimony.

The topic of NASA–DOD cooperation on space transportation is an important one,

and I hope that our witnesses will be able to provide some useful insights into when

such cooperation makes sense as well as when it is inappropriate. NASA and DOD

have had a long history of cooperation across a range of activities, dating back to

the early years of the space age. While there have occasionally been difficulties and

tensions over the years, I believe that the Nation has benefited from NASA–DOD

cooperation.

Space transportation, however, is an area where the record has been mixed. The

National Aerospace Plane and the National Launch System were two major joint

NASA–DOD initiatives that ultimately wound up being canceled. More recently, the

two organizations jointly funded the X–37 space test vehicle until DOD decided that

it was not enough of a priority to warrant its continued participation. I hope that

our witnesses will help us understand why these previous collaborations failed, and

how we can ensure that future cooperative space transportation efforts will fare better.

Finally, I think we need to examine the potential impact of the President’s space

exploration initiative on NASA–DOD cooperation in space transportation. While

there has been some discussion of the role that DOD’s expendable launch vehicle

programs might play in the initiative, my attention is focused on a different matter.

Specifically, in order to fund the President’s space initiative, NASA is canceling the

Space Launch Initiative-and in particular the Next Generation Launch Technology

program.

Advanced engine programs are being terminated, and the funding intended for

hypersonics R&D is being diverted to the Exploration Systems budget. Indeed, some

of these efforts were supposed to be NASA’s contribution to the joint NASA–DOD

National Aerospace Initiative that was announced with much fanfare only a few

years ago.

12

I am very concerned that we are eating our technological ‘‘seed corn’’ to make the

exploration initiative’s budget math work. That doesn’t make sense to me. And

that’s not my definition of an ‘‘affordable’’ exploration initiative.

Well, we have a lot to talk about today, and I look forward to a productive hearing.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And it will be

a pleasure working with you, as it was with your predecessor, and

appreciate your thoughtful statement and the points that you have

made.

I would like to take the Chairman’s prerogative at this moment

to call the attention of the Committee and those present at today’s

hearing to a very important event that has just happened. On Monday, NASA announced that an asteroid would pass closer to Earth

than any other previous asteroid that it has charted. So what we

have got here is an asteroid that we didn’t know anything about

two weeks ago, but now, as I understand, passing within 26,000

miles, is that it, of the Earth. When we talk about cooperation between NASA and the Department of Defense, if there is any example where this might be of benefit to us, it might be in tracking

and providing some sort of protection against this type of threat.

I certainly would like to hear everybody’s ideas on this. If we didn’t

know this, apparently, NASA has catalogued 600 asteroids so far,

which is about—which are a half a mile in diameter or larger. And

by 2008, 90 percent of these large asteroids will be charted. But

there are still thousands of other smaller asteroids out there. And

I believe that we need to take this very seriously. This is not something that—I mean, these small asteroids could take out a city, and

if you take a look up at the Moon—now that is not saying that the

one that they saw could take out a city, I am not sure—but the fact

that we just found it is reason for concern. And take a look at the

Moon. All of those craters up there didn’t happen because of some

space debris from the world from our space program; it happened

because there are asteroids and meteorites and objects out there

that could threaten the Earth as well.

So with that said, without objection, the opening statements of

other Members will be put in the written record unless someone

has something they would like to jump in with right now. If not,

hearing no objection, your opening statements will be put in the

record. And I also ask unanimous consent to insert at the appropriate place in the record the background memorandum prepared

by the majority staff for this hearing. Hearing no objections, so ordered.

And we have a distinguished panel of witnesses today, and we

appreciate you being with us. I would ask you to, if you could, summarize your written statements to five minutes. And if you can get

to the heart of the matter, we will have a better chance for a dialogue right after we come back from this vote. We will have a—we

will be able to hear you. So actually, we—actually, we have six recorded votes, so we’ll get to two witnesses prior to taking off. We

will—the Chair will—the Chair is glad to hear from two witnesses

and then to take off and then to come back immediately after the

last vote. And we apologize. This is out of our control, just sort of

like that asteroid coming right over there that we didn’t know anything about. But we did know these votes were coming. That is

where we had a—all right.

13

So first, our opening witness is Major General—no, it is not. Our

first witness is Rear Admiral, sorry, Admiral, I almost made you

a Major General. Craig Steidle, who is responsible for developing

NASA’s launch vehicles and Crew Exploration Vehicle. He is new

to NASA. I appreciated our visit when he came to my office, but

he comes here, perhaps new to NASA, but with a wealth of experience from the Pentagon. And if there is anyone that would have

a perspective on how NASA and the Pentagon can cooperate, it

would be you, Admiral. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL (RET.) CRAIG E. STEIDLE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SPACE EXPLORATION

SYSTEMS, NATIONAL AERONAUTIC AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY MS. KAREN PONIATOWSKI, ASSISTANT ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, LAUNCH SERVICES

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I will make this very

brief, Sir, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to appear

today to discuss NASA’s ongoing cooperative activities with the Department of Defense.

On January 14, the President visited NASA Headquarters and

announced the Nation’s vision for space exploration. In his address,

the President presented a vision that is bold and forward-looking,

yet practical and responsible, one that explores answers to longstanding questions of importance to science and society, and will

develop revolutionary technologies and capabilities for the future,

while maintaining good stewardship of the taxpayers’ dollars. Key

to the good stewardship of taxpayers’ dollars is appropriate

partnering between NASA and DOD.

At this time, I would first like to introduce Karen Poniatowski.

Karen will be joining me at the table when we start the session for

questions. She is the Associate Administrator for Launch Services

in the Office of Space Flight and has a lot of knowledge on the

areas that you are interested in today as well.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. So you brought your institutional

memory with you. All right.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir.

She is a significant—she has been a significant contributor to cooperative efforts with DOD on the Space Shuttle, Space Station, expendable launch vehicles and such, so that is why I asked her to

come with me today.

There has been a rich history of collaboration and cooperation between DOD and NASA, and I fully expect this tradition will continue. I have some examples that I hope to provide you with later

on.

The Office of Exploration Systems, which I have been privileged

to head, has implemented a strategy of communicating with our

partners and our stakeholders, and we have begun this, holding

our first series of NASA days and industry days in our auditorium,

and some of the staff in here have attended those. This provides

an opportunity for my leadership team to directly communicate and

hold a dialogue with our partners about our plans for implementing

the Nation’s vision. We are currently in the requirements development phase, and that is well underway. Once the requirements

14

have been defined, future opportunities for collaboration, in cooperation with DOD, will be better understood and pursued, and I

intend to continue this communication strategy throughout, as I

did before in the Joint Strike Fighter program, and I found it very

productive to do that.

The Partnership Council, as you will probably hear from my colleagues, is a multi-agency forum with a diverse membership of renowned leaders: Mr. O’Keefe, Mr. Teets, Admiral Jim Ellis, General Lord, and Mr. Sega at the end of the table. The Council is a

mechanism for agencies to frame issues and discuss their individual space mission needs and identify actions to benefit the entire space community, and I understand that the Exploration Systems flowed from the original discussions in that partnership.

Project Constellation, which you have referenced, will develop a

new Crew Exploration Vehicle for future crew transport. This vehicle will be developed in stages with the first flight demonstration

test in 2008, the first unmanned flight in 2011, and the first

crewed flight in 2014. Project Constellation will be discussed at the

Partnership Council this spring to ensure that our space partners

and DOD are kept fully informed about its implementation and our

way forward.

Areas of mutual concern to both NASA and DOD include launch

assets. Discussions are underway with DOD on the topic of assured

space access, exploring the possibility of human rating and enhancing performance and reliability of launch systems to support the

Nation’s vision for space exploration, and defining a science and

technology strategy that will advance the Nation’s ability to meet

future launch needs.

As we implement the recommendations of the CAIB, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, we are working with DOD to refine their support for spacecraft operations and members of various

DOD organizations and facilities are being employed to develop and

validate return-to-flight implementations and approaches. And

NASA is also partnering with DOD to respond to both technical

and cultural issues outlined in the CAIB report.

NASA and the Department of Defense have a long history of cooperation on services, and we hope to have an opportunity to discuss that with you today. Although we have different missions, we

share many of the same issues. The technical challenges are the

same as are some of the requirements, working together within

partnerships to maximize these unique resources. Through numerous cooperative efforts, the American people can benefit from our

joint endeavors in space and on Earth, and I sincerely appreciate

the forum in this particular committee for providing us today the

opportunity to discuss that.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Steidle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL (RET.) CRAIG E. STEIDLE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to

appear today to discuss NASA’s ongoing cooperative activities with the Department

of Defense (DOD). Let me begin with a discussion of a key part of that cooperation.

Partnership Council

NASA’s relationship with the DOD has been coordinated primarily through the

Partnership Council since Mr. O’Keefe began his tenure as the NASA AdminisVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
15

trator. During the last 18 months, NASA’s role has proven instrumental in the evolution of the Council. Early on, key changes began to occur that had elevated the

level of the Council members and changed completely how meetings were run. We

now have on track an effective mechanism for cooperation in a variety of areas.

The Partnership Council is a multi-agency forum with a diverse membership that

includes Mr. Sean O’Keefe, NASA Administrator; Mr. Peter Teets, the DOD Executive Agent for Space and Director of the National Reconnaissance Office; Admiral

James Ellis, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command; General Lance Lord, the

Commander of Air Force Space Command; and Dr. Ronald Sega, the Director of Defense Research & Engineering.

The Agency leaders established the Partnership Council to provide a forum for

senior DOD and civil space leaders to meet face-to-face on a regular basis to discuss

cross cutting issues relevant to the national space community. The purpose of the

Partnership Council is to facilitate communication between the organizations and to

identify areas for collaboration and cooperation.

On January 14th, 2004, the President visited NASA Headquarters and announced

the Vision for Space Exploration. In his address, the President presented a vision

that is bold and forward-thinking, yet practical and responsible—one that explores

answers to longstanding questions of importance to science and society and will develop revolutionary technologies and capabilities for the future, while maintaining

good stewardship of taxpayer dollars. Key to good stewardship is appropriate

partnering between NASA and DOD. The Partnership Council provides us the necessary forum for the strategic communication necessary to turn the vision into reality.

The Council has proven an invaluable mechanism to enable the Agencies that use

space assets to discuss their individual mission needs and capabilities in a forum

where issues can be framed and appropriate actions assigned to benefit the entire

space community.

NASA–DOD Cooperative Activities in Space Transportation

Space launch systems are inextricably woven into the fabric of America’s national

security. As a result, the ability of the United States to launch critical space assets

when and where they are needed is a national security requirement. Civil missions

are also dependent on assured access. Currently, access to the International Space

Station is dependent solely upon Russian launch capability until the Space Shuttle

returns to flight. Accordingly, the Partnership Council routinely discusses launch

topics to ensure that agencies partner appropriately in their approach.

Return to safe flight is a driving priority at NASA. It is imperative that we are

able to return the Space Shuttle to flight in a safety-driven, expeditious manner.

As we implement the recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation

Board (CAIB), NASA is working with DOD to redefine DOD support for space flight

operations. Memoranda of Agreement concerning the CAIB recommendations are

being reviewed and rewritten at all levels.

In addition to the CAIB activities, there are currently over 400 active agreements

between various NASA and DOD organizations. Agreements cover a range of activities between each of the NASA Centers and varied groups within DOD.

Looking to the future, there are new opportunities for collaboration and support

between NASA and the DOD. For example, Project Constellation will develop a new

Crew Exploration Vehicle for future crew transport. This vehicle will be developed

in stages, with the first flight demonstration test in 2008, the first unmanned flight

in 2011, and the first crewed flight in 2014. Project Constellation will be discussed

at the Partnership Council this spring to ensure that our space partners in DOD

are kept fully abreast of the ongoing implementation of our Vision for Space Exploration.

For cargo transport to the International Space Station after 2010, NASA will rely

on existing or new commercial cargo transport systems. NASA does not plan to develop new launch vehicle capabilities except where critical NASA needs—such as

heavy lift—are not met by commercial or military systems. Discussions are underway with DOD on the topic of assured access to space, exploring the possibility of

human rating and enhancing performance and reliability of launch systems to support the Vision for Space Exploration, and defining a Science and Technology strategy that will advance the Nation’s ability to meet its future launch needs.

Space Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicles

There is a rich history of cooperation with the DOD on the Space Shuttle and Expendable Launch Vehicles. From NASA’s early days, we have depended on the DOD

to provide launch range facilities and support for the NASA Space Shuttle and expendable launch activities on a reimbursable basis at both the Eastern and Western

16

ranges. NASA represents one of the largest reimbursable customers of the Air Force

on the Eastern Range. NASA, in close cooperation with the DOD and Industry, established the Advanced Spaceport Technology Working Group and Advanced Range

Technology Working Group. Through these government and industry working

groups we are able to identify advanced technologies to ultimately improve the performance and reduce the cost of range operations for all range users.

NASA has also utilized USAF-unique launch support for missions for which commercial capability was not available, such as the Cassini mission that required the

performance of the USAF Titan IV. Refurbished Atlas E and Titan II services were

provided on a reimbursable basis to support flight of the NOAA Polar Meteorological

satellites and the quick response QuikScat mission launched in June 1999. NASA

has also conducted shared missions, most recently the Kodiak Star launch on an

Athena launch vehicle from Alaska in September 2001 and the February 2000, STS–

99 Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM), which was a joint effort of NASA

and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA-formerly NIMA). The data

collected provided precise, uniform, 3-dimensional elevation data for roughly 80 percent of the land mass of the Earth.

The Space Shuttle is the only reusable launch vehicle in the world capable of

transporting humans to and from space. This capability has made it a workhorse

for the United States space program for more than 20 years. The Shuttle has been

used for a variety of purposes, ranging from launching, retrieving, and servicing scientific payloads to conducting experiments on behalf of the other NASA enterprises

to transporting elements of the International Space Station (ISS) into orbit.

The DOD has flown 11 dedicated missions on the Space Shuttle. NASA is proud

to have provided space access to about 270 secondary DOD payloads, some 260 on

the Shuttle as mid-deck or cargo bay payloads, and four to the Russian Space Station MIR. They were also one of the earliest users of the International Space Station

(ISS). To date, four DOD payloads have used the ISS as a space based research platform. Areas of emphasis for these (and future) payloads include surveillance and

weather, space control and situational awareness, satellite subsystems, assured/responsive access to space, and education.

At present, NASA remains focused on safe return-to-flight of the Space Shuttle

and successful assembly of the ISS. The return-to-flight (RTF) effort is being guided

by ‘‘NASA’s Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond.’’

This plan addresses NASA’s approach for implementing each of the recommendations from the CAIB report.

Members of various DOD organizations and facilities are being employed to develop and validate RTF implementation approaches to fulfill the CAIB recommendations. NASA is also partnering with the DOD to respond to both technical and cultural issues outlined in the CAIB report. Some examples include the use of thermalvacuum facilities at the Arnold Engineering Development Center and Eglin Air

Force Base to test design modifications to the External Tank, collaborating with the

Navy’s Submarine Nuclear Reactors Program, and Submarine Safety Program to enhance NASA’s processes for evaluating issues and concerns.

We are also working with the DOD to respond to the CAIB recommendations as

they pertain to expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). NASA, the United States Air

Force, and the National Reconnaissance Office recently held the 4th Government/

Industry ELV Mission Assurance Forum on March 9–10, 2004. This forum was

originally established by these agencies to ensure that the ELV lessons learned from

the 1998 Presidential Broad Area Review into Launch Failures are not lost and continues to be one of the many forums established to facilitate communication between

the government agencies with regards to space transportation.

The Vision for Space Exploration

Discussions have begun with the DOD in support of the Vision for Space Exploration. At this point, we are early in the process of defining requirements for the

vision. The goal of this process is to develop documented requirements that are

traceable, verifiable and measurable.

Definition of Level 0 requirements for the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is the

responsibility of the NASA Space Architect. NASA anticipates the final set of Level

0 requirements by the end of this month, pending approval by the Joint Strategic

Assessment Committee (JSAC). The JSAC is comprised of the following NASA personnel: the Space Architect (Chair), the Chief Scientist (Deputy Chair), the Enterprise Associate Administrators, Institutions Management and key functional offices.

Definition, documentation and management of Level 1 and 2 requirements will be

the responsibility of the Office of Exploration Systems. Requirements will be subject

to an open and formal review and approval process to be managed by the Office of

Exploration Systems. The Office of Exploration Systems will develop necessary comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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panion products, including a Management Plan. Parts of this process are the studies

and systems analysis of potential exploration scenarios to be conducted as a means

of bounding the requirements trade space and developing meaningful figures of

merit to be used in the design and development of the CEV.

A Requirements team, lead by Office of Exploration Systems is focusing on developing these requirements and scenarios. This activity began in February 2004. A

rigorous requirements formulation approach will yield Level 1 requirements in early

September 2004. At that time, the requirements will be provided to the JSAC for

approval. The JSAC will present the requirement to the Executive Council, which

is composed of the following NASA personnel: the Deputy Administrator (Chair), the

Associate Deputy Administrator for Institutions, the Associate Deputy Administrator for Technical Programs, the Enterprise Associate Administrators, the Chief

Engineer, the Safety and Mission Assurance Associate Administrator, the Chief Financial Officer, and the General Council. The Executive Council will have the ultimate approval authority for CEV requirements. This effort will be followed by a solicitation in Fall 2004 for concept development. Level 2 requirements will be

baselined in early 2005.

In order to develop safe, reliable, and cost-effective requirements for space launch

vehicles to implement NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration, it is essential to learn

from past and present programs such as the Space Shuttle, the Space Launch Initiative, the Orbital Space Plane (OSP), and Next Generation Launch Technology.

The Requirements team, lead by the Office of Exploration Systems, will focus on developing these requirements and scenarios utilizing these lessons learned. Knowledge from OSP will help define the fundamental requirements necessary for developing missions beyond Earth orbit.

The Office of Exploration Systems will work closely with the DOD throughout the

requirements process. Once requirements have been defined, future relationships

with DOD will be further developed in terms of identifying new areas for collaboration and cooperation.

Conclusion

NASA’s Office of Space Flight and the Department of Defense (DOD) have a long

history of cooperation on services that range from staffing our astronaut corps to

collaborating on numerous space technology projects. Although we have different

missions, we share many of the same issues, technical challenges, and requirements. Working together we have formed partnerships to maximize our unique resources. Through numerous cooperative efforts, the American people have benefited

by our joint endeavors in space and on the Earth.

I sincerely appreciate the forum that the Committee has provided today, and I

look forward to responding to your questions.

BIOGRAPHY FOR CRAIG E. STEIDLE

Adm. Craig E. Steidle is the Associate Administrator for the Office of Exploration

Systems. He is the first to hold this position, since the office was created in January

2004.

The Office of Exploration Systems was established to set priorities and direct the

identification, development, and validation of exploration systems and related technologies. Users and technologists will work together to enable a balancing of factors

between requirements, program schedules and costs leading to future space exploration systems.

Since retiring from the Navy in March 2000, Adm. Steidle served as an independent aerospace consultant. His last assignment was as Chief Aerospace Engineer

and Vice Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, which develops, acquires and

supports naval aeronautical systems.

Adm. Steidle entered the Navy after graduating with merit from the United

States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md. He trained as an attack pilot, flew carrier

night combat missions in North Vietnam; served as a test pilot and test pilot instructor; and commanded the Navy’s A–3 weapon systems program. During the

1980’s, he deployed on carriers, frigates, and cruisers in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Additionally, he served as manager of the Navy’s Aerospace Engineers

and as the Special Assistant for Air Combat to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Adm. Steidle commanded the Navy’s F/A–18 Program, naval aviation’s largest

production, research and development program, as well as the largest foreign military sales program. The Secretary of Defense presented Steidle with the Navy’s Outstanding Program Manager Award.

Adm. Steidle served as the Director of the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint

Advanced Strike Technology Office and was the Director of the Joint Strike Fighter

18

Program, DOD’s largest program. Under his command, the Joint Strike Fighter Program was awarded the David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award.

Adm. Steidle earned a Master of Science degree in systems management from the

University of Southern California and a Master of Science degree in aerospace engineering from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. He is a member of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots and a Fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society.

His decorations and honors include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal;

Navy Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Distinguished Flying Cross;

Meritorious Service Medal with gold star; Air Medals with bronze star; Navy Commendation Medals; Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross; and Joint Meritorious

Unit Award.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much.

And now we are going to give the General a chance, General Bob

Dickman, who manages the planning and programming and acquisition of the Air Force Space Systems at the Pentagon. And he has

a great deal of experience in working with NASA and commanded

the Air Force launch wing in Florida. And we welcome you today,

and you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL (RET.) ROBERT S. DICKMAN,

DEPUTY FOR MILITARY SPACE, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Major General DICKMAN. Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss DOD’s close relationship with NASA, and

in particular, our cooperative efforts in space launch.

In particular, I am honored to be here with Admiral Steidle and

Dr. Sega, and Mr. Musk, and our partner in launch, Ms.

Poniatowski. And Karen, I am sorry, I got that—something went

wrong.

Your hearing today underscores the importance to DOD and

NASA and the commercial sector of working together on the challenges in developing launch systems. A healthy and vigorous cooperation, which takes into account the lessons learned from past

ventures, is central to sustaining America’s preeminence in space.

Mr. Chairman, I share your view that there were unintended consequences from that policy of the mid-1990s, but I would point out

that it also led to the two finest expendable launch vehicles flying

in the world today, the Delta IV and the Atlas V.

Let me start off by saying that cooperation between NASA and

the DOD is nothing new, as Craig has pointed out. Civil and DOD

space organizations have worked together since 1958. We share our

commitment to excellence in our space endeavors. Sometimes we

forget that the Atlas and Delta launch vehicles that were the centerpiece of our own launch capability in the military over the last

15 years were developed by NASA and transitioned to military vehicles. There is no issue, then, of whether or not we should cooperate on launch, rather the question is when does the collaboration

make sense.

NASA–DOD collaboration and cooperation in space and in aeronautics makes the most sense when our missions, our requirements, and our technologies are similar. Both NASA and DOD benefit from polling our skills and our limited resources. For instance,

there is a clear advantage to joint DOD and civil efforts in basic

science and technology in areas such as propulsion, materials, avionics, and other launch technologies.

19

However, cooperation is inappropriate when it crosses the line

from civil towards military activities. Tradition and policy dictate

that civil and military space endeavors should remain, and do remain, separate.

On a different level, true joint programs, the field operational

systems that involve funding from multiple agencies and require

design tradeoffs to achieve a common configuration, have proven

both difficult to bring to completion and inordinately expensive.

Given these bounds on when DOD and NASA might work together,

there are many fruitful areas of ongoing and future collaboration.

As I mentioned a moment ago, in the realm of basic science and

technology, the military and civil space communities share many

common interests. Collaborative S&T projects, in addition to the

areas that I mentioned earlier, include sensors, electronics, power

generation, communications, thermal protection systems, structures, test facilities, microsatellite technology, and as you have

noted, detection of near-Earth asteroids. NASA’s Scramjet flight,

now scheduled for March 27, will be an important milestone in our

hypersonics road map. Cooperative development is also underway

through the Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology

Program, a three-phase, 15-year national program to double propulsion capability.

Another major DOD priority is developing operationally responsive space lift. The program to make responsive spacelift a reality

is called FALCON, not to be confused with SpaceX’s Falcon Launch

Vehicle. Our FALCON program is run jointly by the Air Force and

DARPA, and current efforts are focused on concept design. Mr.

Musk’s Falcon is one of the competing designs.

I bring the Committee’s attention to the FALCON program, because NASA has played an important part in those efforts. In particular, the Marshall Space Flight Center is continually consulting

with Air Force Space Command as we have gone through our yearlong operationally responsive spacelift analysis of alternatives.

Our major launch program also has the potential to further

NASA’s space flight efforts, and again, we have a good history of

cooperation. I am speaking, of course, about the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. NASA will use both the EELV boosters, the

Delta IV and the Atlas V, to launch intermediate and heavy payloads. For example, in 2005, they plan to launch the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter on the Atlas V and GOES–N on the Delta IV. In

addition, both the Atlas and Delta boosters have the potential to

be rated for human flight and modified to meet very heavy lift

needs. Should NASA choose to do so, the DOD will work with

NASA to facilitate their efforts.

While EELV is a major arrow in our space launch quiver, the

DOD must continue to look to the future. In this process, we pay

careful attention to encouraging the growth of a domestic launch

market to include emerging commercial space launch providers. A

very appropriate example, considering Mr. Musk’s presence here, is

SpaceX’s Falcon launch vehicle. Later this year, this new launch

vehicle is scheduled to carry a satellite into space, launching from

Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Let me close by saying we appreciate the support the Congress

and this committee have given to help guide and field vital naVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tional space capabilities. We look forward to working with you as

we continue to develop, produce, and operate critical space systems,

both civil and military, for this great nation.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks, and I look

forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Major General Dickman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. DICKMAN

Introduction

While missions and requirements may not always be common, there will always

be obvious synergies that allow a close relationship between the DOD and NASA.

Our shared environment is hazardous, and we will continue to rely on each other’s

experience and continued technical innovation to succeed.

In recent years, the Air Force (AF) and NASA have supported each other in a

wide range of activities. The four major areas of cooperation were centered on interagency coordination, science and technology development, space operations, and

human space flight activities.

NASA–DOD Interagency Coordination

While NASA and DOD have different primary missions, there is significant overlap in the science and technology (S&T) challenges both organizations face. DOD

and NASA are aware of, and recognize this potential for, dual use and therefore,

the importance of cooperation. To facilitate this cooperation, several forums are acting to promote collaborative planning.

Partnership Council—Initially established in February 1997 by Air Force Space

Command (AFSPC) and NASA, this forum is at the most senior level of the planning process. The Partnership Council, consisting of the Honorable Peter B. Teets,

Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director, National Reconnaissance Office

(NRO); Mr. Sean O’Keefe, NASA Administrator; Admiral James Ellis, Commander,

USSTRATCOM; Dr. Ron Sega, Director Defense Research & Engineering; and General Lance Lord, Commander, AFSPC; is the primary forum for high-level discussions between the community. It is intended to achieve efficiencies, effectiveness,

risk reduction, and better understanding of plans and activities in areas of mutual

interest, to include S&T.

Monthly Meeting between Deputy for Military Space, Office of the Under Secretary

of the Air Force; Director, National Security Space Integration; Director, National Security Space Architect; and NASA Space Architect—These National Security Space

(NSS) principals and the NASA Space Architect meet regularly, and as needed, to

improve the intermediate planning process and products, and implement opportunities identified by the Partnership Council.

Space Technology Alliance (STA)—The STA was initiated in 1997 among the AF,

NRO, and NASA to foster cooperative efforts and improve communications.

Other Planning Activities—NASA participates with the NSS community in conducting the annual NSS Program Assessment that, among other things, identifies

interagency S&T cooperation opportunities. NASA also participates in the annual

update of the NSS Plan that provides implementation guidance to the NSS community on desired capabilities, including S&T. In addition, NASA is participating with

the DOD and the Intelligence Community in developing the Congressionally-directed DOD Space S&T Strategy, which will be complete in the summer of 2004.

There are a number of good examples of cooperation and mutual support between

DOD and NASA over our long history of working together. These include launch

and range support, communications, flight experiments, and environmental science.

However, there is always room for improvement. We recognize this as being in the

best interest of the Nation and have therefore taken steps to strengthen our efforts

with the recent initiation of monthly planning meetings and the development of the

Space S&T Strategy.

There are, however, some important differences between NASA and the NSS community—one open by design, and one generally closed for national security reasons.

For the most part, these differences can be overcome on S&T activities through appropriate collaborative planning.

Science and Technology Development

When our missions are common, when our technology requirements are similar,

and when we can make the best use of our nation’s limited space infrastructure,

both NASA and the DOD benefit from cooperative efforts in S&T development.

Whether maneuvering in space, experimenting in space or communicating in space,

21

there is shared workspace that leads to the best possible equipment, processes and

procedures to ensure success, whether the mission is military or civil in nature. In

developing basic technologies for launch systems, materials for use in space activities, or developing infrastructure to command and communicate with our space assets, DOD and NASA cooperation is key to making the most of our space dollars.

When resources, missions, and technologies are purely military in nature, we are

not best served by collaborating. It is important that our civil space activities be

kept free from possible accusations of militarism. While many technologies developed by NASA–DOD collaboration are dual-use in nature, there are some developmental areas that should remain out of bounds.

NPOESS—One of the most important joint collaborative efforts currently underway between NASA and the Air Force is the National Polar-orbiting Operational

Environment System (NPOESS) a tri-agency program of NASA, DOD, and the Department of Commerce (DOC) that converges the DOD and DOC/NOAA polar-orbiting weather satellite programs. NASA, working with NPOESS Integrated Program

Office (IPO), is providing pre-operational risk-reduction demonstration and validation tests for four critical NPOESS sensors that will fly on the NPOESS Preparatory

Project (NPP). NPP is a primary NASA mission that serves as a ‘‘bridge’’ between

the Earth Observation Satellite (EOS) mission and NPOESS. NPP is also a critical

risk reduction mission for the Visual Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS), the

Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS), the Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder

(ATMS), and the Ozone Mapper/Profiler Suite (OMPS) sensors and serves as an

end-to-end test for the Command, Control and Communication (C3) and data processing systems for NPOESS.

DOD Space Test Program—While DOD currently has no requirement for manned

space flight, the S&T community, through the auspices of the DOD Space Test Program, has made excellent use of the Space Shuttle. When necessary, NASA and

DOD have worked to develop new integration methods and hardware to make the

most use of every ounce of available space lift. To date, the Space Test Program has

launched over 200 experiments on over seventy Shuttle missions, including some of

the first science experiments that were carried out on the international Space Station. As part of the effort to provide risk reduction to the NPOESS system, the DOD

Space Test Program launched the Coriolis Mission in January 2003. This mission

hosted both a solar mass ejection imager and WindSat sensor. The WindSat sensor

will be evaluated for use on the NPOESS system.

NASA also assisted the Space Test Program in tests of a new Vibro-Acoustic

Launch Protection Experiment (VALPE). NASA supported two successful sounding

rocket launches from the Wallops Island launch facility. At Cape Canaveral, the AF

supports the launch of NASA payloads, most recently the Spirit and Opportunity

rovers now investigating Mars, from the Eastern and Western ranges.

S&T Forums—In more basic research and development, the AF and NASA collaborate in several major research projects and have several forums set up to facilitate S&T. The three major coordination forums for collaborative work are: the National Thermal Protection Systems (TPS) Working Group, which is led by the AF

and NASA with participation of Army, Navy, Department of Energy (DOE), industry, and academia, and fosters development of new and advanced thermal protection

materials and systems; the National Space and Missile Materials Symposium, which

fosters increased communication and understanding in pursuing key materials technology challenges for space and missiles; and the Air Force Research Laboratory

(AFRL)–Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) Annual Summit, which is held annually to

discuss and coordinate research efforts.

Other areas of research range across the complete spectrum of S&T activities.

NASA and the AF work to track and characterize orbital debris as well as performing asteroid surveys to detect any large objects that are at risk of striking

Earth. Many materials science experiments are carried out to look at environmental

effects of space exposure, as in the DOD Space Test Program MISSE experiments,

as well as high stress/high-cycle experiments on airframe or fuel tank materials. In

the Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology (IHPRPT) Program, AFRL

and NASA have worked to develop a spiral improvement system to the Space Shuttle Main Engines with technology benefits that will help all U.S. next generation

rocket engines. In addition to all of these areas, NASA and the AF collaborate on

other S&T programs that touch on almost every facet of both aviation and space

technologies. For instance, AFRL is teaming with JPL to develop the L–Band antenna for NASA’s space based radar effort.

Even NASA’s Mars exploration mission benefits from AF collaboration with NASA

utilizing AF-developed Rad-6000 32-bit microprocessors and lithium-ion batteries in

both planetary rovers. In addition, AF operational studies provided expertise on

22

human fatigue-related performance issues that will help provide counter-fatigue

strategies for rover operators.

Space Operations

The AF and NASA have existing memoranda of agreement establishing partnerships to support NASA launches with Spacelift Range assets and to pursue advanced launch and test range technologies. The AF’s Spacelift Ranges support all

launch operations for NASA manned and unmanned launches from the Kennedy

Space Center (KSC) or from Vandenberg AFB. Also, at the recommendation of the

Interagency Working Group on Future Management and Use of the U.S. Space

Launch Bases and Ranges, the AF and NASA established the Advanced Range

Technology Working Group (ARTWG), co-chaired by AF Space Command and

NASA–KSC. The ARTWG charter focuses on improving safety, increasing flexibility

and capacity, and lowering range costs in support of future generations of reusable

and expendable launch vehicles. The Joint Base Operating Support Contract

(JBOSC) is a joint procurement effort between KSC NASA and the AF’s 45th Space

Wing (SW) to provide unified base support services for KSC, Cape Canaveral AFS,

and Patrick AFB.

Human Space Flight

AFSPC provided support to NASA (via USSTRATCOM to USNORTHCOM) on the

Columbia accident response and subsequent investigation. Major General John

Barry and Brigadier General Duane Deal, USAF, both served on the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). General Deal also heads the wing (21st SW) responsible for operating the space surveillance network, which assisted in the Columbia investigation. Approximately 20 AFRL personnel from six technology directorates participated in the CAIB via the DOD

Columbia Investigation Support Team. Subject matter expertise was provided in

the fields of non-destructive inspection and test of critical composite structures,

space weather, atmospheric space chemistry and physics, reentry physics, highspeed aerodynamics, aerothermal environments, kapton insulated wiring, ceramic

materials, structural fatigue/fracture failure, and human behavior ‘‘group think’’ decision-making.

In an effort to assist NASA in its return-to-flight activities for the Shuttle fleet,

the AF is assisting in developing and evaluating leading edge repair concepts that

can be applied by astronauts in orbit. To date, 20 specimens from seven different

organizations have been tested with three concepts surviving thermal conditions

representative of flight heat flux and temperature. These three will be studied further to fully characterize the performance of the repair methods and materials and

certify the concepts for flight. The AF is also assisting to analyze and improve the

manual foam spraying operation previously used on the Space Shuttle Columbia ex- ternal tanks.

NASA–DOD Space Organizations

Since 1958, the White House has created several organizational mechanisms to

coordinate civil and military space programs and activities, including R&D investment. These range from President Eisenhower’s Civilian-Military Liaison Committee, which was designed to coordinate NASA and DOD activities, to the Kennedy-Johnson-era National Space Council and Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board, to President Reagan’s National Security Council-led interagency

group, and then to President Clinton’s decision to separate Space Council functions

under the Office of Science and Technology Policy and National Security Council.

The current organization mechanism for coordination between NASA and DOD,

however, is the Partnership Council.

The U.S. can, and always will, explore better ways of coordinating NASA and

DOD space activities. Analysts from both NASA and DOD routinely track developments in space management involving international partners in space cooperation

as well as other spacefaring nations. While it is always beneficial to study how other

countries attack similar problems, we must always be cognizant of the fact that

other countries have different policies, laws, technologies and national security and

civil requirements.

DSB/AFSAB Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space

Programs

We in the DOD have benefited greatly from the recommendations of the joint Defense Science Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board task force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, led by Mr. A. Thomas Young. Mr. Young

is a past Director of the Goddard Space Flight Center, and headed the 1999 NASAchartered review of the Mars Polar Lander loss.

23

Just as in the DOD, during the 1990s, NASA experienced declining budgets, increased acceptance of risk (for example—Faster, Better, Cheaper), unrealized

growth of a commercial space market, increased dependence on space by an expanding user base, and consolidation of the space industrial base.

The Young Panel identified five ‘‘basic reasons’’ for cost growth and schedule

delays in National Security Space programs:

• Cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing space

development programs. . .resulting in excessive technical and schedule risk.

• Unrealistically low cost estimates lead to unrealistic budgets and

unexecutable programs.

• Undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth in system requirements.

• Government capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition process have seriously eroded.

• Industry has failed to implement proven practices on some programs.. . .The

space industrial base is adequate to support current programs, although longterm concerns exist.

Within the DOD, we have taken the Young Panel findings and recommendations

very seriously, and are continuing to implement policy and process changes in response to the Young Panel recommendations. Many of these findings likely have

some applicability to NASA since we share much of the same industrial base and

have experienced similar budget pressures. We have shared the Panel’s results and

our lessons learned with senior NASA leadership during the Partnership Council

and our other interactions.

Conclusion

Historically, the DOD and NASA have fostered a collaborative relationship to

maximize responsive access to space and national space investment strategies, and

we will continue to do so in the future. Both organizations have benefited from this

open exchange of ideas and lessons learned, laying the foundation for future collaborations.

NASA was formed with many DOD centers of excellence as its space-related core.

The Mercury and Gemini missions, for instance, all flew on DOD launch vehicles.

From that time forward, we have continued to collaborate across the full spectrum

of space—launch, communications, sensors, materials, life sciences, and much more.

In many respects, the relationships between NASA and the DOD are as close, or

closer, than they have ever been.

BIOGRAPHY FOR ROBERT S. DICKMAN

Robert S. Dickman is Deputy for Military Space, Office of the Under Secretary

of the Air Force, Washington, D.C. He supports the Under Secretary, who is also

the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, in executing space responsibilities, which include managing the planning, programming and acquisition of space

systems for the Air Force and other military services.

Mr. Dickman was born in Brooklyn, N.Y., grew up in New Jersey, and entered

the Air Force as a distinguished graduate of the ROTC program at Union College,

Schenectady, N.Y. He has had a varied career in space operations, and acquisition

and planning, including being assigned at the Space and Missile Systems Center,

the Pentagon, North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Space Command,

Air Force Space Command, and the National Reconnaissance Office. While serving

on active duty, he was the first Vice Commander of the 2nd (now 50th) Space Wing,

Schriever Air Force Base, Colo., Commander of the 45th Space Wing, Patrick Air

Force Base, Fla., Department of Defense Space Architect, and the senior military

officer at the NRO in Washington, D.C. He retired from active duty in 2000 in the

rank of major general, and was appointed to the Senior Executive Service in March

2002.

EDUCATION

1966—Bachelor’s degree in physics, Union College, Schenectady, N.Y.

1968—Master’s degree in space physics, Air Force Institute of Technology

1976—Distinguished graduate, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force

Base, Ala.

1978—National Security Management Course, National Defense University

1983—Master’s degree in management, Salve Regina College, Newport, R.I.

24

1983—Distinguished graduate, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

CAREER CHRONOLOGY

1. June 1966–June 1968, student, Air Force Institute of Technology

2. June 1968–June 1972, program manager for theoretical and particle physics, Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Arlington, Va.

3. July 1972–May 1973, satellite communications program element monitor,

Directorate of Space, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

4. June 1973–May 1975, terminal systems manager, Air Force Satellite Communications System Program Office, Los Angeles AFB, Calif.

5. June 1976–September 1979, operational manager for military satellite communications, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters

U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

6. October 1979–January 1982, Chief, Implementation Branch, Space Defense

Operations Center, Headquarters Aerospace Defense Command, Cheyenne

Mountain AFB, Colo.

7. February 1982–June 1982, Executive Officer to the Vice Commander in

Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Colorado Springs,

Colo.

8. July 1982–June 1983, student, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

9. July 1983–June 1984, Director of Space Systems, Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations, Headquarters Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.

10. July 1984–June 1985, Chief, Commander’s Group, Headquarters North

American Aerospace Defense Command and Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.

11. July 1985–May 1986, Vice Commander, 2nd Space Wing, Falcon AFB, Colo.

12. June 1986–June 1987, Assistant to the Director of Operations, U.S. Space

Command, later, Director of Missile Warning, Air Force Space Command,

Peterson AFB, Colo.

13. July 1987–June 1989, Chief, Space Systems Division, Directorate of Space

and Strategic Defense Initiative Programs, Washington, D.C.

14. July 1989–June 1992, Deputy Director of Space Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C.

15. July 1992–June 1993, Director of Plans, Headquarters Air Force Space

Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.

16. July 1993–January 1995, Commander, 45th Space Wing, and Director,

Eastern Range, Patrick AFB, Fla., and Cape Canaveral Air Station, Fla.

17. February 1995–September 1995, Director of Space Programs, Office of the

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Washington, D.C.

18. October 1995–June 1998, Department of Defense Space Architect, Washington, D.C.

19. June 1998–August 2000, Director, Office of Plans and Analysis, and System

of Systems Architect; Director, Office of Architectures, Assessments and Acquisition; Director, Corporate Operations Office; and senior military officer,

National Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C.

20. March 2002–present, Deputy for Military Space, Office of the Undersecretary of the Air Force, Washington, D.C.

BADGES

Master Space Badge

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal

Legion of Merit

Defense Meritorious Service Medal

Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster

Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster

25

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

National Reconnaissance Office Gold Medal

1995 Ira Eaker Fellow, Air Force Association

1998 Astronautics Award, National Space Club

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Air Force Association

U.S. Naval Institute

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And we will

have Ron Sega and, of course, Elon Musk, after this. I would—I am

sorry I can’t say short break. It is going to probably be around 40

minutes or 45 minutes. So I appreciate those of you who could stay

around. Elon, you are out in California. I know you are enjoying

yourself out there. And I will be out there tonight. But we will all

be back in 45 minutes. This subcommittee is in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. And so the hearing is called

to order. Our next witness is the Honorable Ron Sega, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, also one of our beloved astronauts

and someone who has seen this firsthand, which we, of course, appreciate your firsthand experience. And he is the Chief Technical

Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all scientific and technical

matters, basic and applied research, and advanced technology development. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RONALD M. SEGA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Dr. SEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to

talk about the Department of Defense’s programs in research and

engineering, particularly in space and aeronautics and DOD’s collaboration with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Thank you for allowing my written testimony to be submitted

for the record.

In addition to discussing some of the specifics of the NASA–DOD

collaboration, it is important to understand how the research and

development program and our activities in space and aeronautics

are integrated within the Department of Defense. We do have several mechanisms for coordination of the R&D activities between

DOD and NASA. One that you heard about was Space Partnership

Council, established in 1997. This Council meets regularly and coordinates space issues. And it is actually meeting more recently

than it has in the past. As a member of the Space Partnership

Council, I believe it is a productive forum to address the overarching DOD–NASA requirements and issues related to space.

One initiative from the Department of Defense and in collaboration with NASA is the National Aerospace Initiative. As I began in

the fall of 2001, it came apparent that there are many studies and

reports in progress, in draft state, and near completion, but there

was a lack of integration among the various efforts. So it was our

goal to look at integrating these activities. And we divided it into

three areas: high-speed hypersonics, space access, and space techVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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nology. And through a series of workshops within government, all

branches of the DOD services and agencies, and NASA looked at

what technologies were a—currently—the state of technology,

which ones were available and opportunities for the future, and

then worked with industry and academia to establish the state of

technology in these three areas and then to provide technology

roadmaps.

One example of a crosscutting program is RASCAL. It is the Responsive Access Small Cargo Affordable Launch program from

DARPA. It combines a high-speed, air-breathing first stage with a

rocket-based upper stage and a small responsive satellite to demonstrate reusable, affordable, and responsive space access. So RASCAL is an innovative approach to space access.

We looked at continuing many programs, because they made

sense, they were part of the roadmap ahead, one was the Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology program,

called IHPTET. It had been a sustained investment from DOD and

NASA and industry since 1988, and it was building a technology

base and meeting milestones. Another example of an ongoing program was a Hypersonic Flight Demonstration Program, called

HyFly, a program that is funded by DARPA and the Navy, in collaboration with NASA, universities, and industry. I personally visited the Langley Research Center during the summer of 2002, and

they were testing in the Mach 6.2 to Mach 6.5 range in the eightfoot tunnel and the effective altitudes of 85,000 to 100,000 feet.

And I believe that the work was being done in a very positive and

effective way.

Recent additional programs, after doing this analysis, were several. Two examples would include a Single Engine Demonstration

program at DARPA, Air Force funded program in the same flight

regime of Mach 7 with a first flight target around 2008. A second

example is FALCON, which you have heard about earlier, that provides technologies toward small launch vehicles, a Common Aero

Vehicle for thermal protection system and aerodynamics as well as

a hypersonic cruise vehicle.

An ongoing program that looks at rocket propulsion is IHPRPT,

Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology program. I

concur with Bob Dickman’s assessment that this is a good program.

It is a 15-year effort focused on developing measurable, affordable,

and goal-directed rocket propulsion technologies. We believe the

payoffs could be quite positive in that program. An example inside

of IHPRPT is an Integrated Powerhead Demonstration, IPD. This

is a key demonstration that is a joint NASA–Air Force project, and

it is scheduled for engine testing at the NASA Stennis Space Center in 2005. They have had four successful component demonstrations over the last 18 months. It is a new flow engine cycle, and

it should enable an increase in rocket engine reliability and mission life as well as reducing maintenance time and cost.

In terms of developing a space science and technology strategy,

the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004 requires the Secretary of Defense to development, implement, and

annually review and revise a space science and technology strategy.

As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, I am charged

to jointly develop and implement this strategy with the Under SecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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retary of the Air Force, who is the Department of Defense’s Executive Agent for space.

We are actively working with the Department’s research laboratories, the Defense Advance Research Projects Agency, DARPA,

National Reconnaissance Office, and the Missile Defense Agency

through a space S&T strategy team to develop and implement this

strategy.

And finally, the Department of Defense and NASA’s research and

development programs support building the technology base to enable future capabilities. Since the days of Chuck Yeager, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and the Bell X–1 that

broke the sound barrier, the DOD has conducted a broad range of

cooperative and collaborative programs with NACA and now

NASA. Recently, the National Aerospace Initiative technology

plans provided an integrated technology roadmap and outlined the

requisite investments to enable critical military and civil capabilities. We are excited about the synergies that can be derived as we

work collaboratively to achieve our common science and technology

goals.

And thank you for allowing me to appear before your committee.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sega follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD M. SEGA

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to talk about the Department of Defense’s (DOD) research

and engineering programs in space and aeronautics and DOD’s collaboration with

National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA). In addition to discussing some specifics of DOD–NASA collaboration, it is also important to understand how the research and development (R&D) activities for space and aeronautics technologies

within the Department of Defense are integrated. There are several mechanisms for

coordination of R&D activities between DOD and NASA.

Space Partnership Council

Since 1997, the Space Partnership Council (SPC) has been, and continues to be,

a very productive mechanism for DOD–NASA collaboration and program coordination. The SPC addresses overarching DOD–NASA requirements and issues related

to space. The council is comprised of the following members:

Under Secretary of the Air Force/Director of National Reconnaissance Office

Commander of Air Force Space Command

Commander of United States Strategic Command

Director of Defense Research and Engineering

Administrator of NASA

The Council meets regularly and coordinates space issues, such as technology development to enable goals like transformational space access, and operational space

capabilities.

National Aerospace Initiative

Collaborative efforts between DOD and NASA over the past several years have

been encompassed in the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI). NAI is a focused effort to coordinate technology development and demonstrations in three key aerospace technology areas, which are the pillars of the NAI. The three pillars are high

speed and hypersonic flight; space access; and space technologies. Beginning as a

concept in 2001, NAI has matured and supported development of integrated technology plans. One program that highlights the potential synergy gained between the

pillars is the Responsive Access, Small Cargo, Affordable Launch (RASCAL) DARPA

program. RASCAL is a program that combines a high speed air breathing first

stage, with rocket-based upper stages, and a small responsive satellite to demonstrate a reusable, affordable, responsive space access system. RASCAL is a five

year program to demonstrate the feasibility of coupled high speed/hypersonic flight,

28

affordable access to space and small payload systems. Beyond RASCAL, extensive

collaborations have occurred in research and development in all three areas.

Through a series of workshops convened by DOD and NASA, which were followed

by input from outside the government, detailed goals, objectives, technical challenges and approaches were developed.

NAI supports many important continuing programs such as the Integrated High

Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET)/Versatile Affordable Advanced

Turbine Engines (VAATE) projects. VAATE is a successful collaborative program

that started in 1988, and involved DOD, NASA, and industry to have a long-term,

focused research program to improve turbine engine technology. IHPTET is currently developing a common core to be used in the various commercial and military

engines. The industry match has been an important component of the in IHPTET

program. This turbine engine technology development is essential to many future

government and commercial aerospace systems.

Each of the three pillars has significant activity. For high speed/hypersonic flight,

the Hypersonic Flight Demonstration Program, known as HyFly, is a jointly funded

program by DARPA and Office of Naval Research. The objective of HyFly is to develop and demonstrate, in flight, advanced technologies for hypersonic flight with

near-term emphasis on a missile application. The HyFly hypersonic strike missile

demonstrator vehicle is powered by a Dual Combustion Ramjet (DCR) engine. A

DCR engine performance at Mach 6.5 was demonstrated on a full-scale model in

freejet testing at NASA Langley Research Center in 2002. Its first powered flight

in the atmosphere is expected in approximately one year.

Another example of an advanced prototype hypersonic missile is the Single Engine Demonstration (SED). SED will integrate the United States Air Force

Hypersonic Technology (HyTech) engine with air vehicle technologies developed by

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The project involves government, industry, and academic hypersonic researchers and builds on previous DOD–NASA efforts. This exciting new demonstration will be flight tested by the end of the decade.

The flight vehicle will be propelled by a hydrocarbon supersonic combustion ramjet

(scramjet), and should ultimately achieve a Mach 7 to 8 flight. Success of HyFly and

SED could enable a new aviation flight regime, historically analogous to the revolutionary introduction of the jet engine to propeller-driven aircraft.

The second area of significant collaboration is in our access to space access pillar.

A long-term government/industry effort for advancing rocket propulsion is the Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology (IHPRPT) program. The IHPRPT

is a three phase, 15-year national program to double space/missile propulsion capability, decrease cost and increase reliability by 2010, using government-industry

partnership. A key element under IHPRPT is the joint NASA–Air Force project

called the Integrated Powerhead Demonstration (IPD), which should culminate in

the completion of engine testing at NASA’s Stennis Space Center in 2005. Four successful component demonstrations have occurred in the past 18 months. This new

liquid engine cycle should enable a 25 percent increase in rocket engine reliability,

a 200-mission life for the engine, and a reduction in maintenance time and cost. The

DOD–NASA cooperation, leading to the IPD full-flow cycle engine, should result in

enhanced reusable and expendable space vehicle propulsion.

Another program which is jointly funded by DARPA and the Air Force is known

as FALCON (Force Application and Launch from CONUS). FALCON is a new program to develop a Small Launch Vehicle (SLV), a Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), and

a Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle (HCV). An initial goal is a rocket boosted glide vehicle

capable of delivering 1,000 pounds at a distance of 3,000. Initial phases of FALCON

are on-going and will demonstrate the aerodynamic properties of the flight vehicles.

This program is envisioned to mature to a hypersonic glide plane capable of delivering 12,000 lbs. over 9,000 miles. Thus, the FALCON program should demonstrate

and validate in-flight technologies that should enable both a near-term and far-term

capability to execute time-critical, prompt global reach missions while at the same

time, demonstrating affordable and responsive space lift.

Space Science and Technology Strategy

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 requires that the

Secretary of Defense develop, implement and, annually review and revise a space

science and technology (S&T) strategy. As the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, I am charged to jointly develop and implement this strategy with the

Under Secretary of the Air Force, who is the Department of Defense’s Executive

Agent for Space. The space S&T strategy is focused on short-term and long-term

goals within the Department, the process of achieving these goals, and the process

for assessing these goals. We are actively working with the Department’s research

laboratories and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), NaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
29

tional Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Missile Defense Agency (MDA) through a

space S&T strategy team to develop and implement this strategy. This Space

Science and Technology Strategy will be incorporated in the National Security Space

Plan.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense and NASA research and development programs support building the technology base to enable future capabilities. Since the days of

Chuck Yeager and the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) X–1

that broke the sound barrier, the DOD has conducted a broad range of cooperative

and collaborative programs with NACA now known as NASA. Recently, the National Aerospace Initiative technology plans have provided integrated technology

roadmaps, and outlined the requisite investments to enable critical military and

civil capabilities. We are excited about the synergies that can be derived as we work

collaboratively to achieve our common science and technology goals and transformational objectives.

BIOGRAPHY FOR RONALD M. SEGA

The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director of Defense Research and Engineering

(DDR&E), is the chief technical advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD–AT&L) for scientific and technical matters, basic and applied research, and advanced technology

development. Dr. Sega also has management oversight for the Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency (DARPA). [Defense Research and Development official

functions]

Dr. Sega has had an extensive career in academia, research, and government

service. He began his academic career as a faculty member in the Department of

Physics at the U.S. Air Force Academy. His research activities in electromagnetic

fields led to a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Colorado. He

was appointed as Assistant Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer

Engineering at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in 1982. In addition

to teaching and research activities, he also served as the Technical Director of the

Laser and Aerospace Mechanics Directorate at the F.J. Seiler Research Laboratory

and at the University of Houston as the Assistant Director of Flight Programs and

Program Manager for the Wake Shield Facility. Dr. Sega became the Dean College

of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs in

1996. Dr. Sega has authored or co-authored over 100 technical publications and was

promoted to Professor in 1990. He is also a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and

Electronic Engineers and the Institute for the Advancement of Engineering.

In 1990, Dr. Sega joined NASA, becoming an astronaut in July 1991. He served

as a mission specialist on two Space Shuttle Flights, STS–60 in 1994, the first joint

U.S. Russian Space Shuttle Mission and the first flight of the Wake Shield Facility,

and STS–76 in 1996, the third docking mission to the Russian space station Mir

where he was the Payload Commander. He was also the Co-Principal Investigator

for the Wake Shield Facility and the Director of Operations for NASA activities at

the Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, Russia, in 1994–95.

Dr. Sega has also been active in the Air Force Reserves. A Command Pilot in the

Air Force with over 4,000 hours, he has served in various operational flying assignments, including a tour of duty as an Instructor Pilot. From 1984 to 2001, as a reservist assigned to Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), he held positions in planning analysis and operational activities, including Mission Ready Crew Commander

for satellite operations—Global Positioning System (GPS)—Defense Support Program (DSP), and Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX), etc. He was promoted to the

rank of Major General in the Air Force Reserves in July 2001.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And I have

some questions for you when we get back—or get past our final

witness, which is—who is, I might say, Elon Musk, the CEO of

SpaceX, an entrepreneurial launch company developing a new family of rockets. He is speaking to us on a video link from Los Angeles Air Force Base. And we welcome you, Mr. Musk, and you may

proceed.

30

STATEMENT OF MR. ELON MUSK, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,

SPACE EXPLORATION TECHNOLOGIES

Mr. MUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you can hear me

okay.

It is an honor to be here with Admiral Steidle, Bob Dickman, Dr.

Sega, and Ms. Poniatowski, I guess in the question period.

It is common knowledge that the U.S. launch industry is noncompetitive. An appropriate comparison is the U.S. auto industry

of the 1970s, prior to entry of the Japanese. However, that would

be quite generous. At no point during that period did General Motors decide, as Boeing has recently done, that they would only service government customers.

In the case of launch vehicles, the noncompetitiveness is so great

that SpaceX is confident of not just a significant improvement in

reliability, but also of maintaining a several fold price reduction.

Hopefully, this will stimulate the other three U.S. launch vehicle

companies to reexamine their processes, as GM and Ford did in

their time, and provide a better and lower cost product to their customers.

I am also optimistic that the success of SpaceX will result in

other entrepreneurial companies entering the space business, both

in launch and the manufacture of lower cost spacecraft. Some look

at the cost of launch and comment that it only represents a portion

of the total mission cost. This is a very naı ̈ve conclusion. In fact,

it all starts with launch. If you are paying $5,000 a pound for

something in orbit, you will naturally pay up to $5,000 a pound to

save weight on your satellite, creating a vicious circle of cost inflation.

The result is a cost impedance match between the spacecraft and

the launch vehicle, but it is driven by the launch vehicle. If you

could launch for much lower cost and manifest quickly, that satellite would cost a lot less. A case example is TacSat–1, the DOD

satellite on the maiden flight of Falcon I.

The benefits and risks for the U.S. launch industry of NASA–

DOD collaboration, the most significant would be automatic crosscertification of a new launch vehicle. If a launch vehicle is found

to be satisfactory for a DOD satellite, then it should be satisfactory

for NASA, and vice versa.

That is currently not the case. For example, the Boeing Delta IV

and Lockheed Atlas V have had to undergo separate DOD and

NASA on-ramp processes. The result is greater expense to the taxpayer and those companies. SpaceX is in a similar position where

we are undergoing a DOD review of our Falcon launch vehicle by

the Aerospace Corporation, but will later have to repeat the process

for NASA.

The biggest risk to launch vehicle development from NASA–DOD

collaboration would be excessive requirements accumulation, as occurred with the Space Shuttle. In my experience, having personally

developed extremely complex technology systems, it is critical that

the number of people determining requirements be kept very small

and consist of only the most talented and experienced personnel.

Otherwise, one may be faced with requirements that are easily addressed individually, but not combined. Asking that a product serve

31

as either a floor wax or a dessert topping is fine, but not both at

the same time. It won’t be a tasty dish.

Recommendations for how NASA and the DOD can support

emerging U.S. launch companies. Okay. Number one, buy an early

launch. Although our launch vehicle has been an entirely private

development, the DOD has been very supportive by purchasing the

first flight. Here we would like to express our thanks to Air Force

Space Command, the Force Transformation group in the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, and the Naval Research Laboratory. Our

country should be proud of those organizations and what they are

doing to strengthen our capabilities in space.

To date, there has been limited dialogue with SpaceX initiated

by the launch vehicle procurement office of NASA. This may be a

function, historically, of the Code M office believing that they have

no mandate to foster new U.S. launch providers. We recommend

that this be established as an explicit goal and that NASA offer to

buy the first, or at least an early launch, of a new vehicle. A promising sign is the funding allocation in the proposed NASA budget,

referred to as the Small Payload Launch Initiative.

All right. Number two, streamline the regulatory process. Obtaining approval to launch from the government ranges is a very

complex process. Once SpaceX has completed this process for the

Falcon, we will work with the Air Force to provide recommendations for how it can be streamlined for other emerging launch providers. This will not benefit SpaceX, as we already will have had

our approval. We will do it simply because it is a good thing for

our country, and the cause of space exploration will be greater

served.

Number three, increase and extend the use of prizes. The strategy of offering prizes for achievements in space technology can pay

enormous dividends. History is replete with examples of prizes

spurring great achievements, such as the Orteig Prize, famously

won by Charles Lindbergh, and the longitude prize for ocean navigation. The subjectivity and error of proposal evaluation is removed, and the solution may be, in a way and from a company,

that no one ever expected. We strongly endorse and urge Congress

to support and extend the proposed Centennial Prizes put forward

in the recent NASA budget. No dollar spent on space research will

yield a greater value for the American people than those prizes.

What unique capabilities might emerging launch providers offer

to NASA and the DOD? Well, number one, reliability. Current

launch vehicles are considered to be ‘‘reliable’’ if their failure rate

is only one in fifty. In any other mode of transport, this would be

considered outrageously unreliable. New companies might ultimately provide reliability levels more comparable with airline

transportation.

In the case of SpaceX, we believe that our second-generation vehicle, in particular, the Falcon V, will provide a factor of ten improvement in propulsion reliability. Falcon V will be the first U.S.

launch vehicle since the Saturn V Moon rocket that can complete

its mission even if an engine fails in flight, like almost all commercial aircraft.

Number two, cost. Citing an inability to sell rockets commercially, the incumbent launch providers are dramatically increasing

32

their prices, forcing NASA and the DOD to do fewer missions while

paying more and more. The effect is material, severe, and gets

worse every year. For a given budget, this obviously results in

being forced to cancel missions that might otherwise have flown.

Apart from public relations, there is no practical difference between

a mission that was canceled for cost reasons and one that failed for

other reasons. Either way, you have lost the mission.

In contrast, the SpaceX launch vehicles are commercially competitive worldwide in price and are only a fraction of the cost of our

U.S. competitors. Moreover, we expect to decrease our prices in

real, if not absolute terms every year.

Factoring in overhead, as anyone could tell by visiting our headquarters, SpaceX can provide a launch vehicle at half the price of

both Boeing or Lockheed. We have made significant strides in each

of the technical cost drivers, which I would be happy to address in

the question period.

Number three, responsiveness. If space assets are needed to

cover a particular geography or replace an unexpected loss of coverage, they can not be deployed in time with the existing launch

providers. Emerging launch vehicle companies can provide, and

dramatically improve, response time.

Four, flight environment. Existing rockets provide a terrible

flight environment for satellites that is extreme in noise, vibration,

shock, and g loading. These factors drive much of a satellite’s design, despite the fact that it sees these loads for only the first 10

to 15 minutes required to reach orbit. For the remaining years of

life, being in microgravity, the satellite sees essentially zero load.

New launch vehicles, like the Falcon, provide a much better

flight environment, thus making the satellite design easier and the

satellite itself more likely to reach orbit.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Musk follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ELON MUSK

How would you characterize the state of the U.S. space launch industry?

It is common knowledge that the U.S. space launch industry is fundamentally uncompetitive. An appropriate comparison one could draw is the U.S. auto industry

of the 1970’s, prior to entry of the Japanese. However, that would be quite flattering. At no point during that period did General Motors decide, as Boeing has recently done, that they would only service government customers.

One must be cautious, therefore, in reaching launch vehicle economics conclusions

that are based on historical U.S. costs. What the reliability and price of launch

should be cannot be determined by looking at Boeing and Lockheed, any more than

one could properly draw conclusions about automobile reliability and pricing by

looking at a 1975 Pinto or Cadillac.

Please note that I emphasize and place reliability ahead of price. The Japanese

automobiles, especially in the 1980’s with the adoption of total quality management

techniques, were not just lower cost, but also of much greater reliability. The latter

was arguably a bigger determinant of their success than price.

In the case of launch vehicles, the level of uncompetitiveness is so great that we

at SpaceX are confident of not just a significant improvement in reliability, but also

of establishing and maintaining a several fold price reduction. Hopefully, this will

stimulate the other three U.S. launch vehicle companies to re-examine their processes, as GM and Ford did in their time, and provide a better and lower cost product

to their customers.

I am also optimistic that the success of SpaceX will result in other entrepreneurial companies entering the space business, both in launch and the manufacture

of lower cost spacecraft. Some look at the cost of launch and comment that it only

33

represents a portion of the total mission cost. This is a very naı ̈ve conclusion. In

fact, it all starts with launch cost. If you are paying $5000/lb. to put something in

orbit, you will naturally pay up to $5000/lb. to save weight on your satellite, creating a vicious circle of cost inflation.

The result is a cost impedance match between the spacecraft and the launch vehicle, but it is driven by the launch vehicle. If you could launch for much lower cost

and manifest quickly, instead of the two years advance notice required to launch

in the U.S., that satellite would cost a lot less. A case example is TacSat–1, the

DOD satellite on the maiden flight of Falcon I.

What are the benefits and risks for the U.S. domestic launch industry, including

emerging U.S. launch vehicle providers, if NASA and the Department of Defense

(DOD) collaborated more in the development and purchases of launch vehicles?

The most significant benefit for the U.S. launch industry from greater NASA–

DOD collaboration would be automatic cross-certification of a new launch vehicle.

If a launch vehicle is found to be satisfactory for launch of a Department of Defense

satellite, then it should be satisfactory for NASA and vice versa.

That is currently not the case. For example, in the EELV program, both the Boeing Delta IV and Lockheed Atlas V have had to undergo separate DOD and NASA

certification or on-ramp processes. The result is greater expense to the taxpayer and

the aforementioned companies. SpaceX is in a similar position, where we are undergoing a DOD review of our Falcon launch vehicle by Aerospace Corporation, but will

later have to repeat the process for NASA.

The biggest risk to a launch vehicle development from NASA–DOD collaboration

in a development program would be excessive requirements accumulation, as occurred with the Space Shuttle. In my experience, having personally developed extremely complex technology systems, it is critical that the number of people determining requirements be kept very small and consist of only the most talented and

experienced personnel. Otherwise, one may be faced with requirements that are easily addressed individually, but not combined. Asking that a product serve as either

floor wax or a dessert topping is fine, but not both at the same time.

What specific recommendations would you make for how NASA and the DOD can

encourage the healthy growth of the U.S. domestic launch market, especially for

emerging commercial launch providers?

Buy an Early Launch

Although our Falcon launch vehicle has been an entirely private development, the

DOD has been very supportive by purchasing the first flight. Here we would like

to express our thanks to Air Force Space Command, the Force Transformation group

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Naval Research Laboratory. Our

country should be proud of those organizations and what they are doing to strengthen our capabilities in space.

To date, there has been limited dialogue with SpaceX initiated by the launch vehicle procurement office of NASA. This may be a function historically of the Code M

office operating under the assumption that they have no mandate to foster new U.S.

launch providers. We recommend that this be established as an explicit goal and

that NASA offer to buy the first or at least an early launch of a new vehicle, even

if only on a success contingency basis. A promising sign is the funding allocation

in the proposed NASA budget referred to as the Small Payload Launch Initiative.

Streamline the Regulatory Process

Obtaining approval to launch from the government ranges is a very complex and

arduous process. Once SpaceX has completed this process for the Falcon I, we will

work with the Air Force to provide a series of recommendations for how this can

be streamlined, without sacrificing safety, for other emerging launch providers.

Please note that this will not benefit SpaceX, as we will have already received our

approval. We will do it simply because it is a good thing for our country and the

cause of space exploration will be greater served.

Increase and Extend the Use of Prizes

The strategy of offering prizes for achievements in space technology or launch vehicle development milestones can pay enormous dividends. We are beginning to see

how powerful this can be by observing the recent DARPA Grand Challenge and the

X–Prize. History is replete with examples of prizes spurring great achievements,

such as the Orteig Prize, famously won by Charles Lindbergh, and the Longitude

prize for ocean navigation.

Few things stoke the fires of American creativity and ingenuity more than competing for a prize in fair and open competition. The result is an efficient Darwinian

34

exercise with the subjectivity and error of proposal evaluation removed. The best

means of solving the problem will be found and that solution may be in a way and

from a company that no-one ever expected.

We strongly endorse and urge Congress to support and extend the proposed Centennial Prizes put forward in the recent NASA budget. No dollar spent on space research will yield greater value for the American people than those prizes.

What unique capabilities do emerging launch vehicle providers, like SpaceX, provide

to NASA and the DOD?

The service of space transportation is defined by four variables: reliability, cost,

responsiveness and payload environment. Emerging launch vehicle providers can

provide breakthroughs in all areas.

Reliability

Current launch vehicles are considered by NASA and the DOD to be ‘‘reliable’’ if

their failure rate is only one in fifty. In any other mode of transport, this would

be considered outrageously unreliable. New companies might ultimately provide reliability levels more comparable with airline transportation.

In the case of SpaceX, we believe that our second generation vehicle in particular,

the Falcon V, will provide a factor of ten improvement in propulsion reliability. Falcon V will be the first U.S. launch vehicle since the Saturn V Moon rocket that can

complete its mission even if an engine fails in flight—like almost all commercial aircraft. In fact, Saturn V, which had a flawless flight record, was able to complete

its mission on two occasions only because it had engine out redundancy.

Cost

Citing an inability to sell rockets commercially, the incumbent launch vehicle providers are dramatically increasing their prices, forcing NASA and the DOD to do

fewer and fewer missions while paying more and more. The effect is material, severe

and gets worse every year. For a given budget, this obviously results in being forced

to cancel missions that might otherwise have flown. Apart from public relations,

there is no practical difference between a mission that was canceled for cost reasons

and one that failed for other reasons. Either way, you have lost the mission.

In contrast, the SpaceX launch vehicles are commercially competitive worldwide

in price and are only a fraction the cost of our U.S. competitors. Moreover, we expect

to decrease our prices in real, if not absolute, terms every year.

Launch vehicle pricing is driven by five factors: company overhead, engine costs,

airframe costs, avionics costs and launch operations (including payload integration

and range costs). Factoring in overhead alone, as anyone could tell by visiting our

headquarters, SpaceX can produce a launch vehicle at half the price of Boeing or

Lockheed. We have also made significant strides in each of the technical cost drivers, although time does not allow me to address each in detail. I would be happy

to do so in the question period.

Responsiveness

The minimum time from contract signing to launch for incumbent U.S. launch

companies is approximately two years. For the DOD in particular, this means a very

constrained ability to respond quickly to threats as they develop. If space assets are

needed either to cover a particular geography or replace an unexpected loss of coverage, they cannot be deployed in time. Emerging launch vehicle companies, like

SpaceX, will provide a response time measured in months or weeks.

Payload Flight Environment

Existing rockets provide a terrible flight environment for satellites that is extreme

in noise, vibration, shock and g-loading. These factors drive much of a satellite’s design, despite the fact that it only sees these loads for the 10 to 15 minutes required

to reach orbit. For the remaining years of life, being in microgravity, the satellite

sees essentially zero load.

New launch vehicles, like the Falcon, provide a much better flight environment,

thus making the satellite design easier and the satellite itself more likely to reach

orbit safely.

BIOGRAPHY FOR ELON MUSK

SpaceX is the third company founded by Mr. Musk. Prior to SpaceX, he co-founded PayPal, the world’s leading electronic payment system, and served as the company’s Chairman and CEO. PayPal has over twenty million customers in 38 countries, processes several billion dollars per year and went public on the NASDAQ

35

under PYPL in early 2002. Mr. Musk was the largest shareholder of PayPal until

the company was acquired by eBay for $1.5 billion in October 2002.

Before PayPal, Mr. Musk co-founded Zip2 Corporation in 1995, a leading provider

of enterprise software and services to the media industry, with investments from

The New York Times Company, Knight-Ridder, MDV, Softbank and the Hearst Corporation. He served as Chairman, CEO and Chief Technology Officer and in March

1999 sold Zip2 to Compaq for $307 million in an all cash transaction.

Mr. Musk’s early experience extends across a spectrum of advanced technology industries, from high energy density ultra-capacitors at Pinnacle Research to software

development at Rocket Science and Microsoft. He has a physics degree from the

University of Pennsylvania, a business degree from Wharton and originally came

out to California to pursue graduate studies in energy physics at Stanford.

DISCUSSION

NASA’S POLICIES TOWARD THE USE OF NEW LAUNCH

VEHICLES

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Musk.

And we will have some questions now. I would like to ask—first

of all, thank you to all of the witnesses for their testimony, of

course, but before we proceed, I would like to ask Ms. Karen

Poniatowski to come to the witness table. And as NASA’s Assistant

Associate Administrator for Launch Services, she will be joining

the Admiral in answering some of these questions. And of course,

the first question, which I will pose to both of you, is NASA’s. What

we have heard today, especially from Mr. Musk just there, is that

current NASA policy forbids NASA to contract for launch services

unless the type of rocket being used has performed at least one

successful flight. NASA’s policy was put in place in the mid-1990s

after several rockets failed.

Now we have heard that the DOD does not have this same policy. And in fact, Mr. Musk, who has spent a considerable amount

of his own money, has been investing in a new rocket system, because he is being given the opportunity by the Department of Defense. Now shouldn’t NASA be providing this same sort of incentive

for people like Mr. Musk to invest their money into launch systems? And you may answer those questions.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. Thank you. Yes, you are accurate. That is the policy. What we have launched is generally oneof-a-kind, significant investment, and Karen was here when that

policy was put together, so she is going to extrapolate from here

on where and why we are doing that.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Yeah. Thank you for the opportunity, Mr.

Rohrabacher and Committee, to sort of address some of these

issues, particularly with the emerging companies. I followed the

small launch companies for, I hate to say it, almost 20 years now.

I started when I was very, very young.

Mr. MUSK. I am having a problem. It is very difficult to hear unless you speak directly to the mike.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Okay. Is that better?

Mr. MUSK. Yes, that is much better. Thank you.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. Go right ahead.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Okay. And so what we have been watching is

an ebb and flow in this particular market class. If you go back to

the early ’90s, you will see, with DARPA, they developed an emerging launch capability that was Orbital Science’s Pegasus, and it

36

had some initial start-up failures but then became a very robust,

reliable system. In the mid-’90s, NASA sponsored and did fly on

the first and only launch of the Conestoga commercial launch vehicle. Unfortunately, that ended in failure. We flew on the first of the

Athena I launch vehicles after their first test flight was a failure.

We flew the first Athena II mission, and so we do, indeed, have a

history of flying on vehicles with no flight history.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. That—does that cost NASA a lot of

money to do that, is that why the policy changed?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. No, not at all. What the policy actually did is

it tried to say, ‘‘We need to take flight history into consideration.’’

The actual policy allows us to fly payloads with no—to fly on vehicles with no flight history. What has happened—what we did is we

set up a process that identified payloads that had the level of risk

that could tolerate a first flight with a new vehicle, missions that

needed at least one flight, and those high-value kinds of missions

that needed a more demonstrated flight history as one of the conditions when we looked at making a mission assignment.

What has happened is, over the past few years, we don’t have

many requirements that have been able to tolerate that risk, and

in tandem with that, as we have worked with the emerging community of which, at any given time, there is nine to ten different

entities that would like to enter the rocket business, we have seen

an influx of international capability in the small class that has

really hurt the domestic capability in that market niche. And that

really has been the biggest threat that we have seen for some of

the emerging companies not being able to get access. There is not

a lot of demand. On average, NASA’s requirements in this class

run one to two flights per year. The DOD is in a similar position,

so the overall demand is not particularly robust in this kind of a

class. But we do look forward to working with vehicles, companies

like SpaceX. We have met with Elon a number of occasions.

The other is NASA is—will not be able to be the first launch on

Falcon since the DOD got there first, but we do have a small technology payload, Spacetech VI, which had been planning to fly as an

instrument on a commercial bus team encounter, they had been

looking at making arrangements for a launch, and they are subsequently now, I believe, in discussions with Mr. Musk on flying

that——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, let me get this straight in

what we are saying here. You are suggesting that there has not

been a policy of no first use, but that you judge—you are making

judgments based on risk——

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Right.

Chairman ROHRABACHER.—and you just haven’t found one yet, or

have you found one that I don’t know about, that is worth the risk?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. And as I said, the Spacetech VI, the current

payload we are discussing right now——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Correct.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Correct.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Correct. But over the last, what, five

or 10 years, that has not been the case.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. That is correct.

37

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. So this is the first one in how

many years?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. 1997.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. So about six or seven years

now.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Yeah, we did have—I think you are familiar

with the University Explorer program. And those were small payloads we were trying to look at in that capability. It ended up, at

that point, there weren’t any small launch vehicles, so we flew

those as half of the Pegasus——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. How many satellites do we have waiting to be launched?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. In this payload class, on average, about one

to two per year.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. How many do we have waiting

now to be launched?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. I don’t have any that aren’t tied to a mission

vehicle. I have none pending.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. There are no pending satellites

of this class that need a transportation system?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Not that aren’t assigned right now.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Because all of these other satellites that are waiting are larger satellites that are——

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Right. Correct. Yeah, we have got some that

we are starting to look at new missions downstream, but right now,

the missions we have are manifested on a vehicle today.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Mr. Musk, does that satisfy you

and the private sector, that answer?

Mr. MUSK. If it were the—that the TMA counter satellites, I

think we are working through that possibility of launch, and hopefully that works out. The sense I get though, and we can provide

more detail on this outside of this forum, is that there are actually—that there are more satellites that wish to go up than one or

two a year. And in particular, there were satellites and payloads

and so forth that might otherwise have gone up on the Space Shuttle, which obviously could not go up on the Space Shuttle today,

and even when it is flying, there is quite a backlog. So I——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. So there is a backlog? Now you are

suggesting, is there a backlog of the smaller satellites that—is that

what you are saying?

Mr. MUSK. I—that is my understanding, yes.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. We have got a little contradiction here.

How about that, Karen?

Mr. MUSK. That is my idea.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Yeah. There are instruments——

Mr. MUSK. The biggest distinction between satellites which are

destined to go up by themselves and satellites which might otherwise have gone up as hitchhikers or as payloads on the Space Shuttle, which still need to go up, but are not considered distinct travels

by themselves.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. Let me see——

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Yeah.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Let me get to the heart of that matter.

Were you just referring to all satellites or are you referring to just

38

the ones that aren’t going to be hitchhiking? I mean, are there satellites that are small satellites that were going up on the Shuttle

that you weren’t counting?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Yeah. The difference is when you fly an expendable launch vehicle, it means that you bring with you a bus

that has your power, your resources to be able to deploy that spacecraft and then use it in space. Many—most of the payloads that we

flew as secondaries on the Shuttle, they take their power from the

Shuttle, and so you can’t transpose something like the gascan payloads that we fly, those are on a one for one transfer to be able to

say you are going to fly on an expendable space vehicle.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. So these satellites that Mr. Musk is referring to——

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Right.

Chairman ROHRABACHER.—are not satellites that a rocket that

he is developing could put into space?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Not without an additional reformatting of

those payloads. Some of them need to be returned. Some of those

payloads need to have intervention; they need a switch turned on

or off. And these types of payloads have tended to be very small,

50-kilogram types of payloads.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Um-hum.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. In the case of gas, you have got predominately

university community in that the payload value—what they do is

they basically pay us $50,000 for that kind of a——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And that has to be all done on the

Shuttle you are suggesting?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Correct.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Is that your understanding, Mr. Musk,

that all of these things have to be done on the Shuttle?

Mr. MUSK. Well, they have basically been intended for the Shuttle, and in some cases you get satellites which are relatively selfcontained, and in some cases, they are more sort of instruments,

but there is still that need that exists for them to go to space. And

the Shuttle is not going to be able to meet that need, which I think,

therefore, points one in the direction of adding the necessary

functionality to those payloads—to those satellites as such that

they can be launched on something like the Falcon I or other

launch vehicles, because the alternative is that nothing happens to

them and they stay on Earth.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I think—well, why don’t we give Karen

the last word for this one?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Yeah, and that is why what the agencies put

forward is the new Payload Launch Initiative, which is allowing us

to put some money in the budget to start looking at some of these

new flight opportunities that may arise, again, and partnering with

both DARPA and with the Air Force Space Test Program, ways

that we might be able to join some of these and do some joint missions and fly some of those payloads. That is why, as we have been

retiring the capability on the Shuttle, we are looking at can we

prime the pump, so to speak, and make some opportunities for

some of these missions.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I would like to end this part of the discussion, and then I will go to Mr. Lampson, with a general. It

39

seems like the Air Force is willing to do this, but we are not willing—we are not getting much response from the Navy and NASA

here. What——

Major General DICKMAN. Well, if the Navy doesn’t launch their

own——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I am sorry. I shouldn’t blame the Admiral for the Navy. I should just—you are in NASA now, Admiral.

Major General DICKMAN. The unwritten policy of the DOD is not

particularly different than the one NASA uses. We judge the material of the launch vehicle and the mission criticality of the payload.

For example, the first heavy-lift EELV, Delta IV, will fly without

a payload, because we are going to do a demonstration flight. We

weren’t willing to fly that vehicle with a payload on it. So we make

the same assessment that Karen and her team often does, and then

chose to fly a demonstration.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. But for a smaller payload, you have

been willing to be a lot more——

Major General DICKMAN. That is correct. It is——

Chairman ROHRABACHER.—courageous.

Major General DICKMAN. It is a great demonstration of both a

launch vehicle and a responsive spacecraft that is worth the risk.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. Mr. Lampson. And there will

be a second round of questions.

IMPACTS OF THE PRESIDENT’S SPACE EXPLORATION

INITIATIVE ON NASA’S SPACE LAUNCH INITIATIVE

Mr. LAMPSON. Admiral Steidle, one of the results of the President’s space initiative is that NASA has decided to terminate the

Space Launch Initiative, including the Next Generation Launch

Technology Program and a number of advanced rocket engine R&D

programs have been terminated. And the funding intended for

hypersonics R&D is being shifted to the exploration systems activity. As I understand it, a number of the activities undertaken in

the Space Launch Initiative represented NASA’s contribution to

the joint NASA–DOD National Aerospace Initiative.

Last year’s budget request stated that NASA’s Space Launch Initiative ‘‘insures America’s superiority on the space frontier in both

conventional rocket and air-breathing hypersonics technology

fields.’’ And it also cited, as accomplishments, that NASA had officially established the rocket-based combined cycle and X–43C

projects. So what are NASA’s plans for the RBCC and the X–43C

projects?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. Your statement is correct, sir,

but we—the Space Launch Initiative has not been terminated, it

has been kind of modified and transferred into the Transportation

Systems. We have taken the Orbital Space Plane and the NGLT,

the Next Generation Launch Technology, and have taken the lessons learned and the concepts and the pieces of those particular

programs as the starting point and the baseline for our exploration

program, which is the CEV systems of systems pieces of it.

Part of the NGLT piece, as you correctly pointed out, was the

hypersonics piece. I did a technology assessment of a number of

programs, 140 programs total, and those different pieces were in

there as well as we made the transition. There are several pieces

40

that are going on and several of them that did not fit into where

we are headed with exploration. The X–43A program is a piece of

that. We did a business case assessment of: does the demonstration

of those particular capabilities meet our needs in exploration? And

the answer came back yes, if we have a disciplined, demonstrated

performance of one flight, second flight, third flight. If we meet

those objectives in each one of the flights, the Office of Exploration

Systems will continue to fund that program through demonstrated

performance.

We looked at NASA-unique technologies, and we made an agreement with the Office of Aeronautics that my particular Office of

Exploration will fund the non-procurable pieces of that NASAunique pieces for hypersonics study and development and that the

Office of Aeronautics will fund the procurement pieces of that. So

we continue on with that program in our commitment to

hypersonics.

There was a piece, the X–43 program. It did not fit our needs.

The X–43C, it did not fit our particular needs at this particular

point for an exploration systems development program, so it was,

indeed, terminated. We shared that information as we went forward with the baseline assessment and the cost benefit analysis of

that particular program, and it was, indeed, canceled. We are doing

that throughout all of the programs and refocusing all of our tech

maturation programs as we go forward in the exploration piece of

it.

Mr. LAMPSON. Is it an accurate statement to say that the funding

that had been intended to follow the hypersonics work, such as the

X–43C project, will be retained by the Exploration Systems Office

and used to support other activities?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Not exactly, sir. We—our funding was reduced $130 million last year and part of finding offsets for that reduction, the X–43 fit in that particular area.

There were some other things that came out that I want to make

sure I am aware of—make you aware of. In that program, also, is

risk mitigation systems engineering development and some very,

very fine work in the people in Marshall that we are bringing on

to our program now. In fact, the director of the NGLT program, I

have just selected him to be my deputy director for Transportation

Systems. So besides the technology pieces of it, there is a wealth

of experience in personnel that I am moving on, either actually

physically moving to Washington or moving into these programs.

Mr. LAMPSON. The—what is NASA’s plan for the RS–84 Reusable

Rocket Engine Program?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Sir, that did not fit at this particular

time. I canceled that program. I called the contractor personally,

the President of that company, and told him that that does not fit

into the needs of our program at this particular time. I had him—

he came to me, Byron Wood is the CEO of that particular company,

and I sat down with him and said, ‘‘This does not fit in our particular program at this time, and this is why, and this is what the

business case analysis shows of that. However, Mr. Wood, I want

you to participate in the program and continue on with the association with where we are headed in the future.’’ And he has agreed,

and he is pursuing that.

41

NASA CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATIONAL AEROSPACE

INITIATIVE

Mr. LAMPSON. What specific projects, if any, will NASA be contributing to the joint NASA–DOD National Aerospace Initiative?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. There are three sections of that. On the

hypersonics side, we are going to continue on to fund the X–43

demonstration through its second, and possibly, its third flight for

demonstration of the Mach 10. We will fund the NASA-unique

pieces of hypersonics work, and that is mainly personnel that are

supporting the interfaces with the NAI. And I hope to increase the

emphasis on the other two pillars of NAI, that being space access

and space technology pieces of it.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you. Dr. Sega, what do you understand

that NASA’s future role will be in the National Aerospace Initiative?

Dr. SEGA. As we formed the technology roadmaps, and that was

a detailed process from a technology perspective, and it went from

goals, objectives, technical challenges, approaches, and tasks, there

was an understanding that they needed to fit within the programmatic requirements and strengths of the organization. So we

have outlined the participation of all—of the partners and the organizations in each of these areas. Now we are not sure, at this point,

how the details and the programs will continue forward by NASA

in these three areas. We anticipate that the collaboration will be

there where it continues to make sense. In the areas where we had

anticipated NASA participation, such as the work in some of the

hypersonics work, we will continue our hypersonics research and

development. It will go at a bit slower pace and will have a bit of

an increased risk, but our program will continue.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you.

FUTURE OF SPACE LAUNCH INITIATIVE PROJECTS

I would like to request that NASA provide a list of all of the previously planned Space Launch Initiative projects and what NASA’s

intentions—what NASA intends to do with each, including the consequences for both the civil service and contractor personnel. If we

could have that——

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMPSON.—done at some point, I would appreciate it.

And I would yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Mr. Lampson, if I could make a recommendation; put that request in writing and that you copy my office, because I want to tell you that I have seen so many Members

over the years make requests and it just never happens. Now I am

sure that the Admiral is new to his job, and every time he gets a

request from Congress like this, he is going to make sure that the

answer—that the questions are answered, but I think that we

ought to just have a policy from now on, whenever we are asking

members of the Administration, we put it in writing and we hold

people to get answers to our questions.

Mr. LAMPSON. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much.

42

And Mr. Feeney from Florida, who is, of course, the energetic

representative from that part of Florida who serves as our launching area for America’s space program. You may proceed.

Mr. FEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And some days I have

more energy than others, but as you pointed out, the Space Coast

blends the NASA Civilian Launch System. We have got the commercial launch facilities, and we have got, of course, Air Force

launch facilities, as well. I think, as General Dickman notes, because of your—when you handled that command of the 45th Space

Wing, there are some times that the artificial boundaries that we

create between those three launch facilities sometimes create some

difficulties in coordinating amongst the three different launch facilities. Sometimes they have historically impeded cooperation, although we have had some successes. And I am glad that there is

a reemphasis on not just the relationship between NASA and DOD,

but also, obviously, NASA and the private facilities, and not just

Lockheed and Boeing that have a significant presence in the Space

Coast, but also Mr. Musk’s and other, you know, entering facilities

out there. So I am very grateful that we are having this hearing

today.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN SPACE EXPLORATION

I wanted to ask the panel, in general, two questions and then

leave it to you to address them during my time. One is with respect, specifically, to President Bush’s new proposal and vision for

a future journey in space, and specifically as he talks about the

United States’ national security interests. What specific national

security interests do you think that the mission that he has laid

out, the journey for the future of NASA, need to be addressed? And

as part of that, General Dickman, you have mentioned in your

written remarks that there are certain areas that are unsuitable

for sharing between the military and NASA. If you would sort of

outline what they are and why it is unsuitable to have cooperation.

I understand there is a need for secrecy, for example, but if you

could be more specific and help me, in my mind, clarify the appropriate places where cooperation should not be expected.

And then finally, I think Mr. Musk has a great recommendation

that NASA and DOD find a way to adopt cross-certification, where

applicable, so that we don’t have to have redundant hurdles in getting space flight either of the manned or unmanned side, especially

in the commercial area, and obviously the regulatory burden that

has made it very difficult for commercial entities to—and created

a barrier for greater commercial growth in space. So if the panel

would sort of address those two questions during my time, I would

be grateful.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. I will start out with the vision, and we

are in the process of defining our requirements. And there are not

any specific requirements along those lines for national security investments and integration pieces of it, but I think the point is if—

from my particular understanding of it, is perhaps if we go along,

perhaps we develop our requirements in the Exploration Office for

a time for rendezvous and docking capabilities or, perhaps, the remote sensing capabilities, those things may be applicable to other

areas of technology maturation as well. Although we don’t have

43

anything specifically entailed, the collaboration is necessary so that

we share these particular technology areas as we go forward.

There were some examples that came out of the partnership, particularly in hyperspectral imagery. NASA had an EO–1 satellite capability, and it was almost ready to be decommissioned or not to

be used when, at the partnership, the exchange of information on

the requirements showed that some other agency needed that capability, and it was passed on to that. So if we redeem this collaboration and we define the requirements to share our tech maturation

programs, I think we will come up to some of those, although they

aren’t defined right from the start.

Mr. FEENEY. Well, also the infrastructure sharing, like the

EELV, for example, and the capabilities.

Major General DICKMAN. I think, Mr. Feeney, there is going to

be an enormous benefit for the Department of Defense and the national security space community from the increased emphasis on

space and the related technologies that will come from the exploration. Whether it is bringing young people through high school

and college educations that are more focused on engineering to the

specific technical base itself, we will benefit directly from that flow,

that increased emphasis, that will be more like where we were in

the 1960s and the 1970s than where we have been over the last

10 years.

With respect to your specific question of where I think it would

be inappropriate to share, the first, and most obvious, is where

there is a direct application of technologies where the technology

level we may be sharing to a weapon system. I refer, additionally,

for example, the thermal protection systems where, at the basic

materials level, we will work very closely with NASA, but as we

extend that technology to, for example, nose cones on ICBMs, that

is not NASA’s business. It would be totally inappropriate for NASA

to be involved in designing a nuclear weapon delivery system. That

is what our job is. As we become more reliant on space in wartime,

and certainly in Operation Iraqi Freedom. That was clear, not only

to us, but to our adversaries. We will be far more concerned about

both defending our own space assets and denying space capabilities

to others if they choose to use them to attack the United States or

threaten our interests. That is also not NASA’s business, that is

our business. And while we may have common science and technology, the translation of that into systems is one that is the responsibility of the Department, and not a shared collaboration with

NASA.

Third, and perhaps more vision in the future, but more real now,

is military presence and a base on the Moon. It is prohibited by

treaty. It is not our business to be doing that. It is NASA’s challenge now from the President to go to Mars and go to the Moon,

and so while we will assist as best we can at the launch pad and

whatnot, there will be no military bases on the Moon. Those are

three examples of where that translation from the shared programs

to uniquely military or uniquely NASA, I think, are appropriate.

Dr. SEGA. I would—the segment about—what General Dickman

said about the impact on the national security interests, with advancing technology, you gain benefits. You gain benefits from civil

systems, from military systems. And the excitement and motivation

44

for folks to pursue science and engineering education and leading

to a more robust aerospace world would be a positive outcome of

the increased excitement in this general area.

NASA AND DOD CROSS-CERTIFICATION OF LAUNCH

VEHICLES

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Karen has expertise in the cross-certification piece.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Yeah. Mr. Feeney, what we have been doing,

as a matter of fact, is working very closely between NASA and the

DOD. Vehicles, such as the EELVs, we have a ‘‘one government’’

team that looks at the RD–180——

Mr. MUSK. I beg your pardon, again. I am sorry. I can’t hear you

at all.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. I am sorry, Elon. Is that better?

Mr. MUSK. Yeah, that is much, much better.

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Okay. I am sorry. I apologize.

What we have done is, in the case of the RD–180 and the RL–

10, we have a one government approach where we are all read into

and look at the same data at the same time. There are two parts

to the certification: one is the generic how do you understand the

vehicle, how do you understand how the systems work, and when

failures happen, the correction of those; the other is that, for each

mission you have, you go through a launch review to make sure

that the mission overall, the changes you might have made and the

vehicle you are actually flying, that it is going to have the highest

probability of success. And so there are two different things. For

when you own a mission and you are flying it, there is one set of

certification that you do for flight readiness for that given mission,

and then there is a more fleet-wide, consistent type of a work. And

what we have been doing with the Air Force, in a very close partnership across all of the various vehicles, is working together on

understanding that baseline understanding and anomaly resolution, so as we come to each individual launch, we are partnering

off of what we have learned across the board.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And Elon, would you like to contribute

to this part of the questioning?

Mr. MUSK. You know, I apologize, cross-certification?

Chairman ROHRABACHER. We are talking about cross-certification.

Mr. MUSK. Yes, and I apologize, I only heard a portion of Karen’s

response, but I—you know, I think—I am sorry. I have to get—unfortunately, I just didn’t hear the—most of the response, but it

seems to me that it would make sense to, as much as possible, not

duplicate efforts, and I assume Karen is. That sentiment makes

sense. Yeah. Sorry.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. It is okay.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL SPACECRAFT

The Chairman will now reclaim the time. Thank you. And I—

things that Elon didn’t hear, General, what percentage of the payloads that the military puts up are weapons systems? I mean,

45

most—aren’t these satellite sensors and a lot of things that are

very similar to civilian payloads?

Major General DICKMAN. Certainly there are, and most of the

technologies would apply. The weapons that we put on the front

end of ICBMs are, obviously, very different.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And there is very—we are putting very

few nuclear weapons on to the heads of ICBMs these days, aren’t

we? I mean, this is——

Major General DICKMAN. There are still 500 warheads that——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yeah, but I hope we are not putting

any—putting them on any new rockets. I don’t think that that

would be——

Major General DICKMAN. Oh, that is correct.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. So in terms of what we are

doing now in the future, there is certainly a huge crossover between what you are doing in space and what NASA is doing in

space in terms of sensors, satellites, you have observation satellites, communication satellites, et cetera, et cetera.

Major General DICKMAN. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, if I suggested anything other than that. It is clear that in science and

technology, many of the systems and subsystems that we work on

are very common.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I am just—this is a guess, I would say

the vast majority. I am just guessing now, being a big supporter

of the SDI and Missile Defense, I know that we don’t have that

based up there yet, but I would hope someday we do. But seeing

that it is not up there yet, the huge number of the satellites, military satellites, are very similar to the civilian satellites that are

put into orbit. And if that is the case, wouldn’t just making sure

that we have sort of a consistency of requirements rather than—

and an attempt to be consistent within the requirements, wouldn’t

that be something that makes common sense?

Major General DICKMAN. I think that for the requirement for

technology, that is probably correct. But NASA doesn’t have the responsibility, for example, for tracking ICBM or missile launches

that take place either in Iraq or from Russia or somewhere else.

So as we take the technology for IR detectors and translate it into

a Space-Based Infrared System, it is a different endgame than

NASA would in taking those same sensor technologies and building

an IR telescope to look into space.

CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yeah, but we are going to—I am going

to get to that in my very last question, which is going to be about

this near-Earth object that just came by and how—which fits right

into your answer there, but first I am going to ask a couple more

questions. And I believe Dr. Sega was talking about the first flight

of the crew exploration vehicle. Was that your testimony? Was that

you, General? Admiral?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. It must have been mine, sir, okay.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes, it must have and because I just

read it in my notes here. You said the first flight of this crew exploration vehicle is going to be in 2014?

46

Major General DICKMAN. Yes, sir, the first manned flight of that,

that is correct.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Holy cow. That is 10 years from now.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Can’t we do anything, you know—does

it take 10 years to build something?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Well——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. When it took 10 years to get to the

Moon, we built everything, and actually had the mission to the

Moon and back in 10 years—less than 10 years.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. It could be, yes, sir. What I—what we

have got out there is a demonstration program in ’08, which is very

well achievable, not necessarily an orbital flight, but a demonstration of systems, so it is much more than the vehicle itself, it is the

systems that go with it and the protocols and those pieces. And

then we follow that up about 2c years later in the start of 2011

with an orbital demonstration of that capability, docking, autonomous rendezvous capabilities. Do we need to do in-space assembly?

So there are a lot of systems that go along with this as well. And

of course, what we are looking at is the exploration piece, not just

a one data point, perhaps, a capsule, but the development of a

whole program or systems of systems. And that is what we will be

developing when we put this up into orbit with humans in 2014.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. What about it, Elon? Do you think the

private sector could build something, if they had this kind of budget, in less than 10 years?

Mr. MUSK. I would say without a doubt. I mean, one has to establish, sort of, the private sector in smaller entrepreneurial companies versus the——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. The large companies that are——

Mr. MUSK.—large aerospace giants, like Boeing and Lockheed,

which I think the fundamental issue with the pace of progress is

not so much—it is not a question of NASA being to blame. I think

I would place, really, the bulk of the blame on the options that

NASA has available to it from industry. And I think that there

may be some new and better options from SpaceX and, perhaps,

from other companies.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, I am just noting that we have

the, you know, Dick Rutan, out there about ready to show us what

can be done in terms of a suborbital spacecraft, and I just have a

feeling that the more we get small companies into this and into the

mix that there is going to be a lot of—let us put it this way. There

is going to be a transfer of know-how and technology from the private sector into the public sector as compared to what we used to

have where all of it was the military and the public sector providing technology for people in the private sector. And I find—Elon,

I find a 10-year timeline to be just—look, I am out of here; I won’t

be around here in 10 years. Is anybody in this room going to be

around here in 10 years?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Sir, can I——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Sure.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. Because what we are looking for

is something beyond just a spacecraft. It is the system of systems

that is going to go and do something that we have never done beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
47

fore. It is going to go beyond. The Moon is going to be a piece of

it, but it is going to be on. It is going to be a spiral development

program. It is going to be systems to support that. It is going to

be—in that particular time frame, we will be going to the Moon

and leaving an orbiting communications satellite.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Right.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. It is the development of our infrastructure. So there is quite a bit. Now if those particular requirements

were just to produce a vehicle and put it in orbit, we could do that,

but to be the right vehicle to grow into something for an exploration vision, that takes an awful lot of work. Now——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, let me suggest that if we end up,

and I knew that when the President made his vision statement

that one of the Achilles’ Heels is that if people start thinking that

they are developing something right now that is going to be used

on the Mars mission for the humans to go into Mars, it is going

to create a lot of waste, and it is going to drain huge sums of

money. Mr. Lampson is already afraid about the money that is

being drained away from other programs. And you start talking

about developing the craft for the Mars program now, there is not

going to be any money left for anything. And I—when you—it

seems to me, we are talking about some crew transportation vehicle that should have something to do with achieving the goal on the

Moon, and then we are going to find out what we need for Mars.

But if it is taking 10 years because we have got to take all of those

other things into consideration, no wonder it is taking 10 years.

And I will tell you, it is going to be expensive. How much are you

suggesting this crew exploration vehicle will cost, as it stands now

in a 10-year program?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. We don’t have the end pieces of that, sir,

but what we have is from here to ’09 and ’10 time frame and the

development of that and all of the demonstration programs to go

and——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And how much is that?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. That is about $6.8 billion that is in the—

in our program that——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Holy cow. That is over a—that is $6

billion over a five-year period, right? Okay.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Sure.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And then—but we are not going to get

anything that we really are going to be using. I mean, there is a

demonstrator, but we won’t be using——

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. No.

Chairman ROHRABACHER.—it for another 10 years?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. No, sir. If we do this right—and that is

what a spiral development program is. If we do this right and set

the requirements to where we eventually want to go so we don’t

eliminate and don’t have some false starts and don’t start down

this path for something in ’11 and then have to start over in ’14

and develop this program so that we can have a vehicle in ’14 that

can be adapted just a couple years later to go to the Moon and back

and support those particular pieces, that is how much it costs to

be able to do a detailed program like that.

48

COOPERATION IN NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS DETECTION

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. One last question, and then I

will turn it over to Mr. Lampson. About the near-Earth objects,

about these near-Earth objects, one, as I say, I announced at the

beginning of this hearing, there is a near-Earth object that came

within 25,000 or 26,000 miles of the Earth. And it is passing by

tonight, I guess, or today sometime. We didn’t know about it intil

four days ago. I consider—now this particular one isn’t big enough

to have caused major damage, but the fact that we really didn’t

know about it until a few days ago indicates that there could be

something out there that might actually be a threat to the world.

Maybe we could just go down the panel and you could suggest to

me what you think would be a good way for NASA, the Department

of Defense, and the private sector to work together in terms of

meeting this potential challenge.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. I can’t answer that question fully, sir. I

could tell you it is a very small object, 30 meters, that is 43 kilometers away will go down through the Atlantic Ocean in—about—

I have the time is about 17:08 tonight, but probably late. But that

is a—I am going to pass it on to my experts here who can say that

sounds like a very difficult one to track. We picked it up on Monday evening. Lincoln labs did a—It was put on our web at JPL on

Monday night.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Now who discovered it?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. I was informed that Lincoln labs did, sir.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Major General DICKMAN. I am not familiar with how Lincoln discovered it. Obviously an asteroid is a passive object, and so tracking an asteroid is—requires either an optical system or—well, it requires, essentially, an optical system or radar, if it gets much closer. But losing radar 1/r4, you can’t get very far away to do a serious radar track. And so we provide our optical sensors to

NASA——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. We have got a radar station on the

Moon.

Major General DICKMAN. It is still a long—it is still 1/r4 to wherever the asteroid is. Radar, we don’t lose much distance going

through the atmosphere, so I am not sure that would help us a

whole lot, although it is certainly worth looking into.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. See, I don’t—I certainly

plead guilty to not being a technical expert on these things.

How can you work with NASA more effectively in this challenge?

Major General DICKMAN. Right now, we provide our optical sensors to NASA for tracking those—tracking asteroids in space. The

best sensors we have are optical sensors that are maintained by

the Department of Defense by our Directed Energy Directorate.

And I think we provide something like 18 nights a month every

month to NASA for doing that tracking.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Dr. Sega.

Dr. SEGA. Our role, in the Department of Defense, has been principally the support of the—NASA’s Near-Earth Asteroid Tracking

program. And so it is in the area of, as Bob said, the optics, the

processing, and so forth of datas where the technology that is eiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
49

ther developed or there is additional sensors that can be supportive

of the NASA tracking program would be the role of the Department.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And as I mentioned to you earlier,

Doctor, I went to a Shuttle launch, and the Shuttle went off—took

off, and we were all standing there, and within two minutes after

the Shuttle took off, a comet went directly over the Florida station

there at Cape Kennedy. And everybody was just aghast, because,

I mean, no one had any idea that this thing was coming, but it

just—it was close. It was very close. And it seems to me that NASA

and the military need to look at this as a potential threat. Look at

the Moon. Those craters didn’t just get there by themselves. These

aren’t volcanic craters.

And Mr. Musk, are you ready to go and to recruit the oil workers

off of the derricks in order to fly up to the asteroid and destroy the

asteroid before it gets to the Earth? That is what was in the—that

was in the movie, I think.

Mr. MUSK. Yes, sir. It is ironic what they have accomplished in

movies. You know, the fact of the matter is that the state of technology today: if the asteroid is big enough for us to see it, we won’t

be able to stop it, and if it is small enough—if it is so small that

we don’t see it, we won’t get it in time. That is sort of where we

are today. Some decades on, that, hopefully, will all be changed.

Certainly, of all of the threats humanity faces over the long-term,

some sort of asteroid, either at—can either significantly damage

civilization or possibly end it. It is highly probable that that possibility certainly exists, and I hope that, at some point in the coming

decades, we are able to present a reasonable counter to that threat.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, thank you. And I think

the private sector will play a role in that. And if by nothing else,

keeping the cost of the rockets down that are part of the system.

Thank you very much.

I would like to turn to Mr. Lampson. Would you——

Mr. LAMPSON. I would. You know, one thing that we could do,

Mr. Chairman, is to have—get a greater look at the points contained within the Space Exploration Act, because it does, indeed,

set a goal of building a craft that would allow us to go out and do

something to those asteroids when and if they are discovered. And

we are going to have to address it. You are—you know, this is a

serious issue, and it is something that we ought to be talking

about. So hopefully we will at some point in time.

ROLE OF INDUSTRY

As much as I respect and appreciate not just Elon Musk’s company, but all of them, I think it important—we don’t have the opportunity for Boeing and Lockheed Martin to be here to make some

comment in reference back to some comments that were made

about their size and how slow they might be in accomplishing

something, but they are doing things that this government has

asked to do that perhaps adds cost to a lot of what they do, because

they have to maintain a lot of personnel to accomplish something

over a long period of time they might not otherwise be doing. I

think that is important to note at some point.

50

CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE

And I—Admiral Steidle, I wanted to also get you to just make

a short comment about, perhaps—that you were talking about all

of the complaints of the development of the CEV and what all we

have to go through in order to meet a 10-year accomplishment for

flight. What is the difference in what we did with Apollo during

those—all of those Apollo years to develop all of the craft that were

involved in those missions?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. That particular program was a—I would

call a single data point. That was one particular event and a destination that we were flying to, and all of our efforts and integration efforts that—were focused on the development of that particular system to accomplish that. This program differs in the fact

that we are looking beyond that. We are looking at a continuum.

We are looking at an infrastructure that will, as well as just the

spacecraft, support future missions. We are looking at a spacecraft

that we will slowly develop, through spiral development, to take us

into orbit, to take us to the Moon, to take us beyond into journeys

to, perhaps, Mars and beyond. So there is much more into it than

that single data point; there is the infrastructure. And I keep referring to this, and we heard it earlier, the systems of systems integration piece of this is quite large, not just the development of the

spacecraft itself, but all of the supporting structure, the support of

the infrastructure that will be here on Earth, the demonstration of

capabilities either on the Space Station or on the surface of the

Moon and the other things that come together to support this development. So this is the significant difference from that.

Mr. LAMPSON. There is also the role that money has played in

it, too. Was there not a little different——

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. If you look at the funding profile

in that particular program, it was a program manager’s joy. It

was——

IMPEDIMENTS TO NASA–DOD COOPERATION

Mr. LAMPSON. Okay. Let me get back to what I wanted to ask

about in the first place. I would like to ask all of you, if you could,

to respond to this. What do you consider to be the biggest impediments to meaningful cooperation between NASA and DOD in space

transportation, and how would you overcome those impediments?

And try to keep them as succinct as possible. Would you start, Admiral?

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. Yes, sir. Very, very quickly. I have looked

at the collaboration efforts that are taking place. We mentioned the

partnership. We mentioned NAI. I asked my staff to put together

where do we stand and what kind of collaboration efforts are underway, and they came with a long list. And there are almost 400

relationships and collaboration agreements and MOUs between our

centers and our departments in NASA. There are some main program pieces that are working here.

What I have seen, as I have gone back and studied this in preparation for coming here, that something changed about two years

ago. The emphasis came from the top down, not from the bottom

up. This is my own assessment. It appears that something took

51

place at the partnership, perhaps just the new people that are involved in that. But their focus on the collaboration and the partnership was felt throughout the organization, all of the way down to

the tech maturation people and the people managing each program.

So the impediment would be the loss of that particular dedication

and focus on making these things happen.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you. General.

Major General DICKMAN. I think the greatest impediment in a

long-term collaboration is that we have different requirements for

the vehicles when they finally get put to use. There is no impediment to collaboration in developing the technology, and the work

that Admiral Steidle mentioned was specifically focused on the

whole spectrum of technologies with—related to launch. The collaboration is very, very good.

With respect to the comment that the partnership changed two

years ago, I would share that view as well. And since Dr. Sega

might not want to comment since he was one of the players in that,

the reality is, the membership of the Partnership Council changed.

It includes the Administrator of NASA. The Administrator is very

proactive about dealing with the Department of Defense. It includes Under Secretary Teets, but it also includes Dr. Sega and Admiral Ellis and General Lord from Space Command, who are all

committed to making the partnership work, rather than getting together and seeing where there might be opportunities for interface.

Mr. LAMPSON. Dr. Sega, do you want to make a comment?

Dr. SEGA. Sure. The—I think the environment is very positive,

not only in the Space Partnership Council, but also at the working

level as we worked hard over a period of over a year to develop

these technology roadmaps. Now once we have this in place, the

challenge is to keep the integrated program on track. We have participation from the Army, Navy, and Air Force in developing some

of the technologies with DARPA and, of course, the Department of

Defense, and NASA inside the government. We have industry, and

so forth, engaged. We also have some of the budgets, as they come

here, are viewed here in Congress. It is important that when there

are connections being made, that that information be passed to you

so that there is an understanding of where the integration is,

where the connections are as one looks at the programs in total

versus in isolation, so keeping it together all of the way through

the process.

Mr. LAMPSON. Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me and let me—

and allow me to ask just a couple more questions, I will be—I will

pass this.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Go ahead quickly.

Mr. LAMPSON. Okay. I will be quick.

NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION POLICY

The Bush Administration—and this is, again, for everyone. The

Bush Administration has indicated that it is reviewing the existing

national space transportation policy. Have any of you played a role

in that policy review?

Major General DICKMAN. I have, Mr. Lampson.

Mr. LAMPSON. Can you—is it Admiral? Have you or Dr. Sega?

52

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. No, sir. I am too new to be a part of that.

I believe Karen’s office has, though.

Mr. LAMPSON. All right. And Dr. Sega?

Dr. SEGA. Not at this time.

Mr. LAMPSON. What sorts of issues are being considered in that

review, and when do you expect the review will be completed, both

of you?

Major General DICKMAN. We are optimistic that the review will

be completed by summer. The issues are, if you will, the ones you

would expect: what kind of work should be done in terms of next

generation launch vehicles, in terms of innovative approaches for

a workforce for launch vehicle, in terms of what NASA would need

for exploration, for what kind of expendable launch infrastructure

we should sustain over the next decade and beyond. Really, it is

a very comprehensive look at how we are going to do space transportation.

Mr. LAMPSON. Karen?

Ms. PONIATOWSKI. Yeah. I think the only thing I would add to

that is it does reinforce the need for the—unlike the previous policy

that said the Air Force would have one focus and NASA another,

the policy is again focused at cooperation between the NASA and

the DOD.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you.

NASA–DOD TEST FACILITIES

And the last thing, what specific steps are NASA and DOD taking to ensure that the national test facilities needed for future

space transportation systems will be maintained? We know that

some of these things were—are being shut down. We know that

there have been some facilities that—at NASA that haven’t been

maintained and are actually—we are losing the capability to provide some service with those at some point of time in the future.

Are there any specific facilities that any of you are concerned

about, and if so, what are they? Everybody.

Dr. SEGA. It wouldn’t be fair to give any specifics, because there

are an awful lot of facilities, but there are needs in terms of testing. I gave an example of the HyFly test. In this case, it was a

DARPA–Navy program testing at Langley and soon to have a single-engine demonstrator test from the Air Force and DARPA also

at the Langley wind tunnel. So this is a case I know personally,

and it is an area that you look at what is coming forward and you

look at the test facilities they need. Now in the future, technology

will move forward and your needs will change, but I think it is a

question that needs to be evaluated continually.

Mr. MUSK. I think, in general, the test structure right now, at

least for propulsion, is fairly robust. Certainly it is robust for testing spacecraft. I believe there are five test facilities that can handle

a one million-pound class engine, a variety of fuels and flows and

sizes. There are test facilities that are relatively new that can handle high-altitude engine testing. So until we actually break new

ground on what we need that would drive us to some place we

haven’t been before, I think we are probably in pretty good shape

right now.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you.

53

Admiral.

Rear Admiral STEIDLE. I have been—in my initiation in NASA,

I have been making trips to as many of the facilities as I possibly

can, looking at their lab structure. In my previous position, I was

commander of a number of centers, so I know what to look for. I

have been looking for those particular capabilities. I haven’t found

anything lacking, so far, in my trips to them.

Mr. LAMPSON. Those are some of the things that I have heard

from some NASA installations around. I went—that is more—

thank you all for your answers, and thank you for your indulgence,

Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Mr. Feeney.

Mr. FEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CROSS-CERTIFICATION OF LAUNCH VEHICLES

When I last addressed you, you talked about the increasing cooperation. Specifically, if we could get a commitment to try to find

some redundancies in the certification requirements, I think that

would be helpful and useful to us. And if you are having success

and everything, we would appreciate any continued success.

But I want to——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Perhaps we could be very specific on

that. If you could, within a month, get back to the Committee a letter indicating what areas you think that you could work on in this

cross-certification area, and making sure that we don’t—where it is

that duplicate and where—with the military and where can people

accept the standards and the—already the specifications that are

on the other side that have already been proven so that people like

Mr. Musk can invest $1 million and can expect it not to have to

be doing the same exact thing with that $1 million with NASA that

it does with the Department of Defense, I mean, rather than waste

that money.

Mr. Feeney, go right ahead.

Mr. FEENEY. Well, despite the optimistic answer, Mr. Chairman,

that we got, I think that there is cause for optimism. You remember Lockheed Martin that has testified in front of this committee

that they think a one-government team would be very helpful to

them. The Space News has recently reported that while these meetings are going on, very little is accomplished, and these may be accusations that are inaccurate, but if you can give us details, we, at

least, can defend you, at a minimum.

REVIEW OF SPACE TREATIES AFFECTING DOD AND

COMMERCIAL USE OF THE MOON

And secondly, I would like the Admiral and the General to tell

me whether it would be a useful exercise for this Partnership

Council, or some other group involving the civilian and the military

and the commercial launch advocates in the United States, to review the 10 or 15 different space treaties that we have out there.

For example, General, you suggested that one of the reasons that

we do—we couldn’t put a permanent facility on the Moon was not

that it was Air Force related, it is because of treaties. Well, treaties

54

come and go, and by the way, the United States tends to honor its

commitments; other nations don’t, many times. You are tracking

some 8,000 pieces of ‘‘space junk,’’ as we speak. It may turn out

that the Moon, for example, is a better place to do some of those

things or enhance what we are doing.

And finally, on the commercial side, there is very—we have used

space treaties to socialize the rewards of exploring space. So if Mr.

Musk, for example, wanted to find a way to colonize a square mile

of the Moon, he would have to share everything that he could accomplish with 191 other nations recognized by the State Department. One wonders, in that light, whether the Queen of Spain

would have subsidized Columbus’ journey knowing that she would

have had to share all of the fruits of his discoveries with the Dutch

and the French and the Brits. So maybe you could tell me a little

bit about a review of space treaties in our future.

Major General DICKMAN. We will be glad to take that as an action.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Now with that said, we are going to

adjourn now, because I do have a plane out at six o’clock at Dulles.

I want to thank Mr. Lampson. This is his first hearing as the

Ranking Member. Thank you very much for your—he has always

been an activist and always had thought-provoking questions and

different insights that he has shared with us. We are very happy

now that he is playing a more important role. You are not just a

Member of the Committee; now you are the Ranking Member. And

someday, who knows, you may sit in this chair. So I have got to

be—I have to be very, very, you know, courteous to this man.

But Mr. Feeney, thank you, as well. And thank you to our panel.

I appreciate it.

One thought, we did say a couple things that seemed derogatory

about big companies, because we have got Elon Musk, this great

entrepreneur here who has put his own money in, and we always

admire that so much, but just——

Mr. LAMPSON. We need them both.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. We need them both. And for the

record, Lockheed, Boeing, Orbital, all of them were contacted about

the hearing, and all are providing written testimony for the record

in this hearing and have been very cooperative with us and

couldn’t cooperate more. They just—so we had a good hearing

today, and I would like to thank the witnesses again. And please

be advised that the Subcommittee Members may request additional

information for the record, and I would ask other Members who are

going to submit written questions to do so with one—within one

week of this date. And I would then conclude this hearing by saying this meeting is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(55)

Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

56

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Rear Admiral (Ret.) Craig E. Steidle, Associate Administrator, Office

of Space Exploration Systems, National Aeronautic and Space Administration

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1. In written testimony provided to this committee, Michael Gass of Lockheed Martin Space Systems recommends that ‘‘there ought to be one government team [between NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD)] to define mission assurance

requirements’’ for launch vehicles before entering into a development program

with industry. He explains that this approach ‘‘would eliminate wasteful redundancy, use common processes for acquisition and contract oversight, share the

benefits of complementary hardware systems and reduce the cost of maintaining

infrastructure.’’ (See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record for Mr.

Gass’s full testimony.)

Will NASA and the Air Force consider this ‘‘one government team’’ approach in

defining launch vehicle requirements to meet both NASA and DOD requirements? What are the pros and cons of such a proposal for NASA?

A1. NASA, the Air Force, and the NRO are looking to maximize our limited resources in space launch. To that end, we collaborate in a number of areas. For example, we share data and common analysis sources. We participate in an interagency working group. We share common risk lists between organizations for our

common rocket fleets. We participate in each other’s Pedigree Reviews and Design

Equivalency Reviews on the key engine systems in the EELV fleet.

However, the concept of a common set of mission assurance requirements, while

attractive, does not recognize the different emphasis each organization places on

various elements of mission assurance. Differences in requirements stem from the

difference in how the systems are to be used. A common set of requirements would

end up being composed of the lowest common denominator. It would treat a human

space launch, a low-cost technology demonstration satellite, and a National security

missile warning satellite as equals. Certain missions demand unique mission assurance investments and scrutiny that are not appropriate or affordable for all flights.

We need the flexibility to succeed at this priority, rather than having a common set

of requirements that we constantly deviate from and issue for waivers based upon

the mission’s importance.

Q2. During the course of the March 18th hearing, both you and Major General

Dickman agreed to investigate how NASA and the Air Force’s separate certification processes for new launch vehicles could be better coordinated. The concern

was that these separate certification processes might be redundant, wasting taxpayer money. What progress has been made to-date? What plans have you made

to minimize the redundancy in the certification process?

A2. NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) collaborate on technical assessments (sometimes referred to as certification) of the launch vehicles we each use to

accomplish our unique space missions. Common reviews and technical assessments

on both existing and evolutionary systems have moved us toward a better understanding of the core launch system. Each agency continues to perform mission assurance and ‘‘certify’’ each individual mission for launch (including the integrated

spacecraft and launch vehicle as ready for launch). However, neither the United

States Air Force (USAF) nor NASA formally ‘‘certify’’ a launch vehicle design, as is

done by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for commercial aircraft in order

to ensure public safety.

The U.S. has not fielded many ‘‘new’’ national launch systems; for example the

DOD did not have a use for the Athena or the Conestoga launch system and was

not engaged in the technical assessments for those ‘‘new’’ vehicles. In the case of

the Pegasus, NASA worked closely with Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the USAF to understand and address challenges met in the start

up of the commercial program. NASA and DOD have built a pattern of cooperation

in the sharing of common launch systems; we would expect to extend that cooperation to the fielding of ‘‘new’’ systems. Likewise, every individual user, be they commercial or government, employs varying levels of technical assessment leading up

to a unique mission. We would expect that practice to continue on new launch systems as well.

Q3. To accomplish NASA’s missions to the Moon and Mars, NASA may need to develop a new heavy-lift launch vehicle beyond the capabilities of the current

57

Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV). At a recent Senate Appropriations

hearing, NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe said there are ‘‘competing options

and alternatives’’ for heavy-lift launch vehicles using the Space Shuttle stack of

boosters and external tank or enhancing DOD-developed expendable launch vehicles.

What is the timeframe for NASA’s decision-making on whether to develop and

how to develop a heavy-lift launch vehicle?

A3. NASA intends to make a decision on both cargo and human launch capability

by the release of the CEV Level 1 requirements in January 2005.

Q3a. What trade studies are NASA conducting to answer the question on whether

or not a heavy-lift launch vehicle is needed? Why wouldn’t existing or slightly

modified expendable launch vehicles be sufficient for NASA’s space exploration

initiative?

A3a. NASA has initiated trade studies that consider options using Space Shuttle

propulsion elements, commercial systems, international systems, and Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV). The study teams are considering payload mass

capabilities from 25mT (the current capability of the EELV heavy) up to 100mT.

The trade parameters currently focus on performance, non-recurring cost, and recurring cost. A trade study has also been initiated that will define the human rating

requirements for a CEV and launch system. These trade studies will be completed

this summer. The follow-on trade studies will combine the CEV human launch capability and cargo launch system requirements into a common study that will evaluate

the synergy between the two system requirements. NASA’s objective is to separate

crew and cargo launch to the maximum extent possible. Industry has also been encouraged to consider these critical launch trades as they prepare responses to the

Request for Information (RFI) and proposals to the Broad Agency Announcement

(BAA) for Concept Exploration and Refinement.

Q3b. Why aren’t the designs for NASA’s Saturn V rocket adequate for NASA’s future

heavy-lift launch needs?

A3b. Elements of the Saturn launch system are being considered in the trade studies for cargo launch, including the J–2/J–2S engine that provided propulsion for the

Saturn upper stage and the Apollo trans-lunar injection stage. The J–2/J–2S

powerhead was most recently used to power the X–33 aerospike engine that was

successfully demonstrated. Other elements of the Saturn launch system may be applicable to a modern launch capability. Although the Saturn launch vehicle design

would provide the performance capability to conduct a lunar mission, the capability

to manufacture it does not exist today and would be extremely expensive to duplicate. More recent launch systems have incorporated modern manufacturing processes and structural materials. Building from the current launch vehicle manufacturing and launch operations infrastructure may be more affordable than resurrecting the Saturn; but the trade studies are assessing all possible launch solutions.

Q4. Both NASA and the DOD are reporting to Congress a 50 percent cost increase

in what industry plans to charge for future purchases of Evolved Expendable

Launch Vehicles due to a sharp downturn in the commercial launch market and

U.S. launch providers not being able to recoup their costs for these new rockets.

Could the U.S. Government possibly achieve some cost savings if NASA and the

DOD bargained together when negotiating its launch vehicle purchase prices

with industry? If so, are there any plans to begin such cooperative bargaining?

A4. NASA and the DOD have a practice of coordinating on launch vehicle acquisitions. We have established forums and working groups to assure that our respective

launch requirements and acquisition plans are discussed to maximize the overall

national benefit. NASA and the USAF closely coordinated our individual requests

for proposals for recent awards to Boeing for Delta II activity. We have also shared

our requirements for EELV class services to facilitate assurance that the U.S. Government is getting a fair and reasonable price. The depressed international market

for U.S. launch services in the EELV class has indeed raised concerns with the potential for cost increases to all government users. We are working with the DOD

to understand and address these concerns.

Q5. NASA recently informed the Committee that it is no longer planning to fly secondary research payloads on the Space Shuttle, affecting 125 experiments. The

European Ariane rocket has developed a fairly robust capability to carry secondary research satellites into orbit, while the U.S. has not developed an analogous means to carry secondary satellites on an EELV. Are NASA and the DOD

58

developing an analogous capability for U.S. expendable launch vehicles? If not,

why not? Could some of these secondary payloads be launched on an Ariane

rocket instead?

A5. NASA has invested funds to enable secondary capability on existing launch systems and has flown approximately 15 secondary payloads over the past 10–15 years

using Delta, Pegasus and Taurus launch systems. With the advent of the EELV, the

USAF has invested in the development of the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter

(ESPA), which is scheduled for flight in 2006. Flight opportunities for small payloads have been a topic of discussion between the agencies. In December 2003,

NASA, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the USAF met to discuss

both the opportunities for excess space on future EELV missions and investment

strategies for complementary secondary carriers beyond ESPA. All agencies have

been actively engaged in maximizing any excess space and performance on larger

launch systems and will continue to coordinate efforts.

The majority of the experiments/payloads that will no longer be flown on the

Space Shuttle are Get Away Special (GAS) payloads that were expressly designed

to fly as tertiary payloads on a ‘‘space-available’’ basis. Most were designed to require human intervention and/or return, which are unique Shuttle capabilities, and

are not readily converted for flight on expendable systems.

Q6. A recent news article said that cost overruns with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s Orbital Express satellite project threaten to shut down

the project. NASA invested $25 million in DARPA’s Orbital Express project to

demonstrate robotic docking technology applicable to future missions to the

Space Station.

If DARPA decides to cancel the Orbital Express project, what would the impact

be on NASA’s investment and technical objectives?

Is DARPA coordinating its decisions with NASA on the Orbital Express project?

A6. NASA has invested $17 million in DARPA’s Orbital Express project and intends

to invest another $8 million through FY 2004 and FY 2005. The Orbital Express

takes the next step beyond NASA’s Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology (DART) flight project in demonstrating robotic docking technology. Orbital

Express will utilize the Advanced Video Guidance System (AVGS) that will be demonstrated on DART to maneuver within close proximity to the target satellite but,

unlike DART, Orbital Express will demonstrate actual docking with the target satellite. Both experiments demonstrate technologies that may be used in the on-orbit

assembly of elements of an exploration mission. If DARPA decides to cancel the Orbital Express project, NASA would incorporate that decision into the technology gap

analysis that is currently underway. NASA will assess the risk to the overall concept of operations and develop a risk mitigation plan to reduce or eliminate that

risk. NASA supports the Orbital Express project and believes that the partnership

with DARPA is the most effective way to reduce the risk of autonomous rendezvous

and docking.

NASA is currently providing engineering support to the Orbital Express project.

DARPA has coordinated their project plans with NASA and intends to complete the

project.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. Please provide a list of all of the previously planned Space Launch Initiative

projects, their intended five-year funding profiles, the numbers of civil service

and contractor personnel involved in each, and what NASA intends to do with

each project, including the consequences for both the civil service and contractor

personnel.

A1. See Enclosure 1 for a list of Space Launch Initiative projects.

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Q2. In your announcement to Congress regarding the cancellation of the X–43C contract, you stated: ‘‘It is important to note that the FY 2004 NGLT budget reduction will only impact contracted activities. NASA civil service workforce efforts

will continue in-house.. . .’’ This statement leaves the impression that NASA is

not concerned with the impact that the abrupt cancellations have on contractors,

and is only focused on protecting its civil service workforce. NASA officials have

indicated that NASA’s Office of Aeronautics is considering whether it might be

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able to pick up some of the hypersonics work that has been terminated. If there

is the possibility that NASA will seek to restart some hypersonics activities in

the FY 2006 budget request, what steps are you taking now to minimize the disruption to the contractor workforce between now and FY 2006?

A2. NASA is always concerned about its contractor teams and any adverse impacts

Agency decisions may have on them. However, part of the rationale for outsourcing

an activity includes the increased flexibility that NASA gains for later reprogramming or termination of a program/project. This flexibility is lost when NASA performs the work in-house based upon the Government civil service laws. Consequently, X–43C contractors were allowed time to close out the contracts in an orderly way, including placement of the employees connected to the contract. NASA

is currently reviewing the options to ease the transition as it considers the priorities

of future hypersonics research. Should NASA validate the requirement to restart the

hypersonic research in FY 2006, the FY 2005 funding will be re-examined, and if

funds are necessary, NASA will work with Congress to adjust the FY 2005 operating

plan to ensure an orderly transition. It is also noted that the Department of Defense

continues its hypersonics activities (e.g., the single engine demonstrator project)

using many of the same contractors.

Q3. What specific factors led you to decide to continue the X–37 program? What data

or systems do you expect to come from that program that will help you achieve

the goals set forth in the new exploration initiative? Please be specific. How

much will the X–37 program cost in total, and what is included in that cost estimate?

A3. The X–37 project provides hardware development experience for the NASA/industry team that will be applied to the exploration mission. The Exploration Mission

requires development of new technologies to achieve the mission objectives and the

X–37 effort provides key technology development in thermal protection systems and

hot structures.

The X–37 Approach and Landing Test Vehicle (ALTV) effort will provide an inflight calibration of air data system technologies, and verification of the aerodynamics and guidance and control for a vehicle other than the Space Shuttle. The

data obtained will be utilized to validate analytical models and trade studies. The

orbital vehicle technologies (wing leading edge thermal protection system and hot

structures) will provide higher reentry temperature capability to apply to the exploration mission. The hot structures development will develop capability in the U.S.

that currently only exists overseas.

The estimate of total X–37 program cost is currently being developed and will include contractor effort, government in-line effort, government insight and management.

Q4. What role, if any, did DOD play in the decision to continue the X–37 program?

Will DOD provide any funding for it?

A4. In the summer of 2001, the Air Force decided to complete its commitment to

the X–37 project of $16 million but provided no additional funding. This commitment was completed in FY 2002. NASA decided independently to continue the X–

37 project in 2003 via the NRA 8–30 competitive process. DOD was not involved

in that decision. NASA encourages potential partnerships where appropriate, however, no DOD funding is currently committed.

Q5. NASA and DOD are collaborating on the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI).

However, it is hard to get a clear picture of the extent of the cooperation. Please

provide for the record: a list of the projects that make up the NAI, which of them

are jointly funded, and the estimated cost of each of the NAI projects.

A5. The following is a list of NAI projects that will continue:

The Integrated Powerhead Demonstrator (IPD) will continue from the NGLT Propulsion Technology. NASA and the Air Force Research Laboratory jointly manage

IPD. NASA will provide $3.4 million in FY 2004 and will provide $7 million in FY

2005. NASA is also providing 25 civil service and 27 support contractors to the effort. IPD is on the NAI Space Access Roadmap and is managed by the DOD Integrated High Payoff Rocket Technology Program.

The X–43A project will continue through the third flight in FY 2005. X–43A is

a critical step in the development of scramjet technology and is on the NAI

Hypersonics roadmap.

Other continuing projects will contribute to the NAI Space Access roadmap, including Auxiliary Propulsion, Vehicle Subsystem power and electric actuator technology, and the University Research and Engineering Technology Institutes. NASA

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is providing funding of $25 million in FY 2004 and $21 million in FY 2005. NASA

civil service and support contractor employees supporting these projects in FY 2004

is 121 and 98 in FY 2005.

Q6. NASA’s decision in the 1990s not to be the first user of an unproven rocket was

based on a series of failures of three new launch vehicles (the Pegasus XL, the

Conestoga, and the LLV). How should the government weigh the risks versus the

benefits when considering the use of new launch vehicles? That is, where should

the government draw the line between prudent stewardship of the taxpayers’

money by not risking a taxpayer-funded satellite on an unproven launch vehicle

versus the need to encourage the development of new launch vehicles that could

ultimately reduce governmental launch costs?

A6. NASA has developed a risk mitigation process that seeks to balance mission

criticality with flight history. The policy enables NASA to launch on a first flight

of a brand new system, the second flight (post demonstration flight), or systems

with proven demonstrated flight history. Over the past several years, NASA has not

identified any missions that can tolerate the risk of a new launch system. NASA

payloads, even the small payloads, tend to be unique, one-of-a-kind efforts, with a

higher overall mission cost.

NASA does believe in encouraging the development of new launch vehicles and

emerging launch companies. NASA is partnering with DARPA on their FALCON

Program, which will provide flight demonstrations for new launch systems. The payloads will be more risk tolerant and better suited to initial flights of new launch

systems. Through this partnership, the government agencies are each able to participate in enabling new launch systems with a balanced risk approach.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Major General (Ret.) Robert S. Dickman, Deputy for Military Space,

Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Department of Defense

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

ONE GOVERNMENT TEAM

Q1. In written testimony provided to this committee, Michael Gass of Lockheed Martin Space Systems recommends that ‘‘there ought to be one government team (between NASA and the DOD) to define mission assurance requirements’’ for

launch vehicles. He explains that this approach ‘‘would eliminate wasteful redundancy, use common processes for acquisition and contract oversight, share

the benefits of complementary hardware systems and reduce the cost of maintaining infrastructure.’’ (See Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record for

Mr. Gass’s full testimony.)

Will NASA and the Air Force consider this ‘‘one government team’’ approach in

defining launch vehicle requirements to meet both NASA and DOD requirements? What are the pros and cons of such a proposal for the Air Force?

A1. All agencies—the Air Force, the NRO, and NASA—are looking to maximize our

limited resources in space launch. To ensure best use of these resources, we collaborate in a number of areas. For example, we share data, common analysis sources,

and have coordination meetings. We share common risk lists between organizations

for our common rocket fleets. We participate in each other’s Pedigree Reviews and

Design Equivalency Reviews on the key engine systems in the EELV fleet. The Air

Force and the prime contractors are looking for ways to develop common support

in order to reduce the program costs. However, common acquisition processes would

likely add complexity and cost.

The concept of a common set mission assurance requirements, while attractive,

does not recognize the different emphasis each organization places on various elements of mission assurance. A common set of requirements would end up being composed of the lowest common denominator. It would treat a manned space launch,

a low cost technology demonstration satellite, and a national security missile warning satellite as equals. Our history is not all space capabilities are equal. Certain

missions demand unique mission assurance investments and scrutiny that are not

appropriate or affordable for all satellite flights. Mission assurance, often referred

to as mission success, is the #1 priority for AF, NRO, and NASA space programs.

We need the flexibility to succeed at this priority, rather than having a common set

of requirements that we constantly deviate from and waiver based upon the mission’s importance.

SEPARATE CERTIFICATION PROCESSES

Q2. During the course of the March 18th hearing, both you and Rear Admiral

Steidle agreed to investigate how NASA and the Air Force’s separate certification processes for new launch vehicles could be better coordinated. The concern

was that these separate certification processes might be redundant, wasting taxpayer money. What progress has been made to-date? What plans have you made

to minimize the redundancy in the certification process?

A2. Neither the Air Force nor NASA formally ‘‘certify’’ a launch vehicle design, as

is done by the FAA for aircraft. The Air Force and NASA do share information to

gain understanding of flight worthiness that aids in certification of the booster.

Technical teams share information on the pedigree of flight hardware—for example,

Air Force and NASA teams review each other’s hardware on Delta II rockets, in addition to hardware for commercial missions, and share their findings to assure they

understand the state of the fleet. Mission teams discuss common rehearsed goals

and techniques between Air Force and NASA Mission Directors. Air Force and

NASA teams jointly work test requirements for hardware—for example, the new

solid rocket booster on the Atlas V will be tested to a program defined by the contractor, NASA, and the Air Force. Additionally, the Air Force, National Reconnaissance Office, and NASA hold a mission assurance forum in which the contractors

and government teams look for synergies, best practices, as well as lessons learned.

The most recent forum was successfully concluded this past March of 2004.

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HEAVY-LIFT LAUNCH VEHICLE

Q3. If NASA needs to develop a heavy-lift launch vehicle for its space exploration

missions, do you foresee possible uses for such a launch vehicle for future DOD

missions?

A3. The recent Air Force mission model (from 2000–2020) does not require development of a heavy-lift vehicle beyond the current capability of the EELV fleet. NASA’s

heavy-lift requirements and architecture appear to be still developing. It is unclear

where the NASA heavy-lift requirements, once defined, can be satisfied by the existing heavy-lift capability of our EELV fleet. However, NASA is keeping DOD informed of any contemplated performance or reliability enhancements to the EELV

fleet to allow DOD to consider how those potential enhancements would benefit

DOD mission needs.

EELV

Q4. Both NASA and DOD are reporting to Congress a 50 percent cost increase in

what industry plans to charge for future purchases of Evolved Expendable

Launch Vehicles due to a sharp downturn in the commercial launch market and

U.S. launch providers not being able to recoup their costs for these new rockets.

Do NASA and the DOD coordinate their launch purchases before going out with

bids to industry? Could the U.S. Government possibly achieve some cost savings

is NASA and the DOD bargained together when negotiating its launch vehicle

purchase prices with industry?

A4. Although NASA and the Air Force do not coordinate with each other on their

respective launch purchases, they do share appropriate information. Despite requirement differences between NASA and the Air Force, it is possible there could

be some synergy if NASA and DOD bargained together for EELV launch services;

however, whether this would yield any saving over the current process is unknown.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

HUMAN-CARRYING SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Q1. Do you foresee a DOD requirement for a human-carrying space transportation

system?

If so, when?

What would be the reason for the requirement?

Will DOD either review or participate in the formulation of the requirements for

NASA’s proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle?

A1. There is no Air Force requirement for a human-carrying space transportation

system at this time. However, the Air Force intends to support NASA’s effort to formulate requirements for their Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), especially as it relates to EELV.

These questions were submitted to the witness, but were not responded to by the

time of publication.

Q2. NASA’s decision in the 1990s not to be the first user of an unproven rocket was

based on a series of failures of three new launch vehicles (the Pegasus XL, the

Conestoga, and the LLV). How should the government weigh the risks versus the

benefits when considering the use of new launch vehicles? That is, where should

the government draw the line between prudent stewardship of the taxpayers’

money by not risking a taxpayer-funded satellite on an unproven launch vehicle

versus the need to encourage the development of new launch vehicles that could

ultimately reduce governmental launch costs?

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by The Honorable Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1. In the wake of the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy and need to finish Space

Station construction, NASA recently informed the Committee that it is no longer

planning to fly secondary research payloads on the Space Shuttle. According to

Major General Dickman’s testimony, over 200 DOD experiments have flown on

over 70 Shuttle missions. NASA reports that over 125 satellite experiments, including DOD payloads, will be affected.

Q1a. What is the impact to DOD space research if these Shuttle rides are canceled?

A1a. The reduction in science and technology demonstration opportunities would

limit collection of scientific data and could result in increased program development

risk. Shuttle and International Space Station flights are an effective means for developing and testing technologies, especially for those test units and experiments requiring post-flight physical analysis.

Q1b. The European Ariane rocket has the means to carry secondary research satellites into orbit. Are NASA and the DOD developing an analogous capability

for U.S. expendable launch vehicles?

A1b. The Space Test Program (STP) and Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) developed

the EELV Secondary Payload Adapter (ESPA) that can fly multiple space experiments. The ESPA fits any EELV medium-class launch vehicle and holds up to six

small satellites, in addition to the primary payload. The first ESPA flight will be

on a dedicated STP launch aboard a medium EELV in September 2006. Success of

this first ESPA flight would provide DOD space experiment possibilities on future

EELV medium launch vehicles.

Q2. If NASA needs to develop a heavy-lift launch vehicle for its space exploration

missions, do you foresee possible uses for such a launch vehicle for future DOD

missions?

A2. Launch needs for DOD and National Security missions are under the purview

of the Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. What, if any, are DOD’s interests in NASA’s X–37 program?

• What role, if any, did DOD play in NASA’s decision to continue that program?

• DOD previously had withdrawn funding for the X–37 program. Will DOD provide any funding for it in the future?

A1. The proposed X–37 Orbital Vehicle (OV) has the potential to demonstrate technologies that would have a range of utility to both DOD and NASA. The technologies that could be demonstrated on the X–37 OV include: non-toxic, storable propulsion and power; advanced thermal protection system materials and structures;

materials, structures and components for long-duration exposure to the space environment; advanced flight control systems; and algorithms for autonomous in-space,

reentry and landing maneuvers.

Q2. NASA and DOD are collaborating on the National Aerospace Initiative (NAI).

However, it is hard to get a clear picture of the extent of the cooperation. Please

provide for the record: a list of the projects that make up the NAI, which of them

are jointly funded, and the estimated cost of each of the NAI projects.

A2. The National Aerospace Initiative serves an integrating role for Science and

Technology (S&T) investment to focus national aerospace research and technology

development and demonstrations toward goals and objectives which support future

high payoff capabilities. Technology roadmaps were developed in the areas of high

speed/hypersonics, access to space and space technology through a collaborative effort between DOD and NASA. The NAI and NASA’s Office of Exploration Systems

are currently identifying and evaluating NAI S&T projects that will support the Vision for Space Exploration. Attachment 1 contains a listing of DOD projects which

include NAI S&T activities. The attachment indicates overall project funding levels

and the level of NAI investment within that particular project. NAI funding is also

split into two categories: core and enabling technologies. Core technologies and enaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:42 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 092514 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA04\031804\92514 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
65

bling technologies, such as materials, aerodynamics, guidance and control, and

power support NAI and other S&T objectives.

Q3a. Do you foresee a DOD requirement for a human-carrying space transportation

system? If so, when? What would be the reason for the requirement?

A3a. On July 22, 2002, the Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Plans,

Policies, and Operations published a Universal Need Statement (UNS) for Small

Unit Space Transport and Insertion Capability (SUSTAIN). This UNS outlined the

need to deliver 13 combat-equipped personnel through and from low earth orbit. The

UNS did not specify a date required.

Q3b. Will DOD either review or participate in the formulation of the requirements

for NASA’s proposed Crew Exploration Vehicle?

A3b. The DOD will participate as appropriate.

Q4. NASA’s decision in the 1990s not to be the first user of an unproven rocket was

based on a series of failures of three new launch vehicles (the Pegasus XL, the

Conestoga, and the LLV). How should the government weigh the risks versus the

benefits when considering the use of new launch vehicles? That is, where should

the government draw the line between prudent stewardship of the taxpayers’

money by not risking a taxpayer-funded satellite on an unproven launch vehicle

versus the need to encourage the development of new launch vehicles that could

ultimately reduce governmental launch costs?

A4. Every launch decision must weigh a complex series of factors to determine acceptable risk. The analysis approach of weighing risk versus benefits of use of new

launch vehicles should be accomplished on a case by case basis. For example, the

launch of Tactical Satellite I (TacSat I), an R&D satellite, is currently scheduled

this year on the first flight of a new booster called Falcon.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Elon Musk, Chief Executive Officer, Space Exploration Technologies

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1. Your testimony mentioned some of your concerns with the regulatory certification

process and costs attendant with those regulations.

Q1a. What specific examples do you have where Air Force or FAA launch regulations

were overly burdensome and not adding value in terms of safety?

A1a. To date, SpaceX has only undergone the Air Force range safety approval, but

will be seeking an FAA license shortly. Our company can therefore only comment

on the Air Force process, but would be happy to provide similar comments on the

FAA at a later date. Most of the FAA regulations are drawn from the Air Force document EWR–127–1 and so some of the comments are likely to be common.

The Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have been working with

SpaceX to improve the certification process and in bring a new launch vehicle to

flight (moreover, using only thrust termination, rather than explosive termination).

My recommendations below should be seen in the context of a relationship that is

working well.

Specific recommendations are:

1. Remove the piece parts & traceability requirement for flight termination

systems in favor of more extensive testing

Piece parts and traceability requirements necessarily result in extremely expensive components, because modern (extremely reliable) electronics are mass manufactured and do not lend themselves to being built in tiny batches. If standard

electronics are suitable for a flight critical autopilot on a 400 passenger 747

landing in zero visibility over a densely populated city, then they should be suitable for a launch vehicle carrying no-one departing over unpopulated ocean.

2. Automatic safety cross-certification between the eastern and western

ranges

At present, there are slightly different subjective preferences held by the eastern

and western ranges. This requires a company to have either both ranges present

throughout the EWR tailoring process, increasing expenses to both the company

and the government, or work with just one and then be forced to modify the system later for launch on the other range. New airplane companies are not forced

to work with FAA branches from all corners of the country and this should not

be the case with rockets either. If a vehicle and its flight termination system

are suitable in California, they should be automatically allowed anywhere else

in the country with a similarly unpopulated flight path.

3. Require transparency of evaluation metrics

One of the critical evaluation metrics is the maximum probable loss calculation

for property and casualty. However, unlike the situation with FAA aircraft certification, this calculation is not done working with the launch vehicle company

and the methodology is not shared. This makes it very difficult for a launch vehicle company to determine how to improve the MPL.

Q1b. How much does it cost your company per launch to comply with the Government’s regulations? Of that amount, how much does your company spend to

comply with regulations that you would categorize as overly burdensome and

not adding value in terms of safety?

A1b.

SpaceX estimates for compliance with Government regulations:

• $400,000 for purchase, integration and installation of the flight termination

system. This number was over $300,000 higher prior to being granted a waiver of the flight termination explosives requirement by Air Force range safety.

• $650,000 for range services required for launch, including flight analysis,

flight termination system oversight, ground safety and launch oversight.

SpaceX estimates of costs that add minimal value and could be eliminated:

• $200,000 could be eliminated from the flight termination system by being able

to use flight termination components with extensive testing as a substitute

for piece parts and traceability requirements. Simply being able to use the

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low cost, high reliability flight termination receivers that are used on missiles

and UAVs would net an immediate $80,000 saving. In fact, SpaceX is approved to use these receivers at the Reagan Test Site at Kwajalein, but not

at the Eastern or Western ranges.

• At least $300,000 or more than half the range services cost could probably

be eliminated by streamlining the launch process. Please note that SpaceX expects to yield close to this number simply by working with the ranges and

increasing their comfort level with the Falcon launch system. I will not have

any recommendations until SpaceX is past its second or third launch.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. NASA’s decision in the 1990s not to be the first user of an unproven rocket was

based on a series of failures of three new launch vehicles (the Pegasus XL, the

Conestoga and LLV). How should the Government weigh the risks versus the

benefits when considering the use of new launch vehicles? That is, where should

the Government draw the line between prudent stewardship of the taxpayer’s

money by not risking a taxpayer-funded satellite on an unproven launch vehicle

versus the need to encourage the development of new launch vehicles that could

ultimately reduce Governmental launch costs?

A1. Prudence is certainly warranted before placing a valuable satellite on a new

launch vehicle. The chance of failure is significant, as suggested by history and common sense. However, we must necessarily venture forth and encourage new developments or be trapped into using the same transport system forever. As I will show

below numerically, staying with the old transport system will very quickly overwhelm the cost of a failure or two on a new launch vehicle.

It is one thing to ask a new company to underwrite all the costs of development,

it is another to force them to fly first with other customers, it is yet another to insist

that serious dialogue on purchase cannot even begin until a successful launch takes

place. This latter point is particularly harsh, since payload manifests are planned

years in advance. If a company cannot enter serious manifesting discussions until

after first successful launch, it means that first launch of a NASA payload will only

occur four to five years after the maiden launch. Our company was told precisely

this by the Office of Space Flight at NASA.

As it is, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has chosen to purchase the first

launch of Falcon I (at a discount to the standard price), for which SpaceX is very

appreciative. The second flight of Falcon I has been purchased by the Malaysian

Space Agency, raising the question of why a foreign government’s space agency is

more supportive of a U.S. launch company than our own.

The first flight of Falcon V, our medium lift vehicle, has also been purchased, in

this case by a U.S. commercial customer.

The analysis below compares Falcon I with Pegasus, the primary NASA launch

vehicle for small payloads.

As can be seen from the above table, at the low end of small satellites, it would

make more financial sense to buy three complete satellites, launch them on Falcon

I and have two fail completely, than buy one launch of Pegasus ($34.8M versus

$35M). The numbers become even more compelling if you consider that SpaceX offers discounts for purchases of three or more flights.

However, even considering the high end for small satellites, it makes sense to

choose Falcon I. Using the commercial launch insurance market as a gauge for probable risk, the premium for a first launch is approximately 30 percent, obviously

mostly for replacement of the satellite. Adding 30 percent to the maximum mission

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cost of $56.6M for launch on Falcon I, we obtain an amount of $73.6M, which is

still significantly less than the $80M mission cost for launch on Pegasus.

Note, in this analysis I have assigned a 100 percent success probability to Pegasus. In actual fact, the failure rate for Pegasus historically has been 10 percent,

which means roughly $3.5M to $8M must be added as risk premium to that price

for launch. Moreover, the above analysis considers only the first few launches. A net

present value of cost savings should be obtained by discounted back over the entire

launch manifest, which would include dozens of launches. The value equation is

therefore overwhelmingly in favor of a new, low cost rocket.

Seen in this light, the Pentagon purchase of first flight on Falcon I is not irrational or based on an appetite for more risk (even if it should turn out that our first

launch fails). The same is true of the commercial customer that has bought the first

launch of Falcon V. While there may be other strategic reasons for these actions,

they can also be viewed simply as sound financial judgment.

(75)

Appendix 2:

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

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STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. GASS

MICHAEL C. GASS

VICE PRESIDENT, SPACE TRANSPORTATION, SPACE SYSTEMS COMPANY

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

Mr. Chairman, Thank you for the opportunity to provide a statement for the Subcommittee hearing record on NASA–DOD cooperation. The subject of cooperation between the Department of Defense and NASA is both timely and delicate. It is timely

because we as a nation are about to embark on a new mission of space exploration.

All of our skills and resources must be brought to bear if this mission is to realize

its ambitious goals. NASA–DOD cooperation is a delicate subject because it evokes

institutional and philosophical biases that have in the past gotten in the way of mission objectives.

Lockheed Martin has, for many years, worked with each of these fine organizations. In partnership with NASA we have built spacecraft and systems that have

surveyed the surface of Venus, monitored the Earth’s environment, landed on Mars,

photographed storms on Jupiter, analyzed the rings of Saturn and sampled the dust

of a distant comet.

With DOD, we have built the space-borne eyes and ears of our military forces,

from surveillance to communications to weather analysis and more. For both institutions, we have provided the boost vehicles that take these spacecraft to orbit and

beyond.

Our experience with each organization has been characterized by mutual respect

and a shared sense of accomplishment. We have seen over the years the thing that

they and we have most in common: a dedication to mission success.

If the Space Exploration initiative is to be successful, NASA and DOD must work

together. Lockheed Martin supports productive cooperation between them, focused

on areas of common interest and respectful of their differing charters.

In the past, the differences between the two—in both size and mission—has

caused some justifiable caution on the part of NASA. This caution is shared no

doubt by Members and staff of this subcommittee. Nonetheless, there are areas in

which these differences can be used to NASA’s advantage, and space launch is one

of those areas.

Currently, access to space for NASA missions involves four distinct sets of infrastructure: STS, Delta II, Delta IV, and Atlas V. There are good, historical reasons

that this is so, but it is an expensive and inefficient way to operate.

The latter two boosters, the Delta IV and Atlas V, are new systems developed by

DOD under the EELV program. Together, they constitute a robust, modular and reliable foundation for virtually all future space launch requirements, be they scientific, military or commercial. STS and Delta II have been workhorse systems for

NASA. If it is to both afford and execute the critical missions of the Space Exploration initiative, NASA must rationalize and streamline its space launch infrastructure. This should be done in accordance with a strict timetable in order to achieve

the necessary savings and meet the necessary milestones.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the four areas that will be addressed

in your hearing today.

1. To what extent can NASA and the DOD benefit from greater cooperation

in the development and purchase of launch vehicles?

NASA and DOD will obtain both cost and reliability benefits from greater cooperation in space launch vehicles. Launch vehicle cost and reliability are significantly driven by the simplicity of the system design and launch rate. The Atlas V

program has made significant reductions in system complexity and labor by the evolutionary (spiral) development of the Nation’s launch vehicle fleet. One of the main

objectives of the EELV acquisition was to reduce launch costs by at least 25 percent.

This has been accomplished with a combination of reduced infrastructure and improved designs. Infrastructure was reduced by going from nine heritage (three

Delta, three Atlas and three Titan IV) launch pads to four pads (one Atlas and Delta

pad per coast). On the vehicle side, the Atlas program has reduced the number of

propulsion elements from nine on the Atlas HAS to only two on the Atlas V 401

configuration improving both reliability and increasing performance. The Atlas

launch operations crew size and processing time have been reduced by 50 percent

through increased use of automation, while performing 70 consecutive successful

launches. If NASA were to launch science and exploration missions on EELV exclusively, the nearly doubled launch rates would minimize the need for USG-funded,

fixed infrastructure, while maintaining two viable systems to provide assured access

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to space. This will create incentives for innovation while maintaining the benefits

of competition.

Reliability Enhancements—As part of the Atlas V evolution, we have significantly

improved reliability by both reducing parts and adding fault tolerance. Withy support from NASA, we have performed an initial Atlas V assessment to identify high

value reliability launch vehicle improvements. The NASA study included singlepoint failure identification, fault avoidance and fault tolerance, design enhancement

and ultimately a recommendation of the top 5–10 investments in reliability improvement. The key elements identified were the upper stage and booster engine singlepoint failure elimination, additional robustness of the solid rocket boosters (SRBs)

and avionics upgrades. These NASA reliability improvements are currently unfunded. The AF Assured Access to Space (AATS) program is initially funding RL–

10 upper stage engine producibility enhancements and critical component engineering which inherently improves reliability. Cooperative NASA and DOD funding of

these high value reliability improvements would directly benefit all launch vehicle

customers.

The recommended NASA approach for human rating combines highly reliable

EELVs with intact crew abort systems enabled by a robust launch vehicle health

management (LVHM) system. The LVHM system provides the critical sensing and

indications required to initiate a crew system abort. This same LVHM sensing system would also provide a valuable Mission Assurance tool for DOD Missions by providing in flight measurements of critical systems, valuable for post flight mission

assessments and feedback for future flights. This valuable activity is also currently

unfunded.

Performance Enhancements—An evolutionary launch vehicle strategy allows incremental and affordable performance improvements, with demonstrated performance at each step, which benefits both NASA and DOD. This enables incremental

funding decisions based upon the ultimate architecture needs. This strategy maintains common launch vehicle elements to maximize production rate benefits. It minimizes changes to the launch infrastructure (pads, vehicle integration facilities). This

enables common launch infrastructure for both current and future NASA and DOD

missions.

Increased launch rate provides both reduced cost and increased reliability. Common elements in the EELV configurations, with appropriate production and launch

rate, maintain proficiency of the production and launch crews, resulting in increased

reliability. The NASA human-rating approach will further improve reliability. Both

DOD and NASA mutually benefit from launch vehicle reliability improvements.

In summary, we believe that there ought to be one government team to define

mission assurance requirements. This would eliminate wasteful redundancy, use

common processes for acquisition and contract oversight, share the benefits of complementary hardware systems and reduce the cost of maintaining infrastructure.

2. What steps NASA is taking to collaborate with the DOD in order to realize those benefits?

There are several positive examples of NASA/DOD cooperation:

First is the USG Partnership Council. This Council consists of the senior leadership from NASA/DOD/AF/NRO/DARPA and meets quarterly to continue to foster

interagency cooperation in technology and program support.

Second, NASA is working with DOD to adapt the EELV program for the Crew

Exploration Vehicle and other space launch requirements. NASA has initiated studies for EELV reliability, human rating and crew escape systems technology that will

benefit all USG agency users.

Third, the NASA Prometheus initiative builds on the Navy’s vast experience in

nuclear power development. By doing so, it will accelerate the availability of advanced space power and propulsion technologies for civil space applications.

Finally, the National Aerospace Initiative has been focused on the development

of third-generation technologies in support of hypersonics, space transportation, and

in-space technologies. A U.S. government joint project office (staffed by experts from

NASA, DOD and NRO) has been working with industry partners for the past several years on focused technology demonstrations in these disciplines.

Government working groups should give priority to the establishment of common

launch vehicle requirements. This process would benefit both NASA and DOD missions in the future.

3. What areas of launch vehicle development are exclusively the role and

responsibility of one agency or the other?

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Current U.S. National Space Transportation policy establishes NASA as ‘‘lead

agency for technology development and demonstration for next generation reusable

space transportation systems.’’ DOD’s role in the current Policy is focused on expendable launch systems. The practical effect of this language has been to limit unnecessarily DOD’s involvement in decisions pertaining to next generation reusable

systems. To meet emerging national security requirements for space control and

force projection, DOD should be able to fully explore next generation reusable system solutions. Conversely, this delineation has precluded NASA innovation in exploiting the DOD investment in expendable launch vehicles. As mentioned earlier,

the current and foreseeable launch rates do not support the development of fully reusable launch systems.

The National Space Transportation Policy (currently in revision) should clearly

state that the Department of Defense/U.S. Air Force has the flexibility to develop

and utilize more responsive launch vehicle capabilities as required to support its

mission requirements. The updated policy should promote full cooperation between

NASA and DOD on both next generation reusable and expendable space transportation systems and clearly articulate the desirability of comprehensive collaboration.

4. To what extent can NASA and the DOD encourage the growth of the U.S.

domestic launch market, including emerging U.S. launch vehicle providers who provide unique capabilities?

Due to the collapse of the commercial launch market and relatively flat demand

for government launches, the current domestic launch vehicle providers are at a

greater than 50 percent over capacity. This has driven prices to below cost, an

unsustainable condition.

By concentrating both NASA and DOD space launch demand around the two

EELV vehicles, the government can help stabilize and strengthen the industrial

base on which space access depends.

As regards emerging U.S. launch vehicle providers, the newly-identified need for

‘‘responsive’’ launch capabilities may provide an opportunity. DARPA, for example,

is developing the Force Application Launched from CONUS (FALCON). This and related technology programs, driven by military utility, offer the best prospect for

these entrepreneurial business. They would be unwise to project a commercial demand that covered their cost.

Many, including Lockheed Martin, have developed small launch vehicles only to

find that the market is not adequate to support the cost. Selling at below cost to

establish a market has not proven to be a successful long-term strategy. Emerging

launch vehicle providers face the historic challenge to make a viable business case

in an unforgiving environment.

Summary

There is an old adage among pilots that says, ‘‘Plan your flight and then fly your

plan.’’ With this subcommittee’s oversight and support, NASA is being reinvigorated

and refocused. If it is to achieve its new goals, however, NASA needs to stick to a

well-thought-out plan. A key enabler is assured access to space. This plan must include a reduction in the complexity, cost and management burden of its current

launch infrastructure. In cooperation with DOD, NASA can take advantage of an

adaptive, responsive range of boosters to meet the needs of its exciting future.

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STATEMENT OF NORTHROP GRUMMAN

NASA–DOD Cooperation in Space Transportation

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for convening a hearing

on March 18, 2004, on the important topic of cooperation between NASA and the

Department of Defense on space transportation. Northrop Grumman believes this

is an important issue, and we would like to take this opportunity to provide input

to the process.

Developing safer, more reliable and cost-effective space transportation systems is

the key to all future U.S. activities in space. New systems will mean more robust

capabilities to defend America and improve our national security. New launch capabilities are a prerequisite to turn our dreams of exploring the Moon, Mars and beyond into reality, because without new systems we will never achieve those dreams.

Such systems would support viable opportunities for industry in space and enable

us to explore concepts such as generating energy from orbit. Science missions would

also benefit since launch costs—often half the cost of a science mission—would be

less significant.

The Defense Department needs operationally responsive spacelift—vehicles that

can be launched on a few hours’ notice, from a variety of locations and with adaptable launch facilities. The current systems, although technologically impressive, are

slow and cumbersome, and they cost so much to operate that they preclude our nation from taking the best advantage of innovative thinking on national security from

space.

NASA needs a system that augments safety while decreasing costs, especially if

it is to achieve sufficient cost savings to support its bold new mission to explore the

Moon, Mars and beyond. As Robert Heinlein once said, ‘‘Reach Earth orbit and

you’re halfway to anywhere in the solar system.’’

These two agencies may seem to be driven by different requirements, yet they are

not mutually exclusive. When there are so many pressing concerns facing our nation, we don’t have the luxury of developing a vehicle that fills only a single need.

A next-generation launch system can be developed that will meet the needs of both

DOD and NASA.

Later this year the White House is expected to issue a new national space transportation policy. Preliminary drafts indicate that the policy will eliminate the current bifurcation that limits NASA to studying the development of reusable vehicles

and DOD to studying the development of expendable vehicles. This is a positive

step. There are great synergies between the needs of NASA and DOD, and although

the Nation needs to be careful not to develop a vehicle that attempts to be all things

to all customers, the two agencies should work together to develop a vehicle architecture that can serve both of their needs.

There are three key aspects to ensure that the United States stays at the forefront of space launch and develops the systems that will support our future national

security and exploration needs:

The Government must make a long-term commitment to sustained investments

in space launch technologies

A spiral development approach that makes gradual improvements is essential

to continued success

NASA and DOD should reach out beyond the traditional base of launch systems

providers to seek out new technologies and approaches

NASA’s recent investments in the Space Launch Initiative and Next Generation

Launch Technology programs have led to tremendous strides in the development of

numerous launch vehicle enabling technologies like Composite Cryogenic Tanks and

Integrated Vehicle Health Management Systems. Similarly, DOD’s FALCON program and future investments in Operationally Responsive Space will continue to expand our knowledge and capabilities. Taken together, these NASA and DOD programs are critical investments in U.S. launch competitiveness.

These programs are an indication that our leaders are beginning to understand

that space launch is not a near-term technological hurdle, but an enduring national

necessity. The United States must invest in these systems and technologies on a

regular and continuous basis, allowing for steady progress and continual improvements to keep this nation at the forefront. Our national security and our scientific

and technological industry base require such a sustained commitment.

Using the stepping-stone, spiral development approach to space launch—moving

from expendable launch vehicles, to hybrid systems that are partially reusable, and

finally to fully reusable systems—is a viable way to ensure steady improvements

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that will keep the United States at the forefront of space access. It is time to move

beyond 30- and 40-year old technologies and build the launch systems that can sustain space development safely and affordably, and in the long run reusable systems

are the clear choice. To get there does not require a revolution, but regular technological improvements that build upon each other. In the same way we evolved from

the Model T Ford to the safer, less expensive and more reliable automobiles of

today, our nation should make the investments in launch technologies that will

move us from expendable vehicles to the reliable workhorses of the future.

A number of companies have innovative solutions to U.S. space launch requirements, and both DOD and NASA should look beyond the established space launch

providers. As recent work on FALCON, NASA’s Alternate Access to Station, and the

National Aerospace Initiative demonstrate, many of the most inventive solutions can

come from companies that take a fresh approach and have not been immersed in

traditional technologies and methods of operation from the past 30 years. Northrop

Grumman is certain we are one of these companies that can bring critical breakthroughs and innovative thinking to our nation’s space launch challenges, and we

hope that space leaders recognize the importance of competition and pioneering contributions from those who are not wedded to the status quo.

Cooperation between NASA and DOD is central to successful advancement in

meeting this nation’s space launch requirements now and into the future. We need

a government-wide assessment of requirements that establishes clear objectives and

acknowledges the technical tradeoffs—that would provide the necessary direction to

build a next-generation system that meets the Nation’s requirements.

Northrop Grumman believes U.S. Government and industry are on the path to

progress. Together we have made great technological strides in recent years, and

with a sustained commitment and step-by-step spiral development we can achieve

lasting success. Congress can provide the multi-year funding to continually invest

in space launch technologies and oversee an obligation to an open, competitive process. With this support from Congress, industry—with the firm commitment of Northrop Grumman—will deliver the launch systems that will maintain U.S. leadership

in space far into the future.

Thank you for accepting Northrop Grumman’s view on this very important topic.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILBUR TRAFTON

WILBUR TRAFTON

VP AND GM, EXPENDABLE LAUNCH SYSTEMS;

PRESIDENT, BOEING LAUNCH SERVICES

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to offer you Boeing’s Launch Services perspective on

NASA–DOD cooperation in space transportation. While this is an area with a complex history, what is not often appreciated is how often NASA and DOD’s space activities have resulted in synergistic benefits to each organization. This trend continues to this day.

First, however, I would like to point out two areas of cooperation that many may

not be well recognized. Most specifically, in the mid-1980’s, NASA’s space station

program, provided an excellent training ground for young space professionals who

had entered the field during a lull in the industry when the Shuttle development

was complete, the existing expendable launch systems were being phased out, and

the DOD did not have a major new development program underway. These young

professional engineers, scientists and factory workers, under the guidance of their

Apollo era superiors, designed and built today’s International Space Station—a technological marvel which, despite budget and programmatic issues over the years, continues to function nearly flawlessly six years after it began its on-orbit assembly in

1998.

In the mid-90’s, as the U.S. Air Force sought to reduce the cost of access, the Boeing Company employed many of the same professionals, benefiting from their ISS

experience, in leading the effort to design and develop the Delta IV—our entry into

the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. To date, the Delta IV has

flown flawlessly three times—a tribute to these professionals and the lessons they

learned while working on space station.

Now that the EELV development is complete, the U.S. has two new fleets of highly capable, modern launch vehicles which can be used both to support the original

DOD mission model as well as jump start the new NASA Space Exploration Vision.

While NASA is currently engaged in trade studies and analysis of the optimal space

transportation solution for crewed missions to Mars and the Moon, a decade or more

of preparatory, early missions can be supported by the existing Delta IV fleet and

modifications to it.

Relatively straightforward and affordable upgrades to the Delta IV Heavy launch

vehicle could increase our capabilities to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) from our current

23 metric tons (mt) up to 45 mt. We would encourage the USG to consider existing

vehicle upgrades as an early element of spiral development to enable near-term successes for space exploration missions. This is similar to the process used in the Apollo era which grew the early Redstone and Jupiter rockets into the Saturn I and Saturn IB—which became the stepping stones which led to the Saturn V.

This spiral development approach could focus on, for example, a larger upper

stage engine that would enhance Delta IV’s performance to support exploration missions and could also be used to support a new super heavy-lift capability—whether

an EELV-Derived, Shuttle-Derived or a Clean Sheet concept. By developing such an

engine early on, the cost and schedule risk of developing the ultimate exploration

launch system could be reduced and, a new in-space propulsion capability (a translunar or trans-Mars stage) could also be developed. Other technologies that could

be considered include upgrades to the existing Delta IV RS–68 engine (the only new

large U.S. booster engine in decades), densified cryogenic propellants, and aluminum lithium propellant tanks.

In the course of these spiral developments of the existing EELV fleets to support

NASA’s Space Exploration Vision, the Nation’s defense will directly benefit from

these upgraded performance capabilities which will be available to meet future military space requirements. And future DOD programs will leverage the engineering

skill base that is sustained and enhanced in support of NASA’s development efforts.

In this way, synergistic cooperation between NASA and DOD will continue to benefit the respective visions of each organization as well as that of our space dependent society.

I thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony.