* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 95-60614

Summary Calendar

__________________

SHELBY STEELE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

EDWARD HARGETT, SUPERINTENDENT,

MISSISSIPPI STATE PENITENTIARY,

Respondent-Appellee.

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Mississippi

(2:95-CV-041-B)

______________________________________________

March 14, 1996

Before KING, SMITH, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:*

Shelby Steele, a Mississippi state prisoner, appeals the

district court's dismissal of his federal habeas petition for

failure to exhaust state remedies. Finding that both claims in his

petition are procedurally barred, we affirm the judgment of

dismissal on alternate grounds.

Shelby failed to present his claims of an involuntary guilty

plea and ineffective assistance of counsel to the Mississippi
1 The statute contains certain exceptions: 

Excepted from this three-year statute of limitations are

those cases in which the prisoner can demonstrate either

that there has been an intervening decision of the

supreme court of either the state of Mississippi or the

United States which would have actually adversely

affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence or

that he has evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the

time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be

practically conclusive that had such been introduced at

trial it would have caused a different result in the

conviction or sentence. Likewise excepted are those

cases in which the prisoner claims that his sentence has

expired or his probation, parole or conditional release

has been unlawfully revoked. 

Section 99-39-5(2). Additionally, an error that "affect[s]

fundamental constitutional rights" provides an exception to the

prescriptive bar of § 99-39-5(2). Luckett v. State, 582 So.2d 428,

430 (Miss. 1991).

2

Supreme Court before seeking federal habeas relief in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Nonetheless, he asserts that he has

exhausted his state remedies because the three-year limitation

period for seeking post-conviction relief in the Mississippi state

courts has expired. See § 99-39-5(2) of the Mississippi Uniform

Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (PCRA).1 Steele is correct.

In Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 1995), this Court

recognized that when a claim is time barred under § 99-39-5(2), a

petitioner "has technically exhausted all available state

remedies." However, we determined that when state remedies become

unavailable due to the petitioner's own procedural default, federal

courts are barred from reviewing the petitioner's claims. Id.

Relying on Sones, the Respondent contends that the dismissal should

have been based on Steel's procedural default. We agree. 

In regard to Steele's claim of ineffective assistance of
3

counsel, this Court recently has held that the § 99-39-5(2) renders

such a claim procedurally barred. Sones, 61 F.3d at 416-17

(citing, inter alia, Campbell v. State, 611 So.2d 209 (Miss.

1992)). In regard to Steele's challenge to his guilty plea, the

Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a claim that the

petitioner's pleas of guilty were coerced, unintelligent, and

involuntary was time barred by section 99-39-5(2). Luckett v.

State, 582 So.2d 428, 429-30 (Miss. 1991). Accordingly, Steele's

involuntary guilty plea claim is also procedurally barred. See

Sones, 61 F.3d at 416-17. 

 For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court

dismissing Steele's claims is AFFIRMED.