This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 35,632 4 GLEN MAYFIELD, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY 7 Fred T. Van Soelen, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 12 B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Public Defender 13 Santa Fe, NM 14 for Appellant 15 MEMORANDUM OPINION 16 VANZI, Chief Judge. 17 {1} Defendant appeals the denial of his mo tion to suppress. We issued a notice of 18 proposed summary disposition proposing to affirm. Defendant ha s responded with a 192 timely memorandum in opposition, which wehave duly considered. We remain 1 unpersuaded that our initial proposed disposition was incorrect, and we therefore 2 affirm. 3 DISCUSSION 4 {2} Defendant continues to argue in his memorandum in opposition that the search 5 warrant affidavit did not contain sufficient information to establish the confidential 6 informant’s basis of knowledge. [MIO 5-6] See State v. Steinzig , 1999-NMCA-107, 7 ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 752, 987 P.2d 409 (stating that to support a finding of probable cause 8 the affidavit must establish (1) the informant’s “basis of knowledge,” and (2) facts 9 showing the informant’s “veracity” (internal; quotation marks and citation omitted)); 10 see alsoRule 5-211(E) NMRA (stating that “probable cause” for i ssuance of a search 11 warrant may be based on hearsay provided there is a substantial ba sis for believing the 12 source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is a factual basis for 13 the information furnished). 14 {3} We disagree. “Under the ‘basis of knowle dge’ prong of the test, we ask whether 15 the affidavit provides a substantial basis fo r concluding the informant[] gathered the 16 information of illegal activity in a reliable fashion.” State v. Haidle , 2012-NMSC-033, 17 ¶ 23, 285 P.3d 668 (internal quotati on marks and citation omitted). 18 The basis of knowledge test wa s satisfied in this case by the confidential informant’s 19 statement that he personally observed De fendant in possession of cocaine at his 203 residence in the past seventy-two hours and that he had seen Defendant selling cocaine 1 from his residence in the past. [RP 70-71] See State v. Montoya , 1992-NMCA-067, 2 ¶ 14, 114 N.M. 221, 836 P.2d 667 (holding thatthe basis of know ledge requirement 3 was satisfied where a confidential in formant had personal knowledge, through 4 observation, of the defendant’s activities). 5 {4} Defendant argues that affidavit was deficient because it did not specify the 6 specific quantity of cocaine the confiden tial informant saw or why the informant 7 believed that it was cocaine. [MIO 6] Ho wever, the affidav it recites that the 8 confidential informant had participated in controlled buys of narc otics in the past. We 9 therefore believe that the magistrate coul d reasonably infer that the informant was 10 familiar with cocaine and ab le to recognize it. [RP 81] See State v. Lujan , 1998- 11 NMCA-032, ¶ 10, 124 N.M. 494, 953 P.2d 29 (observing that a controlled buy bears 12 upon the credibility of a confidential informant, insofar as it “reduces the uncertainty 13 and risk of falsehood about the information provided by [an] informant”); see also 14 State v. Rubio , 2002-NMCA-007, ¶ 8, 131 N.M. 479, 39 P.3d 144 (noting that the 15 confidential informant could be inferred to know what constituted a large amount of 16 cocaine based on evidence showing that he was familiar with cocaine). For these 17 reasons, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress. Defendant also continues 18 to argue that he was denied due process because the arrest warrant was not served for 19 more than six months after it was issu ed. [MIO 7-8] In our notice of proposed 204 summary disposition, we indicated that De fendant had not stated in his docketing 1 statement how this issue was preserved below. See Rule 12-208(D)(4) NMRA (stating 2 that the docketing statement shall contain a statement of how the issues raised were 3 preserved in the trial court); see also State v. Varela , 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 25, 128 4 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280 (holding that to preservean issue for appeal, it is essential 5 that a party make a timely objection that sp ecifically apprises the trial court of the 6 claimed error and invokes an intelligent ruling thereon). 7 {5} Defendant has not responde d in his memorandum in opposition that this issue 8 was preserved below, and we therefore reject this assertion of error. See In re Aaron 9 L ., 2000-NMCA-024, ¶ 10, 128 N.M. 641, 996 P. 2d 431 (stating that on appeal, the 10 reviewing court will not consider issues not raised in the trial court unless the issues 11 involve matters of jurisdictional or fundamental error). Additionally, to the extent that 12 Defendant’s issue can be considered a clai m of pre-indictment delay, Defendant has 13 not shown any prejudice due todelay between the issuance of the arrest warrant and 14 his arrest. See State v. Fierro , 2014-NMCA-004, ¶ 27, 315 P.3d 319 (stating that a 15 defendant must show prejudice to prevail on a claim of pre-indictment delay). 16 {6} For these reasons, we affirm Defendant’s conviction. 17 {7} IT IS SO ORDERED. 18

__________________________________ 19 LINDA M. VANZI, Chief Judge 205 WE CONCUR: 1

_________________________________ 2 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 3

_________________________________ 4 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 5