2023 UT App 147

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TIMOTHY RICHINS,

Appellee,

v.

MARK WELDON,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20220522-CA

Filed December 7, 2023

Fourth District Court, Spanish Fork Department

The Honorable Jared Eldridge

No. 210300134

Walter A. Romney Jr. and Trenton L. Lowe, 

Attorneys for Appellant

Chris A. Dexter, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 Mark Weldon admits he doesn’t like Timothy Richins. But 

they had to deal with each other because Weldon managed the

building in which Richins’s employer is located. Richins filed a 

petition for a stalking injunction after becoming aware of direct 

and indirect communications Weldon had allegedly made 

concerning Richins. After being served with a temporary stalking 

injunction, Weldon requested a hearing. At the conclusion of that 

hearing, the district court made the injunction permanent. Now 

Weldon appeals, claiming that the evidence presented was 

insufficient to support the injunction and that the district court 

erroneously applied the facts to the law. We reject Weldon’s 

arguments and affirm the district court.
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BACKGROUND

Petition and Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction

¶2 Richins was a vice president at a company (Company), and 

his duties included facility management and ensuring that lease 

obligations were being fulfilled. In this capacity, he had known

Weldon since November 2020. Weldon is the manager of the 

business that leased an office building to the Company. The 

Company leased space on the second floor and shared the firstfloor server room with another tenant. According to Richins, the 

primary communications between him and Weldon were 

“discussions about the warehouse that was in current 

construction that [the Company was] going to . . . lease or move 

into once that construction was completed” and “any type of 

office facilities requirement, because it was a full-service lease.” 

At the time of the events giving rise to this appeal, Weldon and 

the business he managed were “involved in civil disputes with 

[the Company] regarding the lease and other disputes.”

¶3 Richins filed a request for a civil stalking injunction against 

Weldon in September 2021. In his civil stalking petition, Richins 

alleged that Weldon had “become increasingly hostile” and 

engaged in the following actions:

1. “On April 15, 2021, Mr. Weldon texted Mr. 

Richins at home and threatened to have him 

arrested and told [Richins] he was going to come 

see him personally.”

2. “On July 8, 2021, Mr. Weldon sent a harassing 

email calling Mr. Richins by various names and 

calling him a liar.”

3. “On July 8, 2021, Mr. Weldon sent an email with 

an implied threat that he ‘will be at the 
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warehouse and he better not see any oil from a 

forklift.’”

4. “Additional emails were sent on July 8 and July 

9, 2021 and again on July 27, 2021 harassing Mr. 

Richins and insulting him.”

¶4 The petition also outlined various events that occurred on 

August 27, 2021—as detailed below—that ultimately prompted 

Richins to file a statement with the police and that became the 

focus of Richins’s civil stalking injunction hearing.

¶5 The district court issued a temporary civil stalking 

injunction against Weldon. Soon thereafter, Weldon requested a 

hearing.

Evidentiary Hearing to Determine Permanence of Injunction

¶6 The district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine 

if the injunction would be modified, revoked, or continued. See

Utah Code § 78B-7-701(5)(a). At the hearing, most of the testimony 

surrounded the events that occurred on August 27 at the 

Company’s office building; unlike the events in April and July, 

Richins was not present for the August events and therefore had

no personal knowledge of what occurred. Richins called six 

employees of the company as witnesses: a computer programmer 

(Programmer), a software engineer (Engineer), a software 

architect (Architect), the Company’s CEO (CEO), an executive 

assistant (Assistant), and himself; Weldon called two witnesses:

the property manager for the building (Manager) and himself.

A. Programmer

¶7 Programmer was present on August 27 for a meeting (the 

first meeting) with Weldon, Manager, Engineer, and Architect in 

the first-floor server room. Programmer, Engineer, and Architect 
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were there to retrieve keys to the second-floor server room from 

Weldon and Manager and to transfer the servers there. 

¶8 Programmer testified that when someone mentioned

needing to get a key from Richins, Weldon expressed a lot of 

anger toward Richins, used “angry and aggressive language,” 

swore, claimed that Richins “was doing wrong to him,” said that 

“he wasn’t going to let [Richins] get away with it,” and stated that 

he was “watching” Richins and CEO.

¶9 After the first meeting, Programmer sent an email to 

Richins and CEO to notify them that Weldon had complained 

about Richins, “was verbally aggressive, [used] harsh language 

and repeatedly [dropped] F-bombs.” The email explained that 

Weldon asked Architect “to tell” Richins that he was “an asshole.” 

Programmer continued, “I don’t remember at what point during 

his rant this was brought up, but he also said that he knows what 

[Richins] did in the warehouse and that he’ll never get away with 

it. He said that he has private investigators following [Richins] 

and [CEO] and that he’ll always be coming for them.” 

Programmer understood this statement to mean that Weldon 

“would pursue legal recourse and other means if . . . deemed by 

him necessary until he got what he wanted.” Programmer also 

expressed “concern” because Weldon “frankly . . . seemed a little 

unhinged and . . . unpredictable,” stating that it made him fear for 

his safety at work.

¶10 Programmer further described a part of the first meeting 

where a screwdriver was needed to complete the task at hand.

After the tool was located, Weldon informed Programmer that he 

would lend it to him but if Programmer “didn’t give it back to 

him, [Weldon] was going to have to go out to his car, get in his 

trunk, grab a gun, and bring that gun upstairs and shoot 

somebody.” When Programmer returned the screwdriver, 

Weldon said, “Good. Now I don’t have to shoot anybody,” which 

Programmer took as “an implied threat,” largely directed against 
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Richins. Programmer explained that Weldon’s anger “the entire 

time” was aimed at Richins. Moreover, Weldon’s anger was 

unsolicited: “[H]e brought it up and kept going off on it.” 

Programmer explained that “given the context,” he understood 

the phrase “shoot somebody” to mean that Richins was the object 

of the threat. However, Programmer clarified that Weldon never 

directly said that he would shoot Richins. 

¶11 Programmer revealed that he was “in fear” for himself and 

Richins after the first meeting. He told Richins “everything” he 

had included in the email and that he “thought” Weldon was 

“unstable” and the interaction was “scary.” In response to 

Programmer’s concerns, Richins explained that some of his past 

dealings with Weldon had been unpleasant and “scary to him.” 

B. Engineer

¶12 Engineer also testified about the first meeting, including 

the screwdriver incident. Engineer expressed that the incident

was “very odd” and “very uncomfortable” because Weldon, with 

whom Engineer had never interacted, was “threatening violence 

in a very . . . serious manner.” Engineer clarified that Weldon’s 

vitriol was directed at Richins. Weldon had called Richins “an 

effing tool,” “an A-hole,” and other “very similar things using 

similar vulgar language.” Engineer said, “[W]eldon expressed his 

hatred of [Richins] very clearly. . . . It sounded pretty serious . . . . 

[H]e did not sound like he was joking.” Engineer testified that the

incident left him feeling “pretty nervous” and “scared.”

¶13 After the first meeting, Engineer sent an email to Richins 

and CEO summarizing the encounter. Engineer wrote that 

Weldon was “spewing F-bombs,” “telling us he’s never going to 

stop going after” Richins and CEO, saying “that he has private 

investigators following” them, and stating that Richins “is a 

fucking asshole.” Engineer’s email also recounted the screwdriver 

threat, noting that (1) Weldon told him that if it was not returned, 

“he would go out to his car, grab his gun, and come upstairs and 
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20220522-CA 6 2023 UT App 147

have to shoot someone” and (2) after returning the screwdriver, 

Weldon responded, “Good. Now I don’t have to shoot someone.”

¶14 Engineer testified that he interpreted Weldon’s statement 

about going after Richins and CEO to mean that he was “stalking 

and following them,” intending to maybe do “harm to them in 

some way” or pursue legal remedies against them. Engineer

interpreted these statements as threatening. Engineer noted in his 

testimony that Richins “remained upstairs” during the first

meeting and that Weldon talked about shooting “someone” but

did not specifically mention Richins. 

C. Architect

¶15 Architect also testified about the first meeting. He stated 

that upon hearing Richins’s name, Weldon “became extremely 

angry” and “agitated.” Architect testified that Weldon “started

ranting” and saying, “[Richins] is an effing tool. I effing hate him. 

. . . I’ve been watching him. I know what he did. I’m never going

to stop coming for him.” Architect explained that he perceived 

Weldon’s statements as “threats” that made him “very 

concerned” for his own safety and especially for Richins’s safety.

Architect was not privy to additional statements Weldon made 

because he “extricated” himself from the situation at that point.

However, when he later recounted the first meeting to Richins, 

Architect indicated that Richins “seemed very uncomfortable”

and “frightened.” 

D. CEO

¶16 CEO testified about his interactions with Weldon at a 

separate meeting (the second meeting) that took place a few 

minutes after the first meeting on August 27. Weldon, Manager, 

CEO, and Assistant were present at this second meeting, which 

was called to discuss some misunderstandings regarding the 

ownership of various equipment. At some point during the 

second meeting, Weldon “mentioned that he was very upset with 
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. . . Richins,” said that CEO should fire Richins, expressed that he 

“wanted to kill” Richins, and stated that since he was “going to 

die anyway, . . . he should take some people out with him.”

¶17 After finding out the other things Weldon had said during 

the first meeting, CEO called the police. In his police statement,

CEO explained that Weldon’s words made him “immediately 

fearful” for Richins’s safety, other employees’ safety, and his own 

safety. CEO elaborated that during the second meeting, Weldon 

offered him some furniture for free and expressed his hope that 

their civil dispute would be settled “quickly and fairly.” CEO felt 

that for Weldon “to threaten [Richins] and others generally to 

[CEO’s] face,” while asking for “a quick and fair settlement[,]

came off as an effort to intimidate [them] into settling.”

¶18 CEO explained that the situation “felt threatening . . . 

against [Richins] specifically” and that Richins was “visibly 

disturbed and worried” when CEO communicated the situation 

to him.

E. Assistant

¶19 Assistant, who was present at the second meeting, testified 

that she became “uncomfortable” because “Weldon started 

saying things that [she] felt were threatening” toward Richins.

Specifically, Assistant heard Weldon say that “he didn’t want to 

die over the issues that they were having, but that he was willing 

to,” and she said his tone sounded “kind of agitated.” She also 

heard him say that “other people would die too before he did.”

She thought he was “serious,” and she understood what he said 

“to be a threat.” Assistant clarified that when Weldon referred to 

“other people” dying, he never specifically mentioned Richins’s

name, but she understood that “this was a threat of death” specific 

to Richins because Weldon was referring to Richins beforehand. 

¶20 Assistant drafted an email to CEO stating these same views 

immediately following the second meeting. And when Assistant
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told Richins about what Weldon said, Richins said that “he was 

concerned for his safety,” that he “had put . . . more cameras up 

around his house,” and that he “was afraid to come to work.” She 

also testified that she knew Richins well enough to know that he 

was “in fear.” 

F. Richins

¶21 Richins read the April 15 text exchange with Weldon into 

the record. In that exchange Weldon said, ”[I]f you do not let 

[Manager] into my building that I own immediately, we will call 

the police. We will also . . . write out a report to the police and 

have you arrested.” Richins responded, “I don’t appreciate you 

threatening me . . . .” Then Weldon replied, “This a threat. It—

what we have done already. You locked us out of our building.

What is wrong with you? We have work to do at the building. . . .

I will come see you personally when I’m back in Utah, and we 

need to talk about it.”

¶22 Richins noted that this text exchange was the first 

“[d]ocumented incident” where he felt threatened by Weldon but 

stated he had “multiple interactions with . . . Weldon, and he is a 

very hostile person.” Richins testified that he did not understand 

why Weldon was texting him at home “early in the morning” and 

“threatening to have [him] arrested” when he had not done 

“anything wrong.” He explained that Weldon was “coming after 

[him] for no reason” and that he had “no control over this 

situation.” And Richins saw the text as threatening: “[C]oming to 

see me personally is [a threat]. He could call me on the phone. He

didn’t need to come see me personally. [T]hat’s an implied threat, 

[especially with] the context previous to this and the hostility 

previous to this.”

¶23 Regarding the August 27 interactions and why he was not 

present at the meetings, Richins testified that he purposely “took 

[himself] out of that situation because of previous fear, and [he] 

didn’t want to interact with [Manager] or [Weldon].” When 
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Richins first learned from Architect about the events surrounding 

the first meeting with Weldon, he testified that it made him feel

“fearful” and “more scared.” He said that he does not “want to go 

to work” and relies on “multiple locks” on his door for security. 

Moreover, he said, 

My wife doesn’t want to leave her house. . . . [T]his 

has been the most terrifying thing I have ever gone 

through, and I am not making that up. I’m fearful to 

be doing this right now and what retaliation may 

come from this, and I never want to go through this 

again. And I am still scared. I am sorry, but this is 

hard, and it’s hard on my family, and it’s hard on 

me. And I’m just trying to be a professional that is 

trying to do his job, and I am being terrorized 

because of it.

¶24 Richins explained what he has done in response to the fear 

he has felt:

I’ve installed a complete security system in my 

house. . . . [N]ow I have motion-activated cameras 

all the way around my house. I had somebody come 

and install a [reinforced] door frame, new locks . . . 

around my house. . . . I don’t let my kids play 

outside anymore by themselves. They don’t walk to

school by themselves. My wife is in fear. We don’t

go out and do recreational things like we used to.

We’re afraid that we’re being followed, because

we’ve been told we’re being followed and that 

people are coming after us, and I need somebody to 

protect me from . . . this.

¶25 Richins continued,

I don’t sleep well. I have bad anxiety. I fear every 

day I go to work. I carry a flashlight so I can look 
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underneath my vehicle when I go out . . . . I don’t 

like working late at night. It has impeded my work.

It has impeded my personal life. It has impeded my 

entire family so I can make an honest living, and 

that’s wrong.

G. Manager

¶26 Manager, who had known Weldon for about fifteen 

months, performed work directed by Weldon and was present at 

both meetings. Regarding the first meeting, he testified, “I don’t 

know if [Weldon] called [Richins] an asshole or referred to him

. . . as an asshole. I just remember ‘asshole’ and ‘[Richins]’ in the 

same sentence,” and that was “the only time” he remembered 

Weldon “talking about” Richins. Regarding the screwdriver 

incident, Manager testified that Weldon “looked around, found a 

screwdriver and made mention that the screwdriver needed to be 

replaced or that [another tenant] could come after us with a gun 

and shoot us.” Manager believed this comment was directed at 

Weldon and himself and “perceived it as funny.” He further 

testified that Weldon never said he would get a gun out of his car 

and shoot somebody. 

¶27 Regarding the second meeting, Manager “vaguely 

recall[ed]” Weldon saying something about not wanting “to die 

over something, but he was willing to,” but Manager said Weldon

was “referring to stress” and his ability to “outlive everybody 

else, kind of like a cockroach would outlive Armageddon.” 

Manager further testified that Weldon’s statement was not 

directed at Richins and “was not a threat.” Manager also testified 

that Weldon did not say he was going to kill Richins. 

H. Weldon

¶28 Weldon testified that the April 15 text message to Richins

“certainly [was] not a threat.” 
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¶29 With regard to the first meeting on August 27, Weldon 

testified that he was frustrated no one had a key or tools, and so

he said, “[Richins] is acting like an asshole. Why aren’t you 

prepared?” And regarding the screwdriver incident, he testified

as follows:

I said, “You can borrow these tools, but don’t forget 

the rules of the universe. You take another man’s 

tool, you don’t put it back, they’re going to come 

shoot us.” Not me shoot [Richins]. Not me shoot 

anybody else. [The other tenant will] come shoot all 

of us, including me, so put the tool back, not only in 

the tool box but in the right way and method it came 

out. The Phillips-head goes back here. The flat-head 

goes back there. The pliers go back here. . . . And one 

of the fellows said, “Oh, don’t let him shoot. Don’t 

shoot me.” And they were all joking and laughing.

¶30 When asked about whether he said he was going to kill 

Richins, he testified, “No, absolutely no. Absolutely not. That 

would be a felony, and I would never talk like that.” He also 

testified that he did not “recall” claiming that he had a gun. 

¶31 About making “any threat” against Richins, Weldon 

explained that he was merely telling Programmer, Engineer, and 

Architect that his attorneys were good and that they were “not 

going to stop” because the Company owed Weldon “a lot of 

money.” And he clarified that when he said, “We’ll always be 

coming [for] you,” he meant that they were “going to go to every 

court possible.”

¶32 About the second meeting, Weldon testified that he told 

CEO, “The stress is going to kill everybody, including me, 

including all of us.” He claimed that he told CEO to “do the right 

thing” and settle the lawsuit. 
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 12 2023 UT App 147

¶33 Regarding Richins, Weldon said that he told CEO that 

there were “some issues with the way [Richins] handles himself.”

And Weldon admitted he “may have” told others that he 

“hate[d]” Richins and that Richins was “acting like an effing Ahole.”

District Court’s Ruling

¶34 The district court ruled that “the key point here is whether 

or not there was a course of conduct,” which the court explained 

required “two or more acts directed at or toward a specific 

person,” citing Utah Code section 76-5-106.5. In that regard, the 

court agreed with Weldon that the April 15, 2021 incident did not 

rise “to the level of something” that would be considered “as part 

of a course of conduct for stalking” and concluded that “the only 

behavior that . . . could potentially satisfy the statute [occurred]

on August 27.” 

¶35 At that point, the court parted ways with Weldon, finding 

that the two meetings on August 27 constituted two separate acts 

for purposes of the stalking statute. The court explained, “These 

[meetings] seem . . . to be two distinct events. They didn’t happen 

simultaneously. They seem to be distinguished by both the parties 

that were involved in the events, as well as a separation of a short 

period of time. So, really, those are the two incidents . . . .” 

¶36 The court then explained that the first incident was made 

up of two comments from the first meeting when Weldon went

into a “tirade” at the mere mention of Richins’s name. The first 

comment involved how Weldon was surveilling Richins and how 

he “would keep coming for him.” The court found Weldon’s 

explanation of this comment—that “he had attorneys that were 

hired, and he didn’t really know what the attorneys were doing, 

and maybe they had hired private investigators, [that he] didn’t 

really know, that was up to the attorneys”—not credible. The 

court found that the second comment to make up the first incident 

was when Weldon said he would get his gun and shoot someone 
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if the screwdriver was not returned properly. And although 

Weldon did not identify who “someone” was, the court found

that “from the context of the conversation, it appears to be pretty 

clear that Mr. Richins was upstairs, and that . . . comment was 

likely directed toward Mr. Richins.”

¶37 Next, the district court found that the second incident 

occurred when Weldon told CEO that he was going to kill Richins. 

Despite the fact that Assistant did not hear those exact words, the 

court found her testimony that she heard Weldon say he was 

going to die but would first take others out and her testimony that 

she interpreted those words to be directed toward Richins as 

supportive of CEO’s testimony.

¶38 Referring to the statements from both meetings 

cumulatively, the court also found that “Weldon made those 

statements either intentionally or knowingly, and [they were]

directed toward a specific person, although they were made to 

third parties.” Additionally, after explaining that Utah Code 

section 76-5-106.5 required a showing “that the course of conduct 

would cause a reasonable person to fear for the person’s own 

safety or to suffer other emotional distress,” the court found that 

“those statements were concerning enough that Mr. Weldon 

should have known . . . that course of action would cause Mr. 

Richins extreme distress.”

¶39 Concluding that the findings of fact supported the 

elements of stalking, the district court made the civil stalking 

injunction permanent.

Events Following the Evidentiary Hearing

¶40 Subsequently, Weldon filed two motions under rules 52 

and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing, in part, that 

the court’s findings were inadequate, that insufficient evidence 

existed to support the injunction, and that, therefore, the findings 

should be struck and the entry of the permanent civil stalking 
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injunction should be dismissed with prejudice. These motions

were denied, and Weldon appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶41 All the issues Weldon raises focus on the district court’s 

interpretation and application of the Utah stalking statutes. See

Utah Code §§ 76-5-106.5, 78B-7-701. Weldon’s initial set of issues 

surrounds the first element of stalking. In that regard, Weldon 

contends that the district court “erred in determining that [his] 

alleged conduct amounted to a ‘course of conduct’ under Utah 

law.” “Whether someone has engaged in a course of conduct 

under the stalking statute is a question of law, which we review 

for correctness.” Hardy v. Hardy, 2020 UT App 88, ¶ 4, 467 P.3d 

931, cert. denied, 474 P.3d 948 (Utah 2020). Weldon further asserts 

that the court erred in determining that certain statements “were 

directed at or toward Richins to satisfy the civil stalking statute,” 

which we also review for correctness. See Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT 

App 150, ¶ 16, 136 P.3d 1242 (“The proper interpretation and 

application of a statute is a question of law which we review for 

correctness, affording no deference to the district court’s legal 

conclusions.” (cleaned up)).

¶42 Weldon also takes issue with the district court’s handling 

of the second element of stalking—that the respondent knew or 

should have known that his course of conduct would cause a 

reasonable person in the petitioner’s position to fear for his safety 

or suffer other emotional distress. Related to this element, Weldon 

first asserts that the district court “erred in determining that [he] 

made a death threat toward Richins.” “We review challenges to 

findings of fact for clear error.” Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 

56, ¶ 10, 271 P.3d 837. Weldon also argues that the district court 

“erred in determining that [his] alleged conduct could cause a 

reasonable person to fear for his safety or suffer other emotional 

distress.” “Although the question of whether the course of 

conduct would cause a reasonable person in a petitioner’s 
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circumstances to suffer fear or emotional distress is a question of 

fact that we review for clear error, we review the district court’s 

interpretation of the underlying legal standard for correctness.” 

Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 22, 530 P.3d 945 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

¶43 Individuals who believe they are victims of “stalking may 

file a . . . petition for a civil stalking injunction against the alleged 

stalker with the district court.” Utah Code § 78B-7-701(1)(a)(i). If 

the district court “determines that there is reason to believe that 

an offense of stalking has occurred,” it may issue a temporary

injunction based on the petition alone, restraining the person from 

behaviors such as coming near or contacting the petitioner. Id.

§ 78B-7-701(3)(a). The accused may then request an evidentiary 

hearing to dispute the injunction, and if this request is timely, “the 

burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of the 

evidence that stalking . . . has occurred.” Id. § 78B-7-701(4)(a), 

(b)(ii). Thus, Richins maintained the burden of proof in this case. 

¶44 To satisfy this burden, Richins had to establish the two 

elements of stalking, which are (1) that a person “intentionally or 

knowingly” engaged “in a course of conduct directed at a specific 

person” and (2) that the person knew or should have known “that 

the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for 

the person’s own safety or suffer other emotional distress.” 

Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 25, 491 P.3d 835 (cleaned up). A 

petitioner must prove both elements for a district court to enjoin 

an alleged stalker’s behavior after the hearing. Id.; see also Utah 

Code § 76-5-106.5(2)(a).

¶45 Here, the district court concluded that the evidence at the 

hearing supported a finding that stalking occurred and made the 

civil stalking injunction permanent. We agree with the district 

court and address each issue in turn.
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I. Course of Conduct Directed at a Specific Individual

A. Course of Conduct

¶46 The stalking statute defines a course of conduct as “two or 

more acts directed at or toward a specific individual.” Utah Code 

§ 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i). These acts may include those where the 

“actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, surveils, 

threatens, or communicates to or about an individual” and may 

be performed “directly, indirectly, or through any third party.” Id.

§ 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(A)(I). These acts also can include those where 

the actor “appears at the individual’s workplace or contacts the 

individual’s employer or coworker.” Id. § 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(B)(II).

¶47 “As the statute makes clear, a single isolated act cannot 

qualify as a course of conduct.” Butters v. Herbert, 2012 UT App 

329, ¶ 12, 291 P.3d 826. “When interpreting a statute, our primary 

goal is to ascertain the legislature’s intent, the best evidence of 

which is the plain language of the statute itself. And when reading 

a statute’s plain language, we presume the legislature used each 

term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted 

meaning.” Ragsdale, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 29 (cleaned up). Under the facts 

of this case, the district court concluded that two separate acts 

occurred on August 27 to make up a course of conduct as the 

statute requires.1 The court found that the first act occurred at the 

1. The district court also concluded, “I don’t think that the April 

incident really rises to the level of something that I would 

consider as part of a course of conduct.” The April 15 incident, 

however, most likely could have been considered an “act” for 

purposes of the statute. An act does not need to rise to any level 

of threat or concern to be considered an act. Our court explained 

in Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, 530 P.3d 945, that while 

“acts might well be threatening, . . . they don’t have to be.” Id.

¶ 25. “As our supreme court has made clear, establishing a course 

(continued...)
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20220522-CA 17 2023 UT App 147

first meeting during the conversation among Programmer, 

Engineer, Architect, Weldon, and Manager and that the second 

act happened at the second meeting during a separate 

conversation among CEO, Assistant, Weldon, and Manager. 

¶48 Regarding the first act, the court highlighted how the 

testimony of Programmer, Engineer, and Architect demonstrated 

“that the mention of [Richins’s] name seemed to send Mr. Weldon

. . . into a tirade.” And the court noted that “during this tirade, Mr. 

Weldon made a comment that he was surveilling Mr. Richins and 

that he would be coming for him.” Also, the court observed that 

Programmer and Engineer both testified how Weldon expressed 

that if they did not return a borrowed screwdriver, “he would go 

get a gun and that he would go upstairs and shoot someone.” 

¶49 The court found that the second act occurred after 

Programmer, Engineer, and Architect had gone back upstairs and 

CEO and Assistant had joined Weldon and Manager for the 

second meeting a few minutes later. This, the court found, was

when CEO heard Weldon say he was going to kill Richins and

when both CEO and Assistant heard Weldon say that “if he was 

going to die, he was going to take out others first.” 

¶50 The court concluded that the conversations that took place 

during the first and second meetings constituted a course of 

conduct because they were “two distinct events,” they “didn’t 

happen simultaneously,” they seemed “to be distinguished by . . . 

of conduct is the first step in the stalking analysis. This step should 

not be conflated or combined with the second part of the analysis, 

which involves a determination as to whether the course of 

conduct would cause a reasonable person fear or emotional 

distress.” Id. ¶ 26 (cleaned up). To the extent that the district court 

did not consider the April 15 incident an act because it was not 

threatening in nature, the court erred in its interpretation of the 

stalking statute. 
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 18 2023 UT App 147

the parties that were involved in the events,” and they appeared 

to be separated by “a short period of time.” 

¶51 Weldon argues that the district court erred in its conclusion 

that these separate conversations constituted a course of conduct 

because all the statements about which the witnesses testified 

were “made in the heat of the moment,” “occurred in the same 

location . . . to a revolving cast of participants over a period of 13 

to 19 minutes from start to finish,” were separated by “a very brief 

pause,” made up “one continuous episode,” and therefore were

not “distinct in time.” Weldon cites Hardy v. Hardy, 2020 UT App 

88, 467 P.3d 931, cert. denied, 474 P.3d 948 (Utah 2020), in support 

of his argument.

¶52 In Hardy, an ex-husband believed his ex-wife was taking 

their child to see a certain therapist in violation of their divorce 

decree. Id. ¶ 2. In response, the ex-husband went to the therapist’s 

office, observed his ex-wife sitting in her vehicle, and 

photographed her. Id. In concluding that the ex-husband’s acts of 

observing and photographing—two potential stalking 

behaviors—did not constitute two separate acts, the court 

explained that “[j]ust because observing and photographing are 

listed separately in the statute does not mean that they are distinct 

acts when they occur simultaneously and where one is inherent in the 

other.” Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis added); id. (explaining that 

photographing “cannot be accomplished without some degree of 

. . . observing”). Because the district court here found that the two 

meetings were not simultaneous, Hardy is distinguishable, and 

Weldon’s reliance upon Hardy fails.

¶53 Moreover, “we do not consider individual acts in a 

vacuum.” Butters v. Herbert, 2012 UT App 329, ¶ 12, 291 P.3d 826. 

“Instead, when determining whether a person’s acts constitute a 

course of conduct, our cases require that we consider the acts 

cumulatively in light of all the facts and circumstances.” Id.

(cleaned up). When doing so, “we consider the time elapsed 
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 19 2023 UT App 147

between individual incidents,” while “also [bearing] in mind, 

however, that course of conduct is defined broadly and does not 

require that the actions that constitute a course of conduct be 

committed within a certain period of time” or that they be 

separated by a certain period of time. Id. ¶ 13 (cleaned up).

¶54 This principle is highlighted well in Anderson v. Deem, 2023 

UT App 48, 530 P.3d 945, where the stalker sent the victim a series 

of Instagram messages, which included an apology followed by 

multiple messages over a period of three hours. Id. ¶ 7. Two 

messages—sent after the apology and minutes apart from each 

other—rescinded the apology and contained a litany of 

grievances. Id. ¶ 8. In the next two messages—sent some hours 

after the first two messages and minutes apart from each other—

the stalker told the victim that he would be “waiting” for her in 

hell and then directed a common profanity at her. Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Our 

court explained that this “incident likely established a course of 

conduct” because, along with each message having a different 

purpose, “a single event with multiple distinct acts . . . separated 

by some amount of time might constitute a course of conduct.” Id.

¶ 26 n.8 (cleaned up); see also State v. Miller, 2023 UT 3, ¶ 126, 527 

P.3d 1087 (explaining that sending emails “in the same thread . . . 

does not convert each of [the] separate emails into a single act” 

when they were sent over multiple days); State v. Kitches, 2021 UT 

App 24, ¶ 50, 484 P.3d 415 (emphasizing that “although a single 

incident may not appear to be a qualifying act directed at the 

victim, an objective evaluation of all the circumstances—

particularly the nature and timing of the acts—may indeed show 

that the incident was part and parcel of a broader course of 

conduct directed at the victim”), cert. denied, 496 P.3d 718 (Utah 

2021).

¶55 Likewise, even if, for argument’s sake, we agreed with 

Weldon that the two meetings make up one continuous episode,

they were distinct in time. Considering “the acts cumulatively in 

light of all the facts and circumstances”—namely, that the acts 
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20220522-CA 20 2023 UT App 147

were not simultaneous, were separated by a period of time, were 

not each inherent in the other, and involved separate parties to 

separate conversations—we conclude that the district court 

correctly determined that the two conversations constituted two 

separate acts for purposes of establishing a course of conduct 

under the stalking statute. Butters, 2012 UT App 329, ¶ 12 (cleaned 

up).

B. Directed at a Specific Individual

¶56 Weldon alleges that even if a course of conduct existed, 

neither of the conversations that took place in the meetings were 

“directed at or toward a specific individual,” namely, Richins, as 

required by Utah Code section 76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i). 

¶57 We first note that, to the extent Weldon asserts it is 

significant that Richins was not in the server room during these 

conversations, we agree with the district court that it is not

relevant to our analysis. As the court observed, Utah Code section 

76-5-106.5(1)(a)(i)(A)(I) allows the course of conduct to be 

performed “directly, indirectly, or through any third party.” See 

State v. Miller, 2021 UT App 88, ¶ 20, 496 P.3d 282 (discussing that

the “statute does not require that the perpetrator intend for his 

message to reach the victim through the victim’s employer or coworkers”), aff’d, 2023 UT 3, 527 P.3d 1087; Carson v. Barnes, 2016 

UT App 214, ¶¶ 16–17, 385 P.3d 744 (explaining that “the statute 

does not require the victim to be physically present for an act to 

be considered in the ‘course of conduct’” and “[b]y the plain 

language of the statute, the threatening act need not be direct, and 

it includes situations in which the actor comes to the ‘person’s 

workplace’ or ‘contacts the person’s . . . coworkers,’ without 

requiring the presence of the victim”). “In other words, the person 

toward whom a respondent’s behavior is ‘directed at’ . . . is 

determined by an objective assessment of whether the respondent 

engaged in conduct prohibited by the stalking statute. And this is 

true even where a respondent directs his or her conduct at a 
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 21 2023 UT App 147

petitioner ‘indirectly or through a third party.’” Ragsdale v. Fishler, 

2021 UT 29, ¶ 37, 491 P.3d 835. 

¶58 Weldon alleges that because some of his threats did not 

name Richins specifically, they could not be directed at Richins. 

In support of this argument, Weldon highlights how Programmer

and Engineer both testified that during the first conversation, 

Weldon stated that if they did not return the screwdriver, he was 

going to go upstairs and shoot “somebody” or “someone.” And 

regarding the second conversation, Weldon points out how both 

CEO and Assistant testified that Weldon said because he was 

going to die anyway, he should take out “other people” or “some 

people” first.

¶59 Our court has explained that, just as with determining 

whether a course of conduct exists, it is appropriate “to analyze 

the entire course of conduct between the parties,” i.e., consider the 

course of conduct “cumulatively in light of all of the facts and 

circumstances of the case,” “in determining whether [the alleged 

stalker’s] conduct was ‘directed at’ [the petitioner].” Ellison v. 

Stam, 2006 UT App 150, ¶ 38, 136 P.3d 1242. One significant aspect 

of the facts and circumstances Weldon fails to mention is that the 

district court found that during both conversations, Weldon 

directed a threat specifically toward Richins in addition to these 

more general threats. For example, the district court found that 

during the first conversation “Weldon made a comment that he 

was surveilling Mr. Richins and that he would keep coming for 

him.” The district court also found that during the second 

conversation, Weldon threatened to kill Richins by name.

¶60 Furthermore, the witnesses also testified regarding 

disturbing language and statements that Weldon directed toward 

Richins during both conversations. For example, Programmer

testified that Weldon directed “angry and aggressive language,” 

including swearing, toward Richins, “saying things that he 

claimed [Richins] was doing wrong to him and that he wasn’t 
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 22 2023 UT App 147

going to let him get away with it.” Similarly, Engineer testified 

that Weldon called Richins “an effing tool” and “an A-hole,” said

other “similar things using similar vulgar language, typically 

directed at [Richins],” and “expressed his hatred of [Richins] very 

clearly.” Likewise, Architect testified that Weldon “became

extremely angry . . . [and] agitated” when he heard Richins’s name 

and “started ranting” about Richins, saying that Richins was “an 

effing tool” and that he “effing hate[d] him.” And in light of this 

testimony, the district court found that “it appears to be pretty 

clear that Mr. Richins was upstairs, and [the comment about 

somebody was going to be shot] was likely directed toward Mr. 

Richins.” -

¶61 Finally, the witnesses testified that, despite Weldon’s 

general references to “other people,” “somebody,” or “some 

people,” they understood these threats to be directed toward 

Richins. For example, Assistant clarified that even though Weldon

never specifically mentioned Richins’s name in reference to 

people dying, she understood that there was “a threat of death”

toward Richins because Weldon was referring to Richins

beforehand. And regarding this statement, the district court 

expressed that given Assistant’s “interpretation of that 

conversation, based on the context and the other comments that 

were made,” it “was expressed and directed toward Mr. Richins.” 

¶62 Programmer also interpreted these statements as a threat 

against Richins because of “the anger” that Weldon had expressed 

“the entire time” they were with him. Programmer testified that 

Weldon’s comments about Richins were unsolicited: “[N]o one 

was asking about this. . . . [Weldon] brought it up and kept going 

off on it.” Programmer said that “the implication of ‘shoot 

somebody’” was that Weldon meant Richins. Also, when asked if 

he was concerned about anyone else’s safety besides his own in 

light of the circumstances, Architect replied, “Yes. Particularly 

[Richins] . . . .”
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 23 2023 UT App 147

¶63 Therefore, taking all these circumstances into 

consideration, namely, the threats specifically directed at Richins, 

the disturbing language about Richins, and the witnesses’

interpretation that the indirect threats were aimed at Richins, we 

agree with the district court that the conversations as a whole 

were directed at Richins.

II. Reasonable Person Fearing for Own Safety or Suffering 

Emotional Distress

A. Weldon’s Threat to Kill Richins

¶64 As an initial matter, we address Weldon’s contention that 

the district court erred in finding that Weldon threatened to kill 

Richins. “In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . , the 

court must find the facts specially and state separately its 

conclusions of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). “Findings of fact, 

whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside 

unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due 

regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of 

the witnesses.” Id. R. 52(a)(4). “A trial court’s factual 

determinations are clearly erroneous only if they are in conflict 

with the clear weight of the evidence, or if this court has a definite 

and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Henshaw v. 

Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ¶ 10, 271 P.3d 837 (cleaned up). 

Therefore, “we give great deference to the trial court and do not 

lightly disturb its factual findings.” Id. (cleaned up). 

¶65 The court based its finding that Weldon threatened to kill 

Richins on the evidence before it and by determining that Weldon 

lacked credibility. For example, CEO testified that Weldon 

“mentioned that he was very upset” with Richins, that CEO 

“should fire” Richins, and that Weldon “wanted to kill” Richins. 

The district court found CEO’s testimony to be credible. And the 

district court already had questioned Weldon’s credibility as a 

witness when Weldon denied saying that he was surveilling 

Richins and instead testified that he said his attorneys might have 
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 24 2023 UT App 147

hired private investigators to surveil Richins. In response, the 

court stated that it was “not really persuaded that that’s the 

conversation that took place.” 

[T]rial courts are often faced with the necessity of 

making factual findings based exclusively on oral 

testimony. Moreover, trial courts have the benefit of 

viewing the witnesses firsthand, to assess their 

demeanor and to consider their testimonies in the 

context of the proceedings as a whole, making them 

much better equipped to make credibility 

determinations based on conflicting oral evidence 

than an appellate court that has access only to the 

cold record.

Id. ¶ 12. Here, the district court assessed Weldon’s and CEO’s 

demeanors and considered their testimonies in the context of the 

proceedings as a whole. And in the face of their conflicting 

testimonies, the court found CEO to be the more credible witness. 

Weldon has thus failed to show that the district court’s finding 

was clearly erroneous.

B. Emotional Distress

¶66 Weldon alleges that the district court “only tied its 

emotional distress ruling to the surveillance comment”2 and “did 

2. Weldon seems to be referring to the district court’s statement, 

“I think the evidence I have is that Mr. Richins, in fact, has 

experienced extreme distress, that he’s taken steps to protect 

himself and his family, including the installation of surveillance 

equipment on his house and limiting their public presence and 

taking other actions.” “Under the second stalking element, a 

petitioner must show that the respondent knew or should have 

known his or her conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear 

for the petitioner’s own safety or suffer other emotional distress.” 

(continued...)
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 25 2023 UT App 147

not address any emotional distress caused by the screwdriver 

comment, which made up the court’s ‘first incident,’ or by the 

purported ‘death threat’ or ‘taking others out’ comment, which 

made up the court’s ‘second incident.’” We understand this 

argument to mean that the district court should have decided 

whether a reasonable person would suffer fear or emotional 

distress for each act that makes up a course of conduct, separately 

from each other. But this argument misconstrues the law, as this 

court has held that a district court should not consider each act “in 

isolation.” Anderson v. Deem, 2023 UT App 48, ¶ 27, 530 P.3d 945. 

Instead, “a district court should consider the course of conduct 

cumulatively.” Id. ¶ 28. If the court had looked at each aspect of 

each conversation separately, then it might have found that each 

aspect of the conversation in isolation would not have caused a 

reasonable person to feel fear or emotional distress. See id. ¶ 31

(“[W]hile the profanity alone might not be enough to cause fear 

or emotional distress, when considered in conjunction with [the 

respondent’s] wish to see [the petitioner] in hell and his earlier 

communication that she was a ‘bitch’ that he would like to see 

‘die,’ a different picture emerges.”). The district court’s conclusion 

here, “that those statements were concerning enough that Mr. 

Weldon should have known . . . that course of action would cause 

Mr. Richins extreme distress,” indicates that the court correctly 

analyzed all of Weldon’s statements throughout both 

Ragsdale v. Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 45, 491 P.3d 835 (emphasis added)

(cleaned up). This is an objective standard under which the 

subjective effect of the respondent’s conduct on the petitioner is 

not the relevant question. See id. Thus, whether Richins actually 

experienced extreme distress is not relevant to our analysis, and 

the district court should not have implied that it was. As our 

analysis demonstrates, however, the court ultimately based its 

decision on a reasonable person standard.
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 26 2023 UT App 147

conversations cumulatively in deciding this element of stalking. 

(Emphasis added.)3

¶67 Furthermore, the Anderson court elaborated that under the 

stalking statute, a “petitioner must establish . . . that the 

respondent’s conduct would cause emotional distress to a 

reasonable person in the petitioner’s circumstances.” Id. ¶ 29 

(cleaned up). And by “including ‘in the victim’s circumstances’ as 

part of the ‘reasonable person’ definition, the statute provides for 

an individualized objective standard, meaning that a court must 

consider the entire context surrounding the defendant’s conduct.” 

Id. (cleaned up). “Courts applying this individualized objective 

standard have considered such factors as the victim’s 

background, the victim’s knowledge of and relationship with the 

defendant, any history of abuse between the parties, the location 

of the alleged stalking,” and “the cumulative effect of [the] 

defendant’s repetitive conduct.” Baird v. Baird, 2014 UT 8, ¶ 27, 

322 P.3d 728 (cleaned up). Another consideration could be 

whether the behavior “might cause damage to one’s reputation, 

relationships, or livelihood.” State v. Miller, 2023 UT 3, ¶ 84, 527 

P.3d 1087 (cleaned up). In other words, to “properly apply the 

stalking statute’s objective standard,” a district court should 

analyze a defendant’s “conduct in light of the specific facts and 

circumstances of [the petitioner’s] individual case.” Ragsdale v. 

Fishler, 2021 UT 29, ¶ 48, 491 P.3d 835.

3. We acknowledge that it would have been better for the court to 

have said “a reasonable person in Richins’s circumstances” rather 

than “Mr. Richins.” That said, we interpret the district court to 

mean a reasonable person. Given the court’s restatement of the 

law that the statute requires the course of conduct to “cause a 

reasonable person to fear for the person’s own safety or to suffer 

other emotional distress,” we are confident the court understood 

and applied the appropriate standard.
Richins v. Weldon

20220522-CA 27 2023 UT App 147

¶68 Here, the entire context includes more than just the two 

conversations that occurred on August 27. Weldon and Richins 

knew each other and had a contentious relationship since 

November 2020, as the text messages of April 15 and Richins’s

testimony demonstrated. And in his civil stalking petition, 

Richins included other interactions with Weldon that he alleged 

were “acts” under the stalking statute, such as emails that Weldon 

sent to Richins on July 8, July 9, and July 27.

¶69 Also significant was the location of the two August 27 

conversations. Given the fact that Weldon was saying very 

negative things about Richins to his fellow employees and boss, 

including telling CEO that he should fire him, Weldon’s behavior 

could have damaged Richins’s work relationships and reputation 

as well as his livelihood. See Miller, 2023 UT 3, ¶¶ 84–86. Thus, 

ample evidence existed for the district court to conclude that a 

reasonable person in Richins’s circumstances would feel 

emotional distress.

CONCLUSION

¶70 In light of all the facts and circumstances in this case, the 

district court correctly concluded that Weldon intentionally or 

knowingly engaged in a course of conduct that was directed at 

Richins and that Weldon knew or should have known that such a 

course of conduct would cause a reasonable person in Richins’s

circumstances to fear for his own safety or suffer other emotional 

distress. Therefore, we affirm the district court in all respects.