U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

65–278 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

THE CUBAN PROGRAM: TORTURE OF AMERICAN

PRISONERS BY CUBAN AGENTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1999

Serial No. 106–118

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

CALEB C. MCCARRY, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel

MARILYN C. OWEN, Staff Associate

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C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

Colonel Jack W. Bomar, United States Air Force, Retired .................................. 7

Andres F. Garcia, Vice President, Cuban American Veterans Association ........ 16

Captain Raymond Vohden, United States Navy, Retired .................................... 10

Michael D. Benge, civilian Economic Development Officer and Prisoner of

War Historian ....................................................................................................... 13

Robert L. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Prisoner of War/

Missing Personnel Affairs, Department of Defense .......................................... 28

Robert J. Destatte, Chief Analyst, Research and Analysis Directorate, Defence

Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office, Department of Defense .......... 30

The Honorable Mark Foley, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Florida ............................................................................................................... 19

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New

York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations ........................... 50

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen a Representative in Congress from Florida .......................................................................................................................... 51

Colonel Jack W. Bomar ........................................................................................... 54

Col. Jack W. Bomar supplement: A definitive history of American Prisoner-of-War Experience in Vietnam, 1964–1973, entitled ‘‘P.O.W.’’ by

John G. Hubbell ............................................................................................ 58

Andres F. Garcia ...................................................................................................... 95

Raymond Vohden ..................................................................................................... 107

Michael D. Benge ..................................................................................................... 114

Michael D. Benge supplementary research on ‘‘Cuban War Crimes

Against American POW’s During the Vietnam War’’ ................................ 121

Robert L. Jones ........................................................................................................ 140

Robert J. Destatte .................................................................................................... 143

Additional material submitted for the record:

Letter to Honorable Lewis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, dated September 24,

1999, from the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ................................................. 148

Letter to Honorable Doris Meissner, Commissioner, U.S. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, dated October 6, 1999, from the Honorable Ileana

Ros-Lehtinen ......................................................................................................... 149

Letter to Honorable Douglas B. Peterson, U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, dated

October 6, 1999, from the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen .............................. 151

Letter to Honorable William J. Clinton, President, dated October 26, 1999,

from David Monson, President of Paralyzed Veterans Association of Florida,

Inc .......................................................................................................................... 153

Letter to Honorable Lewis Freeh, Director, FBI, dated November 1, 1999

from Benjamin A. Gilman ................................................................................... 154

Letter to Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen dated November 4, 1999, from Pete

Peterson, Ambassador, Embassy of the United States, Hanoi ......................... 156

Letter to Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman dated November 22, 1999, from

Robert L. Jones, with attachment concerning Aircraft Losses ......................... 157

Page

IV

Letter to Honorable Robert L. Jones dated December 15, 1999, from Benjamin

A. Gilman .............................................................................................................. 159

Letter to Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman dated January 10, 2000 from Robert

L. Jones ................................................................................................................. 160

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THE CUBAN PROGRAM: TORTURE OF

AMERICAN PRISONERS BY CUBAN AGENTS

Thursday, November 4, 19994House of Representatives,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman

(Chairman of the Committee) Presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order. Members

please take their seats.

Between July 1967 and August 1968 a team of interrogators, believed to be Cubans, brutally beat and tortured 19 American airmen, killing one in the prisoner of war camp known as ‘‘The Zoo.’’

I want to thank Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, our distinguished Chairman of our Subcommittee on International Economic

Policy and Trade for her leadership in pursuing this issue.

I served on the Select Committee that initially investigated the

fate of American prisoners of war and those missing in action, and

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today. This morning,

we will hear testimony from two distinguished panels.

On our first panel, we are honored to have three former prisoners of war, including two who were subjected to the so-called

‘‘Cuban Program’’: Captain Raymond Vohden, who later served

with the Defense Department’s POW-Missing Personnel office, and

Air Force Colonel Jack Bomar, of Arizona. Our other witnesses include Michael Benge, a foreign service officer who was a prisoner

of war in Vietnam for 5 years; and Andres Garcia, the Vice President of the Cuban American Veterans Association.

On our second panel, we will be joined by Robert Jones, Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War and Missing

Personnel Affairs; and Robert Destatte of the Defense Department’s Prisoner of War-Missing Personnel office.

Recent press reports have revived interest in this terrible chapter

of the Vietnam War and raised hopes that those responsible for

those crimes can be identified. In that regard, we have written to

FBI Director Louis Freeh to ask the Bureau for its assistance in

pursuing information in the files of former Soviet Bloc countries regarding the Cuban program.

Those who murdered or tortured our American servicemen are

still at large somewhere, possibly in Cuba. There is no statute of

limitations on the crimes committed against these American servicemen. Neither shall there be a statute of limitations on our commitment to discovering the true identity of those responsible for

such crimes, so that they may be brought to justice. Our Nation

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owes this to the courageous men and women who served us so loyally in Vietnam.

Before we begin with our first panel, let me ask our Ranking

Member, Congressman—Judge Hastings, if he would like to make

any opening remarks.

Mr. HASTINGS. In the interest of time I will ask that any comment that I make be inserted in the record.

I would like to thank Ileana Ros-Lehtinen for her leadership in

this effort.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Dr. Cooksey has asked to be recognized.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My request, Mr. Chairman is that we minimize opening statements as much as possible. I am particularly interested in this

issue. I want the facts out. I would like to have the maximum

amount of time with these witnesses. Due to a counter-request, I

am not going to demand that we have a total limit of time. But I

hope we can get to the witnesses.

Chairman GILMAN. We will get to the witnesses as quickly as

possible. I would like to recognize the distinguished Chairman of

the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, Ms.

Ros-Lehtinen, the gentle lady from Florida.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. I would like to thank

you, Chairman Gilman, for convening this hearing and for your

leadership and commitment. This issue is particularly important to

me for various reasons; but most importantly, as I read through

the accounts of what our men and women in uniform have endured

throughout this century of war, I think of my husband, Dexter

Lehtinen, who served in the Special Forces in Vietnam and was injured in combat—he was relatively fortunate, but so many were

not.

I look at our POW’s who are here today, many in our audience

especially, and I am humbled by their sacrifices and honored to

know them. I thank them for sharing their stories with us. I know

that it is difficult, but their presence is indicative of their caliber

as human beings and as citizens in the service of our country.

The Geneva Convention prohibits ‘‘violence to life and person, in

particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture and outrages upon personal dignity and particular humiliating

and degrading treatment.’’ This is exactly what took place at a

prison camp in North Vietnam known as ‘‘The Zoo,’’ seen there in

a declassified aerial photograph during the period of August 1967

to August 1968, where 19 of our courageous servicemen were psychologically tortured, some brutally beaten by interrogators assessed to be Cuban agents working under orders from Hanoi.

Described by some to be a psychological experiment, the goals of

the ‘‘Cuba Program,’’ as the torture project has been labeled by our

Defense Department and our intelligence agencies, has been described in different ways as an attempt to test interrogation methods, to obtain absolute compliance and submission to captor demands, and ultimately to be used as propaganda by the international Communist effort, as Mike Benge will elaborate upon during today’s session.

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Some POW’s were tortured and then instructed to copy a series

of questions and answers given to them by their interrogators.

These excerpts on most occasions included statements declaring

that the United States was waging an illegal, immoral, and unjust

war.

Prisoners were tortured—again, some psychologically, others

physically—to ensure cooperation in appearances they were forced

to make before visiting delegations. Refusal to comply with the captor’s demands usually meant that ‘‘Fidel,’’ ‘‘Chico,’’ and ‘‘Pancho’’—

as the torturers were called by our POW’s—would be called in for

more intense beatings of the prisoners.

In a chapter of ‘‘P.O.W.,’’ a book published by Reader’s Digest

Press in 1976, Colonel Bomar describes different incidents where

attempts were made to break the prisoners so they would recite the

Communist Vietnam script before visiting groups.

One of these occurred on July 3, 1968, when the camp medic entered the cell of Air Force Major James Kasler to bandage his

draining leg. Having defied the camp commander the day before,

telling him he would not tow the line before a delegation which as

to visit ‘‘The Zoo,’’ Kasler knew that this visit meant that it was

done, as he says, prior to torture to keep the blood and the pus

from staining the interrogation room.

Within an hour he was in torture. Enter ‘‘Fidel.’’ ‘‘Fidel’’ reached

down, grabbed Jim by the neck of his shirt, and shook him like a

rag doll. ‘‘Fidel’’ seemed beside himself with rage. Then he

slammed the heel of his boot down in the center of Kasler’s chest.

Jim gasped, fought for air.

Kasler would not cooperate, and after a while, ‘‘Fidel’’ shifted

psychological gears, offering a drink of water, a cigarette, turning

a small table fan on Kasler. Unable to get him to surrender, ‘‘Fidel’’

administered another beating, and another and another. Jim’s

thumbs were wired together describes Bomar, ropes were tied

around his elbows. The flogging went on and on. After 36 lashes

Kasler’s lower back and legs hung in shreds. This skin had been

entirely whipped away and the area was a bluish, purplish, greenish mass of bloody raw meat.

Unable to get Kasler to surrender, ‘‘Fidel’’ promised to return the

next day for more.

The ruthless nature of the interrogators and the severity of their

actions led prisoners such as Captain Raymond Vohden and Colonel Jack Bomar, as well as Lieutenant Carpenter, who is in the audience today, to question how human beings could so batter another human being. They stood firm in the face of unrestrained

brutality, intimidation, and humiliation 30 years ago.

They are demonstrating their courage here again today by working with us to ensure that the sacrifices made in defense of freedom and democracy are not forgotten; to ensure that the life and

death of one of their fellow POW’s and victims of the ‘‘Cuba Program,’’ Air Force pilot Earl Cobeil, who is pictured in one of the

posters there, is not ignored; to ensure that justice is indeed

served.

Captain Vohden and Colonel Bomar will offer compelling and detailed testimony describing the actions committed against them by

Cuban agents at ‘‘The Zoo,’’ acts which are in direct violation of the

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Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. To violate the provisions

enshrined in this document runs against the grain of civilized society and undermines the integrity of our international community

as a whole. Humanity is one; when one suffers, we all suffer. Violations of this protocol are not just crimes against one individual, but

against all of humanity.

That is the message that one of our witnesses, Andres Garcia, of

my congressional district, a Vietnam veteran and the Vice President of the Cuban American Veterans Association, will underscore

today.

Survivors of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ have been eager to identify and

trace the Cuba agents who systematically interrogated them and

tortured their fellow Americans. Yet despite their efforts, a successful resolution of this matter has not been achieved. This hearing

is the first of many steps aimed at changing that outcome.

We hope to accomplish three goals today. The first is to get leads

that could take us closer to an identification of the Cuban torturers. Could ‘‘Fidel’’ be Fernando Vecino Alegret, or is he Luis

Perez Jaen, as a 1974 CIA report alleged? Is ‘‘Chico’’ a man by the

name of Veiga, as our intelligence agencies suggested in this same

document? Is Gustavo Robreno Dolz the man our POW’s called

‘‘Pancho?’’ The answer to these should be our first priority.

Our second goal is to provide the basis for an ensuing interagency investigation of new evidence, including a search of pertinent data and sources previously unavailable under Cold War parameters. We are fully cognizant of the mission of DOD’s Office of

POW/Missing Personnel who will be testifying today, and while

they are most familiar with the ‘‘Cuba Program,’’ they have completed their mission successfully by accounting for and bringing

back all 20 of our servicemen who were part of the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’ We want the State Department, CIA, FBI, INS, and the Defense Intelligence Agency to coordinate the comprehensive approach to this case.

Last, this hearing will begin to establish the foundation for future action against the torturers.

On a broader scale, this investigation will serve to highlight the

brutal nature of the Castro regime and the historic and ongoing

threat it poses to the American people. Ultimately, our hope is that

this hearing will serve to honor those POW’s who were willing to

give life and limb so that we may all be free.

Mr. Chairman, as part of our preliminary investigation on this

issue, I requested information from INS, FBI, and the Vietnamese

Government through our embassy in Hanoi. I ask that these letters

be included in the record of today’s proceedings.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. ROS-LEHTINEN. Just this morning I received a letter from

Ambassador Peterson in Hanoi which I would like also to be included in the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

[The letters appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In the letter he states, ‘‘I have personally

presented your request to the appropriate Vietnamese officials.’’ He

further states that, ‘‘Given my personal experience, I share and

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deeply appreciate your abhorrence for the inhumane treatment of

POW’s by any country.’’

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Chair lady Ros-Lehtinen.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ros-Lehtinen appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me, at the outset,

thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving your attention to this issue in

the crowded agenda of the Committee’s schedule and for agreeing

to hold a hearing before the Committee.

Let me also recognize the leadership of my colleague from Florida, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for pursuing what others would clearly

want to have be a closed door on a sad chapter in our relationships.

Let me salute all of those whose testimony today will relive some

painful memories, but whom we appreciate in our effort to ultimately get to the truth.

While it has been more than 30 years since the ‘‘Cuba Program’’

ended for the 19 American POW’s who suffered the daily beatings

and interrogations of their Cuban torturers, the ‘‘Cuba Program’’

remains for them a vivid memory, and for some, an everyday nightmare.

Today, we are here to announce that the search for ‘‘Fidel,’’

‘‘Chico,’’ and ‘‘Pancho’’ Garcia is not over. The atrocities committed

by these Cuban agents constitute clear violations of the Geneva

Convention, which has no statute of limitations. It is our intent to

reinvigorate the investigation, uncover the identities of these men

and bring them to trial for their crimes.

I have read the information provided by the Department of Defense, which provides detailed accounts of the Cuban program. Unfortunately, the Department has been unable to definitively identify the Cuban perpetrators, but I believe our search does not end

here. The clues we need to positively identify the three Cuban torturers may very well lie in the further review and declassification

of documents from that time period, which I will join my colleague

in pursuing.

We have encouraged the Department to renew its effort so that

we can find these men before it is too late to bring them to trial

or too late for their victims to see them brought to justice. We

should also fully investigate Fernando Vecino Alegret, the man

identified by retired Air Force Colonel Ed Hubbard as ‘‘Fidel.’’ It

seems quite feasible that the man who has claimed to be Cuba’s

Minister of Higher Education for more than 20 years was part of

the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’ Alegret’s contention that he doesn’t, ‘‘have the

face of a torturer’’ is hardly a satisfactory response.

The allegation against Vecino Alegret is not a recent one. A

Washington Post article of March 5, 1981, indicates that not only

did he take part in the ‘‘Cuba Program,’’ but that he was one of

the most-watched people in Latin America by U.S. Intelligence

services. He has been linked to Cuba’s Cold War activities in Central America and Africa and served as Cuba’s military attache to

Vietnam during the time of the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’

Now, personally, I can’t tell you that he is ‘‘Fidel,’’ but certainly

his past should tell us that he is not above scrutiny. As former

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Chilean Dictator Pinochet has discovered, the passage of years has

increased, not decreased, the likelihood of prosecution in cases involving violations of international law.

I welcome that reality. I would hate to think that in the world

we would send the message that those who think that through the

passage of time they can escape the violations of international law

and the consequences that one should receive for those violations.

That would send a very wrong message.

Castro’s tyranny continues today in Cuba, not against American

POW’s, but against his own people. Pinochet’s trial sends a message to all individuals who violate human rights that they, too, can

and will be held accountable for their crimes.

I look forward to the testimony. I will be going back and forth,

Mr. Chairman. I have a hearing across the hall, unfortunately, at

the same time. But I have read the testimony that has been submitted to the Committee. I think it is rather compelling and gives

us a strong foundation to move forward in the future, and I thank

you.

Chairman GILMAN. We will now proceed with the statement of

Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will be very quick, because I know Mr.

Cooksey wants to get right to the testimony, and so I do.

Let me just say that Ileana has done a terrific job here. We all

owe her a debt of gratitude. It is about time we set the record

straight about Fidel Castro; and there are just so many misconceptions and so many false images created about this monster. I mean,

Fidel Castro is portrayed by so many on the left as being some nationalist just opposed to American domination, but you take a look

at the picture a little closer and you are going to find that that

man is a ghoul.

He is a criminal, he is the worst type of gangster and ran a gangster regime for all these years in Cuba. He was, from the very beginning, a fanatic Communist who put his own people, thousands

of them, in harm’s way throughout the world, as cannon fodder for

the Communist movement in Africa; and he sent his people—he

hated the United States so much that he sent his people over to

torture Americans in Vietnam. We need to know these facts.

I am very pleased that you are here with us today to alert the

American people about Fidel Castro—that his past crimes shouldn’t

be just sloughed off and taken lightly. This man is as evil a war

criminal and is as committed to crimes against humanity as have

ever been committed in this century. We need to remember that

and make sure we put it on the record.

So thank you for helping set the record straight and being with

us today.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

We will now proceed with testimony from our witnesses.

Chairman GILMAN. United States Air Force Colonel Jack Bomar

was born in Michigan in 1926. After refusing a transplant to correct a kidney disorder, Colonel Bomar was grounded, but was later

granted a waiver at his request and assigned to the 41st Tactical

Reconnaissance Squadron in Thailand. Colonel Bomar was shot

down over North Vietnam on February 4, 1967. During his capVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:29 Jul 26, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65278.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
7

tivity, Colonel Bomar was tortured by the Cuban known as ‘‘Fidel.’’

Colonel Bomar retired from the Air Force in 1974.

Colonel Bomar, you may proceed with your testimony. We will

put your full statement in the record and you may summarize,

whichever you deem appropriate.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL JACK BOMAR, UNITED STATES AIR

FORCE, RETIRED

Mr. BOMAR. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. My testimony is a summary of a lengthier, more detailed statement.

Chairman GILMAN. Do you want to put the full statement in the

record at this time?

Mr. BOMAR. I ask that it be included in its entirety in the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection. Please proceed.

Mr. BOMAR. Good morning. My name is Jack Bomar, retired Air

Force Colonel. I am a graduate of the ‘‘Fidel’’ Program, Class of

1968. I wish to thank the Members of this panel for their interest

in uncovering the truth about a subject that has been buried for

31 years—especially you, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida.

When I was shot down in 1967, we were flying an ECM aircraft

out of Takhli, Thailand. It is kind of amazing that a SAM suppression aircraft can get knocked down by a SAM. But that is what

happened. There were six of us on the aircraft; three of us survived. One was captured by the Chinese and turned over to the

North Vietnamese. I went through the initial torture of peasants

on the ground trying to spear me with spears as I came toward the

ground. I kicked one of them aside and in doing that, I think I ruptured a disc in my back, and broke an ankle. I got a big chunk of

shrapnel through my left leg before bailing out. So when I arrived

in North Vietnam, I was not in the mood for games. I was tired,

I just wanted a drink of water and to be allowed to lay down. The

peasants tortured me all day.

Finally I got into Hanoi that night, and went into some real torture by the North Vietnamese.

They didn’t need our ‘‘Fidel’’ to teach them how to torture people.

The Vietnamese were experts at this. I went through what we call

the ‘‘Rope Trick.’’ Your arms are tied behind your back, wrists in

manacles and the pressure is slowly applied to the upper arms

with straps. Eventually I was hung from a hook because I would

not reveal the names of my crew.

Finally after three days with no food or water, constant interrogation, the camp commander was suddenly there, then gone. The

torture guy—we call him ‘‘Straps and Bars’’—applied the pressure

again. Finally, they showed me a list of my crew members, so they

had been working on one of the other three of us pretty harshly.

I was sent to ‘‘The Zoo’’ and put in a camp where I met a delegation from the United States. There were three men in this delegation. One was a doctor, I think from France, one was a lawyer from

Denmark or someplace, and the other was an anti war type from

Berkeley, California, named Neilands, a professor from Berkeley.

He and I immediately hit it off by him sticking out his hand—I was

on crutches, had bandages from here to here to cover up all the

wounds on my hands. I asked him, ‘‘What the hell are you doing

in North Vietnam?’’ He said, ‘‘Dean Rusk, the son of a bitch, will

8

not tell me where I can go and when I can be there.’’ So my purpose, primarily, was to get a letter to my family, which got my

name out in public. We felt that if you were known to be a POW,

your survival chances were much greater than those that were not

known.

After that interrogation, I was tortured several more times by

the Vietnamese and thrown into solitary. I was in solitary confinement in June. After the delegation visit, there was no more treatment for the hole in my leg. I dug the shrapnel out with my fingers. I was on crutches when I saw the delegation; but now the

crutches were long gone. Because of my attitude at the delegation,

I was stashed in solitary.

Suddenly they came in and wanted me to meet ‘‘several of my

countrymen’’. I think they said, ‘‘When you go to Quiz at night, it

is a pretty scary thing; you are not sure what is coming.’’ I wasn’t

sure when I walked in the room with Dum Dum and there were

two Caucasians sitting at this table, and the one in the center was

quite tall, spoke good English, had a Latin accent, offered me a cigarette, which I refused; and then I took it after a few words of encouragement from him. On his side was another gentleman—smaller, lighter hair, I believe—and they said, ‘‘Where do you think we

are from?’’ I said ‘‘I think you are from Romania.’’ It was obvious

that they were Latin Americans. He said he was there to help me

with my defense. I was to be tried by the war crimes tribunal, the

Bertrand Russell Tribunal for War Crimes against the Vietnamese

people, and he would work on my defense for me. Then he sent me

back to the room.

I didn’t know what to make of these two guys, but they weren’t

the normal delegation like the one I had just seen. They were a little scarier; they were a little more intense. They were sitting with

the camp commander to his right, which is a position of authority.

I was called back a couple of days later after he told me now we

must fill out a sheet of paper and you will describe your aircraft,

20 pages written there. I left it lying on my bunk. Being in solitary,

I had a bunk there, a platform of boards, and I left it blank. Finally, at the last minute, I scratched in a crude sketch of the aircraft. This is a wing, this is a window, this is a door—this is the

top, this is the bottom, pure nonsense. The next day I gathered up

my stuff, and I met with two other POW’s.

Ray Vohden was one of them, on crutches. He was badly hurt;

he had also met ‘‘Fidel.’’ The other one was a gentleman named

Dave Duart; I think he was an Air Force captain flying a 105.

There we sat in this room looking at each other, wondering, what

is going on here. Ray Vohden made the—I will not repeat the statement he made, but it was, I think, that we are in deep you-knowwhat. and we were.

We were in that position maybe three or four weeks. We would

go to Quiz, he would threaten us; ‘‘Fidel’’ would threaten us. His

entire program to me, I felt was, you will surrender. He didn’t say

surrender to what, he didn’t say what he wanted you to do, he said

surrender. I think he was running a surrender program up there

and could get maybe 10 or 15 POW’s to surrender to anything that

came up. That’s a bad position to be in.

9

I was badly tortured by him when I refused to surrender, or as

he said, choose the match box or choose the cigarette case. The

match box I chose and went through the straps again. It was just

as bad the second time with the manacles that tore up my hands.

I was just off crutches, I didn’t walk that well right then. So he

got my attention after a guard came running toward me and

grabbed me by the throat and tried to crush my windpipe. That got

my attention.

So I nodded, ‘‘I surrender.’’ There was some histrionics of knocking me around the room, and I was sent back to solitary confinement with some leg irons. We were finally joined in a large group,

either nine or ten POW’s, and some of them are right here. Jim

Kasler was not in our group, as such.

I felt that we were being held in limbo there. He would threaten

us. He would send us to Quiz. We would go back there, back and

forth. He sounded like a Cuban revolutionary to me—Che Guevara.

I made a big mistake one day; when Che Guevara died, I said

something like ‘‘Good riddance’’—really a bright statement at the

time—and that got me in real big trouble, as if I could get in any

more.

We were joined eventually by a fellow prisoner, Earl Cobeil.

Cobeil was a complete physical disaster when we saw him. He had

been tortured for days and days and days. I went down to clean

him up. When ‘‘Fidel’’ dragged us down there, he said, Clean him

up; and if anything happens to this man you, Bomar, are responsible. Then he hit him right in the face, knocked him down again.

His hands were almost severed from the manacles. He had bamboo in his shins. All kinds of welts up and down all over; his face

was bloody. He was a complete mess. They brought him into the

room and as far as we could tell, Captain Cobeil was totally mentally out of it. He did not know where he was. I don’t think he

knew where he had been or where he was going. He was just there.

‘‘Fidel’’ began to beat him with a fan belt. I call it a fan belt but

it wasn’t really a fan belt. I think it was the side of a Russian truck

tire, a very, very painful experience to be hit by this length of fan

belt. I saw Cobeil hit as many as 12 or 13 times directly in the

face. He never blinked his eyes. He never opened his mouth. He

just stood there.

We had him in our cell for I would say 8 months or so. He refused to eat. He refused to bow to the guards. You must understand when the door opened, the guards demanded you will bow,

all criminals will bow. We were always a criminal in North Vietnam. We were never a POW. We were governed by the camp regulations, not the U.S. code of conduct for military personnel.

We took care of Cobeil for about a year. We force-fed him by

holding him down, putting a stick in his mouth, and pushing the

food down his throat. In all that time he never recognized anything

that was going on. Finally he was removed from the room for electrical shock treatments, and then finally was gone. I understand he

died a couple of years later there at the Hanoi Hilton.

I don’t believe ‘‘Fidel’’ was in Hanoi just to torture American

POW’s. I think that events controlled him that he had no control

over. I think the Tet Offensive of 1968 was involved. I think when

Johnson halted the bombing in 1968, that involved what ‘‘Fidel’’

10

was doing up there. I believe a conference that was taking place

in Hanoi—Havana in 1968 had something to do with ‘‘Fidel’’ being

up there. I think we were being prepared for some selective release

that would enhance the Vietnam image of lenient and humane

treatment worldwide. We were almost waiting for something to

trigger this release.

‘‘Fidel’’ used torture not for direct propaganda or anti war statement as the Vietnamese did. He used torture to break us initially,

and to control us and keep us right under his thumb so we would

do what he wanted done. His brutal torture of Cobeil and Kasler

was due mostly to his frustration and his inability to force his will

on others.

When he lost his temper, he was a complete madman. He would

get red in the face; he just exploded with rage. So if you refused

to bow to him like Cobeil refused to do or if I refused to take the

cigarette case instead of the deal, his temper just went out of control.

The North Vietnamese knew exactly what ‘‘Fidel’’ was doing up

there. They may tell you that he was there to teach English to the

guards. I don’t think that had any part in it whatsoever. He was

allowed to do to Cobeil, Kasler and others what was unjustifiable

in any society, even a Communist society.

Perhaps one day we will positively identify and locate this man.

Thank you.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel Bomar.

[The prepared statement of Colonel Bomar appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Our next witness is Captain Raymond

Vohden. Captain Vohden was shot down over Vietnam. He was

held as a prisoner of war from April, 1965 through February 12,

1973. During his captivity, he was tortured by the Cuban known

as ‘‘Fidel.’’ From 1975 to 1978, he served as a principal adviser to

the Secretary of Defense on POW/MIA matters.

Captain, you may put your full statement in the record or summarize, whichever you may deem appropriate. Please proceed.

Mr. CHABOT. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. There is a vote on the

floor.

Chairman GILMAN. We are going to continue. Mr. Rohrabacher

has gone over; he’ll come back and preside while we go over to vote.

Please do it quickly if you are going over, because we have so many

witnesses we want to hear.

Chairman GILMAN. Please proceed, Captain Vohden.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN RAYMOND VOHDEN, UNITED STATES

NAVY, RETIRED

Mr. VOHDEN. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my testimony is a summary of a lengthier, more detailed statement. I ask

that it be included in its entirety in the record.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. VOHDEN. In August 1964, I was assigned to Attack Squadron

216 as the operations officer flying in the A4C Skyhawk off the

USS Hancock. Our carrier was in the South China Sea in early

1965 when the war against North Vietnam began to escalate.

11

On my fifth mission, I was shot down bombing a bridge in North

Vietnam. I broke both bones above the ankle when I landed. I was

then taken to the camp known as the Hanoi Hilton, where I was

in complete solitary and was never moved off a wooden board for

four months except to go to the hospital for two hours one night.

For the next 21⁄2 years I was moved from camp to camp, until

being sent to ‘‘The Zoo’’ in November 1965. In the early part of

1967, September 1967, I was looking forward to the end of the war

and my homecoming, when one night I was taken to an interrogation. To my astonishment, the man sitting across from me was a

Caucasian. One of the Vietnamese camp officers sat next to him.

We talked about the war for the next half hour. He had an excellent command of English and appeared to be very knowledgeable

about the U.S. and the war.

Several days later, I was moved to another room with Jack

Bomar and another Air Force officer. They both had recently been

shot down and had also talked to the Caucasian. One of us named

him ‘‘Fidel’’ because we guessed he might be Cuban. Individually,

we met with him daily. The war was essentially the main topic.

One day I was taken to Quiz. ‘‘The Elf,’’ one of the other Vietnamese officers, was there. The Elf asked me four or five times,

what orders did I give. I said, none. He left and came back with

six or seven guards who forced me onto floor, put manacles on my

wrists behind me and strapped my elbows together behind me.

After some time he finally gave me a clue what the order was, it

was about throwing food away. I had ordered—I was an SRO in a

building one time before, and I told the guys to throw away some

food because some of the younger people didn’t get enough, so they

thought it would be better if we didn’t turn back food.

Five minutes later, as they were taking the manacles and straps

off, the door burst open. In comes ‘‘Fidel,’’ ranting and raving like

a madman, pointing his finger at me and telling me that I better

have a good attitude now and do everything he says. He slapped

me 10 or 15 times. I then had to write on a piece of notebook paper

that I surrendered to the Vietnamese people and would do everything they wanted me to do. He told me other things to write and

then told me to sign it and then eat it to prove I would do everything he told me to do. Eating paper is interesting.

I went back to the room with Bomar, but Bomar and Duart were

gone. For the next two weeks, I was beaten 3 or 4 times a day until

I became demoralized and depressed and started to lose my appetite. I finally gave up eating anything. After failing to eat several

meals, ‘‘Fidel’’ came in yelling and screaming at me that I was trying to cheat him again and that he would kill me if I didn’t eat.

I had reached bottom. I didn’t care if I lived or died. ‘‘Fidel’’ just

stood there and watched. Without a word, he left.

A week later, the tactic shifted; the treatment improved. ‘‘Fidel’’

responded if we didn’t use what he gave us we would be very sorry.

One by one, more POW’s joined us; all had been forced to surrender. At Quiz, ‘‘Fidel’’ tried every argument in the book to convince us that the U.S. was wrong in its war of aggression. Every

day he reminded us not to become reactionary or we would suffer.

One morning in early 1968, one of the camp officers came to the

outside of our room and disconnected the wires to our speaker.

12

Later that day we heard from guys in another building who had

heard the radio program that the first three U.S. prisoners had

been released by the Vietnamese. I felt very relieved and proud of

myself and the others who served with me in the ‘‘Fidel’’ program

because, although I can’t say for sure what the original purpose of

Fidel’s presence was, I believe, the way the program was run, that

its purpose was to find someone who could be of value to the North

Vietnamese if released. Some found it hard to believe that ‘‘Fidel’’

expected us to adopt the enemy views on the war and talk about

good treatment after we were tortured and forced to surrender; but

after getting to know ‘‘Fidel,’’ I could see how this was his goal and

how he believed it was possible.

After ‘‘Fidel’’ failed in having any of his group released, the

‘‘Cuba Program’’ continued without any real purpose or meaning.

Two weeks later I moved to another room with Paul Schultz. I

rarely saw ‘‘Fidel’’ again, except on one or two occasions. ‘‘Fidel’’

had been working with some other men and it appeared that one

of them, Earl Cobeil, was resisting ‘‘Fidel’’ to the maximum. Of

course, ‘‘Fidel’’ was retaliating. Several days after I was moved,

Earl Cobeil was moved in with Don Waltman into the room next

to mine. Waltman said Earl was all mixed up in his mind.

On one occasion, one of the guards, Grimsey, came to the shower

area and took us back to our room. ‘‘Fidel’’ was standing at the

door. All three of us lined up. I had moved into this room with

Waltman and Cobeil. We went to the shower, then we came back.

So Waltman and I bowed, but Cobeil just stood there again. I said,

‘‘Hey, Cobeil, bow.’’ Nothing happened. Suddenly Grimsey raised

his leg and pushed his foot against Cobeil’s body, who went tumbling over toward the back of the room. ‘‘Fidel’’ yelled loudly at

Cobeil to stop cheating him or he would teach him a lesson he

would never forget. The door closed.

After having seen ‘‘Fidel’’ for almost every day for six months, I

knew that ‘‘Fidel’’ was going to get his way. He was not going to

let the Vietnamese see him fail in any endeavor. I was convinced

that he would take a man to any length to get what he wanted.

In addition, the difference between the Vietnamese and ‘‘Fidel’’ was

that more or less once the Vietnamese got what they wanted they

let up at least for awhile. Not so with ‘‘Fidel.’’ There wasn’t a day

that went by that there weren’t threats or warnings to all of us.

I was in this room with Cobeil and Waltman now; and for the

rest of the quiet hour, Waltman and I tried everything imaginable

to get Cobeil to come down to earth, but we were unsuccessful.

Shortly after the gong sounded ending the quiet hour, ‘‘Fidel’’ came

to the door and told me to come outside. ‘‘Fidel’’ asked me if Cobeil

was squared away. I told him that in my honest opinion, Cobeil

was not at all rational; if he continued working Cobeil over, Cobeil

would never make it. I was hopeful that he would believe me about

Cobeil.

He accused me of trying to help Cobeil cheat him. The door was

closed, locked, and bolted. I started to talk to Cobeil again for a few

minutes, when all of a sudden, ‘‘Fidel’’ jumped up in the window,

holding the bars, screaming in his loud voice, ‘‘I caught you, I

caught you cheating me.’’ Seconds later the door slammed open.

‘‘Fidel’’ screamed to me, get out, get out. A few minutes later

13

‘‘Fidel’’ returned with what looked like a fan belt of a car, but cut

so it was like a whip. As ‘‘Fidel’’ passed by he looked at me with

a glaze in his eyes of an enraged madman.

‘‘Fidel’’ went in after Cobeil with Grimsey and Cedric. I could

hear the thud of the belt against Cobeil’s body again and again as

‘‘Fidel’’ screamed. I guess Cobeil was hit around 20 or 30 times.

It was hard to listen, as I did, to ‘‘Fidel’’ beating Cobeil, a frail,

diminutive man, his wrists swollen three times the normal size, a

vacant stare in his eyes already pushed by torture beyond the limit

for which he might have a chance to regain his sanity. It had been

far easier for me to endure the straps than to have to go through

this.

The guards all stood around talking loudly, laughing and yelling

in Vietnamese. When I saw ‘‘Fidel’’ with the fan belt, I was surprised, because up to that time I had never heard of anyone getting

hit like that. As I stood there with my crutches, my heart and mind

overflowed with emotion. It was the most sickening feeling to hear

what was going on and know there was nothing I could do about

it.

That was the last day I saw Cobeil. ‘‘Fidel’’ unmercifully beat a

mentally defenseless, sick man to death. He, as well as the North

Vietnamese Communists, must bear full responsibility for that and

other acts.

There have been considerable efforts to locate ‘‘Fidel’’ in Cuba,

but without success. I have often wondered what we would do if we

found him. Try him as a war criminal?

No mention was ever made to try the North Vietnamese leaders

as criminals. Thus, I question whether trying to locate ‘‘Fidel’’

would be a wasted effort. Maybe this hearing and the interest

shown by Congressman Gilman and Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen

to investigate will mean some justice will be served.

[The prepared statement of Captain Vohden appears in the appendix.]

Mr. COOKSEY. [Presiding.] Thank you, Captain, that was very

moving testimony, and I appreciate your remarks.

Mr. Benge, you are going to be the next witness. I am sitting in

because I am going to skip this vote. To me, your testimony is more

important than voting on the Journal. You will notice, as long as

I am here, there is no time limit. We have a lot of politicians that

need a time limit, but you men are heroes and you can testify as

long as you want.

STATEMENT OF MIKE BENGE, FORMER POW AND POW

HISTORIAN

Mr. BENGE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Madam Chair Lady,

Members of the Committee, fellow former POW’s, our Cuban

friends and distinguished guests. My testimony is a summary of a

lengthy, more detailed statement that I am presenting here today,

and also of my research report and references on the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’ I ask that these be included in their entirety in the record.

Mr. COOKSEY. So ordered.

Mr. BENGE. My name is Michael Benge, and while serving as a

civilian economic development officer in the Central Highlands of

South Vietnam, I was captured by the North Vietnamese during

14

the Tet Offensive on January 28, 1968. I was held in numerous

camps in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. I

was a POW for over five years spent 27 months in solitary confinement, one year in a black box, and 1 year in a cage in Cambodia.

I served for over 11 years in Vietnam. I was released during Operation Homecoming in 1973.

I am a board member of the National Alliance of Families for the

Return of America’s Missing Servicemen, and I am a POW activist;

that is, I am one who is actively seeking the truth regarding the

fate of our prisoners of war and missing in action.

I was not tortured by the Cubans nor was I part of the ‘‘Cuba

Program.’’ There were 19 American POW’s that I know of who were

tortured by the Cubans in Hanoi during the Vietnam War. These

brave men include Colonel Bomar, Captain Ray Vohden, and Commander Al Carpenter, who is in the audience. They named the torturers ‘‘Fidel,’’ ‘‘Chico,’’ and ‘‘Pancho.’’ The torture took place in

‘‘The Zoo’’. It was run by a Vietnamese camp commander call ‘‘The

Lump.’’ He was called that because of the presence of a large fatty

tumor in the middle of his forehead.

I was not tortured by the Cubans in Vietnam, but I was interrogated by The Lump and a person who appeared to be a Latino who

spoke a few words of Spanish to The Lump during my interrogation in the early part of 1970. Upon my return to the U.S., I was

shown a picture taken in Cuba of The Lump, which was taken with

an American anti war group. Yes, it was the same one who had interrogated me in 1970.

I was told by a congressional investigator that he was the man

who was in charge of funneling Soviet KGB money to the American

anti war groups and activists, such as Jane Fonda. After researching my paper, this made more sense, for who would be better suited to liaison with the Cubans then The Lump? This was my first

piece of the puzzle.

I decided to research the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ after repeated claims

by the Administration, Senators John McCain and John Kerry,

Ambassador Pete Peterson and members of the Department of Defense that the Vietnamese Government was cooperating fully in resolving the POW/MIA issue. This is far from the truth. If the Vietnamese Communists were fully cooperating, as purported, they

would have told us the true fate of the 173 U.S. servicemen who

are still missing, who were last known to be alive and in the hands

of North Vietnamese Communists. They would have helped us resolve the fate of over 600 American servicemen who were lost in

Laos, of which over 80 percent were lost in areas totally under the

control of the North Vietnamese. If the Vietnamese were fully cooperating, we would not be here today, for they would have revealed the names of the Cubans—‘‘Fidel’’, ‘‘Chico,’’ and ‘‘Pancho’’—

who were responsible for the torture of 19 POW’s, beating one so

severely that it resulted in his death.

Upon their return to the U.S., the POW’s were told by the U.S.

Government not to talk about the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’ Some of them

resisted as they had resisted ‘‘Fidel’’, and they broke silence. Regardless, the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ was swept under the rug by the U.S.

Government. I began researching the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ and had a

15

draft paper in 1996 for presentation at the annual meeting of the

National Alliance of Families.

After this, former Congressman Bob Dornan held hearings on it,

and it forced the Department of Defense’s Office for POW/MIA Affairs to do an analysis and a compilation which was submitted to

Congress. I reassessed the information in the DPMO compilation

and, nevertheless, from my reading the documents in this compilation, I found a profile. Regardless of what was testified, I read

through these documents and I found the profile of a man that

seemed to match almost perfectly the POW’s description of the

Cuban called ‘‘Chico.’’ However, this profile also partially fit the

POW’s characterization of ‘‘Fidel.’’ The profile was that of Major

Fernando Vecino Alegret.

Last August 22nd, the Miami Herald published an article on the

‘‘Cuba Program,’’ based partially on my report; however, it was

misreported that I had identified a man named Raul Valdes Vivo

as ‘‘Fidel.’’ That was wrong. However, it produced out of the Cuban

exile community a photograph and a report that indeed the man

who was suspected to be ‘‘Fidel’’ was Alegret.

Alegret is now Cuba’s Minister of Education, and Fidel Castro

has issued a denial that Alegret was ever in Vietnam. However,

there was evidence compiled by the DIA, documented and the report submitted to Congress, that he was in Vietnam.

Mr. Bob Destatte of the DPMO office made this report to Congress. However, he says that he was not responsible for the analysis of the ‘‘Cuba Program;’’ and I find it very hard, after reading

this evidence, which was very poorly analyzed, that the Administration, Department of Defense, the POW/Missing Personnel Office

have mastered the art of obfuscation.

I grew up on a farm in the West, and I used to try to catch

greased pigs at the county fair; and I can assure you that trying

to pin down DPMO to truthful facts oftentimes is much more difficult than catching a greased pig.

Mr. Destatte testified to DPMO’s conclusions that the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ was nothing more than a plan to provide instruction in basic

English to the North Vietnamese army personnel working with

American prison POW’s. I have taught English to the Vietnamese,

and I have been tortured by the Vietnamese, and I can tell the difference between the two. One might conclude from Mr. Destatte’s

testimony that neither he nor his associate, Mr. Tarabochia, knew

the difference between torture and teaching English. I can also

read English and understand what I read. From reading that report, it is very evident that the profile fits Alegret, and that perhaps they could take some English lessons from the Cubans.

Mr. Destatte had the audacity to testify that the high command

was unaware that the Cubans were torturing American POW’s. I

find this incomprehensible. I ask, how did Mr. Destatte reach this

conclusion? He questioned a North Vietnamese colonel, Colonel

Pham Teo, who told Destatte that he was in South Vietnam in

1967 and 1968 during the Cuban torture program. He knew nothing of the ‘‘Cuba Program;’’ however, he had heard rumors that it

was an English language instruction program that had gone awry.

16

Mr. Destatte testified that the Vietnamese explanation is fully

consistent with what we know about the conduct of the Cubans. I

find this deplorable.

Mr. Destatte chose to believe a Vietnamese Communist colonel

over American POW’s who were tortured by the Cubans. I find this

incomprehensible. What bewilders me, as it should you, is that

Destatte’s superiors at DPMO had the audacity to let him testify

before Congress to this foolishness. This exemplifies the quality of

DPMO’s investigation and analysis of the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’

My analysis, from what I read over and from what was very evident within the documentation provided by DPMO to Congress,

was that it was a program to gain the complete submission of

American POW’s, and it was in preparation for an October 18 to

21, 1968, Communist International Second Symposium Against

Yankee Genocide in Vietnam, held in Cuba. This symposium was

in continuum of the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal, a kangaroo court and dog-and-pony show held in Denmark the previous

year.

My research paper is based partially on what DPMO gave to

Congress, as well as other documents I have obtained through the

Freedom of Information Act. However, I just scratched the surface,

but I have found enough documents to indicate that there should

be a plethora of other documents related to the Cuban involvement

in Vietnam if they were ever declassified, as two U.S. Presidents

have decreed. I also recommend that this matter be thoroughly investigated by professional investigators, not DPMO analysts.

I shall end this up shortly.

The Cubans were very heavily involved in Vietnam. They maintained a whole section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, where many

American POW’s were lost. I have also uncovered evidence of the

possibility that American POW’s from the Vietnam War have been

held in Los Maristas, a secret Cuban prison run by Castro’s G–2

intelligence service. The Cubans who claimed to have seen them,

later escaped, made it to the U.S. and were debriefed by the FBI.

At the FBI, when I requested documents to be released, I got an

answer of ‘‘Give me their birthdays.’’

My paper raises more questions than it answers, but only history

will prove me right or wrong. However, I think I am on the right

track. Only through full disclosure will we ever know the truth. I

was brought up with old-fashioned values. My mother taught me

at a young age that no matter how hard you search for the truth,

you won’t find it, no matter what, unless you really want to.

I end up concluding with there remarks: ignorance, arrogance,

disinterest, lack of caring, incompetence, obfuscation. I rest my

case.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Benge.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Benge appears in the appendix.]

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Garcia. I understand you are a Vietnam veteran, but not a POW; is that correct?

STATEMENT OF ANDRES F. GARCIA, VICE PRESIDENT, CUBAN

AMERICAN VETERANS ASSOCIATION

Mr. GARCIA. I am a Vietnam veteran, sir, not a POW.

17

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my testimony is a

summary of my lengthier statement, and I would like it to be included in the record in its entirety.

Mr. COOKSEY. Without objection.

Mr. GARCIA. I would also like to have in the record a letter from

the Paralyzed Veterans Association of Florida supporting these

hearings.

Mr. COOKSEY. Without objection, it will be part of the permanent

record.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GARCIA. Chairman Gilman, Members of the House International Relations Committee, ladies and gentlemen. It is a privilege to participate in these hearings.

Let me begin by thanking you and the Members of your Committee for your efforts to learn what happened to our POW’s during

the Cuban Program, under which 20 Americans in Cu Loc, the

POW camp in North Vietnam, were tortured by agents of Fidel

Castro’s government, resulting in the tragic death of one of our

POW’s. My most sincere gratitude to Congresswoman Ileana RosLehtinen for her constant defense of veterans’ rights and for her

tireless efforts in uncovering the truth of the cruelty of Fidel Castro, not only against his own people, but also against the American

people whom he hates with a passion, as demonstrated again and

again by his actions throughout his life.

This time his involvement in atrocities committed against our

servicemen cannot be left unpunished.

For the past 40 years Castro’s Ministry of the Interior has utilized cruel methods of torture to break down those they consider

enemies of the revolution. These same methods were used against

20 defenseless POW’s in North Vietnam. My voice today is not the

voice of a single veteran, who proudly served with the 82nd Airborne Division in Vietnam in 1968–1969 while I was still a Cuban

refugee, but I am speaking for those Cuban-American men, like

me, who do not have a voice today because they gave their lives

fighting for freedom and justice with the U.S. Armed forces in

Korea, Vietnam and Lebanon.

What a difference between the actions of these men and the actions of those monsters that tortured our POW’s.

I am also speaking on behalf of a highly decorated Cuban-born

Marine who served two tours in Vietnam and was killed by the

same terrorist state that tortured our POW’s. His name is

Armando Alejandre, Jr. On February 24, 1996, Castro’s air force

shot down two U.S. unarmed civilian aircraft, killing Armando, two

U.S.-born youngsters of Cuban descent and a legal U.S. resident.

Speaking on behalf of my organization, CAVA, we stand ready to

work with any Federal agency that asks for our support in getting

more information on the POW issue. With the communication we

now have with dissidents on the island and a number of Castro’s

military residing in the U.S., it is possible for us to obtain much

more information today than in past years.

We veterans will not allow this issue to fade away. We are committed to inform the American people of Castro’s crimes again our

servicemen, and we will mobilize the veterans at the national level

if necessary. I am not only a member of CAVA but a member of

18

the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Legion and the Vietnam Veterans of America, and I will seek their support.

Men in Congress, the press, some mayors, Governors and even

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce believe we should be soft with

Fidel Castro in order to change him. I propose that they ask Fidel

Castro that, as a gesture of goodwill, he allow the alleged torturers

to come to the United States to be questioned and to face their victims. If they have nothing to hide, Castro should cooperate.

The fact is that nothing has changed since 1967. Fidel Castro

continues to be the worst enemy the U.S. ever had. He is a dagger

pointing at the U.S. underbelly. Yes, he is capable—after having

ordered the torture of POW’s in Vietnam, he is capable of killing

innocent children. He is capable of shooting down civilian unarmed

airplanes carrying U.S. citizens. He is capable of using the drug

trade to further undermine the U.S. and, yes, he is capable, willing,

and able to perpetrate biological attack against the American people.

He is capable, and he will continue to plan further attacks

against the U.S. with impunity because he has always gotten away

with anything he does.

The time to stand firm is now. We should create a task force

comprised of intelligence agencies to conduct a thorough investigation of the crimes against the POW’s. But more important, we

should indict and prosecute those found guilty, including Fidel Castro, who has all the responsibility.

Every time we have taken a weak stand, we have lost. Look at

the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, and Iran. When we have taken a stand

from a position of strength, we have been victorious. Look at Grenada, Panama, Iraq, and Kosovo. We are the strongest power in

the world and the world respects a leader.

The leaders of this great Nation must assume a very important

responsibility. We pray to God that your actions will lead to America doing the just, the moral, the right thing, without giving up its

political and commercial interest.

I do not want to close my testimony without trying to take care

of a doubt you may have in your mind. Is this another reckless

statement by a Cuban? I am a Cuban American. My parents sent

me to this country when I was a teenager. I paid my dues in Vietnam; I am no longer a refugee, but a proud American citizen. My

children were born here.

I love this country. I want nothing but the best for America. I

am Cuban by birth and American by choice. I am very proud of

both.

Thank you for this opportunity you have given me today and God

bless you all.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Garcia appears in the appendix.]

Mr. COOKSEY. I want to thank all of you for your testimony. It

is very important. It is a story that needs to be out there. Americans need to hear it, the world needs to hear it, and your testimony

has been good.

I will open the questioning first with Congresswoman RosLehtinen.

19

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank

you for this opportunity. I would like, before I ask the panelists my

questions, to recognize Congressman Mark Foley, our colleague

from Florida, who has been participating in the briefings that we

have held and is very anxious for us to move this investigation.

Congressman Foley.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. MARK FOLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. FOLEY. Let me thank my colleague for all of her leadership

on this important issue.

More appalling than the fact that Fernando Vecino Alegret is

now a high-ranking Cuban official is the fact that he has been able

to visit our country. Our country should not be open to thugs like

him. This is why I introduced, with Gary Ackerman and Bob

Franks and supported by my colleague, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, the AntiAtrocity Alien Deportation Act, H.R. 3058, which would make all

war criminals and perpetrators of atrocities, such as torture, excludable from the United States of America.

I didn’t become aware of this problem of war criminals entering

the United States until I recently learned that a key member of the

brutal military dictatorship that ruled Haiti from 1991 to 1994 is

now living comfortably in my congressional district. In fact, more

bizarre, he is a winner of over $3 million in the Florida lottery.

Brutalized his countrymen, came to America under the auspices of

the State Department, and then wins the lottery and lives in a

guarded, gate community in Port St. Lucie, Florida, unlike those

that he beat and brutally assassinated and murdered; they didn’t

have that luxury of travel to the United States.

Initially, I just assumed it was a bizarre and isolated episode.

However, once I began to look into the issue more, I realized how

big a problem we have on our hands. According to the Center for

Justice and Accountability in San Francisco, at least 60 alleged

human rights violators are currently residing in the United States.

These are just the ones who have been identified as living here;

that is not even counting those who have been able to visit the U.S.

on visas.

In 1998, Canada began an aggressive campaign to locate and

keep out human rights abusers who attempt to enter their country.

As of July 1999, the Canadian Government indicated that 400

cases are being processed toward removal, 307 suspected war

criminals have been denied visas, 23 were deported. That is a total

of 700 war criminals that Canada has detected. I applaud Canada

for their pursuit of these people. I think it is fair to say that based

on Canada’s figures and taking into account the much bigger population in the U.S. and other socioeconomic factors, we could have

as many as 7,000 human rights abusers either living in or visiting

the United States at any given time.

We owe it to our brave veterans and refugees who have fled persecution abroad that they should not have to come face to face with

their former tormentors in the Land of the Free. Canada has been

successful in tracking down modern war criminals, and so can we.

20

If I may ask Mr. Garcia a quick question. Obviously, we are

aware of the visit in the past, in 1979. Are you aware of any other

visits Mr. Alegret has made to the United States subsequently?

Mr. GARCIA. No, sir. I am not aware of it.

Mr. FOLEY. Thank you. I appreciate my colleague yielding the

time, and I hope the Chairman will give her some additional time

since I took up her whole five minutes.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing Mr. Foley to speak. I think that the reason the Administration is not fully behind your bill is that then they would not be able

to allow one of the biggest war criminals in the world today, Fidel

Castro, entry into the United States. But we certainly hope that

that bill passes.

I would like to thank the panelists for excellent testimony. I

want to ask you about the debriefing that has been going on and

the information shared and how much you have been a part of

that. News sources and other official and unofficial sources have referred to the existence of a CIA document published in the early

1970’s which provides an assessment of who the Agency believes

could be ‘‘Fidel’’ and ‘‘Chico.’’

Were you, or to the best of your knowledge, were any of your fellow survivors of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ ever shown this report, and

were you debriefed by the CIA and other intelligence agencies?

Last in this set, what more could have been done by these entities, and do you believe that with their resources that they should

have been able to more firmly identify these torturers?

Colonel Bomar.

Colonel BOMAR. I was not aware of being shown a report by the

FBI, or whoever it was who did this, no.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Captain Vohden.

Captain VOHDEN. There may have been that report, but it is a

long time ago now. I may have been shown it, but I just don’t recall.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. In the debriefing process, sketches were

made of the torturers; however, those varied, differing degrees,

from one to another. What physical characteristics stand out about

‘‘Fidel’’ that could facilitate an identification?

Some of your colleagues have identified this person Fernando

Vecino Alegret as ‘‘Fidel,’’ or the man in the photo that is going to

be shown to you—his name is Luis Perez Jaen—fits the description

of ‘‘Fidel.’’ What personality traits would you attribute to ‘‘Fidel’’

and the others?

Colonel Bomar.

Colonel BOMAR. Jaen, I would not recognize this as ‘‘Fidel’’ at all,

no. My comment was, ‘‘was it taken from 30,000 feet over Cuba?’’

However, this photograph is the same as that one. I was shown

this, or sent this, by Colonel Hubbard, this picture. My reaction

was, it could have been, or maybe it couldn’t have been. I wasn’t

100 percent sure that this picture—I think probably because, is he

20 years old here? This is a long time before we met him, and he

matured a lot.

However, there was another picture, Ray.

Captain VOHDEN. I don’t know. Maybe that. That’s all I have.

21

Colonel BOMAR. There was another one that he could very possibly have been. That was the closest that I have seen, but I don’t

have it right here. I think she showed it to me earlier.

Yes, this picture right here. This would have been as close as I

have seen, right here. This man right here. That could be him, but

I am not 100 percent sure.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. For the record, could you tell us who it is

that you are talking about?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That would be Fernando.

Colonel BOMAR. The man in the center in this photograph.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. That was given to us by people close to Fernando Vecino Alegret. These are photos taken in Cuba, family photographs and social events that he attended.

Colonel BOMAR. Very young in this picture.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. He is pointing to a photograph of a social occasion that took place in Cuba where he seems to share those characteristics.

Now, getting back to my other question, unless Captain Vohden

wants to weigh in on this——

Captain VOHDEN. I don’t recognize this man as ‘‘Fidel’’ at all. The

other pictures, in one picture here there is a shirt that he is wearing that is almost identical to the shirt that he wore when I first

met him. I don’t know what you call that shirt.

Identifying features of ‘‘Fidel’’: First, he was exceptionally tall for

a Cuban; he is probably 6’2’’, 6’2–1/2’’, or something like that,

which I think is unusual. He also spoke excellent English and he

was very knowledgeable about the United States. So that would indicate he would have to have spent some time here in the United

States. I had an impression that he was kind of comparable to Li’l

Abner sometimes. He was a big, husky, robust sort of a man.

But so far as the pictures are concerned, they could be. This is

probably as close as I have seen. I have seen the picture of Alegret

when he was older, but that is not at all possible. But this here,

it could be. That is all I know.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. After the initial debriefings, were you ever

approached again about new information, new sketches, new photographs, on the torturers; and if so, by whom and what was the result of these followups?

Colonel BOMAR. No, I never was. We did some initial sketches

then. That was the last I heard of it. It was over.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Is that true for you?

Captain VOHDEN. I saw sketches initially and there was a time,

maybe eight or ten years ago, the FBI came to my house and asked

if I would look at some pictures; and for about three days, I

thumbed through photo albums and I never found a picture of

‘‘Fidel.’’ Also, there was staff from a Senate Committee, a number

of years back, who talked to me on a few occasions.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. When visiting delegations were allowed directly into the camp, were you taken outside to meet them? Do you

recall seeing any outsiders in the camp? By ‘‘outsiders,’’ I mean Vietnamese officials or non-Vietnamese officials, not stationed at the

camp and folks from other countries, journalists, any visits that we

could use to locate the participants in an attempt to gain information about the torturers and who they were?

22

How closed was ‘‘The Zoo’’ to others?

Colonel BOMAR. I believe I saw some Chinese in the camp. Obviously there were some Russians, but we never spoke with them.

But other than one man that was working on some electrical box,

the squawk box in our room—he was definitely a friend of ‘‘Fidel.’’

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Now you had said in your testimony that

‘‘Fidel’’ had had a position of authority in the camp based on where

he was sitting, where he was standing. That would seem to indicate that the Vietnamese certainly knew who this individual and

the others were. Do you believe that they could give us information

to further clarify the identity?

Colonel BOMAR. I don’t think there is any doubt in any mind that

the North Vietnamese knew exactly who this was. He came to the

camp in a staff car, a Russian car, driven by a Vietnamese officer.

We had never seen that before. That is how he traveled.

He did not live in this camp. He came from off-camp somewhere.

He came quite often, and it was always in a staff car. The camp

commander, ‘‘Lump,’’ rode a bicycle. That was the best they got;

going up, there was the bicycle.

But he rode around in a chauffeured staff car, so he was not an

ordinary visitor to the camp.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Just one last question, if I may. I know my

time is up, Mr. Chairman.

What more do you think can be done by our agencies to get to

the identities of these three torturers?

Captain VOHDEN. One thing, just for starters, they should try to

get a picture of this Alegret now, or try to get something from 1968

somewhere around that period of time. That would be very helpful

to really identify and nail him.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Colonel?

Colonel BOMAR. I would give Ambassador Pete Peterson a call

and say, hey, ask the Vietnamese who this guy is, who he was.

Maybe we will turn the aide back on if you tell us. I would put

pressure on our Ambassador up there to put pressure on the Vietnamese, and I think Peterson could do that.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you for your

excellent testimony. We will have some other followup questions for

you at a later date.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel Bomar, is it ‘‘Fidel’’ who had his own car? Is that who

we are talking about, the man who is responsible for torturing you

American prisoners, and he had his own car that he was driven

around in?

Colonel BOMAR. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you believe that if he was simply an

English teacher he would have had his own car?

Colonel BOMAR. That is really hard to believe. No, I never did believe that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So anyone who is suggesting that this program with the Cubans was simply a program to teach English is

ignoring facts, like the fact that ‘‘Fidel’’ was being driven around

in his own staff car, correct?

23

Colonel BOMAR. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It would have to be either an intentional ignoring of facts like that, or we are talking about a total idiot.

Colonel BOMAR. Yes, I agree.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I want to make this very clear. Because this

information that he had his own staff car isn’t just something, you

know; it has to be known by other people as well, right, especially

people who might have been looking into this issue?

Colonel BOMAR. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you think that as you just testified, the

Vietnamese, of course, would have to know the name of the fellow

that they issued the car to, right?

Colonel BOMAR. Absolutely.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the relationship between the Vietnamese

and these Cubans that you are describing was not a relationship

where someone was simply there teaching them English, but it

seemed like they were actually in a position of authority; was that

not true?

Colonel BOMAR. Yes.

Captain VOHDEN. He was a high-ranking official from somewhere, and the Vietnamese gave him a lot of power to do what he

did. He ran that whole show by himself. Because the Vietnamese

knew what he did to Cobeil, and they just let him go ahead and

do it. So this guy really had to have a lot of power to be able to

do that, because I don’t think the Vietnamese liked what happened

to Cobeil.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let’s just say, for the record, having been in

Vietnam several times since the war and once during the war, let

me note that the Vietnamese are claiming that all the reports from

every one of the prison camps have just vanished, disappeared.

They were destroyed at the end of the war, B–52 raids, and everything like that. That is an incredulous answer to those of us asking

for those records.

Colonel BOMAR. They kept very minute notes when you were

being interrogated. I am sure they have records of every possible

thing that happened up there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. They would certainly keep the records of the

person that they issued the car to, right? I mean, this is not like

the camp commander riding on a bicycle, right?

So let us note that the people supposedly representing our government are telling us that they are letting the Vietnamese off the

hook on those records. I am going to ask today—we will ask and

find out whether or not they have insisted on the name of this

English teacher, ‘‘Fidel,’’ from the Vietnamese. If they are not

pushing the Vietnamese on this, why are they not pushing to get

these things from the Vietnamese? Why are they offering these excuses for the Vietnamese?

Would any of you like to add to that?

Captain VOHDEN. For one thing, there was this guy called ‘‘The

Rabbit.’’ He was probably the most well-known interrogation officer

up in Vietnam. I have seen ‘‘Rabbit’’ talking to ‘‘Fidel,’’ so there is

no doubt in my mind whatsoever that they know. They would have

to go to ‘‘Rabbit’’ and ask ‘‘Rabbit’’ what his name was. I am sure

‘‘Rabbit’’ wouldn’t say.

24

Mr. BENGE. I might also end up suggesting that they ask ‘‘The

Lump,’’ and there are DIA reports of ‘‘The Lump’s’’ presence that

should have his name in Cuba.

There are also congressional reports.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we should be pushing——

Mr. BENGE. That would seem be the first person to ask.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Ask about that particular person ‘‘The

Lump’’—they should find him in order to ask about the names of

these torturers. We will try to find out whether or not those people,

supposedly representing our interest and supposedly representing

the U.S. Government, have actually fulfilled that responsibility in

a competent manner. You can count on that.

Mr. Garcia, you mentioned something previously—I read something by you where you said that during the war, you were in Central Highlands and that someone had said something about your

not using your name, because there were other Cubans around but

were on the other side; is that correct?

Mr. GARCIA. No, that is the testimony of one of the members of

our organization. His name is Leonardo Viota-Sesin, and he was in

a fire base close to the Cambodia border. There was an American

officer in charge of the base, and they had Montagnards working

on that base. When he came to the base, the officer asked him

where was he from; he said that he was Cuban, and he took him

aside. He said, don’t ever mention on this base that you are a

Cuban, or they will kill you. When he asked why, the officer pointed out toward Cambodia and said, there is a brigade of North Vietnamese on the other side of the border. They have a group of Cubans who take care of all the interrogation, and many of the

Montagnards have died over there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So there was evidence that the Cubans are

not only in North Vietnam interrogating prisoners, but outside of

Vietnam. Perhaps in South Vietnam there are some intelligence reports that have been privy to that, that indicate that as well.

During the war I was not in the military, but I spent a little time

in the Central Highlands with the Montagnards and found them to

be very brave people. The word would have gotten around—these

people had their whispering networks—if there was a Cuban person torturing them on the other side of the border.

I don’t think I have any more time, but did you have something

you wanted to add?

Mr. BENGE. Yes. There was Raul Valdes Vivo, who was assigned

to COSVN headquarters in South Vietnam. There was a Cuban

contingent at the COSVN headquarters, which was the North Vietnamese headquarters for South Vietnamese operations in Cambodia. Ironically, he was placed there by ‘‘Fidel’s’’ brother, at the

insistence of ‘‘Fidel’s’’ brother, and the Cuban also was on the front

tank.

When the North Vietnamese overran the palace in Saigon, the

Cuban contingent had prestige enough with the North Vietnamese,

that they were on the first tanks going into the palace. They had

an engineering brigade that had maintained a good portion of the

Ho Chi Minh Trail there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

25

Let us just note, finally, you expected the fanatic Communists

under Fidel Castro to have done what you are talking about because they considered that as being their job. You have to consider

the Vietnamese did that, because they were doing their job. What

we have to find out is why our government isn’t doing its job in

protecting the interest of our people and getting the word out to

the people of the United States. It is either incompetence or worse.

I appreciate you putting these words on the record. This is information we need to talk about and call our government to task for

not following up on information they knew about, but the rest of

us didn’t. Thank you.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mr. Chabot.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. I can’t tell you how much respect I

have, and I think every Member of the Committee has, for you gentlemen for putting your lives on the line and having to go through

this terrible torture. It is almost incomprehensible that one human

being can carry out this type of barbarity on another human being.

I think it is embarrassing that our government hasn’t done more

to bring to justice these criminals, these people that visited this

horror on you. This is something that should not be swept under

the rug. This is something that we ought to use the full powers of

this government to get to the bottom of and to bring these people

to justice.

I know we have another panel here, so I will not take up all my

time. The only question I would have is, if we could actually determine who these people are—I hate to even use the term people for

those who did this to the U.S. Air Force pilot and the rest of you—

what do you think would be appropriate if we could bring these

people to justice at this time for what they have done?

Captain VOHDEN. You say, what would be ‘‘appropriate?’’

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. What do you think? If our government could

bring these people to justice, what do you think would be the appropriate punishment at this point, these many years later? What

do you think we should do?

Captain VOHDEN. What are they doing with Pinochet right now,

I would say. What they are doing with Pinochet at a minimum and

try him. If he is found guilty, hang him.

Mr. CHABOT. Colonel Bomar, I heard your testimony before, so I

was wondering if you had any feelings with respect to that.

Colonel BOMAR. Yes, I think he should be tried and brought to

task for what he did there. He is a murderer, and we have laws

that govern this.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, and we appreciate your testimony here today. Hopefully, as I say, this will not be swept under

the rug.

Mr. COOKSEY. Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen, did you have another question?

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. I just had one more question, if

I might. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Captain, you had testified today that you believe that the purpose of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ was to prepare POW’s for release. I

have a question about the reasons that you all thought this heinous

program was under way.

It has also been said that this was part of a propaganda campaign. Others said that it was a psychological experiment linked to

26

the university at Hanoi, and still others say that it was used as a

method to test interrogation techniques.

Could it have been a combination of all of these? Please elaborate, if you might, on what you believe to have been the role of

these torturers; why bring these three in, rather than Vietnamese

interrogators; and why did the Vietnamese allow them such access

to our U.S. pilots.

Captain VOHDEN. I think they wanted to release some prisoners

about the time this program started. I think this ‘‘surrender’’ program was like, you have a child; you want the child to do something, and you spank that kid to make him do what you want him

to do.

There may have been some guys in the program who surrendered

without being tortured, but they wanted you to surrender. So, after

we all had surrendered, we started to get a few extra cigarettes a

day. He brought us tea in the morning. We got a chess set. He gave

me a cigar to smoke. He gave us these extra-special things to make

us feel good. Then he started moving more and more guys into the

room. So that, if we were released, we could say, yeah, we were

with a bunch of guys?

Another thing he did, he forced us to carve things, little wooden

toys and things like this. This would be used to show our remorse,

and we could give these to the Vietnamese people. Everything to

make us look good if we were released.

Another thing we did, we built a fish pond; we dug a big hole,

and they put fish in it to help the Vietnamese people.

Then that last day when the announcement came that the POW’s

were going to be released, they came down and cut our wires so

we couldn’t hear it. So I think all these reasons indicate to me that

it was a release program.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Colonel?

Colonel BOMAR. I agree that we were there for more than Vietnamese propaganda. It was a bigger thing to me, as I stated,

whether it was the Tet Offensive or whether it was this meeting

in Havana. There was more to this ‘‘Fidel’’ program.

But I think it was also, as you said, it could have been techniques that they could use to break Americans or prisoners. You

listed several reasons, and every one seemed to fit. They could all

have been, but I think release may have been a possibility, although I don’t think they would have released me.

Captain VOHDEN. Could I add something?

I think they were just looking for someone in the group who potentially might be released.

Another thing, when we had quizzes, ‘‘Fidel’’ talked about the

war and about going home all the time. He showed us pictures of

fashion models in Magazines. He talked about our wives and families. We saw articles in Time and Newsweek magazine. He tried

every argument in the book to convince us that the U.S. war was

wrong. He did a lot of these things. Again, this helped me to form

my opinion.

Mr. BENGE. In my research report, there is a copy of an FBI report that gives the name of a Cuban gentleman who went to Hanoi

and coincides with the exact time that the ‘‘Cuba Program’’

stopped. It coincides with the exact time that the outside Cuban

27

showed up at the camp and the program was shut down, and in

that FBI report it says that this man was going to gather this information for this second symposium on war crimes trials. It is a

very interesting, interesting piece, and it fits exactly right with the

timing that the program was shut down.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I would

ask that Chairman Gilman’s letter, dated November 1st, to Louis

Freeh, the Director of the FBI, be made a part of our record, indicating that he would like the FBI’s cooperation, especially as it relates to the new partners that we have in Eastern Europe and the

new Soviet Republics and elsewhere, former Communist regimes

that are now moving further toward democracy, who have opened

up many of their records. We would like for the FBI to work with

our new allies to look at those files and ask the individuals there

for help in discovering who these three torturers were and identifying them. I ask that it be made a part of the record.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. COOKSEY. Without objection.

Again, you have been excellent witnesses, and again, this is a

story that needs to be told.

Today we find time to investigate the war criminals that have

committed similar crimes in the Balkans just in very recent history

and very recent memory. But this world also has time to investigate the people that committed war crimes in World War II. Stalin, he probably killed more people than anyone else, also Hitler

and his henchmen. Vietnam is recent memory for those of us that

were in the military at the time. This is something that should be

pursued, too, no matter what the politics of it is.

I think that it is interesting to observe who is here today and

who is not here today at this hearing. I know that two of you were

on active duty in the military at the time. You were Cold War warriors in what was probably the Third World War, and you did win

ultimately that war by standing up to this Communist threat.

Those records that my colleague just referred to are out there; they

are out there in some recent publications.

But, going back to the time that we were all in the military—

Air Force, Navy, Army, whatever—we had incompetent leadership

in the executive branch of government at that time. According to

David Halberstam’s book, ‘‘The Best and the Brightest,’’ the people

that were in Johnson’s Cabinet were incompetent as well and were

responsible for some real dumb things that were done in fighting

the air war in Vietnam. If you want to get a good look at that period, I would encourage you to read a book, ‘‘The Tragedy of the

Soviet Period,’’ written by Martin Malia. It was written by a UCBerkeley professor. I know you made a comment about a UCBerkeley professor, but this is a book I would encourage you to

read.

There is another book, ‘‘The Black Book of Communism.’’ Where

you can go back and find out what really went on. These records

are available.

Again, I want to thank you for coming, for being here today. I

feel very strongly that this should be pursued. Again, you have

been excellent witnesses. We will move on to the next panel. Thank

you very much.

28

Mr. COOKSEY. Our second panel is made up of two individuals

who are former military officers, former United States Army officers, and they are now at the Department of Defense. The first is

Mr. Robert Jones, who has served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Prisoner of War-Missing Personnel Affairs

since May 1998. Mr. Jones is a decorated two-tour Vietnam combat

veteran; he is also a disabled veteran. Previously, Mr. Jones was

a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Public and Intergovernmental Affairs in the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Mr. Robert Destatte is a Technical Adviser to the Deputy Assistant Secretary. Mr. Destatte is the Chief Analyst of the Department

of Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office.

So we are delighted to have you here. I feel that you both can

speak with some authority because you are both veterans, Vietnam

veterans, and have a major responsibility for looking into this matter.

Mr. COOKSEY. We will open with you, Mr. Jones.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. JONES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PRISONER OF WAR-MISSING PERSONNEL AFFAIRS

Mr. JONES. Thank you. I welcome today’s opportunity to address

the Committee on the roles my office and the former Defense Intelligence Agency’s Special Office on POW/MIA Affairs have had in

the ‘‘Cuba Program,’’ a program whose brutal purpose still remains

unresolved.

I ask that my statement in its entirety be entered into the record

after this hearing.

Mr. COOKSEY. Without objection.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, DOD became aware of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ immediately following Operation Homecoming, and we have

shared our knowledge with the appropriate agencies and the Congress beginning as early as July, 1973. We have appeared before

in congressional hearings on this subject in 1987 and again in

1996.

Mr. Chairman, I truly am humbled to follow this group of former

POW’s who have addressed the Committee here this morning.

None of us can fully understand the trying experiences and inhumane treatment that they endured while they were in captivity.

These men sacrificed greatly for this Nation. They are truly American heroes whose sacrifices stretch the limits of one’s imagination.

Those who endured the abuses of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ suffered

dearly and are examples of those whose sense of duty and commitment to our Nation was tested to the limits of their human endurance. Thankfully, all of those who were involved in this brutal activity have been accounted for and returned to the United States.

The mission of my agency is to account for those American heroes who were lost while serving in foreign lands and have not returned to American soil. Currently, there are 2,047 Americans who

remain unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. My office pursues the

resolution of those cases by using a number of investigative tools.

We have received more than 21,000 reports possibly pertaining to

Americans in Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, none of those have

led us to the return of a single live American.

29

We have a robust archival research and oral history program, as

well as unilateral and trilateral investigations in each of the three

Southeast Asian countries. These methods have, in fact, produced

significant investigative leads that have led to a number of resolved cases. To date, we have accounted for 536 missing Americans. We continue to pursue all avenues with live Americans as our

No. 1 priority.

As my staff explained in their separate briefing to Representative

Ros-Lehtinen, our ability to accomplish this humanitarian mission

is wholly dependent on the willingness of foreign governments

around the globe to allow American POW/MIA specialists access to

their territory, their citizens and their historical records. I firmly

believe that any attempt on the part of the Department of Defense

to merge investigations of war crimes into our accounting activities

may jeopardize our ability to accomplish our humanitarian mission.

DPMO is not a criminal investigative arm of the Federal Government. Our mission is separate. We are charged with the fullest possible accounting for U.S. military and certain American civilian

personnel who become missing as a result of hostile action. Our

mission is humanitarian in nature, not linked to other bilateral foreign policy concerns.

DPMO’s role with regard to the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ has been to act

as a repository of historical information to ensure it is available to

the appropriate Federal agencies. The sensitivities associated with

our humanitarian accounting mission clearly prohibit us from any

involvement in the pursuit of the perpetrators of these misdeeds.

Based upon recent congressional inquiries, I directed a complete

historical file review and requested other Federal agencies to provide us with information they may have related to this issue. This

is being done to ensure that my office has a comprehensive record

of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ as a historical file.

I was informed on October 29th that Ambassador Peterson has

met with Mr. Hung, Director of the Americas Department of the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to request the assistance of the Government of Vietnam in supplying information about the Cuban interrogators of American POW’s from 1967 to 1968. Mr. Hung listened with interest and responded that he would research the

questions presented in the talking points that the Ambassador left

with him. I believe we all look forward to the responses to those

questions.

I personally will be in Southeast Asia during the period of November 29th through the 11th of December, traveling throughout

Southeast Asia, to include Vietnam. Rest assured I will discuss this

program with Ambassador Peterson upon my arrival in Hanoi.

Mr. Chairman, I share the same sense of outrage that you and

the Members of the Committee do regarding the torturous abuse

endured by our prisoners of war at the hands of these presumed

Cuban interrogators. I believe that the pursuit of these criminals

by my agency has a real potential to disrupt our mission to return

our men, or their remains, to their families, many of whom have

waited for more than 50 years. I do not recommend my office taking such action when it has the potential to jeopardize the hopes

of the families of our missing.

30

I do believe with all my heart that these men should be tracked

down, brought to justice by the appropriate agency. I recommend

that requests for further investigation of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ be directed to the appropriate agencies that are chartered to pursue violations of the law of armed conflict. DPMO stands equally ready to

continue to provide information to an interagency group as required. We will continue our policy of transparency, making available our historical files and knowledge on this issue.

I clearly support the goals for this hearing as stated by Representative Ros-Lehtinen. I will also say that I will be in Moscow

next week. Rest assured that I will raise this ‘‘Cuba Program’’ with

my Moscow counterpart.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would like to introduce a Member of

my staff, Mr. Bob Destatte, a senior Southeast Asia analyst, a man

who I respect very highly for his knowledge of Southeast Asia. I believe Mr. Destatte can address any technical questions you or the

Committee may have.

Thank you. This concludes my remarks.

Chairman GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Destatte, if you wish you may put your

full statement in the record or you may summarize, whichever you

may deem appropriate.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT DESTATTE, CHIEF ANALYST, PRISONER OF WAR-MISSING PERSONNEL OFFICE, DEPARTMENT

OF DEFENSE

Mr. DESTATTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Chairman Gilman, and distinguished Committee Members. I have a

short statement. I would like to read it and I would like to ask that

the statement be entered into the record in its entirety.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection, the full statement will be

made part of the record.

Mr. DESTATTE. First, let me join Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense Jones in saluting the American heroes who shared with

this Committee this morning their experiences as victims of what

has become known as the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’ One of those gentleman, Captain Ray Vohden, and I worked together for a while in

the Pentagon, when I first joined this issue. Let me begin.

Chairman GILMAN. Put the mike a little closer, Mr. Destatte.

Thank you.

Mr. DESTATTE. I would like to begin with a brief description of

the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ on the basis of what is in the written record,

which I believe will complement the personal accounts that we received earlier this morning.

The American POW’s coined the term ‘‘Cuba Program’’ to describe a program in which a small team of Caucasian interrogators

brutally beat and tortured 19 American aviators in a camp that our

POW’s nicknamed ‘‘The Zoo’’ in Hanoi, between July 1967 and August 1968. One of those POW’s, as we heard earlier today, U.S. Air

Force Major Earl Cobeil, eventually died from those beatings.

The Caucasian interrogators spoke English fluently, but with a

Spanish accent. They spoke knowledgeably about Central America

and the United States. In an exchange with one of our POW’s, a

31

Vietnamese guard referred to the Caucasian interrogators as Cubans. These and other factors led many of the POW’s and analysts,

including myself, to believe that the interrogators were Cubans,

possibly Cubans who had lived in the United States.

The POW’s nicknamed the chief Caucasian interrogator ‘‘Fidel.’’

They nicknamed his principal assistant ‘‘Chico.’’ several days before

the program ended, a third man the POW’s nicknamed variously

‘‘Pancho’’ and ‘‘Garcia’’ appeared to replace ‘‘Fidel.’’ The POW’s, as

we heard earlier, observed another man who might have been

Cuban working as an electrical technician in the POW camp during

the closing months of the program. They also heard the voice of a

woman they believed was Cuban on the camp radio for about two

weeks near the end of the program.

The DOD first learned about the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ in March, 1973

when the reports of the first post-homecoming debriefings began

arriving in the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office. By March 1973, nearly two weeks before the

last POW was released, the DIA’s POW/MIA Office had brought

this issue to the attention of senior Department of Defense officials;

and by the 23rd of March, the U.S. Government had established a

coordinated effort to learn the identity of the Cubans. That effort

involved the Defense Intelligence Agency, each of the armed services, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Senate Internal

Security Subcommittee’s chief investigator, among others.

In April, 1974, a little over a year later, the CIA informed the

DIA that CIA analysts had tentatively identified the interrogator,

nicknamed ‘‘Fidel,’’ as one Luis Perez, also known as Luis Perez

Jaen, a captain in the Cuban Ministry of Interior. This captain was

in Hanoi during the ‘‘Cuba Program’’, had a history of interrogating

foreigners in Cuba, and was in the U.S. during 1956 and 1957,

buying and shipping arms to Cuba; and he possessed most of the

physical and personality traits of ‘‘Fidel’’ that our POW’s had described.

The CIA provided DIA a copy of a photograph of Luis Perez Jaen

that was published in the Cuban newspaper, Oriente, on 25 February 1959. The photograph, which we have shared with the Committee, depicts Perez Jaen wearing a military cap and a full beard.

Between November, 1975 and mid-1976, U.S. Air Force investigators asked seven victims of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ to examine this

photograph of Luis Perez Jaen. Six of these men could not state

positively that he was the interrogator they nicknamed ‘‘Fidel,’’ primarily because the photograph depicts him wearing a full beard.

One of the seven, Colonel Donald Waltman, wrote in a 1976 note

to a U.S. Air Force investigator, quote, ‘‘I say, yes, that is ’Fidel’,

or at least a guy who looks too much like him. I have to try to

imagine him clean shaven, and when I do, it is him. Maybe because

I would like to ID him so damn bad. It is the most look-alike ’Fidel’

picture I have seen,’’ end quote.

Also in April, 1974, the CIA informed the DIA that ‘‘Chico’’ might

be a Cuban named Veiga, whose first name they did not know, an

employee of the Cuban Department of State Security. Reportedly,

Veiga had studied at Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana,

in 1958 and 1959. An extensive followup investigation by U.S. Air

32

Force investigators failed to confirm the identity of this person.

Other names have been suggested over the years; however, subsequent investigations either ruled them out or proved inconclusive.

For example, the DIA POW/MIA Office provided historical information about the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ to the FBI when it investigated

a 1987 report that a Cuban employee of the United Nations might

be one of the Cuban interrogators. The FBI worked closely with returned POW’s in that investigation.

Captain Vohden described the three days he spent going over

photos associated with that investigation. However, the POW’s

could not positively identify the Cuban at the United Nations as

one of the men who tortured them in Hanoi.

Recent news stories suggest that the Cuban Minister of Education, Fernando Vecino Alegret, is the interrogator our POW’s

nicknamed ‘‘Fidel.’’ Fernando Vecino Alegret first came to our attention shortly before he visited the United States in November,

1978. At that time, Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies examined the possibility that he was the interrogator named

‘‘Fidel.’’ We have been searching our historical files for any record

we might have received from those agencies concerning this man.

Two days ago, we discovered a still-classified September, 1973 report that described Fernando Vecino Alegret as an engineering

graduate, who studied at the University of Havana during 1962–

65. The report also stated that he founded the Cuban Military

Technical Institute in September 1966 and that he was its Director

from September, 1966 until January, 1973.

We have not yet had time to confirm the origin and reliability

of that report. However, if the information in the report is accurate,

there is little chance that Fernando Vecino Alegret could be the interrogator ‘‘Fidel.’’

Among the names we have received, the two names the CIA suggested in 1974 remain the most likely candidates for the interrogators named ‘‘Fidel’’ and ‘‘Chico,’’ but I should emphasize we do not

know who he is.

The only information we have concerning the purpose of the

‘‘Cuba Program’’ comes from the American POW’s who were victims

and two Vietnamese military officers. The preponderance of information in our files, most of it coming from the returnees themselves, suggests that the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ was a Cuban assistance

program that went awry, and that the Vietnamese terminated the

program shortly after the interrogator named ‘‘Fidel’’ beat Major

Cobeil into a near-catatonic state from which he never recovered.

The Department of Defense has kept the Congress informed

about the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ from the very beginning. For example,

the DPMO’s predecessor office, the Defense Intelligence Agency’s

Special Office for Prisoners of War/Missing in Action Affairs, presented testimony about the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ to the Senate Internal

Security Subcommittee during hearings on 2 July 1973, about

three months after the last American POW was released. A former

POW who was a victim of the program, U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Larry Spencer, also testified before the Subcommittee.

Later, the DIA POW/MIA Office provided historical information

to the Subcommittee’s chief investigator, Mr. Alfonso L.

Tarabochia, who conducted an independent effort to identify the inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:29 Jul 26, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65278.TXT HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
33

terrogators. I believe Captain Vohden also made reference to that

investigation. By September, 1974, Mr. Tarabochia had tentatively

concluded that ‘‘Fidel’’ was a Cuban named Pedro Fumero. Unfortunately, the returned POW’s who were victims of ‘‘Fidel’’ could not

identify Fumero as one of their interrogators.

The DPMO’s DIA predecessor office also provided an appraisal to

the House Armed Services Committee on 6 October, 1977. More recently, the DPMO provided updates on the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ to Congressman Dornan in March, 1987, August, 1996, and 11 and 17

September, 1996.

The story about the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ is not new. For example, I

have with me eight news articles about the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ published in 1973, 1977, and 1981 in Washington, D.C., New York,

Baltimore, Denver, and Des Moines. These articles are based on information released by DPMO’s predecessor, the DIA’s POW/MIA

Office, and personal accounts by POW’s who were victims of the

program.

I would like to comment briefly for the public record about recent

press reports about the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’ News reports published in

the Miami Herald on 22 August, 1999, and the Seattle Times on

28 October 1999, suggested that this issue was, ‘‘concealed for decades by official U.S. secrecy’’ and, ‘‘the full story of Fidel and the

so-called ‘Cuba Program’ is finally becoming public,’’. The same article speculated that the reason the story has drawn little attention

is, ‘‘perhaps because most POW’s obeyed Pentagon orders to keep

quiet to protect POW’s who might remain in Vietnam and perhaps

because ’Fidel’s’ identification as a Cuban was then only an

unconfirmed allegation by the POW’s.’’

The facts are that the Department of Defense officials asked the

POW’s who were returning during Operation Homecoming in 1973

not to speak out publicly about the torture until after the last POW

was released. The last POW was released on 1 April 1973; the first

stories by returning POW’s about the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ appeared in

American newspapers the next day, on 2 April, 1973.

Some of the sources cited in these articles portrayed DPMO’s role

incorrectly. As Mr. Jones stated, we are not a counterintelligence

office or a law enforcement office. Our mission is humanitarian. It

is to account for American servicemen who were lost while serving

abroad. All American victims of the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ are accounted

for.

Successive administrations, the Congress, the Department of

State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Prisoner of

War/Missing Personnel Office, the Pacific Command’s Joint Task

Force, the U.S. Army Central Identifications Laboratory, the National League of Families—literally thousands of Americans have

worked hard for many years to build and sustain programs that

today are allowing us to account for Americans lost in the old Soviet Union, in North Korea, in Southeast Asia, and many other

areas in the world.

As Secretary Jones stated earlier, our mission is humanitarian,

and it is worldwide. Our ability to accomplish our mission is wholly

dependent on the willingness of foreign governments to allow our

POW/MIA specialists to have access to their citizens, their records,

and their territory. Suggestions that DPMO should investigate war

34

crimes risks undoing the results of years of hard work and would

jeopardize our ability to accomplish our humanitarian mission.

Now, having said that, DPMO is a central repository for historical information concerning the American POW/MIA issue. As Secretary Jones stated earlier, DPMO stands ready to share historical

information and knowledge about the program with appropriate

U.S. agencies. In conclusion, the history of the issue is that the

POW/MIA Office informed senior Department of Defense officials

immediately upon learning about the actions of the presumably

Cuban interrogators. Those officials immediately directed appropriate intelligence and investigative agencies to try to identify

those interrogators. In 1974, CIA analysts tentatively identified

two Cuban officials as the interrogators ‘‘Fidel’’ and ‘‘Chico.’’ Their

victims, however, were not able to confirm their identities.

We have also kept the Congress and the public informed. We will

remain a repository of historical information about all aspects of

the POW/MIA issue and remain ready to share that historical information with appropriate Federal intelligence and investigative

offices. However, as Secretary Jones stated earlier, we believe that

DPMO should not become involved in efforts to investigate the program and jeopardize our accounting mission.

I am ready to respond to questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Destatte appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. There were several Vietnamese interrogators at ‘‘The Zoo,’’ as we had heard from the

POW’s, ‘‘Spot,’’ ‘‘Rabbit,’’ ‘‘Elf,’’ in addition to the camp commander

who we discussed in the previous panel known as ‘‘The Lump.’’

Have any attempts been made by DOD or any other U.S. agency

to question these individuals in order to try to obtain further information about these Cuban torturers?

Mr. DESTATTE. I personally asked the interrogator whom Captain

Vohden and Colonel Bomar call ‘‘The Rabbit’’ about this program.

While he acknowledged that these men were Cubans, he did not

provide the names, and I don’t know of any other efforts.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. So he said they were Cubans.

Mr. DESTATTE. I don’t recall the exact words of the conversation,

but it was during a formal interview. My memory is that I mentioned to him that several of our returned POW’s described having

been interrogated by Cubans at the POW camp the Americans

called ‘‘The Zoo,’’ and that the Vietnamese called Nga Tu So.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. When did this conversation take place?

Mr. DESTATTE. This conversation took place—I would have to

check my notes—in the early 1990’s, sometime in 1992.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. We will followup on that. Thank you.

Without actually revealing the details since the report is still

classified, do you know the origin, the author, the source of the information in the CIA report on the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ and the two

men mentioned in the CIA report, ‘‘Fidel’’ and ‘‘Chico,’’ as possibly

being Cuban agents, part of Castro’s Ministry of Interior. Was any

followup done to this CIA report?

Mr. DESTATTE. There was followup. The CIA report included, as

an enclosure, a 1959 photograph of the Cuban their analysts believe was ‘‘Fidel.’’ The Air Force, Air Force investigator showed that

35

photograph to seven of the victims of the program. Six of those men

stated that they were unable to confirm that this was ‘‘Fidel.’’ The

seventh, as I mentioned in my statement, Colonel Waltman, believed that it was ‘‘Fidel,’’ or at least the most look-alike photograph he had seen of ‘‘Fidel.’’

Other persons have looked at that photograph. As a matter of

fact, at the close of the last panel, I asked Colonel Carpenter, who

was sitting behind the table here, and Captain Vohden again about

that, and they were quite insistent this is not ‘‘Fidel.’’ So I suppose,

parenthetically, our experience has been that making identifications of persons from photographs is a very uncertain endeavor. It

is unlikely to yield conclusive results.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Jones, you had said in your testimony

that you will soon be in Vietnam, in just a few days. In our dealings with the Vietnamese, particularly in recent years as trade negotiations have intensified, has the U.S. raised the issue of the

‘‘Cuba Program’’ specifically with those officials? Have there been

any official requests for information? Why or why not?

Mr. JONES. I cannot answer in regard to the trade negotiations

because my office does not participate in those negotiations, ma’am.

We are fully engaged in negotiating with the Vietnamese concerning accounting for missing Americans. So I am afraid I am not

the person to answer that question.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Eliminate the part about trade negotiations.

I just said that to parenthetically state that we are in such a positive working relationship with Vietnam that now we are discussing

trade deals.

But having nothing to do with trade, what about the many U.S.

agencies that have specifically asked? Do you know if yours or any

others asked the Vietnamese officials about the ‘‘Cuba Program,’’

specific requests made for information?

Mr. JONES. As I mentioned and as Mr. Destatte mentioned earlier, he personally took part in an oral history interview of one of

the guards that was mentioned by the former POW’s. So there has

been some followup in that regard. However, as we testified earlier,

all of the participants in this particular program have been accounted for. Thus, the role of my office has been completed in

terms of investigating specifically what happened to those 19 individuals. We continue to act as a repository for the historical records

related to that program.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Do you believe that the acts committed

against the POW’s violate the Geneva Convention? If those are

found to be true, do you believe that, once identified, the three torturers should be tried as war criminals and that we should gear

efforts toward that goal?

Mr. JONES. As I testified in my statement, ma’am, I firmly support the goals that you stated earlier for the purposes of this hearing, and I most certainly believe that those individuals should be

tracked down and brought to justice for their conduct.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Now, you had said that your specific agency

has a specified mission. What agency then do you believe should

lead the investigation on the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ and what agencies,

in addition, should be included? Should CIA, DIA, FBI, State Department be? What agencies should be involved?

36

Mr. JONES. Looking at the nature of the circumstances, I believe

that the State Department should be lead agency. I believe that

they have an office that is charged to investigate violations of the

Geneva Convention and the laws of armed conflict. So I believe

that the State Department would be the best agency to lead a review of this program and to conduct a followup investigation. I believe that they should be supported by the appropriate Intelligence

Community—DIA, CIA, as well as the FBI.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Destatte, we understand that DPMO has

joint commissions with Russia and is working together with former

Eastern Bloc countries in an attempt to obtain information about

American POW’s which may have been sent to those countries during various Cold War conflicts. Further, we understand that television and other mediums are used to reach out to the general population of those countries so that they can help us have information

to contribute.

Have similar attempts been made regarding information on the

‘‘Cuba Program’’ and the torturers?

Mr. DESTATTE. We have taken a different approach in Vietnam.

Let me preface my remarks by stating that I helped open the first

U.S. office in Vietnam after the war in 1991, and worked over there

for the American POW/MIA Office which we opened in mid-1991.

One of the first things we did was put together a program where

we visited each of the military region headquarters and each of the

province headquarters and delivered to each of those headquarters

information about Americans who were lost in their respective

areas, requesting their support in finding witnesses, finding documents and otherwise accounting for the men who were lost in those

regions.

We have also since 1988, approximately 5 times a year, sent for

a month at a time approximately 100 Americans, mostly active

duty military personnel, into Vietnam. They break down into small

teams of varying sizes, they fan out through the country looking for

information or excavating crash sites or grave sites that were discovered during earlier investigations. I believe that it would be difficult to find a single village in Vietnam that has not been visited

at least once by one of our teams. I think it would be almost impossible to find an adult citizen of Vietnam who is not aware of our

keen interest in accounting for our people.

So we have taken a different approach in Vietnam than the Joint

Commission is taking in Russia. I believe we have covered the

country very effectively, and I believe the results that we have seen

in recent years of this approach demonstrates the effectiveness of

that approach.

Mr. JONES. If I might add to that, I will be traveling to Moscow

on Sunday. I will be in Moscow through the 10th of November.

Rest assured that I will raise this at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow

and with the Russian with whom I will be meeting.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Jones. Have you had a

chance to look at Ambassador Peterson’s letter that we just received this morning? You will be following up with him and other

officials in Vietnam on this issue?

Mr. JONES. I am hopeful, ma’am, that we will have a response

from the Vietnamese before I get to Vietnam. But if we do not, rest

37

assured that I will speak to the Ambassador in regard to this program.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. One last question: Are you aware of reports

which state that the suspect that the CIA believes to be ‘‘Fidel’’

was in the U.S. and involved in smuggling arms to Castro in the

1950’s; and did you know that both Alegret and Jaen were in the

United States at the same time, and this comes from Alegret by his

own admission as quoted in a book that was published by the Castro regime?

We want to note, if there is any followup that you know of on

this data, was it used to trying to discern which of the two was in

fact ‘‘Fidel,’’ if any; and given that Alegret and the one whom the

CIA believes to be ‘‘Chico’’ were in Louisiana and other U.S. locations at the same time, were there any efforts to determine whether Alegret was actually ‘‘Chico,’’ and that the name that the CIA

had for ‘‘Chico’’ was an alias? What attempts have been made to

followup on any of these bits of information?

Mr. DESTATTE. I don’t know that we have. I know that we do not

have a comprehensive record of all the actions that were taken because, as I mentioned earlier, we were not the investigators. The

investigations were conducted by the Air Force, by the other service agencies—the FBI, CIA, et cetera.

The document that I mentioned to you earlier this morning recognizes that there are unconfirmed reports that Alegret attended

high school in the United States. Given his age, I believe his date

of birth is 1939, I graduated from high school in 1957, and I was

born in 1939. So he was in the United States at conceivably the

same time as Jaen, but under different circumstances. But that is

just speculation on my part. I don’t know what efforts were made

by other agencies.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I think it is clear that since this first was

looked at at this point in time a lot of new information has come

out, a lot of new testimony, declassified papers, new information

that could help us to identify these individuals; and certainly an

interagency task force would be one of the ways to get at this information. We hope that that comes about.

I would like to recognize Mr. Rohrabacher for questions.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Now, Mr. Destatte, you asked one of the guards——

Mr. DESTATTE. Not a guard, he was a——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Interrogator.

Mr. DESTATTE. He was a commissioned officer. He described himself as an interpreter. POW’s described him as an interrogator.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You asked him about whether or not the

other interrogators were Cuban, and the answer was?

Mr. DESTATTE. I described the program in a sentence or two—

my memory is that I described it in a sentence or two and asked

him to comment on it. In response, he referred to them as Cubans.

Now, whether he was following my lead or whether that was confirmation, I leave that up to your judgment.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This was a formal interview, you said. That

is how you described it?

Mr. DESTATTE. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You recorded this interview?

38

Mr. DESTATTE. I don’t recall whether we recorded that interview

or not. I know typically when I write a report I usually record over

the interview tapes in any event.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You record over the interview tapes after you

have conducted a formal interview?

Mr. DESTATTE. The purpose of the recording the interview in

most instances is to aid in report writing.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am a little fascinated by that. You are saying that of your formal interviews, you actually don’t keep records

of them then?

Mr. DESTATTE. That is not what I said.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It sounds like what you are telling me is that

you record over the tapes when you do—I am just requesting you

to send that tape and that interview to me.

Mr. DESTATTE. If I have the tape.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Seeing that you just said you record over the

interviews, perhaps that will be a good excuse for not sending me

the tape.

But if you have it, I am making a formal request, Madam Chairman, from this Committee; and we will confirm this with the

Chairman of the Committee, that this is a formal request from the

Committee.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We will pass

that on to the Chairman, and I am sure that he will work with you

on that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would like the notes and the tape that you

have from that interview.

During that interview you said you asked about the names, but

he wouldn’t tell. Is that what you said?

Mr. DESTATTE. Did not tell me.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. What year was this interview?

Mr. DESTATTE. June, 1992.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. June, 1992.

Mr. DESTATTE. I might add that the document that I just consulted for that date is part of the official record of the 17 September 1996 hearing held by Congressman Dornan. You can find

that document.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. I am not just asking for the document; I am asking for that tape, and if the tape still exists——

Mr. DESTATTE. As I told you, Congressman, that was several

years ago. I do not know whether I have that specific tape or not.

I told you that routinely when I use a tape recorder, which is not

in all cases, I use the tape recorder only to assist me in writing my

report. When I finish writing the report, typically I record over

that. I will have to consult our files at the office to know whether

or not I retained a copy of that tape.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is fine. It just doesn’t seem that that is

a very professional way to handle——

Mr. DESTATTE. Sir, I resent your implications that I am being

less than honest with you.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You may resent anything you want. I am

here to ask questions. If you resent those questions——

Mr. DESTATTE. Sir, I came here to provide accurate information.

39

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How long have you been in the position that

you are in today with this POW/MIA issue?

Mr. DESTATTE. I joined this issue in September 1979.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is it normal that they have someone who is

an employee of the Department of Defense at the same job for as

long as that?

Mr. DESTATTE. I don’t know what is ‘‘normal’’ in that respect.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You don’t know what is normal policy for the

Department of Defense where you have worked for all those years?

You haven’t noticed that other jobs seem to be rotating, but you

seem to be staying in the same spot?

Mr. DESTATTE. I don’t know your point.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Rohrabacher, rest assured, as soon as we return

to the office, we will ascertain if the documents and the tape that

you are requesting are in fact part of our files. I will do everything

to personally ensure that you receive those documents.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Was this the first time that you testified that we knew the day

after the prisoners got back that there was a Cuban interrogation

program? Was this the first time, in your interview in 1992, that

a Vietnamese was officially asked about the ‘‘Cuba Program’’?

Mr. DESTATTE. Let me repeat, our mission is to account for missing personnel.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Mr. DESTATTE. The purpose of my interview that day was to

gather information that would lead to an accounting for our personnel. Out of personal curiosity on this particular issue, the ‘‘Cuba

Program,’’ I took advantage of the opportunity to ask that question.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You don’t believe that perhaps—we have a

picture of a gentleman who is murdered under interrogation by

these Cubans; you don’t think that there might perhaps be another

American that was unaccounted for that might have been murdered by the same program that we don’t know about and that

maybe that is your job?

Mr. DESTATTE. That assertion rests on the preposterous notion

that the 19 survivors of that program either, failed to know about

this alleged other prisoner, or knowing about it, failed to tell about

it when they came home.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is it preposterous to say then that there is

information about this program that those 19 prisoners may not

know about?

Mr. DESTATTE. No, I didn’t say that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is what it sounds like you are saying.

Is it preposterous, for example, that the Vietnamese kept Ambassador Peterson, when he was a POW, totally isolated from the

other POW’s for the first three years of his captivity? Is that a preposterous suggestion?

Mr. DESTATTE. Are you familiar with the record?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No other POW knew that Congressman Peterson was being held captive during those first three years; is that

preposterous?

Mr. DESTATTE. How does that relate to our discussion here?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It relates to it because you have a situation

with interrogators from Cuba who may have information about

40

prisoners that is not being followed up on by you, and it is your

job to followup on it. It is your job to determine if there are any

MIA’s out there.

Mr. DESTATTE. Are you suggesting then that there was a secret

POW camp system or something of that nature?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well——

Mr. DESTATTE. I truly don’t understand your question.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will tell you. I will tell what you my question is. My question is, is there any evidence that perhaps some

MIA’s or people who were MIA were being held during that time

period and were actually POW’s, and the information was not

available to the rest of the prisoners or to the United States Government?

Mr. DESTATTE. I believe that we know the identity of every

American who was in that prisoner of war camp during that period

of time, and that all of those prisoners are accounted for.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That was a really good answer to a question

that I didn’t ask. It was really great of you to word it that way.

Mr. DESTATTE. I believe that our focus on the ‘‘Cuba Program’’

and what the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The point, Mr. Destatte, is that the ‘‘Cuba

Program’’ may be a key to answer some information about other

missing prisoners rather than just these 19.

Now, they have committed crimes——

Mr. DESTATTE. To the best of our knowledge and the to best of

the knowledge of the witnesses that have appeared here today,

those Cubans were active in one prisoner of war camp, the prisoner

of war camp that our American prisoners called ‘‘The Zoo,’’ that the

Vietnamese called Nga Tu So. We know the identity of every American who was in that camp, and all of those Americans are accounted for.

Now, if you have information that the Cubans were active in another camp, fine. I don’t have that information.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Did you ask in your formal interview in 1992

whether there were Cubans involved in any other camps?

Mr. DESTATTE. As I told you before, the purpose of that interview

was to learn information that might help us account for Americans

who were still unaccounted for, not to learn about the ‘‘Cuba Program.’’ The Americans who were involved in the ‘‘Cuba Program’’

are all accounted for.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Fine. Luckily, I have some time to followup

on these questions on the record rather than being stuck at five

minutes, so your attempt to use up the time will not get you off

the hook.

Is the fact that there might be another Cuban prison camp which

might indicate that there are some American POW’s that you

didn’t know about, but you are not bothering to ask whether there

were Cubans at another prison in this particular formal interview

that you went through?

Mr. DESTATTE. I believe that the information that the intelligence services, that the DPMO and its predecessor office, have

collected over the years allows us to state with confidence that we

know of every POW camp which held American prisoners in North

Vietnam and all of the prisoners that were in those camps; and all

41

of those prisoners were accounted for. There is no separate prison

camp or there are no American prisoners who were held in a separate prison.

The question about the possibility of Cubans in another prison

camp is a moot question. There wasn’t another prison camp for

them.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Not even worth asking about it. Not even

worth asking, right? Here you are, the one we are depending on to

get this information.

Mr. DESTATTE. No, sir, you are depending on my office to account

for Americans who are still unaccounted for. If you want to know

about the Cubans, if you want to know what the Cubans did or did

not do in Vietnam, then, as we have said before, we suggest that

you address that question to agencies that are appropriately chartered to pursue those questions.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is your office tasked with coordinating all

government activity in terms of POW/MIA’s in Vietnam?

Mr. DESTATTE. We are tasked with accounting for Americans

who failed to return home at the end of the war.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Are you tasked with coordinating the activity

of other government agencies?

Mr. JONES. Sir, my office as the Director of—DPMO is to be responsible to make sure what we do everything we possibly can to

account for missing Americans, and that includes interagency coordination.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So if these questions were going to be examined, you would have to actually make the request or coordinate

the activity?

Mr. DESTATTE. No.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK.

Mr. JONES. Sir, in regard to that comment, I would like to say,

if you recall, in my written testimony, I did in fact send recently

a request to the other Federal agencies to determine if they had

any other additional information related to this program.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right.

Now, in 1992, when you conducted this formal interview for

which the tapes may be missing, you asked whether or not there

were Cubans involved, and you didn’t ask whether the Cubans

were involved in any other camps. But after that, you said that

they didn’t want to give you the names.

You asked for the names; they wouldn’t give you any names involved. Yet haven’t you categorized the North Vietnamese, or I

should say, the Vietnamese activities involved with MIA/POW’s as

being in full cooperation with your efforts?

Mr. JONES. Sir, that is a certification that is required by the Congress of the United States. It is made by the Department of State

and the President of the United States. We provide statistical information to support that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If we have a question being asked, and you

know what the names of these torturers of Americans are, and we

aren’t getting an answer, isn’t that somewhat less than full cooperation?

Mr. JONES. Sir, that question was asked of the Vietnamese on

October 9th by Ambassador Peterson.

42

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It was asked in June 1992.

Mr. DESTATTE. Let me comment on that.

The answer to that question does not contribute one iota to our

efforts to account for Americans who are missing, and that is

not——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You don’t think that the torture of Americans

in prisons in Vietnam and finding them and trying to ask them

what went on and who it was that they were dealing with would

lead to any information that we might not know about who was

being held?

Have you ever met with the person that the prisoners have

called ‘‘The Lump’’?

Mr. DESTATTE. I have no idea who he is.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That is not the question, have you ever met

with the person. You are saying that you have not; is that correct?

Mr. DESTATTE. That is correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Now ‘‘The Lump,’’ of course, is a Vietnamese.

Is this part of our request to the Vietnamese Government to provide ‘‘The Lump’’ and interviews with ‘‘The Lump’’; is that part of

our request that was made by Ambassador Peterson?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I cannot say what Ambassador Peterson requested of the Vietnamese. I was not present.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So if we know this fellow known as ‘‘The

Lump’’ has been identified, they could say who they think he was.

I think that was part of the testimony today—maybe not—that was

part of the testimony that they could identify him. We have not

made an official request to talk to him; is that right?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I am not aware of the identity of anyone called

‘‘The Lump’’ that was made available to my office.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. So we have a request for the names

of the Cubans turned down in 1992 by a low-level person, and that

wasn’t followed up again until seven years later, I guess just recently, when Ms. Ros-Lehtinen decided to call some attention here.

Again, it seems to me that what we are talking about is less than

full cooperation with our efforts.

By the way, this idea, Mr. Destatte, about demanding that people

who tortured Americans be sought and be prosecuted for war

crimes, risks undoing all the work that we have done.

Mr. DESTATTE. Sir, that is a distortion of my statement.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead and clarify it.

Mr. DESTATTE. I said that pursuit of that objective by my office

would risk jeopardizing our ability to accomplish our mission.

If you wish to pursue that, my recommendation would be that

you pursue that through an agency of the U.S. Government that

is duly chartered to pursue those kinds of investigations.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But is not your office duly chartered to task

other government agencies with this type of activity?

Mr. DESTATTE. Is it not your suggestion that we do what we have

just told you, which is not appropriate for our office, and that is

to investigate war crimes?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If you are an American citizen and American

citizens have been tortured and a crime has been committed

against American military personnel——

43

Mr. DESTATTE. There are 2,047 families that are waiting for answers on their missing family member. Our obligation is to account

for their missing family member.

The mission of investigating war crimes lies elsewhere in the

Federal Government, and I would suggest that you would get better answers by pursuing it there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. War crimes committed against those people,

the torture, the brutal torture of American prisoners of war? Is this

of concern to you?

Mr. DESTATTE. As I told you before, we believe that we know the

identity of every American who was a prisoner of war, and they are

accounted for, those who were in the camps in North Vietnam.

Mr. JONES. Sir, if I might interject here——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Because of the full cooperation the North Vietnamese have been giving to you, what about again making just

one last attempt at this. Ambassador Peterson and several other

POW’s and MIA’s who eventually became POW’s, were kept in isolated camps and did not intermingle and were declared missing in

action, and no one knew whether they were alive or dead for several years—isn’t that the case?

Mr. DESTATTE. I would have to go back and look at the record.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me clarify the record for you. Ambassador Peterson told me that personally.

Mr. DESTATTE. I also accompanied Ambassador Peterson back to

that very prison camp, and he described for me and the others with

him how he communicated—even though isolated, how he communicated with prisoners in other parts of that prison.

So I must tell you, I am not sure that you are accurately portraying what he said. I would have to go back to the record and

refresh my memory.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would hope that having been active for so

long on this issue that your memory would be pretty good, considering that you knew we were going to have a hearing today.

Mr. DESTATTE. I came here to discuss the ‘‘Cuba Program,’’ not

to discuss the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The possibility that there were other Cubans

involved in torturing Americans someplace else. That is what the

question is. These people are what I am trying to lead to, of

course——

Mr. DESTATTE. Persons were held in approximately—I don’t recall the exact figure offhand, but I believe—eleven different locations in North Vietnam in the Hanoi area.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That we know of.

Mr. DESTATTE. We believe that that there were no others. That

has been looked at not just by myself. Thousands of Americans

have looked at that issue very carefully, and there is not a shred

of evidence that there was any other prison that held Americans.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will just have to say that I am not convinced, and we have other people who are honest American citizens

who have looked into this and are not convinced.

Some questions don’t seem to be asked; they don’t seem to be

asked and we seem to be cataloguing or categorizing the Vietnamese as being fully cooperating with us when we are afraid to

ask certain questions of them.

44

Mr. DESTATTE. I don’t believe that that is a fair statement. The

‘‘we’’ in this case, I presume, means the U.S. Government; and the

U.S. Government has asked the question. This particular office of

the U.S. Government should not be asking those kinds of questions.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am glad that you are so committed to your

humanitarian mission. I think it is extraordinary that one individual has been at the Department of Defense at the same humanitarian mission all of these years, and I think that the reason why

there are rotations in jobs like your own in the Department of Defense is to ensure that one person or several people cannot monopolize information and use their own judgment that may be good or

bad judgment.

Mr. DESTATTE. There are approximately 120 or 130 men and

women in our office. There is quite a turnover. There is always

fresh blood, there are always fresh views. There is always a fresh

questioning of assumptions and conclusions.

But there are also a few old-timers who help ensure that we

don’t reinvent the wheel every one or two years. One of our greatest mistakes during the Vietnam War was the institutionalization

of inexperience, the one-year tour, very oftentimes broken up into

six months in a given assignment.

I would suggest that the alternative to having experience is

chaos.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, if I might interject at this point, the

success of my office, as I testified earlier, has been based solely

upon our capability to access foreign countries, their citizens, their

historical archives without retribution, to assist us in accounting

for the missing Americans around the globe. We have, in fact, been

very successful in that because we have not pursued war crimes,

we have left that up to the appropriate agencies.

As I testified earlier, I believe that such an investigation into the

‘‘Cuba Program’’ should be led by the appropriate office within the

Department of State, supported by those other agencies who have

the capabilities to assist them in that investigation. I would say for

the record that based upon the current evidence on record, we have

no evidence to substantiate that there was another ‘‘Cuba Program’’ outside the one that we are discussing here today.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. OK.

Several years ago, when I went to Vietnam with Mr. Peterson

while he was a Member of Congress, we participated in negotiations with the Vietnamese. At that time, I asked for the records of

the prisons that the Vietnamese had of all the Americans, and we

were told that those records were not available. Many of them are

like they were erased after doing other interviews, I guess, or their

records were blown up by B–52 raids near the end of the war.

Now, I didn’t really accept that answer, and I made an official

request of them and asked our government, the people involved in

this, to follow through on insisting on receiving the records of those

camps, so that we could prove or disprove whether or not there was

a possibility that there were people kept without other people

knowing about it. Because that information would only be available

in those records.

Has there been a turnover of these records to us? I guess I made

that request five years ago.

45

Mr. DESTATTE. The Vietnamese have turned over quite a large

number of records. I don’t recall the exact number, but it is in the

thousands. Among those records, the only record that comes to

mind that fits the description that you have put forth is a record

that the Vietmanese say is a record of all Americans who entered

the prison system in the North. That has been turned over to us.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I am not talking about a record of all Americans; I am talking about a record of their prison system, and I was

very clear about that. These people, like every other military or

government operation, they kept records of how much food they

bought, how much it cost, who was in charge of procuring food, how

many people they were protecting and guarding, how many people

they were taking care of.

Mr. DESTATTE. I recall you and I had a conversation about that

on a bus in Hanoi. I made a memorandum of that conversation,

and I would like to ask permission to provide a copy of that memorandum of record of our conversation to the Committee and make

it a part of the official record of this hearing. I believe that will answer the question for the Committee.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Maybe instead of holding off to the point that

we can’t ask a followup question, maybe you could answer the

question now, rather than us waiting for the memorandum?

Have the Vietnamese provided the information that I requested

about their camps?

Mr. DESTATTE. To the best of my knowledge, they have not provided the document that you requested. But again I ask if I might

be permitted to enter into the record, in its entirety, my memorandum of record of that conversation.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, they have not complied with

the request. Yet we are talking about the Vietnamese as fully cooperating with us. I think I should leave it at that. I thank the

Chairman for his indulgence.

Chairman GILMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I appreciate Ms. Ros-Lehtinen permitting me

to have the time. Usually I get five minutes to ask questions. I

think this has been very valuable for all concerned.

Chairman GILMAN. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Just a followup question on the line of questions that Mr. Rohrabacher said. We had a previous panelist, as

you know, Andres Garcia; and he referred to the experiences of another Cuban American veteran, several of them, who were told that

there were Cubans who served as interrogators across the Cambodian borders, a presence of Cubans possibly, and in other places

beyond ‘‘The Zoo.’’ We have been talking about that with Mr. Rohrabacher, that line of questioning; and just to reiterate, we believe

that is an important area for us to do further investigation and

finding out, even though you believe that other POW’s may not

have been tortured by these other Cubans.

Mr. DESTATTE. I can give you an answer to that offhand.

There were two camps for Americans in Cambodia. The one camp

was a camp administered by what the Communists called Headquarters B–3 Front. This was the military headquarters that controlled their main force units in the Western Highlands. The other

camp was subordinate to what they called B–2 Front.

46

In both instances, these camps were mobile, and the B–2 Front

camp moved around the area along the border between Vietnam

and Cambodia. Many Americans have returned from that camp

and there is no evidence at all that there was any Cuban involvement in either of those camps.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We look forward to working with

you and especially with the other agencies to followup on some of

these leads and reopen this case so that justice can be done in the

memory of Earl Cobeil, the U.S. Air Force pilot who was murdered

while in captivity, and to honor the brave service of these men who

were testifying today and others who could not be here with us.

Mr. DESTATTE. If I could ask your indulgence for just a moment,

we got off the track here for awhile. I share the interests of all

Americans in ensuring that these people who so brutally treated

our POW’s and, in particular, beat Major Cobeil to death, are

brought to justice properly. But at the same time, I think that it

should be done in such a way that does not jeopardize our mission

to account for those Americans who are still missing.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Destatte.

Thank you Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

I have just two brief questions. Secretary Jones, the fall of the

Berlin Wall created an opportunity to seek information from our

former Soviet bloc adversaries on the ‘‘Cuba Program’’ and other

POW-related matters. Can you please tell us what efforts have

been made to date to glean information from Eastern European

and other sources?

Mr. JONES. Sir, my office has the responsibility for the oversight

of the Joint Commission in support of the U.S.-Russia Commission.

I have staff routinely conducting oral history interviews in former

Eastern Bloc countries, former Soviet Union countries.

Chairman GILMAN. That is still ongoing?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir. As I mentioned while you were voting, sir,

I will personally be in Moscow this weekend and will be meeting

with the U.S.-Russia Commission in Moscow.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Destatte, documents provided to our Committee provide

uncorroborated reports that American POW’s may have been taken

from Vietnam to Cuba. Can you comment on those reports and tell

the Committee what efforts have been made to look into and verify

if such transfers did indeed take place?

Mr. DESTATTE. I am not familiar with those particular reports.

But as I said earlier, I believe that we know the identity of all

Americans who were held as prisoners in the Vietnamese prison

system, and I believe they are all accounted for, either through

their return, alive, the return of the remains; or in some cases,

their deaths have been confirmed, but we have not yet been able

to recover their——

Chairman GILMAN. Have you asked any specific questions with

regard to that issue, the Cubans?

Mr. DESTATTE. Transfer of Americans—I think in a general sense

that we pursued this question in our pursuit of information about

Americans in the camps, we can answer that; but no, we have not

investigated specifically or focused specifically on that that I am

aware of.

47

Chairman GILMAN. Let me ask that you do pursue that and get

back to our Committee with any response you get.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Jones, when you travel to Vietnam in the

near future, we would like to ask you to make an effort, either directly or through our embassy, to secure meetings with the former

guards at ‘‘The Zoo’’ or others who might be able to identify ‘‘Fidel’’

and the other torturers.

Would you make a request of that when you——

Mr. JONES. Sir, I will be more proactive than that.

I will request that my the collection unit, Stony Beach pursue

this task and immediately begin to try to interview those individuals.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much.

Secretary Jones, how many F–111’s were shot down? How many

F–111 pilots survived and how many were returned?

Mr. JONES. Sir, I am not qualified to answer that type of technical question. May I defer to Mr. Destatte and see if he has the

information at hand.

Chairman GILMAN. F–111’s?

Mr. DESTATTE. Can I give you a written answer on that? I don’t

recall that offhand.

Chairman GILMAN. If you could provide that for a Committee, we

would appreciate that.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. I want to thank you so much, Mr. Chairman,

for your leadership and your commitment to discovering the truth

about this terrible ‘‘Cuba Program.’’ We thank you so much.

Chairman GILMAN. We thank our witnesses for your patience

and for being here with us throughout the questioning, and we appreciate your response.

Committee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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