he Soviet Air 

Experience 

by Lieutenant Coldnel David M. 

November 1984 

U.S. 

Command 

Staff 

Army 

and General 

College 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 

Glantz, U.S. Army 

~- --_.....- ---_ 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Glantz, David M. 

The Soviet airborne experience. 

(Research survey / Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College ; no. 4) 

“November 1984.” 

Bibliography: p. 

1. Soviet Union. Arm&-Parachute troops-History. 

2. Soviet Union. Arm%-Airborne troops-History. 

3. World War, 193%1945-Aerial operations, Russian. 

I. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Combat 

Studies Institute. II. Title. III. Series: Research survey 

(U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. 

Combat Studies Institute) ; no. 4. 

UD485.S65G53 1985 356’.166’0947 64-28536 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US. C3overmm-d RInthg O&e, Wnshlngton, D.C. 20402 
CONTENTS 

Maps 

Tables.................* ................................................................................ vi: 

Abbreviations......................................~ .. ix 

Symbols ............................................... xi 

Chapter 1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

THE PREWAR EXPERIENCE.......................... 1 

Genesis of the Airborne Concept ................ Early Experimentation .......................... z 

Formation of an Airborne Force ................. 8 

On the Eve of War ............................... 18 

EVOLUTION OF AIRBORNE FORCES DURING 

WORLD WAR II.................................= 25 

Initial Airborne Involvement ................... 25 

Organization and Employment .................... 28 

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT: VYAZ‘MA, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1942 ........................ 37 

Strategic Context .............................. 37 

Operational Planning . 8th Airborne Brigade Assault ............................................. z$ 

8th Airborne Brigade Operations ................ 53 

Conclusions ..................................... 56 

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT: VYAZ'MA, 

FEBRUARY-JUNE 1942..,........................ 59 

Operational Planning ........................... 59 

4th Airborne Corps Assault ..................... 63 

February Offensive ............................. 65 

March Offensive ................................ 67 

April Offensive ................................ 

Encirclement and Breakout, 1 May-23 June 1942 . . E 

Conclusions .................................... 85 

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT: ON THE DNEPR, 

SEPTEMBER 1943................................ 91 

Operational Planning ........................... Airborne Assault ............................... 5th Airborne Brigade Operations Conclusions .. ........ .......................................... ti; 

iii 

- __.-. --. _ -----_- -. --.__ 
6. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT............................. 113 

General ........................................ 113 

Teryaeva Sloboda, December 1941.....:.......... :ILt 

Medyn, January 1942 ....................... ..... Zhelan'ye, January 1942 ........................ 121 

Rzhev, February 1942 ........................... 126 

Kerch-Feodosiya, December 1941- 

January 1942.......*....*...............* .... 128 

Diversionary Operations ........................ 131 

7. THE POSTWAR YEARS . . . . ..*.......*......*........ 135 

The Intellectual Context ....................... 135 

The Stalinist Years: 1946-53...............= .. 137 

The Nuclear Era: 1953-68 ...................... 143 

Contemporary Airborne Operations ............... 148 

8. CONCLUSIONS.............................,...... 159 

Notes. ................................................ 163 

Bibliography...........................~.........~..~. 197 

iv 
MAPS 

1. Belorussian Maneuvers, 14 September 1935 . 2. Use of Airborne Forces on the Offensive, 1936 .............. ;g 

3. Area of Operations, Soviet Winter Offensive, 

January-May 1942 ................................ 213 

4. 'Situation Facing the Western Front, 

25 January 1942, and Concept of the Airborne 

Operation............'.......................... 43 

2: Vyaz'ma-Dorogobuzh Area ........................... 214 

4th Airborne Corps Plan of Operations, 

25 January 1942 ................................. 215 

7. 8th Airborne Brigade and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps Operations, 27 January-8 February 1942 .......... 216 

8. 8th Airborne Brigade and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps 

Operations, 8-17 February 1942 .................. 217 

9. 8th Airborne Brigade and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps Operations, 17-28 February 1942 ................. 218 

10. 8th Airborne Brigade and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps 

Operations, 28 February-24 March 1942 ........... 219 

11. Western Front Positions, 15 February 1942, 

and the Plan of 4th Airborne Corps ............. 60 

12. Vyaz'ma-Yukhnov Area .............................. 220 

13. 4th Airborne Corps Plan of Operations, 

16 February 1942 ............................... 221 

14. 4th Airborne Corps Operations, 17 February-l March 1942 ....................... 222 

15. 4th Airborne Corps Operations, l-20 March 1942 

16.' German 137th Infantry Division Defensive Area ......... 2:; 

17. 4th Airborne Corps Operations, 

20 March-11 April 1942 ......................... 224 

18. Territory Occupied by Belov's Forces, 

March-May 1942 ................................. 74 

19. 4th Airborne Corps and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps Operations, 11-24 April 1942 .................... 225 

20. 4th Airborne Corps and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps 

Operations, 26 April-30 May 1942 ................ 226 

ii: 

Breakout to 10th Army, l-11 June 1942 ............. 227 

Breakout to 10th Army, 11-23 June 1942 ............ 228 

23. Voronezh Front Advance to the Dnepr, September 1943...-. .............................. Kanev-Bukrin Area ................................. 2% 

Dnepr Airborne Operation Plan, 20 September 1943 . . 230 

26. Dnepr Airborne Operation Revised Plan, 

23 September 1943 ...... ........ ................. 231 

27. Dne r Airborne Operation, 22: September-13 October 1943 .................... 232 

$9": 

5th Airborne Brigade Operations, November 1943 .... 106 

Medyn Area ........................................ 116 

30. Medyn Airborne Operation Plan, 3 January 1942 ..... 118 

V 
Medyn Operation, 3-20 January 1942...... I . e . .e. . . . . 119 

Zhelan'ye Airborne Operation, 20 January 1942..... 233 

Zhelan"ye Airborne Operation, 27 January 1942..... 234 

Zhelan'ye Airborne.Operation, 

29 January-l February 1942.,..:;,...:........,.. 235 

Rzhev Operation, February 1942,....;............... 127 

Kerch-Feodosiya Operation, 

December 1941-January 1942.......,**....:.....:*. 130 

vi 

: 
1. 

6. 

i: 

1:: 

TABLES 

Airborne Brigades, 1936 .......................... 

Airborne Regiments, 1936 ......................... 1': 

Airborne Forces, 1939 ............................ 17 

Airborne Brigade, 1940 ........................... 21 

Airborne Corps, 1941 ............................. 

Airborne Corps Dispositions, June 1941 ........... z; 

Airborne Brigade, 1941 ........................... 29 

SO;~.E: tirborne Operations in the Moscow Region, ........... ...... ... .... ....... ......... 

Conversion of Airborne Units, Summer 1942 ........ z! 

Separate Airborne Army, 1944 ..................... 34 

vii 
ABBREVIATIONS 

................... 

2A 

..+...Arm y ... ................... ..Antiaircraf t detachmentAbn ..................... ..Airborn e 

AC ...................... ..Airborn e corps (Soviet) 

~~ ...................... ..Arm y corps (German) ....... ............... ...................... ..Arm y group 

Et. 

..Airborn e regiment (Soviet) ...... ............. ..Artiller y regiment (German) 

Arty*....::...............Artiller y ATGM .................... ..Antitan k guided missile 

Bde 

Bn .*.....................Brigad e ...................... ..Battalio n 

Cav .... ...................Cavalr y 

cc ...................... ..Cavalr y corps 

CD ...................... ..Cavalr y division 

Cmd ..... ..*...............Comman d 

CO ...................... ..Compan y 

Detach .................. ..Detachmen t 

Div.......................Divisio n 

Flak.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Antiaircraft detachment 

& ................................. Guards army ............ ..Guard s cavalry corps 

GCD ..................... ..Guard s cavalry division Gds ..................... ..Guard s 

GMB ..................... ..Guard s mechanized brigade GMRD......................Guard s motorized rifle 

division 

Gp........................Grou p GRD.......................Guard s rifle division 

Gren......................Grenadie r 

GTA ... .......*............Guard s tank army GTB ..................... ..Guard s tank brigade GTC ..................... ..Guard s tank corps 

HQ.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Headquarters 

I Bde....................*Infantr y brigade ........................ :if Infantry division ................... ..Infantr y IR.::...................*.Infantr y regiment 

Jgd.......................reconnaissance unit 

ix 
MC .... ..*.................Mechanize d corps (Soviet) MC ............ ..*.........Motorize d corps (German) 

MD .............. ..........Militar y district 

MD ............... ..**....*Motorize d division (German) 

Mech ........... ..*.*....*.Mechanize d 

Mot ........... ............Motorize d 

MRB ............ ..*........Motorize d rifle brigade MRD ..... ..*...............I'40torize d rifle division 

Part .*.............*......Partisa n 

Ptn . ..*...................Pl.atoo n 

Pz........................Panze r 

RB ..................... 

.... ..*Rifl e brigade 

ii: 

....................Rifl e corps ...................... ..Rifl e division 

Recon ................... ..Reconnaissanc e 

Regt ................... ..*Regimen t 

Res . ..*.*.................Reserv e 

RR ..... ..*.......;........Rifl e regiment 

2 ...................... ..Tan k army ...... ..................Tan k brigade 

TC ..*...*.................Tan k corps Tk .................. ..*...Tan k 

x 
SYMBOLS 

Soviet 

Front boundary 

* 

Army boundary 

Corps ‘boundary 

r\ Division/brigade boundary , 

Tnfantry.unit assembly. area 

@a Tank/mechanized unit assembly * area 

? 

Cavalry unit assembly area 

‘r. I Infantry unit deployed or moving 

Tank/mechanized unit deployed or moving 

\. J 

G Cavalry unit deployed or moving 

Self-propelled artillery unit deployed 

or moving 

Tanks in firing positions 

Self-propelled guns in firing position 

xi 

---- 
German 

Fielid fortifications, defensive positions 

Fortified zones, permanent 

Section position 

Squad position 

Platoon position 

Company position 

Battalion position 

Regiment position 

Brigade position 

Division position 

Contiguous positions 

----m Fluid (fragmented) positions 

Screened area (limited defenses) 

III Regimental boundary 

xx Divisional boundary 

xxx Corps boundary 

-xxxx- Army boundary 

xii 
CHAPTER 1 

THE PKEWAR EXPERIENCE 

Genesis of the Airborne Conce_pt 

The genesis of Soviet airborne military doctrine 

occurred during the decade of the 192Os, a period characterized by intense intellectual ferment in Soviet 

military affairs. That ferment ultimately converged with 

the movement toward indusfrialization and the adoption of 

modern technology to produce, in the early 193Os, a 

renaissance of military thought within the Soviet Union. 

A generation of military leaders and thinkers, conditioned 

k;ss;a;evolu,tionary philosophy and participation * the 

Civil War and Allied intervention and ea;r to 

elevate the Soviet Union into a competitive military 

position with the rest of Europe, gave shape and focus to 

that renaissance. They were imaginative men, infused with 

ideological zeal, encouraged by their political leaders 

to experiment, and willing to learn from the experiences of military leaders abroad. Their efforts produced a 

sophisticated military doctrine, advanced for its time, 

and an elaborate, if not unique, military force structure 

to implement that doctrine. 

It is one of the major ironies of history that the 

work of these men --the Tukhachevskys, the Triandafilovs, 

the Issersons, and a host of others --would be eclipsed and 

almost forgotten. Their efforts for the Soviet Union 

earned for them only sudden death in the brutal purges of 

the late 1930s. The formidable armed force they had built 

and the sophisticated thought that had governed use of 

that force decayed. The brain of the army dulled, and 

imagination and initiative f’ailed. The military 

embarrassments of 1939-40 and the debacle of 1941 blinded 

the world to the true accomplishments of Soviet military 

science in the 193os, and an appreciation of those 

accomplishments never really returned. The military 

leaders of 1943-45 resurrected the concepts of their 

ilLustrious predecessors and competently employed them to 

achieve victory over Europe’s most vaunted military 

machine. Yet the memories of the Soviets’ 

performance in 1941 never faded and have since col~~~~ 

Western attitudes toward Soviet military art. Thus, it is 

appropriate to recall the realities of Soviet military 

development unblemished by the images of 1941. One of 

those realities was Soviet experimentation with airborne 

forces in the 1930s. 

1 
Soviet receptivity to the idea of air assault was but 

a part of greater Soviet interest in experimentation with 

new military ideas to restore offensive dominance to the 

battlefield. World War I had seen the offensive fall 

victim to static defensive war. 

the firepower 

In positional warfare, 

of modern weaponry stymied the offense and 

exacted an excruciating toll in human lives. Those wedded 

to the idea of the dominance of the infantry--the ultimate 

elevation of men to preeminence on the battlefield--saw 

the infantry slaughtered in the ultimate humiliation of 

man”s power to influence battle. Infantry, the collective 

personification of man, dug antlike into 

overpowered by impersonal 

the ground, firepower and the 

weight of explosives and steel. crushing 

New weapons--the tank, 

wartime, 

the airplane--emerged during 

demeaning 

but most military theorists saw these weapons as 

to the infantry and as an adjunct to the 

existing technological dominance of fire. Yet there were 

those who experienced war in a different context. For 

three years after 

regiments, brigades I 

1918 in the vast expanse of Russia, 

divisions, and armies engaged in a 

seesaw civil war--a chaotic confrontation over vast 

territories, a war in which the zeal of man and his 

ability to act counted more than human numbers on the 

battlefield. 

armies 

Shorn of advanced weaponry, the separate 

paid 

joined a struggle in which imaginative maneuver 

dividends) in which rudimentary operational and 

tactical techniques could once 

prohibitive loss of life, again be tested without 

It was a different sort of 

struggle, one that conditioned many of its participants to 

be receptive to new ideas of warfare. 

the offense emerged supreme, 

The credibility of 

and to that new faith in the 

offense was added the imperative of an ideology that 

inherently embraced the offensive. 

The Red Army (RICKA*) as it emerged from the civil war 

was crude by Western standards. Large) relatively unschooled in military art, ill-equipped, and 

simultaneously 

the Red Army was 

the shield of the Soviet state and the 

lance of revolutionary socialism. 

international Although the ardor for 

revolution waned in the face of harsh 

economic and political realities 

the immediate 

and the army shrank in 

postwar years to provide manpower for 

factories and fields, the revolutionary foundation of the 

army remained. The writings of Mikhail Frunze enunciated 

the uniqueness of the Red Army. The attitudes and 

*Raboehe-Krest’ anskaya Peasants Red Army ry .- Kra_snaya Armiya (Workers and 

2 
actions of the leading commanders and theorists better 

characterized the reality of the army. Theoretical 

debates within the army over the nature of war and the 

role of man and modern weaponry began in the twenties. At 

first, 

reality 

these debates expressed mere hopes, kept so by the 

of Soviet industrial and technological backwardness. But as that industrial development began to 

accelerate, goaded by Stalin’s ruthless “Socialism in One 

Country, ” and as technological proficiency rose, either 

generated from within or imported from abroad, abstract 

hopes turned into concrete policies and programs. These 

new doctrines sought to combine the offensive potential of 

new weapons with the ideological zeal and faith in the 

offensive which was born of revolution and civil war 

experience. Thus, while the victors of World War I sought 

to make new weapons the slave of the defense and guarantee the status quo f those defeated--Germany and the 

U.S.S.R .--turned. to the new weaponry as a means to 

over turn the status quo. In this sense, it is not 

surprising that German and Soviet military thought evolved 

in so similar a manner during the interwar years. 

The shape of future Soviet military thought began to 

take form in the Pate 1920s. Frunze’s postulation of a 

proletarian military doctrine reflecting the classless 

nature of the Socialist state gave focus to that thought. Soviet officers began to ponder the 

Doctrine , ” implications of 

Fr unze ’ s “Unified Military a doctrine that 

dictated dedication to maneuver, aktivnost (activity), and 

the offensive in the real world of battle. These new 

principles rejected the concepts of defensive, static, 

positional warfare so dominant in Western European and 

American military thought.1 

Although Frunze died in 1925, other thinkers expanded 

his theories, deriving. first an intellectual basis in 

doctrine and then specific methods and techniques to 

translate that doctrine into practice. The Field 

Regulation (USTAV*) of IL929 reflected this mixture of 

theory and experiment . It established the objective of 

conducting deep battle (plubokyi boi) to secure victory at 

the tactical depth of the enemy defense by using combined 

arms forces , specifically infantry, armor, artillery, and 

aviation, acting in concert.2 Deep battle, however, 

remained an abstract objective that could be realized only when technology and industry provided the modern armaments 

necessary for its execution. The 1929 regulation was a 

*Ustavlenie (regulation). Russians routinely refer to 

regulations as USTAVs. 

-- 
declaration of intent, an intent that would begin to be 

realized in the early 1930s as the first Five Year Plan 

ground out the heavy implements of war. 

Among those implements of war were tanks and aircraft, 

each symbolizing an aspec.t of potential deep battle. The 

tank offered prospects for decisive penetration, 

envelopment, and the exploitation of offensive tactical 

success to effect greater operational success, the latter 

dimension conspicuously absent in the positional warfare 

of World War I. Aircraft also added a new dimension to 

the battlefield. Besides the potentially devastating effects of aerial firepower, aircraft offered prospects for vertical envelopment, a third dimension of offensive 

maneuver, Vertical envelopment, of potential value even 

isolation would supplement izchanized forces 

the offensive action of 

and further guarantee the success of 

deep battle. Thus, the emerging doctrinal fixation on 

deep battle gave impetus to experimentation with airborne 

forces, experimentation that began in earnest in the late 

twenties. 

Early Experimentation I_-. 

Experimentation with airborne forces went hand in 

glove with doctrinal research. Although many theor is ts 

examined the uses of airborne forces, in par titular the 

problems and the missions, M. N. Tukhachevsky played the 

leading role. As commander of the Leningrad Military 

District, he conducted trial exercises and prepared a 

study on the “Action of Airborne Units in Offensive 

Operations.” As a result of his critiques of exercises 

conducted in 1929 and 1930, he proposed to the Revoensovet 

(Revolutionary Military Soviet) sample aviation 

motorized division TOE (table ofa organization and 

equipment) for use as an 

force.3 operational-strategic landing 

Supplementing Tukhachevsky’s work, A. N. 

Lapchinsky, chief of staff of the Red Army’s air force 

(VVS*) and N. P. 

such precise 

Ivanov wrote an article investigating airborne problems as time and place of 

landing, order of landing, mutual operations with aviation 

and land forces, calculation of required forces, and 

landing times for airborne units of battalion to 

regimental size.4 These theoretical discussions 

paralleled practical exercises in both countryside and 

classroom. Simultaneously, other agencies worked in 

developing all types of airborne equipment as evidenced by the first domestic production of parachutes in April 1930. 

*Voenno-Vozdushnvi sil”. 

4 

- 
Active experimentation grew in scope when, on 2 August 1930, a major test occurred near Voronezh in the Moscow 

Military District.5 

than tactics 8 

To test landing techniques rather 

three R-l aircraft dropped two detachments 

of twelve parachutists armed with machine guns and rifles; 

their mission was to perform a diversionary mission in the 

enemy rear. The detachment commanders, L. G. Minov and 

Ya.. D. Moshkovsky, airborne 

would play a leading role in future 

experimentation. The Voronezh test drop, from 

heights of 500 and 300 meters, focused on solutions of 

such technical problems as preventing dispersal of dropped 

personnel, determining visibility on the part of airborne 

troops, and calculating the time necessary for those 

troops to reform and become combat capable. The exercise 

was repeated at the same location in September 1930 when 

ANT-9 aircraftcoz;zfe$ an eleven-man detachment under 

Moshkovsky’s While the military district 

commander, A. J. I;ork looked the detachment 

successfuIly seized docuhents from oa”ns “enemy” division 

headquarters. The success of these experiments was noted 

in a decree of the Revoensovet on the results of combat 

training. The decree mandated conduct of additional 

airborne exercises in 1931, to emphasize both technical 

and tactical aspects of an air assault.7 From 1933 on, virtually all Soviet field exercises included airborne 

operations. 

Early experimentation in various military districts 

gave rise to the formation of an experimental aviation 

motorized landing detachment in Tukhachevsky’s Leningrad Military District in March 1931. This detachment 

consisted of a rifle company; sapper, communications, and 

light-vehicle platoons; a heavy bomber aviation squadron; 

and a corps aviation detachment. Ya. D. Luk in commanded 

the 164 men, under 

Nikishev a 

the staff responsibility of D. N. 

The unit had two 76-m guns, two T-27 

tankettes, four grenade launchers, three light machine 

guns, four heavy machine guns, fourteen hand machine guns, 

and a variety of light vehicles. Twelve TB-1 bombers and 

ten R-5 kigh t aircraft provided aviation support* 

Tukhachevsky charged the detachment to conduct airborne 

operations to a.chieve tactical aims ; specifically , a 

parachute echelon would seize airfields and landing strips in the enemy rear to secure an area for landing the main 

force,.8 At first, the unit tested organizational 

concepts and equipment the issue of airdrop% 

for airlanding but did not address 

In June 1931, Tukhachevsky ordered 

the creation of experimental detachment in the lstanAviation Br 

non -TOE parachute 

dimension of airborne operations. 

ade to test the airdrop 

This new unit became 

the parachute echelon of the combined airborne force and, 

with forty-six volunteers under Minov, practiced airdrops 

in exercises at Krasnoye Selo and Krasnogvardeisk, outside 

5 
Leningrad, and at Mogilevka, in the Ukraine, during August and September 1931. At Mogilevka, I. E. Yakir, the Kiev 

Military District commander T supervised the 

Minov’s twenty-nine men from several ANT-9 aircraft. d”lPB Of 

On 14 December 1931, I. P. Belov, Tukhachevsky’s 

successor as the Leningrad Military District commander, 

reported on the airborne exercises to the Revoensovet. 

Beiov lauded the success of airborne troops-Trworking 

with ground and naval forces in the enemy’s rear areas. 

In particular, the exercises accented the paratroopers’ ability to capitalize on their inherent element of 

surprise. Below echoed Tukhachevsky’s earlier call to 

create TOE airborne divisions based on existing 

detachments. Specifically, Belov argued that an airborne 

division consist of a motor landing brigade, an aviation 

brigade a parachute detachment, and essential support units +li 

Though positive in general, air force assessments of 

the more than 550 airborne exercises pointed out several 

noticeable shortcomings in the use of airborne forces. 

All the drops had taken place in summer, and few had 

occurred at night. Drops were small-scaLe and usually resulted in considerable dispersion of forces. The air 

force command criticized the haphazard study of foreign 

parachute equipment and urged accelerated work an Soviet 

domestic chutes.12 

On 5 January 1932, on the basis of these and other 

reports, the Revoensovet issued its own report, “Concerning the Aviation Motorized Detachments of the 

Leningrad Military District.” That report mandated the 

creation of four aviation motorized detachments, one each 

in the Moscow, Leningrad, Belorussian, and Ukrainian 

military districts, and the establishment of a squadron of 

TB-1 bombers to transport the airborne troops. The 

Leningrad detachment at Detskoye Selo, designated the 3d 

Motorized Airborne Landing Detachment, was formed from two 

existing aviation landing units e Commanded by M. V. 

Boytsov, the detachment had 144 men organized into three 

machine gun companies and three aviation squadrons, 

supported by an aviation park (aviation support units) = 

These units would deploy on a functional basis as a 

parachute battalion of two companies and a landing group of one company and one artillery battery. The detachment 

had six ?&-mm guns, eighteen light machine guns, 144 

automatic pistols, and Light vehicles. For 

transportation, the aviation squadrons contained six 

ANT-g, six R-5, three TB-1, and three U-2 aircraft.13 

The grandiose plans of the Revoensovet to create four of 

these detachments failed, probabiy because of shortages of 

6 
equipment and trained personnel. Only the Leningrad 

detachment was complete, although the Ukrainian Military District formed a thirty-man parachute platoon. No units 

appeared in other districts. Consequently, exercises 

involving the Leningrad detachment would be the focus for 

further experimentation.14 

The conceptual framew0r.k for use of airborne forces 

&;;e zore elaborate in February 1932 when a Red Army 

Battle,” Temporary Regulation on the Organization of Deep recognized that the 1929 hope of being able to 

conduct such battle was becoming a reality. Although the 

basic regulation emphasized the role of mechanized forces 

in the success of deep battle, the Red Army discussed the 

utility of airborne forces 

‘“Regulation on 

in a companion draft document, 

the Operational-Tactical Employment of 

Aviation Motorized Landing Detachments. I’ The new 

regulation declared that aviation motorized detachments 

were “army operational-tactical units that coordinated 

closely with ground forces.” When mobilized, the 

detachments would perform diversionary missions, such as 

destroying enemy rail and road bridges, ammunition 

warehouses, fuel dumps, and aircraft at forward 

airfields. They would also support ground offensive 

operations 

supply 

by destroying enemy li,“,eds oof,hz;mmunication, 

depots, headquarters, important 

objectives in the enemy rear areas. In addition, they 

would block withdrawal or reinforcement by enemy forces. 

During defensive operations, the detachments would per form 

similar functions by striking enemy command and control 

facilities, disrupting enemy troop movements, and securing airfields in the enemy rear area.15 

Having articulated the concept of airborne operations, the Red Army addressed the issues of training and 

equipment development. The Red Army Training Directorate 

issued a series of directives that outlined training 

requirements for airborne units and subdivided that 

training into four categories: parachute, glider, 

airlanding, and combined operations. Training in each 

category occurred in close coordination with aviation 

units e In April 1932, the “Regulations Concerning the 

Special Design Bureau (OKB) of the VVS, RKKA’” addressed 

equipment requirements anTentrusted theOK=th planning and developing air assault equipmentFin particular 

gliders and parachute platforms for transporting guns and 

vehicles, and modifying the TB-1 bomber to 

airborne troops .16 

transport 

By November 1932, the OKB had worked 

Out specific equipment requirements for the aviation 

motorized detachments, including modifications to the TB-1 

and TB-3 bombers. 

_-___--- 
While the Red Army issued its specific regulations, exercise experience and theoretical writings continued to 

refine practices and concepts of airborne force use. An 

exercise of the Leningrad 

Detachment on 

3d Motorized Airborne Landing 

1932 at 

conducted 

29 September under the Krasnogvardeisk, watchful eyes of the Revoensovet 

chairman, K. E. Voroshilov, included 

airborne 

a full cycIe activities. Drop t and withdrawal were 

all rated successfui.l7 attack, 

A 17 November 1932 Revoensovet 

order assessing the year’s exercises noted that problems of airborne assault still existed but again emphasized the 

importance of the unit. 

Two important contributions ‘to airborne 

appeared in 1932, fueling theory the movement toward 

larger and more numerous airborne units. fielding Tukhachevsky published an article investigating the “New Question of 

War I’ and articulating the role and missions of airborne 

forces a He stressed the operational and tactical missions 

of such forces by stating that “air assault farces must 

operate between deployed enemy corps, army, and front 

reserves, arresting the action of the forces throughout the operational depth of the defense.“18 The chief of 

airborne forces of the Red Army air force staff, E. I. 

Tatarchenko, seconded the views of Tukhachevsky with an 

article . War 

Organizatizal, 

and Revolution titled “Technical, 

and -““-7 Oneratlonal Questions of Airborne 

Forces. I’ 

uniquely 

Tatarchenko argued for >reation of separate, armed airborne forces to operate in close 

coordination with aviation units in attacks on enemy rear 

areas. He stressed the necessity for simultaneous airdrop ;;;Ee larger areas 

and to 

to reduce dispersion of the airborne 

reduce time. 

time-phased drop employment of 

He also proposed a 

the assault: a 

would prepare the landing sight, 

small group 

an advanced guard would 

secure a larger landing area, and a main force would 

follow to conduct the major phase of the operation.19 

Thus, the February regulations and the theoretical 

articles of 1932 paved the way for more concrete measures 

for the development of an airborne force. 

Formation of an Airborne Force 

The growing sophistica,tion of airborne doctrine and 

the development of new equipment forced attention on the 

need to create larger airborne units. An 11 December 1932 

Revoensovet order directly responded to the need, creating 

an airborne brigade from the existing detachment in the 

Leningrad Military District.20 The new brigade would 

train an airborne cadre and establish operational norms 

8 

- _-- ..-__ 
for all Soviet airborne units. In addition, by 1 March 

1933, aviation landing detachments would be created in the 

Belorussian, Ukrainian, Moscow) and military districts, Volga and non-TOE aviation assault, battalions would 

be set up in rifle corps and cadre rifle divisions 

throughout the Soviet Union. To implement the Revoensovet 

order, a directive of the Commissariat of Military and 

Naval Affairs transformed the Leningrad Military District’s 3d Motorized Airborne Landing Detachment into 

the 3d Airborne Brigade (Special Purpose) s commanded by Boytsov. Unlike the earlier detachment, the new brigade 

was a combined arms unit organized with both peacetime and 

war time TOES e 

size), 

It had a parachute detachment (battalion 

a motorized/mechanized detachment (battalion size) I 

an artillery battalion, and an air group comprised of two 

squadrons of TB-3 modified bombers and one squadron of R-5 

aircraft. Initially, four such spedial purpose airborne 

detachments (1st through 4th) were f)ormed in the Volga, 

Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Moscow ‘.military districts, 

each with peacetime and wartime TOEs‘. Throughout 1933, 

the 1 R_evoensovet created twenty-nine $,additional non -TOE 

special purpose airborne battalions in the rifle corps and 

cadre rifle divisions of other military districts so that, 

bY year’s end, the twenty-nine existing airborne 

t;;;alions totaled more than 8,000 men. By 1 January the force structure included one airborne brigade, 

four’aviation motorized detachments, twenty-nine separate 

airborne battalions, and several company- and platoon-size elements totaling 10,000 men.21 TQ train airborne 

cadres, the Revoensovet, in March 1933, initiated a 

special airbox course that focused on the precise 

techniques required by parachute, and combined 

operations.22 

landing, 

While the units organized, staff 

responsibilities governing their use emerged. The Red 

Army staff was responsible for training and overall use of 

airborne forces. In wartime, the Red Army air force would 

de1 iver units to combat, but, once in combat , airborne 

units would be under the operational control of the fronts 

and armies, The 1933 airborne organization remained 

unchanged until 1936. 

Civilian organizations helped provide the manpower for 

Soviet airborne units. Komsomol (Communist Union of 

Youth) and Osoaviakhim (S&iety for the Promotion of 

Defense and the Furthering of Aviation and of the Chemical 

Industry of the U.S.S.R.) sponsored sport parachuting, 

which became popular in the Soviet Union of the 1930s and 

created a Large pool of trained youth parachutists.23 

Meanwh i le , theoretical work airborne force 

employment continued, punctuated by iz:reasingly elaborate 

airborne exercises. On 15 June 1933, the Red Army 

9 

-- 
assistant chief of staff, S. A. Mezhenikov, issued the 

“Temporary Instructions on the Combat Use of Aviation 

Landing Units. “24 This regulation, broader than its 

1932 predecessor, categorized airborne assaults as either 

operational (conducted by a regiment or brigade against 

objectives in the operational depth of the defense) or 

tactical (carried out by one to two companies or a 

battalion against objectives in its tactical depth). The 

regulations also defined the specific functions of each 

command level in an airborne operation. Combined arms 

headquarters staffs, the chief of the air group, and the 

airborne commander were jointly to work out employment plans after conducting a systematic reconnaissance. and a 

careful assessment of force requirements and objectives. Then ,’ the commander of the airborne operation would fully coordinate the actions of the aviation and airborne units 

and also ensure that airborne force plans were coordinated 

with the plans of the ground force commander in whose 

set tor the airborne force operated. The aviation unit 

commander was in command from the time airborne forces 

loaded on the aircraft to the time of their descent or 

landing. The regulation required that airborne forces 

engage in bold maneuvers to capitalize on the element of 

s,urpr i se and to effect speedy emp loymen t and rapid 

concentration of forces. Because airborne units were 

equipped with only light weapons, the regulat-ion 

emphasized the decisive importance of using the forces in 

mass. 

In consonance with the new instructions, exercises 

involving airborne forces intensified. In September 1933, 

at Luga in the Leningrad Military District, the 3d 

Airborne Brigade conducted a tactical exercise under 

Twkhachevsky’s supervision. Operating in poor weather 

conditions (strong winds and low clouds), the paratroopers dropped in a heavily defended enemy rear area to block 

enemy withdrawal and movement of reserves. The surprise 

drop, conducted after the lifting of a friendly artillery 

barrage, succeeded in driving off the enemy, occupying the 

objective, and repulsing enemy reserves. Tukhaehevsky was 

pleased with the results.25 In September the following 

year, near Minsk in the Belorussian Military District, a 

multiple airborne assault supported a ground force 

offensive exercise. On 7 September, a 129-man force 

dropped to secure a section of highway west of Minsk and a 

key crossing over the Svisloch River where, in 

coordination with an advancing motorized regiment, it 

blocked enemy withdrawal routes from the city. On 9 

September near Trostyanets, northeast of Minsk, a second 

operational assault by 603 men, in close coordination with 

an advancing mechanized brigade, blocked movement of enemy 

reserves into the city. The two airborne operations 

10 
emphasized coordination between ground and- airborne units 

operating in the enemy rear.26 

Capitalizing on the success of the 1934 maneuvers, 

more extensive airborne activity occurred in the 1935 

maneuvers. Held in the Kiev Military District, under the 

supervision of Army Commander First Rank I. E. Yakir and 

the watchful eyes of such luminaries as Voroshilov, 

f’,u;;:;y 1 Gamarnik, T;kFachevsky, and Egorov, the exercii.: 

techniques conducting deep battle.* 

scenario involved the penetration of a strong defense by a, 

rifle corps reinforced by a tank battalion and RGK (High Command reserve) artillery (see map 1, p* 12). Acavalry 

corps and a mechanized corps developed that penetration. 

A large airborne assault supported their efforts to 

encircle and destroy the enemy. The airborne force of two 

parachute regiments (1,188 men) and two rifle regiments (1,765 men), under control of a rifle division, had to 

land at Brovary (northeast of Kiev), secure a landing area 

and crossings over the Dnepr River, block the approach of 

enemy reserves from the east, and cooperate with cav;zt;; 

and rifle corps units attacking Kiev from the west. 

than 1,000 troops of the parachute echelon, flying in from 

bases 280 kilometers away, participated in a simultaneous 

p, and secured the landing area. Troops of the main 

rifle regiments followed and, together with the 

parachute echelon, accomplished their assigned mission.27 

Western attaches viewed the drop with interest. The 

British attache, Maj. Gen. (later Field Marshal) A. P. 

Wave11 reported: 

We were taken to see a forde of about 1,500 men 

dropped by par achute ; they were supposed to 

represent a “Blue” force dropped to occupy the 

passages of a river and so delay the advance of 

the “Red ” Infantry corps which was being brought 

for the counteroffensive. This parachute 

Zscen t though its tactical value be 

doubtful, was a most spectacular performan%: We 

were told that there were no casualties and we 

certainly saw none; in fact the parachutists we 

saw in action after the landings were in 

remarkably good trim and mostly moving at the 

*I* E. Yakir, Kiev .Military District commander; K. E. 

Voroshilov, people’s commissar of defense; S. M. Budenny, inspector of Cavalry Forces; Ya. B. Gamarnik, deputy 

commissar of defense; M. N. Tukhachevsky, deputy commissar 

of defense; A. I. Egorov, chief of the General Staff. 

11 
Landing = 90 RR - 0945 

= 43 RR - 1012 

SCA-iE b 5 10 KM 

~mmnmlN!z.-~~- Route of seizure group 

r Defense positions 

Main attack, landing group 

NH 

A Road interdiction 

Map 1. Belorussian Maneuvers, 14 September 1935 
double e They are, of course, a specially picked force and had had some months training. It 

apparently took some time to collect the force 

after the first descent began landing; about one 

and a half hours after the first descent began a 

part of the force was still being collected, 

though the greater part had already been in 

action for some time. The personal equipment 

seemed to consist of a rifle or a light automatic with a small supply of ammunition. 

The less experienced parachutists, we were told, 

landed without rifles, their rifles being parachuted separately. No mechanical vehicles 

were landed by plane as was done at Kiev in 

1933.28 

In the fall of 1936, yet another large exercise in 

Belorussia validated the results of summer exercis,es. 

I. P. Uborevich, the military district commander, 

supervised the exercise along with Voroshilov, 

Tukhachevsky, and Budenny . Combined mechanized, rifle, 

cavalry, aviation, and airborne forces practiced deep 

operations and surmounting water obstacles. A combined 

air assault began with a landing of the 47th Special 

Purpose Aviation Brigade; follow-on tanks, artillery, and 

heavy equipment landed thereafter. From the airborne 

perspective, maneuver controllers gave a favorable 

evaluation to key aspects of the operation, namely) 

preparations for the assault and control of the battle 

after landing.29 During 1936 and 1937, larger exercises 

followed in the Moscow, Belorussian, and Leningrad military districts. The MOSCOW exercise of September 1936 

involved a joint airdrop of a mixed parachute regiment, four non-TOE battalions of the Moscow Military District, 

and a reserve parachute detachment. To add to the 

exercise’s uniqueness, the Soviets flew the 84th Rifle 

Division to the airfield already secured by the more than 

5,000 airborne troops. Other exercises focused on the 

questions of unit organization and tactical employment after landing. 30 

The 1934-37 exercises verified both the utility of 

airborne forces and the doctrinal concepts for their use. 

As expected, the exercises surfaced many problem areas 

that future practice would have to address, such as 

tactics for operating in the enemy rear area, waging battle while encircled, and escaping from encirclement. 

Only superior tactics and timely employment of such forces 

could compensate for the inherent weakness of light 

infantry weaponry. Exercises conducted before 1938 did 

not exploit the possibilities of close cooperation between 

airborne troops and diversionary forces, and most of the 

13 
operations extended to only a limited depth in the enemy 

defense. Equipment problems still hindered airborne 

operations, and a larger more versatile fleet of aircraft 

was essential for larger, airborne groups to conduct 

deeper operations. The Soviet theorists directly confronted such problems in a 1937 report, “The Course of 

Preparing Parachute Landing Forces.“31 

While the Soviets validated their airborne techniques in these and other exercises, theoretical work continued. 

Exercises and maneuvers, in turn, permitted more complete expression of the theory of deep battle. In March 1935, 

the Red Army had issued its “Instructions on Deep Battle,” 

which gave the concept clearer meaning: 

Deep battle is battle involving mass.ive use of 

new mobile and shock means for a simultaneous 

attack on the enemy to the entire depth of his 

combat formation with the aim of fully 

encircling and destroying him. I . . The new 

means and tactics of d(eep battle increase the 

importance of surprise. 3.2 

One of the new means was the infant airborne force. 

The’ 1936 Field Regulation was the epitome of Soviet 

pre-World War II doctrinal development (see map 2, 

p* 15). It elaborated the brief description of deep 

battle provided in the 1935 “instructions” and defined 

deep battle as 

the simultaneous assault on enemy defenses by 

aviation and artillery to the depth of the 

defense, penetration of the tactical zone of the 

&EEEze by attacking units with wide use of tank 

and violent development of tactical 

success into operational success with the aim of 

complete enc i r c lemen t and destruction of the 

enemy. The main role is performed by the 

infantry, and in its interests are or anized the 

mutual support of all types of forces. 35 

Article 7 of the Field Regulation specifically outlined 

the roie of airborne forces: 

Parachute landing units are the effective means . disorganizing the command and rear services 

structure of the enemy. In coordination with 

forces attacking along the front, parachute 

landing units can go a long way toward producing 

a complete rout of the enemy on a given axis.34 

14 
Army 

Group 

Army 

Reserve 

Tactical Zone 

26 belt 1st 

Operational landing 

80400 KM 40-60 KM 32-15 KM 4-6 KM 

Map 2. Use of Airborne Forces on the Offensive, 1936 
Thus, while success in deep battle relied primarily on 

mechanized and tank forces, the airborne arm played a 

considerable supporting role. 

With airborne forces accepted as a participant in deep 

battle, the airborne force structure continued to become 

more sophisticated and to grow in size. In 1936, two new 

airborne brigades (aviation landing and special purpose) 

were organized on the basis of existing TOE and non-TOE 

units in the Belorussian and Kiev military districts, thus 

raising the number of brigades to three (see table 1). To 

augment airborne forces in the increasingly dangerous climate of the Far East, the Revoensovet created three 

airborne regiments from existing s%ar units (see 

table 2). As part of the 1936 force expansion, one 

separate special purpose battalion was formed in each of 

the Moscow, Volga, and Trans-Baikal military districts, 

and three non-TOE parachute regiments of 1,660 men each 

were organized in the Moscow Military District.35 

Table 1. Airborne Brigades , 1936 

Unit Commander -- Location 

3d Abn Bde I. S. Kokhansky Leningrad MD 

13th Abn Bde A. 0. Indzer Kiev MD 

47th Abn Bde A. F. Levasbev Belorussian MD 

Source: Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 35. --I_ 

Table 2. Airborne Regiments, 1936 

Unit Commander Location 

1st Abn Regt M. I. Denisenko Far East 

2d Abn Regt I. I. Zatevakhin Far East 

5th Abn Regt N. E. Tarasov Far East 

Source: Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 35. 

As the overall Soviet force structure expanded 

significantly in the late 193Os, so did the airborne 

structure. In 1938, existing aviation landing units were 

transformed into six airborne brigades of 3,000 men each. 

A year later, three new special aviation landing regiments 

were created in the Moscow Military District. These 1938- 

39 units were organized on a uniform TOE (see table 3).36 

16 
Table 3. Airborne Forces, 1939 

Unit Commander Location 

201st Abn Bde Col. I. S. Bezugly Leningrad MD 

202d Abn Bde Maj. M. I. Denisenko Far East 

204th Abn Bde Maj. I. I. Gudarevich Kiev MD 

211th Abn Bde Maj. V. A. Glazunov Kiev MD 

212th Abn Bde Naj. I; I. Zatevakhin Far East 

(later 

Odessa MD) 

214th Abn Bde Cal. A. F. Levashev Belorussian MD 

1st Rostov Regt 

2d Gorokhovets Regt 3d Voronezh Regt 

Source: Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 36. 

Little information exists about the precise impact of 

the military purges of the late thirties on the airborne ’ 

forces. It is reasonable to assume that the execution of 

the leading theorists of deep battle and the generation of 

military leaders who created the concept and form of 

airborne and mechanized warfare crippled further 

improvement of doctrine and imaginative work in perfecting airborne tactics. Airborne units, however, continued to 

expand in size and number, and doctrine for their use 

ref kected the pattern established in the Field Regulation 

of 1936, As late as January 1941, Lt. Gen. A. Yeremenko 

described a controversial military counci 1 meeting in 

Moscow dur ing which the air force commander, Lt. Gen. 

Pave1 Rychagov, discussed the use of airborne forces.37 

At the same meeting, however I the debate over the use of 

mechanized forces to effect deep battle reflected the 

shift of the pendulum away from the dynamic views of 

Tukhachevsky and toward the views of the less imaginative. 

or the views of those for whom the Spanish Civil War 

experience had raised doubts about prospects for wartime 

success using large mechanized forces. The partial 

eclipse of men who advocated the treat ion of a force 

envisioned by the earlier planners of deep battle had to 

affect adversely further improvement of airborne doctrine 

and refinement of airborne techniques. The airborne 

forces grew, and the Field -Regulations of 1940 and 1941 

parroted the ideas of the 1936 Field Regulation, but the 

vigor of thought and performance waned. Only future years 

of struggle would revive that vigor. 

17 

-- - 
The Soviets were pioneers, in the 

airborne forces during the interwar years. 

development of 

Although other 

nations .gave thought to such forces, only the Germans came 

close to matching Soviet achievements in the field. 

conducted early experiments in Italy 

1928, 

the late 1928s and, in 

formed a company of trained parachutists before its 

interest waned. The British took note of Soviet 

experiences in the 1933 and 1936 maneuvers, but concern 

aver the light nature of airborne forces and an absence of 

lift aircraft thwarted British development of airborne 

units. In essence, the primarily defensive concerns of 

Great Britain argued airborne against the 

offensive force. development. of an 

French experimentation was 

limited to the creation in 1938 of two airborne companies, 

but even this small force was disbanded after war began. Similarly, no serious airborne ex erimentation occurred in 

the United States before 1940. 5 8 Only the use of a 

German airborne force on Crete in May 1941 prompted Great 

Britain. and the United States to create their own airborne 

units. 

The Germans, however t more concerned with offensive 

theory f value of airborne units 

and, in accepted the potential 

the 1930~~ began building an airborne force. 

Airborne forces, ’ German 

possibilities for si:prise eyes, “offered great 

attack, which was something that was occupying the minds of the German Army planners, and it looked to be a suitable way of speeding up the 

armored thrust of the Blitzkrieg. “39 Formation of a 

German airborne force began in secret in 1938. Maj. Gen. 

Kurt Studant formed the first airborne division (7th Air 

Division), which consisted of a mixture of 

battalions and airlanding parachute 

battalions with integrated sir 

units. Yet, by 1940, the German airborne force was still 

limited to a single division. 

Thus, the Soviets and Germans alike accepted the 

validity of airborne concepts. Although both nations 

formed airborne units, the scale was far greater in the 

Soviet Union. The ensuing war would test the 

effectiveness of that large force. 

On the Eve of War .-a 

Even during the crisis-ridden years of 1938-41, the 

Red Army continued to grow and played a role in the prewar incidents that would forecast the coming of more difficult 

times ‘ 

gained 

The airborne force grew apace with the army and 

combat experience in those crises . When tension 

rose in the Soviet Far East between the Soviet Union and 

Japan and finally erupted in the major battle at 

18 
Khalkhin-Go1 in July and August 1939,* Soviet airborne 

forces were sucked into the conflict. Dispatched from 

the Far East into eastern Mongolia, Cal. I. I. 

Zatevakhin’s 212th Airborne Brigade, participating in a 

ground role as part of Army Group Commander. G. K. Zhukov’s 

force earned fame in the assaults on Mount Fui that 

smashed the Japanese right flank.40 During the 

Soviet-Finnish War in the winter of 1939-40, which began with a series of Soviet failures, airborne forces again 

participated as infantry, performing diversionary missions 

while operating with motorized rifle forces. The 201st 

Airborne Brigade operated with the 15th Army, and the 

204th Airborne Brigade was in 15th Army reserve until 

committed to combat in the final stages of the conflict. 

The first use of airborne forces in their proper role 

occurred during the Soviet oceupat ion of Rumanian 

Bessarabia in June 1940. The Bessarabian operation called 

for rapid advance by tank and cavalry units, followed by rifle units to seize and annex the territory from a 

recalcitrant Rumanian government. Airborne forces had the 

missions of capturing important positions to cut the lines 

of withdrawal of Rumanian forces and of waiting for the 

arrival of advancing Soviet mobile forces e Moreover) 

airborne forces would prevent retreating Rumanian forces 

from destroying property and supplies and would secure the 

key cities of Bolgrad and Izmail. The planned operation 

commenced with a ground force advance on 28 June. While 

ground operations proceeded, the 201st, 204th, and 214th 

Airborne brigades, under control of the air force 

commander, moved by rail to airfields 350 kilometers from 

their drop zone. There they joined tbe four heavy bomber 

regiments (comprising 170 TB-3 aircraft) that would convey them to their drop areas. On 29 June, the 204th Airborne 

Brigade dropped twelve kilometers north of Bolgrad, 

advanced to the city, and occupied it that evening. The 

following day, the 1st Battalion, 204th Airborne Brigade, 

secured the city of Kagul at the mouth of the Danube 

River. That same day, the 2Olst Airborne Brigade received 

arders to airland at Izmail and secure both that city and 

the vital road network passing through it. Because an air 

reconnaissance had confirmed the inadequacy of the 

airfields to accommodate so large a force, the brigade 

instead landed by parachute in the Izmail area. By the 

evening of 30 June, against no opposition, the brigade 

*See Edward J. Drea, 

Tactical Combat, 1939 * Leave 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, January 1981). 

19 
occupied the city.41 The Bessarabian operation was 

unopposed and, in reality, was a more realistic repeat of 

the many exercises Soviet airborne forces had engaged in 

during the previous years. 

In the wake of Soviet military confrontations during 1939 and 1940 and in light of the generally poor 

performance of the Red Army, in particular in Finland, a 

major reappraisal began e The program was overseen by 

s. K. Timoshenko P the new commissar of defense, and it 

directly affected airborne forces because new regulations had appeared and the airborne corps had undergone a major 

expansion. Regulations published in 1940 and 1941 

redefined and enlarged the role of airborne forces in 

offensive operations. Article 28 of the 1941 Field 

Regulation specified the role of airborne forces: 

Air assault forces are an instrument of higher command. They are used to decide those missions 

in the enemy rear area which within a specified 

period cannot be satisfied by ather types of 

forces, but the decision of which can have a 

serious impact on the outcome of the entire 

operation (battle). Air assault forces must be 

used as a surprise for the enemy, in large 

masses, independent or in coordination with 

land, air and sea forces. . . .42 

Additional instructions and regulations governing all 

aspects of the wartime use of airborne forces appeared. 

Taken together, these documents accorded the airborne 

forces a list of specific missions: disruption of army 

command and control and supply functions; destruction of 

communications routes; interruption of enemy troop, arms f 

and supply movements ; capture and destruction of airfields 

and bases; seizure of coastal areas in support of naval 

landings; reinforcment of troops in encirclement and of 

mobile units operating in the enemy rear; and fighting 

against enemy airborne landings in one’s own rear area, 

among others e The Soviet High Command invoked its 

regulations ta call upon Soviet airborne forces to perform these types af missions within the next two years. In 

December 1940 )r Timoshenko amplified the place of airborne 

forces in the operational scheme, emphasizing that: 

‘ . . the experience of the World War II in the 

west showed that the high tempo and success of an 

operational offensive were secured by massive use 

of tanks, aviation, and artillery in cooperation with motorized forces and airborne forces. The 

development of a tactical penetration into an 

operational-strategic one was made possible by 

20 
introduction of mob i le forces into the 

penetration 

forces.43 

and by operations of airborne 

As dark clouds of war descended over Europe, the 

Soviet Union heeded Timoshenko’s words and rushed to put 

its forces on a wartime footing. Large and cumbersome 

mechanized units reappear.ed (at least on paper) ; and 

airborne forces underwent massive expansion. In the first 

step toward expansion in November 1940) Timoshenko 

appraved a XEW airborne brigade TOE. This brigade organization contained parachute, glider, and airlanded 

groups, as well as a brigade school to teach airborne 

techniques. The refurbished brigades numbered 3,000 

personnel and had sixty-seven motorcycles ; fifty-four bicycles; and improved artillery, antitank, and 

antiaircraft capabilities (see table 4),44 

Table 4. Airborne Brigade, 1940 

Strength--3) 000 men 

11 tanks 

4 guns (over 5Q-mm) 

Subunits--Parachute Group 2 parachute battalions (546 men each) 

3 parachute rifle companies (141 men each) 3 rifle platoons (38 men each) 

1 mortar platoon (50~mm mortars) 1 control squad (12 men) 

1 signal platoon 

1 reconnaissance platoon (37 men) 

1 sapper demolition platoon 

1 combat rations and supply platoon 

1 medical squad 

1 motorcycle-bicycle reconnaissance company 

1 signal company 

Glider Group-- same as parachute group 

Airlanded Group --same as parachute group plus: 1 mortar company (9x82-mm) 

1 air defense company (12x heavy antiaircraft 

machine guns) 

1 tank company (llxT40 or T38) 1 artillery battalion 

1 artillery battery (4x45-mm) 1 artillery battery (4x76~mm) 

Source: Lisov, gesantniki 37-38. 

21 
TOE, Although the airborne brigades were strengthened by the total number of brigades remained six--three in 

the Far East and three in the European U.S.SR.45 

Further expansion of the airborne force occurred in March 

and April 1941, when five airborne corps were established 

from the cadre of the existing 201st, 204th, 2llth, 212th, 

and 214th Airborne brigades. Each airborne corps had 

about LO,000 men and a significant number of supporting 

weapons. The corps had three airborne 

separate tank battalion, and control brigades ) a 

and 

elements (see table 5).46 logistical support 

through 5th) were positioned in 

The new corps (1st the Pre-Baltic Special (Sth), Western Special (4th), Kiev Special Kharkov 

CW, and Odessa (3d) military districts.47 (lst), 

All were at 

full personnel strength by June 1941; however, equipment stocks were incomplete, especially critical tanks and 

radios. 

Table 5. Airborne Corps, 1941 

Strength--lo,419 men 

50 tanks 

I.8 guns (over 50-mm) 

18 mortars 

Subunits--3 airborne brigades 

4 parachute battalions (458 men each) 3 parachute rifle companies (24 flamethrowers) 

brigade artillery (6x76-mm, 12x45-mm, 

6x82-mm) 1 reconnaissance company (113 bicycles) 

1 antiaircraft machine gun company (6-mm, 12-mm, 7-mm) 

I signal company (4 ~0-2 radios) (never formed) 

1 separate tank battalion (ZOxT-37) (later 

reduced to 32) 

3 tank companies 

1 long-range reconnaissance platoon (4-RSB) 

1 control aircraft flight L mobile equipment platoon (15 motorcycles) 

Source: Lisov, Desantniki, 38-39. 

22 
To further increase the stature of airborne forces and 

make them more responsive to the High Command, the 

Miniistry of Defense, in June 1941, established a special 

G;kz;ne (w*) thus 

away from 

ad;iEistration, 

control of the 

taIcc;g airborne 

force .4& Army air 

On the eve of war, the Soviet airborne force 

appeared formidable: five airborne corps, one airborne 

brigade, and smaller airborne units with a 

administrative staff totaling grQw;m& about 100,000 men. 

Field Regulations expressed well-developed theory, and 

numerous exercises tested it. Thus, guidance existed for 

the operations of this force. Yet, in spite of the 

numbers and doctrine, severe shortages of the following 

equipment required by TOE hindered prospective employment of the force: tanks heavy enough to withstand modern 

antitank and artillery fire; vehicles; radios for command 

and control; aircraft to transport the units, 

particularly, aircraft modified for carrying paratroopers w Work to build new aircraft progressed, but 

total war would intervene before it was completed.49 

Beyond the equipment shortages loomed the question of 

leadership, especially at the higher levels. The purges had eliminated from the High Command those men with the 

potential vision and ability to articulate deep operations 

involving close coordination among mechanized, airborne I 

and major ground forces. Yet, while lamenting the loss of 

the generation of Tukhachevsky, one must ask whether even 

those personalities could have coped with all the problems 

associated with command and control of the immense force 

structure the Soviet Union had built. The size of the 

units and the absence of modern command and control 

equipment would have severely tested the capacities of 

even gifted men, just as it did the commanders of 1941. 

The least one can say is that the new military leaders, by 

virtue of their inherent abilities, limited experience, 

and the political climate, had less chance to adjust to 

the realities of war than their purged predecessors might have enjoyed. This situation condemned the airborne force 

to bitter struggles and a long, harsh education on the 

battlefield. 

*Vozdushno desantnye voiska (airborne forces). 

23 
CHAPTER 2 

EVOLUTION OF AIRBORNE FORCES DURING WORLD WAR II 

Initial Airborne Involvement -- 

War struck the Soviet Union suddenly, like a breaking 

storm of unexpected severity e Many saw the storm clouds, 

particular $Yvisions 

the military leaders who commanded 

corps, and armies on the western border as 

well as t’hose in the higher commands who remained at;uned 

t0 the military situation in Europe * While 

recognized they the ominous storm warnings, the 

leadership political denied the portents to the very moment the 

storm broke. Paralyzed by an inability to act, the 

military were the first to 

of their political leaders. f ay the price for the blindness 

The incompetence of the political leadership was not 

the only burden the military had to shoulder on the eve of _ war. The new Soviet military force structure still 

existed largely on paper only. 

name and number, 

Large units existed in 

but manpower strength and, most notably, equipment production lagged. Doctrine for the use of the 

elaborate force existed, but it had not been tested. 

Also, the military leadership, still suffering from the 

stifling effects of the purges, had not matured 

sufficiently to perform capably in new command positions. 

Rearmament programs were incomplete, a problem compounded 

by the obsolete equipment. Fur thermore, the wholesale 

expansion of the military exacerbated the twin defects of 

incompetent leadership and 

Deployment problems equipment shortages . added to the dilemma of the Soviet 

military. Acquisition of new lands in the west (the 

Baltic States > Eastern Poland, and Bessarabia) and 

political insistence that these lands be defended forced 

the military to abandon fortif ied border positions 

prepared before 1939 and to move westward to occupy new, 

as yet largely unfortified, positions. New fortification 

construction programs were incomplete, as was the 

construction of new logistical and communication systems 

leading west from the Soviet Union’s former borders. 

Adding to these problems was the political injunction not 

to mass large Soviet troop concentrations on the border to 

avoid unduly provoking Nazi Germany. Soviet forces thus 

deployed in dispersed order deep behind the still 

unfinished border fortifications. Lacking equipment I 

suffering from weak leadership, and enjoined from prudent 

25 
readiness 

of Europe prepmadrs~ti~~~~-trained s army 

they would soon face the onslaught 

blooded in war and 

intent on utterly destroying its unwaky Soviet opponent. 

A microcosm of the Soviet force structure, airborne 

forces suffered similar basic problems. these Principal among 

was the Lack of 

levels. experience at higher command 

Few senior commanders were capable of conducting strategic operations requiring the integration of airborne 

forces 

battle. 

into the complex overall combat scheme of deep 

equi ment 

Airborne forces also suffered from the general 

prob B ems 

deficiencies of the Red Army and the deployment of other forces. Elite and well 

airborne units did, however, trained, 

manage to avoid some of the 

problems that plagued other Soviet units. Airborne unit 

commanders generally led well in combat, and many of the 

original airborne leaders rose to prominence in later war 

years.2 The nature of airborne units, as well as their 

prewar deployments, resulted in their immediate commitment 

to combat in I.941 as ground infantry units. Qn several 

occasions 1 airborne units were ordered to join special formations designed to block German advances in critical 

sectors. Only after six months of war would airborne 

units begin to perform, on a large scale, 

tasks for which they had been formed. 

those special 

In June 1941, four airborne corps were positioned in 

the four western border military distriets, and a fifth 

corps was close by in the Kharkov Military District (see 

table 6). 3 

Table 6. Airborne Corps Dispositions, June 1941 

Military -- District Airborne Corps Airborne Brigades 

Pre-Baltic Special 5th 9th, 10th, 201st 

Western SpeeiaL,, 4th 7th, 8th, 214th 

Kiev Special 1st lst, 204th, 211th 

Kharkov 2d, 3d, 4th Odessa 3’:: 5th, 6th, 212th 

Source: Kostylev t ‘“Stanovlenie,” 82. 

When the German attack swept across the border on 22 

June 1941, airborne forces, 

prepared for combat, although only partially 

had to be thrown into the fray, The 

brigades deployed forward as motorized rifle units to 

support crumbling Soviet units on the border and to block 

26 
deep penetrations of advancing German panzer units. The 

surprise of the German offensive an,d the Soviet command’s 

general paralysis during the first few weeks of war 

prevented a concerted Soviet counteroffensive using Soviet 

airborne units. Consequently, airborne units went into 

combat in piecemeal fashion as reinforcements in critical 

areas. Few had the opportunity to conduct airborne 

missions they had trained for. 

The first airborne units to see combat were those of 

the 5th Airborne Corps in the Pre-Baltic 

District. Military In the midst of field maneuvers when the 

Germans attacked, 

Bezugly , the airborne troops, under Gen. I. S. 

cooperated first with the 21st Mechanized Corps 

and then with the 27th Army in unsuccessful attempts to 

halt the slashing German armor advances. After suffering heavy casualties south of Daugavpils, the corps, on High Command orders, moved from the Northwestern Front 

(formerly Pre-Baltic Military District) to the Moscow 

Military District on 15 August.4 Maj. Gen. A. S. 

Zhadov’s 4th Airborne Corps of the Western 

Military Special District fought a bitter six-day defensive 

action, attempting to hold German Army Group Center at the 

Berezina River. After the Germans had forced the river , 4th Airborne joined the 13th Army to defend the approaches to Smolensk. The 214th Airborne Brigade, 4th Airborne 

Corps, under Cal. A. F. Levashev, took part in the defense 

of Minsk and fought for two months in the first great German encirclement of Soviet forces. Few men of the 

brigade survived.5 

Farther south, in the Kiev Special Military District 

(Southwestern Front), Maj. Gen. M. A. Usenko’s 1st 

Airborne Corps also fought defensive battles alongside the 

Soviet 5th and 6th armies as German Army Group South 

battered its way toward Kiev. Reinforced by 2d and 3d 

Airborne corps, defense of Kiev. 

the 1st also participated in the futile 

Both the 1st and 2d Airborne corps were 

caught in the German encirclement of Kiev in AugustSeptember 1941 and suffered such grievous losses that both 

units were disestablished (only to be re-created later). The 3d Airborne Corps, also encircled at Konotop, fought its way out. In November, it was reorganized into the 

87th Rifle Division under Col. A. I. Rodimtsev (former 

commander of 5th Airborne Brigade) .6 The 87th Rifle 

Division, later redesignated 13th Guards Rifle Division, 

achieved lasting fame at Stalingrad and elsewhere. In 

summary, during the opening months of war, actual airborne 

operations were limited to occasional diversionary airdrops, as elite Soviet airborne troops fought as 

infantrymen. 

27 

- 
Organization and Employment 

After the tragic border battles, only the 4th and 5th 

Airborne corps intact. in the Moscow region remained relatively In August and September 1941, the High Command reorganized the airborne forces and redefined the 

guidelines for their future employment. A 4 September order of the FeopTe’s Commissariat of Defense created the 

higher level Administration of the Command of Airborne 

Forces to replace the older lower level airborne force 

administration. The order also withdrew all airborne 

forces from front command and subordinated them to the new 

administration, now commanded by Maj m Gen. V. A. 

Glazunov, Henceforth, airborne units would be used only with specific Stavka* 

missions: 7 approval to perform the following 

e Cooperate with ground forces in encircling and 

destroying large enemy groups. 

* Disorganize enemy command and control and rear area 

logistics facilities. 

@ Secure and hold important terrain, crossings, and 

points in the enemy rear. 

l Secure and destroy enemy airfields. 

0 Secure landings of naval infantry and river 

crossings. 

To bolster the depleted airborne force structure, a 

new airborne brigade TOE strengthened the parachute 

battalion (see table 7), and five new airborne corps (6th 

through 10th) were organized using this new brigade TOE. 

The Soviets reorganized or reinforced the older corps (1st 

through 5th) with personnel and equipment and created five 

new maneuver airborne brigades. By June 1942, creation of 

these new units was completed. The new administration 

also established schools and courses to train cadre for 

these units.8 The Stavka formed nine separate aviation 

transport squadrons ande separate aviation detachments 

to perform the critical function of transporting airborne 

units I During 1942, these units combined to form two 

separate aviation-glider regiments and two aviation 

transport regiments e uipped with U-2, R-5, TB-1, TB-3, 

and FS-84 aircraft. 3 Because of heavy losses of 

aircraft early in the war, the lack of sufficient aircraft 

posed a serious problem for the airborne forces. 

*Supreme headquarters--in essence, Stalin. 

28 
Table 7. Airborne Brigade, 1941 

4 parachute battalions (678 men each) 

3 parachute companies 1 mortar company 

1 sapper demolition platoon 1 machine gun platoon 1 flamethrower platoon 

1 signal platoon 

Source: Lisov, Desantniki, 39. 

Because of these reorganization measures, the Soviet 

airborne force numbered about 200,000 personnel by the end 

of 1941. While the formation of the new airborne force 

was underway, 

forces 

the first concerted large-scale use of those 

occurred (see table 8). During the Soviet 

counteroffensive at Moscow in December 

1942, 

1941 and January the Stavka marshaled all available forces in an 

attempt to =German Army Group Center away from Moscow 

and destroy the German army group. While committing the 

bulk of its rifle forces in an offensive against the 

Germans, the Stavka marshaled its scarce mobile forces in 

an attempt to convert tactical successes into operational 

success and even strategic victory. Into 

cauldron of battle around Moscow, 

the boiling 

the Stavka threw mobile 

groups consisting of ski battalions, cavalry divisions and 

corps, its few precious tank brigades, and its airborne 

forces, as well. 

airborne 

In addition to the role played by 

forces in conducting minor tactical and 

diversionary operations on main army attack axes, 

ultimately an entire airborne corps dropped into German 

Army Group Center's rear near Vyaz'ma to aid in the 

encirclement and destruction of that enemy army group (see 

chaps. 3 and 4). mobility 

At this stage of the war, the limited 

and staying power of Soviet forces thwarted 

Stavka's ambitious plans, 

n fight a 

and airborne forces ultimately four-month battle of encirclement before 

breaking free of the German rear and rejoining Soviet main 

forces. While major airborne operations went on near 

Moscow, a smaller tactical drop occurred at Kereh in theCrimea. 

After the extensive airborne activity during the 

winter campaign of 1941-42, airborne forces underwent 

another major reorganization the following summer. 

Responding to events in southern Russia, where German 

troops had opened a major offensive that would culminate 

in the Stalingrad battles, the ten airborne corps, as part of the Stavka strategic reserves, deployed southward. 

Furthermore, the Stavka converted all ten airborne corps 

29 
Table 8. Soviet Airborne Operations in the Moscow Region, 

1941-42 

Date 

14-15 Dee 41 

2-4 Jan 42 

18-22 Jan 42 

27-31 Jan 42 

13-23 Feb 42 

16-17 Feb 42 

26-18 Apr 42 

29-30 May 42 

*See chap 6. 

**See chap 3. 

***See chap 4. 

Location 

Ter aeva 

S Y oboda 

Medyn 

2helan"ye 

Ozerechnya- Tabory 

Velikopol'ye- ZheLan"ye 

Rzhev 

Svintsovo 

10 km 

south of 

Dorogobuzh 

Airborne Force -11-- 

One Bn, 214th Abn Bde, 4th 

Abn Corps* 

One Bn, 201st Abn Bde, 5th 

Abn Corps One Bn, 250th Rifle Regt* 

1st and 2d Bns, 2Olst Abn 

Bde, 5th Abn Corps 250th Abn Regt 

8th Abn Bde, 4th Abn 

Corps** 

One Bn, 8th Abn Bde, 4th 

Abn Corps 9th and 214th Abn Bdes, 4th 

Abn Corps*** 

4th Bn, 204th Abn Bde, 1st 

Abn Corps* 

4th Bn, 23d Abn Bde, 10th 

Abn Corps*** 

23d Abn Bde, 10th Abn Corps 

211th Abn Bde, 1st Abn 

corps*** 

30 
into guards rifle divisions to bolster Soviet forces in 

the south. Nine of these divisions participated in the 

battles around Stalingrad, and one took part in the 

defense of the northern Caucasus region. In addition, 

five maneuver airborne brigades and one airborne regiment, 

all at full TOE strength, reinforced Soviet defensive 

efforts in the Caucasus as rifle units (see table 9).10 

Table 9. Conversion of Airborne Units, Summer 1942 

Old 

Airborne 

Designation 

Gds Abn Corps 1st 

E 

4th 

5th 

6th 

7th 

8th 

9th 

10th 

Abn Brie 

1st 

2d 

::h 

5th 

4th Res Abn 

Regt 

Source: Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 146-79. 

New 

DesGation -- 

Gds Rifle Div 

37th 

32d' 

33d 

38th 

39th 

40th 

34th 

35th 

36th 

41st 

Rifle Bde 

5th 

6th 

7th 

8th 

9th 

10th Rifle Bde 

Commander 

Maj. Gen. V. G. Zholydev Cal. M. F. Tikhonov 

COl. A. I. Utvenko 

Cal. A. A. Onufriev 

Maj. Gen S. S. Gur'ev 

Maj. Gen. A. I. Pastrevich 

Maj. Gen. I. I. Gubarevich 

Maj. Gen. V. A. Glazkov 

COl. M. L. Denisenko 

Cal. N. P. Ivanov 

Names of commanders are 

not available 

Former airborne units achieved considerable 

distinction in the bitter fighting of fall 1942, 

vindicating Stalin's decision to use airborne units in a 

ground role. Haj. Gen. V. G. Zholydev's 37th Guards Rifle 

LII;ision fought tenaciously in defense of the Barricady Tractor factories at Stalingrad and suffered 90- 

percent casualties while exacting a heavy toll on the 

31 
Germans.ll Maj. Gen. S. S: Gur’ev’s 39th Guards Rifle 

Division participated in the equally tenacious defense of 

the Red October plant. Likewise, Maj. Gen. A. I. 

Rodimtsev’s 13th Guards Rifle Division won lasting fame in 

the street fighting for control of downtown Stalingrad. 

Although it had committed virtually all airborne 

forces to ground fighting in southern Russia, the Stavka 

still foresaw the necessity of conducting actual airborne 

operations later during the war. 

of fulfilling airborne missions, 

To have a force capable 

new airborne corps (lst, 

the Stavka created eight 

4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 

10th) in the fall of 1942. 

these Beginning in December 1942, 

corps became ten guards airborne divisions (two formed from the 1st Airborne Corps and the three existing 

separate maneuver airborne brigades). The new guards airborne divisions trained in airborne techniques, and all 

personnel jumped three to ten times during training. 

Training stressed rear area operations, mutual cooperation with front ground and air forces, antitank warfare round 

defensive techniques, and use of initiative. Y? 

February 1943, as Soviet forces attempted to explo:: German defeats in the winter battles of 1942-43, the 

Stavka dispatched all of these airborne divisions to the 

Northwestern Front where they fought at Staraya Russa and 

Demyansk as part of 1st Shock Army, 68th Army, and the 

Khozin Group. By April and May 1943, in response to 

prospects for renewed German offensive action in the Kursk 

region, the airborne divisions had redeployed southward. 

Seven divisions (2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th) had 

moved to reinforce the Central Front by the end of May, and the remaining three (lst, 10th) and 7th) joined the 

37th and 52d armies at Kharkov in August.14 Dur in the 

Kursk battles, airborne forces a 

fighting, in particular participated in eavy the 4th Guards Airborne Division, 

which defended successfully against German 9th Army panzer forces at Ponyri, and the 9th Guards Airborne Division, 

which participated in the Soviet armored 

German 4th Panzer Army at Prokhorovka. victory over 

After the defeat of German forces at Kursk, the bulk 

of the airborne divisions joined forces to the Dnepr River. 

in the pursuit of German 

Even as ten guards airborne 

divisions fought at the front, new 

formed in the rear areas. 

airborne brigades 

brigades formed and 

In April and May 1943, twenty trained for future airborne 

operations. Most of these brigades had become six new 

guards airborne divisions (11th through 16th) by September 1943.15 The Stavka) however, earmarked three of these 

airborne brigamor use in an airborne operation to 

cross the Dnepr River. 

32 

- 
As Soviet forces approached the new German defensive 

line on the Dnepr, offensive 

the problem of securing bridgeheads for 

operations across the river was paramount. Advanced elements of Soviet forces seized a number of 

small bridgeheads, but only light infantry formations were 

able to cross into these footholds. Larger bridgeheads free from German interdiction were necessary to build 

bridges across the Dnepr and to introduce heavy armored 

forces needed to continue the offensive. 

bridgehead , To gain a larger the Stavka ordered three airborne brigades to 

conduct a major airborne operation across the Dnepr River 

near Velikeyi Bukr in. 

use of airborne 

This second, and last, operational forces failed because of inadequate preparations, 

forces, poor reconnaissance, clumsy coordination of and many of the same reasons that had caused the 

Vyaz ‘ma operation to fail (see chap. 5). The Soviets 

would conduct no further large-scale airborne operations. Instead, airborne forces continued to fight in a ground combat role. 

After the failure of the Dnepr operation, the original 

ten guards airborne divisions participated in campaigns on 

the left and right banks of the Ukraine, in particular as 

part of 5th Army at Kirovograd, at Korsun-Shevchenkovskii, 

and in the advance to the Dnestr River. In January 1944, 

the newer guards airborne divisions became rifle divisions 

within 37th Guards Rifle Corps, 

liberate Karelia .16 

7th Army, and fought to 

In the summer and fall of 1944, 

seven guards airborne divisions, fighting as infantry and 

as part of 4th Guards Army, joined in the rout of German 

and Rumanian forces at Yassy-Kishinev and marched with 

Soviet forces into Hungary. 

Attempts to revive large airborne units began in late 

summer 1944. In August , the Stavka formed the 37th, 38th, 

and 39th Guards Air’borne corps. By October, the newly 

formed corps had combined into a separate airborne arm 

under Maj . Gen. I. I. Zatevakhin (see table 10). 1 s 

However, because of the growing need for well-trained 

ground units, the new army did not endure long as an 

airborne unit. In December, 

separate airborne army 

the Stavka reorganized the 

Gen. V. V. Glagolev, 

into the 9tErds Army of Col. 

and all divisions were renumbered as 

guards rifle divisions. As testimony to the elite nature 

of airborne-trained units, the Stavka held the 9th Guards 

Army out of defensive actions, 

exploitation during offensives.18using&hiL o~~bo~~~ 

divisions, separately or in 

elements of groups, participated as 

frontal ground forces in the remaining 

cam aigns 

l!z 

of the war. Throughout the rest of the war, 

air orne operations were limited to low-level tactical or 

33 

----------.---- --- 
minor diversionary operations, usually conducted by airlanded ground force units. Of note were the numerous 

airlandings that occurred after the collapse of Japanese 

resistance in Manchuria in August 1945.* 

Table 10. Separate Airborne Army, 1944 

Separate Airborne Army, Haj. Gen. I. I. Zatevakhin 

37th Guards Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. I?. V. Mironov 

13th Guards Airborne Division 

98th Guards Airborne Division 

99th Guards Airborne Division 

38th Guards Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. A. I. Utvenko 

11th Guards Airborne Division 

12th Guards Airborne Division 

16th Guards Airborne Division 

39th Guards Airborne Corps, Lt. Gen. M. F. Tikhonov 

8th Guards Airborne Division 

14th Guards Airborne Division 

100th Guards Airborne Division 

Source: Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 238. 

Although the bulk of the airborne force structure 

consisted of guards airborne divisions organized and 

fighting as guards rifle divisions, the Stavka continued 

to recognize the need for specialized airborne units. 

Conse uently, 

2 

it continued to organize separate airborne 

briga es similar to those of 1941 with 3,345 men, six 

76-mm guns, eight 45-mm antitank guns, twenty-eight 37-mm 

antiaircraft guns, twenty-four antiaircraft machine guns, 

thirty-six 

rifles-19 ~Eav,Y,rm~che~Z?, gtubnes'guaatdds 

eighty-one antitank 

airborne divisions 

and separate airborne brigades that had not been 

demobilized would provide the nucleus of the Soviet 

postwar airborne force. 

*See Lt. COl. David M. Glantz, Au ust Storm: 

-I+-- 

The 

Soviet __.___ I945 -_ .- Strateeie ---_-- -- Offensive -~~-~ in Mane uria. Leavenworth 

Papers no. I and August Storm: 

Operational Combat in Manchuria 

Soviet Tactical and 

no. 8 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: i, ~~~~1945 , Leavenworth Papers Combat Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, February 1983 

and June 1983, respectively). 

34 
Thus) from 1942 on, wartime realities demanded that 

airborne forces be used repeatedly fighting along the front. as infantry in ground 

Earlier airborne operations on 

a grand scale had failed because of the light infantry 

nature of those forces, the paucity of aviation available 

to deliver units into battle, the absence of technology required to guarantee accurate delivery, and the inability 

of the light units to compete with the firepower of German 

formations. In 1944, transport aircraft 

carrying the heavy equipment an 

capable of 

airborne unit would 

require to survive and to fulfill its mission were still 

in short supply * Nanpower shortage ruled out 

expenditures of personnel on 

heavy 

airborne operations whose 

chances of success the Soviets rated as only marginal. Thus, strategic and operational use of airborne forces 

faded into memory. The Soviets still used occasional 

tactical assaults, particularly diversionary 

because 

drops, 

those types of airborne missions 

successful earlier in the war (see chap. 6). 

had proved 

In spite of the diminished use of 

airdrops, large-scale Soviet military theory still recognized the 

value of such airborne operations under the 

circumstances. 

proper 

Declarations on the theoretical use of 

airborne forces changed remarkably little from the 

missions outlined in regulations of the mid-thirties. The 

Field Regulation of 1944 echoed the Field Regulation of 

1936 by declaring in Article 34, “Airborne troops are 

means at the disposal of the High Command. characterized by a high degree of mobility, They are 

powerful 

automatic armament, ability to appear quickly and suddenly 

and to conduct battle in the rear of the enemy.““20 The 

regulation detailed the following airborne missions: 

0 Cooperate behind enemy lines with ground troops, 

jointly with partisan detachments, to encircle and utterly defeat the enemy and to combat approaching enemy reserves. 

e Seize important enemy rear lines (boundaries) and 

crossings that protect enemy troops. 

o Seize and destroy enemy air bases. 

* Break up enemy rear command and control 

establishments. 

* Protect seaborne troop regions. landings by seizing coastal 

Having articulated the precise missions of airborne 

forces, the regulations added the important caveat that 

“successful employment of airborne troops requires careful 

35 
preparation and effective cooperation with 

partisan detachments, and mobile troops. “21 aviation, 

The combat 

experiences of Vyaz’ma in the winter of 1941-42 and of the 

Dnepr in 1943 were thus carefully woven into the new 

regulations. The regulations also pointed out that 

success in a frontal attack could be achieved, in part, by “‘decisive actions in the rear of the enemy with airborne 

actions.“ Paragraph 200 of the Field Regulation of 1944 

reiterated the airborne missions it had already listed and 

amplified what airborne forces could accomplish in a 

general offensive; paragraph 416, on pursuit operations, tasked airlandings to “seize the defiles, crossings, road 

centers, and commanding heights and hold them until the 

approach of mobile units. “22 Although airborne 

operations from 1944 to the war’s end would be of 

extremely limited scope, the 1944 regulation captured the 

essence of war experiences and passed their legacy into . the postwar years when peace and a restored economy would 

it 

rovide airborne forces the means to fulfill the missions 

or which they were mast suited at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 

36 
CHAPTER 3 

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT: VYAZ’MA, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1942 

s&rate&c Context 

The Soviets conducted two operational level airborne 

operations during the Great Patriotic War. The first and 

largest in scale and aim occurred during the Soviet winter 

offensive of January-February 1942; 

push German 

ft was designed to 

Army Group Center away from Moscow and, if 

possible, to destroy it. The first phase of the Soviet 

Moscow counteroffensive began on 5 December (see map 3, 

p* 213). After a month of severe fighting in bitterly cold weather, Soviet forces drove German troops from the 

northern and southern approaches to Moscow, freeing Kkin 

and Kalinin in the north and Tula and Kaluga in the south 

and threatening the flanks of German Army Group Center. 

During this first phase, the Soviets used a tactical 

airborne operation west of Klin to facilitate the 

successful ground advance by dropping an airborne 

battalion in the German rear area near Teryaeva Sloboda 

( see chap. 6) e By Late December, with Soviet forces 

approaching Rzhev, Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Medyn, Yukhnov, and Kirov, the momentum of the Soviet offensive had 

ebbed. 

Despite the loss of momentum, the Soviet offensive had 

inf kicted materiel 

forces L 

and psychological damage on German 

German personnel and equipment losses were heavy, 

and Soviet forces threatened to break through the thinning German lines in three distinct sectors of Army Group 

Center. South of Kaluga, the Soviet 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, 50th Army, and LOth Army tore a major gap between 

German 2d Panzer Army and 4th Army. The 12th, 13th, and 

43d Army corps of German 4th Army withdrew westward toward 

Yukhnov in heavy snow and bitter cold and under intense 

Soviet pressure. The Soviets threatened to encircle the 

43d Army Corps from both flanks. The 4th Army rear 

service units and ad hoc lines of communication units 

Et 

ieced together loose defenses east and southeast of 

ukhnov, and depleted units of 4th Army’s 40th Panzer 

Corps (19th and lQth Motorized* divisions) attempted to 

plug the yawning gap between Yukhnov and Sukhinichi.1 

*Panzer grenadier. 
At Maloyaroslavets, north of Kaluga, the Soviet 33d 

and 5th armies pressured 4th Panzer Army and 4th Army’s 

left flank. By early January, Soviet forces had breached 

4th Army’s defenses on a fifteen-kilometer front between 

Maloyaroslavets and Borovsk. The Soviet thrust separated 

4th Army’s left flank unit, the 20th Army Corps, from its 

parent unit, and 20th Army Corps was unable to repair the 

breach.2 

Meanwh i le , farther north, Col. Gen. I. S. Konev’s 

Kalinin Front posed the third serious threat to Army Group Center e Konev ’ s assault forced German 9th Army to 

withdraw fifty kilometers from Kalinin toward Rzhev and 

showed no evidence of weakening. 

Cal. Gen. Franz Halder, chief of staff of the German 

army, recorded growing German desperation in his diary. 

Noting that 29 December was “a very bad day,” Halder also 

wrote: 

. * . in AGp. [Army Group] Center, however, the 

enemy ’ s superiority on the fronts of Second Army and Second Panzer Army is, beginning to tell. We 

did succeed in sealing the penetrations, but the 

situation on the overextended front, at which the 

enemy keeps hammering with ever new concentrations, is very difficult in view of the state 

of exhaustion of our troops. . . .3 

For Halder, 30 December was *‘again a hard day’” and 

31 December was “‘an arduous one,” with Soviet forces 

pressuring 43d Army Corps of 4th Army in the Yukhnov 

sector and 4th Panzer Army in the Maloyaroslavets area. 

On 2 January, a ‘“day of vehement fighting,‘” Halder noted, 

“In Four%h and Ninth Armies . e . the situation is taking 

critical turn. The breakthrough north of 

galoyaroslavets has split the front and we cannot at the 

moment see any way of restoring it again.“4 

The Soviet 33d Army breakthrough between 

Maloyaroslavets and Borovsk, 50th Army’s penetration south 

of Yukhnov, and the Kalinin Front’s thrust on German 9th 

Army’s Left flank were major threats %o the coherence of 

German Army Group Genter ‘s defenses. Because of this 

crisis, Adolf Hitler became involved in operational and 

tactical decisions by insisting that German forces 

maintain their positions or counterattack. This 

insistence inexorably led to the German decision to stand 

fast in a h$y2hc;g defense throughout the winter and 

spring of . Hitler’s orders forced German 

commanders to improvise measures to restore a coherent 

defense. The 4th Army’s 43d Army Corps conducted a 

38 
tenacious, though harrowing, withdrawal toward Yukhnov, 

while 40th Plotorized Corps struggled to erect barriers to 

block the advance of Soviet 50th Army and 1st Guards 

Cavalry’ Corps southwest of Yukbnov. Cut off from 4th Army and attached to 4th Panzer Army, 20th Army Corps failed in 

separate attempts to repair the breached German defenses 

west of Maloyaroslavets. The German counterattacks, 

however, combined with the harsh weather and tenuous 

Soviet supply system to slow the momentum of the Soviet 

advance. The German situation remained critical, but not 

disastrous. 

To restore momentum and to deliver the coup de grace against the reeling German forces, Stalin and the Stavka 

marshaled the remaining strength of the Soviet forces in a 

final, desperate attempt to encircle German Army Group Center with a close and wide envelopment. The KaLinin and 

Western fronts would press German forces westward from 

Moscow) while the left wing of the Western Front and right wing of the Kalinin Front would attack from south and 

north to meet at Vyaz'ma and encircle the bulk of German 

Army Group Center. Together with these attacks, the 

reinforced Northwestern Front, on the right of the Kalinin 

Front, would strike southward to seize Smolensk, deep in 

German Army Group Centerts rear. BY capitalizing on 

German losses at Moscow and the German distaste for winter 

battle, Soviet forces would achieve operational and, 

perhaps, strategic victory. Memories of Russia's 

destruction of Charles XII's Swedish army at Poltava more 

than two centuries before and Napoleon's army more than 

one century earlier mesmerized Soviet leaders. Yet, in 

those two earlier epochs, Russian armies had not been so 

seriously defeated as they were in the disas'trous months 

after June 1941, when only the greatest of sacrifices had 

saved Hoscow. Now, with scarcely any rest, those ragged survivors of the opening months of the campaign again would be called on to conduct deep, sustained operations 

against the foe that had already wrought such terrible 

havoc on them. 

For his January offensive, Stalin massed his 

understrength rifle divisions, rifle brigades, and tank 

brigades on a broad front to strike against the entire 

German line. On main directions,* he assembled his 

dwindling mobile assets, a handful of tank brigades, 

cavalry corps and divisions, and ski battalions, which, 

with rifle division support, would form the shock groups 

*Napravlenie means direction--axis in English. 

39 

c ----- 
and mobile groups for - converting tactical success into 

operational victory. Already weakened by the battles on 

the close approaches to Moscow, these groups of men, 

tanks, and horses would carry the burden of leading the 

advance into the depths of the German defenses. The deep 

snow, subzero temperature, and fierce German resistance 

would test the mettle of these units. Their staying power 

would dictate success or failure of the offensive. 

Rifle forces of the Soviet fronts had the task of 

attacking German forces and making initial penetrations 

through German lines. To guarantee successful encirclement of German forces, mobile groups would advance into 

these penetrations, racing to sow confusion in the German 

rear and to seize key objectives before the Germans could 

recover from the initial breakthroughs. As required, 

airborne forces would go into combat either to assist 

rifle forces in making the initial penetrations or to 

reinforce the mobile groups once they had advanced deep behind German lines. With mobile forces successfully 

committed to the German rear, rifle forces would follow to 

isolate German units and destroy them piecemeal. To these 

ends, in the midst of one of the harshest winters in 

Moscow’s history’ Stalin ordered the unleashing of his .’ 

forces. 

Stavka orders issued on 7 January 1942 outlined the 

missions of those units 

offensive on 

participating in the general the western direction.6 The overall 

objective was to encircle and then to destroy German Army Group Center. Soviet armies of the Kalinin Front’s right 

wing, namely, 39th and 29th armies, would attack from 

northwest of Rzhev toward Sychevka and Vyaz ‘ma against the 

right flank of German 9th Army. The 11th Cavalry Corps 

would lead the Kalinin Front advance. The lOth, 50th, 

49th’ ,and 43d armies (from‘south to north) of the Western 

Front’s left wing would attack toward Yukhnov and Vyaz’ma, 

led by a mobile group consisting of 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. The attack would strike German 4th Army and the 

i;j;;ion between 4th Army and 2d Panzer Army to the 

The remaining armies of the Western Front (from 

south’to north--33d, 5th, 16th, and 20th armies), with 2d 

Guards Cavalry Corps as a mobile group, would attack 

westward toward Sychevka, Gzhatsk, and Vyaz’ma. The 33d 

Army thrust would strike the junction of 4th Panzer Army 

and 4th Army. The 30th Army, 31st Army’ and 1st Shock 

Army of the Kalinin Front’s left wing would pressure the 

German 9th Ar‘my between Rzhev and Volokolamsk. Several 

tactical airborne drops in the rear of German forces on 

Soviet main attack axes would assist the Soviet advances. 

The Stavka planned a large operational airbotrhnee ,d,“,“,p in 

the region southwest -of Vyaz’ma, deep in Of 

40 

--- 
German 4th Panzer Army and 4th Army to complete the 

overql.1 Vyaz*ma encirclement. Precise objectives and 

timing of the airborne drop would depend on the progress of the main offensive. 

On 8 January, the Soviet offensive began in the 

.Kalinin Front's sector and, during the next few days, extended to other sectors. On the eighth, the 39th Army of the Kalinin Front smashed through German 9th Army defensive positions west of Rzhev and advanced fift 

kilometers south toward Vyaz'ma. The 29th Army and Ilt i: 

Cavalry Gorps rushed to exploit the penetration. The 11th 

Cavalry Corps raced 110 kilometers to the western 

outskirts of Vyaz'ma, thus threatening the rear of German 

9th Army. The right wing of the Western Front joined the 

10 January assault, with 20th Army, 1st Shock Army, and 

16th Army pushing German 9th Army units westward through Shakhovskaya toward Gzhatsk. The same day, 5th Army z;i 

33d Army of the Western Front joined the attack 

threatened German 4th Panzer Army units at Mozhaisk and 

Vereya. Simultaneously with the advance of other Western _ Front armies, the 43d, 49th, 5Oth, and 10th armies (from 

north to south) penetrated German 4th Army positions east 

of Yukhnov and Mosal'sk, moved on toward the critical 

Moscow-Warsaw highway near Yukhnov, and drove toward 

Kirov, thus encircling German forces at Sukhinichi, 

German 4th Army, with its north and south flanks turned, 

withdrew toward Medyn. A forty-kilometer gap, formed 

i;;;;en 4th Army and 2d Panzer Army on 4th Army s right . The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps entered the gap ;; 

exploit across the Moscow-Warsaw highway to south 

Vyaz”ma. 

During the initial phases of the new offensive, the 

Soviets launched two tactical airborne assaults to assist 

the advances of ground forces. On 3 and 4 January, to 

assist the advance of 43d and 49th armies, battalion-size 

airborne assaults secured objectives in German 4th ArmyIs 

rear area at Bol'shoye FatEyanovo, near MyatLevo, and in 

the Gusevo area north of Medyn. Both airborne forces 

eventually joined forces with advancing Soviet armies. A 

second airborne assault occurred on 18 January in the 

Zhel-an'ye area west of Yukhnov, where a regimental-size 

force dropped to assist 1st Guards Cavalry Gorps in 

crossing the Moscow-Warsaw highway southwest of Yukhnov. 

This assault was successful, and airborne troops linked up 

with 1st Guards Cavalry forces, with whom they would 

continue to operate. 

Despite initial successes, the advance had slowed by 

late January. Soviet units were tired and nearly out of 

stock. Although mobile forces had penetrated into the 

41 

,~ 
German rear on at least three axes, they lacked the 

strength to secure their objectives. Compounding these 

difficulties, German counterattacks had delayed the 

advance of main frontal forces and cut off communication 

between these mobile forces and main front units. 

Qr iginally threatened by strategic and 

encirclements, operational 

now the Germans threatened to encircle the 

exploiting Soviet mobile units. Marshal A. M. Vasilevsky, then a member af the Stavka, described the situation: 

At the beginning of 1942, having correctly assessed front conditions as favorable for a 

continuation of the offensive, the High Command inadequately took into account real Red Army capabilities. As a result, the nine armies at 

the disposal of the Stavka were almost evenly divided among all strate ic 

f 

directions. In the 

course of the winter 0 fensive, Soviet forces 

expended all reserves created with such 

difficulty in the fall and 

winter * Assigned missions thceoulyginning ,oz 

not 

achieved.7 

Vasilevsky referred to the deteriorating situation of 

late Jan;;rey (see m;iv4btp. 43). By then, the Germans had 

halted marn advance and launched violent 

counterattacks against forward Soviet positions. The 

Kalinin Front offensive ground to a halt short of Rzhev, 

Sychevka, and Vyaz’ma. Renewed German counterattacks 

southwest of Rzhev threatened the overextended front’s 

shock group of 29th and 39th armies. Northwest of 

Vyaz’ma, 11th Cavalry Corps (lath, 24th, and 82d Cavalry 

divisions and 2d Guards Motorized Rifle Division) harassed 

German forces but was unable to cut permanently the 

Smolensk, Vyaz’mat and Ma7,5dcow highway . Armies of the 

Western Front’s right center took Mozhaisk and 

approached, but could not seize, Gzhatsk. Lead elements 

of Lt. Gen. M. 6. Yefremov’s 33d Army penetrated between 

German 4th Panzer Army and 4th Army defenses north of 

Yukhnov and moved forward toward Vyaz’ma. The left wing 

of the Western Front swept south and west of Yukhnov 

against German 4th Army but failed to take the city. Maj. Gen. P. A. Belov’s 1st Guards Cavalry Corps advanced on 

Mosal’sk. To complicate matters further. the Germans, 

though encircled at 

mounted a relief 

Front’s left flank. 

Sukhinichi, stoutly resisted and soon 

effort that threatened the Western 

On 19 January, 

occupied positions Zubsov and Gshatsk, 

German 9th, ,4th Panzer f and 4theisrtmiE; 

running from north of Rzhev, 

to east and south of Yukhnov. The 4th 

Panzer Army’s 9th, 7th, and 20th Army corps defended from 

42 
vojga liver KAtlNIN 

FRRNT 

20 ARMY 

;;; ‘OBJECTIVE 

$ .4 ABN CORPS 

Map 4. Situation Facing the Western Front, 25 January 1942, and Concept of 

the Airborne Operation 

43 

k 
northeast of Gzhatsk to twenty-five kilometers north of 

Medyn. The 4th Army's 12th, 13th, 57th, and 43d Army 

corps defended along the Shanya River west of Medyn in a 

semicircle east, southeast, and south of Yukhnov.8 The 

20th Army Corps right flank divisions (167th and 255th 

Infantry divisions) and the 57th Army Corps left flank 

divisions (98th and 52d Infantry divisions) tried in vain 

to close the twenty-kilometer breach in German defenses 

north of Medyn (a breach occupied by Soviet 33d Army).9 

Southwest of Yukhnov, scattered 40th Motorized Corps units 

and rear service units of 43d Army Corps tried to halt the 

Soviet 50th Army advance toward the critical Moscow-Warsaw 

highway and the Vyaz'ma-Bryansk rail line. German control 

of the . Rollbahn 

Rollbahn y"fs",i Vyaz'ma t'o 

well as 

tiolensk) 

the Moscow-Minsk 

-- , was critical for the 

;;f;i;rcement and resupply of German Army Group Center * Hence 

Soviet'objective. cutting the Rollbahnen became a primary -. 

In the face of these developments, the Stavka issued 

new orders. 

Vyaz ‘ma 

It believed a large airborne operation in the 

area would reinforce advancing Soviet mobile 

forces, destroy the cohesion of German 4th Panzer and 4th 

armies, and enable Soviet forces to take that city. Simultaneously, the main Soviet fronts would resume 

offensive operations to support the advancing mobile 

groups. The Stavka gave priority to 33d and 43d armies 

attacking toward Vya'zma attacking 

from the east and to 50th Army with 1st Guards Cavalry Corps toward the 

Moscow-Warsaw highway and Vyaz'ma from the southeast. 

Onerational Plannina 

On 15 January 1942, the Stavka made the decision to 

insert Maj. Gen. A. F. Levashemth Airborne Corps into 

the area southwest of Vyaz'ma (see map 5, p. 214). It was 

a bold decision because it 

parachute drops 

involved a series of night conducted in the harshest of winter 

conditions with temperatures well below zero. The 

lO,OOO-man 4th Airborne Corps (8th, 9th, and 214th 

Airborne brigades) was then based near Moscow. This corps 

was one of the most experienced--surviving--airborne units, and its commander, General Levashev, had previously operated for a long period in the enemy rear. Also, its 

*Rollbahnen were roads designated as main axes of 

motorized transportation. The Germans prohibited all 

animal transport and marching columns 

roads. 

from using these 

44 
214th Brigade had spent three months encircled in 

Belorussia. The projected airborne assaults would take 

off fram three airfields near Kaluga (Grabtsevo, Zhashkovo, and Rzhavets), 

behind the front.10 

some thirty to forty kilometers 

The staff of the airborne forces, in close 

coordination with the air force, planned the operation 

with part-icular emphasis on operational objectives, unit 

missions, force composition, aviation and combat support, and logistical considerations. Unfortunately, they paid little attention to the conduct of ground operations, specifically to a coordinated linkup with front forces. 

Participating agencies shared responsibilities for the 

operation. The commander of airborne forces, Maj. Gen. V. 

A. Glazunov, supervised preparation of the airborne 

force. The air force commander handled the timing of the 

drop, while the Western Front commander, General of the 

Army 6. K. Zhukov, had ope.rational control of the forces 

after landing. The air force commander had averall 

control of the operation from his Moscow headquarters, 

although he established a forward command 

Kaluga.11 

post at 

On 17 January, General Glazunov assigned specific 

missions to General Levashev of 4th Airborne Corps.12 

The 4th Corps would cooperate with the Kalinin and Western 

fronts to encircle and destroy German Army Group Center. 

The main corps force would land southwest of Vyaz‘ma to 

cut German communications between Vyaz 'ma and Smolensk, 

while a secondary force would interdict the withdrawal of 

German units from Vyaz'ma to the west '(see map 6, 

e 

215). To confuse 

ication 

the Germans about the precise 

of the main drop, the plan authorized several 

auxiliary reconnaissance-diversionary landings spread over 

wide areas of the German rear. 

Only fragmented German forces were in the area west 

and southwest of Vyaz'ma. These forces sought shelter 

from the snow and bitter cold in villages along the 

Moscow-Minsk and Vyaz'ma-Yukhnov roads. Garrisons of up 

to battalion size defended populated points alon the 

major communications routes. Smaller units de ended B 

supply and maintenance installations in villages up to 

twenty kilometers off the highways. By mid-January, 11th 

Panzer Division had general responsibility for security of 

the Rollbahn west of Vyaz'ma beyond the Dnepr River 

crossing. Although still committed to action farther 

east, 3d Motorized Division had units patrolling the 

highways east and south of Vyaz'ma. In late January, the 

309th Infantry Regiment (208th Infantry Division) 

45 
garrisoned the Rollbahn west of Vyaz'ma, and, after 30 

January, 5th Panzer Division units moved into Vyaz'ma and 

the region southwest of the city. These scattered forces 

would be the first to face the Soviet airborne assault.13 

The Soviet airborne landing was scheduled to begin with daylight drop of a battalion-size forward 

detachmaent. It would secure landing sites by the end of 

the first day for the corps's main force. The main drop would occur during darkness to minimize the risk of enemy attack. Originally, the operation was to begin on 21 

January, but slow movement of the corps into the staging 

area had forced a postponement of the drop until 26-27 

January. The corps moved to Kaluga over rail lines cut by the Germans, who had also destroyed the main bridge over 

the Oka River. Consequently, corps units had to ford the 

river, carrying their supplies with them. This entire 

movement to Kaluga had been poorly planned and was 

executed with almost complete disregard for secrecy or 

concealment. Supplies were left uncamouflaged, and 

personnel wore conspicuous new winter uniforms (other troops had not yet been issued them). Moreover, because 

winter weather had driven command posts into villages and 

towns, corps command posts were in populated areas 

recently evacuated by the Germans, who must certainly have 

left behind agents to report on Soviet movements.14 

Similar problems occurred in attempts to concentrate 

aircraft at the airfields. With this inauspicious beginning, 4th Airborne Corps paratroopers slowly arrived 

at their staging areas. 

On 24 January, General Zhukov dispatched the following 

cryptic warning order to General Levashev: "To comrade 

Levashev--Mission: 26-27 January, land corps andC;tczFg positions in accordance with the map. Objective: withdrawal of the enemy to the west. Zhukov 24 January 

1942 1300H."' The order was posted on a l:lOO,OOO map indicating corps areas and summarizing airborne force 

objectives.15 

Having received his mission, General Levashev reviewed 

the situation and, at 1800 on 26 January, issued orders to 

the corps. The corps main force would land southwest of 

Vyaz'ma near Ozerechnya, Kurdyumovo, and Komovo. After 

landing, the corps would advance into the forested area 

west of Vyaz'ma; secure the villages of Yamkovo, MOSO~OVO~ 

Pleshkovo, and Azarovo; cut German communications routes; 

and prevent both German withdrawal from and reinforcement 

of Vyaz'ma. Seven smaller groups of twenty to thirty airborne troops would conduct reconnaissance-diversionary operations near the landing sites. They would establish 

contact with the 11th Cavalry Corps and Maj. N. L. 

46 
Soldatov”s airborne regiment, committed on 18 January in 

the Zhelan’ye area (see chap. 6).16 

Levashev’s order defined specific missions for his 

corps‘s units.17 Lt. CQ~. A. A. Onufriev’s 8th Airborne 

Brigade, preceded by a forward detachment, would land near 

Ozerechnya to secure a line from Rebrovo through Gradino 

to Berezniki and to block German movement the 

Vyaz ‘ma-Smolensk and Vyaz ‘ma-Dorogobuzh roads. along 

COP. I. I. 

Kuryshev’s 9th Airborne Brigade would land near Goryainovo and secure a line from Goryainovo through Ivaniki to 

Popovo to prevent the approach of German reinforcements 

from the west. Lt, Cal, N. Ye. Kolobovnikov’s 214th 

Airborne Brigade, reinforced by the separate tank and 

artillery battalions of the corps, would land and assemble 

in the Vysotskoye, Pleshkovo, and Uvarovo areas and act as 

the corps reserve 9 prepared either to counterattack . . should they penetrate airborne 

d”%!~~~~veG?~~~~ or”n:(3tsreinforce the defense of the 8th and 

9th Airborne brigades . by General Zhukov, Corresponding to missions assigned 

General Levasheves major consideration 

in decision making was to secure the designated objective by surprise and to hold it for two to three days until 33d 

Army and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps linked up with the 

airborne forces. 

After receiving Levashev’s orders, commanders worked 

at assembling the airborne corps and supporting aircraft. 

Planning designated the concentration of forty IS-84 and 

twenty-five TB-3 aircraft to conduct the lift. 

insufficient for rapid movement Although of all airborne forces 

into the drop area, severe shortages in military, transport 

aviation had dictated using so few aircraft. In fact, 

when the tardy concentration of aircraft was complete, only thirty-nine PS-84 and twenty-two TB-3 aircraft were 

available, Similar deficiencies plagued fighter cover for 

the operation. Originally, thirty fighters were expected 

to cover the concentration areas, and one fighter regiment (seventy-two fighters) would protect landing sites. 

nineteen f i hters, Only 

operation.1 Q however, we’re available to protect the 

Given these aircraft shortages, the lan 

necessitated that each aircraft crew make two to t E ree 

sorties a night to complete the movement ,in three or four 

days. Planners ignored the weather, potential aircraft 

combat losses, and the possibility of aircraft mechanical 

failures. In addition, the operation faced adverse aerial 

conditions because German aviation was especially active 

in the sector and was familiar with the Kaluga airfields, having recently flown from them. 

Airborne units established liaison at the aviation 

commanders’ command posts at each airfield and at the 

47 
Western Front and air force headquarters to coordinate 

aviation support. Within the airborne force, commanders 

created signal operation instructions and special radio 

nets connecting brigades to the corps. No communications 

links, however, existed between the airborne force and 

combat aviation units. Transport aviation did coordinate 

well with the airborne forces throughout the planning phases. 

The estimate of the situation did not, however, 

provide data on an important consideration, namely, 

information concerning enemy strength in the drop area. 

There simply was no reliable information on such German 

forces. Neither partisan units (which proliferated in the 

area> nor Major Soldatov‘s paratroopers were close enough 

to Vyaz “ma to provide such intelligence. Soviet 

reconnaissance flights also failed to detect German 

units. Front headquarters optimistically repor ted a 

wholesale enemy withdrawal from the area when, in fact, 

none had occurred. On the contrary, considerable numbers 

of German troops were near the drop area. 

8th Airborne Brigade Assault 

From 24 to 27 January, the overall situation on the 

Western Front seemed favorable for the airborne 

operation. The 11th Cavalry Corps of the Kalinin Front 

remained just northwest of Vyaz’ma. The leading elements 

of 33d Army approached Vyaz’ma from the east, and Belov’s 

1st Guards Cavalry Corps mounted persistent attempts to 

cross the P/foscow-Warsaw highway southwest of Yukhnov. 

Thus, at 0400 on 27 January, General Zhukov senS,Tki; 

following message to 4th Airborne Corps at Kaluga: Levashev that the horse cavalry of SokoPov [llth Cavalry Corps] Group has moved into the area that I marked on the 

map. Therefore, the situation is eased for Levashev. 

Think over the techniques of communications and give the 

men instructions so that there are no misunderstandings . “19 Levashev responded and ordered the 8th 

Airborne Brigade into action (see map 7, p. 216). A 

forward detachment consisting of the 2d Parachute 

Battalion under Capt. M. Ya. Karnaukhov was ordered to 

land at Qzerechnya and, by organizing all-round defenses, 

the area for further landings of the brigade. 

~~~~~~~hov’s battalion left the Zhashkovo airfield at 1430 

on 27 January. Because of poor pilot orientation over the 

drop area, the aircraft dropped the paratroopers at 

high altitude far south of the planned drop zone. The 

paratroopers landed scattered over an area of twenty to 

twenty-five kilometers radius around the village of Tabory 

48 
about twenty kilometers south of Ozerechnya. The 

battalion commander landed with the first contingent. At 

1600, while the 2d Battalion jumped around Tabory, other 

aircraft dropped seven diversionary groups, plus units to 

establish contact with the 11th Cavalry Corps and 

Soldatov’s group, at various locations in the German rear. 

The German command was almost immediately aware of the 

airborne drop. The 4th Panzer Army received two reports. 

The first was that Soviet troops with machine guns and 

grenade launchers were along the Vyaz’ma-Smolensk highway 

near Yakushkino. The second, from 11th Panzer Division, 

was that t between 1600 and 1700 (after dusk) on 27 

January, twenty transport aircraft had dropped about 400 

paratroopers near Mi t in0 station, west of Izdeshkovo 

(probably Group Aksenov). Subsequent reports spoke of 

Soviet attacks on an 11th Panzer Division battalion and a 

309th Infantry Regiment battalion at Izyakovo and at 

several other points along the Rollbahn. Other reports 

said the airborne forces at Mitino had withdrawn south of 

the Rollbahn. The 4th Panzer Army alerted all units in 

the region to the new danger.20 

Meanwhile , Soviet airborne commanders continued the 

pains t;: ingly slow assembly of their scattered forces. 

The Battalion’s reassembly around Tabory took 

considerable time. Of the original 648 men dropped, only 

318 had assembled by evening. The next morning, the total 

had risen to 476 men, but virtually all the unit’s 

supplies had been lost in the snow-covered fields and 

forests.21 Karnaukhov faced immediate dilemma. 

Unable to establish contact with e??her 4th Airborne Corps 

or the other brigade commanders and able to contact 8th 

Airborne Brigade headquarters only long enough to report “‘landed all right” before communications failed, the 

commander could not notify headquarters of his new 

location. Nor could he make a drop zone visible from the 

air without confusing the main force, which expected him 

to be at Qzerechnya. Consequently, on the morning of 28 

January, Captain Karnaukhov moved part of his force to 

Tabory and established a landing zone equipped with 

signals, in case other units of the 8th Airborne Brigade followed his battalion’s course. With his main force, he 

moved to Ozer echnya to establish the prescribed landing 

strip. Karnaukhov arrived at Ozerechnya on the evening of 

the twenty-eighth only to find it occupied by a small 

German force . He reconnoitered the German positions, and, 

during the night, the small Soviet force atta;::: the 

garrison. On the third attack, the Soviets the 

village while inflicting heavy casualties on the small 

garrison, a company-size rear service unit. During the 

remainder of the night, Karnaukhov’s men prepared a 

49 
landing zone, established defenses, and scouted German 

approach routes into the area. 

Meanwhile, at Kafuga, the commander of airborne 

forces, without information from the forward detachment, 

ordered the 8th Airborne Brigade main force to begin its 

assault on the night of 27-28 January. During the night I 

two flights dropped Maj. A. 6. Kobets’s 3d Battalion, 

along with heavy equipment, ammunition, and supplies. As 

on the previous day, the drop was inaccurate, with half 

the units landing in the Tabory area and the other half 

around Ozerechnya. The 3d Battalion could not establish 

communications with corps until late on the twenty-eighth. 

Unfortunate events in the rear further complicated the 

complex situation at the front. Throughout 28 January I 

German aircraft, probably aware of the Soviet airborne 

operations) bombed the airfield at Zhashkovo. When the 

Soviets switched to Grabtsevo and Rzhavets airfields, 

German bombers followed suit. Ineffective Soviet air 

defenses at all three locations allowed German pilots to 

destroy seven * preciYS TB-3 bombers, one fighter, and 

several fuel dumps. Ultimately, because of German air 

attacks, flights from all three airfields ceased. 

To clarify the confused situation, General Levashev, 

on 28 January, sent his assistant chief of reconnaissance, 

Sr. Lt. Al P. Aksenov, in a PO-2 light aircraft to find 

the 2d Battalion’s landing area and to determine its 

condition. Two attempts to find the battalion failed. On 

the second attempt, however, the aircraft, short of fuel, landed at Vorontsovo, twelve kilometers southwest of 

Alferovo. At Vorontsovo, Lieutenant Aksenov discovered 

small groups of Soviet troops) but not the airborne 

headquarters. Having reported to corps, he gathered 213 

men and successfully attacked and destroyed the small 

German garrison at Vorontsovo. On 1 February, using 

captured German fuel, Aksenov flew to 8th Airborne Brigade 

headquarters at Androsovo. His detachment remained in the 

area south of Izdeshkovo to harass German garrisons in the 

area. 

Despite dwindling air transport, the landing of288:t 

Airborne Brigade cant inued . On the night of - January, aircraft dropped 500 skis, ammunition, and 

su plies 

P 

at Ozereehnya. But of the original aircraft 

on Y ten PS-84s and two TB-3s remained serviceable.23 

The Stavka ordered additional aircraft to continue the 

operaTF and, by 2000 on 29 January, 540 more men had 

been airdropped. On the evening of 29-30 January, 

50 
hOWeVf?K F German aircraft again bombed the Kaluga airfields. On 30 January, the Germans hit both Zhashkovo 

and Rzhavets m 

Bad weather (snow with temperatures of -4QOC) and 

enemy aircraft activity had limited the total drop on 30 

January to a mere 120 men. 

jumped, including 

The following day, 215C;Tn 

the 8th Brigade commander, Lt. l 

A. A* Onufriev. 

and ammunition.24 

He also brought desperately needed arms 

While parachute drops continued, at 

0530 on 29 January, the 4th Airborne Corps commander 

ordered the aviation group to reconnoiter landing areas systematically to find his subordinate units. Only on 31 

January did a clear picture of airborne dispositions begin 

to emerge. 

After having landed, Onufr iev moved westward to 

Captain Karnaukhov’s position. Assisted by a platoon sent 

out by the 2d Battalion, the two forces merged on 31 

January. Onufriev reported to both General Levashev and 

General Zhukov that the Germans held the nearby road 

‘unction of 

i! 

Yermolino-Bessonovo, perhaps in infantry 

attalion strength supported by tanks and armored cars. 

Smaller German units occupied the villages of Alferovo, 

Boromaya, and Yermolina ; the German garrison at Izdeshkovo 

(units of 11th Panzer Division and 4th Panzer Army rear 

service units) numbered about 400 men. Out of radio 

contact, Onufriev’s own brigade was dispersed in the 

Ozerechnya, Androsovo, and Komovo areas. 

While Lieutenant Colonel Onufriev operated with the 2d 

Battalion, 

accomplish 

i!!;j;iss~nb~t5sf s 3d Battalion sought to 

Onufriev’s battalion had been 

scattered over a large area on the night of 27-28 January, and Major Kobets had landed near Androsovo. Rather than 

wait for his forces to assemble, Kobets, with a detachment 

of 131 men, moved on his objectives, the rail line and 

road west of Vyaz’ma. After several days of fighting, 

Kobets’s detachment cut German communications between 

Alferovo and Rebrovo and then slipped away from German 

infantry reinforced by armored trains sent to destroy the 

pesky Soviet unit. The 3d Battalion occupied defensive 

positions on the southern edge of the forest north of 

Yeskovo and repelled a German force dispatched from 

Alferovo E The next day, the 3d Battalion took Yeskovo, 

tT;;;oyed the garrison, and cut the rail line. At first 

on 7 February, the Germans again attacked from 

Rebrovo but were repulsed. Subsequent heavy German 

attacks finally drove Kobets’s detachment into the forests 

west of Yeskovo, where it continued to harass German 

communications and forced the Germans to provide heavy 

51 
escorts of tanks and armored cars to protect their convoys and ensure their safe arrival. The Germans burned all 

villages in the area to deny food and shelter to the 

Soviets. In mid-February, after repeated unsuccessful 

attempts to reach 8th Airborne Brigade, the 3d Battalion 

finallY broke out of the German encirclement south via 

Ugra station and met units of 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and 

8th Airborne Brigade. The 3d Battalion's twenty-one-day raid, during which Major Kobets was wounded three times, 

had considerable diversionary value. It had cut the 

Vyaz'ma-Smolensk road and forced German 4th Panzer Army to 

commit valuable forces to reopen the army's lines of 

communication. 

. . 

Major Kobets's battalion and other Soviet airborne and 

;;;Eiry units cut the Vyaz"ma-Smolensk Rollbahn repeatedlr r 27 January, causing the German higher command 

considerable concern. On 31 January, Halder noted: 

In Center, . . . the situation remains tight. 

More heavy fighting on the supply road to 

Yukhnov. The enemy is moving new forces westward 

through the gap between Fourth Army and Fourth 

Panzer Army. The attack to seal the gap has been 

postponed to 3 Feb. . . . Enemy air landings continue. Highway and railroad lines between 

Smolensk-Vyaz'ma still not cleared. Condition of 

troops ' Fourth 

difficultLs.26 Army is serious!. SUPPlY 

Two days later, Halder revealed his impressions of the 

expanding battle: 

The enemy elements that infiltrated behind our 

front are now being attacked by Fifth Armored 

[Panzer] Division. The scenes in this battle 

behind the front are absolutely grotesque and 

testify to the degree to which this war has 

degenerated into a sort of slugging bout that has 

no resemblance whatever to any form of warfare we 

have known.27 

The 4th Panzer Army records confirm that the Rallbahn west 

of Vyaz'ma was closed continuously for three m=er 28 

January.28 

Meanwhile, despite the uncertain situation, landin 

operations continued. Throughout 33. January, another 38 8 

men dropped into the area. Flights finally halted on 1 

February, for the overall military situation indicated the 

hopelessness of continuing the effort: For six days, from 

27 January through 1 February, 2,081: 'of the 3,062 men of 
8th Airborne 

pistols, Brigade landed along with 120 automatic 

light 

72 antitank rifles, 20 82-mm mortars, and 30 

mortars. Of those men, only 1,320 ultimately managed to join Lieutenant Colonel Qnufriev's main force. 

In addition, seventy-six men of the 214th Airborne Brigade landed to establish communications with 11th Cavalr;oz;;;; 

north of the 

diversionary opeVrYaatzib~~.'~~'len~ithroatdhesaad f,'," lightly 

equipped units, the 8th Airborne Brigade now had to cope with a new operational. situation. 

As the drops proceeded, conditions on the Western 

Front were changing. The 11th Cavalry Corps failed to cut 

the Smolensk-Vyaz'ma highway, and German forces drove the 

cavalry units northwest of Vyaz'ma. Lead elements of the 

33d Army pushed into the area immediately east of Vyas'ma, but German counterattacks threatened to cut these units 

off from the remainder .of the 33d Army. Farther south, Belov's 1st Guards Cavalry Corps forced its way across the 

Moscow-Warsaw highway southwest of Yukhnov and joined 

Major Soldatov's airborne force, only to find that the 

Germans had slammed the trapdoor shut, cutting off Belov's 

retreat and separating him from his two rifle divisions 

and his artillery, which remained south of the road.30 

With his own light cavalry force of the 1st Guards and 2d 

Guards Cavalry divisions, 

divisions, and Major 

57th and 75th Light Cavalry Soldatov"s airborne force, Belov 

faced heavily armed German forces at Vyaz'ma. In these 

circumstances and under incessant German air attacks, 

further drops of 4th Airborne Corps ceased. The remaining airborne forces moved by rail from Kaluga to assembly 

areas at L'yubertsy and Vnukovo. 

8th Airborne Brigade Operations --- 

Without reinforcements, Onufriev's 8th Airborne 

Brigade operated with the 746 men who had assembled by 

1300 on 1 February. For seven days, his units attacked 

the small German garrisons chaos in the German rear, 

south of Vyaz"ma, spreading 

but never seriously threatening 

any critical German installation. 

All Soviet units in the Vyaz'ma area were in an 

equally uncomfortable situation. In reduced strength, 8th 

Airborne Brigade harassed German garrisons and dodged the 

blows of German 5th and 11th Panzer divisions. 

from the south, 

Moving up 

1st Guards Cavalry Corps encountered heavy German opposition near Tesnikovo, Maloshino, and Kapustino while, in the cavalr 'S rear, a strong German garrison 

held out at Semlevo.3 s On 4 February, the Western Front 

commander ordered Belov to attack Vyaz'ma from the south, 

53 
in coordination with 33d Army, east of Vyaz'ma, and 11th 

Cavalry Corps, fifteen kilometers west of Vyaz'ma on the 

Moscow-Minsk highway. The Germans repelled all of Belov's 

attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on the cavalry units. Only the village of Zubovo fell into Soviet hands 

on 6 February. 

Also on 6 February, German 5th Army Corps received 

from 4th Panzer Army the missions of coordinating the 

defense of the Vyaz'ma-Smolensk Rollbahn and of maintainin 

road.3 5 

contact with 4th Army along the Vyaz'ma-Yukhnov 

To this end, 5th Army Corps de loyed Panzer, 106th Infantry, and 11th Panzer B then,:;: ivisions 

and south of the railroad and highway running west from 

Vyaz'ma toward Smolensk. In addition, elements of 5th 

Panzer Division cooperated with the 3d Motorized Division 

in operations south and southeast of Vyaz'ma against the 

Soviet 33d Army that was bottled up there. Each of the 

German divisions fought against the enemy simultaneously in two directions. The 11th Panzer and 106th Infantry 

divisions faced both north and south of the Vyaz'ma- Smolensk road. The 5th Panzer Division engaged Soviet 

paratroopers southwest of Vyaz'ma and 33d Army units 

southeast of Vyaz ‘ma. Only by task organizing their units 

into several battalion-size Kampfgruppen (battle groups) could the German divisions successfully parry the 

;;mn~;,us~~ often uncoordinated and haphazard, Soviet 

As German defenses jelled, Belov received a new order 

on 7 February: 

Advance to the east with all forces of the 8th 

Brigade and take Gredyakino, interdict the 

Vyaz'ma-Izdeshkovo rail line and prevent the 

movement of enemy trains. Enter into communications with the 75th Gavalry Division 

advancing east of Gredyakino and with Sokolov 

[llth Cavalry Corps] 

previously.34 

about which I wrote you 

The 1,320 men of 8th Airborne Brigade at Izborovo were 

now subordinated to General Belov's corps, and he ordered 

them to attack east, secure Gredyakino; and cut the rail 

line from Vyaz'ma to Izdeshkovo in coordination with 11th 

Cavalry Corps (see map 8, p. 217). The 8th Airborne 

Brigade would penetrate enemy defenses from Dyaglevo to 

Savino and attack along the road from Vyaz'ma to 

Dorogobuzh to secure Gredyakino. Initially, on 8 

February, the brigade had some success and captured 

Savino, Semenovskoye, and Gvozdikovo. The following day, 

54 
the brigade pushed on to take Dyaglevo and Marmonovo, 

where they claimed to destroy the headquarters of 5th 

Panzer Division, which was actually a battalion of the 

106th Infantry Division. But this success was short lived 

because German reinforcements counterattacked Dyaglevo from Pesoehnya and Staroye Polyanovo. Although repulsed, the attacks cost the 8th 

casualties.35 Brigade another 140 

At,first light on the eleventh, elements of the German 

106th Infantry and 11th Panzer divisions attacked south 

from Semlevo station and southwest from Vyaz'ma in force, 

driving the 8th Brigade from Dyaglevo and severing brigade contact with 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and Kobets's 3d 

Battalion. Although the Slst Cavalry Division had joined the 8th Brigade, Dyaglevo could not be retaken. By 13 

January, the 106th Infantry Division had reoccupied 

Marmonovo. 

units 

On the fifteenth, Dyaglevo fell, and Sovf;: 

withdrew into 

Semlevo.36 

the forests between Dyaglevo 

Belov ceased his attacks on Selivano, 

Stogovo, and Zabnovo in support of the 329th Rifle 

Division of 33d Army and the 250th Airborne Regiment and 

instead assisted the 8th Airborne Brigade in its attack on 

Semlevo. The brigade commander notified front 

headquarters of his problems, and front ordered the 

brigade to join 

Semlevo.37 

Belov in his bypass of Pesochnya to take 

Once Semlevo had fallen, the two units could 

combine with 11th Cavalry Corps in an attack on Vyaz'ma from the west. Such plans, however, were not grounded in 

reality. 

Deep snow delayed the attack by 1st Guards Cavalry 

Division and 114th Ski Battalion on Semlevo. The 75th 

Light Cavalry Division reinforced the attack and gained a 

foothold in Semlevo, but no more. The 8th Airborne 

Brigade joined Belov at Semlevo just as major German 

infantry and armor units counterattacked on 15 February. 

The concentric German attack now included elements of the 

lQ6th Infantry, 11th Panzer, and 5th Panzer divisions. 

Now down to forty-nine tanks, the 5th Panzer Division 

advanced through heavy snow from Stogovo toward Semlevo. 

The 106th Infantry Division, with fourteen or fifteen 

tanks and artillery, moved southward from Semlevo, while a 

battalion of 11th Panzer Division advanced on Belomir to 

the west of 106th Infantry Division.38 The German 

counterattacks forced Belov's units to withdraw westward 

to strike the rail line in a less well defended German 

sector (see map 8, p. 2171.. Belov left the 250th Airborne 

Regiment and 329th Rifle Division in the area southeast of 

Vyaz'ma to continue harassing German forces. All attempts 

to link up with 11th Cavalry Corps were in vain. 

55 
For more than a month, 8th Airborne Brigade operated 

with 1st Guards Cavalry Corps behind German lines, first 

attacking the rail line west of Vyaz'ma and then, on 7 

March, swinging southeast in an attempt to relieve the 

encircled 329th Rifle Division and 250th Airborne Regiment that was surrounded by German forces east of Debrevo and 

Knyazhnoe at Perekhody (see map 9, p. 218). From 7 to 13 

March, Soviet attacks failed to break the German 

encirclement, although Major Soldatov did mamage to 

penetrate the German cordon with seventy-five ski troopers (see map 10, p. 219). By 14 March, 250 to 300 men from 

the 329th Rifle Division finally broke out to join Belov, 

but no more.39 

The 8th Airborne Brigade continued to operate with 1st 

Guards Cavalry Corps west of the rail line from Vyaz'ma to 

Ugra station until 6 April. The next day, the brigade rejoined its parent 4th Airborne Corps, then fighting in 

the German rear on the Yukhnov axis. Smaller groups of 

the 8th Airborne Brigade, including the original seven 

diversionary groups, continued operations in a wide area 

southwest of Vyaz'ma. Elements of 3d Battalion and 

partisans operated near Dorogobuzh until they rejoined their brigade on 8 March. A 1st Battalion group was 

active in the Yurkino area. A large group supplemented by 

partisans near Dorogobuzh attacked and captured the town 

on the night of 13-14 February. A 1st Guards Cavalry 

Corps regiment reinforced these units, which for several 

months held Dorogobuzh as a major base for Partisan 

operations. 

Conclusions 

For more than one month in German rear areas, 8th 

Airborne Brigade conducted a running fight with enemy units around Vyaz'ma. What had begun as a major airborne 

operation to assist in the destruction of German Army 

Group Center quickly degenerated into a series of tactical 

drops with tactical consequences. Ultimately, airborne 

units 

disrupt sought to destroy small German installations, 

German supply routes, and avoid their own 

destruction. The initial drop failed for a variety of 

reasons, including poor reconnaissance,. inadequate 

equipment and transportation, faulty initial coordination 

with ground forces' and chaotic delivery techniques. 

Because the drop lacked security, both ground and air 

forces suffered heavy losses. 

It was evident early that planning had been correct in 

outline, but weak in detail. Initial bottlenecks in the 

availability of transport aircraft forced the corps to 

56 
issue fragmentary orders on the eve of each drop. The 

failwr,e of disoriented aircrews to drop their cargoes of 

men and equipment in the correct zones disrupted planned deployment of forces forward and hindered staff officers 

in keeping track of force deployment. Piecemeal delivery only compounded dispersion and resulted in “penny packet’ employment of the force 

troops fought as 

after landing, On the ground, well as could have been expected, but 

their numbers and armament were simply not sufficient for 

the task, a deficiency planners should have foreseen. As 

a result, the full drop of 4th Airborne Corps aborted, and 

8th Airborne Brigade, along with the units it was supposed 

to cooperate with (1st Guards Cavalry Corps and 33d Army), 

was, by the middle of February, surrounded and fighting for survival. So’ the Stavka committed a new and larger airborne force to reinfor%%?&m in their struggle. 

57 
CHAPTER 4 

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT: VYAZ'MA, FEBRUARY-JUNE 1942 

Operational Planning 

Despite advancing up to 250 kilometers in some sectors 

and making temporary penetrations in others, the January Soviet offensive did not achieve its objectives. Operational gains came only at a prohibitive cost in men 

and equipment and never translated into strategic victory. The most articulate Soviet assessment reasoned 

that 

the absence of large tank units, of powerful aviation, of sufficiently strong artillery, of a 

fresh flow of reserves, understrength forces, . . . @ge deficiencies and difficulties in logistics 

irst and foremost weapons and ammunition)--all 

that rendered impossible the decisive development of success to the depth of the defense after a 

penetration of the enemy front was realized-- 

finally, the Western Front was capable of 

conducting operations only in separate sectors 

with limited means.1 

The great, surging Soviet counteroffensive was over, 

but the Stavka renewed its efforts to liquidate the 

Germans in the Yukhnov pocket and link up front forces 

with Soviet forces now trapped in the Vyaz'ma pocket, namely, 8th Airborne Brigade, 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, 

and four divisions of 33d Army. On 1 February, the Stavka 

appointed General Zhukov to coordinate those efforts as 

supreme commander of forces on the western direction, 

specifically the Kalinin and Western fronts. Zhukov 

mustered his scarce reserves to resume the offensive in 

selected critical sectors. Following the Stavka"s orders, 

Zhukov turned his attention to the Germamnov Group (4th Army's 12th, 13th, 4:te and 57th A;xnli;;;ps), whose 

destruction would open way to Vyaz mat 

Whether the weary Soviet troops could concentrate enough 

strength to overcome the German units was critical. By 

now, the Germans were receiving a steady stream of 

reinforcements and were building formidable hedgehog defenses woven into village strongpoints that dotted the 

area adjacent to main communication arteries. 

The German situation had improved markedly by early 

February (see map 11, p. 60). The Germans firmly held 

Vyaz'ma, and the Soviet threat of 11th Cavalry and 1st 

59 
Al ARM

Map 11. Western Front Positions, 15 February 1942, and the Plan of 4th Airborne 
Guards Cavalry corps had ebbed on both flanks. 

wing of 4th Panzer 

The right Army (20th Army Corps) had linked up with the left wing of 4th Army (12th Army Corps) ;;," 

constructed an unbroken front east of the Ugra River. 

Soviet 33d Army thrust had been cut off at its base, and 

the Germans had surrounded 33d Army's four advanced 

divisions southeast of Vyaz'ma, threatening the Soviet 

divisions with piecemeal destruction. The Gzhatsk-Yukhnov 

line remained firm, as did German positions facing westward from Rzhev toward Sychevka. The 12th, 13th, and 

43d Army corps of 4th Army defended the northern, eastern, 

and southern approaches to Yukhnov, while 57th Army Corps and 10th Motorized Division of 4th Army worked frantically 

to create a continuous defensive line to protect the 

Moscow-Warsaw Rollbahn southwest of Yukhnov. With the 

Moscow-Warsaw and Moscow-Minsk roads under German control, Soviet forces of the Western Front's 

5&h, and 49th armies) were 

lef~ouw:;lngof(lOth, contained the 

Moscow-Warsaw highway. The Stavka understood that if left 

unchanged, &his situation doomed the encircled Soviet 

forces near Vyaz'ma. If those encircled forces were 

crushed, the Germans would further strengthen their front 

with units presently tied down in reducing the encircled 

Soviet forces. 

At the Stavka's direction, Zhukov agreed to a limited 

offensive designed to free encircled forces, cut a gap in 

the Moscow-Warsaw road, and, if possible, encircle the 

German Yukhnov Group (see map 12, p. 220).2 The Stavka 

transferred the 4th Airborne Carps to Western Front 

control to provide Zhukov additional strength. The corps 

had the 9th and 214th Airborne brigades, plus the 1st 

Battalion, 8th Airborne Brigade. Its mission was to jump 

into the Velikopol'ye, Shushman, and 2helan"ye areas and 

to conduct operations toward Pesochnya, Klyuchi, Tynovka, 

and Leonovo, 

13, p* 221). adjacent to the Moscow-Warsaw road (see map 

also continue 

In coordination with 50th Army, it a;E;Aj 

operations against the Germans 

Yukhnov. 

Lt. Gen . I. V. Boldin"s 50th Army was to attack across 

the Moscow-Warsaw road, meet 4th Airborne Corps at 

Batishchevo, vygor , KlYWhi $ and Pesochnya, and subsequently strike Yukhnov from the west. If successful, 

4th Airborne Corps's and 50th ArmyIs thrusts would permit 

an advance into the regions southwest and southeast of 

Vyaz’ma where 1st Guards Cavalry Corps and 33d Army were 

operating. 

The defenses the Germans had just erected along and 

south of the Xoseow-Warsaw Rollbahn southwest of Yukhnov 

were tenuous. The 57th Panzer Corps defended the sector 

61 
that Belov's cavalry corps had passed through two weeks 

earlier. The 19thG Panzer Division, 137th Infantry Division, one regiment of the 52d Infantry Division, and a 

portion of the 10th Motorized Division defended a 

twenty-kilometer stretch of the road southwest of the 

Ressa River, with other 10th Motorized Division elements 

deployed thinly to the southwest. These forces struggled with lead elements of Soviet 50th Army as it pushed 

through the snows past Mosal'sk toward the Rollbahn.3 

Clearly, additional strength was necessary for the Germans 

to defend the highway. To provide this strength, 4th 

Army, on 16 February, ordered the 43d Army Corps to help defend the highway from the. Ressa River to Fomino.4 The 

43d Army Corps's 3lst, 34th, and 13lst Infantry divisions 

defending Yukhnov slowly disengaged units and moved them 

southwest. The 12th and 13th Army corps contracted their 

defensive lines north and east of Yukhnov and took over a 

portion of 438 Army Corps's vacated positions south of 

the city. 

-40oC) made 

The continuing bitter temperatures C-350 to 

the redeployment even more arduous, and 

knee-deep snow made even the mm- Rollbahn difficult to use. 

Also besieged by the cold and snow north of the 

Moscow-Warsaw Rollbahn and along the Vyaz'ma-Yukhnov road 

were the rear service areas of 4th Army's front-line 

divisions and scattered army security and support units. 

These units would be the first obstacles for the Soviet 

airborne force to overcome. South of the projected 

airborne landing area were rear service elements of the 

31st Infantry Division in the villages of Pesochnya, Dertovaya, and Klyuchi and in nearby hamlets.5 East of 

the landing site, at and around Zherdovka and Podsosonki, 

were elements of the 13lst Infantry Division. To the 

northeast, rear elements of the98th Infantry Division and 

a 4th Army SS Police Regiment garrisoned the key Ugra River crossings at Znamenka. Other 98th Infantry Division 

units defended the Vyaz"ma-Yukhnov road on both sides of 

Klimov Zavod. Farther north, at Yermaki, on the road from 

Znamenka to Vyaz'ma, was Service Detachment 152 of the 52d 

Infantry Division. Finally, west of the airborne landing 

zone along the Vyaz'ma-Kirov rail line, four companies of 

Group Haase protected Ugra River.6 the critical rail bridge across the 

The 5th Panzer and 23d Infantry divisions, 

clearing airborne forces and Soviet 33d Army elements from 

either side of the Vyaz"ma-Kirov rail line south of 

Vyaz'ma, posed an even greater threat. 

Alarmed by the earlier airborne operations of the 

250th Airborne Regiment and by Belov's recent operations, these small garrisons had erected all-round defenses 

centered on the stone houses of the villages. Where 

possible, the Germans had 'built breastworks and, often, 

62 
snow and 

artillery 

ice barricades and ramparts. 

defensive zrr”,gs”. 

of Villages within 

one another had prearranged mutual 

Scarce armored vehicles and transport vehicles had been formed into mobile detachments to patrol the snow-covered roads and to maintain tenuous 

communications, especially along the Rollbahn and 

Vyaz’na-Yukhnov supply arteries. In mid-February, with 

their attention riveted on the strained front lines, the 

Germans endured the cold isolation and awaited the 

Russians’ next move, 

cane from the skies. scarcely suspecting it would again 

4th Airborne Corps Assault 

The 4th Airborne Corps staged from the Lyubertsy and 

Vnukovo airfields. 

operating in 

Partisans of the 1st Partisan Regiment the Zhelan’ ye area under Kirillov would 

assist the corps landing and assembly of forces. The 

4th Airborne Corps would drop from two flights of aircraft 

on each of three nights. An aviation transport group of 

forty-one PS-84s and twenty-three TB-3s would carry the 

paratroopers .7 Although plans existed 

crews before the operation, 

to drop radio 

none were actually dropped. Instead , partisan units lit bonfires to guide the planes 

to their destinations. This tactic had limited success, 

however, for numerous fires existed anyway because of the 

cold and the fog, and the Germans had lit diversionary fires, Moreover f German aircraft also guided on the fires. 

On the night of 17-18 February, the first battalion 

from 8th Airborne Brigade dropped (see map 14, p. 222). 

As in the earlier drop in January, instead of jumping, from 

600 meters, the paratroopers had to jump from 1,000 to 

1,20Q meters because of weather and fog.8 The wide 

dispersion of men and supplies and the deep snow made 

reassembly difficult in the severe terrain of the 

forested, roadless region. Once again, many aircraft lost 

their way and returned with their human cargo rather than 

risk dropping them into enemy strongholds. Disrupted 

flight schedules prompted extra sorties and required more 

time for the actual drop. 

From 17 to 23 February, the 9th and 214th Airborne 

brigatpes -jlua;yd into their drop zones. Misfortune struck 

on evening of drops wh en German aircraft 

intercepted the transport carrying the corps commander and 

staff officers. The damaged transport escaped, but the 

German attack had killed General Levashev and wounded 

several staff officers. The corps chief of staff, Col. 

A. F. Kazankin, took command of the corps.9 By the 

morning of 23 February, 7,373 men of his command had 

63 
dropped, but almost 30 percent of those men never found 

their way to the corps, battalion, and brigade assembly 

points. Although some fell directly onto German positions and were lost, 

Army 

an estimated 1,800 ultimately joined 33d 

units, 1st 

bands.10 

Guards Cavalry units, and partisan 

Obviously, of surprise, 

the night drop had taken advantage 

fire. 

and thus few men were lost to German ground Night conditions and heavy snow, however, inhibited 

reorganization and assembly. 

The Germans noted the drop but could do little to 

disrupt it beyond dispatching a few air sorties to 

intervene. Since the dramatic, large-scale landing of the 

Soviet 250th Airborne Regiment on 20 January, German 4th 

Army had recorded numerous 

Velikopol’ye. 

small airlandings at Lugi and 

19 and 20 

February , Suddenly, on the nights of 

the 4th Army war diary recorded a significant 

surge 

that 

in activity when the 52d Infantry Division reported 145 aircraft had landed without interference on 

brightly lit fields at Lugi and Velikopol’ye.11 Initially, 

prevented 

the fatigue of overworked German aircrews had 

effective Luftwaffe interference with the 

landings. Although air sorties were flown against the 

airborne forces, 4th Army regarded the efforts of the 

German air force as unsuccessful. Ground reaction was 

similarly ineffective. Weather conditions and shortages of ammunition for artillery pieces precluded resistance or 

offensive action. Moreover, 4th Army lamented the 

inability of its units to prevent the airborne forces from 

cutting the Vyaz’ma-Yukhnov road. Even the strongest German garrison could do little to thwart the airborne 

landings.12 

Once over the initial surprise, the Germans anxiously 

awaited the paratroopers ’ next move. The long period of 

airborne assembly and regrouping caused the Germans to 

underestimate the total enemy force and to wonder about 

Soviet intent. Russian inactivity caused subsequent 

critics to question 4th Army and 43d Army Corps estimates 

that 3,000 paratroopers had landed. In fact, more than 

7,000 Soviet troops had made the jump, and about 5,000 had 

successfully assembled. 

While the Germans puzzled over Soviet intentions, 

Colonel Kazankin, by the evening of 23 February, had 

establ’ished communications with his 9th and 214th Airborne 

brigades, which had reassembled at Svintsovo and Gryada, respectively. He had also contacted 50th Army and learned 

that its units were locked in heavy fighting with the 

Germans at Sapovo and Savinki near the Warsaw road. But 

no breakthrough had yet been made. Kazankin now faced an 

advance southward more than thirty kilometers across the 

64 
rough, snow-covered country. The broken terrain, forests, 

and frozen swamps made 

difficult. any movement without skis 

The only consolations were that the few roads 

would not support German vehicles and the Germans were not 

skillful at winter operations in open terrain. Alerted by the drop, the Germans used the time the paratroopers were 

assembling to strengthen their network of 

defenses. village In villages, the Germans had shelter and warmth 

against bitterly cold weather; the Soviets had to fend for 

themselves in the open. 

February, Offensive 

Colonel Kazankin ordered his forces to make a 

two-pronged attack southward toward the Warsaw road and 

50th Army,13 From its jumping-off area at Glukhovo, 

9th Airborne Brigade was supposed to advance through Vyazovets, Kurak ino, and Klyuchi ; occupy Preobrazhensk and 

Vyazovets ; and then destroy the enemy in the Pesochnya, Klyuchi, and Tynovka strongpoints. One battalion (4th) with partisans attached was to secure Ugra station. The 

214th Airborne Brigade was supposed to seize Ivantsevo and 

Tat’yanino and reach Novaya, Mokhnatka, and Leonovo by the 

evening of 24 February. The 1st Partisan Regiment I 

subordinate to 4th Airborne Corps, would cover the 

airborne forces’ rear along a line through Gorodyanka, ( 

Svir idovo, Andr iyaki , and Bel’ dyugino against German 

attacks from the direction of Znamenka and Vyaz’ma. Part 

of the force was to cooperate with the 4tb Battalion, 

9th Brigade, in attacks on Ugra station. Three hundred 

men of the 4th Battalion, 8th Brigade, were reserves for 

4th Airborne Corps.* Almost all Soviet movement and 

combat were to be conducted at night to capitalize on 

darkness and to avoid detection and attack by German air 

units. Darkness provided security, but it also meant slow 

movement through the deep snows of the rough terrain. 

On the night of 23-24 February--which in peacetime 

would have marked the end of Red Army Day festivities 

celebrating the Soviet Army’s birthday--Colonel Kazankin 

led his brigades southward. The advance initially fared 

well. Colonel Kuryshev’s 9th Airborne Brigade overran 

several German outposts, and a surprise attack secured 

Vertekhovo station from Group Haase before the Germans 

could react . Heavy German automatic weapons fire from 

*The remaining 250 men of this battalion had jumped into 

the Yurkino area near Dorogobuzh to reinforce their parent unit. 

65 
E;;i;f,ons in Ekaterinovka and Pesochnya halted the brigade 

on the outskirts of Prechistoye and Kurakino. 

Lieutenant Colonel Kolobovnikov’s 214th Airborne Brigade’s surprise night attack had only limited success against Ivantsevo, Kostinki, and Zherdovka. Insufficient Soviet 

artillery and mortar preparation and heavy German fire 

thwarted the attacks.14 

German rear service units from five regiments of the 

13lst, 31st, and 34th Infantry divisions were strongly entrenched in a thick network of villages, the strongest of which were Dubrovna, Kurakino, Der tovaya, Gorbachi, 

Kostinki, Ivantsevo, Pesochnya, , ~;;~~“h~~~s and 

Each of the villages was a company-size strongpoint for all-round defense, and a system of 

mutually supporting automatic weapons and artillery fires 

tied each village into a defensive network with nearby villages. Moreover, the Germans had been alerted to the 

presence of the airborne units, but they did not know the 

units’ precise location. 

On the morning of 25 February, the airborne corps 

relied on resolute surprise attacks to reduce these 

villages. Ey day’s end, 9th Airborne Brigade had secured 

Dubrovna, Kurakino, Borodino, and Gorbachi, but was still 

unable to overcome German opposition in Dertovaya and 

Ekaterinovka. The 214th Airborne Brigade occupied Tat’yanino after heavy fighting, blockaded Ivantsevo, and 

moved Kurakino.16 its advanced elements through the snow to 

In spite of heavy German opposition, the airborne 

corps had advanced twenty to twenty-five kilometers on 

separate axes toward their junction with 50th Army, which 

was still fighting over a sector of the Moscow-Warsaw 

road. Elements of the 4th Airborne Corps and partisans along the rail line nor.th of Ugra station succeeded in 

taking Debransky and Subbotnik from Group Haase. They 

captured seven rail cars full of bombs I food, and 

weapons. Fighting farther south near Ugra station 

revealed strong German garrisons at each station of the 

Vyaz ‘ma-Kirov rail line, demonstrating the great importance the Germans attached to defense of the 

railroad. 17 The major objectives for the airborne 

forces were the German strongpoints at Pesochnya and 

Klyuchi, whose capture would open the way to Astapovo, Lyud kova , and 50th Army.18 

Rlyuchi was the key. At a critical road junction on a 

ridge , it dominated the surrounding flat countryside.19 

Nor eover ) its defensive network interlocked with other 

villages, which , taken together B dominated the Warsaw 

66 

i: 
highway ta the south. On 26 February, the 9th Airborne 

Brigade attacked Klyuchi from the north. German aircraft 

and artillery pounded the periphery of the village, while 

the German garrison the fringes of 

sortied with tanks and infantry into 

the surrounding woods. 

raged all day, Heavy fighting either in the woods near the village or in 

the outskirts of the village proper. After three hours of 

night fighting, 9th Airborne Brigade captured the town and 

killed most of the garrison. Small groups of German 

survivors withdrew southward to Malyshevka, another 

strongpoint about two kilometers 

Moscow-Warsaw road.20 

north of the 

On the morning of 27 February, with the Warsaw road 

almost in sight, the corps pushed on toward Malyshevka. The Germans blasted the paratroopers with artillery and 

air attacks. German infantry and tanks fighting 50th Army south of the highway were shifted to the north to defend 

against the airborne force. Far from its landing sites, 

the airborne force lacked supplies as well as mobility and 

fire support. Conversely, the Germans' 

Warsaw road gave them the proximity toth;t; 

opportunity to use 

superior mobility to bring up fresh units. so, 4th Airborne Corps units withdrew to Klyuchi, frustrated 

b 

z 

their inability to traverse the last two kilometers to 

t e Warsaw highway and by the inability of 50th Army to 

assist them. At Klyuchi on 1 March, the paratroopers established a temporary defensive line anchored on the 

villages of Vertekhovo station, Klyuch,i, Gorbachi, 

Petrishchevo, Tynovka, Yurkino, Andronovo; and Novaya. Corps headquarters took stock of i.t s heavy losses, 

regrouped its forces, and -r~~.leni%hed its dwindling 

supplies of ammunition and food. 

March Offensive 

The respite from combat, however, was brief. Taking 

advantage of superior mobility and firepower, a German 

battalion of infantry supported by artillery and tanks 

began counterattacks north of the highway (see map 15, 

p. 223). Repeated German attacks fr-om 1 to 5 March failed 

to dislodge the Soviet paratroopers from their defensive 

line. This time, the Soviet airborne force had the 

advantage of a village and forest-based defense, while 

German mobile forces, once they had left the road, found 

the going difficult in the forests north of the highway. 

On 4 March, developments to the northeast resulted in 

new orders for the airborne corps. Soviet 43d and 49th 

Army pressure on Yukhnov had finally forced the Germans to 

abandon the city and the salient around it. The 43d Army 

67 
;;;;zntwithdrew its remaining divisions from the Yukhnov . t0 the southwest where they joined the 137th 

Infantry Division and other 4th Army units in defenses 

south of the Moscow-Warsaw Rollbahn. Each division 

occupied a sector for all-round defense (see map 16, 

p. 69). The bulk of each division's strength faced 

southeast against Soviet 5Oth Army. Small battalion-size 

Kampfgruppen, oft en organized from division support units, 

occupied villages north of the Rollbahn to defend against Soviet airborne. cavalry, and partisan units. These 

divisions relied-on the interlocking village defenses and 

Rollbahn communications to thwart Soviet attacks. Until 

the end- of winter, 43d Army Corps relied on occasional 

battalion-size forays north of the road to keep Soviet 

forces in the rear from mounting a successful, concerted 

drive southward to link up with 50th Army. On 7 March, 

43d Army Corps assumed responsibility for the entire 

Rollbahn defense. While 43d Army Corns moved southwest of 

Yukhnov, the 12th and 13th Army Gorps'of 4th Army occupied prepared positions facing east along the Ugra and Ressa 

rivers.22 

In a flash of optimism generated by the German 

withdrawal, the chief of staff of the Western Front sent 

out the following orders: 

Comrade Boldin 15 OE”,hemyAmf I, Comrade Kazankin 

[4th Airborne]. 1s withdrawing from 

Yukhnov along the Vyaz'ma highway. 

High Command order: 

1. Comrade Boldin, strengthen the tempo of the 

offensive, in every possible way cut the Warsaw 

highway and complete the encirclement of the 

enemy in that region. 

2. Comrade Kazankin, while fulfilling the basic 

mission-- strike against Malyshevka and Grachevka 

and send part of the force to cut the Vyaz'ma 

highway near Slobodka. Organize ambushes along 

the Vyaz'ma highway to destroy the enemy.23 

On 3 March, General Boldin dispatched his assistant 

chief of reconnaissance in a PO-2 aircraft to 4th Airborne 

Corps headquarters to coordinate the upcoming operations. 

Boldin passed word to Kazankin that, in view of Kazankin's 

failure to break the German front at Lavrishehevo and 

Adamovkg, 50th Army would now attack toward hill 253.2. 

The following morning, Boldin specified that 50th Army's attack route to the hill would be via Solov'yevka and 

Makarovka and that the attack would occur on the night of 

68 
SCALE 

Map 16. German 137th Infantry Division Defensive Area 

69 
5-6 March against the German 31st, 34th) and 137th 

Infantry divisions. He requested that 4th Airborne Corps 

cooperate, first by sending reconnaissance forces toward 

50th Army and 

units.24 

then by attacking to meet 50th Army 

Colonel Kazankin followed Boldin’s request and 

assigned 9th Airborne Brigade, reinforced by the corps’s 

artillery battalion and part of the 214th Airborne 

Brigade, to secure Malyshevka and subsequently Bavykino (800 meters from the Warsaw road), where 50th Army advance 

units had promised to meet the airborne force. The 

9t-h Airborne Brigade would attempt to take Malyshevka by 

envelopment, a simultaneous surprise attack from both 

flanks and from the front. The 214th Airborne Brigade covered 9th Airborne Brigade’s right flank by an advance 

on Pesochnya. 

While in the woods north of Malyshevka, Colonel 

Kuryshev of 9th Airborne Brigade issued orders to 

battalion commanders and organized fire support. A short 

artillery barrage would precede the 0300 infantry attack. 

After dark s the battalions began their painstaking advance 

to assault positions. early. The 2d Battalion ran into problems 

At 2100, while moving through the northern edge of 

woods one kilometer south of Klyuchi, the unit encountered 

heavy German fire and halted. The 3d and 4th battalions 

continued to advance, expecting to make a coordinated 

attack. At 0100, the 3d Battalion approached Malyshevka from the northeast and, at first light, attacked without 

waiting f,or the 4th Battalion. Heavy German resistance 

and a flank attack by a German ski battalion forced 3d 

Battalion back toward Gorbachi. With 3d Battalion already 

repulsed, 4th Battalion arrived late because of the deep snow) attacked Malyshevka, and secured footholds in the 

northwest and northeast portions of the village. Immediate German counterattacks, however, denied 4th 

Battalion time to dig in and drove the unit north out of 

the village.25 i 

The supposedly concerted Soviet attack failed. Poor 

reconnaissance resulted in underestimation of German 

strength in Malyshevka, which actually numbered two 

infantry battalions with antitank guns and mortars, later 

reinforced by a ski battalion. The disjointed nature of 

the attack also doomed the operation. German reserves 

counterattacking on 6 March forced the airborne force to 

conduct a grueling withdrawal through deep snow at 

agonizingly slow speeds (one kilometer an hour) back to 

its original assembly areas. After its unsuccessful 

offensive, 4th Airborne Corps, on 7 March, tried to 

consolidate its defensive area bY capturing German 

70 

- 
!i ositions at Pesochnya and Ekaterinovka. 

ailed e 

Both attempts 

The 4th Airborne Corps’s attempt to link up with 50th 

Army was condemned to failure in advance e 

3,000 men, 

The corps ’ s 

with their light weapons and short 

were exhausted by more than two weeks of combat sup lies, 

an cr were 

siapl too weak to 

line. 5 6 

engage the heavy German defensive 

The front commander had overestimated the 

capability of his forces. 

earlier the futility of 

The 50th Army had proved trying to break the formidable 

German defenses on the Moscow-Warsaw road. After the 

failed linkup, the situation stabilized. Airborne forces 

continued conducting diversionary operations against the 

German rear from their base area near Zhelan’ye. 

Concentrating their forces for operations along a 

number of axes, the Germans sought to root out and crush 

the troublesome airborne force. The bulk of the 131st and 

elements of the 34th Infantry divisions, reinforced by the 

449th Infantry Regiment of 137th Infantry Division, massed 

near Kostinki I Leonovo t Ivantsevo, Der tovaya, and 

Andronovo to push toward Novaya, while elements of the 

331st and 31st Infantry d’risions assembled south of 4th 

Airborne Corps positions. ii The Germans built a stron 

defensive cordon around the airborne force wit iii 

minefields, snow barriers, abatis, and pillboxes to 

restrict airborne force movement along the SlobodkaZnaaenka road and toward the Moscow-Warsaw highway. Meanwhile, German task-organized mobile groups planned to 

penetrate the airborne defensive area from the southeast 

and south. 

On 11 March, after a thorough reconnaissance of the 

area, the German 13lst Infantry Division attacked 

Andronovo and Yurkino after an artillery preparation. The 

Germans attacked three sides at first light. They forced 

two platoons of 4th Battalion, 214th Airborne Brigade, to 

withdraw into the woods west of Yurkino where the Soviets 

managed to hold their positions. German attacks in the 

center of the corps defense against Novaya and Tat’yanino failed e Particularly heavy fighting occurred at Gorbachi, 

a key Soviet strongpoint within artillery range of the 

Warsaw road * Klyuchi and Gorbachi were constant thorns in 

the Germans ’ side. Because of their proximity to the 

Moscow-Warsaw road, they interfered with German 

communications. 

At dawn on 13 March, after an intense artillery 

preparation, two German infantry battalions from the 3lst 

and 34th Infantry divisions attacked Gorbachi from the 

nor theas t Z west, and south e Repeated German assaults, 

71 
taken under fire by the paratroopers at ranges of fifty to 

seventy meters, finally secured a foothold in the airborne 

defense. The 1st Battalion, 9th Airborne Brigade, was 

unable to dislodge the Germans. At 1700, the commander of 

2d Battalion, Capt. S. P. Plotnikov, dispatched one of his 

companies from Klyuchi on skis to reinforce the 1st 

Battalion. Advancing rapidly through the forest, the ski 

battalion attacked the German left flank and forced a 

German withdrawal to As tapovo e By 1800, the two 

battalions had driven the last German troops from barns on 

the northern side of the village. The 2d Battalion 

commander’s decisiveness and skillful maneuver had won the 

battle. A telegram from the Western Front Military Council lauded the efforts of the airborne force: “The 

Corps operated in outstanding fashion, in spite of 

difficulties e Give to the units operating in the Gorbaehi 

region my thanks. “28 

Yet f despite the victory at Gorbachi and a respite offered by the arrival of a major snowstorm on 14 March, 

German pressure increased unrelentingly as German 

reinforcements continued to arrive in the area. BY 

18 March, the 131st Infantry Division had taken Pushkino 

from the 4th Battalion, 214th Airborne Brigade, and had 

reduced the battalion to only thirty men. The Germans had 

threatened Borodino, Tynovka, Gorbachi t and Klyuchi and 

had KurakfilFf$ bEzEinihe t~~~rp~ea~yfen~~~~SUr~neSt~~as~or~~ 

sought and received front permission to withdraw to a 

defensive line of Vertekhovo station, Zhukovka, Akulovo, 

Prechistoye, Kurakino, Novinskaya, and Dacha. The Soviet 

government recognized the paratroopers” efforts by 

awarding an honorific title to the 4th Airborne Corps. 

Despite 4th Airborne Corps’s 19 March withdrawal to 

better defensive positions, German attacks continued (see 

map 17, p. 224). On 25 March, German units penetrated the 

positions of Capt. D. I. Bibikov”s 4th Battalion, 

9th Airborne Brigade, at Kurakino. In a street battle 

that lasted all day and night, the 4th Battalion suffered 

thirty-eight killed and ninety-one wounded ‘but repulsed 

elements of the German 131st Infantry Division. Although inflicting heavy casualties on the German force, the 

4th Battalion, 9th Brigade, 

men fit for combat .30 

emerged with only eighty-eight 

The survivors transformed 

Kurakino into a fortress of small strongpoints, with the 

battalion command post the center. Repeated 

small-scale German attacks li Kurakino culminated on 31 

March with a major German assault against the junction of 

9th and 214th Airborne Brigade positions at Prechistoye, Dubr ovnya , and Kurak ino. German heavy artillery and 

aviation strikes preceded and accompanied the attack. 

72 
Having both suffered and inflicted heavy losses, 4th 

Airborne Corps units abandoned the three strongpoints and 

established new defenses in the forests to the northwest. 

The 4th Airborne Corps’s March defensive battles 

achieved limited success in holding off the attacks of 

elements of three German divisions. But the 

suffered greatly. By the end of March, 2,000 paratro~~~~~ 

w.ere sick or 

evacuation.31 

wounded, including 600 who required Supplies were short , antitank ammunition 

was gone, and rations were very low. Without 

reinforcement, there was little chance to resist against the continuing German attacks. Fur thermore) the imminent 

spring thaw would make movement even more difficult than 

had the earlier heavy snow cover. 

While the airborne force tried to join 50th Army, other encircled Soviet 

mid-April, 

forces fought for survival. By elements of 33d Army had been decimated under 

constant German counterattacks. 32 Remnants of the 329th 

Rifle Division, 33d Army, and the 250th Airborne Regiment, separated from 33d Army, managed to join Belov’s 1st 

Guards Cavalry Corps, but only after the Germans had 

destroyed the bulk of those units in late March in a 

pocket north of Perekhody. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, thwarted in its attempts either to free Vyaz’ma or to 

rescue 

toward 

33d Army, withdrew its depleted forces westward 

Dorogobuzh where, supported by partisans, it 

reorganized its units and replenished its 

March * 

supplies in 

Belov disbanded his three light cavalry divisions 

and used them to reinforce his remaining units. the 1st 

and 2d Guards Cavalry divisions, the 329Lh Rifle Division 

remnants, and two partisan detachments ‘33 

Auril Offensive 

By late March, it was apparent that only joint efforts 

of the encircled units would ensure their survival as 

fighting entities. In late March, Belov’s cavalry car s 

moved eastward in a last, futile attempt to rescue t bp e 

remnants of 33d Army or, failing that, to join with 4th 

Airborne Corps to reinforce joint efforts to break out of 

German encirclement (see map 18, p. 74).34 

As 1st Cavalry Corps moved east, German attacks on 4th 

Airborne Corps intensified. The German 131st Infantry Division’s attacks on 2 and 3 April hit airborne positions 

at Novinskaya, Dacha, and Akulovo, further shr inking the 

restricted airborne defensive perimeter. German tanks and 

artillery made the task of defense even more difficult. 

On 7 April, the 4th Airborne Corps received some 

73 
Map 18. Territory Occupied by Belov’s Forces, March-May 1942 
assistance when 8th Airborne Brigade returned to its 

parent. unit from 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. Reduced to 

reinforced battalion strength 

BC2lOVf Colonel Kazankin 

in the fighting alongside the 

defensive positions on 

assigned to 8th Brigade the 4th Airborne Corps right flank 

along the rail line from Preobrazhensk to Zhukovka. This 

was the weakest portion’ of the airborne defensive line, 

and indications were that German forces were beginning to 

mount counterattacks there. The only other Soviet force 

in the region was the 2d Guards Cavalry Division. Belov 

had dispatched it south to help Kazankin after the failure 

of the final attempts to rescue 33d Army. The 2d Guards 

Cavalry Division, after securing Ugra station, occupied 

positions in the Baskakovka area and, from 7 April, 

operated with 8th Airborne Brigade to repel German probes north along the rail line from Buda. To further 

complicate matters for the Soviets, the German Group Haase 

still held out at Voznesenfye and Senyutino in the rear of 

2d Guards Cavalry Division, 

Kazankin’s fears for his right flank were well 

founded . On 9 April, after a systematic reconnaissance, 

German forces with air, artillery, and armor support 

struck northward against the junction between 2d Guards 

Cavalry Division and 4th Airborne Corps, fighting, the Germans secured 

Following he;;3 

Ver tekhovo station 

Zhukovka e 36 By nightfall on the tenth, the German force 

h& also seized Ugra station and Kombaya and had lifted 

Soviet 

Voznesen’ye.37 

siege of the German garrison at 

The slashing German attack continued on 

the eleventh with other German forces advancing from the 

northeast. 

With the situation rapidly deteriorating, Belov fired 

off the following message to Zhukov’s headquarters: 

I am reporting to you an assessment of 

conditions and proposals. The extent of the 

corps front in encirclement exceeds 300 

kilometers. Enemy strength: On a Pine 

Milyatino-Yel’nya determined to be six infantry 

divisions. Toward Ye1 ‘nya are fortifications 

from Roslavl to Smolensk. West of the Dnepr an 

undetermined force defends. To the north-- 

‘Yar tsevo, Semlovo, Volosta Byatnitsa station-- 

mixed units) including the 35th and 23d Infantry divisions, cover the approaches to the railroad. 

Conclusion: The corps participates in the 

encirclement of the Vyaz’ma-Yel’nya-Spas Demensk 

enemy group and in its turn is in operational 

encirclement. 

75 
The strength of the corps and extent of the 

front forces me to turn to defensive operations. 

The initiative is clearly in the hands of the 

enemy. There are no reserves. In such 

conditions, I suggest an offensive plan: 

'1. To break the encirclement ring to meet 

50th Army in the general direction of Milyatino. 

2. To this end concentrate in Vskhody a 

shock group made up of 1st and 2d Guards Cavalry Divisions, 4th Airborne Corps, and partisan detachment Zhabo. 

3. Basic group of Colonel Moskalika's 

detachment to leave a small group to blockade 

Yel'nya and with the main force attack Spas Demensk. 

4. Leave '"Dedushka" detachment to hold 

Dorogobuzh. Dnepr floods help that mission. 

5 . To secure the operation from north and 

northeast leave the 329th Rifle Division and 

small partisan detachments. 

6. With 50th Army units and possibly 10th 

Army to seize the Warsaw highway in the Zaitsev 

heights section, Yersha, and also Milyatino. Thereafter' to dig in on the road in the appointed 

sector. 

7. After my linkup with Boldin in the 

Milyatino area to unite my corps with my trains 

including artillery, the tank brigade, the 7th 

Guards Cavalry Division and throw the corps 

either on Yartsevo to join with the Kalinin Front 

or for another assignment. 

8. Preparations of the operation will 

involve 7-10 days and possibly will succeed in 

forestalling an enemy offensive. 

No. 1596. Belov. Miloslavsky. Vashurin.38 

On the eleventh, Zhukov approved Belov's proposal. By then, however, Belov's enthusiasm had waned because Zhukov 

had forbidden him to weaken forces around Dorogobuzh and 

told him that 50th Army was not yet ready to join the 

attack.39 Belov decided to attack anyway and, on the 

twelfth, issued appropriate orders to his units, which now 

included 4th Airborne Corps (see map 19, p. 225). 

76 
Those orders required 4th Airborne Corps to regroup 

and join 1st Guards Cavalry Corps in an advance. southward 

along and east of the rail line to Milyatino. When ready, 50th Army would launch an attack (its third) northward to 

meet Belov’s forces.4* The distance from Belov’s forces 

to 50th Army was only twenty-five kilometers, but between 

them were heavily entrenched German units in all-round 

defensive positions. 

planT;T same* day* Colonel Kazankin developed his offensive 

While the 214th Airborne Brigade would continue 

to hold an airborne base area, the 8th and 9th Airborne 

brigades would strike south in the direction osf Buda, 

Novoye Askerovo I Staroye Askerovo, and Milyatino to 

cooperate with 50th Army and to pierce the Moscow-Warsaw 

highway. The specific orders tasked 8th Airborne Brigade ta attack on an axis of 

Myshenka, Bol’shaya Myshenka, western Buda, and Staroye Askerovo. Malaya The 9th 

Airborne Brigade was ordered to advance through eastern 

Buda to Novoye Askerovo. The 214th Airborne Brigade was 

to secure a defensive line from Akulovo to Dubrovna and to 

cover the flank of the main force from Baraki through Plotki and Platonovka to Akulovo. On the 4th Airborne 

Corps’s right flank, the 2d Guards Cavalry Division was to 

bypass enemy strongpoints and to reach Fanernovo factory, three kilometers southwest of Baskakovka station. Ts 

protect the rear 

the 1st 

of 4th Airborne Corps, one battalion of 

Partisan Regiment former airborne 

defensive lines facing Vyaz’ma. 

occupied 

The offensive began on the night of 13-14 April, and, 

by dusk on 18 April, the 8th and 9th brigades had 

surprised German forces and secured Vertekhovo station 

Terekhovka, I301 ’ shaya Eyshenka I and Bogoroditskoye. 42 

That evening, Belov received heartening news from Western 

Front headquarters. It seemed that 50th Army had already secured the Zaitsev heights and was but six kilometers 

from Milyatino-- this 

three days before.43 

after being unprepared to attack only 

In any case, the front commander 

ordered Bekov to accelerate his advance and rejected 

Belov’s request to bring the 1st Guards Cavalry Division 

forward from Dorogobuzh. Belov’s forces pushed southward 

on the night of 14-15 April and occupied Platonovka, 

Baraki s and Pkotki. On the left flank, the 214th Airborne 

Brigade took Akulovo, but heavy German fire halted further 

advance. Meanwhile, 2d Guards Cavalry Division reached 

within three kilometers ,of Baskakovka. Heavy German air 

attacks and ground resistance, however, made Belov rue the 

absence of his best cavalry division. Without a reserve, 

he could not sustain the advance mwch longer. On the 

fifteenth, heavy German air attacks and ground 

counterattacks threw General Boldin’s 50th Army forces off 

77 *: 
Zaitsev heights and back away from the Warsaw highway. That setback rendered Belov’s attack futile. 

Belov pushed his forces forward, hoping they could 

break the German lines by themselves. Belov ‘ s forces took 

Buda on 17 April and were only three kilometers north of 

Milyatino. There the offensive stalled and soon recoiled 

under renewed German counterattacks. After a full day of 

heavy battle, the Germans retook Buda at 1600 on 18 April 

and halted airborne advances on 

Kalugovo .44 

Novoye Askerovo and 

Belatedly, on the nineteenth, with airborne offensive 

strength expended p reinforcements arrived from the Western 

Front. The 4th Battalion, 23d Airborne Brigade, commanded 

by Sr. Lt. S. D. Kreuts and numbering 645 men, had jumped during the previous Svintsovo.45 

three days into a drop zone west of 

With these meager reinforcements, the 4th 

Airborne Corps regrouped and again attacked toward Novoye Askerovo. 

The 214th Airborne Brigade covered the eastern 

perimeter, and covering detachments from Malaya Myshenka 

to Baskakovka station screened in the west. The corps’s 

main force moved through the now completely thawed 

swamplands southward toward their objective. On the night 

of 20-21 April, the soaked and weary 8th Airborne Brigade 

at tacked the heavily fortif ied and mined German-held 

village, only to be repulsed. At 0200, the brigade 

withdrew to the southern edge of the forest just north of 

Novoye Askerovo. 

While 8th Airborne Brigade attacked, German units 

pounded airborne positions from Milyatino, Kalugovo, and 

Baskakovka. The Germans struck the 9th Airborne Brigade, defending 8th Airborne Brigade’s flank and rear. The 9th 

Brigade used ambush tactics to exact a heavy toll of 

Germans. By morning, the Germans had given up their 

attacks, 

The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps reconnaissance units 

identified elements of the German 331st Infantry Division 

(557th and 306th Infantry regiments) and 504th Motorized 

Engineer Regiment in the Malaya Myshenka, Baskakovka, 

Buda, and Butovo regions and the 41st Motorized Regiment, 

19th Panzer Division, supporting the 31st 

Division in the Novoye Askerovo and Kalugovo Inf antZB regions. 

Thus, elements of at least one panzer and two infantry 

divisions held the narrow corridor between 4th Airborne 

Corps and 50th Army. Most of the German units held 

prepared fortifications established to defend the 

Moscow-Warsaw highway. 

78 
Despite the long odds against success, 4th Airborne 

Corps made a final attempt to break the Germans’ iron grip 

the Moscow-Warsaw highway. iiril, On the night of 23-24 

corps units struck at Novoye Askerovo three times, 

but heavy German machine gun and mortar fire from both 

Novoye Askerovo and Staroye Askerovo and German 

counterattacks from Staroye and Novoye Kalugovo forced the 

paratroopers back to their starting position. Similar 

attempts by 2d Guards Cavalry Division to take the 

Fanernovo factory also failed. The two-kilometer zone to 

the Warsaw highway remained insurmountable.47 

The next day, the Germans struck back at Belov’s 

force. With tank and air support, they attacked from 

Buda, Staroye and Movoye Askerovo, and Kalugovo. German 

units pushed the airborne corps back into new defensive 

positions. The Western Front commander, General Zhukov, 

had no choice but to order 4th Airborne Corps to cease 

offensive actions. Such attacks no longer served any 

useful purpose because 501th Army’s attack on Milyatino at 

0200 that day had been repulsed. On 26 April, 5Ot 

also went on the defense for the foreseeable future.4 

Conditions facing 4th Airborne Carps could scarcely have been worse. The Germans had eliminated the 33d Army pocket and driven Soviet front forces onto the defense. 

German units could now regroup and, when the spring thaw 

ended, thoroughly crush the last threat in their rear, 

namely, 1st Guards Cavalry Garps and 4th Airborne Corps. 

Now that the spring thaw was in progress, rivers were 

running high, swamps were unlocked t and terrain thus 

hindered movement of Soviet troops already facing a 

growing network of fortified positions and roads teeming 

with armed German convoys I In these conditions X resupply 

of the corps was impossible, except by risky 

direct-parachute delivery. 

The front commander consequently ordered airborne 

corps units to return to their 12 April--before the 

Milyatino offensive--positions. The Germans poured more 

troops into the area vacated by 4th Airborne Corps but did 

not resume their counterattacks immediately (see map 20, 

p. 226). 

Encirclement and Breakout, 1 May-23 June 1942 

The first half of May was quiet, as the effects of the 

spring thaw stifled coordinated action by either side. 

The 4th Airborne Carps used the lull to improve its 

defensive positions south and east of Ugra station. 

Sufficient supplies were dropped or flown to improvised 

79 
airstrips to reequip and resupply corps units. Returning aircraft also flew wounded personnel back to bol'shaya 

zemlya (the big world). The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps 

redeployed into a wide area from Dorogobuzh to south of 

Vyaz'ma and refitted its units. The 1st Partisan Regiment covered the north-northeastern flank of 4th Airborne Corps. 

Augmented by the remnants of 8th Airborne Brigade, 250th Airborne Regiment, a battalion of 23d Airborne 

Brigade, and some personnel 

numbered 2,300 men, plus 

from 33d Army, co;:; forces 

2,000 wounded 1,700 

partisans. Weaponry consisted of seven antitank guns, thirty-seven antitank rifles, and thirty-four battalion 

mortars.49 With this force, 4th Airborne Corps defended 

a perimeter of thirty-five kilometers. 

Belov and Kazankin still hoped to break out from the 

German encirclement. 

9 May, 

Their hopes rose even more when, on 

Gen. 

the chief of operations for the Western Front, Maj. 

S. V. Golushkevich, flew into General Belov s 

headquarters with news of a future Soviet offensive.50 

The offensive would involve 50th Army, reinforced by new 

Soviet mechanized formations, and would occur no later 

than 5 June. But the nagging question remained, "Would 

the Germans attack first?" Undeniable evidence suggested 

that as many as seven divisions of the German 4th Panzer 

Army and 43d Army Corps of 4th Army were preparing to 

attack the encircled Soviet forces from both north and 

south. So, Belov and Kazankin prepared to meet the German 

blow. 

The Germans reinforced their garrisons and 

concentrated new units at Mikhali, Veshki, and Znamenka to 

attack against the airborne positions. On 23 May, the 

Germans dispatched a diversionary force from Milyatino. The members wore Soviet uniforms, carried Soviet weapons, 

and were supposed to destroy airborne headquarters. But, 

instead, the 8th and 9th Airborne brigades intercepted and 

destroyed the diversionary unit on 23-24 March. Captured 

Germans revealed German planning for so-called Operation Hanover, an attack that would involve seven divisions from 

two army corps advancing from Znamenka (northeast), from 

Milyatino (south), and from Dorogobuzh station 

(northwest). The objective of the two- to three-day 

operation was to split 1st Guards Cavalry Corps from 4th 

Airborne Corps and then to destroy each piecemeal.5l 

At 0400 on 24 May, in pouring rain, Belov heard the 

distant rumble of guns announcing the opening of the 

German offensive (see map 20, p. 226). All headquarters 

soon confirmed the sound of the guns and, more ominously, 

revealed the coordinated nature of the German attack. The 

80 
6th Partisan Regiment at Vskhody reported to Belov that 

Germans had overrun their positions with scarcely a 

pause. The commander of the 6th Regiment was killed, and 

the 8th Guards Cavalry Regiment was driven 

through Vskhody.52 

into and 

This German attack on Vskhody and a 

similar one north along the rail line toward Ugra were indicative of the enemy's intent to separate the cavalry 

corps from 4th Airborne Corps units. 

At the same time, Kazankin's airborne units were hard 

pressed on all sides. After the 0400 artillery preparation, elements of the German 23d Infantry, 5th 

Panzer, 197th Infantry, 131st Infantry, 31st Infantry, and 

19th Panzer divisions with aviation support attacked 

airborne positions from Mikhali, Znamenka, Only the 

and Milyatino. eastern sector of airborne defenses was 

relatively quiet. Unable to stop the concerted German 

advance and facing certain annihilation if he held his 

5 

round, Colonel Kazankin, with Western 

esignated 

Front approval, covering ,units on his defensive lines. On the 

night of 24-25 May, he moved 'his main forces westward 

toward the Ugra River at Selibka in hopes of crossing and 

rejoining Belov's force.53 

When 4th Airborne Corps reached the Ugra River on the 

morning of the twenty-sixth, it found that German forces 

had brushed aside partisan units on the far side and 

occupied Pishchevo, Selibka, and Sorokino. The 

lacked river-crossing equipment to 

corps 

traverse the 

120-meter-wide water--an obstacle compounded by strong, tricky currents and open swamps on the far ba k. 

Fortunately, the 8th Airborne Brigade could conceal its lf 

in the forests on the near bank of the river while 1 it 

reconnoitered a means to cross the river. By day's 

the brigade had found three large and several small 

at Pishchevo.54 

Meanwhile, Belov launched several local counterattacks 

to relieve pressure on 4th Airborne Corps. The 6th Guards 

Cavalry Regiment, with two T-26 light tanks, attacked 

German units crossing the Ugra at Vskhody and forced them 

to withdraw. At great risk, the understrength 2d and 7th 

Guards Cavalry regiments of 2d Guards Cavalry Division 

rushed to the Sorokino bridgehead of the 8th Airborne 

Brigade and assisted the r.emnants of the corps in their 

river crossing on the night of 26-27 May.55 After the 

crossing, Kazankin ordered his forces to break out of the 

German encirclement by moving westward between Selibka and 

Chashchi and to regroup in the forests south of Podlipki. Subsequently, the corps would move via Frolova and 

Kurakino to Pustoshka and unite with Belovfs forces, which 

had preceded them. At 0030 on 28 May, the Soviets moved 

81 
into the darkness, infiltrated around German forces, and 

reassembled south of Podlipki at first light. The 

withdrawal had been accomplished in such secrecy- that 

German units opened an artillery 'barrage at 0600 on 29 May 

on Chashchi and Selibka, where they still assumed the 4th 

Airborne Corps was entrenched.56 

Not all corps units were so successful in escaping destruction. Surrounded at Bol'shaya Myshenka, one 

company of the 8th Airborne Brigade perished to a man. 

The -214th Airborne Brigade, covering the eastern airborne 

perimeter defenses and the rear guard of the corpsfs 

withdrawal, fought its way out of encirclement on the 

night of 28-29 May near Fursovo, finally crossing the 

Gordota River and joining the corps west of Podlipki. 

Despite a diary entry by Hafder that "Fourth Army has 

closed the ring around the main body of Belov," by the 

twenty-eighth, Belov's cavalry corps had escaped and 

reestablished a fairly firm front facing east on the north 

bank of the Ugra River at Vskhody.57 His forces 

included 1st Guards Cavalry Division, 1st and 2d Partisan 

divisions, and seven tanks, including a heavy KV* and a 

medium T-34. Moreover, the 23d and 211thAirborne 

brigades, with 4,000 men, had landed to reinforce the 

corps and assist Belov in his withdrawal.58 The 

2d Guards Cavalry Division and 4th Airborne Corps would 

soon join Belov after their escape from German forces to 

the east. By 0400 on 30 May, 4th Airborne Corps had 

arrived in Pustoshka, The 329th Rifle and 2d Guards 

Cavalry divisions had preceded them. Belov's force was 

now complete, 

men.59 

though worn down, and numbered about 17,000 

Belov anticipated the 

offensive. He detailed a 

befi;;,ng of tFf Soviet June 

group 1st Guards 

Cavalry Division (4,500 men), 4th Airborne Corps (5,800 

men>, and a partisan regiment to cooperate with 50th 

Army. Perhaps Vyaz'ma might yet be taken. But Belov's 

hopes were dashed when Soviet forces near Kharkov suffered 

a major defeat that canceled the June Soviet offensive. 

The die was cast for 1st Guards Cavalry and 4th Airborne 

Corps. German pressure continued to build. The German 

23d Infantry and 5th and 19th Panzer divisions, advancing 

from the north and east, pushed back the 329th Rifle 

Division and occupied the best of Belov's landing strips 

(see map 21, p. 227). On 4 June, Bel.ov and Kazankin 

dispatched a message to front headquarters outlining the 

*Model Klimenti Voroshilov. 

82 
Situation and requesting approval of their plan to 

"'penetrate east of Yel'nya in the region of the 5th 

Partisan Rifle Regiment subsequent1 8 

to break through. to 

Kirov to unite with front forces." 0 The next day, the 

Western Front recommended either a move north to link up with the Kalinin Front or a move east to Mosal'sk where 

Soviet forces were most active. Both moves were 

'impossible, however, because the Dnepr River to the north 

was flooding, and main force German units prevented escape 

to the east. The Western Front finally agreed that Belov 

should move southeast toward Kirov to rejoin 10th Army. That move meant that Belov had to leave the major partisan 

units behind to operate in small groups against the 

Germans. 

Belov"s planned route of withdrawal passed through the 

forests south of Yel'nya, where S. Laze's 24th Anniversary of the Red Army Partisan Detachment operated, and then 

across the Warsaw highway into the forests west of Kirov, 

where Captain Galyuga's partisans could assist the 

airborne forces. The 4th Airborne Corps would follow the 

axis of Khlysty, Glinka, and Filimony. The 1st Guards 

Cavalr P Corps and 329th Rifle Division advanced on the 

left.6 

At noon on 6 June, the 160- to 200-kilometer march 

began. The next day, the two corps endured heavy German 

air attacks near Filimony. After that, movement was 

restricted to nighttime to avoid hostile aircraft, and, on 

lo-11 June, corps units hid in the forests of Lazots 

partisans, where they replenished their food and 

ammunition.62 By the night of 15-16 June, the corps had 

reached the Moscow-Warsaw highway and was planning its 

attack in the Denisovka and Pokrovskoye sectors, with a 

regrouping in the forests east of Pervovo Buikovo (see 

map 22, p. 228). 

Reconnaissance units estimated that the German force 

in that sector was one infantry regiment, with a tank 

company on continuous patrol along the highway.63 The 

troops' exhaustion made an envelopment of the German 

position impossible. A surprise night attack on a broad 

front offered the only chance fur success. Belov 

organized his forces on a narrow front in the woods 

opposite the highway. The 4th Airborne Corps-on the right had three brigades in first echelon and two in second 

echelon. The 329th Rifle Division was in reserve.. On the 

left, Belov organized 1st Guards Cavalry Corps with the 

1st and 3d Guards Cavalry regiments in first echelon and 

the 6th and 5th in second echelon. Second-echelon units 

stayed with the horses. The weakened 2d Guards Cavalry Division was in reserve. 

83 
They attacked in darkness without any artillery preparation. Soviet units advanced piecemeal because the 

Germans took each unit under fire as they detected it. 

First-echelon cavalry regiments successfully broke across 

the road through a gauntlet of heavy German machine gun 

and mortar fire. 

dashes Subsequent until German tanks 

small groups cr;i;;d in 

arrived, firing the 

highway. Soviet cavalry groups balked at crossing the 

road under the withering fire as daylight approached. Maj. Gen. V. K. Baranov of 1st Guards Cavalry Division 

rallied the force of 3,000 cavalry and several thousand 

paratroopers who hurled themselves across the road in an 

unstoppable mass. German fire killed many, including the 

6th Cavalry Regiment"s commander, Lt. Col. A. V. 

Knyazeva. Those who crossed the road successfully made a 

frantic dash southward. Those who followed ran a gauntlet of fire that stripped the trees of their leaves and took a 

frightful toll of casualties. 

Almost al.1 of General Baranov's 1st Cavalry Division 

succeeded in crossing the deadly road, as did about half 

of Kazankin"s 4th Airborne Corps. However, the 2d Guards 

Cavalry Division, 8th Airborne Brigade, and stragglers from other airborne brigades could not cross nor could the 

329th Rifle Division and the corps staff. Belov remained 

with these forces, trusting in Baranov"s and Kazankin's 

ability to unite their forces with 10th Army.64 

Colonel Kazankin reorganized his truncated 4th 

Airborne Corps and, harried by German air attacks, moved 

southeast into the forests east of Podgerb. There the 

unit rested from 17 to 21 June, replenishing its 

ammunition and food under the protection of Galyuga"s partisan detachment. Colonel Kazankin notified the 10th 

Army commander of his intentions to break through the 

German lines and requested artillery support and whatever 

other assistance 10th Army could provide. Wounded were 

evacuated to front hospitals by light aircraft operating 

from cleared forest landing strips, and the corps prepared 

to attack a German sector near Zhilino, just north of 

Kirov. The plan to weaken German defenses involved 

diversionary attacks by machine gunners and artillery fire 

and infantry attacks by front units. A forward detachment 

of machine gunners led the corps's attack in deep echelon, 

witb the wives and children of the partisans in the middle 

of the formation. After a four-hour fight and 120 

casualties, 4th Airborne Corps finally reached 10th Army 

positions and safety.65 Belov's force and the remainin 

8th Airborne troops under Major Karnaukhov (commander o 

the first airborne detachment to land in the enemy rear] 

ended their hegira on the night of 27-28 June, when they, 

84 
too, broke through German lines north of Kirov.66 After 

five months of bitter combat, one of the longest airborne 

operations in history had ended. 

Conclusions 

Elements of 4th Airborne Corps had operated in the 

German rear for more than six months. In continuous 

battle, the paratroopers had freed 200 villages (many of 

which remained in partisan hands), moved 600 kilometers, 

killed many Germans, and tied down seven divisions of four 

German army corps, thus limiting the Germans' counterattack potential. German assessments, however, credited 

the Soviets with varying degrees of success. A German 

postwar critique of Soviet airborne operations around 

Moscow stated: 

The support given the pa;;isans by ,parachufists considerably increased latter s striking 

power and their threat in the, rear of the German 

Armies. There is also no doubt that, in addition 

to mere reinforcement and. supply by air, the 

systematic recruiting, equipment, and training of 

new troops was made possible by the Russians in 

the rear of the Germans. . . . However 

unpleasant it was for the Germans to have this 

danger in their rear and although it especially affected systematic supply of the front, at no 

time was there a direct, strategic effect. The 

Chief of Staff of the German Fourth Army stated 

in this connection that "Although the whole 

matter was very annoying it had no strategic consequence."' 

According to the statements made by the 

Commander in Chief of the Fourth Panzer Army, the 

army estimated the breakthrough at the front to 

constitute a substantially greater danger than 

the parzyhute jumps in the zone of communications. 

General of Infantry Guenther Blumentritt, chief of 

staff of German 4th Army, wrote, "Strategically, this 

commitment by the Russians had no detrimental effects in 

s ite of the critical situation of the Fourth Army. 

t K e tactical viewpoint, on the other hand, the 'red louse 

From 

in one's hide was unpleasant.'"68 Blumentritt, however, 

was impressed enough by the Soviet airborne operations to 

write a special postwar study concerning operations 

against rear lines of communication that focused on the 

85 
Soviet airborne experience 194-I-42 and its 

applicability in modern battleoSf69 The Germans did 

acknowledge limited Soviet airborne successes: 

The situation in Fourth Army was made far 

more serious by the appearance of the Russian 

airborne corps functioning as a compact unit. 

The war diary of this army almost daily mentions 

the fear that the Rollbahn will be threatened 

simultaneously from the north and south and the 

army cut off. The withdrawal of the army to the 

Ressa-Ugra line at the beginning of March 1942 

may be regarded as a tactical result of this 

threat; that is to say that, in addition to other 

factors, it was due to the effects of the Russian 

airborne corps. It became necessary to release 

German forces (13lst Infantry Division) to attack 

the airborne troops. Another direct result of 

the fighting for the Rollbahn was the abandonment 

of the plan to make a joint attack at the end of 

March with the German Second Panzer Army and the 

Fourth Army to retake Kirov. The forces set 

aside by the Fourth Army for this purpose were 

tied down by the violent attacks of Russian Tenth 

[50th] Army on the Rollbahn from the south and 

the simultaneous threat to it from the north by 

the airborne corps and 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, 

combined into Group Belov. The effective share 

taken by the airlanding corps in this was 

relatively small.70 

The assessment uncannily pinpointed the precise 

reasons for a lack of greater Soviet success: 

The following may well have been the decisive 

reasons: 

a. The lack of the element of surprise. 

b. The lack of artillery and heavy weapons, 

although for the rest, the airborne troops were 

well equipped and trained. But this lack 

substantially diminished their striking power. 

C. The difficulties of the terrain and of 

the weather, which undoubtedly decreased the 

mobility of the Russians also. 

d. The lack of coordination in the measures, 

taken by the two separate forces north and south 

of the Rollbahn, and the lack of synchronization in the date and hour of the attack (perhaps also 

86 
influenced by road conditions); hesitation of the 

airborne troops between attacking and going on 

the defensive. 

It is possible that there were also 

difficulties in the attempt to supply the troops exclusively by air and a rapid decrease of combat 

strength. 

Not the least reason for the failure of the 

Russians was the steadfastness of German 

troops.71 

That higher headquarters shared the concern of 

front-line commanders is 

which 

evidenced by Halder’s diary, repeatedly mentions the airborne threat to Army Group Center. 

For all their personal heroics and individual 

sacrifices, Soviet airborne units had failed in their 

primary mission-- a 

to blame. 

failure for which the High Command was 

A mission with operational-strategic aims had 

achieved only tactical and diversionary objectives. The 

offensive it had supported also failed for reasons beyond the control of the individual airborne units. 

Why did the offensive and airborne operation fail? 

The answers fall into three areas: first, High Command plznning; second, execution and technical difficulties; 

third weather. 

off jcial Soviet 

At the highest command level, 

critiques of the winter offensive best 

summarized the failure: 

When our offensives carried our forces deep into 

the depth of the position, there was 

unsatisfactory coordination between our forces 

which had broken into the enemy position and 

those which remained on the original front line. 

The initial [immediate] task given armies by front commands covered too long a phase of the 

operation, and flexibility was lacking in the 

change or correction of such initial missions in 

light of the subsequent development of the 

situation. . . . Mobile formations were given 

proper initial instructions (missions), but in 

the course of operations they often got cut off, 

and cavalry corps ended often by operating not in 

cooperation with the main force. 72 

Dizzy with success over the results of the December 

counteroffensive, the Soviet High Command continued that 

offensive in January with depleted forces. Mobile groups, 

87 
in particular, lacked the power to sustain the offensive. 

They achieved penetrations but were seldom able to exploit 

them. Exploitation forces entered the narrow penetrations and advanced only to find themselves exhausted and at the 

mercy of better equipped foes. The Germans, ordered to 

stand fast, used their heavier armament to close the 

penetrations and to trap the Soviet exploitation forces. 

Furthermore, the High Command clung too long to 

original hopes and plans. It forbade isolated forces from 

operating with other units until it was too late, and it 

required them to attack their original objectives until 

their combat strength was spent. Thus, Yefremov's three 

divisions of Soviet 33d Army perished east of Vyaz'ma. 

First forbidden to join Yefremov, Belov was then forced to 

leave a major element of his force in Dorogobuzh. April could Only in 

the remnants of all encircled 

forces. 

units join By then, it was too late to conduct a serious 

offensive operation with any prospects for success. The 

Soviets themselves properly concluded that 

the launching of large-scale operations [in 

winter] impulsively, without regard to the 

available troops and resources, leads to 

scattering of forces and a failure to achievz 

substantial results. [Moreover,] mobile 

formations '[including airborne] in offensive 

operations under winter conditions are capable of 

carrying out independent operational missions. 

Rut the .&imitations imposed on them by winter 

conditions make it advisable for them to operate relatively near to the main body of the army and 

in close cooperation with it.73 

Operational planning for the several airborne assaults 

was hasty and incomplete, The poorly planned movement of 

aircraft and personnel to the launch airfields disrupted 

the overall operational plan. Coordination between the 

airborne force and the main front unit it was to link up with was nonexistent or limited. Aviation support of the 

operation, both combat and transport, was insufficient. 

Insufficient advanced reconnaissance of the landing site 

resulted in unrealistic assessments of enemy strength. Logistical support was inadequate in both weapons and 

amounts of supplies needed to overcome enemy forces. Lack 

of communications prevented efficient assembly and 

coordination of forces. 

On top of the poor operational plans, technical 

difficulties further disrupted smooth operations. The 

lack of sufficient aircraft capable of carrying and 

accurately dropping paratroopers lengthened the dropping 

88 
phase, made aircraft and airfields vulnerable to German 

attack, and guaranteed dispersal of the combat troops in 

the drop area. Lack of navigational equipment on the 

ground and in the aircraft made accurate delivery almost 

impossible. Scarce numbers of trained aircrews aggravated this problem. Shortages of good radios hampered communications throughout the operation. 

The harsh weather conditions severely hindered the 

o erations of both sides but had a particularly severe 

e P feet on the less mobile Soviet forces. Low temperatures 

(-30° to -45OC) and dee snows 

meter) limited rapid assem 1 ly (to a depth of one 

and movement of forces and 

robbed the airborne forces of their ability to capitalize 

fully on the initial surprise they achieved. Only 

surprise produced by rapid movement could compensate for 

the light armament of airborne units. 

Slow Soviet movement resulting from all these problems 

puzzled the Germans and confused them as to the actual 

Soviet airborne force mission. Postwar German critics 

claimed 

the operation [January-February] does not present the characteristics of an airlanding operation in 

the sense of an attack from the air. Rather, the 

fighting is solely a ground operation, only the 

assembly of forces takes place by air. This 

assembly although taking place in the rear of the 

enemy, nevertheless occurred in an area which the 

enemy no longer controlled. The operation had 

sound prospects for success, but the Russians 

failed to take quick action and exploit the 

element of surprise. They let weeks pass between 

the first landings and the decisive thrust. As a 

result they lost the best chance they had for 

succeeding. . . . The situation of German Fourth 

Army [would have been critical] if the Russians 

at the end of January 1942 had landed their 

brigade, which up till then had been landed in 

scattered units, as a compact force in the area 

southwest of Znamenka. If these airborne forces 

had then established communications between the 

Russian Thirty-Third and Tenth [50th] Armies, in 

cooperation with Cavalry Corps Belov, the German 

Fourth Army would have been completely 

encircled. It would have been doubtful whether 

this army could have broken out of encirclement, 

in view of the condition it was in at the time. 

The reasons for the way the Russians behaved are 

not known. Perhaps, it was the temptation to 

achieve a greater objective, the encirclement of 

89 

4 

- 
the German Fourth Panzer *Army and Ninth Army. Perhaps it was impossible for them to undertake a 

landing synchronized in both time and space. It 

is useless to. speculate wi.th.out additional 

information on the subject from the Russians.74 

Actual events, as revealed by the Soviets, confirmed the 

correctness of German speculation. " 

Mitigating .these failu,res is the-fact that this first 

Soviet airborne operation occurred during a desperate, 

period under great pressures and extremely complex 

conditions. Unrealistically, the So'viet High Command 

threw all the forces at its disposal into a massive. 

attempt to crush the Germans, who had recently wreaked 

havoc on the Soviet Union but who now s,eemed vulnerable to 

a Soviet counterblow. Reflecting on the regulations of 

the 1930s and their .prescrip"tion for modern successful 

deep battle, the High Command seized upon the.panacea of 

airborne operations, keeping in mind what the regulations 

promised the use of such forces could. produce, namely, 

confusion and ultimate defeat for the enemy. 

The offensive of January 1942 was a. bold, though 

flawed, attempt to follow the prescription 'of the 1930s 

for victory. To the offensive, bold, imaginative resort 

to deep battle would produce victory. But, in 1942, it 

did not. Only later in the war, when for&es and equipment 

matched doctrine and when leaders educated themselves to 

the necessities and realities of battle, would the older 

concepts contribute to victory. 

Airborne forces paid the price of High Command 

failures. About 14,000 men jumped into the cauldron of 

battle around Vyaztma.75 These men, ,under brave 

leaders, endured the subzero cold of January and February, and those who survived contended with the rotting moisture 

and mud of April and May. They fought daily battles with 

Germans, hunger, and the elements, and they reaped little 

of the euphoria of victory. About 4,000 Soviet 

paratroopers survived the four-month ordeal. Their only 

reward, save survival, was the knowledge that they had 

endured the longest airborne operation in history. Their 

personal sacrifice and endurance left a legacy of lessons, 

a step in the education of an army. 

90 
CHAPTER 5 

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT: ON THE DNEPR, SEPTEMBER 1943 

Operational A- Planning 

The Soviets conducted their second and last 

operational level airborne assault in September 1943 

during the Soviet advance to the Dnepr River. Having 

repulsed major German attacks in a strategic defensive 

operation at Kursk in July 1943, Soviet forces 

counterattacked in mid-July and August with two of their 

own offenses. Operation Kutuzov, launched in mid-July, 

drove German forces from the Ore1 salient. The second 

offensive, Operation Rumyantsev, begun in early Au ust, 

smashed German 4th Panzer Army and Operational 8 roup Kempf , and severely mauled German mob i Pe operational 

reserves. By late August, the Soviets had captured 

Kharkov and had begun a broad front pursuit of the German 

forces withdrawing toward the Dnepr River line. 

Though largely unfortified, the Dnepr River was a 

significant obstacle to future Soviet advances. The 

German command believed that this river barrier would 

stabilize the eastern line of contact for the long term. 

Soviet planners had to establish firm bridgeheads over the 

Dnepr River to prevent the Germans from stabilizing the 

fluid front. 

During the second half of September, Soviet forces 

from thrs:iarkov area accelerated their advance toward the 

Dnepr map 23, p. 92). The Soviet Central Front 

advanced westward toward the river on a general axis 

running north of Kiev. Spearheaded by Lt. Gen. P. S. 

Rybalko’s 3d Guards Tank Army, the Voronezh Front lunged 

at the Dnepr in a sector from Kiev to south of Cherkassy. 

As the Soviet advance accelerated, the German command 

rushed troops in to man the Dnepr River line. 

Facing weakening German resistance, General of the 

Army N. F. Vatutin, Voronezh Front commander, in response 

to Stavka orders to accelerate his advance, ordered the 

folmmeasures on 19 September: 

To the acnodnman4detrhs, 

Army, 

3d GuardfheTank Army, 38th 

Army. enemy, while 

withdrawing, tries to burn all the bread 

[crops]. Conditions demand a maximum offensive 

tempo. 1 order: 

91 
SCALE 

I 

0 

Map 23. Voronezh Front Advance to the Dnepr, September 1943 
1. Comrade Rybalko move with care at a 

speed of 100 kilometers Per day to the 

Pereyaslavl area by means of your best mobile 

units and tanks, to arrive not later than 

22-9-43. 

2. Commanders of 40th and 38th Armies 

speed the tempo of the offensive, first of all 

with mobile forces, 

also on 22-9-43. 

to arrive at the Dnepr River 

3. Report measures undertaken. 

Vatutinl 

The Voronezh Front’s mobile group (3d Guards Tank Army with 1st Guards Cavalry Corps) raced forward, with all 

three corps in first echelon, on a 

kilometers, 

front of seventy and reached the Dnepr River on the night of 

21-22 September. The next day, forward units secured 

small bridgeheads across 

Velikyi Bukrin.2 

the Dnepr at Rzhishchev and 

The same day, lead elements of 40th 

Army reached the river and also secured a small 

bridgehead.3 Heavy German air attacks and the Soviets’ 

lack of bridging equipment to allow tanks to cross the 

river placed the bridgeheads in danger of destruction by German counterattacks. At this critical juncture, the 

Stavka decided to use an airborne assault to widen the 

-head at Velikyi Bukrin (see map 24, p. 229). 

The Soviet High Command anticipated the need to use 

airborne forces in the Dnepr River operations. During 

August and September, the Stavka ordered Maj. Gen. A. G. 

Kapitkokin, commander of airborne forces, to train 

airborne forces intensively for missions in the near 

future. The 3d Airborne Brigade held exercises near 

Moscow, and the lst, 5th) similar training.4 As and other brigades underwent 

the Soviet offensive proceeded favorably, the Stavka, in early September, detached the 

lst, 3d, and 5thuards Airborne brigades from the 

airborne administration and assigned them to the Voronezh 

Front commander for use in the planned airborne 

operation. To ensure unity of command, Maj. Gen. I. I. 

Zatevakhin, deputy commander of airborne forces, commanded 

the new airborne corps. His staff officers were from the 

airborne administration. The new lO,OOO-man corps 

contained Cal. P. I. Krasovsky”s 1st Brigade, Col. P. A. 

Goncharov’s 3d Brigade, and Lt. Col. P. M. Sidorchuk’s 5th 

Brigade. 5 

The airborne forces commander and the 

aviation commander jointly planned long-range the operation (see 

93 
map 25, p. 230). By 16 September, airborne force 

headquarters 

composition 

had detailed plans for objectives, force 

and unit missions, preparations, requisite and conduct of the operation. phasing of 

The airborne 

forces commander was responsible for the overall plan and 

all stages until 

aircraft. 

the actual loading of the force onto 

plan’s 

The aviation commander was responsible for the 

in-flight phase. The Voronezh Front commander 

exercised control of the operation after landing. To 

facilitate joint planning, thteb;i:orne force staff (an operational group) was at . with the aviation 

operational groups and the 2d Air Army command post, which 

supported the Voronezh Front, The new airborne 

staff was also in Lebedin, 

neared I but, as the time for oper$iEi it moved nearer to the front lines to the 40th 

Army headquarters. 

On 23 September, the communications network of the 

units involved became operational. The airborne force 

operational group established communications with the 

Voronezh Front, 40th Army, and the long-range aviation 

operational group, as well as with 2d Air Army and the 

airfields from which the airborne would depart. Concentration of the airborne corps a”n”d’psts equipment at 

these airfields was 

before the operation supposed to be completed two days commenced on 

September. 

the night of 23-24 

The airborne corps’s mission, as established 

General Vatutin, bY was to cooperate with the front to secure 

a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnepr River near 

Velikyi Bukrin and to widen and 

br idgehead .6 fortify the expanded 

Specifically, the corps would seize 

Lipovyi Rog, Makedony, and Stepantsy and prevent German 

counterattacks from penetrating the west bank of the Dnepr 

in the sector from Kanev to Traktomirov. The planned 

corps defensive perimeter fifteen 

was thirty kilometers deep and 

to twenty kilometers wide. 

Colonel Krasovsky’s 1st Guards Airborne Brigade would 

land near Lazurtsy, Beresnyagi, and Grishentsy to capture Makedony and Sinyavka and to prevent enemy counterattacks 

toward Kurifovka and Bobritsa. Colonel Goncharov’s 3d 

Guards Airborne Brigade would land near Grushevo, 

Makedony , and Tulitsy to secure a defensive line from 

Lipovyi Rog to Makedony, and to prevent a German advance 

to Chernyshi and Buchak. The 3d Brigade would hold the 

line until 40th Army units arrived from Traktomirov and 

Zarubentsy. Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk’s 5th Guards 

Airborne Brigade would land near Trostynets, Kovali, and 

94 
Kostyanets to secure a defensive line from Gorkavshchina 

through Stepantsy to Kostyanets and to prevent an enemy advance to the Dnepr from the south and southwest.7 

The two-night landing would require 50 PS-84 aircraft, 

150 IL-4/B-25 aircraft, 10 towed gliders, and 35 A-7 and 

G-11 gliders. Aircraft would lift the force from 

Smorodino and Bogodukhov airfields near Lebedin, a 

distance of 175 to 200 kilometers from the drop sites. 

Each aircraft would make two to three sorties a night.8 

The 1st and 5th Guards Airborne brigades would land the 

first night, 3d Guards Airborne Brigade the next night. Gliders carrying artillery would land during the intervals 

between the drops of the parachute echelons. 

Aircraft equipped with cameras would conduct 

continuous reconnaissance of the area for three days before the operations to provide information on enemy dispositions in the drop area. Front aviation units would 

strike German targets detected by reconnaissance. Bombers 

would attack the area immediately before the paratroopers jumped from their aircraft. After the drop, front assault 

and bomber aviation would provide close air support as 

directed by the airborne corps commander. Communications 

units dropped into the landing area would provide close 

coordination between air and land forces. .In addition, 

artillery observers would accompany the force to ensure 

timely artillery support, and a squadron of artillery 

adjustment (spotting) aircraft would help control and 

shift artillery fires. Thirty-five aircraft would carry 

supplies to the airborne force and evacuate casualties on 

return trips from the bridgehead. The paratroopers 

brought two days’ rations and two or three basic loads of 

ammunition.9 The Voronezh Front commander provided 100 

vehicles for movement of men and materiel to the airfield. 

The actual landings would be made in several phases. 

Small units would jump into the area first to clear 

landing sites and to establish contacts with local 

partisan units. The brigades would follow, landing 

according to a schedule worked out jointly by the corps 

staff and the military transport aviation staff. Radio 

communications would link the brigades to the corps and 

the Voronezh Front command post. The aux i 1 iary command 

post of the Voronezh Front and the command post of 40th 

Army also had stations in the communications net. 

Elaborate security measures included strict radio silence 

during the preparatory phase and signal call signs of 

airborne units designated as so-called replacement units 

to mask their true nature.10 

95 
! .,- I 

On 19 September, Gen. G. K. Zhukov, Stavka 

representative, approved the plan. He stressed tham 

missions of the Voronezh Front and the airborne corps had 

to correspond to the time of landing. Zhukov ordered 

Vatutin to update brigade missions.11 

Meanwhile, the pace of the Soviet advance had 

quickened, and, on 21-22 September, lead elements crossed' 

the Dnepr River, Then, a series of unforeseen events 

disrupted the carefully laid plans for conducting the 

airborne operation. Airborne forces were unable to 

Concentrate at the airfields in the required two-day period because of insufficient railroad cars to move the 

corps. Furthermore, the railroad tracks were in 

disrepair, so the requisite supplies and equipment for the 

forces did not arrive on time. In addition, bad weather 

prevented military transport aviation from assembling the 

necessary aircraft at the proper airfields. Only eight planes arrived at the airfields at the appointed time.12 

Plans were altered accordingly (see map 26, p. 231). General Vatutin, who arrived at 40th Army headquarters on 

the morning of the twenty-third, issued amended orders. 

Me delayed the drop one day, to the night of 24-25 

September, and, instead of committing three brigades over 

two nights, he decided to send the two that could complete their movement to the departure airfields. Vatutin 

ordered the 3d Guards Airborne Brigade to land southeast 

of Rzhishchev near Tulitsy, Beresnyagi, Lazurtsy, and 

Potaptsy. The 3d Brigade would secure a defensive line 

from Lipovyi RQ?3 through Makedony and Sinyavka to 

Kozarovka and hold it until the approach of 40th Army, 

while blocking German movement from the west and 

southwest. The 5th Guards Airborne Brigade was to land 

west of Kanev near Kovali, Kostyanets, and Trostynets; 

secure a line from Gorkavshchina through Stepantsy to 

Sutniki; and hold the line until Soviet forces advanced 

from Buchak, Selishche, and Kanev. The 5th Brigade would 

also block a German advance from the south and 

southwest.13 The 1st Guards Airborne Brigade would be 

in reserve, scheduled to join the other brigades on the 

second or third night of the operation, as soon as the 

brigade could concentrate at departure airfields. 

The delay in the operation and the last-minute changes 

in plans caused near chaos in command channels. The 

airborne command and airborne landing forces received the 

changes on the twenty-third at 40th Army headquarters. The commander of airborne forces and the corps commander 

needed the entire day to clarify missions, evaluate the 

situation, and make decisions * response to the 

alterations. Orders to subordinate 'tnits went out on the 

96 

1 ' 
twenty-fourth. Brigade commanders, in turn, studied the 

changes, made their decisions, and issued their orders a 

mere one and one-half hours before the troops loaded onto 

the aircraft. This ripple effect resulting from changed orders most affected battalion and company commanders and 

their men. Company commanders had only fifteen minutes 

before takeoff to brief their subordinates. Platoon 

leaders passed the information to their men during the 

flight to the drop zone. As a consequence, 

the lateness in mission assignment to units and 

subunits of the landing force deprived the 

commanders of the opportunity to clarify problems 

of coordination within the landing force and with 

other combat arms, to check on how subordinates 

understood the mission, and to map out a battle 

plan after landing in the enemy rear. Preflight drills were not conducted with personnel or 

officers, either on maps or on mock-ups of the 

terrain, ’ connection with the forthcoming 

mission. 14 In 

Shortage of time forced brigade and battalion commanders 

to limit their briefings to basic information about drop 

zones, assembly areas, objectives, and defensive zones. 

They did not address questions of supplying the troops adequate weaponry. On the assumption that front units 

would quickly relieve the paratrooper force, parachute 

units lacked both shovels to dig entrenchments and 

antitank mines with which to establish an effective 

defense . Troops did not even carr 

s ponchos for protection 

against the night frosts of autumn. 5 

Moreover , Soviet commanders had virtually no 

intelligence on enemy dispositions in their drop area. 

Bad weather had prevented aerial reconnaissance, but 

commanders operated on the assumption that German forces 

were weak, as indeed they had been up to a week before the 

operation. Unknown to the Soviets, however, the situation 

was dramatically changing. In essence, a race to the 

Dnepr River in the Rzhishchev-Kanev area was in progress. 

What was at stake was the possibility of a major Soviet 

foothold on the south bank. Before 22 September, there 

had been virtually no German troops defending the south 

bank in this critical sector. The 4th Panzer Army was 

withdrawing to and across the Dnepr at Kiev. The 8th Army, responsible for defense of the Dnepr from south of Kiev to 

south of Cherkassy, still had the bulk of its forces on 

the river ’ s north bank. The 24th Panzer Corps (34th, 

57th, 112th Infantry, and 1Qth Motorized divisions) was 

supposed to anchor 8th Army’s left flank. Until the 24th 

Panzer Corps could disengage from heavy fighting with 

97 

i_- 
advancing Soviet forces on the..north bank of the Dnepr, a 

large gap would e,xist in the German Dnepr defenses north 

of Kanev.16 

It was this gap that lead elements of Soviet 3d Guards 

Tank Army approached. 

crossed the river 

When small groups of Soviet troops 

on the morning of 22 September, German troops were on the south bank. That day, f 5; 

noncommissioned officer candidates from the flak combat 

school at Cherkassy and the reconnaissance battalion of 

19th Panzer Division manned scattered defenses along the 

river. The remainder of 19th Panzer was still crossing the Dnepr at Kiev. The evening of the twenty-first, 8th 

Army ordered 24th Panzer Corps to move its most mobile 

elements across the river and to secure the undefended 

section. The 24th Panzer Corps began disengaging from 

combat on 22 September and moved its lead elements to the 

river's south bank at 1500 on 23 September, just as Soviet 

infantrymen who had crossed the river at Zarubentsy and 

Grigorovka attacked and pierced the thin German defensive 

screen. 

The same afternoon, 4th Panzer Army, fearing for the 

open right flank, sent an urgent message to 8th Army to 

hasten reinforcement of the German defenders. The 8th 

Army responded and, at 2010 on 23 September, ordered the 

main force of 19th Panzer Division and the truck-mounted 

72d Infantry Division to reinforce 19th Panzer Division's 

hard-pressed reconnaissance battalion in the Dnepr bend. 

But that reinforcement would take precious time. The best 

hope for successful reinforcement still lay with the 24th 

Panzer Corps, which, by the evening of 23 September, had 

succeeded in moving the bulk of its forces across the 

river at Kanev. By 2115, the 57th Infantry Division had 

crossed the Dnepr and was occupying positions east and 

west of Kanev. The 112th Infantry Division was in the 

process of crossing the river to reinforce German units in 

the threatened Dnepr bend. The 34th Infantry and 10th 

Motorized divisions crossed later in the evening. The 

34th deployed to 24th Panzer Corps's left flank, west of 

Rzhishchev, 10th Motorized Division to the area east of 

Rahishchev. By 0500 on 24 September, movement of the 

panzer corps across the river was complete, so the Germans 

demolished the bridge at Kanev. Motorized elements of all 

24th Panzer Corps divisions had moved to their new 

defensive sections, and division main bodies would follow 

during the day. Completing the German defensive picture, the 19th Panzer Division continued to move toward the 

Dnepr bend from Kiev.17 

German redeployments occurred just in time to contain 

Soviet forces in the Dnepr bend. By noon on the 

- 
twenty-fourth, the Soviets had secured Traktomirov, 

Zarubentsy, and Gr igorovka , but they lacked the strength 

to push farther south to unite those br idgheads into a 

more formidable Lodgment . By late afternoon on 24 

September, the 57th and 112th Infantry divisions were in 

their defensive positions, the 34th Infantry Division was 

closing into its positions, and 19th Panzer and 10th 

Motorized divisions were en route to their new positions 

--positions that, unfortunately for the Soviets, traversed 

the precise regions where Soviet airborne forces would 

land. All this movement occurred unbeknown to Soviet 

intelligence. 

Airborne Assault 

Throughout 24 September, men of the airborne brigades, supplies, and supporting aircraft were being assembled at 

the departure airfields. Despite the one-day delay, the 

full complement of aircraft did not arrive. By the time 

5th Guards Airborne Brigade had assembled, for instance, 

only forty-eight of the required sixty-five LL-2 aircraft 

had arrived; bad weather had halted the remainder. In 

addition, for safety reasons, aircraft commanders insisted 

P;stko;ding fifteen to eighteen units (men and cargo of the planned twenty on each aircraft. 1s 

Because these changes disrupted planning calculations, 

commanders reallocated men and cargo just before takeoff, 

which resulted in a significant quantity of supplies left 

sitting on the runway. 

Landing preparations were also careless. Many 

battalion and brigade commanders did not carry radio crews 

with them, but Colonel Goncharov had the entire command 

group of 3d Guards Airborne Brigade with him on his 

plane. The same storm front that contributed to general 

i norance 

8 concerning enemy dispositions also prevented 

a vanced marking of drop zones with bonfires and colored 

squares. 

At 1830 on 24 September, 3d Guards Airborne Brigade departed; lead elements of 5th Brigade took off two hours 

later (see map 27, p. 232). The capacity of fuel trucks 

supporting the aircraft was less than expected, so they 

could not fuel the planned number of aircraft on time. 

The first wave of aircraft, due to takeoff ten minutes 

before the second wave, could not complete its launch on 

time. As soon as an aircraft had received fuel, it took 

off, so both waves took off intermingled. Refueling of 

subsequent waves was equally confused, and airborne troops shifted from one plane to another in search of an earlier 

departing flight. Fuel shortages naturally developed. 

99 
Because of the fuel shortage, 5th:’ Brigade operations from 

Bogodukhov had to be halted at 0100 on 25 September, 

although all the men had not yet been 

action.19 

lifted into 

Nevertheless, a total of 298 sorties (instead of the 

planned 500) departed the airfields and dropped 4,575 

paratroopers (3,050 from 3d Brigade and 1,525 from 5th 

Brigade) and 660 light parachute bags with ammunition and 

supplies a However, 2,017 men, or 30 percent of the 

planned drop, most of them from Sth Brigade, were left at 

the airfields. By first light on 25 September, the drop 

of 3d Brigade was complete. Unfortunately, aircraft 

carrying 3d Brigade’s 45-mm antitank guns were not ready 

an time and thus failed to join the flight.20 

In a repeat of the Vyaz’ma operation (see chap. 3), inaccurate drop techniques scattered the airborne forces 

far and wide over the region. One aircraft dropped its 

men into the Dnepr River, and one dropped its human cargo 

into friendly positions on the near side. Tws aircraft 

dropped their men in what turned out to be a safer area 

deep in the enemy rear. Indicative of the turmoil, 

thirteen aircraft simply returned without dropping their 

men, which further complicated the already confused flight schedule. 21 

The aircraft flying over the intended drop zone ran 

into dense hostile antiaircraft fire. The pilots’ evasive 

action did not improve the accuracy of the drop. Most 

it 

aratroopers jumped from aircraft flying 200 kilometers an 

our at altitudes of from 600 to 2,000 meters and taking 

evasive action to avoid the antiaircraft fire. But even 

greater shocks awaited the paratroopers. Instead of 

landing in the planned, relatively compact ten-byfourteen-kilometer area, they found themselves scattered 

over a thirty-by-ninety-kilometer area. The area was also 

infested with German defensive positions.22 In short, 

the airborne assault was a disaster. 

The amazement of German troops on the ground, viewitf 

the armada of aircraft spewing forth long strings 

paratroopers, was surpassed only by the horror of Soviet 

paratroopers quickly aware of what awaited them. Lead 

Soviet airborne forces jumped into the Dubari-Grushevo 

area “just as the first troops of the main body of the 

19th Panzer Division reached this locality by way ofhEff 

and Potaptsy e As a result, the parachutists and 

transport planes came under accurate defensive fire. The 

approaching aircraft were dispersed while the parachutists, who had in the meantime jumped, were scattered 

on the ground. “‘23 German accounts describe the reaction 

100 

- 
of German troops as the paratroopers descended onto their 

positions. Some German troops fired small arms and 

machine guns on the paratroopers as they descended, while 

others turned their heavier weapons on the falling host of 

parachutes. Col. E. Binder of the 19th Panzer Division 

recorded a vivid picture of the events: 

The 19th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion was 

fighting west of Zarubentsy. The armored 

personnel carrier battalion of the 73d Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment, with elements of the division staff of the 19th Panzer Division, was 

advancing by way of Pii-Potaptsy-Dudari[Dubari]- Kolesishche ; it was followed by the main body of 

the 73d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, and the 74th 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment. Behind these forces 

came the rest of the division, including the 19th 

Panzer Regiment. After the Germans had reached 

Dudari [Dubari], the first Russian parachutists jumped from a transport plane flying at an 

altitude of 600 to 700 meters directly above the 

little village. While these parachutists were 

still in the air they were taken under fire by machine guns and a ZO-mm four-barreled flak gun. A half minute or a minute later, the second plane 

came over and thereafter at like intervals other 

planes followed, flying in single file; 

seldom did two crafts fly side by side. only 

The parachutists were fired on while they 

were still in the air with all available weapons, 

including rifles and the flak guns which had in 

the meantime been set 

fourteenth or fifteenth F?ine 

As a result the 

turned off in a 

northerly direction and dropped its parachutists 

in the area of Romashki. These parachutists were 

immediately taken under fire by men of the supply 

trains, repair teams, and maintenance sections of 

the 19th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. 

The jumps, which continued for one to one 

and a half hours, 

one of steadily became more irregular, the reasons being the swift German 

counteraction and another the signal lights going 

aloft on all sides. The parachutists were 

dropped without any plan. Wherever they landed 

they were immediately attacked. Those who could 

took cover in the numerous clefts in the ground. 

With the parachutists split up in small 

groups, the fate of the undertaking was sealed. 

During the night great numbers of prisoners were 

101 
brought in. The rest of the parachutists were 

destroyed the next day.24 

Throughout the night f German troops, using the white 

parachutes as beacons, hunted down and killed disorganized 

groups of Soviet paratroopers. The backdrop of bonfires, 

glowing embers, and German and Soviet flares illuminated 

the bizarre and macabre battle. 

As they fell to earth, individual paratroopers fired 

on German postions, them. returning the deadly fire directed at 

0n the ground, the troops frantically attempted to 

reassemble to survive in the midst of the enemy. The 

dispersed landing of the paratroopers and darkness offered 

some succor to the attackers, but only part ial 

compensation for the huge initial Losses they suffered. 

Between Dubar i and Rossava, the Germans counted 1,500 parachutes in the first twenty-four hours, as welP as 692 

Soviet dead and 209 prisoners. Near Grushevo, the 3d 

Gompany , 73d Panzer Grenadier Regiment, suffered heavy losses whiLe annihiL,ating an estimated 150 Soviet 

paratroo ers 

battle.2 5 

in what was really a microcosm of the bigger 

Well into the 

fragmented skirmishes daylight on raged as 

twenty-fifth, small. groups of Soviet 

paratroopers waged unequal struggles with German forces. 

Succinctly put I “a series of fatal mistakes during 

preparation and during the Landing placed the airborne 

troops in a very difficult position in the first hours 

after landing. All attempts of subunit commanders to 

gather their subordinates and establish command and 

control in the course of the night had no success.“26 

To survive, paratroopers from different units formed 

ad hoc groups. 

missions faded. 

All hopes of accomplishing f;b;ejrigade’s The landing problems higher headquarters to postpone indefinitely further drops of the 

1st and 5th Airborne brigades. 

5th Airborne Brigade Operations 

After the disastrous landing, ground units turned 

first to survival and then to whatever damage they could 

inflict on the Germans. As units sought to assemble, a 

major communications problem compounded the effects of 

German resistance. Radios and radiomen had been widely scattered during the drop. Only five of twenty-six radios 

were operative; the remainder had been either destroyed or 

buried by their operators to keep them from German hands. 

Lieutenant Golonel Sidorchuk was the first to establish 

contact with Soviet forces on the Left bank of the Dnepr. 

He passed a message in the clear to friendly forces.27 

102 
Airborne force headquarters and Voronezh Front 

headquarters sent additional radios across the river to 

establish communications. Three groups of men with radios 

dropped on the night of 27-28 September, but nothing more 

was heard of them. The next ni ht, a PO-2 aircraft sent 

out with radios was shot down. 5 8 Not until 6 October 

did the front finally manage to establish even sporadic radio communications with elements of the landing force. 

Surviving paratroopers reassembled slowly. Planned 

assembly areas were obviously too dangerous, so each man 

or knot of men had to improvise. On 25 September, the 

Germans systematically began to scour the countryside with 

mobile detachments of various sizes. German records 

indicate no great concern over the airborne drops. Soviet 

airborne forces were too fragmented and had sustained such 

heavy casualties that they posed no real tactical threat 

to German defenses . airborne 

While the almost casual cleanup of 

remnants progressed, the Germans focused their 

attention on the dangerous bridgeheads to their front. On 

the right flank of 24th Panzer Corps, SS Viking Panzer 

Division of the 3d Panzer Corps cleaned up airborne forces 

dropped south and southwest of Pekari. Meanwhile, Army Group South dispatched reinforcements to 24th Panzer Corps 

to assist in containing and reducing the Soviet 

bridgeheads. On the morning of 25 September, 20th Panzer 

Division was ordered forward to reinforce 24th Panzer 

Corps. 

forward. 

The 72d Infantry Division also continued its march 

The 24th Panzer Corps postponed an attack on the 

bridgeheads planned for 26 September and, instead, 

scheduled the attack for 28 September, by which time the 

reinforcements would have arrived. By then, 7th Panzer 

Division would also be available. 

and, The planned attack finally occurred on 29 September, although it did not eliminate the bridgeheads, it did 

truncate them and remove the threat of a future Soviet 

breakout in the region. While the Germans prepared to 

deal with the bridgeheads, they paid only scant attention 

to the airborne force. By 2100 on 26 September, the 

Germans considered action against the parachutists to have 

been completed. By then, only remnants of the airborne 

force still resisted in the forests south of Kanev, north 

of Buchak, and south of Dubari.29 

For the Soviets, the task now was to salvage whatever 

benefits possible from the abortive drop. From 25 

September to 5 October in the area between Rzhishchev and 

Cherkassy , forty-three separate Soviet groups assembled, 

totaling 2,300 men of the 3d and 5th brigades’ 4,575-man 

landing force. 3O Many others bad been killed or 

captured, while still others managed to join the nine 

103 
partisan groups operating in the vicinity. A small group 

of 230 men who had survived drops into the Dnepr or behind 

Soviet lines rejoined main front forces. 

Initially, the largest groups of assembled paratroopers gathered in three regions: 600 men in the Kanev 

and Cherkassy forests; 200 men around Chernyshi; and four 

groups totaling 300 men near Yablonovo.31 These groups conducted diversionary attacks against German targets of 

opportunity. Much of their time, however, was spent 

searching for equipment, ammunition, and supplies that had 

been dropped into the region. Without these items, they 

could not operate. Because German patrols had gathered and destroyed the scattered Soviet supplies, ammunition 

shortages quickly limited the effectiveness of these 

units. Still, a few small groups experienced a modicum of 

success. On the night of 29-30 September, a group of 150 

men under Sr. Lt. S. Petrosian successfully attacked a 

German police headquarters in Potok village and later 

ambushed a German artillery column south of the village. 

Petrosian's detachment made its way south through Maslovka 

to Kanev where, on 5 October, it joined a larger group 

commanded by the 5th Guards Airborne Brigade commander, 

Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk.32 

By early October, surviving Soviet airborne groups 

were in the northern area from Kzhisbchev to Kanev and 

farther south from Kanev to Cherkassy. In the north, 

where the terrain was relatively open and the Germans bad 

extensive defensive positions, more than 1,000 

paratroopers were forced to operate in small bands h;; 

escape detection. Consequently, their operations 

limited effectiveness. In the south, however, the terrain 

was rough and heavily forested, and the sparsely populated region bad few German defenses. Here, growing concentrations of paratrooper groups harassed the Germans for more 

than a month. Organized .in at least five large detachments I more than 1,200 men operated in this region. The 

largest and most effective of these groups was the 600-man 

force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk, which had 

come together by 5 October in the Kanev forest. 

Unlike other groups, Sidorchuk's unit bad sufficient 

manpower and equipment to organize. Sidorchuk's force bad 

a brigade with three rifle battalions and sapper, antitank, reconnaissance, and communications platoons. On 6 

October, by a stroke of luck, a radio crew joined the 

brigade and established communications wit:ro,4Eth hia;y 

headquarters and, through it, with 

quarters. 33 From 8 to 11 October, front delivered 

supplies and ammunition to the brigade in the Kanev area. 

After concerted German attempts to smash Sidorchuk's 

104 

I 
brigade, the force, with authorization of the front 

commander, moved southward on 19 October into the more 

remote and, hence, more secure Tagancha forest. There it 

joined scattered groups, totaling about 300 men, operating under Senior Lieutenant Tkachev. This combined force of 

more than 1,000 men under 5th Airborne Brigade control 

established defensive positions in the forest and 

conducted forays and raids against small German garrisons 

and supply points near the periphery of the area. 

The first successful Soviet attack occurred on 22 

October when Sidorchuk ‘s unit blew the rail line 

between Korsun and Tagancha station, 

the desut:oying a train in 

process. That evening, his force assaulted the 

village of Buda-Vorobievska, scattering the staff of the 

German 157th Reserve Battalion and burning warehouses in 

nearby Botashnya. The attacks, however, did not go unanswered. The next day, heavy German attacks on 

Sidorchuk’s forest position took a heavy toll in his 

unit. Consequently , the brigade withdrew under cover of 

darkness southward through Baibuz into the 

forest northeast of Bol’shoye Starosel’ye. Cherkassy By then, the 

brigade had picked about 1,200 men, 

up additional personnel and numbered 

despite earlier losses. Sidorchuk added 

one more battalion to his force and armed it with weapons 

dropped by front aircraft.34 

The 5th Airborne Brigade established a defensive base 

in the Cherkassy forests and raided German installations 

and communications routes in the region from 28 October to 

11 November. Aside from conducting diversionary raids, 

the unit also passed intelligence information to the 2d 

Ukrainian Front, 

established 

in whose sector it operated. The brigade communications with 52d Army, which was 

preparing to cross the Dnepr River in the Cherkassy 

set tor . 

On 11 November 1943, forty days after landing in the 

German rear, the paratroopers received orders to 

participate in a new operation intended to achieve what 

the October operation had failed to achieve, namely, the 

advance of Soviet main forces across the Dnepr (see 

map 28, p. 106). The 52d Army ordered Sidorchuk to attack 

and capture the villages of Lozovok, Sekirna, and 

Svidovok, on the left bank of the Dnepr River, thereby assisting the river crossing by 52d Army units. The 

at tack was scheduled for 12-13 November. A 52d Army liaison officer visited Sidorchuk to coordinate army missions, order of attack, 

to perform.35 

and the mission the brigade was 

The 5th Brigade’s attack would coincide 

with an attack by the 254th Rifle Division from across the 

Dnepr River. The Germans in Lozovok had one infantry 

105 
52 A 

-54 RD 

Map 28. 5th Airborne Brigade Operations, November 1943 

106 
battalion with engineer units. At the nearby village of 

Yelizavetovka were two companies from the 266th Infantry 

Regiment, 72d Infantry Division, while an infantry 

battalion and five tanks defended Svidovok. Sidorchuk 

assigned 1st Battalion to take Sekirna by sur rise, while 

the 3d Battalion would attack Lozovok. The 8 d Battalion 

had the difficult job of reducing the Svidovok 

strongpoint. In reserve, 4th Battalion would assist the 

2d Battalion. Two attached partisan detachments would 

occupy Budishche, halt German movement from Moshny to 

Lozovok, and assist 3d Battalion should the need arise. 

All of the night attacks would occur simultaneously.36 

At 0100 on 13 November, brigade units in attack 

positions waited for Sidorchuk’s signal to move through 

the darkness to attack. Maj. A. Bluvshtein’s 2d Battalion 

(4th, 5th, and 6th companies) faced a German battalion 

entrenched in several strongpoints, but lacking anchored 

flanks. The five German tanks at Sv idovok posed a 

considerable problem for the lightly armed paratroopers. 

Bluvshtein’s plan of attack took maximum advanta e of 

surprise and darkness. Advancing without arti 5 lery 

preparations, two assault groups would tie down the 

defenders and, if possible, secure the strongpoints on the 

south fringe of Svidovok. Following the assault groups, 

two rifle companies would attack along the main street 

and, in coordination with units operating on the left, 

overcome the strongpoints in the center of the town. One 

company would advance on the town from the east toward the 

church in the town center. While the three companies 

drove into Svidovok, one squad with machine pistols would 

deploy on the southeast side of the town to cover any 

German relief from Dakhnovka. After the battalion secured 

the town and emerged on the northeast side, two companies 

would secure islands in the Dnepr, while the third company 

blocked enemy appr oath routes from Dakhnovka. Major 

Bluvshtein established a small reserve of a platoon armed 

with automatic weapons, one machine pistol, and an 

antitank rifle. 

At 0400, the assault groups attacked, employing hand 

grenades and small-arms fire. Hard on the heels of the 

assault groups, the 4th and 5th companies, followed by the 

reserve, moved down the darkened streets toward the center 

of town and secured the nearest strongpoints before the 

surprised German garrison could react. From the east, the 

6th Company attacked German outposts on hill 73.8, but 

heavy German automatic weapons fire halted their attack. 

Approaching the center of town, the 4th and 5th companies 

ran into machine gun and tank fire that stopped their 

107 
advance. The 6th Company, unable either to take or to 

envelop hill 73.8, retreated under intense German fire. 

The 4th Battalion, 

2d Battalion’s Left, 

itself facing heavy enemy fire on 

detached one platoon to cover its 

advance. The remainder of the battalion entered Svidovok 

from the west to envelop German strongpoints in the center 

of town. Bluvshtein maneuvered his reserves to the east 

to attack the strongpoints from the right flank. An 

automatic attacked the 

frontally, weapons platoon strongpoints 

using the houses for cover, and the antitank 

riflemen engaged the five tanks, destroying one. 

For the final push, a company of 4th Battalion joined 

the 4th and 5th companies and the automatic weapons platoon in overcoming German resistance. Having lost two 

more tanks in the battle, the Germans withdrew to 

northeast of the town where they joined the force that had 

retreated from hill 73.8. Meanwhile , other Soviet. units 

took Lozovok and Sekirna and established defenses along 

the Ol’shanka and Dnepr rivers. 

Despite its success, 2d Battalion now faced a bigger threat. A German relief battalion with seven tanks rushed 

down the road from Dakhnovka, broke through 2d Battalion’s 

covering force, and attacked Svidovok from the flank and 

rear. Unfortunately for Bluvshtein and Sidorchuk, the 

254th Rifle Division of the 2d Ukrainian Front was unable 

to mount its attack across the Dnepr on the night of 12-13 

November l German forces attacking from south and east 

ejected the 2d and 4th battalions from their newly won 

prize. To avoid German encirclement in Svidovok, the two 

battalions withdrew into the forests west of the Dnepr. 

It was a fitting denouement for the frustrating, tragic operation. 

To close the tale of the 5th Airborne Brigade, on the 

night of 13-14 November, advanced elements of 254th Rifle 

Division captured a foothold on the left bank of the 

Dnepr . By 15 November, that division, followed by 52d 

Army, had cleared the river towns and linked up with 5th 

Airborne Brigade. After thirteen more days of combat, 5th 

Brigade was evacuated to the rear. It had endured two 

months of harrowing combat under the most adverse 

conditions. Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk, commander of 

5th Guards Airborne Brigade, Major Bluvshtein, and others 

received the title “Hero of the Soviet Union” far their 

feats, not the least of which was simple survival. More 

than 60 percent of the force never returned. 37 Other 

survivors received mention in orders and medals, small 

consolation for the thousands who had perished in the 

poorly coordinated operation. 

- 
Conclusions 

It is understandable that the Dnepr operation was the 

Soviets’ last major airborne operation. Even compared 

with the Vyaz’ma ordeal of 1942, the Dnepr operation is a 

classic case of how not to conduct an airborne operation. As at Vyaz’ma, the men of the parachute units were not at 

fault, for they were victims of circumstances, the worst 

of which were higher command planning failures of criminal 

proportions. 

Stavka staff officer and future chief of the General 

Staff. Shtemenko remarked on the operation but only addressed the most basic failure: “The launching of a 

massive airborne assault at nighttime bears witness to the 

ignorance of the organizers of the affair, since 

experience indicates that the launching of a massive night assault, even on one’s own territory, was associated with 

major difficulties.“38 

The choice of a night operation was deliberate, and 

those who made the decision were well aware of the risks 

that a night drop entailed. The Vyaz’ma experience of 

such drops was available. Beyond that, planning deficiencies for the Dnepr operation would have condemned 

a daytime drop to abject failure. A Soviet critique of 

the operation surfaced the basic requirements for any 

successful airborne operation: 

Experience has affirmed that the conduct of 

airborne operations demands from commanders and 

staff a high degree of foresight, an ability to 

define optimum missions and timing for the 

landing, sober assessment of combat capabilities 

of forces designated for the operation, and sharp 

agreement [coordination] on their actions.39 

On all these counts, the Dnepr operation was a distinct 

failure. German critiques echoed this assessment: 

The Russian command lacked the necessary sensitivity for the timing, the area, and the 

feasibility, as well as a correct evaluation of 

the German forces in the organization of the 

joint operation. The whole action carries the 

stamp of dilettantism. Fundamentally the 

reasoning was sound, but apparently an expert was 

lacking to implement the40plans l 

The operation 

was accordingly a failure. 

In their haste to cross the Dnepr River, the Soviets 

committed the airborne corps without adequate preparation 

109 
time.41 

and 

Personnel and aircraft were hastily gathered poorly coordinated. Responsible headquarters planners did not provide proper equipment and support. 

committed the corps 

They into an area where intelligence data 

on the enemy was virtually lacking, thus feeding the unit 

to waiting German guns. plans, 

In his 19 September review of 

Zhukov warned planners to proceed with prudence. 

They did not, Soviet 

and the operation failed. In the words of a 

critic, “In this regard, the commander of the 

Airborne Forces deserved a reprimand because he did not 

draw the appropriate conclusions from the experience of 

4th Airborne Corps, winter of 1.942. “42 which had landed [at Vyaz ma] in the 

German critics pointed out that both the timing and 

the location of the airborne drop were ill-advised. An 

operation conducted against the key Dnepr River bridge at 

Kanev even as late as 23 September could have resulted in 

the destruction or Soviet possession of the bridge, the 

isolation of 24th Panzer Corps on the north bank of the 

river , and a possible major Soviet bridgehead over the 

river .43 The Germans praised the capability of 

individual airborne unit officers and soldiers: 

There were individual cases . . . where tenacious 

and fanatic resistance was put up by the Russian 

soldier. The officers did try to reach the 

rendezvous according to the sketches captured by the Germans. [However,] captured sketches of the 

enemy rendezvous areas facilitated the German 

measures. Whenever Russians were encountered, 

the German officers took the pertinent measures 

without needing to consult their superiors. 

This explains why there was no long drawn 

out fighting in the rear of the corps.44 

Amid the chaos of battle, the Germans did 

underestimate the strength of the Soviet forces and, 

hence, the damage inflicted on the Soviet force. 

According to German records, “Of the 1,500 parachutes 

counted . . . in the area west of the Dnepr line and west 

of Cherkassy-Rzhishchev it is safe to say the total 

strength was at least 1,500 to 2,000 men, since it is 

certain that a considerable number of parachutes were 

never found or were. not seen from the air. During the 

first two days about two-thirds of the minimum strength had been put out of action.“45 In fact, more than 4,500 Soviet parachutists had dropped into the region. 

Even the Vyaz ‘ma operation had achieved certain 

tactical and diversionary results. The Vyaz’ma force 
survived insertion into the German rear and conducted 

operations for more than four months, while tying up 

precious German troops. force was spent Not so on the Dnepr; the Dnepr 

within a matter of hours after takeoff, 

and all hope of tactical ’ lost. The few 

diversionary operations carr iedgaott bysSidorchuk ‘s command 

and the host of other tiny groups scarcely justified the 

tragic Losses the airborne corps endured. 

German assessments credited the Soviet airborne drop 

with having only an extremely limited impact. Thus, 

“because of the lack of German forces, this area [Kanev region] could never quite be cleared of enemy forces. As 

a result, it constituted a latent threat to German rear 

communications and 

effects.“46 occasionally had unpleasant 

The final irony, symbolic of the wasted efforts of the 

R 

aratroopers, 

ad 

was that in early 1944, when Soviet armies 

crossed the Dnepr at virtually every point and pushed 

deep into the German rear, the only portion of the river 

still in German hands was that area around Kanev, the 

October 1943 objective of the airborne corps. 

The Dnepr operation ended Soviet operational use of 

airborne forces. The experiences at Vyaz’ma and on the 

Dnepr revealed the weaknesses of airborne forces: 

dependence on weather conditions, great vulnerability, 

technical deficiencies, and fragile support systems. “In 

large airborne operations, serious mistakes occurred that 

reduced the effectiveness of the airborne force. That 

created in the High Command a hesitation to believe in the 

use of such airborne forces. “47 For the remainder of 

the war, major airborne units, whose men had proven their 

courage and endurance, would serve in a role that the 

Soviet army was more accustomed and better trained to 

Play? namely, infantry conducting ground operations. 

111 
CHAPTER 6 

TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT 

General 

Soviet experiences with tactical airborne operations 

were more productive than their operational experiences. 

Because tactical operations involved smaller units (up to 

a battalion or a regiment) employed at more limited depths (twenty to thirty kilometers) than operational landings, 

they were better suited to the Soviets’ level of expertise 

and technology during the war years. High-level command 

controlled such operations more closely, and the shallow 

depth of employment allowed better coordination between 

airborne and ground forces. 

The missions of units conducting tactical operations 

were limited in nature and, hence, more easily 

attainable. Tactical operations usually involved missions 

that facilitated the ground advance in an army set tor , such as engagement of enemy fire delivery 

disruption of enemy command and control, d is locastyi?nem~i 

the enemy supply system, and attacks on critical junctions 

and bridges on the enemy lines of communication. These 

tactical operations involved relatively small forces in 

support of a specific unit’s advance, so they were of 

shorter duration. The short duration alone reduced 

logistical problems, increased the chances of airborne 

unit survivability, and produced better chances of 

tactical success. In addition, small groups of men were 

better able to escape enemy detection during landing and 

operation. They could avoid the twin threats of enemy 

ground attacks and damaging air attacks. 

Tactical airborne operations, by virtue of their small 

size and limited duration, resembled diversionary 

operations. The primary difference between the two was in 

the intent and, to a degree, the depth of each. Tactical 

operations occurred close to the front, but small-unit 

(usually less than a battalion) diversionary operations 

extended well into the enemy rear. Airborne units 

performing tactical missions operated in close 

coordination with forces (usually armies) advancing on a 

precise axis, and usually linkup was envisioned within a 

matter of days. Diversionary units usually engaged German 

objectives deep in the rear of enemy lines of 

communication or attacked targets whose destruction would 

weaken the German war effort in general. Diversionary 

units also conducted special reconnaissance and sabotage 

Il.3 

---- ~..- 
missions deep in the enetiy rear. Of course, some 

operations, such as Odessa in 1941, did not fit neatly into either category. 

Overall, however, the Soviets were more satisfied with 

their tacticaL and diversionary operations and believed 

that those types of operations provided greater returns 

for manpower expended than did the large-scale airborne 

operations. After the 1943 disaster along the Dnepr, the 

Soviets restricted themselves to small-scale airdrops. A 

brief review of the more significant Soviet tactical 

experiences shows how they fared compared with the 

operational experiences described earlier. 

Teryaeva Sl.oboda, December 1941 --- 

During the Soviet counteroffensive around Moscow 

during December 1941 and January 1942, the Soviets threw 

into combat virtually every resource at their disposal to 

break the back of German Army Group Center. The Soviets 

were particularly interested in employing those forces and 

techniques that facilitated deep battle and exploited tactical successes. They sought to use, mobile units of 

every variety, although such units were in short supply at 

this stage of the war. Among those few mobile units that 

could lend depth to the battlefield were airborne forces, 

The Kalinin Front conducted the first of several 

tactical airborne operations. Beginning on 5 December, 

that front opened the Klin operation, an attempt by 30th 

Army and 1st Shock Army to drive German 3d and 4th Panzer 

groups from the northern environs of Moscow and, if 

possible, to destroy them. Pressured by the shock groups of the two Soviet armies, the Germans did withdraw through Klin to establish a new defensive line near Volokolamsk, 

along the Lama and Ruza rivers.1 The German retreat 

took place in subzero weather over snow-covered roads 

running through the village of Teryaeva Sloboda. 

To disrupt the German withdrawal, the Soviets, on the 

night of 14-15 December, dropped near that village a 

detachment of 415 paratroopers of the 214th Airborne 

Brigade, commanded by, Capt.. I. G. Starchak.2 Its 

missions were to destroy bridges, interdict the road, and 

create general confusion among German forces withdrawing 

along the road from Klin (which fell to 30th Army on 15 

December) = For nine days, Starchak's unit harassed the 

retreating German forces in a wide sector along the roads 

from Klin to Volokolamsk, from Klin to Novo Petrovskoye, 

and from Volokolamsk to Lotochino. It repeatedly cut the 

rail line from Shakhovskaya to Novo Petrovskoye, 

114 
interfering with the flow of German logistics.3 After 

the Soviet occupation of Volokalamsk on 19 December, 

Starchak's unit moved west and continued ,harassing operations for six more days before being withdrawn for 

use in other operations. If subsequent operations were 

any indication, the Soviets were pleased with the 

achievements of Starchak's command. If he did as well as 

they claimed, the Soviets should have been pleased. 

Medyn, January 1942 -- 

Apparently satisfied with the results of the earlier 

tactical airborne drop, Stavka and front planners decided 

to integrate similar airborne operations into the general Soviet offensive ,planned for early January 1942. Such 

airborne operations were also designed to disrupt German 

command and control and logistical systems, block German 

withdrawal, and assist the advance of ground armies. 

Pursuant to these aims, two associated drops would 

take place to facilitate the advance of the Western 

Front. Western Front Directive no. 269 of 9 January amplified earlier Stavka directives by ordering 43d, 49th, 

and 50th armies amt Guards Cavalry Corps to attack 

from the Kaluga-Maloyaroslavets area against German forces 

in the Kondrovo, Yukhnov, and Medyn areas (see map 29, ' 

p. 116).4 Two battalion-size airborne landings would 

occur along the axis of advance of 43d Army in the Medyn 

area. The parachute landing force consisted of one 

battalion of the 201st Airborne Brigade, one battalion of 

the 25Qth Rifle Regiment, and an airlanded group made up 

of the remainder of 250th Rifle Regiment, commanded by Maj, N. L. Soldatov, who would command the entire 

operation.5 

The planned airborne drop would occur in the German 

rear along the boundary between 20th and 57th Army corps 

of German 4th Army. On 29 December, Soviet assaults by 

33d and 43d armies on an axis of Maloyaroslavets, Borovsk, 

and Medyn split the two German corps, The 20th Army Corps recoiled west and northwest of Borovsk where, on 4 

January, it was attached to 4th Panzer Army. The 57th 

Army Corps (34th Infantry, 98th Infantry, and 19th Panzer 

divisions) and 12th Army Corps of 4th Army, by now 

fighting as intermingled Kampfgruppen, conducted 

fighting retreat westward through deep snow and -300: 

temperatures from Maloyaroslavets to Medyn.6 

On 3 January, the Western Front directed Soldatov to 

drop his two parachute battalions in the vicinity of 

Medyn. First, he was to secure landing strips on which to 

115 
LEGEND 

SCALE E i 

5 10 KM 

Map 29. Medyn Area 
land his regiment (see map 30, p. 118). Then, the units 

would cut all highways from Medyn to Gzhatsk and 

Kremenskoye, capture Myatlevo station and temporarily cut 

the rail line, from and block German 4th Army withdrawal routes 

Medyn to Yukhnov 

reinfo’rcements to Medyn. 

and movement of German 

They were also expected to fight until the estimated 5 January the area.7 

approach of 43d Army into 

Soldatov assigned Starchak’s battalion of the -250th 

Rifle Regiment the mission of securing -the airfield at 

Bok”shoye Fat”yanovo and holding it until Soldatov’ s 

air-landing force arrived. The second. 

detachment, Capt. I. A. parachute Surzhik’s battalion of the 201st 

Airborne Brigade, would land northwest’ of Medyn near 

Gusevo, Borduko, and Zsakova to capture and hold a bridge 

over the Shanya River) to occupy Shansky Zavod and 

Kremenskoye, and I with hi.s main force, to CUE the 

Yukhnov-Medyn highway. After Starchak’s battalion 

captured Bol’shoye Fat’yanovo, Soldatov’s main force of 

1,300 men was to land there. The scarc,ity of aircraft 

available for the operation (twenty-one TB-3s and ten 

PS-84s) dictated that the operation occur in distinct 

phases: 

Starchak”s 

Surzhkk’s battalion would Hand the first day, the next.8 

On the night of 2-3 January, Captain Surzh%k pled his 

battalion of 348 men into the Gusevo region (,see map 31, 

P. u-9). After “assembly, his battalion drove the 

surprised Germans out of the villages of: Gribovo and 

Maskova I destroyed the bridge over the Shanya River, and 

established defensive lines. After several days of 

interdicting the roads northwest from Medyn and repulsing German attempts to reopen the road, Surzhik’s battalion 

moved northeast, capturing several villages and ultimately linking up, after 11 January, forces at Kremenskoye.9 

with the advancing 43d Army 

Meanwhile, Major Starchak’s battalion, which numbered 

416 men instead of the planned 202, attacked Bol” shoye Fat”yanovo and Yuk‘hnov (see map 31, p* 119).1Q After a 

reconnaissance and air strikes on Medyn) Starchak’s. 

battalion would land at the airfield in three stages. A 

securing group under CaPt. A. P. Kabachevsky would jump into the area immediately adjacent to the airfield and 

secure runway facilities to allow aircraft from the 

starting command (startovaia kommanda) to land its 

forces. A security group would establish defensive 

positions two or three kilometers from the airfield and 

block any enemy advance.. A platoon-size reserve; dropped 

with the battalion commander onto the airstrip, would 

respond to any threat that arose m-i the airfield. 

--.. 
LEGEND 

Soviet pasitions German positions 

- 3 January - 3 January 

t %I Planned Soviet 

N airborne positions . 

--- Soviet airborne obiectives 

SCALE f 

5 10 ’ KM I 

Map 30. Medyn Airborne Operation Plan, 3 January 1942 

118 
\ .L 

me-+ -- 

Soviet positions German positiot% 

- 3 January - 3 January 

n -1-1 20 January Z 11 January 

Map 31. Medyn Operation, 3-20 January 1942 

119 
The Last element of the battalion to land would be the 

starting command, equipped to prepare the airfield to 

receive aircraft.’ Thirty minutes after the initial 

parachute drop and immediately after the security group had landed, the starting command would jump. After 

landing, the command would establish 

signals, starting 

and receive 

landing 

remove obstacles, Soldatov’s runway 

would airlanding force. Meanwhile, Major the battalion 

send out reconnaissance patrols ’ different 

directions to a distance of five to ten ki;Emeters. If 

Starchak failed to take the airfield, he was to notify Soldatov and move his battalion north to. join Surzhik’s 

forces. Before the operation, each officer and individual 

trooper was given the plan of operations so each could 

still carry out his part, even if the plan was disrupted. 

On the night of 3-4 January, Major Starchak’s 

parachute group jumped into 

resistance. 

the airfield and faced heavy Transport aircraft received heavy German 

antiaircraft fire throughout the drop, which caused an 

inaccurate drop and forced some aircraft to return to base 

without dropping any paratroopers. Starchak assembled 

about 85 percent af his men and attacked the German 

garrison. At 0300 on 4 January, aircraft appeared over 

the starting command 

the airfield but could not Land 

because of continued enemy resistance-below and heavy snow 

covering 

returned 

the landing strip. So, the starting command 

to its home airfield. On 4 January, Starchak 

continued to fight for the airfield. 

secured it, By nightfall, he had 

and his battalion had established a perimeter defense around the field, as well as the villages of 

Bol ’ shoye and Maloye Fat’yanovo and Shchuk ino. The 

following day, front sent two MiG and one U-2 aircraft to 

establish communications with Starchak”s unit, .but this 

attempt failed. Although the U-2 did land, 

flew off when it 

it quickly 

mistook Starchak’s men for Germans. 

Heavy SROW throughout 5 and 6 January also hindered 

establishment of communications and covered the runways. In such deteriorating conditions, front 

canceled Soldatov ’ s 

headquarters 

landing and ordered Starchak’s 

battalion to operate independently. 

On 5 January, Major Starchak ‘s battalion left 

Bol ’ shoye Fat ’ yanovo to conduct diversionary attacks 

against German installations. At Kostino, he destroyed a 

bridge I and then on the night of 7-8 January, he captured Myatlevo station, destroying German tanks. 

two trains and twenty-eight 

operated 

From 8 to 19 January, Starchak”s battalion 

southward from Medyn to the Kondrovo area, 

ambushing German supply convoys and harassing withdrawing German forces. The battalion also destroyed bridges 

across the Shanya River at Bogdanov, Samsonovo, and 
Yakubovsky. These bridges were critical to an orderly German withdrawal. Finally, on 20 January, the remnants 

of the battalion, eighty-seven men, including the wounded 

Starchak, linked up with the advancing 34th Separate Rifle 

Brigade of 

River .11 

43d Army near Nikol’skoye on the Shanya 

The rest of Starchak ‘s command had perished during the seventeen days of combat. 

Starchak had accomplished his basic mission and 

secured the airfield at Bol’shoye Fat’yanovo. Inadequate 

reconnaissance, however) had not detected the actual size 

of the German garrison, and it took longer than planned to 

attain the objective. Moreover , better air cover might 

have improved the operation’s success. Planners had also 

failed to consider weather conditions, predictably severe . January. kiiled. 

Thus, Major Soldatov’s larger operation 

Though Major Starchak had shown flexibility and 

initiative in under taking the diversionary tasks and his 

men had endured a long, difficult operation, the overall 

operation revealed deficiencies that would plague 

subsequent larger Soviet airborne operations. 

Zhelan’ye, January 1942 -~ 

The next tactical airborne operation occurred hard on 

the heels of the operation at Medyn. Likewise, it 

included veterans who had planned or conducted the earlier 

operation. The operation coincided with the expanded Soviet January offensive into the flanks of Army Group 

Center and with growing Soviet hopes to envelop the entire 

German strategic grouping. By mid-January, the left wing 

of the Western Front had penetrated German defenses south 

of Yukhnov with 50th and 10th armies, spearheaded by Maj. Gen. P. A. Belov’s 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. The attack 

hi t German 4th Army’s left flank and tore a major gap between 4th Army and 2d Panzer Army. On 4th Army’s right, 

43d Army Corps fell back toward Yukhnov, while 40th 

Motorized Corps, using small Kampfgruppen, tried to stave 

off Soviet forces driving into the German’s rear on 43d 

Army Corps’s right flank.12 Simultaneously, while the 

Soviet 43d and 49th armies pressed German 4th Army units 

back toward Yukhnov from the east, 33d Army threatened 

Yukhnov from the north. North and east of Yukhnov, a 

twenty-kilometer gap existed between 20th Army Corps of 

4th Panzer Army and 57th Army Corps of 4th Army. The 

divisions of 57th Army Corps, with other units of 4th 

Army’s 12th and 13th Army corps, were withdrawing into 

prepared positions along the Shanya River west of Medyn. These positions covered the northern, eastern, and 

southern approaches to Yukhnov. The 4th Army’s left 

flank, however, was suspended in midair. The 98th 

121 
Infantry Division of 57th Panzer Corps, reinforced by the 

52d Infantry Division, watched helplessly as Soviet 33d 

Army divisions marched through the deep snow westward past 98th Infantry DivisionIs left flank in the Domashnevo area 

north of Myatlevo.13 On 13 January, COl. Gen. Franz 

Halder noted in his diary, perturbing as ever.E'14 

"'The gap north of Medyn is as 

The Stavka and Western Front 

wanted 33d Army to advance to Vyaz'ma and to link up there 

with 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, moving from the south, thus 

sealing the envelopment of a major portion of German Army Group Center. Before that linkup, however, Belov's 

cavalry corps had to penetrate newly established German 

de.fenses along the Moscow-Warsaw highway southwest of 

Yukhnov., The Western Front decided to conduct a tactical 

airborne operation north of the highway to assist Belov's 

crossing of that historic artery. The 250th Airborne 

Regiment and the 1st and 2d battalions of the 2Olst 

Airborne Brigade would land forty kilometers south of 

Vyaz"ma near Znamenka, Zhelan'ye, and Lugi, a region thirty-five to forty kilometers behind the German front 

lines (see map 32, p. 233j.15 after their landing, Using skis for mobility the Soviet forces could block German 

use of the Vyaz'ma-Yukhnov highway and the Vyaz'ma-Bryansk 

railroad line, thereby disrupting German supply efforts. 

They would also attack the German Yukhnov group from the 

rear, thus easing Belov's task. 

Soviet aerial reconnaissaxe indicated that a German 

division headquarters, suPPlY units, and an 

battalion garrisoned Znamenka. 

infantry 

Another German battalion 

guarded an ammunition depot at nearby Godunovka. A major 

German headquarters was at Podsosenki, and elements of an 

infantry battalion were strung out at Kl imov Zavod, 

Sidorovskoye, and Sinyukovo. Farther west, one battalion 

each -garrisoned Debryansky and Ugra station.16 Deep 

snow isolated these garrison strongpoints from one 

another, for only the main roads remained 

traffic. 

open to 

The airborne force completed outfitting and training 

at Vnukovo airfield under supervision of the air force 

administration of the Western Front. Then, by 17 January, 

the lltlits and aircraft had finished their combat 

preparations. Twenty-one PS-84 aircraft would make the 

landing effort. These aircraft had been assembled from 

the civil air fleet, with several TB-3 bombers of the 23d 

Bomber Aviation Division available to 

antitank guns.17 

transport 45-mm 

It was supposed to be a three-stage descent. First, 

the 1st and 2d battalions, 201st Airborne Brigade, would 

j uw and secure Znamenka airfield, organize all-round 

122 
defense, and prepare to receive the starting command and 

airlanded group. Second, the starting command would 

arrive to set up & control area for the main Landing. Third, thirty minutes after the starting command landed, 

the main force of the 250th Airborne Regiment would begin 

landing, transported in two to three aircraft groups to 

avoid congestion at the landing strip.18 

At 0335 on 18 January, the first sixteen planeloads of 

paratroopers departed Vnukovo, and, by 0900, 425 men of 

the 201st Airborne Brigade had dropped between Znamenka 

and Zhelan’ye (see map 33, p. 234). A second group of ten 

aircraft flew in the next night, but bad weather forced 

some of the aircraft to abort their drops. So, only about 

200 more men jumped, bringing the total to 642 men, 

Lightly armed with mortars and antitank rifles. The 

starting command (sixty-five men) landed at 1750 on 18 

January from four PS-84 aircraft. Guided in by partisans, 

the planes landed at night, in snow fifty to sixty centimeters deep, on an unfamiliar field, only 1.5 to 2 

kilometers from enemy-occupied Znamenka.19 The aircraft 

lacked skis, so only one was able to take off after 

discharging its cargo. German troops destroyed the 

remaining aircraft the next day. 

After landing, Captain Surzhik’s 1st Battalion, 20Lst 

Airborne Brigade, assembled near Zhelan’ye and attacked 

the Znamenka airfield. But they were unable to break 

through the strong German defenses, so paratroopers and 

the starting command near Znamenka disengaged from German 

forces and joined Surzhik’s command at Zhelan’ye after a 

march through knee-deep snow. 

Throughout the nineteenth, Captain Surzhik’s men, 

partisans, and local inhabitants prepared a landing strip northwest of Plesnovo.20 On the twentieth, Surzhik was 

able to radio headquarters, ‘“Landing on wheels is possible . . . send [the remaining force] urgently. Surzhik.‘“2L 

Despite unfavorable weather and heavy German artillery fire, an additional 1,100 troops landed in the Zhekan’ye 

area, although the force had had to resort to only night landings from 20 to 22 January. These landings brought 

total strength at Zhelan’ye up to 1,643 men. During the 

Landings , the Germans shot down three Soviet aircraft, 

killed 

others.22 twenty-seven paratroopers, and wounded nine 

The airborne force began fighting within hours after 

landing. One company of the 2d Battalion, 201st Airborne 

Brigade, cut the Vyaz’ma-Yukhnov highway near Zamosh ‘ye 

and Murashovka and captured fifty-four German supply 

123 
wagons. Two German companies with 

counterattacked artillery the support 

company fighting. during two days of heavy 

Meanwhile, the 43d, 49th, and 50th armies of the 

Western Front battered German positions at and southwest 

of Yukhnov, and the 1st Cavalry Corps appeared ready to 

strike across the Moscow-Warsaw highway. On 20 January, General of the Army G. K. Zhukov, the Western Front 

commander, radioed Major Soldatov, the 250th Airborne 

Regiment commander, to accomplish the following missions: 

I$,","' morning of 21 January, with part of your 

secure Kkyuchi, with 'Belov, 

establish communications 

blows 

and cooperate with him by striking against the enemy in the direction of 

Eyudinovo. 

Zhukov soon expanded his original order: 

First--do not leave the Znamenka, Zhelan'ye, Lugi aLea, at any cost hold the region, and occupy Znamenka; second--our units [units of 33d Army] on 22 January enter the Temkino area with the 

mission of establishing communication with you; third--give 

force, help to Bekov with part of your 

for example, two battalions; fourth--at 

all costs halt enemY23 movement along the 

Yukhnov-Vyaz"ma highroad. 

Major Soldatov sent the 1st and 2d battalions, 201st 

Airborne, under Captain Surzhik to attack 

Lyudinovo (see map 34, p. 

Klyuchi and 

235). On the twenty-second, they moved southward through the deep snow at an 

agonizingly slow pace. small During the march, they eliminated 

German garrisons at Tat'yanino, Borodino, 

Aleksandrovka, Andryanovka, and Novaya. Surzhik's force 

reached Tynovka on 28 January and met Belov's 1st Cavalry Corps, which had cut the Warsaw road only the day before. 

While Surzhik linked with 

Soldatov"s 250th Airborne Regykent 

Belov's cavalry, and A. A. Petrukhin's 

partisan detachment attacked Znamenka on the nights of 22 

and 23 January. Strong Soviet attacks failed to dislodge the German garrison. Simultaneously, the 3d Battalion, 

250th Regiment, and a company of the 1st Battalion, 201st 

Regiment, fought Germans on the Vyaz'ma-Yukhnov road. To 

the west, the 1st Battalion, 250th Regiment, attacked 

German positions at Ugra station and cut the 

Vyaz"ma-Bryansk rail line at two locations.24 

Csn 24 January, front ordered Soldatov to "reconnoiter 

[German positions] in the direction of Starosel'ye, and 

124 
Semlevo” (fifteen kilometers southwest of Vyaz’ma)25 which 

added yet another mission to the 250th Regiment. The 

next day, units of the regiment captured Gorodyanka and 

prepared an attack on Bogatyri and Lipniki along the 

Vyaz’ma-Yukhnov road. 

Until the twenty-ninth, the area of 250th Regiment’s operations expanded, especially eastward along the 

Vyaz’ma-Yukhnov road. Although several sections of the 

road were cut, the important town of Znamenka remained 

under German control even after heavy Soviet airborne 

attacks on the night of 29-30 January. 

On 31 January, the 250th Airborne Regiment linked up 

with Belov’s cavalry en route to Vyaz’ma and then moved 

northward. On 2 February, when 1st Guards Cavalry Corps reached the southeast approaches to Vyaz”ma, where it 

joined newly arrived 8th Airborne Brigade, the 250th 

Regiment moved northeast to join advanced elements of 33d 

Army approaching Vyaz’ma from the east. Two days later, 

the regiment joined the 329th Rifle Division of 33d Army 

so that both units could fight as a regular combined arms 

unit in the ensuing battle of encirclement. 

The operations of 250th Airborne Regiment and 1st and 

2d battalions, 201st Airborne Regiment, were a success. 

They secured a base area in the German rear, disrupted German logistics and communications, and assisted the 

advance of 1st Guards Cavalry Corps. The airdrop and 

airlanding went fairly well--most of the force landed-- 

and, once on the ground, units performed their multiple 

missions well, despite organizational and equipment 

limitations. 

The problems of the operation again resulted from 

planners’ mistakes. The operation was too long. Equipped 

with only light weapons and lacking armor and even medium 

artillery, the airborne force had to operate for fifteen 

days isolated from the main force.26 

front During that time, 

the assigned them too many missions and thus 

fragmented airborne strength. notion of force 

Front had an exaggerated what a small could accomplish. The 

five-day landing period was too long, cost the unit the 

element of surprise, and permitted the Germans to organize 

their defenses and counterattacks accordingly. 

The landing operation suffered because the starting command landed at a different airfield from the parachute force and, even worse, less than two kilometers from 

German-held Znamenka. Furthermore, during the operation, 

troops had difficultly on skis, indicating a lack of good training. 

125 
On the positive side, mission, and it 

the regiment did accomplish its 

proved the utility of operating with 

partisan detachments, This 

operation launched 

which was mutually beneficial. 

the long, airborne complicated string of 

operations collectively known as 

airborne operation. 

the Vyaz"ma 

Rzhev, February 1942 

Ongoing Soviet airborne operations in January and 

February 1942 aimed at encircling German forces on the 

approaches to Moscow, but one operation was to do the 

reverse --assist Soviet forces trapped in a German 

encirclement. 

late January, 

After the attack by the Kalinin Front in 

the 39th and 29th armies, led by the 11th 

Cavalry Corps, pushed southward west of Rzhev toward 

Vyaz'ma. In early February, however, German 9th Army forces counterattacked and trapped 29th Army southwest of 

Rzhev.27 The Kalinin Front commander ordered ‘29th Army to break out of the trap and to rejoin 39th Army to the 

southwest. I-Ie also mounted an airborne operation designed 

to reinforce encircled forces and to help 29th Army break 

out. 

The 4th Battalion, 204th Airborne Brigade, of Sr. Lt. 

I?. L. Belotserkovsky took off from Lyubertsy airfield to 

jump into the Monchalovo-Okorokovo area c see map 35, 

p* 127). Signal fires arranged in the form of triangles and squares marked the drop zone in the middle of the 29th 

Army area. Officers acquainted all personnel with the 

names of villages in the drop zone and provided junior 

commanders sketches of the drop zone. 

The 500~man battalion jumped from two flights of 

aircraft on the night of 16-17 February.28 But because 

the entire operational area--friendly as well as eneay-- was ablaze with fires of one sort or another, the planned 

signal system failed. At least 100 men did not drop. 

Those who jumped did so from heights of 300 to 400 

meters. In spite of heavy antiaircraft fire, no aircraft 

were lost. The seven-by-eight-kilometer encirclement area 

was subject to heavy German artillery fire. Moreover, 

German troops had penetrated into the encircled Soviets' 

defensive perimeter. Paratroopers literally landed in 

active fighting and had great difficulty assembling and 

finding the 8f;fp:ies and heavy dropped in bags."29 weapons that had been 

German submachine 

contested the landing, while a German infantry gunners 

company with several tanks threatened Okorokovo from the northeast. 

1 2 6 '.^- 
Map 35. Rzhev Operation, February 1942 
Lieutenant Borismansky”s company landed at Okorokovo 

where it defended the northeast approaches to the town 

from the morning of the sixteenth until 1700 on the 

seventeenth. The 2d Company’s assistant commander 

defended MonchaLovo against repeated German infantry and 

tank attacks e Lieutenant Kovalevsky’s 1st Company, along with a portion of Lieutenant Brusintsy’s 2d Company) 

engaged in a house-to-house, street-to-street battle over 

Everzovo. 

On the sixteenth, the battalion commander, Senior 

Lieutenant Belotserkovsky, gathered sixty men south of 

Okorokovo and finally joined Lieutenant Borismansky’s 

group northeast of the town. Only by nightfall on 17 

February had the battalion commander finally succeeded in 

reassembling his command and establishing communications 

with the 29th Army commander. 

For several days thereafter, the battalion supported $‘9k9ksArmy’s breakout to the southwest b;ovye;ring the 

and rear of the withdrawing forces. 

Especially heavy fighting occurred at Zabrody where the 

battalion repulsed repeated German attacks. After 

suffering heavy casualties, the battalion, on 22 February, followed remnants of 29th Army into 39th Army lines. 

The operation at Rzhev differed from other airborne 

operations because its intent was simply to reinforce an 

encircled unit. Whether 29th Army could have broken free 

of German encirclement without airborne assistance is a 

moot point. Using such a small force for such a hazardous 

operation was indicative of the extremity of 29th Army’s 

g;;ition. The actual drop experienced the same techni;;: 

coordination problems that previous drops 

endured. Repeatedly facing the same problems surely must 

have adversely affected unit capabilities and performance in battle. 

Kerch-Feodosiya, December 1941-January 1942 

Al though the focus of war remained fixed on the 

approaches to Moscow, the German offensive tide also swept 

across the plains of southern Russia. By October, German 

armies had conquered the Ukraine and reached the Don 

Basin. Cal. Gen. E. Manstein’s 11th German Army surged 

into the Crimea, besieged the Soviet nava 1 base at 

Sevas topol, and drove Soviet forces from the Kerch 

peninsula, the eastern extremity of the Crimea. In early 

December f while Manstein reduced Sevastgpol, the Stavka 

ordered the Transcaucasus Front to prepare an operation to 

recapture the Kerch peninsula, raise the siege of 

Sevastopol, and expel Manstein from the Crimea. : 
The operation was an overly ambitious one. On 13 

December, the Stavka ordered two armies and elements of 

the Black Sea fi’leet to conduct a joint amphibious, 

airborne, and ground operation.30 They confronted an 

estimated German force of two divisions and two cavalry brigades at the eastern end of the peninsula and two 

infantry regiments at Feodosiya. 31 The Transcaucasus 

Front ordered 51st Army and the Black Sea Fleet to force 

the Kerch Strait, occupy Kerch and the Turkish wall 

fortifications, and subsequently attack toward Ak Monai. 

The 44th Army and fleet forces would land at Feodosiya, 

capture that city, and occupy various nearby towns. Part 

of 44th Army would attack Marfovka and, with 51st Army, destroy German forces on the Kerch peninsula.32 

The airborne forces’ role was to swppor t the 

amphibious assault with a parachute company drop near Baragova station west of Kerch (see map 36, p. 130). The 

paratroopers wowld capture a base of operations to support 

a naval force landing at Cape Zyuk. An airborne unit from 

2d Airborne Corps would capture the Vladislavovka airfield 

for Transcawcasus Front aviation units to use. After the 

landings, parachute units would be subordinate to 44th 

Army. At the last moment, however, high seas and ice 

forced cancellation of the Ak Monai landing. The airborne 

units received a new mission from front: land near Arabat 

and block either a German advance down the Arabat spit 

from Genichesk or a German withdrawal along the same 

route. The commander of airborne forces planned and 

conducted the operation. 

While Major Nyashin”s airborne battalion at Krasnodar 

airfield prepared for the drop, small reconnaissance 

groups of naval paratroopers carrying radios were dropped 

into the German rear to collect and transmit intelligence 

to the assault force. On 31 December, 

poor weather conditions, the force 

dwriztf extrernnls 

took in - bombers. Heavy cloud cover forced the aircraft to fly in 

single column at substantial intervals. Thick clouds 

forced the aircraft to fly at seventy-five meters, too low 

for a safe drop. After the aircraft navigator had 

threatened Major Nyashin with aborting the mission because 

of the low altitude, the two agreed to ascend to 450 

meters in the clouds just before the jump.33 

In those harrowing conditions, the paratroopers 

finally jumped. As they fell, Germans troops escorting an 

ammunition convoy fired machine guns at the helpless 

troops. Heavy winds dispersed the paratroopers. Assembly 

was difficult, but the dispersion also created the 

impression among the Germans that a much larger Soviet 

force was landing. Heavy but fragmented fighting followed 

129 
Map 36. Kerch-Feodosiya Operation, December 1941-January 1942 
the drop. Small groups of 

infiltrated past 

paratroopers painstakingly German strongpoints and advanced on Ak 

Mona i . When the battalion had assembled enough men, it 

attacked and captured a German artillery position on the 

north flank of the Ak Monai defenses. Early on 1 January 1942, the battalion had occupied defenses at Ak Monai and 

across the base of the Arabat spit. 

Meanwhile, 44th Army occupied Feodosiya and advanced 

ten to fifteen kilometers inland to Vladislavovka, but 

there the Germans stood fast and prevented a Soviet 

encirclement of their forces. As the Germans withdrew 

westward, the Soviet airborne force split into 

diversionary groups and harassed retreating German 

forces. 

infantry 

The paratroopers were later replaced by a naval 

unit. The front commander’s decision to cancel 

the airborne drop designed to secure Vladislavovka 

airfield for Soviet fighters meant that Soviet forces 

would lack effective air cover 

offensive.34 during the entire 

Although the Kerch-Feodosiya relatively small operation, 

airborne landing was a 

less than battalion size, it 

suffered the same ills as the larger operations. Its size 

was insufficient to achieve its assigned mission. Bad 

weather hindered landing operations, and reconnaissance 

had failed to detect enemy strength and dispositions. At 

the command level, planners vacillated between objectives 

and thus were unable to tailor a force suited to the 

mission. As in other operations, the airborne force 

landed in dangerows conditions, but, once on the ground, the forces acted resolutely. The battalion commander 

displayed initiative when conditions seemed 

for him to change the unit’s mission. appropriate The operation was a 

microcosm of other unsuccessful Soviet 

larger airborne units. operations by 

Diversionary Operations 

Diversionary operations were the most numerous and, 

perhaps, the most successful type of airborne operation the Soviets conducted. Diversionary operations varied in 

mission and size. Small landing parties struck at 

objectives deep in the enemy rear. Others 

established contact 

simply with an band to 

raid German rear areas. 

organized part isan 

Larger reconnaissance or sabotage 

groups reported on enemy dispositions and troop movements 

or attacked important enemy installations. Operations by these groups kept the German enemy rear in turmoil and 

tied down in a security role German forces that could have 

been put to better use at the front. At the other 

131 
extreme, small organized groups conducted diversionary 

raids in support of operations by other ground elements. 

Often, diversionary operations sought to achieve 

political, as well as military, aims. The 

examples illustrate their diversity. following 

In early July 1941, German forces drove deep into the 

Ukraine. The 204th Airborne Brigade organized more than 

ten landings in the enemy rear): usually at night, to 

attack German lines of communication and 

facilities.35 logistical 

Airborne 

the 

forces bypassed or encircled in 

initial German offensive routinely under took such 

diversionary operations in the enemy rear areas. These 

operatians were the earliest manifestations of the 

significant 

throughout partisan network that in later years grew 

Belorussia. German-occupied territory, particularly in 

A well-organized diversionary operation with direct 

tactical implications occurred during the defense of 

Odessa in September 

Rumanian and 

1941 .zfrceAsfter months under siege by German 

seaborne ,’ 

the Soviet garrison counterattacked with airborne, and 

forces. garrison The sea assault and the garrison’s sortie were 

supposed to be simultaneous. During the artillery preparation, thirty minutes before the assault, 

twenty-three parachutists were dropped near a German 

communications complex and along the probable route of 

enemy reinforcements. The small group’s surprise attack 

on 22 September paralyzed the enemy. With little 

resistance, parachutists linked up with the amphibious assault group that evening. The next day, with the enemy 

withdrawing, the airborne and naval force joined the 

Odessa garrison. This local victory forced two Rumanian 

divisions to withdraw to new positions farther from the 

Odessa harbor and permitted the safe evacuation of the 

garrison from Odessa 

October.37 

to Sevastopol in the Crimea in early 

During the critical months of the fall of 1942, German 

forces advanced to Stalingrad and into the Caucasus. 

German aircraft operating from Maikop raised havoc at 

Soviet installations along the Black Sea. 38 the 

night of 24 October, forty paratroopers, transpor’ted in 

TB-3 and PS-84 aircraft, raided the Naikop airfield. 

Partisan guides led the way as the paratroopers dropped on 

and nearby the airfield. After an hour-long struggle, the 

Germans finally drove off the airborne force, which had 

destroyed twenty-two of the German’s fifty-four aircraft 

and damaged another twenty. Fourteen paratroopers were 

killed. 

132 
Other small drops of from 80 to 200 men occurred in 

support of the Novorossiisk amphibious landing of February 

1943, the Kursk operation of July 1943, and an operation 

near Polessk in September 1943. 

Perhaps the most interesting airborne operations were 

conducted during the Soviet Manchurian offensive of August 

1945.* Late in that operation, after Soviet troops had 

penetrated deeply into Manchuria and after the Japanese command had decided to surrender, twenty airborne landings brought Soviet soldiers to major Manchurian and Korean 

cities and Japanese command installations. In Manchuria, 

these landing detachments ranged from 150 to 500 men. All 

forces were airlanded without reconnaissance and sometimes 

in an atmosphere of uncertainty about Japanese reactions. 

The landings were as much political as military in their 

aims, for they sought to reinforce Japanese intentions to 

surrender, has ten disarmament of the sometimes 

recalcitrant Japanese 

presence in Manchurit;#Ps) Tbaend establish aaiS;;;;z Manchurlan 

assaults were forerunners of Soviet paratroop landings in 

Czechoslovakia in 1968. 

Soviet diversionary operations were more successful 

than larger operations. They were more economical in 

terms of manpower, and they could be mounted by limited 

means and with more primitive techniques. Although their 

direct dividends were sometimes not readily apparent, 

their long-term influence mounted. They were a useful 

adjunct to the successful partisan warfare of 1943 and 

1944. Since the war, the Soviets have viewed diversionary 

operations with considerable interest. 

*See Lt. Cal. David M. Glantz, Aupust Storm: The 

Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Leavenworth 

Papers no. I d August Storm: Soviet Tactical and 

0 erational Cd,b,“t” in Manchuria, 

hr t Leavenworth . KS : Co1,9b4a:’ ~~uadV~~~“lTItnhs t~~~~~s 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, February 1983 

and June 1983 respectively). 

133 
_- 

CHAPTER 7 

THE POSTWAR YEARS 

The Intellectual Context 

During the inevitable demobilization of the immediate 

postwar years, the Soviet Union concentrated its 

analytical energies on building an armed force to 

guarantee its security and its 

influence. emerging sphere of 

Another objective was to advance Soviet 

interest whenever possible. If a single slogan has 

personified Soviet attitudes since the almost messianic 

seizure of Berlin in May 1945, it has been the words so 

of ten seen in print, on walls, and on placards in the 

Soviet Union, “Nikto ne zabyt, will forget, notmng will b nichto ne zabyto” (No one 

forgotten) Accordingly the 

Soviet Union examined the hfstorical lessons of the recent 

past and proceeded to build for the future. 

The military was no exception. The historical lessons 

of the late war loomed large. For the Soviets, it had 

been the ultimate struggle (equivalent in Stalin’s view to 

nuclear war) out of which would emerge ultimate truths. 

Never before in history had such a titanic struggle been 

waged--a twentieth century culture) --in which only one culture ~erge(w~~premZf cou 

The Soviet Union had won, but at tremendous cost and 

sacrifice and against tremendous odds. The victory confirmed for the Soviets the validity of not only their 

military theory but also their political ideology, and it 

proved that the Soviet military could absorb the shock of 

major defeats, learn from those defeats, and win. Thus, 

original Soviet military theory, the events and lessons of 

war, and the postwar theory that emerged victorious had an 

aura of truth, tried and tested in the heat of war as it 

was. Security for future generations demanded that those 

truths be transmitted to younger military officers as 

accurately and in as much detail as possible. The 

historical study of war experience and technique was the 

essential base from which to derive subsequent theory. By extension, without such a historical basis, present theory 

could not be understood. Obviously, antithesis, as a counterpoint, or 

to the thesis of that emerging theory stood 

the technological changes since 1945. 

Union, Today in the Soviet 

a synthesis of those elements exists: the tried 

and true techniques and theory of the past juxtaposed against and modified by the technological changes that 

have occurred since the profound experiences of the Great 

Patriotic War. 

135 
The Soviet Union reformed its military establishment 

in 1946, and theories, practices, and organizations judged 

to have contributed most to victory were emphasized. 

Taken from 1944-45, the offensive model stressed deep 

operations; maneuver; and judicious use of massed armor, 

artillery, and airpower to effect success on the 

battlefield. Combined arms armies remained the 

numerically most important element of the Soviet force 

structure. These armies were organized into rifle corps and rifle divisions, just as in the late war years, but 

now they also tank and mechanized 

elements. 

contained integrated Mechanized armies of mechanized and tank 

divisions, as the heirs to the wartime tank armies, 

mechanized corps* and tank corps, emerged as the Soviet 

army’s powerful mobile force and, as such, received the 

most attention and resources. The Soviet Union also 

maintained as many as ten airborne divisions in the 

immediate postwar years as an adjunct to its large, increasingly mechanized army. But the real emphasis 

remained on mechanized ground warfare, and airborne forces 

played only an auxiliary role. Stalin”s view of war, in 

general (reflected in his “Permanent Operating Factors”) s 

plus his skeptical view of airborne operations, in 

particular) and the absence of a sufficient technological base to sustain airborne operations relegated large airborne forces to the realm of theory rather than 

practice. I 

Theoretical study of airborne warfare, however, 

continued. Soviet military theorists intensely studied 

war experiences to refine the precise missions airborne 

forces should perform. Theoretical missions were 

extensive, reaching into the strategic realm. * 

Theorists also investigated airborne organizations, planning) equipment, delivery techniques, and methods of 

ground operations. Despite this intellectual activity, there remained severe reservations about the real utility and survivability of airborne forces in modern mechanized 

eomba t . The ghosts of Vyaz ‘ma and the Dnepr were too 

vivid e While Stalin lived, guards airborne divisions did 

exist, but those divisions were copies of the guards airborne divisions of the late war years. A model for the 

Soviet army, they were elite divisions, well trained and 

I well equipped. Prospects for these show troops being used l actual airborne warfare would . until 

iialinist doubts as to their effecti~~~~~~ hra”d”98lded and 

airborne forces had an efficient airborne transport to the 

g,a,t;iEf ield and had equipment to ensure survival in 

Sophisticated theory, elaboration of missions, 

and oiganizational adjustments would develop in tandem 

with technological changes--changes that would soon occur 

136 
and that would result in a rejuvenation of airborne 

warfare theory and practice. 

The Stalinist Years: 1946-53 ---- 

forces 

The general postwar reorganization of the armed 

also affected airborne units. 

command levels, 

At the highest the air force lost control of airborne 

forces when they became directly subordinate to the 

Ministry of Defense in June 1946. The position of 

commander of airborne forces was reestablished, and Col. 

Gen. V. V. Glagolev was appointed the first postwar commander (April 1946) .3 

During the demobilization, new airborne divisions 

emerged from rifle divisions and airborne 

brigades. guards The new guards airborne divisions were 

organized under airborne 

paralleled corps headquarters control and 

the organizational structure of a rifle 

division. They lacked, however, the heavy weapons that 

augmented rifle division TOES in the postwar years (that is, the medium tank and self-propelled gun regiment) .4 

The new units had both organic parachute and airlanded 

(glider-delivered) regiments. Controlled by the aviation 

of airborne troops branch of the air force, air transport 

divisions consisted of transport and glider regiments and 

provided lift capability within the airborne corps. An 

airborne corps had from two to three guards airborne 

divisions and an air transport division.5 

The weaponry available to the units and the 

air-delivery means provided by the air force determined 

both the potential combat role of these airborne divisions 

and unit training, which was rather limited at first. 

Until basic technological changes occurred, training and 

combat use had to be patterned after World War II 

operations and therefore were limited in scope. Thus, “in 

the first postwar years, real changes in the means of 

fulfilling military missions by airborne forces did not 

occur. It is fully understandable because there were 

changes in neither the nor means of 

land ing . “6 techniques 

Airborne divisions were combined arms 

operational-tactical divisions that operated in close 

concert with tank and mechanized forces and aviation units 

during front offensive operations. 

Front operations 

army group defenses 

in 1946-53 aimed at overcoming enemy to a depth of 150 to 200 kilometers by 

means of successive army operations. The front’s 

operational formation consisted of a first echelon of 

combined arms armies, a front mobile group of a mechanized 

137 

-. 
army and a second echelon, plus front aviation, airborne 

forces (one to two divisions), a front antiaircraft group, 

and a reserve. An army organized itself into a first 

echelon of several rifle corps; a second echelon of a 

rifle corps or several rifle divisions; an army artillery 

group; an army antiaircraft .group; and combined 

antitank, tank, arms, 

engineer, and chemical reserves. 

Sometimes, an army employed a mobile group of a separate 

mechanized or tank division.7 

Front operations had a close mission of first 

penetrating the enemy army group defense and then 

encircling and destroying the enemy force. First-echelon 

combined arms armies performed this mission. The front’s 

subsequent mission Wt3S to develop the offensive with 

mechanized armies to 

strategic reserves. 8 destroy enemy operational and 

frontage and depth of 

The front’s and army’s operational mission increased, compared with 

norms of the third period of the Great Patriotic War. The 

Soviets expected the duration of front and army operations 

to be shorter than had been the case during the war years, 

In front operations I airborne forces 

operational depths (100 kilometers) to 

operated to 

assist the 

mechanized armies in exploiting the initial breakthrough. Airborne operations were an integral part of front 

offensive operations or 

Furthermore, after 1950 amphibious 

soviet theorists operations.g visualized 

potential use of airborne forces in separate sectors, in 

conjunction with other ground, naval, and air forces, to 

achieve strategic offensive missions. 

rifle forces, military transport, Specially prepared front aviation, and 

antiaircraft forces (PVO Strany) would be attached to the 

airborne force on such occasions.10 

Because of the light nature of the airborne force and 

limited transport aviation, the guiding principles for the 

use of airborne forces were the same as during the Great 

Patriotic War. Airborne forces would be 

landing in 

objectives 

limited regions, securing and holding until the arrival of main front 

forces. Missions were thus passive. The depth 

of landings did not exceed 20 to 100 kilometers, 

and the length of independent combat action was 

comparatively short. Air transport of that time, 

the IL-12 and IL-14 aircraft were able to land 

only personnel with 

82-mm mortars.11 light weapons, including 

Even more modern aircraft were in relatively short 

SUPPlY l The official 50 Years of the Soviet Armed Forces 

138 
stated, “however, in the airborne forces there remained 

not a few of the obsolete aircraft (IL-Z) with low speed 

and cargo capacity . Therefore, for towing gliders and 

transport of heavy equipment TU-2 and TU-4 

supplied by the air force were used.“12 [bombers] 

This limitation 

changed after 1950, 

became available. 

when large numbers of modern aircraft 

Foreign assessments recognized the overall Soviet 

airborne employment concepts and the emphasis on surprise, deception, and use of darkness. A U.S. assessment noted 

the Soviets believe that airborne troops should 

be used as a surprise element and should be 

employed in sufficient strength to insure 

successful operation against the selected 

objective. The enemy rear and flanks are 

probable areas of employment. Darkness and 

deception are used in order to strike the enemy when and where he least expects it. The airborne 

assault includes paratroopers and air-landed 

troops transported by either helicopter or cargo aircraft or both. 

helicopters Although gliders may be used, 

and assault-type aircraft are 

expected to play the primary role.13 

Although the materiel status of airborne units still 

limited the scope of operations, it was improving: 

Support weapons that can be airlifted include 

both towed and self -propelled antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, mortars up to 120~mm, 

recoilless rifles, and lightweight vehicles. The 

previous Soviet dependence upon captured enemy equipment and 

reduced. 

supplies has now been somewhat 

The lack of armor and heavy caliber 

artillery in the airhead, however, must still be 

compensated for by close support ground attack 

aircraft and early forces.14 linkup with friendly ground 

Doctrine and field exercises shaped specific missions 

airborne forces were to perform.15 The paramount mission was to secure crossing sites (bridges or fords) 

over major water obstacles on the main axis of the ground force attack. 

defenses. Securing such crossings would preempt enemy If airborne forces faced a defended crossing, they would maneuver around the enemy flank and rear while 

the main force attacked from the front. Another important 

mission was to seize important objectives or key terrain 

in the operational depths of the enemy defense in order to 

assist main forces in encircling and destroying the enemy 

139 
or in -order to block enemy withdrawal or reinforcement. 

In airborne operations, key terrain included water 

obstacles, mountain passes, and defiles between lakes. In 

other instances, an airborne force could land over a wide 

area to disrupt enemy withdrawal plans by conducting harassing attacks on his columns or by destroying roads 

and communications routes. At the lower end of the combat 

spectrum, smaller airborne units could attack small, but 

important, .objectives, such as airfields, enemy command 

posts, key road junctions, bridges, warehouses, and enemy 

bases. Complementing amphibious operations, airborne 

forces could make surprise landings to secure beachheads 

where amphibious naval forces could land. In amphibious 

operations, airborne forces could block the advance of 

enemy reserves to a beachhead or prevent enemy withdrawal 

from the beachhead. In certain cases, paratroops could 

seize a port or naval base facilities. 

With such doctrinal missions, airborne forces trained 

using tactics derived from wartime experiences. Most 

airborne training involved close coordination of airborne 

units with mechanized mobile forces operating in realistic 

simulation of wartime conditions, to include all-weather 

and all-season exercises. Parachuting techniques, 

orientation of units on the ground, rapid assembly of 

units, timely seizure of objectives, and establishment of 

defenses on the ground capable of holding terrain unti 

arrival of mobile ground forces received emphasis.1 ik 

Operations occurred in distinct phases: first, landing in 

a limited geographical area; second, securing objectives; 

and, third, holding those objectives until the main force 

arrived. Missions were passive because, after landing, 

paratroopers Lacked mobility and heavy mobile .firepower. 

Foreign analysts retiognized the Soviet view of the 

levels of war and postulated three types of Soviet 

airborne operations: strategic, operational, and 

tactical. Scope and significance of the action 

distinguished the three types. Strategic operations were 

large and were carried out deep in the enemy rear. The 

objective was IftO impair the enemy‘s war making 

capabilities by seizing or neutralizing industrial, 

administrative, and other strategic targets."17 To be 

successful, strategic operations required continuous air 

superiority to secure air delivery and supply routes and 

to protect the airborne force before and after landing. Operational level airborne assaults were “effected deep in 

the enemy ’ s rear defensive area in conjunction with frontal operations by ground forces of at least army size."18 This phased operation began with small 

airborne Afor;;yn dropping to seize airfields and landing 

areas. body of varied size and composition 

140 
airlanded on the captured airfield, performed its combat 

mission, and linked up with advancing ground forces. 

Tactical airborne operations were smaller 

paratroopers or by aircraft- and 

assaults by 

units operating at 

helicopter-transported 

defense. 

shallow tactical depths in the enemy 

axis 

Such forces usually operated on a main attack 

to facilitate the breakthrough of the main zone 

of resistance; to delay the forward movement of 

enemy reserves and divert their commitment from 

the point of the main effort; to complete the 

encirclement of enemy forces and take control of 

commanding heights; to seize enemy antitank, 

artillery, and atomic delivery systems and 

simultaneously disrupt his communications lines; 

to disrupt enemy rear area activities and destroy 

stocks of ammunition and fuel; to seize tactical 

airfields, bridges, and other tactical 

objectives; and to assist in river crossing 

operations and support amphibious landings. 19 

When discussing these missions, Soviet theor is ts 

constantly focused on two major concerns. The first was 

the necessity to reduce 

improve 

airborne force drop time to 

surprise, unit concentration, and firepower once 

on the ground. The second was the need to attain air 

superiority over the drop area to protect the transports from enemy antiaircraft fire and aviation and to provide 

air support for airborne units on the ground in order to 

compensate for their inherent weakness in fire 

support.20 Constant field exercises provided solutions 

for both problems. techniques Larger aircraft and improved drop 

reduced the existing two- to three-day war 

years' drop time to one to two days. This speed provided 

greater tactical surprise and led to more effective ground operations. To reduce drop time even more and to 

capitalize on surprise , the Soviets emphasized the 

importance of reconnaissance and a time-phased rapid 

assault on or near the objective. Reconnaissance 

determined the suitability of the landing sites, enemy dispositions, and weather conditions that could affect the 

assault. Actual landings occurred in three distinct 

waves. The first wave of paratroopers secured and marked 

landing areas for gliders, helicopters, and transport 

aircraft. The second wave of gliders and/or helicopters 

carried troops and light equipment into the secured 

landing area. A third wave of transport aircraft lifted 

additional troops 

area. 21 

and heavier equipment into the landing 

Clearly, these procedures incorporated the 

experiences and lessons of World War II operations. 

141 

c-.- 
Airborne forces trained on the basis of World War 11 

experiences. Simultaneously, the materiel standards of 

airborne units evolved, thus improving their 

capabilities. There was a concerted effort to improve airborne troop weaponry and its sustainability in combat. 

Units received more automatic weapons, modern artillery, 

mortars, antitank guns t and antiaircraft guns. To 

supplement the wart ime 45-mm guns and 50-mm and 82-mm 

mortars, airborne forces received the self-propelled guns ASU-57 and later the SU-85 (1962), 85-mm antitank guns, 

120-mm mortars, and 122~mm (M-30) howitzers.22 Units 

had increased firepower I better antitank protection, and 

improved , though still limited, mobility. New GAZ-67 

trucks’ and tractors could move guns, and the ASU-57 was 

mobile. However) personnel could not move so’ readily, E?;;?;:ute battalions and companies still advanced to 

on foot and also attacked on foot in combat 

formation, supported by ASU-57 guns, recoilless guns, and 

82-mm mortars. When attacking, the enemy flank and rear, 

airborne forces rode on the self-propelled guns.23 

A primary concern in the first postwar period was also 

the availability of delivery aircraft. Without adequate 

numbers of aircraft configured to carry airborne units and 

their equipment and t’o drop them accurately, airborne 

operations remained theoretical. The Soviets.lacked such 

aircraft during the war. After 1945, they developed and 

fielded new aircraft better equipped to land airborne 

forces more accurately. The IL-12 aad IL-14 aircraft of 

the late 1940s had improved carrying capabilities and 

guidance systems, but, because of their side cargo door-s, 

they lacked the capacrty to deliver large, ,bulky items tg the battlefield. A new generation of gliders, towed by the TU-2 and TU-4 bombers, could ,carry men and equipment 

more effectively. New aircraft and improved guidance 

systems increased the depth at which a’irborne, forces could 

operate. Similar experimental work produced safer 

parachutes capable of carrying larger equipment payloads. Improved parachutes also permitted dropping equipment from 

aircraft flying at speeds of 280 to ‘300 kiLometers per 

hour rather than the standard 160 to 180 ki1ometer.s per 

hour. 24 

Beyond these developments, work also proceeded on 

helicopters. By the end of the first postwar period, the 

Soviets had produced the MI-1 and MI-4 helicopters. 

Though Soviet theorists certainly considered the use of 

helicopters for airlanding operations, real progress in 

this regard would not be made until later. 

Airborne operations in the first postwar period were 

an integral part of Soviet offensive theory. Training of 

142. 

_--M 
airborne forces continued apace with that theory. Materiel limitations, however, inhibited prospects for 

full implementation of the theory. The introduction of 

modern equipment gradually improved the airborne forces’ 

capabilities and brought them closer 

framework governing their combat use. 

to the conceptual 

Although there was 

pro ress 

% 

in the first postwar period, the status of 

air orne forces did not improve, and the Soviets did not 

fully recognize their 

the mid-1950s. important contemporary role until 

The Nuclear Era: 1953-68 -- 

In the mid-1950s, several important factors merged to 

produce a renaissance 

airborne forces. 

in the stature and importance of 

Stalin’s death in 1953 removed a major obstacle in the path to reform. In the broadest sense, 

Soviet military thought after Stalin began to cast off the 

shibboleths harbored since the end of the Great Patriotic 

War and began judging military affairs with more emphasis 

on the contemporary situation, but without abandoning faith in the lessons derived from the war. 

of the importance 

A recognition of nuclear weapons and the possibility of surprise engendered by initial wartime use of those 

weapons triggered this basic revision of military theory and force reorganization. identified as 

The following period, usually the Zhukov reforms, was characterized by intense reinvestigation of all areas of military science 

in the light of technological changes. This reappraisal resulted in a wholesale reorganization of the armed 

forces, a redefinition of the role and capabilities of the 

various arms and services within a new concept of military operations, and accelerated development and fielding of 

new weaponry. 1960s) 

A second wave of change began in the early 

keynoted by Nikita S. Khrushchev’s January 1960 

speech announcing Soviet recognition of a “revolution in 

military affairs.“25 The second wave represented a full 

maturation of concepts developed during the first, or 

Zhukov, phase. 

The emergence of a new view on war, in general, and 

offensive operations, in particular, was fundamental to 

the changes after 1953. The new view held that general 

war would likely begin with a nuclear exchange. Ground 

operations would occur against this nuclear backdrop, and 

the mission would be to mop up the theater after a 

devastating nuclear exchange. Ground operations would 

involve the action of mobile tank and motorized rifle 

formations, supported by rocket forces conducting 

high-speed deep operations, often on multiple axes, to 

exploit the effects of nuclear strikes, defeat enemy 

143 
forces, and conquer and territory.26 In this 

nuclear environment, ground “;“o”r”cpeys would play a distinctly 

secondary role to that of strategic rocket forces., 

Such doctrine required a reorganization of the armed 

forces. That reorganization created smaller, more mobile 

forces capable of fighting and surviving on a nuclear 

battlefield. Marshal G. K. Zhukov began the first wave of 

structural changes in 1954 and 1955, and his successors 

cant inued them after his ouster in 1957.27 The 

ponderous mechanized armies and mechanized divisions were 

abolished I as were rifle corps, rifle divisions, and 

cavalry divisions. A new streamlined tank army replaced 

the mechanized army, and a more flexible motorized rifle 

;f;y-$?y;;y~g both the mechanized division and the 

The combined arms army emerged as a 

balanced force of tank and motorized rifle divisions, and 

the tank division was reduced in size as well.29 Units 

were fully motorized, and new equipment, rocket artillery, 

new tanks (T-55), tactical missiles, armored personnel 

carriers (BTR series), and early model surface-to-air 

missiles were incorporated into the force structure. The 

ground forces became a mobile, useful adjunct to strategic 

rocket forces, capable of flexible, semi-independent 

operations on a nuclear battlefield. 

The second wave of change occurred after 1961, when 

the Soviets further streamlined both motorized rifle and 

tank divisions and tailored them to the nuclear 

battlefield. 30 

the Equipment modernization cant inued with 

introduction of &he T-62 tank, antitank guided 

missiles (ATGMs), infantry combat vehicles (I%@ and EMD), 

and tactical missiles at division level. This ‘“Khrushchev 

period”’ placed even greater emphasis on the predominance of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. 

These fundamental doctrinal changes affected the 

airborne forces and their role in contemporary 

operations. Airborne units were tailored to perform more 

realistic combat missions on the nuclear battlefield. 

Symbolizing the closer integration of airborne operat>ions 

with ground operations was the integration of airborne 

forces into the ground forces in 1956.31 New weaponry 

also made airborne units more mobile, hence more capable of surviving on the nuclear battlefield”. -,Hili tary 

theorists could now postulate new, more realistic missions 

for airborne forces. The Soviets defined the theoretical 

context of airborne force use as follows: 

Nuclear rocket weapons are able to strike enemy 

forces located at any distance from the front 

lines. However, considerable gaps in time 

144 
between nuclear strikes on objectives in the deep 

rear of the enemy and the entering of that region 

by ground forces do not permit to ;hofs”ells;;;;~;e 

exploitation of the results of . The problem of shortening that gap can be 

resolved by landing airborne forces in the region struck by rocket forces in order to secure key 

enemy positions. Airborne units came to be 

considered a combat means able to exploit effectively and quickly the results of nuclear 

strikes and completely destroy the enemy. 

Moreover, airborne forces could undertake new 

missions, such as destroying enemy nuclear 

delivery means, bases, and warehouses for nuclear 

weapons, etc. 

They retained the missions of cooperating with the ground forces in securing administrative 

and industrial centers of the enemy, seizing 

crossings and bridgeheads on wide water 

obstacles, mountain passes 

to access.32 

and any difficult area 

Airborne unit capabilities improved as well, so “the 

basic tendency of the development of tactics in that 

period became a rejection of the passive defense of 

limited regions (objectives) and a transition to maneuver 

combat in a wider region. “33 Improved airborne unit 

mobility and broadened combat uses occurred with the 

appearance of nuclear weapons because 

the possibility of suppressing the enemy 

improved, especially in enemy antiaircraft 

systems in the landing region. Favorable 

conditions were created for landing large 

airborne assaults. Use of nuclear weapons 

created high tempos for offensive action of 

ground forces and shortened the period of time 

they took to arrive in the landing region. This 

permitted ’ * 

lncr%slng 

the depth of regiment and 

division drops. 

The introduction of nuclear weapons reatly expanded 

the overall airborne mission, and the it ielding of new 

weaponry and airborne delivery systems also increased the 

variety of missions airborne forces could perform. New 

antitank (PTURS) l~~~~“~~mored vehikles self-propelled artillery 

(ASU-85)) (PT-76)) and an airborne 

combat vehicle (BMD in 1973) improved airborne force 

survivability in combat, as well as sustainability on 

longer duration operations. Furthermore, new transport 

aircraft, including the AN-8 (1956), the AN-12 (early 

145 
196Os), and ultimately the AN-22, enabled airborne forces 

:~ng$f,!?f with more versatile combat weaponry at longer 

Theorists could also articulate more precise tactical and operational missions, such as the use of air 

assaults to reinforce the action of forward detachments on 

the offensive. 

The role of forward detachments in rapidly 

exploiting the results of nuclear strikes and 

securing high rates of advance has also 

increased. Tactical airlandings--a new element 

of the combat formation * divisions:-could 

perform such missions as di:truction of enemy nuclear delivery means and closing gaps created 

as a result of their use.36 

Airborne forces also came to play a greater role in 

meeting engagements . By ,operating deep in the enemy’s 

rear, tactical airlandings and ground forward detachments 

could, in a meeting engagement, forestall enemy use of 

nuclear conventio 71 3 fire and block deployment of the 

enemy main forces. 

Army exercises reflected this extensive expansion in 

airborne missions within the Soviet Union and outside the 

nation”s borders. A major innovation appearing in 

exercises of the late 1950s was the use of maneuverable 

airborne forces in the enemy’s rear area. Exercises in 

the late fifties and early sixties routinely included 

airborne elements. By 1963, Soviet airborne forces were 

participating in such exercises abroad. During Warsaw 

Pact Exercise Quartet held in East Germany that year, at 

least one airborne regiment with heavy equipment dropped from AN-12 aircraft e An advanced assault reconnaissance 

group of reinforced company size landed initially, secured 

the landing site, and prepared for further drops. The 

main body dropped by parachute with heavy equipment and 

secured the airfield for a‘ subsequent large airlanding 

operation.38 Quartet initiated a series of similar 

exercises in the late sixties using the same general scenario, each involving larger forces. 

Perhaps the clearest statement concerning the 

employment of Soviet airborne forces,, and one that best 

described the function of airborne forces within the realm 

of the revolution in military affairs, appeared in V. D. 

Sokolovsky’s classic work on military strategy: 

During the operation [the offensive], wide 

use will be made of tactical and operational airborne landings. These will have the task of 

solving problems of the most effective use of 

146 
the results 

strikes. . attained by nuclear . [such asI 

massing 

capture of the 

where nuclear regions 

are located, objectives, weapons important river crossings, bridgeheads, mountain passes, defiles and the annihilation of 

strategic objectives which cannot be put out of 

commission in any other way. used as 

Helicopters will be 

the main means of dropping tactical 

airborne troops. Transport planes can be used 

for operational landings. To assure the landing of a l.;.t;s:irdrop at a great depth, the enemy air must be neutralized by ECM 

[electronic countermeasures), air operations, and 

rocket strikes.39 

Sokolovsky’s work not only captured the expanded role of 

airborne forces, but also marked the emergence of new 

concepts of air delivery using the helicopter. 

Official U.S. assessments of Soviet airborne force 

missions changed little from the fifties to the sixties. 

Assessments categorized Soviet airborne operations as 

strategic, operational, and tactical and described the 

natur 

1958.$U 

of these missions in the same language used in 

One subtle change was the mention of a new 

front special purpose mission. A special purpose mission 

was elassif ied as “a highly specialized, small-size 

operation conducted by a well-trained unit generally of 

company size or smaller. 

harass and disrupt 

These operations are designed to 

lines of communications, to conduct 

sabotage, or to support partisan activities.“41 The 

assessment also noted the emergence of Soviet concern for 

helicopter operations as a vital means for facilitating rapid ground advance. Specifically, “helicopter assaults 

usually involve forward detachments and are used to assist 

the attacking forces to maintain a high tempo of attack. 

This is accomplished by using a helicopter assault to 

surmount obstacles and large areas of contamination.“42 

Conducted in 

October 

the Ukraine from 24 September to 3 

1967, Exercise Dnepr amply demonstrated the 

expanded role of airborne forces. 

airborne 

Elements of two guards divisions participated and engaged in both 

operational and 

level, 

tactical landings. At the operational 

a reinforced airborne division landed to secure an 

objective deep in the enemy rear. 

first a lead 

In the phased landing, battalion airborne 

reconnaissance force. parachuted as Heavy transports ft;lowed and 

dropped a forward detachment and then the main force. A 

novelty of the drop was the use of rockets to break the 

fall of parachute-landed heavy equipment. At the tactical 

level, a helicopter-borne battalion-size force secured a 

147 
bridgehead across the Dnepr for 

exploit.43 ground forces to 

This symbolic replay of the unsuccessful 

1943 Dnepr operation signaled Soviet commitment to the 

expanded role of airborne forces and became a model for 

future exercises. 

Contemporary Airborne Operations --- 

After Khrushchev’s fall from power, a lengthy debate 

began over Soviet military policy. It culminated in 

significant changes by the early 1970s. The Soviets 

reassessed Khrushchev ’ s sin,gle-option war-fighting 

strategy ahd reached a consensus that conventional war was 

possible. Theorists initially treated techniques of 

conventional war within a nuclear environment. But by the 

197os, that context had eroded, so theorists wrote about 

both nuclear and conventional war. Historical and 

theoretical military writings evidenced such a shift,:; 

emphasis and. seemed to 

war. 44 

indicate a basic change in 

Soviet view of The Soviets still considered 

nuclear war a real possibility, but they increasingly 

indicated an acceptance of, and perhaps a desire for, a 

nonnuclear phase of operations. They appeared to conclude 

that the existence of a strategic and tactical nuclear 

balance (or superiority for the Soviets) could generate a 

reluctance on both sides to use nuclear weapons, a form of 

mutual deterrence that increased the likelihood that 

conventional operations would remain conventional. At a 

mininum, the Soviets prepared themselves to fight either a 

nuclear war or a .convenfional war in a “nuclear-scared” 

posture prepared for either eventuality. This Soviet 

version of “‘flexible response” emphasized the necessity 

for expanding and perfecting the combined arms concept. 

Such a concept of modern war had a major impact on 

Soviet force structuring and military theory. Light units 

of the Khrushchev era (in particular, the motorized rifle 

division) now received significantly heavier weaponry and, 

to some extent, increased manpower. and 

A new emphasis on 

front operations and tactics the study of such 

previous operations required development and fielding of 

new weapons in greater numbers in line 

that continued throughout the seventies.45 

units, a process 

These changes in military policy, of course, affected 

the airborne forces. The combat capability of airborne 

divisions increased with the introduction of the BMD 

airborne combat vehicle, the 140-m multiple rocket 

launcher) t.he BRDM reconnaissance vehicle, the ASD-85 

assault guns) new ATGMs ) and new antiaircraft guns and 

missiles. 

148 
The IL-76 jet transport aircraft substantially 

improved Soviet airlift capacity. The articulation of 

tactical, operational, and strategic airborne missions did 

not change significantly from the early 1960s. The caveat 

that such missions could be performed in either a nuclear 

or a conventional environment was important -46 For 

theorists, was the issue of airborne 

force 

the primary concern 

survivability in a more lethal tactical and 

operational environment, especially without benefit of the 

devastating striking power of nuclear weapons. The 

problems of Soviet airborne units in the Great Patriotic 

War again became a focus of study and concern.47 The 

major objective for such study was to determine what 

missions the airborne force should perform in such an 

intense combat environment and, more important, how it 

should perform such missions. That study’s major by-product was the investigation of the most suitable 

delivery means--helicopter or aircraft--for an airborne 

force. Soviet study of U.S. experiences in Vietnam, in 

part, intensified 

ws 

concern over helicopter-borne 

airmobile operations. 

Study and experience proved the vulnerability of 

forces parachuted into combat or airlanded from aircraft. 

An alternate means emerged in the 1950s when the MI-4 

helicopter appeared in the Soviet aircraft inventory. The 

MI-4, a helicopter capable of carrying troops, light 

vehicles, and artillery, was used in the first 

experimental helicopter-lift operations in the mid and 

late 1950s. Other helicopters, the Yak-24 and MI-6, 

appeared in the late fifties and added the much-needed 

lift capacity to the helicopter force. The MI-6 could 

transport heavier weapons and about sixty-five men into 

combat .49 Helicopter development ultimately dovetailed 

with the new theoretical requirements to ,wage war on the 

nuclear battlefield. 

seemed better 

Helicopters, rather ;kan aircraft, 

suited to per form many the newly 

articulated missions. Therefore, exercises involving 

helicopter-lifted forces increased, reaching a peak during the 1967 Dnepr exercise. The addition of two new 

helicopters to the inventory in the seventies fueled the 

more and more convincing arguments for helicopter 

superiority. The MI-8 troop transport helicopter provided 

improved troop transport capability, and the MI-24 attack 

helicopter afforded accom anying F 

fire for 

helicopter-landed operations. 0 

support 

As the 

utility of 

e uipment 

P improved, theorists discussed the 

he icopters in operational and tactical level 

operations. Shortly after Exercise Dnepr, an article in 

Voennaya Mysl ’ (Military Thought) assessed the role of 

airborne forces in modern combat. Although accep’ting the 

149 
validity of airborne operations in general, it raised the 

helicopter issue: 

The creation of the helicopter has increased the 

possibilities for landing airlifted troops from 

the personnel of regular ground troops wh.ich have 

not been trained in airborne landing. And this, 

in turn, has helped to resolve certain serious 

problems. While in the 

landing, parachute method of 

the troops were greatly dispersed after 

their landing and their combat efficiency remained low for a certain period of time, the 

troops delivered to the landing regi,on in 

helicopters are ready to enter battle 

immediately. 51 

This article’s uniqueness was its emphasis on using other 

than airborne forces for such helicopter operations and on 

the technical and tactical advantages of helicopter-landed 

forces over parachute or airlanded forces. 

By 1969, the Soviet investigation of a variety of air 

assault methods had produced detailed 

Although recognizing that airborne 

conclusi;;;~~~ 

(parachute) could still operate successfully, Soviet theorists 

highlighted the conditions that made their use difficult. 

Parachute forces required special training and equipment 

to perform their mission, a mission, moreover, that 

depended on favorable weather conditions for success. 

ALSO) to land an airborne force of sufficient size, 

parachute troops had to secure a suitable landing area. 

Because of the requirements of modern aircraft, such areas 

were often in scarce SUPPlY l Because the means of 

delivery usually dispersed airborne forces over a 

considerable area during landing, assembling men and 

equipment before beginning combat missions took a long time. Past experiences continually illustrated these 

difficulties, and exercises indicated the persistence of 

this problem. 

The helicopter, however, solved part of the problem 

and provided greater flexibility to operational planners. 

Helicopters had better maneuverability in combat, carried 

heavier loads of men and equipment, and, by using vertical 

takeoff and landing, placed forces in precise combat order 

at a specific location, ready to commence ground 

operations. Because helicopters were able to land in a 

wide variety of locations, forces could more readily 

secure their objectives. Helicopters could also operate 

at considerable ranges and at high speeds, thus making 

them less vulnerable to enemy ground fire and detection 

than aircraft operating at low altitudes. Dur ing landing , 

150 
helicopter firepower could suppress enemy fire as 

effectively as, if not more effectively than, fighter 

aircraft escorting a landing force. Perhaps more 

important, however, was the fact that troop training for 

helicopter assault required less time, thus reducing 

preparation time for an operation. Fur thermore, 

helicopters could carry any type of force into combat, 

including motorized rifle forces with their weapons and 

various types of support units. In short, helicopters 

could deliver a true combined arms force. 

As articulated in 1969, the ideal tactical air assault 

unit was the motorized rifle battalion reinforced to be 

able to conduct long-term combat in the enemy rear, 

independently, if necessary, and free from the 

requirements of fire support from front units. 

Thus, a contemporary motorized rifle battalion 

could successfully conduct battle with its TOE 

weapons against large numbers of enemy tanks; 

every motorized rifle company could defend a 

strongpoint extending to one kilometer of front 

(sometimes more), having created in its set tor 

high densities of automatic weapons fire. It is 

clear that in a tactical landing the battalion, 

on many occasions, must be reinforced by mortars 

and artillery, engineer subunits, radiation and 

chemical reconnaissance and other means to 

increase its combat capabilities.53 

Besides motorized rifle battalions per forming the 

usual helicopter air assaults, task-organized companies 

and even platoons could conduct such missions as seizing 

enemy nuclear delivery means, destroying command 

facilities, and disorganizing the enemy rear. As with 

airborne operations, helicopter assaults involved landing 

in enemy territory while facing enemy fighter aircraft, 

antiaircraft fire, infantry, artillery, and rocket fire. 

World War II had taught that successful completion of the 

missions required thorough preparation, uninterrupted 

reconnaissance, firm command and control, effective 

suppressive fire, adequate supply, and exact landing in 

the designated area. 

By 1970, the concept of helicopter assault had become 

firmly entrenched in the lexicon of suitable airborne 

techniques. In the wide range of missions allocated to 

airborne forces, all that remained to be decided was which 

precise functions aircraft and helicopters would perform 

across the spectrum of airborne combat. In 1970, Col. A. 

A. Sidorenko’s The Offensive articulated the tasks each 

type of force would perrorm. Writing in the context of 

151 
nuclear war, Sidorenko outlined the by now classic 

portrayal of the stages of nuclear war, adhering to 

Sokolovsky's general concepts. General airborne troops, using modern transport aviation and equipped with new 

weaponry, could perform the following basic missions in 

the enemy rear: destroy enemy nuclear delivery means; 

secure important areas and objectives; complete the utter 

defeat of enemy forces subjected to nuclear strikes; 

assist the attacking troops in overcoming water obstacles, 

mountain passes, and passages from the march; prevent the 

approach of enemy reserves and enemy withdrawal; and 

disrupt control,5Jhe operation of the rear area and troop 

Echoing Reznichenko's Taktika of 1966, Sidorenko 

emphasized the utility of airborne parties working in 

tandem with ground forward detachments. To penetrate an 

enemy defense, airborne forces 

landed from helicopters in the depth of the 

enemy's defense right after nuclear strikes can 

make more rapid use of their results than ground /troops and can capture important areas, junctions of lines of communication, and crossings over 

water obstacles. They can hinder the approach of 

reserves and, thus, facilitate an increased rate 

of the attack.55 

Similarly, helicopter-lifted forces could conduct pursuit operations to secure river crossings. 

In addition to forward detachments, tactical 

airborne landing forces can also be employed. Usually they are landed from helicopters on axes 

of operations of forward detachments, advanced 

guards and tank battalions, and regiments. The 

area for the airborne landing is chosen to ensure 

a rapid seizure of crossings and other important 

objectives and the assault crossing of the water 

barrier at high rate.56 

Having dealt with tactical and operational missions, 

Sidorenko addressed accomplishment of diversionary 

missions at all levels of combat: "'The outfitting of 

modern tactical airborne landing forces with powerful 

weaponry and combat equipment permits them to perform 

various missions by raid methods, to make surprise 

assaults on withdrawing and approaching enemy columns, 

control points, and rear service areas, and to cause panic 

in the enemy disposition."57 Moreover, he pointed out 

that World War II had shown that darkness favored 

152 
successful employment of tactical airborne landings, in 

spite of the inherent difficulties of night operations. 

With Sidorenko’s postulations of airborne doctrine, 

Soviet military theorists and planners continued 

throughout the seventies 

theory 

to reform theory and to test the 

in frequent exercises and field training. The 

issue of airborne operations in a conventional 

environment, as well as in a nuclear environment, posed a 

particular challenge: specifically, a means to suppress 

enemy fire in the absence of nuclear strikes on enemy positions. The airborne forces also 

firepower and protection required greater in combat. The fielding of the 

MI-24 helicopter gunship and the BMD airborne combat 

vehicle, in part, solved these problems. 

Foreign assessments detected the changing emphasis of 

Soviet airborne concepts, particularly the 

flexibility of those forces in a potential KrrZ 

environment. Foreign military analysts presumed Soviet 

airborne forces would perform the primary missions of 

“helping ground forces maintain momentum in the attack by dropping to the rear of enemy defenses, possibly capturing or destroying key bridges and other installations and 

independent operations in overseas areas, possibly in 

conjunction with $158 amphibious landings by naval 

infantry. Aircraft-landed 

helicopter- or aircraft-landed paratroopers motorized along with rifle troops trained within a “nuclear battlefield” context in 

lar e-scale operations as part of a general advance or in 

sma f l-scale drops to conduct reconnaissance, capture or 

destroy limited objectives, or inflict sabotage. This 

assessment concluded that battalion-size groups could 

operate up to 160 kilometers in the enemy rear area, 

regimental-size units up to 320 kilometers deep.59 It 

ascribed to airborne forces the mission “to facilitate the 

movement of the ground strike force by seizing bridges and 

fords) capturing airfields for follow-up landings of 

airborne troops and heavy equipment, and carrying out 

sabotage missions against nuclear 

communications facilities.“zgemyThis launching and 

mission had the 

intent of disrupting the enemy’s offensive and defensive 

capabilities. 

Soviet exercises throughout the seventies were 

indicative of the more sophisticated use of airborne 

forces. The largest exercise occurred in March 1970 in 

Belorussia along the Dvina River. Under the direction of 

the airborne troops’ chief of staff, Lt. Gen. P. Pavlenko, 

AN-12 aircraft (and one AN-22) dropped an entire airborne 

division (7,000 men) within twenty-two minutes. Its 

mission was to secure key terrain in the enemy rear and to 

153 
prevent the advance of enemy reserves af.ter a friendly nuclear strike. In June 1971, another airborne division 

participated in Exercise lug. In 1974-75 exercises, the 

new IL-76 and AN-22 aircraft dropped an airborne force 

after a drop of BMD vehicles. The IL-76 appeared again in 

February 1978 in Exercise Berezina in Belorussia. There, 

two battalions of an airborne regiment secured an airstrip for the landing of main force elements in IL-76 aircraft, 

which also carried XI-85 guns.61 of exercises 

The decade-long series 

clearly demonstrated to Soviet military 

theorists the validity of their airborne concepts, and, 

with the new IL-76 with its 5,000-kilometer range, those 

concepts included operations in the strategic realm. 

Since 1976, the scale of aircraft-delivered airborne 

operations has diminished, attesting ‘not only to Soviet 

reluctance to advertise such a clearly offensive weapon, 

but also to a growing Soviet interest in helicopter-landed forces in both the operational and tactical context. The 

proliferation of Soviet articles on helicopter assault 

forces, paralleled by changes in the Soviet force 

structure and weapons, documents this growing belief in 

the utility of such forces.62 

helicopter-landed 

The missions performed by forces are virtually the same as those 

expressed in 1969 I but more often without mention of 

nuclear warfare. In place of nuclear fires, the airborne 

landing force supports itself with its organic fires and 

ultimately with fire from the force advancing to link up from the front (a standard World War II procedure). 

Another mission often mentioned and once performed by parachute landing forces is to support an amphibious landing* 

Force structure changes have accompanied the expanded 

mission of helicopter-landed forces. Large numbers of 

helicopters would deploy at potential wartime fronts, and 

virtually all motorized rifle battalions would be trained 

in an air assault role. The air assault brigade I an 

o erational 

K 

level helicopter assault force introduced at 

t e front level, is a unique organization combining parachute elements with helicopter-lift units.63 The 

brigade’s combat elements consist of two BMD-equipped battalions 

battalion.64 

two parachute battalions, and an artillery 

This organization provides the flexibility 

to operate 

enemy ’ s 

with heavy BMD-equipped forces deep in the 

rear or with lighter parachute troops closer to 

the front lines. The air assault brigade provides the 

front commander a means of supporting either a penetration of enemy defenses or an exploitation into the operational depth of the defense (up to 100 kilometers). So, although helicopter assault forces have claimed a wider role in 

performing airborne missions, that role is commensurate 

154 
with the Soviets’ reassessment of potential wartime combat 

requirements within their current concept of war. And 

helicopter assault forces share that role with more 

traditional airborne forces. 

AS helicopter operations expanded in the 1970s and 

additional helicopters and helicopter air assault units 

appeared in the Soviet force structure, the classic 

airborne division also improved its force structure and 

capabilities. The basic airborne division structure has 

changed little since the early 1960s. While retaining its 

basic triangular configuration (three regiments, each with 

three battalions), the division’s size has diminished 

slightly. The introduction of new equipment, however, has 

markedly improved its firepower and mobility. From a 

strength of more than 7,500, the division has decreased to 

a present strength of about 6,500. Commensurate decreases 

in manpower have occurred at regimental, battalion, and 

company levels as the Soviets have introduced 

combat-fighting vehicles and have rationalized the 

division support structure. 

Although official sources often disagree about the 

exact size and configuration of divisional subunits, some 

general trends have been distinguishable.65 

equipping of the 

The gradual airborne regiments after 1973 with the 

BMD airborne combat vehicle has reduced the re iment’s 

size but has drastically increased its capabi K ity of 

maneuvering to its combat objective. The BMD’s 73-mm 

smoothbore gun and ATGM have improved the regiment’s and 

battalion’s firepower. The new ATOM battery equipped with 

AT-3 Saggers has replaced the older gun antitank battery and further augmented battalion and regimental firepower. 

The BRDM reconnaissance vehicle and new GAZ-69 trucks have 

contributed to greater divisional mobility. Similar 

improvements have occurred in airborne individual weapons 

and automatic weapons. What has emerged from this 

modernizatiou program is a more compact, powerful airborne 

unit that can more flexibly execute missions assigned to 

it by recently articulated doctrine. The modern airborne 

division, side by side with air assault battalions and 

brigades , poses a significantly greater battlefield threat 

than the older classic parachute division. 

The Soviets have constructed airborne forces that can 

be transported into combat by helicopter and aircraft. 

These forces can flexibly perform the wide spectrum of 

tactical, operational, and strategic missions articulated 

since the early 1960s in both a nuclear and a conventional 

environment. Airborne forces can either perform strategic 

missions in support of a theater offensive or perform a 

variety of independent strategic missions. During either 

155 
.: 

day or night, they can conduct operational or d 

missions to support a front offensive 

ivers 

in 

coordination with other front forces, and they can 

out a variety of tactical missions to support offensive operations. 

ionary 

close 

carry 

army 

Strategic forces* will be composed of 

aircraft-delivered units of up to division size employed 

at considerable depths in the enemy rear. Because of the 

relative weakness of airborne divisions, without 

reinforcement by heavier forces, they will be employed 

only in the waning stages of hostilities, after enemy 

theater resistance has crumbled. Then they nil.1 secure 

key administrative, logistical, or communications areas. 

In addition, strategic airborne forces can be used as a 

political tool to “show the flag,“’ demonstrate support for 

a government, or exhibit a “presence“ in a region. 

Smaller airborne groups** will perform a lower level 

strategic mission, that of conducting diversionary 

operations deep in the theater rear e They will attack 

such key targets as nuclear delivery or storage sites, 

command and control facilities, communication centers, 

transportation control centers, and possible wartime seats 

of government. 

Operational airborne forces*** will support front 

operations. They will operate in close coordination with 

other front forces to facilitate achievement of front 

missions, specifically penetration, exploitation, and 

destruction of enemy army group units. Airborne forces 

will operate at depths of 100 to 300 kilometers against 

enemy nuclear delivery means, command and control 

facilities, reserves, logistical facilities, and the rear 

of enemy army group forward defenses. The front air 

assault brigade will operate in tandem with the lead 

elements of the main attack army or the front operational 

group at depths of up to 100 kilometers to assist in 

penetration of the army group defensive zone or in 

exploitation into the army group rear e 66 Once the 

Soviets have penetrated enemy army group defenses, 

regimental or multiregimental airborne assaults will occur 

at depths of up to 300 kilometers to secure major terrain 

features, such as river crossings, or to disrupt enemy 

*Strategicheskii desant (strategic landing force). 

**Desant spetsial’nogo naznacheniya (special landing force). 

***Operativnyi desant (operational landing force). 

156 
attempts to regroup and reestablish new defensive lines. 

Such drops will occur only if warranted by the progress of 

the front offensive and if linkup with advanced ground force elements can occur within two or three days of the 

drop. Elements of airborne divisions will deploy as small 

diversionary teams in support of front operations. These 

teams will attack enemy nuclear delivery means and storage 

areas, command and control installations, and other 

targets, the engagement of which will disrupt enemy army 

group operations. 

Tat t ical airborne forces,* 

assault units, primarily will support army operations. helicopter 

Reinforced 

motorized rifle battalion-size-rhelicopter assault forces 

will support the advance of army and division forward 

detachments. The helicopter-landed forces, 

primarily at night, operating 

landing in 

will destroy enemy covering forces by their rear, preempt the establishment of 

forward defenses or penetrate those defenses by landing within or to the rear of them, and block movement of enemy 

reserves to reinforce or reestablish the forward defense 

by securing key terrain or road junctions in the enemy 

rear .67 Platoon- or company-size helicopter assault 

units can also attack enemy command and control 

nuclear delivery means and 

installations in the army offensive 

set tor . Depths of such tactical missions will be from 20 

to 100 kilometers. Operational or tactical air’borne units 

will also support operations of amphibious forces by securing beachheads or by blocking enemy movements to 

contain or crush an amphibious assault. 

The seventies and eighties have seen Soviet airborne 

forces mature into what the visionaries of the 1930s 

anticipated they could become, namely, a full-fled ed 

vertical dimension of deep battle. They are a credib f e, 

diverse, and survivable force whose capabilities add yet another facet to the concept of combined arms operations. Their existence is the result of years of careful study. 

Evolving technology has enabled military theorists and 

practitioners to realize the fruits of that study and to 

overcome many of the problems that have plagued previous 

airborne forces. A nation whose history should make it 

skeptical of prospects for airborne warfare has overcome 

that skepticism. The Soviets display new confidence in 

the capabilities of their expanded airborne force. 

*Takticheskii desant (tactical landing f,orce). 

157 
CHAPTER 8 

CONCLUSIONS 

Soviet experimentation with airborne operations has 

spanned half a century. That the Soviets would consider 

such a revolutionary military concept was understandable. 

Airborne operations were a natural outgrowth of a greater 

attempt 

warfare. 

to free battle from the fetters of positional Those who developed the concept of deep battle 

to restore the primacy of the offensive to the battlefield 

viewed airborne operations as another dimension of mobile, 

fluid war. Vertical envelopment by airborne forces 

emerged as an adjunct to high-speed mechanized operations intended to strike deeply into enemy rear areas. Tanks, 

mechanized infantry, and airborne forces became the means 

of effecting deep battle. Under the guidance of Marshal 

Tukhachevsky, the theory of deep battle matured and a 

force structure evolved to translate those theories into 

practice. But, although the members of the Soviet High 

Command accepted the utility of the new doctrinal 

concepts, reality weighed against full realization of 

their dreams. 

Lagging technology, underdeveloped resources, and an 

unsophisticated populace were the realities Soviet leaders 

faced. In the thirties, equipment was scarce, 

technological levels were low, and Soviet manpower was 

still rooted in its peasant past. Research, industrial 

development, and education would overcome those problems, 

but only at a cost of precious time. Even if the 

developers of deep battle theory had survived to test and 

improve their theories in war, they might not have fully 

mastered the problems of translating advanced theory into 

practice. Perhaps, at best, their imagination might have 

better adjusted Soviet forces and doctrine to those 

realities. But the purges of the innovators settled the 

issue and sounded the death knell for the prewar Soviet 

army. 

The ambitious plans of the Soviet High Command for 

successfully employing their massive and varied forces in 

battle foundered on the rocks of incompetent leadership, 

inadequate weaponry, and lack of equipment as 

sophisticated as the Soviet force structure. Concepts for 

integrating the combat power of infantry, mechanized, and 

airborne forces were useless in the absence of a sound 

command and control system. Without radios, a refined 

logistics system, or leaders capable of orchestrating the 

actions of large forces, Soviet military concepts became 

159 
mere dreams. In June 1941, the more rehearsed and 

technically competent German army, with its own concepts’ 

of deep battle and the means to realize those concepts, turned Soviet dreams into nightmares. 

Soviet airborne forces escaped the worst effects of 

those nightmares. While Soviet mechanized forces perished and the Soviet ground force structure was shaken to its 

foundations, airborne forces maintained their cohesion and 

survived the harsh first months of war. The opening 

phases of war sucked airborne forces into the cauldron of 

ground combat. 

these forces 

The fact that the Soviet High Command used 

as fire brigades to stem the German tide 

where it rose highest testified to the High Command’s high 

es teem for airborne units. Well 

motivated, and trained, relatively well equipped, the highly airborne 

forces paid a high price for their military competence. By late 1941, when few Soviet units qualified as elite, 

airborne forces still warranted that distinction. So 

when the Bigh Command mustered its forces to strike back 

at the Germans outside Moscow, airborne forces were thrown 

into action. 

airborne 

The desperate forces 

battle of January 1942 drew 

ten ter stage. In a threadbare and 

imperfect attempt to realize offensive deep battle, the 

High Command committed airborne forces to combat in tandem 

with cavalry units, seasoned divisions from Soviet Asia, 

and exhausted survivors of the summer and autumn campaigns. 

The airborne operations in the winter of 1942 were an 

adjunct to the surging efforts of the Soviet High Command 

to crush an overextended and’ exhausted German Wehrmacht. 

Lightly equipped airborne units, from battalion to corps 

size, conducted numerous airborne assaults over 

four-month period in the German rear area in a vail 

attempt to disrupt German defenses, link up with Soviet 

ground forces, and destroy large chunks of German Army 

Group Center. Plagued by poor quantities of transport aircraft; planning; inadequate faulty coordination of 

air, ground, and airborne units; deficient weaponry; and 

the paralyzing cold of a severe winter, the airborne 

forces failed to achieve operational success. The high morale and endurance of the lightly armed units could not 

compensate for the loss of surprise, an element so 

critical for success. As a result, 

became an endurance test. 

airborne operations At stake was the survival of 

the units. Despite heavy costs in lives, airborne forces 

generally passed the test and survived. 

Clearly, the paratroopers the Germans 

had a disconcerting effect 

dO?fficult. 

and made German defensive efforts more 

But however difficult it was for the Germans, 

their defenses held, and Soviet airborne operations failed 
to achieve their primary missions. Again in 1943 on the 

Dnepr River, a hasty Soviet attempt to capitalize on the 

capabilities of airborne forces failed for many of the 

same reasons that 1942 operations had failed. 

On the surface, major Soviet World War II airborne 

operations project an image of abject failure. 

Operational experiences did achieve only limited success, 

and so small was the, success that the Soviets abandoned 

ideas of using large, airborne forces later in the war. 

However, at the same time the Soviets were experiencing failure with large-scale operations, they were achieving 

success with tactical and diversionary airborne 

operations. Experience, whether good or bad, has been and 

still is for the Soviets a vehicle for education and 

im rovement. The bitter 

19 % 2-43 

airborne force experiences of 

were not merely noted and forgotten. The Soviets 

studied and evaluated them just as they did the other 

combat failures of 1941-42. That study rendered failure 

useful as an analytical tool to build a force and a 

doctrine that could succeed in battle. Soviet study of 

World War II airborne experiences focused on the major operational failures around Moscow and on the Dnepr. It 

also surveyed the other tactical and diversionary 

operations conducted throughout the war. That study paved 

the way for sounder theory and practice in the future. 

The war pointed out those elements necessary for 

successful operational airborne assaults and created in 

the Soviets a resolve to address those necessities in the 

future. Study of war experience also evidenced the 

success of airborne forces in the tactical and 

diversionary realm, and, to this day, the Soviets have 

capitalized on building forces to exploit that dimension 

of battle. 

In the immediate postwar period, the Soviets built a 

formidable airborne force and refined their airborne 

doctrine in light of wart ime experiences. Al though 

airborne forces had a distinct place in the operational and tactical scheme, that place was a modest one. The 

corn lexity 

li!l 

of airborne operations, the vulnerability of 

air orne forces in high-intensity mechanized warfare, the 

limited delivery capability of transport aircraft, and the 

restricted mobility of airborne forces dictated that 

airborne units perform only modest missions in close 

coordination with ground forces. 

The “revolution in military affairs” and improved 

Soviet technology resulted in a reemphasis on airborne 

warfare in the 1960s. The projection of nuclear firepower 

onto the battlefield spelled an end to dense combat 

161 
formations, tight multiple echelons, and 

defenses arrayed in contiguous Nuclear 

fragmented great depth. weapons combat and forced potential combatants to 

disperse their forces and to resort to mobility and speed 

to achieve operational and tactical success. If nuclear 

strikes could rupture and fragment defenses, then airborne 

forces could again operate at great depth with less fear 

of inevitable destruction. Airborne forces became a 

useful adjunct to high-speed armored and mechanized forces 

ex loiting de P enses. the effects of nuclear fires deep into enemy 

Advances in technology increased the firepower and 

mobility 

battle, 

of airborne forces and their survivability in 

whether nuclear or conventional. 

of adequate transport means, 

The development 

fire helicopters for transport and 

support, air-transportable assault guns, airborne 

combat vehicles) light surface-to-air missiles, and 

improved communications equipment unfettered airborne 

forces. New types of airborne forces evolved, and the 

helicopter emerged as a versatile means for projecting airborne combat power. 

Soviet airborne forces are structured to perform a 

multitude of missions to support offensive operations at 

any level e They are a flexible element of the Soviet 

combined arms structure. The Soviets have 

studied intensely the historical employment of such forces in 

combat. They understand the strengths and limitations of 

such forces, and they will use 

practical terms, 

them judiciously. In 

the Soviets place the greatest faith in 

the use of airborne troops at the tactical and operational 

levels. In the words of General of the Army V. Margelov: 

NOW airborne forces are equipped with the most 

perfect means of waging combat. Perhaps in no 

other type of force is there concentrated such a 

variety of arms and equipment. Soviet airborne 

forces can appear in the enemy rear, having at 

their disposal all that is essential for the 

conduct of battle (operations) ; they are also 

able to perform large strategic missions in 

contemporary combat.1 

162 
NOTES 

Chapter 1 

1. For a brief survey of Frunze’s work and thought, see 

Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklo edi a 

encyclopedia], 8 342-45 me- citksdovi~~ SVmEf~ftar~ 

selection of his writings is in Voprosy str?iGgii i 

operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikx voennykh trudakh 

Izdatel’stvo, 1965). 

2. V. Matsulenko, “Razvitie taktiki nastupatel’nogo boya” 

[The development of tactics of offensive battle], 

Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military history journal], 

February 1968: 28-29 (hereafter cited as VIZh). 

3. N. Ramanichev, “Razvitie teorii i praktiki boevogo 

pr imeneniya vozdushno-desantnykh voisk v mezhvoennyi 

period” [The development of the theory and practice of the 

combat use of airlanding forces 

VIZh, October 1982:72-77. 

in the interwar period], 

4. Ibid. 

5. 

[Airlar!ding 

I. Lisov, Desantniki --vozduzhnye desanty 

troops --airlandings] (Moskva: Voennoe 

Izdatel’stvo, 1968)) 8-12. 

6. Ibid., 11. 

7. Ramanichev, “Razvitie teorii,” 73. 

8. D. S. Sukhorukov, ed., Sovetskie 

[Soviet airlanding forces] (Moskva: 

vozdushno-desantnye 

Voennoe Izdatel stvo, 

1980), 11; Lisov, Desantniki, 14-15. 

9. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 12. 

10. Lisov, Desantniki, 20. 

11. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 13. 

12, Lisov, Desantniki, 20-22. 

13. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 13-14; Ramanichev, 

“Razvitie teorii,“’ 73. 

14. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 14. 

163 
15. I. Korotkov, “Voprosy obshchei taktiki v sovetskoi 

voennoi istoriografii (1918-194kgg)” [Questions of general 

tactics in Soviet military historiography] s VIZh, December 

X977:88; Ramanichev, “Razvitie teorii,’ 73. 

16. Ramanichev, “‘Razvitie teorii,” 73. 

17. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 15. 

18. Voprosy strategii, 122. 

19. Ramanichev I “Razvitie teorii,” 74. 

20, Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno; 34; LPSOV, 

Desantniki, 22. In 1935, the br iga received 

honorific name Kirov Brigade 

the 

in memory of the Leningrad Communist party chief murdered in 1934. 

21. Ramanichev’ “Razvitie teorii,” 75. 

22. Ibid.’ 74. The course stressed such 

parachute training, topics as 

landing and combined 

operations after landing, techniques, including regrouping for combat, 

maneuvers, raids on objectives, and techniques for 

accomplishing typical missions. 

23. I. I. Lisov, 

1967) ,- 

Soviet Airborne Forces (Hoskva: DOSAAF , 5-10, translated from the Russian title, Sovetskie 

vozdushno-desantnye voiska, 

1969. Today’ by the Techtran Corporation in 

DOSAAF (All Union Voluntary Society for 

Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy) performs the 

same function. - _ 

24. Ramanichev, ‘“Razvitie teorii,” 74-75. 

25. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 39. 

26. Ramanichev, ‘“Razvitie teorii,” 75-76. 

27, Ibid., 76; Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 40. The 

parachute regiments were created from airborne troops of 

airborne brigades and airborne battalions. The two rifle 

regiments were the 43d and 90th of the 59th Rifle 

Division. A detailed English language description of the 

exercise is in A. Yeremenko, The Arduous 

(Moscow: Progress Publishers, h966), 8-10. 

Beginning 

28. John .Weeks, The Airborne Soldier (Poole, Dorset, 

England: Blandford Press, 1982) 1 19 . 

29. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 41-42. 

30. Ibid. 

164 
31. Ramanichev, "Razvitie teorii," 77. 

32. Korotkov, "Voprosy obshchei,"' 89. 

33. v. Daines, "Razvitie taktiki 

nastupatel'nogo obshchevoiskovogo boya v 1929-194lgg" [The development of 

tactics of combined arms offensive battle in 1929-19413, 

VIZh, October 1978:96. 

34. 

regulation Vremen->--!d Army] (Moskva: 

olevoi ustav RKKA (PU-331 [Temporary field 

Voennoe 

Izdatel'stvo, 1936), para. 7. 

35. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 35-36. -- 

36. Ibid. 

37. Yeremenko, Arduous BeginninA, 24-39. 

38. Weeks, Airborne Soldier, 18-26. 

39. Ibid., 20. 

40. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 47-48. For details 

on Khalkhin-Go1 action, see G. Shelakhov and G. Plotnikov, 

"Razgrom yaponskikh zakhvatchikov na reke Khalkhin-Gal" 

[Destruction of Japanese invaders on the Khalkhin-Go1 

River], VIZh, August 1969:31-41; P. A. Zhilin, ed., Pobeda 

na reke Khalkhin-Go1 [Victory on the Khalkhin-Go1 River1 

Ffoskva:Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1981); Edward J. Drea, 

Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939, 

Leavenworth Papers noTort Leavenworth, KS: Combat 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, January 1981). 

41. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 49-50; Lisov, 

Desantniki, 31-32. 

42. V. Kostylev, "Stanovlenie i razvitie vozdushnodesantnykh voisk" [The growth and development of airborne 

forces], VIZh, September 1975:82. 

43. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 50. 

44. Lisov, Desantniki, 37-38. 

45. The 201st, 204th, and 214th Airborne brigades were 

stationed in European Russia; the 202d, 211th, and 212th 

Airborne brigades in the Far East. In 1940, the 211th and 

212th brigades moved to the Ukraine. The 202d Airborne 

Brigade remained at Khabarovsk until March 1944, when it 

moved to Moscow. Ibid., 38. 

165 

-- 
46 V. 

blitzkrieg] 

A. Anfilov, Proval "Blitskr~ga" [The failure of 

(Moskva: Izdatel'stvo Nauka,'" 1971), 123; 

Lisov, Desantniki, 38-39. 

47‘ Kostylev, "'Stanovlenie,"' 82. The airborne 

consisted of the following brigades: corps 

Location Airborne Corps Airborne BrQades 

Pre-Baltic MD 5th 9th, lOth, 201st 

Western Special MD 4th 7th, 8th, 214th 

Kiev Special MD 1st lst, 204th, 211th 

Kharkov MD Zd, 3d, 4th Odessa MD 3": 5th, 6th, 212th 

48. Ibid. 

49. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 51. An airborne 

variant of the ps--84>- have permitted dropping twenty-five men from side doors and dropping equipment through a cargo door. 

Chapter 2 

ii: P. 

For a candid view of Soviet readiness in 1941, see 

Ivanov, ed., Nachal'nyi period of war] (Moskva: 

especially V. Petrov, June 22, 1941: 

and the German 

V-Press) 

Invasiomiumbia: University of: South 

1968) , with its translation of and 

commentary on A. M. Nekrich's 1941-:::<) iyunya [June 

1941-421 (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," . 

2. General I. S. Be&ugly, commander, 5th Airborne Corps; General A. I. Rodimtsev, commander, 5th Airborne Brigade; General A. S. Zhadov, commander, 4th Airborne Corps. Foxy 

Rodimtsev's and Zhadov's airborne experiences, see A. I. 

Rodimtsev, 

(Kiev: 

Tvoi otechestvo, syny [Your fatherland, sons] 

Izdatel'stvo noliticheskoi literatury, 1974); and 

A. S. Zhadov, (Moskva: Chetyie goda voiny [Four years of. war] 

Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1978). 

3. Kostylev, "Stanovlenie," 82. 

4. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 53-54. 

5. Zhadov, .Ch;tyre, 14-18. By 7 July, the 7th and 8th 

Airborne brrga es had shrunk to 1,000 or 1,100 men each 

and fifteen 45-mm guns. 

166 
6. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 54-69 ; Rodimtsev, 

Troi otechestvo, E-16/ By late September, 

5tbAirborne Brigade had only about 500 men, 

Rodimtsev's 

twenty heavy z;;iine guns, and twenty-five light machine guns. See 

I. Samchuk, 

Guards] (Moskva: Trinadtsataya Gvardeiskaya 3[T?iirteenth 

Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 19/l) . 

7. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 83. 

8. Lisov, Desantniki, 39. 

9. Kostylev, "Stanovlenie," 82. 

Morozov, 39- a Barvenkos 

Voennoe Iz +T ate 

of one of those divisions. _. 

10. Sukhorukov. Sovetskie vozdushno, 146-79. 

vskaya [39th Barvenkovo] (M:skv:; 

stvo, 1971'). 3-5. relates the experiences * 

11. Ibid., 161. 

12. See also Rodimtsev, Troi otechestvo, 337-48; and 

Vasilii Ivanovich Chuikov, TheEtle for Stalingrad (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964). 

13. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 180-81. 

14. Ibid., 181-84. 

15. Lisov, Desantniki, 183. 

16. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 226. 

17. Ibid., 238. 

18. -Ibid., 238-39. 

19. G. P. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty vo vtoroi mirovoi 

voine [Airlandings in the Second World War1 (Moskva: 

moe Izdatel'stvo, 1962), 12. 

20. Polevoi ustav krasnoi armii (PU-44) [Field regulations of the Red ArmyJ (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 

1944), 20-21. 

21. Ibid., 21. 

22. Ibid., 84-85, 157. 

167 

-- ~--- -~ 
Chapter 3 

1. Albert Seaton, The Battle for Moscow (Ro,ckville, NY: 

Playboy Press, 1980), ---.- 240-5K 

2, Chales de Beaulieu, et al., '"Die Operationen der 4. 

Panzerarmee im Feldzug gege* die Sowjetunion" [The 

op,erations of the 4th Panzer Army in the campaign against 

the Soviet Union], Foreign Military Studies MS no. P-206, 

Phase C, vol. 2, 68-90, reproduced by U.S. Army, Europe, 

1959 (hereafter cited as MS no. P-206). 

3. Franz Balder, The Halder Diaries: The Private War 

Journals of Colonel General Franz-alder (Bourn CO: 

Westview Press, 1976), 2437 

4. Ibid, I 244-46. 

5. Seaton, Battle, 209-11. 

6. V. D. Sokolovsky, Razgrom nemetsko-fashistskikh voisk 

od 

% 

moskv;AskJihe defeat oIfidayer;4asn;Foascist forces -at 

QSCQW 1 c : Voennoe , 1964)) 307-10. 

Also, see‘ Georgii Konstantinovich Zbukov, The Memoirs of 

Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971), 352-53. 

7. A. Vasilevsky, Delo vsei zhizni [Life's work] 

(Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1975), 

201. 

8. K, Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau [The turning 6 

oint 

at Moscow] (Stuttgart: Deutsche-ags-Anstalt, L 721, 

243-55, Skizze 6. 

9. MS no. P-206, X04-23; M. Gareis, Kampf und Ende der 

frankisch-sudeten deutschen 98. Division [The combat and 

end f the 

(Teger:see, 

Frankish-Sudeten German 98th Division] 

Federal RepubLic of Germany: Gareis, 1956); 

199-201; Walter Friedrich Poppe, "Winter Campaign 

194l-42: Campaign of the 255th Infantry Division East and 

West of Temkino, Mid-December 1941 to April 1942,"' Foreign Military Studies MS no. D-184, l-12, reproduced by the 

Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947. 

LO. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 85-86. Much of the 

operational and tactical detail of 8th Airborne Brigade 

operations and subsequent 4th Airborne Corps operations is 

in Sukhorukov's and Lisov's work and in A. Lukashenko, 

vozdushnogo !ii%2FF (Moskva I 

desanta [The paths of airborne 

Moskovskii Rabochii, 1971). Henceforth, 

footnotes will highlight unusual facts or information 

168 
gleaned from other sources. For a general outline of the 

Vyaz’ma airborne operations in their operational context, 

see SVE, 2:445-46. 

covered in N. F. 

The partisan role in the operations is 

Yudin, Pervaya partizanska a [The First 

Partisan (Regiment)] (Moskva: Moskovskii RaToc YT, ii, 1983). 

11. For details on coordination of air and airborne 

forces, see A. Fedorov, Aviatsi a v bitve pod Moskvoi 

[Aviation in the battle of _I_-- Moscow 5-- moskva: Izdatel’stvo 

“Nauka, ” 1971)) 230-44. 

12. Lisov, Desantniki, 95. 

13. MS no. P-206, Phase D, vol. 1, 32-48; Panzer-Armee 

oberkommando 4/la, Kar tenlagen zum Kr iegstagebuch, Nr 7-8 

(Moskau) , 24-29 January 1942 

-(hereaFter cited as NAM) T31>, 

National Archives Microfikm 

roll 348. Subsequent 4th 

Panzer Army unit positions shown on maps in the text are 

from this source, which covers the period 7 December 

1941-26 April 1942. 

14. Lisov, Desantniki, 96. 

15. D. Sukhorukov, “Vozdushno-desantnye voiska” [Airlanding forces], VIZh, January 1982:40. 

16. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty, 20. 

17. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vo_zdushno, 86-87. - 

18. Sofronov, Vozdushn e desanty, 19. 

d-- 

A single lift of 

the airborne force wou have taken 550 to 600 aircraft. 

See Lisov, Desantniki, 100. 

19. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 87. 

20. MS no. P-206, Phase D, vol. 1, 40-42. German 

after-action reports confirmed the Soviet accounts. See 

Generalkommando-V AK Abt la/lc, Die Luftlandet 

Roten Armee, 25 March 1942, 12-16 NAM-14 

See also 5. Panzer Division/lc, ?atigskeitsb’e 

21. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 88. For details on 

Captain Karnaukhov’s initial operations, see Lisov, 

Desantniki, 103-6. 

22. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty, 20. 

169 
23. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie 89-90. Twelve 

aircraft were --,- 

down, damage- ant re, two were shot 

seven required repairs, 

a mission. 

and one disappeared while on 

24. Ibid., 90. Onufriev brought with him 174 rifles, 129 

automatic weapons, nine antitank rifles, 

machine pistols, twenty-two 

twenty 82-mm mortars, five 50-mm mortars, 

and one radio station. 

25. Ibid., 92-463. 

26. Balder, Diaries, 262. 

27. Ibid., 263. 

28. MS no. P-206, Phase D, vol. 1, 41. 

29. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 91. Sofrmovr 

Vozdushnye desanty, 20, claims that 2,328 men of 8th 

Brigade landed. 

30. For Belov's operation during this time, see P. A. 

Belov, Za nami Moskva [Behind us Moscow] (Moskva: Voennoe 

Izdatel-stvo, 1963) 177-219; 

boi'ba v 

and P. A. 

'"Pyatimesyachnaya 

Belov, 

tylu vraga If [A five-month 

struggle in the enemy rear area], VIZh, 

1962:55-75. August 

see N. 

For operations of Soldatov's 2m Regiment, Soldatov and A. Korol'chenko, "Znamenskii desant" 

[Znamenka airlandingf, VIZh, December 1972~72-74. 

31. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 204-7, 

32. H. Reinhardt, "Russian Air Landings in Area of German 

Army Group Center,"" in %.ussian Airborne Operations,'" Foreign Military Studies MS no. P-116, 17, reproduced by the Historical Division, U.S. Army, Eurape, 1953. 

33. MS no. P-106, Phase D, vol. 1, 120-31. 

34. Lisov, Desantniki, 109. 

35. Ibid.; MS no. P-106, Phase D, vol. 1, 120-28. The 

German 4th Panzer Army estimated Soviet strength in the 

German rear area at 12,000 men and German strength in the 

same area at only 7,000 men. 

36. Ibid., 133. 

37. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 

vozdushno, 96 w 

209-10; Sukhorukov, Sovetskie 

170 
38. MS no. P-106, Phase D, vol. 1, 136. 

39. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 217-19; MS no. P-106, Phase D, 

vol. 1, 152-rThe Germans referred to this encirclement 

operation as the Andrejany Kessel (Andrejany Cauldron). The 5th Panzer Division and 23d Infantry Division (that arrived 24 February) reduced the pocket. The 4th Panzer 

Army claimed 2,380 Soviet soldiers killed and 1,762 

prisoners. MS no. P-116 states that Soviet losses were 

5,000 killed and 700 prisoners. 

Chapter 4 

1. Sokolovsky, Razgrom, 361. 

2. Lisov, Desantniki, 112; Sukhorukov, Sovetskie 

vozdushno, 100. 

3. w. Meyer-Detring, Die 137. Infanterie division im 

Mittelabschnitt der Ostfr[The 13/th In-Fry Division 

in the central sector of the Eastern Front1 (Ansbach, 

Federal Republic of Germany: Georg Gebharht,. 1962); 129-31, 139. For unit disnositions before and after 15 

February, see Heeresgrup*pe Mitte/la, Anlagen zum 

Lagekarten, eigene und Feindlage, 1 

h 1942 NAM T311, roll 225. 

attles' * ' 

An account OT 

Sonderbeilage zum Kriegstii,eb:ih 

Armeeoberkommando 4/h 

Armee lm , Nr 14, Die Kampfe der 4. ersten Krie sjahr gegen f941-June 1942, NAM T312 roll 186. 

die Sowjets, June 

4. Meyer-Detring, 137. Infanterie, 266; F. Hossbach, 

Infanterie im Ostfeldzug 1941-42 [Infantry in the eastern 

campaign] (Osterode, Harz, Fezral Republic of Germany: Verlag Giebel-Oehlschlagel, 1951), 206. 

5. Ibid., 204. 

6. Seaton, Battle, 260-61; 137. 

Infanterie, Meyer-Detring, 134; und 

reinhardt, 

Gareis, Kampf Ende, 208m 

"Russian Air Landings," 9. Detailed German 

order of battle and unit- dispositions are in 

Generalkommando V Ak/la, Lagenkarten zum Kriegstagebuch 2, 

7 February-29 April 1942, NAM T314, roll 252 . 

7. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanu, 22. 

8. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 101. 

9. Ibid. 

171 
10. Sofronov, Vozdushn e desant 23 claims that 6 988 

men had landed- +Tebruaryy' Sukhorukov Sovetkkie 

vozdushno, 102, says the total was 7,373 by 23 February. msantniki, 

joined o-unit%. 114, cites the figure of 1,800 men. who 

11. Reinhardt, "Russian Air Landings," 11; MS no. P-206, 138, states that the 52d Infantry Division reported that 

130 aircraft landed 3,000 paratroopers on 19 and 20 

February. Halder, Diaries, 272, entry for 20 February notes "A Gp Center reports increasing number of 

paratroopers put down behind its lines." The 52d and 98th 

Infantry divisions also confirmed the landing in 52. 

Infanterie Division/la, Kriegstagebuch 6 mit Anlagenband B 

Operationsakteq, 20 February 1942, NAM T315, roll 958; and 

98. Infanterie Division/la, 4, 20 

1942, NAM T315, Kriegstagebuch February roll 1203. 

12. Reinhardt, "Russian Air Landings," 11-13. 

13. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 103. 

14. Reinhardt, "Russian Air Landings," 13. See also 31. 

Infanterie Division/la, Kriegstagebuch 6, Bande I u. II 

mit Anlagenbande 1, 2, 4a, 4b, 4c, und 5 1 January-31 May 942 NAM T315 

DiviLion/la, 

rolls 865-66; 

Anlagenband 3 

and' 34. Infanterie 

zum Kriegstaebuch 4, 1 

January-28 February 1942, NAM T315, roll 877. 

15. Lisov, Desantniki, 118. 

German winter defenses, 

For a thorough treatment of 

see the candid Sbornik Materialov 

po Izucheniyu Opyta Voiny, No. 

LGollectlons of materials 

2, Sentyabr-Oktobr 1942gq fo?-the study of war experience, 

no. 

Izdatef'stvo, 1942) September-October 19421 -(Moskva: * Voennoe 

2-5, translated by U.S. Army, General 

Staff, G2, Eurasian'Branch, Washington, DC. 

16. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 104. 

17. Ibid. 

18. Hossbach, Infanterie, 104. Rear service elements of 

the 31st Infantry Division's 17th, 12th, and 82d Infantry regiments held Pesochnya, Klyuchi, and Dertovaya, respectively. 

19. Lisov, Desantniki, 119 

20. Ibid., 119-22. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 107, 

claims that the Germans lost 6UO men of two Infantry ' 

battalions and a regimental headquarters, as well as fifty 

horses and 200 sleighs. German accounts of Klyuchi battle 

172 
are in 31. Infanterie Division/la, Kriegstagebuch 6, Bande 

;6,u.’ 11, report of I/AR67, 2 March-5 

German strength is given as 435 men’. 

toll 

German ‘losses 

are reported as 1c killed: 34 wounded, 2 missing, and 559 

horses lost. The Germans suffered additional losses at 

Malyshevka and during the retreat from Klyuchi, but 

nowhere near the 600 claimed by the Soviets. The Germans 

reported 83 Soviets dead. 

21. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 107. 

22. Reinhard t , “Russian Air Landings,” 15. 

23. Ibid., 108. 

24. Ibid., 108-10, covers subsequent operations against 

Malyshevka. The German garrison unit was identified as 

the 82d Infantry Regiment, 31st Infantry Division. 

, z5Hirc;b;:42 14 , See also Generalkommando XL111 “: 

Ko; sbefehi’ Nr 121 8 March 1942, and Korpsbefehl Nr 122 , NAM T315, roll 1381. 

26. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 108-10; Reinhardt, 

“Russian Air Lani~ 15. Reinhardt confirms 4th 

Airborne problems: “The behavior of the airborne troops 

itself seemed obscure and changeable. Sometimes the 

prisoners stated that the captured villages were merely to 

be held until the Tenth Army [50th Army] crossed the 

Rollbahn from the south, and sometimes that a breakthrough 

across the Rollbahn was planned. airborne force did not 

It appeared that the 

have any artillery or heavy 

weapons, and that its striking power was limited.” 

27. Lisov. Desantniki. 126-27. The Germans committed two 

regiments of the 13lst’Infantry Division (1,100 men). The 

remaining regiment was commiited farther north against 

Soviet 33d Army’s Group Yefremov. Reinhardt, “Russian Air 

Landings,” 16. Details 

onerations are in l&n. 

131st Infantry Division 

Inf anter ie Division/la, 

Kiiegstagebuch 6 mit Anlagen, 6 March-16 June 1942, NAM 

T315, roll 1381. 

28. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 111-12. See also 

34. Infanterie Division/la, Anlagenband 1 zum Kriegstagebuch 5, Teil 1, 1 March-31, July 1942, NAM T315, roll . 

29. Reinhardt, “Russian Air Landings,” 16, comments on 

the airborne defenses: “With difficulty, it [131st 

Infantry Division] plowed a way through the snow and 

attacked one village after the other. There were 

173 
reverses ; the air landing forces were composed of the very best type ,of Russian infantry. They had ample machine 

guns t mortars, and automatic rifles. The German reports 

laid particular stress on the fact that thesemaf;;ces we;; 

trained marksmen. Installed in trenches 

banked-up snow, they defended tenaciously the viy?ages they had captured." 

30. Lisov, Desantniki, 127-28. 

31. Ibid., 131. 

32. The Germans called the operation against encircled 

33d Army the Droshino Kessel (Droshino Cauldron). 

Reduction of the cauldron is described in MS no. P-206, 

Phase D, vol. 1, 170-78, 198-201; and Reinhardt, "Russian 

Air Landings," 21. In Halder, Diaries, 21, the entry for 

16 April reads, "Russian Thirty-thTrd Army has been 

liquidated." For descriptions of Soviet attempts to 

relieve 33d Army, see Belo;, Za nami Moskva, 225-29; A. P. 

Beloborodov, Vsegda v boiu [Always in battle] (Moskva: 

Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, lm 163-71; and P. A. Kuznetsov, 

Gvardeits --Moskvichi 

-53 

[Guardsmen --Muscovites] (Moskva: 

Voennoe Iz atel'stvo, 1962), 163-71. 

33, Belov, Za nami Moskva, 222-23. 

34. Rei,nhardt, "Russian Air Landings," 18-19, confirms 

Belov's position on 18 March: "Under this [German] 

pressure Cavalry corps Belov again drew south and 

apparently tried to establish contact with the airborne 

corps. In doing so it encountered the small German Group 

Haase at the railroad bridge over the Ugra. This group 

had been cut off since the end of February and was being supplied from the air. On 18 March the main body of the 

Russian Cavalry Corps was situated on both sides of the 

Vyazma-Kiev road and directly north of the Ugra. On this 

day for the first time radio communications between the 

Russian cavalry corps and the airborne corps were 

intercepted." Belov's attempt to rescue 33d Army began on the night of 27 March, but, by 14 April, it had failed. 

Belov, Za nami Moskva., 226-27; Reinhardt, "Russian Air 

Landings," 20-21, notes Belov's attempted rescue. 

Sukhorukov, 

i&kva, 228-29. 

Sovetskie vozdushno, 116; Belov, Za nami 

36. Lisov, Desantniki, 132. 

) 37. For details on the relief of Group Haase, see 131. 

;enTy;te Division/la, Kriegstagebueh 6, 6-10 March 1942, , roll 1381. The 82d Infantry Regiment effected 

174 
the relief. Halder, Diaries, 296, notes the relief on 10 

April: “Relief forces have battled through to Combat 

Group Waase, which will be taken back.” 

38. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 229-31. 

39. Zhukov smoothed over his relations with Belov. See 

Zhukov, Memoirs, 356-58. 

40. Halder, Diaries, 297-98, 

50th Army attack preparations: entry for 12 April notes 

“On XXXX Corps front 

apparently preparations for an attack (two new divs.; 

tanks brought up) .” The entry for the next day mentions: 

“Heavy attacks against Fourth Army and XXXX Corps and XII 

Corps.” Some details concerning 

are in A. A. Andreev 

50th Army’s attack plan 

roads ] (Moskva: Voen;loePOI~~~~~~~s~~,~~~~~ LA$g military 

41. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 118-19. 

42. Lisov, Desantniki, 134. Details on the German 

defense are in 131 

buch 6, 13-25 April 19’42. 

Infanterie Division, Kriegstage43. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 231-32. 

44. Halder, Diaries, 298-99, notes 

attacks on 40th Corps 

the heavy Soviet 

return of “quiet” 

in the Milyratino sector and the 

by the eighteenth. See also Reinhardt, 

“Russian Air Landings, ” 22. 

45. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 119; A. A. 

Yaroshenko, V boi shla 41 y gvardeiskaya [Into battle 

went the 41st Guards1 (Misakva: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 

1982), 4. 

46. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 119. 

47. Halder , Diaries, 301, entry for 22 April states: “In 

Fourth Army sector’ the enemy attack at Fomino was 

repelled. ” Halder mentions no heavy activity in his 

entries for 23-24 April. 

48. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 120; also noted by Halder, Diar ies, 3Dl. 

49. Lisov, Desantniki, 137. 

50. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 283. 

51. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 121. For details on 

Operation Hannover, see Reinhardt, “Russian Air Landings,” 

175 
'22; Armeeoberkommando 4/h Lagekarten, Anlagen zum 

Kriegstaebuch, Nr 12, April-May 1942 NAM T312, roll 183; 

'and 131. Infanterie Division/la. [Renorts. orders. and 

messages], 24 May-l June 1942; NAM- T315, roll '1381. 

Halder, Diaries, 318-20, mentions the operation often, particularly the bad weather and stubborn resistance of 

Belov's force. 

52. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 294-95. 

,53. Lisov, Desantniki, 138-39. 

54. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 122. 

55. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 297. 

56. Lisov, Desantniki, 139. 

57. Halder, Diaries, 319. 

58. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 123. The two 

airborne brigades also brought with them 131 antitank 

rifles, 48 50-mm mortars, and 184 machine pistols. 

59. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 299. Belov's approximately 

17,000 men included 1 800 from the 4th Guards Airborne 

Corps and 2d Guards Ca'valry Division, 4,000 from the 23d 

and 211th Airborne brigades, 2,000 from the 329th Rifle 

Division and Zhabo's partisan detachment, 4,500 from the 

1st Guards Cavalry Division, and the remainder from 

partisan units with Belov. 

60. Ibid., 301. 

61. Yaroshenko, V boi, 6~14. The 23d Airborne Brigade 

covered the withdrawal of Belov's force by defending against German attacks from the north. From 4 to 6 June, 

the brigade fought severe battles at Volochek, Afonino, 

and Kryakov against the German 11th Panzer and 23d 

Infantry divisions, advancing southwest from Vyaz'ma and 

south from Dorogobuzh. On 7 June, the brigade disengaged from the Germans and covered Belov's withdrawal west of 

Yelnya. 

62. Halder, Diaries, 323, entry for 9 June states: 

Center 

South." reports break-out of Cav Corps Belov to I':,": 

The following day, Halder added: 

Cav Corps Belov is being pursued." 

"The escaped On 11 June, Halder 

sourly noted: "Unluckily, the main body of Belov's Cav. 

Corps and of Fourth Airborne Brig. have escaped south." 

176 
63. The attack across the Warsaw highway is vividly 

portrayed in Belov, Za nami Moskva, 308-10. Both Lisov, 

Desantniki, 143, and Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 125, 

play down Soviet difficulty in croxing the highway. 

64. Ha lder , Diaries , 327-28. Diary entries 

recount Belov’s epic succinctly 

escape. On 16 June, Halder wrote: 

“Cav Corps Belov has again broken out and is moving in the 

direction of Kirov. Nothing that we could brag about. ” 

The following day, he recorded his final diary entry on 

Belov, noting with a touch of respect: “Cav Corps Belov 

is now floating around the area west of Kirov. Quite a 

man, that we have to send no less than seven divisions 

after him.” 

65. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno_, 126-27. 

66. On 24 June, Belov flew back to 10th Army headquarters in a U-2 light aircraft that landed in the partisan-held 

territory. Belov, Za nami Moskva, 320. Gunther 

Blumentritt, “Operations Against Rear Lines of 

Communications ,I’ Foreign Military Studies MS no. B-684, 

6-7, reproduced by the Historical Division, U.S. Army, Europe, 1947. The former chief of staff of 4th Army wrote: 

General Belov who played a tragic-comic role and 

showed great daring in 1941-42 should be 

mentioned here. This Russian cavalry general 

crossed the Oka River in December near Farussa 

and Aleksin. By Chr is tmas 1941 his cavalry 

troops and infantry on sleds had advanced as far 

as Yukhnov, deep in the rear of Fourth Army. It 

had been thought that he would cut the R_ollbahn. 

However, for some reason he refrained from doing 

that. He crossed this road and disappeared in 

the swampy forests near Borodoritskoye. There he 

joined forces with partisans and airborne troops 

and constantly harassed the Fourth Army rear 

area. How he managed to obtain supplies was a 

mystery to us. He fought in this manner until 

May 1942. Only Russians and Russian horses can 

exist _ on absolutely “nothing.” Nobody was able 

to catch him. German forces in the rear areas 

were too weak and not suited for that type of 

Indian warfare in the wintry forests. Only 

during May the entire forest area . . . was 

crossed by combat patrols from all sides. Parts 

of several divisions, including some motorized 

177 
units, were employed for this task. But Belov 

escaped with his forces time and again. In May 1942 he was finally cornered in the woods west of 

Spas-Demensk, but he broke through our lines with 

about 4,000 cavalry troops, galloped toward south 

across the Rollbahn, and disappeared again in the 

forests east of Roslavl; from there he slowly moved eastward via Kirov and, avoiding the German 

security lines, 

lines. escaped behind the Russian front 

This episode caused many humorous remarks 

at the time and the motorized troops which had 

taken part in the operation became the butt of 

these jokes. I admired General Belov as a 

soldier and I was secretly glad that he had 

escaped. It was said that he was received with 

all honors in Moscow, and rightfully so. 

The boundless endurance of Russian men and 

horses who led a Spartan existence for 5 months 

during a hard winter in those forests is 

typical. Orders to Belov were transmitted from 

Moscow by radio or liaison planes. 

67. Reinhardt, “Russian Air Landings, ” 26-27. 

68. Ibid. 

69. MS no. B-684, 5-8. Although Blumentritt uses the 

Soviet example to point out that “war against rear lines 

Of communications can be very effective even on the 

ground, “ he believes “it will be the air force and armored 

units who are likely to attack the rear area of a modern 

army successfully in any future war.” 

70. Reinhardt, “Russian Air Landings, ” 27-28. 

71. Ibid., 28-29. 

72. Sbornik Materialov, 5. -1 

73. Ibid., 6, 8. 

74. Reinhardt, “Russian Air Landings, ‘I’ 25-26. 

75. Ibid 30 The Germans estimated that between 15,000 

and 20,OOb’ Sov’iet airborne forces operated at one time in 

the rear of German 4th and 4th Panzer armies, which was 

close to the actual number. 

178 
Chapter 5 

1. K. S. Moskalenko, Na yugozapadnom na ravlenii [In the 

southwest direction] (Moskva: Vo*el’stvo, 1972), 122. 

2. 

the Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1939-1945 [History of 

Second Wor Id War, 1939-19451 (Moskva: Voennoe 

Izdatel’stvo, 1976)) 7: 212-13 (herea-fter cited as IVMV) . This volume devotes but four lines to the subsequent 

airborne landing. Elements of 51st Guards Tank Brigade, 6th Guards Tank Corps, 3d Guards Tank Army seized a small 

bridgehead at Grigorovka. See A. M. Zvartsev, ed 

gvardeiskaya tankovaya [3d Guards Tank Army] (i3osi% 

Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1982), 95. See a brief synopsis of 

the operation in Ya. P. Samoilenko, “Dneprovskaya 

vozdushno-desantnaya operatsiya 1943” [The airlanding operation, 19431, Dnepr SVE, 3:206-7. 

3. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty, 27. 

4. E. Binder, “Employment of a Russian Parachute Brigade in Bend of the Dnepr Northwest of Kanev,” in “Russian 

Airborne Operations,” Foreign Military Studies MS no. 

P-116, 72, reproduced by the Historical Division, U.S. 

Army, Europe, 1953, confirms this: 

brigade was used in the operations. 

“A Russian parachute 

It had been organized and trained about a year previously in the area south of 

Moscow. Approximately half of the men in the brigade were 

trained parachutists who had on the average made seven to 

ten jumps. The rest of the brigade was composed of men 

from seven regiments all mixed up together. These men had 

not received any parachute training. ’ Binder was chief of 

operations, 19th Panzer Division, at the time of the 

operation. 

5. Ibid., 29; Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 195-96. 

6. Ibid., 195. 

7. Lisov, Desantniki, 158. 

8. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty 28. According to Lisov, 

Desantniki, 159, each airplane would carry twenty men. 

9. Ibid., 160. Each man carried one and one-half units 

of fire. One unit was in a container. 

10. Ibid. 

179 
11. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 197. Zhukov's 

memoirs do not mentime disastrous airdrop. 

12. Lisov, Desantniki, 157. 

13. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 198. 

14. Lisov, Desantniki, 158. 

15. Ibid., 159. 

16. W. K. Nehring, "Employment of Russian Parachute 

Forces in Cherkassy-Kiev Area (24-25 September 1943),'" in 

"Russian Airborne Operations," Foreign Military Studies MS 

t3”i. P-116, 35-55, reproduced by the Historical Division, 

Army, Europe, 1952. Nehring was commanding general of the 24th Panzer Corps at the time of the Soviet 

airborne drop. Paul Care11 Schmidt, Scorched Earth: The 

Russian-German War, 1943-1944 (New York: Ballantine, 

* 01-44 * conflrms Nehrina's account. Sukhorukov, 

Sovetskie vozdushno, . 198, portrays slightly more rapid German deployment. 

17. Ibid; Binder, “Employment," 68-70. 

18. Lisov, Desantniki, 162. 

19. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 199. Germans cite 

1730 as the time the drop began. Nehring, "Employment," 46. 

20. Lisov, Desantniki-, 162-63; Sukhorukov, Sovetskie 

vozdushno, 199; Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty, 31. 

21. Ibid. 

22. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 199. 

23. Nehr ing , "Employment," 46. 

24. Binder, "Employment," 70-71. BinderIs account refers 

primarily to actions of the 19th Panzer Division 

reeannaissance battalion because the division’s main body did not reach the area until 25 September. 

25. Schmidt, Scorched Earth, 407. Nehring, “Employment, ” 

47, 59, states that the bulk of Soviet casualties occurred 

from 24 to 26 September. He noted Soviet parachute dro s 

at Dudari-Gruschevo (200 parachutes), at Shandra (390 

parachutes), at Beresnyagi (400 parachutes), and in the 

region west of Pekari. 

180 
26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 199. 

Lisov, Desantniki, 166. 

Sukhorukov, Sovetskie v_pzdushno, 200. 

Nehr ing, “Employment,” 51-58. 

Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty, 32. 

Lisov, Desantniki, 167-68. 

Sukhor ukov , Sovetskie vozdushno, 200-203. 

Lisov, Desantniki, 171-72. 

Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 203. 

Lisov, Desantniki, 175. 

Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushs, 175-76, 

204-6 ; 

cover details of 

and Lisov, Desantniki, fighting, 11-15 

November. 

37. Lisov, Desantniki, 178. 

38. S. M. Shtemenko, [General staff ’ General’gi shtab v 

Izdatek’stvo, 19&k;n, l:%&. 

war years J (Moskva god’* 

39. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 210. -.a 

40. Nehring, “Employment, ” 56. 

41. Ibid., 58, testifies to Soviet haste: “The Russians 

had not thought over the presumable course of events 

carefully enough; . . . [they] did not brief the main body of their troops on the mission, so that the men are said 

to have believed that they were going on a training flight. “Binder, “Employment, ” 72, states that “the jumps 

came as a surprise. There was no advanced information. 

The Germans did not expect an operation of this sort.” 

42. Lisov, Desantniki, 177. 

43. Nehr ing, “Employment, ” 58. 

44. Ibid., 58-59. 

45. Ibid., 60. 

181 
46. Ibid, 

47. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 209-10. -I____ 

Chapter 6 

1. See Sokolovsky, Razgrom, 206-12, 250-54, for context 

of the operation; the airborne operation is not mentioned. 

2. The operational account is from Lisov, Desantniki, 75-76; and Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 78-79. ---up 

3. Halder, Diaries, 235, entry for 19 December notes the 

growing rear area problem: "The Russians attack during the night and turn up behind our positions at the break of 

daylight." 

4. See Sokalovsky, Razgrom, 317-20; and 

Desantniki, 77. Lisov, 

5. Soldatov and Korol'chenko, "Znamenskii desant," 72. 

The 250th Airborne Regiment was formed in mid-December 

1941 from the 250th Rifle Regiment, 82d Rifle Division, 

from the Trans-Baikal Military District. It had three 

battalions, one artillery battery, one mortar companyr and 

a 45-mm antitank gun platoon. Its 1,425 men were trained 

in night combat in villages and in use of explosives. 

6. MS no. P-206, Phase D, vol. 1, 80-90; Seaton, Battle 

for Moscow, 243; Gareis, Kampf und Ende, 191-94. --- 

7. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty, 14. 

8. Lisov, Desantniki, 77. 

9. Sofronov, 

78-81; MS no. 

14; Lisov, Desantniki, ;01. 1, 82-89. The 4th 

Panzer Army noted on 6 January that Soviet airborne 

forces, identified as the 201st Airborne Brigade, cut the 

Medyn-Shansky Zavod road east of Gireyevo. Unfortunately, the overextended right flank division of 20th Army Corps (267th Infantry) was unable to deal with this threat and 

to reestablish links with 4th Army's 98th Infantry Division, then conducting an 

withdrawal to Medyn. agonizingly slow fighting 

10. Lisov cites the planned SQfronciV, 16, actual figure. gives landed 

of Captain Starchak's 

battalian is covered in Sukhonrukov 

l-37-39; and Lisov, Desantniki, 77-86: 

Sovetskie voz -. 

182 
11. Lisov, Desantniki, 86. 

12. Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 137. Infanterie, ill-TX 248-50; Meyer-Detring, 

13. Gareis, Kampf und Ende, 200-202; "Combat in 

Lothar Rendulic, 

D-106, 6-10, Deep Snow," T?gn Military Studies MS no. 

reproduced by the Historical Division, U.S. 

Army, Europe, 1947. 

Division. 

Rendulic commanded the 52d Infantry 

14. Halder, Diaries, 253. 

15. For context, see Sokolovsky, Razgrom, 345-50. On 

349, he includes a short account of the airborne operation. 

16. Lisov, Desantniki, 87; Gareis, Kampf und Ende, 208; Seaton, Battle for Moscow, 260. German recormonfirm 

that 4th Army rear service, security, and police units 

occupied these locations. A 4th Army police regiment and 

a 98th Infantry Division signal battalion garrisoned Znamenka. Other 98th Infantry Division service units 

garrisoned towns along the Znamenka-Yukhnov road, 

including Klimov Zavod. The 52d Infantry Division rear 

service units occupied towns 

to Vyaz'ma. along the road from Znamenka 

17. Lisov, Desantniki, 87. 

18. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 140; Soldatov and 

Korol'chenko, "Znamenskii desant," /l-72. 

19. Lisov, Desantniki, 88-89. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty, 16, says 452 men landed the first day. 

20. Soldatov and Korol'chenko, "Znamenskii desant," 72. 

About 1,000 partisans cooperated with the paratroopers, but only 800 were armed. 

21. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie v_ozdushno, 141. 

22. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty 16-17; Gareis, und Ende, 208; 98 Infanterie Division/la, Kampf 

buch 4 

Januar;, 

15 January-'5 March 1942. KrieFs;;!;; On the night o 

observed 

98th Infantry Division antitank and signal units 

a portion of the airlanding operation. They reported parachute jumps on 20 January near Klimov Zavod 

and larger airlandings on the night of 20-21 January near 

Voronovo (not shown on maps but presumed to be south of 

Znamenka). In the latter instance, 162 twin-engine aircraft landed on '"brilliantly illuminated" landing strips. 

183 
23. Soldatov and Korol'chenko, "Znamenskii desant," 73. 

24. Gareis, Kampf und Ende, 208-10; Seaton, Battle for 

Moscow, 261; Reinhardt, "Russian Air Landings," I The 98thnfantry Division reported combat with the airborne 

force near Znamenka on 29 January and, later, further 

north at Chodnevo (Khodnevo), Petrovo, and Mikaeli 

(Mikhali). Only by 2 February had the division succeeded 

in relieving the surrounded garrisons in its rear service 

area. 

25. Soldatov and Korol'chenko, "Znamenskii desant,"' 74. 

2Lnm Ibid., 74. Soldatov's force was equipped with two 

antitank guns, thirty-four mortars (including ineffective TO-mm), and eleven antitank rifles. 

7-8 (Moskau), 

IVM& 4'3;;; sepean?a;;z 

n zum Kriegstagebuch, Nr -- 

28. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 143. 

29. Ibid.; and Lisov, Desantniki, 91, claim that 400 men 

made the drop. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desanty 26-27 

states that 75 men returned to the airdrome, '312 weri 

dropped, and 38 fell into Soviet lines. Only 166 men of 

the 312 dropped made it into the 29th Army area. The 

details of combat are in Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 143-44. 

30. IVMV, 4:295-99. 

31. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdusyno, 81. Erich von 

Estein* 

Lost Victories (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1958), claims that only the 46th Infantry Division, a 

regiment of the 73d Infantry Division, and elements of the 

Rumanian Mountain Corps were available to resist the 

Soviets the first two days. D. D. Kodola, "Kerchensko-Feodosiiskaya desantnaya operatsiya X941-42" 

iKer;hi;eodosiya landing operation, 1941-423, g,g, 

: states that German strength on the peninsula included' the 46th Infantry Division, a Rumanian cavalry brigade, two tank battalions, two artillery regiments, and 

five antiaircraft battalions. 

32. Sofronov, Vozdushnye desan.ty, 37. 

33. Lisov, Desantniki, 184. 

184 
34. Ibid., 186. 

35. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno_, 59. 

36. For a detailed account, see N. Krylov, Glory Eternal 

(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972)) 237-67. 

37. Halder, Diaries, 116-23, entry for 22 September reads: “At Odessa, the Romanians are making no headway.” The entry for the following day notes that “Romanian 

reverses before Odessa are inconvenient.” On 26 

September, General Hauffe of the German Army Mission to 

Rumania repor ted “the Romanians cannot get Odessa by themselves” and passed to Halder a request for German 

assistance. 

38. Lisov, Desantniki, 187-89. 

39. Ibid., 191-98. More detail is in L. N. Vnotchenko, Pobeda na dal’nem vostoke -- [Victory in the Far East] (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1971), 279-84. 

Chapter 7 

1. Stalin defined the “Permanent Operating Factors” as 

stability of the home front, morale of the armed forces, 

quantity and quality of divisions, armament, and the 

ability of commanders. 

2. Yu. Kostin, “Air Landings in Contemporary Operations ,‘I Voennaya Mysl’ 

bY 

[Military thought], August 1946, translated 

the U.S. Army General Staff, G2, Eurasian Branch, Washington, DC. The author articulates a wide range of 

tactical, operational, and strategic missions, including disruption of enemy mobilization and strategic concentrations at the beginning of war, seizure of industrial 

regions, creation of new theaters of operations, and 

seizure of islands and beachheads. He concludes: “The 

possibilities of further growth of air transport equipment and long range bomber aviation lay a firm basis for 

employment of air landing troops on such a scale, that 

quite possibly further changes in the form of present day military operations may be necessary.” 

3. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 263. 

4. The guards airborne division resembled a light rifle 

division and probably contained the following elements: 

185 
Guards airborne rifle division (about 7 .-L ~~0 men): 

1 parachute regiment 3 parachute battalions 

2 parachute-gli er regiments 1 parachute battalion 

2 glider battalions 

1 gun artillery regiment (24x7 1 mortar re iment (24x120- 1 antitank 

1 attery (12x45- reconnaissance company 1 company 1 signal 

engineer company 1 medical company 1 motor transport company 

See U.S. D~Fa~tme~t of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff 

for Intelligence, Operations, Intel 

(Wash ‘i’;;sn, DC, 1 

1982. 

5, Ibid. The airborne corps three guards robably consisted of two or 

e divisions and an air 

division transport three aircraft 

(each with thirty-two aircraft) regiments and 

thirty-two gliders D 

one glider regiment of 

6. P. Pavlenko I “Razvitie 

voisk v 

airlanding ~~~~~voennyi 

taktiki vozdushno-desant~ykb period” [The development of 

tactics 

January 1980: 27. 

in the postwar period], VIZh, 

7. Changing operational formations are addressed in 

M. Glantz, *‘Soviet Qperational Fo~matio. 

Hilitary Review 63 ~~ebruar~ 1983) : 2-12. 

army contained three rifle corps, 

gun regiment, and support unit A mechanized a 

two tank divisions, two mechani d divisions, and 

three rifle divisions, 

a heavy tank self-pr regiment, a 

motorized ri 

consisted of 

a medium tank self-propelled 
8. 

i 

For details, see I. Kh. Bagramyan, ed. 

voennogo iskusstva [History of war and' m%%%$%$ (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1970), 478-87. 

9. Ibid., 481; L. N. Vnotchenko, "Nekotorye voprosy teorii nastupatel'nykh i oboronitel'nykh (1945-1954gg)" operatsii [Some questions on the theory of offensive 

and defensive operations (1945-1953)], VIZh, August 1970:34. 

10. Ibid., 37. 

11. Pavlenko, "Razvitie taktiki," 27. 

12. M. V. Zakharov et al., eds., 50 let vooruzhennykh sil 

SSSP [50 years of the Soviet Armed Forces] (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1968), 489 (hereafter cited as 50 

Let). - 

13. U.S. Department of the Army, Pamphlet no. 30-50-1, 

Handbook on the Soviet Army (Washington, DC, 1958), 33 

xherearter cited as DA Pam 30-50-l). 

14. Ibid. 

15. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 265. 

16. Ibid., 260. 

17. DA Pam 30-50-1, 33. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Ibid., 34. Subsequent U.S. assessments continued to 

categorize Soviet airborne operations as strategic, operational, and tactical. A 1969 assessment incorporated the same verbiage as the 1958 assessment. 

20. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 266; Kostin, "Airlandings," 15-17. - 

21. Lisov, Desantniki, 240, 250-51, 263-64; DA Pam 

30-50-1, 36. 

22. S. A. Tyushkevich et al., eds., Sovetskie 

vooruzhennye sily [The Soviet armed forces] (Koskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1978), 384-88. 

23. Pavlenko, “Razvitie taktiki," 28. 

24. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 264. 

187 

-- 
25. For a clear definition of the nature of the 

“revolution in military affairs,” see R. Ya. Malinovsky, “Revolyutsiya v voennom dele i zadachi voennoi pechati”’ CThe revolution in military affairs and the tasks of 

milk tary writers], Problem * revolyutsi i v voennom dele 

[The problems of the rev0 --% ution in mXi tary af EiEq (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1965), 3-7 (hereafter cited 

as Problemy). 

26. For an excellent statement of Soviet attitudes toward 

nuclear war in the 1954-60 period, see V. A. Semenov I 

Kratkii ocherk razvitiya sovetskogo operativnogo iskusstva 

IA short outline of the development of Soviet operational art] (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1960), 289-97. For 

the post-1960 view, see I. S. Glebov, “Razvitie 

operativnogo iskusstva” [The development of operational 

artI, in Problemy , 133-39. 

27. In March 1953, G. K. Zhukov became first deputy minister of defense. He was minister of defense from 

February 1955 to October 1957, after which R. Ya. 

Malinovsky replaced him. For details on his career, see 

““Zhukov, ” m, 3:345-46, 

28. The new tank army consisted of four tank divisions 

and support units. The motorized rifle division had three 

motorized rifle regiments, a medium tank regiment, and 

support units, for a strength of 13,150 men and 210 tanks. 

29. The combined arms army comprised three or four 

motorized rifle divisions, one tank division, and support units. The tank division consisted of two medium tank 

regiments, a heavy tank regiment, a motorized rifle 

regiment, and support units, for a strength of 10,630 men, 

368 tanks, and fifty-two self-propelled guns. 

30. By 1968, the motorized rifle division had shrunk to 

10,500 men and 188 medium tanks. The tank division’s 

heavy tank regiment had become a third medium tank 

regiment, and the division strength had decreased to 9,000 

men and 316 medium tanks. 

31. v. Margelov’ “Razvitie teorii . . 

vozdushno-desantnykh voisk v poslevoennyi period Prim~ne~;~~ 

development of the theory of the use of airlanding forces 

in the postwar period], VIZh, January 1977:54. 

32. Ibid., 58. 

33. Pavlenko, “Razvitie taktiki,” 28. 

34. Ibid., 27-28. 

188 
35. Margelov, “Razvitie teorii,” 59. 

36. V. G. Reznichenko, sovetskoi taktiki v 

“Osnovnye napravleniya razvitiya basic 

direction poslevoennye gody ” [The of the development of Soviet tactics in the 

postwar years], VIZh, August 1971:35. 

37. Ibid., 36. For details on such use of airborne 

forces, see V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika [Tactics] (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1966), 239-r 

38. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 296. 

of exercises, 

For a good 

survey see R. Oden and F. Steinert, “The 

Soviet Airborne Troops,” Review of the Soviet Ground 

Forces, March 1980:5-12. - - 

39. Sokolovsky, atrate:;] D{Moskva: Voennaya Voennoe “,“,:a,‘,e;iyg6Qf”;li;;gy Izdatel 

translated by the Foreign Technology Division. 

40. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense 

Agency, Intelligence Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces (Washington, DC, July 1969), 457. -- 

41. Ibid., 46. 

42. Ibid., 47. 

43. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 270-72. - 

44. For a sample of the changing views, see M. M. Kiryan, “Armeiskaya nastupatel’naya operatsiya” [Army offensive 

operations], SVE, 1:239-44; N. Kireev, “Pr imenenie 

tankovykh podraelenii i chas tei pr i proryve oborony protivnika” [The use of tank subunits (battalions) and 

units (regiments) during the penetration of an enemy defense], VIZh, February 1982:38-40. 

45. The motorized rifle division added a separate tank 

battalion, and its strength increased to 12,510 men and 

about 250 tanks. Tank division strength increased to 

10,000 men and 325 tanks. 

46. Kiryan, “Armeiskaya, ” 239-44. 

47. It is perhaps not by accident that these experiences 

were first revealed in detail in 1968 with virtually notbing said about them before that date. The first 

general survey of Soviet and foreign airborne operations during World War II was written by Sofranov in 1962. 

Lisov’s detailed work appeared in 1968, following the more 

general Li sov account, Sovetskie vozdushno-desantnye 

189 
voiska, published in 1962. Sukhorukov's detailed work 

ETEEed in 1980; Few articles of substance on airborne 

experiences appeared before Lisov's work was published. 

48. Articles on the U.S. include P. 

Maslennikov, "Nekotorye experience osobennosti taktiki 

voisk SShA vo V'etname" sukhoputnykh [Some characteristics of the 

tactics of U.S. ground forces in Vietnam], VIZh, August 1970:105-10; V. Matsulenko, “Voina v Yuzhnom V'etname*' 

[The war in South Vietnam], VIZh, January 1971~37-49; A. 

Sinitsky, "'Agressiya SShA v Kambodzhe i Laose" [The 

a ression of the U.S.A. in Cambodia and Laos], VIZh, July l&1:47-52; N. Nikitin, "Nekotorye operativno-tamheskie uroki lokal'nykh voin imperialisma" CS ome 

operational-tactical lessons of the local wars 

imperialism], VIZh December 1978:60-66; V. Matsulenkzf 

"Lokal'nye voifimperializma (1946-1968gg)" [Local war; 

of imperialism, 1946-19681, VIZh, September 1968:36-51. 

49. For information on specific helicopter types and 

capabilities, see G. H. Turbiville, “Soviet Airborne 

Forces: Increasingly Powerful Factor in the 

Equalization," 

Turbiville, Army 26 (April 1976):18-27; and G. H. 

"A Soviet View of Heliborne Assault 

Operations," Military Review 55 (October 1975):3-15. 

50. Ibid. 

51. K. Andrukhov and V. Bulatnikov, "The Growing Role of 

Air-Borne Troops in Modern Military Operations," Voennaya Mysl' [Military thought], July 1966, 175, CIA translation 

FPIR 0475/67 in Selected Readings from Soviet Military Fhoought (1963-1973),SPC report 584 selected and corn iled 

bY Jos;ph D. and Amo'retta Hoeber, 173-84 

(Arlington, VA: Douglass 

System Planning Corporation, April 1980). 

52, 

(helico$er) 

extensive analysis of tactical airborne 

landings is in I. S. Lyutov and P. T. 

Sayaidak, Motostrelkov i 

‘cl-zzzd 

batal'on v takticheskom 

vozdushnom motorizrrif2e‘-battalion in 

tactical xa%gs ] (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 

1969). In addition to theoretical, organizational, and 

operational details, it gives detailed instructions on how 

to engage specific missile systems (U.S. Corporal and Sergeant missiles). 

53. Ibid., 12-13. 

54. A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (A Soviet View), Soviet Military Thought, no. 1 (Washington, DC 

Government Printing Office, 1973), 50, translated' by the 

U.S. Air Force from the Soviet work, Nastuplenie (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1970). 

190 
55. Ibid., 149-50. 

56. Ibid., 193. 

57. Ibid., 173. 

58. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 30-40, Handbook on 

Soviet Ground Forces (Washington, DC, 30 June 19/5), 6-33. 

59. Ibid., 6-36, 6-37, 

60. Ibid., 6-37. 

61. Sukhorukov, Sovetskie vozdushno, 278-92; Oden and 

Steiner-t, "Soviet Airborne Troops'T"'2. 

62. For example, see V. Kokhanov, "By Joint Efforts,"' Soviet Military Review, December 1974:20-21, which 

discusses coordination of ground and airborne forward 

detachments; and M. Belov, Military "Airlanding Forces," Soviet 

Review, which '--- January 1979:22-23, surveys airborne missions and conditions necessary for success. 

63. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 

(Washington, DC, 1982), 29. 

64. U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100-2-3 (Draft), Soviet Army Troop Leavenworth, KS: Organization and Equipment (Fort Threats Erectorate, Combined Arms 

Combat Developments Activity, Combined Arms Center, U.S. 

Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982), 4-108. See 

also "Sowjetische Luftlande-Sturmbrigaden" [Soviet airlanding brigades], Soldat und Technik [Soldier and 

technolo y], 

f 

December 1978:634. The air assault brigade has the ollowing postulated organization: 

1982 air assault brigade (2,000 men): 

2 assault battalions (BMD) 2 parachute battalions 

1 reconnaissance company 1 antiaircraft battery (6xZU-23) 1 artillery battalion 

1 antitank battery (6x85-mm) 1 engineer company 1 signal company 1 parachute rigging and resupply company 1 transport and maintenance company 1 medical platoon/company 1 supply company 1 chemical defense platoon 

191 
65. Among official assessments of Soviet airborne 

division TOES are the following: 

1968 airborne division: 

3 parachute regiments 3 parachute battalions 

1 artillery regiment 1 antiaircraft battalion 

1 assault gun battalion (ASU-57185) 1 reconnaissance battalion 

1 engineer battalion 

1 signal battalion 

1 transportation battalion 

1 chemical defense company 

DOD, DIA, Handbook on the Soviet Armed Forces, 30. 

1975 airborn_e division (7,200 men): 

3 

!il 

arachute regiments parachute battalions 

1 artillery regiment 1 artillery battalion (18x122-mm) 1 rocket launcher battalion (140-mm) 1 antitank battalion (85~mm) 1 assault gun battalion (ASU-57/85) 1 antiaircraft battalion (18xZU-23) 1 reconnaissance battalion 

I. engineer battalion 

1 signal battalion 

1 transportation battalion 

1 maintenance battalion 

1 medical battalion 

1 chemical defense company 1 parachute rigging company 

1975 parachute regiment: 

3 parachute battalions (450 men) L mortar battery (6x120-mm) 1 antiaircraft battery (6xZU-23) 1 antitank battery (6x85-mm) 1 engineer company 1 signal company 1 medical company 1 maintenance company 1 chemical defense platoon 

FM 30-40, 30 June 1975, A-14, A-15. 

192 
1978 airborne division (7.673 men): 

airborne regiments (126 BMDs) 3 airborne battalions 

artillery regiment 1 howitzer battalion (18x122-mm) 1 rocket launcher battalion (k8x140-mm) 

1 assault gun battalion (18xASU-85) antiaircraft battalion (18xZU-23) reconnaissance battalion 

engineer battalion 

signal battalion 

transportation battalion 

maintenance battalion 

medical battalion 

chemical defense company parachute rigging company 

1978 airborne regiment (1,837 men, 40 BMDs): 

3 airborne battalions (350 men) 1 assault gun battery/battalion (9xASU-57) 1 antitank battery (6x85-mm) 1 antiaircraft battery (6xZU-23) 1 mortar battery (6x12~mm) 1 ATGM battery (6xAT-3) support units 

U.S. Army, Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, Concepts, Doctrine, and Literature Directorate, Threats 

Division, HB 550-2, Organization and Equipment of the 

F (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 31 July 19/8) 

1980 airborne division (7,151 men, 127 BMDs, 13 BRDM/ 

BRDM-2s): --- 

3 airborne regiments (1 BMD, 2 non-BMD) 

3 airborne battalions 

1 artillery regiment 1 howitzer battalion (18x122-mm) 1 rocket launcher battalion (18x140~mm) 1 assault gun battalion (18xASU-85) 1 antiaircraft battalion (18xZU-23) 1 reconnaissance battalion 

1 engineer battalion 

1 signal battalion 

1 transportation battalion 

1 maintenance battalion 

1 medical battalion 

1 chemical defense company 1 parachute rigging company 

193 
nt (~~~~ (1,322 men, LO7 BMDs, 3 

3 airborne battalions (270 men> 

1 ATGM battery (9xAT-3) 1 air defense battery (6xZU-23) 1 mortar battery (6x120-mm) support units 

1980 airborne regiment ~~~n-EM~) (1,564 men, 10 BZdDs): II3 airborne battalions (326 men) 1 BMD company (IOxBMD) 1 mortar battery (6x120-mm) 1 antitank battery (6x85~mm) efense battery (6xZU-23) support units 

Directorate 

1982 agrborne divisio_ (6,520 men, 330 BMDs.: 

3 airborne regiments (13 BRDM/~RD~-2s) 3 airborne battalions 

1 artillery regiment 1 howitzer battalion (18x122~mm) 1 corn osite artillery battalion 

(l!xl.22-mm 6x140-mm) 1 assault gun bittalion (31xASU-85) 1 antiaircraft battalion (18xZU-23) 1 reconnaissance battalion 

1 engineer battalion 

1 signal battalion 

1 transport and maintenance battalion 

1 medical battalion 

1 chemical defense company 1 parachute rigging, resupply co 

1982 airbo 

3 airborne battalions (310 men) 1 mortar battery (6x120~mm) 

1 antitank guided missile battery (8xAT-3) I air defense battery (6xZU-23) support units 

FM 100-2-3 (Draft], 1982, 4-188, 4-195. 

194 
66. Glantz, “Soviet Operational Formation,” 10-11. 

67. Army forward detachments would be of reinforced tank 

regiment size; division forward detachments of reinforced 

tank battalion size. See Kireev, “Primenenie,” 38-39. 

For the origins of,,;he concept and cur,fent applicability, 

see N. Kireev N. Dovbenko, Iz oivta boevogo primeneniya peredovykh otryadov tankovykh (mekhonizirovannykh) korpusov” [From the experiences of 

the combat use of forward detachments of tank (mechanized) 

covsl, VIZh, September 1982:20-27. 

Chapter 8 

1. Margelov, “Razvitie teorii,” 59. 

195 
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1982 s 

Documents 

The items listed in this section are German army documents 

from the National Archives' collection on microfilm, 

herein called NAM. They are presented in order from the 

higher level units through the lower level units, e.g., from army group level through division level. 

Heeresgruppe Mitte/la/lc. . 

1 April-30 June 1942. N 

Nr 7-8 Ausb 

Panzer-Armee Oberkommando 4/la. Kartenfagen zum Kriegs- . 7 December 1941-26 April 

208 
Arme;rObleqrkommando 4/la. Sonderbeilage zum KriegstaAebuch, die Kampfe der 4. -_I Armee im ersten me s'ahr 

e en 

gK 

die Sowjets. June mne lQm---NA;"I- 9 T rz, 

ro 1-186, 

Generalkommando V AK Abt la/lc. Die Luftlandetru pen der -II Roten Armee. 25 March 1942. N-14, ro17-25 5. .------ 

Generalkommando V AK/la. La enkarten zum Krie stsebuch 2. 

7 February-29 April 19 ?-2?3mTiiaeb2. ------- 

Generalkommando V AK/lc. Feindla enkarten zum Tati keitsbericht. 7 February--r1 -~-‘L?37;27-~~--~~-~~~~5~1 

. 

Generalkomrnando XII AK/la. Anla en zum Krie~stagehi~ch 5. 

5 March-31 May 1942. NAMTY3-&-fldIi-m: _-.--.---- 

Generalkommando XII AK/lc. Tati keitsbericht. .mz;--^------.-- 5 i%lrch- 31 May 1942. NAM T314, ro 

Generalkommando XL111 AK. Kor sbefehl Nr 121, 8 March .-- 1942, and Korpsbefehl Nr + 1 2, 4 March l%TI- NAM T3.15, 

roll 1381. 

Generalkommando XL111 AK/la. Kriegstagebuch, Band 2, 

Feldzug gegen die 1?3 ApriJT?j--Ee 

1942 . NAM T314,ol 

5. Panzer Division/lc. 

11 December 1941-22 

11. 

11. Panzer Division/la. Kriegstagebuch 2. 25 January20 April 1942. NAM T315, roll 588. 

Division/lc. 

"* ;$zb::h 3. 

Tati keitsbericht 

26 January- ~&T-T 

23. Infanterie Division/la. Anlagenbande 1-5 zum Krie s- 

++%F%?P 

22 January-21 June ln2. NAM T-nx----% $r s 

23. Infanterie Division/la. 

22 June 1942. NAM T315, F5Tfk-K. Krie stagebuch 9. 25 January209 

- 
23. 

31, 

31. 

31. 

34. 

34. 

34, 

52. 

52. 

98. 

. 

210 
106. Infanterie Division/la. Kriegstagebuch 1, Band VII 

mit Anlagen, IIa, Tatigkeitsbericht. 26 

10 May 1942. -- NAM T315, roll 1247. April lm 

131. Infanterie Division/la. 

16 June 1942. 

NAM T315, ,of;i;g;agebuch 6. 6 March131. Infanterie Division/la. Krie stagebuch 6 mit 

6 March-16 June 1942. NAM -?&-roll T 1 13817 Anlagen. 

137. Infanterie Division/la. 

27 March-30 April 1942. Anlage 1 zum Krie sta ebuch 

NAti T315, roll 14-O 

211 

-- 
213 

Soviet writions 

27-29 l~nurty 

c-smm--.- 1-2 February . ..**........ 7-8 Febnlmy 

L-. 

I 1 a-/ Soviet airlanding arssmbly was 

9 

Swiet rirtanlingr 

German posttiorr 

27-29 January 

-w-..smmc- 1-2 Fsbrurry . . . . ..*.*.... 7-8 February 

SCAlE I I n I” I” 

l Banki Plotki 

Soviet Posttkms 

~I~~~~~~~ 11 March 

-.-.- 

. . . . . ..a....- 

Gsrman Positions 

mm-mm---- 31 March -.-.- 

,..........*. 
-.-.- 

,.*.*..**..., 

German pdtions 

__-___-__ 

-.-.- 

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Map 20. 4th Airborne Corps and let Guards Cavalry Corps Operations. 26 April-30 May 1942 
t 3 

Map 21. Breakout to 10th Army, l-11 June 1942 

227 
lm 

I 

---m-m t: f:: 

16th Army 

Map 22. Breakout to 10th Army, 11-23 June 1942 

228 
Map 24. Kanedukrin Area 

229 
230 
Dnepr Airborne Operation Revised Plan, 23 September 1943 

231 
Map 27. Dnepr Airborne Operation, 24 September--13 October 1943 

232 

-- 
ABOUTTHE AUTHOR 

Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz is director 

of Soviet doctrine, Center for Land Warfare, U.S. 

Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 

He received a bachelor’s degree in history from 

Virginia Military Institute and a master’s in modern 

European history from the University of North Carolina. A graduate of the USACGSC, the Russian 

Language School, and the U.S. Army Institute for 

Advanced Soviet and East European Studies, he 

has taught in the Department of Social Sciences 

and the Department of History at the U.S. Military 

Academy and has served with the Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army, 

Europe, and as chief of the Teaching Committee 

I 

and as curriculum supervisor for the Combat StudLieutenant Colonel David M. Glanfz ies Institute, USACGSC. 

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Mission 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a separate, departmentlevel activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 

for the purpose of accomplishing the following missions: 

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to doctrinal concerns of the Army and publish 

the results In a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve components. 

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at CGSC and assist other CGSC departments 

in integrating military history into their imstruction. 

3. Serve as the TRADOC executive agent for the development and coordination of an integrated, 

progressive program of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system. 

4. Direct the CAC historical program. 

5. Supervise the Fort Leavenworth museum.