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96–408 PDF 2004

THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS AND THUGS: A

STATUS REPORT ON PLAN COLOMBIA

SUCCESSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 17, 2004

Serial No. 108–214

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

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C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on June 17, 2004 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Moreno, Luis Alberto, Ambassador to the United States of America, Republic of Colombia; Roger F. Noriega, Assistant Secretary for Western

Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Robert B. Charles, Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Thomas W. O’Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; General James T. Hill, U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Southern Command;

and Karen P. Tandy, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration,

U.S. Department of Justice .......................................................................... 46

Plotter, Carlos, former political commander, Revolutionary Armed Forces

of Colombia (FARC); Marc W. Chernick, professor, Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; and

Adam Isacson, director of programs, Center for International Policy ...... 176

Walters, John P., Director, U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy .... 14

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Charles, Robert B., Assistant Secretary, International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 105

Chernick, Marc W., professor, Department of Government and School

of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, prepared statement of ......... 185

Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia, prepared statement of ................................................................... 4

Harris, Hon. Katherine, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Florida, prepared statement of ................................................................ 8

Hill, General James T., U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Southern Command, prepared statement of ....................................................................... 137

Isacson, Adam, director of programs, Center for International Policy,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 192

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida, prepared statement of .................................................................... 204

Moreno, Luis Alberto, Ambassador to the United States of America, Republic of Colombia, prepared statement of ................................................. 82

Noriega, Roger F., Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs,

U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of ..................................... 95

O’Connell, Thomas W., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, prepared statement of ........................ 127

Plotter, Carlos, former political commander, Revolutionary Armed Forces

of Colombia (FARC), prepared statement of ............................................... 179

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana, information concerning the Colombian conflict ....................... 47

Tandy, Karen P., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S.

Department of Justice, prepared statement of ........................................... 158

Walters, John P., Director, U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 17

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THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS AND THUGS: A

STATUS REPORT ON PLAN COLOMBIA

SUCCESSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES

THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis of Virginia

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tom Davis of Virginia, Souder, Duncan,

Harris, Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney, Watson, Van Hollen,

Ruppersberger, Norton, and McCollum.

Staff present: David Marin, deputy staff director and communications director; Keith Ausbrook, chief counsel; Robert Borden, counsel and parliamentarian; Rob White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy director of communications; Susie Schulte, professional

staff member; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Brien Beattie, deputy

clerk; Corinne Zaccagnini, chief information officer; Michael

Yeager, minority deputy chief counsel; Anna Laitin, minority communications and policy assistant; Tony Haywood, minority counsel;

Richard Butcher, minority professional staff member; Cecelia Morton, minority office manager; and Christopher Davis, minority investigator.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good morning. I want to welcome everyone to today’s oversight hearing on Plan Colombia, an important

component of U.S. foreign and counternarcotics policy. Today we’ll

examine the U.S. Government’s support and contributions to the

progress being made in Colombia in fighting drug trafficking and

international crime, and in improving economic and social conditions.

Since its inception in 1999, Plan Colombia has been an integrated strategy to meet the most pressing challenges confronting

the country today promoting the peace process, combating

narcoterrorism, reviving the economy and strengthening the democratic pillars of society. The combined efforts of several of our Government agencies, who are here testifying today, are providing assistance to meet these challenges and improve the stability and future of Colombia.

Not only is Colombia one of the oldest democracies in our hemisphere, but it is also home to three terrorist groups who fund their

guerrilla activities with drugs smuggled into the United States for

American consumption. Colombia is a significant source of cocaine

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and heroin for the U.S. market. As many of us are well aware, the

drug trade has a terrible and destructive impact on Americans

through addiction, drug related crimes and death. Because drug

trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency have become intertwined

problems, Congress has granted the United States expanded authority and increased flexibility to fight narcoterrorism and reduce

the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

I led three congressional delegations to Colombia last year and

can say first-hand that our significant investment, after years of effort, is beginning to see returns on the time, money and resources

spent in Colombia. Together with the strong commitment of President Alvaro Uribe and historic levels of support from the Colombian people, U.S. involvement is beginning to hit narcoterrorists

where it hurts.

Some European left wing politicians and human rights groups

claim the Uribe administration has failed to honor commitments on

human rights. They’ve also criticized new Colombian anti-terrorism

laws passed in December. But I think the view from Bogota looks

very different. And I think the European left may be guilty of

clinging to an overly romantic, naive opinion of the guerrillas. The

mask is off the Lone Ranger. These are not idealistic liberators.

They’re thugs and terrorists, funded by the illicit drug trade.

The fact is, President Uribe continues to enjoy unprecedented

support from the Colombian people because his no-nonsense strategy is producing results. He’s popular because Colombians feel

safer. Men, women and children once afraid to hit the road to visit

family and friends for fear of kidnapping or worse are now doing

so. A publicly recognized state presence now extends to towns and

villages that for decades had been rebel territory.

We are seeing tremendous results in illegal crop eradication, and

Plan Colombia’s efforts have produced record reductions in coca

production and in the destruction of drug labs. Net coca production

in Colombia dropped from 355,347 acres in 2002 to 280,071 acres

in 2003, a stunning 33 percent decline from the peak growing year

of 2001. Interdiction efforts by the Government of Colombia have

increased significantly and each week brings news of seizures of cocaine and heroin, interdictions that are usually the result of U.S.

supplied intelligence. Eradication, coupled with increasingly successful interdiction efforts, is a key to our war on narcoterrorism,

reducing profitability and slowly but surely leading farmers to

abandon coca in favor of other, legitimate crops. Ultimately that in

turn will mean less cocaine on American streets.

Criminals who have remained at large for years are being captured and extradited to the United States for prosecution. Colombia

extradited 90 suspects to the United States in the first 16 months

of the Uribe administration, quite an accomplishment considering

that 5 years ago it offered up just one of its citizens to the U.S.

justice system. The extraditions illustrate the unprecedented cooperation and partnership between our two nations, and the fact

that public opinion on extradition in Colombia has changed, due

largely to the political will and persistence of President Uribe.

Last month, Attorney General Ashcroft announced the indictment of nine top leaders of Colombia’s largest drug cartel, an organization responsible for as much as half of all the cocaine smuggled

3

in the United States. This cartel has exported more than 1.2 million pounds of cocaine to the United States through Mexico since

1990, a load worth more than $10 billion. To put that number in

perspective, it’s approximately the combined annual budgets of the

FBI, DEA and the Bureau of Prisons.

Our continued support of Colombia’s unified campaign against

drug trafficking and terrorist activities and their effort to obtain

democratic security is a wise investment. Although U.S. assistance

to the Colombian Government has led to meaningful sings of success under the strong leadership of President Uribe, challenges remain. Complete realization of U.S. policy goals requires a concerted

Colombian strategy and effort sustained by continuous U.S. assistance. Our panels of witnesses today will provide an update on the

current status of U.S.-Colombian programs, progress that has been

made in recent years and an assessment of remaining challenges

in the war against narcoterrorism.

I look forward to our discussion today and I again want to welcome our witnesses and their important testimony.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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5

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. I will now yield to any Members wishing

to make opening statements. Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

thank you for holding this important oversight hearing, and I also

want to thank the Chair for the manner in which he conducts the

work of this committee. It’s much appreciated. This hearing is important because Plan Colombia is a $3.2 billion

failed foreign operation. The war on drugs has not been won, nor

is it being won. Drug usage at home has not decreased. Aerial

eradication efforts in the targeted southern provinces have not

eliminated coca production as intended; rather, crop cultivation has

shifted to other regions. In the Department of Putumayo, for example, coca production decreased by 82 percent 1999 and 2002. During that same period, however, coca cultivation rose by 163 percent

in the Department of Guaviare.

This is ironic, considering that aerial eradication efforts in the

Guaviare region in the mid-to-late 1990’s shifted production to the

Putumayo region in the first place. Coca is one of the easiest and

most profitable crops to grow, and simply put, people are going to

continue to grow it if it will bring them money. For the past 15

years, despite several programs aimed at eradicating coca cultivation, crop supply has never ceased to meet demand. And this will

not change.

What Plan Colombia has succeeded in, however, is in the funding

of rightist paramilitaries, groups that have been named terrorist

organizations by our own State Department for their heinous

human rights crimes. This has occurred because the Colombian

military and paramilitary units have a close working relationship.

According to the Human Rights Watch World Report 2002, military

units have been found to ‘‘promote, work with, support, profit from

and tolerate paramilitary groups.’’ The relationship between military and paramilitaries has included active coordination during

military operations, the sharing of intelligence, the sharing of fighters and the sharing of resources such as vehicles, bunkers and

roadblocks. Active duty soldiers have served in paramilitary units,

paramilitary commanders have lodged on Army bases and Army

trucks have been used to transport paramilitary fighters. For their

cooperation and support, military officers have received payments

from paramilitaries.

Most atrocious, however, is that these right wing paramilitaries,

such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, that’s AUC,

have been routinely assassinating labor organizers, making Colombia the most dangerous country in the world for unionists. Since

the mid-1980’s, over 4,000, over 4,000 trade unionists have been assassinated. According to the International Confederation of Free

Trade Unions, in 2002 alone of the 213 trade unionists killed in the

world, 184 were killed in Colombia. Of those, 70 percent were public sector workers.

Why are so many trade unionists being killed? There’s a disturbing correlation between the assassinations and intimidations of

public sector unionists by paramilitary groups associated with right

wing business interests and the rampant privatization in Colombia.

U.S. multi-national corporations are benefiting from the privatization and de-unionization of Colombia.

7

What a terrible irony it is that taxes paid in the United States

are being spent to defeat the basic human rights to decent wages,

job security and the right to organize in Colombia under the guise

of a war on drugs. We have a big problem with the Government

of Colombia, and it starts with the president. In a speech delivered

in September 2003, President Uribe described unions and human

rights non-government organizations as working ‘‘in the service of

terrorism.’’

So I think that it’s going to be useful to hear a discussion on how

the use of war on drugs funds for the de-unionization of Colombia

and the assassination of union supporters serves the cause of the

United States of America. It is not authorized by Congress, it is not

U.S. policy and it should not be tolerated. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Do any other Members wish to make opening statements? The gentlelady from Florida and then Mr. Souder.

Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for

holding this hearing today as well as for providing me the opportunity first-hand to view the coca eradication going on in Colombia.

I also want to thank the distinguished panel of members that we

have today for their testimony. I’ve had the pleasure of working

with several of you on improving U.S.-Colombia relations now for

several years. Up to a half million Colombians reside in my State

of Florida, where they make a tremendous contribution to our economic and cultural dynamism.

In addition, Colombia consistently ranks as one of Florida’s top

10 trading partners. Under the extraordinary and adept leadership

of President Uribe, his domestic approval ratings have remained

above 70 percent. Since August 2000 and 2002 Colombia has made

great strides toward eradicating illicit drug production and trafficking, lowering general crime rates and reviving the domestic economy. Indeed, the GDP growth this year is expected to reach 4 percent, which is the highest in 7 years. Exports have reached record

levels and the return of confidence within the private sector ensures that increased investment will continue to spur the economy.

Moreover, the definitive peace agreement with the national liberation army terrorist group, the ELN, appears to be drawing closer. In this vein, it’s our sincere hope that Mexico’s offer to mediate

these talks will expedite the resolution to hostilities. Yet we are reminded of the difficult path ahead. Just yesterday, 34 campesinos

were apparently killed by the FARC terrorist organization.

This should only steel our collective resolve to continue to provide Colombia and President Uribe with the support necessary to

pacify their nation, bringing opportunity and prosperity to its 45

million citizens. Furthermore, the proposed free trade agreement to

be singed among Colombia, the United States, Ecuador and Peru

should significantly bolster the process in this region to a much

greater level.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Katherine Harris follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. I thank you very much.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for this hearing. I’m on the subcommittee and our chairman has held hearings

on Colombia and the Colombian approach. I believe it merits the

full attention of the committee that you are giving it today.

Mr. Chairman, particularly those of us who live in big cities often

hear the simplistic notion that, you know, go after the supply and

maybe we can settle this matter. Well, I think Colombia shows that

going after the supply is not an easy matter, it’s a very difficult

matter, and just how difficult this entire approach is. The approach

we’re using in Colombia is essentially a bipartisan approach. It was

begun in the last administration, I’m not sure there’s any other

real approach available to us.

I am very concerned that Colombia continues to be the leading

supplier of cocaine and heroin to the United States. I do note with

some optimism that there have been some recent decreases in

those numbers. I also note what our subcommittee has also found,

that Afghanistan is quickly becoming a competitor, a real competitor to Colombia in the provision of these drugs in our country,

something that is particularly worrisome for other reasons.

The new flexibilities seem to be warranted by conditions on the

ground. I have been particularly hopeful, because of some progress

in civilian institution building and the attention that the new

president had been able to get for that approach, and I continue

to be optimistic that he will be able to build the civilian institutions, the justice institutions and other civilian institutions in the

country. I am very disturbed, however, at reports of human rights

abuses. We would hate to see one kind of abuse, drug abuse, be replaced by human rights abuses in order to pacify the country.

And I am concerned, today’s New York Times reports the most

serious massacre since President Uribe took office, 34 coca farmers

killed by FARC. Apparently, they were all farmers who were employed by the paramilitary commanders. All of this has led to the

notion that President Uribe’s efforts to in fact negotiate with the

paramilitaries could bring FARC, could escalate FARC violence. I

cite this because of how difficult it is, not because I have an answer

for all of this or because there are a dozen things the administration could be doing.

But I think that the emergence of these human rights violations

and the continued leading place of Colombia in supplying cocaine

and heroin will be worrisome because of the amount of attention

we have placed on this one country and people therefore want to

see some progress that the money and the attention and the military focus has brought.

I guess we shouldn’t even think that there should be an exit

strategy. We can’t find an exit strategy out of places that we should

find them. I think the way we’re going now, we’re going to be in

Colombia for a very long time, and if we’re not there, even given

the fact that we don’t see huge progress, even the small progress

that we are seeing is enough, I think, to keep us there for a time

to come and to build relationships with the new administration

there, so that we don’t go off on some detour, for example, involvVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:01 Dec 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96408.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing bringing pacification to the country by violation of human

rights.

Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I thank you very much.

I would recognize the subcommittee chairman, Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing.

I want to thank Delegate Norton for her comments, as well as

the ranking member of our subcommittee, Mr. Cummings, and others, for the bipartisan way we’ve been approaching the Colombian

question. Because it’s very difficult, it isn’t enough just to lock up

kids in Washington, DC. or other places around the country, because of their abuse. We have to get to the bigger traffickers, the

people who are behind the growing of this, the distribution of this,

coming into our country, not just the users. We also have to be aggressive toward the users in the United States, because it’s our

problem, that it’s caused the problems in Colombia, the market explosion in cocaine and heroin is because of domestic consumption.

But the fact is, the more that comes in, the cheaper the price,

and the more the purity is. We have to pursue all strategies simultaneously: eradication, interdiction, border control, the networks to

the United States and reducing demand and treating those who are

abusing. We have had a tremendous internal battle since I was

elected in 1994, over how we should fund the Colombia National

Police, then the vetted units in Colombia and how we handle difficult human rights questions when there are major U.S. dollars involved.

I believe the progress in Colombia has been tremendous. It isn’t

perfect, but it’s been tremendous. The pressures of the so-called

Leahy Rule have led the military in Colombia to go through major

reformation, and we hear repeatedly from their units that often an

attorney will be in the field with them. They examine with pictures

when there’s been a battle to see whether there’s been abuse. We

have had two different groups from the right and two from the left

who are committing these violations. The poor campesinos who are

growing it, they get killed by one side and killed by the other side.

The Uribe government has gone in after all of them. It has made

tremendous progress. The oldest democracy in South America, Colombia, has something to buildupon. As I pointed out before, and

I think it’s important for us to understand, we’re seeing the tremendous difficulty in Iraq to get their police force to stand up.

We’re doing most of their fighting for them.

In Afghanistan, we have, in my opinion, a near disaster right

now. Our Government is doing the best it can, but we don’t control

this tremendous explosion of heroin poppy that is occurring in Afghanistan. In Colombia, they’re doing the fighting. We’re having a

debate over whether we should have a few hundred more advisors,

not 100,000 people going into their country. So while we’re at a

critical tipping point, as Director Walters has said, and watching

very closely, can we actually get a reduction for all this money and

see the price rise and the supply go down and the purity drop in

the United States? It is a very critical period.

The fact is, Colombia is a tremendous success story. Policemen

and military people are dying on the ground because of our habits.

14

We have a few hundred advisors there, and maybe we need a little

bit more, but we are rebuilding their institutions. We’re rebuilding

their police forces. We’re rebuilding their military. We’re getting

vetted units. They’re learning more what human rights is, and this

is a success story when compared to the rest of the world.

I want to thank each of our witnesses who are here today for

coming up to the Hill on a regular basis, for giving us the Colombia

story, and for their work over many years. Each one of you have

been involved in different ways. It has been a success story when

those success stories are so rare around the world. Not a perfect

story, just as Delegate Norton says. Drugs aren’t going to go away.

This isn’t something where it’s suddenly going to dry up and disappear, any more than our battles against rape, against spouse

abuse, against the other evils of the world.

But we can control it more. We don’t always have to stay at this

level. If we do our job right and if we’re organized, we can reduce

the level of problems on the streets, and then start to deal with

prevention in the schools and treatment in a more manageable

form. Because right now, when it’s so prevalent and so cheap and

so common, we can’t get control and make our prevention and

treatment programs work.

So I thank the chairman for convening the hearing and I look

forward to the questions and the testimony today.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Any other Members wish to make opening statements?

Let’s move to our panel. We have our first witness, who is the

Honorable John Walters, the Director of the Office of National

Drug Control Policy. Thank you very much. Director Walters will

provide the committee with a report on how we’re achieving the

President’s counter-drug objectives by reducing the production of

cocaine and heroin in Colombia and the Andean region. It’s our policy that we swear you in before you testify, so if you would rise

with me.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. I think you know

the rules, the light will turn orange after 4 minutes. Your entire

statement is in the record. When it’s red, 5 minutes are up, and

then you could move to summary. Questions will be based on your

entire statement. We appreciate the job you’re doing, and we welcome you here today, and look forward to your testimony. Thank

you.

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WALTERS, DIRECTOR, U.S. OFFICE OF

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Mr. WALTERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the many members of this committee. Some of them are not here now, but have

worked very hard on this issue, and we appreciate it very much.

I also appreciate the committee’s particularly longstanding support for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative. And I’m pleased to report today that the news is very good. For the first time in 20

years, thanks to the unprecedented efforts of the Uribe administration and support of the U.S. Congress for the Andean CounterDrug Initiative, we are on a path to realize dramatic reductions in

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cocaine production in Colombia and a complementary reduction in

the world’s supply of cocaine.

My written testimony discusses a number of areas which affect

the success of our drug control efforts, and I request that the full

statement be put into the record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. WALTERS. My opening remarks today will focus on the

progress that’s been made in Colombia, most appropriate for this

hearing, the good news of our eradication and interdiction efforts

against cocaine and heroin. The United States and the Government

of Colombia have developed a strategy which focuses on three

items: one, eradicating almost the entire illegal drug crop each

year, regardless of replacing efforts; two, interdicting and arresting

drug shipments and the traffickers involved; three, pressuring trafficking organizations through extradition and other organizational

attack initiatives.

Today, the United Nations released its latest numbers for coca

cultivation and we have seen more good news, a 15 percent decrease in coca cultivation over the last year in the Andean region,

according to the U.N. numbers. For 2 years in a row, we have seen

record decreases in coca and poppy cultivation, due in part to the

unprecedented commitment to aerial eradications through the

spraying campaign. In 2003, Colombia sprayed about 127,000 hectares of coca and manually eradicated another 8,000 hectares.

At our current pace, coca cultivation should drop to as little as

80,000 hectares by the end of this year, compared to 144,000 in

2002. In 2002, Colombia had as much as 4,900 hectares of opium

poppy under cultivation. U.S. supported eradication programs

sprayed an excess of 3,300 hectares and in 2003, Colombia sprayed

nearly 3,000 hectares of opium poppy and about 1,000 more were

eradicated voluntarily in connection with alternative development

programs.

Our eradication efforts have led to double digit percentage decreases in total cultivation of both coca and poppy. Most importantly, the same good results are holding true throughout the Andean region. Total coca cultivation for Peru and Bolivia declined

from an estimated 61,000 hectares in 2002 to 59,600 hectares at

the end of 2003, a combined reduction of 1,400 hectares, countering

any significant concerning regarding the so-called balloon effect.

Thanks to increased Government of Colombia efforts in 2003, Colombian anti-drug forces destroyed 83 HCL labs, the conversion of

coca plant product into what we see as powdered cocaine, captured

48 metric tons of cocaine base, 1,500 metric tons of solid precursors

and 75,000 gallons of liquid precursor chemicals. We have seen increased success at sea, where the greatest amount of cocaine was

interdicted last year ever. We have taken advantage of improved

intelligence and cooperation with the United Kingdom and Colombia to interdict a high portion of the boats carrying illicit drugs as

they depart Colombia, the principal means of transit to the United

States.

We expect to see a substantially disrupted cocaine production capacity with coca cultivation reduced to about one half its peak level

from 2 years ago. In disrupting the market, we need to continue

our success in eradication, maintain our interdiction performance

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and keep up the pressure we have placed on major traffickers. An

unprecedented number of extraditions from Colombia has helped

fan these efforts referred to by you, Mr. Chairman. In addition,

there have been significant reductions in all indicators of human

rights abuses in 2003. Homicide is down over 20 percent, massacres down 33 percent, kidnappings down 26 percent, and forced

displacement of individuals were cut by 49 percent.

A key indicator of this historic progress is that allegations of

human rights violations committed by the military has dropped

from an excess of 40 percent of all allegations 7 years ago to less

than 2 percent of all allegations in 2003. As a result of these advances, Colombia’s citizens are safer and democracy in Colombia is

more secure. The good news that we have seen in the Andean region and particularly in Colombia is a product of sustained funding

by this Congress for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, the strategic use of resources, our commitment and the commitment of the

Government of Colombia.

Domestically, we have also seen very good news. We have surpassed the President’s 2 year goal of a 10 percent reduction in drug

use among our Nation’s youth, an 11 percent actual reduction between 2001 and 2003. With the continued support of this committee, we fully expect to meet the President’s 5 year goal of a 25 percent reduction in the number of drug users in the United States.

I commend the House for providing full funding for our counterdrug efforts, and not placing burdensome, restrictive conditions on

those dollars. However, continued full funding in accord with the

President’s fiscal year 2002 request of $731 million is necessary

now, more than at any time in our history, to advance this historic

success. We have the opportunity to make a real change in the

world drug market and we need your continued commitment and

support as we have had in the past.

I look forward to working together to ensure that our goals are

met in Colombia and the Andean region and of course, here at

home. Last, I’d like to ask to be able to provide for the record,

given the opening statement by Congressman Kucinich, a detailed

breakdown of eradication province by province to correct the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walters follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Let me start the questioning. I heard Representative Kucinich’s

opening remarks. Is it possible that as we eradicate in Colombia,

it’s moving to other countries?

Mr. WALTERS. It is possible, and it is a great concern, and in the

past this has happened, that cultivation was once much greater in

Peru and Bolivia. It’s been reduced dramatically. During that reduction, cultivation moved to Colombia. That’s why we’ve tried to

make sure that we continue the pressure working with the Governments of Peru and Bolivia. Fortunately, over the past 2 years, we

have been able to sustain that reduction and we have not seen the

spread.

And not to belabor the point, but as the New York Times reported on June 9, 2004, ‘‘The overall decline in coke in Colombia

and the rest of the Andes is indisputable, and the strategy appears

to have controlled the so-called balloon effect, the recurring phenomenon that once saw huge fields of coca pop up in one region

after being stamped out in another.’’ So we have our own estimates, we have the U.N. estimates, and we have the New York

Times. They don’t usually line up, all three, on such a point.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Could you share with me some of the

links we’ve seen in the evidence that the administration has collected that detail the relationship between drugs and financing for

terrorist groups in the Andean region?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes. Our current estimates, and we’re trying to refine some of the dollar amounts, are that substantial operational

resources are provided both for the extreme right and extreme left

groups, the FARC, the ELN and the so-called AUC. The precise

amount that they get from drug trafficking is hard to identify, but

they could not operate at current levels without the resources they

receive. They also take money, as you know, from kidnapping and

from some other criminal activities.

But the bulk of that money, there’s no question about it, has

come from drug trafficking. We have various estimates of the relative amounts. But both for the violence that they cause in Colombia and the violence that we see through armed groups in Mexico,

those organizations that are most dangerous and most violent

make their money and remain under arms and remain able to put

armed, dangerous people in the field because of what they make

from the U.S. drug consumer.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Are there any other cartels or cabals or

drug lords operating independently of the three groups you’ve described in Colombia?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes, there are. We have identified a number of organizational leaders that are facilitators, organizers, sometimes

they use the armed groups and pay them for protection. Sometimes

the armed groups in different areas provide certain levels of product for final processing and distribution. Basically the large scale

distribution and shipment to the United States is not run by the

armed groups, although there have been some of them involved in

a few cases of distribution. But basically, those are run by trafficking organizations, both in Colombia and Mexico today, and they

use both the Central American-Mexican route to move the drugs to

the United States and the Caribbean.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. So let me just understand. What percent

of the cocaine, let’s talk about cocaine for example, and the coca

crop, is controlled by the paramilitary groups and what percent by

these other independent operators or cartels? Any idea?

Mr. WALTERS. I can’t give you a precise percentage, because in

some cases they’re mixed.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Sub-contracting and everything else?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes. They are involved in out stages and later

stages, yes. We’re trying to get a better handle on that. We also

believe frankly that some of what we’ve seen in the large number

of desertions I referred to in my written testimony of the armed

group participants are a result in difficulties of financing because

of the magnitude of the eradication and the disruption of the market for cocaine.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I’m just trying to figure out, OK, we’re

going, the Colombian Government with help from us is going after

some of the paramilitary groups down there now, and we wipe

those out, there are still others standing that are going into the

trade, is what you’re saying?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes. They are working very closely together, and

how it might transform itself in the future. Again, what happened

was, the drug cultivation moved to Colombia and these armed

groups became involved by controlling countryside, keeping government forces, the rule of law from that area so they could grow and

produce cocaine. As the government takes control of the country,

and I think that’s important, we’re not just eradicating, the Government of Colombia is systematically taking back the country, as

you know, providing government presence and rule of law in all

municipalities of the country for the first time in more than two

decades.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What do you think is the major obstacle

and challenge that we face in Plan Colombia at this time?

Mr. WALTERS. Follow-through. We can and have and do make

this problem smaller by pushing back. What happens is, we frequently don’t stay at it. I think that everyone is rightly concerned

that what are the limits of commitment. This is a large dollar

amount, we know that. But when you look at the investment in

terms of the $12.5 billion that we spend on drug control at the Federal level, and many times greater amounts that we spend in trying to pick up the pieces from the consequences of substance abuse,

this is a cost-effective investment.

It obviously only is cost-effective if it makes a difference. I think

that’s what the historic opportunity is that the commitment and

leadership of Colombia, where most of the effort is being applied,

that the resources that we are supplying to support them there and

in the other parts of the Andean region are making a difference

and systematically shrinking in historic allotments the amount of

cocaine coming into the country.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you very much.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Walters, am I correct in understanding that $93 million in

funding has been provided this year to protect the Colombian, to

help the Colombian army protect the Cano Limon oil pipeline?

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Mr. WALTERS. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can you explain to me how that expenditure is justified as part of a program whose primary priority mission is narcotics control?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes, we tried to work carefully with Congress in

the original request over a year ago for these funds. It’s designed

to be a component to our effort to prevent terror organizations from

destroying the institutions and economic opportunities in Colombia.

The oil pipeline was systematically attacked, as you probably know,

by the ELN and the FARC and a significant portion of both gross

domestic product of the foreign earnings of Colombia, as well as a

significant amount of the energy, some of this energy goes to the

United States. What this allowed Colombia to do when protecting

the pipeline is to maintain those earnings at a time when they are

trying to grow the economy and for constructive ways.

Mr. TIERNEY. Explain for us, if you will, exactly how the protection is being provided. Who is providing it and in what manner?

Mr. WALTERS. Off the top of my head, I may not know all the

details. We’re essentially providing airlift and helicopters, and

we’re providing training to Colombian military personnel to be able

to protect the pipeline at this point.

Mr. TIERNEY. And this is a private company’s pipeline, am I correct?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes, it is.

Mr. TIERNEY. And what financial commitment are they putting

into this?

Mr. WALTERS. I don’t know what the company is putting into the

program. In the past, we’ve worked on the basis of the concerns of

the Colombia Government here, obviously.

Mr. TIERNEY. I’m concerned with that. It seems to me we’re moving well beyond our, you know, Plan Colombia is the business of

going after drugs and now expanding over to a pipeline, getting

more involved, putting more money in there. That bothers me in

terms of our exit strategy and our involvement growing on that.

Mr. WALTERS. If I may, if we didn’t consult properly with your

office, I apologize. But we were very careful when this proposal was

initially made to make clear what it was specifically and to include

it in the appropriations process. I want to make clear we did not

intend to say we have a whole bunch of money over here and we’re

going to slide this in on the side. This was up front, because we

knew there could be——

Mr. TIERNEY. I don’t mean to imply that you did. I just want to

address it as a policy question. I think we should consider whether

this is wise policy and whether there is the kind of connection that

should exist there, and whether or not we’re getting into an expansion here that might not otherwise be somewhere we want to go

or should go.

But changing the subject for a second, there was a recent New

York Times article, June 9th of this year, last week in fact, and it

basically was trying to put the 2003 coca eradication estimates into

some sort of historical perspective. What they essentially said in

the article was that although there has been a reduction this year,

it gets us back to where we really were back in the 1990’s, so that

we’re pretty much back to where we started.

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Are you comfortable now or are you confident that this downward trend in cultivation is going to be sustained with the resources that you have?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes, if we follow through. What’s happened is the

cultivation grew after a decline, as a result of the decline in cultivation in Peru basically some in Bolivia, and the shift was to Colombia. We did have a balloon problem. What we’ve done is held

the line in those other two countries and it looks like as Colombia

eradicates at over 100,000 hectares a year, the ability to replant

and reconstitute is broken and we begin to have systematic declines. That’s what’s happened.

Mr. TIERNEY. But there was part of that same article that talked

about it being a race, it was a quote of one of the individuals, I

think somebody from the State Department was saying that it’s a

race. We eradicate, they build somewhere else, we eradicate, they

build somewhere else and we just try to get ahead of them. When

it is that you think we’ll get ahead of them to the degree that we

can start to see some effect on the price and purity? I understand

they’re now currently as high as they’ve ever been.

Mr. WALTERS. We believe, the latest intelligence reports that we

have just completed, that project and look at flow, we believe we

will see a change in availability into the United States, on the

streets of the United States in the next 12 months as a result of

what happens here. It takes some time between the planting and

the processing and the shipping and the dealing. We believe that

will probably first appear in reductions in purity, because most of

the market for this product, as you know, is dependent individuals.

If you raise the price, they go into crisis.

Mr. TIERNEY. So a year from now?

Mr. WALTERS. Some time in the next 12 months. I can’t tell you

precisely, but I’m not saying it’s going to be at the 12th month, I

can’t tell you it’s going to be next month.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me sneak in one more question, if I can, and

that is on the fragmentation issue. What people are saying is instead of getting the balloon effect now, where we might see the

crops moving over to Bolivia or elsewhere that in fact they’re moving into some of the national parks and some of the other more difficult spots where you might not think, that the strains have become more resistant, and that’s where it’s going and it’s going to

be difficult for us to eradicate there. What do you find with regard

to that issue?

Mr. WALTERS. There has been some increased growth in national

park areas, and there’s been a debate, as you probably know, about

aerial spraying in the parks. We have I believe worked out an

agreement with the Congress where the Government of Colombia,

and we will certify spraying in these park areas as only a last resort. They are doing some manual eradication in those areas as

well.

But obviously, we should not create safe havens. And we should

also recognize, as I indicated at some length in my testimony, the

environmental damage that is devastating is done by coca growth.

It is what has stripped Colombia of an estimated million hectares

of rain forest. In addition to the stripping of that rain forest and

the delicate soil in the moving of this, the pouring of hundreds of

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thousands of gallons of toxic chemicals into the delicate ecosystem

as a result of processing through petrochemicals, acids and others.

We believe, I know people are concerned about the environment,

especially in this area where we’re concerned also about biodiversity. But the biggest damage to the environment is to allow the

coca business to continue. It has been the destroyer of the land and

the polluting of the watersheds here of the Amazon. What’s happening is, those can be restored, but we have to again stay at it,

we have to not let patches of protection be created as we begin to

squeeze this down.

But the fact is, the real issue here is, President Uribe has said

he is going to eradicate every hectare of coca and poppy in Colombia, and he has aggressively pursued that course.

Mr. TIERNEY. So is it your position that there is more environmental damage being done from the cocaine growing itself as opposed to the eradication efforts?

Mr. WALTERS. I believe if you look at this carefully, there is no

comparison. What we’re using for eradication is the same chemical

that you can buy in a hardware store and many Americans use. It

is used more widely in Colombia in agriculture settings. It is used

massively in the United States in agricultural settings. It breaks

down into harmless components in 3 days after use. The chemicals,

the insecticides, the others that are being used, sulfuric acid, gasoline, kerosene and others that are being used by the thousand and

thousand gallon lots in processing and in cultivation, there is no

question, anybody that looks at this systematically, I know it

sounds, because people say, well, isn’t spraying always environmentally somehow damaging because you’re killing something.

But this is a business that lives by killing triple canopy rain forest and dumping toxic chemicals into the Amazon watershed. When

we stop that, when we reduce the cultivation, we save that pollution and give the forest a chance to regrow.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I didn’t know you were

going to come to me next. I do have a question. I went down to Colombia 41⁄2 years ago with Chairman Spence on an Armed Service

Committee trip. And I hate to be the skunk at the garden party,

but we heard almost the exact same report that you’ve just given.

It’s nothing against you, but we heard all these wonderful statistics

then. I don’t remember all the exact statistics.

But it seems to me that the Colombia Government is on a permanent dole here. What I’m wondering about, 41⁄2 years from now, are

we going to have somebody else in your same position come here

and give us all these same statistics again, but we’re still going to

be paying $4 or $5 billion a year and this problem is just going to

go on forever? I mean, it’s amazing how similar your statements

are. I’m not criticizing you, because you’re just giving us statistics

that I guess you believe are reliable.

But we had the top three people from the Colombian Government

that were in charge of the eradication program at that time, plus

several of the U.S. military people, and they told us of the great

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progress they had made, and had percentages just like what you

have given us, and that was 41⁄2 years ago.

Mr. WALTERS. If I may——

Mr. DUNCAN. And I’m sitting here, and it just makes me have

to be skeptical about what you’re saying. If you continue to make

the progress that you’re making, then this problem should be wiped

out in 4 or 5 years. But I just have a strong feeling that’s not going

to happen. So how do you explain that?

Mr. WALTERS. Congressman, I do believe that cynicism about the

drug problem generally, on both supply and demand, is our greatest enemy. That cynicism unfortunately has been earned in some

cases. If people told you in Colombia 4 or 5 years ago that there

were the kinds of reductions we’re seeing today, they lied. It’s that

simple. We have numbers. The U.N. has numbers. The numbers

did not show that 4 years ago or 41⁄2 years ago.

But can we tell you that we have perfect knowledge here? No.

But we can tell you that from multiple sources, we have the same

information. There is a significant and measurable and massive reduction, a historic reduction in the production of cocaine in the

world generally led by Colombia where over 70 percent of it is

today grown.

Can we guarantee you or assure you that we’re going to get to

where you and I and everybody else wants to be? That is that we

systematically reduce the drug problem. And I think the answer to

that is, we can’t guarantee it, because we’ve had a history of making progress, real progress. The drug problem today is, the number

of users in the United States, I think it’s important to point out,

is half what they were at the peak in 1979 that we measured.

But it’s still too high. It went to a low point in 1992, and teen

drug use doubled between 1992 and the mid-1990’s. When we forget about it, when we stop acting, when we don’t do effective

things, we get a bigger problem. But that’s true of every problem.

Mr. DUNCAN. I’ll tell you, I think that the Colombian Government is going to do everything they possibly can to make sure that

they continue getting these billions and billions of dollars each

year. And they’re going to tell us that they’ve eradicated it a lot

of places in Colombia, but they’ll tell us that they’ve increased it

someplace else or something.

I hope I’m wrong. I hope they get it wiped out in 4 or 5 years.

And if these percentages that you’re telling us today hold up, then

it should be pretty well eliminated in 4 or 5 years.

Mr. WALTERS. I think it’s important for us to be clear so we don’t

generate cynicism ourselves. Our estimate has been, and it’s not

precise, that the relative ability to reconstitute and replant following spray, again, it’s important to lay some groundwork here. The

coca is a bush, as you probably saw when you were down there. It

takes an estimate, somewhere from between 6 months and 18

months for it to regrow to full productive capacity. So when you

eradicate it, it has to be replanted, it has to be allowed to grow to

be productive.

They can, with the magnitude of workers they have in the field

now, we estimate reconstituted somewhere around 90,000, 96,000

hectares a year. That’s why I think it’s very important that we

spray at the plus 100,000 hectare level as the Colombians have

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done the last several years and begin to collapse that. A some of

those workers move out of this business, the ability to reconstitute,

we anticipate, will go down. But——

Mr. DUNCAN. What you’re saying, though, and I can tell you, I

spent 71⁄2 years as a criminal court judge, trying felony criminal

cases before I came here. And I’ll tell you, I hate drugs. I’m scared

to death of them. I tell all the kids that. I’ve seen horrible things.

Almost every case that we handled was involved with drugs in

some way.

But what you just said a few minutes ago, you said Colombia in

spite of all the billions and billions and billions that we’ve poured

down there over the last several years, that Colombia is still producing 70 percent of the world’s cocaine, is that what you just said?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes. Seventy percent of a pie that’s one-third

smaller, and a pie that will be 50 percent smaller, we estimate, at

the end of this year. So yes, that’s why there isn’t a balloon effect.

If it was producing a smaller percentage, it would indicate that the

movement of growth had gone to other countries.

So we have so far contained and shrunk that pie. We estimate

that will produce reduced availability in the United States, as I

said, within the next 12 months.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I’ll tell you this, I hope in 5 years’ time you

can come back or somebody can come back and tell us it’s all been

wiped out, we don’t have to keep sending all these billions down

there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

The gentlelady from Minnesota, Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Sir, if I understand your testimony, and some information that

I have, it’s correct that the coca farmers are growing in smaller

plots in places like State parks, correct?

Mr. WALTERS. There are some. It’s a small portion of the overall

growth, but there is some movement to State parks.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Would you agree also with some information

that I’ve read that the plants that the farmers are growing now actually produce more leaves per plant?

Mr. WALTERS. We have adjusted our estimate, not so much in

leaf, but of the so-called alkaloid content of the cocaine substance

that’s extracted from the leaf. It’s not necessarily more leaves,

there have been adjustments up and down based on field tests in

Colombia, so we get reliable estimates of what is being produced.

But there has not been in the last couple of years——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I think you answered my question. So you’re

saying that some of the plants can actually produce more?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes, there are different varieties of coca——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Mr. WALTERS [continuing]. But there has not been——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Mr. WALTERS. For the record, please, if I can answer the

question——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I only have a few minutes.

Mr. WALTERS. I’d like to answer the question, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It’s her time.

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Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. So you’re saying that the

amount——

[Power outage occurred 3:40: p.m. to 3:45 p.m.]

[NOTE.—A copy of the transcript held during the power outage

follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Part of this money we put in, the last time I was

down there and talked with Occidental and other companies there,

felt that the number of attacks were going down, They have minor

protection, but they’re like Pinkerton forces against armed forces.

But they can now hopefully start to explore this, because it’s

right near Venezuela, one of the richest oil basins in the world. If

they can make their economy work, they can afford to pay their

own military, and they can afford to buy their own Blackhawks.

But if their economy doesn’t work, their whole country will come

crashing down and then, because of our drug problem, we have to

go in and do it.

I have two questions. One is, we also, in addition to the coca

problem, have a heroin problem, about to be dwarfed by Afghanistan, but nevertheless a heroin problem out of—I couldn’t resist

that—out of Colombia. It’s high in the mountains, it’s hard to get

to. A recent FARC defector said that molasses is being put on the

heroin and it’s making it hard to aerially eradicate. This is one of

the constant debates we’ve had, because in Bolivia, hand eradication worked very well.

You mentioned the national parks problem, which by the way is

happening. We have the first coca in our parks in California. That

is a challenge, even though it’s the same thing we spray crops in

our farmers’ fields and in the farmers’ fields elsewhere about aerial

spraying. Have you seen that problem of molasses coating the heroin? Does that restrict air spraying, and do you see us moving more

to hand eradication in those places if it becomes a problem?

Mr. WALTERS. I haven’t heard about the molasses, but there are

periodically accounts of ways of circumventing the spray, putting

plastic bags over the plants, both poppy and the coca. The problem

with almost all of these is they also inhibit the plant growth over

any period of time. They’re also labor intensive and they make it

more difficult. None of them have been used, to the best of our

knowledge, on a significant enough scale to undermine the eradication effort.

It is true, as you heard, we are looking at over 100,000 hectares

of coca. We’re looking at less than 5,000 hectares of poppy, and

that’s really a basis of figuring two crops on each plot. So that is

less than 2,500 hectares. It’s a much smaller problem, much smaller plots, as you know.

What we are doing, what the Colombians are doing, is mixing

both spray with manual eradication, but that’s not because of

measures they’re taking to prevent the spray, it’s because some of

these areas are very difficult to get to by aircraft. They are high

in the mountains and sometimes it’s hard to get an intelligence

overhead read from an aircraft on where they are. Sometimes it’s

hard to get spray into the side of a mountain where a field may

be because of the geography. So in that case, the Colombians are

trying to move manual eradicators in.

In addition, we are trying to go after this problem with better intelligence. We’re spraying everything we find. We’re trying to kill

one way or the other every plot of poppy that they can find. We

are aware that because it’s smaller and more dispersed there is a

problem of finding it, and the DEA has put in more people. There

is a program now of paying people for information about lots of

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poppy, as well as organizations that are involved in it. So we’ve

tried to go after the poppy problem, which you know we do take

seriously, both in Colombia, in transit and in the movement inside

the United States from its arrival in small amounts, frequently by

aircraft, passengers on aircraft or in their baggage or on their person.

Mr. SOUDER. Part of our problem here is that almost all Afghan

heroin is going to Europe and Europe hasn’t been as great a help

as they should be in Afghanistan. In Colombia, a high percentage

is going to Europe. Even as we try to control our demand, our Colombia problem stays there because so much is going to Europe.

Are you pleased with their help?

Mr. WALTERS. We have consistently asked the Europeans to do

more. The British have been steadfast allies in this for more than

a decade. We have had sporadic help from some other nations. But

it’s been small, especially as you point out, considering what

they’re suffering at this. When President Uribe went to Europe recently, there was, I believe, completely unjustified criticism of him

by people whose nations are dearly suffering and should be thanking him for the progress and the possibilities he’s allowed in the

future.

I don’t know of another nation in the world that has had as

much progress as rapidly on human rights and safety of its citizens

as Colombia has over the last several years since he’s been in office. And instead, there are groups that are living in the past in

Europe and some, frankly, I think in other places, that think that’s

not going on. They have to catch up with modern times. President

Uribe’s popularity in Colombia is based on the fact he’s brought

economic growth, safety and security. And that continues to be the

case.

The military’s popularity in Colombia is based on the fact they’ve

stopped being the thugs that they were a decade ago, and through

our help, largely through the leadership of Colombian officials,

they’ve become more professional. They remain, we have to remain

vigilant, we have to hold the standards, but they understand and

we understand that the progress here requires that not to be a

country that’s a war zone, and not to be a country that’s based on

narco-dollars that will make it a war zone. The progress there has

been historic.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. The gentlelady from California.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’m listening to the witness talk about the progress that’s being

made with Colombia, Plan Colombia, and I must commend the

work that has been done that has gone into that. But the thought

occurs to me when we talk about narcoterrorism, what are we

doing on this end? It’s the consumption of their product that creates the problems, and we have them listed as addiction, drug related crimes, deaths and a destabilizing of our societal core.

I am told that in countries such as Colombia, Afghanistan that

the core of their economy is the growing of these plants. My question is, and you might not be able to answer but you might help

us to think about it, what are we doing on this end, so the demand

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won’t be as large as it is where billions of dollars return back to

someone’s pocket or to the country? Conspicuous consumption, sub

rosa consumption or whatever, the consumption is here.

Mr. WALTERS. Absolutely, and that is, I believe, one of the most

important questions we can ask about this. It is why we have tried

to emphasize in our national effort, is we have to have balance. The

President has said, when he’s met with us privately and he has

said to foreign leaders, we’re not asking other countries to do

things that we should do in our own borders. That’s why we’ve

asked for a reorienting of the drug budget, as well as a strategy

to establish that balance.

The President, as you know, over a year ago in the State of the Union, asked for an additional $600 million over 3 years for treatment through the Access to Recovery program, on top of the $2 billion block grant that we have. He asked us, how do we close the

treatment gap. Our national estimate is that roughly 100,000 people a year seek treatment and are not able to get it, based on our

national survey. The average cost of treatment figure for the Federal Government is $2,000 per episode. The $200 million he asked

for for over 3 years is 100,000 people times $2,000. We offer to be

an example of closing that gap at the Federal level. We got from Congress last year the first $100 million. We just

got applications for that money, 44 States, the District of Columbia,

Puerto Rico and 20 Native American tribes applied. With some

members, I’m not saying members at this table, of this body, we

had trouble convincing them that we could use that money or be

able to make this program work. I think the fact that we’ve had

the applicants we are of the overall estimates of numbers that need

treatment aren’t sufficient indicates we need the full $200 million

we asked for for the next year.

In addition, we have put in a series of programs that are designed to help to move people into treatment that need it. We have

released moneys that will tie crucial health systems, I was at Ben

Taub Hospital in Houston, in the Chicago area we have funded

County Hospital in Chicago, to train all workers, as well as doctors

and nurses, to screen those people who come into our emergency

rooms, many of whom have accidents or are suffering from substance abuse, to screen them and to give them the training to provide them reliable ability to refer individuals to intervention or

treatment for substance abuse.

In Houston, they will do 100,000 people this year. They will

spread it to their satellite community clinic center and do a million

people a year. We have 7 million people we estimate that need

treatment. Many of them are in denial, as we know, every family

suffered substance abuse directly or indirectly. The most pernicious

part of this disease is denial. We need help to bring people in. We

have asked for additional moneys to support drug courts where,

when individuals come into the criminal justice system largely because they have an addiction, rather than allowing them to go

down a path to jail, we use the supervision of drug treatment

courts, as you know, to get them into treatment and to help them

stay there, which we know is a key to their success.

We’ve had trouble getting those funds. Congress funded half our

request.

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Ms. WATSON. Excuse me, I’m going to ask you to yield before the

Chair makes his——

Mr. WALTERS. Sure.

Ms. WATSON. This is explosive, but I’ve got to say it. If we could

take the financial benefit out of it, and I’m just going to throw that

out, and anyone in the audience, and then our panel can figure out

what that means, but some way, No. 1, we’ve got to treat people

who are already addicted.

Mr. WALTERS. Yes.

Ms. WATSON. But we have to take the benefit of people on the

streets who sell this stuff. And somebody up on that 40th floor in

the financial institution is involved. Too much money in it.

Mr. WALTERS. Yes.

Ms. WATSON. So we have to do several things at the same time.

Certainly try to eradicate, and I don’t think we ever do it, because

I remember opium in the far east going back centuries. I understand that in Afghanistan today, there are farmers now growing

the crop to support their families.

So we’ve got to work on the consumption over on this end and

the business that surrounds it. Thank you very much. I appreciate

your response.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, Ms. Watson.

Mr. WALTERS. If I could just touch on that point, we’re focused

on the international programs. The international programs of the

Federal Government, just to put it in context, because I think it is

a point of emphasis, are a little over $1 billion total worldwide, 9.1

percent of the Federal drug control budget. Interdiction is a little

over $2.5 billion at our borders, a little over 20 percent of the budget request. Domestic law enforcement is a little over $3 billion, or

25 percent.

Forty-five percent of the overall budget is prevention and treatment, 55 percent is supply control, including all those things. The

single largest area of funding, at 29.4 percent, is the $3.7 billion

we spend on treatment. We have made progress in prevention in

the last 2 years. We want to treat people, because most of this cocaine, as you know, is going to dependent individuals, and we need

to reduce that demand, and we need to do it through treatment at

multiple points.

But we are not, I didn’t mean to suggest forgetting to do law enforcement in the United States, and of the key component that Administrator Tandy, who will be on a subsequent panel has done, is

every single case DEA does has a money component. Take the

money out, find the money. We do not believe we’re doing a good

enough job against the money. But we are doing a better job

against the organizations and the structures that fund this here

and abroad. We’ve linked in a consolidated way the business of the

drug trade and focusing intelligence and enforcement efforts

against that business.

So we hope that in the future we will be able to both parallel

what we are doing at home in what we’re doing with other nations,

as well as our partners in other parts of the world.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. Van Hollen,

any questions?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right, I think that’s all. Thank you

very much.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, could I ask just two questions?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you for your patience. One is, I talked a little bit at the end of my questioning about reductions and the eradication and whether they affect price and purity. Can you tell me

what the most recent price and purity data from your office is,

what does it show?

Mr. WALTERS. We have not seen a change in price and purity in

the national average over the last couple of years in any aggregate.

What I said was, we anticipate, given what we’re seeing with the

magnitude of eradication and interdiction, worldwide we seized 400

metric tons of cocaine in source countries and in transit last year.

That’s a record. And we know that it takes, the estimate is roughly

18 months to 12 months for the floor from the pipeline in the fields

to the streets of the United States. We expect to see that now, but

we have not seen a change. I can give you the individual reports

of price and purity for cocaine and supply those for the record.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would you do that, please?

Mr. WALTERS. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. And last, following up on the Ambassador’s questions on that, the precursors that you mentioned earlier that go

into the production of the drugs and the money, obviously, what

are we doing with respect to the manufacturers of those precursors

and the distributors and to the banks or other financial interests,

what’s our effort there?

Mr. WALTERS. Not to dodge, but some of the subsequent witnesses can give you more detail. Overall, what we have tried to do

is identify key controllable precursors. Sometimes it’s difficult because they are widely used, things like kerosene or some petrol

products. There are some precursors that have been more critical

in the refining process, and we’ve had efforts at various places to

control them. In some cases, they have been forced to use less effective chemicals as a response and in some cases they’ve used new

methods, so we tried to stay at it.

I think the most encouraging thing on the money side is the effort that Colombia and Mexico have made with us to go after the

black market peso, the exchanges which we believe are a source of

funding a great deal of this, where money comes back through a

system that’s been used in some cases to evade taxes even on a

larger scale in Latin America than to launder drug money.

Now, we also know that there are instances where people move

bulk cash out of the country, we seize it, we’re increasing our efforts to focus on that as well. But what we have tried to do now

for the first time, and I believe you will see cases, frankly, in the

next 12 months, that begin to go after the larger volumes of money.

But we have billions of dollars here. We consider it a weakness

that we have not been able to do a better job.

Now, a substantial portion of that money is of course being

pulled out at the local level where the money first turns from drugs

into dollars. And it’s being used to fund criminal activity and other

activities in our own cities. There are people, I was just in Chicago,

who believe we ought to call our urban drug traffickers urban terVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:01 Dec 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96408.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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rorist instead of drug traffickers, because of the violence, the shooting, the murder and mayhem that they cause.

But we need to do a better job on the money side of it. But it’s

also, you know, there aren’t an enormous number of things we

need to do. It’s basically common sense. We need to collapse this

business. We have to begin with demand, everybody agrees with

prevention, we have to do treatment. We have to be able to go to

where the source is, so they can’t operate with impunity.

But we also have to do a better job at home. My office has begun

to work with major metropolitan areas to bring together demand

and enforcement. We’ve begun to work with our Federal partners

to create a consolidated priority targeting list of major organizations. We want to go after the business as a trade, and I think your

question is right on point, we need to accelerate that. But that is

something we’ve learned I think in regard to terror we have to do.

It’s a small number of people, but we’ve got to find them because

they do a great deal of damage.

Mr. TIERNEY. In the GAO report that came out of the Senate testimony back in June of last year, talked about a lack of adequate

performance measures with respect to Plan Colombia. If I just turn

that over a little bit and say, do you have any performance measures with respect to how we’re doing against these manufacturers

and distributors of precursors and the financiers?

Mr. WALTERS. I don’t think we have a clear numerical goal on

the precursors, simply because some of them are controllable, some

of them aren’t. We’re not quite sure how much is being diverted.

We try to put in diversion control programs in a variety of these

countries that have had some effect. But because we don’t entirely

know how much they use, or it’s hard to tell sometimes how much

is being diverted from year to year. We have seen changes in the

past in the aggregate quality of the product.

For example, Bolivian-produced, on average Bolivian-produced

cocaine and cocaine base is of very low quality. It’s largely, we believe, being sent to Brazil, because it’s a fledgling market, where

inferior product can be consumed. But it has not been able to maintain that. Some of that is because of chemical controls as well as

the ability to control the market. So it does vary. It’s hard to give

you a precise answer, because we can’t rack and stack the exact

number of gallons that go in and get diverted in each place.

But let me try to get back to your staff and to the committee

with the best information we have, because it is an important sector.

Mr. TIERNEY. I thank you for that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Souder, you have some

followup.

Mr. SOUDER. I wanted to make an addition to Mr. Tierney’s information request. Accountability is one of the most difficult things

we have here. But when you respond with the price and purity figures, if you could also include any evidence on stockpiling, because

we simply don’t know what happened in some of this period, including how long is the shelf life of this cocaine when it heads out.

We certainly have found piles of it different places that may have

gone before the implementation of our plan. How long and what potentials are in that messes up our numbers? Because if you have

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a 5-year shelf life, a 10-year shelf life, a 2-year shelf life, if we have

stockpiles in Mexico or in places in the United States, that messes

up our measures of effectiveness.

The second thing is on the signature program, because I’ve been

perplexed by this for a long time, that we apparently depend on determining where the stuff’s coming from a lot on the production

method. And in watching the production method, as others copy

Colombian methods, is it possible that some of this has moved to

Mexico? Are we confident of the signature program and what are

we doing with that?

Mr. WALTERS. I can answer two of those. On the shelf life, I’ll

get back to you on, because I want to give you accurate information. I am concerned about stockpiling as well. We have no evidence, concrete evidence of significant stockpiling. There have been

theories that one of the reasons we haven’t seen more of a reduction is that first of all, the FARC had stockpiles in what was the

demilitarized zone, and when the Government of Colombia went in

or ended that zone, they may have shipped those out.

There also has been some speculation that the right wing

paramilitaries, the AUC, in engaging in these peace talks, may

have taken stocks and moved them out of the country. We do not

have concrete evidence to confirm that at this point. So we don’t

know whether there’s——

Mr. SOUDER. What about Mexico?

Mr. WALTERS. We do not have evidence, to the best of my knowledge, maybe other witnesses will have something else, but we work

pretty closely together on this, because we’re trying to measure the

flow of substantial and large stockpiles that would affect the overall measure in a strategic way.

On the signature program, we do use processing, you’re absolutely right, of course. We are trying to develop another method

that will allow us to determine where the product comes from

based on where the plant is grown. We are funding this and it

looks promising. We’re trying to accelerate that as rapidly as possible with DEA’s laboratory and we’ll give you a full brief on that,

and your staff, at a time convenient to you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK, thank you very much. We’re going to

move to our next panel, we’ll take a 2-minute recess. Thank you

very much, Director Walters.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Again, I want to thank our witnesses for

appearing today. Joining us on our second panel will be the Ambassador of Colombia to the United States, the Honorable Luis Alberto

Moreno. Ambassador Moreno will provide the committee with an

update on his country’s ongoing fight against drugs and terror. Several important leaders in the administration who are key figures

in the battle against narcoterrorism also join us. We welcome the

Honorable Roger Noriega, the Assistant Secretary of State for

Western Hemisphere Affairs; the Honorable Robert Charles, who

will be with us in just a minute, Assistant Secretary of State for

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; the Honorable Thomas O’Connell, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; General James T. Hill,

the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command; and finally, last

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but not the least, the Honorable Karen Tandy, the Administrator

of the DEA.

We welcome all the witnesses and their testimony today. It’s our

policy that we swear you in before you testify. If you’ll just rise

with me and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. I think you know

the rules. Ambassador Moreno, we’ll start with you. Thank you for

being with us.

STATEMENTS OF LUIS ALBERTO MORENO, AMBASSADOR TO

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA; ROGER F. NORIEGA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE;

ROBERT B. CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; THOMAS W. O’CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS

AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; GENERAL JAMES T. HILL,

U.S. ARMY COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND; AND

KAREN P. TANDY, ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT

ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Ambassador MORENO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ranking member and distinguished members of the committee. It is my distinct

pleasure to appear before you today to discuss developments relating to Plan Colombia and the current situation in my country. I

have a written statement that I would like to submit for the record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection. All of your written

statements will be in the record, as will, I might add, let me just

interrupt you, Mr. Souder has a statement he wants to put in the

record.

Mr. SOUDER. This is an insertion about the Colombian conflict.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection, that will be inserted.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Go ahead.

Ambassador MORENO. Thank you.

Let me begin by thanking the U.S. Congress for its support in

Colombia’s ongoing fight against drugs and terror and express my

appreciation to the House Committee on Government Reform for

holding this hearing. It pleases me as Colombian ambassador to

the United States to pay tribute to the chairman of both the committee and the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and

Human Resources Representatives Tom Davis and Mark Souder,

for their personal commitment to the fight against the scourge of

drug trafficking and their contribution to security and developing

it in Colombia.

I am pleased to report today that the U.S.-Colombian partnership under Plan Colombia and its successor programs has proved

a sound investment for both our nations. Now in its 4th year of implementation, Plan Colombia has played a significant role in combating terrorism and narcoterrorism, restoring economic growth

and strengthening the rule of law, human rights and alternative

development opportunities.

The illegal violent actors in Colombia’s conflict have close ties

with international networks that engage in drugs and arm trafficking, money laundering and other criminal activities. The United

States is helping Colombia to cutoff the resources that these terrorist groups use to wage their war against Colombian society. Every

day, thousands of Americans and Colombians work side by side,

building a more secure and prosperous Colombia, and by extension,

help advance U.S. strategic interests in the hemisphere.

In recent years, Colombia has seen dramatic results in the eradication and interdiction of narcotics. I don’t want to burden you or

the committee with figures, all of which can be found in my written

testimony. But I want to stress that there have been advances on

every front. As of December 2003, coca crops were reduced by 33

percent, more than 300 tons of cocaine with an estimated street

value of $9.5 billion have been seized since Plan Colombia started,

and more than 9 metric tons of heroin have been removed from the

U.S. market in 2003 alone.

The current government’s democratic security and defense policy,

with key U.S. cooperation, has significantly enhanced the size,

training and capabilities of Colombia’s armed forces and police.

More than 16,000 police officers have been added since 2000, with

the result that today, every municipality has a police presence—a

first for Colombia.

As for the military, we have added 52,000 plus combat ready

troops since 2000, a 60 percent increase. In addition, our armed

forces have greatly improved their ability to move rapidly to conflict areas, thanks to U.S. provided helicopters and other specialty

aircraft. These assets have been critical in the success of the aerial

spraying program, both for the actual spraying of illegal crops and

protecting personnel engaged in this dangerous activity.

Enhanced military and police readiness has shifted the balance

in the fight against narcoterrorist groups responsible for much of

Colombia’s violence and civil rights abuses to the government’s advantage. As a result of Plan Colombia, the Colombian armed forces

and national police have intensified military operations against

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these organizations. This is shown by significant increases in captures and casualties of members of all illegal armed groups.

Importantly, with U.S. intelligence and training assistance, the

Colombian military is being increasingly successful in going after

high value targets in the terrorist leadership. In the last 5 months,

two high ranking members of FARC have been captured. U.S.

training and equipment have produced a new type of military force

in Colombia: more professional, more efficient, more motivated, better equipped and more respectful of their obligation to human

rights and international humanitarian law.

The U.S. Government has provided training in areas like antiterrorism, anti-kidnapping, bomb disposal and protection for senior

officials. Notably, in 2003 alone, 73,000 members of the Colombian

military received intensive training in human rights and international humanitarian law. There was a significant decline of

human rights violations in Colombia during the year 2003, including a 48 percent decrease in extra judicial executions. To cite an

example, homicides of trade unionists fell by 57 percent during

2003, and were down a further 25 percent in the first 4 months of

this year.

A vast program of judicial reform is underway in order to adopt

the accusatorial system used in common law countries, a change

that is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the administration

of justice. To that end, 39 new oral trial courtrooms have been established with USAID, and training has been provided for 3,400

prosecutors, judges, magistrates and defense attorneys, as well as

more than 700 community based conciliators.

Since the beginning of Plan Colombia, nearly 200 persons have

been extradited to the United States for criminal prosecution, and

in 2003, prosecutions for money laundering rose by 25 percent,

while asset forfeiture cases increased by 42 percent. The United

States and Colombia have successfully implemented alternative development and other social programs to help coca and poppy farmers’ transition to legal activity and provide relief to other citizens

affected by terrorism and crime. More than 45,000 hectares of legal

crops are now in place, benefiting more than 34,000 families who

have committed to give up the cultivation of illegal crops.

Plan Colombia has also successfully completed 835 social and

economic infrastructure projects, including roads, schools, health

clinics and sewer systems in the southern region of Colombia,

where this development leads to reduced dependency on illegal

drug cultivation and production. It has also provided assistance to

more than 1.6 million internally displaced persons, individuals and

families who have been forced to flee their homes and communities

because of violence.

Additionally, U.S. support for military and social programs has

enabled the Colombian Government to earmark the necessary resources for education and health care. This has translated into a

substantial increase in the number of children enrolled in public

schools and a significant enlargement in the reach of the public

health care system.

A strong, growing Colombian economy is fundamental for stability and defeating drugs and terror. Plan Colombia has contributed

significantly to restoring investor and consumer confidence and

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fueled economic recovery in the country. GDP growth in 2003 was

3.8 percent, the highest rate since 1995, and more than 1.2 new

jobs were created. Following the renewal of the Andean Trade Preferences Act in 2003, Colombia-U.S. bilateral trade grew 10 percent

in 2003 to $10.1 billion, contributing to the creation of thousands

of jobs in both countries. Building on that momentum, Colombia

and the United States have just started free trade negotiations. A

free trade agreement with the United States will significantly enhance Colombia’s long term economic prospects and security, and

create a positive and predictable environment for new foreign and

domestic investment.

While significant progress has been achieved under Plan Colombia, the battle against narcoterrorism is far from over. Colombia

and the U.S. need to consolidate the gains in terms of security, law

and order and economic growth and begin to look ahead to ensuring lasting peace, stability and prosperity in the long term.

Some specific challenges ahead are as follows: sustaining the

military offensive against narcoterrorist groups. As Colombia continues to take the fight to the terrorists, the country will need sustained U.S. assistance in the medium term. This assistance is vital

to consolidate the security gains achieved so far and to ensure the

success of ongoing military operations in remote areas of the country. Moreover, continued U.S.-Colombian cooperation on the

counter-narcotics and transnational crime fighting fronts will help

to starve narcoterrorist groups of the drug proceeds they need to

maintain their fighting and logistical apparatus.

Consolidating economic recovery through an FTA with the

United States expanding international trade and attracting foreign

investment remain critical to promoting economic growth, employment and security in Colombia. An FTA with the United States

will not only increase exports and promote job creation, but also

help attract foreign direct investment to the country in such crucial

sectors as oil and gas, where Colombia has enormous untapped potential.

While Colombia continues to exert military pressure on

narcoterrorist organizations, the government has opened the door

for talks with groups and individual combatants genuinely interested in giving up their arms. The government is determined to

seek a peace agreement with these groups in accordance with our

legislation and mindful of international standards. Within this

framework, a peace process with the AUC is currently underway

with international verification. And there is now a distinct possibility of negotiations with the ELN under the auspices of the Mexican

Government.

As part of any agreement, demobilizing illegal combatants must

be realized on a scale never before attempted in Colombia. Therefore, these processes will pose enormous challenges and require significant financial resources.

We must continue to provide help to thousands of Colombian

families who have been displaced by terrorism and violence. This

means returning them to their homes and communities, helping

them find productive employment and generally enabling them to

restart their lives. It is also imperative that we work to repair the

damage done to our valuable rain forest ecosystems by terrorists

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and drug traffickers, both in terms of forest destruction and the

widespread dumping of precursor chemicals into the Amazon River

systems.

Colombia looks forward to working on the consolidation of Plan

Colombia, in order to build on the progress we have realized to

date and to develop new, cooperative efforts to address the changing nature of the conflict. As President Uribe aptly put it during

his recent visit to the United States, we are more now than ever

determined to stay the course.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Moreno follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much, Ambassador

Moreno.

Assistant Secretary Noriega.

Mr. NORIEGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you and members of the committee for your continued leadership on U.S. policy toward Colombia, and in particular, on your willingness to engage with Colombian Government officials and to take congressional delegations to Colombia to see for

yourselves the reality there. We believe that the engagement of the

U.S. Congress, the leadership of the U.S. Congress on this issue is

crucial to developing, implementing and maintaining momentum

behind our policy on Colombia, which is, I think you will agree,

paying solid dividends for our national interests. It is these common efforts between the Congress and the executive branch, and

the bipartisan support that this policy enjoys, that make a big difference to our success and the prospects for meeting our objectives.

You see before you here, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, members of an interagency team here, that work together

well in implementing this policy. There are many who you have

met also in the field, in Colombia, led by Ambassador Bill Wood,

members of the various agencies that are represented here who put

their lives at risk, playing an important role in implementing our

policy in Colombia. I want to recognize their great contribution.

Mr. Chairman, you and your colleagues know this integrated policy very well. We support the Colombian Government’s efforts to

defend and to strengthen its democratic institutions against the

acute threat of narcoterrorism, to promote respect to human rights

and the rule of law, to intensify counter-narcotics efforts, to foster

social and economic development and investment, and to address

immediate humanitarian needs that Colombia is confronting.

As several of you have seen for yourselves, Colombia is a vastly

different country today than what it was just 5 years ago. Then,

many feared that South America’s oldest democracy could unravel

to a failed narco-state. Today, Colombia is heading in a very different, very promising direction, consolidating itself as a stable nation that provides security and stability for its citizens. Today, Colombians have greater confidence and optimism for the future.

Today it is the narcoterrorists who are on the defensive.

Colombia’s economy is growing and investors are again looking

to tap the rich entrepreneurial spirit of the Colombian people, the

private sector. The Colombian people overwhelmingly support

President Uribe’s leadership and in establishing democratic security for all of Colombia’s people. In addition to providing vision, determination and a sense of urgency, President Uribe has accorded

16 percent of Colombia’s national budget now to national defense.

While serious challenges remain, the news from Colombia over

the past several years tells a story of steady progress. Since 2002,

the Colombian national police supported by the United States, has

sprayed close to 760,000 acres of coca and coca cultivation has declined dramatically each year. Opium cultivation declined by 10

percent in 2003, and we are always seeking new ways to find that

crop and kill it.

With the expanded authority provided by the U.S. Congress,

we’ve been able to assist Colombia’s counter-terrorism efforts

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against the 30,000 people who make up three guerrilla groups, the

FARC, the ELN and the AUC, each of which have been designated

a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Government. The Colombian military, in concert with the national police, is taking the

fight to these terrorist groups like never before, significantly stepping up defensive operations and arrests.

At the same time, President Uribe continues to hold out the possibility of a peaceful settlement to these conflicts. Both the AUC

and the ELN have demonstrated an interest in such a process in

recent weeks. However, President Uribe has insisted, I think wisely, that irregular groups observe an immediate cease-fire and end

their illegal activities as preconditions for this process moving forward.

The recent massacre of 34 coca farmers in the northern town of

La Gabarra is proof that the FARC guerrillas have yet to forego

their use of violence and their involvement in the drug trade. While

we support the peace process as part of President Uribe’s strategy

for defeating terrorist groups and imposing the rule of law, we have

made clear that any settlement must hold criminals accountable for

their crimes. In particular, we have stressed that we will continue

to press for the extradition of Colombians indicted by the United

States.

President Uribe’s Plan Patriota has put the FARC on the defensive. Last year, the Colombian military effectively cleared the province around Bogota of terrorist fighters. This year, they have expended operations in south central Colombia, deploying troops into

the traditional FARC stronghold, reclaiming municipalities that

have long been in the hands of that organization, disrupting important lines of communication that are important to the terrorist

threat and also to the narcotics trafficking.

These efforts have produced real results, extending a permanent

security presence into all of Colombia’s municipalities. Internal displacement is down by 50 percent. Fifty key terrorists and their financiers have been killed or captured just since July 2003. Colombian defense spending is up, and the attacks on the vital Cano

Limon oil pipeline is down dramatically in the last several years.

Our human rights goals complement our policy. We consider Colombia a committed partner in promoting human rights, but we

also leverage the human rights conditionality of our assistance program to push the Colombian Government to sever all paramilitarymilitary ties, and to bring to justice military officials involved in

human rights violations, or involved with paramilitarism. We will

continue to treat the protection of human rights as an essential

part of our policy. Frankly, the Colombian Government can and

must be even more proactive in identifying and remedying weaknesses in its human rights record.

The human rights of our own citizens are at stake, too. We are

now at about a 16 month mark for the captivity of three Americans

who were part of our programs there, Keith Stencil, Mark

Gonsalves and Thomas House. We are doing everything that we

possibly can to arrange for their safe return.

Mr. Chairman, our counter-drug efforts in Colombia are complemented by our programs in neighboring states where the illicit

drug trade presents a historic problem. Our strategy is not to push

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coca cultivation from one country to another or from one part of a

country to another, but to hammer away at every link in the drug

chain in all of the countries concerned. We have made steady

progress in reducing illicit crops in both Peru and Bolivia, as well

as securing greater cross-border cooperation from Colombia’s neighbors. We also recognize that trade and economic interaction must

be part of our strategy, so that Colombia and, for that matter, its

neighbors have the resources to carry on this fight and defend their

sovereignty. That’s why the trade talks that we are having with

Andean countries is clearly very important.

Mr. Chairman, skipping ahead, President Bush is committed to

maintaining a robust partnership with Colombia, and we appreciate greatly Congress’s abiding bipartisan leadership on the subject. It is important to note that the Colombian people themselves

have shown the political will and have shared the financial burden

to win the war and eventually to win the peace. We thank you very

much, Mr. Chairman, and I’m prepared to answer any questions

you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Charles, I have to swear you in. You were not here for the

swearing in.

[Witness sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. The light will go

on after 4 minutes, try to sum up after 5. Your entire statement

is in the record, and we appreciate the job you did with the Speaker’s Drug Task Force before you came here and now with the administration. Thanks for being with us.

Mr. CHARLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I really sincerely

want to thank you for holding this hearing and for frankly becoming so engaged in Plan Colombia and the Andean Counter-Drug

Initiative. I think it’s saving lives by the thousands and I think

leadership by the U.S. Congress makes a huge difference. So I

wanted to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman Souder and

frankly, the Republican and Democratic leaders in the House of

Representatives and Senate.

Oddly enough, I think we are also at a unique, almost unprecedented moment. I think we are aligned. That leadership, your leadership in this chamber and in the Senate is aligned with a remarkable administration team that sees eye to eye with mutual respect,

including Secretary Noriega, Secretary O’Connell, General Hill, Administrator Tandy. If you had us off microphone, we would be

agreeing as fully as we will agree with you probably on the things

we have to say today.

I also think that is aligned with a third star element which is

the U.S. ally, Colombia, and the extraordinary leadership of President Uribe and Ambassador Moreno. This is a unique time, and it

is in that spirit that I want to offer you my thoughts, which will

be abbreviated. Again, I want to thank you for inviting us.

Plan Colombia, complemented by our regional efforts in the

Andes, represents a significant investment by the American people

and the Congress to fight the flow of drugs responsible for ending

thousands of young lives each year in America, to fight powerful

and entrenched terrorists in this hemisphere and to protect democratic rule across the Andean region. The success in Colombia over

the past few years would not have been possible without strong

leadership from President Uribe, who took office in 2002. His administration has taken an aggressive position against

narcoterrorism, which enables our Colombia programs to work. It

is again my pleasure to testify with my colleagues today, all of

whom are leaders in their own right.

In a sound bite, you have given us the power to make a difference, and in fact the investment in our national security is paying off. Generally, Congress has a right to look not only for sound

policy and well managed implementation but also for a measurable

return on the American people’s investment. While measuring the

shift of tectonic plates can be difficult, I believe we are seeing real

and one may hope lasting change.

In short, your investment is paying off in numerous ways, and

you’ve heard the statistics, so I’m not going to go through them

again. What I will say in real broad brush strokes is you have drug

cultivation in Colombia down for a second straight year. By the

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way, the only time that has happened in the last 14 years, and a

double digit reduction at that, as Mr. Walters indicated.

Second, you have, despite recent killings by the FARC, you have

violent crime and terrorist attacks down and falling. Third, you

have a respect for rule of law expanding in palpable, measurable

ways and putting tap roots down in places we never had the rule

of law. And finally, we’re providing meaningful, often innovative alternatives to poverty level farmers, titling land, giving them opportunities they never had before by the thousands. The Andean

Counter-Drug Initiative, as you know better than I, is a multi-front

effort that does not begin and end with counter-narcotics. It is a

robust effort, yours as much as ours, at creating a sustainable, regional, deep-seated and democratically faithful alternative to the

destruction in terror on personal, national and hemispheric levels

that comes from drug trafficking and drug funded terror.

In short, what we do in places like Colombia has a direct effect

on us here in the United States, whether it’s Fairfax County or

Fort Wayne, IN, or any of the other locations represented, it is directly affecting the security and the safety of hometown America.

Our policy and our commitment, our aim is to wipe out

narcoterrorists. We will never fully eliminate drugs from this hemisphere, but we can get them down to a level where they are de

minimis and where those organizations are completely taken off

the face of what we worry about day to day. Also to help Colombia

seize their assets, strengthen Colombia’s institutions and increase

legitimate economic opportunities for those who wish to live free

from drugs and terror.

Central to the larger Andean Counter-Drug Initiative is restoring, preserving and sustaining the rule of law in cities, towns and

the countryside in Colombia. Strong congressional support will be

critical to reaching the end game, to consolidating the gains that

you have heard already talked about and no doubt will elicit from

us.

So what is the end game? It’s a hemisphere in which drug funded

terrorism and corruption of struggling democracies by drug traffickers, by drug violence and by drug abuse on the streets of Bogota, but also back here at home in Mr. Cummings’ district in Baltimore and all over this region, are simply reduced to a point where

if they’re not de minimis, they’re dramatically down. And they are

manageable at that lower level.

As Assistant Secretary at INL, I have put a premium on management of these programs. INL is working with Congress, OMB,

GAO, the State Department, IG’s office and others in the executive

branch to ensure the accountability that you require of us and that

we should require of ourselves, that it is front and center and that

every American taxpayer dollar that you give us to spend is actually achieving the purpose that you intend. For example, INL is

working closely with the State Department’s Bureau of Resource

Management and with OMB to develop outcome measures much

talked about earlier today that have in fact been front and center

during the OMB-led program assessment rating tool process. We

aim to make our programs models for performance based management.

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Since time is short, I’m going to jump right to my conclusion.

That is that you will get from us the full promise to work together

as a team, and you will get from me the dedication that INL will

be trying to lead its programs toward the kind of conclusions you

put in legislation and expected of us. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Charles follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. O’Connell, thank you for being with us as well.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Chairman Davis, distinguished members of the

committee, it’s my honor to appear before you today to discuss the

Department of Defense programs and policy that support that National Drug Control Strategy, and provide a current assessment of

this strategy’s effectiveness in Colombia.

The Department appreciates the support Congress provides, and

it’s critical to our efforts in fighting narcoterrorism in Colombia. In

fact, last week, sir, I had the honor of spending a solid afternoon

with Representative Souder’s staff over here, in a very instructive

exchange on a wide range of issues. We do, sir, appreciate the congressional interest and support that we get.

Over 75 percent of the world’s coca is grown in Colombia, and

nearly all the cocaine consumed in the United States is produced

and shipped from Colombia. This coca is primarily grown in remote

areas of Colombia where there is little government control. Colombian narcoterrorists receive large majorities of their funds from

protecting, taxing and engaging in this illegal drug trade. These

narcoterrorists seek to overthrow the freely elected Colombian Government, the oldest democracy in Latin America.

The Secretary of Defense has promised Colombian President

Uribe increased support for the Colombian counter-narcoterrorist

effort. Under President Uribe’s leadership, Colombia is regaining

control of areas long held by the narcoterrorists. It has made exceptional progress in fighting drug trafficking and terrorism, while improving respect for human rights. Colombian security policies have

diminished, the ELN put the FARC on the defensive and pushed

the AUC to come to the negotiating table. The Colombian Government and its people are committed now more than ever to save

their country.

With only a few years left in office, the continued leadership of

President Uribe offers Colombia a unique window of opportunity to

preserve democracy. This administration supports President Uribe

against FARC and other narcoterrorists by providing resources in

support of Colombia’s Plan Patriota. In order to maintain the momentum achieved thus far by the Colombians, Congress provided

expanded authority in fiscal year 2004 to support Colombia’s

counter-narcoterrorist efforts. In the same year, expanded authority has been crucial to leverage our resources both against narcotics and terrorism. We thank Congress for supporting our request

to extend that expanded authority to fiscal years 2005 and 2006,

and in the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization bill.

The Department asked Congress for reprogramming authority of

$50 million during this current fiscal year and I’m pleased to report

that the Department will be able to increase our efforts in Colombia in fiscal year 2005 by some $43 million.

In the coming year, as the Colombian military will be conducting

full scale operations across the country, the personnel cap will

begin to have a deleterious effect on Colombia’s counternarcoterrorism mission. The current troop cap limits the U.S. presence in Colombia to 400 military personnel and 400 contractors

under most conditions. SOUTHCOM manages this on a daily basis,

often canceling or postponing personnel travel to Colombia. While

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U.S personnel will not be directly on the front lines, more training

and planning assistance will be required for the Colombian military, who will be directly engaged on a broader front to defeat the

narcoterrorists.

We should support this effort with manning that bolsters increasing Colombian military needs. Consequently, the administration requested an increase of the personnel cap to 800 military and

600 contractor personnel. The administration’s request of 800 military personnel and 600 civilian contractors is part of a well-defined,

well-phased plan. The administration’s plan was developed with

the government of Colombia to maximize the impact of its Plan

Patriota. The Department urges that the administration’s request

be supported.

As an aside, sir, I’d like to pay tribute to my administration colleagues here at the table. This is a tough and hard working administration team that works well together and realizes the challenges

we’re up against.

As a last thought, sir, I’ve had the opportunity to be both on the

ground 20 years ago as a U.S. officer, fighting terrorism in Colombia, and I’ve had the opportunity to stand with Secretary Rumsfeld

and President Uribe. Those 25 years have seen a remarkable

change and I look forward to being able to answer your questions

later today.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Connell follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Hill, welcome.

General HILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Souder. I’m

honored for this opportunity to appear before you today to provide

my assessment of Plan Colombia.

I greatly appreciate the support of the committee for the U.S.

Southern Command and to soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Coast

Guardsmen and the civilian personnel I am so privileged to command.

As I mentioned in my written statement, Colombia is at a decisive point. Although there is much work to be done, our country’s

significant investments in Plan Colombia and the Andean Ridge

Initiative are beginning to show substantial results. The trends are

generally positive. The Colombian economy is growing, major categories of criminal activity are down, narcotics production is down,

terrorist attacks have been cut almost in half. Desertions and demobilizations by the narcoterrorist organizations are increasing.

The military has grown into a professional, competent force that

respect human rights and the rule of law and has gained the strategic initiative. I am therefore guardedly optimistic that President

Uribe and his government can bring security and stability to Colombia. Over the past 22 months, I have traveled to Colombia 26

times, and will go again next week. I have worked closely with

President Uribe, Minister of Defense Uribe and his predecessor,

Minister Ramirez, along with General Ospina, the Chief of the

Armed Forces, and his predecessor, General Mora.

I have seen these strong and determined leaders in action. I have

visited all corners of Colombia and witnessed the tremendous cooperation between our armed forces. I have seem the professionalism and increased capabilities of the Colombian military. I have

also been inspired by the dedication of the Colombian soldiers in

their daily fight to defend Colombian democracy against vicious

narcoterrorists.

I have observed Colombia’s leaders inculcate the government and

armed forces with an aggressive spirit. The Colombian people believe they can win the war against the narcoterrroists and end the

violence. They are operating in an established governmental presence in areas of the country they have not been in in decades. They

have built and are executing an extensive and aggressive campaign

plan to systematically break Colombia’s narcoterrorists’ will to

fight.

Fully understanding that the problems of Colombia do not have

a simple military solution, President Uribe and his administration

are building the political, social and economic systems that will

eventually return Colombia to the ranks of peaceful and prosperous

nations. However, as it currently stands, President Uribe has only

two more years in office, which coincidentally will mark the end of

Plan Colombia.

Consequently, it is important that we sustain the progress that

has been made under Plan Colombia, and that he gets our steady

support to set all of his long term initiatives firmly into place. As

one of the oldest democracies in this hemisphere, a key trading

partner and supplier of oil, a staunch ally and only 3 hours from

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Miami, a stable Colombia is important to our national security interests.

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you. I look

forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Hill follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Ms. Tandy, thank you for being with us, last but not the least.

We appreciate the job you’re doing.

Ms. TANDY. Thank you, Chairman Davis. It’s a privilege to be

last before you today and also Chairman Souder. And certainly an

honor to discuss with you today the Drug Enforcement Administration’s counter-narcotics role in Plan Colombia.

I want to thank you first for your strong leadership and support

of DEA’s work worldwide, and certainly specifically in Colombia.

Few tasks are more critical to the security, peace and prosperity

of the western hemisphere than dismantling and disarming Colombian drug cartels and their terrorist associates. Both the FARC and

the AUC depend on drug trafficking as the primary means to support their terrorist activities. Plan Colombia’s integrated strategy

to combat the narcotics industry is working, and it is crucial to sustaining the progress that we have achieved to date. Plan Colombia

and the courageous leadership of President Uribe have provided

critical support to a number of coordinated and hugely successfully

Colombian national police and DEA investigations.

As you noted, Mr. Chairman, 6 weeks ago, we announced the indictments of nine leaders of the Norte Valle cartel. As you noted

in your opening statements, this cartel is responsible for exporting

more than $1.2 million pounds of cocaine to the United States since

1990, that value in excess of $10 billion. The cartel has been estimated to be responsible for a third to a half of the cocaine brought

into this country, and it paid the AUC to protect its operations and

its members. The indictments against the Norte Valle cartel are

made possible through Plan Colombia.

While the plan provides limited direct support to DEA, its impact

in bolstering Colombian institutions and the rule of law has created a climate favorable to law enforcement. The justice sector reform program in particular has strengthened law enforcement institutions and infrastructure and directly supports two DEA programs in Colombia. First among these is the Bilateral Case Initiative. That initiative undertakes investigations of drug trafficking

and money laundering organizations outside the United States for

prosecution inside the United States. Under this program, we have

built prosecutable cases in the United States that have led to more

than 50 convictions.

The second Plan Colombia supported program that DEA is involved in is a communications interception program that’s funded

by almost $5 million from Plan Colombia as part of the justice sector reform money. This wire intercept program enables the Colombian national police to gather intelligence through judicially authorized communications interceptions. Effectively carrying out

these kinds of enforcement actions requires strong coordination

with U.S. law enforcement and diplomatic communities and with

our Colombian counterparts. And within Colombia, DEA consults

on most U.S. counter-drug programs and coordinates with the Department of State and with other Federal agencies. And I am especially proud of the effective working relationship that DEA has cultivated with the Colombian national police, Colombian prosecutors

and other Colombian law enforcement counterparts of ours.

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Within this cooperative framework, DEA continues a number of

our own initiatives that are critical to our success in Colombia. Our

Sensitive Investigation Unit, which we refer to as SIUs, take the

lead in operations against the consolidated priority target organizations and other related targets. The specialized financial investigation groups that we have set up have focused on divesting traffickers of the proceeds of their crimes, and we’re working to interdict

the flow of drugs to the United States by targeting go-fast boats

leaving Colombia, and in the last year, we have almost doubled cocaine seizures through Operational Firewall.

We are also working in Colombia’s airports to stop heroin and cocaine couriers. Our strong partnership with Colombia and the programs that I’ve just described have led to major enforcement successes. For example, Operation White Dollar dismantled a massive

international money laundering ring responsible for laundering

millions of drug dollars through the black market peso exchange.

It resulted recently in 34 indictments and the forfeiture of $20 million in the United States.

These are victories, these are successes for Colombia, but these

are victories for America. When we dismantle drug cartels, we

eliminate criminals responsible for bringing in massive quantities

of poison into our own neighborhoods and reciprocally, we know

that violence, instability and terrorism in Colombia are fueled by

American drug consumption. Our successes strengthen Colombia

and ultimately protect Americans from the misery of drug abuse.

I thank you again for your continued support of DEA’s work, and

I’m sure I can speak for all of my colleagues and good friends on

this panel that we are all very pleased now to answer any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tandy follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER [assuming Chair]. I thank you all, and I’m going to

start the questioning, then Chairman Davis will be back to do some

additional questions.

First let me thank each of you and through you, all the people

who work for you for their valiant efforts. With all the news focused on Iraq and secondarily Afghanistan, it’s often forgotten by

many American people that far more people are dying per month

because of drug abuse than we’re actually losing over the whole period of the Iraq war, and that Colombia is one of our, certainly

even if you take Iraq and Afghanistan, the Indian expression would

be, you can count them on one hand and have enough fingers left

to bowl.

In other words, there are very few countries that get as much

money in foreign aid and in direct assistance as Colombia. As Congress, we have to have a lot of oversight on that and a lot of focus,

and we can’t lose track either of the deaths in the United States,

the battles going on in Colombia, or the hot war in what’s happening financially as we go through our budget.

I also want to, even though we’ve had some very interesting conversations and I can’t say how glad I am to see that Mr. O’Connell

is in your position at the Defense Department. You’re in a very

critical position not only to back up SOUTHCOM but help

CENTCOM, as well as Mr. Charles, having both Iraq and Afghanistan in his portfolio.

It’s important that people in your position understand that there

is an interrelationship which you can really see in Colombia between the terrorists and the drug money. We’re seeing that around

the world and having people who are working all those simultaneously, even if the general public doesn’t understand we’ve actually learned a lot in Colombia that now is applying in other areas.

And how we stand up and how we work with that information,

is very important because you’re in positions with which to transfer

that. And now with DEA on the ground and Afghanistan as well,

we can kind of take those worldwide experiences, and secondarily,

that you haven’t forgotten about Colombia. Because while we’re

working on those highly visible things on television, the key thing

is that it’s still the primary supplier of cocaine in the world, and

our major supplier of heroin and other things along with Mexico.

With that, I have a couple of particular questions. I wanted to

make sure I asked General Hill a question, Mr. O’Connell made

some statements about the 800 military advisors that are proposed

in the President’s budget. I wonder if you could elaborate on that

a little bit, why you think that’s necessary.

General HILL. Succinctly put, I need a lot more flexibility to support the Colombian Plan Patriota. About a year ago, they briefed

me on this well thought out, conceived campaign plan, not a onetime military operation, but a campaign plan to retake the country.

Specifically in the old Despye area, where they have not operated

in 20 years.

Today, they have the better part of two divisions and nine brigades, along with the joint task force out there conducting that

fight daily. And they’re having some wonderful success. What I

need to be able to do is put enough planning assistance teams in

there, logistical planners, operational planners, to assist them in

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carrying out this very valuable fight. I think all of us across the

table have mentioned to you that we are at an increasingly closing

window given President Uribe’s time in office and for the end of the

existent Plan Colombia. They will coincide together in 2 years.

We need to take every opportunity to ensure that our already

significant U.S. investment pays off. I believe that we can offer

militarily a great deal of planning support to the Colombian military effort that I’m not able to do right now underneath the cap.

Mr. SOUDER. I may do a followup to this, but I wanted to directly

ask you this question. A number of years ago, General Wilhelm,

when he was head of SOUTHCOM, said he was even micromanaging how planning and control, command and control systems were

working on the ground, because the Colombian military was so in

effect disorganized. It seemed as we first visited in the 1996, 1997

period, Ambassador Moreno would know, because he’s kind of been

the continuity of the Colombian Government and the voice and the

picture of Colombia here in the U.S. Congress, and we really appreciate his continuity.

But somewhere in there, when we started to go down, it seemed

like the Colombian military never won a battle. In fact, we’d visit

a place and then the next year we’d go down and we couldn’t go

there because it had been overrun. There are areas of combat, but

what progress have you seen to respond to Mr. Duncan’s concerns

earlier? Have you seen changes in the Colombian military? Are the

military advisors having that impact on the military?

They certainly seem to be taking casualties. They seem to be taking some victories. Could you talk about that from a commander’s

sense? Because General McCaffrey, when he was there, was saying,

look, this is going to be a long effort to rebuild this, to get vetted

units, to do the human rights. Then General Wilhelm, General

Clark and others.

General HILL. Well, I think the work of my predecessors and the

work of the Colombian military is in fact, it has made them a substantially better unit. They are a substantially more competent, capable force than when I assumed command 2 years ago. I have

watched them. I took over command about the time that President

Uribe came into office, within days of each other. He has inculcated

in them a spirit of aggressiveness and they have responded. He’s

provided them the political support along with the Colombian people, and they have responded. They have moved out of the barracks. They are out in the field in the fight.

Yours and the American people, through the Congress, substantial investment in Plan Colombia, the ability with the helicopter

support that allows them to move rapidly around the battlefield,

around the country in effect, take on the battle. So in just pure

operational sense, they’ve improved significantly.

I don’t believe 2 years ago when I took command that you would

have said to me, they’re going to develop this Plan Colombia, Plan

Patriota, excuse me, and then they’re going to go out into the old

Despye area and they’re going to stay out there, not for 18 days,

but for 18 months and conduct a campaign. I would have said

there’s no way they can do that. They’re out there doing it today.

And we are out there with them, helping them in a very meaningVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:01 Dec 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00168 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96408.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ful way with advice, logistics and operational sustainment. This is

not an easy military problem, and we’re out there doing it.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. O’Connell.

General HILL. Could I have one point, Mr. Souder?

Mr. SOUDER. Yes.

General HILL. The other thing that they’re doing I think that’s

very important, and it should not go unnoticed, they have established a center for coordinated and integrated action. What is that?

That is when an office that says, when we retake an area militarily, we will flow in directly behind it in a coordinated, integrated

manner in order for those other elements of governance to ensure

that we can stay the course in that village, and they’ve done a wonderful job of it.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. O’Connell, in your written testimony you had,

I believe, stated that you were going to work for additional forward

operating locations. Because one of the problems was when the

FARC particularly moved over to the eastern side of Colombia and

where we suspect they may have our kidnapped Americans, it’s

very difficult to move, because it’s Amazon basin, it’s parks, it’s

jungle. How are we going to deal with that, and do you have particular plans in the budget?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Sir, on that, on the tactical operational side, if

you don’t mind, I’ll defer to General Hill.

General HILL. What the Colombian military has been able to do

is very early on in the fight, under Plan Patriota, they reclaimed

several major airfields in that area. Then they had flown in logistics behind them and it allowed them to both sustain the fight and

to take their own aircraft, either helicopter, rotary wing or fixed

wing and conduct operations out of there.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Sir, when you referenced forward operating locations, with respect to those FOLs that we’re concerned with outside

of Colombia, as you know, the closure of Roosevelt Roads has posed

some financial difficulties that we had not anticipated. And you

and I have discussed those before and what demands on other accounts that we just——

Mr. SOUDER. So you were talking about the in between, on the

way in and out of Colombia?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. As opposed to inside Colombia, where we also have

a given problem?

Ambassador Moreno, my impression is, and I know this was in

the written testimony, but if you could expand on it now. You certainly alluded to it and had some detail on a number of towns

where they actually have mayors now and have city councils up

and running. There was not an understanding that until you get

order and security, who wants to be a mayor? Could you talk a little bit about that, and then how you see that progressing into some

of the zones where we still don’t quite have functional control?

Ambassador MORENO. These are very important questions, Mr.

Chairman. Let me begin by saying that about 5 years ago, about

30 percent of the municipalities in Colombia did not have the kind

of military or police presence that we have today. Today all the municipalities have, the municipalities in Colombia have them. So inasmuch as this has been a policy of gaining the upper hand from

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the law enforcement side, from the eradication of coca, from the alternative development and the institutional strengthening, it has

also been a battle for control of the territory in Colombia. Because

without that, or absent that, it’s impossible to really do the success

that we require in terms of drug eradication.

Certainly, for instance, when President Uribe came into office

there were a number of mayors who had basically given up and resigned because there was either no security or simply because they

didn’t feel they were capable of doing their jobs under those circumstances. Today, increasingly with the help of General Hill,

we’re doing a lot in the way of planning, and integrated planning

between both the military operation as well as the civilian side. Because I think we need the hearts and minds of the people in many

of these municipalities. You require not only to have the security,

but also to have the government be able to deliver services.

Some of the things we have found, many of these municipalities

that basically, the only thing that happened was the production of

coca, or perhaps not viable the way they used to be. So it would

require much more good work on the side of the government. But

this is precisely the phase in which we’re in right now.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you, and I want to mention two other

things before I yield the Chair back to Mr. Davis. We really appreciate the efforts, Director Tandy, on-going after the financial and

the money situation and what you’ve done to break up some of

these big networks and follow through. And that I never really

fully understood, until we got into the Afghanistan question, that

even for DEA to be able to work on the ground, you must have

some semblance of order. Because the DEA agents aren’t the military. It is important to be able to infiltrate the different networks

and to be able to move out farther, as the military establishes

those zones, and then the DEA can move in, as we’re attempting

to do in Afghanistan, and start to break up the financial network.

It’s fine to talk about how we have to break up the financial networks, but if you can’t get to the sources, because you’re afraid of

being blown up, it is a very difficult job. I appreciate the recent efforts. Do you have any specific requests of where you think Congress should focus more on DEA related to Colombia?

Ms. TANDY. We have a number of issues with technology in

terms of keeping pace with the changes in technology to support

our ability to continue our partnership with the Colombian national police and the Intercept program. And it is the interception

of communications that is key to our collection of intelligence to determine who is moving the billions of dollars derived from the

American drug consumer. That is at a rate of about $65 billion a

year, and to date, in the past, we have only successfully seized, and

I say we, that’s all Federal, State and local law enforcement, less

than $1 billion.

We have a long way to go. We have restored that priority within

DEA, it was lost over the last number of years. And it is the No.

1 priority in DEA, because we will never effectively dismantle these

cartels if we have left their money in place. To that end, as part

of our right-sizing proposal, which has cleared the House and is in

the Senate, we will be, once that is approved, if it is approved, we

will add a money laundering task force to Bogota to complement

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our SIU that we have with DOS in Colombia that is currently focused on the money.

We have challenges in that regard of simply having the necessary funds and boots on the ground to go after the money.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much. I will yield back to Chairman Davis. I know there are other questions I have. I want to

thank you for that.

I also want to make sure we have adequate radar coverage in all

parts of the country, and we’ll continue to talk about parts of Colombia where I have concerns, and also the ability to track. There

is a sophistication where communications networks get better. And

also, I’m pleased that we’re able to work together with some of the

private sector people who weren’t particularly helpful for a while.

Chairman TOM DAVIS [resuming Chair]. Let me just say thanks

again to all of you. It really has been a team effort, as I think several of you have said in your testimony. Mr. Ambassador Moreno,

let me ask you a question. The hero of today, which is the Colombian army, which is I think taking unprecedented steps to go into

FARC controlled areas and other areas, do you think they have the

staying power to defeat the FARC and the ELN? Do you think

they’re helping to bring the ELN to the conference table? Talks are

going on, they’re starting to sustain some heavy casualties. This is

really a new test. Can you give us your appraisal of that? And then

I’d like to hear from General Hill on the same thing.

Ambassador MORENO. Yes, Mr. Chairman, clearly there’s an opportunity with the ELN, the Mexican Government has been very

cooperative. In fact, recently they named their Ambassador to

Israel to begin the initial contacts with the ELN leadership to see

if we can get to a situation where a negotiation can proceed. President Uribe from the beginning has always stated that our big condition for any pace process is that of a cease-fire and ceasing of

hostilities that would permit any process to go forward. I think it’s

too early to tell.

My sense is from what I hear, and I would like to hear, of course,

from General Hill, who is closer to the military on these issues,

that the relative of the ELN progressively has been losing some of

their strength as a result of clearly the better campaign that the

military is doing with success, especially on territory controlled

throughout the country. As that campaign under their control is

successful, any group, any terrorist in Colombia will have a harder

time going about its business.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What’s the, in terms of the casualties and

everything else that the army is taking on, any kind of ratios?

What’s happening with the FARC and the ELN as we go into some

of these areas? What kind of resistance? Are we hitting them and

they’re running? Try to give me a feel for what’s happening.

Ambassador MORENO. I will try to give you some. Again, I would

like to be complemented by General Hill.

In terms of the number of both casualties and deserters, the

numbers are very impressive. I mean, the last numbers that I’ve

seen are around 7,000 in the last year between FARC, AUC and

ELN, between people who have lost their lives on the field and

those who have deserted. Clearly, the push on desertion has been

working very well. This we have done again with some U.S. fundVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:01 Dec 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00171 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96408.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing, especially for child soldiers. The number of combats, which I

think is a very important denominator, has increased significantly,

meaning that the army more and more is doing combats on the

field. This is a very deep change from what it was as recently as

2 years ago.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. General Hill, what’s your appraisal?

General HILL. Let me take that from a couple of different angles,

Chairman Davis. One is in military parlance, which is the close

fight, and the other is the long fight, or the deep fight. On the close

fight, not only what they’re doing with Plan Patriota, but they’re

standing up a special operations command, they’re improving their

ability to operate jointly, they’re doing a lot better in terms of intelligence sharing. And that has allowed them to conduct tactical military operations that they were simply incapable of doing 2 years

ago, both in terms of major combat operations and in terms of specialized operations, going after the heads of the organizations.

Ambassador Moreno mentioned combat actions. In 2003, they

were involved in 2,312 distinct combat actions. That’s a 73 percent

increase from 2002.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And that’s it. The government’s initiative,

not a reaction, for the most part?

General HILL. Yes, absolutely. Because if you would look at the

results of Plan Patriota in the early stages, the first 2 or 3 or 4

months of it, what we’re seeing is a delaying action by the FARC

in the sense that they are putting out a lot more anti-personnel

mines, they are trying to fight in smaller organizations and they

are trying to avoid major combat. That was to be expected.

The problem for them, however, is they will not be able to avoid

that forever. Because the military is not going to go away. They are

going to continue to push the fight. That’s near term.

Let me talk about one thing just in terms of long term. The one

thing that separates the U.S. military from most militaries in the

world, and if you brought in anybody in uniform and said, what’s

the one thing that makes you different or better than anybody else,

and the answer is, non-commissioned officers. Non-commissioned

officers and the responsibility that we give to non-commissioned officers.

I had a long discussion about a year and a half ago with General

Mora, who was then the chairman of their Joint Chiefs, and General Ospina, the head of the army. And along this professionalization, they wanted to professionalize the Colombian NCO

corps. So my Command Sergeant Major and several senior NCOs

from SOUTHCOM went down, began working with the Colombian

Army, and they have built a non-commissioned officers sergeant

major academy, started the first class with us teaching it, only

Army. Second class, mutual teaching, included some Marines.

Third class includes all services. They did a scrub of their senior

sergeants major and opted about 30 percent of them to retire, and

have changed the role of the sergeant major from an admin role to

a combat role. This will put them, long term, in a much better

stand.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. When they go out on these missions, are

they accompanied by American advisors?

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General HILL. No, sir. We are prohibited from being any, in a direct combat role. We stay on secure bases only in a planning assistance role. And in my request for the CAP increase to 800, those

rules of engagement do not change.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do you have any idea how many Americans are currently held captive by the different groups, contractors

or——

General HILL. Sir, there’s three.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Just the three?

General HILL. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Let me ask Secretary Charles, is it

still your position that the Colombian air wing program is best left

where it is? There’s a lot of debate about moving the program to

a law enforcement agency. Have you been able to identify and assess any existing problem areas with air wing at this point?

Mr. CHARLES. I think it belongs where it is. But the second part

of the question is a very important one. And the answer to it is

that since the 9 months I’ve been there, one of the focal points has

been evaluating the air wing.

In a nutshell, that air wing has run on a shoestring for a long

time. And God bless them every one for having been able to achieve

what they have to date. But the air assets need support. And one

of my missions, in addition to putting performance measures on the

contracts and penalties in place for contractors and contractor oversight is also to look at the capital account of that air wing.

You’re talking about an air wing around which the environment

has changed, and which is responding very well to the changed environment. But nevertheless, in 2002, you had about 194 hits on

that air wing. The next year, 2003, you had about 383 hits on it.

Even this year, while there’s been a reduction in hits, the risk environment is very high. It complements exactly what General Hill

has been talking about, and Ambassador Moreno. As you get closer

and closer to the burning ember of the FARC, the heat is felt by

everybody. And it’s being felt here.

That’s good, in the sense that we’re having an impact. And it will

be good as we capitalize that account and make sure they know

how to do their job there and frankly elsewhere in the world. That

air wing also operates in Pakistan and other locations for other

purposes. But the short answer is, I’m very confident that it belongs there, that it is functionally and operationally where it belongs. But it is also true that proper management of the air wing

is an imperative, and I’m working on it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do you know how the Colombian Government will use the recently acquired DC–3 airplanes for opium

poppy eradication efforts? These planes, will they make it easier to

find and eliminate the hard to reach or concealed fields of opium

poppy?

Mr. CHARLES. As you may or may not know, I am a strong advocate of that particular decision.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That’s why I asked you.

Mr. CHARLES. I appreciate it. I know you are, too. I think this

is again an example of the U.S. Congress working closely with the

administration. And I think we all know that the heroin that shows

up on the eastern seaboard, whether it’s Congressman Cummings’

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district in Baltimore or whether it’s the 352 deaths outside of Chicago, Speaker Hastert’s, or whether it’s anywhere is chiefly coming

on this side of the continent from Colombia. That means we have

to be very aggressive about addressing it.

What those DC–3s do is they give us the opportunity now to get

the altitude with manual eradicators and to complement other programs. Let me just tell you how important we think, I think and

I think this entire table thinks heroin is. Frankly, the leadership

for this also comes as much from the Colombian Government as it

does from the American government, from the U.S. Congress; 1,200

kilograms of heroin seized last year, DEA has an entire operation

that is affecting it, Operation Firewall, significant maritime interdiction, together with other efforts. DEA runs the Heroin Task

Force in Bogota, 50 DEA and CMP members, very aggressive on

it. We’re targeting heroin organizations, which never occurred before.

In the last 2 years on eradication, in 2002, we talk a lot about

coca. But let’s not forget the significant impact of heroin. In 2002,

there was a 25 percent reduction, in 2003, there was a 10 percent

reduction. What do we mean by these reductions? Why do they

count? Why do they matter? They matter because they are deterrents.

Just like in the cold war, aggressive, continuous, consistent, sustained effort ended in victory in every reasonable sense of the

word. The same thing is what we’re shooting for here. We’re looking for an end game that puts deterrents in place, so that if you

destroy those crops again and again and again, people say, the

heck with it, the risks are too high, the prosecution too high, police

are now in every district.

The short version of this is we’re doing good things. We’ve also

got a rewards program. Heroin will not go away soon, but we are

aggressively tackling it, and the DC–3s are a big part of it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just picking up where you left off, we’ve spent

4 years there. It seems like we’re not—well, what’s your vision?

Mr. CHARLES. My vision for Colombia, my vision is really the

President’s vision and this table’s vision. I think it’s shared, if you

ask that question of all of us, more or less in the same way. I think

we are blessed by extraordinary leadership right now in Colombia.

I don’t think that will last forever. It never does anywhere in the

world. But I think we have a moment, a window of opportunity.

I also think objectively we’re at a tipping point. You’ve heard me

use that phrase before, but I believe it with all my heart. We are

at a point where if we do right at each of the missions that we have

here, if we stay in our lanes and get it done right, what we will

end up with is a dramatic reduction in both heroin and cocaine production. We cannot give up on prevention and treatment. They are

central to what we’re doing. But we will make those, as I think Director Walters said, manageable.

As I think Chairman Souder also said and as you’ve said before,

you can’t do those things unless you get the supply down. Because

supply of addictive drugs not only destabilizes the country, not Colombia in this case and its region, not only feeds terrorism, but it

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kets. So if you bring supply down, you make manageable the rest

of the demand reduction side. The vision is that we will never get

rid of drugs completely in this hemisphere or in the world. Human

beings are weak and they have faults and they become addicted.

However, what we can do, we never got rid of crime in Los Angeles, never got rid of crime anywhere in the world. What we will do

is reduce it to a manageable level, where people can breathe better

and safer and feel both in this country and across the hemisphere

that they are not being constantly victimized by major

narcotrafficking, and frankly, also narcoterrorism organizations.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So how you measure your progress?

Mr. CHARLES. You always have three or four measures that you

work with. You’ve got your inputs, and we’re putting them in there

and you’re putting them in there. That matters. You’ve got outputs.

We’re getting direct outputs. We’re seeing that hectarage is coming

down. We’re seeing that prosecutions, interdictions, extraditions,

all the key things that you’re looking for that way are going up.

And then you have outcomes. That’s how many kids do we see

not being victimized ultimately by these drugs. How many families

are not destroyed in this country by this menace. And I think we

will see, as Director Walters said, in the next year to 2 years, next

12 to 24 months, you should see some impact, probably first on purity, because that’s where it will typically show up first, and then

ultimately on price. And you’ll have to see it metropolitan area by

metropolitan area. The DEA collects a lot of this data. You’ve got

the Stride data and other data is collected metropolitan, you should

see Dawn data eventually change.

We have one real, really unusual advantage when we talk about

the drug war. We have done this before successfully. Some things,

when SARS came up and other things, these are brand new. How

to tackle them is not clear. We try against a new event.

But in this case, between 1985 and 1992, cocaine use in this

country dropped by 78 percent. The number of marijuana users,

regular 30 day marijuana users, dropped from 21 million to 8 million. Heroin purity was back at about 7 to 10 percent. It can be

done. With this kind of team and your support, it will be done.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I want to just zero in on Colombia. As you’ve

heard me say many times, people in my district, deal with terrorism on our streets every day. The neighborhood I live in, we have

terrorists on the corners. And 300 people dying a year, and probably about 500 or 600 being saved from death because we have one

of the best shock trauma units in the world, and a lot of that having to do with drugs.

I guess what I’m trying to figure out is, the people in my neighborhood say, we don’t have any planes. We don’t have any boats.

And when they see money going into interdiction, the question is,

well, how does it even get into our neighborhoods. And I try to explain it to them. It’s hard, though. It’s hard. And there are a lot

of people that almost believe that, not almost believe, believe that

we are not putting forth our best efforts, and that’s putting it lightly, in this war on drugs.

I don’t feel that way, because I get a chance to hear all this. But

I can tell you that this 4 years we’ve spent—about how much

money have we spent in Colombia? Do you know?

172

Mr. CHARLES. Well, Plan Colombia is a 5-year plan at about $3

billion, give or take.

Mr. CUMMINGS. $3 billion. And it just seems to me, the reason

why I asked you about the vision, and the reason why I asked you

about how do you measure success, is that I think that all of us

want to make sure that our tax dollars are being spent effectively

and efficiently. No matter which side of the aisle you’re on, that’s

what you want.

And I guess, I just want to make sure that as we go about the

business of spending money in Colombia, and I understand how,

you know, it moved from Colombia, and I’m saying everything you

just said about eventually it showing up in weaker forms on the

street and all that, that’s very significant. But I just want to make

sure we’re doing something that’s effective and efficient. That’s why

I asked you about the vision. There are a lot of people who basically wonder, in my district, whether we are truly being effective.

Mr. CHARLES. I never forget, Mr. Congressman, that you live on

a block that you’ve lived on for many, many years.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Twenty-three years.

Mr. CHARLES. Twenty-three years, goes up by 1 year every year.

And on that same block is a crack house, or was a crack house.

That story has never left me. I know that we will only truly be

showing success downstream when we have done all of the pieces

of the drug war right, and when it shows up your street corner.

That’s the end game. I come from a small town, but the principle

is the same. In order to get there, we have to get this stuff out of

the system. It takes time. People ask, what about price and purity.

The answer is, we don’t know how much excess capacity there is

in the system right now. I think Director Walters said it well, we

are tackling this, we are shrinking the overall production environment. That has to go hand in glove, I know you were just in that

shock trauma unit. And we have to go hand in glove to make sure

that the treatment is effective and real and captures the people

that need it.

The same thing is true with the kids. We’ve got to reduce demand by preventing them from making the worst decision of their

life. We’ve got to educate the parents, so that they not only know

that piece of it’s happening, but that the rest of this expenditure

is very real. It’s a weapon of mass destruction in its own way. And

we’ve got to keep it out of this country. And it will simultaneously

stabilize the rest of the hemisphere, which allows people to have

incomes elsewhere outside of drugs.

But I am very sensitive to the point you make which is that it’s

got to show up here in America in a meaningful way on your street

corner. And we are all, I think, at this table committed, every one

of us, to that mission.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Administrator Tandy, how are we doing with regard to justice in Colombia? You and I have had this discussion before with regard to, I guess it was Afghanistan, about making sure

that we don’t have, you know, corruption is reduced and all that.

How are we looking over there in Colombia? Because we’ve had our

corruption problems.

Ms. TANDY. Corruption goes with drug trafficking like disease

with rats. It doesn’t limit itself to Colombia. It is, as you know, an

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issue everywhere there is drug trafficking. Obviously there are corruption issues in Colombia which President Uribe, and under his

leadership has been very aggressive in tackling the justice sector

reform. Part of Plan Colombia also has focused on corruption as

part of its training of now over 10,000 police, prosecutors and

judges and technical assistance in that justice sector piece of Colombia.

The rooting out of corruption is one of the key elements to our

success. It is something that we are constantly focused on. It is a

constant issue, and it will remain one for all of us. But I am confident that it is a shared concern of the Colombian Government

and leadership with the United States.

Mr. CUMMINGS. As far as the money that we spent over there,

how is that money used to minimize corruption? In what ways? Are

you following what I’m saying? In other words, I assume that

you’ve got to have, you’ve just got to have good people, right? I’m

talking about over there, the people that live there, and the people

that are in the armed services and whatever. A lot of people say

you’ve got to pay folks more money. I don’t know whether that’s a

part of the formula or not. How do you make sure, how do you

maximize the probability that you’re going to have minimal corruption? How do we do that as a country, us?

Ms. TANDY. Within the United States, part of that clearly is the

selection process of our members in law enforcement and all of the

other associated members of law enforcement, such as the analysts

and those people with access to information, limiting access.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think you may misunderstand my question. I’m

sorry——

Ms. TANDY. In Colombia?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, in Colombia. In other words, how do we——

Ms. TANDY. I understand.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, here we are, we’re spending $3 billion, corruption is a major, can be a major problem. You can fight all you

want, but if you’ve got people being paid off, you’re going backward

really. And corruption can lead to so much damage, it can lead to

loss of life, if the wrong information gets into the wrong hands.

So I was just wondering, I just want to make sure that we’re

doing what we can with some of our dollars to make sure that we

minimize the corruption. I know it’s going to be there. I’m just wondering what are we doing, if anything.

Ms. TANDY. I can tell you what we are doing. I would defer to

Ambassador Moreno for what the country of Colombia is doing on

a more broad basis. But within our relationship in Colombia, Representative, we start with the sensitive investigative units where

we carefully select the members of those units, we vett them, we

conduct urinalysis, we do background investigations on those people to ensure that we are working shoulder to shoulder with people

who share our same goals and are not corrupt.

The payment, the salaries and benefits for those people I will

leave to Ambassador Moreno to discuss. We have had issues and

continue to have issues with corruption despite that. Part of rooting that kind of corruption out is dependent on the collection of intelligence and knowing where our potential leaks are. We have had

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ligence with select members of the Colombian Government. And

the Colombian Government has acted swiftly to eliminate those individuals who were at issue.

That is in a nutshell, in a very small sum way how we try to prevent it and then how we address it once it surfaces.

General HILL. Could I add to that, Mr. Cummings?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes.

General HILL. On the military side, we assisted the Colombian

military in developing a JAG school, a Judge Advocate General,

JAG school and the standup of a JAG corps. That helps them in

terms of operationalizing investigations of possible abuse or human

rights violations, and also gets at the idea of having an operational

lawyer on scene with their units. The other piece of it is that we

only train and work with units which we have vetted, both in

terms of corruption and in terms of human rights allegations,

through the U.S. embassy and the State Department.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. NORIEGA. Mr. Chairman, if I could add one last point.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We have to move to our next panel, but

that’s fine.

Mr. NORIEGA. The democracy and human rights and rule of law programs amount to about $200 million of that $3.3 billion, including at training of prosecutors, support for the Colombian judicial

system, and teaching a culture of lawfulness, starting from the municipal local level all the way up to training of prosecutors at the

highest level. Especially developing security for prosecutors so that

they’re not afraid of enforcing and imposing the rule of law against

corruption when it’s detected.

Mr. CHARLES. Could I add one refinement to that, Mr. Chairman? Very short.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, you may.

Mr. CHARLES. Exactly what Secretary Noriega described in many

ways is a microcosm, this is a robust program, anti-corruption is

a very big part of it. The numbers of lawyers, 10,000 lawyers,

judges and public defenders have been trained collectively between,

with us in support of the Colombian Government. Training isn’t

perfect, people get disbarred every day.

But the reality is, it’s significant if it has the right components.

It complements the military, the human rights component, the police have vetted units. There is an intense effort not only in the

near term to look at anti-corruption, but the culture of lawfulness

is a program that goes into all the public schools and talks about

the ethics of what a civil government is all about. Frankly, we need

more of it here, too.

But the reality is, that is a long term strategy and it’s complemented by vetted units, and that’s all.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Ambassador

Moreno.

Ambassador MORENO. Very quickly, for Congressman Cummings,

basically, aside from all the vetting, both in human rights and for

purposes of law enforcement and specialized units in the attorney

general’s office in Colombia. The whole issue of corruption the

President of Colombia takes very seriously. There is a task force

175

that is directed by the vice president of Colombia which basically

goes to look at all levels of government, at the local level, the state

level and the national level with 800 numbers, with ways for people to make demands as to very specific things in terms of contracting, having things electronic government, e-government, so that

people can talk about bids, if there’s a problem with a bid they can

immediately address this issue.

So there’s a whole host of things that are built around a program

of anti-corruption at the level of the vice president of Colombia. Is

there corruption? Unfortunately, yes. Director Tandy said clearly

there is, when it’s associated with drug trafficking and drugs. And

that’s why for Colombia, it is not a choice if we destroy enough

drugs, for us it’s an obligation to rid our society, to rid a generation

that has been full of these problems for years, to have our children

live in a country that will be much better as a result.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to ask you if I could answer

to both what Congressman Duncan and Congressman Kucinich,

who I thought was going to be here, but I see that he didn’t come

back to answer some of the questions and to put in written testimony if you don’t mind.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That would be fine, without objection.

Thank you all very much. It’s been very, very helpful to us. We’re

going to take a brief recess before the start of our third panel.

We’re going to be setting up a screen so that one of our witnesses

is shielded from the cameras. As the media knows, this gentleman

can’t be filmed or photographed. We’re in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We want to welcome our third panel, Mr.

Carlos Plotter, and for him, translating we have Ms. Patricia

Cepeda. I’m going to have to swear you both in. Mr. Plotter is a

former member of the FARC. He’ll discuss the time he spent with

the FARC, why he chose to voluntarily turn himself in to the Colombian national police after serving 10 years as a guerrilla. His

testimony will provide a valuable inside guerrilla perspective on

the peace process between the Colombian Government and the

guerrilla groups in an effort to restore authority and control of the

Colombian Government in areas of the country where the government control was lacking.

We are just very appreciative of your taking the time to be here

today and sorry we’ve delayed you. You can stay seated, would you

raise your right hand?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let the record show he said I do. Muchas

gracias. You may begin, thank you.

We’ll allow Mr. Plotter to speak and then you can translate for

him. Thank you very much.

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STATEMENTS OF CARLOS PLOTTER, FORMER POLITICAL COMMANDER, REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA

(FARC); MARC W. CHERNICK, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF

GOVERNMENT AND SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE,

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY; AND ADAM ISACSON, DIRECTOR

OF PROGRAMS, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY

Mr. PLOTTER. [All remarks of Mr. Plotter are given in native

tongue through an interpreter.]

Ms. CEPEDA. First of all, I want to express my thanks to you for

your invitation and for hosting me in this honorable room.

As you mentioned before, I spent 10 long years with the FARC.

My process of re-entering civil society was part of a very important stage, both in my country, in Latin America and internationally.

I am a man from the provinces, and I was raised with very

strong Catholic convictions.

In that same capacity for analysis, in that same feeling that I

was raised with in the Catholic church, led to a deepening of my

social responsibility feelings.

At age 16, I entered the National University of Colombia to study

engineering. And then I entered a period of exposure, not just to

the academic world of the exact sciences, but also to a deepening

of my feelings of social responsibility by doing community service

in the popular neighborhoods of Bogota.

That interaction I had with people from needy communities deepened in me the feeling that I had to put into practice what I believed and thought in feeling.

This was the period when the Berlin wall was falling and when

there was the crisis of socialism, and this combined with the reading of the theories of Francis Fukuyama, the End of History, led

in me a desire to be more conscious of putting into practice what

I thought and felt.

So I joined the Communist Youth in Colombia.

In that international context, there were also some very local political contexts in Colombia which had to do with the ideological

crisis of the left.

What was happening in Colombia was that there was starting to

be process of demobilization of armed groups, such as the M–19,

parts of the ELN and the EPL. But what was becoming obvious

was that there was lots of aggression against parties like the UP

and the Communist party that were trying to participate in the political processes.

Among, in the middle of all that context, I became aware that

I sort of needed to put into practice what I believed, the love of the

people around me and the care for those that needed it the most.

So I put into practice things I had grown up with in Catholicism.

I was looking for an organization that wanted to build a new society toward socialism, and I wanted also an organization that

would protect the work with the gun, so I joined the FARC.

In 1993, I started looking for a way. And this way was unfortunately the one that was most painful for my country. I participated

in guerrilla activities in various spaces of our national geography.

In those 10 years that I spent with them, I saw how the FARC

went from being a political-military organization with a clear ideoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:01 Dec 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00180 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96408.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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logical north to—it became an armed, just an armed group isolated

from a political aim or context, purely militaristic and with a commercial component.

The lure of easy money, which came by the cultivation, the processing and the sale of narcotics, made the organization lose its political route, and went from being an organization that we thought

was a mass organization, a revolutionary people’s organization.

Colombia lacked at that moment the guarantees for development

of social and economic conditions that we all wished for.

But the fact is that we have a new reality in Colombia. There

are conditions now that allow for those of us who might think differently to set out our ideas in a democratic framework.

There’s now an opportunity for the word to win the war over the

gun.

I think democratic spaces are now open for us to oppose a guerrilla force that is fueled by drug money and will not be able to conquer the hearts and minds of the people.

We Colombians are now trying to have an opportunity to resolve

our differences through discussion.

It is a democratic moment where even though some people say

that the Uribe government is a government of the right, but this

is when the opposing forces of the left have achieved a democratic

security to participate in society.

I left the FARC because, simply, theory did not meet up with

practice.

The moral imperative of a revolutionary fighter was simply substituted for the economic imperative.

There was a qualitative sea change. There was no work done

that would add anything to the local populations. The actions that

we were taking simply lessened the local populations.

We are living a historical moment now where we have an opportunity to lay aside the guns and have an opportunity for discussion

and negotiation in a democratic framework for us to enter civil society.

I believe that we now have a possibility to win the war of ideas

with political and social investment and not try to win the war in

the military terrain.

In this last phase of the struggle, I believe it’s now time to turn

to see how Plan Colombia has affected this last phase.

I repeat, I do not believe in an armed resolution to the conflict.

But I do believe that the military help that has come through

through Plan Colombia has given the army new initiative, and it

has also given it increased operational capacity in the terrains that

are dominated militarily by the guerrillas.

The military component, especially in the area of aerial interdiction, has helped in both stopping the influx of dollars, the outflows

of drugs and components and armaments for the guerrillas.

The guerrilla needs the commerce of narcotrafficking. And

narcotrafficking is now the fuel that motors the barbarism that is

taking place in our country.

But I do believe a social component is important for Plan Colombia, one that has the guarantees that crop substitution, that there

will be a market for the crops that are substituted, so there is a

guarantee of livelihood for our peasants.

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The war in our country is essentially a war between two factions

of poor people. Because there are a lack of guarantees for the crops

that our agricultural workers raise, they are forced in fact to raise

coca. If there was solid investment, planning and some guarantee

that the products they raise have equal access and participation in

markets, this will go a long way toward closing the spaces for coca

growing.

What we are looking for is some justice and equity in the negotiations for market processes. But in our economic relations, there’s

some kind of interest in restricting the protectionism in North

America for our products and some kind of equity of access to their

markets that are demanding of us that we open our borders.

In a world that’s every day more interdependent, we now believe

that the democratic processes are the guarantees that we will be

part of some important decisionmaking that takes place internationally, and that there will be equality, fraternity and solidarity

for us also.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Plotter follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much as well. We also

have Dr. Mark Chernick and Mr. Adam Isacson, well credentialed

in this area. Will you raise your right hand with me?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Let me note for the record your entire testimony is in the record.

We’re expecting votes in about 10 minutes, so if you can get

through, we’ll try to get to some questions. Once the bells go off,

we’ll have a couple of minutes, but I want to get you each going.

I’ll start with you, Dr. Chernick and then to Mr. Isacson.

Mr. CHERNICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you very

much for inviting me to participate in this important meeting.

I just wanted to briefly begin by discussing how we got here, because there’s not a lot of clarity about the origins of Plan Colombia.

Because Plan Colombia in its initial formulation was a $7.5 billion

Colombian strategy developed by President Andres Pastrana 5

years ago, with the assistance and the urging of the Clinton administration to address Colombia’s multiple crises. It was to be funded

by the United States, the European Union, multi-lateral development banks, and the Colombian Government.

President Pastrana, when he took office in 1998, originally spoke

of a Marshall Plan for coca-growing regions. He thought that a negotiated peace with the FARC would enable the state to cerate a

legitimate presence in areas largely abandoned by the state, and

would allow the state to promote alternative development away

from dependence on drug related crops. For Pastrana, the peace

process was viewed as an effective anti-narcotics strategy. To this

end, he hoped to enlist the support of the United States.

This original formulation of Plan Colombia was received with

great skepticism in Washington. By the time Congress approved

the $1.3 billion supplemental appropriation in June 2000, the formula had basically been turned on its head. For the United States,

peacemaking and state building was not seen as viable anti-narcotic strategy. Rather, anti-narcotics was viewed as the basis for

pacification and peace.

As such, the approval of the original assistance strategy to Plan

Colombia needs to be viewed from two perspectives: the anti-narcotics strategy, and second, its impact on peace. And I want to discuss both of these.

From the anti-narcotics perspective, Plan Colombia represents

the continuation of a succession of strategies dating back to the

mid-1980’s of attacking production at its source. This can be seen

in the initial operations in the Bolivian coca fields under Operation

Blast Furnace in 1986, in the efforts to destroy the Colombian cartels, what was known as the kingpin strategy in the late 1980’s

and early 1990’s, and the airbridge strategy that effectively cutoff

the Peruvian and Bolivian coca fields from the producers in Colombia.

In each of these cases, the immediate objectives were achieved.

The kingpin strategy effectively dismantled the Medillin and Cali

cartels. The airbridge strategy led to declines of up to 85 percent

in coca production in Peru and Bolivia. However, in every case,

new patterns of trafficking emerged. Instead of large cartels, small

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dicates in Mexico. And the great reduction in coca production in

Bolivia and Peru led to massive increase in coca cultivation in Colombia.

What has happened with Plan Colombia? Massive aerial fumigation by the United States and Colombian Governments finally has

led to a modest decrease in overall production. But as would be expected, the available evidence is that the market has adjusted. New

producers have entered the market and new techniques have been

forged, including agrinomical advances that allow coca production

at lower elevations, effectively opening up the entire Amazon Basin

and not just the foothills of the Andes. The available evidence is

that production is moving into micro-plots scattered throughout Colombia and into newer areas that do not have a historical relationship with coca production.

But the impact of Plan Colombia was perhaps even more devastating for the peace process. The FARC viewed the development

of Plan Colombia as an effort by the Colombian and U.S. Governments to undermine the peace process and to promote a military

solution. One can be skeptical about the sincerity of the FARC in

engaging in talks. There were clearly divisions among their senior

leadership, and they too increased their military actions during the

period of negotiations.

However, the United States basically sent a signal that it was

not interested in the peace strategy. In so doing, it also alienated

other members of the international community, particularly the

EU, which refused to endorse or support Plan Colombia.

After September 11th and beginning in mid-2002, Congress lifted

the previous restrictions that required all military aid and assistance to be dedicated to anti-narcotics. The action has brought the

United States more directly into Colombia’s internal armed conflict,

something that it had previously attempted to avoid. The new posture of the United States converges well with the policies of the

Uribe administration, elected in 2002 on a hard line platform following the breakdown of the peace talks. Current policy is to confront militarily the FARC and to increase the military and police

presence throughout the national territory.

The Uribe government has also initiated negotiations with the

right wing paramilitaries, the AUC. This is a new strategy. It is

one I support. The AUC has been the largest violator of human

rights in the country and the most destabilizing element in the conflict. However, negotiations will be difficult. The AUC is extensively involved in drug trafficking, it is fragmented, it is undergoing a leadership change following the disappearance of its nominal leader, Carlos Castano.

Successful negotiations with the AUC will not lead to peace. The

conflict with the FARC will continue. However, a durable accord

that removed the AUC from the conflict would clarify the nature

of the war between the state and the FARC. Eventually, removing

the AUC from the conflict might clear the way for a negotiated settlement with the FARC. However, this will not happen in the short

term.

To conclude, the war in Colombia has endured in one form or another for 58 years. The war antedates the drug boom. It is deeply

rooted. For 20 years, the situation can be characterized as an escaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:01 Dec 03, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00187 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96408.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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lating military stalemate. Both sides, government and guerrillas,

have escalated their capacities and neither side is likely to defeat

the other.

Under these conditions, I am convinced that there is no military

solution to the conflict. This dose not mean that the Colombian

Government does not have the legitimate right to defend itself. Yet

peace will take more than battling the FARC or pushing coca cultivation into different corners of the country. The United States can

potentially play a major role in ending this conflict. A stable Colombia is in the interest of the United States. But it will require

a rethinking and reprioritizing of the component parts of the U.S.

assistance program to Plan Colombia, balancing needs of development assistance, human rights, humanitarian assistance, judicial

reform and peace promotion with the more visible policies of

counter-terrorism and anti-narcotics.

For starters, one might want to look at the original $7.5 billion

Plan Colombia, the original Plan Colombia, developed by the Colombian Government in 1999. It presents a more balanced approach.

Again, let me thank the committee for its time, and I’ll be happy

to answer any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chernick follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Isacson.

Mr. ISACSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate

the committee for holding a hearing on Plan Colombia, it is absolutely crucial that Congress closely oversee the U.S. strategy in Colombia. And I thank you for staying this late to hear my testimony.

We’ve heard a lot of glowing statements today about Plan Colombia, including Colombian Government statistics showing less violence and less coca. I don’t have alternative statistics, how can I

cover the whole country? But in the last year, I have interviewed

dozens of local officials, religious and community leaders in Colombia, and I’ve heard a lot of skepticism. People on the ground have

seen little change in violence or drug crop cultivation.

A prime example is Putumayo. Putumayo is a province in southern Colombia about the size of Maryland. Putumayo was the main

focus of Plan Colombia when it began in 2000. I visited there in

March 2001 and I was there again 8 weeks ago, in April. In the

3 years in between, the United States has paid for the fumigation

of at least 100,000 hectares of Putumayo, and we funded a dramatic expansion in Colombian military and police capabilities

there. Conservatively estimating, we spent $1 billion in and around

Putumayo in 4 years.

I did see less coca in Putumayo than there was 3 years ago. But

even after wave upon wave of fumigation, it’s still very easy to find

coca there. I took this picture within a quarter mile of Putumayo’s

only paved road. It shows a pretty commonsite, a small plot of new

coca bushes, about knee high, growing in a field that had been fumigated some months before. Replanting in Putumayo is common,

and several people I interviewed said that seeds and nurseries are

very booming industries right now.

Three years ago, Putumayo was full of large plots of coca. They

would go all the way to the horizon, it seemed. Nobody does that

any more, because it’s too much of a target for the spray planes.

But there’s still a lot of coca, and today the plots are different.

They’re smaller, they’re more widely scattered.

But even more disturbingly, everybody I asked there, and I asked

several times, said that the price of coca leaves and coca paste has

not changed since before Plan Colombia began. A kilo of coca paste

still sells for about $800 in Putumayo, the same as it did before the

year 2000. This would seem to violate the law of supply and demand. If fumigation were actually making coca scarcer, the price

should rise. But that has not happened. There is no tipping point

yet.

A gram of cocaine sold on our streets goes for about $25 to $150,

depending on the city. That was as of January of this year. That’s

the same as the studies ONDCP was carrying out in 1995, and

they say there’s been no change in purity. Supply is meeting demand as well as it ever has. This means that the traffickers are

adapting yet again to increased fumigation.

To counter this, we can’t respond just by fumigating even more.

If you want to reduce drug supplies, we have to start thinking

about real governance. There’s no substitute. Eventually, Colombian Government civilians are going to have to be able to look

growers in the eye in places like Putumayo and tell them, what

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you’re doing is illegal, but we’re committed to providing you the

basic conditions you need to make a legal living.

So far we’re nowhere near there. The United States has given Colombia $3.2 billion since 2000, but of that, only 2 percent has

gone to civilian governance or economic aid, even though 8 out of

10 rural Colombians live below the poverty line, creating a very

strong incentive to grow coca. The rest of our aid is going to guns,

helicopters and spray planes. Even with all this military aid, including the creation of all these new vetted units, Putumayo is still

a very dangerous place.

In April, I had to take a canoe across the Guamues River where

the main road had a bridge going across it, but there was no

bridge. Late last year, the FARC was perfectly able, at complete

liberty to bomb out this and several other bridges along the main

road. This was part of a larger wave of violence in Putumayo at

the end of last year. The guerrillas also launched dozens of attacks

on Putumayo’s oil infrastructure.

Meanwhile, the paramilitaries are heavily present still in the

towns of Putumayo. Bodies show up on the streets and roadsides

nearly every day. There’s no peace talk, cease-fire in Putumayo.

The paramilitary attacks on civilians haven’t let up at all. The

paramilitaries are also very easy to find. I came across a dozen of

them in full uniform on the outskirts of one of the main towns.

Meanwhile, everyone there takes for granted that the military

and the paramilitaries help each other and don’t fight each other.

When I asked local officials, religious leaders whether militaryparamilitary collaboration is still a problem, they looked at me like

I was an idiot. They said, of course it is.

Violence and coca persist in Putumayo, despite all of our investment there. We have to learn from this as we hear about ambitious

new plans to aid military offensives like the Plan Patriota that was

discussed in the last panel. The last several years in Colombia are

full of examples of massive military offensives, there have been

many, with no long term results.

This is a familiar pattern. Here’s what happens. Thousands of

troops rush into a guerrilla stronghold, and as we heard in the last

panel, the guerrillas don’t fight back much, they melt away into the

jungle. Maybe there’s an occasional encounter or ambush, but nothing much more. The soldiers then stay in the zone for a few weeks,

even a few months, but they can’t stay forever. When they eventually have to go back to their bases, we find that nobody made any

effort while they were there to bring the rest of the government

into the zone. There are still no judges, cops, teachers, doctors,

road builders or any of the other civilian government services that

every society and economy needs in order to function.

When the soldiers leave, armed groups simply come back and fill

the vacuum. The former FARC demilitarized zone, much of it, I’m

afraid, is still an example of this. There was a huge military offensive there in 2002, but today the rural part of the demilitarized

zone is again dominated by the FARC. Whether you call it Plan

Patriota or Plan Colombia II, if we’re going to help Colombia govern its territory, we have to remember that military power is only

a small part of doing that. A government gains authority by providing its citizens the basic conditions they need to make a living in

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peace. Both of our governments are going to have to spend much

more than to insert civilian government institutions, not just the

military, but the rest into Colombia’s owned governed areas. We

can pay of a lot of this by diverting money away from our fumigation program and our huge military aid program.

In conclusion, this sort of non-military aid doesn’t just neglect security needs. In fact, development aid is security aid, because Colombia won’t have security without it. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Isacson follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you all very much. I’ve been to

Putumayo. What alternative crop would you suggest for these

farmers? That’s the difficulty.

Mr. ISACSON. Well, there are crops and there are products that

will make money. Juice concentrates are showing some promise.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. They’ll make money, but it’s nothing near

what they’re getting.

Mr. ISACSON. Actually, it wouldn’t be that far off. A coca grower

who has three hectares, after they make their payment to the

paramilitaries and to the guerrillas in the area, after they pay for

all their inputs, two hectares will probably give you a net of about

$300 or $400 a month, which, Colombia’s minimum wage is only

$110. But you could probably make that with hearts of palm or

something like that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. They could use some of our ag programs

where they pay you not to grow, you’d probably do better down

there.

Mr. Plotter, let me ask a couple of questions. What was it like

on a day to day basis being a guerrilla? What was the quality of

life like? Did you have running water? Were you living out there

in the jungle in tents? What kind of food did you get? What was

the quality of life compared to going into the city and living a normal civilian life?

Mr. PLOTTER. [All remarks of Mr. Plotter are given in native

tongue through an interpreter.]

Ms. CEPEDA. It was a drastic and a radical change. I grew up in

the provinces, but I always, up to the moment I went into the guerrillas, lived in urban centers.

In my 10 years as a guerrilla, I was always in the geographical

regions of either the big mountain range or the jungle.

The conditions maybe satisfied the military struggle, but they

didn’t satisfy human needs.

We never get used to war. We just become resigned to living in

those conditions.

Our basic sanitary services, for example, are what nature provides.

When the FARC started getting money and when they started

getting more comfortable in the demilitarized zone, those of us who

were outside the zone wanted to copy those bourgeois kinds of accommodations.

What happened was the sacrifice and the personal giving oneself

up to the revolutionary or guerrilla——

[Power outage occurred 6:15 p.m. to 6:25 p.m.]

[NOTE.—A copy of the transcript held during the power outage

follows:]

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Ms. WATSON. I mean, do you lose sight of what your original goal

was?

Mr. PLOTTER. [All remarks of Mr. Plotter are given in native

tongue through an interpreter.]

Ms. CEPEDA. There needs to be a distinction between what was

the central objective, which was the taking of power and the methods and scenarios where these objectives are trying to be developed

and reached.

The taking, a Colombian expression famously said, do you want

to take power, for what. And my question is, do they want to take

power and have power over the ruins of a country?

But we now have the chance to nullify the power of the gun, because we have democratic mechanisms and democratic scenarios

where there can be divergence of opinion, divergence of ideas and

there can also be dissent. So we do not have to take recourse in

a fratricidal war.

And this war among brothers has its fuel in drugs and the drug

business.

Ms. WATSON. Just let me say this, and then we’ll all have to go.

Was it the narcotics that fueled the revolution in terms of financially, or could there be another kind of way of keeping a stable

democratic government other than the proceeds from narcotics?

And then that goes over to this group, however, we’re not going to

have time.

Mr. PLOTTER. [All remarks of Mr. Plotter are given in native

tongue through an interpreter.]

Ms. CEPEDA. No, it was not always like this. Before drugs fueled

the armed struggle, there was from the part of the guerrilla a really partisan, committed ideology based on the population and based

on looking, and the search for a better society.

The qualitative jump in the characteristics of the FARC is that

now they have a much better, much improved arsenal as a product

of drug profits.

Ms. WATSON. Muchas gracias.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Dr. Chernick and Mr. Isacson, how could we better use our money? You heard what I said a little earlier. We spend

a lot of money, and everybody here, all of us, we want to be effective and efficient. How do you see, what do you see as a better way

of using our money, assuming we want to use it to reduce drug production in Colombia? How would you approach it? Apparently you

don’t feel too good about the way we’re doing it right now.

Mr. CHERNICK. My feeling, and I think most people who have

looked at the drug war, as they call it, over the last 15 to 20 years,

is that the current strategy is not successful. We continue to move

it around and we show no results, zero results. Something else

should be done.

You can change the circumstances in a particular country. We’ve

done that in Bolivia and Peru, and we are changing things in Colombia, change, not lowering, changing politically, changing the

war, changing the political actors, changing the social movements.

But what we’re not doing is stopping the flow of drugs. So I think

something else needs to be thought on the drug side, and it probably means placing a lot more baskets on the demand side.

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Even then, you must remember, the United States is not the only

country fueling the demand for drugs. Brazil is now the second

largest consumer of cocaine, and Europe is close behind. So that

there is a growing global demand. And that’s going to be met.

That’s simply economics. That’s supply and demand.

And the drug war shows, you can send all the planes and helicopters you want, and you will simply push it around, you will not

alter the laws of economics, of supply and demand. If you understand that, you need to think of a new way to approach the drug

problem.

Second, a separate problem is the issue of the war in Colombia,

and what is the impact of a war on drugs and the war in Colombia.

My contention is that the U.S. drug war now collapsed into a war

on terror is simply fueling the war. The United States should be

on the side of the democratic side of democratic security, of promoting development, of dealing with humanitarian crises and dealing

with human rights. And it should be putting its money and its diplomatic and its political weight on that side. It could go a long way.

But one should not collapse the drug war and Colombia’s internal war. One should deal with Colombia’s problems and one should

try to address the issues of Colombia’s armed conflict through some

sort of negotiated settlement.

Mr. ISACSON. Very quickly, right now the United States gives Colombia about $750 million a year. I don’t think any of us dispute

that amount. I think we all endorse that. That is a good investment if it’s done right. Our problem is that is 80 percent going to

the security forces. And it’s not looking at the reasons why people

grow drugs, why people have no choice but to join the guerrillas

and paramilitaries if they happen to live in the rural part of Colombia, which is a vast area.

It’s hard to even imagine from here, but these are zones where

most people have come within the last 30 years, cut down some

jungle and tried to make a living and their government never followed them there. If somebody tries to take your land, you can’t go

to a judge and get it adjudicated. You can’t get a land title, which

means you can’t get credit. There’s no road for you to take your

legal crops to market. And there’s no cops to settle any dispute.

Your kids can’t go to school so they end up unemployed and probably joining one of the armed groups.

There’s a whole lot of other needs that our aid really isn’t meeting. But we certainly have no problem with the amount or the level

of commitment.

Mr. CUMMINGS. So in other words, if the economic and social

problems aren’t addressed, you’re going to continue to have these

problems and we’re going to continue to pour money into Colombia,

and it’s just going to be a bottomless pit.

Mr. CHERNICK. Mr. Plotter mentioned that the FARC are able to,

are very freely able to recruit like crazy in the areas under their

control. Why? Because there’s a lot of people there with nothing to

do. And as long as those social conditions are there, you’ve got this

reserve army of drug growers and future guerrillas and paramilitaries. That’s absolutely true.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me just ask, the Homestead Act,

President Lincoln did so much to develop the west here and the

gold rush and everything like that. Would something like that be

conceivable for Colombia?

Mr. CHERNICK. I think so. Actually, a lot of the places we’re talking about, like Putumayo, some of the people that came in the

1960’s and 1970’s came at the behest of the Colombian Government

as what they called colonization plans. But the Colombian Government didn’t followup.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. They didn’t have Wyatt Earp following it

up.

Mr. CHERNICK. That’s exactly right.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. No cavalry and everything else.

Mr. CHERNICK. No Pony Express, either. Nothing.

Mr. ISACSON. Could I just add something? There is a problem

here. It is true that Colombia has this really hundreds of years

process of colonization of what they call the agricultural frontier.

It’s like the Homesteading Act. The problem is with most of the

areas of homesteading, it’s not only that they don’t have title to the

land and therefore the state doesn’t have infrastructure, no roads

to market and all that, but most of this area is not suitable for agricultural production. Most of this is very fragile rain forest that

does not lend itself to agricultural production.

You asked, what else can you grow? In most places, nothing. And

that is, one really needs to think about it. I in fact worked with

the World Bank on a project of creating alternative poles to development. Because it’s not only alternatives crops, it’s in fact alternative poles of development that would draw populations out of the

forest. Because one can’t think of simply continuing the colonization zones. They’ve thought about that in the past. Half the country

is basically unpopulated.

But it’s not suitable for habitation. And one needs to think of a

different relationship of the population in that lands. The alternative development question hasn’t even begun to address that

issue.

Mr. CHERNICK. That’s true.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Well, our votes are on, and I

don’t want to hold you while we go over and do them, but it’s been

very helpful. We appreciate all of your perspectives, as we put this

in the record and as we move forward.

So, Mr. Isacson and Dr. Chernick and Mr. Plotter, and also for

you, Ms. Cepeda, thank you very much for being with us today.

This has been very, very helpful to us. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. John L. Mica and additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

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