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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

JAMI CLAIRE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs. Case No. 4:20-cv-00020-MW/MAF 

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

MANAGEMENT SERVICES, et al., 

Defendants.

_______________________________/

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs Jami Claire, Kathryn Lane, and Ahmir Murphy (“Plaintiffs”) 

oppose the Motions to Dismiss Counts II, III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII of Plaintiffs’ 

Amended Complaint by Defendants University of Florida Board of Trustees 

and University of Florida Board of Trustees Members (“UF”) (ECF 58) 

(Counts II and VI), and Andy Thomas, Public Defender for the Second 

Judicial Circuit (“Public Defender”), Florida Department of Corrections 

(“FDOC”), and Secretary Inch (ECF 66) (Counts III, IV, VII, and VIII).1

 1 Defendants Public Defender and FDOC filed an Amended Motion to 

Dismiss on June 23, 2020 (ECF 66), and withdrew their argument that the 

Amended Complaint failed to state a claim for sex discrimination under Title 

VII following the decision in Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Ga., 590 U.S. __, No. 

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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs2 are transgender state employees - Jami Claire is a Senior 

Biological Scientist employed by UF, Kathryn Lane is an appellate attorney

employed by Public Defender Andy Thomas, and Ahmir Murphy is a 

Correctional Sergeant employed by FDOC. Plaintiffs have pursued different 

career paths and are employed by three different state agencies, but they 

share a common experience: they have each been subjected to sex 

discrimination under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause through the 

employer-sponsored health insurance plans (“State Plans”) provided to them 

by their respective employers. (ECF 34, at 2-3 ¶¶ 1-4; 4-5 ¶¶ 8-10; 6-13 ¶¶ 

13-38; 14 ¶¶ 44-47; 15-16 ¶¶ 55-56; 17-28 ¶¶ 60-112; 29-36 ¶¶ 118-54; 37-

45 ¶¶ 163-201; 46-49 ¶¶ 204-18; 51-58 ¶¶ 225-61; 59-61 ¶¶ 265-74.) See

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. Ga., 590 U.S. __, No. 17–1618, No. 17–1623, No. 

18–107, 2020 WL 3146686, at *7-8 (June 15, 2020) (Supreme Court 

unequivocally concluded that discrimination against a person because they 

are transgender is discrimination based on sex and violates Title VII); Glenn 

v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (discrimination against a 

 

17–1618, No. 17–1623, No. 18–107, 2020 WL 3146686, at *7-8 (June 15, 

2020).

2 Unless otherwise indicated, “Plaintiffs” refers to Plaintiffs Jami Claire, 

Kathryn Lane, and Ahmir Murphy. 

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transgender individual based on their gender non-conformity constitutes sex 

discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Winstead v. Lafayette,

197 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1345 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (gender stereotype 

discrimination is a cognizable form of sex discrimination). 

Defendants3 are state agencies4 - UF is a public university within the 

State university system, the Public Defender is a constitutionally elected 

official, and FDOC is the largest agency of the State’s government. Through 

the state group insurance program, each Defendant provides the State Plans 

to its employees, including Plaintiffs, as part of their compensation for

employment. The State Plans contain a categorical exclusion for medically 

necessary gender-affirming care, and as such treat transgender individuals 

differently on the basis of sex. It is only by virtue of their employment by 

Defendants that Plaintiffs have been subjected to the facially discriminatory 

State Plans that force transgender individuals to forego medically necessary 

care.

Defendants Public Defender, UF, and FDOC move to dismiss all six of 

Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to demonstrate Article III standing, and 

 3 Unless otherwise indicated, “Defendants” refers to the moving 

parties, Defendants UF, Public Defender, and FDOC, and does not include 

Defendant Florida Department of Management Services (“DMS”). 4 Defendants are considered “state agencies” for purposes of the state 

group insurance program. Fla. Stat. § 110.123(2)(i) (2019).

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additionally move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims under the 

doctrine of sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court 

deny Defendants’ motions because: (1) Plaintiffs have Article III standing to 

challenge Defendants’ discriminatory acts under Title VII and the Equal 

Protection Clause; and (2) sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiffs’ Equal 

Protection claims.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs Have Article III Standing.

Defendants Public Defender, FDOC, and UF argue Plaintiffs “failed to 

demonstrate standing” because “[n]one of the alleged injuries are fairly 

traceable to, or can be redressed by” Defendants.5 (ECF 58, at 2; ECF 66, 

at 2.) Defendants’ arguments lack merit. Establishing standing at the 

pleading stage is not onerous. Mulhall v. UNITE HERE Local 355, 618 F.3d 

1279, 1286 n.8 (11th Cir. 2010) (court must consider the well-pleaded 

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true). General factual allegations of 

injury resulting from a defendant’s conduct satisfy Article III standing at the 

pleading stage, for courts “‘presume that general allegations embrace those 

 5 Defendants Public Defender, FDOC and UF ask this Court to ignore 

their role in the discriminatory conduct at issue here and instead place the 

blame squarely on Defendant DMS, which has elected to file an Answer. 

(ECF 58, at 6-7, 14, 15-16; ECF 66, at 8-9, 15, 17; ECF 57).

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specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” Id. at 1286; see also

Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, Fla., 529 F.3d 1027, 1038 (11th 

Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge employment 

discrimination by Defendants in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection 

Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs pleaded sufficient facts, taken as 

true, to demonstrate they suffered an injury in fact that is traceable to 

Defendants and is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. (ECF 34, at 

2-3 ¶¶ 1-4; 4-5 ¶¶ 8-10; 6-8 ¶¶ 13-18; 14 ¶¶ 44-47; 15-16 ¶¶ 55-56; 18 ¶ 64; 

25 ¶¶ 96-99; 26-28 ¶¶ 103-112; 29 ¶ 118; 33 ¶¶ 139-42; 37-38 ¶ 163; 44-45 

¶¶ 193-201; 46-49 ¶¶ 204-18; 51-58 ¶¶ 225-61; 59-61 ¶¶ 265-74). See Lujan 

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992)

(Plaintiff must show injury-in-fact, causal connection between injury and 

conduct complained of, and likely that injury will be redressed by favorable 

decision). This Court should deny Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Counts II, 

III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII.

a. Plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact.

Defendants do not dispute Plaintiffs suffered injuries in fact. 

Defendants only argue Plaintiffs’ injuries cannot be traced to their actions 

and cannot be redressed by this Court’s favorable ruling. (ECF 58, at 2; id. 

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at 5-17; ECF 66, at 2; id. at 7-19.) Indeed, Defendants cannot dispute that 

Plaintiffs have a legally cognizable interest that was, and continues to be, 

invaded. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. The invasion of a protected legal 

right, including one created by a statute such as Title VII, is a recognized

injury. Palm Bch. Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 781 

F.3d 1245, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants

offered them discriminatory health insurance plans in violation of Equal 

Protection and Title VII are therefore sufficient injuries to establish Article III 

standing. (ECF 34, at 3 ¶ 3; 6-8 ¶¶ 13-18; 14 ¶¶ 44-47; 15-18 ¶¶ 55-56, 60-

63; 23-28 ¶¶ 86-112; 31-36 ¶¶ 135-54; 41- 45 ¶¶ 179-201; 46-49 ¶ 204-18; 

51-58 ¶¶ 225-61; 59-61 ¶¶ 265-74.) 

b. Plaintiffs’ injuries are fairly traceable to Defendants.

Defendants erroneously aver they did not cause Plaintiffs’ respective 

injuries. They argue Defendant DMS exclusively caused Plaintiffs’ injuries 

(ECF 58, at 6; ECF 66, at 8), because “[i]t was solely DMS’s responsibility to 

select and define the contours of the benefits offered under the state health 

plan.” (ECF 58, at 7; ECF 66, at 9.) Defendants claim their proverbial hands 

were tied and that none of their conduct has a genuine nexus to Plaintiffs’ 

injuries. (ECF 58, at 6-8, 14; ECF 66, at 8-9, 15-16.) This argument is a 

distortion of the facts and the law.

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Article III standing requires Plaintiffs to allege “a causal connection 

between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly 

... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result 

[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’” Lujan, 

504 U.S. at 560. To show that their injury is “fairly traceable” to Defendants’ 

conduct, Plaintiffs are not required to prove proximate causation. Resnick v. 

AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Even a showing that a 

plaintiff's injury is indirectly caused by a defendant’s actions satisfies the 

fairly traceable requirement.”). Plaintiffs’ injuries are caused by 

discriminatory healthcare benefits provided to them by Defendants, their 

employing agencies, as compensation for employment. (ECF 34, at 4-5 ¶¶ 

8-10; 14 ¶¶ 44-47.) These allegations are legally sufficient to establish their 

injuries are fairly traceable to Defendant’s conduct at the pleading stage.

Young Apartments, 529 F.3d at 1044 (“a standing ruling at the motion to 

dismiss stage should only address the sufficiency of the allegations in a 

complaint, not their merits”).

Nevertheless, the Public Defender, FDOC and UF Defendants 

erroneously argue Plaintiffs lack standing because Defendants did not 

engage in affirmative, active participation in the State Plan’s operation and 

administration with Defendant DMS, because they neither created nor 

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principally administer the State Plan. (ECF 58, at 11-13; ECF 66, at 12-14, 

relying on Morgan v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 

1989).)6 Plaintiffs do not dispute, and in fact affirmatively allege, their injuries 

are also fairly traceable to Defendant DMS for its part in offering and adopting 

the discriminatory plans to state employees. (ECF 34, at 5-6 ¶¶ 11-12; 13-

14 ¶¶ 39-43; 14-16 ¶¶ 48-49, 53-57; 17 ¶¶ 59-62; 49-51 ¶¶ 219-24; 58-59 ¶¶ 

262-64). But this does not allow the moving Defendants, as the employing 

state agencies, to disclaim responsibility for their participation in the 

discrimination. As observed supra, Plaintiffs need not demonstrate 

affirmative, active participation to satisfy standing requirements at the 

pleading stage. Plaintiffs need only present allegations legally sufficient to 

establish their injuries are fairly traceable to the Defendants. Therefore, 

Plaintiffs are not legally required to demonstrate that Defendants created or 

principally administer the plan to prove their injuries are fairly traceable to 

their employing agencies. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that state 

 

6 Defendants’ reliance on Morgan is misplaced. Morgan involved a 

question of employer liability under Title VII at the summary judgment stage. 

It has nothing to say about standing. It is also factually inapposite as it 

involved whether Safeway and a credit union that offered benefits to 

Safeway’s employees were “joint employers” such that Safeway was liable 

for discriminatory actions by the credit union. This is a far cry from the legal 

relationship between subdivisions of the state — Defendant DMS, who is 

statutorily delegated legal authority for administering benefits offered to all 

State of Florida employees, and Plaintiffs’ employing state agencies.

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agencies “cannot disclaim responsibility” for the discriminatory features of 

the health plans offered by the state’s insurers. Ariz. Governing Comm. for 

Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 

1089 (1983) (Marshall, J., majority concurrence). 

The Supreme Court’s Norris decision is instructive. There, Norris, an 

employee with the State of Arizona’s Department of Economic Security, 

brought her Title VII claims against her employer—the State of Arizona—and 

components of the state government administering the deferred 

compensation plan. Id. at 1078; see also Norris v. Ariz. Governing Comm. 

for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans, 486 F. Supp. 645, 647 

(N.D. Ariz. 1980). Arizona bore the cost of making the necessary payroll 

deductions, but neither the state agency administering the state pension plan 

nor Norris’ employing agency contributed monetarily to the state’s 

employees’ deferred compensation benefits to supplement its employees’

deferred wages. Norris, 462 U.S. at 1077. That Norris’ employing agency 

failed to contribute monetarily to the plan did not obviate her employer’s 

causal nexus to Norris’ injuries. See id. 1089 (“Under these circumstances, 

there can be no serious question that petitioners are legally responsible for 

the discriminatory terms on which annuities are offered”). And although the 

specific component of the state government administering the deferred 

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compensation plans was not Norris’ employing agency, the Court concluded, 

“employers are ultimately responsible for the ‘compensation, terms, 

conditions, [and] privileges of employment’ provided to employees,” 

“regardless of whether third parties are also involved in the discrimination.” 

Id. Any employer who adheres to or provides fringe benefits to its employees 

that discriminate on the basis of sex has a causal nexus to their employee’s 

injuries. See id. at 1089-91.

Kadel v. Folwell, __ F. Supp. 3d__, Case No. 1:19CV272, 2020 WL 

1169271 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2020), offers further support. There, the

plaintiffs alleged North Carolina’s healthcare plans violated the Equal 

Protection Clause, Title IX of the Education Amendments Act, and Section 

1557 of the Affordable Care Act, because the plans categorically excluded 

gender-affirming medical care. Id. at *1. They brought their claims against 

the three state universities employing them, the state treasurer, the state 

agency administering the state plan, and its officer. Id. The universities 

claimed the plaintiffs’ injuries were not traceable to them because they could 

not dictate the state health plan’s terms. Id. at *3-4. Rejecting these state 

employers’ argument, the district court concluded the plaintiffs’ allegations 

concerning their employers offering the state plan to the plaintiffs and 

participating in the plans’ availability sufficiently demonstrated plaintiffs’ 

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injuries were fairly traceable to the defendants at the pleading stage. Id. at 

*4. Had the state universities not hired the plaintiffs, “they would not have 

been permitted to enroll in the [p]lan at all.” Id.

Similarly, Plaintiffs allege each of the state entities employing them 

offer the Plaintiffs the discriminatory State Plans as compensation for 

employment in the instant matter. (ECF 34, at 2-3 ¶¶ 1-4; 4-5 ¶¶ 8-10; 13 ¶ 

39; 14 ¶¶ 44, 46-47; 17-18 ¶ 62-64; 27 ¶ 106; 29 ¶ 118; 37-38 ¶ 163; 45 ¶ 

201; 46-49 ¶¶ 204-18; 51-58 ¶¶ 255-61; 59-61 ¶¶ 265-74.) The Public 

Defender, UF, and FDOC Defendants implicitly concede they employ 

Plaintiffs. (ECF 58, at 7; ECF 66, at 9.) Defendants only offer and provide 

Plaintiffs the option of participating in the discriminatory health insurance 

plans that fail to provide them with medically necessary gender-affirming 

care and treatment. (ECF 34, at 14 ¶¶ 44-47; 15-16 ¶¶ 54-56.)

If the State Plans were not offered by the State, the Public Defender, 

UF, and FDOC would have to offer employee health insurance individually. 

The employing agencies rely on the State Plans to structure employee 

compensation packages and use the State Plans to attract and retain 

employees. (See ECF 34, at 1 ¶ 1 (the State Plans are “compensation for 

employment”), 14 ¶¶ 44, 46-47.) See also Fla. Stat. § 110.123(m) (2019) 

(defining the “state group insurance program” as the package of insurance 

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plans offered to state employees, including the state group health insurance 

plans).

Plaintiffs are only offered the State Plans because they are state 

employees by virtue of their employment with state officers, universities, or 

agencies as defined in the statutory scheme creating this program. See Fla. 

Stat. § 110.123(2) (2019); cf. Boyden v. Conlin, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979, 982-

86 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (transgender employees of the University of Wisconsin

were provided discriminatory health insurance plans by their state employers 

through the Wisconsin Group Health Insurance Program). The State Group 

Health Insurance Program is legislatively created and authorized. Fla. Stat. 

§ 110.123 (2019). The employing agencies have statutory and regulatory 

responsibilities making their involvement essential for the program to 

operate. The employing agencies’ responsibilities include: (a) processing 

their employees’ applications to enroll in the State Plans, (b) verifying the 

employee is either in an open enrollment period or has had a qualifying life 

event that allows a change in coverage, and (c) certifying to the State that 

employee is eligible for coverage. Fla. Admin. Code R. 60P-2.002(5)-(6).

The employing agencies are then responsible for tracking employee 

status changes affecting coverage. See, e.g., id. 60P-2.002(9) (requiring 

employing agency to notify surviving spouse of options for continuing 

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coverage if employee dies); id. 60P-2.012 (changes in coverage due to leave 

without pay, suspension, layoff, or disability leave are processed by 

employing agency). The employing agency is responsible for processing 

employee applications to change coverage, and effective dates of coverage 

are determined based on when the employing agency enters the information 

into the state insurance computer system data base. Id. 60P-2.003(7)(a); id. 

60P-2.004(2)(a).

The employing agencies also have a responsibility to share part of the 

cost of their employee’s coverage, and to collect payment from the employee 

for the employee’s share of the cost. Fla. Stat. § 110.123(4) (2019); Fla. 

Admin. Code. R 60P-2.006. Each employing agency contributes monetarily 

to Plaintiffs’ membership to the State Plans, bears the costs of making the 

necessary payroll deductions, and must withhold appropriate sums from the 

employees’ wages to channel those sums into the employees’ designated

plans. Fla. Stat. §§ 110.123(4)(b)&(c) and id. § 110.14. See Norris, 462 U.S. 

at 1077. If an employee goes off payroll due to leave, suspension, or layoff, 

it is the employing agencies’ responsibility to collect the employee’s premium 

payments until coverage change is effective. Fla. Admin. Code R. 60P2.012. If the employing agency fails to forward required contributions to the 

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State within 60 days, the State can initiate a collection action against the 

agency. Id. 60P-2.006(2)(a)(2).

In short, the State Group Health Insurance Program could not function 

without the substantial involvement, assistance, and financing from 

Defendants Public Defender, UF, and FDOC.7 That Defendant DMS may 

define the coverage of the state’s health insurance plans (“State Plans”) 

offered to state employees does not negate the Public Defender, UF, and 

FDOC Defendants’ participation in offering the discriminatory terms of 

employment to Plaintiffs as part of their compensation packages. See Norris, 

463 U.S. at 1089-91, 1089 n.21. At the motion to dismiss stage, such facts 

provide a sufficient nexus between the alleged injuries and Defendants to 

demonstrate their injuries are fairly traceable to their employing agencies.

See Kadel, 2020 WL 1169271, at *4.

 

7 Defendants’ reliance on Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 957 F.3d 

1193 (11th Cir. 2020), is unavailing. The statutory scheme involved in 

Jacobson conferred exclusive authority to identify the order and print the 

names of the political candidates appearing on election ballots to the 

counties’ Supervisors of Election. Id. at 1207. Therefore, Florida’s Secretary 

of State could not have contributed to the harm about which the voters and 

organizational plaintiffs complained. Id. Unlike Jacobson, Plaintiffs’ 

employing agencies and DMS share responsibility in the instant matter, and 

all of the relevant parties are before this Court. Id.

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c. A favorable decision of this Court will redress Plaintiffs’ 

injuries.

Defendants argue the constitutional and statutory injuries Plaintiffs 

suffer are not redressable. (ECF 58, at 15-16; ECF 66, at 17-18.) This 

argument fails. Where, as here, a lawsuit challenges the legality of 

government action that directly impacts the plaintiff, “there is ordinarily little 

question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a 

judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan, 504 U.S. 

at 561-62. Even where the ultimate resolution of a claim is “dependent on 

many factors outside the [defendant’s] control,” a claim remains redressable 

so long as “an order against the named defendants would offer some relief.” 

Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d 1094, 1096 (11th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiffs establish redressability because “a favorable decision ‘would 

amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain 

relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.’” Harrell v. The Fla. Bar, 608 

F.3d 1241, 1260 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010). Plaintiffs allege an ongoing harm due 

to Defendants’ provision of discriminatory terms and conditions of 

employment. An injunction abating that harm and preventing future 

recurrence would redress this injury. For example, Norris suggests a 

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straightforward remedy: the employer can “supply the fringe benefit [itself], 

without the assistance of any third party.” 463 U.S. at 1091.8

This Court can therefore remedy the injury suffered by enjoining 

enforcement of the discriminatory coverage exclusion in the State Plans 

pursuant to Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause and/or ordering 

Defendants to provide benefits directly. (ECF 34, at 62-63.) Plaintiffs’ claim 

for damages under Title VII likewise demonstrates redressability of Plaintiffs’ 

injuries. Id.; see also Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 

2012) (“Plaintiffs allege a monetary injury and an award of compensatory 

damages would redress that injury.”); Kadel, 2020 WL 1169271, at *4 

(rejecting defendants’ redressability argument and observing plaintiffs would 

benefit from monetary damages for their Title IX claims and/or injunctive 

relief that ordered their employers to provide nondiscriminatory health 

insurance). Defendants’ standing arguments should therefore be rejected.

 8 Defendants make no argument as to why this remedy could not be 

ordered. And Plaintiffs allege that UF already offers alternatives to State 

Plans that do not contain the discriminatory exclusion for gender-affirming 

care. (ECF 34, at 27-28 ¶¶ 107-12.)

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II. Sovereign Immunity Does Not Bar Plaintiffs’ Equal

Protection Clause Claims.

Defendants attempt to shield themselves from liability for violating the 

Equal Protection Clause by claiming Eleventh Amendment sovereign 

immunity forecloses Counts VI, VII and VIII of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 

(ECF 58, at 17-22; ECF 66, at 19-24.) Specifically, Defendants claim the 

Eleventh Amendment grants them immunity because they “have no 

influence, affect or authority to dictate the terms of the state health plans.”

(ECF 58, at 19-20; ECF 66, at 21-22.) Defendants’ sovereign immunity 

defense lacks merit for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims 

properly seek declaratory and prospective injunctive relief for ongoing 

violations of federal law as authorized by Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 

(1908). Second, Defendants are Plaintiffs’ employers, and thus are proper 

parties against whom this Court can order relief to remedy denial of equal 

protection in the workplace. See Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1015-16 

(11th Cir. 1988). This Court should deny Defendants’ motions.

First, Plaintiffs’ claims are clearly authorized by Ex parte Young. To 

determine whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young eliminates an Eleventh 

Amendment bar, courts are instructed to conduct a “straightforward inquiry 

into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and 

seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. 

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Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 636, 645 (2002). When a prayer for relief 

and associated allegations demonstrate the state official can be restrained 

from enforcing a policy that contravenes the Equal Protection Clause, that 

“clearly satisfies [the] ’straightforward inquiry.’” Id. 

Counts VI, VII, and VIII of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint only seek 

declaratory judgment and prospective injunctive relief, not money damages. 

(ECF 34, at 55-58, ¶¶ 242-61; 59-61 ¶¶ 265-74, 62 ¶¶ A, B.) Plaintiffs allege 

an ongoing and persistent violation of the Equal Protection Clause because, 

as part of compensation for employment, Defendants only offer them health 

insurance that categorically exclude gender-affirming care. (Id. at 60-61 ¶¶

268, 271, 274.) A prospective injunction requiring Defendants to stop offering 

discriminatory health insurance or otherwise provide benefits to cover 

Plaintiffs’ medically necessary gender-affirming care would abate the harm. 

(Id. at 4-5 ¶¶ 8-10; 8 ¶ 20; 15-17 ¶¶ 54-61; 17-18 ¶ 63; 59-61 ¶¶ 265-74.) 

Thus, Plaintiffs adequately allege facts and plead relief to overcome 

Eleventh Amendment immunity.

 Second, Defendants are proper parties against whom relief may be 

ordered because they have “some connection” to the constitutional violation. 

See Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1015-16. As the Eleventh Circuit explained:

Personal action by defendants individually is not a 

necessary condition of injunctive relief against state 

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officers in their official capacity. All that is required is 

that the official be responsible for the challenged 

action. As the Young court held, it is sufficient that 

the state officer sued must, ‘by virtue of his office, 

ha[ve] some connection’ with the unconstitutional act 

or conduct complained of. ‘[W]hether [this 

connection] arises out of general law, or is specially 

created by the act itself, is not material so long as it 

exists.’

Id. (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157).

As observed in § I.b., Defendants have more than “some connection” 

with the alleged unconstitutional conduct because they are Plaintiffs’ 

employers and are sued for employment discrimination. But Defendants 

erroneously contend they have no connection to the ongoing harm caused 

by their provision of discriminatory healthcare benefits, because 

administration of the State Plans is delegated by state statute to Defendant 

DMS. (ECF 58, at 2, 6-7, 11-12, 15-16, 20; ECF 66, at 2, 8, 13-14, 17-18, 

22.) See also Fla. Stat. § 110.123 (2019). Defendants’ reliance on Summit 

Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999), to support this 

erroneous contention is misplaced. (ECF 58, at 19-20; ECF 66, at 21-22.)

Summit stands for the uncontroversial proposition that “the doctrine of Ex 

parte Young cannot operate as an exception to [a state’s] sovereign 

immunity where no defendant has any connection to the enforcement of the 

challenged law at issue.” 180 F.3d at 1341. 

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Plaintiffs do not dispute that, to fall under the exception of Ex parte 

Young, they must demonstrate Defendants have some connection to the 

unlawful conduct. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1015-16. However, Defendants’ 

contention that they have no connection to the discriminatory conduct is 

false.

As part of compensation for Plaintiffs’ employment, Defendants chose 

to offer and are mutually responsible for the operation of the state health 

insurance program for their employees as detailed above. That Defendant 

DMS is tasked with soliciting and administering insurance that contains the 

discriminatory exclusion in the State Plans cannot obviate the employing 

agency Defendants’ connection to the constitutional harm. Defendants

failed, and continue to fail, to provide Plaintiffs health insurance plans 

equivalent to the plans that cover medically necessary care and treatment 

offered to Defendants’ other employees.9 (ECF 34, at 2-3 ¶¶ 1-4; 4-5 ¶¶ 8-

10; 6-28 ¶¶ 13-39, 44-47, 55-56, 60-112; 29-36 ¶¶ 118-54; 37-45 ¶¶ 163-

201; 46-49 ¶¶ 204-18; 55-58 ¶¶ 242-61; 59-61 ¶¶ 265-74.) Instead, as part 

of the terms and conditions of employment, Defendants provide 

 9 Defendant UF ignores Plaintiff Claire’s allegations that even though 

they offer alternative plans to other employees that do not contain the 

exclusion, they chose not to provide non-discriminatory coverage to Plaintiff 

Claire. (ECF 34, at 27-28 ¶¶ 107-111; 51-52 ¶¶ 229-30).

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discriminatory health insurance plans that deprive Plaintiffs of medically 

necessary healthcare because they are transgender. (Id.)

These allegations sufficiently establish the necessary conditions for 

enjoining Defendants, Plaintiffs’ employers, in their official capacities. See 

Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1015-16; cf. Madera v. Detzner, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1269, 

1277 (N.D. Fla. 2018) (Secretary of State bears sufficient connection to 

voting rights violations because of the Secretary’s power and supervisory 

and administrative responsibilities over election laws); Brenner v. Scott, 999 

F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1285-86 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Secretary of Department of 

Management Services and Surgeon General were proper parties for refusing 

to recognize same-sex marriages). Plaintiffs seek access to future conditions 

of employment that do not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. Glenn v. 

Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion should be denied.

III. Conclusion

Defendants have subjected Plaintiffs to sex discrimination under Title 

VII and the Equal Protection Clause by providing them facially discriminatory 

employer-sponsored health insurance plans that treat transgender 

individuals differently on the basis of sex. Defendants, as Plaintiffs employing 

agencies, are the proper parties against whom Plaintiffs can seek, and this 

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Court can order, relief. Plaintiffs have demonstrated Article III standing to 

challenge the employment discrimination by Defendants in violation of Title 

VII and the Equal Protection Clause, and sovereign immunity does not bar 

Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claims. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs 

request that this Court deny Defendants’ motions to dismiss Counts II, III, IV, 

VI, VII, and VIII of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. 

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

Pursuant to N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(F), the above Response contains 

4,547 words.

Dated: June 26, 2020 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Simone Chriss 

SIMONE CHRISS, Fla. Bar No. 124062

simone.chriss@southernlegal.org

KIRSTEN ANDERSON, Fla. Bar No. 17179

kirsten.anderson@southernlegal.org

JODI SIEGEL, Fla. Bar No. 511617

jodi.siegel@southernlegal.org

Southern Legal Counsel, Inc.

1229 NW 12th Avenue

Gainesville, FL 32601

(352) 271-8890

DANIEL TILLEY, Fla. Bar No. 102882

dtilley@aclufl.org 

ACLU Foundation of Florida

Case 4:20-cv-00020-MW-MAF Document 68 Filed 06/26/20 Page 22 of 23
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4343 West Flagler Street, Suite 400, 

Miami, FL 33134

(786) 363-2714

ANTON MARINO, Fla. Bar. No. 1021406

amarino@aclufl.org

ACLU Foundation of Florida

4343 West Flagler Street, Suite 400

Miami, FL 33134

(786) 363-2707

ERIC LINDSTROM, Fla. Bar No. 104778

elindstrom@eganlev.com

Egan, Lev, Lindstrom & Siwica, P.A.

P.O. Box 5276

Gainesville, FL 32627

(352) 672-6901

ATTORNEYS FOR ALL PLAINTIFFS

JEFFREY HEARNE, Fla. Bar No. 512060

jhearne@legalservicesmiami.org

JOCELYN ARMAND, Fla. Bar No.44264

jarmand@legalservicesmiami.org

MIRIAM HASKELL, Fla. Bar No. 69033

mhaskell@legalservicesmiami.org

PAMELA FLORES, Fla. Bar No. 0124363

pflores@legalservicesmiami.org

Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc.

4343 West Flagler Street, Suite 100

Miami, FL 33134

(305) 438-2403

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF MURPHY 

Case 4:20-cv-00020-MW-MAF Document 68 Filed 06/26/20 Page 23 of 23