STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES

Leonard Wong

Stephen Gerras

William Kidd

Robert Pricone

Richard Swengros

September 2003
ii

*****

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial 

policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 

This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****
iii

FOREWORD

 On December 21, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the Army tasked the U.S. Army War College to 

identify the strategic leader skill sets for offi cers required in the post-September 11th environment. 

The following report is the result of that tasking. Dr. Leonard Wong, assisted by four U.S. Army War 

College students, reviewed the strategic leadership literature, interviewed corporate leader developers, 

analyzed the leader development system, and gathered the views of key leader developers in the 

Army. They distill the essence of strategic leadership into six metacompetencies that not only describe 

strategic leadership, but also provide aiming points for an integrated leader development system.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute 

v

SUMMARY

The strategic leadership literature in both the academic and military contexts is replete with long 

lists of the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed by strategic leaders of the future. Unfortunately, long 

comprehensive lists are problematic. At the individual level, it is diffi cult to assess one’s leadership 

ability when the lists suggest that a strategic leader must “Be, Know, and Do” just about everything. 

At the institutional level, the long lists make it diffi cult to focus an institution’s attention and resources 

on leader development when the desired endstate is so broad. Hence, the task of identifying the 

competencies of future strategic leaders becomes one of reducing the lists to a few metacompetencies 

that will prove useful in: a) directing leader development efforts in the process of producing leaders 

with strategic leader capability, and b) facilitating self-assessment by offi cers of their strategic leader 

capability. Looking across the existing literature on strategic leadership, the current lists of Army 

strategic leader competencies, and the future environment of the Objective Force, six metacompetencies 

can be derived: identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, 

and professional astuteness. These metacompetencies describe the strategic leadership necessary for the 

future Army. 
On December 21, 2001, the Chief of Staff of the 

Army (CSA) tasked the U.S. Army War College 

(USAWC) to identify the strategic leader skill sets 

for offi cers required in the post-September 11th 

environment. In his charter guidance, the CSA 

specifi cally stated: 

The fi rst of the critical areas to be examined 

is the identifi cation of strategic leader skill 

sets for offi cers in the post-September 11th 

environment, and those necessary to meet the 

leadership requirements of the Objective Force. 

In conducting the study, the student study 

team must start with the Army Training and 

Leader Development (ATLD) Panel (Offi cer) 

recommendations as a baseline, and build on the 

great work already done in this arena. In addition 

to strategic skill sets, the required knowledge and 

attributes of the future Objective Force leader 

should also be discussed. 

A research group of four students and a 

faculty advisor completed the following report 

after extensive research and analysis. Research 

visits conducted by the team included the Center 

for Army Leadership, the Objective Force Task 

Force Offi ce, the Army Research Institute for the 

Behavioral and Social Sciences, U.S. Army Cadet 

Command, the U.S. Military Academy, Training 

and Doctrine Command headquarters and 

schools, and the leader development offi ces in the 

Offi ces of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel 

(DCSPER) and Operations and Plans (DCSOPS). 

Additionally, the group consulted with leader 

development experts in organizations such as 

the Center for Creative Leadership, Bristol-Myers 

Squibb, and Strategic Leadership Solutions.

Assumptions.

The CSA charter began by stating the need to 

identify the skill sets required of future strategic 

leaders. Before identifying these skill sets, 

however, it is useful to defi ne what a strategic 

leader of the future actually means. Ironically, 

“strategic” is often used at both ends of the 

hierarchical spectrum. It is not uncommon to hear 

of the “strategic Captain” or “strategic Corporal” 

guarding the Brcko Bridge. This use of “strategic” 

broadens the defi nition to such a degree that all 

soldiers should be strategic. On the other hand, 

“strategic” is often used in the narrow sense with 

the view that the Army’s strategic leadership 

resides solely in the general offi cer ranks. An 

even more narrow interpretation views strategic 

leaders only at the 3-star level and above. 

This report assumes that future strategic leader 

capability will be required at the Brigade-level 

commander (i.e., the Stryker Brigade Combat 

Team level) or the O-6 level staff offi cer who will 

have increased strategic responsibilities. This 

distinction is important for several reasons. First, 

stating that strategic leader capability, but not 

necessarily strategic leadership, is required at the 

O-6 level recognizes that senior offi cers will need 

to think strategically, even if they are not in troop 

leading positions. For this study, “strategic” 

refers to a way of thinking—not just a level of war 

beyond tactical and operational. Strategic leader 

capability is required in those offi cers who have 

increased responsibility for an organization, who 

are concerned with internal as well as external 

spheres of infl uence, and who are surrounded 

by ambiguity and complexity.1 Second, shifting 

strategic leader capability down to the colonel 

level greatly expands the target population of 

any leader development efforts. Strategic leader 

development must become more deliberate if 

the number of offi cers requiring strategic leader 

capabilities increases from 300 general offi cers to 

several thousand colonels. 

The use of the phrase “strategic leader 

capability” has signifi cant implications. It 

recognizes that although not all colonels or 

general offi cers are in strategic leader positions, 

they still can (and should) possess a level of 

strategic leader capability. Strategic leader 

capability also implies a potential that is not 

instantly acquired, but needs to be developed and 

matured over time. 

This report also assumes that the comprehensive Army Training and Leader Development 

1

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES
2

(ATLD) Panel (Offi cer) report adequately covered 

the development of direct and organizational 

levels of leadership. Thus, there is no reason 

to examine the development of leadership 

competencies other than strategic leadership 

competencies. This report also assumes that the 

leadership competencies required at the direct 

and organizational levels will be resident in 

emerging strategic leaders. 

Finally, this report assumes that a postSeptember 11th environment is the same as the 

Objective Force environment. Both environments 

involve breaking the linear method of warfare 

and allowing the Nation to directly apply 

operational maneuver from strategic distances 

through the use of joint and coalition forces. Both 

perspectives require strategic leaders capable of 

handling a more complex, uncertain, and global 

security environment.2 

Strategic Leadership. 

The search for strategic leader competencies3

is a natural progression of the research in the fi eld 

of leadership. In the late 1980s, some social science 

researchers began to question whether leadership 

actually made a difference in organizations 

while others suggested that perhaps the study 

of leadership had reached its culminating point. 

Rather than disappearing, however, the study of 

leadership took on new energy with an emphasis 

on leadership of organizations, rather than the 

traditional leadership approaches that focused on 

face-to-face interaction at lower levels. Studies 

of transformational leadership, organizational 

culture, visionary leadership, organizational 

change, and charismatic leaders reinvigorated the 

fi eld of leadership. Thus, the notion of strategic 

leadership was introduced. 

While lists of leadership competencies were 

very popular in the 1980s, the most recent 

literature distills strategic leadership to a few 

key skills and competencies or a process. For 

example, Stephen Covey states that strategic 

leaders have three basic functions: pathfi nding, 

aligning, and empowering.4 Pathfi nding deals 

with tying the organization’s value system and 

vision with the mission and environment through 

a strategic plan. Aligning consists of ensuring the 

organizational structure, systems, and operational 

processes all contribute to achieving the mission 

and vision. Empowering is igniting the latent 

talent, ingenuity, and creativity in the people to 

accomplish the mission. 

Other leadership theorists bring up aspects 

of strategic leadership not included in Covey’s 

typology. In his research on future strategic 

leadership, James F. Bolt focuses less on the 

environment and more on the leader.5 He argues 

that there are three dimensions of a leader: 

business, leadership, and personal effectiveness. 

The business dimension has been traditionally 

the focus in executive development. This dimension includes the creation of new kinds of 

organizations, leading change, and how the 

organization works. The leadership dimension 

has typically been overlooked because many 

people do not believe it can be taught. According 

to Bolt, this dimension is developed by the study 

of a broad range of classical and contemporary 

leadership theories and skills. The personal 

effectiveness dimension, according to Bolt, has been 

neglected because of the widespread view that 

work and personal matters must be separated. 

The personal dimension concentrates on helping 

to clarify and develop an individual’s purpose, 

vision, values, and talents. The emphasis on 

self-refl ection is found in the “self-leadership” 

literature that is becoming popular and is actually 

as old as Thales (“Know thyself”) or Shakespeare 

(“To thine own self be true.”).

A related aspect emerging in the strategic 

leadership literature is self-effi cacy.6 Self-effi cacy 

refers to individuals’ judgments about their 

perceived capabilities for performing specifi c 

tasks. Self-effi cacy is the result of life experiences 

that teach one that one can, in fact, take actions 

that will effectively have an impact on one’s 

environment. This concept parallels the fi ndings 

of the Army Training and Leader Development 

(ATLD) Panel. In the ATLD report, one of the 

two leadership competencies for the 21st century 

is self-awareness. Self-awareness is the ability 

to assess abilities, determine strengths in the 
3

environment, and learn how to sustain strengths 

and correct weaknesses. The ATLD report also 

argues that a key leader competency is adaptability. 

According to the panel, adaptability is the ability 

to recognize changes to the environment, to 

determine what is new, what must be learned 

to be effective, and includes the learning process 

that follows that determination.7 

Karl Weick states that in a world of 

uncertainty and doubt, leaders must focus on 

certain properties. Two of those properties are 

improvisation and lightness.8 Improvisation

involves the fl exible treatment of preplanned 

material. It is not about making something 

out of nothing. Instead, it is about making 

something out of previous experience, practice, 

and knowledge. Improvisation is something that 

is almost intuitive to good leaders at the tactical 

level, but seldom is addressed at the strategic 

level. 

Weick’s novel concept of lightness refers to 

the ability to drop heavy tools that are no longer 

useful. Weick’s analogy is the foreman who yells, 

“drop your tools,” to wildland fi refi ghters who 

are trying to outrun an exploding fi re. Firefi ghters 

who refuse to drop heavy tools such as chainsaws 

are prone to be overtaken by the fi re and perish 

(as has happened at least 23 times since 1990). 

To strategic leaders, the now-unwieldy tools are 

those that presume the world is stable, knowable, 

and predictable. Future strategic leaders must be 

able to drop outmoded perspectives, methods, or 

assumptions in a world of uncertainty. 

In their review of strategic leadership, Kim 

Boal and Robert Hooijberg distill the essence of 

strategic leadership to three factors—effective 

strategic leaders must create and maintain 

absorptive and adaptive capacity in addition 

to obtaining managerial wisdom.9 Absorptive

capacity involves the ability to learn by 

recognizing new information, assimilating it, 

and applying it. Adaptive capacity involves the 

ability to change due to variations in conditions. 

Managerial wisdom consists of discernment and 

intuition. Boal and Hooijberg’s assertion that 

absorptive and adaptive capacities are required 

at the strategic level of leadership is very similar 

to the Army’s emphasis on self-awareness and 

adaptability. Although the Army competencies 

are intended to apply to all levels of leadership, 

not just strategic leaders, it is interesting to see 

the parallel development of parsimonious leader 

capabilities in both the military and academic 

literature. 

Strategic Leadership in the Military.

In 1991, the U.S. Army War College hosted 

a conference on the fl edgling fi eld of strategic 

leadership. At that conference, strategic leadership 

aspects were based on Jaques’s Stratifi ed Systems 

Theory (SST).10 SST essentially argues that there 

are critical tasks that must be performed by 

leaders in effective organizations. At each higher 

level in an organization, these tasks become 

increasingly complex and qualitatively different. 

Consequently, leaders at the strategic levels must 

have higher levels of cognitive complexity—the 

ability to deal with abstract, longer timeframe 

concepts. The infl uence of SST on the Army 

War College (and the broader Army) is evident 

with the emphasis on cognitive complexity that 

permeates much of the strategic leadership 

instruction. 

In its Strategic Leadership Primer,11 the Army 

War College provides a list of strategic leader 

competencies using the “Be, Know, Do” typology. 

The list is extremely comprehensive and appears 

to capture every possible aspect of leadership. 

BE (Disposition—values, attributes): 

• The Values Champion—the standard 

bearer beyond reproach

• Master of the Strategic Art—ends, ways, 

means

• Quintessential Student of History

• Comfortable with Complexity

• High Personal Stamina—physical, mental, 

stress management

• Skilled Diplomat

• Possesses Intellectual Sophistication—

alternative frames of reference, pattern 

recognition, and able to see 2d, 3rd, and 

4th-order effects.
4

KNOW (Disposition—skills):

Conceptual—

o Envisioning-anticipating the future, 

proactive thinking—practices critical, 

creative, refl ective thinking

o Frame of Reference Development—

including systems understanding, 

scanning, pattern recognition

o Problem Management—competing 

issues, no right answers, ability to 

recognize and ignore irrelevant issues

o Critical Self-Examination

o Critical, Refl ective Thought

o Effective within Environment of 

Complexity

o Skillful Formulation of Ends, Ways, 

Means.

Interpersonal—

o Communication—to a much 

broader audience; negotiations, 

consensus-building across a variety 

of stakeholders; systems knowledge; 

sophisticated persuasion skills

o Inspire Others to Act

o Organizational Representation—to 

internal and external audiences/

stakeholders

o Skillful Coordination of Ends, Ways, 

Means

o Master of Command and Peer 

Leadership.

Technical—

o Systems Understanding—political, 

economic, cultural, logistical, force 

management, and joint/combined 

interrelationships, etc.

o Recognize and Understand 

Interdependencies—systems, 

decisions, organizations, etc.

o Information-age Technological 

Awareness—next generation 

aware ness, sophisticated time/space 

selection

o Skillful Application of Ends, Ways, 

Means.

DO (Action—infl uencing, operating, and 

improving): 

• Provide for the Future—visioning (longterm focus, time span, perspective)

• Initiator of Policy and Directive

• Shape the Culture—Values-based 

organization, leverage diversity, 

understanding and accepting differences, 

multiple perspectives

• Teach and Mentor the Strategic Art

• Manage Joint/Combined and Interagency 

Relationships

• Manage National-Level Relationships

• Represent the Organization

• Leverage Technology

• Lead and Manage Change—creating and 

building “learning organizations”

• Build Teams and Consensus at Strategic 

Level (can’t dictate action at this level)—

co-opting, coalition building, negotiating, 

etc.

• Practice the Strategic Art—allocate 

resources, develop and execute strategic 

plans derived from the interagency 

process.

Similarly, in FM 22-100, Army Leadership, the 

Army’s doctrinal leadership manual, the skills 

and actions required of strategic leaders are a 

cumulative list of 41 competencies addressing 

the direct, organizational, and strategic levels.12

Twenty-one competencies are provided for the 

strategic level alone:

FM 22-100, Army Leadership:

Strategic Level Skills and Actions—

o Communicating

o Using dialogue

o Negotiating

o Achieving consensus

o Building staffs

o Envisioning

o Developing frames of reference

o Strategic art

o Motivating

o Leveraging technology

o Executing

o Communicating a vision
5

o Developing

o Decisionmaking

o Leading change

o Strategic planning

o Learning

o Strategic assessing

o Translating political goals into military 

objectives

o Building

o Dealing with uncertainty and 

ambiguity.

In one sense, the Army War College and FM 

22-100 lists of strategic leader competencies are 

too comprehensive. At the individual level, it is 

diffi cult to assess one’s leadership ability when 

the lists suggest that a strategic leader must be, 

know, and do just about everything. At the 

institutional level, the lack of parsimony makes 

it diffi cult to focus an institution’s attention and 

resources on leader development when such a 

broad array of competencies is advocated. Hence, 

the task of identifying the competencies of future 

strategic leaders becomes one of reducing the lists 

to a few metacompetencies13 that will prove useful 

in: a) directing leader development efforts in the 

process of producing leaders with strategic leader 

capability, and b) facilitating self-assessment by 

offi cers of their strategic leader capability. 

Looking across the existing literature on 

strategic leadership, the current lists of Army 

strategic leader competencies, and the future 

environment of the Objective Force, six metacompetencies can be derived: identity, mental 

agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, 

world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. 

Before addressing each metacompetency, it 

should be noted that concentrating on just 

six does provide focus, but there are some 

associated disadvantages. First, some skills 

and abilities are not explicitly described by a 

metacompetency label. For example, strategic 

leaders need to be politically savvy—knowing 

when to compromise, understanding that many 

strategic decisions are not black and white, and 

knowing what is best in the long run for the 

Nation and the Army. This ability is captured 

in the professional astuteness metacompetency 

description, but is not obvious in the words 

professional astuteness. Understanding the 

meaning and intent behind each metacompetency 

is much more important than creating a catchy 

mnemonic containing the fi rst letter of each of the 

six labels. Similarly, the metacompetency labels 

may be misinterpreted if separated from their 

descriptions. For example, cross-cultural savvy 

includes the ability to work across organizational 

boundaries, but the metacompetency can be 

narrowly misinterpreted to refer to working only 

across national boundaries. In other words, the 

six metacompetency labels were not developed as 

a stand-alone list. The concepts behind the labels, 

not the labels themselves, are the focal points for 

leader development and assessment. 

The following section describes the six metacompetencies. After a brief discussion of each, 

the development of each in future offi cers 

is examined using the three pillars of leader 

development—institutional, operational, and 

self-development. This report is not intended 

to be an exhaustive explanation of strategic 

leadership—the civilian literature does that 

adequately. It is also not intended as a blueprint 

to overhaul the Army’s leader development 

system. Instead, this report contrasts the future 

environment with the current status of strategic 

leader development and suggests some aiming 

points for leader development efforts. 

Strategic Leadership Metacompetencies.

Identity. This metacompetency is derived from 

the work of Douglas Hall who heavily infl uenced 

the conclusions of the ATLD Panel. According 

to Hall, identity is “the ability to gather selffeedback, to form accurate self-perceptions, and 

to change one’s self-concept as appropriate.”14

The ATLD report uses the term self-awareness and 

describes it as “the ability to understand how to 

assess abilities, know strengths and weaknesses 

in the operational environment, and learn how to 

correct those weaknesses.”15 The metacompetency 

of identity moves beyond simply knowing one’s 

strengths and weaknesses as connoted by selfawareness. It includes the understanding of 

one’s self-concept as an offi cer in the Army. 
6

Identity also includes an understanding of one’s 

values and how they match the values of the 

Army. Identity implies maturation beyond selfawareness as offi cers come to understand who 

they are, not just how well they do things. 

Identity, as opposed to self-awareness, also 

brings in aspects of development over a career. 

In the corporate world, as an executive advances 

in levels of responsibility, “he or she must learn 

to change the basis of his or her self-identity 

away from individual contributions as the basis 

for self-esteem and toward defi ning personal 

value and esteem through the accomplishments 

of subordinates.”16 In an offi cer’s development 

of strategic leadership capability, the metacompetency of identity acknowledges that the role 

of a strategic leader goes beyond personal 

contributions and shifts to serving as a catalyst 

for success by subordinates. 

The development of the identity metacompetency in offi cers can begin as early as 

precommissioning. In the early stages of an 

offi cer’s career, identity focuses more on the 

recognition of one’s strengths and weaknesses, 

but it also includes the establishment of a 

foundation of continual self-assessment and the 

desire to adjust one’s self-concept when needed. 

In the institutional realm of leader development, 

identity can be increased through self-assessment 

tools, simulations, peer evaluations, and coaching. 

In the operational arena of leader development, 

identity can be improved through After Action 

Reviews, 360-degree feedback, Offi cer Evaluation 

Reports, rewarding personal growth, and the 

counsel of a mentor. Finally, identity can be 

fostered through offi cer self-development with 

reading lists and the use of a lifelong plan. 

Mental Agility. In addition to self-awareness, 

the ATLD report recommends that the Army 

focus on developing the enduring competency of 

adaptability. It is defi ned as “the ability to recognize 

changes in the environment; to determine what is 

new, what must be learned to be effective, and 

includes the learning process that follows that 

determination, all performed to standard and 

with feedback.”17 Mental agility builds on the 

ability to scan and adjust learning based on the 

environment, and brings aspects of cognitive 

complexity, improvisation, and lightness found 

in the strategic leadership literature. 

Strategic leaders operate in an environment 

of ambiguity and uncertainty. Typical strategic 

situations lack structure, are open to varying 

interpretations, and potentially pertinent 

information is often far-fl ung, elusive, cryptic, 

or even contradictory.18 Mentally agile strategic 

leaders possess the requisite cognitive skills 

to navigate in this milieu and are adaptable 

enough to alter their actions and those of their 

organizations to function in this complex 

environment.

From a cognitive perspective, strategic 

leaders must learn how to scan the environment, 

understand their world from a systems 

perspective, and eventually envision different 

futures and directions for their organization. 

Scanning involves a constant search for 

information that affects current assumptions, 

along with the future of the organization. Offi cers 

with mental agility search for more information 

and spend more time interpreting it.19 They also 

analyze large amounts of sometimes confl icting 

information and try to understand why things 

happen and identify possible courses of action 

to affect events. Mentally agile leaders know 

which factors really matter in the big picture; 

they identify root causes quickly, display a keen 

sense of priority, relevance and signifi cance, and 

integrate information from a variety of sources 

while detecting trends, associations, and causeeffect relationships. Just as important, mentally 

agile leaders translate complex situations into 

simple, meaningful explanations that others can 

grasp. 

Mentally agile leaders effi ciently gather and 

process relevant information in order to process 

it from a systems perspective and then envision 

feasible futures within increasingly longer time 

horizons.20 From a systems perspective, they 

challenge assumptions, facilitate constructive 

dissent, and analyze second- and third-order 

consequences of their decisions.21 Mentally 

agile leaders are comfortable making important 

decisions with only part of the information 

available. More importantly, they know when 

to act and when to experiment to validate beliefs 
7

or assumptions. Once mentally agile strategic 

leaders have scanned the environment, processed 

information from a systems perspective, and 

envisioned the future effect of that information on 

the organization, they then adapt and implement 

learning mechanisms to alter the processes, 

structure, and behaviors of their organization to 

accommodate their envisioned future. 

Because the level of the organization rather 

than the offi cer’s rank determines the nature of 

problems that will be encountered and the skills 

required, efforts to develop mental agility must 

begin early in an offi cer’s career and not be delayed 

until an offi cer is about to be placed in charge of 

an organization at the strategic level.22 From a 

school perspective, offi cers can be introduced to 

quantitative decisionmaking, critical thinking, 

and systems thinking during precommissioning 

and the offi cers’ basic course. Throughout the 

offi cer’s time at branch schools, simulations 

allow the offi cer to adapt and anticipate changing 

parameters and assumptions.23 Mental agility can 

best be improved with a program of instruction 

that encourages students to develop multiple 

points of view, consider alternative explanations 

and argue the merits of competing solutions to 

complex problems, synthesize as well as analyze, 

challenge existing frames of reference, and 

engage in collaborative tasks. In the operational 

environment, the Army culture determines 

the amount of discretion given to commanders 

to encourage innovation and improvisation. 

Ambiguous scenarios at the combat training 

centers and job variety in the assignment process 

also foster mental agility through the operational 

leader development pillar. Self-development of 

mental agility can be done throughout a career 

by activities that stretch the horizons of the 

offi cer. Reading future studies, publishing, or 

even reading business journals can also increase 

mental agility. Of course, demanding periods 

of an offi cer’s career (e.g., S-3 or XO time) afford 

very little time for reading or self-development. 

Nevertheless, it is possible to improve mental 

agility through self-development when the 

opportunity arises. 

Cross-cultural savvy. With the increasing 

frequency of coalition warfare and an emphasis 

on theater security cooperation, the necessity 

for cross-cultural savvy is obvious. The Army’s 

future leaders clearly need to be well-versed 

in interacting with cultures outside the U.S. 

borders. Cross-cultural savvy, however, refers 

to more than just the ability to work with nonU.S. militaries. The metacompetency crosscultural savvy includes the ability to understand 

cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic, 

religious, societal, geographical, and political 

boundaries. A strategic leader with crosscultural skills is comfortable interacting with 

and leading joint, international, interagency, or 

interorganizational entities. Future strategic 

leaders must be able to work with a diverse 

group of people and organizations ranging from 

24-year-old congressional staffers, to Northern 

Alliance warlords, to representatives from nongovernmental organizations. 

While cross-cultural skills have been 

desirable in the past, they will be even more 

critical for future strategic leaders due to several 

factors. First, globalization has vastly increased 

interaction with other nations. Second, the 

global war on terrorism is illustrating that 

the Army must coordinate closely with other 

services, agencies, and organizations in the new 

national security environment. Third, the Army 

traditionally has been accused of being somewhat 

inept in its dealings with Congress and the media. 

As societal exposure to the military decreases, 

it becomes increasingly important for Army 

offi cers to tell the Army story to those outside the 

Army culture. Finally, although the United States 

remains the world’s only superpower, unilateral 

military action is becoming less common. 

Coalitions will continue to be vital to the security 

strategy. 

Cross-cultural savvy implies that an offi cer 

can see perspectives outside his or her own 

boundaries. It does not imply, however, that 

the offi cer abandons the Army or U.S. culture in 

pursuit of a relativistic worldview. Instead, the 

future strategic leader is grounded in National 

and Army values, but is also able to anticipate and 

understand the values, assumptions, and norms 

of other groups, organizations, and nations. 

Cross-cultural skills can be developed in future 
8

strategic leaders as early as precommissioning 

with courses in foreign languages, international 

relations, or regional studies. Time spent abroad 

or interning with various organizations can also 

help broaden the horizons of offi cers. In the 

institutional school setting, joint and interagency 

issues can be taught along with focused electives 

on specifi c regions. Increasing cross-cultural 

savvy in the institutional arena should move the 

offi cer from the introduction early in the career 

of a general understanding and appreciation of 

other cultures to gradually focusing later in the 

career on particular cultures, organizations, or 

regions. 

The operational pillar also plays a key role 

in developing leaders with cross-cultural skill, 

especially during the 4-to-15 year-mark of 

military service. During this period, developing 

offi cers should have multiple tours outside the 

Army’s mainstream units. Tours overseas, in 

higher headquarters staff (Joint Staff, Major 

Commands), in graduate school or in fellowships 

or internships with Congress, leading industry 

partners, and foreign militaries will contribute 

signifi cantly to developing offi cers with crosscultural savvy. Operational deployments also 

offer a good opportunity to understand and work 

with different cultures and different organizations 

outside the military. 

While self-development can certainly play 

a role in improving the cross-cultural savvy 

metacompetency, it is not the predominant tool 

because self-development cannot substitute 

for experience in working with non-Army 

organizations and cultures. Nevertheless, offi cers 

can gain insights through regional and language 

studies. Additionally, they can pursue diverse 

readings on nonmilitary organizations. As with 

all self-development strategies, care must be taken 

not to assume self-development will make up for 

the lack of deliberate institutional or operational 

development. Too often, leader development is 

relegated to self-development despite the fact 

that self-development is often the fi rst type of 

development to be overcome by events. 

Interpersonal maturity. Many of the interpersonal skills required of strategic leaders are 

basically the same attributes used at the 

organizational level applied at a higher level. 

For example, much like a junior leader, strategic 

leaders are expected to display compassion when 

dealing with subordinates on sensitive issues. 

However, several interpersonal skills, although 

based on direct and organizational leadership 

characteristics, are qualitatively different at the 

strategic level. Strategic leaders must possess an 

interpersonal maturity that goes beyond face-toface leadership. Strategic leaders devote far more 

of their time dealing with outside organizations 

and leaders of other services, agencies, and 

nations. The power relationship between the 

strategic leader and individuals from these 

entities is markedly different from the power 

relationship typically experienced at the direct 

and organizational level.

Several interpersonal skills become very 

important at this level. Most important among 

these is empowerment. Strategic leaders need to 

share power with their subordinates, peers, and 

constituents. They must have the willingness 

and ability to involve others and elicit their 

participation based on the subordinate’s knowledge and skills, because tasks will be too 

complex and information too widely distributed 

for leaders to solve problems on their own.24 An 

interpersonally mature strategic leader needs 

to be persuasive and rely less on fi at, asking 

others to join in rather than telling them.25

Empowerment implies that the leader is a good 

listener; leadership at the strategic level is as much 

collaboration as it is authoritative leadership. 

Interpersonal maturity implies that strategic 

leaders do not feel compelled to do all the talking 

and resist imposing a solution on others unless 

the situation demands it.26

Because of the unique power relationships, 

the skills of consensus building and negotiation 

rise to the top of a strategic leader’s interpersonal 

maturity. Consensus building is a complicated 

process based on effective reasoning and logic 

which may take place over an extended period.27

Peers, outside agencies, foreign governments, 

and other services will not necessarily respond 

to orders. In essence, the process of consensusbuilding is insurance that effective reasoning 

has taken place, and that contentious issues have 
9

been resolved.28 As part of this process, or even 

separate, strategic leaders will fi nd that they 

need to understand the art of negotiation. Again, 

because many relationships at the strategic level 

are lateral and without clear subordination, 

leaders will fi nd themselves in diffi cult situations 

where success rests in their ability to negotiate an 

agreeable solution. 

Interpersonal maturity also includes the 

ability of offi cers to analyze, challenge, and 

change an organization’s culture to align it with 

the ever changing outside environment. Strategic 

leaders must therefore have skills in analyzing 

cultural assumptions, identifying functional 

and dysfunctional assumptions, and evolving 

processes that enlarge the culture by building on 

its strengths and functional elements.29 Strategic 

leaders then need to manage change proactively 

through the processes associated with embedding 

their vision within the organization and shaping 

organizational culture to support the vision. Noel 

Tichy posits, “As long as a culture fi ts the external 

environment, it succeeds, but when the external 

realities change, the culture has to change as well 

. . . at certain critical stages, radical cultural shifts 

are needed, and without leadership, they just 

don’t happen.”30 

Lastly, strategic leaders must have the 

interpersonal maturity to take responsibility for 

the development of the Army’s future strategic 

leaders. Therefore, strategic leaders need to teach, 

coach, mentor, and create an environment where 

other leaders may do the same. Interpersonal 

maturity includes the ability to ensure leader 

development does not get neglected in the pursuit 

of everyday mission accomplishment. 

As with direct and organizational interpersonal leadership skills, interpersonal maturity 

is best developed in the operational and selfdevelopment arenas. The institutional setting 

can provide a background in leadership theory 

or specifi c topics such as negotiation, creating a 

vision, or managing a culture, but interpersonal 

leadership must be modeled and coached, not 

taught in a classroom. Role models, mentors, 

and coaches become critical to fostering 

strategic leaders with interpersonal maturity. 

Self-development of interpersonal maturity 

can include constant self-assessment as well 

as leadership studies. It should be noted that, 

unlike previously discussed metacompetencies, 

development of interpersonal maturity can be 

introduced later in an offi cer’s career. Early 

stages of an offi cer’s career should focus on direct 

and organizational leadership skills. 

World-class Warrior. This is the simplest 

and most understandable of the six strategic 

leadership metacompetencies. As a world-class 

warrior, strategic leaders move beyond tactical 

and operational competence in the employment 

of the Objective Force. They understand the 

entire spectrum of operations at the strategic level 

to include theater strategy; campaign strategy; 

joint, interagency, and multinational operations; 

and the use of all the elements of national power 

and technology in the execution of national 

security strategy. 

The ability to be a world-class warrior rests 

upon the foundation of technical and tactical 

competence formed early in an offi cer’s career. 

The seeds of this metacompetency are planted 

in the study of military history and military 

art in precommissioning. As the offi cer moves 

into the fi eld grade ranks, strategic insights in 

the full spectrum of operations may come from 

operational assignments in key staffs, during 

deployments, in simulations, or in the interagency. 

Additionally, mentoring and coaching can 

help develop strategic leaders into world-class 

warriors. From the institutional perspective, 

the offi cer increases this metacompetency by 

establishing a foundation at the basic and career 

courses and adding a broader perspective with 

intermediate level education and the School of 

Advanced Military Studies. The strategic aspects 

of the full spectrum of operations, however, are 

mostly introduced at the senior service college 

level. Self-development can consist of reading 

professional journals, military history, or taking 

advantage of online courses and simulations as 

they become available. 

Professional astuteness. In their comprehensive 

study of the Army profession, Don Snider and 

Gayle Watkins arrive at one main conclusion 

concerning the current offi cer corps: 
10

The Army’s bureaucratic nature outweighs and 

compromises its professional nature. This is 

true in practice, but, of greater importance, it is 

regarded as true in the minds of the offi cer corps. 

Offi cers do not share a common understanding 

of the Army profession, and many of them accept 

the pervasiveness of bureaucratic norms and 

behaviors as natural and appropriate.31 

Strategic leaders who are professionally 

astute understand that they are no longer 

merely members of a profession, but leaders in 

the profession as the Army serves the Nation. 

They see the need to develop the future leaders 

of the profession, work with stakeholders, and 

communicate this responsibility to future leaders 

of the profession. In his recent book, Good to Great, 

Jim Collins talks about Level 5 leaders—leaders 

who can transform a company. He writes, “Level 

5 leaders channel their ego needs away from 

themselves and into the larger goal of building a 

great company. It’s not that Level 5 leaders have 

no ego or self-interest. Indeed, they are incredibly 

ambitious—but their ambition is fi rst and 

foremost for the institution, not themselves.”32 In 

contrast, Level 4 leaders are often effective and 

charismatic, yet the company falls apart after 

they leave since Level 4 leaders put their personal 

success and egos ahead of institutional success. 

The Objective Force will need strategic 

leaders who are Level 5 leaders—those who 

take responsibility for the Army as a profession. 

Leaders with professional astuteness get the 

mission accomplished, but they also have the 

insight to do what is best for the profession 

and Nation. This may include having political 

savvy, knowing when to compromise, or 

understanding the many constituencies that the 

Army serves. Additionally, strategic leaders 

with professional astuteness seek to ensure the 

offi cer corps maintains its expertise in national 

defense as well as adhering to a professional 

ethic. Professional astuteness is a strategic 

leadership metacompetency that ensures that 

the Army deliberately takes the steps to remain 

a profession, not merely a job, organization, 

bureaucracy, or occupation. 

Don Snider offers a two-stage approach 

to developing professional astuteness in 

future strategic offi cers. In the fi rst phase, or 

precommissioning and 4 to 5 years of mandatory 

active service, the precommissioning education 

and other developmental processes need to create 

in the future offi cer at least three identifi able 

outcomes which may then be matured during 

the initial period of mandatory service. Those 

outcomes are: 

• An understanding of Army offi cership 

(i.e., the role of the offi cer) suffi ciently 

broad as to allow each individual to 

fi nd intrinsic satisfaction in one’s own 

self-concept as an offi cer (initially seen 

as within an individual Branch or 

specialty).

• An individual acceptance of the Army 

profession’s ethic; in other words, 

aligning one’s personal concept of 

duty with the professional ethic such 

that the future “walk” of the offi cer 

will match the moral “talk” of the 

profession.

• An individual understanding of, 

and mutual relationship with, the 

Army profession and its unique role 

within American society that will 

motivate the offi cer toward sustained 

development and service as a member 

of that profession.33

The second stage of development for 

professional astuteness is the time after an offi cer’s 

initial obligation until selection for battalion 

command. During that period, development 

occurs in a culture that encourages:

• The freedom occasionally to fail without fatal career consequences.

• “Careers” in which individual 

offi cers fi nd professional satisfaction 

(developing and applying their 

expertise) out-weighing the personally 

incurred costs of the Army’s bureaucratic nature.

• The pervasiveness of absolute 

“candor” as the cultural norm with 

all Army leaders at all levels at all 

times in interpersonal relations and in 

offi cial reports and communications.
11

• More senior Army offi cers (as 

seen from each rank) leading by 

the example of their own moral 

character, by following and policing 

the profession’s ethic across all of 

its domains, particularly in issues 

requiring the individual moral courage 

to deny oneself, to see what is best for 

the profession and its effectiveness 

from the larger perspective.34

Conclusions.

In both the civilian and military literature, a 

plethora of material discussing strategic leadership 

and strategic leader competencies exists. Part of 

the diffi culty encountered by anyone desiring to 

adjust leader development or education efforts is 

the broad array of competencies presented in the 

literature. This report combines what is known 

about strategic leadership competencies and 

integrates it with the characteristics of the offi cer 

corps and the Objective Force environment. 

The result is a list of six metacompetencies for 

strategic leadership. 

In addition to discussing each metacompetency, some leader development methods 

were presented for each. Several key points 

concerning development of strategic leadership 

competencies should be noted. First, all three of 

the pillars of leader development—institutional, 

operational, and self-development—are critical 

to increasing strategic leader competencies. Too 

often the development of strategic leaders is left 

to the institutional arena—specifi cally the senior 

service colleges. This report emphasizes that these 

schools build on strategic leader foundations 

established as early as in precommissioning 

and should continue with Capstone and the 

Army Strategic Leader Course. Also, this report 

posits that the operational pillar includes the 

assignment process and the Army culture, 

not just training that occurs in units. Strategic 

leadership competencies are not just taught in 

the schoolhouse or learned through events on the 

training calendar—they are also taught through 

developmental assignments and through the 

everyday experiences of offi cers as they work in 

the Army culture. 

Recommendations.

Although this report focused mainly on 

determining strategic leadership competencies, 

several policy implications and recommendations emerge from this analysis. 

Responsibility for the integrated leader development 

process needs to be assigned. Currently, leader 

development efforts are spread across the Army 

staff. The staff element that takes responsibility 

for the integrated leader development process 

should take a holistic approach that includes 

development through training, education, and 

experiences. The personnel process (i.e., strategic 

human resource management) should not be 

neglected as a key part of developing strategic 

leaders. 

Begin growing strategic leader capability at the 

precommissioning level. Several of the strategic 

leadership competencies begin with seeds sown 

during precommissioning education. Current 

accession educational standards are not uniform. 

Some demands must be placed on offi cer 

accession sources to align their precommissioning 

standards with the future needs of the Army 

(e.g., every offi cer must have 2 years of foreign 

language training). 

Self-development must become more than a reading 

list of history books. Currently the CSA reading list 

is restricted to Army heritage and history. While 

these books are worthy of reading, a great many 

other ways to develop strategic leader capability, 

other than reading history books, exist. Other 

topics must be explored (e.g., books from the 

corporate world), other forums examined 

(e.g., the Internet), and other activities must be 

encouraged (e.g., involvement with groups and 

organizations outside the Army). 

ENDNOTES

1. Donald C. Hambrick, “Guest Editor’s Introduction: 

Putting Top Managers Back in the Strategy Picture,” 

Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 10, 1999, pp. 5-16. 
12

2. For a complete description of the Objective Force 

environment, see The U.S. Army White Paper, Concepts for 

the Objective Force, Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 2002. 

3. A competency is an underlying characteristic of an 

individual that leads to effective or superior performance. 

It subsumes knowledge, skills, attributes, and abilities 

(KSAs). Therefore, this report focuses on competencies, 

not KSAs. 

4. Stephen R. Covey, “Three Roles of the Leader in 

the New Paradigm,” in Frances Hesselbein, Marshall 

Goldsmith, and Richard Beckhard, eds., The Leader of the 

Future: New Visions, Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era, 

San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996, pp. 149–159.

5. James F. Bolt, “New Skills for New Leadership 

Roles,” in Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith, and 

Richard Beckhard, eds., The Leader of the Future: New Visions, 

Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era, San Francisco: 

Jossey-Bass, 1996, pp. 161-173.

6. See Marshall Sashkin, “Strategic Leader 

Competencies,” in Robert Phillips and James Hunt, eds.,

Strategic Leadership: A Multi-Organizational-Level Perspective, 

Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1992, pp. 139-160; Robert 

Hooijberg, Richard C. Bullis, and James G. Hunt in James 

Hunt, George Dodge, and Leonard Wong, eds., Out-of-thebox Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army 

and Other Top-Performing Organizations, Stamford: JAI Press, 

1999.

7. Lieutenant General William M. Steele and Lieutenant 

Colonel Robert P. Walters, Jr., “21st Century Leadership 

Competencies: Three Yards in a Cloud of Dust or the 

Forward Pass?” Army Magazine, August 2001, p. 31.

8. Karl Weick, “Leadership as the Legitimation of 

Doubt,” in Warren Bennis, Gretchen Spreitzer, and 

Thomas Cummings, eds., The Future of Leadership: Today’s 

Top Leadership Thinkers Speak to Tomorrow’s Leaders, San 

Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001, pp. 91-102.

9. Kimberly B. Boal and Robert R. Hooijberg, “Strategic 

Leadership Research: Moving On,” Leadership Quarterly, 

Vol. 11, pp. 516-517.

10. The conference proceedings are described in Robert 

Phillips and James Hunt, eds., Strategic Leadership: A MultiOrganizational-Level Perspective, Westport, CT: Quorum 

Books, 1992. See Elliot Jaques, Requisite Organization. 

Arlington, VA: Cason Hall, 1989, for SST. 

11. Roderick R. Magee II, ed., Strategic Leadership Primer, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998.

12. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field 

Manual 22-100, Army Leadership, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Government Printing Offi ce, 1999.

13. The argument against long lists of competencies can 

be found in Jon P. Briscoe and Douglas T. Hall, “Grooming 

and Picking Leaders Using Competency Frameworks: Do 

They Work? An Alternative Approach and New Guidelines 

for Practice,” Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 28, No. 2, 

Autumn 1999, pp. 37-52.

14. Briscoe and Hall, pp. 48-49.

15. Headquarters, Department of the Army, The Army 

Training and Leader Development Panel Offi cer Study Report to 

the Army, http://www.army.mil/atld, 2001, p. OS-3. 

16. Briscoe and Hall, p. 49.

17. Steele and Walters, p. 31.

18. Sydney Finkelstein and Donald C. Hambrick, 

Strategic Leadership, New York: West Publishing Company, 

1996, p. 39.

19. Boal and Hooijberg, p. 531.

20. Emil Kluever, William Lynch, Michael Matthies, 

Thomas Owens, and John Spears, “Striking a Balance in 

Leader Development: A Case for Conceptual Competence,” 

National Security Program Discussion Paper Series 92-02, p. 5.

21. Gregory Dess and Joseph Picken, “Changing Roles: 

Leadership in the 21st Century,” Organizational Dynamics, 

Winter 2000, p. 30.

22. Kluever, p. 7.

23. The Armor Center and School is a good example 

of working towards developing mental agility in the 

institutional setting. 

24. Edgar H. Schein, “Leadership and Organizational 

Culture,” in Frances Hesselbein, Marshall Goldsmith, and 

Richard Beckhard, eds., The Leader of the Future: New Visions, 

Strategies, and Practices for the Next Era, San Francisco: 

Jossey-Bass, 1996, p. 68.

25. Lawrence A. Bossidy and Marcia J. Avedon, 

“Getting an Executive View: An Interview with a Chief 

Executive Offi cer,” in The 21st Century Executive, Rob Silzer, 

ed., San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002, p. 337.

26. Anthony J. Rucci, “What the Best Business Leaders 

Do Best,” in The 21st Century Executive, Rob Silzer, ed., San 

Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002, p. 35.

27. Magee, p. 42.
13

28. Ibid. 

29. Schein, p. 68.

30. Noel M. Tichy, The Leadership Engine, New York: 

Harper Business, 1997, p. 26.

31. Gayle L. Watkins and Don M. Snider, “Project 

Conclusions,” in Don M. Snider, Gayle L. Watkins, and 

Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession, 

New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002, p. 537. 

32. Jim Collins, Good to Great: Why Some Companies Make 

the Leap . . . and Others Don’t, New York: Harper Business, 

2001, p.21. 

33. Don M. Snider, “The [Missing] Ethical Development 

of the Strategic Leaders of the Army Profession for the 

21st Century,” conference paper, XIII Annual Strategy 

Conference, Carlisle, PA, April 10, 2002, p. 2. 

34. Ibid., p. 3.