This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (201 4 ). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15
- 0083 Keith Melillo, Appellant,

vs. Terry Arden Heitland, Respondent. Filed August 31, 2015 Reversed and remanded Johnson , Judge Scott County District Court File No. 70

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- 13076 Terry A. Watkins, Watkins Law Office, LLC, Faribault, Minnesota (for appellant) Bryan J. Chant, Law Offices of Thomas P. Stilp, Golden Valley, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Johnson , Presiding Judge; Kirk , Judge; and Reilly , Judge

. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N JOHNSON , Judge Keith Melillo brought this lawsuit against Terry Arden Heitland based on personal injuries he allegedly sustained in an automobile accident. The district court dismissed Melillo ’s lawsuit on the ground that he did not effect service of process within the applicable statute of limitations

. We conclude that, in light of the relevant caselaw,2

Melillo ’s delivery of the summons and complaint by certified mail, evidenced by a signed

r eturn receipt, is valid service of process. Therefore, we reverse and remand. FACTS On August 1, 2008, Melillo and Heitland were involved in an automobile accident. On four occasions in 2013 and 2014, Melillo ’s attorney attempted to commence this action by personal delivery of the summons and complaint on Heitland . Twice Melillo’s attorney arranged for service of process by the Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office ; twice he contracted with a private process server. All four of t h o se atte mpts were unsuccess ful. On June 6, 2014, Melillo ’s attorney sent the summons and complaint to Heitland at his residence by certified mail , with a return receipt requested

. Melillo’s attorney later received a green return

- receipt post card , which bears Heitland’s signatur e and indicates that Heitland received delivery of the envelope on June 9, 2014. On July 1, 2014, Heitland served his answer . He alleged, among other things, that service of process was insufficient and that Melillo’s claim is barred by the applicable
statute of limitations

. O n August 18 , 2014, Heitland served a motion to dismiss the complaint. In an accompanying memorandum, Heitland argued that dismissal is required because he never was personally served with the summons and complaint and because the applicable statute of limitations had lapsed

. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (2014)

. The district court granted the motion in a two

- page order. The district court conclud ed that Melillo “did not properly serve [Heitland] with the S ummons and Complaint under either R ule 4.03 or 4.05 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure before the expiration of the sta tute of limitations.” Mel illo appeals

.3 D E C I S I O N Melillo argues that the district court erred by granting Heitland ’s motion to dismiss. He contends that service of process was effect ed before the statute of limitations lapsed. This court applies a de novo standard of revi ew to a district court’s determination

w hether service of process i s effective

. Shamrock Dev. , Inc. v. Smith , 754 N.W.2d 377, 382 (Minn. 2008). Melillo ’s appeal implicates the following provisions of rule 4 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure:

4.03 Personal Service Service of summons within the state shall be as follows: (a) Upon an Individual

. Upon an individual by delivering a copy to the individual personally or by leaving a copy at the individual’s usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.

. . .

. . . . 4.05 Service by Mail In any action service may be made by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first

- class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgment conforming substantially to Form 22 and a return envelope, postage prepaid, addressed to the sender. If acknowledgment of service under this rule is not received by the sender within the time defendant is required by these rules to serve an answer, service shall be ineffectual. Unless good cause is shown for not doing so, the court shall order the payment of the costs of personal service by the person served if such person does not complete and return the4 notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons within the time allowed by these rules. 4.06 Return Service of summons and other process shall be proved by the certificate of the sheriff or other peace officer making it, by the affidavit of any other person making it, by the written admission or acknowledgment of the party ser ved, or if served by publication, by the affidavit of the printer or the printer’s designee. The proof of service in all cases other than by published notice shall state the time, place, and manner of service. Failure to make proof of service shall not aff ect the validity of the service. Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.03, 4.05 , 4.06

. Melillo contends that he effected service of process by personal delivery pursuant to rules 4.03 and 4.06 by way of certified mail, with return receipt requested

. 1 H e relies

on Blaese r & Johnson, P.A. v. Kjellberg , 4 83 N.W.2d 98 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. June 10, 1992)

. In that case, this court held that a defendant’s receipt of a summons and complaint by certified mail was effective service of process because the delivery of the summons and complaint to the individual defendant was proved by his signature on the return receipt. Id. at 102 . In reaching that conclusion, this court relied

1 Melillo does not argue in his brief that he validly served process by mail pursuant to rule 4.05. Such an argument would fail because of the requirement that an acknowledgment

- of

- service form be signed by the defendant and returned to the plaintiff. The rule states, “If acknowledgement of service under this rule is not received by the sender within the time defendant is required by these rules to serve an answer, service shall be ineffectual.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 4.05. “ Strict compliance ” with this rule is required. Hughes v. Lund , 603 N.W.2d 674, 677 (Minn. App. 1999). Melillo concedes that he never received a signed acknowledgment

- of

- se rvice form. In fact, the record is silent as to whether Melillo’s attorney included an acknowledgment

- of

- service form in the envelope that he sent to Heitland. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that Melillo did not effect service of process by mail pursuant to rule 4.05.5

on Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Horak , 325 N.W.2d 13 4 (Minn. 1982), in which the supr eme
court considered a case with similar facts and reasoned that a signed return receipt satisfies the requirements of rule 4.06 because the return receipt proves that the summons and complaint were personally delivered to the individual defendant. Id. at 136

. The only significant difference between Blaeser & Johnson and Stonewall is that, in the latter

case, the defendant was not present within the state because he was in military service and stationed in a foreign country. Id. at 135

. But t he defendan t nonetheless received the summons and complaint by certified mail at his army post office box and personally signed the return receipt. Id. The supreme court applied Minnesota’s long

- arm statute, which provided that “ a Minnesota court may exercise perso nal jurisdiction over [a] nonresident defendant

. . . ‘in the same manner as if . . . he were a resident of this state.’”
Id. (quoting Minn. Stat. § 543.19, subd. 2 (1980 ) )

. That portion of the Stonewall opinion allowed this court in Blaeser & Johnson to reason that “if effective service can be made
outside the state under the facts of Stonewall , then similar facts would render effective service within the state.” Blaeser & Johnson , 483 N.W.2d at 101. The facts of th e present case are substantially the sa me as the facts of Blaeser & Johnson . In each case, the plaintiff sent a summons and complaint to an individual plaintiff by certified mail, with r eturn receipt requested. See id. at 100 . In each case, the individual defendant signed the return receipt, which was returned to the plaintiff’s attorney , thereby proving that the defendant received personal delivery of the summons and complaint

. See id. In light of Blaeser & Johnson , Melillo ’s attorney’s efforts to

serv e process on Heitland satisfy the requ irements of rule 4.03 and 4.06

.6

Heitland contends that Blaeser & Johnson is inapplicable on the ground that this court’s decision was based on the defendant’s waiver of the right to challenge the sufficiency of service of process , not on the sufficiency o f service of process itself

. T his
court concluded in part 4 of the Blaeser & Johnson opinion that the defendant had waived his right to challenge the sufficiency of service of process by taking various actions to defend against the plaintiff’s claim on the merits. See id. at 102. But this court also concluded in part 3 of the Blaeser & Johnson opinion that the “requirements [of rule 4.03(a)] have been satisfied,” for the reasons that previously had been expressed in Stonewall

. I

d. In short, this court decided the Blaeser & Johnson appeal on two grounds, either of which would have been sufficient by itself. See id. Nothing in the Blaeser & Johnson opinion suggests that the reasoning in part 3 is dict um or otherwise inconsequential and that the ultimate disposition of the appeal rests solely on part 4. Thus, we reject Heitland ’s argume nt that Blaeser & Joh nson did not hold that service of process could be effected by certified mail, with return receipt requested. Cf. Coons v. St. Paul Cos. , 486 N.W.2d 771, 773 n.1 (Minn. App. 1992) (distinguishing Blaeser & Johnson in case concerning s ervice by mail pursuant to rule 4.05), review denied (Minn. July 16, 1992)

. In sum, we conclude that , in light of Blaeser & Johnson , Melill o effect ed valid service of process by certified mail , as proved by the signed return receipt. We further conclude that service of process was effected within the limitations period. Thus, the7

district court erred by granting Heitland ’s motion to dismiss. Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and rem anded.