IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

MARY SORRENTINI,

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO. 4:20-CV-160-MAF

ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER,

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

________________________________/

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This Social Security case was referred to the Undersigned upon 

consent of the parties, ECF No. 11, by United States District Judge, Allen C. 

Winsor. It is now before the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review 

of the final determination of the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration (Commissioner) denying Plaintiff’s application for a period of 

disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) pursuant to Title II of the 

Social Security Act. After careful consideration of the record, the decision of 

the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

I. Procedural History

On February 11, 2016, Plaintiff, Mary Sorrentini, filed an application 

for a period of disability benefits, alleging disability beginning on June 1, 

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1993. Tr. 71, 76. Plaintiff also filed an application for supplemental security 

income. The claims were denied on April 26, 2016, and upon reconsideration 

on August 4, 2016. Tr. 71, 76, 105-10, 113-25.

At Plaintiff’s request, Administrative Law Judge, Sylvia H. Alonso, held 

a hearing, on January 23, 2019, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Tr. 36-52. There, 

Plaintiff was represented by Ian Lloyd, Esq. Tr. 36, 38. Plaintiff and Mark 

Caso, an impartial vocational expert (VE) testified at the hearing. Tr. 41-48 

(Plaintiff’s testimony); 48-50 (Caso’s testimony); 265-67 (Caso’s Resume). 

Also, during the hearing, the ALJ admitted medical records and other exhibits 

relating to Plaintiff’s claims. Tr. 39. Because there was “insufficient evidence 

to show that [Plaintiff was] disabled,” Plaintiff’s counsel withdrew the prior 

claim and conceded to “an onset date of the filing date . . . [of] February 11, 

2016.” Tr. 40. The ALJ considered the entire record including Plaintiff’s 

medical records; opinion evidence; Plaintiff’s testimony, which the ALJ found 

“not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the 

record”; and the testimony of the VE. Tr. 25-30. The ALJ issued a decision 

on February 21, 2019, denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits. Tr. 22-31. 

Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council on April 10, 2019. 

Tr. 173-74, 269-70. On January 24, 2020, the Appeals Council denied review 

making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. 1-3. 

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Plaintiff filed her Complaint with this Court on March 30, 2020. ECF No. 1. 

Defendant filed an Answer on August 7, 2020. ECF No. 15. The parties filed 

memoranda of law, which have been considered. ECF Nos. 18, 19.

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff raises two claims:

1. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

discounting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician 

regarding residual functional capacity (RFC). ECF No. 

18, p. 1-5.

2. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

discounting the opinion of the consultative examining 

physician regarding Plaintiff’s RFC. Id., p. 1, 5-7.

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ disregarded the opinions based on a lack 

of complaints of back pain after December 2016 without considering that she 

was not able to obtain treatment to provide relief for the back pain. ECF No. 

1, p. 2. Plaintiff claims that the record should have been further developed

because “there . . . [were] no doctor’s visits in the record after December 

2016.” Id., p. 2. According to Plaintiff, the ALJ should have afforded 

“controlling weight” or “substantial weight” to Plaintiff’s orthopedic specialist, 

rather than “disregarding” it, where it was supported by medically acceptable 

techniques and consistent with other substantial record evidence. Id.; ECF 

No. 18, p. 3. Plaintiff argues that even if “substantial evidence exists,” the 

ALJ did not “clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight” to Dr. 

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Brodsky’s opinion. Id., p. 4. Similarly, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ did not 

clearly articulate her findings to support her “discounting” Dr. Gonzalez’s 

consultative opinion. Id., p. 5-6.

The Commissioner argues that there is substantial evidence to support 

the ALJ’s decision to give the consultative examiner’s opinion only partial 

weight and to discount the treating physician’s opinion because it “was 

inconsistent with the overall record evidence,” including Plaintiff’s own report 

that “she was independent in all basic activities of daily living and able to 

drive”; and the ALJ “properly evaluated the medical opinions in accordance 

with applicable legal standards.” ECF No. 19, pp. 10, 12-14. According to the 

Commissioner, the ALJ correctly determined that Plaintiff was not disabled 

because she could “perform light work with limitations.” Id., p. 10.

III. Legal Standards Guiding Judicial Review

Review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited. Bloodsworth v. 

Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1986). This Court must affirm the 

decision if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record and premised 

upon correct legal principles. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 

F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th 

Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a 

preponderance. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would 

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accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bloodsworth, 703 at 1239 

(citations omitted); accord Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 

2005).1

The Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or 

substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d 

at 1239, although the Court must scrutinize the entire record, consider 

evidence detracting from the evidence on which the Commissioner relied, 

and determine the reasonableness of the factual findings. Lowery v. Sullivan, 

979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992). Review is deferential, but the reviewing 

court conducts what has been referred to as “an independent review of the 

record.” Flynn v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 1273, 1273 (11th Cir. 1985).

A disability is defined as a physical or mental impairment of such 

severity that the claimant is not only unable to do past relevant work, “but 

cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in 

any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national 

1 “If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence we must affirm, 

even if the proof preponderates against it.” Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240, n.8 

(11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). “A ‘substantial evidence’ standard, however, does not 

permit a court to uphold the Secretary’s decision by referring only to those parts of the 

record which support the ALJ. “Unless the Secretary has analyzed all evidence and has 

sufficiently explained the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits, to say that 

his decision is supported by substantial evidence approaches an abdication of the court’s 

‘duty to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the conclusions reached 

are rational.’” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).

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economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). A disability is an “inability to engage in 

any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not 

less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509 

(duration requirement); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 223-224 (2002). 

In addition, an individual is entitled to disability insurance benefits (DIB) if 

she is under a disability prior to the expiration of his insured status. See 42 

U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211.

The Commissioner analyzes a claim in five steps, pursuant to 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v):

1. Is the individual currently engaged in substantial gainful 

activity?

2. Does the individual have any severe impairments?

3. Does the individual have any severe impairments that meet or 

equal those listed in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 

P?

4. Does the individual have the residual functional capacity 

(RFC) to perform work despite limitations and are there any 

impairments which prevent past relevant work?2

2 An RFC is the most a claimant can still do despite limitations. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1545(a)(1). It is an assessment based upon all of the relevant evidence including 

the claimant’s description of her limitations, observations by treating and examining 

physicians or other persons, and medical records. Id. The responsibility for determining 

claimant’s RFC lies with the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); see Social Security Ruling 

(SSR) 96-5p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 2, at *12 (July 2, 1996) (“The term “residual functional 

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5. Do the individual’s impairments prevent other work?

A positive finding at step one or a negative finding at step two results 

in disapproval of the application for benefits. A positive finding at step three 

results in approval of the application for benefits. At step four, the claimant 

bears the burden of establishing a severe impairment that precludes the 

performance of past relevant work. Consideration is given to the assessment 

of the claimant’s RFC and the claimant’s past relevant work. If the claimant 

can still do past relevant work, there will be a finding that the claimant is not 

disabled. If the claimant carries this burden, however, the burden shifts to 

the Commissioner at step five to establish that despite the claimant’s 

impairments, the claimant is able to perform other work in the national 

economy in light of the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work 

experience. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-39 (11th Cir. 2004) 

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (e) & (g)). If the Commissioner carries 

this burden, the claimant must prove that he or she cannot perform the work 

capacity assessment” describes an adjudicator’s finding about the ability of an individual 

to perform work-related activities. The assessment is based upon consideration of all 

relevant evidence in the case record, including medical evidence and relevant nonmedical 

evidence, such as observations of lay witnesses of an individual’s apparent 

symptomatology, an individual’s own statement of what he or she is able or unable to do, 

and many other factors that could help the adjudicator determine the most reasonable 

findings in light of all the evidence.”). The Court will apply the SSR in effect when the ALJ 

rendered her decision. See generally Bagliere v. Colvin, No. 1:16CV109, 2017 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 8779, at *10-18, (M.D. N.C. Jan. 23, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51917 

(M.D. N.C. Feb. 23, 2017).

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suggested by the Commissioner. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th 

Cir. 1987).

Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is disabled, and 

consequently, is responsible for producing evidence in support of his claim. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. The responsibility of 

weighing the medical evidence and resolving any conflicts in the record rests 

with the ALJ. See Battle v. Astrue, 243 F. App’x 514, 523 (11th Cir. 2007). 

As the finder of fact, the ALJ is charged with the duty to evaluate all 

the medical opinions of the record and resolve conflicts that might appear. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527. When considering medical opinions, the following 

factors apply for determining the weight to give to any medical opinion: (1) 

the frequency of examination and the length, nature, extent of the treatment 

relationship; (2) the evidence in support of the opinion, such as “[t]he more 

a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, 

particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight” that 

opinion is given; (3) the opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole; (4) 

whether the opinion is from a specialist and, if it is, it will be accorded greater 

weight; and (5) other relevant but unspecified factors. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(b) & (c)(1)-(6).

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“[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different 

medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 

F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). Further, the ALJ must give a treating 

physician’s opinion “substantial or considerable weight” absent “good 

cause.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 

1440 (11th Cir. 1997). This is so because treating physicians

are likely to be the medical professionals most able to 

provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical 

impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the 

medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the 

objective medical findings alone or from reports of 

individual examinations, such as consultative 

examinations or brief hospitalizations.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). "This requires a relationship of both duration and 

frequency." Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 762 (10th Cir. 2003). “’[A] 

medical professional who has dealt with a claimant and his maladies over a 

long period of time will have a deeper insight into the medical condition of 

the claimant than will a person who has examined a claimant but once, or 

who has only seen the claimant’s medical records.’" Id. (citing Barker v. 

Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). The reasons for giving little weight 

to the opinion of the treating physician must be supported by substantial 

evidence, Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 841 (11th Cir. 1992), and must 

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be clearly articulated. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241. "The Secretary must specify 

what weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion and any reason for 

giving it no weight, and failure to do so is reversible error." MacGregor v. 

Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (1986).

“The ALJ may discount the treating physician’s opinion if good cause 

exists to do so.” Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1181 (11th Cir. 1986). 

Good cause may be found when the opinion is "not bolstered by the 

evidence," the evidence "supports a contrary finding," the opinion is 

"conclusory" or "so brief and conclusory that it lacks persuasive weight," the 

opinion is "inconsistent with [the treating physician’s own medical records," 

the statement "contains no [supporting] clinical data or information," the 

opinion "is unsubstantiated by any clinical or laboratory findings," or the 

opinion "is not accompanied by objective medical evidence." Lewis, 125 F.3d 

at 1440; Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing 

Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1987)). Further, where a 

treating physician has merely made conclusory statements, the ALJ may 

afford them such weight to the extent they are supported by clinical or 

laboratory findings and are consistent with other evidence as to a claimant’s 

impairments. Wheeler v. Heckler, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986). 

However, if the decision of the ALJ is explained and relies on evidence in the 

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record it should be upheld. “We will not second guess the ALJ about the 

weight the treating physician’s opinion deserves so long as he articulates a 

specific justification for it.” Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm’r, 808 F.3d 818, 

823 (11th Cir. 2015).

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).

The Court begins it analysis by first outlining the ALJ’s determinations. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe impairments: “spine 

disorder, right shoulder disorder, and degenerative joint disease,” which 

“significantly limit [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work activities.” Tr. 24. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff also had a “nonsevere impairment: headaches”; 

however, “there is no evidence that this significantly limits [Plaintiff’s] ability 

to perform basic work activities.” Id. Plaintiff does not contest these findings 

as existing impairments. Id.

However, the ALJ determined the denial of benefits was warranted.

The ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff “has no past relevant work” and “limited 

education.”3 Tr. 29. “Transferability of job skills [was] not an issue because 

the [Plaintiff] does not have past relevant work.” Id. Still, because the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing jobs that exist in the 

3 Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she did not graduate from high school. Tr. 43. 

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national economy, a finding of “not disabled is . . . appropriate.” Tr. 30. This

determination is contested by Plaintiff.

The ALJ made several other findings. Plaintiff “has not engaged in 

substantial gainful activity since February 11, 2016.” Tr. 24. Plaintiff “does 

not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id., p. 24. Specifically, Plaintiff’s “spine disorder 

does not meet Listing 1.04 for disorders of the spine because the record 

does not demonstrate compromise of a nerve root or the spinal cord with 

additional findings of . . . nerve root compression accompanied by sensory 

or reflex loss, and if there is involvement of the lower back, positive straight 

leg raising . . . spinal arachnoiditis . . . or . . . lumbar spinal stenosis resulting 

in pseudoclaudication.” Tr. 25.

Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “has the residual 

functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b).” 

Tr. 25. The ALJ noted: “the claimant is further limited to . . . occasionally 

climbing ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes and scaffolds; occasionally stooping, 

kneeling, crouching and crawling; and occasionally overhead reaching with 

the right upper extremity.” Id. Moreover, “limiting the claimant to light work 

with additional postural limitations accounts for the claimant’s spine disorder 

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as well as right shoulder pain, and degenerative joint disease. The additional 

limitation to only occasional overhead reaching further addresses the 

claimant’s shoulder disorder.” Tr. 29.

The ALJ determined “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Tr. 29. This 

determination was due following the consideration of the testimony of the 

vocational expert, “[Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity.” Tr. 30. In particular, “[t]he vocational expert testified that 

given all of these factors [Plaintiff] would be able to perform the requirements 

of . . . representative occupations: furniture rental consultant, boat rental 

clerk, shipping/receiving ware.” Id. Finally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was not “under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since 

February 11, 2016, the date the application was filed.” Id.

B. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give the opinion of 

Plaintiff’s treating physician “little weight” regarding Plaintiff’s RFC.

Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Brodsky’s opinion should be given, 

essentially, controlling weight is rejected. First, a treating physician’s opinion 

warrants, at most, “substantial or considerable weight”; however, “if good 

cause” exists, a treating physician’s opinion might be completely discounted. 

Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440; Hillsman, 804 F.2d at 1181. The ALJ considered 

the entire record in making her determinations, including Plaintiff’s medical 

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records spanning an eight-year period. T. 25, 34-35. This Opinion discusses 

only those medical records which are pertinent to Plaintiff’s claims.4 They are 

outlined as follows: (1) Plaintiff’s medical treatment prior to Dr. Brodsky –

2010-2015; (2) Plaintiff’s medical treatment by Dr. Brodsky and others -

2016; and (3) Plaintiff’s subsequent medical treatment and evaluations -

2017-2018.

1. Plaintiff’s Medical Treatment Prior to Dr. Brodsky - 2010-2015

At least as far back as September 20, 2010, Plaintiff complained of low 

back pain. At that time, an x-ray indicated the vertebral bodies were normal 

in height and alignment,” there was “no fracture or subluxation [or] . . . 

spondylolysis,” and “the sacrum is normal in appearance.” Tr. 341-42.

Between 2012 and 2013, Plaintiff presented to the emergency room (ER) on 

five occasions. On April 125, October 116, and October 15, 20127, Plaintiff 

complained of medical conditions unrelated to this case, but the records 

indicated that Plaintiff had “[n]ormal range[s] of motion” in her neck and 

musculoskeletal system. See Tr. 271-73, 321-25, and 274-282, respectively.

4 Many of the Plaintiff’s medical records submitted are duplicate copies. Where that exists, 

the Opinion cites to both the original and duplicate copies.

5 Martin Health System (MHS).

6 St. Lucie West.

7 MHS.

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Then, a few months later, on January 9, 2013, Plaintiff returned to St. 

Lucie West/MHS and complained of “constant and sharp” left lower back pain 

“exacerbated with movement and range of motion . . . numbness of leg,” but

she had no difficulty walking. Tr. 282-83, 315-16. Plaintiff had “[n]ormal range 

of motion” and “no tenderness” in her neck and extremities but there was 

“mild tenderness at left paravertebral lumbar area. SLR is positive at 30 

degrees on left. Negative on right. No CVA.” Tr. 285, 316. An x-ray of the 

lumbar spine again indicated “[t]he vertebral bodies are normal in height and 

alignment. No compression fracture or subluxation . . . No spondylolysis . . . 

[t]he sacrum is normal in appearance” and the study was “normal.” Tr. 292-

93, 333-34. Ultimately, the “differential diagnosis considered” included 

“Lumbar radiculopathy and myofascial strain” with “Sciatica” as a “clinical 

impression.” Tr. 286. Plaintiff stated her back pain improved with the 

medication she received during the ER visit and was discharged “with steady 

gait.” Tr. 317.

Six months later, on June 11, 2013, Plaintiff sought care for her back 

pain, which she attributed to the use of a massage chair. Tr. 287. Plaintiff’s 

diagnoses included “aphthosis” and “bruise of muscle.” Tr. 289-90. The 

doctor prescribed Plaintiff medication to relieve her symptoms. Tr. 289. For 

the next two years, there is no record of any treatment.

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In the year before Plaintiff sought treatment from Dr. Brodsky, she 

presented to the ER on three occasions. On April 13, 2015, Plaintiff 

presented to Tradition Hospital/MHS complaining of pain in her right wrist, 

shoulder, elbow, hip, knee, and ankle the result of a fall but denied any pain 

in her head, neck, or back.8 Tr. 309, 371. Plaintiff had “[n]ormal range of 

motion” in her neck and musculoskeletal system; however, there was 

moderate tenderness to the lower lumbar and sacral spine as well as pain. 

Tr. 309-10, 372. The x-rays showed “[d]egenerative disc disease” in the 

lumbar spine and “degenerative changes” in the right shoulder and hips. 

Tr. 310, 331-32, 372-73. Plaintiff was diagnosed with multiple contusions 

and provided with medications to alleviate her symptoms. Tr. 311.

On August 14, 2015, Plaintiff presented to St. Lucie West/MHS

complaining of pain in her lower back, right shoulder, and neck the result of 

a fall.

9 Tr. 304. “There [was] no neck pain.” Id. Plaintiff described the pain as 

“mild to moderate” with “mild swelling.” Id. The x-rays indicated “mild 

degenerative disk space narrowing at L5-S1” in Plaintiff’s lumbar spine; and 

8 This record is again duplicated at Tr. 386-89.

9 This record is again duplicated at Tr. 375-81.

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Plaintiff was diagnosed with “lumbar strain.” Tr. 306-08, 327-30, 349-52.

Again, Plaintiff received medications for her symptoms. Tr. 305.

On September 16, 2015, Plaintiff returned to St. Lucie West/MHS

complaining of “pain in [her] lower back and in back of both [her] legs.”10

Tr. 300. More specifically, there was:

gradual onset, mild to moderate, dull lower back pain . . . 

The pain is worse in certain positions and better with 

others. It increases with palpitation of the muscles of the 

lower back. . . There is no numbness or weakness of the 

distal extremities . . . There is some radiation of pain to the 

buttock.

Tr. 301. Though there was “mild diffuse muscular paralumbar tenderness . . . 

with decreased range of motion secondary to pain and stiffness,” Plaintiff’s 

neck and extremities appeared “normal” with “[p]ainless range of motion.”

Tr. 302. Her “motor . . . [s]trength” was 5/5 in all 4 limbs” and a “negative 

seated straight leg raise test.” Id. “Degenerative changes” were noted on the 

x-ray; and Plaintiff was diagnosed with “lumbosacral strain.” Tr. 303, 326-27, 

347. Specifically, “[a]t the L-5-S1 level, [there was] moderate disk space 

narrowing and minor spurring . . . minor scoliosis,” and “[d]egenerative 

changes [was] noted at the lower thoracic spine.” Tr. 327, 348. The doctor 

10 This record is again duplicated at Tr. 382-85.

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“stressed . . . the importance of close follow up for the back pain” and 

prescribed Plaintiff medications. Tr. 303-04.

On October 29, 2015, Plaintiff presented to St. Lucie Medical Center 

complaining of back pain related to a fall just two weeks earlier. Tr. 400. It 

was noted that Plaintiff had “decreased” range of motion in her back due to 

pain and a left “straight leg raise + at (30)”; she was able to walk and squat 

with no deficit or weakness. Tr. 401-02. The radiological report indicated 

“multilevel disc disease and spondylosis relatively mild in degree greatest at 

the L5-S1 level.” Tr. 402, 406. Several months later, Plaintiff sought an 

orthopedic/neurological consult by Dr. Brodsky. Tr. 425.

2. Plaintiff’s Medical Treatment by Dr. Brodsky During 2016

Over an eight-month period, Plaintiff had three consultative 

examinations with Dr. Brodsky.11 Plaintiff’s first appointment was five days 

after she initiated her disability claim, on February 16, 2016. Tr. 425. Plaintiff

complained of “severe pain” in her lower back that “can go into both legs,”

as well as arm and joint pain.

12 Id. According to Dr. Brodsky, Plaintiff’s ability 

to conduct usual activities was limited by pain. Id. Although there was

11 MCBP Orthopedics and Neurosurgery.

12 This record is duplicated at Tr. 433-37.

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decreased range of motion in Plaintiff’s neck, right arm, and lumbar region

were noted, her gait was “intact and normal.” Tr. 426-27. Dr. Brodsky 

diagnosed Plaintiff with spinal pathology which “may be secondary to 

underlying discogenic pathology.” Tr. 428. Dr. Brodsky ordered an MRI of 

the lumbar spine. Id. 

Within two weeks, on February 27, 2016, Plaintiff presented to 

Lawnwood Regional Medical Center complaining of upper back pain. 

Tr. 409. Her neck, however, had “full [range of motion].” Tr. 410. Plaintiff was 

prescribed medications to alleviate her symptoms. Tr. 415. The following 

day, on February 28, Plaintiff presented for the MRI of her lumbar spine, 

which indicated disc bulges and degenerative changes but “without 

significant spinal canal or neural foraminal stenosis” except “at the L5-S1 

level there are degenerative endplate changes . . . a disc bulge with a central 

to left lateral recess disc extrusion/herniation, which is extending interiorly 

and causing moderate left lateral recess stenosis and encroachment upon 

the left S1 nerve root.”13 Tr. 430-31.

On May 3, 2016, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Brodsky who noted that “in 

the seated position, a positive straight-leg-lift at 45 [degrees] of flexion of the 

left hip . . . pain, tenderness, and spasm equally over the lumbar facets . . . 

13 This record is duplicated at Tr. 440-41.

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right and left rotation of the neck remain[ed] limited.” Tr. 438. Also, “[f]lexion 

and extension of the right elbow” and “forward flexion of the right shoulder” 

were limited. Tr. 438-39. In line with the MRI findings, Dr. Brodsky 

determined there was a “left disc extrusion/herniation encroaching upon the 

left S1 nerve root superimposed on neuroforaminal disc protrusion and 

herniation L4-5 with annular tear.” Tr. 439. Dr. Brodsky recommended 

“limited activity level[s] . . . [l]imited bending and lifting” and limiting weights

to no “greater than 10-15 pounds.” Tr. 439.

On September 6, 2016, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Brodsky who noted 

Plaintiff was “not doing well at all . . . radiculopathy continues in the same 

pattern without progression” with “a positive straight leg lift . . . at 40 [degrees] 

of flexion of the hip.” Tr. 459. Still, Plaintiff’s gait was “intact and normal.” Id. 

Dr. Brodsky’s assessment remained the same; he recommended “whether it 

is injections or surgery, there is much more that can be done for the lower 

back.” Tr. 460.

In contrast, on October 24, 2016, Dr. Brodsky completed the “Physical 

Capacities Evaluation” form outlining Plaintiff’s condition. Tr. 446-449. Dr. 

Brodsky limited Plaintiff ability to lift or carry “5-10 lbs” -- a reduction from his 

assessment in May -- and maintained that Plaintiff could “never” perform the 

following postural activities: climbing, balancing, stooping, crouching, 

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kneeling, or crawling, rather than just “limited,” as he previously opined. 

Tr. 446-47. Dr. Brodsky indicated on the form that Plaintiff’s ability to stand, 

walk, and sit were affected by her impairment. Id. Specifically, standing, 

walking, and sitting was limited to “4-5 hours” for only “15-30 minutes” at a 

time “without interruption” out of “an 8-hour work day.” Id. According to Dr. 

Brodsky, in a work setting, Plaintiff would require rest periods “every 2-4 hrs” 

for “15-30 minutes” at a time. Tr. 448.

3. Plaintiff’s Subsequent Medical Treatment & Evaluations - 2016-2018

Contrary to Plaintiff’s claims that she was not able to obtain treatment 

to provide relief for the back pain, ECF No. 1, p. 2, she made several visits 

to the ER for various issues, including back pain, for which she received 

treatment. Notably, on occasion, Plaintiff, actually reported no back pain or 

neck pain.

On December 7, 2016, Plaintiff presented to St. Lucie Medical Center 

complaining of intermittent back pain. Tr. 516. Plaintiff claimed that “her back 

. . . goes out on her” and has “pain across her lower back that . . . radiates 

down her legs with some numbness.” Id. “Plaintiff denied any significant 

aggravating or relieving factors.” Id. Plaintiff admitted she was diagnosed 

with degenerative disc disease “a few years ago” but maintained she did not 

have “any money or insurance to follow up with a specialist.” Id. Plaintiff 

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denied having any pain in her extremities. Tr. 517. Still, Plaintiff’s back had 

“[f]ull range of motion, [n]o paraspinal tenderness, [and] no muscle spasms” 

though she “complain[ed] of pain with movement and range of motion.” 

Tr. 519. Plaintiff’s “[m]anual muscle strength in the bilateral lower extremities 

is 5/5. No weakness”; and she “ambulates with a steady gait.” Id. A repeated 

MRI did not reveal any new changes -- “focal degenerative disc changes L5-

S1.” Tr. 520-21. Plaintiff was treated with medications. Id.

The record contradicts Plaintiff’s claims that she made “no doctor’s 

visits in the record after December 2016,” until the consultative examination 

in February 2018, or, alternatively, that she made “three emergency room 

visits . . . for unrelated injuries, but all mention her chronic back pain.” ECF 

No. 1, p. 2 at para. 8(a). Just two months later, on February 25, 2017, 

Plaintiff returned to MHS complaining of rib- and right forearm pain resulting 

from a fall. Tr. 473. However, the medical record indicated “negative for back 

pain and neck pain”; and Plaintiff’s neck had “normal range of motion.” 

Tr. 475-76. Plaintiff’s “strength and sensation were grossly intact 

throughout.” Tr. 476. An x-ray and CT scan revealed a “rib fracture,” which 

was apparently “old.” Tr. 477, 483-84. Plaintiff was “feeling better with pain 

control.” Tr. 477. 

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On March 17, 2017, Plaintiff presented to St. Lucie Medical Center 

complaining of chest pain, apparently, related to a recent fall. Tr. 505. The 

medical report noted that Plaintiff’s neck had “full range of motion” and no 

tenderness. Tr. 506. Plaintiff had “full” and “[p]ainless range of motion” in her 

back, which was not tender; and her “straight leg raise” was negative. 

Tr. 507. Plaintiff also had “[f]ull range of motion” in her lower extremities. Id.

No abnormality was found in the CT scan of Plaintiff’s chest. Tr. 508, 512-

13.

On July 22, 2017, Plaintiff returned to St. Lucie Medical Center 

complaining of left arm and chest wall pain following a fall. Tr. 493.

Specifically, Plaintiff denied back or neck pain. Tr. 494. The doctor noted 

Plaintiff had “full range of motion” in her neck; there was “[n]o swelling” or 

tenderness. Tr. 495. Her right shoulder, arm, and elbow exams were 

“normal.” Tr. 496. Plaintiff was diagnosed with sprains and contusions, but 

there was no fracture or abnormality. Tr. 498, 500-03.

On December 17, 2017, Plaintiff presented to MHS complaining of hip, 

knee, and rib cage pain following a fall. Tr. 461. It was noted that Plaintiff had 

“normal” range of motion in her neck. Tr. 464. Plaintiff’s x-rays confirmed 

there were no abnormalities, fractures, or dislocation of her knee, hip/pelvis, 

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or ribs. Tr. 467-472. ECF No. 16, pp. 471-82. During this visit, Plaintiff made 

no complaints about any back pain. Tr. 461-472.

Related to her disability claims, on February 26, 2018, Plaintiff 

submitted to a consultative opinion by Dr. Gonzalez.14 Tr. 456-458. 

Dr. Gonzalez noted that Plaintiff had full range of motion in her cervical and 

lumbosacral spine, though there was “midline tenderness” and “mild 

paraspinal muscle hypertonicity” at L5. Tr. 457. Also, Plaintiff had the full 

range of motion in her upper and lower limbs without any pain, “strength 

grossly 5/5 throughout.” Id. Dr. Gonzalez considered the MRI from February 

2016 and diagnosed Plaintiff with low back pain with left-sided radiculopathy, 

L/S spine disc disease, and cervical myositis. Tr. 458. Dr. Gonzalez 

recommended that Plaintiff would be able to perform gainful employment 

limited to avoiding lifting/pushing/pulling more than 50 pounds. Id. In the 

statement addressing Plaintiff’s ability to perform work activities, 

Dr. Gonzalez opined that Plaintiff could frequently lift or carry “up to 20 lbs” 

but, occasionally, could do so up to 100 pounds. Tr. 450. Yet, Dr. Gonzalez 

limited Plaintiff’s ability to stand or walk to fifteen minutes at a time without 

interruption and a maximum of two hours out of an eight-hour workday; 

Plaintiff could sit for eight hours. Tr. 451. Dr. Gonzalez did not answer the 

14 This physician examined Plaintiff at the request of the SSA.

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question relating to what activity Plaintiff would be performing if standing and 

walking did not equal or exceed the eight-hour workday. Id. Dr. Gonzalez 

opined that, occasionally, Plaintiff could climb stairs, ramps, ladders, or 

scaffolds; balance; stoop; kneel; crouch; and crawl. Tr. 453.

The ALJ accorded Dr. Brodsky’s opinion “little weight,” but did not

“disregard” it, “because it is more restrictive than indicated by his own 

examination findings” and “the opinion is also inconsistent with the overall 

record.” Tr. 29. Therefore, as a matter of law, the ALJ accepted the treating 

physician’s opinions as true. MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053. The statements 

from Dr. Brodsky conflict with his own earlier opinions and are inconsistent 

and not supported by other evidence in the years following his examinations.

It is important to note that Dr. Brodsky is not Plaintiff’s only “treating 

physician” -- the ER providers were Plaintiff’s treating physicians and their 

notes include references to Plaintiff’s history of chronic back pain.

The ALJ also considered the evidence of the medical consultant for the 

Department of Disability Services. Tr. 27-28. Dr. Lee reviewed Plaintiff’s 

medical records and Dr. Brodsky’s opinions through May 2016 and 

determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity for light work. Tr. 78-97. The 

ALJ accorded the consultant’s opinion “significant weight” because the 

opinion is consistent with the evidence as a whole, particularly the medical 

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record consisting of the shoulder and lumbar spine x-rays, the results of the 

MRI, and Plaintiff’s subsequent medical treatment demonstrating full range 

of motion in her neck, back, and extremities and a normal gait. Tr. 27-28. 

The ALJ made specific findings supporting her decision. Id. A “nonexamining physician’s opinion” may be entitled to “significant weight” if the 

opinions are supported by the evidence in the record. Forrester v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 455 F. Appx. 899, 902 (11th Cir. 2012). The ALJ considered 

the relevant medical records -- pre-consultative and post-consultative -- and 

“there is no rigid requirement that the ALJ specifically refer to every piece of 

evidence in his decision” provided the ALJ’s decision is sufficient to enable 

the court to conclude that the ALJ properly considered the claimant’s 

condition as a whole. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). 

The Court is satisfied that the ALJ did so.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision; and she accorded 

the treating physician’s opinion proper weight and considered numerous 

factors when evaluating the doctor’s opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; 

Tr. 24-29. The ALJ explained the weight she gave to Dr. Brodsky’s opinion 

with sufficient specificity to withstand judicial scrutiny. The Court may not, 

essentially, reweigh the evidence. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240 n.8. No error 

has been shown.

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C. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to give the 

consultative examiner’s opinion partial weight.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the ALJ afforded Dr. Gonzalez’s 

opinion “partial weight” and did not “discount” his opinion. Tr. 28. As 

explained above, Dr. Gonzalez opined that Plaintiff could perform gainful 

employment if she avoided “lifting/pushing/pulling of more than 50 pounds,”

which, in the ALJ’s view, was inconsistent with his own assessment of 

Plaintiff’s limitations and the record as a whole. See Tr. 458. Dr. Gonzalez 

found Plaintiff to have the full range of motion in her cervical, thoracic, and 

lumbosacral spine with only mild tenderness and hypertonicity at L5, which 

is inconsistent with his postural limitations. Tr. 457. True, Dr. Gonzalez 

evaluated Plaintiff approximately seventeen months after her last visit with 

Dr. Brodsky; however, as explained above, during that period, Plaintiff also 

sought ER treatment on multiple occasions, which presented a relevant 

record for the ALJ to consider. Although “the ALJ has an obligation to 

develop a full and fair record,” Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th 

Cir. 2003) (per curiam), she “is not obliged to order [another] consultative 

examination when the record contains sufficient evidence to support a 

determination.” Ybarra v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App’x 538, 543 (11th 

Cir. 2016).

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Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Gonzalez’s opinion of Plaintiff’s limitation 

to stand or walk for maximum of two hours per day somehow translates into 

the inability to engage in gainful employment, is mistaken. See ECF No. 18, 

pp. 6-7. In according Dr. Gonzalez’s opinion “partial weight,” the ALJ pointed

out contradictions in Dr. Gonzalez’s opinion because the limitations were 

inconsistent with a finding that Plaintiff had the full range of motion in her 

cervical spine, lumbosacral spine, and extremities and when compared to 

Plaintiff’s ability to perform the basic activities of daily living and drive. Tr. 28-

29. Also, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s testimony provided at her hearing 

also supports the ALJ’s decision. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that she was 

able to drive but did not feel comfortable doing so given her pain levels and 

opted to have others drive her; and when asked what she, “typically,” does 

“during the day to pass the time,” she responded that she does “a little house 

cleaning,” “dishes . . . some laundry” and is also able to shower to relieve her 

pain. Tr. 47-48. Nonetheless, the ALJ is not required to cite to Plaintiff’s 

specific testimony in order to support her rationale. The ALJ made clear that 

Plaintiff’s testimony was considered in her final decision. Tr. 25-26.

Moreover, Dr. Gonzalez’s opinions relating to Plaintiff’s ability to work 

or her RFC are not entitled to significant weight nor are they outcome 

determinative. Opinions by a treating or consultative physician on issues 

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regarding whether a claimant is unable to work, the claimant’s RFC, and the 

application of vocational factors, “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, 

instead, opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner because they are 

administrative findings that are dispositive of the case; i.e., that would direct 

the determination or decision of disability.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); see Bell 

v. Bowen, 796 F.2d 1350, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 1986); see also, supra, at n.6. 

Although physician’s opinions about what a claimant can still do or the 

claimant’s restrictions are relevant evidence, such opinions are not 

determinative because the ALJ has responsibility of assessing the claimant’s 

RFC. Beegle v. SSA, Comm'r, 482 F. App’x 483, 486 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)).

This Court will not reweigh the evidence or “second guess” the weight 

the ALJ afforded the opinion. Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239; Hunter, 808 F. 

3d at 823. Here, the ALJ accorded the consultative physician’s opinion

proper weight and considered numerous factors when evaluating his opinion. 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527; Tr. 24-29. More importantly, the ALJ explained 

the weight with sufficient specificity to withstand judicial scrutiny. No error 

has been shown.

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V. Conclusion

Considering the record, as a whole, the findings of the ALJ are based 

upon substantial evidence in the record; and the ALJ correctly applied the 

law. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner to deny Plaintiff’s 

application for Social Security disability benefits is AFFIRMED. The Clerk is 

DIRECTED to enter judgment for the Defendant.

IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on October 30, 2020.

s/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick_______________

MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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