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2018 IL App (3d) 170330 

Opinion filed March 27, 2018 

IN THE 

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS 

THIRD DISTRICT 

2018 

CHARLES BOCOCK,	 ) Appeal from the Circuit Court 

) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Will County, Illinois, 

) 

) Appeal Nos. 3-17-0330, 3-17-0331 and

v. ) 3-17-0406 

) Circuit Nos. 15-CH-976, 15-CH-1052 

) and 16-MR-2527 

) 

WILL COUNTY SHERIFF,	 ) Honorable 

) Arkadiusz Z. Smigielski, 

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding. 

JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Holdridge and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
 

OPINION 

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Charles Bocock, was a pretrial detainee at the Will County Adult Detention 

Facility (WCADF) during 2015 and 2016. During this time period, plaintiff requested numerous 

records from WCADF through the Illinois Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 

et seq. (West 2014)). The WCADF did not comply with plaintiff’s various requests for 

information. Those denials resulted in three separate lawsuits filed by plaintiff against the Will 

County Sheriff (defendant). Plaintiff now appeals the adverse ruling in all three cases and the 
 

 

three separate appeals have now been consolidated for purposes of this appeal. We affirm in part, 

reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 I. Plaintiff’s First Complaint 

¶ 4 On April 10, 2015, plaintiff filed a complaint, followed by an amended complaint (first 

amended complaint) on June 23, 2015, in Will County case No. 15-CH-976. The first amended 

complaint alleged defendant improperly denied five FOIA requests initiated by plaintiff. The 

first amended complaint contained five counts—tracking the original five FOIA requests—with 

each count seeking both an injunction compelling defendant to produce the requested documents 

and civil penalties for the alleged willful and intentional failure to comply with FOIA. Count V 

of plaintiff’s first amended complaint is the only count relevant to this consolidated appeal. In 

count V, plaintiff alleged he filed a FOIA request on March 22, 2015, seeking “Documentation 

showing the brand, product name, ingredients, nutrition information, expiration / best by date of 

the milk drink served on the morning of 3/21/15.” Plaintiff alleged he received the following 

response to his request: 

“The [WCADF] Food Service personnel have advised that the milk drink served 

on 3/21/15 was a commodity and there was only enough for one meal. Food 

Service personnel have checked all of the commodities and determined that they 

no longer possess any of the product or any labeling or product information from 

the milk drink.” 

Plaintiff further alleged defendant failed to “search any of its garbage or trash receptacles or 

Dumpsters for remaining containers from the milk drink.” 

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¶ 5 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss count V of plaintiff’s first amended complaint on two 

grounds. First, defendant claimed that a used milk container did not qualify as a public record 

and could “more accurately [be] defined as refuse or garbage, as they are part of food items 

served to pre-trial detainees at the facility.” Alternatively, even if the refuse could be considered 

a public record, defendant argued that “[c]ombing through days old garbage *** would impose 

undue burden.” 

¶ 6 Plaintiff filed a reply to defendant’s motion to dismiss. In his reply, plaintiff stated that 

the milk container was on WCADF premises at the time of his FOIA request, albeit in the 

garbage. In addition, plaintiff conceded that the packaging for the used milk carton was no 

longer in defendant’s possession, mooting his request for injunctive relief. 

¶ 7 Following a hearing held on February 11, 2016, the circuit court dismissed count V of 

plaintiff’s first amended complaint, finding that the milk container was not a public record. 

However, the court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, in part, and ordered defendant to 

answer the first three counts of plaintiff’s first amended complaint. 

¶ 8 II. Plaintiff’s Second Complaint 

¶ 9 Plaintiff filed a separate 11-count complaint (second complaint) on June 23, 2015, Will 

County case No. 15-CH-1052, pertaining to the denial of previous FOIA requests made by 

plaintiff for records that were unrelated to those records relevant to the pending lawsuit in Will 

County case No. 15-CH-976. Once again, plaintiff sought injunctive relief compelling defendant 

to produce the requested documents, and assess civil penalties against defendant on each count. 

It is undisputed that defendant denied each of plaintiff’s FOIA requests. 

¶ 10 The circuit court’s rulings on counts VI, X, and XI are the only rulings at issue in the 

present appeal. Count VI of plaintiff’s second complaint pertained to plaintiff’s FOIA request 

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seeking a “List of all lockdown dates/times/durations/reasons during March 2015” (lockdown 

documents). In Defendant’s answer to plaintiff’s second complaint, defendant asserted the 

records requested in count VI were exempt under FOIA, in that giving an inmate information 

regarding lockdowns “would present a danger to security within the WCADF.” See id. § 7(1)(e). 

¶ 11 Count X of plaintiff’s second complaint alleged plaintiff made a FOIA request seeking 

“All documentation (e.g. emails, grievances) regarding detainee Christopher Conway’s 

last/stolen books, including amount paid in compensation for the loss” (Conway documents). In 

the answer to count X, defendant asserted the requested documents were exempt under FOIA 

(see id. § 7(1)(c)) in that disclosure to plaintiff would violate Conway’s privacy interest in his 

private personal information. See id. § 7(1)(e). 

¶ 12 Count XI of plaintiff’s second complaint alleged plaintiff made a FOIA request seeking a 

copy of the WCADF “Policies and Procedures” manual (policy manual). In the answer to count 

XI, defendant asserted the policy manual was exempt for security purposes. 

¶ 13 Furthermore, plaintiff alleged that after his request for the policy manual was denied, 

plaintiff submitted the case to the Illinois Attorney General’s Public Access Counselor for 

further review. See id. § 9.5(a) (proving that a person whose FOIA request is denied may file a 

request for review by the Public Access Counselor). After conducting a confidential review of 

the manual, the Public Access Counselor found that while certain portions of the policy manual 

(often regarding the location of weapons or the intake and movement of inmates) were exempt 

from FOIA and subject to redaction, the policy manual as a whole was not exempt from FOIA. 

The nonbinding determination letter prepared by the Public Access Counselor concluded 

defendant should provide plaintiff with the redacted policy manual, but declined to issue a 

binding opinion. Defendant also admitted to the existence and substance of the Public Access 

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Counselor’s letter, but answered these allegations by observing the letter was not intended to be 

binding. 

¶ 14 In an order dated July 19, 2016, the court agreed to review in camera documents 

pertaining to the dates and times of lockdowns and documents pertaining to WCADF’s 

compensation for Conway’s books. Defendant also submitted a number of Bates-stamped 

documents for the court’s in camera review. 

¶ 15 On July 22, 2016, the court entered an order that began: “Cause comes on for entry of 

order consistent with the court’s ruling in open court on July 19, 2016.” The court ordered 

defendant to produce a list of the times and dates of lockdowns occurring in March 2015, but 

ruled that information relating to the reasons for or durations of the lockdowns was exempt. The 

court ruled the Conway documents exempt in full based on Conway’s privacy interests and 

plaintiff’s lack of legitimate interest in the documents. In an order dated July 27, 2016, with 

regard to the policy manual, the court wrote: “Jail operations manual is exempt in total, with 

exception of bates # 0-05.” As none of the Bates-stamped materials appear on the appellate 

record, this court has no way to determine which portions of the manual were deemed exempt 

and which portions were not. 

¶ 16 III. Trial 

¶ 17 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (case No. 15-CH-976) and second complaint (case 

No. 15-CH-1052) were consolidated for trial. Plaintiff, in his brief, characterizes the trial as 

pertaining only to the issues of civil penalties raised in both complaints. Each case contains the 

following identical order dated February 2, 2017, apparently issued after the trial: “Matter for 

directed finding on all counts is granted for reasons established by court.” The report of 

proceedings of the trial has not been included in the record on appeal. 

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¶ 18 Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate judgment in Will County case No. 15-CH-976, and Will 

County case No. 15-CH-1052. After the trial court denied the request to vacate the judgment in 

each case, plaintiff filed a timely appeal in both cases on May 12, 2017. 

¶ 19 IV. Plaintiff’s Third Complaint 

¶ 20 On September 27, 2016, plaintiff filed an unrelated third complaint (third complaint). 

This filing was case No. 16-MR-2527. In the third complaint, plaintiff alleged that after the price 

of stamps had been reduced from 49 cents to 47 cents by the United States Postal Service 

(USPS), the WCADF continued selling stamps and books of stamps at the higher price. In 

relation to this claim, plaintiff filed a FOIA request seeking “Documents showing name + CIMIS 

of all detainees who purchased stamps/books of stamps for 49¢/$4.90 after the price was reduced 

to 47¢ per stamp by the USPS. Also to include the amount of stamps purchased.” 

¶ 21 Plaintiff alleged in the complaint that defendant responded by informing him that “a list 

showing names and booking numbers listing detainees whom purchased stamps does not exist.” 

According to plaintiff, defendant further responded: “However, a report does exist to show how 

many stamps were purchased for $0.49 after the rate drop.” Defendant informed plaintiff that 

566 single stamps and 30 books were sold “after the rate drop.” Plaintiff alleged in his complaint 

that every purchase from the commissary generates a receipt showing what each inmate 

purchased. He attached as an exhibit to his complaint one of his own such receipts, showing the 

date he had purchased stamps. 

¶ 22 Defendant filed a combined motion to dismiss under sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the 

Code of Civil Procedure (Code). See 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2016). In the motion, 

defendant asserted plaintiff “was essentially seeking an answer to the question of which inmates 

were overcharged for stamps purchased through the commissary.” Further, defendant asserted it 

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had never sold stamps purchased for 47 cents to inmates for 49 cents, and “[t]herefore no such 

documents exist, and it would be impossible to tender non-existent documents.” 

¶ 23 Defendant attached to its motion an affidavit from Ken Wright, vice president of sales for 

the Keefe Group (Keefe), the parent company of WCADF’s commissary provider (Keefe 

affidavit). In the affidavit, Wright swore that all the stamps sold through the WCADF 

commissary through June 9, 2016, had been purchased by Keefe from the USPS for 49 cents 

each. He averred that all stamps resold to inmates for 49 cents had been purchased originally for 

49 cents. The price at which the stamps were resold to inmates was reduced to 47 cents on 

June 10, 2016, following complaints from inmates. 

¶ 24 On June 9, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss Will 

County case No. 16-MR-2527. At the hearing, defendant insisted that all of its stamps had been 

purchased in bulk prior to the price reduction and provided an affidavit stating the same. 

Defendant argued this fact proved it had not violated FOIA, as no documents showing which 

inmates had been overcharged existed. Defendant reiterated it did not have to answer plaintiff’s 

question of who had been overcharged. 

¶ 25 Plaintiff argued he had not asked a question, but requested documents. He argued that 

defendant’s partial response, detailing the number of stamps sold following the price reduction, 

indicated defendant understood his request, including the relevant time period. Plaintiff insisted 

that commissary receipts were in each inmates’s file, and therefore accessible by defendant. 

Though plaintiff maintained the actual overcharging of inmates was irrelevant to his FOIA 

request, he pointed out that if the commissary had purchased stamps in bulk at a higher price, 

“[t]hat’s on them.” 

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¶ 26 The circuit court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. It agreed with the defendant’s 

argument that a stamp purchased at 49 cents could be resold for 49 cents. The court also pointed 

out that plaintiff had not requested the commissary receipts of any particular inmate, nor had he 

specified the date of the price change. Plaintiff interjected, arguing defendant demonstrated 

awareness of that date by disclosing the number of stamps sold. The court responded: “Okay. 

Nonetheless I am granting the [defendant’s] motion.” 

¶ 27 Plaintiff timely appealed the ruling in Will county case No. 16-MR-2527. This court 

consolidated that appeal with the appeals stemming from plaintiff’s first amended complaint and 

second complaint for purposes of this appeal. 

¶ 28 ANALYSIS 

¶ 29 On appeal, plaintiff argues the circuit court erred by denying injunctive relief and failing 

to order defendant to turn over the following documents to plaintiff: (1) the discarded container 

of milk sought in the first amended complaint (case No. 15-CH-976), (2) the full lockdown 

documents sought in the second complaint (case No. 15-CH-1052), (3) the Conway documents 

sought in the second complaint (case No. 15-CH-1052), and (4) the full policy manual sought in 

the second complaint (case No. 15-CH-1052). Plaintiff also argues (5) the circuit court erred by 

dismissing his third complaint (case No. 16-MR-2527) relating to the sale of stamps. 

¶ 30 In this appeal, plaintiff contends the circuit court erred by denying his requests for civil 

penalties in his first amended and second complaints. The circuit court denied that relief by 

granting a directed verdict during the trial conducted on February 2, 2017. The report of 

proceedings does not appear as part of the record on appeal. 

¶ 31 Without a report of proceedings and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it 

must be “presumed that the court heard adequate evidence to support the decision that was 

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rendered.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 394 (1984); see also People v. Fernandez, 344 Ill. 

App. 3d 152, 160 (2003) (“[A]ny doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record will be 

construed against defendant, whose responsibility it was as appellant to present a complete 

record on review.”). Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling denying the award of civil 

penalties in case Nos. 15-CH-976 and 15-CH-1052. 

¶ 32 I. Milk Container 

¶ 33 Plaintiff argues “the trial court erred in determining records in the garbage are not public 

records.” Plaintiff does not state explicitly what relief he is seeking, only concluding by 

“pray[ing] this Court to declare that records stored in the garbage by a public body *** are 

public records under the meaning of the FOIA.” On January 13, 2016, in plaintiff’s response to 

defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff wrote that he “concedes that the packaging is now no 

longer in the possession or control of the SHERIFF therefore mooting his request for injunctive 

relief.” 

¶ 34 We cannot ignore plaintiff’s concession on this issue. A question is moot when it presents 

no actual controversy or where the issues involved have ceased to exist. People v. Blaylock, 202 

Ill. 2d 319, 325 (2002). “Courts of review will generally not consider moot or abstract questions 

because our jurisdiction is restricted to cases which present an actual controversy.” Id. The issue 

of injunctive relief relating to the milk container is moot because the used milk container is 

outside the control of defendant at this point. It would be impossible for defendant to produce the 

milk container, even if ordered to do so. 

¶ 35 As a corollary to the mootness doctrine described above, an appellate court generally will 

not issue advisory opinions. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 351 (2009). While reviewing 

courts will occasionally consider a moot issue under an exception to the doctrine, plaintiff has 

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failed to raise or argue in favor of any such exception in the present case. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 

341(h)(7) (eff. July 1, 2017). Accordingly, because the issue relating to the milk container is 

moot, this court need not address plaintiff’s argument that the container should be considered a 

public record. 

¶ 36 II. Lockdown Documents and Conway Documents 

¶ 37 Plaintiff next argues the circuit court erred by failing to grant in full his request for 

injunctive relief regarding the lockdown documents and the Conway documents. Regarding the 

lockdown documents, the court ordered defendant to disclose the dates and times of the 

lockdowns, but allowed defendant to withhold the durations and reasons for the lockdowns, 

citing security purposes. Regarding the Conway documents, the court denied plaintiff’s request 

for injunctive relief, citing Conway’s personal privacy and plaintiff’s lack of a legitimate interest 

in that information. 

¶ 38 Section 1.2 of FOIA provides that “[a]ll records in the custody or possession of a public 

body are presumed to be open to inspection or copying. Any public body that asserts that a 

record is exempt from disclosure has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 

that it is exempt.” 5 ILCS 140/1.2 (West 2014). The exemptions provided by FOIA include 

“[p]ersonal information contained within public records, the disclosure of which would 

constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” (id. § 7(1)(c)) and “[r]ecords that 

relate to or affect the security of correctional institutions and detention facilities” (id. § 7(1)(e)). 

Thus, defendant bore the burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Conway 

documents and the lockdown documents, respectively, qualified for the exemptions the trial 

court relied on. 

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¶ 39 The report of proceedings in case Nos. 15-CH-976 and 15-CH-1052 has not been 

included in the record on appeal. We have no record of what transpired in open court on July 19, 

2016 and are unable to determine if defendant presented any witnesses or other evidence. We 

must once again construe this uncertainty, arising from an incomplete record, against plaintiff as 

appellant, and presume “that the court heard adequate evidence to support the decision that was 

rendered.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 394. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s ruling granting in 

part and denying in part plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief with respect to the lockdown 

documents. We also affirm the circuit court’s ruling denying in full plaintiff’s request for 

injunctive relief with respect to the Conway documents. 

¶ 40 III. Policy Manual 

¶ 41 Plaintiff next contends the circuit court erred when the court found the policy manual 

“exempt in total.” He argues the policy manual must cover a wide range of topics, many of 

which would not relate to the security of the facility, and defendant failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that those portions of the manual should not be exempt from FOIA. 

¶ 42 The policy manual, which the circuit court reviewed in camera, is not included in the 

record. Obvious difficulties are presented when reviewing whether the policy manual should be 

exempt from FOIA, without access to the manual itself. As stated above, an insufficient record 

on appeal is generally construed against appellant. Id. This remains the case here. Even when 

plaintiff is not privy to the materials in question, plaintiff could have requested the circuit court 

submit the materials under seal. See People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 342 (2008). 

¶ 43 The incompleteness of the record requires us to affirm the circuit court’s ruling where 

that incompleteness hinders our review. E.g., Bezanis v. Fox Waterway Agency, 2012 IL App 

(2d) 100948, ¶ 11; People v. Appelgren, 377 Ill. App. 3d 137, 141 (2007). Here, our ability to 

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review the issue is plainly hindered by the lack of the policy manual, as we are unable to parse 

the individual policies within the manual to determine which policies should be exempt. 

Accordingly, we must affirm the circuit court’s ruling. 

¶ 44 IV. Stamps 

¶ 45 Finally, plaintiff argues the circuit court erred as a matter of law when it granted 

defendant’s motion to dismiss the third complaint (case No. 16-MR-2527), seeking the 

production of records relating to WCADF’s sale of stamps. In response, defendant reiterates the 

arguments it made before the circuit court, that plaintiff’s request did not reasonably describe the 

records sought and, alternatively, no such records exist. 

¶ 46 We note that defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s third complaint was brought under 

both sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code, and properly divided its arguments into the 

corresponding sections. See 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2016). Because those sections 

contemplate dismissals on different grounds, we will address each in turn. We review the circuit 

court’s granting of any motion to dismiss de novo. Bouton v. Bailie, 2014 IL App (3d) 130406, 

¶ 7. 

¶ 47 When ruling on a motion to dismiss brought under section 2-615 of the Code, “[a]ll wellpleaded facts alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences from them are to be taken as 

true (citation), and the allegations are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 

Oldendorf v. General Motors Corp., 322 Ill. App. 3d 825, 828 (2001). “[A] cause of action 

should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts 

can be proved that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 

Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2016). 

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¶ 48 Our supreme court has held that “when a public body receives a proper request for 

information, it must comply with that request unless one of the narrow statutory exemptions *** 

applies.” Illinois Education Ass’n, 204 Ill. 2d at 463. No distinction has been made, either in case 

law or in FOIA itself, between a “proper” and an improper request. Defendant argues, however, 

that a proper FOIA request must provide a reasonable description of the documents sought, so 

that the public body is able to retrieve those documents. Defendant also cites Chicago Tribune 

Co. v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL App (4th) 130427, ¶ 33, for 

the proposition that “[a] request to inspect or copy must reasonably identify a public record and 

not general data, information, or statistics.” 

¶ 49 Initially, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that our supreme court—in the 

excerpt from Illinois Education Ass’n quoted above—intended to create a line of demarcation 

between proper and improper FOIA requests. Such a distinction would lie completely outside of 

FOIA itself. Rejection of such a position perhaps explains the relative dearth of case law in 

which a FOIA suit has been resolved on a section 2-615 motion. 

¶ 50 Even if we were to accept that argument, plaintiff’s FOIA request in the present case was 

proper. Plaintiff merely requested documents showing which WCADF detainees had purchased 

stamps in a certain time period. Plaintiff’s FOIA request cannot be construed as a general inquiry 

or a request for data. It is, explicitly, a request for documents. Plaintiff identified the documents 

sought based upon a description of their contents. To require a citizen seeking public records to 

identify those records with any greater specificity would be in complete contravention of the 

public policy underlying FOIA. Indeed, plaintiff’s request surely must not have been irreparably 

vague, given that defendant was able to conduct a “thorough search” of its files and records and 

conclude the documents sought did not exist. 

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¶ 51 We further reject the argument that plaintiff’s FOIA request was improper because it did 

not include a time frame for the records requested. In his FOIA request, plaintiff sought records 

relating to the sale of stamps after the time the USPS lowered the price of stamps from 49 cents 

to 47 cents. While the third complaint identified the exact date of the price drop, this information 

was not conveyed in the FOIA request itself. In its response to the FOIA request, however, 

defendant wrote: “[A] report does exist to show how many stamps were purchased for $0.49 

after the rate drop.” Thus, defendant plainly demonstrated awareness of the time frame in 

question, and may not now claim otherwise. 

¶ 52 Section 2-619(a)(9) permits involuntary dismissal where the claim asserted against 

defendant “is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the 

claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2–619(a)(9) (West 2016). In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss 

under section 2-619, a reviewing court considers the pleading and any supporting documents 

found on the record, interpreting everything in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 368 (2003). The nonexistence of requested 

documents is a cognizable affirmative defense to a complaint grounded in FOIA. E.g., Hites v. 

Waubonsee Community College, 2016 IL App (2d) 150836. 

¶ 53 Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s FOIA request was “interpreted as a request for the 

names and inmate identification numbers of those who were overcharged for the stamps 

purchased through commissary.” Next, defendant points out that the Keefe affidavit 

demonstrates that all stamps sold at WCADF for 49 cents were originally purchased for 49 cents. 

“Therefore,” defendant writes, “the WCADF commissary did not overcharge any inmates $0.02 

per stamp,” and, in turn, no records of such overcharging could possibly exist. 

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¶ 54 Defendant’s argument, both before this court and before the circuit court, rests on a 

fundamental mischaracterization of plaintiff’s FOIA request. Plaintiff asked for records of 

stamps being sold to inmates for 49 cents after the USPS lowered the price to 47 cents. This is an 

objective request for documents. Whether or not inmates were “overcharged” for stamps is a 

legal conclusion read into plaintiff’s request entirely by defendant. Plaintiff did not request that 

information, nor did his request require the production of compiled information. 

¶ 55 Based on this record, the pleadings and supporting documents do not support defendant’s 

contention that the documents plaintiff requested did not exist concerning the sale of stamps to 

inmates. Here, the supporting document provided by plaintiff is a copy of his own commissary 

receipt showing the purchase of stamps by plaintiff. This receipt demonstrates that defendant 

prepares records of the stamps purchased by individual inmates.1 It appears to this court that 

WCADF prepares receipts for stamp sales and the production of such existing records would be 

responsive to plaintiff’s FOIA request. Consequently, we reject a dismissal premised upon 

section 2-619 of the Code for lack of records would be improper. 

¶ 56 Construing the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to 

plaintiff, his original FOIA request was not fatally unclear. In summary, neither section 2-615 

nor section 2-619 of the Code supports dismissal of the third complaint (case No. 16-MR-2527). 

¶ 57 We affirm the trial court’s rulings denying plaintiff’s complaint seeking injunction relief 

and civil remedies with respect to the complaint in case No. 15-CH-976 and the complaint filed 

1

While defendant might argue that querying each inmates’ commissary records from the given 

time period might be unduly burdensome, it does not make such an argument before this court, and did 

not do so in the circuit court. More importantly, FOIA sets out specific steps to be undertaken where a 

public body deems a request unduly burdensome, including allowing the requesting party to amend their 

request. 5 ILCS 140/3(g) (West 2014). Defendant did not follow any of those steps. 

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in case No. 15-CH-1052. We reverse the circuit court’s ruling dismissing plaintiff’s third 

complaint in case No. 16-MR-2527 and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 58 CONCLUSION 

¶ 59 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 

remanded for further proceedings. 

¶ 60 

¶ 61 

Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

Cause remanded. 

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