2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al

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Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o you for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit at V i l l a no va U nive r sit y S choo l of L a

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### 1 PRECE DENTI AL

UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF AP PEA LS F OR TH E TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 03-4356

THREE RIV ERS CE NTER F OR INDE PENDE NT LI VING, INC .; DANA WA SH ING TO N, o n beh alf of herse lf and all ot her s sim ilarly situ ated ,

Ap pellan ts

v.

HOUSI NG AUTHORI TY OF T HE CITY OF PITT SBURGH; KEITH KINAR D, in his offici al capaci ty as the Exe cu ti ve Direc to r o f the HOUSI NG AUTHORI TY OF T HE CI TY OF

PI TTSB URGH

On Appeal from the United St ates Distri ct Court f

or the Weste rn District of Pen nsylvan ia (Dist. Court No. 02-cv- 01069) Distric t Ju dge: Hon. TerrenceF.

Mc Verry

Argued: May 12, 2004

Before: NYGA ARD , MCK EE and CH ER TO FF , Circuit

Judges (Fil ed: August 30, 2004)

Stephen F. Gold ( Argued) 125 South Ninth St

reet, Suite 700 Philadelphia, PA 19107
Mark J. Murphy Robin Resnick Disabil iti es Law Project 1315 Walnut Stre et, Suite 400 Philadelphia, PA 19107-4798

David Kahne P.O. Box 66386 Houston, TX 77266

Paul O’Hanlon Disabil iti es Law Project 1901 Law & Finance Buil ding 429 Fourth Avenue Pitt sburgh, PA 15219-1505

Co unse l for Ap pellan ts
Susan A. Yohe (Argued) Buch ana n I nge rs ol l P .C. One Oxf ord Ce ntre 310 Grant Str eet, 20 th Floor Pitt sburgh, PA 15219-1410
Counsel for

Appellee

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

CH ER TO FF , Circuit

Judge

T his is a suit seeking de clara tor y

### 2

and in ju nctive reli ef compelli ng the Housing Authority of t he Cityof Pit tsburghto complywith regul ations the Departmentof Housing and Urban Development promulgated pursu an t to Section504 of the Rehabili tati on Act. The regulat ions require the Pit

tsburgh Housi ng Au tho rity to eff ect cer tain system ic

re forms in ord er to pr ovid e acc essible pub lic housing t o handicapped in dividuals. They require, among other t hings, that

five percent of the dwell ing units in any new ly constructed public hous ing proj ect be

acce ssible to persons w ith ambu latory disabi lities and an addition al two percent of the unit s be access ible to pers ons w ith hearing or vision impairments.
The Ho using Au thority— and th is appears to be undisput ed—has contin ually fail ed to com ply with HU D’s regulations. Plaintiffs alle ge that , as a result , the Pitt sburgh Housing Authorit y has deni e d

acce ssible housing to disabled individuals

. As troub ling as th is may be, however, our task here is to dete rmine whether appe llants may properly maintai n a suit to enforce the HUD regu l ations , byway of eithe r a private right

of acti on u nde r the Rehabili tati on Act or under Section 1983. T here are certainl y steps HUD itself c a n and should t ake to effect compliance. But the Distri ct Court parti ally dismis sed appel lants’ com plaint because i t determi ned that t

hey did nothave a priva te right of a ctio n t o e nf or ce th e HUD reg ulati ons

. Our analy sis requires a ca reful review and discus sion o f the l aw gov erning wh en pr ivate p arties ca n sue to enforce a legislative or re gulatory mandate. For

th e f ol lo win g r ea so ns , w e will affirm the deni al of a right o f actio n to enf orc e the reg ulati ons

.

I.
Section504 of the Rehabil itat ion Act of 1973 is commonly re ferred to as the “civil rights b ill of the disabl ed,” ADAPT

v. Skinner , 881 F.2d 1184, 11 87 (3d C ir. 1989) (en banc), or the “c ornerstone of the civil rights m ovem ent of th e m ob ilit yimp aired .” Id. at 12 05 ( M ans ma nn, J ., concurri ng in part

and disse nting i n p art). G en er all y, the st atute “prohibi ts any program or acti vity

recei ving feder al funds from discrimi nating again st perso ns w ith d isab ilities.” Bow ers v . Nati ona l Co llegiate Athletic A ss’n , 34 6 F.3d 402, 432 (3d C ir. 2003 ). It prov ides:
No otherwis e quali fi e d indivi dual with a disab ility in t he Un ited S tates

. . . shall, solel y byreason of her

or hi s d isa bi lity, be excluded from the part

icipation in, be denied the be nefits of, orbe subjected to d iscrimination under an y pro gr am o r activity recei vi n g Federal financi al assis tance or under any pr o gram or activ ity conducted by anyExecutive agency or by the Unite d States Postal Service.

### 3

29 U .S.C. § 794 (a). 1
HUD prom ulgate d reg ulati o ns to eff ectua te Section 504 i n 1988. The provisi ons that address access i bility in pub lic housing p r oject s and faci lities appearamong the regulat ions at 24 C. F. R. §§ 8 .20- 33.
When a pub lic hou sing a utho rity that receiv es fed eral fu nds c onstru cts new housing or “subst ant i ally alte rs” exi sti ng housing, 2 the HUD regulat ions re quire t

hat five per cent of the dwelling units in those facili t ies be ac cessib le to pe rsons with

mo bility disab il iti es and two perce nt be

acc es sible to pers ons with hearing or vi sion imp airm ents

. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 8.22(a) -( b), 8.23(a). W hen on e or mo re dwelling units in an ex isting fa cili ty are alte red—but the altera tions d o no t rise to th e level of “subst antia l alterati ons”—t h e units must be made access ible to the

mo bility impaire d, unti l five percent of the units in th e f ac ilit y are ac ces sible

. See 24 C.F.R. § 8 .23(b)(1). 3
In additi on, acces sibl e dwelli ng units must, t o t h e “maximum extent fea sible ,” be distribut ed througho u t projects. 24 C. F. R. § 8.26. And they must “be availa ble in a suffici ent range of si zes and ameniti es so that a qual ifie d indivi dual with handi caps ’ cho ice of livin g arrang eme nts is, as a w hole, c om parab le to tha t of other persons eligibl e for housi n g assis tance under

the same progr am.” Id.
Because the Pit

tsburgh Housi ng Au thority receiv es fed eral funding th rough HUD, it i s sub

je ct t o S ec tio n 5 04 's requirements. The Housing Authority has alte red existing facilities a nd b uilt ne w
o n es since t

he time t he HUD regulat

ions went into ef fect, but it fail ed to satisfythe obligat ions the regulations impose. 4

1 The Reh abili tati on Act’s other provisi ons serv e sim ilar e nds

. Section 501 proh ibit s employment discriminat ion base d

on di sa bi lity b y fed eral a gen cies

. See 29 U.S .C. § 79 1. Sec tion 50 3 pro hibits employ me nt discrimination by federal contractors and gra ntee s. See 29 U .S.C . § 793

.

2 “Substan tial alterations” are alte rati ons that cost75% or more than the replac ement cost of

the co m pl ete d f ac ilit y. 24 C .F.R . § 8.2 3(a ). 3 The regulat ions al low HUD , upon requ est, to pres cribe a

higher percentage or number than the re gul ations addressi ng newly- constructed and alt ered housi ng require, “based upon demonstration to t he

reaso nable sati sfa cti on of HUD of a need for a higher pe rcenta ge or nu mber, base d

on census dat a or other avail able current data

. . . or in r esponse t o evidence of a need for a highe r percent age or number recei ved in anyot her mann er .” 24 C. F. R. §§ 8.22(c ), 8.23(b)(2).

4 Since thi s case r eaches us upon t he Distri ct Co urt’s disp osition of a m otion to d ismiss und er Fe deral R ule of Civil Pr oc edure 12(b)(6) , we relate the facts a s set for th in pla intiffs’ c om plaint.

### 4

A s a consequence of t

he Housing Autho rity’ s fail ure to c ompl y with the HUD r egu lati ons, the demand fo r accessi bl e public hous ing in Pi tts burgh exceeds the su pp ly . Indeed, in 1995 the Housing Autho rity si gned a “Vo luntary Co mpliance Agr ee men t” wit h HUD acknowledging “c ompliance deficiencies” and “civil ri ghts deficiencies. ” It c onceded the need for at l east 546 ac cessi ble rent al units, and it prom ised to provide them. In return, HUD agreed t o continue to provi de the Housing Authorit y with federal funding. By th e Ho us in g Au th or it y ’s own admissi on, however, the re were only 200 units accessible to pe ople in w heelchairs as of March 2002.
As a resu lt, when Dana W ashingt on appl ie d for publi c housing i n 2001, the Ho using Authority as signed her to a un i t with s tair s even though s he suffers from near-p aralysis of h er low er left lim b and must use a wheelchai r. When Washington complainedabou t the ass ig n ment, the Housing Au tho rity re-assign ed he r to another uni t. But again the sink and bathtub in the ne wly-assigned u nit were inac ces sible to W ash ing ton

. Si m ila rly, Three R ivers Center for Independent Living, In c. (“Thre e Ri ve r s ” ) —a non-pro fit corp or ation t hat advocates for the rights of individ uals w ith disabili ties— r epor ts that m any of its clients have a hard time f inding acce ssible and afford ab le housi ng. 5 C on se qu en tly, Three Rivers ex pends c onsiderab le effort assis ting p eople wit

h disabi lities i n try ing to locate acces sibl e housing.
In Jun e of 2002, Washingt on and Three Rivers filed the present s uit against the Pitt sburgh Housing Aut hor ity and its Executive Dir ecto r, K eith K inar d, in h is offici al capacity. They see k a n order declaring the Pitt sburgh Housing Autho rit y in violat ion of the H UD regulations and enjoini ng th e H ou sin g A ut ho rity to compl y with th em. 6 Specifi call y, plaint iffs seek to

5 Th ree River s is a f

ederal ly -funded

e nti ty that i s stat uto rily req uire d to , inter alia , promote “equalaccess of individ uals with signi ficant

disabi lities t o society and to all services, pro gr ams, activities, resources, and faciliti es, whether public or private and re g ardles s of the fundi ng source.” 29 U.S.C . § 796f-4 (b)(1)(D).

6 In their c om plaint, p laintif f s soughtto re p resen t a class o f “all p eople with disabi lities who curr ently , or i n the future, will liv e i n public hous ing [maintai ned by the Pitt sburgh H o using A ut ho rity] that is no t acces sible . . . as w ell

as all pe ople w ith disabi lities who

curren tly are, o r in th e fu ture , wil l be, o n the wa iting list fo r . . . p ublic hou sing .” App. 12 . The docket e ntri es from the Distri ct Court indi cate that al though plaint iffs moved for cla ss cert ific ation and the issue was briefed, the part ies fi led a joint motion ask i ng th e D istrict Co urt to “hold in abey ance Certi fi cati o n Ac tivitie s.” Ap p. 5. The District Cou rt grantedthe mo tion an d as a result it neve r ruledon the motion for c lass c erti fication. We theref

ore treat the present

suit as an

### 5

enforce fou r requ ireme nts: (1) th at a spec ific pe rc en tag e o f n ew ly c o nstruc ted pub lic housing be ac cessi ble to t he disabl ed, see 24 C.F.R. § 8. 22(a)- (b); (2) that a s pe cif ic p er ce nt ag e o f s ub sta nt ial lyalte red public hous ing be acces sibl e to the disabl ed, s ee 24 C.F.R. § 8. 23(a); (3) that alte red (but n o t subst antia lly alte red) pub lic housing be made acce ssible untilat leas t fi ve percen t of the units are accessi ble, see 24 C.F.R. § 8 .23(b)(1); and (4) that a ccessi ble ho usi ng be dist ributed throughout

project s and co m parab le to hou sing available to non-disa ble d ind ivid uals , see 24 C.F.R. § 8. 26. 7
De fend ants mo ved to dismiss plaintiffs’ co mplai nt “to th e exte nt that it seeks reli ef for the vio lati ons o f regulat ions promul gat ed by [H UD ] to implement§ 504 of the Rehabil itat ion Ac t.” App. 25. They argued that plai ntiff s did not have a private r i ght o f actio n to enfor c e the regul ations because the regu la tion s “are t oo far removed fr om Congressiona l intent

as refl ected in § 504 to cons titute ‘fed eral righ ts’ priva tely enfo rceab le under either § 504 or § 198 3.” App. 26-27. The Dist rict Court granted defendants’ motion, rely ing largely on our opinion in Sout

h Camd en Ci ti zens in Action v. New Jersey Dep’t of E nvtl. Pro t. , 274 F.3 d 77 1 (3 d C ir. 20 01) , cert. denied , 536 U.S. 939 (2002) and t h e Su pr eme C ourt’s decisi on in Ale xan der v. S andoval , 532 U.S. 275 (200 1). Plain tiffs tim ely appealed. 8
II.
The Distri ct Court, whi c h exerci sed its juri sdiction under 28 U.S .C. §§ 1331 and 1343, did not

dismis s plai ntiff

s ’ complaint

in its e ntire ty. Rath er, it dismis sed the co mp lain t only insofar as plaint iffs so ugh t to e nf

or ce th e HUD regulations. The Court was of the opi nion, how ever, th at the parti al dis missal involveda control ling que sti on of law as to which t here is subs tanti al ground for differe nce of o pin io n— na m ely, “[w]hethe r indivi dual acti on brought byWashington and Th ree R iver s.

7 In their co mp laint, app ellants based their

clai ms on other portions of the HUD regulat

ions—specifi call y, 24 C.F .R. § 8.24(a) (add re ssing a ccess ibil it y req u ireme nts in exis ting, non-altered ho us ing), 24 C.F.R. § 8. 25(c) ( requiring hou sing authori ties to promulgate and implemen t a “needs ass essment” and “trans iti on plan”), and 24 C .F.R . § 8.27(a) (requi ring housing authori t ies t o make disabl ed perso ns aw are tha t acces sible units are avai lable and e nsu re that

ac c essible units are uti lize d by di sabled persons to the f

ulles t exte nt pos sible ). See App. 18-19. Appell ants appear to no longersee k enforcement of thes e regulations. See Appel lan ts’ B r. 7-9

. 

### We thereforeonly address t h e regula tions appellants pu rsue on app eal. 8 

### As we expl ain below, plain tiffs’ indi v idual claims that t he Housing Authority denied them

their right to acce ss u nderSection 504 s till r

emain before th e District Court.

### 6

Plaintiffs have a pri vate ri ght of acti on against Defe ndants fo r e nfo rcement of regulat ions of the Uni ted S tate s Departmentof Housing and Urban Development . . . as s et forth i n 24 C.F .R. §§ 8.20-33 which mandate the number and dist ribution of

accessi ble housi ng units for qu al ifie d hand icapp ed ind ividua ls in pub licly fun ded hou sing dev elop me nts,” App. 42—and that an immediat e appeal may materi ally

advance the u ltimate termination of

the li tigat ion

. We therefore exercise juris dicti on u nde r 28 U.S .C. § 1292(b ).
We revie w de novo the Dist rict Cou rt’s dismis sal under Federal Rul e of Civil Procedure 12( b)(6) f or failure to st ate
a claim

. See, e. g. , Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd. , 292 F.3 d 36 1, 3 74 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002). “I n evaluating the pro priety of dism issal, we acceptall f actualalle gations

as true, construe the complai nt in the l ight most f avo rable to the plainti ff, and determi ne wh ethe r, u n der an y reason able reading of the complai nt, t he plaint iff may be enti tled to reli ef.” Id.

A. Although we affirm th e D ist rict Cou rt’s judgment, we do so based on reasoni ng that di ffers somewhat from the Distri ct Cou rt ’s. We begin with three general pro pos ition s. First , Congress may effectits legis lati ve goals t hrough vari ous
means. “Congress sometimes legis late s by innuend o,” for exa mp le, “ma kin g declara tion s of polic y and i ndicating a preferenc e while requ iring measu re s that, though fall ing short of legislating its goals, ser ve as a nudge in the preferred dire ction s.” Rosado v. Wyman , 397 U .S. 397, 413 (19 70) , quo ted in Pen nhu rst State Sch. & Hosp . v . Ha ld er ma n , 45 1 U.S. 1, 19 (1981). O ther times, Con gress mo re specifi cal ly creat es “r ights an d obligat ions. ” Pennhurst , 451 U.S. at 15. Second, Co ngre ss can create various ty pe s of rights and obligati ons. See, e.g. , Gran fina ncie ra, S .A. v

. Nord berg , 492 U.S . 3 3, 51- 52 & n.8 (1989) (disting uishin g betw een “ pub lic rights” and “private ri ghts” for purposes of the Sev enth Amendment’s right to trial by jury). And one subs et of rig hts that c ourts have di scerned i n stat utes i s “persona l righ ts.” 9 Personal right s inher e in the individ ual; they are “i ndi vidual l y fo cused”; they crea te “ind iv idua l entit lem ents .” Non-personal right s, by contra st, often have a“sy stemwide” or “aggregat e” focu s; are d efine d in terms of obligat ions of th e perso n or e ntity regu late d rath er than i n terms of entitlem ents of the i ndividualprotected;

are “not concerned with whether the needs of any particul ar pers on hav e been

9 

### Courts hav e been inco nsi sten t in theterms they

use t o refer to “personal rights,” somet imes calli ng the m “indiv id ual rights, ” “priva te rights,” or simply “fed e ral rights.” We

use the term “personalrights ” throughout thi s opinion to maintain the dem

arcation between “personalrights”and “pri vate ri ghts of action.” See Gonzaga Un iv. v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) 

### (using the term “personal righ ts”).

### 7

sati sfied”; and rega rd “institutional pol icy

an d pr acti ce, not

indivi dual ins tances” of cond uct. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273, 282, 288 (200 2); Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 288 -89; Blessi ng v. Frees tone , 520 U.S. 32 9, 343-44 (1997).
To be sure , systemic legisl ation may in fact b enef it a group of individuals. That does not mea n that the legislation con fers

a personalrig ht on those individuals. “[T]he ques tion w hethe r a statute is in te ndedto bene

fit particu lar plain tiffs is quite diffe rent fro m the ques tio n wh ether the stat ute in fact

bene fits those pl ainti ffs

. . . . ” Pa. Pharmaci sts Ass’ n v. Houstoun , 283 F.3d 5 3 1, 535 (3d Cir . 2002) ( en banc). Persona l rights ar e th ose intent ional ly and “una mbiguousl y conferred” throu gh “r ig hts-cre atin g ” language. Gonzaga , 536 U. S. at 283, 284;

see Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Ri chman , 367 F.3d 18 0, 187-88 (3d Cir. 200 4). Third, even when Congress cre ates rights or ob ligation s (inclu di ng personal rights), it do es no t necess aril y fol low that private parties c an en force them or ob tain

a dire ct r emedy through the j udicia l process. Id. at 284 . It is often the case that only the execu t ive can enforce a federal stat ute. Som e statute s cr eate rig hts in individ uals that are onlyenfo rc eable by agencies , see, e. g. , Communications Wo rkers of America v. Beck , 487 U. S. 735 , 742 ( 198 8), or n ot enf orcea ble at all,

see Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
Of c our se, t

here are also many statutorily cre ated ri ghts and obl igati ons that private parti es may s eek to enfor ce in judicia l p roceedi ngs. Congres s may expr essly provide i n a parti cular s tatute, for exam ple, that a p arty can b ring su it seeking en fo rc eme nt . D e te rminin g whether a stat

ut e explicitl y provides a private re m edy invo lves a r elatively straightforw ard inquiry. A court must l ook to the text of the st a tute to see i f it states, by its t erms, that a p rivate p arty may bri ng suit to en for ce it. See Hallst rom v. Till amook Co unty , 493 U.S. 20 , 25 (1989 ). Congress explic itl y pr ovided a private re med y in Title II o f the C ivil Rig hts A ct of 196 4, fo r inst anc e, a statute that pro h ibit s discrimination in pl aces of pub lic accommodation on the basis of “race, colo r, re ligio n, or natio nal o rigin .” 42 U.S.C. § 20 00a

. Titl e II pr ovides t hat when som eone has o r is abo ut to contrave ne its p rohibi tion aga i ns t discri minat ion, “a civi l act ion fo r preventi ve reli ef, i ncluding an appli cati on for a permanent or

temporary

injunct ion, restraini ng or der, or other order, may be instituted by the person aggr ieved. ” 42 U.S .C. § 2000a-3(a) . Simil arly , many environment al statutes c ontain express private righ ts of actio n. See Hallst rom , 493 U.S. at 23 n .1 (citing statutes). Indeed, when Congress authorizes

an express rightof ac tion, it can choo se to allow private parti es to enforce a range of rights andobl ig at io ns t hat Co ng ress creates. Some statutes create personal rights, for example, and provide t hat private parti es ma y bring sui t to enf orce those per son al rig hts. See, e. g. , 4 2 U. S. C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1), 2000e-5(f) (1) (Title VII of the C ivil R igh ts A ct of 196 4). Ot her

### 8

stat utes creat e right s or obli gations that do not cons titute per sona l rights

— or impose obligat ions in addit

ion to per sonal rights —an d still expre ssly allow private parti es to e nfor ce those rights or obligations. See, e. g. , 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a ), (g) (C lean W ater A ct) . I ndeed,

som e statutes c reate p rivate rig hts of acti on—often cal led “cit izen sui t pr ov isi ons”—that extend pl ainti ffs ’ capa city to br ing sui t to t he bounds of Article III sta ndi ng. See Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidl aw Environmen t al Servi ces (T OC) , Inc. , 528 U.S. 167 ( 2000) (Clean Wa ter Act). Congress may also circ u mscribe a private right of action th at it creates. It may limi t, for

ex ample, t

he ty pe of rel ief availa ble to a p laint iff. Com pare 42 U.S .C. § 200 0a-3 (a) (limitin g rem edies a vailab le for violat ions of Title IIof the Civil Righ ts Act of 196 4 to injunctive relief) wi th 4 2 U.S .C. § 2000e-5(g) (injunc tions av ailable to remedy vi olati ons of T i tle VII) and 42 U.S .C. § 1981a(a)(1) (damages a va ilable to remedy vi olatio ns of T itle VII). Si m ila rly, Co ngre ss ma y create a p rivate right of ac tion tha t allow s plaintif fs on ly to enforce a li mited set

of the ri ghts or obligat ions that a statu te cre ates

. See Olmsted v. Pruce Li fe Ins. Co. of N.J. , 283 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 200 2) ( obs erving that in the In vestm ent Comp any Act of 1940 C on gr es s e xp lic itly p rovided a private right

of acti on to en for ce s ome prov isio ns of the statute bu t not others). All this go es to sa ying that n ot a ll private rights of ac tio n a re cr ea ted eq ua lly; Congress may (and doe s) tailor ri ghts of act ion to suit vari ous purposes and goals. Many statu tes, h ow eve r, do not conta in provisi ons address ing eit her whether priv at e parti es may mai ntain a right of acti on or the s cope o f a ri ght of acti on a private party

may maint ain. When that is the case, cour ts may still recogniz e
a private right

of a ction i n one or both of two ways . Fi rst, a court mayfind an impli ed right

of ac tion i n the st atute

. Second, Section 1983 mayprovide a private right

of acti on. 10 T hese are sepa rate yet ov erlap pin g in qui ries. See Gonzaga , 536 U.S. at 283 -84 ; W. Va. Univ. Hosp s., Inc. v. Casey , 885 F.2d 11,

10 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of an y s t atute , ord inance, regulat ion , cus to m, or u sag e, of any State or Territory or t h e D ist rict of Co lu mb ia , subj ect s, or causes to be subjected, any citi zen of the United States or othe r person with in th e juri sdiction t he reof to t he de pr ivati on of any rights, privileges, or imm unit i es secured by the Constit

ution and laws, s hall be liabl e t o the party injured in an acti on at law, sui t in equi ty , or otherproper pr ocee di ng for red ress

. . . .
42 U .S.C . § 19 83.

### 9

18 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989 ).
Con gress’s intent

in enacting a statute is al ways the “foc al poin t” in determi ning whether court s should i nfer a private right

of acti on from the st atute

. Thompson v. T hompson , 484 U.S. 174, 179 (198 8). Th e fou r facto rs set fo rth in Cort v. Ash , 422 U.S. 66 ( 1975) guide a court’s revi ew in disce rning that inten t. Tho mpson , 484 U.S. at 179 ; see al s o Hindes v. F. D.I .C. , 137 F.3d 148, 169 ( 3d Cir. 1998) . Those fact ors are : First, is the plainti ff “one of the class for whose especial ben efit the st atute was enacted, ”—that is, does the stat ute cre ate afederalright in fav o r of the pl ainti ff? Second, i s the re an y indic ationo f legisla tiv e intent, explic it or

impli ci t , ei th er to create such a remedy or to d en y one? Third, is it

co ns is te ntwi t h the underly ing purpo ses of the l e gislative sche me to imply such a remedy for the pl ai ntiff ? [Fourth, ] is t he

cause of act i on on e traditio n ally relega ted to state law, in an are a basica lly the co ncern of the States, so that

it would be in ap prop riate to infer a

cause of ac tion ba sed so lely on f ed er al la w?
Cort v. Ash , 422 U.S

. at 78 (cit ations omitt ed) (emp hasis in orig inal)

. “The first two criteria are critical . If t hey do not point to wa rd a pr iv at e r ig ht , t he re mai ni ng two ‘cannotby themselves be a basis for imply ing a right

of acti on

. ’” Am . Te l. & Tel. Co. v. M/V C ape Fear , 967 F.2d 864, 866 (3d C ir. 1992 ) (quo ti ng Touche R oss & Co. v. Redington , 4 42 U

. S. 560 , 580 (1979) ( B rennan, J ., c oncurri ng)). Put
su cc in ctl y, for an impli ed right of action to exi st, a statute must m anifest Co ngress’s intent to crea te (1) a personalright , and (2)

a pr iv ate re m ed y. See Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 286.
Det ermining whether there is a private right

of acti on under Secti on 1983 to en fo rc e a fe de ra l st atu te r eq ui re s o nl y a slightly dif fer ent anal ysi s. Section 1983 by its terms , of co urse, fu rnishe s a priv ate
re m ed y. 11 The threshold question remains, how ever, wh ether th e fed eral s ta tute creat es a pers onal r ig ht—i.e., a plai ntiff must show that “t

he stat ute c reat es ‘enfo rceab le righ ts, pri vileg es, o r immuniti es within th e meaning of § 1983.’” Pa . Pharmaci sts Ass’ n v

. Houstoun , 283 F.3d at 535 ( quoting

11 Thus the secondprong of Cort v. Ash —w hetherthe statu te man ifests Congr ess’ s intent to create a priva te
re m ed y, wh ich is criti ca l to i mplication analysis— is irreleva nt to the analysis under Section 1983: “Plaint iffs s uing under § 1983 do not hav e the burde n of showing an inte nt to cre ate a p rivate remedy because § 1983 gener ally suppli es
a reme dy for the vin di cation of righ ts secured by fed eral s tatut es.” Gonzaga , 536 U.S. at 284.

### 10

Wright v. Roano k e Re deve lopm ent & Housing Auth. , 479 U .S. 418, 423 (1987)). Once the plainti ff

establish es “the existence of a fed eral right,” there aris es a rebu ttable pre sum p tion tha t the righ t is enfo rceab le through t

he remedy of

§ 1983. Pa. Pharma ci st s As s’ n v. Houstoun , 283 F.3d at 53 5. T h is pre sumption maybe rebutted by sh owi ng that “Congress spec ifically foreclosed a remed y under § 1983, [either] expr essly , byforbiddi ng
recourse to § 1983 in t

he stat ute it self, or im pl ied ly, by cr eati ng a c o mprehensive enforcementsche me th at is inco mp atible with indivi dua l enforce ment un der § 198 3.” Powell v. Ridge , 189 F.3d 387, 401 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quot ations a nd citations om itted ), quo ted in Sou th Camden , 274 F.3 d at 7 80.
C riti ca lly, th e in qu iry w hether there is a pers onal rig ht un der impli ed right of acti on analysi s an d the question whether there is a p erson al “en force able rig ht” under Section 1983 are the s am e. As the S u pr eme Court held i n Gonzag a Un iversity v. Doe : “[T ]he init ial [Secti on 1983 ] inquiry—d etermining w hether a statute conf ers an y right at all— i s no differe nt from the i niti al inq u iryin an impli ed right

of acti on case, t

he e xpr ess purpose of which is t o determi ne whether

or n ot the stat

ute ‘conf

er[s] right s on a pa rt icula r class of persons. ’” 536 U.S. at 2 85 (quoti ng California v. Sierr a Club , 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981 ) ). The Court further explai ned:
A court' s role in d iscerning whether pers onal rig hts ex is t in the § 1983 context

shou ld therefore not diff e r from its role in dis cerning whether personalright s exist

in the impli ed right

of acti on conte xt. Bot h inq uirie s
s imply requir e a determi nationas to whether

or not C on gress in tende d to confer indivi dual ri ght s upon a cl ass o f beneficiaries. A cc or di ng ly, whe re the text and struc ture of a stat ute prov i de no indication that Congress intends to cr ea te ne w indivi dual rights, there is no ba sis for a p rivate su it, whether under § 1983 or under an impli ed right of acti on. Id. at 285-86 (internal citations omitted). Thus 

### Congress’ s crea

tion of a person a l right is necessary

to the existence of

both
an implied rig htof action a nd a right of action und er Section 19 83.
To sum up, private parties may only enforce personal rights through implied rights of action

o r through Section 1983. This distingui shes im

plied ri ghts of act

ion andrights of a

ction under

Section 1983 from express rights of actio n. Only under thelatter may pla

intiffs enforce more than personal rights, whenCongress ex pressly
so prescribes. See, e.g. , Laidlaw , 528 U. S. at 175-76, 185



### . B.
T hat l eads us t o the is sue of whether a priv ate righ t of ac tion ex ists to

### 11

enforce regulat

ions that an agency pr omu lgate s pursuant

to a feder al st atute

. Wher e Co ngress has created an express right of acti on, a court

must examine t

he scope of t he s tatute’s ri ght of action—as evidencedin the sta tute’s tex t— to d etermi ne whether a pl ai nt if f ma y main tain a cau se of actio n to enforc e the regu la tio ns. Congress may , for example, explic itly establ ish a private right of acti on to enforce regulations. Thus, the Resource Conservat ion and Recovery Act of 1976 “pe r mits indivi duals t o commence an acti on in district cour t to enf orce w aste disposal re gulatio ns pro mu lg ated under th e Act.” Hallst

rom , 493 U.S. at 22. 12
The in quirybecomes mor e complicated, h o we ver, w hen a private party seeks t o enforce a regulat ion an ag ency prom ulgate s purs uant to a statu t e that does not cont ain an expr es s ri ght of acti on ; t hat is, when the statute gives rise t o a private remedy eithe r thr ough an impli ed right

of acti on or thr ough Section 1983.
We addressed whe ther a pl ainti ff

co uld bring sui t to enf orce regul ations promulgate d under a st atute with an im pli ed right of acti on in Angelastr o v. Prud ential-Bache Secu rities, Inc. , 764 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1985). There , we arti culat ed

a t h ree-tiered analy sis for determi ning “whetherto imply a p rivate right of acti on from an [agency ] rul e, and only indirec tly from the enabli ng stat

ute. ” Id. at 94 7. A

cour t m ust determine “( 1) ‘whether the agency rule is properl y within the s cope of the en ab li ng s tatu te ’; (2 ) ‘ wh e ther t he statute under which the rule was prom ulgate d properly permit s t h e impli cati on of a p rivate righ t of action’; and (3 ) ‘w he th er im pl yi ng a private right of acti on will fur

ther t he p urpos e of the enabli ng stat

ute. ’” Pol ar oi d Co r p. v. Disney , 86 2 F .2 d 987, 994 (3d Cir . 1988) (quoti ng Ang elastro , 764 F .2d at 9 47); see
a lso Corestates Trust Fee Liti g. v. Corestates Ban k, N. A. , 39 F.3d 61, 67-68 (3d Cir. 1994) (appl yi ng Ang elastro ).
The S upre me C ourt su bseq uently addresse d the iss u e in Alexander v. Sandoval , which involve d a regulation that the Department of J usti ce (“ DOJ”) had promulgate d und er Title V I of the Civil Righ ts Ac t of 1 964

. See 532 U.S. at 278. Section601 of

Ti tl e VI proh ibits recipie nts of federal funding f

ro m inte ntiona lly discriminating aga i nst i ndividual s based

on race , c olo r, or

nationa l ori gin. 42 U.S .C. § 20 00d ; see also Sandoval , 532 U. S. at 280 -8 1. Sec ti on 6 02 o f Ti tl e VI auth ori zes fede ral age ncies “ to eff ectua te the provisi ons of [Se cti on 601] . . . by issui ng rules , regul ations , ororders of general app li cab il ity .” 42 U. S. C. § 2000d1. The DOJ promulgated a regu lati on prohibi tin g recipi ents of fede ral fundi ng 12 The statute p rovides, in re lev ant part, that “ any per son may commence a civil actio n on his o wn beh alf . . . ag ainst any person . . . who is al leged to be in violation of any permit, s tandard , regulat ion, conditi on, requi rement , proh ibitio n, oror der

whi ch h as bec ome effecti ve pursuan t to thi s chapter .” 42 U.S.C . § 6972(a )(1)(A).

### 12

from taking action s that ha d a dis parate impacton r acia l gro ups

. See 2 8 C. F.R . § 42.104(b )(2) (2000).
Since Section 601 proh i bits on ly intent ional disc rimi natio n, t he Co urt explai ne d, the DOJ’s dis parate impact regulat ion had to deri ve from Section 602. Thus the plainti ffs did no t ha ve a rig ht to

sue under Secti on 601’s pri vat e rig ht of acti on; “[t ]h atri ght

mu st c om e, if at all, from the ind epen dent f orce of § 602.” Id. at 28 6. 13 The Court therefore anal yzed Section602 to dete rmine whether it could infera right

of acti on under that

provisi on. In doing so, the Court f ound that Sec tion 602 does not m anife st Co ngre ss’s inten t to create a pers onal rig h t, namely because “right s-cre ating ” language i s absent from the statu te. Id. at 288. In addi tion, the Cou rt found that

Section602 does not manifest an inte nt to cre ate a p rivate

re m ed y, mostlybecause the enforcement sys tem th at S ecti on 602 and Secti on 603 create suggest just th e op pos ite. Id. at 289- 90.
Becaus e n o private right of acti on exists t o enforce Section 602, a nd the DO J’s regulat

ion deri ved from that provisi on of T itle VI, th e plain tiffs in Sandoval did n ot h ave a right o f actio n to enforce the r egu latio n. Id. at 290-91. The Cou rt noted, however, that private parti es may bring suit to enfo rc e r egulations that va lidly construe a statute f or wh ich there exists a private ri ght of action. “ A Congress that i ntends t he stat ute to be enforced through aprivate cause of action i n tends the authorit ative inter pretat ion of the statute to be so enforced a s well. ” Id. at 284. Thus Sandoval is consistent with this court’s jurispru denc e in Ang elastro and its p ro ge ny. Ang elastro , li ke Sandova l , teaches that court s must look t o the

en ablin g stat

ute to f ind the s ource of a right of action to enforce regulati ons, because “an agenc y's rulemaki ng power cannotexceed the authori ty grantedto it by Co ngr ess.” 764 F.2 d at 9 47. A regulat ion cannot“conjure up a private ca use o f acti on that has not been authorized by Congress. A ge nc ies m ay p lay t h e sorcerer’s apprentice but not the so rce rer himself. ” Sandoval , 532 U.S . at 29 1.
Sandoval and Gonzaga do allow us to refine ou r de cisi on in Ang elastro

. 

### Sandoval and Gonzaga expla i n in no uncertain terms that

Congress’s statutory creat ionof a person al right is a predica te to finding an im

plied ri ght of

ac tion in a statute. The agency andits regulat ions do not furn ish an indep ende nt bas is to “conjure ” an implied right of acti on. Thus, when determi ning as a par t of Ang elastro ’s private right

of acti on analy sis “whether the agency rule i s properl y within the

sc o pe of the enab ling statu te,” a co urt is really loo kin g more preci selyat whether the agency ru le is within the s cope of— i.e., cons trues, fle shes o ut, or fills in the inter sti ces of—a personal r ight that the enabling statute creates. Sandoval and Ang elastro were 13 

### The Court concluded that it was “beyond dispute” that a n implied right of action existsto enforce

Se ction601. 532 U.S. at 280.

### 13

impli ed ri ght of act ion deci sions

. Therefore, neither address ed whether plaint iffs co uld enforc e the re gulati ons at issue in those cases by wa y of a priv ate right of a ction und er Se ction 1 983 . This court s ubsequentl y exami ned that issue in Sou th Cam den C itiz ens in Action v. New Jersey De p’t of E nvtl. Pro t. , 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 200 1), cert. denied , 536 U.S. 939 (2002). The re, we cons idered a disp arate impactregulat

ion that t he Environmental Protection Agency had promul gated under Section602 of T itle V I. We extended Sandov al ’s reasoni ng to the Sec tion 1983 context and c oncl uded that

a regulation cannot“creat e a right en force able through secti on 1983 where the al leged ri ght does not appear expl icitly in the s tatute, but only appears i n the regul ation. ” Id. at 781. A plaint iff can onl y enforce a regul ation under Sect io n 1983 if the regulat ion “me rely define[s] the speci fic ri ght that Co ngress alrea dy ha[s ] conferred throu g h the statute. ” Id. at 783. In other words, private p arti es cannot e nforce regul ations under Section 198 3 w hen the re gulati ons “do m ore than defi ne or fle sh out the content of a sp ecifi c right

conferred upon the plaint

iffs ” by the stat

ute and i nstead “give the st atute a sc ope beyond t hat Congress contemplated.” Id. at 7 90

. Under Section1983, theref ore, regulations give rise to a rig ht of a ction o nly insofar as theyconstrue a personalright tha t a statute creates. Id. ; see also Harris v. James 127 F.3d 993, 1008- 09 (11 th Cir. 1997 ).
W ith th es e p ri nc ip le s i n mi nd, we turn to whether pl ainti ffs here can br ing suit to enforc e the HUD regulati ons, ei ther vis- à-vis a right of action u nder t h e Rehabili tati on Act or Secti on 1983.

C.
To determi ne whether pl ainti ffs ha ve a private right

of acti on under the Rehabili tati on Act to enfo rc e the HUD regu la tion s, we must make a seri es of inquiries. First , we examine the scope of the private right of

action that ex ists to enforce Sec tion 504. We conclude that since Section 504' s private ri ght of acti on is contig uou s with Title V I’s—for which

an impli ed, not

express, right

of acti on exist s—plainti ffs can b ring su it to enforce personalright s that

Section 504 cre ates, and only such personal right s. Se co nd, we examine Secti on 504 and the pe rtinent H UD regu lations to determi ne wh eth er the HUD regulati ons construe any per sonal right t hat Section 504 cr eates. We ultimat elyconclude that wh ile the HUD regu lat ions we examine here may const

rue ri ghts or obl igati ons that Section 504 c reate s, they do not construe perso nal rig hts that Sec tion 504 creates. We theref ore fin d that t he Reh abi lit ation Act does not pr ovide a private ri ght of action to enforce these particular

HU D regulations.

1.
The Reh abilita tion Act , a s origina lly ena c ted, did not ex plicitly prov id e a private right of acti on. In t

he years f ollo win g its e nac tme nt, h ow eve r, a
n umbe r of co urts (inc luding this C ourt) concluded that an impli ed right acti on existed to enforc e the s tatut e. See Lloyd v.

### 14

Reg’l Transp. Auth. , 548 F.2d 1277, 1280- 81 (7 th Cir. 19 77); Kap meier v . N y quist , 553 F.2d 296, 299 ( 2d Cir . 1977) (foll owing Ll oyd ); Un it ed Handicapped Fed’n v. And re , 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8 th Cir. 1977 ) (foll owing Ll oyd ); Lea ry v

. Crapsey , 566 F.2d 863, 865 ( 2d Cir. 1977 ); Da vis v. So uthea stern C mty. Co ll

. , 5 74 F.2d 1158, 11 59 (4 th Cir. 1978) (foll owing Ll oyd ), rev’d on other gr ounds , 442 U.S. 397 (197 9); NAA CP v. Med. Ctr., Inc. , 599 F.2d 124 7, 1258-59 ( 3d Cir. 1979) (foll owing Ll oyd ); Kling v. County of Los Angeles , 633 F .2d 876, 87 8 (9 th Cir. 1980) (foll owing Ll oyd ). Congress’s subsequent

ame ndm ents to the Rehabi lit ation Act reinforce, indeed compel, the co nclusi on t hat a private ri ght of action exists t o enforce Section 504. First, Congress added Section 505(a)( 2) to the Reh abilitation Ac t in 1978. The provisi on provi des that t he “remedies, procedures , and rights se t forth in title VI o f the C ivil Rig hts Act of 1964 shall be avail able t o any person aggrieved by any ac t orfailure to act by anyrecipi ent of Federal a ssis tanc e o r Federalprovider of such assistanc e unde r sect ion 794 of this ti tl e. ” 29 U.S .C. § 794a(a)( 2). At t he time, “the courts, includi ng [the S u pr eme Co urt], ha[d] unani mously concluded or

as sum e d tha t a pri vate action may be maintai ned under Title VI.” Reg ents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke , 438 U.S. 265, 419 (1978) (Stevens , J. , concurring in part and dissent ing in par t). As the S uprem e Cou rt has exp laine d, Cong r ess is pre sumed to be

aware of an adminis trative or judici al inter pretat ion of a statute and to adopt

that in terpr etat ion when i t
re-ena cts a stat

ute without change. So too , w here, a s here, Co ngre ss ado pts a new law incorpor ating s ecti ons of a prior law , Congress

n orm ally can be presum e d to hav e h ad knowledge of the interpre tation g iven to the incorp o rated law, at l east insofar as it affe ct s the new stat ute. Lorillard v. Pons , 434 U.S. 575, 58 0-81 (1978) (in te rnal ci tati ons omitted). Thus Congress, in esse nce, provi ded a p riv ate right of acti on under Sect io n 504 by incorpor ating Titl e VI’s “re medies , procedures, and right s” int o the st atute

. See also Barnes v. Gorman , 536 U. S. 181, 184-85 (200 2); Bow ers , 346 F.3d at 426 (“[A]lt hough the r e med y availab le to persons aggrieve d by vi olati ons of the Rehabili tati on Ac t . . . is at root an i mplied one, [the statute], by cro ss- referenc ing Title VI , w hich al readyhad been inter pretedas creat

ing a pri vate rightof acti on, arguably

[contai ns an] ex plicit pr ovi sion[] creating a pri vate ri ght of actio n.”)

. Second, Congress confi rmed that a priv ate right

of acti on exist s to enfor ce Section504 when it

ra ti fi ed t

he S upr eme Cou rt’s decisi on in C annon v. Univ. of Chicago , 441 U.S. 677 (19 79). In Cannon , the Co urt held that

a private right

of acti on exists to enforce Title IX of the Education Amendm en ts of 197 2, because Title IX

### 15

“was patterned af ter T itle VI” an d “[i]n 1972 when Title I X was enacted , t he [para llel] langu age in Ti tl e VI had alre ady been cons trued a s creatin g a pr ivate

rem edy.” I d

. at

694 , 6 96. Li ke Ti tl e I X, Section504 was also patte rned after T itle VI

. See Med. Ctr., Inc. , 599 F.2d at 1258. And Congress subse quently enacted Section 1003 of the Rehabil itat ion Act Am endm ents of 1 986 , 42 U .S.C . § 2000d7, which the Supreme Court has inter pretedas “a val idati on o f Ca nnon ’s hol din g.” Fran klin v. G win net t Cou nty Pub. Sch. , 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992) ; see also Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 280. 14
We note the se circumstances not because the parties dispute w hether a private right

of acti on exist s under Section 504. Rather, we do so because the sour ce of the priv ate rig ht of a ction sp eaks to its scope. Section50 4's private right of acti on d erives —through Congress’s u se o f pa rall el langu age, in corp oration of T itle VI’s remedies i n t h e 1978 amen dments, and rati fi ca tion of Cannon — from the right of acti on that e xist s to enf orc e Title VI. Consequently , “the remedies for violat ions of . . . § 504 of the Rehab ilitati on Act ar e coextens ive with t he remedies avail able i n a private cause of acti on brought unde r Titl e VI.” Gorman , 536 U.S . at 18 5. The private right of acti on that exists to en force Title VI is , of cours e, an impli ed righ t of a ction

. See Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 280; Bow ers , 346 F.3dat 428 n. 21; Med. Ctr., Inc. , 599 F .2d at 125 7-58. Since, as we hav e ex plain ed, Sandoval mandates t h at an i mplied ri ght of action

can exis t o nly where Congress creates a personalright, a plai ntiff can enfo rce on ly personalright s through an impli ed right of

ac tion. Because Secti on 50 4' s remedies—includi ng the sco pe of its private right

of acti on— are coextensi ve with Titl e VI’s, i t foll ows that pl ainti ffs

can onl y bring sui t to enf orce pers onal righ ts tha t Se ction 504 crea tes.
Ac cord ingly we conclude that insofar a s plaintiffs s eek to enforce these HU D re gu lat io ns , th ey m ay d o s o o nl y i f the regulat

ions c onstrue and define a personalright tha t Sectio n 504 creates; “[a]genci es may play the sorcerer’s apprenti ce but not the s orc erer him self .” Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 291. W e turn to the relation ship be twe e n Section 504 and the HU D r egu latio ns a t issu e.

2.
The Suprem e Cou rt has inter preted Se ct ion 504 in two principal decisions: Sou theaste rn C mty. Co ll. v. Da vis , 442 U.S. 397 (1979) and Alex ande r v. Ch oate , 469 U.S. 287 ( 19 85). I n Da vis and C hoate , the C ourt ar ticulated tw o countervaili ng legis lati ve concerns t hat unde rlie Section 504 and guide courts’ inter pretat ion of it: “(1) effe ctuation of the statute’s objectives of a ssi sti ng the handicapped; and ( 2) th e need to impose 14 Section 1003 “ abrogate d the States’ Ele ven thAmend me n t imm unity under Titl e IX, Title VI, § 504 of the Rehabi li tati on Act of 1973, and t he Age Discri minati on Act of 19 75 .” Fran klin , 503 U.S . at 72

.

### 16

reaso nable boundaries in accompli shing this purpose. ” Skinner , 881 F. 2d at 1191 (ci ting Ch oate , 469 U.S. at 299). The Cou rt struck a balance between these consider ationby r ea din g Section 504 a s requiring federalfund gr antees to offer “meaningful access ” to progr ams they administer. Meaningful access , as explic ated by the Court, doe s not require that gr antees “fu nda me nta lly alte r” or “sub stantially change” the nature of t he pr ogr am. Mo reover, grantee s need not make accommodations t hat would impose undue financi al or administrati ve burdens. See Skinner , 881 F .2d at 1 192 ; Nathanson

v. M ed. C oll. of Pa. , 926 F.2d1368, 1383 (3d Cir . 199 1). “ Ch oate and Da vis therefore contemplate a contin uum in which some modest modifi cati ons may be necessary to avoid di scri minati on bu t oth er
more subs tantial m odific a tions are not
re quiredby se ction 504. ” Skinner , 881 F.2 d at 1 192

. De spite courts ’ effort s to i nterpret Section504 and determine what it requires of fede ral gran tees, the statute is nonetheless sti ll “‘ ambiguous and lacki ng in specifi cs.’ ” Disa bled in Action of Pa. v. Sykes , 833 F.2d 1113, 1117 ( 3d Cir. 1987) (quoti ng R.I. Handicapped Act io n Comm.

v. R.I. Publ ic Transi t Auth. , 718 F.2d 490, 494 (1 st Cir. 19 83)); see also Skinner , 881 F.2d at 119 3 (ref erring to the “ diffic ulty in determi ning precis elythe extent of accommodation mandated by secti on 50 4"). As a result , some court s have “suggest ed that t

he rele vant feder al agency and not the court

has the chie f respo nsibility to de te rmi ne wh at Section 504 requires of reci pients of federalfunds i n accomm odating the needs of disa ble d persons. ” Sykes , 833 F.2d at 1117.
Sect ion 504 does not, by it s terms,
man date the issuance o f re gu lations to im pl eme nt the s tatut e. See Helen L. v. Did ario , 46 F.3d 3 25, 330 n .9 (3d Cir. 1995). Section 504 's legislative history in dicate s, however, tha t Congres s contemplated the promulgation o f such regulations. See S. R ep. N o. 93-1297, at 40 (19 74) , repri nted in 1974 U. S. C. C. A. N. 63 90- 91; see also Cmty . Tel evis ion of S. Cal. v. Gottfried , 459 U.S. 498, 509 (1983) (“[S]i nce § 50 4 w as pa tterned after T itle VI o f the C ivil Rig hts Ac t of 19 64, it was unders tood that resp onsib ilit y fo r enforci ng it, insofar

as it regu lated p rivate recipie nts of fe deral f und s, wo uld lie w ith those agencies adm in ist ering t he federal fina ncia l assi stan ce p rog ram s.”).
In 1976, Pr esident

Ford iss ued Executive Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (Apr. 28, 1976), which required t he Departmentof Health, Education, and We lfare (“ HEW” ) to “ esta blish

. . . g uideli nes for d eterm ining w hat a r e di scriminatory practi ces, within the meaning of secti on 504.” HEW issued “coordination regu lations” in 197 8. See 43 Fed . Re g. 21 32 ( Jan . 13, 1 978 ).
Th e HEW regulat

ions now appear at 28 C .F .R. Pt. 41. 15 After provi ding

15 HEW eventual ly became t h e De partm ent of Health and Human Servic es (“HH S”), see 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (19 79), and in 19 80 Preside nt Carte r tr ansferr ed

### 17

som e gener a l pres cript ions agai ns t di scri minati on in fede rall y funde d pr ogr ams and activ ities, see 28 C. F. R. § 41.51, the regul ations specificall y address

e m ploy ment discrimination and progr am
acc essib ility. See C.F.R. §§ 41. 52-58. 16
The pro gr am a ccess ibilit y regulat ions prov id e: “N o qu alifie d handicappe d person shal l, be cause a
re cip ien t's facil iti es are i naccessi ble to or

unu sable by handi capp ed persons, be denied the ben e fits of, be excl uded from parti cipation in, or

otherwis e be subjected to di sc rim in ati on un de r a ny prog ram or activity that receives or benefi ts fr om federalfi n anc ial as sista nce .” 28 C.F .R. § 41.56. The regu lati ons ’ mo re spe cific program ac c essibi lit

y r equirement s go on to di sti ng ui sh be tw ee n e xi sti ng , ne w lycon struc ted, a nd a ltere d fa cilitie s. With respect

to ne w construction, the regulat

ions re qui re that ne w facili ties “be designedand c onstru cted to be rea dily

acce ssible to and usabl e by handi capped pe rso ns.” 28 CFR § 41.58(a). And “[a]l terat ions to exis ting f

a cilities [must], to the maximum exten t fe asibl e, be designeda nd c onstru cted to be rea dily

acce ssible to and usabl e by handi capped persons. ” Id.
After HEW promulgate d i ts regulat ions , Congress amended Section 504. As w e described above, Congress enacted Section 505( a ) (2) an d in co rporat ed by reference T itle VI’s “remedies, procedures, and rights. ” 29 U.S .C. § 794a(a)( 2). Congres s also a dded te x t to Secti on 504 requiring feder al agencies to “promulgate su ch regulat ions

as m ay b e n ec es sa ry to ca rry o ut the

ame ndm ents to thi s section made by the Rehabili tati on, Com pre h ensive Services, and Deve lo pme nt al Disabi lities Act of 197 8.” 2 9 U .S.C . § 79 4.
The Suprem e Cou rt has inter preted the 1978 a me ndments as “ma[ki ng] explic it” Co ngre ss’s the retofo re imp licit underst anding that

agencies administering federalfinanci al ass ist ance pr og ra ms
wo uld enforce Sect ion 504 b y promulgati ng reg ulati ons

. Gottfri ed , 459 U.S. at 509. The Court has also inter preted th e amendmen ts a s “inco rp orat[i ng] the subst ance of the HH S’s coordinat

ion and enfor cement autho rity to th e A ttorn ey G ene ral. See Executive Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980). The DOJ thereafter adopted t he H EW coor dinatio n reg ulatio n s withoutsubstant

ive c hanges. See Bragdon , 524 U.S. at 633. For the s ake of inte rnal

co ns ist en cy, we refer to t he regulat

ions as the “ HE W reg ulati ons .”

16 Th us the r egulations re flect the

concerns that

motivat ed Congress to e nact Section504

. See Ch oate , 469 U.S. at 306- 07 (“In enac ting t

he Rehabili tati on Act and in subsequ en t am end me nts, C ong ress

. . . focus[ed] on se veral subs tantiv e
areas— emp loymen t, ed ucati on, and the el imi nationof p hysical barriers t o
a ccess

— in which it c onsider ed the soci et a l and personalcosts of refu sals to provide meaningful access to the h andic appe d to be particularly high.”).

### 18

[H EW] r egu latio ns in to th e sta tute.” Co nsol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone , 465 U. S. 624, 634 n.15 (1984). 17 As the S upre m e Cou rt has rep eat edl y n ote d, t he HEW regu lati ons deserve cons iderab le def erence because they consti tute t h e “contemporaneous r e gulati ons iss ued by the agency responsible for i mplementing a congressi onal enactment. ” Id. at 634 ; see also Brag don v. A bbo tt , 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998); Toyot a Motor Mfg., Ky. , Inc. v. Wil li ams , 534 U.S . 184 , 1 95 (2002) (same); Che vr on U .S .A

. Inc. v. Echazabal , 536 U.S . 73, 8 2 n.4 (20 02) (sam e).
Im po rta nt ly, t he HEW reg ulati ons require each agencyto “is sue, after notice and opp ortun ity for com me nt, a regulat ion to implement s ecti on 5 04 with respe ct to the p rogra ms a nd ac tivities to w hich it provides a ssistance.” 28 C .F.R. § 41.4(a);

see al so 28 C .F .R . § 41. 4( c) (2 ). HUD promulgate d Section 50 4 regulations, wh ich w e de scrib ed a bov e, in 1 988

. 

### Thatbrings us t

o the question on which this appeal hin ges: What isthe precise relat

ionship bet

ween the r

ight of action under

Sect ion 504 a

nd the HUD regulations? There is a universe of three possibilities. First, the regul ationsmay do
no morethan construe personal rights that Section504 creates. S econd , th e r egulati ons may (instead or additionally ) construe non-pe rsonal r ight s o r obligati ons that Section 504 cre a tes. Third, the regulation s m ay also create distinct rights or obligations—either personal or non-p ersonal— i n addition to those that Section 50 4 creates. 18 

### As we haveexplained , onl y in the first instance would plaintiffs have a pr iv ate ri ght of action to enforce

the regul ations. Tha t i s because Section 50 4's right of action only all ows plaintiffs to enforce p ersonal rights that the sta tute cr eates , andany

regulat ions

17 As the Court e xplaine d, “the

re sp onsib le congressi onal committees parti cipat ed in their formulation, a nd both these com mittees and C ong ress itself endorsed the regu la tions in their final form.” Darrone , 465 U.S. at 634. 18 

### W e di stinguish— as we did in South Camden—between regulations that “construe” a statute and regulations that “create rights or ob ligations in addition to those that the

statute crea

tes.” If Congress duly authorizes an agency , it may promulgate both typesof regulations. See 1 Richard J. Pierce , Jr., Adminis trative Law Treatise § 6.4, at 325-26 (4 th 

### ed. 2002); see also Chao v. R oth erme l , 327 F.3d223, 227 ( 3d Cir. 2003) ( discuss ing “interpretative” and “legislative”rules); Am. Mining Co ng. v . M in e S afet y & Health A dmi n. , 995 F.2d 1106, 1108-09 (D.C. Cir. 1993 ) (same). A ppellees
assu me that Cong ress has so autho riz e d HUD un der the Rehabilitat ion Act and that the HUD regul ation s ar e valid. We adopt that as sumpti on for thepurposes of this d ecisio n. Nothin g here is meant to cast doubt o n th e val idit

y of the HUD regulat ions thems elves. But the val idity of theregulations is a different question than whether the y a re privately

enforceable. See South Camden , 274 F.3d at 787.

### 19

aplaintiff seeks t

o e n force must merely “flesh out” those statutory personal rights. Cf. South Camden , 274 F.3d at 790.
An analy sisof t

he HUD regulati ons here reveal s that in any

event t hey do not articulate personal

rights. At the outset, we o bserve th a t as a general matt er the HUD regulations are dire c tedat the Housing Authority’s obligati ons as a grantee. Section 8. 22, for example, require s that new housing projects “shall b e designed an d constructedto bereadily accessibleto and usable by individuals with handicaps.” 24 C.F.R. § 8.22(a). This mandate is not couched in te

rmsof an y benefici ary ’s entitlement, but aim s at the fund recipient’sconduct. Id. The regula tions, t o the exte

nt they effectua te Sect ion 504 , s peakto the regulated s tate e ntity and d o not focus on the individual be nefi ci ar y. Words “that focus on the pers on regulated rather than individual s protected creat e ‘no implication

of an intent to conferrights on apartic u lar class of persons.’ ” Sandoval , 532 U.S. at 289 (quoting Califor nia v. Si erra Club , 451 U.S. 287, 294 (198 1)). Thus the regulation s fall short of the ty pe of individu all y- focused entitlement t hat theSupreme Cou rt has foun d criti cal i n determ ining wh e ther Congress created personal rights. See Gonzaga , 536 U.S. at 287; Richman , 367 F.3d at 187-88



### . Equ ally important , the H U D regulat ions plaint

iffs seek to enf

orce relate to “instit ut ional pol icyand practice, not indivi dual inst ances” of di scri minati on. Gonzaga , 53 6 U.S. at 288. So, for in st ance, Section 8. 22 provides that ne w housing projects “sh al l be desi gned and construct ed to be re adily acce ssible “ to handicappedpersons. 24 C.F.R. § 8 .22(a). And Section 8.26 re qui res tha t acces sible dwelling units “b e distr ib uted throughout project s.” 24 C.F. R. § 8.26.
Si m ila rly, th e HUD rules have an “‘aggrega t e focus’” and “are no t concerned with ‘whether the needs of any parti cular

person have bee n satisfied.’” Gonzaga , 536 U.S. at 28 8 (q uoting Bless ing , 520 U.S . at 343 , 344) . In this regard, we e mphasize that al l but one of the regulat

ions pl ainti ffs seek t o enforce turn on the per c entage of uni ts that meet

acce ssibility re qui rem ents

. Five perce nt of th e units in newly -constructed a n d substant ially- altered h ousing projects must be acces sib le to those w ith ambu latory disabili ties, andtwo per cen t mu st be

acce ssible to thos e with hearing and vis ual disabili ties. See 24 U .S.C. §§ 8.22 (b), 8.23(a). And when the Housing Au thority alters a unit , butnot substantial ly, it must make the unit

accessi ble unle ss five perce nt of th e units in the housi ng project

are already access i ble

. See 24 U .S.C . § 8.23 (b).
Thus the Housing Authority can f ai l to comply wit

h the regu lations a nd still not deny acce ss to a d isabled individ ual. Con sider, for ins tance, if the Housing Au tho rity we re to bu ild a ne w 1 00-u nit housing faci lit

y and, although none of the

new ly-buil t units were accessible to t he

mo bility impaire d, the H ousin g A utho rity had a polic y of retr ofitt

ing every unit to be accessi ble whenever an i mpaire d

### 20

indivi dual s ought publi c housing. The Hous ing Au thority wo uld p rovid e
acce ssible housing to disabled individuals , yet it would have fail ed to com ply with the regulat ions. We do not o ffer th is exam ple to suggest t

hat Section 504 does not authori ze the prophy lactic measure s the regulat ions ar ti cul at e. Rather , t he e xamp l e demonstrates t ha t the mandates the regulat ions set for th are n ot indiv idualoriented and hav e a s ystem wid e fo cus

. See Blessi ng , 52 0 U.S. at 343- 44 (tr eati ng focus on sys temwide compli ance as inconsi stent

with the c reati on of personal rights). 

### Since theHUD regulat ions at i ssue do not artic ulate personal rights, they

of
course cannot co nstrue pers onal rights that Section 504 creates; a

nd whetherthe HUD regulat ions otherwise construe general obligati ons that Section 5 04 c reate s or cr eate d istinc t obligations is no t dispositi ve f

or privat e right of a

ction analysis. Thus, al though we a ssu me that the HUD regulat

ions prope rlyeffec tuate Sectio n 5 04, we cannot conclude that the regulat ions construe a personalright with in Sec ti on 5 04. As a resu lt, plaint iffs cannotenforce the regulations by way of Section 504' s private ri ght of action.
In reachi ng our conclus ion, we note that while Sandoval drives our d ecisio n , this cas e di ffe rs fr om Sandoval . In Sandoval , plaint

iffs coul d not su e to enforce the dis parate impact r egulations because no private right of ac tion existed at all to e nf orce the stat utoryprovisi on (Sec ti on 602 of Titl e VI) from which the regulat ions derived. Here, a ri ght of action does exist to enforc e the regulati ons’ enabli ng s tat ute (Sect

ion 504). But the right of actio n that e xist s under Section 504 only all o ws plaintiffs t o enforce personalright s tha t S ection 504 creates. And the HUD regulati ons do not const rue a personalright

under Secti on 504.
Sim ilarly , this case al so diff ers fro m recent cas es a pply ing Sandoval . In Jackson v. Bir mi ngham Board o f Education , 309 F.3d 1333 (11 th Cir. 2002 ),

c ert. granted , 124 S. Ct. 2834 (2004 ) an d Pe ters v. Jenney , 327 F.3d 307 (4 th Cir. 2 003) the E leven th and Fou rth C ircuits addresse d whether plainti ffs had a right of acti on to enfo rc e anti-re taliatio n
r e gulati ons that a gencies promulgated under Section 601 of

Titl e VI and the para llelprovisi on in Title IX of th e Education Am endments of 1972, 20 U.S .C. § 1681. The is sue in t hose cases

w as not w hethe r the an ti-retaliati o n regulat ions articulated personal rights. Rather, the issue was whethe r the regulat ion arti culat ed a personalright that Congress creat ed in Ti tl e VI an d Ti tl e I X, respe cti vel y. This is the very ty pe of qu es tion rais ed in Sandoval its elf. The Fou rth Circuit

held that the regulation s ’ “reta liat ion proh ibition is an inte rpret ation of § 601's core a ntidiscri mina tio n
ma nda te.” 327 F.3 d at 3 16. The Elev enth Ci rcui t, in contrast, held that “[b]ecause Congress has not created a right t hrough Title IX to redr es s harms resul ting fr om retali ation, [th e Department of Ed ucati on’ s
r egulation] may not be read to c reate on e eithe r.” 3 09 F .3d a t 13 46.
Our ca se is far d iffere nt bec ause it

### 21

involves regu la tions implem entin g systemic r i gh t s and ob l i ga t i on s. Wh e ther the HUD regulat

ions const

rue Section 504 (orcr e ate ne w ob lig ati on s), Se cti on 50 4's impli ed rig ht of ac tio n o nl y a ll ows plaint iffs to e nforce pers onal ri ghts that the statute creates and no t s y st emi c obligations. Thus, even i f we w er e to
as sum e that

Co ngre ss crea ted the systemic rights an d ob li ga ti ons th at th e HUD regulat ions articula te, plaint

iffs maynot enforce thos e ri ghts under Section 504 because they are not personal rights.
Fi na lly, our d ecisio n is consi stent wit h past cas es in which pl ainti ffs ha v e enforced regulat

ions promul gated under stat utes (includ ing S ection 504 ) that did not contai n expr e ss rights of action. In Disabledin Action of

Pa. v. Sykes , 833 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1987 ), fo r e xa mpl e, we grantedsummary j udgment to pl ainti ffs seeking to enforc e D ep artme nt o f Tr a nsportation regulat ions promul gated under Se ction 504. The regulations

re quiredgran tees to m ake tra nspo rtati o n facilities— in Sykes , a part icular subway station in Ph iladelp hia— accessi ble when a facility is subs tantially alter ed. Id. at 1119. Those regulat

ions re quired t

he Cityof Philad elphia to make a common area individ ually accessi ble; t hat is , an are a that any disabl ed i ndi vidu al had to acc ess in

o rder to use the publ ic faci lit y. Thus the regu l ations construed plai ntiff s’ pers onal right to ac ces s. See also Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd. , 348 F .3d 85 0, 858 (10th Cir. 200 3 ) (find ing ca use o f actio n to enforce regulat

ions promul gated under Title II of th e A DA ). Tha t is entirely in accord with our decis ion here. 

### D. The reasons that compe l us to conclude that plai ntif fs ca nno t ma int ain theirsuit to enfo rce th e HU D regulat ions
as a private cause of a

ction under Sect

ion 504 also com

pel us to conclude that they cannot sue to enfor

ce the r egulati ons underSection 1983. As we held in South Camden , plaintiffs canonly enforce under Section 1983 p ersonal rights that Con gress creates. Whether or not Congress created thesys temic rights tha t the HUD regulat ions articulate, plaintiffs cannot enforce them under

Section 19 83 because they are not personal rig hts.

III.
For the re a sons s tat

ed abo ve, we will affi rm the District Court’s ju dgment. We emphasize, as the defendants concede,
se e Appellee ’s Br . 26, 3 2, tha t pla intiffs may continue to bring suit to enforce their personal rights to access dir ectly under Section 504. Thus tho se claims, as well as plai ntiff s ’ motion seeking clas s certificati on, remain before the Dist rict Court. We note that the District Courtwill haveto deter

mine the extent to whichany of the HUD regul ationsmay be relevant to determ ining whether de fendants are liable underSection 50 4. See, e. g. , Nathanson , 926 F.2 d at 1 386

. 

### Moreo v er, if pla intiffs continue to seek class certification as w ell
as injunctiv e relief, the Cou rt will have to address several inter- connected issues
overthe course of the pro c eedings. See Armst rong v. Davis , 275 F.3d 849, 860 (9 th 

### Cir. 2001) (“[W]here a district c ourt

### 22

grants sy stem-wide injunctive relief, t he issues of standin g, class certificati on, and the propriety

and scope of

relief are often interm in gled.”). Finally, HUD retains its in dependentauthority—indeed, it s independent

obliga ti on—to en force its
own regulat

ions afte r many ye ars of the Housing Authority’s noncompliance

.