In the

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 22-2833 

CHRISTOPHER ROALSON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v.

JON NOBLE, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:18-cv-01831-PP — Pamela Pepper, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MAY 15, 2024 — DECIDED AUGUST 28, 2024 

____________________ 

Before BRENNAN, KIRSCH, and LEE, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. Christopher Roalson is serving a 

life sentence for stabbing and bludgeoning a 93-year-old 

woman to death. At his trial, a DNA analyst testified about 

evidence left behind on the two knives and barstool used to 

commit the murder. The testifying analyst did not swab the 

items and develop the sample left on the weapons—another 

analyst performed that work but was unavailable at trial. Instead, the analyst who took the stand testified that Roalson 
2 No. 22-2833 

was a possible contributor after comparing the sample from 

the weapons to a sample of his DNA. Roalson was convicted 

and now collaterally challenges that conviction. He argues

that the trial court denied his right to confront a witness by 

allowing the substitute analyst to testify. The district court denied his habeas petition, and he asks us to reverse that decision. 

I.

In 2009, Christopher Roalson and Austin Davis broke into 

the Radisson, Wisconsin home of a 93-year-old woman. Davis 

was in the kitchen looking for items to steal when Roalson 

emerged from the woman’s bedroom holding a bloody knife. 

Roalson and Davis had each taken a knife from Davis’s 

cousin’s house, their last stop before the break-in. Wordlessly, 

Roalson grabbed Davis’s knife from his hand, picked up a 

wooden kitchen stool, and went back into the bedroom. Davis 

heard the woman screaming from the kitchen. Then, he heard 

something break and saw Roalson running out of the bedroom. Roalson kicked down a screen door and ran from the 

house, and Davis followed. As the two fled, Roalson broke the 

silence. He said that he stabbed the woman “a bunch of times” 

and “broke the chair over her,” that “he was Satan’s son,” and 

that the woman “would [have] been saved if God was here.” 

A few days later, Roalson told his friend Jacqueline 

Walczak that he stabbed a woman. According to Walczak, 

Roalson said he and Davis set out “to rob a lady,” they broke 

into the house, the “lady ... caught them,” “he took a chair 

and he hit her and he hit her and he hit her,” “he stabbed her 

and he stabbed her and he stabbed her and he stabbed her,” 

“he said hail, Satan” while stabbing her, and “if he got away 

with it, he’d do it again.” When Walczak heard that a woman 
No. 22-2833 3

had been found murdered and the cause of death was not being disclosed, she contacted police and told them what 

Roalson had told her. 

The state charged Roalson with burglary and first-degree 

intentional homicide. Davis pleaded guilty to second-degree 

intentional homicide in exchange for cooperating with law 

enforcement and testifying at Roalson’s trial. 

Several witnesses testified at Roalson’s trial in Sawyer 

County, Wisconsin Circuit Court. Davis shared what he saw 

and what Roalson told him after the murder. Walczak described Roalson’s confession to her. And Carly Leider, a DNA 

analyst at the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory in Madison, 

also testified. 

Leider’s testimony is at issue here. Another analyst, Ryan 

Gajewski, had swabbed evidence collected from the scene, 

tested the DNA samples he recovered, and concluded that 

Roalson’s DNA was a possible contributor to some of the samples, including the knives. But Gajewski was unavailable to

testify at trial because he was employed elsewhere and was in 

Afghanistan. So Leider appeared at trial. 

Leider testified that she looked at Gajewski’s notes and 

was able “to reach [her] own conclusions based on developed 

profiles[,]” which she compared to “standards” (that is, a person’s DNA sample) to identify potential contributors. She explained her analysis was just like that of a peer reviewer, who 

examines the principal analyst’s work. But in the peer review 

process, the reviewer does not retest the sample because the 

initial swab generates “the best collection of that DNA.” 

During Leider’s testimony, counsel for the state presented 

her with several pieces of evidence—in particular, the two 
4 No. 22-2833 

knives and the barstool—and asked if she was able “to reach 

an opinion regarding the profile that was developed ... versus 

the standards that were ... developed.” Each time, she testified as to her own conclusions. For example, Leider said she 

reached a conclusion about the DNA collected from swabbing 

the handle and the blade of one of the knives. The DNA detected from the handle included four “possible contributors 

to this DNA mixture profile,” including the victim, Roalson, 

and Davis. And the DNA detected from the blade included “a 

female DNA profile,” of which the victim “was the source.” 

The jury found Roalson guilty, and he was sentenced to 

life in prison. 

He appealed his state conviction, arguing the trial court 

violated his right to confront Gajewski by allowing Leider to 

testify instead. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed, applying a rule from the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in 

State v. Luther Williams, 644 N.W.2d 919 (Wis. 2002). Citing

that case, the court explained the Confrontation Clause is not 

always violated when one analyst testifies to his own conclusions about samples tested by another analyst. When the testifying analyst can provide an independent evaluation of the 

initial report, the original analyst need not be called. 

After the Wisconsin and United States Supreme Courts denied certiorari, Roalson began his collateral attacks on his conviction. The state trial court denied his challenge without a 

hearing, and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed without addressing his Confrontation Clause claim.

Roalson then petitioned for habeas corpus in the Eastern 

District of Wisconsin. The court dismissed the petition. In just 

a few sentences, the court explained there is no federal law 
No. 22-2833 5

“clearly holding” that the Confrontation Clause bars a testifying analyst from testifying to “her own independent opinions 

and conclusions regarding the DNA collected ... .” Roalson 

was free to confront Leider “about those opinions and conclusions,” so the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was 

not unreasonable. Roalson appeals. 

II.

To grant a writ of habeas corpus, the adjudication of the 

prisoner’s claim must have resulted in a decision that was either: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1) & (2). We defer to the state-court decision if it is 

reasonable and review the district court’s decision de novo. 

Gonzales v. Eplett, 77 F.4th 585, 591 (7th Cir. 2023). 

Under § 2254(d)(1), an application of federal law is unreasonable if it is “so erroneous that ‘there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision 

conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents.’” Nevada v. 

Jackson, 569 U.S. 505, 508–09 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)). The federal law itself must be 

“clearly established,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which “refers to 

the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s 

decisions.” Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (quotations omitted); Shirley v. Tegels, 61 F.4th 542, 545 (7th Cir. 

2023); see also Bland v. Hardy, 672 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(“Until the Supreme Court has made a right concrete, it has not 

been ‘clearly established.’”); White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 

(2014) (“[C]ourts must reasonably apply the rules ‘squarely 
6 No. 22-2833 

established’ by [the Supreme] Court’s holdings to the facts of 

each case.” (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 

(2009))).

Our first step is to “determin[e] the relevant clearly established law.” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660 (2004).

Broadly speaking, the federal law at issue is the Confrontation 

Clause and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it. That 

Clause provides “the accused [in a criminal prosecution] shall 

enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against 

him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [may be] admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had 

a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). The state cannot introduce a report 

with testimonial conclusions into evidence without producing the analyst who prepared the report. See Melendez-Diaz v. 

Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308–09 (2009); Bullcoming v. New 

Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 657–58 (2011). But it is less clear whether 

a state may allow an analyst to testify to his own conclusions 

about data another analyst collected. 

In Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), the Court’s most 

recent and relevant Confrontation Clause decision,1 the Court 

1 The Supreme Court recently decided another Confrontation Clause 

case that touches on the question here. Smith v. Arizona, 144 S. Ct. 1785 

(2024). In that case, an analyst who did not testify collected some samples, 

tested them, and concluded that they tested positive for certain drugs. Another analyst reviewed this report to reach his own, independent conclusion about what the samples were, but also testified to the substance of the 

other analyst’s report. Id. at 1795. The Court held that the testifying analyst 

testified to the truth of the other analyst’s report and remanded for the 
No. 22-2833 7

held that the Confrontation Clause was not violated when an 

analyst testified that swabs from a rape victim matched the 

defendant’s DNA. Id. at 61–62, 71. Like Leider here, the analyst in Williams had not collected the swab, but reviewed the 

work of the analyst who did collect it. Id. at 61–62. From that 

review, she formed her own conclusion about whether the 

swab and the defendant’s DNA matched. See id.

A fragmented Court decided Williams. Justice Alito wrote 

the plurality opinion joined by three other justices. He explained that the original analyst’s report “was not to be considered for its truth but only for the distinctive and limited 

purpose of seeing whether it matched something else.” 567 

U.S. at 79 (quotations omitted). Justice Thomas, writing alone, 

agreed that the scheme did not violate the Confrontation 

Clause, but only as applied to Williams’s case. The original 

report, he explained, “lacked the requisite formality and 

solemnity to be considered testimonial for purposes of the 

Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 104 (Thomas, J., concurring)

(quotations omitted). Justice Kagan, in dissent and joined by 

the remaining justices, saw no difference between introducing 

an unavailable analyst’s report and allowing another analyst 

state court to determine whether the report was testimonial. Id. at 1799–

1802. 

That Supreme Court case does not affect our analysis, as the Wisconsin Court of Appeals issued its decision in 2014. See Greene v. Fisher, 565 

U.S. 34, 38 (2011) (“[Section] 2254(d)(1) requires federal courts to focu[s] 

on what a state court knew and did, and to measure state-court decisions 

against this Court's precedents as of the time the state court renders its 

decision.” (quotations and emphasis omitted) (second alteration in original)).
8 No. 22-2833 

to read that report and testify to her own conclusions. Id. at 

125 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 

We do not conclude that Williams clearly established a rule 

that helps us decide whether to grant Roalson’s petition. 

“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 

‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken 

by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 

narrowest grounds[.]’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 

(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) 

(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). If “a concurrence that provides the fifth vote necessary to reach a majority 

does not provide a ‘common denominator’ for the judgment,” 

the rule set out in Marks “does not help to resolve the ultimate 

question.” United States v. Heron, 564 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 

2009); see id. (listing cases).

Justice Thomas’s concurrence and the plurality opinion do 

not share a “common denominator.” Id. Justice Thomas focused on the formality of the original report, while the plurality opinion addressed how the report was presented at trial.

It is true that Justice Thomas “share[s] the dissent’s view of 

the plurality’s flawed analysis.” Williams, 567 U.S. at 104 

(Thomas, J., concurring). But “under Marks, the positions of 

those Justices who dissented from the judgment are not 

counted in trying to discern a governing holding from divided opinions.” Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 760 F.3d 600, 620 

(7th Cir. 2014). For one, Marks is expressly limited to the justices who “concurred in the judgments.” 430 U.S. at 193 (quotations omitted); see Gibson, 760 F.3d at 620. Further, as this 

court explained in Gibson, “the dissenters have disagreed with 

the plurality and the concurrence on how the governing 
No. 22-2833 9

standard applies to the facts and issues at hand []even if there 

is agreement” on some other issue. 760 F.3d at 620. 

We are not the only court scratching its head at Williams. 

Other circuits have applied Marks to Williams and been left 

wanting for clarity, United States v. Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d 

988, 994 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2013); Garlick v. Lee, 1 F.4th 122, 133 (2d 

Cir. 2021), including in the habeas context, Washington v. Griffin, 876 F.3d 395, 409 (2d Cir. 2017). 

Marks aside, neither this court nor the Supreme Court has 

suggested that Williams clearly established a rule. This court 

has applied Williams to reach a holding once. United States v. 

Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2013). In that case, the 

defendant did not object to the Confrontation Clause issue 

and did not dispute the chemical makeup of the material 

tested. Id. at 727. The other two times this court has been presented with the opportunity to apply Williams, it has assumed 

a Confrontation Clause violation and focused instead on the 

harmless error question. United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 

1194 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Garvey, 688 F.3d 881, 885 

(7th Cir. 2012).

The Supreme Court has also noted the lack of clarity surrounding Williams. Dissenting in Williams, Justice Kagan recognized the “uncertainty” of the opinions of the plurality and 

Justice Thomas and stated that she believes the earlier cases 

“continu[e] to govern, in every particular, the admission of 

forensic evidence.” 567 U.S. at 141 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court recognized the “muddle” Williams caused in 

lower courts just over a month after this case was argued, in 

Smith, 144 S. Ct. at 1794. 
10 No. 22-2833 

Recognizing Williams’s cloudiness, we are left with

Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming as the clearly established law 

governing Roalson’s habeas appeal. These cases hold that a 

state cannot introduce a report with testimonial statements

into evidence without producing the analyst who prepared 

the report. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308, 329; Bullcoming, 564 

U.S. at 658. 

Thus, the next question is whether the rule that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals applied is an unreasonable application of clearly established law. That rule, from Luther Williams, 

provides “one expert cannot act as a mere conduit for the 

opinion of another” and must instead “render[] her own expert opinion.” Luther Williams, 644 N.W.2d at 926; see State v. 

Deadwiller, 834 N.W.2d 362, 377 (Wis. 2013) (applying rule). 

The testifying expert cannot be just anyone. The expert must 

be “highly qualified[,]” “familiar with the procedures at 

hand[,]” and must have “supervise[d] or review[ed] the work 

of the testing analyst.” Luther Williams, 644 N.W.2d at 926. 

That rule does not contradict Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming.2

To the contrary, it expressly prohibits a state from introducing 

an underlying report through testimony and requires that an 

2 The Wisconsin Supreme Court implicitly reached the same conclusion in State v. Deadwiller by holding the Luther Williams rule does not

contradict Williams. In Deadwiller, an analyst testified at trial to his own 

conclusion that the defendant’s DNA matched a profile another analyst 

collected from semen from sexual assault victims. 834 N.W.2d at 365. The 

jury found the defendant guilty. Id. at 368. The court in Deadwiller discussed Williams at length and concluded that the overlap among the facts 

of Williams, Deadwiller, and Luther Williams meant that the Luther Williams

rule does not contradict Williams. Deadwiller, 834 N.W.2d at 375–77.
No. 22-2833 11

analyst form an independent opinion and testify to that independent opinion. See Deadwiller, 834 N.W.2d at 370 n.7. 

So, as he must, Roalson argues that the state broke that 

rule and did introduce Gajewski’s report through Leider’s testimony. But this is not so. First, Roalson says Leider testified 

several times that she was “able to look at the ... materials that 

were prepared by another analyst in the lab to reach [her] 

own conclusions.” A peer reviewer would have to look at the 

notes to locate the profile and conduct her own comparison. 

What matters is whether the peer reviewer testified to the 

original reviewer’s conclusions. Leider did not. 

Second, Roalson argues Leider testified to Gajewski’s process when asked: “[F]rom the review of the notes, does it indicate how the profiles were developed, meaning was there 

just one or were there ... multiple?” Leider answered “yes” 

and explained, “[t]he knife was processed by swabbing the 

blade of the knife and the handle of the knife separately.” This 

is not a case where one analyst testified that another analyst 

“had followed standard procedures in testing the substances 

and that he reached the same conclusion based on the resulting data that [the original analyst] had ... .” Turner, 709 F.3d 

at 1191. Further, this case comes to us on habeas review, 

where we defer to a state court’s reasonable application of 

federal law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably concluded, based on Leider’s testimony, that “[t]he opinions [she] 

reached on the basis of the materials she reviewed were her 

own.” State v. Roalson, 855 N.W.2d 492 (unpublished table decision) (Wis. Ct. App. July 15, 2014). Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming do not establish that this kind of testimonial corollary 

is problematic.
12 No. 22-2833 

Even if Roalson were correct that the state court committed an error under § 2254(d) because the state introduced 

Gajewski’s report for its truth via Leider’s testimony, ample 

evidence supported his conviction, so any error did not have 

a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict. 

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quotations 

omitted); Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 133 (2022). On habeas review, a reversible error must be harmful by more than 

a reasonable possibility. The court must find that the defendant was “actually prejudiced by the error.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 

U.S. 257, 268 (2015) (quotations omitted); see Rhodes v. 

Dittmann, 903 F.3d 646, 665–66 (7th Cir. 2018). When the error 

is a deprivation of an opportunity to cross-examine, this court 

considers several factors:

[T]he importance of the witness’ testimony in 

the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony 

was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the

extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the 

prosecution’s case. 

Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1052 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations 

omitted); see Rhodes, 903 F.3d at 666. 

These factors favor the state. Leider’s testimony was not 

the most important evidence for the state. Far more impactful 

was Davis’s testimony—which placed Roalson at the scene 

and provided Roalson’s statements in the moments following 

the murder—and Walczak’s testimony as to what Roalson 

confessed to her. Fingerprint evidence corroborated Leider’s 

testimony in part; forensic examiners found a fingerprint 
No. 22-2833 13

matching Roalson’s left pinky finger on one of the knives. 

And Roalson does not suggest that the court restricted his

opportunity to cross-examine Leider. The prosecution supported its charge that Roalson committed the murder by calling Davis and Walczak, who had not spoken to each other and 

yet testified that Roalson reported the same details to each of 

them. Therefore, even if the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was 

incorrect and the Constitution prohibited Leider’s testimony, 

the error did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence” on the jury’s verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quotations omitted).

III. 

The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Luther Williams is in line with the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. So, the court’s rule is a 

reasonable application of clearly established law. Even if there 

were an error, it is not substantial enough to justify releasing 

Roalson. The district court’s judgment denying Roalson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is therefore AFFIRMED.