U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

63–238 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE IMPORTANCE OF

EXTRADITION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 13, 1999

Serial No. 106–96

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California

HELEN CHENOWETH, Idaho

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

CARLA J. MARTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

BOB BARR, Georgia

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

DOUG OSE, California

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

ROBERT B. CHARLES, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SEAN LITTLEFIELD, Professional Staff Member

GIL MACKLIN, Professional Staff Member

AMY DAVENPORT, Clerk

CHERRI BRANSON, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 13, 1999 ............................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Borek, Jamison S., Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State;

Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice; and Donnie R. Marshall, Deputy

Administrator, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration ............................ 5

Riutta, Rear Admiral Ernest R., Assistant Commandant for Operations,

U.S. Coast Guard; and Ronald E. Brooks, past-president, California

Narcotic Officers Association ....................................................................... 72

Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:

Borek, Jamison S., Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 9

Brooks, Ronald E., past-president, California Narcotic Officers Association, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 86

Marshall, Donnie R., Deputy Administrator, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, prepared statement of ........................................................... 41

Riutta, Rear Admiral Ernest R., Assistant Commandant for Operations,

U.S. Coast Guard, prepared statement of ................................................... 74

Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Florida, prepared statement of ................................................................ 97

Warren, Mary Lee, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice:

Extraditions from Mexico to the United States ...................................... 18

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 23

(1)

INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE IMPORTANCE OF

EXTRADITION

THURSDAY, MAY 13, 1999

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,

AND HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in room

2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Mica (chairman

of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, Gilman, Barr, Hutchinson, Ose,

and Kucinich.

Staff present: Robert B. Charles, staff director; Sean Littlefield

and Gil Macklin, professional staff members; Amy Davenport,

clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk.

Mr. MICA. Good afternoon. I would like to call this meeting of the

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order, and welcome you this afternoon.

Our subcommittee is going to deal today with the topic of the importance of extradition, and we will hear from several witnesses

who can shed some light on problems that we have incurred with

specific countries and also in getting compliance with our requests

for extradition.

I am going to open before our ranking member comes. I have an

opening statement, I will recognize others, then we will hear from

our first panel, and proceed in that order.

Today, the subcommittee will address an issue that I believe lies

at the very root of our drug war—getting those traffickers who ship

deadly drugs and kill innocent citizens returned to the United

States.

This issue is extradition—and I believe it is at the very heart of

winning that war the drugs—and it is the key to international law

enforcement and respect for law and order. Unfortunately, international extradition, especially with our neighbor to the south,

Mexico, is seldom publicly examined. That is why this issue is the

subject of our oversight hearing being conducted today.

Since a critical part of returning drug trafficking felons to the

United States is apprehending them, we will also look at the status

of our drug-fighting maritime agreements in this hemisphere,

again, with a focus on Mexico, a country with which we have had

problems in this area, also.

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A little background of the enormity of the international drug crisis may be useful. Both the United States and many other nations

confront a drug problem today which is reaching epidemic proportions. In this decade alone, drug use has cost American society

more than 100,000 dead and in excess of $300 billion. Each year,

illegal drugs send over a half million Americans to hospital emergency rooms and cause at least 14,000 drug-related deaths. We

have lost more American citizens to drug deaths than we have lost

in the entire Vietnam conflict. This past year, in central Florida,

in my home area, we had more heroin-related deaths than homicides.

In nations that serve as drug source and transit areas, powerful

and increasingly violent drug-trafficking groups often act with impunity. They become more powerful than duly elected governments.

These groups seize and maintain their power through threats, intimidation, and murder, and they increasingly apply those same

tactics on U.S. soil.

Without the capacity or ability to extradite foreign criminals to

the United States where they are certain to stand trial, face conviction, and receive very stiff sentences, we will never fully defeat

these death-dealing cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine drug

trafficking organizations. Unfortunately, as most know, the chief

offenders have been impossible to dislodge from the country of

Mexico, also our ally to the south.

Not surprisingly, the only potential nightmare for murderous

drug kingpins of Colombia, Mexico, and elsewhere, is that they

could be extradited to the United States. In the United States—unlike other locations in the western hemisphere and, particularly, in

Mexico—bribes and influence will not set them free. Only when

they face the prospect of confronting our judicial system and an

American judge, do international drug dealers become at all concerned.

One example will illustrate the fear that extradition ignites in

the hearts of drug traffickers. Roll back the clock to the Colombian

trafficking organizations of the late–1980’s and early–1990’s.

Medellin and Cali were drug war zones. In that nation, more than

3,000 police officers and nearly the same number of innocent

women and children were executed in an all out effort by Pablo

Escobar and his traffickers to stop the Colombian Congress and

President from passing a tough drug extradition treaty.

In 1985, 11 of 24 justices of the Colombian Supreme Court—were

murdered in cold blood by leftist guerrillas employed by drug cartels. All 11 judges who were killed were supporters of the extradition treaty.

When the reconstituted supreme court voted on the validity of

the extradition treaty in 1987, the treaty was mysteriously found

to be unconstitutional. One cartel slogan is particularly memorable.

They would say, ‘‘We prefer a tomb in Colombia to a jail in the

United States.’’

So now, wind the clock forward to 1999. Here we are, and we

now have an honest and determined President in Colombia. Again,

we are very fortunate to have President Pastrana in office. We

have an international and national hero in the person of the Colombian National Police Chief Director Jose Serrano. We are makVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:17 Jul 24, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\63238.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing progress against traffickers from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia

and the Greater Antilles, through the courage and initiatives of

both President Hugo Banzer of Bolivia and with the cooperation of

President Fujimori and his actions in Peru.

Missing is that same progress in two nations that continue to

make extradition and maritime apprehension difficult, if not at

times totally impossible. The countries which will receive the better

part of our attention today because of these actions are Mexico and

Cuba.

In Mexico, we have a number of requests for the extradition of

drug traffickers still outstanding. To date, not a single, major Mexican drug trafficker and zero drug kingpins have been extradited by

Mexico to the United States for prosecution under United States’

law; that is zero.

We have at least 41 requests outstanding, which I would like to

make part of the record, without objection, so ordered. We will list

all of them in the record at this point.

What is worse, we seem to have little hope without some new

legislation or some new initiatives by Congress for achieving any

results in this area. That is one of the reasons this subcommittee

hearing is so important today, as we get a fix on where we have

been, where we are, and where we are going with this very serious

problem.

Yes, there has been an increase in dialog, and there are more

common points in our relationship with Mexico than there are differences. But the problem we face, the extradition impasse, is

among the biggest—perhaps, I think the biggest—aspect of our relationships now on this important issue that requires the attention

of Congress.

Also in this hemisphere, and wholly without cooperation in this

great extradition effort, is Cuba. Castro’s Cuba remains a safe

haven for drug traffickers, and the message today from Congress,

should be clear that we are not going to tolerate inaction by any

country in the western hemisphere, particularly when we see the

damage it is doing to our Nation and to our young people.

Extradition is not a game of diplomacy or an inconsequential

sideshow in our war on drugs. It is at the very heart of winning,

at the heart of defeating, the kingpins in Mexico and elsewhere,

and I believe it is not only in the best interest of the United States

and our future generations, but also in the interest of all children

in this hemisphere. So, that summarizes the reasons we are having

this subcommittee hearing today.

We have an outstanding list of witnesses who are very qualified,

from the Department of Justice, Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, the Coast Guard, and we are also

pleased to have participation by a member and past-president of

the California Narcotic Officers Association. Each will give us their

perspective on the problems they face without full cooperation in

the matter of extradition.

For those comments, I am pleased to yield now to a very distinguished member of our subcommittee and also the incredibly dedicated chairman of our International Affairs Committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman. You are recognized.

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Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Chairman Mica, and I want to thank

you for holding this important hearing on extradition. Your Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources

is especially important to us these days, as we find that the use

and trafficking of heroin and cocaine, have been climbing incredibly

high. There are few more important tools than extradition in our

arsenal against international criminals, terrorists, and drug traffickers who are targeting our Nation and targeting our people.

On the drug battlefront, there can be no safe havens for those

who seek to destroy our communities and the lives of our young

people by shipping their poisons into our Nation. Three Presidents

have previously called illicit drugs a serious security threat to our

Nation. Such a threat warrants a serious response, including extradition, among other weapons that we have in our arsenal.

The Attorney General of the United States, Janet Reno, best

summed up the new post-cold war fight against international crime

not long ago when she said, ‘‘There is no such thing as one Nation’s

crime problem anymore. To a new generation of very ambitious

criminals,’’ she said, ‘‘national boundaries are no more than a line

on the map.’’

I believe the Attorney General’s statement is the best argument

for why we need aggressive extradition, greater international cooperation, and the ability to bring to justice, here in the United

States, those who violate our laws and destroy our communities.

Whether these drug dealers are from Thailand, Colombia, Mexico,

or other drug-producing areas around the globe, they must be held

accountable to our American people, to our institutions, and to the

laws they violate by making us the targets of their criminal activity.

Our hearing today will highlight the need for more accountability, and I look forward to reviewing today’s testimony. I am pleased

that we have such outstanding panelists as the Deputy Assistant

Attorney General for the Criminal Division, Ms. Mary Lee Warren;

Ms. Jamison Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser to the Department of

State; Mr. Donnie Marshall, Deputy Administrator of our DEA; and

Rear Admiral Ernest Riutta, Assistant Commandant of Operations

for our U.S. Coast Guard—our U.S. Coast Guard does such a good

job in interdicting—and Mr. Ronald Brooks, past-president of California Narcotic Officers Association—who we had breakfast with

earlier this morning.

I also want to welcome our law enforcement officers who are here

today on Police Memorial Week. I was just looking over some statistics, Mr. Chairman; 14,000 law enforcement officers have died

since our Nation began some 200 years ago. Over 400 already this

year, and we can’t say enough about their heroic efforts and what

they are doing, protecting lives and property.

I would also like to remind those who are in the battle with us

on drugs to make certain that we recognize that we have five major

battlefields out there in reducing supply and reducing demand, all

at the same time. Reducing supply by going to the areas where it

is grown and eradicating. Interdicting once it gets into the mainstream of distribution. Law enforcement, when it reaches our

shorelines. And, in addition to reducing supply, to reduce demand,

by educating our young people and reminding them that drugs are

5

not recreational, but they can be deadly. And finally, to treat and

rehabilitate those who have become victims of drug abuse. We can’t

take money from one to do the other; they all have to be fought

simultaneously.

Again, I want to commend Chairman Mica and his subcommittee

for doing the outstanding job of focusing attention on the need to

‘‘beef up’’ our war against drugs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

I am pleased now to recognize the gentleman from California,

Mr. Ose, for an opening statement.

Mr. Ose does not have an opening statement at this point, so we

will go directly to our first panel.

And our first panel has three witnesses: Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, of our Department of Justice; Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, the

Department of State; and Donnie R. Marshall, Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

This is an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. We do swear in our witnesses, so if you wouldn’t mind,

please stand? Raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. Thank you. The witnesses answered in the affirmative, and I would like to welcome you.

I see we have at least one repeat offender, and a couple of new

victims here. [Laughter.]

We have a few ground rules. We try to ask you to limit your oral

presentation to 5 minutes. We won’t, since we have two smaller

panels today, be too tight on time. We also allow you the opportunity to submit, without objection, longer statements, a written

statement, or other materials for the record.

So, with those guidelines, we welcome you, and I will recognize,

first, Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the

Department of Justice.

STATEMENTS OF JAMISON S. BOREK, DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MARY LEE WARREN,

DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND DONNIE R. MARSHALL, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Ms. WARREN. Mr. Chairman, with your and the subcommittee’s

indulgence, would it be possible for Ms. Borek to begin? I think it

will be more a logical progression. She will——

Mr. MICA. Is this something you all have worked out in advance?

[Laughter.]

No?

Ms. WARREN. I think she——

Mr. MICA. That is fine.

Ms. WARREN. Thank you so much.

Mr. MICA. That is fine; we will recognize Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, who is with the Department of State. And I am

pleased to recognize you first.

Welcome.

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Ms. BOREK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, members of the committee.

As you have requested, I will simply summarize a few points and

ask that my prepared statement be accepted for the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, your entire statement will be made

part of the record.

Go right ahead.

Ms. BOREK. Thank you.

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to discuss

international extradition with you today. As you have noted, the

growth in transborder organized and other transborder crime has

become a major international problem, especially in the area of violent crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and laundering of the proceeds of crime. This has confirmed the need for increased international law enforcement cooperation. This is an across-the-board

effort and extradition is an essential tool in that effort.

Extradition is the only formal and organized way to seek the return of people for trial. In some cases, deportation can achieve the

same effect, but it is more an ad hoc and occasional process, although sometimes very effective.

There is no general obligation in international law to extradite

persons, but there is a widespread practice, and certain features of

extradition practice are fairly well established among all countries.

Other aspects, on the other hand, are very much a question of local

procedure and local requirements, and so there is a great deal of

variation in the actual practice from country to country.

Under U.S. law, fugitives can only be extradited either pursuant

to a treaty or, in certain cases, a special statutory authority. Generally, it is by treaty, and we have some 110 extradition treaties

with countries throughout the world. There is also authority under

existing law to extradite persons where it is necessary to ensure

the prosecution for crimes against U.S. nationals abroad, and this

can be done under a provision of 18 U.S.C., which is fairly recent.

In the new 1999 crime bill, which will be formally submitted next

week, we have asked to expand the authority to permit extradition

in two additional cases, where there is not a treaty, but where this

is in the law enforcement interests of the United States.

Extradition requests are made by the Department of State in the

United States, but at the initiative of the Department of Justice,

based either on Federal or State or local charges. The Government’s decision to request extradition in different countries is divided in different ways between the executive and the judicial

branches. The decision typically involves both branches, with some

degree of judicial review under the respective laws of the country,

and the things which are at issue in a judicial review may vary

from place to place.

We have been engaged in a constant process of seeking to enter

into new extradition relationships as well as to update and improve

existing ones. We have many old treaties that go back even as far

as the late–19th century and treaties which apply to countries because of decolonization. We are trying to update these treaties and

to have treaties with countries with whom we do not now have

treaties, so that we will have, as much as possible, a comprehensive web of extradition treaties throughout the world.

7

This is a very aggressive extradition policy. It is based on the

idea that everyone should be subject to effective prosecution somewhere for their crimes. There are, however, some limitations on our

ability to accomplish this.

One big problem that we have encountered concerns the extradition of U.S. nationals. As a matter of longstanding policy, the

U.S. Government does extradite U.S. nationals for trial in other

countries. This is important to ensure prosecution of persons who

have committed serious crimes, whom we, ourselves, would not be

able to prosecute. Not all countries, however, take this approach.

Civil law countries, in particular, often have limitations on the

extradition of their own nationals. At the same time, they typically

have jurisdiction, themselves, to prosecute these people for crimes

committed anywhere in the world. This is a theoretical adjunct to

non-extradition, but, in practice, it is not as effective an approach.

We have been, along with the Department of Justice, aggressively seeking to persuade other countries that it is important—in

fact, necessary—to extradite their nationals in this modern world

of transnational crime. We have had, I think, some success in this.

I think thanks, in particular, to the strenuous and even personal

efforts of the Attorney General, also, the coordinated efforts of the

two departments, and the fundamental logic of the need to extradite in the interests of the countries concerned. There have been

notable advances, especially in Latin America, with respect to this

issue in recent years. Our recent treaties with Bolivia and Argentina are clear expressions of our efforts in this regard.

At the same time, however, there are many countries which are

still extremely reluctant—indeed, completely reluctant, to extradite

nationals, and we are still continuing to work on that with those

countries.

Some of the other problems that we have encountered in extradition relationships have to do with the question of death penalty

and human rights concerns. This is particularly true in connection

with European countries, but also a number of Latin American

countries do have problems, even prohibitions, with extraditing in

death penalty cases, unless we are able to give assurances that the

death penalty would not be imposed.

One troubling problem that is emerging is that, in some cases,

this is being extended to the question of life sentences, and we are

encountering some situations in which countries are unwilling to

extradite unless there are assurances against life sentences, which

is a much more difficult, I think, and troubling expansion.

Another problem has to do with the fact that there is a judicial

process involved in this in all countries, and judicial process gives

rise to opportunities for delay of increasingly, I think, persons who

are facing extradition are hiring more and more sophisticated lawyers. This gives rise to additional issues; legal issues are being exploited which previously had not been, and we are encountering a

number of problems with particular judicial rulings and general judicial delays.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, we continue to work hard

with countries around the world to enhance international extradition, to address each problem as it arises, both in terms of the

8

specific cases and in terms of the overall systemic approach to extradition to ensure that it is effective.

In this regard, we work in total lock-step with the Department

of Justice, and we appreciate the excellent partnership that we

have enjoyed in this endeavor.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, members of the committee. And

I would be pleased to answer any of your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Borek follows:]

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15

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, we will save questions until we have

heard from all the panelists.

We will now go to Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General.

Ms. WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased to appear before the subcommittee today on this

very important issue, that is the importance of extradition and the

global effort to deny safe haven and impunity to fugitives.

Ms. Borek gave sort of a global overview of the extradition situation with the United States at the moment, and I will focus more

particularly on the United States/Mexico extradition relationship.

The report of that extradition relationship is a mix of good news

and not so good news. Extradition, particularly the extradition of

nationals, as Ms. Borek said, has been an Attorney General, Department of Justice, and Department of State priority, and we do

see a changing tide in the world on this issue. We have even seen

the changing of attitudes in Latin America, where the subject had

previously been considered unspeakable. And since 1996, the Government of Mexico has found that in exceptional cases, the extradition of Mexican nationals may be justified.

I have provided a chart attached to my written statement that

gives a statistical overview for 1995 through 1999 of the United

States/Mexican——

Mr. MICA. Without objection, we will make that part of the

record.

[The information referred to follows:]

18

19

20

Ms. WARREN. Thanks.

In Mexico, during 1998, they basically maintained the improved

record that they achieved since 1995, by formally surrendering 12

fugitives through the extradition process, including 3 Mexican nationals. In 1997, it was 13, with no Mexican nationals; in 1996, 13,

with 1 Mexican and 1 dual-national. One of the Mexican fugitives

returned to the United States in 1998 faces marijuana trafficking

charges in this country, but the major crime for which his surrender was sought was the murder of an INS boarder patrol agent.

Thus far, in 1999, two fugitives have been extradited by Mexico,

one a United States citizen and the other a Mexican national who

had escaped from a United States Federal correctional facility following his conviction on substantial narcotics charges.

In addition, as very good news, in 1998, the Mexicans deported

to the United States approximately 30 United States citizens

sought on criminal charges here. They were found in Mexico in violation of immigration laws there and turned over to the United

States authority.

This total is more than three times any other year for which we

have statistics. However, as the chairman noted, no major Mexican

narcotics traffickers has yet been extradited by Mexico to the

United States. This fact is clearly a disappointment to the Department of Justice, as we know it is a disappointment to the members

of the subcommittee.

We believe it is important to note at the same time, however,

that the executive branch of the Government of Mexico, through

the SRE, their foreign ministry or state department equivalent,

issued 19 orders of extradition in 1998, including 5 orders against

Mexican citizens facing significant drug trafficking charges in the

United States. They have issued five more such extradition orders

in 1999. Of those, some of the major traffickers, they have ordered

extraditable are the two Amezcua brothers, the methamphetamine

kingpins, and Arturo Paez Martinez, an enforcer in the Tijuana

cartel.

We await the extradition of one or more major Mexican traffickers in 1999, but we are mindful, as are our Mexican counterparts,

that recent court decisions in Mexico could pose real threats to our

extradition efforts.

In Mexico, as in the United States, we are reminded of the independence of the judicial branch of government. In two cases, one

against Oscar Malherbe, who was a chief lieutenant in the Gulf

cartel, and the other against Jaime Gonzalez Castro, a supplier of

narcotics from Sonora. In Mexico, intermediate appellant courts

have issued nonappealable rulings that article 4 of the Mexican

penal code is mandatory, and that the exceptional case exception

to the prohibition against extraditing nationals applies only when

there is no bilateral extradition treaty in effect, which is to say

that Mexicans must be tried domestically, in Mexico, for crimes

committed abroad. And they may not be extradited when there is

an extradition treaty between the requesting country, such as the

United States and Mexico. This is from two intermediate appellant

courts that really do not have the same precedential value as our

U.S. courts, but it is an alarming decision.

21

In an attempt to have this mandatory article 4 issue raised to

a higher level and resolved in a manner favorable to our bilateral

extradition relationship, the Mexican foreign ministry and the Office of Attorney General recently sought discretionary review of the

issue before the Mexican Supreme Court in the ‘‘Kitti’’ Paez Martinez case. Regrettably, their high court refused to exercise its discretion and reached down and exercised jurisdiction over this case,

and the issue still remains unresolved at the highest levels.

Another disappointment, this one involving two Argentine citizens sought by the United States. Again, one of those intermediate

courts held that fugitives cannot be extradited if they face the possibility of a life sentence, something mentioned by Ms. Borek, at

least they may not be extradited without an assurance that such

sentence will not be imposed. The United States/Mexico Extradition Treaty contains a provision for assurances against the death

penalty, but no similar provision for potential life terms. And I note

that most of the major narcotics traffickers sought by the United

States will be facing life sentences for the crimes for which they

are charged. And we hope that the reasoning of this decision, plainly wrongly decided in our view, is not followed by any other Mexican court.

I would like to bring some significant cases to the attention of

the subcommittee and the status of those cases.

Two defendants accused of killing law enforcement officers in the

United States, Agustin Vasquez Mendoza and Rudolfo Romero, unfortunately remain at large, despite continuing efforts to locate

them by authorities on both sides of the border. With regard to

major Mexican narcotics trafficker, Paez Martinez, the Amezcua

brothers remain in custody in Mexico, as they appeal the orders of

extradition entered against them. In addition, U.S. citizen, Arizona

drug trafficker William Brian Martin, who has been successfully

manipulating their amparo or appeal process, remains in custody

where he has been for years. Finally, accused murderer Jose Luis

DelToro, a U.S. citizen, has similarly appealed the issue of his

extraditability but at least remains incarcerated as this process

slowly grinds forward.

I must raise another caution, although the foreign ministry, the

SRE, has found numbers of fugitives extraditable in the past, we

suffered a recent setback when the SRE declined to find Alfredo

Martinez extraditable recently. He is charged in a murder case

filed in the State of Colorado, accused of stabbing his wife to death.

Although stabbed 20 times, she was still able to utter that Alfredo

did this. They denied our extradition request at their State Department level, and we have received no acceptable rationale yet for

this denial. We are still seeking that.

In another discouraging turn, the SRE has recently advised that

they may automatically transform our extradition requests into

those domestic prosecutions under article 4. In the past, we had always believed that we would be consulted before this ‘‘flipping’’ of

our extradition cases into domestic prosecutions decision was entered.

We have been less than enthusiastic about domestic prosecutions

of nationals for crimes committed abroad, an option that many

countries try to interpose. As a general proposition, we disfavor

22

such domestic prosecutions because the costs of transferring proceedings to another country can be extraordinary, because evidence

gathered in one country may not be easily transferrable or accepted

with the same weight and import in the other country, and because

there is enormous hardship to witnesses and victims to travel long

distances to proceedings in another language in another country,

and, finally, because there is no real finality or sense of justice in

the community where the crime was committed and the harm felt.

Not being consulted about whether our extradition case should

instead be processed under the domestic prosecution regime in

Mexico is a turn for the worse, but we do not consider this issue

settled, and we will continue to discuss this point at the highest

levels with our Mexican counterparts.

If there are other fugitives’ cases or extradition-related issues of

special interest to the subcommittee, we will, of course, be happy

to supply additional reports, but on behalf of the Department of

Justice, I thank you all for the opportunity to appear today.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Warren follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony.

I would now like to recognize Donnie R. Marshall, who is the

Deputy Administrator of our DEA.

Mr. MARSHALL. Chairman Mica, members of the subcommittee,

thank you very much. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today

to talk about the importance of extradition.

Mr. Chairman, as you probably already know, it is an issue that

I feel very strongly and passionately about.

I would like, first of all, to thank the subcommittee for your support to the Drug Enforcement Administration and drug law enforcement, in general.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a complete statement for the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that will be made part of the

record.

Mr. MARSHALL. I think that it is very appropriate that this committee is focusing on the extradition problem during National Police Week, as we have already heard referred to here this morning.

National Police Week honors law enforcement officers who have

given their lives in the service of their community and of their

country. And it is appropriate because so much of the crime and

violence that we see in this country today emanates directly from

the drug trade, and that drug trade is controlled largely by people

outside the United States, the very kind of people that this hearing

is focusing on today. And the work of the subcommittee, I believe,

will help ensure that those officers and their families that we are

honoring here during National Police Week did not make their sacrifices in vain.

As you are aware, DEA’s primary mission is really to target the

highest levels of international drug trafficking organizations operating today. We recognize that our success will continue to be limited until the leaders of these international organizations are

brought to justice, either in their own country or through the extradition process.

Now the mechanics of the extradition process is really not within

DEA’s purview, but I want to comment that we have seen in DEA,

time and time again, the thing that international drug traffickers

fear most is extradition to the United States. And, Mr. Chairman,

I believe in your opening statement you articulated very well some

of the reasons why they fear that extradition. And for that reason,

extradition can be a very important tool in our anti-drug arsenal.

U.S. law enforcement has to be able to attack the command-andcontrol functions of the international syndicates operating in the

world today, which are directing the flow of drugs into this country,

and I believe that U.S. law enforcement does that very well.

As for DEA, we direct our resources against the leaders of the

major drug organizations. We seek to have them located, arrested,

extradited where appropriate, prosecuted, and given sentences commensurate with their crimes.

The international drug trafficking group—a very complex and sophisticated group operating out of Colombia and Mexico—really are

very vicious, violent, destructive, rich, and sophisticated organizations that operate on a global scale. The drugs and the violence

which accompany the drug trade have really reached virtually

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every community in the United States—communities I am sure in

your own districts and States. The international criminal organizations based largely outside the United States control the drug trade

from its source, up through the Caribbean and Mexico, and on into

the United States. We can’t really understand the drug trafficking

situation, I believe, today, without looking at the evolution of the

groups from Colombia and how the groups from Mexico have

learned from the Colombian groups.

During the late–1980’s and early–1990’s, the major traffickers

from Medellin were investigated, arrested, prosecuted by the Colombian National Police and the DEA—and expulsions and extraditions actually played a major role in those investigations. As

those Medellin traffickers were immobilized, the Cali traffickers

really moved in and assumed power that was more or less equal

to the Medellin cartel. These groups were not as violent, but they

were just as corrupting and intimidating. The Colombian National

Police, however, to their credit, and with a lot of heroism by those

people, continued the intense law enforcement pressure. They focused on the Cali leaders, and by 1995 and 1996—and certainly,

today—many, if not most, of the top trafficking leaders from the

Cali organizations are either in jail or dead.

But as a result of this, the traffickers from Mexico took on even

greater significance, greater prominence. In addition to their traditional roles as cocaine smugglers and marijuana and heroin traffickers, the Mexico-based organizations used their strength to

emerge as major methamphetamine producers and traffickers. This

helped make them an even stronger and greater force in international drug trafficking.

Now, the Mexico-based organizations are no longer simply middle-men for the Colombians or transporters for the Colombians.

With the disruption of these Cali groups, the groups in Mexico such

as the Carrillo-Fuentes’ organization, the Arellano-Felix organization, the Amezcua, the Caro-Quintero group, and others have really

consolidated their power, and they now dominate the drug trafficking along the United States/Mexico border, inside Mexico, and in

many United States cities.

These organizations, I believe, reach into the very institutions

which are intended to fight drugs, as the traffickers continue a

reign of violence in Mexico and along the border with the United

States.

Historically, these and other traffickers in other countries and at

other times in our history, have had the ability to corrupt and intimidate public officials and institutions throughout the world. The

ability, I believe, of any government to attack these organizations

is dependent upon the existence of honest, dedicated law enforcement professionals. And to attain this goal, meaningful anti-corruption initiatives which lead to sound investigations and prosecutions

of corrupt officials, must be aggressively pursued. And only then,

I believe, can we realize success, and we will realize that success

through an honest cadre of law enforcement officials.

Part of this process, I believe—I believe very strongly—must be

grounded and must be based upon bringing to justice those individuals who control large-scale drug trafficking. Only through ensuring that these criminals face prison sentences commensurate with

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their crimes, can we make any significant progress. In many cases,

in countries such as Colombia, we have seen that the traffickers

are arrested and jailed, but they continue to wield influence from

their prison cells. And despite our many efforts and successes in indicting the leadership of these international organizations, too

often, the drug lords are not apprehended or they are not returned

to justice to serve sufficient prison sentences.

The obstacles that law enforcement in Mexico and Colombia face

are really enormous obstacles, and we shouldn’t fool ourselves

about that. One of the biggest threats to our success right now in

Mexico is that the traffickers are accustomed to operating in an environment free of the threat of extradition, free of the threat of

meaningful prison sentences, and in an environment where they

can intimidate, bribe, corrupt, and violently retaliate against law

enforcement and judicial officials and against the systems.

In order for DEA and our international counterparts really to be

successful in our efforts, we have to break, I believe, that stranglehold of violence and intimidation. And we have to address that

through aggressive law enforcement, continual improvement of

criminal justice institutions, and, perhaps most importantly, as a

prelude to those things, extradition.

It is my strong belief that the expulsion and extradition of the

major traffickers from Mexico, many of whom have been repeatedly

indicted in the United States, would be a strong measure of Mexico’s success in the counterdrug efforts. But more importantly, for

the Government of Mexico, the extradition of some of these incredibly violent traffickers, particularly such as Ramon Arellano Felix,

could very well, I think, assist in breaking the pattern of violence

and intimidation that exists in these countries. And it would serve,

I think, to benefit those dedicated professionals within the Government of Mexico, and particularly within the PGR, and give them

the opportunity to combat these major drug-trafficking organizations, similar, frankly, to what was experienced in Colombia following some of these major trafficker extraditions and expulsions in

the 1980’s.

Other notable extradition requests that are currently in place—

have already been referred to—for the Amezcua brothers, who were

arrested in 1998 on Government of Mexico charges, but recently

the Mexican charges have been dismissed for insufficient evidence.

Both Luis and Jesus Amezcua were rearrested and are being held

in Mexico, really solely on the United States provisional arrest

warrants.

The DEA recognizes that the extradition to the United States of

these international drug traffickers is not necessarily the long-term

solution to solving the drug problem that exists in our country. But

we hope that new initiatives and continued cooperative efforts can

really enhance our ability to combat these major organizations in

Colombia and Mexico, and really throughout the world. By building

institutions that sentence traffickers to significant prison terms or

by allowing extradition of these traffickers to the United States, I

believe, our international counterparts can enhance their potential

for success.

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In summary, Mr. Chairman, I believe that extradition is a very

key essential first step from which a lot of other progress and perhaps many other successes could ultimately be accomplished.

I thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I will be happy

to answer any questions that you have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marshall follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, and I do have several questions.

First of all, Ms. Warren, how many outstanding extradition requests for Mexican nationals do we have?

Ms. WARREN. I don’t have the number—well, I can find it out—

of Mexican nationals that are sought. I think it is a total of about

275 inactive and active extradition requests that we have in total.

Mr. MICA. And how old do you think the earliest of that——

Ms. WARREN. It can be a couple of decades, some of the earliest

ones.

Mr. MICA. Again, we have not had one major drug trafficker or

drug kingpin extradited; is that correct?

Ms. WARREN. No Mexican national major trafficker; correct.

Mr. MICA. And they did, however, extradite one individual. I

guess it was last year? And one this year—a Mexican national?

Ms. WARREN. They have extradited——

Mr. MICA. According to your chart.

Ms. WARREN. Right. They have extradited several Mexican nationals over time. One so far this year; three last year; two in 1996.

Mr. MICA. Of those several hundred that we have outstanding

extradition requests for Mexican nationals, do you know how many

are in custody in Mexico? And how many are not held?

Ms. WARREN. Forty-seven, total, are in custody in Mexico on our

extradition requests. I would have to work out the breakdown of

how many of those are Mexican nationals.

Mr. MARSHALL. If I could help on that——

Mr. MICA. Yes.

Mr. MARSHALL. According to my list of traffickers, the most important ones that we have the provisional arrest warrants for,

there are a total of—by my count—about 10 major traffickers that

are in custody.

Mr. MICA. Ten major traffickers in custody out of 40 major drug

traffickers or total?

Mr. MARSHALL. I am sorry; I can’t give you the total list of how

many we have requested extradition for, but I have a list of what

we would consider the major traffickers, and there are about 10 of

these in custody.

Mr. MICA. OK.

Did we ever get a list of all the extraditions?

If we didn’t, we would like to request all of the outstanding extradition requests for Mexican nationals. If you could provide us

with that, we would appreciate that.

One of the things that concerns me about the process is something that you testified to, Ms. Warren. And I appreciate your candor in testifying. Particularly, for the first time, about the problems

we are experiencing with Mexico. That is, the delays that are now

being employed by drug traffickers—using the judicial process,

both in legitimate appeals, but also I am concerned about corruption in this process.

Maybe, Mr. Marshall, and, Ms. Warren, you might comment as

to what you see going on here—again, the difficulty in getting any

resolution to these requests.

Ms. WARREN. It seems to take an inordinate amount of time

sometimes. We had the very good experience last year of Velardes,

the killer of the Border Patrol agent, who was extradited in a peVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:17 Jul 24, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\63238.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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riod of 4 months. We have a U.S. citizen, William Brian Martin,

that we want on major narcotics charges, who has played out the

system down there for 41⁄2 years. Clearly, his wealth allows him to

continue again and again to appeal issues. Unlike the United

States’ system where we must consolidate our appeals or forever

lose them, they can do them seriatim, one after another, and they

use the system and abuse the system that way.

Mr. MICA. You seem particularly frustrated by a couple of the recent decisions which just seem to fly in the face of what should be

a just decision, particularly by SRE. Do you think there is corruption in the process? And, again, I will also ask Mr. Marshall, because I know he monitors some of the situation. Or are there legitimate delays?

It doesn’t appear like there is reason or rule of law in the decisions. What is influencing these decisions?

Ms. WARREN. We don’t really know. I can tell you that the SRE

has granted the—ordered extradited many fugitives that the courts

have found not to be extraditable: they have, in effect, overruled

their courts because their courts’ decisions are simply advisory

opinions in extradition in Mexico. So they have really been forward-leaning on Mexican national extraditions since 1996, which

was the first time Mexican nationals were extradited.

And we were terribly disappointed by what seemed to be a step

backward in that Martinez decision and have been very vocal about

our disappointment and I think have caught their attention that

this is unexplainable to us and hard to rationalize in today’s world.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Marshall, what do you see going on?

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, we don’t have any evidence that

I know of, in the corruption of the extradition process itself. I think

that Ms. Warren probably summed it up very well, in that most of

these traffickers use their wealth to buy the best lawyers and to

really put legal obstacles in the way.

My professional judgment is that is probably what is happening.

However, I will say that we saw in Colombia a number of years

ago, where the traffickers, when they were jailed in their native

country, they just continued to run their operations. They continued to threaten; they continued to bribe. They continued to order

retaliation, and that is certainly a very real risk as long as these

major traffickers, with their wealth and power, are in jail in their

own country. And that is why I was referring to it in my opening

statement, that it would be so necessary and such a big step forward to get them out of that environment, into the United States,

to break that stranglehold.

But with regard to your particular question about corruption in

the process, we have no evidence of that.

Mr. MICA. Finally, Ms. Borek, one of the major issues, both in

Congress, and regarding the certification question—2 years ago in

March, Congress—the House side—asked for cooperation, and extradition was one of our top priorities, and it has always been

something that has been of concern for a number of the committees. And Members of Congress have expressed concern about extradition.

54

Do you know if President Clinton and President Zedillo discussed

this? Was this brought up by our administration and the President

when he met with Zedillo in Mexico recently?

Ms. BOREK. I know that law enforcement cooperation across the

board, and especially in this drug area, is one of the highest priorities, also from a State Department point of view. And I know it

certainly has been discussed at cabinet-level meetings. As for that

particular meeting, since I am sworn to give you only the facts, and

I don’t know the facts, I would like to give you an answer for the

record.

Mr. MICA. Well, we would appreciate that. And if there was specific communication on the extradition question that is part of any

Department of State record or Department of Justice, we would

like that for the record and will request that in writing.

I would like to yield now to the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr.

Hutchinson.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I believe my—I think they called this

an 8-minute vote on the Upton——

Mr. MICA. They can’t do that.

Mr. OSE. Well, then I must have misread——

Mr. MICA. That would be against the rule. [Laughter.]

Go right ahead.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me make a couple of comments, first.

In reference to the problems of the judiciary in Mexico, you addressed the question, Ms. Warren. You suggested that they have

serial appeals, whereas we have to consolidate them. That happened in America because of a legislative initiative to solve a problem in the courts. I haven’t heard any discussion yet about whether

President Zedillo and the executive branch and the Attorney General of Mexico have urged the legislature to change these laws that

are allowing the courts to circumvent the extradition process?

Ms. WARREN. There has not been any legislative initiative in that

area. This particular process that is more appeal than habeas-like,

the Mexican public sees as their most important protection against

governmental abuse, and the administration would probably have

a very difficult time making the important changes that were made

here.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. You are talking about habeas, which would be

applicable, but in reference to one decision, it was based upon a

construction of the law that was passed by the legislature that

looked like a misconstruction of it. But whenever the courts do

that, you can have a legislative remedy. You indicate that the

Mexican executive branch has not initiated any legislative changes

that would help solve the problem.

Ms. WARREN. That is correct, and we have urged a legislative fix,

because, in fact, it is a statutory interpretation that those courts

are——

Mr. HUTCHINSON. OK. And at what level have we, in the United

States, urged a legislative fix?

Ms. WARREN. We have urged it at a lower worker level, but we

have asked about it at higher levels. This is something I can report

on personally. I know our Deputy Attorney General met with their

Deputy Secretary of Foreign Relations and——

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Mr. HUTCHINSON. Was that with Mr. Holder?

Ms. WARREN. Mr. Holder met with their Deputy Secretary, Juan

Rebilledo, and asked if there would be a legislative initiative.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. With all due respect to Mr. Holder—and I

have a high regard for him—I would suggest that the Attorney

General of the United States put the pressure on—and I think this

also should be addressed by the President. This is extraordinary.

I know that Colombia had some problems in extradition, and they,

have made some adjustments in their legislature because of that.

But we have got to put the pressure on, not at a working group

level, but at a high level. The Executive Department of Mexico has

the ability, you know, to pressure some legislative changes.

And I think we have got to pressure them to do that. Obviously,

there is going to be resistance, but I really think it is extraordinarily important that we do that.

Ms. WARREN. If I could just say, I don’t think there is anyone

who has been more vigorous about the extradition issue, with Mexico or with any other country, than Attorney General Reno.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. But you indicated that she has not raised it,

herself, as far as any legislative fix, for this problem.

Ms. WARREN. She has not raised these particular cases. She will

be meeting, as part of the Bi-national Commission, with her counterparts and all the other cabinet members who—or most of the

cabinet members—in the Mexican cabinet the first of next month,

and I know it will be an issue on her agenda.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I know these are great international complex

issues, but it would just appear to me that this is so important to

our well-being in the United States, that we advise Mexico that if

they do not take appropriate action, when they have the ability to

change something and the Executive Department has not pursued

that, that if they do not pursue that and try to remedy that problem, then I don’t think they are fully cooperating and should not

be certified. And that is the kind of leverage that the Attorney

General and the President should communicate.

We might have a disagreement in that, but I think that is the

only thing that works, to get that type of attention.

Ms. Borek, my understanding is the Department of Justice

makes a request on extradition to the State Department, and the

State Department actually pursues extradition. Has the State Department done anything in regard to requesting the Mexican Government to change their laws to allow these extraditions to go forward without the judicial interference?

Ms. BOREK. Thank you. I think it is certainly true that we work

together and closely with the Department of Justice on pursing

this. These are relatively recent developments, and they are not

fixed in law, given the nature of the system. And they are, therefore, things which we are addressing actively with the Government

of Mexico, now and in the immediate future. There will be a discussion of these issues and——

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Has there been any in the past, on the issues

that I raised?

Ms. BOREK. Well, they have been—they have certainly been discussed. Now, you are saying, though, at which level?

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There will be a cabinet-level detailed discussion of these issues

coming up at the next regularly scheduled meeting, and there is no

question that we share the objective of ensuring that there is an

effective extradition process here.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. And it is going to take a legislative change;

otherwise, you are going to be blocked by the courts.

Ms. BOREK. Well, I would let Ms. Warren speak to that. Obviously it is, in principle, the easiest solution. Sometimes, however,

given the nature of legislatures and in particular countries, it is

not the most—the easiest solution to achieve. And I think our interest is in seeing this problem fixed in the most expeditious way.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Let——

Ms. WARREN. There is still a chance before their courts to fix this

as well. If another appellate court decides otherwise, then they will

have a conflict. It will go, not as a discretionary matter, but automatically to their Supreme Court, to resolve this issue.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, you work both tracks.

Ms. WARREN. Exactly.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I mean that is a possibility, but also the executive branch, if they have that desire, they should submit legislation

to correct that.

Ms. WARREN. It is going to be clear that it is not just one track.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. True. Right now, we have one track going; I

want to go two tracks; that is what my suggestion would be.

Has there been any problem, from a Justice Department standpoint, with the State Department in regards to their efforts in securing extradition after you certify?

Ms. WARREN. Absolutely none.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. That is all.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Borek, on page 3 of your testimony, the final decision on

whether a fugitive will be extradited from the United States is

made by the Secretary of State?

Ms. BOREK. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. How many requests for extradition of fugitives in the

United States have been granted by the Secretary of State in the

last year?

Ms. BOREK. I would have to get you an exact number on that.

I might say the other side of it, which is extradition requests are

inevitably granted by the Secretary of State, unless there is some

very serious problem about, generally, of a humanitarian nature

concerning conditions that the person might be facing, or something along those lines. So, although there is this discretion, in

fact, it is more a question of having an opportunity to consider and

work through any concerns that are raised, and in the end—at

least in the time that I am aware of this—we have always granted

extradition.

Mr. OSE. Well, that brings me to my followup question, which

would be, how many have been denied?

Ms. BOREK. As I say, in the time that I am aware of, there have

been a number of cases in which there were issues about conditions

or so forth, that we were able to resolve through assurances with

the other government. We have not denied extradition requests.

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In fiscal year 1997, we surrendered 100 persons. In 1996, 105.

That seems to be roughly the range, although the increase I think

in transnational criminal activity and also extradition treaties and

requests is really exponential.

Mr. OSE. Is there a tracking on your numbers from 1997 or 1996

as to how many fugitives in the United States were extradited to,

say, Mexico?

Ms. BOREK. I think we have those statistics here.

Now this is on a calendar basis, so there is some discrepancy.

What I was giving you before was on a fiscal year basis. But we

have, in 1998, 15 extraditions from the United States to Mexico. In

1997, 21; in 1996, 16; and then in 1995, 14.

Mr. OSE. Do you have any information as to how many requests

for extradition in those years were made by the country of Mexico,

as opposed to the number of extraditions granted?

Mr. MICA. Mr. Ose, I think we have less than 5 minutes on this

vote now, so we do need to recess. We will come back; we will be

at least 15 minutes. So about 3:30—we will recess until then, and

you may continue.

[Recess.]

Mr. MICA. Call the subcommittee back to order, and I would like

to yield back to the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose, for questions.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to make sure I finish my line of questioning earlier. And

perhaps you have had some time to dig some information up.

In terms of the number of requests made of the United States

to extradite fugitives here in the United States, in 1997, it was

100, and in 1996, it was 105. And then the followup question was,

how many of those requests for extradition, for instance, came from

Mexico?

And, if—I don’t recall the answer to that.

Ms. BOREK. Thank you. Let me preface this by saying that our

various recordkeeping systems are really case management systems, and they are not very well geared to producing statistics.

In the case of incoming Mexican requests, we don’t really have

comprehensive, automatic statistics on that. However, I think it is

a little bit misleading to look at requests, because sometimes a provisional arrest request is made on the chance that somebody is

somewhere, or they might be there and then they might leave, and

that is counted as a request. So without looking at the sort of requests, whether they are active and the quality of the information

involved, sometimes it is not a complete picture.

The general—the number of 100 is the number of people that we

actually extradited throughout the world in 1997 and——

Mr. OSE. From the United States to other countries?

Ms. BOREK. From the United States to other countries.

Mr. OSE. OK.

Ms. BOREK. And 105 in 1996.

I understand that the general order of United States requests to

Mexico is 30 to 40 a year, that the general order of requests from

Mexico to the United States is actually higher. However, as I say,

some of these requests might be for people when it is not clear that

they are in the United States or we might find that the request did

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not meet the requirements of the treaty. This could happen, also,

in the case of our requests.

So looking at just the bare number of requests probably doesn’t

give you a very solid picture of what is going on.

Mr. OSE. Well, lacking any other standard, how much higher do

you suggest was the number of requests from Mexico to the United

States?

Ms. BOREK. I don’t think I would want to speculate. We would

have to compare the Justice and the Department of State records

on that.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, is it possible to submit a question for

the record.

Mr. MICA. Oh, no problem. I can do that.

Mr. OSE. All right.

The other——

Mr. MICA. We will leave the record open.

Mr. OSE. The other question—I have two more questions, if you

will, please, Mr. Chairman.

You cite in the testimony—in particular, Ms. Warren—the person

known as William Brian Martin. I am curious, he is a fugitive from

the United States we believe to be in Mexico?

Ms. WARREN. No; he is a U.S. citizen.

Mr. OSE. Correct. He is a United States citizen, fugitive from justice, we believe to be in Mexico?

Ms. WARREN. He has been arrested and is in jail, and has

been——

Mr. OSE. He is incarcerated in Mexico?

Ms. WARREN [continuing]. On our extradition request.

Mr. OSE. OK.

And the lack of ability to have the appeals consolidated, as opposed to in a series, one after the other, is the impediment?

Ms. BOREK. He has sought to delay his review at every possible

turning. He delayed the review from the trial court to the first appellant court, and now he has taken an appeal to their Supreme

Court on the constitutionality of the extradition treaty.

Mr. OSE. OK. The reason I bring that up is that we have a list

of countries with whom we do not have an extradition treaty, and

the question arises in my mind as to the circumstances under

which we would have a discussion with these countries about establishing an extradition treaty and the provisions thereof, as they

would relate to American citizens who might flee the United States

and end up residing in these countries, and the laws that would

apply to them for extradition.

It would seem to me that if we can, since they are not nationals

of those countries, that we should be able to negotiate with these

other countries about the rules under which American fugitives

would be returned to the United States. Now, is that part of the

deliberation that the Department of Justice—excuse me—is that

part of the advice that the Department of State receives from the

Department of Justice on this?

Ms. WARREN. The Department of Justice and State really collaborate on those issues. I guess, yes. Maybe Ms. Borek can——

Ms. BOREK. I think we have difficulties with any country where

the limitations are constitutional. This is also the case in the

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United States. If you have a constitutional right, and there are constitutional rights that apply in the extradition process, that protect

non-citizens as well as citizens in that context. Now there is a

great deal of latitude, additional latitude, in the area of expulsion

and deportation if you are dealing with American citizens. And we

do try to take advantage of that way of getting Americans back to

the United States in a more expeditious way.

However, some of the problems that we are looking at here are

constitutional or they have to do with internal civil rights. It is

hard to get them to adopt—nor would we adopt, in many cases, a

completely different standard for an alien.

This is, I think, the problem with the amparo process—that as

a general matter and having nothing to do with extradition—it is

regarded by the population as a major bulwark of the individual

human rights. They don’t have the same kind of refined constitutional rights system that we have. And, therefore, although it is a

very blunt instrument and it has a lot of difficulties, it is very

much respected as a civil rights and a human rights protection,

and that makes it difficult, just as a general matter and outside

the extradition context.

Mr. OSE. Well, that begs the question I have been trying to get

to, and that is, what are the standards that the Department of Justice uses in evaluating whether or not a country is cooperating on

an extradition?

It would seem to me that the extension of their laws to people

who might have entered their country illegally, under the Amparo

regime, would be frustrating, to say the least, to our lawful authorities. And if that is something we can use in their evaluation,

as to whether or not we have a country that is eligible for full certification, I would like to know about it.

The question really is, is that something that the Department of

Justice uses in evaluating whether a country is eligible for full certification?

Ms. WARREN. Just in terms of the Department of Justice’s review

of the various certification criteria, ours is a factual review, so that

we can provide advice to the Secretary of State and on to the President who, alone, makes the certification decision. We do look at extradition, but not solely to one particular facet of the law enforcement relationship, but all parts of it.

For example, in Colombia, we have not had an extradition since

1991, yet the passing of the extradition law, although restricted

and not retroactive, was a good sign, and the President fully certified Colombia. Extradition was a consideration there.

To the Department of Justice, extradition is a very important criterion in our relationship beyond certification, just across the board

and about how we get our fugitives back to this country to be tried

in our court.

Mr. OSE. Well, as it relates to Mexico, the empirical data you

gave us indicates that, in fact, we have had a decline in the degree

of cooperation on extraditions since—well, we did a very good job

stepping up from 1995 to 1996——

Ms. WARREN. And then it plateaued.

60

Mr. OSE [continuing]. And maintained it pretty well those 3

years, but I have to say, the first 4 months—fully a third of a

year—we have reduced that by about 50 percent.

Ms. WARREN. No, and so far in 1999, we have not kept pace.

Let me just, if I may, also remind of the 30 deportations that we

had. That was very important last year, in terms of returning fugitives.

Mr. OSE. And I would—I am trying to get to the point where I

commend you for that. So I appreciate you beating me to the punch

on that.

Do you think this degree of extraditions is sufficient to qualify

for full certification?

Ms. WARREN. I won’t respond in a certification context. We are

disappointed at the moment in the rate of extraditions and in that

extradition relationship. So, too, are the Mexicans, particularly

those who we work with most directly in the Office of the Attorney

General. The problems in the courts are frustrating them as much

as they are frustrating us, of course.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I thank you for your generosity.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With regard to the chart on page 14, Ms. Warren, the number

of Mexican nationals extradited on drug charges—the one in 1999,

I presume that is Velardes?

Ms. WARREN. In 1999?

Mr. BARR. In 1999.

Ms. WARREN. It appears in 1999 it is Velardes Lopez.

Mr. BARR. OK; that is what I said.

So aside from him, there have been no extraditions of Mexican

nationals to the United States on drug charges this year. There

was only one in 1998—and your footnote notes, I presume, accurately—that that person was extradited principally for the murder

of a United States Border Patrol agent, not so much for drug trafficking.

How many Mexican nationals are extraditable to the United

States on drug charges?

Ms. WARREN. I can, with a little counting, I will be able to give

you the number of those who have been found extraditable by Mexico, but their cases are either still in the courts on appeal or——

Mr. BARR. How many do we consider extraditable?

Ms. WARREN. We have sought the extradition of an enormous

number so we would consider—we wouldn’t seek their extradition

if we didn’t believe they shouldn’t be extradited.

Mr. BARR. So it is a very high—I mean, dozens?

Ms. WARREN. Dozens, and we have set certain priorities. Deputy

Administrator Donnie Marshall testified about the DEA’s priority.

Mr. BARR. I mean we have this huge gulf between the number

of Mexican nationals that are extraditable from our standpoint on

drug charges, and, aside from this one fellow who was extradited

this year in May on the escape, and so forth, I mean none have

been extradited. That is pretty distressing.

How much aid does the United States receive from Mexico?

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Ms. WARREN. I know of none, but——

Mr. BARR. How much asset forfeiture proceeds does our law enforcement receive from Mexico?

Ms. WARREN. At the moment—just recently their law has

changed. Their law did not provide for sharing with other countries. Their law will now allow for that, and we will——

Mr. BARR. How much aid does Mexico receive from the United

States—economic assistance?

Ms. WARREN. I don’t know that.

Mr. BARR. Does the State Department know?

Ms. BOREK. The State Department can provide you with that answer.

Mr. BARR. The State Department doesn’t know?

Ms. BOREK. Well, the State Department Office of the Legal Adviser doesn’t know. [Laughter.]

Mr. BARR. Fair enough.

Does the United States—I mean does Mexico receive economic

assistance from the United States?

Ms. WARREN. Yes.

Mr. BARR. I suspected as much.

Does Mexico receive asset forfeiture proceeds from the United

States?

Ms. WARREN. They have received $6 million from the United

States and more is currently in the——

Mr. BARR. Would we be giving them more of this stuff if they extradite even fewer people to the United States? I mean we seem

to be rewarding them for doing nothing.

Ms. WARREN. The purpose of the sharing of the assets is, as they

participated in the investigation, or assisted in the forfeiture of the

assets. We like to encourage that, as well as encourage extradition.

Mr. BARR. I mean it seems to me that this is all one way. We

give Mexico substantial foreign aid; Mexico receives substantial

sums in asset forfeiture proceeds—[laughter]—a balance of trade,

similarly. Yet they—aside from this one person this year, and one

person extradited last year, primarily on other charges—Mexico

has extradited none of their nationals to the United States on drug

charges.

Something just doesn’t match up here.

Would it be fair to say that when the President of our country

meets with the President of Mexico, he can raise whatever issues

he wants with them? Are there any legal treaties limiting the

issues that the United States President can raise with the President of Mexico?

Ms. WARREN. No.

Mr. BARR. I didn’t think so.

Why don’t we make the furnishing of assistance? Why don’t we

make the furnishing of asset forfeiture proceeds contingent on Mexico lifting its little finger and extraditing some of its nationals to

this country on drug charges, insofar as there are literally dozens

of Mexican nationals who would fall into the category of extraditable to the United States on drug charges?

Ms. WARREN. I would like to say, just to point out, that they—

at least the foreign ministry there—has found important Mexican

national drug traffickers extraditable to the United States. Those

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individuals continue either to appeal the rulings or are serving sentences in Mexico at this time, but there are some that have been

found extraditable, and we are awaiting their surrender to the

United States.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Marshall, do you and your drug agents feel satisfied with that? I mean, does that make you feel that everything is

being done that is being done, because Mexico recognizes some of

these people, but they won’t extradite our extraditable? And that

there are some sitting in Mexican prisons?

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, Congressman, we are quite disappointed,

and I think that you heard some of my testimony about how deeply

I feel about the importance of this issue. And I have to say I am

quite disappointed. And I think that a lot more progress could and

should be made in this area.

Mr. BARR. Is it true that in 1997, we provided 72 Hueys—helicopters to the Mexican Army to fight drugs?

Ms. WARREN. I don’t know the——

Ms. BOREK. I am informed that in the 2 years 1996 and 1997,

we provided 73, total.

Mr. BARR. It must be more than I thought, and I thought it was

72.

Ms. BOREK. One crashed. [Laughter.]

Mr. BARR. Can you explain that rationale—if there is any rationale—between providing that number of Hueys to Mexico with the

poor record of cooperation and assistance they have provided us?

And yet we have to, you know, beg, borrow, and steal for years to

try and get helicopters provided to Colombia for General Serrano,

for example?

I mean, what is it that Mexico is doing that is so outstanding

that they are given these, you know, tremendous resources, in addition to all of the economic assistance, drug proceeds, and everything? I mean I am just—it seems as if we are rewarding them for

slapping us in the face.

Ms. BOREK. Let me comment on that, generally.

In terms of the drug cooperation effort, very often the highest

priority that we have is to encourage national measures of investigation, enforcement, interdiction, eradication, and to try to

strengthen national mechanisms, which may have a lot of problems. They may be ill-trained; there may be corruption. They may

be just underdeveloped. Certainly at the moment, I think it is true

to say that extradition has emerged as a very serious issue and one

that we will have to look at and raise at the highest levels in the

country——

Mr. BARR. You make it sound like all of a sudden there is a dilemma on the State Department.

Ms. BOREK. Well, there is; in terms of extradition, there have

been changes in the recent past. We had a situation where they

would not extradite nationals at all. Now, they are not the only

country that refuses to extradite nationals, and there was a tremendous amount of pressure brought, and the SRE agreed to—

really, there was a breakthrough in terms of agreeing to take advantage of this possibility of extraditing nationals in extraordinary

circumstances, and that worked, and that was working.

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And, then, there were a series of what are really judicial setbacks, and now we have the issue, which I think was discussed

earlier, that there is a possibility of legislative remedy, and there

is a possibility of judicial remedy here, and we certainly need to address it very strenuously.

But the—in the asset forfeiture——

Mr. BARR. How about having our President address strenuously,

as opposed to working level discussions?

Ms. BOREK. The next level of discussion is at the cabinet level,

and it is on the agenda for that level of discussion.

Mr. BARR. Would anybody disagree that one of the things—perhaps ‘‘the’’ thing that these drug traffickers—whether they are

from Colombia or Mexico—fear more than anything else is to be extradited to this country, because they know that when they get up

here, they will receive a lengthy, mandatory prison sentence?

Mr. Marshall, is that about as creditable a threat as we have?

And if that threat isn’t present, then——

Mr. MARSHALL. Congressman, yes, sir; you are right on target

with that. And we saw in Colombia, where the Colombian—the

Medellin cartel—back in the 1980’s, had the country of Colombia

and the government and government officials so wrapped that, basically, they operated with impunity there. Even when they were

jailed they ran their drug empires and they threatened and bribed

and intimidated from their very jail cells. And only when we managed to get a few of them expelled and extradited, beginning with

Carlos Lehder in 1987, did we break that pattern. They feared it

so much that they entered into, then, a campaign of terrorism and

violence. They even blew an Avianca airliner out of the sky and

claimed credit for it, in protest of the extradition.

So I think that, yes, that is the thing that they absolutely fear

most, and in a situation like this, it is our, I think, absolute most

valuable tool, at least as a first step, that could possibly be applied.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Marshall.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

A couple of questions; the Governor of Quintana Roo, the

Yukatan Peninsula, recently fled, just before the end of his term.

We were informed, when we took our subcommittee and other

Members of Congress down to Mexico to meet with officials, that

one of the reasons for not going after him is, I guess, the incumbent official had some immunity from prosecution while he was in

office. That he had some extra status, and he was going—they were

going to go after him afterwards. But we have known that, with

that sort of narco-terrorist state that is corrupt from the bottom to

the top in Quintana Roo and the Yukatan Peninsula.

Has he been indicted in the United States? Do you know?

Ms. WARREN. He has not.

Mr. MICA. Do you know if there are any plans to go after him?

Ms. WARREN. That I could not comment.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. At the present time, we have no plans. We are

trying to assist, to the degree that we can, the Mexican Government in locating him. But as far as I know, there are no plans for

64

indictment in the United States. Not to rule that out for the future,

perhaps, but not at the present.

Mr. MICA. I raise that because it seems like he is such a highprofile individual, if he were indicted in the United States, and a

request for extradition certainly for the death and destruction he

has brought, not only in his own state, but also to the United

States, has to be immense. And everybody has known what was

going on there.

We heard some questions by Mr. Barr about assistance, and certainly we negotiate trade. And Mexico has gotten some incredible

trade assistance from the United States—benefits from NAFTA,

the collapse of their financial markets when we underwrote financing of their currency in a very difficult time.

Do we ask for any conditions? Or, as we negotiate these various

treaties, do you know if the drug issue and extradition are raised

at all in those negotiations, Ms. Borek?

Ms. BOREK. To my knowledge, NAFTA was negotiated on the

basis of mutual interests in the trade area. It was negotiated not

on the basis that that was an assistance program for Mexico, but

on the basis that it was in the interests of the United States.

Mr. MICA. Do you go beyond extradition? Are you involved in

other treaty negotiations?

Ms. BOREK. I am telling you what I understand. I am not responsible for the NAFTA——

Mr. MICA. Yes, but do you go beyond that in your work? Or are

you just covering extradition issues?

Ms. BOREK. I cover a number of other subjects besides extradition. Economics is not one of them.

Mr. MICA. Well, I am just wondering if, at any level, extradition

is made a topic of discussion or condition in any of our treaty negotiations with Mexico or——

Ms. BOREK. Extradition is, I think, probably not—and this is a

‘‘probably’’ I would say—is probably not made a condition in general treaty negotiations. It is extensively and intensively discussed

within the law enforcement cooperation context, and it also figures

on general agendas for high-level discussions. And usually, the Secretary of State, for example, is not involved in treaty negotiations,

but she regularly does raise the question of law enforcement cooperation and extradition which, as I say, is, I think, at the moment, a particular focus of attention with the Government of Mexico.

Mr. MICA. But you can’t site any high-level discussions or written

communications in which the topic of extradition was raised?

Ms. BOREK. I think we could give you a summary of, I think,

some of the law enforcement and extradition subjects that have

been raised over a period of time. We could give you that.

Mr. MICA. But I mean outside of the context of the question of

law enforcement, it is not raised in any other context. I am trying

to get to what Mr. Barr was talking about, the various benefits

that accrue to Mexico from the United States through treaties,

agreements, international finance, and trade. Any contacts from

the highest levels, or in these treaties, is there anything we can

point to that might mention this?

65

Ms. BOREK. I think it is not expressed as a condition, for example, in a treaty negotiation. I think it is clear and it is repeatedly

expressed as an important essential part of our overall bilateral relations, and that has implications across the board for all issues.

I think it has been raised in that context repeatedly by high-level

Department of State officials.

I think in the diplomatic area, the level and frequency with

which an issue is raised is one of the important indicators that a

government takes it seriously. And we can certainly give you a

summary history of efforts that we have made to impress upon

the——

Mr. MICA. I would like to see anything in writing for the past

couple of years. We will make a note of it; we will make a written

request.

I understand, also, that through the Department of State and

through our various embassies that there is established a priority

list for the embassies and for their goals and objectives. Are you

aware of where extradition might be, or if it is on the list of priorities for the Mexican Embassy, United States?

Ms. BOREK. Yes, it is very definitely one of our highest priority

issues with the Government of Mexico.

Mr. MICA. And it is on their priority list?

Ms. BOREK. It is on our priority list, the U.S. Embassy’s, it is

right up there with trade and other essential bilateral interests.

Mr. MICA. All right, and if you have a copy of anything written,

as far as their priorities, we would also like to have that for the

record.

Has the United States/Mexican High-level Contact Group ever offered Mexico a formal bilateral maritime agreement, to your knowledge?

Ms. BOREK. To my knowledge, no; it has not been raised at that

level.

Mr. MICA. Ms. Warren, do you get involved in that at Justice?

Ms. WARREN. We are involved in some of the maritime agreements and assistance at the time of negotiations, but I know of no

work done with Mexico thus far.

Mr. MICA. Are you aware of any efforts by our Government to—

because when we were in Mexico, we also were criticized for not

offering a maritime agreement, and it hadn’t been part of a Highlevel Contact Group discussion?

Would it be possible—I don’t know if you could make this commitment, Ms. Borek, but maybe we could ask you to call that to

the attention of the Secretary of State and maybe the high-level

working group as an agenda item.

The Congress passed, 2 years ago in March, a resolution requesting certain actions by Mexico—the House of Representatives did.

One of the first items of about five or six was extradition. I believe

the second or third was a maritime agreement. I know that sometimes the administration doesn’t pay much attention to what the

Congress would like to see, but it happened to be the current

speaker’s bill that did pass in resolution, and I think we are going

to try to find some way to get a maritime working agreement with

Mexico. I thought maybe we could get your cooperation on that?

66

Ms. BOREK. I might say that although it hasn’t been raised in

that context, I think it certainly has been raised. And it is interesting that you say it that we were criticized for not having offered

that. That certainly is a nice opening, because I think we are interested in such an agreement.

Mr. MICA. All I can do is tell you what they told us. We get down

there—especially me—[laughter]—at some personal peril—[laughter]—or infliction of abuse to hear their side of the story, but also

to try to work with them and find some agreements. And certainly

we do give economical and financial assistance, trade assistance,

and almost open commercial borders, and incredible financial backing. Yet, it doesn’t appear that some of these issues relating to

stopping the flow of illegal narcotics into our country, which are

costing us billions, are addressed, and it is a major concern.

We are going to figure out a way to get folks’ attention on it, too.

Mr. Marshall, has DEA ever recommended to the Justice Department or to any other Department that economic cooperation be conditioned on extradition?

Mr. MARSHALL. I am not sure that we have made a formal recommendation in that regard. That is really kind of a political process that is outside the expertise of law enforcement.

Mr. MICA. Is there anything outside of the negotiations as far as

law enforcement to law enforcement agency requests, to your

knowledge, that DEA has said that we should look beyond just

these simple requests and try to get some leverage to elicit action

from the Mexicans?

Mr. MARSHALL. In a formal manner, not that I am aware of, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. MICA. What is the response the DEA Administrator has received from the Mexican Attorney General or other Mexican officials when he sought to promote the extradition issue?

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, we deal with the PGR, and I think that the

PGR—the reception that we have gotten among those officials, including Mr. Herran, Mr. Ibarolla, and Attorney General Madrazo

I think has been very favorable. I think that they have a genuine

interest and a genuine desire to work toward solving the extradition problem.

I am not sure that the problems that we are encountering emanate from the PGR. I think they emanate perhaps from other elements such as the judiciary, perhaps the SRE.

So the reception with our own counterparts has been good, but

it hasn’t resulted in actual extraditions, as we would like to see.

Mr. MICA. I have been here in Congress for almost 7 years and

helped write the certification laws as a staffer back in the 1980’s

when I worked down in the Senate. The only time we see any

movement from Mexican officials and others—countries who have

severe narcotics production and trafficking problems—is just before

the question of certification comes up.

Now, Mr. Gilman and I introduced a bill that extends the decertification bill for Mexico indefinitely until we come up with a solution to deal with the problems we are facing with Mexico. Short of

decertification, I ask each of you to respond, is there any legislative

fix, or is there anything the administration can do to try to elicit

additional cooperation, whether it be on extradition, a maritime

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agreement, or anything else to help us get a handle on this serious

problem? And, as you all know, more than 50 percent of the illegal

hard narcotics coming into this country are now trafficked through

and produced in Mexico, with an increase in heroin production. It

is a long question, but maybe you have a short answer of anything

you think we can do legislatively or the administration can do,

short of decertifying Mexico?

Ms. Borek, any ideas?

Ms. BOREK. I can’t say anything new. And I would say that

the——

Mr. MICA. You have all the legislative tools you need—legal and

otherwise—anything that we could do, again, to help elicit a little

more cooperation? Something we are doing wrong?

Ms. BOREK. I think the——

Mr. MICA. We are too nice?

Ms. BOREK [continuing]. Certification statute is a very powerful

tool which focuses attention very well, in general terms, on the

problems that we are looking at, at the moment. At this exact moment in time, I wouldn’t say that there is a clear legislative tool.

I wouldn’t say that could not be true.

Mr. MICA. Ms. Warren.

Mr. BARR. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman; I might have misunderstood.

Mr. MICA. Yes.

Mr. BARR. Did you say that the certification process is a great

tool?

Mr. MICA. Yes. Yes, we have that on the record. [Laughter.]

Ms. BOREK. I think I said ‘‘powerful.’’

Mr. MICA. Powerful.

Mr. BARR. Powerful for who? I mean is Mexico a fully cooperating partner in the war against drugs? With extradition statistics—

[laughter]—like these, in your opinion?

Ms. BOREK. I think the statistics you are looking at are for this

year, and I think——

Mr. BARR. Oh, heaven forbid. [Laughter.]

Ms. BOREK. Well, I think the——

Mr. BARR. Whether you look at this year or 1998, 1997, 1996, or

1995, they are a bunch of zeros.

Ms. BOREK. There is no question that they did not extradite nationals before 1996.

Mr. BARR. What I am saying—what?

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I mean it is just ludicrous I mean to

have witnesses sit here and tell us that, you know, this is a great

tool.

It might be a great tool if it were utilized properly, but with statistics like these, it is a laughing—you know, it makes people

laugh.

Mexico isn’t cooperating with us. Have they—do they cooperate,

Mr. Marshall, with DEA to the extent that you have the tools and

the cooperation that you need from Mexico from the Mexican law

enforcement and military and government?

Mr. MARSHALL. There are some core groups that we get good cooperation from. Overall, the law enforcement results have not been

encouraging, and it has been quite disappointing.

68

Mr. BARR. I mean how can the State Department sit there and

say that this is a great and powerful tool? I mean you ought to at

least be honest with us that it isn’t. I mean the chairman is giving

a tremendous opportunity here. Are there some things that we

could be doing? And all you come back with and say, ‘‘Oh, you

know, this is a great and powerful tool.’’ They aren’t cooperating;

they are not giving us the tools, the cooperation that we need. They

are not extraditing people on drug charges. In what sense is this

a powerful tool?

Ms. BOREK. I think you can’t——

Mr. BARR. They are laughing at us.

Ms. BOREK. If you are looking at the whole history of cooperation

with Mexico, you can’t only look at extraditions. I think what has

been viewed as important—and I defer to the Department of Justice and DEA on this—is to try to strengthen institutions across

the board and to find the most effective way to do that.

There is no question that the certification of Mexico has been

controversial, and that is part of what I think points to the fact

that the certification process is a real process and people do take

it seriously. I think, obviously——

Mr. BARR. Who takes it seriously?

Ms. BOREK [continuing]. There have been differences of opinions

about Mexico.

Mr. BARR. Why should Mexico take it seriously? They are not

providing us the tools; they are not providing the cooperation, and

yet they are certified. They are the ones that get millions and millions of dollars in assistance. They get millions of dollars in asset

forfeiture, and we are not demanding anything of them in return.

How is that a powerful tool?

I know that is a rhetorical question because you think it is a

powerful tool, but I think that is an absurd position to take.

I am sorry, Mr. Chairman; I interrupted you.

Mr. MICA. Ms. Warren, did you want to respond?

Ms. WARREN. I wanted to offer some legislative suggestions as

part——

Mr. MICA. Go right ahead.

Ms. WARREN. As part of the announcement of the crime bill yesterday, one of the provisions that the administration is suggesting

would be to bar Federal prisoners from getting credit for the time

spent abroad fighting extradition. That might get someone like William Brian Martin to the United States faster if he knew he was

not going to get any kind of credit for the 41⁄2 years that he spent

spinning out the extradition process in Mexico.

There are other suggestions that may seem minor but are of

great moment to State and local jurisdictions. The cost of an extradition can wipe out a local budget—the translations and the cost

of putting a package together. Have a fund to help assist them in

that. And those are some of the suggestions that we are offering.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I think that certification can be

a powerful tool, and I think we saw that it was a powerful tool

when applied to Colombia. And I think that it, perhaps, gave some

of the initiative to make some progress in that country. I am a

strong supporter of the certification process, and I agree with some

69

of your comments and some of Congressman Barr’s comments, that

really we need to apply it across the board. That is what is was

designed for, and, when applied properly, I think it can be a powerful tool.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. If I understand correctly from Mr. Barr’s question, we

have 72 operating Hueys in Mexico? And we have sent

Blackhawks—are they still there—to the Army for drug interdiction; is that correct?

And we also have six Blackhawks we sent down to Colombia

that, just last month, participated in busting—if I recall, I think in

your testimony—there is a 7-square-mile cocaine processing facility?

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, it was one of the largest in terms of area

processing facilities that we have ever seen down there. I don’t recall the 7 square mile description, but it was quite a large processing complex.

Mr. OSE. Well getting back to the chairman’s request about how

we can make this work better, are we placing restrictions on the

use of the Hueys or the Blackhawks? Or are we not utilizing them

properly? Is there training we could do? I mean, what would be the

consequence, for instance, of having 12 Blackhawks in Colombia?

Would we affect the price and purity of coke here on the streets

of the United States?

The way I look at it is boil it down in the number of lives saved.

Mr. MARSHALL. I would have to say, Congressman, that with regard to the helicopters in Colombia, there have been some differences in times past about the way those helicopters were used—

differences between the State Department, INL, and differences between DEA. We were concerned at one time that the helicopters

were used exclusively for coca eradication at the expense of heroin,

opium poppy eradication and law enforcement. Those disagreements have been, for the most part, worked out, and we are beginning to see some poppy eradication.

Now with regard to impact on the price and purity and availability, that is really a difficult, almost impossible question for me to

answer. There are perhaps other experts in the intelligence community that could do a better job of this, but I think it is real difficult to say what it would take to affect the price and purity, particularly with regard to cocaine, because the cultivation areas are

so vast in so many countries and can shift fairly dramatically and

rapidly.

In the case of the opium poppy in Colombia—and as you probably know, Colombian heroin probably accounts for about 60 or 70

percent of the total heroin seized in the United States now. But

with regard to that opium poppy cultivation in Colombia, it is confined to a reasonably small area, and reasonably easily reachable.

And we believe that if we work to focus in a very concentrated, a

very intense way, on the opium poppy eradication, that perhaps in

that one instance that that could result in some impact on the

availability.

Mr. OSE. So your last comment seems to suggest that there is a

connection between our ability to eradicate and the availability of

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supply and price in the United States? It is not direct, but perhaps

indirect?

Mr. MARSHALL. In the case of heroin, I believe that we could

have a very good chance of having an impact. In the case of cocaine, I am not so sure, and I am really even doubtful that we

could, in a direct way.

Mr. OSE. Well if General Serrano took down—I am trying to find

it. I think it was a lab producing 8 tons a week of hydrochloride,

which is the cocaine precursor—if General Serrano took down 8

tons a week, would that have an impact?

Mr. MARSHALL. It is—again, Congressman, it is difficult to say

at what level you begin having an impact and——

Mr. OSE. All right; 16 tons a week?

Mr. MARSHALL. I like to explain it, I think, in a manner where

you have a certain level of demand for the product in our country.

If you look at the amount of cultivation and you look at the producing capability of laboratories, they are capable of producing—or

they are actually producing a level that is in excess of our demand

in the United States and on the European markets. They do that

because they build in a certain number of losses. They build in a

certain spoilage. They build in a certain amount that they think

will be seized by law enforcement. So they actually produce more

than the demand. But then when you look at the amount under

cultivation—the production capability—that is an even higher

number. So you would have to bring that production capability, not

the actual production, down to the level of demand, but you have

to bring the capability down to a lower level, and this a very, very

difficult thing to do.

I believe, personally, that there is an almost limitless amount of

cultivation—or cultivation capability, at least—and I think it is

going to be very, very difficult to impact that larger number up

there.

Mr. OSE. Has the provision—let me just ask what I think is a

real simple question. Has the provision of the helicopters to General Serrano been a positive or negative influence on his ability to

interdict this market?

Mr. MARSHALL. Very positive, both in the area of the Colombian

National Police law enforcement capabilities and in the area of heroin, opium poppy eradication, very positive.

Mr. OSE. So it has been positive?

Mr. MARSHALL. Yes, I believe it has been positive.

Mr. OSE. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. I am fine, Mr. Chairman; thank you.

Mr. MICA. Well I appreciate the witnesses coming before us

today. We have additional questions we would like to submit, and,

without objection, we will leave the record open for at least 2 weeks

for additional responses.

Since we have the Department of State here today and the Department of Justice and DEA, you all are really in the forefront of

our efforts to seek cooperation.

We have gotten excellent cooperation from the Bolivians, President Banzer; excellent cooperation from President Fujimori. President Pastrana, the new President of Colombia, has pledged, and I

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feel very confident that he will be, a good working partner in this

issue.

But the problem we have in the whole western hemisphere is the

question of Mexico. We also have a problem with Cuba becoming

a drug haven and other areas. But this extradition question really

goes to the heart of it, and you all have a key role to play.

We are just Members of Congress, we just try to respond to the

concerns of our constituents. Unfortunately, this somehow doesn’t

get national attention. But when you go home tonight, I want the

three of you to think about this—this issue is like three Columbine

High Schools every single day across this country. And if you see

the tragic deaths—I had another heroin death in my district—these

are just unbelievably horrific deaths, particularly among our young

people. There has been an 875 percent increase in heroin use

among our teens in the last 5 years. These are staggering statistics

that just aren’t getting adequate attention.

But we, in Congress, are charged with getting some response. We

view Mexico as a good ally, but you are on the forefront of the Department of Justice and State efforts and enforcement efforts to get

their cooperation, so anything you can do, particularly on the extradition front, the maritime agreement front. We are not doing this

to be bad guys or to call you here and harass you, but this is an

incredible national problem—100,000 deaths in the last 6 years,

plus—and most of it can be attributed to narcotics coming through

Mexico, unfortunately.

So, we solicit your cooperation, your suggestions, and I appreciate your being with us today and hope that you will take these

back to your respective agencies and work with us on these important items.

Thank you.

I would like to call our second panel this afternoon. Rear Admiral

Ernest R. Riutta, the Assistant Commandant for Operations of the

U.S. Coast Guard; and Ronald E. Brooks, past-president of the

California Narcotic Officers Association.

We are pleased to welcome both of these gentlemen to our subcommittee. I did indicate—I am not sure if you heard my statements for our first panel, but we are an investigations and oversight subcommittee of Congress. We ask our witnesses to submit

any lengthy statements for the record, or other materials for the

record, And we do swear in our witnesses, so if you would stand,

gentlemen, and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. Thank you. The record will reflect the witnesses answered in the affirmative. We are pleased to, again, welcome both

of you. And we will hear, first, from Admiral Ernest—is it Riutta?

Admiral RIUTTA. Riutta.

Mr. MICA. Thank you; Assistant Commandant for Operations of

the U.S. Coast Guard. Thank you.

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STATEMENTS OF REAR ADMIRAL ERNEST R. RIUTTA, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. COAST GUARD;

AND RONALD E. BROOKS, PAST-PRESIDENT, CALIFORNIA

NARCOTIC OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Admiral RIUTTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am honored to be here, on behalf of the Commandant, to testify before this committee.

I have submitted a statement for the record, and with your

permission——

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that will be made part of the record.

Admiral RIUTTA. I would like to just make a few comments to

summarize my statement.

Mr. MICA. Go right ahead, sir. Admiral RIUTTA. Sir, bilateral agreements are extremely effective tools for international cooperation and drug interdiction. International cooperation is critical to the success of the suppression of

drug smuggling at sea. In recognition of this importance, an international law framework for cooperation in combatting drug flow

has been developed. The 1988 United Nations Convention against

Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances recognizes maritime drug trafficking as an international problem requiring bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Article 17 of this convention requires parties to cooperate to their

fullest extent possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea in conformity

with the International Law of the Sea. It urges parties of the convention to enter into a bilateral or reasonable agreement to facilitate or enhance cooperation. Article 17 serves as the basis for the

U.S.’s bilateral maritime counterdrug agreements.

The operational goal of these regional agreements is quite simple: to make territorial boundaries as transparent to law enforcement as they are to smugglers seeking refuge from interdiction. As

the lead agency for maritime drug interdiction, your Coast Guard

actively patrols the waters of the Caribbean Sea and the eastern

Pacific in an effort to interdict or deter drug smugglers.

Campaign Steel Web is the Coast Guard’s multiyear strategic

plan for increasing seizure rates to achieve prescribed targets in

the national drug control strategy. International engagement by

way of bilateral agreements is one of the cornerstones of Campaign

Steel Web. The Coast Guard conducts frequent combined operations with military and law enforcement organizations of many

source and transit nations. In addition, Coast Guard law enforcement detachments deploy aboard British and Dutch warships involved in counterdrug operations. Leveraging foreign assets

through bilateral and regional cooperation raises the smugglers’

risk of interdiction and enhances the denial of maritime smuggling

routes.

The United States has developed a comprehensive model agreement to enable maritime interdiction forces to work effectively and

efficiently with other nations. Coast Guard officers are key members of interagency teams led by the Department of State who negotiate agreements with foreign nations. Currently, there are 19

counterdrug bilateral agreements in force and 14 other agreements

or amendments to existing agreements in various stages of negotiaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:17 Jul 24, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\63238.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion. These agreements vary in scope between nations as they deal

with national sovereignty on a cooperative basis.

The comprehensive model includes standing authority to take the

following actions: board and search vessels waving the flag of a signatory nation; embark a shiprider empowered to authorize patrols,

boardings, searches, seizures, and arrests in sovereign waters; pursuit of suspect vessels into sovereign waters, with permission to

stop, board, and search; entry into sovereign waters to investigate

suspect vessels and aircraft, also with permission to stop, board,

and search; overflight by national aircraft in sovereign airspace in

support of counterdrug operations, and authority to relay orders to

land in the territory of a signatory nation.

Since these agreements deal with the issues of national sovereignty on a cooperative basis, the United States is not always

able to reach agreement on all six parts of the model maritime

agreement, and, therefore, some of our agreements are more limited in scope than the six functions I just described.

These negotiations, as you would expect, are a lengthy process,

so we expect to conclude about one to two agreements of this nature per year. Our current focus involves Central American countries, including Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras.

Under ideal conditions, a comprehensive regional agreement that

denies safe havens for any smugglers would be our ultimate goal.

Until that day comes, however, the next best thing are the bilateral

agreements that we are putting in place.

That concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any

questions.

[The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Riutta follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, we will hear from Mr. Brooks, first, and

then we will ask questions.

Mr. Brooks is past-president of the California Narcotic Officers

Association. We are pleased to have you.

You are recognized, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Chairman Mica; and let me first thank

you and this committee for the leadership role that you have taken

and the support that you have given to drug law enforcement.

I am here representing the California Narcotic Officers Association, our president, Christy McCampbell, and our more than 7,000

members in the National Narcotic Officers Association’s Coalition,

33 State associations with 50,000 members.

I am not an expert in extradition treaties or national security

matters like our previous presenters, but I am a working narcotics

agent who, for the last 24 years, has put my own life and the lives

of the men and women that work for me at risk on a daily basis

in the fight against drugs.

The United States and all Americans are currently under attack

from enemies based on foreign soil. We are faced with daily acts

of terrorism that make the bombing of the Murrah Building and

the World Trade Center pale by comparison. With the cost to

Americans reaching more than $50 billion annually, and thousands

of lives lost each year, it is clear that drug trafficking is international terrorism. The greatest threat to the security of this Nation is drug abuse and the crime, violence, and social ills that accompany it.

It is very appropriate that we are holding these hearings today,

during the annual Police Memorial Week services. This is a sacred

time for those of us in law enforcement. Since 1794, when U.S.

Marshal Robert Forsythe became the first law enforcement officer

to give his life in the line of duty protecting American citizens,

14,600 of my fellow law enforcement officers have given their lives

in the service of their country.

Addiction and the problems associated with drug abuse have

plagued this country since the turn of the century. Drug use and

enforcement were at the forefront of our Government’s attention

through the 1980’s. In fact, from 1979 to 1992, through a strategy

of drug education, treatment, and strong enforcement of our drug

laws, we reduced drug abuse in this country by 50 percent. That

is a victory by anybody’s standards.

Yet, sadly, the interest in the war on drugs has steadily diminished during recent years. Yet, average Americans, when polled,

continue to describe drug abuse, violent crimes, and gangs as their

major concerns, and rightfully so. Every American deserves the opportunity to live and raise a family in communities that are safe

and drug free.

The foreign threat that we face is particularly evident in California and throughout the Southwest border. America is especially

vulnerable to the terrorism waged by international drug cartels operating along our very porous 2,000-mile border with Mexico. As

you have learned today, the vast majority of the drugs—two-thirds

of the cocaine, 14 percent of the heroin, 80 percent of the methamphetamine—on the streets of the United States today, either

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comes from Mexico or is distributed by groups with command and

control structures in Mexico.

While I believe President Zedillo and the leadership of the Government of Mexico is truly making an effort to fight drug-related

corruption, and although there have been improvements in Mexico’s response, with the drug crimes within the past year, it simply

has not been enough.

The Government of Mexico has long described itself as an ally of

the United States in the fight against illegal drugs. If Mexico is our

ally, the true proof of their counter-narcotic cooperation would start

with the actual extradition of major Mexican drug kingpins to the

United States. This would be the single most important accomplishment that the Government of Mexico could make. The return

of Mexican drug kingpins and other major narcotic traffickers to

the United States to stand trial before the bar of justice is the single most effective way to destroy the drug mafias and reduce the

level of corruption in the country of Mexico. It is time that we bring

these merchants of death to the United States where they can face

our judges with the stars and stripes prominently displayed in the

courtroom, where these thugs could soon come to realize that they

are in the greatest country in the world, and that their corruption

and intimidation cannot help them escape justice.

The only way that our Government will be successful in dismantling these powerful drug cartels and halting the flow of drugs to

our citizens is through the arrest and incarceration of the leaders

of the cartels. Law enforcement officers working within the United

States have effectively attacked these drug trafficking groups and

have gathered sufficient evidence to bring their foreign-based leaders to justice in the United States. Virtually everyone in a leadership role in the cartels in Mexico and in Colombia have been indicted in the United States over and over again. The problem has

been obtaining cooperation from Mexico and other countries in actively pursuing, arresting, and extraditing these drug lords.

We will never make a significant impact on the drug problem in

America until we have the ability, through extradition, to bring the

leaders of these crime groups to this country for prosecution. Unfortunately, as you have heard already today, the Mexican Government has never once conducted a legal extradition to the United

States of a drug lord. The only way that we are going to deliver

a death blow to these drug-trafficking groups operating outside the

borders of the United States is to have the key leaders of those

groups arrested and brought before us.

It has been heartening to learn this last July that law enforcement officials in Mexico arrested Jesus and Luis AmezcuaContreras, based on indictments in the southern district of California. These brothers operate a criminal organization that is responsible for the vast majority of the methamphetamine that finds its

way across the Southwest border and into the heartland of America.

We must, however, withhold our praise for the Government of

Mexico until such time as the Amezcua-Contreras’ are sent to the

United States to pay for their crimes. The pending extradition of

these dangerous drug kingpins is a test case that the Government

of Mexico can use to demonstrate its resolve to join with the United

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States as a partner in the elimination of Mexican-based drug trafficking groups, but this extradition, alone, will not be enough. Mexico must make an honest effort to arrest and extradite the other

infamous members of the drug cartels.

It is obvious that drastic steps must be taken to force the extradition of drug kingpins. I would urge the House of Representatives

to develop companion legislation to that proposed in the U.S. Senate by Senators Coverdell and Feinstein that would allow narcotic

traffickers to fall under the International Economic Powers Act,

where we can freeze out businesses and individuals that participate with these drug traffickers.

I would also urge, as has been suggested in this committee, economic sanctions against governments that clearly are not cooperating in our efforts, the only way we are going to make an impact.

Those of us in law enforcement have accepted the risks that accompany our chosen professions, but we should not be asked to

take these risks unless our Government is prepared to demand, in

the most forceful terms, the cooperation of all nations to actively

pursue and arrest foreign-based drug kingpins, and then extradite

them here to the United States.

In closing, extradition is one of the most critical weapons that we

have in dealing with foreign nationals involved in drug trafficking

in the United States. Organizations in many countries have used

violent means to pursue their deadly trade. They are a common

enemy of all civilized nations, and we need to work together to

meet this common threat. We must bring the might of this great

Nation to bear upon the countries that refuse to come to our aid,

and only then we will be able to stop the narco-terrorists that

threaten the citizens of the United States and people everywhere.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for having me present

this to you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Brooks.

Admiral, you said there—are there 19 maritime agreements in

place?

Admiral RIUTTA. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. And you are negotiating how many?

Admiral RIUTTA. We are in the process of either negotiating or

modifying 14 more.

Mr. MICA. Now, are you also involved in negotiations with Mexico?

Admiral RIUTTA. Not on a bilateral agreement; no, sir.

Mr. MICA. Has there been any attempt to do that in the past?

Admiral RIUTTA. Not in one of these bilateral agreements that

we have been negotiating across the Caribbean; not yet.

Mr. MICA. Who makes that decision, is it the Commandant of the

Coast Guard and some equivalent with the Mexican Government?

Or is it our State Department and the Department of Justice?

Admiral RIUTTA. The State Department has the lead on negotiations. We consult with them on what are priorities.

And as part of our Campaign Steel Web, when we began our negotiations for the bilaterals, we started in the eastern Caribbean.

The reason we started there was because there are many small nations that have territorial seas that the drug runners were able to

move in and out of with impunity, because these nations had no

ability to do anything about drug smugglers——

Mr. MICA. What has happened off the coast of Mexico?

Admiral RIUTTA. Mexicans have some capability of responding,

and we have found that when we are able to get the Mexicans

timely notification and they have forces available, that they do respond within their territorial waters. We have had some recent

successes with that.

Mr. MICA. Has there been any prioritization of having a maritime agreement or some bilateral agreement with Mexico, now that

you have done 19 of these?

Admiral RIUTTA. They would be very high on our list of ones we

desire to have a bilateral——

Mr. MICA. And has there been contact, to your knowledge, requesting that?

Admiral RIUTTA. No, sir; I don’t know that there is any direct

contact at any level.

Mr. MICA. It seemed like State indicated there had been some

contact, or Justice.

Admiral RIUTTA. There is none that I am aware of directly, officially, that says we are trying to negotiate a bilateral. There have

been some informal talks to indicate that, up until now, a bilateral

probably wasn’t a good thing to push forward. But we have had no

official——

Mr. MICA. Why wouldn’t it be a good thing? And who says that?

Admiral RIUTTA. These are working level people at my level, sir.

Mr. MICA. What is the reluctance?

Admiral RIUTTA. The reluctance is, some of the sovereignty

issues that are prevalent across all of the countries may be a little

more sensitive in Mexico than others.

Mr. MICA. Are you sensing that it is a policy of the United

States, then, not to push, either from the State Department, a dipVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:17 Jul 24, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\63238.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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lomatic standpoint, or the Department of Justice, the question of

entering into a bilateral maritime agreement with Mexico?

Admiral RIUTTA. To push it, at this particular time; no. I think

everyone agrees with us that it would be a very good thing to have.

There are many negotiations that are going on with the High-Level

Contact Group——

Mr. MICA. But you seemed to indicate that it wasn’t something

that they wanted to bring up.

Admiral RIUTTA. That is——

Mr. MICA. If it could be avoided?

Admiral RIUTTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. That is basically the attitude?

Admiral RIUTTA. I don’t know if it is an attitude so much as it

is a practicality of the number of things they want to negotiate. Is

this as important as some of the other things that are on the table?

Mr. MICA. That it doesn’t seems to be up there, from your perspective?

Admiral RIUTTA. No, sir.

Mr. MICA. They don’t want to raise it.

What happens in the situation of——

Admiral RIUTTA. Can I add something, sir, at this point?

Mr. MICA. Go ahead.

Admiral RIUTTA. There is a multilateral negotiation that is being

sponsored by the Netherlands for the Caribbean, and that is the

preferred method that the State Department has been using in recent months, to try to press it forward on——

Mr. MICA. With Mexico?

Admiral RIUTTA. With Mexico; that is correct.

Mr. MICA. We are using the Dutch route? Maybe we could use

the Amsterdam needle model. [Laughter.]

Admiral RIUTTA. Well, if you recall, sir, that the genesis of this

is the United Nations’ resolution, so I mean it worked very well

when——

Mr. MICA. Right, from last year.

Admiral RIUTTA [continuing]. They created that, so if the Dutch

can help us achieve a bilateral or multilateral arrangement——

Mr. MICA. And would that give us, our Dutch ships, the right

to—[laughter]—to participate with the Mexican nationals encounter?

Admiral RIUTTA. I would suspect so; yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. What happens in the case of hot pursuit rights in

Mexican waters now?

Admiral RIUTTA. Today?

Mr. MICA. Yes.

Admiral RIUTTA. Right now, when we are pursuing someone into

Mexican waters, or approaching Mexican waters, we inform the

embassy through the IAC group—I don’t remember what the acronym stands for, but it is a coordinating group in the embassy. They

go to Marina through Cendro, and the Mexicans respond, of

course—there had been one case last year where the Mexicans actually allowed us to continue the hot pursuit necessary in their territorial seas until such a time as they were able to pick up the case

and then we were asked to depart their waters.

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If we don’t get the agreement, or they aren’t able to do it then,

we can’t go into Mexican waters——

Mr. MICA. So there was one case where we could pursue. Have

there been cases where they have been lost?

Admiral RIUTTA. There have been some, sir. I can’t tell you exactly. I can find them.

Mr. MICA. How would you view this, as far as your involvement

in trying to help us, then, go after these boats? Would it be helpful

to have this in place?

Admiral RIUTTA. A bilateral agreement?

Mr. MICA. Yes.

Admiral RIUTTA. Absolutely.

Mr. MICA. And where else are we lacking? Did you say Panama,

Nicaragua, and Honduras?

Admiral RIUTTA. Yes, sir. We are starting to work our way up

Central America if you will. As I mentioned earlier, we started in

the eastern Caribbean because that was where we judged the biggest problem was. We are working our way around, and the objective is to have agreements with every country that has a

coastline——

Mr. MICA. Has Haiti approved one yet?

Admiral RIUTTA. No, sir, they haven’t approved one yet

because——

Mr. MICA. Because the parliament hasn’t met—addressed the

problem?

Admiral RIUTTA. That is correct. That is the problem.

Mr. MICA. What do you see as far as trafficking in and around

Cuba?

Admiral RIUTTA. There is a substantial amount of traffic that

goes through Cuba. I could get the numbers for you if you like of

what the percentages that we get from international—cocaine flow,

but there is quite a bit——

Mr. MICA. Of course, you have no agreement with Cuba?

Admiral RIUTTA. No, sir; we do not.

Mr. MICA. What about pursuit? Do you just stop at the——

Admiral RIUTTA. We stop outside the territorial sea.

Mr. MICA. Are there any instances of Cubans picking up on your

pursuit to——

Admiral RIUTTA. Yes, sir. We have had some cases where the

Cuban Border Guard has actually come out and picked up the pursuit of the——

Mr. MICA. You said ‘‘some cases.’’ Are they pursuing most of

them, or are most of them ignored? And are they going into this

water and using it as an escape route—knowing that you are not

able to pursue them?

Admiral RIUTTA. In answer to the first question, when the Cubans have resources available, and we are able to give them timely

notification, they seem to respond. I don’t know of any case that

they just turned us down flat. However, there is an awful lot of

coastline that has no one to respond.

And the answer to your second question is, ‘‘Yes.’’ The drug runners using the waters through where we cannot go on—yes.

Mr. MICA. What kind of craft are you seeing used for those operations?

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Admiral RIUTTA. Sir, they are mostly ‘‘go fast’’ boats.

Mr. MICA. ‘‘Go fast?’’ In and out?

Admiral RIUTTA. Yes, sir—in and out.

Mr. MICA. OK.

Mr. Brooks, are you seeing more or less heroin on the street? Cocaine and methamphetamine? What are your observations?

Mr. BROOKS. We are seeing a decrease, actually, in cocaine——

Mr. MICA. Cocaine——

Mr. BROOKS [continuing]. But certainly an increase in heroin. On

the West Coast where we are, the majority of the heroin is ‘‘black

tar,’’ Mexican-produced heroin. In fact, 14 percent of all the heroin

in the Nation is produced in Mexico.

What we are seeing is, in California—1,578 clandestine methamphetamine labs last year. We are awash in methamphetamine,

and we are tracking now with the DEA methamphetamine across

the United States to the Midwest, and even now, to the Northeast

and the Southeast.

This methamphetamine—the small mom and pop clandestine

labs are not—although there are a lot of them, they don’t produce

a significant amount of methamphetamine. But the super labs producing hundreds and hundreds of pounds of methamphetamine in

California are being run by Mexican crime families, particularly

the Amezcua’s and the Arellano-Felix’s, from command and control

structures in Mexico. Labs on the ground, precursors coming over

from Mexico, and the cash proceeds from those sales going back to

Mexico. That has truly become a drug that is causing us tremendous problems, not only in toxic dumping, in drugs on the street,

but in domestic violence. And, in fact, some studies show as much

as 86 percent, 80 to 86 percent, of all the child abuse and family

violence that we are seeing now in California is related to methamphetamine because the drug causes so much violence.

So it is a big problem for us, and it is a problem because we have

these Mexican crime bosses operating in the relative safety of their

own country, and not truly fearing arrest or extradition.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I am going to yield to Mr. Barr for two purposes.

Mr. Barr, would you take over and finish the hearing, ask questions that you may have, and then conclude the hearing? They are

just calling me to the floor right now, so I would appreciate it

if——

Mr. BARR. Actually, Mr. Chairman, you covered the topics that

I was going to cover.

I very much appreciate the witnesses being here and hope that

we can see some action as a result of these hearings today, so that

both the Coast Guard and our narcotics officers in California can

see some of these folks brought up here.

I know the extradition matter isn’t directly related to what you

are doing, Admiral, but I appreciate you testifying with regard to

the various agreements, and, hopefully, we can see some, because

I understand, knowing both maritime law and international law is

very, very complex. And as you indicated, you can take a drug runner that goes from Florida down to the coast of South American

Venezuela, and you go through dozens of jurisdictions, and each

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one of those gives them an opportunity to do stuff that you are not

aware of because you can’t actually go into those waters.

Hopefully, we will see a comprehensive model agreement. I agree

that it is sorely needed, and, hopefully, through your testimony

today, we can maybe in some small way, light a fire under the

State Department to move forward with a little more dispatch on

this. I think this is very, very important for our interdiction efforts

in the Caribbean area, more than anyplace else in the world.

Admiral RIUTTA. Sir, if I may, I would like to say that the State

Department has been working very well with us—as you said,

there are very complex agreements. We have almost a set negotiating team, and they have done a very good job in working with us

in bringing these to court——

Mr. BARR. OK.

Mr. Chairman, if I could, ask unanimous consent to have a statement by Ms. Ros-Lehtinen placed in the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen follows:]

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Mr. BARR. OK; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I would like to thank both of you.

Mr. BARR. And thank you, Mr. Brooks, and, Admiral.

Mr. MICA. We may have some additional questions for you, Admiral. I hate to cut you off short, but, again, I am being called to

the floor.

I want to thank you so much, Mr. Brooks, and what your folks

do.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. We are very proud of you, particularly during a week

when we can remember those who put their life on the line for our

country and all Americans.

There being no further business to come before the subcommittee

at this time, this meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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