[Cite as State v. Shanklin, 2014-Ohio-5624.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

UNION COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 14-13-23 

 v. 

GEORGE A. SHANKLIN, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 08-CR-0103 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: December 22, 2014 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Alison Boggs for Appellant 

David W. Phillips and Thayne D. Gray for Appellee 
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PRESTON, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, George A. Shanklin (“Shanklin”), appeals the 

November 7, 2013 judgment entry of sentence of the Union County Court of 

Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

{¶2} On August 6, 2008, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Shanklin 

on five counts, including: Count One of aggravated theft in violation of R.C. 

2913.02(A)(3), (B)(2), a second-degree felony;1

 Count Two of passing bad checks 

in violation of R.C. 2913.11(B), (F), a fifth-degree felony; Count Three of passing 

bad checks in violation of R.C. 2913.11(B), (F), a fourth-degree felony; Count 

Four of passing bad checks in violation of R.C. 2913.11(B), (F), a fourth-degree 

felony; and Count Five of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity in violation of 

R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), a second-degree felony.2

 (Doc. No. 1). After Shanklin was 

indicted, a warrant was issued for his arrest and bond was set at $50,000 cash or 

surety. (Doc. Nos. 2, 3, 5). 

{¶3} On October 9, 2008, Shanklin entered pleas of not guilty at 

arraignment, and the trial court increased Shanklin’s bond to $100,000 cash or 

surety. (Doc. No. 6). On October 14, 2008, Shanklin posted a $100,000 surety 

bond through HLS Bonding, International Fidelity Insurance Company (“the bond 

 

1

 Due to a change in the statute, the parties in the plea agreement stated, “[W]ith the change in law HB 86, 

this offense of Aggravated Theft is now a felony of the third degree with the value of the property or 

services stolen is one hundred fifty thousand dollars or more and is less than seven hundred fifty thousand 

dollars.” (Doc. No. 209). See also Am.Sub.H.B. 86, 2011 Ohio Laws 29. 2

 The charge was amended to a first-degree felony on February 15, 2013. (Feb. 15. 2013 Tr. at 4). 
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company”) as the surety. (Doc. No. 10). An extradition waiver was also filed. 

(Doc. No. 11). 

{¶4} On February 2, 2010, Shanklin failed to appear at a change-of-plea 

hearing. (Feb. 2, 2010 JE, Doc. No. 135). As a result, the trial court placed the 

case on inactive status, revoked Shanklin’s bond, issued a warrant for his arrest, 

and ordered the bond company to produce him within 30 days. (Id.). The trial 

court noted that the State may seek to have Shanklin’s bond forfeited if the bond 

company did not produce Shanklin within the 30 days. (Id.). Shanklin was not 

apprehended until January 2012 when he was apprehended in California and 

extradited to Ohio. (Doc. No. 154). Because Shanklin was out of the jurisdiction 

for almost two years, the trial court ordered his bail forfeited. (See July 23, 2010 

JE, Doc. No. 144); (Feb. 22, 2011 JE, Doc. No. 150). The bond company agreed 

to remit the $100,000 bond it posted for Shanklin, and the trial court disbursed the 

proceeds. (Id.); (Id.). (See also July 23, 2010 JE, Doc. No. 145); (Feb. 23, 2012 

JE, Doc. No. 153). 

{¶5} On February 15, 2013, the trial court held a change-of-plea hearing. 

(Doc. No. 209). Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Shanklin pled guilty to 

Counts One and Four and the State dismissed Counts Two, Three, and Five. (Id.). 

The trial court accepted Shanklin’s pleas and found him guilty as to Counts One 

and Four. (Feb. 15, 2013 Tr. at 18). After continuing sentencing a number of 
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times at Shanklin’s request so he could arrange payment of restitution, court costs, 

and fees, the trial court sentenced Shanklin on November 7, 2013 to 30 months 

imprisonment as to Count One and 17 months imprisonment as to Count Four, to 

be served consecutively. (Nov. 7, 2013 JE, Doc. No. 225). The trial court granted 

Shanklin 609 days of credit for time already served as of the date of his 

sentencing.3

 (Id.). Further, the trial court ordered Shanklin to pay $136,626.09 in 

restitution and to pay for his jail time, court costs, costs of prosecution, and fees 

under R.C. 2929.18. (Id.). On November 19, 2013, the trial court clarified that 

Shanklin was to pay $140,763.14 in court costs, fines, and restitution. (Nov. 19, 

2013 JE, Doc. No. 229). 

{¶6} On December 6, 2013, Shanklin filed his notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 

234). He raises four assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error No. I 

The trial court erred when it failed to merge the charges of 

aggravated theft and passing bad checks for sentencing 

purposes, as the charges are allied offenses of similar import. 

{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Shanklin argues that the aggravated 

theft and passing bad checks offenses for which he was convicted were allied 

offenses of similar import and that the trial court erred by not merging them for 

 

3

 The record reflects Shanklin filed a motion on April 3, 2014 requesting an additional 62 days of jail-time 

credit. (Doc. No. 249). The State filed a memorandum on April 10, 2014 in which it did not oppose 

granting Shanklin an additional 62 days of jail-time credit. (Doc. No. 250). However, the record does not 

reflect any judgments of the trial court granting Shanklin’s motion. 
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purposes of sentencing. Specifically, Shanklin argues that because Count Five of 

the indictment stated, “Between the dates of June 28, 2005 through October 31, 

2005 in a continuing course of criminal conduct in the furtherance of the same 

conspiracy and/or similar modus operandi * * *,” he recognized that passing bad 

checks was part of a continuing course of conduct related to a loan for vehicles 

that he fraudulently induced Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (“DCFS”) into 

entering. As such, he argues that the two offenses for which he was convicted 

should have been merged. 

{¶8} Whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import is a question of 

law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Stall, 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-10-12, 

2011-Ohio-5733, ¶ 15, citing State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-31, 

2011-Ohio-1461, ¶ 36. 

R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s multiple-count statute, states: 

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to 

constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the 

indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses, 

but the defendant may be convicted of only one. 

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more 

offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or 

more offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or 
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with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may 

contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be 

convicted of all of them. 

In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 

2941.25, the court must first determine whether it is possible to commit both 

offenses with the same conduct. State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 

2010-Ohio-6314, ¶ 48. “If the multiple offenses can be committed with the same 

conduct, then the court must determine whether the offenses were committed by 

the same conduct, i.e., ‘a single act, committed with a single state of mind.’” Id. at 

¶ 49, quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569, ¶ 50 

(Lanzinger, J., dissenting). 

{¶9} If it is possible to commit the offenses with the same conduct and the 

defendant did, in fact, commit the multiple offenses with the same conduct, then 

the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and will merge. Id. at ¶ 50. 

However, “if the court determines that the commission of one offense will never

result in the commission of the other, or if the offenses are committed separately, 

or if the defendant has separate animus for each, then according to R.C.

2941.25(B), the offenses will not merge.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 51. “The 

Supreme Court of Ohio has defined animus as ‘purpose, or more properly, 

immediate motive.’” State v. Hadding, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-12-14, 
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2013-Ohio-643, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 131 (1979). 

“‘The defendant bears the burden to prove entitlement to merger.’” State v. Love, 

3d Dist. Marion No. 9-13-09, 2014-Ohio-437, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Forney, 2d 

Dist. Champaign No. 2012-CA-36, 2013-Ohio-3458, ¶ 10. 

{¶10} Here, Shanklin was convicted of aggravated theft, under R.C. 

2913.02(A)(3), and passing bad checks, under R.C. 2913.11(B). R.C. 

2913.02(A)(3) provides: “No person, with purpose to deprive the owner of 

property or services, shall knowingly obtain or exert control over either property 

or services * * * [b]y deception.” R.C. 2913.11(B) provides: “No person, with 

purpose to defraud, shall issue or transfer or cause to be issued or transferred a 

check or other negotiable instrument, knowing that it will be dishonored or 

knowing that a person has ordered or will order stop payment on the check or 

other negotiable instrument.” 

{¶11} We must first determine whether it is possible to commit the offenses 

of aggravated theft and passing bad checks with the same conduct. Johnson at ¶ 

48. Applying Johnson, at least two districts have determined that theft offenses 

and passing bad checks can be committed by the same conduct. State v. Rogers, 

2d Dist. Greene No. 2011 CA 0057, 2012-Ohio-4451, ¶ 14 (“It is possible, in 

committing the offense of passing bad checks, to knowingly obtain control over 

the property or services of a person who provides the property or services in 
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exchange for the bad check, when the actor has the purpose of depriving the owner 

of the property or services he provided.”); State v. Snyder, 12th Dist. Butler No. 

CA2011-02-018, 2011-Ohio-6346, ¶ 19-20 (finding that it is possible to commit 

the offenses of grand theft by deception and passing bad checks with the same 

conduct). We agree and conclude that it is possible to commit the offenses of 

aggravated theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3) and passing bad checks in 

violation of R.C. 2913.11(B) with the same conduct. 

{¶12} Because we determined that it is possible to commit the two offenses 

by engaging in the same conduct, we must determine if Shanklin committed 

aggravated theft and passing bad checks—as alleged in Counts One and Four of 

the indictment—separately or with a separate animus to each. Rogers at ¶ 14, 

citing Johnson at ¶ 50-51. Shanklin argues that because Count Five of the 

indictment charged him with engaging in a continuing course of criminal conduct 

from June 28, 2005 through October 31, 2005, his acts under Counts One and Four 

should be considered the same conduct under Snyder. See Snyder at ¶ 23-24. The 

defendant in Snyder was convicted of one count of grand theft by deception and 

three counts of passing bad checks. Id. at ¶ 1. In the grand-theft-by-deception 

count, Snyder was charged with engaging in a continuing course of criminal 

conduct from January 26, 2009 through March 3, 2009. Id. at ¶ 22. During that 

time, Snyder issued three bad checks—one on February 11, 2009 and two on 
Case No. 14-13-23 

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February 18, 2009. Id. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals concluded that 

Snyder’s grand-theft-by-deception and passing-bad-checks convictions were allied 

offenses of similar import and subject to merger because, in part, Snyder issued 

the bad checks during the continuing course of conduct alleged in the 

grand-theft-by-deception count of the indictment. Id. ¶ 25, 33. However, the 

decision in Snyder is inapplicable to the facts in this case for the reasons that 

follow. 

{¶13} Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Shanklin pled guilty to 

Counts One and Four and the State dismissed Counts Two, Three, and Five. The 

offenses of aggravated theft and passing bad checks—as alleged in Counts One 

and Four of the indictment—were charged in discrete counts in the indictment, 

and no continuing course of conduct in relation to the two offenses was alleged. 

Compare Rogers at ¶ 9 with Snyder at ¶ 22, 25. In addition, unlike the defendant 

in Snyder, Shanklin did not issue the bad check to obtain the loan for the vehicles. 

Compare Snyder at ¶ 31-32 (concluding that Snyder committed grand theft by 

deception and passing bad checks with the same animus because Snyder issued 

bad checks to obtain steel studs). 

{¶14} In Count One of the indictment, Shanklin was charged with having 

the “purpose to deprive the owner of property or services” by “knowingly 

obtain[ing] or extert[ing] control over the property or services by deception” “[o]n 
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or about June 28, 2005 through August 15, 2005.” (Doc. No. 1). During that 

period of time, Shanklin entered a contract valued at $598,938.00 to purchase or 

lease a fleet of 13 vehicles—one Jeep Grand Cherokee, three Mercedes, and nine 

Dodge Sprinter vans—to use in his dry cleaning business and, subsequently, took 

possession of the 13 vehicles. (Doc. Nos. 4, 14); (Feb. 15, 2013 Tr. at 15-16). To 

obtain the vehicles, Shanklin provided documents to Nelson Auto Group in 

Marysville, Ohio that falsely inflated the value of his business. (Feb. 15, 2013 Tr. 

at 15). Shanklin provided the false documents to Nelson Auto Group to secure 

financing from DCFS to purchase or lease the vehicles. (Id.). In an interview with 

the Marysville Police Department on June 7, 2006, Shanklin stated that he knew 

that if he provided DCFS with accurate information, DCFS would not loan him the 

money for the vehicles. (Shanklin Inter., Doc. No. 73 at 7). Thus to obtain the 

loan, Shanklin falsely inflated the value of his business by altering the 2003 and 

2004 financial records of his company. (Id. at 4). He also provided a false credit 

questionnaire and credit application. (Feb. 15, 2013 Tr. at 15-16). Accordingly, 

between June 28, 2005 and August 15, 2005, Shanklin knowingly deceived DCFS 

by misrepresenting the value of his business to induce DCFS into loaning him the 

money for the vehicles. See State v. Edmondson, 92 Ohio St.3d 393, 397 (2001), 

citing R.C. 2913.01(A) (defining “deception” to include “any false or misleading 

representation * * * that creates, confirms, or perpetuates a false impression in 
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another”). During that same period of time, Shanklin knowingly obtained control 

over the vehicles with the purpose to deprive DCFS of them. Id.

Second, in Count Four of the indictment, it was alleged that: 

“[o]n or about October 31, 2005 * * *, Shanklin with purpose to 

defraud, did issue or transfer or cause to be issued or transferred a 

check or other negotiable instrument, knowing that it would be 

dishonored, and the check or other negotiable instrument was issued 

or transferred to a single vender for the payment of five thousand 

dollars or more but less than one hundred thousand dollars.” 

(Doc. No. 1). A discussion of the offense demonstrates how Shanklin’s actions in 

passing the bad check were committed separately and with separate animus to his 

actions as alleged in Count One of the indictment. 

{¶15} “With respect to purpose or intent to defraud in passing bad check 

cases, financial damage is not necessary to the existence of a fraud.” State v. 

Bergsmark, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1137, 2004-Ohio-5753, ¶ 12, citing State v. 

Lowenstein, 109 Ohio St. 393, 400 (1927). See also R.C. 2913.01(B) (defining 

“defraud” as “to knowingly obtain, by deception, some benefit for oneself or 

another, or to knowingly cause, by deception, some detriment to another”). 

“Fraud exists where the check writer gains any type of advantage as a result of his 

or her actions.” Id., citing State v. Hedrick, 92 Ohio App.3d 618, 620 (2d 
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Dist.1994) and State v. Smith, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2002CA306, 2003-Ohio-2033, ¶ 

47. “The terms ‘advantage’ and ‘benefit’ have not been interpreted to require that 

something of value be obtained as a result of the deception.” Id. at ¶ 13, citing 

State v. Doane, 69 Ohio App.3d 638, 650 (11th Dist.1990). 

{¶16} On October 31, 2005, Shanklin issued a check for $20,463.73 from 

his account with Fifth Third Bank, which was closed by Fifth Third Bank on or 

about September 29, 2005. (Feb. 15, 2013 Tr. at 16); (Doc. No. 15). In the 

presentence investigation (“PSI”) report, Shanklin stated, “Once I got too deep and 

spread too thin in the proposed acquisitions, my cash flow suffered dramatically. I 

did everything humanly possible to keep the business operating, thinking if I could 

just hold on things would work out. Writing a bad check just postponed the 

inevitable * * *.” (PSI at 4). Thus, Shanklin admitted that he issued the bad check 

to obtain the benefit of “postpon[ing] the inevitable.” Therefore, on October 31, 

2005, Shanklin knowingly defrauded DCFS by issuing a check for $20,463.73 

from a closed account knowing that it would be dishonored. 

{¶17} Consequently, Shanklin’s conduct—as alleged in Counts One and 

Four of the indictment—was not part of a continuing course of conduct or 

committed with the same purpose or immediate motive. Instead, his conduct was 

committed separately and with a separate animus for each. Shanklin provided 

documents falsely inflating the value of his business to obtain the loan from 
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DCFS. The theft offense was complete once he took possession of the vehicles 

after inducing DCFS to lending the money to him based on the false information 

he provided. See State v. Ballard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98355, 2013-Ohio-373, 

¶ 14. Separate from that, Shanklin intended to defraud DCFS by issuing a check 

on a closed account that he knew would be dishonored. “‘Because one offense 

was complete before the other offense occurred, the two offenses were committed 

separately for purposes of R.C. 2941.25(B), notwithstanding their proximity in 

time and that one was committed in order to commit the other.’” State v. Sludder, 

3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-69, 2012-Ohio-4014, ¶ 14, quoting State v. Turner, 2d 

Dist. Montgomery No. 24421, 2011-Ohio-6714, ¶ 24. In addition, Shanklin did 

not commit the offenses with the same purpose or immediate motive—that is, 

Shanklin intended to deceive DCFS by misrepresenting the value of his business 

to obtain a loan from DCFS for the vehicles and, later, Shanklin intended to 

defraud DCFS by issuing the bad check to “postpone[] the inevitable.” See 

Rogers, 2012-Ohio-4451, at ¶ 15. Therefore, we conclude that the two offenses 

were committed separately and with a separate animus for each, and merger is 

avoided under R.C. 2941.25(B). 

{¶18} For these reasons, Shanklin’s first assignment of error is overruled. 
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Assignment of Error No. II 

The trial court erred when it failed to conduct a separate 

hearing to determine the exact amount of restitution due the 

victim. 

{¶19} In his second assignment of error, Shanklin argues that it was error 

for the trial court not to conduct a separate hearing to determine the exact amount 

of restitution due to the victim. 

{¶20} Shanklin concedes that he did not object to the restitution ordered by 

the trial court. “A failure to object to the trial court’s award of restitution waives 

all but plain error.” State v. Stewart, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-08-11, 

2008-Ohio-5823, ¶ 7, citing State v. Marbury, 104 Ohio App.3d 179, 181 (8th 

Dist.1995) and Crim.R. 52(B). “In order to have plain error under Crim.R. 52(B), 

there must be an error, the error must be an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial 

proceedings, and the error must have affected ‘substantial rights.’” Id., citing 

State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). “Plain error exists only in the event 

that it can be said that ‘but for the error, the outcome of the trial would clearly 

have been otherwise.’” Id., quoting State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 431 (1997). 

“Plain error is to be used ‘with the utmost caution, under exceptional 

circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Id., quoting 

Barnes at 27. “[I]mposition of a sentence not authorized by statute constitutes 
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plain error.” Id., citing State v. Rhoda, 135 Ohio App.3d 21, 25 (3d Dist.1999) 

and State v. Samuels, 4th Dist. Washington No. 03CA8, 2003-Ohio-6106, ¶ 9. 

{¶21} R.C. 2929.18 governs financial sanctions that are imposed by a trial 

court, and, in pertinent part, states: 

(A) * * * Financial sanctions that may be imposed pursuant to this 

section include, but are not limited to, the following: 

(1) Restitution by the offender to the victim of the offender’s crime 

or any survivor of the victim, in an amount based on the victim’s 

economic loss. If the court imposes restitution, the court shall order 

that the restitution be made to the victim in open court, to the adult 

probation department that serves the county on behalf of the victim, 

to the clerk of courts, or to another agency designated by the court. 

If the court imposes restitution, at sentencing, the court shall 

determine the amount of restitution to be made by the offender. If 

the court imposes restitution, the court may base the amount of 

restitution it orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the 

offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts 

indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other 

information, provided that the amount the court orders as restitution 

shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by the 
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victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the 

offense. If the court decides to impose restitution, the court shall 

hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor 

disputes the amount. All restitution payments shall be credited 

against any recovery of economic loss in a civil action brought by 

the victim or any survivor of the victim against the offender. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). The statute is clear that a trial court must 

hold a hearing on restitution if the offender disputes the amount of restitution. 

State v. Lamere, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-07-11, 2007-Ohio-4930, ¶ 10. See also State 

Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248, 2013-Ohio-3093, ¶ 22-23. Absent such a challenge, 

the statute grants the trial court the authority to order restitution “in an amount 

based on the victim’s economic loss” as established by “an amount recommended 

by the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation report, estimates or 

receipts indicating the cost of repairing or replacing property, and other 

information.” State v. Halcomb, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-12-13, 2013-Ohio-1301, 

¶ 31, citing R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). See also State v. Buckeye Truck & Trailer 

Leasing, Inc., 187 Ohio App.3d 309, 2010-Ohio-1699, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.). “[T]he 

amount of restitution must bear a reasonable relationship to the loss suffered.” 

State v. Estes, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-11-14, 2011-Ohio-5740, ¶ 20, quoting 

Marbury, 104 Ohio App.3d at 181. “There must be competent and credible 
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evidence in the record from which the court may ascertain the amount of 

restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty.” Id.

{¶22} We conclude that it was not plain error for the trial court not to 

conduct a hearing to determine the exact amount of restitution due to the victim or 

for the trial court to order Shanklin to pay restitution in the amount of 

$136,626.09. State v. Wilkins, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-13-13, 2014-Ohio-983, ¶ 

11. First, at the November 7, 2013 sentencing hearing, Shanklin’s trial counsel 

did not object to the amount of restitution. Since there was no dispute as to the 

amount of restitution, the trial court was not required to hold a hearing. Buckeye 

Truck & Trailer Leasing, Inc. at ¶ 26 (“By the clear language of the restitution 

statute, a court need only hold a hearing on the award if one of the named actors 

disputes the amount.”). 

{¶23} Second, the trial court ordered restitution in an amount recommended 

by the State, which was based on DCFS’s economic loss as established by its 

victim-impact statement. R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) allows the trial court to base the 

amount of restitution it orders “on amount recommended by the victim,” “a 

presentence investigation report,” or “other information, provided that the amount 

the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss 

suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the 

offense.” Wilkins at ¶ 12; R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). DCFS’s victim-impact statement, 
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which was also included in the PSI, asserted that its economic loss was 

$243,148.17. (Doc. No. 4); (PSI). “Economic loss is defined by R.C. 2929.01(L) 

as, ‘any economic detriment suffered by a victim as a direct and proximate result 

of the commission of an offense and includes any loss of income due to lost time 

at work because of any injury caused to the victim, and any property loss, medical 

cost, or funeral expense incurred as a result of the commission of the offense.’” 

Halcomb at ¶ 31, quoting R.C. 2929.01(L). “Restitution is limited to the actual 

economic loss, which requires that any losses be offset by any gains.” State v. 

Love, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-13-09, 2014-Ohio-437, ¶ 57, citing State v. Clayton, 

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22937, 2009-Ohio-7040, ¶ 56. 

{¶24} In its victim-impact statement, DCFS asserted that its economic loss 

was based on the total contract value less the amount it was able to recapture after 

repossessing and reselling the vehicles. (Doc. No. 4).4

 The State recommended 

restitution in an amount less than this. At oral argument, the State clarified that it 

further offset the amount of restitution requested by DCFS by deducting interest 

and finance charges that were built into the original contract price. Thus, not only 

was the amount of restitution requested by DCFS offset by its mitigation efforts in 

repossessing and reselling the vehicles, but the State further offset that amount to 

Shanklin’s benefit by deducting additional interest and finance charges built into 

 

4

 We note that the victim-impact statement reflects only 12 vehicles and does not include any value for the 

Jeep Grand Cherokee. (See Doc. No. 4). 
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the original contract price. Accordingly, the trial court based the amount of 

restitution on “other information” recommended by the State that did not exceed 

the economic loss asserted by DCFS as a direct and proximate loss of Shanklin’s 

conduct. Therefore, there was competent, credible evidence that DCFS’s 

economic detriment—namely, the loss in value of the vehicles less additional 

interest and finance charges in the amount of $136,626.09—was directly and 

proximately related to Shanklin’s offenses and bore a reasonable relationship to 

the loss it suffered. Thus, the trial court did not err in ordering Shanklin to pay 

restitution in the amount of $136,626.09. 

{¶25} We also note that Shanklin appears to argue that his $100,000 bail 

forfeiture should have been applied toward his restitution and court costs under 

R.C. 2937.40. Specifically, Shanklin avers, “It is unclear from the record if the 

court applied any of the forfeited bail money to Appellant’s restitution and other 

costs, even though it had the authority to do so.” However, Shanklin’s contention 

is erroneous as there were neither bail proceeds posted by Shanklin on his own 

behalf nor bail proceeds remaining in his case.5

 See R.C. 2937.40(A)-(C). See 

also R.C. 2937.35; R.C. 2937.36. 

{¶26} Therefore, Shanklin’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

 

5

 Shanklin did not appeal from the trial court’s judgment entries of July 23, 2010, February 22, 2011, and 

February 23, 2012 declaring his bail forfeited, executing judgment against the bond company, and 

distributing the forfeited proceeds. (See July 23, 2010 JE, Doc. No. 144); (Feb. 22, 2011 JE, Doc. No. 

150); (Feb. 23, 2012 JE, Doc. No. 153). See also App.R. 3(A); App.R. 4(A). 
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Assignment of Error No. III 

Appellant was deprived effective assistance of counsel when 

counsel failed to identify for the court that the aggravated theft 

and passing bad check charges were allied offenses of similar 

import and the failure to object to the restitution amount. 

{¶27} In his third assignment of error, Shanklin argues that he was deprived 

the effective assistance of trial counsel. In particular, Shanklin argues that his trial 

counsel failed to raise with the trial court that the offenses of which he was 

convicted were allied offenses of similar import, that his trial counsel failed to 

object to the amount of restitution requested by the State, and that his trial counsel 

failed to review the allegations in the indictment. 

{¶28} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

must establish: (1) the counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable under 

the circumstances; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 

State v. Kole, 92 Ohio St.3d 303, 306 (2001), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In order to show counsel’s conduct was deficient or 

unreasonable, the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided 

competent representation and must show that counsel’s actions were not trial 

strategies prompted by reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687. Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions fall within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 

673, 675 (1998). Tactical or strategic trial decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not 
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generally constitute ineffective assistance. State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558 

(1995). Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of 

counsel’s essential duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St. 3d 136, 

141-42 (1989), quoting State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 396 (1976). 

{¶29} First, Shanklin argues that his trial counsel’s performance was 

deficient because his trial counsel failed to raise with the trial court that the 

offenses of which he was convicted were allied offenses of similar import. The 

failure to make a motion is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. 

Schlosser, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-10-30, 2011-Ohio-4183, ¶ 34, citing In re Smith, 

3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-01-34, 2002 WL 255126, *6 (Feb. 22, 2002). “Without 

proving that trial counsel was deficient for failing to make certain motions and that 

those motions had a reasonable probability of success, the ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim fails.” Id. As we determined in Shanklin’s first assignment of 

error, the offenses of which Shanklin was convicted were not allied offenses of 

similar import and, thus, not subject to merger. Accordingly, Shanklin’s argument 

here is without merit—that is, Shanklin cannot show that had his trial counsel 

raised the issue of merger with the trial court, his trial counsel’s motion would 

have had a reasonable probability of success. 

{¶30} Next, Shanklin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he failed to object to the amount of restitution requested by the State and ordered 
Case No. 14-13-23 

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by the trial court. As we determined in Shanklin’s second assignment of error, the 

trial court properly imposed $136,626.09 in restitution under R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). 

On appeal, Shanklin has not argued that there was any additional information that 

would have altered the final restitution order. Indeed, because the trial court 

ordered an amount of restitution that was less than the economic loss DCFS 

asserted in its victim-impact statement, it is unlikely that Shanklin would have 

prevailed even if his trial counsel challenged the restitution requested by the State 

and ordered by the trial court. Having no argument that would have changed the 

outcome here, we are not persuaded that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

object to the restitution requested by the State and ordered by the trial court. See 

State v. Tate, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25386, 2013-Ohio-5167, ¶ 88 (concluding 

that the defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to object to the 

restitution order because the restitution was properly imposed under R.C. 

2929.18(A)(1) and the defendant did not provide any evidence that would have 

changed the final restitution order). 

{¶31} Third, Shanklin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because 

he failed to review the allegations in the indictment. Specifically, Shanklin asserts 

that his trial counsel should have reviewed whether Count One of the indictment 

should have been based on the contract amount or the actual value of the vehicles. 

However, we decline to address Shanklin’s assertion because he did not provide 
Case No. 14-13-23 

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any argument relative to how he was prejudiced or how his trial counsel was 

deficient for failing to review the charges in the indictment. State v. Raber, 189 

Ohio App.3d 396, 2010-Ohio-4066, ¶ 30 (9th Dist.) (“[I]f an argument exists that 

can support [an] assignment of error, it is not this [c]ourt’s duty to root it out.”). 

See also App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R. 16(A)(7). 

{¶32} Accordingly, Shanklin’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

Assignment of Error No. IV 

The trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences. 

{¶33} In his fourth assignment of error, Shanklin argues that the trial court 

erred in sentencing him to consecutive sentences. Specifically, Shanklin argues 

that the trial court did not make the proper findings required by R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) and that it was improper for the trial court to impose consecutive 

sentences because of the change in the law. 

{¶34} Shanklin concedes that he did not object to the imposition of 

consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing. Consequently, Shanklin’s failure 

to object to the imposition of his consecutive sentences waives all but plain error 

on review. State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 152. As we 

noted above, plain errors are obvious defects in the proceedings that affect 

substantial rights, and include the imposition of a sentence not authorized by 

statute. Stewart, 2008-Ohio-5823, at ¶ 7. 
Case No. 14-13-23 

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{¶35} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires a trial court to make specific findings on 

the record before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Hites, 3d Dist. Hardin 

No. 6-11-07, 2012-Ohio-1892, ¶ 11; State v. Peddicord, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-12-

24, 2013-Ohio-3398, ¶ 33. Specifically, the trial court must find: (1) consecutive 

sentences are necessary to either protect the public or punish the offender; (2) the 

sentences would not be disproportionate to the offense committed; and (3) one of 

the factors in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a), (b), or (c) applies. Id.; Id. 

{¶36} Here, before imposing consecutive sentences, the trial court found 

that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public and punish 

Shanklin and that the sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of 

Shanklin’s conduct. (Nov. 7, 2013 Tr. at 11). Further, the trial court found that 

two or more of the multiple offenses Shanklin committed were so great or unusual 

that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any courses 

of conduct adequately reflected the seriousness of his conduct and that Shanklin’s 

history of criminal conduct—in particular, his absconsion from the jurisdiction of 

the court during the pendency of the case—demonstrated that consecutive 

sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime. (Id.). 

{¶37} The trial court incorporated these findings into its judgment entry of 

sentence. (Nov. 7, 2013 JE, Doc. No. 225). Therefore, because the trial court 

made the requisite findings before imposing consecutive sentences and 
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incorporated its findings into its sentencing entry, it was not plain error for the trial 

court to impose consecutive sentences. 

{¶38} For these reasons, Shanklin’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶39} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the 

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ROGERS and SHAW, J.J., concur. 

/jlr