SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0815-18T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JERMAINE J. OLIVER, a/k/a 

OLIVER JERMAINE, HILL, 

OLIVER JEROME, OLIVER 

JERMAINE, OLIVER 

JERMAINE J., OLIVER 

JACKIE J., and OLIVER JACKIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

______________________________

Submitted June 3, 2020 – Decided July 1, 2020

Before Judges Whipple and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 14-10-1212.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Al Glimis, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney 

for respondent (Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Following the denial of his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty 

pleas, defendant was sentenced in accordance with a plea agreement to an 

aggregate seven-year term of imprisonment, subject to an eighty-five percent 

period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), 

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. He now appeals from the October 4, 2018 judgments of 

conviction, raising the following point for our consideration:

POINT I

THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 

IGNORING EVIDENCE OF [DEFENDANT'S] 

COLORABLE CLAIM OF INNOCENCE AND BY 

DENYING HIS PRE-SENTENCING PLEAWITHDRAWAL MOTION.

A. [DEFENDANT] ASSERTED A COLORABLE 

CLAIM OF INNOCENCE BY PRESENTING 

"SPECIFIC POTENTIALLY PLAUSIBLE FACTS, 

AND NOT SIMPLY A BALD ASSERTION."

B. [DEFENDANT] ASSERTED STRONG 

REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL. 

C. THE EXISTENCE OF A PLEA BARGAIN 

SHOULD NOT OUTWEIGH THE OTHER 

FACTORS.
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D. WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT RESULT IN 

UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO THE STATE OR 

ADVANTAGE TO THE DEFENDANT.

E. [DEFENDANT] HAS MET ALL OF THE 

SLATER[1] REQUIREMENTS FOR PLEA 

WITHDRAWAL, AND THE TRIAL JUDGE'S 

REFUSAL TO HONOR HIS REQUEST WAS AN 

ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL.

We reject defendant's contentions and affirm.

On February 4, 2016, defendant was charged in a twelve-count Mercer 

County indictment with second-degree eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b) (count 

one); four counts of second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(6) 

(counts two through five); fourth-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(2) 

(count six); four counts of third-degree assault by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(c)(2) 

(counts seven through ten); second-degree assault by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(c)(2) (count eleven); and fourth-degree assault by auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(c)(2) (count twelve). The indictment stemmed from allegations that while 

attempting to elude police during a high-speed pursuit, defendant rear-ended one 

vehicle and crashed head-on into another, injuring the occupants of both 

vehicles. After the crash, defendant was arrested when he tried to flee on foot. 

 

1

 State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009).
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Richard Nelson, a passenger in defendant's vehicle at the time of the crash, gave 

a statement to police identifying defendant as the driver. 

On November 14, 2016, defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea to 

count two of the indictment, as well as a one-count accusation charging him with 

third-degree possession of a sawed-off shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(b). 

Defendant also pled guilty to violations of probation on two earlier convictions. 

During the plea colloquy, as to the indictment, defendant admitted causing 

bodily injury to the victim on June 22, 2015, when he attempted to elude police 

in the motor vehicle he was operating and caused an accident. Regarding the 

accusation, defendant admitted that on January 22, 2016, he was in possession 

of "a Springfield 67F 12[-]gauge shotgun" in the City of Trenton. Additionally, 

defendant admitted violating his probation by incurring the new charges. In 

accordance with Rule 3:9-2, the judge accepted the guilty pleas, finding that 

"defendant [was] competent," and that "[t]he pleas [were] being made freely, 

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily" with "sufficient factual bases " to 

support the charges. 

On June 7, 2017, prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his 

guilty pleas. In a supporting certification, defendant averred that when he 

entered the guilty pleas, he "had been diagnosed with and suffered from Bipolar 
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Disorder and Schizophrenia" and was "prescribed [twenty-eight] medications 

for various mental and physical ailments," but "had not been provided Seroquil, 

Zofran, Percocet, and Xanax." Additionally, according to defendant, he 

"indicated to [his then attorney] that there were witnesses" who "would 

exonerate [him] and provide statements to that effect." Defendant submitted an 

"attorney ethics grievance form" he had filed against his plea counsel on April 

27, 2017, alleging "[s]he misled [him] on the case" and "held onto information 

about the case that [would] prove [his] innocence." Defendant also submitted a 

report of a psychiatric evaluation conducted on October 2, 2015, at an outpatient 

facility, as well as a certification prepared on May 31, 2016, by Nelson. 

In the certification, Nelson averred that "[c]ontrary to the police report, 

[he] did not tell police that [defendant] was the driver." He explained that the 

driver was an unidentified "third person" who was driving them "to buy 

synthetic marijuana." According to Nelson, after the crash, "[he] was briefly 

knocked out" and "[w]hen [he] regained consciousness[,] the driver was gone." 

Nelson claimed that before the police pulled them out of the car, he "pulled" 

defendant from the backseat "into the front passenger seat" while he (Nelson) 

"scooted over to the driver side."
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On August 22, 2018, following oral argument, the trial judge denied 

defendant's motion. In an oral opinion, the judge analyzed each of the four 

Slater factors: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable claim of 

innocence; (2) the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) 

the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in 

unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." 198 N.J. at 

157-58. Because the judge determined defendant failed to meet his burden in 

establishing "even one of the Slater factors," the judge concluded "the interests 

of justice [did] not support the . . . motion."

Regarding the first Slater factor, the judge determined that rather than 

asserting a colorable claim of innocence, "defendant's assertion [was] exactly 

the type that the Slater [C]ourt" rejected.

2

 As to the second Slater factor, the 

judge determined defendant failed to advance "a good faith basis for asserting a 

defense on the merits." The judge also dismissed as "baseless" defendant's 

purported reasons for withdrawal, namely his "ineffective . . . counsel" and

failure to "fully understand the nature of the guilty plea[s]" due to "mental 

 

2

 In Slater, the Court catalogued "examples" of cases in which withdrawal of a 

plea was warranted, including where "the defendant has not only made a 

plausible showing of a valid defense against the charges, but also credibly 

demonstrated why that defense 'was forgotten or missed' at the time of the plea." 

Id. at 159-60 (citations omitted). 
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instability." As to the former assertion, because plea counsel was aware of 

Nelson's certification, which was obtained prior to the plea hearing during an 

interview by an investigator for the Office of the Public Defender (OPD), the 

judge determined defendant "fail[ed] to assert facts that would have been 

revealed" through counsel's further investigation or facts that "potentially would 

have exonerated him."

As to defendant's latter assertion, the judge stated:

While [defendant] was previously diagnosed 

with bipolar disorder and other psychotic [dis]order not 

due to a substance or known psychological condition by 

an advanced practice nurse at Oaks Integrated on 

October 2, 2015, the State is correct that the more 

recent mental evaluation is relevant to his mental 

stability at the time of the plea on November [14, 2016].

That being said, on December [7], 2016, 

[defendant] was seen at his request for a mental health 

evaluation which reported that he was alert, aware and 

oriented. . . . Thereafter, on December [9], 2016, 

[defendant] was evaluated by Dr. Edward Hume. Dr. 

Hume reported that he had first seen [defendant] earlier 

in February of 2016 and his impression at that time was 

that [defendant] was malingering. . . .

Dr. Hume noted next that he saw [defendant] on 

April [8], 2016, and concluded that [defendant] had no 

active psychiatric disorder. . . . Dr. Hume then saw 

[defendant] on March [6], 2017, and reported that his 

medications, specifically Seroquel, Depakote, Xanax,

[and] Gabapentin are either drugs of abuse, drugs with 
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no psychiatric indications or both with the exception of 

the Depakote. . . .

Dr. Hume concluded that [defendant] has no 

treatable psychiatric illness, and that while he could 

continue to take Depakote for seizures, no psychiatric 

meds were needed at his evaluation. . . .

Thereafter, on May [9], 2017, a psychologist, Dr. 

Melissa M. Detora evaluated [defendant]. Dr. Detora 

concluded that [defendant] does not present with any 

acute mental health issues at this time other than 

ADHD. He appears to be feigning and exaggerating 

symptoms to obtain medications.

Further, based on his review of the November 14, 2016 plea colloquy, the 

judge was "satisfied" that defendant "underst[ood] the questions posed by the 

[c]ourt" and "answered each question without hesitation." The judge found "that 

defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into the plea 

agreement," and "testified under oath that he was satisfied with defense counsel, 

he had the opportunity to review the discovery, and he understood the charges 

against him."

Turning to the third Slater factor, while the judge acknowledged that 

defendant had "a heavier burden" because he pled guilty "pursuant to a plea 

bargain," the judge did "not give great weight to this factor in the overall 

analysis," notwithstanding the fact that defendant benefited from the dismissal 

of numerous charges and reduced sentencing exposure. Finally, the judge 
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determined that the fourth Slater factor did "not weigh in favor of defendant" in 

"light of the fact that the three preceding factors" weighed against him. The 

judge entered a memorializing order and set a sentencing date for the following 

month. Thereafter, on September 21, 2018, defendant was sentenced in 

accordance with the plea agreement, and this appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant focuses solely on his guilty plea to the eluding 

indictment, asserting that "[s]ince the conviction . . . was a substantial part of 

the plea agreement, the entire plea agreement should be vacated" because the 

judge failed to "proper[ly] balanc[e] . . . the Slater factors under the more liberal 

pre-sentence standard for plea withdrawals." Specifically, defendant argues the 

judge abused his discretion "in failing to consider Nelson's certification" to 

satisfy the first Slater factor, in finding that "the lack of prescribed psychiatric 

medications" failed to satisfy the second Slater factor, and in evaluating "the 

fourth Slater factor . . . based on an erroneous assessment" of the other factors. 

We disagree. 

"A more relaxed standard applies to plea-withdrawal motions made before 

sentencing" than after sentencing. State v. Munroe, 210 N.J. 429, 441 (2012). 

"Before sentencing, a 'defendant shall be permitted to withdraw' a guilty plea if 

'the interests of justice would not be served by effectuating the [plea] 
10 A-0815-18T4

agreement.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:9-3(e)). "In such cases, 

'courts are to exercise their discretion liberally to allow plea withdrawals,'" and

"[i]n a close case, the 'scales should usually tip in favor of defendant.'" Ibid.

(quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 156). "However, '[l]iberality in exercising discretion 

does not mean an abdication of all discretion.'" Id. at 441-42 (quoting Slater, 

198 N.J. at 157). Thus, "[o]n appellate review, the issue is whether the trial 

court properly exercised its discretion at the time it denied the withdrawal 

motion." Id. at 443. A trial court abuses its discretion "when 'there has been a 

clear error of judgment.'" Id. at 448 (quoting State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 

313 (1988)).

"In moving to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant bears the burden of 

presenting a 'plausible basis for his request' and a good-faith basis for 'asserting 

a defense on the merits.'" Id. at 442 (quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 156). In turn, 

in deciding a plea withdrawal motion, "courts should 'consider and balance'" the 

four factors identified in Slater. Munroe, 210 N.J. at 442 (quoting Slater, 198 

N.J. at 157-58). 

As to the first Slater factor, "[a] colorable claim of innocence is one that 

rests on 'particular, plausible facts' that, if proven in court, would lead a 

reasonable factfinder to determine the claim is meritorious." Ibid. (quoting 
11 A-0815-18T4

Slater, 198 N.J. at 158-59). While "[i]t is more than '[a] bare assertion of 

innocence,' . . . the motion judge need not be convinced that it is a winning 

argument because, in the end, legitimate factual disputes must be resolved by 

the jury." Ibid. (quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 158). However, the trial judge must 

still distinguish between "a colorable claim of innocence" and a "bald assertion." 

State v. Lipa, 219 N.J. 323, 333-34 (2014). Doing so requires a judge to engage 

in some weighing of evidence to determine whether facts are "credible" or 

"plausible." Ibid.

As to the second Slater factor, "[t]he nature and strength of a defendant's 

reasons for withdrawal of a plea will necessarily depend on the circumstances 

peculiar to the case." Munroe, 210 N.J. at 442. "A defendant will likely satisfy 

this factor if he can make a 'plausible showing of a valid defense against the 

charges' and credibly explain why an otherwise legitimate defense was 

overlooked during the plea colloquy." Id. at 443 (quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 

159-60).

A court should evaluate the validity of the reasons 

given for a plea withdrawal with realism, understanding 

that some defendants will be attempting to game the 

system, but not with skepticism, for the ultimate goal is 

to ensure that legitimate disputes about the guilt or 

innocence of a criminal defendant are decided by a jury.

[Ibid.]
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The third Slater factor "receives the least weight in the overall analysis." 

Munroe, 210 N.J. at 443. "Although this factor should not be discounted, for 

our system 'rests on the advantages both sides receive from' the plea-bargaining 

process, '[courts] recognize that the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved 

through plea bargains.'" Ibid. (quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 161). The critical 

inquiry in evaluating the fourth and final Slater factor "is whether the passage 

of time has hampered the State's ability to present important evidence." Munroe, 

210 N.J. at 443 (quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 161). "Thus, the trial court must 

consider the delay to the State in presenting its case to the jury because of the 

plea-withdrawal motion." Ibid.

Applying these factors, our Supreme Court held that the trial court erred 

in denying the defendants' respective pre-sentence motions to withdraw their 

guilty pleas in Slater, Munroe, and Lipa. In Slater, the defendant pled guilty to 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine after police discovered drugs and a 

scale in a motel room he occupied. Id. at 151. Less than two weeks later, Slater 

sought to withdraw his plea, asserting that he had not rented the motel room; he 

was just visiting; he was unaware the drugs were in the room; and the drugs did 

not belong to him. Id. at 152-53. Slater's account was supported by the record 

evidence that the police approached the motel room in search of two white men 
13 A-0815-18T4

who allegedly possessed cocaine; but, Slater was African-American. Id. at 151-

52, 163. Also, the State failed to disprove Slater's claim that he did not rent the 

room and was only visiting. Additionally, Slater asserted his innocence claim 

both in his pro se plea withdrawal motion and in remarks he made for inclusion 

in the presentence report. Id. at 163.

In Munroe, the defendant pled guilty to aggravated manslaughter, but 

supported a self-defense claim with evidence that the victim, "who had robbed 

him in the past," threatened him with a knife and a parked car blocked the 

defendant's retreat. Id. at 445. A police report confirmed that the deceased 

victim was found with a box cutter in his hand, and the State presented no 

witness statements contradicting Munroe's claim he had no room to retreat. Id.

at 445-47. The Court found Munroe's admission in his initial plea colloquy that 

he shot the victim at close range was not inconsistent with his later claim of selfdefense. Id. at 445. "[N]ot a word that defendant uttered in court during his 

plea colloquy was inconsistent with either the account that he gave to the 

probation officer who prepared his presentence report or his sworn testimony 

when he moved to withdraw his guilty plea." Ibid.

In Lipa, the defendant pled guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual 

assault. Id. at 326. To support his plea withdrawal motion, he presented 
14 A-0815-18T4

photographic evidence of his knee, which was operated on around the time in 

question, as well as the exterior of the subject building, to establish that it was

impossible for him to climb into the victim's second-floor bedroom window, as 

she had alleged. Id. at 333. The Court noted that because the victim asserted

that Lipa "was inebriated" when he committed the offenses, "[h]is condition thus 

would have further hampered his ability to commit the assault in the manner [the 

victim] described." Ibid. Lipa also presented evidence that "a [Division of 

Youth & Family Services] investigation found that [the victim's] previous 

accusations of sexual assault against [the] defendant and a family friend lacked 

merit." Ibid.

"[M]indful that the admissibility and veracity of [the] defendant's 

evidence ha[d] not been tested," the Court determined "the specific facts that 

[the] defendant asserted could provide a plausible basis to impeach [the victim's] 

testimony and cause a reasonable jury to find reasonable doubt as to [the] 

defendant's guilt." Id. at 334. Further, the Court found that the defendant 

"presented sufficient reasons to support his request for withdrawal" by 

"claim[ing] that his counsel induced him to plead guilty" and by "offer[ing] 

some evidence that contradicts the State's charges." Id. at 335. 
15 A-0815-18T4

We draw from these cases the principle that evidence corroborating a 

defendant's claim of innocence supports the claim's plausibility, as does the 

State's failure to present evidence on easily verifiable facts that would 

undermine the defendant's innocence claims. Here, as to the first Slater factor, 

defendant relies on a certification in which Nelson recants his earlier statement 

to police incriminating defendant, in order to establish a colorable claim of 

innocence. Notably, defendant was aware of the certification, which was 

prepared during an OPD investigator's interview conducted almost six months

before defendant pled guilty. 

"[C]ourts may look to 'evidence that was available to the prosecutor and 

to the defendant through our discovery practices at the time the defendant 

entered the plea of guilt.'" Slater, 198 N.J. at 158-59 (quoting State v. Smullen, 

118 N.J. 408, 418 (1990)). Through this lens, we are satisfied defendant's 

proffer fails to establish the "colorable claim of innocence" standard 

countenanced in Slater, Munroe, and Lipa. Defendant failed to either "present 

specific, credible facts" or "point to facts in the record that buttress [his] claim." 

Id. at 158 (citations omitted). On the contrary, nothing in the record supports 

defendant's account. Indeed, the presentence report indicated that after the 

crash, "[t]he driver of the suspect auto," identified as defendant, "exited the auto 
16 A-0815-18T4

and began to run from the scene" before "[p]olice tackled him to the ground and 

placed him under arrest." Additionally, during his presentence interview, 

defendant admitted that "he was driving" when "police began chasing him."

Defendant also failed to establish the second Slater factor, which 

"dovetails with his assertion of innocence," id. at 163, and requires a "showing 

of a valid defense against the charges." Id. at 159-60. Thus, this factor likewise

finds no support in the record. Additionally, we are convinced the judge 

properly rejected as belied by the record defendant's claim that his mental 

impairment resulting from the lack of prescribed psychiatric medications 

prevented him from entering a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea. 

See R. 3:9-2. 

Further, the third Slater factor, "[t]he presence of a plea agreement, weighs 

against defendant," albeit not heavily. Lipa, 219 N.J. at 335. Defendant entered 

his plea as part of a plea agreement that involved the dismissal of related charges 

that could have resulted in consecutive sentences. Finally, as to the fourth Slater

factor, "[t]he State is not required to show prejudice if a defendant fails to offer 

proof of other factors in support of the withdrawal of a plea." 198 N.J. at 162. 

In sum, after balancing the evidence and arguments, we agree with the judge 
17 A-0815-18T4

that defendant failed to meet his burden, and we discern no abuse of discretion 

in the judge's denial of defendant's pre-sentence plea withdrawal motion.

Affirmed.