RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4191-15T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD 

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

A.E.,

Defendant, 

and 

I.B.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF R.B., 

a Minor.

__________________________________

Argued May 21, 2018 - Decided June 19, 2018

Before Judges Messano, Accurso and O'Connor.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex 

County, Docket No. FN-07-0460-12.

Victoria D. Miranda argued the cause for 

appellant (Williams Law Group, attorneys; 

Allison C. Williams, of counsel and on the 

brief; Victoria D. Miranda, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-4191-15T4

Michelle Mikelberg, Deputy Attorney General, 

argued the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. 

Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Andrea 

M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Michelle Mikelberg, on the brief).

Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, argued the

cause for minor (Joseph E. Krakora, Public 

Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Todd 

Wilson, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This abuse and neglect matter returns to us following our 

remand for the judge to consider the testimony of a psychologist 

offered by the Division of Child Protection and Permanency to 

corroborate five-year-old Rose's report of sexual abuse by her 

father, defendant I.B.1 N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. 

I.B., 441 N.J. Super. 585, 598 (App. Div. 2015). Upon 

consideration of the testimony, the judge found it corroborated 

Rose's allegations and entered a finding that I.B. abused or 

neglected his daughter. We affirm.

We provided the background of this case in our prior 

opinion. 

The Division claimed that defendant 

father I.B. committed an act of sexual abuse 

against his five-year-old daughter, Rose, by 

calling her into the bathroom at their home 

and telling her to touch his penis. Some 

days later, Rose spontaneously revealed this 

incident to her mother, A.E., a medical 

doctor who had trained as a gynecologist in 

 

1 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the child's privacy. 
3 A-4191-15T4

the family's native Sudan. Rose's mother 

initially discounted the allegation. She 

assumed the child may have accidently seen 

her father naked and been naturally curious, 

given her age, prompting the child's 

conversation with her. When she asked Rose 

about it sometime later, however, the child 

got upset and said she didn't want to talk 

about it because it made her stomach hurt.

After several more such conversations in 

which the child shared additional details, 

including that her father had washed "the 

glue" from her hands afterward, A.E. sought 

a restraining order against her husband in 

which she revealed the child's allegation.

Court personnel advised A.E. that she should 

report the incident to the Division.

[I.B., 441 N.J. Super. at 588 (footnotes 

omitted).]

We noted "both parents acknowledged marital discord predating the allegation of sexual abuse," and that I.B 

"categorically denied the child's account." Ibid. He claimed 

his wife, A.E., "coached their daughter to make false 

allegations against him." Ibid.

Describing the investigation, we wrote that

[f]ollowing an initial interview by a 

Division caseworker, Rose participated in a 

videotaped interview conducted by a 

certified forensic interviewer at Wynona's 

House Child Advocacy Center. Rose recounted 

the allegation to the interviewer, providing 

some specific details such as the television 

program she had been watching when her 

father called her into the bathroom as well 

as the particular towel he had wrapped 

around him. Using anatomically correct 

dolls to demonstrate what had occurred, the 
4 A-4191-15T4

five-year old placed the female doll's hand 

on the male doll's penis and moved the hand.

She reported that her father was silent as 

he "finished peeing." At the end of the 

interview, Rose spontaneously asked the 

interviewer whether "touching butts [the 

word she used to describe the vagina, penis 

and buttocks on anatomical drawings] is [a] 

good thing or not a good thing?"

Following the interview, the Division 

filed its complaint and referred Rose to the 

Metropolitan Regional Child Abuse Diagnostic 

and Treatment Center. Staff psychologist 

Justin Misurell, Ph.D., conducted a 

psychosocial evaluation of the child based 

on the videotape of the forensic interview, 

Division records, and a clinical interview 

of Rose. In that interview, Rose confirmed 

the statements she made during the forensic 

interview and "reported that she frequently 

experiences nightmares about 'bad things 

like getting locked in the bathroom.'" She 

also reported that her parents used to often 

argue, that she thinks frequently about 

those incidents, and that they make her feel 

sad.

Misurell diagnosed Rose as suffering 

from Adjustment Disorder with mixed 

disturbance of emotions and conduct and 

concluded her "statements and presentation 

are consistent with a child who has 

experienced sexual abuse." He found she 

"has exhibited trauma related symptoms" 

including intrusive thoughts about the 

incident, nightmares, and has engaged in 

active attempts to avoid thinking about the 

abuse. Misurell attributed Rose's symptoms 

to "her sexual abuse experience and exposure 

to marital discord."

[I.B., 441 N.J. Super. at 589 (alterations 

in original).]
5 A-4191-15T4

The trial judge ruled Dr. Misurell's testimony 

inadmissible. Id. at 589-90. Although rejecting I.B.'s 

assertion that A.E. coached their daughter to lie about the 

incident after hearing A.E.'s testimony, the judge nevertheless 

found inconsistencies in the timeline she offered and ultimately 

determined the Division lacked any corroboration of the child's 

report of her father's abuse. Id. at 590.

We concluded the judge erred in striking "psychological 

evidence of emotional effects" routinely admitted in Title Nine 

cases to assist judges "'to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue.' N.J.R.E. 702; [N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v.] Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. [427,] 439 [(App. Div.

2002)]." Id. at 591-92. We expressed our expectation that "the 

judges in these cases [will] rigorously evaluate expert 

testimony offered to corroborate a child's allegation of abuse," 

but held that "so long as the proffered testimony meets the 

requirements of N.J.R.E. 702 and [State v. ]Kelly, [97 N.J. 178 

(1984)], as the evidence offered here does, the questions should 

be directed to the weight and not the admissibility of the 

testimony." I.B., 441 N.J. Super. at 596-97 (footnotes 

omitted). 

Accordingly, because we held "the expert's opinion was 

admissible as substantive evidence to corroborate the child's 
6 A-4191-15T4

allegation of abuse," we remanded "for consideration of the 

expert's report and testimony," with instructions to the judge 

"to weigh all of the evidence, including Misurell's testimony, 

make determinations as to the credibility and weight of that 

evidence, and come to a final determination as to whether the 

allegation of abuse has been proven by a preponderance of the 

evidence." Id. at 598. Allowing for the possibility that the 

trial judge's decision to exclude "the expert's testimony may 

have resulted in the . . . judge not probing the expert's 

opinion as he would otherwise, we [did] not foreclose the judge 

from recalling the expert to address any questions the judge 

might have regarding his testimony." Ibid.

On remand, the trial court provided the parties the 

opportunity to brief whether Dr. Misurell should be permitted to 

testify and the weight the court should afford the testimony. 

The Division opposed reopening the record for Dr. Misurell's 

testimony, arguing it was unnecessary as he had already 

testified to his opinions at length. I.B. argued the court 

should reopen the record to address specific issues raised by 

this court, including "how, or why, Dr. Misurell attributed 

[Rose's] nightmares to sexual abuse, and not to her parents' 

marital discord." The court elected to hear additional 

testimony from Dr. Misurell as requested by I.B. The judge
7 A-4191-15T4

questioned the psychologist at length, focusing particularly on 

the symptoms the child was reported to have exhibited and their 

relation to: the expert's diagnosis of adjustment disorder; the 

child's use of different descriptors for the conduct at 

different times; and why the expert concluded the child's 

nightmares were more likely related to her alleged sexual abuse 

than to her parents' marital discord or the shunning the family 

suffered following the child's disclosure. The judge also 

probed whether the expert considered that the child's nightmares 

only began after the child's report of the incident, days or 

perhaps weeks after the incident occurred and asked what "red 

flags" would have caused the psychologist to question the

validity of the child's disclosure. I.B.'s counsel crossexamined the expert, getting him to concede the acrimonious 

relationship between her parents undoubtedly played a role in 

the child's distress, and that the enormous variability in 

children's reactions to sexual abuse makes diagnosis difficult.

After hearing the testimony, the judge issued an oral 

opinion from the bench, concluding the expert's testimony 

corroborated Rose's report of sexual abuse by her father. The 

judge stated he found Dr. Misurell "very credible, honest and 

straight-forward in his testimony." The judge was particularly 

impressed by the expert's acknowledgment of the limits of 
8 A-4191-15T4

psychological evidence, recapping his testimony on the point by 

saying, "look, if you're looking for the answer in a 

psychologist to tell you whether the incident happened, I can't. 

I can only tell you that she is suffering from this syndrome and 

that this syndrome is consistent."

Again expressing the opinion that "this was an extremely 

close case," for the reasons discussed at length in his decision 

after the fact-finding hearing in 2012, the judge pronounced

himself satisfied based on Dr. Misurell's testimony that Rose 

suffered from an adjustment disorder, "pre-post traumatic 

stress," consistent with abuse, providing "the corroboration 

necessary for a determination in this case."

I.B. appeals, arguing the trial court erred by giving undue 

weight to Dr. Misurell's testimony and "making legal 

determinations that do not flow from the facts presented at 

trial." I.B. further argues Dr. Misurell's testimony did not 

provide sufficient corroboration for Rose's out-of-court 

statements, and thus "cannot be used to sustain a finding of 

sexual abuse," and that he was deprived of the effective 

assistance of counsel during the fact finding hearing. Having 

reviewed the record, we conclude none of those arguments is of 

sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
9 A-4191-15T4

I.B.'s arguments as to the judge's assessment of Dr. 

Misurell's testimony reduce to quarrels with the judge's factfinding, which we are simply in no position to reject. We will

not overturn the factual findings and legal conclusions of a 

trial judge sitting in a non-jury case "unless we are convinced 

that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with 

the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to 

offend the interests of justice[.]" Seidman v. Clifton Sav. 

Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (alteration in original) 

(quoting In re Trust Created By Agreement Dated December 20, 

1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008)). Deference is 

especially appropriate in a case such as this where "the 

evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of 

credibility." Ibid.

As the Supreme Court has observed, because the trial court 

"'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, [and] hears 

them testify,' it has a better perspective than a reviewing 

court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses." Pascale v. 

Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961)). 

The Court has instructed reviewing courts to accord a special

"deference to family court factfinding" in light of "the family 
10 A-4191-15T4

courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." 

Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). 

Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the trial 

judge fulfilled all of his obligations on remand. The judge 

admitted Dr. Misurell's testimony and rigorously questioned the 

expert in order to understand the limits of the testimony and 

the weight the court should accord it. After weighing the 

expert's testimony in light of the other evidence in the record, 

the judge concluded the psychological evidence corroborated 

Rose's report of her father's sexual abuse. See Z.P.R., 351 

N.J. Super. at 436. We find no error in the judge's assessment 

of the evidence or his conclusion that the Division proved its 

case by a preponderance of the evidence. I.B.'s contention that 

he was deprived the effective assistance of counsel on remand is 

utterly without merit. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.