U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

95–973 PDF 2004

S. HRG. 108–643

AFGHANISTAN: CONTINUING CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 12, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

WITNESSES

Gouttierre, Dr. Thomas, dean of international studies and programs and

director of The Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska

at Omaha, Omaha, Nebraska ............................................................................. 3

Isby, David, foreign and defense policy analyst, Washington, D.C. .................... 23

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24

Perito, Robert, senior fellow and special advisor, Rule of Law Program, United

States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. ...................................................... 19

Schneider, Mark, senior vice president, International Crisis Group, Washington, D.C. ........................................................................................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15

Map of Afghanistan ................................................................................................. 48

APPENDIX

Additional Material Submitted by the International Crisis Group

Elections and Security in Afghanistan ........................................................... 49

Additional Material Submitted by the United States Institute of Peace

Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan ................................................ 58

(III)

(1)

AFGHANISTAN: CONTINUING CHALLENGES

Wednesday, May 12, 2004

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 9:35 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, and Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order.

Today the committee again meets to examine the challenges in

Afghanistan. Despite many successes on the ground, the prospect

that we could fail in Afghanistan is still very real. Congress and

the administration must soberly assess the state of political and

economic reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and devise adjustments to the current plan where necessary.

The same sources of conflict and instability that allowed the

Taliban to seize power and fueled the growth of Al Qaeda’s terrorist network continue to threaten the future of Afghanistan. Conflicts among heavily-armed militias controlled by warlords, pervasive poverty, systemic corruption, and an increasingly entrenched

narco-economy threaten to undermine reconstruction activities. Despite coalition efforts to establish security, disarm the warlords and

strengthen the central government of President Karzai, the situation sometimes appears to be getting worse, not better.

Too little assistance to Afghanistan has been provided, and often

it has come too late to address the daunting needs of that country.

The lack of security and continuing attacks on aid workers, particularly in southern Afghanistan, have delayed or prevented aid

deliveries. In 2003, Congress appropriated funding to speed up the

training of Afghan security forces, including the Afghan National

Army, police, and border guards. The security force has increased

to about 20,000 Afghanis, but this is a fraction of what is needed

across the country.

Many of the same warlords who helped the coalition oust the

Taliban are fighting each other, instilling fear in the population,

and frustrating rebuilding efforts. These warlords control vast regions of Afghanistan. Reports by the UN Special Representative for

Afghanistan, Jean Arnault, indicate that efforts to disarm the

clashing Afghan militia factions have barely begun.

2

NATO decided last December to expand the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, outside of Kabul, but the number of

NATO forces has increased only from about 5,000 to 6,500. NATO

allies promised to provide increased equipment and personnel support, but thus far the NATO effort has been tentative and incremental. Given the extreme challenges in Afghanistan, NATO must

step forward with a much bolder commitment.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the PRTs, units that concentrate military and civilian capabilities in critical locations, have

been successful in establishing islands of security. The intended

purpose of the 13 PRTs is to jump-start reconstruction outside

Kabul. But this relative success has been hampered by a lack of

resources, equipment, common doctrine, coordination, and training.

Without a substantial expansion of resources and commitment, the

PRTs will not succeed as a platform for reconstruction.

The failure of efforts to stem poppy production and provide alternative sources of income undermines every aspect of reconstruction

in Afghanistan. The warlords are financing themselves through the

illegal opium trade, valued at close to $2.3 billion last year. If this

estimate is accurate, it would account for more than 50 percent of

Afghanistan’s gross domestic product. This drug trade also is funding resurgent Taliban units, Al Qaeda, and other criminal and terrorist elements.

As we tackle these security problems, the administration and the

Congress must ensure that prisoners of war in Afghanistan are not

being abused and that vigorous investigations occur into any

wrongdoing. The revelations about prisoner abuse in Iraq have repulsed Americans and hurt our reputation in the international

community. We need to establish absolute accountability and stay

true to our principles and values without reducing our efforts to

overcome terrorism.

The President and Congress have made clear our long-term commitment to a free and stable Afghanistan. Last fall, Congress

strongly supported more resources in the Emergency Supplemental,

bringing U.S. aid to Afghanistan to $3.7 billion since 2001. Our

hope was that security enhancements and other improvements

would lead to successful elections, now scheduled for next September. The UN has reported that nearly 2 million of the 10 million eligible Afghanis have been registered to vote thus far. Of

those already registered, an estimated 29 percent are women. As

September approaches, we must either register voters far more efficiently or develop alternatives to traditional registration that will

allow elections to proceed.

This year’s budget request includes $1.2 billion for Afghanistan.

The administration recently announced it will seek an additional

$25 billion contingency fund for Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress

must carefully review these requests, assess how these funds are

to be used, and ensure that they are managed properly.

We have asked a distinguished panel of experts to testify today

about the priorities and the prospects for redevelopment in Afghanistan. Which elements of the reconstruction effort are succeeding

and which are failing? What adjustments can be made now to improve the prospects for long-term success?

3

We are pleased to welcome Dr. Thomas Gouttierre, Mr. Mark

Schneider, Mr. Robert Perito, and Mr. David Isby. I would point

out that Dr. Gouttierre is Dean of International Studies and Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska, Omaha. Mr. Schneider is Senior Vice President of the

International Crisis Group. Mr. Perito is Senior Fellow and Special

Advisor for the Rule of Law Program at the United States Institute

of Peace, and Mr. David Isby is author of several books on Afghanistan and a foreign aid and defense policy analyst.

We look forward to your insights, and we look forward to the opportunity to question you. We thank you for coming to the hearing

this morning. I would like for you to testify in the order that I mentioned. That would be Dr. Gouttierre to begin with.

Let me indicate that all of your prepared statements will be

made a part of the record in full. We would ask, just for the sake

of moving on in the hearing, that you either give your statement

or summarize in about 10 minutes or so. In the event that it moves

it beyond that, the chair will be liberal, because the purpose is to

hear you today, and to make certain that we encompass the ideas

that you bring to us. Thank you for coming and would you please

proceed, Doctor.

STATEMENT OF DR. THOMAS GOUTTIERRE, DEAN OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND PROGRAMS AND DIRECTOR OF

THE CENTER FOR AFGHANISTAN STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF

NEBRASKA AT OMAHA, OMAHA, NEBRASKA

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. Thank you, Senator Lugar. I am pleased to

mention that I’m an IU graduate, and I remember seeing you on

campus when you were mayor of Indianapolis. So that puts both

of us back quite a number of years, as you well know.

The CHAIRMAN. An excellent qualification for testifying today.

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. Well, I think it is as well.

I am pleased to be able to come here, and I know the other panelists are as well because the issue of Afghanistan is still a very

important one. I think in many ways, though it is often obfuscated

by the news that we see daily coming from Iraq, it offers to the

United States a greater opportunity for success and a greater opportunity for us to take the type of advantage we have been seeking in the Middle East with fewer challenges if we do it correctly.

So thank you and the committee for having this hearing. I appreciate the fact that it is being done. It is good for U.S. interests. It

is very important for Afghanistan.

In the nearly 30 years of war and instability which preceded the

swearing-in of the Karzai government, nearly every element of Afghanistan’s infrastructure, human and material, was significantly

destroyed or displaced. Most of those services and resources upon

which Afghans had come to rely in the years leading up to that

tragic period are still not available to Afghans.

And yet, there can be no denying that many positive developments, some of which I observed in my most recent trip to Afghanistan a month ago, are also occurring. There are also many challenges, and I will try to address the primary ones of both the positive developments and the challenges.

4

The thing that stood out most to me was the fact that the population and commercial centers of Afghanistan are truly being resuscitated. The bazaars of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-iSharif are well stocked with food, essential goods, and an amazing

array of commodities. The people are in the streets in colorful

clothing like they were in years past. They bargain for their purchases, shouting above the cacophony and gridlock created by the

four-wheel vehicles of donor nations and organizations, the other

means of transport drawn by humans and animals, and the ubiquitous music blaring from loudspeakers in the bazaars.

Most noticeable is the look of hope and anticipation in the eyes

of a nation where none existed 3 years ago. There is a building and

rebuilding boom in these centers, a demonstration of confidence

that perhaps the long national nightmare of Afghanistan is coming

to an end.

This expression of confidence is further fueled by a number of

other demonstrable developments in several key sectors of Afghan

society. I’m just going to mention these briefly.

Education is one with which our Center for Afghanistan Studies

is intimately involved, and we’ve been pleased to be involved with

USAID and the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs and the

Afghan Ministry in a number of programs over the last couple of

years. Right now, education is being pursued by Afghans with a

vengeance. This follows, of course, nearly 30 years of little or no

access. More Afghan school children today, over 4 million, are in

school than at any other time in Afghan history. Education is the

only national effort currently reaching into all the provinces and

districts of Afghanistan.

I first went to Afghanistan 40 years ago as a Peace Corps volunteer. I lived there for 10 years, and I have been working since then

at the Center for Afghanistan Studies, so I’m able to offer a perspective on education. I’ve never seen an interest in education in

Afghanistan at the level that there is today.

The reconstruction of Afghanistan’s ground transport infrastructure is improving access of Afghans to their government and regional commercial centers. Afghanistan’s so-called ‘‘Ring Road’’ is

being rebuilt. The Kabul-Kandahar corridor is reopened, reducing

travel time from nearly 2 days to 5 hours. The Salang Tunnel

through the Hindu Kush mountains is repaired and reopened,

again reducing travel time from Kabul to the north from several

days to 5 or 6 hours. Donors have been identified for each of the

remaining sectors of this ‘‘Ring Road.’’

This road reconstruction also plays an important role in the improvement of Afghanistan’s economy and its ability to play an integral role in the trade between South and Central Asian nations.

When asked why Afghanistan is important to regional and U.S. interests, I always like to answer what real estate agents always recite in their mantra: ‘‘location, location, location!’’

Astride the arteries of the Silk and Spice roads, Afghanistan is

already profiting as a transit sector for commercial traffic between

its neighbors in South and Central Asia and from Iran to South

Asia as well. Should a natural gas pipeline be built from

Turkmenistan to Pakistan, it will likely travel a route above the

5

Herat-Kandahar sector of the ‘‘Ring Road.’’ In essence, Afghanistan

has begun the process of rejoining the world economy.

The economy of Afghanistan, according to a recent statement by

U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, grew by 29 percent in 2003.

The traditional exports of Afghanistan, fruits, nuts, textiles and

carpets, jewelry and precious stones, are once again being shipped

abroad. In 2003, America bought over 14,000 square meters of

handwoven carpets, 13 tons of dried and fresh fruit, and almost

600 tons of licorice root, an amazing kind of ad there.

Unlike Iraqis and many others in the Muslim world, Afghans

have previous history with constitutional democratic process. During the decade under the Constitution of 1964, Afghans elected national officials and governments and turned them out with votes of

no confidence. Afghans retain this democratic experiment, as it is

often called, in their collective memory. Many believe that a democratic process is their legacy and their right.

After years of being a stateless nation, a system of governance

is being rebuilt. In a series of efforts, beginning with the Bonn

process in December 2001, Afghans have taken several steps towards reconstituting a national government. The constitution approved in January of this year is regarded by many observers as

among the most progressive and enlightened in the Muslim world.

It mandates a strong central government and presidency, with a

two-house national assembly and independent judiciary. National

presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for this

September.

These positive developments have been obtained despite what

most analysts characterized as a slow, distracted, and sometimes

inept start on the part of U.S. and Coalition forces. The donor conference approach has proven to be disjointed, inconsistent, and

largely unmanageable. Pledges are late in coming; some do not

come at all. U.S. leadership in the process has often been solicitous

rather than forthright. In the face of U.S. involvement in Iraq, Afghans have questioned whether the U.S. is committed, over the

long haul, to reconstruction of their country.

A number of recent developments, however, have helped to assuage these concerns of Afghans. The first is the arrival of Zalmay

Khalilzad as U.S. Ambassador. In my opinion, he is the best person

for this job at this critical juncture. He knows most of the Afghans

in national and regional leadership roles. He is considered credible

and tough by those who share U.S. and Afghan aspirations for a

stable Afghanistan. Needless to say, these favorable opinions are

not shared by terrorists, warlords, and drug lords.

Khalilzad can speak to leaders and common citizens effectively.

He is fluent in Dari and Pashto. He has good connections to the

White House and with Congress. His relations with Hamid Karzai

and other key Afghan leaders are constructive.

Another positive development centers around the growing number and effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams

(PRTs) as you indicated earlier. Lieutenant General David Barno’s

vision for the PRT process is solid, anchored in community-based

reconstruction. Members of the Center for Afghanistan Studies

have observed particularly successful PRT efforts led by New Zealand forces in Bamiyan and British forces in Mazar-i-Sharif.

6

The new, imposing American embassy and adjoining residential

and office buildings are nearing completion. They have gone up in

a remarkably short time. Afghans note that the investment required to construct these buildings suggest the Americans are, indeed, in it for the long haul. This builds confidence.

The continuing security, political, and economic challenges to the

reconstruction of Afghanistan remain formidable. The most critical

is security. It negatively affects all other factors. The lack of security is perhaps the only factor that might ensure a return of a

stateless society to Afghanistan.

The three primary security threats are terrorists, drug lords, and

warlords. These are holdovers, sometimes protagonists, other times

allies, from the period of protracted civil war in Afghanistan.

Though routed out of their strongholds and camps after 9/11, replenished and reorganized elements of Al Qaeda and the Taliban

remain at large and constitute a threat, both real and symbolic, to

the overall reconstruction effort. They gain financial support from

drug interests.

These elements threaten Afghan teachers, students, election

workers, and other government workers, even shop owners and

farmers. They threaten them with death or other bodily harm if

they teach, go to school, register to vote or assist in the election

process, or appear to side with the government. International assistance workers and military forces are also threatened; some

have been killed. The continuing capacity of these terrorists to intimidate slows and even terminates certain reconstruction efforts.

I have some recommendations on how these might be addressed.

First, increase the military capacity to provide security in the

rural areas of Afghanistan through expanding the PRT program.

Second, go after Osama bin Laden, Aiman Zawahiri, Mullah Muhammad Umar, and Gulbudeen Hikmatyar with a ‘‘deck-of-cards’’

intensity. They remain the real and symbolic leaders of the terrorist networks and organizations whose activities are the cause of

the periodic alerts in the U.S. and around the world, not those adversaries in Iraq. The fact that they remain at large undermines

the confidence in U.S. policy among Afghans, reduces the credibility of the Afghan government and international reconstruction

efforts, and sends the wrong message to Afghan and Pakistani

tribes in their respective border areas.

Third, the pace and financial support for the creation of adequate

Afghan security forces should be increased.

The U.S. Government should intensify pressure on Afghanistan’s

neighbors and Persian Gulf nations not to aid and support forces

connected to the security threats to Afghanistan.

Afghan Vice President Hidayatullah Aminarsalah has suggested

that instead of going after terrorists, warlords, and drug lords in

sequential fashion, a concerted effort be made. His argument is

that a sequential approach permits those sectors not targeted to

aid those that are. His idea of following a more concerted approach

against these threats I believe has merit.

Relating to education and the challenges there, although there is

an unprecedented number of Afghan school children in school,

there still are many, many challenges.

7

More teachers are needed. This should be a priority of the Afghan government and donors.

More in-service teacher training is necessary to bring some

standard to education throughout the country. Many current teachers do not possess any manner of formal training.

The delivery of textbooks and teachers’ kits is still flawed.

Though millions of textbooks have been produced, many classrooms

remain without books.

Vocational education is essential for the unemployed and the

under-employed. The Afghan government has set a target to demilitarize 60,000 Afghan men from militia forces in the near term.

What will they do for employment? They are not likely to go back

to primary school, if they ever were in school, or to secondary

schools. Many of them are illiterate. Vocational education in the

basic construction and office management skills would attract large

numbers. This need is severe. Currently, there are thousands of

foreign workers in Afghanistan, primarily in Kabul and Kandahar,

due to the lack of trained Afghans, taking places that many Afghans might occupy were they trained. For many, vocational literacy will also be essential.

The pace of the physical reconstruction of schools has also been

slow. Many schools are still without water and sanitation.

Security threats continue to impede the attendance of girls in

schools and intimidate female teachers.

Finally in this area, higher education, an area in which the U.S.

was the leading donor prior to the Soviet invasion, remains neglected. Few laboratory resources remain at Kabul University. This

sector within education is kind of a stepchild without the priority

accorded the primary and secondary education sectors by the Afghan government and donor nations.

Health care is in even a worse state. Most Afghans do not have

access to reliable health care. This is particularly critical for mothers and children. Afghan infant and maternal mortality rates are

the highest and second highest in the world, respectively. There is

no plan for comprehensive training of Afghans to take over their

own medical health needs currently on the boards, primarily because Afghanistan’s colleges of medicine, which were located at

Kabul University and Nangrahar University, have not yet been reconstructed. The only type of education going on there is through

lecture. There is no laboratory, no practical clinical experience.

Most of Afghanistan’s trained medical personnel left during the

war years. So the situation in the medical profession and the medical treatment in Afghanistan still remains very woeful. Most of all

of the medical attention that any Afghans get is delivered by international support and organizations.

Rural reconstruction lags far behind that of the reconstruction

moving forward in the population centers, which I mentioned briefly earlier. This greatly enhances the power of warlords and handicaps the reach and influence of the central government. The crowding of Afghans into population centers, coupled with the inflationary presence of international organizations, leaves many Afghans without any real option. They cannot stay in the neglected

rural areas and cannot afford to relocate in the centers where services are available. The men, in particular, are vulnerable to those

8

who would employ them away from the process of reconstruction

into the militias of warlords and the cultivation of poppies. Until

the central government is able to provide the carrots and sticks

that outnumber those of the warlords, the warlords are going to

continue to be able to hold sway in their regions.

I would like to conclude with just a few comments about what

I feel still remain the windows of opportunity for the United States

to help the Afghans, and some of the assets that we have. I am certain the other members of the panel will focus on these particular

comments that I have made in greater detail.

On balance, in spite of a slow and inconsistent start, the window

of opportunity for all involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan

remains open. There are many factors which constitute significant

assets in this.

One, a credible political process has been launched without the

uncertainties that plague Iraq. The Afghan government is gaining

capacity. It is true that its reach is often limited to Kabul and, tenuously, to other population centers. At the same time, it must be

noted that almost all members of the government had little or no

experience in the governance process before their current assignments. They literally had to learn on the job. There are legitimate

complaints stimulated by evidence and rumors of corruption and

incompetence. Yet, some in this new cadre of Afghan civil servants

are learning well and have helped to restore a measure of credibility in the restoration of Afghan state.

The leadership of this government has been identified and confirmed by a national assembly. President Hamid Karzai, though

not without detractors, and even implacable enemies among Afghans, is largely well-known and well-regarded and is popular. He

understands and is a believer in human rights. He pursues consensus, perhaps to a fault. He learned this skill from his late father, a highly regarded tribal khan. His likely reelection in September should enhance stability and provide continuity to a delicate process.

Afghans are very clear about the way they feel about Americans.

They want them in Afghanistan. They want American leadership

and assistance in the reconstruction process. There are no armed

insurrections in the towns and villages, no demonstrations. Afghans have never regarded Americans as their enemies. To the

contrary, they appreciated our development assistance in the 50s,

60s, and 70s. They appreciated American support in their war

against the Soviet Union and in the war, though belated, against

terrorists. They now see us as their primary allies in the reconstruction of their country.

I have attached to my statement a copy of my favorite Dari

poem, ‘‘Rose and Clay,’’ which Afghans often use in describing to

me how they feel about Americans. I am going to subject you to a

reading of that because I always believe it is important to point out

the cultural aspects of Afghan society, something that gets left behind when we talk about these issues and urgencies and emergencies in the country.

One day at bath a piece of perfumed clay was passed to me

from the hand of a friend.

9

I asked the clay, are you musk or ambergris?

because your delightful scent intoxicates me.

It answered—I am but a worthless piece of clay that has

sat for a period with a rose.

The perfection of that companion left its traces on me

who remains that same piece of earth that I was.

The whole world, especially the Muslim world, is watching what

is going on in Afghanistan today. If we do not try to do Afghanistan

on the cheap and in piecemeal fashion, we can work with the Afghans in this cooperative venture. We will acquit ourselves admirably in our own eyes, in the eyes of Afghans, and in the eyes of

others around the world.

If we muddle through, we will probably still prevent Afghanistan

from returning to its status as a haven for terrorist camps. It will

cost us more, take a longer period, and not really gain the credit

we would deserve by doing it right. We might also lose an already

unstable Pakistan in the process.

Much effort has been expended. We have learned much in the

process. Assets are available. The Afghans are allies. They are in

place. We can do this right. The window is open. I think the choice

is ours. I think we are on the right track. I hope we really go at

this with all the resources that we are able to bring to bear in this

effort.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Doctor, for a very,

very compelling piece of testimony. We appreciate your coming and

all that you have brought to the hearing.

I would now like to recognize the distinguished ranking member

of the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am

anxious to hear the witnesses. I will forgo my opening statement.

Just by way of explanation, I have been very involved as the author of the Violence Against Women Act years ago. There is a conference that was taking place downtown this morning that I had

to—not had to—I was invited to attend, and it ran a little bit

longer, and I apologize for my tardiness. But I am anxious to hear

the rest of you.

I ask unanimous consent that my statement be placed in the

record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record and published in

full.

[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for calling this hearing. Although our attention is

focused on Iraq these days, we must never let ourselves be distracted from the urgent challenges in Afghanistan.

For the past two years, many of us on this Committee have been making the same

basic points about Afghanistan:

10

First, the reconstruction and stabilization of Afghanistan is a vital national security imperative of the United States. We cannot permit this country to again become

a haven for terrorists.

Second, the reconstruction of Afghanistan will require a very significant investment of American capital, both financial and diplomatic. We can’t do this on the

cheap.

Third, without bringing security to Afghanistan, nothing else is possible. Unless

we are able establish stability and basic order throughout the country, any reconstruction will be built on a foundation of sand.

Three simple points. And it would be tough to dispute any of them. But, looking

at the administration’s performance since the fall of the Taliban, one has to wonder

whether the White House has received the message.

On the issue of security, vast areas of Afghanistan are still disputed territory,

with the resurgent Taliban launching attacks throughout the south and southeast.

The movement is stronger now than it was two years ago.

Most of the rest of Afghanistan is only nominally under the control of the central

government. Instead, it is brutal warlords who wield real power.

The Afghan Ministry of Defense has promised to disarm 40,000 of the nation?s

100,000 warlord militiamen by June 30. According to the UN, as of last week, the

number who had been disarmed was exactly zero. [AP report, May 6]

The administration has put forward the idea of training the Afghan National

Army to combat the warlord militias—and someday this force will indeed be able

to shoulder the burden. But today the ANA has an operational strength of just over

8,000—and few of these troops, if any, have the training or experience necessary for

serious combat.

The warlord armies support themselves through the illicit profits of the drug

trade. As several of our witnesses will describe in greater detail, this trade risks

turning Afghanistan into a full-blown narco-state.

Under the administration’s watch, Afghanistan has firmly entrenched itself as the

world’s number-one supplier of opium and heroin. The opium crop of 2003 was up

7 percent from the previous year, to a near-record 3600 tons. The crop for this year

is expected to increase another six percent. The drug profits amount to $2.3 billion

annually—five times the entire budget of the Afghan government.

On the issue of reconstruction, the administration has failed to make good on the

President’s pledge of a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan.

According to the assessment of the World Bank and other authorities, Afghan re- construction will require at least $28 billion over the next 7 years. How do the commitments thus far add up? To date, the world community has disbursed only $3.7 billion in nonmilitary aid, with $1.4 billion of this sum coming from the United States.

What’s more, the vast majority of this aid has gone for humanitarian relief, not

for long-term reconstruction. Relief aid is necessary to stave off immediate disaster,

but it is not the basis on which to build a stable nation.

Looking to the future, there seems to be little encouragement in sight. Total

pledges from all sources, ever since 2001, add up to less than $10 billion, of which

about one-third are American. And here the administration’s lack of long-term vision is apparent.

In the current fiscal year, the administration proposes a marked increase in reconstruction funding—to $2.2 billion, compared with a mere $900 million for the

past two years combined. This would be encouraging if it were the beginning of a

program—but it seems, instead, to represent the end of the administration’s

stepped-up commitment.

The administration’s request for fiscal year 2005 is barely half the rate for this

year. [$1.2 billion, 54% of FY 04]. That is not the kind of sustained commitment

that Afghanistan needs.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to asking questions about Afghan policy to witnesses from the administration. I am concerned, too, that the prisoner abuse scandal

we’ve been contending with in Iraq could also touch Afghanistan—I very much hope

the Administration will get all the facts out as quickly as possible and make clear

what steps have been taken to prevent this from happening again. Mr. Chairman,

I understand that you are planning to schedule a hearing, before the summer recess, at which we will be able to get answers on Afghanistan policy from top-ranking

administration officials. I look forward to that hearing, because this issue is too important to be put off any longer.

Today’s hearing, however, will be informative and valuable. Our privatewitnesses

bring a varied range of experiences and perspective to the discussion, from security

to narcotics to nation-building. Let me also welcome the first Afghan graduates from

a journalist-training program established by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty at my

11

urging, with the strong support of Congress. Your work will be vital to building a

free and open society in Afghanistan.

I welcome all of our witnesses.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. Schneider.

STATEMENT OF MARK SCHNEIDER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator

Biden. Let me thank the committee, the Chairman and the leadership for holding this hearing on the continuing challenges facing

the Afghan people, the United States, and the international community.

The International Crisis Group is deeply concerned that the effort to assist Afghanistan in building democracy and rebuilding its

shattered economy may fail. As you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, it may fail because there has been a failure

to recognize the magnitude of the threats that face Afghanistan,

and we believe as well to direct sufficient political, military, and financial resources to overcome those threats. We also believe there

have been several policy mistakes, a few of which have yet to be

corrected.

This does not mean that we do not recognize positive progress

that has been made from the Kandahar Road, to the constitution,

to immunizing children, and to ridding the country of the Taliban

repression.

However, after more than nearly 2 and a half decades of war, Afghanistan is second to last in the indicators of human development

of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

There are still 2 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran, 300,000

displaced persons inside Afghanistan.

The country’s first and, therefore, most important transition election has yet to be held. The date already has been postponed from

June to September. We believe that those elections must be fair,

free, credible, and legitimate. Yet, registration is barely at 20 percent of eligible voters. The electoral law has not yet been decreed.

A smattering of political parties has been registered. No one yet

knows where the voting sites will be or who will protect them, and

the decision of how the votes will be counted is still to be determined.

Opium, as you’ve noted, has been allowed to expand now to 28

of 34 provinces. Its cultivation, transformation into heroin, and

trafficking across borders now accounts for $2.3 billion of a $4.5 billion to $5 billion economy. Afghanistan is in clear and present danger of descending from a narco-economy into a narco-state.

My colleague noted that Afghanistan has begun to reenter the

world economy. With respect to drugs, it has reentered, fully. Warlords siphon off customs revenues that the central government

needs badly to address its needs. They also increasingly use their

drug-financed militias to intimidate and to challenge President

Hamid Karzai.

As you noted, the central government barely has some 8,000

newly minted ANA soldiers who show up for roll call, barely anVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
12

other 10,000 new police, and it faces several times that number,

solely in terms of the militia forces, that are responding to regional

and local commanders. And the Taliban and Al Qaeda continue to

pose a significant military threat to security, and it is very important, a significant political threat to the transition itself. Their attacks on the United Nations NGOs and Afghan government officials have nearly doubled over the past 4 months compared to last

year. More NGO staff were killed in these first 4 months of the

year than all of 2003.

When I stayed overnight in Gardez in November behind the

barbed wire encampment of the UN, I was really stunned at the

level of security that was viewed as necessary. It hit me a few days

later as to why when a young UNHCR field worker was murdered

in Ghazni.

Closing the security gap—and I think you will hear that from all

of us—is absolutely crucial to the success of the transition in Afghanistan. In many ways, we believe that the extension and expansion of NATO/ISAF beyond Kabul is the linchpin to greater

progress on many of these issues, with respect to peace, political

transformation, relief, and reconstruction. ICG has been working in

Afghanistan now since 2001, just prior to the Bonn conference. We

have offices in Kabul and Islamabad, and our field-based people

really allow us to try and understand the real-time dynamics of

what is occurring.

Let me just mention, as you did at the outset, that we also are

concerned about the issue of human rights and the issue about how

prisoners are being dealt within the prisons; there is a New York

Times story today. A month ago, though, Human Rights Watch put

out a report that contained information detailing mistreatment of

detainees. They raised questions about the different areas in the

country, where prisoners are being held and who controlled them.

Some of the same issues about control, the lack of the application

of the Geneva Convention were raised in that report. I think it is

an issue of concern because, obviously, it can undermine our role,

our presence, and the values that we all believe are important to

convey.

With respect to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the recent Pakistani

offensive, together with the U.S., in south Waziristan should not

have been something so new. It should have been going on from the

start. Taliban political leaders still appear to move with relative

ease in many of the Pakistani cities. Pakistan has just announced

an amnesty proposal for foreign fighters in that region, and that

proposal also needs to be scrutinized very closely. With respect to

Al Qaeda, it should be cut off and terminated.

The Taliban and other Islamic extremists are still recruiting in

Pakistan’s madrasas, and they are seeking through intimidation

and violence to rebuild their power base in Afghanistan. So in

terms of policy, there needs to be greater pressure on Pakistan to

go after both Taliban political and military leadership on a continuing and unyielding basis, not just going after Al Qaeda.

Second—and here I would agree with my colleague, Dr.

Goutierre—there has been a recent increase of U.S. forces as part

of the coalition to some 15,500. That should not be reversed. If anything, it should be increased. Really, no significant reduction

13

should be considered until the full task of security has been taken

over by the new indigenous Afghan forces when they are prepared.

A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke of having U.S. troops leaving Afghanistan by June of this year. That was simply not realistic,

and it sent the wrong signals. Achieving real security on the

ground is the only way to pave the way for a successful exit strategy.

With respect to disarmament and demobilization, President

Karzai emphasized at the time of the Berlin conference some 6

weeks ago, that the DDR program, which began last November,

would produce a 40 percent reduction in militias and cantonment

of 100 percent of their heavy weapons by the end of June. We are

not even close to meeting that goal. As you heard—you mentioned

yourself—the UN raised that issue last week and is very concerned.

The key policy change needed for the demobilization program to

be effective is a shift in focus from disarming and demobilizing individual soldiers to the complete removal of militia units, including

those still under the control of the minister of defense. Until that

happens, the credibility of the entire program is in question.

There is something else that I would call to the committee’s attention, which is the worrisome proposal to create a new paramilitary force called the Afghan Guard Force. They would operate

in combat alongside U.S. Special Forces units. Partisan and poorly

trained, coming from the militias—to have the U.S. identified with

those paramilitary forces is really a bad idea. They say it is a stopgap until ANA troops are produced in greater numbers. The answer is to increase the pay, increase the incentive structure, offer

long-term career guarantees, and put more resources into developing trained Afghan National Army to do the job.

Another part of the answer is to rapidly obtain a major expansion of NATO/ISAF. I know that this committee has supported

that, and I know that you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Biden have

spoken out for it. Unfortunately, even after the agreement by

NATO last October to expand those forces, as you said, barely

1,500 additional troops have been added, nothing like the three

battalions that have been requested to be deployed across northern

Afghanistan. NATO/ISAF has chapter VII authority and could provide the mailed fist behind the demobilization program, help prevent local conflicts, and ensure greater confidence in the election

process. We need to double or triple the size of NATO/ISAF.

Just a few weeks ago, the Deputy Commander of the Canadian

Army who used to be the Deputy Commander of NATO/ISAF spoke

specifically to that. They need at least to double, another 5,000 and

probably an additional 10,000, and spread around the country, including the PRT in every province, but the additional forces should

focus on security. We would urge you to urge your North Atlantic

Assembly colleagues at the North Atlantic Assembly at the end of

this month to pressure their governments to make commitments at

the Istanbul Summit that would permit this to take place in time

to have the ability to put a security mantel out there for the elections.

Let me talk briefly about drugs. Last year 1.7 million people,

about 260,000 farm families, were engaged in producing 3,600 metVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
14

ric tons of opium, three-quarters of the world’s illicit production.

There was a recent survey of farmers’ intentions and there’s an expectation now, as a result of that survey, that the farmers are

going to increase their production of opium this year. We are now

in the beginning of the harvest. It is likely that we are going to

find that it is going to go well over the 4,000 mark in terms of tons

produced, and it probably will reach the largest ever amount of

hectares under cultivation. In 1999, 91,000 hectares were under

cultivation; it will probably go well over 100,000 this year.

It is important to understand that this is directly linked to the

warlords. The local commanders are among the ones, as in Colombia, in terms of illegally armed groups—they provide protection for

the drug traffickers. They tax their produce. Sometimes they help

with transportation, and if Colombia is any example, in a very

short time, they will begin acquiring the land, forcing farmers off

the land. They will combat each other for the routes, and they will

become the drug traffickers.

The response we all know has to be law enforcement, alternative

development, and political leadership. Within the enforcement category, there is an argument now about eradication between the

British and the United States. I can go into that later, but essentially right now we think the focus on law enforcement has to be

interdiction on the roads and on the border and the destruction of

laboratories and warehouses to go after not the small farmer but

the traffickers and the warlords who are running the trade. We

happen to be in the best position because we have more international forces in Afghanistan that anyone could ever imagine in

a similar situation.

But three policy decisions are crucial.

First, the rules of engagement and mission of the expanded

NATO/ISAF have to clearly state that one of their missions is

counter-narcotics and helping the Afghan government destroy that

network.

The second is that the United States, DOD, and our other coalition forces also have to amend their rules of engagement to include

counter-narcotics within their mandate. They have shifted now

from a ‘‘don’t look/don’t tell’’ stance with respect to drugs that they

find, to one where, if they run across them, they will destroy them

when they find them. But that is really not good enough. Actively

disrupting and destroying the opium network should be within

their mandate.

Finally, of course, expanded resources in training police and

building a justice system are crucial.

With respect to elections that are upcoming—supposedly in September—I know the bells, and so I will close quickly by just simply

saying that with respect to elections, there are many things that

need to be done. It is not clear it is going to happen. They need

to be credible first rather than held without the level of security

and the level of participation that are needed. There are things

that can be done we believe.

Finally, with respect to reconstruction, I will simply say that we

have not put sufficient resources into Afghanistan. The international community now is putting about one-fourth the level per

capita that it did in Bosnia and East Timor and El Salvador. We

15

need to do better. And I would urge the committee in that regard

to authorize a full 7-year commitment that matches the needs assessment defined in the recent Berlin conference in terms of external support from the United States that would provide somewhere

between 25 and 40 percent of the external aid required, which

would replicate, generally, what we have done in other situations.

I would urge the committee to consider doing that. It would be the

best way to attract others as well to make the same kind of commitment.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I will simply say that making that kind

of commitment and helping Afghanistan complete its transition is

the most cost effective way of avoiding a recurrence of the conflicts

that have virtually destroyed the country and whose consequences

have reached out to cause enormous suffering in our own country

and elsewhere.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schneider follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK L. SCHNEIDER, SR.

I want to thank Chairman Lugar and the ranking member, Senator Biden, for

holding this hearing on the continuing challenges facing the Afghan people, the

United States and the international community in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime

was repressive and a willing ally of al-Qaeda in its terrorist endeavors. The allied

effort to removing the Taliban reflected an international consensus, backed by UN

authorization, to defeat and destroy al-Qaeda and to assist Afghanistan in building

democracy and rebuilding its shattered economy.

This effort may fail. It will not fail because of a lack of desire, a lack of commitment by millions of Afghans, or a lack of bravery and determination among U.S.,

British and other coalition soldiers, diplomats, development professionals and relief

workers. Instead, it may fail because the administration has been unwilling to recognize the magnitude of the threats which we face and to direct sufficient political,

military and financial resources to overcome them. In Kabul, Kandahar and Gardez,

bombs and mines have not disappeared, and killings take place on a regular basis.

Afghanistan remains second to last in the world in the human development

rankings of UNDP. Warlords continue to siphon off customs revenues that should

go to the national government, and nearly half of Afghanistan’s $4.5 billion economy

comes from drug trafficking. There still are more than 2 million Afghan refugees

in neighboring countries and some 300,000 internally displaced persons within Afghanistan.

The International Crisis Group has been working in Afghanistan since 2001, just

prior to the Bonn Conference. Our offices in Kabul and Islamabad allow us to conduct intensive field research in developing our analysis and recommendations. When

I drove with our team from Kabul to Gardez last November and visited local Afghan

offices, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), I saw the sacrifice and courage that they all were making.

It was even more poignantly conveyed to me again a few days later when a young

French field officer for UNHCR in Ghazni was killed. While I will touch on the

major issues of security, elections, drugs and economic reconstruction, I want to be

clear that expanding NATO/ISAF remains the lynchpin to greater progress on

peace, political transformation, relief and reconstruction.

Security

Security affects everything from elections to reconstruction, and it is vital to understand that this is not a post conflict situation—an unrelenting battle continues

in Afghanistan. The Taliban government and al-Qaeda bases were quickly dispatched by coalition forces barely two months after 9/11. That is the good news because it opened the window for fundamental change. But many of the Taliban and

al-Qaeda simply took refuge across the border in Pakistan, and for many, many

months, little pressure was placed on Pakistan to deny them sanctuary. Taliban political and military leadership moved with relative ease. The just announced Pakistani proposal to provide amnesty to foreign forces in South Waziristan, bordering

16

on Afghanistan, presumably including al-Qaeda, in return for pledges of ‘‘good behavior,’’ is particularly disturbing. The Taliban and other Islamic extremists are

still recruiting and have built up their strength. If anything, the capacity of Taliban

and al-Qaeda today to maintain a deadly insurgency across the south and southwest

of the country appears to be increasing. Within Afghanistan, there has also been

an unwillingness to take on the hard work of disarming and demobilizing regional

warlords and militias, despite its crucial linkage to political stability and to controlling the drug trade.

Al-Qaeda and Taliban attacks on UN, NGOs and Afghan government officials

have nearly doubled over the past four months compared to last year. More NGO

staff were killed in these first four months than all of 2003. Two schools recently

rebuilt with international aid were burned down in a village south of Kandahar and

a senior Muslim cleric critical of the Taliban was assassinated in Kandahar city.

And it is not limited to the south and southeast. Only last week, two British private

security contractors and an Afghan elections worker were killed in the north eastern

province of Nuristan.

A year ago, Secretary Rumsfeld spoke of having U.S. troops leaving Afghanistan

by June of this year. There needs to be a clearer understanding that achieving real

security on the ground is the only way to pave the way for a successful exit strategy.

We were pleased to note that last month there was an increase of some 2,000 U.S.

Marines, bringing U.S. forces up to 15,500. These troops need to be there—and

maybe even more troops need to be there until Afghan security forces are capable

of defending the country against whatever remains of an armed al-Qaeda and

Taliban military forces.

Getting the security services up and running has moved in fits and starts. The

U.S. has bolstered the German-led coordinated training of Afghanistan police, with

some 20,000 police slated to be trained, equipped and on the ground by the end of

June, in time for the coming elections. UNAMA has estimated that between 29,000

to 38,000 police will be required for polling places. But the pressures to get more

people through the training pipeline have resulted in shorter and shorter training

sessions and more questions about vetting. More than one quarter of the 10,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) troops trained have disappeared, presumably deciding

that either the risks or the money did not match the competing offers. There needs

to be a re-thinking of strategy to ensure that this kind of attrition does not continue.

Disarmament and demobilization: The failure to disarm and demobilize individual

warlords and factional militias has sharply undercut progress on a number of fronts.

UN Special Representative Lakhtar Brahimi and his successor, Jean Arnault, have

criticized sharply the weakness of the demobilization program. While some militias

appear willing to identify their futures with a new national Afghan government;

most have simply claimed land, resources and power and used their armed militias

to maintain those claims. The militias continue to engage in bitter factional infighting, retain ties to organized crime and drug trafficking and have not been particularly helpful in combating terrorism.

President Karzai emphasized at the time of the Berlin conference six weeks ago

that the demobilization program, which began last November with three pilot efforts, would produce a 40% reduction in the militias and cantonment of 100 per cent

of their heavy weapons by the end of June. Not only has this effort not produced

any results, since Berlin this accelerated phase of the Afghan New Beginning Programme has not even begun. The initial weapons turned in included a collector’s

treasure of 19th century Lee Enfield rifles and World War I artillery.

The demobilization program will not be effective until it shifts from a focus on

disarming and demobilizing individual soldiers to the complete removal of militia

units. Some 6,225 militia members have been demobilized thus far nationwide. The

militia universe initially was claimed to be 100,000, but it is probably even lower

than the 45,000 to 60,000 that international observers cite. The units that are presently based in Kabul, including at least three that are directly accountable to the

Minister of Defense remain in place two and a half years after the Bonn Agreement

called for their withdrawal. Unless they are decommissioned, the credibility of the

demobilization process itself will be undermined. Worse, until the bulk of the militias are decommissioned, there is a grave risk that the coming elections will be determined by those who control the guns.

The Afghan Defense Ministry also recently adopted a Coalition plan to fold 2,000

members of existing militias into a new Afghan Guard Force (AGF). Without real

training, but under Special Forces supervision, they would be operating in combat

alongside U.S. Special Forces units in the east and southeast. This would essentially

be a national paramilitary force, with enormously dangerous political implications.

Its formation serves as a disincentive to the national disarmament and demobilization effort. The potential, as we have seen in country after country, of such a parVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
17

tisan and poorly trained force, for abuse of civilians, is enormous. To identify the

U.S. with such forces seems particularly unwise.

NATO/ISAF One of the most effective forces in providing security in Kabul and

in Konduz has been NATO/ISAF. Fortunately, the U.S. government removed its objection to the expansion of NATO/ISAF outside Kabul last August, a step widely

called for. In October 2003, NATO and then the Security Council authorized that

expansion, but to date, barely a few hundred more troops beyond the 5,000 previously authorized for Kabul are in place, far fewer than the three battalions requested to be deployed across northern Afghanistan. Nor has there been a great

deal of movement toward the concept of a PRT in every province. At this point there

are 13 on the ground, with only two operating under NATO authorship—Konduz

and Faizabad. The window is closing on the opportunity to create the security environment needed for elections and reconstruction. NATO/ISAF has chapter VII authority and could provide the potential mailed fist behind the demobilization program, help prevent local conflicts and back up legitimate local and national government decisions. It also could ensure greater confidence in the election process by deploying rapid reaction forces from forward bases.

NATO member countries have not responded adequately to the call. ICG has

joined with other organizations including IRC, CARE and Mercy Corps, in appearing before the North Atlantic Council in an unusual effort to emphasize the strong

link between NATO expansion and the entire reconstruction effort. Time is running

out in Afghanistan. The frustration is building. A robust NATO/ISAF expansion beyond Kabul should take place immediately. The deputy commander of the Canadian

Army and the former deputy ISAF commander, Gen. Andrew Leslie, said doubling

NATO/ISAF forces nationwide to 10,000 or more is essential. The Istanbul NATO

Summit really is the final opportunity for pledges to meet NATO/ISAF needs before

for expansion before the proposed elections and then there has to be the earliest

possible deployment. ICG also would hope that NATO parliamentary members of

the North Atlantic Assembly would press their governments toward objective.

The new Secretary General of NATO Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has said, ‘‘We cannot

afford to fail . . . if we do not meet our commitments to the people of that country

to help them build a better future—then who will have confidence in us again?’’

Drugs

Last year in Afghanistan, according to the UN Office of Drugs and Crime,

(UNODC), 1.7 million people were directly engaged in producing more than 3,600

metric tons of opium three quarters of the world’s illicit opium production. In a

UNODC survey, 69% of last year’s poppy farmers stated that they intend to increase

their production, and 43% of those who have not been growing will start cultivating

in 2004. Afghanistan is in clear and present danger of descending from a narcoeconomy into a narco-state.

Local commanders, many in the areas controlled by President Karzai’s allies, others by political opponents, are providing protection for the drug traffickers, taxing

their produce, and sometimes helping with transportation. Opium poppy cultivation

has expanded to 28 of the country’s 32 provinces from a handful, and the illegal

armed groups are financing themselves and seeking to use the political process to

insure they keep those streams of financing flowing. If Colombia is any example,

it will not be long before local commanders begin to acquire the land; combat each

other for the routes and become the drug traffickers themselves. The good news is

that President Karzai has been ahead of the curve in terms of knowing that his

international colleagues were letting the drug market get out of hand.

While everyone now asserts that they recognize the seriousness of the drug trafficking threat to political stability, more needs to be done. The common elements

of the international approach appear to be: Eradication, Law Enforcement—including interdiction and destruction of laboratories, Alternative Development and political leadership. However, the UK and the U.S. disagree on eradication. The British,

particularly in the prelude to elections, argue against forced eradication of a small

impoverished farmer’s crop when there is nothing to offer in return. Not surprisingly, they believe it will antagonize those farmers and make them far more likely

to sympathize with opposition forces. The U.S. position is to move forward on eradication under any circumstances—whether there is replacement income or not.

The compromise reached at a recent conference papers over the differences but

does not resolve them. The British moving in Phase I, will fund governors who pay

the ANA to go out and eradicate in Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar provinces

where there are DFID and other externally financed alternative development

projects. The U.S. has a centrally directed $40 million Phase II program in which

a U.S. contractor finances an Afghan eradication force comprised of individuals chosen by the Ministry of Interior to actually pull out the poppy plants. It started MonVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
18

day, according to the State Department, in one province. That eradication force will

be protected by a U.S. contractor-financed private foreign security force. This again

raises additional questions about who is responsible for security in Afghanistan and

the standards which apply to a U.S. financed private military force.

The primary focus should be on a broad rural development strategy that provides

rural credit to small farmers, alternative crops and alternative income generating

opportunities, and investment in a community’s schools, clinics and infrastructure.

In addition, community elders and figures of authority, and after the September

polls, elected representatives, should be enlisted to argue against planting opium

poppies. At the same time, interdiction, by both Afghan and international security

forces, on the roads and at the border is essential.

Three policy decisions are crucial to taking advantage of the unique presence of

international troops:

• The rules of engagement and mission of NATO/ISAF need to state clearly that

one of its missions is counternarcotics and helping Afghan government agencies

to destroy the Afghan drug trafficking network.

• Coalition forces also must amend their rules of engagement to incorporate an

offensive command to go after drug traffickers. While they have shifted from

don’t look, don’t tell when encountering drug traffickers to being able to destroy

what they find when pursing other objectives, it is not good enough. Actively

disrupting and destroying the opium network should be within their mandate.

• Building an effective police and judicial system also has to be part of the

counterdrug efforts as well. While the British are training an Afghan interdiction force, right now it will only be 200 strong. It needs to be expanded. Similarly the U.S. is working on producing more police fast and INL has $160 million to help train and equip those police over time. The judicial side of the house

is moving even more slowly.

Elections

The forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections are vital. Originally

scheduled for June, they were postponed until September by President Karzai, and

with good reason. Security conditions have impeded the registration process, and

would not permit open campaigning by candidates. And there is a question whether

citizens would be able to vote in confidence and safety. The fundamental question

now is whether adequate conditions will exist to permit both elections to be held

in September—and it is ICG’s view that every effort should be made to hold those

elections together—and not merely because of the cost savings involved. Having the

assembly in session will permit the critical institutions of government to be in place.

Without a legislative body, Afghanistan would begin its democratic life with a serious lack of accountability and challenges to the central government’s legitimacy.

But even more questionable is the level of registration. Barely 20 percent of Afghan voters have been registered, 2,033,568, 30% of them women, out of an estimated 10.5 million Afghans eligible to vote. There are some 275 registration sites

and plans to increase those to a number equal to the 2,600 sites where ultimately

voting would take place. At this point, results of the registration drive are tilted toward the center of the country because it has been too dangerous to reach potential

voters in the south and southeast. However, all of this should have taken place

weeks ago. The delay will make it increasingly difficult for the 70% registration figure to be reached that was among the benchmarks cited as essential in holding a

credible election. Finally, the contours of the electoral law are still in question, and

there are serious concerns about the absence of a centrality for political parties in

the law. The electoral law supposedly to be promulgated before the Berlin conference was still in debate this Monday within the Karzai cabinet. Political party

registration, despite USAID and NDI efforts, has been slow. To date only five parties have been registered. There have been threats directed at the Justice Minister

by some parties anxious to by-pass serious inquiry into whether they have armed

forces. The process for nominating candidates has not yet defined nor the forms prepared, nor has agreement been reached on what procedures will be followed for

counting the ballots, nor have security arrangements been finalized.

New provinces also seem to be springing up as negotiations over electoral constituencies remains unresolved. Two new provinces, Dai Kundi in the central highlands and Panjshir in the northeast, have been announced.

It is difficult to see how the September date can be met for the combination of

presidential and parliamentary elections since the electoral law has not even been

approved and some significant issues remain to be resolved. However, if elections

are to be postponed, the reasons for yet another delay in transferring power to a

truly representative government should be conveyed; a definite date announced for

19

presidential and parliamentary polls; and all possible steps taken to ensure that

there is no need for yet another postponement.

Reconstruction

Afghanistan’s reconstruction is a case of starting from zero. Few other countries

are trying to build roads, schools, agriculture, and public infrastructure nearly from

scratch after 23 years of war, a four year drought and a continuing insurgency.

There has been a reasonable level of planning for the mid and long-term rather than

the short-term alone. The World Bank, ADB, UNDP and others have engaged the

government in a coherent strategy for development that has an initial, post humanitarian relief phase of seven years. During that period there is a $27.5 billion shortfall in financing. The international community took the first step toward meeting

that request with commitments of some $7.2 billion at the Berlin conference. While

most were not for the full seven years, there were a good number, including the U.S.

that at least set out a multi-year pledge.

There are some significant steps to show progress already, from the first stage

of the Kandahar-Kabul road being completed, to a nationwide polio immunization

campaign, to irrigation projects. However these actions pale alongside the need and

the willingness of the U.S., as well as other donors, to meet that need. Security also

impedes the recovery process in a host of ways, most clearly by restricting access.

A USAID official lamented the inability to visit the NGOs the U.S. is funding. To

drive outside the city there would be a need for two extra escort teams ‘‘of protective

shooters in the front and the same in the rear.’’

There also is a particular need for the focus to be on rural poverty and rapid evidence of the impact of those programs. For Afghanistan to succeed in reaching even

the minimum levels of development that President Karzai has described—achieving

$500 per capital annual income in 10 years, the legitimate economy must grow at

an annual rate of 9 percent. Alongside the growth of the private Afghan economy

there will need to be a state whose institutions can alleviate the social deficit facing

some four million vulnerable members of Afghan society, and provide an opportunity

for broad active participation in national life by all of its diverse ethnic groups and

by women.

For the international community, there must be at least a 10 year commitment

at an even higher level of support than currently is the case. One of the strongest

arguments for doing so is that it is the most cost effective way of avoiding a recurrence of the conflicts that have virtually destroyed the country and whose consequences reached out to cause enormous suffering in our own country and elsewhere.

[A report by the International Crisis Group, ‘‘Elections and Security in Afghanistan,’’ appears in the appendix to this hearing.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Schneider, for

that very helpful and comprehensive statement. We will look forward to asking questions of you and the other witnesses.

Mr. Perito.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT PERITO, SENIOR FELLOW AND SPECIAL ADVISOR, RULE OF LAW PROGRAM, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. PERITO. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the

opportunity to appear here this morning. I would like to thank you

and Senator Biden for your interest in this very important topic.

Mr. Chairman, my oral statement this morning is a summary of

a report entitled ‘‘Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan,’’

which I co-authored; I ask your permission to have the report entered in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be placed in the record.

Mr. PERITO. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, two-and-a-half years after the defeat of the

Taliban, security remains the primary concern in Afghanistan.

During 24 years of war, the rule of the gun long ago replaced the

20

rule of law. Today Afghanistan faces a combined threat of resurgent terrorism, fractional conflict and dependence on narcotics.

In the south, U.S.-led coalition forces are engaged in a running

fight with resurgent Taliban and Al Qaeda. In the north, warlords

and militia commanders maintain private armies and engage in

armed clashes over territory, border crossings, and transportation

routes. They use intimidation and violence to control the local population, and they rely on narcotics trafficking and extortion to finance their operations.

The U.S. provided money to the northern warlords in 2001 and

continues to work with them in the fight against Al Qaeda and the

Taliban. Some of the most powerful warlords hold positions as provincial governors but ignore the central government and refuse to

turn over tax revenue. Other warlords hold key positions in the

central government. Mohammed Fahim, an ethnic Tajik leader

with a strong northern power base, serves as the Vice President

and the Defense Minister.

More than terrorists and warlords, however, the growing dependence on narcotics poses the greatest threat to Afghanistan’s future.

Since the fall of the Taliban, there has been an explosion in poppy

cultivation, opium production, and narcotics trafficking. According

to the annual report of the United Nations Office of Drugs and

Crime, opium production has spread from the traditional growing

areas in the south of the country to 28 of the country’s 32 provinces. Today Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium. In 2003, Afghans earned $2.3 billion from opium production. This

amount was equal to half the country’s legitimate gross domestic

product and five times the government’s annual budget. According

to the UN, the international trade in Afghan opiates generates a

worldwide turnover of some $30 billion.

In Afghanistan, the narcotics problem is exacerbated by the fact

that growers, brokers, and traffickers enjoy the protection of police

chiefs, militia commanders, provincial governors, and even cabinet

ministers. These officials use the proceeds from drugs to fund personal armies and to maintain their independence from the central

government. Profits from narcotics trafficking also find their way

through supporters to the Taliban and Al Qaeda that are used to

finance local and international terrorism.

In a situation where there are few disincentives and no equally

lucrative alternatives, the country’s rural population has turned to

opium production. Afghanistan’s renowned orchards and vineyards

were sown with land mines and withered during the conflict. In

contrast, opium grows very well in barren and arid terrain.

Opium brokers and traffickers provide a kind of highly organized

agricultural extension service. Farmers are provided with seed, fertilizer, advance payments, technical training, and an assured market for their product. Opium is easy to package, store, and transport, and it does not spoil. Growing poppies enables farmers to

earn 10 times the amount that they would earn from other crops,

and opium production is particularly attractive to returning refugees who find ready work and good pay helping farmers grow poppies.

With the assistance of the UN and Britain, the Afghan government has put in place the institutional framework to begin a

21

counter-narcotics program. Afghanistan now has a Counter-Narcotics Directorate, a national drug control strategy, and a modern

narcotics control law. The Karzai government, however, is incapable of implementing its own counter-narcotics program. Afghanistan does not have a national police force. There are some 50,000

men in Afghanistan who work as police, but they are generally untrained, ill-equipped, poorly paid, if paid, and loyal to warlords or

local commanders.

International efforts to create a national police force, including

the drug enforcement capacity, are just beginning. The U.S. is

spending $110 million to provide training to 50,000 currently serving police. This training is taking place in Kabul and at seven regional training centers co-located with provincial reconstruction

teams. The initial training is focused on basic skills and election

security, however. It will take time before a newly trained police

force can be counted on for effective law enforcement.

Germany, which is the lead donor nation for police training, has

spent some $70 million on new equipment and rebuilt the police

academy in Kabul. But under the German program, 1,500 new police officers and 1,000 non-commissioned officers are enrolled in a

5-year work/study program. The Germans are also working to create a 12,000-member border guard force. This effort is well intentioned, but the benefits are years in the future.

The UK, which is the lead donor nation for counter-narcotics programs, will spend $12 million over the next 3 years to create an

anti-narcotics task force to conduct eradication. The UK has also

promoted crop substitution and alternative livelihood programs for

Afghan farmers, but again, the benefits are not going to be felt for

some time.

Once trained, Afghan police will be ineffective, however, if there

is no functioning criminal justice system to support them. Unfortunately, little has been done to aid courts and prisons. There is no

master strategy or even consensus on priorities for judicial reform.

Italy, the lead donor nation, has failed to promote cooperation

among the relevant Afghan institutions. There is a critical shortage

of trained personnel, buildings, equipment, and financial resources.

International funding for judicial projects has been very limited.

There is also an ongoing debate within the country about which

law to enforce and about what the role of religion should be in the

legal process. The new constitution concentrates the power to appoint judges in the hands of the Chief Justice of the Supreme

Court, but the current Chief Justice, a conservative cleric, has

packed the court system with mullahs with no legal education.

In the critical area of corrections, jails and prisons, there has

been almost no effort made. Prison conditions in Afghanistan are

routinely described as inhumane, lacking adequate food, sanitation,

trained personnel, and space. Outside of Kabul, warlords control

detention facilities and conditions are even more deplorable.

International assistance for corrections has been severely limited.

Other than a few NGO projects, the UN is working alone on jail

and prison improvement. Currently the UN is spending only $2

million over 2 years on very basic renovation of a detention center

in Kabul and three cellblocks of the infamous Pul-e-Charki prison.

22

The UN is also providing some limited training to administrative

staff.

The interrelated problems of terrorism, warlords, and narcotics

are extremely serious, but many Afghans, particularly Afghans

that we spoke with when we visited there, think the situation may

still be reversible. Afghan farmers are reluctant to engage in illegal

activities, especially those that are viewed as immoral by Islam.

Any hopeful scenario, however, involves a race against time. The

UN has warned that Afghanistan is in critical danger of becoming

a narco-state and a haven for narco-terrorists.

To prevent this from happening, the United States should make

counter-narcotics its top priority. Curtailing the narcotics trade will

deny terrorists and warlords the funds they use to recruit followers

and conduct operations. The U.S. is currently training four teams

of Afghan police in crop eradication, but this and other law enforcement programs must be coupled with effective projects for creating

alternative livelihoods and imaginative programs for crop substitution. Thanks to your leadership, Mr. Chairman, the United

States now has the financial resources it needs. The emphasis must

now be placed on vigorous implementation.

The U.S.-led coalition and the International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF) must now join in the fight against narcotics. Military

forces must begin to proactively perform at least a limited number

of counter-narcotics mission. These would include intelligence sharing, destruction of drug warehouses and heroin laboratories, and

drug seizures. At present U.S. military forces only seize drugs if

they encounter them in the course of their routine operations.

The U.S. must make good on Secretary Powell’s recent statement

that warlords have no place in Afghanistan and private armies

must be disbanded. Warlords and militia commanders are a source

of insecurity and a threat to the central government. U.S. military

payments to what are called regional influentials conflict with our

overall policy of promoting national unity. Stopping payments

would correct the impression that many Afghans have, that the

U.S. military condones the warlords’ participation in the drug

trade.

There must also be a vigorous effort to curtail corruption. We

should assist the Afghan government to pay adequate salaries to

police, judges, and prison personnel. It is impossible to have judicial reform when judges earn only $36 a month and policemen earn

only $15 a month and then are not paid.

The U.S. should ensure that equal attention and resources are

paid to police, the judicial system, and prisons. Emphasis on police

training at the expense of the other parts of the justice triad will

produce the kind of results that we saw in Haiti and in Iraq. Without effective courts and humane prisons, there can be no rule of

law. As events in Iraq demonstrate, we cannot allow ourselves to

ignore conditions and practices in Afghan detention facilities.

At this point, the U.S. should not be constrained by the lead

donor nation approach and should do what is needed to provide

training and technical assistance. The effort to promote burden

sharing has not worked well and the U.S. can no longer wait for

other donors to take effective action. The United States has both

the most experience and the most at stake.

23

The missing ingredient in international assistance to Afghanistan has been leadership. The so-called ‘‘light footprint’’ approach

has left the Afghans adrift. Afghans realize they need help. Afghans look to Americans for guidance. We need to move quickly,

however, Mr. Chairman, before it is too late.

Thank you.

[The report to which Mr. Perito referred, ‘‘Establishing the Rule

of Law in Afghanistan,’’ appears in the appendix to this hearing.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Perito.

Mr. Isby.

STATEMENT OF DAVID ISBY, FOREIGN AND DEFENSE

POLICY ANALYST, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. ISBY. I would like to thank the chair and the distinguished

members of this panel for the opportunity to talk here about Afghanistan.

There have been a number of successes affecting Afghanistan in

recent months, including the donor conference in Berlin. But new

challenges to Afghanistan’s security are emerging. These include

the effects of the elections called for under the new constitution.

The revival of often divisive politics inside Afghanistan has led to

largely cross-border violence aimed at preventing electoral participation. Reconstruction has been limited in the south and east by

the same violence. Narcotics cultivation and trafficking have been

revived. Disarmament has stalled. The Afghan security situation is

more difficult and complex than it was a few months ago.

To prevent a challenging situation becoming a deteriorating one,

the United States and its international partners must shift their

Afghanistan priorities. Long-term security commitments should

match the aid commitments made at Berlin. These should include

a sustained, enhanced U.S. presence, ideally matching ISAF expansion. But regardless of NATO actions, there is no substitute for the

perceptions of commitment to both security and reconstruction created by deployed U.S. forces, especially in areas where the UN and

NGOs have been deterred from operating.

An enhanced U.S. security commitment to south and east Afghanistan could take the form of a near-term surge deployment to

secure the elections, attack Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants, build

intelligence networks, and revive reconstruction. Military units

committed to reconstruction can provide their own security while

training Afghans to take over their tasks. A longer-term U.S. security commitment can take the form of expanding the successful provincial reconstruction teams.

Such an enhanced commitment needs to be reconciled with admittedly over-stretched U.S. capabilities in force structure and integrated with those forces already operating in Afghanistan. The

commitment needs to be implemented in a way that at the grassroots level will enhance security rather than focus Afghan resentment.

The most important U.S. contribution to security in Afghanistan,

however, is through engaging with regional countries. One of the

functions of a long-term U.S. security commitment to Afghanistan

is to show these countries that they are more likely to realize their

24

own security goals by cooperating with the international community and Kabul. Since 2001, Pakistan has cooperated in antiTaliban activities and anti-terrorist activities. Yet, the Taliban culture that exists in Pakistan provides support for terror and violence inside Afghanistan. U.S. engagement with Pakistan needs to

encourage them both to crack down on the roots of violence in the

Taliban culture and to improve their cooperation with Kabul.

Outside funding and support coming into Afghanistan, often

through religious channels, is another security challenge. This can

affect the upcoming elections, especially those for parliament. However, effective reconstruction must include an Islamic dimension

amongst its objectives.

Assessing U.S. policy success in Afghanistan is more complex

than simply counting troops deployed or dollars spent. We need to

avoid the entanglement of Afghan politics. We must not treat the

Afghan government as just another faction, but we must also avoid

an embrace of them that will make them appear as a United States

creation. We must not act as Kabul’s enforcer, carrying out politically costly tasks.

Today our most important security contribution to Afghanistan is

to prevent outside spoilers. We need more U.S. boots on the ground

in the near term because of the election. We need to jump start reconstruction in the south and east and we need to address disarmament and narcotics issues. Together, these actions will demonstrate U.S. commitment to Afghans and regional countries alike.

The best hope for Afghanistan is the Afghans. If the United

States and the international community can enable them to decide

their own future and prevent outside spoilers, there is cause for

guarded optimism about the future of Afghanistan.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Isby follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID C. ISBY

I would like to thank the Chair and the distinguished members of this panel for

the opportunity to talk here about Afghanistan.

There have been a number of successes in Afghanistan recent months. The new

constitution has been generally accepted. Increased United States government efforts have resulted in $1.2 million Emergency Supplemental assistance programs

under the ‘‘Accelerating Success in Afghanistan’’ strategy. The initial stages of the

Kabul-Kandahar highway reconstruction have been completed. A new ‘‘South and

Southeast Strategy’’ has provided resources to combat hostile activities and enhance

lagging reconstruction. At the recent donor’s conference in Berlin, the Afghan government presented a request for aid commitments based on what it had determined

would be required to re-create a functioning national economy and saw those commitments, reflecting the priorities of Kabul rather than the donors, largely met.

The war against Taliban and Al Qaida needs to continue. The national security

of the United States is served by defeating these forces in detail. Key leadership

figures remain to be captured. While they present only a limited military challenge,

their campaign of violence and terror is preventing reconstruction and political participation in areas in the south and east.

The national security of the United States is also served by effectively implementing our commitment to assist in the international community’s efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, to prevent it ever again being a base of terrorism and extremism

that threatens other countries. Afghanistan still has a need for humanitarian assistance and, increasingly, reconstruction throughout all the country. Such activities

also contribute to security. They demonstrate to the Afghan grass roots that their

lives are being made better. Functioning government outside Kabul and a viable national economy are both evolving slowly despite many setbacks.

25

Through its continuing commitment to Afghanistan, the United States can demonstrate that they can help a people that suffered from Taliban and Al Qaida oppression, terrorism, and warfare. In Afghanistan in 2001, the U.S. demonstrated the

power of even a relative small part of its armed forces in helping their Afghan allies

militarily defeat the Taliban and Al Qaida on the battlefield. In 2001, the world saw

the jubilation of Afghans as the Taliban and Al Qaida were driven from Kabul, including the joyful re-openings of the long-shuttered movie theaters. Now the U.S.

is faced with the opportunity to help bring about a third success, making possible

the rebuilding of Afghanistan. I believe that the United States needs to do more to

meet emerging challenges to this last—and most critical—of our national security

goals in Afghanistan.

Conflict in Afghanistan tends to be about legitimacy. To win the current conflict,

the government in Kabul needs to continue to increase its legitimacy, building on

continued commitment to the Bonn process and the desire for peace of the vast majority of the Afghan people. I believe that the U.S. and the world community need

to do more. Success in Afghanistan requires effective diplomatic activity to prevent

outside forces from acting as spoilers, both a near-term surge and a long-term security commitment of troops on the ground, and more resources available for addressing emerging new challenges.

The military elements of U.S. policy in Afghanistan since 2001 have been, in

many ways, the most successful. Yet the U.S. must use military force with care,

avoid the pitfalls of resurgent Afghan politics and avoid involvement in implementing policies of the Kabul government that would make it appear an outside creation. In some cases, international security cooperation cannot serve as a substitute

for U.S. action. Perception of a long-term U.S. security commitment is crucial.

Afghanistan’s new challenges come from diverse sources. The requirement, under

the new constitution, for presidential and parliamentary (both houses) elections has

led to critical security concerns. It has presented a target for the forces that are

using terror and violence against the Kabul government and its international supporters and so must be considered the most significant security threat in Afghanistan. The Taliban and Al Qaida are making a strong attempt to limit voter registration in a number of areas in the south and east of Afghanistan.

The upcoming presidential election itself marks the formal return of Afghan politics. The wars of 1978–2001 polarized Afghans, not only along the ethno-linguistic

divisions but also those of economic interest, religious practice and philosophy, class

and locality, and other complex factors. Recently, these tensions have undercut ambitious internationally-supported programs aimed at disarmament. A revival in narcotics cultivation and traffic presents an international threat and provide a source

of funding for those opposed to the Kabul government.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to identify many missed opportunities

in Afghanistan since 2001. The prompt and skillful military action that enabled and

empowered our Afghan allies to liberate their own country from the Taliban and Al

Qaida was not matched by comparable decisive action, unity of command, and application of resources in other areas. Too often, opportunities to build on momentum

were not taken. The U.S. now has enough experience and knowledge to learn from

mistakes.

Yet I believe the bottom line is guardedly optimistic. Afghanistan is neither the

former Yugoslavia nor Iraq. The Afghan people, resilient though destitute and warweary, have demonstrated they are willing and able to deal with the deep and fundamental issues that divide them. The U.S. needs to give them the tools to make

this possible and help stop those that aim, for their own ends, to blight Afghan

hopes.

What Should We Be Doing?

The current U.S. commitment to security, reconstruction and developmental aid

to Afghan government is vital. The Afghan government has had an increasing role

in decisions to allocate this aid, demonstrating competence and legitimacy both

internationally—as seen at the Berlin conference—and domestically, where it allows

the government to find sources of revenue outside of aid, build patronage and demonstrate its relevance.

The U.S. needs to support implementation in Afghanistan that will avoid what

Ambassador Peter Thomsen has termed ‘‘the briar patch of Afghan politics.’’ The

United States must not treat the Afghan government as just another faction. Yet

it must also avoid too close an embrace that will make that government appear as

a creation of the U.S. Nor must the U.S. act as the Afghan government’s ‘‘enforcer,’’

implementing policies that Kabul lacks the political or military strength to carry

out. The elections, the conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaida, disarmament, corruption, narcotics, human rights abuses, the lack of economic development and many

26

other critical problems can block progress. These issues are now firmly enmeshed

in Afghan politics. Afghans are increasingly accusing their political opponents of

these (and other) problems and insisting that justice requires that foreign influence

(or force) be used to put them (and their friends) into power.

What the U.S. should aim for as a priority of a strengthened commitment to Afghanistan is not implementing specific solutions devised by the Kabul government

of the U.N., but rather to continue to enable and empower Afghans to work together, to build confidence is each other, and to identify steps that will lead to an

emergence of a more mature political culture in a society that has been mobilized

by war throughout the 1978–2001 period by using every possible claim and rationale

to get Afghans to fight others, usually other Afghans.

It is vital that the U.S. not be seen as being politically manipulated in policy implementation in Afghanistan, especially with the elections likely to hold center stage

for the immediate future. While the U.S. is rightly engaged primarily with the

Kabul government, it also needs to engage with regional leaders (including some of

those lumped together pejoratively as ‘‘warlords’’ by their political opponents) and,

through mechanisms such as the PRTs and cooperation with NGOs, the grass roots.

The Afghan government will have in effect, to repeat the state-building process

that took place in the generation before 1978 while avoiding the mistakes in that

process that led directly to the tragic events that followed. It is a difficult task.

There are many places in Afghanistan where nothing good came from Kabul in

1978–2001. Legitimacy and a presumption of competence and even-handedness

must be rebuilt from less than zero in 2001.

Indeed, there are still many Afghans—in and out of government and of many different political alignments—that, like the post-revolutionary Bourbons, appear to

have both learned nothing and forgotten nothing. Urban Kabulis with Pushtun roots

want Dari-speaking rural Panjsheris disarmed and out of their city. Those that collaborated with the Soviets during the occupation or are returning from exile demand

criminalization of the ‘‘jihadis’’ that fought the Soviet invaders and took part in the

civil wars of 1992–2001; they, in turn, disparage the ‘‘washers of dogs and cats’’ returning from exile that, without their record of being able to get things done on the

ground (made possible by their appropriation of income, patronage networks and

their Kalashnikovs), have to rely on foreign support. All will try their best to secure

U.S. support in the emerging world of Afghan politics.

Regional Security Issues

The most important U.S. contribution to Afghanistan’s security is through interaction with the regional actors. In 1992–2001, it was the willingness of those actors—especially but not exclusively neighbors—to back opposing sides in Afghanistan’s civil wars that kept the conflicts going.

If the neighbors believe the U.S. security commitment to Afghanistan be a longlasting one, they will be more likely to permanently turn away from their 1990s

policies and seek to accommodate their security interests through cooperation with

the internationally-recognized government in Kabul and not by backing Afghan regional military commanders to oppose it. If the neighbors believe the U.S. presence

and interest in Afghanistan are transitory and that the U.S. is, despite its rhetoric,

looking for an exit strategy, then they will hedge their bets in their relations with

Afghanistan. U.S. long-term security commitments are going to be stronger than

any coming from elsewhere in the international community, including NATO.

Effective U.S. interaction with Pakistan is most important thing we do for security in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s involvement with Afghanistan has been, in recent

decades, an order or magnitude greater than any other neighbor. The conflict currently going on in Afghanistan by Taliban and Al Qaida is a cross-border insurgency

mounted from Pakistan. It is not a grass-roots insurgency by Afghans aggrieved at

the slow rate of reconstruction or that members of other ethnic groups hold ministerial positions in Kabul. Even though the Taliban may have sympathy in some areas

in Afghanistan on ethno-linguistic, local, or religious grounds, it they are no longer

a viable political movement inside Afghanistan. However, in Pakistan, the ‘‘Taliban

culture’’ remains, including a network of internationally linked fundamentalist

groups, madrassas and Pakistani religious parties that support the conflict in Afghanistan.

Challenging this culture is politically costly for any Pakistani government. In the

longer term, however, it is likely to prove critical not only for Afghanistan but for

the future nature of state and civil society in Pakistan. Yet as long as the Taliban

culture remains strong across the Durand line, achieving peace in Afghanistan will

be problematic, regardless of how many resources are committed by the international community, including the U.S., to Afghanistan.

27

The current U.S. engagement has been met with increased Pakistani willingness

to address the threat to achieving peace and security in Afghanistan that is coming

from Pakistan. This was demonstrated in recent Pakistani military operations in

South Waziristan. It has also been seen in President Musharref’s address to parliament earlier this year and in a range of other actions dating back to his 14 January 2002 speech and before. Pakistani cooperation in arresting foreign terrorists has

included a number of significant successes. These actions have been recognized by

the recent U.S. designation of Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally.

Yet problems remain. Taliban leaders—not limited to ‘‘moderates’’—live openly in

Quetta. The Pakistani intelligence services and elements of the military have not

turned away from the policies that brought Afghanistan to the disastrous situation

of 2001. In recent weeks, statements of concern about Pakistani policies from U.S.

Ambassador to Afghanistan, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad and the commander of Combined

Forces Command, U.S. Lieutenant General David Barno, have been matched by

statements from the Afghan government.

The upcoming Afghan election is vulnerable to a broad range of action by its opponents. While the Taliban and Al Qaida must be considered the most important

threat, they are not the only one. Throughout Afghanistan, regional and local leaders—who tend to perceive no viable alternative to themselves—are likely to use all

the power at their disposal, from the use of patronage to armed intimidation, to see

that the elections do not overturn their power. However, in these cases, U.S. and

international community interaction with these leaders are important to try and

minimize their effect. The security situation is most important in those areas in the

south and east where the threats to the election include terrorist violence. Nor is

reducing participation to reduce legitimacy the only threat goal. Reports at the time

of loya jirga delegate selection from the south have told of convoys of ‘‘voters’’ being

trucked from Pakistan.

Regional Security is Linked to Reconstruction

The importance of reconstruction aid is that it allows the U.S. to have an impact

that will increase stability while not becoming hostage to Afghan politics. For example, gender issues are likely to remain politically polarizing for the immediate future. They may be used as a shorthand to rally opposition to the current government on a range of issues. Yet by backing programs that make Afghans lives better

at the grass roots by rebuilding schools or microcredit schemes that put sewing machines in villages, the U.S. can hope to avoid its policies being perceived as contributing to the continued divisions and polarization that marks Afghan politics.

No one is likely to be against schools and sewing machines. If the Taliban and

Al Qaida come with guns to burn them, they need to be detected and defeated. If

mullahs—supported with rupees from Pakistan’s ‘‘Taliban culture’’ or from foreign

radical Islam—preach against them and demand the schools and sewing machines

be burned, then there needs to be a countervailing support for traditional Afghan

Islam, which has long demonstrated that piety can lead to resistance to fundamentalism and oppression.

It has been a long time since anyone has funded traditional Afghan religious practices and leaders, while those attacking them have enjoyed extensive foreign support. While this may be an uncomfortable issue for the U.S., it remains that a purely secular conception of reconstruction will be inadequate to deal with Afghanistan

and the role of Islam in its politics and life. Reconstruction has to include not only

government, infrastructure and economy, but Afghan Islam as well. If this is not

an area where the U.S. is competent or comfortable in acting, then by all means

let us engage with international partners to deal with this issue, as so long as they

do not have their own agendas. If there is a vacuum in funding and support here,

it will be filled by men from outside Afghanistan with evil ideas and suitcases full

of dollars.

This is a necessary part of security making possible reconstruction—blocking the

outside spoilers. The religious element is more difficult than interacting with the regional players, for most of the action here involves sub-national actors and many

of these have committed Afghan political allies. Addressing this problem in a way

that will not be perceived as an attempt to criminalize opposition politics by the

Kabul government is a challenge.

Security Forces in Afghanistan

The national security interests of the United States in making Afghanistan secure

are likely to mandate the presence of military forces there for at least the next five

to ten years. Currently, there are three distinct foreign security forces in Afghanistan. In Kabul is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), currently

under NATO. There are the coalition forces taking part in the war on terror, often

28

with the support of aircraft and assets based outside Afghanistan. U.S. and coalition

provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) (plus an ISAF German effort in Konduz)

carry out high-value relief programs while being able to provide for their own security. They bring an outside presence and token of commitment to grass-roots Afghanistan.

ISAF expansion remains problematic despite the 2003 commitment to its expansion. While there are places in the north and west where such forces could be useful—Herat, Konduz, areas of tension in the northwest—they would best be employed

in the south and east, to counter Taliban and Al Qaida terror and help make possible humanitarian aid and reconstruction. While NATO is making good current

commitments and has offered to deploy an additional five PRTs in north Afghanistan (where there is largely not a security threat) lack of long-term security commitments to match the aid commitments made at Berlin earlier this year is disconcerting.

In reality, it has been difficult to sustain the force at its current level. While expansion of ISAF would be a good thing, it is hard to see how it could be carried

out on a sustainable basis. NATO countries are finding that the Afghanistan commitment stretches their forces and funding even at current levels. They have cut

back force structures and have other commitments. While expanding ISAF may be

possible, before implementing it is necessary to recall that poorly trained, illequipped or ineffective troops are worse than no troops. One must be hesitant about

any expansion that would bring in untrained or inexperienced units—in terms of the

current situation rather than conventional operations—into Afghanistan.

Deployment of additional U.S. forces to southern and eastern Afghanistan could

provide security, assist with reconstruction, and help the campaign against Taliban

and Al Qaida. There is a need a short-term this-year surge deployment to deal with

emerging problems such as making possible election security, the completion of

high-value infrastructure reconstruction, narcotics eradication, and disarmament.

Even if the troops do not carry out these missions themselves, their presence and

military action against the threat will help make it possible for Afghans to carry

out these actions.

The current force structure and resources overstretch by the U.S. (and any participating NATO or coalition members) means that deployment of such forces needs

to be targeted to help provide security especially in areas where reconstruction efforts by the UN and NGOs being deterred by terrorism or, as in case of UN with

election registration, have turned the program over to Afghans. In these areas, the

U.S. and coalition presence is currently limited to those forces waging military operations against the Al Qaida and Taliban remnants and the PRTs.

While the PRTs have done good work (despite the hostility of some NGOs and

skepticism of some of the local population), their actions have not been sufficient

for average Afghans in this area to see how their life is better. The deployment of

additional PRTs should be made alongside the surge deployment. The PRTs can remain as a part of a long-term commitment to Afghan security.

While ISAF expansion into areas in the south and east would be a good and important advance, NATO troops are not a substitute for U.S. troops in those areas

of Afghanistan. Only U.S. troops are the ‘‘boots on the ground’’ that indicate superpower commitment and an effective willingness to support Afghanistan and the

Kabul government against both Taliban and Al Qaida and the policies of regional

players.

Deployments will also have to be done to skillfully minimize friction (and friendly

fire incidents). More garrisons in the south and east—unless integrated into an effective operational concept—may only provide targets for Taliban and Al Qaida mortars and rockets. Many Afghans are anxious for an outside presence to assure security, but it needs to be implemented to avoid the streak of xenophobia that runs

alongside the hospitality of Afghanistan.

An expanded U.S. security commitment should not be judged by troop endstrength but rather by effectiveness. It should include increased intelligence assets

and be able to work with both grass roots Afghans and Kabul government forces

to develop intelligence. It could include expanded PRTs; or units such as engineer

battalions that could both initiate reconstruction programs and train Afghans—

ideally demobilized fighting men paid by aid money—to take over their jobs.

While the U.S. military should look to make clear its security commitment to Afghanistan is a long-term one, in carrying out reconstruction tasks the goal should

be to train and turn over the tasks to Afghans as soon as possible. Infrastructure

building and provision of security are two exceptions but those digging wells and

carrying out other needed tasks should be Afghans.

To meet regional goals and make Afghanistan a place that will not be a haven

for terrorism and extremism, I believe that U.S. forces, concentrating on security,

29

will need to remain in place for foreseeable future, five to ten years. I believe that

a similar commitment of ISAF forces will be required if it is to remain viable. I believe that a near-term surge commitment of U.S. and ISAF forces to the south and

east is required to help provide security, defeat terrorist forces, and help jump-start

reconstruction.

DDR—Example of an Emerging Challenge

There is no disagreement that the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) process is vital to the future of Afghanistan. and that, at some point

in the future, there will be a single national army and police force in Afghanistan.

It has also been determined by the Bonn process and the Afghan constitution that

the armed forces that liberated Afghanistan in 2001 are not to enjoy the central

place in national life that has been the case in many developing countries, most notably that of Pakistan. It has also been determined that the emerging national army

and police forces are to reflect the entire country’s ethno-linguistic makeup (especially in their commanders), which is frequently not the case in many developing

countries, most notably region that of Pakistan.

Demobilization of fighting men outside the Kabul government’s army and police

forces without jobs creates only bandits and narcotics cultivators. Demobilization

has to be a primary aim of reconstruction aid. In long term, rebirth of a national

economy is the only answer. But in the short term, the U.S. may have to look to

these forces to assist with security.

However, in the short term, the DDR process has led to a stand-off between U.N.

authorities trying to implement it and defense minister Marshal Fahim. In the

longer term, effective DDR is going to be the consequence of the successful assumption of legitimate and competent national power by the government in Kabul rather

than the cause.

Since 1978, armed power wielded by Kabul has been discredited, and it will require years of increasing legitimacy and competency to restore it. The Hazaras and

the Bamiyan shura are going to have a different view of the DDR process than that

held in Kabul by our friends in the government. They are going to want re-assurance that the emerging national army and police force and not going to be used as

the ‘‘big stick’’ of a repressive center-periphery relationship. The same considerations also apply to other armed forces in Afghanistan, which need to have their

security situation considered on a case-by-case basis.

The U.S. can contribute to an effective DDR process. The most important elements are already being carried out—the creation of a national army and reconstruction that can both employ and train former fighting men. An important challenge will be to extend the benefits of DDR not only to the regional commanders—

they already have jobs with the government—but to their senior and mid-level commanders. If they end up as bandit chiefs or narcotics growers, then the effectiveness

of the entire process will be undercut.

Hindering the implementation of DDR is a widespread belief by the Afghans affected by it in political bias by both UN and the Kabul government. If the U.S. retains the confidence of the regional commanders, it can act as a trusted interlocutor,

looking for ways to implement DDR. This is likely to be more effective than having

U.S. combat units physically disarming Afghans. Effective actions in support of

DDR can include the continued provision of U.S. Special Forces teams with Afghan

forces. On multiple occasions, these have ‘‘deconflicted’’ potential problems and demonstrated earnest that the regional commanders should continue to support Kabul,

the constitution, and the Bonn process rather than call up their foreign supporters

and look for funding to start implementing their own agenda.

The U.S. needs to work with these commanders and forces where appropriate.

While they are ‘‘yesterday’s men’’ and they know it, their residual power—in the

terms of patronage networks and armed men—is significant. Demanding that they

be swept away as an a priori condition for the elections while the central government’s institutions that would replace them—and the legitimacy for their non-repressive use—are both still weak is unachievable and will undercut the potential

for limited—but still real—gains.

Conclusion

These are just a few elements of a vast interconnected problem. While judging the

U.S. effort by money spent or number of troops in-country rather than their effect

is dangerous, more U.S. resources would be good. There is a continued need for reconstruction funds. Money can smooth over many of the center-periphery political

problems. There would be many fewer Afghans carrying Kalashnikovs for regional

commanders or maintaining poppy fields if there were programs where, funded by

aid money, they could work on rebuilding in the morning and be taught to read in

30

the afternoons. When such programs have been offered, there have been literally

hundreds of applicants for each place.

But until that time, even with more U.S. troops on the ground and more U.S. aid

over what is currently available, we will have to prioritize. I believe that the elections make regional security the highest priority. But additional resources would

make it possible for the U.S. to have more policy options in dealing with worsening

problems such as disarmament and narcotics. Dealing with both while avoiding becoming a participant in Afghan politics or making the Afghan government appear

to be a U.S. creation will be difficult, but this cannot be an excuse for inaction.

A goal of all U.S. and international action—diplomatic, security, reconstruction—

is to ensure an Afghan government is able to make meeting the needs of its citizens

a priority. This was not a priority in 1978–2001. The government needs, within the

context of the constitution and the Bonn process, to grow revenues and patronage

networks that can help stabilize Afghanistan. But do not expect—or try and fund—

short-term success. While supporting the government in Kabul, we must help ensure tomorrow’s Afghans do right what the former King and his governments—flush

with superpower aid at the height of the Cold War—did terribly wrong in the decades before 1978.

There is a desperate need for training Afghans in many fields, especially civil administration. The concept of effective, accountable, impartial administration was put

aside in 1978–2001 when power and its possession were often the sole concerns. Between the pre-1978 heritage and the skills of individual Afghans, there is hope for

improvement, but this is an area where the aid is needed.

U.S./NATO troops are needed to make reconstruction possible in the south and

east. But keep in mind that goal should be the minimal level of troop commitment

consistent with effectiveness. While U.S. troops are a unique and important symbol

of commitment, good foreign troops are needed to share the burden and demonstrate

international security commitments. The wrong foreign troops need to stay home.

The most important reconstruction aid—that only the U.S. can provide —is preventing regional players acting as spoilers in Afghanistan. This means, in the near

term, undercutting support for the cross-border actions by the Taliban and Al

Qaida. In the longer term, it means support for efforts that will undercut the

‘‘Taliban culture’’ on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line and encourage the growth

of civil society and effective governance. Religious funding originating in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region will be critical if it is used in the election

process.

In the final analysis, Afghans are likely to work things better out themselves. We

need to build back their infrastructure, act as interlocutors and mediators, prevent

outsiders from acting as spoilers, and be guided by a goal of not doing for the Afghans what they can do for themselves. The U.S. and the international community—by making long term security commitments to match the aid commitments

given recently at Berlin—can help the Afghans work things out themselves. If the

U.S. and the international community can enable and empower them to decide their

own future and can prevent outside spoilers from doing damage, then there is cause

for guarded optimism about the future of Afghanistan. But as new challenges have

emerged in Afghanistan—the need to conduct elections, the need for disarmament

and narcotics eradication, the creation of a national economy—they require new responses and commitment of resources from the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Isby.

Let me say that we will try to have 10 minutes of questioning

by each Senator and then maybe another round. Let me recognize

for a moment Senator Biden. You have to leave.

Senator BIDEN. Yes. I am supposed to address a national police

organization, but this is, quite frankly, much more important. I

wonder if you would indulge me to ask one question.

The CHAIRMAN. Please.

Senator BIDEN. I know it is not appropriate. The Chairman

speaks first.

Gentlemen, some of us on this committee have had a running

and legitimate debate with people inside and outside the administration, from the moment the Taliban collapsed, as to how we

should proceed. I want to make it clear that I think when we are

talking about Afghanistan or Iraq and how we should have proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
31

ceeded, a strong dose of humility is in order for anyone who has

a recommendation, particularly speaking for myself. I am not suggesting by the question I am about to ask that had the prescriptions offered by the majority of this committee been followed, that

things would be materially different. I think they would, but I do

not know. This is not one of these ‘‘we told them so and here we

are and what do we do.’’ I want to get to the heart of what I see as a difference in policy

prescriptions here without speaking about the details, the tactics,

whether we are speaking about education and whether or not— when I was in Afghanistan, meeting with a man who had been in

Italy for the last 24 years and came back to become the head of

the Department of Education, in effect, he talked about opening up

the university. I went in to see him and I said, basically what do

you need? I thought he was going to tell me he needed supplies,

laboratories, books, et cetera. He said, I need one thing. I need security on the roads. No student is going to show up without security on the roads. I said, what do you mean? He said, literally on

the roads. I have got to be able to have a student who lives in

Kandahar or lives in Herat or lives in Bagram to be able to think

they can travel the road to get to the university.

When I visited the first schools that were open, the grade

schools, it was impressive the determination of the young girls in

particular who had been out of school for 5 years, some of them 14,

15 years old going back to primary school and their determination

to learn to read. One young woman, as I said I was leaving, stood

up with those magnificent hazel eyes so many of them have and

with fire in them, looked at me and said, ‘‘You cannot go.’’ I

thought she meant I could not leave the classroom. She said,

‘‘America cannot go. I will never learn to read. I want to be a doctor

like my mother.’’ This was through a translator. Her determination

was incredible.

But again, security. Even immediately after the Taliban was on

the run, I met with two women ministers and sublevel women in

the government who told me that, as they took the bus to work,

they wore their burka. They told me of examples where cars would

drive up with four men and the men would jump out, throw the

women against the wall, threaten them, tell them if they are not

covered next time, they will be punished.

So, when we tried to expand the security force—and Secretary

Powell weighed in on this force as well—there was a reluctance, a

judgment made at the highest levels in our government that that

was not the way to go.

Then in what were at the time weekly meetings with Dr. Rice—

and I think she expresses a legitimate view, but a different view—

I remember one day saying to her, Condy, the warlords are gaining

power not reducing power. For a brief, shining moment there, they

were all sort of cowed and they all were worried about whether

benefactors would continue to support them, whether it be any one

of the five surrounding countries. There was a moment there where

they were ready to let international security forces in sort of as

apartheid cops. They kind of viewed it as if the international security force was there, at least their territory would not be encroached upon by a competing faction.

32

And Dr. Rice looked at me and she said this—I am not telling

tales out of school—she said, ‘‘What do you mean? What is the

problem?’’ I said well, Ismail Khan in Iraq. She said, ‘‘What is the

problem? The Taliban is not there. Al Qaeda is not there. It has

always been this way.’’ So I think we should level with one another here about what is

the base, fundamental difference in approach and what we have to

deal with here. There has been a judgment made, if not by direction, by indirection in a sense, that the way to maintain stability

in Afghanistan was to try to do whatever is necessary within our

power and divert our attention to deal with Al Qaeda and deal with

the Taliban. Part of that seems to have been that the warlords are

an element in that. If you have Khan in charge, you do not have

the Taliban in charge.

And also, this debate, Mark, about the British view and the

American view on dealing with poppy. We met with some high

ranking German officials who said this is not the time to crack

down on the poppy trade because you will just cause more unemployment and you will have another problem. Now, maybe I have

spent too much of my life, 23 years of the 32 I have been here,

being chairman or ranking member of the subcommittee on drugs

of the Judiciary Committee. This seems to me a prescription for

disaster.

It is a long prelude to a short question. I am not looking for what

you think should be our policy. I want you to respond to what you

think our policy is. Does the support or the failure to attempt to

crack down—and we have limited capacity right now—on warlords

have, for all the bad aspects of it, the positive impact at least of,

other than in the south, curtailing the activity, growth, and influence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda? That is my first question. Can

you just give me a yes or no, since we only have 10 minutes here?

Does it have that effect? Not all the bad effects that flow from it.

Does it have that effect of dampening the influence of the Taliban

and Al Qaeda to the degree to which the warlords have increased

power and do not answer to Kabul?

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. Initially right after the 9/11 events, and as we

went into Afghanistan with our own forces, I think that it did. I

think it no longer does. I think now it has a negative impact on

the long-term objectives that we and the Afghans have, and it only

in a sense sustains the instability that permits the conditions that

encourage the resuscitation of the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the

border areas.

Senator BIDEN. Because part of what I think some view—and

these are serious people. They suggest that our ability to actually

devote the resources, in light of our circumstances in Iraq and the

unwillingness of the Europeans to do even more in Afghanistan is

that we are given one of two options. We either put in significantly

more resources, that is, more troops, more money, not just ours,

but the international community, and more direct effort to bolster

Kabul.

For example, one of the things we argued about was whether

every single project should go through Karzai. What value is there

if you give your money directly to Ismail Khan to build a road or

a school? He is the one delivering it. Why call Karzai? Why call

33

Kabul? If you don’t have any military control over that part of the

region because of the warlords’ capacity, at least there has to be

some reason why anyone in the provinces would want to deal with

Kabul, and if the money is not controlled and the projects are not

controlled from there, then who needs it? You become the Mayor

of Kabul.

But it seems the realists on the left and the right in our political

spectrum are coming up with what I think will be a compelling argument to some, not one I agree with, which is, look, the resources

required are significantly larger than are now committed. That is

not going to happen. So we should at least decide to limit the damage and reduce the objective, the objective being keep the Taliban

from resurging, keep Al Qaeda out. The only way to do that is invest, in effect, indirectly in the warlords.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I do not think that is going to get you where you

want to be, Senator. In fact, I think that one of the conclusions of

the United Nations and of others is that if that position holds and

there is a continued support for or at least acceptance of the warlords maintaining their power base, what that does in the Pashtun

area is essentially allow them to argue that they need, in a sense,

their own warlords. If this is the way it is going to be, then they

say we have got lots of linkages back with the Taliban. And so you

are going to see a greater degree of political insertion of roots in

that area by the Taliban. What the warlords bring is essentially illegal activity being accepted as legitimate, and this is not going to

be the basis for building any institutions for the future.

But you are right. There is going to be a need for greater resources, both military and economic, to be devoted. I do think,

though, that there is an opportunity to get more European contributions from the Spanish, from Turkey, particularly in terms of

meeting what is now set out by NATO as their requirements.

Senator BIDEN. I happen to agree with you. I totally disagree

with what I have just put forward, but I think we should be realistic and understand where we are.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Understood. That is not acceptable any longer

inside Afghanistan I do not think.

Mr. PERITO. No. Senator, the realists among the Afghans that we

talked to pointed out that the U.S. military continuing to provide

financial resources to the warlords creates a duplicity in our position. It makes it look as if we are on all sides of the issue.

Mr. ISBY. Can I say a good word for duplicity, sir?

Mr. PERITO. Are you in charge of duplicity?

Mr. ISBY. I will stand up for duplicity, sir. I think we need to

support the people that you call warlords. I do not call them that.

It is a pejorative term. Judge them individually. They are not our

enemies. They are yesterday’s men, but it is going to take many

years to phase them out and their armies. We cannot become an

arm of Kabuli power, Kabul has to rebuild its legitimacy and competence which was reduced to less than zero in 1978–2001. Marshal Fahim is not our enemy. The other people that are called warlords are not our enemies. We do need to engage them to show if

you join in with this process, even though at the end of it, there

is only an honorable retirement for you, it is better than getting

34

out your Rolodex and calling your foreign supporters for more free

Kalashnikovs.

Senator BIDEN. Well, let me just conclude by saying that as I

said to you, I think this different school of thought is a totally legitimate argument. I am not making a moral judgment about it. As

I said at the outset, I think I am right, but I acknowledge that

there is another position.

What you have said is different than what is happening, I think.

What you said is you want to, in fact, treat them as friends, do it

over a process, incorporate them into the process, and in fact, over

time as Kabul grows in strength and they become more integrated,

and end up with, down the road, a more coherent state.

Mr. ISBY. That is the Bonn solution, the process envisioned at

that conference.

Senator BIDEN. Right. No, I understand that. All I am suggesting

to you is I am not sure that is the alternative that is being pursued

now. It seems to me the alternative being pursued now is there is

not much we can do about this. Period. And we ought to just focus

on a more narrow objective.

But again, this is a legitimate area of debate. I just think sometimes in this area we do not meet head on what the significant differences are in terms of policy proscriptions, and they lead to other

decisions along the road.

But I truly appreciate you all being here. I am anxious to follow

up with you, and I really appreciate the courtesy, Mr. Chairman,

of you allowing me to go first and apologize. It is a longstanding

commitment I made to the International Police Organization to

speak, and I am required to do that. So I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.

While you are here, I wanted to recognize the fact that there are

nine journalists from Afghanistan in our hearing today. Would you

please stand wherever you are?

Senator BIDEN. Welcome, gentlemen, ladies.

The CHAIRMAN. We are delighted that you are here, and there

are three ladies in the back. All right. There they are. Very good.

I just simply wanted to mention that the program that sponsors

you, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, is one that we have

strongly supported. Senator Biden has been a champion specifically

of the program that has brought us all together today. So before

you left, I wanted to recognize that.

Senator BIDEN. You were kind to mention that. Welcome to all

of you.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me continue the questioning by indicating

that I was pleased with your evaluation, Dr. Gouttierre, and your

conclusion that Afghans are very clear about the way they feel

about Americans. They want them in Afghanistan. They want

American leadership and assistance in the reconstruction process.

Now, what is the basis for that evaluation? In other words, how

do you know that there is that regard for the United States? I ask

this, because very clearly the polling in Iraq is very different.

Iraqis do not like us. We think they should. They have been liberated and what have you, but they do not like us at all. As a matter

of fact, in a good number of countries in the area, as the Pew Foundation or others have gone about asking about popular opinion, we

35

are not doing so well. Is this different in Afghanistan and if so,

why?

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. You really should not give me such an entree

because the opportunity to take a look at this requires a history

lesson in many ways, but I am pleased that you asked that question because I think it is, in many ways, the key to our ability to

have success in Afghanistan.

I have been involved with Afghanistan—I hate to admit it—40

years. I hate to admit it because it confesses my age. But I am

pleased to admit it because it has been a very pleasing experience

in terms of dealing with the people.

Right from the very beginning, when I went as a Peace Corps

volunteer, 40 years ago this year, to Afghanistan, the thing that

was very evident was that Afghans really enjoyed playing hosts to

people from other countries if they had well-intentioned reasons for

being there.

We have had a long and wonderful history in Afghanistan, as I

suggested. We have been very much involved with the Afghans in

development projects through the 1950s and 1960s and 1970s. Afghans remember us as helping them against the Soviets. I think

their biggest disappointment with us was when in the 1990s we

were not there during the time when the terrorists hijacked the

country.

We helped to create Kabul University. We helped to build the

Ministry of Education and set up the whole education process with

Afghans, of course. We brought many Afghans to the United

States.

They have never been obsessed with this issue that the United

States has been waging a crusade against Islam. They have never

been focused on this particular issue that the United States has

malevolent intentions in the Middle East. Probably almost every

Afghan would feel that we tilt unfairly to Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, but that has not overwhelmed them in their evaluation of the United States.

I think Afghans have always felt positively about us. They have

never been among those included in the question, ‘‘Why do they

hate us?’’ Never. And I think our history with them has helped

them to retain that. It has been a positive history, and we should

be proud of that, and we should build upon it.

I am sure each of these journalists here would agree. I did not

read that poem in Persian because I did not think I had the time,

but I would love to do that for them afterwards because this poem

is very indicative of the way Afghans feel. They believe that they

gain from the relationship. They are always a little apprehensive;

like Senator Biden suggested, the young school girl was saying, do

not leave or I will not get the future I dream of.

I say that often the U.S. is solicitous. There has been a statement here that the donor process thing in Berlin was a success.

Only if we take the right leadership, because it is the U.S. leadership that the Afghans are counting on, not just our money. They

identify success that they see in Afghanistan with the United

States. They are also going to identify failures with the United

States.

36

We are not going to have another country in any part of that region. Pakistanis do not feel the same way as Afghans do. Maybe

some in Central Asia could feel that way. We know how Iranians

and Iraqis feel, but Afghans are our best possible allies to do something correct in that region.

I go to bed at night having trouble sleeping, not just because I

am concerned about Afghans, but primarily because I do not want

to see us blow this opportunity to deal with people who really do

want us there, who have given every indication throughout a long

time.

So I said you should not have given me that entree. You are

lucky I have not gone on and on and on with all of the history,

which I could. I am certain others here on the panel could as well.

But it is from 40 years of experience, and they have always been

positive experiences in dealing personally with Afghans. Even with

some of those who are of a questionable, they always were exceedingly hospitable and always solicitous of our interests.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that testimony because obviously this is why we are having another hearing on Afghanistan,

and we continually are having hearings—— Dr. GOUTTIERRE. A quick interjection, Senator. Senator Biden

said, well, you know, it has always been this way amongst Afghans. I just get so angry when I hear that because it has not always been that way. Afghans have not always been fighting each

other, and there is this misconception because the West has become

focused on Afghanistan only with crises and those crises were the

Soviet invasion and this current set of circumstances.

When I lived in Afghanistan, it was not a perfect place. It sounds

like I am describing Valhalla perhaps. It was not. But it was a

place where I did not worry about my car being attacked. I could

go individually into the depths of the bazaars in any town without

any concern, and Afghans were not killing each other. There was

a reliance on a central government. It was growing. It was not perfect, but it was growing. If you took a look at Afghanistan in 1970,

let us say, and you take a look at any other country around that

part of the world today, Afghanistan then was light years ahead of

not only itself but of most of the other countries surrounding it

today. It took a very methodical, sometimes too deliberate, but methodical and deliberate approach to trying to bring in a national

sensitivity, and it was working, though it was not perfect. But

there is never a perfect democracy and they were trying through

this democratic experiment. It was something anybody living there

would have been tremendously pleased to be a part of.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow on from this as the basis for this

question. We established that Afghans like us, and we have some

possibilities here. Now then, the question is, will they still like us

if we do all the things that we are discussing today, or even some

of them? How many of them should we try to do to at least establish a basis on which Afghans will solve the problem?

For example, Senator Biden quoted the young lady who was very

worried about her education in the event that we leave, probably

with good reason. But this gets to the heart of a great cultural

change. We have discussed the warlords already in various ways.

As we Americans, along with our NATO allies, endeavor to estabVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
37

lish a system of education that clearly is open to women—and

there is no dispute about that element—and we somehow dispense

with the warlords—some would think that is important, to enable

the central government to work.

Furthermore, should we do something about the poppies—either

we interdict them, start chopping them down or what have you—

in each of these three areas. I sense that there will be some in Afghanistan who would say that we are overreaching. On the other

hand, some would say perhaps that these are things that we can

do as Afghans if you give us time and money and some structure

and you keep the outsiders from intruding and so forth.

What I want to hear from the panel is, what are the appropriate

areas in our idealism as to what the best outcome for Afghans

would be, if we devote the time and money? The committee starts

with the prejudice that we ought to do more, and we have been on

the side of always amending relevant pending bills to do more. You

might testify that it is going to have to be a lot more if we really

are serious about Afghanistan. You are also saying that we should

be serious about Afghanistan. It would be tragic if we were not.

Let us say that we get much more serious. We beef up the resources, even personnel, tough as that may be given our commitments elsewhere. We exhort our NATO allies successfully. Given

the good will that we now have, what are the things that are reasonable to suspect that we will be able to do, or that we should be

advocating? How can we set the stage for Afghans to implement reforms, which perhaps they must do if they are to have a cohesive,

ongoing democracy?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Chairman, I would begin by saying that the

fundamental issue is our long-term engagement, that there has to

be an awareness that whatever we do we have to be engaged with

Afghanistan, not for the next 2 years or the next 4 years but for

the long term. That kind of engagement and that kind of commitment is why I suggested an authorization that would match the 7-

year period that the Afghan government itself has set forth as its

next planning phase. That was the basis for the Berlin conference

and the donor discussion. It seems to me that that answers part

of your question because the proposals and goals in education help

reconstruction. All of those in a sense begin with an Afghan input,

and while there has been support from lots of people, that does depict to some degree Afghan ownership.

Whether we stay with them throughout that process is going to

be the question, and that will determine whether or not there is

a maintenance of the kind of sympathy for the United States that

was described. If we pull out or if we begin to ramp down our involvement during this period, I suspect that it is going to go the

other way.

The key issue is, are we going to stay with them and create the

kind of security environment that permits these other things to

take place. I spoke with an aid worker, and I asked her about going

out to some of the rural programs that the U.S. is funding. I said,

‘‘How do you drive there? I drove to Gardez.’’ She said, ‘‘We do not

go really by road. It would take a car full of shooters in front and

a car full of shooters behind as an escort.’’

38

When you think about that kind of security obstacle to reconstruction, you know that the situation remains extremely hard, and

it requires continued military engagement and, as you say, an expanded involvement.

I would also note with respect to legitimacy of the government,

the most important thing we can do, it seems to me, is to help ensure that parliamentary elections take place and represent all

parts of the country in the context of security where there is a belief that they can be credible and they can be fair because they

really are going to set the stage for the next period of development

of Afghan institutions. And if they are not fair, we also will be

blamed for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me interrupt at this point because I wanted

to recognize Senator Feingold. I will ask other members of the

panel who might have responses to my questions to withhold for

the moment, and we will get back to that in another round.

I just wanted to comment, Mr. Schneider, as I listened to you,

perhaps what we need—and this is never exactly the right metaphor, but something like the 10 Plus 10 Over 10 program that we

have with Russian nuclear disarmament, for example. In other

words, with the Nunn-Lugar program, we say we are going to go

for 10 years, and therefore you in the G-8, the other seven, can

count on that. The Russians can count on that. That is 10 years

and $20 billion. Maybe it is that kind of commitment in which in

fact no government, including our own, can appropriate in this

place for years down the trail, and yet there is at least sufficient

bipartisan support that that is in our national interest. It occurs

to me maybe as a picture of what people in Afghanistan and our

NATO allies need to see, maybe not the G-8, but in this case, whoever sort of adds in at least. There are additions to this program

given that kind of context.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I would agree absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to

thank Senator Biden for calling this important hearing, and I want

to thank all the witnesses for being here.

The last time the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a

hearing explicitly focused on Afghanistan was in late January of

this year, and I remember asking Ambassador Taylor at that hearing about how we will define success in Afghanistan. He told me

that our mission will be complete when a stable, responsible government that will never harbor terrorists is firmly in control of the

country.

In the months since that hearing, Americans have continued to

fight and die in Afghanistan, and clearly insecurity persists in

much of the country. It is unfortunate that there are no witnesses

here today from the administration who could speak authoritatively to current U.S. policy and, most importantly, to what has

changed in the last 4 months. What progress have we made toward

overcoming the obstacles to policy goals? Do our goals actually remain the same? Do we believe that our current strategy is working,

or do we need to make changes to achieve success?

When we reflect on the terrible attacks of September 11th, 2001,

when we remember when and why we embarked on our current

39

initiative in Afghanistan, we then recapture the sense of urgency

and priority that I fear is sometimes missing from discussions of

this initiative today.

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses even more in the

future and also to hearing especially from the administration sometime soon about where this whole effort actually stands.

I would like to ask the panel a follow-up on a question Senator

Lugar asked related to the success of U.S. public diplomacy efforts

thus far in Afghanistan. How about U.S. efforts to explain our policy and practices in Afghanistan to the rest of the world? How does

the Muslim world view the continuing U.S. intervention in Afghanistan today? Mr. Schneider?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is varied. Obviously, there are those who are

linked to the more extreme side of the Islamic world that criticize

everything that we have done and criticize the international community generally, what the United Nations is doing.

I think that it is important to note that we generally have support from many of the Islamic governments in the region, and after

9/11 and the adoption of the resolutions authorizing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and authorizing

the intervention in Afghanistan, I think that you have seen a degree of sympathy that is, unfortunately, obviously not there in Iraq.

Senator FEINGOLD. Apart from the governments, what about the

Muslim peoples? Do they, in your view, distinguish pretty clearly

between what we are doing in Afghanistan and what is happening

in Iraq, or do they see it as part of the same thing?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think it is a closer question there. The level

of communication within the Islamic world gets to be biased to

some degree by the kinds of messages that come, and I would say

that it is not quite as clear. In Afghanistan, I do not think there

is any question about the feeling of the people about getting rid of

Al Qaeda and the Taliban and the support for the international effort, although with a growing degree of concern about where it is

going.

Senator FEINGOLD. How about the recent news? Has the Iraq

prison scandal and the reports of other instances of abusive treatment that occurred in U.S. military prisons in Afghanistan and

elsewhere affected international perceptions of U.S. policy in Afghanistan?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is going to. There was a Human Rights

Watch report 2 months ago. I do not have any question that given

what is going on in Iraq, that there will be—and there should be—

a focus on allegations of mistreatment of detainees, on whether or

not the Geneva Convention is being respected, the kinds of management of those facilities, and I do not have any question that

there will be a greater negative view on the U.S. role. And as a result of the publicity around it, I am sure that there is going to be,

unfortunately, a very negative message coming out.

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. Senator Feingold, I think in Afghanistan right

now, the people of Afghanistan, after nearly 30 years of instability,

violence, war, they are focused on Afghanistan. I think the issues

relating to Iraq come to their attention primarily in their own fear

that the U.S. focus on Iraq will lead the U.S. from doing what they

hope the U.S. will do for Afghanistan in its reconstruction.

40

I think also the impact of what we are doing in Afghanistan right

now is not going to register high on any country’s citizens just because we are so shortly into the process. So little has been made

evident that we are nearing any type of goal. I think that that is

going to take time. I always like to tell people, it is going to take

Afghanistan nearly a decade to put it back where it was in 1973

so that it can begin developing from there. I think it is going to

take us a long, long time, as has been suggested by a number of

comments here. I cannot remember who said that. I think maybe

it was David, but if it was one of the other of you, I apologize. But

we need to make it very clear that this is not just a 2-year, a 3-

year, a 7-year program you mentioned, Senator. This has to be a

long-term commitment.

I think as we have successes, if we do not muddle through in our

approach, we will continue to sustain the respect and appreciation

of the Afghans, and others will begin to notice. But we are not

going to be able to use this for any spin at the moment. It is just

going to take too much time and too much of an effort because

there is so much left to be done.

Senator FEINGOLD. Recent press reports indicate that Pakistan

has offered amnesty to foreign militants who have been operating

along the border with Afghanistan. What does this mean for our efforts to eliminate the terrorist presence in Afghanistan and bring

stability to the country?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I personally think it is a very bad idea, particularly as was originally put out, there was no distinction between

which foreigners they are talking about, whether they are Afghans

or whether they are part of Al Qaeda. I think that that needs to

be looked at very closely, and I would urge the committee to, in

fact, look at that very closely in order to make a recommendation

to the administration and to Pakistan, with whom we obviously

have a very strong relationship. But to provide amnesty to Al

Qaeda forces seems to me a bad, bad idea.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Isby?

Mr. ISBY. Perhaps more importantly it depends who is being

amnestied and where. Certainly individuals carrying Kalashnikovs

are not the issue. The problem is the Taliban leadership and not

only the ‘‘moderate’’ Taliban who live openly in places such as

Quetta. I am more concerned perhaps about madrasas and other

institutions that provide money and funding for cross-border violence than individuals—Uzbeks or whatever—who may be caught

as foot soldiers. So that is the most important thing.

This is also vital to the focus of Pakistan. The future of Pakistan

is not going to thrive if the people who support the violence in Afghanistan remain strong and to a large extent outside the rule of

law.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask if the pervasive climate of insecurity in Afghanistan in recent months has led to increased popular

support for a return to Taliban rule simply out of a desire to see

some order, even if that order is unjust and repressive. I know that

Senator Biden sort of got at this from a different angle. I just wonder if we could put on the record any responses to that.

Mr. PERITO. Senator, I do not think that is the case. I think that

the Taliban resurgence, thanks to the effectiveness of Operation

41

Enduring Freedom, is contained along the Pakistani border. The

greater threat to security within the country, as we have talked before, is the warlords. That is something which we now we need to

begin to focus on.

I believe the solution lies in going after the problem of narcotics

because it is the narcotics trade that provides the funding to all

those people who oppose our goal, which is a strong democratic and

effective central government. Draining away resources through

doing something about narcotics would begin to really affect the

situation.

There is now total impunity for the narcotics trade. The government has no enforcement capability. That enforcement capability is

coming on line, but it is coming on line very slowly. That is where

we need to place our emphasis. We need to begin to create disincentives at the same time we create alternatives.

Mr. ISBY. Certainly there is no national economy either, and that

is the key thing. Narcotics enforcement before a national economy

is put in place may not be efficacious. And I point out this is one

reason I have been talking about a long-term commitment; many

of these problems do not have short-term solutions. The Afghan institutions and the Afghans have to have ownership of the program

to suppress the narcotics trade. They are going to take years to

train, deploy, and get there which is going to sit poorly with Americans who want solutions now.

Mr. PERITO. Can I take this argument on just for a second?

There is a national economy in Afghanistan. It is an opium-based

economy. If opium was a legal commodity, Afghanistan would be

the poster child for international development. In fact, it is an illegal commodity, and we have an economy which is based on organized criminal activity. That is our first challenge. We have only

to look at Colombia for an example of what happens to a society

when organized crime becomes the motivating factor in the economy and the driving force in the society. We cannot wait. We have

to start doing something about that now.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answers.

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. Senator Feingold, I want to quickly——

Senator FEINGOLD. Very quickly because I have got to go.

Dr. GOUTTIERRE (continuing). ——Just ask any of these journalists if they feel there is a sympathy in Afghanistan for in any way

a return of the Taliban. No possibility. The lifestyle of the Taliban

is an anathema to Afghans. When I lived there for 10 years in the

1960s and 1970s, it was not that kind. Women were not wearing

veils. Women were working. Women were even wearing miniskirts. There was an active, modern life in that country. The

Taliban style of life is not, in the minds of the Afghan people, a

desirable choice.

Senator FEINGOLD. Obviously, I am very pleased to hear that.

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I understand obviously you have

worked hard to keep Afghanistan from slipping off the agenda of

the Congress and the administration. I know you plan to hold another hearing with representation from the administration in the

coming weeks, and I want thank you for your continued leadership

on this, and I thank the panel for the answers.

42

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Feingold. Be

assured that we will hear from the administration again. Our hope

today, of course, was to hear from each of you, some independent

benchmarks as to how things are going. We have not asked any of

you to take responsibility for this, as we will do with future administration witnesses. It is not that they would have to be overly defensive, but at the same time, you do not have to defend anybody.

You can offer your suggestions, which are very helpful, I think, for

our consideration. As Senator Feingold has phrased it, I think correctly, we are attempting to make sure Afghanistan remains very

much on the agenda, even in the midst of other stories currently

that are also very important to us.

Let me just continue the discussion of the narcotics and the poppies. Mention has been made, for instance, of Colombia and before

then, Peru and the Upper Huallaga Valley. Those of us who have

visited those areas found, just as you have pointed out today, that

this is a daunting problem in terms of substitution. If you are a

farmer and you are making 10 times as much off of poppies as you

can over any visible alternative, this is a very tough choice in a situation in which people are very poor to begin with. What clearly

is astonishing for most observers, as you have pointed out, and as

I have mentioned in my opening statement, is that as much as half

of the gross domestic product of the country comes from opium,

from the drug trade. That is a formidable situation. As you pointed

out, Mr. Isby, there has to be an economy.

What are the possibilities for the development of an economy? If

opium is 50 percent now, what could substitute for it—not just simply agricultural substitution, but what other industries? You mentioned trade. That opens up possibilities, but we have also said that

the road system and security are currently, to say the least, pretty

dicey, even for governmental officials now. I am just trying to get

some sort of a road map in mind. Granted, I know that this is a

long-term problem, or at best an intermediate problem, in terms of

a substantial solution. What is the prognosis for some successful

strategy?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I could just speak specifically to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schneider.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If you look at the plan that was submitted by

the government of Afghanistan with the support of the World

Bank, they identify three major sectors. Actually agriculture is one

of those where they anticipate in the short term, in 1 to 5 years,

10 to 15 percent growth per year is possible in cereals, in livestock,

and in other areas. Also, as you noted, in industry they focus on

transport power as again about the same level of per-year growth

and in services. They do, in fact, feel that you can have a fairly successful growth over the course of the next 10 years without having

poppies. They also argue that to some degree it undermines the

ability for the licit economy to take hold because it brings with it

the kind of violence that undercuts the possibility for private investment.

I would just add that poppy cultivation in the case of Afghanistan is somewhat different than the case of cocaine cultivation in

Colombia and Peru. The recent surveys that the UN has done show

that the Afghan poppy growers turn only about 27 percent of their

43

land to poppy cultivation, but the bulk of their land is dedicated

to other crops, generally food crops. So there is a slight difference

in the relative impact of eradication on farm incomes in Afghanistan contrasted to Colombia where the bulk of their land goes to

coca or poppy cultivation.

The other fact to remember is that the $2.3 billion is divided, a

billion for farmers and $1.3 billion for the traffickers. So I think

that one of the things that we would argue, at least I would argue

strongly, is to go after the traffickers, focus on interdiction; go after

warehousing, laboratories as a first step. Do not forget about eradication, but that is the one where you want to be sure that you are

not going after the small farmer and putting him in a situation

where he cannot survive. I think that there is a distinction there.

In fact, you can then link that to the building up of an alternative

rural development program, which everybody recognizes is necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Schneider, you mentioned—this I think is an

important point—that the Afghan government itself has a plan.

Now, a year ago roughly, in June of last year, I met with President

Karzai, the Minister of Finance, and other ministers of the Afghan

government at the World Economic Forum conference outside of

Amman, Jordan. On that occasion, the Finance Minister, as I recall, had a 5-year plan. His plea was both for help from the United

States, first of all, in financing what he hoped would be our part

of it, and likewise for diplomacy with regard to other countries before a pledging conference that was due shortly thereafter, in addition to others that might come along.

I thought this was very important. I contrasted this, for example,

with the fact that in Iraq there was no 5-year plan, not any plan

of that sort, unfortunately. So this is prior to the constitution’s success and other things that have come along subsequently. I want

to highlight that because there is within this government, if we are

talking about how Afghans are going to try to move to govern

themselves, at least this kind of ongoing line of thought.

What is not clear to most of us is the contents of the plan. You

have illuminated some of that today. This is probably going to be

helpful not only for members of the American Congress and the

American press and so forth, but for everybody who is thinking

about this, who seek some idea of what Afghans envision, and how,

if the money was provided, you would fill in the gaps, whether it

be with the help of our country or internationally.

Mr. Isby, you were wanting to comment.

Mr. ISBY. Certainly. The plan, which Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai

has presented at Berlin, has received general acceptance. I would

say, however, more important than the contents of the plan itself

is the fact that it is a plan. We can see not just a request for more

money, whatever the donors come up with, but a way to get from

here to there that they hope will get them away from dependence

on international aid.

Now, everyone knows that economic plans, as a whole, have a

very poor track record of implementation, but I think the most important thing, rather than as a road map, is as an example of how

the Afghans can build their own future.

44

I agree that looking at the things that create a national economy

is important. Currently the Afghan economy is much broken into

regional areas which are low-rent annexes to the economies of their

neighbors. That is one of the reasons why the emergence of a national economy is going to increase legitimacy and competence of

Kabul, when it acquires functions other than simply giving out aid

money to regions or to other participants. So making Afghanistan

economically viable through trading, extractive activities, and with

the help of the Afghan diaspora is critical. That is a key advantage

they did not have in the old days. Afghans from overseas have foreign business contacts. The micro-credit projects the Americans

have stressed can also help there.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Perito.

Mr. PERITO. Yes. There is a difference between Afghanistan and

Colombia that I think is worth noting. Other than three major

provinces in the south, growing opium poppy is a new experience

for most people in the country. This is a recent phenomenon, and

it is one that could be rolled back. We have to remember that a

couple of years ago when the Taliban decreed that all opium production must stop, it did for 1 year. There is a cultural impediment

against growing opium, and that is the moral problems that exist

relative to Islam. So that is something we need to utilize for our

crusade against narcotics.

Then there are several things that we can do, and we are beginning to do them. The program to begin to create alternative livelihoods has now been funded by Congress, and it is starting in Afghanistan. But this has to be sustained over the long term.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Could I just add to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, of course.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. That is one of the areas where, it seems to me,

that we made a major mistake. We had very little available to fund

alternative development for the first several years. When I was in

Afghanistan in November, I asked the embassy and was told that

they had something like $17 million to $20 million available, total,

for alternative development. If you contrast that with the $1 billion

farm gate, you can see the impossible situation. Even today, in

terms of the funding that has been made available through State

and INL (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs), they essentially have about $30 million total from the

FY 2002 supplemental and this last FY 2004 supplemental for alternative livelihoods. The rest is focused on eradication and enforcement. It is just not enough.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask now about Pakistan. We have

touched upon that in several different ways, but each of you has

mentioned that they are neighbors, and they have their influence

in different ways. In the case of Pakistan, the question was raised,

and you responded to Senator Biden, Mr. Schneider, that it was a

mistake on the part of the Pakistanis to offer amnesty to various

people.

President Musharaf is under great pressure from people in his

government and elsewhere. First of all, he faces pressure from us

to pursue Al Qaeda and the Taliban. From time to time, there are

new Pakistani efforts to do that, that have some vigor. Then after

a few weeks, there is less vigor, and the situation comes to a halt

45

until there is another round, simply because in that particular area

of the country, as President Musharaf has explained to us in a couple of coffees the committee has had, as have other Pakistanis,

there is a tenuous Pakistani hold. The Afghan government is not

the only one that sometimes, in terms of its central government,

has difficulty. Some of the territory near the border seems to be

among those provinces that are the most tenuous, and that have

the strangest election results when pressed by us and others to let

democracy work. Democracy does work, but with very adverse consequences toward Musharaf and the central government.

Now, on the other hand, Pakistanis strongly feel that the situation would be very much exacerbated by American troops marching

in there and going after Al Qaeda or the Taliban, either one. At

this point, Musharaf’s difficulties with regard to his maintenance

and control of the army and civil society really take a blow and

continue taking blows so long as we are there rumbling about. This

is bound to lead to a very unsatisfactory situation for a while, for

those in Afghanistan who are nearby, because many of our troops

are close by on the border, and sometimes they are engaged in military action. Sometimes tragic errors occur, and innocent Afghans

are killed. Mistakes are made with regard to intelligence.

So, in the same way that we were talking earlier about how Afghans like us, in some situations that has turned abruptly. Yet we

would say, listen, we came over here to try to clean up the Al

Qaeda situation and the more orthodox Taliban, and we are still

here for that task. In a way, Afghans understand that. They just

wish we were more fastidious in our work, more successful with regard to our relationship with Pakistan.

Can any of you foresee some way to offer some blue sky in this

situation?

Yes, Doctor.

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. I think if in the textbook on American foreign

policy failures, the chapter on Pakistan would be the lead article

or the lead chapter. We have not made friends and influenced people. We have made enemies and lost our influence there. And that

is with a country which at one time was really very friendly to the

United States. I do not think you can find a Pakistani who would

use the term ‘‘reliable’’ in describing the United States in any form

of the relationship. Every politically correct issue that comes before

Congress is visited upon the Pakistanis and our relationship. We

have been in and out, and we are back in again because it is in

our interest, and that is what Pakistanis see.

We have not yet, I think, convinced the Pakistanis that our presence back in Pakistan is in their interest, and that is where the

blue sky has to be sought. We have had our military in Pakistan,

as well you know. They were a charter member of the Baghdad

Pact, as were Iraq and Iran. It is kind of a sad story there if you

take a look at that one. There is only Turkey and the U.S. left of

no pact.

But in any case, I think the only way we are going to be able

to do this is to find some way to convince the Pakistanis that we

are there in their interest. I think Musharaf understands that

Pakistan’s interest was not being advanced by the influence that

the fundamentalists were having upon the Pakistani citizenry. He

46

came to understand that the pan-Islam was more important to the

Pakistani than any pan-Pakistani or Pakistani nationalism. I think

that is the element we have to work with.

Pakistan needs a lot of help economically. One of the best things

that could happen to Pakistan is to have access to natural gas in

Turkmenistan, which will have to travel through Afghanistan because that is the cheapest and most direct route, and Pakistan has

a lot of labor that can be put to work in a very sophisticated country in terms of certain industries.

Mr. ISBY. One hopes the U.S. relationship with Pakistan will improve. I mean, unfortunately, in the case of the Pakistani military,

even if Musharaf has been brought over to support our Afghanistan

policy, the evidence is less clear that this is shared by all military.

They see the ethnic, the ethno-linguistic dimension as primary, and

their goal is still an ethnic Pashtun government in Kabul that

would follow an Islamist agenda comparable to what they believe

in. They believe that this is important for Pakistani national security. One of the reasons that the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan

is important is to say to the Pakistani military that, guys, this is

not going to happen. Instead, work with us. We can deal with your

national security concerns other ways.

Now, it would be great if we had another carrot to offer the Pakistanis. It would be great if we could wave a magic wand and create

a Northern Ireland solution in Kashmir. That is not going to happen anytime soon. But Musharaf needs to have things more concrete than the designation as a major non-NATO ally to show to

his supporters and electorate, to say the future is with the Americans, not the people killing aid workers. Let us go with them.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. If I could just add one thing, Mr. Chairman, and

that is I think one of the problems in Pakistan is that we have not

emphasized that the government’s movement back to democracy is

an important objective in our relationship. I think we have issued

several reports that we strongly argue that Musharaf in fact could

take more action against the radical Islamist groups within Pakistan without endangering his political situation. The evidence that

we have had about madrasas continuing to be the source of recruitment for extremists, both with respect to Kashmir, but also with

respect to, most importantly, to Afghanistan, is clear. And the steps

that Musharaf promised with respect to regulation, of financing, et

cetera, of those madrasas has not taken place.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we could have and should have another

hearing on Pakistan soon. I wanted to raise this because this is a

difficult neighborhood. As all of you know, in terms of our foreign

policy prior to 9/11, our relations with Pakistan were nil or barely

alive. Suddenly Secretary Powell, in a dramatic meeting I recall

somewhere, perhaps over in S. 407 of the Capitol Building, comes

over and says to us, you have got to lift all of the sanctions on

Pakistan, military, economic, and what have you, now and permanently. This is a new world, new business.

Well, that was a long drink of water all in one statement. Many

people asked, all of them? Permanently? After all, there has been

an overthrow of democracy. They had a nuclear test, albeit one in

India as well, but we ought to have sanctions on them too. Powell

replied, lift all of them, at the same time on both.

47

This is quite an evolution, in fact, almost a revolution in American foreign policy in the region, in a very short period of time. The

other steps that are required to build on that relationship—so that

both of those countries have confidence in us, are very important.

In the meanwhile, we are discussing Afghanistan, which is in the

midst of all of this. Iran is a major influence, but that is another

story all by itself, as we try to develop American foreign policy in

the region. I mentioned this simply because it would be helpful if

we could just take Afghanistan in isolation, but of course that is

not possible. We understand that, and you have illustrated that.

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. That is what makes doing it right in Afghanistan so important.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Dr. GOUTTIERRE. That is the point. Pakistan with 150 million

people compared to Afghanistan with between 15 million and 22

million, whatever people find—there are all kinds of estimates primarily generated by computer programs, not real counts. It is

something that we can deal with, and it is in the middle. As I said,

location, location, location. It is in the center of it all.

Mr. ISBY. But truly, it is harder to deal with things with the Iranians where we have much less influence, if any, and also things

like the nongovernmental money coming out of the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. With the elections coming up, I suspect

the candidates they are going to fund are those which are committed not to traditional Afghan forms of Islam but those who have

been paid by Wahabis in the past. This is a time when money is

going to be very key. It is also a problem for the Americans who

see reconstruction largely as a secular process and are not comfortable with its Islamic dimension. We are going to have to deal

with this because, as well as rebuilding the country and institutions, Afghan Islam has to be rebuilt because, since 1978, people

have been sending money to Afghanistan for outside strains of

Islam from Deobandis, from Wahabis, many different sources. Very

few people have been helping and nurturing the Afghan practice of

Islam which has been resistant, over 1,300 years, to terrorism and

extremism.

The CHAIRMAN. This is why I started with Dr. Gouttierre and his

thought that we have some friends in Afghanistan. There is some

basis, therefore, to hope that some day that will be the case in

greater numbers in the surrounding countries as well. That would

be very important for our foreign policy.

Just putting on our hats as people in political life for a while, you

go to constituents and they might well ask why in the world are

we contributing money to the governments of people who dislike

us? Take a look at the polls, and what they think of us, and so

forth! Yet this is a long-term situation. The polls may change, but

maybe not for quite a while.

At least in Afghanistan, the case being made for doing more, for

augmenting the appropriations the administration is asking for

and trying to offer amendments that are constructive for those programs, is really a viable situation that I believe has political support in this country. American people want to see success there,

and they are prepared to spend some time doing that. We, in our

own way, have to keep underlining that.

48

Well, I very much appreciate your testimony today, both your initial papers, which are a great contribution to our record, as well

as your responses to our questions. We look forward to staying in

touch with you as this progresses.

Having said that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

AFGHANISTAN

(49)

1The conference will be guided in part by a document, ‘‘Securing Afghanistan’s Future: Accomplishments and Strategic Pathway Forward,’’ that revises cost estimates for national reconstruction. It was prepared by the Afghanistan Assistance Coordination Authority, headed by Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, and includes several technical annexes produced by the United

Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) that assess, often frankly, the degree of

progress made in such key areas as disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration; police and

national army training; and judicial and civil service reforms. Available at http://www.af. See

also, Finance Ministry, ‘‘Press Release on Berlin Conference,’’ 24 March 2004. 2For greater simplicity and in the hope that the usage will become more common, ICG employs in its reporting the abbreviation DR, to include, as appropriate to individual situations,

the concepts of disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration that

are elsewhere often abbreviated as DDRRR or DDR.

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

ELECTIONS AND SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Kabul/Brussels, 30 March 2004

I. OVERVIEW

Representatives of the Afghan government, the UN and the major donor countries

and institutions will assemble in Berlin on 31 March and 1 April for the first highlevel diplomatic meeting on Afghanistan in more than two years. The principal objective is to secure substantial long-term aid commitments—the Afghan government

seeks U.S.$27.6 billion over seven years. In addition to meeting this global figure,

it will be important for donors to make multi-year pledges that provide a basis for

predictability and to increase cash on hand for immediate projects over the coming

year. All this is needed if Afghanistan’s governance and security institutions are to

be reconstructed, development goals met, and poverty alleviated.1

Unless conference participants also set in train discussion of the political framework within which aid can be effectively utilised, however, they will only be doing

part of their job. In particular, there is need to:

• discuss candidly the security failings and other internal obstacles that are seriously hindering implementation of the Bonn Agreement and endangering the

success of the September 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections that are

meant to promote accountable, democratic government;

• establish much more quickly the promised robust international security presence beyond Kabul, which is vital to the disarmament and reintegration (DR) 2

of Afghanistan’s militias and in turn to fostering an environment in which a

culture of democratic politics can develop; and

• give greater attention to the legal and institutional infrastructure required for

democratic politics.

The international community’s failure thus far to extend a strong security umbrella beyond Kabul is perpetuating, indeed deepening, the political and economic

power of regional commanders. Even Kabul, where militiamen from Panjshir and

Shamali remain concentrated more than two years after their entry into the capital,

is not yet demilitarised. NATO still lacks troop commitments from its member

states to deploy additional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) across northern

Afghanistan by September, as its already slow plan for gradually extending its presence in the countryside envisages. Nor has it obtained a commitment of troops for

forward-basing rapid reaction forces as originally planned.

50

3See Dr. Antonio Giustozzi and Mark Sedra, ‘‘National Army: Technical Annex,’’ in ‘‘Securing

Afghanistan’s Future,’’ op. cit. 4 Ibid.

5See ICG Asia Report No. 65, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, 30 September

2003. 6Mark Sedra (BICC/UNAMA), ‘‘Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants,’’ in ‘‘Securing Afghanistan’s Future,’’ op. cit. 7 ICG interview with an ANBP official, 25 March 2004.

The new Afghan National Army (ANA) has suffered setbacks that limit its ability

to extend the authority of the central government, facilitate DR, and provide security during the elections. Ministry of defence control of the recruitment process initially led to a disproportionate representation of Tajiks in the ANA, a situation that

has prompted the U.S. to establish recruitment centres in Jalalabad, Kabul, Gardez

and Bamiyan in an effort to encourage a more diversified army. The desertion rate

in the ANA reached 10 per cent during the summer of 2003. A number of measures

have been taken to address the desertion problem but the present strength of approximately 7,500 is still far short of the 40,000 projected by Coalition officers.3

DR programs to cut down the many militias around the country are going slowly.

The proposed establishment of new Special Forces-led militia units (Afghanistan

Guard Forces, AGF) would cut across those programs, providing a disincentive to

DR. There is, moreover, no publicly disclosed plan for the eventual disarmament

and demobilisation of the AGF. The hazards in the AGF concept include increasing

the authority and armament of militia commanders as well as potential command

and control problems.

President Hamid Karzai has yet to issue either a draft electoral law or a presidential decree on the provincial and district boundaries that would form electoral

constituencies. The registration of political parties has proceeded very slowly, in

part due to a cumbersome structure for registration that involves screening by six

different government departments or ministries, but also due to political pressure

exerted by fundamentalist leaders. Only about 1.5 million voters out of an estimated

potential electorate of 10 million have been registered, and those unevenly. Registration is markedly lower in the south and southeast in both absolute numbers

and the proportion of women.

There is a real risk that elections under present conditions will merely confirm

an undemocratic and unstable status quo. To avoid this, the international community needs to make serious efforts over the next few months to invigorate the disarmament and reintegration process, guarantee the independence and impartiality of

electoral institutions, and ensure that Afghan authorities create opportunities for

non-militarised political parties and independent candidates to participate meaningfully in the electoral process.

II. DISARMAMENT AND REARMAMENT

The salient feature of the UNDP-managed DR fund, known as Afghanistan’s New

Beginnings Programme (ANBP), is that it is an essentially voluntary process, with

the ministry of defence having ultimate authority to identify the target personnel.

The program is intended to cover 100,000 militiamen over three years; that figure

is based on negotiations with the ministry not on informed estimates of the actual

number of active-duty and reserve forces affiliated with the militias. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) estimates the maximum number of troops

in the militias recognised by the ministry at 45,000.4 ICG’s own observations at militia corps and division bases, coupled with interviews with Afghan professional officers, suggest that the number of active duty personnel is lower still. The elasticity

of membership in militia units and the paucity of information about district level

command structures make any projection of potential strength inherently speculative.5

With most militia commanders maintaining only a relatively small number of

combatants on active duty but retaining the capacity to mobilise many more

through ‘‘team leaders’’ (sargroups) in each village, the scope for abuse of the process is considerable. Not surprisingly, the first ANBP pilot project in Kunduz—which

collected arms from 1,008 former combatants, slightly above the target figure of

1,000— yielded a high proportion of effectively demobilised combatants: small farmers who had not seen active combat since the intervention against the Taliban in

the northeast.6 Moreover, some troops ostensibly demobilised during the subsequent

pilot project in Mazar-i Sharif were later re-recruited by their commanders. There

is inherent risk in downsizing, rather than decommissioning militia units.7

51

8 Conversely, provincial division commanders interviewed by ICG in Takhar and Khost, in

July and August 2003, argued that DR should be implemented in Kabul prior to its roll out

in the provinces. See ICG Asia Report, Disarmament and Reintegration in Afghanistan, op. cit. 9 ICG interview with a diplomat in Kabul, 13 March 2004.

10 ICG interview with a diplomat in Kabul, 25 March 2004. Weapons that are collected in the

program are brought to Kabul and stored at the Afghan National Army base, under a dual key

system that prevents the ministry of defence from having unilateral access to the storage containers. 11 Ibid. 12 ICG interviews with diplomats in Kabul, 26–28 March 2004. 13 Ibid.

A major impasse developed in early 2004 over ANBP implementation in the central region, encompassing the provinces of Kabul,8 Parwan, Kapisa, Wardak, and

Logar, and including the key units directly accountable to Vice President and

Defence Minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim. The main phase of DR there was originally slated for February but was stalled by the defence ministry. The Army Chief

of Staff, General Bismillah Khan, insisted that all pilot projects should be completed

before the main DR phase was launched in Kabul.9 Subsequent developments led

some international observers to speculate that the ministry was attempting to stall

those other pilot programs in order to protect the militia presence in Kabul. Getting

the ministry to field its operational groups (the units assigned to the ANBP for registration, collection, and storage of weapons, and other tasks) has been a persistent

problem, as has been delivery of vehicles for the operational group assigned to the

Kandahar pilot project.10

Defining the scope of the main phase of DR was contentious as well. The UN and

Japan, the program’s major donor, maintain that the objective should be the decommissioning of entire divisions, leading to a 40 per cent reduction prior to elections

in the overall size of the Afghanistan Military Forces (AMF), as the militias are collectively known. The ministry proposed instead that the size of each militia be reduced by 40 per cent, leaving their structures intact and therefore the formal authority of each of their commanders. DR would thus become a cosmetic exercise in

which militias currently enjoying the status of divisions would be downgraded to

battalions, battalions would be downgraded to regiments, and so on.11

A compromise reached on 25 March 2004 by UNAMA, the ANBP, President

Karzai, and Defence Minister Fahim, in the presence of U.S. Ambassador Zalmay

Khalilzad, entailed only modest concessions by the minister. Under its terms, a 40

per cent reduction in the size of the AMF is to be achieved by decommissioning 20

per cent of the units and downsizing a further 20 percent by July 2004. The decommissioning is projected to include four Kabul-based units: Division 7, composed of

Badakhshani and Panjshiri troops, linked respectively to former President

Burhanuddin Rabbani and Fahim; Division 10, composed of troops from Paghman,

linked to Ittihad i-Islami leader Abd al-Rabb Rasul Sayyaf; Division 31, composed

of Hazara troops from the Harakat-i Islami faction led by Agriculture Minister

Sayyid Hussain Anwari; and Regiment 42, a Pashtun unit. Of the units to be decommissioned, the most significant politically would be Division 10, based in West

Kabul, near Sayyaf’s stronghold of Paghman; neither Rabbani nor Anwari wield

much authority in the capital.12

Two of the three units in Kabul directly linked to Fahim, Divisions 1 and 8, composed largely of troops from Panjshir and Shamali, are slated only for downsizing.13

The failure to decommission these units ultimately reflects inadequate pressure on

the defence minister from Coalition members, a result perhaps of the erroneous assumption that Fahim’s present support for Karzai makes the disarmament of his

forces less critical. Unless that pressure is brought to bear by July 2004, when the

status of the three units will again be open to negotiation, however, Fahim will not

only be able to project, but arguably even enhance his authority during the election

campaign. Further progress on DR, as well as credible reforms in the defence ministry, would be compromised as a result.

Another potential set of hurdles for DR and political stability lies in a Coalition

plan to re-equip and retrain militia units to support Special Forces units in counterinsurgency operations. First disclosed in January 2004, the plan originally entailed

creating a Pashtun force for operations in the Pashtun-populated east and southeast. The prospect of a revamped force drawn from Pashtun militias was immediately seized upon by General Khan as a pretext to shelve DR in Kabul. His statements were echoed by other Tajik commanders as well as non-military personalities

associated with the former United Front (Northern Alliance). ‘‘The [DR] process is moving slowly because most people don’t see it as a just and

fair process,’’ Mohiuddin Mahdi, a leader of the Nazhat-i Milli party, told ICG. ‘‘In

parts of Afghanistan, arms are being distributed, new militias are being created. In

52

14 ICG interview with Mohiuddin Mahdi, Nazhat-i Milli, Kabul, 13 March 2004. 15 Referring to a question about ‘‘a proposed national guard,’’ General Barno was reported to

have said it would number between 5,000 and 6,000 troops selected from existing militias under

the ministry of defence’s control. ‘‘Security Not Main Issue for Polls: U.S.,’’ Dawn, 2 March 2004.

Ambassador Khalilzad said, ‘‘We are considering building a 5,000-man Afghan Guard Force to

give increased security in the short term especially in the south and east.’’ ‘‘Remarks by U.S.

Ambassador and Special Presidential Envoy Zalmay Khalilzad during Ghazni PRT Opening,’’ 4

March 2004. Also, ICG interview, Tim Wilder, deputy director for Afghanistan, U.S. State Department, Washington, DC, 11 February 2004. 16 ICG interview, Kabul, 9 March 2004. 17 As noted in fn. 16 above, General Barno has recently spoken of a possible 5,000 to 6,000-

man force, and Ambassador Khalilzad of a 5,000-man force. 18 ICG interview, Kabul, 9 March 2004. 19 Ibid.

other parts, militias are being disarmed.’’ 14 The new Afghanistan Guard Force

(AGF) is accordingly now being reconceived by the Coalition as a multiethnic force.

The top-ranking U.S. military and political representatives in Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, who commands the Coalition forces, and Ambassador

Zalmay Khalilzad, have publicly discussed the AGF in terms of a proposal.15 Members of the diplomatic community in Kabul, however, accord it much greater weight.

One reason for the concept is that the U.S. military is simply overstretched in Afghanistan and will be hard pressed to meet its force requirements for a spring offensive without significant Afghan auxiliaries. Each of the Special Forces units deployed in Afghanistan, known as Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs), is intended to have twelve members but the average is now down to eight.16 The delay

in extending NATO/ISAF forces beyond Kabul in sufficient size adds to the current

security vacuum.

The size, composition and relationship to the ministry of defence of the proposed

AGF are still undetermined. In January 2004, when the Coalition linked its proposed mandate to election security, the goal was to have 3,000 troops trained by

March and 5,000 by June—the date by which the Bonn Agreement of 2001 envisaged elections being held.17 According to an informed source, the current projected

goal involves having 100 militiamen attached to each ODA. Vetting procedures remain undefined but the recruits are likely to be drawn from units that have been

handpicked by the Special Forces, in other words, those with whom they already

have field experience.18

The AGF strategy is risky, not least for its impact on DR. Though the Coalition

initially maintained that AGF troops would be paid less than their counterparts in

the Afghan National Army, their wages plus food, clothing, and accommodation

would far outstrip the flat rate of 800 Afghanis per month that militiamen (AMF)

receive from the defence ministry (and often those salaries arrive months late or are

siphoned off by commanders). As a result, resistance to DR is reportedly growing

among AMF troops in the south, who hope that they might instead find employment

in the AGF.19

Most problematic, however, is the absence of a DR strategy for the AGF itself.

Rearmed, and in many cases remobilised, the AGF would likely entrench the power

of their commanders at a time when donors expect the Karzai administration to

demonstrate its authority in the provinces. If not included in a DR program, the

AGF could pose a challenge to the new army once the Coalition presence is scaled

back. There is also the problem of countering the predatory behaviour that Afghan

militia forces have engaged in over the last twenty years. If this is not guarded

against in the proposed AGF through careful vetting of personnel and adequate

training, U.S. Special Forces in command responsibility could be held ultimately responsible for abuses.

III. ELECTION INSTITUTIONS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

President Karzai announced on 28 March 2004 that simultaneous presidential

and parliamentary elections would be held in September, three months later than

envisioned in the Bonn agreement. The delay reflects concerns within UNAMA and

among donor agencies assisting the election process about the low levels of voter

and political party registration, as well as the absence of a firm security strategy

for the elections. Much remains to be done in the interim to convince the Afghan

public that the election process will be not only reasonably free and fair, but also

meaningful.

The legal framework for the elections remains unclear. A draft election law has

been under revision by the Joint Election Management Board (JEMB), the mixed

Afghan-UN commission the Afghan component of which was appointed by Karzai

and which has the mandate of managing the electoral process. It has been anticiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
53

20 ICG interviews, Kabul, 13 March and 26 March 2004. 21 Joint Electoral Management Board (JEMB), ‘‘Voter Registration Analysis: Week Ending

26th February 2004.’’ 22 ICG interview, Kabul, 13 March 2004. 23 Constitution of Afghanistan, Article 35. 24The following political parties have been registered as of 25 March 2004:

• Republican Party of Afghanistan, led by Sebghatullah Sanjar, a 36-year-old former member of the Emergency Loya Jirga Commission with a degree in political science from Kabul University. • National Unity Movement, led by Sultan Mahmud Ghazi, a cousin of the former Afghan

King Muhammad Zahir. The formerly royalist party has been supporting President Karzai since

the Constitutional Loya Jirga.

• Party of National Solidarity of Youth of Afghanistan, led by Muhammad Jamil Karzai.

• Party of Islamic Independence of Afghanistan, led by Faruq Najrabi.

• Party of National Unity of Afghanistan, led by Abdurrashid Jalili, a former member of

the Khalq faction of the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. ICG interviews,

Kabul, 25–26 March 2004.

pated that the law will be promulgated by the president prior to the Berlin conference. The draft does not address what is likely to be one of the most controversial

issues: the provincial and district boundaries that will serve as electoral constituencies. This will instead be dealt with in a presidential decree, which must be

issued at least 90 days before the election.20

Registration to date has been markedly uneven, with respect to both region and

gender, according to data collected and analysed by JEMB. As of late February

2004, the multiethnic central region, including Kabul, had by far the highest share

of registered voters, 42 per cent, followed by the mainly Pashtun east and the mainly Persian-speaking west, each at approximately 15 per cent. There were far lower

rates in the Pashtun-majority south and south east, 5 per cent and 3 per cent respectively. The mainly Hazara central highlands had the highest proportion of registered women, 42 per cent of the total, followed closely by the West, at 37 per cent.

The lowest proportions were recorded in the south and south east, where women

made up less than 20 per cent of the total.21 These disparities, if reflected in the

election, are likely to yield results with a pronounced northern and central bias.

The first phase of registration has been limited to the eight major urban centres

and has included a civic education campaign supported by the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) and aimed at government employees. Plans to

carry out an accelerated three-week registration drive during May, with a goal of

registering 6.5 million voters, were shelved in late March due to delays in appointing qualified local staff and obtaining registration kits and to allow for prior civic

education efforts in rural areas. Postponement of the elections to September will,

according to election officers, compensate by allowing additional time for registration. To address regional disparities in both absolute numbers and women registered, an elections officer told ICG, there have been efforts to mobilise traditional

elements, such as elders in Khost, and clerics. The latter issued a resolution in

Kandahar that addressed in part the need to register women voters.22

Afghanistan’s new constitution recognises the right to form political parties, but

with certain qualifications. A welcome restriction, reflected as well in the law on political parties, prohibits the participation of parties that have ‘‘military or paramilitary aims and structures.’’ Other provisions, however, act as barriers to free association by barring the formation of parties whose charters are ‘‘contrary to the

principles of [the] sacred religion of Islam’’ or that are based on ethnicity, language,

religious sect or region.23 Some authorities have defined fundamental principles of

Islam to include any principle agreed upon by the major schools of jurisprudence

(fiqh); a party whose charter calls for full equality before the law of women and men

could by this reasoning be defined as contrary to Islamic principles. Prohibiting the

registration of ethnic parties could limit the ability of ethnic groups to seek redress

for perceived injustice or discrimination through the electoral process or to articulate and advance the demands and interests of their communities.

To date, 27 political parties, including both mujahidin factions and nonmilitarised parties established after the collapse of the Taliban, have applied for

registration at the justice ministry’s Office for Coordination and Registration of Political Parties and Social Organisations. Five have been registered,24 while eight

have completed the registration process and are awaiting screening for compliance

with the constitution and the political parties law by the ministries of interior,

defence, and finance, the National Security Directorate (NSD), and the Japanese

Embassy, acting on behalf of the DR program. Many observers believe the registration process has been slow and may minimise the potential for non-militarised political parties to participate actively in the upcoming elections.

54

25 ICG interview with Sebghatullah Sanjar, Republican Party of Afghanistan, 14 March 2004. 26 ICG interview with a United National Party member, 13 March 2004. 27Those that have applied include Jamiat-i Islami, led by former President Burhanuddin

Rabbani. 28 ICG interviews, Kabul, 25–26 March 2004. 29 Ibid. 30 ICG interview with Sebghatullah Sanjar, Republican Party of Afghanistan, 14 March 2004.

A ministry of justice official told ICG that most of the new political parties have

been unable to meet the criteria specified in the law and that some have failed to

furnish a list of 700 members, the minimum required to form a political party. Independent observers identified other bottlenecks, including administrative difficulties

in getting the ministerial and NSD members of a review committee to convene. According to the official, a permanent committee is now being constituted with

secondments from each of the concerned ministries and the NSD, in the hope of expediting the review process. USAID is helping to identify space for the registration

office, which is currently very limited.

The Kabul-based Republican Party of Afghanistan, led by a liberal former Emergency Loya Jirga commissioner, Sebghatullah Sanjar, was the first to be registered.

Though the process took two months, Sanjar holds a benign view: ‘‘They [the justice

ministry] carefully assessed our applications and copies of the national ID cards of

our members to make sure one person was not a member of more than one party

at the same time. These types of inquiries are good and right indeed. We believe

in both lawfulness and political pluralism.’’ 25

The obstacles encountered by the United National Party (UNP), formed by former

members of the Parcham faction of the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), point to serious weaknesses in the registration process, however.

According to a party member, the UNP was the first to submit a complete application but has yet to be registered. ‘‘Apparently, the minister [Abdul Rahim Karimi]

is under pressure by fundamentalist mujahidin such as Shinwari, Sayyaf, Rabbani

and Asif Muhsini, not to register our party,’’ the party member said. ‘‘During a

meeting with us the minister acknowledged that he is under pressure.’’ 26 These allegations, which have also been related to ICG by international observers, are significant not only because the former Parchamis have a large national constituency,

particularly among the professional classes in urban areas, but also because the

stigma of being former communists can and has been used against other socially liberal political actors.

Though very few mujahidin parties have yet applied for registration,27 some are

in the process of establishing front parties and nominating new leaders in an attempt to circumvent a prohibition in the law of parties that maintain armed forces.

Sayyaf’s Ittihad-I Islami faction, for example, has been recently reconstituted as

Dawat-i Islami with his deputy, Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, formally assuming leadership of the party. Enforcing the intent of the political parties law will, in the current

security environment, pose a challenge for the registration office.28 The likely influence of powerful fundamentalists on the registration process, the relative vulnerability of Minister Karimi, an Islamic law professor from Takhar who lacks an independent power base, and the administrative obstacles would argue for including on

the permanent review committee a member of the Afghan Independent Human

Rights Commission and, for this election, UNAMA.

Likewise, maintaining the independence and effectiveness of the JEMB and the

election secretariat is vital to the process. Both non-militarised parties and international observers have questioned the effectiveness of the Afghans whom President

Karzai appointed to the JEMB. ‘‘The formation of the election commission [JEMB]

has been entirely based on the relationship of the officials with different individuals,’’ said the UNP member. ‘‘They have not considered the qualifications and competencies of the people they have appointed there.’’ 29 That sentiment was echoed

as well by Sanjar, who maintained, ‘‘The election commission lacks adequate experienced and competent staff to carry out an effective registration process.’’ 30

The objectivity of a panel whose composition is determined or unduly influenced

by the president, who is himself a candidate, will inevitably be disputed. The constitution mandates establishment of an independent electoral commission by the

Transitional Administration; this should be treated as a priority, with criteria for

membership defined beforehand and approval required by the cabinet and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.

The main obstacle faced by non-militarised parties and genuinely independent

candidates, however, is the lack of adequate security assurances. ‘‘Young parties like

ours won’t be able to take part in the election if ISAF is not expanded to ensure

55

31 ICG interview, Kabul, 9 March 2004. 32 ICG interview with a diplomat in Kabul, 25 March 2004. 33See Mark Sedra, ‘‘National Police and Law Enforcement: Technical Annex,’’ in ‘‘Securing Afghanistan’s Future,’’ op. cit. 34 ICG interview, November 2003. 35 An alternative proposal is to establish satellite missions in Faizabad and Baghlan, linked

to the PRT in Kunduz. 36 Ibid. 37 ICG interviews with a diplomat in Kabul, 16 and 25 March 2004. See also Nahim Qadery, ‘‘Scandinavians to send troops: Swedish ambassador visits northern Afghanistan ahead of expected troop deployment,’’ Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Afghan Recovery Report, No. 112, 26 March 2004. The report cites Swedish ambassador Ann Wilkens as saying that

Norway and Sweden plan to contribute a combined force of 60 to 80 soldiers to the British-led

PRT in Mazar-i Sharif, in May or June 2004. 38See comments by Gen. James Jones, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, in ‘‘NATO ready

to take wider role in Afghanistan Command Structure,’’ Financial Times, 11 March 2004. 39 As one international observer put it, ‘‘the Coalition is doubling [the number of] PRTs by

halving the number of people.’’ ICG interview, March 2004.

our security outside Kabul,’’ Sanjar said. ‘‘Obviously, we can’t compete with provincial governors who have guns and all [other] resources under their control.’’ Current plans call for the creation of a security ring around voter registration

sites, with successive zones of authority patrolled in turn by trained police, the Afghan National Army, and either a Coalition or ISAF quick-reaction force, with

medevac, intelligence, and logistics capabilities.31 All three elements of this security

arrangement are tenuous propositions, however. Training for police officers in the

German-administered Police Academy in Kabul and constables in the seven U.S.-

supported regional training centres established since November 2003 will not keep

pace with the numbers required for election security. The interior ministry is accordingly attempting to expedite the deployment of 30,000 police for the elections

through a ‘‘train the trainers’’ program,32 a task that should be measured against

the three-year timetable intended for training 50,000 constables and 12,000 border

guards in the regional training centres.33 The ANA, as mentioned earlier, has problems of attrition and is stretched by its current deployments as presidential guard,

in counterinsurgency operations in the south east, and since mid-March, in Herat,

following armed clashes between forces loyal to provincial governor Ismail Khan and

the Kabul-backed 17th Division.

While the planned measures may well reduce the potential for interference during

the voting itself, security during the campaign will be contingent on the extent to

which DR has been carried out and international security arrangements extended

beyond the capital. At present, NATO has command over both the ISAF contingent

in Kabul and the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz. Its

planners hope to complete the first of a four-phase NATO expansion across the

country with new PRTs in Maimana and Faizabad by June 2004. This would be substantially later than conceived when NATO ministers approved ISAF expansion in

October 2003.34 At this time, the British-led PRT in Mazar-i Sharif and possibly the

New Zealand-led PRT in Bamiyan would come under NATO authority.35

Phase two of the NATO expansion should be concluded by September. This entails

new PRTs in the towns of Chagcharan, Qala-i Nau, and Farah and assuming command over the existing PRT in Herat (currently U.S.-led but expected to be taken

over by a European country, an arrangement that may be reviewed in light of the

internal armed conflict in Herat in late March and the subsequent deployment there

of 1,500 ANA troops). Current and planned PRTs across virtually the entire

Pashtun belt, extending from Kunar province up to the border of Farah province,

will be under the authority of the U.S.-led Coalition and be staffed by U.S. army

personnel. Though these eastern and southern regions are due to be covered during

phases three and four of the NATO expansion, target dates have not been identified.36

The approach taken by Britain in Mazar-i Sharif, and intended to be echoed by

a joint Nordic PRT,37 involves an explicit focus on security, including patrols, support for security sector reform, and the maintaining of small detachments in

neighbouring provinces. If additional PRTs along this model are established in the

northern and north eastern provinces by June,38 they may indeed have a positive

impact on security during the election campaign, even if their presence would be

insufficient to guard against intimidation and election-related violence in outlying

areas. (Phase two of the PRT expansion is unlikely to have a comparable impact

on election security unless it is completed well before September). However, the emphasis on reconstruction projects by the U.S.-led PRTs, together with the diminished

staffing levels that are reportedly accompanying their expansion,39 will do little to

promote security in the southern and eastern provinces during the run up to elecVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
56

40 Ibid. 41See UNAMA, ‘‘Holding a Free and Fair Election in Afghanistan’’ [undated]. 42 In the weeks since the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the president has appointed a number

of former Hizb-i Islami (Hikmatyar) commanders and political figures to high-level posts, including Bashir Baghlani as governor of Farah, Khyal Mohammad as governor of Zabul, and

Sabawoon as minister-adviser in the Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs. 43 ICG interview with a royalist party leader, Kabul, 11 January 2004.

tions. ‘‘It’s a hearts and minds campaign for Americans, not for Afghans,’’ a Kabulbased diplomat said of the Coalition PRTs.40

UNAMA has defined a series of benchmarks that will have to be met prior to elections if they are to be considered free and fair. These have received the backing of

the main diplomatic envoys to Afghanistan. Security figures prominently among

these benchmarks, with stipulations that include:

. . . a vigorous [DR] program aiming at the cantonment of 100 per cent of

heavy weapons and the demobilisation and reintegration of no less than 40

per cent of the AMF troop strength, . . . [and] promoting the deployment

by NATO and the Coalition of international military forces, both static and

mobile, in numbers large enough to assist effectively domestic security

forces in the protection of the electoral process against extremists’ attacks

and factional intimidation and interference.41

The international community should treat these recommendations as binding, and

elections should be held only when the necessary measures have been implemented.

IV. EMERGING POLITICAL FAULT LINES

The signal event during the Constitutional Loya Jirga was the consolidation of

Pashtun delegates behind President Karzai, which ensured the retention in the

draft of a strong presidency. Rather than representing a spontaneous development,

this consolidation appears to have been the outcome of concerted lobbying by

Karzai’s principal advisers and allies, including his brothers Qayyum and Ahmad

Wali Karzai and certain high-level Pashtun officials in the central government. The

decision by the pro-Karzai camp to cultivate an ethnic support base had a profound

impact upon the delegates, whose debates over such critical issues as the extent of

presidential powers and the status of minority languages split decisively along

Pashtun and non-Pashtun lines. An alternative strategy, which would have required

a greater willingness to limit presidential powers in the constitution and correspondingly strengthen those of parliament, could have avoided this polarisation

and helped maintain the president’s standing as a national figure.

An important element of the pro-Karzai camp’s strategy was to secure the support

of Pashtun mujahidin, formerly associated with the Hizb-i Islami factions led by

Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Yunis Khalis, as well as Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i Islami. The

incorporation of former Hizb-i Islami personalities into the government has accelerated since the Constitutional Loya Jirga, an indication that the support extended

to Karzai by the party’s erstwhile members may be more than a short-term alliance.42 Sayyaf, while promoting a more radically Islamic agenda than that reflected

in the draft constitution, was relatively muted in his protests when his party’s proposals were rejected and is reported to have played a conciliatory role during disputes over the draft.

Simultaneously, most delegates from the royalist National Unity Movement, a

mainly Pashtun party with considerable strength in southern and eastern Afghanistan, abandoned their support for a parliamentary system during the Constitutional

Loya Jirga and threw their weight behind Karzai. This shift was due in part to

pressure exerted upon them during the delegate elections. According to a royalist

leader, party members in Oruzgan province were threatened with arbitrary detention by provincial officials if they did not support candidates favouring a presidential system. But the decisive factor appears to have been pragmatism. ‘‘We want

to support Karzai because he is the person the U.S. and the West have confidence

in,’’ the same leader said. ‘‘Without the support of Western countries, we can’t protect our [country’s] independence.’’ 43

That the President’s camp chose to focus its attention on Pashtun delegates was

not in and of itself surprising. Support for a centralised, presidential form of government is considerably weaker in the north, particularly among Hazaras and Uzbeks,

who have rarely held positions of leadership at the centre. In addition, Pashtun delegates had felt themselves marginalised during the Emergency Loya Jirga in June

2002, when Tajiks associated with the dominant Shura-yi Nazar faction had leveraged their control of key security institutions to confirm their positions in the cabinet. The Constitutional Loya Jirga offered them an opportunity to redress those

57

44 ICG interview with Mohiuddin Mahdi, Nazhat-i Milli, Kabul, 13 March 2004. The

organisers of the front would object particularly to the current text of Article 64 (2). The Dari

and Pashto texts approved by the Constitutional Loya Jirga stated that the president’s power

included ‘‘determining basic policies of the state with the approval (taswib)’’ of the parliament.

The published Dari and Pashto texts of the constitution replaced taswib with taid, a word meaning ‘‘confirmation.’’ According to Front organiser Hafiz Mansour, taid does not include the right

to reject, and was introduced in the text to weaken the parliament further. 45 ICG interview, Kabul, March 2004. 46 ICG interview, Kabul, 8 January. 47Karzai’s spokesperson, Jawed Ludin, claimed that Mohaqqeq had resigned following a dispute with the president during a cabinet meeting. Amin Tarzi, ‘‘Dispute Erupts Over Afghan

Minister’s Purported Resignation,’’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 11 March 2004. 48 Hizb-e-Wahdat Islami Afghanistan Political Committee, ‘‘Press Release: Ustad Mohaqiq will

run for president of Afghanistan,’’ 20 January 2004. 49 Nahim Qadery and Sayed Yaqub Ibrahimi, ‘‘Street Protests After Minister’s Removal: Demonstrators in northern city demand reinstatement of leading Hazara minister,’’ Institute for War

and Peace Reporting (IWPR), Afghan Recovery Report No. 110, 17 March 2004.

grievances, particularly with a dominant Pashtun presence in the Constitutional

Commission’s secretariat and the exclusion of the Panjshiri-dominated National Security Directorate from the Loya Jirga compound.

Since the Emergency Loya Jirga, Shura-yi Nazar has succumbed to sharp internal

rifts, with Vice President and Defence Minister Fahim now seen to be supporting

Karzai, a decision likely informed by his expectation that the president will name

him as his running mate during the presidential election. The mantle of challenging

Karzai has been taken up Ahmad Wali Massoud, Afghan ambassador to the United

Kingdom and brother of the late Panjshiri commander Ahmad Shah Massoud; Hafiz

Mansour, the editor of the weekly newspaper, Payam-i Mujahid; Mohiuddin Mahdi

of Nazhat-i Milli, and other non-military figures associated with the former United

Front.

They have approached Abdul Rashid Dostum’s Junbish-i Milli-yi Islami, Herat

governor Ismail Khan, the Shia parties Hizb-i Wahdat and Harakat-i Islami and a

few minor parties in the hope of forming a ‘‘Front for Justice and Democracy’’ that

would field a common candidate during the presidential election. This front would

campaign around a limited set of objectives: proportional representation in parliament based upon a new census, direct election of provincial governors, and repeal

of all changes made to the text of the constitution following the conclusion of the

Constitutional Loya Jirga.44

The chief limitation facing its organisers at present is the lack of firm support

from a major regional commander—a circumstance one ascribed to the militia lead- ers’ opportunism. ‘‘The commanders are supporting those who are supporting them,

who have confirmed them in their posts, who are paying them,’’ he said.45 Although

the proposed front’s leaders claim to be building a national alliance, their concerns

and appeals are clearly regional and ethnic in nature. In early January, one privately speculated that the pro-Karzai camp’s cultivation of Pashtun support during

the Constitutional Loya Jirga reflected a ‘‘strategic imperative for Karzai and those

around him to restore Pashtun hegemony.’’ 46

The removal on 7 March 2004 of Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq, a presidential candidate and former leader of the Hizb-i Wahdat forces in northern Afghanistan, as

planning minister illustrated the continued sensitivity of ethnic representation at

the centre. In a press conference the following day, Mohaqqeq accused Karzai of firing him during a cabinet meeting for criticising a decision to transfer some of his

ministry’s powers to Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani, an ethnic Pashtun, and in retaliation for announcing his intention to run for president.47

Although Mohaqqeq had been widely considered an ineffective minister, he frequently spoke in the name of the Hazara community. In announcing his presidential

candidacy, he said he was doing so to demonstrate that a Hazara could run for the

highest office.48 His dismissal less than two months after the declaration of that

candidacy prompted Hizb-i Wahdat leaders in Mazar-i Sharif to organise a 2,000-

strong demonstration against Karzai on 12 March 2004.49 In informal conversations,

ICG found that there was also great resentment among ordinary Hazaras in Kabul

toward Karzai and his perceived ally, the Hazara Vice President Karim Khalili. The

circumstances surrounding Mohaqqeq’s dismissal are thus likely, in the short term

at least, to enhance his standing among Hazaras and diminish Karzai’s credibility.

V. CONCLUSION

Political reconstruction in Afghanistan has frequently been equated with the extension of the central government’s authority. Less attention has been paid to the

development of democratic norms. The country’s long-term stability, however, rests

on the ability of its institutions to accommodate the latter process and to provide

58

50 Early realisation of the NATO plan for two forward bases in Mazar and Herat with distinct

1,000-strong rapid reaction forces would also be highly desirable. ‘‘NATO gets aggressive on

forces for Afghanistan,’’ Reuters, 10 March 2004. Also ICG interview, Washington DC, March

2004.

channels through which the various components of Afghan society can find political

expression. The debates during the Constitutional Loya Jirga on the relative powers

of the president and parliament, as well as symbols of the state such as its national

and official languages, underscore the imperative of accommodating these competing

interests. But democratic institutions can only develop in an environment that allows open discussion about governance, something that continues to elude Afghanistan more than two years after the signing of the Bonn Agreement.

Without a reinvigorated DR process, political and economic life in both the centre

and the provinces will continue to be dominated by the gun or the shadow of the

gun. Elections under the prevailing conditions will only confirm this reality—something that is understood by the commanders who control the ministry of defence and

have steadfastly resisted efforts to dismantle their militias. The limits of the present

DR process should now be evident: unless the authority responsible for DR, namely

the ANBP, is backed by a credible deterrent, there will be no incentive for commanders to surrender the bases of their political and economic influence. That deterrent could be provided through NATO, the Coalition, or a combination of the two,

but neither force is present in sufficient strength to project its authority over the

larger part of the country or considers that it is presently mandated to take part

in DR.

NATO’s planned four-phase expansion across Afghanistan provides a framework

within which to create an interim security regime that would enable DR and facilitate the rebuilding of Afghanistan’s own security institutions. But NATO’s appeal

to member states to contribute a modest three battalions in the north to cover the

first two phases of that expansion has yet to result in a single firm commitment.

This limited first step must be taken very quickly if the near-term objective of defensibly free and fair elections and the longer-term administrative and security sector reforms proposed by the central government are to be realised.50 The alternative

would be continued accommodation of, and reliance upon, militia commanders by

the central government and the surrendering of reforms.

The poor integration of Coalition counter-terrorism strategy with the Bonn political process needs to be replaced by far closer coordination between the two. The

establishment of an Afghanistan Guard Force without a DR plan or apparently even

consideration of its potential impact on the ANBP and on political stability is a glaring illustration of the extent to which military planning is proceeding in isolation

from the Bonn process. Donor states, even as they commit with their checkbooks

during the Berlin Conference to helping Afghanistan over the long haul, should

make it an urgent priority to harmonise these disparate elements by promoting

transparency and consultation between military and political planners. Kabul/Brussels, 30 March 2004

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFLY

• In most of Afghanistan, the rule of law has never been strong, but after 23

years of warfare it has been displaced almost completely by the ‘‘rule of the

gun.’’ In most of the country, regional power-holders, whether they hold official

positions or not, effectively exercise political, police and judicial authority

through their control of militia forces.

• The justice system and law enforcement suffer from a very low level of human

resource and physical infrastructure capacity. In addition, the discontinuity of

regimes over the last quarter century has left a patchwork of differing and overlapping laws, and an incoherent collection of security structures. Rebuilding and

reform will require the commitment of Afghan authorities and foreign donors

over a long haul.

• No national civilian police force yet exists in Afghanistan. The approximately

50,000 men working as police are generally untrained, ill-equipped, poorly paid,

59

and illiterate, and they owe their allegiance to local warlords and militia commanders rather than to the central government. U.S. and German police training programs have begun efforts to shape a national force. From July 2003

through 2005, the United States plans to conduct in-service training for 50,000

police in Kabul and at regional centers. Germany will train a much smaller

number of officers in a more comprehensive program at a reconstructed Police

Academy in Kabul. No efforts appear underway to reform the parallel and secretive intelligence police under the control of the National Security Directorate.

• Though Afghan and international officials often refer to rule of law development

as a high priority, the necessary measures are not being treated with urgency,

except for police training. In the justice sector, no strategy has been agreed

upon for the reform and rebuilding process. Donors have left this task largely

to ‘‘lead nation’’ Italy, whose performance and approach is seen by other donors

and Afghan officials and observers as more narrowly focused. Fractious relations among the Afghan stakeholder institutions and the inability of the Judicial Reform Commission to play the coordinating and facilitating role envisioned

for it have hobbled the process.

• Some progress has been made in law reform, some legal training programs are

underway, and a minimal amount of infrastructure repair has been performed.

Virtually nothing has been done to update the court structure, establish and

apply qualifications for judicial personnel (Afghan legal experts consider many

judges to be unqualified), ensure widespread access to legal texts for practitioners and students, develop court administration, improve the poor quality of

legal education, or address deep-rooted corruption. Defense attorneys are essentially unheard of. The vast needs for improvement in the corrections system

have been almost entirely ignored.

• The burgeoning narcotics trade presents a fundamental challenge to the future

of Afghanistan, and specifically to efforts to develop a culture of rule of law. The

trade earns Afghan traffickers an amount equal to half the country’s legitimate

GDP and nearly five times the government’s budget. Nearly all elements of local

and regional power structures use the proceeds from trafficking to fund their

activities and maintain their independence from the central government.

Though important steps have been taken to create a legal and institutional

framework for counter-narcotics work, it will be years before the Afghan government has an operational capacity robust enough to put a dent in the narcotics

trade. Unless U.S.-led Coalition military forces become willing to undertake at

least some counter-narcotics actions, traffickers will continue to operate with

utter impunity, and the perceived message of tolerance of this activity will continue to undermine efforts to build the rule of law.

• Warlordism—control of local populations through force and intimidation by provincial governors, militia commanders, police chiefs, and other power-holders—

continues to destabilize Afghanistan and impede reform of justice and law enforcement institutions. The most powerful warlords continue to exercise influence over key ministries and institutions including the judiciary.

• The slow pace of efforts to establish the rule of law has resulted in part from

the inherent difficulties of conducting a post-conflict reconstruction operation in

a country that has suffered over two decades of modern warfare. But it is also

a consequence of the decision of the United States and United Nations to limit

the international presence and to place primary responsibility upon the Afghans

for providing their own security and directing their own reconstruction—responsibilities they have had little capacity to execute.

• A corollary to the UN’s ‘‘light footprint’’ approach has been to assign certain donors ‘‘lead nation’’ responsibility for particular sectors. In the rule of law area,

this has not worked well. The United States already has significantly augmented ‘‘lead nation’’ Germany’s efforts in police training, putting in place a

much larger program. A similar recognition is needed that greater international

leadership and political attention from a broader array of donors is required in

the justice sector. At the same time, Afghan authorities should undertake to reform the judicial reform process, either dissolving or significantly enhancing the

stature and capabilities of the Judicial Reform Commission.

• An integrated, holistic approach to establishing the rule of law is needed.

Though significant funds are being put into police training, even a well-trained

force will not be able to provide genuine law enforcement if there is no functioning criminal justice system or corrections system in which to place offenders. At best, such a force will be able to provide some public order; at worst,

the international community will have enhanced the ability of power-holders to

60

control and abuse the population without creating mechanisms to protect the

rights of Afghans. A substantial investment in one area of rule of law will not

have a meaningful pay-off in terms of real democratic governance and stability

unless other pieces of the puzzle are put in place as well.

INTRODUCTION

Two years after the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan is at a defining moment concerning its future. The adoption of a new Constitution on January 4, 2003, delineated the permanent shape of national institutions and set the stage for holding national elections. At the same time, security remains an overwhelming concern of Afghans, and a desire to get out from under the control of warlords remains their primary aspiration. The country faces the combined challenges of resurgent terrorism,

factional conflict, and rampant narcotics production. In the south, U.S.-led Coalition

forces are engaged in a running fight against al Qaeda remnants along the border

with Pakistan and against a reconstituted Taliban that retains support among the

Pashtun majority. In the north, the Afghan government is challenged by recurrent

armed conflict among regional warlords, and by the refusal of provincial governors

to turn over revenues to the center. Throughout the country, there is a near-explosion in the cultivation of poppy. Traditional growing areas have been augmented by

vast new areas brought under cultivation in the past year. In the absence of disincentives, production of opium has returned to record levels and the production of

refined heroin has expanded, as has local drug consumption. With earnings from

narcotics amounting to an about half of the country’s gross domestic product, Afghanistan is in critical danger of becoming a ‘‘narco-state.’’

In most of Afghanistan, the rule of law has never been strong, but after 23 years

of warfare, it has been displaced almost completely by the ‘‘rule of the gun.’’ Moreover, the discontinuity of regimes over the last quarter century has resulted in a

patchwork of differing and overlapping laws, elements of different types of legal systems, and an incoherent collection of law enforcement and military structures. Provincial governors, militia commanders, police chiefs, and other power brokers now

exercise control through fear and intimidation, and through manipulation of the traditional shuras (village councils). In most of the country, regional power holders—

whether they hold official positions or not—exercise political, police, and judicial authority through their control of militia forces. Their activities are financed by profits

from production and trafficking in opium, and through their control of roadblocks

on transportation routes at which they exact ‘‘taxes’’ on travelers and commodities.

In the final days of his tenure, UN Special Representative of the Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi stated at the closing ceremony of the Constitutional Loya

Jirga (grand assembly) that, ‘‘[t]he people of Afghanistan are afraid of the guns that

are held by the wrong people and used not to defend them and not to wage a jihad,

because the time for jihad is finished, but to terrorize people, to take advantage for

their own and the people who are close to them.’’ The current year will be critical

in determining whether Afghanistan will continue its slow progress toward representative government, the rule of law, and a responsible role in the international

community, or whether it will lose ground and slide back toward political and religious extremism and economic chaos.

BACKGROUND

The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan

Following the U.S.-led military operation that ousted the Taliban regime in the

fall of 2001, the starting point for rebuilding Afghanistan was the ‘‘Agreement on

Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending Re-establishment of Permanent

Institutions’’—the Bonn Agreement—signed by representatives of the Afghan people

on December 5, 2001. The Agreement established an Interim Afghan Authority, and

provided the basis for an interim system of law and governance, employing the 1964

Constitution as its foundation. The Agreement also laid out a timetable for further

steps toward establishing a new government, constitution, and ultimately elections.

The Emergency Loya Jirga of June 2002 installed a Transitional Administration,

with Hamid Karzai as its president; Karzai later appointed a cabinet of four vicepresidents, four special advisors, and 28 ministers. Karzai’s government, through a

constitutional commission, drafted a new constitution, which was released in early

November 2003 and adopted with amendments by a constitutional Loya Jirga on

January 4, 2004.

Foreign Military Forces

Annex I of the Bonn Agreement called for the deployment of an international military force to maintain security in Kabul, with possible expansion to other areas of

61

the country. In response, the UN Security Council authorized the creation of an

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). ISAF deployed in January 2002,

and by summer had 5,000 troops from 19 countries. ISAF’s responsibility was limited to providing security in the capital, where it conducted routine patrols with

local police. ISAF’s purpose was to provide ‘‘breathing space’’ during which the Afghans could create their own security forces. In October 2003, the UN Security

Council, responding to requests from President Karzai, expanded ISAF’s authorized

area of operations to include all of Afghanistan, but did not further define ISAF’s

mandate. NATO, now in command of ISAF, so far has been unable to generate the

forces needed for a significant expansion.

ISAF operates separately from ‘‘Operation Enduring Freedom’’ (OEF), the U.S.-led

military mission focused on destroying the remnants of the Taliban and al Qaeda.

With 11,500 troops participating, OEF is the most potent military force in Afghanistan. While OEF does not conduct peacekeeping activities, it has occasionally engaged in settling disputes between warlords, usually by dispensing cash or issuing

veiled threats of force. OEF forces have not taken action against narcotics traffickers or supported law enforcement.

In Spring 2003, the Pentagon responded to the continuing deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan by authorizing a somewhat greater involvement in

civil affairs and reconstruction by U.S. military forces. American troops began providing humanitarian assistance and took on some road and school construction

projects. The Defense Department initiated a program to deploy ‘‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’’ (PRTs) near major cities throughout Afghanistan. The PRTs are

designed to provide assistance in rebuilding local infrastructure and ensuring local

security, but not to perform police functions. Of eight PRTs currently operational,

one is under NATO command (the first NATO presence outside Kabul) and will

have up to 240 personnel, two are 100-person teams commanded by the United

Kingdom and New Zealand, and the remainder are 30-person U.S. teams commanded by a senior U.S. officer and including personnel from Special Forces, Civil

Affairs, Army engineers, the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Department

of Agriculture. The PRTs are the centerpiece of the international community’s strategy for stabilizing areas outside of Kabul and enabling the central government to

extend its reach, but given their limited number and sizes, some observers have

questioned their real impact. In some areas, the central government has relied on

the presence of the PRTs in beginning to remove problematic local officials, while

not challenging the most powerful warlords.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

The UN model for its mission in Afghanistan is vastly different from that used

in Kosovo and East Timor. In those missions, the UN established an interim authority that was responsible for civil administration and for guiding the local population

toward democratic self-government. In Afghanistan, the UN has sought to limit its

involvement and to encourage Afghans to assume responsibility for their own political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. As a consequence, the UN mission

has limited material resources and no operational role with respect to the Afghan

police, judicial, or corrections systems.

Under the leadership of Special Representative of the Secretary General Brahimi,

the UN advocated a ‘‘light footprint,’’ a euphemism for a minimalist UN mission.

The light footprint was publicly advocated as a way to ensure space for Afghans to

take the leading role in rebuilding their country, in contrast to the outsider-dominated approaches of the Kosovo and East Timor missions. The main underlying rationale, however, was that a light UN footprint would force donor nations to accept

their responsibility for assisting Afghanistan, rather than putting responsibility on

the UN and then underfunding the mission and blaming it for the resulting failure—as has occurred in other circumstances. As part of this approach, certain donors have taken on ‘‘lead nation’’ responsibility for assistance to particular sectors.

The ‘‘light footprint’’ approach, however, has to some extent been reflected in the

nature of the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan more generally.

Despite initial promises of billions of dollars in foreign largess and a rhetorical commitment not to neglect Afghanistan once again, international assistance has been

characterized by a relatively light wallet. The ‘‘peacekeeping-light’’ mode is also seen

in the international community’s approach to ensuring internal security and assisting Afghan law enforcement—for example, the lack of peacekeeping forces outside

of Kabul and the absence of a foreign police mission.

62

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN POST-TALIBAN AFGHANISTAN: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION

The Justice System

Afghanistan cannot be said to have a genuine system of justice at present. To be

sure, there are many appointed judges and prosecutors in the country, there are

laws on the books, and there are occasional trials, but there is no functioning system. Court management is archaic or non-existent, central judicial and prosecutorial

authorities often have no technical means of communicating with colleagues in the

provinces, and judicial appointments are routinely made on the basis of personal or

political connections without regard to legal training or other qualifications. Moreover, the organization of the judicial apparatus fails to comply with existing law in

important respects (e.g., both the 1964 Constitution—in force until recently—and

the new Constitution call for a Supreme Court of nine members, but the current

Chief Justice has added several more justices); judges routinely make decisions

without reference to written law; there are effectively no means of enforcing decisions; and despite a theoretical right to counsel, there are virtually no defense lawyers in the country. To a great extent, the written law in Afghanistan is not applied—or even widely known, including by judges and lawyers. As one senior Afghan

judicial official put it, Afghanistan ‘‘has many laws, but no implementation.’’ With

apparent good reason, Afghans do not trust the judiciary, and avoid recourse to it

as much as possible.

Though Afghan and international officials often refer to rule of law development

as one of the highest priorities in the reconstruction process, the necessary measures are not being treated with urgency (other than recently in the police sector).

U.S. funding, for example, for rule of law activities other than police or counter-narcotics for FY 2004 is $10 million in State Department funds, plus some limited (but

not yet decided) portion of USAID’s $54 million in ‘‘democracy and governance’’

funds for Afghanistan, the majority of which will be used for elections support, compared to over $110 million for police training. In 2003, the U.S. spent about $13 million on rule of law activities other than police, including support for the Judicial Reform, Constitutional, and Independent Human Rights Commissions. (As insufficient

as these amounts are relative to the needs of the Afghan justice sector, they make

the U.S. the second largest donor to the sector.) Money aside, relatively little political attention is being paid to the justice sector; the field has been left largely to

‘‘lead nation’’ Italy, which is widely seen as focused mainly on implementation of its

own projects, rather than coordination of broader efforts. As a consequence, and despite the presence of some Afghan officials who are committed to reform, since the

fall of the Taliban little progress has been made toward building a functioning justice system.

Key issues that need to be addressed in order to turn around this situation include a flawed reform process, inadequate international capacity and attention, and

a desperately low level of Afghan capacity in terms of both physical and human resources. The latter—a result of 23 years of war and a low level of development before that, and a limiting factor in every area of Afghanistan’s reconstruction—can

only be addressed over the long haul and through sustained international commitment. But the first two obstacles can be addressed in the near term.

Institutional Architecture and the Reform Process

The justice sector in Afghanistan is administratively complex and highly

factionalized. The three main permanent institutions—the Ministry of Justice, the

Supreme Court, and the Attorney General’s office (Saranwali)—are coequal in stature, and for a variety of political, personality, and turf-consciousness reasons have

fractious relations with each other. While police perform a central role in criminal

justice, the Ministry of Interior has not played an active role in the justice rebuilding process. The lack of clear legal guidelines regarding proper institutional roles,

and the absence of steps to provide clarity, has allowed this fractiousness to persist.

The Judicial Reform Commission (JRC) created under the Bonn Agreement to guide

the reform and be a facilitator among the permanent institutions and between them

and the donor community, has instead become a fourth faction in the sector. The

Italian government operation in Kabul, which, as leader of the donor effort, will

need to work to bridge the differences among the other players, has to an extent

become a fifth faction, having very difficult relations with its natural partner, the

JRC, in particular.

In principle, the JRC should have become the driving force behind the reform and

reconstruction process in the justice sector. In practice, partly as a result of lack

of buy-in from the permanent institutions, this has not occurred. No consensus has

been developed regarding the proper role of the JRC—whether it should be a policy

63

body or a project implementer, whether it should take a leading role in setting the

agenda or facilitate support for the priorities of others. Moreover, the JRC’s efforts

have been hampered by lack of resources and a sluggish pace of support from

UNDP, the main conduit for the JRC’s funding (of $6 million available for support to the justice sector, UNDP had expended only $500,000 as of November 2003). Regardless whether the JRC itself is at fault or whether it has been ill-served by its

partners, it is apparent that the JRC is not performing as intended. Meanwhile,

building the JRC from scratch has been a major task in a resource-poor situation,

and has consumed resources and donor attention that otherwise could be devoted

to building the capacity of the permanent institutions. Other than some limited provision of equipment and infrastructure repair in Kabul, the permanent institutions

have received little direct support from foreign donors. A reform of the reform process is needed.

Coupled with these difficulties, the international effort to support the justice sector suffers from a lack of strategy and a lack of capacity. Other donors have deferred

to Italy to develop a strategy, but no clear strategy has been coordinated among donors and stakeholders. UNAMA in early February 2004 released a ‘‘Proposal for a

Long-Term Strategic Framework’’ that offers its view on priorities for improving the

justice system, highlighting the need to strengthen capacity in the permanent institutions; it remains to be seen whether the proposals will be adopted or funded. The

Consultative Group (CG) for the justice sector—in which Afghan stakeholders and

donors are supposed to meet to air and address priorities and obstacles—does not

function, unlike the CGs for some other sectors. Furthermore, the justice sector—

including infrastructure repair, institutional capacity building, training, law reform,

and corrections—is relatively lightly funded. As of November 2003, according to official Afghan government figures, just over $19 million in assistance was ‘‘disbursed’’

during that year for the justice sector, but with $4.7 million of that amount

unallocated to any projects (and some of the ‘‘disbursements’’ not clearly identified

and therefore questionable). In addition, key posts such as the UNAMA senior rule

of law advisor and the UNDP justice sector project director have been vacant for

many months.

Courts, Judges and Prosecutors

The nearly uniform view of observers inside and outside the justice system in Afghanistan is that the greatest need in building the system is to improve the quality

of judicial personnel. To some extent, the lack of qualified personnel is part of the

broad human resource capacity deficit plaguing Afghan reconstruction in general.

But particular to the justice system, many judges appointed in the post-Taliban period, including some on the Supreme Court, do not have a legal education (secular

or Shari’a), and have been educated only in madrassas. Having little—and in some

cases in the provinces no—access to legal texts, many judges are unfamiliar with

the law and make decisions without reference to it. Moreover, corruption in the judiciary is considered to be rampant—not surprising in light of salaries of about $36

a month. Bribery aside, one senior judicial official commented that it is not possible

at present to hold judges accountable for their conduct because they are under pressure from and control of ‘‘commanders.’’ Some judges and others report that judges

assigned to the provinces are able to perform their duties only if they are personally

in favor with the local power-holder. Corruption and pressure from local power-holders is similarly widespread among prosecutors.

Assessing the actual level of activity among judges and prosecutors is difficult. Reliable data on caseloads appears to be unavailable. Some who have visited courts

in the provinces have reported no apparent sign of legal proceedings at particular

courthouses. According to the Attorney General’s office, there are 3,274 prosecutors

in the country, and they are actively prosecuting a variety of criminal cases—murder, adultery, rape, and, mostly, theft—with an 85% conviction rate. But, though

there are 341 prosecutors in Kabul center and the districts of Kabul province, there

are only 600 persons (‘‘men, women, and infants,’’ according to the Attorney General’s office) in detention in Kabul—a small number for a city of over two million

persons, and an apparently small caseload for the prosecutors.

In addition to improving the human resource capacity of the judiciary, a tremendous need exists to begin the arduous process of determining a sound structure for

the court system and developing basic court management techniques. No work has

yet been done to analyze the number of judges and courts, and their locations, that

makes sense for Afghanistan. The current organigram of the judiciary was developed haphazardly during the Najibullah and Mujahedeen periods (approximately

1986–1996) in order to create jobs for people in particular places based on political

exigencies. Similarly, no work has been done to develop a court management system

suitable for conditions in the country. This should include establishing technical

64

means of communication between the central justice authorities and the provinces;

currently, days, months, or more are required to send or receive information.

In some other post-conflict/transition situations (most notably East Germany, and

more recently Bosnia and Herzegovina), the problem of corrupt and/or inefficient judicial personnel has been handled by serving notice to all, allowing them to reapply, and re-hiring selectively. This approach probably is not feasible politically in

Afghanistan.

Under the country’s current judicial appointment structure, improving the quality

of judicial personnel will prove difficult. The Supreme Court is responsible for administering the entire judiciary, and the Chief Justice has authority (nominally as

chair of a committee) to nominate all judges. The Supreme Court is headed by a

Chief Justice who is a noted religious conservative originally appointed by the

‘‘mujahadeen’’ government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani and reconfirmed by

President Karzai. Notably, the Supreme Court has created within its administrative

structure a ‘‘Fatwa Council’’ composed of clerics. The Council reviews questions of

Islamic law, and has, on its own initiative, issued rulings even in matters not actually brought to the Supreme Court by any parties. Although the President has the

final appointment power under the law, President Karzai reportedly has not rejected any of Chief Justice Shinwari’s judicial nominees, many of whom do not meet

the education and experience requirements of Afghan law. At a February 2003 U.S.

Institute of Peace symposium on rule of law in Afghanistan, the Afghan participants

(including the Minister of Justice, JRC chairman, two Supreme Court justices, and

other senior legal officials) concluded that judicial appointments should be based on

merit and education, and proposed new minimum qualifications that should be established; these recommendations have not been implemented. While there are some

differences of opinion within the Supreme Court, the leadership of the institution

is regarded as opposed to any consideration of enhancing judicial qualification requirements, purging the judiciary of unqualified personnel, or reforming the structure of the court system.

As the centerpiece of their efforts to strengthen the justice sector, Italian officials

have decided that the most urgent need is to extend the justice system to areas of

the country where courts presently are not functioning. They plan to address this

need through a focus on selected district (primary) courts. They have developed a

new, streamlined interim code of criminal procedure, which was promulgated into

law by Presidential decree in February 2004. This interim code has been the subject

of some controversy, as it was prepared by Italian officials with help from U.S. military lawyers but relatively little input or support from the Afghan justice institutions, and was reportedly adopted under strong foreign political pressure. The interim code officially now replaces the pre-existing code of criminal procedure

throughout the country.

The Italian project will focus first on introducing the interim code in selected district courts, i.e., those located in provincial capital cities, which in theory could also

hear cases from other districts in the province where courts are not functioning.

They plan to train an initial corps of 20 judges and 20 prosecutors in this new code,

after which these persons would be assigned to the selected districts. The Italian

program will first be implemented in a pilot project in Gardez. The remaining districts in which they will pursue this effort remain to be identified, as does the number of districts they intend to target and over what time period. Italian and Afghan

officials also need to determine clearly how they will amend or work around the existing procedure for appointment and assignment of district judges. Some Afghan

and foreign observers have expressed skepticism regarding this plan, suggesting

that an approach that focuses on use of a new code in a small number of district

level courts could produce inconsistency and isolated pockets of administration of

justice. An alternative strategy would focus on Kabul plus the five major provincial

capitals (Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Kunduz), and outside of

Kabul would focus on the provincial courts rather than district (primary) courts.

(The provincial courts are appellate level, but have some first-instance jurisdiction.)

An approach that is focused on provincial courts would have a wider potential impact than one focused on district courts. Outside of these urban centers the population generally relies on and has much greater trust in informal systems of dispute

resolution (such as decisionmaking or mediation by shuras and tribal elders). Inside

these centers, the traditional, informal systems tend not to function, and the need

is therefore greater for access to a formal justice process that works. A soundly functioning provincial court could provide a check on unreformed district courts throughout its jurisdiction.

65

Defense Attorneys

Though Afghans have a legal right to defense counsel, defense attorneys are virtually unknown in Afghanistan. Even in criminal proceedings, defendants are almost never represented by counsel. Traditionally, clients have used lawyers for commercial matters, but even these could be characterized better as brokers or agents,

who, for example, handle payments of bribes to judicial officials. A legal aid department within the Supreme Court is supposed to provide assistance to indigent defendants, but according to multiple sources, the office exists in name only. Understanding of the role of defense counsel is lacking as well. For example, a senior prosecutorial official said that a lawyer is only necessary for a defendant who is not literate. Apparently the only work to build defense lawyering capacity is being undertaken by a U.S. NGO, the International Legal Foundation, which launched a small

training program in Kabul in August 2003, and which also provides some training

through other organizations.

Legal Reform

Legal reform in Afghanistan has been complicated by lack of clarity regarding

what laws exist in the country. The Bonn Agreement called for existing law, with

some exceptions, to continue to apply, but this provision ignored the fact that there

are significant overlaps and contradictions among different laws promulgated during

different periods. In addition, all existing significant collections of legal texts were

destroyed during the wars. The International Development Law Organization in October 2003 completed a digital chronological compilation of Afghan laws going back

to the 1920s, but this has not yet been indexed or distributed. In 2002, the Institute

together with the American Bar Association and International Resources Group, collected authenticated versions of several key legal codes, and with the cooperation

of the Ministry of Justice and the U.S. Army, printed and distributed 1,000 copies.

The U.S. Army delivered most of the copies to regional governors.

While the lack of clarity regarding existing law is likely to persist for some time,

some progress has meanwhile been made in revising laws and writing new ones. According to the Ministry of Justice, 12 amended or new laws have been approved by

the government as of November 2003, and several others are in progress. Many of

these are focused on commercial law, and other areas related to regulation of the

economy. In current circumstances, law reform may be the easiest area of justice

sector development; relatively few resources are required, there is no parliament to

contend with (laws are adopted by Presidential decree after cabinet review), and results can be achieved just on paper. The real test of law reform, however, will be

whether new and improved laws are actually implemented, and in that regard,

there is so far little change. In order to create a possibility of implementation, a system will have to be devised for distributing, and providing training regarding, the

new and revised laws to judges, prosecutors, and legal educators.

Legal Training and Education

As already noted, improvement of the quality and professionalism of judges and

prosecutors is the greatest need in the justice sector. Legal training and education

is fundamental to meeting this need, particularly in the current situation where

purging unqualified personnel is not politically feasible. Both short-term fixes and

long-term investments are needed. Some attention is being paid to the former, as

several training programs are underway, but no attention is yet being paid to the

latter, which requires taking steps to improve the currently dismal state of university law faculties. Short training programs can provide benefits, but major gains in

the quality of administration of justice can only be achieved if investments are made

in the preparation of the next generation of legal professionals.

The largest training program underway for current judges and prosecutors is

being conducted by the International Development Law Organization (IDLO). This

program will provide 50 days (300 hours) of training to 450 persons over a 16-month

period ending in September 2004. There does not appear to have been any outside

evaluation of the quality or impact of this training as yet. The professional skill

level of the participants—even those with 25 or more years of experience—is very

low. They have no experience in producing written opinions, no experience with defense advocates in the courtroom, and are accustomed to disposing of issues without

any reference to legal texts. Working to impart the basic idea of making judicial decisions based on actual law has been an important element of the training. Separately, the Judicial Reform Commission has initiated a nine-month training program for new judges and prosecutors. The first class of 150 students began training

in 2003 and is still in progress. A common understanding exists that responsibility

for this program needs to be moved to a permanent institution, preferably with creVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
66

ation of a national judicial training center, but no concrete steps have yet been

taken in this direction.

The needs of the university law faculties, both secular and Shari’a, are huge.

These include books (libraries were destroyed and students cannot afford their own

texts, even when available), infrastructure repair, faculty training (most have no

more than an undergraduate degree), curriculum development, and visiting professors from abroad. Virtually no assistance has yet been provided to law faculties in

Kabul or in provincial capitals.

One factor limiting opportunities to provide training and assistance for law faculties (as well as law reform and other efforts) is the lack of trained interpreters

and translators who have knowledge of legal vocabulary. The dearth of qualified linguists in general is a challenge in Afghanistan’s reconstruction process, but it is a

particular problem in justice sector projects where precise use of legal terminology

is essential. A program to train a cadre of individuals in the necessary skills could

facilitate the execution of many projects.

Customary Law

Outside of the major cities, village councils or tribal elders have for generations

played the predominant role in resolving disputes and meting out justice. There are

indications that this customary system of law—which varies in form and substance

throughout Afghanistan—has been subverted and manipulated by local wartime and

current power-holders, but to what extent and effect has not yet been closely examined. Though the issue has not been greatly considered, there appears to be broad

agreement that legal reform should include limiting the authority of customary law

mechanisms, particularly in areas of criminal justice. Some also believe it will be

important to design connections between the formal and informal systems, perhaps

by crafting procedures for courts to confirm results of customary dispute settlements. In rural areas for the foreseeable future, fostering the informal system will

be both more realistic and more sensible in the cultural context than trying to push

the formal justice system into remote areas. In the near term, it will be constructive

to study the nature and current state of customary law practices in order to provide

an information base for future action. USIP is currently conducting one such study.

Police

Historically, the police were organized as a quasi-military force on the Soviet

model with a two-track system of career officers and conscripts who chose to serve

for two years as police patrolmen rather than join the army. During the past decades of conflict there has been no national civilian police force in Afghanistan.

Though figures are uncertain, there are estimated to be about 50,000 men working

as police, but they are generally untrained, ill-equipped, illiterate (70–90%), and owe

their allegiance to local warlords and militia commanders and not to the central

government. Many of those serving as police are former Mujahedeen who have experienced a lifetime of armed conflict and are accustomed to acting with impunity. A

few professional police officers remain from the Afghan National Police of the Soviet

period, but these officers have little understanding of the role of police in a democratic society. In Kandahar, for example, 120 officers out of 3,000 police had received

some police training, but it was more than a decade ago.

The Bonn Agreement provided for the creation of an Interior Ministry responsible

for police and corrections. The border police were transferred to the Ministry of Defense in January 2002, and responsibility for corrections was moved to the Ministry

of Justice during 2003. The Kabul police have cooperated with ISAF and helped reduce the number of armed militia fighters in the city.

In addition to a lack of training and questionable loyalty, the Afghan police suffer

from a lack of uniforms, inadequate equipment and transportation, dilapidated facilities, and little or no pay. The UN-administered Law and Order Trust Fund, established in 2002, has received only $11.2 million of the $65 million requested for

two years. Failure of the international community to provide the required funding

means that the central government lacks the resources to fund the police outside

of the capital, and thus the ability to reduce the influence of regional leaders. Even

within Kabul, as of November 2003, police had not been paid since May 2003. Low

or no pay has resulted in widespread corruption, further undermining public confidence in police, who are generally regarded with a mixture of fear and disdain.

For purposes of creating a capacity to handle internal security, Afghan authorities

and the international community determined that it would be more cost-effective to

focus on training and equipping a national police force than a national army. Given

Afghanistan’s size and population, creating a national police force represented a far

greater challenge than any police-related program the international community has

ever attempted. At the request of the UN and the Interim Authority, Germany asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 08:43 Oct 21, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 AFGHAN SFRELA2 PsN: SFRELA2
67

sumed responsibility as ‘‘lead nation’’ for training and equipping the Afghan police.

This request was based upon the Afghans’ positive experiences with German police

assistance programs prior to the Soviet intervention. Germany’s goal was to create

an ethnically balanced force that was familiar with human rights standards and

modern police methods and capable of assisting with the country’s transition to democracy.

Germany developed an initial plan for police training and announced the commit- ment of $70 million toward renovating the police academy in Kabul, providing 11

police instructors, refurbishing Kabul police stations, and donating 50 police vehicles. The first team of 14 German police advisors arrived in Kabul on March 16 and

the German Coordination Office was opened on March 18, 2002. The Coordination

Office advised the Interim Authority on police training and reform and supervised

the reconstruction of the Police Academy that formally reopened on August 22,

2002, with 1,500 cadets in residence. The Academy provides a five-year recruit

training course for officers and a three-month recruit course for non-commissioned

officers.

In November 2003, the Academy had 1,000 officer cadets and 500 non-commissioned officers in residence. Education requirements for admission were 12 years for

officers and six years for non-commissioned officers. The student body was composed

of 60 percent Pashtuns, 30 percent Uzbeks and 10 percent others. Students came

from 26 provinces, but most were from the Kabul area. Only 11 members of the officer class and 22 members of the non-commissioned officer class were women. Germany accepted responsibility for training an Afghan border patrol as well, but as

of November 2003 had trained only 125 officers, who serve as guards and immigration inspectors at the Kabul international airport. The future of the new border police is dependent upon the central government’s ability to remove the local commanders and heavily armed military forces that now control the border and the

smuggling of drugs and other contraband across it.

In 2003, the U.S. State Department established a police assistance program to

provide in-service training for currently serving Afghan police in Kabul. There are

three American and six international instructors, plus Afghan staff. When fully

operational, the facility will graduate 700 police officers every eight weeks. The U.S.

program aims to train 7,000 police, including 3,000 officers and 4,000 patrolmen, for

Kabul. Students in the U.S. program are selected by the Interior Ministry, and are

not vetted by U.S. program administrators. The program offers the following basic

courses that the U.S. has provided in other post-conflict situations, such as Kosovo

and Bosnia:

• Transitional Policing (policing in a democracy for officers) 2 weeks

• Basic Police Skills (for NCOs and patrolmen) 8 weeks

• Instructor Development 2-4 weeks

The Kabul site will be a prototype for seven regional training centers that will

be located around the country and staffed by international and Afghan instructors.

The U.S. expects to train 50,000 police by 2005. The regional sites will be co-located

with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, but will be larger in size, housing up to

500 students and trainers. The U.S. Congress has provided $110 million in funding

for this program.

Corrections

Typical for a post-conflict reconstruction situation, the corrections system in Afghanistan is the neglected step-child of justice sector reform. Though corrections

nominally falls within Italy’s lead, it has paid limited attention to this area and

other donors have paid none. Afghan authorities also have applied few resources to

address the huge needs of the prison system.

Except for a few limited NGO projects, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime

(UNODC) is the only organization working on prison and jail improvement projects

in Afghanistan. UNODC is currently spending $2 million provided by the Italian

government over two years on very basic renovation (e.g., water, sanitation, kitchens) of the male and female detention centers in Kabul and three cellblocks of the

Pul-e-Charki prison outside Kabul, and limited training of administrative staff in

the Ministry of Justice, to which responsibility for prisons was transferred during

2003 from the Ministry of Interior. The International Committee of the Red Cross

has regularly visited prisons, and to some extent has provided food and water to

detainees. Though information on the situation outside of Kabul is inconsistent, it

appears that all or most actually functioning prisons and detention facilities (with

an unknown number of detainees) are effectively controlled by commanders or other

regional power-holders, rather than the central government. Prison conditions generally in Afghanistan have been harshly criticized by those who have examined

68

them, but other than the work described above, no concrete measures are underway

to address the situation.

Transitional Justice and the Human Rights Commission

Transitional justice—the process of dealing with the legacy of atrocities and

human rights abuses—has taken a backseat in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Political

support, both within and outside the country, for documenting such crimes and developing mechanisms to deal with them has been minimal. According to one senior

Afghan official, a serious effort to pursue a war crimes agenda could implicate half

the current cabinet. While the legacy of past atrocities and continuing human rights

violations fail to be addressed, the culture of impunity will continue to undermine

development of a culture of rule of law.

Transitional justice is included within the broad human rights mandate of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission established under the Bonn Agreement. Recognizing the reality of the present environment—that it is difficult to envision a full-fledged transitional justice process while probable violators hold the reins

of power—the Commission is undertaking two categories of activities to lay the

groundwork for future efforts in this area. First, the Commission is beginning work

on documentation of past crimes, and, second, the Commission is preparing to

launch a ‘‘national consultation’’ on transitional justice that will consider what types

of mechanisms should be adopted. The Commission does not see the Afghan judicial

system as being capable of handling war crimes or other serious human rights matters any time soon, given that the judiciary is politicized, many judges are poorly

qualified, and corruption is widespread.

The documentation work has been slowed by security risks for witnesses and

Commission staff, as well as, in the Commission’s view, by the lack of political support, particularly from the United States, for investigations of past crimes at the

current time. Nevertheless, the process has begun in select areas, where the security situation is satisfactory and where probable perpetrators are not in official local

positions of power.

The Commission is preparing for the national consultation process by consulting

first with civil society groups. Commission staff hope to start the national consultation early in 2004. The consultation is expected to include a media campaign, public

presentation of options, and use of civil society groups and shuras to organize discussions around the country. The Commission hopes to conclude the process by the

time of elections—now slated for June 2004, but likely to slip until the late summer

or fall. Commission staff predict the consultation will show popular interest in a

combination of a limited number of trials for major perpetrators, and some form of

truth and reconciliation process, probably using traditional shuras, for most perpetrators. Such conclusions would reflect the deep-rooted Afghan traditions of both

revenge and forgiveness. This approach would also recognize the need to balance

legal accountability for past abuses with the limitations of the criminal justice system and the imperative of dealing with the past through complementary processes

that can move Afghan society forward in a constructive fashion.

KEY CHALLENGES

Narcotics and Organized Crime

A fundamental challenge to the future of Afghanistan, and specifically to the effort to develop a culture of rule of law, is the growing domination of the economy

by, and the dependence of most power-holders on, the production of opium and the

international traffic in narcotics. In a situation where there are no disincentives and

no equally lucrative alternatives (opium provides farmers ten times the income of

wheat or other crops), Afghanistan’s rural population is turning increasingly to

farming poppies and the production of opium and its derivatives. Opium production

fuels the rural economy and provides livelihoods for seven percent of the population.

At the same time, nearly all elements of local and regional power structures, who

take most of the profits, use the proceeds from narcotics trafficking to fund their

activities and maintain their independence from the central government.

Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of illicit opium. The UN Office of

Drugs and Crime reported in its ‘‘Afghanistan Opium Survey 2003’’ that Afghanistan produced 3,600 metric tons of opium, or three-fourths of the world’s supply.

This amount of opium earned Afghan traffickers, and to a lesser extent farmers,

$2.3 billion, an amount equal to half the country’s legitimate GDP and nearly five

times the government’s annual budget. Production was six percent greater than the

previous year, despite poor weather, disease, and limited government efforts at

eradication. In the past, cultivation was concentrated in only three provinces; by

2003, it had spread to 28 of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces. At present, 80 percent of

69

Afghanistan’s opium production is consumed in the region. Pakistan and Iran have

an estimated two million addicts each, and there are growing addict populations in

the former Soviet republics on the Afghan border. At the same time, Afghanistan

supplies 70 percent of the heroin consumed in Western Europe. According to the

UNODC, the international trade in Afghan opiates generates a total turnover of $30

billion worldwide.

Expansion is fueled by a lack of restraints and the encouragement of provincial

governors, warlords, corrupt officials, and even some Islamic clerics. In addition, the

return to the countryside of large numbers of refugees with no employment opportunities other than laboring in poppy fields has contributed to increased production.

As central government authority does not extend beyond Kabul, poppy growing is

not subject to interference by law enforcement authorities. Experts uniformly agree

that counter-narcotics efforts must combine ‘‘carrots’’ and ‘‘sticks,’’ but essentially no

sticks are now being wielded. While large-scale interdiction and eradication programs may not be feasible in present circumstances, close observers have said that

even targeted, sporadic seizures and other enforcement measures would provide

some deterrent.

The opium economy also benefits from a well-organized ‘‘agricultural extension’’ system sponsored by drug brokers and traffickers that provides farmers with seeds,

fertilizer, advance credit, technical assistance, and an assured market. Credit may

be used for production of legitimate crops as well as opium, but repayment must

be in the form of opium. Drug brokers buy directly from farmers or from opium merchants in small towns and village markets. They resell to drug traffickers, who either supply refiners or exporters. Local refining of opium into morphine base and

production of heroin is increasing.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has identified some ten major

ethnic-Pashtun traffickers engaged in moving drugs over the traditional smuggling

route between Kandahar and Quetta in Pakistan. Major traffickers from other ethnic groups are also involved and control the trade in areas where their kin live on

both sides of the Afghan border. Transportation of narcotics frequently is carried out

in police or military vehicles controlled by provincial governors, commanders, or

other power-holders.

Over the past two years, the Afghan government has put in place the legal and

institutional framework to begin an effective counter-narcotics program. In January

2002, President Karzai issued a Presidential decree outlawing the cultivation, production, trafficking, and abuse of narcotics. In October 2002, the Counter-Narcotics

Directorate (CND) was created as part of the National Security Council. In May

2003, a National Drug Control Strategy was adopted. In October 2003, a modern,

national narcotics control law was enacted. Also in 2003, an initial Afghan government enforcement program resulted in the claimed eradication of 21,000 hectares

of opium in the major growing areas of Helmand, Kandahar, and Ningarhar provinces. As the central government had no capacity, the eradication effort was undertaken by provincial governors, but without independent verification. This raised suspicions that any poppies actually destroyed probably belonged to political rivals or

farmers who refused to pay for protection.

The government’s program has been supported by the United Kingdom, which is

the ‘‘lead nation’’ among international donors on counter-narcotics efforts. The British have provided effective coordination of international and Afghan initiatives, and

have contributed funding and political support for the government’s eradication program. The UK has pledged $12 million over the next three years to create an antinarcotics task force. British customs agents are training a new police enforcement

unit of the CND. They have also promised drug-related equipment for the Afghan

border police.

The UNODC has also played a valuable role in supporting the CND, particularly

in the area of research and advising on strategies for creating alternative livelihoods. For the first time this year, the UN’s annual report on opium production was

produced in cooperation with the Afghan government. For its part, the U.S. government has promised to provide assistance for eradication, alternative crops, and effective law enforcement. Some U.S.-trained Afghan police will be assigned to controlling opium production, providing the missing ‘‘shock troops’’ for a local war on drugs.

That said, a robust operational capacity on the part of the Afghan government is

years away.

Taliban and al Qaeda Resurgence

Nearly two years after their defeat by U.S. and allied Northern Alliance forces,

the Taliban has re-emerged as a growing security threat along Afghanistan’s southeastern border with Pakistan. Taliban forces have staged attacks and have tried to

regain political influence in Pashtun areas. Similarly, al Qaeda’s training camps in

70

Afghanistan have been destroyed and a substantial proportion of its cadre eliminated, but it retains the capacity to conduct military operations. From sanctuaries

in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, bands of al Qaeda extremists have staged crossborder raids on U.S. bases. At the same time, forces loyal to renegade militia commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar operate in the northern border provinces of Kunar

and Nuristan, where they have declared their own jihad against the United States

and Coalition forces. Taliban insurgents have also attacked and killed foreign aid

workers, Afghan police, and road crews. These events have caused a dramatic scaling back by international agencies, and a consequent lack of capacity to provide assistance to a significant portion of the country.

Warlordism

Other than in the southern and eastern areas, the blame for the lack of security

in Afghanistan falls on a number of heavily armed regional warlords and their subordinate militia commanders. These local leaders also remain a major impediment

to national unity. They have refused to disband their private armies, and routinely

engage in armed clashes over control of territory, border crossings, and transportation routes. They also use intimidation and violence to control the local population, and rely upon criminal activities including narcotics trafficking and extortion

to finance their activities. In many cases, the most senior warlords serve as provincial governors or hold other official positions, but refuse to accept direction from or

provide revenue to the central government. The problem of regional warlords is particularly serious in the north, where ethnic divisions and personal rivalries among

commanders persist. Conflicts among these leaders pose a problem for the United

States, as the American military provided money and military support to these leaders in the battle against the Taliban. The United States continues to provide these

regional commanders with financial support and to rely upon their forces to engage

Taliban remnants. Observers note that many ordinary Afghans question the U.S.

approach and have been disappointed that the Coalition has not taken a harder

stand against the warlords, whom people consider to be their abusers.

To help deal with the warlord problem, the UN, with Japan in the ‘‘lead nation’’

role, has begun implementing a program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate as

many as 100,000 soldiers and militia members. The program began by demobilizing

a group of 1,200 fighters in Kunduz and Paktia provinces in October 2003. On December 9, two thousand former Northern Alliance soldiers surrendered their weapons in Kabul and agreed to participate in a job-training program to prepare for civilian life. Many regard disarmament to be of critical importance to the stabilization

of Afghanistan; whether the efforts that have only recently been set underway will

prove to be substantial and effective remains to be seen.

As with many areas of the reconstruction process, the warlordism problem is a

direct impediment to efforts to build the rule of law. Warlords, whether they hold

official positions or not, currently subvert both formal and informal justice processes

through intimidation and interference in areas from the capital to rural districts,

and they largely control whatever law enforcement apparatus exists outside of

Kabul. Even in Kabul, militia men are able to assert control on the streets, despite

a semblance of central government police presence.

RECOMMENDATIONS

• Move beyond the ‘‘lead nation’’ approach for the rule of law. After two years, it

is clear that the ‘‘lead nation’’ approach has not worked effectively in the rule

of law area. The significant and multiple challenges in restructuring and rebuilding Afghanistan’s justice sector requires the intensive involvement of more

than one foreign donor. ‘‘Non-lead’’ donors need to engage more dynamically

with Afghan institutions on these issues, rather than leaving Italy to shoulder

most of the task. The lack of strong international leadership in energizing reform, bridging differences among the Afghan institutions, and coordinating donors has resulted in drift. Three steps should be taken to introduce stronger

leadership:

—Donors other than the ‘‘lead nation’’ should work more proactively with

Afghan authorities and Italy to help define and drive a reform strategy for

the justice sector and undertake initiatives where they are needed, as the

United States has done recently in police training. Though the United

States already has significant commitments in other sectors and is already

the second largest donor in the justice sector, it also has the most at stake

and invested in Afghanistan’s reconstruction and the greatest political influence of any international player in the country, and should not wait for

71

other donors to act in this area. Other donors should also step up for particular aspects of the rule of law portfolio, such as corrections.

—UNAMA should immediately fill its vacant position of a senior rule of law

advisor. The institutional weaknesses of UNAMA (e.g., its lack of operational capacity) might limit the ability of such a person to play a significant role, but a dynamic, highly qualified individual could still make a difference in working with the Afghan institutions to push reform, and in

stimulating donors’ interest in key priorities.

—The Ministry of Justice and donors should activate the moribund Consultative Group (CG) for the justice sector. Consideration might be given to putting a revitalized Judicial Reform Commission in the chair of the justice

sector CG, instead of the Ministry of Justice, in view of the persistent institutional rivalries in the sector. Some criticize the CG process as being a bureaucratic talk shop, and the usefulness of Groups for different sectors appears to vary. But the CG does provide a forum for a variety of donors’ voices to be heard, and for questions to be raised about the lead nation’s approach. It also provides a mechanism for regular communication between

Afghan stakeholders and donors.

• Devote greater resources to developing human resource capacity through professional education and long-term training. Realistically, it will be difficult to

make significant headway in improving the quality of law enforcement, judicial,

and legal personnel without extensive efforts to improve literacy and provide

basic education, including for adults. At present, much of the training provided

is wasted or lost on students who lack the basic understanding and skills necessary to make the best use of the training provided. There is a specific need

to improve the legal education system, which is being almost entirely ignored.

While quick-impact training has a useful role, a long-term and deep impact will

be achieved only by preparing the next generation of legal professionals. In addition, given the relatively short period of training most police will receive

through the U.S. program, regular follow-on training will be necessary to ensure

a lasting impact. Finally, donors should initiate a program to train a cadre of

high-quality translators/interpreters with knowledge of legal terminology; the

current lack of such capacity is a bottleneck for all other capacity-building

projects.

• Work, where possible, to improve the quality of judicial and law enforcement personnel through professionalized selection procedures. While a comprehensive

weeding-out process for current personnel is not realistic at present, Afghan authorities should take steps wherever possible to professionalize judicial and

prosecutorial selection procedures in accordance with established standards.

Any progress on this front would begin the essential process of reducing the impact of madrassa-educated personnel in the system, and would complement

short- and long-term training. Similarly, steps should be taken to adopt a transparent and merit-based recruiting and selection system for police, who are now

mostly converted militia members. This would include a mechanism for vetting

to ensure that human rights abusers and criminals are rejected.

• Focus the rule of law reform strategy on Kabul and the five major provincial cities. Efforts toward improving law enforcement and the judiciary should focus on

the major cities in Afghanistan because that is where the formal justice system

is most used and most needed. Bearing in mind the reality of limited resources,

judicial reform should be focused on the provincial (rather than district) level

courts in order to have a broad impact in ensuring a reasonable quality of justice. An improved provincial court could provide a check on as-yet unreformed

district courts throughout the province. The strategy should include intensive

training of police, judges, prosecutors, and court administrators; enhanced salaries; improvement of facilities; provision of equipment; improvement of court

management; and replacement of poorly qualified personnel.

• Require Coalition military forces to perform limited law enforcement functions

until Afghan police and law enforcement capacities come on line. Unless the

U.S.-led OEF is willing to expand its mandate to include at least a minimum

of counter-narcotics activities, it will be years before the Afghan police are prepared to undertake on their own the kind of high-risk operations that are required. At present, OEF forces rarely interfere with narcotics trafficking or heroin production even if they discover such activity in the performance of other

duties. A limited, but extremely useful, change in the military mandate would

involve intelligence sharing with civilian law enforcement and a willingness to

take action against drug warehouses and heroin laboratories. This would help

72

correct the impression of most Afghans that the U.S. military purposefully ignores the participation of the warlords in the drug trade. In the absence of any

enforcement actions against the narcotics trade, the perceived message of tolerance of this activity will continue to undermine the effort to develop a culture

of rule of law.

• Reform the judicial reform process. In theory, the Judicial Reform Commission

(JRC) was a sensible idea, given that no single Afghan institution has authority

over all elements of the justice sector; in practice, it has not been able effectively to drive reform in the sector.

—One option is to wind down the JRC and shift donor resources to building

capacity in the permanent institutions. The persistent lack of consensus regarding the proper role of the JRC, the JRC’s having become another faction in an already factionalized sector, and the limited time remaining in

its currently defined lifespan militate in favor of beginning now to wind

down the JRC and spin off its activities. Donor resources now being devoted

to or earmarked for building up the JRC could be redirected to building the

capacity of the permanent institutions directly, including the Ministry of

Justice, Saranwali, Judiciary, and Ministry of Interior. In order to provide

a new umbrella body for driving reform and coordinating with donors, creation of a joint body composed of representatives of the permanent institutions would seem to have the benefit—in contrast to the JRC—of buy-in

from the stakeholders. However, such a body probably would mirror the disputatious relations among the institutions rather than bridging their differences. Consequently, if the JRC is disbanded, a new expert advisory body

attached to the President’s office is recommended instead, in particular because the current posture of the Supreme Court is a primary obstacle to

reform, and only the chief executive has the potential for influence over

that institution. This body should be composed in a way that would give

it greater political clout than the current JRC, in order to enable it to

bridge differences among the permanent institutions and carry weight with

foreign donors.

—A second option is to substantially enhance the JRC’s political stature

and capacity in order to improve its effectiveness. The continuing need for

an umbrella over and facilitator among the coequal permanent institutions

in the justice sector argues in favor of maintaining, but enhancing, the

JRC. This would entail reorganizing the JRC to give it a more politically

powerful membership; forging a close relationship between the Presidency

and the JRC, so that the latter becomes the President’s agent in dealing

with the justice sector; and extending the life of the JRC beyond the coming

elections, while clarifying and enhancing its somewhat ambiguous terms of

reference in a new decree. At the same time, donors would need to speed

the flow of resources to the JRC, supplement its currently limited technical

capacity, and provide professional management capability. A revitalized

JRC could play a leading role in facilitating regular dialogue and cooperation among the permanent institutions, thus helping to ensure an integrated approach to developing the rule of law.

In either scenario, it is imperative that organizational arrangements ensure that Afghans, with international assistance, decide how their judicial

system should look and function, by addressing such issues as the role of

Shari’a and tribal tradition and the respective roles and authority of the

various institutional actors in the justice sector. Until such issues are addressed, any new commission or advisory body—in all likelihood involving

personnel from the various institutions—will continue to be fractious.

• Establish a judicial monitoring program. As part of a renewed engagement with

justice sector rebuilding, UNAMA would be best-placed to establish an independently managed judicial monitoring arm. Without any systematic observation of how the system functions in reality, measuring progress, applying resources, and identifying specific issues to be addressed will continue to be exceedingly challenging. Monitoring personnel also could work to foster appropriate disciplinary systems in Afghan institutions.

• Significantly increase funding for corrections programs. Except for one $2 million program and limited NGO activities, the dire need to improve prisons and

detention centers in Afghanistan and ensure central government control over facilities is being ignored. Lack of overhaul of the corrections system has a direct

negative impact on the functioning of the entire criminal justice system. One

or more donors are needed to step forward and play a major role in this area.

73

Even if resources for implementation of prison infrastructure projects are limited in the near term, it would be possible with more modest resources to build

capacity in the Ministry of Justice for professional corrections planning and

management, and to train corrections personnel. At the same time, the political

and diplomatic work of disengaging warlords from control over prison and detention facilities in the provinces should proceed.

ABOUT THE REPORT

Two years into the process of re-building Afghanistan, and in the wake of the

adoption of a new Constitution in January 2004, this report evaluates the progress

that has—and has not—been made in establishing the rule of law in Afghanistan.

The report assesses efforts by Afghan institutions and international donors to develop the apparatus of law enforcement and administration of justice necessary to

ensure that the rights and protections guaranteed to Afghans in their new Constitution can be meaningfully implemented. Both the reform process and priorities are

analyzed with respect to police, courts, judges and lawyers, law reform, legal education, and corrections. Key cross-cutting challenges to rule of law development,

such as narcotics and organized crime, are also addressed. The report is based principally on approximately 70 interviews conducted by the authors in Kabul and

Washington during October and November 2003. Interviewees included officials of

the Afghan government, judiciary, and commissions created under the Bonn Agreement, the United Nations, the United States and other donor governments, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as independent observers. This report was written by Laurel Miller and Robert Perito of the Institute’s Rule of Law Program.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect views of the United

States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Æ