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******************************************************WILLIAMS GROUND SERVICES, INC. v. ROBERT F. JORDAN (AC 38333)
Alvord, Prescott and Bear, Js. Argued February 8—officially released June 27, 2017 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Hon. Edward R. Karazin, Jr., judge

trial referee.)
Robert D. Russo, III

, with whom was Colin B. Con-nor, for the appellant (defendant).
Paul S. Nakian, for the appellee (plaintiff).Opinion BEAR, J. The defendant, Williams Ground Services, Inc., appeals from the judgment rendered, following a bench trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Robert F. Jordan,
on the plaintiff’s claim ofpayment due for unpaid landscaping and snow plowing services. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) determining that the statute of limitations had been tolledbecausehe unequivocallyacknowledgedthe debt and (2) admitting certain documents that he argues are inadmissible under various provisions ofthe Connecticut Code of Evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. The followingfacts, as foundbythe court, andprocedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. Beginning in approximately 2001, the plaintiff ‘‘performed lawn, cleanup, lawn maintenance, and
snow plowing services’’ for the defendant at his single family home in Darien. These services were provided annually from 2001 through 2013, and were billed to the defendant, who made payments on an irregular and infrequent basis.
At some point, the plaintiff became aware that the defendant’s house was for sale, and the two parties discussed the matter. When the sale of the home was imminent, the defendant asked the plaintiffto plow the driveway so that a moving company could move him out safely. The defendant indicated that the plaintiff would receive a ‘‘fat check’’ at the closing. He also indicatedthat the outstanding bill would be paid in full. The plaintiff acceded to the defendant’s request and plowed the driveway.1
On January 6, 2015, the plaintiff commenced this action againstthe defendant to recoverthe outstanding balance due for his services. The defendant filed an answer and three special defenses asserting that (1) the plaintiff sought compensation for services he did not provide, (2) the plaintiff was not the entity the defendant knew to have performed work on his property, and (3) theplaintiffwasnotentitledtothepunitive damages and attorney’s fees he claimed. The parties subsequently submitted pretrial briefs in which the defendantforthefirsttimeraisedastatuteoflimitations defense as a basis for dismissing the action, and the plaintiff argued that the continuing course of conduct doctrine tolled the statute of limitations. OnAugust 18, 2015, following abench trial, the court issued its memorandum of decision. The court found thatthe defendanthadwaived anystatute oflimitations defense by failing to raise it as a special defense. Alternatively, the court found that the defendant’s several acknowledgments of the debt and the conduct of the parties tolled the statute of limitations. The court also found that the defendant had not proved his first andsecond special defenses, but it found, pursuant to his third special defense, that he had proved that the plaintiff was not entitled to punitive damages or attorney’s fees. Finally, the court found in favor of the plaintiff
on his claim for unpaid landscaping and snow plowing services, awarded him $32,558.70 in damages with taxable costs, and renderedjudgmentthereon. This appeal followed. Further facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary for the resolution ofthis appeal.
I
The defendant claims that the court erred in finding that the statute of limitations was tolled by, inter alia, his acknowledgments of the debt.2 We disagree.
Before addressing the court’s determination that the applicable statute oflimitationswastolledbythe defendant’s acknowledgments ofthe debt, we assess the trial court’s reliance inthis case onZatakiav. EcoairCorp., 128 Conn. App. 362, 18A.3d 604, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 936, 23 A.3d 729 (2011). The defendant claims that the court’s reliance on Zatakia is misplaced.3 This court held in Zatakia that, inter alia, the trial court had not committed clear error when it found that correspondence from the defendant’s president was a clear acknowledgment of indebtedness. Id., 370–71.
The defendant claims on appeal that the court’s ‘‘factualanalogy’’toZatakia, insupportofits determination that he acknowledgedthe debt, was misplaced because the cases are factually distinguishable and, thus, its determination that he unequivocally acknowledged the debt was clear error. We reject this argument because
we disagree with the defendant’s characterization of the manner in which the court relied on Zatakia

. The court quoted Zatakia for the applicable legal standard to determine whether an unequivocal acknowledgment of a debt has tolled the statute of limitations. At no pointdidthecourtrefertoorrelyonthefactsofZatakia
as set forth by the defendant.
The defendant also claims that, under the rule stated in Zatakia, the conduct of the parties in the present
case was insufficient to infer an unequivocal acknowledgmentofthedebtand, thus, thecourt’s determination
was clearly erroneous.4 We disagree. ‘‘The [s]tatute of [l]imitations creates a defense to an action. It does not erase the debt. Hence, the defense
can be lost by an unequivocal acknowledgment of the debt, such as anewpromise, anunqualified recognition of the debt, or a payment on account.

. . . Whether partial payment constitutes unequivocal acknowledgment of the whole debt from which an unconditional promisetopaycanbeimpliedtherebytollingthe statute of limitations is a question for the trier of fact.

. . . ‘‘A general acknowledgment of an indebtedness may be sufficient to remove the bar ofthe statute. The governing principle is this: The determination of whethera sufficient acknowledgment has been made depends upon proof that the defendant has by an express or implied recognition of the debt voluntarily renounced the protection of the statute.

. . . But an implication of a promise to pay cannot arise if it appears that although the debt was directly acknowledged, this acknowledgment was accompanied by expressions which showed that the defendant did not intend to pay it, and did not intend to deprive himself of the right to rely on the [s]tatute of [l]imitations.

. . . [A] general acknowledgment may be inferred from acquiescence
as well as from silence, as where the existence of the debt has been asserted in the debtor’s presence and he did not contradict the assertion.

. . . ‘‘We review the trial court’s finding

. . . under a clearly erroneous standard.

. . . [A] finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to supportit, the reviewing court onthe entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

. . . We do not examine the record to determine whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclusion other than the
one reached. Rather, we focus on the conclusion ofthe trial court, as well as the method by which it arrived at that conclusion, to determine whether it is legally correct and factually supported.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Co. v

. Errato, 71 Conn. App. 447, 461–63, 802 A.2d 887, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 918, 812 A.2d 861 (2002); see also Zatakia

v. Ecoair Corp., supra, 128 Conn. 369–70.
In the present case, the court found that the defendant’s several acknowledgments of the debt tolled the statute oflimitations. In support ofthis conclusion, the court relied on the testimony of the plaintiff, stating: ‘‘Therewastestimonybytheplaintiffthatthe defendant said he was unable to pay the bill. There is testimony that the defendant said ‘the property had been sold and the plaintiff would receive a fat check at the closing.’ The defendant said ‘the plaintiff would be paid when the house was sold.’ ’’ The court also found: ‘‘Exhibit 2 showspaymentbythe defendant on October28, 2011, being check [number] 6067 showing a $500 payment with a note on the front that it was ‘on account-2011’ indicating to this court that there was money due, and this was payment on it.’’5
The defendant argues that evidence presented was insufficient to infer an unequivocal acknowledgment of the debt. Specifically, he asserts that the plaintiff’s testimony regarding his promises to pay was ‘‘undocumented, uncorroborated, and self-serving hearsaytestimony from the party directly and materially benefitted by said testimony.’’6 Additionally, he argues that his testimony contradicts that of the plaintiff. All of these arguments go to credibility and the weight to be givento the evidence presented. Credibility and weight ofthe evidence are matters for the finder offact. Baillergeau

v. McMillan, 143 Conn. App. 745, 754 n.2, 72 A.3d 70 (2013). Having reviewed the record, we determine that the testimony and other evidence submitted to the court supportthe court’sfindingthatthe defendantunequivocally acknowledged the debt. The defendant acknowledges that the $500 payment could be considered as evidence of his unequivocal acknowledgment of the debt. He does not challenge any finding of the court made on the basis of this evidence. He merely claims thattheamountofevidencesupportinganysuchfinding is sparse. Although this evidence concerning the $500 payment, standing alone, could be enough to support the court’s finding that the defendant acknowledged the debt,7 the court also considered the defendant’s various statements that he was unable to pay his outstanding balance, his promise of a ‘‘fat check’’ upon closing, and his additional statement that the plaintiff would be paid when his house was sold. Any testimony by the defendant to the contrary, the plaintiff’s interest in the outcome, and the plaintiff’s lack of documentation and corroboration ofthe defendant’s acknowledgments, are matters of credibility and weight that we do not considerindependently on appeal. Accordingly, the defendant has failed to carry his burden ofproving that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous. The court’s conclusionthatthestatuteoflimitationshadbeentolled bythedefendant’sseveralacknowledgmentsofthedebt thus was not error. II
The defendant also claims that the court erred by admitting, forthe truth oftheir contents, certain photocopies of invoices, which he describes as ‘‘yearly summaries,’’ of the monthly bills allegedly delivered to the defendant over more than a decade. We disagree.
Thefollowingadditionalproceduralfactsarerelevant to the resolution ofthis claim. Whentheplaintiffsought to admit the first invoice into evidence, which included landscaping charges for services performed over the
courseof2001, thedefendantobjectedasfollows: ‘‘Your Honor, I’m going to object on the grounds that this is
an incomplete business record. It has the top cut off of it. It has no date from when it was created and he doesn’t really remember the specifics of when it was created.’’ The court responded: ‘‘The objection is overruled. It goes to weight, not admissibility.’’8
On appeal, the defendant claims thatthe invoices are inadmissible because the yearly summaries were not business records underthe legal definition andbecause the summaries, as photocopies, were incomplete business records and not complete and accurate copies of theoriginalssufficienttosatisfy§ 8-4(c) oftheConnect-icut Code of Evidence. We reject this argument. The defendant objected attrialthatthe invoices were

‘‘incomplete business record[s],’’ and the court, based
on its ruling on the objection, understood his objection to go to completeness. The defendant did not seek to clarify or to add other grounds to his objection as each ofthe twenty-one other invoices was admitted into evidence.9 The defendant, therefore, failed to preserve an objection related to a ground other than to lack of completeness.10
‘‘Our role in reviewing evidentiary rulings ofthe trial court is settled. The trial court has wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings will be reversed onlyifthe courthas abusedits discretion oraninjustice appears to have been done.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., 297 Conn. 105, 133, 998 A.2d 730 (2010. ‘‘In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling for review, trial counsel must object properly.

. . . In objecting to evidence, counsel must properly articulate the basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature ofthe objection and its real purpose, in ordertoformanadequatebasisforareviewableruling.’’ (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) Statev

. Rivera, 169 Conn. App. 343, 366, 150 A.3d 244 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 905, 15 A.3d 544 (2017). ‘‘Our review of evidentiary rulings made by the trial court is limited to the specific legal ground raised in the objection [to the trial court].

. . . This court reviews rulings solely on the ground on which the party’s objection is based.

. . . [W]e have explained that, to afford petitioners on appeal an opportunity to raise different theories of objection would amount to ambush of the trial court because, [h]ad specific objections been made at trial, the court would have had the opportunity to

. . . respond.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DiLieto v. County Obstetrics & Gynecology Group, P.C., supra, 133–34.
Because the defendant’s objection was that the invoices were incomplete business records, he failed to preserve his evidentiary claims under §§ 8-4 (a), 10- 2, and 10-5 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. We, therefore, do not review these claims.
The defendantalso claimsthatthe invoices, asphotocopies, were not complete and accurate copies of the originals sufficient to satisfy § 8-4 (c).11 We disagree.
At trial, the defendant examined the plaintiffregardingthe invoicespriorto the admission ofthe firstyearly invoice.12 The plaintifftestified that he would leave the original invoices at the defendant’s home and would keep aphotocopy for his own records. He testified that the document sought to be admitted into evidence was one ofthesephotocopies. The defendantaskedwhether the plaintiffhad testified at his deposition that he gave‘‘the originals’’ to his attorney. The plaintiff clarified that he had photocopied the copies that he had kept for his records, kept those photocopies, and gave his attorney the copies that he first kept for his records. Section 8-4 (c) ofthe Connecticut Code ofEvidence provides that a ‘‘reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, shall be as admissible in evidence as the original in any judicial or administrative proceeding

. . . .’’ Although the defendant argues that the plaintiffsought to admit reproductions into evidence, the plaintiff soughtto admithisoriginal businessrecords

. His original business records, forthe purposes of§ 8-4 (c), were the photocopies of the invoices sent to the defendant that the plaintiff kept for his records. These were the documents that the plaintifftestified were being admitted into evidence. He did not testify that reproductions ofbusinessrecordswerebeingsubmittedintoevidence. The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the invoices into evidence. In the circumstances ofthis case, any issue concerning whetherthey
were substantively complete went to the weight to be giventhemandnottotheiradmissibility. SeeLPPMortgage, Ltd. v. Lynch, 122 Conn. App. 686, 699 n.11, 1 A.3d 157 (2010) (‘‘[B]usiness records do not carry any presumption of accuracy merely because they are admissible. The credibility of such records remains a question for the trier of fact.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
In summary, the court’s finding of several acknowledgments ofthe debtbyplaintiffwasnot clearlyerroneous. The court did not err in concluding that the applicable statute oflimitationswastolledbythe defendant’s acknowledgments ofthe debt. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the plaintiff’s business records into evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The courtalsofoundthatpriortothesaleofthe defendant’srealproperty,

some confusion occurredbecausetheplaintiffimproperlyfiledamechanic’s lien onthe land records forthe estimated amount ofhis services, but money
was held out at the closing to satisfy any damages awarded to the plaintiff from any legal action.

2 We neednot reachthe defendant’s claimthatthe courtimproperlyfound that he waived his statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it as a special defense, orthatthe statute oflimitationswastolledbythe continuing

course ofconduct doctrine because we affirmthe court’s alternative finding that the defendant’s acknowledgments ofthe debt tolled the statute oflimitations.
3 The defendant also claims that an ancient case, Weed v. Bishop, 7 Conn. 128 (1828), controls. The court in Weed held that a creditor, as party to the case, was incompetent to testify to an acknowledgment of a debt. Id., 131–32. The defendant failed to raise Weed before the trial court as the controlling law in this case regarding the acknowledgment of the debt. Accordingly, the defendant failed to preserve his claim that the plaintiffwas incompetent to testify to the defendant’s acknowledgment of the debt. See Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App. 124, 143–44, 101 A.3d 279, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 901, 104 A.3d 107 (2014). Nevertheless, the defendant’s reliance

on Weed is misplaced because the General Assembly abolished the general common-law rule upon which Weed was based nearly 170 years ago. SeeState v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 560, 560 A.2d 426 (1989) (‘‘[i]n 1848 the

common law disability of parties to testify as witnesses was removed by a statute now incorporated in General Statutes § 52-145 [a]’’).

4 We note that the court appears to have raised sua sponte the tolling doctrine on the basis of the defendant’s several acknowledgments of his debt to the plaintiff. At trial, the defendant did not object to the court’s sua sponte insertion ofsuch tolling doctrine into the case, and he has not raised the issue on appeal as it relates to any ofhis claims. We thus do not consider whether the court erred by inserting and relying on that doctrine.

5 The defendant asserts that the court improperly considered a $2500 payment made by him in 2012 as part of its determination that he acknowledged the debt. As the defendant states, however, the court found that the payment was made as an advance payment and was made ‘‘in order to induce the plaintiffto continue working.’’ The court, thus, did not consider thispaymentin determiningthatthe defendantunequivocallyacknowledged the debt.
6 As statements of a party opponent, the plaintiff’s testimony about the defendant’s statements falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. Conn. Code Evid. § 8-3 (1).

7 Having concluded that the defendant had waived any statute of limitations defense, the court did not determine whether the three year statute of limitations for oral contracts, General Statutes § 52-581, or the six year statute oflimitations forwritten contracts, General Statutes § 52-576, would apply to this case. The $500 payment made in 2011 could have tolled the six year statute oflimitations ifit applied. Because there also was evidence that the defendant acknowledged the debt within three years of the commencement of the action, we need not decide which statute applies.
8 The defendant made his objection to the first landscaping bill for 2001. He seems to have attempted to maintain his objection on the same grounds with respect to other billing documents, stating, ‘‘And ifyou’re comfortable with it Your Honor, for expediency purposes, I don’t need to voir dire every single invoice that looks like this,’’ to which the court responded, ‘‘Okay.’’ The plaintiff submitted twelve other similar annual landscaping invoices, eightsnowplowinginvoices covering2003through2013, andasingleinvoice for extraworkin 2005, 2008, 2011, and 2013. We assume thatthe defendant’s objection was maintained for all of these documents even though these documents arguably differ.
9 See footnote 8 of this opinion.
10 The defendant also claims that the invoices were inadmissible because the plaintiff failed to establish that the documents were business records under § 8-4 (a) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence; that the plaintiff did not establish that the original documents qualified as summaries of voluminous writings orthatthe documents from which the summaries were prepared were admissible business records sufficient to satisfy § 10-5 ofthe Connecticut Code of Evidence; and that the plaintiff failed to establish that the summaries satisfied the best evidence rule under § 10-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence. These claims are not preserved, and, therefore, we do not discuss them.
11 Section 8-4 (c) ofthe Connecticut Code ofEvidenceprovides inrelevant part: ‘‘[I]fany person in the regular course ofbusiness has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, and in the regular

course ofbusiness has caused any or all ofthem to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic, photostatic, microfilm, microcard, miniature photographic or other process which accurately reproduces or forms

a durable medium for so reproducing the original, the original may be destroyed in the regular course ofbusiness unless its preservation is otherwise required by statute. The reproduction, when satisfactorily identified, shallbeasadmissibleinevidence asthe originalinanyjudicialoradministrative proceeding, whether the original is in existence or not, and an enlargement or facsimile of the reproduction shall be likewise admissible in evidence ifthe original reproduction is in existence and available forinspection under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement or facsimile shall not preclude admission of the original.’’ (Emphasis added.) Section 8-4 (c) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence

was amended in 2015 to make technical changes that are not relevant to this appeal.
12 The following exchange occurred between the defendant’s counsel and the plaintiff: ‘‘Q. Mr. Williams, is this a complete copy of the original? ‘‘A. Yes, as far as I know. ‘‘Q. It’s not cut off at the top?‘‘A. No. Well, Williams Ground Service is in there. Sometimes when you put it in the copy machine it cuts it off. ‘‘Q. But it is not a complete copy of the original invoice? ‘‘A. It looks like one for me, except for the name at the top. ‘‘Q. So it is cut off on the top? ‘‘A. Yes. ‘‘Q. Is [it] possible there’s other writing up there that we can’t see? ‘‘A. It would just say Williams Ground Service. ‘‘Q. Where are these original invoices? ‘‘A. These are the only ones that I have. I—when I made these I gave the originals, left them at [the defendant’s] and I keep the copy. ‘‘Q. Didn’t you saythe other dayyou gave the originals to [your attorney]? ‘‘A. In other words I copied and gave them to him off copies that I had. The originals—when I put the original bill, I would turn the originals in and I would keep a copy for myself. Okay. So— ‘‘Q. Oh, turn them you mean give them to [the defendant]? ‘‘A. That’s correct. So then I would copy the bills I have and those are the bills that I gave to [my attorney].’’