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95–509 PDF 2004

S. Hrg. 108–708

VOICING THE NEED FOR REFORM:

THE FAMILIES OF 9/11

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 17, 2004

Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

JANE ALONSO, Professional Staff Member 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

KEVIN J. LANDY, Minority Counsel 

AMY B. NEWHOUSE, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 2

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 17

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 18

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 24

Senator Durbin ................................................................................................. 27

Senator Specter ................................................................................................. 29

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 32

Senator Mikulski .............................................................................................. 35

Senator Clinton ................................................................................................. 38

Senator Nelson (FL) ......................................................................................... 41

WITNESSES 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2004

Mary Fetchet, Founding Director and President, Voices of September 11th, 

and Member, 9/11 Family Steering Committee ................................................. 5

Stephen Push, Co-Founder and Board Member, Families of 9/11 ....................... 9

Kristen Breitweiser, Founder and Co-Chairperson, September 11th Advocates, 

and Member, 9/11 Family Steering Committee ................................................. 12

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Breitweiser, Kristen: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 55

Fetchet, Mary: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 45

Push, Stephen: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 52

APPENDIX 

Copy of S. 1718 from the 104th Congress submitted by Senator Specter .......... 66

Copy of S. 2811 submitted by Senator Specter ..................................................... 143

(1)

VOICING THE NEED FOR REFORM: 

THE FAMILIES OF 9/11

TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2004

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m., in room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Lieberman, Levin, Specter, Coleman, 

Durbin, Carper, and Dayton. 

Also present: Senators Warner, Mikulski, Clinton, and Nelson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Good 

morning. I want to welcome our witnesses here today. Out of their 

tragedies, they are doing so much to help our country, and I hope 

that each of you who has suffered such a horrible loss can take 

comfort in the fact that you have been able, out of your loss, to do 

great good for our Nation. We thank you for being here with us 

today. 

This morning, the Committee on Governmental Affairs continues 

its series of hearings on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission for restructuring our intelligence organizations. 

Our witnesses today come from families who lost loved ones in 

the attacks of September 11. They remind us of why we are here. 

The victims were fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, husbands and wives. Those of us who did not lose loved ones that terrible day can never fully comprehend their loss, but all Americans, 

indeed all civilized people throughout the world, experienced an 

overwhelming mixture of grief, shock and anger, feelings that persist to this day. 

As this Committee wrestles with the issues, as we wade through 

the alphabet soup of the 15 agencies that comprise our intelligence 

community, and debate questions of budgets, personnel, authority 

and accountability, we must never forget that we are not doing this 

as an exercise in bureaucratic reshuffling. We are undertaking this 

important task because 3,000 innocent people were murdered by 

terrorists on American soil. 

The September 11 attack was not just an attack against our Nation, it was an attack against the entire world. The victims came 

from 37 States and Puerto Rico, and from 17 other countries. 

Six Maine families suffered the most profound of losses that day. 

Among the victims was a retired couple from Lubec, the easternVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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most town in the United States, who boarded Flight 11 to celebrate 

a son’s wedding in California. Joining them on that flight was a 

businesswoman whose parents lived in Parsonsfield. 

Two natives of Lewiston, Maine were on Flight 175. One, a lawyer and former Army paratrooper, was on his way to Thailand. The 

other, a former Marine, was on a business trip. A Navy commander, born and raised in Gray, Maine, was at work in his office 

at the Pentagon. And a young University of Maine graduate was 

in just his third week on the job on the 101st floor of the North 

Tower. 

The senselessness, the cruelty, of the attacks that ended these 

and so many other happy, productive and promising lives, only 

magnifies the tragedy. 

Since September 11 many family advocates have applied themselves with great energy and devotion to discovering just what 

went wrong. All who heard the testimony from family representatives before the 9/11 Commission this spring had to be impressed 

with the depth of their knowledge on terrorism prevention and response. 

Their knowledge is extensive, not because they are government 

policymakers, but because they are driven to find answers to their 

personal tragedies. This is a position that none of them chose to 

be in, but where they are determined to make a difference. And 

they have. You have made a difference. 

Today we will hear from three individuals who have devoted 

their time and their resources to making sure that we do all we 

can to prevent another September 11. Mary Fetchet is the Founding Director and President of Voices of September 11th. Stephen 

Push is a leader of Families of 9/11. And Kristen Breitweiser is the 

Founder and Co-Chairperson of the September 11th Advocates. 

We very much appreciate your testifying today to help us, as this 

committee undertakes the critically important task of revitalizing 

our intelligence community. Thank you for all that you have done 

since that terrible day. 

Senator Lieberman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman, for 

your introductory words, and thanks to our witnesses, and welcome 

to Mary Fetchet, Stephen Push, and Kristen Breitweiser. 

You and so many other families of the victims of September 11 

have become familiar faces, friends, coworkers in the quest to understand how September 11 could have happened and what America must do to make sure, to the best of our ability, that it never 

happens again. 

We are, as we gather here today, moving toward our shared goal 

of passing the needed reforms that might have prevented September 11, and which we believe will help detect and prevent future attacks. 

I think the three of you have become skilled enough in the legislative process to know that we are not there yet, and that is where 

your continued advocacy, your presence this morning and of the 

mornings and afternoons and evenings to come, is going to be critical to achieve the goals that we have together. The fact is that the 

3

bill that many of us introduced to create the 9/11 Commission 

would never have passed if you three, and those who are your colleagues and friends in tragedy, had not come to Washington and 

spoke the truth of your loss, and questioned those in power in this 

town who did not want the 9/11 Commission to happen. 

As a result directly of your advocacy, in my opinion, the Commission was created, and that set the pattern that brings us to where 

we are today, as you, the families of the victims of September 11, 

continued to pressure and petition your government to do what was 

right in ways that were much less visible than your advocacy for 

the 9/11 Commission. 

I can testify to this, that you were there when the Commission 

had difficulty gaining access to the information it needed; when the 

Commission needed its budget increased; when some in Congress 

threatened to block the Commission’s request for a 2-month extension. On each of those occasions you were there, and the result was 

a lot better than it otherwise would have been. I would say to you, 

Madam Chairman, although I think you know, that these citizens, 

these survivors, have become skillful advocates for a critical national cause. 

If a Congressman or Senator refused to meet with Kristen 

Breitweiser and her compatriots, known collectively and famously 

as ‘‘the Jersey girls,’’ three of them would wait inside the office, 

while the fourth stakes out the side door. They figured out those 

side doors of the Members of Congress. 

Stephen Push opened lines of communications using his experience in public relations with editors and reporters around the country. When a Congressman or a Senator was opposing the 9/11 Commission, Stephen made sure that the member’s hometown papers 

and voters knew about it. 

Mary Fetchet opened her home in New Canaan, Connecticut to 

family members of other September 11 victims who needed to 

share their grief and seek assistance and strength, using her training as a clinical social worker. 

I guess I should have mentioned, Kristen, that you are a lawyer, 

but maybe that would have been self-evident. [Laughter.] 

And then in Mary’s spare time, she also lobbied for the 9/11 

Commission all the way up to the President of the United States 

himself. 

I want to say to the three of you that I continue to be awed and 

inspired by the drive that you have shown to turn your personal 

tragedies into public safety for our Nation. 

Now the Commission has finished its work, the story of September 11 has been laid at more comprehensively than before, before the American people, along with bold recommendations for reform. Congress is taking it seriously, and I am proud that this 

Committee, under Chairman Collins, has set the pace in holding 

these August hearings, and has set some tough goals for action in 

September out of this Committee. 

I must say that some people think we are moving too fast, which 

is unusual for Congress. Somebody, I saw in a statement the other 

day, said doing it right is more important than doing it fast, but 

the important thing that you all have come to know is that there 

is more than one alternative to doing it right and wrong. The alterVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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native is not to do it slow and wrong. The alternative is to do it 

fast and right. With your help, that is exactly what we are going 

to do. 

Yesterday in our Committee, the Chairman and Vice Chair of the 

Intelligence Committee, Senator Roberts and Senator Rockefeller, 

came forward and suggested to us that they were supportive of a 

strong National Intelligence Director. We are going to hear the details of their proposal soon, but I thought that was encouraging. 

On the other hand, there are voices that were heard yesterday, 

particularly in the Armed Services Committee that held a hearing, 

that were resistant to change. 

I want to say to the families generally, through the three of you, 

that we need you now more than ever. We have come this far together. We need to stay together to get the job of genuine and comprehensive intelligence reform done. I think you know, but if you 

do not, let me say it. You are a mighty force. You are a citizen 

army. Ultimately, you are a great moral force. And no mindless defense of the status quo can withstand the pressure that you are capable of bringing. 

This is going to be a battle. It is a battle for very substantial 

change, and people will resist change, even if it means protecting 

our country from another September 11. But your presence here 

gives me confidence that when all is said and done, we are going 

to have the real intelligence reform that America needs to keep the 

American people safe, and we are going to have it soon. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to acknowledge that we have been joined by two Senators 

who do not serve on this Committee, but who both lost a number 

of constituents on September 11, and who have both followed the 

Committee’s work very closely. I know that both Senator Mikulski 

and Senator Clinton made a great effort to join us here today because they wanted to firsthand hear your compelling statements. 

So we welcome them to our Committee today, and we are very 

happy to have you join us. 

I would now like to introduce the three witnesses. Mary Fetchet 

lost her 24-year-old son, Brad, in the World Trade Center. She is 

a Founding Director of Voices of September 11th, which serves as 

a clearinghouse for information for the September 11 families 

around the world. Her advocacy began immediately after the attacks by calling for respectful recovery efforts and family notification, and for the creation of an appropriate memorial at the site. 

As a Founding Member of the Family Steering Committee, she has 

not only advocated strongly for the establishment of the 9/11 Commission, but has also helped many other families. She is, as Senator Lieberman mentioned, a clinical social worker, and her organization is in the process of expanding its mission to providing counseling and social services to victims’ families. She lives with her 

family in Connecticut. 

Stephen Push’s wife, Lisa Raines, was a passenger on Flight 77 

which struck the Pentagon. He is a co-founder and board director 

of Families of September 11th, an organization that supports public 

policies that improve the prevention of and response to terrorism. 

Families of September 11th also works with private charities to 

5

1The prepared statement of Ms. Fetchet appears in the Appendix on page 45. 

reach out to family members of the victims of September 11 that 

may need counseling or other help. Mr. Push and his organization 

helped secure passage of the legislation that created the Commission, and he has served as the liaison between the families and the 

members and staff of the Commission. Before September 11 he was 

head of corporate communications at a biotech company in the DC 

area, and he now lives in Northern Virginia with his wife Deborah, 

who is also here today. 

Kristen Breitweiser lost her husband, Ron, in the World Trade 

Center. She is the founder and co-chair of the September 11th Advocates, a group that has vigorously lobbied Congress and the 

White House for the independent Commission. Like Ms. Fetchet, 

Ms. Breitweiser is also a Founding Member of the 9/11 Family 

Steering Committee. As Senator Lieberman noted, she is a lawyer. 

We do not hold that against her. [Laughter.] 

She used to practice at a firm specializing in family law, and she 

and her 5-year-old daughter live in New Jersey. 

Again, I want to thank each of you so much, not only for being 

with us today and helping us sustain the momentum, which as 

Senator Lieberman mentioned, is so critical. We are at an impotant 

stage right now to complete the work that you started when you 

pushed for the creation of the Commission. We look forward to 

hearing your testimony. 

Mary Fetchet, we will start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF MARY FETCHET,1 FOUNDING DIRECTOR AND 

PRESIDENT, VOICES OF SEPTEMBER 11TH, AND MEMBER, 

9/11 FAMILY STEERING COMMITTEE 

Ms. FETCHET. Hon. Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and 

other distinguished Members of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I am honored to be here today to testify on behalf of the 

9/11 families. 

My name is Mary Fetchet. I am a member of the 9/11 Family 

Steering Committee, and Founding Director and President of 

Voices of September 11th, a 9/11 family advocacy group. More importantly, I am the mother of Brad Fetchet, who tragically lost his 

life at the age of 24 in the terrorist attacks on the World Trade 

Center on September 11. 

We appreciate your urgency in holding these hearings to address 

the critical task of implementing the recommendations made by the 

9/11 Commission. We are equally indebted to the 9/11 Commissioners and their staff, who worked tirelessly in a bipartisan manner over the last year to examine the events that led to the attacks 

and to develop recommendations to prevent future tragedies. The 

Commission may not have answered all our questions, but its report does offer a much-needed overall strategy to develop a comprehensive foundation for creating a safer America. 

The challenge now before all of us is whether we have the national will to combat a political bureaucracy, general inertia, and 

the influence of special interest groups in order to enact a comprehensive set of recommendations to improve our national secuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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rity. The work will not be easy. It is, however, essential if we are 

to protect our families and our country. 

The last 3 years has been a painful education for me. It began 

on September 11, 2001, when my husband contacted me at work 

to let me know Brad had called him shortly after the first plane 

hit Tower 1. Brad was on the 89th Floor of Tower 2, and he wanted 

to reassure us that he was OK. He was shaken because he had 

seen someone fall from the 91st floor, ‘‘all the way down.’’ But Brad 

told my husband he expected to remain at work for the remainder 

of the day. The Port Authority, after all, had used the PA system 

to assure everyone in Tower 2 that they were safe, and directed 

them to remain in the building. Brad remained with his coworkers 

in their office as they were told. Other individuals, who attempted 

to evacuate Tower 2 at that time, were ordered back up to their 

offices. Shortly after my husband’s call, I witnessed the plane hit 

Tower 2 on television. The image is forever etched in my mind, as 

it was at that moment that I knew our country was under attack, 

and that my son Brad was trapped in a high-rise building that he 

would not be able to escape. 

I never had the opportunity to speak with Brad. We later learned 

from a message he left his girlfriend at 9:20 a.m. that he was attempting to evacuate after his building was hit by the second 

plane. Obviously, Brad and his coworkers never made it out. He, 

and nearly 600 other individuals in Tower 2, who should have survived if they had been directed to evacuate, died senselessly because of unsound directions. As a mother, it did not make sense to 

me that they were directed to remain in a 110-story building after 

the high-rise building next door had been hit by a plane, had a 

gaping hole in its side and was engulfed in flames. 

Since that day I have come to recognize the inadequacies in our 

overall preparedness, as well as the grave responsibilities and the 

inexcusable inertia of our political system. As with many who 

worked on the 9/11 Family Steering Committee, I came to Washington as a political novice, unfamiliar with politics or the political 

system, without a party affiliation. 

Every election day I voted for individuals irrespective of political 

party who I thought would best represent our country. However, 

my political involvement ended as I cast my ballot, assuming like 

most that my elected officials would act in my best interest, ensure 

my family’s safety and counter any terrorist attacks. I believed that 

my government was a comprehensive organization, whose officials 

and agencies, in the best interest of national security, would share 

intelligence, collaborate and coordinate their counterterrorism efforts. Sadly, I was wrong. 

I, like others, have also tried to make sense of my son’s death 

and those of the nearly 3,000 other innocent victims by collecting 

and scrutinizing newspaper reports on 9/11 issues. Two important 

themes quickly became apparent. One system did not fail our country, virtually all systems failed. They failed to follow existing procedures and failed to have protocols or effective lines of communication in place, leading to widespread breakdowns in our preparedness, defense and emergency response. The other painful realization was that our government is often paralyzed by partisanship 

and complacent to a fault. 

7

Our sad and frightening pre-September 11 history includes pervasive failures and shortcomings within and amongst government 

agencies due to breakdowns in communication on all levels, lack of 

direction and overall strategic plan, and a disconnect between policy, priorities and allocation of funds. 

More specifically, failures occurred due to: 

Intelligence agencies not sharing information within and 

amongst their organizations despite their common responsibility to 

protect our country; 

Not leveraging or updating technology already in place, which 

would have helped identify and stop these terrorists from entering 

our country or passing through domestic airport security point 

checks, ultimately preventing them from turning passenger planes 

into weapons; 

Inadequate or failed procedures and communication systems that 

prevented emergency response teams from effectively working with 

each other, connecting to workers in the World Trade Center, and 

communicating with outside agencies, such as airports and buildings that had already been identified as targets; 

Failure of the North American Air Defense Command and the 

FAA to have a protocol in place to rapidly identify and respond to 

hijacked planes; 

Failure of the FBI to process and act on Colleen Rowley’s report 

and the Phoenix memo, which would have identified terrorists and 

the potential for planes to be used as weapons; 

Failure of the legislature to act on earlier recommendations to 

address the threat of terrorism, such as those proposed by the 

Hart-Rudman Commission, and those related to airline security by 

the Gore Commission; 

Allowing special interest groups to undermine and block preventative safety measures that could have prevented the September 11 

attacks in an effort to save money, and 

Failure of our government and its intelligence agencies to have 

an overall strategy, to establish and coordinate policies, priorities 

and procedures based on the escalating threat of terrorism. 

Colonel Randall Larsen and Ruth A. David of the Anser Institute 

for Homeland Security, summed up the situation facing pre-September 11 America in an article published in Strategic Review in 

the spring of 2001, obviously, before September 11: ‘‘What is needed now is leadership from the administration,’’ they wrote. ‘‘There 

is widespread concern that threats to our homeland are both real 

and growing. . . . However, one of the most troubling questions yet 

to be answered is whether substantial changes such as those recommended by Hart-Rudman or Collins-Harowitz, can be made unless America experiences a tragic wake-up call.’’ Ultimately, Larsen 

and David asked: ‘‘Will the administration and Congress have the 

vision and courage to act before we experience another Pearl Harbor or something far worse that could change the course of history?’’

We all recognize that we have experienced another Pearl Harbor, 

now known as September 11. The administration and Congress did 

not have the vision or the courage to act on previous information. 

Now 3 years after this tragic event and the death of nearly 3,000 

innocent victims, it is apparent that the status quo is unacceptable, 

8

and reform is necessary. The questions we now face are twofold: 

Are we prepared? And if not, are we ready to move decisively to 

embrace a comprehensive overall such as the ones presented by the 

9/11 Commission? 

As a Nation, we remain amazingly ill prepared to prevent an attack or at least minimize its impact. This is especially frightening 

since we are under a greater threat than ever. 

Consider for a moment that we live under a heightened national 

terrorist alert, and yet 3 years later systems have not been put in 

place to educate our families, our schools, our communities, on how 

to prepare for another attack. Several initiatives have been put in 

place since September 11, yet many of the core problems within 

and amongst government agencies have not been addressed. 

Communications systems are still inadequate; community and 

city-wide preparedness plans have not been effectively established 

or communicated; government agencies and legislative groups do 

not effectively share or leverage intelligence and general information or even readily accept it from the public as I know firsthand; 

an effective, government-wide control center for all intelligence has 

yet to be established; and crucial Congressional oversight and 

budgetary control of this effort is not in place; no one is in charge. 

Some in Washington have warned that it may take 3 to 5 years 

to enact all the measures needed. That is not acceptable to the 9/

11 families or the American people. Our enemies are preparing to 

strike us now, and the longer we wait to move decisively, the greater advantages and opportunities they have to harm us. 

Former Defense Secretary William Cohen put the impact of unchecked aggression into perspective 6 years ago in speaking to New 

York’s Council on Foreign Relations: ‘‘No government can permit 

others to attack its citizens with impunity if it hopes to retain the 

loyalty and confidence of those it is charged to protect.’’ Americans 

have lost faith in our government and its ability to protect us. You 

have to act now to restore it. 

I recognize the challenge with moving a Federal bureaucracy, 

however well meaning, in a new direction. Like any system, change 

and restructuring are difficult. Special interest groups, turf battles 

and simple fear of the unknown can all work against reform. Yet 

when American lives are at stake, indifference or inertia is unacceptable. I am confident you recognize what is at stake and are up 

to the challenge. We must embrace a complete and interlinking set 

of recommendations proposed by the 9/11 Commission. This plan 

should include the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center, 

and the appointment of a National Intelligence Director (NID) who 

reports directly to the White House. 

The NID should: Oversee all national intelligence and counterterrorism activities; develop an overall strategy to promote national 

and regional preparedness; coordinate policies, priorities and protocols amongst the 15 intelligence agencies; authorize and allocate 

the budget and resources to execute this strategy; ensure qualified 

individuals are appointed to key posts and have the ability to hire, 

fire, and more importantly, promote, individuals who are proactive 

in the fight against the war on terrorism. 

The aim is simple: A coordinated and comprehensive approach in 

gathering information and operating our intelligence agencies. I 

9

1The prepared statement of Mr. Push appears in the Appendix on page 52. 

recognize that this Committee is charged with solely examining intelligence issues, but we must not allow ourselves to become shortsighted or piecemeal in our approach to America’s safety. We must 

examine and embrace all of the Commission’s 41 recommendations, 

for they are interconnected. 

As Governor Kean has mentioned, the success of the reorganization is also dependent upon changes made in foreign policy, public 

diplomacy, border and transportation security. Effective implementation is reliant on legislation, executive order, and a willingness 

to maintain a consistent strategy in each of these areas. Is there 

risk in transition? Absolutely. Governor Kean, Chairman of the 9/

11 Commission, acknowledged as much in his report. He warned, 

however, that there is even more risk in doing nothing. We cannot 

afford to continue with the status quo. We must act now. 

Ultimately I want to do what I was not able to do on September 

11. I want to protect my children and keep them safe. I cannot 

bring my son Brad back, but I can, in his memory, push for a safer 

America. When critical reforms are implemented to make our country safer, I will know that neither Brad’s life, nor the lives of nearly 3,000 others who perished on September 11, were lost in vain. 

As a result of research into the horrific circumstances of my son’s 

death, I came to realize that our country was unprepared for the 

threat of terrorism despite forewarning. I now recognize that I cannot just be an observer, but have an obligation and a responsibility 

as an American citizen to be educated and aware of the larger 

issues that impact the safety of my family and friends. I encourage 

all Americans to read the 9/11 Commission report, and to contact 

their elected officials to urge them to act expeditiously in a nonpartisan fashion to enact reform. 

Again, I want to thank you for this opportunity to express my 

views. My hope is that these hearings will lead to critical reforms. 

We now look to you, our elected officials, for leadership, courage 

and fortitude to embrace the recommendations. The safety of our 

families, our communities, and our country rest in your hands. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for such an eloquent statement. 

Mr. Push. 

TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN PUSH,1 CO-FOUNDER AND BOARD 

MEMBER, FAMILIES OF 9/11

Mr. PUSH. Good morning, Senators Collins and Lieberman, and 

Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting us, representatives of the 9/11 families, to provide testimony on this important 

issue. 

With all due respect to the Members of this Committee, your colleagues in Congress, and the Members of the Executive Branch, I 

would like to state what I believe is at stake in this debate. What 

is at stake is nothing less than the legitimacy of the U.S. Government. 

The primary function of government is to defend its people. If the 

government cannot prevent terrorists from entering the country 

10

and murdering innocent civilians by the thousands, its other functions have little value. 

The 9/11 Commission has confirmed what many of us who lost 

loved ones in the attacks have long believed since shortly after September 11: The U.S. intelligence community failed to capitalize on 

numerous opportunities to discover and disrupt the 9/11 plot. This 

failure disclosed long-standing systemic problems that render the 

intelligence community ill-prepared to deal with the threat of terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists. 

In fact, the term ‘‘intelligence community’’ is an oxymoron. One 

of the so-called community’s greatness weaknesses has been its inability to coordinate its operations and share its intelligence with 

those who could use the intelligence to provide the Nation’s leaders 

with useful, timely information. 

I have no doubt that, in the wake of September 11, this weakness has been ameliorated, in part by internal reforms, and in part 

by heightened diligence on the part of intelligence officers shocked 

by the devastation of the attacks. But I also have no doubt that 

these reforms have not gone far enough. And as the memory of 

September 11 fades in the minds of those not directly affected, the 

systemic problems will reassert themselves and our intelligence 

agencies will slip back into the old habits that left the Nation so 

vulnerable 3 years ago. 

I concur with the Commission’s conclusion that fundamental organizational reforms must be undertaken in the government to create an intelligence community worthy of the name, worthy of the 

trust and treasure that the American people have invested in it, 

and worthy of the blood and sweat of the intelligence officers who 

labor, and sometimes risk their lives, serving the Nation. 

In my testimony I would like to focus on three issues that I believe you, as Senators and Members of this Committee, must address as you consider the Commission’s recommendations regarding organizational reform of the intelligence community. 

First, you must provide the new National Intelligence Director 

with sufficient authority. We do not need a toothless intelligence 

czar, who can only cajole the intelligence agencies from the sidelines. 

The NID must be able to marshal all of the intelligence community’s resources for collection and analysis. The NID must also be 

able to ensure that intelligence and assessments are shared with 

all of those who need them. To accomplish these goals the NID 

must have control over budgets and personnel. 

I recognize the concerns raised by the intelligence needs of the 

military. We must provide our war-fighters with the intelligence 

they need to accomplish their missions without exposing them to 

avoidable risks. But this concern is not a sufficient reason to maintain the status quo, in which the Pentagon controls 80 percent of 

the estimated $40 billion annual intelligence budget. 

While I do not want you to fix what is not broken in military intelligence, you must face the fact that the status quo has failed us. 

The current allocation of authority over intelligence budgets failed 

to prevent the murder of nearly 3,000 people in one day on American soil. If the status quo continue, and if terrorists obtain weapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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ons of mass destruction, future attacks may take tens of thousands 

or even hundreds of thousands of lives. 

I urge you to draft legislation that recognizes the need to coordinate intelligence for both military and homeland security purposes. 

I believe this goal can be achieved with the organizational structure recommended by the Commission, or something very similar 

to it. 

The position of the Deputy NID for Defense Intelligence can ensure that the military continues to receive the tactical intelligence 

it needs on demand, while enabling greater integration with the 

CIA, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. This integration will benefit both the military and homeland security, and 

is essential for the development of comprehensive intelligence assessments for the President and others. 

Some have complained that the Deputy NID for Defense Intelligence would have two bosses. That complaint reveals ignorance 

about the success of matrix management structures in solving similar organizational problems. Such structures have been used to 

great advantage for decades in corporations and other organizations. 

This model can be successfully applied to the intelligence community as well. But the ultimate authority must rest with the NID. 

What clearly does not work in the intelligence community or anywhere else is having 15 agencies ostensibly working towards a common goal without someone in charge full time. 

The second issue I would like to address today is the vulnerability our Nation has during presidential transition periods. While 

this may not be an issue that you will address in legislation, it is 

an issue you face when you confirm presidential nominees. I urge 

you to expedite the approval process of all nominees to intelligence 

and homeland security positions. When there is a change of administration, we do not need acting or lame duck people in these positions. We need these positions filled quickly with someone that the 

President has selected and trusts. 

I also believe that the President, through the selection of nominees, and the Senate, through the confirmation process, should 

avoid partisanship. When it comes to homeland security, there 

should be no Democrats or Republicans, only Americans. 

The third and final issue I would like to address is a need for 

prompt action. Since the Commission released its report last 

month, we have heard some officials urge us to take our time in 

reforming the intelligence community. I realize that fundamental 

reforms must be undertaken with deliberation, but the problems of 

the intelligence community have been painfully obvious to the public since September 11. In fact, previous commissions and other 

knowledgeable commentators have tried to alert Congress and the 

public to many of these problems for more than a decade. And the 

9/11 Commission, composed of 10 eminent individuals, backed by 

an outstanding staff of 80, has spent 20 months studying these 

problems. 

Meanwhile, al Qaeda and its offspring continue to hatch plots 

against Americans. Time is not on our side. 

Of course, please exercise due diligence in drafting the legislation, but please do so quickly. Otherwise, we may have yet another 

12

1The prepared statement of Ms. Breitweiser appears in the Appendix on page 55. 

terrorism commission analyzing opportunities that the government 

missed today to thwart another terrorist attack. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to address you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for an excellent statement. 

I want to acknowledge that we have been joined by the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, who also lost a number of constituents that terrible 

day. I remember Senator Warner organizing a van to go out to the 

Pentagon to assist the rescue workers, and he has shown great 

commitment to this cause, so we are very pleased to have him here 

today as well. 

Ms. Breitweiser. 

TESTIMONY OF KRISTEN BREITWEISER,1 FOUNDER AND COCHAIRPERSON, SEPTEMBER 11TH ADVOCATES, AND MEMBER, 9/11 FAMILY STEERING COMMITTEE 

Ms. BREITWEISER. Good morning, Senator Collins, Senator 

Lieberman, and other Members of Congress. I want to thank you 

for inviting me here today. 

Prior to September 11, we had no significant commitment or political will to dedicate the necessary resources to counter terrorism. 

Almost 3 years post September 11, perhaps that environment has 

changed. Testifying before all of you here today, I want to believe 

that it has changed, and that the time has now come to reform our 

Intelligence Community. 

We, as a Nation, should have made a historic reorganization of 

our domestic security structure a priority on September 12, 2001, 

or at the very least, studied it more seriously. Yet nothing has been 

done or even seriously considered in this regard until now. Without 

doubt, the appointment of a NID in the next few weeks or months 

will not thwart the next attack, but perhaps if a NID was appointed 3 years ago, we might have been in a safer position than 

we are today. 

Realize that on the day of the next attack, Congress and the Executive Branch agencies will no longer have to deal with the 9/11 

families, you will have to deal with the entire American public who 

had read the 9/11 Commission’s final report. They will ask, ‘‘How 

could this have happened?’’ I only hope that there will be real 

changes underway so that at the very least your collective consciences will not haunt you. 

It has been said by some that they would have moved heaven 

and earth to prevent September 11. Respectfully, almost 3 years 

after September 11, we do not need heaven and earth to move. We 

just need our Executive and Legislative Branches to move so that 

we are in the best possible position on the day of the next attack. 

September 11 has been called an intelligence failure. Prior to 

September 11 we have legal impediments, intelligence agencies 

that were not necessarily cooperative, integrated or coordinated in 

their efforts, outdated computer systems, no clear accountable and 

strategic management structures, and very little strategic analysis 

performed on terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. Part of the reaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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son for these failure was due in part because our intelligence community lacked a true captain of its ship. 

While DCI Tenet was, in theory, in charge of the entire intelligence community, the record from Septemer 11 indicates that he 

failed in that capacity. One reason he might have failed was because he lacked budgetary authority to make all 15 intelligence 

agencies that he oversaw work efficiently, cooperatively and successfully. Or, perhaps the real reason was that the expectation that 

one man could effectively perform the job responsibilities of a true 

DCI were far too high and impossible to meet. 

Yet, after reading the 9/11 Commission’s Final Report, it appears 

that our intelligence agencies did perform quite well on some levels, because the record proves that our intelligence agencies did 

have enough information to stop the attack. For whatever reason, 

judgments were made at crucial times that negated field agents 

and analysts from properly doing their jobs. Sadly, the examples of 

these instances are far too many to be fully enumerated in this limited testimony. Suffice it to say that they are all clearly laid out 

in the Commission’s Final Report, its accompanying footnotes, and 

the Joint Inquiry of Congress’ Final Report. 

Going forward, we must ensure that when intelligence community judgments are made and people are killed, at a bare minimum, someone in our intelligence community is held accountable. 

The NID would be that person. 

With a NID and a NCTC established, the next time we have a 

terrorist organization planning against us, we will recognize the existence of that threat sooner and develop a proactive covert action 

program to counter that threat before it grows to a reality. We will 

not suffer from instances of poor judgment that hampered our 

agents’ abilities to stop the September 11 hijackers. And if we find 

a series of poor judgments being made, we will not only hold the 

deputy of that department responsible, but we will hopefully have 

a NID to who has ultimate responsibility for the actions and behavior of the Intelligence Community. 

Our intelligence community consumes $40 billion of taxpayer dollars. The American public should expect some sort of accounting 

from this organization. No one doubts the commitment and work 

of the field agents and rank and file workers in our intelligence 

agencies, but they need clear leadership. A NID would provide this 

leadership. A NID would make a difference. 

Prior to September 11, inadequacies in airline security were recognized, yet there was no action taken by the FAA or the airlines 

to remedy these system-wide shortcomings. Examples of such inadequacies range from poorly trained and paid airport security personnel, failure to maintain an effective/integrated no-fly list, and a 

failure to establish effective airline security protocols. 

Three years post September 11, the need for a NID is more urgent than ever. The impact of a NID on the airline security apparatus is undeniable. Airline security is not fixed. Chain of command and authority issues are not resolved. A NID would be able 

to force all constants and variables involved in the airline security 

equation to work together cooperatively. He would be able to assign 

accountability and responsibility so that problems are identified, 

addressed and remedied. He would be able to effectively prioritize 

14

problems because he would have the benefit of knowing our overall 

national intelligence strategy. He could apply that overall strategy 

to affect the day-to-day operations of the airlines industry. 

In sum, a NID would be able to take the airlines, just one component of the national security apparatus, and better equip them to 

meet the demands of the ever-evolving national security environment. He would not be influenced by financial interests or persuaded by lobbyists. He would look at the airline security system 

through a pure and singular focus to make the airlines as safe as 

they can be. None of our public transportation systems will ever be 

100 percent safer, but they can most definitely be made safer. A 

NID would set goals, assign tasks to meet those goals, demand accountability, and allocate funds accordingly. A NID would make a 

difference. 

The largest problem presented to our military was in some way, 

and continues to be, the failure of our intelligence community to 

gather actionable intelligence for our military to justifiably act 

upon. Prior the September 11, whether it was missile strikes, deploying our special forces to infiltrate organizations, or sending reconnaissance aerial vehicles to gather information, all of these options ultimately failed because they lacked the actionable intelligence to spark their action. 

Prior to September 11, much debate took place about whether to 

fly the Predator over Afghanistan, who would pay for the flights, 

who would be responsible if the aerial vehicle got show down, who 

would be responsible if the vehicle marked and killed people, etc. 

In short, no one, neither DCI Tenet or DOD, wanted to take operational responsibility or fiscal responsibility for flying this vital reconnaissance vehicle. 

This was the topic of discussion during the first principals meeting of the Bush Administration held at the end of the summer of 

threat. September 11 was a mere 6 days away, 3,000 civilian people were rightfully carrying on with their lives, completely unaware 

of their sealed fate. And our leaders, those charged with protecting 

us, were fighting over whether to fly the Predator halfway around 

the world to try and gain surveillance video of al Qaeda. As their 

heated debate continue, their argument over money and responsibilities, al Qaeda was already here in the United States, lying in 

wait, fully embedded and prepared to kill 3,000 innocent people. If 

that does not illustrate how off the mark our military and intelligence community was in the months leading up to September 11, 

I do not know what does. A NID might have made a difference. 

Regarding the need to remove many of the 15 intelligence agencies outside the Department of Defense, perhaps one thing needs 

to be made clear. In the fight against terrorist organizations, ‘‘boots 

on the ground,’’ engaging our military, is Step Two in that process. 

We must not forget about Step One, our intelligence community. In 

truth, if all players in Step One, our intelligence community, do 

their job, we never have to get to Step Two, our military. Our military should not be our primary tool, it should be our secondary 

tool, our backup plan. That is why we must strengthen our abilities 

and capabilities in Step One. 

Step One involves our intelligence community having the most 

direct unfiltered information and effectively acting upon that inforVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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mation. To get the best most direct information our intelligence 

agencies need the authority and budgetary control over the tools 

that provide them with such information. Leaving management 

and budgetary authority over these tools in the hands of DOD had 

proven ineffective. September 11 speaks to that ineffectiveness. 

In a perfect dynamic, if tools are used correctly, intelligence information flows freely and directly, and our intelligence community 

acts effectively, Step Two, boots on the ground, might never be 

needed. The problem to this very day is that nobody is coordinating 

our intelligence resources, being held accountable for improving 

and reorganizing our overall intelligence apparatus, and demanding responsibility from all of those elements in our intelligence 

community, so that we do not have to arrive at Step Two. Again, 

perhaps a NID could make a difference. 

Both prior to, and post September 11, the use of diplomacy to 

deal with terrorist groups like al Qaeda was not a model of success. 

The problem regarding counterterrorism and diplomacy was a 

problem involving evidence and action. 

Prior to September 11, we had a clear and present danger presented by al Qaeda that was clearly not fully appreciated. Our intelligence community failed to pick up and act upon the real threat 

that was presented by al Qaeda. Politics and policy might have 

played a role in this. Post September 11 we did not have such a 

clear and present danger of WMD in Iraq and our intelligence community apparently overstated that danger. Politics and policy 

might have played a role in this result as well. Nevertheless, in 

both scenarios, two constants remain: One, people are being killed, 

and two, we have an intelligence community failing to do its job. 

This has to change. 

We, as a Nation, must find the middle ground. First, we must 

have an intelligence community that we can rely upon. We must 

equip them with the skills, tools and resources to do their job, and 

we must set up a structure that will hold them accountable when 

they fail to do that job. We must insulate their work product from 

both politics and policy. Only then can our leaders earnestly rely 

upon their work product and advice in making their own policy 

level decisions. From that pure unfiltered work product, our leaders 

can decide whether, when, and how to take action. A NID could 

make a difference. 

A NID would be able to integrate our border control into our national security strategy and give our border control agents commensurate resources. A NID would ensure that terrorist travel intelligence became a valued part of our counterterrorism strategy. A 

NID would recognize that disrupting terrorist mobility globally is 

at least as important as disrupting terrorist financing. He would 

demand that our student tracking system be operable and effective. 

He would oversee follow up and designate resources for the use of 

biometrics in our border security system. He would make sure that 

programs like TIPOFF are able to work effectively and share their 

information collectively. 

Three years since September 11 our border security still suffers 

from inefficiencies, poor funding, inadequate intelligence sharing, 

and the poor integration of an overall strategy. A NID would make 

a difference. 

16

While the two recommendations, the NID and the NCTC, that 

are the focus of this hearing are important, we must not lose focus 

on the equal importance of the remaining 39 recommendations. 

Quoting Commissioner John Lehman, ‘‘the Commission’s report is 

not a Chinese menu.’’

We must no longer take a single-track approach to our Nation’s 

security. It is not simply striking out and fighting the terrorists 

overseas. We need to contemplate other complimentary methods in 

this ongoing war. By holding public hearings on these supplemental methods, the American public will be able to consider these 

additional methods. methods that include providing education and 

economic opportunities, eviscerating terrorist funding, decreasing 

our dependence on foreign oil, and reallocating funds to pay for 

vital programs. 

Sitting here before you today, I want to divulge my self-interest 

and the turf I want to protect. My self-interest is to make sure that 

no other person has to walk in my shoes. I want to do everything 

I can to ensure that no other family has to feel the unparalleled 

pain that I felt on the morning of September 11 as I watched my 

husband get murdered on live, worldwide television. The turf I 

want to protect is the turf that my 5-year-old daughter and I walk 

and drive across. It is our great Nation. I answer only to the memory of my husband, Ron, and my own good conscience. 

The 9/11 Families are not concerned about reelection and pleasing our constituents. We are not worried about losing budgetary 

controls. We are not misguided by interagency turf wars. We have 

one singular purpose, and that purpose is to make our families, 

your families, and the Nation safer than it is right now. 

We ask the Congress, the White House, and all other Congressional and Executive Branch agencies to be Americans first, not 

partisan politicians with self-interests, not appointed officials with 

turf to protect, not unimaginative figures unwilling to embrace 

change out of fear of losing the status quo, because it is no longer 

sufficient to support national security on an ad hoc basis. Your support of national security must be all inclusive and wholehearted, 

regardless of how it may hurt you personally or politically. In 

short, working cooperatively to make this Nation safe is like the 9/

11 Commission’s recommendations. Your commitment must be 

wholesale, measured in thought, and endorsed by sound action. 

You cannot pick and choose which initiatives should succeed on the 

basis of your own self-interest. You must have the courage to be 

an American first. 

We stand before you as people who have lost our loved ones. We 

felt our pain on September 11, and we are now adapting to life 

without our loved ones. We have taken our unspeakable pain and 

made some good out of it by fighting for the creation of the 9/11 

Commission. We are now urging you to act upon the Commission’s 

recommendations. 

There are many other families whose loved ones are today risking and giving their lives to defend this great Nation, both at home 

and overseas. We are so grateful to them, and we share their pain. 

We appreciate and are grateful to their self-sacrifice in being Americans first, and making this Nation safer. 

17

In the ensuing months, hopefully not years, as this language begins to be drafted, and thereafter battled out behind the scenes, I 

simply, humbly, and with great respect, ask all of you to remember 

during those negotiations and the heated conversations, how many 

of us have already learned to be Americans first. I truly hope that 

you can do the same. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your moving testimony. In my 

opening statement I said that you remind us of why we are here, 

and why this task matters so much, and your eloquent testimony 

helps us accomplish the goal that we have been assigned, and that 

is to pass reforms that will help to make our country safer, and I 

am very grateful for your role in that. 

I am going to go out of the usual order because two of our members, Senator Warner and Senator Levin, are going to be leading 

hearings in the Armed Services Committee in just 10 minutes or 

so, so I am going to recognize them first for any comments that 

they might have or any questions. 

Senator Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I commend 

you and your Committee for the work that you have done. 

I have been privileged to be here for a number of years, and I 

have seen many groups formed to advocate their causes, but none 

have ever equalled your groups collectively in terms of your strong 

feelings, and yet your realistic appraisal of the problem and how 

it can best be addressed. You have come before the committees of 

the Congress, remarkably well prepared, and you delivered your 

messages as well as any witness that ever sat at that table. So I 

commend you. 

I really believe that Congress can do some things, and will do 

some things, important things. The President is considering several 

options that can be implemented by executive order. Much has 

been done since September 11, from the Patriot Act to the Terrorist 

Threat Integration Center. So it is an ongoing process, but each 

step must be done with great care, such that we achieve a positive 

incremental improvement in deterring terrorism and protecting 

ourselves against attack. 

I pledge to you, as I have to my committee in the Senate, I am 

not concerned about turf. I have been here many years. I know exactly what our committees can do and should do, and I am certain 

they will do the right thing, together with the Senate as a whole, 

once we put together our report. 

But bear in mind this Nation is at war. The intelligence system 

that we have in place now must serve those brave young men and 

women in the far-flung battlefields of the world, from Iraq to Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and they must serve them right at this 

very minute while we are here. 

So, as we begin to discuss changes to our intelligence structure 

and consider new authorities, we have to do it very carefully so 

that we do not lose a single beat in the efficiency of the system that 

is now serving this country. So bear with us. I think our President 

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ership. And we can achieve some things in this remaining Congress, but it is an ongoing process, and I thank you once again. 

I thank the Chairman 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator WARNER. I invite you to our committee hearings in the 

Caucus Room, for those of you who wish to, when this Committee 

concludes its work. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Madam Chairman, thanks to you and Senator 

Lieberman for not just today’s hearing, which is incredibly powerful, but for the other important hearings that you have had and 

that you will have. Your leadership is essential. 

Our witnesses today have given us a powerful push towards resolution of this matter, towards reforms. I think all of us are guided 

by one goal, and that is to make our country safer so that your 

loved ones will not have died in vain and that some measure, positive measure of good, can come out of their loss. That is not much 

solace, but I am afraid it is the best that we can do and what we 

must do, but I only want to assure you that every one of us, I believe, even though there will be differences as to what the right 

way to go at these reforms is and what the best reforms are will 

be moved by your standard. We had better be or else we are letting 

you down, and letting our families, and our children and our grandchildren down. That standard is what will make our Nation stronger. 

There will be differences, however, among people as to what will 

make our Nation stronger. You will not probably find, at least an 

easy consensus on that matter, but there is a consensus on that 

goal, and you have reinforced that goal among us. We thank you 

for that. I think you would want us to have an honest debate and 

deliberation providing that polar star is what will make our Nation 

stronger. Thank you for reinforcing that. 

One of the matters that is most troubling to me has been the 

lack of accountability. We have to build in accountability in a system, and I think the appointment of a NID, a National Intelligence 

Director, can lead to that, but I must restate my deeply held belief 

that there was a failure of accountability in the existing system for 

people who failed to do their assigned tasks, and that is an ongoing 

failure. We are still waiting for word from the CIA, and the FBI 

as to what about the failure to carry out assigned tasks. Where has 

been the accountability there? So I am going to keep my focus on 

that, among all the other needs here, but I want to again just add 

my thanks to you and all of the other families for sharing with us 

the pain that you have suffered so that hopefully we can be stronger and avoid that pain for other families. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Ms. FETCHET. Senator Levin, could I just comment on what has 

been said so far? I am very concerned that it seems like there is 

this mentality where there is more focus internationally. I think 

that we have to rethink that. I think we are at war in our own 

country today and that it needs to be a priority. There has been 

report after report, commission after commission, over the last decVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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ade, many with the same recommendations. We cannot afford to 

continue to debate. We have to move on this. 

It does not mean that things have to be disassembled. I think 

they have to be complemented and maybe readjusted—not to move 

the boxes around, as some people have said, but to have real structure and a real strategy in place so that domestically we are protected. These people live in our country. There is not monitoring in 

place, and I think there is really an imbalance between the CIA 

and the FBI, which really, in a sense, led to some of the challenges 

that they faced. 

We have to be focused on domestic security, and we are at war 

in our own country. Our families are not protected. Your family is 

not protected today. So I welcome the debate, but I think, at some 

point, we have to make some hard decisions, and we have to move 

on them. We cannot continue to debate and do nothing, and that 

is what has happened over the last decade. 

I heard Ms. Harman mentioning that we have a plan in place 

from 1947. We have other issues. It is a different world today than 

it was in 1947, and we have to set those priorities. They have to 

be constantly evaluated and re-evaluated. That system is not in 

place. I mean, what are our priorities? They are always changing. 

And so I think, because our priorities should be changing, our approach should be changing. And maybe the government that is in 

place worked in 1947, but we have different issues today. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator LEVIN. I agree with that, very much different. 

Chairman COLLINS. I want to point out that we have been joined 

by Senator Bill Nelson of Florida. He has attended I think every 

one of our hearings. He has been extremely interested. I know that 

he will be going to Armed Services, as will Senator Clinton, and 

Senator Dayton, who was here earlier. They will be coming back 

and forth, and I just wanted to explain that to our witnesses today. 

All of you have made the point that every one of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission is important. One of you 

quoted Secretary Lehman as saying, ‘‘This isn’t a Chinese menu. 

They all work together.’’ But based on all you have learned in the 

past 2 years, which recommendations do you believe will make the 

most difference? I am not saying that we should ignore those that 

may be secondary, but which ones, based on all of your study, all 

that you have learned, do you believe would make the most difference? 

We will start with you, Ms. Fetchet. 

Ms. FETCHET. Well, I think the National Intelligence Director 

and the Center really go hand-in-hand. There were breakdowns. I 

mean, it is well-known that there were breakdowns in communication between, really even within some of these agencies. I think to 

have somebody in control, not just a figurehead, but somebody that 

is working hand-in-hand with the White House, so their policies, 

their procedures, and their focus are in line because, again, I go 

back to talking about priorities. The priorities change, and the priorities have to be constantly reassessed, and so to do that that person has to be able to evaluate, through these 15 agencies, what the 

real priorities are of the day, and then they have to allocate funds 

that are focused on that. 

20

One thing that came up when we were researching this is that 

some of the intelligence agencies had budgets and had resources, 

but they were not in line with what the priorities should have 

been. So the FBI may have been focused on drug smuggling and 

prostitution rings, when the real focus should have been the threat 

of terrorism. So I think having somebody in control that can set the 

tone, identify the priorities moving forward, would certainly be, I 

think, the most important thing. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Push. 

Mr. PUSH. Well, I would like to call attention, particularly to the 

recommendations that the Commission made concerning diplomacy 

and foreign policy. We need to change our relationship with Saudi 

Arabia. It cannot just be about oil and selling arms. We need better 

public diplomacy to win over the vast majority of moderate Muslim 

people to our way of seeing things or at least to create a dialogue 

with them to get us communicating with them and to deprive al 

Qaeda of the recruits that it currently has access to. 

I hope you do appoint a strong NID, and I hope that individual 

is able to make the country safer. But we can have the best intelligence in the world. We can have heavy security around every 

building in the country, but we are never going to be able to stop 

people from coming here and killing Americans if we do not win 

the war of ideas in the Muslim world. And so those, very often in 

the press, those particular recommendations get short shrift and 

are not concentrated on, but I think they are very important. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Ms. Breitweiser. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. I concur with both Mary and Steve. Candidly, 

I think the most important recommendation is the one that is most 

likely to get done sooner rather than later. If I had to pick one, I 

would say border security. My understanding is that our border security apparatus is in shambles. It is in very bad shape, and that 

is something that really could be fixed with the proper allocation 

of funds. It is inexcusable that we have a budget that we have, and 

yet border security has finite solutions to problems that they are 

currently facing and we are allocating the funds properly towards 

that direction. Certainly, a NID would be able to make sure that 

those funds were allocated to where they needed to go, but I would 

have to say the border security recommendation by the Commission. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Some groups have expressed concerns about the privacy and civil 

liberties aspects of some of the recommendations of the Commission. They point, for example, to the proposal to give the NID authority over both domestic and foreign intelligence, an area where 

we have always had a sharp divide, but a divide that we now know 

has led to a lack of communication that should have occurred prior 

to September 11. 

They also point to the recommendations for biometric screening 

and also the recommendations to have a standard driver’s license 

so that each State would not have a different form of a driver’s license. Some fear that is the equivalent of a national identity card. 

Do you have any concerns about our ability to strike the right balance between security and civil liberties? 

We will start with you, Ms. Breitweiser. 

21

Ms. BREITWEISER. You know, clearly, I think that there has to be 

a balance. We have to strike that balance. I think we particularly 

have had some problems striking that balance with regard to the 

Patriot Act, and I think that we live in a Democratic society, and 

I think that more than anything we need to make sure that we do 

not lose the spirit of a democratic society. 

Nevertheless, I think what it comes down to is trust. If the 

American people have confidence in our government and in our 

leaders, particularly a NID, if we have the apparatus set up in 

such a way that we have confidence that it will not be abused, that 

it is necessary to have something like an international identity 

card to carry out biometrics, then I think that the American people 

will support that. 

But I have to tell you they need to be educated on that, and that 

is something that is a perfect topic for a public hearing. Let the 

American people be educated and then let them make an informed 

decision by calling all of their elected officials up and giving their 

opinion. That is how democracy works. And I think you can strike 

that balance. I just think that you need to make an effort to do 

that, and one way you do that is by holding hearings on that topic. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. Let 

me join you in welcoming Senator Mikulski and Senator Clinton, 

and thanking them for taking the time to be here. They have been 

very strong supporters of the 9/11 Commission in its initial fight 

over whether it would exist and now in implementing its reforms, 

and I thank them for taking the time to be here. 

I would have to declare, by way of full disclosure, that when it 

comes to the three of you, I am not unbiased, but I thought your 

statements were very effective, very powerful. You obviously bring 

your own experience of September 11 and the loss you suffered, but 

you also made a study of this tragedy. And with all respect to anybody else who would claim to be a so-called expert, I would put you 

up against anyone. I think you know this subject very well, and as 

a result there are two critical roles, just to develop a little bit what 

I said in my opening statement, that I think you can play in the 

weeks ahead as we move to get this done. 

The first is that you do bring your own human experience here. 

Mary, you lost a son. Steve, you lost your wife. Kristen, you lost 

your husband. And if this process, as it naturally will at some 

point, does yield to turf protection or partisanship, you have a 

unique, sadly, ability to focus us on what all of you said in one way 

or another. We have to be Americans here. We have to focus on 

protecting the safety of the American people so that no one else is 

in your position next time. 

Second, you are experts, and you have studied this. You have 

reached some conclusions. And from what I have heard from the 

three of you, you feel very strongly about adopting the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and you are as well-prepared to stand toe-to-toe with people and argue for their recommendations as anyone. So I think you have a critical role to 

play, and I thank you for your extraordinary testimony this morning. 

22

I want to go back to when the report came out and you read it. 

I am interested to know which of the factual findings struck you 

as most significant or most surprising before you got to the reform 

recommendations section. 

Mary or Kristen, you want to start, please. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. We all have done so much research in the past 

couple of years, so that really, after reading all of the staff statements, there was very little in the final version of the report that 

surprised us. 

I would have to say, for me, personally, it would be in the footnotes on page 502, particularly footnote 44, and I think that is a 

prime example of why we need someone like a NID. Because I 

think when you look at the record from September 11 and you read 

the Joint Inquiry of Congress’s report, and you read this report, 

clearly, we need to make sure that we have a CIA that is answering to a boss because the record is just replete with examples of 

the CIA making judgment calls. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. What does that footnote, just generally, say? 

Ms. BREITWEISER. My favorite footnote. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I do not need you to read it. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. It is page 502, footnote 44. It discusses the 

watch listing issue, and it is a CIA desk officer. You have to read 

the footnotes, too. 

Chairman COLLINS. The print is too small. [Laughter.] 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, that is what my law professors used to 

tell me. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. All the good stuff is in the footnotes. 

I think it does bring up the important point that our CIA needs 

to be answering to someone, and I know there is talk behind the 

scenes that we do not need a NID. We will leave a DCI and just 

give them budgetary authority. I think the record from September 

11 clearly indicates that the CIA needs to answer to someone, and 

that someone could be a NID. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Amen. Incidently, I appreciate that you 

mentioned the Predator story because part of the argument made 

for not altering the Pentagon’s control over its intel budget is that 

nobody has said that the Pentagon fell short or contributed to September 11, but the very fact that there was that argument going 

on, right up to 6 days before September 11, shows why there needs 

to be somebody at the top. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. I totally agree with you, and I think more than 

the argument which, in my opinion, was a petty argument that carried on for far too long, had we had a NID to say, ‘‘Cut it out,’’ like 

a mother saying, ‘‘Cut it out’’——

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. And to add to that the fact that we were looking halfway around the world. These people were here. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. There were sleeper cells, and what is sad is 

that you had DCI Tenet at that meeting. He knew about Zacarias 

Moussaoui. He had that information in his head. It should have 

been brought up at that meeting, and that is where the attention 

should have been placed, not flying a very important piece of machinery halfway around the world. 

23

Senator LIEBERMAN. Steve. 

Mr. PUSH. Similarly to what Kristen said, very little in the report surprised me because I had been following the issue so closely, 

but I really appreciated that we finally had an authoritative assessment of all of these facts. 

The two things that I found most surprising was the role of Iran 

in aiding the hijackers, which is, I think, a very important point 

and speaks to the geopolitical issues that need to be addressed in 

that part of the world. And the other is the fact that the head of 

the CIA knew about Moussaoui, but the head of the FBI did not, 

which I found rather shocking, that not only do we have a lack of 

communication between agencies, but also a lack of a communication within an agency. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. PUSH. The so-called stovepiping, as opposed to—the one advantage of the stovepiping is supposed to be providing information 

up to the top, and it was not even doing that in the FBI. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Ms. Fetchet. 

Ms. FETCHET. Well, I would agree with both Kristen and Steve. 

I was sort of reading between the lines because we do have so 

much information after studying this for 3 years, but I think the 

lack of communication. Maybe it is because my husband works for 

IBM, but I just cannot understand, when there is technology out 

there, how people are not put on watch lists. I mean, if an airline 

can know what flight you are on, what seat you are in, what time 

you are leaving, what time you are landing, they should be able to 

simply put in names and to identify not, as hijackers, but as the 

possibility of being a terrorist. 

And I think that just the systemic inadequacies, a lack of communication, I mean, when you read the report that is consolidated 

like it is, I think just the lack of communication. And I think the 

thing that frustrates me is we are all working towards one goal. 

I mean, if the goal is to protect our country, to represent our citizens, and I see the duplicity, the lack of having systems in place, 

that seems so logical to me. I just cannot understand that. And I 

have seen that actually in Congress, since I have been here, to just 

mention the commission reports that have sat on shelves, but also 

that one committee might come up with a finding, a recommendation, and then the committee changes, and they start the whole 

process over again. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. FETCHET. That there is never any follow-through, and I 

think that is pretty apparent overall, that the government, in a 

sense, is antiquated, not having computer technology in the FBI 

when you are supposed to be following people? That just does not 

make sense to me. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Your questions, your eyes are open so clearly, and the questions you are raising, recommendations you are 

making are so sensible. And in one sense, what is on the line here 

in our response to this, is what one of you said, which is the legitimacy of our government to carry out its first responsibility, which 

is to protect the security of our people or our citizens. 

Ms. FETCHET. Senator Lieberman, could I just—Senator Collins 

brought up the civil liberties issues. One thing I would say, as we 

24

were working on this—and that came out with the Patriot Act—

I think it was very misleading to the general public that that was 

going to fix what happened on September 11. And as you look at 

the report, you can see it was not that they did not have information—they did not share information, they did not compile information. 

So I think that there was a sense, by the general public, that this 

was going to address that issue, but that was not the issue on September 11. And I think that we have to think in terms of what is 

out there already—licensing, traffic violations, visas, expired 

visas—all of these things that they could compile in one database, 

and it would raise a red flag. I mean, there is information out there 

that is not in a database yet. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You are absolutely right. 

My time is up. I will just say this. The testimony you have offered and the responses you just gave to the question I asked remind me of something else. Our Committee has been focused on 

what Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton said were their 

top two priorities: The National Intelligence Director and National 

Counterterrorism Centers. But they made a lot of other very important recommendations. And you have highlighted them in different 

ways: The integrated screening system for people coming in and 

out of the country, a possible need for a standardized license, combining the watch lists the impact of diplomacy, the whole border 

security system. I was struck that you, Steve, pointed out in one 

of your top three issues the need to accelerate the transition from 

administration to administration. 

They first hit the World Trade Center in 1993, the first year of 

the Clinton Administration. They then hit the towers again in 

2001, the first year of the Bush Administration. Maybe coincidental, maybe not. Thank you. 

Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I again want to thank the witnesses for sharing their personal 

stories. This is really extraordinary. Yesterday, we had before this 

Committee three former heads of the CIA, and we all said we 

learned a lot, and we did. But here we have average citizens who 

have been deeply personally impacted who know this stuff, who 

really know this stuff. I find it pretty overwhelming. And in your 

tragedy, you have come to understand a system that, in the end, 

we are going to make some changes. We will make some changes. 

Mr. Push, you indicated, and you talked about the primary function of government is to defend its people, and I agree, but you also 

then raised a cautionary note about the fading of the memory of 

September 11, and I just want to make this statement. I come from 

a Midwest State, impacted personally. I have gotten to know one 

of the families, the Burnett family, whose young son, Tom, was on 

Flight 93 and one of those folks who charged the cockpit. And I 

come from Brooklyn, New York, and had a grade school and high 

school friend on that same flight. 

25

But I have to say my family is still in New York, and they are 

in New Jersey. They have a much different sense, a much different 

present sense than I think many of my constituents do because 

they live in Marlboro, Manalapan, and friends worked in the World 

Trade Center, and so it is—so I just want to express the importance of keeping the sense, and the memory, and the impact alive. 

It then helps us kind of move through. 

And we face the challenge that Senator Lieberman talked about 

and that you talked about, to move quickly, but to do the right 

thing. Because we have had ‘‘reform’’ in this country in the past. 

We had the Church Commission and the Pike groups, and they reformed us to a point, I think, and then they limited our ability to 

do the right things, in the name of reform. 

And so we do face a challenge here, but I guess my reflection is 

to listen to citizens who—talking about foreign policy, the Iran situation, this report says Congress needs to follow up on that. I hope 

we do. 

I want to get back to the issue that Chairman Collins raised 

about civil liberties, and in particular I just want to talk about the 

Patriot Act, not a long discussion. But here is my question, and I 

am a former prosecutor. There are those things out there that we 

just have not taken care of, I mean, basic stuff out there. And that 

is part of your message. We have all of this stuff. What are we 

doing with it? 

But we are also, Ms. Fetchet, as you talked about, in a war right 

here. We know there are cells right here. We know there are folks 

who want to do bad things today. Part of that Patriot Act gives us 

the ability to do things that I, as a former prosecutor, used to be 

able to do with organized crime: The nature of wiretaps, and cellphone technology. 

I just want to kind of get your sense, about the Patriot Act. Because there is this balance that we always hear about. I do not 

think pre-September 11 we could have done a Patriot Act. Is there 

a sense that we need to do more, in terms of our ability to figure 

out what is going on right here, right in this country today, and 

to give folks more power to do that? And, again, Ms. Breitweiser, 

your comment was if you let the public know, they will kind of do 

the right thing. Just a little further reflection on that issue. 

Ms. FETCHET. Well, I think, as Kristen said, if they know what 

the limitations are—I think we are living in another world, and I 

think our country really has to have a better sense of who is coming and going. I think INS was a big—well, it was a failure. Visas 

were processed that were not completed. I do not think that they 

had the resources that they needed. It seems like the people that 

are really going through the process in the right way are delayed. 

It is the ones that are coming in illegally that have more rights almost than we do as an American citizen. 

So I think to educate the public, to know what the limitations 

are with regard to the Patriot Act, but I do think we should begin 

by having a database and not reinventing the wheel. There is technology out there that can get you up to 80 percent, and then modify 

the other 20 percent, rather than creating a whole new system. 

Three years later, I do not think we have a system in place. 

26

So I think that the real focus, my feeling is, should be on getting 

the information that we have up and running, and complement it 

by more information with some limitations. 

Senator COLEMAN. I raise it because my concern is for folks who 

are already here. They are here. Some may be coming, but they are 

right here, and they have been here a while, and we saw that on 

September 11. How we get to that and how we protect that. 

No one has mentioned the Department of Homeland Security. 

Reflections on what they are doing? Obviously, by not mentioning 

it, I sense the deep concern that what has gone on has not been 

sufficient, but just reflections on Homeland Security? Reflections on 

terror alerts? Can you respond to what you see going on there? 

Ms. BREITWEISER. If I could just go back to what you were talking about, the Patriot Act, and then I would love to answer that 

question on DHS. 

You also mentioned in the beginning that you are from the middle of the country, and I think that even when people live in the 

middle of the country, if they drink water, eat food, go to malls or 

have planes flying over their home, they need to care about these 

issues. It is not just the people that live in the tristate areas or the 

big megalopolises, it is everyone, because you either will do one of 

those things or you will have a loved one that will do one of those 

things. I just wanted to say that. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I share that, absolutely. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. Listen, I try to make that point all the time 

so people in the middle of the country who feel safely ensconced realize if you are eating food, drinking water or have planes flying 

over your head, you need to care about this. 

Having said that, with regard to the Patriot Act, I think that 

there needs to be an analysis. There needs to be proof that the Patriot Act to date would have made a difference on September 11, 

because our understanding from our research is that we already 

had enough information on these individuals. I think, like Mary 

said, I just want to reiterate, we have enormous sources of information that we are not even using right now. To set up the Patriot 

Act, which is giving access to things that we do not even need, because right now with all the information we have, we are not fully 

using it in an efficient manner. It just seems like what are we 

going to do with all this information? It is like a fire hose of information. As we have been told, on September 11 they could not 

make sense of any of it. Why are we enhancing the fire hose? 

I think you need to keep that in mind. I would like to see an 

analysis as to where exactly, specifically, with the information regarding the 19 hijackers on September 11 that the Patriot Act 

would have made a difference, because my understanding is that 

really it would not have made much of a difference. 

Your comment about the Department of Homeland Security. I 

think that certainly there is an awful lot of confusion with regard 

to the threat levels. I think that particularly, I think it was in June 

we had an incident, where DOJ, the Director of the FBI and Mr. 

Ridge, were apparently not all on the same page because someone 

thought we needed to go under alert, someone thought we did not. 

That is a problem. There is really no point in having a Department 

of Homeland Security if they are not going to be talking to DOJ 

27

or the Director of the FBI. I think that it is scary to hear the threat 

levels rise and fall, and I think we need to know that those levels 

are rising or falling for the right purposes and the right information, and again, you have to strike a balance. 

I think the Commission spells out that the Department of Homeland Security is not necessarily working as well as it could be 

working. It is a great idea, but especially Sally Reagan Hart could 

sit and talk to you all about local responders and how they need 

a lot more attention and a lot more priorities need to be set, and 

I think Department of Homeland Security could have played a big 

role in that in the past couple of years. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. PUSH. With respect to the Department of Homeland Security, 

I support the Commission’s recommendation that another look be 

taken at how funding is allocated to local areas, that is allocated 

based on threat rather than as some kind of a grant program. It 

is true, what Kristen says, that we are all at risk, but clearly, there 

are cities like New York and Washington that are prime targets, 

and the fact that New York could get lower per capita funding than 

more remote areas that are under less a threat is, I think, a mistake. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. I just want to make it clear. I agree with 

Steve. I was just drawing the point that everyone needs to be interested in homeland security, but I think clearly we need someone 

to prioritize the funding. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Durbin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman 

Ms. Breitweiser, in your testimony you have a paragraph on the 

first page which struck me. You say: ‘‘We, as a Nation, should have 

made a historic reorganization of our domestic security structure a 

priority on September 12, 2001. Or, at the very least studied it 

more seriously. Yet nothing has been done or even seriously considered in this regard until now. Without doubt, the appointment of 

a NID in the next few weeks will not thwart the next attack. But, 

if a NID had been appointed 3 years ago, we might have been in 

a safer position than we are today.’’

We are here because of this 9/11 Commission Report, and I am 

going to go out on a limb and tell you, we would not have this 9/

11 Commission Report had it not been for you. Had the families 

of those who died on September 11 not been steadfast and resolute 

and demanding, this would have fallen apart a long time ago. 

There was resistance to creating this Commission. There was resistance to funding this Commission. There was resistance to extending the deadline for this Commission. Now when you hear this 

chorus of praise for the 9/11 Commission, you know better. There 

was a time when this was not a popular idea at all. And the reason 

it happened was because you stuck with it. Had you not done that, 

we would be off on our vacations in August as usual, but we are 

at work, as we should be, on a very important and critical national 

issue. 

28

We like to stand in judgment of the Executive Branch. I guess 

that is our role as an oversight committee. I would like you to 

stand in judgment of us. You have been on Capitol Hill now for a 

long time. You have been nudging and pushing and making your 

presence known to create this force. There have been press reports 

that some committee chairmen were hiding behind doors so that 

they could avoid you. [Laughter.] 

But you got the job done as American citizens, as you said, who 

came here with not just grief but a determination to get something 

done. What is your report card on Congress in terms of what we 

have done? I mean let us put it all on the table right here. What 

would you say needs to be done on Capitol Hill for us to do the 

right thing, the American thing, and follow through on these Commission reports? What is your greatest fear in that regard, Ms. 

Breitweiser? 

Ms. BREITWEISER. I think your grade at this point is an incomplete, and I think that you are serving the summer recess, summer 

school. I really do, I think all of the families want to thank everyone for attending the hearings this summer. We are enormously 

grateful. 

But undoubtedly, Congress has a lot of work to do, and I do not 

think it just has to do with the Executive Branch agencies reorganization. I think Congress needs a reorganization. I think that the 

set-up of the Joint Inquiry, particularly when they looked into the 

attacks on September 11, where you had both houses, the Senate 

Intel and the House Intel together, working cooperatively to 

produce one product, I think that was a good setup. I know it is 

recommended in the Commission’s report, and I would urge you to 

seriously contemplate doing something like that, because more 

than symbolically indicating and illustrating that everyone is working together. I just think on a realistic basis it is something that 

we could all stand to benefit from, was to combine the Intel Committees that they are working together. 

We cannot urge you enough to act, and not necessarily act in 

haste. Act with sound reform, because one of the things that I just 

do not get is all this talk about reorganization. I think that it is 

futile to reorganize the intel community if you are going to leave 

people in positions that failed in the years leading up to September 

11 or the days before September 11 or on the day of September 11. 

If you are going to leave those people in those positions and just 

reshuffle the boxes, then you are setting this reorganization, if it 

does happen, up to fail. 

Senator DURBIN. Which was a point I tried to make in yesterday’s hearing. Are we ready for reform? I mean can we pass a law 

that is really going to achieve real reform? 

In the New York Observer piece about your experience with the 

Jersey Girls going around to the FBI and all the different agencies, 

the fact that you are an attorney and you have some training and 

skills, I could tell from the questions that you asked and pressed 

on, that you were more successful than some, but I could also note 

some real frustration here. You felt like you were getting the runaround, that people there would not accept responsibility for reality. 

29

Ms. BREITWEISER. I would say that I think I have acted like a 

lady, in that I have not really been very transparent in some of the 

behaviors and the tones and the attitudes of certain individuals, 

who are elected officials, and going forward, I will continue to act 

like a lady. 

Nevertheless, we have an American public who is enraged, outraged after reading this report. I know people that are just commonplace people, moms, they do not work, they are stay-at-home 

moms. They cannot get past page 50 because they are shaking with 

anger that it was as bad as it was. I think that is something, the 

jig is up. Everybody is going to know, and there is going to be no 

more excuses. And I just urge you, because I will be a lady, but 

there are going to be other people that are going to want meetings, 

and they are going to walk out of those meetings, and they are not 

going to act like gentlemen and ladies. They are going to say exactly what went on. 

There are Websites currently being created by people like that 

who are saying things, that you cannot carry out and support national security on an ad hoc basis. You cannot call for the declassification of over classified material and then not support wholesome border security because it may affect your constituency. 

We need this to be a committed effort, and I want to believe it 

can be done, and I promise I will continue to be a lady. 

Senator DURBIN. I hope you all will continue in your effort, and 

I thank you for it, and that noise, that pressure, that heat, is democracy. That is what it is all about. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. I am not saying I will be a lady behind the 

scenes. [Laughter.] 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. I am sure you will. Thanks, Madam 

Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Specter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SPECTER 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much for your very powerful 

testimony, and thank you for pursuing your advocate’s role. You 

have a lot of people who are with you in this Committee and the 

Senate, and in the House and Congress generally. 

Madam Chairman, just for the record I want it noted that the 

reason I was not here yesterday was that I had 85,000 notices for 

town meetings circulated in Pennsylvania on meetings which could 

not be postponed. I just wanted that noted in the record. 

You have put the case very powerfully, Ms. Fetchet, when you 

talk about inexcusable inertia, and, Mr. Push, when you have excellent testimony. I think the highlight was your sentence that 

‘‘What is at stake is nothing less than the legitimacy of the U.S. 

Government.’’

You are correct when you note that the U.S. intelligence community failed to capitalize on numerous opportunities to discover and 

disrupt the September 11 plot. As Ms. Breitweiser said about the 

same thing, the intelligence agencies did have enough information 

to stop the attack. 

All of that was put on the record in October 2002 when we noted 

the FBI Phoenix report about the suspicious man who wanted to 

fly a plane, learn how to fly, but was not interested in takeoffs or 

30

1 A copy of S. 1718 from the 104th Congress submitted by Senator Specter appears in the Appendix on page 66. 2 A copy of S. 2811 submitted by Senator Specter appears in the Appendix on page 143. 

landings, and about the two al Qaeda people known to the CIA in 

Kuala Lumpur not told to the INS, and about Zacarias Moussaoui, 

where Colleen Rowley, the FBI agent, had a 13-page, single-spaced 

memorandum. 

In this room, we had a hearing with FBI Director Mueller and 

found that the FBI did not use the proper standard for probable 

cause to get a warrant—just sort of incomprehensible. But notwithstanding that, we were not able, when that bill was passed restructuring homeland security, to put all of it under one command. We 

could not get that job done because of the entrenched opposition of 

the CIA and the FBI and the Department of Defense and their cultures of concealment and their ability to stop it. 

Now, the point was made by Ms. Fetchet that the legislature has 

failed to act on earlier recommendations to address the threat of 

terrorism, such as those from the Hart-Rudman Commission, the 

Gore Commission, and many others. 

I chaired the Intelligence Committee back in 1995 and 1996, and 

in a Senate bill, S. 1718, called for, ‘‘enhancement of authority of 

the Director of Central Intelligence to manage budget, personnel 

and activities of the intelligence community,’’ going right to the 

core of what the 9/11 Commission has asked for. Then we had a 

cross-reference. It went to the Armed Services Committee and they 

cut it to ribbons. 

I ask, Madam Chairman, that this bill be made a part of the 

record.1

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator SPECTER. Two weeks ago, I circulated a bill to establish 

a national director and to put under that director—and I would ask 

that this be made part of the record, too, Madam Chairman.2

Chairman COLLINS. Without objection. 

Senator SPECTER. To put the FBI counterintelligence out of the 

FBI, put them under the national director; the same thing for CIA 

foreign intelligence. We do have to look at the tactical issue, but 

I think we can solve that as well. 

Senator Roberts, the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, is 

about to file a bill, and a few of us are about to introduce for the 

record the 9/11 Commission bill. So there will be plenty of bills to 

start the markup and to make decisions that we have been studying for a very long time. 

The Scowcroft Commission has an excellent report. We are not 

short of reports and we are not short of debate and we are in a position to move. And it is my hope that we will start the process and 

mark up in September and work on a bill before we adjourn for the 

election. But that is going to be difficult unless we get started very 

early because in late October people are looking at the election. But 

your words today are very forceful. 

There are two questions I have for you where I am thinking in 

a different direction from the 9/11 Commission and would like to 

know your thinking, because you have demonstrated a lot of insight and a lot of work here. 

31

One question goes to the idea of a 10-year term. The bill which 

I have drafted calls for a 10-year term for the director so that we 

insulate as much as possible the director from political influence. 

The precedent would be the FBI Director. 

The second point where I diverge from the 9/11 Commission is 

the idea of double-hatting. For example, they want to leave counterintelligence in the FBI, to report to the Director of the FBI, and 

also to report to the national intelligence director. I have grave 

doubts that can be done, to have double reporting. My thought is 

to take it out of the FBI and have them report just to the National 

Intelligence Director. 

I would be interested in all three of your comments on those two 

points. Ms. Fetchet. 

Ms. FETCHET. The first one—refresh my memory because I am 

focusing on the second one. 

Senator SPECTER. The 10-year term for the National Intelligence 

Director. 

Ms. FETCHET. The 10-year term. I think one thing, like Steve 

brought up, was the issue about transition from one administration 

to the other. So I think in terms of a longer term, I think that 

would be very important, and to time it so there is not a gap when 

there is a change or a possible change in administration. 

I think to keep it non-political is going to be very important, and 

so to sort out how can you best address those issues. I don’t know, 

during a transition, if maybe Congress gets sort of focused when 

there is a transition on reorganizing, and maybe Congress should, 

in a sense, be really focused on the transition and making sure 

that legislation is passed, that deadlines haven’t elapsed, and that 

there is some follow-through from one administration to the other. 

So I think the transition is a huge thing with regard to the term. 

The principal meetings which they used during the Clinton Administration, but there wasn’t as much focus on during the Bush 

Administration, I think, are an important aspect to pull those people together so they are all on the same page. That is how I would 

respond to your second question. 

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Push. 

Mr. PUSH. On the first issue on the 10-year term for the director, 

I agree with your concern about keeping the director’s position nonpolitical, and I think we should find ways to do that. However, the 

National Intelligence Director is going to have to have a very close 

relationship with the President, a relationship based on trust, and 

it is hard for me to see how that can happen unless that person 

serves at the pleasure of the President. 

On the other issue, the double-hatting issue, I have long felt that 

the FBI is not really the right place for a domestic intelligence 

agency. I know that the Commission decided to keep it in the FBI, 

recommended keeping it in the FBI, and I know there have been 

arguments that the FBI already has a well-developed investigative 

function that could be capitalized on. 

We certainly don’t want to go and create something anew that 

already exists, but I see no reason why whatever the FBI has been 

able to build in that area, in the domestic intelligence area, can’t 

be transferred to another department. For example, the Coast 

Guard was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security 

32

and I haven’t seen the Coast Guard miss a beat on any of its responsibilities. 

Senator SPECTER. Ms. Breitweiser. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. With regard to the 10-year term, I think it is 

a no-brainer. I think that really you need to make sure more than 

anything that a NID, if the position is created, is insulated from 

politics and policy. More than that, we have to be able to trust this 

individual. We need to have confidence in them. 

Rather than worrying about a 10-year term, I think you should 

be more worried about who you are going to find. But I think a 10-

year term is very important. I think it works very successfully with 

regard to the FBI, and I think there is a very steep learning curve. 

There is a lot to learn in this position. It is an incredible job description, and we don’t want a revolving door. We want some sort 

of continuity and we want to give the person the time that they 

need to really develop long-term strategies, because I think that is 

what we have really failed to have. 

We did not have long-term strategy. If you read the Commission’s report, there is much information about George Tenet going 

from operation to operation. When it was over, that was it; we 

moved on. We took care of the next threat. We need to make sure 

that we have a long-term strategy, and the way that you do that 

is by putting someone there who will have the time to develop that 

long-term strategy, who will have an acute memory, who will not 

forget things. I think it is a very wise decision to have a term like 

that, in my humble opinion. 

With regard to the FBI and double-hatting, I am no expert, and 

I think really what you should probably do is have a meeting with 

the actual agents, the analysts, personally and see what they 

think. We could sit and listen to everyone at headquarters and all 

of the head honchos, and you are not going to get the story that 

the guys in the field and the women in the field are going to give 

you. 

They are the ones you should listen to because they are the ones 

who will tell you the truth. They will tell you, look, I am not going 

to do something like that because I won’t raise myself in the FBI; 

I am going to be set back by that; I have a family and kids to support. You really should listen to the rank-and-file. Their hearts are 

in this and they have an enormous amount of information that is 

yet to be tapped. I really would encourage you with regard to that 

question to ask the people in the lower ranks. They will have a lot 

to share. 

Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Ms. Fetchet, Mr. Push, 

and Ms. Breitweiser. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

To each of you, thank you for being here with us today. I can’t 

imagine what you have suffered in the last 2 or 3 years. Thank you 

for not just dwelling on that sorrow, but for using it to transform 

it into something positive, I hope, for you, and I am sure for our 

Nation. 

33

Senator Durbin earlier held up a copy of the 9/11 report and he 

said we wouldn’t have this report were it not for your efforts and 

the collective efforts of others, thousands of families that you represent here today. He is absolutely right. 

A friend of mine who is a pastor of a church in Wilmington, Delaware—I am from Delaware—likes to say it is not how high we 

jump up in church that counts; it is what we do when our feet hit 

the ground. 

We are having a lot of hearings; I think it is great that we are. 

I want to commend our Chairman, and certainly Senator 

Lieberman for pulling us all together not once, not twice, not three 

times, but four times during an August recess, which is rather extraordinary. I have only been here 31⁄2 years, but it is extraordinary certainly by my standards, and I think by most people’s 

standards. 

I am encouraged that we are not just going to jump up in this 

church today, but when our feet hit the ground and the television 

cameras go away and we have the tough work of figuring out how 

to craft legislation that we will actually do it. 

Having said that, Senator Lieberman worked real hard on creating the Homeland Security Department. It took a lot of time and 

a lot of effort, and I don’t know that he ever got the kind of commendation and thanks for all of his efforts, but he certainly has 

mine. 

Senator Collins and I have been working for about 3 years on 

postal reform legislation, and we have a bill that has been approved unanimously by this Committee, with bipartisan support, to 

say what kind of postal system we are going to have in this country 

in the 21st Century. Similar legislation in the House passed unanimously out of committee, and it is not altogether clear whether or 

not something that enjoys unanimous support in the House and the 

Senate is actually going to be signed into law. It is just tough to 

get anything done around here. 

I guess as I thank you, on the one hand, for the remarkable tenacity and devotion you have brought to this important cause, I 

would just ask you not to relent or not to let up. In football jargon—and I know it is still baseball season and we are getting some 

exhibition games going, but in football jargon, we have the ball, we 

have possession of the ball, we have gone across the 50-yard line 

and we may be inside the 20, but we are not in the end zone. We 

need your help and your effort and your energy to continue to push 

us to get there. 

Mr. Push, I appreciate what everyone has said, but I want to 

come back to something that you said. I don’t think I heard it from 

anyone else, and I am going to ask you just to revisit it and then 

I am going to ask our other two witnesses to comment on it. 

Let me paraphrase what I understood you to say. It is important 

that we adopt a number of the changes recommended by the 9/11 

Commission with respect to our intelligence functions—the way we 

function, the way we organize, the way we operate, how we hold 

people accountable. That is important. It is important that we act 

militarily to go after and flush out sources of danger, folks that 

pose threats to us. 

34

But I think you also said that as important as the intelligence 

work is and as important as the military work is, if we forget about 

the minds of millions of people around the world who have come 

to hate our country, we have not completed the job. In a way, we 

will have dealt with the symptoms, but maybe not the root cause. 

Would you just revisit briefly what you said? And then I am 

going to ask both Ms. Fetchet and Ms. Breitweiser. I am going to 

ask each of you to comment on that aspect of his testimony. 

Mr. PUSH. In response to your question, I said that I felt that we 

should pay more attention to the specific recommendations that 

were made with regard to public diplomacy and, as you pointed 

out, developing allies around the world, but also developing allies 

within the Muslim world to create opportunities for better dialogue 

with the vast majority of moderate Muslims, to improve our relationships with countries like Saudi Arabia so that they are not 

based only on selling arms and buying oil. 

There is a reason why al Qaeda has fertile ground to operate in, 

and unless we change those reasons, our children and our grandchildren are going to be fighting this battle in the future. I think 

while the NID and some of the other recommendations that are 

made are the more urgent ones, the ones that need to be acted on 

quickly, I think the more fundamental ones, the ones that are 

going to really win the war on terrorism are the ones that are 

going to change the hearts and minds of people who create young 

men who want to come and crash planes into buildings in our country. 

Senator CARPER. Mr. Fetchet. 

Ms. FETCHET. I would agree with Steve. I think our foreign policy 

is really the core of the threat of terrorism, and I think that we 

have to reach out to other countries. We have to develop an understanding of their culture, their religions, and their beliefs. Many 

times, maybe we have to back off and we can’t dictate what women’s rights should be or how they should run their country. 

I think that we had such an outpouring after September 11. I 

have a husband that travels internationally and I am very concerned about him traveling. He has developed individual relationships with people in many of these countries, but for the most part 

people don’t respect Americans. They think that we are arrogant. 

They think that we are trying to dictate the world, and I have a 

concern about that. 

I think that we have to develop some respect for people of other 

cultures and we have to understand those cultures to know really 

what our relationships should be. So I think we can continue to 

build walls around our country, and certainly we have to make our 

country secure. But to really address the core of terrorism, we have 

to develop better relationships and respect for people from other 

countries. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Ms. Breitweiser. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. I think Mary and Steve said everything. I 

would just like to add that it is upsetting to hear from one of the 

Senators from before that we can’t do both; we can’t protect the 

boots on the ground and fix our intel community. 

I think when you read the report, they say harden the homeland, 

continue the situation we are in now with regard to striking out. 

35

And, in addition, we need to get at the root of the problem. Just 

on a basic level, I am a big believer in education and I think that 

it has to be done wisely. You cannot, as Mary said, go into a Nation 

and trample them and drop propaganda everywhere and say this 

is what you should believe. 

We need to really work on our reputation, and the bottom line 

is these people hate us and they want to kill us. We cannot handle 

that situation in a one-track way. We need a multi-track approach 

and I think the Commission does a good job in setting that out. 

Nevertheless, it is going to take a prioritization and we are going 

to have to find funding for that. Rather than discussing whether 

or not we should—I said to one of the Senators last week that I 

know you all mean business when you start setting out the funding. When you start discussing the budget and where it is coming 

from and how it is going to be paid, that is when, in my opinion, 

I realize that we are getting down to business. 

I think, though, that really we need to fight this new enemy in 

a multi-pronged approach, and I think we should not just be focusing on Muslim radicals. We have other groups that are not 

metasticizing and sort of following along in other areas of the 

world. I think we need to be patently aware of those groups, too. 

It is not just about Muslim radicals. It is about a whole host of people that we have offended through years of behavior that we really 

need to take a multi-track approach at, and one of those ways is 

by reestablishing our respect in the world. To do that, you need to 

respect others. It is a two-way street. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Mikulski, welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKULSKI, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND 

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you very much, Chairman Collins. I 

want to thank you and Senator Lieberman for inviting me today 

to participate. We appreciate your collegiality and your graciousness. 

As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I want to pledge to 

you as the team that will be putting together the bill our utmost 

support and collegiality to make sure our war is against terrorism 

and not about turf. So we want to thank you for that. 

We want to thank the 9/11 families who are here today, and all 

of those other families that you represent that would like to be 

here today. We thank you for being their voice. 

We remember and honor the memories of the loved ones of the 

3,000 people who lost their lives on that horrific day. I am here as 

a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee committed to reform, but I am also here as the Senator from Maryland. We lost 

60 people that day. 

I am honored to be here to interrupt my Senate recess. I am 

happy to be here today to hear you. I am happy to be here tomorrow when I listen to testimony at the Intelligence Committee. I am 

ready to cancel the whole summer recess so that we can move on 

reform. How about moving on the homeland security appropriations bill that is just floating like a feather in the Senate ethers 

36

right now? So we are ready to move and I am ready to come back 

if we need to. That is the kind of urgency we need to feel. 

Why do I feel so strongly? We know about your loss and about 

the loss in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, but we in the 

capital region lost people that day, too. Sixty Marylanders died 

mostly at the Pentagon. They came from all over Maryland, but 24 

of the 60 came from one county, Prince George’s County. Most of 

them were African American. Many of them were women, like 

Odessa Morris, who had just celebrated her 25th wedding anniversary. Max Bielke, working in financial services, was the last soldier 

to leave Vietnam. Leslie Wittington and Charles Falkenburg were 

academics who, with their two children, were on their way to a sabbatical. Adam White, a career worker at Cantor Fitzgerald. Darin 

Pontel, just out of the Naval Academy, with his brand new bars, 

working at the Pentagon. One of my own Senate staff lost someone 

who was a police officer at the World Trade Center. So we feel very 

strongly about that, we in the capital region. 

So this is why we are committed to listening to you. We want to 

thank you for what you have done because in your own unflinching 

and unflagging way you helped create this 9/11 Commission. We 

thank you because the Commission could do in the sunshine what 

we in the original intelligence inquiry had to do in a classified way. 

So the Commission could build on our work and be able to function. 

We think the Commission did a fantastic job with integrity, independence, and intellectual rigor. 

So where are we now? I believe we need to focus on the three 

Rs—reform, resources and being relentless to accomplish both. 

Let’s practice the three Rs. 

They talked about the surprises. I will never forget being in that 

committee, when I realized that of the 19 terrorists, 4 were stopped 

by local enforcement, 1 in my own State. When they put the guy’s 

name in the computer, there was nothing that came out. We know 

more about deadbeat dads and their child support than those who 

are trying to come into the country to kill us. 

When they gave us the Phoenix memo, I put my head down on 

the table and wept about a missed opportunity. But it is not time 

for tears; it is time for action. This Commission calls for 41 recommendations; 16 the President could do right now; 9 the President could do with funding, and we could pass our appropriations 

by October 1. I am on the Appropriations Committee. I know that 

where there is a will, there is a wallet. Sixteen recommendations 

call for congressional action. This is why I feel so strongly about 

this. 

Now, after all of your days and months of speaking truth to 

power, I want to talk about truth and about power. When all is 

said and done, more often gets said than done. So my main question to you is, would you support some type of mechanism to stand 

sentry over the Executive and Legislative Branches, scorecarding 

us through benchmarks on how we implement the reforms of this 

Commission? 

Have you considered this? What would be your thoughts? What 

would be your recommendations, so that we speak not only truth 

to power, but we have to understand the truth about power, which 

is no one likes to give it up? 

37

Ms. BREITWEISER. I would say first I would encourage you to 

visit our website and that report card is underway. I would also 

note that a number of news programs, both cable and local, do a 

little thing at some point in the show where they say number of 

days 9/11 Commission report released, number of things acted 

upon, zero. 

It started out on just a couple of channels and now it is making 

its way onto a number of channels. It is my favorite part of the 

viewing process. Everyone shakes their heads. The newscasters are 

hysterical. They say number of days the report released, number 

of recommendations implemented. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Kristen, that is voluntary, and three cheers 

for that. But I am talking about this Congress passing a legislative 

framework with appropriate funds that would extend a form of the 

9/11 Commission for monitoring the implementation of the reforms. 

It would be organized, it would be systematic, it would be mandatory, and it would be in the sunshine. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. I think it is an excellent idea. My only concern 

is that it has to stand away from Congress. You cannot have elected officials. You need to have independent people. It has got to be 

bipartisan. I think undoubtedly that is an idea that is an excellent 

idea. 

Unfortunately, I have spoken to some of the commissioners, because I know the topic was broached by someone recently. I don’t 

know if they are necessarily interested in doing something like 

that. You would have to speak to them directly, but I think we see 

the benefit of this Commission. 

I think one of the commissioners testified last week or the week 

before and said you should have seen these people when our staff 

went in and started doing interviews; you should have seen when 

we entered the room. I mean, they were worried. Agencies that for 

years have intimidated or sort of let people know, don’t muck 

around with us, were scared. 

There is a value in that because we know that we can stay on 

top of things now. I think one of the greatest things this Commission did is that it has shed sunlight onto intelligence agencies that 

for years stayed in the dark, in a shroud of secrecy. I think the 9/

11 Commission speaks to the damage that keeping these things in 

the dark results in. I think it is a great idea. I would recommend 

looking into it. 

Mr. PUSH. I would agree. Again, as Kristen stated, it needs to be, 

like the independent Commission, independent, bipartisan. The 

cost of doing something like that is so small compared to the 

amount of money we are talking about investing in intelligence and 

border security and homeland security, to have someone independent looking at that and making sure that the public knows 

how we are being served. 

That was one of the lessons for me from September 11. The fact 

is I didn’t know a lot about this before September 11. There were 

other commissions out there that had reported and it had gotten 

very little press coverage, and I was quite ignorant about things I 

should have known. I think that would be a great public service to 

provide an independent commission like that. 

38

Ms. FETCHET. I would agree with what Steve and Kristen said, 

but I think I would defer to the commissioners if it should be something that is legislated and funded by the government. I know Governor Kean has talked about raising public funds, and in that 

sense I think he would feel that the Commission was more removed from the government. 

Senator MIKULSKI. You mean private funds? 

Ms. FETCHET. Private funds, yes. I am sorry. I know that he was 

pursuing private funds to fund the oversight, but when I think 

about the last 3 years, I think we, in a sense, have become an oversight committee. I know I have received some information that I 

have forwarded from an office in the House to an office in the Senate, and vice versa. 

So I think, as Steve said, we weren’t aware of the previous commissions. The public, like I was before September 11, is typically 

not involved in the process, and I think that has been something 

that has been a life lesson to me. But I hope other Americans do 

as well, participate in the democratic process. You can’t assume 

anymore that things are being done in your best interest. 

I think to have a relationship with your Senator and Congressman to talk to them about what your concerns are—that educates 

them and their office on how they should pursue things, what 

stand they should take, what your concerns are. I think it is a twoway process, and that we can’t assume that you can make decisions 

without information from your constituents. 

So I would be in favor, to answer your question, of oversight because I think that is where you fell short on these other commissions, that they were just done and they sat on a shelf. There was 

no oversight, and so other things came up that became a priority 

that shouldn’t have been. I think in this case, this report is public 

and it is educating the American public about changes that have 

to be made. 

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you. I know my time is up. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Clinton, welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLINTON, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you so much. I particularly want to 

thank the Chairman of the Committee, who has done extraordinary 

work along with her Ranking Member. Both of you deserve a great 

deal of gratitude not only from those of us in the Senate, but everyone else who cares about these issues. Of course, I want to thank 

our witnesses. 

There are other family members and advocates in the audience 

today, Madam Chairman, and perhaps if it would be appropriate, 

could we have them just raise their hands or some way of being 

acknowledged, because so many of them have gone the extra mile 

time and time again on behalf of these issues and I know we are 

all very grateful to them? 

[Several members of the audience raised their hands.] 

Senator CLINTON. I think that the testimony illustrates clearly 

the need for us to act in a comprehensive way on all of the recommendations because they are interrelated. It is difficult to imagine that we will have a successful reform without looking at public 

39

diplomacy, border security, a counterterrorism center, all of it together. So I appreciate the comprehensive look that this Committee 

is providing. 

But I think it is also fair to say that our biggest obstacle will be 

the Defense Department. I, like some of my colleagues, will be leaving shortly to go to an Armed Services Committee that is currently 

hearing from Secretary Rumsfeld, General Meyers, and John 

McLaughlin, the Acting Director of the CIA. 

As we heard from Senator Specter, as numerous commissions 

and reports have pointed out, the effort to try to create some overall intelligence apparatus runs afoul of both the legitimate concerns 

of the Defense Department about tactical battlefield intelligence 

and the desire to basically continue to control 80 to 85 percent of 

the budget and call the shots as they wish. 

Yesterday, it was clear in the Armed Services Committee hearing 

that was held with three former members of the Defense Department, CIA and other distinguished positions that time and time 

again, the CIA Director, whoever it was, has basically run into a 

brick wall. You can declare war on al Qaeda, as George Tenet did, 

and nobody can know about it, and you can have previous efforts 

to try to consolidate the intelligence functions and to create some 

accountability and it doesn’t get done. 

Now, I will be leaving to go to this hearing and I want to ask 

each of you if you have any questions for Secretary Rumsfeld, General Meyers, or John McLaughlin, because I will ask them when it 

is my turn. I think that really goes to the heart of whether we are 

going to be successful or not because any Secretary of Defense is 

extraordinarily powerful and is due a lot of deference because of his 

position. But it has been time and time again the place where good 

ideas about consolidating the intelligence functions and creating a 

better mechanism for sharing that information basically go to die. 

So I would like to ask each of you if you have questions you 

would like me to pose to any one of these three gentlemen. Does 

anyone want to start? Kristen. 

Ms. BREITWEISER. It is my limited understanding that one of the 

reasons why this idea of a NID has not happened in the last 15 

or 20 years is because of DOD and various Secretaries of Defense. 

I think undoubtedly no one wants to harm or in any way put in 

jeopardy the boots on the ground, but I think it is unacceptable for 

us to not expect a department like the Department of Defense to 

be able to adequately, and above adequately take care of the boots 

on the ground while at the same time reorganizing their department, their intelligence agencies, and work with all of the other 

agencies involved to get this structure set up and going. 

To say that they can’t do two things at once is unacceptable because al Qaeda is doing about a hundred things at once. And in addition to al Qaeda, there are other groups doing things. We no 

longer can accept that excuse from DOD because, going forward, 

we don’t know if there will ever be a time that we will not have 

boots on the ground. So if we are not going to do it now, then when 

are we going to do it? 

I would reiterate what I said. You need to fix the intel community because if the intel community does its job right, we don’t necessarily need to get to the boots on the ground. I don’t understand 

40

the failure. We had the embassy bombings, the Cole bombing. We 

had September 11. I don’t understand how that doesn’t warrant 

someone saying, look, this is a broken system, it is not working effectively, we need to do this and we need to do it now. 

I am very sympathetic to individuals that are going to have to 

lose a lot of their budget. Nevertheless, someone has got to take a 

good, hard look at how DOD is handling these budgets, and it is 

going to have to change because there is always going to be a war. 

We are always going to have people on the battlefield. That is the 

nature of the world we live in today. Like I said, al Qaeda is not 

taking a rest and we need to accommodate that fact. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you. Mr. Push. 

Mr. PUSH. Senator Clinton, I would ask Secretary Rumsfeld to 

imagine for the sake of argument that there is a national intelligence director along the lines proposed by the 9/11 Commission. 

Under that assumption, what assurances would he need to ensure 

that the military received the tactical intelligence that they needed 

to continue to be effective and protect the war-fighters? 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you. 

Ms. FETCHET. I would agree with what Kristen and Steve said. 

But, in addition, I would like to know—there really wasn’t a reaction on September 11 and I would like to know what were the protocols on September 11 with regard to the military and NORAD, 

and compare that to the changes that they have made hopefully 

today, because it is our understanding that NORAD was in a Cold 

War mentality and that despite knowing the threat of terrorism, 

their main priority was illegal drugs. 

So it is hard for me to understand how somebody that is responsible to monitor our air space did not react on September 11, flew 

40 miles away from NEADS itself, flew about 60 miles away, some 

of these planes, from Camp David and weren’t intercepted. So I 

would like to know what the protocols are. Without a shoot-down 

order, what are the protocols? 

I am concerned after attending that hearing yesterday that I do 

feel that people are digging in their heels and that they aren’t 

open, particularly DOD, to change or giving up either funding or 

power. I think we need an accounting for where this money is 

being directed, and I would like to understand what their priorities 

are and have an understanding on what their focuses are and 

where this funding is going because I don’t think that they have 

ever had to account for their funding. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Madam Chairman, may I just echo what 

you said earlier? Senator Nelson has really been remarkable in this 

series of hearings. As is well known, he doesn’t live next door, so 

he has come up here from Florida as a real expression of his support for the Commission report and his interest in learning from 

the witnesses, and I am very grateful to him for that. He has done 

something else in the three previous hearings that Senators don’t 

normally do very well. He just sat and listened, and I have sure 

learned. 

Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

41

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NELSON, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. And I will be returning this afternoon to our 

most recent version of Ground Zero, which is Punta Gorda, Florida, 

where I was over the weekend, where we have another disaster, 

but nothing of the magnitude that you all had suffered through. 

That is why I am here. 

Like Senator Mikulski, there were Floridians that were affected. 

I can name a few: Petty Officer First Class Johnny Doctor, from 

Jacksonville, and he was in the Pentagon; Stephen Philip Morris 

of Omond Beach, and he was in the World Trade Center; Timothy 

Grazioso, from Gulf Stream, also in the World Trade Center; and 

C.C. Lyles, from Fort Myers, not far from where the hurricane entered the coast. She was a flight attendant on Flight 93 that ended 

up in Pennsylvania. 

I am going back to the same hearing where I have been listening 

to the Secretary of Defense, and I will backstop Senator Clinton on 

some of those questions. But one thing I wanted to get some further commentary from you on as a result of your comments with 

Senator Mikulski is yesterday in the Commerce Committee when 

we had the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, 

they were remarking ruefully that in a week the Commission evaporates because the funding runs out. 

They were talking about how they are going out and doing all 

this private financing, and several of us were lamenting that fact. 

Thank goodness that you all pressed to get the 9/11 Commission, 

and then you have pressed to have them heard and now they are 

going to disappear, except for private funding. 

Madam Chairman, I went up to Chairman John McCain and 

proffered the idea that since most of their staff is going to disappear after next week, at least the essential staff want to continue 

to assist the Chairman and Vice Chairman and other members 

with the private financing. 

One thing that we could do immediately is, through some Federal rule, allow that staff to continue its Federal benefits. Many of 

them are already Federal employees and have been for the last 

year. Health insurance clearly is one incentive, and maybe some of 

the best staff in order to protect their families need that protection 

and might not continue on. That is at least something that we 

could do. So Chairman McCain seemed to be quite interested in 

that. We are working together. 

I offer it to you for your and Senator Lieberman’s suggestions. 

Chairman COLLINS. The Senator may be interested to know that 

Senator Lieberman and I have hired four of the Commission staffers to work with us until we complete the legislation. We are also 

working very closely with the top two staffers, but we have actually 

brought on to our staff in non-partisan positions four of the very 

senior staffers. So we are doing our part and they have been extremely helpful as we have been going forward. 

Senator NELSON. Will that staff be working for you? 

Chairman COLLINS. Working for the Committee. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I think that is illustrative that where 

there is a will, there is a way. Now, I am talking about so that the 

important staff can continue with Governor Kean and CongressVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
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man Hamilton to give them the support that they need, as they are 

going to continue to press the case along with the families. I would 

like you to put on your thinking cap and see if we can’t come up 

with a solution, and Senator McCain seems to be very willing to 

do this. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for that suggestion. 

Senator NELSON. I want to raise two other issues, and it is more 

for us than for you all because, Madam Chairman, one of the 

strongest suggestions to come out of the 9/11 Commission report is 

that we have to get our house in order here with the congressional 

oversight. 

A good example occurred yesterday in the Commerce Committee. 

The number two person at the Department of Homeland Security 

was there and was defending the review that has taken 4 months 

of whether or not butane lighters ought to be allowed on aircraft. 

They are now, and this was right after Governor Kean had testified 

about the fellow Reid who got on the flight that was coming across 

the ocean, and had he had a butane lighter—the flip thing—instead of a series of matches, he would have been able to successfully detonate that shoe bomb. Yet, today we allow butane lighters. 

We have been pressing the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security for 7 months, and so the question was raised and it was raised 

in a bipartisan fashion. So when it was my turn, I said, Mr. Secretary, you have heard Governor Kean say that one of the biggest 

things we have to do is have vigorous congressional oversight; you 

have heard the comments of this committee in a bipartisan fashion. 

Now, listen to the congressional oversight and start paying attention, and listen to the congressional direction: Get rid of the butane 

lighters. 

I said this in a friendly way, but I also said it in a rather firm 

way, and I think it is beginning to get across. It is like us sitting 

in the Armed Services Committee with Secretary Rumsfeld and 

others—and I am not saying this in a partisan way, but so often 

we get the feeling that they don’t care a wit about what our oversight is. You know the non-answers that we get up there in S407, 

in the secure room. 

So we have to start asserting our constitutional role as a separate branch of government that is necessary for checks and balances for this government to function like it should. Otherwise, you 

run into the problems that we see. 

The final thing that I would mention is something else that came 

out of Armed Services yesterday. We paid a lot of attention to 

structure and analysis and collection and reorganization, and so 

forth. But somewhere along the line, we have to start paying attention to how personalities affect the analysis and the dissemination 

of intelligence information; in other words, leadership. 

I don’t have any magic bullet for this, but I am surely raising the 

issue. If we are going to get clear, unvarnished, timely and accurate intelligence, which is the only way for us to protect ourselves 

from the terrorists, then clearly that issue of personalities has got 

to be discussed and handled. 

So that is my comment to your hearings, and thank you for letting me sit in on all these hearings over the course of the last 2 

or 3 weeks. 

43

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for your contributions. 

Let me close this hearing today by thanking not only our witnesses who were so eloquent and well-informed in their presentations to this Committee and who gave such powerful statements 

to us, but also all the family members who are here today. 

I was intending to at the end of the hearing do exactly what Senator Clinton has already done by recognizing you and thanking you 

for being here. You are the reason that we are here today, and that 

is why Senator Lieberman and I felt so strongly that, in addition 

to hearing from government officials and the official experts, we 

wanted to hear from the family members. 

Your personal tragedies motivate us, your expertise and your 

knowledge inform us, and your efforts give momentum to the cause 

that we have all embraced. Please be assured that all of the Members of this Committee are working hard in a bipartisan way. Senator Coleman has been here at every one of our hearings. We are 

all working together to produce a bill as quickly as we can. 

I know for many of you it feels like it should have been done yesterday. Believe me, this is an extraordinarily rapid path that we 

are on. We have held a number of hearings. We need to hold more, 

but we are committed to reporting a bill, and I hope that we can 

get unanimous support, or close to that, for a bipartisan bill that 

we will report next month. 

The Senate leaders have committed to us to expediting that, and 

our goal is to get it signed into law as soon as possible because as 

soon as we get started on these fundamentally important reforms, 

the safer our Nation will be. 

As we continue to make progress toward this goal, I want to tell 

you that your testimony and your tragedies will always be part of 

me; that what you have told us today will help us accomplish the 

goal that we all embrace. So I thank you so much for being here 

today. You really are making a difference. Out of your unspeakable 

tragedies, I believe a great good will come for our Nation, and I 

thank you for that. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for that 

statement and for your leadership. 

I want to say to the three of you how moved I was by your testimony. I will say as your friend, and in one case as your Senator, 

I am proud of you. It was very powerful. Too often, progress is not 

easy here. You have all said that in different ways. It is a lot harder than it should be, but at no point did you or the others in the 

family member groups accept no for an answer. That is why the 

Commission was adopted, that is why the report is here, and that 

is why, with your help, we are going to adopt the recommendations 

of the report. 

There is going to be resistance. This Commission has recommended bold change. It is critically necessary, but that is no 

guarantee that it is going to get adopted because people don’t like 

change. People don’t like to lose power, but it has to happen for the 

greater good. 

I can’t thank you enough. Let’s stick together, and we are going 

to get this done. We are not only going to thereby make the American people safer, but we are actually going to prove that the AmerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 12:47 Dec 17, 2004 Jkt 095509 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\95509.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN
44

ican governmental system can still work, and that is a big accomplishment. 

God bless you. Thank you. See you soon. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

This hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(45)

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