STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Dr. Andrew Scobell

March 2003
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ISBN 1-58487-121-0

ii
FOREWORD

War with Iraq will signal the beginning of a new era in

American national security policy and alter strategic

balances and relationships around the world. The specific

effects of the war, though, will vary from region to region. In

some, America’s position will be strengthened. In others, it

may degrade without serious and sustained efforts.

To assess this dynamic, the Strategic Studies Institute

(SSI) has developed a special series of monographs entitled

Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq. In each, the

author has been asked to analyze four issues: the position

that key states in their region are taking on U.S. military

action against Iraq; the role of America in the region after

the war with Iraq; the nature of security partnerships in the

region after the war with Iraq; and the effect that war with

Iraq will have on the war on terrorism in the region.

This monograph is one of the special series. SSI is

pleased to offer it to assist the Department of Army and

Department of Defense in crafting the most effective

strategy possible for dealing with the many consequences of

war with Iraq.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ANDREW SCOBELL was born and raised in Hong Kong.

He joined the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) in August

1999 and is SSI’s expert on Asia. He taught at the

University of Louisville, Kentucky, and Rutgers University,

New Jersey. Since 1988 Dr. Scobell has published articles in

such journals as Armed Forces and Society, Asian Survey,

China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Journal of Political

and Military Sociology, and Political Science Quarterly.

Recent articles have focused on China-Taiwan relations and

China’s military modernization. Dr. Scobell holds a B.A. in

History from Whitman College, an M.A. in International

Studies from the University of Washington, and a Ph.D. in

Political Science from Columbia University.

iv
STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT

WITH IRAQ: AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

This study considers the strategic consequences of U.S.

and allied military action against Iraq for the countries of

Australia and New Zealand and provides some policy

recommendations. The prospect of imminent U.S. military

action against Iraq is of enormous interest to both Australia

and New Zealand.

1

Conclusions:

Australia is one of the staunchest supporters of U.S.-led

military action against Iraq. Canberra has been very

willing to provide combat troops to fight alongside U.S.

forces.

Australia supports the U.S. action with or without U.N.

approval, although significant unease and dissent are also

evident in the country.

Australia is confident about the strength of its security

relationship with the United States.

New Zealand is one of the most circumspect countries in

the world regarding the merits of a war with Iraq.

New Zealand is willing to contribute noncombat

military and humanitarian support in the closing stages of

a conflict or after a conflict only if the U.N. sanctions the

war.

New Zealand remains ambivalent about its security ties

with the United States.
AUSTRALIA

Australian Prime Minister John Howard, aside from

Prime Minister Tony Blair of the United Kingdom, has been

the staunchest supporter of a U.S.-led military action

against Iraq. Moreover, Australia is one of the few countries

that has been ready and willing to provide combat forces for

a conflict with Iraq. In spite of this, the United States must

be attuned to significant reservations among the political

elite and popular opposition to Australia’s participation in a

conflict and the possible impact of this dissent on

Canberra’s security cooperation with Washington. In

mid-February 2003 hundreds of thousands of anti-war

protesters marched in Australian cities, and the Australian

Senate gave Prime Minister Howard a vote of no confidence

on his decision to send military forces to the Persian Gulf.

Many of the factors identified below will have a considerable

influence on Australian opinion and in turn either

strengthen or weaken support for future Australian-U.S.

security cooperation.

Duration of War.

Australians would prefer a short war. A long war might

test the limits of Australian support for military cooperation

with the United States. Australian public resolve would be

strengthened if the U.N. sanctioned the conflict.

Level of Destruction.

Australia would prefer a low level of destruction and

small number of casualties, especially among Australian

troops and Iraqi civilians. The Australian public might

react negatively to substantial losses of Australian forces

and extensive civilian casualties. Either or both of these

outcomes might put strong public pressure on Canberra to

lessen its level of support for the United States.

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Use of Terror/WMD.

Australia recognizes that the use of terrorism by groups

supported by or sympathetic to Saddam Hussein is a

distinct possibility. If this terrorism involved weapons of

mass destruction (WMD) or if the Iraqi military itself used

WMD, then Australians would be particularly outraged.

Further, if Australians or Australia were targeted, then this

would likely only strengthen the national resolve for

continued security cooperation with the United States.

Global Economy.

Australia is concerned about the impact of a war on its

economy, most directly through a disruption in the supply of

oil and higher energy costs, which would lead more

generally to an economic slowdown.

Perception of U.S. Intent.

Australians generally have a positive perception of U.S.

intentions in the war on terrorism and tend to identify

closely with these. Australia has been one of America’s most

steadfast allies for 75 years. Australian troops fought

shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. troops in Afghanistan and

are prepared to do so again in Iraq. Intelligence sharing

between the two nations is particularly important.

Australia is a natural and effective partner for pursuing the

war on terrorism in the Asia-Pacific, which is likely to be one

of its major battlegrounds. Moreover, Australians have

been the victims of terrorism. As many as 90 Australians

died in the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade

Center. Australia suffered a major terrorist attack of its

own in October 2002 in Bali, Indonesia, when bombs

detonated by Islamic extremists killed more than 100

vacationing citizens.

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Size of Coalition.

Australia would prefer as large a U.S.-led coalition as

possible but would almost certainly stay the course no

matter what the size of the coalition.

Nature of U.S. Post-War Presence and Activity.

Australian support for security cooperation with the

United States could shift based on the conduct and outcome

of a war against Iraq. If the war is seen as successful, then

this will strengthen the position of Prime Minister Howard

and his policy of staunch support for the United States. If

the war with Iraq is judged to be a failure, then this would

weaken Howard’s position and may even lead to the

downfall of his government. Moreover, some Australians

are sensitive to the perception that their country is a lap dog

of the United States. This is evident from the furor caused

several years ago by the widely (but inaccurately) reported

remarks of Prime Minister Howard that Australia was best

viewed as America’s deputy sheriff.

NEW ZEALAND

For New Zealand’s Prime Minister Helen Clark, the key

element of her country’s approach to a war against Iraq is

whether or not the conflict is U.N. sanctioned. Prime

Minister Clark stated in February 2003 that, if the war has

the U.N. imprimatur, then New Zealand, particularly in the

“end stage” of a war or in the post-conflict period, stood

ready to provide logistical or humanitarian assistance and

specialized military forces such as medical, engineering,

and mine clearance units.

Duration of War.

New Zealand hopes the war is a short one. Prime

Minister Clark told the New Zealand parliament in

February 2003 that the Iraqi people were already suffering

4
greatly, and a war would only add to this suffering. Hence

the longer the war, the greater would be the humanitarian

catastrophe in Iraq.

Level of Destruction.

New Zealand would prefer little destruction since this

would limit the scale of human suffering for the people of

Iraq.

Use of Terror/WMD.

The use of terrorism by Iraq or groups sympathetic to

Iraq would be viewed with great concern. Any use of WMD

by the Iraqi military or terrorists would cause widespread

outrage among New Zealanders. The country has a deeply

held anti-nuclear policy that is largely responsible for its

suspended security alliance with the United States.

Global Economy.

As an island nation in the South Pacific, New Zealand

relies heavily on international trade and imported oil. A

long war, especially one that resulted in serious damage to

oil fields in the Persian Gulf region, would have a severe

impact on New Zealand’s economy.

Perception of U.S. Intent.

New Zealand is skeptical of U.S. intentions. While not

necessarily opposed to U.S. goals in the war against

terrorism, it is strongly opposed to some U.S. methods.

Size of Coalition.

The U.N. imprimatur is much more important to New

Zealand than the size of coalition, although, of course, the

two are likely to go hand-in-hand.

5
Nature of U.S. Post-War Presence and Activity.

New Zealanders have mixed feelings about the war on

terrorism and the prospect of a war against Iraq. New

Zealand has been a willing coalition partner in previous

U.S.-led operations such as DESERT STORM (1991) and

ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan (2001). If the U.N.

sanctions the war, then New Zealand is likely to participate

in a post-war relief effort, just as New Zealand forces played

a key role in the humanitarian intervention in East Timor

several years ago.

If the war is brief, causes few casualties, limited

destruction, and the cooperative experience is a positive

one, it might lead to a serious rethinking of New Zealand

attitudes toward security cooperation with the United

States. If, however, the war does not have the U.N.

imprimatur, is prolonged with widespread destruction and

many Iraqi civilian casualties, then this will likely reinforce

the critical attitudes among many New Zealanders towards

the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Focus on Australia’s contribution to the war effort and

on New Zealand’s contribution to post-conflict Iraq.

Do not take Australia’s support for granted. Be sure to

express sincere thanks to Australia at the highest

levels of government for its contribution. President

Bush and other cabinet-level officials, including

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, should publicly

express U.S. appreciation for Australia’s contribution

to the war against Iraq. A senior administration

official or officials should visit Australia to reinforce

the depth of U.S. appreciation for Australian support.

Enable Australian forces to return home promptly

following the cessation of hostilities in Iraq. This will

ease Canberra’s heightened sense of vulnerability to

6
terrorism at home after the October 2002 Bali

bombing.

Express appreciation for any New Zealand

contribution in post-conflict Iraq.

Publicly express respect for the strongly held

anti-nuclear views of New Zealand. Affirm that good

friends and allies can still work together toward

achieving common objectives (i.e., fighting terrorism),

even if they disagree on other issues.

7
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven Metz

Author

Dr. Andrew Scobell

Director of Publications

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

Ms. Kimberly A. Rockwell-Jacoby