[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 15-14109

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-23264-JAL

WILLIAM RAMIREZ, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Respondents-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(April 11, 2017)

Before HULL, WILSON and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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William Ramirez, a Florida prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his second 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We affirm.

Ramirez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus that challenged his 

conviction and sentence in a Florida court for kidnapping with a weapon. The 

district court denied Ramirez’s petition as untimely. After the district court denied 

Ramirez’s motion for a certificate of appealability, on February 24, 2014, he filed a 

motion in this Court to appeal the denial of his petition. See id. § 2253. We denied 

that motion on November 9, 2015.

On September 3, 2014, Ramirez filed a second petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus, which the district court dismissed on August 24, 2015. The district court 

ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain a second petition while the judgment 

denying his first petition was pending on appeal. Had the earlier judgment not been

pending on appeal, the district court stated, it “would [have] dismiss[ed] the 

[second] Petition as second or successive.” Alternatively, the district court ruled

that “to the extent the [second] Petition can be viewed as a motion to amend the 

original petition, . . . it is untimely.”

The district court did not err by dismissing Ramirez’s second petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus. Ramirez argues that the district court impermissibly 

construed his second petition as being barred by the prohibition against successive 

filings, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), but the district court did not dispose of 

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Ramirez’s petition on that ground. The district court correctly ruled that it lacked 

jurisdiction to consider Ramirez’s second petition while this Court was reviewing 

the judgment denying Ramirez’s first petition. This Court and the district court 

cannot entertain simultaneous challenges to the same conviction. See Griggs v. 

Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (“The filing of a notice of 

appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court 

of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case 

involved in the appeal.”); Shewchun v. United States, 797 F.2d 941, 942 (11th Cir.

1986) (“[T]he filing of a timely and sufficient notice of appeal acts to divest the 

trial court of jurisdiction over the matters at issue in the appeal . . . .”). And had 

Ramirez meant for his second petition to serve as a motion to amend, it was 

untimely. A petitioner cannot amend his petition after the district court enters 

judgment. See Jones v. United States, 304 F.3d 1035, 1043 n.16 (11th Cir. 2002)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15).

We AFFIRM the dismissal of Ramirez’s second petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus.

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