### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Brie fs Ma y 5, 200 5 I N 

### T HE 

### M ATTER 

### O F 

### : A.L.N. A ND 

### B.T.N. Appeal f romthe Juvenile Court for Davidson Cou nty No. 2119-62114 & 2119- 62116 Betty A dam s Gr een, Judge

No. M2004- 02830-COA-R 3-P T - F iled Augu st 24, 2005

Father a ppeals the te rmination of his pare ntal rig hts to h i s t wo m i n or childre n, arg uing that Petitioner, the children’ s materna l gr andmother, did not show by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that F a the r h a d a

band on e d h is c hil dr e n. F a the r also a sse rt s that bec aus e the re is no trans c ri pt or aud io rec o r d in g o f

th e tr ial c o u rt’ s h e ar in g th is c o u rt i s u n ab leto c o n d u c t an a d e q u a teap p e ll a ter eview. We ag reewith Fathe r and f ind that due to the lack of a transcript or audiotape of the ev i d ence pr e s e n te da t th e te r mi n a ti o n h e ar in g , w e ar e u n ab leto d e te r mi n e w h e th e r c le ar a n dc o n v in cing evidenc e supported the termination of his pare ntal rig hts. Consequently , Father ha s been de prived of an e ffe ctive re view on appe al. We therefo re vacate the judg ment of the trial c ourt terminating Father’s pa

renta l rig hts and remand for f urther pr ocee dings. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Juvenile Court Vacat ed and Rem anded F RAN K G. C L EME NT , J R . , J

. , d elivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM B. C A IN and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J J ., joined. J . Stephen Mills, Nashville, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, J .N. Larry L. C r a i n , B r e n t w o o d , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e a p p e l l e e , M

. I. Ni c k Pe re nic h, Na sh vil le , T e nn e sse e , g ua rd ia n a d li te m. OP IN ION Petitioner, the maternal g randmother of two minor childre n, A.L .N. and B .T.N., filed a petition on May

25, 2004 seeking to terminate the pa renta l rig hts of the minor children’ s father on the g round of a

bandonment, as de fined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 3 6 -1 -1 0 2

. The c hildren’s mother, Father’s e x -wife and Petitioner’s daug hter, died on October 6, 2002. T he childre n arein Petiti oner’ s c us tod y pu rs uant t o a

prior or de r o f the tria l c ou rt
.Fat her i s i nca r cer at ed on four f el ony conv i ct i ons – bur gl ar y , r eck l es s ag gr ava t ed as s aul t , at t emp t ed ag gr ava t ed 1
ro b b e ry a n d a g g ra v a te d ro b b e ry.

T hr ough out it s F i nal D ecr ee of G uar di ans hi p, t he t r i al cour t r epeat edl y ch ar act er i zed Fat her ’ s t es t i mo ny as 2

“ not credi bl e. ” H owever , t he t r i al cour t al s o f ound t hat , “ O ne of t he few i ns t anc es of

cr edi bl e t es t i mo ny f

r om t he f at her was hi s admi s s i on of

ha vi ng a dr i nk i ng probl em and bei ng out of cont r ol pri or t o hi s i nca r cer at i on. ” -2- F a the r, c ur

re ntl y incarce rate d andno t e xpe c te d to be re le a se d u nti l 20 10 , f ile d a re sp on se contesting the termination of his par ental rig hts. There afte r, the trial c ourt dec lare d Fa t h er to be 1 indige nt and appointed an attorney to repre sent him. The court also appointed a g uardian ad litem to repre sent the intere sts of the minor children. Fa t h eran dP et i t i o n erwe re t h e o n l y wi t n es s es att h e O ct o b er1 , 2 0 0 4 t er m i n at i o n h eari n g. Al tho ug h A .L .N . andB .T .N . did not te sti fy , the tria l c ou rt ma de writt e n f

ind ing s th a t area ttribu ta

ble to their testimony . For

the most part, the trial court deemed Father ’s testimony to be not cre dible. 2 It also found: The mother and fathe r sepa rated in 1999 and wer e divorc ed at the time of mother’s de ath in 2002. The mother ha d sole custody of the c hildren. P rior to the separ ati o n in 1999, the mother and f ather lived with petitioner (the mate rnal g rand mothe r) fo r p e ri od s o f time . T he fathe r h ad a drinki ng pr ob le m, andwo uld become violent and abuse the mother, and on at least one occa sion, the petitioner. The poli ce w erecalled se vera l times. Often, these a ctions happene d in front of [A.L .N.]. [ A.L .N.] has exhi bited fea r and othe r prob lems due to witnessing the fathe r’ s v iol e nc e . [A .L .N .’ s] on ly me morie s o f h e r f

a the r a reba d me morie s. After the mother and fathe r sepa rate d, the mother and [A.L .N.] lived with the petitioner. In 2000, [B.T.N.] was born. The fathe r only saw [B.T.N.] onc e or twice , and [B.T.N.] does not reme mber the f ather at a l l

. T he mother lived w ith the g randmother

for a period, then on her own in a house the g randmother purcha sed for her. In 2002, t h e m o t h er, her boy friend, and the childre n moved bac k in with the g randmother

wher e she r esided until her de ath. (F ootnote omitted.) T h e f at h erh as n o ts ee n t h e c h i l d re n i n ap p ro x i m at el y fo u r y ears . Al t h o u gh he wa s u n der a

child support order , he did not pay any child support during 2002, prior to being incar cer ated. Thefathe r knew of his oblig ation to pay support, he wa s em p l o y ed at a number of jobs during 2002. Howeve r, he did not bother to pay support. Nothing chang ed afte r the mother died. The father did not visit the children a nddidno t pay

su pp ort. H e ne ve r s e nt a

c ardor le tte r. Hene ve r m a de a

ph on e c a ll. The father wa s soon incarc erated and is not expected to be r elea sed until 2010, when [A.L .N.] is 13 y ear s old and [B.T.N.] is 10.-3-

The trial c ourt held that Father had abandone d the minor children pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 10 2( 1) (A )( iv) , f

ind ing that Fath er wi llf

ull y faile d to vis it the c hil dr e n andwi llf ull y faile d to su pp ort th e c hil dr e n f

or thefo ur -m on th p e ri odprior to h is inc arc e ratio n. Th e tria l c ou rt a lso he ld that prior to his incarc eration, Father eng ag ed in conduc t which ex hibited a wanton disreg ard f or the welfa re of his children and that termination of Father’s pa renta l rig hts was in the best interests of the c h i l d r e n a s s e t f

o rt h i n T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 ( i )

. P e t i t i o n e r w a s a w ar d e dc o m p l e t e c u s t o d y, control and g uardianship and was g iven the rig ht to adopt the children. F ather appealed. Onapp e a l, F a the r a

rg ue s that the e vid e nc e did no t su pp ort the tria l c ou rt ’s te rm inatio n o f h is pare ntal rig hts. He conte nds that the trial court “flipped the bur den of pr oof” so as t o requireFather to prove that he paid support and visited his children rathe r than re quiring Petitioner to prove that he did not. Furthermore , Father a sserts that the lac k of a transcript or audiotape of the evidenc e prese nted at the t ermination hearing , preve nts this court from conducting a re view of the evidenc e. Parents have a fundamental right t o the ca re, c ustody

and contr ol of their childre n. Stanley v . I lli no is , 405 U. S. 645 , 6 51 (1 97 2) ; Ha wk v . H awk , 855 S.W .2d 573, 577 (Tenn. 1993) . This rig ht is superior to t h e cl ai m s o f o t her pe rsons and the g overnme nt, y et it is not absolute. A court may term i nate a

pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts if it finds byclea r and c onvincing evidenc e that one of the statutory g rounds for termination of pare ntal rig hts ha s been established and that the termination of su c h rig hts is i n th e be st i nte re sts of thec hil d. Te nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 1- 11 3( c ); J on e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W. 3d83 5, 83 8 (Ten n. 20 02 ); I n re A

. W. , 1 14 S.W. 3d

54 1, 54 4 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 2 00 3) ; In re C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 475-76 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2000). The c lea r and convincing e vidence standard is a heig htened bur den of pr oof which se rves to minim ize the risk of er

roneous de cisions. I

n re C

. W. W. , 3 7 S. W.3 d at 47 4; Ma tte r o f M .W .A ., J r. , 980 S.W .2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Evidence satisfy ing this hig h standard produce s a firm belief or conviction reg arding the t ruth of facts soug ht to be esta blished. I n re C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d a t 47 4. It ha s b e e n e xpla ine d b y thi s c ou rt

a s f oll ow s: The " clea r and c onvincing eviden ce " s tandar d defie s prec ise definition. Ma jor s v . S mi th , 776 S.W .2d 538, 540 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1 9 8 9 ). Whil e it is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidenc e standa rd, Santosky v . Kramer , 455 U. S. a t 76 6, 10 2 S. Ct. at 1401 ; Rentenbac h Eng'g Co. v. General Realty Ltd. , 707 S.W .2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), it does not re quire suc h certainty as the bey ond a re asonable doubt standard. Brandon v. W right , 8 3 8 S

. W

. 2d 532, 536 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 2) ; S ta te v . G ro v es , 73 5 S.W.2 d 8 43 , 8 46 (T e nn . Crim. App.1987). Clear and con v i n ci n g evidenc e eliminates any serious or substantial doubt conce rning the cor

rec tness of the c onclus i o n s to be dra wn from the e vidence

. See Hodges v

. S

. C

. T

oof & Co. , 8 33 S.W. 2d89 6, 90 1 n . 3 (T e nn . 1 99 2) . It sh ou ld pr od uc e in the fa c t- fi nd e r' s mi nda fi rm be lie f or c on vic tio n wi th re g ard to thetruth of t he allegations soug ht to be established. In re Estate of Armstrong , 859 S.W .2dD a v id so n C o u n ty Ju v e n ile C o u rt L o c a l R u le o f C o u rt 1 2 p la c e s the re sp o n sib ili ty o n the c le rk o f t h e ju v e n ile 3
cou r t t o “ pr ov i de for t h e r ec or di n g of pr oce edi n g s i n a l l h ea r i n g s . ” W h y t h i s w as n ot don e i s n ot e x pl ai n ed. T he G uardian ad L i t em ass ert s t hat t he Stat em ent of t he E v ide nce f i l ed by hi m was cert i f

i ed , but we see no 4 ind ic a tio n o f t h a t i n the re c o rd

. -4- 32 3, 32 8 (T e nn . Ct. Ap p. 19 93 ); Brandon v. W right , 8 38 S.W. 2da t 53 6; W iltcher v. Bradley , 708 S.W .2d 407, 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). O' Da n i el v. Me ssier, 9 0 5 S. W. 2 d1 8 2 , 1 8 8 ( T e n n . Ct

. A p p . 1 9 9 5 )

. It i s u n d e r th is h e ighte ned standard of

revie w that we must re view the tria l court’s finding s. The recor d on appeal in this m atter is sig nificant only for the la ck of a

rec ord of the e vidence prese nted at trial. The re is no off icial transc ript of the evid ence bec ause no c ourt reporter wa s prese nt for the Oc tober 1, 2004 t er m i n at ion hearing. T hereis also no tape re cording of the proce eding s, from which a transcript could be produc ed. Whil e the r ecor d contains two compe ting 3 pr op os e d s tate me nts of

thee vid e nc e , o ne fi le d b y F a the r andon e fi le d b y

theGu ard ia n a d li te m, neither state ment is certifie d by the trial judg e. 4 As a c on se qu e nc e , w e arefa c e d w itha re c or d th a t is no t of su ff

ic ie nt c omp le te ne ss to p e rm it proper appellate revie w of the pare nt’s claims. Unfortunately , this is not the first occ asion this court has fa ced suc h a def

iciency in a termination proce eding

. We c onsidered a simil ar situation in In re A do p t i o n o f J
. D
. W. , No. M2000-00151-COA- R3-CV, 2000 WL 1156628 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug . 16, 2 0 0 0 )

. In J

. D
. W. the fathe r’s pare ntal rig hts were terminated y et no court reporte r wa s prese nt at the hearing, thus no verba

tim transcript of the evidenc e was produce d. The fathe r appe aled c ontending that the evidenc e wa s not sufficient to support a f inding of wi llful abandonment. F inding the incomp l ete recor d preve nted this court from de termining whether the evidenc e supported or preponde rate d ag ainst the trial court’s finding s, the order terminating the father’s pa renta l rig hts was vacated. As we explained: The lac k of such a record preve nts our review of the evidenc e to determine whether it supports or preponde rate s ag ainst the trial court’s finding s an d p revents our application of the clea

r and c onvincing evidenc e standard. Whil e in other ty pes of civi l case s we would be require d to conduct our r eview using the Statement of the Evidence , see Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c) , or to ac cept a s conclusi v e t h e trial court’ s finding s, see King v. King , 986 S.W .2d 216, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App. 199 8 ), s u ch proce dures do not satisfy

the constitutional require ments app li c a b le to anappeal from an orde r terminating pare ntal rig hts. J
. D
. W. at *3. See also In re J .M.C.H., No. M 2002-01097-COA- R3-CV, 2002 WL 31662347, at *4 (Tenn. C t
. App. Nov. 26, 2002) (holding that the c onstitut ional implications of a termination proce eding r equire a re cord of sufficie nt completeness to permit proper appe llate re view of theIn re A d o p tio n o f J. D

. W

. a n d In r e J
. M. C

. H. b o t h rel i ed o n t he U ni t ed Stat es Sup rem e C o urt op i ni o n i n M
. L
. B. 5
v. S. L. J. , 519 U

. S. 10 2 (1996 ) , i n w hi ch an i ndi gen t mo t her wh ose par ent al r i gh t s ha d been t er mi nat ed was d eni ed an ap p eal due t o her i nab i l i t y to p ay t he reco rd p repa rat i o n fees

. T he C o urt em p hasi zed t hat t erm i nat i o n de crees ar e “ am o ng t he mo s t s eve r e f

orms of s t at e a ct i on. ” M .L .B . 5 1 9 U .S . at 1 2 8 . T h e C o u rt c o n c lud e d tha t t h e s ta te c o u ld no t with h o ld “a ‘ reco rd o f suf

f i ci ent co m p l et eness ’ t o p erm i t p rop er [app el l at e] co nsi d erat i o n o f

. . . cl ai m s” f rom an i nd i gent pa rent se e k ing re v ie w o f a te rm ina tio n o f p a re n ta l righ ts a c tio n . Id. a t 1 2 8

.

T h e O rd e r A p p o intin g C o u n se l f o r In d ige n t P a rty in D e p e n d a n t/N e g le c t o r T e rm ina tio n o f P a r e n ta l R igh ts 6 Proc ee di n g ma k es r ef

er en ce t o Fa t h er ’ s a f

f i dav i t of i n di g en cy f

i l ed i n t h i s ma t t er , how ev er t h at a f f i dav i t i s n ot a pa r t of the re c o rd

. -5- pare nt’s claims). J.D.W . a lso e xpla ine d th e imp orta nc e of makin g a re c or d for app e a l a vaila bleto 5 a n in dig e nt p are nt. Th e c ou rt op ine d th a t, “ I f the pa

re nt wh os e ri g hts are to be te rm inate d is ind ig e nt, then the trial c ourt must ensure that suc h a re cord is cr eate d and made avail ab l e t o a p ar ent who seeks to appe al.” Id. at *4. Father wa s decla

red indig ent and was appointed counsel to repr esent him in the termination pr oc e e din g s. Th e de te rm inatio n of F a the r’ s ind ig e nc y no t on ly e nti tle d F a the r to app oin te d c ou ns e l,

6 it also entitled him t o a s u ff i ci ent record on a

ppeal. S e e J

. D
. W. a t *4 (h old ing if

thepa re nt w ho se pare ntal rig hts are te rminated is indige nt, the trial court must ensurethat such a r ecor d of suffic ient completene ss is c reated and madeavailable to ensure an eff ective a ppeal wa s prese rved) . The re cord befor e us does not mee t this st andar d. As a conseque nce, Father ha s been de prived of an eff ective revie w by this court on appeal. There fore , the judg ment of t he trial court is vacated and this matter is re manded f or further proce eding s consistent with this opinion. Costs of appeal a re a ssessed ag ainst Appellee/Petiti oner, M

. I.

___________________________________ FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR ., J UDGE