UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES: THE COMPLEX

TASK OF COORDINATING CONTRACTS AMID

THE CHAOS AND THE REBUILDING OF IRAQ

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 11, JUNE 15, AND JULY 22, 2004

Serial No. 108–213

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES: THE COMPLEX TASK OF COORDINATING CONTRACTS

AMID THE CHAOS AND THE REBUILDING OF IRAQ

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UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES: THE COMPLEX

TASK OF COORDINATING CONTRACTS AMID

THE CHAOS AND THE REBUILDING OF IRAQ

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 11, JUNE 15, AND JULY 22, 2004

Serial No. 108–213

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on:

March 11, 2004 .......................................................................................... 1

June 15, 2004 ............................................................................................. 177

July 22, 2004 ............................................................................................. 313

Statement of:

Kelman, Steven, Weatherhead professor of public management, Harvard

University, John F. Kennedy School of Government ................................. 570

Lanzilotta, Lawrence, Principle Deputy and Acting Under Secretary of

Defense (Comptroller), U.S. Department of Defense; Deidre Lee, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, U.S. Department of

Defense; Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (policy

and procurement), U.S. Department of Defense; General Paul Kern,

Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command; Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander, Southwestern Division, U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers; and William H. Reed, Director, Defense Contract

Audit Agency, U.S. Department of Defense ................................................ 235

Neffgen, Alfred, chief operation officer, KBR government operations,

Americas Region; William Walter, director of government compliance,

KBR government operations; Charles ‘‘Stoney’’ Cox, vice president and

past Restore Iraqi Oil [RIO] Project director, KBR government operations; and Keith Richard, regional project manager, Theater Transportation Mission, LOGCAP III, KBR government operations ...................... 507

Strock, Major General Carl A., Director of Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers, U.S. Department of Defense; General Paul J. Kern, Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, U.S. Department

of Defense; Major General Wade H. McManus, Jr., Commanding General, U.S. Army Field Support Command, U.S. Department of Defense;

Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (policy and procurement), U.S. Department of Defense; Lewis Lucke, Deputy Assistant

Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development; Dov S.

Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Defense; William H. Reed, Director,

Defense Contract Audit Agency, U.S. Department of Defense; and Rear

Admiral David Nash, USN (ret.), Director, Iraq Program Management

Office, Coalition Provisional Authority ....................................................... 25

Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the United States, accompanied by William T. Woods, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. General Accounting Office, and Neal P. Curtin, Director,

Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. General Accounting Office 197

Warren, James, former truck driver, KBR; David Wilson, former truck

driver, KBR; and Marie deYoung, former logistics specialist, KBR ......... 364

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Ballard, Tina, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (policy and procurement), U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statements of........... 56, 261

Blackburn, Hon. Marsha, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Tennessee:

Copy of subcontract ................................................................................... 399

Resume of Ms. deYoung ............................................................................ 393

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 585

Clay, Hon. Wm. Lacy, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Missouri, prepared statement of .................................................................. 141

Crear, Brigadier General Robert, Commander, Southwestern Division,

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, prepared statement of ............................. 274

Page

IV

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by—Continued

Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia:

Memo from Ms. deYoung to Mr. Lesar .................................................... 498

Prepared statements of ..................................................................... 5, 181, 321

Washington Post article dated July 20, 2004 ......................................... 316

Davis, Hon. Jo Ann, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia, prepared statement of ................................................................... 146

deYoung, Marie, former logistics specialist, KBR, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 375

Harris, Hon. Katherine, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Florida, prepared statement of ................................................................ 308

Kelman, Steven, Weatherhead professor of public management, Harvard

University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, prepared statement of ........................................................................................................... 573

Kern, General Paul J., Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statements of .................. 42, 267

Lanzilotta, Lawrence, Principle Deputy and Acting Under Secretary of

Defense (Comptroller), U.S. Department of Defense:

Memo dated June 7, 2004 ......................................................................... 237

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 240

Lee, Deidre, Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, U.S.

Department of Defense, prepared statement of ......................................... 255

Lucke, Lewis, Deputy Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, prepared statement of ........................................... 64

Maloney, Hon. Carolyn B., a Representative in Congress from the State

of New York, prepared statement of ........................................................... 139

Nash, Rear Admiral David, USN (ret.), Director, Iraq Program Management Office, Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared statement of ...... 83

Neffgen, Alfred, chief operation officer, KBR government operations,

Americas Region, prepared statement of .................................................... 511

Reed, William H., Director, Defense Contract Audity Agency, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 248

Ros-Lehtinen, Hon. Ileana, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Florida, prepared statement of ................................................................ 148

Ruppersberger, Hon. C.A. Dutch, a Representative in Congress from the

State of Maryland, prepared statement of .................................................. 311

Strock, Major General Carl A., Director of Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps

of Engineers, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statement of .......... 29

Walker, David M., Comptroller General of the United States, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 200

Warren, James, former truck driver, KBR, prepared statement of ............. 366

Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State

of California:

Copies of audits ......................................................................................... 410

Memorandum dated March 10, 2004 ....................................................... 10

Minority views ........................................................................................... 329

Prepared statements of ................................................................... 20, 189, 347

Wilson, David, former truck driver, KBR, prepared statement of ............... 370

Zakheim, Dov S., Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief

Financial Officer, U.S. Department of Defense, prepared statement of ... 75

(1)

THE COMPLEX TASK OF COORDINATING CONTRACTS AMID CHAOS: THE CHALLENGES OF

REBUILDING A BROKEN IRAQ

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2154,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman of the

committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tom Davis, Burton, Ros-Lehtinen,

McHugh, Mica, LaTourette, Ose, Jo Ann Davis, Platts, Turner,

Carter, Tiberi, Waxman, Lantos, Kanjorski, Maloney, Tierney,

Clay, Watson, Lynch, Van Hollen, Ruppersberger and Norton.

Staff present: Melissa Wojciak, staff director; David Marin, deputy staff director, director of communications; Keith Ausbrook,

chief counsel; Ellen Brown, legislative director and senior policy

counsel; David Young, counsel; Robert Borden, counsel/parliamentarian; Drew Crockett, deputy director of communications; John

Cuaderes, senior professional staff member; Edward Kidd, professional staff member; Ken Feng, investigator/GAO detailee; Teresa

Austin, chief clerk; Brien Beattie, deputy clerk; Allyson Blandford,

office manager; Phil Barnett, minority staff director; Kristin

Amerling, minority deputy chief counsel; Karen Lightfoot, minority

communications director/senior policy advisor; Anna Laitin, minority communications and policy assistant; Jeff Baran and David

Rapallo, minority counsels; Mark Stephenson, minority professional

staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; Cecelia Morton, minority office manager; and

Naomi Seiler, minority staff assistant.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good afternoon. We are going to go

through two opening statements before we get to our witnesses, so

take your time getting to your seats, the witnesses.

A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.

We meet today to look into the complex task of coordinating contracts amid the chaos and challenges of rebuilding Iraq.

Even before the conclusion of major military actions, there were

plans for a major effort to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure and government. Emergency supplemental appropriations bills for both fiscal

year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 have provided more than $20 billion

to rebuild postwar Iraq. Many Federal departments and agencies

have already awarded or soon will award contracts for the

sustainment and reconstruction efforts.

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The rebuilding of Iraq is a monumental task. Saddam Hussein

spent decades frittering away his nation’s vast wealth on himself

and his Baath party cronies, while little to nothing was spent to

meet the urgent needs of the Iraqi people. Decades of neglect and

inaction have turned this once great nation into a country where

the majority of people live in poverty and despair.

However, with Saddam’s ouster, we are witnessing a rebirth of

Iraq. Freedom and liberation have brought a new sense of urgency

to the Iraqi people. They understand what is at stake; and we, as

part of the coalition of the willing, must do our part to sustain freedom by rebuilding their nation.

Twenty days ago, I, along with other members of this committee,

returned from Iraq where we witnessed the enormity of the reconstruction effort. This was my second trip, and in the 6 months since

my last visit to the region I saw significant progress in our reconstruction efforts.

The task at hand is enormous. It will be years before we are able

to get Iraq running on its own. Yet each day Iraqis are getting a

better life, thanks to the dedicated American soldiers and civilians

working there. Our reconstruction efforts are being completed

under even life-threatening conditions. Our military is nothing

short of superb. Besides ensuring the safety of the country, they

have become master builders and diplomats. The use of funds from

the Commanders Emergency Relief Program paves the way for

local and regional stabilization by allowing for small rebuilding

projects that have an immediate impact on the local population.

For example, we recently met with General Odierno, Commander

of the 4th Infantry Division, who told us how he used his CERP

funds to build a water treatment facility in Tikrit and a sewage

treatment facility in Baji. In many ways, the Commanders Emergency Relief Program is meeting the immediate needs until our

larger construction projects are completed.

The positive offshoots of the Iraqi rebuilding effort are beginning

to take shape. Entrepreneurialism is sprouting; and unemployment, which was once a major problem, is coming under control.

Our efforts are paying off. Reconstruction, together with an interim

constitution, locally elected leaders and a functioning, bettertrained security force all add up to a stable and more peaceful Iraq.

Today we meet to specifically discuss the complexity of coordinating our rebuilding of Iraq, primarily as it pertains to the larger

construction projects and sustainment efforts. Currently, there are

many U.S. Government agencies working to improve conditions in

Iraq. For example, the Department of Defense, including the U.S.

Army of Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Agency for International

Development, are both working to rebuild Iraq. Both DOD and

USAID have their own procurement shop, their own management

team, and their own audit mechanisms. The committee is interested in the efforts made by each agency to manage and coordinate

acquisition activities to ensure that taxpayer money is spent both

effectively and efficiently.

In addition, enormous amounts of money have already or are

about to be expended in the efforts to rebuild Iraq. We need to

make sure that acquisition rules are being followed. Congress has

spent years streamlining complex government rules and regulaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tions to make it easier for businesses to sell to the Federal Government, but did so in a way that carefully balances affordability, accountability, and accessibility to make sure taxpayer dollars are

protected. It’s our job to make sure that these things are happening

in Iraq.

We hope to learn today how our acquisition system and the professionals who run it have responded to the challenges raised in

Iraq. No one doubts that the circumstances are extremely difficult.

I’ve seen the chaos on the ground there. The security situation is

tenuous at best. Our servicemen and women are being killed and

wounded. A number of contractor employees have also been killed

and wounded.

Large-scale procurements are complex and difficult to understand in and of themselves. When it comes to procurement, if

you’re not confused, you’re not paying attention.

Add in the urgency and inherent dangers of contracting in a war

zone, and the challenge of acquiring urgently needed goods and

services becomes quite daunting. Through this hearing we hope to

separate fact from fiction, truth from rhetoric, and in turn help

make sure we are coordinating contract processes in Iraq in a way

that ensures success and safety.

Fortunately, our acquisition laws have been carefully crafted by

Congress to provide enough flexibility for the government to quickly get the goods and services it needs in emergency situations.

There are provisions in the acquisition laws that allow for carefully

circumscribed exceptions to our standard for full and open competition to provide for a more limited, less time-consuming award of

contracts for urgently needed supplies and services. I frankly cannot think of a situation that would better fit within these flexibilities than what we faced on the ground when we came into Iraq.

Sometimes we just don’t have time to take our time.

I find it ironic that those who are complaining that the government doesn’t have sufficient people on the ground to oversee and

administer the current contracts in Iraq would foster contracting

strategies that would increase substantially the need for contract

administration. For every complex problem, there is a simple solution that doesn’t work.

I recognize that there have been mistakes. The contract oversight

process is not always pretty, and the decisions made under the

pressures of combat are not as always as lucid as those made

under less-threatening conditions.

I commend my ranking member and others who have raised

some important questions pertaining to the reconstruction process.

Today I hope we can differentiate between real issues worthy of serious inquiry and those with little or no basis in fact that are

raised solely to create a whiff of scandal.

There are some who have disagreements with contractors overpayments, and it should come as no surprise to anybody who’s familiar with the administration of complex contracts in difficult circumstances. These difficulties should be viewed within the context

of the wartime environment in Iraq.

Many of the disputes that have been made public show that the

contract oversight process is indeed working. This hearing is part

and parcel of a functioning oversight process.

4

Make no mistake, I have no patience for fraud or abuse. I expect

that any such instances that are proven will result in harsh punishment for the perpetrators. I also expect that, as the conditions

on the ground improve, the next generation of contracts will be

awarded and administered in accordance with our standard acquisition procedures. Emergency procedures are for emergencies only.

This is a monumental task, and there is no room for error. Nor

is there room for partisan sniping aimed merely at undermining

the overall reconstruction efforts. We are interested in the truth,

not rhetorical calisthenics. We are interested in helping coordinate

the many important contracts in place today or planned for the future. In short, we are interested in moving forward with a contracting framework that benefits our reconstruction goals. We are not

interested in simply repeating disingenuous sound bites.

Now, pursuant to committee rule 14, following the witnesses’

opening statements, the ranking minority member and I shall each

control 20 minutes in order to permit some important but complex

lines of questioning and allow adequate time for full responses. Following the 40-minute questions, we will continue under the 5-

minute rule.

Mr. Waxman and I have agreed that we don’t expect any votes

today at this point.

He has asked—requested of us that a number of documents be

released from this committee. I understand that DOD has gone on

their own volition and that these documents have been released.

We are also joining with him in a request for more documentation from the Department of Defense reiterating an earlier request

for some of these documents, and we join him in this. If when we

get the responses back, they are not adequate, we will then address

what further avenues we may wish to pursue.

In the interests of time and given the 20-minute block agreement

I have made with Mr. Waxman, we are limiting opening statements to the ranking member and myself. But statements will be

included in the record, and you will have 10 calendar days to do

so.

I also want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing before the

committee, and I look forward to their testimony. I also want to

recognize a new member of the committee, the gentleman from

Ohio, Mr. Tiberi. We have had a couple of vacancies on this committee, and we are very happy to have him here. We understand

he is going to be here for the entire hearing, and we appreciate it.

Thank you.

At this time, I will yield for Mr. Waxman’s opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to

thank you for holding this hearing today.

The subject we are going to consider, contracting in Iraq, urgently needs congressional oversight. It is an issue that has crucial

implications for the success of our efforts in Iraq and for U.S. taxpayers. Usually I keep my remarks short at committee hearings,

but today I am going to speak at some length in this opening statement.

I have been investigating contracting in Iraq for many months

and I believe few of my colleagues understand just how big a mess

this administration has created. I want to explain to the members

of this committee and the public what is going wrong and why.

The problem starts with the procurement strategy that the administration is using in Iraq. It is profoundly flawed.

I have a chart that I want to display. It is over there.

The chart shows two numbers, the first, 2,300; 2,300 is the number of discrete reconstruction projects that the coalition provisional

authority is planning to do in Iraq. The second, zero, is the number

of projects that will be subject to competitive bidding.

Instead of promoting competition, the administration is giving

contractors monopolies over huge sectors of the reconstruction effort. One company, Halliburton, gets all work related to oil reconstruction in southern Iraq. Another company, Parsons, gets all

work related to oil reconstruction in northern Iraq. And they never

have to bid against each other for any specific project. The administration has a procurement strategy that intentionally shields contractors from competition.

Think about this: For nearly a year both Halliburton and Bechtel

have had enormous operations in Iraq. Both companies can do virtually the same work. But never once have they had to compete

against each other for a specific project. This is a great deal for

Bechtel and Halliburton, but it is an absolutely horrendous deal for

the taxpayers.

These problems are compounded by the fact that many of the

contracts that are being issued are cost-plus contracts. Under a

cost-plus contract, the more the contractor bills, the more money

the contractor makes. That is why cost-plus contracts are notoriously prone to abuse.

In the absence of competition to discipline the process and to

hold down prices, the taxpayer has to rely on contracting officers

working for the Defense Department to keep prices reasonable.

These officials are supposed to scrutinize the proposals submitted

by Halliburton and other contractors and reject those that are loaded up with unnecessary expenses. But they are inexperienced and

overworked.

Representative John Dingell and I asked GAO to investigate

what kind of job the Defense Department is doing managing the

largest contract in Iraq, Halliburton’s LOGCAP contract. The contract alone is worth over $4 billion to Halliburton.

GAO told us that the Army Central Command in Kuwait has not

made cost control a priority. GAO found that the Army does not

have the expertise or the personnel in Kuwait needed to ensure

that taxpayers are not being overcharged. According to the General

Accounting Office, inexperienced reservists are being sent to KuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
9

wait and given key oversight responsibilities. A 2-week training

course on contract management is the only preparation they receive.

GAO told us that in one instance the Army approved a LOGCAP

contract worth $587 million to Halliburton in just 10 minutes. The

documentation for this mammoth contract was just six pages long.

In essence, this administration’s approach to contractors like Halliburton is ‘‘trust but don’t verify.’’

Auditors like the Defense Contract Audit Agency and criminal investigators with the Inspector General and the Justice Department

can try to catch waste, fraud and abuse after it occurs, but there

are few mechanisms in place to prevent overcharges from occurring

in the first place. We are now learning that the administration’s

approach is an enormous mistake.

This week, the committee received two recent audits of Halliburton by DCAA. At the appropriate time—well, I won’t need to

move to have the committee release these documents publicly because I understand that we have all agreed and the DCAA has

agreed to make these documents public, so they will be available.

These audits are a scathing indictment of Halliburton.

According to DCAA, Halliburton’s cost accounting system has,

‘‘significant deficiencies’’ and the company has repeatedly violated

Federal acquisition regulations. Well, anybody who has followed

this issue has heard Halliburton say over and over again that any

violations or overcharges are isolated occurrences. This is what it

said when it was revealed that Halliburton sought fees for millions

of meals it never served, and it is what Halliburton said when it

disclosed that company procurement officials participated in a $6

million kickback scheme, and this is also what Halliburton said to

the DCAA.

When the audit agency gave Halliburton a chance to respond to

its preliminary findings, Halliburton wrote, ‘‘this issue is not a significant estimating system deficiency as stated in the DCAA reports. Rather, this was a unique situation.’’

The problem with Halliburton’s response is that it is not true.

According to the DCAA, ‘‘The estimating deficiency is not a onetime occurrence. It is systemic.’’

Now here is a stunning fact that is revealed in the DCAA audit

documents. The DCAA brought these systemic problems to the attention of the Army Corps of Engineers on January 13. Three days

later, on January 16, the Army Corps gave Halliburton another

$1.2 billion contract. It was as if the decisionmakers simply didn’t

care.

Yesterday, I sent my colleagues a briefing memorandum that

went through some of these issues in detail, and I’d like to ask

unanimous consent that it be made part of the hearing record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Hearing no objection, I would note that

there are parts of the briefing memorandum that we take issue

with on the factual side, Mr. Waxman. We will get to that in our

questions, but with that understanding, without objection, it will be

entered into the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. WAXMAN. It is not just the government auditors who are

complaining about Halliburton’s practices. Halliburton’s own internal auditors have said that the company procedures are, ‘‘antiquated’’ and that it has, ‘‘weak internal controls.’’

Last month, my staff was contacted by two former Halliburton

procurement officers. They described company practices that systematically overcharge the taxpayer on hundreds of routine requisitions every day. When they tried to protest, they were ignored.

They said that the company’s motto was ‘‘Don’t worry about price.

It’s cost-plus.’’

Well, it’s very hard to get details from the administration about

the specific amounts Halliburton is charging for particular projects.

The White House, Secretary of Defense, and the USAID all have

an aversion to any form of oversight. When Representative Dingell

and I wrote letters raising significant issues, they were almost always ignored. But we have been able to penetrate one particular

contract, Halliburton’s contract to import fuel from Kuwait into

Iraq; and what we have learned is that Halliburton and its obscure

subcontractor, Altanmia, have been gouging the taxpayer.

I have another chart, and I want to show this to everyone here.

Halliburton imports gasoline from Kuwait into Iraq for Iraqis to

use. The Defense Energy Support Center imports gasoline from Kuwait into Iraq for the military to use. The chart simply compares

the prices the government pays with those that Halliburton pays.

The differences are astounding.

Gasoline in the Middle East is a commodity. Everyone should be

able to get it at essentially the same price, but Halliburton is paying over 20 cents more per gallon than the Energy Support Center

just to purchase the fuel. Both Halliburton and the Energy Support

Center have to transport the fuel through dangerous conditions

into Iraq, both entities are using private contractors to handle the

transportation, and both entities receive, military protection for

convoys. But it costs the Energy Support Center just 36 cents per

gallon compared to $1.21 for Halliburton, and then Halliburton

adds on a markup for itself of 24 cents per gallon and another category called ‘‘other’’ charge of 2 cents per gallon. The end result is

that it costs the taxpayer twice as much when Halliburton imports

the fuel as it would cost the government to do it.

Representative Dingell and I first raised this issue on October

15. Since then, all I have been hearing from the Army Corps of Engineers, which is the agency responsible for the fuel contract, is a

string of denials and platitudes. As recently as February 1, the

Corps spokesman said, ‘‘We have our own internal audit process,

and we haven’t turned up any serious wrongdoing or major problems.’’

When you get to the bottom of this, that is the real problem. The

policymakers in this administration don’t seem to care about the

pattern of waste, fraud and abuse that is coming to light.

Fifty years ago, the CEO of General Motors said, what is good

for the country is good for General Motors and what is good for

General Motors is good for America. Well, I have a message to this

administration: What is good for Halliburton is not always good for

America. Iraq is a dangerous country. All of us in Congress want

to do whatever is necessary to make sure our troops have the

19

equipment and protection they need, and Americans are a generous

people. They are willing to spend billions to help Iraqis rebuild

their nation and establish democracy. But gouging and profiteering

is heinous and should never be tolerated.

I firmly believe that Congress has an important oversight roll to

play in ensuring the wise expenditure of taxpayers’ dollars. Part of

the problems that we are experiencing can be attributed to the lack

of vigorous congressional oversight. But I’m encouraged by the recent steps that Chairman Davis has taken. He has joined me in requesting the DCAA audit documents. He scheduled this hearing,

and he has promised to hold another hearing hopefully by the end

of April. This is not easy for him to do, and I am sure it will alienate many in the administration, but I commend him for the steps

that he is taking, even as I will be pressing him to take more.

In closing, let me say that I look forward to today’s hearing and

the opportunity to hear from and question the distinguished witnesses before us.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Waxman.

We have our panel today. We have Major General Carl Strock,

who is the Director of Civil Works, Army Corps of Engineers; General Paul Kern, Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command, Department of Defense; Major General Wade McManus,

Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Support Command;

Ms. Tina Ballard, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for

Policy and Procurement, U.S. Department of Defense; Lewis Lucke,

Deputy Assistant Administrator, USAID; Honorable Dov Zakheim,

the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, and Chief Financial

Officer, Department of Defense. We have Mr. William Reed, the Director of the Defense Contract Audit Agency [DCAA]; and Rear Admiral David Nash, the director of Iraq Program Management Office, Coalition Provisional Authority.

It is our committee’s policy that all witnesses be sworn before

you testify. So if you would rise with me.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think I went over with everybody that

we try to keep a 5-minute rule. Mr. Waxman and I didn’t observe

it. So we understand. Your total statement will be in the record.

Obviously, there are a lot of allegations and things going out there.

We want to give you adequate time to make your statements.

We have a distinguished panel that I think for most of you are

career military or civil servants, served under administrations of

both parties. We appreciate your taking the time to be here.

I am going to start with General Strock and work our way down.

General STROCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I also need to recognize that Dr. Zakheim

will be retiring on April 15. I want to extend my gratitude for your

many years of service to our country and best wishes as you move

forward and thank you for being with us today.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The others will be here for our next hearing, but this may be our last bite at you.

Dr. Zakheim do you want to start off.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I think if you would like to go in that order, just

in terms of the flow, of how this is all seen in terms of oversight,

then probably starting with General Strock is the right way to go.

I will be talking specifically about contract performance oversight,

and to start there is almost like starting a story in the middle. So

with your permission I think we will start at——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We will then thank you.

Again General Strock, thank you for being with us.

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STATEMENTS OF MAJOR GENERAL CARL A. STROCK, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL WORKS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; GENERAL PAUL J. KERN, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND, U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MAJOR GENERAL WADE H.

McMANUS, JR., COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FIELD

SUPPORT COMMAND, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; TINA

BALLARD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

(POLICY AND PROCUREMENT), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; LEWIS LUCKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT; DOV S.

ZAKHEIM, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

DEFENSE; WILLIAM H. REED, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; AND

REAR ADMIRAL DAVID NASH, USN (RET.), DIRECTOR, IRAQ

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE, COALITION PROVISIONAL

AUTHORITY

General STROCK. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,

thank you for allowing us to testify today. It really is an honor to

be here to tell you a bit about what we faced in Iraq.

As you mentioned, I am the Director of Civil Works for the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, but from March to September I served

with ORHA and later CPA in a number of capacities, culminating

as the Deputy Director for Infrastructure in the CPA. What I

would like to do today is give you a limited description of the operating environment that was faced by coalition military forces and

civil authorities as we went into Baghdad.

Sir, ORHA was established in January 2003—that’s the Office of

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance—and we deployed to

Kuwait on March 15, 2003. ORHA consisted of three pillars: reconstruction, led by the U.S. Agency for International Development

[USAID]; civil administration, led by the Department of Defense;

humanitarian assistance, led by the Department of State; and

three regional coordinators for north, central and south Iraq headed by two retired general officers and one former Ambassador.

The priority of effort for ORHA initially was the planning for an

expected humanitarian crisis. Significant effort went into planning

for food, water, shelter and medical support. The reconstruction

focus was to repair damaged infrastructure to prewar conditions.

We understood that the future of Iraq relied on the integrity of the

infrastructure, so careful efforts were made to use precision weapons to minimize impacts on infrastructure. The ground forces were

also sensitive to the need to limit damage to infrastructure. The

U.S. Agency for International Development was given a $680 million effort to apply to all sectors of infrastructure, and oil was handled separately through a contract under a task force to restore

Iraqi oil from the Corps of Engineers that reported directly to coalition forces land component commander.

The third element of ORHA was civil administration, and that

was aimed at the reestablishment of government functions in the

liberated country. This consisted of senior advisors for each of the

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ership would flee but that ministry work force and facilities would

be intact on our arrival.

Lieutenant General Gardner and his leadership really concentrated on creation of a guiding coalition for the future of Iraq.

The first elements deployed to the port of Umm Qasr in late

March, shortly after the commencement of the hostilities, and the

main body began deployment to Baghdad in mid-April. When we

arrived, we found a country roughly the size of California in terms

of population and geography where virtually every element of government did not exist.

There was relatively little damage due to combat operations,

with the exception of the communications infrastructure which was

deliberately targeted. We anticipated some looting but not as significant as it turned out to be. It was extremely difficult for our

forces to control, and it was especially bad in government facilities.

We also anticipated some level of sabotage, but again this exceeded

our expectations, not as much as expected in the oil infrastructure,

where very few fires were set, but much more in other elements of

infrastructure. Virtually every public building was burned, with its

records, its equipment and supplies all destroyed.

The most challenging aspect we found in the infrastructure was

really not about the damage caused by the war and its aftermath

but by 30 years of neglect under the Saddam regime. We found an

infrastructure that was fragile and antiquated, that was really on

its last legs. It was only to the credit of the Iraqi public servants

that this infrastructure worked at all, largely as we understand it

through threat that they produce for the country. Saddam also

used basic services and infrastructure to reward those who favored

him and to punish those who did not.

In the electricity sector, there was no generation of electricity

when it arrived in Baghdad, a tremendous challenge. There was no

water treatment. There was no sewage flowing. All the irrigation

in the country had ceased. Fuel supplies were far more limited

than we anticipated. The hospitals were in darkness and closed

down. Schools were not operating. The work force will be expected

to take advantage of.

As expected, the key leaders were absent. They either fled or had

been removed from debaathification. But the remaining civil servants we found were competent, committed and courageous. However, they really lacked a sense of initiative that is so important

in a self-performing government and virtually had to be told to do

everything that was necessary. They also lacked facilities, tools,

and equipment and supplies and money to get their job done.

Finally, the security situation that all of us faced was a tremendous challenge for everyone.

I might add that ORHA, those civil servants who went in with

General Gardner, faced exactly the same living conditions as the

Iraqis—no food, no fuel, no power, no transportation, everything

the same.

Sir, when we got on the ground we first established a regional

presence through our regional coordinators to include Baghdad. We

relied very heavily on the military forces in the early stages. Their

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struction and establishment of government, utilizing seized and invested assets and their own capabilities.

General McKiernan, who commanded the Combined Forces Land

Component Command, recognized the need early on to get electricity flowing in the country, so he convened a task force called

‘‘fajr,’’ which is first light in Arabic. It’s a multidisciplinary task

force led by Brigadier Steve Hawkins that went into Baghdad right

behind the military forces with a priority to establish electricity, to

first furnish it to hospitals, then water supply, then sewage treatment, and finally to domestic needs of the Iraqi people.

We also found a flooding situation on our hands, as all the reservoirs had been abandoned and they were operated at free flow.

Working with the Iraqi public servants we were able to find, we

brought the rivers under control, and we started up the power

plants and began to establish the electrical grid and began to treat

water and get hospitals back on line. Eventually Task Force Fajr

expanded their scope to a national level.

Another task force that was established was Task Force Restore

Iraqi Hope—Iraqi Oil. On February 13, the Army was designated

as executive agent for restoration of oil infrastructure, and that authority was passed on to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which

further delegated authority to Brigadier General Bob Creer from

the Southwestern Division to pull together a task force and accomplish that mission.

The immediate mission was to fight anticipated fires and to safely shut down the oil fields in Kirkuk and Rumaila and then to

bring the refineries, pipelines and export facilities back into operation. We used LOGCAP to reposition the firefighting forces that

we needed for the immediate aftermath of the fighting, and after

careful analysis decided to go to sole source with Kellogg, Brown

and Root services to accomplish, the reconstruction of the oil infrastructure.

There was far less sabotage than expected. We quickly brought

the fires under control with the assistance of the Kuwaitis and,

working with the Iraqi Oil Ministry, have made remarkable

progress. We are now at prewar oil production levels of 2.5 million

barrels per day. We are exporting 1.5 million barrels per day and

refining about 500,000 barrels per day for domestic consumption.

The expected earnings are $1.5 to $2 billion a month; and so far,

to date, we have returned $8 billion to the DFI for use by the Iraqi

people.

Task force RIO also picked up an additional responsibility to provide domestic fuel for all the people of Iraq. This is not just gasoline. It included diesel, kerosene and LPG, which they used for

cooking and heating.

Sir, our final task was Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity. In

August, General Abizaid was very concerned about the progress of

reconstruction. He was concerned that we were losing the consent

of the Iraqi people, and frequently you heard from these people

that this is the Nation that put a man on the moon but we can’t

get the lights on in Baghdad. Out of frustration, General Abizaid

convened a conference in which he wanted to look at what we were

doing with the electricity, the oil and refined fuel and the security

situation that cared for all that infrastructure.

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One of the outcomes of that conference was the need for a

FEMA-like capability similar to our domestic disaster response

where teams of experts with flexible contracting tools and the necessary resources to fix problems as they encountered them could

flow into Iraq. We deployed this task force within 2 weeks. We

pulled General Steve Hawkins back, not to the fight and put him

ashore, and since that time we’ve contributed in many ways to the

restoration of electricity working under the leadership of USAID

and the CPA.

We accomplished the first mission of 4,400 megawatts of productivity in October, and we are well on the way to achieving the

6,000 megawatt target by May. The task force really focused on

temporary generation, distribution controls and logistics, while

USAID focused on the longer-term aspects of electrical generation

and distribution. To do this, we employed four competitively bid

projects much like the IDIQs used by LOGCAP and Task Force

RIO, and so far our efforts have been tremendously successful.

My written includes far more detail, but I again appreciate the

opportunity to lay out for you the situation we faced and some of

the mechanisms we employed to address.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. As I noted before,

your entire statements are in the record; and questions will be

based on the entire statement.

[The prepared statement of General Strock follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. General Kern, thanks for being with us.

General KERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee. I appreciate the opportunity today to speak to you

about the Army’s Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, referred to as LOGCAP by the members and in our current testimony.

My command, the Army Materiel Command’s mission is to support our warfighters, and that includes all of our services as well

as Ambassador Bremer’s CPA, the Polish Multinational Division

and other organizations in this theater.

I have just returned from talking to members of the CJTF Command, General Sanchez in our area, and I would report that it’s remarkable that it’s been less than a year since the conditions which

General Strock just described have been turned into a country

which has been restoring itself into an economy and we hope to a

democracy. We work each day to improve our support in the theater, and the observations that we have made show great success in

that area as well as the areas that we need to improve. Part of the

purpose of my visit there was to find those areas we need to improve so that we get direct feedback from our customers in their

requests.

LOGCAP provides to us the vital support for our forces in peace

and in war. It gives us today the ability of an entire division of soldiers that can be returned to the fighting force and support

through LOGCAP contracting. It provides us agility, flexibility, and

fulfills critical, time-sensitive needs, and that is the critical part of

a contingency-type contract where time is essential. It provides the

means for our warfighters and our Nation to execute national security missions.

These contracts are around the world, not just in Iraq, and they

provide us extensive capability in each area we use them. When

our forces go in as General Strock has described, they carry with

them everything that they have for life support. The food, the

water, the tents and the laundry they hope will not be far behind.

LOGCAP has provided us the capability to change their conditions in which the soldiers and the support structure lives, from

lying on the ground and eating MREs to one to being able to have

shelter, sleep on cots, and have hot food prepared. If they wanted

to shower when they arrived in Iraq last year, they used a bucket

of water. Today, they have facilities to shower in. If they wanted

a clean uniform, they used the same bucket of water; and today

they have laundries that they can use. As many of the soldiers

have reported to us, LOGCAP has changed the way that they can

live and survive in that theater.

Today force provider has provided transportable shelters, it has

provided dining facilities, it has provided maintenance facilities, it

manages large pieces of our general support for parts, and it is providing a new quality of life in the country.

The stories are similar throughout. There are 61 base camps and

today 79 dining facilities, which are supporting more than 180,000

soldiers. It is time critical, and so it is a contingency type contract

which allows us to go in based on requirements and work through

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port is not what we would expect, and our contingencies allow us

to both plan for that early and then react as requirements develop.

Again, timing is critical and key in all of these.

The contractors also—and I would like to correct my written

statement, since three additional contractors were killed just yesterday, has resulted today in eight killed from any accident and

two killed in accidents. So they are exposed to the same dangers

that our soldiers and others in Ambassador Bremer’s organization

are exposed. We don’t know precisely where we are going to be in

our security arrangements, and this has given us the flexibility to

respond.

We also believe in fiscal responsibility. So our process, which I

will ask General McManus to describe in some more detail, allows

for that fiscal responsibility. It is a process of defining requirements, making sure that they fit within the scope of our contracting efforts and then following up with audits and defense contract

management administrative contracting officers to ensure that everything is done in accordance to our Federal acquisition regulations.

The point is, we do plan and we do followup and we are fiscally

and legally responsible for the actions that we do take.

I believe that LOGCAP and our soldiers are doing a remarkable

job. We aren’t perfect. It is a war zone, and we are correcting the

mistakes as we find them. I believe you will find that we have corrected more than we have found by the basis of just eliminating

and working together both with our supporting requirements and

our audit agencies. The soldiers have done a remarkable job, and

they have been supported by the LOGCAP contract admirably.

We look forward to your questions and I appreciate the opportunity on our behalf to testify.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Kern follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Can we go now to Ms. Ballard.

Ms. BALLARD. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the

committee, thank you for this opportunity to report to you on the

U.S. Army’s role in contracting in Iraq.

It is my privilege to represent——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Could you pull the mic just a little closer

there?

Ms. BALLARD. Is that better, sir?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It’s better.

Ms. BALLARD. It is my privilege to represent the Army leadership

and the military and civilian members of the Army’s contracting

work force who are at the forefront in the reconstruction and restoration of Iraq’s infrastructure. We are very proud of these dedicated men and women because of their extraordinary efforts to help

create a stable and successful Iraq, especially in light of the dangers they face every day.

This is a time of tremendous change, and we are most grateful

for the committee’ wisdom, guidance and strong support. Over the

last year, our Army has met the demands of the global war on terrorism with more than 330,000 troops deployed around the world

in more than 120 countries. They are doing what our country needs

them to do in Bosnia, Kosovo, in the Sinai, in Korea, in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The U.S. Army—well-trained, well-led and wellequipped—is an important part of our globally engaged joint force.

Our Army was instrumental in the defeat of Saddam Hussein and

the subsequent liberation of more than 46 million people from oppression and despair. Our Army remains a central and critical participant in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

On May 21, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated

the Secretary of the Army as the Executive Agent for the Office of

Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, later to become the

Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA], in Iraq. On January 14,

2004, the Deputy Secretary of Defense further assigned responsibility for Acquisition and Program Management Support for CPA to

the Secretary of the Army. The Army is the lead service, helping

Iraqi people build a stable and democratic society.

Our job is enormous, but we continue to make progress in an extremely difficult situation. I would like to reiterate the widespread

neglect of basic services that Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul

Wolfowitz reported to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

May 22, 2003. He said:

Before the war, large numbers of Iraq’s children under 5 years old suffered from

malnutrition.

Only 60 percent of the Iraqi people had access to safe drinking water.

Ten of Basrah’s 21 potable water treatment facilities were not functional.

Seventy percent of Iraq’s sewage treatment plants needed repair. According to

UNICEF reports, some 500,000 metric tons of raw or partially treated sewage was

dumped into the Tigris or Euphrates rivers, which are Iraq’s main source of water.

Eighty percent of Iraq’s 25,000 schools were in poor condition. In some cases, as

many as 180 students occupied one classroom—with an average of one book per six

students—while at the same time every one of the first 100 or so schools we inspected in southern Iraq had been used as military command posts and arms storage sites.

Iraq’s electrical power system operated at half its capacity.

Iraq’s agriculture production had dropped significantly.

Iraq’s oil infrastructure was neglected.’’

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It will take time to reverse these desperate conditions, but we

are making steady progress.

The Army, as Executive Agent, is providing contracting and program management support both in Iraq and in the United States.

We are charged with procuring all nonconstruction items and services to meet the humanitarian needs—the basic needs—of the Iraqi

people as well as the economic reconstruction and repair of Iraq’s

infrastructure. To date, in total, more than 1,500 contracts valued

at more than $9.7 billion have been awarded. Of that total, more

than 1,300 contracts totaling $1.3 billion have been awarded by our

contracting office in Iraq. These contracts were awarded for the repair and renovation of schools, banks, railway stations, clinics,

mosques, a human rights building, a teacher training institute, a

women’s rights building, and water treatment plants. These contracts were awarded to provide police and firefighters with uniforms and equipment, hospitals with badly needed supplies, electrical power system equipment, rescue equipment and buses. In addition, our contract awards are helping to build playgrounds, youth

centers, emergency housing, roads, sewers and irrigation systems. Again, of the overall total of more than $9.7 billion, contracts awarded within the United States total $2.5 billion for more than

200 contracts that are restoring Iraqi oil, shutting down and repairing oil wells, firefighting, explosive ordinance demolition, restoring Iraqi electricity, radio installation throughout Iraq, laptops,

and emergency medical personnel in each of Iraq’s 18 governates.

Led by Admiral David Nash, U.S. Navy retired, the Program

Management Office for rebuilding Iraq is located in Baghdad with

a support office located in the Pentagon. As the requirement focal

point for all Iraq reconstruction contracting, the PMO is responsible for oversight and implementation of the $18.4 billion appropriated by the U.S. Congress to support the reconstruction of Iraq’s

infrastructure. The construction sectors are oil, electricity, public

works and water, security and justice, transportation and communications, buildings, education and health.

Over $12.6 billion will be spent toward actual construction over

the next few years, and $5.8 billion will be spent on nonconstruction. Some of the funds will go toward democracy, which is not covered by supplies. Computers are needed to monitor and control

electrical and water systems; vehicles are needed to transport materials or to support system maintenance; uniforms and supplies

are needed to support the police and civil defense corps; and supplies are needed to support schools.

On January 6, 2004, the Army released seven design/build construction solicitations. Proposals were received in February and are

under evaluation for project awards in March of this year. These

seven solicitations will result in 10 contracts in support of electrical, public works and water, water resources, transportation,

communication, security projects and buildings. Contracts will be

awarded using best value valuation methodology based on technical, management, past performance and cost factors.

Our contracting personnel on the ground in Iraq are courageous,

dedicated volunteers. Since June 2003, when our first person arrived, we have been operating in Iraq. We now have a total of 28

individuals. They are multi-service and civilian: 3 Army, 4 Navy,

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1 Marine, 11 Air Force and 9 civilians working in small, jampacked work spaces. They are doing a phenomenal job under very

tough and dangerous conditions.

Let me illustrate my point. Army Colonel Elias George Nimmer,

a Medical Service Corps Officer and a member of the acquisition

work force assigned to the Office of Assistant Secretary of the

Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology was deployed in

late June 2003, as part of a team supporting CPA’s work with

Iraq’s Ministry of Health. In the early morning of October 26, 2003,

a barrage of rockets hit the al-Rashid Hotel where he was staying,

and a rocket impacted directly inside his room. Colonel Nimmer

was hit with shrapnel in the spine and unable to move. Following

three surgeries, he is doing remarkably well and recently returned

to duty within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army.

Currently, the General Accounting Office, in response to requests

from Congress, is reviewing Iraqi essential services contracts to

perform that the Army has followed proper procedures. We are

working closely with the GAO auditors to ensure that they have all

the information necessary to complete their work.

I have a deep and growing appreciation for the courage, competence, dedication and efforts of our contracting personnel.

Thanks to their hard work and extreme dedication, the U.S. Army

leads the way in providing contracting support to CPA and to the

people of Iraq. The work has been—and will continue to be—performed in accordance with proper procedures by military and civilian volunteers who are concerned and committed to accomplishing

their work under the toughest and most austere conditions. We are

proud of our role in helping to create and rebuild a stable and successful Iraq. Our accomplishments are helping the citizens of Iraq

move toward governing themselves and sustaining, operating and

maintaining their own infrastructure which, in turn, will help our

soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines to return home sooner.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ballard follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let’s move to Mr. Lucke. Again, your total

statement is in the record, so try to keep it within 5 minutes.

General McManus is here for questions, and Mr. Reed is here for

questions. That is why they are sitting up there, but they don’t

have to give opening statements. Thanks.

Mr. LUCKE. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the

committee, I welcome the opportunity to testify on the U.S. Agency

for International Development’s participation in Iraq reconstruction.

USAID began contingency planning for possible humanitarian

and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict Iraq in late 2002. As part

of this process, we mobilized significant resources and technical expertise to support both potential humanitarian as well as reconstruction requirements. I arrived in the region in November 2002,

moved to Baghdad in April 2003, and remained as USAID mission

director until last month.

Working with CPA to improve the lives of Iraqis, USAID is working throughout Iraq to restore critical infrastructure, support the

delivery of health care and education services, expand economic opportunity and improve governance. With a staff of some 160 ex-patriots and Iraqis, we are managing some $3.8 billion in projects to

date. The USAID contractors and grantees now number some 800

ex-patriots, 3,000 Iraqis with a presence in every province of Iraq.

Starting from zero, we’re now fully mobilized and producing results, and we have moved fast. Our infrastructure contract alone

has obligated over $1 billion in power, water and other work since

the contract was awarded in March of last year. In coordination

first with ORHA and then CPA, USAID was tasked with managing

some $2.1 billion of the first April 2003 supplemental appropriation.

We have many partners in Iraq within CPA: the Corps of Engineers for infrastructure supervision, the U.S. Army for the power

sector, and the State Department in various sectors, especially governance.

Our role in post-conflict Iraq has been twofold: first, to avoid a

humanitarian crisis, which didn’t happen; and, second, to lay the

foundation for long-term reconstruction, where we are well on the

way to helping CPA accomplish this goal.

Our specific accomplishments in Iraq are significant.

In infrastructure, we have repaired and are repairing power systems, the port of Umm Qasr water and sanitation systems, airports, telecommunications facilities, schools, health clinics, railways

and irrigation systems.

In social services, we’ve immunized millions of children,

strengthened the health care system, printed and distributed millions of new textbooks, distributed school and student kits to millions of students, and trained teachers.

In the area of economic opportunity, we have implemented key

reforms in economic governance related to the regulatory environment, banking, taxation, replacement of the old currency, and

begun work in the key agriculture sector.

In governance, we have helped establish local councils throughout Iraq, awarded rapid response grants to provide essential local

services, begun civic education programs, helped reestablish funcVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tioning government ministries, established hundreds of community

associations, and we’re helping CPA lay the groundwork for a

democratic and sovereign Iraq.

We have accomplished this work under the initial 2003 supplement by awarding nine contracts for port administration, airport

administration, logistic support, infrastructure repair, architecture

and engineering services for infrastructure, health, education, economic recovery and reform and agriculture.

Additionally, we have significant grants to five U.S. NGO’s for

community development throughout Iraq, grants to the World

Health Organization, UNICEF and UNESCO for health, water

sanitation and replacement of math and science books respectively,

and grants to five U.S. universities to partner with Iraqi universities.

Under the second Iraq supplemental, USAID was the first agency to make an award in support of the continuing efforts in Iraq

with a $1.8 billion infrastructure contract utilizing full and open

competition. It’s anticipated that this contract will primarily provide additional work in the power and water sectors.

Although proud of our efforts in Iraq, our work takes place in the

context of considerable security and logistical challenges associated

with standing up the largest U.S. reconstruction program since the

Marshall plan. USAID has remained as open and transparent as

possible in our procurement process. We have made serious efforts

to make available virtually every procurement document we legally

can on our Web site.

Steven Schooner of the George Washington University Law

School recently wrote at a Government Contracts Year in Review

conference that USAID, ‘‘has endeavored, for the most part successfully, to provide information related to its contracting activities on

its Web page.’’ He goes on to say, ‘‘I believe that USAID has set

a new standard for transparency and public procurement.’’

We will continue to expand our efforts to meet the very high

standards that we have set for ourselves. We are also doing everything we can to ensure that the taxpayers receive value for their

dollar, that includes posting U.S. direct-hire staff to Iraq, including

to three regional offices to oversee these contracts, as well as hiring

senior contracting officials to help administer these awards.

We are co-located in Baghdad with the USAID Inspector General’s Office and receive audit support from the Defense Contract

Audit Agency to ensure funds are spent appropriately and are accounted for. And we take this accountability responsibility seriously.

USAID is determined to successfully help CPA lay the foundation

for governmental and economic transformation in Iraq. We are successfully managing an enormous sum of public funds to an ambitious but focused reconstruction program, and we are prepared to

continue this effort for the duration of the construction period.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lucke follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Dr. Zakheim, thank you.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Waxman, members of the committee.

I want to focus on Department of Defense oversight of contracts

related to military operations and reconstruction in Iraq. With me

on my left is Mr. Bill Reed, who has been serving as Director of

DCAA, the Contract Audit Agency, for 16 years and is a respected

professional in his field.

DOD considers the oversight of contracts an essential responsibility. We have a number of strong organizations, policies and

regulations to fulfill this responsibility. Our task is not only to

identify contract issues, but also to prevent future occurrences of

problems we identify, recover any excess charges and take appropriate action against any contractor wrongdoing.

As the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller and also the Department’s Chief Financial Officer, I am responsible for ensuring

the adequate financial management of funds spent on the reconstruction of Iraq. My involvement in DOD contract performance

oversight comes primarily from my office’s responsibility for the

Defense Contract Audit Agency. Bill Reed reports to me.

DCAA’s mission is provide all contract audit and financial advisory services related to DOD acquisition of goods and services.

Other DOD organizations that are not within my office, such as the

Defense Contract Management Agency and the DOD Inspector

General, also play important oversight roles in terms of managing—of watching contracts—and work closely with DCAA. My colleague, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, is responsible for the contract policies to help ensure the Department obtains the best value when acquiring equipment and services and

also is responsible for oversight of the Defense Contract Management Agency.

The Army and DCAA are strategic partners in the oversight of

contracts through performance. The Army, as the executive agent

for all Department reconstruction requirements in Iraq, is responsible for contract and program management activities there.

DCAA, which is co-located with Army personnel in Baghdad,

evaluates all contractor proposals and reviews all billing paperwork

for primes and subcontractors.

My office’s financial management activities in Iraq began at the

end of major combat operations there. I created and had in place

by late April 2003 a 20 member forward cell that included representatives not only from DCAA but also from the DOD Inspector

General, from the Office of Management and Budget, from the Defense Contract Management Agency, from the Joint Staff, from

USAID and from the General Accounting Office. This team and its

supporting rear cell at the Pentagon were especially critical to getting the Coalition Provisional Authority fully operational and capable of undertaking its enormous reconstruction tasks.

DOD contract performance oversight is now being supported by

DCAA’s Iraq branch office under Branch Manager Dan Altemus.

The office now has 25 auditors. I met all 25 of them when I was

in Iraq 2 weeks ago, the office it will increase to 31 auditors by the

end of May.

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Complementing this in-country support, DCAA has auditors that

also provide contract oversight at stateside locations that have

major contracts in Iraq.

Let me talk briefly about some of our findings and actions. DOD

oversight of contract performance in Iraq has uncovered a number

of problems. A resulting action has ranged from recommending

changes in processes to rejection of unsupported proposal costs to

reductions in billed costs for potentially unreasonable expenditures,

to referral of our findings to the DOD Inspector General for possible legal action against the contractor.

Contractor performance in Iraq has not been perfect, but it has

not been terrible. Iraq presents a difficult security environment for

contractors, as you have heard. A number have already been killed,

many wounded. Many contractors that have not had problems in

performing their domestic DOD contracts are having difficulties in

adjusting to the unique environment in Iraq and to their own firm’s

influx of new business.

We believe that contractor financial and internal control problems will resolve themselves. In the meantime, we will take whatever actions are necessary to protect the government’s financial interest. DOD has enforced and will continue to enforce the highest

standards for contracts in Iraq and anywhere else. Halliburton,

mainly through its Kellogg, Brown and Root subsidiary, is the largest contractor operating in Iraq with contract ceilings that approach $18 billion. We are not surprised that the largest contractor

has the bulk of the contract problems we found.

KBR has been responsive to the reported contract findings and

has agreed to work on improving its contract performance. Contract problems reported to date generally have been caused by contractor deficiencies, not by problems with contract policies or the

DOD organizations managing these contracts. The process works.

Still, to mitigate only process problems, the Department has

taken action to ensure that its contract processes are integrated, effective and efficient. Especially significant has been the creation of

the CPA’s Program Management Office, led by Admiral Dave Nash

who is here. I should also mention, new CPA Inspector General.

My statement for the record provides details on DOD oversight

of Iraq contracts and the major issues we have identified. I will

only highlight a very few of them orally.

Estimating practices: DCAA has identified significant deficiencies

in KBR’s estimating practices relating to the award of subcontract

costs. Earlier this year, after consultation with the contracting officer, DCAA returned two major task order proposals worth more

than $3 billion to KBR because they were inadequate for the purposes of negotiating a fair and reasonable price.

KBR later resubmitted one of the task orders for $700 million

less than the original proposal. Even this resubmitted proposal was

later withdrawn by KBR due to continuing pricing issues.

It was DCAA that found that $700 million problem. These issues

included proposal subcontract costs that were significantly different

from previously negotiated actual subcontract amounts and KBR’s

use of proposal estimates instead of more than $290 million of actual costs already incurred. Both issues were disclosed during the

DCAA audit.

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On January 13, 2004, DCAA notified the appropriate government

contracting officials that KBR’s subcontracting estimating process

and procedures were considered inadequate and recommended that

DCAA be advised before the negotiation of any future contract

awards. KBR’s deficiency in estimating some contracts was the catalyst of DCAA’s review of potential gasoline overpricing under the

Restore Iraqi Oil [RIO], contract.

The review found significant issues related to KBR’s pricing and

award of subcontract costs. It disclosed potential overpricing on

gasoline of $61 million through September 2003. During DCAA’s

review, the auditors came across other information that led them

to make a referral to the DOD Inspector General, which recently

launched an investigation of this potential overpricing of gasoline.

KBR and dining facilities subcontract costs: DCAA has identified

inadequate support for billed dining facilities costs. In DCAA’s

opinion, the billed number of meals appears to exceed significantly

the actual meals served.

DCAA and KBR have agreed on the withholding of $176.5 million, of which it voluntarily withheld $140.7 million from future billings while KBR prepares a response to issues reported by DCAA.

Then there is the violation of the ‘‘Anti-kickback’’ Act. KBR itself

has voluntarily disclosed a possible violation of the ‘‘Anti-kickback’’

Act by two of its employees. KBR has already reimbursed the government for the estimated impact of $6.3 million. DCAA has requested supporting data from KBR to validate that sum. DCAA has

helped identify contracting issues that stem from the fact that

major contracts in Iraq have been slow to get definitized, and by

definitized, I mean to get a definite contract price negotiated.

DCAA found that KBR was not observing the 85 percent limit in

the reimbursement vouchers it submitted for its undefinitized

LOGCAP task orders. In late February, DCAA told KBR that it

should apply that 85 percent limit to its vouchers, in other words,

not charging the additional 15 percent. The Army’s contracting officer has received KBR’s response to the DCAA recommendation and

is currently evaluating it.

There are other contract issues that go beyond KBR, and it is important to mention a few of these.

Titan Corp.: Recent DCAA audits disclosed deficiencies in Titan’s

labor distribution system, which records costs to Titan employees.

DCAA also found that Titan lacked procedures for adequate tracking of hours worked by foreign national consultants. Based on

these findings, the Defense Contract Management Agency contracting officer implemented a 10 percent withhold on all of Titan’s

labor and consulting costs until all identified deficiencies are corrected and bills to the government are based on adequate internal

controls.

Restore Iraqi Electricity: In January and February of this year,

DCAA auditors evaluated proposal costs exceeding $900 million

from the three prime contractors for the RIE program, Fluor Federal systems, Perini Corp. and Washington Group International. As

a result of these proposal reviews, DCAA reported to the Army

Corps of Engineers that all three contractors had substantial subcontract pricing issues.

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DCAA will continue to perform oversight of the subcontract estimating and billed costs. It will work closely with the prime contractors and the Corps of Engineers to ensure that future subcontract

estimates are adequate. In addition, it will evaluate each voucher

submitted by the prime contractors to ensure that contract costs,

including subcontract costs, are properly billed and paid.

In closing, I first want to underscore the context in which all of

this is taking place. You have heard the details of how the country

of Iraq has been completely transformed in less than a year. After

the war, we have opened hospitals; we have opened medical clinics;

we have restored Iraqi oil to prewar levels; courts are back in operation and are probably functioning a bit better than the previous

30 years; a new currency in circulation; 170 newspapers are being

published; students sit in rehabilitated classrooms with new textbooks whose contents probably are true for the first time in many

years; and a Governing Council that ratified a Bill of Rights.

That is the context in which we have all operated. Beyond that,

I want to underscore that we in the Department of Defense are absolutely committed to an integrated, well-managed process in Iraq.

We will not tolerate the billing of costs that are not properly documented and supported. If internal controlled systems are deficient,

we will continue to use protections, such as contract withholdings,

to safeguard the people’s interests. And we will provide whatever

personnel and budget resources are needed to enforce integrity in

DOD contracts.

My comptroller organization will continue to work with other organizations within and outside the Department to assist those organizations and to share our findings. From the beginning, DCAA

and my office have coordinated closely not only with the DOD Inspector General but with the General Accounting Office and now

with the CPA Inspector General, since its creation.

We have regularly provided these organizations with information

on our activities. And this has included DCAA detailed briefings to

the GAO on June 23 and November 7 of last year. And this past

January 7, DCAA Director Bill Reed and I personally briefed David

Walker, the Comptroller General and Gene Reardon, the Deputy

Inspector General of DOD, on DCAA’s contract audit support of

Iraq reconstruction.

DCAA and my office are the primary source of information on

Iraq oversight for both the GAO and the DOD Inspector General.

I repeat, we are the primary source. GAO and the DOD IG have

been supportive of our work in Iraq and have allowed DCAA to

continue its programmed audits without attempting to duplicate

their work.

In sum, I believe the Department’s contract oversight has been

vigilant, and we will ensure that it continues to be vigilant. I look

forward to addressing any questions or comments you have on this

matter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zakheim follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Admiral Nash, clean up here.

Admiral NASH. Thank you and good afternoon, Mr. Chairman

and members of the committee.

I will submit my written remarks for the record and I would like

to summarize them very quickly. I really appreciate this opportunity to offer a field perspective on the reconstruction in Iraq

based on my 8 months of experience there. It is an honor to appear

before you and to bring the information that I have.

The Program Management Office is a living example, in my opinion, of how a total can be greater than the sum of its parts. I am

proud to represent that team today that is dedicated. Speaking in

the broadest of terms, the Public Management Office is responsible

for managing and executing the U.S.-funded reconstruction of

Iraq’s infrastructure and essential services. As the Office’s Director,

I report to the Coalition Provisional Authority’s Administrator, Ambassador Bremer. I also report to Acting Secretary of the Army—

Brownlee—for Acquisition and Program Management Support.

Our goals are simple: To properly execute the supplemental

work; to build the capacity for Iraq to do large program management for their own future; to build the capacity of Iraq construction

and construction support industry; and finally and most important,

is to win the peace in Iraq.

Most of you have seen the statistics about electricity and water

and telephone and other infrastructure elements in Iraq. Having

lived in Iraq for 8 months, I can attest to the severity of these challenges. As you know, Saddam Hussein’s government paid little attention to maintaining the country’s infrastructure. Before the war,

the electrical grid left more than one-third of the Iraqi citizenry

without power; 40 percent of their citizens lacked access to safe, reliable water supplies, with only 6 percent of the population linked

to a sewage treatment system, and telephones limited to only a

handful of homes. In summary, facilities and services across the

country ran until they were broken and then abandoned.

Rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructure is a key part of the overall

strategy to assist Iraq in becoming a free and democratic country.

You all did your part by providing the $18.4 billion to help rebuild

Iraq. The $12.6 billion will be focused on construction and approximately $5.8 billion on nonconstruction. Our emphasis is creating

security through stability that will ultimately accelerate the pace

at which Iraqi sovereignty will lead to all of our troops returning

home permanently.

Lieutenant General Sanchez and I agree wholeheartedly on this

principle, and we are committed to working together. Moreover, we

are firmly committed to the concept that time is of the essence, and

we must work as fast as possible to rebuild Iraq infrastructure.

And to ensure accountability for the funds allocated under fiscal

year 2004 supplemental appropriations bill for the reconstruction of

Iraq, a coordinated body was necessary.

The Coalition Provisional Authority and Ambassador Bremer created the Program Management Office designed to direct, coordinate

and oversee the contracting organizations for this endeavor. U.S.

Government organizations and agencies, such as USAID and the

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Army Corps of Engineers, will serve as executive agents in contracting on our behalf.

We established an approach and reconstruction efforts that follow four basic tenets: First, financial and contractual authority will

follow a clear chain of responsibility; second, program management

will follow an innovative and highly leveraged approach that relies

heavily on the private-sector participation; third, contracting the

work will follow a strategy of full and open competition and comply

with the Federal acquisition regulations in the supplemental bill;

and finally, we will have maximum transparency in everything we

do.

Our approach leverages the private sector for construction and

program management support while maintaining a layer of government oversight protecting the American taxpayer. This concept of

operations is inherently agile and allows us to evaluate and adjust

each stage based on performance. The result is the greatest value

at the least cost.

The assistance you have provided in response to the President’s

emergency supplemental request is vast and speaks well for the

generosity of the American people. It will lay a solid foundation for

the future in Iraq.

As we move forward, we are organized for success and have the

people, technology and processes to do the job. We are at work

today on the following: The supplemental funds for reconstruction

are being committed in accordance with the 5 January 2007 report

to Congress. Each contract contains explicit incentives for hiring

Iraqi citizens. And finally, we are emphasizing transparency of operations by using off-the-shelf management information systems for

real-time reporting, visible on the Program Management Office

Web site.

I said earlier that our actions were open, competitive and transparent. To assure that they remain so, the following auditors, including others, will oversee and review our work: The Defense Contracting Auditing Agency has already joined us. The Coalition Provisional Inspector General has already stood up, and I have already

spoken to the General Accounting Office and the Comptroller General.

Continuing audits, in my experience, are a normal part of the acquisition cycle and not only serve the classic functions of preventing waste, fraud and abuse but also will serve as a running tutorial

for the Iraqi Government and business community.

I am confident that we have made a solid start to the task ahead.

However, no effort of this size or scope has ever been flawless. We

will work hard to continually evaluate ourselves, improve and ask

the auditors to help us do so.

Mr. Chairman on June 30, a sovereign Iraqi Government assumes power. However, the mission to rebuild the infrastructure of

Iraq will continue. Rebuilding power plants, water treatment facilities, telecommunications facilities, schools, security facilities, public

buildings, this all will take time. In my 8 months in Iraq, I have

met hundreds of Iraqis. Their message has been consistent. They

want nothing more than what we enjoy here, reliable electricity,

clean water, functioning sewage systems, an educational infrastrucVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ture and better health care. Beyond that, they expect the United

States will make good on its promises, and we shall.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Nash follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you all very much.

Let me start the questioning. This really goes to everybody on

here. I am going to ask a three part question, but I want to get

this on the record, and everybody is under oath. Have you or anyone in your office ever discussed with the Vice President or with

his office the award of a contract for Iraqi reconstruction prior to

any contract being awarded?

General STROCK. No, I have not.

General KERN. No, sir, I have not.

General MCMANUS. No, sir, I have not.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir, I have not.

Mr. LUCKE. No, sir, I have not.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. No, sir, I have not.

Mr. REED. No, sir, I have not.

Admiral NASH. No, sir, I have not.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Did the fact that the Vice President was

a former officer, CEO, of Halliburton influence the selection of Halliburton and KBR in any way?

General STROCK. No, sir, it did not.

General KERN. No, sir, it did not.

General MCMANUS. No, sir, it did not.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir, it did not.

Mr. LUCKE. We have no contractual arrangement with Halliburton.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. We oversee, but I have no knowledge of any of

this.

Mr. REED. No, I have no knowledge.

Admiral NASH. No, sir, I have not.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Have you or anyone in your office been

pressured by any political appointee or high official in the administration to make an award to a particular firm or go easy on any

contractor in carrying out contract oversight activities?

General STROCK. Not to my knowledge.

General KERN. No, sir, not in my office.

General MCMANUS. No, sir, not in my command.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir.

Mr. LUCKE. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. No, sir.

Mr. REED. No.

Admiral NASH. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

An issue was raised, given the conditions on the ground in Iraq,

do you think it would have been practical to have used multiple

award task order contracts for sustainment or reconstruction services?

There was a chart put up by the ranking member on a number

of discrete projects and the number of discrete projects subject to

competition. Is there any chance you would have been able to conduct competition for any of these task orders? Let me start with

you, General McManus.

Admiral Nash, you now are current. Maybe as the situation

changes, could we do a better job?

General MCMANUS. It is important to note that the LOGCAP

contract provides us a flexibility and agility to respond to unknown

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requirements over unknown timelines in uncertain conditions. As

we began to prosecute this campaign—and remember, we were operating in Iraq as well as Afghanistan and Kuwait with forces employed to include bringing in the additional support for ORHA and

CPA, the Iraqi Survey Group, and now the multinational division—

the timelines against which we execute the warfighter’s requirements or the customer’s requirements are often very, very tight.

In the course of normal competition, we wouldn’t be nowhere

near where we are today in terms of life support, distribution logistics support, if we had to do that. Time really becomes the biggest

enemy, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I understand that, but LOGCAP is given

to one company.

General MCMANUS. That is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So, basically, when you go out to them,

nobody can say, ‘‘I can do it cheaper or better,’’ on any number of

tasks, isn’t that right?

General MCMANUS. That is correct. It’s also important to note

that LOGCAP, as a former program, we have been using as an institution for a decade. This is competition in which we select competitively a contractor to support contingency operations.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Admiral Nash, did you want to add anything to do that?

Admiral NASH. When you use multiple award contracts, it requires that you have a lot of contractors mobilized onsite. It works

very well in the United States where you have lots of contractors.

But when you don’t have lots of contractors, then you end up

with the additional costs of mobilizing many. As we get many contractors mobilized in Iraq in the future, it will be something we

will look at, because we will be looking for ways to become more

efficient.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Since the contractors had to be there,

there was no—there wasn’t a lot of people knocking on the door to

send people over?

Admiral NASH. No, sir, to my knowledge.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Lucke, do you have any comments?

Mr. LUCKE. We began planning in November 2002, and we were

able to use limited competition for eight of our nine grants. The one

that we did not use limited competition on was for personnel, and

that was a sole source that we absolutely needed in order to have

personnel present in order to implement the programs.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask Mr. Reed, you are head of the

Defense Contract Audit Agency. How many years have you been in

the business of looking at government contracts?

Mr. REED. Thirty-nine years.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You served under a lot of different administrations and seen—you have seen a lot of contracts go awry during that time?

Mr. REED. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The ranking member made a comment

that cost-plus contracts are notoriously open for abuse. Let me ask

about the reliance on cost-plus contracts in this particular circumstance.

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Obviously, there are some cases where there are better vehicles

than others. As you look at this from your perspective having to

audit these, were there better ways to do this, or was this the most

efficient way to accomplish the mission?

Mr. REED. The selection of the contract type is usually a balancing of risk between the government and the contractor. Firmfixed contracts shift most of the risk to the contractor. Obviously,

cost reimbursement is more of a balanced risk.

There’s no question that, when you are dealing with a contingency operation, that it will be very difficult to get any contractor

to bid firm-fixed price for the scope of some of these efforts, which

the requirements are very fluid, quite frankly. So I believe that the

contracting vehicle selection is appropriate in my judgment.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And when you talk about cost-plus, there

is an award fee with that, too, that goes to your ability to manage

the contracts and bring costs down?

Mr. REED. That is correct, and that is a classic vehicle used by

contracting officials to ensure contract performance.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You have seen, obviously, a lot of cost-plus

contracts in your time. In this situation, there have been allegations that one of the contractors, Halliburton in particular, would

send in invoices for meals that weren’t served. Is this a common

practice, when you’re not sure what logistics are going to be and

what is our catch to catch this and make sure there are corrections

made as this goes through the process?

Mr. REED. DCAA certainly is not an expert in restaurant services, but just from a common sense standpoint and what we have

been advising to the contracting officer that we would expect to see,

just common sense, is a reimbursement based on actual meals

served plus a small margin for unexpected surplus based on some

pattern of history. So, you know, if the average is 3,000 meals a

day, 1 day only 2,900 show up and we have a small margin for the

contractor to be covered because he estimated based on history to

serve 3,000 meals.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So it is not uncommon for them to come

in with an invoice for more or less than they actually served, based

on historical——

Mr. REED. That should be a condition of the contract. The contract should spell that out. And DCAA will audit to whatever the

terms of the contract are.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do you have any comments on that?

General MCMANUS. No, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. Ballard.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. As I understand it, the allegation here is

that there were meals not served, and there were billings coming

in. But ordinarily, on an audit, it would be reconciled?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. That is exactly right.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The process is set up that it would not be

uncommon for someone to come in slightly over or under and on

audit, you pick those up and reconcile?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Exactly.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That is not necessarily evidence of fraud,

that’s just the way it works in the normal scheme of things?

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Mr. REED. That’s right.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Why is any gasoline being imported from

Kuwait under Halliburton’s IO contract? Why are they such high

prices? Ms. Ballard, can you explain that to us, because you have

the chart that was up there and the chart leaps out at you?

Ms. BALLARD. Mr. Chairman, first, the oil is being imported from

Kuwait because of safety issues for our soldiers. Initially, when we

began to import oil from Kuwait, it was a few days after the hostilities had ceased in Iraq. There were lines miles long, two to three

cars wide. This gave openings to riots, to civil unrest, which created threats to our soldiers. The crowds became cover upon which

the insurgents could use it to attack our soldiers. So our first and

primary objective was to obtain fuel so we could disburse crowds

and eliminate the civil unrest.

Strategically, we need to be able to obtain fuel from the north

and south. If a border is shut down in the north and we are only

receiving north fuel, then we have returned to the situation where

we have created opportunities for civil unrest and threats to our

soldiers.

And third, sir, in obtaining fuel from Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey, we are just making the requirements for fuel in the region,

and it is a principal requirement to maintain fuel supplies in the

region.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Who within the Defense Department

would decide what that reasonable price for fuel would be on that?

Tina, do you know why $1.32 might be normal in some cases and

$2.64 would be normal under other circumstances?

General STROCK. Sir, if I could take that on, sir. Again Carl

Strock from the Army Corps of Engineers.

This is a very complex question to resolve and answer. The prices

you see here have a lot of variables in them. As Ms. Ballard mentioned, at the time that we entered into our first contract for delivery of fuel, it was early May, and, sir, I was in Baghdad the day

that a U.S. soldier from the 3rd Infantry Division was assassinated

in a gasoline line trying to keep order. We were told to get fuel

moving now.

Sir, we worked with our contractor to do that. The contractor secured three prices on May 4th and, on May 5th, made an award

to the lowest price. That price was as reflected on the board here.

Sir, that price has three components, one is the cost of the fuel.

The other is transportation and other costs associated with that.

The transportation costs were $1.2 a gallon. They are significantly

different from the lower one because the distance was three times

further Camp Cedar versus Baghdad. So the distance, considerably

longer. And the turnaround time on that distance is considerably

longer as well. About a 2-day turnaround to Camp Cedar is 6 to

10 days to get in and out of Baghdad.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So this is really not apples to apples?

General STROCK. No, sir, it is not. There is a time span here as

well. The contract on the top was awarded on May 5th. The other

was awarded later in August. Our contractor, when we approached

him, said, ‘‘Give me time. I can negotiate a better price.’’ We said,

‘‘There is no time. Do the best you can, and this is it.’’

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The additional costs there, sir, the 24 sentences of other costs,

has to do with the capability of Iraqi infrastructure to download

the fuel we delivered. Iraq does not routinely import fuel. They

move fuel around the country by pipelines, and the storage places

take fuel from the tanks to trucks. They are not set up to take fuel

from trucks to tanks. We had to create those conditions through

our contractor, and there was a cost associated with that, sir. So

the 24 cents has to do with those kinds of expenses and difficulties.

And finally, sir, the 2 percent represents, as I am told, the markup from the contractor for the management of this contract. It is

the normal cost of doing business.

I would also like to add, sir, that the cost of fuel from Turkey has averaged $1.20 to $1.30 per gallon. We import about two-thirds

of the fuel from Turkey and about one-third from Kuwait, and we

do that for the reasons Ms. Ballard has cited.

We need to keep it flowing from two different directions. We

could not use Turkey exclusively because, for example, at one point,

when we were negotiating with the Kuwaitis, the border of Turkey

was closed for 4 days, and the fuel was shut off. So the uncertainties of the situation required that. And further, the Turkish drivers

would not take fuel into Baghdad, but the Kuwaiti drivers were

willing to do so.

Today, sir, we are paying 39 cents less per gallon than we did

with that first task order, as we have negotiated with the supplier,

who has agreed to work a spot market price for our fuel, still accelerated because we buy on spot market. We have not been willing

and able to enter into contracts longer than 30 days duration.

I can’t speak to the DESC contract and how that’s structured,

but I know ours was deemed to be fair and reasonable.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What was the justification for selling this

gas inside Iraq for 4 to 15 cents a gallon in some cases?

General STROCK. We worked on that with the Iraqi Ministry of

Oil and State Oil Marketing Organization. They have a responsibility for the provision of domestic fuel to their people. They were concerned about the level of strategic reserves and they were also willing to do what it took to get fuel to the pump. They chose not to

transfer the cost of this fuel to the Iraqi people because of the impact it would have had on the economy in Iraq.

I would also like to point out that it doesn’t really matter where

this money comes from. We must use it in a responsible way. But

of the $1.4 plus billion we spent on the importation of fuel, 95 percent of that money has been from the development fund for Iraq

and only about 5 percent, or $72 million, has come from U.S. taxpayers.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Most of this was in dinars and was from

the Development Fund?

General STROCK. Yes. It is from the $8 billion worth of revenue

from the oil market as well as the $1 billion that the U.N. put in.

Again, I want to emphasize, that is not a reason to not demand the

lowest possible price, but——

Mr. OSE. Would the gentleman yield?

One point that gets lost here, over the past decade or 15 years,

the average price of gasoline in Iraq has been around 8 cents a gallon. So to go into Iraq and all of a sudden start charging a dollar

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a gallon, you are going to have massive disruptions. And I think

that is the point that General Strock is trying to make.

General STROCK. This applied to all types of fuel. LPG and kerosene, they use for cooking and heating. If we had charged the actual cost that we paid——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. There would have been a riot in Iraq and

reconstruction would have been over before it started. I appreciate—who first raised the issue of the potential overpricing by

Halliburton under this task order? Was it DCAA, the contracting

people?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. DCAA raised it first. Bill will give you some details on that.

Mr. REED. We were doing our normal activities, in terms of auditing these various task orders. This was one of the larger task

orders, and we were doing a review of how KBR was administering

its subcontracts for fuel and found that they were very deficient in

documenting the basis of the awards. Much of the information you

just heard from General Strock, unfortunately, was not documented by KBR in their subcontract files.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. No reason to believe it was inaccurate,

just undocumented?

Mr. REED. Just undocumented, and the haste was their reason,

people were turning over and they were just a little sloppy.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. I think that puts it into perspective.

Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, could we get the DESC to buy gasoline

and ship it to California? I don’t know who has this information.

I am looking at a piece of paper, background information, U.S. support for Iraq reconstruction efforts, that lists the appropriation expenditures together with five separate contracts that were awarded

as of January 2004. Do you have this paper down there, any of

you? It came in this packet that I got.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think that was for committee members.

Mr. OSE. There are five contracts listed at the bottom of that.

There is one to USAID, three to the Corps and another to AID. One

is $1.8 billion to Bechtel, $1.6 billion to KBR, another $1.2 to KBR

and another billion for Bechtel and $800 million to Parsons. And

then above—I think they need this form down in front of them.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman raised an issue in his opening testimony about the northern part being—going to Parsons in

the RIO contract exclusively and the southern part of the country

going to Halliburton, and that we don’t bid tasks off between the

two of them. Would that make any sense?

Ms. BALLARD. Mr. Chairman, when the acquisition strategy was

developed for the Restore Iraqi Oil solicitation, we found that Iraq’s

existing infrastructure had a northern and a southern oil company.

Based on this, the procurement specialist determined that to best

integrate with the existing Iraq infrastructure we should also have

contractors in the north and the south. There were also some technicalities with regard to the different type of fuels that were generated in the north and the south.

Sir, the issue of multiple awards, IDIQ contracts, has been

raised. The Federal Acquisition Regulations specifies that—when

we are not to use that type of contract. The circumstances specified

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in the regulation exist here. For example, we must determine that

the benefits of structuring the contract as we did outweigh the benefits of competing the contract as Congressman Waxman has suggested. Those circumstances do exist, because our objective is to

then transfer these capabilities to the northern and southern

Iraqis. To maintain stability in the region, we structured our contracts to match the infrastructure that existed in Iraq when we arrived.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think that puts all of this in a much different perspective than we have heard. But my time is up, and I

now yield 20 minutes to Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Earlier Chairman Davis asked each of you whether anybody was

under political pressure to award contracts to particular companies, and you all answered no. He also asked whether you are

aware of any political pressure on administration officials, and

again, you all answered no.

I want to draw your attention to a December 15 Wall Street

Journal article. The article refers to two letters by an Army Corps

contracting officer, Mary Robertson. Ms. Robertson indicated that

she was under political pressure to direct Halliburton to negotiate

exclusively with Altanmia, an obscure and inexperienced Kuwaiti

firm. Ms. Robertson wrote, ‘‘Since the U.S. Government is paying

for these services, I will not succumb to the political pressures from

the Government of Kuwait or the U.S. embassy to go against my

integrity and pay a higher price for fuel than necessary.’’ She wrote

that to her superiors, but then Halliburton went ahead and contracted with Altanmia.

She is not the only one who claims political pressure. Thomas

Crum, a senior Halliburton official, stated, ‘‘The concern that the

embassy had was expressed clearly, and it was the same as the

Government of Kuwait, that we weren’t buying enough gasoline

from Kuwait.’’ How do you respond to these two statements from

U.S. Government employees that they were under political pressure?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. In the first place, Congressman, half of what you

are discussing is the Government of Kuwait, not the Government

of the United States.

Mr. WAXMAN. I am discussing the U.S. embassy, and they work

for us.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Well, yes, but that is a different agency and so at

least——

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me ask General Strock because this woman

works for him.

Were you aware—and maybe she even contacted you—that she

was under pressure from someone to tell—to have Halliburton contract with Altanmia, and she urged them not to because she didn’t

feel she could give in to that political pressure and charge the higher price as a result?

General STROCK. Sir, at the risk of sounding evasive, she did not

work for me. I work for the CPA, and I was on loan to CPA, and

I happened to be an Army Corps of Engineers officer there.

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She worked for Brigadier General Robert Crear in the Task

Force RIO, and I am not aware of anything surrounding that allegation, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. I see. We are going to have another hearing, and

maybe we can get to the bottom of that. But I would indicate that

maybe none of you are aware of political pressure, but there were

two people working for the government that did feel they were

under political pressure.

Mr. Reed, I want to ask you about the audit that was done, what

is known as the Flash Report. So I want to get some questions answered about it. This Flash Report found significant deficiencies in

Halliburton’s cost estimating practices, is that correct?

Mr. REED. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. Can you explain what these deficiencies were?

Mr. REED. Well, the largest deficiency was the inadequate support for their subcontract estimates. They simply were not following what we considered reasonable business procedures to solicit

bids, evaluate bids and justify the fair and reasonable price of the

subcontracts being awarded. At least we couldn’t tell that was

being done by the documentation in their files. That was certainly

very significant.

Generally, there was—I would characterize the general deficiency

as a real problem supplying current, accurate and complete data in

support of all of their proposed costs, not just subcontract estimates, but subcontracts were by far the most material part of the

proposal.

Mr. WAXMAN. The Flash Report also found that Halliburton repeatedly violated the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Is that

right?

Mr. REED. There is a guideline in the Federal Acquisition Regulations prescribing what the contractor should submit in its proposal to support its proposed costs. They failed to follow those

guidelines, particularly in the case of subcontracts.

Mr. WAXMAN. The report found that Halliburton even violated its

own cost estimating manual. Is that right?

Mr. REED. That’s correct. Their own manual very closely followed

the FAR guidelines.

Mr. WAXMAN. In a statement yesterday, Halliburton claimed they

had no opportunity to respond to your findings. They said, ‘‘We

have not been given a chance to respond to accusations before they

were released publicly.’’ Did Halliburton have an opportunity to review DCAA’s Flash Report before it was issued?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir. Our standard practice is to provide a draft

report to the contractor for written comments. In this case, we did

that; written comments were received. In fact, they are attached to

our Flash Report.

Mr. WAXMAN. You even mention in your report that they had a

chance to review it, and they responded?

Mr. REED. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let’s turn to one of Halliburton’s responses to your

audit. You said DCAA found significant deficiencies in Halliburton’s estimating system. Did Halliburton agree that these deficiencies were significant?

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Mr. REED. While agreeing to the deficiencies, they argued that

they were not significant.

Mr. WAXMAN. And what did DCAA think about Halliburton’s

claims that these deficiencies were insignificant?

Mr. REED. We disagreed and stated that to the contracting officer

in our report.

Mr. WAXMAN. You thought there were serious problems, and

DCAA explicitly concluded the estimating deficiency was not a onetime occurrence, but it was systemic?

Mr. REED. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. These cost estimate proposals are very important.

Once approved, the cost proposals are the basis for Halliburton’s

fees, aren’t they?

Mr. REED. There are many factors that go into the fee setting,

but certainly cost is a consideration in setting the fee.

Mr. WAXMAN. DCAA found that Halliburton submitted a $2.7 billion proposal that, ‘‘did not contain current, accurate and complete

data regarding subcontractor costs.’’ Is that correct?

Mr. REED. That’s correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. If Halliburton’s estimate is too high and is accepted, then Halliburton gets profits for work it has never completed.

Is that right?

Mr. REED. That’s a possibility.

Mr. WAXMAN. GAO told us that there were enormous discrepancies between the first proposal that Halliburton submitted in October and the second proposal that Halliburton submitted in December after DCAA rejected their first proposal. According to GAO,

the first proposal was $700 million higher than the second proposal. Is that correct?

Mr. REED. That’s correct. And actually, it was DCAA who identified that and briefed it to the GAO.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, is this normal to have that kind of $700 million deficiency?

Mr. REED. Certainly the materiality of that issue is not normal,

no, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. In fact, I understand there still has not been a

final proposal submitted. GAO told us that DCAA continued to

have doubts about the validity of the second proposal, and as a result, Halliburton withdrew this proposal also. Is that correct?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir. That is correct. The company is taking these

rejections very seriously. I have had the highest level of commitments from the company officials that they are going to get these

problems solved, and they are hesitant to submit additional proposals until they can submit current, accurate and complete data. We

are urging them to do so expeditiously.

Mr. WAXMAN. On January 13, DCAA sent its December audit to

the Army Corps and other Defense agencies overseeing major Halliburton contracts. The January 13 cover memo from DCAA highlighted the serious nature of the audit findings and concluded with

the final explicit warning to the Corps and others, ‘‘We recommend

that you contact us to ascertain the status of Halliburton’s estimating system prior to entering into future negotiations.’’ Nonetheless, 3 days later, the Corps issued a new $1.2 billion

contract to Halliburton.

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Mr. Reed, your January 13 memo asked the Corps to contact you

before it entered into any further contracts with Halliburton. Do

you have a recollection of anyone from the Corps contacting you

about this matter before it signed the new contract with Halliburton?

Mr. REED. No, sir, I have no knowledge of being contacted.

Mr. WAXMAN. Were you surprised when you learned that Halli- burton just received this contract worth $1.2 billion?

Mr. REED. I wouldn’t say I was surprised, sir. There are circumstances where contracting officers do have other ways of evaluating price and cost data. We are giving them our advice so we can

explain to them what we saw as the risk in the contractor’s proposals. If they had read our report and considered those risks and considered as well other data they may have had, I can’t say that they

did not have a sufficient basis to award the contract.

Mr. WAXMAN. But they never talked to you about it?

Mr. REED. No, they did not.

Mr. WAXMAN. General Strock, Mr. Reed says the Army Corps

never contacted DCAA about its audit findings before giving Halliburton another $1.2 billion contract. Do you have any information

to contradict this?

General STROCK. No, sir, I do not. I know the contracting officer

did have the DCAA January 13 memo in his hands when he made

this and considered it and documented the reasons for his decision.

Mr. WAXMAN. Why didn’t the Corps followup with DCAA?

General STROCK. I can’t answer that. I was not in the process.

Mr. WAXMAN. I can’t understand how the Corps can operate this

way. The government auditors have just found enormous problems

with Halliburton’s performance, and these are just ignored. We are

talking about a contract that will cost the taxpayers $1.2 billion,

yet it doesn’t seem like the Corps even bothered to contact the

DCAA before issuing the contract.

General Strock, your Web site says when the Corps was deciding

who to award this contract to, one of the key factors was past performance. Other key factors were Halliburton’s management approach and its contract administration plan. I want to ask you how

you could possibly have found there were no problems with

Halliburton’s past performance or its management approach or its

contract administration plan. The DCAA audit in its warning said

that the company can’t accurately predict its costs. It also found

significant deficiencies and systemic problems. That is not a good

sign of past performance or good contract management, is it?

General STROCK. I can’t comment on the basis for the decision.

I do know the contracting officer had that information available to

him. And generally, the position is, we make decisions based on

substantiated claims, not purely on allegations.

Mr. WAXMAN. At the briefing with my staff, we asked you to be

able to answer these questions. Are you able to answer them? You

don’t have the contracting officer here. Did you contact the contracting officer, anticipating that you were going to be asked these

questions?

General STROCK. I did speak with the contracting officer about

whether or not they had possession of the 13 January memorandum and whether they considered that in their decision, and that

100

was the answer I got. It was considered and reviewed and found

to be an appropriate outcome.

Mr. WAXMAN. And that satisfied you?

General STROCK. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. At the time the new contract was awarded, Representative Dingell and I had been bringing information to the

Corps for months that showed Halliburton was charging twice as

much for gasoline as it should. DCAA validated these concerns in

December. I don’t know how these overcharges figured into the assessment of Halliburton’s past performance.

The day before the contract was awarded, Halliburton, in fact,

told the Defense Department that its procurement officers had

been involved in a $6 million kickback scheme. Do you know if this

was factored into the evaluation of Halliburton’s past performance?

General STROCK. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, does anybody know that?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I can’t speak to the evaluation. What I can say,

however, is that, in fact, it was Halliburton that informed us of

this, and therefore, we are taking appropriate action as a result.

So they came forward. It certainly doesn’t seem to me to be to the

detriment of KBR that they reported on their own people.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, let’s look at this thing. They report to you that their own employees were getting kickbacks of $6 million.

Your own audit people were telling you that there were systemic

problems with Halliburton’s handling of this whole business. You

have this whole system of problems with Halliburton in the past,

and so the next day, they are given a $1.2 billion contract, and the

claim is they are given a $1.2 billion contract because they had

good past performance. How could they reach that conclusion?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Congressman, in the first place, Halliburton identified two people out of I believe 19,000 that are working for KBR

right now around the world. So I hardly think that means that the

other 18,998 are in the same boat. They found the people themselves. They reported that.

As General Strock said, certainly, I don’t have visibility into how

the Army Corps of Engineers makes a decision. But clearly, the

fact that they identified these people, and we have taken appropriate action doesn’t seem to me like being to their detriment.

Mr. WAXMAN. We had the $6 million in kickbacks. We also heard

about millions of dollars in meals that were being charged, but had

not been served. We had an obscure Kuwaiti subcontractor given

the gasoline contract. And one of the Army Corps Officials thought

that was beyond her integrity to have that done. We had a systematic deficiency in accounting practices.

They are under investigation by the Pentagon Inspector General,

and we now also know they are under investigation by the Justice

Department. Now those investigations by the Justice Department

and the Inspector General and the State Department Inspector

General, that is not just for overcharging the government. These

are criminal investigations.

That means there is something really wrong, fraud or criminal

action not just Halliburton overcharging.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Not necessarily. Let me take your points one by

one. In terms of the meals, as Bill Reed has already indicated,

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there is a disagreement. KBR is within its rights to make its case,

and that is still being evaluated.

Isn’t that right, Bill?

Mr. REED. That’s correct.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. The issue and the outcome have not been settled.

As for the officer, I told you earlier, I wasn’t personally familiar

with the so-called pressure. However, once we did become familiar

with her letter, that was part of the reason that we referred this

whole oil—$61 million—to the Inspector General. So we were the

ones who referred it in part on the basis of something that we

didn’t have visibility into.

Finally, in terms of your talking about investigations, of course,

an investigation is simply that. It doesn’t necessarily mean that

someone is guilty. Very often—the Inspector General of DOD has

told me this on several occasions—an investigation is undertaken

just to clear someone’s name. It is not at all clear that just because

an investigation has been undertaken those people are guilty.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me ask you a question because you just raised

an interesting thought in my mind. A minute ago I asked you if

you knew about that letter from Mary Robertson, and you said you

didn’t know about it. And then you testified, on the basis of that

letter, that you referred it to the Justice Department Criminal Division.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I understood your question—perhaps I misunderstood you, Congressman—I understood your question to be whether

I was aware of the pressures outlined in that letter, and I was not.

Was I aware of letter? Yes, of course.

Mr. WAXMAN. Chairman Davis asked you if you were aware of

any charges of political pressure by anybody involved in this contracting issue. And here we have a letter that you have seen from

someone working for the Army Corps of Engineers saying that it

would violate her integrity to pay more than necessary and she is

under political pressure but she doesn’t want to give into it.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I understood the question of whether I was aware

of political pressure. The letter does not necessarily convey to me

that there was pressure. There was an allegation of pressure, and

it was referred to the Inspector General to see whether the allegation is valid or not.

Mr. WAXMAN. I know that before anybody is convicted of a crime,

it has to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. But I don’t think

it should be the job of this administration to give Halliburton the

benefit of the doubt in every case when they have a long record of

charging for millions of meals that they didn’t deliver, overpaying

for gasoline they were bringing in, systemic deficiencies in their

cost estimating system and your own auditors telling us there are

big problems with the way they are handling their contracts in

Iraq.

I just want to ask one very clear question. When there are criminal charges being investigated, doesn’t that indicate to you that it

is not just an instance of poor judgment?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Again, I can’t speak to an investigation. On the

other hand, what I can speak to is what I have seen in Iraq since

I have been out there twice, most recently 2 weeks ago. I did see

services provided, and I did see clean toilets, and I did eat decent

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food, and I didn’t hear complaints from anyone about how they

were being supported.

It seems to me, in the larger context of what is going on with

a massive tax that is taxing one of the larger companies in this

country, it seems to me—and I have said this on the record before,

that they are not doing a great job, but they are not doing a terrible job.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, you have pointed out that they are already at the budget ceiling of $18 billion, which is more than we realized

they were getting in Iraq. That is a lot of money for you to have

a clean toilet and a good meal in Iraq and for them to do the job

they need to do. They need to do the job they are paid to do. We

need you and them to protect the taxpayers in this country from

overpaying. And we are worried whether we are getting that kind

of service from people in this administration.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Congressman, we are the ones that have found the

discrepancies. We are the ones that referred them to the Inspector

General. We have 25 auditors risking their lives out there. We are

carrying out our responsibility.

Mr. WAXMAN. But you are the ones who are also ignoring all the

evidence including the report from your own audit team that the

taxpayers are overpaying and that Halliburton is contracting with

subcontractors and paying those subcontractors more than they

should be paying.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. On the contrary, Congressman. With respect, I

have to differ. If, indeed, it is proved that there is overcharging

taking place, that money will be restored. That has already happened in several cases. In those cases where there is a dispute, it

has to be resolved. But any money that is identified as having been

overpaid is indeed being restored.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you think it was appropriate to issue the $1.2

billion contract without the Corps talking to DCAA when they sent

an audit saying, ‘‘Please talk to us first?’’

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I believe General Strock answered that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me make a comment. How many

criminal investigations are being undertaken now by the IG’s office? Any idea.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I don’t know if they’re all criminal. There are four

investigations all told.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, I mean ongoing.

Mr. REED. For the whole Federal Government?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. For the whole Federal Government, right.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I have no idea. We’d have to get you that for the

record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But it’s a lot, isn’t it?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. It’s more than four.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It’s more than a dozen, isn’t it?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I will have to get that for you for the record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Absolutely.

How many IGs are there?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Quite a few. We’ll get you that for the record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Exactly. I mean all of us who have been

in government contracts know that whenever you see anything suspicious—Mr. Reed, isn’t that right, that you would refer to this?

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Mr. REED. Yes. DCAA has made up to hundreds of referrals a

year.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. That’s what I’m trying to establish here. This isn’t so out of bounds, particularly when the contractor himself comes to you and says, we think we have allegations with some of our employees. And they want to use that and

blacklist them?

We went through this. We had votes in the House on this issue

before about blacklisting contractors over some allegation or some

investigation before there’s an adjudication, and this House voted

opposite where Mr. Waxman is on that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I’d be happy to.

Mr. WAXMAN. The House and the Senate faced supplemental bills

and one the Senate had a provision saying there ought to be criminal penalties for war profiteering. The conference met and took

that provision out.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That may be, but that wasn’t the vote I’m

talking about, the blacklisting regulations that were promulgated

by the previous administration. And we’ve had votes on this and

what——

Mr. WAXMAN. No one is calling for a blacklist. What we’re calling

for is scrutiny——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Reclaiming my time, I——

Mr. WAXMAN. Are you on your time?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I’m on my time.

All I’m trying to say, Mr. Waxman, is—and I understand you are

raising some important points here as we go through, but that’s not

a mark of past performance when an employer comes forward and

says, look, we may have a problem with some employees, we may

have a problem with the government that’s trying to extort and

make us go to one contractor, and they come forward to the government and disclose this. They shouldn’t be punished for it. This is

what you want contractors to do when they have problems like

that.

Am I right on that, Mr. Reed? Isn’t that how you want a contractor to act?

Mr. REED. That’s true. The DOD Inspector General has promoted

this voluntary disclosure program for that very purpose, to encourage company management to take responsibility for enforcing its

own internal controls.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask you this. Documentation in a

war zone is sometimes a little more difficult to undertake, isn’t it,

than if you’re sitting back in an office somewhere? Is that fair it

to say?

Mr. REED. That would certainly be my expectation. You would

not necessarily see the same type of documentation you would in

an environment in the States.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And is Halliburton—since you let them

know the standard of documentation you’re now expecting in a war

zone, are they shaping up, are they coming forward with better

documentation?

Mr. REED. I wouldn’t want to comment on this point. That’s still

a work in process. But they——

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. They don’t get paid unless they provide the documentation; isn’t that correct?

Mr. REED. Well, we obviously in certain cases feel we have

enough basis to suspend costs, which we have done in the case of

the—the dining facilities. The company, though, has, I think,

shown the right response in terms of stating to us what actions

they are planning to take; and we’re going to make sure they take

those actions in a timely way.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me just get back—the reason you have

a cost-plus fee, an award fee, fixed fee, whatever in some cases is—

who fronts the cost in a contract of that type?

Mr. REED. Contractor—I may defer to Ms. Ballard.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. Ballard, doesn’t the contractor front

the costs?

Ms. BALLARD. Yes, he does.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So in this case, the contractor, whoever it

is—Bechtel, Halliburton, whoever—fronts the costs and then they

submit reimbursements from what they have already upfronted; is

that correct?

Ms. BALLARD. That is correct. And if the costs that they submit

are not fair and reasonable, allowable or allocable, we do not pay

those costs to the contractor.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Theoretically, they end up costing them

money if they don’t clear DCAA in their scrutiny and they don’t

clear your shop; is that fair to say?

Ms. BALLARD. Yes, that is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And so there’s no taxpayer money invested up front. It comes in the reimbursements and that’s when

the auditors come in; is that correct?

Ms. BALLARD. That is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What a deal. It seems to me, under those

circumstances, that’s a pretty good vehicle for the government.

We’re not having the taxpayers upfront money, putting money at

risk, until we see the audits and it’s cleared. And it’s not uncommon, from my 20 years of experience in government contracting, to

see contractors come forward with costs and have them thrown

right back at you from alert, trained auditors that are used to this

and you argue about it from there. Is that your experience?

Ms. BALLARD. That is correct and that does happen.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I just want to put all of this in an appropriate framework for this. This is a war zone and things go on.

I think Mr. Waxman has raised some important points. One

thing he’s talked about is the contracting officer that decided not

to notify DCAA before they went ahead. I mean, we’d like to talk

to that officer, like to have that officer come before the committee,

but to find out what they weighed.

And, General Strock, if you could make that available to us.

Mr. WAXMAN. Just a correction. It’s my understanding that Ms.

Robertson did contact the contracting officer, her superiors, and

urged them not to go forward and be pressured into the subcontract with Altanmia.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let’s find out. I think we need to get—and

that can be a subject; we just need to find out what went into this.

105

Obviously, whenever you have allegations of the type that are

coming forward here, favoritism or something, given this, then we

want to get to the bottom of it and see. I don’t see that it’s happened, but we still have some threads we have to follow through

on.

I think it’s pretty clear from your testimony that there’s no obvious evidence of this. From what I understand from Mr. Waxman’s

questions, the political pressure was on using a company in Kuwait, and I don’t know under what circumstances they would have

told us—the embassy or anybody else would have said, we have to

use a certain oil company in Kuwait. But am I wrong? Aren’t the

Kuwaitis doing their own investigation on that?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. You’re absolutely right. The Kuwaitis are investigating, and that just shows that there is a concern both here and

there. I mean, we are investigating. There is a concern.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Not to cast aspersions, but isn’t corruption

not uncommon in that part of the world?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I don’t want to cast aspersions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to a question from

me?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I’d be happy to.

Mr. MCHUGH. I get a little confused sometimes in my old age,

but wasn’t your question to the panel that Mr. Waxman has referred to, did they receive any political pressure from the administration to award the contract to Halliburton?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That’s correct.

Mr. MCHUGH. Now, did Halliburton, where this lady was employed, receive pressure to award it to a Kuwaiti firm, correct?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That’s correct. I didn’t ask that question.

Mr. MCHUGH. I thought so and——

Mr. ZAKHEIM. To be clear, the contract officer was working for

the government, but our answer was, that we were not aware of

political pressure. She has made an allegation, and that is part of

an overall referral to the inspector general precisely to get to the

bottom of this.

Mr. MCHUGH. She was working with Halliburton, but Halliburton already had the contract was the point. It was not so the

administration was trying to enrich——

Mr. ZAKHEIM. No. Absolutely not.

That’s correct, Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. But that was the suggestion that was made.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That’s fine. Mr. Waxman, you have 5 minutes.

Mrs. Maloney, you’re recognized for 5 minutes. Thanks for bearing with us.

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Chairman Davis and Ranking Member Waxman.

I just want to state that I’ve been fortunate enough to visit Iraq

twice with Chairman Davis, in August and in February, and to

meet with the troops and review the contracts; and the troops are

really doing a remarkable job under very severe conditions, and we

are thankful for their service and to your service.

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I would like to go back to Ms. Ballard, when you testified earlier

that when a decision is made to give a monopoly contract, a solesource contract, you make a determination.

Was a determination made in the case of the sole-source monopoly contracts in Iraq? Was that procedure followed in the letting of

those contracts.

Ms. BALLARD. Congresswoman, I need to be sure I understand

your question. Are you speaking of the sole-source award to Halliburton, or are you speaking of the Parsons award in the north and

the KBR award in the south?

Mrs. MALONEY. I’m speaking to all three.

You said that when you make a decision to let a no-bid, solesource contract, you make a determination that is appropriate to

do that as opposed to having a competitive bid. That was part of

your testimony that was part of the procedures that if you don’t

have a competitive bid, you make a determination that it’s important for whatever reason, an emergency or whatever, to follow the

other course; and my question was, was that determination made

in all three contracts?

Ms. BALLARD. In the case of the Restore Iraqi Oil contract, a determination was made under the Competition in the Contracting

Act that unacceptable delays existed and therefore a sole-source

award was appropriate.

Mrs. MALONEY. Could we have an example or could we have a

copy of the written determination, all three cases?

Ms. BALLARD. The LOGCAP contract is the one sole source and,

yes, ma’am, there is a determination that we can make available.

In the case of the Parsons award in the north and the KBR

award in the south, those were not sole-source contracts. Those

contracts were competed and, in fact, there were six offerers who

competed for those awards.

Mrs. MALONEY. And I would like to see a copy of the determination and the types that you provided with a no-bid contract.

Admiral Nash, when we were in Iraq——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. There’s no problem with supplying that is

there?

Ms. BALLARD. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I just wanted to get that on the record.

I just wanted make sure there’s no problem with supplying that.

They said there’s not.

Mrs. MALONEY. And we had this conversation when we were in

Iraq, and I asked and I believe the chairman also asked why we

were not allowing Halliburton and Bechtel to compete for specific

projects. At one point, you said we had to let these contracts because you had to get the people over there.

Now they’re both over there. Why couldn’t we let these two companies compete? Would that not save taxpayer dollars?

Mr. NASH. Some of the contracts under which they’re working

are not full and open, so therefore I can’t use them in some cases.

In fact, KBR, Halliburton is the contractor for the oil in the south.

It was full and open competition; and they will in fact be doing the

work down there.

We will look at the opportunity, whether we can do some competition, but the goal is to be able to implement this work effiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00114 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ciently and effectively. So I guess the answer is, we can and we

can’t for those contracts that are not correctly—were not done in

a way that the supplemental laid out. We won’t be able to use

them. So we’ll take a look at that.

Mrs. MALONEY. I think that could save taxpayers’ money.

And General Strock, didn’t the Army Corps recently award a construction contract for the Central Command to 10 different companies?

General STROCK. Yes, ma’am, we did, out of our Transatlantic

Center in Winchester, VA.

Mrs. MALONEY. So, Admiral Nash, why did the administration

choose to deviate from this practice?

Admiral NASH. I’m sorry. I don’t understand. We are using some

of those 10 contracts right now to do work in Iraq with the supplemental money, because they were full and open competition.

Mrs. MALONEY. And now that Parsons and Halliburton have monopolies in the south and in the north, what’s wrong with having

these two groups compete, as opposed to cost-plus contracts in

which there is really no incentive to save taxpayers’ money?

Admiral NASH. Well, if I may, all of these contracts have mechanisms so that we have tasks and those tasks are negotiated. So it’s

not the true cost-plus that they just send us a bill after they’re

done and we pay whatever it is.

If I understand your question, why can they not compete for all

of the oil work, whether they are working the north or the south—

and that’s what I said we would take a look at now that we have

those in place—it depends on what the contract—what the contract

clause is saying.

And I will take a look at that, ma’am.

Mrs. MALONEY. When I arrived in Iraq on the very first—we actually were in Kuwait. The headline in the Kuwaiti paper was that

Altanmia was being investigated by the Kuwaiti Government, by a

unanimous vote of their parliament, over allegations that Altanmia

was making profits of over $800,000 a day; and that’s extremely

troubling.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Mrs. MALONEY. I just want to say, if I could, Mr. Chairman, that

I truly I do believe that the American taxpayer owes a great deal

of debt to Mr. Waxman and yourself for your diligent overview of

taxpayers’ money in these contracts.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. This isn’t our last

hearing, but we appreciate that.

The gentleman from New York.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m getting confused

again. I’ve been on the Armed Services Committee for 12 years. I

serve as the chairman of the Total Force Subcommittee.

I thought I understood LOGCAP. I heard the gentlelady from

New York say ‘‘sole-source,’’ ‘‘exclusive,’’ ‘‘no-bid,’’ and other such

colorful adjectives, ‘‘contracts.’’ Isn’t the purpose and hasn’t the

purpose of LOGCAP always been to, after a competitive process,

which happened here, and after the winner is announced, which

was Halliburton in this case, you make use of those in extreme situations just as we did when I visited Haiti with General Sullivan,

just as they did when I was with the Chief of Staff of the Army

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when I was in Bosnia, just as I did when I visited a K–2 in

Uzbekistan, or the twice I’ve been to Iraq, or 10 days ago when I

was in Afghanistan for 2 days.

Am I correct on that or am I really badly confused?

General MCMANUS. You’re correct, sir.

General KERN. Congressman, if I can elaborate on the LOGCAP

contract, we’re on LOGCAP 3 right now, which gives you an indication that this isn’t the first time in this—as mentioned earlier,

we’ve been doing this for 10 years and it has been competitively

awarded.

Mr. MCHUGH. Let me ask you that because you raised a point.

This one was competitively awarded. I seem to recall about the

time I went to Bosnia in 1997, there was a competitive award process run. DynCorp won that under the previous administration. The

previous administration rejected that competition and thereafter

awarded a true sole-source contract to Halliburton. Is my memory

correct there?

General KERN. DynCorp had the previous LOGCAP contract;

that is correct. It was competed in 2001.

Mr. MCHUGH. It was competed later, but in Bosnia, Halliburton

was kept on the ground; is that not correct?

General KERN. This is another confusing issue. There was a

sustainment contract awarded in Europe for Bosnia. That was competed separately. That was different than the——

Mr. MCHUGH. And who——

General KERN. LOGCAP contract that we’re talking about.

Mr. MCHUGH. Who held that?

General KERN. DynCorp held it previously, but the pieces of it

were then recompeted.

Mr. MCHUGH. And who held it for Bosnia?

General KERN. I will have to make sure——

General MCMANUS. Congressman, I think this is important because LOGCAP won—that was a 5-year contract 1992 to 1996,

Corps managed. Brown & Root Services won that competition then.

There were four other companies that competed.

During the period of time of that contract, we supported operations in southwest Asia, in Somalia and we began to work in the

Balkans. That’s an important thought because I’m going to come

back to that in a second.

Then on the LOGCAP, which you were talking about, the second

iteration, LOGCAP 2, was the period 1997 to 2001. That again was

competitively awarded, then to DynCorp; and there were three

other defense contractors in that competition during this time period between the operations. And this is what we try to do: We go

into an area with a contingency contract, when the requirements

are unknown here, duration, and this gives us the flexibility and

agility to deal with those changing requirements in the battle

space.

After about 2 to 3 years, with experience in the Balkans, you, sir,

then made the decision to compete for sustainment purposes the

continuation of that mission in the Balkans, which is separate from

LOGCAP today, sir.

Does that——

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Mr. MCHUGH. It does, but the point remains the same. There

was a unique treatment in the Balkans that I suspect, if it were

done today under the current administration, would somehow be

characterized as special treatment because Halliburton was already

there and obviously participated to advantage in that contract.

General MCMANUS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCHUGH. And that’s the answer I could have gotten 3 minutes ago. I appreciate it. But that is the key point.

Now let me ask you another question. The cost-plus contract

today, it’s a 1 to 3 percent; is that correct? What was it under the

previous administration.

General MCMANUS. Sir, let me—let me go back to LOGCAP 2,

sir, if I may.

Under LOGCAP 2——

Mr. MCHUGH. I enjoy our travels.

General MCMANUS [continuing]. Lessons learned off of the—each

time we do this because you cannot compare each contingency we

support. They’re unique in their own right.

Mr. MCHUGH. General, I’m not asking you to justify it. I’d just

like you to answer what the cap is today.

General MCMANUS. It’s 3 percent. It’s a 1 percent base fee, 2 percent award fee, which they compete for, that we’ve not gotten to

yet.

It was 8 percent in LOGCAP 2, so we drew——

Mr. MCHUGH. Eight percent. So if you’re concerned about the

percentage, then actually Halliburton is receiving less under this

administration than they did under the previous. And by the way,

I think those charges, if anybody would make them, are ludicrous.

I supported that initiative back then and I support it now, and in

all those places, I’ve seen good work being done by men and women

in uniform I couldn’t be more proud of.

And that doesn’t suggest that Dov Zakheim and others don’t

have a lot of work to do on any contract, they do, but we have been

there trying to work these out to the benefit of the American people. Somehow to suggest that an embassy who conveys the issues

with the country, that they work to any corporate interest of America that is in that corporation is somehow criminal, then I’ll tell

you what we ought to do is go back, get Ben Franklin and everybody to Secretary Albright because they’d all be in jail.

So I just think we ought to understand what the realities are

today. These are not clear-cut issues whether you’re dishing out

meals or cleaning toilets, as—having clean toilets, as the ranking

member said. This is incredibly difficult work, and you folks have

difficult work, and I feel confident that at the end of the day you’re

going to make sure the taxpayers get what they deserve while

we’re taking care of our men and women in uniform.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Recently two former Halliburton employees who worked for

Halliburton’s LOGCAP procurement office in Kuwait came forward

with, I think, some disturbing information about a culture of overVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00117 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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charging. According to these whistleblowers, Halliburton officials

frequently told employees that high prices charged by vendors were

not a problem because the U.S. Government would reimburse

Halliburton’s cost and then pay Halliburton an additional fee. They

referred to an informal Halliburton motto, ‘‘Don’t worry about the

price, it’s cost-plus.’’

Examining the situation from a different angle, the GAO is reporting the same indifference to cost.

Dr. Zakheim, if these accounts are accurate, would you agree

with me that this is a completely unacceptable attitude?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. If they’re accurate. And what we have done is

taken this account and treated it as a hotline referral; and as you

know, a hotline referral goes to the inspector general precisely to

investigate this.

One other point that I think is very important to make: We know

that the courts have continually held that you cannot deny a contractor award on the basis of allegations. An investigation looks

into allegations. You’ve got two guys here——

Mr. TIERNEY. I don’t want to interrupt you, but I don’t think I

said anything about denying contracts. I was simply asking you a

question.

Let me followup, because I understand that Mr. Reed immediately sent it over to the inspector general on a hotline referral,

but what troubles me is, the inspector general is apparently doing

nothing to followup on this.

The minority staff contacted one of the whistleblowers yesterday—his name is Henry Bunting—and he said that no one from

the inspector general’s office has contacted him.

Mr. Zakheim, how do you explain this? The allegations of the

whistleblowers are serious; you’ve admitted that. Where is the followup?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. There will certainly be followup. They’re very methodical. Their approach, as I understand it, and obviously I’m not

working with the inspector general’s office, but as I understand it,

they are very careful, they assemble their facts, they interview people. I guarantee those two gentlemen are going to be interviewed.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, both Mr. Dingell and Mr. Waxman sent a letter explaining all of this in significant detail over a month ago—

over a month ago.

The whistleblowers also say that Halliburton employees delib- erately keep purchase orders below $2,500 so they can avoid the requirement to solicit more than one quote, in other words, to avoid

having vendors compete to supply the company with goods.

They say that Halliburton’s supervisors encouraged them to use

a list of preferred Kuwaiti vendors even though many of these

firms were unreliable or charged outrageous prices. Now, this letter

is over a month ago and we’ve seen nothing come back.

Mr. Bunting testified before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee last month. The same day, or virtually the same day, GAO

investigators contacted the minority staff to ask for more information on how to contact Mr. Bunting and the other whistleblower.

That’s what I would think an investigator would do if they were

serious about this, but no one from the inspector general’s office

has ever contacted Mr. Waxman or his staff to learn how to get in

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touch with these whistleblowers, and apparently no one has contacted Mr. Bunting despite the fact that they were put on notice

over a month ago.

Mr. REED. Mr. Congressman, could I tell you one additional thing

that is being done? I’m not sure where it stands with the IG, but

in addition to the regular conduct that might have been suspected

from the letters, we took it as an issue, as well, of normal contracting for DCAA to followup on this.

So I have sent that letter to my audit office in Iraq. We have

been looking—working with the Defense Contract Management

Agency, that is responsible for administering the contracts and for

approving these $2,500 awards. They have to sign off on every single one of them. So we have brought these very serious allegations

to their attention, and we are working together with DCMA to see

if we can validate and correct these situations.

Mr. TIERNEY. I appreciate that, Mr. Reed. And I appreciate, Mr.

Reed, your immediate referral to the inspector general’s office. I

think that was the appropriate action to take, and I think you

should be commended for that.

Will you be getting back in touch with the attorney—the inspector general to find out why this lapse has occurred or what’s going

on?

Mr. REED. We do normally receive periodic updates from hotline

referrals. And, yes, sir, we will do that.

Mr. TIERNEY. I thank you for that. I yield back.

Mr. LATOURETTE [presiding]. I’m going to recognize myself for 5

minutes.

I didn’t have the opportunity to go with the chairman on his trip,

but I did have the chance to be in Iraq in January with the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee to look at civil works

projects. And before I ask a couple of questions, I want to just relay

a story.

There was a young lieutenant from Toledo, OH, who talked to me

about the 2,000 civil works projects that had gone on in Iraq, and

some of them have been mentioned—redoing schools, Operation

Chalkboard, reopening hospitals, making sure hospitals were up

and running, giving people running water that had never had running water in their life. I think the chairman in his opening statement talked about a wastewater treatment plan by General

Odierno in the Sunni Triangle. And I made the observation to the

lieutenant, I said, you know, lieutenant, I watch a lot of television,

as I think we all do in my job; and I can tell you, back home when

we do something swell, we as politicians have a band and a ribbon,

and we all cut it with scissors, and we take the scissors home or

the shovel home after the groundbreaking. How come I’ve never

seen any of this on television? Why have you never had a ceremony?

And the lieutenant said, we’ve had a ceremony for every one of

those successfully completed civil works projects.

I said, how come you think I’m not watching it back on television?

He said, Congressman, we watch a lot of CNN and Fox here, because we’ve got it in Baghdad, and we’ve never seen it on television

either; and our feeling is that the broadcast media waits by the

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scanner for one of our buddies to be injured and you’ll see that on

the news at night, but you’ll not see our successes. So when you

go home, it would be nice if you could tell people about the successes.

So I’m keeping my promise today to the lieutenant from Toledo.

You are doing an amazing amount of work in Iraq, and you

know, I saw a guy on TV when I was there and he said, under Saddam Hussein I had electricity 24 hours a day and now I only have

it 16 hours a day.

And I asked the lieutenant, why is that?

He said, because he’s from Tikrit. Everybody in Tikrit had electricity 24 hours a day, but the guy in the next town had it zero

hours a day, and so through our redundancy efforts, we’re going to

make sure that everybody’s treated the same and everybody has it

16 hours a day.

Now to my question. When the ranking member, Mr. Waxman,

was making his opening remarks—and if I misquote him, I apologize and I’ll be certain to yield to him—but talking about contractors’ officers, and I think he said that reservists are going over and

are being given a 2-week crash course in contract management,

words to that effect.

And, Ms. Ballard, I heard you talk about the contract officers

that are in station. Is there a 2-week sort of correspondence crash

course on how to administer these contracts? Are these contracts

being administered by people on the ground in Iraq by professionals or the Keystone Kops?

Ms. BALLARD. Congressman, I have no knowledge of 2-week

training crash courses to go over and be contracting officers in theater. In my experience, the reservists who come to work for us are

usually put in positions where they have experience from their

commercial occupations or from their military service. On the

ground, our professionals come from the Defense Contract Management Agency, an agency I’m proud to have worked for, and I can

say clearly that they do have professionals on the ground that administer these contracts and provide oversight to us.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much.

And Admiral——

General KERN. Congressman, could I add—I think I’d like to

clarify——

Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure.

General KERN. There is a Reserve unit called the LOGCAP Support Unit, which I believe is what Congressman Waxman was referring to. It was the first time we had employed that unit, starting

with operations primarily in Afghanistan, when we began the

buildup of the LOGCAP work. That organization is comprised, however, of the professionals that was referred to, of DCMA auditors

as well.

I just met with them in Baghdad. They are on their second

iteration of it. It’s a multiservice, multicomponent unit composed of

professionals. The professional PCOs are part of General

McManus’s office that oversees the contract. The ACOs, the administrative contracting officers, in theater, are professionals as part

of DCMA.

I’d let McManus describe it in more detail.

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General MCMANUS. Sir, the LOGCAP Support Unit concept is a

new edition, based again on lessons learned, because as we have

to leverage this capability, we have to train our folks. We provide

these planners to go into the theater, out to the base camps, to the

units, if you will, 4th division, to the brigades and so forth. So as

requirements are generated, these are the folks who work together

to create the scopes of work.

And so prior to their deployment, this is a case of having a new

organization. We wanted to bring them up as currently as we

could, because this is a case of forming, organizing and deploying,

and have the support and get your skills at the same time. So this

was an attempt to bring it up to speed.

This is a new organization, new capability we’re trying now to

build for future operations, because it’s making a huge difference

for us as we work the requirements through this whole process

from—from origin through completion.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Well, General—either general—let me ask you

this: Do you have confidence that these men and women know

what they’re doing? Are they watching the American taxpayers’

buck on these contracts?

General KERN. Yes, they are. And we have taken that from the

previous lessons provided by GAO and others on how to improve

the process. And that’s why this unit exists today and that’s why

the training that we are using with them. The task order process

we are using also breaks it down into further detail, and it is a

complex process, to ensure that we have oversight of the entire operation.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much. I believe the gentleman

from Massachusetts is recognized, Mr. Lynch, 5 minutes.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank Chairman Davis and also Ranking Member Waxman for their good work in putting this together. I also want to

thank the members of the panel for coming before us and helping

us in our inquiry.

I also had a chance to go into Iraq. I was actually part of the

first delegation to go into Baghdad after the invasion. And I’ve got

about 20 years in construction management, managing contracts.

And a couple of things I know about no-bid and cost-plus contracts. No. 1, since there is no or very little competition, it’s basically a guarantee for whatever contractor is anointed. The second

thing, on a cost-plus contract, the profits are guaranteed and there

really are no restraints on how much a project will cost. There are

no internal restraints on the part of the contractor. So I think Mr.

Zakheim would agree that the auditing function here, and Mr.

Reed would agree, the auditing function is extremely important, because the more the company spends or the contractor spends, the

more they’re going to make on their percentage. So the auditing

function is extremely important.

Is that correct, Mr. Zakheim?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Absolutely, sir. I agree.

Mr. LYNCH. In this case we have an auditing function where

our—the DCAA wrote a recommendation to the Army Corps of Engineers and said—and I’m going to pull it right from the letter. It

said, ‘‘They have identified systemic problems with Halliburton’s

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accounting, and it urged ‘‘the DOD not to award further contracts

to Halliburton without talking to the DCAA about Halliburton’s accounting problems.’’

And the problem that I have is, this is the way the system is

supposed to work, that the auditor is supposed to oversee what’s

going on and that the contracting authority is supposed to listen.

But that didn’t happen here.

That didn’t happen here, and another $1.2 billion went out to

Halliburton and, in other cases, Brown & Root. Despite some problems that have been found in their operation, they continue to

work without any correction or any restraints at this point.

General Kern, I’d like to bring your attention to a couple of reports regarding several Halliburton employees who were caught

taking kickbacks. They took them from a Kuwaiti company in exchange for steering contracts of that company; and as I understand

it, Halliburton caught the officials engaged in these activities and

reported them to the Defense Department; is that correct?

General KERN. That’s correct, Congressman.

Mr. LYNCH. Last week, General, your staff met with our committee staff in preparing for this hearing and our staff asked for the

identity of those two individuals. Your staff at that time reported

that they didn’t have the information then, but they’d get back to

the committee with the information.

Unfortunately, we have been waiting and that has not happened,

to my knowledge. Is that forthcoming or——

General KERN. I was away last week, Mr. Congressman, so I

don’t know—have the precise answer. I promise you, I will get back

to you, and if there is no legal reason why I cannot provide that,

it will be provided.

Mr. LYNCH. I’ve got to tell you, I’m one of the Democrats who actually supported the action in Iraq, and I supported the money for

our troops and for reconstruction, and I’ve got to tell you, I’m concerned right now. I’m concerned. I’m not somebody who has criticized the military or been reluctant to support you, but I’ve got to

tell you, it’s our responsibility, all of us, to protect the American

taxpayer.

General KERN. I agree with your concern.

Mr. LYNCH. I’m concerned.

General KERN. And we are—I will promise you, and I have spoken a number of times with my command counsel about this specific incident, and it is going to be thoroughly investigated; and we

will bring those concerns to the forefront for you.

Mr. LYNCH. Well, more than concerns brought to the forefront.

I’d like to have an opportunity to talk to those individuals and find

out how senior are those individuals who accepted the bribes from

this Kuwaiti company. Do we have at least an indication of how

senior those Halliburton officials are?

General KERN. I do not have any indication of that. I know that

it was brought forward. I know that it is under investigation, and

I know that they have provided us compensation for what they believe was the amount of the bribe that was taken. But that is what

we are going to ensure is investigated thoroughly.

Mr. LYNCH. I will conclude, Mr. Chairman.

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I keep hearing this: that the price is overcharged and then the

penalty is to give the money back that we caught you stealing.

That’s just not going to get it. That’s just not adequate.

General KERN. Congressman, we agree with you 100 percent and

that is, in fact, what is happening, that we are——

Mr. LYNCH. There’ve got to be more serious consequences than

just, oh, we caught you stealing, give the money back. This is millions and millions of dollars of the taxpayers’ money, and we have

to have a better standard than that. And I’m just going to conclude

with these remarks.

I don’t understand how you couldn’t know the rank and the identity of these officials. These officials were at the very top of the procurement ladder. These people were handing out millions of dollars

in taxpayers’ money in the form of contracts.

We know who these people are. That’s why I say, my confidence

has been shaken on this point, and we ought to put a lot of sunlight on this process, find out who these people were, find out how

many contracts they oversaw, find out who the Kuwaiti contractors

were that were bribing them. And are those subcontractors who

provided the bribes doing other contract work in the country as

well? We need some accountability here. That’s all I’m asking.

Chairman TOM DAVIS [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired.

But just to clarify, it was the—Halliburton came forward and

said, we suspect bribery. Right? You wouldn’t have known about it

had they not come forward and said, We think there are employees—am I correct on that?

General KERN. I would hope that our audit would have picked

it up, as well.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Eventually, maybe.

General KERN. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Strock, your stars are confirmed by the Senate, are they

not?

Mr. STROCK. Yes, they are.

Mr. OSE. General Kern, the same? Your stars are confirmed by

the Senate?

General KERN. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. OSE. General McManus.

General MCMANUS. Sir, that’s correct.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Ballard, are you subject to Senate confirmation?

Ms. BALLARD. No.

Mr. OSE. Are you a political appointee?

Ms. BALLARD. No, I am not.

Mr. OSE. You’re a civilian——

Ms. BALLARD. A career civil servant.

Mr. OSE. OK. Long-term?

Ms. BALLARD. Twenty-nine years.

Mr. OSE. You’re almost permanent then, aren’t you?

Mr. Lucke.

Mr. LUCKE. I’m a career foreign service officer, not subject to

Senate approval.

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Mr. OSE. Dr Zakheim.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I was confirmed by the Senate.

Mr. OSE. OK. Mr. Reed.

Mr. REED. I’m a career civil servant.

Admiral NASH. I’m a private citizen back on duty here.

Mr. OSE. As an admiral, you were confirmed by the Senate were

you not?

Admiral NASH. That’s true.

Mr. OSE. All right. I’ve always enjoyed sandcastles here. Let me

just—I want to make sure I’ve got this correct here.

Halliburton, it’s been alleged, has some nefarious scheme going

to pick the pocket of taxpayers. Now, if I understand, what you all

have done is, they have submitted something for $2.7 billion, some

contract here; you told them, well, it doesn’t quite meet our expectations. So they came back at $2 billion, saving the taxpayers $700

million. But that wasn’t satisfactory either.

Now, as I understand it, you’ve got to be nominated—who nominated you General Strock, to be a general?

Mr. STROCK. Sir, the President nominated me.

Mr. OSE. The President——

Mr. STROCK. Of the United States.

Mr. OSE. President Bush?

Mr. STROCK. I’m sorry, President Clinton.

Mr. OSE. President Clinton nominated you to be a Brigadier?

How about a Major—for your second star, did you go to President

Bush?

Mr. STROCK. President Bush, yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. General Kern, your fourth star was from President

Bush?

General KERN. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. OSE. General McManus.

General MCMANUS. Yes, sir. My second star was President Bush.

I’ve been a general officer about 6 years now.

Mr. OSE. All right. Let’s see.

Dr. Zakheim, you were nominated by the Bush-Cheney administration and confirmed by the Senate?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. Admiral Nash, your stripes?

Admiral NASH. President Clinton did both of my stars.

Mr. OSE. So let me make sure I’ve got this right. The people—

the Bush-Cheney administration, who nominated some or all of you

for your stars or for your positions, under the sandcastle scenario,

is doing all this heavy lifting for Halliburton, but then all you people are sitting there telling Halliburton they can’t have the contracts that they otherwise are submitting? You’re saying the contracts aren’t specific enough or they aren’t clean enough or they

don’t meet our requirements under FAR.

Now, the sandcastle I’m trying to understand, as described by

certain members on the other side, exactly how does Halliburton

benefit when you guys return their contracts to them, when you

say their contracts aren’t good enough?

General Kern, you’re the four-star here. Tell me how that works.

I’m missing some picture here.

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General KERN. Congressman, we take an oath to obey the laws

of the President of the United States in orders from him and from

the Constitution of the United States, and we are responsible to

the American public to make sure that all of those things happen.

So as our commander in chief, we follow the law and the orders of

our administration, and we ensure that all the regulations that

have come forth, such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation, provided by this Congress, and oversight are also met.

So we will continue to make sure that both the taxpayers’ money

is well spent and the security of our Nation is met.

Mr. OSE. General, I have actually gotten great comfort from the

testimony here. It’s the sandcastle allegations I’m trying to address.

Dr. Zakheim, you’re a political appointee. You ought to be looking

out for, under the scenario of the sandcastles, the interests of a certain individual, but your department is sending the contracts back

for further review. You’re costing these people money. I mean, exactly what are you up to?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Well, my understanding is, I support the President

of the United States and the American people by looking after the

taxpayers’ dollar, and the only pressure that I’m aware of is the

pressure that I put on poor Bill Reed here to keep going after anybody or anything that’s untoward or might rip off the taxpayer.

Mr. OSE. Which brings me to my point.

Now, Mr. Reed, there have been allegations that things weren’t

forwarded to the IG or that the IG is supposed to report to you on

their activities. If I understand correctly, any illegal behavior that

you suspected, you have, in fact, forwarded to the IG; is that correct?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Mr. OSE. Now once it’s forwarded to the IG, is it within your domain to prosecute?

Mr. REED. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. That’s somebody else’s job?

Mr. REED. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. OSE. Does the IG report to you?

Mr. REED. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. So the IG is supposed to pick up the burden at that

point and carry on?

Mr. REED. That is correct, sir.

Mr. OSE. Are you aware of a contract that’s been introduced or

that the Corps entered into for recent——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes, thank you.

First thing, there’s a lot of testimony about Halliburton and

other issues which are very important and need to be addressed.

I’m more concerned about where we’re going now and in the future,

because our men and women are at risk. We have other people

there. We’re trying to rehabilitate a country, and I think it’s very

important that we take the lessons learned and go forward.

Now, I’m very concerned about—and I’m going to review a case

right now, a contract, and I’m going to ask your comments on that,

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because I’m concerned about this contract because it affects what

is happening now and in the future.

Let me get into this issue. Major General Charles H. Swannack,

Commander of the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, criticized the

failure of U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq to deliver

equipment needed by newly formed Iraqi security forces.

And by the way, I was just in Iraq a couple of weeks ago. You

know that part of the insurgents’ plan is not only going after our

men and women, but after the men and women in Iraq, especially

security, that are working with their country. So it’s a very important issue.

Now, Swannack said his division has successfully trained more

than 10,000 Iraqis to be police security and border guards in the

volatile regions stretching from Falluja to the Syrian border, but he

said the forces lack the equipment needed to fight insurgents,

which I assume was ammunition and guns and things of that nature, to protect the vast Iraqi border. Swannack voiced frustration

because lack of equipment had hampered Iraqi efforts to secure the

region.

Now, the equipment was to be delivered under a controversial $327 million contract that the Pentagon canceled last week, a

month—that could delay the process for months. That concerns me.

These people are at risk right now.

The contract had been awarded to a small Virginia firm with no

history of arms dealing, and it is alleged that the company Nour,

N-o-u-r, USA—and the President is A. Huda Farouki, F-a-r-o-u-ki, has close ties with Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi Governing

Council and a close ally of some Pentagon officials. Again, that’s alleged and I’m not asking you to comment on that.

The contract was canceled after protests by competing companies

that found Nour had claimed to be partners with high-profile companies, an individual who said in interviews they had no links to

the firm.

Now, this was a quote that was made by the General, ‘‘Not only

are the security forces bravely leading the fight against terrorists;

they are in some cases insisting on doing it alone.’’ And I know

that those of us who were over there saw the will of those Iraqi

individuals who want to take control their own country. And the

only way we can get our men and women out of that country is to

get them to secure their own country, build the infrastructure that

is necessary.

But, anyhow, they are in some cases insisting on not doing it

alone, not depending on coalition forces.

Swannack said this: ‘‘if we had the equipment for these brave

young men, we would be much further along.’’ That concerns me.

Pentagon officials blaming—this is alleged—irregularities in the

contracting process for the cancellation and saying they were rushing to finalize a new contract, but they predicted it would take 60

to 90 days before a new supplier was selected. That concerns me.

And that is an issue we need to look at, we need to evaluate it so

that it doesn’t happen.

Here’s what I would like: First thing, how was that contract put

out to begin with, No. 1? How was the contract given to this company that really had no expertise? Who was involved with that?

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Where—and I’d like to ask, really—I guess, Mr. Zakheim, you’re

getting a lot of the heat today, but I’d like to ask, who was responsible for this type of contract?

The men and women of Iraq are relying on us, our leadership,

to provide them the resources that are necessary. Not only was this

contract a bad contract, but we’ve got 60 to 90 days where we have

a general saying that these Iraqi individuals—I mean, these Iraqi

security people cannot do their job. That’s what I’m concerned

about.

We are going to deal with the Halliburton issues and all that;

that will be around, and investigations will be done. But what

about the future? That’s very serious.

And the other issue I want to ask, because I’m concerned—my

time is going to be up and I want to lay it out. I think the Iraqi

Governing Council—I’d like to know how much money is given to

them, if at all, that allows them to negotiate contracts using American dollars? I think that’s an important issue. Using American dollars, how much influence do they have? Are they given any authority to contract with anyone with our American dollars?

I also supported the $87 billion because I believe we have to finish what we started. Whether you are for or against the war, we’re

there and we have men and women that are doing a good job there;

and it’s a hard job and we understand that.

So if you could address those issues—I think we need to have lessons learned, but let’s deal with these kinds of situations. When

you are affecting the security of these Iraqi security people and our

men and women, that’s serious.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Congressman, let me address the question about

what about the future. I think one of my colleagues can talk to you

a little bit about the Nour contract, and I’m sure Admiral Nash can

talk about how the Iraqis properly get involved in the contracting

process.

Regarding the future, we are as concerned, as you rightly are,

that we can’t just wait around for the process to play itself out.

And frankly, we’re caught here because, on the one hand, we want

to have the proper procedures, the proper competition, all the

things we’ve been hearing about, in order to protect the American

taxpayer; and that takes time. On the other hand, you’ve got commanders in the field and our young men and women who are being

shot at, and we’ve got to help them out immediately, and we have

to keep finding that delicate balance.

In this case, the one you raised, we are looking at alternative

sources of financing, possibly out of the Development Fund for Iraq,

that might help acquire some of this material, since the DFI, as it’s

called, is purely for the Iraqi people and this is for Iraqi security

forces; and that, of course, we could implement much more quickly.

So we are indeed trying to do exactly what concerns you. Let me

turn to my colleagues——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But my question was, how did this occur?

How was that——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We’re way over the time. I want to give

him a chance to answer. I want to get——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And don’t forget the Chalabi issue, too.

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Ms. BALLARD. Congressman, I’d like to say, first, that we have

awarded over 1,300 contracts in Iraq, valued at $1.3 billion, of

which approximately 1 percent is appropriated dollars. The competition rate on those actions is 99 percent, and 65 percent of the

awards have gone to Iraqi businesses as primes. And we’ve generated over 21,000 jobs. We’ve done this with currently 28 personnel on the ground in Iraq facing significant challenges in austere

circumstances.

By way of comparison, in 2002, the Robert Morris Center had

roughly $2 billion in contracting actions and 305 people who

worked those actions.

The contracting process, we strive every day for greater excellence in that process. Clearly, our staff in Iraq, faced with challenges in austere circumstances, is making significant contributions

to the rebuilding of Iraq.

In those circumstances, with 1,300 contracts awarded, we have

found the circumstance where offerers did identify concerns. The

contracting process worked as it should; those circumstances were

evaluated. We determined that action needed to be taken, and we

took action. And the GAO, satisfied with our course of action, dismissed the protest.

In response to your question with regard to what we will do to

support the soldiers, as Dr. Zakheim has indicated——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me stop you here because you’re not

answering my question.

Mr. Chairman, I’m trying to get them to answer the question

about the Nour contract.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I know. I know. And we’ve got time. We’ve

got to move on. Let me try to get it in the rebuttal at the end.

We’ve got 20 minutes aside at the end——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I’ve got to take off. So if somebody could

follow through with that. It’s just the Nour contract and Chalabi.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you very much.

The gentleman from Texas.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just got back here a

little while ago from going over there with the chairman, and I

want to say that I think that I saw miraculous things happening

in Iraq, and I was very impressed with everything that I saw. And

there’s no better group of fighting men and women on the face of

the Earth than the ones I got to talk with and have supper with,

and I’m very proud to be associated with them.

I’ve been hearing a lot of stuff here, and my background makes

me listen for the magic words. And I hear words like so and so—

it has been found that so and so ‘‘took a bribe.’’ It has been found

that such and such, so and so—I’m asking—my first question is,

are there any actual people who are supposed to be finders of fact

who actually found that this happened, or—it sounds more like this

should be said: Someone has alleged that these things are taking

place. Is that a better use of the description than a finding?

It may be as clear as it could be, but nobody has actually made

a finding that would say that bad behavior has taken place. There

were allegations that have taken place.

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Mr. ZAKHEIM. I think in the main that’s absolutely correct, and

we’ve tried to stress that, that even an investigation is simply to

look into what really went on.

It’s an investigation of allegations; you’re absolutely right. With

respect to the so-called ‘‘kickbacks,’’ that was presented to us by

KBR and even that’s being investigated, so——

Mr. CARTER. And it rightfully should be investigated before anybody is punished. I have never seen anybody in prison because

somebody alleged that somebody did something. We generally went

out and found out—had a finder of fact make a finding that they

actually did that, like a jury or a judge or whatever procedures

there may be in the Federal Government.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Due process is part of our process.

Mr. CARTER. All of these things that we’ve heard about here

today, including a question that was raised just a few minutes ago

about an allegation that someone said that you’re supposed to—

don’t worry about the cost because it’s a cost-plus contract. That’s

being looked into is that correct?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. CARTER. And, in fact, all the other allegations that have been

raised here today, all those are turned over to the proper authorities to be investigated?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Absolutely.

Mr. CARTER. And is anyone at the table here in charge of those

investigations?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. In some cases, yes. When we’re doing audit investigations, Bill Reed here does that. The inspector general is not at

this table, but he certainly takes over those, as well.

Mr. CARTER. Right. But those then, as to the audit investigation,

which there is someone at this table responsible for, would you say

that’s being sandbagged or is that a current investigation being

carried on as we speak?

Mr. REED. The audit process is alive and well and being pursued

vigorously with the support of all the contracting officers involved

in these contracts.

Mr. CARTER. So we’re doing the job—you are the only ones that

can speak for this investigation, and we’re doing the job that we’re

supposed to do. We’re currently looking into the allegations that relate to the audit investigation.

Mr. REED. All of the contract audit issues are being pursued aggressively.

Mr. CARTER. So we’re doing the job on that?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARTER. We’ve turned the others over to the proper authorities to be looked into.

Does anyone have knowledge that these proper authorities are

not looking into these allegations?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. No.

Mr. CARTER. So does everybody agree that, as far as you know,

they are currently investigating these things on a reasonable timetable to investigate these kinds of allegations?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. That’s correct.

Mr. CARTER. That’s kind of what I assumed was right, but the

sounds that were going around here didn’t make it sound that way.

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Mr. Ruppersberger’s contract question that he was talking about,

that’s a concern to me, too, because I was over there. I met those

troops, and I was told the same thing, as soon as we get these guys

geared up like we are, these guys are going to get out in the field

and they’re going to do a good job. So I also agree with Mr.

Ruppersberger that we need to get those people supplied.

And the kind of contract—and I don’t know the particulars of

that contract, but when we start talking about the first initial contracts that are involved over there in Iraq, basically the military

says we have a theater, a dangerous theater, that has a lot of contingencies that we can’t predict exactly what those contingencies

are; and that’s why we go through this type of contracting process,

which we’re calling a cost-plus contract. And if I’m wrong, correct

me, because I sure can be.

Is that right.

General MCMANUS. Sir, for contingency planning purposes we

have a LOGCAP contract in region for those unknowns as they

evolve.

Mr. CARTER. Right. And this is one of those unknowns that have

evolved. So what can we do to make this an emergency situation

to get these supplies to these troops that we’ve been training over

there?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Well, as I said, Congressman, we are looking at alternative sources of funding so that we can get the money more

quickly, because the contracting process takes what it takes, and

it’s got to be done properly or else we will be answering questions

as to why it was not done properly.

But there are alternative sources and we are looking carefully at

that to get the money so that we can get the equipment to those

Iraqis. Because you’re absolutely right; they’re being shot at every

bit as much as our people, if not more.

Mr. CARTER. I guess what I’m saying is, this wouldn’t be a real

smart idea to just let this out for bid for the next 6 months to try

to figure out who gets the highest bid. We’ve got an emergency.

We’ve got to deal with it.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. And we’re going to move on that.

General KERN. Congress, I met with General Sanchez on that

specifically this week on how we’re going to get through that. We

are going to move out.

Mr. CARTER. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Ms. Watson is recognized for

5 minutes.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.

I guess I will address this to Major General Strock, and just say

yes or no. The Army Corps of Engineers awarded an initial no-bid

contract to restore and operate Iraqi’s infrastructure currently valued at $2.44 billion to Halliburton and its subsidiary, Kellogg

Brown and Root.

General STROCK. The capacity of that contract was $7 billion, but

that’s correct.

Ms. WATSON. And almost $1.4 billion has been obligated for fuel

importation into Iraq?

General STROCK. Yes, ma’am.

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Ms. WATSON. More recently, the Corps split the oil work into two

competitive contracts, one for the north and one for the south. And

the Corps awarded Halliburton the new $1.2 billion contract to operate Iraq’s oil industry in the southern half of the country?

General STROCK. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. WATSON. The Army Materiel Command has obligated over $4 billion for logistic support in Iraq under Halliburton’s logistical

civilian augmentation program?

General KERN. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. WATSON. And then I am very supportive of what all of you

in the military and those assigned to build the infrastructure of

Iraq and continue whatever we have to do militarilywise in Iraq.

I did not support the war, but I support our troops, and I support

our obligation.

I am concerned about reports that we are hearing, and we heard

them from Halliburton, which got the contract, that there were

kickbacks, and as I understand, and I want someone out there to

correct me, that the persons involved must have been at the highest level because they were in control of millions of dollars, maybe

billions of dollars of government procurement. And so I would request that with all due speed that we weed out these wrongdoers.

My job is to protect my constituency and their tax money, billions

of dollars that are being spent 10,000 miles away, and we have infrastructure problems right here. I am going to ask you with all

due diligence to weed out—I don’t care if it is 2 or 18,000. We need

to know. Apparently goes way up high, because the decisionmakers

make decisions over millions to billions of dollars.

And so to do the job in Iraq, it is costly. We understand that, and

we support you. But I do not support the wrongdoers, I am suspicious because why Halliburton, no-bid contract, before we knew

the people were on the ground, and you can trace an association

to someone high up in the administration. Just the appearance of

impropriety should not exist, but it happened, and we need to move

on. But I would like the overseers, whoever is responsible, to immediately get back to us what steps are being taken, because it makes

all of us look bad. And those who have the oversight and the auditing and so on, you look like you are not doing your job and you are

not being responsible.

So let’s dig them up and identify them if they exist, and let’s

clean them up, and let’s see that every dollar of taxpayers’ money

is used effectively and efficiently and in the best interest of America and Iraq.

Thank you, and I yield back the rest of my time.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I make one exception to one part of your statement, the part about the auditors, about not really being on top of

it.

Ms. WATSON. Let me tell you what I meant. I want with all due

speed for all of those—the buck stops here. I don’t know who has

the final oversight and who is going to do this investigation. It has

not been cleared or clarified in what I have heard, so whoever is

responsible. I am not blaming one person or the other. Dig out the

wrongdoers, bring them to justice, and let’s move on.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. We certainly could agree on that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Van Hollen, 5 minutes.

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to

thank all the witnesses for being here as well. I want to thank the

chairman of the committee for leading the bipartisan delegation to

Iraq recently, and I was pleased to join him on that trip.

And, Admiral Nash, it was great to meet you there. And I want

to thank you for doing hard work under very challenging circumstances. And we all agree, as we talked about today, that at

the same time we want to make sure we protect the American taxpayer.

And I want to delve into some issues that Congressman Waxman

raised, because he has raised some very important issues, and I

want to focus specifically starting with DCAA and, Mr. Reed, the

contract where you concluded that there were about $61 million on

potential unaccounted for charges. And I understand that DCAA

did that around December 11 of last year; is that right?

Mr. REED. If you are addressing the fuel issue on the restructuring?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. The KBR fuel contract, $61 million.

Mr. REED. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. And you recommended at that time that the

contractor disallow those $61 million in costs; isn’t that right?

Mr. REED. No, sir. What we did was we issued a draft report to

the company to get their response to what we believed was some

poorly documented costs that they were billing to us. At the time,

based on some data that we had, we felt that the impact could be

as high as $61 million, and we asked them to justify that cost.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. You are saying they should justify that cost;

is that right?

Mr. REED. That’s correct.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. And you were going to recommend to the contracting officer that they justify that cost; is that right?

Mr. REED. We were going to receive the company’s response,

evaluate it, and if they satisfied us, we would make no recommendation. If they did not satisfy us, we would recommend the

cost be disallowed immediately.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Eight days after that, the Army Corps then

filed a waiver, which essentially exempted KBR from providing

that supporting documentation; is that right?

Mr. REED. That’s right.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. In your experience, have you ever heard of a

waiver being granted in that way especially after auditors at DCAA

had found overcharges and were in the process of reviewing the

charges?

Mr. REED. Let me clarify my previous answer. What we were

looking for was for Kellogg Brown and Root to show us how they

determined that was a fair and reasonable price. That may or may

not have called for the submission of cost or pricing data, which the

waiver was granted for. Certainly there were facts or indicators

that if indeed we were locked in with a sole-source supplier, that

we should get cost and pricing data. That was one of the points

that had not been pinned down as to whether we were locked in

with a sole-source supplier, although there were certainly indications. I will let the Corps of Engineers address the waiver.

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Let me ask you, are you satisfied as of today

that $61 million should not be disallowed, that the American taxpayer has been treated fairly?

Mr. REED. No, I am not satisfied, and there is an investigation

underway by the IG. And once their work is done, it is turned back

to us, we will continue our audit work.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Let me turn to the Corps, General Strock. It

seems to me that if we wanted to get to the bottom of this, we

would tell KBR, look, you’re charging this amount of money. It is

your subcontractor. You should be providing the supporting documentation.

Why did we grant them a waiver.

General STROCK. A couple of factors. First of all, the chief of engineers as head of the contracting agencies is granted that waiver,

and he was presented with the facts at the time he made the decision he thought was appropriate. The issue here is the cost and

pricing data. We are informed that under Kuwaiti law, the subcontractors are not required to provide cost and pricing data, and

we requested that, and that is the answer that we got, that the law

disallows that.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Let me followup on that because, at least in

my question, which is that we have independently tried to evaluate

whether or not that is true, that amount equated to law, and Congressional Research Service, an independent agency here, has

reached a different conclusion, and I am wondering if you could

supply this committee, since the Army Corps reached that conclusion, with the specific provisions of Kuwaiti law that say they are

prohibited—this subcontractor is prohibited. Have you seen that

documentation yourself?

General STROCK. I have not seen the documentation. I have seen

records of some of the conversations that went on from which we

reached that conclusion.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. If you could provide us with—because that was

the primary rationale in disallowing this, and it seems to me it was

reached very quickly. I understand Halliburton requested 1 day,

and this waiver was granted the next. And I think that as important an issue as that, that the committee receive the legal support

that was behind this decision. If that turns out not to be the case,

that it is not barred by Kuwaiti law, would you review the waiver

and ask KBR to provide the information?

General STROCK. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Will the gentleman yield to me?

The point is that we have asked for this information from the

State Department and the Kuwaiti Embassy, and they have not

been able to tell us about any Kuwaiti law that requires the contract to have been given out only to this one sole-source subcontractor.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That is part of the criminal allegation. He

has gone to the Congressional Research Service, and they can’t find

this in the law, and obviously we would like to get to the bottom

of this. And I am sure it is going to be part of the criminal investigation as well, but anything you can get us on that will be helpful.

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General STROCK. May I clarify, this was not a sole-source subcontract? The contractor got three quotes for the fuel, and this contractor was selected as the low bidder on that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I would hate to have seen the high bidder

on that.

Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you for your patience.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am going to direct questions that may not be directly applicable

to what the purpose of the hearing is, but over the last several

months, I have had returnees from the Iraqi war, both National

Guardsmen and Reservists, called me and asked to have meetings

with me, and some of them were very disturbing. One sergeant

came in and related that his Reserve unit was not capable of getting the boots that fit them, and for a period of 7 or 8 months while

in Iraq never got the proper equipment, and he was firmly convinced that there is a prejudice between the real Army and the Reserve and National Guard forces that are over there in terms of

getting material there like boots.

Having walked in the Army in my past life, boots are pretty important. And it would seem to me—I am all for, you know, building

some of their waterworks over there, but can you find out why we

can’t give boots and shoes to the soldiers that are in combat zones?

And when you are doing that, I have at least 3 or 4 mothers and

fathers who have contacted me over the last 9 months that they

are literally buying protective vests for their sons and daughters

that are in a combat zone because they are not available by the

military. And these kids are getting shot at, injured, and in some

instances killed because they lack this basic protective device. And

it seems to me that somebody has to step up to the plate and ask

some of the questions what’s wrong.

And finally, you are awarding all these contracts over there, and

I understand we have Humvees that were never anticipated to be

used in insurgencies. Why it was not anticipated that they may be

used in insurgency situations is beyond me, but they lack armor.

Can’t you guys award a contract real fast to Halliburton for a couple of billion dollars to put half-inch armor on the bottom of these

things so we don’t have any more legs, arms or heads blown off?

Don’t come back and tell us, well, we awarded a contract, we are

going to bring these things back, and 18 months from now we are

going to have armed Hummers. We have people over there, and

they are dying, and most of them will tell you that these explosive

devices that are being placed along the road, they are dying not because they couldn’t be protected; because the vehicles they are driving aren’t properly armored. And I am sure we could find some unemployed welders and people in Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania,

and I can get you a lot of them and perfectly willing to go over and

do this work.

Now, last, and probably you can’t answer this, a disturbing news

report about a month ago was talking about the extraordinary success that we are having with training policemen in the Iraqi services to provide security once we leave. And the whole story was

about the fact that there were 600 recruits hired under contract of

approximately $150 million to train over a period of 5 or 6 months,

these recruits, half of which resigned within 3 weeks of showing

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up. So they anticipated the graduating class would consist of about

300 police officers being trained by contract by the United States.

And if you take the $150 million, I came to the conclusion that is

$500,000 per police officer.

Now, you know, I got news for you. We have some police academies in Ohio, Pennsylvania and Michigan, and we have all kinds

of aircraft going back and forth. If it costs us half a million dollars

in Iraq to train a police officer, somebody is wacky. And if this contract is by Halliburton or by Bechtel, somebody ought to have the

good sense to say half of a million dollars is ridiculous. We don’t

spend that amount to train a police officer in the United States,

and there is no damn reason in the world we should throw taxpayers’ money away to train them in Iraq.

Can anybody tell me whether there is any factual basis for those

types of costs in training security and police officers in Iraq?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. You asked four questions. I will try to handle the

first three, and Mr. Lucke will try to address your fourth.

On the boots issue, I have heard this before. I believe it is being

taken care of, but I will get you an answer for the record because

I don’t know the exact specifics.

You asked about the body armor. We expect to have basically

175,000 kits in theater by the end of this month, that is to say

March 2004, which will fully support the CENTCOM requirements.

So it is not 18 months, it’s this month.

On the up-armored Humvees, we are ramping up production.

Current production is about 138 a month. We will ramp it up by

more than 50 percent.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Where are you doing this? Here?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Yes.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Welding isn’t a tough thing.

General KERN. Could I answer that? Two points. One, every soldier today in Iraq has body armor. That was done by the end of

January. The CENTCOM number goes beyond Iraq. It includes the

people who are in Kuwait who would be transiting, and that is the

number. So we have addressed that. General Schoomaker took that

on as a personal issue. The Acting Secretary of the Army Mr.

Brownlee took that on as a personal issue. And we reported to

them every single day on the outfitting of those soldiers, boots,

BCUs and the protective gear, and that has been done.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I hope it has been done, and if it has been done,

congratulations. But, you know, what bothers us, where was the

planning, where was the anticipation that there should have been

enough body armor, there should be enough boots, there should be

armored Humvees over there? Where was the planning behind this

operation? There wasn’t any? Nobody thought about this?

General KERN. The original planning gave the body armor to

those soldiers who would be in direct contact, infantry armor, artillery soldiers. The secondary planning which went beyond that is

everybody in theater, including our civilians who are working in

the theater right now, and there is where we fell short in the original planning.

The other point on the Humvees, in addition to what Mr.

Zakheim reported to you, we are producing armor kits in every

depot. And I can’t promise you that the one I have is producing it

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in Pennsylvania, but it is doing it in Sierra, out in California. We

are doing it in Alabama. Armored kits—in addition to the new production Humvees, in addition to the Humvees, those kits are also

being put on the family of medium tactical vehicles and the heavy

equipment transport.

So that is being done as quickly as we can from all sources we

can, and we have gone to find those welders and sources of steel

to make sure that does happen. We have taken that very seriously.

We are not going to wait for the production.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you very much. We were 3

minutes over. What I am going to do is move to summary at this

point. Mr. Waxman is going to get up to 20 minutes for any additional questions, and I will summarize from there. And he can yield

to any Members over there who still have questions under his time.

Anybody feel they need to take a break right now? I guess otherwise we will try to go ahead and get it done.

Mr. WAXMAN. I want to find out more about Altanmia. General

Strock, you said that you agreed with the statement by Halliburton

that this was an open and competitive process whereby they chose

Altanmia as the subcontractor to provide the gasoline. Is that a fair

statement of what your views are?

General STROCK. I have been informed that KBR solicited for

quotes to three suppliers, and Altanmia was the lowest quote received.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, the Army Corps sent to us on January 6

their justification for this claim that it was fair and reasonable, but

in that justification it said Halliburton did not issue a public solicitation or a public request for quotations for the purchase of gasoline. Halliburton did not seek out all qualified bidders. Instead,

Halliburton hand-picked three companies and telephoned them informally on May 4 to obtain quotes for the purchase of gasoline.

And then on that same day, after they made these three calls, they

chose Altanmia and requested the Corps’ approval, which it received. Is that an inaccurate statement?

General STROCK. I think that’s accurate, sir. We received three

quotes and selected the smallest. I don’t know the details. But I

want to reiterate, the conditions at the time were long gas lines in

Baghdad. Soldiers were getting attacked guarding those gas lines,

and the contractor was told on May 3rd that they were to begin delivering fuel, and they did it in a very short and compressed period

of time.

Mr. WAXMAN. According to your documents, Halliburton had

three companies that they contacted. One was Altanmia, KAFCO

and Monmar. The Defense Energy Support Center, which has been

doing fuel purchases and transports in the Gulf for over 50 years,

said they had no knowledge of doing business with any of these

three companies. The Defense Energy Support Center also told us

that it does do business with several other companies in Kuwait,

including TriStar, Mubarak and LeNouvelle. But your records do

not show that Halliburton called any of these companies. Do you

know whether Halliburton even contacted the Defense Energy Support Center to find out who they would recommend in the region?

General STROCK. No, sir, I don’t know.

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Mr. WAXMAN. With a contract of this magnitude, a company’s

past performance and experience is clearly one of the most significant factors in the selection. What experience did Altanmia have in

purchasing and transporting fuel?

General STROCK. I can’t comment. I don’t know.

Mr. WAXMAN. If Altanmia had no prior experience, as we understand the case to be, how would they know even to call them for

a price quote? Does someone at Halliburton know someone at

Altanmia? Do you know anything about that connection?

General STROCK. No, sir, I don’t.

Mr. WAXMAN. Halliburton claims it was unable to locate any

company in Kuwait that currently does fuel purchasing and transport for the U.S. Government, yet Halliburton was somehow able

to find this other company, Altanmia, which had no experience and

awarded a multimillion-dollar contract in less than 1 day. Does this

process raise any eyebrows for you, General?

General STROCK. Certainly, sir, suggested that way, yes. May I

just say, subsequent to that original award, the Kuwaiti Petroleum

Co. refused to allow us to deal with anybody but Altanmia. And

also the DESC traditionally deals directly with the Kuwait Petroleum Co., as I understand, and as the Kuwaitis prefer, so it was

somewhat unusual that they would deal with a contractor, in this

case KBR. So they prefer that the KBR not deal directly with the

Kuwaiti Petroleum Co., but rather with the subcontractor.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you know who owns Altanmia?

General STROCK. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. WAXMAN. Does anybody here know information about that?

The record will indicate that no one responded.

I have heard multiple allegations that the brother of the Kuwaiti

Oil Minister had some sort of financial interest in the company. Do

you know whether that is true?

General STROCK. No, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Anybody else know whether it is true? Do you

think it is important to know whether the Kuwaiti Oil Minister or

his family had an interest in this company? Does anybody in the

panel think it was important to know whether the Kuwaiti Oil

Minister or his family had an interest in this company?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. I don’t know if that would be the kind of question

somebody would immediately ask. Certainly it wasn’t the kind of

thing that sprang to my mind when I looked at all this and passed

it on and worked with Bill Reed on it, whether there was some

family connection or something.

Mr. WAXMAN. I raised this issue in a letter dated January 15 to

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. I wrote that several

sources had told us that Talal al-Sabah, the brother of the Kuwaiti

Oil Minister, had financial ties to Altanmia. I wrote further that

although this off-the-books arrangement appears to be undocumented, the sources claim that Mr. Al-Sabah is acting as a consultant for the company or as a hidden partner. I also said that some

sources said that other members of the Kuwaiti royal family had

ties to Altanmia. In response to my letter, Ms. Rice said this would

be investigated by the Defense Department.

General Strock, what steps have you taken to investigate these

allegations since then?

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And, Mr. Zakheim, what steps have you taken?

Mr. ZAKHEIM. This is all part of the inspector general’s investigation of this entire matter.

Mr. WAXMAN. General Strock, do you know about any steps?

General STROCK. I am not sure if my command has taken any

either except, as Dr. Zakheim said, to refer it to the investigator.

Mr. WAXMAN. Another mystery has been why the Army Corps

keeps saying Halliburton’s gasoline prices are fair and reasonable

in light of all the evidence to the contrary. On October 18, your

spokesman Scott Saunders said that Halliburton was, ‘‘getting the

best price possible.’’

Let me take one stark example. We know the Defense Energy

Support Center buys gasoline from Kuwait for 96 cents a gallon.

Is it just the gasoline and not the transportation? And according

to your office, Halliburton charges the U.S. Government $1.17 per

gallon. To be clear, we are talking about the same Kuwaiti source.

Yet Halliburton charges 21 cents more per gallon to buy the fuel.

Explain to me why Halliburton prices are fair and reasonable in

light of this large differential. Why isn’t this an overcharge for the

purchase of this commodity?

General STROCK. The support center purchases directly from the

Kuwait Petroleum Co. We purchase from Altanmia, not the Kuwait

Petroleum Co. I also understand that as our contractor suggested,

they could get a better price if we could have a longer-term contract and more time to negotiate. The exigency of the situation prohibited that. It is my understanding that Altanmia buys on the

spot market instead of buying futures in the fuel, and therefore

that fuel is more expensive.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you know whether the energy support center

buys on the spot market or has a long-term contract?

General STROCK. I don’t know. They buy directly from the Kuwait Petroleum Co., as I understand it.

Mr. WAXMAN. I am somewhat taken aback with the entire rationale for finding Halliburton’s prices reasonable; hinges on the sham

1-day telephone competition in which Halliburton excluded more

experienced companies from the bidding. General, let me——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Could I ask the gentleman to yield?

Mr. WAXMAN. Not yet.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I will wait.

Mr. WAXMAN. I am just trying to make sure I can get through

these questions. Let me ask you to think of yourself not as a contract manager, but as a taxpayer for the moment. Doesn’t there

come a point where you have to say the U.S. taxpayer should not

be forced to pay Halliburton far more than the U.S. Government

pays for exactly the same product? Did you ever reach that point?

General STROCK. I am sorry. If you would repeat that, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Are you troubled that Halliburton pays more for

the gasoline that the government in the energy support center is

paying for the same gasoline in Kuwait?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask a question. Mr. Reed, you are

looking at that, aren’t you? Doesn’t DCAA look at the price they

paid, and if you determine it is unreasonable, then you disallow,

and they end up eating it?

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Mr. REED. We were in the process of looking at this very issue

and question when other matters came to our attention that resulted in us referring the whole matter to the DOD IG for investigation.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Reed, weren’t you prevented from looking at

this issue of Altanmia’s prices because of the waiver?

Mr. REED. No, I don’t think that is the way I would state it. We

never got to that point because other matters came to our attention, and we referred it for investigation.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let’s step back for a minute. Halliburton says they

are going to use Altanmia, and they did a bidding process, but it

seemed like a sham bidding process. Now they are with Altanmia

and overpaying compared to what others are paying for the same

gasoline. And we would want the Defense Department to be examining this more carefully. But suddenly the Corps came in with this

waiver that Mr. Van Hollen asked about, and the reason—there

was a reason from the requirement to get the data from Altanmia

about why they are charging these higher prices—was that Kuwaiti

law required it. So we don’t know that information because someone said Kuwaiti law required that they not give this information.

Now we have checked it out, and Mr. Van Hollen indicated that

we can’t find any evidence of Kuwaiti law that says you can’t look

at that point. I think we need a clarification of it, and I expect for

the record we will find out what do you think—where you got the

idea that Kuwaiti law prevents this information from being supplied. Since we’re paying the bills, why do we have to go along with

Kuwaiti law that says we have to pay whatever they charge and

we can’t explore why they are overcharging?

Now, it appears that the underlying premise for the waiver is

false. You may not agree to that, but I believe it is a false statement.

The other premise that we had was that the Army Corps suggested that Altanmia was the only company the Kuwaiti Government would allow Halliburton to use to buy gasoline and transport

it to Iraq. In addition, an Army Corps whistleblower claimed she

was being pressured to negotiate future fuel contracts exclusively

with Altanmia. Now, this morning’s Wall Street Journal reports

that the Kuwaitis sent a letter to Halliburton and to the Army

Corps on January 25, 2004, recommending that you drop Altanmia

and buy the gasoline directly from the Kuwait Petroleum Co. Yet

it appears that the U.S. Government has continued to pay inflated

prices for gasoline to Halliburton and Altanmia even though we

didn’t have to.

Why wasn’t Altanmia dropped in January as the Kuwaitis recommended, General Strock?

General STROCK. Sir, we awarded a task order on that same contract on March 2nd. We received a copy of that letter dated January 26 on March 4th, 2 days later. When we received that letter,

we immediately suspended deliveries of fuel under that contract.

However, when the fuel supplies dropped in Iraq in 2 days, we purchased under that instrument an additional 7 days, which will expire 2 days from now. So we were forced by the situation we faced

to go to the only source we have to provide this fuel for the Iraqi

people.

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Mr. WAXMAN. The journal reports the letter was sent by DHL to

the Army Corps officials at Camp Doha. And the letter was faxed

to Halliburton on the same day, so that would have been January

25, 2004. And there is a time-stamped receipt.

Have you gone back over your files to determine when you, in

fact, received the letter?

General STROCK. I believe that has been done. And indirectly, I

have heard that the letter was addressed to a contracting officer

who had departed the command and therefore was not acted on by

the people who followed. And it was only after it was brought to

our attention on March 4th that we acted on it. It was also based

upon the way in which it came to us and questioned the legitimacy

of that letter. We confirmed just yesterday that, in fact, it was a

legitimate letter, and we will comply with it, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. So because the letter got in somebody else’s hands,

we have spent how many millions of dollars extra for this gasoline

that might have been saved if we had gone to the Kuwaiti Petroleum Co.? What was the figure? $300 million because someone at

Doha wasn’t working there anymore for the Army Corps? Is that

your explanation?

General STROCK. No, sir, I would not necessarily reach that conclusion.

Mr. WAXMAN. What is the current status of the Altanmia contract? Are we still paying them inflated prices as of today? And are

we taking any steps to recoup the $300 million paid to Altanmia?

General STROCK. I can’t answer the second part. We are still paying under that contract because of the circumstances in Kuwait.

That delivery order we have out will expire 2 days from now. There

is no other source.

Mr. WAXMAN. What bothers me about the gasoline contract is

that again and again what the administration and Halliburton

have said turns out to be wrong. The Corps and Halliburton told

us the prices were fair because there was full and open competition. We now know there wasn’t real competition. The contract was

issued in 1 day, and none of the established companies in fuel

transport got a chance even to bid. Halliburton told us that the

reason the energy support center prices were so low is they used

military transport vehicles, whereas Halliburton had to use private

contractors. We now know this is wrong. The energy support center

used private contractors just like Halliburton. They just used much

cheaper ones.

We were told that the reason it was necessary to give Halliburton a waiver from providing cost and pricing data was that the

Kuwaiti law prohibited Altanmia from providing this data. We now

know, and you helped establish that you believed it, too, that this

was false. We were told that the reason that Halliburton had to use

Altanmia was that the Kuwaitis would not allow anyone else to

have the contract. We now know that’s not true.

I see a pattern here that I don’t like. I have not said it is a coverup, but it troubles me that the administration and Halliburton

keep putting out false and misleading information. The whole affair

does not smell right. We clearly need a full investigation. Do you

agree with that?

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General STROCK. Sir, I agree we need a complete investigation.

I don’t agree with everything you have said, no, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Who do you think ought to do that investigation?

You think there ought to be an investigation. Who ought to do it?

General STROCK. I think it is in the hands of the IG at this time,

and I understand the Justice Department has also been called in.

Mr. WAXMAN. I would like to yield to Mr. Van Hollen 2 minutes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I just have a brief followup on the whole issue

of granting the waiver, because as I understand it, the Corps has

the discretion whether or not to grant the waiver. I have a very

simple question, because we have been talking about the need to

save the taxpayer money, and my question is, how did granting

that waiver help protect the American taxpayer?

General STROCK. We followed an established process which does

protect the American taxpayer. The situation in Iraq at the time

when the chief engineer signed that waiver was felt to be urgent

and compelling, that it had to be done, and this was the only

source available. And again, I don’t want to understate the importance of this decision, but the moneys applied to this contract are

Iraqi moneys from the DFI, not American taxpayer money. And I

understand that does not matter here, but this is not American

taxpayer dollars.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Did the KBR say they would no longer be providing these services unless you granted the waiver?

General STROCK. I don’t know the answer to that.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Why should the burden fall on the American

taxpayer as opposed to KBR with respect to the decision of the Kuwaiti Government? I think it is clear there is a question about

whether Kuwaiti law requires that they not disclose this information. I think it is clear that that may not be the case. Why should

the burden fall on the American taxpayer as opposed to KBR as the

prime contractor of what Kuwaiti law says?

General STROCK. I don’t think this burden is falling on the American taxpayer. And second, as we indicated here, our process is to

audit all of these proposals we get from the contractor. That has

been initially done as irregularities have come forward. That will

continue to be investigated. So in the end, I have confidence that

the system will work as designed.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I agree we should continue to audit. That is

why I am puzzled by the fact that you provided the waiver, because

the waiver essentially said to KBR, did it not, that you don’t have

to provide the underlying documentation?

General STROCK. They did receive a waiver on cost and pricing

data, which is permitted in the FAR, yes, sir.

Mr. REED. Notwithstanding the waiver, we would still expect

KBR to justify how they determined the price to be fair and reasonable. Notwithstanding they didn’t give us cost to pricing data, we

would expect some other supporting data to establish the fairness

of that price.

Mr. WAXMAN. I would yield 5 minutes to Mr. Lantos. But before

I do, we didn’t get to some questions on Bechtel, and perhaps if you

will join us to get some of the answers to some of the questions we

wanted to ask USAID about Bechtel.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And we will leave the record open.

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We will recognize the gentleman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Records and documents. We want both.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Gentleman from California.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first

express my respect and admiration for all of our military working

and fighting in Iraq. I had the privilege of visiting the Baghdad

area and up in Mosul, and my respect and admiration is

unbounded.

I would like to change the subject, if I may, to an entirely new

area. Under Saddam Hussein one of the many restraints and restrictions of that despicable police state was on the rights of workers to organize and to be represented. I would be grateful if any

of you, ladies and gentlemen, would tell me what we are doing with

our contractors to ensure that in this new world, we are attempting

to make sure workers’ rights are respected and then enforced.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Congressman, we will look into that. As you know,

there are a number of programs that we are working in conjunction

with our partners at AID and State that fall under the rubric of

governance that have to do with everything from the rule of law

to setting up courts and so on, and we will get you an answer for

the record on that specific question.

Mr. LANTOS. I hope you can do better than that because you have

been operating there now for over a year, and I would be deeply

disturbed if my question would be the first time the question of

labor rights emerged in the context of spending billions and billions

of American taxpayers’ dollars employing Iraqi employees.

You wanted to say something.

Mr. LUCKE. I can tell you that we are very concerned about the

rights of citizens and the participation—the fuller participation of

Iraqi citizens in their own governance. We have been involved—we

have been financing a $167 million local governance contract.

Mr. LANTOS. I am not asking about governance. I am asking

about workers’ rights. One of the most objectionable aspects of a

police state is that it does not accept the concept of workers’ rights.

Stalin did not accept it. Hitler didn’t accept it. And Saddam Hussein did not accept it. He did not want to see the emergence of

independent and viable labor unions that would represent an alternative source of power and influence in society.

Now we are attempting to bring about a metamorphosis of Iraqi

society, which is a generational undertaking. You folks have been

in charge of this now for about a year. Has the issue of labor

rights, the right to unionize, the right to protect workers, been part

of your discussion? Has it been part of your contracting with various contractors? When you deal with Bechtel or you deal with any

of the others, do you discuss workers’ rights? Do you discuss the

right of Iraqi workers to unionize?

Mr. LUCKE. Workers’ rights does not fall under any of the USAID

contracts for now.

Mr. LANTOS. Under whom does it fall, since you are the one who

signs the contract that gives the money to the contractors? Who

else should deal with this?

Mr. LUCKE. There are many implementers of programs. My agency works only with appropriated dollars on contracts. CPA is an organization that works with ministries for the Provisional GovernVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00142 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ment of Iraq. There is a Ministry of Labor, and I am quite sure

that CPA, if they were represented here, could tell you about some

of those programs that may be implemented with other funds, with

funds or seized assets. There are no programs that I know of that

are being implemented with appropriated funds, and not through

AID.

Mr. LANTOS. But your testimony is, that the funds—what is the

amount of funds under your control?

Mr. LUCKE. We have about $3.8 billion that we will eventually—

have been promised now under the first supplemental and the second supplemental together.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Congressman, I am going to turn over to Admiral

Dave Nash, who heads the CPA Program Management Office. But

before I do, there is another aspect that goes beyond contracting,

and that is we now have the new administrative law, the TAL it

is called, and that does provide for basic human rights. And that

is the first step to what you are discussing, but I would like to have

Admiral Nash talk about it.

Admiral NASH. There is a Ministry of Labor, and there is a senior advisor to the Ministry of Labor, and we will get some information back to you. But I understand your question to be what are

we doing about the contracts that we are letting. And I think the

answer is, I will have to get back to you on that. They are being

let just like the contracts are in this country, because all the contracts, at least the ones I am responsible for, are being awarded

under the Federal acquisition regulation.

Mr. LANTOS. Our labor laws do not apply in Iraq.

Admiral NASH. That’s correct.

Mr. LANTOS. So it is the responsibility of CPA to see to it that

Iraqi labor is protected.

Admiral NASH. And I will carry that message back, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Lantos, thank you for being patient.

Mr. Waxman, thank you very much.

And we obviously have a lot of concerns as we take a look at the

amount of expenditure. I want to thank this panel. A lot of tough

questions, some within your purview, some without the purview,

but I think it shows the seriousness we have in Congress about

overseeing contracting there.

When you went over there, it was a mess. In fact, you have

150,000 troops you have to house and feed and worry about telephone calls, transporting them across a difficult country, making a

lot of snap decisions. There are mistakes that get made. I feel a little more confident as we go up and find them. In many cases the

contractors under these cost plus contracts front the money up

front and then come back for reimbursements. That makes me feel

a little better about it.

And, Mr. Reed, this is the first time I have had you before this

committee, but having had contacts with the DCAA in my previous

life, it is a pretty good organization. And if anything, we want you

to take away from this, we want you to continue to do your job.

We don’t want any favoritism, and we are going to hold you accountable.

We are going to be coming back on this. You have a very difficult

task. When you said in your opening comments—when you spelled

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out the task for America in Iraq and getting that mission accomplished, you are doing the job. And along the way, you have to rely

on contractors to do a lot of things, and by and large we have done

a good job, but there are things that slip through. The whole Kuwaiti oil incident is something that if we don’t watch contractors

very closely, obviously if we could do this over again, this is something they should have come to you right away, and it would have

been done differently.

As we move forward, I think the warning is we need to be even

more careful. And we want to work with Mr. Waxman to get to the

bottom of exactly what happened there. And I know the Kuwaiti

Government has their ongoing investigation. My understanding is

in that part of the world, that nobody can get the cost and pricing

data from any Middle Eastern country. I don’t know if there is a

law. I don’t know if they strong-arm us, but we are going to make

an effort to try do to it. And if there is any way to do it, we would

like to get it, because it looks to me just on its face that something

went wrong here. And I don’t know if Halliburton might have been

the victim, but that would mean the American taxpayers would be

the victims, and Iraqi citizens at the same point who are shouldering much of that burden.

It is a tough job, and I think as I have been over there on a couple of occasions now, see the job many of our contractors are doing.

We didn’t talk about some of the contractors that haven’t gone too

well besides one. It happens the Vice President was a past president of one company, and the focus has been on that, but every

company doing business over there has their own concerns and

their own problems, and some contracts have been terminated. Our

focus doesn’t need to be on everybody.

We know it is a tough job, but we are looking and watching you.

And we are going to come back and do followup hearings and investigations in May, and we wish you to continue to do the job. But

if anything, we want you to err on the side of being tough and

making sure that we are getting our dollars’ worth on this. And as

the situation gets a little bit more manageable, we expect, I think,

as Mr. Waxman and others have talked about, a little more competition as we get into these, on some of the task orders and everything else, looking at some of the contracting vehicles. I think it is

a little too early to make any definite determination on charging

practices on the part of any company because they are all under

investigation. And I have been in this business a long time, and

what you hear and what may look on the surface, after it goes back

and forth, hopefully this can be resolved, but it looks like we want

you to stay tough. I guess that is our message to you as we move

forward.

I don’t think I have any other questions at this point from our

side, but we will have some followup requests for documents, and

we may get some other written questions back and forth. And although Mr. Waxman and I don’t agree on every aspect of this, I

think every member of this committee wants to make sure that as

we move forward, we learn from what has happened before. We

proceed to get more efficient about the way that we contract, and

we want to work together to that, and you are a critical part of

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that. I thank you for the job you are doing, and I want to reiterate

this. You are doing a great job over there.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ZAKHEIM. Mr. Chairman, may I make one comment? And I

think it is important so there be no misunderstanding. We are

tough and, we do ask the tough questions, and you have seen that

today. But there are an awful lot of dedicated contractor people,

not just Halliburton and their 19,000, but all the contractors who

are risking their lives as we speak, and we shouldn’t minimize this.

And, yes, we will get to the bottom of these issues, but we should

be at the same time we look at it as being cognizant of the fact that

these people are dedicated, that they are not deliberately trying to

rip anybody off, least of all their fellow Americans, and they are

sticking their necks out while we are sitting here.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We met some of the contractors over there

as well and talked to them. It is a tough breed of cat. They uproot

themselves from their family and their children to go over there to

help the war effort. And let’s not lose sight that the vast, vast majority of not just our people in uniform, but our civil servants and

our contractors are there to accomplish a mission. But things still

go wrong under those circumstances, and that is when we get involved and you get involved. I am confident that working together

that we can try to resolve some of these issues.

Mr. WAXMAN. I want to thank the members of this panel as well.

We are doing our job when we have this kind of a hearing to try

to raise these questions and get some answers. And I don’t know

that we got all the answers. I know we didn’t get all the answers.

We got only some. I think there needs to be a thorough investigation. And I look forward to working with the chairman in getting

the answers we need.

But I must tell you this. When we are asking our young men and

women to put their lives on the line in Iraq, I don’t want to see

anybody enrich themselves unfairly. This is a situation where our

country’s interest is at stake, and lives are at stake, and we ought

to make sure that the taxpayers are being protected and someone

along the line is not just getting rich and profiteering in this war

while our young people are dying every single day. Thank you very

much.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I would just note that in terms of profiteering, this is just my perception coming off this, there might have

been some decisions that could have been made differently downstream, but in the Kuwait situation, if there was a bribery there,

no company was profiteering. You might have had an individual or

two that has gone astray, might have paid too much for gas, but

there was no profiteering on that. These were costs that were

passed on. But as Mr. Waxman said, obviously, we all have an interest in making sure that doesn’t happen.

The vast majority of contractors are there for the right reasons.

I commend you for the job you are doing for this country, and we

thank you for being here today.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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[The prepared statements of Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Wm.

Lacy Clay, Hon. Jo Ann Davis, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and additional information submitted for the hearing record follow:]

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UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES: THE COMPLEX TASK OF COORDINATING CONTRACTS

AMID THE CHAOS AND THE REBUILDING

OF IRAQ

TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:20 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis of Virginia

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tom Davis of Virginia, Shays, Mica,

Souder, LaTourette, Ose, Lewis, Ms. Davis of Virginia, Platts, Cannon, Schrock, Duncan, Deal, Miller, Murphy, Turner, Carter,

Blackburn, Tiberi, Harris, Waxman, Maloney, Cummings,

Kucinich, Mr. Davis of Illinois, Tierney, Clay, Lynch, Van Hollen,

Sanchez, Ruppersberger, Norton, Cooper, and McCollum.

Staff present: David Marin, deputy staff director/communications

director; Keith Ausbrook, chief counsel; Ellen Brown, legislative director and senior policy counsel; Robert Borden, counsel/parliamentarian; Rob White, press secretary; Drew Crockett, deputy director

of communications; John Cuaderes, senior professional staff member; John Brosnan, GAO detailee; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Brien

Beattie, deputy clerk; Robin Butler, financial administrator;

Allyson Blandford, office manager; Corinne Zaccagnini, chief information officer; Leneal Scott, computer systems manager; Phil

Barnett, minority staff director/chief counsel; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy chief counsel; Karen Lightfoot, minority senior policy

advisor & communications director; Anna Laitin, minority communications & policy assistant; David Rapallo, Alexandria Teitz, and

Jeff Baran, minority counsels; Mark Stephenson, Nancy Scola, and

Adam Bordes, minority professional staff members; Cecelia Morton,

minority office manager; Teresa Coufal, minority assistant clerk;

Christopher Davis, minority investigator; Theresa Foote, minority

special assistant; and James Temple and Lawrence Atkinson, minority interns.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good morning. I appreciate everyone’s indulgence. The ranking member and myself have been trying to

make this move as smoothly as we can for Members.

The committee will come to order. We meet here today to look

into the challenges surrounding the complex task of coordinating

and executing contracts amid the chaos of rebuilding Iraq.

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Even before the conclusion of major military actions, there were

plans for a massive effort to rebuild Iraq’s infrastructure and government. Those responsible knew this endeavor would require an

enormous amount of contractor support. Anticipating the worst,

and recognizing the need for quick and decisive action, agency procurement professional properly invoked the carefully circumscribed

statutory flexibilities designed to quickly provide urgently needed

goods and services.

I am referring here to contracts that were let just prior to or soon

after the conclusion of major military action. The urgency and difficult circumstances surrounding the anticipated scenarios justified

the use of limited competition or, in a few cases, single source

awards. Although I am an advocate for full and open competition,

Congress, in anticipation of war and other emergency scenarios,

provided our procurement professionals with these flexibilities to

deal with emergencies just like we had in Iraq.

The rebuilding of Iraq is a very monumental task. Saddam Hussein spent decades frittering away his nation’s vast wealth on himself and his Baath party cronies, while little or nothing was spent

to meet the urgent needs of the Iraqi people. Decades of neglect

and inaction turned this once great nation into one where the majority of people live in poverty and despair.

However, with Saddam’s ouster, we are witnessing a rebirth of

Iraq. Freedom and liberation have brought a new sense of urgency

to the Iraqi people; they understand what is at stake and we need

to do our part to sustain freedom by rebuilding their nation.

The task at hand is mammoth; it will be years before we are able

to truly get Iraq running on its own. Yet, as each day passes, Iraqis

are getting a better life thanks to the dedicated American soldiers

and civilians working there. Our reconstruction efforts are well

under way, even under life-threatening conditions.

Currently, there are many U.S. Government agencies working to

improve conditions in Iraq. For example, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Agency for

International Development are all working to rebuild Iraq. There

is no question that each of these entities is working in an extremely challenging environment. And although every day brings

progress, we all recognize there are still major obstacles facing our

military, government civilians and contractors.

There are serious security concerns as well, and the simple necessities of life like water and electricity are only sporadically

available in many areas. So it is no surprise that our normal acquisition support and oversight resources are sorely stretched. The

committee is interested in the efforts made to manage, oversee, and

coordinate acquisition activities to ensure that taxpayer money is

being spent as effectively and efficiently as possible in this difficult

wartime atmosphere.

In addition to our ongoing work, the General Accounting Office

has also been reviewing these efforts. A report on the challenges

faced in awarding the contracts has just been issued. Another GAO

report on the performance challenges faced by sustainment efforts

is in the works.

Huge amounts of money have already been or are about to be expended in our reconstruction efforts. We need to make sure that acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00186 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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quisition rules and the integrity of the processes are being followed.

Congress has spent years streamlining complex government rules

and regulations to make it easier for businesses to sell to the Federal Government, but did so in a way that carefully balances affordability, accountability, and accessibility to make sure taxpayer

dollars are protected. It is our job, this committee’s job, to make

sure that is happening in Iraq.

We hope to learn today how our acquisition system and the professionals who run it have responded to the challenges faced in

Iraq. No one doubts that the circumstances are exceptionally difficult. I have seen the chaos on the ground there. The security situation is tenuous at best. On a daily basis, our military, civilians

and contractors come under hostile fire. Our service men and

women are being killed and wounded. A great number of contractor

employees have also been killed, captured, or wounded. It is a

major understatement to say that this is a difficult place to conduct

business, but we are doing just that and we are slowly accomplishing our goals.

Government contracting is difficult even under normal circumstances. Add in the urgency and the inherent dangers of a war

zone and the challenge of acquiring urgently needed goods and

services, and it becomes quite daunting. Through this hearing we

hope to continue to separate fact from fiction, truth from rhetoric

and, in turn, help make sure we are coordinating contract processes in Iraq in a way that ensures success and safety.

I recognize that there have been mistakes. That is why we are

holding hearings. That is why we are requesting documents and

getting briefed on a daily basis. The contracting process is not always pretty, and decisions made under the pressure of combat are

not always as lucid as those made under less threatening conditions. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the new contract awards

were done properly. While there were some difficulties, particularly

in the issuance of task orders under existing contracts, it is my understanding that while the procedures used may have been flawed

in some cases, the awards themselves could clearly have been accomplished under other authorities. Not surprisingly, it also seems

that the management and oversight of contract performance remains a thorny challenge due to the evolving needs on the ground,

staffing difficulties, and an intimidating security environment.

Many of the disputes that have been made public show that the

contract oversight process is working. We need to let the give and

take of contract oversight and management work. Make no mistake, overcharges cannot and will not be tolerated, and contractors

need to establish systems and processes that protect the Government from waste and that maximize the reach of pressure taxpayer

dollars. But we need to keep in mind the enormity of the effort involved and that it is being executed in a wartime environment

where lives are at stake. This hearing is part and parcel of our

functioning oversight process.

As chairman of the committee, I would like to move beyond the

politics, honestly explore the challenges the military and contractors face, and figure out how to overcome them. I am not new to

politics; I understand why others feel the need to say the word Halliburton as often as humanly possible, but we have more than just

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one contractor in Iraq and lives are on the line. I would hope that

our friends on the other side would agree and begin to move this

debate in a more constructive direction, away from really what I

would consider partisan politics that really serve the interest of a

few.

For the record, we have spent months working together with the

minority on these issues. We have set up joint witness interviews

with DOD personnel; we have submitted joint document requests;

we have had joint GAO briefings and my staff has participated in

joint whistleblower interviews; and we are trying to conduct these

in good, constructive, bipartisan faith with our friends.

On Sunday, Mr. Waxman sent a letter to the Vice President that

included, in my judgment, unwarranted insinuations about improper contact between the Vice President’s office and DOD contracting officials, something I am sure we will talk about today, allegedly based on a briefing by DOD officials. Just so we are clear,

it was my staff, majority staff that set up and attended the briefing, and those who came over from DOD stated clearly that they

had not experienced inappropriate influence from the Vice President or anyone in that office. We had no idea that the majority

would send their own letter when we had been working together

on these issues. It wasn’t shared with us before it was released to

the press, and we don’t share that politically charged interpretation

of what was said at the briefing. There are witnesses here today

that can elaborate on that issue.

I completely understand what is going on here in the political

context, but I find it distasteful from our role as an oversight committee to choose oversight by press release or by leaking draft reports and confidential briefings. This is a strategy that, as the majority, we will not pursue and, if we ever become the minority, I

hope as long as I am the ranking member, would not pursue.

All you have to do is look back at the wide-ranging complex bipartisan oversight this committee has conducted over the past year

and a half to understand why they have had to make, I think, some

rather extreme statements to make their point that we don’t think

stands up for scrutiny, and we are not going to participate in that

circus. We are going to continue to conduct responsible oversight,

and I hope this hearing will serve as another step in that direction.

I said this back in March at our last hearing on this issue, and it

is worth repeating: I have no patience for fraud or abuse. I expect

that any such instances that are proven will result in harsh punishment for the perpetrators. Since our last hearing, many of the

limited competition contracts have been replaced by ones awarded

through full and open competition. Emergency procedures are for

emergencies only. When initial decisions were made, time was not

our ally, but fortunately we anticipated this and were able to react

in such a manner that assisted the war effort rather than hindering it. Our soldiers have benefited from this and lives have been

spared because of this, and we need to keep that in mind as we

conduct the oversight we are charged with conducting.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman, your opening statement?

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In early March, this committee held its first hearing on Iraq contracts. I spoke at length at that hearing about the fundamental

flaws in the administration’s procurement strategy and the enormous waste of taxpayer dollars that was occurring in Iraq. Today,

more than 3 months later, none of these fundamental problems

have been addressed. We know more today than we did 3 months

ago about how the administration has mismanaged the contracts to

reconstruct Iraq, and what we have learned shows that the problems are even worse than we thought.

The focus of today’s hearing is the two largest Iraq contracts.

One contract, called LOGCAP, was awarded to provide the military

with logistical support, such as housing and dining facilities. The

other contract, called RIO, was awarded to import fuel and restore

Iraq’s oilfields. Both of these contracts went to one well-connected

company, Halliburton. In total, Halliburton has been awarded a

phenomenal sum of money, over $7 billion, under these two contracts.

In the course of our investigation into the Halliburton contracts,

we have tried to look at the contracts from three different perspectives. One is the boots on the grounds perspective of the employees

who work for the company; one is the flyover perspective of Pentagon auditors who scrutinize Halliburton’s books to ensure that the

taxpayer is not being overcharged; and one is the 50,000 foot perspective of the General Accounting Office, which has examined

whether the Federal Government has the necessary safeguards in

place to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. All three perspectives

come to the same conclusion: Halliburton is gouging the taxpayer,

and the Bush administration doesn’t seem to care.

Yesterday I released the statements of five former employees of

Halliburton. These individuals describe a company that acts like it

is spending someone else’s money, which is just what Halliburton

is doing. Under the company’s cost-plus contract, the more taxpayer money Halliburton spends, the more profit it makes. The examples of waste, fraud, and abuse provided by the former Halliburton employees are stunning. One former logistics specialist told

us that Halliburton charged taxpayers $10,000 a day to house its

employees in the five-star Kempinski Hotel in Kuwait. The same

employees could have stayed in air conditioned tents like those

used by our troops for less than $600 a day.

A former convoy commander told us that Halliburton removed

the spare tires from its brand new $85,000 trucks, and if one of the

trucks got a spare tire, Halliburton would abandon or torch the

truck. Can you imagine that? Halliburton’s approach to fixing a flat

tire is to buy a new truck. Another truck driver, James Warren,

tried to do something about the waste and theft he observed. He

called Randy Harl, the president and CEO of KBR, the Halliburton

subsidiary operating in Iraq. Instead of investigating Mr. Warren’s

allegation, KBR fired him.

The Pentagon auditors at the Defense Contract Audit Agency observed the same kind of problems that the whistleblowers report.

In an audit that was completed last month, but withheld from Congress, DCAA found multiple deficiencies in Halliburton’s billing

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practices. In one example, DCAA found that Halliburton submitted

‘‘billings to the government for as much as three times the meals

they actually served.’’

Well, last year, Representative John Dingell and I requested that

the General Accounting Office review Halliburton’s LOGCAP contract. Today we will hear GAO’s testimony about the results of the

investigation. GAO found widespread problems, including inadequate planning, little concern for costs, and poor contract management. Here is one example GAO told us about. Prior to the Iraq

war, the military had a contract with a Kuwaiti company called

Tamimi to provide meals to the U.S. troops in Kuwait. Before the

war started, the Bush administration turned the contract over to

Halliburton with the specific instructions that Halliburton subcontract with Tamimi to continue feeding the troops. According to

GAO, a cost-conscious procurement official finally terminated the

Halliburton contract this spring and they returned the contract to

Tamimi. Well, when they finally got rid of Halliburton acting as a

middleman, they cut the cost by over 40 percent. What purpose did

Halliburton serve except to increase the cost that we were paying

for the same meals being served by the same subcontractor who

was doing it for 40 percent less?

Our own investigation has exposed other examples of astoundingly bad contract management. In the March hearing, I objected

to the Bush administration giving the job of overseeing the reconstruction contracts to private contractors. When I investigated further, I learned that the companies hired to oversee the private contractors had significant conflicts of interest. Parsons, for example,

was hired to oversee its business partner, Fluor, while CH2M HILL

was hired to oversee its business partner, Washington Group International. When you are hired to oversee your business partner,

there is a good reason to believe that you may not want to be as

vigorous in making sure that your business partner doesn’t overspend the money.

Well, these decisions have real consequences. Our troops have

died in Iraq because they lack body armor and reinforced Humvees.

We can’t afford to throw away money on Halliburton when we don’t

have enough funds to adequately equip and protect our soldiers.

Now, GAO will tell us today that the Bush administration did

not have contingency plans in place for feeding and housing the

troops. But the administration did have detailed contingency plans

for running Iraq’s oilfields. In fact, Halliburton was given the secret contract in November 2002 to develop these plans. Now, here

is the message that sends about this administration’s priorities:

protecting Iraq’s oil came before protecting our own troops.

Many people have wanted to know what role the Vice President

has played in all of this. For months he has denied any knowledge

about Halliburton’s contracts. He said, on television, and I want to

quote him directly, this was on Meet the Press last September,

‘‘Since I left Halliburton to become George Bush’s Vice President,

I have severed all my ties with the company, and as Vice President

I have absolutely no knowledge of, in any way, shape, or form, contracts let by the Corps of Engineers or anybody else. I deliberately

stayed away from any information on that.’’

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The administration has also consistently maintained that Halliburton was selected for the Iraqi contracts by career procurement

officers. But we now know that simply was not true. Halliburton

was selected for the oil contracts by political appointees in the

Bush administration, not by procurement officials, and the Vice

President’s chief of staff, Scooter Libby, was personally briefed on

the contracts before they were issued.

We don’t know the full extent of the Vice President’s involvement

in the Halliburton contracts. All we know for sure is that what the

Vice President has said so far is false.

Now, that has come, in part, from a briefing that both the minority and majority staffs participated in. It was not a confidential

briefing, and that briefing gave information that contradicted the

statements that Vice President Cheney, and this administration

have been making over and over again, and it contradicts sworn

testimony given to this committee in March, when we held our last

hearing.

Americans cannot rely on the Bush administration to fix the contracting problems in Iraq. This administration is notorious for refusing to acknowledge mistakes or to hold officials accountable. In

fact, as the Vice President’s comments demonstrate, it is even hard

to trust the administration to provide honest and full information.

So it is really up to the Congress to look after the interest of the

troops and the taxpayers, and the question I have is whether we

are up to this challenge.

Chairman Davis has taken some commendable steps. We have

had a conversation as a result of the letter that we sent him, and

he has now agreed that we will hold a hearing in July to bring in

the whistleblowers identified by the minority before the committee.

We will discuss exactly who will participate in that hearing and

that will be something that we will discuss together. He has also

agreed that Halliburton’s CEO, David Lesar, and KBR’s CEO,

Randy Harl, will receive formal written invitations to testify before

the committee. I think Halliburton ought to testify before this committee. If they think that some of this information is inaccurate,

they ought to be here to say so under oath and to be questioned

about it.

Chairman Davis and I have discussed our concern about some

other essential steps that I think we need to take. Three months

ago, Chairman Davis and I wrote to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld

and USAID Administrator Natsios to seek documents relating to

the Halliburton and Bechtel contracts in Iraq. The administration

failed to provide most of these documents. In fact, even when the

administration finally did respond to portions of the request, it

withheld key documents. I think we need to protect our rights to

the documents and subpoena them, if necessary, so that we in this

committee get those documents.

We cannot conduct effective oversight by consent. The test of

what we investigate should be what we need to do in order to fulfill

our oversight responsibilities, not what the administration agrees

to let us see. If we are going to do our jobs, we need to be far more

assertive than we have been so far.

George Will said something very wise in a recent column. He

wrote, ‘‘Failures are multiplying because of choices for which no

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one seems to be accountable.’’ Although asking tough questions can

be politically inconvenient, we will be doing the President no favor

if we refuse to fulfill our Constitutional oversight responsibilities.

Oversight can be painful at times, especially if you look at this

whole issue from a partisan perspective. But it is an essential part

of our system of checks and balances.

I look forward to the hearing today. I look forward to the hearing

we will have in July, and I hope that it marks the beginning, not

the end, of our committee’s work on Iraq contract oversight.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this chance to make

the opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Waxman. I think that we

have Members here expecting you to put some motions. I am going

to allow members to submit opening statements for the record, and

during your 5 minutes of questions, if you prefer to use that time

for statements, we will do that; otherwise, we will dispense with

additional opening statements. And I understand you have some

motions.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, before I do that, I want to

welcome Representative Betty McCollum, who joins us today as the

newest member of the Government Reform Committee. Throughout

her career as a teacher, a city council member, and a member of

the Minnesota House of Representatives, she has championed

issues that are important to her constituents and to all Americans,

and she has worked to ensure excellence in education, environmental protection, and health care access for all. And I am pleased

she is joining us on this committee as a member of the Government

Reform Committee, and she brings a wealth of experience and expertise to this committee, and I know all of us look forward to

working with her.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me

just say for the majority we are happy to have her here and look

forward to working with her.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that we need to subpoena

documents in order to get those documents submitted to our committee. You and I have had a conversation prior to this meeting

about these documents. Some of these documents involve matters

that you and I have both requested from the administration, and

with regard to those documents, we have requested them; some

have been given to us, but not all of them. And I think it is appropriate to demand them and to subpoena them if we can’t get them

voluntarily. And I would like to yield to you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Waxman. We still don’t

have a number of documents that we requested on March 26th.

Some documents, which the minority was able to obtain anyway,

I might add, actually post-dated March 26th and weren’t included

in that request. But what we don’t have is the DOD cost estimate

for Task Order 59; DOD reports on the Bechtel construction contract; determination to award a single, rather than multiple, award

contract for oil infrastructure contract; various documents relating

to the KBR contract for imported gasoline; and the aid reports on

the Bechtel construction contract. By all right, the committee

should have these.

What I will say today is I would like to give the Department

until June 30th to get those documents before us. If there is a security reason why they can’t do that, or logistical reason, we would

like them to come up and at least give us the courtesy of meeting

with Mr. Waxman and myself to see why these documents

shouldn’t be forthcoming. And if we don’t hear by that time, it

would be my intent, I think, to move ahead with subpoenas, but

we want to give them an opportunity to move ahead with that or

to at least give us a reason why they shouldn’t, which they haven’t

to date.

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Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to put a list of some

of these items in the record. We don’t need to go through them

now. You and I both requested the documents. You are suggesting

that we give them until June 30th, and if they don’t respond, either

by coming forward and telling us why they can’t respond or giving

us the documents as we have requested, you will go forward with

subpoenas, which you can issue on your own, without even convening a meeting of the committee, is that correct?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That is correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, under those circumstances, I don’t see it necessary to offer a motion for the committee to vote on; I accept that

is a reasonable course to fllow.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me just say to our friends at the Department that we need these documents. We are entitled to them

under law, and we ought to have them, and it has been a joint bipartisan request. And there were other documents, I might add,

that Mr. Waxman wanted to add to this that we did not join him

with that weren’t in this list, but these were jointly agreed to.

Mr. WAXMAN. I have another motion for a subpoena that involves

some other matters, if we can have them reported.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Will the clerk designate?

Ms. AUSTIN. Which one would you be referring to?

Mr. WAXMAN. This is the one that involves the Vice President.

Ms. AUSTIN. Motion to subpoena Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld for documents relating to DOD contacts with the Vice

President’s Office of the White House. Under House Rule

11(2)(k)(6), I move the committee issue a subpoena to a witness,

Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, to appear before the

Committee on Government Reform on July 6, 2004, to produce certain documents relating to contracting and the rebuilding of Iraq.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the

motion be agreed to and considered as read.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection, so ordered and considered as read.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, we have

the right to move for subpoenas to get this information, and there

are documents that we are requesting that we think you would, on

reflection, agree that we ought to have. But in our conversation before this hearing, you expressed to us you haven’t had a chance to

review all of our requests to see whether you would support them.

And rather than put this to a vote, if you will afford us the opportunity to discuss these requests and join us jointly in requesting

the information, where you feel it is appropriate, and not only

make the request, but back it up with a subpoena if the request

is not agreed to in an appropriate amount of time, I would find

that an acceptable way for us to proceed together in comity on this

second group.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, Mr. Waxman, I always think we

work better together as a bipartisan unit on these issues and try

to take at least the partisan sting out of these. In addition to that,

we have some disagreements on the documents, but in discussing

this beforehand, I think there are some areas where we can agree

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to move forward, and I would be happy to work with you in that

regard, as we have in the past.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think what you have suggested

to us in good faith is helpful and constructive for us to proceed with

together, and rather than put the committee to a vote that might

well be partisan, and I so much don’t want this to be partisan because it is our committee’s responsibility on a bipartisan basis to

do the investigation that is appropriate I will ask unanimous consent to withdraw my motion for a subpoena. We will discuss further the items. I want to make a case to you on each of the items

and hope that I can get you to agree to jointly request them and

back it up with a subpoena if the request is not honored.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I thank the gentleman. If there is no objection, the request will be withdrawn.

Mr. WAXMAN. I have a third motion, and without offering that

motion officially and withdrawing it, I do want to indicate to you

that I would like to handle it in the same way we have handled

the second one. It involves further request for Halliburton documents, and we would like to discuss them with you further, see if

we can join together in a request for those documents, with the understanding that if we do request them jointly, and after an appropriate time if they are not forthcoming, that we will go to subpoena.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I look forward to working with the gentleman on his request.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We have not had an opportunity to review

all of these at this point, and we have some reservations about

some of the things that have come up, but there are others I think

we can find some area of closure, so I look forward to working with

the gentleman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I

think that is the appropriate way for us to proceed, and I look forward to working with you. I want to make the case to you on each

and every one of these, and hope I can get you to agree. That is

all I can do, is make the case, and if you don’t agree, you don’t

agree.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We have the same opportunity on your

witnesses, so we have a lot of things to talk about. I appreciate it.

Mr. WAXMAN. I appreciate it, and I do want to have you acknowledge that we are going to go ahead and have a meeting in July.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That is correct, we will have a July hearing.

Mr. WAXMAN. Where we will have an opportunity for whistleblower testimony.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Of course. As I had indicated in previous

hearings, we will.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes. Gentleman from California.

Mr. OSE. I have heard a lot of talk focused on a particular company, however, this contracting officer from our March 11th hearing was far larger than just one company. Am I to understand from

your discussion that we are limiting our inquiries to one company?

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Not at all. Not at all. In fact, some of the

inquiries and the documents we have requested do relate to other

companies.

Mr. WAXMAN. If the gentleman would permit to yield to me, one

of the documents we have requested involves Bechtel, which is the

second largest contractor. We haven’t received that information. It

is impeding our investigation. But we are not just focused on Halliburton.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. There are others as well. If the gentleman

has any suggestions, as I know he does, we would be happy to look

at those as we.

Mr. OSE. Well, I am still waiting on answers to the questions we

submitted through you and Mr. Waxman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. From DOD. Well, we can add that to our

request.

Mr. OSE. I would appreciate that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Is there any other discussion?

Mr. WAXMAN. We also had questions from our side. I remember

Mr. Lynch asked some questions and had a promise he would get

the information. So I hope we will get that as well.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, why don’t we make sure that staff

includes that in our discussion, Mr. Waxman, as we move ahead

and get it sent to the Department of Defense?

As I said before, Members will have 5 legislative days to submit

opening statements.

We move forward to our first panel now. We are pleased to have

the Honorable David M. Walker.

This means no votes, to committee members. You are certainly

encouraged to stay here for the testimony and questions, but you

won’t be needed for a vote.

Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

The Honorable David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the

United States, accompanied by Mr. William T. Woods, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. General Accounting Office, and Mr. Neal Curtin, the Director of Defense Capabilities and

Management, U.S. General Accounting Office.

As you know, it is our policy that we swear all witnesses.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, gentleman from California.

Mr. OSE. I noticed in the context of your conversation with Mr.

Waxman that you were issuing invitations to the July hearing to

the president of a couple of companies. Are those same invitations

going to the leadership of the other companies who are engaged in

contracting?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, there are literally hundreds, if not

thousands, of companies.

Mr. OSE. Well, I am particularly interested in the companies

Parini, UBS, and Washington Group.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, if the gentleman would work with

us on that, we will see if we can accommodate his request. Would

the gentleman agree to work with us on that?

Mr. OSE. I would be happy to work with you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right, thank you.

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[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Walker, thanks for being with us and

thanks for the good staff work you continue to do to shed some

light on these issues. The issue of a report I know is sometimes

subject to various interpretations, but we look to you here for guidance on these matters, and thanks for being with us.

STATEMENTS OF DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM

T. WOODS, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AND NEAL

P. CURTIN, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Minority Member Waxman, other members of the committee. It is a pleasure to

be back before you here to discuss various GAO activities dealing

with operations and rebuilding efforts in Iraq.

I would like to summarize my statement. I believe all of you have

been provided with the entire statement for the record, and hopefully all of you have also been provided a copy of the report that

was released yesterday entitled, ‘‘Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003

Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges.’’ My testimony will address a summary of this report, as well as our work

to date on various logistical support contracts on a global basis involving all four services.

Before I discuss our findings, I would like to briefly touch upon

the scope of these two efforts. First, given the widespread congressional interest in ensuring that Iraq reconstruction efforts are

awarded properly and administered effectively, we initiated this review under my authority, meaning the review that I am referring

to here, the report that was issued yesterday. Specifically, we

judgmentally selected 25 fiscal year 2003 contract actions. These 25

contract actions represented about 97 percent of the nearly $3.7 billion that have been obligated for Iraqi reconstruction through September 30, 2003. We are currently working on looking at 2004 contracting activity.

With regard to our work on the military’s use of global logistic

support contracts, this work was initiated at the request of Ranking Minority Member Waxman of this committee and the ranking

minority member of the Energy and Commerce Committee, Mr.

Dingell. It is one of a series of studies we have done on the military’s use of private contractor support deployed forces on a global

basis. Importantly, we looked at this on a global basis; we look at

it for all the services, and we did not target any particular region

or any particular company.

With regard of the award of fiscal 2003 Iraqi reconstruction contracts, we found that agencies generally complied with applicable

laws and regulations governing competition when using sole-source

or limited competition approaches to award new contracts. However, they did not always do so when issuing task orders under existing contracts. In several instances we found that contracting officers issued task orders for work that was not within the scope of

the underlying contracts. The out-of-scope work under these orders

should have been awarded using competitive procedures or, beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00205 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cause of the circumstances involved, supported by justification for

other than full and open competition in accordance with applicable

legal requirements. In this regard, given the needs relating to and

the challenges associated with the Iraqi reconstruction efforts, such

justifications are likely possible, but needed to be made and documented in order to comply with the law and to protect taxpayer interest.

We made several recommendations to the Secretary of the Army

and the Secretary of the Defense with regard to the lessons learned

in this report, and I am pleased to say that DOD has generally concurred with our recommendations and plans to take actions based

on our recommendations.

With regard to DOD’s use of global logistic support contracts, we

found mixed results in each of four critical areas that we reviewed,

namely, planning, oversight, efficiency, and personnel matters. For

example, we found that some DOD customers planned quite well

for the use of contracts, following service institutions and including

the contractor early in planning. Conversely, we found the use of

the LOGCAP contract in Kuwait and Iraq was not adequately

planned, nor was it planned in accordance with applicable Army

guidance.

We also found that while oversight processes were in place and

functioning well in some places, there were several areas needing

improvement, such as reaching an agreement on terms, specifications, and prices of services to be delivered. This is especially critical in connection with cost-based contracts.

We also found that while some military commands actively

looked for ways to save money, others exhibited little concern for

cost considerations.

Finally, shortages in personnel trained in contract management

and oversight is also an issue of critical importance that needs to

be addressed. Our report will make a number of recommendations

when it is issued later this summer in this regard.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Waxman, and

members of the committee, the United States, along with its coalition partners and various international organizations and donors,

has undertaken an enormously complex, costly, and challenging effort to rebuild Iraq in an unstable security environment. At the

early stage of these efforts, agency procurement officials were confronted with little advance warning on which to plan and execute

competitive procurement actions. An urgent need existed to begin

reconstruction efforts quickly, and the uncertainty as the magnitude in terms of the work required was evident.

Their actions in large part reflected proper use of the flexibilities

provided under existing procurement laws and regulations to

award new contracts using other than full and open competitive

procedures. However, with respect to several task orders issued

under existing contracts, some agency officials overstepped the latitude provided by competition laws by ordering work outside the

scope of the underlying contracts. This work should have been separately competed or, alternatively, justified and approved at the required official level for performance by an existing contractor. Importantly, given the war in Iraq, the urgent need for reconstruction

efforts, and the latitude allowed by the competition law, these task

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orders reasonably could have been supported by justifications for

other than full and open competition.

Logistic support contracts have developed into a useful tool for

the military services to quickly obtain needed support for troops deployed to trouble spots around the world. Because of the nature of

these contracts, however, that is, a cost-based contract arrangement, they require adequate planning and definitions of related requirements, as well as significant ongoing and active oversight by

a variety of parties in order to make sure that they are meeting

the needs of the forces in the most economic, efficient, and effective

way possible under the circumstances.

While the military services are using how to use these contracts

well, in many cases the services are still not achieving the most

cost-effective performance and are not adequately learning and applying the lessons of previous deployments. Because of the military’s continuing and growing alliance on these contract vehicles,

it is important that improvements be made in the planning and

execution of these arrangements, and that related oversight be

strengthened.

I might note, Mr. Chairman, finally, that DOD contract management has been on GAO’s high risk since 1992. There is a good reason for it: there are serious problems. They still exist. They are exacerbated in a wartime climate, and it is important that we continue to make progress to address these longstanding problems.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Waxman, I think by agreement, I am going to yield 15 minutes to you for questions, and then we will go with 15, and then

we will go to the 5 minute rule.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Walker, on the Army’s LOGCAP global logistics contract,

your team examined several important issues, including planning,

cost and efficiency, oversight, and training. And as I read your testimony and heard what you had to say, you found significant problems with each in Iraq, and I want to walk you through some of

these findings.

For a logistics contract, such as LOGCAP, to be effective and efficient, it is crucial that planning be done ahead of time. And in the

case of Iraq, planning should have been done regarding the number

of troops, their locations, how many meals they would need, how

much water they would drink, and how much housing would be required in various locations.

Mr. Walker, you believe the Pentagon’s prewar planning for

LOGCAP was inadequate, is that correct?

Mr. WALKER. Our report finds that there were shortcomings with

regard to the adequacy of planning for post-offensive operations. At

the same point in time, I think we also have to look at the timeframes involved and try to understand that there wasn’t a whole

lot of time. But clearly planning was not as robust as it should

have been or could have been.

Mr. WAXMAN. You said that the use of LOGCAP in Iraq was not

planned in accordance with applicable Army guidance, is that accurate?

Mr. WALKER. That is my understanding.

Mr. Curtin, do you have anything to add on that?

Mr. CURTIN. Yes, sir, that is exactly right. The key issue is that

the contractor needs to be involved early in the planning process

under the Army guidance, and in this case the contractor was not

involved at all until May 2003.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Curtin, isn’t it true that our soldiers were eating MREs, meals ready to eat, through August and living in tents

because there hadn’t been adequate prewar planning for dining facilities and housing?

Mr. CURTIN. Well, they were clearly living in tents and eating

MREs. That can be partially attributed to a planning problem, but

remember also the environment that you had was very unsettled.

It is not clear how much preplanning could have avoided that, but

it certainly would have helped the situation.

Mr. WAXMAN. It seems to me that there was actually far less

planning for the safety, security, and welfare of our troops than for

restoring and operating Iraq’s oil infrastructure. Halliburton started planning for the oil infrastructure in November 2002, 5 months

before the invasion. When did the planning for our troops begin

under LOGCAP?

Mr. CURTIN. Well, the Task Order 59 under LOGCAP, which

supports our forces in Iraq, was finally developed in May 2003, so

that was after the actual military action, fairly late in the game,

probably. But the problem we have even with that May 2003 plan

is that it has been having to change so frequently that it was not

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a very complete or comprehensive plan. There were nine changes

to that task order.

Mr. WAXMAN. Why did planning for our troops wait until 6

months after the planning for Iraq oil?

Mr. CURTIN. I can’t tell you; we never got a good answer to that.

I don’t know why it was done like that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, these priorities just don’t make sense.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think it is important to note, Mr. Waxman, though, that the failure for them to do what they should have

done with regard to the task orders doesn’t mean that they weren’t

doing some planning. But clearly they were not nearly as far along

as they should have been in many critical areas.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, they spent months preparing for plans for

Iraq’s oil infrastructure; they had briefings at the highest levels of

the administration. Substantial resources were being devoted to

planning for the oil, yet there was little or no planning under

LOGCAP to provide for the basic needs of our troops during the

same timeframe. And with all due respect, our priority should be

protecting the troops, not Iraq’s oil.

I would like to ask you about cost control. This LOGCAP is a

cost-plus contract, so Halliburton has its costs reimbursed and then

receives an additional profit that is a percentage of its cost. Given

the size of this contract, cost control is obviously crucial. Former

Halliburton employees have come forward with information indicating that Halliburton made virtually no effort to control costs under

LOGCAP in Kuwait and Iraq. For instance, they cited that brand

new $85,000 trucks were being torched because of a flat tire and

Halliburton subcontractors charged $100 per bag of laundry. More

than one whistleblower has said that Halliburton managers told

them not to worry about the price because it was all a cost-plus

contract.

GAO observed a lack of concern for cost considerations among

LOGCAP managers in Iraq after the invasion. What did you find

specifically?

Mr. WALKER. I think it is important to note that these are costbased contracts, and to try to clarify my understanding of how they

work. And I would ask, if Neal or Bill have a clarification, to jump

in.

First, that under these contracts, the contractors are reimbursed

for their costs, which is full absorption costing. In other words, it

is not just the direct cost, it is an overhead allocation and things

of that nature. Second, they can receive a separate base fee, which

is supposed to be based upon the estimated cost, not the actual

cost, of what it would take in order to provide the services under

the contract. And, third, they can receive an award fee or a success

fee of up to a certain percentage based upon actual performance.

The fact of the matter is that in order for these types of arrangements to work effectively, you have to plan up front as to what the

nature and scope of the activities are going to be; you need to estimate a reasonable cost, and the fees should be based upon those

numbers. To this point in time, quite frankly, they still haven’t

fully negotiated what the nature and scope of services would be,

what the estimated cost would be, and, therefore, we have a higher

level of risk than we should at this time.

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Last, I would say oversight is of critical importance as well.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Walker, your staff gave a briefing to our

staff and they said in Operation Iraqi Freedom costs were not significant concern in LOGCAP management until late in 2003; there

were no periodic reviews that had been conducted, which would be,

for example, the validity of the requirements and that appropriate

level of services; an award fee process was not in place for

LOGCAP; and that Army plans June award fee board, which requires definitization of task orders. Is this accurate?

Mr. WALKER. There were serious planning and oversight problems.

Mr. CURTIN. You have described it very accurately.

Mr. WAXMAN. When our troops are in major combat operations

and in need of support, cost can’t be the primary concern. But after

a while it should be an important concern, and I don’t understand

how there can be a debate about whether costs should be considered. The whole point of having a contractor do this work, instead

of the military, is to reduce costs. I want to ask you about a specific

example I mentioned in my opening statement.

In early 2003 there were was a Kuwaiti company called Tamimi.

They had a contract with the Army to provide four dining facilities

in Kuwait. In June 2003, Halliburton was given this work under

the LOGCAP agreement, but they were instructed by the Army to

use Tamimi, which was already there, as its subcontractor. And

more recently the work was turned back over to Tamimi.

When the dining facilities were turned back over to Tamimi,

what happened to the price of the meals?

Mr. WALKER. My understanding is the total cost on that contract

declined dramatically.

Mr. CURTIN. About over 40 percent by having a direct contract

with the local contractor versus going through LOGCAP.

Mr. WAXMAN. That doesn’t sound to me like it was providing

good value to the military. Certainly that is unfair to the taxpayers, to pay an extra 40 percent for the meals that had already

been served by Tamimi before Halliburton got in to take its cut.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Waxman, one of the things I think is important

to note is you are correct that when you are in a wartime environment, there are certain issues other than cost that have to be considered, such as the safety and security of our troops. And in that

regard, my son fought in Iraq as a captain in the Marine Corps,

so I am very sensitive to that. At the same point in time, I think

you rightfully point out that a lot of the services that we are talking about here aren’t directly in support of the troops, or at least

aren’t in combat operations directly, and, therefore, we need to be

concerned with cost. Cost does matter. At the same point in time,

there has to be a balancing of various interests, I think, to make

sure that we can accomplish our mission.

Mr. WAXMAN. You have said that the Army did not instruct commands to look for ways to control cost under LOGCAP until December 2003. Why did they wait until 9 months after the invasion?

Mr. CURTIN. I can address that one to some extent, at least. I

think the order you are talking about came down from the Department of the Army in December 2003 when they realized that fiscal

year 2004 funding was tight and they were spending in Kuwait and

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Iraq at almost unsustainable rates. And they looked for dollar savings at that point, and that is what got them interested in dollar

savings. And what we will be showing in our report is that when

you look, when the Government looks for savings potential in these

types of contracts, we almost always can find it; there are savings

available if the Government provides the right kind of oversight.

Mr. WALKER. And a lot of it, Mr. Waxman, has to do with the

nature and scope of services that are being provided, rather than

necessarily the cost, per se, of those services. It can be both; both

can result in savings.

Mr. WAXMAN. But as I understand what you are saying, Mr.

Curtin, there was no interest in holding down costs until December

2003, so they went practically the whole year without thinking

about those costs.

Mr. CURTIN. It was not a priority. We did not see the emphasis

at all.

Mr. WAXMAN. Your team also stated that an award fee process

was not in place for LOGCAP. How does this affect Halliburton’s

incentives to control costs?

Mr. WALKER. Well, my understanding is, again, the way that

these cost-based contracts work is that the contractor is reimbursed

for the direct cost, as well as an overhead allocation, so it is full

absorption costing, which can affect their profitability, I might add,

by being able to allocate part of your overhead expenses to the contract. Second, they receive a base fee, which is supposed to be

based upon the estimated cost of the contract in order to provide

some control and prevent abuse. Unfortunately, those haven’t been

defined fully yet. And, furthermore, they can receive an award fee

of anywhere from zero up to a stated percent based upon actual

performance based upon the individual facts and circumstances.

And, again, those are supposed to be based upon the estimated

cost, not the actual cost, in order to provide some type of checks

and balances against potential abuse.

And I might also add that all costs that are reimbursed are supposed to be ‘‘reasonable costs,’’ and, therefore, there is supposed to

be not only a review by the contractor, but a review by DCMA and

others to try to ascertain that in fact they are reasonable costs, because we shouldn’t be paying somebody for something that is not

reasonable or necessary.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, let me ask you, in conclusion on my questioning, about oversight and training. Army material command has a

LOGCAP support unit to advise military commanders on how to

use the contract. Is it true that reservists who had never heard of

the LOGCAP contracts were given only a 2-week training course

before being sent to the Middle East to provide contracting advice

to commanders?

Mr. CURTIN. Yes, sir, I can comment on that. The initial team

that went over at the time of the conflict was actually a well

trained unit that does that type of operation. But when replacements came through a few months into the occupation period, those

troops were the ones that had not had the experience and had just

the 2-week orientation type training. So what you saw was a real

thin layer of oversight capability there; once the first unit was

gone, you lost your capability.

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Mr. WAXMAN. Well, were these reservists expected to prepare

independent government cost estimates so that the Army would

have its own numbers to compare to Halliburton’s?

Mr. CURTIN. That is one of the functions they perform, yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Shouldn’t experienced contracting specialists be

preparing these estimates?

Mr. CURTIN. It is clearly better for the Government if they are

experienced.

Mr. WAXMAN. You also found that the Army approved a 6-month

contract renewal worth $587 million in just 10 minutes and based

this decision on just six pages of documentation. Is that correct?

Mr. CURTIN. Yes, sir. That was a meeting that my staff actually

attended in Kuwait. In the press of business, the time available,

the documentation was very thin and the time was limited; the

committee was going through very different proposals, and they literally approved it in about 10 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Walker, your testimony helps put a lot

of what we have learned in perspective, because individual Halliburton employees have described anecdotes of egregious waste,

fraud, and abuse. The Pentagon auditors are going to testify today,

and they are going to tell us about systemic problems with how

Halliburton kept its books and submitted its bills. But you have

looked at the big picture and tried to assess whether the administration has the management and training in place to oversee

Halliburton’s contracts and control costs, and what you are telling

us is that we have a serious problem. Essentially, Halliburton was

given a blank check by this administration and has run up enormous costs at taxpayers’ expense.

I thank you very much for your testimony.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

DOD has been on your watch list since 1992, is that correct?

Mr. WALKER. Contract management at DOD, correct, has been on

our high risk list since 1992.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think that is important to point out.

There has been a longstanding issue.

In terms of the flat tires and dumping the trucks, do you know

what the military rules are on a convoy if there is a flat tire; do

you know if they stop and change a tire there in the middle of a

convoy, opening it up to an attack, or if the rules are to keep moving? Do you have any idea of that or should we ask the next panel?

Mr. WALKER. I think you should ask the next panel. I would

imagine it would depend upon the security and environmental circumstances.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So there may be some satisfactory explanations why you abandon a truck when you have a large convoy

of people coming, as opposed to sitting there and changing it and

then opening yourself up to an attack. We will get that on the next

panel.

Did you find, in your review of this, and I think it is one of the

largest reviews you have done, isn’t it, of a contract?

Mr. WALKER. To date. We have many others underway.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Did you find any evidence of fraud or

abuse on the part of the LOGCAP contractor in Iraq?

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Mr. WALKER. We have not tried to ascertain whether or not

fraud was involved, because fraud involves willful intent. Let us

just say that there are serious problems, but I wouldn’t go to that

point in time. We don’t have any evidence to say that there was

willful fraud based upon the work that we have done so far.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Now, as I understand the way the contracting works in these areas, the contractor would get reimbursed

only for reasonable, allocable, and allowable costs. And what so

often happens in contracts, contractors will submit costs for reimbursement, but we have a catch-all system through the Defense

Contract Audit Agency that will catch a lot of those and kick them

back, is that correct, and say you are not getting reimbursed; you

might have charged us for this, but we don’t think it is reasonable?

Did you find any evidence of DCAA stepping forward in this and

doing their job?

Mr. WALKER. Well, there are a number of players that are on the

field, not only the COTR and the DCMA, but also you can have

subsequent audits by the DCAA, the Defense Contracting Audit

Agency. Let us just say a lot of people are involved, but they are

very stressed. There is absolutely no question that people are being

asked to do a tremendous amount; they are trying to do the best

they can with the resources and training that they have. But,

frankly, the ratios we are talking about here, the volume is much

greater, for example, than what was happening in the Balkans,

and yet the number of people actively engaged on a ratio basis is

much less. So I think there is clearly a challenge there.

Neal, anything you want to add?

Mr. CURTIN. No, the same thing. It is an interesting comparison.

We were trying to get a handle in this work on what would be the

right number of people to have in these oversight positions for this

type of situation, and there really is no criteria for it; it is a judgment by the agencies as to how much they can afford based on all

their other priorities. And you mentioned the Balkans comparison.

The size of the contract in Iraq is about 15 times larger than what

it was in the Balkans, but DCMA has only——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And the casualty was much higher than

that. The casualty rate much higher than it was in the Balkans on

a percentage basis.

Mr. CURTIN. Absolutely.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Which obviously, under those kind of

stresses, you would expect to see more mistakes, wouldn’t you, and

people trying to get the job done, and costs probably wouldn’t be

the same kind of factors if you are sitting behind a desk?

Mr. CURTIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALKER. It is a much more difficult environment, there is

no question about that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So you would expect mistakes to be made

in order to accomplish the mission as a practical matter, wouldn’t

you?

Mr. WALKER. I would expect that mistakes would be made, but

I also would expect that some of the checks and balances would

hopefully correct some of those.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, that is right. And that is why we

have you and that is why you have DCAA and you have your conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00227 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tracting officers’ technical representative and people. Before the

bills are actually paid, this goes through a lot of review, and we

are part of that review process. But when you are out there in the

battlefield trying to feed and clothe troops and the like, I think, as

we found with the gasoline, the first thing you need to do is accomplish the mission. But along the way sometimes cost is the first

casualty.

Mr. CURTIN. And it is interesting, too, because we have done

work in the Balkans for a number of years, and what we have seen

is a progression there. In the early years in Bosnia, it was a dangerous security situation and you saw some of the same problems.

And we made a lot of recommendations back at the end of 2000

that have been taken to heart, and the Balkans contract, a similar

type of logistic support contract, is actually working pretty well

now; with a lot of oversight they have made a lot of improvements.

We are right back where we were in the early days of the Balkans

now in Iraq and Kuwait.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Considering all the circumstances here,

how do you view the overall performance of DOD and the other

agencies involved?

Mr. WALKER. I wouldn’t want to give them a grade. I would say

this, Mr. Chairman, that planning is a serious problem; that oversight is a serious problem; that as has been the case for many

years, contract management is a high risk area; as has been the

case for many decades, DOD is an A+ on fighting and winning

armed conflicts, but they are a D on economy, efficiency, transparency, and accountability. And I think one of the problems that

we have here is for any system to work, including this type of system, you have to have incentives for people to do the right thing,

adequate transparency to try to hopefully assure they do, and accountability if they don’t. And I think it is particularly an acute

problem when you are dealing with cost-based contracts, and I

think we need to learn more of the lessons from the past and apply

them more rigorously, those lessons learned, and I hope that they

will do that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Particularly regarding the challenges with

the LOGCAP contract in Iraq, do you have any assessment of

whether the customers of LOGCAP, how they view the performance

of the contractor?

Mr. WALKER. My understanding, and I would ask for Neal to

jump in, is that most of the customers are satisfied, because most

of the customers are looking from the standpoint of are they getting their services in a timely and acceptable manner.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Which is the most important factor, isn’t

it?

Mr. WALKER. Well, it is clearly a critical important factor, but I

do think cost is important.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, I didn’t say. I am just saying first

of all you have to accomplish the mission, and at least in that

sense this was fulfilled. We can argue about costs, and that is what

we are here to go over, and hopefully we have enough checks and

balances in the system that we will look that over, and a contractor

who ignores that, it will be to their detriment.

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Mr. WALKER. In the final analysis, Mr. Chairman, as you know,

we face significant deficits, and to the extent that there is any

waste, there is an opportunity cost associated with that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You stated, in connection with the task

order that was issued under the LOGCAP contract to KBR for the

planning efforts for the Iraqi oil infrastructure mission, that it was

beyond the scope of the contract. I notice that in commenting on

your report, that DOD does not agree with your conclusion on that.

Given this disagreement, would you consider is it unusual or at all

alarming that lawyers within DOD wouldn’t agree with you on this

issue, or is this commonplace, auditors versus lawyers on these

kind of issues?

Mr. WALKER. My understanding is they agree with us on one

issue and that there is a disagreement within the Department on

another. The issue that they agree with us on is that the type of

services that ultimately would have been provided under the all infrastructure program were not covered under the LOGCAP contract. So they agree with us on that. Where there is a disagreement, and I understand there is a difference of opinion within the

Department of Defense, as to whether or not you could allow for

planning under this contract that wasn’t otherwise coverable by the

LOGCAP contract itself. And in our view, we believe that you

should not, that it was only anticipated that you would be able to

provide for planning for services that could and would be rendered

under the normal LOGCAP contract, and there is general agreement that these types of services would not be rendered under

LOGCAP contract.

Is that correct, Bill?

Mr. WOODS. Can I jump in on that?

Mr. CURTIN. Sure.

Mr. WOODS. There was a disagreement within the Department,

and as we point out in our report, these are issues of contract administration, these are issues of judgment, and these are issues

where reasonable people can look at the same set of facts and come

to different conclusions.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. As we see up here as well.

All right. Well, thank you very much. We have a vote on. What

I will do is dismiss this panel and we will move to the second panel

when we return here in about a half an hour. So I will recess right

now.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, let me just ask if they can wait

around. I know we want to get on, but other Members may have

questions. I just want to protect their rights.

So if you would wait here until we come back.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, we will try to move as quickly as we

can though if anybody comes back, we will talk on the floor; if not,

I will move the next panel.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. There’s been a coup, and I am going to

start. We are back in session. I think Mr. Waxman had the floor.

Mr. Davis, I am going to recognize you for 5 minutes, and then

I will take some time.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. Walker, how are you?

Mr. WALKER. Well. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Good.

GAO examined Halliburton’s task order to prepare contingency

plans for Iraq’s oil infrastructure and Halliburton’s sole source contract to implement those plans, and that is what I would like to

talk about for a moment. It is my understanding that usually the

military develops a requirement, and that requirement is turned

over to Career Procurement Office, who figure out how to meet the

need. Career civil servants than award a contract or issue a task

order, preferably after competition. A key responsibility of the career procurement officials is to determine who should get the contract.

Mr. Walker, is that your understanding, that it is generally career civil servants, and not political appointees, that decide who

gets a contract?

Mr. WALKER. That is my understanding. That is correct. The responsibility for awarding contracts and running the procurement

process is typically done by career civil servants.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Then if that is the case, it appears to me

that very different procedures were used to award Halliburton’s

contingency plan and task order. Michael Mobbs, a special advisor

to Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Fife, recently revealed that

he made the decision to choose Halliburton. He selected Halliburton based on informal contacts with Government officials and

retired corporate executives.

Do you think it is unusual for political appointees to select a contractor purely on the basis of informal conversations with Government officials and formal corporate executives, if that was the case?

Mr. WALKER. If that was the case, it would be unusual, if that

was the case.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Isn’t the normal practice to have career

procurement officials decide which company receives a task order

or contract?

Mr. WALKER. My understanding is that is the normal course. As

we said, typically, contracts are awarded by career civil servants.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. It is also my understanding that the

White House usually stays out of procurement decisions and is not

given the opportunity to influence those decisions. Is that the understanding?

Mr. WALKER. That is also correct, sir.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. The administration certainly has claimed

that there were absolutely no contacts between the Vice President’s

office and the officials who awarded the contracts to Halliburton;

however, this appears to be inaccurate. According to Mr. Mobbs, in

October 2003, he presented his conclusion that Halliburton should

be awarded the task order to the Deputy’s Committee, a group of

senior level Government officials that included Scooter Libby, the

Vice President’s chief of staff, in order to give them an opportunity

to veto his plan on political grounds.

Do you think it is unusual for Defense Department officials to

give political appointees an opportunity to veto procurement decisions on the basis of political sensitivity?

Mr. WOODS. Can I? Do you mind?

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We have not spoken with Mr. Mobbs in connection with the description of events that you just outlined. We did come across, in

the course of our review, a classified memorandum for the record

that was authored by Mr. Mobbs that outlined the rationale that

went into the selection, the course of events that they decided to

take in regard to the contingency task order. That memorandum,

for the record, recognized, and we reported in our recently released

report, that once they made the decision to go with a particular

contractor for the contingency planning task order, that would pretty much decide who would eventually get the larger contract to actually execute the contingency plan.

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. I guess the bottom line question then becomes are there instances where political sensitivities are deemed

appropriate when making a selection or a decision, even though

this might be outside the normal range or the normal process that

is used?

Mr. WALKER. I think the bottom line is that when you are making contacting decisions, they should not be made for political reasons. And we don’t have any reason to believe that was the case

here. I think it is important to understand that it depends upon

the timing and the nature of the communications. There could be

communications, but were those communications FYI in anticipation of the fact that there could be significant press interest and

activity as a result of the decisions, or was it more than FYI? And

that is the key; what were the nature and extent of the communications. Merely that there were communications doesn’t necessarily mean there is a problem, per se.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

I would just note that sometimes congressional offices are notified of contracts before they are announced. We have no say in who

gets this contract, but we are given a heads up if it is a contractor

in our district. And that has been fairly routine since before I came

here.

Let me just ask a question before I give Mr. Souder his 5 minutes.

Is there any evidence that the White House played any role in

this decision?

Mr. WALKER. We have not tried to conduct an investigation as

to whether or to what extent.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You didn’t find any evidence that they

did, did you?

Mr. WALKER. No. And that was beyond the scope of what we

tried to do.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But you didn’t undercover anything, in

the course of talking to anyone, that would have indicated that?

Mr. WALKER. We have come across the document that Bill mentioned. We have come across one email, but, again, the nature of

the documents that we have come across are more from the standpoint of FYI, this is going to happen.

Mr. WOODS. That is correct.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You didn’t see anything in the documents,

and I think it is the same documents that Mr. Davis had, that indiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00231 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cated do you approve of this or anything like that, it was more this

is what is happening?

Mr. WOODS. That is correct, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Souder, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you. And I wanted to basically make some

opening comments that we weren’t able to do at the beginning,

through the chairman’s agreement, and also respond to a couple of

things that have occurred, as somebody who has been a member

of this committee for some time.

One, I wanted to reiterate what Chairman Davis said about mission first. And certainly at the beginning of a mission and when

the danger is greatest, the mission is especially first, and cost second. I thought that the statement from Mr. Curtin about the Balkans was very informative. In other words, they saw the same

problems in the earliest stages when there was the greatest danger

to the troops, and then you come in and you try to clean it up as

best as possible. But when you are pushing for security and speed,

that you have a slightly different goal at the beginning of a battle

than you do at the end.

I also want to share my frustration with the administration’s

lack of general responsiveness to documents to this committee. I

think every subcommittee chairman has been frustrated with this

administration and the lack of responsiveness, and you can see

that today. On the other hand, we are not doing fishing expeditions; we are not doing political control. We are actually an oversight committee that is trying to get that information. And I agree

with the statement of Mr. Walker that the Defense Department

has had this problem—I was elected in 1994—certainly since 1994.

When I was vice chair of the subcommittee that had defense and

narcotics together with it, when now Speaker Hastert was chairman of that, we had tremendous problems in Defense Logistics

Agency trying to get any kind of accounting out of the Defense Department because of the national security reasons. They seem to

think more that they are exempt to some of the oversight.

On the other hand, we have to allow, particularly when they are

in a shooting war and when the contractors have now gotten involved in a shooting war themselves. I think it is fairly safe to say

that when we hear a hotel example, you know, the troops, with all

due respect, and I have had several killed from my district and I

have hundreds and thousands there now from Indiana and from

my area of Indiana. They at least have some armored Hummers;

they have some defense weapons. We are sending contractors who

now are in effect, there is no front line to this war. They are getting beheaded, for crying out loud. You know, they may not be able

to stay in a secure place except in Kuwait. They may not be able

to stand there by their vehicle if it brakes down, because they don’t

want to be beheaded. Their families don’t want them to go in the

first place. I have people who work not for Halliburton, that I know

of, but for other contractors over there, and their families don’t

want them there.

Yet, what we hear out of the other side is speed, speed, speed.

Why is it taking so long to rebuild Iraq? How come this is taking

so long? Why do you have to do this? And then the second you say,

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OK, we are going to do speed, they go, oh, cost, cost, cost. Now, you

can’t have it both ways. You can’t have our contractors out there

taking their lives at stake with no protection, or minimal protection, not knowing where they are going to get hit, and then expect

them to behave like they are working in some kind of safe environment in Indiana; it is a different type of thing.

Now, one other frustration I have here, and I realize that these

hearings are partisan in nature to some degree. No matter who the

administration is, the other party has to do that. I have tremendous respect for the ranking member of this subcommittee; I think

he is a man of high integrity and he works aggressively to make

sure we hold the administration accountable. But I sat here under

6 years of the Clinton administration, when there were people not

in danger, when we were looking at travel office budgets with hundreds of emails going out to Members of Congress and to other people talking about how contracts were given and how they weren’t

given. And what we saw mostly out of the other side was a tremendous defense of that. Here, we are not talking about any known

cases other than what it looks like is tremendous sloppiness, lack

of preplanning. And, by the way, on preplanning, in reading Bob

Woodward’s near—the closest thing we have to tapes in the Oval

Office anymore are Bob Woodward’s books. When you go through

his books and listen to that, maybe, just maybe the administration,

while the war plan was there, didn’t have enough preplanning for

some of the followup because they didn’t expect that they were necessarily going to have to put the boots on the ground; they were

hoping for another solution. And, by the way, we were probably

going to be called in on the oil even if we didn’t send the troops

in, because had they been U.N. troops, had they been NATO

troops, had they even been the Iraqis themselves overthrowing

Saddam Hussein, the oil, as an amendment was offered in this

Congress by a Democratic Member of this Congress, supported by

the entire other side said, we have to have that oil revenue to support that country. So regardless, whether we had preplanning for

boots on the ground and how we were going to do MREs and what

kind of tents we were going to have, we had to protect the oil because probably these firms were going to be called in no matter

who the government of Iraq was, no matter who the troops were

going to be.

Yes, there should have been more preplanning. Yes, it is terrible

how they over-billed for MREs, and that is why you all are there

to try to do it. And we need to get the documents and we need to

hold them accountable. But I find it appalling to have this turned

into some kind of a political show, where the administration is fingered for things, without talking about what is actually happening

to the contractors on the ground, the pressures they are under that

we have not seen anywhere. I have never heard of contractors

being beheaded on television, of the dangers that they are exposed

to right now. And then to kind of be ‘‘two penny ante’’ about this

when they are under that kind of pressure is a disgrace.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you very much.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, could I mention something quickly?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, Mr. Walker.

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Mr. WALKER. First, I agree with you, Mr. Souder, that mission

first. Costs do matter, however, especially as time moves on. But

I think, like most things in life, we need to look at value and risk,

and we have to recognize that many of the services being provided

here, the nature of the services vary, the timing of the services

vary, and the location of the services vary. I have been in Iraq; I

have been in Kuwait. The situation is very different in Kuwait

than it is Iraq. And so I think we have to apply the facts and circumstances, because you get different conclusions based upon applying those facts and circumstances based on these factors.

Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very—I think you need to go——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. No, we had 15 minutes on my side, and

I broke for the recess. I was going to let you finish and then we

will move over here.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. Walker, when you first came in there was a lot of controversy as you tried to straighten out your office and get it aligned

in a way that you thought would be more effective, and I noticed

you stopped getting criticism when you started wearing that pin

with the flag and the Marine on it on your lapel, which reminds

me of what Newt Gingrich told me. He said periodically he would

take issue with what the Marines were doing, and he always lost

in the battles on the floor of the House. So he just tried to figure

out what they wanted and then he championed them.

So in that spirit I would like to know, first, would you summarize the biggest criticism or two you have with the procurement

process, and would you please summarize your biggest commendation or two with the procurement process?

Mr. WALKER. Well, I guess I would say that in the context of the

subject that we are dealing with today, inadequate planning and

inadequate oversight. I would also say that you have to recognize

that there are examples included in our testimony where various

parties have done their job well and where they have defined the

appropriate scope of the services, where they have nailed down an

estimated cost, and where everybody has done their job well, and

where they periodically reviewed the contract to determine whether

or not the nature and scope of the services should be revised and

whether or not the costs are reasonable. One example I would give

you is the Balkans to give you one example of where the system

worked well, where there was a review that resulted in significant

savings to the taxpayers and yet the needed services were provided

to the troops.

So I would say planning and oversight are the biggest areas of

challenge, but I think we also have to recognize that while we have

certain broad-based problems, there are examples of people doing

their job well, and those should not go unnoticed.

Mr. SHAYS. So is that your only response, is your biggest saying,

job well done? What is the thing that we did best when it came to

procurement? You’ve told me what we have done worst.

Mr. WALKER. In this particular context or overall?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. In the context of Iraq.

Mr. WALKER. Bill.

227

Mr. WOODS. I would say that we demonstrated that we collectively, as a Government, demonstrated that the procedures that we

have in place, the laws that the Congress has put in place are flexible enough to be able to accommodate contracting under very, very

difficult circumstances. In 14 of the new contracts that we looked

at, they were all awarded either on a non-competitive or limited

competition basis, but by and large they were all done in accordance with the way the laws require them to be made.

Mr. WALKER. And I would say the ability to act expeditiously

when the circumstances required.

Mr. SHAYS. No matter what administration is in power, no matter what Congress is in power, this system has to act quickly, and

what I am hearing you say is, for the most part, the job was done

well. There is really a question of was it bid in the case where it

could have been and was there overcharging, and I am struck by

the fact that the system worked well in catching the overcharging.

Do you have fear that there is a lot of overpayment that we are

not being made aware of; that we have just scratched the surface?

Mr. WALKER. There are a lot of players on the field, Mr. Shays,

a lot of inspector generals, DCMA obviously is involved, DCA is involved, as well as ourself. I think we are in the early stages of understanding the nature and extent of the challenge here. And as I

mentioned before, contract management has been on the high risk

for many years. I think the risks are particularly acute when you

are dealing with a situation of urgency and when you are dealing

with a cost-based contracting arrangement.

Mr. SHAYS. So you are basically testifying that you are concerned

there could be a number of instances where we paid more than we

should have had to have paid. That is kind of what you are suggesting.

Mr. WALKER. That is correct. And I think there are two dimensions of that. One dimension is were the services needed, because

in the absence of nailing down the requirements and the specifications as to the services, in the absence of coming up with what a

reasonable estimate of cost would be for that, you don’t have an effective control mechanism. And there is a shared responsibility for

that, and the Government has a responsibility for not having done

that.

Mr. SHAYS. My time is running out and I just want to say, particularly to the point of Mr. Souder, I have been to Iraq five times,

and usually we come in from Kuwait or Amman, Jordan, and I am

in interaction with these consultants, these contractors, and they

are very brave people. They are outside the umbrella of the military, in the communities in many cases, and they may have some

security, but they are not in the green zone, they are out in the

red zone doing their jobs, and I think we all know that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Clay.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Walker, five former Halliburton employees recently came forward with firsthand knowledge of waste, fraud, and abuse under

Halliburton’s LOGCAP global logistics contract with the Army. For

instance, a former Halliburton convoy commander and a former

truck driver explained that brand new $85,000 Halliburton trucks

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were abandoned or torched if they got a flat tire or experienced

minor mechanical problems because Halliburton removed spare

tires from trucks and performed no maintenance.

If these accounts are accurate, don’t they indicate a serious lack

of cost control under the LOGCAP contract in Iraq?

Mr. WALKER. I think it is appropriate that somebody review and

investigate the actual facts and circumstances here, and I understand that this committee is going to hold an oversight hearing as

well to look further into some of these specific assertions.

Mr. CLAY. Let me ask you about a former Halliburton labor foreman, who said that Halliburton exercised virtually no supervision

over a Jordanian subcontractor that was building a dining facility

in Fallujah. He said that he would go to the site and take a few

pictures each day, but that no one else was doing any supervision

at all.

Doesn’t this lack of subcontract oversight leave the taxpayer vulnerable to overpricing and doesn’t it increase the chances that our

troops will be left with inadequate facilities?

Mr. WALKER. Obviously, that is a matter of concern as well that

should be reviewed.

Bill, did you want to add something?

Mr. WOODS. I don’t think we are in a position to speak to the

specific allegations, but I think the subsequent hearing that the

panel plans to hold will provide an opportunity to get into that.

Mr. CLAY. OK, well, another example. Former employee of the

subcontracts department in Kuwait revealed that employees were

instructed to pay subcontractor invoices and to extend subcontracts

without evaluating whether prices were reasonable and without

verifying that services and equipment were actually being delivered. She also said that Halliburtonsite managers were denied access to the subcontract documents they needed to provide proper

oversight of the subcontractor.

If this account is true, Halliburton isn’t considering appropriate

subcontractor management in Kuwait, is it? Are they considering

proper management of subcontractors in Kuwait?

Mr. WALKER. You are getting to a level of detail, Mr. Clay, that

was beyond the scope of the work that we did, and I think it is important to note that we tried to deal at the high level, as Mr. Waxman talked about, looking at overall contract award for new contracts, for task orders, also for the global logistical contracts. There

are other players that are looking at a much greater level of detail

and the type of issues that you are dealing with, some of the other

inspector generals, than we are.

Mr. CLAY. Well, Mr. Walker, these are serious allegations that

we have discussed and just some of the revelations the former employees were willing to share with the committee today. Despite

the fact that these individuals were stationed in different locations

in Iraq and Kuwait, and worked in different departments, their

independent accounts all portray Halliburton as a company with a

near total disregard for costs and poor or nonexistent subcontract

management and oversight, and I think these claims should be

fully investigated. You had something to do with awarding the contract. Did you have something to do with awarding?

229

Mr. WALKER. With awarding these contracts? No. That would be

a separation of powers problem. No.

Mr. CLAY. Well, but you have a responsibility to oversee them,

don’t you?

Mr. WALKER. Well, there are a lot of people that have a responsibility. I mean, obviously there is a contracting——

Mr. CLAY. You are not shirking your responsibility, are you?

Mr. WALKER. Oh, no.

Mr. CLAY. OK.

Mr. WALKER. Keep in mind, Mr. Clay, we work for the Congress,

and we are part of the oversight mechanism to try to help get facts

for the Congress to be able to do its job. So we have no management responsibilities here. We don’t have any responsibility for

awarding the contracts; we don’t have any responsibility for managing the contracts; we don’t have any responsibility for reporting

on the contracts.

Mr. CLAY. Well, wait a minute. When you hear these allegations,

does a red flag come up?

Mr. WALKER. Absolutely. And one of the things that I have asked

my colleagues with regard to some of these issues is who is following up on these types of issues. I think that is a relevant question.

Because as I mentioned before, there are a lot of players on the

field. You know, we have the CPAIG, we have the DOD and Army

IG, we have the State IG, we have the AIDIG. There are a lot of

players on the field, and so I want to make sure we are not bumping into each other.

Mr. CLAY. What has been DOD’s response?

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Clay, I would respectfully suggest you ought to

ask DOD what their response is.

Mr. CLAY. Well, they will be next.

Mr. WALKER. They are going to be next; they are up next.

Mr. CLAY. What has been their response to you?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. You

will get a chance to ask DOD in the next panel.

Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to followup on some of the questions that Mr. Davis

of Illinois raised, because we heard statements from the administration early on that with respect to the Halliburton contracts, that

contract was chosen by civil servant, as opposed to political appointees, and my understanding is some recent information has

come to light that suggests that is not the case.

What is your understanding with respect to Michael Mobbs’ involvement in selecting Halliburton for the purpose of the task

order?

Mr. WOODS. If I could take that one. We did come across a

memorandum for the record authored by Mr. Mobbs, and it was a

memorandum that brought together some of the discussions that

were held by a group called the Energy Infrastructure Planning

Group. I do not know all of the members of that group, but I do

believe that some of them were contracting professionals of the

type that would award contracts. But there were other people in

that group who represented customers, if you will, program officials

and people that were familiar with the requirements process. And

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it was the job of that group to define what the requirements were

and to devise a strategy for addressing those requirements.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Do you know was it a group decision with respect to awarding the task order contract, or was that an individual decision? Do you know? Do you have any information that

would cast light on that question?

Mr. WOODS. I do not know, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. You do not know.

Based on your experience in Government contracting, is the normal practice to allow the civilians, the nonpolitical individuals with

the department to make the final decisions with respect to contract

awards?

Mr. WOODS. Well, the selection decisions are certainly made by

the career professionals, and they run the procurement system. But

that is not done without close coordination with the people that

draft the requirements, and those can be people at any level of the

organization.

Mr. WALKER. But the final decision is typically made by career

officials.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. And do you know for certain, in this case,

whether the final decision was made by career officials or whether

it was made by somebody else?

Mr. WOODS. No, I do not know, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. The document that you mentioned, does the

committee have that document, do we know?

Mr. WOODS. I do not know if the committee has that. At the time

that we were doing our work, that document was classified, and it

is my understanding that document is still classified.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. All right. My understanding is there are a

number of documents that the committee has requested that GAO

has, is that right? Not that we have requested of GAO; that the

committee has requested of the administration.

Mr. WALKER. I don’t know that to be the case. As you know, generally the information that we have is restricted until we end up

issuing the related report. I would be happy to have a conversation

with the appropriate players on the committee as to whether or not

that is the case.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. Because I have been told by our staff that

is the case.

Mr. WAXMAN. Would the gentleman yield? This is a document

that we have requested and we want to get, and we hope that we

can work with the chairman to obtain that document.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. My point, I guess, is it has been requested

from the administration by at least some members of the committee, and I guess GAO has a copy; we don’t. But that is one of the

documents.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Is it your understanding, Mr. Waxman, if

I may, that we have a document that the committee is seeking? Is

that your understanding?

Mr. WAXMAN. I think that is the case, yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, I think we should have a discussion

with our staff. Part of the issue is whether or not we have already

completed our work and issued our report in accordance with our

protocol. So I think we should have a separate conversation.

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Mr. VAN HOLLEN. If I could ask, Mr. Chairman, just with respect

to the issue of the oversight of some of these contracts and what

the practice is with respect to contracting out the oversight process.

Ranking Member Mr. Waxman raised some examples in his opening statement where Parsons was hired, I believe, to oversee some

of the business that was being done in Kazakhstan and other

places by one of its business partners.

My question to you is do you believe that is appropriate, to contract out the oversight process to someone who has a business relationship with an entity that they are providing the oversight of?

And are you aware of these examples that were raised?

Mr. WALKER. I am not aware of this example. I would say I think

looking at independence issues and business relationships is a factor that should be considered in determining whether and to what

extent you should award a contract. Now, obviously it depends

upon what the nature of that business relationship is, the materiality of that business relationship, etc.

And I guess I would ask Bill if you have anything to add.

Mr. WOODS. Well, fundamentally it is the Government’s responsibility to administer and oversee contracts, and the Government

cannot and should not walk away from that responsibility. That is

not to say that they, from time to time, should not seek the assistance of contractors. They may have particular expertise in certain

areas that may be of assistance to the Government in carrying out

that responsibility, but when they do that, they need to make sure

that the proper controls are in place and that they are particularly

vigilant in guiding against potential conflicts.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. McCollum can yield to you if you have

a followup.

Gentlelady from Minnesota, welcome to the committee. You are

recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the

time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. She can yield to you if you would like.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I find it rather curious that in the press it reports, in several news articles, that there was an Army lawyer who

was very concerned about the way that these contracts were being

let; made a statement, in fact, that the contracts should be held differently, that they should not be awarded the way that they were

to Halliburton. Did you come across any of this? I find it in CBS

News and other places on the Internet. Did you come across that

at all?

Mr. WALKER. My understanding—and I would ask for Bill to followup—is that we did ascertain as a result of our review that there

were certain differences of opinion within the Department of Defense and, in fact, within the Army General Counsel’s Office as to

whether or not it was appropriate to issue a contract dealing with

the planning for the oil services and the oil reconstruction, and

that there were differences of opinion that exist within the Office

of General Counsel of the Army as well as within the Department

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ment of the Defense made the decision that he did feel that it was

legal.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Is the general counsel for the Department of Defense—I am new to the committee—are they civilian or are they career military? That individual who made the decision to override,

are they a political appointee or are they career military?

Mr. WOODS. I believe that the Department of Defense seniormost counsel is a political appointee, but these were made——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. So a political appointee.

Mr. WOODS. No, no. These were made—the memo that we saw

was made by a career person in the Department of Defense General Counsel’s Office. This was a career individual who ultimately

decided that, yes, this contingency planning task order was within

the scope of the LOGCAP contract, and that——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. After discussions with the political appointee, it

sounds like.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I just want to clarify this for the record,

since we’re all under oath. So, Bill, just to confirm, there was a difference of opinion between the counsel for the Army and for the Office of the General Counsel for Secretary of Defense, but you are

saying the documentation we have does not deal with the general

counsel, it deals at a career level where the decision was made?

Mr. WOODS. That is correct. It was not the general counsel for

the Department of Defense.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. That is important. I think it is

important for you to understand that.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. That is helpful to know.

Mr. WAXMAN. Would the gentlelady yield to me?

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. WAXMAN. But as I understand it, GAO thinks that the original career lawyer that thought the planning was outside the scope

of the LOGCAP contract, and that was his position, and that is the

one you believe is the correct decision.

Mr. WALKER. Our view is that the action that was taken was not

in accordance with the law, and our view is consistent with the

original Army general counsel person. At the same point in time

I think it is also important to note that while we believe that it

was not in accordance with the law, we also believe it is likely that

it could have qualified for one of the exceptions, given the urgency

and the conditions that existed. They didn’t attempt to do that, but

it is likely that they could have qualified for that.

Mr. WOODS. That is correct.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. Reclaiming my time.

I find this urgency and state of emergency rather interesting,

when this was a war that we chose to go into, where there was no

urgency or emergency, imminent threat by Iraq to our country.

Could you please tell me, sir, I have been kind of concerned

about the inventory, the manifest shipping things that I have read

not only in news articles, but in the letters that were provided.

When you were doing your investigation, I know that you said you

weren’t charged with finding fraud and abuse, and once again I

would want to know who is responsible for finding fraud and

abuse. We can’t have the fox watching the hen house and expect

everything to be caught. But inventories, shipment, over-billings, it

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appears when people who worked either as military personnel or

civilian personnel made questions, people who were familiar with

how inventories and shipping receipts should be handled, they

were told, oh, don’t worry about it.

What did you find in your investigation?

Mr. WALKER. I think the way to respond to that, Congressman,

is the whole concept that we saw in the early stages of the operation there in Iraq was to get the mission done, and there wasn’t

the cost consciousness which would have resulted in the kinds of

questions you are raising until at least December 2003.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Well, sir, I would beg to differ that this has

something to do with cost, but it also doesn’t. If I am at the 101st

Airborne in Mosul and I have ordered protective gear or I have ordered food or I have ordered ammunition, I would certainly hope

that when it comes to me, I get the amount, the quantity, the size

of what I have ordered. And without any shipping manifests going

along with these convoys, I find that pretty hard to say that our

soldiers were in fact being served very well. In private business

they are used constantly.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

Mr. WALKER. I think one has to keep in mind that there is a difference between whether or not they got what they wanted and

whether or not what they wanted was appropriate and acquired at

a reasonable cost; and there are differences there.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think the testimony was already that

they seemed to have gotten what they wanted, that the needs of

the client were met. The question you deal with is cost.

Mr. WALKER. With regard to things like kevlar vests and things

of that nature, those aren’t the kinds of things that we are talking

about under this contract; those aren’t the types of products or

services that are being provided here, it is more like housing, it is

more like food, which are obviously important.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman and I each get a minute to

sum up.

Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think GAO has done a good job

in helping us understand the issues and also in identifying issues

I think we need to pursue. GAO has said that decisions about who

gets contracts should be made by career people, but Mr. Mobb, who

is a political appointee, said he made the decision to use Halliburton, so this is clearly an issue that we need to investigate. GAO

said there is a difference between an FYI communication to the

White House and a communication that seeks White House assent,

but Mr. Mobb told us that the White House was briefed so that

White House officials could object, and that is more than an FYI

communication. So this is an other issue we need to investigate.

I want to return to the question of whether there were contract

irregularities in the issuance of the Halliburton contract. I think

these are questions that we need to pursue not just with GAO, but

with others. There is a question of this career lawyer who’s view

was overturned, that this bootstrapping, of giving authority under

the LOGCAP contract in October 2002 to do the planning in fact

meant that they would get the sole source contract the next March.

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So in that first contract, that seems to me a question of whether

a career person’s decision was made or whether that was elevated.

And so I think we need to learn more about it, maybe have Mr.

Mobb and others here to pursue these matters before we draw any

conclusions about it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

I gleaned something different. First of all, we need to remember

Halliburton had LOGCAP under previous administrations that had

been awarded. We have heard testimony that in their analysis they

found no fraud or abuse. That wasn’t what they were primarily

looking for, but they didn’t uncover that.

We have another panel coming up that I think will be able to

talk at length about some of the questions that maybe this panel

wasn’t charged to look at.

And the fact that you sometimes have, not just career people, but

that you had Schedule C or others make decisions on contracts is

not a rarity in Government contracting, particularly at the higher

levels as some of this goes up. This wasn’t awarded in secret in the

sense that this was secret, it was classified. And when you are

doing classified things, anything that you put out in the public, the

enemy knows about and everybody else, and you can understand

why this was done in a classified way.

We appreciate the insights that this has brought Mr. Walker, we

appreciate the work that you and your group have done on this and

look forward to working with you on others.

I am going to dismiss the panel at this point. We will take a 2-

minute recess as we assemble our next panel. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We have Mr. Lawrence Lanzilotta, the

Principle Deputy and Acting Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller; Mr. William Reed, the Director of the Defense Contract

Audit Agency, U.S. Department of Defense; we have Mrs. Deirdre

Lee, who is the Director of the Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy and worked at OFPP in the previous administration,

here with the Department of Defense.

I understand, Mr. Lanzilotta and Ms. Lee, you do not have prepared testimony, you are here for questions, is that correct? You

are welcome to say anything.

Tina Ballard, who has been here before, the Deputy Assistant

Secretary of the Army; General Paul Kern, Commanding General,

U.S. Army Materiel Command; and Brigadier General Robert

Crear, Commander, Southwestern Division, U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers.

It is our policy all witnesses be sworn before your testimony, so

if you would rise with me and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. I think everyone

is aware of the rules. Mr. Reed, I guess we will start with you. Any

comments?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I just have a very

short opening comment.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That would be fine.

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STATEMENTS OF LAWRENCE LANZILOTTA, PRINCIPLE DEPUTY AND ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DEIDRE LEE, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; TINA BALLARD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (POLICY AND

PROCUREMENT), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; GENERAL

PAUL KERN, COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL

COMMAND; BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT CREAR, COMMANDER, SOUTHWESTERN DIVISION, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF

ENGINEERS; AND WILLIAM H. REED, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE

CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Mr. Chairman, I am here to discuss the Department of Defense oversight of contracts related to military operations and reconstruction of Iraq. The Department of Defense gives

the utmost seriousness to its oversight of contracts. In an environment as fast-moving and as difficult as Iraq has been, contracting

can be extremely complex, and that makes oversight especially important. The Department has a number of strong organizations,

policies, regulations to fulfill its contract oversight responsibility.

Our task is not only to identify contract issues, but also to prevent

future occurrences of problems we identify, recover any excess

charges, and take appropriate action to protect the Government’s

interest.

The role of the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller in contracting oversight comes primarily through the Defense Contract

Audit Agency [DCAA]. DCAA’s mission is to provide all contract

audit and financial advisory services related to DOD acquisition of

goods and services.

Other DOD organizations, notably the Defense Contract Management Agency and the DOD Inspector General, also play important

contract oversight roles and work closely with DCAA. Additionally,

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and

Logistics is responsible for contract policies that help ensure the

Department obtains the best value when acquiring equipment and

services, and is also responsible for DCMA.

In Iraq, the Army and DCAA are strategic partners in the oversight of contractor performance. The Army, as executive agent for

all the Department’s reconstruction requirements in Iraq, is responsible for contract and program management activities there.

DCAA, which is co-located with Army personnel in Baghdad, evaluates contractor proposals and performs audit procedures on contractor-incurred costs. In addition, DCAA personnel are available

upon request to assist contracting officers on all phases of the contracting process.

In the first 8 months of fiscal year 2004, DCAA issued 285 audit

reports related to Iraqi reconstruction contracts. Of these 285 reports, most have not had significant findings; however, the large

number of these DCAA reports underscores the seriousness of the

Department’s contract oversight. The findings that DCAA has

made has led to actions including changes in processes, rejection of

unsupported proposal costs, reductions in billed costs for potential

unreasonable expenditures, and referral of suspected irregularities

to the DOD Inspector General for investigation.

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Contractor performance in Iraq has not been perfect, nor as bad

as some characterize. Many contractors that have not had problems

in performing their domestic DOD contracts have had difficulties in

adjusting to the unique environment in Iraq. We are working with

these contractors to help them resolve their problems in Iraq, but

we are also taking whatever actions are necessary to protect the

Government’s financial interest.

In regarding the Army contracting, I understand that this committee has expressed concern about an email from Mr. Steven

Browning of the Army Corps of Engineers. Mr. Browning prepared

a memo in response to your concerns, and with your permission,

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit it for the record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

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238

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Mr. LANZILOTTA. In closing, I want to underscore that we in the

Department of Defense are absolutely committed to an integrated,

well managed contracting process in Iraq. We will not tolerate the

billing of costs that are not properly documented or supported. If

internal control systems are deficient, we will continue to use protections, such as contract withholdings, to safeguard our interest,

and we will provide whatever personnel and budget resources are

needed to enforce the integrity of this process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lanzilotta follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Reed, welcome back.

Mr. REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members

of the committee, my statement for this hearing will center on the

Defense Contract Audit Agency’s oversight of contracts related to

military operations and reconstruction in Iraq.

DCAA has been an integral part of the oversight and management controls instituted by DOD to ensure integrity and regulatory

compliance in Iraq-related contracting. DCAA’s services include

professional advice to acquisition officials on accounting and financial matters to assist them in the negotiation, award, administration, and settlement of contracts. It is important to note that decisionmaking authority on DCAA recommendations resides with contracting officers within the procurement organizations who work

closely with DCAA throughout the contracting process.

Since April 2003, DCAA has worked with all U.S. procurement

organizations supporting Iraq reconstruction to establish the resources and planning information needed to carry out required audits of contract costs as they are incurred and billed. These organizations include the Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA], the

Army Materiel Command, the Army Corps of Engineers, USAID,

and the State Department. This coordination has enabled DCAA to

build a universe of all Iraq-related auditable contracts, which is a

significant step toward ensuring that needed audit procedures are

timely and comprehensive.

DCAA currently is responsible for providing Iraq-related contract

audit services to both DOD and other Government organizations at

56 contractors holding more than 80 prime contracts with contract

ceiling amounts of $34.6 billion and funding to date under these

contracts of about $12.4 billion.

To carry out the extensive and time-sensitive audit requirements,

DCAA has implemented new planning and coordination procedures

to effectively integrate audit work between the new Iraq Branch

Office, opened in May 2003, and more than 50 DCAA CONUS

Audit Offices with cognizance of companies performing contracts in

Iraq. The Iraq Branch Office itself now has 22 auditors, and will

increase to 28 auditors by the end of June.

As has been noted, during the first 8 months of fiscal year 2004,

DCAA has issued 285 audit reports related to Iraq reconstruction

contracts. These reports address forward pricing proposals, adequacy of contractor internal controls and business systems, as well

as compliance with acquisition regulations and contract terms. Especially important has been DCAA’s in-country testing of contractor timekeeping, subcontract management, and cash disbursement

procedures which represent immediate risk in the provisional approval of interim contract payments. In the balance of my statement, I will present some of the more significant examples of what

we have found in these audits, beginning with the largest contractor, Halliburton, Kellogg Brown & Root.

KBR has been awarded Iraq reconstruction contracts with ceilings totaling more than $18 billion under two major programs: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program [LOGCAP] for $10 billion, and

Restore Iraqi Oil for $8.2 billion. DCAA has been providing continuous contract audit oversight on both programs.

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The first area I want to address is estimating practices. DCAA

has identified significant deficiencies in KBR’s estimating practices

related to the award of subcontract costs. Earlier this year, after

consultation with the contracting officer, DCAA returned two major

task order proposals worth more than $3 billion to KBR because

they were inadequate for the purpose of negotiating a fair and reasonable price. On January 13, 2004, DCAA notified the appropriate

Government contracting officials that KBR’s subcontracting estimating process and procedures were considered inadequate. Currently, DCAA is in the process of performing a comprehensive review of the entire estimating system to address this matter as well

as other possible deficiencies.

KBR’s deficiencies in estimating subcontracts are contributory

factors in potential dining facility overpricing and delays in

definitization of task order prices under the LOGCAP contract,

both of which I would like to comment on next. They were also a

contributory factor in potential gasoline overpricing under the Restore Iraqi Oil contract as explained in Dr. Zakheim’s testimony before this committee on March 11, 2004.

Turning to the dining facility subcontract costs, DCAA has identified issues related to the reasonableness of negotiated subcontract

costs for dining facilities, which I will refer to hereafter as DFACs.

KBR has been unable to support the reasonableness of subcontract

prices or the appropriate billing methodology intended in its subcontracts. The DFAC subcontractor costs exceed $800 million and

are continuing to increase. KBR awarded contracts to several subcontractors to provide dining facility services at more than 60 locations throughout Iraq and Kuwait. The DFAC subcontractors generally charge for meals at a negotiated fixed meal cost—per person—using various headcount schemes including estimated camp

population, estimated numbers from the subcontract statement of

work, and billeting records to set the number of billed meals. These

billed headcount numbers exceed the actual meals served by at

least 19 percent according to KBR’s own studies and could be as

high as 36 percent based on ongoing DCAA analysis. KBR has been

unable to support the intended billing methodology or how it may

relate to the fixed cost per meal negotiated with its various subcontractors.

Initially, DCAA and KBR agreed on a withholding of $176.5 million until additional supporting data could be provided by KBR,

$140.7 million that KBR voluntarily withheld from future billings

and $35.8 million that DCAA suspended on current billings. KBR

performed an internal analysis and estimated that billed meals exceeded actual meals served based on headcount—boots through the

door—by approximately 19 percent. However, KBR asserts that the

excess meals are allowable, primarily because the various task orders under the LOGCAP contract do not specify a specific billing

methodology. While KBR has since renegotiated the terms of most

of the DFAC subcontracts to establish a ‘‘boots through the door

billing methodology,’’ they have begun now to resubmit their voluntary withhold under the original subcontracts.

DCAA found substantial deficiencies in the data provided by

KBR and believes cost should continue to be suspended related to

the original subcontracts until additional support and analysis can

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be completed. Therefore, DCAA has currently increased its suspended DFAC costs to $186 million.

We are continuing to evaluate additional supporting information

provided by KBR and will be issuing final recommendations to the

contracting officer on the first of several of these DFACs in the

near future. Depending on our conclusions, DCAA may either reinstate the suspended cost or convert the suspension to a disallowance. If a disallowance is recommended, this will provide the basis

for the contracting officer to evaluate and decide the merits of the

dispute.

KBR has voluntarily disclosed a possible violation of the AntiKickback Act by two of its employees. KBR has already reimbursed

the Government for the estimated impact of $6.3 million, but has

failed to provide data necessary for DCAA to verify the accuracy of

that amount. We have brought this to the attention of the DOD IG,

which is in the process of reviewing the matter as part of its normal Voluntary Disclosure Program process.

Due to urgent requirements, most of the LOGCAP task orders

were issued as undefinitized contract actions. The FAR limits contract reimbursement to a maximum of 85 percent until a contract

price is definitized to adequately protect the Government’s interest

in effective cost management. DCAA found that KBR had never applied reimbursement limitations to undefinitized LOGCAP task orders and brought the matter to the Army contracting officer’s attention. She agreed to apply the clause on a prospective basis to

LOGCAP task orders depending on KBR agreeing to a firm schedule for submitting the required proposals. Currently, a mutually

agreeable schedule has been established and KBR proposals are

being submitted for audit. AS of this date, the LOGCAP contract

has 36 task orders with an estimated value of $8.2 billion that require proposal audits and final price determination. Of that

amount, DCAA has received and is in the process of auditing 28

proposals with an estimated value of $7.6 billion.

DCAA recently completed a comprehensive billing system review

at KBR. The audit report was issued May 13, 2004, with an overall

opinion that the billing system is inadequate in part. As a result,

KBR is not authorized for direct billing and is required to continue

to provide all billings to DCAA for provisional approval prior to

submission for payment. Key issues disclosed during our audit included: not effectively monitoring subcontract billings, for example,

DFAC costs; inadequate written policies and procedures for the

billing system; and failure to adjust billings for changes in indirect

rates. DCAA will continue to monitor all aspects of the billing system until these matters are resolved.

Turning to another contractor, Titan Corp. Titan was awarded a

contract valued at $402 million to provide linguist and translator

services to the U.S. Government, mostly in Iraq. Titan presently

has over 4,400 linguists working in Iraq. Recently DCAA audits

disclosed deficiencies in Titan’s labor distribution system which

records costs for Titan employees. DCAA also found that Titan

lacked procedures for adequate tracking of hours worked by foreign

national consultants. Based on these findings, the DCMA contracting officer implemented a 10 percent withhold on all of Titan’s

labor and consultant costs until all identified deficiencies are corVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00253 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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rected and bills to the Government are based on adequate internal

controls. The resulting withhold amount could be as much as $4.9

million on future billings depending on the timeliness of the needed

improvements. In addition, DCAA recently discovered that Titan

was not adjusting their provisional billing rates to actual rates at

the end of each fiscal year. Titan agreed to make the necessary billing adjustments of $937,000. Last, Titan recently informed us they

will adjust previously billed costs for the Titan employee and subcontractor employee named in connection with potential abuses at

Abu Ghraib Prison. These reductions are scheduled to be made by

June 18, 2004, and include Titan and subcontractor costs totaling

over $178,000.

DCAA is expanding its audit coverage at another contractor,

CACI, based on recent disclosure of additional contracts awarded

to the company. Since August 2003, the Department of Interior, at

the request of the Army, has awarded 11 task orders under a GSA

Supply Contract for Information Technology services for interrogation and intelligence gathering effort in Iraq. At least three of these

tasks related to the interrogation of Iraqi prisoners. Billed costs as

of March 2004 under these task orders is $12.7 million, with a total

funded contract value in excess of $60 million. DCAA is reviewing

the potential misuse by CACI of the GSA schedule contract on this

Department of Interior contract that is funded by the Army since

‘‘interrogator’’ type effort is not a function provided by CACI in

their GSA schedule. We understand the GSA and Department of

Interior inspector generals have initiated reviews of this matter as

well.

Turning to another company, Washington Group International.

In support of the Restore Iraqi Electricity Program, WGI received

a contract totaling $309 million. As a result of a WGI proposal to

definitize this contract, on February 13, 2004, DCAA reported to

the Corps of Engineers’ contracting officer that WGI had substantial subcontract estimating problems. On February 26th, the DCAA

also reported to the contracting officer that WGI’s estimating system deficiencies were significant and required immediate contractor attention. Since that period, DCAA and the Corps have worked

closely with WGI to correct estimating system deficiencies and obtain improved subcontract cost support. While WGI has made excellent progress in providing additional documentation for the majority of the unsupported costs, DCAA has suspended over $11.5

million of billed costs because WGI has been unable to support the

reasonableness of certain security-related subcontract costs. In addition, DCAA has suspended $4.9 million on a separate contract related to costs billed for undefinitized task orders. As discussed earlier, the FAR limits contract reimbursement until a contract price

is definitized to adequately protect the Government’s interest.

DCAA is working closely with the Corps of Engineers and WGI to

address these issues.

In closing, I want to underscore that I am committed to working

with other DOD organizations to ensure an integrated, well-managed contracting process in Iraq. The Department will not tolerate

the billing of costs that are not properly documented and supported. If internal control systems are deficient, we will continue

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sion to safeguard the Department’s interest. Rest assured that I

will provide whatever resources are needed for DCAA to continue

to provide contract audit oversight in Iraq.

In sum, I believe that DCAA has been vigilant about contract

oversight and protecting the taxpayers’ interest. I am committed to

making sure this continues. I look forward to addressing whatever

questions or comments you may have on this oversight. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reed follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Dee, do you want to say anything? Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. I have a brief statement.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That would be fine. Welcome.

Ms. LEE. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I am Deidre Lee, Director of Defense Procurement for the

Department of Defense. I am appearing before this committee

today to provide information on Iraq contracting actions taken

prior to the designation of the Army as executive agent.

As you know, many of you from your personal visits to Iraq,

much has been accomplished and progress continues to be made.

A vast array of projects improving water, electricity, health care,

and education are ongoing. The Iraqis will assume governance on

June 30th, and many ministries have already made the transition.

On June 8th, Iraq assumed full authority for the national oil sector.

Much of this work is accomplished through contracts, contracts

with Iraqi citizens and Iraqi companies, as well as with United

States and coalition companies. As we all see on the news every

day, operations in Iraq are dangerous and complex. Conditions remain harsh for our soldiers and civilians, including our contractors,

and security remains a constant challenge.

As our in-country knowledge and operations have matured, so

have our contracting strategies. The contracting strategies employed were those proper for the urgent mission support and protection of our troops. In the last 18 months, we have moved across

the spectrum from prewar classified planning through urgent and

compelling orders to full and open competition emphasizing inclusion of small business and Iraqi employment.

Procurement actions involving Iraq’s oilfields are an example of

this compendium. In December 2001, Kellogg, Brown & Root won

a competition for the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program. We all call that the LOGCAP contract. This contract was the

third contract in a series of competitive contracts, and they provide

capability to support global contingencies. We have been doing this

since 1992.

In the fall of 2002, a classified requirement to develop a contingency support plan for repair and continuity of operations of the

Iraq oil infrastructure was identified by CENTCOM. A task order

under the KBR LOGCAP contract was issued on November 11,

2002 by a contracting officer. The order, for planning only, was determined to be within the scope of the global contingency support

contract.

In February 2003, based upon urgent operational need, a sole

source letter contract consistent with FAR requirements was issued

to KBR for pre-positioning of resources such as firefighting equipment to enable rapid response in the event of oil well fires or other

critical damage.

In early March 2003, still in the mission preparation stage but

moving across this continuum, although for imminent urgency, a

sole source indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract was

awarded to KBR. Task orders were issued against the contract for

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ations. As noted by GAO, negotiation of this contract on a sole

source basis was approved and documented as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation.

In June 2003, the strategy for competitive procurement to support oil infrastructure in Iraq was approved, resulting in competitive awards in January 2004 to Parsons Iraq Joint Venture for the

north and KBR for the south. Work under these contracts is ongoing today.

Iraq contracting is not without issues, as we have discussed this

morning and continued to the afternoon. The witnesses here today

will talk about ongoing audits and performance monitoring, and

what steps we are taking to make sure that money is spent wisely

and results are delivered. Government contracting is not a simple

process, even in the best of conditions. The Congress has given us

numerous laws which govern the contracting process, and has recognized and authorized specific flexibilities to be applied in certain

circumstances. Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of these circumstances and of how our people successfully responded to meet

urgent mission needs.

Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Ms. Ballard, welcome back.

Ms. BALLARD. Thank you, sir.

Good afternoon, Chairman Davis, Representative Waxman, and

distinguished members of the Committee on Government Reform.

Thank you again for this opportunity to report to you on the U.S.

Army’s role in contracting and the rebuilding of Iraq. I respectfully

request that my written statement be made a part of the record for

today’s hearing.

Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. The Army, as executive agent, continues to make progress in an extremely difficult situation by providing contracting and program management support both in Iraq

and in the United States. We continue to procure all non-construction items and services to meet the humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq, as well as the economic reconstruction and repair of

Iraq’s infrastructure.

Have we accomplished this tremendous task without missteps?

No, we have not. But I would like to take a moment to make a few

comments on the recently released GAO report on Iraq contracts.

We have been in Baghdad for only 10 months, under desperate

and dangerous conditions. To date, we have awarded over 2,800

contract actions valued at more than $11 billion, and the GAO reported concluded with only four recommendations. I am very proud

of the fact that the Army Field Support Command took positive

steps in advance of the report to initiate a process for definitizing

outstanding task orders under the LOGCAP contract in a timely

manner. Additionally, we are taking proactive measures to address

the other three recommendations.

Our contracting personnel on the ground in Iraq now total 65 individuals, more than double what was there when we previously

visited the committee. There are multi-service and civilian personnel in Iraq. They are brave, dedicated volunteers who are doing an

outstanding job under very dangerous conditions.

I would like to highlight some of the reconstruction accomplishments that we have made since last March. Ms. Lee has highlighted several, so I will be very brief.

Mr. David Nash reported on June 11 that more than 14,000

Iraqis are employed thus far in the rebuilding of Iraq. As Ms. Lee

indicated, we are making significant progress in buildings in

health, oil, electricity, security, and water. Our accomplishments

help to continue the citizens’ improvement and movement toward

governing themselves and sustaining, operating, and maintaining

their own infrastructure. This in turn will help our soldiers, sailors,

airmen, and Marines to return home sooner.

This concludes my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would be

pleased to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ballard follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Kern, thanks for being with us.

General KERN. Chairman Davis, Congressman Waxman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity

to update you on the LOGCAP, Logistics Civilian Augmentation

Program. I request that my written comments be submitted for the

record.

The LOGCAP contract is executed by the Army Field Support

Command, one of my subordinate commands. As noted, this is the

third award of the LOGCAP contract. The first, which was awarded

in 1992, was to Brown & Root, administered by the Corps of Engineers, covered the Southwest Asia Pipeline, Somalia, and the Balkans. The second contract, which was awarded in 1997, was awarded to Dyncorp and was administered by the Army Materiel Command, my command. It covered East Timor, Philippines, and Colombia.

LOGCAP III was awarded in 2002, as noted, and is significantly

different both in magnitude, where the others were in the order of

a few hundred millions and this is in the order of a billion dollars;

the others were direct contracting and this one includes the management of significant number of subcontractors, many of them for

third-country nationals. It includes operations in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Iraq, Djibouti, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and the Republic of Georgia.

I recently did meet with the GAO and reviewed the report which

they had previously reported to you in the earlier panel. They were

very helpful in pointing out some areas that we needed to improve,

as they have been since the earlier LOGCAP contracts, and which

we are continuously working for lessons learned and to make an

improvement in the way we do business.

I would like to put in context, however, a few of the comments,

but note that I do agree with their assessment that we need better

planning and better training of our personnel.

First, if we remember March of last year, when we began the operation, there were two contingency parts of the plan: one with the

4th Infantry Division to come in from the north through Turkey,

and the second on who went first, the Air Force or the ground operations. In a play at the scrimmage line, the ground operations went

first. Critical lesson learned from 1991 was to protect the infrastructure and, hence, the importance of making sure that we had

a plan in place for ground operations to ensure that the oil infrastructure was protected in the early phases of the battle. This in

part answers the question of why that planning document was critical in those early phases.

The second point that we note there, that the contingency contracting is different than procurement in the continental United

States, and, hence, we have adapted to the lessons learned to make

sure that the many subcontracts in our cooperation with DCAA,

DCMA, and Defense Finance and Accounting System are all working toward prompt payment and correct oversight. This is an area

which I think needs continual review as we look at how we do contingency contracting in the future.

I would also note that we were concerned about process, procedures, and costs early on. In June 2003, just 3 months after we iniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00273 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tiated hostilities, I asked my inspector general to oversee the operation of the LOGCAP contract both from the process standpoint

and from our ability to meet the needs of the users. They reported

back to me in December and I instituted corrective action that they

had found through the Army Field Support Command, General

McManus. General McManus and I also visited the commanders in

Kuwait and Iraq in September 2003, with an expressed purpose of

looking at the lessons learned from the Balkan operations on how

costs and scope of work could be controlled, and we worked that

with the commanders on the ground.

There is no issue that we disagree in substance, but there is in

the context of which those operations did occur. We also are looking

today that the contracting officers have been asked to support the

war fighters requirements, and when there is a disagreement in

opinion provided by the legal community, as described earlier, the

contracting officer is going to look for the best method of executing

the contract, which is the case when we have a difference of opinion, he chose the opinion which would allow him to execute the contract in favor of the war fighters.

Finally, we do have strong partnerships with the Defense Contract Management Agency, which has increased the number of personnel supervising the contract, and we have met with both their

civilian and military leaders to continually review whether we have

them in the right places and the adequate numbers.

DCAA, as described by Mr. Reed, continues to play a critical role

in the oversight and audit of the rough orders of magnitude estimates and the actual execution against the billing processes which

is submitted by KBR. We agree and have been working with KBR,

Kellogg, Brown & Root, for some time now to improve their billing

processes both so we can finish the proposals and get to

definitization quickly.

Finally, we are continually learning on the part of Kellogg,

Brown & Root on managing significant subcontractors, and on the

part of the Government in executing contingency contracts over a

broad distance throughout Southwest Asia on how to do our job

more effectively for our war fighters.

And I would add one last note, that this past month, earlier in

this month, we conducted a memorial exercise in Kuwait for the

lost members of Kellogg, Brown & Root. This is not contracting

under peacetime conditions, these are tough conditions which they

operate.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Kern follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

General Crear.

General CREAR. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Waxman, members

of the committee, I am Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of the Southwest Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

I am honored to appear before you today to testify on the work of

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in concern with our coalition

partners and the Iraqi people. Our mission was to extinguish fires,

repair, restore, and rebuild the oil infrastructure in Iraq, and provide vital supplies of diesel, gasoline, kerosene, and propane in

order to meet the demands for humanitarian assistance, and to

maintain stability and ultimately to save lives. We also had the

mission to work closely with the Iraqis to enable them to be able

to take over this vital mission.

I returned last November, after serving 9 months as Commander

of Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil [RIO]. The task force consisted of

approximately 120 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers personnel, active

duty military, U.S. Army reserves, coalition forces, Department of

the Army civilians, over 500 contractor personnel from Kellogg,

Brown & Root, and about 60,000 Iraqi oil workers. U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers was assigned the mission in late January and

we immediately started to plan to implement the contingency support plan. Our advance party deployed in mid-February, followed

by the main body in early March. We had the distinct pleasure of

working with Central Command, the Office of Humanitarian and

Reconstruction Assistance, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the

Combined Forces Land Component Command, Combined Joint

Task Force 7, USAID, many NGO’s, and other coalition partners.

Early on, we met with Central Command and the Combined

Forces Land Component Command staff before deployment. They

were able to give us then the combatant commanders’ intent and

heighten our sense of awareness and urgency for the mission. They

wanted to ensure that before hostilities took place, in the event of

hostilities, there would be enough equipment on the ground to be

able to start putting out fires, to be able to assess the conditions

as soon as the facilities could be secured by the forces, and also

provide a capability to train coalition forces on actions to take in

that type of environment.

The environment I will describe. In the first Gulf war we saw

how Saddam Hussein set ablaze over 700 oil wells and caused a

spill of over a million barrels of crude oil in Kuwait and in the

Gulf. Given the size of Iraq, planners knew that should Saddam

employ the same tactic, it would be nightmare for coalition forces

in order to execute the tactical mission; it would cause unnecessary

delay, could bog down the particular forces, and ultimately cost the

death of coalition soldiers. That is why it was imperative to have

a plan to execute the oil restoration and be able to put out the fire

mission.

The good news is that the coalition forces were able to seize and

secure the infrastructure before Saddam could go and do significant

damage. However, what we found were not oil well fires, but significant damage due to looting. It was estimated to be about $1.4

billion in overall damage, and about 85 percent of that due to

looting. We also found out that the infrastructure was suffering

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from years of neglect, misuse, and mismanagement. Added to that

was the lack of consistent electricity that directly affected oil production. Additionally, there was no phone system for communications, water, trains. These were conditions that made even the

work that would seem to be easy hard in Iraq.

The looting was total. Entire buildings were emptied of their contents, meaning they were looted with only the steel frames remaining. They took everything in total, anything to value, to include

wires out of the walls. And this was true of most public facilities,

to include the 13 operating companies and their facilities in the oil

infrastructure. Needless to say, Task Force RIO faced considerable

challenges dealing with this catastrophic situation, as did other coalition forces.

The entire country, about the size of California, was our area of

operation, and as we made repairs to this fragile oil infrastructure

between the southern fields in Rumaila and the northern fields in

Kirkuk, each task force personnel rose to the occasion. They were

subject to personal hazards with movements throughout the country. I visited our wounded personnel, both military and contractor

personnel, in field hospitals and I mourned the death of others.

Some of the accomplishments that I will highlight to you and am

very proud to talk about is that we had civilians and contractors

on the ground in Iraq Day 2 of the war, and they continue to remain there and continue to operate to restore the infrastructure.

By April 13, all oil well fires were extinguished. By mid-April we

had re-established the leadership, re-employment of the north oil

companies in Kirkuk and the south oil companies in Basra, producing the first oil for export by June 22nd. We are now at the prewar

level of production, since March, producing over 2 million barrels

of crude per day. Revenues being produced are about $1 billion per

month since June. This goes to the Development Fund of Iraq for

use by the Iraqi people.

A mission that we had not planned for, but were faced with, was

the shortage of refined products. We have imported refined products by the billions. We have prevented a humanitarian disaster,

a forced security issue for our coalition forces, and loss of life.

I was happy to see recently that as of June 8 the Oil Ministry

is the first Iraqi ministry to become fully functional and responsible for its future direction. That would not have happened without the efforts of the task force. And by the end of May we had executed over $2.5 billion to restore the oil infrastructure. I note that

most people don’t realize $1.7 billion of that came from the Development Fund of Iraq, and not taxpayers’ dollars, and most of that

money went to import the fuel into the country.

I am enormously proud to lead men and women of the U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, and I am continually inspired by their technical and diplomatic skills and their selfless service. On the ground

there is only one team, consisting of coalition forces and civilians,

contractors to include KBR, and Federal employees united with one

purpose: to make Iraq a better place for the Iraqi people. Those

that have deployed always say two things: that they volunteered

because they knew they could make a difference and, two, I can’t

wait to get back. I have also witnessed what happens when they

return: they bring a renewed energy and enthusiasm that is clearly

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evident as they accomplish their work back home. I am proud to

have been part of such a team with such a vital mission. Progress

is staggering.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Brigadier General Crear follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, thank you very much.

Let me just ask each of you, did the fact of the Vice President

was a former CEO of Halliburton influence the selection of Halliburton and KBR in any way?

Mr. Lanzilotta.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. No, I know of no instance.

Mr. REED. Not to my knowledge.

Ms. LEE. No.

Ms. BALLARD. No.

General KERN. I know of no incident.

General CREAR. No, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Were you or anybody in your office pressured by any political appointee or high official in the administration to award any contract or task order to a particular firm, or go

easy on any contractor in carrying out contract oversight activities?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. No.

Mr. REED. No.

Ms. LEE. No, sir. In my 29 years of Government service, I have

frequently had congressional remarks, but I have never——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I didn’t ask that, Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE [continuing]. I have never had an executive department

direct, no.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir.

General KERN. No, sir.

General CREAR. No, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Lanzilotta, will you walk us through

the KBR as one of the contractors selected to assist Government in

planning of the Iraqi war continuances?

Do you want to yield to Ms. Lee on that?

Ms. LEE. Could you repeat the question, sir?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I just wonder if you could walk us through

the selection of KBR, how they were selected, so everybody can understand that this didn’t come down with a memo from the Vice

President’s office to reward his former company. Could you walk us

through how KBR was selected? I think it is important for everybody to understand how this happened.

Ms. LEE. Certainly, I will give an overview, and then General

Kern may want——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And let me ask you, Ms. Lee, since you

are talking. You were a political appointee in the Clinton administration, is that right?

Ms. LEE. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And you are a professional career officer?

Ms. LEE. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Ms. LEE. The first LOGCAP contract, when we are talking about

the competitive contract in 2001, was a standard competition,

where we would run a competition, contractors would propose. To

the best of my knowledge, we received three proposals that were

evaluated; the contract was awarded. A year later the decision,

when we were discussing how to in fact support, first identify the

mission. I think one of the things we kind of get a little confused

here is what are the operational requirements. And those are very

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broadly discussed across the Department possibly, and probably beyond the Department, is do we really need to be prepared to do

protection oil infrastructure. Those requirements are discussed.

Once it is determined that, yes, that is a requirement, the contracting team gets involved and says, OK, how do we properly structure

the business arrangement to support that.

In this particular case, after much discussion and a legal opinion,

we determined that, for urgency and some other good and valid

reasons, to issue an order against this existing LOGCAP contract.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And who is the contracting team, are

these basically career civil servants?

Ms. LEE. Yes, sir. A contracting officer would be awarded, a contracting officer civil servant. I am aware of no political appointees

that have been contracting officers.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Any active duty military involved in this?

Ms. LEE. Could be active military as well.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

General KERN. If I could add, Mr. Chairman, to that. It was the

decision of that discussion of the requirement that Ms. Lee referred

to which resulted in the use of the LOGCAP contract. Prior to its

use, however, there were a number of opinions which were debated

back and forth between the command counsel and my headquarters

of the Army Materiel Command, the Department of the Army General Counsel’s Office, and the DOD General Counsel’s Office. And

so we have three different legal discussions that were going as to

whether it was in the scope of the contract or not.

In the opinion of my command counsel, he thought it was outside

of the scope. In the opinion of the further discussions, it was decided that it was in the scope of the contract to proceed for the

planning only. But the decision also said that we should proceed

further with a requirement for a sole source award only with a justification and approval of that, which required us to go through a

second process and a second contract effort; and that is the process

which was followed. The contracting officer, looking at all those

opinions, made the decision first to use it for the Brown & Root

contract, the KBR contract for LOGCAP for planning, and then to

ask for a J&A for approval to go forward from that position. That

was the process.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Now, it appears at one point, I don’t know

if any of you would have firsthand knowledge, that there were officials notified that the decision was made to award it to KBR, officials in the administration were notified prior to that. Is that a

normal procedure in a large contract of this nature?

General KERN. Mr. Chairman, as you noted earlier, that is a normal procedure. We notify the Congress and the White House when

we have contracts to be awarded.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The Vice President’s office in this case.

Evidently there is some allegation that they knew about it. Do you

know anything about that?

General KERN. I have seen the same information that you have.

I couldn’t tell you anything more about what may have taken place.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It didn’t strike you as out of the ordinary?

General KERN. The notification process has appeared to me to be

very normal.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right.

Dee, you have been involved in this for years. Is that out of the

normal, to involve Members of Congress or the administration?

And would you tell them this was happening or would you say this

may happen, or do you have any input, or how does that work?

Ms. LEE. Sir, you were right when you mentioned earlier we

have a very kind of formal internal procedure when a contract is

ready to get awarded. In fact, we award it after the old day’s close

of the market, late in the day; we notify Congress before, we make

the phone calls. There is actually a process and it includes public

affairs in many cases so that the Congressman with the winner in

their district can in fact notify them. So there is a process. And it

would be quite normal to follow that process.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, General Crear.

General CREAR. Sir, the other thing you could add to that is that

at that time we were in a contingency planning mode, at that time

the contingency plan was classified, and so we needed to have the

contractor be able to let people know what mission they were going

to be able to do in order to hire people. And so to get that to happen, they had to do notifications. They felt, certainly, that if the

contingency plan is going to be declassified so you can hire personnel, then we wouldn’t want KBR or Congress to find out about that

we actually had a mission in the Department of Defense to secure

the oil without letting you know that from us first, and that was

really the purpose of getting the declassification and the notification.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. How did Mr. Mobbs become involved in

this? Can anybody explain that?

Ms. LEE. I do know Mr. Mobbs. My first recollection of this was

actually from my then-boss, Pete Aldridge, and it was the summer

of 2002, very late in the summer, maybe even early fall; and he

said we have a classified project I want to talk to you about, and

he said basically what we are doing is planning to support, should

there be fires and the time being appropriate, when we enter conflict, and said we are looking at how to do that; and, in fact, we

assigned a contracting person to work with their team just to go

through what the plan was, what the requirement was, and how

it could be properly contracted for.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And the fact that this was classified

strikes this as probably appropriate in this case?

Ms. LEE. Yes, sir, given the timing.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

Let me yield to Mr. Ose for just a few questions.

We are doing 15 minutes on a side, so this is part of our 15.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity

to have some time. I, in particular, want to direct my questions to

Ms. Ballard.

I know that the chairman and the ranking member have asked

you about this previously, but subsequent to the September 11th

hearing there were questions put forward. I can’t express quite accurately the depth of my dissatisfaction with the fact that I do not

have answers to questions 3 months old, even though we are now

having the second of a series of hearings. I presume we are going

to have another one in July. And I am curious whether or not I am

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going to have answers to my questions by the time we have that

third hearing.

Ms. BALLARD. Congressman, I too am very disappointed that the

answers have not been provided to you. We have discussed this.

The answers are in review and you will have them, sir. If I have

to walk them over here personally, you will have them.

Mr. OSE. Well, I haven’t moved since the last time we gathered,

so you can still find me at that same spot.

Ms. BALLARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSE. I want to make sure that—rather than belabor the

point, if you can get me answers to the questions that I have already asked, I will be able to pursue a line of questioning accordingly.

But, Mr. Chairman, I have to say I have done my fair share of

contracting for my own account, and with all due respect to these

witnesses, when I have control of the checkbook, I get my answers

before I write checks. And I have to tell you I am just dissatisfied.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, I think Ms. Ballard is going to make

every effort to get you answers as expeditiously as possible. Thank

you.

Let me ask you. I am still puzzled on Mr. Mobbs’ role in this.

I have gotten different conflicting opinions. Was he a decisionmaker in this or is just a guy who is popped off in the press? What

was his role in this?

Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I know his role to have been in the Department, in working in our planning shop, our planning organization, we had a group of people, pre-conflict, saying what is it we

need to do. Now, there has been some discussion here in this meeting today saying, well, you know, you focused on oil, but what

about the operations themselves. Those operations were planning

for the operation, as General Kern has talked about, that is done

by the combatant commanders, and they were planning their own

operation in accordance with whatever direction they were given.

This particular planning piece was kind of that infrastructure

planning as to how do we get ready. And I know Mr. Mobbs, working in the planning organization, was kind of the head of that planning group to figure out how to support.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So it is your understanding he was more

of a big picture guy than the contracting officer with the warrant

out there.

Ms. LEE. Yes, sir. As we do with all our contracts, we have a requirements group and we kind of hash out what is it we really

want to do, what are the parameters for that, and then from a contracting standpoint, OK, if that is what you want to accomplish,

what is the right business arrangement.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. A couple other questions occurred to me.

One is when a truck would go down with a flat tire in a convoy,

was it Army procedure at that point that we don’t stop and repair

the tire, we keep the convoy moving at that point, rather than stop

and prepare, because that was danger, or was that a contractor decision? This has been an allegation by someone who hasn’t appeared before the committee formally but has been interviewed.

General KERN. The convoys have taken different context over

time. As we moved our forces centrally into the Baghdad region, we

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were running numerous convoys between Kuwait and Baghdad

that would be up to 300 vehicles a day moving, primarily focused

on fuel and munitions, sometimes carrying food and parts. It is

normal practice for convoys like that to carry spare vehicles, with

the assumption that something would break down on that long a

route, and those highways are not exactly like Interstate 95. So you

expect that you are going to be under rough conditions.

If you remember, because the part that I cannot precisely tell for

you is the timing of when that occurred, because this spring those

convoys started coming under considerable attacks. Bridges were

taken out; convoys had to be replanned around them. More security

was provided to those convoys as those attacks intensified. So at

one point in time we actually stopped running them and were flying supplies into Baghdad. So there were periods in there in which

the tactical commanders were making decisions in conjunction with

the convoy commanders about the security on that route and what

would take place. And so in some cases they may have decided that

a security arrangement said it was too dangerous to stop and try

to recover a vehicle, and it was better to decommission it than let

it fall into the hands of those who were attacking it. But I cannot

precisely tell you because each convoy was run under a different

set of security conditions during that period.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Reed, let me ask you how many of the

285 audits referenced in your testimony were related to Halliburton KBR, any idea?

Mr. REED. I don’t have a specific number, Mr. Chairman, but I

would be happy to get that for you for the record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Can you give me a ball park? Was it 5,

30?

Mr. REED. I would say probably in the neighborhood of 20.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. And a referral to the IG, is that a

rare thing in your business; is it a unique thing; is this a once in

a year happening or does this happen more often?

Mr. REED. To put it in some perspective, I believe in fiscal year

2003 we issued approximately 60 referrals. Some years we have

issued several hundred. So that gives you some perspective on the

question.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. As a general counsel to a contractor, you

are on the receiving end to one of those, but then the process would

be able to go to the IG, and then if they see anything, they would

refer to Justice would be one possible way to handle it, correct?

Mr. REED. That is correct, because a referral is not a conviction,

it is merely that the auditor has some reason to be concerned, and

he is turning it over to experienced investigators who have the

wherewithal, as well as the legal advice, to judge whether there

has been a violation of civil or criminal law.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And I want to make sure I am clear about

the relationship between the DCAA auditors and the contracting

officer. It is my understanding that the DCAA auditors act as professional advisors to the contracting officer on cost, pricing, and related matters. The contracting officer is free to take that advice or

not. For example, DCAA may find there is an overcharge of, say,

$1 million. The contracting officer can agree or not based on his or

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her judgment. Any action against the contractor would be initiated

by the contracting officer rather than DCAA?

Mr. REED. Yes, that is correct. Many, in fact, most of the contract

issues that DCAA raises are judgmental issues that involve advice

of not only DCAA, but also technical people, engineers and so forth.

And we fully expect that the contracting officer is going to be advised by others, and in most cases attempt to negotiate an issue

where there is not certainty. Where no one party is absolutely right

or wrong, we negotiate it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And my time is up, but this can get pretty

complicated, can’t it, sometimes between the lawyers and the accountants in terms of judgments?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Waxman, you have 15 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, your first question today of each of the members

of this panel was whether any influence took place from the Vice

President’s office, and each one responded no. But this is a very different question than you asked in the March hearing. This is what

you asked in the March hearing: I want to get this on the record,

and everybody is under oath. Have you or anyone in your office

ever discussed with the Vice President or with his office the award

of a contract for Iraqi reconstruction prior to any contract being

awarded? And General Schrock said, ‘‘No, I have not;’’ General

Kern: ‘‘No, sir, I haven not;’’ General McManus: ‘‘No, sir, I have

not;’’ Ms. Ballard: ‘‘No, sir, I have not;’’ Mr. Zakheim: ‘‘No, sir, I

have not;’’ Mr. Reed: ‘‘No, sir, I have not;’’ Admiral Nash: ‘‘No, sir,

I have not.’’

Is that the testimony of each of you today? And the question, of

course, let me repeat it, is: Have you or anyone in your office ever

discussed with the Vice President or with his office the award of

a contract for Iraqi reconstruction prior to any contract being

awarded.

Mr. REED. My answer remains the same.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. My answer remains the same as Dr. Zakheim

gave at the previous hearing.

Ms. LEE. No, sir, I have never met the Vice President or talked

to him. It would be an honor, but I have not.

Mr. WAXMAN. No, that is not the question of you. Would you or

anyone in your office?

Ms. LEE. Not that I know of.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK.

Ms. Ballard.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir, not that I know of.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK.

General KERN. My answer remains the same. I know of no one

in my office who has talked to.

General CREAR. Sir, not me or anyone in my office.

Mr. WAXMAN. The problem is that we have now got additional information from Mr. Mobbs, and Mr. Mobbs told our staff collectively that he tried to make a decision as to who ought to have this

planning contract in October 2002, and so he talked to different

people on his own. He talked to oil executives, he talked to DOE,

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and maybe others as well, to try to figure out who would do the

best job. And he said there were three companies that could have

done the job: Bechtel, Fluor, and Halliburton. And he thought Halliburton would be the best one to choose, and he went to this deputies committee made up of representatives from the political side

of each office, including Scooter Libby, who is the political chief of

staff of the Vice President of the United States, and other deputies

and secretaries in charge of State and Defense, and whoever else

was at the meeting. And he went to them to get their assent, their

agreement that this would be OK to ask Halliburton to do this

planning, and they didn’t object. And then he went to the career

people and said this is the decision, we want to award this to Halliburton. In fact, he even wrote what is called the justification and

approval document and gave it to the career people.

Do any of you know facts to contradict what I have just said?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Sir, on the deputies committee meeting, I

wasn’t at the deputies committee meeting, but I was told two

things were made clear.

Mr. WAXMAN. Wait a second, you were told by somebody else, but

you weren’t at the meeting.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. That is correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. Now, you have said that you know about a deputies meeting. Was somebody there at the deputies meeting from the

Vice President’s office that you know of?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I was told there was a representative from the

deputy’s office.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I just asked you the question, which Mr.

Davis asked last time, have you or anyone in your office ever discussed with the Vice President or his office the award of a contract.

So you know somebody in your office had discussed with somebody

in the Vice President’s office?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. No, that isn’t what I said.

Mr. WAXMAN. OK.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I didn’t say that anybody in my office was at

the deputy’s committee meeting or anybody in my office has ever

talked to the Vice President or his office concerning this contract,

or, for that matter, concerning any matter.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you know what was discussed at the deputies

meeting?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. But I was told from the deputies meeting that

two items were discussed when this came up. I was told one, that

it was perfectly made understood that this conversation of the deputies meeting would not be shared with the Vice President and

two, that the Vice President wouldn’t have any involvement in the

contract. And that was made known to all the members at the deputies meeting.

Mr. WAXMAN. And when were you told that?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I was told that today.

Mr. WAXMAN. So it is not contemporaneous with October 2002,

it is contemporaneous with a hearing that points out that perhaps

there was more involvement with the Vice President’s office and

people in this administration than they ever let on. Let me just

read to you what——

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Mr. LANZILOTTA. Well, may I clarify that? It wasn’t until yesterday that I was even told I was coming to the hearing, and so I have

done some research in preparation for the hearing.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, let me ask you this. Who told you this?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Pardon me?

Mr. WAXMAN. Who told you this information about the deputies

meeting?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I got this from Mr. DiRita.

Mr. WAXMAN. And who is he?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. He is the Acting Public Affairs Officer.

Mr. WAXMAN. Of?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Department of Defense.

Ms. LEE. Mr. Waxman, if I may.

Mr. WAXMAN. Was this fellow that told you about it at the meeting, to your knowledge?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I don’t believe he was.

Mr. WAXMAN. So you are telling us that somebody who wasn’t at

the meeting told you a story about what happened at the meeting.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Well, I think I made it clear that I got it from

somebody else. I never meant to represent that I was there or

knew anybody there.

Mr. WAXMAN. No, no, no. Did the fellow who told you about this,

Mr. DiRita?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. DiRita.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you know whether Mr. DiRita was at that deputies meeting?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I don’t know.

Ms. LEE. Sir, if I may. Again, one of the things in contracting

that is not at all unusual for a requirements organization or a program manager or a mission needs person, in fact, it is encouraged

under the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the new FASA, is to

go around and do what we call market research and say who could

do this kind of work, who is in this kind of business; and then the

technical community discusses that requirement and learns more

about the marketplace before we make a buy.

In this particular case, my understanding is that is the kind of

discussion that was ongoing, which is—What is it we really need

to do? How do we fight fires? What would happen if? What would

that requirement look like.

Mr. WAXMAN. No, I think it is absolutely reasonable, and I am

not charging, because I don’t know enough information, that there

was any wrongdoing. What I am pointing out is that Mr. Mobbs’

report to us is inconsistent with the statements we have heard

from the Vice President and people in this administration who told

us they didn’t know anything about it, they were never involved,

their office wasn’t involved, and it was done by only career people.

So that is the point I am making.

We have made a document request for additional information

that has been submitted to the Vice President and the President

and others, and that will help us; we will know more after that.

Mr. Reed, I want to go to you, because you were here last March

and you talked about, at that time, that there were major problems

with Halliburton. You issued a report on December 31 and then a

memo on January 13th highlighting deficiencies in the way HalliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00299 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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burton and its subcontractors estimated their costs. Halliburton argued that these were only isolated problems; you disagreed, calling

them systemic and significant. You said they were so serious that

you warned other Pentagon agencies not to negotiate further contracts with Halliburton until they talked to you.

Mr. Reed, I would like to know whether the problems you identified in December and January have now been remedied, 6 months

later. Let me ask you have you received information from Halliburton that has caused you to change the conclusions in your December or January reports?

Mr. REED. We continue to work the issue with Halliburton. It is

not resolved yet. And I wanted to point out in regards to our comment about ‘‘not awarding until you talk to us.’’ It is important to

put that in the context of what we really were seeking, that is for

contracting officers to ask us to assist them in evaluating estimates, particularly, in those areas indicated potential deficiencies

in those estimates. And so if someone had contacted us, we would

have said, ‘‘would you like us to assist you in evaluating the pricing

information or the cost data.’’ It was not DCAA’s intent that the

contracting officer not award a contract unless DCAA said yes, OK.

Mr. WAXMAN. That wasn’t really the point I was asking about.

I was asking about an opinion you issued the last time you were

here and in those two memos, and you said the problems were systemic and significant. What I want to know is do you think there

are still systemic and significant problems with Halliburton estimating systems as far as you are concerned?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir, those problems continue; they are not resolved.

Ms. LEE. Sir, if I may.

Mr. WAXMAN. I would like to pursue some questions with Mr.

Reed first, and then we will let you jump in on this.

Your May 13th report, which is the most recent report on Halliburton, instead of the company’s estimating system, you focused on

its billing system, how they bill the Government for their work,

and again you found significant problems, and I want to read from

your report. ‘‘Our examination disclosed several deficiencies in

KBR’s billing system resulting in billings to the Government that

are not prepared in accordance with applicable laws and regulations and contract terms. We also found material invoicing

misstatements that are not prevented, detected, and/or corrected in

a timely manner. As a result, KBR is not authorized for direct billing and will be required to continue to provide all billings to DEAA

for provisional approval.’’

What does it mean that Halliburton has major problems with

both its estimating system and its billing system? Are the problems

compounded?

Mr. REED. Well, they do overlap somewhat, in the sense that

costs that are proposed ultimately will be billed. If there are issues

in terms of the reasonableness of the cost when you are evaluating

the proposal, those same issues, if they are still not unresolved,

would then become a billing issue when they actually started to bill

the costs.

However, the cause of the issues that we are talking about, with

in Halliburton in terms of its cause I would say, as I testified in

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the earlier hearing, I believe, that Halliburton is a company whose

business base expanded extremely rapidly. Their own management

recognizes that their prior business systems were not adequate to

keep pace with the rapid award of contracts that they received because of the contingency. Therefore, there is no dispute by KBR

that their business systems need to be improved in several areas.

Mr. WAXMAN. In your May 13th report you discuss Halliburton’s

inability to exercise control over subcontractors, and I want to read

again from the report: ‘‘KBR does not have adequate control over

subcontract billings our audit activity has identified inadequate or

nonexistent policies and procedures for notifying the Government of

potential significant subcontract problems that impact delivery,

quality, and price. KBR also does not monitor the ongoing physical

progress of subcontracts or the related costs and billings.’’

One of the whistleblowers that we hope to hear from who came

forward, Mike West, was a labor foreman for Halliburton, and he

reported that Halliburton hired a Jordanian company to build a

dining facility, but nobody from Halliburton supervised the work.

He said he was sent over once a day to take a few photos. If Mr.

West’s account is accurate, it seems to track closely with your

broader finding about Halliburton’s failing to monitor the ongoing

physical progress of subcontracts, doesn’t it?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir, it is certainly related. There are contracting

officials who should be on the ground. At the prime level we refer

to them as contracting officer technical representatives who do

oversee the progress of the work on the ground.

Mr. WAXMAN. We have another whistleblower who wants to remain anonymous who claims that a subcontractor charged Halliburton millions and millions of dollars in completely made-up costs.

He reports that there was nobody there to check on the subcontractor’s billings and the whole line items were simply made up out of

thin air. This case too seems to be consistent with DCAA’s broader

conclusions.

Mr. Reed, if we make these individuals available to you, would

you be willing to examine their cases further to determine whether

specific remedial action is necessary?

Mr. REED. We certainly would. We will explore every single allegation and do the necessary fact-finding.

I would point out that if these deficiencies exist, every one of

these costs, when they are billed to us, are going to be audited by

DCAA. If there is no support for these subcontract costs, as this individual apparently is stating, I guarantee you we are not going to

allow that to be billed.

Mr. WAXMAN. Ms. Ballard, you wanted to say something?

Ms. BALLARD. Yes, sir. On the question of contractors responding

to the estimating system, points made by DCAA, it is our practice

in contracting per the regulations, sir, that DCAA provide us a formal report on those estimating system issues, and then the contracting officer has an obligation to allow the contractor to respond

to those allegations and to take corrective action relative to them.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you.

Mr. REED. May I add one other thing? I think I should state, to

be totally fair to both parties here, that when I said that the estimating issues were not resolved, it does not mean that KBR has

294

not done anything. We are making progress, but we are not satisfied yet, and there is further to go.

General KERN. Could I add a comment too, Mr. Waxman?

Mr. WAXMAN. Sure.

General KERN. Remember we set out and General McManus laid

out for you the last time a definitization schedule. Part of that we

would like to have done sooner, but the issue has been getting adequate cost data from KBR that DCAA will support. And while we

have seen improvements, neither the contracting officer working to

definitize those task orders nor the data that they have provided

to DCAA has been adequate, and I think what you see in process

is good government. We have an auditing process overlooking it, we

have a contracting officer who is doing their job making sure that

we are not going to pay for things that we should not pay for.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

Let me ask Mr. Reed two things. First of all, Mike West, we may

have an opportunity to examine him in July, his allegations. It is

not uncommon in these situations, is it, when materials maybe

don’t match up, the personnel gets there first and they are waiting

for the materials, or vice versa? We saw this on our plane over

there, where we had plenty of air conditioners, but we didn’t have

the air condition repair man. These can be logistical nightmares,

particularly in the early parts of a conflict, is that——

Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, it sounds like you have been in the

Army. I have been in the Army too.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I was in the Army.

Mr. REED. And we know that is the case; that the logistics

stream is very effective, but it is not perfect. Personnel deployment

has the same difficulties, especially where you are sending volunteers. It is important to note that we are asking civilian professionals to get up off their couch, watching their football games, and

risk their lives and go to Iraq on a voluntary basis right now. So

that is a process that does take a little bit of time to get people——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I am just trying to give a perspective of

how things, when you are sitting there as an armchair quarterback, it looks so easy, but when you are out there in the arena,

sometimes things get a little complicated; and that is really where

you come in. You come in and examine these things, and you take

a look at what is reasonable, what is not reasonable. You don’t

know how many meals you are doing when you are pricing you are

going to serve, correct? You don’t know what the logistics are going

to be; people are going to be there week to week. You come back

and examine this and you say, well, you gave us a bill that was

too high, or sometimes they are amended upwards. Is that fair?

Mr. REED. I think that is fair. It is also fair to note that the main

point was that the troops needed to be fed.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You have to feed them, No. 1, right?

Mr. REED. You have to feed them. We will worry about the accounting, the billing and the auditors later. But the main thing is

the commanders were right to say our troops need hot meals; and

that was what KBR was tasked to do. We will ultimately get to the

fair price for those meals. That is our process.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Now, as I understand it, most of the matters that we are discussing are still under discussion with the contractor and a lot of these issues are still open, is that right?

Mr. REED. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Many of these reports raising these issues

have not been made public, or they have been made public because

of just the scrutiny we have gotten? Making them public in a preliminary stage is not the usual practice, is it?

Mr. REED. No, sir. All of DCAAs reports, its formal reports, are

issued for official use only, and they are protected under the U.S.

Code to protect contractor proprietary data. There is a very specific

process that must be gone through before these types of reports

should be made public.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But some of these preliminary reports still

have been leaked, it appears; not to me, I might add, to the minority in this case.

Mr. REED. I believe the only instance I am aware of involved a

DCAA draft report on the reconstruct Iraqi oil gasoline issue. I

have never seen anyone show me they had that draft report.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It has been referred to a lot, though.

Mr. REED. It has been referred to a lot, but to my knowledge that

report has not—I have not seen anyone possess it who should not

have it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Now that you have the resources in place

and your organization is able to work with contractors and contracting officers to get a better picture on the ground, would you

say, as far as you are concerned, the process is beginning to gel and

beginning to work?

Mr. REED. Absolutely. We are making progress every day.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. There are some allegations, I think, that

Halliburton and KBR are somehow trying to enrich themselves

through these Iraqi contracts. Are you satisfied that at the end of

the day the taxpayers will be protected from any unwarranted

overcharges?

Mr. REED. With reasonable assurance, yes. And by that I mean,

of course, nobody audits 100 percent of everything, but we do audit

a substantial amount, and the techniques we use will assure that

ultimately the taxpayers’ interest, with reasonable assurance, will

be protected.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And, Ms. Ballard, let me ask you a similar

question. Are you satisfied with the oversight mechanisms that

have been established to oversee work performed by contractors in

Iraq?

Ms. BALLARD. Yes, sir, I am satisfied with the oversight that has

been provided, and I am also satisfied that we have taken significant positive measures to increase the oversight that is provided in

Iraq.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Because ultimately that is what we look

to. There are always going to be disputes that we have, as you

know, Federal Acquisition Regulations, pages and pages of rules

and regulations to resolve these disputes, and I think at the end

of the day you can point fingers and you can make a lot of allegations. We just want to make sure that the taxpayers aren’t paying

more than they ought to be paying and that the services are being

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provided, particularly for our troops, but to accomplish our mission.

The rest of it, it is an election year, and we also have a responsibility to oversee this and call you up here and make sure you understand that we are looking at these things. That is part of the ongoing responsibilities of this committee, whatever the administration.

OK, I am ready to recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts,

Mr. Tierney, for 5 minutes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the individuals

for testifying.

In November 2002, Halliburton received a task order to develop

a secret contingency plan to restore and operate Iraq’s oil infrastructure. The task order was issued under the Army’s LOGCAP

global logistics contract, which is used to provide services like laundry and meals to the troops. GAO has determined that the administration violated Federal procurement law when it issued this task

order because LOGCAP’s contract isn’t broad enough to include

contingency planning for oil infrastructure.

General Kern, you are in charge of that Army Materiel Command which administers the LOGCAP contract, so let me ask you

isn’t it true that a career lawyer from the Army Materiel Command

wrote a memorandum concluding that the LOGCAP contract

should not be read to encompass contingency planning for the operation of Iraq’s oil infrastructure?

General KERN. It is true that one of my legal officers within the

Command Counsel Office offered an opinion that he did not

think——

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you see that memorandum when it was issued?

General KERN. I did not see it until after it had been worked

through the contracting channels, which would be normal.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would you provide a copy of that document to the

committee?

General KERN. If it is fair that I can, I will, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, will you?

General KERN. Unless there is some legal reason I cannot, I will

provide it, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK, that is a better answer. Thank you.

Isn’t it also true that when the memo was forwarded to the

Army’s Deputy of General Counsel for Procurement, he was inclined to agree that the contingency planning was outside the scope

of LOGCAP?

General KERN. His initial opinion said yes, he agreed with him,

and there was ensuing discussion that said in both his opinion and

in discussing it further with the OSD General Counsel, three lawyers now involved, that it was right on the margin of being allowable.

Mr. TIERNEY. So he, at first, was inclined to agree that it was

outside the scope, but then the Defense Department’s general counsel weighed in and the career lawyer backed off and had his recommendations objected to, is that right?

General KERN. I am not going to try to put words in any lawyer’s

mouth, which I know I would fair anyway. They were all in a set

of negotiations with one another determining if this was allowable.

Mr. TIERNEY. But the sequence was the first——

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General KERN. But the senior attorney in the group from the

DOD General Counsel’s Office ruled that it was.

Mr. TIERNEY. So he overruled the other fellow, right?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Sir, could I maybe add something to this? These

are all career lawyers that come together. This is a judgment call

that these lawyers get together. When we sit down there and say

overrule, it seems like we put more definition to it than what there

is. This was a gray area.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, let me interrupt you for a second. The sequence as we understand it is that first the Army’s Deputy General

Counsel for procurement agreed that the contingency planning was

outside the scope of LOGCAP. Then he met with the Defense Department’s general counsel and they weighed in and the original

lawyer’s objections were rejected. So he had an opinion, and then

they met and then the opinion was changed.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. But I happen to know the general counsel lawyer that we are talking about here and I have the highest regard.

He is a career civil servant and he understands these issues. I

work in these issues in fiscal law all the time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Are you saying that wasn’t the sequence, then?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Well, that is the sequence.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. But the thing is this is an ongoing discussion

that goes on among these lawyers.

Mr. TIERNEY. I understand that. And I just wanted to establish

what the sequence was on that. And I guess my next question,

General Kern, that general counsel’s attorney was somebody who

worked with Michael Mobbs, isn’t that right?

General KERN. I cannot tell you that they do or not. They worked

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. TIERNEY. As did Mr. Mobbs.

General KERN. Yes. But that is a very large office. And I have

no idea whether he was included in that discussion. I would be surprised if he were.

Mr. TIERNEY. General Kern and General Crear, I wanted to ask

you a particular question. Both have oversight of LOGCAP and

RIO, respectively. Can you explain to us or share with us the pay

differential and the benefit differential between private contractors

that provide services under those programs and enlisted servicemen and women in Iraq performing similar duties? We have been

told that the salaries for the private contractors range as high as

$80,000 for truck drivers and $120,000 for convoy commanders. Are

those accurate figures? Would you provide us information on such

payment and benefit differentials to this committee when you get

an opportunity? And explain to us a little bit about whether or not

that is the situation.

General KERN. I cannot precisely tell you whether those are correct differentials. I can tell you under general circumstances, particularly in an international operation, regardless of whether you

are at war or not, that a contractor will make more money than

a uniform person. The second set of issues which we know are significantly impacting the ability to hire people today are the liabilities which they must assume under war zone conditions, and in

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ple to sign up for the job and two, to get the coverage for them for

their insurance.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I understand all of those risks. Obviously, our

men and women are taking those risks everyday. What I guess I

wonder is what can be done about those relative pay scales and

what effect does it have on the morale of our troops, our men and

women who are working at one pay scale and may be protecting

the lives of others making substantial amounts of benefits and

moneys more than they are.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. TIERNEY. If I could just have an answer to my question, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Sure.

General KERN. I don’t have a precise answer for you. Our soldiers work side-by-side with the contractors and with other DOD

civilians on a day-by-day basis, and I can tell you what they don’t

do is usually compare paychecks. What they are usually comparing

is the conditions in which they are operating and trying to get the

mission done.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And let me just say this committee discussed that when we were working on the NSPS, the National Security Personnel System. The fact is everybody gets paid more than

our uniform soldiers over there. Civilian employees doing the same

thing are generally paid at a much higher level for the kind of

work than you would get doing a private or a Spec 4, somebody

doing that, unfortunately.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I look forward to having that information so

we can see just how substantial the differentials are.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. That is beyond the scope of this committee

in terms of looking at these contracts, but that, unfortunately, is

a fact. But the goal was to make soldiers soldiers, not to have them

doing other things. We have many who have criticized the administration for not having enough manpower. We are having to have

the soldiers be soldiers here.

Mr. Ose, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am intrigued by a line of questioning that the ranking member

pursued earlier. If I got it verbatim, he asked each of you whether

or not, relative to Mr. Mobbs, you have any knowledge to disprove

Mr. Mobbs’ allegations. Let me rephrase that. Mr. Mobbs has made

some allegations about conduct between certain offices at the Pentagon and certain offices at the White House. Do you have any

knowledge to prove those allegations? Mr. Lanzilotta. Rather than

prove the negative, do you have anything to prove the positive?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I am sorry, I really don’t understand the question.

Mr. OSE. OK. Mr. Mobbs has made some allegations regarding

contacts that were made between certain parties. Are you aware of

that?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. When talking with Mr. Mobbs, I only know

from a brief conversation, I don’t have a lot of firsthand knowledge.

I know that he did talk to career and non-career people versus

Halliburton——

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Mr. OSE. Are you aware of Mr. Mobbs’ allegations regarding the

Vice President’s office?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. He told me——

Mr. OSE. Mr. Mobbs?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Mr. Mobbs that it was the same as given in his

previous testimony, it was more in the terms of notification of a

contract award.

Mr. OSE. OK, well, I want to just run through this. So you don’t

have any knowledge to prove Mr. Mobbs’ allegations?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I have no firsthand knowledge.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Reed, do you have any knowledge that would prove

Mr. Mobbs’ allegations? You were asked whether you have anything to disprove it. Do you have anything that would prove his allegations?

Mr. REED. No.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. No, sir. I can’t speak for Mr. Mobbs.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Ballard.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. General Kern.

General KERN. Sir, I never heard of Mr. Mobbs until yesterday.

Mr. OSE. General Crear.

General CREAR. No, sir, no firsthand knowledge.

Mr. OSE. So we not only have no knowledge to disprove his allegations, we have no knowledge to prove it.

Mr. Lanzilotta.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. In talking with Mr. Mobbs, though, he tells me

that there was no inappropriate contact made.

Mr. OSE. I know that. It is a political year, and I just want to

make sure we get this flushed out properly in the course of the

record.

There have been many elected officials who have been involved

in elective office during the time in question of the Vice President’s

tenure at Halliburton. For instance, Senator Boxer has held significant amounts of stock in Halliburton, almost consistent with Mr.

Cheney’s tenure at Halliburton. Do you have any knowledge of

Senator Boxer weighing in to influence the award of any of these

contracts to Halliburton, Mr. Lanzilotta?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. No, I do not.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Reed.

Mr. REED. No, I do not.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Ballard.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. General Kern.

General KERN. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. General Crear.

General CREAR. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. OK. Senator Feinstein’s husband, Mr. Richard Bloom,

is a significant shareholder in Parini and UBS. Do you have any

knowledge of Senator Feinstein weighing in regarding the award of

contracts to Parini or UBS, Mr. Lanzilotta?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I do not.

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Mr. OSE. Mr. Reed.

Mr. REED. No, I do not.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. Ms. Ballard.

Ms. BALLARD. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. General Kern.

General KERN. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. General Crear.

General CREAR. No, sir.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just do a followup

on that, because I am a little bit confused.

Mr. Lanzilotta, earlier on questions from Mr. Waxman, you stated that you got your information from Mr. DiRita and that you

didn’t speak to Mr. Mobbs.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Pardon me?

Mr. LYNCH. Is that true or false?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I spoke to Mr. DiRita concerning the deputies

committee meeting and what was said at the deputies committee

meeting. I spoke to Mr. Mobbs as to what his contact was with the

Vice President’s office.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. All right. Just so I am clear. All right, thank

you.

First of all, I want to thank the panel for helping the committee

with its work.

General Kern, at the committee’s last meeting, on March 11th,

we had an opportunity to have a brief conversation on the record,

and I asked you about two Halliburton employees who took kickbacks from a Kuwaiti subcontractor in the amount of about $6.3

million in exchange for steering contracts to that Kuwaiti company,

and I asked you for their identity, and I also asked you for the information on the Kuwaiti company to find out if they are doing

similar things in other areas. Here is what I asked you. I said, we

put a lot of sunlight on this process to find out who these people

were, and we need to do more of that. We need to find out how

many contracts they oversaw, we need to find out who the Kuwaiti

contractors were that were offering these bribes or kickbacks, and

we need to find out are those subcontractors who are providing

these bribes doing other work in the country as well, and obviously

we need to find out who these employees are.

And in response to my question you stated, ‘‘I promise you I will

get back to you.’’ Unfortunately, sir, with all due respect, I have

not heard from you. It has been a couple of months now and I just

want to ask you why that is.

General KERN. Mr. Lynch, one, I was under the assumption that

our offices had gotten back to you and given you the information

which I was given, which was an advisory from the Department of

Justice, because they have this under investigation, that I could

not provide you the information at this time because it is an active

investigation.

Mr. LYNCH. An active criminal investigation?

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General KERN. An active criminal investigation by the Department of Justice.

Mr. LYNCH. It is a little bit inconsistent. I just want to explain.

We have had situations like this before with Mary Robinson. We

were investigating the situation where the Kuwaitis were charging

us 100 percent over what we should have been paying for gasoline

from certain Kuwaiti contractors. This committee, both the majority and the minority leaders had Ms. Robinson, who was also under

a criminal investigation, she came in, testified. I will point out that

her testimony was expected to be favorable to the administration,

but she was offered to the committee even though it was in the

midst of a criminal investigation.

So I am just curious why these two individuals who—Halliburton has already paid the money back, the $6.3 million that they received in kickbacks. I don’t know what the Kuwaitis got on the

deal, how much they got, but the kickbacks have been paid back

to the Government. And I am just curious why we can’t get the

identity of these folks. This is not a criminal investigation, this is

a congressional investigation. I just want to know the identity of

these folks and how widespread this practice of bribing our people,

Halliburton’s people through these Kuwaiti contractors.

General KERN. Mr. Lynch, one, I have to believe that the lawyers

in the Department of Justice are giving me good advice so that I

do not prejudice the ongoing investigation so that we all see that

this comes out the way we think it should equitably. Second, I do

know that there is a threshold associated with these investigations

where the fraud issues of $10 million changes, and we have not

proved yet what the amount that has been alleged as being involved is the right amount, and I think that is one of the critical

factors in this particular investigation. And if I could, I will bring

one of my counsels over to your office and we can talk about this

in more detail.

Mr. LYNCH. That would be terrific. OK, general, let me ask you,

then. We have other Federal departments that are investigating

this misconduct.

General KERN. That is correct.

Mr. LYNCH. Have you shared that information with them?

General KERN. We have shared all the information with them,

yes.

Mr. LYNCH. OK.

Let me ask Mr. Reed, then. Mr. Reed, have you gotten information regarding the identity of these two employees that took the $6

million, or some such amount, from these Kuwaiti contractors? You

are doing the audit here for the Department of Defense. Have you

got the information?

Mr. REED. No, we haven’t, but that is not unusual. When a matter of this nature is being investigated, the identities of the parties,

both the ones who may have taken the kickbacks as well as the

ones who may have given the kickbacks, is not publicly disclosed

or provided to people outside of the investigation, because to do so

might compromise an investigative approach of the criminal investigators or whoever else is investigating. So I would not expect to

be told that kind of detailed information.

Mr. LYNCH. Let me be clear here.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Gentleman from Maryland, he can yield to you.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to yield a moment to my colleague.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

Mr. LYNCH. OK, so, Mr. Reed, you haven’t been given the information.

General, can you tell me what department are you sharing this

information with if it is not with the contract auditing wing of the

Department of Defense?

General KERN. It is the Department of Justice.

Mr. LYNCH. OK.

All right, in deference to my colleague, my kind colleague, I want

to end my questioning. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman from Maryland is still recognized.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lanzilotta, I just want to followup on some of the statements

you made this morning. I understand you were not working at the

Defense Department, or were you, at the time of the 2002 meeting,

the deputies meeting?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. I was not at the deputies meeting. I was working at the Department of Defense.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. And can you tell me what individuals you

have spoken to about what took place at the deputies meeting? You

mentioned earlier today that you had gotten some information from

the public affairs officer, Mr. DiRita, I believe, is that right?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. He is the only one.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. Did you ever have any conversation with

Mr. Michael Mobbs about the meeting?

Mr. LANZILOTTA. About the deputies meeting?

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Yes.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. No.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. About anything that took place at that meeting.

Mr. LANZILOTTA. Not concerning that meeting.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. I am trying to get a sense, and anyone

on the panel who has information about this, if you could jump in,

but my understanding is that Michael Mobbs was the presenter at

the deputies meeting that took place in 2002, where they discussed

this. Does anyone have any information to contradict that assessment?

Ms. LEE. I was not at the meeting, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I am sorry?

Ms. LEE. I was not at the meeting.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Have you had any conversations with anybody

about what took place at that meeting?

Ms. LEE. Just a discussion. In fact, when we were prepping yesterday, there was a discussion yesterday that said what happened

here, and we got into discussing it, that was the notification. I still

characterize that as here is an operational question: is this what

we want to do operationally. In fact, do we want to be prepared to

fight fires in Iraq. And that is my understanding that was the discussion. Any subsequent discussion would have been a notification

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of we are getting ready to declassify and do some things that have

been discussed here.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. I think the reason this is important is, as

Mr. Waxman said, no one has made any allegations about influence

from the Vice President’s office taking place at that meeting, but

the earlier statements suggested that there was almost a firewall

between the political appointees and the professional civil servants

with respect to the Halliburton contracts. And the information that

has come out more recently suggests that there was not a firewall.

Now, that may be standard practice for the contract officers to be

talking to other people in the decisionmaking capacity, but getting

this story right, it seems to me, is important because there have

been statements that were made that were interpreted that Mr.

Mobbs essentially made the decision, took it to the deputies meeting, and then went on and told the contracting officers essentially

this is what we want, do it, give it to Halliburton.

And so as I understand, none of you are in a position to really

tell us whether that is the way events unfolded or whether they

didn’t. I guess we need other witnesses to followup on that.

Ms. LEE. No, sir, but I can tell you we have been working for

years to try to get the requirements organization and the contracting organization to work together to make sure we support the mission properly, something we have been working on.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. No, I understand that is important, but it is

also important, I think you would agree, to make sure that these

decisions are insulated as much as possible from the political process in terms of who gets a contract award. And people have bent

over backward within the administration to make statements representing that is in fact how it happened, without any political influence, and so that is why some of these recent facts coming to

light I think have raised a lot of serious questions about exactly

how things unfolded there.

If I could, Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield to my colleague,

Mr. Lynch.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Lynch, you have another minute.

Mr. LYNCH. Just to go back, General Kern and Mr. Reed. We know that there was mishandling here, that there was over $6 million in kickbacks that were paid to Halliburton employees. You

won’t tell me the names of the individuals. I can’t find out the

names of the Kuwaiti companies involved. I can’t find out if they

are doing other work other places. I can’t understand why someone

won’t tell me what other contracts these two individuals were overseeing.

Can you at least tell me, either of you, have we severed all contracts with this company, this Kuwaiti company that has been paying kickbacks to Halliburton employees? Can you at least tell me

that?

General KERN. Sir, I cannot tell you that. Part of what you are

asking me is to presume that we have already judged that they are

guilty, and I can’t do that until the investigation takes place to

make any judgments against them. And I can’t prejudice the investigation while it is ongoing by divulging information which is not

under my purview, but under the investigator’s purview right now.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time——

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Mr. LYNCH. So have we suspended the contracts or anything like

that?

General KERN. What I can assure you, Mr. Lynch, is that this

is being pursued by our Government to do the right thing legally,

and at the right time I think it all will be shared with you. We are

watching this very closely to do the right thing.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

There are hundreds of contracts under dispute right now. If you

were to suspend all of these, the Government would never get anything done. That is the nature of contracting; that is why we have

the DCAA and these other groups to come in afterwards and look

at the forward pricing and compare it to the reality on the ground.

I think normal procedures are working.

Ms. McCollum, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In looking at part of the testimony from the Brigadier General,

you talk about the planning prior to war. On page 2 you talk about

‘‘Prior to war, we originally expected that we would have to repair

the damage caused by military action, deal with the resulting humanitarian crisis, set a stage for a new Iraqi government to oversee

further exploration production, refining, distribution facilities for

the oil.’’

Did you have any contact with the State Department? I understand the State Department had made contingency plans. Did you

look at any of them, were they consulted?

General CREAR. We did not look at any State Department plans

that I know of.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. OK, thank you. Then I have a concern and a

question. I too had the opportunity to go to Iraq, and our servicemen and women are heroes trying to do a difficult job under very

difficult circumstances. Our civilian contractors, our civilian employees in the Department of Defense and State Department all

face grave danger in trying to do their jobs, as well as it is dayto-day life or death for many Iraqi citizens. But when I was in the

dining hall, I have to wonder because it crossed my mind so often

when I saw the civilian employees there. That was the day that Al

Rashid had first been shelled inside the green zone; it was a very,

very tense situation. And I looked at these civilian employees and

I looked at all these soldiers I had been with and I thought, geez,

what happens? What happens if there is civilian contract employees when a situation goes to gunfire? Who is responsible for the

safety of the civilian contractors? How does our soldiers’ role become challenged? Because many of the soldiers that I spoke with

said, ma’am, I don’t know whether I am a humanitarian worker,

a police officer or soldier today. How does that get sorted out and

who is responsible for their security in situations like that, and

who is paying for the contractors’ security in the convoy situations?

General KERN. Let me try to answer that question for you. First,

the combatant commander in the theater is responsible for the security of the people——

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I am sorry, there is something wrong with the

acoustics, sir, and I am not understanding you.

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General KERN. The combatant commander is responsible for the

security of the people in his area of operation, and that includes

the civilians, DOD, and contractors. In some cases within the green

zone, you are in Ambassador Bremer’s area, and he has hired other

people to provide security within his immediate vicinity. So you

have a two-tiered kind of operation that is going on there, one in

the immediate CPA facilities, and then in the area of operations,

and depending upon when you were there would depend upon who

the commander was in charge of that particular area.

We have, in the case of security for the convoy operations, placed

a uniformed soldier in the cab with the contractors riding those

since last April, when security became much more of a problem for

those convoys. So we have changed and we have worked that out

with KBR, and they have placed one of their personnel in theater

to look at very particularly the security of those operations on a

daily basis.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Sir, thank you. And I am not trying to be flippant about this, but it sounds very complicated at a time when you

might not know what is happening around you or what your orders

might be to respond to fill in to a line or to do something that you

have a group of American civilians that I would think, from meeting the, as I said, terrific soldiers that I met, would feel conflicted

about what they may or may not need to do. And they follow orders

and they would do the best job that they could under the circumstances, but we have really changed contracting. First the Department of Defense was contracting out what civilians would typically do. This is the first situation, to my knowledge, where we

have so many civilian contractors working side-by-side, described

in some of the testimony here as part of our troops, in other words,

as part of the military, when the military used to perform many

of these functions with people who had been through boot camp,

who did know what to do, and we have civilians who don’t. And I

find that rather a concern.

And that brings me to my other question. Do you have a summary on what happened with the contractors that is available to

either this committee or Members of Congress on the prison situation?

General KERN. I am not sure that I fully understand what you

mean do I have a document that describes. We have many thousands of contractors there working on very different kinds of operations. And I share your concerns about how we run that whole security operation. Some of them are field service reps that do technical contracting in support of operations; some of them are the civilians working for the CPA and the reconstruction effort, as well

as State Department and other; and then we have the third level

of the support kind of contractors that are running services that we

have. So there are lots of different categories, and I don’t have a

single report that covers that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Ms. McCollum.

Mr. Waxman, you want to give a summary?

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think this panel has been

very helpful, and I want to thank them for their participation in

the hearing today. A lot of people ask why is there so much pasVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00313 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sion, why do we care so much about this issue. At a time of massive budget deficits and stories about our troops not getting everything they need to support them in Iraq, when I hear about these

egregious situations where there are overcharges by Halliburton

and anyone else, it really gets me angry. And when I hear from the

DCAA, telling us there are no internal controls to stop the overcharging, the DOD hasn’t done enough to prevent this sort of thing

from happening, from stopping waste, fraud, and abuse, I think the

whole situation is ripe; it is a perfect situation for those contractors

that want to take advantage and overcharge for them to do it,

somewhat like what we had in California with the energy crisis.

We had a situation where the energy suppliers could overcharge

us. People said it wasn’t happening, it couldn’t be, and now we

know from the internal tapes of the discussions at places like

Enron and some of these other companies that they knew what

they were doing.

Well, I think what is missing is accountability, and that, to me,

means that we in the Congress have to be more aggressive, hold

hearings, get the documents, and pursue the truth. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your commitment to doing that and

your willingness to continue pursuing the matter, because I think

that is a very serious part of our job as Members of Congress.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman, thank you.

Let me thank our panel for this.

Let me just note this committee originally started as five different committees, all overseeing the expenditure of Government

funds, and in the 1950’s was consolidated in the old Government

Operations Committee. In 1995 they consolidated Civil Service

Committee and the D.C. Committees and molded us into one, but

one of our primary objectives is to oversee waste, fraud, abuse in

Government expenditures, and that is what we are doing.

From what I have heard, I don’t see any real strong evidence of

fraud or political favoritism, but there is always waste when you

are dealing with contracts of this magnitude in a war zone; there

are things that may be in the calm of the day might have been

done differently. Our job is to now come back and examine these.

We hope that it is a learning experience for you.

The one thing Enron didn’t have to face was DCAA. We can see

from Mr. Reed and his troops that are over there we are not going

to pay a penny more than they can substantiate, and that there are

literally hundreds of millions of dollars in dispute in the one contract that has been highlighted today, and there are hundreds of

other contracts where there is money in dispute, where people

make decisions in a war zone that, on reflection, maybe the taxpayer shouldn’t be responsible for.

So, Mr. Reed, we are glad you and your cohorts are here. Go to

it. As Mr. Waxman said, these are Federal tax dollars that are

taken from hardworking people, and we don’t want them wasted.

We will be doing more oversight on this, as we discussed at the

beginning of this.

Mr. Waxman, thank you for your cooperation. I thank the members for their perseverence, as well.

This meeting is adjourned.

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[Whereupon, at 3:40, the committee was adjourned, to reconvene

at the call of the Chair.]

[The prepared statements of Hon. Katherine Harris and Hon.

Dutch C.A. Ruppersberger follow:]

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(313)

UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGES: THE COMPLEX TASK OF COORDINATING CONTRACTS

AMID THE CHAOS AND THE REBUILDING

OF IRAQ

THURSDAY, JULY 22, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tom Davis of Virginia, Shays, Burton,

Ros-Lehtinen, McHugh, Mica, Souder, LaTourette, Ose, Lewis of

Kentucky, Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, Platts, Cannon, Schrock, Duncan, Deal, Miller of Michigan, Murphy, Turner of Ohio, Carter,

Blackburn, Tiberi, Harris, Waxman, Lantos, Owens, Towns, Kanjorski, Sanders, Maloney, Cummings, Davis of Illinois, Tierney,

Clay, Watson, Lynch, Van Hollen, Sanchez, Ruppersberger, Norton,

Cooper, and McCollum.

Staff present: David Marin, deputy staff director/communications

director; Keith Ausbrook, chief counsel; Ellen Brown, legislative director and senior policy counsel; David Young, counsel; Robert Borden, counsel/parliamentarian; Rob White, press secretary, Drew

Crockett, deputy director of communications; John Cuaderes, senior

professional staff member; Edward Kidd, professional staff member; John Brosnan, GAO detailee; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Brien

Beattie, deputy clerk; Allyson Blandford, office manager; Leneal

Scott, computer systems manager; Andrew Stein, legal intern; Phil

Barnett, minority staff director; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy

chief counsel; Karen Lightfoot, minority communications director/

senor policy advisor; Anna Laiti, minority communications and policy assistant; Jeff Bara, Rosalind Parker, and David Rapallo, minority counsels; Mark Stephenson and Nancy Scola, minority professional staff members; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; Jean

Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Cecilia Morton, minority office

manager.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Good morning. The committee will come

to order, and I want to welcome everybody this morning to our full

committee oversight hearing entitled, ‘‘Unprecedented Challenges:

The Complex Task of Coordinating Contracts Amid the Chaos and

the Rebuilding of Iraq.’’ This is the fourth in the series of hearings

this committee has held on the challenges involved in the execution

of contracts for rebuilding Iraq amid the chaos and dangers of war.

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Just a few short weeks ago, the Coalition Provisional Authority

turned over the reins of government to the people of Iraq. This

transition to self-government shows that our commitment to the

Iraqi people is genuine and real. Yet we still have much to accomplish, and the road ahead is still difficult and perilous. American

soldiers and civilians continue to lose their lives protecting freedom. Make no mistake, as long as we have the resolve to finish the

job, I am certain we are going to prevail.

As a major part of our mission to bring peace to Iraq and the

surrounding area, we have committed a substantial amount of taxpayer money. To that end, we rely on our military and civilians to

carry out day-to-day activities which are essential to security and

the rebuilding process. The military has been nothing short of superb and the unsung heroes are the many civilians in Iraq, who,

like the military, work tirelessly and under very dangerous conditions.

The majority of civilians working in Iraq are private contractors.

The sacrifices these people make are inspiring, and I believe history will give them the credit they deserve for changing the face

of this region.

I can’t emphasize how hard it is to conduct normal business in

Iraq, and yet we continue to make progress. Nevertheless, whatever the danger and no matter the difficulties, we demand that

contractors doing business in Iraq do so in accordance with the governing laws and regulations. I can understand how the difficulties

of a war zone can lead to poor recordkeeping. I know there are

those individuals who think they can turn a quick but questionable

buck because they hope the fog of war will cover their actions. And,

yes, there are bad apples who can turn up wherever opportunity

presents itself. Such opportunism cannot be condoned.

We are having this hearing today because there are those who

believe we have a company, in this case Kellogg Brown and Root,

that is wasting tax dollars or abusing its contracting role, or even

defrauding the U.S. taxpayer. From what I have seen to date, I

happen to disagree. I have yet to see any serious evidence of this,

but we do have reviews going on across the spectrum with Defense

Contract Audit Agency and others, and as allegations are brought

to us we need to make sure these are forwarded on to the appropriate officials who are trained in these areas to review them and

to make sure the taxpayers aren’t fleeced.

What I see and what we have seen to date are occasional failures

to communicate, inattentiveness in adhering to strict business procedures, and a clearly less-than-perfect accounting process. Of

course, in a perfect world, we would have contractors that would

accomplish the mission and maintain perfect peacetime business

practices with the appropriate paper trails. But even when the best

business practices aren’t maintained, the taxpayer is still protected

because our government procurement system prohibits reimbursement to KBR or any other contractor until they have shown the

military that the costs presented, as determined by the contracting

officer, are reasonable, allocable to the contract, and allowable

under the government’s cost principles.

We have seen a display of this process through the various Defense Contract Audit Agency reports on cost issues that have been

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made public. To me, these reports show that the oversight process

is alive and working. They reveal issues of contract interpretation,

cost reimbursements that are not at all unusual in large, complex,

cost-type contracts.

The last hearing we held on Iraq contracting, a little more than

a month ago, explored those issues with those responsible for contract management and oversight. Because of the overheated political atmosphere surrounding the war in Iraq, and a misplaced concern about the use of KBR as a contractor in particular, we are

holding yet another hearing on Iraq contracting. But this time, instead of contracting experts, we are hearing from so-called whistleblowers who will air their complaints against KBR. We will also

hear the firm’s reaction to those complaints.

Today, we will hear from representatives of Kellogg Brown and

Root, a subsidiary of the Halliburton Co., and the prime contractor

on two of the larger contracts associated with Kuwait and Iraq, the

LOGCAP and initial Restore Iraqi Oil [RIO] programs.

I want to publicly thank KBR for testifying today. They come of

their own accord. I, for one, still believe that if it weren’t for the

fact that the Vice President was the former—and I emphasize

former—CEO of the parent company, we probably would not be

here today. Politics is driving this agenda, and I suspect that not

even the truth will keep detractors at bay.

Despite this, KBR has decided to answer under oath allegations

that continue to be shopped to the media. In fact, I want to highlight that point by submitting for the record, if there is no objection, a Washington Post article dated July 20, page A–15 under the

White House Notebook, by Dana Milbank titled ‘‘The Kerry Campaign One-Word Weapon.’’ The gist of the article is how the Democrats are using Halliburton as fodder for the Presidential campaign.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. However, before we hear from the representatives of KBR, we will first hear testimony from former employees who believe they personally witnessed waste and abuse. I

think it will become clear that these individuals are not experts in

government contracting, but they have, for various reasons, something against the company. Although the minority has worked with

these witnesses for a long time, in the case of Ms. deYoung who

is here, the minority knew of her allegations 8 months ago. They

were brought to our attention only 2 months ago. At that time, the

ranking member wanted an immediate hearing without allowing us

to evaluate their claims and determine whether a hearing would be

appropriate.

After a preliminary evaluation, we agreed to a hearing involving

some of the whistleblowers, only to see that the whistleblower

statements were on their Web site, which also led to the appropriate television news interviews. Again, all without any concern

for the validity of the statements. In other words, the minority was

more about the sensational accusations getting out to the media

than in the actual fact-finding that this committee is generally

equipped to look at.

We decided to hold this hearing and have the whistleblowers testify and to help put this in context to help us move beyond the

rhetoric and to try to get to the truth of the matter. I have asked

my staff to verify their accusations, even though I thought it

should have been incumbent on the minority to do this.

For those who came hoping to hear witnesses’ firsthand evidence

of waste, fraud and abuse by KBR, in my opinion you are going to

have to brace yourself for some disappointment. The accusations

leveled by the whistleblowers against KBR, both in their written

testimony and through personal interviews, are either in some

cases flat-out wrong, or are minor or a naive or myopic view of contracting in a wartime environment.

Ms. deYoung’s experiences in Kuwait led her to accuse KBR of

waste and abuse. Her claims focus on what she calls poor oversight

of the subcontractors, who she believes were fleecing the taxpayer.

She also claims that KBR wastefully leased a five-star hotel for its

employees, when the employees should have been staying in airconditioned tents on U.S. military bases.

Ms. deYoung is quick to jump to conclusions without understanding the whole story. As for leasing the five-star hotel, KBR is guilty

of this, but let me put that in context. I’ve been to Kuwait, a couple

of times. In Kuwait, most hotels start at the five-star level. Kuwait

is not like any country you’ve ever been to. It’s rich. That’s why

Saddam wanted it so badly. It seems that KBR had little choice.

The only real choice was to pick the particular five-star hotel. And

what Ms. deYoung did not know was that KBR wanted to be stationed on the base, and had even requested to house employees on

that base. A military base is more secure than a hotel and the base

was where the work is.

As I understand it, the military, for good reasons, didn’t want

KBR on the base. By the way, I understand these hotel rooms had

many occupants. So it wasn’t like a suite for an individual; sometimes up to five or six people were in a room at a time.

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The majority of her allegations concern subcontract administration. In her interview with committee staff, she painted herself as

a contract specialist who uncovered subcontractors overcharging for

goods and services. I think you will look at the math skills, and

maybe there is a little to be desired there. She attacks the kind of

contracts the minority has been touting. The accusations surrounding soda and laundry are tied to fixed-price contracts. Again, this

all seems to be explainable, or, at worst, relatively minor when the

entire story is told.

Mr. Mike West’s problems started early with KBR. He claims

that prior to starting with the company, he negotiated a starting

salary of $130,000, only to learn his salary would be $82,000 per

year, based on a 12-hour day, 7-day-per-week schedule. Although

Mr. West felt he was cheated, he decided to accept the salary and

join KBR as a labor foreman. In his interview with the committee

staff, Mr. West often complained that he had to wait; wait to get

from point A to point B, wait to be assigned work, wait to get a

ride back to the States.

Well, as a former member of the military myself, I’m familiar

with this feeling. We used to call it, when I was in the Army,

‘‘hurry up and wait.’’ Hurry up and wait isn’t waste and abuse; it’s,

unfortunately, part of the logistical challenges that are presented

when working with the Army that changes its mind more often

than not.

Mr. West did eventually work, but he didn’t like the work and

he left after 2 months. The experience left a bad taste in his

mouth, so he quit. Obviously, this type of environment didn’t suit

him. Unlike working in the States, the atmosphere in Iraq was not

conducive to his plans being carried out like clockwork. It’s just the

opposite.

In the early days after the war, adapting to the situation was

more the rule than the exception. I know my colleagues who traveled with me to Iraq can verify this is true.

James Warren and David Wilson are truck drivers who drove

convoys in Iraq. They both have similar stories, and I see their

similarity extends to the lawyers that they brought with them

today. The gist of these gentlemen’s allegations has to do with

what they see as waste and abuse of taxpayer assets. They claim

that poor maintenance and the lack of proper spare parts led to

trucks breaking down, and a lack of interest in conserving assets

resulted in disabled vehicles being destroyed onsite rather than

fixed or towed. After all, these were not KBR’s trucks, so why

should they care.

Again, what we have here are accusations made with very myopic tunnel vision. I think we will see when we have the opportunity to hear the whole story, that most of the actions of the contractor were likely out of its control, and make sense given the security concerns in running convoys through Iraq in hostile fire.

Yes, it makes sense to retrieve a truck, and I understand how

a professional truck driver loathes seeing a piece of equipment like

that being destroyed. However, an $85,000 truck is simply not

worth a life, whether it’s one of our soldiers or a civilian who might

be in harm’s way without the protection of an entire convoy. Mr.

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Warren and Mr. Wilson ought to be grateful that they returned

from Iraq unharmed.

These truck drivers, like the rest of these whistleblowers, believe

that what they saw while working in Kuwait and Iraq were not

simply examples of paperwork problems or the hurry-up-and-wait

environment, but were, instead, the result of wanton and careless

disregard of KBR toward American taxpayer funds.

Our acquisition system is a complex web of regulations and safeguards put in place to protect the taxpayer. A person with a view

of only a small part of an entire process cannot see that there are

many players and considerations involved in decisions that, in wartime especially, might sometimes overlook some formalities to ensure the mission is accomplished and that no one gets hurt.

Unfortunately, even with these goals in mind, this conflict has

cost 47 KBR employees their lives. I believe that tunnel vision, inexperience, and naivete are behind many of the allegations we will

hear today. But to be honest, I fear some are here because they

have ulterior motives, whether it’s a book or a try at the litigation

lottery jackpot. Today, the truth will come out. I tried to convince

the minority that there was not much here. But, again, there are

some who have a different view of this and think that oversight advances their political agenda.

As we saw clearly in past hearings, the contract oversight process is hard at work here. All the charges under the LOGCAP contract will come under the scrutiny of government auditors, career

employees trained to ferret out waste, fraud, and abuse, and they

are not going to be paid unless the contracting officer is confident

that they are reasonable, allocable to the particular contract, and

allowable under the government’s cost principles.

Our second panel today is made up of representatives of Kellogg

Brown and Root, a subsidiary of the Halliburton Co. KBR is the

major prime contractor on executing the Army’s LOGCAP program.

LOGCAP was established in 1985 to manage the use of various

civilian contractors who perform services in support of DOD missions during times of war and other military mobilizations.

LOGCAP has been used to support DOD missions from Somalia to

Afghanistan to Iraq. It was used effectively during military operations at Bosnia and Kosovo. The effort in Iraq is the largest in the

history of the LOGCAP program. As of last May, the estimated

value of the contract services in Iraq is $5.6 billion. The LOGCAP

contractor in Iraq provides such logistics and engineering services

as food preparation, laundry, housing, and construction in support

of military operations.

This particular contract, held by KBR, is the third iteration of

the Army’s LOGCAP contract. The first was awarded to KBR in

1982, the second was awarded to DynCorp in 1994, and the current

contract awarded to KBR in 2001 competitively. I think it is important to keep in mind that all three of these contracts were awarded

under competitive acquisitions.

The LOGCAP contract was awarded on a cost-plus award fee

basis. Such contracts provide that the contractor is only to be reimbursed for reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs incurred as

prescribed in the contract.

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A cost-plus award fee contract provides financial incentives based

on performance. The logistical needs of our military in Iraq and

Kuwait are massive, time sensitive and ever changing. In order to

meet these needs, KBR must be able to react swiftly. These requirements dictate the use of such cost-type contracts. Cost-type

contracts are commonly used where, as in Iraq, urgency and uncertainties do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy

to permit the use of fixed-price contracts.

Indeed, defense auditors have criticized KBR for inadequate cost

estimating and problems with its accounting and documentation

practices. There are a number of outstanding issues concerning

KBR, particularly concerning food service. These types of issues

often arise in the context of cost-type contracts and are part of the

normal contract oversight process. The issues tend to be exacerbated here because of the large amounts of money involved and the

extremely difficult conditions in Iraq.

KBR has told committee staff that they were prepared to answer

all the questions relating to the whistleblowers and other allegations that have been leveled against them through the press or by

congressional critics. These include answering dining facilities

charges, kickback schemes, gasoline subcontracts, and other allegations of overcharging. We look forward to hearing their side of the

story today and taking appropriate questions from Members.

In closing, I want to ask that everyone here, especially my colleagues and the members of the media, stick around and listen to

our third panel witness, Dr. Steven Kelman of Harvard University.

Dr. Kelman is the Weatherhead professor of public management at

the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and the former director of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy in the Clinton administration. He is above the political fray. Dr. Kelman is here to

offer some general observations about our acquisition system and

its operations in a wartime atmosphere in Iraq.

The minority has questioned the contracting activities in Iraq,

and I can think of no better person to testify as to whether or not

our acquisition system and its contract vehicles can do the job in

Iraq. In many ways, Dr. Kelman’s testimony is the most important

here today.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman, I recognize you for an opening statement.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today is the committee’s third hearing this year on Halliburton’s contracts in Iraq, and

I want to begin by commending Chairman Davis for holding this

hearing. The Bush administration is notoriously opposed to oversight, so it has taken independence and a commitment to oversight

for our chairman to agree to hold this hearing. Halliburton holds the two largest contracts in Iraq: a $5.6 billion

contract called LOGCAP, to provide support services to the troops;

and a $2.5 billion contract, called RIO, to restore Iraq’s oil fields.

Yet from the very beginning, these two contracts have been

plagued by mismanagement and inflated billings.

There is an old saying, ‘‘Don’t miss the forest for the trees.’’ But

sometimes the reverse is true. You have to study the individual

trees to really understand the forest. That is why this hearing is

so important. The administration’s approach to the reconstruction

of Iraq is fundamentally flawed. It is a boondoggle that is enriching

a lot of contractors but not accomplishing enough on the ground,

and there is no better window on what is going wrong than Halliburton.

Halliburton is an $8 billion microcosm that symbolizes the administration’s misplaced priorities. Our troops are clamoring for

body armor. But when it comes to Halliburton, GAO has found that

there were no spending limits. Two years ago, the administration

started the drum beat for war by providing Congress and the

American people with misleading information about the threat

posed by Saddam Hussein and his alleged links to al-Qaeda. We

know now that what we were told was unreliable and often wrong,

but we didn’t know enough to correct the mistakes until after the

fact. We can’t let that happen again.

The administration says it has a highly sophisticated plan for rebuilding Iraq, but in fact it is doling out monopoly contracts worth

millions to private contractors, squashing competition that could

discipline prices, and paying millions of dollars to so-called oversight contractors who are the business partners of the very companies they are supposed to be monitoring. We know this is occurring,

but where is the outrage? This committee is investigating, but no

one else is, and no legislation is moving to fix these problems.

Yesterday, Mr. Dingell and I released two reports about

Halliburton’s contracts. This is what they reveal. Halliburton is

gouging the taxpayers. And aside from the independent auditors at

the Defense Contract Audit Agency, the Bush administration

doesn’t seem to care. The whole justification for hiring private contractors and private companies like Halliburton is that the companies can save the taxpayers money. But Halliburton has turned

this principle on its head.

In April, a government agency took over the responsibility of importing gasoline into Iraq. My staff’s investigation revealed the

agency is now doing this job at a fraction of what Halliburton

charged. Here is one example, which is illustrated by a chart over

to the left.

Both Halliburton and the Defense Energy Support Center used

the same company, Altanmia, to import gasoline from Kuwait into

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Iraq, but Halliburton billed $1.30 in transportation charges for

every gallon trucked across the border while the Defense Energy

Support Center is paying just 42 cents per gallon, less than onethird of the price.

The GAO report released yesterday is a top-to-bottom indictment

of how the administration has mismanaged Halliburton’s LOGCAP

contract. The GAO found that the administration’s planning was

‘‘ineffective and piecemeal;’’ that there were no spending limits for

LOGCAP until spring 2004; that ‘‘It is difficult to know how much

the contractor has actually spent;’’ and that the military officials

responsible for oversight had ‘‘little or no training.’’

Here is a telling fact. We know from last month’s hearing that

the administration started to plan for taking control of Iraq’s oil

fields in the summer of 2002, months before the war began, yet

GAO’s report reveals that there was no contingency planning for

feeding and housing our troops until May 2003, after the fall of

Saddam. Those are not the priorities of most Americans.

Today, we are going to hear from a panel of former Halliburton

employees. They will describe their firsthand experiences working

for Halliburton in Iraq and the instances of waste, theft, and mismanagement they personally witnessed. It is not easy to come before a congressional committee and blow the whistle on these kinds

of abuses, and I want to commend them for their candor and their

patriotism for appearing here today.

What they will say to us in their testimony in a few minutes is

not the first indication that waste is going on. They are telling us

from the inside perspective what we have seen from an outside perspective from three different audit agencies, the DCAA, the CPA IG

and the GAO. Now, those are letters, but the Defense Contract

Audit Agency works in the Pentagon, the Coalition Provisional Authority is the organization that was running the government in

Iraq, now more behind the scenes, and their Inspector General has

told us the same thing, as has the General Accounting Office. All

three audit agencies have told us Halliburton is wasting our

money. They have told us from their outside review. The witnesses,

who are whistleblowers, are going to tell us from their insider perspective. They are not telling us something new, they are just telling us something from a different perspective.

And for the first time Halliburton officials will testify before Congress, and I especially welcome their participation. There can be

two sides to every story, and I look forward to learning

Halliburton’s side of this one.

But let me contrast the fact that the witnesses who are whistleblowers were not allowed to testify before, because the majority

wanted to talk to them at length to review what they had to say

and also to try to find any evidence they could to try to discredit

them. Well, I suppose that is not politics. But Halliburton witnesses were not open to any substantive review by our staff in advance and we are not complaining about that. Witnesses who have

something to say ought to come forward, we ought to hear their

testimony, and we ought to be able to ask them questions. And

sometimes the questions—to get out the truth—are going to be hostile or adversarial. But I wanted to just compare the two panels of

witnesses that we have today.

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I want to conclude by addressing the role of the Vice President

and the allegations that the attention and criticism Halliburton

has received is politically motivated. My focus and my concern has

been for the U.S. taxpayer. We are spending tens of billions of dollars in Iraq, and the company with the two largest contracts is Halliburton. If you want to know whether the taxpayers’ interests are

being protected, you have to follow the money, and in this case the

money leads to Halliburton.

Last September, Vice President Cheney appeared on national television and said ‘‘I have absolutely no knowledge of, in any way,

shape, or form, of contracts let by the Corps of Engineers or anybody else in government.’’ Senior government officials assured the

public that Halliburton’s no-bid contract was done by career civil

servants.

Well, I accepted those assurances at face value, and many Americans did also. But we now know those assurances were false. The

decision to give Halliburton the sole-source Iraq oil work was made

by a political appointee, not career procurement officials, and the

Vice President’s chief of staff received an extensive briefing. These

revelations fundamentally change our oversight responsibilities.

A shrewd politician once said, ‘‘Fool me once, shame on you. Fool

me twice, shame on me.’’ We’ve been fooled once by the White

House about the role of the Vice President and political appointees

in the Halliburton contract. Now we need to investigate to learn

the full story.

Today, we will take another step forward, and a big one, in our

oversight of contracting in Iraq. And I commend the chairman for

holding this hearing and look forward to working with him as our

investigative efforts continue.

I also want to ask, Mr. Chairman, that the reports that Mr. Dingell and I released yesterday be made a part of the hearing record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We will be happy to make it part of the

record, but just make it clear that these are minority views. Be

happy to include it as part of your statement.

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes, as part of our statements, we will include the

report.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have completed my opening statement, but I want to bring to the attention of the members of the

committee a motion that I am going to make for a subpoena.

Since March 2003, administration officials have repeatedly said

there are absolutely no contacts between the Vice President’s Office

and the Pentagon regarding Halliburton’s November 2002 task

order to develop a contingency plan for Iraq’s oil infrastructure and

its March 2003 no-bid contract to implement that plan. Administration officials also have consistently said that career civil servants

were responsible for choosing Halliburton to conduct the planning

and oil infrastructure work.

My motion that is before us—and maybe you want to report it

so it is before the body, and I can then continue with my opening

statement—is a request for a subpoena.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The motion offered by the gentleman from

California is in order under House Rule XI clause 2(k)(6). Mr. Waxman and I have talked about this prior. We talked about it yesterday and today. That rule states that the chairman shall receive

and the committee shall dispense with requests to subpoena additional witnesses. Pursuant to that rule, the chairman may determine the timing of the consideration of such request.

At this time, the motion shall be considered as entered, and the

committee will consider the motion offered by the gentleman from

California today.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. If we want to try to set a time certain, Mr.

Waxman, here at the conclusion of the third hearing?

Mr. WAXMAN. I will leave it to the discretion of the Chair to determine a time certain, so long as it is fairly noticed to all Members

on each side of the aisle.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me say 2 p.m. We should be through

with the third panel, and we will have Members here for a vote at

2 p.m. on Mr. Waxman’s motion.

Mr. Waxman, you may address it, and then I’ll address it, and

we can then move on to our witnesses.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I want to play a video excerpt from

a hearing we had in March. On this tape you will hear Chairman

Davis ask each witness whether there were any contacts with any

person in the Vice President’s Office before any Halliburton contract was issued.

Could we have that videotape?

[Videotape shown.]

Mr. WAXMAN. The facts, however, depict a very different set of

circumstances. We now know that the Vice President’s Office had

contacts with the Defense Department in October 2002, prior to the

award of the contingency planning task order, and in March 2003,

prior to the award of the sole- source contract.

Vice President Cheney’s chief of staff, Scooter Libby, was briefed

about the proposal to issue the November 11 task order to Halliburton and was given the opportunity to object. According to a Pentagon e-mail and the author of that e-mail, the Defense Department also coordinated with the Vice President’s office in March

2003 before the award of the sole-source contract to Halliburton.

So while the administration said for months that there were no

contacts between the Pentagon and the Vice President’s Office, we

now know that there were contacts on at least two occasions. We

also know that a political appointee, Michael Mobbs, not career

civil servants, made the decision to award the task order to Halliburton, knowing that the company that did the planning would receive a sole-source contract to implement the plan.

Mr. MCHUGH. Would the distinguished ranking member yield?

Mr. WAXMAN. No, I won’t at this point.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let him finish his statement first.

Mr. WAXMAN. The claims of the administration that the Vice

President’s Office knew nothing about Halliburton’s contracts have

been contradicted by the facts. That is why it is essential for the

administration to disclose all contacts between the Vice President’s

Office and the Defense Department relating to these contracts.

Mr. Chairman, at the last Iraq contracting hearing, I moved to

subpoena these documents. After you agreed to consider a joint request, I withdrew that motion. You have since notified me that you

will not join me in a joint request. Given the importance of these

documents, I am left with no choice but to renew my motion to subpoena them.

Mr. Chairman, I am not claiming the Vice President exerted inappropriate influence over the award of these contracts. We don’t

have enough information at this point to answer that question. The

point is that the administration has repeatedly asserted that there

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fice regarding Halliburton contracts. The Vice President himself

said this. We now have clear statements that this is not true. We

have the right to know, and I think the duty to know, the extent

of those contacts.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Mr. Waxman, let me just add

that where we agreed to issue subpoenas did not include the Vice

President. Those were on previous issues we had talked about. I

just said I would look at this and work with you.

But, look, over the past year, I have tried to establish a reasonable strike zone on this issue. This is our fourth hearing. We have

jointly requested and received thousands of pages of documents

and participated in dozens of joint briefings. But the minority, led

by the ranking member and his staff, keep trying to stretch the

strike zone and make it wider and wider and wider, and there

comes a time where we have to say we are not going to let it go

any further. And this is an attempt, in my opinion, to embarrass

the Vice President in an election season.

The Washington Post article by Dana Milbank said, ‘‘There is

seemingly no charge the Bush campaign can level against John F.

Kerry that will not produce a one-word retort: Halliburton. Kerry’s

proposed tax increases? Halliburton. Kerry’s vote against Iraq war

spending? Halliburton. Kerry’s anti-terrorism credentials? Halliburton. Kerry’s ties to Hollywood liberals? Halliburton, Halliburton, Halliburton. Halliburton, said Kerry’s spokesman, Chad

Clanton, will always be the fire Dick Cheney can’t put out. That

is certainly the Democrats’ hope as they try to portray the oil services company once run by Vice President Cheney as a metaphor for

all things anti-Bush. When Cheney spoke about health care in Toledo, Kerry forces held a counter rally saying ‘health care, not Halliburton.’ ’’ And it goes on and on and on.

We have already received the most important and relevant information on this question at two hearings and a joint briefing that

no influence was exerted by the Vice President’s Office on a decision to award the RIO contract and task order, and that the decision was made by career acquisition personnel. The Vice President’s Office may have been notified the contract was coming, as

our congressional offices are when there is a contract awarded in

our districts. These assurances that there was no improper communication were given under oath. If I were to agree with this motion,

I am fearful the minority’s witch-hunt would continue.

When Mr. Mobbs spoke to staff, not under oath by the way, the

minority heard what it wanted to hear. I don’t see his statement

that White House staff in a pro forma fashion received notice of an

imminent award as amounting to a hill of beans. The question is

one of efforts to exert influence, and there is no evidence that there

was any effort to exert influence.

So I understand you have the right to ask for a subpoena. We

all understand the election season is upon us, and I think we will

schedule a vote for 2 p.m., if that is convenient with Members here,

so Members can be here and can vote appropriately on it. And we

will postpone the vote until that time.

Thank you. Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I might just respond briefly.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Sure, please.

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Mr. WAXMAN. Briefly. I just want to point out the reason I

showed the tape is that the first time in any of the hearings that

the question of the Vice President came up is when you asked each

of the witnesses, under oath, whether they knew of or had any contact, or their office had any contact with the Vice President, each

witness answered your question under oath in the negative. Now

we have information to the contrary, from an interview we had

with a political appointee at the Department of Defense that shows

a contradiction of the facts.

I have not heard you deny any of the facts that we have put forward. You have only suggested that it is political. Well, I think

asking these questions is our responsibility. It is our responsibility

to get to the truth, even if it might be embarrassing. And I don’t

know if it will be. But it is our responsibility to get to the truth,

to do the oversight that is necessary, and that is why I think the

subpoena ought to be issued, since we are not jointly requesting it

nor are they volunteering to give us the information to clarify the

record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I just don’t see any ambiguity here. The

Vice President’s Office may have been notified that a contract was

forthcoming, which routinely happens to executive branch personnel and certainly to Members of Congress, but in no way is there

any indication that there was any influence. And I take the people

who testify here under oath, who are career Federal employees, at

their word. So I am going to oppose the subpoena, but the committee will have an opportunity to vote on that today at 2 p.m.

And thank you, Mr. Waxman.

We are now ready to move to our first panel. We have four scheduled witnesses, I see three are hear, so if you would rise with me.

Mr. James Warren is a former truck driver for KBR; Mr. David

Wilson, who is a former truck driver for KBR; and Ms. Marie

deYoung, who is a former logistics specialist at KBR.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, may I make an inquiry please?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. West is not here, and I had questions for him.

Is he going to be here, do you know?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let me ask the minority. He is a minority

witness. Is Mr. West——

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, we don’t know why he’s not here.

Maybe he’ll still——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We don’t know. If he comes in, we will

swear him at the appropriate point.

I would say for Mr. Waxman, that to come before a committee

and face questioning under oath, we appreciate your willingness to

do that.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We have a light down here in front of you

that will be green. Generally, we allow 5 minutes for witnesses. If

you have a written statement, the entire statement will go in the

record and the questions will be based on that. But when the light

turns orange, that means 4 minutes are up. When it turns red, 5

minutes.

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We would appreciate your summarizing, but this is important

testimony, and if you feel you need to go over it I won’t gavel you,

but it just moves things along.

Mr. Waxman and I have also agreed we would have a half-hour

of questioning on each side to be controlled by myself and the ranking member that we will be able to yield out, so that we can get

a continuity of questions instead of going back and forth. Is that

correct, Mr. Waxman?

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Warren, we’ll start with you. Thank

you for being with us.

STATEMENTS OF JAMES WARREN, FORMER TRUCK DRIVER,

KBR; DAVID WILSON, FORMER TRUCK DRIVER, KBR; AND

MARIE DEYOUNG, FORMER LOGISTICS SPECIALIST, KBR

Mr. WARREN. You’re welcome. My name is James Warren. Thank

you for the opportunity to speak with you about my work as a

truck driver in support of our troops in Iraq. I have given a signed

statement to the committee staff. I would like to read a summary

of that statement, and will then answer any questions you may

have.

I worked as a truck driver for Kellogg Brown and Root in Iraq

from October 2003 to the end of March 2004. Before coming to Iraq,

I worked as a truck driver for 13 years. For 11 years I worked for

private trucking companies, including Builders Transport, Cal-Ark

International, and Truck Service Inc.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Warren, would you pull the mic a little closer

to you? Some of the Members are having a hard time hearing.

Thanks.

Mr. WARREN. For 2 years I worked as an independent truck driver. During my time in Iraq, KBR didn’t seem to care about what

happened to its trucks. KBR bought its trucks new, usually Mercedes or Volvos, with virtually no mileage on the odometers.

KBR removed the spare tires from the trucks on my convoys. I

don’t know why they did this, but one convoy, one of the trucks got

a flat tire. Since we didn’t have any spares, we had to leave the

truck on the side of the road. As someone who has been in trucking

for 13 years, I do not understand how a company could ditch a

brand-new truck because they didn’t have a spare tire. No trucker

I know would have been that careless with his own truck.

For the first 4 months I was in Iraq, it was common to torch

trucks that we abandoned. The Army torched the trucks, even

though we all carried chains and could have towed them to be repaired.

Basic maintenance was nonexistent. The only maintenance I saw

done was changing tires and some electrical work. The biggest

problem was that KBR provided no air filters, fuel filters, or oil

changes for these trucks. Especially in Iraq, these trucks should

have been getting replacement filters and oil changes on a regular

basis.

By the time I left Iraq, about 6 months later, the truck assigned

to me had 59,000 miles on it and never got a single oil change. The

joke from one of the two or three mechanics we saw working out

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of the Conex container, was ‘‘We may not have any filters, but Iraq

has plenty of oil.’’

On a lot of the convoys there were empty trucks. Normally, convoys had 28 flatbed trucks. There were plenty of times we would

run with seven, eight, or even a dozen empty trucks. Sometimes we

had to carry equipment and supplies out of Camp Anaconda. We

called this retro. We would also have empty trucks both coming

and going, which didn’t make any sense. One time there were 27

empty trucks in one convoy. It just didn’t seem like there was good

planning about where things were going and when. This was a

major waste of time and money, and it put us and our military escorts in danger for absolutely no reason. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Warren follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. My name is David Wilson. I appreciate the invitation to this committee to speak about my experience working as a

truck driver in support of our Armed Forces in Iraq. Last month,

I gave a signed statement about this experience to the committee’s

staff. Today, I will give a summary of that statement and answer

any questions that you may have.

I was an alternate convoy commander and a convoy commander

for Kellogg Brown and Root [KBR], in Iraq from November 2003

until March 2004. I arrived in Kuwait at the end of October and

went to work in Iraq the first week of November as part of KBR’s

sustainer mission, delivering supplies within Iraq under its

LOGCAP contract with the military.

I ran over 100 missions during my employment with KBR. While

I was in Iraq, I saw problems with KBR’s mission. In my opinion,

the company did not adequately plan how they were going to do

this job. I arrived in Iraq 6 months after the war and they still did

not have the right personnel and equipment in place.

KBR ran two convoys each day, each in a different direction. The

convoys usually had 28 trucks with trailers and two bobtails. These

trucks were used for recovery, and they went from Camp Cedar II

in southern Iraq to Camp Anaconda, 300 miles to the north above

Baghdad. We also stopped at Camp Scania, which is a mid-point

station between Cedar II and Anaconda. The problem with having

only two crews was that if one had problems, there would be nobody there to pick up the sustainer the next day.

When I arrived at Camp Arafjan—we called it Truckville—in Kuwait last November, I noticed there were about 50 to 100 brandnew trucks sitting there unused. I was told that KBR brought

these trucks into Kuwait to use in the convoys. Five months later,

when I came home, a large number of trucks were still there, not

being used. These are $85,000 or more Mercedes and Volvo trucks

that are marked KBR-owned assets. I have been told that KBR

could not get the right tags to license the vehicles to do business

in Kuwait. I don’t know if KBR billed the U.S. Government for

these trucks, but they were not used for a third or fourth crew on

the Cedar to Anaconda sustainer convoys.

As every other trucker working on these convoys will tell you,

KBR had virtually no facilities in place to do maintenance on the

trucks. It was like their whole preparation was to buy the trucks,

hire the drivers, and let the rest take care of itself. There were absolutely no oil filters or fuel filters for months on end. I begged for

filters but never got any. I was told that oil changes were out of

the question. The lack of maintenance was a major problem for

trucks doing daily runs on Iraqi highways.

In addition to being the convoy commander, I also drove a truck.

During one convoy, my truck shut down because my fuel filter was

completely clogged. Luckily, we were at the mid-point station at

Camp Scania, and I got an Army bobtail to pull me inside the barriers. At that point, I borrowed a fuel filter wrench from a local

Iraqi and I removed the fuel filter myself. I ran gasoline through

it to clear it out, and then I found some ether to clear it out further. I learned this from my years in trucking. At any rate, I was

able to replace the filter and at least get the truck going again. But

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when I got back to Camp Cedar and requested a new fuel filter,

they refused. They said ‘‘Your truck’s running now, isn’t it?’’

I am 100 percent certain that if we had been out on the open

Iraq highway instead of near Camp Scania, we would have lost

that truck, and all because of an $8 fuel filter. I have no idea how

KBR or the military were planning these convoys, or how they

dealt with all the lost equipment and supplies. Basically, all they

were looking for was the number of trucks with freight on them.

A related problem was that KBR would run trucks empty quite

often. Sometimes they would have five empty trucks, sometimes a

dozen. One time we ran 28 trucks and only one had anything on

it. Nobody knew why we were hauling empty trucks around, but

it definitely caused extra wear and tear, which just made maintenance a bigger problem.

Personally, I came under fire myself, including mortar fire, IEDs,

and shrapnel bouncing off my truck, so I know from firsthand experience the dangers. Our convoys had rocks thrown through the

windshields, we had Iraqis attack us on the roads, and in some

cases our drivers were seriously injured. Mike Stroud, one of my

drivers, got hit with IEDs a couple of times and managed to drive

through it. That wasn’t always the case, however. I lost a good

friend of mine, Al Kaden, who got killed driving an SUV for KBR.

In March, my job was terminated. The documents terminating

me stated that this was because of a breach of the business code

of conduct, when supposedly I failed to report vehicles in my convoy that ran Iraqis off the road.

The problem with that was that both KBR and the military made

clear to everyone that was in the convoys that this was what we

were supposed to do. They would say, we can’t tell you to do this,

but just remember that if you get captured, you will be raped, beaten, raped again, and beaten again. So if you need to put vehicles

off the road, that’s what you need to do. Although I never witnessed it, I know trucks ran Iraqis off the road.

Finally, although I was a convoy commander, KBR did not pay

me a convoy commander’s salary, but a regular truck driver’s salary. I don’t have any way of knowing whether KBR billed my time

to the U.S. Government as a truck driver or a convoy commander.

This information basically repeats the information I provided to

the Government Reform Committee on June 2, 2004, when I was

willing to testify, if required. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. deYoung, thanks for being with us.

Ms. DEYOUNG. My name is Marie deYoung. Mr. Chairman and

distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify on issues related to the Halliburton LOGCAP subcontracts department in Kuwait. And, I emphasize, Kuwait not

Iraq.

Since receiving my commission through Officer Candidate School

in 1984, I served more than 10 years in the military as a chief of

services, a commander, a chaplain, and, last, as an operations officer. I attained the rank of captain, and, yes, I published two books

about women in the military. I am currently pursuing a doctorate

in education leadership and public policy analysis.

During my time with Halliburton, I came to the conclusion that

very poor subcontract management practices were evident in every

phase of the company’s work, from the negotiation and drafting of

subcontracts to the oversight of subcontract work and implementation of inventory and property controls, as well as to the management of data, costs, and the proper closure of each subcontract.

As a matter of policy, the Kuwait Document Control Department

made only a few subcontract documents available to operations

management. That’s in the first year. And then only shells, without

specific delivery or performance schedules. Lack of subcontract documentation made it impossible for site supervisors to properly

manage their subcontracts.

After receiving negative publicity about subcontracts, Halliburton

established a Tiger Team to address these problems. When the

Tiger Team examined a subcontract, they just checked to make

sure all the forms were in the file. The Tiger Team looked at subcontracts with no invoices and no confirmation that the products

contracted for were being used. Instead of investigating further,

they often recommended extending the subcontract and, I will add,

adding funds.

At one point, KBR Tiger Team members told us to bring 400 expired subcontracts up to date. The staff was instructed to cut

change orders and requisitions to extend subcontracts without verifying if site managers and subcontract administrators had already

updated the file or determining if equipment or services were still

needed. We were instructed to pay invoices without verifying

whether services were delivered.

I personally told a KBR Tiger Team member not to pay an invoice that I knew was a double billing because I helped set up another subcontract through which the services were properly delivered. The long-term KBR employee told me I didn’t know what I

was doing, and she proceeded to cut a change order and an invoice

payment and authorization for the wrong account, under the prodding of the vendor who had not provided the services.

Halliburton rarely collected adequate information from subcontractors to justify payment of their invoices. When I attempted

to properly verify invoice terms before setting up payment authorization, I was chastised. Management’s intent was to pay the old

accounts as quickly as possible and to close them, because only

open accounts were being audited by the government.

Given these practices, it is not surprising that I observed significant waste and overpricing. Under a subcontract with La Nouvelle,

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a Kuwaiti company, Halliburton was paying a fixed price of between $1 million and $1.2 million per month for laundry for a facility in Kuwait. Because there wasn’t very much laundry to be done,

Halliburton was paying La Nouvelle about $100 a bag for a 15-

pound bag. At the same time, Halliburton was paying $28 per bag

under a separate contract with the same company, and this laundry originated in Iraq, not in Kuwait.

In August 2003, Halliburton entered into another subcontract

with La Nouvelle to provide cans of soda with ice for a hospitality

bar at the same facility in Kuwait. La Nouvelle charged for 37,200

cases of soda per month, at a cost of about $1.50 per case. However, La Nouvelle delivered only 37,200 cans, and the sodas were

just dropped off, without ice or a hospitality bar.

Only after I insisted that there was a problem did the Tiger

Team confirm this overpayment. Meanwhile, Halliburton procurement and Tiger Team staff live at the five star Kempinski Hotel

while the troops in Kuwait live in tents. It costs about $110 to

House one KBR employee per day at the Kempinski while it costs

the Army $1.39 per day to bunk a soldier in a leased tent. The

military requested that Halliburton move into tents, but Halliburton refused.

During my 5 months working on subcontracts in Kuwait, I’ve

tried to correct some of these practices, but the Halliburton corporate culture is one of intimidation and fear, and I would add, as

I experienced this morning, a little bit of ridicule. When I approached my new interim subcontracts manager with concerns

about overbilling and duplicate accounts for the same service, he

fearfully said, I think you are trying to make this company look

bad. When I began to make progress in getting La Nouvelle to revise its invoices downward to reflect actual costs for services provided, La Nouvelle complained to the vice president who headed

the Tiger Team. She had me taken off the La Nouvelle accounts.

I brought my concerns to the Government Reform Committee because it is critical that our troops, and I will add our truck drivers

and other personnel in Iraq who work for KBR—that they receive

the services that they need and deserve. Every dollar that is squandered because of waste, fraud or abuse is a dollar that we do not

have for critical equipment and supplies for our troops.

Mr. Chairman, I’ve prepared additional remarks, including more

detailed knowledge and analysis of the Kuwait LOGCAP project. I

request that you add this statement to the official record of these

proceedings so your committee can in good faith consider this information in its ongoing review of contract operations in Kuwait and

Iraq.

[The prepared statement of Ms. deYoung follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do we have a copy of that additional? We

are happy to look at it. It would be good to have the committee

members look at it so we can ask questions based on that. And

without objection, it will be entered in the record.

Committee staff get that.

Thank you all very much for being here.

Mr. Waxman, we are going to start on our side, and we will take

a half an hour. And I would yield 15 minutes to Mr. Schrock.

Mr. SCHROCK. Thanks to all of our witnesses for being here

today. I am particularly interested in the circumstances surrounding the allegation made about operations of convoys with KBR drivers. Most of my questions will be addressed to Mr. Wilson and Mr.

Warren, and I can see that the both of you have a good deal of time

under your belts driving trucks in the United States; is that correct?

Mr. WARREN. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. Yes.

Mr. SCHROCK. Neither of you is still in the employ of KBR; is

that correct?

Mr. WILSON. That’s correct.

Mr. WARREN. That’s correct.

Mr. SCHROCK. And I believe in both of your cases, Mr. Wilson

and Mr. Warren, your employment was terminated by KBR for violations of their business code and improper behavior in Iraq; is that

correct?

Mr. WILSON. I was terminated for breach of the code of business

conduct.

Mr. WARREN. I couldn’t tell you exactly why I was terminated.

Mr. SCHROCK. Your testimony does not mention it, but am I safe

in saying that both of you in your experience working for KBR, this

is the first time you have ever been in a war zone?

Mr. WARREN. For me, it is.

Mr. WILSON. Yes.

Mr. SCHROCK. In your statements, you both wrote that you believe the practice of Army personnel purposely using incendiary devices destroying trucks that could not keep up with the convoy was

wasteful; is that correct?

Mr. WARREN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. No, sir. I never stated that.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Wilson, I see from your written testimony and

you so state that you personally were in convoys that came under

attack from mortar fire, IEDs and such; and I believe you testified

you and other drivers were injured working for KBR; is that true?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. Iraq is unlike any other driving experience in the

United States?

Mr. WILSON. Similar to New York on occasion.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Wilson, in your testimony you stated you had

a convoy of 28 trucks accompanied by armed military escort vehicles. Am I safe in assuming that all of your convoys were escorted

by uniformed military personnel, heavily armed and responsible for

the security of your convoy during your drives?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir, we had excellent escorts.

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Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Warren, I would imagine your experience with

the convoys would be similar to those of Mr. Wilson; is that correct?

Mr. WARREN. That’s correct.

Mr. SCHROCK. I was privileged to spend 24 years in uniform, including time in Vietnam, and I have been a close observer of this

war and of every major conflict this country has been engaged in

for the last 30 years.

My assessment would be that convoys such as the ones that you

participated in are safer when they are moving forward as a single

unit, presenting a more difficult target and able to be secured by

your military escorts as a single unit. Would you gentlemen agree

with that?

Mr. WILSON. I would agree with it to an extent. The size of the

convoy in the situations has a lot to do with it. Our number of escorts was limited. We had, on the average, three to four vehicles

with armed personnel in them at one time—a 28 truck convoy. I

am sure, if you have been in that situation, it stretches quite a distance.

Mr. SCHROCK. But did you feel safer when you were moving than

when you were standing still?

Mr. WILSON. Depending on the area we were in. Generally we

felt safer moving.

Mr. SCHROCK. As a member of the Armed Services Committee

and former military officer myself, I cannot imagine a situation in

which a military commander anywhere would require a security detachment assigned to protect a convoy to place either the civilian

contract drivers under his charge or his military personnel in danger if he believed that the environment was too dangerous to halt

the entire convoy while maintenance was performed on a disabled

vehicle, can you?

Mr. WILSON. Sir, that is not the way we did that. If we had a

vehicle with a problem, say the vehicle was in 15th position in the

convoy and the vehicle had a problem in that position, that vehicle

would pull off to the side of the road, a military escort would immediately go to that vehicle. I would take the rest of the convoy and

continue up the road until my escort, who was generally the

NCOIC, would determine that we were in a safe enough location

that we could go into a box formation and stop and wait for them

to decide if they were going to be able to recover that vehicle or

they were going to have to abandon it.

Mr. SCHROCK. Do you agree with that?

Mr. WARREN. Yes.

Mr. SCHROCK. I believe the loss of a relatively expensive truck

in Iraq is certainly unfortunate and certainly wasteful. We are

going to explore the maintenance practices more extensively with

the second panel. However, I would not trade a single truck in Iraq

for the life of either an American civilian or a soldier. And as a

military commander, I would certainly not endanger an entire convoy of trucks, their drivers or other military personnel under my

command, if I believed that the threat from insurgents precluded

recovering that vehicle.

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Do you believe that perhaps when you witnessed trucks being

purposely destroyed, it was because the Army believed it was

tactically necessary to do so?

Mr. WARREN. In my opinion, I don’t think it was necessary to do

so. Maybe the Army or KBR.

Mr. SCHROCK. Were you in on the military planning to make this

decision?

Mr. WARREN. No, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. I don’t know of any instance in which the Army

took it upon themselves to destroy a KBR asset. Every instance

that I am aware of when that happened, the NCOIC talked to the

convoy commander; and we did work closely together, and we made

decisions together.

Mr. SCHROCK. You think they maybe took that action because it

was in the best interest of the convoy and your best interest to protect your lives and the lives of the soldiers who were assigned to

you all?

Mr. WILSON. As far as destroying the trucks that were left? No,

sir, that wasn’t the intent on destroying the trucks. The intent in

destroying those vehicles was so that there would be nothing left

for the Iraqis to use against us. People would come out of the

sand—we would call them the ‘‘sand people’’—when we had a truck

break down like that, wearing their native garb, and you would

never see any tools or anything like that.

By the time we would leave, I would have NCOIC tell me they

were thugs.

Mr. SCHROCK. So what I hear you saying is, destroying it might

prevent the enemy from taking parts of the chassis, for instance,

for their use?

Mr. WILSON. I didn’t consider them the enemy. They were civilians.

Mr. SCHROCK. If you can figure out what civilian is an enemy

and which one is not an enemy, we need you up here to help us

with that. I don’t know how anybody could control that.

Mr. WILSON. That wasn’t my job. That was the Army.

Mr. SCHROCK. They were the ones who were making the decisions.

Don’t you think it is a little capricious for us to sit here in this

air-conditioned room questioning the tactical decisions of our military personnel charged with protecting lives in Iraq. I believe your life is worth far more than $85,000 as well as

every single life of every American in Iraq. Do you agree with that

assessment.

Mr. WILSON. I agree with you.

Mr. WARREN. I agree.

Mr. SCHROCK. Perhaps there is a little more to this situation

than there would be had these trucks been driving down some big

interstate in California and Texas; don’t you agree?

Mr. WARREN. Much different.

Mr. SCHROCK. No pun intended, but I want to shift gears here

for a second. In your written testimony, you both stated that running convoys with some empty trucks was wasteful and inappropriate, or the convoys would sometimes arrive at the scheduled locaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00397 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion to find that the unit they expected to be there was gone. Is

that true?

Mr. WILSON. We didn’t necessarily discover they were gone. We

were told that was the reason we were hauling retro back from Anaconda to Cedar II to later be transported back to Kuwait. A lot

of times this was new material and a lot of times it was used-up

material, was the way they referred to it.

We just generally questioned at one time why we were taking

new equipment back to Kuwait, and we were told that it was considered retro and the reason that happened is maybe the unit that

had ordered had rotated out.

Mr. SCHROCK. Let me state again, as I understand your responsibilities in Iraq, I believe you were hired to drive trucks in a military convoy, correct?

Mr. WILSON. Correct.

Mr. WARREN. That’s right.

Mr. SCHROCK. So you did not participate in the decisions on what

needed to be transported on a given day or where it needed to go?

Mr. WARREN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. That’s correct.

Mr. SCHROCK. I would surmise the military commanders with

greater situational awareness knew what each individual unit

needed and where they needed it and they made those decisions.

After all, they were plugged in to the military command structure

and were responsible for deploying and equipping military units in

Iraq as well as for the security of those units.

Deciding how to fight the war was the military’s responsibility,

not yours; is that correct?

Mr. WILSON. Absolutely right.

Mr. WARREN. Uh-huh.

Mr. SCHROCK. That is what I thought.

Is it conceivable to think that perhaps in that situation, a military commander with a job to do, a mission to complete, might

have made a judgment that it was more important to have those

trucks available at point A so they could move supplies, even if

they had to come from point B without carrying any cargo on

them? Isn’t that a possibility?

Mr. WILSON. That is one possibility, yes, sir.

Mr. WARREN. I would agree. I am not in charge of the logistics

and stuff like that. I don’t know why they do stuff like that.

Mr. SCHROCK. Do you think it was possible that a unit may have

to pick up and leave on short notice because they had received military tasking and leave without waiting for your supplies to arrive?

Is that a possibility in a war zone?

Mr. WILSON. Yes.

Mr. WARREN. Possibly.

Mr. SCHROCK. Did you think that perhaps those trucks had to

run empty for a reason because when you were engaged with insurgents in a fast-moving, fluid environment like the war we have in

Iraq, sometimes the logistics and the judgment of the truck drivers

have to take second place to the mission of the military units that

you were supplying?

Mr. WILSON. As far as the number of trucks?

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Mr. SCHROCK. That the military requirements for what they do

with those trucks take precedence over what the truck drivers

might think needs to be done.

Mr. WARREN. Sure.

Mr. WILSON. Sure.

Mr. SCHROCK. Very different than driving on our highways

around here, I can assure you.

You both mentioned theft of supplies from the convoys. Is it safe

to say that the majority of this occurred when the trucks were in

Army camps during the evenings?

Mr. WARREN. The stealing was going on in Army camps, and

while en route to Army camps. Both instances.

Mr. WILSON. It happened in staging lanes at the Army camps as

well as on the road.

Mr. SCHROCK. Did either of you witness this theft either on the

road or in the camps at night?

Mr. WARREN. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. Did either of you participate in that theft at any

time?

Mr. WARREN. No, sir.

Mr. WILSON. No, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. Of course, I certainly cannot endorse the unauthorized removal of supplies from military convoys by U.S. military

personnel, but the experience I had in Vietnam, I can tell you that

I believe that this is a fact of military life in a wartime environment since the dawn of time. When I was in Vietnam we called it

comsho.

If troops saw parts that they needed and they were in the staging area and they needed to put the equipment back together, they

took it. They didn’t take it for their own benefit, but for the folks

they were trying to protect and to defeat the enemy. And we must

do all we can to limit this.

However, I just wanted to clarify with both of you, gentlemen,

that you were hired to drive trucks and that was your responsibility and KBR’s responsibility and that did not include management

of the inventory you were assigned to haul nor were you or KBR,

to the best of your knowledge, responsible for the purchase, delivery or receipt of this cargo. You just drove the trucks.

Mr. WARREN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. I made that statement in my statement.

Mr. SCHROCK. Mr. Wilson, you testified you did not have any details about what you were carrying in the truck. Could that be because, in fact, you were not responsible for the cargo manifest, that

the control of the inventory was the responsibility of the Army and

not yours?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. I would think that the reason that you as a KBR

employee or KBR as a company, for that matter, was not charged

with security is the same reason that you were not charged with

fighting the war, because you did not have the training or the tools

to do that. And gentlemen, you both took issue with the decision

to not containerize most of the shipments on the trucks that were

military—that the commanders and the logistics officers——

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Mr. WARREN. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. Yes.

Mr. SCHROCK. The way I understand the situation, you and your

colleagues were hired to drive trucks under the command of our

military personnel, under the security they provide, so our troops

could carry rifles and do the jobs they were trained to do?

Mr. WARREN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. That’s correct.

Mr. SCHROCK. I believe we will hear testimony shortly from the

second panel that the Army required that open, flatbed containers

be used to facilitate easy loading and unloading and there is certainly a reason for everything.

Now Mr. Wilson, Mr. Warren, as we briefly discussed earlier,

both of you were terminated for cause by KBR. May I ask, do you

know the exact details of why you were terminated?

Mr. WARREN. In my instance, I don’t know why I was terminated. What happened was, I was—I had made a phone call with

Mr. Harl one evening, I believe it was in mid-March or the first

part of March, somewhere around that timeframe. I spoke to him

on the phone, and I was telling him about—that I felt like I was

being pushed out the door, like—and I wanted a fair hearing, you

know, to present my case.

And what happened was, security wanted to talk to me about

running people off the roads in convoys and I would not disclose

the names of who was doing that. And I was transferred to Kuwait,

and I stayed in Kuwait for a period of approximately 2 weeks; and

after 2 weeks, I was terminated. And I was told to sign some paperwork by the KBR, and I refused to sign them; and they would

not tell me why I was terminated because I did not cooperate with

them in the termination process.

Mr. SCHROCK. I believe my time has expired.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mrs. Blackburn.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. deYoung, I will come to you first. And I would like to ask

you some questions specifically about your background and work

product, since many of your allegations and conclusions seem to

draw from what you claim is expertise in government contracting

and procurement and subcontract administration.

Your resume, which I am going to ask the Chair to enter into the

record, lists your last employment at Camp Bondsteel Kosovo.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. From what you have written on your resume,

you were an administrative assistant there; and your two previous

jobs were as musical director for elementary, junior and high school

bands. And your work with our Lady of the Lake University, you

designed brochures, a Web site and a newsletter. And prior to that,

you describe your experience as a chaplain.

Your resume does not indicate that you are a specialist in procurement or contracting, although the closest you come to procurement expertise seems as a shopkeeper over 20 years ago. You have

never been a contracting officer or a contract specialist, have you?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I do not claim to be a contracting specialist. I said

I was a logistics specialist. I base my testimony on firsthand documentation and documents.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. You have never been a procurement specialist?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I was asked by the manager, who was the president of the Contract Management Association, to be his assistant

in subcontracts. And he, ‘‘favored my tough investigative skills to

help him get the truth about the subcontracts.’’

Mrs. BLACKBURN. You might have received some logistics training in a correspondence quartermaster course while you were in

the Army. I don’t believe you have ever received any extensive formal training in government contracts.

Ms. DEYOUNG. On-the-job training there and also—and Congresswoman, also you are leaving out part of my resume. I managed a

government grant, $213,000, Federal grant that President Bush

awarded to my Center for Women. It was a government contract.

I managed grants for the Army. I managed construction for the Army in 1984. I helped build the child development center, a $1

million project, and renovate——

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Even though you have had some experience

with contracts as part of your other work experience, isn’t it true

that you don’t have the expertise that a contracting officer, contracting specialist or an auditor would have? Is that correct?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Congresswoman, half of the people in the subcontracts department have not been certified. And a subcontract

specialist——

Mrs. BLACKBURN. You are not answering the question that I am

asking.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Am I certified auditor, no. And I never claimed to

be, ma’am.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. In your statement posted on the minority’s

Web site, you explained that your position was a writer, logistics

center writer for operations and briefings. Being a writer seems to

be something supported by your resume and your work experience.

And it seems logical that a writer would write reports on various

subjects.

The job you were hired for was not to buy products and services

for Halliburton or KBR or act as a procurement officer or subcontracts administrator, was it?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I was hired to do logistics on the operations side.

They moved me to subcontracts because of the audits, to help the

managers to prepare for audits, because they, ‘‘needed the help desperately.’’

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Mrs. BLACKBURN. You make multiple allegations regarding

KBR’s Tiger Team. Are you aware of Tiger Team’s recommendations and how they were implemented?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Which recommendations? I describe specific accounts, and I provided documentation to the committee of specific

accounts where recommendations—for example, one contract, No.

23, the recommendation was to add money, extend the subcontract

even though the Tiger Team member said, there are no invoices in

there, that nothing has been paid. On specific accounts, recommendations were made without any research to add money, to

pay bills, and there was no evidence that the services had been

provided.

There was no investigation.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Ma’am, are you aware of the recommendations

the team made and how those were implemented? Yes or no? Are

you aware of the Tiger Team’s recommendations that were made

and how those were implemented, yes or no?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I did not see implementation.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you. When companies notice a problem

in a particular area and when companies notice there is a problem

in a particular area of operations, they might send a team of experts to try to solve that problem. And you allege that Halliburton

and KBR lacked adequate subcontract documentation.

So could that not be the reason that they sent the Tiger Team

in there to try to fix that?

Ms. DEYOUNG. The experts were not looking for documentation.

All they did was go down checklists to see if a form had been

signed. They were not matching invoices with records of inventory.

They were not matching invoices with records of services being provided. And that, to me, was inadequate supervision. And both the

GAO and DCMA and DCAA were complaining about that.

I am a corroborating firsthand witness who observed that.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. We understand that in February 2004, you

were—you asked to be reassigned to the procurement department.

Ms. DEYOUNG. No, ma’am. I requested to go to Iraq to be on the

operations side of the house.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Isn’t it true you were turned down for the position because you had no procurement experience? And, further,

isn’t it true when the company asked you questions about basic

subcontracts administration, such as the difference between a subcontract and a purchase order, you were unable to answer them

and you ultimately agreed that you were unqualified for the position?

Instead, we are going to hear that you were given an administrative job of helping the subcontracts administrator gather documents and information. You were never given the title of subcontracts administrator, were you?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I did not ask to go to the contracts department;

I was put there. I wanted to go to Iraq to be in logistics, which is

my specialty. The reason I was put there was because I, ‘‘had the

ability to fix problems’’ as I had done with subcontracts out at

Camp Udairi. I did not ask to go there. I had asked to be assigned

in Iraq in logistics.

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Mrs. BLACKBURN. You were never given signature authority over

any contracts, right?

Ms. DEYOUNG. No, I was not. But I was asked to monitor and

correct problems, to create ITFs and cut change orders and to prepare reports for the manager.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Let’s go specifically to one of your major allegations, which concerns contractors staying in very nice hotels. And

you have this on your supplemental statement.

Many members of this committee have been to Kuwait and I, for

one, have noticed that the hotels are of nice quality with good

amenities. It is my understanding that KBR requested that the

military provide lodging for its employees at Camp Arafjan in the

tents, but we are told there was no room.

I expect the witnesses will also testify that it was KBR’s intention to have the company employees lodging in a central location

for security reasons, very obvious security reasons, as well as for

logistical reasons. Most employees actually worked at the camp and

required transportation there from their hotels.

Were you aware that employees were sometimes housed three,

four and five to a room?

Ms. DEYOUNG. The hotels that I described, they were housed one

to a room unless there were social relations going on.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Are you aware that sometimes they were

housed three, four, five to a room?

Ms. DEYOUNG. When you say room, a room—they are villas. And

in those hotels that I——

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I have a copy of the contract with me, and I

understand that testimony from KBR will corroborate this. And I

can see that without having access to the entirety of this information regarding KBR’s housing options, a person might think that

the employees were taking the government for a ride.

Ms. deYoung, would you agree if what I told you about KBR’s option for housing is true, employees staying in centralized hotels

might actually be the most fiscally responsible and secure arrangement for the circumstances in which they were working?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Army officers and managers of the project were

communicating in March that the Army had asked them to move

into tents, not to build a man camp, not to continue the hotels. And

retired General Peterson had meetings. I was sitting adjacent to

the courtyard where all of the managers came and these meetings

were discussed.

Various managers continually repeated——

Mrs. BLACKBURN. That is not the information I asked for, and I

am going to ask that we put a copy of the subcontract into the

record.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Without objection.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. In the written and oral testimony you have

provided for the committee, you state that it cost $110 to house one

KBR employee per day at the Kempinski Hotel. You provided,

through the minority, a copy of what seems to be the subcontract

between KBR and the Kempinski Hotel, and I will enter those

records so we have that.

And looking at the subcontract, it seems that the hotel rooms

were priced per room and not per employee. And as I said before,

the committee expects to hear testimony later in the hearing stating that as many as five people stayed in the rooms.

Would you agree that if the rooms were charged per night regardless of the number of occupants and that several employees

shared many rooms, that your cost estimate would be high?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I would ask that you have line-for-line documentation of every instance where they were paying for ‘‘five persons per room.’’ They were five per villa.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. I would like you to answer the questions as

they are asked.

Ms. DEYOUNG. If that was true, I would say yes, but it is not

true.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Let’s talk about soft drinks.

Your second allegation concerns wasteful spending on a contract

to provide our soldiers with soda. You allege that a subcontractor

charged KBR for 37,200 cases of soda per month at $1.50 per case

and delivered 37,200 cans of soda instead. You believe that KBR

failed to maintain adequate quality control over the goods and

services it was receiving from subcontractors; isn’t that correct?

Ms. DEYOUNG. That is correct.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. It is my understanding after reviewing the

subcontract, and I am not an expert in contracting, that the subcontract did not specifically call for cases or even cans of soda. The

subcontract seems to indicate that the subcontractor, La Nouvelle,

was required to provide up to 1,000 soldiers per day with a bag

that contained two cans of soda, 2 pounds of ice and nonglass cups.

Given what the subcontract provides, how did you arrive at $1.50

per case versus the $1.50 per can prices?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I arrived at that by taking the logs which you

have in your records and doing the math.

Now, as I pointed out, if the contract had been done according

to the terms, the payment was still inflated by two to three times

what it should have been. You have the logs, and if you compare

the logs to the actual statement, you can see. Anybody who has

done—I have been a restaurant manager.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. ‘‘Cases’’ is not mentioned anywhere on this,

and I understand that KBR was still unsatisfied with La Nouvelle’s

performance of the subcontract. And I expect we are going to hear

testimony from the second panel that KBR suspended further payment and withheld over $110,000 in payments on this specific soda

contract.

Now, you have already said that you did not believe that KBR

was keeping its subcontractors accountable, correct?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I’m sorry?

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Mrs. BLACKBURN. You said you did not think that KBR was

keeping its subcontractors accountable?

Ms. DEYOUNG. That is a fact.

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Wouldn’t you agree that if, in fact, KBR withheld payment from La Nouvelle as a result of La Nouvelle’s incomplete performance on the contract that KBR was, in fact, ensuring

that money wasn’t being wasted for services that were not received?

Ms. DEYOUNG. When I brought that contract to the investigating

team, I was ridiculed for an extended period of time; and after a

week, when I persisted and insisted that this was just one example

of how——

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Would you agree that the money was withheld?

Ms. DEYOUNG. The 4 months that I brought to them were paid.

I have no knowledge—until the day that I left, until the testimony

was made public, I had no knowledge that they had corrected it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Time has expired.

Did you share this with government auditors?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I’m sorry?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Did you share this information with the

government auditors?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I did not. This instance I shared with the Tiger

Team investigative team and with management.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The only people, outside of Halliburton

and KBR, that you shared this with was with this committee?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Not to government auditors and so on

that would be auditing these contracts?

Ms. DEYOUNG. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman, you are recognized for 30

minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. I want to thank you for being here. You are doing

a service, but you are feeling a discomfort from the questions that

I have been hearing asked of you. You would think with the kind

of questions that you have had that you have made all this up. I

guess that’s what the Republicans are trying to suggest.

It was interesting also from the last questions, she talked about

specifics of what we are going to hear from the next panel, the Halliburton panelists. Well, this sounds like the Republicans had a private meeting with the Halliburton witnesses to go over what

they’re going to say. We weren’t invited to that meeting, but we

have tried to work together with the staffs on both sides to interview witnesses. But I want to go through some points, because obviously you didn’t make all this up.

Since last December, government auditors have produced a series

of reports that have found widespread, systemic problems with

every aspect of Halliburton’s work in Iraq, from accounting and

billing practices to subcontractor management to exorbitant overcharging. And I am going to list a few of these.

In December, the Defense Contract Audit Agency prepared a

draft audit that found Halliburton was overcharging for the gasoline it was importing from Kuwait. The draft report found $61 million in overcharges. DCAA concluded that Halliburton had not

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demonstrated that they did an adequate subcontract pricing evaluation prior to award of the Altamira contract.

On December 31, the auditor at DCAA issued a flash report concluding that Halliburton’s cost estimating system was deficient and

that a $2.7 billion Halliburton proposal did not contain accurate,

current and complete data regarding subcontractor costs. DCAA

concluded the estimating deficiency is not a one-time occurrence;

it’s systemic.

In January, the DCAA review warned agencies throughout the

Pentagon that they should not negotiate any further contracts with

Halliburton until they check with DCAA to make sure these problems were addressed.

In May, DCAA examined Halliburton billing practices. This audit

found systemic deficiencies in the way Halliburton prepares and

submits its bills to the Federal Government.

In June, the Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority issued an audit that found that Halliburton was overcharging for unauthorized and unnecessary expenses at a five-star hotel

in Kuwait. That was the Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority, reporting on the same example that you have

given us, Ms. deYoung.

And just yesterday, GAO completed its audit and GAO found a

pattern of recurring problems with almost every aspect of

Halliburton’s work on the LOGCAP contract to supply the troops

with essential services. And GAO raised problems with cost control,

subcontracts, and a host of other areas.

That is six audits by three different independent auditors, all of

whom reached the same conclusion: Halliburton has been repeatedly overcharging and overbilling the U.S. taxpayers.

And I ask, Mr. Chairman, that these audits be made part of the

hearing record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Absolutely. It will be put in the hearing

record.

[NOTE.—The report entitled, ‘‘Military Operations, DOD’s Extensive Use of Logistics Support Contracts Requires Strengthened

Oversight,’’ may be found in committee files.]

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Mr. WAXMAN. Now, what you bring to this committee is a different perspective. The auditors come in after the fact and their

conclusions are based on a review of the invoices, purchase orders,

and billing records. But each of you worked inside the company

and saw these problems happen in real time, so you are able to

provide a completely new perspective to this committee. Some of

the Members may not want to hear this perspective, but it corroborates what all these auditors had to say.

What I would like to do is ask you about some of the auditors’

conclusions and see whether you agree with them and whether you

observed the kinds of problems they described when you were on

the ground in Iraq and Kuwait.

In the audit GAO issued yesterday, GAO found Halliburton had

no spending limits for LOGCAP until the spring of 2004, a year

after the end of the war. You were over there during this timeframe. I would like to ask each of you, from your perspective, do

you think GAO is right when it says that Halliburton had no

spending limit?

Mr. Warren, do you know?

Mr. WARREN. I don’t know, sir.

Mr. WILSON. I wasn’t involved in any of the contracting procedures. I couldn’t honestly answer that question.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you think they showed a concern about how

well the money was being spent?

Mr. WILSON. At the camp that I was at with the supervisors that

I had at that time, no, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Warren.

Mr. WARREN. Personally, it seemed like there was no end in

sight for the money being spent. It was just nothing but the best.

Mr. WAXMAN. How about you, Ms. deYoung?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I was in Kuwait and these gentlemen were in

Iraq. There was no regard for spending limits, but the priorities

were backward. Luxuries, KBR came first, soldiers, the people in

the field were second.

Mr. WAXMAN. People in the field?

Ms. DEYOUNG. KBR people. KBR people.

Mr. WAXMAN. The DCAA audit from May found systemic deficiencies in Halliburton’s billing practices.

Ms. deYoung, you were working in Halliburton’s subcontract office and were involved with billing issues. Based on your experience on the ground, do you agree with the auditors at DCAA that

there were billing problems?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Absolutely.

Mr. WAXMAN. Halliburton argued to DCAA that these were isolated problems. DCAA disagreed and concluded that they were systemic.

Based on your experience, do you know who is right, DCAA or

Halliburton?

Ms. DEYOUNG. DCAA was right. They were systemic because

they were using manual systems rather than automated systems.

Mr. WAXMAN. What about the CPA Inspector General who found

the overcharging at the Kuwait hotel? You found similar problems

yourself at the five-star Kempinski Hotel in Kuwait; is that correct?

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Ms. DEYOUNG. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. The chairman said in his opening statement that

Halliburton wanted to move out of their five-star hotels and into

the tents on the base; they wanted to move to the cheaper quarters.

This is the exact opposite of your testimony. You said the military asked Halliburton to leave the hotel, so there is a contradiction here. Can you explain this difference?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Halliburton wanted to build man camps, which

are a cut above what soldiers were living in. Soldiers were living

in tents. The Army, the DCAA was telling our management, come

and live in tents with us. And when the man camps go up for soldiers, you can have man camps. But our manager said ‘‘no.’’ We

had a retired general over there as a manager who met for days

with key staff and they couldn’t come to an agreement; and he finally went up north to Iraq.

Mr. WAXMAN. Halliburton is going to come before us in this next

panel, and Republicans seem to know some of the details of what

they are going to say.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Will the gentleman yield on that?

First of all, every briefing we have had, we have invited you. And

second, there is testimony unlike Ms. deYoung’s testimony, which

she put out today after she appeared here. Their testimony was

made available to the minority, and it’s in our books and it’s in

your books. You have the same testimony.

I don’t want to leave the impression that we know something

about Halliburton that you don’t. Every meeting we have had, you

have been invited to, and their testimony is in the record books for

the public to read today.

I want to clarify that.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Chairman Davis, please know that the extended

statement I have is all based on documents that I have previously

provided, that I understand both sides do have.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And we have entered it in the record.

Mr. WAXMAN. When we hear from Halliburton and they say

things that we may know about from their statement or we may

hear for the first time, we will get a chance to ask some questions.

Do you have any suggestion for questions we ought to ask them?

Ms. DEYOUNG. To ask Halliburton? I would ask them why, if they knew that they could not handle the $7 billion—why did they sign

up for a $7 billion contract which—from the day I was hired, they

knew it was going to be $7 billion. That number was used up front,

this is a $7 billion contract.

Why did they sign on—why, with 10 years of experience in

LOGCAP, being a world class oil services company and government

contractor, did they sign on with manual requisition systems, with

individual data bases rather than an enterprise data system and

with inadequate personnel? And if they made a decision to do this

as a subcontract operation, which a number of Tiger Team managers did tell me that this is the wave of the future, why did they

continue to hire all of these logistics personnel, operations personnel, when these things were being subcontracted out?

They should have hired a couple of hundred subcontract managers instead of people who do operations.

Mr. WAXMAN. That will be helpful.

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Today’s Washington Post had a couple of articles. On the front

page, there is a story about the military might run out of money

before the end of the year. The article says that one of the reasons

is, ‘‘The Army is having trouble paying for the escalating costs of

the logistics contract with Halliburton.’’ This is why so many Members are concerned about the kind of waste and abuse that you

have described.

And this is the headline, ‘‘War Funds Dwindling, GAO Warns.’’

We are running out of money for essential military operations at

the same time that companies like Halliburton are squandering

millions by putting their employees up in five-star hotels and paying $45 for a case of soda.

Another article in the Washington Post recounts the experience

of another former Halliburton employee, who is not testifying

today, John Mancini. Mr. Mancini was a procurement supervisor in

Halliburton’s LOGCAP office in Kuwait, and according to the

Washington Post, Mr. Mancini observed Halliburton employees pay

inflated fees for cell phone services and buy hundreds of rolls of

duct tape at $60 each. He concluded that no one at Halliburton was

making sure that government money was wisely spent.

I want to make those comments so people don’t think that you

are just making all this up.

I yield to my colleague, Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Waxman. I think what is important here is that we follow the facts and

review what has happened in the past so we can move forward and

do things the right way.

You are talking about accountability of taxpayers’ money. That’s

an important issue. More important than that right now are the resources we give to our troops, and that’s what’s important. So let’s

get into the area of fact.

Ms. deYoung, it’s true you were a chaplain and an officer in the

Army before you went to work for Halliburton?

Ms. DEYOUNG. That’s correct.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You have firsthand experience of

Halliburton’s subcontract management because you worked in the

LOGCAP subcontracts department in Kuwait, correct?

Ms. DEYOUNG. That’s correct.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You have met with the committee staff and

briefed them on the problems you found. You provided your observations and conclusions and supplied the committee with scores of

documents to support your claims?

Ms. DEYOUNG. That’s correct.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I would like to walk through some of those

with you. Let’s talk about Halliburton’s poor, what is alleged, poor

subcontract management.

Is it true you and other employees were told to extend subcontracts and increase their value even though no one had determined if equipment or services were still needed?

If you’re going to answer the question, stick to the facts.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Yes, that is correct. I will give an example: one

contract, 23, people on the Tiger Team who had no background

whatsoever in government contracts, accounting government work;

contract 23 was for forklifts and other equipment, and there was

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no evidence that these things had ever been used. And the Tiger

Team auditor suggested that—no invoices had been paid—pay the

invoices and extend the subcontract, as if this thing was actually

operational.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Were you instructed to pay the invoices

even though no one could confirm the services were actually delivered?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Yes, exactly. And my point was, you don’t do that.

I sent a letter up to the Vice President saying, this is not the way

to go. We need to go account by account, look at the documents,

check with the end users, Is the equipment there?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Who was the Vice President, and do you

have a copy of that letter?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Yes, I do. And if I haven’t forwarded that one, I’ll

be very happy to forward it. Vice President Burnell and also John

Cowings were there.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Did you get a response to that letter?

Ms. DEYOUNG. John Cowlings eventually sent a little note saying

thank you for your experience.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That letter would be important as evidence.

You testified that Halliburton site managers were denied subcontract documents?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I’m sorry?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You testified that Halliburton’s site managers were denied subcontract documents so that you could see

what the subcontract was about and so you could manage it.

Ms. DEYOUNG. That is correct.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How could they properly manage the subcontracts without these documents? How could anybody you work

with do that?

Ms. DEYOUNG. They couldn’t. I’ll give you an example.

DCMA out at Camp Udairi, they were building the tower and

there wasn’t a contract in place. The construction managers who

were overseeing couldn’t get a copy of the contract. DCMA actually

fought to get a copy of that contract so that the Camp Udairi staff

would have production schedules, time schedules.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Did you complain to upper level management about this?

Ms. DEYOUNG. All of us complained and finally Tom Crum

promised——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Who is Tom Crum?

Ms. DEYOUNG. He is the vice president of the Middle East.

When all of these things were becoming public and coming to a

head, he finally, in meetings with the site managers in February,

promised them we would get subcontracts. But I can send you emails that were as late as end of March and early April; people in

Iraq who knew me were sending me e-mails because they still

couldn’t get copies of their dining facilities contracts.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Were these isolated problems, in your opinion, or were they more of intimidation? What were these problems?

Ms. DEYOUNG. As far as——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Isolated problems or—was this one or two

incidents or was this a culture of what was occurring?

Ms. DEYOUNG. It was systemic.

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Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And what do you think the reason was that

you did not receive their subcontracts?

Ms. DEYOUNG. In some cases, it directly was related to fraud.

The people who have been terminated that we know were the perpetrators of fraud, their names are on them, and—for example, the

laundry.

When I raised the questions about laundry, I kept telling the

procurement managers who were above me, we have independent

records to corroborate this. When our auditors put two and two together, they are going to say you weren’t managing this properly.

I sent forward a copy of our daily operations report that has the

amount of laundry that was listed. When I sent that forward and

showed them that we have independent ways of corroborating this

information, my immediate manager said, go get the data. I went

out to the laundry personnel and got the data. And they said to me,

for the year prior, they had tried to look at this and tried to have

input, and the people in subcontracts refused to let them see it.

They said they had no business getting involved. This is $1.2 million per month.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You were an employee of Halliburton, and

the DOD was responsible for managing Halliburton or hiring Halliburton to provide the resources and the services that were needed.

At any time, did you see anyone in the DOD and the Army get

involved in this process or try to see what was occurring and

whether we were getting what we were paying for?

Ms. DEYOUNG. DCAA was asking questions. And, Congressman,

you are opening up a door here if I may explain something that is

very frustrating to me. I have been subject to audits, when I ran

Army day care centers. Auditors come in and they look at your

books directly.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The price of management, accountability.

Ms. DEYOUNG. And yet in this system here, with private contractors, all of the information is getting filtered through government

operations people, and I think that is the first correction that needs

to be made. These auditors need to be able to come right in and

take a look at your books the same way they would if I was running an Army day care, an Army guest House or an Army chaplain

fund.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Based on your observations, are you saying

that you didn’t see the Army involved at all in any of these issues

that you were concerned about?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I saw the Army asking the questions. And then

the KBR, personnel who were in government operations, were trying to filter the information down. And I provided e-mail examples

where managers were instructing me to filter down the information, only give them what they ask, which is not what they need

to know in order to know whether or not waste, fraud and abuse

has happened.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask you this. During this process

when you were employed by Halliburton and you were raising

issues that you were concerned about, were you ever reprimanded

for providing too much information?

Ms. DEYOUNG. I was verbally chastised.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Who chastised you and what occurred?

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Ms. DEYOUNG. The first example was the laundry incident, and

I decided to just go ahead and put everything in writing, because

that way I would have a record, and I sent the information forward

anyway by e-mail. But the managers were basically saying, you are

giving too much information.

DCAA started to ask about the transportation mission, and they

wanted to have all subcontracts related to transportation to find

out what the true cost would be. Once again, I gave them a whole

list of everything that they would need, types of contracts.

I was told in that meeting, that’s too much. All we want to do

is give them this piece. What they needed to know was this much.

And I was basically removed from that activity because I was providing too much information.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let’s get into the laundry. Under one subcontract, Halliburton was paying a Kuwaiti company called La

Nouvelle a fixed price of over 1 million a month to do laundry at

one facility. And because there wasn’t much laundry to be done,

Halliburton was paying on average of about $100 a bag; is that correct?

Ms. DEYOUNG. That’s correct.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is it true that laundry was much cheaper

under other subcontracts even when the laundry came from Iraq

rather than Kuwait?

Ms. DEYOUNG. That’s correct, and that is with the same company. I was negotiating with them trying to get them to come to

terms with that. And the original argument was that there was no

data and no way of tracking it, it was a war. This contract was in

Kuwait, it was not in Iraq. And when I was able to produce data

that their own subcontractors had left with us, that was the point

at which they could see that the discrepancy, that we had records

to prove that this was a serious overcharge.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Did Halliburton try to renegotiate the contract at that point?

Ms. DEYOUNG. They did not. And for an entire year—and that includes Tiger Team people—for an entire year on that one line item,

there is only one letter saying, gee, your prices are too high generically.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. In your opinion, we were not getting what

we were paying for?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Absolutely not.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And there were other subcontracts that

were a lot cheaper?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Absolutely.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You were asked about soda and you discovered that La Nouvelle was charging Halliburton for 37,200 cases of

soda per month, but only delivering 37,200 cans. I want you to testify to that because under examination before, there was a discrepancy. And I want you to be able to tell your story about it.

The way I look at it, Halliburton was paying an average of $45

for a case of soda.

Ms. DEYOUNG. That’s exactly what they were paying. The concept

of a hospitality table, it looks suspicious. Soldiers don’t really get

treated that well anywhere in the Army. And the contrast between

how they live and how Halliburton lives would shock you. If your

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son or daughter was over there, you would be very upset. But if

we provide that and if everything worked out fine, OK.

The first evidence that I had was monthly bills, monthly invoices

that said there were 37,200 cases. I thought this is a perfect contract, it’s done well, there’s supporting documentation.

I looked at the supporting documentation, and it’s only 37,200

cans, no matter how I added, subtracted or divided. And for 4

months this thing was paid. It came out to the price of about $45

per case of soda.

Over there in the desert, I was in the desert, soldiers could get

cans off the shelf for 30 cents. You could get a case of soda for $1

or $2. It made no sense to me that Halliburton was paying about

$45 a case.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. When you informed Halliburton’s investigative Tiger Team about this, what was their response?

Ms. DEYOUNG. They tried to make it look like I didn’t know how

to do these things. You know the old routine, you are a chaplain,

you pray. You probably don’t know anything about this business.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I don’t know the routine, but if that’s what

it is.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Well, here’s the thing. When you are a parish

minister or when you’re a chaplain in the Protestant world—maybe

not in the Holy Ghost church, but in the Protestant world, it is just

the way the government should be. A year in advance, you plan out

your expenses for your education, for all of those things. You plan

out your expenses and then you have to live by that budget.

I said this to a number of managers. There is no reason in the

world why Halliburton can’t do real-time data management, because they already have a ROM where they estimate what their

budget is supposed to cost. When I ran Army day care centers in

the 1980’s, every month I got statements saying this is what you

are supposed to spend. Here’s what percentage you have spent to

date.

We didn’t have that. And we should have had it 25 years later.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I thank you for your testimony and your

courage in coming here today. I know it is difficult. Hopefully, the

committee will follow the facts and get to the results of fiscal accountability and getting the resources that we need for our men

and women in Iraq.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. One thing with respect to you, Mr. Warren

and Mr. Wilson, I think the question on the issue that was raised

about these trucks is not what happened after the trucks were broken down, but the question is why they broke down to begin with.

And the first question is whether you feel it is the Army’s responsibility or Halliburton’s in what happened before the trucks

even broke down. So we have to deal with this issue to begin with.

Do you have an opinion?

Mr. WARREN. I am not for sure whose responsibility it was to

make sure these trucks were maintained. But Halliburton, KBR,

they had built garages in Camp Cedar II and Anaconda. They had

these garages built with maintenance crews there onsite. And the

whole time I was over there, these maintenance crews were just

limited in what they can do. They wouldn’t—all they would do is

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just change a tire. They would do a little bit of electrical work and

that was basically it. We had lots of mechanics over there.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. It seems to me it is an issue of management accountability and planning. Truck drivers’ lives are at stake

over in Iraq, too. And I want to thank you for your service to our

country in Iraq.

Mr. WAXMAN. I want to yield to my colleague, Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. I want to say to the three of you who are brave

enough and courageous enough to come forth, do not be intimidated

by the questioning. Just stick with the truth. When you distort or

lie, you forget which one you told. So if you come with the quest

of telling the truth, you will be OK.

Our responsibility here is for oversight. And my dear friends on

the other side will come to the floor and talk about waste, fraud

and abuse.

I was suspicious that the former company of the Vice President

got a contract, sole source, unbid. We didn’t know anything about

it until they were on the ground in Iraq. So I come into this with

great amount of suspicions. How did that happen? I understand today we have spent $65 billion already in Afghanistan and in Iraq. And I understand that because of the budget

crunch, it will have an adverse impact on our military.

I love our military. They are the best in the world. We need to

treat them like that. And I find it outrageous that Halliburton

would put its people up in a hotel. We can quibble how many were

in the room, but by the fact that they were paying over $100 U.S.

dollars per day and our fighting forces were in tents, there is something that really troubles me there.

Now, I listened very closely to the testimony of the drivers. You

are not military men. You are not in on the command and command tactics; is that true, Mr. Warren? Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WARREN. That’s true.

Mr. WILSON. Ma’am, as a convoy commander, I did discuss intelligence with my NCOIC, and we did make decisions on whether we

would travel a particular route or not, together. And we worked

well together.

I was very impressed by our military over there, and I was very

happy to have the regular Army as my escorts over there; and they

did an excellent job. Several times the decisions that we made

saved lives because we decided not to take a route and wait it out,

and other convoys did take that route and were attacked.

Ms. WATSON. I think it might have been Mr. Warren, just correct

me if I am wrong—that your truck broke down because there was

not a filter.

Mr. WILSON. That was my truck, ma’am. It was because of a

plugged fuel filter that I had been asking to be replaced, and I was

told repeatedly there weren’t any replacements at that time for

that filter on that truck and I kept running the truck to complete

the mission until the truck actually stopped.

Ms. WATSON. Do I understand these are brand-new trucks?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, ma’am. The trucks that I ran when I originally

started running the sustainer mission, we picked up in Kuwait and

transported to Iraq with our personal effects in those trucks; and

those were the trucks that we started the mission with.

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Ms. WATSON. And you were traveling on very rough terrain,

sandy, dry, scraggly terrain.

Mr. WILSON. The roadways, they actually had rather impressive

roadways over there, but you were surrounded by desert and did

get caught in dust storms. And probably our worst place to have

the trucks operating was on the bases. In Cedar II, it is a dust

bowl.

Ms. WATSON. Wise management would say, you need filters.

Mr. WILSON. The trucks need extra maintenance not less maintenance.

Ms. WATSON. The other point I didn’t quite understand is why

they took the spare tires off the trucks.

Mr. WILSON. Ma’am, I couldn’t answer that for you, you have to

ask KBR that. I know for a fact when I picked up those new trucks

in Kuwait to go into Iraq to begin this mission, the first thing we

did was take the trucks to Truckville. We pulled up beside a Conex

and put those tires in the Conexes. I thought maybe they were

going to ship them to Cedar in those Conexes, but I never saw

those tires again.

Ms. WATSON. This is a question for all three of you.

Did Halliburton’s Tiger Team do anything to correct these problems or to eliminate the waste? Anyone that would like to respond.

Ms. DEYOUNG. I think I may be the only one who worked with

them.

No, they did not.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. Watson, your time has expired.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you very much, witnesses. Thank you Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We now go to the 5-minute rule, where

Members have 5 minutes. Are you all OK? We’ll try to wrap it up

quickly, because we have two more panels and we have votes that

may cut this short.

But let me ask, Ms. deYoung, your allegation the DCAA can’t

look at private contractor records. Under the contract they are allowed to look at contracting. What do you mean by that?

Ms. DEYOUNG. What I mean is that all of this information—what

was happening—DCAA, GAO, they would send information requests, it would go to a government operations team. Their request

would come down——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Government operations team are who?

Ms. DEYOUNG. KBR staff. And then they would send the request

down to procurement management. The procurement management

would try to gather the data. And the way that they would accumulate the data is where you have this breakdown.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. But under the contract itself, if you

read the contract, they are allowed—the government is allowed to

come in and look directly at the books. Often they go to the contractor and say get us these answers. But I wanted to clarify that.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Oh, I appreciate that. And I’m suggesting—I’m

here to fix problems. I’m not here to say KBR doesn’t deserve that

job. I’m just saying we need to fix the problems.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Now, let me ask you this. I have an e-mail

you sent to Mr. Lesar. Is that his name?

[The information referred to follows:]

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Ms. DEYOUNG. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Where you note a couple of things. ‘‘As a

former personnel officer and former chaplain in the Army, and as

a relatively new employee, I am grateful for your efforts to communicate your concerns.’’ ‘‘As a published author who campaigned

against previous malignant press/political campaigns against army

soldiers, I know that you are at a great disadvantage, because the

political slurs are masked as legitimate public policy debate.’’ And

this was December 13th.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. ‘‘I only worked for the company 3 months

in Kosovo.’’ So I gather this is after you had left Kosovo?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. So, ‘‘I only worked for the company 3

months in Kosovo, and so, I am not eligible for your employee contest to improve this great company. But, as a pretend contestant,

I would like to give you feedback about the recent media slurs

against Kellogg Brown.’’

And you go on and on, but never in this do you offer any of the

complaints that you are offering here. And you note in another email, back in March, this is again after you had left, ‘‘Please know

that KBR folks really do good work for the Army, because they care

too. They are all doing a great job, and their spirit and determination is very strong.’’

Now, how do we reconcile all that with where you are today?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Very easy, sir. And there is nobody more disappointed than me. I had everything to lose by coming home and

coming here. That letter was written the day before we flew—the

day before Saddam’s capture was announced and we flew over to

Kuwait. And in the personnel briefings they talked about greed:

Why are you taking this job? You want money, money, money. And

that is why you are taking this job. And I suggested to him, as you

can see in that letter, scrub that. Scrub that.

Second, I believed at the time—the folks on your side of the aisle

there are assuming I’m a Democrat. Please do not assume that. I

believed at the time that this was a political slur; OK? And I

didn’t—because what I saw and what I wanted to participate in

was first-class support to the soldiers. And that’s what Kosovo,

even though it’s very expensive, that was happening in Kosovo.

I get to Kuwait, and in the subsequent testimony, we are experiencing time and again situations where, for example, for over a

month we could not repair a roof. A simple—you know, a simple

temporary structure, a roof, because we didn’t have screws and a

ridge cap. A ridge cap costs about $30, and they could have been

gotten off the economy.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But these e-mails are long after you had

left Kosovo. I mean, not Kosovo, long after you had left Kuwait. Excuse me.

Ms. DEYOUNG. The e-mail——

Chairman TOM DAVIS. These e-mails are after your experiences

over there.

Ms. DEYOUNG. The e-mail to Dave Lesar is before I went to Kuwait.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Well, one is dated April 1, 2004.

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Ms. DEYOUNG. No, no, no. The original—it’s about December

13th, the original. It may be a copy of how I sent it home to myself.

But the original e-mail to Dave Lesar was on December 13th. It

was the day before I flew.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. February 26, February 20. And you don’t

mention any of these issues.

Ms. DEYOUNG. And I had not—I went down to subcontracts. I

was working in subcontracts on the outside until March 1st.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Did you ever send any of this stuff to the

President himself?

Ms. DEYOUNG. He came, and I went and shook his hand.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But you never mentioned any of this in

the e-mails? You had e-mails back and forth with him, of course,

but did you ever mention this there, or did you just keep it down

here and wait till later on to tell the committee?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Oh, no.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Because you didn’t tell government auditors. We know you didn’t inform the government auditors.

Ms. DEYOUNG. The government auditors were trying to get the

same information I was trying to provide them. They were trying

to get that information, and I was trying to provide it. And when

I saw internal shutdowns, that is why I came to this committee.

When Dave Lesar came, sir, and truck drivers, after the four

men died, to include a guy who was in my cohort, named Fish,

truck drivers were trying to tell him how unsafe it was. They were

being shot at, and other instances were being discussed. And when

that information was not considered, and when the information

was not considered by the Vice President, whom I had sent e-mails

to, that’s when I made a decision.

I continued to receive e-mails until my last day, saying only give

out this amount of information. You are asking too much. That’s

when I came to the committee.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. McCollum, you are recognized for 5

minutes.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Warren, you did call the CEO.

Mr. WARREN. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. And in your conversation you tried to convey to

him that there were problems, and you did show that there were

problems with that. You reported that to him. What was his response to you?

Mr. WARREN. I had reached him when he just got out of a board

meeting, and at that time when I called him, I was having problems in my own convoy. I was a very, very outspoken critic to safety, to my supervisors and to my foremen and to just about everybody, to the maintenance of the trucks.

I was involved in an accident while I was over there, and I felt

like I was being pushed out the door because they just wanted me

gone. And I wanted to speak to Mr. Randy Harrel and express to

him my concern about my employment. And in the course of our

conversation I brought up some of the problems we were having.

He thanked me for bringing it to his attention. He was very nice

to me, and he just seemed like he was in a hurry; that he needed

to go. And he promised me, he said, well, I assure you of one thing,

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Mr. Warren, I won’t leave you over the grease to burn. And I took

that as a fair shake. I would get a fair shake, anything that pertained to me.

So after a couple of weeks I was transferred to Kuwait, thinking

I was getting a new job assignment. And after 2 weeks in Kuwait,

I was terminated.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Did you ever see any evidence that someone

had, from the company, come out and talked to the drivers and to

others to say, you know, we need to do everything possible we can

do to stop these thefts from occurring? Was there any difference in

the amount of thievery you saw before or after your phone call?

Mr. WARREN. No. As a result, whenever I was called in to security, I thought they were going to address the concerns that I spoke

to Mr. Harrel about. I thought they were going to talk to me in private. It wasn’t nothing about that. It was about who have I seen

run people off the roads? Or I was told that—they told me that

they were in the know; they have some eyewitnesses that made

statements that I know who was running them off the road, and

they wanted me to give names.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. OK. Well, thank you, Mr. Warren.

Gentlemen, could I ask you, in your opinion, were any of the

trucks that you saw that stopped functioning or that were torched

due to the fact that the air filter gave out—I mean, you are experienced drivers. I’m sure you talked to the other drivers of the

trucks. Was it air filters, just general maintenance, that was not

being done in these areas?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, ma’am, there were problems in general maintenance. In particular, in my truck, when I was a convoy commander

shut down because of filters. It wasn’t air filters in my case, it was

fuel filters. Diesel engines are sensitive to fuel filters. If the fuel

filter stops up, the engine won’t run. It will shut down.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. Ms. deYoung, I know you were

asked some questions about the different levels and all that. I have

many years in retail management. I usually see things that, if they

are contracts, it says ‘‘contract’’ on the top of the form, and if it is

a purchase order, it says ‘‘purchase order’’ on the top of the form.

And I am assuming Halliburton, being a private sector company,

wouldn’t be that different from the major companies that I worked

for.

You can tell the difference between a contract and a purchase

order, and you know how to match up to do basic inventory; is that

not correct?

Ms. DEYOUNG. Absolutely. And because of my expertise in it or

ability to do it, if I’m not certified, the subcontracts manager, who

was the president of the National Contract Management Association, who is new there and trying to fix problems, he had me do

investigations. He had me look at every single purchase order and

subcontract to fill out reports for him.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. So it is easy to do when all the paperwork is

there, to find out what came in and what went out.

I would just have one comment I would like to make. Thefts

occur, and you did say in your testimony, and it was mentioned by

one of the members here, that in times of war sometimes people

come and purloin things. Well, in times of war, if you are deliverVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00511 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ing something to one of the units and they are counting on that

being there, it makes a difference as to whether or not that piece

of equipment arrives. So thefts should be prevented.

Mr. Warren, thank you for trying to make them stop that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Ms. McCollum, would you yield to me for 1 second?

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. I just wanted to ask the two gentlemen, do you

know of other drivers of trucks that worked with you that have

similar stories?

Mr. WARREN. I have many friends that would be associates I

worked with that would say the same thing.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, if you have any of these names and phone

numbers that you are willing to supply to the committee, we would

appreciate it. Because we would like to see if others have experienced the same thing.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. The

gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. SOUDER. First, let me say that if I have ever heard a hearing

where the forecast of what we were going to hear today and what

we have heard are substantially different, it is this hearing. We

have been hearing over and over about all these different allegations. Two of the five witnesses didn’t show. The one I was supposed to question, which had this huge dollar amount there, when

we actually get into the details and go over it from a business

standpoint, quite frankly, he didn’t realize, like the two gentlemen

here with the trucks, that the military was making the decision,

not Halliburton. He didn’t realize that the cost he was projecting

was incorrect, and he didn’t have any proof that if there was a

problem, it was Halliburton or KBR that had anything to do with

it; that it was in fact inside his company, if there was a problem.

So he begged off today not to come. We don’t know why the other

witness is not here.

And with all due respect, while it is very difficult for you to come

forward, and quite frankly, I’m a little confused as to why the two

of you were terminated in the truck incidents, because running

Iraqis off the road, if you felt you were in danger, doesn’t seem like

much grounds for termination for such a lay observer. At the same

time, you’ve acknowledged here under oath that you didn’t realize

that the military was making the decisions on how many trucks

would go or whether they were empty. You didn’t realize that the

military was making the decision as to what was going onto the

trucks. And your cases, really, in the big picture of things, are

more or less irrelevant.

There are things that need to be dealt with that the military felt

that they needed certain actions, and maybe we should be calling

the military in, but what this hearing was hyped was that somehow Vice President Cheney is corrupt and President Bush is corrupt because contracts went to Halliburton, and Halliburton was

enriching themselves. And not a single fact today showed that. In

fact, Ms. deYoung, who actually makes what I believe are some

fairly serious charges that we need to look into and they need to

be continued to be looked at, because we need to make sure money

is spent accurately and that the right bills are paid, but as you look

at that, the fact is, as you said, you would not necessarily say that

505

KBR shouldn’t keep the contract or that Halliburton shouldn’t.

What they need to do is correct errors in their process.

Furthermore, what we have heard today does not adjust for the

fact that in the first days of that war, Members of this body, including critics of the administration, and people here today, were

saying, oh, we have to make sure that the oil wells don’t explode,

and we have to make sure that money gets into the Iraqis flow.

And then they say, well, there are too many guys standing around.

In case something happened, the military wanted to make sure

that they had the guys around. They said, oh, we need to make

sure the electrical grid works. So the thing is, get everything you

can, pay whatever price to get in there, even if it hadn’t worked

for a long time, and then we criticize the company because they

paid too much to get the materials there on a rapid basis.

This body and the American people have been pushing the military and the contractors past even the point of safety, where we

see them beheaded and captured and other types of things. Yes,

they are making more money, but you know what, you can’t pay

most Americans enough money to go over there and risk the chance

they are going to die, and without adequate protection. And so the

contractors in my book are as much heroes as our soldiers, because

they do not have the same security.

Now, a lot of what happened, and always happens, and it is happening around the world with our military in every zone there is,

in the early days, quite frankly, speed is the most important thing.

Second, we always have problems with maintenance, particularly

in the first parts. And the reason we need auditors with integrity,

who then match it up, is that after and as the mission changes,

and as you get stabilized, you make sure there wasn’t fraud in that

process of overpaying; that indeed it was because there was a need

to overpay, to maybe get the speed with a contractor that was relatively reliable because we couldn’t spend the time checking out

the normal low bidder that you would do in a normal situation

with a retail store. I grew up in retailing, too.

You know, I had time and the ability to plan ahead. Here there

isn’t with these type of things. But as time goes on, if we are not

correcting the maintenance questions, if we are not correcting the

overbilling questions, if we are not doing better management to

forecast the cost, if we find out that we are paying more than we

should have paid, then those adjustments should occur. And to the

degree that people like Ms. deYoung and you all help us sort that

out, that is helpful to this committee. To the degree this becomes

a witch hunt, which in fact this hearing has become—and that

every time we seek out other people who have complaints so we

can bring them up here and then find their complaints aren’t valid.

Now, it isn’t your complaints aren’t valid that there are empty

trucks, but the fact is we don’t know. We don’t know why the military asked for that, but it had nothing to do with Halliburton and

the hearing. And even that last question for seeking information

had the implication that somehow this has a tie back to the political arena.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Can I respond to that, sir?

Mr. SOUDER. This hearing would not be occurring if it wasn’t politically motivated. That’s the fact. We would have done it in a difVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00513 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ferent way. We would have looked at the auditors. This show hearing, and the reason the press is here today, is because of the allegations made in the opening statements, not because of your information.

Yes.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Sir, I would like to respond to that. I understand,

with my 10 years of tactical experience, I have been in all the combat units and trained with them, what the Congressman was talking about, about the military being in charge. But these gentlemen

are absolutely understating the problem that Halliburton bought

trucks, leased trucks, and they didn’t have repair parts. All the European-made trucks have metric tools. They didn’t have metric

tools in country.

Subcontract administrators, if you put them under oath, they

will tell you that. That’s a fact. There are people who are trying

to take pictures and trying to bring information back. The fact that

the priorities were backward, taking care of luxuries for the people

and the hotel staff, instead of getting armored trucks, instead of

getting tools, fuel filters, that’s a fact. It was a subcontract procurement problem.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. The time has expired.

We have Mr. Duncan, 5 minutes.

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Chairman, I know we have votes going on, so

I won’t take the full 5 minutes. I don’t have any questions, but I

would like to make a couple of comments.

I think Mr. Souder made some good points. And I think it is ridiculously unfair to charge or imply that Vice President Cheney

had anything to do with these problems, because all of these problems, if these allegations and charges are true, occurred while he

was Vice President, long after he had left Halliburton. So it does

appear to many people that some of this is being done purely for

partisan political purposes.

Having said all that, I will say this, though. We didn’t really

have many of these problems like this when the government was

small, the Federal Government was small. But when Federal

spending exploded in the early seventies, we started hearing and

reading about more and more examples of waste, fraud and abuse.

And conservative Republicans have traditionally been the biggest

critics of waste, fraud and abuse, whether it occurred by the government bureaucracies themselves or whether it occurred in government contracts.

Now, I can tell you this. Most of us have no connection whatsoever to KBR/Halliburton. If these charges are true, and if there

are, as I heard on one national newscast, $166 million of overcharges, I want to put it on the record that conservative Republicans are almost more horrified by that across this country than

anybody else would be. I don’t want it to appear to anybody that

conservative Republicans would defend any company that overcharged the government by many millions of dollars, or, as one witness said, had people not doing work and charging the government

for it, or doing horrendous overcharges. I think it is terrible.

So I think if some of these charges turn out to be true—and they

may not—but if they were, then these companies should be banned

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from doing further business with the Federal Government and people should be prosecuted criminally.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. We have 10 minutes before the vote.

Mr. Platts, do you want to say anything before I dismiss the

panel?

OK, then. Let me just thank the panel for being here. We will

recess this part of the hearing. When we come back from votes, we

will swear the second panel and move from there.

Thank you very much.

Ms. DEYOUNG. Thank you very much.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The committee is in recess.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. We will reconvene,

and if you would rise with me.

Our witnesses are Alfred Neffgen, Chief Operations Officer, KBR

Government Operations, Americas Region; Mr. William Walter, Director of Government Compliance, KBR Government Operations;

Mr. Charles ‘‘Stoney’’ Cox, vice president and past restore Iraqi Oil

Project director; and Mr. Keith Richard, regional project manager,

Theater Transportation Mission, LOGCAP III, KBR Government

Operations.

It is the policy of the committee to swear all witnesses before you

testify. Please raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much. Mr. Neffgen, we’ll

start with you and move straight down the line. We try to keep the

testimony to 5 minutes and then we’ll open it up to questions. Your

entire testimony will be part of the record. Thank you, and thanks

for patient and staying with us.

STATEMENTS OF ALFRED NEFFGEN, CHIEF OPERATION OFFICER, KBR GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, AMERICAS REGION;

WILLIAM WALTER, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT COMPLIANCE, KBR GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; CHARLES ‘‘STONEY’’

COX, VICE PRESIDENT AND PAST RESTORE IRAQI OIL [RIO]

PROJECT DIRECTOR, KBR GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS; AND

KEITH RICHARD, REGIONAL PROJECT MANAGER, THEATER

TRANSPORTATION MISSION, LOGCAP III, KBR GOVERNMENT

OPERATIONS

Mr. NEFFGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the

committee. My name is Al Neffgen, chief operating officer for Government Operations, Americas Region at KBR, the engineering

construction subsidiary of Halliburton. In this role, I oversee all

work performed by KBR for the U.S. Government.

Mr. Chairman, there have been many criticisms of KBR this

year. We are happy to be able to appear here today to tell the story

of what KBR has done to support the military. When reviewing our

activities, we think it is important you consider the environment in

which we are serving.

Within hours of the beginning of the war in March 2003, KBR

personnel joined the Army at the Iraq border and provided logistic

support for the Army as it invaded and later secured Iraq. Over the

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next 16 months, our people have been in harm’s way. There are attacks on KBR personnel every day. Weekly, there have been anywhere from 40 to 80 incidents. We had not lost a single employee

to hostile action in more than a decade of supporting U.S. troops

in assignments in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and

elsewhere. In Iraq, 42 employees and top-tier subcontractor employees, have lost their lives. Another 93 have been wounded. Some

have been kidnapped, including Tommy Hamill, who later escaped.

Two employees are still missing in action.

When we entered Iraq 16 months ago, we began work under intense pressure with inadequate infrastructure, with almost no communications, few phones, and little electricity. Our people slept in

makeshift facilities and in the hallways of abandoned buildings. In

these conditions, the military assigned us jobs, like bringing in millions of gallons of fuel for the military, feeding the troops, and

transporting critical military supplies. In this situation, KBR employees were determined to get the job done and do it well. We are

accomplishing this mission.

The challenges were expressed in an article in the New York

Times in June 2003. It said, ‘‘KBR essentially took an entire army

base out of containers and made it rise in the middle of the Kuwaiti desert 2 days ahead of schedule. To conjure Camp Arifjan in

a twinkling, amid one of the most hostile environments on the

planet, was by any measure a stunning logistical achievement.’’

Over the last 16 months, we have set up more than 60 camps

for soldiers, helped restore oil flow to prewar levels 3 months ahead

of schedule, delivered 463 million gallons of gasoline to Iraq to alleviate the very real possibility of civil unrest, and another 700 million gallons for the military.

Supporting the troops is an enormous logistics exercise. Every

day we serve more than 475,000 meals to our troops, provide them

more than 2.3 million gallons of water, wash almost 16,000 bundles

of their laundry, collect nearly 10,000 cubic meters of trash. We did

this with constant changes from the Army, the kinds of changes

that are to be expected in a war zone.

The LOGCAP contract scope of work called for KBR to be prepared to support 25,000 troops, with an absolute maximum of

50,000. Within months, we were charged with supporting nearly

200,000 United States and Coalition Forces, as well as 11,000 others, a total of 211,000 people. Under these conditions, no one

should expect the assembling and complicated logistics would be

the epitome of pristine precision. These unanticipated requirements

did tax and stretch our systems, but we placed continuous pressure

on ourselves to do better. We identified problems and fixed them.

We have an elaborate system to detect improprieties, and when

they occurred, we acted. Let me give you two examples of where

we identified and fixed problems.

By late 2003, we were concerned about the overload to some of

our procurement systems. We dispatched a special Tiger Team of

seasoned procurement professionals that improved our systems.

And when we discovered a billing irregularity that suggested a subcontractor may have improperly paid a kickback to a former employee, we investigated it, reported it to the Federal authorities,

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and provided the government a $6.3 million credit, far in excess of

the alleged kickback amount.

Despite all these challenges, KBR has constantly delivered on its

promise to feed and house the soldiers and fuel and supply the

military. In the end, that is our proudest accomplishment.

Facing all these realities, KBR undoubtedly made mistakes. But

where we identified mistakes, we quickly moved to fix them. For

example, earlier this year, a regular review showed some examples

of splitting requisitions to keep them under $2,500. When it did

happen, it was done to meet urgent Army need, not to avoid competition. When we found out about it, we put a stop to it. That is

not the way we do business.

The other area where we find fault with ourselves is in subcontract documentation. These issues came about for a number of

reasons: The huge ramp-up of LOGCAP, the need to utilize more

than 200 subcontractors, and the speed needed to accomplish these

jobs. Again, the goal was to provide service to the Army as quickly

as possible. But it is an area where we could have done better, and

we are doing so today.

In addition to our self-criticism, we are well aware of the external criticism, as typified by a few of our former employees. The

company has long had procedures to encourage such complaints

and criticisms and to address them. We encourage any and all employees to promptly report any violations of our company’s code of

business conduct, either by going to a supervisor or using our confidential ethics hotline and e-mail address for reporting any such

concerns.

We take any allegations seriously and fully investigate. We are

sorry that a few of these former employees failed to use these procedures. In any event, we believe their criticisms are mistaken and

misinformed. We welcome the opportunity to speak to the facts on

these and other issues.

Let me set out some of these: In the area of procurement, one

former employee claims that people have been putting too many

hours on their time sheets. Our policy strictly prohibits that. And

if we learn of violations, they are dealt with very seriously.

Another employee claims to have read files and seen that we contracted to buy soda for $1.50 per case. That is just a little over 6

cents a can. Think about that premise: 6 cents a can. I don’t know

when you could buy soda for 6 cents a can.

We have also heard about what was called a $61 million fuel delivery overcharge, when in fact it is just the opposite. KBR’s actions

saved a lot of money.

Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I hope you will

come away from today’s hearings with three conclusions: first,

never before has a contractor worked in as difficult and dangerous

a situation as we do in Iraq; second, we have performed and performed well for our soldiers and for our country; third, we have

performed our work within the law and consistent with Federal

contracting requirements. There have been times when we made

mistakes, and our systems were stretched, but we have identified

mistakes and we have quickly moved to fix them.

Mr. Chairman, without question, the public has a right to expect

that its tax dollars are spent wisely. All we ask is for a fair assessVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00517 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ment of whether KBR has done the best they could under the difficult and challenging conditions of operating in a war zone. We

firmly believe we have met that challenge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, and

I look forward to your questions.

Let me now please turn it over to Bill Walter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Neffgen follows:]

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Walter. Thank you.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee,

thank you for inviting me here today. My name is William Walter.

I am the director of Government Compliance for KBR Government

Operations. I welcome this opportunity in part because I am familiar with these issues from several perspectives.

Early in my career, I worked as an auditor for the Defense Contract Audit Agency. Next, I served as a consultant to government

contractors, and as a teacher for George Washington University’s

government contracts program. Today at KBR, I currently spend

about a quarter of my time in Kuwait and Iraq.

Let me make a few things clear at the outset about some assertions we have heard today. When I am in theater working with

KBR procurement specialists, they are constantly trying to negotiate the best deals possible with vendors. I have never heard any

guidance remotely close to ‘‘it’s cost-plus, don’t worry about it.’’ Not

once.

Before employees complete their time sheets, they are told they

are responsible for their time sheets. We have heard that people

have put too many hours on their time sheets. Our policy strictly

prohibits such padding of hours, and if we find it is happening, we

will deal with it directly.

We have also heard about our laundry contract. Early on in the

deployment, the Army believed that the laundry from each soldier

and facility would be considerably more than it turned out to be.

But we had negotiated a fixed price based on the Army’s higher estimate of laundry requirements. When it turned out there was less

laundry, KBR renegotiated a lower price with the vendor.

Finally, we heard from Ms. deYoung that we overpaid for sodas

for the troops. Our contract provided that our subcontractor should

deliver a bag of sodas, ice, and cups to soldiers and provide a hospitality lounge at the airport. KBR, through its own auditors, discovered that the subcontractor was delivering only soda, without the

ice and the cups. This was corrected. This investigation was undertaken by KBR before Ms. deYoung began to work as a logistics assistant in subcontracts.

Mr. Chairman, the common thread here is that KBR takes seriously the matters of controlling costs and providing the fiscal accountability the taxpayers expect. Contracting in Iraq poses greater

and different challenges than those faced by a defense contractor

building a weapons system, a contract that involves a permanent

manufacturing plant and blueprints, even though the audit process

is the same for both.

As a logistics contractor, we don’t have a blueprint for a camp.

We get the layout when a general points and says, let’s put the dining facility here, and let’s put the showers over here. There is always a clear sense of urgency. For example, we were asked to set

up 26 dining facilities throughout Iraq in less than 3 weeks, and

the requirements for dining facilities kept expanding so that soon

it grew to more than 60. Requirements change on a daily basis. For

example, one dining facility in Kuwait served 8,900 soldiers 1 day

and the next day it served over 16,000 soldiers.

KBR’s LOGCAP and RIO contracts are cost-plus contracts, the

type of contract the government uses to meet urgent and unpredictVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00540 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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able needs. As Major General Wade McMahon testified before this

committee in March, it is important to note that the LOGCAP contract provides us the flexibility and agility to respond to unknown

requirements over the unknown time lines and uncertain conditions.

Cost-plus contracts work like this: First, the Army issues a statement of work. This frequently involves a pressing assignment defined in broad terms, one that is later adjusted to fit changing conditions. KBR then develops a rough estimate of what it will cost.

The Army then approves or modifies the estimate and issues a notice to proceed. The parties then work together to negotiate a final

cost estimate. Once the costs are agreed to, this estimate serves as

the basis for calculating KBR’s base fee and our possible award fee

pool.

Our base fee is very small, typically 0 to 2 percent. Our incentive

is to obtain the award fee, the largest of the fees that can be

earned. If our costs exceed the definitized amount, our base fee remains fixed. There is no additional fee if KBR were to simply rack

up additional costs. Our award fee may be reduced or denied if we

do not do a good job of controlling costs, one of the significant

award fee criterion.

There are many reports in the media accusing KBR of running

up costs to increase profits. This is not true. A contractor like KBR

does not have an incentive to run up excessive costs. In fact, the

opposite is the case. The review and the award fee process provides

strong incentives for KBR to control costs. Our operations in Iraq

and Kuwait are undergoing extensive and continuing government

scrutiny and audits. This oversight is common for all cost-plus contractors and will ultimately assure that the costs charged will be

fair and reasonable under the circumstances.

And all of this serves the best interest of our customer, the U.S.

troops, and, of course, the U.S. taxpayer. The wartime conditions

in Iraq have stretched our contracting systems, and there are a

number of complicated issues of contract administration that we

are in the process of resolving with the government. Many of these

issues arise, we believe, because review mechanisms that are well

suited for conventional contracting during peacetime have proven

less well suited during a wartime environment.

In the wartime environment, subcontracts must be placed on an

urgent basis. Even a simple task like assembling the necessary documentation is extremely difficult because of the hostile environment and the significant initial requirements. To address these

unique issues, we are involved in a cooperative process with the

Army, the Defense Contract Management Agency, and the Defense

Contract Audit Agency to explore ways to bring these contracting

processes in line to the wartime realities, based on our lessons

learned, without sacrificing accountability.

We believe these contracting processes, oversight procedures, and

our internal policies, taken as a whole, offer a system that is agile

enough to serve the needs of the U.S. troops while also assuring

the fiscal responsibility and the safeguards of the people’s interests.

We are proud of our record as a Federal contractor and proud of

our record of operating with business systems that assure absolute

integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness.

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Thank you for allowing me to talk about our procurement policies and practices, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Cox.

Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, my

name is Stoney Cox, and I am vice president of operations for the

KBR’s Governments Operations Unit. I returned last month, after

14 months in Kuwait and Iraq, where I served as the project director for KBR’s Restore Iraqi Oil [RIO] project as it is called.

Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Defense Department decided that getting Iraq’s oil flowing again was fundamental to the

future of the Iraqi people. The RIO project was an outgrowth of

that prewar planning. Our involvement began when the Army

Field Support Command issued KBR a task order for planning

under the competitively awarded LOGCAP contract that we hold.

We were asked to develop a contingency plan to assess Iraq’s oil

infrastructure and how it could be returned to full production.

Later we were asked to implement that plan on a sole- source

basis. And I know there has been a lot of criticism of the Army for

giving KBR this contract without any competition, but I would

point out that this matter was fully reviewed by the GAO and it

was decided that it was both legal and appropriate, given the wartime conditions and the urgency of the mission.

Under RIO, KBR helped restore oil production and oil exports

ahead of schedule, and imported fuels for the everyday use of the

Iraqi civilians to cook, heat their homes, and drive their cars. On

March 21, the second day of the war, KBR’s engineers crossed into

Iraq, following in the footsteps of the Coalition soldiers as they initially assessed the oil facilities. We faced mines, unexploded ordnance, booby traps, and roving bands of looters who actively targeted KBR personnel.

Operating under these harsh conditions, KBR helped the Army

Corps of Engineers meet its goal of restoring Iraqi oil. The first oil

flowed from the southern oil fields on April 23, 2003, just 5 weeks

after we began the assignment. Exports started again in June

2003, and have produced some $12 billion in revenues for the Iraqi

people in 1 year’s time. And on December 30, 3 months ahead of

schedule, Iraq reached its prewar production levels of 2.4 million

barrels per day.

Mr. Chairman, any balanced examination of a contractor’s work

must take into account how it responds to the urgent demands of

the military in the war zone. The perfect example of that for us is

the emergency fuel mission. On May 3, 2003, the Army Corps contacted KBR in Kuwait and directed that we begin to procure and

transport millions of liters of fuel for Iraq as soon as possible. The

Army indicated to us that a fuel shortage for the Iraqi citizens

threatened civil unrest and posed a serious danger to U.S. soldiers.

As testified here before this committee, one soldier in fact was

killed while trying to maintain order in a gas line in Baghdad.

Outside the war zone, a contractor might have months to develop

such a complicated program. When the Defense Energy Support

Center took over this mission, it had 3 months to complete the contract, compete it, and put it in place. We did it in 3 days. We simply did not have the luxury of time. We simply acted in 30 hours

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and arranged for the logistics, and the first trucks of gasoline were

rolling from Kuwait into Iraq. This eventually grew into a massive

11-month undertaking. We made almost 9,000 gasoline deliveries

per month, delivering over 463 million gallons of gasoline to Iraq.

There are several important points I wish to make about this

program.

First, It was a very dangerous mission. Our subcontractors have

lost some drivers who have been killed due to hostile incidents,

most of them from making deliveries from Kuwait.

Second, we did everything possible to ensure that the Army’s requirements were met at the lowest possible cost, even given the urgency. Within 24 hours of being contacted by the Army, we had

contacted several firms and had received several bids. We chose a

low bidder, a Kuwaiti company named Altanmia.

A significant reason for the high cost of fuel in Kuwait was the

high cost of logistics. We anticipated, when we began the mission,

that each truck would be able to make four round trips per month

from Kuwait to Iraq, but we were 100 percent reliant on the military-controlled convoy system. And because of the security situation and the many delays in getting the convoys going, tankers instead only averaged slightly less than two round trips per month,

about half.

Since our tanker charges, our costs, were a fixed price per

month, this caused the price of delivered fuel to increase. Four

round trips per month would have been a savings of $0.46 a gallon,

or less than 20 percent of the overall cost of the fuel delivered to

Kuwait or Iraq.

The third point I would like to make is that at our own initiative,

we saw alternative sources of fuel, namely from Turkey, which

was—costs substantially less than the fuel from Kuwait. It was less

costly because the vendors there deemed it less dangerous to deliver from Turkey and because there was a better competitive market for fuel, for that product, from Turkey. By May 11th, we also

began delivering fuel from Turkey, and in the end, at the end of

the mission, nearly 72 percent of the fuel that we delivered to Iraq

came from Turkey rather than Kuwait.

Our critics often allege that we overcharged by some $61 million,

and there is a new report out today that ups that to $167 million,

but they allege that we overcharged by $61 million because simply

we didn’t buy all of the fuel from Turkey. A simple calculation. But

it simply was not possible to do so, and we were not directed to do

so. We were, in fact, directed where to purchase the fuel.

Now, why was that? Well, for one thing we needed two sources

of fuel, two approaches, if you will. Turkish drivers often refused

to drive through the Sunni Triangle because of the dangers there.

And, in fact, Turkish drivers went on strike in November and shut

down the Turkish fuel flow, and had we not had the Kuwait fuel

flow at that time, we would have definitely been in trouble. We and

our client would have been in trouble.

As I said, we are certainly aware of the minority’s report that

was issued yesterday alleging that we have overcharged $167 million compared to DESC current price for this mission. We strongly

disagree that there was any overcharge, and we believe this report

is flawed in several ways. For example, based on the rising spot

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price, we believe today that DESC now pays a higher price for the

gasoline than did KBR. Any difference, major difference, though,

comes from the transportation cost.

We believe the report is flat wrong, and to compare our immense

startup costs as we put the system in place to do this, for which

DESC has reaped the benefit of this system, we believe that is

wrong. I would welcome the opportunity, as we get into the Q and

As, to further address those issues, but I think I will stop now. And

thank you for allowing me to be here today and address these

issues with the committee.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Richard.

Mr. RICHARD. Thank you, Chairman Davis and members of the

committee. My name is Keith Richard. I am the KBR government

operations regional project manager for the theatre transportation

mission in Iraq and Kuwait. In this role, I oversee all KBR

LOGCAP transportation missions in Iraq and Kuwait.

I am pleased to address the committee on a key role that KBR

is playing to help support our troops in Iraq. In addition to the

trucks that you just heard about that supplied Iraqi civilians with

fuel, KBR also wanted a separate program in Iraq to support military fuel, military parts, food and mail to coalition forces. Thus far

these KBR trucks have driven nearly 40 miles and made more than

128,000 deliveries.

We operate a fleet of about 2,000 trucks, employ 1,700 drivers,

300 truck mechanics, along with logistics specialists, clerks and

heavy equipment operators. In miles driven and fleet size, we are

the equivalent of the fourth largest trucking company in the United

States, and we set up that capability in a matter of months.

Let me take you through a typical trip, if typical is the right

word. Our truck typically traveled from Kuwait to the central distribution center at Camp Anaconda and back. A distance of 1,100

miles round trip in a States trip, equivalent of travel from Richmond to Boston, would take 2 days, or 9 hours up and 9 hours

back. But in Iraq it is almost a 5 or even a 6-day trip, and that’s

if all goes well. On the run to Camp Anaconda, the driver’s day begins with a pretrip inspection of his truck in Kuwait followed by

a meeting with the latest security briefing.

The mood is tense, and I certainly know that in trips I have

made, my adrenalin is pumping. Trucks are joined by military escorts at the Iraqi border. From there they travel to Camp Cedar,

a support center, where they overnight. The next day a new set of

escorts joins in to head on to Scania, a massive truck stop where

yet another escort awaits.

The third day is a straight run for Camp Anaconda. This is dangerous work for our drivers, and provides explosive devices, or

IEDs, or a constant threat of rocket-propelled grenades, land

mines, mortars, and small-arms fire and spikes in the road. On a

recent trip a 25-truck convoy suffered serious damage to 17 windshields from rocks thrown in two particular hostile cities. That is

not unusual.

Sadly, 14 drivers have been killed while carrying out this important mission. That’s 14 drivers. One driver, Al Caton, was also a

friend of mine, as you heard in previous testimony. Al was a real

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leader and one of the nicest guys I know. Some of the other drivers

were killed in the coordinated ambushes of convoys on April 8th

and 9th, and two drivers are still missing from those tragic days.

These drivers are a brave and courageous group of people.

But the danger does not end when the driving does. Even simply

being at Camp Anaconda can be dangerous. In my 6 weeks in Anaconda this spring, there was virtually mortar fire every night,

which means you get up, wait, go to the bunker and pray. At Anaconda I was asleep in my containerized housing when a mortar

came flying just over my sleeping area and slammed into a KBR

mail van parked 15 feet away.

Earlier this month at the same camp, a number of KBR employees had gathered for a July 4th celebration when two mortars hit.

Twelve employees were injured, and three had to be evacuated to

a combat support hospital. These close brushes with danger are not

unusual for the men and women of KBR working in Iraq. It is simply a part of the job.

I also want to address some of the allegations made today. First

was that we abandoned trucks because of flat tires or simple repairs. The Army provides all security, tells us what to deliver,

when to travel and what routes to take. Contrary to some assertions, if a truck breaks down or is disabled, the decision to abandon

or destroy a truck is made by the Army, not KBR. The Army

makes a judgment based on their assessment of how best to save

lives, not just equipment or trucks. KBR is the only contractor in

Iraq with satellite tracking of its assets and personnel, and full recovery capability. Even a seemingly simple matter like changing a

tire is at least a half-hour project.

So the Army must make difficult decisions. Let me repeat this.

The Army, not KBR, makes all decisions regarding whether to halt

the convoy, fix a truck or abandon it. We are operating in a war

zone. The Army also provides records for driving, including security

issues. We are told to run tight convoys and not allow intervening

civilian vehicles, but the Army does not direct KBR to run civilians

off the road. KBR, in fact, has disciplined several drivers who were

found to have caused an accident by doing so. Several were terminated.

It has been said that we do not maintain our vehicles. That’s not

true. Today our teams of mechanics conduct routine preventive

maintenance of each truck every 2 weeks. Current readiness rate

is 81 percent and has never fallen below 75 percent.

While theft is not rampant, it is a problem. Protection of supplies

from theft, it is the responsibility of the Army, and when thefts do

occur, KBR promptly reports incidents to the Army. Cargo is

tracked by radio frequency system making paperwork unnecessary.

Mr. Chairman, we are doing everything humanly possible to support our troops. I know you would be proud of us if you saw us in

action.

Thank you for the opportunity to address you, and I look forward

to your questions.

Mr. SCHROCK [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Richard,

and thank you all for being here.

538

As we did with the first panel, and we agreed upon, we will have

30 minutes per side. I think, Mr. Waxman, we agreed that we will

proceed first.

We have heard from the so-called whistleblowers, and I would

like for you KBR folks to respond to the allegations that were leveled here today. But, first of all, for the record, did KBR have a

policy as it pertains to the LOGCAP contract that costs didn’t matter because it was a cost plus contract? Any of you can answer

that.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHROCK. Yes, sir.

Mr. WALTER. We absolutely did not have a practice that costs did

not matter. As I mentioned in my oral testimony, as I work with

people, we are doing our best to make sure we do obtain the best

value for the taxpayer and for the soldier in this environment.

Mr. SCHROCK. Any other comment? We heard from Ms. deYoung

in the first panel, and I need to ask you first a question about her.

Was Ms. deYoung hired as a contract or as a procurement specialist? Basically, what was she hired to do?

Mr. NEFFGEN. She was not hired as a contract specialist. She

was hired in the logistics area as an administrative assistant. We

have over 300 subcontract administrators on the LOGCAP contract, and every one of them is trained in that capacity and receives a warrant that authorizes them in writing to execute contracts, negotiate contracts, issue modifications to contracts. Ms.

deYoung never had that warranty.

Mr. SCHROCK. Did she have signatory authority on any of the

contracts?

Mr. NEFFGEN. She did not.

Mr. SCHROCK. None at all?

Mr. NEFFGEN. None at all.

Mr. SCHROCK. Concerning the Kempinski Hotel, can you elaborate on your decisionmaking process for housing your employees,

and specifically any communication your company had with the

Army in that effort?

Mr. NEFFGEN. Yes, sir, I would be glad to do so. When there was

a buildup the latter part of 2002, there was a scrambling for accommodation within the country of Kuwait. We tried to get our

people, as many people as possible, on Marfan in Kuwait. The

Army chose priority for placement of troops inside Arifjan. We had

some folks that live there and live in tents and Conex containers.

But we were forced to search for any accommodation.

Our first priority in seeking accommodations on the outside in

hotels like the Kempinski is security, and the hotel was gracious

enough to accommodate our security concerns. It is a hotel that is

off the beaten path. It is securable, and that was a primary concern.

I do have some pictures that I would like to show of some of our

living accommodations to give you an idea.

We have 14,000 expatriate personnel on our payrolls living in

Kuwait and Iraq; 88 percent of them either live in tents such as

you see here, or they live in Conex containers. They are not the

greatest living condition. It is the same as our troops live in in both

locations. I personally requested Brigadier General Bob Radin, the

539

senior logistitian at Camp Arifjan, the senior representative of our

customer in the LOGCAP, contact the Army Materiel Command to

allow us to move people out of the hotels in Kuwait onto the camp,

Camp Arifjan, and for us to build Conex living accommodations.

This occurred in April of this year. He said he would support that

request. However, there is an implication. There is a dispute with

the landowner of the property going on. Until that is worked out,

they couldn’t allocate us a designated area within the complex of

the camp to do so. He said he would support that request at the

appropriate point in time when they have it all cleared up on

where it is going to go.

We have had repeated discussions between senior members of

our company and senior officers in the Army to allow us to move

on to secured military camps and get out of these hotels. In the hotels we put people—we fill every bed that we lease in the hotels.

We pay a daily rate for the room, and if it has one bed in it, we

put one person; if it has two beds, we put two people per room; if

it has five, we will put five in that room. So we have people doubled, tripled, quadrupled and quintupled up at the various hotel accommodations.

Our average cost per man per room per hotel a day in Kuwait is running $45 a night. Now, that compares to the government’s

per diem rate for allowable expense of government personnel living

in a hotel room in Kuwait of $258. So it is only 20 percent of the

allowable cost.

Mr. SCHROCK. The living conditions sound remarkably like what

I experienced when I was on a ship in the Navy.

Mr. NEFFGEN. I can imagine.

Mr. SCHROCK. Yes. Concerning Ms. deYoung’s allegations regarding a subcontractor, did that company overcharge for sodas under

the contract that was questioned by Ms. deYoung?

Mr. Walter.

Mr. WALTER. Sir, the perception of waste in this matter is incorrect. The facts show that KBR actually did our best in this case to

try to protect the government from waste. The allegation that we contracted for soda at $1.50 per case is wrong. I heard Ms. deYoung’s testimony. She said it was $45 per

case. Nowhere in the documentation that I have reviewed for the

subcontract have I come up with that number. What I have come

up with in the contract is a $45 KD, or Kuwaiti dinar, price per

package. And the package is two cans of soda, ice and a cup and

a plastic bag, and the cost of delivering it, and the cost of cleaning

up afterwards when the soldiers get on their plane to fly wherever

they have to go.

As Ms. deYoung began working a procurement. She was assigned

to assist, provide administrative support for one of our subcontract

administrators. That subcontract administrator was already working on this particular issue and had already identified the problem

in February, and KBR had made the decision that we were going

to withhold payment of over $100,000 to the vendor until we could

remedy the situation.

Mr. SCHROCK. With respect to the sodas, again, what exactly did

KBR contract for with respect to the sodas? We heard earlier that

it was a bag of two sodas, ice and I think nonbreakable cups. Was

540

La Nouvelle also responsible for setting up and breaking down the

area where these bags would be handed out as well as clearing out

the trash?

Mr. WALTER. That is my understanding, yes, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. Concerning laundry, that’s a lot of laundry they do

over there. Please walk this committee through what was being

charged, what is being charged today, and why it is different than

your local laundry down the street.

Mr. WALTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to try

to clear up this misconception. During the testimony this morning, it was identified that $28 a bag for a 15-pound bag would be more reasonable than paying $100

per bag. What happened in this case was KBR, as I mentioned during my testimony, got a statement of work. In the statement of

work it said, provide laundry services for 6,200 soldiers.

We took the statement of work and we provided that to our various vendors, and our subcontractor looked at that requirement,

and it also had an open requirement, because included in the laundry charge is the laundry for the medical facility as well as the

sleeping bags for the soldiers to get them laundered as well. What

we did was we provided that to our subcontractor, and they put together a quote of $1.2 million per month to do all of that laundry. If you calculate the number of soldiers, that comes out to $24 a

bag for the soldiers’ laundry, but that also includes the cost of

laundering all of the medical laundry out of the hospital as well as

the sleeping bags.

Once again, during the progress of this particular task order,

KBR identified that the volume of troops were not coming through

the airport facility, which is where this contract was located. As a

result of that, KBR negotiated with the subcontractor to get a persoldier-per-bag price for laundry that was, I believe, $24 per bag,

and that is what the price is today.

Mr. SCHROCK. How big are the bags?

Mr. WALTER. I’m sorry, sir?

Mr. SCHROCK. Like a seaman’s bag? How big a bag?

Mr. WALTER. It is a 15-pound bag, I believe, of laundry.

Mr. SCHROCK. Is La Nouvelle still subcontracting?

Mr. WALTER. La Nouvelle is subcontracting in a very minor way

with us. They are no longer doing laundry services.

Mr. SCHROCK. Typically with that subcontractor and other subcontractors, do you believe you have sufficient administration in

place to oversee these contracts?

Mr. WALTER. I believe we do.

Mr. SCHROCK. Ms. deYoung has commented that she thought

subcontracts were being closed out in order to avoid government

contracts. Could you discuss KBR’s policy on closing out subcontracts? In your experience, were closed subcontracts immune

from government audits?

Mr. WALTER. I would like to clear that point up very readily. As

my job with KBR, I am the director of government compliance. I

work on a daily basis with the defense contract agency auditors in

Houston and in theater, and in no way, shape or form do they

allow us to get by by trying to close out a file so they do not have

to audit.

541

I receive over 1,200 requests per month for supporting documentation as the auditors are going through their transactions,

and one of the key elements they are looking for right now is the

documentation to support a lot of the payments that we made in

the 2000, 2001 and 2002 timeframe. And what they are doing is

they are looking at these files, many of which are closed, to make

sure that we have the adequate supporting documentation in place.

Mr. SCHROCK. Was Ms. deYoung a member of the so-called Tiger

Team?

Mr. WALTER. No, sir, she was not.

Mr. SCHROCK. Could you explain in a little more detail the purpose in the mission of the Tiger Team?

Mr. WALTER. I would be happy to.

Mr. SCHROCK. I don’t know, and I would like to know.

Mr. WALTER. Toward the end of 2003, we found that there were

a number of our vendors that were not getting paid. And in reviewing that, what we found was that our company’s internal controls

were working. If a subcontractor invoice does not have the adequate supporting documentation, it will not be able to be paid by

our accounting and finance group. So what we were doing is we

worked with our accounting and finance people and found that this

was an issue.

During a wartime situation, when we have immense buildup, a

lot of our procurement people start out on the task order. They

have a cell phone, a stubby pencil and a piece of paper, and they

start making the requisitions, and they start getting the goods in

place. The documentation for some of these things, the complete

documentation package, sometimes will take a while to get in

place.

What happened here, as Ms. deYoung was involved, she was

helping the subcontract administrator pull together documentation

for subcontracts that were issued back in 2002 and earlier in 2003

as the campaign was building significantly.

Today what we have done is—one of Ms. deYoung’s statements

is KBR is not like a company that has all of these things tied together in a nice electronics package. One of the things that was not

available during the startup of this mission was communications.

So, that is why our people were working with very heavily manually intensive systems. We did not have communications. And even

today as I try to get ahold of people throughout the theater to get

my questions answered for the government auditors, we have a

very difficult time getting hold of them. E-mail is intermittent at

best in many locations, so trying to get a very sophisticated communications system in place that links all of these things electronically was not possible at the time. So what happened was our procurement people would put together spreadsheets for the different

camps, and that is how they were tracking their information.

Toward the end of 2003 we started to have improved communications. During 2003, we implemented a procurement tracking system called Procurement Plus. We now have all of our camps up and

running on that with current procurements, and we are trying to

get caught up with the few remaining older subcontracts that are

out in place.

542

Mr. SCHROCK. Let me go to the testimonies of Mr. Warren and

Mr. Wilson. This will be kind of a rapid-fire series of questions. In

terms of convoys and trucks in both the RIO and LOGCAP, who

was responsible for those convoys?

Mr. RICHARD. From the LOGCAP perspective, the military.

Mr. SCHROCK. Who supplied security for the convoys?

Mr. WALTER. The military.

Mr. SCHROCK. Did the convoys always carry spare tires?

Mr. RICHARD. Yes, they did.

Mr. SCHROCK. Did KBR ever destroy a tractor-trailer because of

the need of a spare tire?

Mr. RICHARD. No, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. Who made the decision to destroy trucks?

Mr. RICHARD. The military.

Mr. SCHROCK. Did KBR conduct regularly scheduled maintenance on the fleet? I think we heard.

Mr. RICHARD. Yes, we did.

Mr. SCHROCK. Did KBR advocate the stealing of goods off of

these convoys?

Mr. RICHARD. No, we did not.

Mr. SCHROCK. When it comes to the drivers, what was KBR’s policy concerning the drivers; are they responsible for keeping looters

at bay? Who is?

Mr. RICHARD. It is the military and the Army’s responsibility.

Mr. SCHROCK. Strictly?

Mr. RICHARD. Strictly.

Mr. SCHROCK. What is KBR’s policy for drivers running people

off the road in order to maintain convoy integrity?

Mr. RICHARD. We hold all of our personnel to the highest standards. If they are involved in any type of theft at all, those issues

are investigated, and actions are taken.

Mr. SCHROCK. Nobody ever told them they could run people off

the road?

Mr. RICHARD. No, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. With respect to Mr. Warren, was he himself ever

accused of stealing from the convoys, and could you elaborate on

that?

Mr. RICHARD. That has not been proven, no, sir.

Mr. SCHROCK. Why were Mr. Wilson and Mr. Warren terminated?

Mr. RICHARD. For violating code of business conduct and running

Iraqi civilians off the road.

Mr. SCHROCK. Tom, do you want to come back?

Chairman TOM DAVIS [presiding]. We still have 15 minutes on

our side, and in 5 minutes I am going to recess for a few minutes

as we vote on a subpoena, and then we will come back.

Any questions here, Mr. Platts?

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cox, you talked about the field contracts in Kuwait versus

Turkey, and the process of that decision of having the two sources,

and what went into the time-sensitive nature, especially the beginning of getting the fuel in place?

Mr. COX. Well, the situation on the ground in Baghdad in late

April rolling into the early May was characterized—can be characVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00550 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
543

terized by long lines at gas stations, fuel stations there due to the

lack of the gasoline. The Iraqi refinery and gasoline production was

simply not back up to speed, and so there was no gasoline being

produced in country at that time.

So the situation was very, very urgent that we start providing

and importing gasoline, particularly that product, immediately, and

that is how it was put to us. We need this immediately. Can you

start hauling tomorrow?

We took a few days to get it going, and we are under the whip

the whole time to start making it happen. We took that mission.

We contacted vendors in Kuwait, which is where our offices were

at the time, and began the process of soliciting that gasoline and

the transportation to take it forward.

Kuwait is a very small country, essentially a large city, and there

were very few trucks there and assets to haul the gasoline. The

Kuwaiti Government agreed to sell the fuel to us, or to the U.S.

Government, and so we ended up with very quickly in a couple of

days getting three vendors who quoted.

We took the lowest vendor. We took the lowest vendor. We did

an examination. We had worked with this guy before on some other

things—not transportation and not fuel—and determined that he

had the wherewithal to buildup and start this mission coming out

of Kuwait pretty rapidly.

We also were required—we required—when I say we, the Army—

sent a letter to the Kuwait petroleum company validating that this

guy was an official. We were buying this for the U.S. Government

basically. The Kuwaiti Government wanted that, so it wasn’t KBR

and Altanmia doing this. So very rapidly we put that in place and

started moving the fuel.

Almost immediately, the discussions in the staff meetings with

our client were, you know, this may not be the only avenue of approach. We are coming into Baghdad from the south, and there are

some download points south of Baghdad that we need to service.

But there are also some north of Baghdad, and it seemed with the

unrest in Baghdad that it was not wise to try to haul through

Baghdad to the north.

At the same time, we, KBR, had a small office in Turkey had

been put in place to support the flow of troops through Turkey.

That didn’t occur, and they were getting ready to fold their tents

and go home. And we got in contact with them and asked if they

could procure and ship fuel to Turkey. As you heard in my oral,

by May 11th they were doing so, and so they put contracts in place

there, and so they were coming at it from two directions.

Mr. PLATTS. Was it a similar process in—as far as soliciting different competitors?

Mr. COX. Absolutely. It was competitively done there also. A little bit different market conditions there. In Kuwait, of course, you

have one source to purchase the fuel from. Turkey is larger, more

sources, more competition, more trucks, quite frankly, than in Kuwait.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I thank the gentleman. We will suspend

for now.

We still have 11 minutes left on our side. What I would like to

do is yield back the balance of my time, but maybe reserve a couple

544

minutes for clarification at the end if we need to say something.

But they will get their 30 minutes to say something.

I am going to suspend now, recess, and go back to the business

meeting for the vote on Mr. Waxman’s amendment. The hearing

will be in recess.

The committee will now consider the postponed motion offered by

the ranking minority member. The motion has already been entered. The gentleman’s motion would authorize the chairman to

issue a subpoena for documents relating to communications between the DOD and the Vice President’s Office regarding Halliburton contracts. The question occurs on the motion. All those in

favor, signify by saying aye. Aye.

Opposed, no. All opposed say no. No one said no. Come on, no.

No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The ruling. The chairman knows how to

ask for roll call. A little off script there.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes. You have a roll call.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I might ask a unanimous consent

on this. Some Members thought we would complete the hearing before they come in. Some were told that they should be here at 2.

I would like to request that we keep the roll, that Members can

come and let your staff know how they wish to vote, and then we

will tally the vote.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. With unanimous consent, during the hearing I may suspend for a moment during Q&A as a Member comes

in to let them record their vote as they come in and let them go,

I think keeping it open for the next hour or so. Is that amenable?

Mr. WAXMAN. At least until the hearing is over.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Which should take about hour. Thank you

very much.

The clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Davis.

Chairman DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Davis votes no.

Mr. Shays.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Burton.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. McHugh.

Mr. MCHUGH. No.

The CLERK. Mr. McHugh votes no.

Mr. Mica.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Souder votes no.

Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. LATOURETTE. No.

The CLERK. Mr. LaTourette votes no.

Mr. Ose.

[No response.]

545

The CLERK. Mr. Lewis.

Mr. LEWIS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Lewis votes no.

Mrs. Davis.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Platts votes no.

Mr. Cannon.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Putnam.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Schrock.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Duncan.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Deal.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mrs. Miller.

Mrs. MILLER. No.

The CLERK. Mrs. Miller votes no.

Mr. Murphy.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. No.

The CLERK. Mr. Turner votes no.

Mr. Carter.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mrs. Blackburn.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Tiberi.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Harris.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Waxman.

Mr. WAXMAN. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Waxman votes aye.

Mr. Lantos.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Owens.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Towns.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Kanjorski.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Kanjorski votes aye.

Mr. Sanders.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mrs. Maloney.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Cummings.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Kucinich.

[No response.]

546

The CLERK. Mr. Davis.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Yes.

The CLERK. Mr. Tierney votes aye.

Mr. Clay.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. Watson votes aye.

Mr. Lynch.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Van Hollen.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. Sanchez.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Yes.

The CLERK. Mr. Ruppersberger votes aye.

Ms. Norton.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Cooper.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Aye.

The CLERK. Ms. McCollum votes aye.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. No other voters at this point. I would ask

the clerk to stay close, and we will resume our hearing.

Gentlemen, you can come on back, and we will resume the hearing.

Members who are recorded will stay recorded. We don’t anticipate followup votes.

Do you have other questions or not?

I am going to recognize Mr. Souder for—if we can get Mr. Souder

back in the room. Here is Mr. Souder.

Mr. Souder, you are recognized.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to reinforce, I thought, the question on the oil. I had

the same reaction listening to the testimony, that I hope the corrections get in the record as much as the inflated charges get in the

record. In fact, had we had just one source, it could have been a

disaster, and that is the whole challenge that you face in these

types of contracts between cost and urgency, because an error

would be so catastrophic to delivery of services that sometimes cost

is not the primary variable, and I hope that the American people

can understand this.

Second, I had a particular question. We heard about these truck

convoys and empty trucks, and my understanding from your testimony and from what we understood previous is that the military

makes those decisions. But do you know why there would have

been convoys and empty trucks?

Mr. RICHARD. Yes. When the military plans a mission, they plan

a mission to pick up supplies, say, from point B. But in the case

of the Iraq-Kuwait theater, they plan a mission from Kuwait to

547

Camp Anaconda to pick up supplies. So, therefore, they move

empty flatbeds to Kuwait to Camp Anaconda to pick up supplies.

But everyone has to remember, we are operating in a war zone.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Would you suspend for just a minute? Ms.

Norton, you are not recorded. Would you like to vote aye?

Ms. NORTON. I would like to vote aye.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, sir. Go ahead.

Mr. Tiberi.

Mr. TIBERI. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Tiberi is no. Thank you.

This is very informal, but we are trying to—I don’t think we have

done this before, but it is the most efficient way in an inefficient

process.

Go ahead.

Mr. RICHARD. I was on a roll there. But on a 3 or 4-day trip,

things change. We are operating in a war zone.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Clay, the gentleman, you are not recorded. You would like to be recorded——

Mr. CLAY. Aye.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. We will try to let people finish

their sentence.

Mr. RICHARD. Thank you. I was on a real roll there.

Chairman DAVIS. One more time, Mrs. Maloney.

Mrs. MALONEY. Aye.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Aye.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We will get you back on that roll. You are

doing well?

Mr. RICHARD. We are operating in a war zone, so on a 3 to 4-

day transit to Camp Anaconda, things change. The military may

need the supplies that we were scheduled to pick up. If they need

the supplies, therefore we have to return that empty equipment

back to Kuwait.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have one other comment. I thought in Mr. Neffgen’s testimony KBR provided to Somalia and Haiti and the Balkans as well

and done services in other areas, because sometimes reading news

media accounts and listening to news media, the only way you get

an impression of an account is if Vice President Cheney called up

the company. If I recall, he wasn’t Vice President during those 8

years where you received many contracts. Is that correct, that you

had many government contracts under both Presidents, and it

doesn’t always take a call for your company to get a contract?

Mr. NEFFGEN. That’s correct, sir. We have dozens and dozens of

government contracts. We have been a government contractor for

60 years starting in World War II and Korean War, Vietnam War,

and up to the current day. We have won contracts with both Democratic and Republican administrations. I have never been aware of

an elected official that awards a government contract. It is always

government contracting officers that do so.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If you read the Means of Ascent and you

read the Lyndon Johnson trilogy, Brown & Root were the largest

548

funders of President Johnson back when it was a Texas firm. They

have been around for years.

We have a number of Members who have not been recorded. I

will start on my right. Mr. Towns.

Mr. TOWNS. Aye.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Towns votes aye.

Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Aye.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mrs. Davis.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. Deal.

Mr. DEAL. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Mica.

Is there anyone else? Oh, yes, the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. Cummings votes aye.

Thank you. At this point, I would like to reserve a minute or so.

I am ready to go to Mr. Waxman in your half hour.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Davis, if I could interject one thing?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Please.

Mr. WALTER. During my testimony on the laundry, I mentioned

45 KD. What I meant to say was 0.45 KD, which is about $1.50.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Before we start our yield and Mr. Waxman’s time—keep our time running—we talked about a laundry

contract, which is a firm fixed price, and after it looked like the

government had made a number of assumptions that were not true,

you were gouging him in terms of the results. You came back on

your own and renegotiated, is that right? You were not forced to

renegotiate that point. You were locked into a contract?

Mr. WALTER. Sir, we did it because it made sense to provide the

best values to the taxpayer.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Contractually the government was really

up for more money had you enforced it.

Mr. WALTER. Had we not changed it, but, yes, we would have

changed it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. One of the most prominent charges of

KBR in the May 13th DCAA report rates the Iraqi-Halliburton contract. DCAA indicates you are not billing on the proper standards,

but instead billing the government for a number of meals far in excess of that amount. Could you give us the company’s position on

that?

Before you answer, I want to record Mr. Cannon. You get to vote.

OK. Mr. Cannon votes no.

Go ahead. Thank you. Go ahead. Go ahead.

Mr. WALTER. Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to clarify

this. We have read quite a bit in the media. What has happened

in this case, as we provide the dining facilities services to the government, we get a statement of work that identifies how many

troops need to be served, and that’s what we prepare for.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

We have a couple of other Members. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Ms. Harris.

Ms. HARRIS. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

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Mr. Waxman, you are recognized for half an hour.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Neffgen, Mr. Walter, Mr. Cox and Mr. Richard, I want to

thank all of you for being here today. I think it is important for

us to have a chance to hear your perspective and to have an opportunity to ask questions. Given the size of your contracts, the two

biggest contracts in Iraq, there’s really no way we can do our oversight without hearing directly from you.

When the public hears about Halliburton and Iraq, there are two

major questions on people’s minds. The first question is was there

special treatment when the administration gave Halliburton a solesource, no-bid contract worth up to $7 billion for oil infrastructure

work in Iraq? And the second is has Halliburton been engaged in

profiteering; has the company taken advantage of the war to overcharge the U.S. taxpayers?

These are the two issues I want to focus on in my questioning

of you. I want to start with the special treatment issue. For over

a year we heard that there was no special treatment because a decision to choose Halliburton was made by career procurement officials. On August 28, 2003, for example, your spokeswoman, Wendy

Hall, said Halliburton’s work in Iraq was awarded ‘‘not by politicians, but by government civil servants under strict guidelines.’’ I

have a chart over here with her actual quote.

We learned recently at our last hearing this wasn’t true. We discovered that the decision to choose Halliburton and the decision not

to allow other companies even to submit a bid was made by a political appointee. The decision was made by Michael Mobbs, who

works for Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

And we learned that there was a deputies committee, which is

made up of a senior White House and departmental officials, that

signed off on that decision.

Does your company still maintain that career civil servants made

the decision to choose Halliburton for this work?

Mr. COX. Congressman, I will be happy to field that. We have no

knowledge whatsoever of how the decision was made, other than

what has been published, which is the sole source justification document, which we have seen. We do not know who made the decision specifically. We received our marching orders from the procuring, contracting officer. I am not aware of any political appointee

deciding who got the contract.

Mr. WAXMAN. You don’t know?

Mr. COX. We do not have insight to that.

Mr. WAXMAN. You don’t know the facts?

Mr. COX. No, sir. We do not.

Mr. WAXMAN. Is that true of all you?

Mr. NEFFGEN. That’s true.

Mr. COX. Yes, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. You need to speak.

Mr. RICHARD. Yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. May be true of all four of your, but your

spokesperson made a statement that was quite uneqivocal.

Mr. Waxman, would you suspend for one moment?

Pardon me. Would you like to vote?

Mr. SANDERS. Yes, I would.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. How do you vote?

Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Waxman, what do you suggest?

I vote yes.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman is recorded. Thank you.

Go ahead.

Mr. WAXMAN. We have a statement from your spokesperson and

the four of you, are unable to give any further information about

that. Mr. Mobbs said he gave Halliburton the task order to plan

for the takeover of Iraq’s oil fields. And he knew at the time that

Halliburton would therefore get the sole-source contract to put out

the oil fires and restore the oil fields. So he was obviously in a position to know. You are not. Your representative spokesperson said

something to the contrary.

One of the justifications we have heard for awarding these contracts to Halliburton without any competition is that Halliburton

was the best-qualified company to do the work. So let me ask about

Halliburton’s experience and qualifications.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Will the gentleman suspend?

Mrs. Davis, would you like to be recorded?

Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS OF VIRGINIA. No.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that the Members

record their votes without interruption? They could be on the

record.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I would like to have the Members record

their votes without interruption. But what I would like them to do

is get the assent that both you and I hear or see them, a Member

from each party as opposed to just registering with the clerk or

making signals or something, without objection.

Mr. WAXMAN. That’s fine.

The major rationale that Halliburton gave for why Halliburton

was the best qualified is that you had put out oil well fires after

the first Gulf war.

On March 24, 2003, you issued a press release announcing the

award of the Iraqi oil contract. That press release said the following: ‘‘In 1991, Halliburton crews brought 320 wells in Kuwait

under control. More than 190,000 work hours were incurred.

Halliburton’s crew extinguished 90 percent of the blowouts within

1 year.’’

This press release stated that Halliburton crews put out more

than half of the 650 oil well fires in Kuwait. Obviously such experience would be extremely relevant. But my staff has investigated

these claims, and they don’t appear to be true. The company that

had the contract to put out the oil well fires after the first Gulf war

was not Halliburton, it was Bechtel. And by all accounts Bechtel’s

performance was excellent. Yet Bechtel was not even allowed to bid

on the contract to put out the oil well fires this time.

And I have an article here about Terry Farley, who was the individual who led the effort to put out oil well fires after the first Gulf

war, and according to Mr. Farley, Halliburton ‘‘put out no fires.

Zero.’’ Now, how do you gentlemen respond? Who was the prime

contractor in charge of putting out the oil well fires after the first

Gulf war, Halliburton or Bechtel?

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Mr. NEFFGEN. I don’t have the specific information on 1991 on

who put out the oil fire. What I can tell you is the LOGCAP contract was competitively awarded to us in 2001. There was several

other offers that submitted proposals in that solicitation, and when

we were awarded the contract, nobody protested.

The original task order that we were issued under the LOGCAP

contract for the planning, the advance planning for the potential oil

fires if an invasion occurred was issued under the LOGCAP contract, and then it was the Army’s decision to transfer that from the

Army Materiel Command, who is our client for LOGCAP, to the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

Mr. WAXMAN. I understand all of that. We will get to some of the

questions about that, but do any of you have any information about

who actually put out the fires after the first Gulf war?

I think it is fair to say that none of you have further information

to give us.

Well, my understanding is that after the first Gulf war, Bechtel

deployed 1,000 engineering and construction professionals. The

company oversaw a work force of 16,000 nationals from 35 countries. Bechtel brought in 200,000 tons of equipment, the largest airlift since World War II, and reportedly capped over 650 oil well

fires.

In contrast, I have here an April 7, 2003, article in which your

spokesman Ms. Hall said only 60 Halliburton employees were on

the scene. That’s quite a difference.

Here is the problem as I see it. Bechtel had the most relevant

experience because it did most of the work after the first Gulf war.

Yet this time Bechtel was not even allowed to submit a bid. Instead, the contracts were awarded to Halliburton without any competition. That’s not the way our system is supposed to work.

The other rationale for giving Halliburton this contract was that

the Pentagon could do it quickly as a task order under the existing

LOGCAP contract that you are referring to, Mr. Neffgen. But this

explanation is also suspect. It does not appear that Halliburton

was uniquely positioned to work with DOD. Bechtel does a lot of

work for the military. In fact, Bechtel historically has done at least

as much military work as Halliburton, if not more. There should

have been no question about Bechtel’s ability to work for the military or to have the necessary clearances.

In fact, I understand that Bechtel also had an existing

preawarded indefinite contract with the Pentagon. This contract is

the cooperative threat reduction integrating contract. Under this

contract there’s not one preapproved company, but five. Bechtel is

one. Halliburton is also preapproved under this contract. So if DOD

had decided to use this contract as the vehicle for the task order,

DOD could have gotten bids from both Halliburton and Bechtel.

But DOD didn’t use this vehicle. DOD used the LOGCAP contract,

which excluded everyone but Halliburton. Is that correct, Mr.

Neffgen?

Mr. NEFFGEN. Yes, for the planning task order.

Mr. WAXMAN. I recognize it might have been a stretch to use the

cooperative threat reduction contract, but it would have been no

more of a stretch than using the LOGCAP contract. As we learned

at last month’s hearing, both GAO and the procurement attorneys

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responsible for LOGCAP determined that the Halliburton task

order was outside of the scope of LOGCAP. There is a strong presumption again awarding contracts without competition.

That’s the point I really want to emphasize. There’s a strong presumption against it for the very simple reason is that competition

protects the taxpayers. But in this case there was no competition,

and there don’t appear to be compelling reasons for failing to let

other qualified companies like Bechtel compete. That’s what we call

the definition of special treatment.

Now, in fact, the award of this contract, is only one example of

how the Bush administration sheltered Halliburton from competition. You were also sheltered during the implementation of the contract. Ten task orders were issued under the oil contract worth a

total of $2.25 million, yet my understanding is that Halliburton did

not have to compete for any of these task orders. There were five

task orders given to import fuel from Kuwait and other countries

into Iraq. These task orders were worth over $1 billion. Did Halliburton have to compete for any of these task orders, and did DOD

ever put this out for bid and allow other companies the chance to

show that they could bring in the gasoline for a lot less than Halliburton?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Will the gentleman yield for just a moment?

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I would like to see if we can get an answer

to the question.

Mr. NEFFGEN. It was an Army decision to award us the solesource contract, and we were pleased to see it and be in a position

to respond quickly and appropriately. I believe the GAO has done

an analysis on the—both the issuing of the task order for the planning under the LOGCAP, and it had some questions on that, but

that was resolved by the DOD’s General Counsel’s Office that

deemed it was appropriate use of LOGCAP to give us that planning

task order.

And also the GAO has reviewed the decision to give us the solesource award for the RIO and ruled that appropriate.

Mr. WAXMAN. These other task orders.

Mr. NEFFGEN. Once you have a contract, then the client issues

task orders for work that they think is important to be executed

under it. And typically task orders within a contract are never competed.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. My only question was, I think, in a sense,

they are the wrong people to ask. We had the military and everyone here last week. We can always review that. But they are the

wrong people to ask on this because they weren’t in the decision

mode in terms of how these vehicles and which one to choose.

Mr. WAXMAN. It shouldn’t be a surprise. We have questions

about how the contract was awarded to Halliburton. This has been

in the news for some period of time. We have raised it over and

over again. Finally, we have representatives from Halliburton here.

I would have hoped that we would have had people who could answer these questions.

But this highlights what is fundamentally wrong with the administration’s contracting approach. There was no competition at

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the front end when the political appointees gave Halliburton the

work. There was no competition at the back end when billions of

dollars’ worth of task orders were issued.

I now want to examine the other major question: Have there

been overcharges? Let me first ask about the hotels in Kuwait

where Halliburton employees have been staying for more than a

year. According to Marie deYoung, who testified earlier today, the

U.S. taxpayers paid Halliburton $10,000 a day to house Halliburton employees at a five-star hotel in Kuwait, but in the op ed

in the Wall Street Journal, David Lesar, the CEO of Halliburton,

denied this. I want to put up his quotation. He said, ‘‘Our Halliburton employees live in the same conditions as the troops.’’

I would also like to show you some pictures that we have of the

hotels where Halliburton employees have been staying. These are

pictures of the five-star Hilton Hotel in Kuwait and the five-star

Kempinski Hotel, also in Kuwait. I see one of them, and I will assume that is also one of them.

Do our troops stay at five-star hotels with maid service and complementary fruit baskets like this?

Mr. NEFFGEN. There are other government agencies staying in

these hotels.

Mr. WAXMAN. But the quote was ‘‘our Halliburton employees live

in the same conditions as the troops.’’ Do you know of any of the

troops that got to stay at these kinds of hotels?

Mr. WALTER. We would like to make sure that it is understood

that 87 percent of our 14,000 employees that are there are staying

in conditions with the troops, on the sites with the troops. We tried

to get onto these bases. We continue to this day to try to get onto

these locations. There is not space to do so.

So as we have to do that, we have to try to find locations where

we can stay in a secure location, and a hotel is the host that will

have the most availability of rooms in a location that is securable.

So that is why these locations have been selected. But we are trying our best to get out of them.

Mr. WAXMAN. You answered a question earlier. You were asked

to put in the camps in April of this year; is that correct?

Mr. NEFFGEN. Yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. That doesn’t contradict about what Ms. deYoung

had to say, because she was talking about a time preceding April

of this year.

Mr. NEFFGEN. Last fall, a year ago, we also had discussions

about building a 1,000-man camp of Conex containers at Camp

Arifjan. We were not able to go through with that deal. The best

we can get is a 5-year lease for property, and our task orders go

3 months to 6 months in duration. We cannot obligate government

money beyond that period of time.

Mr. WAXMAN. Her testimony is that they wanted to put them in

the tents.

Mr. NEFFGEN. Same thing. We have to get space designated

available for use to put tents up. We were not given that space.

Mr. WAXMAN. I think it is important to recognize that Marie

deYoung’s allegations have been confirmed by independent auditors

a few weeks after she made these allegations and they first surfaced. The inspector general for the CPA confirmed that HalliVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:37 Nov 17, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00561 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 D:\DOCS\96407.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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burton was billing the taxpayers to house people at the five-star

Hilton Hotel in Kuwait. According to the IG, the taxpayers could

have saved $3.6 million on an annual basis if these individuals had

been moved to other quarters.

Mr. WALTER. I would like to address that audit report, sir. That

audit report was not accusing Halliburton of overspending and

waste. What that report was doing was focusing on the CPA itself.

The CPA would present people to Halliburton. We were tasked by

CPA to maintain a forward deployment center so that their—diplomats and others coming into theater could be processed, given

their flak jackets and all of their equipment that they need and

their training so they could be sent up to Iraq to their particular

location.

The points made in the inspector general’s report were that if the

CPA were more diligent in how they would assign people and who

should get what type of facility, then the taxpayer would be able

to save money. That was not a criticism of Halliburton, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. The CPA said it included contractor employees

that were being put up there.

Mr. WALTER. Sir, since the FDC is located at the Hilton, we do

have to put our employees there. We follow the direction of the

CPA where our employees are. There are two types of facilities

there. There are rooms that—one or two people to a room. Then

there are what are called villas, larger facilities that can—I believe

they have four to five bedrooms, and downstairs is used for office

space. We will go wherever the CPA asks us to put our people.

Mr. WAXMAN. I appreciate your comments. I just put it in contrast to what your own representative said about employees living

in the same conditions as the troops.

Mr. WALTER. Like I said, sir, 80 percent of our employees are living in the same conditions as the troops. And as we can get more

people onto the sites, we will.

Mr. WAXMAN. Who were the elites that got to stay in the hotel?

Mr. WALTER. I don’t agree that the term would be elites per se.

Mr. WAXMAN. Who got to stay in the hotel?

Mr. WALTER. The people who are currently at Camp Arifjan are

the people who are working on Camp Arifjan. The people who are

not able to stay at Arifjan or the support functions and other types

of roles, they can either do the job on Arifjan or off Arifjan.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me turn to fuel importation. You consistently

said you delivered gasoline at the best value, the best price and the

best terms. Yesterday Representative Dingel and I released a report comparing Halliburton’s gasoline prices from Kuwait with

those of the Pentagon’s own fuel delivery unit, the Defense Energy

Support Center.

Your average price of gas from Kuwait was $2.68 per gallon. On

April 1st the Pentagon took this center away from you and gave

it to the Energy Support Center. That job pays just $1.57 a gallon

to import gasoline from Kuwait. As that chart over there illustrates, the military is now doing the identical job for $1 per gallon

less. How can you say that your price was reasonable?

Mr. COX. I would like to address that, if I may, sir. First, it is

interesting to note in the report that we released to say this is an

apples-to-apples comparison. I submit to you that it is not. Quite

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frankly, our costs are all in, after the job has been done, and, you

know, the three components of our price are what they are.

The DESC costs that are presented in the report, I think, need

to bear some scrutiny, and—but in a general sense, we are comparing what KBR did at one point in time, almost a year ago, a little

over a year ago now, to what DESC was able to accomplish 9, 10

months later, given a 90-day ramp-up period. DESC came to theater in December, worked side by side with us from December until

April 1st when they took over the mission.

Turning to the three components of the price, our understanding,

and we understand—and I do not have insight as to their contracts

or whatever, but I understand that they were paying for fuel a

price, a certain amount of money. It is a fixed price with economic

adjustment, meaning that they pay the spot price plus I think it

is $0.16 per gallon is what they are paying. Today I am told

that——

Mr. WAXMAN. But they were buying it from the same company

you were buying from.

Mr. COX. They were buying from DESC.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did they get a better deal than you?

Mr. COX. No, sir, I don’t think they did, and I will tell you why.

We had a fixed price with a subcontractor. No matter what the spot

market did, we had the price locked in. In December and January

we know that the spot price—we know he was losing money providing fuel to us because of the fixed price he gave us. DESC’s fixed

price of $0.16 over the spot market. If you look at that today,

that’s—around July 16th, that was $1.04. The spot market plus 16

is $1.20. We only paid $1.14 per gallon. So right now my understanding is DESC is paying more per gallon as we did.

Mr. WAXMAN. As I understand it, yours was 32 cents over the

spot price, and the DESC was 16 cents over the spot price. So the

spot price can change, but if you have that——

Mr. COX. But in my case it doesn’t matter what the spot price

does. I had a fixed price of $1.14 a gallon. Today I would be paying

$1.14 a gallon. They’re paying $1.20.

So I think, sir, we need to look inside some of those numbers.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, we need to haul them in here and find out

why they are charging us less. We need a hearing on this.

But Halliburton’s prices stayed extraordinarily high for month

after month, and there was no major price drop until the DESC

came in and took over. And then there was a price drop. They are

using the same supplier, they are picking up the gasoline in Kuwait from the same supplier, they are transporting it to Iraq. It’s

the same service, yet they are able to do it at a lower price.

We consulted with independent experts, and they have a very

different view than Halliburton. Phil Verleger, a California oil

economist, said it’s as if they put the gasoline on the Queen Mary

and took it around the globe before they delivered it.

Jeffrey Jones, the former Director of the DESC, said, I can’t construct a price that high. One oil expert from the region said simply,

‘‘it’s highway robbery.’’ Based on what we know now, that may not

be a bad description.

You dispute that?

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Mr. COX. Sir, I do dispute the overcharge allegations. If I may,

I would also disagree with the statement we didn’t achieve any cost

savings over the course of our contract to deliver fuel. We reduced

the cost of trucking by approximately 20 percent through renegotiation.

We were not able to renegotiate the fuel prices, but I think if you

look—the biggest difference that has been identified is the cost of

the transportation. The cost in the report, as issued for DESC,

states that it’s based on three round trips per month per truck. We

only achieved about two round trips per truck, and I am told that

is all DESC is achieving also. So maybe there is a premise or assumption of three round trips that needs to be reevaluated before

we start comparing those.

I would also make the point on transportation that DESC is benefiting from the system that we put in place. Altanmia’s startup

costs were already paid for in our contract. They had a fleet already on the scene for DESC to utilize, and we built staging facilities under our contract that DESC is using.

So, in essence, it’s not surprising to me that Altanmia is giving

them a lower price than we got. I think you find that in many of

our contracts, where when we first go on scene, the cost comes

down from that because we build the facilities initially. Those are

capitalized in 6 months or so.

Mr. WAXMAN. You might say it was a startup cost, but

Halliburton’s costs remained high for month after month. And the

only time the price was dropped is when DESC took over.

Mr. COX. Sir, that’s not factually correct. There was a change in

the price of the transportation. The cost of the trucks went down

in about the October timeframe.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me ask you about another aspect of your

prices: fees and overhead. For the gasoline from Kuwait, these totaled over $31 million, and I have a chart over there that shows

this is 40 times greater than DESC’s overhead costs. Why should

the U.S. Government pay Halliburton $31 million when the Pentagon can do this work itself and get a better price?

Mr. COX. Well, first of all, the 24 cents per gallon, let me explain

what is in that; 13 cents of that is an award fee that I have not

earned yet, have not been awarded yet, haven’t gotten yet. The remaining 11 cents is pretty reasonable per gallon. That covers our

overhead management cost from top to bottom. Staff back here in

Arlington, the staff in Houston that support us all comes from that

cost.

And when I look at the DESC costs, sir, it seems very low to me,

and I would want to ensure that they have included the cost of the

DESC office back here in Washington that supports those DESC

troops in the field, if you will. Having been involved in a couple of

outsourcing decisions for the government, I know it is very difficult

for the government to capture all its cost and do an apples-to-apples comparison. And I personally feel like we don’t have that here

yet.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, the whole rationale for using private contractors is supposed to be to save the taxpayers money, but in

Halliburton’s case, the exact opposite seems to be happening. The

taxpayers are paying millions more for something apparently this

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government can do a lot cheaper, and that doesn’t make sense to

me.

I want to go into a different subject. The GAO also released a report yesterday on Halliburton’s other major contract for work in

Iraq: LOGCAP. As in the gasoline report, GAO found that when

the military removed Halliburton from the equation, it saved

money. Here is the example GAO gave.

Prior to the war, a Kuwaiti company called Tamimi was feeding

our troops in Kuwait. Last year, DOD terminated that contract and

gave the contract to Halliburton, but because Tamimi had been

doing a good job, Halliburton was instructed to subcontract the

feeding contract to Tamimi. So here, as in the case of the oil contracts, you were simply a middleman. All that has happened was

that Halliburton went out to Tamimi, they continued to feed the

troops, but Halliburton got to take its own cut of the expenses.

Finally, somebody in DOD decided to examine the situation, and

earlier this year DOD eliminated Halliburton as the middleman.

And here is what happened. Overnight the cost to the taxpayers

were reduced by 43 percent at 6 dining facilities in Kuwait without

a loss of service or quality. And according to GAO, the total savings

to the taxpayers from getting rid of Halliburton was $31 million.

Halliburton had a chance to review GAO’s report, but you didn’t

object to GAO’s findings, did you?

Mr. WALTER. No, sir, and I’d appreciate the opportunity to discuss that point.

What we have here is, once again, an apples-to-oranges comparison. Tamimi was not at these facilities at the time. It was a new

task order at a new location, and the government asked us, in fact

directed us, to use Tamimi to do the dining facility services.

As we did that, we required Tamimi to get all of its up-front

costs, to hire all the personnel, to get the kitchens and generators

and everything they needed to put into place to run that dining facility. At the end of the year, we would then renegotiate a lower

price with Tamimi, because they would have their mobilization

costs and all the rest of these costs taken care of.

Now, what happened is as this contract was winding down, the

government did go back to Tamimi, and the government directed

us not to continue negotiating with any of our other vendors. We

had already opened up a competition for the Kuwait dining facilities. And our Iraq dining facilities, after the initial 6-month term

for those, we were able to negotiate significant savings after the

contractors had their initial let’s get everything in place, let’s get

the dining facilities up, let’s serve the troops in the wartime environment. We have RPG rounds. We have pictures of all sorts of

things that are happening that are causing a lot of mayhem and

confusion in this area.

But once it’s in place, once the people know what’s happening,

they have a little bit better idea of what the scope is going to be,

we are identifying those significant cost savings, and we are passing them directly back to the taxpayer.

Mr. WAXMAN. And one of the cost savings was to eliminate you

as a middleman and go to them directly.

Mr. WALTER. Well, sir, in the cases of the dining facilities that

we’ve been able to cut out, we’ve been able to cut out prices that

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exceed 45 percent. So I think we would be able to identify even

more savings to the government, possibly.

Mr. WAXMAN. I appreciate that.

I want to clarify a matter. In the previous panel I said that I was

concerned the majority was working with Halliburton in preparing

for this hearing, and that the majority was receiving information

that was not being shared with the minority. In response, Chairman Davis said that all the information the majority had received

was in the written testimony.

In fact, that doesn’t appear to be true. In Representative

Blackburn’s questioning, she asked about conversations between

Ms. deYoung and her managers at Halliburton. We asked Ms.

deYoung about this after she testified, and she said these were conversations with Tom Quigley.

This was not in any of your written testimony, and it wasn’t

shared with the Democrats. So my question is: Did any of you or

anyone at Halliburton share information with the Republicans that

wasn’t shared with the Democrats?

Mr. NEFFGREN. Congressman, we’ve been working with your staff

as well as the majority staff for months and sharing information,

telling the story, telling the facts, and everything else. I have no

direct knowledge of any communication between Tom Quigley, who

is actually in Kuwait——

Mr. WAXMAN. No, no, my question is not about that. You talked

to our staff, and you talked to their staff. But my question is: Did

you share some information with their staff that you didn’t share

with us?

Mr. NEFFGREN. Did not.

Mr. WAXMAN. You did not. So she did some terrific research in

finding out about things that weren’t within your written statements.

Mr. NEFFGREN. Did not share anything with her; correct.

Mr. WAXMAN. Did anybody from Halliburton?

Mr. WALTER. I did not, sir.

Mr. COX. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. RICHARD. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. WAXMAN. So none of you individually did. Do you know

whether anybody in your company has?

Mr. NEFFGREN. I’m unaware of anybody else in my company

doing that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentleman’s time has expired, but let

me try to explain it.

To my knowledge, and I have staff who I just rechecked with,

and I know that our staff put together a briefing memorandum for

our Members that we didn’t put together for yours based on documents available to both parties, just as you do the same for yours.

But I’m not aware of any ex parte communication.

We tried to work this with you, and there were a lot of documents that we got back and forth that we drew certain conclusions

that I don’t think were shared with you. But the documents were

available to you as well. We just put them up as talking points for

other side, as I’m sure you do for yours.

I think that clarifies it.

Mr. WAXMAN. I appreciate that clarification.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. I have yielded back. I would just make

one comment.

Mr. WAXMAN. We never got those documents.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. I think you did get the documents.

Mr. WAXMAN. My staff is telling me that, for the record, we never

got documents that would have been the basis for that question.

We will review it again. It could be just a misunderstanding.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. We will go over it with staff.

We have had two hearings with DOD witnesses to explore the rationale for awarding the planning task order and RIO contracts to

Halliburton. We marched everyone up here, and the government,

I think, made their case at the time. And after a certain amount

of time, where they felt they were able to, they went out in a competitive way.

In wartime you don’t always have that luxury. So I think we

have already explored those issues with appropriate witnesses.

It is interesting that we mentioned Bechtel should have been

permitted to compete. Bechtel didn’t complain. They didn’t protest.

In fact, Bechtel also has multibillion-dollar contracts with Iraq

through USAID.

Also, the incident that the ranking member mentioned concerning Altanmia and GAO was not in the final report. It was in a

draft report. And as so often happens in these issues, GAO might

have changed their mind when the facts are learned. Often with

these reports you go back and forth with people you are investigating, and that is the difficulty when you move forward with tentative reports. But it was an issue that was raised, and I think an

appropriate question he raised to you.

I don’t have any other questions at this point for the gentlemen

here, except that we will continue to exercise vigorous oversight of

every contractor. That’s our job up here. But from my perspective,

we appreciate the job you are doing, your company is doing, and

the people in the field. You have lost a number of employees over

there, had others injured, and people there in harm’s way as well.

From our perspective, we appreciate the job that they are doing.

Mr. NEFFGREN. Thank you.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Mr. Waxman, any other questions?

I guess we have the 5-minute rule, so we can go down the road

and let your Members have a shot.

Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Chairman Davis.

First thing I want to say is that your role is to help manage Halliburton. I think each one of you are doing the best that you can.

We know it’s difficult. But you have a sole-source contract because

you are considered one of the best, and we can expect no less from

you.

Our job is to investigate issues and allegations that are relevant

to the subject matter, that being were there overcharges; was there

a possibility of bad management. So we need to follow the facts. I

know you are in a defensive mode because certain allegations are

made, and that is why we are here, and then we have to determine

that.

So in that regard, first, Mr. Neffgren, for several months we have

been trying to get information about Halliburton employees you

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identified as taking up to $6.3 million in kickbacks from a Kuwaiti

subcontractor. Representative Lynch in particular has asked questions about this on two previous committee hearings. We have not

yet received any information about this.

I know in your invitation letter to come here today to testify that

the chairman directed you to address this issue. Will you please let

us know who the employees were involved in the $6.3 million kickback?

Mr. NEFFGREN. I am sorry, sir. There is an ongoing investigation

with the Department of Justice and the DOD IG. I am not permitted to provide that information.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I know there is an ongoing criminal investigation, and we have an investigation going on, too. These are

issues where we are asking for the two employees so that we can

determine from our investigative point of view. Have you been ordered not to disclose any of that information by the Justice Department?

Mr. NEFFGREN. I have been advised by counsel not to mention

the people.

Mr. WALTER. I will answer that, sir, though. We have provided

all the files, all of the procurement files, to the Department of Justice so that they can complete their review. We are working, our

legal department is working very closely with the Department of

Justice on that.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. So you’re saying that we don’t have the information we have asked for, but you have given that to the Justice

Department. Not arguing with you, just asking as a fact.

Mr. WALTER. I believe that is true.

Mr. NEFFGREN. Yes, that’s correct.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me ask you this: Have you made any

comments to the media, or anybody from Halliburton, involving

these two employees?

Mr. NEFFGREN. Personally, no.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You are not aware of anybody at Halliburton having comments with the media about this incident and

these two employees for the subcontractor?

Mr. WALTER. When this was initially mentioned, there was a

press release, and there is a notification in our financial statements

that identify that there is an issue. But I believe that is as far as

it goes.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Were these two employees managers?

Mr. NEFFGREN. No, they weren’t.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. They were not managers? Do you know

what their positions were?

Mr. NEFFGREN. Administrative people.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. They must have been in some kind of management capability or they wouldn’t be involved with $6.3 million.

Mr. NEFFGREN. Let me clarify. Senior subcontract administrators.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How many of those did you have in Iraq at

that time?

Mr. NEFFGREN. We have about 300, 350 right now.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What is the name of the subcontractor that

paid the bribes?

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Mr. WALTER. Sir, there is no statement that they have paid

bribes. That is under investigation. It is an allegation of a kickback.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Then I take that back.

What is the name of the country where there was alleged bribes

to have been paid?

Mr. NEFFGREN. Kuwait.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. In Kuwait. But what’s the name of the

company, the subcontractor?

Mr. NEFFGREN. I’ve been advised by counsel that I can’t disclose

that.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Have you had other contracts with this Kuwaiti company over and beyond what this incident was dealing

with, with respect to the two contractors, the $6.3 million kickbacks?

Mr. NEFFGREN. We have provided information to the Justice Department on this specific incident, and then all of the documentation pertaining to the subcontractor and to the employees that potentially received the kickback.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You did pay back money to DOD; did you

not?

Mr. NEFFGREN. Yes, sir.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Now, as a result of that, at this committee’s

hearing on March 11, Dov Zakheim, the Pentagon’s comptroller, reported that KBR has paid the government $6.3 million for the estimated impact of the kickbacks. He then said, the DCAA, Defense

Contract Auditing Agency, has requested supporting data from

KBR to validate that sum.

At our June 15th hearing, Halliburton had still not provided the

information DCAA requested. And, according to the testimony of

William Reed, the Director of DCAA Halliburton, Halliburton failed

to provide data necessary for DCAA to verify the accuracy of that

amount.

I would like to know whether or not you or anybody else at Halliburton is under any legal requirement to withhold this information

from us.

Mr. NEFFGREN. I’d be glad to answer that question. When we provided the $6.3 million refund to the government, that was the

full value for the task order that was subcontracted. It was a 100

percent reimbursement for the prior billings under that task order.

So, in effect, the government has not paid for the services received

by them. Therefore, at the time of the request in March, there was

nothing for DCAA to audit because the government had not paid

for anything.

We have had subsequent communications with DCAA.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. My 5 minutes are up.

Mr. WALTER. But we have provided information to DCAA and we

continue to provide it in accordance with what our legal counsel advises.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Let the Chair just say that under the voluntary disclosure policies, when we encourage companies to come

forward if they think there has been an act of fraud committed, if

congressional committees then go in there and start reaching out,

nobody is going to disclose anything. There has to be confidentiality

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to encourage companies when they find something wrong to come

forward with it. That is why we have not pursued this after discussions with Justice. We are satisfied that these are being investigated by investigators who have teeth to make the appropriate

enforcement mechanisms. At least that is my position as chairman

of the committee.

Ms. Watson. We do have one more panel, so I would just caution

Members, but I don’t want to deprive anybody of taking their time.

Ms. Watson.

Ms. WATSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your consideration,

and I want to thank the witnesses for being here.

I want to turn to trucks, because earlier, in the first panel, we

heard testimony, and I would like to reiterate some of that testimony.

It says that KBR brought its new trucks, usually Mercedes or

Volvos, with virtually no mileage on the odometers. And they said

that in a convoy, one of the trucks got a flat. ‘‘since we didn’t have

any spares, we had to leave the truck on the side of the road.’’

Who’s responsible to perform the maintenance on the trucks; is

it the military, or is it Halliburton? And why would Halliburton remove the spare tires?

Mr. RICHARD. Ma’am, thank you for allowing me to clarify that

issue. It is KBR’s responsibility to provide maintenance for all of

our assets, and all of our convoys have spare tires. I do want to

clarify that issue. All of our convoys have spare tires available.

When a convoy is out on MSR, it is the military’s responsibility

to provide protection for that convoy. But no truck has been abandoned, no truck has been lost due to a spare tire.

Ms. WATSON. Let me ask you this: Are you saying that the gentleman who testified in front of the committee before your panel

was not telling the truth?

Mr. RICHARD. Ma’am, what I’m saying is that gentleman did not

testify that a truck was lost or abandoned.

Ms. WATSON. Let me phrase my question clearly. The testimony

was that there were no spare tires available. The spare tires were

taken. ‘‘And since we didn’t have any spares, we had to leave the

truck on the side of the road.’’

I didn’t say, and he did not say, the truck was destroyed. Why

were there no spare tires if these were new vehicles, Mercedes and

Volvos?

Mr. RICHARD. I want to clarify two points, ma’am. All convoys

had spare tires. His truck may not have had a spare tire, and I will

clarify that point, but all convoys have spare tires. A convoy consists of 25 trucks.

The issue of spare tires. We are in and amongst several hundred

other trucks while we are in a staging area in Iraq. We only represent 20 to 30 percent of the total convoy movement in Iraq. There

are several other contractors direct-hired by the military to support

the effort. Many of those drivers are foreign nationals. Many of

those drivers are from other countries. They don’t have the same

type of equipment KBR has. They are not as well equipped as our

trucks. So, therefore, at times, they do take equipment from our

trucks.

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And I would like to reiterate for my testimony that it is the

Army’s responsibility to provide security for our equipment. But

sometimes those tires are taken from our trucks. But we do replace

those tires, and all convoys have spare tires.

Ms. WATSON. Is this not a true statement? This is a gentleman

who has been driving for 13 years, and he stated in front of the

committee that ‘‘KBR removed the spare tires from the trucks on

my convoys. I don’t know why they did this, but on one convoy, one

of the trucks got a flat tire. Since we did not have a spare, we had

to leave the truck on the side of the road.’’ Is that not a true statement?

Mr. RICHARD. That truck may not have had a spare, but the convoy, other trucks in the convoy, could have a spare tire. All convoys

have spare tires, ma’am.

Ms. WATSON. It said ‘‘but one convoy,’’ they didn’t have a spare

tire. Well, then, if they did, then why would they leave the truck

on the side of the road?

Mr. RICHARD. That’s a military decision, ma’am, based on the

level of hostility.

Ms. WATSON. Oh, OK. It was the military that made that decision?

Mr. RICHARD. It’s the military’s decision to abandon a truck, yes,

ma’am.

Ms. WATSON. Also, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Warren that used to

work for Halliburton testified on the first panel that they lost an

$85,000 truck because they didn’t have a spare tire. Then we heard

later that they were told to destroy the trucks so that the enemy

could not get them, strip them, and use them.

Mr. RICHARD. The Army makes a decision to destroy a truck

based on the level of hostility and the insurgents that are in that

particular area. Again, the Army has command and control of the

convoy. It is their responsibility to provide protection for our employees and for the trucks.

We have lost 14 civilians, ma’am, and it is their responsibility to

provide that protection.

Ms. WATSON. I didn’t ask about protection. I’m asking about the

maintenance.

Mr. RICHARD. Yes, ma’am.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The gentlewoman’s time has expired.

I am going to go to Mr. Ose and recognize him for 5 minutes.

Mr. OSE. Mr. Chairman, I won’t take 5 minutes. As I understand

it, during the delay in my getting here, you had a vote that was

transpiring, and that is left open?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Correct. Still open.

Mr. OSE. How am I recorded?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You are not recorded.

Mr. OSE. And this is the vote on the subpoenas for documents

that may represent communication between the Office of the Vice

President and the Department of Defense?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Correct.

Mr. OSE. And I am recorded in what way?

Chairman TOM DAVIS. You are not recorded.

Mr. OSE. I am opposed to that. I would vote no on issuing such

a subpoena.

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Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. The committee is noticed.

Would the gentleman like to make any other comments.

Mr. OSE. No, I just want to talk to committee counsel here.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK, thank you.

The gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. TIERNEY. I thank the chairman and I thank the witnesses

for their testimony here today. I know we have been talking mostly

about particular accusations of charging or overcharging, things of

that nature, but I want to broaden it out just a little bit to talk

about some of the planning aspects on this.

I want to ask you a little about the planning that was done with

respect to Iraq’s oil infrastructure on the one hand and the planning done to provide basic support for the troops on the other.

My understanding is that your company was involved with the

planning efforts for both of those through the LOGCAP contract; is

that correct?

Mr. WALTER. Yes, sir, that’s correct.

Mr. COX. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, Michael Mobbs, who is an adviser of Under

Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, told our committee staff that contingency planning for the reconstruction and operation of Iraq’s oil

infrastructure began months before the war. It was a deputies committee setup of all the deputies of the relative departments and

agencies.

Mr. Mobb said that he was charged by them to work on a plan

during the summer of 2002, and then Halliburton was issued a

task order in November 2002 to do the planning; is that correct?

Mr. COX. I believe that’s correct, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, from the information we have from previous

hearings, we were told that a career lawyer from the Army Materiel Command wrote a memorandum saying that the LOGCAP contract couldn’t be read to encompass contingency planning for the

operation of Iraq’s oil infrastructure, and that then one of the

Army’s Deputy General Counsel for Procurement agreed with that

memo, and then eventually, apparently, it was overturned when

one of the Department of Defense’s general counsel made an overriding decision. But GAO has since then indicated that it also

thinks that it was beyond the scope of that contract to have

LOGCAP’s contract read to encompass the contingency planning for

the oil.

Did anybody in your company raise that issue during that time,

that you know of? Anybody in your company indicate that this may

not be the appropriate vehicle by which to take this contingency

planning contract?

Mr. NEFFGREN. No. We feel it was appropriate under the

LOGCAP contract. The LOGCAP contract has a component that is

a planning component. We have full-time planners that do scenarios for all different countries in the world and all different type

of potential events, and that is their full-time job. So it would only

be appropriate for them to be involved in this type of a scenarioplanning exercise.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you think the GAO is incorrect in their determination?

Mr. NEFFGREN. No. You asked my opinion.

565

Mr. TIERNEY. I’m not trying to debate with you, I want to know

if that is your opinion.

Mr. NEFFGREN. I do. I think it was a legitimate task order to a

planning mechanism within the LOGCAP program.

Mr. TIERNEY. The final version of the plan was completed in February 2003?

Mr. COX. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is that about the same time that Halliburton also

started making the deals with subcontractors to implement the

plan and to start their prepositioning of the equipment? Would it

be about that time?

Mr. COX. About that time, during the planning phase and when

we were notified to start getting ready, we put together a proposal,

if you will, to do that. At that time we put together our team to

execute the contract.

Mr. TIERNEY. My point on this only indirectly affects you, so

you’re going to get a little relief here for a second. The point I’m

trying to make is if I compare this to the planning for the troops,

under LOGCAP you were supposed to provide for the essential support services to our troops, the meals, the water, the housing, and

the other essentials of life for the servicemembers; is that correct?

Mr. NEFFGREN. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. Now, when GAO issued yesterday’s report on

LOGCAP, one of their key findings was that the planning for the

use of LOGCAP’s contract to support the troops in Iraq did not

begin until after the fall of Baghdad. You looked at that report and

didn’t make any objections or corrections, so we are assuming that

is an agreeable statement with you? That is when the planning

started, after Baghdad fell?

Mr. WALTER. For the work in Iraq, yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it is a little astonishing to me, and I think to

others, the planning for what is going to happen to our troops,

their meals, their water, their housing, the essentials of life, their

protection, all of that doesn’t even begin to happen until May 2003,

after Baghdad falls, but in the meantime the administration had

your company planning for Iraq’s oil infrastructure months before

it had a plan how to support our troops.

The GAO report also indicated that the Army failed to follow its

own guidelines. The Army’s guidance recommends a comprehensive

statement of work be developed in the early phases of the contingency planning. Can I take it that you were never charged by the

Department of Defense to start the planning with respect to the

support of the troops; and that it wasn’t a case of your delaying it

on your own?

Mr. WALTER. In Iraq, yes. We were already involved in the planning in many other areas, in Kuwait, in Afghanistan, in Djibouti

and other locations. So we have been working with the Army in

many other locations.

Mr. TIERNEY. So despite the contact that you had with them,

they never asked you to start the contingency planning for the

troop situation in Iraq until May 2003?

Mr. WALTER. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. I think it is just disturbing, when we look at these

priorities, that we have troops living in tents, eating MREs through

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August 2003, because there hadn’t been adequate prewar planning

for dining facilities and housing. We have heard reports over and

over again that our troops didn’t have enough body armor or armored vehicles.

I have one family in my district that lost a son, who wrote home

that he was scared every time his troops went out because they

didn’t have armor for their vehicles. And it was a matter of a week

or two that the family learned that he had, in fact, been killed because an RPG went through his unarmored vehicle.

It seems to me that these shortfalls all could have been prevented with some proper planning, and that this whole timing consequence is just a misplaced priority of this administration. They

put oil planning ahead of planning for our troops’ safety and for

their support. They placed no spending limits on the LOGCAP

work done by your company in Iraq. Yet we find over here they are

shortchanging veterans’ health care. They issue monopoly contracts

to private companies in Iraq, but they don’t adequately fund education in this country.

This isn’t a statement of your performance or anything like that,

it’s just a general observation. We have gone over the overcharging

hearings, and we’ve gone back and forth, and I don’t have much

else to add on that, but I do have just an abhorrence here for the

fact these priorities were so out of line and so out of whack that

in the summer of 2002 we had an administration focusing on planning for oil, but not until May 2003, and after Baghdad fell, would

they even begin to ask your company to start planning for how to

take care of our troops and how to protect them and how to service

them.

So I thank you for your testimony, but those are questions I

think we will have to address back to the administration on a

broader scale.

Mr. MICA [presiding]. Mr. Lynch, if you have questions.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, again, thank you for coming here to help the committee with its work.

I just want to say that, first of all, we had a discussion recently

with Bill Reed over at the Defense Contracting Audit Agency, and

also I think we had General Kern at the same time, and I asked

them this question about the whole bribery issue with these two

Halliburton employees.

Can you tell me whether you provided information to this committee and to others regarding the bribery under this Voluntary

Disclosure Act?

Mr. WALTER. Sir, under the Voluntary Disclosure Act and the

regulations, it says that you make a voluntary disclosure to the inspector general or to the Department of Justice. We went to both

of those groups with this information. To the best of my knowledge,

they are performing an investigation.

I have talked to our counsel. They said that we have been providing information to them.

Mr. LYNCH. Well, apparently, there is some inconsistency here,

and I want to get to the bottom of this. On Tuesday we learned

that was, in fact, not true, that the Pentagon IG said the information was not provided to the Pentagon under this program, and

567

that even if it was provided under this program, matters of bribery

would not be protected; that the information would still have to

come forward to this committee.

I just want to give you another example. We had a woman, Mary

Robinson, who was also in the midst of a criminal investigation,

who came before this committee even though there was an active

ongoing criminal investigation, came forward and provided information that was helpful to this committee. Actually, it was helpful

to the administration, and she came forward and testified.

So what I’m trying to get to the bottom of is why are we not

being told at least the names of these employees, the names of the

contractors? What level—if you can’t tell us the individuals involved, what level of Halliburton’s administration and company hierarchy, what level were these two individuals at; and were they,

in fact, overseeing other government contracts in other countries as

well?

Mr. NEFFGREN. They were not officers of the company. They were

employees of KBR. They were low-level supervisory people, senior

subcontracts administrators were their titles. They are no longer

with the company. And all the contracts that they have touched

while they were employees of the company have been provided to

the Department of Justice for their review and investigation. There

is an ongoing Justice Department investigation.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Let me just ask you to pause there. We were

once told that one of these Halliburton employees involved in the

payoff scheme was the procurement materials and property manager of Halliburton/KBR in Kuwait, and that he was in charge of

a very large number of contracts and purchase orders.

Are you telling me now that testimony before, which was also

provided under oath, was false? Are you telling me that?

Mr. NEFFGREN. I have been advised that the employee’s title was

a senior subcontracts administrator, not the manager of PMP.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Other Members?

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If you have a truck and you don’t maintain it by replacing the

filters on it routinely, and then the truck breaks down in a convoy

and it has to be either abandoned or destroyed, who is responsible

for the loss of that truck in dollars, the American taxpayer, or does

your company assume the responsibility for not keeping up the

maintenance?

Mr. RICHARD. Ma’am, we’re not aware of any trucks that have

been lost due to lack of maintenance.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. So the truck drivers that were speaking to us

before were lying?

Mr. RICHARD. You’ll have to repeat that, I didn’t hear you.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. The truck drivers with years of experience, the

one gentleman who even described how he on his own cleaned out

the filter on his truck, he was lying to us then under oath?

Mr. RICHARD. No, ma’am, I do not disagree that truck drivers periodically have to perform maintenance on their trucks as well. We

operate in a very substandard environment.

568

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I understand that, Mr. Richard, but he said that

the trucks weren’t being placed on a regular log of maintenance,

just like we do with our cars. I realize you are in a war zone, but

I also realize that some of the filters, carrying with and having at

both ends—so you have maintenance logs on every single truck?

Mr. RICHARD. Yes, we do. We currently perform routine maintenance every 2 weeks on our trucks.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. That’s fine.

Mr. WALTER. But, ma’am, just to clarify one point. He did not

state the vehicle was abandoned by the side of the road. It broke

down outside of a facility, and he pulled it into the Scania facility,

I believe.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I wasn’t talking about that particular truck.

Thank you, though.

I’m trying to understand how these contracts work a little better.

So you have a master contract, and then you do a subcontract. The

cost plus cost, is that the subcontractor? Do they also have the ability to do the cost plus cost?

Mr. WALTER. No, ma’am, they do not. What we do is a majority

of our subcontracts are awarded on a fixed price or a fixed unit

price basis.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. So the Kuwaiti oil company, Altanmia, you have

all the documentation for what they charged through you?

Mr. COX. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. For their prices?

Mr. COX. Yes, ma’am, we do.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Is that available to the committee?

Mr. COX. It has been provided in the last month, I believe,

ma’am, since I returned. We provided every contract document for

the Kuwaiti fuel mission and the Turkey and Jordan. The total fuel

mission has been provided to the Department of Defense, I believe,

at the request of this committee. But I do not know if they have

provided it to you or not.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Well, I will ask Mr. Waxman to yield in a

minute.

I have one other question. Payroll. You have two ways in which

you pay, like I am sure you are salaried employees, but you have

two ways in which you are paying some of your employees in Iraq

and Kuwait. One is 8-hour, and one is 12-hour; is that correct?

Mr. WALTER. No, ma’am, that is not correct. Our employees are

paid for the hours they work. If there is a case where an employee

cannot do something, for example, they are in a convoy that does

not have the security and cannot leave, or they are at a location

where they cannot get to their activity, there is a standby pay,

which is a maximum of 8 hours a day. That means they are ready

to go, but because of the conditions they are not allowed to go.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I don’t disagree with that.

Mr. WALTER. But everything else is based on the hours worked.

So if an employee works 10 hours in a day, they record 10 hours

on their time sheet, and get paid for 10 hours. If they work 12

hours a day, they will record 12 hours and be paid for 12 hours.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. And when you advertise for a job, do you advertise based on the 8 hours? We hear things on the news that so-andso is being paid so much to drive a truck. That is based on 8 hours?

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Is that based on 8 hours standby? Is standby a lower rate than

when you are actually in the convoy driving?

Mr. WALTER. The compensation can be very flexible, depending

on what is happening. All of that is described to the employees

when they are given their compensation packages. There is no

promise of a 12-hour day. The only guarantee is if you are going

to be over there and not able to work, you will get a minimum of

8 hours per day on standby.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. And they sign their time cards. Does a supervisor have to sign each time card, validating them?

Mr. WALTER. Yes, they do.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. And all that information is available, and everything is documented where everybody is?

Mr. WALTER. Yes, ma’am.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Do you follow that on your subcontractors? How

often do you audit those time clock records?

Mr. WALTER. If a subcontractor has timekeeping requirements,

for example, we do subcontract some labor, their time cards are included with their invoices.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. I would like to yield to Mr. Waxman.

Mr. Waxman, have you been given all the information on this

Kuwaiti contract? I understand we had some difficulty getting

some information. We were told that Kuwait couldn’t provide it.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I am not sure I can answer that at this time,

but let me, for the record, clarify it.

And then, also, I want to ask these gentlemen some further questions, but I prefer to do it in writing and have them respond in

writing, for the record, if they will all agree to that.

I see them indicating in the affirmative.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, the ranking member will submit

additional questions to the panelists, and you can respond in writing, and it will be made a part of the record.

Has there been an agreement on keeping the record open?

On a time agreeable to the majority and minority, without objection, so ordered.

I want to thank you gentlemen for participating today and for

your assistance with the committee. We will excuse you at this

time, and we will now move to our third panel and final witness.

And that witness is a single individual on this panel, Dr. Steven

Kelman. Dr. Kelman is a Weatherhead professor of public management at Harvard Kennedy School of Government and former Director Of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy under the Clinton

administration.

Dr. Kelman, if you will stand and raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. MICA. Let the record reflect that the witness answered in the

affirmative.

Dr. Kelman, you are recognized. The custom is we give you about

5 minutes. You are the only witness on this panel. I guess we could

be a little lax.

Mr. KELMAN. I was actually told since I’m a panel, I get a little

more. We’ll see what happens. I know it’s late.

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Mr. MICA. Any lengthy statement or material you would like to

be made part of the record, you can do so through a request of the

Chair.

With that, Dr. Kelman, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF STEVEN KELMAN, WEATHERHEAD PROFESSOR OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Mr. KELMAN. Congressman Waxman and Congressman Mica,

and particularly my fellow Massachusettsan, Congressman Lynch,

it is a pleasure to have an opportunity to speak before the committee today on some of the broader issues for the health of our procurement system that the oversight of Iraqi contracting raises. I

am not an expert on Iraqi contracting. I am going to limit myself

to some of the broader issues.

And what I would like to do is start with some quick vignettes,

and you might say, what does this have to do with these hearings?

So please be a little patient, and I will explain what they have to

do with the hearing in a minute.

The first vignette. I was teaching an executive education program recently at the Kennedy School for some senior government

managers and military officials, and we were discussing another

subject, performance measurement in government. And a woman

from the Defense Logistics Agency, in the context of that discussion, got up to talk about the efforts that DLA has been making

over the last decade to improve its customer service, to be more

customer-oriented and so forth, and how they had used performance measures for that.

She was standing or sitting at one end of the class. After she

talked, a gentleman raised his hand at the other end of the class,

who it turns out is the wing commander at Minot Air Force Base

in North Dakota, and he said to her, in front of the class, thank

you very much. I have noticed as a customer, as a wing commander, I have noticed that the procurement system is serving us

better. We are getting things more quickly, you are more responsive, the procurement system is doing a better job.

At lunch I talked with him in more detail, and I have more of

that in my written testimony, but I asked him more about that,

and he just said there has been a real change in attitude, and then

he added on, in addition to that, on the planes that he flies, they

are able to upgrade them technologically, you know, technological

refreshment on planes, much faster than they used to be able to.

So that is vignette one.

Vignette two. I had breakfast recently with a long-time career information technology manager at the Bureau of Labor Statistics,

who is now in the private sector, and when he asked me to breakfast, he had experienced the procurement changes over the last 10

years at the end of his government career, and he said, how are

they going, Steve? And I said, well, they are under some challenge

now, whatever. He said, gee, that’s too bad. And then he told me,

again, a number of stories, but I will only share one with you.

He talked about a situation where he was the program manager

for an IT contract in the late 1980’s; that is to say, the time of the

old procurement system. The vendor was performing terribly. He

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went to his assistant administrator to say, the vendors aren’t performing, we have to get rid of them. And the assistant administrator said, look, if we get rid of this vendor, it will take 2 years

to get on contract again, and then 6 months for bid protest. Just

live with it. And he had to.

Vignette three. Two of my students at the Kennedy School just

did a study, did a lot of things, but let me share the thing I want

to share with you. They looked at a sample of information technology services contracts at GSA and asked the government customer how satisfied they were with the contractor’s performance

and the contract, how good a job the contractor had done; 1 to 10

scale; 10 was the best, 1 was the worst. The average satisfaction,

and this is now, 9.4 on a scale of 1 to 10. Very satisfied.

I did a similar survey in the late 1980’s, same question, same

kinds of contracts, again among government customers, how satisfied they were then, the old procurement system; 6.9 on a 1 to 10

scale. So it’s moved from 6.9 to 9.4.

So what’s the relationship between these vignettes and oversight

of Iraqi contracts, you might ask? The relationship is that each of

these vignettes illustrates how we are doing a better job than before in focusing the government’s procurement system on its primary goal, which is to deliver the best value to taxpayers. What

we have been trying to do over the last decade is to switch the

focus of the procurement system from simply avoiding doing bad

things to trying to do good things.

What do I mean by that? Let me illustrate as an example as a

Member of Congress. We have all sorts of rules, as we should, ethical rules for standards of conduct among Members, and we expect

people to comply with them. But imagine a Member of Congress

who spends 20 years in Congress, and they have never violated the

rules, but that’s all. No legislation, no oversight, they haven’t done

anything else. And they say, I never violated a rule of Congress.

They have done nothing wrong, but they haven’t accomplished anything. They haven’t done anything right.

And that’s the distinction I’m trying to draw with what we’re trying to do with the procurement system. We have ethical standards

for contractors, saying they shouldn’t be cheating the government,

government officials should be observing the rules in awarding contracts, and so forth. But a contractor could have a spotless record

of never having cheated the government and still done a terrible

job in all their contracts in terms of their substantive performance.

A government official can always follow all the rules and still have

done a terrible job of asking for the right things in the first place

or putting the right performance measures in the contracts, or

whatever.

And, traditionally, the government procurement system was almost completely focused on trying to prevent people from doing the

wrong thing, rather than, in addition to that, saying, you have to

do the right thing as well. What we have tried to do, mostly in a

bipartisan way over the last decade, is to refocus the system toward saying, your job is not done when you follow the rules. You

need to be oriented toward the mission of the organization and use

your head to come up with innovative solutions.

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I present this history, and will finish up shortly, because experienced government contracting people remember the old days. And

given this history, it is very easy for our procurement work force

to get the message from the headlines that we want them to go

back to those old days of just being the procurement police. I know

no member of this committee has this intention, and I know many

members of this committee are advocates of the Federal work force.

Chairman Davis and Congressman Waxman are cochairs of the

Congressional Public Service Caucus, for which I really admire

both of you for what you do on that. But I think it is important

to understand, and I want to emphasize, that I think it is unintentional, nobody means to be doing this, but I will tell you from talking with career folks in government that a lot of these headlines

about Iraqi contracting and a whole bunch of things going on are

really demoralizing and even terrorizing the government work

force.

Now, you don’t intend it, but they are getting the message, the

unintended message, that there is no downside to asking for another review; to say no to the customer, to the military customer,

whatever; to slow down the process; to just be the police. That is

the message they are getting. I know you are not trying to send

it. So what I am begging the committee to do is to work to counteract that message that I know you do not intend to send.

I urge you to do two things. One is I would urge, and we really

need to repeat over and over again to our contracting work force

and to contractors, that you believe that their responsibility is provide best value for the taxpayer; not just to avoid doing things

wrong, but to do the right things. Their job isn’t done when they

follow the rules.

Second, I would urge the committee to hold a hearing where you

bring in career government employees to talk about—not an Iraq

contract; a hearing just in the general, Committee on Government

Reform, on innovative business solutions that they have been working on to try to improve the value that contracting gives the government. And by doing that, you will send a message that you care

about that kind of behavior and performance as well.

So that is my message, and I appreciate your time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelman follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Well, thank you, and I am going to yield immediately

to the ranking member for questions. Thank you.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kelman, for your testimony, and

we value what you have to say on these issues because we know

you are an expert in this area, and I appreciate the key message

you are bringing to us.

But I want to ask you about a certain situation. In Iraq there

seems to be a pattern of awarding monopoly contracts, splitting up

the geographical areas for electricity contracts in one area or oil

contracts in another area of Iraq, and the contractor gets a monopoly, and then they do not compete for that. They will go out and

hire—or they may even compete, but there is no opportunity for

competition in it. For the over 2,000 discrete projects.

As a procurement expert, don’t you think it would be better to

have competition on the discrete projects so that we can get the

benefit of competition, rather than a monopoly, with which it is

hard to get the market forces to work?

Mr. KELMAN. That is a very, very good question. In fact, while

I was in the government, we passed the Federal Procurement

Streamlining Act of 1994, which did just what you said. It recognized task order contracting and set up a preference for multiple

awards so there could be ongoing competition.

So as a general matter, I am in favor of using that whenever it

is feasible, and actually had some conversations with your staff and

others about it because I thought you were raising a very good

issue.

And I want to emphasize I do not know very much about Iraq,

but I asked a fairly senior person at the Defense Department, a career civil servant, hey, what about this suggestion? Why aren’t you

guys doing this more? Because I think, as a general matter, it is

a very, very good idea. What the person told is, you’ve got to be

careful, and I think you should continue to look at this issue, because I think as a general policy matter, I agree with you 100 percent, but what this person told me she was worried about was if

you award a multiple contract here in Washington to IBM and

Computer Sciences Corp. and KPMG, or whatever, they have all

these employees who are working on a lot of projects at one time.

So you bid them on an individual task order, and if they don’t win

that task order, they are working on something else, and so you

switch to this other. It’s just a lot of work to sort of share around.

This career DOD person—and again I’m putting it in the mix. I

agree with the direction you are going, but this career person said

to me, our concern would be that it’s not like these, if you did a

multiple award in Iraq, that they have a lot of other things to do.

If they do not win an individual task order, they will just sort of

sit around and do nothing, and might that not increase the price?

That was her worry.

But I would be curious for your reaction to that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, all the major companies are in Iraq. Bechtel’s

there, Halliburton’s there, Parsons is there, and there is no reason

why they shouldn’t be able to compete with each other on a task

order and then get the job based on the competition.

Mr. KELMAN. What I would say——

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Mr. WAXMAN. And their whole strategy with this administration

is to carve out these monopolies, and then let them make the decision on the subcontractors.

Mr. KELMAN. What I would say is I would hope, if possible on

a bipartisan basis, but have you been asking DOD about this?

Mr. WAXMAN. From the very beginning. See, the original contract

was to Halliburton to run the oil fires infrastructure. They said

they were going to put out oil first, but then they were given the

monopoly to run the oil sector, and we asked, well, why were they

given a no-bid contract? Other companies might have competed.

And they came through with a series of reasons.

Mr. KELMAN. What I would say is continue to push this issue.

I believe, as a matter of procurement policy, and it is reflected, as

I say, in the procurement reform legislation in the 1990’s, the idea

of a multiple awards and task order contracting is a good idea.

A person whom I trust at DOD has argued to me, and she is a

career person, there are reasons not to do it here, but I would continue to push. Unless you are satisfied with the answer, keep pushing them, because I think as a general matter it is a very good

idea.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony, and I see

we have a vote on.

Mr. MICA. Additional questions?

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. No.

Mr. MICA. Well, we do have a vote.

Now, you come before the committee as a pretty experienced witness and on the subject in particular of acquisition. You have probably reviewed some of what took place with the awarding of the

contract that is under question with Halliburton and this

LOGCAP. It is my understanding that this was let initially some

time ago under the previous administration.

Given what you know about the previous contract and then the

situation we found ourselves in, do you think generally the way

they proceeded in allowing this to be an extension of an existing

contractor, sort of an add-on, was the appropriate way?

And then I think the ranking member raised the question of

breaking these up into smaller parts. Just one quick general question.

Mr. KELMAN. Yes. I think I am going to—all I really know about

this is what I have read in the newspapers. There is a lot of stuff

back and forth, so I don’t really feel like I am an expert on how

these contracts were awarded and so forth. I do know just—I feel

pretty confident before I read the newspapers. Actually the original

LOGCAP contract was awarded the first time in the first Bush administration, was repeated in the Clinton administration and then

repeated.

Mr. MICA. A long-time contract. But when you get into a situation where you need services ASAP and have an existing

contract——

Mr. KELMAN. The——

Mr. MICA. Not just in general.

Mr. KELMAN. The whole reason for a contract in this situation—

and it was an innovation and a good innovation in the first place—

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in order to be able to gear up quickly for things in battlefield situations, you can’t gear up quickly unless you have a contract in place

before you do it.

Now, the debates about what was in scope, what was out of

scope, that really goes beyond what I know enough about having

an opinion. But the general idea that we should be setting up these

vehicles in advance, I think, is a very good one. Indeed, there are

other examples of them done by very progressive—our most innovative career people.

You know, Defense Logistics Agency in Philadelphia, the way

they changed during the 1990’s the way they buy medical supplies

and uniforms, where they moved to what is called a prime vendor

distributor. And what they did was some smart guy who got the

message, your job is not over when you have obeyed the rules, you

have to think creatively, he came up with the idea when they

awarded those contracts for medical supplies—they have sort of a

normal distribution, you know, during peacetime. The contract

that’s prenegotiated says, in the event of war, you have to be ready

to send us X percent more. That’s part of your contract. And so

that is in place before a military action starts.

That is very intelligent contracting. That’s the kind of thing we

want our work force, our career work force, to be thinking more

about and using their heads. That is the whole idea behind the procurement changes of the last decade.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I may have additional questions, too, to

submit.

We are running a little bit out of time. I do appreciate your being

patient with the committee.

Mr. KELMAN. You have been very patient.

Mr. MICA. Well, you have been very patient to wait to be our

final witness.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, would you permit me to ask the

gentleman to extend my best wishes to his father-in-law?

Mr. KELMAN. I will be seeing him very shortly. Thank you so

much.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Without objection, wishes will go to your father-in-law.

We have one item of unfinished business. We have had a rolling

vote here. The clerk will report the tally on the open vote on the

ranking minority member’s motion to authorize a subpoena.

The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, I have 19 ayes and 23 noes.

Mr. MICA. There being 19 ayes and 23 noes, the motion is not

agreed to.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, might I point out that this was a

straight party-line vote?

Mr. MICA. Well, I thank the gentleman for recognizing that there

is still a Republican majority on the committee and in the Congress.

There being no further business to come before the committee,

the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton and additional information submitted for the hearing record follow:]

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