1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

MATHEW SELOVER, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 3:20cv04698-TKW-HTC 

ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD 

OF COMMISSIONERS and 

RAYME EDLER, 

Defendants. 

___________________________/

DEFENDANT RAYME EDLER’S MOTION TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT 

WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUME OF LAW

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., Defendant Rayme Edler (“Dr. 

Edler”) moves to dismiss plaintiff Matthew Selover’s complaint because it fails 

to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and because Dr. Edler is 

entitled to qualified immunity.

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.

Plaintiff filed a five-count complaint against the Escambia County Board 

of County Commissioners (“the County”) and Dr. Edler in the Circuit Court for 

Florida’s First Judicial District in and for Escambia County. The County timely 

removed the case to this Court. 

Counts I and III assert claims under 42 USC §1983 against the County 

and Dr. Edler in her official capacity for alleged violations of the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff alleges that the County and Dr. Edler failed 

to give him due process and retaliated against him in violation of the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States constitution. Counts II and IV 

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assert the same claims against Dr. Edler in her individual capacity. Count V 

asserts a claim under the Florida Private Whistleblower’s Act against the 

County and Dr. Edler in her official capacity. 

Following removal, the County moved to dismiss Counts I, III and V, the 

claims asserted against the County and Dr. Edler in her official capacity. 

Because “official capacity” suits are simply another way to plead claims 

against the County. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 105 S. Ct. 

3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985). Consequently, granting the County’s 

motion to dismiss Counts I, III and V would work a dismissal of the “official 

capacity” claims against Dr. Edler. Id. For the avoidance of doubt, Dr. Edler 

joins and adopts the County’s motion as to Counts I, III and V.

With this motion, Dr. Edler seeks the dismissal of Counts II and IV 

because at all times relevant to the Complaint she acted within the scope of 

her discretionary authority and did not violate clearly established law, so the 

doctrine of qualified immunity protects her from suit. See Harbert Int'l, Inc. 

v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1998) citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 

457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Because 

qualified immunity protects Dr. Edler from suit, including discovery, Plaintiff’s 

complaint may be dismissed at the 12(b)(6) stage where, “(1) from the face 

of the complaint, (2) [the court] must conclude that (even if a claim is 

otherwise sufficiently stated), (3) the law supporting the existence of that 

claim-given the alleged circumstances-was not already clearly established, (4) 

to prohibit what the government-official defendant is alleged to have done, 

(5) before the defendant acted.” Marsh v. Butler County, Ala, 268 F.3d 1014, 

at 1023 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). 

There can be no doubt that Dr. Edler was performing a discretionary 

function. Plaintiff’s allegations all relate to Dr. Edler’s statutory authority to 

supervise and assume direct responsibility for the medical performance of the 

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emergency medical technicians and paramedics operating for Escambia 

County’s Emergency Medical Services, to conduct a quality assurance review 

of the medical performance of a paramedic operating under her supervision, 

and to report any grounds for concern regarding such paramedic to the 

Department of Health. Fla. Stat. § 401.265(1) (1998).

Likewise, Dr. Edler did not violate clearly established law. The Florida 

Department of Health has specifically held that a Medical Director for an 

Emergency Medical Services system “has the authority to condition, limit, 

modify or suspend the [paramedic]’s medical performance while operating for 

the licensee [Escambia County EMS] consistent with the Medical Director’s 

direct responsibility for the medical performance of all [paramedics] operating 

for the licensee.”1 Further, such “conditioning, limitation, modification or 

suspension of a Certificate holder’s medical performance” can include required 

training “as a precondition for some or all parts of the certificate holder’s 

medical performance while operating for the licensee.” 

On its face, Plaintiff’s complaint establishes Dr. Edler’s immunity, and it 

is due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Even if Dr. Edler did not 

have immunity, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may 

be granted.

II. COMPLAINT’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS.

Plaintiff’s complaint includes the following allegations relevant to Dr. 

Edler: 

1 Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Emergency Services, Final Order Granting 

Petition for Declaratory Statement, November 1, 2007, attached as Exhibit 1. The Eleventh 

Circuit gives substantial deference to a state agency's interpretation of a statute the agency 

administers. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Meadows, 304 F.3d 1197, 1208 (11th Cir. 

2002). 

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• Plaintiff has been employed as a paramedic with Escambia County’s 

Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”)2 since February 2012.

(Complaint ¶5).

• Since April 2018, Dr. Edler has been the EMS Medical Director,

3 with 

responsibility “for the medical performance of all Emergency Medical 

Technicians and Paramedics of Escambia County,” who operate under 

her license as set out in §401.265, Fla Stat. (Complaint ¶¶3, 8, 

Complaint Exhibit A). 

• On April 23, 2019, Dr. Edler chaired an EMS Quality Assurance review

of Plaintiff’s medical performance, with a 5-member committee which 

included County officials who did not usually serve on QA 

committees. During the review, Dr. Edler allegedly “brought up 

matters that were almost a year old and/or were already resolved.” 

(Complaint ¶¶17, 21, 28).

• After the Quality Assurance review:

o Dr. Edler reported concerns about Plaintiff’s medical 

performance to the Department of Health, and required Plaintiff 

to undergo training, and limited or modified his medical 

performance pending completion of the Department of Health’s 

investigation. (Complaint ¶¶31 and 38).

o Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dr. Edler with the County’s 

Human Resources Department, and several weeks later an 

2 Escambia County’s Emergency Medical Services are regulated by the “Emergency 

Medical Transportation Services Act,” Fla. Stat. § 401.2101, et seq., which sets out the duties 

and responsibilities of emergency medical technicians and paramedics like Plaintiff, and of 

Medical Directors like Dr. Edler. 

3

“Medical director” means a physician [like Dr. Edler] who is employed or contracted by 

a licensee [like Escambia County Emergency Medical Service] and who provides medical 

supervision [to paramedics like Plaintiff], including appropriate quality assurance but not 

including administrative and managerial functions, for daily operations and training pursuant 

to this part. Fla. Stat. § 401.23 (2013).

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unnamed HR representative met with EMS Chief Leon Salter, 

Interim Public Safety Director Dosh and Dr. Edler about 

Plaintiff’s complaint. (Complaint ¶¶28 and 30).

• Subsequently, Director Dosh advised Dr. Edler that her conduct 

appeared to be retaliatory and that she should prepare a performance 

improvement plan. Dr. Edler did not prepare a performance 

improvement plan for Plaintiff, but “continued to press for disciplinary 

action against Plaintiff,” recommending that he ben demoted or 

terminated, and he was placed on administrative duty, in which he 

could not work overtime, before returning to an EMT position.

(Complaint ¶¶32, 33, 34, 35, 41 and 49).

• Subsequently, County Attorney Peppler gave the legal opinion that 

Dr. Edler did not have the authority to demote, terminate, or 

otherwise discipline Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶42, and Complaint Exhibit 

A). 

• HR Representative Spainhower also prepared a draft report which 

concluded that Dr. Edler may have engaged in retaliation. Ultimately, 

however, the County’s Director of Human Resources Jana Still 

determined that Dr. Edler had not retaliated against Plaintiff. 

(Complaint ¶¶45 and 68; Complaint Exhibit B).

• Notwithstanding Mr. Peppler’s opinion, and Mr. Spainhower’s report, 

the County has failed and refused to follow its own policies, but 

instead allowed Dr. Edler to limit his medical performance, by 

assigning him to EMT duties, rather than paramedic. (Complaint ¶¶43

and 64). 

• Last, Dr. Edler called the Medical Director of Santa Rosa County to 

advise him that Plaintiff was not qualified to work as a paramedic for 

the Lifeguard Ambulance Service. Santa Rosa’s Medical Director 

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disagreed, and Plaintiff has continued his work for Santa Rosa. 

(Complaint ¶75).

III. ARGUMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard.

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant

t o mov e fo r di smi s sal o f a complain t whi ch i s legally in su f fi cien t , 

i .e. , fail s t o state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). I n t h e c o n t e x t o f Rule 12(b)(6) motion

practice, the court must assume that all the factual allegations set forth in

the complaint are true and construe those allegations in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593,

598, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1382, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989); United States v.

Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 327, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 113 L.Ed.2d 335

(1991); Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990). 

Rule 8(a)(2) sets the standard for legally sufficient allegations : 

a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim 

showing that the pleader is entitled to relie f.’ See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). While 

Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’” it does demand “more 

than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. 

Plainly stated, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id., quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-1965, 

167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked 

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id., quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1955. 

When defendant asserts qualified immunity, the Court may dismiss 

Plaintiff’s complaint may be dismissed at the 12(b)(6) stage where, “(1) from 

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the face of the complaint, (2) [the court] must conclude that (even if a claim 

is otherwise sufficiently stated), (3) the law supporting the existence of that 

claim-given the alleged circumstances-was not already clearly established, (4) 

to prohibit what the government-official defendant is alleged to have done, 

(5) before the defendant acted.” Marsh v. Butler County, Ala, 268 F.3d 1014, 

at 1023 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). See also

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-2156, 150

L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). (“Where the defendant seeks qualified immunity, a

ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the

costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive.

Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other

burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a

mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively

lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. As a result, we

repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at

the earliest possible stage in litigation.”) (emphasis in original; internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. Official Capacity Claims Against Dr. Edler.

The County moved to dismiss Counts I, III and V, which assert claims 

against the County and Dr. Edler in her official capacity. While the County did 

not directly move for dismissal as to Dr. Edler in her official capacity, it is well 

established that 

official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of 

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. 

“As long as the government entity receives notice and an 

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects 

other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is 

not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in 

interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an 

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official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the 

official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a 

damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the 

government entity itself.

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L. Ed. 

2d 114 (1985), quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 

U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 1978)(other 

internal citations omitted). Consequently, granting the County’s motion to 

dismiss the claims against the County would necessarily dismiss the official 

capacity claims against Dr. Edler. Id.; See also Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 

F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Because suits against a municipal officer 

sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are 

functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity 

actions against local government officials, because local government units can 

be sued directly (provided, of course, that the public entity receives notice 

and an opportunity to respond)”). For the avoidance of doubt, Dr. Edler joins 

in County’s motion to dismiss Counts I, III and V and adopts its arguments 

for dismissal.

C. Individual Capacity §1983 Claims Against Dr. Edler.

Plaintiff’s Counts II and IV assert the §1983 claims from Counts I and III 

a s s e r t s c l a i m s D r . E d l e r i n h e r individual capacity. P l a i n t i f f 

c o n tends g e n e r a l l y t h a t D r . E d l e r f a i l e d t o g i v e h i m d u e 

p r o c e s s a n d r e t a l i a t e d a g a i n s t h i m i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e F i r s t 

a n d F o u r t e e n t h A m e n dm e n t s t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s 

c o n s t i t u t i o n . These claims against Dr. Edler should be dismissed both 

because she has qualified immunity and because they fail to state claims on 

which relief may be granted.

Dr. Edler asserts the defense of qualified immunity, which affords 

complete protection to government officials performing discretionary

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functions from suit in their individual capacities unless their conduct violates

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known. Harbert, 157 F.3d. at 1281. Because qualified 

immunity protects Dr. Edler from suit, and not merely liability, her entitlement 

to the defense may be decided at the 12(b)(6) stage:

The purpose of this immunity is to allow government officials

to carry out their discretionary duties without the fear of

personal liability or harassing litigation, protecting from suit all

but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly violating []

federal law. Because qualified immunity is an entitlement not

to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, questions

of qualified immunity must be resolved at the earliest possible

stage in litigation. It is therefore appropriate for a district court

to grant the defense of qualified immunity at the motion to 

dismiss stage if the complaint fails to allege the violation of a 

clearly established constitutional right. 

Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d. 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2005). (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted; footnote added).

1. Dr. Edler’s Discretionary Function.

To be entitled to qualified immunity, Dr. Edler must show that she was

acting within the scope of her discretionary authority when the allegedly

wrongful acts occurred. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir.

2002), quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). “In

making this determination, ‘[i]nstead of focusing on whether the acts in

question involved the exercise of actual discretion, we assess whether they

are of a type that fell within the employee’s job responsibilities. Our inquiry

is two-fold. We ask whether the government employee was (a) performing a

legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job- related goal), (b)

through means that were within his power to utilize. . .. In applying each

prong of this test, we look to the general nature of the defendant’s action,

temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been committed for an

unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an

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unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate

circumstances.” O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004),

quoting Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th 

Cir. 2004). In making this determination, the court asks whether the 

complained of acts “would be within, or reasonably related to, the outer 

perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties. The scope of immunity should 

be determined by the relation of the [injury] complained of to the duties 

entrusted to the officer.” Harbert, 157 F.3d at 1282. 

The statutory framework for the County’s Emergency Medical Services is 

set out in the “Emergency Medical Transportation Services Act,” Fla. Stat. 

§401.2101, et seq. Dr. Edler is the County’s Medical Director, “a physician 

who is employed or contracted by a licensee and who provides medical 

supervision, including appropriate quality assurance but not including 

administrative and managerial functions, for daily operations and training 

pursuant to this part.” Fla. Stat. § 401.23(15)(2013). Plaintiff is a paramedic, 

“a person who is certified by the department [of health] to perform basic and 

advanced life support pursuant to this part.” Fla. Stat. § 401.23(17). See 

also §401.23(1)(2)(7) and (8)(2013)(definitions of “Advanced life support,” 

“Advanced life support service,” “Basic life support,” and “Basic life support 

service.”). 

Dr. Edler’s responsibilities as Medical Director are delineated by 

statute, in pertinent part, as follows: 

(1) . . . . The medical director must supervise and assume direct 

responsibility for the medical performance of the emergency 

medical technicians and paramedics operating for that emergency 

medical services system. The medical director must perform 

duties including advising, consulting, training, counseling, and 

overseeing of services, including appropriate quality assurance 

but not including administrative and managerial functions.

(2) Each medical director shall establish a quality assurance 

committee to provide for quality assurance review of all 

emergency medical technicians and paramedics operating under 

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his or her supervision. If the medical director has reasonable belief 

that conduct by an emergency medical technician or paramedic 

may constitute one or more grounds for discipline as provided by 

this part, he or she shall document facts and other information 

related to the alleged violation. The medical director shall report 

to the department [of health] any emergency medical technician 

or paramedic whom the medical director reasonably believes to 

have acted in a manner which might constitute grounds for 

disciplinary action. Such a report of disciplinary concern must 

include a statement and documentation of the specific acts of the 

disciplinary concern. 

Fla. Stat. § 401.265.

Under the test set out in O’Rourke, 378 F.3d at 1205, there can be no 

doubt that Dr. Edler was acting within the scope of her discretionary authority 

relevan t to the events alleged in the complaint. Pursuant to her duty to 

“supervise and assume direct responsibility for the medical performance of the 

emergency medical technicians and paramedics,” she convened a “quality 

assurance review” of a “paramedic[] operating under . . . her supervision,” 

and reported concerns about Plaintiff’s medical performance to the Department 

of Health, and to the Medical Director of Santa Rosa County. That is, she 

engaged in acts that were entirely within her job responsibilities, and were 

legitimate job-related functions, through means that were within her power to 

utilize. O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004), quoting 

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). 

2. Dr. Edler Did Not Violate Any Clearly Established Right.

Dr. Edler having established that she was acting within the scope of

his discretionary authority, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that

Dr. Edler is not entitled to qualified immunity. See O’Rourke, supra, 378

F.3d at 1206 (“Once a government official demonstrates that he is

potentially entitled to qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff

to demonstrate that the official is not actually entitled to it.”). In Saucier

v. Katz, supra, the Supreme Court set forth the following two-part analysis

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for determining whether qualified immunity is appropriate: first, considering

the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, do the facts show

that the defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right; and, second,

“if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’

submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established.” 533 U.S. at 200 & 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2155 & 2156; see also

Vinyard, supra, 311 F.3d at 1346 (“The Supreme Court has set forth a twopart test for the qualified immunity analysis. ‘The threshold inquiry a court

must undertake in a qualified immunity analysis is whether [the] plaintiff’s

allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation.’ If a constitutional

right would have been violated under the plaintiff’s version of the facts,

‘the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly 

established.’” (internal citations omitted)).

Distilled to its essence, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he did not 

receive Fourteenth Amendment due process because the QA meeting was 

called on short notice, and he was not given an opportunity to challenge Dr. 

Edler’s conclusion that he could not “work as a paramedic under her license,” 

and that his First Amendment right to free speech was violated when Dr. Edler 

reported concerns about his medical performance to the Department of Health 

and to the Medical Director of Santa Rosa County’s EMS after he made a 

complaint about her to the County’s Human Resources Department. These 

allegations do not Plaintiff’s contention that his clearly established 

constitutional rights were violated. 

(a) Dr. Edler did not violate Plaintiff’s due process rights

Dr. Edler adopts and incorporates the arguments in the County’s motion

to dismiss, (Doc. 8, Section III.D, pages 15-22) and adds that Plaintiff will also 

be entitled to a hearing from the Department of Health, as set out in Fla. Stat. 

§ 401.265. 

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Moreover, Dr. Edler was not responsible for establishing due process 

procedures or providing them to Plaintiff. Quite the contrary, as set out by 

statute, Dr. Edler’s responsibility was to report concerns about Plaintiff’s 

medical performance to the Department of Health. Fla. Stat. § 401.265. 

Since Dr. Edler was not responsible for providing due process to Plaintiff, she 

did not cause any due process violation. See Watkins v. Central Broward, ___ 

Fed. Appx. ___, 2020 WL 40152 (11th Cir. 2020).4

(b) Dr. Edler did not violate Plaintiff’s free speech rights

Dr. Edler adopts and incorporates the arguments in the County’s motion 

to dismiss and adds that the sequence of events alleged in the complaint 

establishes that she did not retaliate against Plaintiff. As plead, Dr. Edler 

convened a Quality Assurance review of Plaintiff’s medical performance on April 

23, 2019, which led to her report to the Department of Health. Because the 

Quality Assurance review which prompted the report to the Department of 

Health took place before Plaintiff complained to Human Resources, his 

complaint could not have been the cause of the Quality Review and the related 

report to the Department of Health. 

(c) Florida Law clearly establishes the Appropriateness of Dr. 

Edler’s Actions. 

In a November 1, 2007, Final Order Granting Petition for Declaratory 

Statement, attached as Exhibit 1, the Florida Department of Health, Bureau 

of Emergency Services determined an EMS Medical Director’s scope of 

authority over “certificate holders” such as paramedics. The Bureau held that 

the Medical Director has “direct responsibility for all Certificate holders,” 

accompanied by the “supervisory authority necessary to require that the 

medical performance of the Certificate holders is of a quality and type for 

4

“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be

cited as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

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which the individual Medical Director is willing to take direct responsibility.” 

Further, “the exercise of this supervisory authority by the Medical Director is 

a mandatory part of the job,” which includes “assessing the medical 

performance of all certificate holders,” including through quality assurance 

reviews. Such “supervisory authority enables the Medical Director to consider 

whether and how Certificate holders perform medically.” In short:

The Medical Director has the authority to condition, limit, modify 

or suspend the certificate holder’s medical performance while 

operating for the licensee consistent with the Medical Director’s 

direct responsibility for the medical performance of all certificate 

holders operating for the licensee. 

Such conditioning, limitation, modification or suspension of a 

Certificate holder’s medical performance while operating for the 

licensee can include requirement of completion of Medical Director 

identified training as a precondition for some or all parts of the 

certificate holder’s medical performance while operating for the 

licensee.

Final Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Statement, attached as Exhibit 

1. Because the Florida Department of Health has clearly set out the 

parameters of a Medical Director’s authority under §401.265(1), Plaintiff 

cannot establish that Dr. Edler violated his clearly established rights by acting 

in conformity with the statute. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am. V. Meadows, 

304 F.3d 1197, 1208 (11th Cir. 2002) (Courts give substantial deference to a 

state agency’s interpretation of a statute the agency administers.) 

IV. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons set out above, Dr. Edler’s motion to dismiss the 

complaint is due to be granted. Dr. Edler has qualified immunity because all 

times relevant to the Complaint she acted within the scope of her discretionary 

authority and did not violate clearly established law, so the doctrine of qualified 

immunity protects her from suit. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged adequate 

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facts to support his claims that his due process and first amendment rights 

were violated. 

WHEREFORE Defendant Rayme Edler moves to dismiss plaintiff 

Matthew Selover’s complaint because it fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted against her, and because Dr. Edler is entitled to qualified 

immunity. 

CERTIFICATION UNDER L.R. 7.1 (F)

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1 (F), I hereby certify that the number of words 

in the Motion and Memorandum do not exceed 8,000 words. The total number 

of words is 4,187.

Dated: April 13, 2020

/s/ Cecily L. Kaffer

Cecily L. Kaffer

pro hac vice 

The Kullman Firm

A Professional Law Corporation

Post Office Box 1287

Mobile, Alabama 36633

Telephone: (251) 432-1811

clk@kullmanlaw.com

Attorney for Defendant Rayme Edler 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on April 13, 2020 I electronically filed the foregoing with the 

Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such 

filing to the following:

Katie Gudaitis

Stephanie Pidermann

Lydecker Diaz

495 Grand Blvd.

Miramar Beach, FL 32550

Telephone: (305) 416-3180

kg@lydeckerdiaz.com

sp@lydeckerdiaz.com

J.J. Talbott

Law Office of Jerimiah J. Talbott, P.A. 

900 East Moreno Street

Pensacola, Florida 32503

Telephone: (850) 437-9600

jjtalbott@talbottlaw.com

/s/ Cecily L. Kaffer

Cecily L. Kaffer

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