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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. ANGEL AGRON

(SC 19499)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.

Argued September 20—officially released November 22, 2016

Paul A. Catalano, for the plaintiff in error (3-D Bail

Bonds, Inc.).

Timothy F. Costello, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Kevin T. Kane, chief state’s

attorney, Michael Dearington, former state’s attorney,

and Leah Hawley, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the defendant in error (state).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. This case is before us on a writ of

error brought by the plaintiff in error, 3-D Bail Bonds,

Inc. (plaintiff), who claims that the trial court improperly denied its motion seeking relief from its obligation

on a surety bail bond (bond) pursuant to General Statutes § 54-65c, which the trial court had ordered forfeited

after the principal on that bond, Angel Agron, who is

the criminal defendant in the underlying case, failed to

appear for a scheduled court date. The defendant in

error, the state of Connecticut, responds that the trial

court properly denied the motion, claiming that the

plaintiff had not satisfied the requirements of § 54-65c

because Agron was not ‘‘detained’’ for purposes of § 54-

65c when he was personally confronted by fugitive

recovery bail enforcement agents in Puerto Rico, and

the state refused to extradite him to Connecticut. We

conclude that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s motion and, therefore, dismiss the writ of error.

The record reveals the following relevant facts. In

2006, Agron was arrested and charged with several

offenses.1 The trial court set bail on these charges in

an amount totaling $20,000. The plaintiff executed a

bond in that amount and Agron was subsequently

released from custody.

Agron failed to appear for a scheduled court date on

June 23, 2014, and the trial court ordered the total

amount of the bond forfeited. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2013) § 54-65a (a), the court ordered a six

month stay of execution of the forfeiture. Upon being

notified of Agron’s failure to appear, the plaintiff initiated an investigation that revealed that Agron fled to

Puerto Rico and remained there. On December 17, 2014,

Agron was personally confronted by bail enforcement

agents in Puerto Rico. The state’s attorney, however,

declined to initiate extradition proceedings.

On December 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion

with the trial court to release the plaintiff from its obligation on the bond pursuant to § 54-65c. In support of

its motion, the plaintiff filed an affidavit from one of

its employees, Andrew J. Bloom, who attested that he

spoke with the State’s Attorney’s Office and informed it

that bail enforcement agents had personally confronted

Agron. Bloom further averred that, although he

requested an authorization for extradition, a representative of the state’s attorney had declined his request.

The plaintiff also submitted an affidavit in which Agron

attested that he was ‘‘detained’’ in Puerto Rico by bail

enforcement agents and made aware of his warrants for

failure to appear in Connecticut. Agron further attested

that he was told that the state was not authorizing

extradition and that he was free to go. A photocopy of

Agron’s identification card and a photograph of him

holding a Puerto Rican newspaper dated December 17,
2014, were also attached to the motion.

The trial court denied the motion and the plaintiff

sought reconsideration. After considering briefs from

both parties and conducting a hearing, the trial court

denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. In its

memorandum of decision, the trial court reasoned as

follows: ‘‘[Agron] has not been proven to be in custody

of the authorities in Puerto Rico; rather, bail enforcement agents made contact with him and he refused to

consent to return. The [plaintiff] has not met the burden

placed upon it by the statute, namely that [Agron] be

detained orincarcerated.’’(Emphasis added.) The plaintiff thereafter filed a writ of error.

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly

denied its motion for relief from bond under § 54-65c

because the trial court incorrectly interpreted the term

‘‘detained’’ as used in the statute. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the legislature intended the term

‘‘detained’’ to include action by a bail enforcement agent

to capture the principal.2

In response, the state asserts

that for the purposes of § 54-65c, the term ‘‘detained’’

requires state action. Specifically, the state asserts that,

to satisfy the ‘‘detained’’ requirements of § 54-65c, a

surety holder must show that the principal is detained

by the government of another state, territory or country,

not simply the personal contact made by a bail enforcement agent. We agree with the state and conclude that

the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had

not met the requirements of § 54-65c.

At the outset, we set forth the standard of review

that applies to the plaintiff’s claim. The question of

whether § 54-65c affords relief for a surety holder upon

demonstrating that the principal has been located and

personally confronted by a bail enforcement agent presents a question of statutory construction.

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In seeking to determine that

meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship

to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is

plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or

unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test

to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when

read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. . . . When a statute is not plain and

unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to

the legislative history and circumstances surrounding

its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to

implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation

and common law principles governing the same general

subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chairperson, Connecticut Medical Examining
Board v. Freedom of Information Commission, 310

Conn. 276, 283, 77A.3d 121 (2013). The issue of statutory

interpretation presented in this case is a question of

law subject to plenary review. See id., 282–83.

We begin with the text of the statute. Section 54-

65c provides as follows: ‘‘A court shall vacate an order

forfeiting a bail bond and release the professional

bondsman, as defined in section 29-144, or the surety

bail bond agent and the insurer, as both terms are

defined in section 38a-660, if (1) the principal on the

bail bond (A) is detained or incarcerated (i) in another

state, territory or country, or (ii) by a federal agency,

or (B) has been removed by United States Immigration

and Customs Enforcement, and (2) the professional

bondsman, the surety bail bond agent or the insurer

provides satisfactory proof of such detention, incarceration or removal to the court and the state’s attorney

prosecuting the case, and (3) the state’s attorney prosecuting the case declines to seek extradition of the

principal.’’

Resolution of the plaintiff’s claim requires us to determine whether Agron was ‘‘detained’’ for purposes of

§ 54-65c when the bail enforcement agents personally

located him and confronted him in Puerto Rico.

‘‘Detained’’ is not defined in § 54-65c. In accordance

with General Statutes § 1-1 (a), we, therefore, look to

the common usage of the word ‘‘detain’’ to discern the

definition intended by the legislature in § 54-65c. See,

e.g., Potvin v. Lincoln Service & Equipment Co., 298

Conn. 620, 633, 6 A.3d 60 (2010). ‘‘In the absence of a

definition of terms in the statute itself, [w]e may presume . . . that the legislature intended [a word] to

have its ordinary meaning in the English language, as

gleaned from the context of its use. . . . Under such

circumstances, it is appropriate to look to the common

understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Saturno,

322 Conn. 80, 90, 139 A.3d 629 (2016).

The term ‘‘detain’’ is defined with substantial similarity in a number of dictionaries. Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary (2002) defines ‘‘detain’’ as,

inter alia, ‘‘to hold or keep in or as if in custody . . . .’’

The American Heritage College Dictionary (4th Ed.

2007) similarly defines ‘‘detain’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘[t]o keep

in custody or temporary confinement.’’ Finally, the

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language

(5th Ed. 2011) also defines ‘‘detain’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘[t]o

keep in custody or confinement . . . .’’ Applying the

dictionary definition of ‘‘detain’’ supports that the legislature intended § 54-65c to require governmental action.

‘‘When determining the legislature’s intended meaning of a statutory word, it also is appropriate to consider

the surrounding words pursuant to the canon of construction noscitur a sociis.3 McCoy v. Commissioner of

Public Safety, 300 Conn. 144, 159, 12 A.3d 948 (2011).
By using this interpretive aid, the meaning of a statutory

word may be indicated, controlled or made clear by

the words with which it is associated in the statute.

State v. Roque, 190 Conn. 143, 152, 460 A.2d 26 (1983).’’

(Footnote in original.) State v. LaFleur, 307 Conn. 115,

133, 51 A.3d 1048 (2012). In § 54-65c, the legislature

chose to use the word ‘‘detained’’ in association with

the term ‘‘incarcerated.’’ ‘‘Incarcerated’’ necessarily

indicates confinement by government. See The American Heritage College Dictionary, supra (defining ‘‘incarcerate’’ as ‘‘[t]o put into jail’’); Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary, supra (defining ‘‘incarcerate’’

as ‘‘to put in prison: imprison’’). A review of other statutes in which the legislature has used the term

‘‘detained’’ in connection with the term ‘‘incarcerated’’

demonstrates that in using the two words together, the

legislature intended to referto custody by a government

agent. See General Statutes § 54-142g (d) (4) (all persons ‘‘detained or incarcerated in any correctional facility in this state’’); General Statutes (Supp. 2016) § 18-

81cc (a) (‘‘[a]ny agency of the state or any political

subdivision of the state that incarcerates or detains

adult or juvenile offenders, including persons detained

forimmigration violations, shall, within available appropriations, adopt and comply with the applicable standards recommended by the National Prison Rape

Elimination Commission for the prevention, detection

and monitoring of, and response to, sexual abuse in

adult prisons and jails, community correction facilities,

juvenile facilities and lockups’’). Therefore, the legislature’s use of the term ‘‘incarcerated’’ in connection with

‘‘detained’’ in § 54-65c is furtherindication that the legislature intended ‘‘detained’’ to require governmental

action.

Furthermore, a review of other statutes reveals that

the legislature has repeatedly used the term ‘‘detained’’

to referto governmental action. Forinstance, in General

Statutes § 46b-133, the term ‘‘detain’’ or ‘‘detained’’ is

used throughout the statute to refer to the process by

which a governmental authority may hold a child in

custody when a child is arrested. See General Statutes

§ 46b-133 (c) (‘‘[u]pon the arrest of any child by an

officer, such officer may [1] release the child to the

custody of the child’s parent or parents, guardian or

some other suitable person or agency, [2] at the discretion of the officer, release the child to the child’s own

custody, or [3] seek a court order to detain the child

in a juvenile detention center’’). In General Statutes

§ 54-108d, the term ‘‘detain’’ is used to describe the

process by which a probation officer may hold a person

in custody. See General Statutes § 54-108d (a) (‘‘[a] probation officer may, in the performance of his or her

official duties, detain for a reasonable period of time

and until a police officer arrives to make an arrest [1]

any person who has one or more unexecuted state or

federal arrest warrants lodged against him or her, and
[2] any person who such officer has probable cause to

believe has violated a condition of probation and is the

subject of a probation officer’s authorization to arrest

pursuant to subsection [a] of section 53a-32’’). In General Statutes § 14-12h, the legislature used the term

‘‘detain’’ to describe the process by which a police officer may address an unregistered motor vehicle being

driven on the highway. See General Statutes § 14-12h

(b) (1) (‘‘[i]f any police officer observes a motor vehicle

being operated upon the public highway, and such

motor vehicle is displaying registration number plates

identified as suspended . . . such police officer may

. . . stop or detain such vehicle and its occupants’’);

see also General Statutes § 54-126 (‘‘the [Chairman of

the Board of Pardons and Paroles] may detain any convict or inmate pending approval by the panel of such

retaking or reimprisonment’’); General Statutes § 54-

192h (b) (addressing requirements for law enforcement

officerto detain individual pursuant to civil immigration

detainer); General Statutes § 54-53a (addressing detention of individuals accused of crimes who have not

made bail in community correction centers); General

Statutes § 7-135a (addressing reimbursement for town

operating lockup ‘‘wherein prisoners are detained for

arraignment before, or trial by, the Superior Court’’).

An examination of these statutes demonstrates that the

legislature has consistently used the term ‘‘detain’’ to

require governmental action.4

It is axiomatic that, when interpreting the terms of

one statute, ‘‘we are guided by the principle that the

legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . . Legislation

never is written on a clean slate, nor is it ever read in

isolation or applied in a vacuum. Every new act takes

its place as a component of an extensive and elaborate

system of written laws. . . . Construing statutes by reference to others advances [the values of harmony and

consistency within the law]. In fact, courts have been

said to be under a duty to construe statutes harmoniously where that can reasonably be done. . . . Moreover, statutes must be construed, if possible, such that

no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void

or insignificant . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Standard Oil of Connecticut, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 320 Conn. 611,

645, 134 A.3d 581 (2016). Applying this principle to the

terms of § 54-65c, we conclude that the plain language

of § 54-65c, as read in connection with other statutes,

demonstrates that the legislature intended the word

‘‘detained’’ as used in that statute to require custody by

a governmental entity.

The plaintiff seems to assert, however, that reading

§ 54-65c so as to require custody by a governmental

entity leads to absurd or unworkable results. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that such an interpretation of

the statute prevents a surety from obtaining recourse
under § 54-65c based on the state’s decision not to extradite the principal. We disagree. First, the plaintiff’s bail

contract was between itself and Agron. The state was

not a party to that contract and has no responsibilities

under that contract. The plaintiff does not assert that

the state or any other governmental entity promised

that it would extradite Agron in the event that he fled

to another country. As we explained in State v. Sheriff,

301 Conn. 617, 628, 21 A.3d 808 (2011), ‘‘even if we

assume that the chief state’s attorney could have extradited [the principal] from Jamaica, in the absence of

any promise by the chief state’s attorney that he would

seek extradition of [the principal] in the event that he

fled, the chief state’s attorney had no obligation to [the

surety] to extradite [the principal] from Jamaica in

order to fulfill the obligations that [the surety] willingly

undertook. As one court has observed, ‘[t]he state is

not the surety’s surety.’ Umatilla County v. Resolute

Ins. Co., 8 Or. App. 318, 322, 493 P.2d 731 (1972). . . .

The fact that [the surety] cannot compel [the principal]

to return to this state so that [the surety] can fulfill its

obligation is primarily the result of [the principal’s]

decision to flee to Jamaica, and [the surety] must accept

the consequences of that decision.’’ Similarly, in the

present case, we are not persuaded that our interpretation of § 54-65c leads to absurd or unworkable results

merely because the plaintiff is required to forfeit the

bond when Agron fled to a United States territory and

the state decided not to extradite him. Instead, we conclude that our interpretation of § 54-65c requires the

plaintiff to abide by the terms of the bond agreement,

namely, to forfeit the bond if Agron did not appear

in court.

On the basis of our conclusion that § 54-65c requires

that Agron be incarcerated or detained by a governmental entity, we conclude that the trial court properly

denied the plaintiff’s motion for relief from bond in

the present case. It is undisputed that Agron was not

incarcerated or detained by any governmental entity in

the present case, accordingly, the plaintiff did not meet

the requirements of § 54-65c.

The writ of error is dismissed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 Agron was charged with sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation

of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 53a-73a and risk of injury to a child in

violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 53-21.

2 The plaintiff also asserts that the trial court incorrectly failed to afford

it relief under General Statutes § 54-65 (b). Section 54-65 (b) provides that

‘‘[i]f the principal of a surety in a recognizance in criminal proceedings

absconds, such surety may apply, prior to six months after the date the

bond is ordered forfeited, to a judge of the Superior Court to be released

from such bond. The judge may release such surety from such bond for

good cause shown.’’ A careful review of the record demonstrates that the

plaintiff did not assert a claim under § 54-65 (b) before the trial court and,

therefore, the trial court did not decide the issue of whether relief was

proper under § 54-65 (b) in the present case. ‘‘Our appellate courts, as a

general practice, will not review claims made for the first time on appeal.

We repeatedly have held that [a] party cannot present a case to the trial
court on one theory and then seek appellate relief on a different one . . . .

[A]n appellate court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is not

distinctly raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause our review is limited to

matters in the record, we [also] will not address issues not decided by the

trial court.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v.

Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 313 Conn. 610, 619–20, 99 A.3d 1079 (2014).

Accordingly, we do not reach the plaintiff’s claim under § 54-65 (b).

3 Noscitur a sociis translates from Latin, ‘‘it is known by its associates

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Graham

County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson,

559 U.S. 280, 287, 130 S. Ct. 1396, 176 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2010).

4 The plaintiff cites to General Statutes §§ 17a-484 and 53a-119a without

analysis. To the extent that the plaintiff is asserting that these statutes

demonstrate that the word ‘‘detained’’ does not require state action or that

a bail enforcement agent is authorized to ‘‘detain’’ an individual for purposes

of § 54-65c, we are not persuaded. First, § 17a-484, which addresses regional

mental health boards, does not contain the word ‘‘detain’’ at all. Second,

although § 53a-119a (a) and (b) does grant shopkeepers and library agents

the authority to ‘‘detain’’ suspected shoplifters and vandals, it only allows

that detention ‘‘for a time sufficient to summon a police officer to the

premises.’’ Nothing in these statutes supports the plaintiff’s reading of

§ 54-65c.