EFFECTS OF CATASTROPHIC EVENTS

ON TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS

Northridge Earthquake—January 17, 1994

April 22, 2002

U.S. Department of Transportation

ITS Joint Program Office
Notice

This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of

Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States

Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof.
Technical Report Documentation Page

1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.

5. Report Date

April 2002

4. Title and Subtitle

Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management

and Operations, Northridge Earthquake–January 17, 1994

6. Performing Organization Code

7. Author(s)

Allan J. DeBlasio, Amanda Zamora, Frederick Mottley, Robert

Brodesky, Margaret E. Zirker, Michelle Crowder

8. Performing Organization Report No.

9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

U.S. Department of Transportation

Research and Special Programs Administration

Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

55 Broadway

Cambridge, MA 02142-1093

11. Contract or Grant No.

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

Catastrophic Events Case Study

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Highway Administration

ITS Joint Program Office

400 Seventh Street, SW

Washington, DC 20590

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplementary Notes

Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) – Joseph Peters

16. Abstract

This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to the earthquake in Northridge,

California on January 17, 1994, and is part of a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on

transportation system facilities and services. The findings documented in this report are a result of a detailed

literature search on Northridge lessons learned. As part of a larger effort, four case studies will be produced:

• New York City, September 11, 2001

• The Pentagon and the National Capitol Region, September 11, 2001

• Baltimore, Maryland, rail tunnel fire, July 18, 2001

• Northridge, California, earthquake, January 17, 1994.

17. Key Word

Emergency Response, Emergency Preparedness,

Security, Transportation System Recovery, Disaster,

Catastrophic Event, Earthquake

18. Distribution Statement

No restrictions

19. Security Classif. (of this report)

Unclassified

20. Security Classif. (of this page)

Unclassified

21. No. of

Pages

59

22. Price

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
ii

Foreword

This report was prepared by the U.S. Department of Transportation's (U.S. DOT)

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) for the

U.S. DOT's Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) Joint Program Office. The

Volpe Center study team consisted of Allan J. DeBlasio, the project manager,

Amanda Zamora, Frederick Mottley, and Robert Brodesky from EG&G Technical

Services; Margaret E. Zirker and Michelle Crowder from Cambridge Systematics

Inc.; and Terrance J. Regan, Kathleen Bagdonas and Dan Morin from Planners

Collaborative. Vince Pearce is the U.S. DOT manager of the review.

This report documents the actions taken by transportation agencies in response to the earthquake in Northridge, California on January 17, 1994, and is

part of a larger effort to examine the impacts of catastrophic events on transportation system facilities and services. The findings documented in this

report are a result of a detailed literature search on Northridge lessons learned.

As part of a larger effort, four case studies will be produced:

◆ New York City, September 11, 2001

◆ The Pentagon and the National Capitol Region, September 11, 2001

◆ Baltimore, Maryland, rail tunnel fire, July 18, 2001

◆ Northridge Earthquake, January 17, 1994.

Each of these events resulted in substantial, immediate, and adverse impacts

on transportation, and each has had varying degrees of influence on the

longer-term operation of transportation facilities and services in their respective regions. Each event revealed important information about the response of

the transportation system to major stress and the ability of operating agencies

and their public safety and emergency management partners to respond

effectively to a crisis. This report emphasizes the transportation aspects of this

catastrophic event and lessons learned that could be incorporated into future

emergency response planning.
iii

Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1

2.0 Transportation System Response................................................................................ 3

2.1 Pre-Event ...................................................................................................................... 3

2.2 Day of Event ................................................................................................................ 9

2.3 Post-Event ................................................................................................................. 16

2.4 Post-Event Traffic Management Operations ................................................ 30

3.0 Findings ............................................................................................................................. 35

3.1 Advance Preparations and Planning ............................................................... 35

3.2 Institutional Coordination .................................................................................. 37

3.3 Guiding Priority: Mobility .................................................................................... 39

3.4 Communications .................................................................................................... 40

3.5 The Role of Advanced Technology .................................................................. 41

3.6 System Redundancy and Resiliency ............................................................... 41

4.0 Conclusions ...................................................................................................................... 45

Appendicies

Appendix A: Northridge Earthquake Chronology .................................................... 47

Appendix B: Northridge Literature Review .................................................................. 53

List of Tables

Table 1. Regional Statistics ................................................................................................... 4

Table 2. Journey to Work (Mode Split) ............................................................................. 4

Table 3. Los Angeles Freeways ........................................................................................... 5

Table 4. Regional Freeway Management........................................................................ 6

Table 5. Regional Public Transportation ......................................................................... 7

Table 6. ADT on I-5/SR-14 Detours ................................................................................. 20

Table 7. ADT on I-10 Detours ........................................................................................... 23

Table 8. Metrolink Ridership ............................................................................................. 26

Table 9. ADT Comparisons ................................................................................................ 28

Table 10. Freeway Reconstruction Incentives ............................................................ 34

Contents
iv

List of Figures

Figure 1. Northridge Earthquake Freeway Destruction ............................................ 1

Figure 2. Los Angeles County ............................................................................................. 3

Figure 3. Pre-Event Transportation Conditions ............................................................ 8

Figure 4. I-5 Damage at Gavin Canyon ......................................................................... 11

Figure 5. Damage at I-5/SR-14 Interchange................................................................ 11

Figure 6. Damage at I-10/La Cienga Boulevard ......................................................... 12

Figure 7. Transportation Conditions – January 17, 1994 ........................................ 13

Figure 8. 1-5 and I-5/SR-14 Interchange Detours ..................................................... 19

Figure 9. I-10 Detours ......................................................................................................... 22

Figure 10. SR-118 Damage and Alignment ................................................................. 24

Figure 11. SR-118 Detours ................................................................................................. 25

Figure 12. 1993-94 Metrolink Ridership ....................................................................... 27

Figure 13. Post-Earthquake Transportation Conditions ......................................... 29

Figure 14. Demolition of I-10 at La Cienga Boulevard ............................................ 31

Figure 15. Caltrans Reconstruction Public Outreach ............................................... 33

Figure 16. Seismic Retrofitting Outreach Program .................................................. 35

Figure 17. Reconstruction of Los Angeles Freeways ............................................... 37
1

1.0 Introduction

On Monday, January 17, 1994, at 4:30 a.m., an earthquake of a magnitude of 6.8

shook Los Angeles, California. While the actual earthquake (and its subsequent

aftershocks) lasted only about 1 minute, it damaged 114,000 residential and

commercial structures spread over 2,100 square miles, took 72 lives, and

significantly impaired the Los Angeles regional transportation system, generating a year’s worth of highway work in a single event. Figure 1 gives an example

of the level of destruction to the regional freeway network. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported the Northridge earthquake as

one of the largest and most costly federal disasters, with initial cost estimates

of total damages at $25 billion.

The highway destruction caused by the earthquake was a significant strain on

auto-dependent Southern California. Because the highway system is such an

important part of regional mobility, transportation agencies quickly responded

to the damage. In fact, the first contracts to rebuild regional highways were in

place by 7:00 p.m. on January 17, and crews had already begun to work on

debris clearing and demolition. Within 3 days, the Southern California Regional

Rail Authority (SCRRA) expanded Metrolink commuter rail service north to

Lancaster and west to Ventura County. Bus services were changed, shuttle

services were implemented, detours were put in place, and employers offered

free shuttle services while federal, state, and local governments partnered to

reconstruct the highway system in record time. According to the California

Department of Transportation (Caltrans)/Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA) The Lessons Learned from the Northridge Earthquake, “Everyone involved

was driven by the desire to ‘be part of the recovery effort,’ and ‘take pride in

showing what we could do.’”

Figure 1. Northridge Earthquake Freeway Destruction

The Northridge

Earthquake:

• Damaged 114,000

commercial and

residential

structures

• Took 72 lives

• Caused $25 billion

worth of damage.
2
3

2.0 Transportation System Response

Among the agencies cooperating in response to the Northridge destruction

was Caltrans. Caltrans led the successful reconstruction effort and made two

key decisions quickly after the earthquake: to rebuild the damaged freeways,

and to retain traveler mobility and keep traffic flowing as smoothly as possible

during the rebuilding efforts. With the lead of Caltrans, this costly disaster

became a model of incident management.

2.1 Pre-Event

Los Angeles County

Southern California is a 6-county region spanning 38,000 square miles. In

Southern California, Los Angeles County remains one of the region’s and the

nation’s largest counties with 4,081 square miles, an area approximately 800

square miles larger than the combined area of Delaware and Rhode Island.

Figure 2 shows an aerial view of Los Angeles County.

Southern California has more than 200 geologic faults long enough to produce

earthquakes as large as magnitude 6 on the Richter scale. Between 1980 and

January 16, 1994, these faults produced 19 minor earthquakes. Table 1, on the

next page, shows other regional statistics.

Regional Transportation

Considered the most extensive highway network in the world, the Los Angeles

region has 27 freeways and over 882 centerline miles of highways. There are

over 6 million registered vehicles in Los Angeles County alone, and about 90

percent of all regional households have access to a vehicle. The Los Angeles

Figure 2. Los Angeles County
4

metropolitan area is also one of the most congested in the nation. In 1994, it

ranked first among the nation’s 68 largest urbanized areas in all ten measures

of the Texas Transportation Institute’s indices of congestion. The region ranked

number one in delays caused by heavy traffic flow and incidents, and number

one in annual delays in person-hours per capita. Contributing to the first place

ranking were a 41 percent share of daily travel undertaken in congested

conditions and an annual congestion cost of $795 per capita.

In Los Angeles County, driving is the overwhelming mode of choice for commuting. Approximately 85 percent of workers commute by personal automobiles, while less than 10 percent rely on public transportation. Motorists make

about 23 million vehicle trips daily. Table 2 shows the mode split of commuters in the region.

Table 1. Regional Statistics

Southern California Los Angeles County City of Los Angeles

Population 15,600,000 9,312,200 3,624,700

Workers 5,915,600 3,710,500 1,572,000

Area in sq. mi. 38,000 4,081 467

Density of residents per sq. mi. 411 2,282 7,762

Density of workers per sq. mi. 156 909 3,366

Sources: 1990 US Census projections for 1994.

Table 2. Journey to Work (Mode Split)

1990 1990 1990 2000 estimate

Southern Los Angeles City of Los Angeles

California County Los Angeles County

SOV 72% 70% 65% 71%

HOV (2+) 15% 16% 15% 14%

Bus 4% 6% 10% 6%

Subway, rail <1% <1% <1% <1%

Walk, bicycle 4% 4% 5% 3%

Other* 4% 3% 4% 5%

Total 100% 100% 100% 100%

Source: US Census

*Other includes all other modes of travel including work-at-home.
5

Major Freeways

Geographically, Los Angeles is separated from central and northern California

by the San Gabriel Mountains to the north and San Bernardino Mountains to

the northeast. Access over the mountains is limited to two major freeways: I-5,

which runs the length of the state, and SR-14, which provides access to the

Antelope Valley. The I-5 corridor is especially important to Northern Californians who depend on I-5 freight movements originating at the Port of Los

Angeles destined for the Sacramento area and other cities in northern California. East-west traffic is mainly dependent on I-10. Table 3 summarizes the

major Southern California thoroughfares affected by the earthquake.

Freeway Management and Operations

Because the highway system is critical to the people and the economy of the

Los Angeles region, the management of the highway network is a cooperative

priority, and was so even before the Northridge earthquake. Freeways, highways, and traffic management are handled by both state and local agencies as

shown in Table 4 on the next page.

Table 3. Los Angeles Freeways

Arterial ADT Description

I-5: The Golden State Freeway 133,000* Primary north/south route in California;

measured north of SR-14 connects the Los Angeles basin to

Northern California through the San

Gabriel Mountains.

State Route (SR) 14: 130,000** Connects the cities of Lancaster and

The Antelope Valley Freeway measured between Palmdale with Los Angeles;

San Fernando Road and I-5 intersection of I-5 and SR-14 is the

busiest on SR-14 with average peak

hour traffic counts at 11,500 vehicles.

I-10: The Santa Monica Freeway 261,000** Busiest freeway in the world; runs east/

measured east of I-405 west 2,460 miles through 8 states from

the panhandle of Florida to the Pacific,

where it terminates at the Pacific Coast

Highway.

State Route (SR) 118: 121,000** Runs from I-210 in San Fernando west

The Simi Valley Freeway measured west of I-405 into Ventura County through the

Granada Hills and Mission Hills sections

of Los Angeles County.

*May 1993 ADT **January 1993 ADT
6

The California Department of Transportation, Caltrans, has run the Los Angeles

Traffic Management Center (TMC) from the Caltrans District 7 Office building

in downtown Los Angeles since its inception in 1971. (A more detailed description of the Caltrans TMC is provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.5.) At the time of

the earthquake, the TMC was being staffed 24 hours a day, 365 days a year with

Caltrans and California Highway Patrol (CHP) personnel. Extensive traffic

management capabilities were already in place on most of the major freeways

well before the earthquake, including speed monitoring loop detectors, closed

circuit television (CCTV), on-ramp meters, and permanently mounted variable

message signs (VMS). In an emergency, the Caltrans TMC serves as the regional

communications hub, providing up-to-date information on closures, detours,

and reconstruction activities. This information is distributed through the TMC

to public officials, media, and other agencies.

Traffic intersections within the City of Los Angeles are monitored by the

LADOT Automated Traffic Surveillance and Control System (ATSAC) in the

ATSAC control center located four floors below the street in the Los Angeles

City Hall. Constructed for the Olympics in 1984, this system has the ability to

adjust signal timing in response to real-time traffic data and monitor key

intersections throughout the city. In an area the size of Los Angeles, with a

commuting population of over 2 million people daily, traffic control redundancy in the transportation system is extremely important.

The CHP also deploys police officers for a Freeway Service Patrol (FSP), which is

operated jointly by CHP, Caltrans, and the Metropolitan Transportation AuthorTable 4. Regional Freeway Management

Agency Traffic Major Functions

Management

Caltrans District 7 Regional Traffic Monitors regional traffic operations using cameras

Management Center (TMC) and VMS on Caltrans District 7 freeways;

responsible for deploying Freeway Management

Teams and the CHP Freeway Service Patrol.

Los Angeles Automated Traffic Surveillance Monitors traffic at intersections within Los Angeles

Department of and Control System (ATSAC) City Limits; adjusts signal timing in response to

Transportation real-time traffic flows; responsible for managing

(LADOT) the "Smart Corridor" for diverting freeway traffic

onto parallel arterials.

California Highway Freeway Service Patrol Responds to highway incidents with officers and

Patrol (CHP) tow truck crews; removes stranded motorists from

freeways; jointly operated by Caltrans, LADOT,

and MTA.
7

ity (MTA), the regional transit agency, from the Caltrans TMC. The goal of the

FSP is to reduce travel delays through early detection and clearance of incidents during peak commute hours. The patrol also provides quick-fixing

services, like refilling gallons of gasoline, changing flat tires, repairing leaking

hoses, and recharging dead batteries. On January 16, the FSP was operating

144 tow trucks on 40 freeway sections covering 381.3 centerline miles of

freeways in Los Angeles County. The FSP makes about 220,000 freeway assists

annually.

Figure 3 (see next page) shows the pre-earthquake transportation conditions,

including traffic volumes and transit daily ridership for the affected area.

Regional Public Transportation

The MTA and the Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA) provide

the majority of public transportation in the Los Angeles region. On a typical

workday, about 6.5 percent of all commuters utilize public transportation

services. Table 5 shows the transit options available at the time of the

Northridge earthquake. Figure 3 shows Metrolink lines and pre-earthquake

transit ridership.

In the early 1990’s, it seemed that Los Angeles County might lead the region in

building and encouraging alternative transportation to relieve regional congestion. In early 1994, prior to the Northridge earthquake, ridership on MTA

subway and light rail lines as well as Metrolink commuter trains was approaching 100,000 total riders per day. Between 1985 and 1995, however, annual

passenger miles traveled dropped 35 percent despite the opening of three

new lines.

Table 5. Regional Public Transportation

Transit Agency Ridership Services Provided (1994)

Metropolitan Transportation Light Rail/Subway: Blue Line light rail (above-ground street

Authority (MTA) 32,462 total riders per day* car), operating from Los Angeles to Long

Bus: 940,000* Beach; Red Line subway segment

operating from downtown Los Angeles to

Wilshire; extensive bus service operating

1,900 buses daily.

Metrolink: Southern 9,500 total riders per day Commuter rail services operated through

California Regional Rail a three-county joint venture (Los Angeles,

Authority (SCRRA) Ventura, and Orange Counties); 5 lines,

350 miles, 39 stations.

*Based on FTA 1995 FTA ridership data, which is approximately equivalent to pre-earthquake ridership.
8

14

126

118

2

134

110

60

90

27

23

1

170

2

23

126

14

138

138

710

101

101

Castaic

Santa 

Clarita

Lancaster

Palmdale

Los Angeles

County Ventura

County

Simi Valley

Thousand Oaks

Northridge

Woodland Hills

Hollywood

Basemap source: Caltrans

Pasadena

Los 

Angeles

Moorpark

Freeways

Metrolink Transit

101

118

495 5 

495 5 

495 5 

495 10 

495 10 

495 405 

495 405 

495 605 

495 710 

495 110 

495 210 

495 105 

495 210 

SR 118 Mission/Gothic

Metrolink daily ridership

Santa Clarita line 1,000

Systemwide 9,500

SR 118 

349,000

264,000

197,000

156,000

78,000 198,000

303,000

272,000

127,000

322,000

260,000

380,000

123,000

310,000

257,000

171,000

Figure 3. Pre-Event Transportation Conditions
9

Importance of Intermodal Freight Movements

The Los Angeles area is a critical intermodal transfer point for the west-to-east

movement of goods across the United States. The Port of Los Angeles is the

busiest intermodal freight port in the United States and among the 10 busiest

ports in the world, with over 3,000 vessels arriving per year. The port handles

over 5 million 20-foot equivalent containers per year. From the port, chemicals,

manufactured goods, fruits and vegetables, and other items are transferred to

rail cars and trucks and shipped throughout California and the rest of the

United States. Trucks leaving the port are typically headed for the major

Southern California interstates, I-5 and I-10, for distribution of goods throughout the country.

2.2 Day of Event

By 4:31 a.m. on the day of the Northridge earthquake, the “event” itself was

already over. Fourteen minutes later, after both the City and the County of Los

Angeles’s Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs—see Page 35, Section 3.1 for a

full discussion of EOC activities) were activated, FEMA responded, and government officials began making decisions on what should happen next. The

following is a chronology of the key events that occurred on the day of the

earthquake, including the key steps in post-event decisionmaking on January

17.

Chronology of Events—January 17, 1994

Time Elapsed Time Event/Actions Taken

4:30 a.m.: 0 minutes An earthquake of a magnitude of 6.8 occurred in the Los Angeles area,

centered in Northridge. Damage spread over 2,100 square miles and

through three different counties.

4:31 a.m.: [1 min.] 5.9 aftershock.

4:35 a.m.: [5 min.] Los Angeles City and County Emergency Operations Centers are activated.

4:45 a.m.: [15 min.] FEMA response began.

5:45 a.m.: [1 hr. 15 min.] Los Angeles Mayor Riordan declared a state of emergency.

6:00 a.m.: [1 hr. 30 min.] FEMA Headquarters Emergency Support Team was activated.

6:45 a.m.: [1 hr. 45 min.] As many as 50 structural fires were reported, in addition to numerous

ruptures in water and natural gas mains. Power outages reported

citywide.

9:05 a.m.: [4 hr. 35 min.] California Governor Pete Wilson declared a State of Emergency.

9:45 a.m.: [4 hr. 45 min.] All active fires were under control.

2:08 p.m.: [9 hr. 38 min.] President Clinton declared a national disaster for Los Angeles County.

7:00 p.m.: [14 hr. 30 min.] First of several contracts put in place and crews began work on debris

clearance and highway demolition.
10

By 5:45 a.m., the mayor of Los Angeles had declared a state of emergency in

the city, while Caltrans began sending out its own traffic management teams

to assess the damage to the regional transportation system. Power outages

were widespread, communications were impaired, structures were damaged,

water and gas mains were ruptured, and four critical Southern California

freeways (I-5, SR-14, I-10, and SR-118) were severely crippled.

I-5 Damage

The most severe damage caused by the Northridge earthquake was on I-5. I-5,

the main north/south artery in Southern California connecting the Los Angeles

basin to Northern California, had collapsed at both the interchange with SR-14

(which connects the cities of Lancaster and Palmdale with Los Angeles) and on

top of Old Road at the Gavin Canyon underpasses. I-5 also suffered damage

north of the I-5/SR-14 interchange, effectively closing the main highway link

over the mountains. Figure 4, on the next page, shows the damage at the

Gavin Canyon interchange.

SR-14 Damage

The connector at the I-5/SR-14 interchange in Sylmar collapsed. This connector was the only freeway link over the mountains to Lancaster and Palmdale.

Except for the extensive damage at the interchange, SR-14 to the north was

unaffected. Figure 5, on the next page, shows an aerial view of the damage at

the I-5/SR-14 interchange.

I-10 Damage

The major east/west freight corridor (the highly traveled Santa Monica Freeway) was destroyed at four overpasses: La Cienega, Venice, Washington, and

Fairfax Streets. Structural damage to buildings, roads, and utilities also occurred in the I-10 corridor connecting Los Angeles and Santa Monica, with the

most severe damage in Northridge. Figure 6, on page 12, shows the damage at

I-10 and La Cienga Boulevard.
11

Figure 4. I-5 Damage at Gavin Canyon

Figure 5. Damage at I-5/SR-14 Interchange
12

SR-118 Damage

SR-118, just north of Northridge (the earthquake epicenter), had sustained

extensive damage. The eastbound roadway had collapsed completely at two

separate places in the Granada Hills area over the intersections of Gothic

Avenue and San Fernando Mission Boulevard. Additional damage over Balboa

Boulevard and other areas along SR-118 closed the entire section of highway

between I-405 and I-210 in both directions. At all these locations, closures

were immediate and no freeway traffic was able to pass through the damaged

zones. Figure 7, on the next page, shows the transportation conditions that

prevailed the day of the earthquake.

Day-1 Response Actions

By 2:08 p.m., Caltrans had completed an initial damage assessment, all subsequent hazards such as earthquake-related fires were extinguished, and President Clinton had declared a national disaster in Los Angeles County. The

Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) reacted immediately to the declaration by releasing Emergency Relief (ER) funds to Caltrans and good-faith

agreements to completely fund the rebuilding of the highway network. (The

ER program is explained in detail on Page 37, in Section 3.2.) Even before ER

funds were in place, Caltrans acted quickly to ensure the safety of the public.

Knowing that obstructions and debris must be cleared, damaged facilities

shored, and detours established, Caltrans made “handshake” agreements with

contractors on work and tentative payment methods. And, by 7:00 p.m. that

first night, the first contracts were in place and work had already begun on I-5

and I-10 demolition.

Figure 6. Damage at I-10/La Cienga Boulevard

Even before

Emergency Relief

funds were in place,

Caltrans acted

quickly to ensure the

safety of the public.
13

Caltrans took critical action to rebuild the highway system and provide mobility on the day of the attack:

◆ Caltrans used emergency contracting procedures to immediately

begin debris removal and demolition activities. Because of the media

coverage on the freeway damage, Caltrans’ experience dealing with

disasters, and its relationship with local contractors, Caltrans was able

to mobilize a demolition contractor and crew at each of the four major

damage locations.

◆ Caltrans implemented initial detours. Initially, Caltrans maintenance

superintendents established detours in conjunction with Caltrans

Traffic and Structures sections using maps from the District 7 management plan. These detours were only designed for incident response

but proved effective in the initial incident management and contracting efforts.

14

126

118

2

134

110

60

90

27 23

1

170

2

23

126

14

138

138

710

101

101

Castaic

Santa 

Clarita

Lancaster

Palmdale

Los Angeles

County Ventura

County

Simi Valley

Thousand Oaks

Northridge

Woodland Hills

Hollywood

Basemap source: Caltrans

Pasadena

Los 

Angeles

Moorpark

Freeways

Earthquake 

Epicenter

Metrolink Transit

Freeway Quake 

Damage Locations

101

118

495 5 

495 5 

495 5 

495 10 

495 10 

495 405 

495 405 

495 605 

495 710 

495 110 

495 210 

495 105 

495 210 

I-5 at Gavin Canyon I-5/SR14 Interchange

SR 118 Mission/Gothic

I-10 Fairfax

 Figure 7. Transportation Conditions – January 17, 1994
14

Day-1 Mobility Decisions

Immediately following the earthquake, Caltrans sent traffic management

teams to inspect immediately recognizable hazards and implement initial

closures and detours on local streets. These teams were in the field on January

17 directing traffic, but because the earthquake occurred early in the morning,

there was very little traffic on the roadways at the time. Also, because January

17 was Martin Luther King Day, a national holiday, roadway volumes were

lower than on a typical workday. Overall, area traffic volumes were substantially lower the week following the earthquake as people made alternative

travel or work plans, which aided the recovery effort.

The Caltrans TMC served as the center of initial decision-making efforts by the

traffic management teams, and on the day of the earthquake, all coordination

of traffic operations was handled there. The TMC used backup electrical

generators for power and relied on landline telephones for primary communications. The FSP also was run out of the Caltrans TMC. While the TMC was very

functional, its technological capabilities were limited for real-time decisionmaking purposes. Many of the areas affected by the earthquake did not have

ITS technologies in place in 1994. The same was true for the LADOT’s ATSAC.

On the day of the earthquake, Caltrans and the LADOT immediately began

strategizing about ways to upgrade facilities to handle the overload on the

Caltrans TMC and ATSAC.

For the motorists that were driving that day, initial detours allowed the regional highway network to continue to function while decisions about alternative transportation routes were being made. Originally, motorists that were in

or destined for areas outside of the Los Angeles basin were encouraged to

circumvent the area completely. Recommended detours, however, added as

much as 50 miles to trips, underscoring the importance of implementing

additional measures to handle traffic throughout the duration of the reconstruction period.

The media played a large role in both disseminating detour information on the

day of the earthquake and discouraging motorists from driving if at all possible. During the 6-1/2 hours of news programming on the day of the

Northridge earthquake, there were pictures showing the damaged freeway

segments in 31 percent of the news programming; 18 percent of the television

stories were directly about the downed freeway segments. This day-1 news

coverage may have helped travelers with their alternate route planning, but

more likely the news of heavy damage throughout the Los Angeles freeway

system encouraged people to curtail their travel plans for at least the first few

days.

Detours added as

much as 50 miles to

trips, underscoring

the importance of

implementing

additional measures

to handle traffic

throughout the

duration of the

reconstruction

period.
15

Reconstruction Begins On Day 1

Early in the morning on January 17, the Executive Director of Caltrans and the

District 7 Regional Administrator started the chain of emergency field responses. Within hours, FHWA field representatives were working with Caltrans

on reviewing and approving all reconstruction efforts. At the same time,

several contractors who had prior experience with disaster recovery began to

mobilize manpower, equipment, and demolition supplies directly to the

damaged freeway locations, where they were prepared to work around the

clock.

Using emergency contracting procedures, under orders to immediately begin

debris removal and demolition activities, Caltrans paid the demolition contractors for actual costs of materials, labor, and equipment with an agreed profit.

The contractors started work based on these informal contracts. By day’s end,

demolition work was started at these locations:

◆ I-5: Demolition activities started at Gavin Canyon overpasses; completed in 10 days with round-the-clock operations.

◆ I-10: Demolition activities started at Fairfax Boulevard, La Cienga

Boulevard, and Washington overpasses; Fairfax Boulevard demolition

was completed in three 24-hour days.

◆ I-5/SR-14 Antelope Freeway Interchange: Contracts for demolition in

place on January 17; demolition activities then began January 17 and

were completed on March 17 with round-the-clock operations.
16

2.3 Post-Event

Restoring Regional Mobility

During the first week following the Northridge earthquake, many businesses

and schools were closed, which significantly decreased the demand on the

freeway network. Many people also stayed at home that week to repair their

own earthquake damage. After the first week after the earthquake, people

began to return to their jobs and traffic volumes were steadily increasing. Early

rough estimates indicated that repairs would take from 6 months to a year.

While contract incentives made it likely that the freeway repair might be

expedited, Caltrans knew that mitigation measures had to be implemented

quickly to balance capacity and demand. Two primary measures were used to

reduce strain on the highway network:

◆ Created alternate routes and detours for I-10, I-5, SR-14, and SR-188

freeways

◆ Implemented freeway demand-reduction measures.

The use of local streets proved to be the most effective way to handle freeway

detours. The damaged freeway segments were far enough apart that detour

routes could be designed for each site exclusively without overlapping detour

routes and related congestion at other damage locations. For the initial detour

routes, Caltrans and the LADOT re-timed traffic signals at 300 intersections and

installed 1,000 directional signs and 7,500 parking signs. (Other traffic operations initiatives are described in the Post-Event Traffic Operations section of

this report.) Caltrans also developed a transportation management plan (TMP)

to handle traffic until the damaged freeway sections were reopened. They also

implemented an Emergency Detour Management Center (see page 30 for a

full discussion of the Center) with emergency communications equipment,

helicopter surveillance, and traffic performance acquisition data as well as

enhanced tow service, construction zone speeding enforcements, and parkand-ride lots.

In some corridors, separate detours were implemented for high-occupancy

vehicles (HOVs—2 or more persons per vehicle) and single-occupancy vehicles

(SOVs).

The FSP was also on the scene, having covered the 1-10 corridor and SR-118

before the earthquake. They did not cover the I-5/SR-14 corridor prior to the

earthquake, but extended service to it there-after. They reported one of the

detours for 1-5 and SR-14, Old Road, as having the highest number of traffic

incidents during reconstruction as a result of the limited number of parallel

arterials in the area.

Primary traffic management strategies:

• Created alternate

routes and detours

for I-10, I-5, SR-14,

and SR-188 freeways

• Implemented

freeway demandreduction measures.
17

Chronology of Events

Day 2 All I-5 lanes completely shut down between Roxford Street and north to Lyons Avenue

January 18, 1994 in Santa Clarita; I-5 trucks-only lanes were undamaged and remain open.

All SR-14 Lanes were closed. Local streets used as detours.

All I-10 lanes closed between Centinela and Washington Blvd. Local streets used.

All SR-118 lanes closed between Tampa Avenue and I-210. Local streets used.

FEMA Special Facility Tele-registration Center is activated.

Day 5—Friday, I-10 northbound and southbound connectors to I-405 were opened.

January 21, 1994

Day 9—Tuesday, Metrolink ridership hit 22,000 boardings per day, (normal average: 1,000 per day) along

January 25, 1994 the new extension of the Santa Clarita rail line serving areas surrounding earthquakedamaged roads.

Day 12—Friday, The southbound SR-14 to southbound I-5 truck bypass opened with one

January 28, 1994 HOV and one mixed-flow lane.

I-5 detour route was opened using a reconstructed frontage road.

End of January Lane capacity in the damaged roadway corridors is restored to 70 percent of the preearthquake level.

Early February Regular system of detours and emergency express bus service are in operation.

Day 20—February 5, 1994 Construction on I-10 Santa Monica Freeway begins.

Construction on Camarillo Metrolink begins.

Day 36 Westbound SR-118 was reconstructed and restriped to provide three eastbound and

February 21, 1994 three westbound lanes, replacing the detours on local streets.

Day 85 I-10 Santa Monica Freeway opens 74 days ahead of schedule.

April 11, 1994

Day 121—May 17, 1994 I-5 Golden State Freeway at Gavin Canyon opens.

Day 173—July 8, 1994 The I-5/SR-14 Interchange re-opened 3 weeks ahead of schedule (2 ramps at the

SR-14/I-5 Interchange re-open: southbound SR-14-southbound I-5 and northbound

SR-14-northbound I-5).

Day 230 SR-118 Simi Valley Freeway westbound lanes opened more than 2 weeks ahead of

September 3, 1994 schedule.

Day 234 September 7, 1994- eastbound SR-118 lanes re-open to traffic.

September 7, 1994

Day 293 The remaining two ramps at SR-14/I-5 interchange opened to traffic ( southbound

November 4, 1994 SR-14-northbound 1-5 and southbound I-5-northbound SR-14).
18

The media played a large role in disseminating detour information in the days

and weeks following the Northridge earthquake. Daily press conferences were

held by members of Caltrans and FHWA to discuss the progress of the rebuilding efforts, the status of detours in the area, and how to advise commuters to

avoid earthquake damage. Newspaper inserts and brochures were also used

to inform travelers of other options.

I-5 and SR-14 Detours

I-5 is the primary north-south route through central California. It connects the

Los Angeles area with the San Fernando Valley. Average daily traffic on I-5

before the earthquake was about 133,000 vehicles (measured north of SR-14).

The Northridge earthquake damaged I-5 in two major places. At the Gavin

Canyon underpass, the freeway collapsed on top of the Old Road, closing down

the highway from Roxford Street to Lyons Avenue, a distance of about 7 miles.

Initial detours using local streets in this area were established in just a few

hours following the earthquake and were improved and changed within two

weeks.

Old Road, which runs parallel to I-5, was established as a detour on January 29

to move traffic around the damaged bridges at Gavin Canyon. Caltrans crews

established this 3-mile detour from Calgrove Boulevard to the I-5 truck stop

just north of the I-5/SR-14 interchange. Two mixed-flow lanes were provided in

each direction. Figure 8 shows the I-5 detour at Gavin Canyon.

While the Old Road detour did remove all traffic from the freeway at Gavin

Canyon, the four-lane arterial used was the only parallel route available for

detours and was not adequate for peak period demands. Metrolink service

does not extend past the I-5/SR-14 interchange, so utilizing public transit to

get around the I-5 damage was not an option. Consequently, peak period

travel times skyrocketed during reconstruction, with motorists experiencing

individual delays of as much as 1 hour in January and February. By March,

traffic conditions had stabilized, with average delays only at 10-15 minutes

during the morning commute and 5-10 minutes during the afternoon as

motorists became familiar with the detour routes and adjusted their travel

times accordingly. During the off-peak, there was no travel delay and the

detour only added an extra 2 minutes to normal driving times. Weekday traffic

volumes on the Old Road Detour ranged between 88,000 and 97,000 until

reconstruction was complete in mid-May and traffic flow was restored.

SR-14 connects the northern Los Angeles County cities of Lancaster and

Palmdale with the rest of the Los Angeles region. Average daily traffic on SR-14

(measured between San Fernando Road and the I-5 junction) was about

130,000 vehicles before the earthquake. Damage to the SR-14 freeway occurred at the interchange of I-5 and SR-14 in the Santa Clarita area, where all

four connectors between the two roadways were either damaged or destroyed.

The media played a

large role in

disseminating

detour information

in the days and

weeks following the

Northridge

earthquake.
19

Southbound SR14

1 HOV Lane and

2 mix flow, begins at

Detour route before SAND CANYON RD

the Old Road

opened

Northbound SR14

Southbound SR14 4 mixed flow lanes

2 mixed flow

Use truck lane

1 lane north

1 lane south

San Fernando Rd. southbound

SR14 on-ramp:

HOV & trucks only 5-9am M-F

SIERRA HWY

3 lanes south

2 lanes north

SIERRA HWY

3 lanes south

1 lanes north

Calgrove Closed

to thru traffic

THE OLD ROAD

2 lanes north & south,

trucks right lane only

14

14

RAMPS CLOSED:

Sierra Hwy southbound SR14 on-ramp

Placerita Canyon southbound SR14 on-ramp

SR14 southbound San Fernando off-ramp

N

S

W E

495 5 

495 5 

210 

Placerita Cyn Rd

Sand Cyn Rd

San Fernando Rd

Weldon Cyn Rd

Gavin Canyon 

Underpass 

Lyons Ave

San Fernando Rd

San Fernando Rd

Sepulveda

Sierra Hwy

Sierra Hwy

The Old Road

The Old Road

Calgrove BL

Santa Clarita

Los Angeles City

Los Angeles County

Earthquake 

Damage

Metrolink

Detour

Highway

SEPULVEDA

2 lanes south

only

Foothill Bl

Roxford St.

SAN FERNANDO RD

3 lanes south

1 lane north (local only)

SR14 northbound detour

on truck by-pass

1 HOV lane

2 mixed flow lanes

5 

126

Initial detours, set up just hours after the earthquake, at the SR-14/I-5 interchange had southbound I-5 traffic diverted at Lyons Avenue to San Fernando

Road. Traffic then returned to the interstate at Roxford Avenue. Northbound

traffic used Foothill Boulevard as the main detour route. Additionally, a lane in

each direction on SR-14 was set up using the right shoulder of the undamaged

truck lanes connecting I-5 and SR-14. During peak periods, these detours were

changed to one-ways to accommodate the large amount of traffic.

On January 28, two lanes of SR-14 opened for southbound traffic connecting

to southbound I-5. Caltrans used the undamaged southbound truck bypass to

make one mixed-flow lane and one HOV lane. Later, it was restriped to make

two mixed-flow lanes and one HOV lane. Figure 8 shows the detour at the I-5/

SR-14 interchange.

Figure 8. 1-5 and I-5/SR-14 Interchange Detours
20

A temporary HOV lane was put in place on southbound SR-14. A northbound

HOV lane was established using the right shoulder area of the truck lanes. The

temporary HOV lanes relieved congestion in the area as the average hourly

volume for the southbound and northbound lanes was about 1,800 vehicles

and 1,450 vehicles, respectively. Motorists also saved time by using the HOV

detours, with average delays ranging from 5 to 20 minutes.

Due to limited alternative routes on arterials and local streets, daily traffic

volumes soared on two local roads parallel to I-5 in the vicinity of the SR-14

interchange. Table 6 shows ADTs on Foothill Boulevard to the east and San

Fernando Road to the west of SR-14/I-5.

Peak period delays on SR-14 were as high as 40 minutes immediately following

the earthquake. By early February, travel times had stabilized due to the

improved detour routes and delays dropped by 20 minutes and 10 minutes for

northbound and southbound travelers, respectively.

The total detour volume for all I-5/SR-14 northbound detours was about

10,500 vehicles per hour. This included SOV lanes, HOV lanes, truck lanes, and

all local road detours, and constituted 102 percent of the pre-earthquake

volume in the same area. The southbound detour volume was about 12,000

vehicles per hour. This was about 88 percent of the pre-earthquake volume on

the parallel arterial.

On I-5, 56 percent of all commuters changed their departure times throughout

the day to avoid congestion. Of commuters departing for work between 6 a.m.

and 8 a.m., 40 percent shifted departure times to either before 6 a.m. or after 8

a.m.

Before the earthquake, the northernmost Metrolink station was near the I-5/

SR-14 interchange at the Santa Clarita station. Ridership there was only about

1,000 boardings per day. After the earthquake, in order to alleviate some of the

congestion on the detour routes, Metrolink (on January 21) expanded service

into Lancaster and Palmdale. By January 25, daily ridership went up to 22,000

boardings, which made Metrolink and Caltrans officials hopeful that freeway

congestion could be reduced by transit ridership. However, just one week later,

ridership fell to about 13,000 boardings per day and continued to steadily

Table 6. ADT on I-5/SR-14 Detours

Arterials Used Pre-Earthquake April 19, 1994

 as Alternative Routes Daily Traffic Volume Daily Traffic Volume

Foothill Boulevard

parallel to I-5 5,200 16,700

San Fernando Road

at Sepulveda Boulevard 3,900 22,100
21

decrease over the reconstruction period. By July, average ridership on the

Santa Clarita line was about 3,800 passengers. Metrolink continued to provide

a valuable option to commuters in the SR-14 region following the earthquake

and, at its peak, accounted for 10 percent of all trips made along this corridor.

I-10 Detours

I-10 runs east-west between Florida and Santa Monica, California. The I-10

corridor through Los Angeles (The Santa Monica Freeway) is known as the

busiest freeway in the world with average daily traffic about 261,000 vehicles

(measured east of I-405). The Northridge earthquake significantly damaged I10 at the bridges over Fairfax Avenue, and Washington, Venice, and La Cienega

Boulevards. The damaged section stretched over 9.4 miles between the San

Diego Freeway and the Harbor Freeway. This area of I-10 had five lanes in each

direction east of the earthquake damage and four lanes in each direction west

of the damage. Peak period traffic in this area is evenly split in each direction.

Detours on I-10 were implemented January 25 and revised on February 1 to

increase efficiency. Separate detours were implemented for HOVs and SOVs.

HOVs were given preferential treatment and were allowed to stay on the

freeway as far as the interchange closest to the closure site and reenter immediately past the closure. SOVs had to exit two exits upstream (before the

closure site) and reenter two exits downstream (past the closure site). HOV

detours were also closer to the freeway than SOV detours. SOV detours were,

on average, about 5 miles longer than the HOV detours.

Figure 9, on the next page, shows the detour routes near the I-10 damage.

Westbound HOV traffic exited the freeway at Washington Boulevard then

followed Apple Street across Washington and Venice Boulevards. Traffic was

able to reenter the freeway using the unused eastbound ramps to move under

the construction and over Ballona Creek. This HOV detour required the use of

0.5 miles of already congested city streets.

Mixed-flow traffic exited the freeway at La Brea Avenue and then used Venice

Boulevard, Cadillac Avenue, crossed La Cienega Boulevard, and then reentered

the freeway at the La Cienega westbound on ramp. This detour used close to 3

miles of city streets. Eastbound HOV detour routes were more complicated.

Eastbound traffic had to share the roadway space with local traffic. HOV traffic

exited the freeway at La Cienega Boulevard to Washington Boulevard and then

reentered the freeway at the eastbound on ramp at Washington Boulevard.

The eastbound HOV detour used about 0.8 miles of city streets. The eastbound

mixed-flow traffic exited at Robertson Boulevard to Venice Boulevard to

National Boulevard and then to Jefferson Boulevard. It then followed Jefferson

Boulevard to La Brea Avenue where it reentered the freeway. This detour also

used about 3 miles of city streets.
22

Motorists had many options on this stretch of road. They could continue to

maneuver around the damage on the detour routes. They could switch to

parallel freeways such as I-405, which opened before the earthquake. They

could also use parallel arterials that were not officially designated as detour

routes. Forming carpool groups to utilize the new HOV detours, or shifting to

transit were also options. Most motorists, however, chose to remain in their

own vehicles and adapt to the changing transportation environment rather

than change their mode of travel.

Increases in transit usage in the I-10 damaged segment were minimal due to

extensive parallel arterials. Daily bus ridership only rose by about 2,000

passengers in this area and remained consistent throughout the reconstruction process. By the middle of March, MTA officials began to scale back some

of the newly added bus routes in the area due to the lack of ridership.

Providing an HOV-specific detour route increased commuter carpooling,

although this increase was not significant. HOV volumes during the peak hour

ranged from 1,000 to 1,300 vehicles during reconstruction and were about the

N

S

W E

Earthquake 

Damage

HOV Detour

SOV Detour

Highway

495 10 

495 10 

WashingtonArlington

Crenshaw

S. Western

Pico

Pico

Washington

Washington

La Cienega Fairfax Fairfax

Venice Bl

LaBrea

LaBrea

Washington

Overland Ave

Jefferson

Jefferson

Rodeo

Cadillac Ave Cadillac Ave

Exposition

Adams

Robertson Bl Robertson Bl

National

405 495 

Eastbound HOV

lane begins at

Overland

Single Occupant

Vehicles must exit

at Robertson

Westbound HOV

lane begins at

Western

Single Occupant

Vehicles must exit

at La Brea

Figure 9. I-10 Detours
23

same prior to the earthquake. The reluctance of drivers to take advantage of

ridesharing may be due to the fact that drivers did not see a significant time

difference in using the HOV detour.

Between January 17 and February 1, daily traffic volumes on I-10 dropped

drastically until the primary detours were established. Once the detours

opened, volumes began climbing steadily, stabilizing at about 42 percent of

pre-earthquake ADT. Table 7 shows the distribution of traffic on I-10 detours

following the earthquake during peak hours.

LADOT’s “Smart Corridor” project on I-10, while only in the test phase in 1994,

helped divert freeway traffic to detours as it was specifically designed to divert

traffic from I-10. Smart Corridor uses the technology of the LADOT’s ATSAC to

monitor traffic flow. If there is heavy congestion or if there is an accident that

backs up traffic on I-10, controllers within the ATSAC TMC can guide motorists

off of the freeway and onto parallel arterial streets using VMS and hihway

advisory radio (HAR). Those drivers detoured off the freeway are guided

through the parallel streets and back onto the freeway past the area of congestion. For the Northridge detours, the Smart Corridor’s fixed VMSs provided the

way to communicate detour information with travelers. Moreover, the Smart

Corridor technologies on I-10 allowed the LADOT to monitor the overall traffic

situation and respond appropriately.

SR-118 Detour

SR-118 runs through the northern section of Los Angeles County and into the

Simi Valley section of Ventura County. The Northridge earthquake affected this

freeway at a few locations but the worst damage was between I-405 and I-210,

which resulted in complete closure of this section of roadway. Pre-earthquake

average daily traffic in the area just to the east of the closure (measured west

of I-405) was 121,000 vehicles per day.

Immediately following the earthquake, local street detours were implemented

relatively easily due to the arterial network in the area. Traffic signals were retimed to reflect the changes. By February 21, repairs had been completed to

Table 7. ADT on I-10 Detours

Alternative Percent of ADT

Primary I-10 detour 42%

I-105 (parallel freeway) 2%

Other streets 41%

Trips eliminated 15%

(transit, telecommuting,

and/or ridesharing)

Variable message

signs provided a way

to communicate

detour information

with travelers.
24

Figure 10. SR-118 Damage and Alignment

the westbound SR-118 lanes. The westbound freeway section was set up to

provide three lanes in each direction with a concrete barrier separation. This

became the main SR-118 detour route. Figure 10 shows the SR-118 damage

and alignment.

Figure 11, on the next page, shows the SR-118 detour. Because the junction of

I-405 and SR-118 required closing, the I-405 north/southbound to westbound

SR-118 detour required drivers to get off at Nordoff Street or Devonshire Street

to Tampa Avenue. The westbound SR-118 detour took motorists to the exit at

Rinaldi Street, onto Reseda Boulevard, and then to the SR-118 on-ramp. Some

of the local street detours were carrying as many as 30,000 more vehicles a day.

Peak period delays on the detour routes were as high as 30 minutes. Once the

westbound SR-118 freeway detour opened, almost all delays were eliminated.

Until February 18, daily volumes recorded on SR-118 west of I-405 were less

than 50 percent of the pre-earthquake volumes as motorists were looking for

alternative routes. After the westbound lanes of the SR-118 were reopened,

traffic stabilized at just over 110,000 vehicles per day (March 1994). The

remaining 11,000 vehicles (from the pre-earthquake ADT of 121,000) continued to use parallel arterials.
25

Metrolink in this area was not used as a viable transportation option, since the

Ventura County line ran further south than the damaged areas. Ridership on

the Ventura County line only increased by about 1,000 riders from the time

before the earthquake to the time following. The area also has an extensive

parallel arterial system, so motorists did not have to leave their cars and

changes modes of transportation.

Figure 11. SR-118 Detours

118

118

495 405 

495 5 14

495 5 

210 

Northridge

Chatsworth

Tampa Ave

Desoto Ave

Roscoe Bl

Hayvenhurst

Zelzah Ave

Ba bl oa Bl

Gothic

Sepulveda Bl

Reseda Bl

Nordhoff

Nordhoff

Devonshire

Lassen

San Fernando Mission

Rinaldi St

Earthquake 

Damage

Detour

Highway

N

S

W E Eastbound

Lane

Traffic traveling east 

diverted to repaired

westbound lane on

February 21
26

Table 8. Metrolink Ridership

Pre-January 17 Post-January 17

Transit Agency Ridership Peak Ridership 1995 Ridership

Metrolink lines:

 Total Ridership 9,551 31,276 16,600

 Santa Clarita Line 1,017 21,952 3,000

 Ventura County Line 2,154 3,050 3,000

Providing Travel Options

In order to completely restore regional mobility, transportation agencies

understood that highway detours would not be enough. The Los Angeles

region would have to begin to utilize alternate transportation modes (like

transit, HOV, and telecommuting), which would be difficult in the auto-dependent region. Transit agencies reacted quickly to the potential demand increases. Three days after the earthquake, the SCRRA Board agreed to extend

Metrolink commuter rail service north to Lancaster and west to Ventura

County (through an agreement with the Southern Pacific Railroad) in an effort

to provide mobility options to commuters. The Ventura County extension

included the Moorpark stop shown in Figure 12. Metrolink also purchased new

rail cars to increase existing service headways. Within 1 week, Metrolink had

increased service on the Santa Clarita Line from 14 to 23 trains per day in order

to accommodate a ridership increase from approximately 850 riders to 22,000

riders per day. Metrolink also decreased its ticket prices by about 50 percent

for the Lancaster Station extension and 25 percent for the Santa Clarita Station.

Six of the bus transit systems operating in Los Angeles County added new

emergency services, including new routes and revisions of existing schedules

and services. Most of the bus service changes were implemented on routes on

or near I-10. Three new park-and-ride lots also were created at strategic

locations to encourage carpools and transit use. These lots were either newly

constructed or leased, and were located in the vicinity of the I-5/SR-14 interchange.

Caltrans, the MTA, Metrolink, LADOT, and other local agencies also developed a

multi-faceted public awareness campaign to disseminate traveler information.

The agencies put together a unified Commuter Action Plan to provide accurate

information on alternative transportation options for residents and workers in

the earthquake-affected areas through the use of newspaper, radio, and

television public announcements. With the slogan “Together, We’ll All Get

Moving Again,” the agencies also published an 8-page comprehensive newspaper offering regional transportation and commuter information for bus and

rail routes and schedules, carpool partners, vanpools, park-and-ride lots and

telecommuting centers, and a 1-800-COMMUTE number to disseminate

information via telephone.

Strategies to

encourage

alternative

transportation use

including transit,

HOV, and

telecommuting were

implemented within

days of the disaster.

Local agencies also

developed a multifaceted public

awareness

campaign to

disseminate traveler

information.
27

Table 8, on the previous page, shows the effects of the highway demand

reduction measures implemented to encourage transit use on Metrolink lines.

Ridership skyrocketed during reconstruction to 300 percent of pre-earthquake

ridership levels. Figure 12 shows Metrolink ridership on the Santa Clarita Line.

The opening of the new Metrolink lines kept ridership in 1995 slightly higher

than pre-earthquake ridership; however, it is interesting to note that even at its

peak, Metrolink ridership represented only about 4 percent of the total commuting trips in Los Angeles County. There was little change in MTA bus,

subway, and light rail ridership during reconstruction.

Telecommuting and ride sharing also were encouraged after the Northridge

earthquake. Although only about 7,000 people bought GTE and Pacific Bell

telecommuting technologies for their homes following the Northridge earthquake, 90 percent of these people were still using telecommuting services in

August 1994. Ridesharing did have an initial impact as a result of the HOV

strategy; however, because of the relatively small time savings offered by the

HOV detours, the increase in HOV vehicles was relatively minor. During the

reconstruction period, HOV volumes ranged from 1,000 to 1,300 vehicles,

although HOVs represented a higher proportion of the total average daily

vehicle counts because of the overall lower traffic volume. After the reopening

of I-10 on April 12, 1994, peak hour HOV volumes ranged from 1,200 to 1,500.

The media helped to communicate mobility information to travelers above

and beyond informing motorists of detours, particularly by covering the

expanded Metrolink service. Most commuters learned about Metrolink for the

Figure 12. 1993-94 Metrolink Ridership

20,000

16,000

12,000

8,000

4,000

0

Oct-93

Nov-93

Dec-93

Jan-94

Feb-94

Mar-94

Apr-94

May-94

Jun-94

Jul-94

Aug-94

Sept-94

Avg.

weekday

ridership
28

first time as a result of the news coverage following the earthquake. A study

done by The Journal of Transportation and Statistics indicated that the news

coverage helped increase Metrolink ridership.

Post-Earthquake Conditions

Table 9 shows the traffic volumes on the damaged freeway segments before

the Northridge earthquake, during reconstruction, and post-construction.

Figure 13, on the following page, shows post-event transportation conditions

on a regional map. The post-construction ADTs show that after reconstruction,

freeway traffic immediately returned to about 95 percent of pre-earthquake

levels for the I-10, I-5, and SR-14 damaged corridors. SR-118 traffic volumes

were significantly reduced on the day of the earthquake with some local

streets carrying 30,000 or more vehicles until the main freeway detour was

established. On February 21, the freeway detour opened, providing three

travel lanes in each direction, and the ADT on SR-118 quickly rose to preearthquake levels.

Table 9. ADT Comparisons

PostPre-Quake Reconstruction Construction

Freeway ADT ADT ADT Reopening Date

I-10 261,000 110,000 250,000 Reopened 4/12/94- traffic

stabilized by June 1994.

I-5 133,000 88,000 127,000 Reopened 5/17-5/18/94.

SR-14 130,000 108,000 125,000 Reopened 7/8/94.

SR-118 121,000 110,000 120,000 Westbound lanes reopened

2/24/94; Eastbound lanes

reopened 5/13/94.
29

14

126

118

2

134

110

60

90

27

23

1

170

2

23

126

14

138

138

710

101

101

Castaic

Santa 

Clarita

Lancaster

Palmdale

Los Angeles

County Ventura

County

Simi Valley

Thousand Oaks

Northridge

Woodland Hills

Hollywood

Basemap source: Caltrans

Pasadena

Los 

Angeles

Moorpark

260,000

Freeways

Earthquake 

Epicenter

Metrolink Transit

Freeway Quake 

Damage Locations

242,000 127,000

117,000

101

118

495 5 

495 5 

495 5 

495 10 

495 10 

495 405 

495 405 

495 605 

495 710 

495 110 

495 210 

495 105 

495 210 

Reopened

April 11

Metrolink daily ridership

Santa Clarita line 3,400

Lancaster extension 4,500 

Systemwide 16,600 I-5 at Gavin Canyon I-5/SR14 Interchange

SR 118 Mission/Gothic

I-10 Fairfax

166,000

195,000

349,000

264,000

197,000

314,000 214,000

279,000

82,000

Figure 13. Post-Earthquake Transportation Conditions
30

2.4 Post-Event Traffic Management

Operations

Following the earthquake, a $12.64 million design-build contract was put into

place to install new traffic monitoring and commuter information equipment

to areas that were affected by freeway damage but were not covered by the

existing traffic operations equipment. (Design-build contracting is explained

more thoroughly in the Rebuilding the Transportation Network section of this

report.) The contract between Caltrans and National Engineering Technology

was agreed to on January 20, 1994.

The new field operations equipment included:

◆ 8 VMSs

◆ 9 HAR installations

◆ 7 CCTV locations

◆ 2 CCTV communication links

◆ 20 vehicle detector system locations

◆ 2 video image-processing locations.

The establishment of the Emergency Detour Management Center, which was

later re-named the Earthquake Planning and Implementation Center (EPICenter), was also part of this contract. Housed within the Caltrans district office

in Los Angeles, it was built in order to maintain and monitor the new field

equipment. The Emergency Detour Management Center also took some of the

burden off of the existing Caltrans TMC by solely focusing on the earthquake

affected areas and detour routes.

The FSP also took an active role in managing post-earthquake congestion by

providing 13 additional roving tow trucks to earthquake-affected areas. The

deployment included extended peak schedules to all regular beats patrolled

by the officers as well as two new beats for the I-5 and SR-14 detours. (A beat is

a regular route followed by CHP patrol officers.) Following the Northridge

earthquake (January 17 to May 1994), 90 percent, or about 15,000, of all assists

made by the FSP were on beats covering the damaged freeway areas. The I-5

beat had the highest number of assists due to the few parallel alternative

routes available for travelers. The comparisons of pre-earthquake and postearthquake incidents on the damaged freeways show that where parallel

arterials were used for detours, the number of incidents was significantly lower

than areas where freeway capacity was simply reduced (lane closures).

Where parallel

arterials were used

for detours, the

number of incidents

was significantly

lower than areas

where freeway

capacity was simply

reduced (lane

closures).
31

Rebuilding the Transportation Network

Rebuilding the Los Angeles regional freeway network required a sustained

effort by Caltrans and unprecedented cooperation between local, state, and

federal government agencies. Through demolition, construction bidding, and

reconstruction, the agencies involved exercised innovative solutions to existing “red tape” problems to restore the highway network.

The demolition of damaged highway infrastructure started on January 17,

1994, and operated around the clock until completion, using non-competitive

bid contractors in all but one case. The demolitions of I-10 and I-5 damaged

infrastructure were both started on January 17 and completed in 3 and 10

days, respectively, while the demolition of the I-5/SR-14 Interchange, which

sustained significantly more damage, was started on January 18 and completed on March 17, 1994. Figure 14 shows the demolition of I-10 at La Cienga

Boulevard.

Figure 14. Demolition of I-10 at La Cienga Boulevard

Rebuilding the Los

Angeles regional

freeway network

required a sustained

effort by Caltrans

and unprecedented

cooperation

between local, state,

and Federal

Government

agencies.
32

In the first days following the earthquake, Caltrans and FHWA discussed

bidding, and eventually signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on

January 26, 1994, which outlined the three bidding procedures:

1. A+B bidding

2. Invitation-to-bid procedures

3. Design-build bidding.

A+B bidding is a “cost-plus-time” bidding procedure that selects the lowest

bidder based on a combination of the contract bid items (A) and the amount

time (B) needed to complete the project or a critical portion of the project.

A+B bidding is used to motivate the contractor to minimize the overall time on

high priority and high usage projects. This encourages contractors to finish

early by offering bonuses (incentives) for early completion and assessing fines

(disincentives) for late completion.

Invitational bidding was another procedure used to expedite contract administration by FHWA and Caltrans. This concept was used for those projects that

had high user delay costs and an urgent need for early completion. These

projects were expected to have short time frames for Caltrans to prepare the

bid packages, greatly expedited advertising periods for the contractors to

submit bids, and one-day bid openings and awards. Limiting the number of

bidders on these critical projects allowed Caltrans to provide packages to the

contractors quickly and answer questions. The MOU, signed on January 26,

1994, between Caltrans and FHWA, outlined the criteria to be used for the

invitation-to-bid approach. Caltrans Headquarters Structures Division identified contractors to be on a “short list” for the invitational bidding based on

internal criteria. Caltrans used the invitation-to-bid approach on 8 of the 10

A+B earthquake reconstruction contracts.

Design-build construction is another contracting mechanism that allows initial

construction to begin before final drawings for design are approved. Following the Northridge earthquake, Caltrans had 70 design engineers in place and

ready to being work on plans for the damaged freeway sections. Contractors

submitted technical proposals for construction work, and those proposals that

met the minimum technical guidelines were allowed to participate in the price

proposal section of the bidding.

The use of ER funds (see page 38 for a more complete discussion) allowed for

non-competitive bidding for work and contracts either negotiated or by force

accounts as best suited by public health and safety. ER projects are exempt

from regional planning and transportation improvement plan (TIP) and air

quality conformity requirements as long as the damaged structures are replace

in-kind, i.e. not significantly different from the original structure, and in-place,

i.e., in the same place as the original structure.
33

The use of ER funds and innovative contracting procedures allowed for the

expedited rebuilding of the Los Angeles regional transportation network. The

closure of some of the most heavily traveled roadways, including I-10, was

costing the community about $1 million a day, reinforcing the need for the

construction process to be done as quickly as possible. For the major reconstruction projects, the time period from advertising to awarding the contract

ranged from 3 to 30 days. Construction on I-10 and SR-118 began in late

January and early February 1994. The demolition of the old I-5/SR-14 Interchange was complete on March 17, 1994, and construction on the new infrastructure started shortly thereafter.

Figure 15. Caltrans Reconstruction Public Outreach
34

Table 10. Freeway Reconstruction Incentives

Freeway Segment Work began Work Finished Incentive-Disincentive Bonus

I-10 February 5, 1994 April 11, 1994 $200,000/day $14.8 million

74 days early

SR-14/I-5 Interchange* March 19, 1994 July 8, 1994 $100,000/day $3.5 million

35 days early

SR-14/I-5 July 9, 1994 November 4, 1994 $20,000/day N/A

Interchange** on schedule

I-5 at Gavin Canyon January 29, 1994 May 17, 1994 $150,000/day $4.95 million

Southbound;

May 18, 1994

Northbound

33 days early

SR-118 Eastbound February 10, 1994 May 13, 1994 $50,000/day $400,000

8 days early

* South SR-14 to South I-5; North SR-14 to North I-5.

** South SR-14 to North I-5; South I-5 to North SR-14

Construction on three of the four Los Angeles freeways was completed ahead

of schedule. Table 10 shows the construction schedule for the major damaged

freeway segments and the monetary incentives for early completion. Figure 15

shows part of the public outreach campaign used by Caltrans to tout the rapid

reconstruction of I-10.
35

3.1 Advance Preparations and Planning

Experience with previous earthquakes has significantly strengthened the

preparedness of the California transportation system for seismic activity. After

the damage and destruction to several bridges and overpasses during the

1989 Loma Prieta earthquake in Northern California, the California State

Legislature enacted a plan for seismically retrofitting vulnerable bridges and

overpasses throughout the state, and, prior to the Northridge earthquake, 122

state bridges in the Los Angeles region (out of 456 in the region designated)

3.0 Findings

Figure 16. Seismic Retrofitting Outreach program
36

had already been retrofitted. Consequently, none of these bridges were

damaged during the Northridge earthquake.

After the Northridge earthquake, Caltrans continued its bridge retrofitting

program and implemented an extensive public outreach program to gain

support for additional bridge retrofitting. Figure 16, on the previous page,

shows an example of the seismic retrofitting process presented to the public.

But seismic activity is just one in a number of events for which the Los Angeles

region must prepare. Los Angeles hosted the 1984 Summer Olympics and has

many large-scale entertainment and sporting events each year, all requiring

significant traffic management and emergency preparedness. Los Angeles and

the rest of the State of California also must plan for significant environmental

emergencies. In fact, in the 1970s, fire officials developed the Incident Command System (ICS), now widely adopted across the country, in response to a

series of major fires in Southern California. At that time, municipal, county,

state, and federal fire authorities collaborated to address severe recurring

problems that occurred when fighting forest fires. From non-standard terminology to a lack of integrated communication systems, the ICS addressed

issues that enabled consolidated action plans to be developed.

The result was a comprehensive model for effective incident management. By

applying a common organizational structure and key management principles

in a standardized way, ICS has evolved into an “all-risk” system appropriate to

all types of emergencies that has been adopted by FEMA for use by communities to better prepare for emergency situations. ICS was used after the

Northridge earthquake, with FEMA coordinating the Federal emergency

response.

In times of crisis, both the City and County of Los Angeles activate their Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), built after the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The

EOCs were activated at 4:35 a.m., 5 minutes after the Northridge earthquake.

The centers, originally built to withstand a nuclear blast, are intended to

facilitate interagency decisionmaking and information flow. They accomodate

utility representatives and representatives from various City of Los Angeles

departments including public works, fire, police, building and safety, transportation (LADOT), city administration, and the mayor’s office. Also represented at

the EOCs are the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, the MTA, the CHP,

and Caltrans.

Caltrans has run the Los Angeles TMC from its office in downtown Los Angeles

since its inception in 1971. Staffed 24 hours a day, the TMC includes computeraided dispatch, VMS, and live CCTV updates, as well as other traffic management technologies. TMC staff is responsible for sending out the FSP to respond to traffic incidents as they occur.
37

3.2 Institutional Coordination

Traffic Management

A team of traffic engineers from Caltrans developed the Traffic Management

Plan (TMP) to coordinate all traffic operations for the region. The TMP set in

motion many different measures, with its top priority to organize and identify

the detours that were to be set in place. It also planned for transit adjustments

to handle the new influx of ridership.

The Caltrans TMC was the initial site of traffic management following the

earthquake. Besides its traffic monitoring capabilities (VMS, CCTV, and traffic

counters), the TMC deployed the FSP, which is jointly run by Caltrans, the

LADOT, and the CHP. As was discussed earlier, directly following the earthquake, the FSP deployed 157 tow trucks to the regional freeway system and

extended their regular peak commute hours. The tow trucks were equipped

with radios and a mobile traffic data terminal, which allowed the drivers to

communicate with dispatchers at the TMC. In January 1994, the freeway

service patrol assisted about 1,250 motorists. That number peaked at about

4,100 in March 1994, or 14,898 total motorists from January to May 1994.

Reconstruction

In managing the damage to the transportation system in Los Angeles, Caltrans

took the lead on coordinating the transportation response with the LADOT,

CHP, and FHWA. Working with the FHWA and regional transit agencies as well

as the LADOT, Caltrans assessed the damage on the day of the earthquake and

quickly set up detours around the damage. Caltrans then worked closely with

the FHWA to rebuild the highway network.

Federal, state, local, industry leaders, and officials took a “hands-on role” in the

stages of recovery. The early presence and participation of the Secretary of the

USDOT, the FHWA Administrator, the Governor of California, the Director of

Caltrans, the Mayor of Los Angeles, leadership within industry and the private

sector, and many others, set a tone of commitment to the public. It demonstrated that government would work with the private sector to expedite the

reconstruction effort.

The decision to replace damaged facilities in-kind and in-place also helped

expedite the reconstruction efforts. This minimized the environmental and

right-of-way impacts of recovery reconstruction and was possible because of

the use of ER funds for reconstruction. It also facilitated the use of as-built

plans and other available historical data for expediting the re-design process.

Figure 17 shows the reconstruction of the regional freeway network.
38

The Role of FEMA

FEMA coordinated the response of the 27 federal agencies involved in the

Northridge earthquake using the FEMA ICS. With the coordination of agencies,

services were provided quickly, decisions were made based on need and

without the usual formal process, and financial challenges were overcome.

FEMA positioned emergency equipment and supplies for the state’s use at a

nearby Air Force base and opened an Earthquake Service Center with representatives of all disaster assistance agencies to aid victims. Coordinating with

other federal agencies, FEMA helped make some of the big decisions involving

transportation, expediting the loan process for victims, and disseminating

useful information to the residents of Los Angeles County.

The Role of the FHWA

An established relationship and partnership existed among Caltrans, the

FHWA, and the construction industry. The relationship and partnership was

grounded in the Federal-Aid Highway Program and the extensive experience

that FHWA and Caltrans had in cooperatively administering and implementing

the highway program.

In July 1977, Congress authorized a special program from the Highway Trust

Fund for repair of damaged roadways—the ER Program. The ER program funds

are available for use by the FHWA to help with the repair or reconstruction of

federally funded roadways that are damaged as a result of a natural disaster or

catastrophic failure from an external cause. Damage, however, must to be

severe, must occur over a large area, and must result in unusually high expenses to the state highway agency. FHWA can provide up to $100 million in

ER funds to a state for each natural disaster and if a disaster exceeds the $100

Figure 17. Reconstruction of Los Angeles Freeways
39

million state limit, Congress may allow for an increase. The cap was raised to

$100 million in 1987 following many large-scale disasters, such as the Mt. St.

Helens volcano in 1982.

Following the Northridge earthquake, FHWA initially released $45 million to

begin work on clearing debris and demolition. The $100 million funding limit

was soon reached due to the amount of damage, and additional funds were

made available based on damage and reconstruction estimates. Although

transit costs are generally not covered under FHWA ER funds, approximately

$9.3 million was set aside to help expand Metrolink commuter rail service in

order to replace some of the commuting capacity lost with the damaged

freeways. FHWA ER funds released for the Northridge earthquake totaled $350

million.

3.3 Guiding Priority: Mobility

The dependence of the Los Angeles population on the highway network

underscored the importance of transportation agencies to restore regional

mobility. Because the earthquake occurred in the early morning hours of the

Martin Luther King holiday when traffic volume was extremely light, emergency response needs were limited, and agencies were able to focus rather

quickly on mobility decisions. In a report published after a review of transportation decisions made in response to the earthquake, the Transportation

Research Circular (published by the Transportation Research Board and the

National Research Council) reported several mobility findings:

◆ Providing immediate transportation solutions took precedence over

the opportunity to change motorist behavior.

◆ Stabilization of traffic conditions took several weeks to several months.

◆ Where sufficient alternate routes existed, motorists continued driving;

where convenient detours were not available, transit options became

much more attractive.

◆ Availability of accurate traffic data was critical in developing emergency detours.

◆ Areas with well-developed traffic management centers were able to

accommodate sudden traffic changes more easily.
40

3.4 Communications

Communication immediately after the Northridge earthquake was very

difficult for both emergency workers and residents. Power was out for most of

the area, which affected the operation of the central phone system. There were

numerous fires at electrical stations and telephone switching stations. One

reason for phone service failure after the earthquake was that the system itself

was overwhelmed. There were many phones off the hook, either knocked off

by the earthquake or because of the volume of calls. The system will automatically turn itself off when a certain percentage of phones are off the hook, to

limit the amount of damage done to switching stations and allow for faster

service restoration.

In 1994, the use of cellular phones was just starting to become widespread.

During the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, cell phones were some of the only

communications tools working and proved invaluable. In the first hours

following the Northridge earthquake, with landlines out, cellular phones and

radios were the only means of communication into and out of the earthquake

area for emergency personnel. However, communication in the canyon areas

was intermittent due to terrain and limited coverage, and it was very difficult

to get a signal for a cell phone or a radio. Since much of the earthquake

damage occurred there, the surrounding terrain hindered communications

during the initial stage of recovery. Other communication tools were used

extensively, such as pagers, FAX machines, and electronic data sharing via

computer. Another source of communications was the use of helicopter

surveillance to find areas of congestion and problems and transfer the information to commuters via radio, television, or signage on the highways.

As noted earlier, the media was essential in getting transportation-related

information to the people in the Los Angeles area. Daily press conferences

and bilingual information hotline was established to give that gave out detailed transportation information.

Caltrans also implemented an extensive campaign to keep the public informed

about construction activities. Cooperating with the LADOT and CHP, Caltrans

produced about 200 each of Los Angeles County Road Closures Reports and

Special Bulletins. In addition, a brochure Accelerate, Caltrans’ Action Plan to Get

All Our Freeways Moving Again, was distributed in Los Angeles are newspapers

on March 27 and mailed to non-subscribing households that same week. Over

2.6 million copies of Accelerate were distributed by June 1994.

In the hours

following the

earthquake, cellular

phones and radios

were the only means

of communication

for emergency

personnel.

Caltrans implemented an extensive

public information

campaign to keep

the public informed

about construction

activities.
41

3.5 The Role of Advanced Technology

As has been already discussed, the Caltrans TMC served as the center of

decision-making efforts by the traffic management teams after the 1994

Northridge earthquake. Extensive traffic management capabilities were

already in place on most of the major freeways well before the earthquake,

including speed monitoring loop detectors, CCTV, on-ramp meters, and permanently mounted VMS. The TMC used backup electrical generators for power

and relied on landline telephones for primary communications.

Although the TMC was able to initially deploy the FSP and serve as an emergency command center for the regional highway network, it quickly became

evident that the existing TMC could not handle all the unprecedented congestion generated by an earthquake, as it was already operating at capacity. The

TMP recognized this, and with federal emergency relief funding of $12.64

million, implemented the Earthquake Planning and Implementation Center

(EPI-Center). The 2000-square-foot EPI-Center opened on April 17, 1994, and

acted as a hub for many advanced technologies that facilitated the traffic

management in the disaster areas. Connected with the TMC, the EPI-Center is

used only when an earthquake occurs to relieve some of the burden on the

TMC. The goal of the EPI-Center was to focus on communication between

transportation and emergency officials and commuters, relaying important

information directly to those affected. The EPI-Center was vital in coordinating

the traffic management deployments and giving traffic engineers accurate and

immediate information. This allowed them to make better decisions and to

collect information about the changes in the traffic behavior during a disaster.

Since the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the TMC has updated the means by

which they relay traffic information. Cable TV is now being used, real-time

traffic information is available on the Internet, and Teletext, a scrolling sign

placed at key points in the freeway system, updates commuters to potential

back-ups.

3.6 System Redundancy and Resiliency

Highways

In an area the size of Los Angeles (about 9,000,000 people in 1994) redundancy in the transportation system is extremely important, especially for work

commutes. LADOT’s “Smart Corridor” project has identified these parallel

arterials as an important option for commuter traffic. The Santa Monica

Freeway (I-10) Smart Corridor was designed to help ease the congestion on

this extremely busy roadway. When the Northridge earthquake hit in 1994, the

Smart Corridor project was still being tested on I-10.

An Earthquake

Planning and

Implementation

Center, connected to

Caltrans’s Traffic

Management

Center, coordinates

communication

among transportation and emergency

officials and the

public.

Pre-identified

arterial detour

routes were

important for

maintaining

commuter mobility

after the disaster.
42

This system has the ability to divert freeway traffic onto the arterial streets

during times of heavy congestion. Having these arterials available for detours

following the Northridge earthquake was a tool that the transportation

agencies were able to use to help relieve some of the post-earthquake traffic

burden.

Transit

In addition to roadway redundancy, having a reliable and extensive public

transportation system alleviated some of the initial congestion caused by

reconstruction. With an already extensive bus system, the LACMTA increased

Metrobus service following the earthquake to respond to the demands of

commuters. Metrolink, though still in its infancy, extended lines further into

northern Los Angeles County and into neighboring Ventura and Orange

counties.

During construction, transit use tripled on MTA and Metrolink rail and bus lines

(on average); however, 1-year later, transit use fell to pre-earthquake ridership

levels.

Telecommuting

Telecommuting during the time following the Northridge earthquake became

another important option for affected commuters. Caltrans, the MTA,

Metrolink, the City of Los Angeles, and other local agencies developed the

Commuter Action Guide to encourage alternative transportation. The Commuter Action Guide gave valuable advice to those wanting to learn how to set

up telecommuting program; this information was also available by calling 1-

800-COMMUTE, the hotline for commuters. Pacific Bell and GTE were two

communications companies that set up telecommuting centers to help their

customers.

Pacific Bell set up an Emergency Telecommuting Relief Package on January 20,

for their customers. Installation charges were waived for all businesses and

individuals who had proof that their commute to work was made worse by the

highway damage. This package also included Centrex business telephone

service, Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), and voice mail. Pacific Bell

also had a $1 million loan program for equipment including modems and

terminal adaptors for small businesses, schools, and non-profit organizations.

GTE also had similar services available. They waived basic monthly phone rates

for up to 90 days for people affected by the earthquake. They also offered free

services for 1 year to earthquake victims who transferred a number to a new

location, re-established phone service at their existing location, or used the

remote call-forwarding feature. GTE’s telecommuting package included a

second phone line, three-way calling, call waiting, voicemail, and for businesses,

the addition of a toll-free line. They also had ISDN capabilities and other data

communications technologies. The charges for setting up the telecommuting

An extensive

existing transit

system also

provided critical

commuter options.

Local

telecommunications

companies offered

free and discounted

services to

encourage

telecommuting.
43

package were waived through February. GTE also established teams to educate customers on the different telecommuting options and also promoted

the benefits of telecommuting during this time.

Ninety percent of those surveyed who signed up for packages (random

sampling of 1,300 customers) were still working from home in August.

Telecommuting proved to be an important option for those affected by the

Northridge earthquake and also aided the reconstruction efforts by having

those people off the roads. Telecommuting might be an important option for

businesses to have in the case of any future emergency situations.

Intermodal Freight

The redundant highway network proved effective for the intermodal freight

movements in Southern California. Initially, congestion and circuitous routing

did impair freight transfer. Public officials, however, moved quickly to restore

facilities after the earthquake and were quick to make changes to solutions

that were not working. The initial detour for I-5, for example, directed truckers

on a circuitous route to the 101 Freeway. But during the first few weeks, more

direct detours were implemented. With the implementation of the Old Road

detour, trucking through the I-5 corridor returned to “almost exactly its preearthquake patterns.”

The reconstruction of the highway network and related detours had little

financial impact on the trucking industry. A study undertaken by the California

State Polytechnic University indicated that revenues declined by 0.2 percent in

the first quarter FY ‘94 while first quarter costs increased by 3.5 percent.

Moreover, some trucking companies gained customers as a result of the

earthquake as there was a need to transfer or deliver goods so that these

customers could resume normal operations.

The rerouting and rescheduling strategies of trucks due to the freeway detours

and changing customer base following the Northridge earthquake were made

on an ad hoc basis rather than as a part of pre-arranged earthquake responses.

Only 15 percent of the trucking companies surveyed in the study by the

California State Polytechnic University had plans to prepare for future earthquakes.

Detour routes were

improved over time

to better

accommodate

freight mobility

needs.
44
45

4.0 Conclusions

The Northridge earthquake caused extensive damage to the freeway system in

Los Angeles County, California, shutting down four major freeways (I-5, SR-14, I10, and SR-118) in some of their busiest locations. The damage required

decision makers in the Los Angeles region, the State of California, and the

federal government to make decisions with respect to the challenges that the

region would face. Caltrans played a key role in decision making for the region

and made two key decisions quickly after the earthquake: to rebuild the

damaged freeways, and to retain traveler mobility and keep traffic flowing as

smoothly as possible during reconstruction.

The 1994 Northridge earthquake generated the equivalent of nearly a year’s

worth of highway projects in a single event. While freeway damage was

extensive, an earthquake of the same magnitude with an epicenter closer to

urban Los Angeles could have caused much more extensive damage and loss

of life. Because the Northridge earthquake occurred on a holiday, traffic

volumes were significantly lower on that Monday compared with those of a

normal workday, giving transportation agencies time to deal with the regional

freeway destruction. The media discouraged people from driving through

various forms of news coverage during the week following the earthquake,

and many people stayed home to repair damage further reducing travel

demand. By the time commuters returned to normal work schedules, detours

had been implemented, alternative commuting modes had been publicized,

and much of the demolition of the damaged freeways and initial construction

had already begun.

Transportation officials can learn from the successes of the Northridge transportation response from the following six lessons:

◆ Advance preparations mitigated damaged: None of the 122 state

bridges that were retrofitted in Los Angeles County as a result of the

program begun in response to the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake were

damaged during the Northridge earthquake.

◆ Redundant arterials provided traveler mobility: The extensive highway network in the region allowed vehicles to be diverted off of I-10

and SR-118 to local streets to retain traveler mobility and safety with

minimal delay. Where parallel arterials were limited or non-existent

(near the I-5 and SR-14 damaged sections), detours were more difficult

to implement and travel times were greatly increased during the

reconstruction period.

◆ Traffic management centers provided operations: Caltrans and the

LADOT both had TMCs operating in Los Angeles County before the

earthquake.
46

◆ Public transportation and other mode alternatives provided travelers with commuting options: Transit agencies reacted quickly to the

possibility of increased demand by extending transit lines and increasing transit frequency. SOV restrictions also encouraged travelers to

find alternatives to commuting alone. Telecommuting also provided

an alternative to the daily commute. These actions provided the

traveling public with alternatives to travel, but it should be noted that

traffic volumes returned to normal almost immediately after the

freeways were opened to regular traffic.

◆ Innovative contract bidding and construction methods minimized

construction time and increased accountability: The use of A+B

bidding (including incentives and disincentives) and other contracting

mechanisms like design-build construction allowed for close coordination and transparency between the FHWA, Caltrans, and construction

contractors.

◆ The multimodal response did not change traveler behavior: Before

the Northridge earthquake, transportation options were available, but

not widely used. Metrolink commuter rail and MTA subway, light rail,

and bus services provided commuting options to the region. During

construction, transit use tripled on MTA and Metrolink rail and bus

lines (on average); however, at its peak, Metrolink ridership represented

only about 4 percent of the total commuting trips in Los Angeles

County. One year after the Northridge earthquake, transit use fell to

(approximately) pre-earthquake ridership levels.
47

Day 1 – Monday, January 17, 1994

4:30 a.m.: An earthquake of a magnitude of 6.8 occurs in the Los

Angeles area, centered in Northridge. Damage spreads

over 2,100 square miles and through three different

counties.

4:31 a.m.: 5.9 aftershock.

4:35 a.m.: Emergency Operations Center is activated.

4:45 a.m.: FEMA Response begins.

5:35 a.m.: Region IX Regional Operations Center is activated.

5:45 a.m.: Mayor Riordan declares a state of emergency.

6:00 a.m.: FEMA Headquarters Emergency Support Team is activated.

6:45 a.m.: As many as fifty structure fires have been reported, in

addition to numerous ruptures in water and natural gas

mains. Power outages reported citywide.

9:05 a.m.: California Governor Pete Wilson declares a State of Emergency.

9:45 a.m.: All active fires were under control.

2:08 p.m.: President Clinton declares a national disaster for Los

Angeles County.

7:00 p.m.: Disaster Field Office is opened.

7:00 p.m.: First of several contracts are in place and crews begin to

work on debris clearance and highway demolition.

Other Day 1 Events

March Air Force Base is designated as the Federal Mobilization Center.

U.S. Public Health Service deploys four Disaster Medical

Assistance Teams to the disaster area.

FEMA deploys two urban search and Rescue teams.

American Red Cross sets up 26 shelters; Salvation Army

sets up 5 shelters.

EPA responds to investigate a 200,000-gallon oil spill into

the Santa Clarita River.

Many major freeways and roadways are partially or completely closed, diverting massive amounts of vehicles onto

adjacent streets.

Appendix A: Northridge

Earthquake Chronology
48

Within hours of the earthquakes, existing Emergency

Operations Centers set up initial detours for the damaged

roadways.

Caltrans Traffic Management Plan (TMP) is set in motion to

organize

detours, plan for transit adjustments, and deploy ITS

technologies controlled by the Earthquake Planning and

Implementation Center (EPI-Center).

Caltrans decides to take two arterials parallel to a damaged

roadway, re-stripe them and operate them one-way only

during peak periods, open truck bypass lanes to all traffic,

and add an HOV lane in each direction.

Day 2 – Tuesday, January 18, 1994

All I-5 lanes are closed except northbound I-5 to northbound SR-14 truck lanes.

All SR-14 Lanes are closed. Local streets are used as detours.

All I-10 lanes are closed between Centinela and Washington Blvd. Local streets are used as detours.

All SR-118 lanes are closed between Tampa Ave and I-210.

Local streets are used as detours.

The Mobil Emergency Response System (MERS) arrives in

southern California with 28 telecommunication specialists.

FEMA Special Facility Tele-registration Center is activated.

Day 3 – Wednesday, January 19,1994

Casualty Information Center reported 2,400 injuries treated

and released at area hospitals, 526 hospitalized, and 40

deaths.

President Clinton arrives in Los Angeles.

Los Angeles Mayor Riordan declares a curfew.

Caltrans and National Engineering Technology agree to

design-build contract for new traffic operations technologies.

Tele-registration lines are expanded from 57 to 336 lines.

Metrolink enhances services to handle immediate increase

in ridership, including using buses and taxis as shuttles to
49

Metrolink stations, adding three park-and-ride lots with

900 new spaces near a damaged interchange, enhancing

routes and schedules for rail and bus service, allowing

bicycles on Metrolink rail.

Metrolink adds parking spaces at Santa Clarita station and

increases number of trains during peak rush hours.

A new station is opened in Northridge on the Metrolink

Ventura rail line and 2 new stations are added to the end

line.

Six LA County bus systems add new routes, modify existing

routes, and extend schedules in areas affected by damaged

roadways.

Day 5 – Friday, January 21, 1994

I-10 northbound and southbound connectors to I-405 are

opened.

Metrolink rail opens 2 (of 4) new stations (eventually with 7

new trains), extending the Santa Clarita line to service

commuters in an area along one damaged freeway corridor.

Day 9 – Tuesday, January 25, 1994

Metrolink ridership hits 22,000 boardings per day, up from

the normal average of 1,000 per day, along the new extension of the Santa Clarita rail line serving areas surrounding

earthquake-damaged roads. (Ridership decreased steadily

during road reconstruction, and leveled off at 4,500 upon

completion of road repairs.)

Day 10 – Wednesday, January 26, 1994

Demolition of the I-5 Gavin Canyon structures is complete.

Day 12 – Friday, January 28, 1994

The southbound SR-14 to southbound I-5 truck bypass

opens one HOV and one mixed-flow lane.

I-5 detour route is opened using a reconstructed frontage

road.

Day 13 – Saturday, January 29, 1994

The Old Road detour opens two lanes in each direction

through Gavin Canyon.
50

Day 15 – January 31,1994

Sierra Highway is restriped for three southbound lanes and

one northbound lane.

San Fernando Road also begins operating three southbound lanes and one northbound lane.

Sepulveda Blvd operats as a one-way street between San

Fernando

and I-5.

End of January 1994

Lane capacity in the damaged roadway corridors is restored to 70 percent of the pre-earthquake level.

Along one damaged freeway corridor, 4 new commuter rail

stations have been opened, extending commuter rail

service along the Santa Clarita line for 50 miles.

January/February 1994

Commuter express bus services between Santa Clarita and

downtown LA are rerouted to compliment Metrolink, but

no additional services are provided.

Early February 1994

Regular system of detours and emergency express bus

service are in operation. A fifth new station is added to the

Santa Clarita Metrolink line.

Day 20 – February 5, 1994

Construction on I-10 Santa Monica Freeway begins.

Construction on Camarillo Metrolink begins.

Day 23 – February 8, 1994

For SR-118, all lanes remain closed from Roseda Blvd to I405.

Local streets were used as detours for this closed segment.

Day 28 – February 13, 1994

Metrolink Princess Station Opens
51

Day 29 – February 14, 1994

Camarillo commuter rail station construction is complete.

Day 34 – February 19, 1994

SR-118 detour opens.

Day 36 – February 21, 1994

Westbound SR-118 is reconstructed and restriped to

provide three eastbound and three westbound lanes,

replacing the detours on local streets.

Day 46 – March 3, 1994

MTA is asked to submit strategies for further traffic reduction.

Day 60 – March 17, 1994

Demolition of the I-5/SR-14 interchange is complete.

Day 63 – March 20, 1994

A 5.3 aftershock causes new damage.

April 1994

Commuter bus service is expanded; 3 new express routes

are added.

Day 85 – April 11, 1994

I-10 Santa Monica Freeway opens 74 days ahead of schedule.

Day 121 – May 17, 1994

I-5 Golden State Freeway at Gavin Canyon opens.

Mid-May 1994

Major portions of the most heavily damaged freeways

reopen to traffic.

Day 173 – July 8, 1994

The I-5/SR-14 freeway interchange re-opens three weeks

ahead of schedule.
52

July 1994

Some mainline freeway connectors reopen.

Day 230 – September 3, 1994

SR-118 Simi Valley Freeway opens more than two weeks

ahead of schedule.

November 1994

Last connector ramps reopen.
53

Bureau of Transportation Statistics (http://www.bts.gov/)

1

A Brief Overview of the Northridge earthquake and Its Transportation

Impacts Rolf Schmitt. Journal of Transportation and Statistics. Volume 1,

Number 2, May 1998.

2

Transport-Related Impacts of the Northridge earthquake

Peter Gordon, Harry Richardson & Bill Davis.

http://www.bts.gov/programs/jts/V1N2/gordon.pdf

3

Impacts of the Northridge Earthquake on Transit and Highway Use

Genevieve Giuliano & Jacqueline Golob.

http://www.bts.gov/jts/V1N2/giuliano.pdf

4

BTS-Transportation Studies- Northridge Earthquake Study

http://www.bts.gov/programs/transtu/laquake.htm

5

Impacts and Responses: Goods Movement After the Northridge

Earthquake

Richard Willson.

http://www.bts.gov/jts/V1N2/WILLSON.PDF

6

An Assessment of Transportation Issues Under Exceptional Conditions:

The Case of the Mass Media and the Northridge Earthquake. Jane Gould.

May 1998. Journal of Transportation and Statistics

http://www.bts.gov/jts/V1N2/GOULD.PDF

7

Business Losses, Transportation Damage, and the Northridge Earthquake.

Marlon Boarnet. May 1998.

http://www.bts.gov/jts/V1N2/boarnet.pdf

California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) (http://www.dot.ca.gov)

8

CALTRANS District 7 Profile

http://www.dot.ca.gov/dist07/aboutdist7/facts/district_profile.html

9

CALTRANS Fact Sheet- Earthquake Reconstruction

http://www.dot.ca.gov/dist07/aboutdist07/facts/fs_scans/fs_er.htm

California State Senate

10Proposition 192: Seismic Retrofit Bond Act (March 1996 Ballot)

http://www.sen.ca.gov/sor/props/0396p192.txt

City of Los Angeles (http://www.lacity.org)

11Emergency Preparedness Division- Emergency Operations Center

http://www.lacity.org/EOO/epd/eoc.htm

Appendix B: Northridge Literature Review
54

12Community Preparedness/Interagency Liaison Division

http://www.lacity.org/epd/edpEPD2b.htm

DIS, Inc.

13Loma Prieta Earthquake fact sheet

http://www.dis-inc.com/lomaprie.htm

Emergency Preparedness for Industry and Commerce Council (EPICC).

(http://www.epicc.org/)

14Transportation System Collapse and Recovery after the Northridge

Earthquake.

Craig Tillman, Dames and Moore.

www.epicc.org/eppicgram/05/transport.htm

EQE International, Inc. (http://www.eqe.com)

15The January 17, 1994 Northridge, CA Earthquake- EQE Summary Report

Earl Aurelius- Executive Editor

http://www.eqe.com/publications/northridge/transpor.htm

16Highway System Performance Measures and Economic Impact

Stephanie Chang & Nobuoto Nojima

http://www.cive.gifu-u.ac.jp/~nojima/pdf/1997_7usjwedpls_sec.pdf

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

17The FEMA response to the Northridge Earthquake

http://www.fema.gov/nr/nr_0106.htm

18The Northridge Earthquake One Year Later. January 17, 1995.

Federal Highway Administration (http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/)

19Innovative Traffic Management Following the 1994 Northridge Earthquake.

Steven Debban.

http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov//JPODOCS/REPTS_TE/1BJ01!.pdf

20The Lessons Learned from the Northridge Earthquake

The joint FHWA/Caltrans/Industry task force Executive summary

21The Northridge Earthquake: Progress Made, Lessons Learned in SeismicResistant Bridge Design. James D. Cooper.

http://www.tfhrc.gov/////pubrds/summer94/p94su26.htm
55

22Transit-Management Systems. Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1. California Advanced Public Transportation Systems

http://www.itsdocs.fhwa.dot.gov/edldocs/13480/ch6.pdf

23Input to 1-Year After Report. Northridge Earthquake / California Division.

Jan. 1995.

Federal Transit Administration (http://www.fta.dot.gov/)

24Los Angeles Earthquake Transportation Study: An Analysis of the 1994

Northridge Earthquake on Metrolink Commuter Rail Ridership, August

1995.

Governing Magazine

25Disaster Master. John Buntin. December 2001.

http://governing.com/archive/2001/dec/disaster.txt

Government Computer News (www.gcn.com)

26Interview with Wendell McCullough, California’s telecom director.

TrudyWalsh

www.gcn.com/archives/sl/1998/September/10.htm

Los Angeles Almanac (http://www.losangelesalmanac.com)

27Busiest Highway Interchanges- LA County 1999-2000

http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Transport/tr27.htm

28Communities with Highest Percentage of Working Residents

http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Transport/tr20.htm

29LA County Freeway & Highway Traffic Volumes

http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Transport.tr26.htm

30Metropolitan Transportation Authority

http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Transport.tr17.htm

31MTA Light Rail Lines

http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Transport/tr17.htm

32Public Transit Ridership 1998-1999

http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Transport/tr15.htm

33Railroads

http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Transport/tr35.htm
56

34Travel Time to Work 1990-2000

http://www.losangelesalmanac.com/topics/Transport.tr19b.htm

Los Angeles County

35Los Angeles County overview

http://www.co.la.ca.us/overview.htm

36Los Angeles County- economic research statistics

http://www.co.la.ca.us/lacostats.pdf

Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Centers

37Emergency Operations Center Fact Sheet

http://www.lacoeoc.org/mission.html

Los Angeles County Sheriff Department

38Emergency Operations Bureau

http://205.158.5.90/lasd-eob/eobweb.htm

Los Angeles Fire Department

39LAFD Northridge Earthquake Operations

http://www.lafd.org/eq.htm

Odetics, Inc. (http://www.odetics-its.com/)

40Corridor Systems Infrastructure Summary

-Existing Corridor Infrastructure: Los Angeles Region- Transportation

Management Systems

http://www.odetics-its.com/showcase/TASK2-2/la.html

Port of Los Angeles (http://www.portoflosangeles.org/)

41Facts and Figures

http://www.portoflosangeles.org/about-facts.asp

42Economic Impacts

http://www.portoflosangeles.org/about-economic.asp

Southern California Earthquake Center (http://www.sced.org/)

43Confronting the Inevitable- Putting Down Roots in Earthquake Country

(http://www.sced.org/outreach/eqbasics/eqrisk.html)
57

Spangle Associates, Inc. (www.spangleassociates.com)

44Interview with Jim Sherman, Principal Transportation Engineer of LADOT.

Interviewed by Laurie Johnson. June 21, 1995. An excerpt from The Recovery and Reconstruction Plan of the City of Los Angeles: Evaluation of its Use

after the Northridge Earthquake. (http://www.spangleassociates.com/

LADOT.htm)

Stanford University

45Team to Assess Earthquake Vulnerability of Bay Area Transportation

Networks.

Kathleen O’Toole. July 15, 1998.

http://www.stanford.edu/dept/news/report/news/july15/quaketrans.html

Transportation Research Board (http://www.trb.org/)

46Second National Symposium on Integrated Transportation Management

Systems

May 8-10, 1995. Seattle Washington. Use of ITMS Actions to Manage Traffic

after the Los Angeles Area Northridge Earthquake. Anson Norby.

http://plan2op.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/Pdf1/Edl05323.pdf

471994 Northridge Earthquake. Transportation Research Circular, Number

462, September 1996. ISSN 0097-8515

Union Pacific Railroad

48About Union Pacific

http://www.uprr.com/aboutup/usguide/usa-ca.shtml

University of California- Institute of Transportation Studies

 49Technology Transfer Newsletter- Fall 1998

California’s TMC Future

U.S. Census Bureau

50Los Angeles County QuickFacts

http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html

511994 Los Angeles County-General Profile

http://www.census.gov/statab/USACounties/06/037.txt

U.S. Department of Transportation Joint Program Office (www.dot.gov)

52A Petition by the U.S. Department of Transportation for Assignment of an

Abbreviated Dialing Code (N11) to Access Intelligent Transportation
58

System (ITS) Services Nationwide. Before the Federal Communications

Commission. Section IV: The Public Benefits of ATIS Services.

http://www.its.dot.gov/tcomm/n11pet.htm

University of Washington (www.washinton.edu)

53Measuring Post-Disaster Transportation System Performance: The 1995

Kobe Earthquake in Comparative Perspective. Stephanie Chang and

Nobuoto Nojima.

July 1999.

http://depts.washington.edu/~ujtrans/public/chang_nojima.html

U.S. Government

54Lessons Learned from the Northridge Earthquake. Hearing Before the

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. U.S. House of Representatives. March 2, 1994.

ISBN: 0-16-044395-4.
59
60

U.S. Department

of Transportation