U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

96–816 PDF 2004

FIRST RESPONDERS; HOW STATES, LOCALITIES

AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO MAKE AMERICA SAFER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION

JULY 17, 2003

SERIAL NO. 108–17

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Christopher Cox, California, Chairman 

Jennifer Dunn, Washington 

C.W. Bill Young, Florida 

Don Young, Alaska 

F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Wisconsin 

W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana 

David Dreier, California 

Duncan Hunter, California 

Harold Rogers, Kentucky 

Sherwood Boehlert, New York 

Lamar S. Smith, Texas 

Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania 

Christopher Shays, Connecticut 

Porter J. Goss, Florida 

Dave Camp, Michigan 

Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida 

Bob Goodlatte, Virginia 

Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma 

Peter T. King, New York 

John Linder, Georgia 

John B. Shadegg, Arizona 

Mark E. Souder, Indiana 

Mac Thornberry, Texas 

Jim Gibbons, Nevada 

Kay Granger, Texas 

Pete Sessions, Texas 

John E. Sweeney, New York 

Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member 

Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 

Loretta Sanchez, California 

Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts 

Norman D. Dicks, Washington 

Barney Frank, Massachusetts 

Jane Harman, California 

Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland 

Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New York 

Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon 

Nita M. Lowey, New York 

Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Zoe Lofgren, California 

Karen McCarthy, Missouri 

Sheila Jackson–Lee, Texas 

Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey 

Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin Islands 

Bob Etheridge, North Carolina 

Charles Gonzalez, Texas 

Ken Lucas, Kentucky 

James R. Langevin, Rhode Island 

Kendrick B. Meek, Florida 

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director 

David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director) 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk

(II) 
C O N T E N T S 

Page

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman, Select Committee on Homeland 

Security ............................................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Florida .......................................................................................... 15

The Honorable Jennifer Dunn, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ......................................................................................... 7

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of North Carolina 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 14

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 15

The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Massachusetts .................................................................................... 11

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Rhode Island ................................................................................ 15

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Texas 

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 13

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New York ............................................................................................ 11 

The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Massachusetts .............................................................................. 11

The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey .......................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California ............................................................................................ 9

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi .................................................................................... 8

The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ............................................................................................................. 26

The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania ................................................................................................. 28

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Mitt Romney, Governor, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 16

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 18 

Mr. Michael Grossman, Captain, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 43

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 45

Mr. George Jaramillo, Assistant Sheriff, Orange County, California Sheriff’s 

Department 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 39

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 40

Mr. Ray Kiernan, Fire Commissioner and Chief of New Rochelle Fire Department and Member of Westchester Career Fire Chiefs and Northeast 

Fire Consortium, New Rochelle Fire Department, New Rochelle, New 

York ................................................................................................................... 47

Mr. Jamie Metzl, Senior Fellow and Coordinator for Homeland Security 

Programs, Council on Foreign Relations 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33

Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 36

(III) 
MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Questions and Reponses for the Record ............................................................. 54 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Dick Murphy, Mayor, San Diego, 

California ........................................................................................................... 58 

Letters Submitted for the Record ....................................................................... 60

(IV) 
(1)

FIRST RESPONDERS; HOW STATES, LOCALITIES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 

ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO MAKE AMERICA SAFER 

Thursday, July 17, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m., in Room 2318, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Cox [chairman of 

the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Cox, Dunn, Smith, Weldon, Camp, 

Diaz–Balart, Linder, Shadegg, Souder, Sweeney, Turner, Thompson, Sanchez, Markey, Frank, Slaughter, DeFazio, Lowey, Norton, 

McCarthy, Jackson Lee, Pascrell, Christensen, Etheridge, Lucas of 

Kentucky and Langevin. 

Chairman COX. [Presiding.] Good afternoon. A quorum being 

present the Select Committee on Homeland Security will come to 

order. The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on how 

states, localities and the federal government are working together 

to make America safer. 

I would like to welcome the members in attendance this afternoon, advise members that we expect votes to come up on the floor 

as soon as 15 minutes from now. The first vote would likely be a 

15-minute vote, so it is my hope that we can go through very brief 

opening statements and immediately to the testimony of our first 

witness, Governor Mitt Romney from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 

I would like to thank both distinguished panels of witnesses for 

appearing today. None of us will ever forget the images seared into 

our memories of those who gave their lives to rescue an estimated 

15,000 men and women from the World Trade Center towers, or 

those who responded so quickly at the Pentagon on September 11. 

The events on that tragic day reminded all of us of the indispensable role of firefighters, police officers and emergency medical 

service personnel, a role that they fulfill every day. 

It forced all of us to rethink the way in which the federal government works with state and local communities to detect and prevent, but also to prepare to respond effectively to acts of terrorism. 

Since that tragic day in September, Congress has increased the 

funding for the estimated 2 million first responders by over $20 billion—1,400 percent increase since September 11. 
2

Unfortunately, however, this massive infusion of funding is not 

reaching our first responder community effectively. It is not getting 

there fast enough, and sometimes the money is not getting there 

at all. 

We are here today to find out how we can do better. Just last 

month, the committee visited California for hearings on port security at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and to meet with 

the first responder community in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. 

One of our witnesses there is also a witness here today, Assistant 

Sheriff Jaramillo, who was eloquent in discussing the broken pipeline funneling money from Washington to the states, and in offering suggestions on how to better coordinate federal grant programs. 

There was also some good news. We have heard encouraging testimony from the sheriff of Los Angeles County, Lee Baca, and the 

sheriff of Orange County, Mike Carona, about interjurisdictional 

information sharing between Orange and Los Angeles Counties, 

among them some 25 million people, and about the joint Orange/

Los Angeles County Homeland Security Advisory Council, which 

meets regularly and brings federal, state and local government officials together with private sector representatives to develop a 

homeland security strategy for the region. 

They have, on their own initiative, made real progress, which we 

want to recognize and reward. Regional cooperation in funding decisions should be a top priority. 

Washington must also encourage the states to quickly and efficiently release federal grant moneys to the localities that are most 

at risk. Washington must do its part to fix the broken pipeline, 

which carries federal money to the states to enhance they statewide efforts. 

We, in Congress, must also do a better job of providing states 

and localities the information they need to allocate resources efficiently to those areas facing the greatest risk of attack. 

But perhaps the most important point is that these funds can no 

longer be distributed based on political formulas. In this and so 

many other areas of the homeland security mission, we need better 

intelligence to understand the terrorist threat. 

And we must get this information to the first responders, who require it to enhance our security. We must have better intelligence, 

and we must find ways to share it more broadly if we are to bound 

the terrorist threat, if we are to limit our vulnerabilities, and if we 

are to develop cost-effective solutions. 

Nearly two years after the attacks of September 11, grants are 

still being distributed to states using political formulas, formulas, 

in fact, that take no account of whether the recipient is, based on 

our best intelligence, at risk. 

Presently, the Office for Domestic Preparedness within the Department of Homeland Security distributes a baseline amount of 

0.75 percent of the total amount appropriated to the grant program 

to every state, regardless of location, population, geographic size, 

number of critical assets or terrorist targets. This baseline amount 

is then followed by a distribution based merely on population. The 

formula has resulted in an astonishing distortion in funding for 

first responders. 
3

California, a state with seven times the population of Wyoming, 

receives just under $5 per person in first responder grants, while 

Wyoming receives over $35 per person. Even on a population formula alone, therefore, the system isn’t working. 

Wyoming’s largest city, Cheyenne, has a population of 53,000, 

while California has 140 cities with populations equal to or above 

that number. A distribution system based on population alone creates such distortions. We need to apply some common sense and 

bring threat assessment into the equation. 

Congress has offered ODP virtually no guidance on the structure 

of first responder grants. The Homeland Security Act simply does 

not address this. We have provided no guidance on the methods of 

distribution or guidelines to recipients, unallowable uses of the 

funds. As a result, Congress is appropriating and the department 

is allocating billions of dollars to states with very little input from 

Congress on how these decisions should be made. 

This is not to say that Wyoming may not face the greatest risks 

of terrorism. We simply aren’t using that kind of analysis in making these decisions. In fact, every state of the union faces plenty 

of risk and has many vulnerabilities. But the great disparity and 

the distribution of funds must be addressed on an objective basis 

so that states—all states and all people within the United States—

are best prepared to face potential terrorist threats. We need to 

prioritize based on real risk of attack, real threats. 

Today the committee looks forward to hearing suggestions on 

how the grant formulas can be changed to integrate risk-based 

analysis into the formula, so that states facing the highest risk, localities facing the highest risk, and regions, whether they be within 

states or among states facing the highest risk, receive priority assistance from the federal government. We also look forward to 

hearing your thoughts on ways to simplify the process for states 

and localities to seek and receive funds for their first responders 

and how these funds have been utilized. 

At present, we have in many cases a 12-step formula for obtaining first responder grants. Legislation that we are considering here 

today would change that to a two-step formula and vastly speed up 

the process, simplify it, make it more understandable and comprehensible for people around the country. 

Lastly, we would like to hear your suggestions on how the Department of Homeland Security can further support states, local 

governments and first responders in the full range of their responsibilities. 

CHAIRMAN: I would like to welcome the Members in attendance 

this afternoon and thank both distinguished panels of witnesses for 

appearing today. 

None of us has forgotten the images of those first responders who 

gave their lives to rescue an estimated 15,000 men and women 

from the World Trade Center Towers or those who responded so 

quickly at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. 

The events on that tragic day reminded all of us of the indispensable role our firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical 

service personnel fulfill every day. It forced all of us to rethink the 

way in which the federal government works with state and local 
4

communities to detect and prevent, but also to prepare to respond 

effectively, to acts of terrorism. 

Since that tragic day in September, Congress has increased the funding for the estimated 2 million first responders by over $20 billion, a 1,400 percent increase in anti-terrorism aid to states and localities. Unfortunately, however, this massive infusion of funding is 

not reaching our first responder community fast enough, and sometimes not at all. We are here today to find out how we can to do 

better. 

Just last month, the Committee visited California for a field 

hearing on Port Security in the Ports of Los Angeles and Long 

Beach, and to meet with the first responder community in neighboring Orange County. One of our witnesses here today, Assistant 

Sheriff Jaramillo, was eloquent in discussing the broken pipeline 

funneling money from Washington to the States and in offering 

suggestions on how to better coordinate Federal grants programs. 

There was also some good news. We heard encouraging testimony from Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca and Orange County Sheriff Mike Carona about inter-jurisdictional information sharing between Orange and Los Angeles Counties and about the joint 

Orange-LA County Homeland Security Advisory Council. The 

Council meets regularly and brings federal, state, and local government officials together with private sector representatives to develop a homeland security strategy for the region. They have—on 

their own initiative—made real progress, which we want to recognize and reward. Regional cooperation is a top priority. 

Washington must also encourage the states to quickly and efficiently release Federal grant money to the localities that are most 

as risk. Washington must do its part to fix the broken pipeline 

which carries federal money to the states to enhance their statewide efforts. We in Congress must also do a better job of providing 

states and localities the information they need to allocate those resources efficiently to those areas facing the greatest risk of attack. 

But perhaps the most important point is that these funds can no 

longer be distributed based on political formulas. In this and so 

many other areas of the homeland security mission, we need better 

intelligence to understand the terrorist threat and we must get this 

information to the first responders who require it to enhance our 

security. We must have better intelligence and we must find ways 

to share it more broadly if we are to bound the terrorist threat, if 

we are to limit our vulnerabilities, and if we are to develop costeffective solutions. 

Nearly two years after the attacks of September 11, grants are 

still being distributed to states using political formulas. Formulas, 

in fact, that take no account of whether the recipient is, based on 

our best intelligence, at risk. Presently, the Office for Domestic 

Preparedness within DHS distributes a baseline amount of .75 percent of the total amount appropriated to the grant program to 

every state—regardless of location, population, geographic size, 

number of critical assets and terrorist targets. This baseline 

amount is then followed by a population-based distribution. 

The formula has resulted in an astonishing distortion in funding 

for first responders. California, a state with 70 times the population of Wyoming—receives just under $5 per person in first re-
5

sponder grants while Wyoming receives over $35 per person. Wyoming’s largest city—Cheyenne—has a population of 53,000, while 

California has 140 cities with populations equal to or above that 

number. A distribution system based on population alone creates 

such distortions. We need to apply some common sense and bring 

threat assessment into the calculation. 

Congress has offered ODP virtually no guidance on the structure 

of first responder grants, the methods of distribution, or guidelines 

to recipients on allowable use of these funds. As a result, Congress 

is appropriating and the Department is allocating billions of dollars 

to states with very little input from Congress on how these decisions should be made. 

This is not to say that Wyoming faces no risk of terrorism?every 

state in the Union faces some risk and plenty of vulnerabilities. 

But the great disparity in the distribution of funds must be fixed 

so that states are better supported to face these risks. We need to 

prioritize based on real risk of attack?real threats. 

Today, the Committee looks forward to hearing suggestions on 

how the grant formula can be changed to integrate risk-based analysis into the formula so that states facing the highest risk receive 

priority assistance from the federal government. We also look forward to hearing your thoughts on ways to simplify the process for 

states and localities to seek and receive funds for their first responders, and how these funds have been utilized. Lastly, we would 

like to hear your suggestions on how the Department of Homeland 

Security can further support States, local governments, and first 

responders. 

I would recognize next, for purposes of an opening statement, my 

distinguished colleague from Texas. The gentleman is the ranking 

member on the committee, Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and welcome, Governor. 

We are glad that you are with us today. I had the opportunity 

to visit just a few minutes ago with your co-chair, Governor Minner 

of Delaware. I had good visit with her, and both of you seem to be 

doing outstanding work on behalf of the governors. It is a pleasure 

for us to have the opportunity to hear from you today. 

As we convene this hearing today, Mr. Chairman, we all know 

that it is likely that somewhere a terrorist group is developing 

plans to use chemical, biological, radiological or other weapons of 

mass destruction to attack our nation. 

At the same time, federal, state and local emergency preparedness officials across the nation are working to prevent and prepare 

for such attacks. 

Congress created the Department of Homeland Security to comprehensively address the need to prevent, prepare for, respond to 

and recover from the threat of terrorism. And as I have suggested 

in the past in meetings of this committee, a principal mission of the 

Department of Homeland Security is to ensure that all levels of 

government, across the nation, have the capability to work together 

efficiently and effectively, using a national approach to domestic incident management. 

We are gathered here today to make sure that these words become a reality, and that the Department of Homeland Security is 

creating a genuine partnership among the state, federal and local 
6

officials who are committed to making America safer. It is our duty 

to make sure that the might of federal government is being put 

into action to prepare America, to prevent, respond to, and recover 

from attacks. 

On June 29, the Council of Foreign Relations’s Independent Task 

Force on Emergency Responders released a report entitled, ‘‘Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared.’’ The report stated that nearly two years after September 11, 

the United States is drastically underfunding State and local emergency responders, and remains dangerously unprepared to handle 

a catastrophic attack on American soil. 

The work of this expert, bipartisan task force makes clear it that 

we must move faster and stronger to prepare our communities in 

order to protect our nation. We rightly made a commitment to provide the very best training and equipment to our troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now we must make the same level of commitment 

to the men and women who will be the first to respond in the case 

of a terrorist attack here at home. 

Both the task force report and my ongoing discussions with 

emergency responders around the country have demonstrated to 

me that the time for comprehensive change in our preparedness 

programs is now. I plan, with the help of the members on the 

Democratic side—and I hope to work jointly with the chairman—

to address both the critical deficiencies identified in the report, and 

the Department of Homeland Security’s partnership with state and 

local governments by introducing legislation to deal with these 

issues. 

This first responder legislation, in my judgment, should deal 

with four critical issues. 

First, we must define preparedness. The legislation should require the Department of Homeland Security to provide clear guidance to communities on necessary skills and resources required to 

prevent, prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks. 

Communities will apply this guidance to their individual threats 

and vulnerabilities, in order to determine their specific needs and 

necessary funding. 

Second, we must build, State and local capabilities. 

Our legislation should direct the Department of Homeland Security to create a single terrorism preparedness grant program and 

a one-stop shop to cut bureaucratic red tape in order to address 

communities’ lack of essential equipment and training capabilities. 

Traditional programs, such as COPS and the Fire Grant Program, should be preserved, but the new combined grant program 

should be flexible enough to address the legitimate needs that we 

are hearing about every day from our first responders. 

The third area that our legislation must address is the issue of 

interoperable communications. The legislation should direct the Department of Homeland Security to make recommendations on spectrum needs, provide funds for an interim interoperable communications capability in major metropolitan areas, and work with industry and first responders to set standards for equipment and communications systems. 

And lastly, our legislation should revise the early warning system. 
7

The legislation should direct the Department of Homeland Security to reform the homeland security advisory system to identify 

threats by region and by critical infrastructure sector. 

The department also should ensure continuous, actionable information sharing with state and local officials. Security clearance for 

state and local personnel should be funded and expedited as appropriate. 

The task force report that I referred to earlier and the continued 

call for systemic to the funding system changes from state and 

local emergency responders are a wake-up call to our nation. They 

show that America’s security needs are great, that they are not 

being met and that we must act now. 

America’s enemies are united in their desire to harm America, 

and we must be united in moving faster and deploying stronger 

forces to win the war on terror. 

I look forward to hearing the excellent testimony that will be offered to this committee today, and I want to thank in advance all 

those who have come to share their ideas with this committee, to 

help us move faster and stronger in support of our first responder 

community. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman COX. Thank the gentleman. 

The Chair next recognizes for the purpose of an opening statement the Gentlelady from the State of Washington, the vice chairman of the full committee, Ms. Dunn. 

Ms. DUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you and thank you, Governor Romney, and to our entire 

panel for being here with us today. 

It is so important to us in our effort to figure out what is working 

well and what needs improvement, to hear from you who are there 

on the front lines and from all representatives at all levels of the 

network that is charged with keeping our constituents safe. 

We will only be successful in preventing attacks and preparing 

for disasters if everybody is engaged in the effort, including federal, 

state and local government, as well as the private sector. 

First responders are absolutely essential to securing our homeland. They are on the ground, often risking their own lives to help 

keep the rest of us safe. 

Most of the time they are working for a local government who 

can’t afford the costs of prevention, preparedness and response any 

more than can the governors of the states, or the federal government. These organizations must be provided the resources necessary to carry out training exercises, to hire personnel and to buy 

the equipment that they need. 

I have heard recently growing criticism and growing concern 

among local law enforcement and first responder groups about the 

channels through which federal dollars must pass before reaching 

them. Some complain that instead of flowing through the governors’ offices, the funding should be directed to local jurisdictions. 

I look forward to hearing our witnesses talk about whether current funding strategies are working. Our job as an oversight committee is to help make sure that committed federal dollars—and we 

know there are many—are being delivered and spent efficiently 
8

and are getting to those who are on the ground and who need this 

money to carry out their own responsibilities. 

I recently had the opportunity to witness the first responder organizations in my own district, in Washington state, exercising 

their emergency preparedness skills during the TOPOFF 2 exercise 

that was held in Seattle. The lessons learned from this exercise 

will prove to be invaluable to the Department of Homeland Security and to all of us on this committee. 

It is without a doubt that exercises such as this one improve our 

capabilities and develop a network of the stakeholders who are involved in disaster response and crisis management. 

I was pleased to see top federal and state officials, mayors, city 

managers, hospitals, law enforcement units, fire departments, the 

Red Cross and local businesses all working together during 

TOPOFF 2. Their ability to, in effect, practice the response to a potential terrorist-caused disaster enabled them coordinate who 

would act as the lead agency and how and who would make the 

critical decisions. This communication network is a critical base on 

which the public will rely for timely response in an emergency situation. 

I cannot underscore enough to you our belief in the importance 

of first responders to the broad goal of keeping our constituents 

safe. We must keep our focus on steps that will allocate funds in 

an efficient, but a sensible way, and make sure the dollars get to 

the ground. 

I look forward to the hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman COX. I thank the gentlelady. 

Who next seeks recognition for purposes of an opening statement? 

Mr. Thompson? 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am pleased that we have assembled this witness panel today 

to discuss the critical issue of the federal, state and local partnership for terrorism preparedness. 

In previous hearings, officials from the Department of Homeland 

Security have stated that they are working to ensure that all levels 

of government across the nation have a capability to work efficiently and effectively together using a national approach to terrorism preparedness. 

As I have stated before, the job of this committee is to provide 

an oversight function for the department, and thereby assist local 

units of government in three key phases of hazard, mitigation, prevention, response and recovery. 

To that end, I continue to encourage the department to listen 

closely to the needs, successes and frustrations of our first line of 

homeland defense, the first responders. 

DHS must create more open and frequent lines of communication. The men and women who prepare our communities for disasters and then help our communities to rapidly recover are absolutely critical. 

I have met frequently with these men and women in my district, 

and I have told them that the work we do here in Washington 
9

must match the needs of the people at the local level. It is my belief that these needs are not being met. 

Put simply, DHS is not preparing local communities to prepare 

for and respond to terrorist attacks. For example, DHS has not 

worked with state and local governments to determine when communities are prepared for terrorist attacks. We don’t know what 

equipment, planning, training and personnel and how much funding are needed to secure communities. 

The first responder grant program is broken. Current grants 

can’t target the greatest needs, take too long to reach first responders, pit agencies against each other in applying for funds and are 

overly bureaucratic. Our response personnel can’t talk to each 

other. DHS is not assessing the interoperability communications 

problems. 

Finally, specific threat information is not readily available to 

states and localities. DHS is not providing first responders with 

timely intelligence and threat information. We must move faster, 

and we must be stronger in our efforts to protect and defend the 

United States of America. 

I hope the testimony we hear today will assist us, Mr. Chairman, 

in developing a road map for doing so. 

Lastly, representing primarily a rural area, I don’t want us to 

miss rural America in this discussion. We have to include rural 

America. 

I yield back. 

Chairman COX. I thank the gentleman. Obviously, there is now 

a vote on the floor. There will be 15 minutes in the first vote. And 

so, we will proceed either with opening statements or the testimony 

of our first witness. Members are reminded that under the rules of 

the committee, a member who waives his opening or her opening 

statement have three minutes added to their opportunity for questioning the witness. 

Who seeks recognition on this side for purposes of an opening 

statement? 

Seeks recognition of the gentlelady from California. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a written opening statement. I would like 

to submit it for the record. And just to save a little time here, I 

would just like to go over some six points just for our panelists in 

case, when you are talking to us, you might be able to hit in particular on these six that I would like to try to get some information 

on what we can do to make this system better. 

The first would be the whole issue of allocating resources from 

the federal government on a risk basis, as the chairman indicated. 

I think it is the most important reason that we are here, and we 

would like to hear your ideas. 

The second would be how to make the pipeline shorter. And I 

know that we have the governor here from Massachusetts. But, at 

least in my state, people are telling me that when you send it to 

the state, it doesn’t necessary get to the local level. So for the locals 

here, I would like to hear what ideas you have with respect to 

shortening that pipeline to getting it down. 

The third thing would be to preserve the cops and the fire programs that we have and not be cannibalizing from those and say-
10

ing that it is homeland security money now. So I would like to hear 

if that is happening to any of you out there. 

The fourth, it is my belief, in having met with all of my first responders up and down the state now in California, and there is 

quite a bit, all from the very smallest agency to our great sheriffs 

in L.A. and in Orange County, that maybe our grants aren’t hitting 

the right items. In other words, we don’t have grants for overtime 

or personnel costs. And, in the city of Anaheim, protecting 

Disneyland and all our other great assets there. It is about money, 

money spent to pay our first responders when we go on orange 

alert. 

I also would like to hear, and I haven’t taken the look all the 

way down, on the hospitals because I think they are a piece of the 

first responder equation that some of us tend to forget. So if any 

of you have any ideas on how we might be able to help there. 

And lastly, and some of the members have mentioned it, I think 

the chairman mentioned it in his opening remarks, the whole issue 

of standards. For example, some of my local law enforcement said 

that the standards for masks and these types of equipment are 

really military standards. And are they necessarily the standards 

that we need for equipment that would be used on a first responder 

basis within our own city? 

So if you have any ideas on that, I would appreciate it. 

And I will yield back to Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONABLE LORETTA SANCHEZ, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to welcome our distinguished guests 

and thank each of you for coming here today to talk about this well-publicized and 

enduring issue facing local communities throughout the country. Since September 

11 our local first responders have taken exemplary measures to make sure that, in 

the face of a new national security reality, they are ready to respond to another terrorist event. However, despite these efforts, recent high-profile reports, such as the 

one that was completed by one of our distinguished witnesses here today, have determined that our first responders remain ‘‘drastically underfunded’’ and ‘‘dangerously unprepared.’’

As Members of Congress, many of us have met with our local responders, and we 

know how dire the situation is. We have heard what they are telling us, we understand their need for federal funds, and we fought in a number of venues— during 

the tax cut, through the appropriations process, etc.—to bring more money home to 

our local police, fire fighters, emergency personnel, and hospital administrators. 

However, here we are, almost two years later, and for most of these individuals and 

agencies the situation remains unimproved. Our locals don’t have clear guidelines 

on what it means to be ‘‘prepared,’’ they are not receiving the information they need 

to be aware of impending threats, and many of them still haven’t seen ANY of the 

billions of dollars in new funding that the Administration has constantly promised 

to help with their new national security mission. This cannot go on. 

We need to start doing more than just talking. We need to develop a threat-based 

plan that will provide adequate money to our first responders without overspending, 

that will provide the means to ENSURE that this money promptly gets to the entities that need it, and that will provide first responders the guidance on how to best 

use this money. And we need to be doing this as quickly as possible. 

It has been almost two years since September 11. I don’t think that anyone in 

the homeland security business doubts that a terrorist group somewhere has been 

using that time to plan another attack on our country. Ideally, we would be able 

to foresee and prevent such an attack. However, if we are not so lucky, we need 

to make sure that our first responders are ready. We need to make sure that America’s own ill preparedness doesn’t end up hurting us more than the terrorists could 

themselves.

Chairman COX. Thank you, gentlelady. 
11

The gentlelady from New York is recognized for purpose of an 

opening statement. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman COX. Oh, I am sorry. I have gone in the wrong order 

here. I apologize. 

I wanted to recognize one or both of the gentlemen from Massachusetts, for purposes of recognizing and introducing our first witness. But if you want to also make an opening statement, I will 

recognize now for that purpose. 

The gentleman from Massachusetts. 

Mr. MARKEY. Thank you. And I will just take a minute. 

And it will also be a welcome to the governor as well. We are 

very grateful to you, Governor, for coming down here today to provide your insights to the Homeland Security Committee on these 

very important issues. 

The governor was the chairman and the CEO of the very successful Olympics in Salt Lake City. Obviously, there he had the great 

responsibility of providing against a successful terrorist attack 

upon their very high profile international event, and he did a very 

good job in ensuring that we had a very successful Olympics. 

Up in Massachusetts, obviously, there are many issues that provide examples, illustrations, of the problems that we have nationally. Logan Airport is the place where both planes were hijacked 

that flew into the World Trade Center. 

The LNG facilities in Boston Harbor are the only urban-sited 

LNG facilities in the United States. They provide special security 

problems. And next year we are going to have the Democratic National Convention in Boston, and the governor’s working very hard 

on that issue. 

Never before has a Republican worked so hard and providing so 

much safety for so many Democrats, and the governor is doing a 

good job in ensuring that we are going to have a great convention 

next year. 

And we welcome you, Governor. And we thank you for your? 

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman COX. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank. 

Mr. FRANK. I fully agree with everything my colleague said, except one slight amendment. The governor gets a lot of practice in 

providing protection for a lot of Democrats every day that he provides security at the State House, as we know. 

I am very pleased that the governor is going to come here and 

share his broad experience with us. I just want to stress the central 

point. We are here talking about how essential it is that government, federal, state and local government, have access to enough 

resources to protect us. 

We have in this society debates about what is appropriate for the 

private sector or the public sector, and there is a role for the private sector here. But it is overwhelmingly a public sector responsibility, and it is, I hope, important for people to remember there is 

a temptation to kind of demonize government, there is an argument that says less government is always better. 

And we should be very clear, this is a public function we are 

talking about, to be discharged only by government. And let us also 

be very explicit. State, local and federal government can only do 
12

their jobs if taxes are at a level sufficient to produce revenues for 

them to do this. 

There is sometimes a disconnect in this society in which taxes 

are always bad, and the things that taxes pay for are always good. 

I am a great believer in volunteerism, and I know there are volunteer fire departments some places. 

But the people I am aware of, the cops and the firefighters and 

the EMTs and the others, on the whole, I don’t expect them to be 

volunteers. I don’t think we can expect people to risk their lives on 

a regular basis and acquire a great degree of expertise on a regular 

basis as volunteers. 

So I just would remind everybody we are talking here about government. 

And the notion that you can continually shrink government and 

denounce government and demonize government and talk about 

public employees as somehow people who don’t produce as much, 

and do this job well, don’t work together. 

So I am very glad to be here as we on a bipartisan basis celebrate the importance of government. 

Chairman COX. I thank the gentleman. There are seven minutes 

remaining in the vote. Does any member wish to be recognized for 

purposes of an opening statement? 

The gentlelady from New York. 

Mrs. LOWEY. Yes, I will take a couple of minutes, because it is 

my distinct pleasure to thank Fire Commissioner Ray Kiernan for 

joining us today. Mr. Kiernan is the fire commissioner of the New 

Rochelle Fire Department, a member of the Westchester Career 

Fire Chiefs, the Northeast Regional Fire Consortium, and Commissioner Kiernan visits us from my district in Westchester County, 

New York, and I am delighted to have him here. 

Ray has given over 30 years of his life to protecting our local 

community, and we are grateful for his service. He is on the front 

lines of emergency preparedness and response, and can speak firsthand to the challenges he has faced throughout the years and since 

the attacks on September 11. 

We are here today to discuss additional efforts we can take to 

win the race between those plotting to harm this country and those 

working to prevent it. 

It is critical that we as a committee and as a Congress make 

smart, calculated decisions on how funds are allocated, based on 

input from our first responders and state and local officials. 

We must address issues of operability, communication and coordination, and we must address them now. I agree with the Council on Foreign Relations that we obviously can’t spend every last 

dime of the GDP on response and preparedness. Nor would this be 

fruitful. 

However, two things are clear: First responders are underfunded, 

and a better process must be put in place to coordinate and disseminate these funds. The federal, state and local governments 

cannot operate in a bubble. And every first responder unit cannot 

work independently of one another. 

We will hear Commissioner Kiernan describe an exceptional example of how one community came together and made a strategic 

decision to coordinate preparedness efforts and maximize available 
13

funding. Commissioner Kiernan and his colleagues in Westchester 

County are doing everything they can to keep our communities 

safe. But they, like many others, need additional support. 

I am pleased that I was able to secure funding for this preparedness program through the appropriations process. While this funding will be helpful, however, we all know that this piecemeal approach is the wrong way to get things done. We must coordinate 

better. We must make responsible decisions. And we must listen to 

our local heroes. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Governor and welcome to all of our other witnesses. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COX. I thank the gentlelady.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS 

We are here today to strengthen the partnership between federal, state, and local 

homeland security officials. Our main goal should be getting funds and equipment 

to our local communities. Our local communities and first responders need to prepare for terrorist attacks now. To prepare they need federal funds now. Hundreds 

of millions of dollars have been authorized and appropriated for homeland security, 

but far too many of our first responders tell us they are not getting the funds they 

need. We must expedite the funding process and get resources to our local communities immediately. 

The amendment I proposed would have helped local communities prepare for terrorist attacks immediately. The amendment directed a percentage of funds directly 

from the Department of Homeland Security to city and county agencies to eliminate 

unnecessary paperwork and delay. For many homeland security grant programs, 

local communities must submit a lengthy grant application to the Department of 

Homeland Security. If the grant is approved the funds are allocated to the States, 

not to the locality that applied for the funds. 

Presently, there are twelve steps that a local agency must go through in order 

to receive grant funds. That is far too much delay; The Members of the Select Committee on Homeland Security must collaborate with our federal, state, and local 

agencies to expedite the process so that needed funds can be received, equipment 

can be purchased, and training programs can be conducted. 

As I have said many times before, America is still not safe. Our communities remain vulnerable to terrorists, our police departments, fire departments, hazardous 

materials teams, and emergency medical technicians remain insufficiently funded, 

trained, and equipped. Our hearing today to discuss strategies for strengthening the 

partnership between federal, state, and local agencies is an important step. But we 

must follow through with action. The safety of every American citizen depends on 

it.

The Chair announces that the hearing will remain open during 

this vote, but we will postpone further statements or the introduction of our witness until the conclusion of the current round of 

votes on the floor of the House. I anticipate that will put us back 

in this hearing room immediately after the last vote, at approximately 2:15. 

I thank the witnesses and the members for their patience. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman COX. I would like to welcome our members back from 

the floor. 

Again, I would like to thank our distinguished witnesses for your 

indulgence. 

Governor Romney, I understand that you have committed to be 

with us for two hours, and that you have a hard deadline that you 

have to meet at 3:00, and we appreciate that. 
14

I believe that we are finished with opening statements, but I will 

ask if those members that are here whether any member wishes 

to make an opening statement. 

Mr. Etheridge? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. I will be brief, Mr. Chairman, recognizing the 

governor’s time. 

Thank you. 

And let me thank you and the ranking member for giving those 

of us on Homeland Security Committee the first opportunity to 

hear from state and local officials. 

And Governor, we are glad to have you here. 

As has been stated already, former Senator Rudman and the 

Council on Foreign Relations have provided Congress with an important evaluation of the state of our nation’s first responder community with a report, ‘‘Emergency Responders: Dramatically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared.’’

I think it documents many things we have to do, should do and 

must do to help our first responders across the nation, and I have 

heard that firsthand from my people in North Carolina. 

And as we all know, law enforcement officials and firefighters 

will be the first people on the scene of any domestic terrorist incident. And Congress must make sure that they have the training 

and the equipment they need to properly evaluate the situation, to 

best protect the public and themselves. 

I welcome the opportunity to hear from the governor, and representatives of Los Angeles and Orange County Sheriff’s Department and others who are here today. 

They obviously have a lot of experience in terrorist prevention activities. 

However, I think it is absolutely critical that the Select Committee on Homeland Security hear from testimony from emergency 

responders from small states and rural areas. We need to hear 

from police officers, emergency medical technicians, emergency 

room doctors, public works officials. Those are the people on the 

front line every single day of the year. 

And they play a critical role in our nation’s defense and response 

network, and I would say, Mr. Chairman, why that is so critical: 

When the response code goes up it doesn’t say just to New York 

or to Boston or somewhere else, you would be on alert. It says to 

every state, every volunteer fire department, every police department, you have to go up on alert. 

So they don’t where it is going to happen. And the results of that 

I acknowledge that there are those who need to have more, but we 

can’t ignore the thousands upon thousands of volunteers across this 

country, who have to meet the same standard every time that code 

goes up. 

So Governor, we look forward to hearing from you. 

You should have some information that we could use, and I look 

forward to it. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
15

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB ETHERIDGE, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 

Thank you, Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner, for giving members of 

the Homeland Security Committee the first opportunity to hear from state officials 

and local first responders on their needs and concerns. 

Former Senator Rudman and the Council on Foreign Relations have provided 

Congress with an important evaluation of the state of our nation’s first responder 

community with their report ‘‘Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, 

Dangerously Unprepared.’’ The report documents many of the concerns I have heard 

from the first responders in North Carolina. 

As we all know, law enforcement officials and firefighters will be the first people 

on the scene of any domestic terrorist incident. Congress must make sure that they 

have the training and equipment they need to properly evaluate the situation to 

best protect the public and themselves. 

I welcome the opportunity to hear from Governor Romeny and representatives of 

the Los Angeles and Orange County Sheriff’s Departments. They obviously have a 

lot of experience in terrorism prevention activities. 

However, I think it is absolutely critical that the Select Committee on Homeland 

Security hear testimony from emergency responders from small states and rural 

areas. We need to hear from police. officers, emergency medical technicians, emergency room doctors and public works officials. These people are on the front lines 

every day, and they play crucial roles in our nation’s defense and response networks. 

I call on the Congress and this Administration to make the training and equipping of our nation’s first responders a top priority. It is the responsibility of the Administration and Congress to make sure that they have the information, training 

and resources necessary to protect the men, women and children of America, as well 

as themselves.

Chairman COX. I thank the gentleman for his statement.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA 

Mr. Chairman I believe this hearing gets to the heart of the matter. If local, state, 

and federal officials aren’t working as an effective team, we place ourselves at a 

grave disadvantage in preventing another terrorist attack, and particularly will endanger many more Americans if one were to occur. 

The Bush Administration and the Congress have made emergency preparedness 

and response a top priority since the attacks on September 11, 2001. This commitment is clearly evidenced in the House version of the Homeland Security Appropriations bill. 

In the House passed Homeland Security Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2004, 

we have funded the Office of Domestic Preparedness’ basic formula grant program 

at $1.9 billion. 

The House has also approved $500 million each for the state and local law enforcement terrorism prevention grant program and the high-threat, high-density 

urban areas grant program. We further provide $750 million for Firefighter Grants 

and $200 million for Infrastructure Grants. However, our responsibility does not end 

with the appropriations process. We must also ensure that the funds are getting 

into the hands of our local first responders, but we must also make certain that this 

is done in a way that the process ensures strategic thinking and coordination. 

Thank you Governor Romney particularly for your written statement. I agree that 

our states must be prepared with comprehensive response plans and that the plans 

must be based in a sound analysis of the potential terrorist threat. 

We’ve seen in Florida that the only way to respond to such a disaster as a hurricane, federal, state, and local officials have to be working as one with clear roles 

and clear communication. 

Unfortunately, a terrorist attack often gives no warning compared to most natural 

disasters. It will test our officials and response mechanisms to a greater degree. But 

we have fine men and women that understand the magnitude of their efforts. 

Thank you again, and I look forward to your testimony. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have an exceptional group of witnesses with us 

today, and I am very much looking forward to hearing their testimony. 
16

I am particularly interested to hear from Jamie Metzl about the work of the 

Council on Foreign Relations on first responder issues and the conclusions and recommendations of the Council’ recent report. We all know that more needs to be done 

to ensure our communities are prepared for an emergency, but putting those needs 

into concrete terms has been a continuing challenge. Mr. Metzl and his colleagues 

have provided an excellent tool for us to use in rising to that challenge, and I hope 

Congress and the Department of Homeland Security will take advantage of their research and use it as a blueprint for continued progress. 

It has become clear that one of the critical ‘‘missing links’’ on the path to preparedness is a set of national standards and guiding principles that can be used at 

the federal, state and local levels to measure progress and determine shortfalls. I 

hope our witnesses will spend some time discussing the issue of preparedness standards and how they might help sharpen the focus of emergency responders on the 

most critical capabilities and provide direction to Congress in determining where 

our limited federal resources will be most effective. 

Finally, and at the risk of sounding like a broken record, I am interested to hear 

about one of my top priorities—the intelligence aspect of DHS. It is my strong conviction that the regular dissemination of reliable and specific threat information 

from DHS to state and local agencies and emergency responders is critical to 

achieve a satisfactory level of preparedness. I hope Governor Romney and our first 

responder witnesses will speak to the frequency and quality of intelligence that they 

have been receiving from the Department. If, as I suspect, the information you are 

receiving has not been sufficient, I would like to know what additional information 

you need, how often and in what form, in order to ensure the safety of those who 

rely on you. 

Again, I thank our witnesses for being with us today, and I appreciate the Chairman giving me this time.

And we next will hear from the Honorable Mitt Romney, governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, who comes to us as 

former president and CEO of the first post–9/11 Olympics. 

You have a unique understanding of the challenges we face in 

preparing against potential terrorist acts for that reason alone. But 

you come, also, to us as governor of a coastal border state, a hightech state, a popular state with a diverse industrial base that was 

one of the staging areas for the 9/11 hijackers. And you come to us 

as co-chairman of the National Governors Association, homeland 

security efforts. 

And so, Governor Romney, you are uniquely qualified to address 

the issues that are before us today, and we welcome you and thank 

you for being here with us. 

We have your prepared testimony, and we thank you for that. It 

is in the record. And so you are free to summarize your remarks 

as you see fit. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MITT ROMNEY, GOVERNOR, 

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Governor ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, also Congressman 

Turner and the congressman from Massachusetts, who are I believe are returning. Thank you for welcoming me here today. 

I do come representing the National Governors. And along with 

Governor Ruth Ann Minner of Delaware, we worked together to 

help chair a homeland security committee at the National Governors Association. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned my experience with the Olympics. 

I had in that respect a real learning experience associated with 

homeland security. And in that setting, where there was a limited 

time frame and limited geography, I saw how homeland security efforts can be planned and implemented in such a way to really create a very effective, comprehensive homeland security plan. 
17

As I become governor I recognize we have much greater challenges. We are dealing with issues on a much greater scale. But 

I acknowledge that, if you will, the metaphor, Are you going from 

drinking from a drinking fountain to drinking from a fire hydrant, 

as you look at the scale of issues that we have. 

I salute the effort that is being done by the Department of Homeland Security, by the governors, by the first responders, by all who 

come together in the area of homeland security. But we are facing 

enormous challenges with very little time. And we are working 

very quickly, and I think good progress is being made. 

There were, however, some principles from the Olympic experience where I think the homeland security effort was in many respects ideal, that I think can help us as we look at what we are 

doing on the homeland security front nationwide. 

First, I believe we were successful in part because we had a comprehensive, holistic homeland security plan for the assets and people we were protecting. 

In the Atlanta games, we learned that if you ask each of the 

communities to come up with their own plans, that the communities cobble together their individual plans, but in many respects 

these plans aren’t comprehensive. They are gaps between them. Oftentimes, the communications systems are lacking. There is not a 

centralized command and control system. 

And in Atlanta we learned that the system did not work by asking all of the municipalities to create their own plans and somehow 

stapling it together and thinking that was a holistic plan. 

Following Atlanta, a decision was made to create a far more comprehensive effort. And by funneling the funds through one source, 

and that was the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, we were 

able, in the state of Utah preparing for the games, to have the 

local, state and federal agencies all work together in one entity 

that created a plan for the safety of the community being protected. 

That plan was holistic, comprehensive, and it allowed us to have 

equipment that worked across the venues to have personnel that 

could move across the venues, a single training system. 

That kind of holistic approach to planning is essential, I believe, 

in homeland security. I would say that the decision to have states 

be the source of the funding is a critical element in having the ability to create a holistic plan. 

I have noted that in the most recent appropriation that has been 

made by the federal government to the states, directing that 80 

percent of the funds reach local municipalities, that virtually every 

single state that has received these funds has now within 45 days 

distributed the money to the localities. 

This is a big change from the past, but the pipeline is now open 

and functioning well. This is on the basis of a National Governors 

Association survey that we have carried out. 

Secondly, I would note that it is essential to have guidelines as 

to what it is we are trying to accomplish. If you ask the cities and 

towns and the states how much money they need for homeland security, but don’t tell them what you expect them to do, what kind 

of event they are trying to prepare for, how they are supposed to 

protect a particular asset, then the sky’s the limit as to what they 

will come back with. 
18

In the case of the Olympics, we said precisely what we were trying to accomplish at each venue, the level of security required, and 

then developed a plan to achieve it. 

Number three, we had to make sure that the money at the Olympics was going to the place where the risk was greatest, and so we 

assessed all of the things we were doing at the Olympics, the degree of risk associated with each of them, and we allocated our resources according to those risks, and made sure that the dollars 

were going where the threat was greatest. 

I recognize that the Department of Homeland Security has 

adopted that very principle in carrying out the homeland highthreat assessment and developing procedures by which funds are 

going to the areas of greatest risk. 

Fourth, I would say that, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the word 

of prevention and intelligence. I think one of the areas that is a potential gap in our own state’s homeland security effort is in thinking about the gathering of information, taking information and 

turning it into intelligence, through analytical work, and deciding 

who it is that is responsible for that intelligence function. 

Is that a local function? Is it something our state police should 

be doing? Is this something that is the sole responsibility of the 

FBI? But we need to have a very clear set of guidelines as to who 

it is that is doing the intelligence work, how that is being funded, 

how it is being supported, what kind of communication we have 

across the intelligence world, to gather and process this information. 

And I believe that there is much more that we as a state, and 

I am sure we as a nation, should do to assure a more effective program, not just in responding to homeland security crises, but in 

preventing them, and assuring that our intelligence is superb. 

I would say that particular aspect of the Olympic experience was 

the most unique in my regard. We had a very large number of intelligence teams evaluating threats prior to the games and during 

the games. That is primarily why the games were safe, not just defensive, not just the magnetometers, but the fact that we had intelligence work going on extensively prior to and during the event 

itself. 

I appreciate the chance to meet with you. 

There were many questions that were asked by the various members as they made their introductory comments. I would be happy 

to respond to those anytime you would like to provide. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also Mr. Turner. 

[The statement of Governor Romney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MITT ROMNEY, GOVERNOR, 

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Mr. Chairman: I appreciate this opportunity to testify before the House Select 

Committee on Homeland Security and thank you and Ranking Member Turner for 

seeking the input of Governors in your oversight of this most crucial issue. 

I would also like to express my gratitude to Secretary Tom Ridge of the Department of Homeland Security, who has worked tirelessly to assist my colleagues and 

myself in meeting the challenges of governing in the aftermath of the September 

11 attacks. It is miraculous to see the homeland security apparatus that has sprung 

up under Secretary Ridge’s leadership in the short time since he answered President 

Bush’s call to service. As a former Governor, he is keenly aware of the difficulties 

we face balancing fiscal pressures with our overriding commitment to the public 
19

safety. As a former Congressman, he understands the responsibility this body has 

to demand results for the taxpayer’s money. This combination makes Secretary 

Ridge the right man for a very difficult job. We are all grateful for his vision and 

leadership and salute the Secretary, and the dedicated men and women who serve 

in the Department, for their success in preventing subsequent terrorist incidents. 

With everything that has happened since September 11, it is sometimes easy to 

forget that we are still in the early stages of defining the homeland security mission. 

Much remains to be done in both the public and private sectors. Therefore, it is appropriate that Congress assess the lessons learned to date, ensure that there is consensus at every level of government on both the degree of progress made and the 

most critical next steps, and establish a framework for future actions and funding. 

I commend you and the members of this Committee for the commitment you have 

made to this task. 

Similarly, I want to express my appreciation for the steps that Congress and the 

Bush Administration have taken, just since my visit earlier this year to testify on 

this subject before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, to make our citizens safer and our nation stronger. 

In Massachusetts, and throughout the nation, we have overseen the distribution of nearly $10 billion in federal homeland security-related funds for federal fiscal 

year 2003. Your decision to funnel the vast majority of that money through state 

government has helped to ensure that we avoid duplication, maximize efficiency, 

prevent gaps in first responder coverage and address the most significant threats 

and vulnerabilities that we face statewide. As you know, each state, even each Congressional district, has unique needs and capabilities that would make direct appropriations to cities and towns an extremely cumbersome process. Moreover, Governors believe that attempting to do so would be detrimental to our ongoing, coordinated efforts to secure the homeland. 

In return for the trust you have placed in us to distribute federal funds appropriately, Governors have taken great pains to ensure that the requirements placed 

on states by Congress have been met. While the 45-day window for passing the most 

recent round of federal funding through to local authorities has not expired for all 

states, all evidence indicates that those for whom it has expired have exceeded the 

minimum 80 percent pass-through and done so within the time allotted. This while 

facing logistical hurdles ranging from procurement restrictions to establishing a 

means for the electronic submission of grant proposals. 

In spite of these challenges, states have been remarkably innovative in their 

grant-making efforts, with an eye towards creating the most coordinated, interoperable homeland security network possible. Several, including Massachusetts, have 

brought together the various branches of the public safety community, as well as 

neighboring municipalities, for the first time in memory to gather a truly comprehensive picture of homeland security needs and to address them in a holistic, coordinated fashion. And the cooperation has not stopped at the border. In my region, 

the Northeast Regional Homeland Security Agreement will unify planning and sharing of resources across 10 states, while strengthening the information sharing process and creating an inventory of resources and assets available to be shared across 

borders. There are similar examples throughout the country. 

Recently, Governor Ruth Ann Minner of Delaware and I were asked by the National Governors Association to serve as ‘‘co-lead Governors’’ on Homeland Security 

issues. In this role, we will work with our nation’s Governors to develop recommendations and consensus positions on a number of the key issues under discussion in this arena. Our goal is to provide a single point of contact for the Congress. 

As a first step, we have conducted a survey of our fellow Governors to determine 

their priorities. Three issues stood out as overwhelmingly important to Governors, 

and they will serve as the centerpiece of my testimony today. These are: 

• Investing resources based on comprehensive and integrated state-wide plans 

• Maximizing the investment in intelligence gathering and analysis 

• Working with the Department of Homeland Security to develop guidelines for 

states to follow in the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks 

First, we believe it is critical that homeland security funding and resources be applied against comprehensive and integrated state-wide plans.

Frankly, this is the only way that our nation’s citizens can be assured that we are 

getting the maximum impact from the billions of dollars we are investing annually 

in Homeland Security. You have all heard the anecdotes that are beginning to circulate—of communities side-by-side that purchase incompatible radio equipment 

and cannot when responding to multi-jurisdictional emergencies. Or of the rural 

community that I understand requested homeland security funds for a new fire 

truck, despite the fact that they had neither roads on which to operate it nor a 

building in which to house it. Unfortunately, if we who are responsible for over-
20

seeing the expenditure of homeland security funding are not careful, those stories 

will become legend. The reality is that almost every state and community in this 

country is in fiscal crisis this year yet, like the federal government, we are all choosing to provide the necessary funding and resources for homeland security. But, recognizing how tight dollars are, I believe you will find that all Governors and municipal officials are eager to ensure that we get at least a dollar’s return in additional 

security for every dollar we spend. And the most critical step to maximizing our resources is developing integrated statewide plans and channeling virtually all homeland security funding through these plans. 

The National Strategy for Homeland Security, signed by President Bush on July 

16, 2002 articulates a comprehensive vision for the common defense of the nation. 

The nation’s Governors are very supportive of the strategy because they recognize 

that to effectively combat terrorism in this country requires a fully collaborative 

partnership between federal, state and local governments. However, for these plans 

to truly be effective, they must not simply be a compilation of individual plans as 

a package. We need to bring all jurisdictions together to develop an integrated plan 

for public safety—one that maximizes the resources on hand and provides a detailed 

framework for training, operations and equipment. 

As most of you know, I was the CEO of the 2002 Salt Lake Olympic Games, which 

has been described by many as a model for an integrated, comprehensive public 

safety plan. Although there are aspects of that planning process that would be hard 

to duplicate in all fifty states, it nevertheless it provides a strong example of the 

difference between a coordinated plan and an integrated plan. 

Interestingly, the decision for Salt Lake to pursue a fully integrated federal, state, 

local and private sector security plan for the Games was a result of the security 

planning process for the Atlanta Olympics. The Atlanta planning process followed 

what was until then a traditional format. Each of the affected jurisdictions—federal, 

state and local—developed individual plans for the activities within their jurisdiction—law enforcement, fire, and emergency response. Then those plans were 

meshed into a single whole. Unfortunately, when the plans were pulled together, 

they didn’t mesh well. Several areas had more resources than needed, others were 

significantly under-funded. Some areas were deemed the responsibility of more than 

one entity, while other areas were deemed to be no one’s responsibility and had been 

completely left out. Although there was a security plan, in reality it was a hodgepodge of individual plans and there were clearly holes. 

The federal government stepped in to assist in filling these holes and to help 

merge the plans and operations of the individual jurisdictions. But, the lessons 

learned from this experience were relayed in detail to the Salt Lake team and we 

decided to try something new. Federal, state and local governments, together with 

the private sector Olympic Committee, all agreed to come together and jointly develop one plan and use the planning process to work out jurisdictional issues, assess 

resources available, and agree on a plan that would use the minimum in additional 

resources to achieve the maximum in security. 

And that’s what we did. Over a period of several years, an integrated plan was 

developed that identified all the activities to be done and determined the resources 

necessary to carry out those activities. In many cases it was the federal government 

that provided guidance on the standards we were to use—much as we look to the 

Department of Homeland Security today to provide guidance to states on best practices and standards for securing critical infrastructure. 

Then, perhaps most uniquely, the participants identified all the resources each 

had to put towards carrying out the missions. Federal, state, and local government 

all participated in this, as did the private sector. Air and ground resources were 

pooled, communications resources were pooled, IT and dispatch resources were 

pooled, and manpower was pooled. And when we had thus maximized the use of 

our existing resources, we were able to clearly articulate to the federal government 

where we were short in resources and exactly what we needed those resources to 

do. Moreover, those resource shortfalls were part of an integrated security plan that 

the federal government—specifically the Secret Service, FBI and FEMA—had 

helped to develop. 

During the months that the Olympic Security Plan was operational, this integrated planning effort led to an integrated and well-coordinated training program. 

It also led to more efficient procurement of resources since we were able to use bulk 

purchasing to the maximum extent possible. And, as you could predict, it then led 

to a well-integrated operational effort during the Games. Federal, state and local 

public safety operations merged seamlessly and cooperated closely with the private 

operations that we were running at SLOC. Not only was this approach operationally 

superior, but in the world of public safety and counter-terrorism where the enemy 
21

can exploit any gap, the tight-knit coordination and integration among all security 

and public safety operations was essential. 

In my role as Governor of Massachusetts, I have sought to apply the lessons 

learned during the Olympic Games to the implementation of our statewide homeland security program. We have begun the process of developing an integrated plan 

by starting with a ‘‘bottoms up’’ assessment of our state of preparedness and an inventory of our resources. My Secretary of Public Safety, Ed Flynn, has led this effort 

and it has been conducted across federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. While the assessment has identified a number of positive actions taken 

to date, it has also identified a number of deficiencies, which must be addressed 

across our Commonwealth. 

Massachusetts established a model process for awarding federal homeland security dollars. We were the first state to apply for this money, the first to receive it, 

and the first to deliver it to municipalities. We combined the FFY03 and FFY03 

Supplemental funding into one grant process. This allowed us to award $21.5 million nearly a month before the 45-day deadline. And we established a competitive 

grant process, encouraging communities to work across jurisdictions and across disciplines to put together comprehensive plans for homeland security. 

Rather than award money based solely on population or location, Massachusetts 

evaluated applicants on four criteria: 

1. Degree of Threat • Population • Critical infrastructure 

2. Degree of Readiness • Emergency management plan • Training 

3. Degree of Cooperation • Mutual aid agreement(s) • Training across jurisdictions 

4. Reasonableness of Request • Grant request must complement existing equipment • Equipment must not be duplicative 

Every proposal was evaluated and scored by three readers. Massachusetts called 

on grant readers from throughout the region with various areas of expertise to score 

the proposals and, at our request, a federal Department of Homeland Security representative participated in the review process, answering technical questions. 

One of the most encouraging ramifications of this experience in Massachusetts 

has been the way in which a statewide process that required coordination and communication of its disparate public safety community has brought this community together. With the ‘‘carrot’’ of federal homeland security dollars, states can make this 

type of interagency, multi-jurisdictional cooperation the rule, rather than the exception. 

I share this experience to show you how seriously my fellow Governors and I take 

the charge you have given us to spend homeland security funds in the most efficacious way possible. Each of my colleagues recognizes that working with local governments and the federal government in the development of a comprehensive statewide plan is a matter of the utmost importance to the people of their state. And 

it is through those plans that we can ensure that homeland security funding is 

spent only for activities that will have the maximum impact, resulting in the highest level of public safety. 

For that reason, I, along with the other Governors, believe that Homeland Security funding should flow to the states and should be distributed then in accordance 

with the state-wide plans. It is only by flowing funding through the funnel of the 

state that we can ensure that funds are spent effectively and efficiently. Programs 

and funding that bypass the states could easily be spent outside the state-wide plan 

and lead to gaps in coverage, incompatible equipment including communications 

systems, and wasteful duplication. The National Strategy calls for states to develop 

a plan that sets priorities based on assessment and vulnerability analysis. Therefore 

it is only logical that funds should be distributed in accordance with those priorities. 

Second, we need to maximize our nation’s investment in information and intelligence sharing. One of the primary ways that state and local governments can work 

to prevent future acts of terrorism is to ensure the effective flow of information 

among federal, state and local law enforcement. In the months that preceded the 

attacks of 9/11, agencies were unable to draw a larger pattern out of disparate bits 

of information contained in separate databases about the activities of terrorists involved in the attack. We will never know whether better data sharing would have 

helped thwart the attacks. But we do know that terrorists often use traditional 

crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, bank robbery and illegal weap-
22

ons trafficking to offset the costs and further support their political/terrorist objectives. 

In fact, the first indication that a terrorist cell is operating within the United 

States may be behavior discovered during an investigation by state or local police, 

following the report of suspicious circumstances or some type of criminal event. 

Whether the focus in on stopping drug trafficking or preventing an act of terrorism, 

rapidly collecting and disseminating solid information about the people who commit 

crimes and where they commit them is key. 

Yet most police, public health entities, parole officers and courts are operating 

with 20-year old technology. Even though high-speed digital technology is currently 

available, many police officers still wait long periods to receive basic information 

about a vehicle or person they stop. Days or weeks may pass before criminal warrants find their way into state databases, leaving dangerous criminals on the street 

and police without this information. Judges might sentence offenders with outdated 

information regarding their criminal history records. Investigators in one jurisdiction may be unaware that information regarding an individual under investigation 

exists in a neighboring jurisdiction. 

This must change if we are to be successful in preventing future acts of terrorism. 

Another challenge we face in information sharing is ensuring that there is an appropriate exchange of information between the federal government and the state 

and local officials who may be able to use that information. We recognize that there 

is information critical to the nation’s security that must be guarded at the highest 

levels. Yet, as mentioned above, it is often state and local officials and responders 

who can facilitate the apprehension of potential terrorists if they have the necessary 

information. 

Additionally, state and local officials need information if they are to match their 

response to an increased threat level appropriately to the increased risk. For example, if our nation moves to Threat Level Orange in response to increased risks, then 

state and local officials need to know if that increased risk is contained to only one 

region of the country or one type of critical infrastructure. With that information, 

they can develop an appropriate response. Without it, they have no choice but to 

take actions that assume that the highest level of threat may be aimed at their region and at the various types of critical infrastructure in their state. The point here 

is that every community cannot be equally vulnerable at the same time to terrorism. 

If information is available, the sharing of that information will ensure that money 

and resources are not wasted in a region of the country that does not have an increased threat. 

One way to address the intelligence-sharing dilemma is for security clearances to 

be standardized and reciprocal between agencies and levels of government—perhaps 

within the Department of Homeland Security. There is also a need to process federal security clearances more expeditiously. Some states have waited over a year for 

vital security clearances for their law enforcement agents. The bottom line is that 

a more effective liaison must be established between the FBI, CIA, DHS and other 

national security agencies if we are to maximize our nation’s investment in intelligence. 

The third challenge is to work with the Department of Homeland Security and other relevant federal agencies to establish minimum guidelines 

and standards for state homeland security practices. In its recent report on 

the state of emergency responder preparedness, the Council on Foreign Relations 

suggested that Congress, ‘‘require the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to work with state and local 

agencies and officials as well as emergency responder professional associations to establish clearly defined standards and guidelines for emergency preparedness. These 

standards must be sufficiently flexible to allow local officials to set priorities based 

on their needs, provided that they reach nationally determined preparedness levels 

within a fixed time period.’’

I strongly support this recommendation. In the wake of September 11, states have 

each taken and are continuing to take the interim steps necessary to ensure that 

our citizens are protected. In many cases, these actions may not be the most cost 

efficient, such as temporary use of the National Guard to secure airports while a 

permanent security force is hired and trained. Yet, the priority of each Governor has 

been to take the immediate actions necessary to ensure the safety of our citizens. 

Even as we take these short-term steps, each of the states, through the comprehensive state-wide planning process, is developing a blueprint for homeland security. Among the many areas to be addressed in those plans are: 

• A focus on prevention: what actions and investments can we take to ensure that 

critical information is shared, analyzed and acted upon in a timely manner? What 

are the appropriate steps for securing our nation’s critical infrastructure including 
23

the 362 ports nationwide, approximately 168,000 public drinking water systems, 

600,000 miles of sanitary sewers, and 200,000 miles of storm sewers? Likewise, how 

can we protect our food supply from the threat of terrorist attack and build the capacity to trace potential food borne illness outbreaks, food contamination and infectious animal diseases? 

• Incident management: Clarification of roles, ensuring that training throughout 

the state is uniform and coordinated, developing necessary reciprocal agreements 

both within the state and with surrounding states, ensuring the interoperability of 

equipment, and ensuring the capacity for disease surveillance and detection exists 

throughout the state. 

• Response: Identification of the training and equipment needed by first responders, plans for escalating response beyond the local jurisdiction to surrounding jurisdictions, state-wide and then beyond the state borders, and identification of medical 

supplies and personnel and facilities necessary to treat victims of a public health 

emergency. 

These are questions that are best answered in coordination with federal officials 

who have decades of experience in countering and, for the most part, preventing terrorism. Governors believe that the Department of Homeland Security should take 

the lead in sharing this expertise with state and local officials charged daily with 

the protection of potential terrorist targets. Moreover, the Department should encourage states to share their own unique homeland security experiences and, with 

the assistance of federal experts, make information on how to duplicate anti-terror 

‘‘successes’’ available to all state and local officials. 

The Department should also increase its role in serving as a clearinghouse for 

technology and products related to homeland security. Currently, each state’s homeland security advisor is inundated with vendors’ products addressing the diverse 

issues of security. In the tight timeframe within which federal dollars must be 

turned around by the states, evaluating the competing claims of these vendors can 

be extremely difficult. And the technical and or scientific expertise needed to separate the truly innovative and effective products from the snake oil is often lacking. 

A ‘‘Consumer Reports’’-like department that can test products, interview purchasers/

users and disseminate that information would be tremendously helpful. 

I am encouraged to see that language necessary to meet these goals was included 

in Senator Collins’ first responder legislation, and has been spoken of positively by 

the leadership of this committee. Similarly, I applaud the efforts in both the House 

and Senate to streamline and simplify the myriad grants available to state and local 

governments for homeland security-related purposes. Establishing ‘‘one-stop shopping’’ for these funds is another means by which the federal government can consolidate and make available valuable information to states. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we can best ensure that we are able to invest wisely 

in homeland security in this nation if funding is distributed through the states 

based on a comprehensive and integrated state-wide plan, if information sharing 

and intelligence sharing between federal, state and local governments is maximized, 

and if state and local officials have access to the most up-to-date information available in the field. Mr. Chairman, the nation’s Governors understand the difficult task 

and the challenges ahead in protecting the homeland, and stand ready to work in 

partnership with the President and Congress to meet these challenges.

Chairman COX. I want to thank you very much for your testimony. I am going to ask two questions. I am going to put them together, so one you can tell me first whether it is accurate or not, 

and then provide some analysis. 

A recent article in USA Today pointed out instances in which 

local agencies received such a large influx of money that they 

weren’t sure how to spend it. One of the examples they cited was 

the Massachusetts Steamship Authority, which runs the ferries in 

and out of Martha’s Vineyard. One of the Vineyard harbors was 

awarded $900,000, to upgrade port security last week. 

The Oak Bluffs harbor master, Todd Alexander, told the Vineyard Gazette newspaper, and this was recounted in USA Today, 

‘‘Quite honestly, I don’t know what we are going to do, but you 

don’t turn down grant money.’’
24

Now, this is probably an example in the extreme of grant that 

is not based on threat assessment. But are you familiar with this 

example? And is it anomalous, or is there more to this story? 

Second, I really do want to delve into the conclusion of your testimony, which focused on your experience at the Olympics with intelligence analysis and your suggestion that we solve the problem of 

how we coordinate the roles of everyone from FBI, CIA and the 

other 15 intelligence agencies here in Washington to the state police in Massachusetts, the local police and so on. You posed very 

good questions about whose job and whose role that should be. 

I wonder if you could give us your best answers to those questions? How would you suggest, as we write legislation designed to 

sort this out, that we go about it? 

Governor Romney. Let me begin with your question about Oak 

Bluffs. I had guessed that that might attract the attention of at 

least one of the members of this committee, and was likewise chagrined to hear of a substantial grant being given to a community 

and the community didn’t know how it was going to spend it, but 

was happy to receive it. 

This is in fact a prime example of what happens when the federal government makes appropriations directly to communities 

rather than having the appropriations and the grant money go 

through a state, which can evaluate the grant requests of various 

communities. This was a grant that was made by GSA. It was 

made to the port authority on the island of Martha’s Vineyard. The 

funds went to Oak Bluffs. And this was not part of our state-wide 

plan. 

Let me contrast that with the funds that have come from the federal appropriation. Those funds which we were to distribute within 

45 days and actually distributed the money 10 days before that 35 

days were up, were appropriated, I believe, in a way that was correct. 

We began by contacting all of the communities in the state, some 

351, and said we will be happy to respond to grant requests that 

come from you. However, we will respond based upon the risk assessment that we make of your community and the particular assets and areas that may need protection. And number two, we will 

look at your request and favor those requests which are submitted 

on a regional basis. 

So if you are the community of Everett or the city of Boston or 

the community of Belmont, we will pay much more attention to 

your request if it is combined with other communities around you. 

So if you are asking, for instance, for a mobile command center, if 

you are just a single town or city, you are not likely to get that 

funding. But if you combine with five or six other communities 

around you and work together on a regional basis, we will make 

that appropriation. 

We received 117 grant requests. We approved 34 of them. These 

requests were read by individuals from three different states. We 

wanted to draw on homeland security expertise beyond our borders. 

So we read those different requests and then sent those monies 

out, ranking all of the requests based upon whether they were a 

regional request and also what the degree of threat was. 
25

I contrast that again with a process where the federal government is trying to send out money, and, in the case of my state, the 

351 different communities, without understanding our state-wide 

plan, without understanding the needs of our respective communities. 

We have even had a circumstance where one entity made an application to the federal government for funding, received an approval, and the same entity had another division which made an 

appropriation request to the state for a different piece of equipment. And within the same entity, these pieces of equipment were 

noncompatible. They didn’t know that they were each making these 

requests. And the federal government, TSA, had approved one; we 

were about to approve the other. 

And I just think it is critical to make sure that funding goes 

through a single source. And whether it is a single office in the federal government, and I would prefer a single office at the state 

level, to assure that the money going out is going out according to 

threat assessments and need and a regional plan and a comprehensive, holistic plan having been developed. So that is part one with 

regard to Oak Bluffs. 

Secondly, with regards to intelligence, I am very much of the 

view that this becomes the critical element of our protection, which 

is not just the police officer standing at the base of the bridge, and 

we know that can be a deterrent, but also the extensive intelligence 

work to assess what threats are coming into our country, where 

people might be located, what actions are being carried, and letting 

people know that we are watching them. 

In that regard, I believe the responsibility of the local police department is to gather information, to gather data, to gather information, to report crimes. I believe the state police departments 

should then take that information and compare it, look for trends, 

look for information that suggests perhaps a criminal activity that 

might have a foreign source, or a broader organized criminal activity, which may have associated with it a terrorist route. 

But that information is taken by the state police and given to 

federal authorities, namely the FBI. And the FBI carries out the 

intelligence work to assess the degree of risk and perhaps begin a 

process of monitoring or surveillance associated with a particular 

type of criminal activity. 

These different stages could be defined in a different way. But 

what I do know is that right now we have cities, the state and the 

federal government all working in the area of intelligence, but 

without a clear understanding of who is doing what. 

One of the most frequent questions I am asked by local law enforcement is what are we supposed to be doing with regards to 

homeland security? What are we supposed to be gathering? If I receive information about someone who I think is at risk, what am 

I supposed to with that? Who do I give it to? Is it the state police? 

Is it the FBI? 

Then they wonder if they gave it to the FBI, what was ever done 

with it. Did someone follow up? Was there any processing of that 

information? 

This kind of intelligence effort, I believe, needs to be thoroughly 

defined. And we as a state, and I am sure our local communities 
26

will march to the direction we receive, to make sure that we are 

carrying out a complete intelligence effort and that we are leaving 

no gaps. 

But I am afraid right now that a lot of information is being gathered, but it isn’t being analyzed and turned into true intelligence. 

And those kind of gaps could result in the, if you will, very serious 

consequences if we don’t thoroughly evaluate them. 

Chairman COX. Thank you very much for those responses. 

The gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. TURNER. Governor, thank you again for your presence and 

your testimony today. 

The issue you just raised is one that we have certainly heard 

about before. I think it is very important that we get the information out to local law enforcement officials, so that when they do 

have information, they do know where it is supposed to go. It is 

my understanding that the Department of Homeland Security is 

the place to and from which that information is supposed to flow, 

and where it should be is integrated, analyzed and utilized. 

So, currently, I believe that when local law enforcement is passing on some information, they are probably giving it to the FBI, 

which is fine, too. 

But I also think the Department of Homeland Security has the 

responsibility to carry out the function that you describe as missing 

today. 

The other issue I am interested in hearing your comments on, 

from the perspective of the governors, is what kind of information 

flow on intelligence do you see flowing from the federal level down 

to the states and local government? 

If you respond to that, I have a follow-up on that too I want to 

ask you about. 

Governor Romney. Well, I appreciate the information we do receive. 

We have a joint terrorism task force, a task force that meets 

under the direction of the U.S. attorney in Boston, and we receive, 

I believe, timely, effective information of potential threats. 

On the basis of that information which is, by the way, far more 

detailed than just code orange or code yellow?we receive pretty specific information?we make assessments of what actions we should 

take to protect critical infrastructure, or to protect individuals. 

And so the code orange is a helpful indication of the level of 

threat, but we go beyond that code information to actually have direct communication with the Department of Homeland Security, or 

the FBI, or other federal sources. 

And on the basis of that further information, we decide what specific action we should take, and in some cases, for instance at the 

beginning of the Iraq war, the threats were of such significance 

that we took very extensive precautions. 

However, the more recent code orange assessment was far more 

generic, and we took less aggressive action. And that is something 

which we assess on a basis of having direct communications with 

Washington. 

So I would tell you we receive a good deal of information. I hope 

we do a good job in getting out to our localities. We have a system 

in our state called our Saturn System, where we communicate to 
27

the respective first responders the information we think will help 

them in being able to respond or prevent attack on any critical 

asset or group of individuals. 

Mr. TURNER. I notice in your written testimony that you suggest 

we should modify the current system we have on levels of alert, 

that it should be more specific, aimed at regions, and aimed at critical infrastructure as appropriate. 

I certainly agree with you on that. 

I think some refinement is necessary. Many of the states and localities have complained to us that if their response is the same 

every time we move up a notch, it costs them hundreds of thousands of dollars that may not be need to spent in their particular 

locale or in a particular category of critical infrastructure. 

Every time you apply for federal money, if I understand the process, you are required to submit a state plan. When you prepared 

your state plan, or when your other counterparts prepared their 

state plan, what kind of intelligence information did you have at 

that time upon which to base your state plan? 

Governor Romney. Well, first of all, I think the term ‘‘state plan’’ 

is reminiscent of the Atlanta Olympics. 

And I can’t speak for all states—I believe our state is doing an 

excellent job, but in many respects our state plan consists of some 

broad principles which we apply at the state level, but it is also a 

collection of what is being done on a local level. It is taken together 

and put a notebook and said, here, here is all of our local plans collected, now it is a state plan, as opposed to a thoroughly prepared, 

comprehensive, directed, holistic plan being created on a statewide 

basis. 

And that is something which we are attempting to do, but has 

not been completed yet to my satisfaction, not to the level that I 

saw at the Olympics, and I think we have more effort in that regard. 

With regards to the intelligence input, I would say that I think 

more than knowing a specific threat that we are to respond to for 

our state plan, it would be helpful to know what, if you will, guidelines or template might be suggested to us as to the level of capability, the level of homeland security resources to be applied to our 

various assets. 

And by that I mean one would look at a state and say, What is 

the degree of risk in a particular state? And given that risk, let us 

look at different types of assets, from a nuclear power plant to a 

drinking water source to a bridge to a tunnel to a major facility of 

another kind. And the Department of Homeland Security could provide us guidelines as to the level of protection that might be appropriate for one of those assets, given a certain level of risk, meaning 

green, yellow, orange, red and so forth. 

That kind of template would allow us to determine exactly what 

the level of resources might be for our entire state. 

Today, we make that assessment ourselves. Today, we decide if 

we have a tunnel, what we think we should do to protect that tunnel. My guess is that Delaware does something different, New York 

does something different, California does something else. 

What is the appropriate level? What is the level which is being 

done in other states? What is the best practice? 
28

And the communication of best practices which would allow us 

to set, if you will, state by state templates, guidelines, I think 

would be helpful for us to be able to create truly holistic, comprehensive statewide plans. 

That is something which the Department of Homeland Security 

is racing to do. That is something which we are doing on a state 

basis as well as we can. And it is something which if we don’t make 

enough progress, why I think the National Governors Association 

should undertake on its own, but I think the Department of Homeland Security is going to lead the way. 

Mr. TURNER. Governor, I really appreciate the clarity of your answers, because it points to a problem about which the chairman 

and I have been very concerned. I think you are absolutely right: 

The comprehensive, holistic plan that you require has to be based 

on some intelligence information that you do not have at present. 

We are purporting to pass out money today based on state plans 

that I think in many ways we must all acknowledge are inadequate 

to the task of making critical decisions. 

Before you can have a comprehensive plan—you are absolutely 

right—we have got to have the Department of Homeland Security 

set out standards and best practices from which you can then move 

to develop a plan using those best practices. 

Therefore, you have pointed out two very critical areas, and I 

really appreciate your testimony. 

Chairman COX. Mr. Weldon. 

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Governor, for being here. 

Governor, I have read through your statement and can tell you 

I agree with many of the assessments you provided, and especially 

be concerned about the fact that our governors do not yet have the 

same classified status that members of Congress have, which I 

think that is a shortcoming which needs to be corrected. 

I would say that I do have some problems with your heavy focus 

on the state level. 

As you know, the bulk of the first responder community in this 

country in fire service is not paid and is not a part of government. 

The bulk of the 32,000 fire departments in this country are volunteer. It is nice to tell them they should do something, it is nice to 

tell them they have bought incompatible radio equipment. But by 

and large, the bulk of those departments bought it with money 

they raised from chicken dinners and from tag days. 

And it is nice now for the federal government to come in and say, 

or the state government, Well, you should have done this, when the 

states weren’t providing, in most cases, a dime of money over the 

past 200 years. 

I know. I was a volunteer fire chief and represent all the firefighters of this country. And having been a mayor and a county 

commissioner, I get upset that states sometimes think they have 

all the answers when the history of this country for 200 years, the 

32,000 departments have handled every disaster we have had, from 

that large warehouse fire in your state, where six firefighters were 

killed, to hazmat incidents, hurricanes, floods. 

And in my opinion, our problem has been we have been listening 

too much to the bureaucrats at the top, and not enough to the first 
29

responder on the bottom, who have been out there where the rubber meets the road. 

When our first training programs were set up to provide training 

for homeland security and terrorism before 9/11, the fire service 

wasn’t even brought in. We hired consultants at the government 

level, paid bureaucrats in Washington who are supposedly going to 

tell these firefighters how to do what they have been for 200 years. 

It was a slap in their face. 

And what I think, and what I know, is that the program that we 

established in Congress who, for the first time, give dollars on a 

competitive basis to the fire and EMS departments in the country 

has been the most successful program we have operated. 

In your testimony you single out a community that you understand bought a fire truck without roads. I am not aware of that. 

I wish you would tell me that. Because the GAO has done an investigation of our grants program. It is the most successful program 

we have in Washington. In fact, your state, many of your departments have paid 10 percent or 30 percent of the match to get those 

funds. 

The concern that local departments have—and I have been in 

every state, I have been in your state many times meeting with 

your fire leaders—is that states siphon off money for bureaucracy. 

They take money the federal government provides and they build 

fiefdoms, they build consultants. 

And I know. I was a county commissioner. They develop people 

who can tell others how to do the job. But when that alarm sounds, 

when that incident occurs, don’t look for those bureaucrats, because 

that first apparatus driver had better have the equipment to respond. 

And when you talk about communication systems, and you talk 

about communities side by side purchasing incompatible radio 

equipment, that was a problem in the past, because those local fire 

departments had to raise the money on their own to buy that 

equipment. 

What I don’t see here, and what is the number one issue for the 

emergency responders, is for the government to take on the communications industry and set aside the frequency spectrum allocation to allow for a standardized communication system. They want 

to go to high band frequency. They want to go to a standardized 

system. But because the networks will not give up the frequency 

spectrum that they were supposed to give up within two years, the 

fire service and the emergency responders and law enforcement 

community can’t get access to that frequency spectrum. That is not 

an issue they can control. That is an issue that this Congress and 

the federal government needs to respond to—recommendations 

made by the Pitswack advisory committee in 1995. 

Now the strength of the emotion in my response is aimed at you 

personally. It is aimed at frustration of being here 17 years, leading the effort for our firefighters, and now all of a sudden having 

groups like the Council on Foreign Relations coming in and saying 

what we have been saying for 17 years. I mean, where was Senator 

Rudman when he was here? Where was his effort to support the 

first responders? This wasn’t a new need after 9/11. This was something that should have been addressed decades ago. 
30

So my only concern is that the focus does not just have to be at 

the state level. I agree with statewide planning. California has an 

excellent model. But they buy the fire apparatus, not the local fire 

department. And they bring them in when they need them for disasters. 

I agree with that coordination. But I also think we have to be 

sensitive to the people who are paying the bill. And in most cases 

in America, those bills are still being paid by local volunteers, who 

raise the money through chicken dinners and tag days. 

Thank you. 

Governor Romney. Let me make just a comment with regards to 

a couple of points that you made, many of which I agree with. 

I would note that in the case of the grants that are being made 

to our state, of federal funds, that these grants are going to out 

communities based upon regional plans, and those plans are being 

proposed by fire departments, police departments, EMS departments, that combine together to look for specific resources that will 

help them on a regional basis. 

And I will use as an example the fact that we have an LNG 

tanker and LNG plant that comes into the Boston Harbor on a 

weekly basis. The fire equipment necessary to contain a fire of 

LNG is not the kind of equipment that any one fire department 

would propose to acquire. The community came together and said, 

We as a group of communities want to purchase a particular type 

of equipment. It is aquatic-based equipment. And that is something 

we feel is appropriate to support and provide money for. 

And so that is an example of the local fire departments coming 

together and requesting equipment that allows them to deal with 

the threat that no one of them alone would find as an appropriate 

appropriation or allocation. 

I note as well that with regards to the state share, that Congress, I think, wisely in the most recent appropriation, has said 

that 80 percent of the funds should go directly to the localities and 

the locality needs. And 20 percent would stay at the state level. 

In our case, we have made the full distribution within actually 

35 days for the localities. And we have not kept the full 20 percent, 

even though we have a substantial state police effort that could 

just end National Guard effort that could justify maintaining some 

of those funds. 

We have distributed a larger amount than the 80 percent required by Congress. I think Congress continues to have the right, 

and I would suggest the appropriate direction in suggesting which 

portion of the funds go to local first responders. 

Chairman COX. I thank the gentleman. 

Governor Romney, I understand that you have a hard 3:00 deadline. We also have members who want to ask questions. And we 

also have our own hard 3:45 deadline, because of the joint session 

of Congress. What I would like to do is take one more question 

from the minority side, and then let you go, if you would be willing 

to stay for that even though we are past the appointed time. 

Who seeks recognition? 

The gentleman from Massachusetts? 

Mr. MARKEY. I will yield to the other gentleman from Massachusetts. 
31

Chairman COX. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Frank, 

is recognized. 

Mr. MARKEY. —if you don’t mind and it would just be to make 

the point, before I yield, that although it is not immediately obvious from the hinterlands, people like Curt Weldon and I have always been in silent agreement on these issues and pride working 

together over the years to provide funding. 

But we do wind up in communities like Everett, where the LNG 

facility is actually located in my district where the mayor has had 

to lay off 20 of the 105 firemen in that community, even though 

it does present maybe the greatest terrorist target. 

Let me yield to the other—

Mr. FRANK. Actually, I think, Governor, in another part of the 

state in which I represent, there is a proposal now pending for another LNG plant, as you know, in Fall River. And obviously, people 

there are concerned, probably because of this resource remained, 

and we hope to be able to work with you. 

I have one specific question and one more general one. You mentioned an entity in Massachusetts which had applied for two different pieces of equipment, one through the federal government 

and one through the state, and it applied for inconsistent equipment. What entity was that? 

Governor Romney. That was Massport. 

Mr. FRANK. They had applied and had—were in the process of 

trying to get two inconsistent pieces of equipment? 

Governor Romney. My understanding is that the harbor portion 

of Massport had requested equipment and received a grant from 

TSA, and that the airport side of Massport applied to the state—

Mr. FRANK. Governor, since all of us were about to fly into that 

place, I am probably sorry I asked you. 

Governor Romney. We are still very safe, thank you. 

And that actually the—

Mr. FRANK. It wouldn’t help to go by boat. 

Governor Romney. The state system required the chief executive 

of Massport to sign the grant request. And in signing that grant 

request, he identified the fact that they were coming from—that 

two areas were asking for equipment to happened to not be compatible. 

Mr. FRANK. The more general question: You had this responsibility to take all these applications and parcel them out, and I am 

partly concerned about the adequacy of research, and particularly 

since, as my colleagues pointed out, on the one hand because of 

other issues we are seeing first responders laid off—police, fire, 

emergency drivers. 

And obviously, there aren’t two separate entities out there, one 

group that deals with homeland security and two, the regulars. 

That is the same group. And there is a tradeoff there. 

My question is as you got this list of projects, what percentage 

of the worthy projects are you able to fund? I mean answer the 

question, the adequacy of resources. Did you find yourself in the 

position of having to say no to projects which you thought had 

merit, even though, obviously, you funded the ones you thought 

were best? 
32

But how many projects that were well thought out and met a 

real need did we have to turn down because there was scarcity of 

resources? 

Governor Romney. We did not come away thinking that we had 

left major holes, and that many of the grant requests were worthy, 

but we just didn’t have enough money to fund them. We thought 

that a number of the grant requests were not appropriate, because 

they were municipally based, rather than regionally based, and encouraged the communities to go back and prepare a more regionally based plan. 

I would tell you, however, that there is clear indication that 

there is more need than dollars. And you are not going to hear any 

governor say anything different, nor will you have any mayor or selectman say anything different than that. 

We were dismayed that not all of our communities put in grant 

requests. There were regions of the state. In the time frame during 

which we were directed to distribute funds, 45 days, some communities couldn’t get a grant in quickly enough. 

And so your community, the city of Fall River, for instance, made 

no application for funding. New Bedford did put in a substantial 

request, and we provided funding to New Bedford and many other 

portions of your district, but Fall River didn’t. 

We recognize that, gosh, this is a major hole, so we put some 

money aside, and said, We are going to send this to Fall River, 

even though they didn’t have a request in, but it is suggested—

Mr. FRANK. I appreciate it. I didn’t mean to be parochial. That 

is for the Appropriations—

[Laughter.] 

But I thank you for acknowledging that there is this problem, 

there is more need than dollars. 

Governor Romney. Yes, there is more need than dollars. 

And let me draw that back to the original point that I made 

about needing to have a sense of where we are trying to go, and 

a national and state-wide plan. And I say we have had many requests for hazmat teams and for mobile command centers. Well, 

how many hazmat teams does a state need? We have a population 

of 6.5 million people. Should we have 1 per 100,000? One per million? One per 50,000? Every community will ask for hazmat dollars, even our smallest communities. But I am not sure what the 

standard is we are trying to get to. 

Are we looking for hazmat capability at level A, B or C on a national basis? We can make great grants to provide hazmat equipment. But I don’t know what the level we are trying to reach might 

be. 

Likewise with regard to protecting our LNG tankers. 

What is the level of protection we need? I know that with regards 

to nuclear plants that over the years the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has said this is the outline of what effective security is for 

a nuclear plant. 

That level of guidance may well be appropriate for key assets, 

key to critical assets. Medical response key assets. Gatherings of 

large individuals. 

What is the standard we are shooting for? Once we know what 

the standard is, we will know how much money we need? 
33

Mr. FRANK. I will just close up. On the medical, I just said this 

before. We got problems in the emergency rooms on Friday night 

from people hitting each other over the head and running each 

other over, much less somebody being a terrorist. So, there is clearly a greater need. 

I would just say I appreciate your acknowledging that there is 

more need than dollars. I just think that the next time people 

think that what we need are fewer government dollars, they ought 

to understand that that would widen the gap between need and 

dollars. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman COX. Thank you, Governor Romney, for your excellent 

help to this committee and to our work and for your excellent support for our national effort in homeland security. 

I hope you have a secure flight. 

Governor Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman COX. We now welcome our next panel. And as the 

members of the next panel are being seated, I will briefly introduce 

them. 

Jamie Metzl is the senior fellow and coordinator for Homeland 

Security Programs at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Captain Michael Grossman, commander of the Emergency Operations Bureau, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, is also 

the head of the multiagency Terrorism Early Warning Group. 

Chief George Jaramillo is here from the Orange County Sheriff’s 

Department. And I am especially grateful because, of course, I hail 

from Orange County myself, for your appearance here today. 

Ray Kiernan is the Fire Commissioner and Chief of the New Rochelle Fire Department, a member of the Westchester Career Fire 

Chiefs and Northeast Fire Consortium. He has been described as 

a fireman’s fire chief. 

And we are very happy to have all four of you. We appreciate 

your outstanding prepared testimony, which we have already included as part of the record. And we invite you each to summarize 

your testimony. 

We will begin with you, Mr. Metzl. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JAMIE METZL, SENIOR FELLOW AND COORDINATOR FOR HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAMS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS; 

Mr. METZL. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Turner, members of the 

committee, particularly my congresswomen from my home town of 

Kansas City, Karen McCarthy, thank you very much for inviting 

me to testify before you today. It is an honor for me to be here. 

I serve as project director for what Congressman Weldon described as the Johnny–Come–Lately Council on Foreign Relations 

when we arrived here. And as you all, I believe, know, we issued 

a report two weeks ago entitled Emergency Responders: Drastically 

Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared. 

Our task force is chaired by Senator Rudman. And members of 

our task force include many prominent Republicans and Democrats, including George Schultz, William Webster, former chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former chief of staff of the Army, three 

Nobel Laureates and others. 
34

The task force met with emergency responders around the country and with emergency responder professional associations and 

others. And based on our extensive contacts and the totality of our 

investigation, we came to one very simple conclusion. Almost two 

years after September 11, America is not sufficiently prepared for 

another terrorist attack. 

This is not to say that we are not at all prepared. It is not to 

say that we are not in some ways better prepared than we were 

on September 11. But the gap is too large to be acceptable. As Senator Rudman has said, the question is not if the next attack will 

place, but rather when it will take place. 

There are many elements of emergency preparedness and many 

elements of the overall homeland security picture. And we focused 

on only one, which was emergency responders. 

What we found shocked us. And our report, as I believe all of you 

have, outlines gives some examples of what is missing. That fire 

departments across the country have only enough radios to equip 

on average half the firefighters on a shift. There is not adequate 

breathing apparatus. The public health system in the United 

States is in a terrible, dangerous state of disarray. 

In sum, we found that emergency responders across the country 

don’t have the equipment and the training they need to respond 

safely and effectively to a terrorist attack. 

So we worked with these emergency responders and professional 

associations to try to quantify what was missing. And we were very 

clear that what we were looking for wasn’t a wish list. 

We carefully reviewed the data that we collected, and we believe 

we were very, very conservative in our estimates. But based on our 

calculations, we believe that America will fall roughly $98.4 billion 

short of meeting critical emergency responder needs over the next 

five years if current funding levels are maintained. 

Getting to this level would require as much as tripling overall expenditures. And if one believes that this is a federal responsibility, 

it would require quintupling federal expenditures. 

While these critical needs must be addressed immediately, our 

task force is the first to admit, and we did so in our report, there 

our figures for meeting them are preliminary, and that the United 

States must develop a more sophisticated requirements generation 

process, as Governor Romney and others have mentioned. 

Unless we both get the necessary resources to America’s frontline 

responders and create a policy framework for spending these funds 

most efficiently, the American taxpayer will not receive the best return on our investment in homeland security, and, more importantly, we will not be as safe as we must become. 

If we allocate the funds without getting the policy issues right, 

or if we get the policy issues right without allocating the funds, we 

will not be prepared. America must do both. 

The centerpiece of this policy framework, as has been discussed, 

must be national preparedness standards. We need to define what 

preparedness is, so we can know where we are and build a road 

map for getting from where we are to where we need to be. Otherwise, we are going to be throwing money at the problem and our 

response capabilities will be uneven. 
35

We need a requirements generation process, similar to what the 

military has, where we identify the threats, we determine the capabilities necessary for responding to those threats, and then we generate requirements for reaching those capability levels. 

If we don’t have that, money is going to be wasted, and at the 

end five years we will have spent a lot of money. We will have 

some extra capabilities out there, but it will be dangerously uneven. 

As you, Mr. Chairman, and others have mentioned, we need to 

change the formula grant process. Right now, we are distributing 

money in a very inefficient way. 

And even if the federal government fixes the federal formula, we 

need to make sure that the states fix their formula. It makes no 

sense that if there is a federal formula based on threat and risk, 

which we don’t have yet, but I imagine that at some point we will, 

but then states are evenly distributing finds based on the old system, we are not going to be as safe as we need to be: We are going 

to be diluting funds to the point of being wasted. 

Another issue is that we need to encourage and incentivize longterm thinking among cities and states. If cities and states receive 

funds and don’t have confidence that additional funds will consistently be coming, there is an incentive to spend on short-term 

needs, rather than doing what needs to be required, what needs to 

be done, which may include adding staff, it may include maintenance, it may include long-term training. And we need to 

incentivize that type of long-term thinking. 

This committee has spent a lot of time discussing the congressional oversight issue, and I imagine that you would all agree with 

the recommendation in our report that the congressional oversight 

process needs to be streamlined, and we believe, as, Mr. Chairman, 

I know you do, that this committee would be transformed into a 

standing committee with a formal, leading role in the authorization 

of emergency responder expenditures. 

And I would agree with your proposal that this committee should 

have legislative jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security, and oversight jurisdiction over federal homeland security activities. 

Finally, federal and state grants systems are duplicative and 

need to be streamlined. As Congressman Turner and Senator Collins and others have mentioned, we need to have a system for onestop shopping. 

It makes no sense that states often have to submit as many as 

five separate homeland security plans covering the same ground. 

We need to make this process easier, not harder, so we can have 

the kind of coordination that Governor Romney has mentioned. 

America’s local emergency responders will always be the first to 

confront a terrorist incident, and will play the central role in managing its immediate consequences. Their efforts in the first minutes 

and hours following an attack will be critical to saving lives, reestablishing order and preventing mass panic. 

America wouldn’t think of sending our military to fight a war 

overseas without proper equipment and training, but that is what 

we do every day with our emergency responders across the country, 

who are the front lines of our war on terror. 
36

One of the many lessons we learned from? 

Chairman COX. Mr. Metzl, I just need to ask you to summarize. 

Mr. METZL. Last sentence. Last long, run-on sentence. One of the 

lessons we learned from September 11 is that our emergency responders will rush to the scene of a terrorist incident, even if they 

don’t have the tools to respond effectively. We cannot afford for 

them and for us to have that be the case. We need to get them the 

equipment and the training they need; otherwise, we will all be in 

danger. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Mr. Metzl follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JAMIE F. METZL 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today. It is an honor for me to be here. 

I serve as Project Director of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent task 

Force on Emergency Responders, where I work with our Chairman, Senator Warren 

Rudman and Senior Advisor Richard Clarke. The non-partisan task force has 

brought together leading Americans from diverse political and professional backgrounds to examine whether or not America is sufficiently prepared for another terrorist attack. Our members include former Secretary of State George Shultz, former 

CIA and FBI Director William Webster, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, three Nobel laureates, and other senior experts of a similar stature. 

The Task Force met with local emergency responders across the country, worked 

closely with emergency responder professional associations, and partnered on spending-related issues with two of the national leading budgetary analysis organizations, 

the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment and the Concord Coalition. 

Based on these extensive contacts and the totality of our investigation, we came to 

one very simple conclusion: almost two years after 9/11, America is not sufficiently 

prepared for another terrorist attack. 

This is not to say that we are not better prepared to address some aspects of the 

terrorist threat or that the government has done nothing since 9/11. In our report 

entitled Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared 

which we released on June 30, the Task Force credited the Bush administration, 

Congress, governors, and mayors with taking important steps since the September 

11 attacks to respond to the risk of catastrophic terrorism. It is to say, however, 

that we are not as prepared as we must be given the magnitude of the threat we 

face and the tremendous repercussions of another attack. As Senator Rudman has 

said, the question is not if the next attack will take place, but rather when it will 

take place. 

Somewhere in the world, perhaps even here in America, terrorists are now likely 

planning attacks on the United States. At the same time, America’s diplomats, military officers, intelligence agents, policemen, firefighters, and others are working 

frantically to prevent and prepare for such an attack. These two groups of people 

are in a race with each other that our side cannot afford to lose. 

An effective homeland security strategy must therefore play both offense and defense. We must attack terrorists wherever they are, cut off their financing, and destroy their networks. We must also address global causes of instability that provide 

fertile soil for the recruitment of terrorists. At home, we must protect our critical 

infrastructure, keep our airways, ports, and highways safe, and make sure that our 

local policemen, firefighters, health workers and others have the equipment and the 

training they need to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. Although there are 

many aspects of homeland security that need to be reviewed, our examination focused on the preparedness of emergency responders. What we found shocked us. 

We found that on average, fire departments across the country have only enough 

radios to equip half the firefighters on a shift, and breathing apparatuses for only 

one third. We found that a mere ten percent of fire departments in the United 

States have the personnel and equipment to respond to a building collapse. We 

found that police departments in cities across the country do not have the protective 

gear to safely secure a site following an attack with weapons of mass destruction. 

We found that public health labs in most states still lack basic equipment and expertise to adequately respond to a chemical or biological attack, and that 75 percent 

of state laboratories report being overwhelmed by too many testing requests. In 
37

sum, we found that emergency responders across the country don’t have the equipment and the training they need to respond safely and effectively to a terrorist attack. 

In order to quantify this preparedness gap, we worked with each emergency responder community—fire, police, emergency medical, public health, emergency management, and others—and asked them to determine and cost out the minimum essential capabilities they required to be prepared for a terrorist attack. We were very 

clear that we were not asking for a wish list, and we carefully reviewed the data 

we collected from these sources. We were extremely conservative in our estimates. 

The high funding estimate provided to us by the fire community, for example, was roughly $85 billion over five years. The number that we ended up using for our calculation, however, was $37 billion. The high estimate for establishing interoperable 

communications was $18 billion over five years, but we used the much lower number of $6.8 billion based on the more economical funding model of the Capital Wireless Integration Network project in the greater DC area. Most significantly, because 

police organizations were unable to provide us with any reliable estimates of their 

need, we decided not to include a police figure rather than include a number we 

would not be able to support. Finally, we assumed that every dollar allocated for 

emergency responders would be used to address terrorism preparedness needs, not 

for more generic purposes. Based on our calculations, we found that America will fall roughly $98.4 billion 

short of meeting critical emergency responder needs over the next five years if current federal, state, and local funding levels are maintained. According to our estimates, combined federal, state, and local expenditures would need to be as much 

as tripled over the next five years to address this unmet need. As you know, states 

across the country are in their worst financial situation in decades, and there are 

many who argue that terrorism is a national security threat which, according to the 

constitution, is primarily a responsibility of the federal government. Covering the 

$98.4 billion funding shortfall using federal funds alone, therefore, would require a 

five-fold increase from the current level of $5.4 billion per year to an annual federal 

expenditure of $25.1 billion. 

Among other things, these additional funds are badly needed to enhance federal 

and local urban search and rescue capabilities; to foster interoperable communications systems for emergency responders across the country; to enhance public health 

preparedness by strengthening laboratories and disease tracking capabilities, and 

training public health professionals for biological, chemical, and radiological events; 

to provide basic protective gear and WMD remediation equipment to firefighters; to 

support an extensive series of national exercises that would allow responders to improve on response techniques; to enhance emergency agricultural and veterinary capabilities for response to a potential national food supply attack; and to help develop 

surge capacity in the nation’s hospitals to help them better prepare for a WMD attack. 

While these critical needs must be addressed immediately, our Task Force is the 

first to admit that our figures for meeting them are preliminary and that the Unites 

States must develop a more sophisticated requirements-generation process. Unless 

we both get the necessary resources to America’s front-line emergency responders 

and create a policy framework for spending these funds most efficiently, the American taxpayer will not receive the best return on our investments in homeland security and, more importantly, we will not be as safe as we must become. If we allocate 

the funds without getting the policy issues right, or if we get the policy issues right 

without allocating the funds, we will not be prepared. America must do both. 

The centerpiece of this policy framework must be national preparedness standards. America needs national standards that define what emergency preparedness 

means. Every city of a given size should have a minimum set of capabilities—they 

should be able to respond to a biological event of a certain size, decontaminate a 

certain number of people, etc. But because America has not defined what preparedness is, we have no way of knowing systematically how prepared we are or what 

we need to do to get from where we are now to where we need to be. Standards 

should not become the basis for federal micromanaging of state and local governments, but they must establish minimum essential capabilities that every jurisdiction of a certain size should either have or have access to. Within these parameters, 

state and local governments should be allowed flexibility for determining priorities 

and allocating resources so long as national standards are met over a fixed period 

of time. 

National standards can then provide the basis for a requirements process similar 

to that employed by the United States military. Threats must be identified, capabilities for addressing threats determined, and requirements generated for establishing 

or otherwise gaining access to necessary capabilities. Effective coordination and 
38

planning between and among all levels of government and emergency responders on 

the ground must then transform new capabilities into a national preparedness system. 

A second element in getting the policy framework right is fixing the system for 

allocating scarce emergency responder funds. It makes no sense to distribute funds 

based primarily on a divide the spoils formula. As Secretary Ridge and others have 

correctly asserted, we need to think less about politics and more about our 

vulnerabilities and the hierarchy of threats facing us when making decisions about 

distributing funds. This must be the case on both the federal and on the state level. 

Otherwise, our funds will be diluted to the point of being wasted. America must 

smartly allocate our limited resources to address our greatest vulnerabilities. 

In addition, the erratic nature of federal funding has created perverse incentives 

for short-term thinking among cities and states, and this process must be fixed. 

State and local governments can’t make long-term decisions to address their needs 

without confidence that increased federal funding will be sustained. Multi-year 

funding is extremely difficult in our political system, even for military appropriations, but we must work to create confidence among states and localities that funding levels will be maintained over time in order to establish proper incentives for 

systematic, long-term planning. 

You are the experts on the issue of Congressional oversight, and I am therefore 

hesitant to make recommendations regarding how Congress might be organized. 

Nevertheless, the Task Force found that an estimated 88 committees and subcommittees of the House and Senate have a hand in the unwieldy homeland security authorization and appropriations process. For this reason, the Task Force has 

recommended that the authorization and appropriations processes must be focused 

and streamlined both to ensure necessary oversight and to better guarantee that 

funds will be appropriated and distributed with necessary speed. The Task Force 

believes that Congress should have a lead committee, or an effective joint committee, to shape overall policy in order to prevent the fragmentation of oversight 

and the distortion of appropriations. As I’m sure you know, the Task Force has recommended that the House of Representatives transform this committee into a 

standing committee and give it a formal, leading role in the authorization of all 

emergency responder expenditures. 

Finally, the federal and state grants systems are duplicative and unnecessarily 

complicated and serve to slow the funding process for no real benefit. The current 

inflexible structure of homeland security funding, along with shifting federal requirements and increased amounts of paperwork, place unnecessary burdens on 

state and local governments. For example, some states have been required to submit 

as many as five homeland security plans in order to qualify for federal assistance. 

While a balance should be maintained between the need for the rapid allocation of 

emergency preparedness funds and the maintenance of appropriate oversight to ensure that such funds are well spent, the present danger is too great to allow for 

business as usual. As part of an overall response to this larger structural problem, 

we believe that Congress should require DHS to work with other federal agencies 

to streamline homeland security grant programs in a way that reduces unnecessary 

duplication and establishes coordinated ‘‘one-stop shopping’’ for state and local authorities seeking grant funds. 

America’s local emergency responders will always be the first to confront a terrorist incident and will play the central role in managing its immediate consequences. Their efforts in the first minutes and hours following an attack will be 

critical to saving lives, reestablishing order, and preventing mass panic. America 

would not think of sending our military to fight a war overseas without proper 

equipment and training. It is therefore unconscionable that we are not providing 

those same necessities to the local emergency responders who are also on the front 

lines of the war on terror. 

One of the many things we learned from the 9/11 attacks is that our local emergency responders will rush to the scene of a terrorist incident, even if they do not 

have everything they will need once they get there. In New York, this led to inexcusable deaths. The United States has both a responsibility and a critical need to 

provide our emergency responders with the equipment, training, and other necessary resources to do their jobs safely and effectively. Otherwise, we will all be in 

unnecessary danger. America must do better. 

Thank you very much. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Chairman COX. Thank you. Mr. Chief Jaramillo. 
39

STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE JARAMILLO, ASSISTANT SHERIFF, ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 

Mr. JARAMILLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Sheriff 

Mike Carona and the men and women of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department, as well as the people from your district, we appreciate the opportunity to be heard on this. 

We have submitted, as you know, a more extensive written testimony, but I want to give you a brief overview of a few things that 

are paramountly important within that testimony. 

Orange County is the second-most populous county in California. 

It has got 3 million residents, and 38 million yearly visitors. If it 

were a stand-alone economy, it would be the 31st largest economy 

in the world. 

Unfortunately, it is a major target, also. It has Disneyland, John 

Wayne Airport, Anaheim Stadium and San Onofre nuclear generating station. We’ve got a great partnership with Los Angeles 

County. 

We work very well with Sheriff Lee Baca and the men and 

women of his department. In fact, California’s divided into mutual 

aid response regions. 

Orange County and LA County combine to form Region 1, which 

is the largest response region in America. Region 1 has 122 cities, 

exceeds 50,000 emergency responders, and has a 13 million resident population. 

These two counties alone represent 40 percent of California’s first 

responders, and 36 percent of California’s total population. Together, both counties have, with multidisciplines in mind, (law, fire 

and health,) jointly participated in several full-scale training scenarios and tabletop exercises, as well as developed compatible 

plans for regional emergency response. 

This training establishes relationships, tests equipment, communications and command and control capabilities. Beyond this, we 

have established our terrorism early warning groups. 

Both in L.A. and Orange County, these countywide multidisciplinary units established before 9/11 bring together law enforcement, fire, health, special districts, public utilities and private sector businesses to share and disseminate information and intelligence. 

We coordinate daily with Los Angeles and other counties. These 

TEWGs, as we call them, monitor trends and potentials to prevent 

and mitigate any potential terrorist threat to Orange and L.A. 

counties, all of Region 1. 

The TEWG managea a list of sites critical to the county’s infrastructure, and maintains response plans based on the threat assessment and current trends. 

Additionally, private sector terrorism response groups, and Region 1 homeland security advisory councils, bring together business 

and industry leaders from Orange and L.A. counties on a regular 

basis, to advise both sheriffs, to network and, most importantly, to 

identify what resources they could share if something happens and 

the government isn’t there to provide. 

That is the good news. Here is what is needed. First, we need 

to get dollars from the federal government, we need to get them 
40

fast. As an example, Orange County has been supposedly awarded 

nearly $12 million in grant funding. To date, we have seen about 

$875,000 of those dollars. 

Second, our war on terror is labor intensive. We have to understand that. 

It requires additional personnel. Grant monies should be more 

flexible and reflect our needs and provide us the ability to pay for 

those all-too important personnel costs associated with our terrorism early warning groups and our joint terrorism task force. 

In fact, as we assign personnel to take care of homeland security 

issues, we have to backfill personnel in our original missions. This 

creates the cost of taking care of the homeland security problem, 

as well as the additional, generally time-and-a-half, costs of taking 

care of our original police mission. 

Number three, grant funds should be focused on the local agency, 

whichever that is, whether it is state, county, or more local, city, 

on the local agency primarily charged with the responsibility for 

fighting terrorism. 

This entity, not necessarily state, not necessarily county, perhaps 

even at a city level, should be primarily responsible for a cohesive 

plan, producing a cohesive plan, that will work in that region or 

that area. 

It makes sense then that it is within this entity that the funds 

should be trickled down. 

Last, there must be more work done to ensure interagency intelligence sharing. 

While establishing a joint task force staffed with federal and 

local law enforcement officers is a great concept, information sharing only works if the local officers are given access to information 

which they can bring back to the agencies they represent. 

Mr. Chairman, we stand committed, as you in Congress do, to 

fight terrorism. 

We now must ensure that all our people stand ready to do so. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Jaramillo follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GEORGE JARAMILLO 

Chairman Cox, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the Orange County Sheriff’s Department, and our 

Sheriff, Mike Carona. This is the second opportunity within a short timeframe that 

our agency has been invited to testify before the Select Committee, and I would like 

to acknowledge extra gratitude for the hard work and due diligence of Chairman 

Cox and all of the Committee members. 

It was the request of Chairman Cox that my remarks today focus on the interjurisdictional intelligence sharing efforts and working relationship that has been put 

in place between Orange County and our neighbors to the north, Los Angeles County. 

First, I would like to provide you with some background on Orange County, which 

is the second most populous county in California with 3 million residents and over 

38 million visitors annually. Orange County is the 31st largest economy in the 

world. The County includes 34 incorporated cities, 42 miles of coastline, 3 harbors, 

numerous internationally known tourist attractions, technical/manufacturing locations, shopping malls including the third largest shopping mall in the nation, John 

Wayne Airport, various venues hosting national and international entertainment 

and sporting events, and large convention centers. Over 16,500 private and commercial yachts valued over $2 billion are moored within the three harbors of Orange 

County. 
41

The Orange County Sheriff’s Department has taken a primary role in preparedness for acts of terrorism within our communities. With over 9,000 emergency responders in Orange County from law, fire, and health disciplines, the response capabilities of these dedicated men and women are, in my opinion, unsurpassed. Over 

160 participants from local agencies respond to the County Emergency Operations 

Center when activated for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station annual graded exercise. Several tabletop and full-scale exercises are conducted each year to prepare our emergency responders for natural disasters and acts of terrorism. Utilizing 

Unified Command and Standardized Emergency Management principals, the County of Orange is on the leading edge in disaster preparedness and mitigation. This 

concept is also used in the fight against terrorism. Several terrorism specific exercises have been conducted and more are planned, to combat terrorism and its 

threat. 

Prior to September 11, 2001 the Orange County Sheriff’s Department saw the 

need to establish a county wide multidisciplinary unit to enhance communication 

and interoperability efforts within the 114 local government entities of Orange 

County. The Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG) was formed to bring law enforcement, fire, health, special districts, public utilities, and private sector businesses together to share and disseminate information and intelligence. This TEWG 

monitors trends and potentials to prevent and mitigate any possible terrorist threat 

to the Orange County Operational Area. Open source data and information received 

by Terrorism Liaison Officers from local agencies is collected, verified, and disseminated to local, State, and Federal agencies. The TEWG interlinks with their TEWG 

counterparts in Los Angeles County and other adjacent counties to provide a synthetic analysis of local intelligence in the quest to deter terrorists. The TEWG has 

developed relationships with literally hundreds of these agencies including private 

businesses throughout the nation. This communication link is vital during crisis 

management of an actual event and during ongoing public awareness and prevention efforts. TEWG maintains liaison officers within the FBI though our Joint Terrorism Task Force and the State through the California Anti Terrorism Information 

Center where all information is shared. 

The TEWG manages a list of sites critical to the county infrastructure and maintains response plans based on the threat assessment and current terrorist trends. 

With over 85 percent of Orange County’s infrastructure owned by private business, 

the Private Sector Terrorism Response Group plays an essential role in the fight 

against terrorism. Business leaders and security personnel meet on a bimonthly 

basis to discuss current trends and potentials. These companies, many in the Fortune 500, are potential targets or have assets available during consequence management in a terrorist attack. 

This year the TEWG received 77 terrorism related incidents in Orange County. 

Of these, 50 advisories have been disseminated to agencies both inside and outside 

of Orange County. The TEWG has provided presentations to hotel and hospital security directors, created dispatch advisory cards, and liaisons with the Homeland 

Security Advisory Counsel. 

The Orange County Operational Area is utilizing standardized 800 mhzradio communication equipment for interoperability between agencies. Every agency in the 

Operational Area has access to this system. Additionally, the Orange County Sheriff’s Department and Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office are working to provide 

interoperability in communications for deputies working in bordering cities with 

these two counties. 

The Orange County Operational Area has established training and equipment 

committees to research and recommend standardized Personal Protective Equipment for emergency responders. These items were also compared with Los Angeles 

County Sheriff’s Office for compatibility as these two counties are in the same Mutual Aid response region. 

An Emergency Responder Preparations Plan was developed by emergency responders from all public safety agencies to address equipment, training, planning, 

and exercise needs for the Operational Area. We have been able to utilize funds received through both fiscal year 2002 Office for Domestic Preparedness Grants and 

fiscal year 2003 Homeland Security Grants to assist us in meeting the goals set out 

in this plan. 

California is divided into Mutual Aid Response Regions. Region One includes Orange and Los Angeles County. Our two counties, particularly law, fire, and health 

agencies, have participated in several full scale training scenarios and tabletop exercises to establish a rapport and test equipment, training and communication compatibility. The Sheriff’s agencies share a particular bond with Emergency Management. The Mutual Aid Response Plans and methods of operation are similar where 
42

deputies responding across county lines are familiar with general training and tactics. 

The Terrorism Early Warning Groups in Orange and Los Angeles Counties are 

nearly identical in concept and design. These units converse on a daily basis sharing 

information and intelligence. Members of these teams regularly attend training 

seminars, exercises, and conventions together. As a result of the efforts of the effectiveness of the Terrorism Early Warning Group, agencies from California, Washington, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, and Nebraska have formed TEWG’s. The information sharing and dissemination at a local level continues to grow. Monthly conference calls have been established with several southland agencies where information is shared regarding terrorism issues. 

Orange and Los Angeles County’s have developed a Homeland Security Advisory 

Council. These key leaders within the business community from Orange and Los 

Angeles County meet on a bimonthly basis. The goal is to provide direct interaction 

among senior executives from industry and the community with law enforcement 

and public safety services in support of Homeland Security, civil protection, and critical infrastructure protection. This creates a bridge for the business community to 

have a direct contact with subject matter experts for counsel and advice in support 

of planning, training, and activation. 

The Orange County Sheriff’s Department is the local agency charged with the protection of our county’s harbors and interacts diligently with local lifeguards, State 

Fish and Game, United States Coast Guard, and Seal Beach Naval Weapons Station 

staff towards this goal. The high visibility approach by the Harbor Patrol has hardened the protection against acts of terrorism within our harbors and along the coastline of Orange County. 

With the close proximity to the Long Beach and Los Angeles Harbors, the Orange 

County Sheriff’s Harbor Patrol trains closely with and works alongside Los Angeles 

County, State and Federal agencies assigned to protect their ports. 

The challenge before all of us in local law enforcement is a daunting one. The 

heightened level of vigilance and preparedness has created a need to prioritize and 

reorganize, and to focus and redeploy tremendous amount of personnel and resources towards the important task of Homeland Security. 

I can tell you that we have been, and continue to do everything within our means 

to make Orange County as safe as possible from the threat of terrorism. Additionally, we are doing everything in our power to ensure that should something occur 

with our county, we are prepared to quickly respond and deal with that crisis. We 

stand ready to assist our neighboring jurisdictions, including Los Angeles County, 

should the need arise. 

Orange County has been awarded nearly $12 million in grant funding, although 

as of today we have only received $875,000 of these funds. This grant funding has 

been for equipment, planning, training and exercises for the 9,000 first responders, 

35 law, fire and health agencies representing this large county. Los Angeles County 

has been awarded over $35 million with an additional $45 million to the City of Los 

Angeles. Taken together, both counties comprise over 40 percent of California’s 

emergency responders, and over 36 percent of California’s population. 

Some recommendations that I would make to the Select Committee, relative to 

grant funding, are as follows. First, I would re-examine the process that is being 

used to fund these grants, and move federal dollars out to the states, and to the 

local government level charged with combating terrorism. I cannot emphasize 

enough how the lengthy process is creating difficulties for those of us who are First 

Responders to purchase equipment, and to give optimal training and exercises to 

our personnel. 

Equally as important, the grant process should be altered to factor in threat assessment, and should be based more on local needs. There should also be more flexibility on how local agencies spend grant dollars. Each jurisdiction is unique, and the 

grant process should recognize that fact. 

Another suggestion that I would make, relative to grant funding, is to allow for 

some grant monies to be used towards personnel costs. In order to plan and provide 

training and conduct exercises, and to conduct local intelligence gathering and work 

with federal agencies on an operational basis, it requires additional personnel. Currently, grant funding may not be used to fund additional personnel—and I believe 

that decision should be re-evaluated. 

Grant funds should also be focused on the local jurisdiction that is charged with 

the primary responsibility for fighting terrorism. For example, if a county, under 

grant-distribution guidelines, is required to disburse funds to dozens of smaller cities, it becomes a significant challenge for the county to retain enough funds for 

major expenditures that benefit the entire Operational Area. 
43

Finally, I would like to suggest that while we have come a long way, more work 

must be done to ensure the sharing of intelligence data between federal and local 

agencies. While establishing join task forces is a great concept, information sharing 

only works if those representing local agencies are given access to information, 

which they can bring back to their agencies. 

In closing, I would like to once again take a moment to thank the Congress, and 

specifically the members of the Homeland Security Committee for their diligent and 

tireless work as we all do everything in our power to ensure that the United States 

is as safe as possible from all enemies, foreign and domestic.

Chairman COX. Thank you very much. 

Chief Grossman? 

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL GROSSMAN, CAPTAIN, LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am here representing Sheriff Lee Baca from Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, and I will try not to reiterate some of the positive things 

that are being done between the two counties. 

But I will elaborate on some of the things that we are doing, and 

then talk about some of the things where we need some assistance. 

The terrorism early warning group that was mentioned was developed back in 1996. It is a multiagency, multidisciplinary organization made up of fire, law and health, all first responders of local, 

state and federal agencies all working together to share information and cooperate with one another in making sure that we are 

prepared to respond to and prepare for potential terrorist attacks. 

The terrorism early warning group has been recognized as a 

model for the nation, and through the Memorial Institute for the 

Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City, we are on an expansion 

project to expand that to six other cities. 

And now with the Office of Domestic Preparedness in DHS, there 

are 24 additional cities that we will be expanding that too. 

Now, the terrorism early warning group can be designed to fit 

any local needs, whether it is a large area or small area, but the 

major point is that it is all first responders working together, as 

well as all jurisdictions, from local, state and federal, truly working 

together. 

We have members from our own organizations on the joint terrorism task force, and we can exchange information back and forth. 

The clearances that a lot of areas are trying to get, we have several 

individuals in our units with clearances, and that part is working. 

We do need to improve it, but we are on our way to do that. 

Another thing we established based on a very successful program 

in the South Bay region of Los Angeles County is a terrorism liaison officer program. And that is created to establish a point of contact for each law enforcement agency in the county. It was done 

within that regional area of Los Angeles County. 

We have expanded that to every law enforcement agency in the 

county. That includes railroad police, specialty police, the Los Angeles Port Police, and the airport police, as well as all the universities. 

So all law enforcement agencies in Los Angeles County have a 

terrorism liaison officer, as do, we have expanded it to include fire 
44

departments and health agencies. And the same concept is going 

to be replicated in Orange County, with whom we work every day. 

My counterpart, Captain Catherine Zurn, at their emergency operations unit, we collaborate on these issues frequently. 

The next thing that we have done is Sheriff Carona and Sheriff 

Baca have created the Homeland Security Advisory Council, made 

up of CEOs of major corporations and infrastructure in both counties, to connect the private sector to what we do, so that we can 

share information and share resources between industry and first 

responders, in order to prepare for the hardening of targets by completing assessments of locations and different types of facilities. 

To this end, we recently held a subcommittee meeting with the 

Entertainment Subcommittee. The Entertainment industry is one 

of the targets that has been mentioned in the past. We had heads 

of security for all the different entertainment industry locations. 

And we also had the TLOs from fire and law at this meeting so 

that the local jurisdictions could meet each other. When a studio 

calls for help, these are the guys that are going to come help them, 

so they can meet them and do some planning and meet the people 

ahead of time, as opposed to waiting until they have to dial 911. 

We are in the process of setting up a terrorist threat assessment 

center with the Los Angeles Police Department primarily, and we 

will also bring in other agencies in the county, a representative 

from each of the mutual aid areas in the county. 

And this will be an intake center and an analysis center for all 

information and all threats. This will bring in the public number, 

the 877 number currently published in Los Angeles, will come into 

this center as will, information from the terrorism liaison officers 

from fire, law and health. 

Fire department goes out on a scene. They will see different 

things than law enforcement sees, and there may be vital information that gives us leads and pieces of a bigger puzzle to solve, that 

may indicate, give indications, warnings or trends for a type of terrorist threat. 

So we have, basically, all information coming into this center and 

analyzed by analysts from the sheriff’s department, the FBI, the 

California Anti–Terrorism Information Center, which is the state 

level, and Los Angeles Police Department. And we will be training 

analysts from the other agencies as well. 

One of the things we need assistance with here is some financial, 

but mostly political, support to build a SCIF, a secure compartmentalized information facility, so we can receive and store classified 

information at the local level. 

None exists at a local level at this time. We need to have that, 

so that we don’t have to either drive across Los Angeles, and if you 

have been there, you know that is a challenge in itself, or fly in 

a helicopter over to Westwood to meet the FBI to read the classified documents. We need to be able to receive those in our own locations in a secure manner, and share that with all of our entities 

within our county, as well as Orange County, and the neighboring 

counties if a threat is indicated for their counties. 

Although we have not yet received a great deal of federal resources, we have applied for and expect to get a great deal of 

equipment and training for new equipment to prepare for response 
45

to terrorism. There are a couple things that we would recommend 

here regarding the issue that the current urban security initiatives 

brings money directly to specific cities. 

In Los Angeles County, we have an organization based on the region. And we need to enhance the regional capability, as opposed 

to any individual city. We have a group where we have all met 

from all the entities in the county to divide up the money with 

pretty much the goal of everyone leaves the room equally unhappy, 

because there is never enough money to get all the things that you 

need. We far exceeded our goals in that area, but we continue to 

look for more resources. 

We recommend that future funding be appropriated consistent 

with existing regional procedures, which ensure area-wide readiness, as opposed to specific cities that are within the region. We 

would recommend the formation of a task force comprised of first 

responders and emergency managers from regions large and small 

acting as an advisory group to the federal government for effective 

distribution of funds to local areas. 

Future grant guidelines should also include provisions for additional personnel where costs cannot be borne by local governments 

from existing budgets. We are creating new positions, things that 

local law enforcement and fire agencies have not done in the past: 

things like strategic analysis, as opposed to case analysis for 

crimes, intelligence analysis, and that is a whole new field. And so 

we have to create new positions. We have to fund those positions. 

If we take from other areas in the department and try to move people in, we don’t meet our goals in those areas. 

Chairman COX. Captain Grossman, I do need to ask you to summarize. 

Mr. GROSSMAN. I am done, sir. 

Chairman COX. That was the shortest summary ever. 

Mr. GROSSMAN. On behalf of Sheriff Baca, I would like to thank 

the committee for this opportunity to represent our region in discussing our status and concerns with respect to the homeland security issues. Thank you, sir. 

[The statement of Mr. Grossman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL GROSSMAN 

My testimony today will address the structure established to facilitate inter-jurisdictional coordination and intelligence sharing between Los Angeles and Orange 

Counties, relative to the prevention of, and response to terrorism. I will also discuss 

some recommendations for improving the current Federal Homeland Security Grant 

process to better benefit our regional security effort. 

The issue of inter-jurisdictional intelligence sharing between Los Angeles and Orange Counties is addressed in several ways. Steps to craft a solution for combating 

terrorism in Los Angeles County were initiated in 1996 with the formation of the 

the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group. This is an entity which provides the 

framework for coordination of effort between agencies that heretofore were often 

competitors for scarce resources rather than collaborators. The TEW applies a 

networked approach, integrating law enforcement, fire, health, and emergency management agencies to address the intelligence needs for terrorism and critical infrastructure protection. 

The TEW integrates a multi-agency (local, state and federal) and multi-disciplinary (fire, law and health) network within L.A. County to gather, analyze, and 

share information related to terrorist threats. It relies primarily upon open source 

intelligence (OSINT) for monitoring trends and potentials that influence training 

and doctrinal needs. During an actual threat period or attack, the TEW provides 

consequence projection (forecasting) to identify potential courses of action to a Uni-
46

fied Command Structure. The TEW maintains daily contact with the FBI’s Joint 

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center 

(CATIC), and other local, state and federal agencies dealing with terrorism issues. 

The TEW has been replicated in Orange County with whom we maintain continuous 

contact on issues of emerging threats and related cases. TEWs have also been established in adjacent counties and are developing in many cities across the nation as 

a part of the TEW expansion project, supported by the Memorial Institute for the 

Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in Oklahoma City. 

In order to directly involve the private sector in this effort, Orange County Sheriff 

Mike Carona and Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca have created the Region 

I Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to provide direct interaction among 

senior executives from industry and the community with the law enforcement and 

public safety services in support of homeland security, civil protection, and critical 

infrastructure protection. This effort enhances the effectiveness of the Los Angeles 

and Orange County Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Groups by providing a capacity 

for direct contact with subject matter experts for counsel and advice in support of 

planning, training and activation. 

A successful adjunct to the TEW is the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Program. 

The TLO program is based on a successful model implemented in the South Bay 

area of Los Angeles County, which has been expanded to the entire Operational 

Area (County). Every Sheriff’s station, law enforcement, fire, and health agency in 

the County has a liaison officer assigned to facilitate networking and information 

sharing within mutual aid areas in the county, and with the TEW. The Terrorism 

Liaison Officer program is also linked with the private sector through the Region 

I Homeland Security Advisory Council. The TLO concept is being replicated within 

Orange County and will further enhance the flow of information between the field 

to the TEWs. 

One proposal I wish to bring to your attention concerns the timely sharing of pertinent classified information and the associated coordination required between local 

and federal entities. It is our hope to build a Secure Compartmentalized Information 

Facility (SCIF) within the Los Angeles County Emergency Operations Center 

(CEOC). This building currently serves as the hub for emergency operations within 

the Los Angeles Operational Area and as the home site of the Los Angeles TEW. 

An on-site SCIF would greatly enhance our information sharing capabilities, therefore we are seeking political and financial assistance for this proposal. 

Although we have yet to directly benefit from federal resources, we have applied 

for and are awaiting the receipt of federal funds from the Homeland Security Grant 

Programs. These funds will significantly enhance our ability to acquire the necessary resources and equipment needed to protect our personnel in the event of a 

terrorist attack. We have successfully worked with all of the first- responder agencies in our County to ensure that these funds have been equitably distributed to 

best prepare one of the most target rich and complex regions in the Nation. 

There are, however, two specific areas that need revision for these funds to be utilized effectively. The first area of concern is the current funding stream and the second is the need to fund personnel as opposed to simply funding equipment. 

The most recent grants, known as the Urban Area Security Initiatives, do not sufficiently benefit the California Counties of Los Angeles and Orange ? a region which 

is home to nearly 13 million citizens. The funds from these grants have been allocated directly to designated cities, to be expended in cooperation with the contiguous 

counties. While the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach have special needs, there 

remain 86 additional cities and many square miles of unincorporated county area, 

all with contiguous borders, that make up the Los Angeles ?Operational Area.? This 

dispersal method is counter to the process that has been followed in all previous 

Homeland Security Grant Programs, and does not address the overall regional readiness and needs requirements. Any attack in the Los Angeles/Orange County area 

would unquestionably require a regional response. 

The second issue is the need for additional personnel dedicated to anti and 

counter-terrorism. When equipment provided in the grants arrives at the local level, 

a critical void still exists for adequate personnel to accomplish the many related 

tasks to combat terrorism at a level never before required of local law enforcement. 

Therefore, I recommend the following: 

— Future funding be appropriated consistent with the existing regional procedures which ensure area-wide readiness 

— Formation of a task force, comprised of first-responders and emergency managers from various regions across the country, who would act as an advisory 

group to the Federal Government for the effective distribution of funds to local 

areas. 
47

— Future grant guidelines include provisions for additional personnel where the 

cost can not be borne by local government’s existing budgets. 

On behalf of Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy D. Baca, I wish to thank the Committee for this opportunity to represent our region in discussing our status and concerns with respect to Homeland Security issues.

Chairman COX. Thank you very much. 

Chief and Commissioner Kiernan? 

MR. RAY KIERNAN, FIRE COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF OF NEW 

ROCHELLE FIRE DEPARTMENT AND MEMBER OF WESTCHESTER CAREER fIRE CHIEFS AND NORTHEAST FIRE CONSORTIUM, NEW ROCHELLE FIRE DEPARTMENT, NEW ROCHELLE, NEW YORK. 

Mr. KIERNAN. I want to thank the chairman and Nita Lowey, my 

congresswoman. And I would like to say hello to Bill Pascrell from 

New Jersey—very helpful on a lot of the things we have done in 

the fire service. And to Chief Weldon, my fellow chief in Waukesha, 

Pennsylvania. Always good to see him. 

But anyway, I plan to submit a formal testimony for the record. 

But under time constraints, I was unable to prepare one in advance. I was called last night finally to come to the hearings today. 

And as you know, when people call the fire department, we come 

right away. 

What I would like to do is take you back to—everybody always 

takes the, you know, it is 20 months since the last World Trade 

Center attack and all this. We go back, we say, no, it is 10 years; 

that was the first World Trade Center attack, and that is when we 

should have really woke up. 

We are the guys when all the plans of the sheriffs and all the 

plans of the governors don’t work, we are the guys that inherit the 

rest. And I have been the commissioner and the chief of department of my department for many years. And it is the seventh largest city in New York state, and it borders New York City on the 

north. We were one of the first departments into New York City 

when the Twin Towers were hit. And we, you know, did the best 

job we could and helped out any way we could. 

It is very difficult to this day to realize, after seeing that horrific 

site and seeing things that you still couldn’t believe you saw, that 

not one dime has reached us. Not a single penny has reached us 

to help our plight at all. 

I am not sure how the money goes out. You know, we always say 

when we hear about the billions in Washington, we say it is like 

the weatherman: There are billions up there, but none of it is raining, and it is not reaching the ground. We down in the trenches 

have not seen any money. 

After months of receiving no guidance, no standards, no communications from the state or federal authorities, firefighters from 

New Rochelle, Yonkers, Mount Vernon, Scarsdale, Eastchester, 

Fairview, Greenville, Hartsville, White Plains and other places 

came together and created the Westchester Career Fire Chiefs 

Task Force. 

We thought and listened to everything Secretary Ridge said what 

he expected; what he thought a good plan would be: regionalization, standardization, communications, compatibility. We did all of 

this because we knew from experience when you don’t have hose 
48

threads, for example, that match your neighbors, you can’t really 

function well with him. 

So we approached Congresswoman Lowey and asked her could 

she help us out. Well, she found some money someplace and got 

money to our team. And we were able to train 600 firefighters in 

weapons of mass destruction training: six hundred men with not an 

awful lot of money. 

But the sad thing is once they received the training, they went 

back to their fire departments and had no equipment—no equipment. As difficult as it is to believe, after seeing the effects of the 

attacks, we would go back and know what we were supposed to 

have and would end up having a situation where we know the guys 

would respond and go into situations that would be virtually suicidal. 

What we proposed was to have—we think the firefighter is the 

answer to the whole situation, post-incident situation. 

Your neighborhood fire houses exist already, your fire departments exist already, you are here to talk about setting up teams. 

We know the response time of state and federal teams, of 24, 48 

hours to be operational. Here the guys down the street will be 

there in four minutes. 

We talk about equipment them so that they could at least remove people from harm’s way, suits on trucks, training, that if 

there were a sarin gas thing, if there was some sort of a biological 

attack that you knew about, that they could remove people from 

harm’s way, and probably mitigate a lot of the situations and reduce casualties dramatically. 

If we had to wait for federal teams to arrive, then state teams 

to arrive, it would be forever. And it would be very, very probably 

an unnecessary loss of life. 

So what we are saying here is for some reason the money hasn’t 

reached us, for some reason we fell we are the answer post-incident. These guys have done a hell of a job preventing things from 

happening. But post-incident, we are the guys. 

We need to be trained in building collapse. All of these incidents 

involved tremendous fires after they occurred. And now the next 

threat, of course, is some sort of a biological or chemical or some 

type of an attack of that nature. And your area firefighters have 

to be equipped to respond into it. 

And what we need is guidance, we need, certainly, money. New 

York State, we have met with—the chiefs of New York State have 

met with those giving out the money, and we just told them, We 

think your plan is nuts. It is just not getting to us. I have no idea 

what we have to do or what to get money, but it is not reaching 

us. 

So any help you can give us in that way, we would be more than 

happy to listen. 

Chairman COX. Thank you very much, Chief. 

Mr. KIERNAN. Thank you. 

Chairman COX. I want to thank all of our panel. You have been 

exceptionally helpful to us. 

I am going to yield my time to the members because we are looking forward to our joint session in just a few minutes with Prime 

Minister Blair. 
49

Who seeks recognition on our side? 

Mr. Weldon. 

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

And I thank all of you for coming. 

And I hate to sound cynical at this hearing of an issue that has 

been a passion of mine for my lifetime. But I have to be a little 

cynical. 

First of all, I want to congratulate the California folks, because 

I think they wrote the book on emergency response and the way 

you can integrate agencies. 

I was at Loma Prieta, Northridge, I saw the way you moved 

equipment in. I was at the wild lands fires in the south, the way 

you prepositioned equipment where the state pays for it and bring 

it when it is needed. And you have done an outstanding job; you 

really have kind of wrote the book on how to integrate the entire 

statewide network. 

And Chief, up in New York you have done a great job. You convinced your legislature to create the LOWSAT program, which 

helps encourage people to volunteer. 

And you know what frustrates me, Mr. Chairman? We get more 

studies. Now we got Nobel laureates. Nobel laureates are going to 

tell the fire chief how to better protect his town that he has been 

defending and protecting for 200 years. The fire service is older 

than America. But it takes a Nobel laureate to come in and tell us 

what we need. 

Excuse my cynicism. 

But I mean there is nothing new here. I mean, Governor Gilmore 

showed three Gilmore Commission reports before 9/11. If you took 

the time to read the Gilmore Commission reports, as I know my 

good friend Mr. Pascrell did, all the recommendations were there. 

There is nothing new. You get money for the D.C. Fire Department, and they can’t buy the boots to put on the firefighters, because they used the money for some other purpose. 

The same thing was true down in Fort Worth, Texas. 

So Mr. Chairman, I get a little upset that the focus on the headline grabbers, as opposed to the substance of what the 1.2 million 

men and women in this country need who are out there serving in 

32,000 departments, just as Chief Kiernan mentioned here today—

Commissioner Kiernan. 

You know, Mr. Chairman, it is really simple. These fellows are 

out there, and these women, doing the job. Eighty-five percent of 

them are volunteers. Why don’t we come up with some recommendations of how we can encourage more volunteers? Maybe a 

Nobel laureate could address that. Maybe tax policies would give 

you more incentives to get more people to volunteer, since 85 percent of your members are volunteers. Do you agree, Chief? 

Wouldn’t that be helpful? 

Or maybe we could address the issue of why the publicly—see 

frequency spectrum allocation issue has not been addressed. Maybe 

because our liberal lawyers don’t want to take on the industry leaders in the communications sector, who don’t want to give up the 

frequency spectrum to let our public safety officials have an integrated communication system. 
50

And why don’t our Nobel laureates take on the issue of the union 

versus volunteer? You have it up in New York, Chief, you know 

what I am talking about. The IAFF has got an item on their agenda that basically tells paid firefighters they can’t volunteer when 

they are off duty. I wonder if that is covered in the Council on Foreign Relations report to our distinguished—and I am not aiming 

this at the executive director, because it is not his fault. 

It is just the frustration I have, Mr. Chairman. I wouldn’t be in 

this job were it not for the fire service. I have been on every disaster we have had in the last 15 years, from Loma Prieta–

Northridge, the Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City, Hurricane Andrew, Hugo, the floods, all of them. The World Trade 

Center in 1993, the World Trade Center in 2001. 

And what I see coming, keep coming out, are more reports; and 

the L.A. Times has a big headline: Oh, now all of a sudden we 

know what the problem is. 

The problem is the same as it has been for the last 50 years. We 

don’t listen to the people where the rubber meets the road. 

They know what they need. They know what their concerns are. 

And if we pay attention to them, as opposed to some grandiose 

scheme of creating some new mechanism where the states are 

going to tell them how to better do their job, I think we would all 

be a lot better off. 

I wish I would have heard somebody talk about technology transfer. 

Mr. Chairman, we had five firefighters die up in Boston because—actually, six—because two firefighters, when their air supply ran out in the building, no one knew where they were. Four 

other firefighters went in to rescue them. If we would had the same 

equipment that the taxpayers have paid for for the Army, GPS 

equipment with sensor technology to tell us the vital signs of the 

soldiers, those six firefighters might be alive today. 

We would have known where they were in the building, and we 

would have known their vital signs when their air ran out. 

Does it take a Nobel laureate to tell us that, Mr. Chairman? And 

if it doesn’t, why isn’t that in the report? Because they are the 

kinds of things that we could and should be doing now. 

The first responder community in this country has been slapped 

around repeatedly by people pretending to have all the answers. 

And damn it, I want the first responders to be listened to directly, 

because they know what they need. 

The same thing applies to the resources for first responders. I 

don’t know how we arrived at a figure of $33 billion. It sounds good 

because I am for supporting this. 

But I can tell you this. The first year of the grant program, 

which that gentleman down there led the effort on, Bill Pascrell, 

and we worked together, every fire department in America could 

apply. There are 32,000. We had 20,000 fire departments apply 

with 30,000 requests. The total amount of the requested money 

was $3 billion. 

Now where do you get $33 billion from that, Mr. Chairman I 

have no idea. But maybe there is some other magical figure that 

we pulled out of the air to create a headline. 
51

I am saying we need a solution. We don’t need more rhetoric. We 

don’t need more pie in the sky bullshit—excuse me. We need solutions to help the first responders. 

Chief, you know what I am talking about. It has been the subject 

of every conference you have been at, every conference I have been 

at, in every state. It is about time we respond. 

Thank you. Be happy to yield, even though I don’t have any more 

time. 

Mr. PASCRELL. I think the organization that the gentleman represents, Mr. Metzl, wouldn’t you agree that they have a confusion, 

because they can’t distinguish between basic needs, which existed 

before 9/11, and the needs which exist in terms of terroristic vulnerability? 

And if you don’t understand the difference between the two, then 

you make mistakes like this gentleman and the governor. I am 

sorry he had to leave. I am sorry he had to leave. 

But the program he talked about doesn’t even go through this 

team. It goes through the Transportation Security Act. But we 

can’t talk to him. So. He has gone. 

Thank you. 

Chairman COX. I will—

Mrs. LOWEY. Well, I think my good colleague, Curt Weldon, said 

it all. And I am not a firefighter. I am just a congresswoman. But 

I happen to have three children and six grandchildren. And as 

Commissioner Kiernan knows, I have been meeting with the first 

responders. I have been meeting with the hospitals. I have been 

meeting with the police. I have been meeting with superintendent 

of schools. I have been meeting with parents. 

And frankly, when, and I can’t remember, when we had a witness here who is head of the office of emergency—about a month 

ago. And he said, Commissioner Kiernan, that he was going out 

with an RFP within the year. This is on the interoperability of 

communication systems. He was first going out with an RFP. And 

then he was going to let you all know what the results of his success were. 

But we figured if you go out with the RFP, by the time a year 

and a half to two years, God forbid there is another emergency, we 

will probably be able to let you know the state of the art of the 

equipment. 

Well, I know that through this regional organization you have 

figured out how to deal with interoperability of communication systems, which is just one of the emergency needs you need. 

And I was talking to my colleague Curt Weldon, who was giving 

us some advice. But you figured it out yourself. 

And this is what is so tragic to me, because you exemplify what 

is happening everywhere. The federal government formed this 

agency, the Agency of Homeland Security. And they are finding office space. And they are trying to hire people. 

Well, it is way past September 11. And you are all having to fend 

for yourselves, trying to figure out how you are going to get this 

equipment, because you are not the money. I did find some money 

to do some of the work. We won’t discuss that. We did find some. 

And some of us are scrounging here and there. 

But you and I know that there is so much more that is needed. 
52

So I really want to thank you. You made your position absolutely 

clear. I am not going to take the time to ask you additional questions. But I am sure that you would welcome some guidance from 

the federal government, some expertise that must be there some 

place in the federal government, so that you can move forward with 

your purchasing equipment. And in fact, I know that you would 

welcome some additional money. It is moving very, very slowly. 

And I want to thank you again for keeping our community safe, 

for your expertise that you are sharing with the other communities 

in Westchester. 

And I want to thank Mr. Metzl, Mr. Jaramillo, and Mr. Grossman for your testimony. 

I would hope that we can just all wake up. As you said, we had 

a wake-up call 10 years ago. And I haven’t seen, frankly, an efficient response to our communities. 

And in addition to the fire service, I can remember a police chief 

from Greenburgh said if, God forbid, anything happened and we 

have a nuclear plant in our district at Indian Point, he would have 

to go out with his raincoat to protect the community. 

So we have a lot of work to do. 

Thank you all for coming here. I do hope through this committee 

we can move the process to work more efficiently. 

Thanks. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Would the gentlelady yield? 

Chairman COX. The gentlelady has a minute remaining. 

Mrs. LOWEY. I would be delighted to yield for the minute. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That light was on green. Had a little bit more 

time. 

Let me thank the gentlelady. And I want to thank the panelists. 

It looks as if business on the floor is going to cause us to shorten 

the hearing more than I would like. 

I particularly want to send my greetings out to Sheriff Baca, 

whose wonderful hospitality, the pointed insight when this committee took their tour out to Long Beach, L.A. ports. And I thank 

you for your special hospitality on that. 

But again, waking this committee up. 

Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this hearing. 

We are talking, gentlemen, not because we are disrespectful of 

your testimony. But we are talking because many of us have a commitment to homeland security, having organized our own first responder, if you will, anti-terrorist advisory committee. 

Then, I would like to leave these two points on the table. 

Mr. Chairman, I hope that in the next 24 hours we can reestablish this committee as a fix-it committee, as a problem solver committee, as an implementing committee. Because you have heard 

from all of us, my dear friend Congressman Weldon?well, we said 

a lot about our frustration. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I would really think it would be important, 

one, to take up the issue that I have argued for, which is the expediting of funds directly to the first responders, and directly to the 

local entities, in their hands. 

The other thing I want to look at is we think that we have a day 

of Sundays for you to file applications and to have them reviewed, 

as if we are trying to build a local park. You are dealing with crisis 
53

issues. And an application process that allows you to fill out some 

paperwork, even if it is e-mail and even if it is sent by the Internet, 

I would argue that it is too much of a delay. 

And there must be a system to document to document your credibility and to get these funds in your hands. 

So Mr. Chairman, what I am arguing for, I have listened to the 

first responders collectively from all over the country. I respect 

what they are doing. But I think this committee has got to restructure itself to fix problems. 

We have heard over and over again about money going directly 

to these entities. I think we have got to rewrite the legislation, and 

do that first of all. The second thing is I think we have got to rechange this application process. My police in Houston right now, 

with a director of public safety, are still waiting for money. 

Why? They are sitting around talking about what plan are we 

going to have, and what application process are we going to put in 

place. And then let us get with the local county people and see how 

they are going to put it in place. 

And any moment, even though we are not operating at the highest alert right now, we could be subject to a terrorist attack. 

It is imperative that this committee take its rightful place in this 

House and start designing efforts to direct our dollars and have 

oversight out where the dangers are, and make sure that we can 

work toward a secure nation and secure neighborhoods. 

I said I was closing, and I am, Mr. Chairman, because you have 

been very kind. Gentlemen, I hope that you will go back and encourage your neighborhoods to become part of the Citizen Corps, 

that is something under homeland security, a program under 

Homeland Security, that will secure neighborhoods. 

Most of America does not know that it even exists. And I would 

like to encourage this committee not only to work with Citizen 

Corps, but to provide a revenue stream to help these neighborhoods 

become secure. 

And I encourage that; it is happening in Houston with the Millennium Effort in our community, and I hope it will happen around 

the nation. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman, I thank you. 

Chairman COX. I thank our panel. You have been extraordinary 

witnesses. Chief Kiernan, I appreciate your coming on short notice. 

To all of you, thank you. 

As you know, the war on terrorism requires coordination among 

the federal, state and local levels. It also requires international coordination with foreign governments. 

And we are now going to rush over to the House floor and join 

our Senate colleagues in hearing from the British prime minister, 

Tony Blair. He is going to talk to us about many of these same subjects. 

So you are here on an eventful day. This is very important work. 

Godspeed to all of you. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
54

QUESTIONS AND REPONSES FOR THE RECORD: 

MR. GEORGE JARAMILLO RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM REP. LANGEVIN. 

1. I assume you have all been, and will continue to be, involved in training exercises and other efforts to gauge your preparedness levels and identify problem areas.

Question: a. After you complete these exercises, is there any process by which 

your experiences and findings are shared with theDepartment of Homeland Security? 

Response a. In California after any training exercise or activation of the local 

Emergency Operations Center, we are required to complete an After-Action Report (AAR) and submit it to the State Office of Emergency Seivices. These 

AAR’s identify future training needs based on what worked well and what did 

not. A segment on ‘‘lessons learned’’ is included to assist in revising current or 

developing future protocols, plans, and equipment needs.

Question: b. Have you received any information from DHS about best practices 

and lessons learned in other communities that might be helpful to you?

Response b. To date, we have not received any in formation from DHS about 

best practices and lessons learned in other communities. I do want to emphasize 

that we have developed a network among our mutual aid partners in all disciplines and at all levels (national, state, regional, local) to share lessons 

learned during a training exercise. We are unaware of any formal distribution 

of information that has been developed by DHS to share with local first responder agencies.

MR. GEORGE JARAMILLO RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM REP. ETHERIDGE. 

Question: 1. How many people in your departments are primarily responsible for 

anti- terrorism activities? 

Response: 1. The Orange County Sheriff’s Department is the largest law enforcement agency in Orange County with over 4,000 members. We have 15 full-time 

members responsible for anti-terrorism activities along with approximately 40 members who have auxiliary duties relating to anti- terrorism. Additionally, we have 

marshaled hundreds of volunteers to assist in these efforts.

Question: 2. Have you found that the increased emphasis on terrorism diverted 

people and resources from your daily crime-fighting activities? 

Response: 2. Absolutely there has been a strong impact on our daily crime-fighting activities with the diverted people and resources to anti-terrorism. Due to lack 

of funding, there have been only seven replacements for the 15 full-time members 

who have left their prior assignments, including general and special crime investigation duties, training academy assignments, investigation assistance, and field patrol 

work. Monies have also been diverted for equipment needs, computer software networking, and office support for the full-time anti-terrorism staff members.

Question: 3. How has the current state budget crisis affected your ability to protect the citizens in Orange and Los Angeles Counties? 

Response 3. The current state budget crisis in California has impacted the release of anti-terrorism and homeland security funding from the State level to the 

local levels. The grant guidance set forth by California’s Office of Homeland Security 

and Office of Emergency Services are set up to release the equipment, training, exercise, and planning funds on a reimbursement basis. This severely impacts the first 

responder agencies that have to purchase the equipment or develop the training and 

exercises within their existing budget in the hopes that reimbursement will follow. 

At this time, Orange County Sheriff’s Department has been approved for the 2003 

Homeland Security Grants Part I and Part II in excess of $9 million plus the 2002 

Office of Domestic Preparedness Grants for over $1 million on behalf of the entire 

county. No monies have been received to date as agencies are scrambllng to re-allocate monies to cover the initial costs prior to submitting reimbursement in voices 

to the State. The State has consistently imposed unrealistic timelines and expectations for expenditures without clear guidance or agreement on the release of grant 

funds to the 58 designated Operational Areas in the State of California.

MR. GEORGE JARAMILLO RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE MINORITY STAFF. 

Question: 1. This question regarding the High Threat Urban Area grants and is 

directed to Captain Grossman from Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department. 

Response: 1. No response requested from Assistant Sheriff Jaramillo.
55

Question: 2. Can you describe the timeline between when the Department of 

Homeland Security has announced funds for California, Los Angeles, and Orange 

County and when the funds have arrived? 

Response 2. The 2003 Homeland Security grant was issued in two parts. Part 

I (CA -$45 million) was announced by DHS on March 10, 2003. The State of California notified the 58 Operational Areas including Los Angeles and Orange County 

by letter on March 28, 2003. The letter advised that grant guidelines would be distributed on or before April 11 On April 15 we received the grant guidelines with 

a due date for submission of May 15, 2003. We met the grant guidelines and were 

telephonically notified on June 5 that our grant application was approved for 

$284,369. No money has been received to date due to the reimbursement requirement of the grant. The State developed the required reimbursement forms and made 

them available late June. 

2003 Homeland Security grant Part II was announced by DHS in early May2003 

(CA—$103,355 million). We received the grant guidelines from the CA Office of 

Homeland Security on May 14 with a due date of June 15, 2003. We submitted our 

grant a, on June 13 and received a letter of grant approval dated August 8 for 

$6,727,564. To date, no monies have been received due to the reimbursement requirement of the grant funding. We are in the process of re-prioritizing our budget 

to purchase the equipment, provide the training, and develop the exercise with existing funds with the expectation that reimbursement funding will occur in a timely 

manner. Together, Part I and Part II grant funding for homeland security will cost 

Orange County an outlay of $9 million with an unknown reimbursement date by 

the State of California for costs incurred in anti-terrorism and homeland security 

preparedness.

Question: 3. Sheriff Jaramillo’s statement says ‘‘I cannot emphasize enough how 

the lengthy process is creating difficulties for those of us who are First Responders 

to purchase equipment, and to give optimal training and exercises into our personnel.’’ He adds that ‘‘Orange County has been awarded nearly $12 million in grant 

funding, although as of today we have only received $875,000 of these funds.’’ Governor Romney testified that the stares are passing though federal funds to the local 

level within Congress’ 45-day requirement. If the delay isn’t at the state level, 

should we assume that it is slow to come out of the Department of Homeland Security? 

Response 3. We have been unable to receive confirmation through the State of 

California whether the homeland security grant funds have been transferred to the 

state coffers from OHS. All indications are that OHS is not responsible for the slow 

distribution of funds. Because of the design of California’s grant guidelines with the 

grant requiring reimbursement to Operations Areas after costs are incurred, no 

funding has yet been received for homeland security or anti- terrorism equipment, 

training, exercises, or planning.

Question: 4. What federal resources do you have to address the personnel needs 

you have to adequately conduct anti-terrorism operations? 

Response 4. In California, all federal resources must be accessed through SEMS 

(Standardized Emergency Management System) after local resources are depleted. 

As the County Operations Area we are the link between our local jurisdictions and 

the State to obtain additional resources as needed. We also have in Orange County 

a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) that we co manage with the FBI.

Question: 5. I assume you both run frequent exercises...to gauge your preparedness for terrorist attack. After you do the exercises and identify the lessons learned, 

do you share this information with DHS? Does DHS send you lessons learned from 

exercises in other regions? 

Response 5. In California after any training exercise or activation of the local 

Emergency Operations Center, we are required to complete an After-Action Report 

(AAR) and submit it to the State Office of Emergency Sevices. These AAR’s identify 

future training needs based on what worked well and what did not. A segment on 

‘‘lessons learned’’ is included to assist in revising current or developing future protocols, plans, and equipment needs. To date, we have not received any in formation 

from DHS about best practices and lessons learned in other communities. I do want 

to emphasize that we have developed a network among our mutual aid partners in 

all disciplines and at all levels (national, state, regional, local) to share lessons 

learned during a training exercise. We are unaware of any formal distribution of 

information that has been developed by DHS to share with local first responder 

agencies.
56

MR. MICHAEL GROSSMAN RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM REP. LANGEVIN. 

1. I assume you have all been, and will continue to be, involved in training exercises and other efforts to gauge your preparedness levels and identify problem areas. 

Question: a. After you complete these exercises, is there any process by which 

your experiences and findings are shared with the Department of Homeland Security? 

Answer: a. We have not shared information (lessons learned) with the Department of Homeland Security after the completion of training exercises, and are 

not aware of any existing process to do this. 

Question: b. Have you received any information from DHS about best practices 

and lessons learned in other communities that might be helpful to you? 

Answer: b. No, we have not received any information about best practices from 

other regions in the nation.

Question: 2. Are any of you receiving regular intelligence briefings or updates 

from DHS to assist you in preparing for the most likely threats? 

Answer: 2. Yes, we receive advisories from the State and Local Watch at the 

Homeland Security Operations Center. However, our primary source of intelligence 

from the Federal Government is the weekly FBI Intelligence Bulletin that we receive from our sworn personnel assigned to the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task 

Force (JTTF). 

Question: a. If so, I’m interested to know how often and in what form you receive the information. 

Answer: a. The DHS Advisories are transmitted via email as information is 

available. 

Question: b. If not, how is the lack of threat information affecting the decisions 

you make every day about where to focus personnel, what equipment to purchase and how to prioritize training and other efforts? 

Answer: b. N/A 

Question: c. What kind of information would be most helpful to you in making 

the most efficient and effective use of your limited resources? 

Answer: c. It would be most helpful to receive information that is already 

verified and accurate in order to prevent the unnecessary deployment of personnel and equipment. As mentioned in the written testimony, it is vital to have 

the ability to have a secure compartmentalized information facility (SCIF) in 

order to receive classified information in a timely manner, particularly if it pertains to an impending threat to our region.

MR. MICHAEL GROSSMAN RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM REP. ETHERIDGE. 

Question: How has the current state budget crisis affected your ability to protect 

the citizens in Orange and Los Angeles Counties? 

Answer: The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department currently has 29 sworn 

and civilian employees assigned full-time for anti-terrorism activities which includes 

intake, analysis and investigations. There are also three part-time management positions that dedicate a good portion of their time to anti-terrorism efforts. This is 

not nearly enough for an area of our size and vulnerability. Hence the reference in 

the written testimony to provide funding for additional personnel and positions in 

future grants.

Question: Have you found that the increased emphasis on terrorism diverted people and resources from your daily crime-fighting activities? 

Answer: Yes, the increased emphasis on terrorism has diverted personnel from 

other necessary law enforcement activities. Of the 29 assigned to the full-time effort, 

eight are on loan to the Emergency Operations Bureau/Terrorism Early Warning 

Group from detective, patrol and other units throughout the sheriff’s department.

Question: How many people in your departments are primarily responsible for 

anti-terrorism activities? 

Answer: The current budget situation in the State of California has a direct effect on our ability to protect the citizens of Los Angeles County. The sheriff’s department is experiencing a nearly $100 million reduction in our operating budget for 

this fiscal year, with additional cuts pending. This renders us unable to redistribute 

any additional personnel from essential law enforcement functions to the anti and 

counter-terrorism effort. It also makes it impossible to even loan additional personnel without replacement.
57

MR. MICHAEL GROSSMAN RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS FROM THE MINORITY STAFF. 

Question: 1. Captain Grossman, do I understand your testimony—that the City 

of Los Angeles has received tens of millions of dollars in the High Threat Urban 

Area grants, but that your department and the region outside the city gets none of 

that? Isn’t the ‘‘Urban Area’’ much larger than the city itself? Do you know why the 

Department of Homeland Security specified the grant that way? 

Answer: 1. I do not know why the Department of Homeland Security specified 

the grant in this manner. The County of Los Angeles ‘‘Operational Area’’ is made 

up of 88 cities, including L.A. and Long Beach. The previous Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) equipment grants were allocated through the state to the county 

to be distributed as needed to the first-responder agencies in the region. The Urban 

Area Security Initiative (UASI) process differs in that it allocated funds directly to 

the designated cities with the guidance that the funds were, . . .‘‘to be expended in 

cooperation with the contiguous cities and county.’’ We believe that this method does 

not address the overall regional preparedness because it is not consistent with existing procedures for our Operational Area (county). 

In the first phase of the UASI grants, the City of Los Angeles was allocated 

$12.5M. The County of Los Angeles is waiting to receive its share that will total 

approximately $lM (for fire and sheriff). In the second phase, L.A. City is anticipating an award of $18.87M, and the City of Long Beach (both cities are in the Los 

Angeles County Operational Area) $6.46M. The allocation process is still in progress 

for the distribution of these funds. Unlike the first phase, this requires extensive 

needs assessments, which are underway, to establish the strategy which will determine the apportionment. To this date, we have not received any of the funds from 

the UASI grants. The only funds the sheriff’s department has received from all of 

the grants totals $297K from the 2001 ODP Equipment Grant Program.

Question: 2. Can you describe the timeline between when the Department of 

Homeland Security has announced funds for California, Los Angeles, and Orange 

County and when the funds have arrived? 

Answer: 2. I can not address the funding for Orange County, however, the attached Grant Summary Sheet describes the timeline and status of all of the federal 

grants for Los Angeles County. This does not include the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants that are being administered by the cities of Los Angeles and 

Long Beach. The process requires that the state pass the funds to the local entities 

within 45 days. The difficulty is that we are processing the multiple grants with 

vary requirements, all at the same time. Of the seven grants, we have received only 

$297K (to the sheriff’s department), which is from the 2001 grant. We are in various 

stages of processing on all of the other grants and have not yet received any additional funds.

Question: 3. Please help me understand what is somewhat conflicting testimony. 

Sheriff Jaramillo’s statement says ‘‘I cannot emphasize enough how the lengthy 

process is creating difficulties for those of us who are First Responders to purchase 

equipment, and to give optimal training and exercises to our personnel.’’ He adds 

that ‘‘Orange County has been awarded nearly $12 million in grant funding, although as of today we have only received $875,000 of these funds.’’ Governor Romney testified that the states are passing through federal funds to the local level 

within Congress’ 45 day requirement. I have heard from my constituents that the 

funds aren’t flowing. So if the delay isn’t at the state level, should we assume that 

it is slow to come out of the Department of Homeland Security? 

Answer: 3. The 2001 grant is the only one that is a direct appropriation of funds. 

All of the subsequent grant programs require reimbursement for the distribution of 

funds. This means that once the grant is approved, the recipient agency must purchase the items consistent with their jurisdictions procurement rules, and once the 

products are finally received they can then submit for reimbursement under the 

grant. This appears to be the primary cause for the long delays in actually receiving 

granted funds.

Question: 4. What federal resources do you have to address the personnel needs 

you have to adequately conduct anti-terrorism operations? 

Answer: 4. We have not received any federal resources to address personnel 

needs. As previously stated in the response to Rep. Etheridge, we strongly encourage that funding for additional personnel be included in the 2004 and subsequent 

grants on a non cost-sharing basis.

Question: 5. I assume you both run frequent exercises, both real and tabletop, to 

gauge your preparedness for terrorist attack. After you do the exercises and identify 

the lessons learned, do you share this information with the Department of Home-
58

land Security? Does the Department send you lessons learned from exercises in 

other regions? 

Answer: 5. We have not shared information (lessons learned) with the Department of Homeland Security after the completion of training exercises, and are not 

aware of any existing process to do this. We have not received any information 

about best practices from other regions in the nation. 

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. RAYMOND F. KIERNAN

Question: I—Do you think the Fire Act should be maintained separately from 

other First Responder Grants? 

Answer: Yes. The American Fire Service is in sad shape in many communities. 

Please see the enclosed executive summary of the results of a survey commissioned 

by Congress on the American Fire Service 

The F.I.R.E. Act is the first federal money to go to anyone in the Fire Service in 

the history of the Country. 

We can no longer expect chicken dinners, fish fries and bake sales to keep the 

balance of our Departments in business to protect its citizens. One has to sell a lot 

of brownies to purchase a $250,000 fire truck. 

The F.I.R.E. Act has been one of the most successful programs ever because 

money goes directly to the Department and not filtered through the States for their 

cut and control. 

In your State of North Carolina so far, $4,303,692.00 has been awarded to 71 Fire 

Departments of all sizes for necessary equipment. Much of this could never have 

been bought by them. (Enclosed North Carolina FIRE Act recipients.)

Question: 2—Do you think the Fire Grant Program should emphasize anti-terrorism equipment and training or should it consider all requests equally? 

Answer: No. Each year millions upon millions of dollars work of valid requests 

go unfilled with the FIRE Act. The amount of money allotted in no way meets the 

demand for assistance. The FIRE Act could be $5 billon annually and still wouldn’t 

meet requests. 

As you can see from the Congressional Report, local Fire Departments are lacking 

the basics. To further dilute this by putting WMD items into the mix would seriously affect the small and rural Fire Departments, as their risk level might be considered low. 

My suggestion is to leave the F.I.R.E. Act alone. Fund it more generously next 

session, as it is a great success. 

Develop a method of getting Homeland Defense monies to First Responders, which 

has been a total failure. 

We are here, just down the road from your house. Give us the tools to do the job. 

MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DICK MURPHY, MAYOR, SAN 

DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 

Chairman Cox and Honorable Members of the committee, on behalf of the citizens 

of San Diego, I appreciate this opportunity to address the committee and articulate 

some of the challenges facing San Diego in its efforts to prepare for and respond 

to terrorist threats.

San Diego Background 

San Diego is the nation’s 7th largest city with a diverse population of 1,275,100. 

Despite the comfortable small town atmosphere of the city and its residents, San 

Diego is a large city and the protection of its residents and critical infrastructure 

is of utmost importance. 

San Diego is a city with potentially high-profile vulnerabilities. Some of those distinctive attributes include: multiple military installations; the San Ysidro International Port of Entry—the busiest border crossing in the nation; regional water 

and wastewater facilities; a full service maritime port including a substantial military presence; an international airport; large professional sports facilities, major 

tourist attractions such as Sea World and the San Diego Zoo, as well as other symbolic sites such as the Coronado Bridge. 

Of particular note is the City’s responsibility for critical infrastructure of national 

significance. San Diego is not only the home to multiple military installations, but 

is the sole provider of water and wastewater services to all military installations 

within the City as well as the provider for naval bases home to three of the nation’s 

aircraft carriers and several nuclear submarines.
59

Homeland Security Grant Programs: 

A significant concern for San Diego is the distribution method of State Homeland 

Security Grants (SHSG). The base plus population distribution to States is not effectively delivering federal funds to large urban cities such as San Diego. Instead, 

States are determining how to ‘‘pass through’’ the federal funds to the local jurisdictions on a state by state basis with no consistency across the nation. Under California’s rules for SHSG distributions, the Counties control the use of federal funding 

support, including what amount they retain or pass on to cities. 

For example, San Diego is one of 18 cities within San Diego County, but represents approximately 43 percent of the region’s population. San Diego has the largest most sophisticated police and fire departments in the region, and is the primary 

first responder and mutual aid provider to a majority of the people in the urban 

area of San Diego County. These City departments are most likely to be the first 

to respond to any large scale emergency, should one occur. However, of the current 

funding allocated to the region by the State, only 24 percent of the region’s share 

was dedicated to San Diego. 

Additionally, the City of San Diego has entered into a Joint Powers Agreement 

with the other 17 cities in the county as well as the County government, to provide 

hazardous materials response for the entire region. Despite being the lead agency 

responsible for responding to hazardous materials incidents anywhere in the county, 

the SHSG program does not require funds be allocated to such an agency for this 

purpose. 

A potential solution for the inequitable distribution plans being adopted across the 

nation is to support direct federal funding to the largest U.S. cities based on population served, threat/need criteria, and recommend that future State funding account for high-threat metropolitan areas. 

The largest U.S. cities have sufficient scale and sophistication to justify direct federal funding. For example, the population of the City of San Diego is larger than 

Rhode Island and New Hampshire yet the method for distribution does not recognize this size and sophistication. Instead the system creates three layers of administrative bureaucracy, which reduces funds ultimately available to service providers 

and delaying expenditure.

Planning/Overtime Expenses: 

Another challenge facing cities is the inability to use federal funds for personnel 

costs such as planning and overtime reimbursement. While some funds have been 

identified in SHSGP II (2003 Supplemental Appropriations bill), not nearly enough 

have been identified for planning purposes. In order for public safety agencies to be 

adequately prepared for a terrorist emergency, funding for the development of response plans, training personnel and exercising the plans is necessary. Once emergency plans have been developed and exercised, public safety entities will have an 

even greater knowledge of the equipment needed to respond to terrorist incidents. 

San Diego is an area with many potential terrorist targets and therefore incurs 

exceptionally large added personnel costs for heightened security, especially when 

the Department of Homeland Security raises the national threat level to High (Code 

Orange) or Severe (Code Red). These additional expenses are difficult for cities to 

absorb, especially given the current budget conditions of cities and the very real 

threat of additional revenue reductions by the State. California is facing an estimated $38 billion state budget deficit, and cities and counties are expecting to see 

a severe reduction in revenues in the near future. 

Future SHSG funding should allow the funding to be allocated to personnel expenses and overtime costs for personnel assigned to homeland security functions 

(planning, training and exercising) and incremental ‘‘backfill’’ expenses of overtime 

and benefits for others to replace those personnel in regular duties.

Conclusion: 

In conclusion, I would respectfully request the committee include the issues I 

identified above in their recommendations on how to improve the partnership between Federal, State and Localities by improving the current distribution system of 

federal funding. Those issues are: 

1. Recognize the unique characteristics in certain large cities and the necessity 

to identify funding accordingly; 

2. Revise the distribution of State Homeland Security Grants to include direct 

funding for the largest U.S. cities; and 

3. Allow planning and overtime expenses to be considered eligible for SHSG funds. 

Again thank you Chairman Cox and members of the committee for the opportunity to share San Diego’s perspective on some of the Homeland Security challenges facing the City.
60

LETTERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

The PRESIDENT,

The White House

Mr. President, 

My name is Thomas Kennedy and I am a retired New York City 

Fire Department Deputy Chief and a member of the Northeastern 

States Fire Consortium. 

The Northeastern States Fire Consortium (NSFC) is made up of 

State Fire Officials and Fire Organizations from Connecticut, 

Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 

New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont. 

The NSFC strongly supports the House of Representatives proposal that retains the management of the FIRE Act in the Us Fire 

Administration (USFA), 

The USFA is the reason the FIRE Act is such a successful program. The USFA knows and understands the needs of the Fire 

Service. Under the USFA the funding goes directly to where it is 

needed, the local Fire Departments. Why alter a successful program? 

Again, the NSFC strongly urges that the USFA retains management of the FIRE Act. 

Sincerely, 

Thomas M. Kennedy, Committee Member 

Additional Note: FIRE Act information can be accessed at http://

www.firehouse.com/funding/fireact/2003/recipients/nc.html
(61)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

Washington D.C. 20515

HON. CHRISTOPHER COX

Chairman, House Select Committee on Homeland Security, The 

Capitol, Washington, D.C. 

MR. CHAIRMAN: I was somewhat puzzled when Governor Romney 

during his committee testimony volunteered with no particular context that the city of Fall River had failed to apply for homeland security funds. I had asked him no question to which that would 

have been the answer, and he seemed to me to be trying to make 

some political point. The reason for his seeking to do and the point 

itself were unclear to me then and remain so. 

My puzzlement deepened when I learned from Edward Lambert, 

the Mayor of Fall River, that the city had in fact applied for funds, 

directly contrary to the Governor’s testimony, in fact, Fall River’s 

experience appears to contradict the Governor’s testimony. In several ways. In his testimony Governor Romney defended the view 

that Federal Homeland Security funds should go through the 

states, stressing that local governments should form regional 

groupings to make their amplifications, so as to provide greater efficiency. The irony is that Fall River did exactly that, at the urging 

of the Romney administration. 

As the following letter from Mayor Lambert says, Fall River was 

told by the Romney administration not to apply on its own, but 

rather as part of a regional collaborative. It was that regional collaborative application that was rejected. It is thus ironic that Governor Romney inaccurately accused the city of Fall River of failing 

to apply. I have worked closely with Mayor Lambert over the past 

years along with my colleague Mr. McGovern who shares with me 

the representation of Fall River. The mayor is very aggressive— 

which is entirely appropriate—in seeking both federal and state 

help for the city of which he is Mayor, and I have found Mayor 

Lambert and his administration willing and able partners in putting together proposals for funding to meet the needs of Fall River 

and its citizens. As mayor Lambert’s letter says, the Governor’s incorrect assertion that the city failed to apply for funds ‘‘only adds 

insult to injury’’ and while I am unable to correct the injury that 

Fall River suffered when the collaborative of which it was a part 

was denied funds, I do want to take this opportunity to rebut the 

insult.

BARNEY FRANK
62

ATTACHMENT

Dear Congressman Frank: I was outraged when it was communicated to my office that Gov. Mitt Rorrmey, in testimony before 

the Congressional Select Committee on Homeland Security, said 

that the City of Fall River did not apply for funding in the recent 

round of federal grants for Homeland Security. 

The fact is that Fall River did apply, as part of a regional 

colloborative as we were encouraged to do by the state, only to be 

rejected in spite of the tremendous need we have for such security 

funding. 

Jane Tewksbury, Chief of Staff for Public Safety Secretary Ed 

Flynn, has admitted to me, as recently as today, that cities, during 

the application process, were discouraged from hung applications 

on their own, being directed instead to file applications with other 

communities identi a regional response to homeland security 

issues. Fall River played by that set of rules as we were told to by 

the state, then found ourselves without funding as other cities were 

rewarded with their own grants. In fact, the awarding process 

seems to have left a lot to be desired, as many cities and regions 

were funded that do not have any of the port security, interstate 

transportation, or water resource issues that we have in Fall River. 

Our city’s inability to access these homeland security funds given 

the tremendous needs that we have and the strength of the collaborative application we filed, is a glaring omission. The Governor’s incorrect assertions, that we didn’t even seek funding before your 

committee, only adds insult to injury.

Sincerely,

Edward M. Lambert, Jr., Mayor

Æ