Toward Combined Arms Warfare:- 

A Survey of 20th~Century Tactics, 

Doctrine, and Organization 

by Captain Jonathan M. House, U.S. Army 

August 1984 

U.S. Army 

Command and General 

Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 660274900 
Library of Congress Gataloging in Publication Data 

House, Jonathan M. (Jonathan Mallory), l&X?- 

Toward combined arms warfare. 

(Research survey / Combat Studies Institute; no. 2) 

“August k984.” 

Bibliography: p. 

1. Tactics--History--20th century. 2. Armies-- 

Organization--History--20th century. 3. Military 

art and science--History--20th century. I. Title. 

II. Series: Research survey (U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College. Combat Studies Institute; no. 2) 

U165.H8 1985 355.4’2 85-W 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gavemaent Printting OWce, WeshEngton, D.C. 28402 
CONTENTS 

Contents........................... iii 

Figures............................ iv 

Maps............................. V 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 

Chapter One. Prologue to 1914 ................ 7 

Chapter Two. World War I. .................. 19 

Chapter Three. TheInterwarPeriod.............. 43 

Chapter Four. World War II: The Axis Advance, 1939-1942. . . 79 

Chapter Five. World War II: 

The Complexity of Total War, 1942-1945. . . . 105 

Chapter Six. Combined Arms After 1945 . . . . e . . . . . . . 141 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 

Notes ............................. 191 

Bibliography ......................... 207 

iii 
FIGURES 

1‘ Type French and German Divisions, 1914. . . . . . . . e . 10 

2. Type British and Russian Divisions, 1914. a . e . e * . = 11 

3. Trench System, World War I. . . . * . l . , . . a e . . . 23 

4. Type U.S. and German Divisions, 1918. . . . e . . . . a . 41 

5. Type German Panzer Division, 1935 . . a (F . c m . . * * . 56 

6. French Light Mechanized Division, 1934, and 

Armored Division,.1940 e a s . . . . a . e e . . . = t s 62 

7. Soviet Mechanized Carps, December 1935, and 

MotorizedDivision,1939.... *..* *.*..$.. 67 

8. U.S, Triangular Infantry Division, June 1941. + . . . e . 74 

9. British Armored and Infantry Divisions, 1942. . * . . t . 90 

10. Schematic of Blitzkrieg Encirclement. . m . . = . . . . . 98 

11. Soviet Tank Corps5 1942, and Tank Army, 1943. * . . . . . 101 

12. Type U.S. Armored Division, March 1942 and 

September 1943. . . f . . . . c . . . . . . . e e * . . 109 

13. Soviet Assault Group Formation. V . . * . . . . . . . . . 124 

14. Type Soviet Tank Division, 1947, and 

Mechanized Division, 1946/51. e . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 

15. Type U.S. Infantry and Armored Divisions, 1947. . . . l . 148 

16. U.S. Pentamic Infantry Division . e m . . l . . . * e . . 156 

17. Type U.S. Armored Division, ROAD, 1965-1983 . e m . . . . 159 

18. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1965. . . . . . . * . e 163 

iv 
MAPS 

1. Battle of Cambrai, 20-30 November 1917. ......... 30 

2. Second Battle of Armageddon, 19-24 September 1918 .... 38 

3. The Maginot Line and the 1940 Campaign. ......... 59 

4. Khalkin-Gol, lo-31 August 1939. ............. 70 

5. Sidi Barrani, December 1940 ............... 92 

6. Sidi Bou Zid - Kasserine Pass, February 1943. ...... 120 

7. Imphal-Kohima, March-April 1944 ............. 136 

8. Task Force Dolvin, Anyang-ni, Korea, 5 February 1951. .. 151 

9. Lam Son 719, February-March 1971. ............ 166 

10. 7th Armored Brigade at Abu Agheila, 1956. ........ 175 

V 

- 
INTRODUCTION 

We have gotten into the fashion of talking of 

cavalry tactics, artillery tactics, and infantry 

tactics. This distinction is nothing but a mere 

abstraction. There is but one art, and that is the 

tactics of the combined arms. The tactics of a body 

of mounted troops composed of the three arms is 

subject to the same established principles as is 

that of a mixed force in which foot soldiers bulk 

largely. The only difference is one of mobility. 

-Major Gerald Gilbert, British Army, 1907’l 

The concept of llCombined Arms” has existed for centuries, but 

the nature of the combination and the organizational level at 

which it occurred have varied greatly. Prior to the seventeenth 

century, for example I there was often no need to combine 

infantry, artillery, and cavalry at the small-unit level. Each 

branch served a specific function on the battlefield, and only 

the senior commanders present needed to coordinate the effects of 

the different arms. In succeeding centuries, the general trend 

has been to combine the arms at progressively lower levels of 

organization. The concern of commanders has gone from 

coordinating the separate actions of separate arms, to gaining 

greater cooperation between them, and finally to combining their 

actions to maximize the effect of their various properties. 

At the time that Gilbert made his plea, many officers paid 

lip service to “combined arms,” but few understood the need to 

achieve such cooperation or combination between the branches at 

the small-unit level. Since then, twentieth century warfare and 

especially mechanized warfare have developed to the point at 

which some form of combined arms is essential for survival, let 

alone victory, on the battlefield. Yet the very complexity of 

this warfare leads to specialization in both training and 

maintenance, a specialization that is currently reflected in the 

formation of companies and battalions consisting of one or at 

most three different major weapons sys terns. A mechanized 

infantry battalion, for example, normally includes direct-fire 

infantry weapons, antitank weapons, and limited indirect-fire 

support in the form of mortars and grenade launchers. Such a 

battalion has little or no organic capability in the areas of 

armor, air defense, engineers, long-range indirect fire, or air 

support. A tank or artillery battalion is even more specialized 

and restricted in its equipment. 

1 
Although these units are task organized and cross attached 

for field operations, the demands of specialization, unit 

identity, and maintenance naturally cause many soldiers to 

concentrate on the use of one weapon or arm to defeat the 

corresponding weapon or arm of the enemy. Such a narrow view has 

frequently characterized professional soldiers, who wish 

naturally to conserve techniques that seem effective. This 

simplistic approach is perhaps less common among senior 

commanders and within infantry or reconnaissance (armored 

cavalry) units, where the different weapons are integrated on a 

more frequent basis than in some other organizations. Still, at 

least some tank crews train primarily to fight enemy tanks, 

tactical fighter units seek air superiority over enemy fighters, 

and engineers concentrate on enhancing the mobility of their own 

forces while impeding the mobility and eountermooility efforts of 

enemy engineers. All of these tasks are essential for combat 

success, but none by itself will ensure proper interaction 

between the different arms and weapons. Indeed, almost by 

definition a particular arm or weapon system has most of the same 

strengths and weaknesses of its enemy counterpart, and thus may 

not provide the best means of defeating that enemy. 

The very term "combined arms" often means different things to 

different people, or is left undefined and vague. As a minimum, 

however, this term includes at least three related elements: 

1‘ The combined arms concept is the basic idea that 

different arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to 

maximize the survival and combat effectiveness of each other. 

The strengths of one system must be used to compensate for the 

weaknesses of others. Exactly which arms and weapons are 

included in this concept varies greatly between armies and over 

time. Today, however, the list of combined arms would include at 

least the following: infantry (mechanized, motorized, airborne, 

air assault, light, and special or unconventional operations 

forces1, armor, cavalry/reconnaissance, artillery, antitank 

forces, air defense, combat engineers, attack helicopters, and 

some form of close air support. Under certain circumstances, 

this list may also include electronic warfare and, when 

authorized, nuclear and chemical fires. Beyond this basic list, 

all the combat support and serviee support elements are equally 

important if the force is to fight in a coordinated and sustained 

manner. In the interests of brevity, however, logistical aspects 

of combined arms will be discussed only briefly in this study. 

2. Combined arms organization, at whatever level 

(company, battalion, brigade/regiment, etc.), brings these 

2 
differe:lt arms and weapons systems together for combat. This may 

include both fixed, peacetime tables of organization and ad hoc 

or task-organized combinations of elements in wartime. 

3. Combined arms tactics and operations are the actual 

roles performed and techniques applied by these different arms 

and weapons in supporting each other once they have been 

organized into integrated teams. This is the area that is of 

most concern to professional soldiers, yet it is precisely this 

area where historical records and tactical manuals often neglect 

important details. Moreover, combined arms tat tics and 

techniques at the level of battalion or below are the most 

difficult aspects about which to generalize historically, because 

they are most subject to frequent changes in technology. 

A short study such as this cannot possibly consider all the 

complexities that these three elements bring to recent military 

history. Hhat it can do is trace some recurring themes or 

problems in the recent conduct of combined arms warfare in the 

British, French, German, Soviet, and United States armies. At 

various times, each of these armies has led the world in the 

development of tactics and doctrine. For the period since 1948, 

the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) must be added to this list, 

because the Israeli experience has had a major influence on 

weapons and doctrine elsewhere. In particular, this paper will 

identify general trends in the development of tactical and 

organizational concepts for integrating the different arms and 

weapons systems at division level and below. This does not mean 

describing the thousands of minute changes that have occurred in 

divisional structure in these armies since the division became a 

fixed table of organization. Yet, the trends in terms of 

proportions of different arms and levels at which those arms were 

integrated can be illustrated with a limited number of line and 

block charts. Such trends should provide an historical framework 

and background for readers who are developing their own more 

detailed concepts of how to organize and employ the combined arms 

today. 

This study is a tentative overview rather than an exhaustive 

analysis. My hope is that it will prompt others to develop or 

even contest the trends described in these pages, thereby 

advancing the study of a central issue in land combat. 

Before proceeding to specific historical developments, some 

basic comments on the combined arms concept are in order. Most 

of these comments are self-evident, but they may assist readers 

in placing the following chapters into context. 

In the abstract, tactical warfare may be considered as a 

combination of three elements : mobility, protection, and 

3 
offensive power.2 Mobility means not only the ability to 

maneuver and concentrate forces over terrain, but also the 

ability to move men and units when exposed to the fire of the 

enemy. Mobility is not an absolute, but must be measured 

relative to the difficulty of the terrain and to the mobility of 

other friendly or enemy forces. For a combined arms team, the 

least mobile element may determine the mobility of the entire 

force. Without mobility, the principles of mass, maneuver, and 

offensive cannot be applied, and surprise becomes very 

difficult. Protection means both security against enemy surprise 

attack and protection to allow offensive maneuver or defense on 

the battlefield. This battlefield protection may be accomplished 

by using terrain defilade and defensive fortifications, or by 

employing artificial means such as armor. Qffensive or fire 

power is necessary in order to impose onefs will on the enemy, to 

overcome his protection. 

These three elements have interacted continuously throughout 

military history. In particular, the past century has been 

characterized by a vast increase in weapons power, an increase 

that can be overcome only with great difficulty by a carefully 

designed combination of protected mobility and other firepower. 

The most obvious example of this is the defensive system of World 

War I. That combination of firepower and protection had to be 

countered by close coordination of infantry (mobility), fire 

support (offensive power), and armor (which theoretically 

combined all three elements). Even this explanation of World War 

I is simplistic, but the three bask elements of mobility, 

protection, and offensive power are present in most tactical 

equations. 

At a more practical level, these three elements are combined 

technically in the design and employment of individual weapons 

and tactically in the eombination of different weapons and arms. 

The 1982 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, divides the 

concept and practice of combined arms into two procedures: 

supplementary or reinforcing combined arms, and complementary 

combined arms. As the name implies, supplementary combined arms 

means increasing the effect of one weapons system or arm with the 

similar effects af other weapons and arms. For example, the 

effects of mortars and artillery may reinforce or supplement each 

other in an integrated fire plan, Engineers may enhance the 

protection of armored vehicles by digging in those vehicles with 

engineer equipment. Complementary combined arms, by contrast, 

have different effects or characteristics, so that together they 

pose a more complicated threat, a dilemma for the enemy. The 

defender may place a minefield so that it halts an enemy force at 

a point where observed artillery or antitank fires can attack 

that enemy as he clears the minefield. The defender has thus 

integrated the different weapons to provide a much greater effect 

4 
than any one by itself could achieve. The resulting dilemma 

forces the enemy to accept casualties while clearing the mines, 

or to seek a passage elsewhere. 

It is not sufficient, however, to develop a doctrine for 

combining the different arms and services. In order to practice, 

refine, and employ this doctrine, at least five other elements 

are necessary. First, an army must design and procure weapons 

with the characteristics required by the doctrine and must stay 

abreast of technical changes that may invalidate or modify those 

weapons and doctrine. 

Second, the doctrine must be effectively explained and 

disseminated to the commanders who are expected to use it. 

Third, the commanders must believe that the doctrine can be 

effective with the organizations, weapons, and troops available. 

Dissemination and acceptance are hampered by the fact that 

soldiers naturally rely on past experience, so that a colonel may 

unconsciously expect platoons to function as they did when he was 

a lieutenant, years or even decades before, Experience is a 

priceless asset to any army, but it naturally retards or distorts 

the application of changes in technology and doctrine that may 

render parts of that experience obsolete. 

Fourth, in the eyes of the commander, his unit must have the 

training and morale to implement the doctrine. A recurring theme 

of this study will be that professional soldiers tend to 

overestimate the amount and quality of training necessary for the 

rank and file to perform effectively in war. There is no 

substitute for good training, but historically leaders with high 

standards have rejected or modified doctrine that their troops 

seemed incapable of executing. On the other hand, training may 

genuinely be an obstacle to a particular dot trine or 

organization. If company commanders are, on the average, capable 

of coordinating only eighty men and two types of weapons systems, 

it would be useless to design 170-man companies with ten 

different weapons systems. Training officers to handle these 

larger, more complex units may be prohibitively expensive in 

peacetime. 

Finally, a combined arms system cannot work without effective 

command and control to integrate and direct that system. Indeed, 

factors that improve span of control, speed of decision making, 

and leadership ability can be as important as the weapons 

themselves. 

Successful commanders throughout history have instinctively 

understood these requirements. One could argue that neither 

Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, nor Frederick the Great of Prussia, 

nor Napoleon I of France actually developed major new doctrines 

5 
and weapons for the combined arms. What they did well was to 

procure weapons, understand and disseminate doctrine, train their 

troops, and apply the results in battle, With the larger armies 

and technical complexity of weapons in this century, it may be 

beyond the capability of a single leader to fulfill all these 

requirements. This possibility further complicates a military 

reality in which, since 1914, the combination of different arms 

has become essential for survival rather than optional for 

improved combat power. The process of developing and 

institutionalizing the combined arms concept, organization, and 

tactics in this century is the focus of this study. 

Jonathan M. House 

Captain, Military Intelligence 

Combat Studies Institute 

U.S. Army Command & General 

Staff College 
CHAPTER ONE 

PROLOGUE TO 1914 

In the 169Os, European armies developed and fielded the 

socket bayonet , a long spike-shaped blade that could be fixed on 

the end of a musket without obstructing the bore of the weapon 

during loading and firing.1 This simple device allowed 

well-disciplined infantry to withstand norse cavalry charges 

without the aid of specialized weapons such as the pike. For the 

next 150 years, infantry units armed solely with smoothbore 

firearms and bayonets were the backbone of all Western armies. 

Skilled senior commanders understood how to coordinate this 

infantry with cavalry and with direct-fire smoothbore artillery, 

but such coordination was rarely important at the level of 

regiment or below, because these units were basically armed with 

a single type of weapon. The need to maximize the firepower of 

inaccurate smoothbore weapons led to extremely linear deployments 

on the battlefield. The infantry maneuvered into long formations 

of two or three ranks, with the artillery located between or 

slightly behind the infantry battalions. The limited effect of 

even such carefully arrayed firepower made it possible, if 

dangerous, for dense masses of cavalry and Infantry to attack at 

a specific point and break the thin lines of the defender. 

Fire-support coordination was simple, because the infantry and 

artillery unit commanders had face-to-face contact or used hand 

signals to designate targets. 

The fundamentals of weaponry, technology, and small-unit 

tactics were refined but remained basically unchanged until the 

mid-1800s. Stability made professional soldiers skeptical of 

innovations even when they came from serious students of tactics. 

Technology and Manpower 

During the period 1827-1870, the first of two waves of 

technological change In the nineteenth century revolutionized the 

battlefield. The most important innovation of this first wave 

was the development of rifled, breech-loading firearms. The 

muzzle-loading rifle with a bullet-shaped proJectile initially 

replaced the smoothbore musket. Rifling and an improved seal 

between bullet and bore increased the velocity and accuracy of 

small arms fire out to an effective range of nearly 500 

meters .2 During the American Civil War of 1861-1865, dense 

infantry formations in daylight provided lucrative targets for 

defenders armed with rifles. Both sides learned to spread out 

into skirmish lines when attacking. Defenders, for their part, 

had to dig in to reduce their own vulnerability to the attackers’ 

rifle fire. 

7 
The muzzle-loading rifles used by most soldiers during the 

Civil War were already obsolescent, the result of the Prussian 

Army ' s development of the breeeh-loading rifle. 3 Unlike 

muzzle-loaders, breedh:loaders could be reloaded in a prone 

position, allowing infantry to remain under cover while firing 

repeatedly, Soon fixed, metallic-eased ammunition made loading 

even faster. By the time of the Franco-Prussian War in 

1870- 187 1, most armies had adopted breech-loading artillery as 

well as rifles. 

The first wave of technological change also included the 

introduction of the railroad and the telegraph. These inventions 

greatly increased the speed of communication, mobilization, and 

troop movement at the strategic and operational levels. At the 

tactical level, though, troops still maneuvered on foot or on 

horseback. 

The second wave of technological change came in the 1880s and 

1890s. Smokeless gunpowder, magazine-fed repeating rifles, 

recoiling and quick-firing artillery, improved artillery fuzes, 

machine guns, and internal combustion engines appeared in rapid 

srmecession e With the exception of the engine, these developments 

all increased the volume, range, and accuracy of fire, placing 

the soldier in the open at a tremendous disadvantage compared to 

the soldier in prepared positions. General staffs were created 

to mobilize and deploy enormous armies using these new weapons. 

Although radiotelegraphs existed in the armies of 1974, the radio 

had not yet improved to the point where staffs could follow and 

direct events on the battlefield. 

The cumulative effect of these two waves was to make 

cooperation and coordination between different units and arms 

absolutely essential. Anything less than total coordinatkon in 

the attack might well result in defeat by defensive firepower. Canverse ly , an uncoordinated defense invited disaster. 

The American Civil War and the Wars of German Unification 

61864-1871) gave professional soldiers many opportunities to 

evaluate the first wave of technological change, That 

teehnology, in combination with an effective reserve component 

system, provided the tools of victory in Prussia’s struggles to 

unite Germany. When World War I began, however, professional 

soldiers had not yet digested and agreed upon the effects of the 

second wave of change. As will be seen below, most tactical 

daetrines in 7914 showed a healthy respect for the effects of 

firepower, but such doctrines had not solved the resulting 

problems on the battlefield, 
Quite apart from changes in weaponry, the Prussian example of 

large cadre and reservist forces overwhelming professional armies 

convinced other European governments that they must develop mass 

armies of reservists. European general staffs therefore produced 

elaborate plans to mobilize and deploy such reserves by railroad 

at the outbreak of war. As a result of these efforts, by 1900, 

Germany had only 545,000 men on active duty but a total wartime 

strength of 3,013,OOO; France had 544,450 men in peacetime and 

4,660,OOO in war; and Russia could mobilize over 4,000,OOO from a 

peacetime strength of 896,OOO.Q In contrast , the British Army 

Expeditionary Force of 1914 consisted essentially of regulars and 

contained only a limited percentage of reservists who had 

previously served on active duty. 

The Prussian reserve and militia (Landwehr) formations of the 

1860s were successful partly because they were filled with the 

veterans of previous Prussian wars. By 1914, however, a long 

period of peace had deprived most armies of such experienced 

reservists. Every continental army had to develop its own system 

of reserve training and organization, and every army had to 

decide what percentage of reservists could be absorbed into an 

active duty unit on mobilization. Many officers distrusted the 

competence of their citizen-soldiers. The absence of reservists 

from regular army formations during most of the year meant that 

units were well below authorized wartime strength and were in 

effect skeleton formations, thus making realistic training for 

both officers and conscripts difficult. 

Organization and Doctrine 

Pre- 19 14 armies organized the different combat arms into 

divisions and corps that bore a superficial resemblance to those 

of today. The most obvious difference was the absence of the 

vehicles and electronics associated with modern combat. By the 

end of the Napoleonic Wars, European armies had accepted the 

division as the war time unit for combining infantry and 

artillery, although most cavalry was concentrated into separate 

brigades, divisions, or even corps.5 As in so many other 

areas, the Prussian example had produced considerable agreement 

by 1914 on the basic organization of an infantry division. Most 

divisions contained twelve battalions of infantry, each with two 

machine guns either assigned or in direct support (see Figures 1 

and 21.6 Battalions were usually grouped into four regiments 

and two brigades, although the British regimental headquarters no 

longer had a tactical command function and therefore remained in 

garrison. Divisional cavalry was universally very small, because 

most functions of screening and reconnaissance were assigned to 

the separate cavalry brigades or divisions. These large cavalry 

9 
TYPE FRENCH DIVISION, 1914 15,000 men. 36 guns, 24 machine guns 

xx 

HQ 

2 x machine gun 

TYPE GERMAN DIVISION, 1914 17,600 men, 72 guns, 24 machine guns 

84-3330 -lO6 El cl un 18 x 77mm 18 x 106mm 

18 x 77mm 

Figure 1. Type French and German Divisions, 1914 
1 

r 

a 

xx 

0 O FiE!l a 

2 x mschine gun 

TYPE BRITISH DIVISION, 1914 18,000 men, 76 gunr, 24 mechine gun6 

18 x 83.8mm 

cl 0 

18 x 4.6”; 

4 x 127mm 

E 

TYPE RUSSIAN DIVISION, 1914 21,000 men, 48 guns, 32 mschine gun6 

Figure 2. Type British and Russian Divisions, 1914. 

84-3330 -11- 
formations were almost pure cavalry, with a few horse artillery 

batteries attached. Not until 1923-14) for example, did the 

Germans add company-sized elements of mounted engineers and 

bicycle-equipped infantry to their cavalry divisions.7 

Where the armies differed most markedly was in the proportion and 

calibers of artillery included in the infan try divisions. 

Ciivisfonal artillery varied from as few as thirty-l&x light guns 

of 75-m in the French dkvision to as many’as seventy-six 

artillery pkeces, including eighteen 4.5-inch (114.5~Id 

howitzers and four 127~mm guns, in the British division. These 

variations in structure ref leeted profound confusion and 

disagreement over the role of artillery and the importance of 

combined arms. 

In order to understand the doctrinal interrelationships of 

the different arms before World War I, some conskderation of each 

arm is in order. Cavalry and engineers may be discussed briefly; 

infantry and artillery deserve a more detailed explanation. 

Because the U.S. dfviskon was only just developing during the 

period 1911-17, it is omitted from this discussion. 

Cavalry had the greatest mobility in the days before 

automobiles and was therefore closely assoeiated with functions 

requiring such mobility. Traditionally, cavalry had three 

missions : reconnaissance and security before the battle, shock 

action on the battlefield, and pursuit after the battle. The 

increases in firepower during the later 1800s led many tacticians 

to suggest that shock action was no longer a feasible role except 

under rare circumstances. They argued that, because the charge 

seemed almost obsolete ) cavalry should be reequipped as dragoons 

or mounted infantry. This would enable the mounted arm to 

continue its reconnaissance or security mission I while also 

functioning as highly mobile infantry that dismounted to fight 

after making contact with the enemy. Cavalry actually operated 

in this manner during the American Civil War, the Boer War 

(1899-1902)) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). By 1974, the 

British and German armies had equipped their cavalry with machine 

guns and trained them to fight dfsmounted when necessary. 

Yet the desire to retain cavalry*s operational mobi.lity in 

reconnaissance, security, and pursuit eaused many cavalrymen to 

prefer mounted fighting whenever possible, despite the large 

target a horse and rider presented to the enemy. Another factor, 

social conservatism, also helped preserve the traditional Cavalry 

of lances and sabers in most armies. In additisn, defenders of 

cavalry shock action justified their views by citing one cavalry 

charge of the Franco-Prussian Mar, an action appropriately known 

“‘VOE? Bredow” s death ride.” At 

;Tonville-Mars-la-Tour on 76 August 1870, 

the battle of 

NaJ* Gen. von Bredow 

12 
led his Prussian cavalry brigade down a depression to within a 

few hundred meters of the left flank of the French VI Corps. The 

French had already suffered from artillery fire and were not 

entrenched when von Bredow charged out of the smoke. The charge 

achieved its objective. Yet during an attack that took less than 

five minutes and produced only a momentary tactical advantage, 

380 out of 800 German cavalrymen were killed or wounded.8 

Of the four combat arms, engineers were the most neglected in 

doctrine. They generally operated in very small units, 

performing technical tasks and maintaining weapons or equipment 

in addition to their mobility and countermobility missions. 

Because of these missions, engineers were often the only troops 

trained in the detailed construction and destruction of obstacles 

and field fortifications.9 

With respect to infantry, a rifle battalion before 1914 was 

just that--four companies of rifle-armed infantry plus, in most 

cases, two heavy machine guns. Such battalions lacked the 

variety of grenades, mortars, and similar short-range, 

indirect-fire weapons that we today associate with “infantry.” 

To some extent, armies neglected these weapons because of the 

specialized training they required, or because, in the case of 

the heavy machine gun and mortar, the pieces were too heavy to 

keep pace with advancing infantry. Machine guns were usually 

cast in an economy-of-force role, such as protecting an open 

flank. Moreover, once an infantry battalion detrained and 

advanced to contact , it was neither more mobile nor more 

protected than infantry in the eighteenth or nineteenth century. 

The firepower of breech-loading, magazine-fed rifles and machine 

guns had greatly outstripped the mobility and survivability of 

foot-mobile infantry. As everyone discovered in the fall of 

1914, the only immediate remedy was to entrench. All 

professional soldiers were aware of this problem before the war, 

but they regarded defensive firepower as a costly obstacle that 

had to be overcome by a highly motivated attacker. At tacking 

infantry was expected to forego protection in order to maximize 

its own firepower and mobility. 

In order to understand this belief, we must consider the war 

that professional soldiers expected to fight in 7914. The Wars 

of German Unification had provided models of short wars won by 

decisive offensive action. Over and over during the summer of 

1870, the better-trained and better-armed French infantry had 

taken up carefully selected defensive positions, only to be 

outflanked and driven back by determined and costly German 

attacks . JO Thus, many soldiers concluded that standing on the 

defensive was a sure road to defeat. In any event, no one 

believed that a war that mobilized the entire manpower of a 
nation could go on for mare than a few months. War in ?914 meant 

that an entire economy halted while the reserves mobilized and 

rough t . Under such circumstaneesS societies and economies would 

collapse if the war dragged on. 

Tfiis belief in a short war determined many of the tactical 

expectations of European soldiers. With few excegtfons, they did 

not anticipate assaulting prepared fortifications across open 

ground. Instead I most soldiers envisaged a series of meeting 

engagements or encounter battles.lf Each commander hoped that 

his cavalry screen or his infantry advance guard would find a 

weak point whioh he would attack immediately to develop the 

situation, and force that enemy onto the defensive. The 

attaoker’s artillery would then act ta pin down and isolate the 

enemy defender, preventing rei~~Qrceme~t or serious entrenchment. 

Meanwhf. le , the attacking infantry would approach the hastily 

entrenched enemy I preferably by ~a~~u~~ri~ to an open flank. 

The gaal was to infiltrate to within 400-800 meters of the 

defender by using all available cmver- and concealment, During 

the Balkan Mars of 1972-13, Serbian and Bulgarian infantry had 

infiltrated to within 200 meters of the enemy before opening 

fire. Most soldiers considered this to be an exceptionally 

successful movement.72 Once the defender engaged the advancing 

infantry, the attaeker would deploy into a series of skirmish 

lines W The desired density of these skirmish lines varied 

between armies and over time, but soldiers generally moved one to 

three meters apart, Because of the reco nized strength of the 

defender’s firepower, skirmishers would advance by fire and 

movement, one group providing covering fire ~hlle another group 

rushed forward for a short distance L The skze of each group and 

the distance cavered at one rush would both beeome sm 

attacker closed with his opponent. Enemy fire would intensify 

while the attacker found cover more sparse. Casualties were 

expected, but supporting troaps would replenish the attacking 

skirmish line, The defender would be outnumbered and isolated. 

Prewar machine guns were too heavy to accompany the advancing 

skirmishers, so these guns were usually deployed to provide fire 

support from the rear. Eventually, the attacker expected to get 

within a short distance of the defender, establish fire 

superiority with infantry rifles, and assault with the bayonet. 

With certain variations I most armies shared this doctrine 

before 19 14. It had a number of problems that are obvious in 

retrospect, but were not so evident at the time. First, the 

attacker assumed that he would have local numerical superiority 

over the defender, whereas the numbers of troops fielded in 1914 

were so similar that numerical superiority, even at specific 

points ( was difficult to achieve. Second, this scenario assumed, 

14 
perhaps unconsciously, that the enemy and friendly forces were 

operating in a vacuum, moving to contact against each other with 

their flanks open for envelopment. In practice, however, the 

density of forces along the French, German, and Belgian frontiers 

in 1914 was so great that anyone seeking to maneuver to the flank 

was likely to encounter another unit, either friendly or enemy. 

Open flanks did occur, notably in the battles of the Marne and 

Tannenberg at the end of August, but these were exceptions caused 

by faulty command decisions on a battlefield that was still 

fluid.13 

The most significant problem with prewar doctrine was that 

many professional soldiers considered their subordinates 

incapable of executing the tactics required. The kind of battle 

envisioned seemed to depend on two things: high morale and firm 

control. Officers, especially in the French, Austrian, and 

Russian armies, continually emphasized the psychological 

advantage of the attacker. Yet most professionals recognized 

that discipline and control would be extremely difficult to 

maintain under intense direct fire. The problem was compounded 

by the fact that, with the partial exceptions of the British and 

German armies, most European units had a large number of 

reservists and untrained draftees. A French first-line infantry 

company, for example, had a wartime authorized strength of 225 

enlisted personnel, of which 65 percent were reservists or 

first-year conscripts. 14 According to many observers of 

peacetime maneuvers, these reservists and conscripts demonstrated 

that they lacked the training and discipline necessary to conduct 

dispersed fire-and-movement tactics under heavy enemy fire. 

Professional soldiers argued that these troops would never stand 

up and advance if they were allowed to take cover. This belief, 

correct or not, led French, Russian, Austrian, and other officers 

to attack standing up in relatively dense formations. These 

officers recognized the risk they were taking, but felt that 

there was no other way to achieve the necessary rapid victory 

with undertrained personnel.15 

Because the British Expeditionary Force of 1924 was a 

phenomenally well trained body of regulars and some reservists, 

the British did not face this training problem at the outbreak of 

war. The German Army minimized the same problem by a 

three-tiered system of units, consisting of twenty regular army 

corps with a relatively low proportion of well-trained recent 

reservists, fourteen reserve corps composed of regular cadres and 

large numbers of reservists, and numerous smaller Landwehr or 

militia formations. By carefully focusing on training before the 

war, the German Army not only reduced the problem in first-line 

units, but became the only European army to produce fairly 

effective reserve component units. Indeed, one of the great 

surprises for France in 1914 was the German willingness to use 

15 
these cadred formations in the line of battle immediately. 

Prewar French estimates of enemy strength had ignored these 

reserve units.16 Both the British and German armies, however) 

suffered heavy casualties in the initial campaigns. They had to 

form new divisions from half-trained, patriotic volunteers during 

the fall of 1914, and these volunteers were then used in rigid 

attacks that repeated the suicidal French tactics of 

August&September. 

Given the emphasis in all armies on the meeting engagement 

and the hasty attack, prewar training of ten neglected the 

defense. The Germans constructed field fortifications for their 

annual maneuvers, but their defensive doctrine focused on rigidly 

holding a single, densely occupied trench. French defensive 

doctrine 9 as reflected in prewar engineer manuals t planned for a 

defense-in-depth , with an advanced position to delay the enemy, a 

main line of resistance f and a second position to limit a 

successful enemy penetration. 17 Ironically 1 these doctrines 

had been reversed by 19 15, with the French and British defending 

well forward in a rigid structure, while the Germ 

beginning to develop a defense-in-depth. 

If infantry had difficulty adJusting to the requirements of 

the new .firepower, artillery was even slower to react. The 

traditional tactic for artillery, as perfected by Napoleon, was 

to concentrate the guns in a direct-fire role, placing them 

between or a few hundred meters behind the infantry units they 

were supporting . This tradition of direct-fire support meant 

that by 1914 all armies had standardized on relatively light, 

highly maneuVerable field guns with flat trajectories, even after 

advances in technology had made accurate indirect fire possible. 

The French 75-m, the German 77-m, the American and Russian 

X-inch CT6.2-mm), and the British 18~pounder (83.8~mm) were all 

designed for this role. Larger weapans were too heavy for a 

standard team of six horses to move across country. These guns 

were too small to have much effect against even hasty field 

fortifications, and they lacked the high traJectory necessary for 

indirect fire in rough terrain., This was perfectly satisfactory 

to the French. In preparation for an infantry attack, French 

commanders relied upon an extremely rapid rate of direct fire to 

;:P,&-yl temporarily) rather than to destroy, a defending 

The volume of such fire was intended to force the 

enemy to remain under cover, unable to provide effective aimed 

fire, even if he were not wounded by the French shells. The 

colonial wars of the nineteenth century had encour 

British to believe in a similar suppressive function. That same 

experience had also led the British Army to maintain a much 

higher proportion of artillery than in French divisions, because 

British infan try had discovered the value of such fire 

16 
support. 19 Artillerymen knew about indirect-fire techniques 

but rarely practiced them because they seemed complicated and 

unnecessary. 

The Boer War, and even more the Russo-Japanese War, provided 

a glimpse into the future, with trench systems and the skillful 

use, particularly by the Japanese, of indirect-fire artillery. 

Many professional soldiers dismissed these conflicts as minor 

wars fought at the end of long supply lines and having no useful 

lessons for a future war in Europe. Yet observers of the 

Russo-Japanese War, especially those from the German Army and 

British Royal Artillery, were impressed with the necessity for 

indirect fire, if only to protect the gun crews from enemy 

counterbattery fire. The rest of the British Army, however, 

insisted upon having close direct-fire support and believed 

simplistically that massed firepower was accomplished only by 

massing guns well forward on the ground. Thus, the British in 

1914 fell between two chairs: they possessed an assortment of 

weapons but no clear doctrine.20 The German Army, by contrast, 

conducted a serious study of indirect-f ire techniques and 

equipment. Beginning in 1909, the Germans increased their 

indirect-fire capability by converting one battalion in each 

division to 1054111 howitzers and by adding a battalion of 150~mm 

howitzers to each corps artillery. These weapons had an 

effective range of 7.5 kilometers, as opposed to the French 75-mm 

with a four kilometer range ,21 BY 1914, Germany had 3,500 

medium and heavy pieces, including many howitzers and large siege 

mortars, while France had only 300 modern guns larger than 

i’5-mm.22 A few of the German heavy weapons had been developed 

to reduce Belgian fortresses, but they were still available for 

field use. 

The small caliber and limited number of guns involved in most 

of the lesser wars at the end of the 1800s meant that no one was 

prepared for the devastating effects of massed, large&caliber 

artillery fire on the battlefield. To complicate matters 

further , in the nine years between the Russo-Japanese War and the 

start of World War I, a final technological change occurred in 

the explosive charges contained in artillery rounds. The 

experiments of Alfred Nobel and others gave all armies high 

explosive rounds that were much more destructive than the 

artillery shells of the nineteenth century.23 

Thus, at the outbreak of World War I, cavalry and artillery 

in most armies had not fully adjusted to the new technology, 

while infantry commanders doubted their ability to execute the 

relatively sophisticated fire-and-movement tactics of the day. 

Perhaps most significantly , none of the combat arms had trained 

for really close cooperation with the others, an oversight that 
proved disastrous in 19 14 s The most obvious axamp& of this 

mind-set was the standard methad of describing the siae of an 

army in the field. Instead of counting combined arms divisions, 

or even single am regiments, the average praEessionaL officer 

described any force in terms of the numbers of rifles, sabers, 

and guns--the separate weapons af the three principal arms. 

18 
CHAPTER TWO 

WORLD WAR I 

The defensive power of indirect artillery and machine guns 

dominated the battlefields of 19 14. From the very first 

contacts, commanders had to restrain the llimpetuosity” of their 

troops and insist upon careful engineer preparation in the 

defense and artillery preparation in the offense.1 The French 

and British were shocked by the vulnerability of their exposed 

troops and guns to carefully sited German machine guns and 

artillery. The Germans, in turn, were surprised by the accuracy 

and rapidity of British and French guns. By the end of 1914, 

this firepower had resulted in the creation of a continuous line 

of foxholes and hasty trenches from Switzerland to the North 

Sea. Thereafter, every attack was of necessity a frontal attack 

on these trenches. 

The stereotype of trench warfare did not appear overnight. 

On both the Eastern and Western fronts, the battles of 

August-September 1914 were characterized by a great deal of 

fluidity and maneuver. Prewar infantry tactics appeared to work 

under the right circumstances. At 0430 on 8 September, for 

example t the infantry of the Prussian Guard Corps infiltrated 

forward and, in a surprise attack without artillery preparation, 

overran the positions of the French XI Corps .2 On the Eastern 

Front, the German Eighth Army surrounded and destroyed an entire 

Russian army by a double envelopment. In fact, the Eastern Front 

was never as immobile as the Western, because of the greater 

frontages involved. Yet, this fluidity produced indecisive 

results until first the Russians and then the Austro-Hungarians 

became exhausted and demoralized by attrition. 

Given these examples of maneuver, many commanders regarded 

the thin line of 1914 entrenchments as an unnatural and temporary 

pause in the war. British and French commanders spent most of 

the war seeking the means of penetrating and disrupting the enemy 

defenses in order to restore the war of maneuver. Because the 

Germans concentrated most of their efforts on the Eastern Front 

during 1914-19 16, they conducted an economy-of-force defense with 

relatively few attacks in the West. In order to understand the 

nature of World War I tactics, therefore, we need to examine the 

problems of Allied attacks and, then, the development of German 

defensive doctrine. The solutions to both problems involved 

greater cooperation than had previously been established on 

either side; in some cases they also involved the combination of 

the different arms. 

19 
Artillery and Coordination 

Once the infantry attacks failed and trench warfare because 

the reality of combat, the most obvious means of creating a 

penetration was massed artillery fire. Indeed) the British and 

French rapidly gave up any idea of combining artillery fire with 

infantry maneuver and concentrated instead on achieving 

overwhelming destruction in the preparatory fires. Although 

higher-level planners still saw a role for infantry, many 

tactical commanders interpreted the new techniques as “*the 

artillery conquers, the infantry occupies.“3 

Artillery conquest was not easy. Everyone had expectted a 

short war, and thus few armies had sufficient supplies of 

ammunition and heavy artillery to ConduC t the massive 

preparations necessary to demalish even temporary field 

fortifications. In both Britain and Russia, scandals arase over 

the long delays necessary to produce more ammunition and guns. 

Even when France began ta produce more guns, the first madels of 

medium and heavy artillery had extremely slow rates of fire, 

while the more rapid TS-mm gun had such a short range that it had 

to move well forward and displace frequently behind the advancing 

troops in order to destroy any defenses-in-depth.4 

Adding to the problem was the fact that most gunners had 

little experience in precision indirect fire. b&my of the 

procedures that are commonplace to artillerymen today were 

developed painfully during the period 19 14-1911: establishing 

forward observer techniques, measuring and compensating for the 

effects of weather and worn barrels, and using ammunition from 

the same production lot to ensure that sueeessive volleys fell in 

the same general area. The first French regulation describing 

such procedures was not published until November 1W5. The 

British Royal Artillery needed new maps of the entire area of 

Northeastern France before it could establish a grid system for 

surveying battery locations and ad$.zsting indirect fire. The 

fledgling air services of the belligerents had to provide 

aircraft for photographio mapping and both aircraft and balloons 

for adJusting indirect fire. Finally, improved radiotelegraphs 

allowed aerial observers to talk to the artillery fire 

controllers.5 Such developments took most of the war to reach 

perfection. 

Quite apart from the technical problems of indirect fire, 

there was the even greater problem of coordinating the infantry 

and artillery in an attack. The first deliberate attacks 

conducted by the British and French during late 1974 and early 

1915 were particularly difficult to control, because both 

artillerymen and oommanders lacked experience in indirect fire. 

The easiest procedure seemed to be the establishment of a series 

20 
of phase lines, with artillery firing on the far siae of a phase 

line while all infantry remained on the friendly side. Once the 

commander directed artillery fires to shift forward past a new 

phase line, the troops could advance in relative safety. 

Such phase lines encouraged commanders to ignore the terrain 

contours to their front and the possibilities for maneuver, and 

to favor instead simple advances by all units on line. This in 

turn discouraged massing of artillery or infantry at critical 

points. More importantly, there were no effective communications 

procedures that would allow the leading infantry units to talk to 

their supporting artillery. During the Champagne campaign of 

1915, the French went to the extreme of sewing white cloths on 

the backs of their soldiers to help observers determine the 

forward progress of troops, but casualties from friendly fire 

still occurred. The Germans experimented with colored flares and 

signal lamps to communicate between infantry and artillery, but 

su eh signals were often difficult to recognize amidst the 

destruction of battle.6 

Beginning with the battle of the Somme in July 19 16, 

artillery was able to provide a rolling barrage of shrapnel that 

could advance at a steady rate of speed. The use of shrapnel 

instead of high explosive made it safer for the infantry to 

advance close behind the artillery barrage labout 100 meters), 

because the explosive effect of shrapnel was focused forward 

along the line of flight. Shrapnel, however, had almost no 

effect against well-prepared positions--the best It could do was 

force the defender to stay under cover during the assault. In 

addition, there was still no way for the infantry to adjust the 

rate at which the rolling barrage moved forward. The rigid 

forward movement of artillery -fire often outran the heavily laden 

infantryman struggling across the shell-pocked battlefield, 

allowing the defender time to leave his shelter and engage the 

attacker after the barrage had passed over a trench. 

This problem of infantry-artillery coordination was only one 

aspect of the greater problems of command, control, and 

communications that plagued a World War I commander. The huge 

scope of offensives and the scarcity of trained staff officers at 

junior headquarters meant that most operations were planned at 

the level of field army or higher. Given the crude nature of 

artillery procedures in the early stage of the war, artillery 

planning and control were also centralized at a high level. This 

meant that each time the advancing infantry reached an objective 

or phase line they had to stop and request permission to continue 

the advance or to commit reserves. A messenger had to hand-carry 

the request under fire back to the lowest headquarters (usually 

brigade , regiment, or division) where the field telephone 

circuits had survived enemy counterfire. These circuits then 

21 
relayed the request through the different levels of headquarters 

in order to obtain a decision from the senior commander in charge of operatfons. Once a staff estimate had been made and the 

cammander”s decision announced, this communications process had 

to operate in reverse before the troops could advance. For 

example, at the battle of Neuve GhapelPe on 10 March 1915, one of 

the first concentrated artillery preparations of the War 

destroyed most of the shallow German defenses. The forward 

British troops, however, had to wait at a phase line for seven 

hours before they received authorization from their corps 

commanders to continue the advance. During this delay, the 

Germans were able to move in reserves and reestablish a defense 

in the very path of the British advance.7 Once the momentum of 

an attack was lost, it was very diffLcult to organize a renewed 

advance. 

To some extent, these communications problems were a product 

of the technology of the Ume. A senior commander could not 

command chose to the front even if he wished to, He was tied to 

the field telephone system that brought all information to him 

and conducted all orders forward. Although radios did exist, 

they were bulky, unreliable, and generally suspect because of the 

possibility of enemy signals intelligence, These limitations, 

*plus the difficulty of direct communication between infantry and 

artillery, made subordinate inftiative and rapid exploitation 

potentially disastrous. The attacking troops might well fall 

prey to their own artillery support if they did not coordinate 

with higher headquarters. 

BY 1918, improvements in artillery techniques and 

communications made such initiative muoh more practical. The 

Australian general Sir John Monash, for example, developed an 

elaborate system to determine the forward progress of his 

forces. Advancing troops carried specially oolored flares, while 

a detachment of aircraft did nothing but spot the location of 

these flares F write out reports based on the locations, and 

airdrop the results to Monash’s headquarters, This gave a corps 

commander the forward trace of his forces with a delay of twenty 

or fewer minutes + provided he had local air superiority.8 

The Problem of Penetration 

The problems of indirect artillery fire and of command and 

control were only two aspects of the basic tactical question of 

how to achieve and exploit a penetration more rapIdly than the 

defender could redeploy to prevent or seal off a penetration. 

Consider the accompanying abstract diagram (Figure 3) of a 

fully developed trench system. In order to advance, one side had 

to begin by neutralizing the defensive fire of the enemy ts 

22 
NO MAN’S LAND 

v V V V V V V V v barbed 

n n n n n n n n n wire 

artillery positions 

Figure 3. Trench System, World War I. 

s-3330 -23- 
trenches and artillery batteries. As early a3 the battle of 

Neuve Chapelle in 19 15, the British had demonstrated the 

possibility of achieving sueh a penetration by concentrated or 

prolonged artillery fire. Eliminating the barbed wire and 

similar obstacles in front of the enemy trenches was somewhat 

more difficult, Shrapnel had very little effect against wire; 

nor would prewar fuzzes For high explosive rounds detonate against 

the very slight resistance they encountered when passin& through 

barbed wire. By 191’7 the British had developed the Instantaneous 

model 106 fuze that would detonate high explosive rapidly enough 

to destroy wire .9 Indeed, even the German3 conceded that 

artillery and infantry together could always capture the first 

and even the second trench lines, especially if a short artfllery 

bombardment and good operational security maintained surprise. 

The problem came when the attacker tried to displace forward 

to develop and exploit the resulting partial penetration. The 

infantry that had made the initial assault would be exhausted and 

in many cases decimated, while the artillery would need to move 

forward in order to continue its fire3 on the enemy third line 

and artillery posItions. Even after a senior commander learned 

of succe3s, decided to exploit, and communicated his decision 

forward, all of his troops9 guns I and supplies had to move acros3 

the intervening No Man’3 Land and captured enemy trenches 9 an 

area that usually was a sea of mud and shellholes. In most 

cases t by the time the attacker had completed this displacement, 

the defender had been able to bring up reserves and establish new 

trench line3 in front of the attacker. The defender*s role was 

much easier I because his reserve3 could move by railroad and 

motor truck while the attacker”3 forces toiled forward over the 

broken ground. Moreover) the defender could easily counterattack 

and pinch off any penetration that did not occur on a broad 

frontage, because the newly captured area would be exposed to 

concentrated defensive artillery fire, 

Even if the attacker Tmoved faster than the defender and 

actually penetrated through existing trenches and gun positions, 

the second echelon infantry would aga~in be tired, out of the 

range of artfllery support and communications, and essentially 

restricted to Foot mobility, Thus ) another passage of lines 

would be required. In theory, thLs was the stage when horse 

cavalry could use its greater mobility to exploit, although in 

practice a feu machine guns could delay such exploitation 

significantly. 

Thus ( the timing of the decision to exploit and the problems 

of mobility across No Man?3 Land ,remained major obstacles for any 

attacker . Various solutions were tried. Some artillery 

batteries secretly moved forward prior to the battle and 

eamouf laged themselves just behind the friendly first-line 

24 
trenches, allowing sustained artillery support to a slightly 

deeper range. Attacking brigades or regiments developed a system 

of leapfrogging, with second-echelon battalions passing through 

the attacking battalions to sustain the advance. Ultimately, 

however, the point would be reached where the attacker’s , advantages of artillery preparation and, if possible, surprise 

were cance 1 led out by the defender’s advantages of depth, 

terrain, and operational mobility. 

Of course, these problems could be minimized if the attacker 

did not try to achieve a complete penetration in any one attack, 

but settled for capturing a limited objective. Meticulous 

planning and preparation would allow such a surprise attack to 

succeed within the limits of artillery range and command and 

control capabilities, after which a new defense would be 

organized to halt the inevitable counterattack. French 

commanders such as Philippe Pktain were particularly noted for 

using thrs technique during 1917-18, after the French morale had 

been shattered by too many blind frontal attacks. Such a 

set-piece battle certainly improved morale and could achieve a 

limited victory at low cost; it could not, however, break the 

stalemate and win the war. Ultimately, a combination of 

attrition, new weapons, and new infantry tactics were required to 

achieve the elusive victory. 

Flexible Defense 

While the British, French, and later the Americans sought to 

solve the mystery of the penetration, the Germans gradually 

perfected their defenses against such a penetration. This 

evolution of German defensive doctrine was by no means rapid or 

easy, but the result was a system of flexible defense-in-depth 

that not only hindered attack but developed the capabilities of 

the German infantry. 

At the beginning of the war, senior commanders on both sides 

emphasized a rigid defense of forward trenches. As the cost of 

taking ground increased, it seemed treasonous to surrender 

voluntarily even one foot of precious soil to an enemy attack. 

Moreover, m=u commanders believed that creating 

defenses-in-depth and allowing units to withdraw under pressure 

would encourage cowardice, as troops expecting a retreat would 

defend their positions only half-heartedly . I0 Only gradually 

did German leaders realize that massing their forces in the 

forward trenches was suicidal; the artillery bombardment before a 

French or British attack eliminated many of the defenders in 

those trenches, increasing the possibility of enemy penetration. 

This was most obvious at the battle of Neuve Chapelle, when the 

single line of German trenches disappeared under the weight of a 

British bombardment, leaving nothing but a string of concrete 

pillboxes behind the lines to block the British advance until 

reinforcements arrived. 

25 
Beginning with the shock of Neuve Ch&pelle, Germany gradually 

evolved a system that by 1917 included up to five successive 

defensive lines, one behind the other, in critical sectors. The 

first two or three lines were sited on reverse slopes wherever 

the terrain permitted. This not only complicated the task of 

adjusting enemy fire on those trenches, but meant that the 

attacking British and French infantry were out of sight and 

therefore out of communication with their own forces when they 

reached the German defenses. At the same time, if a German 

trench on a reverse slope were captured, it would be fully 

exposed to fire and counterattack from the German rear 

positions. The rearward trenches were beyond the range of enemy 

light and medium artillery, making them more difficult to reduce, 

Quite apart from the choice of terrain, the German defensive 

system emphasized three principles : flexibility , decentralized 

control, and counterattack. In terms of flexibility, the forward 

German trenches most exposed to bombardment contained few troops, 

with perhaps one battalion out of every four in the first two 

trenches. By contrast, the French put two-thirds of every 

regiment in these forward lines, with orders to hold at all 

costs. BY 1916, the Germans had gone even further and had 

decided that trench lines were useful shelters only during quiet 

periods. Once a bombardment began, the rearward German troops 

moved into deep bunkers, while the forward outposts moved out of 

the trenches, taking cover in nearby shellholes. The British and 

French artillery bombarded the deserted trenches until their 

barrage passed and their infantry began to advance. At that 

point the Germans would come out of the shelters and open fire 

from the shellholes or from the remains of the trenches. 

The second aspect of the German system was decentralized 

control, Squad and platoon leaders had considerable independence 

and might defend or delay anywhere forward of the third, or main, 

defense line. The forward or “Front Battalion Commander” 

frequently directed the entire defense of a regimental Sector. 

In the mature system of 19 17-18, this battalion commander ,had the 

authority to commit the remaining two or three battalions of his 

regiment in a counterattack at the moment he judged most 

appropriate, This only exaggerated the difference in decision 

cycles: while the British and French attackers had to seek 

orders and reinforcements from their corps or army commander 

located miles to the rear, the defending German battalion 

commander could direct a regimental counterattack on the spot.11 

This, in fact, pertains to the third element of the German 

defensive tactics : counterattacks at every echelon to retake 

lost ground before the attacker could consolidate. In those 

areas that seemed most vulnerable to attaok, a second-echelon 

division was located behind every one or two front divisions, 

26 
ready to counterattack if needed. Whenever a major offensive 

began, the German defenders sought to contain the flanks of the 

penetration by blocking positions; counterattacks would then 

eliminate the resulting salient. 

Such tactics did not evolve overnight. Many German 

commanders bitterly opposed the flexibility and decentralized 

control of the elastic defense. For example, at Passchendaele in 

July-August 1917, the local commander ordered all outposts to 

hold in place while awaiting the counterattack. The result was 

disaster, with many outposts being cut off. There is some 

evidence that the British incorrectly decided that this costly 

experiment was the real key to German defenses, leading to the 

rigid forward British defense that collapsed in March 1918.12 

The combination of flexibility, decentralized control, and 

counterattack at every echelon made the German defensive system 

almost invincible until attrition and demoralization gave the 

Allies an overwhelming numerical superiority. 

The Allies, by contrast, received fewer ,attacks. from the 

Germans and therefore took longer to arrive at the same 

conclusions. A French directive of 8 July 1915 did require 

commanders to hold the majority of their troops in the rear for 

counterattack, but this order was frequently ignored. Not until 

the five German offensives of 1918 did French field commanders 

learn to array their forces in depth and accept the loss of 

lightly defended forward positions.13 

Technologica_l Change 

Like all major wars, World War 1 accelerated the development 

of new technology. In addition to changes in artillery and 

communications, a number of new weapons appeared as the result of 

efforts to solve the penetration problem. None of these efforts 

was entirely successful, but they all represented additional 

weapons or tools to be combined with the traditional arms. 

Gas warfare was the first attempt to break the trench 

defense. Although the French had experimented with various 

noxious gases on a small scale at the end of 1914, it was the 

Germans who first conducted major gas attacks. The first German 

test of gas took place in January 1915, at Lodk on the Russian 

front. Much of the chemical, however, failed to vaporize because 

of low temperatures. The first use on the Western Front was on 

22 April 1915 at the Ypres salient. There a surprise attack 

routed French colonial troops on a five-mile front, but the 

Germans were not prepared to exploit their success. They had no 

significant reserves available to advance before the French 

sealed the breach. Thereafter, each side found that primitive 

27 
gas masks and uneertain weather conditions made the existing 

nonpersistent and early perslstent agents difficult to employ 

successfully . When the British first used gas at Loos on 25 

September 1915, the wind eondltions were extremely calm, so that 

the gas moved too slowly or in the wrong direction along most of 

tne front. The British troops advanced Into their own gas, 

suffering more casualties than their opponents. The Germans, for 

their part, had problems with chemical warfare on the Western 

Front because the prevailing winds came from the west, often 

blowing gases back in their faces. Gas warfare became only an 

adjunct, useful to degrade enemy effectiveness but not to achieve 

a penetration ,by itself. By 1917-78, the most common use of gas 

was to mix chemical and high explosive artillery shells during a 

preparatory fire, in hopes of forcing the enemy out of - his deep 

shelters where the gas settled.14 

World War I was also the first oonflict to have significant 

air action. Hllitary aviation aeveloped at a tremendous rate 

dur%ng the war, but was still in its infancy in 1918. All of the 

pubXicity went to fighter pilots, whose primary mission was to 

achieve local air superiority. This eondition allowed the 

primitive aircraft of the time to conduct their more basic 

functions of reconnaissance and artillery fire adjustment. Not 

until 191'7 did the BrLtlsh and Germans officially recognize the 

posslbklity of ground attack by fighters in the forward area, and 

both sides considered the main effect of such an attack to be 

demoralization rather than destruction.15 By 1918, the first 

bombers with significant payloads appeared, but in moat cases 

reconnaissance and not bombardment was the critical. contribution 

of air power. 

The military motor vehicle also developed from a few 

prlmltive cars in 1914 to thousands of large trucks by l916* 

Although not a tactical weapon, the truck allowed the rapid 

movement of troops ,and supplies between widely separated points. 

As such, it increased operational mobility as significantly as 

had the raflroad in previous generatlons. This made It possible 

to mass suddenly and conduct a surprise attack at an unexpected 

point, or to move reserves to blunt a penetration. Trucks were 

also essential for stockpiling the ammunition and materiel needed 

for major offensives. 

The tank was originally designed as a special weapon to solve 

an unusual tactical situation, the stalemate of the trenches. 

Basically, the tank was intended to bring the firepower of 

artillery and machine guns across the morass of No Man’s Land 

while providing more protection than a purely infantry unit could 

carry. The sole purpose of this weapon was to assist the 

infantry in creating a penetration so that the eavalry,~ which had 

been waiting for the opportunity since 1914, could exploit into 

the German rear. 

28 
This purpose must be remembered in order to understand the 

shortcomings of early tanks. British and especially French heavy 

tanks had slow speeds, poor mechanical reliability, and great 

vulnerability to direct-fire artillery once the initial surprise 

wore off. After all, these new weapons had to advance only a few 

miles and then turn the battle over to the cavalry. Moreover, 

the great secrecy surrounding tank development, coupled with the 

skeptioism of infantry commanders, often meant that infantry had 

little training to cooperate with tanks. As a result, the 

infantry would become separated from the tanks, allowing the 

German infantry to defeat the two arms separately. Generally 

speaking, infantry that had the opportunity to train with tanks 

before battle and to work with tanks in battle swore by them, 

while infantry that was thrown into battle without prior tank 

training swore at them. 

Small, local attacks, beginning at Flers on the Somme on 15 

September 1916, dissipated the initial surprise of the tank. Not 

until 20 November 1917, at Cambral, did the British Tank Corps 

get the condfktions it needed for success. Using new survey 

techniques, the British guns moved into position without firing 

ranging shots prior to the attack. The tanks then began to move 

forward at the start of a very short artillery bombardment, with 

the Infantry following in the lee of the tanks. The elimination 

of a long artillery preparation not only achieved surprise, but 

also left the ground more traffieable. Four hundred seventy-four 

healy tanks In three brigades had practiced extensively with five 

of the six infantry divisions they accompanied. Tanks operated 

in sections of three: one tank used machine gun fire and its 

treads to suppress the defending infantry, while the other two 

tanks, accompanied by British infantry, crossed the trenches. 

These tactics worked well except at Fl&qui&res .Ridge, in the 

center of the Cambral sector. Here the commander of the 51st 

Highland Division, believing that German r'lre would be focused on 

the armor, had forbidden his infantry to come within 100 yards of 

their tanks. Furthermore, the Royal Flying Corps erroneously 

reported that it had driven off the German artillery in the area, 

whereas one enemy battery had moved onto the reverse slope of the 

ridge. As a result, the British tanks were unsupported when they 

slowly topped the ridge. Direct-fire German artillery knocked 

out sixteen unmaneuverable tanks In a few minutes.16 This 

Incident convinced many people that .armor could not survive when 

separated from infantry, an attitude that persisted after 1918, 

even when tank speed and maneuverabllity improved. In any event, 

the available tanks were distributed evenly across the Cambrai 

front, leaving no reserve to exploit the greatest success. 

Moreover, because of the attrition battles of 1916-17, the 

Brltlsh had few infantry reserves to commit at Cambrai--they had 

regarded it as a raid rather than another attempt to penetrate. 

29 
30 NOV 

BR ADVANCE 21 NOV 

GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS, CAMBRAI 

\+BR ADVANCE . 

ENBURG MAlN LINE 

avrincourt Woods 

0 5KM 

SCALE 

Map 1. Battle of Cambrai, 20-30 November 1917. 

84-3330 

COUNTER-ATTACKS 

NOV 
The usual problems of Allied generals commanding from the rear 

meant that the Germans rebuilt their defenses before the Brltlsh 

cavalry moved forward to exploit. Ten days after the British 

offensive at Gambrai, the Germans counterattacked and restored 

the original front. In Its own way, this counterattack also 

reflected the latest developments of the war: surprise, colored 

flares to shift artillery at phase lines, and multiple attacking 

waves to clear out Brltlsh strongpoints bypassed by the first 

wave. 

Even before Cambral, the Germans had begun to develop an 

antitank doctrine. Ln marked contrast to the beliefs of British 

armor commanders, the German commanders were more concerned by 

the psychological effect of tank attacks than by the LImited 

firepower and armor of the tanks themselves. Psychological 

effect rather than infantry support was the point emphasized by 

postwar German theorists. In 1917-18, however, the Germans 

lacked the resources to compete in tank production. Instead, 

they relied upon obstacle plans combined with existing light 

artillery pieces (the 77-m guns) and some armor-piercing rounds 

for Infantry weapons. These rounds were effective against early 

British tanks, and by 1918 the Germans had developed oversized 

antitank rifles against later British models. To combat the 

terror of tanks, German troops received training on how to defeat 

them. Where possible, German infantry would wait until the 

attacking tank had passed, engage the accompanying British 

infantry, and throw bundles of grenades to disable a tank 

tread.17 

By 1918, tanks were extremely vulnerable unless accompanied 

by infantry and ground-attack aircraft, both of which worked to 

locate and suppress antitank defenses. During the first three 

days of the battle of Bapaume in August 1918, German antitank 

defenses or mechanical failures immobilized 81 percent of the 

attacking tanks.18 Any tank that broke down on the battlefield 

was almost certain to be knocked out by antitank fire In a few 

minutes. Again, such experiences shaped perceptions of tank 

capabilities and roles long aster technological change had 

restored the tank's Initial advantage. 

The French, British, and (with French equipment) Americans 

organized light tank units in 1918. The British Whippet" tank 

was faster (7.5 miles per hour versus four miles per hour) than 

most heavy tanks, but was still hardly a vehicle for rapid 

exploitation. Light tanks were much easier to redeploy in secret 

from one sector to another, because they could be loaded onto 

trucks instead of moved by rail. 

Although the Royal Tank Corps experimented with special 

armored vehicles in which to transport radios, supplies, and even 
machine guns, all tank units in World War I were just that--pure 

tank formations of up to brigade size, intended for attachment to 

infantry un3.ts rather than for independent combined arms 

mechanized operations of their own. 

Gas warfare, aviation, motor transport, and tanks had two 

effects, otner than those derived from their individual tactical 

eharacteristkcs, on the positional battlefield of World War I. 

On the one hand, their development made the problem of combining 

different weapons for attack or defense much more complicated. 

This reinforced the tendency for detailed planning and 

centralized control at a time when infantry-artillery cooperation 

was still being developed. On the other hand, the army that 

succeeded in this orchestration had a much better chance of 

eventually defeating its opponent by attrition, even if 

penetration was never achieved. 

The Resusence of lnfantry 

Host of the developments in artillery, gas warfare, aircraft, 

and armor were based on the supposed inabrlfty of 1914 infantry 

to advance under fire. During the course of World War I, 

however, the infantry gradually evolved to a point where it had 

recovered some of its original ability to take and hold terrain 

on Its own, In the process, modern infantry organlzatfon was 

developed. 

The 1914 Infantry battalion was almost exclusively armed with 

rifles, plus a few heavy and almost immobile machine guns. As 

soon as the effects of firepower became evident on the 

battlefield, however, the infantry of various armies sought to 

increase their own firepower in return. The first such effort 

was the trench mortar. Nortars had existed as a form of heavy 

artillery for centuries, but in 1914 the German Army introduced a 

llmlted number of small, eheap, portable minenwerfers, which were 

breech-loading, low-trajectory mortars. Other armies quiokly 

copied the minenwerfer, and in March 1915, the English engineer 

Wilfred Stokes developed the grandfather of all current infantry 

mortars, the 3-inch muzzle-loading Stokes mortar.l9 This 

weapon was much simpler to manufacture than artillery and 

therefore was employed extensively in all armies during the war. 

However, larger caliber mortars were often classified as weapons 

for artillerymen or, in the German Army, for engineers, and thus 

placed in batteries <and battalions separated from the infantry. 

As early as 1915 the French began to issue other new weapons 

to the infantry, notably the light automatic rifle and the rifle 

grenade launcher. These, plus ordinary hand grenades, gave the 

32 
French infantry more mobile automatic firepower and short-range 

\;II, to 150 meters) indirect-fire capability. On 27 September 

France reorganized the Infantry company to consist of a 

headiuarters, which included communications and pioneer (combat 

engineer) personnel, plus four platoons of two sections each. 

Within these twelve&men sections, hand grenadiers, rifle 

grenadiers, and riflemen were organized around the automatic 

rifleman as the base of fire. Three of these infantry companies, 

Plus a company of eight heavy machine guns and a 37-m gun in the 

headquarters, made up an infantry bat tallon that modern 

infantrymen can recognize as such. Other armies adopted similar 

armament and organizations, although the Germans delayed until 

1917. The German preoccupation with accuracy of fire by heavy 

machine guns made them reluctant to accept the relatively 

inaccurate light machine guns and automatic rifles, until in 

desperation the frontline German Infantry began to use captured 

French automatic rifles.20 

The resulting changes in infantry tactics were slow to take 

root. In May 1915, an obscure French captain named Andre/ 

Laffargue privately published a pamphlet that suggested a variety 

of innovations, including not only trench mortars but so-called 

skirmisher or sharpshooter groups. These groups, armed with 

light machine guns, rifle grenades, and hand grenades, would 

precede the main assault wave by fifty meters. Their mission was 

to provide covering fire for the ma-in attack and, if possible, to 

infiltrate through the forward German positions to suppress and 

outflank German machine gun posts. The French government 

distributed but did not endorse this pamphlet; the British 

largely ignored it and were among the last to give up the linear 

advance. Not until 1916 did the French officially reduce the 

density of their skirmish lines to one man every two, and later 

every five, paces, as opposed to every pace, and Integrate the 

new weapons fully into infantry organization. Meanwhile, the 

Germans captured a copy of Laffargue’s pamphlet during the summer 

of 1916 and may have adapted parts of It to their own tactical 

doctrine.21 

The evolution of German offensive tactics during World War 1 

was slower than that of the elastic defense. Although the 

Germans as early as Verdun In 1916 used small groups of riflemen, 

‘machine gunners, and engineers to inflltrate past the French 

outposts at the start of an attack, their new infiltration 

tactics actually evolved in 1977 on the Russian and Italian 

fronts, in the battles of Riga and Caporetto. These tactics are 

sometimes called, probably erroneously, Wutier tactics .'I Gen. 

Oskar von Hutier commanded such attacks on the Russian and 

Italian fronts during 1917 before directing one of the field 

33 
armies in the German spring offensive of 1918, but he did not 

invent the COnCepts. Some German officers nave since denied the 

very existence of the Hinfiltrationlf or "soft-spot" tactics, and 

in fact the victories of 1918 were probably the result of the 

intelligent application of lessons learned against the Russians 

and Italians, rather than any sudden Innovation In tactics. It 

is clear, however, that the German Chief of Staff, Erich von 

Ludendorff, issued a set of offensfve instructions dated 8 

February 1918, which directed infantry to attack on Its own using 

machine guns, rifles, grenades, light .mortars, and accompanying 

direct-fire artillery pieces. During early 1918 as many as 

seventy divisions rotated tnrough a special training course in 

the new offensive tactics.22 

The result was the astonishing German success of March and 

April 1918. The taetios involved represented the culmination of 

German developments in combined arms during World War 1. The 

spirit behind these tactics, when combined wrth armored 

equipment, had much to do with the later German blitzkrieg. 

The Return Of Mobility, 1918 

The German infiltration tactics of 1918 can be summarized 

under four headings: BruckmGller artillery preparation; the 

combined arms assault or storm battalion; rejection of the linear 

advance in favor of bypassing enemy centers of resistance;- and 

attacks to disorganize the enemy rear area. 

Cal. Georg Bruckmliller, an obscure officer retired for 

nervous problems in 1913 but recalled to duty for the war, 

developed German artillery techniques to a fine art. The essence 

of the Bruckm6ller artillery preparation was a carefully 

orchestrated, snort but intense bombardment designed to isolate, 

demoralize, and disorganize enemy defenders. Before each of the 

great offensives, Bruckmuller and hrs assistants held classes for 

junkor leaders of both artillery and infantry, explaining what 

would take place. The result was not only unprecedented 

understandLng and cooperation, but a much greater confidence on 

the part of the infantry. Next, BruckmiEller allocated .different 

weapons against different specific targets. For example, each 

trench mortar was given only twenty-five to thirty meters of 

enemy front to engage, while each artillery battery was assigned 

to suppress a speclfie enemy battery or to attack 100 to 150 

meters of enemy positions. 23 BruckmGller avoided area targets, 

concentrating on such key points as artillery observation posts, 

command posts, radio and telephone centers, rearward troop 

concentrations, bridges, and major approach routes. Be carefully 

Pinpointed all. these targets on aerial photographs. The result 

was to cut enemy communications and isolate forward units. The 

effect was increased by surprise. Using the survey techniques 

34 
developed in aI.1 armies during 1916-17, Bruckmiiller was able to 

position and range his batteries in secret from point3 

immediately behind the forward infantry trenches. 

At the start of the German orfensive on 21 March 1918, 

Bruckmiiller began his bombardment with ten minutes of gas shells 

to force the British to mask, followed by four how-3 and 

twenty-five minute3 of mixed gas and high explo3ives.24 The 

preparatory I-ire3 shifted back and forth, 30 that the BrltLsh did 

not know when the artillery was actually lifting for the Infantry 

advance. Meanwhile, automatic rifle team3 moved as close as 

possible to the British positions during the bombardment.*5 

When the Germans did advance, they moved behind a rolling 

barrage, further enhanced by intense fog. The combination of 

surprise, brevity, intensity, and carefully selected target3 was 

unique. 

The combined arms assault or storm battalion was a union of 

all the weapons available after years of trench warfare, weapons 

which could be focused by a battalion commander. A typical 

assault battalion task. force consisted of: 

3-4 infantry companies 

1 trench mortar company 

1 accompanying artillery battery or half-battery of 

77-m guns 

1 flamethrower section 

1 signal detachment 

1 pioneer (combat engineer) section 

The regimental commander might attach additional machine gun 

units and bicyclists. The accompanying artillery pieces did not 

participate in the artillery preparation, but waited behind the 

infantry, ready to move immediately. One of the principal tasks 

of the pioneer3 was to assist in the movement of the guns across 

obstacles and shellholes. Upon encountering a center of 

resistance, the infantry provided suppressive fire, while the 

guns, mortars, and flamethrower3 attempted to eliminate that 

resistance. Despite a specially constructed low carriage on some 

77-m guns, the result was a very high casualty rate among the 

exposed crews, al though the disorganized state of British 

defenses made such situations relatively rare.26 

The essence of the German tactic3 was for the sirst echelon 

of assault unit3 to bypass centers of resistance, seeking to 

penetrate into the enemy positions In columns or squad groups, 

down defiles or between outposts. Some skirmishers had to 

precede these dispersed columns, but skirmish lines and linear 

tactics were avoided. The local commander had authority to 

continue the advance through gaps in the enemy defense3 without 

35 
regard for events on his flanks, A second echelon, again 

equipped with light artillery and pioneers, was responsible for 

eliminating bypassed enemy positions. This system of 

decentralized tfsoft-spottf advances was second nature to the 

Germans because of their fIexible defensive experience. At the 

battle of Caporetto in 1917, the young Erwin Rommel used such 

tactics to bypass forward defenses and capture an Ltalian 

infantry regiment with only a few German companies.27 

The final aspect of the German infiltration tactics was the 

effort to disorganize the enemy rear. The artillery preparation 

began by destroying communications and command centers; the 

infiltrating infantry also attacked such centers, as well as 

artillery positions. The BrLtish defenders who opposed the r’zrst 

German offensive of 1918 lost all organization and retreated 

thirty-eight kilometers in four days. Col. 3.F.C. Fuller, one of 

the foremost British tank tacticians, observed that the British 

seemed to collapse and retreat from the rear forward. Major 

British headquarters learned of multiple German attacks on 

forward units just before PosMg contact with some of those 

units. The higher British commanders then ordered their remaining 

forces I which were often successfully defendkng their bypassed 

positions, to withdraw in order to restore a conventional linear 

front ,z8 

The German spring offensives ultimately faILed for a variety 

of reasons, including lack of mobUity to exploit initial 

successes and lack of clear strategic objectives. As a result, 

Ludendorff dissipated his forces in a series of attacks that 

achieved tactical success but no operational or strategic 

decision. 

fn other words, the German offensive of 1928 used tactics and 

organization that could be described as a bfitzkrie wlthout 

tanks, disorganizing and demoralizing rather than systematically 

destroying the defender. This was especially easy to do against 

a World War 1 army, where the static nature of deployments and 

telephone communlcatlons had combined with the elaborate planning 

nec!essary for a set-piece battle to produce a defender who had 

great difficulty reacting to sudden changes. Both sides found 

that their soldiers no longer knew how to fight in open terrain, 

but dug in immediately whenever they broke through the enemy 

defensive system. 

The German spring offensives of 1918 were the most obvious 

example of mobility returriirig to the battlefield, but Ln fact all 

armies in 1918 were better able to attack than they had been in 

the preceding three years. Beginning on 15 July 1918, the 

British, French, and Americans launched a sustained series of 

a.ttacks that combined all the Allied innovations made during the 

war. Infantry units used renewed mobility and firepower, plus 
tanks to precede them and suppress enemy strongpoints. Airpower 

provided llmited ground-attack capability plus reoonnaissance 

both before and during the battle. This air reconnaissance 

focused on antitank threats to the advancing forces. Artillery 

had become much more sophisticated and effective than in 1914. 

Most important of all, the different weapons and arms had learned 

to cooperate closely, at least in carefully planned set-piece 

operations. Commanders could no longer rely on one or even two 

arms, but had to coordinate every available means to overcome the 

stalemate of the trenches. 

Despite all this, the 1918 offensives in France never 

achieved a decisive result on the battlefield, and the Germans 

were defeated more by sustained attrition and demoralization than 

by any decisive penetration and exploitationW29 One of the few 

cases In which a 1918 army penetrated a prepared defense and then 

exploited with conclusive results occurred in Palestine rather 

than France, where the British defeated Germany’s ally, Turkey. 

This victory is known as the second battle of Armageddon or 

Megiddo (Map 21, because it was fought in the same area as the 

original battle of 1479 B.C.30 

The British commander, Sir Edmund Allenby, had steadily 

advanced from Egypt tnrough Palestine against a Turkish army with 

a German commander, Liman von Sanders, and a few German units. 

The Turkish government had diverted its resources elsewhere, so 

that in 1918 the British outnumbered the Turks two to one. 

Allenby further increased his advantage by a detailed deception 

plan that convinced the Turks that the British would attack at 

the eastern end of the front, in the Jordan Valley. The actual 

attack was then conducted in the west, near the seacoast. The 

fact that the British possessed a tremendous numerical advantage 

does not detract from the significance of the second battle of 

Armageddon in terms of its tactical methods and strategic 

objectives. 

Allenby used all available elements, beginning with irregular 

troops in the enemy rear areas. On 17 September 1918, two days 

before the planned offensive, the famous T. E. Lawrence and 

Prince Feisal of Arabia conducted a wave of attacks on Turkish 

rail lines In order to divert attention and isolate the 

battlefront. The Royal Air Force also harassed Turkish lines of 

communlcations for days. At 0430 on 19 September, the British 

infantry began to move forward behind a fifteen-minute artillery 

barrage. This short preparation achieved surprise and avoided 

tearing up the ground. Moreover, the long delays in assembling 

troops and supplies prior to the offensive had enabled the 

British and Commonwealth infantry to train to high standards Of 

flexibility. Unlike the campaigns in France, exploitation forces 

37 
MEDlTERRAffEAN 

\ \\ CARMEL fib NAZARETH 

\ 

. FRONT, 

18 SEP 1918 

SCA.LE 

Contour lntervsl 150 meters 

Map 2. Second Battle of Armageddon, 19-24 September 1918 

84-3330 -38- 
did not have to wait for authority to engage. Instead, one 

Australian and two British cavalry divisions began the battle 

closed up tightly behind the assaulting infantry, with 

exploitation objectives already designated. Because of this 

decentralized control, the 4th Cavalry Division had completed Its 

passage of lines and had begun the exploitation within four nours 

of the initial assault. 

The primary objectives of the campaign were the railroad 

junctions at El AfuYe and Beisan, forty miles behind the front; a 

secondary objective was Nazareth, the German-Turkish 

headquarters. Seizure of these points would cut off the forward 

Turkish units from their supplies., commanders, and route of 

retreat. The key was to move cavalry through the passes of the 

Mount Carmel heights so rapidly that the Turks could not react to 

block the passes. This was accomplished on the evening of the 

first day. The next morning, a brigade of the 4th Cavalry 

Division encountered a reinforced Turkish infantry battalion 

marching forward in a belated effort to block the pass at 

Musmus. A combination of armored car machine gun fire and horse 

cavalry lances captured this battalion before it ever deployed. 

Twenty-five nours after the offensive began, another British 

cavalry brigade surrounded Nazareth, which had been Isolated and 

harassed by alr attacks. Although the German commander escaped 

in the confusion, the British captured all the documents in the 

enemy headquarters. The Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies, 

except for a few hundred stragglers, surrendered In mass, and 

only the November armistice ended the British pursuit. 

The significance of Second Armageddon was threefold. First, 

it represented a rare ability to make a transltion from 

penetration to exploitation and pursuit before the defender could 

react. The key to this success, apart from numerical 

superiority, was the fact that the exploitation force did not 

wait for permission from higher headquarters, but was committed 

on the decision of division commanders and in execution of a 

previously arranged plan. Second, Allenby used all his weapons 

and units in a flexible and integrated manner that was matched in 

World War I only by the Germans. Finally, Second Armageddon 

influenced an entire generation of British cavalry officers, who 

considered it the model of a mobile, deep battle. After the 

frustrations of trench stalemate in France, the exploitation in 

Palestine seemed a dream come true. When these cavalry officer3 

became armor commanders, they stressed the need for mobile, 

lightly armored vehicles. As a result, one-half of the British 

armored force in 1939 wasp equipped with inadequate guns and armor 

and was not prepared to cooperate with the other combat arms. 

39 
Organizational Results 

In addition to the changes in infantry battalion structure, 

the rapid development of weapons and tactics during World War I 

significantly changed tactical organizations. The number of 

automatic weapons in an infantry division rose from a norm of 

twenty-four heavy machine guns in 19l4 to the following totals in 

1918: 

Germany : 144 automatic rifles and 54-108 machine guns 

France: 216 automatic rifles and 72-108 machine guns 

Britain: 192 automatic rifles and 64 machine guns 

Italy: 288 automatic rifles and 72 machine guns 

United States: 768 automatic rifles and 260 machine 

guns31 

Artillery developed almost as dramatiealfy, although most of 

the additional guns were concentrated in nondivisional units 

whose numbers varied depending on the mission of the division 

being supported. As Gen. Wilhelm von Balck, a major German 

tactician both before and after the war, remarked: 

The question as to the proportion of the artillery is no 

longer: 'How many guns for each thousand men should be 

provlaed?,' but far rather: 'HOW much infantry will be 

required to utilize the success of the fire of the 

artillery?? a . .there are no longer principal arms. 

Each arms has its use, all are necessary.32 

More complex problems drove other organizational cnanges. 

For example, both the French and the Germans found that the 

square division structure, with two brigades each of two 

regfments; was unsuited to positional warfare, Given the broad 

frontages involved in this type of war, no European power had 

enough manpower and units to deploy divisions with two regiments 

in first line and two in second. If, on the other hand, tnree 

regiments were in the first lfne and the fourth regiment served 

as a general reserve, one of the twa infantry brigade commanders 

was superfluous. So the Germans left one brigade commander in 

control of all infantry, and by 1916 both the French and the 

Germans had reduced the number of infantry regiments in a 

division from four to three (Figure 4). The British had entered 

the war with a three-brigade structure, which they retained, but 

they eventually followed suit by reducing the brigade from four 

infantry battalions to three when manpower shortages became 

acute. This had the added advantage of increasing the proportion 

of artillery and other branches to infantry, although the Germans 

moved part of their artillery into nondivisional units. Thus, a 

40 

--. 
HO 

TYPE U.S. DIVISION, 

1918 

28,106 men, 77 guns, 

2_60 machine guns 

3” or 76mm 

TYPE GERMAN DIVISION, 

1918 

11,643 men, 36 guns, 

64-108 machine guns 

HQ &I 

- 

I 

I 

I 

84-3330 

MRD 

cl @ 

Bearers 

ffl 

1. I 0 0 

-I * 

106mm how 

tzo 

@ 

77mm gun 

Figure 4. Type U.S. and German Divisions, 1918 

-41- 
1914 French Infantry division consisted of 87 percent infantry, 

IO percent artillery, and 3 percent support elements, while the 

1918 version had a proportion of 65 percent infantry, 23 percent 

artillery, and 8 percent support.33 

The one exception to this trend was the United States Army, 

which not only insisted upon a four-regiment structure, but 

actually increased the size of rifle companies during 1911 (see 

figure 4). The result was a division that varied in size from 

2Y,OOO to over 28,000 aen, a giant considerFng the average 

strength of a European division was down to 8,000 men or fewer, 

In fact, the French and British commanders who oontrolled 

American divisions refused to use them according to their design 

and, instead, pushed them into line with .three regrments forward 

and the fourth either in second echelon or in corps reserve. In 

one instance, the 42d U.S. Infantry Division assumed the defense 

of a sector previously occupied by an entfre French corps of 

three divisions.34 In principle, however, the American design 

was intended to provide for sustaIned offensive and defensive 

operations despite the high casualties of trench warfare. The 

apparent intent was that an American brigade commander, wkth one 

regiment in contact and the second behind it, could leapfrog his 

reglxnents to sustain an offensive almost indefinktely, thereby 

cuttkng the decision cycle time necessary to relieve exhausted 

assault troops. Unlike all higher commanders on the Allied side, 

this colonel or brigadier general had only a few aides and was 

free to command from forward locations. The only reserve 

available to the dlvision commander was the two-battalion combat 

engineer regiment, which was frequently pressed into service as 

infantry. 

Even though the Americans differed with their allies about 

many details, all participants came away from World War I with 

certain impressions In common: the tremendous problems of 

logistics and manpower; the necessity for detailed planning and 

coordination; and the difficulty of advancing even when all arms 

worked closely together. Under carefully planned and controlled 

circumstances, the Allies had been able to combine all weapons 

systems to maximize the effects of each. Of all the belligerent 

systems for achieving this combination, the German proved to be 

most adaptable to new weapons and tactics. 

42 
CHAPTER THREE 

THE INTERWAR PERIOD 

The conventional image of military affairs and doctrine 

between the two world wars depicts most armies as rigidly 

committed to a repetition of the positional warfare of 1914-18. 

According to this view, only Hitler's Germany listened to the 

advocates of mechanized warfare, with the result that between 

1939 and 1947 the German blitzkrieg achieved almost bloodless 

victories over the outdated Polish, French, and British armies. 

The reality was much more varied and complex. No major army 

entered World War 11 with the same doctrine and weapons that it 

had used twenty years before. During the interwar period, the 

majority of professional soldiers recognized that some change was 

necessary if they were to perform better the battlefield 

functions of penetration and exploitation that had proven so 

difficult during World War 1. Yet armies differed markedly in 

their solutions to these problems. lnstead of a simple choice 

between trench warfare and blitzkrieg, each army was faced with a 

variety of possible changes, a series of degrees of modernization 

between the two extremes. In many cases, the choice was 

determined by social, economic' and political factors more than 

by the tactical concepts of senior officers. Even in Germany, 

the advocates of mechanized warfare did not have a free hand. In 

a real sense, the German forces and doctrine of 1939 were not so 

much the perfect solution as they were simply a solution that was 

closer to the problems of the moment than were the organizations 

and doctrine of Germany's early opponents. 

Because of this tactical variety between the world wars, the 

doctrine and organization of each of the major powers must be 

considered up to the point at which that nation entered World War 

11. Before reviewing these armies, however, it is necessary to 

examine some common factors that hampered military Change in mOSt 

nations. 

The first of these factors was a general revulsion against 

warfare and all things military. After decades of peacetime 

preparation and years of incredible bloodshed, few people in 

Europe or America were interested in further military 

expenditures or experiments with new weapons and tactics. 

Particularly in France, firepower seemed so great that few 

soldiers foresaw any type of offensive success against prepared 

enemy positions without the combination of a mass army with 

tanks, artillery, and attrition tactics, the means that had 

succeeded in 1918. Even after most armies concluded that trench 

warfare was a special kind of combat that would not necessarily 

recur, the general public and political leadership were unwilling 

43 
to risk another war, In 1928, fifteen nations signed the 

Kellogg-Briand Pact, renouncing the use of war except in national 

self-defense. During the 1920s and early 19309, a series of 

international conferences attempted to limit military and naval 

armaments, Although these conferences ultimately failed, it was 

difficult for professional soldiers to justify the purchase of 

new weapons such as tanks and aircraft in a social and political 

environment that might outlaw such weapons at any time. 

During the first fifteen years of peaoe, extremely tight 

defense budgets reflected the public distaste for warfare. The 

victorious armies were saddled with nuge stockpiles of 1918-model 

equipment and ammunition and had to use up these stockpiles at 

peacetime rates before major new expenditures could be 

justified. Thus, during the early 1930s the U.S. Army spent more 

money researching means to preserve ammunition than to develop 

new weapons,? Just as the stockpiles were consumed or worn 

out, the Great Depression caused even tighter defense budgets, 

which hampered development and procurement of tanks, aircraft, 

and other new weapons. The Germans, by contrast, had been 

deprived of their weapons by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 

and could therefore start fresh. To some extent, the German 

tactical successes of 1939-42 were due not to any superiority in 

equipment quality or quantity, but rather to the fact that the 

German tanks and other vehicles were produced early enough to 

allow extensive experimentation and training before the war. In 

contrast, the British and Freneh had few modern weapons with 

which to train until the very eve of World War 11, when they 

mass-produced them on a crash basis. Nations with a smaller 

industrial base, such as Japan and Italy, could not fully Compete 

in the arms race. The Japanese selectively built a few types of 

warships and aircraft of high quality. In land warfare, they 

relied upon training and morale to make up for weapons that they 

could not afford to mass-produce. ltaly lacked not only 

production facilities, but equipment design eapability and even 

public understanding of automobiles and other machinery. As a 

result, the Ltalians failed to produce any modern, well-designed 

weapons.2 

A third factor was teohnology, which affected military change 

in two ways. On the one hand, rapid changes in technology made 

governments even more reluctant to invest in existing designs 

that would soon be outmoded. Pn 1938, for example, the 

Inspector-General of the French Air Force had to advise the 

French and British governments to avoid a showdown at Munich 

beoause he believed that the majority of French combat aircraft 

were suddenly obsolescent; new developments such as flush-riveted 

metal construction gave the German Luftwaffe the appearance of 

technical superiority.3 On the other hand, it was often 

difficult to aetermine exactly now this new technology affected 

44 
the tactics of 1918. Equipment designed to fulfill these tactics 

might be unsuitable for different functions and concepts, while 

new designs appeared witnout appropriate tactical concepts to 

accompany them. 

There was also considerable confusion in terminology. Both 

advocates and opponents of mecnanizacion often used the term 

?.ank" loosely to mean not only an armored, tracked, turreted, 

gun-carrying fighting vehicle, but also any form of armored 

vehicle or mechanized unit. Such usage made it difficult for 

contemporaries or historians to determine whether a particular 

speaker was discussing pure tank forces, mechanized combined arms 

forces, or mechanization of infantry forces. Similar aonfusion 

existed about the term "mechanization." Strictly speaking, any 

use of the gasoiine engine for warfare could be termed 

mechanization. However, this term is usually employed to 

describe tne use of armored tracked combat vehicles. By 

contrast, "motorizatibnf' describes the use of motor vehicles that 

are not intended to go into combat, but which may improve 

logistics and mobility off the battlefield. No nation in the 

world could afford to mechanize fully in this sense, but all 

armies made some motions in the direction of motorization. 

Indeed, there was almost no choice about the matter. Prior to 

World War I, all nations relied on a pool of civilian horses as 

transportation in case of war. With the rise of motor vehicles 

during the 19209, this supply of civilian animals declined to the 

point where armies had to base their transportation planning on 

motor vehicles.4 Thus, motorization was often seen as an 

easier, cheaper, less revolutionary change than mechanization. 

Fifth, advocates of change did not always speak persuasively 

or with one voice even when their terms were understood. Even 

those reformers with a clear vision of mechanized, combined arms 

war were often so extreme in their statements that they alienated 

the men they needed to convert, the commanders and politicians 

who set military policy. In the French and Soviet cases, 

political issues retarded the development of new mechanized 

formations. Moreover, proponents of strategic airpower such as 

William Mitchell and Emil10 Douhet made exaggerated claims that 

retarded the development of the tactical combined arms team. 

Intent on achieving independence from army control, the airpower 

adVOCateS vigorously opposed tactical air support and air-ground 

cooperation; they considered the targets involved to be too minor 

to justify risking aircraft. These air enthusiasts nad a limited 

success as publicists, influencing politicians with an apparently 

cheap, efficient solution to defenSe needs. As a result, funds 

were diverted from valuable training or ground weapons 

development to build air forces that were not in proportion to 

their respective armies. This leads to the sixth and final 

common factor, the opposition of the more traditional combat 

45 
arms. Many commentators nave blamed such opposition for 

thwarting or retarding the development of mechanized warfare. 

There is some truth to this accusation, as will be seen below. 

Yet the tank and the alrcraft were not the only weapons systems 

that developed between the world wars. The older branches had 

genuine needs that competed with new weapons for funding and for 

roles in the combined arms team. The infantry nad legitrmate 

requirements for increased organio firepower, for antitank and 

antiaircraft defenses, as well as for some form of armored 

support to assist it in the deliberate attack. The artillery 

needed the same moblllty as the armored forces in arder to 

support those forces in the breakthrough. Fast moving mechanized 

formations required more flexible communications and sire 

support. Combat engineers, whfch had become preoccupied with 

makntaining lines of communication during the posktional warfare 

of 1914-18, were more important than ever when mechanized units 

increased the problems of mobility and countermobflity on the 

battlefield. AS a result, although much of this chapter will 

focus on the development of mechanized formations and tactics, 

such development must be viewed within the context of a more 

traditional mass army. Any nation that created a mechanized 

elite ran the risk of dividing its army, with catastrophic 

problems of coordination and morale. 

Great Britain: '"Hasten Slowlyf~5 

In 1918, Great Britain led the world in both armored 

equipment and armored doctrine. At a time when most soldiers 

regarded the tank as a specialized infantry-support weapon for 

crossing trenches, a significant number of officers' in the Royal 

Tank Corps had gone on to envision much broader roles for 

mechanized organizations. In May 1918, Col. J,F.C. Fuller had 

used the example of German infiltration tactics to refine what he 

called "'Plan 1919.tr This was an elaborate concept for a 

large-scale armored offensive in 1919, an offensive that would 

not only produce multiple penetrations of the German forward 

defenses, but also totally disrupt the German command structure 

and rear organization. Fuller's expressed goal was to defeat the 

enemy by a "pistol shot to the brain" of enemy headquarters and 

communications, instead of by destroying the combat elements 

through systematic attrition. In order to attack German 

headquarters before they could displace, Fuller reLied upon the 

Medlum D tank. Potentially, the Medium D could drive at twenty 

miles per nour, a speed that would allow it to exploit the 

rupture of trenehes caused by slower heavy tanks. In fact, the 

Medium D suffered the usual developmental problems of any radically new piece of equipment and might not have been 

available even if the war had continued into 1919. Moreover, 

then as later, Fuller was noteworthy for his neglect of infantry 

in the mechanized team. He could and did conceive of trucked 

46 
infantry advancing after the tanks under certain ClrCUmStanCeS, 

but not fighting in close coordination with armor except at the 

point of rupture in a deliberate attack.6 

Despite the efforts of numerous innovators like Fuller, the 

British Army gradually lost its lead not only in armor but in 

most areas of tactical progress. In addltlon to the six common 

factors previously discussed, there were several special 

obstacles to continued BrLtlsh innovation. 

The most commonly cited obstacle was traditionalism within 

the Brltlsh Army. This institutional resistance has often been 

exaggerated, but certainly the strong unit identity of the 

Brltlsh regimental system discouraged radical changes wlthin the 

traditIona arms and services. A related problem was that Great 

Britain was the first nation to create an independent air force. 

The Royal Air Force (RAF) was intent upon developing its own 

identlty as a separate service and resls ted any close 

relationship with the army. Like most other air services, the 

RAF was increasingly interested in interdiction and strategic 

bombing, but not ground support. In 1922, for example, the army 

requested that eight “Army Co-Operation Squadrons” be permanently 

assigned for liaison and reconnaissance duties with ground 

troops. The RAF would only provide three squadrons. During 

meehanlzed exercises in 1926, a number of RAF pilots practiced 

close air support for armored units, but after this display the 

Air Ministry formally requested that the army refrain from 

encouraging pilots to violate RAF doctrine.7 This limitation 

was clearly reflected in Brltlsh Army regulations from 1924 

onward, where the RAF was described as providing only liaison and 

reconnaissance in the immediate proximity of ground units. 

Fighter aircraft could conduct strafing and other ground attacks 

“in exceptional circumstances, II but only at the expense of their 

air superiority mission. DespSte the efforts of many British 

armored theorists, close air support doctrine was not really 

developed In Britain untI.1 1942.8 

The problem of imperial defense also limited change. Sine e 

1868, most British troop units stationed at home exchanged places 

with units overseas on a regular basis. In particular, a large 

portion of the British Army was always stationed In the Middle 

East and India. These overseas garrisons required large numbers 

of infantrymen to control civil dlsorders and made loglstical 

support of elaborate equipment and weapons difficult. 

Consequently , a unit in tne British isles could not be motorized 

or Qechanized without considering the effect of this change on 

that unit’s performance In low intensity, imperial police 

operations. This did more than delay mechanization. It also 

meant that In designing armored fighting vehicles the British 

47 
were often thinking about the requirements of warfare against relatively unsophLsticated opponents, and not against well-armed 

European forces. 9 

Despite these limitations on innovation, British doctrine did 

not stand still during the 1920s. A repetition of World War I 

seemed unthinkable, so positional warfare rapidly declined in 

British aoocrine to the status of a special ease. Instead, the 

British returned to the concepts of open, maneuver warfare that 

had been common before 1914, updating those ooncepts only to 

allow for the effects of firepower and motor vehicles. The 1924 

Field Serv&ce Regulations considered infantry support to be the 

chief mkssion of tanks, but also recognized the possibility of 

tanks attacking the enemy flanks and rear to disorganize the 

opponent, as envisioned by Fuller. These regulations showed a 

serious and practical concern wrth the problems of antitank and 

antiaircraft defense of all arms, although actual weapons for 

these problems were slow to appear. By 1929, British regulatfons 

had abandoned the old belief in the primacy of infantry, which 

instead became "the arm which aonrirms the victory and holds the 

ground won" by a close cooperation of all. arms. Stikl, this 

cooperation was apparently to be achieved by detailed, meticulous 

planning of the 19 18 variety. Coordination in encounter battles 

was much more difficult.lQ 

At the same time the British, despite significant budgetary 

restrictions, were able to motorize parts of their artillery and 

supply units and to oontinue development of the small Royal Tank 

GOlTp3 6 In 1927-28, an Experimental Mechanized Force conducted 

brigade-level exercises in Britain. This force included a light 

tank battalion for reoonnaissanoe, a medium tank battalion for 

assault, a machine gun battalion for security and limited 

infantry operations, five motorized or mechanized artillery 

batteries, and a motorized engineer company. Unfortunately, the 

equipment used varied greatly in its cross-country mobhlity and 

reliability. The vehicles were a mixture of tracked and wheeled, 

experimental and well-developed equipment that could not move 

together except at very slow speeds. 

of the Royal Tank Corps decided 

incompatible with armored operations 

on aunost pure tank formations. 

The British War Office dissolved the Experimental Mechanized 

Force in 1928 for a variety of factors, including buagetary 

restrictions and the opposition of some- military eonservatives. 

This force dfd, however, provide the basis for Col. Charles Broad 

to produce a new regulation, Mechanized and Armoured Formations, 

In 1929. This regulation was a great advance in deseriblng’ the 

rakes and missions of separate armored formations, but it also 

As a result, some officers 

that the other arms were 

and focused their attention 
reflected the pure-tank attitude that was becoming common in the 

Royal Tank Corps. Even wnen Broad proposed a Royal Armoured 

Corps that included tanks, mechanized cavalry, and mechanized 

infantry, he explicitly excluded artillery and englneers.ll 

StlLl, Broad recognized different models of armored vehicle and 

different roles for them. In particular, the standard “mixedtt 

tank battalion of an inaependent tank brigade was a combination 

of three different types of vehicle. Within each company; seven 

light tanks would reconnoiter the enemy posltions and then 

provide fire support for five medium tanks that actually 

conducted the assault. In addlt ion, two %lose support 

tanks” --really self-propelled howitzers or mortars--would provlde 

smoke and suppressive fire for the assault. l2 Since in 

practice the “light tanks” were often small armored personnel 

carriers, the parallel with more recent American armored cavalry 

snould be obvious. 

British armored theorists did not always agree with each 

other. Basil Liddell Hart, a noted publieist of armor, wanted a 

true combined arms force with a major role for mechanized 

infantry. Fuller, Broad, and other officers were more interested 

in a pure-tank role, in part because they experienced difficulty 

cooperating with the other arms. G. L. Martel, one of the most 

innovative theorists and tank designers of the period, was 

fascinated with the idea of using extremely small armored 

personnel carriers, capable of transporting one to three men and 

a machine gun, to assist the infantry in its attacks. 

Unfortunately, the machine gun carriers designed at Martel’s 

instigation participated in experiments both as reconnaissance 

vehicles and infantry carriers, and proved inadequate for either 

function. I3 Not until the eve of World War II did the British 

develop a reliable machine gun carrier, and even then it was 

dispersed in small numbers within infantry battalions that 

attacked on foot. 

Despite these differences of opinion, the next step in 

developing the role of armor was to form an independent 

mechanized force of division size. This was undertaken as an 

experiment in 1934, using Col. Percy Hobart’s 1st Tank Brigade, a 

newly formed unit of the type envisaged by Broad, and Ma j. Gen. 

George Lindsay t s partially mechanized 7th Infantry Brigade. 

Unfortunately for the British, personality differences, lack of 

training, and artificial restrictions from the umpires turned the 

resulting exercise into a disaster. General Lindsay, one of the 

few senior officers who was genuinely commltCed to the 

development of a combined arms mechanized division, was so 

dlscredited by the fiasco that he ceased to have any influence 

over policy. 14 

49 
Instead, the conservative Chief of the Imperial General 

Staff, Gen. Sir Archibald Montgomery-Masskngberd, chose to create 

a permanent "Mobile Division" by mechanizing large portions of 

the British cavalry. The Mobile Division authorized in Deoember 

1937 consisted of two armored cavalry brigades, each almost 

entirely mounted in light tanks and armored cars, plus one tank 

brigade, two mechanized infantry battailons, and limited amounts 

of artillery, engineers, and support units. Such a formation was 

quite appropriate for performing the funcrlons of reconnaissance 

and security, whether in the empire ar on the continent. It dfd 

not, however, integrate the different arms at a sufficiently low 

level. to fight in fluid operations as an armored formation 

against a sophistioated enemy. In most cases, reconnaissance, 

medium armor, infantry, and artillery were under separate 

brigade-level commands. with various minor changes, this mobile 

division became the 1st Armoured Division, whleh sacrificed 

itself piecemeal in France in 1940.15 A second mobile division 

formed In Egypt, providing the basis for later Brftlsh operations 

there. 

There were also problems with equipment. The Royal Tank 

Corps had to make do with Wle same basic tanks from 1922 until 

1938, despite frequent changes in design and technology. Almost 

the only improvement came in the period '1930-32, when radio 

communioations changed markedly. Until this time, each vehicle 

crew had to tune Its radio by nand to a common frequeney, and the 

motion of a moving tank could easily throw the radio off that 

frequency. Colonel Broad instigated a series of developments 

that eventually provided crystal-controlled, preset frequencies. 

The complexity and expense of such equipment, however, made 

distribution of radios down to individual tanks very 810~~1~ 

Only such radios could allow a eommander to control his rapidly 

moving units while observing and leading from the front. 

During the 193Gs, the confusion about tank roles combined 

with frequent changes in the defense bureaucratic structure to 

thwart good armored vehicle design,'7 Generally spe*iws II 

BritUh armored vehicles tended to maximize either mobility Or 

protection. Both the cavalry and the Royal Tank Corps wanted 

fast, lightly armored, mobile vehicles for reconnaissance and 

raiding--the light and medium (or **cruiserf~) tanks. On the other 

hand, the "army tank battalions" performing the traditional 

infantry-support role required extremely heavy armored protectron 

in order to advance successfully against prepared enemy defenses 

that included antitank guns. 

.As a consequence of these two doctrinal roles, firepower was 

neglected in t&k design. As late as 1937, the very thin.armor 

on most tanks of the world made armor-piercing maehine guns, or 

at most a 20-mm cannon, seem entrrely adequate for antitank 

50 
defense. In fact, many soldiers believed that the tank was more 

vulnerable than ever because infantry had acquired some antitank 

training and equipment. Anticipating improvements in tank armor, 

the British standardized on a two-pounder (40+&m) antitank gun. 

This was also the standard weapon mounted in most British tanks 

well Into World War II. Yet such a weapon could only penetrate 

German armor of 1939-42 design at 500 or fewer meters and was not 

designed to fire high explosive ammunition to suppress enemy 

Infantry and towed antitank gun rire. Although Hobart called for 

a six-pounder (57-1~) tank gun in 1938, this was not stated as a 

formal requirement for tank design until after the fall of France 

in '1940.18 Even then, most turrets designed for the 

two-pounder were too small to be upgunned. 

While Britain drifted in the area of mechanization, 

developments In the more tradltional arms were equally mixed. 

Cavalry, as already noted, in essence merged into the 

mechanization process, al though too late to learn all the 

mechanical and tactical differences between horses and light 

armor. Infantry was saddled with inappropriate weapons 

throughout the 1920s. It had no useful antitank capability, and 

the Lewis machine gun was really too heavy to maneuver as a squad 

weapon. Between 1936 and 1939, new equipment and organization 

finally restored the firepower and mobility of British infantry, 

but at a price. The excellent Bren light machine gun, with its 

accompanying small armored carrier, was a significant advance. 

Each squad in a rifle platoon had a dismounted Bren gun, and the 

platoon had a two-inch smoke mortar and a caliber .55 Boyes 

antitank rifle. The battalion consisted of four rifle companies, 

plus a headquarters wlth platoons of Bren gun carriers, 

two-pounder antitank guns, three-inch mortars, and antiaircraft 

machine guns. Heavy machine guns and 4.1-inch mortars were 

centralized into separate support battalions. The result was 

tnat the infantry battalion was much lighter and more mobile than 

it had been, but it had a somewhat reduced firepower and only 

limited antitank capabllity. On the eve of World War 11, the 

inadequacies of the Boyes rifle rapidly forced the artillery to 

assume primary responsibility for antitank defense. 19 The 

artillery had indeed developed excellent pieces that had an 

additional antitank capacity. In the process, however, the 

British had largely neglected the scientific proceaures of 

indirect fire developed during World War 1. Only the School of 

Artillery continued to teach these techniques, so that a few 

officers were familiar with them. In 1939, the prejudice of many 

artillerymen against artillery survey techniques led to a 

artillery reorganization headquarters.giefly that eliminated survey parties from 

51 
Thus, by 1939 the British Army had lost much of its 

pioneering advantage in both equipment and technology. Outside 

of the infantry battalion, cooperation between different weapons 

systems and arms was little better than it had been in 1914. 

Germany: "'Strike Concentrated, Not Disper~ed"~~ 

France, Britain, and the United States, the victors of 1918, 

had a natural tendency to employ at least some of the materiel 

and doctrine of 1918 during the immediate postwar years. A 

defeated Germany, by contrast, had every reason to embraee new 

tactics and weapons. 

Even if it wished to, Germany could not reproduce the mass 

armies and static defenses of 1914-18. The Treaty of Versailles 

limited the German Army to 100,000 long-tour professional 

soldiers, wlthout reserves except for the paramilitary police 

forces. The same treaty forbade Germany to possess tanks, poison 

gas, combat aircraft, and heavy artillery. Paradoxically, for 

the Germans thks prohibition may have been a blessing in 

disguise. The German defense budget and tactical thought were 

less restricted to, or dependent on, the technology of 1918 than 

were other budgets and armies. Instead, planners could study 

concepts and then develop the equipment to make those concepts 

reality. Doctrine led technologfcal development, in contrast to 

the situation in other armies. ln those instances where field 

trials had to be conducted, the Germans used mack-ups, or tested 

equipment and concepts in secret within the Soviet Union." This 

is nat to say that German planners started from scratch. No army 

can completely escape its past, but Germany certainly had an 

advantage over the victorious Allies. 

Since the 1860s, the German tradition of tactfes and 

operations had favored outflanking and encircling the enemy or, 

if that failed, breaking through to disrupt his organization. 

This was in contrast to the frontal battles of attrition that 

most of Germany's enemies had fought in World War 1. This German 

tradition meant two things. First, unlike the French and 

British, who had learned to attack on a broad front in order to 

protect their flanks, the Germans believed in concentrating all 

their resources 

breakthrough.22 Seooyd a 

relatively narrow front for 

this concentration of forces required 

the careful integration' of all weapons and arms at battalion 

*As the two outcast natfons of Europe during the 19209, 

Germany and the Soviet Union had much in common. Their secret 

exchange of military knowledge continued until Hitler came to 

power. 

52 
level or below to overcome the enemy’s defenses . The 

infiltration tactics of 1917-18 reflected this viewpoint and were 

retained after the armistice. Despite the restrictions of the 

Versailles Treaty, the 1921 German Regulation on Command and 

Combat of the Combined Arms included not only the Infantry 

assault battalion and the carefully planned artillery and 

preparations of 1918, but also close air support, gas warfare, 

and tanks in an infantry-support role.23 Again, the Germans 

were free to develop doctrine on the basis of their experience 

but without being restricted to specific technology. Despite 

later manuals, this sophisticated regulation remained the basis 

of German doctrine between the wars. 

Another part of the German mllltary tradition was 

decentralized execution. German commanders moved forward to 

observe and make tactical decisions for themselves. This enabled 

them to communicate their decisions to subordinates much more 

rapidly than was possible from a command post in the rear. This 

decentralization was facilitated by a mutual understanding among 

German leaders, an understanding based on common doctrine such as 

the Command and Combat of the Combined Arms. Aware of both a 

commander ’ s intention and the common doctrine, subordinate 

leaders could execute that intention in accordance with that 

doctrine and, thereby, reduce the need for detailed instructions 

from higher echelons. This decentralization and rapidity of 

decision making were ideally suited to any form of fluid combat, 

including mechanized operations. 

In retrospect, it might seem inevitable that, once combined 

with the German experience of the psychological effects of tanks 

during World War 1, the German infiltration tactics, the belief 

in massing on a narrow front, and decentralized execution would 

lead to blitzkrieg. In fact, however, the German Army did not 

wholeheartedly accept the concept of mechanized blitzkrieg until 

the defeat of France in 1940. Prior to that time, the majority 

of senior German commander3 apparently regarded mechanization as 

a userul but very specialized tool that would not replace 

ordinary infantry divisions. In thinking this, they shared much 

of the traditional viewpoint that characterized their 

counterpart3 in Britain, France, and elsewhere. 

Among the German proponents of mechanization, Gen. Heinz 

Guderian was probably the most influential. Like Percy HObaFt in 

Great Britain, Guderian had considerable experience with the 

early mlkltary use of radio communications. This had two effects 

upon his later career. First, Guderian’s 1914 service with 

radiotelegraphs in support of cavalry units led him to insist on 

a radio in every armored vehicle, a major advantage in command 

and control. By contrast, the French and others often had radios 

only for the command tanks and depended on hand signals or flags 

to maneuver small units. More generally, Guderian’s early 

53 
service taught him the diffioulties of integrating new doctrine 

and equipment and then overcoming institutional resistance to 

that dot trine and equfpment .24 As a staff officer concerned 

with motorized transportatfon, Guderian gained further experience from his first studles of mobi-le warfare. The small size of the 

German Army in the ‘1920s foroed it to Increase its mobility Ln 

order to shift limlted forces rapidly. Guderian was one of a 

group of officers who studied tne use of motor vehicles to 

achieve this mobility. To a certain extent, the German theorists 

had to rely on BrLtish experience and regulatbons to learn about 

equipment that Germany did not possess in large numbers. Yet I 

the German concept of me ohanized war fare developed almost 

Independently of such trends in Britain. By 1929, @hen many 

British students of armor were tending towards a pure armor 

formation, Guderian had become convinced that it was useless to 

develop just tanks, or even to mechanize parts of the tradrtkonal 

arms. What was needed was an entirely new mechanized formation 

of all arms that would maxlmlze t&e effects of the tank. Only 

such a formatfon co&d sustain mobile warfare, whether offensive 

or defensive .25 

The general belief among military theoreticians that antitank 

defenses were becoming stronger did not deter Guderian. Unlike 

most advocates of armor, he considered antitank weapons to be an 

essential part of the mechanized combined arms team, rather than 

the defender of the traditional arms agadnst the new weapons. 

Most early tanks were t00 small and unstable to carry accurate, 

hrgh-velocity antitank guns. By contrast, the towed antitank gun 

was specially designed far maximum effectiveness against armor, 

and Its small silhouette made it difficult to detect and engage. 

The German armored units trained to avoid fighting other tanks or 

antltank guns, and instead to exploit in areas of little or no 

resistance. In the event of tank-versus-tank earnbat, the German 

tanks might withdraw temporarily t luring the enemy into a hidden 

screen of antitank weapons that had deployed behind the German 

spearhead. To do. this, tanks needed reconnaissance units to lead 

the way and screen the flanks of the advance, with combat 

engineers to sustain the mobility of the mechanized force, 

Motorized or mechanized infantry and artillery were necessary %o 

reduce bypassed centers of resistance, to support tanks in the 

attack, and to hold areas seized by such attacks. The entire 

force required support units that could keep up with a rapid 

advance. 

In 1931, Guderian became commander of the 3rd Motor Transport 

Battalion. Using dummy equipment because of the almltaclons of 

the Versailles Treaty, this battalion was ae tually an 

experimental ??&?chanized” force consisting of one company each Of 

motorcycles, armored cars, tanks, and antitank guns. A similar 

small-scale demonstration, using some of the first light tanks 

54 
produced in Germany, impressed Hitler In 1934.26 That same 

year, experlmental maneuvers for a full panzer division took 

place, and In 1935 Hitler formed the first three such divisions 

on a permanent basis (see Figure 5 1. As in the other armies, 

Germany t s first effort at armored organization included a 

tremendous number of tanks (561 per division).27 Otherwise, 

this organization showed considerable balance in numbers and 

types of weapons. Moreover t regard less of the paw- organization t the brigade and regimental headquarters were 

trained to control cross-attached units and weapons systems. 

Such a system required considerable training and put great stress 

on the maintenance and logistical support of the cross-attached 

elements, but it enabled the panzer division to combine different 

weapons systems as needed. 

Guderian did not, however, succeed without opposition and 

difficulties. The other branches of the German Army resisted the 

creation of this new arm and demanded a share of mechanization 

and motorization for tnemselves. During the later 19309, the 

Chief of the German General Staff directed the motorization of 

all antitank units and one engineer company in all infantry 

divisions, plus complete motorization of four selected infantry 

divisions t at a time when the panzer divisions were still short 

of transportation. In 1937-38 t two separate tank brigades were 

formed for infantry support, Isolated from the other arms. At 

the same time, four “Light Divisions, It based on cavalry units in 

most cases t absorbed more motorized and mechanized equipment. 

The actual composition of these units varied, but the most common 

pattern was an armored reconnaissance regiment, two motorized 

infantry regiments, one light tank battalion, and two towed 

howitzer battalions. A frustrated Guderlan found himself shunted 

aside as “Chief of Mobile Troops,t’ with little or no control over 

the motorized infantry and light divisions. 

Nor were the German tanks up to the standards of Guderlan’s 

concept. Despite Hitler’s support for panzer units, those units 

had to compete for production capacity and new weapons not only 

with the rest of the expanding German Army, but also with the 

German Air Force. Hitler placed first priority on the Luftwaffe 

because of the Lntimidation value that air power gave him when 

dealing with the rest of Europe. Under the circumstances, 

Guderian had to settle for tanks that were not completely 

battleworthy. The Mark I was really a machine gun-armed 

tankette, derived from the British Garden-Loyd personnel 

carrier. The Mark II did have a 20-mm cannon, but little armor 

protection. These two vehicles made up the bulk of panzer unlts 

until 1940.29 Their value lay not so much in their armor and 

armament, out In the fact that tney were available early, In 

considerable numbers , and with radio communications. This 

55 
“. .I - _. ,. _. .- _ -. . _-. 

TOWED, LT AR CARS 

B 

MTCL 

(HVY WPNS) LT 

Q 0 

MT2 

HMG 

e 

MIXED 

MIXED 

LT 

f?!ziib 

MTCL 

Figure 5. Type German Panzer Division, 1935. 
allowed the new panzer force to conduct extensive training, 

establish battle procedures, identify and solve problems, and 

develop changes in organization and equipment. BY 1939, the 

panzer divisions were not completely ready, but they had gone 

through their first, most necessary stages of organization and 

tralnlng . Such an advantage was aenied to most of Germany’s 

opponents. 

Another German advantage was in the field of close air 

support of ground operations. When the Luftwaffe was establlshed 

in 1933, most of the higher commanders were World War I aviators 

and others who had served in the ranks of the 100,000~man army 

imposed by the Versailles Treaty. Initially, the Luftwaffe, like 

other air services, favored mlsalons such as strategic bombing 

and air superiority to the neglect of supporting ground forces. 

The experience of the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) changed 

priorities to some extent. The German force sent to aid Franc0 

used a llmlted number of obsolete flghters in a ground-attack 

role, with considerable effect. These experiences provided the 

impetus for Germany to create five ground-attack aviation groups 

in the fall of 1936. Ernst Udet, the chief of the Luftwaffe‘s 

development branch after 1936, persuaded his superiors to produce 

a limited number of close support dive-bombers patterned after 

the U.S. Navy ’ s Curtlss Helldiver. The resulting JU-87 Stuka 

dive-bombers equipped four of the five ground-attack groups 

during 1939. Dive-bombers were extremely accurate and 

demoralized ground defenders rapidly. In addition, in both Spain 

and Poland a very small number of air liaison detachments were 

attached to the Infantry corps and armored division headquarters 

making the main attack. These detachments could pass air-support 

requests directly to the Luftwaffe and could monitor In-flight 

reconnaissance reports. They could not, however, actually guide 

the aircraft onto targets without departing the ground 

headquarters to which they were attached, nor did they have 

training for such a role. In any event, the handful of 

dive-bomber groups and air liaison detachments was available only 

to the army units at the point of main effort; all other army 

headquarters had to submit preplanned requests that might or 

might not be honored. In 1939, on-call air support against 

targets of opportunity was well in the future for most of the 

German Army. 30 

Thus the tradition of combined arms integration was continued 

and updated in the German Army between the world wars. Guderian 

was tactically incorrect when he denied the need to provide armor 

and motorized equipment for the other elements of an army that 

remained essentially foot-mobile and horse-drawn. His determined 

opposlt ion, however, did enable Germany to keep the majority of 

its mechanized assets concentrated in combined arms mechanized 

57 
units, despite the equipment given to other branches. In 

September 1939, twenty-four out of thirty-three tank battalions 

and 1,944 out of 3*195 tanks were concentrated in the six panzer 

divisions.31 The contrast with other countries, where large numbers of tanks were dedicated to infantry support and cavalry 

roles, ls striking. 

France 

The existence of a lOO,OOO-man professional German Army 

forced the French to develop plans to counter a sudden invasion 

by that army. The postwar French Army was huge, but ill prepared 

to stop a surprise attack by even the small German force. Pt was 

basically a cadre for reservists, who required weeks or even 

months to mobilize. After 19 I&, French war weariness eliminated 

the highly developed mobilization system of 1914 and, in 1928, 

reduced.conscripted service to a bare twelve months of training. 

To protect itself from a sudden attack by the small German 

Arm France chose to construct a sophisticated version of the 

defenses that had apparently worked so well at Berdun. The 

Maginot Line (Map 3) was a string of self-contained concrete 

forts with gun turrets. It was built between 1930 and 1936 in 

Northeastern France; its function was to protect the Land 

regained in 1918 and to force any German invasion to pass through 

Belgian territory before reaching France. This extra distance 

would give France time to mobilize. 

The Maginot Line has frequently been criticized because, in 

retrospect, it appeared child's play for the Germans to outflank 

tnese- fortifications. Yet, quite apart from the political 

reality that France could not abandon BeIgLum by bullding a major 

wall between the two countries, the Maginot tine concept was much 

less defensive than popular wisdom suggests, In addition to 

provldIng security during mobilization and protecting critical 

areas near the French frontier, the Maginot Line was a secure 

anchor, a base around which the mobile rield farces of the French 

Army would maneuver.32 More specifically, in the later 1930s 

both France and Britain expected that any future war with Germany 

would be a repetition of 1914, with Germany advancing thraugh all 

of Belgium and possibly the Netherlands as well. Because Belgium 

was neutral, France and Britain could not enter that country to 

help defend it until the Germans had already invaded. Thus, the 

majority of French and British mobile forces planned to make a 

headlong rush into Belgium. The surprise to the Allies in 1940 

was the German penetration through Luxembourg towards Sedan, a 

penetration that eut the hknge between the mobile forces and the 

Maginot Line. 

58 
,,, NETHERLANDS 

PARIS e 

0 25 KM 

Map 3. The Magi ¬ Line and the 1940 Campaign. 

EXPECY’ED GERMAN AXIS OF ADVANCE, 

ACTUAL GERMAN AXIS OF ADVANCE, 194 

1940 

Lo 
Moreover) despite the intent of the Maginot Line, its 

practical effects were mueh less positive for French defense. 

The tremendous expense of fortress construction restricted the 

depth of the fortifications and even the size of armament Of 

those forts. Only a few positions included the lavishly 

constructed works shown in contemporary photographs. In case of 

war the line had to be supplemented by field fortifications and 

troops deployed between the fixed positions. More Importantly, 

once built the Maginot Line had a negative psychological effect 

on the politician8, if not on the commanders. The apparently 

invincible defensive strength of the Maginot Line reinforced the 

general left-wing political belief that France should avoid any 

aggressive actions and be content to defend its frontiers. 

This defensive orientation influenced not only national 

budgets but French military doctrine, at least immediately after 

1978. More than any other participant in the First World War, 

France retafned the positional warfare concept in its postwar 

regulations. Under the influence of Marshal Phslippe Pe/tain, the 

French Army produced the Provisional Instructions for the 

Tactical Employment of Larger Units C19211. This regulation was 

not entirely defense-oriented, but to minimize casualties It- dfd 

insist on careful, methodical preparations before attacking. 

Within the carefully coordinated circumstances of a set-piece 

offensive, battle wauld involve all arms to assist the infantry: 

The infantry is charged with the principal mission in 

combat. Preceded, protected, and accompanied by 

artillery fire, aided where possible by tanks and 

aviation, it conquers, oecupiest organizes, and holds 

the terrain.33 

This conception had two flaws. First, such a meticulously 

planne‘d, centrally controlled operation was unable to react to 

sudden changes. The German offensives of 1918 had already 

aemonstrated that any enemy actkon that disrupted the defender"s 

linear deployments and lockstep planning would catch the French 

headquarters off guard, unable to reorganize a defense against a 

highly mobile attacker. 

More generally, the French doctrine viewed combined arms as a 

process by which all other weapons systems assisted the infantry 

in its forward progress, Tanks were considered to be fsa sort of 

armored infantry,,t1 subordinated to the infantry branch.34 This 

at least had the advantage that armor was not restricted purely 

to tanks* The French cavalry experimented extensively during the 

l92Gs with armored cars and ultimately half-tracks* These 

half-tracks sometimes formed combat teams with armored cars, 

towed artillery, motorcycles, and light tanks carried on trucks 

until contact was made.35 In fact, the French half-tracks may 
well have been the models for later German and American infantry 

carriers. Still, the subordination of tanks to infantry impeded 

the development of roles for armor other than close infantry 

support. Moreover, while half-tracks might be useful in oolonial 

wars or for reconnaissance tasks, infantry still walked in the 

deliberate assault. Armor was tied to the rate of advance of 

foot-mobile infantry. The alternative of finding ways to 

increase the moblllty and protection of the infantry in order to 

keep pace with the tanks was rarely considered. The slow speed 

of the World War I vintage FT tank, which equipped most French 

armor units throughout the 19209, reinforced this attitude. 

Not all Frenchmen held this view. Gen. Jean-Baptiste Estienne, commander of the World War I French tank corps before 

it was disbanded, was quite farsighted in his concept of 

mechanized warfare. In 1919, Estienne submitted a “Study of’ the 

MissIons of Tanks in the Field” to Petain’s headquarters. This 

remarkable document explained the need to provlde armored, 

tracked vehleles not only for tanks, but also for reeonnalssance, 

infantry, artillery, and even battlefield recovery teams. 

Estienne’s vision of this massed ‘force , supported by air 

bombardment and attacking in-depth against a narrow enemy front, 

closely resembled the best mechanized ideal of World War II. In 

1920, Estienne proposed a fOO,OOO-man armored army with 4,000 

tanks and 8,000 other vehicles. Instead of rejecting the use of 

infantry, he argued that armored infantry would again be able to 

attack using its organic weapons.37 Estienne’s concept was not 

only radical mllltarily, but also seemed too offensively minded, 

too aggressive to be acceptable to French politicians. 

Nevertheless , Estienne remained Inspector of Tanks until his 

retirement in 1927. 

Despite the restrictions imposed by the Great Depression and 

by the enormous cost of the Maginot Line, Chief of Staff Maxime 

Weygand took significant steps towards motorization and 

mechanization during the early 1930s. Five and ultimately seven 

infantry divisions became motorized, and one brigade in each of 

four light cavalry divisions was equipped with half-tracks and 

armored cars. In 1934, Weygand continued the trend towards 

armored cavalry by forming the first “light mechanized division” 

(Division L&&re Mecanique, or DLM, shown in Figure 6). This 

division, with its combination of reconnaissance, light tanks, 

trucked lnr’antry , and towed artillery, was remarkably similar to 

the German panzer division being developed at the same time. 

Because Weygand was a cavalryman, and beoause it was politically 

easier to justify a defensive covering force than an lloffensivel’ 

armored unit, the four DLMs ultimately formed by France all 

ret eived standard cavalry missions of re connalssance and 

security, rather than mechanized main battle tasks. s8 

61 
FRENCH LIGHT MECHANIZED 

DIVISION, 1934 220 LT/MDM TANKS 

crl 0 

FRENCH ARMORED DIVISION, 1940 0 168 WXWHW T/WCS 

0 

12x75 mm 

Figure 6. French Light Mechanized Division, 1934, and Armored Division, 1940. 

843330 --a- 
Just as the French Army was cautiously moving forward in the 

area of mechanization, Its development was almost aborted by the 

writings of Charles de Gaulle. In 1934, Lieutenant Colonel de 

Gaulle published Towards the Professional Army. This call for a 

100,000~man armored army was based heavily on Estienne's work. 

De Gaulle's book was hardly innovative in terms of doctrine and 

organization in that it envisioned a pure armor brlgade operating 

in linear formation, followed by a motorized infantry force for 

mopping-up operations. The real problem was political. In a 

nation that was extremely pacifistic and dedicated to the 

doctrine of the citizen soldier, de Gaulle was -advocating an 

aggressive, professional standing army of technicians. HIS 

"instrument of repressive and preventive maneuver"39 might well 

be used to start an offensive war with Germany or to support a 

military coup d'etat in republican France. 

De Gaulle's sensational book not only jeopardized the more 

gradual efforts of Weygand, but also set extremely high standards 

for what constituted an armored division. In 1936, France 

belatedly decided to produce armor and other equipment in larger 

quantities, including 385 B-l his tanks. The B-l his, developed 

by Estienne in the early 19209, was still one of the best tank 

designs in the world fifteen years later. It had sixty 

millimeters of frontal armor in a carefully cast hull, hydromatie 

transmission, and other advanced features. It was limited by the 

small size of Its turret, where one man had to be both tank 

commander and gunner for a 47-mm gun, but a lower-velocity 75-mm 

gun was mounted in the hull. The B-l bis was an excellent weapon 

that caused the Germans much difficulty in 1940. Yet, given the 

fine craftsmanship involved in B-l bis production and the 

weakened state of France's industry, it took years to produce 

sufficient tanks to organize an armored division on the pattern 

desired by Estienne and de Gaulle. Even after the war started, 

France could never produce more than fifty of these tanks per 

month, and the rate prior to 1939 was much lower.40 As a 

result, France did not form its fjirst two armored divisions 

(Division Cuirasske, or DCR, as shown in Figure 6) until after 

the war began and, even then, had to greatly reduce the 

authorized number of heavy tanks in each division. The resulting 

unit was primarily a collection of tanks for an armored 

breakthrough; it lacked sufficient reconnaissance, antitank, 

infantry, artillery, and engineer support. Similar problems 

plagued the production of other tanks and military equipment, so 

that French troops rarely had the tlLme for realistic training and 

experimentation that the Germans had achieved before 1939. The 

French regulation for large armored unit tactics was not Issued 

until March 1940, a few weeks before the German invasion of 

France.41 

63 
Despite such limitations, France slowly modernized during' the 

1930s. The 1921 Provisional lnstruetions gave way to a much more 

sophisticated regulation in 1936. The new Instructions 

recognized the major changes In warfare, including fortified 

fronts such as the Maginot Line, motorized and mechanized units, 

antitank weapons, increased air and antiaircraft involvement in 

combat* and improved communications. The regulatkon no longer 

classified tanks by size, but rather designated the particular 

mission they would perform at any given time. Tanks could either 

accompany infantry, precede infantry by bounds to the next 

terrain feature, or operate independently, especially after the 

enemy t 9 defenses had already been disorganI.zed. The 1936 

regulatkon, however, still insisted on the primacy of infantry, 

the careful organization of artillery, and the methodical advance 

of al1 elements in accordance with an elaborate plan- As in 

Britain, French air support to ground forces consisted primarily 

of recannakssanee in the battle area8 with bombing only outside 

the range of artillery. The regulation repeatedly emphasized the 

need for "defense without thought of retreat,"' which tended to 

mean rigid orientation toward the terrain and the enemy to one*s 

front, rather than toward maneuvering to deal with a threat to 

the flank or rear. References to antitank defense-in-depth also 

appeared frequently in this regulation, but France lacked the 

troops to establish such a defense in 1940. Finally, because of 

the possibility of enemy signals kntelligence, radios were only 

to be used when no other means of communication were avaklable. 

In any event, at least some French tank radios were meant only 

for short-range communications with dismounted infantry in a 

deliberate attack and were consequently useless in mobi'le 

operations. Thus, most of the French command and control still 

moved at the pace of communications in World War IL,42 

France entered World War II wfth a militia army that would 

require months to organize and train, and with new mechanized 

formations and modern equipment that had been fielded too late 

for proper testing, evaluation, and trakning. Like those of the 

Brftlsh, French armored units were specialized either for cavalry 

missions or deliberate breakthrough attacks; they were not 

balanced for all types of mobile operations. Given these 

limitations, the French doctrine of slow, methodical. offensive 

action appeared as the only course that would allow them to 

attack at all. Unfortunately, the Germans did not wait for the 

French to plan and execute such attacks. 

The Soviet Union: Weep Battle"43 

The Soviet Union*s military development after World War 1 

differed from that of the rest of Europe for two reasons* First, 

the Red Army was created in 1918 after the Eolshevik revolution 

64 
and lacked the traditions and training of other major armies. 

Many of the new Red commanders had been noncommissioned or 

commissioned junior officers during World War 1, but few trained 

senior officers of the Tsarist Army remalned with the new 

regime. Even those who did remain were, with some exceptions, 

suspected of anti-Bolshevik sympathies. As a result, the Red 

Army was open to change, unhampered by excessive traditions or 

past habits. It was also subject to the blunders of ignorance. 

Second, the Russian Civil War of 1918-21 was markedly different 

from most of' the European campaigns of World War 1. Because of 

the vast distances and understrength armies involved In the Civil 

War, penetration and encirclement were no longer difficult, and 

fluid maneuver was the rule. The elite of the Red Army by the 

end of the Civil War was Marshal S.M. Budenny's 1st Cavalry Army, 

which had patterned its encirclements and pursuits after the best 

Tsarist cavalrymen. The veterans of this army received the 

patronage of Joseph Stalin, who had been the commissar of the 

next higher headquarters. As a result, many officers from this 

army rose to senior positions before and during World War 11.44 

Like Hitler's Germany, but unlike France and Britain, the 

Soviet Union was openly interested in offensive warfare as a 

means of spreading its political doctrines. As a practical 

matter, Stalin chose to concentrate on developing the Soviet 

Union before expanding into Europe. Still, the Red Army could 

expect that any future war would be offensive, using weapons that 

democratic societies abhorred as too aggressive. This offensive 

orientation was reinforced by the close relationship that existed 

between the Red Army and the German Army from 1923 to 1932. 

Soviet officers studied in Germany, while the Germans secretly 

manufactured and tested tanks, aircraft, and poison gas in 

European Russia. Soviet doctrine, however, appeared to be 

largely independent of similar developments in Germany; Soviet 

concepts were official policy long before Guderian gained even 

partial approval from his government. 

During the course of the 1920s and early 19309, a group of 

Soviet officers led by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky developed a 

concept of "Deep Battle" to employ conventional infantry and 

cavalry divisions, mechanized formations, and aviation in 

concert. These efforts culminated in the Field Regulations of 

1936. instead of regarding the infantry as the premier combat 

arm, Tukhaehevsky envisioned all available arms and weapons 

systems working together In a two-part battle. First, a massed, 

echeloned attack on a narrow front would rupture the defender's 

conventional infantry-artillery-antitank defense. The attacker's 

artillery and mortars would suppress defending artillery and 

especially defending antitank guns. Moving behind the artillery 

barrage and a Few meters In front of the infantry, the tanks 

could safely crush wire, overrun machine gun postsI and reduce 

65 
other centers of enemy resistance. Onee the enemyIs forward 

defenses were disrupted, ac!companying tanks would not be tied 

strictly to the infantry rate of advance, but could take 

advantage of local opportunities to penetrate and attack enemy 

reserves, artillery, headquarters, and supply dumps. This action 

would duplicate on a smaller scale the second part of the battle, 

which was to disrupt and destroy the enemy by deep attacks. 

"Mobile Groups,ft composed of cavalry, mechanized formations, or 

both, would exploit their mobility advantage to outflank the 

enemy or develop a penetration in order to reach the enemy rear 

areas. The obJect was to attack the entire depth of the enemy 

defenses simultaneously, with conventional frontal attacks, long 

range artkllery fires, deep penetrations by mobile forces, and 

bombing and parachute attacks of key points, Smoke and deception 

operations would distract the enemy from the attacker's real 

intentions.45 

This remarkably sophistioated doctrine was backed up by a 

force structure that, by 1937, was well on its way to 

implementing Tukhachevsky's concepts. &iing the expanded 

production facilities of the Soviet government's first Five Year 

Plan with design features taken in part from the American 

inventor Walter ChrIstie,' the Soviets produced 5,000 armored 

vehicles by 1934.46 This wealth of equipment enabled the Red 

Army to create tank organizations for both 4;nfantry support and 

combined arms mechanized operations. Virtually all rifle 

divisions had a tank eompany or battalion attached to them, with 

an entire regiment of 190 or more tanks for each of the horse 

cavalry divisions. Beginning in 1930, the Red Army experimented 

with integrating all arms into mechanized functional groups at 

battalion, brigade, and higher levels. Although organizations 

changed frequently as equipment and tactical techniques evolved, 

the 1935 mechanized $*corps" was typical of these developments 

UQgure ?I. The four corps organized under this concept were 

really small armored divisions (the Soviets frequently used the 

terms Qorps'" and "brigadel" to designate experimental units of 

division and regimental size, respectively). These mechanized 

corps were extremely armor-heavy, but nevertheless integrated the 

essential eombat arms at a relatively low level. The trend 

during the later 1930s was for these corps, redesignated “‘tank 

corpstt in 1938, to become increasingly large and armor-heavy. 

This Soviet force structure had Its prablems, of course. To 

begin with, desplte the massive industrfal support of the Soviet 

Unfon, the armored force Was so ambitious that not all units 

could be fully equipped. Soviet historians have criticized the 

separation of available equipment into infantry-support and 

independent formations under these circumstanoes.47 More 

66 
SOVIET MECHANIZED CORPS 

DECEMBER 1936 

8,966 men; 348 tanks; 

63 tankettea; 62 flamethrower 

tanks; 20 guns 

TANKElTE 61 RIFLE/MO 

t 1 I I 1 1 

REFLE/MG 

SOVIET MOTORIZED DIVISION 

DECEMBER 1939 

11.6SCI men; 276 tanks: 

17 tankettes; 98 guns/mortars 

BT : BT model light tank; MTZ: Motorized: 

MO: Machine gun. 

Figure 7. Soviet Mechanized Corps, December 1935, and Motorized Division, December 1939 

84-3330 -67- 
specifically, the average Soviet citizen had little experience 

with motor vehicles, so that maintenance was often a problem, 

particularly as the vehicles wore out. Soviet radios were 

notoriously unreliable, making command and control of this mass 

of moving vehicles difficult. Despite frequent major exercises 

during the mid-193Gs, the Soviet armored force needed several 

more years of experimentation and training before It could 

realize its full potential. 

It never got that time. On 12 June 1937, cthe Soviet 

government executed Tukhachevsky and eight of his high-ranking 

assistants, as Stalin shifted his purge of Soviet society against 

the last power group that had the potential to threaten him, the 

Red Rrmy. In the ensuing four years, the Soviet government 

imprisoned or executed at least 20 percent of the officer corps, 

including a majority of all commanders of units of regimental 

size or larger. Thus, at the same time the Red Army was 

expanding because of the threat from Nazi Germany and Imperial 

Japan, it was losing its most experienced planners and leaders, 

The politically reliable survivors were promoted into positions 

far above their previous training and experienee, with disastrous 

effects on unit development and tactics.48 

At the same time that T*Whachevsky$s thought was under 

suspicion, the Soviet experience in the Spanish Civlil War oaused 

the Red army to reassess mechanization. Dimitri Pavlov, chief of 

tank troops and one of the senior Soviet commanders to serve in 

Spain, came bac?k wrth an extremely pessimistic attitude. The 

Soviet tanks were too lightly armored, their Russian crews could 

not communicate with the Span&h troops, and in combat the tanks 

tended to run away from the supporting infantry and artillery. 

Pavlov argued that the new mechanized formations were too 

unwieldy to control, too vulnerable to antitank fire, and would 

have great difficulty penetrating enemy defenses in order to 

conduct a deep battle. The fact that Pavlov had been able to use 

e>nly f&fty tanks wlthout any chance of surprise at the battle of 

Esquivas 629 October 19361 apparently did not dissuade him from 

generalizing.49 In any event, many observers from ather armies 

reached the same conclusions based on the limited .experienee in 

Spain, 

In July 1939, Gen. G.I. Kulik chaired a commission to review 

the question ,df tank force organization. With most o.f 

Tukhachevsky's followers dead or imprisoned, there were few 

aavocates for large mechanized formatlons, The eomml.ssion 

therefore directed the partial dismantling of such units, 

emphasizing the infantry-support role. The commission also 

created a new, more balanced organization, the motorized division 

of December 1939 (Figure 7’1. This continued support for the 1936 

doctrine and force structure may have been in response to the 

68 
German armored success in Poland in September 1939, and the 

Soviet success that year against Japan (see below). Four of a 

planned fifteen motorized divisions were formed in early 1940, 

representing a better all-around organization than the tank corps 

they replaced e 50 

In spite of this reorganization, the Red Army was a shambles, 

unable to occupy Poland effectively in 1939 or to defeat Finland 

rapidly in 1939-40. These battlefield failures prompted a series 

of reforms in organization, leadership, and tactics that slowly 

began to improve Soviet military ability. The only successful 

Soviet campaign of this period was in the undeclared war against 

Japan. Stalin was apparently so concerned about Japanese 

expansion in northeast Asia that he gave one of Tukhachevsky’s 

most able students, Gen. Georgi Zhukov, a free hand in commanding 

the Soviet forces there. The Red Army in Siberia was among the 

last to be affected by Stalin’s purges, and so, with the 

exception of some reserve component units, the training and 

command structure of these forces were still in tat t when 

hostilities with the Japanese Army erupted in the summer of 1939 

on the Khalkin-Go1 River of Manchuria (Map 4). The Japanese 

decided to fight the Soviets in this remote area on the border 

between Japanese-occupied Manchuria and Soviet-dominated Outer 

Mongolia, believing that the Soviets would be unable to 

concentrate and supply a major force there. To the surprise of 

the Japanese, the Soviets massed 469 light tanks, 426 other 

armored vehicles, 679 guns and mortars, and over 500 aircraft, 

all supplied by thousands of trucks. Zhukov organized a classic 

double envelopment between 20 and 31 August 1939. First, a 

series of Soviet probing attacks in the center fixed the Japanese 

defenders‘, and Soviet artillery concentrated against strongpoints 

found by these probes. Then the two Soviet flanks pressed 

forward, encircling the Japanese 23rd Infantry Division and part 

of the 7th lnfantry Division. The Soviet attacks used tank and 

machine gun direct fire, as well as coordinated artillery fire, 

to protect their advancing infantry. In some cases, the infantry 

rode on the outside of armored cars, reducing the time needed to 

close with the enemy, but exposing both vehicles and riders to 

concentrated enemy fire. On the other hand, some Soviet 

commanders were unimaginative in executing Zhukov’s plan, making 

repeated frontal attacks instead of 

resistance.51 

bypassing Japanese 

Still) Khalkin-Go1 provided an excellent trial 

of Soviet doctrine on the very eve of World War II. Zhukov and 

his subordinates naturally rose to prominence during that war. 

PlnLted States 

The U.S. Army, despite its unique division structure, was 

heavily under the influence of French tactical and staff doctrine 

in 1918. Of necessity, American officers had learned to do 

business in a manner compatible with the French units they dealt 

69 
I \( 

Map 4. Khalkin-Gol, 20-31 August 1939. 
with daily. To some extent, therefore, the immediate postwar 

doctrine of the U.S. Army paralleled that of the French Army. As 

in France, the United States subordinated tanks to the infantry 

branch. Initial postwar regulations reflected the French view of 

combined arms so faithfully that in 1923 the War Department 

drafted a Provisional Manual of Tactics for Large Units that did 

not even mention the fact that it was a direct translation of the 

1921 French Provisional Instructions.52 The same year, the 

revised version of the U.S. Field Service Regulations inslsted 

that "No one arm wins battles. The combined employment of all 

arms 1s essential to success." In the next paragraph, however, 

it stated that the mission of the entire force "is that of the 

infantry."53 

Still, this rigid view of combined arms did not affect all 

American soldiers, nor did it last for a long period of time. As 

early as 1920, staff officers such as Brig. Gen. Fox Conner had 

decided that the requirements of trench warfare were 

inappropriate for operations on the American continent, the 

expected arena of future American wars. Conner asked Gen. John 

J. Pershing, the U.S. wartime commander in France, to discard the 

square division structure because it was too immobile and 

unwieldy for such operations. Pershing recommended that the 

infantry division be reorganized along the lines of European 

triangular divlslons and that units needed only for specialized 

operations be pooled at the level of corps and field army.54 

These principles eventually produced a comprehensive review of 

the fundamental relationships between the different arms and 

services. 

Despite a number of boards reviewing the American experience 

in World War 1, the square divislonts organization changed only 

slightly during the 1920s. By 1925, American officer education 

was focused on mobile warfare, with trench warfare relegated to 

the status of a special operation. However, financial 

restrictions and the general peacetime neglect of the U.S. Army 

prevented major changes In equipment and organization until the 

mid-1930s. Then the army was able to use public works funds 

allocated to restart the depression economy as a means of 

achieving llmlted improvements In equipment. These included 

partial motorization of active and National Guard divisions and 

production of different carriages with pneumatic tires for 

existing artillery pieces. Such carriages allowed the artillery 

to be towed by motor vehicles and, in the case of the 

French-designed 754111 gun, to be used in a limited antiaircraft 

role. 

In 1935, Gen. Malin Craig became Chief of Staff of the U.S. 

Army. Cralg had apparently been influenced by Fox Conner and the 

other reformers of 1920, and he instigated a review of all combat 

71 
organization and tactics.55 Craig specifically suggested 

development of a smaller, more mobile division using mechanical 

power to replace human power wherever possible. A General Staff 

board drew up a proposed division structure that totalled only 

13,552 men and closely paralleled European divisions of the same 

period. From 1936 through 1939, the 2d U.S. Infantry Division 

conducted extensive tests of this concept, reviewing such mattsers 

as the amount of firepower and frontage that should be allocated 

per man and per unit, the proportion of artillery and 

transportation that should support the infantry, and the echelon 

(platoon, company, battalion, or regiment) at which different 

infantry weapons should be pooled. One of the driving forces 

behind these tests was Brig. Gen. Lesley J. NcNair, who later 

designed and trained the Army Ground Forces of World War 11. 

The resulting organization of infantry was remarkably close 

to the Persh,lng-Conner ideas of 1920. In essence, the machine 

gun and other specialized heavy weapons were integrated into the 

knfantry rifle organization at every level. To avoid an 

excessrve span of control, each commander had a headquarters, 

three subordinate rifle units, plus a weapons ,unit--three rifle 

platoons and a heavy weapon platoon in each company, with three 

such companies plus a heavy weapons company fn each battalion. 

In practice, commanders might shift companies from one battalion 

to another, or even move entIre battalions between regiments, but 

doctrinally all units operated with three subordinate maneuver 

unkts. 

Each echelon also had a combination of flat-trajectory and 

hkgh-angle weapons e Although the infantry received greater 

firepower in terms of automatic weapons and mortars I this 

firepower was echeloned so that it did not impede the mobilkty of 

the parent infantry unit, Thus, for example, the infantry 

platoon had nothing heavier than the Browning Automatic Rifle 

(BAR), while the company had nothing heavier than the 6~hmn 

mortar .56 It should be noted that thls dedication to mobility, 

when combined with a continued faith in the individual Pif'ieman, 

meant that an American army platoon had less firepower than its 

European counterparts--the BAR had a much lower rate of fire than 

most light machine guns found in European squads. This 

deficiency was only partially corrected by the rapid-ffre ability 

of the Ml rifle. Since American tactics were based on the 

premise of establishing a base of fire and then maneuvering a 

light force in conjunction with that base, this organization left 

U.S. infantry at a disadvantage. 

The same principle of weapons pooling was contknued 

throughout the triangular division. L-light antitank guns, heavy 

mortars, and machine guns were relegated to the heavy weapons 

72 
company of each battalion. Specialized arms such as tanks, 

antiaircraft, and most antitank weapons were not authorized 

within the division, because McNair believed that such weapons 

anould be held in a central mass and used only against a mafor 

enemy force. Similarly, the division received only one 

reconnaissance troop, with long-range re eonnaissance being 

assigned to higher headquarters. The general result was an 

infantry force that was at once more mobile and more heavily 

armed than its predecessors, yet deficient compared to foreign 

armies. Its principal drawback, in addition to automatic 

weapons, was its limited capacity for antiaircraft and antitank 

defense . As remarked before, during the later 1930s heavy 

machine guns still seemed effective against alrcraft and armored 

vehicles, so that these weapons, plus 37411 antitank guns, 

appeared adequate for the triangular division. Once the German 

blitzkrieg demonstrated its psychological and physical effect on 

infantry, the U.S. Army realized that it had to add more antitank 

defenses. 

The controversies about the triangular division tests 

included the proportions of engineers and artillery for the 

infantry component. The army was conditioned to regard the 

engineers only in their World War I role of road construction and 

limited fortification support. At one point, General Craig 

suggested eliminating all engineers from the division structure. 

In 1938, General McNair recommended an engineer company of 175 

men, or 1.7 percent of the division, because he believed that 

only hasty road repalr and limited roadblock construction would 

occur in the next war. The engineers had to campaign vigorously 

for their very existence In the division, arguing that an 

increasingly motorized and mechanized army had greater need ‘for 

engineers to construct and reduce antitank defenses and other 

obstacles. Only the German use of combat engineers for such 

tasks in 1939-40 finally convinced the U.S. to retain an engineer 

battalion in each division.57 Even this was a mixed blessing 

for the engineers, because they were frequently used as the 

division’s infantry reserve force. 

The 1935 division proposal had envisioned a division 

artillery consisting of three combined 75-mm gun/81-mm mortar 

battalions for direct support, with a 10%mm howitzer battalion 

for general support. All other artillery was to be 

nondivisional, attached as necessary. In actual testing, the 

artillery found that the 81-mm mortar was essentially an infantry 

weapon. In any event, McNair objected to this emphasis on 

dedicated support to the infantry, arguing that longer-range 

weapons with greater centralized control would lead to more 

flexible massed fires. No unit, he said, needed weapons whose 

73 
.- _ _, ..-.. ” 

U.S, TRIANGULAR INFANTRY DIVISION, 

June 1941 

IS,245 men. 48 howitzers. 68 antitank guns 

I 

HHB * 

I 1 “- 1 - - 

How 8 x 76mm 

Figure 8,. U. S, Triangular Infantry Division, June 1941. 
range exceeded the parent unit’s area of operations. Ultimately, 

the decision was made to have three battalions of 75-1~1 guns, to 

be replaced by 105~mm howitzers when they were produced, plus 

155-mm general support artillery. The June 1941 organization 

(Figure 8) represented the final step prior to American entry 

into the war. 

The debate over artillery in the division organization 

occurred at the same time that the U.S. Army Field Artillery 

School was developing the next major step in infantry-artillery 

rire coordinat ioh, the ablllty to mass fires on targets of 

opportunity. During World War L , massed fires were normally the 

result of carefully planned artillery concentrations, in which 

known targets were predesignated on maps or overlays. If the 

infantry needed artillery t’ire on an unexpected target of 

opportunity, however, it was difficult to bring more than one 

battery to bear on such a target. To begin with, a battery 

forward observer had both to see the target and to communicate 

with his battery, which meant in practical terms that he had to 

keep in field telephone contact with the battery. This reliance 

on landline communications greatly restricted his ability to 

accompany the infantry in the advance, although some forward 

observers managed this feat. Even if the forward observer could 

adjust his own battery onto a target, he had no accurate way of 

guiding other batteries, unless the target ‘3 map location was 

known precisely. 

Between 1929 and 194T, a series of instructors at the Field 

Artillery School gradually developed a means of concentrating any 

amount of available fire on a 

opportunity.58 

artillery target of 

One obvious step in this process was to have 

observers use new, more reliable radios instead of field 

telephones to communicate. More importantly, the gunnery 

instructors developed forward observer procedures and a firing 

chart that together would allow a battalion headquarters to 

record adjustments In the impact of artillery shells as viewed 

from the observer’s location, Instead of the battery location. 

Graphic firing tables compensated for differences in the 

locations of different batteries, and one artillery piece in each 

battalion was ultimately surveyed in relation to a common 

reference point for all artillery in that division area. The 

resulting fire direction centers (FDCS) could provide infantry 

units with an entire battalion, or even multiple battalions, of 

field artillery f’iring on a target that only one observer could 

see. By contrast, throughout World War II German artillerymen 

had to use well-known terrain features to adjust on a target of 

opportunity; massed fires remained extremely difficult. Fire 

direction centers gave the U.S. Army a new and unprecedented 

degree of infantry-artillery integration. Lt also encouraged the 

75 
U.S. to maintain large amount3 of nondivisional artillery to 

reinforce divisions as needed. 

The United States was not nearly so advanced in the 

development of armored and mechanized forces.59 As in France, 

the supply of slow World War I tanks and the subordination of 

tanks to the infantry branch impeded the development of any role 

other than direct infantry support. Yet the British experiments 

of the later 19209, plus the persistent efforts of a cavalry 

officer named Adna Chaffee Jr., led to a series of limited steps 

in mechanization. In 1928 and again in 1929, an ad hoc 

Experimental Armored Force (EAF) was organized at the Tank School 

In Fort Meade, Maryland. Two battalions of obsolescent tanks, a 

battalion of infantry in trucks, an armored ear troop, a field 

artillery battalion, plus small elements of engineers, signals, 

medical, ammunition, chemical warfare, and maintenance, formed 

the EAF. Despite frequent mechanical breakdowns, the experiments 

aroused sufficient interest for a more permanent force to be 

established at Fort Eustis in 1930. The continuing economic 

depression, however, caused the Army to disband this unit a year 

later for lack of funds. The Xnfantry School at Fort Benning 

absorbed the Tank School and remaining infantry tank units. 

As Chief of Staff from 1930 to 1935, Douglas MacArthur wanted 

to advanee motorization and mechanization throughout the army, 

rather than confining them to one branch. Restricted army 

buagets made thfs impossible, but Chaffee did persuade MacArthur 

to conduct limited mechanized experiments with cavalry units, 

because cavalry's existence was threatened by Its apparent 

obsolescence. By law, %anks" belonged to the infantry branch, 

30 the cavalry gradually bought a group of "'combat cars," lightly 

armored and armed tanks that were often indistinguishabLe from 

the newer infantry fttanks.u In 1932 a one-squadron mechanized 

cavalry regiment moved to Camp Knox, Kentucky, to be followed by 

another regzment in late 1936. These units were the nucleus of 

the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). A series of early armor 

advocates commanded this brigade, including Adna Chaffee himself 

in 7938-40. However, this force was plagued by the same 

difficulties as mechanized cavalry in Europe. It was too lightly 

armed and armored and was viewed generally as a raiding or 

pursuit force in the cavalry tradition. Despite all of Chaffee's 

efforts, the other arms only eooperated with the brigade on 

periodic exercises. Not until January 1940, for example, was a 

mechanized engineer troop authorized for the 7th Brigade.60 At 

about the same time, the 6th Infantry Regiment joined the 7th 

Brigade, and a Provisional Tank Brigade grew out of the infantry 

tank units at Fort Benning. 

76 
The German armored attack on France in May 1940 gave further 

impetus to mechanized experiments already conducted in U.S. Army 

maneuvers. To avoid branch prejudices, Chaffee convinced the War 

Department to create an "Armored ForceV outside of the 

tradltional arms. In consequence, in July 1940 the 7th Cavalry 

Brigade and the Provisional Tank Brigade became the nuclei For 

the first two armored divisions. These .divFsions, like the First 

organizations of the European powers, were excessively tank 

heavy. Bach was authorized six battalions of light tanks and two 

battalions of medium tanks (approximately 400 tanks total), but 

only two battalions of armored infantry and three battalions of 

artillery, The majority of light tanks reflected the cavalry 

heritage of this division. Such a structure left inadequate 

infantry to support the tanks and too many lightly armored 

vehicles to fight the heavier German tanks. Considerably more 

production and development was needed before the lopsided 

American armored units became a cohesive mechanized force. 

Finally; close air support was also lacking in the American 

combat team. Despite the efforts of a Few aviators such as Frank 

Lackland, the U.S. Army Air Corps was preoccupied with strategic 

bombing to the neglect of close air support.61 As in France 

and Britain, American aviators argued that air power was best 

used in areas beyond the range of ground artillery. This 

apparently logical division of labor overlooked three aspects of 

ground combat: the psychological impact of close air attack, the 

necessity of massing all combat power to overcome the inherent 

advantages of the defender, and the need to achieve this mass 

rapidly in order to sustain mobile operations and deny the 

defender time to organize. Like Guderian, Chaffee hoped to use 

such techniques to avoid the delays and logistical buildup 

necessary for a deliberate, breakthrough attack. All three 

aspects argued in favor of close air support at the critical 

point, but in 1939-40 only the German Luftwaffe had made even 

limited preparations to provide such support. 

The preceding discussion of Five different armies appears to 

go in Five different directions, and yet certain common threads 

are evident. First, anti-war sentiment, limited defense budgets, 

and similar restrictions hampered the development of new weapons 

and doctrine in every army except the pre-7937 Red Army. As a 

consequence, no nation was Fully equipped with modern weapons 

when It entered World War II, although the Germans were several 

years. ahead of their opponents and, therefore, had more 

experience and trarning with such weapons. 

Second, even within the peacetime armies, the World War 1 

traditions of Infantry-artillery dominance delayed new 

developments designed to broaden the nature of the combined arms, 

77 
altnough the Red Army was again an exception until 1937. In the 

British, French, and American armies, mechanization developed in 

two divergent directions. Heavy, alnsost armor-pure formations 

supported conventional inPantry attacks, while highly mobile but 

poorly armed and protected light forces performed cavalry 

functions. For the British, the demands of imperial policing 

further restricted any move towards development of large 

mechanized units. Still, even the Germans and Soviets diverted 

some armor to specialized oavalry and infantry-support roles. 

During the 193Os, professional soldiers gradually broke Free of 

tradLciona1, 1918 views about the role of various arms. The 

Germans had the advantage in these new developments, certainly 

aFter the purges had shattered the Red high command. Thanks to 

GuderLan and Hitler, the Germans Funneled more of their assets 

into fewer Panzer unllts than did their opponents, who tended to 

modernize slightly a muoh larger part of their armies, and who 

therefore had no Force trained and equ%pped for mechanized combat 

in 7939-41. 

Finally, the air power advocates of all natkons retarded the 

development of close air support for ground operatkons. Even the 

Germans had only the embryo of an air-ground eommand and control 

system when the war began. 

Had World War If come in 1936 or 1937, Tukhachevsky's 

developments in the Red Army probably would have triumphed 

despite problems with materiel and training. Had the war begun 

in 1942 or later, the British, French, and Americans would all 

have had time to experiment with and adjust their mechanized 

organizations and doctrine. Germany t s military auwess in 

1939-41 was therefore the produot of a very transitory set of 

advantages. The Germans had produced equipment and fielded 

mechanized units in the mid-1930s, so that this equipment was 

still usable and the units were well organized and trained when 

war began in 1939. In addition, Germany had two advantages that 

the other powers lacked: a primLtive but developing close 

air-support system, and a command and oontrol network that 

allowed for much more rapid maneuver than any opponent could 

achieve. 

78 
CBAPTER FOUR 

WORLD WAR II: THE AXIS ADVANCE, 1939-1942 

World War II did more than force armies to integrate all the 

available arms at every level into a mobile, flexible team. It 

also forced those armies to adjust to a variety of threats and 

terrain. Despite the vast scope of the struggle, some major 

trends are evident. First, the mechanized combined arms force 

cane of age in this war. In 1939, most armies still thought of 

an armored division as a mass of tanks with relatively limited 

support frcm the other arms. By 1943, the same armies had 

evolved armored divisions that were a balance of different arms 

and services, each of which had to be as mobile and almost as 

protected as the tanks they accompanied. The Soviet, German, and 

American armies cannibalized infantry-support tank units to form 

more armored divisions. Second, this concentration of mechanized 

forces in a small number of mobile divisions left the ordinary 

infantry unit deficient in both antitank weapons for the defense 

and armor to accanpany the deliberate attack. The German, 

Soviet, and American armies therefore developed a number of tank 

surrogates such as tank destroyers and assault guns to perform 

these functions in cooperation with the infantry. Third, one of 

the driving forces in both of the previous trends was the gradual 

development of the means to counter and control the blitzbieg. 

During the period 1939 to 194 1, conventional infantry units were 

unprepared psychologically and technologically to defeat a 

rapidly moving armored foe who broke into their rear areas to 

disrupt communications and organization. By 1943, those same 

infantry units had lost their paralyzing fear of armored 

penetration and had acquired a much greater antitank capability. 

Successful armored penetrations were still possible, as the 

Soviets demonstrated, but they were increasingly difficult. 

Finally, World War II represented the end of pure ground 

operations. Mechanized attack required air superiority and close 

air support, airborne landings required close coordination 

between air transport and ground forces, and amphibious landings 

developed as the most sophisticated and complicated form of 

combined arms and joint operations. Such joint service 

interaction was not achieved without operational errors and 

doctrinal arguments, but by the end of the war ground commanders 

had reached a temporary working compromise with the other 

services on most questions. 

The best way to examine these developments is to consider the 

actions and reactions of the opposing armies during the course of 

the war. This chapter will begin with the reasons for the German 

success of 1939 and 1940, followed by British reactions and 

adjustments to that success. Turning to the next cycle of 

developments, the German victories in Russia during 1941-42 must 

be compared with Soviet efforts to adjust organization and 

tactics both before and after the German invasion. After 

reviewing American developments in organization, the next chapter 

79 
will consider the many technological advances of the war, then 

swvey the development of Allied antitank, mechankzed, and dose 

air support operations in the second half of the war. 

Specialized cases such as airborne, amphibious, and 

unconventional operations are discussed separately at the end of 

Chapter Five. 

Poland, 1939 

During the first seventeen days of September 1939, Germany 

overwhelmed Poland and occupied more than half of its territory. 

The western Allies, who were still mobilizing and training their 

reserve ccmponents, were unable to make more than a symbolic 

attack along the French-German border duri.ng this period, Yet 

the speed of the German conquest obscured a number of problems 

that the Germans encountered, problems that they attempted to 

solve during the winter of 1939-40, As a result, the Germans 

widened the gap of experience and experimentation that separated 

them from their future opponents, Great Britain and France.1 

To begin with, the German higher commanders had not accepted 

Guderian's theories and did not employ their mobJ.le divisions in 

mass for deep exploitation. The panzer and light divisions were 

parceled out among the various armies. The only exception was 

the German Tenth Army, which had two panzer, two motorized, and 

three light divisions in addition to its six conventional 

Mfantry divisions. In general, the mechanized and motorized 

forces were employed as the cutting edges of a more conventional 

advance on a broad front, with relatively shallow penetrations of 

the Polish defenses. Not until after organized Polish resistance 

collapsed did armored forces exploit into the rear for any 

distanoe.2 

Although German tanks and motorized infantry had developed 

techniques for close interaction, the same was not true between 

these elements and their fire support. Within hours of the first 

attack, General Guderian was bracketed by his own artillery, 

which violated orders by firing blindly into the morning fog., 

The Luftwaffe eoneentrated on achieving air superiority and 

titerdieting Polish lines of communication, rather than on 

supporting the ground troops directly. The csnphexity of close 

air support operations, the problems of eoordinatkng and 

eommunieating between air and ground units, and the lack of 

training in such methods made it very difficult for the Luftwaffe 

and army to work together. 

Nany German tactical commanders were too cautious, allowing 

themselves to be halted by even minor Polish resistan%?. This 

was a natural response for an army that had not seen combat for 

years, but it was not appropriate to the situation. The Poles 

were probably doomed at the outset, because they had dispersed 

80 
their forces along the entire Polish-German border in an effort 

to prevent any limited German grab for territory. Under the 

circumstances, German forces needed to punch through the thin 

Polish frontier defenses rapidly, rather than stopping to deploy 

whenever they made contact with Polish troops. 

The German system of division and higher level commanders 

going forward to make on -the-spot decisions greatly increased the 

t=PQ of operations. However, the same system had several 

drawbacks that were evident even in this first campaign. The 

presence of a higher commander on the scene tended to Snhibit the 

initiative of the battalion or regimental commander. This 

inhibition may have been partially responsible for the caution 

displayed by German units in Poland. Moreover, the senior 

commanders were extremely vulnerable to enemy attack while moving 

about in a fluid battle. For example, Guderian, a corps 

commander, was pinned down for hours by a few bypassed Polish 

troops. This was a recurring problem for leaders in many armies 

during World War II, especially for the more daring German 

commanders in North Africa. Ultimately some, like Rcmnmel, 

organized ad hoc security task forces to travel with them. Yet 

such a security force reduced the combat power of subordinate 

units and at the same time increased the tendency for a senior 

commander to become involved personally in the small unit actions 

he saw when he visited the front. If he lost radio contact with 

his headquarters, the senior commander became isolated and even 

less effective. 

Although no German unit advanced more than 250 kilometers 

into Poland, significant problems of supply and maintenance 

developed. All major tank repairs required evacuation to 

Germany, and forward maintenance units were unprepared for the 

new demands of active campaiming. By the end of the Polish 

campai.~, the German mechanized force was almost immobilized for 

maintenance reasons. 

A related problem was the unsuitability of German equipment. 

As noted in the previous chapter, the Germans had intended the 

Mark I tank for training rather than combat, and the Mark II was 

scarcely better. The use of such vehicles in Poland reflected 

two problems: Germany had begun the war before her mechanized 

forces had developed canpletely, and those forces still did not 

have priority for industrial production. During the month of 

September 1939, for example, the Germans lost 218 tanks in 

battle ? approxtiately 10 percent of their entire force, while 

manufacturing only fifty-seven new ones. Even at the time of the 

invasion of France eight months later, the second generation Mark 

III and IV medium tanks constituted less than one-fourth of 

German tanks in field units.3 The Polish c=paiED did 

accelerate the retirement of Mark Is by revealing their 

deficiencies and may have hastened the movement of Mark 11s into 

81 
reconnaissance, engineer, and command units. As a result, the 

relatively few Mark III and IV tanks bore the brunt of the effort 

in 1940, 

By contrast, other German equipment had unexpected uses* The 

half-tracks originally intended as prime movers for artillery 

proved to be so mobile that infantry units in panzer divisions 

sought to acquire them as armored personnel carriers. The vast 

majority of panzer grenadiers, however, continued to travel in 

trucks and motorcycles throughout the war; there were never 

enough half-tracks available: The 88-m antiaircraft gun proved 

to be extremely useful in a ground-support role, foreshadoting 

its later use as the premier antitank weapon of the German Army. 

A basle result of the German invasion of Poland was to begin the sloti evolution of the German panzer division structure 

towards greater balance among the arms. At the time of the 

Polish campaign, the six panzer divisions averaged between 276 

and 302 tanks each, organized into a panzer brigade of four 

battalions. Those same divisions had only three battalions of 

infantry and two of artillery. This tank-heavy force proved too 

untieldy for some commanders, and in any event Hitler was 

interested in creating more panzer divisions. At the same time, 

the German "'light divisions,'" built around two motorized infantry 

regiments and one tank battalion, pr%Ved to be too light for 

sustafned operations, lacking the combat power of either a panzer 

division or a conventional infantry division. Given the limited 

number of tanks in the German inventory, the s01uti0n was 

obvious--tanks moved frmn the existing panzer divisions to the 

light divisions, three of whkch beeante panzer divisions during 

the winter of 1939-40. In addition, during the Polish campaign 

ad hoc panzer division had formed around one of the 

zantry-support tank brigades created in 1938; this formation 

became the 10th Panzer Division. Thus, by the time of the Freneh 

c=P~En, even more of the available German tanks were 

concentrated into panzer divisions, some of which were reduced 

from a four-battalion tank brigade to a three-battalion tank 

regiment, with a total of 16%20Q tanks. This put the tank 

element in balance with the rest of the divisfon, which normally 

consfsted of three infantry battalions and two or three towed 

artillery battalions, an armored reconnaissance battalion, 

engineer battalion, and signals.4 This trend towards a more 

balanced division would continue throughout the war. 

'Regardless of exact organization, all the panzer divisions 

were in the habit of task organizing for eanbat. The brigade, 

regimental, and battalion headquarters all practiced attaching 

and detaching elements of other arms in order to have a 

combination of tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, and, on 

occasion, air defense. The balance between these arms varied 

with the mission, terrain, and enemy forces involved. 

82 
Beyond these organizational changes, German tactical concepts 

and structures seemed essentially sound. With the exception of.a 

few technical problems with a particular machine gun design, the 

infantry divisions functioned well. The only other lesson of the 

Polish campaign was the predictable discovery that armored forces 

were at a disadvantage when fighting on urban 

terrain--fifty-seven tanks were lost in one day while attempting 

to seize Warsaw.5 This experience only reinforced the need for 

a higher proportion of infantry to tanks, in order to provide 

close-in security for the tanks on urban terrain, where the tanks 

were vulnerable to short-range antitank attacks from nearby 

buildings. 

The German Advance, 1940 

Between the fall of Poland in 1939 and the beginning of the 

Belgian-French camp&@. in May 1940, another German operation 

unsettled Allied morale and foreshadowed the future complexity of 

joint operations. On 9 April 1940, an improvised German force 

used motor movements, small-scale airborne drops, and seaborne 

landing3 to occupy Denmark and Norway by surprise. Only one of 

the six German divisions sent to Norway was a fully trained, 

established organization, yet all units performed remarkably 

well. Despite the shoestring nature of the German operation, 

this "warfare in three dimensions" (land, air, and sea) caused a 

shift of Allied resources and planning away from the battlefields 

of France.6 This shift meant further confusion and delays in 

the process of mobilizing and training the British and French 

troops. 

The stunning operations in Denmark and Norway preceded 

another surprise when the main battle in France and Belgium was 

joined. On 10 May 1940, a small party of German glider troops 

landed on top of the elaborate concrete fortress of Eben Emael, 

the key to the Belgian defensive system. Using shaped-charge 

explosives* and the element of surprise, these Germans blinded 

and neutralized the huge fortress until ground troops arrived, 

thereby eliminating one of Belgium's main defenses.7 This 

surprise, coming on the heels of the Norwegian invasion, caused 

many Allied milktary and civilian leaders to become excessively 

*The "shaped charge" was a concept fully developed only 

during the 1930s. It allowed the user to focus the blast of a 

particular amount of explosive in order to achieve a much greater 

effect than the same explosive would produce if detonated 

normally, The essence of this shaping was to mold the explosive 

with a cone-shaped hollow on one end, so that the blast effect 

that centered within that hollow would produce a shock wave in 

one direction, towards the wide end of the cone. 

a3 
concerned about the rear area threat posed by airborne and 

unconventtonal warfare forces. Such eoneern was the first step 

in creating the psychological uncertainty that was so critical to 

the success of the blitzkrieg. 

Gcmquering Belgium and France required more than propaganda 

and a few paratroopers to create psycholo@cal paralysis. 

Ccmtrary to frequent stereotypes, the western armies were 

remarkably well armed by 1940, having greatly increased their 

production during the later 1930s. One calculation indicates 

that Britain and France had a ccmbined total of 4,340 tanks on 

the continent during the 1940 campaign, as compared to only 3,863 

for Germany. Despite weaknesses such as lack of radio 

communications and crowded turrets, most of the Allied tanks were 

actually better armed and armored than their German 

counterparts. Only the light British cruiser tanks were more 

vulnerable. For instance, one obsolete French FCM tank took 

forty-+%) hits from German 37-m antitank guns without being 

knocked out of action. The Germans had to bring up 88-mm 

antiaircraft guns or medium artrllery to deal with the more 

heavily armored French B-l his and British infantry support 

tanks. Indeed, the Germans were d4sturbed by the general 

ineffectiveness of their antitank weapons. By contrast, the 

outnumbered French 25-mm and 47-man antitank guns had much higher 

muzzle velocities and therefore 

greatger 

armor penetration 

capacity than the German and British guns. 

Pet the Germans defeated the Allies so rapidly that they 

seemed to validate the concept of blitzkrieg in Germany and 

abroad, even when the details of this concept were not well 

understood. The true r=SOIlS for this success have already 

appeared in this study. 

First, in contrast to their own performance in Poland and to 

the French dispositions in 1940, the Germans concentrated thekr 

available mechanized forces into a few large masses at critical 

points. Seven out of ten panzer divisions, with five motorized 

divisions following close behind them to mop up and protect the 

flanks, advanced through the Ardennes forest on a 

seventy-kilometer front. By contrast, the Freneh Army dispersed 

thirty-six tank battalions evenly along its borders in support of 

infantry armies, even in the Maginot Line area. In most cases 

these battalions had never trained with the infantry and 

artillery to conduct a deliberate attack or counterattack. Much 

of the remaining French and British armor was in the extreme 

north, moving into Belgium in a direction away from the mafn 

German advance on Sedan. Four French armored divisions were 

still forming, but these were scattered at wide distances behind 

the front 

battle. 9 

and were broken up in some cases when committed to 

84 
In additicm, the western Allies had organized themselves for 

a linear defense, spreading their forces thinly across a wide 

front. The French command structure in particular was geared to 

methodical, set-piece battles, but lacked the forces to create a 

true defense-in-depth on the World War I model. By rushing 

through the Ardennes forest, the main German attack shattered 

this linear defense at one of its weakest points. By the fifth 

day of the campaign (14 May 19401, the German mobile forces were 

conducting the type of deep exploitation envisioned by many 

theorists during the 1930s. Such penetrations were 

psychologically unnerving to the defenders, who were suddenly 

faced by major enemy forces in the rear, but who lacked a 

procedure to redeploy units rapidly to meet and contain that 

threat. The rapid German advance disorganized French command and 

control and prevented any resc&ration of a cohesive defense. 

Because there was so little resistance, the German commanders 

did not always lead with tanks. Instead, the armored 

reconnaissance battalions, plus in some cases engineers to clear 

obstacles, led the advance by up to a day's march, with the 

slower elements strung out in column behind. Ganmanders used 

armored vehicles or light aircraft for control during the 

pursuit. Of course, this advance in column made the Germans 

rather vulnerable if the defenders were able to mount a 

counterattack, as Erwin Ranrnel discovered when the British struck 

the flank of his panzer division at Arras on 21 May. Only the 

improvised use of 88-m antiaircraf t guns and 105-m howitzers in 

an antitank role halted the heavy infantry-support tanks of the 

British 1st Army Tank Brigade. The British did not realize that 

the 88-m gun was responsible for their defeat until they met the 

weapon again in North Africa. Even thPs unsuccessful British 

counterattack at Arras put sczne of the fear of tanks into the 

German higher commanders, causing German armor leaders to seek 

larger antitank weapons and higher velocity tank guns after 

Arras.10 

At the tactical level, both the British and the French were 

at a distinct disadvantage in force structure and practice. 

German armored divisions were clearly bett,er organized than those 

of France. The French Division Cuirassee was too tank-heavy, 

tith four tank and only one infantry and two artillery 

battalions. When ordinary infantry or artillery units were 

attached to this division to correct the problem, the attached 

units had not trained to cooperate with tanks. French logistical 

support was too dependent on roads and rails to follow the 

all-terrain maneuver elements of these divisions. Finally, the 

inexperienced French commander of an armored division had to 

control most of his subordinate units direetly; the 

"demi-brigade" headquarters that controlled his tank battalions 

were not trained or intended to integrate the other armSI BY 

85 
contrast, the German commanders had a number of subordinate 

head quarters, each of which had practiced the control of a 

ccmbination of' the various arms. 

German training in combined arms was especially evident 

during the penetration of the Ardennes. The rapid German advance 

over a poor road network was made possible only by road repairs 

conducted by ecmbat engineers. Anti-aircraft guns in the German 

oolumns decimated Allied air attacks. At the eritieal crossing of the Meuse River on 13 May, the German infantry and some 

engineers crossed the river under the covering fire of tanks, 

artillery , and tactical aircraft. Indeed, the Germans had relied 

on air support to limit the need for artillery units and 

ammunition resupply while moving through the Ardennes. Because 

close air support was still developing, however, the success at 

the Meuse River was a combination of good training and luck. In 

exercises before the campaign, Guderian had arranged for aecurdte 

air support fran German dive-banbers, without which it wauld have 

been difficult to suppress the French defenses on the far side of 

the river. The day before the attaok, the panzer group 

commander, General Ewald von Kleist, attempted to arrange high 

altitude saturation attac& by the less aoourate medium bcolbers. 

This would have made crossing the Meuse during bombing attacks 

extremely dangerous for the Germans. Fortunately for them, the 

Luftwaffe did not honor von Kleist’s air support request in time, 

while Guderian's prearranged dive-bombers did arrive.ll 

The fall of France demonstrated not only the importance of 

combined arms mechanized formations and blitzkrieg penetrations, 

but also the German advantage over the British and French in 

combined arms training and procedures* Yet the images of 

paratroops, tanks, and screaming Stukas tended to obscure the 

combined arms nature of blitzkrieg from many contemporary 

observers. 

The British Response, 7940-42 

The s'udden collapse of France in 1940 caused professional 

soldiers in many armies to reassess their organizations as well 

as their offensive and defensive doctrine. As the only major 

belligerent still at war with Hitler, Great Britain had the most 

urgent need to reorganize its forces and reassess its doctrine in 

the months after Dunkirk. Unfortunately for the British, the 

period 1940-42 seems in retrospect to have witnessed the 

development of two British armies--the =v at home, which 

gradually rebuilt and developed new doctrine and organization, 

and the field army in the Middle East, which after initial 

success against Italy found itself repeatedly outmaneuvered by 

the small forces of the German Afrika Korps. The British troops 

in North Africa were never able to reorganize and retrain as did 

86 
the army at home. Yet these two armies were connected in 

doctrine if not in practice, and the British vic+&ries of 1942-45 

owed a great deal to the quiet process of rebuilding forces at 

home. 

Faced with the possibility of German invasicn after France 

surrendered, the British felt that there was no time for major 

changes in organization, doctrine, or equipent. In a desperate 

effort to rearm the troops evacuated from Dunkirk, British 

industry continued to produce weapons whose designs were clearly 

obsolete. Cruiser tanks, armored cars, and two-pound antitank 

guns appeared by the hundred because there was no time to 

redesign and build better weapons.12 Same British commanders 

became preoccupied with the material difficulties of obtaining 

trucks to motorize infantry elements within the newly formed 

armored divisions, thereby obscuring the more fundamental need 

for doctrine and techniques of infantry-armor cooperation. The 

British did develop some new weapons during this period, most 

notably a six-pound (5'7~nnn) gun for use both as an antitank 

weapon and as the main gun on new tanks. Yet this gun did not 

appear in the field until 194.2, and even then was too large to be 

mounted in the turrets of older model tanks.13 

As the threat of invasion lessened, the British Army could 

emphasize training and reconsider its prewar doctrine in light of 

the experiences of 1940.'4 The General Staff published a 

series of notes frcm various theaters, identifying such points as 

the need for combined arms organization below division level and 

the German use of antitank weapons rather than tanks to defeat 

enemy tanks. Under the direction of Gen. Alan Brooke, 

Commander-in-Chief Home Forces and later Chief of the Imperial 

General Staff, the units of the expanded active and reserve 

(Territorial Army) forces conducted training at all levels. Some 

of this training was simply an improvement on prewar principles, 

such as the development of fire-and-movement battle drills for 

small infantry units. Col. H. J. Parham experimented with a 

single radio net to mass artillery on the basis of an estimated 

map reference; the results were rather inaccurate, but in the 

absence of the American fire direction center, Parham's ideas 

allowed the Royal Artillery to provide at least scme response to 

targets of opportunity. 

The most unusual feature of the period 1940-42 was the 

conduct of large-unit command post exercises and field maneuvers, 

with detailed study before and critiques after each step. Lt. 

Gen, Bernard L. Montgomery had pioneered such exercises as a 

division commander in France during 1939-40, enabling his 

division to move more rapidly and flexibly than most other 

British units. After Dunkirk, Montgomery applied the same 

training techniques as commander of two different corps and 

finally of an army-level force. He also acted as chief umpire 

87 
for exercises 1nvoLving other unkts in Britain. Similar if less 

elaborate training took place in the newly formed armored 

divisions under Lt, Gen. Giffard Martel, the Commander of the 

Royal Armoured Corps after December 1940. 

McnQomery contended that few British officers had experience 

maneuvering any unit larger than a brigade, and certainly his 

exercises helped to produce commanders, staffs, and units that 

were capable of much more rapid changes in deployment and mission 

than those of World War I. More importantly, Montgomery and 

others developed a common conception of the interaction of 

different arms and of how to commit divisions and larger units to 

battle. For example, Montgomery argued that the decentralized 

nature of German mechanized pursuit and exploitation had caused 

many British commander3 to lose sight of the neeessity for 

centralized control in the deliberate attack and defense. 

Reconnaissance, artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, and air 

power had to be “stage-managed" at the highest levels in order to 

concentrate combat power at any point where the enemy presented 

an organized defense or attack, Only in a fluid situation could 

commmders decentralize these arms and push them forward, so that 

subordinate leaders would have the different weapons readily 

available. Defense meant not a series of fixed lines on the 

terrain, but rather blocking positions in depth plus massive 

counterattack3 of the kind Germany had used so well in World War 

I. All arms needed to employ night attacks to reduce the lethal 

effects of aimed enemy fire. Finally, Montgomery opposed the 

traditional British concept that tank units should maneuver like 

cavalry. Instead, he saw the armored division as a combined arms 

force that would seize key terrain in order to use the advantages 

of tactical defense when the enemy armor counterattacked. 

Infantry and antitank forces would foilow the initial armored 

assault to mop up and hold terrain, releasing the amr to refit 

or attack again.15 

In the Royal Armoured Corps, Martel developed these same 

concepts in a series of exercises, until in June I%2 the senior 

armor commander3 in Britain agreed to an "RAC creed." This 

creed--a product of exercises and of a critical analysis of 

events in North Africa--began, 'lan armoured division is a 

formation of all arms. Each am or branch of the service is a 

member of the team, and has its vital part to play.+' Like the 

Germans before them, British armor commanders concluded that 

antitank guns were the best means to defeat enemy tanks, although 

tank-tank combat might still OCXYR+. Motorized infantry and 

antitank weapons together would hold key terrain, around which 

the armored forces maneuvered.l6 

88 
Changes in organization accompanied changes in doctrine. 

Imediately after DunkIrk, the pure tank brigades of the early 

armored divisions had given way to brimdes composed of one 

motorized infantry and three tank battalions.* A 1940 British 

armored division therefore consisted of an armored car 

reconnaissance battalion, two armred brigades, and a support 

group, which included battalions of field, antitank, and light 

antiaircraft artillery, an additional infantry battalion, two 

engineer companies, and trains. Martel and his subordinates 

deliberately retained this orenization until 1942 to avoid 

constant changes that would disrupt training. 

BY 1942, however, this structure was obviously too 

tank-heavy, and so the War Office removed one of the two armored 

brigades from the division (see Figure 9). The separate brigades 

that resulted from this removal could reinforce any division as 

needed for a particular mission. Moreover, the term "support 

group" had apparently caused the nonarmored elements of the 

division to be regarded as an afterthought to the tanks. A 

motorized infantry brigade plus a division artillery element 

therefore replaced the support group, with the intention that 

artillery, antitank, antiaircraft, engineer, and support elements 

would be centralized or attached to the armored or infantry 

brigade as needed. At the same time, the British created two 

different types of infantry division. The "division" per =, apparently intended for Asian operations, retained the 

traditional configuration of three infantry brigades of three 

battalions each. Conversely, the "infantry division" lost one 

brigade in favor of an infantry-support tank brigade. Martel and 

the new Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, Bernard Paget, strongly 

advocated this latter change in order to improve training and 

cooperation between infantry and supporting tanks.!? 

Unfortunately, the British returned to a division of three 

infantry brigades by 1944. As a result, the quality of 

tank-infantry cooperation in 1944-45 varied widely between 

different divisions. 

War in the Desert, 1940-42 

The battles of North Africa did not always reflect the state 

of the British Army at home. In late 1940, the small force in 

the Middle East was the only British field army still trained to 

*The British frequently used the term "regiment" to desisate 

an armored force equivalent to an American battalion. American 

terminology and symbology are used here for simplicity. 

89 
BRITISH ARMORED 

DIVISIQN, 1942 

16,OOQ men, 246 medEum tanks. 

44 light tanks, 361 armored carriers, 

46 field guns. 78 antitank guns 

e 0 

PARK 

BRITISH INFANTRY 

DIVISIBN, 1842 

19.000 mem. 190 medium tanks, 

33 light tanks, 32 field guns, 

110 antitank guns 

26-lber 

57- or 7%mm 

9PT /HVY WPNS): Heavy Weapons or 

Support company, including mortars 

and antitank guns. 

Figure 9. British Armored and Infantry Divisions, 1942. 

84-3330 -9oi 

0 

25-Ibar 

a 

57- or 7%mm 

_. .-~------ -____ 
hi& prewar standards, although its equipment was little better 

than that found at home. Once Italy joined the war on Germany's 

side in mid-1940, Prime Minister Winston Churchill took a 

calculated risk and sent a portion of his scarce resources to 

defend Egypt against the threat from Libya, which was an Italian 

colony at the time. The shipment included a single battalion 

(7th Royal Tank Regiment) of heavily armored Mark II infantry 

support tanks. This battalion, Fn combination with the two 

understrength but well-trained divisions already in Egypt, was 

the basis for a classic demonstration of prewar British tactical 

doctrine (see Map 5). 

In SeptEYnber 1940, Marshal Rudolf0 Graziani's Italian army of 

ten divisions had advanced eastward from Italian Libya into 

British Egypt. Graziani was cautious, however, and in any event 

his force was largely foot mobile with poor logistical support. 

He therefore halted and established a series of widely scattered 

camps in the general area of SIdf Barr&i, about eighty 

kilometers east of the Libyan frontier. Lt. Gen. Richard 

O'Connor, commander of the British Western Desert Force, used the 

infantry support tanks in conjunction with the 4th Indian 

Infantry Division to reduce these camps in a surprise advance on 

8-10 December 1940. The tactics involved exemplified the best of 

interwar British practice.18 Because the Italian camps were 

protected by minefields and obstacles, the British passed between 

these camps and attacked them from the far (western) side, aiming 

at the unmined entrance road to each camp. Artillery and mortar 

fire pinned the defenders down and distracted attenticm from the 

unexpected assault. Then two canpanies of the slow infantry 

tanks moved forward, with platoons of Bren gun carriers following 

behind and to the outside flanks, providing flank security and 

macNne gun fire for the tanks. As soon as the British C,anks 

broke into the enemy positions and came to close quarters, 

infantry moved up as closely as possible in trucks, dismounted, 

and accaupanied the tanks in mopping-up operations. 

After the tank-artillery-infantry team had reduced the enemy 

defensive system, the 7th British Armoured Division used its 

light!, mobile armored vehicles to conduct a high-speed pursuit. 

The retreating Italians lacked effective tanks or antitank 

weapons and were tied to the single road that paralleled the 

Mediterranean Sea. The 7th Armoured Division therefore made a 

series of wide flanking movements south of the road, repeatedly 

turning north to the coast in order to intercept the Italian 

retreat. This Italian disaster led to the introduction of German 

forces in North Africa. 

91 
MEDITERRANEAN SEA 

- 

\ 62 crl r=>a 

LIBYAN m 

J----J 

9 DEC 

1940 1 

SCALE 

)o= Fortified Mian Positions 

Map 5, Sidi Barrani, December 1940, 
The roots of the British victory lay in advantages of 

superior training, mobility, and equipment. German intervention 

negated these assets. In early 1941 and again a year later, the 

British reduced their forces in Egypt in favor of needs 

elsewhere--first in Greece and, then, after Japan entered the 

W=-, in Southeast Asia. As a result, when the German Afrika 

Korps attacked in March 1941, it met only partly trained British 

troops e q@ped with worn out and inferior equipment. 

Thereafter, German victories and Landon's repeated demands for 

British counteroffensives meant that the British desert forces 

had little time to analyze their mistakes and to train to correct 

them. With few exceptions, the senior British commanders did not 

stay in office long enough to learn and apply the lessas of the 

desert war. The Germans had arrived in Africa with a system of 

combined arms battlegroups, flexible commanders, and variable 

tactics to mass canbat power on the basis of battle drills. By 

contrast, the British units had rarely studied combined arms 

tactics. Newly arrived units from Britain might be better 

trained, but were often squandered piecemeal before they had 

beccme acclimated to the desert. 

The Germans also had a considerable technological advantage 

in equipment.19 After their shocking encounter with British 

infantry-support tanks in France, the Germans had experimented 

with the 88-m antiaircraft gun to test its effectiveness as an 

antitank weapm against captured British equipment. The German 

divisions sent to Africa had a number of organizational 

modifications, such as less field but more antitank artillery, 

including a small number of 88-xn guns. In addition, the German 

tanks in Africa were largely Mark III and IV medium tanks, with 

Mark II tanks in reconnaissance and command elements. These 

medium tanks were considerably better armed and armored than the 

British cruiser and light tanks. 

During the course of 1941, a 504un medium-velocity main gun 

replaced the 37-mm on most Mark IIIs. Then in mid-1942, the 

Germans installed an even higher velocity 50-mrrm on scme Mark 

IIIs, giving them the same penetration power as the 50-mm towed 

antitank gun that had already replaced the ineffective German 

37-mm. This new 50-mm tank gun had improved sights and fired 

special "arrowhead" ammunition (an early form of Armor Piercing 

Discarding Sabot) capable of penetrating even thickly armored 

infantry support tanks at short ranges. By contrast, the Germans 

had designed the Mark IV to provide area fire support for other 

tanks, suppressing enemy antitank defenses while the Mark IIIs 

closed in the attack. As such, the Mark IV's original armament 

was a 75-m low-velocity gun capable of damaging British tracks 

and roadwheels at 1000 meters, but not of penetrating thick 

armor. Again during 1942, the continuing German quest for 

93 
gunpower caused some Mark IVs to receive a higher velocity 75mm 

b3~. All of these weapons outclassed the British two-pound tank 

and antitank gun, As late as May 1942, the British forces had 

only 100 six-pound antitank guns and were just receiving their 

first American Grant tanks with 15-mm guns. Cconsidering that the 

frontal armor on German tanks was Pas@-hardened, while that on 

British tanks was not, the British had to close to almost 

sticidal ranges of 500 or fewer meters in order to penetrate the 

German vehicles. In many cases, the British had to hit a German 

tank ttice--once to shatter the face hardening and a second Sfme 

to penetrate the armor. 

These equipment problems obscured the more basic British 

failure to coordinate and combine different weapons systems. 

Despite Martel's efforts, British tank battalions in Britain and 

North Africa found it difficult to resist the temptatfon to close 

with the enemy, even when they had not located the enemy's antitank guns. Because the basic German tactic for dealing with 

enemy armor was still the antftank gun line, this British 

tendency was disastrous. On 15 June 19411 for example, a few 

German tanks decoyed the 16th Royal Tank Regiment into a screen 

of Y&mm antitank guns; the British lost 17 tanks in a matter of 

minutes.20 Such bitter lessons rapidly convinced the Brftish 4. UO value gun power above all other elements and to regard 

infantry as a liability in the desert. The armor's tendency to 

maneuver on its own often left the infantry exposed, and the 

resulting mistrust made any attempt aC, cooperation between these 

arms extremely difficult. In those cases where the British and 

CcoPnonwealth infantry was able to entrench effectively, the 

commanders chose positions that were not mutually support;lng, so 

that the Germans could concentrate all available firepower 

against one British unit at a time. 

Early in the desert war, British commanders apparently 

grasped the German concept of combined arms task organization at 

the small-unit level, but did not always develop the tactics to 

ccmplement that organizatfc62. As Plontgomery was preaehfng in 

Great Britain, the tendency to form combined arms units of 

battalion and brigade size was not always appropriate or 

sufficient, and caused the divisions to fight as uncoordinated 

and dispersed eolleetlons of small units. The concentrated 

efforts of the German Afrika Korps often defeated these British 

task forces in detail. 

The British tried to reverse this process. General Martel 

vi&ted North Africa in early 1942, and the loeal armor 

commanders agreed to the newer concepts of a combined arms 

armored divisica?. The local units, however, did not implement 

these changes in organization and taotics before the next German 

offensive, so the British again lost armored "brigade groups" 

94 
piecemeal despite their intentions to employ divisions as unified 

forces. After losing most of their tanks, the British resorted 

to small motorized columns built around the few remaining 

effective field and antitank artillery units, with just enough 

motorized infantry to provide local security for those units. 

"Excess" infantry went to the rear.21 

This was the situation when Montgomery took command of Eighth 

British Army in August 1942. Lt. Gen. Brian Horroaks, who had 

participated in Martel's training exercises as an armored 

division commander, arrived soon thereafter to command one of the 

corps. In effect, Montgomery had to retrain the Eighth Army from 

scratch, focusing upon the problems of centralized command and 

control for set-piece battles. 

The British gained tFme by halting the Germans at Alam Halfa 

(31 August-5 September 1942). Having predicted the key terrain 

that the Germans would have to seize, British and Ccunmonwealth 

defenders dug in to deny the enemy that terrain. The Royal Air 

Force attacked German armor while it was immobilized in British 

minefields. The main British defenses included Grant tank fire 

at long range, towed antitank guns at closer range, and finally 

massed artillery protective fires at short range. These 

successive defenses exhausted the German attacks.22 

After Alam Halfa, Montgomery used an abbreviated form of his 

training program from Britain to prepare the Eighth Army for the 

deliberate attack known as the second battle of Alamein 

(October-November 1942). To ensure that the entire army attacked 

kn a coordinated manner, Montgomery resorted to the elaborate 

planning and centralized direction characteristic of British 

attacks in World War I. Each corps directed its artillery, for 

example. Such procedures were more familiar to British staff 

officers than the fluid, improvisational tactics that they had 

attempted to copy from the Germans. Engineers, infantry, and 

artillery conducted a night penetration of the German-Italian 

defensive positions, seizing high ground on which to establish 

infantry-antitank defenses. Next, Montgomery planned to move 

armor forward under the protection of these antitank defenses, 

tempting the Germans to counterattack. In actual practice, the 

second battle of Alamein was an attrition contest in which 

Montgomery's plans changed frequently, largely because the 

armored units still had difficulty cooperating with the artillery 

and infantry. The ultimate British success clearly owed as much 

to Montgomery's methods of forcing combined arms cooperation upon 

his subordinates as to the British material superiority at the 

time. Historians have frequently criticized Montgomery for the 

cautious manner in which he conducted both deliberate attacks and 

more fluid exploitation and pursuits. Yet this caution enabled 

95 
him to minimize or avoid the errors of his predecessors, errors 

caused in large part by an inability to coordinate the different 

arms.23 

The German Advance In Russia, 1941 

While Germany went from vietory to victory in the period 

1939-41, 

Stalin's 

the Soviet Army stood nearly impotent, *thanks in part to 

PW@ of its officer corps. The adminfstrative 

occupation of eastern Poland in the fall of 1939 strained Soviet 

logistios to the breaking poincU, and the disastrous Russo-Finnish 

War of 1939-40 demonstrated Soviet inability to coordinate units 

for a deliberate attack.24 It is true that the Soviets 

eventually learned from their mistakes, redoubled their efforts, 

and forced the Finns to negotiate an armistice in March 1940. 

Nevertheless, the Red Army was a shambles. 

In light of these experiences, during the period 1940-41 the 

Soviet government undertook massive reforms in military 

organization, equipment, command structure, and deployment. The 

Sov5.ets mismanaged most of these changes, and none was complete 

by the time Germany attacked In June 1941. The Germans caught the Red Army in transition and rkpped it apart.25 

For our purposes the most noteworthy Soviet change before the 

German invasion was the reintroduction of large combined arms 

mechanized formations. In reaction to the German victories of 

1940, the Soviet government ordered the creation of mechanized 

corps, each consisting of two tank and one motorized rffle 

division, for use as C,he exploitation forces in each field army. 

By January 1941, the Red Army had on paper twenty-nine of these 

huge corps, authorized 1,031 tanks each. Unfortunately, the 

Soviets had neither the men nor the eq&.pment to implement their 

ambitious plan. By removing all tanks from infantry and cavalry 

support .units, the Soviets collected approximately 17,000 tanks, 

but the new organizations called for a total of 29,899. Worse 

still, these tanks were almost entirely the lightly armed and 

armored variety produeed in the mid-1930s. By 1941, such 

equipment was tactically obsolete and mechanically worn out. In 

late 1939, the Red Army had tentatively approved designs for newt 

second generation equipment, including the T-34 medium and m-1 

heavy tanks. Yet incompetent management prevented production of 

more than 1,475' of these outstanding ,new weapons before the 

German attack.26 Similar managerial and bureaucratic problems 

depfived the Soviets of trucks to move infantry and artillery, of . mines to stop'tanks, and of modern fighters to contest German air 

superiority. 

In contrast to Soviet disarray, the German Army that invaded 

on 22 June 1941 was at the top of its form, Hitler "s continuing 

96 
desire for more panzer divisions had unintentionally improved the 

balance of arms within those divisions. In order to assemble the 

tanks necessary for the additional divisions, the Germans had 

reduced all panzer divisions to an establishment of only two or 

three tank battalions of three canpanies each, for a total of 

150-202 tanks per division. This action, plus an increase in 

infantry to a total of four trucked and one motorcycle battalion, 

meant that e&h division had six to nine tank companies, but 

fifteen motorized infantry canpanies; the other arms remained 

unchanged. Considering the high casualties and many demands for 

motorized infantry, this ratio was probably the most effective 

for all forms of mechanized combat. 

Armored enthusiasts have frequently criticized Hitler for 

this reduction in tank strength, arguing that the resulting 

panzer division lacked the combat 

27 

power for sustained advances of 

the type necessary in Russia. It would be more accurate to 

argue that German planners geared the entire German Army for 

relatfvely limited distances and tied it to railroads and 

horsedrawn logistics. The problems in the German maintenance 

system, for example, had been evident even in the short Polish 

campaign of 1939. The Russian campaign involved much greater 

distances and longer operations. Under these circumstances, the 

German system of centralizing spare parts and evacuating most 

major repairs back to the factory was completely inadequate. In 

August 1941, the field commanders in Russia had to mount a major 

argument to convince Hitler to release 300 tank engines to 

replace those already worn out in the campaign. Every vehicle 

covered hundreds of miles over uneven and dusty roads, causing 

many breakdowns. If each panzer division had retained another 

tank battalion, those additional tanks would have worn out at the 

same rate as the rest of the division, leaving only a handful of 

additional vehicles still in the field by the time the division 

reached the gates of Moscow in December 1941. What the Germans 

needed was not so much more tanks as more trucks for resupply and 

a better field maintenance 

equipment.28 

system to repair existing 

These problems, however, were not immediately evident. 

Operationally, the 1941 campaign was the heyday of German 

blitzkrieg and especially of the encirclement battle. The Sovie: 

analysis and description of these encirclements offers the best 

summary (see Figure 101.29 

First, C,he attacker had to penetrate or outflank the enemy's 

defenses. This was relatively easy in 1941, when the Germans 

caught the Soviets in their peacetime garrisons, unorganized for 

any coherent defense. Under these circumstances, the attacker 

97 
ENCIRCLEMENT 

lNlTfAL 

EN.EMY 

DEFENSES 

INTERDICTION 

2 

m< 2 

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT 

II / V PHASE 111: 1\ 

’ PHASE Ii: CONIINUED \ 

EXPLOITATION > I Sl IRRnl INrIFT) A 

INFANTRY OR 

e-h\ MOTORIZED INFANTRY . v(I PHASE I: 

DEFENDER’S EFFORTS 

TQ BREAK ENCIRCLEMENT 

Figure 10. Schematic of Blitzkrieg Encirclement. 

54-3330 -98-- 
could exploit Mediately with armored units. If a deliberate 

attack proved unavoidable, however, the Germans preferred to 

conduct the penetration with a conventional infantry force, 

supported by engineers to clear obstacles, with artillery and 

preplanned air strikes to suppress enemy defensive fires. As the 

war lengthened, such penetrations became increasingly difficult 

for all armies. 

Next, once penetrations or flanking maneuvers had succeeded, 

the German armored forces sought to encircle the enemy in 

pincers. A combined arms battlegroup of battalion or regimental 

size usually led each pincer. After the jaws of the pincers 

closed, the attacker had to create two encirclements--one facing 

inward, to hold the surrounded force and gradually reduce it, and 

another facing outward, to ward off any efforts to relieve the 

encircled units. In order to establish these encirclements, the 

Germans tried to give each panzer corps one or more motorized 

infantry divisions c4 follow and support the two panzer 

divisions. In practice, the Germans never had enough force in a 

panzer corps to seal off the encirclements, so the process of 

holding and reducing encirclements had to wait upon the arrival 

of the foot-mobile infantry divisions. During the interim, 

surrounded Soviet soldiers and even entire Red Army units were 

able to infiltrate or break out of the loosely cordoned 

encirclement, escaping to join local partisans or to return to 

their own lines and fight again. This lag time also immobilized 

the panzer units, prevented further exploitation, and gave the 

defender time to reorganize his forces farther to the rear, Only 

when the infantry and logistics had caught up with the panzer 

units could the latter resume the exploitation and pursuit. 

The Soviet Response, 1941-42 

As the Germans advanced into European Russia, encircling me 

Soviet field army after another, the Soviet military took 

desperate measures to overcome their weaknesses. Two basic 

problems were immediately apparent. On the one hand, the average 

Soviet commander or staff officer lacked the skills necessary to 

orchestrate the different arms and weapons for an effective 

defense or counterattack. The general staff finally had to 

reprimand these commanders for continually deploying their forces 

evenly across the ground as if on a textbook exercise, wkthout 

regard for the terrain or the high-speed avenues of approach that 

required antitank defenses-in-depth. On the other hand, the Red 

Army was seriously short of the specialized units and weapons 

that its comanders found so difficult to employ--engineers, 

tanks, antitank guns, and artillery. 

99 
The solution to both questions seemed obvious. stavka 

(Supreme Headquarters) Circular 1, dated 15 July 1941, ordered 

the simplification of the commander's span of control by 

centralizing specialized units in pools at higher levels. Th-fs 

allowed more experienced commanders to mass them at the critical 

points. Specifically, the circular disestablSshed the rifle 

corps as a level of command. For the next two years, a Soviet 

field army consisted of only four to six divisions or separate 

brigades, plus specialized units such as artillery, tanks, and 

antitank weapons. Similarly, by the removal of tank and antitank 

units, and by a major reduction in artillery, the circular 

reduced the infantry division, which until that time closely 

resembled divisions in other European armies, frun 14,483 men to 

only 10,859.30 Much of this equipant only existed on paper in 

any case, and what was actually available was centralized at the 

level of field army or higher. The same order disestablished the 

huge mechanized corps of 1940-41. Some of the tank divisions 

within those eorps were retained as separate formations, but in 

general the first German onslaught had already shattered the 

mechanized corps. 

The remainder of 1941 was a desperate struggle for the Red 

Army, a struggle in which its traditional doctr-lnes of deep 

battle and large mechanized units were inappropriate because of 

the German advantage in equipment and initiative, The few tanks 

coming off Soviet assembly lines were formed into small brigades 

used solely for infantry support. 

Once the Red Army halted and threw the invaders back from 

Noscow in December 1941, the Soviet commanders began to revive 

their organization and doctrine.31 Soviet factories made a 

phenomenal production effort in the spring of 1942, enabling 

COIL.-Gen. Yakov Fedorenko, chief of the Armored Forces 

Adminkstration, to begin construction of new tank ozrps in 

April. 'Efy J&Y, these corps had se ttled on an organization of 

one rifle and three tank brigades, plus supporting arms--a fairly 

tank-heavy force that the Sovkets intended to use as the mobile 

exploitation unit for a field army (Figure 311. In the fall of 

1942, Fedorenko added mechanized corps, whieh were more 

infantry-heavy and therefore more expensive in manpower and 

trucks. Truck production was in fact a major problem throughout 

World War II, and the Soviets depended upon jlmported Ameriean 

wheeled vehicles to move and support their mobile formations. 

Unlfke those of 1940, these 1942 Soviet tccorps" were actually 

of division size or smaller. To conduct the deep exploitations 

of 150 kilometers or more envisaged in the 192Os, the Red Army 

needed a larger formation, on the order of a German panzer corps 

or panzer army. In May 1942, the Commissariat of Defense took 

the next logical step, uniting the existing tank corps into tank 

armies. The 1942 tank armies, however, were merely improvised 

100 
1942 SOVIET 

TANK CORPS 

1943 SOVIET 

TANK ARMY 

MTCL 

48.000 Men, 460-560 Tanks 

&j :‘a’; 

Q 

OBSVN 

Figure Il. 1942 Soviet Tank Corps and 1943 Soviet Tank Army. 

84-3330 -lOl- 
combinations of armored, cavalry, and infantry divisions, 

ecmbinations that lacked a common rate of mobility and doctrine 

of employment. Moreover, these armies rushed into battle against 

the Germans during the summer of 1942 and wore largely destroyed 

before they had even trained together. 

Not until January 1943 did the Soviets finally produce a 

coherent tank army (Figure 11); the sfx tank armies formed in 

1943 were the spearheads of all Soviet offensives for the 

remarnder of World War II. Each of these new tank armies was 

actually a corps-sized formation in western termfnology and, like 

the tank Vt~orp~,)F was extremely tank-heavy. This was probably an 

appropriate organizatica?, both because of the open tank oountry 

of European Russia, and because of the high Soviet tank losses 

against the Germans. Given the inexperience of most tar& crews 

and junior leaders in the Red Army of 1941-43, it was inevitable 

that the better trained German antitank and armor formations 

would inflict such disproportionate losses on the Reds. Thus, 

the Soviet Union's armored forces remained much more tank-heavy 

than those of other armies. Yet throughout the war, the Soviets 

also maintained corps-sized formation of horse cava3.ryt with 

limited tank and artillery support, for use in swamps, mountains, 

and other terrain that did not favor heavily mechanized forces, 

The new mechanized formations must be understood in the 

eontext of their accompanying doctrine. During 1942, the Soviets 

digested the lessas of the first year of war and fssued a series 

of orders c& correct their errors. These orders greatly 

increased the effectiveness of the Soviet counteroffensive that 

encircled Stalingrad in November 1942. Senior Red commanders 

held conferences before Stalingrad to ensure that their 

subordinates understood the hew doctrine. 

The first problem was to penetrate the German defenses in 

order to conduct a counteroffensive. The initial Soviet 

counterattacks of December 1941-January 7 942 had suffered from 

such dispersion that the German defenders often outnumbered their 

Soviet attackers. On 10 January 1942, Stavka Circular 3 directed 

the formation af "shock groupsPfV concentrating combat power on a 

narrow frontage in order to break into the enemy defenses. 

Divisfon and larger units were instructed to mass on narrow 

frontages in this manner. Stalin's Order 306, dated 8 October 

1942$ supplemented this directive by explicitly forbidding the 

echelonment of infantry forces in the attack. Given the 

continuing shortages of equipment and firepower, the Soviets 

decided to maximize their available force by putting almost all 

the infantry into one echelcaz. Thus, in a typical rifle 

division, as many as nineteen of the twenty-seven rifle companies 

would be on line for a deliberate attack.32 The German 

defenses in 1942 were stretched so thin that this forward Soviet 
massing of infantry was more important than echelonment to 

sustain the attack. Later in the war, when both sides defended 

in greater depth, the Soviets tended to echelon their attack 

accordingly. Even in 1945, however, shallow German defenses 

prompted one-echelon Soviet attacks. Other orders in October 

1942 governed the correct use of those tanks still assigned to 

assist the infantry assault. Because infantry commanders were 

still inexperienced, all such tank units were to be employed in 

mass under their own commanders. 

Once the Soviets completed a penetration, their "mobile 

groups" would pass through for exploitation and encirclement 

operations, as described above. In effect, one such encirclement 

might include other, smaller encirclements within its pincers. 

Each field army attempted to use its own mobile group, composed 

of a tank, cavalry, or mechanized corps, to exploit penetrations c Wo a relatively shallow depth of fifty or fewer kilometers, 

defeating the enemy reserves or linking up with a similar group 

from a neighboring army. Meanwhile, the tank armies acting as 

mobile groups for larger elements, such as a "Front" (amy 

group), penetrated even deeper into the German rear areas. This, 

at least, was the theory. The first of these large p operational-level Soviet encirclements was in November 1942, when 

the German Sixth Army was surrounded at Stalingrad. In fact, the 

Soviet use of separate tank and mechanized corps in this battle 

may have been a test for the new tank army structure adopted two 

months later. 

Thus, by late 1942, the German techniques for mechanized 

warfare had reached their peak, but were no longer meeting with 

the success of 1939-47. On the contrary, Great Britain and the 

Soviet Union had reorganized and retrained their own armies and 

were beginning to conduct their own successful mechanized 

offensives. Both German and British armored formations had 

become balanced structures where tanks no longer outnumbered the 

other arms. Moreover, all three armies were discovering the need 

for effective and mobile logistical support to make the 

mechanized offensives possible. The stage was set for a conflict 

in which logistics, technology, and defense-in-depth would 

determine as many battles as the armored division had decided in 

1939-41. 

103 
CHAPTER FIVE 

THE COMPLEXITY OF TOTAL WAR, 1942-1945 

By deferring any consideration of the war in the Pacific, the 

previous chapter has reviewed the evolution of ccmbined arms in 

World War II from the simple perspective of German advance and 

Allied response. The participation of the United States and the 

Soviet Union, however, made the war a much more complex affair, a 

war of productian and technology as much as of battlefield 

maneuver. This chapter will identify those aspects of technology 

and tactics that affected the development of caubined arms forces 

and doctrine during the second half of World War XI. It will 

begin with the evolution of American force structure and 

doctrine, and then consider the changes in weapons design that 

made the latter half of the war so different frcm the first 

half. It will next survey the general trends in operational 

practice frcm 1943 to 1945 and conclude by examining the more 

complex and specialized questions of air-ground cooperation, 

airborne operations, amphibious landings, and special warfare 

Units. 

The American Response, 1941-44 

Prior to the Japanese attack an Pearl Harbor in December 

1941, the United States was an interested observer of World War 

II. Most of the U.S. Army did not become involved in major 

ground operations until the end of 1942 or even later. During 

the period 1941-42, however, the U.S. drew certain conclusions 

about the nature of weapons, organization, and tactics, and 

implemented those conclusions by continuing its evolution of the 

triangular infantry division and the 1940 armored division. 

Then, on the basis of maneuvers held in the U.S. and of initial 

ccmbat experiences overseas, certain changes in American doctrine 

and organization occurred in the middle of the war. The 

resulting tactical system dominated American military thought 

into the 1950s. 

In March 1942, Lt. Gen. Lesley MeNair, one of the designers 

of the triangular division in the late 19309, became head of Army 

Ground Forces, in charge of all unit training and organization. 

McNair continued to follow the concepts that had guided him in 

the 19309, and thus the basic organization of the triangular 

division did not change significantly until after the war.1 

First, McNair wanted each unit to have only the minimum 

essential forces that it needed to conduct offensive operations 

in fluid, maneuver warfare against relatively limited 

resistance. In the case of the triangular infantry divisicn, 

105 
this meant that the standard base of the division remained the 

three infantry regiments, four artillery battalions, 

reconnaissance troop, and engineer battalion developed in 1937-41. 

On the other hand, a division did not need specialized units 

that were required only for specific situations or missions. 

This applied particularly to arms with an essentially defensive 

missicm ) such as antitank and antiaircraft artillery. These 

units that McNair "streamlined" out of the infantry division 

became a "pool" of specialized nondivisional compaties and 

battalions, units that higher headquarters could attach to a 

division for a particular mission or else employ in mass at 

critioal points on the battlefield. Thus the actual canbat power 

of a division ml from day to day, depending upon 

requirements and missions. In Deceraber 1942, McNair extended 

this trend to form ad hoe task forces to nondivisional units by 

persuading the War Department to abolish all nondivisional 

regiments in favor of flexible groups. Nondivisional armor, 

antiaircraft, field artillery, mechanized cavalry, and canbat 

en@;lneer battalions all reported to group headquarters when not 

attached to divisions. Some group headquarters, notably those of 

mechanfsed cavalry, also acted as tactical. control 

headquarters.2 The number of battalions or companies 

subordinate to any .wow headquarters depended on the 

circumstances. 

Another of McNair's principles was that staff and support 

elements must be as small as possible, in order to maxinize the 

proportion of forces actually available for comb& and %o reduce 

papermrk and other organizational obstacles to rapid decision 

making and communication. Logisticians should bypass divisional 

and corps headquarters on routine supply matters in order to keep 

those headquarters small, mobile, and oriented on the tactical. 

situaticen. Wherever possible, a specialist unit or person should 

have weapons to perform a secondary role as infantry or rear area 

security forces. 

Finally, MoNair sought to restrict as much as possible the 

amount of motor transportation in a unit in order to facilitate 

strategic deployment. The fewer vehicles that were organic to a 

division, the Less shipping space that division would need when 

sent to Europe or the Pacific. For example, MeNair sought to 

authorize only the number of trucks needed to shuttle necessary 

supplies and ammunition to the regiments during a 

twenty-four-hour period, rather than the number that could 

transport all necessary materials in one lift. Rifle units were 

not motorized, but could become so temporarily by the attaohment 

of six truck companies to the division. Alternatively, if the 

division had attached elements such as a tank battalion, the 

106 
infantry could mount the tanks and the organic trucks borrowed 

from the artillery, allowing short-range mo+&r movements with 

some loss in logistical support. 

When the U.S. Army finally employed these concepts overseas, 

they proved only partially successful. Regardless of the terrain 

or enemy involved, most divisions in Europe and many in the 

Pacific believed that they needed tank, antiaircraft, **tank 

destroyer" (antitank), and nondivisional engineer support in 

virtually all circumstances. Corps and field army commanders who 

followed doctrine by shifting these nondivisional units from 

division to division according to the situation found that they 

could maximize the use of such elements only at the cost of much 

confusion and inefficiency. Attachmen& CI + *o a different division 

meant dealing with a different set of procedures and 

personalities before the a ttached units could mesh smoothly with 

that division. Once such a smooth relationship waz established, 

the division was reluctant to release its attachments as 

ordered. In many instances, tactical commanders found it 

expedient to leave the same nondivisional elements attached to 

the sane divisions on an habitual basis that might last for 

months. A typical U.S. infatitry division in France during 1944 

normally had attached battalions of tanks, tank destroyers, 

antiaircraft automatic weapons, and corps engineers. In some 

cases the division also had attached 4,2-inch mortars, 

transportation, and logistical support fran the pools at corps 

and field army level. Thus, the triangular division in combat 

was much larger, more rigid, and more motorized than McNair had 

envisioned. An augmented infantry division of this kind might 

well have the mobility and firepower of a motorized division or 

even an understrength armored division, which goes far to explain 

the superior mobility of American infantry units when ccmpared 

with standard German infantry forces. 

Many of these attached forces were subdivided and further 

attached to infantry regiments, as were the division's organic 

assets such as engineers and medical support. Minor changes in 

the regiment's organization in 1942 and 1943 had added six 105-m 

howitzers, so that the regiment had its own artillery even 

without the direct-support field artillery battalion. In 

practice, a majority of infantry regiments normally operated as 

"regimental combat teams!' (RCT). As a minimum, this meant that 

they had their share of the division's medical, engineer, and 

field artillery attached or in direct support. In addition, as 

noted above, many RCTs also had canpanies of tank destroyers, 

tanks, and self-propelled antiaircraft guns. Thus, the RCT was a 

combined arms force, a small division in itself.3 

107 
During the same period, the armored division underwent many 

more changes than the infantry division.4 Of the six different 

changes in armored organization during the war, two were most 

significant. As described earlier, the 1940 American armored 

division was composed largely of light tanks that greatly 

outnumbered the medican tanks, infantry, and artillery; this 

division also had several fixed headquarters designed to control 

only cne type of unit, including the headquarters for armored and 

infantry regiments. When Maj. Gen. (later General) Jacob Devers 

became chief of the Armored Force in August 1941, he sought to 

establish a more flexible, functional organization. His efforts 

culminated in the reorganization of I March 1942 (Figure 12). 

This reorganization eliminated the armored brigade headquarters 

and established two "Canbat Commands," A and B, as headquarters 

that tight control any mixture of subordinate battalions given 

them for a particular mission. This was an American way to 

institutionalize the battle group concept that the German panzer 

forces achieved by improvisation. The 1942 organization also 

reversed the ratio of medium and light tanks, leaving the armored 

division with two armored regiments, each consisting of two 

medium and one light tank battalion. The new structure still had 

six tank battalions, but only three armored infantry and three 

armored field artillery battalions. This imbalance existed in 

part because the Armored Force planned to create a large number 

of armored corps which, like the German panzer corps, would have 

two armored and one mo4&rized infantry division each. 

By early 1943, intelligence studies of the more balanced 

German and British armored. divisions had reinforced General 

MeNair's desires for a less curnbersome division structure. The 

me U.S. armored division used in the North African campaign 

never operated as a coherent division, but its dispersal into 

three or four different subgroups QnlY illustrated the 

difficulties of controlling such a large formation. At the same 

time, the U.S. Army had dropped the concepts of an armored corps 

and motorized infantry division, making the imbaJ-ante of arms 

within the 1942 armored division structure even more 

significant. Technically, the U.S. light tanks had been no match 

for the increasingly well-armed and armored German vehicles, and 

therefore the U.S., like Britain before ft., lost enthusiasm for 

the coneepL v of deep raids by lightly armored vehicles. 

As a result, in September 1943, the War Department announced 

a new, smaller armored division structure. This structure 

eliminated the regimental headquarters that had theoretically 

controlled only one type of battalion and reduced the tank 

ccmponent to only three tank battalions of four companies each. 

Thus, the 1943 structure had three battalions each of tanks, 

armored infantry, and armored field artillery, although in 

108 
TYPE U.S. ARMORER DIVISION, MAR 1942 

14,620 men, 232 medium tanks, 158 light tanks. 

54 self-propelled howitzers 

I 

I 

Typical 

, g (ttachr;;ts 

TYPE U.S. ARMORED DIVISION, SEP 1943 PI 

10,937 men, 186 medium tanks, 77 light tanks, 

54 self-propelled howitzers 

Typical 

Attachments 

same as 

above, less 

the infantry regiment. 

Figure 12. Type U.S. Armored Division, March 1942 and September 1943. 
practice there were twelve tank companies to only nine infantry. 

A third, smaller canbat oczmnand headquarters, designated reserve 

or R, was added to control units not subordinated to the other 

two ccnnbat commands. Some division coaMlanders used this VCR" as 

a tactical control element like CCA and CCR. 

Two U,S. armored divisions, the 2d and 33, oontinued under 

the heavier 1942 table of organization throughout the war. Corps 

01” army headquarters frequently reinforced each of these 

ditisions with an infantry regiment borrowed from an infantry 

division * As a result, the balance of tanks and infantry in 

American divisions, as in the German and BrZtish armored 

divisions, came to be approximately equal. Both types of U.S. 

armored dfvision received attachments similar to those given to 

infantry divisions. In addition, virtually every American 

armored division habitually controlled two quartermaster truck 

canpanies capable of handling the great logistical requirements of a mobile division.5 

The actual task organization within each of these divisions 

varied greatly, but a typical ocmbat ccmmand within a 793 

(light) armored division usually had two task forces. The combat 

command headquarters created these by trading a mediurn tank 

company from a tank battalion for an armored infantry company 

from an infantry battalion, producing one task force of three 

tank companies and one armored infantry company, and one task 

force of two armored infantry caupanies and one tank company. 

These battalion task forces also had attached platoons of tank 

destroyers, armored engineers, and in some cases self-propelled 

antiaircraft guns. An armored artillery battalion could be 

either %n direct support of the ccmbat command, or attached to 

that command if the division were widely dispersed. 

Antitank Technology 

Effective force structure and tactics are intimately related 

to effective weapons design, and therefore any study of combined 

arms warfare must consider the major effects of technology. 

During World War II, one obvious influence of technology on 

tactics was related to the entire question of tank and antitank 

warfare. Even if defenders managed to overcome their 

psychological fear of deep mechanized penetration, the blitzkrieg 

would still succeed unless the defense acquired effective 

antitank weapons and doctrine. 

Antitank ditches and similar obstacles may slow the movement 

of armored units or channelize those units fnto anti-armor kill 

zones ) but ultimately there are only two ways to defeat armored 

vehicles.6 Kinetic energy weapons penetrate armor plate by 

110 

- 
sheer momentum, as if they were "pur~hing~~ through the metal, 

while chemical energy weapons use explosive blasts to destroy the 

armor. Until the middle years of World War II, chemical energy 

weapons were usually ineffective against armor. Antitank design 

therefore concentrated on the kinetic energy weapon. 

Mathematically, the energy of an object is equal to one-half the 

product of the object's mass times 

(l/2 Mvq; 

the square of its velocity 

therefore improving the armor penetration of a 

kinetic enere weapon required increasing either its mass or its 

velocity, or both, Greater mass meant larger caliber weapons or 

heavier, denser material in the projectile. Thus, basic physics 

explains the general trend towards larger caliber weapons during 

World War II, although an increase in caliber alone would reduce 

the projectile's velocity unless the designer also took other 

steps. Velocity, in turn, would be Pnereased through changes 

such as longer gun barrels, more effective propellants, and a 

better seal within the breech so that all the propellant effect 

went to drive the projectile out of the gun tube. 

In practical terms, World War II improvements in antitank 

guns had three consequences: first, the size and weight of those 

guns increased steadily as calibers increased, gun tubes 

lengthened, and stronger carriages were added to absorb the 

recoil of high-velocity weapons; second, tanks needed increased 

armor to protect themselves from improved antitank weapons; 

third, these antitank weapons were much more effective than those 

of the previous decade, but they were also more expensive and 

specialized. Such weapons formed the backbone of any antitank 

defense, yet no army could afford to have antitank weapons 

organic to every small unit that might need them. The kinetic 

energy antitank gun simply did not fulfill the battlefield 

requirement that every unit must have some protection when it 

suddenly encountered enemy armor. 

The alternative means of defeating armor was the chemical 

energy weapon. The detonation of an explosive charge usually had 

little effect against armor, because unless it were focused 

against the armor plate it had to destroy, the blast effect 

dissipated in all directions equally. Ordinary explosive 

artillery rounds had to be quite large before they could do more 

than damage the tracks and roadwheels of a tank, and medium 

artillery, like antitank guns, was too large and specialized to 

be of general use. Moreover, using field artillery in an 

antitank role diverted it from its primary function of indirect 

fire. The solution was to concentrate the effects of a 

relatively small amount of explosive on one particular point of 

the enemy's armor--the shaped-charge principle described in 

Chapter Four. Because the blast and not the momentum of the 

shell caused the destruction, the high velocity and elaborate gun 

carriage of a kinetic energy weapon were unnecessary for a 

chemical energy weapon. 
By April 1942, the U.S. Ordnance Department had developed the 

2,3&inch "bazooka," which fired a shaped-charge warhead with a 

rocket motor. Later that same year, the Germans captured an 

American bazooka fran the Soviets, and from it developed the 

larger and more effective Panzershrek antitank rocket launcher. 

The British PIAT (Projector, Infantry, Antitank) and the German 

Panzerfaust used the shaped charge propelled by a small 

conventional charge, similar to that of a grenade launcher. The 

same type of warhead enabled the Germans and Americans to develop 

experimental low-velocity recoilless rifles, which were light 

artillery pieces that eliminated the recoil by a controlled 

release of propellant blast behind the gun. Although recoilless 

rifles and rocket launchers lacked the long range and accuracy of 

conventfonal artillery, they gave the infantry, and indeed any 

unit, a much greater firepower and capability for organic 

short-range antitank defense.7 

Tank Surrogates 

Short-range antitank weapons were incapable of stopping a 

massed armor attack by themselves. Such weapons were most 

effective against the thinly armored flanks and rear of a tank 

that had already passed the defender. Towed antitank guns 

presented a small target for the enemy to detect and engage and 

could be maneuvered onto steep hills or river crossing sites 

where a self-propelled weapon could not go. The towed weapons, 

however, had very little armor; even if the enemy failed to score 

a direct hit on such an antitank weapon, a near-miss might cause 

casualties or at least disturb the gunner's aim. Many 

professional soldiers realized early in the war that the most 

effective antitank defense was a careful integration of 

obstacles, antitank mines, artillery, short-range antitank 

weaponsL4 and some type of large caliber, longer-range antitank 

t3m* This requirement for mobile, large-caliber antitank guns in 

the defense matched the continuing need for armor to support the 

infantry in the deliberate attack. Even if the nature of the 

enemy defenses did not always require tanks, the presence of 

tanks exerted a great psychological effect on both attacker and 

defender. 

Armor experts in most armies, however, were determined to 

avoid being tied to the infantry, and in any event a tank was an 

extremely complicated, expensive, and therefore scarce weapon. 

The British persisted for much of the war on a dual track of 

development, retaining heavy tanks to support the infantry and 

lighter, more mobile tanks for independent armored formations. 

The Soviets similarly produced an entire series of heavy breakthrough tanks. Nevertheless, the widespread demand for 

tanks or tank-like vehicles outside of mechanized formations led 

112 
c uo a number of tank surrogates, weapons designed to provide 

armored antitank defense, close support of the infantry attack, 

or both. In the latter case, the surrogate needed considerable 

frontal armor and a dual purpose (antitank and antipersonnel) 

main gun. 

The most original of these tank surrogates was the American 

"tank destroyer.++ One particular source of controversy about 

General McNair+s force structuring system was the question of 

antitank defense. McNair did not accept the extreme view, common 

in 1940-41, that the armored division had rendered the infantry 

division almost obsolete. Instead, McNair agreed with the German 

concept that the best means to halt the armored division was an 

antitank defense integrated with infantry units. McNair and Cal. 

Andrew D. Bruce of the War Department sCvaff sought hi&ly mobile 

antitank guns that would end the psychological threat of 

blitzkrieg by aggressive action against the attacking armored 

forces. After the successful experiments during the 1941 

maneuvers, Bruce became head of a Tank Destro er Center that 

developed its own doctrine for these weapons. B While McNair 

had supported towed antitank guns on the conventional European 

model, Bruce wanted a high-velocity gun mounted on a mobile 

platform, sacrificing armor protection for speed and gunpower. 

The 1942 tank destroyer battalions were combined arms forces 

in their own right, although they did not include a balance of 

all arms: each platoon had four self-propelled guns, an armored 

car section for security, and an antiaircraft section; in 

addition to three companies of such guns, the bat%alion included 

a reconnaissance canpany of three reconnaissance platoons plus a 

pioneer platoon. Ideally, when an armored penetration occurred, 

the tank destroyer battalions would mass to ambush the en-y 

tanks in the depth of the American defense. Within each tank 

destroyer battalion, the reconnaissance canpany selected likely 

anti-armor kill zones and emplaced mlnefields to impede the enemy 

advance through these areas. The gun canpanies would move to 

hull-down positions to reduce their vulnerability and then engage 

the enemy armor. 

When the U.S. Army first encountered the Germans in Tunisia 

during 1942-4 3, the tank destroyers proved a dismal failure. 

Both tank destroyer doctrine and German armor design had outpaced 

the actual development of American tank destroyers, so that 1942 

tank destroyers were little more than improvised guns mounted on 

half-tracks. The early tank destroyers lacked mobility and 

effective pex-&ration power, the very characteristics that they 

were supposed to maximize. Moreover, most American units in 

North Africa were widely scattered, making it difficult to 

concentrate the tank destroyer forces accx>rdlng to doctrine. 

Finally, much of the North African terrain was too open for tank 

113 
destroyer vehicles to find effective hull-down positions. As a 

consequence, American commanders in Africa tended to favor the 

British system of towed antitank weapons and specifically asked 

that one-half of all tank destroyer battalions slated for the 

1944 invasion of France use towed rather than self-propelled 

weapons. Once in Normandy, however, the Americans discovered 

that the towed antitank gun was almost useless in the more 

restricted terrain of Western Europe. Towed guns were not only 

slow to move, but too close to the ground to shoot over hedgerows 

and other obstacles. Furthermore, between Africa and Normandy, 

the Tank Destroyer Center had procured much more effective, 

properly designed self-propelled guns. The Ml8 model tith a 

76-m gun and especially the M36 with a 90-mm gun were excellent 

weapons, although even the go-mm had less penetration capability 

than the German 88-xm. Also by 1944, improvements in German 

armor had rendered the standard 57-m antitank gun of the 

American infantry regiment largely ineffective. 

The original tank destroyer battalions had developed frcm 

divisional antitank battalions, which the 1944 divisions lacked. 

Tank destroyer units consequently became even more important for 

antitank defense. As a result, in July 1944 the U.S, Army began 

to reconvert all tank destroyer battalions to self-propelled 

weapons, These newly converted battalions did not mass in 

accordance with Bruce's doctrine. The limited nature of the 

German armor threat in the west prior to the Ardennes 

counteroffensive of December 1944 made massed antitank defense 

seem unimportant. Instead, commanders wanted a few effective 

antitank weapons distributed to every unit, where they could 

defeat the small German armored counterattacks that were common 

at the time. In most cases, therefore, corps and army comanders 

habftually attached a tank destroyer battalion to each infantry 

division, and in turn division commanders attached tank destroyer 

companies to infantry regiments. The regiments used the tank 

destroyers not only as antitank weapons, but also as acecmpanying 

artillery and as substitutes for 

attacks.9 

tanks to support their infantry 

Thus, the American tank destroyer units beeame a 

classic case of an arm that rarely functioned according to its 

doctrine, because that doctrine was never articulated clearly to 

field commanders. 

In keeping with their doctrine of maneuver, U.S. tank 

destroyers usually had their guns mounted in turrets and, in 

fact, resembled tanks so much that they were often mistaken for 

such. In European armies, however, relatively few tank 

surrogates had turrets, because a turretless vehicle was much 

stipler and cheaper to produce. The absence of a turret gave 

German and Soviet tank surrogates a low profile that made them 

smaller targets on the flatter, open battkef ields of Eastern 

Europe. This apparent advantage meant that the entire vehicle 

114 
had to turn in order to traverse the gun more than a few 

degrees. Thus tank surrogates were at a disadvantage if they 

engaged tanks or infantry from anything except an ambush position. 

The Germans actually developed two series of tank 

surrogates--assault guns to support the infantry in situations 

where tanks were not available, and "tank hunters" (Panzerjaeger) 

for the antitank role. Both were distinguished from 

self-propelled indirect-fire artillery by considerably thicker 

armor protection and by a flat traJectory gun intended for direct 

fire. Although armor purists criticized the expenditure of 

resources to produce these hybrids instead of true tanks, such 

weapon3 performed a necessary role, particularly as the German 

towed antitank guns became progressively less effective against 

Soviet armor. The armored self-propelled tank hunter was much 

more survivable and mobile than its towed predecessor. The one 

drawback of all such weapons was that, unlike the towed antitank 

guns, they had difficulty accompanying the infantry into 

inaccessible areas such as steep hills or bridgeheads across 

rivers. 

The Soviet Union also produced outstanding, heavily armored 

assault guns during the second half of the war, but tended to use 

those guns as one component of a three-way team in the deliberate 

attack. MediLrm tanks led the assault, using their mobility 

wherever possible to turn the f la-r&s of German defensive 

positions. Heavy tanks, operating in pairs, advanced slightly 

behind the medium tanks, supporting the Soviet infantry and 

eliminating German strongpoints. In the event of a German 

armored counterattack, the heavy tanks would move forward to 

engage the German tanks head on, while the less protected medium 

tanks maneuvered c& the German flanks. Finally, the assault guns 

provided accanpanying artillery support for both infantry and 

tanks. To accomplish this direct-fire role, the assault guns 

began the battle in camouflaged positions from which they could 

overwatch the advancing tanks and infantry. The assault guns 

engage centers of resistance that had survived the Soviet 

artillery preparation. This freed the assaulting forces to 

advance without halting to engage the enemy unless a 

counterattack appeared. At intervals, the assault guns bounded 

forward to new positions, always keeping within 500 meters of the 

heavy tanks and infantry. '0 By staying behind in this manner, 

assault guns avoided meeting enemy armor in a maneuver battle at 

close range. In such a battle, tank turrets could traverse and 

fire much faster than the turretless assault guns could turn 

their entire vehicles to aim their guns. On many occasions, of 

course, the attacking Soviet unit did not have all three 

different types of armor, but the assault guns preferred to 

operate from an overwatch position in any case. 

115 
Tank Design and Production 

These teohnological trends in antitank weapons and tank 

surrogates form a necessary background to the actual design and 

production of tanks during World War II. In general, both the 

armor and armament of tanks increased along tith antitank 

t ethnology , but different nations followed different design and 

productkon strategies. These factors exerted considerable 

influence on the battlefield. 

During the war, German tank desfgn went through at least 

three generaticm-3, plus constant minor variations.11 The first 

eneration, as already mentioned, kneluded such unbattleworthy 

Prewar vehicles as the Mark (or Panzerkampfwagen) I and II, which 

were similar to the Russian T-26 and BT series and to the 8ritQh 

crufser tanks. The Germans converted their tank battalions to a 

majority of Mark III and IV medium tanks after the 194Cl French 

campaign, thereby stealing a march on the Soviets and BrStish, 

who still possessed the obsolete equipment described earlier. 

However, the appearance of a few of the new generation T-34 and 

KV-1 tanks in Russia durFng 1941 ccmpelled the Germans to begin a 

race for superior armor and gunpower. Stiultaneously, their 

successes of 1939-41 encoura"ged them to rely increasingly on 

armor, rather than infantry, when conducting a rapkd breakthrough 

attack. The German solutfon was to design third generation tanks 

that combined greater armor protection WiCYh the 88-InIn 

antiaircraft gun that had proved so successful in the antitank 

role. The third generation included many different variants, but 

the most important designs were the Mark V (Panther) and Mark VI 

(Tiger) tanks. Unfortunately for the Germans, their emphasis on 

protection and gunpower canpromised the mobility and relfabflity 

of their tanks. The automotive design of Mark V and VI tanks was 

notoriously underpowered and unreliable. 

Ivloreover, Hitler and his assistants were fascinated with 

technological improvements and frequently stopped production to 

apply the latest desi.@;n changes to the existing tanks. The 

fighting characteristics of Genncsn tanks remarned current at the 

cost of interference with mass production. This interference, 

plus shortages of raw materials, meant that Germany could not 

compete in sheer numbers of tanks produced. In 1943, for 

example, Germany manufactured only 5,966 tanks, as ccmpared to 

29,497 for the U.S., 7,476 for Britain, and an estLmated 20,000 

for the Soviet Union.l2 A disparfty in numbers of this 

magnitude would eventually overcoxe the highest quality in 

inditidual tank design. Similarly, the presence of so many 

different versions of the same tank, often within the same 

company or battalion, made it extremely difficult for the Germans 

to obtain spare parts and repair damaged equipment. 

116 
The alternative to constant changes in tank design was to 

standardize a few basic designs and mass produce them even though 

technology had advanced to new improvements. This was the 

solution of Germany's principal opponents, The Soviet T-34, for 

example, was an excellent basic design that survived the war with 

only cme major change in armament (?6.2-mm to 85-mm main gun) and 

various minor modifications. When the Soviets did introduce new 

designs, such as, the heavier tanks and self-propelled guns of 

1944, they did so without halting production of the older types. 

The United States had even more reason to standardize and 

mass produce than did the Soviet Union. By concentrating on 

mechanical reliability, the U.S. was able to produce vehicles 

that operated longer with fewer repair parts. This helped 

alleviate the chronic shortage of shipping space when the army 

moved to Europe and the Pacific. To further ease the shipping 

problems and to ensure that American tanks were compatible with 

American bridging equipment, the War Department restricted tank 

width +to 103 inches and maximum weight to thirty tons. The army 

relaxed these requirements only in late 1944.l3 

There was also a tactical reascm for these restrictions. 

General McNair wanted to ensure that American tanks were designed 

in accordance with the U.S. doctrine for employing armored 

divisions. As already indicated, this doctrine foresaw tank 

destroyers, not tanks, defeating enemy armor. Chance encounter8 

between tanks might occur, but the primary role of the armored 

division was to exploit and pursue, not fight enemy armor. 

For all these reasons, the U.S. Army standardized on the M4 

Sherman medium tank, an excellent canpromise between reliability, 

mobility, armor protection, and gunpower. When the British first 

employed the Sherman in North Africa during late 1942, it proved 4. vo be at 1Ei3t equal, if not superior, to the German 

second-generation tanks, Mark III and IV. Once the Tiger tank 

appeared in Tunisia in early 1943, however, the Sherman tank and 

most of the U.S. antitank force seemed inadequate. 

The width limitation further hampered the Sherman by forcing 

designers to gLve the tank narrow tracks. These tracks had much 

less mobility in muddy terrain than the wider tracks used by the 

Soviets and Germans. The M4's only advantages over later German 

tanks were superior reliability and a power-driven turret. 

During meeting engagements at close ranges this latter feature 

allowed the Sherman's crew to traverse their gun and engage the 

enemy more rapidly than could German crews using hand-cranked 

turrets. Sherman tank crews often carried a white phosphorus 

round in their guns to blind enemy tanks during such maneuvers, 

117 
Despite its drawbacks, the Sherman remained the main battle 

tank of the U.S. Army. In early 1945, apparently as a result of 

the large-scale "German armored attacks during the Battle of the 

Bulge, the U,S, Army finally allowed a few heavy tanks of the T20 

series to I23 sent to Europe for canbat testing. The array’s 

Qrdnance bpartment had developed the T2Q series in 1943, but 

considerations of doctrine, shipping, and mass production had 

prevented its use in battle until the closing days of the war.l4 

Great Britain also used the Sherman during the latter half of 

World War II, but was concerned by the limited penetrating power 

of the M4's ?5-mm, medium-velccity main gun, After considerable 

discussions with the Americans, the British finally modified saee 

of the Shermans they reodved, The British version of the 

Sherman, called the V+F%refly,l" included the third-generation 

British antitank gun, the seventeen pounder (77-rnmZ1 This gunvs 

lcxlg bore. and higher velocity gave it much greater capability 

against German armor.qs 

Skgnala Intelligence and Ccmmunioations 

In additfon to the tank and aircraft, another piece of 

technology came of age during World War II. Signals 

intelligence, or SIGINT, was yet one more instrument or arm that 

the commander had to integrate and caordinate with others. 

Recent histories of the war probably havs overstated the 

strategic imprtanee of SIGINT, while they have understated its 

tactical role. An army's ability to plan for future operations 

and concentrate the different arms at the deoisive location 

depended in part on such intelPigence.q6 

Ultra, the British codeword for intelligence based on 

decoding highly classified German radio messages, gave the 

western Allies only limited access to German military intentions 

and capabilities. The German Army normally used secure landline 

communications for high-level messages, except when fluid 

operations forced them to make radio transmissions. Even then 

the Allies did not necessarily intercept, let alone decode in a 

timely manner, every German message. The Germans changed their 

code every twenty-four hours and periodically made major shifts 

in codes or equipment. The Allies might go for days QP even 

months without being able to decode transmissions on specific 

radio networks. On 1 May 1940, for example, Germany changed 

virtually all its codes, blinding the Allies" SIGINT effort until 

22 May, by which time the German offensive through the Ardennes 

had succeeded.l? Similar problems recurred during most of the 

War. 

118 
Nor were the deciphered messages of Ultra always illuminating 

for the tactical and operational situation. Only rarely did the 

most senior German commanders communicate their specific plans, 

except where Hitler was personally interfering in operations and 

required detailed reports. Intelligence analysts pieced together 

much of the most valuable Ultra information over long periods, or 

inferred capabilities on the basis of logistical messages. 

Moreover, few Allied commanders below field army level had access 

to this information. 

The worst drawback of Ultra-level SIGINT was that it 

discouraged the use of other sources of intelligence collection 

that might confirm or deny Ultra information and blinded Allied 

commanders to threats that were not discussed in German radio 

traffic. In early 1943, for example, the Allied forces in 

Tunisia relied heavily on Ultra; their other intelligence 

collection means were improvised and largely ineffective. The 

German offensive of Sidi-bou-Zid-Kasserine Pass in February 1943 

(Map 6) surprised the Allies because available SIGINT indicated 

that higher German headquarters had disapproved such an operation 

in favor of an attack elsewhere. Of course, SIGINT could not 

know that Rommel and other German commanders had met face-to-face 

on 9 February and had developed a plan that led to the attack on 

Sidi-bou-Zid. This attack mauled a dispersed U.S. armored 

division.18 Lack of SIGINT and misinterpretation of available 

intercepts also had a considerable effect on Allied failure to 

predict the scale and intensity of the German counteroffensive in 

the Ardennes in December 1944. 

Although the western Allies held a priceless asset in the 

strategic intelligence they received from Ultra, for much of the 

war German SIGINT was more effective at the tactical level. From 

1940 to 1942, for example, a single Horch (listening or 

intercept) company in North Africa skillfully interpreted the 

unencrypted tactical communications of British units, giving 

Rcrnmel a complete picture of enemy dispositions ati intentions 

during battle. When the British finally became aware of this 

unit's activities in July 1942, an Australian battalion raided 

and captured the company. German replacements could not replace 

the expertise of the analysts lost in that company and thus had 

more difficulty detecting later British deception operations.'9 

By contrast, relatively little information is available 

concerning Allied tactical SIGINT, including the British "Ytr 

Service and American "Radio Intelligence." German tactical 

communications were often unencrypted, or used easily deciphered 

code systems. From a miniscule prewar basis, the Allies had to 

develop their knowledge of German tactical radio networks and 
TUNISIA 

CONTOUR lNTERVAL 500 METERS 

Map 6. SIDI BOU ZID-KASSERINE PASS, February 1943. 

_-.-...-__ 
procedures. In terms of offensive electronic warfare, the Allies 

had a nrnnber of notable successes. During the evacuation of 

Dunkirk in 1940, the British effectively jammed German bomber 

communications, hampering Luftwaffe attacks on the retreating 

British forces. Two years later, when Montgomery launched the 

second Battle of Alamein, airborne jammers disrupted German 

tactical radio communications for hours.20 

The development of effective tactical radio canmunications 

was the basis for controlling fluid, mechanized operations as 

well as the raw material for tactical SIGINT. The demand for 

such communications greatly accelerated research and development 

in this area. In particular, the U.S. Army pioneered the use of 

frequency modulation (FM) radios for short-range tactical 

communications, and both very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high 

frequency (UHF) radios for longer range communications.21 

Unlike the European armies, the U.S. Army used FM extensively, 

because it provided static-free signals over a wide variety of 

channels without using a separate crystal for each frequency. 

The combination of reliable radio communications with 

efficient tactical signals intercept services also provided a new 

opportunity for senior commanders to follow the course of battle 

without delays in the communications system. Both the British 

and American armies developed means for senior headquarters to 

receive battle reports by radio without waiting for the messages 

to be processed through intermediate layers of command. That is, 

the senior headquarters could monitor tactical unit radio 

networks directly, or else assign a radio-equipped liaison 

detachment to each forward unit to report the situation to the 

senior headquarters. The British GHQ Liaison (Phantom) units and 

the American Signal Information and Monitoring (SIAM) ccmpanies 

performed this service admirably during 194445, and in the 

British case as early as 1942. The danger with such a monitoring 

system, as Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower noted after the war, was 

that the senior commander might be tempted to bypass the 

intermediate headquarters and interfere directly in the battle, 

using the system for command rather than as a source of timely 

operational and intelligence information.22 In the latter role 

these monitoring services enabled much more effective 

coordination of the battle, allowing the commander to react 

through his subordinate commanders to situations as they 

developed. 

Soviet Concepts and Practice, 1943-45 

Many of the foregoing technological considerations became 

evident on the Eastern Front, beginning with the Battle of Kursk 

in July 1943. The last great German offensive in the east ran 

directly into an elaborately prepared Soviet defense organized 
around antitank strongpofnts established by all units of company 

size or larger. The German blitzkrieg stalled because it was 

unable to achieve the initial penetration of the enemyts 

defenses--Soviet antitank defenses were simply +too strong and, 

above all, too deep for the Germans to breech wfthout 

catastrophic losses. If anything, the Germans played into Soviet 

hands by leading their attack in some areas with massed armor, 

instead of a more conventional infantry-artillery-engineer-tank 

attack to create the breech. The Germans apparently led with 

massed tanks in an effort to Increase the tempo of the 

penetration, but without decisive numerical superiority the 

result was a disaster, 

After Kursk, the Soviet Union held the initiative, although 

it was not always attacking the Germans and their Axis allies on 

all fronts. Generally speaking, the Soviets exerted tremendous 

efforts to penetrate the deep German defenses. In the ensuing 

exploitation, logistical restrictions usually caused the Soviet 

offensive to grind to a halt even where there was little German 

resistance. In the course of the war, improvements in Soviet 

logistics led to steady increases in the depth of exploitation. 

Once the Germans gained a respite to reorganize their defenses, 

the cycle repeated itself. Aocordingly, the Red Army developed a 

variety of techniques for both penetration and exploitation 

against the German defenders. 

One significant development during 1944 was the change in 

Soviet reconnaissance techniques before a deliberate attack. 

Prior to that year, the Red Army had been very effective in 

conducting small, time-consuming long-range reconnaissance 

patrols. To shorten the time required to prepare for a new 

offensive, the Soviets in early 1944 sent out experimental 

company- and battalion-sized units to engage the German outposts 

or reconnoiter by fire, thereby identifying the main German 

defensive organization much more rapfdly. In the process, the 

Red Army received an unexpected bonus. Soviet reconnaissance 

units were often able to sefze control of outposts that the 

Germans were defending only lightly, as part of the long-standing 

German doctrine of defense-in-depth. By late 1944, the Soviets 

had transformed thefr reconnaissance units into the first wave of 

the deliberate attack. Cwm-w and larger units on 

reconnaissance missions attacked within a few hours of the main 

offensive, seizing the German outposts and thereby unmasMng the 

main German defenses. Then the main attack focused on those 

principal defenses.23 

Although Soviet commanders massed their forces on relatively 

narrow breakthrough fronts, their successes were due to more than 

just numerical superiority. Whether in the reconnaissance 

echelon or the main attack, the Soviets used a variety of 

122 
procedures to overcome German defenses. First, artillery units 

fired their preparations under centralized control and according + *o elaborate plans. The Soviets used a variety of deception 

measures, such as sending the assault infantry forward during a 

lull in the firing in order to lure the Germans out of their 

bunkers so that renewed Soviet artillery fire could destroy 

them. Heavy tanks to support the infantry and eliminate 

strongpoints, medium tanks to penetrate rapidly and suppress 

enemy infantry fires, and assault guns for direct-fire support 

against antitank guns and strongpoints cooperated as described 

earlier. Canbat engineers or specially trained infantrymen 

frequently rode on each tank. Their mission was to eliminate 

obstacles and provide 

German short-range 

close-in protecti2y for the tank from 

antitank weapons. The tank might 

temporarily assume a hull-down position and provide covering fire 

while engineers cleared minefields and infantry eliminated enemy 

short-range antitank weapons. 

The Soviets reluctantly accepted the high casualties produced 

by this technique Fn an effort to accelerate their rate of 

penetration. Given the meticulous German defensive preparations 

and the lack of Soviet armored personnel carriers, the Soviets 

had to combine engineers, infantry, and tanks in this manner, 

regardless of losses. Soviet commanders may have used battalions 

of "expendable" criminals for these tasks. In general, however, 

by 1944 casualties were a subject of great concern for the 

Soviets. The best means to reduce casualties were concentration, 

speed of penetration, and careful task organization of the 

attacking forces. Instead of advancing on-line and in mass, the 

Soviet attackers operated in tailored assault groups of platoon 

to battalion size (Figure 13). Where time allowed, each assault 

group trained to eliminate a specific German strongpoint, thereby 

dislocating the German defensive organization. Assault groups 

normally included four subgroups: a reconnaissance subgroup to 

clear an approach route to the objective, a blocking subgroup to 

engage and pin down the defenders, a fire subgroup to isolate the 

strongpoint from reinforcement, and an attack subgroup, including 

engineers and heavy tanks or assault guns, to eliminate the 

objective from the flanks or rear.25 

Once the Sovie%s ccmpleted their penetration, their 

commanders sought to sustain the momentum, moving rapidly from 

encirclement to renewed exploitation and pursuit so that the 

defenders had no opportunity to reorganize a coherent defense. 

German exploitations of 1939-42 had normally been centrally 

controlled, to ensure that all elements moved in the same general 

directjlon and were available to support each other in the event 

of counterattack. Soviet exploitation, particularly after the 

initial encirclement was canpleted, tended to be more 

decentralized and diffuse. Notoriously poor Soviet radio 

123 
^ 

E 

ii 

0 FORTIFIED POINT 

RECDNNAISSANCE 

SUBGROUP 

I 

Li 

7 ATTACK 

SUBGROUP 

1 

Ji I I 

I 

j/ 6 d’[ 

IRIFLESQUJ~DS,PLTSI 

If aaa ',I 

: N-------.-- 152MM SP GUNS,' 

ANTITANK RIF& 

‘N--,-,,--,J 

4 HEAVY MACHINE GUN 

ANTITANK GUN w MORTAR 6 LIGHT MACHINE GUN 

Figure 13. Soviet Assault Group Formation, 1944-45. 

---aBLOCKING 

‘\ff IFLE SQUADS, PLATOONS : SUBGROUP 

,,-.-----w-0 

w 

FIRE 

SUBGROUP 
communications may have been partially responsible for this 

decentralization, but more to the point the Soviets retained 

their belief in the interwar theory that rapidly moving forces 

could fan out and confuse as well as disorganize the defender. 

Decentralization and small-unit initiative allowed leading Soviet 

units to seize targets of opportunity, such as bridges and river 

crossings, that were not immediately obvious to the senior 

planners. The same decentralization made the Soviets more 

vulnerable to defeat in detail by massed German counterattacks. 

Beginning in 1943, a ccmbination of factors, including declining 

German combat effectiveness, growing Soviet tactical experience,, 

and better close air support of the exploitation forces allowed 

the Soviets to defeat most German counterattacks and continue 

their mission. 

The most common formation for Soviet exploitation was the 

"forward detachment," a caubined arms organization of great 

mobility and firepower that was sent ahead of the main unit to 

seize key objectives and disrupt enemy efforts to reorganize the 

defense.26 During the war, both the size of the typical 

forward detachment and the distance it operated ahead of the main 

body increased steadily. In the last two years of the war, a 

forward detachment normally was a tank brigade reinforced by 

batteries or battalions of field and antiaircraft artillery, 

heavy tanks, assault guns, and engineers. When available, an air 

controller accompanied the detachment to direct close air 

support, and air units were dedicated to support specific 

detachments. This reinforced brigade operated as much as ninety 

kilometers ahead of the rest of its parent tank corps, which, in 

turn, might be acting as a forward detachment for a tank army. A 

forward detachment did not necessarily follow the same routes as 

the main body of troops and was not responsible for advance guard 

security of that main body. Frequently, an efficient forward 

detachment commander could brush through hasty German defenses 

along the way, allowing the following troops to continue their 

exploitation and pursuit without deploying to attack the 

scattered Germans. When logistics and lack of ccmbat power 

finally halted a forward detachment, the detachment eommarder 

attempted to seize a bridgehead over the next river obstacle as a 

starting point for a renewed offensive at a later date. In 

short, the forward detachment led the mobile group envisaged in 

prewar Soviet doctrine and greatly increased the tempo of 

exploitaticm and pursuit. 

The German Decline, 1943-45 

While the Red Army grew in both equipent and tactical 

proficiency, the German Army declined not only in numbers but in 

overall training and tactical ability. When faced with local 

Soviet superiority achieved by massing on a narrow breakthrough 

125 
German defenders naturally ascribed all soviet 

successes to overwhelming numerical advantage. In reality, the 

quality of the German armed forces declined as a result of their 

deelining quantity. As early as the summer of 1942, the German 

dtvlsions that were, not involved in the second German offer&W 

in the east were deliberately filled to only 55 percent of 

authorized personnel. Even spearhead units received only 85 

peroent of authorized equi ent.27 In order to maintain their 

armies In the field, the Ge n leaders pro ressively reduced the 

l3XE0Ullt of training given to replacements and used training units 

in combat during Soviet breakthroughs. This became ,a vicious 

cycle, in which poorly trained German soldiers survived for only 

short periods at the front and had to be replaced even more 

rapidly than before.28 This decline in infantry quality 

prcoapted German eommanders to seek ever-increasing amounts of 

firepower in the form of assault guns, antitank rockets, 

automatic weapons, and artillery. 

Given shortages of personnel, many German infantry divisions 

operated with only six instead of nine infantry battalions from 

1942 onwards. In 1944, the German General Staff formally changed 

the division structure to reflect this reality. According to the 

1944 reorganization, an infantry division consisted of three 

infantry regiments of two battalions each. This configuration 

allowed each battalion to have a greater share of the weakened 

regimental artillery and antitank companies than had been 

possible with a three-battalion regiment. On the other hand, 

such a structure retained the large overhead af three regimental 

staffs and support elements, yet denied the regimental commander 

a third battalion to act as a local reserve force. In practice 

some ditisions organized themselves into two regiments of three 

battalions each. In either case, the 1944 German infantry 

division retained all four artillery battalions of the previous 

structure, so that, at least on paper, the declining ability of 

the infantry was offset by a larger proportion of fire support. 

Recognizing enemy air superiority, the 1944 divisional 

organization also included a battery of self-propelled 

antiaircraft guns.29 

Despite such improved fire support, after 1943 the German 

defenders found themselves increasingly hard pressed to contain, 

let alone halt, Soviet offensives. The basis for the German 

doctrine of defense-in-depth was to absorb enemy attacks and 

separate armor from its supporting infantry, in order to defeat 

each element independently. By 1944, tiproved Soviet cooperation 

among the arms nullified German efforts to Isolate those fighting 

components from one another. Many German commanders experimented 

with the idea of a preemptive withdrawal, pulling back their 

troops just before a Soviet deliberate attack in order to save 

lives and to force the Soviets to reorganize for another attack a 

126 
few kilometers farther west. Yet such a withdrawal under 

pressure required high morale and well-trained troops, the very 

commodities that were declining most rapidly in the German 

Army.30 

While the infantry divisions gradually wore down, the Germans 

made a belated effort to rebuild their panzer forces. Heinz 

Guderian dedicated himself to this task as Inspeetor-General of 

Panzer Troops (1943-44) and then as Chief of the General Staff 

(1944-45). However, his continued insistence on the panzer arm 

as a force separate fran the rest of the German Army was no 

longer appropriate. It was true that panzer divisions were the 

principal German instrument for counterattacking e nemy 

penetrations and encirclements. Yet these divisions were so few 

in numbers canpared to the great distances on the Russian front 

that they often counterattacked singly or in pairs, wearing 

themselves down as fast as Guderian could rebuild them. By 

removing armor training and doctrine from the appropriate 

branches of the General Staff, Guderian only increased the 

estrangement between the panzer and infantry forces and made 

training between the arms more difficult.37 

Despite these problems, the balanced panzer division remained 

an extremely effective force at the tactical level. Only minor 

changes in organization and tactics occurred after 1941. 

Production requirements for tanks, assault guns, and other 

tracked vehicles meant that the panzer grenadiers remained 

largely motorized, rather than mechanized, throughout the war. 

Even at its peak in the fall of 193, the German panzer force had 

only 26 of 226 panzer grenadier battalions, or 71 percent, 

mounted in armored half-tracks.32 Thus, except in certain 

elite units, no more than one of the four to five infantry 

battalions in a panzer division was actually mechanized. 

Generally speaking, one or two ccmpanies of such a mechanized 

battalion accompanied each panzer battalion in advance, with the 

mo+&rized infantry following later to consolidate and defend the 

areas seized by the first attacks. Artillery forward observers 

in tanks or half-tracks aecaupanied the first wave. Where only 

motorized infantry was available, these troops went into battle 

dismounted, following in the lee of the tanks until they were 

needed to clear obstacles or defend against enemy infantry. To 

avoid being tied to this dismounted infantry when the attackers 

met with effective fire, the German tanks sometimes bounded 

forward, assumed hull-down positions that minimized the target 

they presented to the enemy, and provided suppressive fires to 

cover the infantrymen hurrying to rejoin the tanks. To protect 

the attacking panzer force from enemy armored counterattack, 

antitank guns leapfrogged into a series of overwatching posi%iOnS 

0I-i the flanks of the advance* Assault guns remained with the 

motorized infantry reserves to consolidate gains or to engage an 
enemy counterattack that penetrated into the division mass. 

Because of Allied air superfority on all fronts, German armored 

forces needed much greater air defense protection in 1944-45 than 

in 1940‘ Truck-mounted panzer grenadier battalions therefore 

included the Z&mm antiaircraft guns that had proven so effective 

earlier in the war, while tank and half-track mounted infantry 

received self-propelled antiaircraft guns, in some cases as low 

as company level.33 Such, at least, was the theory of panzer 

organization and tactics; in practice, of courses the declining 

strength of such units produced a variety of improvised battle 

groups. 

American Concepts and Practice, 1943-45 

The initial. contact of American forces with Axis troops did 

not fulfill the promise of previous U.S. developments in doctrine 

and organizatioP1. During the 19&!-43 invasion of North Africa a 

variety of factors, including inexperience, led American 

commanders to scatter their forces in regimental or smaller 

units, thereby depriving them of the advantages of the American 

centralized fire control system. The U.S. armored divisions had 

stressed decentralized, mobile combat by direct fire so often in 

training that their self-propelled artillery battalions had 

neglected the study of indirect-fire techniques. Inadequate 

logistics forced the Americans to leave their corps artillery far 

behind the front in Tunisia, further reducing available fire 

support when the Germans counterattacked in February 1943. In 

the crisis of Kasserine Pass, however, the artillery of the 1st 

and 9th Infantry Divisions was finally able to operate on an 

organized basis, with devastating effect on the Germans (Nap 6, 

above).34 

Similar problems arose in the Southwest Pacific, where in 

1942 General Douglas MacArthur committed the 3 2d Infantry 

Division to battle in Papua with no artillery and only a few 

mortars. Despite the protests of the 326 Division commander, 

MacArthur's staff mistakenly thought that artillery would be 

ineffective in the jungles. Moreover, the local air commander, 

Gen. George C. Kenney, assured the division that "the artillery 

in this theater flies," and then failed to provide effe&uive air 

support throughout a long campaign.35 Weather and terrain 

prevented such air support on many occasions, and there was so 

little communication between air and ground that Kenney's pilots 

attacked Americans by mistake on a weekly basis. Based on the 

bitter experfence of assaulting Japanese bunker complexes without 

appropriate fire support, the 32d Division learned af great cost 

the need to coordinate artillery and air support with the 

infantry. 

128 
To some extent the U.S. troops who invaded Normandy in 1944 

had to relearn this lessen. Many of the U.S. infantry divisions 

used in the invasion had not been in eanbat before and had not 

had the opportunity for extensive tank-infantry training with the 

separate tank battalions that supported them. Furthermore, the 

radios issued to infantry, tank, and fighter aircraft units had 

incompatible frequencies, making communication among the arms 

impossible. Even when the infantry commander was riding cn the 

outside of a tank or standing next to it, the noise of the tank 

engine made it difficult for the infantry and tank commanders to 

communicate face-ca-faee .36 

The U.S. Army gradually corrected these problems and 

developed more effective canbined arms teams during the breakout 

from Normandy. The need for close tank-infantry cooperation 

reinforced the habitual association of the same tank battalion 

and infantry division. Signalmen installed improvised external 

telephones on tanks, so that the accanpanying infantry could 

enter the tank intercommunications network. In July 1944, the 

commander of IX Tactical Air Command, Gen. Elwood A. Quesada, 

provided VHF aircraft radios for installation in the leading 

tanks of each armored task force. When the U.S. broke out of 

Normandy beachhead, these tanks could communicate with fighter 

bombers. The IX Tactical Air Command flew "armored column 

cover," providing on-call fighter-bombers for close air support. 

It is true that this tactic was very wasteful of air resources, 

but the high tempo of exploitation that these tank-aircraft teams 

could maintain justified the expenditures. 

Advancing on parallel routes also facilitated American 

exploitation and pursuit across France. Where the road netmrk 

allowed, U.S. armored divisions and combat commands advanced with 

+ VW0 Or more task forces moving along parallel routes. 

Frequently, a German strongpoint would halt one column, only to 

find itself outflanked by another American column a few 

kilometers away. These tactics and massive air superiority 

propelled the Allied advance. The Allied forces usually found 

their progress hindered as much by logistical factors as by enemy 

defenses. Strategically, logistics hampered the Allies 

throughout 1944-45. Tactically, scme armored units found it more 

secure to travel with their canbat trains in the midst of the 

column, rather than following behind where they might encounter 

bypassed enemy resistance. Of course, such a tactic was only 

appropriate when exploiting against limited enemy defenses. When 

logistics elements moved on their own, they often required small 

antiaircraft, tank destroyer, and infantry escorts for local 

security.37 

129 
This dispersion of anU.aircraft units in small detachments 

exemplified the fate of specialized American forces when their 

particular fun&ion was not in demand. Although U.S. 

antiaircraft units conducted a number of air defense operations, 

most .notably the proteotion of the bridge at Remagen during the 

conquest of Germany, overwhelming Allied air superiority made an 

integrated air defense system increasingly unimportant during 

1944-45. Instead, senior commanders used antiaircraft weapons in 

a ground fire-support role and deaotivated some antiaircraft 

units to provide much needed infantry replacements during the 

fall of 1944. Similarly, chemical smoke generator ecmpanies 

repaired roads when line units did not need smoke support. This 

misuse developed a set of false attitudes and priorities among 

comtat commanders, but the shortage of manpower was so severe 

that no uni,t could stand idle. The excellent performance of sueh 

specialized units in an infantry role during the Rattle of the 

Bulge justified the American policy that support troops should be 

trained and equipped to defend themselves and fight when 

necessary. Even if, for example, the engineers had been employed 

to construct barriers in front of the German advance, there were 

no other forces available to provide firepower in conjunction 

with those obstacles* At that point, the situation was so 

desperate that local commanders were fully justified in using all 

available forces as infantry. 

Air-Ground (Non)Cooperation 

Air support of ground operations, and especially elose air 

support, was the subject of intense controversy between ground 

and air services during World War II, No one disputed the 

importance of air superiority, but ground attack priorities were 

another matter . That controversy was perhaps most acute in the 

United States, but the questions involved found echoes in other 

nations as well, 

Throughout the war, the U,S. Army Air Forces (AAF) operated 

almost independently from the other elements of the Army. Soon 

after Pearl Harbor President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave the AAF a 

tremendous mission--precision strategic bombing of Germany and 

eventually Japan--that strained the limited air resources of the 

U.S. for mast of the war. AAF leaders believed strongly in the 

value of strategic bombing. This belief only inereased their 

tendency to distance themselves from the ground arms. The result 

was near disaster on the battlefield, retrieved only by the 

common sense of tactical commanders on the spot. 

AXTL~ Air Force doctrine defined three priorities for tactical 

aviation: first, air superiority; second, fFisolation of the 

battlefield," which in effect meant air interdiction; and third, 

attacks on ground targets "in the zone of contact'" between 

130 
opposing armies.38 Throughout the war, the AAF phrase for 

close air support was "third phase"' or "priority three" missions, 

reflecting a basic belief that such targets were an uneeoncmical, 

inefficient, and unimportant use for air power, and rightfully 

belonged to the field artillery. Some basis for this belief 

existed, of eourse-- close air support required extremely careful 

training and coordination and suffered from the difficulty of 

differentiating friend from foe while flying at hi& speed= 

Moreover, the air leaders were probably correct in their belief 

that the air weapons of World War II had only limited destructive 

effect against small, point targets of the type found near the 

line of contact. Centrally directed interdiction of the enemy by 

tactical air assets, the ARE argued, was the most efficient use 

of this weapopl. Yet the ground commanders valued the 

psychological effects of close air support on both friend ard. 

foe, while the unseen interdiction attacks had no such effects. 

In addition, close air support was an excellent means of rapidly 

massing eanbat power at. the decisive point. The more that air 

leaders opposed the decentralized use of their aircraft for close 

air support, the more ground commanders felt the need to control 

scme air assets to ensure their availability when needed. 

As commander of the Army Ground Forces, General MeNair led a 

vain effort to change Army Air Force priorities. He argued that, 

even if close air support missions were the exception rather than 

the rule, that exception should be stressed in training because 

it was the most difficult form of ground attack mission. Yet the 

AAF was unwilling to provide aircraft even for major ground 

maneuvers, let alone small-unit training. Six months before the 

Normandy invasion, thirty-three U.S. divisions in England had 

experienced no joint air-ground training, and tmnty-one had not 

even seen displays of friendly aircraft for purposes of 

recognition in battle. As noted above, in 1943 the AAF 

arbitrarily changed the radios in fighter-bombers to a type that 

was incanpatible with ground radios. Air and ground units had 

little understanding of the tactics and capabilities of their 

counterparts.39 

The results were predictably poor. During the North African 

invasion, ground forces received little air support, and ground 

commanders with no experience in the employment of tactical air 

support misused the little that was available. U.S. gmund 

troops saw so few friendly aircraft that they fired on anything 

that flew. One American observation squadron lost ten aircraft 

in North Africa--two to enemy air attack, three to enemy ground 

fire, and five to American ground fire. Gradually, both sides 

learned to recognize and cooperate with each other, but the 

process was painful.4U 

131 
The United States did not develop a formal doctrine and 

training procedure for air-ground cooperation until late in the 

war. In the interti, effective air support depended upon 

personalities and initiative in the field, The XII Air Support 

Ccnmnand collocated its headquarters with the fifth U.S. Army in 

Italy, meeting each evening to plan strikes for the next day and 

improvising a eomon network of liaison officers and radios. 

Within the air resources allocated by higher headquarters, the 

ground operations offleer establFshed priorZties that the air 

operations officer rejected ,only when the proposed use was a 

technical impossibility. A stiilar relationship gradually 

developed between the 9th U.S. Tactical Air Force and some of the 

U.S. field armies in France and Germany. Yet, even in ?946, AAF 

officers assfgned to study the lessons learned from tactical air 

operations in Europe continued to describe close air support as a 

ftpriority three"* mission and recommended the continued use of RAF 

doetrine on this subject. MeanwhEle, in the absence of effective 

aerial observation support, the ground forces had developed their 

OWn aviation, using light aircraft for artillery adjustment, 

command and control, and movement of critical supplies.41 

Not even the German armed forces were immune to this type of 

interservice misunderstanding and rivalry. As late as November 

1941, for example, the Luftwaffe refused Erwin Rommel's request 

for a single air liaison officer to arrange on-call aircraft for 

the Afrika Corps, because such an arrangement ‘“would be against 

the best use of the air foroe as a whole." With such attitudes, 

it is not surprising that German Stukas dive-bambed their own 

armored divisions on at least one occasion.42 On the Eastern 

Front, of course, German air-ground cooperation reached its peak 

during the period 1941-43. Thereafter, the growing strength of 

the Red Air Force and the demands of ati defense for Germany 

against American and British strategic bombardment caused a 

steady decline in the number and qualkty of German tactical 

aircraft. In addition, from 1942 onward the improved quality of 

Soviet tanks caused the Luftwaffe to experiment with better 

air-ground antitank weapons, including 304111 automatic cannon and 

shaped-charge armor-piercing bombs.43 Thus, although the 

Luftwaffe developed adequate procedures for air-ground 

cooperation in most respects, the lack of sufficient aircraft to 

conduct such support and the technolog5cal decline of the 

Luftwaffe fsl eomparisan to its opponents made this support rare 

after 7943. 

The Royal Air Force continued its policy of independence from 

the Britksh Army well fnto World War II. As in the U.S., RAE 

leaders oonsidered strategic bombing and air superiority much 

more important than air-ground cooperation. From 1%2 onward, 

however, a working compromise developed in three different 

132 
theaters almost simultaneously. First, the battles of North 

Africa demonstrated the importance of air-ground cooperation 

there. Bernard Montgomery developed an entire network of liaison 

officers and collocated ground and air headquarters to provide 

such support while still leaving much independence to the RAF. 

Second, the British and Commonwealth forces that reconquered 

Burma eventually developed an even closer relationship with their 

airmen, a relationship based on their mutual sense of having to 

depend on themselves because of poor support from Britain. 

Meanwhile, in Great Britain, RAF Fighter Command sought a more 

active mission once it had won the Battle of Britain, This 

institutional need for a new mission coincided with the rise in 

Fighter Command of one of the few British fliers with extensive 

experience in close air supporC$-Air Vice-Marshal Sir Trafford 

Leigh-Mallory. The irritating but effective Leigh-Mallory built 

the British 2d Tactical Air Force as an instrument to support the 

Normandy invasion; he then directed both this force and the 

American 9th Air Force during the 1944 eampaig. Even then, the 

proportiotl of ground-attack sorties expended on close air support 

was often much lower than that cn interdiction missions that 

searched for targets almost at random.Q4 

BY 1945, most armed forces had developed unofficial 

techniques for effective air-ground cooperation in the field. 

Such techniques did not resolve the basic doctrinal differences 

between air and ground components. These disputes persisted in 

peacetime long after the procedures for close air support were 

forgotten. 

Air Transportation and Air-Landing Forces 

One of the neglected aspects of air-ground operations during 

World War II was the use of air transportation to move supplies 

and even nonparachute troops within a theater of operations. 

Just as railroads and trucks had changed the logistical and 

operational mobility of earlier armies, so air transportation 

promised to eliminate the historical vulnerability of all ground 

forces--their land-based lines of communication. Leaving aside 

for the moment the use of true airborne troops, the techniques of 

air transportation and supply bear closer examination. 

The most significant use of these techniques was in Asia, 

where vast distances, poor road netmrks, and few railroads made 

aerial supply almost a necessity. In order to understand the 

British use of air transport in Burma, however, we must digress 

briefly to consider the tactics of Britain's opponent, Japan. 

As previously noted, Japanese industry could not hope to 

corn&e with the mass production of weapons by its enemies. Much 

as the Japanese Army would have liked to have had such weapons, 

133 
it often had to rely on uurorthodox taetics to make up for Pack of 

equiment and firepower. In particular, surprise attacks by 

night or frun unexpected directions seemed to allow the Japanese 

to close rapidly with the enemy. In hand-to-hand fighting, 

Japanese leaders believed that their superior morale and training 

would compensate for shortages of equipment and manpower.45 

During the conquest of Malaya and Burma in 1942, the Japanese 

tactic% made a virtue out of the lack of heavy weapons, 

Generally speaking, British and Commonwealth defenders were tied 

to the few available roads for supply purposes and considered the 

surrounding hills and jungles almost impassible. Upon cantacting 

the enemy, the Japanese therefore used a small demonstration 

attack along the road to fix the attention of the enemy and sent 

a lightly armed infantry force in a lang flank march through 

difficult terrain into the enemy rear. Once in position, the 

outflanking Japanese force would attack British logistical 

installations and set up roadblocks behind the bypassed British 

defenders, The British response was predictable--they turned 

their,canbat forces around to fight through the roadblocks behind 

them and rejoin their logistioal support, allowing the Japanese 

&to defeat them in detail. *As the war continued and Japanese 

supplies became even thinner, many Japanese commanders acquired a 

habit of planning to live off captured enemy supplies, Having 

achieved their objectives, the Japanese would then establish 

elaborate bunker defenses that wsre difficult to identify, let 

alone destroy, when the British counterattacked. 

Some of the British responses to these tactics were simple 

and effective. Divisions reduced their establishment of wheeled 

vehicles and trained to secure their flank and move through 

"impassable" terrain. To destroy Japanese bunkers, the British 

14th Army developed two tactics, which incidentally represented 

partial solutions to the continuing problems of how to keep the 

defender pinned down by fire while the attacker covered the final 

few meters in the assault. First, British tanks accompanying the 

attack fired a careful sequence of ammunition at the 

bunkers --simple explosive to clear the jungle, then high 

explosive with delayed action fuzes to break into the bunkers, 

and finally solid armor-piercing shot as the infantry made the 

final assault. So long as the infantrymen stayed out of the 

tank's direct line-of-fire, they could safely close with the 

Japanese because this solid shot had no explosive effect. Later 

in the war, the extremely high degree of cooperation and mutual 

confidenoe between air and ground elements in Burma allowed the 

British close air support aircraft to fly a final, FtdummyE" 

bombing pass against the enemy, causing the Japanese to stay 

under cover until the Allied infantry and tanks were on top of 

them.46 

134 
The key to defeating Japanese infiltration tactics was air 

transportation. In March 1944, Gen. William Slim, the 14th Army 

commander, correctly predicted a major Japanese offensive against 

his logistical base area around the town of Imphal (see Map 7). 

Using large numbers of RALF and U.S. transport aircraft, Slim was 

able to parachute or air-land supplies to all his bypassed 

elements, thus allowing them to fight without being tied to their 

threatened lines of communkcation. Furthermore, Slim air-landed 

most of the 5th Indian Division on the airfields around Imphal, 

and these fresh troops went straight into battle against the 

infiltrating Japanese. 

By 1945, the victorious advance of the 14th Army in the more 

open country of central Burma was made possible only by a 

combination of air and surface transportation. Two of Slim's 

divisions reorganized into an unusual configuration for this 

advance. Two out of three infantry brigades in each division 

reequipped with their wheeled transportation, so that they could 

accompany attached army tank brigades in a mechanized advance 

down major arteries. As each objective fell, one of these two 

brigades paused long enough to construct an air strip for 

resupply. The third brigade in each division was specially 

equipped with very light trucks and narrow artillery gun 

carriages that would fit onto transport airplanes. Thus the 

entire brigade could be air-landed onto airstrips or captured 

airfields to reinforce the ground elements when they encountered 

sfgnificant resistance. Until that time, the brigade was in 

essence a divisional reserve that did not burden the logistical 

system in the combat zone. This combination of armor, wheeled 

infantry, and air-landed infantry established a tempo of advance 

that the poorly equipped and foot-mobile Japanese could not hope 

to match. The only drawback to this form of aerial resupply and 

redeployment was the need for air superiority or at least air 

parity to allow hundreds of transport flights into forward areas 

each day.47 

Other nations also used air transport for resupply and 

limited movement of troops. In the German case, air 

transport--like close air support--was a promising concept that 

the Luftwaffe was too weak to sustain in many cases. Thus, the 

surrounded German forces in encirclements like Stalingrad rarely 

received adequate air resupply. 

Airborne Operations 

All the considerations and difficulties of close air support 

and of air transportation loomed even larger when ground troops 

used parachutes and gliders to land behind enemy lines. In fact, 

the Americans and British finally decided that the only solution 
IV 14 

49 23 

254 IV 

161 

INDIA \\ \m\\ / \\ \p\\\ \c 

. 

i 

: 

INDIAN ‘r 

$ Map 7. IMPHAL-KOHIMA, MARCH 1944 

84-3330 -136- 

(idQ KM 

SCALE 
to such coordination problems was to establish a joint and 

combined organization--the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which 

controlled both the troops and the troop carrier aircraft. Even 

with close integration of air and ground assets, the potential 

for error in planning and executing airborne operations was great. 

In theory, airborne operations appeared as an answer to the 

difficulties of penetrating prepared defenses--the attacker 

simply flew over those defenses and assaulted the enemy rear 

areas. Sudden assault from above had the same psychological 

effects as early armored penetrations, confusing and 

disorganizing the structure of the defending army. In practice, 

of course , planning and communications between the air and ground 

elements of such an operation were complicated in the extreme. 

The effects of German air defense, the inaccura&es of air 

navigation, and the difficulty of controlling early parachutes 

and gliders during landings meant that most airborne drops were 

widely scattered. Paratroops had to land prepared to fight as 

individuals or in ad hoc small groups and without the advantages 

of organization that make any military unit so much more 

effective than the sum of its individual members. 

In a few operations, such as the German capture of the island 

of Crete in 1941, airborne troops took and held an objective 

aLmost unsupported, but only at great cost in men and equipment. 

Generally, airborne operations were best conducted in conjunction 

with a conventional ground offensive, so that the paratroops 

could link up with the attacking ground forces within a few hours 

or days of the initial airdrop. Finding such an ideal situation 

was difficult. Commanders had to abort many planned airborne 

operations because, by the time the decision was made and 

planning completed, the advancing ground troops had overrun the 

proposed drop zones. 

Because of the difficulties of transporting heavy weapons and 

vehicles even in gliders, airborne units could not be equipped 

like conventional infantry forces. Furthermore, the parachuting 

personnel often found themselves separated from the gliders and 

cargo parachutes carrying their heavy weapons. Thus, an airborne 

unit lacked much of the firepower, protection, and ground 

mobility of ordinary infantry divisions. Once on the ground, an 

airborne division was extremely vulnerable to enemy mechanized 

attack and had to seize and hold its objectives before the enemy 

could react. Gen. James Gavin and other U.S. airborne commanders 

concluded that it was better to accept heavy casualties and 

parachute injuries by landing on or close to the objective than 

to descend on a safer drop zone that was several miles from the 

objective.48 
The poor firepower and mobility of an airborne division was 

especially significant for the British and Americans, because the 

shortage of combat troops of all kinds meant that airborne 

divisions frequently remained in ground combat alongside 

conventional divisions even after the two forces had linked up. 

Ultimately, U.S. airborne commanders urged that their divisions 

be organized and equipped like conventional infantry divisions, 

with the heavy weapons and vehicles rejoining the airborne 

division overland after the drop zone had been secured.49 

Many of the same problems plagued the Soviet efforts in 

airborne warfare. Despite an initial lead in airborne concepts 

and training during the 193Os, by 1941 the Red Army's higher 

level paratroop commanders suffered from the same problems of 

their more conventional peers--poor leadership and staffwork, 

inadequate intelligence, and lack of key equipment, including 

transport aircraft. Of the two division-sized Soviet airborne 

operations of World War II, the Vyazma landing in early 1942 was 

at best a partial success, because attacking ground elements 

never established firm contact between the airborne pockets and 

the main Soviet lines. The Dnepr landing of September 1943, on 

the other hand, was a disaster because the troops landed on an 

unsuspected concentration of German troops. As a result of these 

experiences, Joseph Stalin virtually ignored airborne tactics and 

development after the war.50 

Amphibious Operations 

If airborne operations required meticulous cooperation and 

eoardination between two services, air and ground, amphibious 

operations were far more complex. The ClppXS?d amphibious 

landings of World War II foreshadowed the nature of future wars, 

when sea, air, and land forces would have to be integrated and 

coordinated with each other and often with the forces of ather 

nations. 

Tactically, the U.S. Marine Corps had developed the doctrine 

of amphibious landing during the interwar period, at a tim@ when 

most armies considered such operations impossible. When war 

broke out, the marines were still struggling to resolve the 

problems of fire support. An amphibious assault against prepared 

enemy defenses has all the problems of a deliberate attack, plus 

the inability of the attacker to bring his own artillery onto the 

beach immediately and the difficulties of wind and tide as the 

attacker comes ashore. The solution to these problems, besides 

careful organization and command and control, was fire support 

from naval and air units. Yet as late as 1940, the USMC's own 

aviators followed the familiar argument that air strikes should 

be used only when conventional artillery was unavailable. Even 

138 
during the invasion of Saipan in June 1944, there was only one 

frequency available for forty-one air liaison teams to control 

marine close air suppart y causing considerable delays in air 

strikes. Still, by the end of the war the USMC had extremely 

effective and responsive air support, and even naval gunfire was 

so refined that it could provide a rolling barrage kn front of 

the marine attackers on the beach. Only the flat trajectory of 

naval 

f? 

uns 

inland. 1 

limited their ability to provide fire support 

In addition to coordinating the elements of fire support, 

there was the question of moving the assault infantry and support 

forces across the beaches and through enemy shoreline defenses. 

The amphibious tractor gave the attacker that ability even where 

the water was too shallow for ordinary landing craft. The 

British Army developed an entire armored division, the 79th, 

which was equipped with specialized weapons such as amphibious 

Sherman tanks and mine-roller or flail tanks. This equipment 

proved invaluable, not only during the invasion of Normandy in 

June 1944, but also in the assault river crossing of the Rhine in 

1945. Both of these operations, with the combination of ground, 

air, amphibious, and parachute forces of several nations, were 

models of the steps required to combine many different weapons 

and units into an effective whole. 

Unconventional Warfare 

One final specialized weapon was prominent in World War 

II--unconventional warfare or guerrilla forces. Dozens of German 

divisions were involved in rear-area protection against partisan 

forces in the Soviet Union and the Balkans. In France and again 

in the American reconquest of the Philippines, these guerrilla 

armies were much more than an additional irritant to the 

occupying army. On a number of occasions, U.S. and British 

forces used the guerrillas as an economy-of-force tool, bypassing 

enemy positions and leaving the guerrillas to protect friendly 

flanks and rear. This, plus the great intelligence and sabotage 

potential of guerrillas, made them a significant weapon. 

The principal drawback to the Allied use of guerrillas was 

largely one of perception. Because most military planners 

regarded the guerrillas as an auxiliary force, dependent upon the 

conventional armies for weapons and training, they tended to 

underestImate the capability of guerrillas for independent 

actions of the type that dominated the 1950s and 1960s. 

To some extent, the experience of the German Army reflects 

the experience of all armies in World War II. Initially, Germany 

had advantages in training and experience, advantages that 

139 
allowed its soldiers to integrate the different weapons on the 

battlefield and to move so rapidly that their opponents became 

disoriented and incapable of rapid response. As the war 

lengthened, the Germans tended to rely increasingly on their air 

support and high-quality armored formations to perform missions 

that were inappropriate for such formations, such as penetration 

of a prepared defense. Heavy tanks took precedence over 

half-tracks for the accompanying infantry, and thus German 

production was never able to support a fully mechanized force. 

Simultaneously, Germany's opponents were learning how better to 

integrate their forces at a tactical level and how to organize an 

effective antitank defense-in-depth. Moreover, from 1943 onward 

inprovements in both the quantity and quality of Allied air and 

ground forces dissipated the early German advantages of training 

and weaponry. The twin issues of quality and quantity became 

even more acute for the Japanese, who were never able to compete 

in manpower and production with their enemies, especially because 

hundreds of thousands of Japanese troops were tied down in China. 

Sheer mass was not sufficient to defeat the Axis forces on 

the battlefield, however. The Soviet, British, and American 

armed forces also gained greater skill in combined arms and 

adjusted their organizations to improve this combination. By 

1945, these armies had developed true combat effectiveness at the 

small unit level, even though that effectiveness was sometimes a 

product of field improvisation rather than of careful 

institutional development. At that point, the problem of 

combined arms integration shifted, at least temporarily, to a 

higher level of organization. The lingering problems of 

combining the arms in 1945 were not so much at battalion or 

division levels as they were between the army and the other 

services. Air support in particular was a critical link in the 

success of most offensives in World War II, yet the U.S. Army had 

only achieved a temporary truce on this issue with the Army Air 

Forees. Once the war was over, the practical lessons of small 

unft integration and of air-ground cooperation were frequently 

forgotten. 
CHAPTER SIX 

COMBINED ARMS AFTER 1945 

By 1945, the victorkous armies of the United Nations had 

developed a very sophisticated, equipment-intensive form of 

combined arms mechanized war. Even in the Pacific theater, the 

Americans and British used generous amounts of air power, 

specialized landing craft, and armored vehicles to support their 

infantry operations. Yet during the immediate postwar years, the 

same armies faced two trends that argued against the mechanized, 

armored solution to the problems of combined arms combat. First, 

the destructive power of the atomic bomb convinced m=v 

strategists that traditional land combat was obsolete and caused 

others to expect radical modifications to any future land 

combat. The atomic weapon made dense concentrations of ground 

forces on narrow frontages extremely dangerous and caused the air 

power advocates of the world to regard air-ground cooperation as 

even less important than they had previously viewed it, because 

the super weapon seemingly made close air support unnecessary. 

Especially during the late 194Os, when the United States had a 

nuclear monopoly, the future role of armies appeared to be to 

secure the bases for strategic bombers before a war and to mop up 

and occupy enemy territory after a nuclear bombing. Until the 

early 195Os, technological limitations restricted the design and 

production of truely small-yield, tactical nuclear weapons. Thus 

by definition nuclear warfare meant using large-scale, strategic 

nuclear weapons; consequently, ground combat fell into neglect. 

The second, and opposing, challenge to the mechanized armies 

of 1945 was the so-called "war of national liberation“ that 

employed unconventional warfare tactics. During the later 194Os, 

insurgencies in China, Indo-China, Greece, and Malaya made 

conventional armies appear too expensive and too musclebound to 

compete efficiently against the politicized peasant outfitted 

with a rifle and a bag of rice. To meet this challenge, western 

armies had to neglect the development of new generations of 

expensive armored weapons in favor of renewed interest in 

increased mobility for light infantry forces. The French in 

Indo-China and Algeria, and the British in Malaya, Kenya, and 

Aden, were clearly distracted from the mechanized trends of 

1945. In the 196Os, the Europeans were again able to focus on 

home defense in an intensive, mechanized war, but almost 

simultaneously the U.S. became involved in Vietnam. Not until 

the mid-1970s were all the NATO Allies actively studying and 

developing doctrine for their own defense in Europe. In the 

interim the Soviet Union had gone far to make up its previous 

technical disadvantages in conventional combat. Of course, some 

developments in counterinsurgency wars may have application in a 

more intense, mechanized environment. For example, despite the 

141 
potentially high air defense threat posed by Soviet-equipped 

forces, airmobility is clearly one of the major new tactical 

trends of the later 20th century. 

Most jar armies, including that of the Soviet Union, have 

been forced to adjust to the challenge of nuclear warfare or 

guerrilla insurgency, or both, The only major exception has been 

Israel, and even there persistent terrorism has posed a difficult 

problem for the mechanized Israeli forces. Thus, major themes in 

combined arms since World War II are difficult to identify. 

Different armies have faced the same problems, but rarely at the 

same time. This chapter will examine the postwar period from 

three different perspectives: the development of organization 

and doctrine in the Soviet Army, the experience of the United 

States and to a lesser extent its European allies, and finally 

the rapid development of the Israeli Defense Forces from 

guerrillas to armor-heavy conventional soldiers. 

The Soviet Army, 1945-66: The Deoline of Conventional Forces 

The Soviet Army, as it was renamed after World War II, has 

experienced at least three distinct periods of doctrZne and 

organization since 1945. First, from the end of the war to the 

death of Stalin fn 1953, the Soviets demobilized a portion of 

their forces but continued with the same tactical and operational 

doctrines and organizations developed during the war. Seoond, 

from 1953 to approximately 1967, the ground forces took a back 

seat to the nuclear-equipped arms of the Soviet state. During 

this period, the Soviet Army shrank in size and neglected Its 

historical experience in combined arms in favor of an armor-heavy 

force designed to survive and exploit nuclear strikes. Finally, 

since the late 1960s the Soviet Union has reversed this decline 

of land forces, restudied the experience of the '"Great Fatriotic 

War," and prepared for the possibility of an extensive, combined 

arms mechanized oonflict with or without the use of nuolear 

weapons.1 

Immediately after World War II, the Soviet Union had no 

nuclear weapons and therefore sought to refine its increasingly 

mechanized conventional forces for any European eventuality. At 

the time, this was the only possible Soviet counterweight to the 

U.S. nuclear monopoly. Although the Soviet Union demobilized 

from a total of over 500 division-sized units to approximately 

175 divisions during the period 1945-48, the number of armored 

and mechanized units actually increased from thirty-nine to 

sixty-five. In the process, '"tank corps" became tank divisions, 

and "mechanized corps" became mechanized divisions (see Figure 

141.2 Each of these divisions reflected the experience of 

World War II, including integration of tanks, self-propelled 

guns f infantry, artillery, and air defense at regimental level. 

142 
TYPE SOVIET TANK 

DIVISION, 1947 

11,541 men (wartime): 208 medium and 

44 heavy tanks; 84 self-propelled guns; 

24 artillery pieces 

I I I I I I I 

I I I* 

-’ / 

I I I 

HO 0 0 

5 / l 

&TEL Medium Hvy tk/SP 

Q 

122mm 

Howitzer 

f 1 I I c I I 1 1 

TYPE SOVIET MECHANIZED 

DIVISION, 1946/61 

12,600-14,244 men (wartime); 178 

medium and 2’t heavy tenks; 63 relfpropelled guns: 64 artillery pieces 

cl 0 cl Gil lsh klX 

120mm 

Mortar f 

KEY: MTCL: Motorcycle; Mtz: Motorized; 

SP: Self-propelled gun; MO: machine gun; 

SMG: Sub-machine gun; MRL: Multipb rocket launcher. 

Figure 14. Type Soviet Tank Division, 1947, and Mechanized Division, 19461’51. 

84-3330 --143- 
Indeed, the addition of a heavy tank/self-propelled gun regiment 

to the mechanized division in 1951 made this division almost too 

unwieldy for a small Soviet staff to control. 

Simultaneously, the Soviets motorized their rifle divisions. 

The demobilization of 1945-48 allowed them to equip the remaining 

divisions completely with motor transportation, as evidenced by a 

three-fold increase in the number of trucks in a rifle division 

between 1944 and 1946. The first Sovfet armored personnel 

carriers, the BTR-152 series, came into production in late 1945, 

but even the motorized rifle regiment of a tank division was 

truck-mounted until well into the 1950s. At that point, the 

tracked BTR-50 series came into production for the mechanized 

units, and apparently other motorized rifle units inherited the 

BTR-152.3 

Soviet doctrine remained essentially unchanged until 7953. 

During this period the Soviets produced their first nuclear 

weapons, so that their conventional ground forces became less 

vital to natkonal strategy. Then Stalin's death in 1953 allowed 

Marsh&l Georgi Zhukov to return to power wfthin the armed 

forces.* By 1955, Zhukov had-won government approval for a major 

reorganization of the ground forces. His primary goal was to 

adjust the ground forces to the realities of nuclear warfare. 

All units had to became smaller for better command and control, 

and better armored for protection against the effects of nuclear 

weapons. The tubed artillery preparations of the Great Patriotic 

War declined in significance, giving way to a doctrrne that 

viewed mechanized, armor-heavy forces as the exploitation element 

after nuclear strikes had shattered the enemy defenses. 

In the realm of organization, Zhukov abolished the rifle 

corps, the unwieldy mechanized division, the rifle division, and 

the remaining horse cavalry divisions. The motorized rifle 

division replaced both the mechanized and the rifle division. BY 

1958, only three types of division remained: tank, motorized 

rifle, and airborne rifle. Armies consisted only of three to 

four tank divisions in a tank army, or two to three motorized 

rifle divisions and one tank division in a combined arms army. 

Missile-equipped artillery and air defense replaced much of the 

conventional artillery of the Soviet Army.4 

*Because of his great prestige, Zhukov posed a potential 

political threat to Stalin. As a result, Stalin banished Zhukov 

to minor posts for a number of years after World War II. 

144 
At the same time, the influx of new equipment and the 

reduction in the overall size of the army meant that all units, 

with the exception of airborne divisions, were at least motorized 

and in many cases mechanized. The term "mobile group," which for 

three decades had designated cavalry and mechanized forces that 

were more mobile than conventional infantry, lost its meaning and 

fell out of use. The function of exploiting penetrations 

remained, however, becoming a role for the tank and motorized 

rifle divisions. 

Perhaps most significantly, the entire concept of combined 

arms seemed less important once the Soviet Army decided that any 

future war would be a nuclear war. In particular, infantry as 

well as conventional artillery shrank within existing 

organizations. In 1947, for example, a typical "mechanized army" 

consisted of two tank and two mechanized divisions. Because all 

the maneuver regiments in these divisions had integrated infantry 

units, there was a total of thirty-four motorized or mechanized 

infantry battalions in this mechanized army. By contrast, the 

1958 "tank army" consisted of only four tank divisions, and these 

four divisions had lost the motorized rifle battalions from their 

tank regiments. Consequently, the tank army had only twelve 

infantry battalions, all of them mounted in armored personnel 

carriers in part to shield them from the blast and radiation 

effects of nuclear weapons.5 

Beginning in 1960, Nikita Khrushchev further slighted the 

conventional ground forces in favor of the "Strategic Rocket 

Forces." Individual army organizations, as well as the total 

strength of the army, declined to a postwar low of 740 small 

divisions. The Soviet Union appeared totally committed to the 

concept of the "single option," the expectation that any major 

war must be a nuclear war. 

Rebirth of Soviet Combined Arms After 1967 

Following Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, a debate began within 

the Soviet military about the general direction of military 

affairs. The exact causes of this debate remain unclear, 

although to some extent it may have been a response to the 

American doctrine of flexible response. This U.S. doctrine, 

which will be discussed below, called for military forces that 

would be capable of fighting along the entire range of possible 

conflicts, from terrorism and guerrilla warfare up to full 

conventional and even nuclear war. Regardless of the causes of 

the Soviet reappraisal, by 1966-67 the Kremlin had apparently 

determined that the "single option" was too simplistic. In 

January 1968, for example, Maj. Gen. S. Shtrik publicly announced 

that: 

145 
a situation may arise in which combat operations begin 

and are carried out for some time (most probably for a 

relatively short duration) without the use of nuclear 

weapons, and only subsequently will a shift to 

operations with these weapons take place.6 

To meet this possibility, the Soviet military renewed its 

study of conventional combined arms warfare. The government 

allowed many senior commanders of World War II to publish their 

memoirs, openly identifying the operational and tactical errors 

that the Soviets had made while fighting the Germans. More 

importantly, these memoirs focused on the continuing relevance of 

certain techniques of the Great Patriotic War. In particular, 

Soviet military scholars paid attention to the concepts of the 

mobile group and the forward detachment, both of which were key 

to Soviet methods of mechanized exploitation and pursuit. 

Although the term "mobile group" no longer applied in a fully 

mechatized Soviet Army, the functions involved remained relevant 

to conventional Soviet tactics.7 

Soviet organization reflected these doctrinal and historical 

concerns. During the 197Os, Soviet tank regiments gradually 

regained the mechanized infantry and conventional artillery 

battalions that they had lost under Zhukov"s regime. Perhaps 

most important, some Soviet divisions received a r*new"' formation, 

the separate tank battalion. Viewed as a pure tank unit, thFs 

battalion tight seem to be an additional reserve for the division 

commander. Within the context of renewed Soviet interest in the 

Great Patriotic War, however, the separate tank battalion might 

well be the nucleus for a forward detachment in any future 

exploitation and pursuit. 

Thus, by the mid-1970s the Soviet Union had come full circle 

in the doctrine and organization of combined arms combat. While 

the United States lost a decade of mechanized development because 

of its involvement in Vietnam, the Soviet Union had developed new 

generations of armored fighting vehicles to implement fully its 

long-standing doctrine of deep battle and mechanized combined 

arms. 

The U.S. Army: Demobilization to Korea 

In eontrast to Soviet commanders in 1945, American field 

commanders were only partially satisfied with their organization 

and equipment, In 1945-46, the General Board of the U.S. 

European Theater of Operations conducted an exhaustive review of 

past and future organization. This review recognized the actual 

practices of the army in 1944-45, thereby departing from MeNair's 

concepts to a considerable extent. 

146 
For example, in reviewing the performance of the triangular 

infantry division, both the General Board and the War Department 

concluded that armor should be organic to that division in order 

to provide support for infantry attacks and to act as the primary 

antitank weapon of the army. The infantry's 57-mm antitank gun 

seemed ineffective, and the tank destroyer was too specialized to 

justify in a peacetime force structure. In a reversal of 

previous doctrine, the U.S. Army concluded that "the medium tank 

is the best antitank weapon."8 Although such a statement may 

have been true, it ignored the difficulties of designing a tank 

that could outshoot and defeat all other tanks. Moreover, even 

if the tank was the best antitank weapon, using it to defeat 

enemy armor might not be the best employment of available tanks, 

which found themselves tied to their own infantry instead of 

attacking and exploiting enemy vulnerabilities. In any event, 

each infantry regiment in the postwar U.S. Army received 

authorization for an organic tank company, with the division as a 

whole acquiring an additional tank battalion. 

By the time the War Department finally approved a new 

infantry division structure in November 1946, a variety of 

changes had occurred based on wartime experience (Figure 15). 

The self-propelled antiaircraft machine guns and 4.2-inch mortars 

that had frequently provided fire support to the World War II 

division became organic to that divisfon. Regimental cannon 

companies and antitank companies disappeared, but each infantry 

battalion received recoilless rifles. Even the infantry squad 

and platoon changed. After a conference at Fort Benning, 

Georgia, in 1946, the army reduced the rifle squad from twelve to 

nine men. This change not only facilitated the squad leader's 

control of his squad, but also released personnel to man a light 

machine gun and an antitank rocket launcher in the weapons squad 

of each reorganized platoon. These new platoons had a greater 

capacity for independent fire and maneuver than their wartime 

predecessors. On the other hand, the nine-man squad had little 

staying power once it suffered casualties.9 

In the armored division, similar modifications occurred. The 

limiting factor in most armored operations during 1944-45 was the 

shortage of armored infantry, even in the smaller 1943 

divisions. At the end of the war, Gen. George S. Patton 

estimated that the armored infantry suffered 65 percent of all 

casualties in these divisions while inflicting only 29 percent of 

the German casualties.fo Conventional infantry and armored 

engineers found themselves pressed into service to perform the 

infantry's close security and urban combat functions for armored 

task forces. In 1946, the War Department therefore increased the 

armored infantry in each armored division from three battalions 

of three companies each to four battalions of four companies each. 

147 
TYPE U.S. INFANTRY 

‘DLWSIO-N, l&i7 

I i/l 

LIizxklm 

Al 20-mm 

17,700 men [wartimej; 141 tanks; 

72 howitzers 

$1 [-y] $-ATYPE U.S. ARMORED 

DIVISION, 1947 

14,976 men (wartime): 361 tanks; 

72 self-propelled howitzera 

84-3330 -148- 

I T \ 

REPL - 

Figure 15. Type U.S. Infantry and Armored Divisions, 1947. 
Just as in the infantry division, the postwar armored 

division acquired a number of units that had previously been 

attached to it. A "heavy" tank battalion, actually equipped with 

M26 medium tanks because of their 90-mm high-velocity guns, 

replaced the departed tank destroyers as the antitank element of 

an armored division. Battalions of 155-m self-propelled 

artillery and self-propelled antiaircraft machine guns alSO 

became organic. The three armored engineer companies of the 

World War II division had proved inadequate for mobility 

missions, let alone for doubling as armored infantry, and so the 

postwar engineer battalion received a fourth line company and a 

bridge company. The two truck companies normally attached to any 

armored division were not added as separate units, but the 

divksion's available wheeled transportation certainly grew during 

the postwar reorganization. To cite but one example, the number 

of two and one-half ton cargo trucks kncreased from 422 in 1943 

to 804 in 1947.11 

Most of these notable improvements in the combination of arms 

were stillborn because of postwar demobilization. The U.S. Army 

shrank to a garrison force occupying Germany and Japan, with only 

skeleton units at home. Given America's nuclear monopoly, few 

people outside the army saw any requirement for combat ready 

forces. Except for one divksion in Germany, the U.S. Army had no 

formations that even approched the 1946-47 tables of organization 

and equipment. All four divisions occupying Japan in 1950 had 

only two-thirds of their wartime authorization in men and 

equipment. Each of these divisions had only one tank company and 

one antiaircraft battery and was missing one out of every three 

infantry battalions and artillery batteries.12 

The Korean Conflict 

When the Soviet-equipped North Korean People's Army invaded 

South Korea in June 1950, the understrength American divisions in 

Japan entered combat in a matter of days. This sudden commitment 

to battle revealed more than a simple lack of combat power; it 

also demonstrated that the U.S. Army had a force structure that 

did not fit its doctrine. Regimental commanders were deprived of 

their primary antitank weapon, the tank, and had only the 

obsolete 2.36-inch rocket launcher for short-range antitank 

defense. With only two infantry battalions instead of three, a 

regiment had no reserve if it tried to defend on a normal 

frontage of two battalions. The shortage of manpower and the 

hilly terrain of the Korean peninsula increased the dispersion 

and isolation of defending units. Such dispersion allowed the 

North Koreans to practice tactics that were a combination of 

Japanese offensive operations in 1942 and the Soviet forward 

detachment. A small unit of Soviet-supplied T-34 medium tanks 

led each column as the North Koreans moved south. If this tank 

149 
force encountered a strongpoint that it could not overrunf light 

infantry forces bypassed that strongpoint through the surrounding 

hills, out the defender's line of communications behind him, and 

foroed the defender to withdraw or be cut off.13 

Later in the war, the Americans, like the British a decade 

before them, learned to accept being cut off and under attack 

from flank and rear. Throughout the war, the most eomm5n 

Amsrioan defensive positian was a cw=w entrenched for 

all-round defense of a ridge or hilltop, separated by hundmds or 

even thousands of meters from the units to its flanks. This type 

of dispersed, strongpoint deployment has become increasingly 

common in most armies since 1945, but it requires excellent fire 

support and, if possible, active patrolling ta provide an 

effective defense. In the case of Korea, U.S. infantry 

frequently had to forego patrols and outposts, relying on 

superior firepower to defeat sudden enemy attaoks delivered at 

close range. When such attacks occurred, a combination of 

artillery, heavy infantry weapons, and the opganie weapons of the 

infantry proved effective in halting them.14 

The initeal contacts with the Chinese Communist Force CCCF) 

in October and November 1950 were not deliberate attacks or 

small-unit defenses, but rather a series of meeting engagements 

in which both sides were trying to use the same roads and 

streambeds as avenues of movement. By late 1950, the U.S. 

divisions had built up to their full tables of organization and 

were oriented on the few roads in an effort to occ,upy North Korea 

rapidly. Although much more lightly equippd, the CCF also used 

the low ground, moving southward in solid columns with security 

screens out and hiding in woods or villages when aerial 

reconnaissance searched the area. Once the initial surprise 

encounter was over, the CCF, many of whom were veterans of the 

guerrilla wars of China in the 194Os, shifted their attention to 

the high ground, moving around the U.S. and allied forces tied to 

the roads. American firepower soon made any daytime movement 

dangerous for the oommunists, and the establishment of company 

and battalion perimeter defenses on high ground further hampered 

the CCF movements, Thus, during the later years of the Korea 

eanfliot , the preferred CCF maneuver once again became the 

advance along the low ground at night, seeking to bypass enemy 

strongpoints in order to attack from unexpected directions.15 

When the front began to stabilize in 1952, the Korean War 

became a war of attrition, with each side launching ltiited 

attacks to destroy enemy personnel. The U.S. used Pts World War 

II doctrine for combining the different arms in such attacks, 

modifying that doctrine slightly to maximize the available 

firepower and to minimize casualties. One small example of this 

operational technique was the second phase of Operation Punch, a 

150 
178 

/ ANYANGNI 

L. MYQNGHAKTONG 

Map 8. Task Force Dolvin, Anyang-ni, Korea, 5 February 1951. 

843330 -lcIl- 
multi-battalion limited attack conducted by the 25th U.S. 

Infantry Division during early 1951 (Map 8). Two task forces 

advaneed along parallel roads to reduce CCF resistance, withdrew 

at night to avoid infiltrations, and then returned to inflict 

additional casualties after the enemy had reoccupied his 

defenses. One of these two U.S elements was Task Force Dolvin, 

which consisted of a battalion headquarters and two companies of 

medium tanks, a battalion of infantry, a 4.2-inch mortar platoon 

from a regimental mortar company, a self-propelled antiaircraft 

maehine gun platoon, a combat engineer platoon, and elements for 

communications, medical aid, and tactical air control. Because 

the intent was to clear enemy bunkers in the area of Hill 300, 

the infantry commander controlled the entire force. 

Coaxnunication between tank crews and the infantry riding on those 

tanks was difficult, because the newer M46 tanks, like the M4 

tanks of 1944, had no external telephones mounted on them. 

On 5 February 1951, the entire task force moved up the 

highway and deployed around the .base of Hill 300. The 

self-propelled antiaircraft guns, with the enormous firepower of 

multiple heavy machine guns, deployed behind the tanks, with the 

two lines of vehicles staggered so that all could aim at the hill 

to engage the enemy defenses, For thirty minutes, the 4.2-inch 

and 81-mm mortars, the infantry recoilless rifles, the 

antiaircraft machine guns, and the tank weapons methodically 

blasted Hill 3001 trying to suppress and if possible destroy 

enemy resistance. Then the infantry, which was sheltered behind 

the tanks during this preparatory fire, advanced up the hill. 

One man in each platoon deliberately exposed himself by wrapping 

a colored panel, originally intended for signalling aircraft, 

around his body. Whenever these leading men took cover beeause 

of enemy fire, all supporting weapons knew exactly where the 

friendly troops were, together with the approximate area of enemy 

resistance.16 

In November 1951, the U&ted Nations and its Communist 

opponents tentatively agreed to a demarcation line for the 

armistice they were negotiating. Thereafter, the United States 

and its U.N. allies had 'little opportunity for maneuver attacks 

even as small as that of Operation Punch, because there was no 

object in clearing ground that would be lost at the armistice. 

Except for patrols, raids, and counterattacks in response to 

communist advances, the war became largely a matter of holding 

defensive positions,l7 Many observers compared this phase of 

the Korean War to the artillery and trench struggles of World War 

I, but in fact there were notable differences. Instead of a 

defense-in-depth along relatively narrow unit frontages, U,N. 

units in Korea formed a very thin line of strongpoints on high 

ground. Centralized fire control and artillery proximity fuzes 

152 
gave the U.N. defenders unprecedented firepower in the defense, 

while the attacking communists often had only limited fire 

support. In 1951, the U.S. Army further improved its fire 

direction capability by introducing rotating plotting boards, 

allowing an F.D.C. to adjust fire on a target without knowing the 

observer's location. Upon report of a communist attack, a 

horseshoe-shaped concentration of artillery and mortar fire, 

called a "flash fire," would descend around a U.N. outpost. This 

firepower isolated the area from further enemy reinforcement for 

hours and provided illumination to assist the defenders. Within 

the horseshoe of artillery shells, the defending infantry had to 

deal with the attackers who had closed on the strongpoint. A 

defending infantry canpany often had up to a dozen machine guns 

above its normal authorization and, in some cases, could call on 

self-propelled antiaircraft machine guns for ground fire 

support. On occasion, the artillery of an entire corps would 

fire in support of one such outpost. During a 24-hour period in 

April 1953, nine artillery battalions fired a total of 39,694 

rounds to protect one infantry eompany.JS 

Artillery fire, even on such a lavish scale, could stop a 

determined enemy only while the shells were actually falling. By 

contrast, air support had a tremendous psychological effect on 

both sides in a ground action. Recognizing this, the U.S. Marine 

Corps in the Korean War maintained the tradition of intimate 

air-ground cooperation. This was especially important for the 

Marines, who had less nondivisional artillery and other fire 

support than the army. The U.S. Air Force preferred to 

concentrate on interdiction missions and established a cumbersome 

procedure for requesting close air support. In December 1951, 

the commander of the Eighth U.S. Army, Lt. Gen. James Van Fleet, 

expressed the dissatisfaction of his subordinate commanders on 

this issue. In a formal proposal to the U.N. commander, Gen. 

Mark Clark, Van Fleet requested that each of his four army corps 

receive an air force fighter-bomber squadron as a permanent 

attachment. This would ensure that the pilots were familiar with 

the units and terrain in a particular area and would respond 

rapidly when needed. General Clark studied the matter and 

finally rejected the proposal because it would divert scarce 

aircraft from other missions such as interdiction. He did, 

however, get both the Navy and Air Force to provide a much larger 

proportion of available aircraft for close air support9 culminating in 4,500 sorties in October 1952. Gradually, the air 

and ground leaders became more familiar with each other's 

operations and capabilities. For example, the army learned that 

firing high explosive rounds with proximity fuzes just before an 

air strike would help protect the aircraft by suppressing enemy 

antiaircraft fire in the target area.19 

One new area of air-ground operations in Korea was the use of 

helicopters. At the end of World War II, both the U.S. Marine 

Corps and the U.S. Army had purchased a few primitive helicopters 

153 
and studied their C3llp10pf2nt. The Marines organized an 

experimental helicopter squadron in 1947 and used those 

helicopters in small assault landings during amphibious 

exereises, Intersemice agreements meant that the U.S. Air Force 

controlled design and procurement of helicopters for the army, 

significantly impeding development of this capability. Moreover, 

the U,S. Army stressed parachute and glider mobility at the 

expense of newer concepts. Still, by 1953 both the army and the 

marines had used helicopters not only for medical 'evacuation and 

liaison but also for limited movement of troops and supplies.20 

In Search of a Mission: U.S. Army Organization From Triangle to 

ROAD 

The genuine success of the U.S. Army in the Korean War caused 

a temporary Increase in its size and budget. Armored forces 

especially profited from the example of North Korean tanks in 

1950, and the army increased its armored strength from one combat 

command to four armored divisions between 1948 and 1956.21 

At the same time, the Eisenhower admknistration chose to base 

its national strategy on %assfve retaliation" with nuclear 

weapons. In order to Justify its existence and mission, the U.S. 

Army had to develop a doctrine and organization that would allow 

ground forces to function effectively on a nuclear battlefield. 

Concentrated, fixed defenses of the type used in both world wars 

appeared to be vulnerable to nuclear attack, and so the army had 

to find a means of greater dispersion and flexibility, yet still 

retain efficient command and control. Unlike the Soviet Army, 

which had to fight only in the terrain of Europe and 

Asia--terrain favorable to mechanization--the U.S. Army had to 

remain relatively light in equipment, so that it would deploy 

rapidly to any trouble spot in the world. 

These strategic considerations greatly influenced the 

tactical structure and concepts of the army. Taotieal units had 

to be sufficiently small so that they would not present a 

lucrative nuclear target, sufficiently balanced between the arms 

so that they could defend themselves when isolated, and 

sufficiently self-supporting that they could fight without 

vulnerable logistical tails. Army commanders also wanted to 

streamline the command structure in order to speed the passage of 

information and decisions. The need for dispersion and for fewer 

command echelons prompted some theorists to consider increasing 

the span of control from three subordinate units to five. Five 

units, Spread over a greater area, could report to one higher 

headquarters, thereby reducing the number of such headquarters 

needed at any level. 

154 
The result of all these concerns was the "Pentomic? Division," 

a public relations term designed to combine the concept of five 

subordinate units ("penta") with the idea of a division that 

could function on an atomic or nonatomic battlefield. Five 

"battle groups" were at the core of the pentomic infantry 

division (Figure 16). Each battle group was an infantry 

formation that was smaller than a regiment but larger than the 

established triangular battalion. The authors of this design 

believed that they were eliminating the battalion level of the 

chain of command while retaining the reconnaissance, h=w 

weapons, and command and control elements of the triangular 

infantry regiment. In retrospect, however, a battle group 

appeared to be an oversized battalion, consisting of a 

headquarters and service company, four infantry companies of four 

rifle platoons and a heavy weapons platoon each, as well as a 

4.2-inch mortar battery. Within the headquarters and service 

company, a variety of specialized units were available. The 

reconnaissance platoon, for example, integrated light tanks, an 

81-m mortar, and an armored infantry squad. The assault gun 

platoon, equipped with the unarmored, self-propelled M56 gun, 

provided both antitank and limited offensive gun support for the 

infantry, The infantry companies, which included the 81-mm 

mortars and 'tO6-mm recoilless rifles previously located at 

battalion level, proved to be too large for effective control. 

In 1959 the battle group therefore acquired a fifth rifle 

company, but each company was reduced to only three rifle and one 

weapons platoon. Even the squad changed, increasing from nine to 

eleven men and officially acquiring a second automatic rifle. As 

a result, the pentomic infantry squad was able to practice the 

fireteam, fire and movement tactics used by all Marine Corps and 

some army squads during and after World War II.22 

The pentomic division structure allowed the division 

commander to attach to each battle group, if necessary, one tank 

company, one engineer company, and one 105~mm howitzer battery. 

This fire support proved inadequate, and in 1959, the division's 

five direct-support batteries gave way to five composite 

direct-support battalions, each consisting of a 105~mm battery 

and a 155-m battery. Such a composite battalion posed notable 

problems in training, ammunition supply, maintenance, and fire 

control of two dissimilar weapons. Because mortars had again 

proved unsuitable as an artillery weapon, the 1959 modifications 

also reduced the number of 4.2-inch mortars in a battle group and 

returned control of those mortars to the infantry. 

Fire support was not the only difficulty with this 

organization. The division commander had only one brigade 

headquarters, commanded by the assistant division commander, to 

help control the five battle groups, the tank battalion, and the 

armored cavalry squadron. Even with a new division trains 

155 
U.S. PENTOMIC INFANTRY 

DIVISION 14,000 mml 

(deleted 

John 

Rocket 

I 

(The S-battery 105mm batt. 

wm replaced 

by 5 composite 

battalions in 

1 s5sj 

1959) 

l!i 105mm 

ts” 

1 S5mm 

84-3330 

Figure 16. U.S. Pentomie Infantry Division. 

-Ed%- 

r--J XX 

J 

L? 
headquarters to control logistical support p the division 

commander and headquarters risked being overwhelmed by the number 

of subordinate units involved. The growth of the signals element 

of the infantry division from a company to a battalion 

illustrated these command and control difficulties. Similar 

problems existed at the battle group level, where a colonel and 

his small staff had to control four or five rifle companies, a 

mortar battery, reconnaissance and assault gun platoons, a tank 

company, and direct-support artillery. By eliminating one level 

of headquarters, the pentomic infantry structure left all other 

headquarters with an excessive span of control. The loss of any 

one of those headquarters could be disastrous in battle. 

Mobility was another problem, The pentomic structure 

included both a helicopter company and, for the first time, a 

large number of armored personnel carriers. These carriers, 

grouped in a transportation battalion, were able to move one 

battle group at a time. Because the carrier drivers belonged to 

one unit and the infantry to another, close cooperation between 

the two was difficult. Any battle group without these armored 

carriers had only limited protection and mobility. In addition, 

many senior commanders anticipated that their divisions would be 

deployed for nonatomic struggles in various areas of the world. 

Such a deployment could well mean leaving the tank battalion and 

other heavy equipment behind. 

The effects of the Pentomic concept on the rest of the U.S. 

Army were much less drastic. The armored division retained its 

three combat commands, four tank battalions, and four armored 

infantry battalions. It acquired an aviation company to 

centralize existing aviation assets and received the same general 

support artillery battalion (155-mm/8-inch/Honest John rocket) as 

the infantry division, instead of the previous '155-1~~ battalion. 

As in the infantry division, the armored signal company grew to a 

battalion. 

The pentomic changes also brought the nondivisional armored 

cavalry regiment, the descendent of the World War II cavalry 

reconnaissance group, to the structure it retained into the 

1970s. Each of three reconnaissance squadrons in this regiment 

received enough logistical support elements to enable it to 

operate semi-independently, Such a squadron consisted of a 

headquarters and headquarters troop, three armored reconnaissance 

troops, a tank company, and a self-propelled howitzer battery. A 

reconnaissance troop represented an ideal of combined arms 

organization, because each of its three platoons integrated 

tanks, infantry, scouts, and a mortar.23 

157 
This arganizatian of cavalry recsnnaissance organizatians 

served two purposes. Fkst, the variety of main battle vehfeles 

in such units made it diffkcult for an opposing force to 

dkstingufsh between U.S. cavalry and other combined arms forces 

ati, therefore, to determine whether the U-S, force in question 

was simply a cavalry screen or a major force. Second, this 

combination of weapons and vehkcles allowed U.S. reconnaissance 

forces to fight;, if necessary, to develop intelli$ence about the 

enemy ‘ As the Soviets had discovered in 194U, a reconnaissance 

force that is not able to fight in this way will be much less 

effective even in its primary role of intelligence collection and 

sweening. 

By 1959, the U.S. Army had a radically new structure and 

operational concept to meet the changing demands of nuclear 

warfare. This structure and concept differed markedly from the 

armor-heavy solution of the post-Stalin Soviet Army, but the 

American commanders were no happier with the results than were 

their Soviet counterparts. 

During the same time period, the possibilEty of nonnuclear 

conflict Increased. The Kennedy administration came into office 

in 1961 committed to the concept of flexible response. Despite 

the army's original purpose, the pentotic division was heavily 

oriented for nuclear warfare. Thus, the army needed new 

structures to fight across the entire spectrum of possible 

conflicts from '"low intensity" terrorism and guerrilla wars up to 

fully mechanized and even nuclear warfare. The new 

administration quickly approved ongoing army studies for a 

different division organization, the Reorganization Objectives 

Army Division (ROAD) (Figure 17). The different types of ROAD 

division shared a eornmon division base, including a cavalry 

reconnaissance squadron of some type, three brigade headquarters, 

division artillery, division support command, engineer battalion, 

and eventually an air defense battalion. The brigade 

headquarters, like the oombat commands of the World War IT 

armored division, could control a varying number of combat aMi 

combat support elements. The combat arms battalion replaced the 

battle group as the largest fixed-maneuver organizatkon, but 

retained many of the battle group's elements, including 

reconnaissance, mortar, and service support units. 

The unique aspect of the ROAD division was the ability to 

"'task organizeFt and taflor structures at any level, 

Strategically, the army could choose to form and deploy armored, 

mechanized, conventional infantry, airborne, and later airmobile 

diviskonss, dependkng upon the expected threat. Although there 

were recommended eonfigurat~ons of each division type, in 

practice planners could further tailor these different division 

types by assigning various numbers and mixes of armored, 

158 
TYPE U.S. ARMORED DIVISION, ROAD 18.000-20.000 men. 66-70 guns/howitzers. 

27-36 light tanks, 300+ medium tanks 

II - IV& later Rocket 2 

1KKmm CD 

I-J-I, 

I * I I I I I 

166/203mm. Tgt Acquisition 

later 203mm 

?--I 

xx ki-l SPT El’ I*p I 

Military Military Police 

r -I- Intelligence 

Assigned 1 I 1 

I I Maneuver 

‘r Sns 

Oh 

. I I Personnel Div SUPPlY . Service Materiel 81 Trans 

(Actual numbers and types of assigned 

battalions varied; type infantry division 

(mechanized) had 6 tank and 6 mechanized bns) 

Mgt Ctr 

Notes: 1. unit added after 

initial ROAD structure was approved. 

2. unit later deleted from structure. 

Figure 17. Type U.S. Armored Division, ROAD, X265-1983. 
mechanized infantry, infantry, airborne infantry, and airmobile 

infantry battalions, for a total of anywhere from seven to 

fifteen maneuver battalions. The division commander and staff 

had considerable flexibility in 'attaching these battalions to the 

three brigade headquarters. Finally, within the brigades and 

battalions, commanders could task organize combined arms fosces 

by temporarily cross-attaching infantry, mechanized, and armored 

companies and platoons, as well as attaching engineers, air 

defense artillery, and other elements. Thus a battalion task 

force or company team might receive a variety of subordinate 

units of different arms, allowing integration of the arms as the 

mission required. In practice, of course, such tailoring and 

task organizing were prey to the same problems that the World War 

II system of pooling and attachment had suffered. Constantly 

shifting units resulted in inefficiency and poor coordknation 

between subordinate elements that were unfamiliar with each 

other. As a result, battalion and brigade commanders tried to 

keep the same elements "habitually associated" with each other 

unless a radical change of mission or terrain occurred. 

Nevertheless, the ROAD structure gave the U.S. Army the span of 

control and flexibility of organization it had lacked under the 

pentomic structure.24 

Air Assault 

The Kennedy administration's dedication to flexkble response 

also brought the long-standing question of helicopter mobility to 

resolution. The result was a noteworthy new capability in 

air-ground interaction and in tactical operations in general. 

During the later 195Os, the USMC continued to lead the other 

services in the application of helicopters for battalion and 

larger unit assaults, While the army struggled with the pentomic 

structure ) the marines reconfigured their divisions and regiments 

to eliminate much heavy equipment, relying on mortars, naval 

gunfire, and aircraft rather than on howitzers for direct-support 

artillery. The assault elements of a marine division became 

eampletely air transportable as a result.25 The more limited 

army experiments focused on helicopters in a cavalry role, with 

small aviation units for screening, raids, and reconnaissance. 

Brig. Gen. Carl I. Hutton, comandant of the U.S. Amy Aviation 

School during the period 1954-57, conducted extensive experiments 

to improvise gun and rocket armament for helicopters and then to 

use armed helicopters tactically. The U.S. Army Infantry School 

made similar efforts, and the Director of Amy Aviation, Ma3. 

Gen. Hamilton H. Howze, attempted to popularize the concept of 

completely hellborne units. The U.S. Air Force adamantly opposed 

any expanded role for army aviation as a challenge to air foree 

missions, 

1950s. 26 

and thus only limited progress was possible during the 

160 

------ ..--_--__------~-. 
Then in 1962, following the suggestions of several army 

aviation advocates, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara asked 

the U,S. Army to study the bold use of aviation to improve 

tactical mobility for ground forces. The result was the Howze 

Board of 1962. General Howze and his staff conducted tests on 

everything from dispersed fuel stockpiles for helicopters to 

close air support bombing by army fixed-wing aircraft. Howze 

recommended the formation of a number of air assault divisions 

depending almost entirely on army aircraft, as well as separate 

air cavalry brigades for screening and delay roles and air 

transport brigades to improve the mobility of conventional 

divisions. He noted that an air assault division could maneuver 

freely to attack a conventional foe from multiple directions and 

could use both artificial and natural obstacles to delay or 

immobilize an enemy while itself remaining free to fly over those 

obstacles. 27 

After a considerable internal struggle, the Defense 

Department authorized 'the creation of a division for further 

testing. From 1963 to 1965, the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) 

at Fort Bennkng acted as the vehicle for extensive tactical 

training and experimentation. The 11th itself was so small that 

it often had to borrow elements of another division to conduct 

exercises. When the division first formed, army regulations 

still forbade army aircraft to fly in formation, and thus many 

techniques had to be developed with little or no background 

experience. In order to make the division's supply system as 

mobile as its maneuver elements, the division commarder, Maj. 

Gen. Harry Kinnard, developed refueling and rearming points 

camouflaged and dispersed near the battle area. Artillery, 

aviation, and infantry had to cooperate closely to suppress enemy 

resistance during an assault landing. Artillery and available 

air force aircraft fired on the proposed Landing zone (LZ) until 

assault aircraft began their final approach, one or two minutes 

prior to landing. The last artillery rounds were smoke, to 

signal helicopter gunships to take up direct-fire suppression 

around the LZ while troop helicopters landed and discharged their 

infantry. Early helicopter weapons were rather inaccurate, but 

their fire had a considerable psychological effect on both friend 

and foe. Artillery and infantry changed location frequently by 

helicopter and often conducted false, temporary landings in 

multiple locations to confuse the enemy as to their actual 

dispositions and intentions. 

The division's air cavalry squadron combined elements for 

aerial observation, insertion and recovery of ground 

reconnaissance teams, and armed helicopter '"gunships" within each 

akr cavalry troop. The air cavalry conducted the traditional 

cavalry missions of reconnaissance, screening, and raids almost 

entirely from the air. After a number of tests, the air assault 
division had clearly demonstrated its potential. The two most 

obvious vulnerabilities of such a unit were the loss of mobzLlity 

and resupply capability in darkness or extremely poor weather, 

and the debatable effects of enemy air defense on helicopter 

tactics 28 

During the same period, U.S. Army helicopter units, both 

armed and unarmed, supported the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 

(ARVN). This provided a combat test for the concepts developed 

by Howze, Kinnard, and others, and personnel and ideas passed 

frequently between Vietnam and the 11th Air Assault Division at 

Fort Benning. Initially, American helicopters in Vietnam did 

little more than transport troops from one place to another. By 

1964 American helicopter gunships and transports formed small air 

assault units with Vietnamese infantry on a semi-permanent 

basis.29 

Inevitably, the U.S. Air Force protested the U.S. Army's use 

of armed helicopters and even armed fixed-wing aircraft fn a 

close air support role in Vietnam. The government of South 

Vietnam was so concerned about possible disloyalty in its own 

forces that it further complicated the already cumbersome process 

of requesting air support from Vietnamese Air Force elements. 

Despite USAF protests, American and Vietnamese ground commanders 

felt compelled to use any air support that was available, 

including amy aviation when air force channels proved 

unresponsive. By 1967, the U.S. involvement had reversed the 

situation , providing large amounts of air force close support for 

ground forces in most circumstances. Because there was no enemy 

air threat over South Vietnam, the USAF supported the ground 

forces to such an extent that Congress held hearings about the 

neglect of the air superiority mission. This artificially high 

level of air-ground cooperation temporarily buried much of the 

rivalry between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Foree.3U However, 

no air force would have been able to provide s,uch sustained 

support to ground forces while stiultaneously struggling for air 

superiority against a comparably equipped enemy air force. 

In the interim, the U.S. Army fully integrated the helicopter 

and its tactics. In the summer of 1965, the 11th Air Assault 

Division became the Ist Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and deployed 

to Vietnam (see Figure 171. General Howze's plan to use' 

fixed-wing army aircraft in a ground-attack role had failed, but 

many of his other recommendations were reflected in the new 

airmobile division. An aerial artillery battalion armed with 

rocket-firing helicopters replaced the general support artillery 

battalion found in other ROAD division structures. A division 

aviatZon group, including two light and three medium helicopter 

battalions and a general support aviation company, could redeploy 

several infantry battalions simultaneously. 

162 
r 

HO 

i/i 

V 

r 

64-3330 -163- 

15,787 men, 434 aircraft, 64 

howitzers, 1800 vehicles 

I 

HHT E?l 

EF I Grounc 

Air Cav Cav 

Troops 

I 

I 

V Ea!l 

1 (1 Bde also airborne) 

r --- 1 

I I I I I COMMAND 

XT , 

Light General Support Medium 

Figure 18. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 1965. 
Entering combat in the fall of 1965, the 1st Cavalry much 

more often found itself fighting North Vietnamese conventional 

light infantry regiments than smdl guerrilla bands. On 14 

November 1965, for example, a battalion landed by helicopter in 

the base camp of the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment, forcing the 

enemy to turn and fight in his own rear area. Superior mobility 

and firepower of this type temporarily halted a North Vietnamese 

invasion of the south.31 

One key to the airmobile or afr assault concept was the close 

integration, within the same unit, of helicopter and ground 

forces. By eo*trast, using helicopter gunships and transports 

from one major unit to airlift infantry or artillery elements of 

another unit was much less efficient, requiring more time and 

effort to ensure coordination and mutual understanding between 

the parties involved. In practice, the U.S. Army lacked 

sufficient helicopter assets to make all the American, Korean, 

and Vietnamese units fully airmobile with their own organic 

aviation. Instead, the 1st Aviation Brigade controlled up to 100 

company-sized aviation units of various types. Battalions from 

this brigade were habitually associated with different 

divisions. Even the two airmobile divisions, the 1st Cavalry and 

10lst Airborne, frequently had to lend their assets to support 

neighboring units.32 

Airntobility did more than put the enemy off balance and 

neutralize conventional obstacles. It also forced the U.S. Army 

to change many procedures to accomodate operations over a large 

territory without a defined '"front line." For example, both 

field artillery and signal units ordinarily oriented their 

support towards a particular front line or axis of advance. By 

contrast, in Vietnam these branches had to operate on an area 

concept, providing fires and communications in any direction from 

a pattern of small bases. Even this system did not always give 

sufficient artillery support for a large-area operation, and thus 

the 1st Cavalry Division controlled a nondivfsional 155-m 

artillery battalion that could be lifted by heavy transport 

helicopters.33 

Lam Son 7lg 

When the 1st Cavalry Division deployed to Viet Nam in 1965, 

It used the tactic of terrain flying--hugging the ground with 

helicopters--to present a fleeting target for ground air 

defense. This procedure worked well in jungle and rough terrain, 

but in more open areas the enemy on the ground had more time to 

react and to fire on helicopters. Because the principal 

air-defense threat was small arms and automatic weapons fire at 

t64 
low altitudes, at least some aviation units began to fly above 

the effective range of such weapons. Many observers argued that 

such high altitude, level flight would be suicidal against an 

enemy with larger and more sophisticated air defense weapons. 

One battle in 1971, known as Lam Son 719, became the center of 

the debate on the vulnerability of helicopters in combat.34 

The purpose of Lam Son 719 (Map 9) was to destroy the North 

Vietnamese base area in Laos, specifically the large logistical 

installations around Tchepone. This would forestall a major 

North Vietnamese offensive to take control of the northern 

provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. I ARVN Corps planned to 

make the main effort with the 1st ARVN Airborne Division 

conducting airmobile operations north of the Ye Pon River, while 

the 1st Armored Brigade, which was attached to the airborne 

division, advanced westward along Route 9 into Laos. The 1st 

ARVN Infantry Division would conduct a secondary attack south of 

the Ye Pon River, providing fire support and flank protection for 

the main attack. Finally, a three-battalion force of Vietnamese 

rangers was responsible for the northern (right) flank of the 1st 

Airborne Division. 

This plan had problems even before the offensive began. 

First, the U.S. government would not permit U.S. forces to 

operate on the ground inside Laos, and thus the ARVN units had to 

fight for the first time without their American advisors. 

Although most ARVN units were capable of such operations, the 

absence of advksors made eoordinatkon of air support and 

airmobile transport much more difficult. On the other hand, the 

ARVN units depended upon American helicopters and air support for 

their mobility and firepower. U.S. Army aviation and ARVN ground 

unit commanders had to plan each operation as equals, which 

inevitably slowed down the planning process even though both 

sides tried to cooperate. 

Terrain was another major handicap. The Ye Pon River valley, 

including Route 9 that paralleled the river, was the natural 

avenue of approach between Viet Nam and Tchepone. This valley 

was so narrow that the 1st ARVN Armored Brigade lacked maneuver 

space for its three armored cavalry squadrons. The valley was 

also a natural air corridor, especially when clouds reduced 

visibility over the high ground on either side of the valley. 

The Ye Pon River was the most prominent terrain feature for 

helicopter navigation. As a result, much air traffic was 

channeled down the valley, and once the ARVN forces began their 

advance, their future axis of attack was immediately obvious to 

the defending North Vietnamese. Huge ARVN convoys near the 

border gave the North Vietnamese ample warning of the projected 

attack. 

165 
LAOS i S. VET NAM 

- x x Is. A 

10 KM 

SCALE 

Map 9, Lam Son 719, February-March 1971. 
For several years prior to Lam Son 719, the communists had 

established an integrated air defense oriented on the valley and 

on the few natural helicopter LZs. Nineteen antiaircraft 

artillery battalions were in the area, including 23-m, 37-m, 

57-m, and 100-m antiaircraft guns, and 12.7-m machine guns, 

The antiaircraft coverage was thickest around the Tchepone supply 

dumps. In addition, the North Vietnamese had preplanned 

artillery fires on all likely LZs. The North Vietnamese 

reinforced their defenses during the battle, reaching a total of 

twelve infantry regiments, two tank battalions, and considerable 

artillery support.35 

The result was a "mid-intensity war" rather than a 

counterinsurgency operation. The ARVN began its attack on 8 

February 1971, but had to delay operations the next day because 

of poor weather. Throughout the offensive, air force air support 

was often unavailable because of low cloud cover. Even single helicopters on medical evacuation or supply flights needed armed 

helicopter support to suppress enemy air defense. This in turn 

strained the available resources of AH-l attack helicopters and 

forced the U.S. Army to use the slower, more vulnerable, and 

generally obsolete UH-16 gunships. 

The helicopters engaged North Vietnamese light tanks, 

destroying six and immobilizing eight. At the same time, T-34 

medium tanks overran the ARVN firebase at LZ 31 after repeated 

attacks. Because the U.S. and ARVN forces had rarely needed 

large-caliber antitank weapons before this battle, they had few 

effective defenses available. The W.S. Army aviation commander 

for Lam Son 719 urged the army to renew its study of antitank 

helicopters.36 

After several weeks of limited success, the ARVN commander 

abandoned plans for a ground advance west of Aloui. Instead, 

during the first week of March 1971, the 1st ARVN Infantry 

Division established a series of temporary firebases on the 

escarpment along the southern side of the river. On 6 March, two 

battalions of the 1st ARVN Airborne Division air assaulted into 

LZ Rope, This LZ was in the center of the enemy air defense 

umbrella, but the two battalions lost only one helicopter out of 

120 in the attack. These later air assaults were carefully 

planned and supported operations. Strategic and tactical bombers 

suppressed local enemy defenses and often created clearings to be 

used as new, unexpected LZs. Gunships and air-delivered smoke 

screens protected the infantry during their landings. 

The ARVN accomplished its mission, destroying the support 

facilities around Tchepone before withdrawing with considerable 

losses. This operation delayed a major North Vietnamese 

offensive for a year, but the cost seemed excessive. In addition 
to several infantry battalions virtually destroyed, the U.S.-ARVN 

attackers lost a total of 107 helicopters shot down in six 

weeks. Many observers cited Lam Son 719 as proof that akrmobile 

operations were too vulnerable to enemy air defense and could not 

be conducted in complex, mechanized wars. 

Yet, these helicopter losses must be evaluated carefully. 

one hundred and seven helicopters represented perhaps ten percent 

of the number of U.S. Army aircraft involved at any one time, but 

only a small loss in an offensive during which the U.S. Army flew 

more than 100,000 sorties. This was true even though many of 

these sorties were only short ?‘hop~.~~ The terrain neutralized 

most of the advantages of an air assault force, allowing the 

defender to focus his attention on a few critical, areas through 

which the advance and withdrawal had to pass. This concentration 

of antiaircraft fires, in combination with poor weather, forced 

the helicopters to avoid terrain flying by increasing their 

altitude to about 4,000 feet above ground level. Finally, since 

1971, helicopters have acquired improved navigation devices and 

more survivable mechanical designs. Similar circumstances of 

weather and terrain might still hamper air assault operations, 

but Lam Son 719 by itself did not definitely prove such 

operations to be impossible.37 Certainly the other NATO powers 

and the Soviet Union used the airmobile experience of Vietnam to 

help in the development of their own army aviation doctrine. 

The Nato Powers 

For fifteen years after 1945, the military policies and 

posture of Western European powers resembled those during the 

same period after 1918. The war had exhausted the Europeans, who 

were reluctant to finance major new weapons systems for their 

armed forces. The Allies allowed West Germany to rearm only 

after a decade of occupation, and even then only because of the 

conflict between East and West. The new Bundeswehr could not 

afford to mechanize all its formations in accordance with the 

experience of World War II, and so the first-line units had 

different equipment and tactics fran the other German ground 

forces. France and Britain had even greater problems, developing 

three elements within their armies: a fully mechanized force 

committed to defense of central Europe, a less-equipped conscript 

and reserve force at home, and a lightly equipped but 

well- brained and strategically mobile element for conflicts 

outside of Europe. Such conflicts and the demands of strategic 

mobility encouraged British and French interest in light tanks 

and armored cars that might be used both at home and abroad. 

In the 196Os, the end of conscription in Britain and the 

gradual termination of counterinsurgency wars abroad caused both 

the British anal French armies to reorient on defense in Europe. 

168 
Even then, democracies were naturally suspicious of "'offensive" 

weapons such as tanks, preferring to develop Mdefensive" weapons 

such as the antitank guided missile (ATGH). The Freneh SS-11 was 

the first effective ATGM in NATO, and many nations including the 

United States adopted it during the early 1960s. 

Britain, France, and West Germany all accepted the concept of 

combined arms or "all-arms cooperation" as a principle of 

tactics. This similarity of concept was reflected by some 

SFmilarity in large-unit organization. All three armies 

converged on fixed combined arms forces that in U.S. terms are of 

brigade rather than divisional size. By contrast, within the 

U.S. ROAD division, brigades might change their configuration to 

adjust to different situations and missions. The evolution of 

the fixed European brigade may be a result of orientation on the 

single mission of mechanized operations in Europe. In any event, 

this evolution deserves a brief review. 

At the end of World War II, the British Army retained its 

two-brigade armored division and three-brigade infantry division 

with only minor changes. The mixture of three tank and one motor 

battalion in an armored brigade, and three infantry and one tank 

battalion in an infantry brigade, allowed for cross-attachment at 

battalion and company level. The resulting combinations would be 

in the proportion of three companies or platoons of one arm with 

one of another. During the 195Os, the British Army of the Rhine 

(BAOR) developed a '"square brigade" structure that was more 

suitable for a variety of tactical situations. Each brigade then 

eonsisted of two tank and two mechanized infantry battalions. 

These brigades came to have a fixed organization of other arms,. 

generally including a 10%mm artillery battalion, two engineer 

companies, and more service support than any other NATO brigade. 

Although these units might nominally belong to the division as a 

whole, they were habitually assigned to specific brigades. Thus, 

the two levels of command, division and brigade, became 

redundant. Many brigade headquarters disappeared or became 

"field forces" in 1977-78. This, plus the needs of economy, 

prompted the BAOR to reduce the division to only six maneuver 

battalions--three tank and three mechanized infantry--in 1982. 

Pairs of tank and mechanized infantry battalions still carried 

the designation of "brigade," and might control a sem2-permanent 

combination of artillery, engineers, and other arms. This 

structure bore a considerable resemblance to the 1943 U.S. 

armored division. Outside of the BAOR, the brigade level of 

COlTlIMnd was more important. Although designated divisions 

existed in the United Kingdom, the deployable unit was usually 

the infantry brigade, consisting of approximately five infantry 

battalions plus other arms.38 

169 
As late as 1954, the French Army, whose Free French divisions 

had been equipped by the U.S. during World War II, retaFned the 

equipment and organization of the U-S. armored division. After 

the Algerian War ended in 2961, the French Army renewed its study 

of mechanized operations and organizations, eulminatjng in the 

Type-67 (1967) mechanized division consisting of three mechanized 

brigades . Each of these brigades, like their German and British 

counterparts, had a permanent structure. The brigade included 

one main battle tank battalion, two mixed mechanized battalions, 

a self-propelled artillery battalion, and an engineer company. 

As in the case of Britain, this structure for European operations 

was so fixed that the brigade and division levels of command were 

somewhat redundant. As a result, in the mid-1970s, the French 

Army began to convert all of its units to a new structure, 

labeled a division, that was in fact an oversized brigade. The 

armored division, for example, consisted of only 8,200 nen, 

organized into two tank, two mechanized, one artillery, one 

engineer, and one headquarters and service battalion. The 

infantry division within France became even smaller, totaling 

6,500 men in three motorized infantry and one armored car 

battalion, plus other arms as in the armored division. The 

French hoped that this smaller division structure would be more 

responsive and fast-moving on the nuclear battlefield. For the 

French Army, the function of armored divisions in such a battle 

was to cause the enemy forces to mass and present a vulnerable 

target for French tactical nuclear weapons.39 

One of the unique aspects of French Army structure during the 

1960s and 1970s was the organic combination of different arms 

withfn one battalion. The French began experiments with combined 

arms battalions in the early 19609, culminating in the mixed or 

"tank-infantry" battalion of 1967. Within this battalion, two 

light tank companies each consisted of four tank platoons plus an 

antitank guided missile platoon, while two meehanzzed infantry 

compani.es had three mechanized platoons each. The two types of 

companfes cross-attached platoons for tactical operations. The 

battalion headquarters controlled other arms, including 

communications, reconnaissance, and mortar platoons. Use of the 

same basic vehicle chassis simplified the maintenance problems of 

each battalion and ensured that all elements had uniform 

mobility, First the AMX-13 and later the AMX-10 family of 

armored vehioles included compatible vehicles for light armor, 

ATGH launchers, and infantry. The French had to extend greatly 

the amount of training given to junior leaders to enable them to 

control three types of platoons. This problem helped force the 

French Army to reduce the size of both tank and mechanized 

infantry platoons to three vehicles each, a unit easier to 

supervise and control. Finally, because these tank-infantry 

battalions could no longer provide infantry support for pure tank 

units, the medium or main battle tank battalion in each 

170 
mechanized brigade acquired an organic mechanized infantry 

company. In practice, this tank battalion often had to support 

the tank-infantry battalions because of their limited armor 

protection against massed enemy attack.40 

While France led the western powers in the integration of 

different arms within the infantry battalion, West Germany led in 

the development of mounted infantry integrated with armor. Based 

on the experience of World War II panzer-grenadiers, the postwar 

German commanders were determined to provide effective armored 

fighting vehicles for their infantry. The resulting Marder was 

the first mechanized infantry combat vehicle (MICV) in NATO. The 

Marder had a turret-mounted automatic cannon, NBC protective 

system, and gunports for infantry weapons. German commanders 

intended the mechanized infantry to fight from their MICVs, 

dismounting only when necessary for special operations such as 

patrols or urban combat. The German panzer-grenadiers had the 

smallest dismounted squad size-- seven men--of any western army. 

The Marder itself became the base of fire around which the 

dismounted squad maneuvered as the assault team. 

The German concept and design for a MICV drew considerable 

attention and imitation both in the Soviet Union and in the other 

members of NATO, Yet, if tanks and mounted infantry operated as 

a team under all circumstances, the MICV required the same 

mobility and protection as a tank, becoming in essence another 

tank. The British Army had recognized this at the end of World 

War II, when it had used a limited number of Sherman tank chassis 

without turrets as "Kangaroo" heavy personnel carriers. The 

Marder itself went a long way in the same direction, but its 

weight of 27.5 tons made crossing obstacles difficult, and its 

production cost prevented the Bundeswehr from equipping all 

German infantry with this vehicle.7 

The Germans were also the only power to field new armored 

tank destroyers during the 19609, although a decade later the 

Bundeswehr replaced those tank destroyers with tanks. The 

Jagdpanzer was organic to German brigades and sometimes carried 

ATGMs as well as a 90-mm high-velocity gun. A gun-equipped 

antitank vehicle of this type seemed too specialized to maintain 

in peacetime, especially when ATGMs were so much more effective 

and flexible. In the later 197Os, however, new forms of ceramic 

and other specialized armor protection greatly reduced the 

effectiveness of the shaped-eharge chemical energy warheads used 

on most ATGMs and low-velocity guns. The shaped-charge round was 

not totally useless, because no nation could afford to use 

ceramic armor on all its combat vehicles, or even on all surfaces 

of main battle tanks. Still, the tank or a high-velocity gun on 

a tank surrogate was again the most effective weapon against 

enemy tanks, and infantry units were potentially more vulnerable 

171 
to armored attack than they had been since 1943. Both high-and 

low-velocity antitank weapons can neutralize the armor of 

existing MICVs, but nothing the mechanized infantryman has can 

effectively neutralize ceramic-armored tanks. 

development must occur 

Further weapons 

before the low-velocity, man-portable 

antitank weapons that were so popular in the 1970s can again 

compete on an equal basis with tank or tank destroyer 

high-velocity guns. 

From Home Defense to Blitzkrieg: The Israeli Army to 1967 

In four wars and numerous undeclared conflicts sinee 1948, 

Israel has become famous as an expert practitioner of highly 

mechanized combined arms warfare. Yet to understand the 

strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli Defense Forces we must 

remember the origins of those forces. 

In 1948, the Israeli portions of Palestine d eelared 

independence from Great Britain while under attack by their Arab 

neighbors. At the time, the Israeli armed forces were a loose 

eonfederation of self-defense tilitia, anti-British terrorists, 

and recent immigrants. A number of Israelis had training as 

small-unit leaders, both in the local defense forces and in the 

British Army of World War II. What Israel lacked were commanders 

and staff affieers with experience or formal training in 

battalion or larger unit operations. Even after independence, 

Great Britain would allow only a few Israelis to attend British 

military schools. Moreover, until the 1960s Israel could find 

neither the funds nor the foreign suppliers to purchase large 

quantities of modern weapons. 

As a result, the Israeli Army of 1948-56 was an amateur army, 

poorly trained and equipped. It relied on its strengths Ln 

small-unit leadership and individual initiative, strengths that 

were sufficient for self-defense until the Soviet Union began to 

supply Egypt with large quantities of modern heavy weapons. The 

honored elite of this light infantry army ware the paratroopers 

of 202d &rigade, who conducted raids into Arab territory. 

Indeed, throughout its history Israel has always assigned the 

cream of its army recruits to the airborne brigades. 

Noshe Dayan became Chief of Staff of this unusual army in 

1953. In 1939, Dayan had been one of a number of Jewish 

self-defense soldiers who received unauthorized small-unit 

training from Capt. Orde Wingate, the erratic British genius who 

later founded long-range British attacks in the jungles of 

Burma e During the 1948 War of Independence, Dayan eommanded the 

89th Mechanized Commando Battalion, a ragged collection of 

half-tracks and light vehicles that conducted daring raids into 

Arab rear areas, While visiting the United States, Dayan by 

172 
chance met Abraham Baum, the famous World War II tank company 

commander who had led a small raiding party behind German lines 

to release American prisoners of war at Hammelburg, Germany. 

Baum's account of American armored tactics in World War II 

reinforced Dayan in his belief in speed, mobility, and commanders 

going forward to make decisions on the spot. Thus, Dayan 

discovered that his own ideas were in part a reinvention of the 

principles used by both Americans ard Germans in World War II.42 

Dayan's genius in the 1956 war lay in his recognition of Arab 

vulnerability to rapid attacks: 

The Egyptians are what I would call schematic in their 

operations, and their headquarters are in the rear, far 

from the front. Any change Fn the disposition of their 

units, such as forming a new defense line, switching 

targets of attack, moving forces not in accordance with 

the original plan, takes them time--time to think, time 

to receive reports through all the channels of command, 

time to secure a decision after due consideration from 

supreme headquarters, time for the orders then to filter 

down from the rear to the fighting fronts. 

We on the other hand are used to acting with greater 

flexibility and less military routine e . .43 

The Egyptian defenders of the Sinai desert in 1956 occupied a 

string of positions at key terrain points lacking both depth and 

flank security. These defenses were vulnerable to outflanking 

Israeli movements and lacked a large counterattack force to 

support them. Dayan planned to disorganize and ultimately 

collapse the defense by rapid thrusts at Egyptian lines of 

communication. 

Still, the instrument that Dayan planned to use for the 1956 

campaign was not a mechanized force. On the contrary, he 

depended on the Israeli strengths in small-unit leadership and 

light infantry operations. An airborne drop at the critical 

Mitla Pass would assist the ground infantry columns, which moved 

across the desert in commandeered commercial vehicles, plus a few 

light tanks and artillery pieces. Initially, Israel's only 

armored brigade, the 7th, remained in reserve, with no mission 

except to use its tank guns as additional indirect-fire weapons. 

The 7th was a fairly ty ical 

period. 4 f 

armored brigade of the immediate 

post-World War II It consisted of a battalion of 

Sherman medium tanks, a battalion of AMX-13 light tanks, a 

battalion of half-track mounted infantry, a reconnaissance 

c-paw 9 and an artillery battery. The brigade commander, 

Col. Uri Ben-Ari, was dissatisfied with his symbolic role, and 

173 
almost derailed the entire Israeli plan by erossing the border 

too early. His reconnaissance company penetrated the poorly guarded Dyka Pass on the southern flank of the key Egyptian 

position of Abu Aghe ila -Urn Katef (Map 10). Al though this 

reconnaissance indicated that the road thraugh the pass would 

support only a few vehicles, Ben-Ari took a calculated risk and 

committed his three cross-attached task forces on three different 

axes to fracture the Egyptian defense. Task Force A attacked in 

vain against the sauthern side of the Urn Katef, defenses ) where 

two other Israeli brigades were already making expensive frontal 

assaults e Task Force C exploited to the southwest, towards the 

Suez Canal. Ben Ari sent Task Force B, consisting of one company 

of Sherman tanks and one company of mechanized infantry, through 

the Dyka Pass and into the middle of the Egyptian position. The 

task force commander I Lt. Col. Avraham Adan, held this pssition 

against limited Egyptian attacks from two directions and strafing 

by his own aircraft. Only the 7th Brigade’s artillery battery 

gave Adan effective support. This small task force greatly 

discouraged and confused the Egyptian defenders in the area, who 

felt that their line of communications had been cut. The frontal 

infantry attacks were therefore able to overrun the Egyptians. 

The 7th Armored Brigade‘ did not win the 1956 war by itself 8 

yet its actions at Abu Agheila and elsewhere convinced Dayan that 

armored forces were a superior instrument for future wars of 

maneuver e During the decade after 1956, the Israeli Defense 

Forces gave the armored corps almost as high a priority for men 

and material as the air force and paratroopers received, As 

deput.y commander of the Armor Corps from 1956 to 1961, and 

commander after 1964, Israel Tal shaped Israeli armor into an 

effective force. Tal soon discovered that complicated armored 

tactics and equipment required the same discipline and methodical 

maintenance that had long been common in western armies, but 

which were rare in Israeli forces, 

The main problem was that Israel lacked the resources to 

maintain a superior air force and elite paratroop element while 

still developing a balanced mechanized army. Tal got the 

government to purchase modern American and British tanks and to 

improve the older Shermanst but the rest of the armored force 

suffered. Most of the Israeli infantry still rode in the 

?94T-vintage H3 American half-track, a vehicle with no overhead 

protection, limited side armor, and increasing maintenance and 

mobility problems as it aged. Tal insisted that the 

tank-mechanized infantry team was a European tactic that was less 

important in the Middle East. In the open spaces of Sinai, 

Israeli tanks needed less infantry security against short-range 

enemy antitank weapons. To Tal, infantry was useful for reducing 

bypassed centers of resistance and mopping up after the battle, 

Otherwise ) he agreed with the British in North Africa who had 

considered ordinary infantry more a burden than a help. 45 

174 
TO SUEZ CANAL 

0 

84-3330 

iI 

10 20 KM 

SCALE 

Map 10. 7th Armored Brigade at ABU AGHEILA, 1956. 

-175- 
The Six Day War of 1967 seemed to confirm these arguments. 

The set-piece attacks conducted by teams of Israeli infantry, 

paratroops, artillery, and tanks to break open the Egyptian 

border defenses were forgotten in the euphoria of another armored 

exploitation to the Suez Canal. The technology of 1941 

half-tracks could not keep pace with the technology of 1961 

tanks, either under fire or across difficult terrain. The close 

and constant assistance of the Israeli Air Force made army air 

defense and field artillery seem unimportant, especially in fluid 

operations when the Air Force could arrive more quickly than the 

artillery could deploy. Consciously or otherwise, Israel came to 

rely largely on the tank-fighter-bomber team for its victories. 

Israel: The Failure of Combined Arms, 1967 to 1973 

Many of these trends continued and intensified after the 1967 

success. The Israeli armored force grew from nine armored and 

two mechanized brigades in 1967 to an estimated sixteen armored 

and four to eight mechanized brigades by 1973. The rest of the 

army remained relatively stable in size e Because Israeli 

doctrine regarded the tank as the best means of defeating other 

tanks, the Israeli Defense Forces refused an American offer to 

supply new TOW ATGMs.~~ 

Armor became the main avenue for promotion in the Israeli 

Army. Aside from the small number of paratroop units, no 

mechanized infantry officer could expect to command above company 

level without first qualifying as an armor officer, Israel 

distinguished between paratroop, conventional, and mechanized 

infantry, with the latter being part of armor branch, but having 

the lowest priority for quality recruits. Most conventional and 

mechanized infantry units were in the reserve, where they 

received less training and priority than tanks. For example, the 

three armored brigades located in the Sinai when the 1973 war 

began had all their tanks and crews at a high level of 

availability, but their mechanized infantry components were still 

in the unmobilized reserve. 

almost pure tank forces.lf7 

These brigades went into battle as 

As commander of the armor corps from 7969 to 1973, Maj. Gen. 

"Bren" Adan, the task force commander at Abu Agheila in 1956, 

tried to reverse these developments. He assigned higher quality 

recruits to the mechanized infantry forces of the Israeli Army, 

only to have those recruits seek reassignment away from such an 

unprestigious branch. Adan also tried to obtain large numbers of 

Ml13 armored personnel carriers to replace the dilapidated M3s. 

Upon becoming chief of staff in 1972, Gen. Israel Tal opposed 

this purchase. Tal argued that the true role of mechanized 

infantry, if it had a role, was to fight mounted, as in the West 

German doctrine. Although the Ml 13 was a considerable 

176 
improvement over the M3, neither vehicle had enough armor 

protection and firepower to act as the MICV Tal sought. The 

Chief of Staff therefore opposed spending scarce funds on a good 

but not perfect vehicle.l18 Israel continued to emphasize the 

tank and the fighter-bomber to the neglect of other arms. 

This neglect was also apparent in Israeli unit structures. 

Despite the great increase in the Israeli Army, all echelons 

above brigade remained ad hoc task forces , rather than deliberate 

designs to integrate an appropriate balance of arms. 

By contrast, the Egyptian Army carefully analyzed its 

weaknesses and strengths between 1967 and 1973. Indeed, one 

reason for its initial success in the 1973 war was that for the 

first time the Arabs initiated a war with Israel according to a 

detailed plan, rather than having Israel conduct a preemptive 

attack. Moreover, President Anwar Sadat recognized that a holy 

war to destroy Israel completely was impossible. In 1972 he 

appointed a new staff and commanders to plan a rational, limited 

war .49 

This staff recognized the same problems that Dayan had 

exploited since 1948. Egyptian leadership and control procedures 

could not react quickly to sudden changes in mission, and the 

Egyptian troops became demoralized rapidly in a maneuver battle 

where Israeli troops could bypass them and attack from unexpected 

directions. 

The classic World War II solution to this problem would be to 

prepare the troops psychologically to continue fighting when cut 

off and surrounded, and then develop a defense-in-depth to absorb 

Israeli armored attacks before they could penetrate. Yet the 

Egyptians recognized the lack of cohesion and mutual trust in 

their units and, therefore, sought a different answer to their 

problem. They planned to force the Israelis to attack Egyptian 

positions at a time and place of the Egyptians’ choosing. This 

would allow the Egyptian soldier to fight at his best, stubbornly 

defending his own position from frontal attack without worrying 

about his flanks or his fellow soldiers. To do this, the 

Egyptians planned a surprise attack across the Suez Canal, the 

line of contact between Egypt and Israel since the 1967 war. 

This attack would isolate the small Israeli outposts known as the 

“Bar Lev Line” along the eastern bank of the canal. Egyptian 

units that were not involved in this attack surrendered their 

ATGMs and surface-to-air (SAM) missiles to the assault echelons, 

who therefore had three times the normal complement of such 

weapons. The first waves of these well-armed troops rushed about 

four kilometers east of the canal and then set up defensive 

positions. When the local Israeli armored reserves 

177 
counterattacked to relieve the Bar Lev outposts, the 

missile-armed Egyptian infantry faced perfect targets of pure 

tank units without infantry or fire support. 

The decision to defend only a few kilometers east of the 

canal also enabled the Egyptians to seek shelter under the 

integrated air defense system that they had constructed with 

Soviet materials on the western bank. Israeli aircraft suffered 

heavily when they tried to support their armor inside the range 

of the Egyptian SAMs. 

The Egyptians also profited from the famous Israeli method of 

command, which depended on leaders operating well forward and 

communicating with each other in a mixture of slang and codewords 

on the radio. The Egyptian Army jammed many of the Israeli 

command nets and captured codebooks that enabled them .to 

interpret messages they could not jam. Moreover, Israeli 

commanders committed the classic mistake of becoming personally 

involved in local battles instead of directing their troops. On 

the night of 8 October 1973, the third day of the war, an Israeli 

brigade commander, battalion commander, and artillery commander 

all risked themselves to rescue personally the garrison of one of 

the outposts that had escaped to the east. Their involvement 

showed an admirable concern for the safety of their troops, but 

left them unable to coordinate and control the battle.50 

The Arab armies also made mistakes in 1973. In contrast to 

the carefully prepared Egyptian plan, Syria attacked on the Golan 

Heights in a rigid carricature of Soviet doctrine, with all units 

moving on a fixed schedule and no one assigned to mop up bypassed 

centers of resistance. Soviet advisors may have taught these 

tactics because they considered Arabs incapable of more 

sophisticated operations. Israeli armor fought these dense 

masses from prepared tank positions that minimized the target 

presented to the Syrians. The defenders moved between 

engagements, rather than leaving their positions to maneuver 

during a battle. Although hard pressed, the Israelis were able 

to halt and counterattack the Syrians, despite the tremendous 

initial advantage the Syrians had in numbers and surprise. Syria 

then appealed to Sadat for help, and thus on 14 October 1973 the 

Egyptians gave up most of their advantages by attacking eastward 

into Sinai, away from their prepared infantry positions and air 

defense umbrella. By this time, nine days into the war, all 

surprise was lost, and the Israeli forces in Sinai were fully 

mobilized and ready to fight.5' 

'In the ensuing days, the Israelis arrived at improvised 

solutions to their immediate problems. Airborne units functioned 

as conventional and even armored infantry, because of the low 

regard armored commanders had for their own mechanized infantry. 

178 
After counterattacking and crossing to the west side of the 

canal, the Israeli forces concentrated on eliminating Egyptian 

SAM sites, destroying the integrated air defense system, and 

thereby allowing the Israeli Air Force to provide more support. 

Still, the 1973 war completed the cycle in which the Israeli 

Defense Forces almost exactly repeated the experience of the 

German Wehrmacht in the use and misuse of mechanized forces. 

Like the Germans in World War I, the Israelis before 1956 had 

regarded tanks as specialized weapons that they could not afford 

to maintain. In 1956 a few armored experts like Col. Ben Ari 

showed the Israeli commanders the value of mechanized units for 

penetrating and disorganizing thin enemy defenses, just as 

Guderian had taught his seniors in 1939-40. Nineteen sixty-seven 

was the heyday of the Israeli blitzkrieg, but then, like the 

Germans before them, they came to rely on the main battle tank 

and the fighter-bomber to the neglect of the other arms. Once 

their Arab opponents developed more effective means of antitank 

and antiaircraft defense and adjusted their defensive systems to 

the threat of armor penetration, the Israeli commanders found 

mechanized operations almost as difficult as the Germans had 

found them in 1942-45. Blitzkrieg was still possible, but it 

required much greater combat power and much less reliance on 

psychological confusion than had been the case in earlier 

eampa igns . 

The Aftermath of 1973 

As the most significant mechanized war since 1945, the 4th 

Arab-Israeli War of 1973 attracted immense concern and study by 

all professional soldiers. The Israelis themselves were 

understandably reluctant to talk about the detailed problems they 

had encountered. The renewed Israeli interest in organic mortars 

for maneuver battalions and increased procurement of armored 

personnel carriers certainly indicated that they placed greater 

stress on the need for fire support and mechanized infantry to 

support their armor. 

At the time of the 1973 war, the U. S Army was just 

reorienting its doctrine and force structure to deal with the 

Soviet threat in Europe. It was therefore natural that the U.S. 

would seize upon the Israeli example as an indicator of future 

tactical problems. For much of the 1970s) the influence of 

Israeli experiences on the U.S. was evident in such areas as the 

great emphasis placed on ATGMs and on fighting from hull-down 

positions to wear down a numerically superior mechanized opponent. 

Yet the lessons of 1973 and indeed of the entire Israeli 

experience are sometimes obscure. First, the Israeli Army is 

organized and trained to fight only one type of war in a 
relatively narrow variety of terrain; conclusions about the way 

that the Israeli Army fights may not apply to some of the many 

possible situations for which the U.S. Army must prepare. 

Second, as noted above, the Egyptian defensive system along the 

Suez Canal in 1973 was an artificial one, carefully crafted to 

use concentrations of antitank and air defense weapons that were 

far above what any army in the world issues to its field units. 

Moreover, since 1973 the development of ceramic armor has made 

the shaped-charge warhead ATGM significantly less effective. 

Third, the Israelis played into Egyptian hands by neglecting 

combined arms organization and practice, producing artificially 

high tank losses that gave a mistaken impression about the future 

role of armor. 

What is clear from the 1973 war is that all weapons and arms, 

and especially high performance aircraft, are quite vulnerable on 

modern battlefields. This realization simply reinforces the need 

for mutual support by different weapons to negate the threats 

posed to other arms. To cite one obvious example, since 1973 

suppression of enemy air defense has become a much higher 

priority for ground units if they wish to have friendly rotary 

and fixed-wing aircraft support the ground battle. 

Thus in some ways, the experience of the Israeli wars 

revalidates the experience of World War II. Successful 

operations in mechanized warfare require not only combined arms 

organization, but also compatible equipment, so that all arms and 

services can move over the same terrain with the same degree of 

protection. Combined arms training must ensure that the 

different arms and the aviation assets can actually cooperate 

with each other on a complicated battlefield. ATGMs and air 

assault or army aviation units must be integrated into existing 

organizations and practices, instead of treated as special cases. 

180 
CONCLWSION 

Summary 

Prior to World War I, the various combat arms existed 

independently of each other, with very little doctrine or 

training in cooperation. Thoughtful professional soldiers 

frequently discussed the concept of combining the different arms 

for mutual support, but in practice such combination was the 

exception rather than the rule, at least below the level of a 

division or corps. In particular, there was profound 

disagreement over the organization and role of field artillery on 

the battlefield and the degree of cooperation needed between 

artillery and maneuver forces. Some armies, notably those of 

Germany and Japan, became aware of the importance of indirect 

fire to aid the infantry while protecting their own artillery 

from enemy fire. Other armies, especially the French, maintained 

the tradition of massed artillery in a direct-fire role to 

suppress enemy defenses at close range. 

More generally, professional soldiers were acutely conscious 

Of the effects of the new firepower developed during the previous 

century. However, even where official doctrine allowed for 

dispersion and maneuver to minimize the attacker's exposure to 

firepower, professionals felt compelled to accept the risks of a 

relatively dense attack. They believed that the need for a quick 

victory and the inadequate training of their conscript and 

reservist troops left few alternatives to such attacks. 

After an initial period of maneuver warfare in which prewar 

doctrine seemed to justify itself at least inpart, European 

nations gradually developed the elaborate trench systems of 

1915-18. Restoring mobility on the battlefield required a number 

of developments. First, all armies had to apply and refine 

procedures for indirect-fire support. Between 1915 and 1917, the 

British, French, and German field artillery learned how to place 

massed fire on any preplanned target, although targets of 

opportunity remained difficult to engage. Mapping and survey 

techniques, aerial and ground forward observer procedures, and 

concern for such variables as weather, ammunition production 

quality, and the wear of the gun tubes all became common. 

However, this preplanned fire was possible only because of a 

series of rigid phase lines and schedules of targets, with no 

means to change the firing once it began and little opportunity 

for the infantry to communicate with its supporting artillery. 

During the same period, infantry regained some of its 

firepower and mobility by developing the weapons and organization 

which have dominated that braneh ever since. Led by the French, 

European armies produced and issued mortars and rifle grenade 

181 
launchers for indirect fire, automatic rifles and light machine 

guns for mobile direct fire, and small caliber accompanyd.ng guns 

to reduce enemy strongpoints. With these weapons came the 

familiar infantry structures of today: a section or squad 

integrating rifles, grenade launchers, and an automatic weapon, 

and companies and battalions combining such maneuver elements 

with heavier support weapons. The German Army then mastered 

these new weapons and organization, giving infantry the tactios 

to advance or defend in a decentralized, flexible manner. The 

linear deployment of infantry that had been used to maximize 

firepower for three centuries was no longer necessary; the target 

that infantry presented to enemy fire was thus reduced. 

Developments In Allied artillery and infantry could not 

accomplish much without changes in command, control, and 

communications. Even if the artillery succeeded in suppressing 

the power of enemy defensive ,fires, the infantry had to struggle 

forward across No Man's Land with no means of communicating 

either with the guns or with higher headquarters. Long delays 

ensued while the advancing infantry sent runners and telephone 

messages up the chain of command and waited for decisions to come 

beck down that same chain. General officers had to command from 

the rear, because the inflexible nature of telephone 

communications and the poor visibility inside the trenches made 

control from the front almost impossible. Even when the 

commander was able to receive information and communicate in a 

timely manner, supplies, artillery, and reinforcements all had to 

cross zones of destruction produced by the attacker"s own 

artillery preparations. By contrast, the German defenders 

accepted the risk of allowing junior commanders on the spot to 

make independent decisions and even to commit the reserves of 

their parent units, thereby increasing the difference in 

decksion-cycle times between French and British attackers and 

German defenders. Hence the trenches largely immobilized 

opposfng armies, even when German infiltration tactics or the 

Allied artillery-infantry-tank-aircraft team achieved tactical 

successes. 

By 1918 most armies had come to imitate the German doctrine 

of defense-in-depth, leaving only lightly held outposts in the 

forward area and thereby absorbing enemy artillery preparations 

and infantry attacks forward of the intended main line of 

resistance. 

Nevertheless, the seeds of future combined arms attacks were 

present in 1918. German infiltration tactics in the west and the 

British cavalry exploitation in Palestine both acted as 

forerunners for the mechanized doctrine of thefr respective 

countries. 
Between the world wars a number of factors common to all 

nations hampered the development of such doctrine and practice. 

Anti-war sentiment, tight defense budgets, and the huge 

stockpiles of 1918 equipment all discouraged innovation. 

Confusing terminology, the extreme and contradictory claims of 

various abrasive but visionary theorists, and constant changes in 

technology also made it difficult for professional soldiers to 

develop a rational basis for changes in equipment, organization, 

and doctrine. Despite such problems, few armies stood still, 

although they varied in the exact compromise they reached along 

the long continuum between military conservatism and total 

mechanization. 

Great Britain could not afford to become so mechanized that 

its battalions were unable to function in the low intensity 

operations required to police the British Empire. This need for 

one army to fight in various types of war foreshadowed the even 

greater problems of the U.S. Army since 1945. For Britain 

between the wars, this restriction, plus the problems described 

above and a number of unfortunate experiments with mechanization, 

caused the nation that developed the tank to lose its lead In 

armored warfare during the 1930s. Instead, British armor 

developed in two divergen$ directions, a pattern repeated to some 

extent in the French and American armies of the same period. 

British armor and cavalry officers sought tanks that were lightly 

armed and armored, providing the mobility to function as armored 

cavalry both in Europe and the empire. On the other hand, slow, 

heavily armored tanks were still necessary to support the 

deliberate infantry attack. As a consequence, no British 

vehicles or armored organizations emphasized firepower. Even the 

British infantry, which improved its mobility somewhat by 

developing lighter and more effective weapons, lacked effective 

antitank capability in 1939. Only the Royal Artillery had such a 

capability, and it had neglected the indirect-fire experience of 

World War I. 

In Germany, the determination of Heinz Guderian and other 

visionaries, plus the limited support of Adolf Hitler, produced 

the panzer division. Guderian built a fully mechanized force in 

which all arms were integrated, although the service and 

maintenance elements were never as mobile as the units they 

supported. As in other armies, the traditional combat arms 

controlled some of Germany's mechanized equipment, but two-thirds 

of the available armored vehicles remained concentrated in the 

panzer divisions by 1939. Germany's first tanks were in some 

ways inferior to those of France and Britain, but the Germans 

produced such equipment several years before the hasty rearmament 

of their opponents. Thus, the panzer units had enough equipment 

in their hands before the war to train and experiment extensively. 
Prior to 1937, the lead in mechanized warfare belonged to the 

Red Army. From the Russian Civil War of 1918-21 to the present, 

the Soviets have been remarkably consistent in their doctrine. 

This doctrine envisioned a "deep battle" fought by combined arms 

mechanized formations that could rupture conventional enemy 

defenses and then simultaneously attack all echelons of that 

defense with artillery, paratroops, air strikes, and the maneuver 

of mechanized "mobile groups." However, the Red Army purge of 

1937-41 was a maJor factor which caused the Soviets to fall 

behind Germany, producing the ineredible unpreparedness that 

contributed to the initial German victories of 194142. 

If the Soviet Union was the most advanced in nilitary 

doctrine between the world wars, France was the most 

conservative. The French reserve system was inferior in quantity 

and quality to that of 1914, reinforcing French commanders in 

their belief that only methodical, set-piece operations of the 

World War I variety were possible. The same reserve system 

prompted the French government to construct the Maginot Line. 

The purpose of this line was not to hold the Germans 

indefinitely, but to act as a shield for French mobilization and 

as an anchor for French maneuvers in the low countries. The cost 

of the Maginot Line, the limitations of French industry, and the 

French distrust of elite standing armies all delayed the 

formation of armored divisions until the war began, denying 

French soldiers the experienee and training that their German 

counterparts had gained in the last years of peace. When Germany 

invaded France in 1940, French armor was largely dispersed in an 

infantry support role, or functioning as mechanized cavalry in 

Belgium, too far from the main German thrust to redeploy under 

the rigid Freneh command structure. In any event, France lacked 

sufficient troops to establish an effective defense-in-depth and 

maintain counterattack forees to repel German penetrations. 

The United States was heavily under French influence during 

the 192Os, but did develop new structures and doctrine in the 

following decade. The triangular infantry division gave the 

United States Army, at least on paper, a more mobile, responsive, 

and strategically deployable force than it had had in World War 

I. Unfortunately, the organizational concepts of that division 

required significant modification under the test of combat. Also 

during the interwar years, the U.S. Field Artillery School far 

outstripped its European competitors by inventing the fire 

direction center procedures that allowed massed artillery to 

concentrate rapidly on targets of opportunity. Such centralized 

and flexible fire direction has been a major advantage of all 

subsequent American field units. 

Germany's initial victories in 1939-41 defined blitzkrieg as 

the standard for mechanized combined arms. Although all armies 

184 
eventually developed the psychological and technical capability 

to react to the blitzla?ieg, the principles involved had 

considerable merit. The German panzer division was a combined 

arms mechanized formation in which the balance between the arms 

improved as the war progressed, and in which all elements had 

trained to regroup and reorganize to meet different conditions. 

The principal role of this force was exploitation, encirclement, 

and pursuit after a more conventional attack penetrated the enemy 

defenses on a narrow, concentrated frontage. This exploitation 

was not a random scattering of forces; German commanders strove 

to focus the actions of their subordinate mechanized units 

throughout the battle, seeking to disorganize and encircle the 

enemy forces. After the success of 1940, the limited German 

capability for close air support expanded to assist the ground 

units in such operations. 

In German hands, these tactics produced difficulties that 

were not Immediately apparent to observers. In their heyday, 

German tankers concentrated on exploitation, leaving antitank 

gum 9 not tanks, to defeat enemy armor. From 1942 onward, by 

contrast, the Germans redesigned thekr equipment to Put 

increasing responsibility on the tank-aircraft team for both 

penetration and antitank defense. When Germany's opponents 

developed effective antitank defenses and challenged German air 

superiority, this system fell apart. Germany denied the 

infantry, artillery, and other elements of the panzer force the 

production priorities that they needed to remain equal partners 

with the increasingly sophisticated German tanks. Moreover, 

limited transportation and maintenance assets had restricted the 

German force from the start, making sustained operations such as 

those in the Soviet Union a tremendous strain. 

Poor deployments, training, and command and control were 

largely responsible for the British and French defeat in 1940. 

The British response was to readjust both organization and 

training. Gradually infantry, armor, artillery, and antitank 

forces became equal partners in the British armored division at 

home, although the forces in North Africa were too pressed by 

combat to adjust until 1942. At the same time, Gen. Bernard 

Montgomery led a group of officers who used large-scale exercises 

to develop a common set of concepts and procedures for mobile 

warfare. Realizing that the British Army still had slow command 

procedures and considerable branch prejudices, Montgomery 

"stage-managed" large unit operations to ensure integration of 

all elements of the combined arms teams. The result, while much 

less responsive and fluid than the German battlegroups, at least 

enabled the British to use their forces to best advantage. 

The Soviet Union also had to change its organization and 

training in response to the German menace. German accounts of 

185 
the war in the east usually describe the Red Army during 1941-42, 

the period when Soviet leadership and staff procedures were 

poorest, and when the necessities of the moment forced the 

Soviets to abandon temporarily their prewar organization and 

doctrine. Beginning in 1942, however, the Red Army rebuilt its 

tank and mechanized forces and retrained its leaders to solve the 

problems of penetration and exploitation against the Germans. 

Popular German accounts rarely speak of these techniques, which 

became standard by 1944-45. In the deliberate attack, the 

Soviets used deception operations and selective massing on narrow 

frcrntages to achieve an overwhelming superiority at a few points 

even when they could not claim such superiority across the entire 

front. A wave of task-organized company- and battalion- sized 

units then initiated the offensive by fighting to develop 

information about the enemy and to occupy German outposts. 

Combined arms assault groups reduced specific strongpoints, while 

heavy tanks, medium tanks, assault guns, engineers, infantry, and 

artillery cooperated to push rapidly through the main German 

defenses. Once this penetration developed, combined arms forward 

detachments led the larger mechanized formations in rapid 

exploitation, seeking to preempt German efforts to organize a new 

defensive line. 

As remarked before, the U.S. Army entered the war with a 

triangular infantry division that was designed to adJust its 

combat power by frequent attachment and detachment of specialized 

units. Unfortunately, most commanders concluded that the 

infantry division was inc?apable of sustained attack or defense 

without such attachments under all oiroumstanees, Moreover, 

frequent changes in these attachments caused much inefficiency 

and misunderstanding between those attachments and the gainPng 

divisions. Thus, the U.S. infantry and armored divisions, 

although nominally small and strategically mobile, actually 

fought as larger formations because of the habitual attachment 

and as'sociation of nondivisional armor, antitank, antiaircraft, 

field artillery, and transportation assets, At least some of 

these attachments became organic to the division strudtures when 

the U,S. Army recognized the reality of its practice after the 

war. 

The other developments of World War II were obvious to 

everyone. The shaped-charge antitank warhead allowed all arms to 

acquire limited capacity to kill tanks with low-velocity guns and 

rockets. The demands of infantry units for long-range antitank 

defense and for armor support in the attack produced a number of 

tank surrogates, primarily armored assault guns. Most nations, 

including Germany, had considerable ,difficulties in aehieving 

effective air-ground cooperation, because air commanders saw only 

the inefficiency and 1Fmited destructive capacity of close air 

support, while ground commanders appreciated the rapid response 

186 
and psychological effect of such support. Although this issue 

did not prevent temporary cooperation between air and ground 

forces on the battlefield, air-ground problems were symptomatic of the larger difficulties of coordination and combination when 

all operations became joint service, and most combined the forces 

of more than one nation. 

Since 1945, the atomic bomb has called into question the 

entire role of land combat and has certainly made massing on the 

World War II model quite dangerous. In the 1950s and 196Os, the 

Soviet response to this new development was to organize and equip 

their ground forces for an armor-heavy exploitation, with 

penetration left to nuclear fires. Since the late I 960s) 

however, the Soviets have recognized the possibility of renewed 

conventional warfare and have restudied the lessons of World War 

II while restoring the balance of arms within their divisions and 

regiments. 

The U.S. Army, by contrast, faced challenges not only from 

nuclear warfare, but also from insurgencies and a variety of 

other conflicts around the world. The necessity to fight any war 

any place at any time with only a handful of divisions places a 

tremendous burden on American doctrine and organization, a burden 

rarely understood by America's allies or even the general 

public. The skeleton configuration 'of garrison forces in the 

later 1940s was inadequate to fight a limited conventional war, 

while the pentomic division structure of the 1950s lacked the 

flexibility of command and control required to fight in 

nonnuclear environments. The requirements of flexible response 

to a variety of possible threats go far to explain not only the 

ROAD structure, with its variety of strategic and tactical task 

organizations, but also the American emphasis on firepower to 

make up for inadequate forces and mobility kn different 

environments. Airmobility is another major new development that 

promises to give the U.S. Army both firepower and mobility on the 

battlefield, but only if the U.S. has the strategic 

transportation assets to move bulky helicopters and large amounts 

of supplies to an overseas battlefield. 

Today Israel and many of America's NATO Allies are not 

confronted with the prospect of conducting extended contingency 

operations outside of their own regions; they need only limited 

forces for such contingencies. Thus, the British, French, and 

German armies have tended to standardize on integration of 

mechanized assets at smaller unit levels, producing fixed 

organizations equivalent in size to an American brigade or 

armored cavalry regiment. Israel was also able to focus on a 

limited number of possible conflicts. The tremendous armored 

successes of 1967 and the lack of resources in a small nation led 

the Israelis to repeat the error of Germany in World War II, 

187 

-. -- 
relying on the tank and fighter-bomber to the neglect of the 

other combined arms. This error, plus the limited variety of 

terrain and threat that Israel faces, make generalizing lessons 

fram the Arab-Israeli wars to other future conflicts rather 

hazardous. 

Trends and. Principles 

Certain trends or principles recur in all these 

developments. Some of these trends are so self-evident that the 

military rarely discusses them, yet because they have survived 

the test of different technologies and armies over different 

periods, they merit some attention. 

First, major armies have tended to integrate more and more 

arms and services at progressively lower levels of organization, 

in order to combine different capabilities of mobility, 

protection, and firepower while posing more complicated threats 

to enemy units. Integration does not necessarily mean combining 

individual weapons or even companies of different arms together 

in a permanent organization in garrison; indeed, suoh a fixed 

structure would be almost as dangerous tactically as the current 

organization, because battalions and companies could not adjust 

the balance of weapons in response to varying terrain, enemy, or 

mission. To be effective the different arms and services must 

train together at all times, changing task organization 

frequently. When making such changes in task organization, 

however, it is more effective to begin with a large combined-arms 

unit, such as a division or fixed brigade, and select elements of 

that unit to form a speeifie task force, rather than to start 

with a smaller brigade or division and attach nondivisional 

elements to that formation. In the former case, all elements af 

the resulting task force are accustomed to working together and 

have a sense of unit identity that can overcome maw 

misunderstandings. In the latter ease, confusion and delay may 

oeeur until the nondivisional attachments adjust to their new 

command relationships and the gaining headquarters learns the 

capabilities and limitations of these attachments. Frequent 

changes in the partnership of units, especially changes that are 

not practiced in peacetime, till produce inefficiency, 

misunderstanding, and confusion. kly the need to adjust the 

proportion of arms to different tactical situations limits the 

degree to which those arms can be grouped together permanently. 

One corollary is that all arms and services need the same 

mobility and almost the same degree of armor protection as the 

units they support. Not only infantry, engineers, field 

artillery, and air defense, but also logistics units need to be 

able to go where the tank units go in order to conduct sustained 

operations. 

188 
Another corollary is that the arms must be balanced within an 

organization, grouped together to perform according to a 

particular doctrine. Units above battalion level in which one 

arm dominates the others numerically may be useful in certain 

circumstances, but lack flexibility. Similarly, specialized arms 

and elites of all kinds, like the tanks and tank destroyers of 

World War II, have special capabilities that must be balanced 

against their vulnerability when not supported by other arms. 

A fourth trend is the continuing problem of air-ground 

cooperation, Artillery and infantry learned to function together 

in World War I, and with much difficulty tanks, antitank weapons, 

engineers, and antiaircraft artillery joined that team during an3 

after World War II. Yet the aircraft is still not integrated 

into the combined arms team. In three wars since 1941, the U.S. 

Army and U.S. Air Force have had to develop ad hoc compromises 

and procedures for air-ground cooperation because their peacetime 

training and doctrine were always inadequate. To some extent, 

the development of the helicopter has been an army effort to 

acquire a capability that receives low priority in the air 

force. As General Howze argued at the time that the air assault 

team developed, 

We drew a parallel to the indirect fire support 

available to the infantry company commander. That 

gentleman had call on battalion 4.2-inch mortars, 

brigade 105mm howitzers, division 155~mm and eight-inch 

howitzers, and 240~mm howitzers. Even so, he would not 

give up that crummy little platoon of three 81-mm 

mortars that was part of his own company. For he had to 

ask no one's permission to use them--they were totally 

responsive, always available, a precious asset even 

though a small part of the total firepower backing up 

the infantry company.1 

The United States is not unique in suffering this problem; even 

the German Luftwaffe and army had similar disagreements during 

World War II. Until the legitimate concerns of both services are 

adjusted, air support of ground forces will remain a broken reed 

at the start of each new conflict. 

A final problem of combining the different arms and services 

is the difficulty of defense against enemy penetration. The 

Germans in 1915-17, the Allies in 1939-42, and the Egyptians in 

1956 and 1967 have all suffered in this regard. Few armies have 

the time and troops in peacetime to train in the establishment Of 

a true defense-in-depth, to prepare their troops psychologically 

as well as technically to continue to fight when penetrated and 

bypassed by enemy forces. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. Army 

189 
conducted such preparation as part of the ""Active Defense'$ 

doctrine in Europe, only ta be maligned by critics who considered 

that doctrine too oriented on defense and on firepower. If 

anything, however, the true test of an army's skill in combined 

arms is its ability to reorient and orchestrate the different 

arms under the pressure of a fast-moving enemy attack. 
Abbreviation used in the notes: 

CARL-U.S. Command and General Staff College Combined Arms 

Research Library, followed by the document call number. 

INTRODUCTION ENDNOTES 

1. 

2. 

3. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

LO. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

Gerald Gilbert, The Evolution of Tactics (London, 1907), 

183-84. 

John F. C, Fuller, The Foundations of the 'Science of War 

(London, 19251, 148. 

U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations 

(Washington, 1982), 7-4. 

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES 

Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 

rev. and enl. ed. (Bloomington, IN, 1973), 82. 

Ibid.. 132. 

Dennis E, Showalter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, 

Technology and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, CT, 

19761, 75-139. 

David- Woodward, Armies' of the World, 1845-1914 (New York, 

1978)) 30, 46, 74. Actual forces in maneuver units were 

about half the size of these totals. 

David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, 

19661, 351-63. 

The division structures discussed here are derived 

primarily from James E. Edmonds and Archibald F. Becke, 

History of the Great War: Military Operations France and 

Belgium, 1914, vol. I, 3d ed. (London, 1933), 6-7, 490-97. 

For Russian division organization, see A.A. Strokov, 

Vooruzhennye Sily i Voennoe Iskusstvo v Pervoi Mirovoi 

Voine [The Armed Forces and Military Art in the First World 

War] (Moscow, n.d.1, 142, 144-47, 588-89. On machine gun 

organization, see Wilhelm von Balck, Development of 

Tactics-World War, trans. Harry Bell (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

19221, 176. 

Pascal Lucas, L'Evolution des Ide’es Tactiques en France et 

en Allemagne Pendant la Guerre de 1914-1918, 3d ed. rev. 

(Paris, 19321, 29. 

Michael Howard, The France-Prussian War: The German 

Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (New York, 19691, 156-57. 

Lucas, Id&es Tactiques, 6; H. Burgess, Duties of Engineer 

Troops in a General Engagement of a Mixed Force, Occasional 

Papers No. 32, U.S. Army Engineer School (Washington, DC, 

1908), 20, 28-32. 

Howard, France-Prussian War, 85-117. 

Jonathan M. House, "The Decisive Attack: A New Look at 

French Infantry Tactics on the Eve of World War I," 

Military Affairs 40 (December 1976): 164-65. 

Balck, Tactics, 31. 

See, for example, S.L.A. Marshall, World War I (New York, 

19751, 76-88, 100-5. 

191 
14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21, 

22. 

23. 

1. 

2, 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

Henri Bonnal, La premiere bataille; le service de deux ans; 

Du carac&re chez les chefs; Discipline-Arm&e nationale; 

Cavalerie. (Paris, 19081, 59-60. 

House. "Decisive Attack,ff 165-67. 

Woodward, Armies, 30-33; Lucas, Idles Tactiques, 31-34. 

Wilhelm von Leeb, Defense, trans. Stefan T. Possony and 

Daniel Vilfroy (Harrisburg, PA, 1943), 62; Lucas, Id&es 

Tactiques, 6. 

Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British 

Arnvy Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945 (Boston, 1982), 

14. 

Robert H. Scales, Jr., '"Artillery in Small Wars: The 

Evolution of British Artillery Doctrine, 1960-1914"' (Ph.D. 

dissertation, Duke University 1976), 308-17. 

Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 10-11. 

Ibid., 17; Lucas, Id&es Tactiques, 37. 

Marshall, World War I, 44. 

Brodie and Brodie, Crossbow, 126, 

CRAPTER TWQ ENDNQTES 

Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. T. 

Bentley Mott (London, 19311, 16-17, 

Ibid., 80, 83. 

Lucas, Id&es Tactiques, 115. 

Ibid,, 55-58, 

Ibid.; 57-58, 103n; Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 101-7. 

Balck, Tactics, 244, 

Graeme C. Wynne, If Germany Attacks: The Battle in Depth in 

the West (London, 19401, 26, 30. 

John Mona&, The Australian Victories in France in 1918 

(New York, n.d.1, 124-25, 171-72. 

Ian V. Hogg, Barrage: The Guns in Action (New York, 19701, 

28. 

Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 19; Lucas, Ide/es Tactiques, 75. a The best account of this German defensive system remains 

Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 126-29, 202-12. See also 

Wynne's hThe Development of the German Defensive Battle in 

1917, and its Influence on British Defence Tactics,'" The 

Army Quarterly 24 (1937): 15-32, 248-66; Balck, Tacti= 

151-68. 

Wynne, '"The Development of the German Defensive Battle," 

22-27. 

Lucas, Idges Tactiques, 7.5-76; George C. Marshall, Memoirs 

of My Services in the World War (Boston, 19761, 61-63. 

Alan Clark, The Donkeys (New York, 1962), 77-82, 84-85, 

145-49. 

Brereton Greenhous, "Evolution of a Close Ground-Support 

Role for Aircraft in World War I,"' Military Affairs 39 

(February 1975): 22-28. 

192 
16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

Bryan Cooper, The Battle of Cambrai (New York, 19681, 

107-20; Greenhous, "Evolution," 25. 

George H. Raney, "Tank and Anti-Tank Activities of the 

German Army," Infantry Journal 31 (1927): 151-58. 

John Wheldon, Machine Age Armies (London, 19681, 24-26. 

See also Samuel D. Rockenbach, "Tanks" (Fort Meade, MD, 

1922), 17; Balck, Tactics, 130-31. 

Ian V. Hogg, The Guns, 1914-1918 (New York, 1971), 72-76. 

Balck, Tactics, 39-40, 181. 

Wynne, If Germany Attacks, 53-58; Lucas, Id&es Tactiques, 

109. 

John A. English, A Perspective on Infantry (New York, 

19811, 24-26; Lucas, Id&es Tactiques, 230-31. See also 

Lazlo M. Alfoldi, "The Hutier Legend," Parameters 5 (1976): 

69-74. 

Georg Bruckmiiller, The German Artillery in the 

Break-Through Battles of the World War, 2d ed. trans. by 

J.H. Wallace and H.D. Kehm (n.d.), 41, 44-46. 

Ibid., 49-50, 65-70, 73; S. L. -A. Marshall, World War I, 

346-47. 

Balck, Tactics, 186. 

U.S. War Department, General Staff, Historical Branch War 

Plans Division, A Survey of German Tactics, 1918 

(Washington, DC, 19181, 12. See also BruckmG'ller, 54, 

73-74; Robert R. McCormick, The Army of 1918 (New York, 

19201, 171. 

Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks, trans. by G.E. Kidde 

(Washington, DC, 19441, 177-204. 

John F.C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier 

(London, 19361, 253. 

John Terraine, To Win A War - 1918, The Year of Victory 

(Garden City, NY, 19811, 45, 55-57. 

This account of second Armageddon is based primarily on 

Cyril Falls, Armageddon, 1918 (Philadelphia, 1964) and on 

Archibald W. Wavell, The Palestine Campaigns, 2d ed. 

(London, 1929). 

Balck, Tactics, 188. 

Ibid., 259. 

Ibid., 37; Lucas, Id&es Tactiques, 299-300; Rene/ Altmayer, 

Etudes de Tactique G&&rale, 2d ed. (Paris, 19371, 20. 

U.S. War Department, General Staff, War College Division, 

Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the 

World War: American Expeditionary Forces, Divisions 

(Washington, DC, 1931), 446-47; George C. Marshall, 

Memoirs, 25, 61-63; John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the 

World War, Vol. I (New York, 19311, 1Oln. 

193 
CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES 

1. 

2, 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

Constance M, Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter 6. Roots, 

The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, The 

United States Army in World War II (Washington, 1955), 205. 

Edward J. Drea, Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical iombat, 

1939, Leavenworth Paper No, 2 (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19811, 

17-20; John J. T. Sweet, Iron Arm: The Mechanization of 

Mussolini's Army, 1920-1940 (Westport, CT, 19801, 49, 73, 

184. 

C* Serrg, Rapport Fait Au Nom de la Commission Charge/e 

d'Enqu@ter sur les Ev&ements survenus en France de 1933 a 

1945, Vol. 2, (Paris, 1947-51), 298-99, 313. 

Sweet, Iron Arm, 17; Harold Winton, "General Sir John 

Burnett-Stuart and British Military Reform 1927-1938" 

(Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 19771, 2-3, 

Comment by General Sir George Milne, Chief of the Imperial 

General Staff, on a I.926 FroFOSal for mechanized 

formations. Quoted in Kenneth Gacksey, The Tank Pioneers 

(London, 19811, 69. 

Fuller,.Memoi &, 318-41. 

Winton, ""Burnett-Stuart," 95, 198. 

Great Britain, War Office, Field Service Regulations, 

Volume II: Operations Cl9241 (London, 19241, 25; Great 

War Office 

Graham, Fire-Power, 261-74. 

Giffard LeQ. Cartel, In the Wake of the Tank (London, 

19351, 243, 251-55; Winton, Burnett-Stuart, 4. 

War Office, Field Service Regulations Volume II: 

Operations (19.24), 122-23; Great Britain, War Office, Field 

Service Regulations, Volume II: Operations (P9291, 117. 

Harte1, Ln 'the Wake, 147-48; Winton, '"Burnett-Stuart," 

198; Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 81, 

Cartel, In the Wake, 227-28, 

Ibid., 120-22; Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 99, 

Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 132-4; Winton, "Burnett-Stuart,'" 

341-64. 

Winton, 509 and passim; Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 139, 

180-81. 

G. MacLeod Ross, The Business of Tanks, 1933 to 1945 

(Infracombe, UK, 1976), 81-137. 

Helmut Kkotz, Les Le9ons Militaires de la Guerre Civile en 

Espagne, 2d ed. (Paris, 19371, 61-62, 85-93; Ross, 

Business of Tanks, 13C?-39; Nacksey, Tank Pioneers, 142, 

160-62. 

English, Perspective, 74-78; Bidwell and Graham, 

Fire-Power, 194-95. 

Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power, 164-65, 198, 

194 
21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

44. 

Heinz Guderian, 1940, quoted in Guderian, Panzer Leader 

(NY, 19521, 105. 

Germany, Ministry of National Defense, Command and Combat 

of the Combined Arms, (1921-231. Translated by U.S. Army 

General Service Schools (Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 19251, 107. 

Ibid., 23-24, 91, 116, 118. 

Kenneth Macksey, Guderian: 

1975), 6-10. 

Creator of the Blitzkrieg (NY, 

Guderian, Panzer Leader, 24. 

Charles Messenger, The Blitzkrieg Story (NY, 19761, 77-79. 

Macksey, Guderian, 65. 

Robert M. Kennedy, The German Campaign in Poland (19391, 

Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 20-255 (Washington, DC, 19561, 

28-30; Matthew Cooper and James Lucas, Panzer: The 

Armoured Force of the Third Reich (NY, 19761, 22-23. 

Kennedy, Poland, 28. 

Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in Support of 

the Army, U.S.A.F. Historical Studies No. 13 (Maxwell Air 

Force Base, AL, 19621, 33-36, 131-33. 

Cooper and Lucas, Panzer, 23. 

France, Minis&e de la Guerre, Instruction Sur 1'Emploi 

Tactique des Grandes Unite/s (Paris, 19361, 16. 

France, Ministere de la Guerre, Instruction Provisoire sur 

1'Emploi Tactique des Grandes Unitds (Paris, 1922), 23. 

Ibid., 24. 

Jeffrey J. Clarke, "Military Technology in Republican 

France: The Evolution of the French Armored Force, 

1917-1940" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 19691, 

94-97. 

Jean Baptiste Estienne, "Etude sur les missions des Chars 

blind& en Campagne," 25 May 1919, quoted in Georges Ferre', 

Le De/faut de 1'Armure (Paris, 19481, 34-47. 

Estienne, Confe'rence Faite le 15 F&rier 1920 sur les Chars 

d'hssaut (Paris, 19201, 37-38, 42. 

Messenger, Blitzkrieg Story, 89; Robert A. Doughty, "The 

Enigma of French Armored Doctrine, 1940," Armor 83 (Sep-Ott 

1974): 41. 

Charles de Gaulle, Vers l'Arme/e de Metier (Paris, [1934] 

1963), 97. 

Serrk, Rapport, Vol. 2, 377; Clarke, "Military 

Technology," 152; Robert Jacomet, L'Armement de la France, 

l-936-1939 (Paris, 19451, 123-26. 

Ferre', D&faut, 74-75. 

Ministgre de la Guerre, Instructions (1936), 16, 18, 21, 

23, 44, 46, 111, 154; Clarke, "Mili .tary Technology," 82. 

The Soviet concept of "Deep Battle" is summarized in David 

M. Glantz, "Soviet Operational Formation for Battle: A 

Perspective," Military Review 63 (February 1983): 4. 

Albert Seaton, Stalin as Military Commander (NY, 19761, 

62-63. 

195 
45. 

46, 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 

53. 

54. 

55. 

56. 

57. 

58. 

USSR, Commissariat of Defense, General Staff, Field Service 

Regulation, 1936 (Tentative) translated by U.S, Army War 

College (typescript 19371, 4-6, 83-84. 

A. Ryazanskiy, "The Creation and Development of Tank Troop 

Tactics in the Pre-War Period," Voyennyy vestnik, 1966, no. 

11: 25, 32. 

A. Yekimovskiy and N. Makarov, "The Tactics of the Red Army 

in the 1920's and 1930's,"' Voyennyy vestnik, 1967, no. 3: 

Il. 

John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War With 

Germany, Volume I (New York, 19751, 6, 19-20. 

Messenger, Blitzkrieg Store, 100. 

Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 18, 32. 

This accaunt of Khalkin-Go1 is based primarily on Drea, 

Nomonhan, 23-86. 

U.S. War Department, General Staff, War College, 

Provisional Manual of Tactics for Large Units (Washington, 

1922-23). 

U.S. War Department, General Staff, Field Service 

Regulations, U.S. Army, 1923 (Washington, 1923), 11. 

John J. Pershing, Wrapper Indorsement (Forwarding Report of 

A.E.F. Superior Board on Organization and Tactics) to 

Secretary of War, General Headquarters, ArEeF., 16 June 

1920; Fox Conner, letter to Major Malin Craig (concerning 

division organization), 24 April 1920, copy in U.S. Army 

Military History Institute. 

The primary sources for this discussion of the triangular 

division development are Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R, 

Palmer, and Bell I, Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The 

Organization of Ground Combat Forces. United States Amy 

in World War II (Washington, 19471, 271-78; Harry C. 

Ingles, "The New Division,' Infan --- 521-29; Janice E. MeKenney, Field Ari -~ ~- Series (Washington, 1980), 255-61; 

2d Division, "Special Report Based on Field Service Test of 

try Journal 46 (19391: 

:illery Army Lineage 

U.S. Army, Headquarters 

the Provisional- 2d Division, conducted by the 2d Division, 

U.S. Army, 1939," National Archives File 52-83. 

Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., Weapons and Equipment Evolution and 

its Influence Upon Organization and Tactics in the American 

Army From 1775-1963 (Washington, 1963), 61-67, 77. 

Blanche D. Gall, Jean E. Keith, and Herbert H. Rosenthal, 

The Technical Services: The Corps of Engineers: Troops 

and Equipment. United States Army in World War II 

(Washington, 19581, 10-20; Paul W. Thompson, Engineers in 

Battle (Harrisburg, PA, 1942). 

On the development of fire direction centers, see McKenney, 

Field Artillery, 266-73; Riley Sunderland, "Massed Fires 

and the F.D.C.," Army 8 (19581: 56-59. 

196 
59. 

60. 

61. 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

The primary sources for this discussion of U.S. armor 

between the wars are Timothy K. Nenninger, "The Development 

of American Armor, 1917-1940" (M.A. Thesis, University of 

Wisconsin, 19681, 55-188; James M. Snyder (ed.), History of 

the Armored Force, Command, and Center, Army Ground Forces 

Study No. 27 (Washington, 19461, l-17; Mildred H. Gillie, 

Forging the Thunderbolt: A History of the Development of 

the Armored Force (Harrisburg, PA, 19471, 37-178. 

Co11 et al., Engineers, 17. 

Frank D. Lackland, "Attack Aviation," student paper written 

at the Command and General Staff School (Ft. Leavenworth, 

KS, 1931); U.S. War Department, General Staff, FM 100-5: 

Tentative Field Service Regulations-Operations (Washington, 

19391, 22. See also Brereton Greenhous, "Aircraft Versus 

Armor: Cambrai to Yom Kippur," in Timothy Travers and 

Christon Archer (eds.) Men at War: Politics, Technology 

and Innovation in the Twentieth Century (Chicago, 19821, 96. 

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES 

This critique of the Polish campaign is based on Guderian, 

Panzer Leader, 65-82; Kennedy, Poland, 130-35; and Cooper 

and Lucas, Panzer, 25-28. 

Kennedy, Poland, 61-62. 

Cooper and Lucas, Panzer, 24, 27, 29. 

Kennedy, Poland, 28-30 and 133; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 89. 

Cooper and Lucas, Panzer, 27. 

J. L. Moulton, A Study of Warfare in Warfare in Three 

Dimensions: The Norwegian Campaign of 1940 (Athens, OH, 

19671, especially 61-63. 

James E. Mrazek, The Fall of Eben Emael (Washington, DC, 

1971). 

R. H. S. Stolfi, "Equipment for Victory in France in 1940," 

History: The Journal of the Historical Association, 55 

(February 1970): l-20. 

Ibid.; Ferre, Le Defaut, 185-95. 

Macksey, Tank Pioneers, 160-62. 

Guderian, Panzer&Leader, 98, 101-2. 

I. S. 0. Playfair, F. C. Flynn, C. J. C. Molony, and S. E. 

Toomer, The Mediterranean and Middle East: Vol. II: The 

Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally (1941). Historyof 

the Second World War (London, 1956), 175. 

Ibid. 

This 

deriv 

Hamil 

York, 

19451 

on ar 

Ham11 

; Ross, The Business of Tan&, 151. 

discussion of British developments after Dunkirk is 

ed largely from the following sources: Nigel 

ton, Monty: The Making of a General, 1887-1942 (New 

19811, 394-545; Martel, Our Armoured Forces (London, 

155-63, 199-201; and 

am, Fire-power, 230-34. 

75-181; English, Perspective, 

*;illery, Bidwell and Grah 

ton, Monty, 459-60, 533-55.. 

197 
16. 

17. 

18. 

19, 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23, 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

Martel, Our Armoured Forces, 159-61. 

Ibid., 379-80. The detailed organization is included in 

Great Britain, War Office letter number 2O/GENj6059 (S.D. 

11, dated 1 October 1942, CARL N-6136. 

Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.. 

I: The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941) 

(London, 19541, 261-68. 

On equipment in North Africa, see Playfair et al., The 

Mediterranean and Middle East, Qol, II, 13-14, 173, lr 

341-45; Vol. III, 27-28; U.S. War Department, General 

Staff, Military Intelligence Service, Artillery in the 

Desert, Special Series No. 6 (25 November 1942), 2-30; 

Macksey, Afrika Korps (New York, 1968>, 36, 39-41; Je A. I. 

Agar Hamilton and L. C. F. Turner, The Sidi Rezeg Battles, 

1941 (Cape Town, S.A., 

w,s, 

19571, 33-55. 

War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence 

Service, Special Bulletin No. 36: The Battle of Salurn, 

June 15-17, 1941 (Washington, DC, 19411, 26. 

Great Britain, Middle East Command, "Notes on Main Lessons 

of Recent Operations in the Western Desert,"" dated 10 

August 1942. Typescript copy by U.S, War Department, 

General Staff, Military Intelligence Service, in CARL, 

N-3915; Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, 

Vol. III, 213-14, 223-24, 254, 287. 

Hamilton, Monty, 653-54, 680-81. 

Ibid., 732-844. 

A. Eremenko, The Arduous Beginning fMoscow, nld.)l 12-22; 

U.S. War Department, General Staff, Military Intelligence 

Division, Special Bulletin No. 2: "Soviet-Finnish War: 

Qperatians From November 30, 1939, to January 7, 1940"@ 

dated 10 January 1940, 62 document 2657-D-1054. 

On Soviet reforms in 1940-41, see Erickson, Road to 

Stalingrad, 13-49; A, Yekimovskiy, "'Tactics of the Soviet 

Army During the Great Patriotic War,'" Voyennyy vestnik, 

1967, no. 4: 12. 

Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 32-34.. 

Guderian, Panzer Leader, 138; Coaper and Lucas, Panzer, 

40-42. 

Martin Van Greveld, Supplying War: Logistics from 

Waklenstein TV Patton (New York, 19771, 160-80; Daniel R. 

Beaver, "Polities and Policy: The War Department 

Motorization and Standardization Program for -Wheeled 

Transport Vehicles, 1920-1940, It Military Affairs 47 

(October 1983): POP; Guderian, PanzerLeader, 

The Soviet theory is summarized in N. Kobrin, '"Encirclement 

Operations," Soviet Military Review, 1981, no. 8: 36-39. 

Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 173; V,D. Sokolovskiy ted.), 

Soviet Military Strategy 3d ed., 

Fast Scott (New York, 19?;), 163. 

translated by Harriet 

198 
31. Erickson, 341, 358; A. Ryazanskiy, "Tactics of Tank Forces 

During the Great Patriotic War,'" Voyennyy vestnik, 1967, 

no. 5: 

32. Stalin's 

13-20; Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, 165. 

Order No. 306, 8 October 1942, captured and 

translated by the German- Army, retranslate4 by‘U.S. Army. 

Copy in CARL N-16582.256. E. Bolton, "Talks on the Soviet 

Struggle to Capture 

1967, no. 6: 45<. 

Art of War: 2, Strategic Defence, The 

the Initiative," Soviet Military Review, 

33. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 442. 

CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES 

1. This discussion of McNair's concepts is based on 

Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, Organization of Ground 

Combat Forces, 271, 273, 185. 

2. Ibid., 356-59. 

3. Ibid., 307. 

4. Ibid., 322-35; Snyder, History of the Armored Force, 

5. U.S. Army, European Theater of Operations, General 

"Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment 

Armored Division," Study No. 48 (Washington, DC, 

Appendix 1. 

29-43, 

Board, 

of the 

n.d.),. 

6. For an excellent nontechnical explanation of antitank 

7, 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

design factors, see John Weeks, Men Against Tanks: A 

History of Anti-Tank Warfare (New York, 19751, 12-16. 

Ibid., 100-2, 67-69; Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning 

Munitions, 355-61. 

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions, 388-90, 

402-4; Baily, Faint Praise, 12-38. 

U.S. Amy, European Theater of Operations, General Board, 

"Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of Tank 

Destroyer Units," Study No. 60. (Washington, DC, n.d.1, 

l-2, 10. 

Pave1 Rotmistrov, "Cooperation of Self-Propelled Artillery 

With Tanks and Infantry," Zhurnal brontetankovykh i 

mekhanizirovamykh voisk, 1945, no. 7: 8-13, translated by 

U.S. Department of the Army, G2, n.d.; K. Novitskiy, 

"Coordination Between Medium and Heavy Tanks in Offensive 

Combat," Tankist 1947, no. 9: 40-43, translated by U.S. 

Department of the Army, G2, n.d. Copies of both 

translations in Military History Institute. 

Green, Thomson, and Roots, Planning Munitions, 246-56, 

283-86; Cooper and Lucas, Panzer, 54 ff. 

Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Design and Development of Fighting 

Vehicles (Garden City, NY, 19681, 36. 

Army Regulation 850-15, cited in Green, Thomson, and Roots, 

Planning Munitions, 278. 

On the M4 Sherman, see ibid., 282-87 and 302-4; Baily, 

Faint Praise, iii, 7, 41-48. 

Ross, Business of Tanks, 213, 263-300. 

199 
16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26, 

27. 

28. 

29. 

301. 

31. 

32. 

33. 

On Ultra and its limitations, see Ralph Bennett, Ultra in 

the West: The Normandy Campaign, 1944-45 (New York, 19791, 

13-20; Patrick Beeslg, Very Special Intelligence: The 

Story of the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Centre, 

1939-1945 (London, 19771, 63-65, 110-11. 

F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F.G, Ransom, and R.C. Knight, 

British Intelligence In the Second World War: Its 

Influence on Strategy and Operations, Vol. I (London, 

19791, 144, 

Ibid.; Vol. II (London, 19811, 582-87, 739-46; 757-63. 

Anthony Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York, 1975), 

102-4. 

Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, VCFI. I, 148 ; 

Hamilton, Monty, Vol I, 777; see also Aikeen Clayton, E 

Enemy Is Listening (London, 1980); H.W. Everett, "The 

Secret War In the Desert," British Army Review 60 (December 

197%): 66-68. 

Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency (To 

December 1941), United States Army in World War II 

(Washington, DC, 1956), 118-20, 141-47, 178-85. 

Eisenhower letter to the General Board, 4 October 1945, 

reproduced in U.S, Army, European Theater of Operations, 

The General Board, '"Army 

Tactical Information Service," Study No. 18 (Washington, 

DC, n.d.), appendix. 

Vasili 1. Chuikov, The Fall of Berlin, translated by Ruth 

Risch (New York, 1968), 30-33. 

See, f Ol? example, S. Alferov, "Wartime Experience: 

Breakthrough of Enemy Defenses by a Rifle Corps )" 

",o,Y,;~;~s;l~i;seskiy zhurnal, 1983, No. 3: 53-56. 

Autumn Storm, 

(Ft. Leavenworth:KS, 1984). 

Leavenworth Paper No. 7 

On the development of forward detachments, see ibid., and 

N. Kireyev and N. Dovbenko, "From the Experience of the 

Employment of Forward Detachments of Tank (Mechanized) 

co;ps;" Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal 1982, no. 9: 20-27. 

Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in 

the East (Washington, DC, 1968), 17, 

Timothy A. Wray, Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine 

on the Russian Front During the Second World War (Ml%8 

Thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1983), 162, 221-35. 

Ibid-, 227, 273; U.S. War Department, Technical Manual E 

30-451, Handbook On German Military Forces, 15 Mar 1945 

(Washing&on, DC, 19451, II-$, II-14. 

Wray, Standing Fast, 275, 298-30 13. 

Ibid.; Guderian, Panzer Leader, 290-91; 249-51, 

Richard E. Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry (Oxford, UK, 19801, 

22. 

TM E 30-451, II-46 to X-51, IV-9 to IV-13. 
34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

44. 

45. 

46. 

47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

David M. Hazen, Role of the Field Artillery in the Battle 

of Kasserine Pass (MHAS thesis, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 19731, 

38-42, 77-79, 147, 174-75, 187; Snyder, History of the 

Armored Force, 17. 

Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, United States Army in 

World War I1 (Washington, DC, 19571, 92-95, 135, 375-76. 

This account of combined arms problems in Normandy is based 

on Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, United States 

Army in World War II (Washington, DC, 1961), 41-43, 208. 

U.S. Army Armor School, "Armor in the Exploitation," 

Student Project (unpublished, 1949), 60-61; CARL N-2146.74. 

Kent R. Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground 

Battle Team, Including Organic Light Aviation, AGF Study 

No. 35 (Washington, DC, 19481, 47. Much of this discussion 

of U.S. close air support is derived from this brilliant 

analysis. 

Ibid., 30, 43, 74. 

Ibid., 49, 53. 

Ibid., 58-67, 178-83, 87-92; U.S. Army, European Theater of 

Operations, General Board, "The Tactical Air Force in the 

European Theater of Operations," Study No. 54 (Washington, 

DC, 19461, 10, 15; Frederic C. Bergerson, The Army Gets an 

Air Force (Baltimore, MD, 1980), 29-37. 

Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 

III, 71, 241. 

Deichmann, German Air Force, 37-48. 

On British air-ground cooperation, see Bidwell and Graham, 

Fire-Power, 185-87, 260-75; W.A. Jacobs, "Air Support for 

the British Army, 1939-1943," Military Affairs 46 (December 

1982): 174-82; William Slim, Defeat Into Victory (New York, 

1961), 260, 337-38, 346. 

Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, Far East, Japanese Research 

Division, Japanese Night Combat (Tokyo, 1955), Vol. I, 8-15. 

Slim, Defeat Into Victory, 199, 337-38. 

Ibid., 249, 260-2, 321, 376, 409. 

James M. Gavin, Airborne Warfare (Washington, DC, 19471, 81. 

U.S. Army, European Theater of Operations, General Board, 

"Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of the 

Airborne Division," Study No. 16 (Washington, DC, 19461, 

20, 29-30. 

David M. Glantz, "Soviet Airborne Forces in Perspective" 

(unpublished, 19831, Chapter 2. 

Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Growl, The U.S. Marines and 

Amphibious War: Its Theory, and Its Practice in the 

Pacific (Princton, NJ, 19511, 3-4, 36-39, 59, 233, 334. 

20k 
CHAPTER SIX ENDNOTES 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12, 

13. 

A. Ryazanskiy, "Land Forces Podrazdeleniye Tactics in the 

Postwar Period,' Voyenny vestnik, 1967 No. 8: 15. 

John Erickson, "The Ground Forces in Soviet Military 

Policy," Strategic Review 4 (April 1976): 65. 

Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry 31; M.V. Zakharov (tad.) 50 

Let Vooruzhennykh sil SSSR (50 Years of the Soviet Airnx 

Forces] (Moscow, 19681, 483. 

Erickson, '"The Ground Forces," 66; David M, Glantz, "'Soviet 

Offensive Military Doctrine Since 1945," Air University 

Review 34 (March-April 1983): 27. 

U.S.) Department of the Army, Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Intelligence, Intelligence Research Project No. A-1729, 

"'Soviet Tank and Motorized Rifle Division" (Washington, DC, 

19581, 

S. Shtrik, "The Encirclement and Destruction of the Enemy 

During Combat Operations Not Involving the Use of Nuclear 

Weapons," Voyennaya mysl', 1968, No. 1: 279. 

Glantz, "Soviet Offensive Military Doctrine," 29; Kireyev 

and Dovbenko, "Forward Detachments," 20-27; R.Y. 

Malinovskiy and 0. Losik, 'Wartime Operations: Maneuver of 

Armored &sd Mechanized Troops," -Voyenno istoricheskiy 

zhurnal, 1980, no. 9: 18-25. 

Quoted in Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army 

Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, Leavenworth Paper No. 1 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 1979), 4; see also U.S. Army, European 

Theater of Operations, General Board, "Organization, 

Equipment, and Tactical Employment of Tank Destroyer 

Units," Study No. 60 (Washington, DC, n.d.1, 27-29; "Types 

of Divisions-Postwar Army," Study No. 

n.d.l, 8. 

17 (Washington, DC, 

"The New Infantry, Armored, and A/B Divisions," typed explanation and tables issued by Headquarters, U.S. Army 

Ground Forces, 24 January 1947, copy in CARL. 

George S. Patton, 1945, quoted in Ney, Evolution, 114. 

Comparison between Staff Officers‘ Field Manual 101-10 

(Tentative), U.S. Army Command and General Staff School, 

with changes to 1943; "Armored Division" table in '"The New 

Infantry, Armored and A/B Divisions;" and Greenfield et 

al., Organization, 320-21; see also U.S., Department of the 

Amy, The Armored School, "Armored Division Organizational 

and Manning Charts, TO&E 17N," Instructional Pamphlet No. 

G-2 (Fort Knox, KY, 19491, l-2. 

James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, 

United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC, 

19721, 54. 

T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: Korea: A Study in 

Unpreparedness (New York, 19641, 126-51. 

202 
14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

S.L.A. Marshall, Commentary on Infantry Operations and 

Weapons Usage in Korea, Winter of 1950-51, Operations 

Research Office Study ORO-R-13 (Chevy Chase, MD, 19511, 6-7. 

Ibid., 128-31; Marshall, “CCF In the Attack (Part II)" Operations Research Office Study ORO-S-34 (EUSAK) (Tokyo, 

19511, 7-18. 

S.L.A. Marshall, Operation Punch and the Capture of Hill 

440, Suwon, Korea, February 1951, Technical Memorandum 

ORO-T-190 (Baltimore, MD, 19521, 9-10, 43-44, 69. 

Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent -and Fighting Front, United 

States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC, 19661, 

119-21. 

S.L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man 

in Action; Korea, Spring, 1953 (New York, 1956), 47, 196; 

Hermes, Truce Tent, 370-72. 

Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force, 52; Hermes, Truce 

Tent, 325-28. 

Johll R. Galvin, Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile 

Warfare (New York, 1969), 254-56. 

Doughty, Evolution, 23. 

This discussion of the Pentomic Division is derived from 

Theodore C. Mataxis and Seymour L. Goldberg, Nuclear 

Tactics; Weapons, and Firepower in the Pentomic Division, 

Battle Group, and Company (Harrisburg, PA; 19581, 103-112; 

John H. Cushman, "Pentomic Infantry Division in Combat," 

Military Review 37 (January 1958): 19-30; Letter, U.S. 

Continental Army Command, 8 January 1959, Subject: Changes 

in ROCID TOE (U), with supporting CGSC documentation; CARL, 

N-17935.62-U. 

Letter, U.S. Continental Army Command, 13 January 1959, 

Subject: The Armored Cavalry Regiment (U>, and Letter of 

Instruction, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 

14 January 1959, Subject: DA approved Divisional Changes, 

with accompanying charts CARL N-17935.62-U. 

Doughty, Evolution, 19-25; Ney, Evolution, 75. 

Mataxis and Goldberg, Nuclear Tactics, 122; Galvin, Air 

Assault, 264. 

Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force, 80-106; Hamilton 13. 

Howze, "The Howze Board," Army Part I (February 19741, 

12-14. 

Howze, "The Howze Board," Part 11 (March 19741, 18-24, and 

Part III (April 19741, 18-24; Howze, "Tactical Employment 

of the Air Assault Division," Army (September 19631, 44-45, rn 

ZJ)L. 

Galvin, Air Assault, 280-87, 293; John J. Tolson, 

Airmobility, 1961-1971 (Washington, D.C., 19731, 51-59. 

Tolson, Airmobility, 25-28. 

Ibid., 32, 43-44; Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force, 

119. 

203 
31. 

32. 

33. 

34. 

35. 

36. 

37. 

38. 

39. 

40. 

41. 

42. 

43. 

44, 

45. 

46. 

Dave R. Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in 

Perspective (San Rafael, CA, 19781, 98-102; Galvin, Air 

Assault, 294-95. 

Tolson, Airmobility, 88, 102-4, 195, 201-2. 

Ibid., 120. 

This account of Lam Son 719 is based on U.S. Army, 

Headquarters, 1Olst Airborne Division (Airmobile), "Final 

Report-Airmobile Operations in Support of Operations Lam 

Son 719" (24 April 19711, Vol. I; CARL N-18430.56-A; 

Tolson, Air Assault, 236-52; Palmer, Summons, 238-43. 

1Olst Airborne Division, I-12, I-15, 

Ibid., I-52. 

Ibid., I-42 to I-43; Tolson, Airmobility, 251-52. 

Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry, 25; Jean Marzloff, "The 

French Mechanized Brigade and its Foreign Counterparts," 

International Defense Review 6 (April 1973): 178; Terry 

Gander, Encyclopedia of the Modern British Army, 2d ed. 

(Cambridge, UK, 19821, 17-23, 89. 

France, Ministeke de la Guerre, Ecole Superieure de Guerre, 

Etudes Op&ations ler Cycle, 1953-1954 (Paris 19531, Book 

I, Annex 3; Marzloff, "French Mechanized Brigade," 176-8; 

International Institute of Strategic Studies, "The Military 

Balance 1977-78," Air Force Magazine 60 (December 1977): 

80-81; Philippe C. Peress, "The Combined Arms Battalion 

Concept in the French Army," unpublished student study 

project, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1977, 

l-41, CARL N-13423.472; Ecole Superieure de Guerre, 

"Memorandum on Nuclear Weapons," undated, 1976 translation 

No. K-6556 by U.S. Department of the Army, Assistant Chief 

of Staff for Intelligence, 17-8. 

Peress, "Combined Arms Battalion," 1-41. 

Marzloff, "French Mechanized Brigade," 177-78; Edgar D. 

Arendt, "Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Non-U.S. Army 

Small Infantry Unit Organizations'" (Washington, DC, 19671, 

17-22. 

Moshe Dayan, Moshe Dayan: Story of My Life (New York, 

19761, 45-49, 97-98, 10‘0-20. 

Moshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York, 19661, 

34-5. 

This account of Abu Agheila in 1956 is derived from S.L.A. 

Marshall, Sinai Victory (New York, 19671, 94-140; and 

Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, The Israeli Army (New 

York, 19751, 148-49, 151. 

Avr aham Ad&, On the Banks of the Suez (San Rafael, CA, 

19801, 207-13. 

Trevor N, Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 

1947-1974 (New York, 19781, 231, 612-13; Edgard O'Ballance, 

No Victor, No Vanquished: the Yom Kippur War (San Rafael, 

CA, 19781, 55. 

204 
47. Adan, Banks of the Suez, 57; Jac Weller, "Armor and 

Infantry in Israel," Military Review 57 (April, 1977): 3-11. 

48. Adan, Banks of the Suez, 491-92. 

49. Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (New York, 19751, 

14-43, 208, 240-41; Charles Wakebridge, "The Egyptian Staff 

Solution," Military Review, 55 (March 1975): 3-11; Chaim 

Herzog, The War of Atonement: October 1973 (Boston, 19751, 

273; O'Ballance, No Victor, 115. 

50. Adan, Banks of the Suez, 141; Herzog, War of Atonement, 1%. 

51. Herzog, War of Atonement, 84-113; 205. 

CONCLUSION ENDNOTES 

1. Howze, "The Howze Board," Part II, 23. 

205 
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231 

Q U.S. QOVERNMENT PRINTINQ OFFICE: 1@93 755401162083 
ABOUTTHEAUTHOR 

:, * 

,) . . *.- i Captain lonathan M. House earned a bachelor’s 

degree at Hamilton College and a master’s and doctorate in European and Military History at the University of Michigan. He has since completed courses at 

the U.S. Army Armor School, the U.S. Army ln8telEigence 

Center and School, and the I1.S. Army Command 

and General Staff College. 

Captain House has taught at the University of 

Michigan, the Armor School, the Intelligence Center 

and School, and the Command and General Staff 

College. He has also served as a tactical intelligence 

officer in both the United States and the Republic 

of Korea. He wrote this survey while serving as a 

research fellow in the Combat Studies Institute of 

the Command and General Staff College. 

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Mission 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a separate, department-level 

activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for 

the purpose of accomplishing the folEowing missions: 

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the Army 

and publish and distribute the results of such research in a variety of formats to the Active 

Army and Reserve components. 

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at CGSC and assist other CGSC departments 

in integrating applicable military history materials into their resident and nonresident instruction. 

3. Serves as the TRADOC executive agent for the development and coordination of an integrated, 

progressive program of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system. 

4. Direct the CAC Historical Program. 

5. Supervise the Fort Leavenworth Museum.