Report to Congressional Committees

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 

April 2006 ELECTRONIC 

WARFARE 

Option of Upgrading 

Additional EA-6Bs 

Could Reduce Risk in 

Development of 

EA-18G 

GAO-06-446 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-446.

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and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li, 202-

512-4841, lia@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-446, a report to 

congressional committees 

April 2006

ELECTRONIC WARFARE 

Option of Upgrading Additional EA-6Bs 

Could Reduce Risk in Development of 

EA-18G 

EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy’s suppression of enemy air 

defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps 

through 2025-- as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted with 

upgraded electronics suites. The conclusion that the EA-6B inventory would 

be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy’s requirement for 90 

aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would meet the 

needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of systems using 

multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be required to support 

all of DOD’s electronic attack requirements. However, insufficient quantities 

of upgraded jamming systems means that the majority of the EA-6B fleet is 

equipped with the older jamming system that is limited in its ability to 

conduct numerous critical functions. If the Navy is required to support all 

services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate its EB-52 standoff 

jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the Improved Capability 

(ICAP) III upgrade. 

The risk of cost growth and schedule delays in the EA-18G program is 

increasing because the program is not following a knowledge-based 

approach to acquisition. None of its five critical technologies were fully 

mature as the system development phase began, and that is still the case 

today. Of particular concern is the ALQ-218 receiver, placed in the harsh 

wingtip environment on the EA-18G and not the more benign setting of the 

EA-6B’s tail, for which it was developed. While the EA-18G’s design appears 

stable, and almost all its design drawings are complete, that may change 

once the aircraft is flight-tested. Production of the EA-18G is also risky: Onethird of the total buy will be procured as low-rate initial production aircraft 

based on limited demonstrated functionality. 

EA-18G Mockup: F/A-18F Loaded with Jamming Pods 

Source: Copyright 2001 the Boeing Company. 

The EA-6B has conducted airborne 

electronic attack for all services 

since 1996. In 2002, the Department 

of Defense (DOD) completed an 

analysis of alternatives for the EA6B that concluded the inventory 

would be insufficient to meet the 

DOD’s needs beyond 2009. Since 

then, the services have embarked 

on separate acquisition efforts to 

develop airborne electronic attack 

assets. In 2003, the Navy started 

development of the EA-18G aircraft 

to replace the EA-6B. This report 

was done under the Comptroller 

General’s authority and assesses if 

(1) DOD’s 2002 conclusion that the 

EA-6B inventory would be 

insufficient beyond 2009 remains 

valid for assessing the Navy’s 

future needs, and (2) the 

acquisition approach used to 

develop the EA-18G is knowledgebased and might mitigate future 

risks. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

determine how many EA-6Bs with 

upgraded electronic suites are 

needed to deal with the existing 

and near-term capability gap, and 

consider procuring them. If DOD 

does this, it should cancel plans to 

end the electronic suite production 

line after 2006. If DOD outfits more 

EA-6Bs with upgraded electronic 

suites, it should restructure its EA18G low-rate initial production 

plans so that procurement occurs 

after the aircraft demonstrates it is 

fully functional. DOD partially 

concurred with our 

recommendations.
Page i GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 5 

Changes in Operational Concept and Upgrades Extend Operational 

Viability of the EA-6B, but Quantities Are Insufficient to Meet 

Identified Requirements 9 

EA-18G Program at Risk of Cost and Schedule Growth because It 

Is Not Following a Knowledge-Based Approach 13 

Conclusions 18 

Recommendations for Executive Action 19 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 22 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 23 

Related GAO Products 25 

Figures 

Figure 1: EA-6B Improved Capability III 6 

Figure 2: Service-Identified Airborne Electronic Attack System of 

Systems 8 

Figure 3: Current EA-6B Inventory Decline Projection Showing 

Fatigue Effects and Operational Attrition 11 

Figure 4: EA-18G Mock-up: F/A-18F Loaded with ALQ-99 Jamming 

Pods 14 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

Abbreviations 

AEA airborne electronic attack 

AoA analysis of alternatives 

CCS Communications Countermeasures Set 

DOD Department of Defense 

FRP full-rate production 

J-UCAS Joint Unmanned Combat Air System 

LD/HD low-density/high-demand 

LRIP low-rate initial production 

OPEVAL operational test and evaluation 

SAM surface-to-air missile 

SOJ Standoff Jammer 

SoS system of systems 

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Page 1 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

April 26, 2006 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

In conducting military operations, U.S. aircraft are often at great risk from 

enemy air defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The services 

use specialized aircraft to neutralize, destroy, or temporarily degrade 

enemy air defense systems through either electronic warfare or physical 

attack. These aircraft use electronic warfare jammers, which disrupt 

enemy radar and communications to temporarily suppress enemy air 

defenses. Other specialized aircraft use antiradiation missiles that home in 

on radars used by surface-to-air missiles or antiaircraft artillery systems to 

degrade or destroy them. Because specialized aircraft protect aircraft of 

all services in hostile airspace, the suppression mission necessarily 

crosses individual service lines. 

Over the past decade, we have issued several reports calling attention to 

the possibility that our nation’s ability to counter such defenses is being 

degraded. In 1996, for example, we reported that the Department of 

Defense (DOD) had decided to eliminate the F-4G and EF-111 suppression 

aircraft without first fielding comparable replacements. 1 Because no 

replacements were available, the Navy’s EA-6B aircraft became DOD’s 

only standoff radar jammer aircraft, providing suppression support for all 

services. In January 2001, we called attention to the acknowledged gap 

 1

 GAO, Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses May 

Be Too Low, GAO/NSIAD-96-128, (Washington, D.C.: April 10, 1996). 

 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

between the services’ suppression capabilities and their needs.2 The gap 

was a consequence of the increasing modernization of enemy air defenses 

that had outpaced DOD’s effort to improve its suppression capabilities. At 

that time, DOD stated that the analysis of alternatives (AoA) for airborne 

electronic attack (AEA) would provide a basis for its future strategy and 

lead to a balanced set of acquisition programs for the services. Urgency to 

complete such an analysis of alternatives was motivated by a projected 

shortfall of the EA-6B inventory, primarily caused by attrition, and the 

increasing cost of operating such aging aircraft. The study found that the 

EA-6B aircraft inventory was declining faster than had been projected and 

concluded that it would be insufficient to meet DOD’s needs beyond 2009. 

In November 2002 we recommended that a comprehensive strategy was 

needed to remedy the situation. 3 Since then, the military services have 

embarked on separate acquisition efforts to develop a future AEA system 

of systems (SoS) for DOD. In 2003 the Navy started development of the 

EA-18G aircraft to replace the EA-6B as its contribution to the DOD AEA 

SoS. 

We examined the analysis of alternatives and planned acquisition efforts to 

determine (1) whether the key conclusion that the projected inventory of 

EA-6Bs would be insufficient beyond 2009 for all services remains valid for 

projecting the Navy’s future needs and (2) whether the acquisition 

management approach to developing the Navy’s airborne electronic attack 

core component, the EA-18G, is knowledge-based and can help mitigate 

future risks. We conducted this work under the Comptroller General’s 

authority and are addressing the report to you because of your 

committees’ jurisdiction on these issues. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed the 2002 analysis of alternatives; 

pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents addressing the status of 

the EA-6B inventory; plans for maintaining them; status of EA-6B 

suppression capabilities; testing conducted for the EA-6B Improved 

Capability (ICAP) III program; the AEA system of systems; gaps in the 

AEA; and potential solutions for AEA. We interviewed officials from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Strategic Command (Offutt, Nebraska); 

Commander Electronic Attack Pacific Fleet (Whidbey Island); and officials 

 2

 GAO, Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppression of Enemy 

Air Defenses, GAO-01-28 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2, 2001). 

3

 GAO, Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for Suppressing Enemy 

Air Defenses, GAO-03-51, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25, 2002).
Page 3 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

responsible for requirements and programs for the Air Force, Navy, and 

Marine Corps. We interviewed personnel responsible for ICAP III 

electronic warfare testing at the Office of the Director, Operational Test 

and Evaluation (Washington, D.C.); Commander of Operational Test and 

Evaluation Navy (Norfolk, Virginia); and VX-9 personnel responsible for 

ICAP III testing at China Lake, California. We discussed airborne 

electronic attack issues and EA-18G development and production with 

contractor personnel at Boeing Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri and El 

Segundo, California. We discussed software matters with officials at China 

Lake and Point Mugu, California. We met with pilots at Patuxent River 

Naval Air Station; China Lake, California; Whidbey Island Naval Air 

Station, Washington; Fallon Naval Air Station, Nevada; and Boeing 

Corporation to discuss pilot workload issues, the nature of the threat, 

ICAP III testing, and tactics developed for AEA. As with our past work on 

the EA-18G development effort conducted under our annual assessment of 

selected major defense acquisition programs, we focused our work to 

determining whether the program was following a knowledge-based 

acquisition approach. We met with Navy EA-18G program officials 

currently involved with the development effort to document the maturity 

status of the aircraft’s critical technologies, and the status of its design 

effort and plans for producing the aircraft. We performed our review from 

May 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

The conclusion of the May 2002 AoA report that the EA-6B inventory 

would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy’s requirement 

for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would 

meet the needs of all services. The subsequent decision to move to a 

system of systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no 

longer be required to support all of DOD’s electronic attack requirements. 

As a result, EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy’s suppression of 

enemy air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine 

Corps through 2025—as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are 

outfitted with ICAP III electronics suites. However, insufficient quantities 

of upgraded jamming systems means that the majority of the EA-6B fleet is 

equipped with the older ICAP II jamming system, which is limited in its 

ability to conduct numerous critical functions. If the Navy is required to 

support all services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate its 

EB-52 standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the ICAP 

III upgrade. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

While the EA-18G program is currently on cost and schedule, the risk of 

future cost growth and schedule delays in the program is increasing 

because the development effort is not fully following the knowledge-based 

approach inherent in best practices and DOD’s acquisition guidance. A 

knowledge-based approach encourages managers to attain high levels of 

knowledge at key points to support investment decisions, ensuring, for 

example, that technologies are mature before starting development and 

that the design is stable before beginning manufacturing. The EA-18G 

entered system development without demonstrating that its five critical 

technologies had reached full maturity, and that is still the case today. 

Although three technologies are now very close to maturity, two have not 

been demonstrated as they will exist on the aircraft. While the EA-18G’s 

design appears stable, the potential for costly design changes remains until 

all its technologies are mature. Driven by the expected decline in the EA6B inventory, the program plans to make a decision to enter low-rate 

initial production in April 2007 to meet a required 2009 initial operational 

capability. DOD acknowledges that the EA-18G development schedule is 

aggressive. By adhering to this target, whose premise is no longer valid 

given the Navy’s projected needs; the development schedule is 

unnecessarily compressed. Further, one-third of the aircraft will be 

purchased during low-rate initial production based on limited 

demonstrated functionality. This could result in the need to retrofit 

already produced EA-18G aircraft, a possibility that the Navy is already 

anticipating. Software mature enough to test whether the aircraft is fully 

functional will not be available until after the production decision. A fully 

functioning EA-18G aircraft, one that meets or exceeds the upgraded EA6B ICAP III capability, will not complete operational testing until January 

2009–3 months before the projected full-rate production decision. 

This report recommends that the Secretary of Defense consider the option 

of procuring the necessary number of EA-6Bs equipped with ICAP III to 

deal with the existing and near-term capability gap. It also recommends 

that if DOD follows this course, the Secretary direct extension of ICAP III 

production for the EA-6B. It further recommends that if DOD acquires 

additional ICAP III capability, it restructure the EA-18G procurement so 

that it demonstrates the aircraft is fully functional before committing to a 

large low-rate initial production plan. In commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendations. DOD agreed 

that refinement of Navy Electronic Attack inventory is needed, but 

believes that it was premature to make a decision on ICAP III production 

until ICAP III inventory requirements are determined. Determination of 

this and other AEA issues are expected on September 15, 2006 after 

completion of an AEA study directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. 
Page 5 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

The four-seat EA-6B Prowler aircraft conducts missions for all services. 

The AEA mission is focused on protecting U.S. aircraft and ground forces 

by disabling enemy electronic capabilities. The EA-6B performs this 

mission with a complement of electronic receivers and jammers, referred 

to as its electronic suite, which are located on the aircraft structure and in 

external pods attached to its wings. A development effort is currently 

under way to replace the EA-6B with a two-seater electronic attack variant 

of the F/A-18F, designated the EA-18G Growler. 

The EA-6B joined the Navy’s fleet in January 1971. The EA-6Bs’s initial 

deployment was in 1972 over the skies of Southeast Asia. Since the early 

1990s, use of the EA-6B has steadily increased. In 1991 the aircraft was 

used in Operation Desert Storm and in support of Iraqi “no-fly” zones 

instituted after that war. In 1995, the EA-6B was selected to become the 

sole tactical radar support jammer for all services after the Air Force 

decided to retire its fleet of EF-111 aircraft. This decision resulted in 

increased use of the EA-6B. Since 1995 the Prowler force has provided 

AEA capability during numerous joint and allied operations against both 

traditional and nontraditional threats. It was used to provide support for 

Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and for peacekeeping operations over 

Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, and is currently being used against 

traditional and nontraditional target sets in support of ground forces. 

These capabilities continue to be demonstrated in the Global War on 

Terrorism, in which EA-6B operations in Afghanistan and Iraq protect 

coalition forces and disrupt critical communications links. 

There have been several upgrades to the EA-6B’s electronic suite since it 

was initially fielded to address increased threats faced by U.S. forces. The 

standard version, fielded in 1971, was quickly replaced in 1973 with the 

expanded capability EA-6B, which augmented the electronic 

countermeasure coverage of the aircraft. In 1977, the Improved Capability 

version entered service, and was followed by a more sophisticated ICAP II 

version, first deployed in 1984. The EA-6B/ICAP II featured updated 

receivers, displays, and software to cover a wider range of known 

surveillance and surface-to-air missile radars. As a result of heavy use and 

the limited inventory of the EA-6B, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that 

the inventory of EA-6Bs be managed as low-density/high-demand (LD/HD) 

assets. Low-density/high demand assets are force elements consisting of 

major platforms, weapon systems, or personnel that possess unique 

mission capabilities and are in continual high demand to support 

worldwide joint military operations. In 1998 an ICAP III upgrade was 

initiated to address capability gaps against threats from mobile surface-toair missile systems. In addition, concerns surfaced about an anticipated 

Background 
Page 6 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

decline in the EA-6B inventory because of structural fatigue issues. As a 

result, an AEA analysis-of-alternative was started in 1999 to find a 

replacement for the EA-6B. At that time it was anticipated that the EA-6B 

would remain in the inventory until at least 2015. 

Plans, as recently as December 2001, were to upgrade all 123 EA-6B 

aircraft in the inventory to the ICAP III configuration. The ICAP III 

provides rapid emitter detection, identification, geolocation, selective 

reactive jamming, and full azimuth coverage. Also, ICAP III-equipped EA6Bs will have the ability to integrate multiple EA-6Bs to match any threat 

density, and to control other manned or unmanned assets. The upgrade is 

needed to address capability gaps in the ICAP II electronic suite presently 

installed in EA-6B aircraft. The EA-6B ICAP III production line is currently 

scheduled to shut down after the fiscal year 2006 buy. 

Figure 1: EA-6B Improved Capability III 

The AoA report, published in 2002, concluded that an EA-6B replacement 

would be needed in 2009 to meet the services needs. The AoA further 

concluded that two components are needed to provide a complete AEA 

solution that is able to meet DOD’s collective needs. These two 

Source: U.S. Navy. 
Page 7 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

components are a recoverable “core” component and an expendable 

“stand-in” component. 

The AEA AoA report identified 27 platform combinations that were 

capable of delivering jamming support. The study concluded that the final 

AEA solution must address both anticipated short-term platform 

shortfalls, as well as how best to implement the follow-on capability based 

on the menu of alternatives developed by the AoA. In addition, the study 

concluded that before a service can begin a formal acquisition program, 

the discussion should consider, among other things, whether one service 

will provide all DOD core component capability, and whether the AEA 

core component will reside on a single platform. 

Subsequent to the AoA report, the Navy and the Air Force each decided to 

develop their own unique aircraft from the 27 platform combinations 

identified in the AoA to perform the core component of AEA, as shown in 

figure 2. The Navy opted to develop the EA-18G Growler, a derivative of 

the F/A-18F, as its core component. The Air Force decided to develop an 

electronic attack variant of the B-52, designated the EB-52 SOJ (Standoff 

Jammer), to function as its core component of the AoA solution and an 

unmanned combat air vehicle and an unmanned decoy as the expendable 

stand-in components of its AEA AoA solution. The Marine Corps opted to 

continue using the EA-6B with the ICAP III electronic suite in anticipation 

of an electronic variant of the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) being developed 

as a replacement for its EA-6Bs. The combination of these service AEA 

solutions is shown below in the DOD AEA system of systems. 
Page 8 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

Figure 2: Service-Identified Airborne Electronic Attack System of Systems 

Note: SAMs are surface-to-air missiles. 

As a result of these changes the services have updated a memorandum of 

agreement that would allow Navy expeditionary EA-6B squadrons to be 

decommissioned between fiscal years 2009 and 2012, to be replaced by 

U.S. Air Force electronic attack capability. The Navy’s aircraft would be 

dedicated to providing carrier-based AEA support to the Navy. The Navy 

determined that an inventory of 90 aircraft would be needed to support the 

Navy’s core component requirement. In 2001 it was projected that an 

inventory of 108 EA-6Bs would be needed if the Navy were to continue to 

provide AEA mission support to all the services. 

In February 2006, DOD proposed to terminate two major components of 

the system of systems: the B-52 Standoff Jammer system and the Joint 

Unmanned Combat Air System (J-UCAS). The goal of the B-52 SOJ 

program was to provide long-range jamming of sophisticated enemy air 

defense radars and communications networks, using high-powered 

jamming equipment. The Air Force believes that a standoff jamming 

capability is still required, and it is investigating the solution options, 

UCAS & MALD

Systems of Systems

Known SAMs SAM Range

Stand -off

Outside 

Defended Airspace

Penetrating Escort

Inside

Kinematic Range 

of Known SAMs

Stand -In

Inside

No Escape Range 

of Known SAMs

Mod-Escort

Inside

Defended Airspace

B-52

EA-6B

J- -J

EA-18G

F/A-18 E/F, F-22,

JSF AESA

Compass Call

Source: DOD. 
Page 9 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

platform numbers, and mix to deliver this capability. As part of the 

cancellation of the B-52 SOJ, the Air Force is investigating other solution 

options and platforms to provide the standoff capability, including 

examining how the B-52 SOJ cancellation affects Navy plans to retire the 

expeditionary squadrons of EA-6Bs. The goal of the J-UCAS program is to 

demonstrate the technical feasibility and operational value of a networked 

system of high-performance and weaponized unmanned air vehicles. 

The conclusion of the May 2002 AoA report that the EA-6B inventory 

would be insufficient past 2009 was not based on the Navy’s requirement 

for 90 aircraft, but on an inventory requirement of 108 aircraft that would 

meet the needs of all services. The decision to move to a system of 

systems using multiple aircraft types means the Navy will no longer be 

required to support all of DOD’s electronic attack requirements. As a 

result, EA-6B aircraft will be able to meet the Navy’s suppression of enemy 

air defense needs through at least 2017 and the needs of the Marine Corps 

through 2025 as long as sufficient numbers of the aircraft are outfitted 

with ICAP III electronics suites. If the Navy is required to support all 

services, given the recent Air Force proposal to terminate the EB-52 

standoff jammer program, additional EA-6Bs may require the ICAP III 

upgrade. 

According to program officials, the EA-6B ICAP III electronic suite 

upgrade was determined to be operationally effective and suitable in 2005 

and has proven to be significantly better than the ICAP II electronic suite 

that is currently in use on all but a few EA-6Bs. However, while the EA-6B 

inventory decline has been postponed, the planned number of aircraft that 

would receive the ICAP III electronic suite upgrade has been significantly 

reduced, leaving most EA-6Bs with a shortfall in electronic attack 

capability against some current and future threats. Production of the EA6B ICAP III upgrade is scheduled to end after the 2006 buy. 

Program officials said that DOD’s 2002 decision to move to a system of 

systems concept has reduced the inventory requirement for the Navy from 

108 aircraft to 90 aircraft. The Navy determined that an inventory of 90 

aircraft would be needed to support Navy’s core component requirement. 

An inventory of 108 EA-6Bs would be needed if the Navy were to continue 

to provide electronic attack mission support to all the services. The 

memorandum of agreement between the services, in which the EA-6B has 

been the sole provider of electronic attack since 1996, allows the Navy 

expeditionary squadrons to be decommissioned between fiscal year 2009 

Changes in 

Operational Concept 

and Upgrades Extend 

Operational Viability 

of the EA-6B, but 

Quantities Are 

Insufficient to Meet 

Identified 

Requirements 

System of Systems 

Decision Reduces the 

Inventory Requirement for 

the Navy 
Page 10 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

and 2012 and replaced by the U.S. Air Force’s EB-52 standoff jammer. 

However, the Air Force has recently canceled the EB-52 jammer. 

As shown in figure 3, the EA-6B inventory levels are now expected to be 

sufficient to meet the Navy’s requirement for 90 aircraft through at least 

2017 and the Marine Corps requirement for 31 aircraft through 2025. 

Procurement and replacement of 114 wing center sections for the EA-6B, 

begun in 1998, have been made on 94 aircraft and are ongoing. A few 

aircraft have received more than one wing center replacement because of 

heavy use. As a result, program officials identified the fatigue life of the 

fuselage as the determining factor in projected inventory levels. The 

official estimated life analysis of the EA-6B was conducted between 1984 

and 1988. The aircraft used in that analysis had 1,873 actual flight hours 

when the test began, and program management believes that factor was 

not considered in determining the current fuselage life limit. Program 

management has asked that updated fatigue life charts be developed based 

on this information. Program management predicts that this will result in 

an increase in fuselage life to 14,000 hours, as shown in the solid line in 

figure 3. In addition, according to program officials extended inventory life 

can be obtained by procuring 32 additional EA-6B wing center sections at 

an estimated cost of $170 million. This would result in an inventory of over 

90 EA-6Bs through 2019. This projected inventory is represented by the 

dashed line in figure 3. However, according to program officials, Northrop 

Grumman Corporation will wrap up wing center section production late 

this summer, and any new wing center section production would have to 

be placed on order this year to avoid additional startup and production 

break costs. 
Page 11 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

Figure 3: Current EA-6B Inventory Decline Projection Showing Fatigue Effects and Operational Attrition 

Note: Fatigue life is the number of cycles of stress and strain of a specific nature that a material will 

sustain before failure occurs. 

While the inventory of EA-6Bs is now projected to meet the Navy’s 

inventory needs through 2017, most of that inventory will be less able to 

address some current and future threats than recently anticipated. 

According to program documents, the ICAP II tactical jamming system, 

currently installed on most EA-6B aircraft, is limited in its ability to 

conduct numerous critical functions. Its receivers and integrated 

connectivity are limiting factors in the ICAP II’s ability to detect, locate, 

and react to threat systems. Threat systems have become more 

sophisticated and incorporate advanced technology, severely limiting 

current ICAP II equipped EA-6Bs’ receivers’ ability to detect and identify 

threats. The ICAP III upgrade, at an estimated cost of $11.7 million per 

aircraft for the last four upgrades, provides selective reactive jamming 

capability; accurate emitter geolocation; full azimuth coverage; and a 

flexible command and control warfare core system that can integrate and 

coordinate multiple EA-6Bs to match any threat density, as well as the 

ability to integrate and control other manned or unmanned command and 

Electronic Suite Upgrade 

Is More Capable, but 

Quantities Are Insufficient 

to Meet Requirements 

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

120

20052006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

20132014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

20302031

20322033

20342035

2036

2037

20382039

2040

2041

Number of aircraft

Source: U.S. Navy.

Year of inventory

Without 32 additional wing center sections

With 32 additional wing center sections

Inventory drops below 

Navy requirements

Inventory drops below

Marine Corps requirement
Page 12 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

control warfare assets. Program officials project that a lower unit cost 

could be achieved if higher quantities are procured. 

Recent operational test and evaluation (OPEVAL) results for the EA-6B 

equipped with the ICAP III electronic suite have determined it to be 

operationally effective and suitable. Since these results, Navy operations 

and training units have flown and observed two EA-6B squadrons 

upgraded with ICAP III and found the upgrade to be significantly more 

capable than EA-6B aircraft equipped with the ICAP II electronic suite. 

According to Navy users who flew the EA-6B with ICAP III during a recent 

training detachment, the ICAP III system demonstrated a 30 percent 

increase in jamming effectiveness over the ICAP II. More data on the 

superior performance of ICAP III relative to the ICAP II system will 

become available as results from its first deployment, which just recently 

occurred, develop. 

Although the ICAP III-equipped EA-6Bs have been found to be significantly 

more capable, the numbers of aircraft that are funded to receive the ICAP 

III upgrade has been reduced compared with earlier DOD intentions to 

fully upgrade all EA-6Bs. Currently 14 EA-6B aircraft have been funded to 

receive the ICAP III upgrade, because of funding reductions, development 

test results, and the decision in 2003 to replace the EA-6B with the EA18G. 

According to Navy and Marine Corps requirements officials, fitting only 14 

EA-6Bs with ICAP III is not sufficient to allow for the transition to the EA18G without leaving them with an airborne electronic attack capability 

shortfall against some current and future threats. They believe that 

between 21 (to meet the Navy requirement) and 31 (to meet the Marine 

Corps requirement) EA-6Bs should be fitted with ICAP III to address this 

shortfall. However, an analysis provided by the EA-6B program office 

concluded that 44 ICAP III aircraft would be needed to meet both Navy 

and Marine Corps requirements. We have not validated the number of 

aircraft Navy and Marine Corps officials identified as needed. Because of 

recent decisions affecting Air Force electronic attack near-term 

capabilities, additional EA-6Bs may be needed if the Navy is tasked to 

support the electronic attack requirements of all services beyond 2010. 

However, increasing the number of EA-6Bs with ICAP III will not be an 

option if ICAP III production ends in 2006 as currently planned. 
Page 13 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

The EA-18G development schedule is aggressive according to program 

officials and the DOD Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s 2005 

annual report. While the program is currently on cost and schedule 

according to program officials, our analysis shows that the program is not 

fully following the knowledge-based approach inherent in best practices 

and DOD’s acquisition guidance, thus increasing the risk of cost growth 

and schedule delays. In addition, we have found that most research and 

development cost growth is reported after a program has passed the 

critical design review--the acquisition phase the EA-18G recently entered. 

Over the last several years, we have undertaken a body of work examining 

weapon system acquisition in terms of lessons learned from best system 

development practices. Successful programs attain high levels of 

knowledge in three aspects of a new product or weapon: technology, 

design, and production. If a program is not attaining high levels of 

knowledge, it incurs increased risk of problems, with attendant cost 

growth and schedule delays. The EA-18G airborne electronic attack 

program entered system development with immature technologies, and 

some of these technologies are still not mature. Also, while most of the 

design drawings are complete, it is possible that redesign may be needed 

in the future as the technologies mature. In addition, the Navy plans to 

procure a large percentage of the total EA-18G aircraft during low-rate 

initial production based on limited knowledge of the aircraft’s ability to 

perform the electronic attack mission. This could result in the need to 

retrofit already produced EA-18G aircraft, shown in mock-up form in 

figure 4, a possibility that the Navy is already anticipating. 

EA-18G Program at 

Risk of Cost and 

Schedule Growth 

because It Is Not 

Following a 

Knowledge-Based 

Approach 
Page 14 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

Figure 4: EA-18G Mock-up: F/A-18F Loaded with ALQ-99 Jamming Pods 

According to program officials, the EA-18G program is currently on cost 

and schedule. While it held its critical design review in April 2005, it is now 

in the phase where most research and development cost growth is 

recognized and reported. We recently reviewed the development cost 

experience of 29 programs that have completed their product development 

cycle--the time between the start of development and the start of 

production.4

 We found a significant portion of the recognized total 

development cost increases of these programs took place after they were 

approximately halfway into their product development cycle. These 

increases typically occurred after the time of the design review of the 

programs. The programs experienced a cumulative increase in 

development costs of 28.3 percent throughout their product development. 

Approximately 8.5 percent of the total development cost growth occurred 

 4

 The 29 programs include ATIRCM/CMWS, AEHF, AESA Radar, AIM-9X/Air to Air Missile, 

ATACMS BAT, B-1B CMUP, Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 Upgrade, CH-47F, CEC, EELV, 

F/A-18E/F, F-22A, GMLRS Tactical Rocket, JASSM, JDAM, JPATS, JSOW, Longbow Hellfire, 

M1A2 Abrams, MCS, MM III GRP, MIDS-LVT, NAS, SDB, Strategic Sealift, Stryker Family of 

Vehicles, Tactical Tomahawk, Tomahawk TBIP, and V-22. The average design review is 

based on 21 of the 29 programs that either reported a critical design review date in the 

annual Selected Acquisition Reports or was provided to us by program officials. 

EA-18G Program Has 

Entered the Acquisition 

Phase Where Most Cost 

Growth is Reported 

Source: Copyright 2001 the Boeing Company. 
Page 15 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

up until the time of the average critical design review. The remaining 19.7 

percent occurred after the average critical design review.5

Our work shows that the demonstration of technology maturity by the 

start of system development phase is a key indicator of achieving a match 

between program resources (knowledge, time, and money) and customer 

requirements. We recently reported that the cost effect of proceeding into 

product development without mature technologies can be dramatic.6

Research, development, and test and evaluation costs for programs that 

started development with mature technologies increased by an average of 

4.8 percent, while those that began with immature technologies increased 

by an average 34.9 percent. 

In December 2003, after a truncated concept exploration phase, the EA18G was approved to enter system development, in order to achieve a 2009 

initial operational capability date directed by the Chief of Naval 

Operations. Prior to entering system development, the program office 

assessed the readiness of the EA-18G’s technologies and concluded that 

the system was not developing or advancing any new technologies and 

that only proven systems with minor modifications using mature 

technologies would be utilized. In addition, program officials stated that 

the EA-18G development benefited from the maturity of the F-18F 

platform and the airborne electronic attack suite currently flown on the 

EA-6B. 

Our assessment of the technology maturity of the EA-18G, however, differs 

from that offered by program officials. Over the last few years, we have 

reported on the system’s progress in our annual assessment of selected 

major defense acquisition programs. We have reported that at the start of 

system development7

 none of the program’s five critical technologies were 

fully mature, and as recently as our March 2005 report this had not 

 5

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs

GAO-06-391 (Washington, D.C., March 2006). 

6 GAO-06-391. 

7

 Milestone B-the stage of system development focused on reducing integration and 

manufacturing risk; ensuring operational suitability and reducing the logistics footprint; 

implementing human systems integration; designing for producibility; ensuring 

affordability and protection of critical program information; demonstrating system 

integration, interoperability, safety, and utility. 

Potential for Cost Growth 

and Redesign Because of 

Technological Immaturity 
Page 16 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

changed.8 While they are similar to the mature technologies found on the 

EA-6B and the F/A-18F, integrating those technologies on the EA-18G 

involves form and fit challenges. Three of the critical technologies--the 

ALQ-99 jamming pods, the F/A-18F aircraft, and the tactical terminal 

system--are approaching full maturity; two other technologies—the 

communications countermeasure set and the ALQ-218 receiver--are less 

mature. 

The Communications Countermeasures Set (CCS) provides 

communications detection and processing to the EA-18G. Among other 

things, it is used to degrade the effectiveness of the communications 

components that make up enemy integrated air defense systems. The 

existing set used on legacy EA-6Bs is out of production, and a replacement 

system is needed for use in the EA-18G. The new one is to be composed of 

new components, and it will function in a new environment. We believe 

that putting the CCS into the space constraints of the EA-18G platform 

may be a challenge and thus should be considered a technology risk to the 

program. 

The EA-6Bs fitted with ICAP III have a new technologically mature 

receiver, the ALQ-218, which is housed in the large space on the aircraft’s 

vertical tail. The ALQ-218 receiver for the EA-18G, however, is being split 

and redesigned so it can be integrated into the aircraft’s smaller wingtip 

pods. The wingtip environment is also known to be harsh, with noise and 

vibration that are known to be particularly severe and can degrade the 

reliability of receiver components. Isolators will be used in an attempt to 

lower the vibration levels. Since the ALQ-218 antenna elements will be 

subject to flexing of the wing that could reduce system performance, 

accelerometers will be placed in the wingtip pods to measure relative 

movement between the wingtips so that accurate threat locations can be 

made. In addition, many subcomponents also include new and modified 

parts, so the receiver’s performance and delivery schedule are being 

tracked as risks to the program. Furthermore, the unique ALQ-218 wingtip 

covers, or radomes, have recently surfaced as potentially problematic. 

There are technical risks with the radome’s electrical characteristics and 

environmental specifications--especially its ability to withstand hail strike 

requirements. The radome is being tracked as a high risk to the program 

because it may not meet a performance requirement. Flight tests on the 

 8

 GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs, 

GAO-05-301, (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005). 
Page 17 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

EA-18G to measure the impact of noise and vibration on completed 

components will not start until February 2007. The performance of the 

ALQ-218 radome will not be known until flight tests that demonstrate its 

capability are conducted later this year. The maturity of the full ALQ-218 

will not be fully known until the EA-18G aircraft completes flight tests 

with these components during developmental testing scheduled to start in 

April 2008. 

The design of the EA-18G appears stable because almost all of its design 

drawings are complete. However, the order in which knowledge is built 

throughout product development is important to delivering products on 

time and within costs. Our past work has shown that knowledge gaps have 

a cumulative effect. For example, design stability cannot be attained if key 

technologies are not mature. Until all the EA-18G critical technologies 

demonstrate maturity, the potential for design changes remains. While the 

program held its system-level critical design review in April 2005, flight 

tests will be needed to verify the loads and environment used for some of 

these designs and determine the maturity of the critical technologies. 

The EA-18G production decision scheduled for April 2007 will be based on 

limited demonstrated functionality. The initial capability demonstrated in 

support of the production decision will be less than that of the ICAP III on 

the EA-6B. Four EA-18G aircraft will be built to conduct operational tests 

during the system development and demonstration test phase. The Navy 

plans to procure an additional one-third, or 30, of the EA-18G aircraft 

during low-rate initial production (LRIP), at an estimated cost of $2,297.1 

million for the two low-rate initial production lots in fiscal year 2007 and 

fiscal year 2008. This low-rate initial production quantity is significantly 

higher than the recommended DOD acquisition target of 10 percent. The 

program does not plan to demonstrate through flight tests a fully 

functional production representative prototype until testing in April and 

May of 2008. In addition, program plans call for procuring 56 EA-18G fullrate production (FRP) aircraft to achieve the procurement objective of 90 

aircraft. As a result, full funding for 56 of the 90 EA-18G aircraft and 34 of 

the 56 airborne electronic attack suites will be committed prior to the 

completion of operational testing and evaluation.9

 This creates a risk, 

acknowledged by the program office, that redesign and retrofitting may be 

 9

 The EA-18G is composed of the aircraft and an airborne electronic attack suite. 

Production Decision Based 

on Limited Demonstrated 

Functionality, and Initial 

Capability Provided Will 

Be Less than That of EA6B ICAP III 
Page 18 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

needed, since it will not be known how effective and suitable the EA-18G 

will be or what changes are required until after those tests are completed. 

The EA-18G requirements are to meet, and in some cases exceed, those of 

the EA-6B ICAP III, adding an air-to-air intercept capability and the ability 

to communicate while jamming. However, according to program 

documents the first operational test, scheduled to be completed in 

February 2007, 2 months before the low-rate initial production decision, 

will demonstrate a much more limited capability, primarily the ability to 

radiate a simple, single-source jamming assignment and the ability to 

receive, identify, and display limited simple emitters. Test results 

demonstrating full ICAP III equivalent capabilities will not be available 

until the operational evaluation scheduled to be completed in January 

2009, 3 months before the projected full-rate production decision, when 

the third and final software release will be available for testing. 

The test plan is driven by software development, and the EA-18G software 

will be available for testing in three releases, or builds. Software is on the 

critical path to program completion and will provide the functionality that 

is available for testing before each production decision. While the program 

officials responsible for managing the software appear to be tracking all 

major cost, schedule, and quality markers, software development is still 

considered a moderate risk. Problems or delays in the initial software 

releases could affect the start of the operational evaluation. Even before 

that, the current software development schedule will not allow the 

program to demonstrate that the EA-18G system can fully function until 

after the program office has committed to producing all 30 of the low-rate 

initial production aircraft. Under the current schedule, operational testing 

of the final software release needed to demonstrate the desired 

functionality of EA-18G aircraft will not be completed until January 2009 – 

3 months before the projected full-rate production decision. 

Should the Air Force decisions to terminate its EB-52 jammer and JointUnmanned Combat Air System programs stand, the airborne electronic 

attack framework that arose after the 2002 analysis of alternatives will not 

materialize as planned. These decisions and the emergence of irregular 

threats place an added burden on the Navy’s EA-6B and EA-18G airborne 

electronic attack assets and may result in an even larger gap in DOD’s 

capability. 

A reduction in plans to upgrade Navy EA-6B with ICAP III electronic suites 

creates a transition shortfall in capability until the EA-18G becomes 

Conclusions 
Page 19 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

operational. Potential delays in the EA-18G development and testing effort 

would only aggravate this shortfall. The EA-18G development schedule is 

based on a premise--EA-6B inventory will not be sufficient beyond 2009--

that is no longer valid for assessing the Navy’s future needs. The inventory 

of EA-6B aircraft is now projected to be sufficient to meet Navy and 

Marine Corps needs for another decade or longer. In addition, the 

compressed and aggressive schedule, a direction given to the program 

office, does not allow decision makers to benefit from the demonstration 

of knowledge at critical junctures, a proven mitigator of risk. 

The availability of EA-6B aircraft allows DOD to consider an alternative to 

its current strategy. After determining how it will fulfill the warfighter’s 

needs and address capability shortfalls, DOD could outfit additional EA-6B 

aircraft with upgraded ICAP III electronic suites. This option is made 

possible by the successful integration of the ICAP III electronic suite with 

the EA-6B aircraft and structural improvements. However, this would 

necessitate not closing production of these electronic suites in 2006, as 

presently planned. 

To mitigate the effects accruing from the shortfall in upgraded EA-6B 

aircraft, the risk of delay in the development of the EA-18G, and the 

proposed cancellation of the EB-52 jammer and the Joint-Unmanned 

Combat Air System, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the 

following two actions: 

• Determine the number of EA-6Bs equipped with ICAP III electronic 

suites necessary to deal with the existing and near-term capability 

gaps. 

• Consider procuring this necessary number of ICAP III upgrades. If 

DOD implements the option, we recommend that the department 

• continue the EA-6B ICAP III production line after the fiscal year 

2006 buy, and 

• restructure its EA-18G low-rate initial production plans so that 

procurement of the aircraft occurs after the aircraft has 

demonstrated full functionality. 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. The 

comments appear in appendix II. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense determine the necessary number of EA-6Bs equipped with ICAP 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 20 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

III electronic suites to deal with the existing and near-term capability gap. 

DOD agreed that the Navy’s airborne electronic attack inventory needs 

review and has directed a study of department wide airborne electronic 

attack forces to be issued on September 15, 2006. However, it is unclear 

from DOD’s response if the department's review will specifically identify, 

as we recommended, the necessary number of ICAP III-equipped EA-6Bs 

needed to address the existing and near-term capability gap. In light of the 

end of planned ICAP III production this year, DOD needs to identify this 

specific number, as it is a necessary prerequisite to our second 

recommendation. 

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary 

of Defense consider procuring the determined number of ICAP III 

upgrades and that if DOD takes this option, the department (1) continue 

ICAP III production and (2) restructure the EA-18G low-rate initial 

production plans so that the procurement of the aircraft occurs after the 

aircraft has demonstrated full functionality. Regarding the first part of our 

recommendation, DOD agreed that it should consider procuring the 

required ICAP III upgrades, as determined by the ongoing airborne 

electronic attack review, but stated that it is premature to make a decision 

until the ICAP III inventory levels are determined. We agree that such 

determination is a prerequisite and have so stated in our first 

recommendation. However, that determination needs to be completed 

before the ICAP III production line ends in fiscal year 2006. With regard to 

the second part of our recommendation, DOD stated that the current EA18G low-rate initial production plan provides the best balance of risk and 

cost to expeditiously meet warfighters’ needs. We remain concerned that 

producing EA-18G aircraft before testing demonstrates that the design is 

mature unnecessarily increases the likelihood of design changes that will 

lead to cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. In the 

past, Congress has raised concerns about the costly outcomes of highly 

concurrent development and production efforts that are not "flying before 

buying." Starting production before flight tests demonstrate the full ICAP 

III equivalent capability works as intended places the $2,297.1 million lowrate initial production investment at significant risk. The procurement of 

additional ICAP-III-equipped EA-6Bs would allow the time to properly test 

the EA-18G before making a production decision and reduce the risk of 

costly retrofitting of the initially produced EA-18Gs. Therefore, we 

continue to believe that our recommendation should be implemented. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, and 

Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Director, Office of 
Page 21 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

Management and Budget. We will provide copies to others on request. This 

report will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or any of your staff have any questions on matters discussed in 

this report, please contact me on (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our 

offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Principal contributors to this report were David 

Best Assistant Director, Jerry Clark, Robert Ackley, Michael Aiken, Judy 

Lasley, Chris Miller, and Robert Swierczek. 

Allen Li 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 22 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

To determine if the key conclusion reached in the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) May 2002 airborne electronic attack (AEA) analysis of 

alternatives (AoA)--the projected inventory of EA-6Bs would be 

insufficient beyond 2009--is still valid, we interviewed officials in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Strategic Command (Offutt, 

Nebraska); the Commander Electronic Attack, Pacific Fleet (Whidbey 

Island); and officials responsible for Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 

AEA requirements. We interviewed personnel responsible for Improved 

Capability (ICAP) III electronic warfare testing at the Office of the 

Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (Washington, D.C.); 

Commander of Operational Test and Evaluation Navy (Norfolk, Virginia); 

and VX-9 personnel responsible for ICAP III testing at China Lake, 

California. In addition to the reviewing 2002 AEA AoA, we reviewed 

pertinent DOD, service, and contractor documents addressing the status of 

the EA-6Bs inventory, plans for maintaining the status of EA-6B 

suppression capabilities, testing conducted for the EA-6B ICAP III 

program, the AEA system of systems, gaps in the AEA, and potential 

solutions for AEA. 

To determine whether the acquisition management approach to the Navy’s 

airborne electronic attack core component, the EA-18G, is knowledgebased and can help forestall future risks, we reviewed pertinent DOD, 

service, and contractor documents addressing the status of the EA-18G 

development effort. We discussed airborne electronic attack issues and 

EA-18G development and production with contractor personnel at Boeing 

Corporation in St. Louis, Missouri and El Segundo, California. We 

discussed software matters with officials at China Lake and Point Mugu, 

California. We met with pilots at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, China 

Lake, Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, Fallon Naval Air Station, and 

Boeing Corporation to discuss pilot workload issues given the transition to 

the two-seat EA-18G from the four-seat EA-6B. As with our past work on 

the EA-18G development effort conducted under our annual assessment of 

selected major defense acquisition programs, we focused our work to 

determining whether the program was following a knowledge-based 

acquisition approach. We met with Navy EA-18G program officials 

currently involved with the development effort to document the maturity 

status of the aircraft’s critical technologies, the status of its design effort, 

and plans for producing the aircraft. 

We performed our review from May 2005 through March 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

Page 23 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

Page 24 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 
Related GAO Products 

Page 25 GAO-06-446 Electronic Warfare 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs. 

GAO-06-391. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006. 

Military Readiness: DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and 

Potential Risks in Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for 

Selected Equipment. GAO-06-141. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon 

Programs. GAO-05-301. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD's Revised Policy Emphasizes Best Practices, 

But More Controls Are Needed. GAO-04-53. Washington, D.C.: 

November 10, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to 

Improve DOD's Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. 

GAO-04-393. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004. 

Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Still Needed for 

Suppressing Enemy Air Defenses. GAO-03-51. Washington, D.C.: 

November 25, 2002. 

Electronic Warfare: Comprehensive Strategy Needed for Suppressing 

Enemy Air Defenses. GAO-01-28. Washington, D.C.: January 3, 2001. 

Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities Poses 

Challenges. GAO/NSIAD-00-164. Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2000. 

Combat Air Power: Joint Assessment of Air Superiority Can Be 

Improved. GAO/NSIAD-97-77. Washington, D.C.: February 26, 1997. 

Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses May Be Too Low. GAO/NSIAD-96-128. Washington, D.C.: 

April 10, 1996. 

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making 

Program and Budget Decisions. GAO/NSIAD-96-177. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 1996. 

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