NO. 03-15-00078-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS, 

AT AUSTIN, TEXAS

CHRIS BELL, 

Appellant

v. 

REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION,

Appellee. 

On Appeal from the 261st Judicial District Court, Travis County

Honorable Judge Dietz Presiding

APPELLEE’S BRIEF

HUSH BLACKWELL LLP HANCE SCARBOROUGH, LLP 

Elizabeth G. Bloch Terry L. Scarborough

State Bar No. 02495500 State Bar No. 17716000

Heidi.bloch@huschblackwell.com TScarborough@hslawmail.com

Thomas H. Watkins V. Blayre Pena 

State Bar No. 20928000 State Bar No. 24050372 

Tom.watkins@huschblackwell.com BPena@hslawmail.com

111 Congress Avenue, Suite 1400 400 W. 15th Street, Ste. 950 

Austin, TX 78701 Austin, TX 78701 

Telephone: (512) 472-5456 Telephone: (512) 479-8888 

Facsimile: (512) 479-1101 Facsimile: (512) 482-6891 

 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

CHRIS BELL REPUBLICAN GOVERNORS 

ASSOCIATION

ACCEPTED

03-15-00078-CV

5234933

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

5/11/2015 3:24:10 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 5/11/2015 3:24:10 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
2

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53.2(a), the parties to the 

judgment at issue in this appeal are:

APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Chris Bell Trial Counsel

Randall B. Wood

Doug W. Ray

Ray & Wood

2700 Bee Cave Rd. #200

Austin, Texas 78746

Counsel on Appeal

Elizabeth G. Bloch

Thomas H. Watkins

Husch Blackwell LLP

111 Congress Ave., Ste. 1400

Austin, Texas 78701

APPELLEE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Republican Governors Association Trial and Appeal Counsel

Terry L. Scarborough

V. Blayre Pena

Hance Scarborough, LLP

400 W. 15th Street, Ste. 950

Austin, Texas 78701
3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL .................................................2

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...............................................................4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................6

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ...................................7

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ............................................................8

SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE... .....................................................9

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES.....................................................10

I. Standard of Review..........................................................10

II. Bell did not object to or otherwise controvert RGA’s evidence in

support of the reasonableness of its attorney’s fees. Accordingly, fees

may be awarded as a matter of

law.................................................................................................11

III. Bell’s argument has no basis in law or

statute..........................................................................13

1. The Texas Election Code and Texas’ statutory interpretation law 

do not support Bell’s 

argument...................................................................13

2. Appellant cites to no case law which supports his position..........15

3. Case law supports the award fees to RGA............................17

4. The award of fees to RGA does not violate public interest.........18

CONCLUSION..............................................................................20

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE......................................................21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................22
4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 212 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2006, no pet.) .............................................................................................................. 10

Aquaduct, L.L.C. v. McElhenie, 116 S.W.3d 438, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2003, no pet.) ................................................................................................................ 10

Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998) ................................................ 10, 11

EMC Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 167 S.W.3d 406, 418 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005,

pet. denied) ................................................................................................................................ 10

Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997) ................................................... 10

Hoelscher v. Kilman, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 1351, 18 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 

16, 2006, no pet.) ..................................................................................................................... 12

Hunsucker v. Fustok, 238 S.W.3d 421, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, 

no pet.)......................................................................................................................................... 12

In re Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. 2007) ................................................................. 16

In the Interest of L.M.M., 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7191, 43 (Tex. App.—Austin

2005, no pet.) ............................................................................................................................ 10

Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014) (quoting

Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009)............ 13

Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 619 (Tex. 2007) ...................................................... 11, 15

Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996)......................... 16

Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 49 (Tex. 2000) ............................................................ 19

Petroleum Analyzer Co. LP v. Olstowski, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5581, 66 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.)........................................................................ 12

Phillips & Akers, P.C. v. Cornwell, 927 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)....................................................................................................... 10

Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990) ........... 12
5

Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989) ............................................. 15

Samlowski v. Wooten, 332 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011) ........................................................ 16

Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871 (Tex.

App.—2010, pet. denied) ............................................................................................... 17, 18

Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Lazy Nine Mun. Util. Dist., 198 S.W.3d 300,

318-19 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. denied) ..................................................... 18

Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas, 244 S.W.3d 

629 (Tex. App—Austin 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part in other grounds, 354 

S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010) ................................................................................................. 16, 17

Tull v. Tull, 159 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) ...................... 10

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) ............................................... 11, 15

Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) ........................ 11

Zapata County Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 90 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) ............................................................................ 10

Statutes

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.008 ........................................................................................ 14

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 18.001(b) .................................................................................... 12

TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 253.131 – 253.133; §§ 254.231-32 ............................................... 19

TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 253.131(e) and 254.231(d) .............................................................. 11

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.323(b) .............................................................................................. 14
6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case: Chris Bell (“Bell” or “Appellant”), a Democratic 

nominee for governor of Texas in 2006, brought suit 

against the Republic Governors Association (“RGA” or 

“Appellee”) alleging violations of the Texas Election 

Code. This is the second appeal from that case. In the 

first appeal, this Court correctly ruled that the RGA did 

not violate the Texas Election Code, and as such reversed 

a bench trial judgment in Bell’s favor. Republican 

Governors Assoc. v. Bell, 412 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2013, pet. denied). This Court also remanded the 

case for the limited purpose of determining whether to 

award attorney’s fees to the RGA. The trial court 

ultimately did award attorney’s fees to RGA, and this 

appeal followed.

Trial Court: The Honorable John Dietz of the 261st Judicial District 

Court, Travis County, Texas.

Trial Court’s Actions: Upon remand, RGA filed its Motion for Attorney’s Fees

relying on previously submitted evidence in support of 

fees pursuant to an agreement between the parties. Bell 

did not object to or otherwise controvert the evidence. 

The court then entered a Final Judgment awarding the 

RGA $300,000.00 in attorney’s fees and conditional fees 

upon appeal.1

 

Related Action: Prior appeal: Republican Governors Assoc. v. Bell, 412 

S.W.3d 42 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. denied).

 1 See Appellant’s Brief, Appendix A
7

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument is not necessary. The only issue on appeal is a 

straightforward one regarding the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. Contrary 

to Appellant’s position, there are no policy concerns at play, as this appeal requires 

nothing more than the standard abuse of discretion review applying the plain 

language of the statutes under which attorney’s fees were awarded. Accordingly, 

oral argument is not necessary to assist the Court in determining the outcome of 

this appeal.
8

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

RGA does not generally disagree with Bell’s Statement of Facts subject to 

the following exceptions. First, it is RGA’s position that this Court’s decision in 

the First Appeal turned on a correct reading of the statutes at issue, as opposed to 

Bell’s assertion that it turned on a “novel legal issue.” Additionally, clarification is 

necessary as to the procedural history of the attorney’s fees evidence relied upon 

by the trial court. During the first trial on this matter, the parties agreed that they 

would submit evidence of their respective attorney’s fees post-trial, which they 

did.2

 Bell did not object to or controvert RGA’s evidence of fees. Upon remand 

RGA filed its Motion for Attorney’s Fees relying on the previously submitted 

evidence of its reasonable attorney’s fees3 pursuant to an agreement between the 

parties.4

 Once again, Bell did not object to or controvert the evidence.

 2 First Appeal CR 574-78, 840-973 and 974-78; First Appeal RR 58-59.

3 CR 6 – 193.

4 CR 196 (Rule 11 Agreement providing that the Parties “stipulate and agree to the admissibility” 

of the affidavit and exhibits submitted by RGA in support of Motion for Attorney’s Fees “both as 

to the amount and reasonableness of past trial and appellate fees, and the amount and 

reasonableness of future appellate fees.”).
9

SUMMARY OF THE RESPONSE

Bell incorrectly argues that the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees 

constitutes an abuse of discretion under the relevant statutes because his original 

claim was “colorable,”5 and as such the only just and equitable exercise of 

discretion under the applicable guiding principles is that RGA should have not 

been awarded any fees.6 However, the relevant statutes do not require the court to 

make such determinations when exercising its discretion. To the contrary, the only 

requirement of an attorney’s fee award under the statutes in question is that it be 

reasonable. Bell did not object to or otherwise controvert RGA’s attorney’s fee 

evidence as to the reasonableness of its fees, and as such it was within the trial 

court’s discretion to award RGA its attorney’s fees as a matter of law. 

Accordingly, there can be no abuse of discretion in making such award. 

 5 Appellant’s Brief p. 2.

6 Id. at p. 10.
10

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

I. Standard of Review7

An award of attorney’s fees must be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 

standard. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); EMC

Mortgage Corp. v. Davis, 167 S.W.3d 406, 418 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet.

denied). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable,

and without reference to guiding principles. Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441,

446 (Tex. 1997). However, there is no abuse of discretion where an award of 

attorney’s fees is supported by the evidence. See In the Interest of L.M.M., 2005

Tex. App. LEXIS 7191, 43 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); Tull v. 

Tull, 159 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). 

Further, when reviewing a trial court's decision under an abuse of discretion

standard, the court of appeals must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the trial court's ruling and indulge every presumption in its favor. Aquaduct, L.L.C.

v. McElhenie, 116 S.W.3d 438, 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no

pet.); Phillips & Akers, P.C. v. Cornwell, 927 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). The judgment must be affirmed if it can be 

7 Note that a line of cases exists which could be interpreted as requiring a mandatory award of 

fees to RGA. See Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 212 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. 

App.—Austin 2006, no pet.); Zapata County Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp., 90 

S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied). While RGA is not raising this issue 

for the purposes of this appeal, nothing in this appeal should be taken as a concession by RGA 

that those cases and their holdings do not apply to an award of fees under Texas Election Code 

sections 253.131 and 254.231. 
11

upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence. Worford v. Stamper,

801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). A trial court abuses its discretion 

when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, not when it 

simply exercises that discretion in a different manner than reviewing appellate 

courts might. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 620 (Tex. 2007). The Court may 

not reconsider the facts and substitute its judgment for the judgment of the trial 

court. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992).

II. Bell did not object to or otherwise controvert RGA’s evidence in

support of the reasonableness of its attorney’s fees. Accordingly, fees

may be awarded as a matter of law.

Texas Election Code sections 253.131 and 254.231 both read in relevant part 

as follows: “Reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the suit may be awarded to the 

defendant if judgment is rendered in the defendant’s favor.”8

 In this case judgment 

was rendered in RGA’s favor.9 Thus, if the award of fees to RGA was reasonable

then there has been no abuse of discretion.

The reasonableness and necessity of an award of fees is a question of fact. 

Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21. However, although what constitutes reasonable

attorney's fees is a question of fact, clear, direct, and uncontroverted evidence,

even evidence from an interested witness, will establish that attorney's fees sought

are reasonable and necessary, particularly where the opposing party had means and

 8 TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 253.131(e) and 254.231(d). 9 CR 189.
12

opportunity to disprove the testimony but failed to do so. Ragsdale v. Progressive

Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1990); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code

§18.001(b). In such instances, attorney’s fees may be awarded as a matter of law. 

Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882.

The record is clear that the evidence submitted by Defendant as to the

reasonableness of its fees was clear, direct and uncontroverted and that Plaintiff did

not object to that evidence although he had the means and opportunity to do so.

10 

The reasonableness of the fees is therefore established. 

In fact, under such circumstances it would have been an abuse of discretion

had the court failed to award any fees. See, e.g., Hoelscher v. Kilman, 2006 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 1351, 18 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 16, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(finding the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding appellate attorney’s 

fees under CPRC section 38.001, when defendant’s attorney’s testimony as to 

reasonable appellate attorney’s fees was not controverted); Hunsucker v. Fustok, 

238 S.W.3d 421, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (holding that 

it is an abuse of discretion not to award fees when party submitted uncontroverted 

affidavit establishing reasonableness of fees); Petroleum Analyzer Co. LP v.

Olstowski, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 5581, 66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010,

 10 See First Appeal CR 840-973 (Notice of Affidavit of Attorney’s Fees); CR 6 – 193 (RGA’s 

Motion for Attorney’s Fees); CR 196 (Rule 11 Agreement regarding admissibility of fee 

evidence); and CR 197-200 (Bell’s Response to RGA’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees)
13

no pet.) (mem. op.) (trial court had discretion to award less than requested, but to

have awarded nothing would have been abuse of discretion). 

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making an award

of fees to RGA.

III. Bell’s argument has no basis in common law or statute.

1. The Texas Election Code and Texas’ statutory interpretation law

does not support Bell’s argument.

Bell argues that the trial court’s decision to award fees to defendant was

unreasonable because his claim was “colorable” and the “guiding principles” of the

statute mandate that the only equitable and just outcome is no award of fees.11 

However, as set forth above, the evidence submitted by RGA established the

reasonableness of the fees and supported an award of fees as a matter of law. What

Bell is really arguing is that additional language should be read into the statutes

concerning the discretion of a trial court to award fees. However, Texas law does

not support reading additional requirements into the statutory language. 

It is well established under Texas law that courts must enforce a statute as

written and “refrain from rewriting text that lawmakers chose.” Jaster v. Comet II

Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. 2014) (quoting Entergy Gulf States, Inc.

v. Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009). The court limits its analysis to the

 11 Appellant’s Brief p. 2 and 10.
14

words of the statute and applies the plain meaning of those words “unless a

different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd

or nonsensical results.” Id. (citing Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Tex.

2011). 

As set forth above, the only requirement imposed by the relevant statutes is

that any award be reasonable. The legislature clearly could have included

additional language in the statutes regarding how to assess fees had it so intended. 

See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.323(b) (providing that in exercising discretion to 

award fees, the court shall “consider whether the conduct of the governmental 

body had a reasonable basis in law and whether the litigation was brought in good 

faith.”); CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.008 (requiring that in addition to being 

reasonable, attorney’s fees must be equitable and just). No such language exists 

here. All that is required is that the award be reasonable.

Additionally, even if Bell is correct as to the factors the trial court should

have considered, which he is not, he points to nothing in the record supporting his

position that the Court did not consider the issues he raises.

12 Where there are no

findings of fact or conclusions of law, the court of appeals must view the evidence

 12 To the contrary, Bell raised these same arguments to the trial court, so it cannot be said that the 

court was not aware of them when making its decision. See CR 197-200 and 217-19. It should 

also be noted that the trial court in this matter actually reduced the amount of fees requested by 

Defendant, which further suggests it did consider additional factors when making its 

determination other than the reasonableness of the fees. See CR 9 (RGA’s request for an award 

of $528,299.00) and 201-02 (Final Judgment awarding $300,000.00).
15

in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and indulge every presumption

in its favor. Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989) (per.

curiam). Accordingly, it must be presumed that the trial court considered the

appropriate factors in making its award, and just because Bell disagrees with the

outcome it does not establish that there was an abuse of discretion.

2. Appellant cites to no case law in support of his position

In support of his argument, Appellant cites to no case wherein a court was

found to have abused its discretion by awarding fees under a discretionary statute

when the evidence otherwise supported the award, nor is RGA aware of any such

case. This stands to reason, as it is well established under Texas law that a Court

of Appeals will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court simply because it

disagrees with how the trial court exercised its discretion. See, e.g., Low v.

Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 620 (Tex. 2007); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 

(Tex. 1992).

Finding no case law supporting his position, Appellant instead cites to a

variety of cases concerning alleged abuses of discretion in other contexts, none of

which are analogous and all of which are easily differentiated from the case at

hand. 
16

In Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp v. Rhyne,

13 it was held that the trial court

abused its discretion in denying the appellant a jury trial despite a previous order

from the court providing for expressly that. 925 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. 1996). In

Samlowski v. Wooten,

14 it was held that the trial court abused its discretion in not

granting the appellant an extension to see if she could cure a defect in a required

expert report, as such denial effectively precluded plaintiff from having an

opportunity to present the merits of her case. 332 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. 2011). In In

re Pirelli Tire,

15 it was held that the trial court abused its discretion in not

dismissing a case on forum-non-conveniens grounds when it was clear that Mexico

was the proper location for the case. 247 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. 2007). None of these 

cases are even remotely related to the case at hand or dispositive of the issue 

presented by this appeal.

The only case cited by Appellant in support of his arguments concerning an 

award of fees is also easily differentiated. See Texas Comptroller of Public 

Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas, 244 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. App—Austin 2008),

aff’d in part, rev’d in part in other grounds, 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010).

16 In that

case, a trial court did not award fees to a prevailing defendant because it found that 

there was no evidence that the case was not brought in good faith, a factor which it 

 13 Appellant’s Brief p. 4.

14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. at pp. 9-10.
17

was expressly required to consider by statute.

17 The trial court likewise exercised 

its discretion not to award fees under the UDJA on the same basis. The crucial 

difference between that case and this appeal is that in Texas Comptroller the statute 

expressly set forth that the court must consider whether the case was brought in 

good faith. No such language exists in the statutes under which the trial court 

awarded RGA is fees, and even if it did it would not warrant a different outcome. 

Accordingly, Bell’s appeal should be dismissed.

3. Case law supports the award fees to RGA.

The two cases which RGA has found that come closest to encompassing

Bell’s argument were, not surprisingly, not cited to in Appellant’s Brief. In Save

Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, 304 S.W.3d 871 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied), the appellant argued that an award of fees to the

prevailing defendant under the UDJA was not equitable and just because it was a

"nonprofit organization dedicated to the public good." Id. at 893. Additional

arguments were made by amicus curae that an award of fees in the case would

have a chilling effect on citizen suits (an argument parroted by Bell in this case). . 

Id. . This Court, in affirming an award of fees to the defendant, ruled that:

“[w]e do not consider this, standing alone, to make the award of

attorneys’ fees to Mark Foster inequitable or unjust. It may very well

 17 TEX. GOV’T. CODE §552.323(b) (“In exercising its discretion under this subsection, the court 

shall consider whether the conduct of the governmental body had a reasonable basis in law and 

whether the litigation was brought in good faith.”).
18

have been equitable and just for the district court not to have awarded

fees or to award some other amount, but that does not make this

award inequitable or unjust.”

Id.

In another case involving the same plaintiff but a different Court of Appeals,

the court reached the same decision. See Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. v. Lazy

Nine Mun. Util. Dist., 198 S.W.3d 300, 318-19 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet.

denied) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in award attorneys'

fees to defendant in UDJA action, even though SOS Alliance was "a local

nonprofit organization," because "reasonable minds can differ concerning whether

the attorney's fees are just and equitable"). 

These cases both illustrate that even when the statutory language provides 

that an award be equitable and just, it is not an abuse of discretion to award fees to 

a defendant, regardless of whether the plaintiff is fighting for the alleged public 

good.

18

4. The award of fees to RGA does not violate public interest.

A large portion of Appellant’s Brief is focused on unsubstantiated arguments 

that the award of fees to RGA somehow violates the intended purposes of the 

Texas Election Code and does not favor the public interest over private interest. 

As an initial point, these arguments are nothing more than a red herring to distract 

 18 It should be noted that Bell is not a non-profit dedicated to the public good, but is instead a 

failed gubernatorial candidate who brought suit after he lost the election. 
19

from the actual language of the statutes in question, and as such do not merit a 

lengthy response or analysis. However, a couple points do warrant mentioning.

Bell argues that the public interest underpinning the Election Code is an 

interest encouraging actions by private citizens who believe there have been a 

violation of the campaign finance laws.19 That is not correct. The public interest is 

preventing campaign finance corruption and “[p]reventing evasion of...important 

campaign finance provisions.” Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 49 (Tex. 2000).

20 

An award of fees does not violate this public interest, because there was no 

violation of the Election Code by RGA. 

As a final note, the award of fees in this case will not serve to discourage 

suits under the Election Code nor will it embolden potential violators to disregard 

campaign finance laws and Bell points to no evidence establishing such. At most 

the award makes clear that a potential plaintiff should carefully consider the merits 

of his case before filing suit and causing an innocent defendant to incur years of 

legal fees defending itself against baseless claims.

 19 Appellant’s Brief p. 6.

20 The Election Code does this by providing for statutory damages against a party found to have 

committed a violation. See TEX. ELEC. CODE §§ 253.131 – 253.133; §§ 254.231-32.
20

CONCLUSION

As established herein, the statutes under which the RGA was awarded its 

fees require only that the award be reasonable. The evidence submitted by RGA in 

support of its fees was clear, direct and uncontroverted and Bell did not object to

that evidence although he had the means and opportunity to do so. Accordingly,

the trial court was entitled to award RGA its attorney’s fees as a matter of law, and

it would only have been an abuse of discretion had the trial court failed to make an

award. Further, Bell cites to no case law in support of their position or language in

the relevant statues requiring the court to not award fees if Bell’s claim is colorable

or otherwise brought in good faith. Accordingly, this appeal should be denied in

its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

HANCE SCARBOROUGH, LLP

400 W. 15th Street, Ste. 950

Austin, Texas 78701

Telephone: (512) 479-8888

Facsimile: (512) 482-6891

By: /s/ Terry L. Scarborough 

Terry L. Scarborough

State Bar No. 17716000

tscarborough@hslawmail.com

V. Blayre Pena

State Bar No. 24050372

bpena@hslawmail.com
21

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4, I hereby certify that this 

brief contains 2609 words. This is a computer generated document created in 

Microsoft Word, using 14 point typeface for all text, except for footnotes, which 

are in 12-point typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on 

the word count provided by the software used to prepare the document.

/s/ Terry L. Scarborough 

Terry L. Scarborough
22

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of Appeellee’s Brief was served on the 

following counsel of record on May 11, 2015, via certified mail, return receipt 

requested, and/or the electronic filing system: 

Trial Counsel

Randall B. Wood

Doug W. Ray

Ray & Wood

700 Bee Cave Rd. #200

Austin, Texas 78746

Phone: (512) 328-8877

Facsimile: (512) 328-1156

Counsel on Appeal

Elizabeth G. Bloch 

Thomas H. Watkins

Husch Blackwell LLP

111 Congress Ave., Ste. 1400

Austin, Texas 78701

Phone: (512) 472-5456

Facsimile: (512) 479-1101

/s/ Terry L. Scarborough 

Terry L. Scarborough