Report to the Subcommittee on 

Homeland Security, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

November 2004 GENERAL AVIATION 

SECURITY 

Increased Federal 

Oversight Is Needed, 

but Continued 

Partnership with the 

Private Sector Is 

Critical to Long-Term 

Success 

GAO-05-144 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-144.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen 

Berrick, 202-512-8777, Berrickc@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-144, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland 

Security, Committee on Appropriations, 

House of Representatives. 

November 2004

GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY

Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, 

but Continued Partnership with the 

Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term 

Success 

Federal intelligence agencies have 

reported that in the past, terrorists 

have considered using general 

aviation aircraft (all aviation other 

than commercial and military) for 

terrorist acts, and that the 

September 11th terrorists learned to 

fly at general aviation flight 

schools. The questions GAO 

answered regarding the status of 

general aviation security included 

(1) What actions has the federal 

government taken to identify and 

assess threats to, and 

vulnerabilities of, general aviation; 

and communicate that information 

to stakeholders? (2) What steps has 

the federal government taken to 

strengthen general aviation 

security, and what, if any, 

challenges does the government 

face; and (3) What steps have nonfederal stakeholders taken to 

enhance the security of general 

aviation? 

GAO recommends, among other 

things, that the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) 

develop a plan for implementing a 

risk management approach to 

strengthen general aviation 

security, and that the Federal 

Aviation Administration establish a 

documented process to review and 

revalidate flight restrictions. 

TSA and FAA generally concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations. 

The federal and state governments and general aviation industry all play a 

role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal government 

provides guidance, enforces regulatory requirements, and provides some 

funding, the bulk of the responsibility for assessing and enhancing security 

falls on airport operators. Although TSA has issued a limited threat 

assessment of general aviation, and the FBI identified that terrorists have 

considered using general aviation to conduct attacks, a systematic 

assessment of threats has not been conducted. In addition, to assess airport 

vulnerabilities, TSA plans to issue a self-assessment tool for airport 

operators’ use, but it does not plan to conduct on-site vulnerability 

assessments at all general aviation airports due to the cost and vastness of 

the general aviation network. Instead, TSA intends to use a systematic and 

analytical risk management process, which is considered a best practice, to 

assess the threats and vulnerabilities of general aviation. However, TSA has 

not yet developed an implementation plan for its risk management efforts. 

TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have taken steps to 

address security risks to general aviation through regulation and guidance, 

but still face challenges in their efforts to further enhance security. For 

example, TSA has promulgated regulations requiring background checks of 

foreign candidates for U.S. flight training schools and has issued security 

guidelines for general aviation airports. However, we found limitations in the 

process used to conduct compliance inspections of flight training programs. 

In addition, FAA, in coordination with TSA and other federal agencies, has 

implemented airspace restrictions over certain landmarks and special 

events. However, FAA has not established written policies or procedures for 

reviewing and revalidating the need for flight restrictions that limit access to 

airspace for indefinite periods of time and could negatively affect the general 

aviation industry. 

Non-federal general aviation stakeholders have partnered with the federal 

government and have individually taken steps to enhance general aviation 

security. For example, industry associations developed best practices and 

recommendations for securing general aviation, and have partnered with 

TSA to develop security initiatives such as the Airport Watch Program, 

similar to a neighborhood watch program. Some state governments have 

also provided funding for enhancing security at general aviation airports, and 

many airport operators GAO surveyed took steps to enhance security such 

as installing fencing and increasing police patrols. 

Examples of General Aviation Aircraft 
Page i GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 6 

Intelligence Information and Industry Characteristics Challenge 

TSA’s Ability to Identify and Assess Threats and Vulnerabilities 

and Communicate with General Aviation Stakeholders 15 

TSA and FAA Have Taken Actions to Reduce Security Risks 

Associated with General Aviation but Face Regulatory and 

Funding Challenges 24 

Nonfederal Stakeholders Have Taken Steps to Strengthen General 

Aviation Security 41 

Conclusions 50 

Recommendations for Executive Action 52 

Agency Comments 52 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 54 

Appendix II Comments from the Transportation Security 

Administration 57 

Appendix III GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 60 

GAO Contacts 60 

Staff Acknowledgments 60 

Tables 

Table 1: Some Major Industry Associations Representing General 

Aviation 13 

Table 2: TSA and FAA Regulatory Actions Governing the Screening 

and Validation of Pilot and Student Pilot Identities 25 

Table 3: Examples of Security Measures Used by Aviation 

Departments of 55 Fortune 500 Corporations 50 

Figures 

Figure 1: Use Categories of General Aviation 7 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 2: Composition of the General Aviation Fleet, 2002 10 

Figure 3: Categories and Numbers of Airports in the United States 11 

Figure 4: Example of a Rural Turf Runway General Aviation 

Airport (top) and a More Complex Urban General 

Aviation Airport (bottom) 12 

Figure 5: Example of Security Advisory Issued by TSA 21 

Figure 6: TSA Has Established Regulations that Expand Federal 

Security Requirements from Commercial Air Carriers to 

Include Some Private and Public Charter Aircraft 29 

Figure 7: Temporary Flight Restriction over the Crawford Ranch in 

Texas when the President Is Present 32 

Figure 8: Washington, D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone 

Surrounding the 15-Nautical-mile Radius Flight 

Restriction Zone 34 

Figure 9: Remaining and Cancelled Security TFRs Over Military 

Installations 35 

Figure 10: Violations of Temporary Flight Restrictions Have 

Increased 36 

Figure 11: Sign at St. Mary’s Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, 

Warning General Aviation Pilots to Avoid Restricted 

Airspace 38 

Figure 12: Airport Watch Program Signs Distributed to General 

Aviation Airports Around the Country 44 

Figure 13: Examples of Propeller Locks to Prevent Unauthorized 

Aircraft Use 49 

Abbreviations 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

TFR temporary flight restrictions 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

November 10, 2004 

The Honorable Harold Rogers 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

General aviation accounts for three-quarters of all aircraft that take off and 

land in the United States. These aircraft encompass a wide range of flight 

operations at nearly 19,000 general aviation airports nationwide.1

According to the National Air Transportation Association, the general 

aviation industry contributes about $100 billion to the U.S. economy each 

year and accounts for about 1.3 million jobs. Federal intelligence agencies 

have reported in the past that terrorists have considered using general 

aviation aircraft for terrorist acts and that the September 11 terrorists 

learned to fly at flight schools in Florida, Arizona, and Minnesota. In 

addition, the 9/11 Commission identified concerns that vulnerabilities 

continue to exist in general aviation. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), along with other 

federal agencies, state governments, and the general aviation industry, 

plays a role in securing general aviation operations. While the federal 

government provides guidance on threats and vulnerabilities, enforces 

regulatory requirements, and provides some funding assistance, because 

of competing needs of commercial aviation security funding and the 

vastness and diversity of the general aviation network, the bulk of the 

responsibility for assessing and enhancing security falls on airport 

operators. This public/private partnership has been strengthened following 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, in part, through the teaming of TSA 

and general aviation industry associations by means of the Aviation 

Security Advisory Committee, which, among other things, helped develop 

 1

The range of general aviation flight operations encompasses personal/family 

transportation, power line inspection and repair, pipeline patrol, training, transporting 

medical supplies, emergency services, rescue operations, wildlife and land surveys, traffic 

reporting, agricultural aviation, firefighting, and law enforcement. 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

security guidelines for general aviation airports based on industry best 

practices.2

To assess the status of general aviation security, we answered the 

following questions: (1) What actions has the federal government taken to 

identify and assess threats to, and vulnerabilities of, general aviation, and 

communicate that information to stakeholders? (2) What additional steps 

has the federal government taken to strengthen general aviation security, 

and what, if any, challenges does the government face in further enhancing 

security? (3) What steps have non-federal stakeholders taken to enhance 

the security of general aviation? Due to TSA’s concerns that the public 

release of our detailed findings could compromise aviation security, we 

issued a separate restricted report to you detailing the results of our 

review. This report is intended to summarize, in a publicly releasable form, 

our overall findings and confirm TSA and the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s (FAA) agreement to take action to better assess the 

potential for terrorist misuse of general aviation aircraft, improve the 

communication of terrorist threat information to the general aviation 

community, help manage security risks associated with access to general 

aviation aircraft and airspace, and help ensure that temporary flight 

restrictions issued for indefinite periods of time are reviewed, revalidated, 

and consistently applied. Information determined to be sensitive has been 

removed from this report. 

To determine the actions taken by the federal government to assess and 

communicate threats and vulnerabilities associated with general aviation, 

we reviewed federal agency reports and studies sponsored by industry 

associations, and interviewed federal officials and general aviation 

industry representatives, including those who provided input to TSA’s 

Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group on General 

Aviation. To identify what additional steps the federal government has 

taken to address national security risks from general aviation, we obtained 

and analyzed data from the FAA, including the number of flight 

restrictions that affect general aviation and information from TSA on 

 2

The Aviation Security Advisory Committee was formed following the 1988 Pan American 

World Airways Flight 103 tragedy (Lockerbie, Scotland) to allow all segments of the 

population to have input into future aviation security considerations. The committee was 

originally sponsored by the Federal Aviation Administration. However, when the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act was signed into law, primary responsibility for civil 

aviation security were transferred from the Federal Aviation Administration to TSA, and 

accordingly, sponsorship of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee also was transferred 

to TSA. 
Page 3 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

efforts to ensure compliance with general aviation regulations and provide 

security guidelines for airport operators. We sought to determine the 

reliability of these data by, among other things, discussing methods of 

inputting and maintaining data with agency officials. On the basis of these 

discussions, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this review. To identify what steps nonfederal aviation 

stakeholders have taken to enhance the security of general aviation, we 

judgmentally selected 31 general aviation airports to observe security 

measures implemented since September 11, 2001, and discuss securityrelated issues.3

 We selected these airports based on characteristics 

including size, location, and aviation activity.4

 Because of the limited 

number of airports in our sample, and because the selected airports did 

not constitute a representative sample, the results of our case study 

analysis cannot be projected to the universe of general aviation airports. 

We also discussed security issues with selected state aviation officials. In 

addition, we surveyed a random sample of publicly accessible general 

aviation airports that are eligible for federal funding to obtain airport 

managers’ views on changes in the security environment in general 

aviation since September 11.5

We performed our work between October 2003 and August 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I provides more details about our scope and methodology of our 

work. 

TSA and other federal agencies have not conducted an overall systematic 

assessment of threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to 

determine how to better prepare against terrorist threats. Although TSA 

issued a limited assessment of threats associated with general aviation and 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated that terrorists have 

considered using general aviation to conduct attacks, a systematic 

 3

We visited general aviation airports in Alabama, California, Georgia, Maryland, 

Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. 

4

General aviation activities also take place at some commercial airports, but we did not 

include commercial airports in the scope of this review. 

5

Because this is a probability sample, population estimates based on this sample data are 

subject to sampling error. All percentage estimates based on this sample have 95 percent 

confidence intervals that are within +/- 6 percentage points of the estimate itself, unless 

otherwise noted. 

Results in Brief 
Page 4 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

assessment of threats has not been conducted. In addition, TSA has 

conducted vulnerability assessments at selected general aviation airports, 

but agency officials stated that conducting these assessments is costly 

and, therefore, impractical to do for the 19,000 general aviation airports 

nationwide. TSA intends to implement a risk management approach to 

better assess threats and vulnerabilities of general aviation aircraft and 

airports and, as part of this approach, is developing an online vulnerability 

self-assessment tool to be completed by individual airport managers. 

However, we found limitations in the use of the self-assessment tool. 

Further, TSA has not yet developed a plan with specific milestones for 

implementing these tools and assessments. Without such a plan, it will be 

difficult for TSA to (1) monitor the progress of its efforts, (2) hold 

responsible officials accountable for achieving desired results, and 

(3) ensure that alternative approaches are considered should the tool not 

provide sufficient data to provide a desired security baseline of 

vulnerabilities. 

TSA has also partnered with industry associations to develop security 

guidelines that enable general aviation airport managers to assess their 

own vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, and works through industry 

associations to communicate threat information. However, industry and 

state aviation officials we spoke with stated that security advisories 

distributed by TSA were general in nature and were not consistently 

received. In part this is understandable because, among other things, the 

agency relies on other federal agencies for threat information. However, 

we have found that applying these principles to the extent possible 

provides organizations like TSA with the best opportunity to achieve 

desired results. 

TSA and FAA have taken steps to address security risks to general aviation 

through regulation and guidance, but still face challenges in their efforts to 

further enhance security. For example, TSA has developed regulations 

governing background checks of foreign candidates for U.S. flight training 

schools and has issued security guidelines for general aviation airports. 

However, we found limitations in the process used to conduct compliance 

inspections of flight training programs. Further, should TSA establish new 

security requirements for general aviation airports, competing funding 

needs could challenge the ability of general aviation airport operators to 

meet these requirements. In addition, FAA, in coordination with TSA and 

other federal agencies, has implemented airspace restrictions over certain 

landmarks and special events to guard against potential terrorist threats. 

However, FAA has not established written policies or procedures for 

reviewing and revalidating the continuing need for extended flight 
Page 5 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

restrictions that limit access to airspace for indefinite periods of time and 

could negatively affect the general aviation industry. In addition, we found 

limitations in the process used to allow pilots to fly through securityrelated flight restrictions. 

Nonfederal general aviation stakeholders have partnered with the federal 

government and one another to enhance general aviation security and 

have individually taken a number of steps to address the threat of misuse 

of general aviation aircraft. For example, in addition to developing their 

own sets of best practices and recommendations for securing general 

aviation aircraft and operations, industry associations have worked with 

TSA to develop security initiatives such as the Airport Watch program,6

launched jointly by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and TSA, 

and the TSA Access Certificate program,7

 developed by the National 

Business Aviation Association and currently being evaluated at selected 

airports by TSA. Some state governments have also provided funding for 

enhancing security at general aviation airports and established security 

regulations. For example, New Jersey requires that all aircraft stored at 

general aviation airports be secured with at least two locks to prevent 

unlawful access to the aircraft. In addition, many of the general aviation 

airports we visited and surveyed had taken steps to enhance security such 

as installing fencing and lighting, and requesting increased local police 

patrols. 

Because of the importance of securing general aviation operations and to 

help address associated challenges, we are making recommendations to 

the Department of Homeland Security to take four actions to better assess 

the possibility of terrorists’ misuse of general aviation aircraft, better 

communicate terrorist threat information, and help mitigate security risks 

to general aviation operations. We are also making a recommendation to 

the Department of Transportation to take action to ensure that temporary 

flight restrictions issued for indefinite periods are reviewed and, if 

appropriate, revalidated and consistently applied. 

 6

Airport Watch is a program initiated by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 

working with TSA. The program is supported by a TSA-sponsored toll free hotline (866-GASECURE) and warning signs for airports, informational literature, and training videotapes 

provided by the association. 

7

The TSA Access Certificate program is based on a set of security protocols developed by 

the National Business Aviation Association. TSA is testing this program at three airports in 

the Northeast for possible use as a national security standard for corporate and business 

operators. 
Page 6 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Secretary of Transportation, the Assistant 

Secretary of Homeland Security for the Transportation Security 

Administration, and the Administrator of the Federal Aviation 

Administration who generally concurred with our findings and 

recommendations. TSA’s written comments are presented in appendix II. 

General aviation encompasses a wide variety of activities, aircraft types, 

and airports. About 85 percent of all general aviation hours flown falls into 

one of five categories of flying activity, as defined by FAA and described in 

figure 1. The largest of these categories is recreational flying, which is 

defined as flying for pleasure or personal transportation and not for 

business purposes. In 2002, recreational flying accounted for about 

41 percent of all general aviation hours flown. The remaining categories 

include activities such as medical services, aerial advertising, aerial 

mapping and photography, and aerial application of seeds or chemicals.8

 8

TSA considers general aviation aircraft to include all U.S. registered civil aircraft not 

(1) operated under 14 C.F.R. Part 121 (scheduled commercial airlines), (2) military 

operations, and (3) on-demand air carriers that operate nonscheduled commercial service 

under 14 C.F.R. Part 135 

Background 
Page 7 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 1: Use Categories of General Aviation 

 Percentage 

 of aviation 

Use hours flown Description

Recreational 40.8 Use of aircraft for 

pleasure or personal 

transportation and not

 for business purposes.

Instructional 15.6 Flying under the 

supervision of a flight 

instructor.

Business 12.2 Use of aircraft in 

connection with the 

pilot’s occupation or 

private business.
Page 8 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 
Page 9 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Various types of aircraft can be used in general aviation operations, 

including single-engine and multi-engine piston aircraft, turboprops, 

turbojets, helicopters, gliders, and experimental aircraft. The general 

aviation fleet in the United States consists of about 211,000 active aircraft. 

While this fleet is diverse, certain activities are generally associated with 

specific types of general aviation aircraft. For example, corporate flying 

generally involves the use of turboprop and turbojet aircraft, while 

personal and instructional flying generally involves the use of singleengine propeller-driven aircraft. The largest category of general aviation 

aircraft is single-engine propeller, which in 2002 made up 68 percent of the 

general aviation fleet. Types of general aviation aircraft and their uses are 

described in figure 2.9

 9

For a more detailed discussion on the general aviation industry, see GAO, General 

Aviation: Status of the Industry, Related Infrastructure, and Safety Issues, GAO-01-916, 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 2001). 
Page 10 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 2: Composition of the General Aviation Fleet, 2002 

There are approximately 14,000 private-use and 4,800 public-use general 

aviation airports in the United States, and about 550,000 active general 

aviation pilots and instructors. 10 Non-U.S. citizens can also possess active 

student pilot certificates in the United States, according to FAA. Although 

 10According to FAA’s Airmen’s Registry as of July 3, 2004. 

Single-engine piston, 68.0%

Multiengine piston, 8.3%

Turboprop, 3.2%

Turbojet, 4.0%

Rotorcraft, 3.1%

Experimental, 10.4%

Other, 3.0%

Aircraft with this type of engine are driven by 

propellers. Examples of uses include personal 

and business flying, flight instruction, and 

aerial application.

Propeller aircraft with two engines. Examples 

of uses include corporate and business flying 

and public use.

Aircraft driven by both jet thrust and 

propellers. Examples of uses include business 

and corporate flying and air taxi.

Aircraft powered by a turbojet engine. 

Examples of uses include corporate flying and 

air taxi.

Aircraft whose lift is derived principally from 

rotors, such as helicopters. Examples of uses 

include aerial observation, public use, and 

medical evacuation.

Aircraft that do not have a specific make and 

model, including aircraft built by amateurs for 

recreational purposes, used for exhibition 

purposes such as military surplus aircraft, and 

involved in research and development. 

Refers to other aircraft not included in above 

categories.

Sources: FAA, TSA, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, and the Helicopter Association International.
Page 11 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

general aviation aircraft can take off and land at almost any airport, 

including most of the nation’s commercial service airports,11 there is an 

extensive system of general aviation airports nationwide. Figure 3 

identifies the categories of airports in the United States. 

Figure 3: Categories and Numbers of Airports in the United States 

a

According to FAA, commercial service airports are those airports that handle regularly scheduled 

commercial airline traffic and have at least 2,500 annual passenger enplanements. TSA considers 

commercial service airports to be those subject to security requirements under 49.C.F.R. part 1542 

and by that definition, there are approximately 450 commercial service airports. 

Public-use general aviation airports can range in size and complexity from 

the short, grass landing strip in rural areas to the very busy urban airports 

with multiple paved runways of differing lengths that can accommodate 

large jet aircraft. Figure 4 illustrates examples of a rural general aviation 

airport with a grass landing strip and a more complex urban general 

aviation airport. 

 11Airports that handle regularly scheduled commercial airline traffic and have at least 2,500 

annual passenger enplanements. 

14,296

4,770

510

Public-use general aviation airports

Commercial service airportsa

Private general aviation airports, 

not open to the public

Source: FAA.
Page 12 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 4: Example of a Rural Turf Runway General Aviation Airport (top) and a More Complex Urban General Aviation Airport 

(bottom) 

Source: Georgia Department of Transportation.

2,815 foot turf

runway

3,746 foot

runway

3,967 foot

runway

6,001 foot

runway

3,383 foot

runway

3,746 foot

runway

3,967 foot

runway

3,383 foot

runway

2,815 foot turf

runway

6,001 foot

runway 
Page 13 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

General aviation industry interests are represented by a variety of national 

organizations. One of the functions of these organizations is disseminating 

information from federal agencies to their members. These associations 

also provide their members with security best practices and 

recommendations tailored to their members’ specific needs. Table 1 

provides an overview of some of the largest industry associations and their 

role in general aviation. 

Table 1: Some Major Industry Associations Representing General Aviation 

Association Who they represent 

American Association of Airport Executives Airport executives at public use airports 

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association Pilots and aircraft owners 

Experimental Aircraft Association Recreational aviation enthusiasts and 

builders 

General Aviation Manufacturers Association Companies manufacturing general 

aviation aircraft, engines, and component 

parts 

Helicopter Association International Helicopter operators and manufacturers 

National Business Aviation Association, Inc. Companies that own or operate general 

aviation aircraft as an aid to the conduct of 

their business or are involved with some 

other aspect of business aviation 

National Agricultural Aviation Association Licensed commercial applicator-operators 

that use aircraft to enhance food and fiber 

production, protect forestry, and control 

health-threatening pests 

National Air Transportation Association Companies that provide general aviation 

service including on-demand air charter, 

fuel and ground services, aircraft 

maintenance, and pilot training 

National Association of State Aviation 

Officials 

Officials in state government aviation 

agencies 

Source: Industry associations. 

Prior to the passage of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in 

November 2001, FAA had primary responsibility for securing all civil 

aviation, including general aviation. Although the act transferred much of 

that responsibility from FAA to TSA,12 FAA maintains a security role 

because of its regulatory authority over the imposition of temporary flight 

 12Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), (g), 115 

Stat. 597, 603 (2001). 
Page 14 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

restrictions (TFR)13 and its disbursement of grants to fund safety and 

security enhancements at commercial and general aviation airports. 

Most of the civil aviation security regulations TSA assumed from FAA did 

not apply to general aviation, but rather to commercial passenger air 

carriers and commercial airports.14 Although the security of general 

aviation airports remains largely unregulated, the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act and subsequent laws required TSA to develop 

additional regulations that affect specific segments of general aviation—

flight training schools and certain charter flight operations.15

Among other things, with regard to all modes of transportation, the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act also required TSA to 

• receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to 

transportation security; 

• assess threats to transportation security and develop policies, strategies, 

and plans for dealing with those threats, including coordinating 

countermeasures with other federal organizations; 

• enforce security-related regulations and requirements; and 

• oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security 

measures at airports and other transportation facilities.16

 13FAA has sole authority to issue TFRs and other rules to restrict aircraft from operating 

within defined areas, on a temporary or permanent basis, in order to protect persons or 

property in the air or on the ground. When time permits, FAA issues security-based TFRs 

after consultation with TSA and other federal agencies, as appropriate. 

1449 C.F.R. parts 1540, 1542 & 1544 (formerly codified, in part, at 14 C.F.R. parts 107 & 108). 

15Pub. L. No.107-71, §§ 113(a) & 132, 115 Stat. at 622 & 635. 

16Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 101(a), 115 Stat. at 598. 
Page 15 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

TSA and other federal agencies have not conducted an overall, systematic 

assessment of threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to 

determine how to better prepare against terrorist threats. However, in July 

2003, TSA issued a limited assessment of threats associated with general 

aviation activities. In addition, the FBI stated that intelligence indicates 

that terrorists have considered using general aviation aircraft in the past to 

conduct attacks. To determine vulnerabilities, TSA conducted 

vulnerability assessments at some general aviation airports based on 

specific security concerns or requests by airport officials, and have 

conducted less intensive security surveys at selected general aviation 

airports. To better focus its efforts and resources, TSA intends to 

implement a risk management approach to assess the threats and 

vulnerabilities of general aviation aircraft and airports, and conduct onsite vulnerability assessments only at those airports the agency determines 

to be nationally critical. However, TSA has not yet developed a plan with 

specific milestones for implementing these tools and assessments. 

While TSA has partnered with industry associations to develop security 

guidelines for general aviation airports and communicate threat 

information to airport operators, we found limitations in the 

communication of threat information. Industry and state aviation officials 

we spoke with stated that security advisories distributed by TSA were 

general in nature and were not consistently received. Risk communication 

principles provide that specific information on potential threats include—

to the extent possible—the nature of the threat, when and where it is 

likely to occur, over what time period it is likely to occur, and guidance on 

actions to be taken. Applying these principles presents problems for TSA 

because, among other things, the agency receives threat information from 

other federal agencies and that information is often classified. 

Neither TSA nor FBI has conducted an overall systematic assessment of 

threats to, or vulnerabilities of, general aviation to determine how to better 

prepare against terrorist threats. In July 2003, TSA issued a brief summary 

assessment of the threats associated with general aviation. However, the 

assessment was not widely distributed or made available to general 

aviation airports or other stakeholders. In 2004, the Secretary of the 

Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that the department, 

along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), FBI, and other agencies, 

lacked precise knowledge about the time, place, and methods of potential 

terrorist attacks related to general aviation. Additionally, industry and TSA 

officials stated that the small size, lack of fuel capacity, and minimal 

destructive power of most general aviation aircraft make them 

Intelligence 

Information and 

Industry 

Characteristics 

Challenge TSA’s 

Ability to Identify and 

Assess Threats and 

Vulnerabilities and 

Communicate with 

General Aviation 

Stakeholders 

Theft of General Aviation 

Aircraft Has Been a 

Concern, but Intelligence 

on Threats to General 

Aviation Is Infrequent and 

Non-specific 
Page 16 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

unattractive to terrorists and, thereby, reduce the possibility of threat 

associated with their misuse. 

Historical intelligence indicates that terrorists have expressed interest in 

using general aviation aircraft to conduct attacks. The following are 

examples of intelligence information indicating terrorist interest in general 

aviation: 

• CIA reported that terrorists associated with the September 11 attacks 

expressed interest in the use of crop-dusting aircraft (a type of general 

aviation aircraft) for large area dissemination of biological warfare agents 

such as anthrax. 

• CIA reported that one of the masterminds of the September 11 attacks 

originally proposed using small aircraft filled with explosives to carry out 

the attacks. 

• In May 2003, the Department of Homeland Security issued a security 

advisory indicating that al Qaeda was in the late stages of planning an 

attack, using general aviation aircraft, on the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, 

Pakistan, and had also planned to use general aviation aircraft to attack 

warships in the Persian Gulf. 

TSA and industry stakeholders we spoke with stated that general aviation 

airports are vulnerable to terrorist attack. TSA officials stated also that it 

would be difficult for the agency to systematically conduct on-site 

assessments of the vulnerabilities of individual general aviation airports to 

terrorist activities because of the diversity and large number of airports. 

Officials cited the nearly 19,000 general aviation airports nationwide, 

noting that each has distinct characteristics that may make it more or less 

attractive to potential terrorists. 

TSA’s efforts to assess vulnerabilities at specific general aviation airports 

have been limited. At the time of our review, TSA had conducted 

vulnerability assessments at selected general aviation airports based on 

specific security concerns or requests by airport officials. TSA officials 

stated that the resources associated with conducting vulnerability 

assessments, and the diverse nature of general aviation airports, makes it 

impractical to conduct assessments at the approximately 19,000 general 

aviation airports nationwide, or even the approximately 4,800 public-use 

general aviation airports. TSA officials said, however, that they had 

conducted a less intensive security survey at additional general aviation 

The Extent of General 

Aviation’s Vulnerability to 

Terrorist Attack Is Difficult 

to Determine 
Page 17 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

airports. TSA selected these airports, among other things, in preparation 

for special security events such as the G-8 summit and national Republican 

and Democratic political conventions. 

In response to industry requests for federally endorsed security protocols, 

TSA issued security guidelines in May 2004 meant to enable individual 

general aviation airport managers to assess their own facility’s 

vulnerability to terrorist attack and suggest security enhancements.17

Although these guidelines were issued after we conducted our survey of 

general aviation airport managers, we found that the majority of airport 

managers surveyed stated that they would use a security 

review/vulnerability assessment tool if it were provided. To produce these 

security guidelines, TSA partnered with industry associations participating 

in the Aviation Security Advisory Committee’s Working Group on General 

Aviation Airports Security. The guidelines include an airport characteristic 

measurement tool that allows airport operators to assess the level of risk 

associated with their airport to determine which security enhancements 

are most appropriate for their facility. The guidelines also contain security 

guidance based on industry best practices. TSA officials emphasized that, 

because security at general aviation airports is not currently regulated by 

TSA, the security enhancements suggested by the guidelines are voluntary 

and are to be implemented at the discretion of the airport manager. While 

TSA’s and general aviation airport managers’ assessments at specific 

general aviation airports have been limited, TSA has identified a number of 

factors that could make general aviation aircraft and airports vulnerable to 

exploitation by terrorists. 

In order to address challenges in assessing threats and vulnerabilities to all 

modes of transportation—including general aviation—and focusing scarce 

resources, TSA plans to implement a risk management approach based on 

assessments of criticality, threat, and vulnerability.18 TSA’s risk 

management approach, as it relates to general aviation security, is 

summarized below. 

 17Transportation Security Administration, Security Guidelines for General Aviation 

Airports, Information Publication A-001, (May 2004). 

18See GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach,. 

GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2001). 

Implementing a Risk 

Management Approach 

Could Improve the 

Assessment of Threats and 

Vulnerabilities, but TSA 

Lacks an Implementation 

Plan 
Page 18 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

• TSA plans to use a criticality tool to provide the basis for prioritizing 

which transportation assets and facilities require additional or special 

protection. On the basis of a criticality assessment, TSA intends to provide 

greater security scrutiny to general aviation airports that require special 

protection. 

• TSA plans to apply threat scenarios of how terrorists might conduct 

attacks in specific situations in airport environments to assess threats 

faced by individual general aviation airports. 

• TSA is developing an online self-assessment toolintended to help general 

aviation airport managers develop a comprehensive security baseline for 

their facility. 

• TSA is developing a Transportation Risk Assessment and Vulnerability 

Evaluation tool for conducting on-site assessments of general aviation 

airports that are deemed to be nationally critical. 

TSA intends to compile baseline data on security vulnerabilities from 

these tools and use the data to conduct a systematic analysis of security 

vulnerabilities at general aviation airports nationwide. TSA officials stated 

that such an analysis will allow the agency to establish the need, if any, for 

minimum security standards; determine the adequacy of current security 

regulations; and help the agency and airports better direct limited 

resources. They noted that because airports will not be required to use the 

tool, the usefulness of the data gathered will be dependent on the number 

of airports voluntarily submitting assessment results to TSA. 

Despite these plans, however, TSA has not developed an implementation 

plan with specific milestones for conducting its risk management efforts. 

These efforts have been under development for over a year and were 

originally scheduled to have been completed between June and August of 

2004. Without a plan that establishes specific time frames for 

implementation of the tools and assessments, it will be difficult for TSA to 

monitor the progress of its efforts and hold responsible officials 

accountable for achieving desired results. Similarly, without a plan that 

includes estimates of the resources needed to effectively implement the 

agency’s risk management approach, TSA’s ability to allocate its resources 

to areas of greatest need could be impaired. A plan could also address 

alternative approaches that could be implemented if the extent of 

voluntary participation of general aviation airport managers does not 

provide sufficient data needed to establish the desired security baseline of 

vulnerabilities. 
Page 19 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

TSA faces challenges in ensuring that threat information is effectively 

communicated to the general aviation community due to the generality of 

intelligence information given, and the lack of a current, reliable, and 

complete list of airport contacts. In addition, intelligence information may 

be classified or sensitive, thus limiting with whom it can be shared.19 TSA 

partners with industry associations that are part of a General Aviation 

Coalition as a primary means for communicating threat information and 

developing security guidelines for general aviation airport managers.20

Specifically, rather than notifying general aviation airport operators 

directly, TSA communicates threat advisories to these industry 

associations, which in turn are to provide it to their members. A majority 

of general aviation airport managers we surveyed reported that they had at 

least some contact with nonfederal entities such as state aviation officials 

or industry associations such as the American Association of Airport 

Executives or the National Business Aviation Association.21 Additionally, a 

majority indicated that they had established procedures for disseminating 

security-related information to airport employees and tenants. 

TSA issued threat advisories for dissemination by general aviation 

associations to general aviation airports. However, industry association 

representatives and state aviation officials we spoke with stated that these 

security advisories were general in nature and were not consistently 

 19For example, 49 C.F.R. Part 1520 limits TSA’s ability to distribute sensitive security 

information to persons with a need to know, and Executive Order 13292—Further 

Amendment to Executive Order 12958, as Amended, Classified National Security 

Information, March 25, 2003, limits the distribution of classified information. 

20The General Aviation Coalition consists of the major general aviation organizations and 

focuses on addressing aviation issues of common interest and concern. The coalition meets 

every 6 months with the FAA Administrator and senior FAA managers to present and 

update issues. The industry associations that make up the coalition consists of the Aircraft 

Electronics Association, the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, the Experimental 

Aircraft Association, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the Helicopter 

Association International, the International Council of Air Shows, the National Aeronautics 

Association, the National Agricultural Aviation Association, the National Air Transportation 

Association, the National Aircraft Resale Association, the National Association of State 

Aviation Officials, the National Business Aviation Association, the Professional Aviation 

Maintenance Association, the Small Aircraft Manufacturers Association, the Soaring 

Society of America, the U.S. Parachute Association, and the University Aviation 

Association. 

21TSA officials said they also conducted outreach programs before national events requiring 

special aviation security to educate the general aviation community on flight restrictions 

and other planned security measures and that TSA planned to assign a lead federal security 

director in each state as a point of contact for states’ general aviation communities. 

TSA Faces Challenges in 

Applying Risk 

Communication Principles 

to Improve the Quality of 

Threat Information 

Disseminated to General 

Aviation Stakeholders 
Page 20 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

received. An example of one of TSA’s threat advisories is shown in figure 5 

below. 
Page 21 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 5: Example of Security Advisory Issued by TSA 

Timely, specific, and actionable information are three key principles of 

effective risk communication. However, TSA faces inherent challenges in 

applying risk communication principles because of: (1) the generality of 

Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Page 22 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

intelligence information received from the intelligence community, (2) a 

limited capability to identify appropriate officials and airports to receive 

threat information, and (3) potential restrictions placed on communicating 

classified or sensitive security information to general aviation 

stakeholders. Providing threat information to the public or those with a 

need to know in accordance with these principles is challenging and 

extends beyond threat communications related to general aviation. 

The first challenge TSA, along with other federal agencies, faces in 

applying risk communication principles is the generality of intelligence 

information and the difficulties the government faces in developing such 

information. According to TSA, gathering specific threat information is 

difficult because the threat posed by a particular person or group varies 

over time with changes in the terrorist organization’s structure, objectives, 

methodologies, and capabilities. Targets also change depending on the 

security of the target in question; likelihood of success; mission 

complexity; and potential psychological, emotional, and financial impact 

of the attack. These variations in groups and targets make predicting how 

and when a terrorist event could occur difficult. Nonetheless, we have 

reported that public warning systems should, to the extent possible, 

include specific, consistent, accurate, and clear information on the threat 

at hand, including the nature of the threat, location, and threat time frames 

along with guidance on actions to be taken in response to the threat.22

According to risk communication principles, without adequate threat 

information, the public may ignore the threat or engage in inappropriate 

actions, some of which may compromise rather than promote the public’s 

safety. 

A second challenge faced by TSA in communicating threat information to 

general aviation airports is the lack of current, reliable, and complete 

information about who to contact to facilitate communication. General 

aviation airport operators are widely spread among a diverse range of 

airports that have historically been subject to little or no federal regulation 

or contact. As a result, contact information about who the owners or 

operators of individual airports are may not be complete, current, or 

readily available. Neither FAA nor TSA maintains a current database with 

contact information for all general aviation airports. Thus, identifying who 

 22GAO, Homeland Security: Risk Communication Principles May Assist in Refinement 

of the Homeland Security Advisory System, GAO-04-538T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 

2004). 
Page 23 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

should receive threat information at the nearly 19,000 airports poses a 

significant challenge. While general aviation industry associations typically 

maintain contact information on their members, association officials 

stated that when they need contact information on general aviation 

airports they generally use data from the FAA. 

A third challenge TSA faces in providing classified threat information to 

general aviation airport operators is determining which airport officials 

have a need and clearance to receive classified or sensitive intelligence 

information. In general, the more detailed and specific the threat 

information, the more likely the information is classified and, therefore, 

not available to those without appropriate security clearances. TSA 

officials said they had sanitized threat information in order to issue the 

five security advisories to general aviation industry associations in an 

unclassified format. TSA officials said they had also granted security 

clearances to individuals at certain industry associations who were willing 

to undergo the required background check process. However, although 

TSA has developed the ability to communicate classified threat 

information to some general aviation industry representatives, the agency 

still faces limitations on its ability to ensure that airport operators with a 

need to know have access to classified threat information, and have the 

appropriate clearances. 

According to TSA officials, the agency’s approach to risk management 

should improve its ability to communicate threat information to the 

general aviation community by addressing the three challenges mentioned 

above. Specifically, once TSA completes threat and criticality assessments 

and—in coordination with general aviation airport managers— 

vulnerability assessments, the agency will have a greater sense of the 

threats that individual general aviation airport managers should be aware 

of and therefore be able to communicate more useful and specific threat 

information. Conducting vulnerability and criticality assessments should 

also help TSA identify airports for which current and reliable contact 

information is needed, and identify airport officials with a need to know 

classified threat information. 
Page 24 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

TSA and FAA have taken steps to address security risks associated with 

general aviation through regulation, guidance, and funding. However, in 

response to the September 11 attacks, TSA has primarily focused on 

strengthening the security of commercial aviation and meeting associated 

congressional mandates. As a result, TSA has dedicated fewer resources to 

strengthening general aviation security, and both TSA and FAA continue to 

face challenges in their efforts to further enhance security. For example, 

TSA has developed a regulation governing background checks of foreign 

candidates for flight training at U.S. flight schools and issued security 

guidelines for general aviation airports.23 However, TSA has not yet 

developed a schedule for conducting inspections or determined the 

resources needed for monitoring compliance with new regulations. In 

addition, should TSA establish security requirements for general aviation 

airports, it may be difficult for airport operators to finance security 

enhancements independently and federal funding will also be a challenge 

since general aviation airports’ needs must compete with the needs of 

commercial airports for security funding. FAA, in coordination with TSA 

and other federal agencies, has implemented airspace restrictions over 

certain landmarks and events, among other things, to guard against 

potential terrorist threats. FAA officials said that they intermittently 

reviewed the continuing need for flight restrictions limiting access to 

airspace for indefinite periods of time—those established at the request of 

the Department of Defense and for the defense of the national capital 

region. However, they had not established written procedures or criteria 

for revalidating the need for restrictions to ensure such reviews were 

consistently conducted. In addition, we found limitations in the process 

used by TSA to review and make recommendations regarding waivers to 

allow general aviation pilots to fly through security related flight 

restrictions. 

 23TSA has proposed a regulation pursuant to section 612 of the Vision 100Century of 

Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490, 2572-74 (2003), to codify 

TSA’s authority in light of the transfer of responsibilities from the Department of Justice. 

The Department of Justice issued and enforced regulations that require background checks 

of foreign candidates for flight training pursuant to section 113 of ATSA, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 

115 Stat. at 622-23. 

TSA and FAA Have 

Taken Actions to 

Reduce Security Risks 

Associated with 

General Aviation but 

Face Regulatory and 

Funding Challenges 
Page 25 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Recognizing the threat posed by larger aircraft, whether carrying 

passengers or cargo, the Department of Justice, in February 2003, issued a 

requirement that all non-U.S. citizens seeking flight training in aircraft 

weighing 12,500 pounds or more must undergo a comprehensive 

background check.24 Both TSA and FAA subsequently issued regulations 

intended to limit access to aircraft for certain segments of the general 

aviation community by increasing requirements for background checks of 

pilots. As table 2 shows, TSA and FAA promulgated new regulations 

governing the screening and validation of pilot and student pilot identities. 

Table 2: TSA and FAA Regulatory Actions Governing the Screening and Validation of Pilot and Student Pilot Identities 

Date Agency New requirement 

Feb. 2002 TSAa Individuals must successfully complete a fingerprint-based criminal history records check before 

serving as a flight crew member. 

Feb. 2002 FAAb Flight crew operating aircraft to or from College Park Airport, Potomac Airfield, or Washington 

Executive/Hyde Field must successfully complete a background check by a law enforcement 

agency and that may include a fingerprint-based criminal history records check. (All three airports 

are within 15 nautical miles of key landmarks such as the Washington Monument.) 

Oct. 2002 FAAc All pilots must carry and present picture identification along with their pilot certificates. 

Jan. 2003 FAA and TSAd FAA may suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue an airman certificate to anyone (any citizen or 

noncitizen) when notified by TSA after TSA’s determination that such a person is a threat to 

transportation security. 

July 2003 FAA FAA began issuing the new certificates made of plastic and incorporating security features such as 

a hologram of the FAA seal to replace the old paper certificates. 

Dec. 2003 TSAe All non-U.S. citizens or nationals seeking flight training at a U.S. flight school must undergo a 

comprehensive background check by TSA, regardless of aircraft weight. 

Source: GAO’s analysis of regulations. 

a

49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.229 & 1544.230. 

b

14 C.F.R. Part 91, SFAR 94. 

c

14 C.F.R. § 61.3. 

d

14 C.F.R. § 61.18 and 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540.115 & 1540.117. 

e

Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 612, 117 Stat. @ 2572-74 (TSA has yet to finalize its implementing 

regulation). 

Prior to September 11, FAA did not require background checks of anyone 

seeking a pilot license, also referred to as a pilot certificate. In November 

 2428 C.F.R. Part 105. Vision 100 subsequently amended this requirement, transferring 

responsibility for conducting the background checks to TSA and applying this requirement 

to all non-U.S. citizens seeking flight training in aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds. 

TSA has developed, but not yet implemented, regulations to this effect. 

DOJ, FAA, and TSA Have 

Issued Requirements for 

Student Pilots, but 

Limitations Exist 
Page 26 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

2001, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act required that foreign 

student pilots seeking training in aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more 

undergo a background check by the Department of Justice. Under 

regulations issued by the Department of Justice, flight training providers 

are responsible for ensuring that aliens applying for flight training in 

aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more fill out and submit a Department 

of Justice Flight Training Candidate Checks Program form and are 

fingerprinted.25 The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force is to perform a 

criminal history background check of the foreign candidate and notify the 

flight training provider whether or not the foreign candidate is cleared to 

receive flight training.26 According to officials from the Foreign Terrorist 

Tracking Task Force, a number of foreign student pilot candidates have 

been denied from enrolling in a flight training program between March 17, 

2003 and August 18, 2004.27 FAA officials said that in February 2002 they 

took additional steps to make sure that foreign student pilots who already 

had student pilot certificates when the new requirements went into effect 

were checked. 

In December 2003, the Vision 100—The Century of Aviation 

Reauthorization Act (Vision 100)28 transferred responsibility for 

conducting background checks from the Department of Justice to TSA and 

expanded the background check requirement to include all foreign student 

pilots regardless of the aircraft’s size in which they train.29 TSA has 

 2528 C.F.R.Part 105. 

26The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force was created in response to Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 2, Oct. 29, 2001. The purpose of the task force is to (1) deny entry 

into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of being engaged in, or 

supporting terrorist activity; and (2) locate, detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens 

already present in the United States. The directive required that the task force be staffed by 

personnel from the Department of State, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Customs Service, the intelligence 

community, military support components, and other federal agencies as appropriate. The 

Department of Justice delegated authority for establishing and administering the Flight 

Training Candidate Checks Program to the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. 

27The regulations establishing the Flight Training Candidate Checks Program became 

effective on March 17, 2003. 68 Fed. Reg. 7,313 (Feb. 13, 2003) (codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 

105). 

28Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 612, 117 Stat. at 2572-74. 

29As of July 2004, FAA reported that 3,742 foreign student pilots had active student 

certificates and TSA officials estimated that over 200,000 pilots currently licensed by FAA 

are non-U.S. citizens. 
Page 27 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

developed a regulation implementing the mandates of Vision 100 and, at 

the time of our review, planned to publish the final regulation and assume 

the background check responsibilities from the Department of Justice by 

September 30, 2004. According to TSA officials, TSA’s Alien Flight Student 

program will be similar to the Department of Justice’s Flight Training 

Candidate Checks Program.30 A key challenge for TSA is fulfilling its 

responsibility to enforce security related regulations will be monitoring 

the compliance of flight training programs in the United Sates and Puerto 

Rico with this new requirement. We found limitations in the monitoring of 

these flight-training programs. 

In addition to the Department of Justice regulations governing foreign 

student pilots, FAA, in July 2002, implemented changes to the process of 

issuing a U.S. pilot certificate to foreign nationals already holding a pilot 

certificate from a foreign country.31 Historically, FAA issued pilot 

certificates to pilots who held licenses issued by nations that are members 

of the International Civil Aviation Organization based on their foreign 

license. Members of the organization, including the United States and 187 

other nations, (including nations known to sponsor terrorism) agreed to 

issue private pilot certificates to those holding pilot licenses from other 

organization member nations without requiring them to undergo skills 

testing. 

Because of the destructive potential of larger aircraft, the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act directed TSA to promulgate new rules 

governing security requirements for certain public and private charter 

operations. Generally, the “twelve-five rule” requires nonscheduled or ondemand charter services (for passengers or cargo) using aircraft weighing 

12,500 pounds or more to implement a specific program of security 

procedures similar to those required of scheduled commercial airlines and 

 30According to TSA officials, most foreign candidates must receive a U.S. student or work 

visa to receive flight training in the United.States. Under the Department of Justice’s Flight 

Training Candidate Checks Program, the Department of State would not issue such visas to 

foreign candidates unless they had received preliminary approval from the Department of 

Justice. TSA officials said that TSA intends to work with the Department of State to 

continue this process when the TSA regulation is finalized. 

31According to TSA officials, responsibility for conducting these checks will transfer from 

Department of Justice to TSA in October 2004. 
Page 28 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

public charters.32 Similarly, the “private charter rule” requires private 

charter services using aircraft weighing 100,309.3 pounds (45,500 

kilograms) or more, or that have 61 or more passenger seats, to implement 

many of the same security procedures required of the major airlines. 

However, we found that TSA faces challenges in monitoring compliance 

with these new security regulations. Figure 6 shows that selected existing 

security requirements have been expanded from commercial air carriers to 

public and private charter aircraft. 

 32Prior to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, certain aviation charter services 

were already subject to security requirements. For example, charter services using aircraft 

with 31 seats or more were required to meet security requirements similar to those in place 

for scheduled commercial air carriers. 
Page 29 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 6: TSA Has Established Regulations that Expand Federal Security Requirements from Commercial Air Carriers to 

Include Some Private and Public Charter Aircraft 

a

The sterile area is the portion of an airport defined in the airport security program that provides 

passengers access to boarding aircraft through the screening of persons and property. 

Since September 11, 2001, FAA has issued temporary flight restrictions 

(TFR) for some Department of Defense facilities and for the protection of 

the national capital region for indefinite periods without a documented 

process to justify their continuance. FAA imposes TFRs to temporarily 

restrict aircraft operations within designated areas. Prior to September 11, 

FAA issued TFRs primarily to safely manage airspace operations during 

events of limited duration. Since then, however, FAA, in coordination with 

TSA, the Department of Defense, and the Secret Service, among others, 

Procedures for 

Determining Continued 

Need for Temporary Flight 

Restrictions Have Not 

Been Developed 

Minimum requirements

Scheduled passenger 

or public charter 

using aircraft with 

more than 60 or more 

seats into/from a 

sterile areaa

Aircraft weighing

12,500 lbs. or more if:

into/from a sterile area or 

over 100,309.3 lbs. or more 

than 60 seats and not a

government charter

Aircraft weighing 12,500 lbs. 

or more; scheduled or 

charter, cargo or passenger; 

and not under a full or partial 

security program

All aircraft 

under 

12,500 lbs.

Full security 

program

Twelve-Five 

security program

Private charter 

security program

No security 

program

Requirements existing before September 11, 2001

Requirements expanded after primary responsibility for aviation security transferred from FAA to TSA 

November 2001

Source: GAO analysis of regulations.

Written security program, approved by TSA, that 

describes procedures used to comply with requirements 

Procedures for handling bomb or air piracy threats 

Training and knowledge for individuals with

security related duties

Compliance with security directives and 

information circulars

Carriage of accessible weapons 

Designation and use of security coordinators

Availability of qualified law enforcement personnel

Development of contingency plan 

Transportation of federal air marshals 

Fingerprint-based criminal history records checks 

for flight crew members 

Aircraft operator’s security program must include 

procedures for use of facilities and equipment to 

ensure security of the aircraft and facilities
Page 30 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

has increasingly used TFRs for the purposes of national security over 

specific events and critical infrastructure.33

FAA has authority over the U.S. National Airspace System and is the 

agency responsible for implementing TFRs via the Notice to Airmen 

system.34 For security-related TFRs, FAA generally requests that TSA’s 

Office of Operations Policy evaluate requests received from federal and 

nonfederal entities—such as the FBI, the Department of the Interior, and 

state or local government entities—associated with National Special 

Security Events and selected sporting events.35 TSA evaluates such 

requests using security related criteria. 

Based on their evaluation of requests for selected security-related TFRs, 

TSA officials will make recommendations to FAA regarding whether the 

TFR should be issued. On the basis of this information, FAA will make a 

determination whether to issue the TFR through the Notice to Airmen 

system. 

According to FAA officials, prior to September 11, 2001, TFRs were rarely 

issued for security purposes. Since then, however, FAA has issued 

numerous TFRs for the purpose of national security as a result of 

increased focus on aviation security. FAA officials stated that Notices to 

Airmen and other records of TFRs were historically not kept after the 

restrictions were removed, thus they were unable to provide accurate 

information on the number of TFRs issued for national security purposes 

prior to September 11, 2001. Since that time, however, FAA officials said 

the agency had issued approximately 220 Notices to Airmen and 

associated TFRs. 

 33FAA may issue TFRs related to security including TFRs issued for sporting events and 

significant national landmarks (14 C.F.R. § 99.7.) In addition, FAA may issue securityrelated TFRs by working directly with the Secret Service for the security of the President 

and other dignitaries (14 C.F.R. § 91.141) and the Department of Defense for protection of 

certain military facilities (14 C.F.R. § 99.7). 

34Notices to Airmen are a method by which FAA communicates to pilots information that is 

time-critical and is either of a temporary nature or is not known far enough in advance to 

permit publication on aeronautical charts or other operation publications. This can include 

the establishment, condition, or change in any facility, service, procedure, or hazard in the 

national airspace system. They may be regulatory (restrictive) or advisory in nature, or 

both. 

35The Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Homeland Security 

Council, is responsible for designating events as National Special Security Events. A recent 

example was the 2004 G-8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia. 

The Number, Size, and in Some 

Cases Duration of TFRs Has 

Increased since September 11, 

2001 
Page 31 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

The size—that is, the amount of airspace restricted both vertically and 

laterally—of some TFRs has increased. For example, prior to September 

11, TFRs for presidential visits had a radius of 3 nautical miles with a 

ceiling of 3,000 feet.36 Since then, presidential TFRs have had a radius of 

30 nautical miles, with a ceiling of 18,000 feet.37 The rationale for 

increasing the size of presidential TFRs, according to FAA, was based on 

the difficulty the military might have in preventing an airborne attack on 

the President once an aircraft was within the 3-nautical mile zone. Figure 7 

illustrates the area now covered by a presidential TFR over the Crawford 

Ranch in Texas when the President is in residence. 

 36Presidential TFRs are issued to address security with respect to airspace over presidential 

and other parties. No person may operate an aircraft in the vicinity of an area to be visited 

or traveled by the President, Vice President, or other public figures for which this type of 

restriction is issued. According to TSA officials, the size of TFRs issued for dignitaries 

other than the President did not increase after September 11, 2001. 

37The first 10 nautical miles from the center of the TFR constitute a no-fly zone. The area 

from 10 to 30 nautical miles of the TFR constitute an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) 

where operators must obtain a unique beacon code to identify themselves and maintain 

constant radio contact with air traffic controllers. 
Page 32 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 7: Temporary Flight Restriction over the Crawford Ranch in Texas when the President Is Present 

In the case of the national capital region and selected military installations, 

the duration of TFRs implemented for national security reasons has been 

put in place and subsequently extended for indefinite periods of time. For 

example, temporary flight restrictions in and around the national capital 

region were established shortly after September 11 and according to FAA 

officials, no set date has been established for their removal. These 

restrictions in and around Washington, D.C., are the flight-restricted zone 

Crawford

Dallas

Austin

Waco

0 40 80

miles Presidential temporary flight restriction zone around Crawford Ranch in Texas (30 nautical mile radius)

Source: GAO.
Page 33 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

and the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Air Defense Identification Zone, as 

shown in figure 8.38

 3814 C.F.R. § 99.3 defines an air defense identification zone as an area of airspace over land 

or water in which the ready identification, location, and control of civil aircraft is required 

in the interest of national security. General aviation aircraft must meet certain operational 

requirements; that is, pilots must have an approved flight plan by FAA, maintain two-way 

radio communications with air traffic control, and have a transponder that transmits a 

unique code. According to TSA officials, smaller general aviation aircraft are limited in 

their ability to access the flight restricted zone because of limited operational capabilities 

needed to operate in the air defense identification zone. FAA officials noted that additional 

airspace, extending in places as much as 45 nautical miles from the Washington Monument, 

is also included in the zone. 
Page 34 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 8: Washington, D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone Surrounding the 15-Nautical-mile Radius Flight Restriction Zone 

Note: The Air Defense Identification Zone consists of three overlapping zones centered on the 

regions three major airports—Baltimore-Washington International, Dulles International, and Reagan 

National Airport—and extends approximately 30-nautical miles in all directions. 

In addition, FAA issued 21 TFRs around various military facilities 

throughout the country because of security concerns at these facilities 

after the terrorist attacks of September 11. While 8 of these TFRs have 

since been canceled, 13 were still in effect as of July 27, 2004, with no 

scheduled date for removal or documented analysis to justify their 

continued need. According to FAA officials, the agency plans to convert 

Washington-Dulles

International Airport

Virginia

Maryland

DC

Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ) around White House (15 nautical mile radius)

Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around airports (30 nautical mile radius)

Source: GAO and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.

0 40 80

miles

The White

House

Washington-Reagan

National Airport

Baltimore-Washington

International Airport
Page 35 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

11 of these areas to national security areas.39 Once FAA publishes revised 

aeronautical charts reflecting the new, permanent advisories 

recommending that pilots avoid the airspace, FAA officials said they plan 

to cancel the TFRs. In January 2004, FAA issued proposals for converting 

the remaining two TFRs to permanently prohibited airspace (where no 

flights are permitted). At the time of our review, FAA was still reviewing 

comments on the proposal to permanently restrict the surrounding 

airspaces. Figure 9 shows the status of security-related TFRs FAA 

established over military installations since September 11. 

Figure 9: Remaining and Cancelled Security TFRs Over Military Installations 

 39In commenting on the draft report, FAA officials noted that one of the 11 remaining 

military TFRs—Anniston, Alabama—was canceled and established as a national security 

area after completed we completed our review. National security areas are established at 

locations where there is a requirement for increased security and safety of ground 

facilities. For example, FAA designated a national security area over Rocky Flats 

Environmental Technology Site, located in Colorado. Pilots are advised to avoid flying over 

these designated areas. During times of heightened alert levels, FAA may increase the 

national security area advisories to TFRs. 

Still in Effect Canceled Date canceled

Anniston, AL

Richmond, KY

Newport, IN

Pine Bluff, AR

Pueblo, CO

Tooeloe, UT

Hermiston, OR

Bremerton, WA

Everett, WA

Bangor, WA

Port Townsend, WA

St. Mary's, GA

Honolulu, HI

Augusta, GA

Kingsport, TN

Taxarkana, TX

Wright Patterson, OH

Knob Knoster, MO

Valdez, AK

Mayport, FL

Crane, IN

1/29/2002

4/05/2002

6/20/2003

9/27/2001

5/02/2003

6/10/2003

3/18/2002

11/23/2003

U.S. Army U.S. Air Force U.S. Navy

Source: FAA.
Page 36 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

TSA, FAA, and general aviation industry stakeholders we spoke with 

stated that TFRs negatively affect primarily general aviation operators and 

airports. According to aviation industry representatives we contacted and 

FAA, the increase in the number, size, and duration of TFRs and, at times, 

limited notice given prior to their establishment since September 11 has 

resulted in numerous inadvertent violations of restricted airspace. For 

example, the Washington, D.C. Air Defense Identification Zone has been 

violated over 1,000 times, constituting over 40 percent of all TFR violations 

since September 11, 2001. As figure 10 shows, since September 2001, the 

number of violations of all TFRs has increased dramatically. General 

aviation has accounted for most TFR violations committed within U.S. 

airspace. Further, about 95 percent of all TFR violations occurred in 

airspace secured for either presidential security or other national security 

purposes. 

Figure 10: Violations of Temporary Flight Restrictions Have Increased 

Although no TFR violations have been shown to be terrorist related, 

violators are subject to disciplinary action. According to FAA officials, 

violations of a TFR typically result in a suspension of the pilot’s certificate 

ranging anywhere from 15 days to 90 days. They said that the most 

common reason for TFR violations is pilots not reading the Notices to 

Airmen for the flight area, a required preflight procedure. Other reasons 

TFRs May Negatively 

Affect the General Aviation 

Industry 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

Jan. to 

May

2004

Sept. to 2002 2003

Dec.

2001

Jan. to

Aug.

2001

1998 1999 2000

Source: GAO analysis of FAA data.

Number of violations

28 41 30 17

314

417

1,238

506
Page 37 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

for violations included weather problems, mechanical failures, and pilot 

in-flight disorientation (i.e., getting lost). FAA officials stated that the 

number and severity of disciplinary actions imposed on pilots violating 

TFRs have increased since September 11. However, FAA officials were 

unable to provide statistical information on the number and severity of 

disciplinary actions for pilots violating TFRs before or since September 11. 

The imposition of TFRs can also have an economic impact on general 

aviation operations.40 TSA, FAA, and industry associations we spoke with 

stated that the costs associated with restricting airspace can be significant. 

The National Business Aviation Association commissioned a study to 

estimate the economic impact TFRs have had on general aviation since 

September 11.41 While we did not independently assess the validity of the 

association’s assumptions or calculations, the study estimated that general 

aviation passengers and firms lost over $1 billion because of increased 

costs to passengers and lost revenues and additional operating costs for 

general aviation firms.42

We visited St. Mary’s Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, to discuss the 

economic impact of TFRs with an affected general aviation airport 

operator.43 St. Mary’s is located approximately 3 miles south of the Kings 

Bay Naval Base, where FAA issued a security-related TFR shortly after 

September 11. The airport operator stated that the loss of much of the 

general aviation traffic through his airport resulting from the TFR had 

significantly reduced his ability to generate revenue to sustain operations. 

 40These costs may be expected to increase with the number of TFRs, and with their size 

and duration. A TFR that encompasses a large area and is in effect for a long period of time 

is more likely to cause flights to be cancelled, delayed, or diverted than is a TFR that covers 

a smaller area or is in effect for only a short while. 

41Key assumptions underlying the study’s estimates were that the typical TFR lasts about 4 

hours and affects approximately 15 flights per hour. Of the affected flights, about 40 

percent were assumed to be delayed, with about 50 percent assumed to be diverted, 

imposing costs on passengers and aircraft operators. 

42HLB Decision Economics INC (HLB Reference 6795) March 2004, “The Economic Costs 

of Restricting General Aviation Access to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and 

TFRs (Temporary Flight Restrictions) Since September 11, 2001.” The study estimated that, 

from September 11, 2001, through March 2004, 2,898 TFRs affected general aviation in the 

following ways: approximately 11,101 general aviation flight cancelations, 74,334 general 

aviation flight postponements, and 103,162 general aviation flight diversions to more 

circuitous routes. 

43St. Mary’s would be directly affected by FAA proposals to permanently prohibit flight 

operations within airspace under temporary flight restrictions at the time of our review. 
Page 38 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

According to the operator, the airport’s proximity to the TFR around the 

base significantly deters pilots from using the airport. Other airport 

operators we visited that were affected by TFRs also cited their negative 

economic impacts. A sign warning pilots to avoid restricted airspace near 

the St. Mary’s Airport is pictured in figure 11. 

Figure 11: Sign at St. Mary’s Airport in Brunswick, Georgia, Warning General 

Aviation Pilots to Avoid Restricted Airspace 

Although TFRs may have economic and other negative impacts on the 

general aviation industry, FAA did not establish a systematic process for 

periodically reviewing the continuing need for TFRs over the national 

capital region and the 13 TFRs over military installation, or determine the 

long-term economic or other impacts on general aviation operations of 

these restrictions. While FAA officials said they frequently reviewed TFRs 

on an informal basis, they did not conduct routine assessments of the 

continuing need for indefinite TFRs based on a consistent, documented set 

of criteria or determine the impact of these restrictions on general 

aviation. In June 2004, FAA officials, in reporting to Congress on the Air 

Defense Identification Zone, did not cite specific criteria or the process 

used to determine the continuing need for the restrictions. Instead, FAA 

based its report primarily on unspecified security reasons submitted by 

TSA. TSA officials cited the continuing threat posed to the national capital 

region by organizations such as al Qaeda. While the air defense 

identification zone around the national capital region is unique, it is 
Page 39 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

possible that future circumstances may warrant the issuance of other 

temporary flight restrictions of indefinite duration. Without documented 

procedures and criteria, FAA cannot ensure that future reviews of flight 

restrictions issued for indefinite periods are properly conducted, or 

consistently ensure that restrictions on airspace are still needed. 

We also found that TSA and FAA were limited in their ability to mitigate 

the threat of airborne attack. This is a result of limitations in airspace 

restrictions, and the practice of granting pilots waivers to enter 

temporarily restricted airspace. 

Enhancing general aviation security is difficult because of funding 

challenges faced by the federal government and general aviation airport 

operators. General aviation airports have received some federal funding 

for implementing security upgrades since September 11, but have funded 

most security enhancements on their own. General aviation stakeholders 

we contacted expressed concern that they may not be able to pay for any 

future security requirements that TSA may establish. In addition, TSA and 

FAA are unlikely to be able to allocate significant levels of funding for 

general aviation security enhancements, given competing priorities of 

commercial aviation and other modes of transportation. 

About 3,000 general aviation airports are eligible to receive FAA Airport 

Improvement Program grants.44 General aviation airports can use Airport 

Improvement Program grant funds for projects that provide safety and 

security benefits. For example, 6 of the 31 airport managers we 

interviewed, including one of the largest general aviation airports in the 

country, said they used Airport Improvement Program grants to pay for 

some of their security enhancements after September 11, 2001. In fiscal 

year 2002, general aviation airports received $561 million in Airport 

Improvement Program grants, of which $3.2 million (or about 0.6 percent) 

was awarded for security projects, and in fiscal year 2003, $680 million, of 

which $1.3 million (or about 0.2 percent) was awarded for security 

 44These airports are eligible to receive Airport Improvement grants because they have 

submitted applications to be included in and have been accepted in FAA’s National Plan of 

Integrated Airport Systems. These grant funds are usually limited to planning, designing, 

and constructing projects such as runways, taxiways, aprons, and land purchases. 

However, they may also be used for security and safety purposes. Eligible safety and 

security projects include improvements or equipment that is required by federal regulation 

or, according to FAA officials, if TSA makes an airport-specific determination that security 

enhancements are needed. 

Enhancing Security at 

General Aviation Airports 

Is Difficult because of 

Funding Challenges 
Page 40 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

projects.45 Because general aviation airports are generally not subject to 

any federal regulations for security,46 in order to meet eligibility 

requirements for their grants, general aviation airport projects are 

generally limited to those related to safety but have security benefits, such 

as lighting and fencing, as well as the acquisition and use of cameras, 

additional lighting, and motion sensors.47 FAA officials stated that if new 

security requirements were established for general aviation airports, 

security-related enhancement projects related to these requirements 

would be eligible and receive priority for Airport Improvement Program 

funding. However, given the competing demands of commercial airports, 

the large number of general aviation airports eligible for such funding, and 

the limitations of the Airport Improvement Program,48 funding could be 

uncertain for general aviation airport operators to meet any new securityrelated requirements. 

The Office for Domestic Preparedness within the Department of 

Homeland Security administers two grant programs that could benefit 

general aviation airports—the State Homeland Security Grant Program 

and the Urban Areas Security Initiative.49 Under these programs, states 

may purchase equipment to protect critical infrastructure, including 

equipment for general aviation airports, if the state declares general 

aviation airports critical infrastructures. During the course of our review, 

we learned of one state that plans to spend a small amount of Department 

 45The amounts of 2002 and 2003 Airport Improvement Program funds do not include grants 

provided to general aviation airports in states that receive FAA block grants since detailed 

information about the total amounts given to general aviation airports or the amounts of 

those funds that went for general aviation security are not readily available, according to 

FAA officials. Airport Improvement Program block grant states are Illinois, Michigan, New 

Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee Texas, and Wisconsin. 

46The Potomac, Washington Executive/Hyde Park, and Montgomery County general 

aviation airports in Maryland are subject to federal security regulations. 

47The Aviation and Transportation Security Act had extended eligibility for Airport 

Improvement Program funding to any additional security-related facilities and equipment 

required by law or the Secretary of Transportation after September 11, 2001, and before 

October 1, 2002. 

48GAO, Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Meet Airports’ 

Planned Developments, GAO-03-497T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2003). 

49The Office of Domestic Preparedness allocated nearly $1.7 billion in State Homeland 

Security grants among the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five territories for fiscal 

year 2004, and an additional $671 million in Urban Area Security Initiative grants among 50 

metropolitan areas. 
Page 41 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

of Homeland Security grants to improve the security of general aviation 

airports. According to officials in Wisconsin, the state plans to use at least 

$1.5 million of its $41 million Homeland Security Grant in 2004 to enhance 

security at general aviation airports located along the Great Lakes. 

Vision 100 also authorized the Department of Homeland Security to 

establish a $250 million Aviation Security Capital Fund administered by 

TSA to alleviate some of the demand on the Airport Improvement Program 

for security enhancement grants. Of this amount, $125 million is 

discretionary, with priority given to the installation of baggage-screening 

equipment at commercial airports while the balance is allocated by 

formula based on airport size and other security considerations. TSA 

officials noted that Congress did not provide an appropriation for fiscal 

year 2004 for the fund. If Congress decides to make appropriations in the 

future for these purposes, general aviation airports will still have to 

compete with commercial airports for this discretionary funding. Given 

the extent of unmet security funding needs at commercial airports, it 

seems unlikely that a significant proportion of funding would be available 

for general aviation. For example, estimates to install explosive detection 

system machinery with commercial airport baggage systems range from 

$3 billion to $5 billion. At the time of our review, $1.2 billion had been 

appropriated for this effort, and according to the House Committee on 

Appropriations, airports will be funded, at best, for about half of their 

installation needs. Even if funds were available, TSA would face a 

challenge in establishing and prioritizing security projects eligible for 

Aviation Security Capital Fund grants across a wide spectrum of general 

aviation airports with diverse characteristics. Although funding is limited 

for airport improvement, someairport managers we spoke with said they 

had expended thousands or hundreds of thousands of dollars for security 

in order to attract more tenants to their facility or to retain their existing 

tenants. 

Nonfederal stakeholders with an interest in general aviation security—

including industry associations, state governments, general aviation 

airport operators (owners and managers), and users of general aviation 

airports and aircraft—have taken steps to strengthen the security of 

general aviation airports and operations. Industry associations have 

developed and provided recommendations on best practices for enhancing 

security around general aviation airports, have partnered with the federal 

government to develop federally endorsed security guidelines, and have 

sponsored and provided training for their own voluntary security 

programs. Some states also have suggested best practices, established 

Nonfederal 

Stakeholders Have 

Taken Steps to 

Strengthen General 

Aviation Security 
Page 42 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

regulations, and provided funding to general aviation airports to reduce 

security vulnerabilities. General aviation airport operators and tenants, 

such as air charter services, have also implemented policy and procedural 

measures to restrict access to airport property and aircraft. Many airports 

we visited and surveyed had installed physical security enhancements, 

such as fencing, lighting, surveillance cameras, and electronic access 

control gates, and had hired additional security guards. General aviation 

aircraft owners have also taken steps to protect their aircraft from misuse. 

Many of the general aviation industry associations we contacted had 

developed guidance to help enhance the security of general aviation 

operations and airports. For example, the following are some of the 

recommendations or best practices designed to strengthen security at 

general aviation airports made by some of the members of the Aviation 

Security Advisory Committee’s Working Group on General Aviation 

Airports Security:50

• Posting signs at general aviation airports warning against unauthorized use 

of aircraft. 

• Securing aircraft when unattended using existing mechanisms such as 

door locks, keyed ignitions, and locked hangars to protect aircraft from 

unauthorized use or tampering. 

• Controlling vehicle access to areas where aircraft operate by using signs, 

fences, or gates. 

• Installing effective outdoor lighting to help improve the security of aircraft 

parking, hangar, and fuel storage areas, as well as airport access points. 

• Allowing local law enforcement operational space at the airport to provide 

a security presence that serves as a natural deterrent to terrorism. 

 50The members of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group on General 

Aviation Airports Security are the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, the Airports 

Consultants Council, the American Association of Airport Executives, the Experimental 

Aircraft Association, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the Helicopter 

Association International, the National Air Transportation Association, the National 

Association of State Aviation Officials, the National Business Aviation Association, and the 

U.S. Parachute Association. 

Industry Associations 

Have Provided General 

Aviation Airport Operators 

Guidance on Security 

Practices and Made 

Recommendations to TSA 
Page 43 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Several general aviation industry associations, in partnership with TSA, 

have also initiated their own voluntary security programs to address the 

security of general aviation operations and airports. For example: 

• The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, working with TSA, 

established and operates the Airport Watch program. The program was 

formed in March 2002—similar in concept to a neighborhood watch 

program—to improve general aviation airport community awareness. 

Through the program, the association provides warning signs for airports, 

informational literature, and training videotapes to educate pilots and 

airport employees on how the security of their airports and aircraft can be 

enhanced. TSA operates a toll-free hotline (866-GA-SECURE) where 

airport operators, managers, and pilots can report suspicious activity to 

TSA. In May 2004 the hotline began receiving calls regarding a variety of 

airport users’ concerns of suspicious activities or individuals in and 

around general aviation airports. Figure 12 shows an example of the 

posters identifying the hotline TSA provides to general aviation airports. 
Page 44 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Figure 12: Airport Watch Program Signs Distributed to General Aviation Airports 

Around the Country 

• The National Business Aviation Association developed a set of security 

procedures that corporate aircraft operators can put into place to increase 

the security of their operations. In January 2003, the association, in 

partnership with TSA, initiated a pilot project, called the TSA Access 

Certificate program, at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey for operators who 

had established these procedures in a security program and had their 

security program reviewed and approved by TSA. TSA approval allows 

operators to operate internationally without the need of a waiver each 

time they enter the country.51 (In August 2003, TSA expanded the program 

 51According to general aviation industry association officials, general aviation aircraft 

operators wishing to fly to the United States from other countries must stop in one of seven 

portal countries before entering the country. 
Page 45 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

to include corporate aircraft operators based at Morristown, New Jersey, 

and White Plains, New York.) According to association officials, the 

concept of a TSA-approved security program could be applied to other 

types of general aviation operations. Officials also stated that one operator 

of a single general aviation aircraft applied for and received a TSA access 

certificate to operate internationally.52

• The National Agricultural Aircraft Association created a program to 

educate aerial application pilots on safety and security issues (the 

Professional Aerial Applicators Support System).53 According to 

association officials, the training program qualifies operators in most 

states to meet continuing education requirements needed to maintain state 

agricultural aviation licenses. 

In addition to providing security guidance and developing security 

programs, 10 general aviation industry associations worked together to 

make security recommendations to TSA to help prevent the unauthorized 

use of general aviation aircraft in a terrorist attack. The group met 

throughout the summer of 2003 to review and discuss numerous general 

aviation airport security recommendations and evaluated each 

recommendation for its appropriateness and effect on enhancing security 

at general aviation airports. On the basis of this review, the group issued a 

report to TSA on suggested security guidelines.54

We visited 10 states and found that their efforts to enhance general 

aviation security reflected a range of activities. Some states had 

implemented new requirements for security, funded security 

enhancements, or provided guidance on best practices. Specifically, 2 of 

the 10 states we visited had imposed requirements for general aviation 

airports and aircraft owners and operators since September 11, 2001.55

 52TSA officials noted that all certificate holders are corporations. 

53According to the association, the majority of its members are licensed as commercial 

applicator-operators who use aircraft to enhance food and fiber production, protect 

forestry, and control health-threatening pests. 

54Report of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group on General 

Aviation Airports Security, October 1, 2003, Transportation Security Administration, 

Washington, D.C. 

55In addition, TSA officials said that New York had mandated that all general aviation 

airports in the state apply TSA’s security guidelines. 

States We Visited Varied in 

Their Efforts to Address 

General Aviation 

Vulnerabilities 
Page 46 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

• In July 2002, the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission issued a 

requirement that all airport employees—including general aviation airport 

employees—wear special photo identification badges. According to state 

officials, the badges enable airport personnel to distinguish between those 

who are, and are not, authorized to be on airport property. 

• In March 2003, the Governor of New Jersey issued an executive order that 

directed aircraft owners and operators who use the state’s 486 licensed 

general aviation facilities to take steps to limit access to aircraft. Called 

the “two-lock rule,” the executive order requires that all aircraft parked or 

stored at a general aviation facility in New Jersey for more than 24 hours 

be protected by a minimum of two locks that secure or disable the aircraft 

to prevent illegal or unlawful operations. 

Four of the 10 states we contacted provided funding for security 

enhancements at general aviation airports. This funding, however, was 

generally limited to matching funds for federal grants used to install 

measures that had both a safety and a security benefit, such as airport 

perimeter fencing and lighting projects. Some states had grant programs 

that could be used strictly for security enhancements: 

• For fiscal years 2002 through 2004, Georgia’s Department of 

Transportation Aviation Programs provided a total of $1,174,000 in grants 

to general aviation airports for fencing, lighting, and electronic card-reader 

gates. 

• In February 2002, Tennessee’s Aeronautics Commission issued a policy 

that the state would provide 90 percent of the cost (not to exceed a total of 

$50 million annually) on security-related projects at general aviation 

airports. Eligible projects include security fencing and gates, signage, 

security lighting and motion sensors, and surveillance cameras and 

monitors. 

• In 2003, the State of Washington established a $2 million annual matching 

grant program for general aviation airport security enhancements funded 

by proceeds from the state’s aviation fuel tax. 

• In 2004, Virginia appropriated $1.5 million to the state’s Department of 

Aviation specifically for security upgrades at general aviation airports. 

• California’s Aviation Division established a grant program for research and 

development projects that could fund security enhancements at general 

aviation airports. However, the Aviation Division’s budget has not been 

sufficient to provide any grants from the program over the past 3 years. 
Page 47 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

One of the 10 states we contacted provided guidance on security best 

practices, while 2 others provided guidance on preparing airport-specific 

security plans and self-assessments of vulnerabilities. In 3 of the 10 states, 

the incentive for airports to develop security plans is tied to funding 

eligibility. 

• In March 2003, Virginia’s Aviation Department Director issued a set of best 

practices and later established a voluntary security certification program, 

encouraging airports to assess their vulnerabilities and develop airportspecific security plans. 

• In May 2002, Tennessee’s Aeronautics Division issued guidance on 

developing an airport emergency and security plan. 

• In April 2003, Washington’s Aviation Division issued security guidelines for 

general aviation airports based on recommendations from a task force of 

pilots, general aviation associations, airports, law enforcement, and 

government agencies. 

Unlike commercial service airports, general aviation airports are not 

subject to current federal security regulations,56 and, therefore, general 

aviation managers and aircraft owners determine what security measures 

they will use to protect their assets. To determine security measures 

undertaken since September 11, we judgmentally selected and visited 31 

general aviation airports in 10 states open to the public and part of FAA’s 

National Plan of Integrated Airports.57 Airport managers we contacted 

reported spending as little as $10 for providing forgery-proof identification 

badges for airport employees to as much as $3 million on, among other 

voluntary measures at one airport, fencing and around-the-clock security 

guards. In our survey, about a third (36 percent) of managers reported that 

funds to pay for security improvements had come from airport revenues, 

while about a fifth reported receiving federal grants (21 percent) and a 

 5649 C.F.R. Part 1542. 

57A primary purpose of the National Plan of Integrated Airports (NPIAS) is to identify the 

airports that are important to national transportation and, therefore, eligible to receive 

grants under the Airport Improvement Program. The NPIAS is composed of all commercial 

service airports, all reliever airports, and selected general aviation airports. The word 

“airport” includes landing areas developed specifically for helicopters and seaplanes as 

well as conventional fixed wing aircraft landing areas. 

General Aviation Airport 

Managers and Aircraft 

Owners Are Primarily 

Responsible for Security 

Enhancements 
Page 48 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

fifth reported receiving state grants (22 percent) to finance security 

improvements.58

According to 18 of the 31 airport managers and 3 of 5 tenants (e.g., fixed 

base operators)59 we visited, the security measures and practices they 

implemented following the September 11 attacks were self-initiated, 

common sense kinds of measures that were expected by the public and 

their clients to help protect property from vandalism or theft. Many of 

these measures were no-cost or low-cost security enhancements based 

primarily on procedural changes. For example, for those airports that did 

not have formal written security plans, airport managers said they 

generally discussed security issues with their tenants on a regular basis 

through meetings and e-mails. Other airports that had formal written 

security plans or procedures updated those security plans and procedures 

based on recommendations from industry associations. Some of the 

31 airport managers we visited said they had arranged for more frequent 

patrols by local law enforcement officers since September 11, some for no 

cost to the airports. 

Many of the airports we visited had implemented an “airport watch” 

program—similar to neighborhood watch programs—and displayed signs 

designed and provided by the Airline Owners and Pilots Association, as 

discussed above. Other airports absorbed the cost of installing new signs 

warning against trespassing. Our survey of airport managers identified an 

increase in the use of security awareness training since September 11. For 

those aircraft owners who do not store their aircraft in a hangar, forms of 

securing their aircraft from unauthorized use include attaching devices to 

propellers, known as “prop locks,” to prevent them from rotating; and 

devices to cover throttle levers, known as “throttle locks,” to prevent 

someone from being able to start the aircraft. Figure 13 shows two kinds 

 58 We conducted a probability sample consisting of 499 or the 2,829 general aviation 

airports that are open to the public and part of FAA’s National Plan of Integrated Airports 

(NPIAS). We conducted this survey between March and May 2004, and obtained 344 

eligible responses. From this sample, estimates are produced for a target population 

defined as managers of service level general aviation airports that were included in the 

FAA National Plan of Integrated Airports database as of January 2004. Because we used a 

probability sample, the estimates could be different for a different random sample. For 

estimated percentages in this report, we are 95 percent confident that the actual value is 

within +/- 6 percentage points of the survey estimate. 

59Fixed-base operators provide a variety of services to pilots, such as flight training, aircraft 

rental, fueling, maintenance, parking, and the sale of pilot supplies. 
Page 49 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

of prop locks aircraft owners use. According to airport and state aviation 

officials, prop locks range in cost from about $150 to about $300. 

Figure 13: Examples of Propeller Locks to Prevent Unauthorized Aircraft Use 

Several of the airport managers we visited had invested in high-cost 

security measures to minimize access by potential criminals and terrorists 

to airport property and, thus, tenants’ aircraft. Specifically, airport officials 

Chain Lock

Chain Lock

Sources (top to bottom): San Carlos Airport, San Carlos, California and Virginia Department of Aviation.
Page 50 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

we visited had obtained federal or state grant assistance for purchasing 

additional fencing and lighting or purchasing high-tech surveillance 

cameras. However, several airport managers and tenants considered 

additional security a cost of conducting business in the post-September 11 

environment. Airports officials generally said that they spent between 

$25,000 and $500,000 on security enhancements such as fencing, lighting, 

and electronic access gates. While airport officials said they would like to 

add more security enhancements, they were reluctant to spend much more 

on enhancing security until TSA issued guidance on what security 

measures, or combination of security measures, TSA considers 

appropriate. (As noted previously, TSA issued security guidelines with 

recommended enhancements in May 2004, after the majority of our site 

visits.) 

Officials from the National Business Aviation Association said that 

corporate aviation departments are more likely to take high-cost measures 

to protect their aircraft. For example, some of the large member 

corporations had provided information on the types of security measures 

they used before September 11, to protect their aircraft from tampering, 

theft, or hijacking. According to the association, these included the types 

of security initiatives shown in table 3. 

Table 3: Examples of Security Measures Used by Aviation Departments of 55 

Fortune 500 Corporations 

All aircraft are stored in hangars 

All hangars are closed and monitored with security systems when the area is 

unattended. 

Mechanics are all company employees or vetted contractors. 

Visitors are personally escorted. 

Aviation facilities are restricted by an access control system. 

Aircraft doors are kept closed and locked when the aircraft is in a secure hangar. 

Comprehensive background investigations are conducted for flight crew personnel. 

Source: National Business Aviation Association. 

From its inception, TSA has primarily focused its efforts on enhancing 

commercial aviation security to prevent aircraft from again being used as 

weapons. The amount of TSA’s resources and the vastness and diversity of 

the general aviation airport system mean the bulk of the responsibility for 

determining vulnerabilities and instituting security enhancements has 

fallen and will likely continue to fall on airport operators. As the 9/11 

Commission concluded, homeland security and national preparedness 

Conclusions 
Page 51 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

often begins with the private sector. While the federal government can 

provide guidance and some amount of funding for security enhancements, 

long-term success in securing general aviation depends on a partnership 

among the federal government, state governments, and the general 

aviation industry. 

Even with such a partnership, enhancing security at general aviation 

airports presents TSA and the general aviation community with challenges 

that will not be easily or quickly resolved. For example, TSA’s planned risk 

management approach for general aviation could assist the agency in 

providing guidance and prioritizing funding for security enhancements by 

assessing vulnerabilities and threats to better target its efforts. However, 

without a documented implementation plan for assessing threats and 

vulnerabilities that sets forth time frames and goals and the resources 

needed to achieve these goals, there is limited assurance that TSA will 

focus its resources and efforts on areas of greatest need, monitor the 

progress of its efforts, and hold responsible officials accountable for 

achieving desired results. In addition, completing vulnerability and threat 

assessments in partnership with general aviation airports should help TSA 

better communicate threat information. However, because TSA must rely 

on other federal agencies to provide threat information and follow federal 

requirements governing disclosure of classified information, it is difficult 

for TSA to adhere to risk communication principles, particularly in 

providing specific and actionable information. Nevertheless, effective 

communication of threat information is important because misallocation 

of limited resources and disruption of operations are possible effects of 

communicating nonspecific or incorrect threat information. 

While TSA and FAA have promulgated regulations to help reduce security 

risks associated with access to aircraft and airspace, the intended security 

benefit of these regulations may be limited for a variety of reasons. For 

example, we found limitations in TSA’s process for monitoring flight 

training providers and operators of private charter aircraft, and in granting 

waivers to pilots to fly through security related flight restrictions. In 

addition, FAA has not documented its process for reviewing and 

revalidating the need for continuing security-related flight restrictions on 

airspace that are established for indefinite periods. Without plans for 

monitoring compliance or procedures to document agency processes, TSA 

and FAA cannot ensure that these regulations achieve their intended effect 

or minimize the negative impacts of the regulations on affected general 

aviation industry stakeholders. 
Page 52 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

To better assess the threat of terrorists’ misuse of general aviation aircraft 

and to improve the quality of communicating terrorist threat information 

to the general aviation community, we recommend that the Secretary of 

the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary of 

Homeland Security for the Transportation Security Administration to take 

the following two actions: 

• Develop an implementation plan for executing a risk management 

approach that will help identify threats and vulnerabilities. Such a plan 

should include milestones, specific time frames, and estimates of funding 

and staffing needed to focus its resources and efforts on identified 

airports. 

• After identifying the most critical threats and vulnerabilities, apply risk 

communication principles, including to the extent possible the nature of 

the threat, when and where it is likely to occur, over what time period, and 

guidance on actions to be taken—in developing and transmitting security 

advisories and threat notifications. 

To help ensure that temporary flight restrictions issued for indefinite 

periods are reviewed and, if appropriate, revalidated and consistently 

applied, we recommend that the Secretary of the Transportation direct the 

Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to establish a 

documented process to justify the initiation and continuance of flight 

restrictions for extended periods. 

In our restricted report, we also made two recommendations to the 

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security regarding monitoring 

compliance with regulations governing the identification of student pilots, 

their training, and the operation of certain general aviation aircraft; and 

the process for granting pilots waivers to enter restricted airspace. 

We provided draft copies of this report to the Department of Homeland 

Security, the Department of Transportation, the Transportation Security 

Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration for their review 

and comment. TSA generally concurred with the findings and 

recommendations in the report and provided formal written comments 

that are presented in appendix II. TSA provided technical comments that 

we incorporated as appropriate. FAA also generally concurred with the 

findings and recommendations in the report and provided technical 

comments that we incorporated as appropriate. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 
Page 53 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the 

date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the 

Department of Transportation, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland 

Security for the Transportation Security Administration, and the 

Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration and interested 

congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to discuss 

it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at berrickc@gao.gov, or 

Chris Keisling, Assistant Director, at (404) 679-1917 or at 

keislingc@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix 

III. 

Sincerely yours, 

Cathleen A. Berrick 

Director, Homeland Security 

 and Justice Issues 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 54 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

To determine what steps the federal government has taken to identify and 

assess threats to and vulnerabilities of general aviation, and communicate 

that information to stakeholders, we interviewed individuals in the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) Office of Transportation 

Security Policy, Office of Operations Policy, and General Aviation 

Operations and Inspections Office on TSA’s role in enhancing general 

aviation security. Individuals from these offices provided documentation 

on TSA’s threat assessment efforts as well as its past vulnerability 

assessment activities and future vulnerability assessment plans. We 

examined documentation on TSA’s means of obtaining intelligence 

information and disseminating that information to general aviation 

stakeholders. We also interviewed individuals from FAA’s Special 

Operations Division and Airspace and Rules Division on their roles in 

securing general aviation. We examined documentation from the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 

on intelligence regarding potential terrorist misuse of general aviation. In 

addition, we examined documentation from TSA and FBI on the reasons 

general aviation may be vulnerable to terrorist misuse. We also spoke to 

staff in and examined documentation from TSA’s Office of Threat 

Assessment and Risk Management to obtain information on plans to 

implement a risk management approach to further assess threats and 

vulnerabilities and to enable the agency to implement risk communication 

principles to communicate threat information. 

To determine what steps the federal government has taken to strengthen 

general aviation security, and what, if any, challenges the government 

faces in further enhancing security, we obtained and analyzed information 

from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), including data on the 

number of flight restrictions that affect general aviation and the amount of 

federal funding that has been spent on enhancing general aviation security. 

We sought to determine the reliability of these data by, among other 

things, discussing methods of inputting and maintaining data with FAA 

officials. We spoke to TSA officials about, and examined related 

documentation on, security guidelines published by TSA, including 

documentation on TSA’s activities with the Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee’s Working Group on General Aviation Airports Security. We 

interviewed general aviation industry representatives, including those who 

provided input to the TSA-sponsored Aviation Security Advisory 

Committee’s Working Group on General Aviation Airports Security, to 

obtain their views on federal efforts to enhance general aviation security. 

We also interviewed individuals from TSA’s Office of Compliance on the 

promulgation of regulations as a result of the passage of the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act, as well as TSA’s plans for ensuring operator 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 55 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

compliance with these regulations. We interviewed personnel from FAA’s 

Special Operations Division regarding FAA’s issuance of temporary flight 

restrictions, including the criteria and internal controls FAA uses to 

examine requests for these restrictions from federal and nonfederal 

entities. As part of this analysis, we took steps to verify the reliability of 

data from FAA on the number of violations of temporary flight restrictions. 

We interviewed FAA and TSA officials on potential limitations of the 

effectiveness of these flight restrictions. We also contacted the Director of 

the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force on efforts to screen foreign 

students applying for flight training in the United States. We examined 

potential sources of funding for additional security measures at general 

aviation airports, including challenges associated with limited funding. 

To determine the actions individual general aviation airport managers 

have taken to enhance security at their airports, we visited 31 general 

aviation airports in 10 states. We judgmentally selected these 31 airports to 

observe a cross section of general aviation airports. However, we limited 

our selection of general aviation airports to the 2,829 listed in FAA’s 

National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems, because these airports are 

eligible for FAA funding and are open to use by the general public. The 

remaining 16,000 general aviation airports are generally privately owned 

and not open to use by the public, and/or are small landing strips with 

fewer than 10 based aircraft, and are not eligible for federal funding. To 

ensure we selected a cross section of general aviation airports listed in the 

National Plan, we based our selection on: 

1. Size, using the number of based aircraft as an indicator—100 or more 

aircraft we considered large, 25 to 99 medium, and 24 or fewer small. 

2. Regional location—northeast, northwest, southeast, and southwest 

areas of the country. 

3. Proximity to potential terrorist targets such as large population centers 

versus sparse population areas, as well as near to and far from other 

critical infrastructures and symbolic landmarks. 

4. Airport characteristics, including number, length, and type (turf or 

paved) of runways, and primary types of general aviation operations 

such as recreational aviation, business and corporate aviation, charter 

services, and flight training. 

Because we judgmentally selected these general aviation airports, we 

cannot draw generalized conclusions based on airport managers’ interview 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 56 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

responses. However, the anecdotal information provided is intended to 

complement the findings of our random survey of 500 general aviation 

airports. 

To obtain examples of what some states have done to enhance general 

aviation security, we judgmentally selected 10 states with efforts to 

enhance general aviation security ranging from issuing new security 

requirements to those in the early stages of determining how they would 

address general aviation security. To select this range of states, we 

conducted a literature search to determine which states had proposed or 

enacted new security laws, regulations, or requirements. We also 

requested recommendations from the National Association of State 

Aviation Officials and other industry associations such as the Aircraft 

Owners and Pilots Association, and noted which state aviation directors 

had participated in the National Association of State Aviation Officials’ 

Task Group on General Aviation Security. We also considered whether a 

state participated in FAA’s block grant program in which FAA provides 

airport improvement program grant money to a state in a lump sum and 

the state determines which airport projects to fund, rather than each 

airport applying directly to FAA for grant funds on a project-by-project 

basis. Finally, on the basis of our resources, we considered those states in 

which we also planned to visit general aviation airports. Because we did 

not randomly select the states in which we obtained information, we 

cannot draw generalized conclusions about all states. However, the 

information obtained from these 10 states serves to provide examples of 

what some states have done to enhance general aviation security. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Transportation Security Administration 

Page 57 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Appendix II: Comments from the 

Transportation Security Administration 
Appendix II: Comments from the Transportation Security Administration 

Page 58 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 
Appendix II: Comments from the Transportation Security Administration 

Page 59 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 
Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 60 GAO-05-144 General Aviation Security 

Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404 

Chris Keisling (404) 679-1917 

In addition to those named above, Leo Barbour, Grace Coleman, 

Chris Ferencik, Kara Finnegan-Irving, Dave Hooper, Stan Kostyla, 

Thomas Lombardi, Mark Ramage, Robert Rivas, Jerry Seigler, and 

Richard Swayze were key contributors to this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(440245) 
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help 

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost 

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To 

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go to 

www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.”

Order by Mail or Phone The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to:

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Contact:

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Congressional 

Relations

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Susan Becker, Acting Manager, BeckerS@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548