NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RYAN LEE PIERCE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-35387 

D.C. No. 3:21-cv-05384-MAT 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Mary Alice Theiler, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 13, 2023

Seattle, Washington

Before: GRABER, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

Ryan Lee Pierce appeals the district court’s order affirming the 

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 

we review de novo the district court’s order. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 

1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). We may set aside the ALJ’s denial of benefits “only if 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

AUG 10 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based in legal error.” Smartt v. 

Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted).

1. The ALJ did not err by giving “minimal weight” to the examination findings 

and assessments of state agency physicians Dr. Neims, Dr. Wheeler, Dr. Krueger, 

Dr. Eisenhauer, and Dr. Ruddell. The ALJ analyzed each state agency physician’s 

opinion separately, but ultimately gave them less weight for the same reasons: that 

they appeared to lack an objective basis and were inconsistent with Pierce’s

medical record as a whole. These reasons were “specific and legitimate” and

supported by substantial evidence. See Smartt, 53 F.4th at 494. The ALJ

explained that the state agency physicians seemed to rest their findings largely on

Pierce’s subjective reports, which the ALJ found to be unreliable because of 

Pierce’s “disability conviction.” Their opinions were also inconsistent with the

opinions of the treating physicians who saw Pierce more regularly throughout the 

2000s and 2010s. Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the 

record as a whole, the more weight the ALJ gives to that medical opinion. See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4).

2. The ALJ also did not err by giving “minimal weight” to the statement of 

Pierce’s physical therapist, Ms. Larsen, and to the statement of Pierce’s father. 

Opinions of physical therapists are not entitled to the same deference as the 
3 

opinions of providers within the definition of “acceptable medical sources,” but 

ALJs must still give “germane” reasons for assigning less weight to or rejecting 

their opinions. Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 655 (9th Cir. 2017); see 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(b), (f). The ALJ permissibly explained that she gave less 

weight to Ms. Larsen’s opinion because it was expressly based on a single 30-

minute evaluation and relied heavily on the claimant’s subjective reporting of 

symptoms. “An ALJ need only give germane reasons for discrediting the 

testimony of lay witnesses. Inconsistency with medical evidence is one such 

reason.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal 

citation omitted). As with the state agency physicians, the ALJ gave less weight to 

Pierce’s father’s statements because his statements were inconsistent with Pierce’s 

medical record as a whole. Accordingly, the ALJ gave “germane reasons” for 

giving less weight to Ms. Larsen’s and Pierce’s father’s statements.

AFFIRMED.