# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 22, 2019 *

Decided April 23, 2019

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 17-2820

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee

,

v

.

PHILLIP J. JEFFERSON, Defendant-Appellant

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 CR 734-1

Thomas M. Durkin, J udge

.

O R D E R

Phillip Jefferson appeals his sentence —specifically, one condition of his supervised release—imposed by the district court after he was convicted of making a false claim against the government, 18 U.S. C. § 287, and stealing government funds, id. § 641. Both parties agree that the supervis ed-release condition requiring him to remain within the jurisdiction is vague and ov erbroad. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for a limited resentencing hearing.

* We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and le gal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited onl y in accordance with Fed. R. A pp . P. 32.1No. 17-2820 Page 2

After a jury found Jefferson guilty, th e judge adopted the probation office’s proposed recommendations and guidelines calculations and sentenced him to 30 months in prison and 2 years of supervis ed release. As relevant here, the judge imposed a discretionary supervised-release condition stating: “[Y]ou shall remain within the jurisdiction where you are bein g supervised, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a probation officer.” Af ter reading the condition aloud, the judge asked if Jefferson needed explanation of the conditions or had objections, and Jefferson’s counsel replied that he did not.

On appeal Jefferson first contends that th e term “jurisdiction” in this condition is impermissibly vague, and he points to our recent cases that hold as much. See United States v. Hudson, 908 F.3d 1083, 1084–85 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Dickson , 849 F.3d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); United States v. Ortiz , 817 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2016). The government concedes, and we agree, that the wording of this standard condition is flawed. The better term to use fo r this condition is “judicial district,” which suggests geographical, not jurisdictional, boundaries . See Hudson , 908 F.3d at 1085.

Jefferson relatedly challenges the condit ion for omitting a scienter requirement. He notes that the standard supervised-rel ease condition under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(3) was revised in November 2016 to include the word “knowingly”: “The defendant shall

not knowingly leave the federal judicial district wher e he or she is authorized to reside without first getting permission from the court or the probation officer.” § 5D1.3(c)(3) (2016) (emphasis added). True, we have obse rved that the inclusion of a scienter requirement would “improve” th e wording of the condition, United States v. Kappes

, 782 F.3d 828, 849–50 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Johnson , 911 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he word ‘knowingly’ in this condition cures any potential vagueness.”), but that language “is not ma ndatory, and ... courts may impose this condition without it,” United States v. Givens , 875 F.3d 387, 390 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).

We are left with the question of how to remedy the problematic condition. The government argues that remand is unnecessary because there is no suggestion that the judge meant anything other than “judic ial district” when he used the word “jurisdiction.” This court, according to the government, readily could correct the judgment by changing “jurisdiction” to “jud icial district.” The proper inquiry, however, relates not to the understanding of the judge but that of the defendant, and whether the defendant “correctly understood [jurisdict ion] to denote a geographical area, [and]No. 17-2820 Page 3

what the boundaries of that area are.” Ortiz , 817 F.3d at 555. Unlike Hudson , the judge here did not define “jurisdiction” or “judicial district,” nor did he explain the boundaries, so there is no reason to assu me that the defendant correctly understood what the judge meant by “jurisdiction.” See Hudson , 908 F.3d at 1085; see also Ortiz

, 817 F.3d at 555. Thus, remand for a limited rese ntencing of this condition is warranted. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.