alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EX-10.6
                 AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

                 AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT

     This Amendment to Employment Agreement ("Amendment") is made this
15th day of January, 2003, and shall supplement and amend that
Employment Agreement ("Agreement"), dated January 15, 2003, entered
into by and between Synthetic Turf Corporation of America, a Nevada
corporation ("Company"), and Gary Borglund, ("Employee").

     All terms and conditions of the Agreement not otherwise amended
by this Amendment shall remain in full force and effect.

     The value of the shares of common stock as set forth in Section
4.0 of the Agreement shall be valued at $0.005, instead of the
value of $0.02 as set forth in the Agreement.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Amendment to be
executed and delivered as of the date first above written.

                                    EMPLOYER:

                                    SYNTHETIC TURF CORPORATION
                                    OF AMERICA


                                    By: /s/  Mark Crist
                                    Mark Crist, Director


                                    EMPLOYEE:


                                    /s/  Gary Borglund
                                    Gary Borlgund
Searched for **https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/ES-05-10968.pdf**

 

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*Note:* This calendar view maps the number of captures of **https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/ES-05-10968.pdf**, *not* how many times the site was actually updated.

Look Up URL in general Internet Archive web collection.
#### Maria Santagata, Respondent-Appellant, v. Alfonse L. Santagata, Appellant-Respondent.

In an action for separation, the defendant husband appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated August 15, 1968, which, *inter alia,*granted plaintiff a judicial separation on the ground of cruel and inhuman treatment, dismissed defendant’s affirmative defenses, granted plaintiff custody of the infant child of the marriage, and awarded her $50 a week alimony, $100 a week support for the infant and a $2,500 counsel fee; and the plaintiff wife cross-appeals, as limited by her notice of appeal and her brief, from so much of the judgment as thus limited the awards of alimony, support and counsel fee and failed to grant her request for possession of household furnishings. Judgment modified, on the law and the facts and in the exercise of discretion, by striking from the fourth decretal paragraph the figures $150 and $100 and substituting therefor the figures $125 and $75, respectively, so that defendant shall be required to pay plaintiff $125 weekly, $50 thereof for her support and $75 for the child’s support. As so modified, judgment affirmed, without costs. In light of all the facts disclosed by this record, we are of the opinion that the weekly award of child support was excessive to the extent indicated. Christ, Acting P. J., Brennan, Rabin, Benjamin and Munder, JJ., concur.
Will you qualify for 

EITC this year?

You may qualify for Earned Income Tax 

Credit (EITC) on your 2013 tax return. 

If eligible, you must file a tax return to 

claim your EITC.

Publication 3954 (EN/SP) (Rev. 10-2013) Catalog Number 33279N

Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service www.irs.gov

Life’s a little easier with

you earned under $46,227 and have three or more 

qualifying children ($51,567 if married filing jointly)

you earned under $43,038 and have two qualifying 

children ($48,378 if married filing jointly)

you earned under $37,870 and have one qualifying 

child ($43,210 if married filing jointly)

you earned under $14,340 and have no qualifying child 

($19,680 if married filing jointly)

If...

Check out the EITC Assistant, an interactive tool that shows 

you whether or not you qualify, and why. The EITC Assistant is 

available on www.irs.gov/eitc or call 1-800-TAX-1040 for more 

information.
¿Reunirá usted los requisitos 

para el Crédito Tributario por 

Ingreso del Trabajo (EITC) 

este año?

Usted podría reunir los requisitos para recibir el 

Crédito Tributario por Ingreso del Trabajo (EITC, 

por sus siglas en inglés) en su declaración de 

impuestos para el año 2013. Si tiene derecho al 

crédito, tiene que presentar una declaración de 

impuestos para poder reclamar el EITC.

Publication 3954 (EN/SP) (Rev. 10-2013) Catalog Number 33279N

Department of the Treasury Internal Revenue Service www.irs.gov

La vida es más fácil con el

usted ganó menos de $46,227 y tiene tres hijos calificados 

o más ($51,567 si es casado que presenta una declaración 

conjunta)

usted ganó menos de $43,038 y tiene dos hijos calificados 

($48,378 si es casado que presenta una declaración conjunta)

usted ganó menos de $37,870 y tiene un hijo calificado 

($43,210 si es casado que presenta una declaración conjunta)

usted ganó menos de $14,340 y no tiene un hijo calificado 

($19,680 si es casado que presenta una declaración conjunta)

Si...

Consulte el “Asistente EITC”, una herramienta interactiva que le 

indicará si usted reúne o no los requisitos para el crédito y el porqué. 

Éste está disponible en español en www.irs.gov/espanol, o llamando 

al 1-800-829-1040, para más información.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                             5
       
<S>                                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                         12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                     DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                776,207
<SECURITIES>                          0
<RECEIVABLES>                         198,527
<ALLOWANCES>                          0
<INVENTORY>                           0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                      0
<PP&E>                                13,493,552   <F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                        3,806,865
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                        11,364,140
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 0
<BONDS>                               8,716,089    <F2>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                 0
<PREFERRED>                           0
<COMMON>                              2,376,679   <F3>
<OTHER-SE>                            0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>          11,364,140
<SALES>                               0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      2,213,622  <F4>
<CGS>                                 0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                         1,107,671                 <F5>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                      0                          
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                    864,778
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       0
<INCOME-TAX>                          0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   0
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0
<CHANGES>                             0
<NET-INCOME>                          241,173
<EPS-PRIMARY>                         0
<EPS-DILUTED>                         0

<FN>
<F1>   "PP&E" REPRESENTS INVESTMENT IN REAL ESTATE [LAND AND
BUILDING]
<F2>   "BONDS" REPRESENTS MORTGAGES PAYABLE
<F3>   "COMMON" REPRESENTS TOTAL PARTNERS CAPITAL
<F4>   "TOTAL REVENUES" REPRESENTS RENTAL, INTEREST, AND OTHER
INCOME
<F5>   "TOTAL COSTS" REPRESENTS TOTAL EXPENSES 
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
#### § 29.6028 No Grade.

A designation applied to a lot of tobacco classified as damaged, dirty, nested, offtype, semicured, or wet; tobacco that is improperly packed, contains foreign matter, or has an odor foreign to the type. (See Rules 5 and 17.)
#### Mary Slone et al., Respondents, v Peter A. Salzer et al., Defendants, and John DeCicco, Appellant.

[775 NYS2d 891]

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the defendant John DeCicco appeals from an order of the *610Supreme Court, Nassau County (Segal, J.), dated March 21, 2003, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.

The appellant made out a prima facie case that his conduct did not constitute malpractice through the affirmations of Drs. Donna Mendes and Lawrence Kobak *(see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,*68 NY2d 320 [1986]). In opposition, the affirmation submitted by the plaintiffs of their undisclosed expert merely stated in conclusory terms that the appellant’s failure to consult with the injured plaintiff’s vascular specialist exacerbated the injured plaintiffs condition. Moreover, it failed to address the contentions of the appellant’s experts. Thus, it was insufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment *(see Kaplan v Hamilton Med. Assoc.,*262 AD2d 609 [1999]; *Fhima v Maimonides Med. Ctr.,*269 AD2d 559 [2000]; *Yasin v Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp.,*254 AD2d 281 [1998]). Santucci, J.P., S. Miller, Schmidt and Townes, JJ, concur.
#### § 29.6048 Type 55.

That type of cigar-leaf tobacco commonly known as Northern Wisconsin Cigar-leaf or Northern Wisconsin Binder-type, produced principally north and west of the Wisconsin River and extending into Minnesota.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

OSCAR MARTINEZ,

Defendant Below,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF DELAWARE,

Plaintiff Below,

Appellee.

§

§ 

§ No. 623, 2015

§

§

§ Court Below: Superior Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ Cr. ID No. 0905009708

§

§

Submitted: January 7, 2016

Decided: February 23, 2016

Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and SEITZ, Justices.

O R D E R

This 23rd day of February 2016, after careful consideration of the 

appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to affirm, and the record on appeal, 

the Court concludes that the October 23, 2015 order of the Superior Court

dismissing the appellant’s second motion for postconviction relief should be 

affirmed. The motion was subject to summary dismissal under Superior Court 

Criminal Rule 61 because it was the appellant’s second motion for postconviction 

relief after he pled guilty.

1

 The appellant also failed to plead with particularity the 

 

1

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2) (providing that second or subsequent motion for postconviction 

relief shall be summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after trial and pleads with 

particularity new evidence creating a strong inference that the movant is actually innocent or a 

claim that a new rule of constitutional law is retroactively applicable and renders the conviction 

invalid).
2

existence of new evidence that created a strong inference of actual innocence2or a 

new rule of constitutional law that was retroactively applicable.

3

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 

GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice 

 

2

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(i).

3

Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(ii).
**EXHIBIT 31.1****Certification**I, G. Gary Yetman, certify that:1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q of Coleman Cable, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is madeknown to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in whichthis report is being prepared;  b. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  c. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarterthat has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operationof internal control over financial reporting, which are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  b. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employeeswho have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting.   Date:November 7, 2006 **/s/ G. Gary Yetman**     **Chief Executive Officer and President**
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Edgar Webster, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered October 27, 1967, convicting him of attempted burglary in the third degree, on a guilty plea, and imposing a second-offender sentence of 2% to. 4 years. Judgment reversed, on the law, and case remitted *558to the court below for further proceedings as hereinafter indicated. The findings of fact below have not been considered. After his guilty plea defendant was arraigned on a prior offense information. At that time he admitted identity, but challenged the prior conviction on the ground that it had been unconstitutionally obtained. Without a hearing and determination of the issue raised by that challenge, the sentencing court adjudged defendant a second felony offender and imposed a second-offender sentence, without prejudice to any future *coram nobis*application that defendant might choose to make addressed to the alleged invalidity of his prior conviction. In our opinion, the procedure followed by the sentencing court violated section 1943 of the former Penal Law (which was the controlling statute when the crime was committed) and that error requires reversal of the judgment. As we read section 1943, when a defendant, being arraigned on a prior offense information, challenges the constitutionality of the prior conviction, the statute requires that the sentencing court must hear and determine such issue before it imposes a sentence on the current conviction (cf. *People*v. *Jones,*17 N Y 2d 404, 408-409). If it finds the prior conviction valid, it may then adjudicate the defendant a multiple offender and sentence him accordingly on the current conviction; but if it finds the prior conviction constitutionally defective, it may not use it as a predicate for a multiple offender sentence on the current conviction. Since the sentencing court .in the ease at bar did not hear and determine the issue raised by defendant before it adjudged him a second offender and sentenced him as such, the sentence must be reversed and the case remitted for resentencing in the manner herein indicated. Christ, Acting P. J., Rabin, Hopkins, Benjamin and Munder, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of the Claim of Leo N. McCann, Respondent, v. City of New York, Appellant. Workmen’s Compensation Board, Respondent.

Herlihy, J.

Appeal by the self-insured employer from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Board, dated April 21, 1965 which granted an award to the claimant for the occupational disease of Dupuytren’s contracture. The claimant had been employed by the appellant since early 1961 as a *619tractor operator. His work involved the operation of motorized equipment and particularly bulldozers which required the constant grasping of levers with his hands. He had been doing this type of work for about 25 years. It appears that he was first made aware of this Dupuytren’s contracture in January of 1961 when he was examined by the board doctor in regard to a cut on his thumb. The board found “that the claimant has an occupational Dupuytren’s contracture condition causally related to his work activities as a crane and tractor operator for the City of New York, and that the claim is not barred under the time limitations of Section 40 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, as there was continued exposure to the disease in the employment.” The appellant contends that the claimant’s disability was not an occupational disease because there is no link between the disability and the nature of his employment by it. Both the appellant’s doctor and the claimant’s doctor testified that claimant’s employment by the appellant did adversely affect the claimant’s condition. In *Matter of Cannon*v. *Terry Contr.*(20 A D 2d 740, 741), it was determined that an aggravation of a pre-existing Dupuytren’s contracture condition in the last employment will confer liability on the last employer. The appellant further contends that the claim was not made within one year after contracting the disease and therefore was not timely filed as required by section 40 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. As to this issue, it has been established that aggravation in the last employment is the equivalent of contraction as that word is construed in section 40 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. *(Matter of Morrooco*v. *Mohican Stores,*17 A D 2d 684, affd. 13 N Y 2d 1015; *Matter of Cannon*v. *Terry Contr., supra.)*The question of apportionment among employers under section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law does not arise until the liability of the appellant is finally determined. Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workmen’s Compensation Board. Gibson, P. J., Reynolds and Staley, Jr., JJ., concur with Herlihy, J.
Page 1 of 2

Case No. 3:20cv5259-MCR-HTC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

ARIEL TRASANCO,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20cv5259-MCR-HTC

DMD PATRICIA MASON,

RN MARTHA LANG,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation on April 7, 2022.

ECF No. 50. The Plaintiff was furnished a copy of the Report and 

Recommendation and afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to Title 28, 

United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). There have been no timely filed objections.

Having considered the Report and Recommendation and the record, I have 

determined the Report and Recommendation should be adopted.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. The magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 50) is 

adopted and incorporated by reference in this Order.

Case 3:20-cv-05259-MCR-HTC Document 51 Filed 08/29/22 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

Case No. 3:20cv5259-MCR-HTC

2. This case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to 

prosecute and failure to comply with Court orders.

3. The clerk of court is directed to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of August 2022.

 M. Casey Rodgers

M. CASEY RODGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:20-cv-05259-MCR-HTC Document 51 Filed 08/29/22 Page 2 of 2
Case 3:98-cr-00086-RV Document 256 Filed 06/30/09 Page 1 of 2Case 3:98-cr-00086-RV Document 256 Filed 06/30/09 Page 2 of 2
Exhibit 32

CERTIFICATION
OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER  PURSUANT TO  18 U.S.C. SECTION
1350,  AS ADOPTED PUSUANT TO  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the
year ended October 31, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13
(a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information
contained in such Annual Report fairly presents in all material respect the
financial condition and results of operations of Vitro Diagnostics, Inc.

Date:   February
9, 2007

| | By:/s/   James R. Musick
Name: James R. Musick Title: President, Chairman, Chief Executive
Officerand Principal Financial OfficerVitro Diagnostics, Inc.
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
**Exhibit 31.1****CERTIFICATIONS**I, Steven J. Malcolm, certify that:1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Williams Partners L.P.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relatingto the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by otherswithin those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;  b) [Intentionally omitted pursuant to SEC Release No. 34-47986];  c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;and  d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’sfourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrol over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and  b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.Date: November 2, 2006                                                       /s/ Steven J. Malcolm   Steven J. Malcolm   Chief Executive Officer of Williams Partners GP LLC,general partner of Williams Partners L.P.(Principal Executive Officer)  
50
#### § 29.3548 Steam-dried.

The condition of unfermented tobacco as customarily prepared for storage by means of a redrying machine or other steam-conditioning equipment.

[30 FR 9207, July 23, 1965. Redesignated at 49 FR 16759, Apr. 20, 1984]