UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

ex rel. ROBERT V. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20cv3678/MCR/EMT

JAY A. ODOM and OKALOOSA COUNTY,

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS,

Defendants.

______________________________________/

DEFENDANT JAY A. ODOM’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

COMES NOW, Defendant Jay A. Odom (“Odom”), by and through counsel,

and moves this Court, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 

12(b)(6), for dismissal of Relator’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, with prejudice, and

respectfully requests an award of attorneys’ fees in favor of Odom. In support of 

this Motion, Odom states the following:

I. INTRODUCTION

Okaloosa County (“County”) is the airport sponsor of Destin Executive 

Airport (“DTS”), a federally regulated airport. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 2, 17. Like most 

federally regulated airports, annually, the County enters into an agreement with the 

Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) to receive a grant for capital projects at 

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DTS. The annual grant agreement contains a series of standard conditions known

as “grant assurances,” which pervasively regulate how the County can spend grant 

monies and how the County operates DTS. Among these grant assurances is a 

commitment that the County will not grant an “exclusive right” to any airport user 

that provides aeronautical services to the public, known as a fixed base operator 

(FBO).1 ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 2-3, 17, 28.

Relator Robert Smith (“Relator”) claims that Odom and the County

(collectively, “Defendants”) have violated this prohibition on exclusive rights and 

thereby have violated the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, et seq., (“FCA”) and 

the Florida False Claims Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 68.081, et seq., (“Florida FCA”’). As is 

required by the unique procedures mandated by the FCA, the Relator offered the 

United States the opportunity to prosecute this litigation. When the United States 

declined to do so, Relator chose to proceed with this litigation on his own.

Relator’s Complaint should be dismissed for five discrete reasons:

1. The FCA’s public disclosure bar prohibits these claims, because

Relator relies solely on publicly disclosed information and is not an 

original source.

1 An FBO is a business at an airport that provides all the essential services that are 

required by private aircraft operators, such as fuel, maintenance, servicing, and other 

ancillary services. FBOs are highly regulated enterprises.

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2. The submissions to the United States were not false or material as a 

matter of law, and the United States knew or should have known of the 

facts underlying Relator’s Complaint prior to approving the grants at 

issue.

3. Relator failed to state a claim with particularity, including failing to 

state how the United States was misled by any alleged false claim or 

submission.

4. Relator’s Complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading that fails to 

properly state which allegations of fact support each FCA claim against 

each Defendant. 

5. As to violation of the Florida FCA, neither Relator nor the United States 

has standing to bring the claim, without notice to or naming the State 

of Florida as the party in interest.

Each of these deficiencies is fatal to Relator’s causes of action, and dismissal of all 

counts with prejudice is warranted.

II. ARGUMENT

A. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and raises “a right 

to relief above the speculative level.” Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human 

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Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2020). A claim is plausible “‘when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to nudge 

his “claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Further, the “tenet that a court must accept as 

true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal 

conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds 

upon which the pleader is entitled to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, 

and a mere formulaic recitation of the elements is insufficient. See id.

1. The FCA Public Disclosure Provision Bars These Claims

The “scheme” imagined by Relator – while not fraudulent in the first place –

was well publicized at all relevant times. While the FCA imposes liability on any 

person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim 

for government payment or approval; or who knowingly makes, uses, or causes to 

be made a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim, the statute 

prohibits FCA causes of action where the information is obtained through public 

disclosure.2 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A-B); United States ex rel. McCullough v. 

2 “The Florida False Claims Act mirrors the federal False Claims Act and is subject 

to the same pleading standard.” United States ex rel. Schultz v. Naples Heart Rhythm 

Specialists, P.A., No. 217CV237FTM29MRM, 2020 WL 2473456, at *3 (M.D. Fla. 

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Colasante, No. 1:10cv126/MCR/GRJ, 2014 WL 12873165, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 

31, 2014); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). “The purpose of the FCA is to encourage 

private citizens who are aware of fraud against the government to expose the fraud, 

while preventing opportunistic suits by individuals who hear of fraud publicly but 

play no part in exposing it.” United States ex rel. Matheny v. Medco Health 

Solutions, Inc., 671 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2012). 

A threshold question in qui tam actions is therefore whether the Court must 

dismiss the action pursuant to the public disclosure bar in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e). The

FCA provides:

(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section, 

unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same 

allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were 

publicly disclosed—

(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in 

which the Government or its agent is a party; 

(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or 

other Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or 

(iii) from the news media, 

(B) unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person 

bringing the action is an original source of the information. 

May 13, 2020). The arguments for dismissal of the FCA claim apply equally to the 

Florida False Claims Act. Therefore, Count II should be dismissed with prejudice 

for the same reasons that the federal claim should be dismissed.

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31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (emphasis supplied). “Original source” under the statute 

“means an individual who either (1) prior to a public disclosure under subsection 

(e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on which 

allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who has knowledge that is 

independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or 

transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the information to the Government 

before filing an action under this section.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 

In applying the public disclosure bar, courts consider: (1) whether the 

allegations made by the relator have been publicly disclosed; (2) if so, whether the 

allegations in the complaint are substantially the same as allegations or transactions 

contained in the public disclosures; and (3) if yes, whether the relator is an original 

source of that information. United States ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 

805, 812 (11th Cir. 2015). “A relator bears the burden of proving that the public 

disclosure bar does not preclude his FCA action.” United States ex rel. May v. 

Purdue Pharma L.P., 811 F.3d 636, 640 (4th Cir. 2016). The Eleventh Circuit 

continues to recognize that § 3730(e)(4) “creates grounds for dismissal for failure to 

state a claim . . . [and] it instructs courts to dismiss an action when the public 

disclosure provision applies.” Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 810. 

For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) review in the FCA context, and particularly 

relevant to the public disclosure analysis, a district court may consider extrinsic 

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documents that are central to the plaintiff’s claim and documents that are judicially 

noticed.3 Osheroff., 776 F.3d at 811; see also Jacobs v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 

1:15-CV-24585-UU, 2017 WL 2361943, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2017), on 

reconsideration, No. 1:15-CV-24585-UU, 2017 WL 2361944 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 27, 

2017) (noting that Rule 12(b)(6) review may take “judicial notice of facts that are

not subject to reasonable dispute because they are capable of accurate and ready 

determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned”); United States ex rel. Bernier v. InfiLaw Corp., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1288, 

1291 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (Bernier I) (stating, in FCA cases, “courts may take judicial 

notice of documents such as newspaper articles and information on publicly 

available websites”).

a. Relator’s Allegations Have Been Publicly Disclosed

The public disclosure bar requires dismissal of this case. Because the

Relator’s allegations stem exclusively from publicly disclosed information, namely 

news media publications, emails, and information found on the Internet, Relator is 

left with a high burden to avoid dismissal. The scope of “news media” in 

§3730(e)(4) has a broad sweep and includes information found on publicly available 

3 Odom is filing a Request for Judicial Notice with Exhibits A through J, which 

consist of the publicly disclosed documents that form the basis of Relator’s 

allegations, for the Court’s consideration. Those exhibits are identified herein as 

“Defs.’ Ex.__.”

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websites. Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 813. Additionally, Freedom of Information Act 

(“FOIA”) requests and materials obtained through discovery qualify as public 

disclosures under the FCA. United States ex rel. Brown v. BankUnited Tr. 2005-1,

235 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2017); see also Schindler Elevator Corp. v. 

United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 411 (2011). 

Here, the publicly available information referred to in the Complaint includes: 

newspaper articles; public emails; public documents from the Florida Secretary of 

State; publicly disclosed annual reports and financial statements; publicly available 

County agendas and grant applications; publicly available manuals, advisory 

opinions, and Q&As on the FAA website; and public records pursuant to Florida’s 

public records laws. See ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 25, 37-39, 52, 55-57, 59, 60-61, 67-69, 74, 

77, 80, 83, 86. Indeed, most of Relator’s allegations against Defendants are derived 

from, and mirror, a March 2014 Northwest Florida Daily News article. See Defs.’ 

Ex. A, Turbulence at Destin Airport: County looks at possible ‘anti-trust violations,’

(“NWF News Article”).

Additionally, the transactions that are the subject of the Complaint are

described in public documents found in Okaloosa County’s public records and 

newspaper articles. See Defs.’ Exs. A, G, I, J. The County Agenda request, March 

3, 2015, and accompanying amended lease agreements are available to the public 

through the Okaloosa County website at https://onbase.okaloosaclerk.com/. See 

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Defs.’ Ex. D. Notably, the publicly available First Amendment to Amended and 

Restated Lease Agreement for Fixed Base Operator, March 3, 2015, explicitly 

proscribes an exclusive right, stating: “[n]othing contained herein shall be construed 

as permission to conduct any commercial activity or venture exclusive of other 

operators.” See Defs.’ Ex. H.

b. Relator’s Allegations are Substantially the Same as 

the Public Disclosures

Relator fails to differentiate the Complaint’s allegations from the information 

found in these public disclosures, which are substantially the same. As stated by the 

Eleventh Circuit, this second prong of the test is a “quick trigger” to get to the more 

exacting original source inquiry. Osheroff, 776 F.3d at 814. The significant overlap 

between Relator’s allegations and the public disclosures alone “is sufficient to show 

that the disclosed information . . . is substantially similar to the allegations in the 

complaint.” Id.; see United States ex rel. Brown v. Walt Disney World Co., 361 F. 

App’x 66, 68 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiff relied on publicly disclosed information to 

support all of her allegations; thus, it follows that the disclosed information formed 

the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint.”).

Here, the allegations in Relator’s Complaint rely on publicly disclosed 

information. For example:

x Paragraph 46, Compl.: “Odom opened a second FBO, Destin Jet, in 

2009.”

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x NWF News Article: “Destin Jet opened in 2009 and began 

competing with Miracle Strip Aviation.”

x Paragraph 48, Compl.: “Regal Air’s acquisition of Miracle [Strip 

Aviation], later operated as Regal Air Destin, combined with 

Odom’s Destin Jet gave Odom an exclusive right . . . .”

x NWF News Article: “Regal Capital bought out a struggling 

Miracle Strip Aviation in March of 2013 and opened Regal 

Jet.”

x Paragraph 49, Compl.: “Sterling Diversified, LLC . . . became the 

owner of Regal Capital, and therefore controlled Regal Air.”

x NWF News Article: “Sterling Diversified LLC, a company 

managed by Odom and two partners, had bought out Regal 

Air.”

x Paragraph 54, Compl.: “Okaloosa County gave Odom the approval 

to merge Destin Jet with Regal Air.”

x March 3, 2015 County Agenda Request: “County agrees to 

authorize Destin Jet and Regal Air to operate under common 

ownership.”

x Paragraph 69, Compl.: “The 2013 annual report filed with the 

Florida Secretary of State for Sterling Diversified listed Jay Odom, 

Chester Kroeger and Timothy Edwards as managers and Jay Odom 

as the Registered Agent.”

x NWF News Article: “Jay Odom was listed as [Sterling 

Diversified, LLC’s] registered agent and manager on ‘articles 

of organization’ filed with the Florida Division of 

Corporation. Chester Kroeger and Tim Edwards . . . are listed 

in the original documents as Odom’s co-managers.”

x Paragraph 77, Compl.: “Odom publicly admitted that he still holds

a one-third ownership interest in Sterling Diversified.”

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x NWF News Article: “At the meeting Mr. Odom also informed 

the director and deputies, that as of Dec. 31, 2013, the Sterling 

Group LLC., of which he was a one-third equity partner, has 

acquired ownership of Regal Air Destin LLC.”

x Paragraph 81, Compl.: “When Odom purchased Miracle Strip 

Aviation, which he later operated as Regal Air Destin[,] Odom had 

obtained an ‘Exclusive Right’ for FBO services. Odom’s Destin Jet 

was the only other FBO at the airport.”

x NWF News Article: “Harman said he is ‘fairly confident if 

Destin Jet does the right things the case is compelling enough

to point to a single fixed base operator’ at the airport.”

Clearly, the Complaint is based on publicly available information, which defeats any 

attempt to assert these FCA claims.

c. Relator is not an Original Source

Because the information contained in the Complaint has been previously 

disclosed to the public, Relator may only proceed with his cause of action if he is 

able to demonstrate that he is an original source of the information. A relator can 

meet the original source requirement in two possible ways: (1) disclosure to the 

government prior to public disclosure; or (2) disclosure to the government of 

knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed 

information prior to filing an FCA action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Neither 

exception to the public disclosure bar is established by this Complaint.

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i. The Complaint Fails to Allege or Establish a 

Disclosure to the United States Prior to the 

Publicly Disclosed Information

A relator may be an original source “by voluntarily disclosing information to 

the Government that forms the basis of an FCA claim prior to a public disclosure.”

See Bernier I, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 1297 (emphasis in original). However, the original 

source exception to the public disclosure bar is inapplicable based on the face of the 

Complaint. The Complaint merely makes a bare allegation that Relator “is an 

original source of the straw buyer scheme executed by Defendants” and then alleges

that Relator provided, as he was required by statute to do, a written disclosure to the 

United States sometime prior to filing the qui tam action, which would have been 

approximately February 2020. ECF No. 1, ¶ 15; 31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(2). Yet, the 

public disclosures acknowledged in the Complaint date back and run from 2012 

through 2019. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 12, 47-52, 55-59, 67-69, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86-87, 91, 93. 

There is no indication from or allegation in the Complaint that Relator provided 

information to the United States prior to the public disclosures spanning at least eight 

years.

ii. The Complaint Fails to Allege or Establish 

Disclosure of Independent Knowledge that 

Materially Adds to Publicly Disclosed 

Information

A relator may still qualify as an original source where the relator possesses

“knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed 

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allegations or transactions.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). However, Relator’s 

Complaint does nothing to show that Relator possesses this requisite independent 

and material knowledge.

“‘To establish original source status knowledge, a qui tam plaintiff must 

allege specific facts—as opposed to mere conclusions—showing exactly how and 

when he or she obtained direct and independent knowledge of the fraudulent acts 

alleged in the complaint and support those allegations with competent proof.’” 

Brown, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (quoting United States ex rel. Hafter D.O. v. 

Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999)). 

“Secondhand information, speculation, background information, or collateral 

research do not satisfy a relator’s burden of establishing the requisite knowledge.” 

Id.

“[B]ackground information that helps one understand or contextualize a 

public disclosure is insufficient to grant original source status.” Osheroff, 776 F.3d 

at 815; see also United States ex rel. Saldivar v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, 841 

F.3d 927, 936 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The phrase ‘direct and independent’ is most 

naturally read as creating an extreme limit on secondhand knowledge that is 

sufficient to qualify as an ‘original source.’”). Furthermore, knowledge based on 

research into or review of public records or materials, or some combination thereof, 

such as the research and review that Relator has apparently engaged in to bring these 

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baseless claims, does not suffice. Brown, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 1359; see also United 

States ex rel. Lewis v. Walker, 438 Fed. App’x 885, 888 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding 

relator was not original source where compilation of information relator used to 

reconstruct grant application was publicly available to anyone). 

Relator does not present a single, concrete allegation, let alone competent 

alleged evidence, indicating his information is direct and independent of the public 

information. Even a generous review of the Complaint shows that Relator’s 

information is nothing more than a generic summary of publicly disclosed 

background information over the prior eight years cobbled together in an attempt to 

infer a violation. Relator’s attempt to describe alleged “independent knowledge” 

relies entirely on a vague reference to “prior business dealings” with Odom. ECF 

No. 1, ¶ 15. Tellingly, because Relator has no direct and independent knowledge of 

the airport transactions or the grant application process, he then tenuously concludes 

that he obtained such knowledge based on his “unique familiarity” with Defendants. 

Id. These allegations do not meet the specificity requirements mandated by the FCA.

None of the allegations in Relator’s Complaint pertaining to Defendants contain 

specific facts as to how or when he obtained any direct or independent knowledge 

of the allegedly fraudulent acts. In fact, Relator’s past business relationship with 

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Odom ended in 2009 and had nothing to do with any Okaloosa County Airport or 

the County.4

In short, “Relator’s Complaint is littered with public disclosures and publicly 

available information,” and such information available to anyone does not qualify 

Relator as an original source. Brown, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 1359. The purpose of the 

public disclosure bar is “‘to strike a balance between encouraging private persons to 

root out fraud and stifling parasitic lawsuits.’” Schindler Elevator Corp., 563 U.S. 

401 at 413 (quoting Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States 

ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 295 (2010)). Relator’s Complaint is the latter. 

The public disclosure bar warrants dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice.

2. The Complaint Fails to State a Claim Under the FCA as a 

Matter of Law

On its face, Relator’s Complaint does not allege a violation of the FCA. The 

Supreme Court made clear that “[the] False Claims Act is not an all-purpose 

antifraud statute, or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches of contract or 

regulatory violations.” Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar,

4 While Relator claims a “unique familiarity” with Odom, Relator deliberately fails 

to disclose that he had no involvement of any kind with Odom related to DTS, any 

FBO, or the County. Relator, individually, has initiated two lawsuits against Odom 

stemming from their prior business relationship in an unrelated real estate 

development, one of which is still pending. Odom respectfully requests the Court 

take judicial notice of Bay Loop Land Company, Inc., et al., v. Odom, et al., Case 

No. 2017-CA-002069 pending in the First Judicial Circuit in and for Okaloosa 

County, Florida.

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136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 (2016). Nor does it permit harassing or frivolous litigation. 

Though Relator attempts in a meandering 32-page Complaint to bootstrap his 

grievances against Defendants into an actionable claim, he fails to properly state a 

claim under the FCA.

While not entirely clear, the Complaint appears to tie Count I to subsection 

(A) of § 3729(a)(1), and possibly subsection (B), of the FCA. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 96, 97. 

To state a claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A), “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that a 

defendant: (1) presented a false claim; (2) with knowledge that the claim was false; 

and (3) that the false claim was material to the Government’s decision to pay the 

claim.” Jacobs, 2016 WL 11653744, at *5. “Under subsection (B) of the False 

Claims Act, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant made a false record or 

statement for the purpose of getting a false claim paid or approved by the 

government; and (2) the false record or statement was ‘material to a false or 

fraudulent claim.’” Id. at *7 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B)). Nevertheless, 

under either prong, a requisite element is that the defendant “knowingly” took action.

Because the Complaint fails to allege an actual violation of federal regulations, the 

Complaint does not meet the required standard for materiality with respect to the 

false claims, and it does not sufficiently allege that Defendants knew their conduct 

was false or fraudulent, particularly given that the government had knowledge of the 

underlying facts. The Complaint should therefore be dismissed. 

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a. The Complaint Fails to Allege That the County was 

Not in Compliance with Nonexclusivity Regulations

Relator’s Complaint relies on baseless and conclusory allegations pertaining 

to the lawful acquisition of an FBO as an alleged violation of FAA nonexclusivity 

regulations. These allegations are premised on a misunderstanding of the meaning

of, and an improper application of, an “exclusive right” in federal regulations. 

A violation of the prohibition on “exclusive rights” at an airport “is the denial 

by the airport or sponsor to afford other qualified parties an opportunity to be an onairport service provider.” Defs.’ Ex. B, FAA, Order 5190.6B, Airport Compliance 

Manual, ¶ 8.9(b) (Sept. 30, 2009). “The fact that a single business or enterprise may 

provide most or all of the on-airport aeronautical services is not, in itself, evidence 

of an exclusive rights violation.” Id. “A single enterprise may expand as needed, 

even if its growth ultimately results in the occupancy of all available space.” Id. at 

¶ 8.9(d). An exclusive rights violation may occur when an airport sponsor takes 

action that “unreasonably excludes a qualified applicant from engaging in an onairport aeronautical activity without just cause or fails to provide an opportunity for 

qualified applicants to be an aeronautical service provider.” Id. (emphasis added). 

The existence of a single FBO is not in itself a violation of the exclusive rights 

prohibition. The Airport Compliance Manual explicitly confirms this: “Where a 

sponsor has not entered into an express agreement, commitment, understanding, or 

an apparent intent to exclude other reasonably qualified enterprises, the FAA does 

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not consider the presence of only one provider engaged in an aeronautical activity 

as a violation or the exclusive rights prohibition.” Id. at ¶ 8.2 (emphasis added). 

The allegations in the Complaint do not, as a matter of law, allege a violation 

of nonexclusivity regulations. Though Relator alleges his erroneous belief as to the 

law surrounding exclusive rights, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 30-32, the Complaint is devoid of 

any allegations establishing a violation of the regulations—including that (a) another 

qualified applicant sought to engage in on-airport aeronautical activity; (b) the 

County took separate actions to exclude any other applicant; or (c) any such actions 

as to any other applicants were unreasonable. The County’s approval of the FBO 

and lease, as alleged in the Complaint, is not a violation so long as the County did 

not take future action to prevent competition. Nothing in Relator’s Complaint 

alleges that the County prevented another competitor from establishing an FBO. 

Similarly, Odom’s alleged actions to consolidate the FBOs at DTS cannot be said to 

have caused the County to submit a false certification of compliance where 

noncompliance did not occur. Thus, based on Relator’s allegations, there was no 

violation of nonexclusivity regulations to form the basis for any allegedly false 

statements or claims.

Relator fails to allege any facts to plausibly show how any grant applications 

claiming that the County was in compliance with federal and state laws constitute a 

false claim. Relator does not, and cannot, present such allegations because the 

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County has not submitted false statements or claims to the United States, nor has the 

United States approved its grant applications based on any false or misleading 

statements. 

b. Any Alleged Representation was not Material to a

Government Payment Decision by the United States

“A misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or 

contractual requirement must be material to the government’s payment decision in 

order to be actionable under the False Claims Act.” Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002. 

The standard for showing materiality is demanding, and “[u]nder any understanding 

of the concept, materiality ‘look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of 

the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.’” Id. (quoting 26 R. Lord, Williston 

on Contracts § 69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003)). Key to the present case, the Supreme 

Court held, “if the Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full 

despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has signaled 

no change in position, that is strong evidence that the [statutory or regulatory 

compliance] requirements are not material.” Id. at 2003-04 (emphasis added). An 

alleged representation to the government cannot be material under the FCA, where 

the government was not only aware of, but approved, such action. 

Here, the allegations in the Complaint establish that, since at least 2013, the 

government regularly approved the County’s grant applications with knowledge of 

the alleged exclusive right issue alleged in the Complaint. ECF No. 1, ¶ 52, 93.

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Thus, even if the Defendants’ representations were inaccurate as to DTS grants,

which they were not, the County’s certifications regarding nonexclusive rights were

immaterial to the award of grant funds because of the government’s continued 

payment of funds with knowledge of any such issue.

The Complaint fails to provide sufficient and specific detail as to how Odom 

caused the County to present a false claim that was material to the government’s 

payment of the grant funds. The Complaint and the public records demonstrate 

Defendants’ transparency with respect to the acquisition and merger of the two 

FBOs. Indeed, the Complaint admits that the FAA was fully aware an “exclusive 

right” issue could arise in the future but continued to bestow grants even with this 

knowledge. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 6, 52; see also Defs.’ Exs. E, F. The government cannot 

be defrauded by that about which the government is fully aware. See United States

ex rel. Bane v. Breathe Easy Pulmonary Servs., Inc., No. 8:06-CV-40-T-33MAP, 

2009 WL 1148632, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2009) (noting that action may 

constitute vexatious and harassing litigation “where the government’s undisputed 

prior knowledge of information alleged to constitute fraud defeated any inference of 

a false claim”).

c. Relator Has Not Pled Sufficient Allegations Showing 

That Defendants Acted Knowingly, Particularly 

Where the United States Had Knowledge of the 

Conduct Alleged in the Complaint

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While evidence of specific intent to defraud is not required, “[with] regard to 

scienter, a relator must show that the defendant acted ‘knowingly,’ which the FCA 

defines as either ‘actual knowledge,’ ‘deliberate ignorance,’ or ‘reckless disregard.’” 

United States ex rel. Phalp v. Lincare Holdings, Inc., 857 F.3d 1148, 1155 (11th Cir. 

2017) (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)). Where a relator alleges a defendant has falsely 

certified compliance with a government regulation, the court must “determine 

whether the defendant actually knew or should have known that its conduct violated

a regulation in light of any ambiguity at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. at 857 

F.3d 1148, 1155. “Liability attaches to only those who act in gross negligence—

those who fail to make such inquiry as would be reasonable and prudent to conduct 

under the circumstances.” Id.

Further, government knowledge may negate scienter in addition to 

materiality, requiring a relator’s claim to be dismissed. United States ex rel. Hunt v. 

Chochise Consultancy, Inc., 887 F.3d 1081, 1092 n. 10 (11th Cir. 2018). To the 

same extent that government knowledge may disprove materiality because “if the 

Government pays a particular claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain 

requirements were violated, that is very strong evidence that those requirements are 

not material . . . [e]vidence that the government knew the relevant facts at the time 

that the defendant submitted its claim may also show that the defendant understood 

its conduct to be lawful.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).

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Relator’s Complaint does not meet any of the burdens imposed above. Relator 

alleges that Defendants submitted or caused to be submitted purported false 

certifications that the County had complied with its grant assurances. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 

96-97. However, Relator’s own allegations, as well as public documents, show that 

the County was in communication with and sought an opinion from the FAA – the 

agency tasked with interpreting and enforcing the relevant federal regulations with 

which the County was certifying compliance – during all times Relator alleges 

fraudulent conduct was occurring. See ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 6, 52. Neither actual 

knowledge nor deliberate knowledge can be attributed to Defendants under these 

circumstances. Further, the “reckless disregard” scienter was intended to capture 

the “ostrich type situation,” where a defendant has “buried his head in the sand and 

failed to make simple inquiries which would alert him that false claims are being 

submitted.” Phalp, 857 F.3d at 1155 (internal quotations omitted). Clearly, no such 

situation exists here, where the Complaint shows that active steps were taken by 

Defendants to ensure that the County’s certifications to the FAA would be 

considered lawful. 

The Complaint also establishes that the FAA continued to award federal 

grants to the County “with full knowledge of [Relator’s] claims” about the alleged 

exclusivity issue. United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus., 872 F.3d 645, 668 

(5th Cir. 2017); ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 52, 93. Relator points to a County Agenda Request 

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from March 3, 2015, which states that “concerns regarding compliance with the 

grant assurances . . . were all raised to the FAA, however in each instance the FAA 

determined that this is a lease administration issue and that the acquisition of an FBO 

provider – a prevalent practice, does not in itself constitute as a violation of grant 

assurances.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 57; see also Defs.’ Ex. D.

This level of interaction with the FAA regarding the conduct at issue, which 

is pled in the Complaint, eliminates the possibility of FCA liability on the part of 

Defendants. See Harman, 872 F.3d at 668 (noting record “[left] no question about 

‘what the government knew and when’” but instead demonstrated that the 

government continued to make payments despite full knowledge of the relator’s 

allegations). Because the FAA knew or should have known of the underlying facts 

alleged in the Complaint, and Defendants knew that the FAA knew, Relator has not 

pled materiality or scienter. 

3. The Complaint Fails to Plead Fraud with Sufficient 

Particularity

Relator’s Complaint also fails to satisfy the well-established heightened 

pleading requirements imposed when a plaintiff alleges fraud. “When a claim arises 

under the FCA, ‘Rule 8’s pleading standard is supplemented but not supplanted 

by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).’” United States ex rel. Bernier v. Infilaw 

Corp., 347 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1084 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (Bernier II) (quoting UrquillaDiaz v. Kaplan Univ., 780 F.3d 1039, 1051 (11th Cir. 2015)). “Rule 9(b) imposes a 

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heightened pleading standard for allegations of fraud, requiring a party to ‘state with 

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.’” Id. at 1084-85

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). This heightened pleading standard prevents 

speculative suits against innocent actors, by requiring allegations of fraud to

“‘include facts as to time, place, and substance of the defendant’s alleged fraud.’” 

United States ex rel. Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of America, Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1308 

(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., 19 F.3d 562, 

566-67 (11the Cir. 1994)).

A complaint under the FCA satisfies Rule 9(b) if it sets forth:

(1) precisely what statements were made in what 

documents or oral representations or what omissions were 

made, 

(2) the time and place of each such statement and the 

person responsible for making (or, in the case of 

omissions, not making) same, 

(3) the content of such statements and the manner in which 

they misled the plaintiff, and

(4) what the defendants obtained as a consequence of the 

fraud.

United States ex rel. Boros v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc., No. 4:10-CV-10013-

KMM, 2012 WL 5304172, at *1–2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2012). “When a plaintiff does 

not specifically plead the minimum elements of their allegation, it enables [him] to 

learn the complaint’s bare essentials through discovery and may needlessly harm a 

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defendants’ goodwill and reputation by bringing a suit that is, at best, missing some 

of its core underpinnings, and, at worst, are baseless allegations used to extract 

settlements.” Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1313 n.24. 

Though the 109-paragraph Complaint attempts to plead an alleged scheme, 

it does so only in the broadest terms and is completely devoid of the specific people, 

places, dates, content, and manner required for an FCA claim. See United States v. 

Health First, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-501-Orl-37DAB, 2016 WL 3959343, at *4 (M.D. 

Fla. July 22, 2016), as amended (July 27, 2016) (dismissing complaint for failure to 

adequately plead fraud). Rather than providing specifics about the alleged scheme 

and how exactly it constituted fraud, Relator makes conclusory (and incorrect)

allegations about the law surrounding exclusive rights at the airport and how the 

FAA should have reacted to its knowledge of the facts (rather than how it did). ECF 

No. 1, ¶¶ 30-39. Once these “[mere] legal conclusions” are disregarded, as is 

required at this stage, the Complaint is without well-pleaded factual allegations to 

give rise to a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 

Notably, Relator failed to make any allegations as to how the United States, 

through the FAA, was misled by the alleged claims. A proper FCA complaint must 

describe with particularity the “who, what, where, when, and how” of the alleged 

fraudulent scheme. United States ex rel. Paul v. Biotronik, Inc., No. 8:18-cv-396-T36JSS, 2020 WL 191146, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 2020). Here, as alleged by 

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Relator, the FAA was well-aware of the circumstances underlying Relator’s 

grievances. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 52, 57. It is impossible for a County submission, that it 

was in compliance with its grant assurances, to be misleading, when the FAA had 

earlier been apprised of the County’s concerns that the circumstances surrounding 

the FBOs may or may not have given rise to potential violations of those grant 

assurances. Relator fails to draw a connection between the conduct by Defendants 

with which he takes issue and how any claims the County submitted were false or 

fraudulent. 

B. Relator’s Complaint Should be Dismissed as an Impermissible 

Shotgun Pleading

The Complaint also is an impermissible shotgun pleading that “is replete with 

conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular 

cause of action” and asserts “multiple claims against multiple defendants without 

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or 

which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. 

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2015). Relator incorporates by 

reference into Counts I and II, 93 separate paragraphs haphazardly strewn together 

to form a vague and imaginary scheme. Many of the paragraphs are lengthy,

convoluted, and contain multiple circumstances in violation of the Federal Rules of 

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Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Dismissal of such pleadings is 

appropriate.

The Complaint lumps together two distinct claims in a single count. “The 

elements that a plaintiff must allege under each subsection [of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)] 

differ.” United States ex rel. Westlund v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 8:10-cv2882-T-23TGW, 2011 WL 6846748, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2011). Here, Relator 

sets forth allegations under subsections (A) and (B) of § 3729(a)(1) against 

Defendants without specifying which alleged act or defendant violated which 

subsection. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 96, 97. Instead, in a single count, Relator unintelligibly 

claims “[b]y virtue of the acts described above” both named defendants violated two 

separate subsections of § 3729. Id. Relator’s shotgun pleading makes it impossible 

for Defendants to know which allegations of fact purportedly support each alleged 

FCA violation.

Further, solely to harass Odom with spurious allegations, the Complaint is 

replete with conclusory, immaterial, and inflammatory jargon unrelated to any cause 

of action against Odom under the FCA. See, e.g., ECF No. 1, ¶ 46 n.2. Indeed,

much of the Complaint involves neither Odom nor the Airport at issue. See, e.g.,

ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 66-79 (related to Ward, Kroeger, Edwards, Simmons, and Chestnut 

Hill Tree Farm, LLC). Those irrelevant allegations demonstrate Relator’s true 

objective to coerce a settlement in an unrelated lawsuit with Odom.

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The Court should dismiss the Complaint as an impermissible shotgun 

pleading. See Lawrie v. The Ginn Cos., LLC, No. 3:09-cv-446-J-32JBT, 2010 WL 

3746725, at *3 n.12 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2010) (dismissing complaint as shotgun 

pleading). 

C. COUNT II – FLORIDA FCA CLAIM – SHOULD BE DISMISSED 

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

A motion to dismiss for lack of standing may be brought under Rule 12(b)(1), 

because standing is a threshold jurisdictional determination. See Jallali, 2015 WL 

10687577, at *10. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 

Rule 12(b)(1) may present either a facial or factual challenge to the complaint. 

Blessey v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:18cv1415/MCR/CJK, 2018 WL 4291735, at *2 (N.D. 

Fla. Sept. 7, 2018). In a facial challenge, a court “construes the allegations of the 

complaint as true and considers only whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a 

basis of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. A factual attack challenges the existence of 

subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and the court may 

consider matters outside the pleadings. See Brown, 235 F. Supp. 3d at 1359. “In the 

face of a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff 

to prove that jurisdiction exists.” OSI Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th 

Cir. 2002). 

There is no common-law right to bring a qui tam action. Thus, a relator must 

allege standing under a qui tam statute. See Stalley v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare 

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Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1233-34 (11th Cir. 2008). As to the Florida FCA claim, 

both factually and on its face, Relator and the United States lack the requisite 

standing. Thus, dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Count II, the 

Florida FCA claim, is appropriate. 

Dismissal of Count II is necessary because: (1) the Complaint fails to name 

the State of Florida as the true party in interest; and (2) the Complaint fails to certify 

that the Attorney General of the State of Florida was served with a copy of the 

Complaint and written disclosure of the material evidence and information Relator 

alleges to possess. Relator’s failures deprive this Court of jurisdiction over Count 

II, and dismissal is proper. See Stalley, 524 F.3d at 1234-35 (dismissing complaint 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where relator lacked standing). 

1. The Complaint Fails to Name the State of Florida as a Party

“The Florida False Claims Act authorizes a private person or the State to 

initiate a civil action against a person or company who knowingly presents a false 

claim to the State for payment.” Barati v. State, 198 So. 3d 69, 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2016). All civil actions under the Florida FCA, whether brought by a private person 

or the State itself, “shall be brought in the name of the State of Florida.” See Fla. 

Stat. § 68.083(2). Relator, individually, has not and cannot allege an injury in fact 

to establish standing for a Florida FCA claim. “An interest unrelated to injury in 

fact is insufficient to give a plaintiff standing.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United 

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States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000); see also United States ex rel. Bibby

v. Mortg. Inv'rs Corp., 985 F.3d 825, No. 19-12736, 2021 WL 137739, at *10 (11th 

Cir. Jan. 15, 2021) (noting that “relator does not have standing to pursue 

a qui tam action based on his own injury in fact”). Federal courts “have jurisdiction 

over any action brought under the laws of any State for the recovery of funds paid 

by a State or local government, if the action arises from the same transaction or 

occurrence as an action brought under section 3730.” 31 U.S.C. § 3732(b). 

However, the State government must be named as a co-plaintiff with the United 

States. 31 U.S.C. § 3732(c). 

“Under the Florida FCA, the Attorney General is the real party in interest.” 

Barati, 198 So. 3d at 81. “[T]he relator is and always remains an assignee of the 

State’s substantive right to prosecute a qui tam action.” Id. Indeed, the action must 

be brought on behalf of the State itself, not on behalf of the federal government. See 

id. at 84 (“Conducting and terminating legal actions brought in the name of and for 

the benefit of the State is the sine qua non of the State’s chief legal officer.”); United 

States ex rel. Koch v. Gulf Region Radiation Oncology Centers, Inc., No. 

3:12CV504/RV-CJK, 2013 WL 12328938, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2013) (noting 

that United States, as intervenor, pursued its federal FCA claim while the relator 

pursued case on behalf of the State of Florida, which explicitly declined to 

intervene). 

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Here, there is no indication that the State of Florida is even aware of this 

action, much less that the action is filed on behalf of the State. The Complaint is 

brought solely in the name of the United States. While the Complaint alleges that 

Relator brings the claims on behalf of the United States as a party, there are no 

similar allegations as to the State. Nothing in the FCA or Florida FCA allows the 

United States to bring a claim or otherwise proceed with a qui tam action in the name 

of a State. See United States ex rel. Stop Illinois Marketing Fraud, LLC, v. Addus 

Homecare Corp., No. 13 C 9059, 2018 WL 1411124, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2018)

(“The notice and opportunity that Relator afforded the federal government does not 

absolve Relator of its duties to the State of Illinois”). Indeed, paragraphs 102 

through 109 of Count II can only be interpreted as brought by the Relator on behalf 

of the United States alone. As such, Count II must be dismissed. 

2. The Complaint Fails to Certify Disclosure of Material 

Evidence to the State.

The Florida FCA requires that the complaint “and written disclosure of 

substantially all material evidence and information the person possesses shall be 

served on the Attorney General.” See Fla. Stat. § 68.083(3). The Attorney General 

then has 60 days to elect to intervene and proceed with the action on behalf of 

Florida. Id. This requirement amounts to a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a 

FCA claim. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Anderson v. ITT Indus. Corp., No. 

1:05CV720, 2006 WL 4117030, at *3 (E.D. Va. 2006) (dismissing complaint 

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“because Plaintiff’s failures to comply with the jurisdictional service and filing 

requirements of the FCA frustrated the congressional goals underlying those 

provisions, and the failures cannot be cured or remedied”). The same reasoning as 

to the federal government should necessarily apply to the failure to afford the State 

with statutorily required disclosure.

Here, the absence of certification with this statutory requirement amounts to 

a concession that Relator has not followed the procedure in Fla. Stat. § 68.083. The 

Complaint references only providing the federal government with evidence and 

information in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). ECF No. 1, ¶ 15. Thus, 

Relator knew of the obligation to provide this information to the federal government 

and must have known of the same obligation under the Florida FCA. The failure to 

comply with the Florida FCA’s requirements warrants dismissal of Count II.

III. COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE

Dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice is proper because there is no 

realistic prospect that amendment will cure the deficiencies contained therein. 

“Although a district court ‘should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so 

requires,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), it may deny leave, sua sponte or on motion, if 

amendment would be futile.” L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v. Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 

1332 (11th Cir. 2020). Leave to amend would be futile if an amended complaint 

would still fail on a motion to dismiss. See id. Here, the underlying facts of this 

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case cannot support any claim for relief against Defendants, such that dismissal with 

prejudice is proper. See e.g. United States ex rel. Smith v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., 

No. 06 CIV 4056 NRB, 2007 WL 2142312, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2007) 

(dismissing FCA fraud claim with prejudice).

IV. THE COURT SHOULD AWARD ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730, a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees 

where a relator’s claim is “clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, [and] brought 

primarily for purposes of harassment.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4); see United States ex 

rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 356–57 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding relator had 

no reasonable chance of success and awarding $68,228.75 in attorneys’ fees to 

defendant); United States ex rel. Bain v. Georgia Gulf Corp., 208 F. App’x 280, 

283–84 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming $65,000 award of attorney fees where relator 

failed to comply with FCA requirements, failed to establish original source, and

failed to plead with particularity); United States ex rel. Fox Rx, Inc. v. Omnicare, 

Inc., No. 12CV275 DLC, 2015 WL 1726474, at *1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015)

(granting $168,967.61 in attorneys’ fees for frivolous FCA claims).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant respectfully requests the Court 

dismiss Relator’s Complaint, with prejudice, and for such other relief as the Court 

may deem appropriate.

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Dated: February 12, 2021.

Respectfully Submitted,

Counsel for Jay A. Odom

A. Benjamin Gordon

A. Benjamin Gordon, III

Florida Bar No. 528617

AnchorsGordon, P.A.

2113 Lewis Turner Blvd., Suite 100

Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32547

Phone: (850) 863-1974

Fax: (850) 863-1591

Email: bgordon@anchorsgordon.com

cyndi@anchorsgordon.com

and 

By: /s/ Nathaniel Hunt

Peter J. Kirsch

Nathaniel Hunt

Sarah Wilbanks

KAPLAN KIRSCH & ROCKWELL LLP

1675 Broadway, Suite 2300

Denver, CO 80202

(303) 825-7000

(303) 825-7005 Facsimile

pkirsch@kaplankirsch.com

swilbanks@kaplankirsch.com

nhunt@kaplankirsch.com

Co-counsel for Defendant Jay Odom

Appearing Pro Hac Vice

LOCAL RULE 7.1(F) CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(F), the instant Memorandum contains 7,819

words.

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I CERTIFY that a that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been 

electronically filed on the CM/ECF system for the Northern District of Florida, 

which will send notification of such filing to the following attorneys of record:

Michael Schofield and Amelia Beard, Clark Partington, 125 East Intendencia Street, 

Pensacola, Florida 32591-3010, and Elizabeth Billhimer, Clark Partington, 4100 

Legendary Drive, Suite 200, Destin, Florida 32541, attorneys for Relator; and to 

Lynn Hoshihara, Nabors Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., 1500 Mahan Drive, Suite 200, 

Tallahassee, Florida 32308, attorneys for Okaloosa County, and to David M. 

Sobotkin, U.S. Department of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, 175 N. Street, 

NE, Washington, DC 20002, attorney for the United States of America, this 12th

day of February, 2021.

A. Benjamin Gordon

A. Benjamin Gordon, III

Florida Bar No. 528617

AnchorsGordon, P.A.

2113 Lewis Turner Blvd., Suite 100

Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32547

Phone: (850) 863-1974

Fax: (850) 863-1591

Email: bgordon@anchorsgordon.com

cyndi@anchorsgordon.com

and 

By: /s/ Nathaniel Hunt

Peter J. Kirsch

Nathaniel Hunt

Sarah Wilbanks

KAPLAN KIRSCH & ROCKWELL LLP

1675 Broadway, Suite 2300

Denver, CO 80202

(303) 825-7000

(303) 825-7005 Facsimile

pkirsch@kaplankirsch.com

swilbanks@kaplankirsch.com

nhunt@kaplankirsch.com

Co-counsel for Defendant Jay Odom

Case 3:20-cv-03678-MCR-EMT Document 25 Filed 02/12/21 Page 35 of 35