IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0906

Filed June 30, 2021

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP OF JUSTIN PAUL SULZNER,

JUSTIN PAUL SULZNER,

Ward-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, Richard D. Stochl, 

Judge.

Justin Sulzner appeals district court orders filed in his temporary involuntary 

conservatorship. APPEAL DISMISSED.

Justin P. Sulzner, Cedar Rapids, self-represented appellant.

Benjamin M. Lange of Swisher & Cohrt, P.L.C., Independence, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ.
2

TABOR, Judge.

After contesting the decree dissolving his marriage to Terri Sulzner in a prior 

appeal,1 Justin Sulzner now challenges various orders in a related case 

establishing an involuntary conservatorship over him. The district court has since 

terminated that conservatorship. Justin claims the court erred in four 

ways: (1) appointing Terri as his temporary conservator, (2) allowing an 

“ineffective” attorney to represent him in the conservatorship proceeding,

(3) approving the conservator’s final report, and (4) using threats and intimidation 

to coerce him into signing the divorce stipulation that included a provision on

conservatorship attorney fees. Because all four claims arise from a temporary 

conservatorship that no longer exists, we find Justin’s appeal is moot. Having 

found no justiciable controversy, we dismiss the case.2 

After the parties separated in 2019, Terri petitioned for an involuntary 

conservatorship over Justin, alleging his mental illness impaired his 

decision-making capacity. Based on her allegations, the district court appointed 

an attorney to represent Justin at the contested hearing under Iowa Code 

section 633.118–.120 (2019). Rather than wait for the hearing, Terri asked the 

court “to appoint a conservator on an emergency basis.” She asserted that, within 

 

1

In January 2020, Justin appealed the parties’ stipulated divorce decree. See In 

re Marriage of Sulzner, No. 20-0218, 2021 WL 210761 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 

2021). He argued the binding stipulation was unfair because the district court and 

the attorneys pressured him into signing the agreement at the combined 

dissolution and conservatorship hearing. Id. at *3. Because Justin failed to 

preserve error on his appellate claims, we affirmed the decree earlier this year. Id.

at *2–3.

2

In briefing, Terri challenges Justin’s appeal as both moot and untimely. Because 

we opt to resolve the issues on mootness, we need not reach the timing issue. 
3

a few days, Justin had “applied for at least [two] new credit cards,” “gotten access 

to precious metals,” and was planning “to buy several thousand dollars-worth of 

merchandise.” Finding an ex parte order inappropriate, the court denied Terri’s

application. But as an alternative, the court scheduled a hearing for both sides to 

present evidence on the proposed temporary conservatorship. 

Following the hearing in late August 2019, the district court agreed 

intervention was necessary based on evidence Justin suffered “medical 

conditions” that rendered him “currently unable to handle his finances.” Granting 

her request in the original petition, the court appointed Terri as his temporary 

conservator. In appointing her, the court reflected: “The Sulzners are not legally 

separated, [and] no dissolution of marriage proceedings are on file or 

planned.” Justin did not contest the court’s ruling establishing the temporary 

conservatorship. 

Two months later, Justin sent a personal letter to the court, requesting a 

new attorney. His letter complained that his current attorney was refusing to “file 

any actions disputing the conservatorship that was granted to [his] soon to be 

ex-wife.” Representing himself, Justin then moved to dismiss the temporary 

conservatorship. Justin also asked the court to order the release of $4000 so he 

could hire a divorce attorney.3 

Terri resisted all three requests. She claimed allowing Justin to hire a new 

attorney at this stage of the litigation would serve only to “reduce [his] assets and 

the marital assets as a whole.” She clarified that she had no “objection to funds 

 

3 When Justin filed for divorce in October 2019, the temporary conservatorship was 

still in place. 
4

being distributed to [Justin’s] attorney for continued representation including but 

not limited to dissolution of marriage.” As for the motion to dismiss, Terri urged 

“any assets should continue to be protected by this court-ordered conservatorship” 

given Justin’s mental impairment.

While those motions were pending, the parties changed course. They 

disclosed to the court they reached a “tentative” agreement resolving both the 

conservatorship and the dissolution. Relying on that assurance, the court 

combined the two proceedings for a final hearing. In the same order, the court 

ruled Justin’s motion for change of counsel was moot. 

The court incorporated the parties’ written stipulation in the January 2020 

divorce decree. Beyond the distribution of marital assets, that agreement included

a provision on the conservatorship, stating 

[Justin] expects that, following Court approval of this Stipulation and 

entry of Decree adopting the same: (a) the conservatorship shall 

abate and terminate; (b) both parties expect that [Terri] shall be 

discharged as Conservator; and (c) all property of the parties divided 

herein shall belong to each of them solely.

Honoring those agreed-upon terms, the court terminated the

conservatorship and discharged Terri as conservator the next day. Despite that 

final order, the court entered a “nunc pro tunc order” requiring Terri to file a final 

report in the conservatorship. See Iowa Code § 633.670(3) (2020). In June, the 

district court ruled “the final report is approved and the conservatorship is 

closed. Costs are taxed to the conservator.” From that order, Justin appealed. 

Before addressing Justin’s appellate claims, we must confront Terri’s 

contention that this appeal should be dismissed as moot. See Homan v. Branstad, 

864 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Iowa 2015) (describing mootness as “a threshold 
5

question”). Under the mootness doctrine, we refrain from deciding a case “that no 

longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have 

become academic or nonexistent.” Martin-Trigona v. Baxter, 435 N.W.2d 744, 745 

(Iowa 1989). To determine whether an appeal is moot, we consider “whether a 

judgment, if rendered, would have any practical legal effect upon the existing 

controversy.” Junkins v. Branstad, 421 N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 1988). 

Applying that test, we agree Justin’s claims are not justiciable. The 

challenged orders on the appointment of a temporary conservator, designation of 

the ward’s attorney, and approval of the conservator’s report became academic 

when the court terminated the conservatorship in January 2020. See Iowa 

Bankers Ass’n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep’t, 335 N.W.2d 439, 442 (Iowa 1983) (“The 

department’s rescission of the 1979 real estate loan rules renders academic any 

decision by this court as to their validity.”). Put another way, our view on those 

actions would have no practical legal effect on the parties’ present 

circumstances. For instance, Justin challenges the court’s approval of Terri as his 

temporary conservator, arguing there was a conflict of interest based on their 

“impending divorce.” But no matter if we agree with Justin’s contentions, a conflict 

of interest no longer exists. Nor is there “a live dispute between the parties” on the 

divorce because that has also since been finalized. See State ex rel. Turner v. 

Scott, 269 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978). Because the court already discharged 

Terri as temporary conservator, the challenge to her appointment is moot. 

In that same vein, the remaining issues disappear with the termination of 

the conservatorship. Justin attacks only those rulings predating the termination 

order that were adverse to his position at that specific time. But we have rejected 
6

similar as-applied claims when the underlying action has been concluded. See 

Martin-Trigona, 435 N.W.2d at 745 (dismissing appeal as moot because “Martin–

Trigona did not challenge the caucus system generally, but only as it was being 

conducted in 1988, specifically” and “nothing [the court] could do now would affect 

the 1988 caucuses”); State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 

2002) (declining to address constitutionality of witness-arrest statute “as applied to 

their specific factual situation” because defendants were later released from 

custody). As Justin obtained the relief he sought in the district court—namely 

terminating the conservatorship—our resolution of issues tied to the existence of 

the conservatorship would have no practical effect. Because Justin’s appellate 

claims stem from a conservatorship that is no longer in effect, the case is moot. 

Thus, we dismiss the appeal.4 

Finally, Terri seeks attorney fees for the costs of defending this appeal. In 

considering her request, we weigh her obligation to defend, along with her financial 

needs and Justin’s ability to pay. See In re Guardianship of G.G., 799 N.W.2d 

549, 554 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (citing Iowa Code section 633.551(5)). While we 

appreciate Terri’s efforts as appellee to address the claims on appeal, we do not 

find Justin in a position to pay her attorney fees. We do assess the costs to Justin.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

 

4 Justin did not file a reply brief addressing any of the exceptions to the mootness 

doctrine. In any event, we have considered the exceptions and find they do not 

apply under these facts. See In re Guardianship of Kennedy, 845 N.W.2d 707, 

711 (Iowa 2014) (“An exception to the general rule exists ‘where matters of public 

importance are presented and the problem is likely to recur.’” (quoting In re M.T., 

625 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Iowa 2001))); In re B.B., 826 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Iowa 2013) 

(noting “an appeal is not moot if a judgment left standing will cause the appellant 

to suffer continuing adverse collateral consequences”).