Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1143 | October 29, 2020 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Travis A. Van Winkle

Law Office of Travis Van Winkle, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Paternity of 

T.G.;

Terrance Gray, Jr.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Devika Naicker,

Appellee-Petitioner.

October 29, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

20A-JP-1143

Appeal from the Marion Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Sheryl L. Lynch, 

Judge

The Honorable Melissa Hayden 

Kramer, Commissioner

Trial Court Cause No.

49C01-1502-JP-93

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1143 | October 29, 2020 Page 2 of 5

Statement of the Case

[1] Terrance Gray, Jr. appeals the trial court’s denial of his second motion to 

correct error. Gray raises two issues for our review:

1. Whether Indiana Trial Rule 59 permitted him to file a 

second motion to correct error following the trial court’s 

order on his first motion to correct error, which order 

modified the original final judgment. 

2. Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed Devika 

Naicker’s petition to modify child custody for failure to 

prosecute without first holding a hearing on its intent to 

dismiss her petition.

[2] We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 18, 2019, Naicker filed a petition to modify custody with respect to a 

minor child she had had with Gray. In January of 2020, the court held a 

hearing on Naicker’s petition, but she did not appear. Gray then requested that 

the court deem admitted his request for admissions to Naicker, to which she 

had not responded. The court denied that request and dismissed Naicker’s 

petition.

[4] On February 14, Gray filed his first motion to correct error. In that motion, he 

reiterated his position that the unresponded-to admissions should be deemed 

admitted. On March 13, the court entered its order on Gray’s first motion to 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1143 | October 29, 2020 Page 3 of 5

correct error. In that order, the court deemed the admissions admitted and then 

affirmed its dismissal of Naicker’s petition.

[5] On April 13, Gray filed a second motion to correct error on the ground that 

dismissal of Naicker’s petition was not a proper remedy. The trial court 

dismissed Gray’s second motion as untimely on May 13. On June 11, Gray 

filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision1

Issue One: Gray’s Second Motion to Correct Error

[6] On appeal, Gray first asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his second 

motion to correct error as untimely. The trial court entered its final judgment in 

this matter in January of 2020 when it denied Gray’s request to have the 

admissions deemed admitted and dismissed Naicker’s petition. Gray timely

filed his first motion to correct error from that judgment on February 14, 2020. 

As our trial rules make clear, a motion to correct error “shall be filed not later 

than thirty (30) days after the entry of a final judgment . . . .” Ind. Trial Rule 59(C) 

(emphasis added).

1

 Naicker has not filed an appellee’s brief and, as such, we review Gray’s arguments on appeal for prima facie 

error. Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1143 | October 29, 2020 Page 4 of 5

[7] On March 13, the court entered its order granting Gray’s motion to correct 

error in part by deeming the admissions admitted. Thus, in that order, the court 

modified the original final judgment.

[8] Our Supreme Court has held that such an order permits the parties to file an 

additional motion to correct error. As the Court has held: 

after one motion to correct error has been filed and the trial court 

has subsequently altered, amended, or supplemented its findings 

and/or judgment, the parties have the discretion to appeal 

immediately or to file a new motion to correct error directed to 

the changed findings and/or judgment. This liberal 

interpretation provides the needed flexibility in our trial rule and 

gives an equitable opportunity for appeal to all parties. This 

holding is consistent with our present T[.]R. 59.

Breeze v. Breeze, 421 N.E.2d 647, 650 (Ind. 1981) (footnote omitted). Although 

Breeze is nearly four decades old, it is still good law. Accordingly, the trial court 

erred when it denied Gray’s second motion to correct error as untimely.

Issue Two: Whether Dismissal Was Proper

[9] We thus turn to the merits of Gray’s argument on appeal, namely, that the trial 

court erred when it dismissed Naicker’s petition. The trial court dismissed 

Naicker’s petition sua sponte for failure to prosecute under Indiana Trial Rule 

41(E). Trial Rule 41(E) permits a trial court to dismiss a matter on its own 

motion, but only after the trial court orders and holds a hearing on dismissal 

with notice of the hearing date having been sent to the plaintiff. See Caruthers v. 

State, 58 N.E.3d 207, 211-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The trial court did not set a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JP-1143 | October 29, 2020 Page 5 of 5

hearing date or hold a hearing on its intent to dismiss Naicker’s petition and did 

not serve her with notice of that hearing date. Accordingly, we agree with Gray 

that the trial court erred when it sua sponte dismissed Naicker’s petition.

[10] Gray further asserts on appeal that the proper remedy is to deny Naicker’s 

petition on its merits based on Naicker’s admissions. But it is not our place to 

make that call in the first instance. Rather, we conclude that the proper 

resolution of this appeal is to remand with instructions for the trial court either 

to set a hearing date on its intent to dismiss Naicker’s petition and serve 

Naicker with notice of that date or, alternatively, the court on remand may 

consider Gray’s argument to deny Naicker’s petition on its merits.

[11] Thus, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Gray’s second motion to dismiss and 

remand with instructions.

[12] Reversed and remanded.

Bradford, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.