RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 18a0237p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DOCKERY CLEVELAND,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 17-3993

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Youngstown.

No. 4:15-cr-00427-1—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: October 19, 2018

Before: NORRIS, DONALD, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: David L. Doughten, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Laura McMullen Ford, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Dockery 

Cleveland of conspiring and attempting to possess, as well as possessing, cocaine with the intent 

to distribute it. Cleveland’s appeal raises whether the district court properly (1) admitted certain 

evidence extracted from his cellphone; (2) overruled a Batson objection to a peremptory juror 

challenge; (3) admitted testimony that a weapon was seized from co-defendant Larone 

Williams’s residence and that it may have been stolen in a previous burglary; and (4) overruled 

>
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 2

objections to the government’s references in closing argument to drug-related harm and a 

correlation between drug dealing and guns. For the reasons that follow, we determine the answer 

to each issue is yes and therefore, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment entered on the 

conviction. 

I. Background

Around October 17, 2015, the Drug Task Force in Youngstown, Ohio became aware that 

several individuals had conspired to transport ten kilograms of cocaine from California to 

Warren, Ohio, by hiding the drugs inside of a damaged car that was loaded onto a transport 

truck. The shipment’s bill of lading indicated the damaged car would be delivered to an 

individual named “Stephen” at an address that law enforcement knew to be associated with 

Williams, a suspected drug dealer. Before the delivery occurred, however, the agents intercepted 

the vehicle and searched it pursuant to a warrant. The car’s rear section revealed ten kilogramsized bricks of cocaine, which the agents seized for evidence and then replaced with bricks of a 

non-narcotic substance resembling cocaine, packed in wrapping laced with a powder identifiable 

under fluorescent ultraviolet light. After the switch, the agents allowed the delivery to proceed. 

They witnessed two men arrive at the delivery location and pick up the car. The agents tailed 

these men, later identified as Cleveland and Williams, as they transported the car to a house 

where Williams resided. In the home’s vicinity, agents saw two other men circling the 

neighborhood on bicycles and apparently surveilling the area to see if they were being watched. 

One of these men, later identified as Menford McCain, carried a backpack into the house. 

Based on these witnessed activities, agents obtained and executed a warrant to search 

Williams’s residence. There, in the kitchen, they found one of the fake cocaine packages, cut 

open, as well as an electronic scale, two surgical masks, a razor knife, a drill charger, and a 

screwdriver. In the bathroom vanity, agents found a 9-millimeter Smith and Wesson firearm, a 9-

millimeter magazine, and 9-millimeter rounds. In the home’s garage, the agents found three 

“sham kilos” and an electronic scale stored inside the transported car. Other evidence came 

directly from Williams and Cleveland, who were present during the search: their hands, 

examined under fluorescent ultraviolet light, revealed trace amounts of the powder used in 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 3

packaging the fake cocaine. Both men were arrested, as was McCain, who was apprehended 

after fleeing the house with $3,000 on his person and $108,000 in his backpack. 

One piece of evidence seized from the home’s search—Cleveland’s Samsung Galaxy 

cellphone—is a focal point of this appeal. On November 6, 2015, law enforcement obtained a 

warrant to search the cellphone (the “November 6 warrant”), which authorized “the forensic and 

physical examination of the device for the purpose of identifying the electronically stored 

information . . . .” This warrant specified that law enforcement was “commanded to execute this 

warrant on or before 11-27-2015.” The parties do not dispute that on November 9, 2015 (the 

next business day after the warrant was issued), the government removed the cellphone from the 

non-drug vault of the Youngstown Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) office and shipped it to a 

DEA laboratory in Lorton, Virginia, for extraction of its digital data. According to the 

laboratory’s report, extraction began and ended on December 21, 2015. 

Meanwhile, on November 17, 2015, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of Ohio 

returned an indictment against Cleveland, McCain, and Williams. Cleveland then filed a motion 

to suppress the evidence seized from the cellphone. His case proceeded to trial, at which the 

district court denied the motion to suppress. The government introduced into evidence certain 

information extracted from the cellphone, including call logs showing two outgoing calls to the 

truck driver transporting the damaged car and photographs that depicted Cleveland holding a 

large amount of cash. The jury convicted Cleveland of all counts against him. Following 

sentencing, the district court entered final judgment against him on September 18, 2017. 

II. Suppression Motion

Cleveland argues that the district court erroneously denied his motion to exclude the data 

obtained from the cellphone. He contends that the data extraction was unlawful because it was 

untimely under the November 6 warrant.1 In support of his argument, Cleveland maintains that 

the warrant’s directive—stating law enforcement is “commanded to execute this warrant on or 

before 11-27-2015”—created a deadline of November 27, 2015, by which the extraction needed 

 

1Cleveland does not dispute the government’s assertion that the earlier warrant to search Williams’s 

residence authorized law enforcement to seize the cellphone from the house.
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 4

to be completed. The government disagrees, arguing that the warrant’s execution deadline 

established only the date by when the cellphone needed to be shipped to the data extraction 

laboratory to initiate the analysis of the phone’s data, not when the extraction itself had to occur.

The district court denied Cleveland’s suppression motion based on Rule 41(e)(2) of the 

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear 

error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Navarro-Camacho, 186 F.3d 701, 705 

(6th Cir. 1999). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when we are left with the definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Cooper, 893 F.3d 840, 843 

(6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). And because the district court denied the motion to suppress, 

we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Id. (citation omitted). 

This court has recognized that the “federal rules of criminal procedure give law 

enforcement the authority to conduct searches of lawfully seized phones after they are seized.” 

United States v. Castro, 881 F.3d 961, 969 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing, in part, Fed. R. Crim. P. 

41(e)(2)(B)). Rule 41(e)(2)(B) states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he time for executing the warrant 

in Rule 41(e)(2)(A) and (f)(1)(A) refers to the seizure or on-site copying of the media or 

information, and not to any later off-site copying or review.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B). As 

the 2009 Advisory Committee’s Note concerning Rule 41 recognize, practical considerations 

necessitate that a warrant’s execution date govern only the date by when the seizure of the 

device, or, alternatively, on-site copying of the device, must occur, and not when off-site 

investigation and analysis of its contents must be completed:

Computers and other electronic storage media commonly contain such large 

amounts of information that it is often impractical for law enforcement to review 

all of the information during execution of the warrant at the search location. This 

rule acknowledges the need for a two-step process: officers may seize or copy the 

entire storage medium and review it later to determine what electronically stored 

information falls within the scope of the warrant. 

* * *

While consideration was given to a presumptive national or uniform time period 

within which any subsequent off-site copying or review of the media or 

electronically stored information would take place, the practical reality is that 

there is no basis for a “one size fits all” presumptive period. A substantial amount 

of time can be involved in the forensic imaging and review of information. This 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 5

is due to the sheer size of the storage capacity of media, difficulties created by 

encryption and booby traps, and the workload of the computer labs. The rule does 

not prevent a judge from imposing a deadline for the return of the storage media 

or access to the electronically stored information at the time the warrant is issued. 

However, to arbitrarily set a presumptive time period for the return could result in 

frequent petitions to the court for additional time.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendments.

Thus, under Rule 41, an execution period specified in a warrant applies to the time to 

seize the device or to conduct on-site copying of information from the device. This deadline 

does not apply to the time to analyze and investigate the contents of the device off-site. 

Applying this interpretation of Rule 41, the district court held, and we agree, the November 6 

warrant’s execution date set a deadline only for when the physical cellphone itself had to be 

seized, and not for when its data were to be extracted.

Our analysis finds support in United States v. Carrington, 700 F.App’x 224 (4th Cir. 

2017), in which the FBI obtained a fourteen-day warrant authorizing the search of numerous 

electronic devices that had been lawfully seized during an investigation, including two cellular 

phones. Id. at 231. The warrant expired on April 18, 2014, but it was not until October 2014 

that the FBI completed its forensic analysis of the phones and discovered a series of text 

messages referencing drug smuggling activity. Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendant’s 

argument that the “phone was not ‘searched’ for Fourth Amendment purposes until the FBI 

completed its forensic analysis of the phone in October of 2014,” because the court found this 

argument inconsistent with Rule 41:

In other words, an initial seizure of [the defendant’s] phone after the 14-day 

expiration period would have contravened the terms of the warrant—but that is 

not what happened here, where the phone already was in government custody 

pursuant to a lawful seizure. And the fact that the government did not “review” 

the texts on the phone until after the warrant’s expiration date is consistent with 

the warrant itself.

Id. at 232; see also United States v. Huart, 735 F.3d 972, 974 n.2 (7th Cir. 2013) (“We do note 

that, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e)(2)(B), a warrant for electronically stored 

information is executed when the information is seized or copied—here, when . . . the phone 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 6

[was seized]. Law enforcement is permitted to decode or otherwise analyze data on a seized 

device at a later time.”).

Similarly, here, the magistrate judge signed a warrant authorizing the search of a 

cellphone already in law enforcement’s custody pursuant to a lawful seizure for the purposes of 

off-site analysis. Execution of the warrant occurred when the cell phone was removed from its 

location and shipped to the analytics laboratory—an act that occurred prior to the warrant’s 

deadline.2 It is not relevant for compliance with that deadline that the subsequent extraction 

occurred after the warrant’s execution date. 

Cleveland disputes the applicability of Rule 41 and argues that 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which 

details procedures for interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, applies. Pursuant 

to that statute, an application must contain “a statement of the period of time for which the 

interception is required to be maintained,” id. § 2518(1)(d), and each order authorizing or 

approving the interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication shall specify “the 

period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether 

or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been 

first obtained.” Id. § 2518(4)(e). Cleveland posits that because his cellphone continued to 

receive electronic communications in the form of voicemails, text messages, emails, etc., the 

government was “intercepting” electronic communications when it conducted the extraction. 

There might be some merit to Cleveland’s argument if both the phone actually continued 

to receive information3 and Cleveland was seeking to suppress evidence received or created by 

the cellphone after the warrant’s execution deadline. In those circumstances, one could 

potentially argue that the government’s consideration and use of information constituted 

 

2Although the issuing magistrate judge specified a 21-day deadline for executing the warrant, the warrant’s 

form language and Rule 41(e)(2)(A)(i) contain a 14-day deadline. However, neither time period affects the outcome 

of this case because law enforcement executed the warrant well before the earlier deadline. 

3The government notes that after arriving at the laboratory, the phone was placed in a “Faraday room” to 

isolate the phone from the network and put it in airplane mode. In other words, this sequestration disabled 

transmissions to the phone. A digital forensic examiner with the Drug Enforcement Administration also testified 

that “[m]ost of the time the devices are already powered off when [they are] receive[d] . . . whether it’s the agents 

turn them off when they seize them or the battery’s died in transit.”
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 7

warrantless “interception” of the activities of the cellphone. But, Cleveland makes no claim that 

any of the proof at his trial was derived from cellphone data that post-dated the warrant.

Nor is United States v. Corrado, 803 F. Supp. 1280 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), cited by 

Cleveland, sufficiently analogous to this case. In Corrado, officers received a search warrant for 

a home and entered the home before the search warrant expired. Id. at 1285. The officers 

remained in the home for fourteen hours waiting for the defendant to return and arrested him. Id. 

It was not until after the defendant’s arrest—and after the warrant’s execution deadline had 

expired—that the officers began to seize marijuana plants and other incriminating items. Id. at 

1285. The district court determined that the evidence must be suppressed because officers 

remained in the home longer than “reasonably necessary” to execute a search warrant and seize 

the physical evidence. Id. Here, by contrast, the seizure of evidence occurred before the 

warrant’s deadline. Though the significance of that evidence—that is, the incriminating nature 

of the information on the cellphone prior to its seizure—was not discovered until after the 

seizure, that fact does not make that evidence inadmissible under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 41.4

III. Peremptory Challenge of a Juror

During the selection of the jury, Roger Reed, an African-American male, was seated as a 

prospective replacement juror. Reed said he had a law enforcement background that included 

working as a protection officer with the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, and he had 

spent “27 years in security.” His current job was working in “services for [the] Cleveland Clinic 

through a temp agency,” though he hoped to obtain full-time employment. When the district 

court asked how Reed felt about being a juror in the case, he responded, “Fair.” Reed also stated 

that he thought he could be fair in light of his law enforcement background. The government 

subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge to remove Reed from the jury. 

Defense counsel asked for a reason as to the discharge of “an African-American man 

named Roger Elston Reed.” The government responded that Reed left law enforcement 

 

4Because we hold that extraction of the cellular data did not violate the warrant at issue, we need not reach 

the parties’ alternative argument regarding the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 8

“suspiciously” because “he said he’d been in law enforcement for 27 years” but he “didn’t really 

give a reason for why he left that profession and was now working a temporary job at the 

Cleveland Clinic.” Furthermore, the government explained that Reed “exhibited ambivalence 

about serving on the jury in a way many of the other jurors had not expressed. Most of the jurors 

that [were] seated said it was an honor or that they were looking forward to serving,” while Reed 

only responded with “Fair.” The government conceded that “primarily, it was the way in which 

[Reed] described his leaving law enforcement that made the United States uncomfortable.” 

Additionally, the government stated that “given the way in which [the court] seats the 

replacement jurors,” “the United States doesn’t have an opportunity to get up and . . . question 

and flesh out those issues. So perhaps if [the government] had that opportunity to speak with 

him, [the government] could have arranged a way in which to properly rehab or rehabilitate any 

concerns . . . .” Finally, the government noted that it did leave two individuals of color on the 

jury. 

Following this explanation, the district court found the government’s rationale to be raceneutral. We review this ruling under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which held that 

the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a party from using peremptory challenges to exclude 

members of the venire on account of their race. 

To establish an equal protection violation under Batson, the claimant must first make a 

prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was based on race. McCurdy v. Montgomery 

Cty., 240 F.3d 512, 521 (6th Cir. 2001). If the claimant establishes a prima facie case, the party 

making the strike must articulate a race-neutral explanation for removing the juror in question. 

Id. (citation omitted). This explanation “need not be particularly persuasive, or even plausible, 

so long as it is neutral.” Id. (citing United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1999)). 

Once a race-neutral explanation is produced, the claimant must prove purposeful discrimination. 

Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. Purposeful discrimination may be shown by demonstrating that the 

proffered explanation is merely a pretext for racial motivation. McCurdy, 240 F.3d at 521. 

“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered 

will be deemed race neutral.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 9

Throughout the Batson inquiry, the ultimate burden of persuasion always rests with the 

party challenging the strike. McCurdy, 240 F.3d at 521. A district court’s ruling on whether the 

exercise of a peremptory challenge violates equal protection is entitled to “great deference” and 

will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Buchanan, 213 F.3d 302, 308 

(6th Cir. 2000).

In this case, Cleveland asked the government for an explanation for its decision to strike 

Reed, and the district court allowed the government to respond without first considering whether 

Cleveland had established a prima facie case. This situation is similar to that in United States v. 

Jackson, 347 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2003), and rather than reinvent the wheel, we quote much of 

Jackson’s analysis verbatim in the discussion below.

In Jackson, we held that, although the district court did not consider whether the Batson

challenge movant established a prima facie case, “once a party offers a race-neutral explanation 

for a peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional 

discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant [has] made a prima facie showing 

of intentional discrimination becomes moot.” Id. at 604 (citation and internal quotations 

omitted). Thus, as in Jackson, “we need not consider whether [Cleveland] has established a 

prima facie showing that the peremptory challenge was based on race.” Id. at 604–05. 

“The second step in the Batson inquiry is to assess whether the government articulated a 

race-neutral explanation for its decision to strike [Reed] from the panel.” Jackson, 347 F.3d at 

605. “A district court must independently assess a race-neutral explanation and explicitly rule on 

its credibility, ‘particularly in cases when the purported race-neutral justification is predicated on 

subjective explanations like body language or demeanor.’” Id. (quoting McCurdy, 240 F.3d at 

521). “It is inappropriate for a district court to perfunctorily accept a race-neutral explanation 

without engaging in further investigation.” Id. (citing McCurdy, 240 F.3d at 520–21). 

“However, ‘it is the defendant’s burden to rebut, to whatever extent possible, the prosecutor’s 

reasons for exercising his or her peremptory strikes on the record at the time such reasons are 

proffered.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Harris, 15 F. App’x 317, 321 (6th Cir. 2001)). “If a 

defendant fails to rebut a race-neutral explanation at the time it was made, the district court’s 

ruling on the objection is reviewed for plain error, and the movant in this setting is in no position 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 10

to register a procedural complaint that the district court failed to give a specific reason on the 

record for accepting the government’s race-neutral explanation.” Id. (citing United States v. 

Wilson, 11 F. App’x 474, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2001)).5

In the instant case, the district court determined that the government’s rationale is 

“certainly a race-neutral reason.” Thus, as in Jackson, “[t]he district court concluded that the 

government had come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its peremptory 

challenge, and [Cleveland] did not object to the court’s ruling or attempt to rebut the 

government’s proffered explanation by arguing that it was a pretext for discrimination.” 

Jackson, 347 F.3d at 605.

On appeal, Cleveland argues that the government failed to provide an adequate, clear, and 

reasonably specific race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge on prospective 

juror Reed. But “[b]ecause [Cleveland] failed to rebut the government’s explanation at the time 

it was made, we review the district court’s ruling on his objection for plain error.” Id.6

Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a Batson violation 

of the Equal Protection Clause; racially disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient. Id. “In 

the Batson context, a party’s explanation for its decision to strike is ‘neutral’ if it is based on 

something other than the race of the juror. In the absence of discriminatory intent inherent in the 

explanation, the reason offered is deemed race neutral.” Id. (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 

360). 

Here, “[t]here was no evidence of discriminatory intent inherent in the government’s 

proffered explanation . . . , and [Cleveland] made no attempt to argue to the district court that the 

 

5

In Jackson, we contemplated that “[a] movant’s failure to argue pretext may even constitute waiver of his 

initial Batson objection.” Jackson, 347 F.3d at 605 (citations omitted).

6Cleveland argues that he did object because defense counsel, in the first instance, requested that the 

government provide a rationale for exercising a peremptory challenge on Reed. This argument misconstrues the case 

law. Cleveland raised an issue with the government’s peremptory strike, and the government then responded with a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. The issue is whether Cleveland objected, or otherwise attempted to rebut, 

after the government offered its reason for the challenge. In other words, once the government offered a legitimate, 

non-discriminatory reason for striking Reed, the burden was on Cleveland to object that the proffered reason was 

pretextual and/or rebut the government and demonstrate purposeful discrimination. The record shows that 

Cleveland did not do so. 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 11

explanation was a pretext for discrimination. Furthermore, [Cleveland] has not asserted any 

arguments on appeal that suggest the district court plainly erred by overruling his objection.” Id. 

at 606. “The burden was on [Cleveland] as the party challenging the strike to prove the existence 

of purposeful discrimination, and when faced with the government’s seemingly race-neutral 

explanation, [Cleveland] made no response.” Id.; see also United States v. Lucas, 357 F.3d 599, 

609 (6th Cir. 2004) (“In reviewing the government’s race-neutral explanation, we need not find 

that the reason given is ‘persuasive, or even plausible.’ All that is necessary is that the reason not 

be inherently discriminatory.” (internal citations omitted)). 

“It is, therefore, difficult to conclude in this case that the district court made a[n] . . . error 

in determining that the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge was free of race bias, since there is no 

other evidence of discriminatory bias and the prosecutor did not exercise a peremptory challenge 

in order to eliminate the other one of two [] persons [of color] from the jury.” Lucas, 357 F.3d at 

609. “Under these circumstances, the district court did not plainly err in overruling 

[Cleveland’s] Batson objection.” Jackson, 347 F.3d at 606. 

IV. The Firearm

Law enforcement agents testified that they found a loaded nine-millimeter Smith and 

Wesson firearm, magazine, and rounds in a bathroom vanity during the search of Williams’s 

residence. The firearm was located in an area that could be accessed quickly given the house’s 

small size. Agent Nusser testified that the firearm’s presence in the residence was significant 

because “[d]rug dealers . . . tend to be violent and rob each other” and “they keep guns to protect 

their wealth and their drugs, and they . . . fear other drug dealers and sometimes law 

enforcement. So they keep guns ready at hand and load it usually.” Cleveland objected. Nusser 

also testified that the firearm’s serial number revealed that it had been stolen during a burglary in 

Trumbull County.7 Cleveland objected. The district court overruled the objections. 

 

7The trial transcript appears to contain a typographical error when it misidentifies the district court as 

making the statement that, “We generally seize firearms that are in drug houses and drugs and guns go together and 

we—we try to take them and we try to determine if they’re—who the owner is. In this case, it was stolen in a 

burglary somewhere in Trumbull County.” In fact, this statement was made apparently by Agent Nusser as part of 

his testimony, as both parties indicate in their briefing. 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 12

During closing arguments, the government stated, “[I]n the Northern District of Ohio, 

and elsewhere, you heard testimony that guns and drugs go together. Violence is an inherent part 

of the distribution trade.” Cleveland objected, and the district court overruled the objection.

A district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Langan, 263 F.3d 613, 620 (6th Cir. 2001). “Under this 

standard, we will leave rulings about admissibility of evidence undisturbed unless we are left 

with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in 

the conclusion it reached.” United States v. Dixon, 413 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation, 

brackets, and ellipses omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court relies on 

clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law, or uses an erroneous legal 

standard. Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 1995). “Broad discretion is 

given to district courts in determinations of admissibility based on considerations of relevance 

and prejudice, and those decisions will not be lightly overruled.” Dixon, 413 F.3d at 

544 (citation omitted).

In reviewing a district court’s decision on the exclusion of evidence under Federal Rule 

of Evidence 403, we “giv[e] the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its 

minimum reasonable prejudicial value.” United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 364 (6th Cir. 

2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 403 balancing is “highly 

discretionary” and thus, “the district court’s decision is afforded great deference.” United States 

v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 445 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “[A] decision will not be disturbed 

if substantial injustice did not result,” Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 832 (6th 

Cir. 2000), and “[a]n erroneous admission of evidence that does not affect the substantial rights 

of a party is considered harmless, and should be disregarded.” United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 

757, 775 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Cleveland argues that the district court erred when it “failed to exclude the testimony 

regarding a weapon . . . found at the residence” under Rule 403 because any relevance of the 

weapon is outweighed by the unfair prejudice to Cleveland. He concedes that “[t]he fact that a 

gun was found is clearly relevant and permissible evidence” to establish an ongoing drug 

conspiracy, “[b]ut the testimony that the gun was stolen, while still somewhat relevant, becomes 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 13

. . . prejudicial with the testimony that the gun had been used in a burglary in Trumbull County, 

Ohio.” He argues this is because “the testimony in question would tend to lead the jury to 

believe that Cleveland was a dangerous person who had committed previous serious felonies and 

posed a threat to law enforcement. Such testimony may cause the jury to convict him for [] 

purposes . . . [other] than the evidence present[ed] [in] the actual charge.” Cleveland also argues 

that the effect of the testimony regarding the weapon, which resulted in the government’s 

statements at closing argument, analyzed below, violates his Fifth Amendment Due Process 

rights.

To the extent that Cleveland argues that evidence of the weapon itself should not have 

been admitted, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion. “This court has made 

clear that firearms, as tools of the drug-trafficking trade, are probative evidence in drug 

prosecutions.” Wheaton, 517 F.3d at 364; see also United States v. Makki, 129 F. App’x 185, 

193 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have previously held that firearms may be used as ‘tools of the trade’ 

evidence in drug trafficking prosecutions.”); United States v. Reyes, 51 F. App’x 488, 493 (6th 

Cir. 2002) (“Possession of firearms is also admissible in drug cases as evidence of ‘tools of the 

trade,’ even if no firearms offense has been charged.”); United States v. Arnott, 704 F.2d 322, 

326 (6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that firearms are “tools of the trade” in narcotics trafficking); 

United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120, 1123 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that evidence of weapons 

is allowed even though the indictment does not charge firearm offenses because weapons are 

“tools of the trade” in drug trafficking). 

Cleveland’s argument is similar to the one advanced by the defendants in United States v. 

Randolph, No. 97-5990, 1999 WL 98564 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 1999), who were charged with drug 

offenses and not firearm offenses. We held: “In light of our previous rulings that firearms are 

recognized tools of the drug trade, and the fact that the firearm was loaded and fully operational 

when found, we find that the evidence which Defendant challenges was probative of the drug 

charges and not unfairly prejudicial.” Id. at *4; see also Fed. R. Evid. 402 (stating that “relevant 

evidence” is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence). Similarly, in Wheaton, this court found that it was not error for the 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 14

district court to have admitted a photograph of a firearm found at a residence during a drug 

conspiracy trial because although “there was no testimony linking [the defendant] directly to the 

gun at [the residence], there was ample evidence linking him to the location,” including that his 

car was parked at the residence. 517 F.3d at 364. 

Here, we find that the testimony regarding the firearm found at the residence was 

admissible evidence indicative of the drug-trafficking conspiracy given that Cleveland drove the 

transported vehicle containing the ten kilograms of fake cocaine to Williams’s residence, 

McCain was apprehended fleeing the house with $111,000, agents found the fake cocaine and 

tools used to package drugs in the residence, Cleveland was in the residence when the warrant 

was executed, Cleveland’s hands had visible traces of fluorescent powder residue from the fake 

cocaine packaging, and the gun was in a common area of the home. To the extent that Cleveland 

argues that admission of the testimony concerning the firearm was improper propensity evidence 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), although we are not convinced this is propensity 

evidence, the same rationale would still apply—the firearm was used as evidence to demonstrate 

the “plan” to traffic drugs. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (stating that propensity evidence may be 

admitted in a criminal case for another purpose, such as proving “intent, preparation, plan,” etc.). 

We do express concern, however, that the district court allowed testimony from Agent 

Nusser indicating that the firearm was previously stolen during a burglary. Nevertheless, even if 

the testimony about the stolen gun was improper, it did not deprive Cleveland of a fair trial 

because no one suggested that Cleveland stole the weapon or knew that it was stolen. In fact, it 

was not clear that the firearm belonged to Cleveland. Finally, given the strength of the evidence 

against Cleveland on his drug-trafficking charges as detailed previously, it is unlikely that the 

error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). Thus, any error in eliciting evidence about 

the stolen weapon was harmless.

V. Prosecutorial Misconduct During the Closing Arguments

In the course of closing arguments, the government stated: “This is a serious day for the 

Defendant and a serious day for the United States because ten kilograms of cocaine is sitting here 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 15

in bricks. But if this had gotten into the community, lives would have been at stake.” Cleveland 

objected, and the court overruled the objection. As detailed above, the government also stated: 

“[I]n the Northern District of Ohio, and elsewhere, you heard testimony that guns and drugs go 

together. Violence is an inherent part of the distribution trade.” Cleveland objected again, and 

the court overruled the objection. On appeal, Cleveland argues that the prosecutor’s statements 

calling for a verdict against Cleveland, in order to protect the community, constitutes 

prosecutorial misconduct. 

“Whether the government’s closing argument constitutes prosecutorial misconduct 

presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” United States v. Tarwater, 

308 F.3d 494, 510–11 (6th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 687 (6th 

Cir. 2008). “When reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine first whether the 

statements were improper.” Tarwater, 308 F.3d at 511 (citing United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 

1166, 1177 (6th Cir. 1986)). “If they appear improper, we then look to see if they were flagrant 

and warrant reversal.” Id. (citing United States v. Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1388 (6th Cir. 1994)). 

“To determine flagrancy, we consider: 1) whether the statements tended to mislead the jury or 

prejudice the defendant; 2) whether the statements were isolated or among a series of improper 

statements; 3) whether the statements were deliberately or accidentally before the jury; and 4) the 

total strength of the evidence against the accused.” Id. (citations omitted); see also United States 

v. Funzie, 543 F. App’x 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2013). “If the challenged remarks are not flagrant, 

reversal is warranted only if proof of the defendant’s guilt was not overwhelming, the defendant 

objected to the improper remarks, and the court failed to cure the error with an admonishment to 

the jury.” Funzie, 543 F. App’x at 553. The issue is whether the prosecutor’s statements “so 

infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). 

A. Comments Regarding the Community

Cleveland argues that “it is improper for the prosecutor to appeal to jurors to act as a 

conscience for the community or to make other remarks likely to inflame the passions of the jury 

if the remarks are intended to lead to a conviction for an improper reason[].” We have 

previously held that “[p]rosecutors may not press the jury to send a message to all criminals in 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 16

the community by convicting the defendant because the amelioration of society’s woes is far too 

heavy a burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear.” United States v. Herring, 641 F. 

App’x 451, 454 (6th Cir. 2016). However, we have also rejected a defendant’s claim that a 

prosecutor’s statement during closing argument regarding preventing poison from entering the 

community misled the jury or prejudiced the defendant. See United States v. Scott, 716 F. App’x 

477, 487 (6th Cir. 2017). Similarly, here, we are not persuaded that the government’s statements 

misled the jury or prejudiced the defendant. The statement was not a request “to send a 

message.” Id. Instead, the government was referencing the common fact that drugs are a 

community problem without asking the jury to fix or combat that problem through a verdict. Id.

(holding that the government “was accurately describing facts” when referring to the drugs as 

poison). In other words, the government’s statement does not rise to the level of “do your duty” 

and/or “send a message with your verdict” comments that may constitute prosecutorial 

misconduct because nothing in the government’s statement requested the jury to act in a 

particular manner. See United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 514 (4th Cir. 2013).

Moreover, although it “[i]t is axiomatic that a prosecutor may not make remarks that are 

calculated only to arouse the passions and prejudice of the jury[,] . . . isolated inappropriate 

remarks by the prosecutor, in an otherwise fair trial, do not generally justify reversal of a 

criminal conviction.” United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1213 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations 

omitted). This is especially true when, as here, the total strength of the evidence against the 

defendant is compelling. 

B. Comments Regarding the Firearm

Cleveland argues that the prosecutor’s comments regarding guns and drugs “go[ing] 

together” improperly emphasized the theme of protecting the community from violent drug 

dealers even though Cleveland was not charged with possession of guns, stolen property, or 

burglary.8 

 

8We note that the prosecutor did not reference the testimony regarding the stolen nature of the firearm, or 

the firearm’s involvement in a burglary, during closing arguments. 
No. 17-3993 United States v. Cleveland Page 17

As detailed above, testimony that agents seized a firearm during execution of the search 

warrant was related to the drug-trafficking and drug conspiracy charges and thus, was relevant 

and probative evidence even though Cleveland was not charged with a firearm offense. 

Accordingly, the prosecutor’s comment did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct or rise to the 

level of argument that might mislead or inflame the jury concerning its duty, particularly in the 

context of a case such as this one involving compelling evidence of guilt. 

VI. Conclusion

For the abovementioned reasons, we therefore AFFIRM the district court.