STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQ WAR:

U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA REASSESSED

Elizabeth Wishnick

May 2004

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FOREWORD

 Central Asia is a key theater in the war on terrorism where 

fragile new states are attempting to consolidate political power, 

build legitimacy, and stoke economic development at the same time 

that they face a range of threats with security forces badly in need 

of reform. While the United States has recognized the pivotal role 

of Central Asia and greatly expanded its activities there, this is a 

new venue for America. U.S. policymakers are learning in stride as 

they seek ways to both strengthen the Central Asian states and to 

encourage them to undertake badly needed political reforms.

 In this monograph, Elizabeth Wishnick builds on the analysis in 

her important 2002 SSI study, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central 

Asia. She contends that by highlighting antiterrorism, the United 

States addresses a symptom rather than the causes of instability in 

Central Asia; thus it is contributing to the radicalization of political 

opposition movements and discrediting both democratization 

and the U.S. commitment to it. Instead, she argues, the United 

States should do more to address the underlying human security 

problems in Central Asia, which increase its vulnerability to terrorist 

movements. 

 The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph to 

help national security strategists better understand the complexities 

of America’s security interests in Central Asia.

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute 
iv

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

ELIZABETH WISHNICK is a Research Associate at the Weatherhead 

East Asian Institute, Columbia University, and a Visiting Professor 

in the Department of Political Science, Graduate Faculty of Political 

and Social Science, New School University. In 2003-04 she was a 

Fulbright Visiting Scholar in the Department of Politics and Sociology 

at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. She has taught at Barnard 

College, Columbia University, and at Yale College, and has been a 

research fellow at Taiwan’s Academia Sinica, the Hoover Institution, 

and the Davis Center at Harvard University. Dr. Wishnick is the 

author of Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from 

Brezhnev to Yeltsin (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001) 

and of numerous articles on great power relations and regional 

development in Northeast Asia, published in Asian Survey, NBR 

Analysis, SAIS Review, Journal of East Asian Affairs, Issues and Studies, 

and Perspectives Chinoises, as well as in several edited volumes. Her 

current research focuses on transnational threats from China and 

their impact on regional threat perceptions; human security and 

Chinese migration to the Russian Far East; and great power relations 

and the Korean nuclear crisis. Dr. Wishnick received a Ph.D. in 

Political Science from Columbia University, an M.A. in Russian 

and East European Studies from Yale University, and a B.A. from 

Barnard College, and speaks both Russian and Chinese. 
v

SUMMARY

 Support for continuing operations in Afghanistan and for 

antiterrorism has been the driving force for the strengthening of 

American security cooperation with Central Asia. This monograph 

1) explores the military rationale for U.S. security interests in Central 

Asia; 2) examines the impact of the Iraq war on the sustainability 

of U.S. forward basing in Central Asia; 3) evaluates the broader 

consequences for U.S. foreign policy of an American military 

presence in Central Asia; and 4) assesses the implications for the 

U.S. Army.

 The U.S.-led war in Iraq has introduced new complications into 

security cooperation between the United States and Central Asia and 

revealed inconsistencies in the U.S. approach to regional security. 

The increased U.S. security focus on the region has led other regional 

powers--especially Russia, China, and India--to compete for influence 

there more overtly, and a continued American military presence is 

likely to create tensions in Russian-American relations in particular. 

Central Asian leaders concerned about the implications of the U.S. 

interest in “regime change” for their own rule, now have an added 

incentive to overstate terrorist threats facing their countries, while 

justifying the persecution of any political opposition and peaceful 

religious activity.

 By highlighting antiterrorism in U.S. security cooperation with 

Central Asia, the United States addresses a symptom, rather than the 

causes of regional security; thus it is pursuing a counterproductive 

strategy, contributing to the radicalization of political opposition 

movements and discrediting both democratization and the U.S. 

commitment to it. Instead, the United States should do more to 

address the underlying human security problems in the region, 

which increase its vulnerability to terrorist movements. To this end, 

the U.S. Army should contribute to humanitarian demining efforts 

and expand training in drug interdiction there.

1

STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQ WAR:

U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA REASSESSED

 Almost three years since 9/11 and the October 2001 war in 

Afghanistan, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia shows 

no signs of diminishing. To the contrary, the U.S. military has 

been consolidating existing forward basing in Kyrgyzstan and 

Uzbekistan, and maintaining its contingency access to the Almaty 

and Dushanbe airports. Support for continuing operations in 

Afghanistan and anti-terrorism have been the driving forces for the 

strengthening of American security cooperation with Central Asia. 

This monograph will 1) explore the military rationale for U.S. security 

interests in Central Asia; 2) examine the impact of the Iraq war on 

the sustainability of U.S. forward basing in Central Asia; 3) evaluate 

the broader consequences for U.S. foreign policy of an American 

military presence in Central Asia; and 4) assess the implications for 

the U.S. Army.

 The U.S.-led war in Iraq has introduced new complications 

into security cooperation between the United States and Central 

Asia and revealed inconsistencies in the U.S. approach to regional 

security. The increased U.S. security focus on Central Asia has led 

other regional powers—especially Russia, China, and India—to 

compete for influence in the region more overtly, and a continued 

American military presence is likely to create tensions in RussianAmerican relations in particular. Concerned about the implications 

of the U.S. interest in “regime change” for their own rule, Central 

Asian leaders now have an added incentive to overstate terrorist 

threats facing their countries, while justifying the persecution of any 

political opposition and peaceful religious activity.

 Moreover, by highlighting anti-terrorism in U.S. security 

cooperation with Central Asia, the United States addresses a 

symptom, rather than the causes of regional security, and is 

pursuing a counterproductive strategy, contributing to the 

radicalization of political opposition movements and discrediting 

both democratization and the U.S. commitment to it. Instead, the 

United States should do more to address the underlying human 

security problems in Central Asia, which increase its vulnerability to 

terrorist movements. To this end, the U.S. Army should contribute 
2

to humanitarian demining efforts and expand training in drug 

interdiction in the region.

BACKGROUND

 To support Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the U.S. military 

acquired temporary forward basing rights in Uzbekistan and 

Kyrgyzstan as well as access to airspace and restricted use of bases 

in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. All the Central Asian states offered 

to share intelligence, and U.S. security cooperation with the region 

has increased substantially since 9/11, involving high-level visits, 

funding, and training. 

 After Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Tashkent 

on October 5, 2001, Uzbekistan signed an agreement with U.S. 

officials allowing approximately 1,500 American military personnel 

to operate out of the Karshi Khanabad airbase in exchange for 

security guarantees and U.S. agreement to target training camps in 

Afghanistan known to harbor the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.1

The agreement also provided for intelligence sharing and U.S. use of 

Uzbekistan’s airspace. By the Karimov government’s request, aircraft 

based at Khanabad were to be used primarily for humanitarian and 

search-and-rescue attacks.2 The airbase also coordinates air traffic 

control for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.3

 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Uzbekistan have 

been cooperating closely, and in December 2001, five Uzbek 

representatives were posted there.4 During CENTCOM Commanderin-Chief General Tommy Frank’s visit to Uzbekistan in January 2002, 

CENTCOM and the Ministry of Defense of Uzbekistan signed an 

agreement to develop military-to-military cooperation through joint 

seminars, training, and partnerships with U.S. units.5 In March 2002, 

the United States and Uzbekistan signed a strategic partnership: in 

exchange for allowing the United States to remain in Uzbekistan 

as long as necessary to complete antiterrorism operations in 

Afghanistan, the United States would “regard with grave concern 

any external threat to Uzbekistan.”6

 Uzbekistan has played an important role in supplying economic 

assistance to Afghanistan. Since the beginning of hostilities, more 
3

than 300,000 tons of humanitarian aid reached Afghanistan from 

Uzbek territory. Uzbekistan also has been supplying its neighbor 

with electric power and liquefied gas. In May 2003, Uzbekistan 

offered to provide logistical and medical assistance to the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Afghanistan, in 

addition to helping with humanitarian aid deliveries.7 Germany, a 

participant in the NATO peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, also 

continues to operate an air base in Termez, near the border with 

Afghanistan, and stations 150 troops there.

 In contrast to the largely secret agreements the U.S. military 

concluded with Uzbekistan, on December 5, 2001, the U.S. 

Department of State and Kyrgyz officials signed a basing access 

agreement, allowing U.S. forces to use Manas airport, renamed the 

Peter Ganci airbase in honor of the New York City fire chief who 

perished in the attacks on the World Trade Center. The agreement 

allowed for basing rights for Western forces for a 1-year period.8 The 

agreement was then prolonged for a second year, and on June 5, 

2003, Kyrgyzstan committed to a 3-year extension. Approximately 

1,300 U.S. and South Korean troops and 300 Kyrgyz civilians work at 

the base, which sends aerial tankers to Afghanistan daily, as well as 

regular transport of food, medical supplies, equipment, ammunition, 

and coalition troops into Afghanistan.9

 Kyrgyzstan has posted five 

representatives at CENTCOM since May 14, 2002. The country has 

played a key role, along with Tajikistan and Russia, in supplying 

wheat and flour to northern Afghanistan under the auspices of the 

United Nations (UN) World Food Program.10

 Because weather problems at times disrupt use of the Ganci 

airbase, on July 10, 2002, the United States and Kazakhstan signed 

a memorandum of understanding regarding use of the Almaty 

airport for emergency landings. Kazakhstan also provided 

overflight rights and has allowed transshipments over its territory 

of supplies destined for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.11 While the 

Kazakh Foreign Minister has denied that there would be any 

permanent U.S. military presence, the United States has increased its 

assistance for training and equipment for Kazakhstan’s military and 

is renovating a military base at Atyrau in the Caspian Sea to improve 

the security of the country’s energy infrastructure.12 In September 

2003, CENTCOM and the Kazakhstan Emergency Situations Agency 
4

organized an international conference to strengthen the detection, 

prevention, and elimination of emergency situations in Central 

Asia, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD).13 Three representatives from Kazakhstan have 

been at CENTCOM since June 2002.

 Tajikistan allowed the Pentagon (and later the French military) 

to use the Dushanbe airport on a contingency basis, mostly for 

refueling, and granted the United States overflight rights.14 France 

deployed transport aircraft to Dushanbe for use in humanitarian 

assistance and other airlift support. Some 60 percent of international 

assistance to Afghanistan’s power industry is shipped via Tajikistan. 

Since March 2003 the Tajik Ministry of Defense also has been 

providing some training for the new Afghan Army.15

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA

 In testimony to Congress in October 2003, Assistant Secretary 

for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Elizabeth Jones stated that the 

United States currently has three sets of security interests in Central 

Asia: 1) security (antiterrorism, nonproliferation, combating drug 

trafficking); 2) energy (ensuring reliable and economically viable 

access to global markets and the use of energy revenues to promote 

sustainable development); and 3) internal reform (including 

democratization and market-oriented changes). The Assistant 

Secretary emphasized that since 9/11 U.S. strategic interests in 

Central Asia have focused on antiterrorism, especially the elimination 

of the influence of terrorist and other destabilizing groups. She also 

noted that the Central Asian states continue to provide critical air 

support to U.S. antiterrorism operations in Afghanistan.16

 In recognition of the importance of Central Asia to U.S. 

antiterrorism goals, these countries have seen their share of Freedom 

Support Act funding increase at a time of decline in assistance to 

Eurasia as a whole. Thus, cumulative aid to Central Asia FY1992-

FY2002 amounted to $2.76 billion, or 12 percent of total Freedom 

Support funds for that period, but the $157 billion in aid requested 

for Central Asia in FY2004 represents 27 percent of the total Freedom 

Support Act request for the current year.17 According to the State 
5

Department, these funds are essential “to sustain efforts begun in 

the wake of the September 11 attacks to enhance long-term stability 

in these key front-line states.”18 (Freedom Support programs 

in the security area include law enforcement, export controls, 

nonproliferation, and redirection of nuclear scientists and weapons 

experts to civilian occupations.)

In addition to Freedom Support Act funds, the Central Asian 

states receive additional antiterrorism assistance from a range of 

other agencies, including the Department of Defense (DoD), as well 

as through other State Department programs. The latter include 

Foreign Military Financing (providing grants for purchases of U.S. 

military equipment, as well as training in counterterrorism and 

counterinsurgency, and other services to support interoperability in 

the Partnership for Peace Program), International Military Training 

and English (funding for English language instruction and other 

training for Central Asian militaries) and Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs (supporting export 

controls and border security assistance).

Kaz. Kyr. Taj. Uzb.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 2.9 3.9 0 8.6

International Military Education and 

Training (IMET)

0.872 1.1 0.34 1.1

Non-Proliferation, AntiTerrorism, 

De-Mining, and Related Programs 

(NADR)

8.5 2.5 0.55 3.9

Freedom Support Act Security 

Programs

4.98 2.5 0.42 3.9

Source: U.S. Department of State, http: www.state.gov.

Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia in FY2003

(in millions of US$).
6

MILITARY RATIONALE

 The military rationale for U.S. security interests in Central Asia 

follows from new approaches to U.S. national security strategy, 

developments in Afghanistan, and the war in Iraq. Central Asian 

bases are likely to take on increased strategic importance in the 

context of ongoing reassessments of U.S. basing policy.

U.S. National Security Strategy.

 The October 2001 U.S. DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

advocated a capabilities-based strategy and emphasized the 

importance of preparing forward deployed forces for a variety of 

contingencies worldwide. It did this by expanding basing options 

beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia and by securing 

temporary access to facilities for training and exercises in areas where 

the United States lacks bases. The QDR also called for strengthening 

U.S. alliances and partnerships by increasing peacetime training and 

preparations for coalition operations.

 Building on the themes outlined in the QDR, the U.S National 

Security Strategy published in August 2002 advocates a preemptive 

strategy because it “is not possible to defend against every threat, in 

every place, at every conceivable time. The only defense is to take 

the war to the enemy. The best defense is a good offense.”19 The 

document summarizes many of the general principles underlying 

U.S. security interests, which clearly are underpinning U.S. 

diplomatic overtures and military engagement with Central Asia: 

preventing the hostile domination of key areas and preserving a 

stable balance of power; maintaining access to key markets and 

strategic resources; addressing threats from territories of weak states 

and ungoverned areas; preventing the diffusion of weapons to nonstate actors; sustaining coalitions; and preparing to intervene rapidly 

in unexpected crises. 

 What this means specifically for U.S. security interests in Central 

Asia is clarified in the Secretary of Defense’s 2002 annual report 

to Congress. The report states that “an arc of instability” spans 

from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, including weak states that 

are vulnerable to radical movements. Although emphasizing the 
7

importance of safeguarding stability in Asia, the report acknowledges 

that “the density of U.S. basing and en route infrastructure is lower 

in Asia than in other critical regions.”20 Consequently the United 

States must place a priority on securing additional basing access and 

signing infrastructure agreements with key states and on developing 

new forms of security cooperation.

 More than 2 years since the attacks against the World Trade Center 

and the Pentagon, the war against terrorism continues to be the focal 

point of U.S. foreign policy. As President Bush emphasized in his 

State of the Union address on January 20, 2004, homeland defense 

and worldwide antiterrorism operations remain key American 

priorities.21 The antiterrorism strategy outlined by the White House 

in February 2003 highlighted the importance of creating new 

partnerships with those willing and able to pool resources to defeat 

terrorism.22 In this policy context, where antiterrorism efforts occupy 

pride of place in American foreign policy, security cooperation with 

Central Asian states is focused on addressing challenges from 

domestic and foreign terrorist threats to these countries. 

 The U.S. Army Transformation Roadmap notes that the national 

security strategy places considerable demands on the American 

military.23 Making virtue out of a necessity, at a time when Army 

resources are straining to cope with current missions in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker has 

portrayed strategic agility as a key aim.24 U.S. basing access in 

Central Asia enables American forces to react quickly in case of 

terrorist threats or other crises in the region. “Operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan have brought home an important lesson--speed matters,” 

the Secretary of Defense’s 2003 report to Congress concludes.25

Developments in Afghanistan and U.S. Basing in Central Asia.

 Central Asian leaders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan 

provided support for the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan due 

to their own concerns over the potential for instability caused by 

the Taliban’s support for Islamic movements within their borders. 

They especially were troubled by the armed radical organization, 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), then based in northern 

Afghanistan, and reportedly linked to al-Qaeda. The IMU was 
8

implicated in bombings in February 1999 in Tashkent that nearly 

killed President Karimov and led armed incursions into Kyrgyzstan 

in July-August 1999. After further IMU attacks in Uzbekistan in 

August 2000 during which several Americans were held hostage, in 

September 2000 the State Department included the IMU in its list of 

foreign terrorist organizations.26

 During the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, the IMU 

leader, Namangani, was believed to have been killed, and the 

organization’s activities were disrupted.27 Nevertheless, in July 

2003, Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Service Deputy Chairman 

Tokon Mamytov reported that the IMU had received $400,000 

from international terrorist organizations to fund actions in Central 

Asia. He claimed that the IMU had already joined Uighur groups 

in establishing a united Islamic Movement of Turkestan and was 

seeking to establish ties with Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami (The Party of 

Islamic Liberation). While Hizb-ut-Tahrir is a nonviolent political 

party, it is banned throughout Central Asia due to the group’s aim to 

reestablish the Caliphate and reunite all Muslim lands under Islamic 

rule.28

 U.S. officials also believe that the IMU is regrouping, despite 

its losses in Afghanistan. At a December 2003 press conference, 

U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Steven Young called the group 

the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the Central Asian region. He 

noted that U.S. security cooperation with Kyrgyzstan should be 

able to counter IMU terrorist activities in the country, and that the 

U.S. military presence there would remain as long as necessary to 

address the ongoing terrorist threat in Afghanistan.29

 The United States declared the end of major combat operations in 

Afghanistan on May 1, 2003, paving the way for a greater emphasis 

on reconstruction, although antiterrorist operations are continuing. 

Secretary Rumsfeld has stated that the reconstruction of Afghanistan 

could be a laboratory for reconstruction in Iraq, and thus support 

from Central Asian bases for such efforts will continue to be highly 

important. Since the conclusion of the war in Afghanistan, U.S. 

forward basing in Central Asia has played a key role in supporting 

U.S. efforts to combat remaining pockets of opposition and terrorist 

operations, establish stability, promote reconstruction, and provide 

humanitarian aid.
9

 The United States still has approximately 11,000 troops in 

Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Since 

August 11, 2003, NATO has taken on its first mission outside Europe 

and has assumed command of the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF), the 5,500-strong international peacekeeping force 

established under a UN mandate. Former NATO Secretary-General 

Lord Robertson noted that NATO would play a key role in assisting 

Central Asia to combat terrorist threats once it assumed leadership 

of the peacekeeping force.30

 While NATO agreed to expand ISAF’s activities beyond Kabul, 

thus far just one provincial reconstruction team has been dispatched. 

In January 2004 a team of 170 German troops was sent to Kunduz in 

northern Afghanistan, although the U.S.-led coalition also operates 

teams in several other cities. U.S. forces provide logistical assistance 

and training for the Afghan military, but they do no engage in 

peacekeeping.31 NATO has been under pressure both to expand 

significantly its peacekeeping operations across Afghanistan and to 

take over antiterrorist operations from the United States. A decision 

on NATO’s future role in Afghanistan is expected at the June 2004 

summit in Istanbul.32

 While new NATO commander Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has pledged 

to make Afghanistan a priority for the Alliance, his predecessor faced 

considerable difficulty in obtaining sufficient troop contributions.33

In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Marine 

Corps General James Jones noted that more than 5,500 troops would 

be required to expand the peacekeeping effort, but the Alliance 

had yet to decide how to pay for them, transport them, or maintain 

them.34 Former UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi contended that 

as many as 10,000 more troops would be necessary to expand the 

NATO force beyond Kabul, a step UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 

has been urging for the past 2 years.35

 Pockets of resistance from Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants 

remain throughout Afghanistan. Military engagements and rebel 

attacks occur periodically, as U.S. Special Forces continue to hunt 

for remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda units.36 There is evidence that 

as many as 5,000 fighters, possibly including Osama Bin Laden 

himself, may have fled to western Pakistan, where a pro-Taliban 
10

coalition of Islamic parties, the Mattahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), 

was elected in October 2002. Linked by ethnic ties--both the Taliban 

and these provincial leaders are from the Pushtun ethnic group---as 

well as anti-Americanism and opposition to the Karzai government 

in Afghanistan, the new provincial coalition is believed to be 

providing sanctuary and support to the Taliban, now feared to be 

regrouping.37

 Since late 2002, the Bush administration and Afghanistan’s 

President Hamid Karzai have been more openly critical of Pakistan’s 

role in the war against terrorism. In January 2003 U.S. Ambassador 

to Islamabad Nancy Powell called Pakistan “a platform for 

terrorism.”38 U.S. military commanders have complained about the 

slow progress in cooperating with Pakistan in the search for fugitives 

across the border from Afghanistan. In April 2003 President Karzai 

presented President Musharraf with a list of Taliban commanders 

allegedly using Pakistan as a base for guerrilla operations against 

Afghanistan.39 Tensions increased between Kabul and Islamabad in 

the summer and fall of 2003 as members of the Karzai government 

accused Pakistani officials of tacit support for the Taliban and other 

Islamic militants seeking to destabilize Afghanistan.40 Musharraf, 

who has faced a series of death threats including two in December 

2003 alone, has been under intense pressure from militant Islamists 

in Pakistan for his support for the U.S.-led war against the Taliban 

and now for his scrutiny of the role of Pakistani scientists in nuclear 

proliferation to Iran. In late September 2003, al-Qaeda issued a death 

threat against the Pakistani leader, and in a taped message, Osama 

bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman Al-Zawahari, called for Muslims in 

Pakistan to “uproot” Musharraf for his betrayal of their interests.41

Nevertheless, in January 2004, Pakistani Prime Minister Zafarullah 

Khan Jamali visited Kabul for the first time since the fall of the 

Taliban and pledged to improve cooperation with Afghanistan on 

antiterrorism.42

 The security of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan 

also is important to efforts to reduce narcotics trafficking, an 

important revenue source for terrorist groups. The opium grown in 

Afghanistan and trafficked through Pakistan supplies 70 percent of 

the heroin sold in Europe and 40 percent of that sold in the United 
11

States.43 Despite ongoing U.S.-Pakistani cooperation against narcotics 

trafficking, drug control remains an uphill battle due to corruption 

implicating Pakistani intelligence services, the difficulty in policing 

the border with Afghanistan, and the postwar resumption of opium 

production in that country. Afghanistan produced 3,400 tons of 

opium in 2002 and is now the world’s leading source of opium.44

Despite President Karzai’s imposition of a decree in January 2002 

banning the cultivation, trafficking and abuse of opiates, opium 

production increased by 6 percent and poppy cultivation by 8 percent 

in 2003. While the UN, Great Britain, and other donors are assisting 

Afghanistan to implement a strategy banning opium cultivation 

within 10 years, currently the drug accounts for more than half of 

the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) of $4.4 billion.45

 The difficulty of establishing security on Afghanistan’s borders 

points to a more fundamental problem: the central government 

under President Karzai has yet to establish effective control over 

the entire country, which continues to be threatened by warlordism 

and political disintegration. U.S. military and financial support for 

regional commanders during the 2001 war served to strengthen 

these leaders and, even after the Taliban’s ouster, they continue 

to undermine central government authority.46 While the warlords 

have access to customs revenues, the central government remains 

underfunded, compounding its weakness and reducing its public 

support. Despite American military efforts to stabilize southern 

Afghanistan, aid workers deem the region to insecure to visit. 

Moreover, this region has been impoverished by persistent droughts, 

prompting residents to choose opium production over livestock 

herding.47

 In recognition of the continuing security problems in southern 

and eastern Afghanistan, in December 2003 Lieutenant General 

David Barno, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, 

announced that American troops will be deployed to those areas in 

provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). While the PRTs previously 

distributed emergency relief, now they will focus on improving 

security by patrolling, training the local police and Afghan security 

forces. Twelve PRTs will be in place by March 2004.48

 Although the deployment of PRTs and the loya jirga’s (grand 
12

tribal council) approval of Afghanistan’s new constitution on 

January 4, 2004, will contribute to the consolidation of control by the 

Karzai government, the Iraq war is diverting international attention 

(and funds) away from the country’s needs. President Bush’s $87 

billion aid package for Iraq and Afghanistan allocated just $1.2 

billion for security and reconstruction in Afghanistan, only $800 

million of which is new money.49 Moreover, the U.S. Government 

spends nearly ten times that amount--$11 billion--to maintain 

American forces in Afghanistan.50 Members of Congress, the UN, 

and the Karzai government have been highly critical of what they 

view as inadequate U.S. efforts thus far to assist Afghanistan’s 

recovery.51 Indeed, the inability to stabilize Afghanistan serves to 

compound doubts that the much more complex tasks involved in 

achieving a secure and economically functional Iraq are likely to be 

achieved successfully. As one observer noted, “Afghanistan was not 

supposed to be simply a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Iraq. It 

was meant to be a premiere, the blueprint for how to rescue a failed 

state without colonizing it.”52

The War in Iraq and U.S. Forward Basing Strategy.

 After the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, Secretary 

Rumsfeld announced future changes in U.S. basing in the Middle 

East, including the withdrawal of troops from Saudi Arabia, the shift 

of the major air operations center from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, and 

the withdrawal of attack and support aircraft from Turkey.

 The U.S. military has sought to relocate its combat air operations 

center from Saudi Arabia for some time, due to restrictions placed 

on operations originating there and concerns over the security of 

American troops stationed at the Prince Sultan base. The United 

States began using the al-Udeid base in Qatar on September 29, 

2001, to position aircraft for use in the war in Afghanistan. In early 

2002 the Air Force built a back-up command center at the base, in 

case Saudi Arabia refused to allow the United States to direct its Iraq 

installations from the Prince Sultan base. Initially used to direct air 

operations in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, al-Udeid now 

directs all regional missions. CENTCOM also established a regional 
13

command post at Sayliya in Qatar, and the heavy equipment 

prepositioned there was shipped to Kuwait and then used in the 

Third Infantry Division’s invasion of Iraq.53

 On April 29, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld and Prince Sultan bin 

Abdul Aziz held a news conference broadcast on Saudi television, 

announcing the withdrawal of the 5,000 American troops stationed 

there since the first Gulf War in 1991. With the demise of Saddam 

Hussein’s regime, the U.S. rationale for its military mission in 

Saudi Arabia ended. Only a small training program involving 

approximately 500 American soldiers will remain near Riyadh. 

Despite the long-standing security relationship between the United 

States and Saudi Arabia dating to World War II, increasingly Saudi 

leaders have seen the American military presence as a political 

liability. They claimed they would initiate democratic reforms upon 

the U.S. departure and, in fact, in October 2003 the Saudi government 

announced its intention to organize elections for local councils. 

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Qatar depends on U.S. security guarantees and 

has welcomed the increased U.S. military presence on its territory.54

 The changes in U.S. basing in the Middle East, particularly in 

light of recent tensions between the United States and Turkey over 

the use of bases to support military operations in Iraq, could lead 

to a reappraisal of the role of Central Asian bases in U.S. policy 

towards the Middle East. Some have speculated that the United 

States might seek more permanent basing in Central Asia to 

support ongoing operations in Afghanistan,55 a move likely to evoke 

opposition in Russia, as well as in China and Iran. Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith has noted that post-Cold War 

conflicts require rapidly deployable forces since forward-deployed 

forces are not likely to be fighting where they are located. Citing the 

war in Afghanistan as an example of global power projection, Feith 

described how forces from bases in Europe and Asia used Central 

Asia as a beachhead for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.56

 In general, the focus of U.S. basing strategy has shifted east, 

opening discussion of the merits of maintaining long-standing 

commitments to stationing forces in Western Europe and inviting 

speculation about new opportunities for basing in the Balkans, 

perceived as more convenient for operations in the Middle East. 
14

Since 9/11, the U.S. military has reinvigorated its basing presence 

in a number of countries, including Pakistan, the Philippines, and 

Singapore, to support antiterrorism operations and other strategic 

goals in the Middle East. 

 Assuming a pro-American regime takes over Iraq in 2004-05, 

some speculation exists that the Pentagon may seek basing rights 

in Iraq. The Bagdad international airport, Tallil near An Nasiriyah 

in southern Iraq, the H-1 airstrip in the western desert, and the 

Bashur airfield in the Kurdish north have been mentioned among 

possible basing options.57 Nevertheless, the political costs are likely 

to outweigh the military benefits of such a move---U.S. basing in Iraq 

could undermine the new government’s efforts to achieve autonomy 

from the United States and may not be militarily necessary given 

other basing access in the region. 

THE IRAQ WAR AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF U.S. 

BASING IN CENTRAL ASIA

 Opposition to U.S. military intervention in Iraq may serve 

to undermine regional support for continued U.S. basing in 

Central Asia. With the exception of Uzbekistan, the Central Asian 

governments expressed concern that their military cooperation with 

the United States could lead them to be dragged into the conflict with 

Iraq and inflame domestic tensions as a result. Nevertheless, these 

governments have used the Iraq War, like the war on terrorism, as 

a pretext for further crackdowns against political opposition and 

Islamic activity.

Central Asian Views of the Iraq War.

With the exception of Uzbekistan, Central Asian leaders 

were critical of the U.S.-led military intervention in Iraq because 

of its potentially adverse impact on support for radical Islamic 

movements and terrorist groups within the region. Like other oil 

producers, some of Kazakhstan’s initial concerns about U.S. military 

intervention in Iraq stemmed from fears that Iraqi oil would flood 

the market, lowering the price. In a March 2003 poll of residents 

of 10 major urban areas conducted by the Kazakh Association of 
15

Sociologists and Political Scientists, 83.5 percent of respondents 

were against war in Iraq. Of those opposing intervention, 25 percent 

stated that they believed that the United States aimed to control Iraqi 

oil.58 Kazakh military officials also feared that stray missiles or rogue 

aircraft could place their country at risk. Kazakhstan’s air defenses 

were placed on alert during the Iraq war, and in one instance a U.S. 

plane was denied the right to fly through Kazakh air space from 

Karshi Khanabad to Ganci because it lacked proper authorization.59

 Officials in Kyrgyzstan, a strong advocate of the primacy of the 

UN in conflict resolution, were concerned that the United States 

would seek to use the Ganci airbase to support operations in Iraq, 

provoking renewed terrorist activities in the region and destabilizing 

of the fragile peace in Afghanistan.60 In the weeks leading up to the 

U.S. decision to intervene, some antiwar demonstrations took place 

in Kyrgyzstan, tacitly supported by the government, according to 

some reports.61 The Kyrgyz parliament issued a statement on March 

24, 2003, calling U.S. intervention in Iraq a violation of international 

law and appealing to the Bush administration to resolve the crisis in 

the UN Security Council. International Affairs Committee Chairman 

Alisher Abdimomunov noted that Kyrgyz officials were afraid that 

their country could get dragged into the conflict if planes based at 

Manas were sent to Iraq.62 Although the American base commander 

insisted that Ganci was used exclusively to support the international 

antiterrorism coalition in Afghanistan, suspicions about U.S. 

intentions for use of Ganci may have contributed to Kyrgzystan’s 

decision to grant Russia basing rights. 

 In Kyrgyzstan’s more open society, some prominent opposition 

politicians, such as Topchubek Turgunaliev, head of the Erkindik 

Party, criticized the Kyrgyz government’s opposition to the U.S.-

led war in Iraq, which he viewed as a war of liberation against a 

despotic regime, a process he saw as equally necessary in Central 

Asia.63 Nevertheless a poll by Expert in Bishkek and Osh in March 

2003 revealed pervasive distrust of U.S. motives in the Iraq War, 

with 42 percent attributing the American military intervention to 

Washington’s interest in controlling Iraqi oil, and 14 percent stating 

that the action was taken to reinforce U.S. authority in the world. 

Some 66 percent of urban residents wanted their country to remain 

neutral.64
16

 Like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan’s leaders feared a resurgence of 

Islamic radicalism and terrorist activities in Afghanistan as a result 

of the Iraq war. Given the precarious balance between religion and 

secularism achieved by Tajikistan’s coalition government since the 

civil war ended in 1997, U.S. intervention in Iraq had the potential 

to destabilize the domestic situation in Tajikistan as well.65 Both 

countries also stood to lose international assistance, as international 

attention was diverted by major reconstruction tasks in Iraq.66 Tajik 

President Imomali Rakhmonov called for a rapid end to hostilities in 

Iraq for fear of a new humanitarian crisis in the region.67

 Although Uzbekistan refrained from providing any military 

support for the U.S.-led war in Iraq, Uzbek media consistently 

reinforced American positions regarding Iraq’s possession of WMD. 

Ironically, the authoritarian regime in Tashkent cited Saddam’s 

Hussein’s despotic rule and human rights abuses as a further 

rationale for military intervention in Iraq.68 In a meeting of the U.S.-

Uzbekistan Security Council in April, Uzbek officials offered to help 

with reconstruction in Iraq.

 While public opinion in Kazakhstan opposed the war, after 

the U.S. invasion President Narsultan Nazarbaev was quick to 

praise American efforts in the war against terrorism. Kazakhstan 

became the first Central Asian country to send a peacekeeping unit: 

on August 20, 2003, 27 of its citizens traveled to Iraq to help with 

demining and water extraction, Kazakhstan’s first peacekeeping 

mission ever.69 The Kazakh government is considering increasing 

this force.

 After the conclusion of major hostilities in Iraq, Central Asians 

remain skeptical about the benefits of the Iraq war for the Iraqi 

people and especially for themselves. A June-July 2003 State 

Department poll of urban residents in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan showed little optimism about the broader 

regional consequences of the war. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan, more respondents stated they did not believe the Iraq 

war would result in regional stability (46 percent in Kazakhstan, 

42 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and 31 percent in Tajikistan, while just 

29 percent, 27 percent, and 10 percent, respectively, saw improved 

prospects for stability in the Near East). Respondents in Uzbekistan 
17

were most sanguine: 40 percent saw improved stability, while 20 

percent did not.70 While majorities or pluralities expressed support 

for humanitarian aid, they also stated that the UN (rather than the 

United States) should be in charge. Respondents overwhelmingly 

disapproved of their own countries contributing troops to the 

peacekeeping effort in Iraq.71 This was especially clear in the case 

of Kazakhstan, where 77 percent of those polled were opposed to 

sending peacekeepers, compared to just 10 percent in favor, an 

indication of a public at odds with the government’s decision to 

contribute men to this effort.

The Iraq War and Islamic Terrorism in Central Asia.

 There is some evidence, since the onset of the Iraq war, of 

expanding political activities in Central Asia by pan-Islamic 

movements such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and of an effort by the IMU 

to reactivate their organization in the region, although regional 

analysts dispute the latter.72 Hizb-ut-Tahrir also was important 

in anti-war protests in Muslim states outside the region, such as 

Indonesia, inviting the possibility that shared opposition to the Iraq 

war may contribute to inter-regional networking between radical 

Islamic movements in Central Asia and in other countries. 

 Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which first emerged among Palestinians in 

Jordan in the early 1950s, has a radical political ideology---the 

formation of a pan-Islamic state that would replace existing regimes 

in the Muslim world and recreate the Caliphate---but eschews 

violence. The group primarily focuses on propaganda activities, 

through the distribution of leaflets and, increasingly, internet use. 

Despite the group’s rejection of violent change, Russia’s Federal 

Security Service (FSB) accuses Hizb-ut-Tahrir of forming links with 

separatist fighters in Chechnya, as well as with the IMU.73 Central 

Asian security forces and Hizb-ut-Tahrir have exaggerated the 

membership in the organization for their own purposes. According 

to the International Crisis Group, a human rights organization that 

has done extensive research on Hizb-ut-Tahrir, the group is unlikely 

to have more than 20,000 members throughout the region. Other 

analysts put the group’s membership at 10,000.74

 The International Crisis Group (ICG) acknowledges that some 
18

Hizb-ut-Tahrir members, particularly in Uzbekistan, are dissatisfied 

with the group’s position on nonviolence, and other regional 

observers have noted that the Iraq War led to some discussion 

about the need for a more radical approach to broaden the group’s 

appeal.75 These appear to be a minority, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir 

continues to pursue a gradualist program, involving missionary 

work, such as the distribution of print, audio, and video materials 

about the group.76 Moreover, ICG downplays the prospect of any 

meaningful cooperation between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other groups, 

such as the IMU, since its interventions in Kyrgyzstan and routing in 

Afghanistan proved it to be an incompetent fighting force.77

 Hizb-ut-Tahrir attracted the largest following in Uzbekistan 

(approximately 7,000) because it represented the only serious 

opposition group. After the Karimov regime undertook a major 

campaign against the group in 1998, mass arrests and show trials 

took place. Some 4,200 Hizb-ut-Tahrir members were in prison as of 

December 2002, though the party itself claims that more than 8,000 

of its members did jail time at one point or another.78 According 

to Human Rights Watch, authorities in Uzbekistan tend to charge 

religious activists with subversion or antistate activity, punishable 

with 20 years in prison. The group documented more than 100 cases 

of torture used against such prisoners in 2002 alone.79

 In Tajikistan, membership in Hizb-ut-Tahrir is likely to be in 

the low thousands, according to the ICG.80 Since 1998, 600 Hizb-utTahrir members have been arrested in Tajikistan and are serving 

prison terms of 10-15 years for inciting religious hatred, seeking 

to overthrow the constitutional order, and belonging to a criminal 

organization.81 Since the beginning of 2003, more than 20 Hizb-utTahrir activists have been detained in Tajikistan’s Sughd Oblast, and 

two underground printing operations, with computer facilities likely 

to have been obtained through foreign support, were discovered 

there.82 While previously Hizb-ut-Tahrir activities were concentrated 

in areas bordering Uzbekistan, authorities in Tajikistan are now 

concerned that the group’s influence is spreading southward.83

 Kazakhstan has relatively few Hizb-ut-Tahrir members, probably 

no more than a couple of hundred since the group first appeared in 

2000.84 Most of the membership is concentrated in the south of the 

country. After the onset of the Iraq War, Hizb-ut-Tahrir leaflets in 
19

Kazakh advocating war against the United States were delivered to 

mailboxes in Shymkent, the South Kazakhstan oblast administrative 

center. A number of arrests have been made in the oblast for illegal 

religious activities, including by foreign preachers.85

 In Kyrgyzstan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has a membership of 1,000-2,000, 

according to the ICG.86 Estimates from Kyrgyz government sources 

vary widely, from 2,000 (National Security Board) to 3,000-5,000 

(Committee on Religious Affairs),87 with some sources projecting 

more than 10,000 (Interior Ministry). While the group’s activities 

have mostly been confined to the south of the country, more recently 

reports have been that Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s following had expanded 

to the north. In the first 6 months of 2003, some 18 activists were 

apprehended in the north of Kyrgyzstan, in the Chui, Issyk-Kul, and 

Talas regions.88 During the same period, law enforcement officials 

placed a total of 1,500 citizens under observation for their role in 

disseminating Hizb-ut-Tahrir materials. According to First Deputy 

Prime Minister Kurmanbek Osmonov, who is also Kyrgyzstan’s 

Justice Minister, Hizb-ut-Tahrir wanted to seize power in Kyrgyzstan 

and, to this end, had been expanding “its spying and propaganda 

activities.” The group was focusing its efforts on recruiting young 

people and was forging alliances with other opposition groups, as 

well as the IMU and Uighur organizations.89

 Osmonov claimed that Kyrgyzstan’s unduly liberal laws and 

weakly coordinated security agencies make it difficult to prosecute 

members of the group, while human rights organizations, such as the 

Geneva-based World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), allege 

that Hizb-ut-Tahrir members in Kyrgyzstan “are being targeted for 

their religious and political beliefs, [and] subjected to harassment, 

arbitrary arrest and detention, ill-treatment, and potentially 

torture.”90 OMCT claims that repression of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir party 

has increased in Kyrgyzstan since the beginning of 2003, notably in 

the period prior to and during the conflict in Iraq. The OMCT sent 

an open letter to Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev on June 24, 2003, 

calling for an end to official harassment of Hizb-ut-Tahrir members. 

 Thus Central Asian regimes consider independent Islamic 

expressions as a political threat and target them widely even though 

there is little support for a greater role for Islam in these societies. A 

poll of elites in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan revealed 
20

that 80 percent in each country believed that Islam’s role should 

remain the same (70 percent in Uzbekistan, 49 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 

59 percent in Kazakhstan) or be reduced (19 percent in Uzbekistan, 

32 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 21 percent in Kazakhstan).91 Nevertheless, 

repression of Islamist activity, mass arrests, and mistreatment of 

prisoners has deepened mistrust between the population and the 

authorities. As a result, Islamist groups may gain greater support 

in the absence of other means of channeling political support and in 

the face of mounting discontent with the pervasive corruption of the 

Central Asian governments.92 The U.S. commitment to maintaining 

and expanding basing in the region puts the United States in the 

position of appearing to side with weakening authoritarian states 

seeking to repress societal challenges.

RENEWED GREAT POWER RIVALRY IN CENTRAL ASIA

 Regional powers such as Russia and China tolerated U.S. military 

presence in Central Asia because of its clear role in supporting the 

war in Afghanistan and the struggle against terrorism in the region. 

With the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, and especially in 

light of opposition in Russia and China to the U.S.-led war in Iraq, a 

long-term U.S. military presence in Central Asia is likely to become 

a source of friction in U.S. relations with Russia and China. One 

year after the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, Russia and China 

have taken steps to reassert their own military presence in Central 

Asia and to promote regional security cooperation. Moreover, other 

regional powers--particularly India--have become more active in 

developing security relations with the Central Asian states. While 

activities by these powers in the region do not necessarily run at 

cross purposes with U.S. security interests there in the short run, 

a long-term American military presence may contribute to a more 

intensified struggle for influence among regional powers. 

Russia’s Reaction to Expanding U.S. Influence.

Despite its initial acquiescence to a temporary U.S. military 

role in Central Asia, of all the regional powers, Russia is the least 

comfortable with a long-term U.S. military presence in what Russian 
21

officials continue to regard as their sphere of influence. With the 

election of a more nationalistic State Duma in December 2003, this 

trend is likely to accelerate. In January 2004, for example, Secretary 

of State Colin Powell’s comments in Moscow about the Pentagon’s 

plans to shift U.S. military bases eastward led to speculation in the 

Russian media that the Washington would seek permanent bases 

in the Caucasus in Central Asia. Although Powell contended the 

United States would only establish “temporary facilities,” many 

Russian observers remained skeptical about American long-term 

intentions.93

 Thus far President Putin has accentuated the positive, indicating 

his support for U.S. actions against the Taliban as well as Russia’s 

readiness to cooperate further with the United States in Central Asia, 

leaving his ministers to voice Russian displeasure.94 In the past year, 

several top Russian officials have indicated their opposition to the 

indefinite stationing of U.S. military personnel on Central Asian soil. 

Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that Russia expected U.S. forces 

to withdraw as soon as the mission in Afghanistan was completed.95

Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called for the UN to regulate the time 

frame for the U.S. military presence in the region, which he stated 

should be strictly linked to the international peacekeeping mission 

in Afghanistan.96 According to First Deputy Foreign Minister 

Vyacheslav Trubnikov, a former director of Russia’s foreign 

intelligence service (SVR), the U.S. military bases in the region are 

redundant, given Russia’s key security role in the region, and can 

only be viewed as stabilizing insofar as they contribute to ongoing 

antiterrorism operations in Afghanistan.97 Long-standing opponents 

of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, such as Chief General 

Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, assert that Washington is using the war 

on terror as a cover for its aim to expand its control over Central 

Asian energy resources and interfere in the domestic politics of the 

region.98

 To counter American influence in Central Asia, Russia has 

taken a series of steps in the past year to strengthen its bilateral and 

regional security cooperation in the region and to enhance Russian 

control over Central Asian energy flows. In a reminder that Soviet 

conceptions of spheres of influence die hard, at an October 9, 2003, 
22

press conference, Ivanov revised the January 2000 National Security 

Concept, known as the “Putin Doctrine,” to allow for Russian military 

intervention in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to 

resolve disputes should negotiations fail. Ivanov had already stated 

on October 2, 2003, that Moscow did not exclude the possibility of 

preemptive strikes to defend Russia’s interests or those of its allies. 

At the same October 9 conference, held in honor of German Prime 

Minister Gerhard Schroeder’s visit, Putin further asserted Russia’s 

intention to maintain its control over the energy pipeline network 

in Central Asia, which he characterized as a key Russian national 

interest.99 According to a September 2003 agreement on the creation 

of the Single Economic Space, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus agreed 

to give up some of their sovereign rights to a supranational body in 

which Russia has the largest bloc of votes. 

 The American military foothold in Central Asia made the 

strengthening of CIS institutions all the more urgent. Although 

Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, and Belarus 

signed a collective security treaty (CST) in 1992, it was not until 

May 14, 2002, that the members agreed to enhance coordination 

and integration among their militaries by forming a Collective 

Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), modeled on NATO. At the 

CSTO Defense Ministers’ meeting in October 2002, the group placed 

a priority on improving collective defense by establishing a rapid 

reaction force in Central Asia, with an aviation component stationed 

at the Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan. The current force numbers 1,500, 

but is expected to double in 2004. Most CSTO members will assign 

one battalion each, with Tajikistan contributing two.100 Located 20 

km from Bishkek, the Kant aviation force is comprised of Russian 

aircraft (including 5 SU-25 ground-attack planes, 5 SU-27 fighter 

aircraft, 4 L-39 trainer aircraft, Il-76, Il-18, An-12, and An-24 military 

transport aircraft, and 2 Mi-8 helicopters) and currently is supported 

by 400 Russian troops, who have relocated with their families.101

The number is expected to grow to 500, but the facility could 

accommodate a much larger group of forces.102

 In the Soviet era, Kant served as the Soviet Air Force’s main 

aviation personnel training ground. Russia is now funding the 

reopened base completely, while providing another $3 million 
23

in small arms and other equipment to Kyrgyzstan.103 Part of 

Kyrgyzstan’s outstanding debt to Russia will apply to the 

development of infrastructure at the airbase.104 Thus far Moscow has 

allocated 79 million rubles to the reconstruction of the Kant base, out 

of a total of 219 million required.105 Beginning in January 2004, all 

CSTO members will also have the opportunity to purchase Russian 

weapons at domestic prices.106

 The base is to provide air support to Russia’s 201st division 

stationed in Tajikistan. Although the Kant facility is supposed to 

be a component of the Collective Security Organization’s Rapid 

Deployment Forces, officially base personnel belong to Russia’s 

Urals Air Force and Air Defense Army. Lieutenant General 

Albert Druzhinin, director of the Russian Defense Ministry’s 

Administration for Military Cooperation with CIS Member States, 

noted that the stationing of Russian forces would enable Russia to 

carry out missions on the territories of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan. It is unclear whether the consent of these countries would 

be required.107 In talks with President Akaev regarding the opening 

of the base, Putin noted Central Asia’s importance to Russia. “While 

the situation there is stable, it is not simple. Our military presence is 

something both we and our CIS partners need,” said Putin.108 After 

some delay, the Kant airbase opened officially on October 23, 2003, 

the first time Russia has acquired a new base since the collapse of 

the Soviet Union. At the opening, Putin stated that the new airbase 

would help “strengthen the security of a region whose stability is 

a growing factor in the international situation.”109 The base will 

operate for 15 years and the lease could then be renewed in 5-year 

increments.110

 In contrast to the Kant base in Kyrgyzstan, negotiations 

regarding permanent basing in Tajikistan have been proceeding 

with difficulty. For some time Russia has sought basing rights for the 

201st Motorized Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan, but the two 

countries have yet to reach agreement.111 In September 2003, Major 

General Nuralisho Nazarov, first deputy chairman of the Tajik 

Border Protection Committee, announced that the 201st Division, 

which patrols the border with Afghanistan, is no longer needed, and 

that local troops could do job instead.112 While officials in Dushanbe 
24

disavowed the statement, the 10-year agreement between Tajikistan 

and Russia regarding the stationing of the division expired in May 

2003 and terms for its extension remain under discussion. Now that 

Tajikistan has joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace and has been 

expanding security ties with a variety of states, including the United 

States, France, and India, Dushanbe has proven to be a harder 

bargainer. Although Lieutenant General Aleksandr Markin, the new 

Commander of the 201st Division, stated that he expected Russian 

forces to remain in Tajikistan for the next 10-15 years, mostly to 

combat drug trafficking,113 a number of issues cloud the RussianTajik security agenda. In particular, Tajikistan is displeased with 

the 50-50 cost sharing for the division and wants Tajik forces to be 

included in meetings between Russian and Afghan border troops.114

 In contrast to Tajikistan, which has proven to be less compliant 

than expected in recent months, Putin has hailed Kazakhstan as 

“Russia’s closest and most consistent ally.”115 Indeed Russia has 

had long-standing security interests in Kazakhstan, particularly 

nonproliferation and the security of nuclear facilities located in the 

country. The Russian uranium industry depends on uranium and 

other products from Kazakhstan and Russia leases the Baikonur 

cosmodrome.116 Moreover, Kazakhstan has been the most active 

participant in CIS training exercises in the Caspian. A defense 

agreement with Russia signed in June 2003 provides for training for 

Kazakh officers at Russian military institutes. Some 800 servicemen 

from Kazakhstan now train in Russia, one-third of all CIS military 

personnel receiving training in the country.117

 The main problem for Russia in Central Asia has always been 

Uzbekistan, which remains outside CIS security structures and is a 

member of the pro-American GUUAM (an organization made up 

of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, and 

using the first initial of each country to make up the name). With 

Uzbekistan’s acceptance of U.S. and German bases on its territory 

and support for the U.S. war in Iraq, Russian officials have had 

more reason to be concerned regarding their loss of influence with 

President Karimov. This may be one reason for the sudden decision 

to shift the location of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s 

new antiterrorism center from Bishkek to Tashkent. Russia’s main 
25

leverage in Uzbekistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, continues to 

be its influence over the region’s energy resources. While less than 

pleased with the new Russian base at Kant, Uzbek officials have 

been seeking Gazprom’s investment in exploring new gas fields in 

the country and in modernizing its pipeline network.118

 Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two main powers in Central Asia, 

and rivals for influence in the region, have been the most wary of the 

new competition for influence there between the United States and 

Russia. For poorer and smaller Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, increased 

attention from Washington and Moscow means more resources and 

an improved bargaining position. To stay in the good graces of both 

benefactors, the Kyrgyz government has accentuated the need for 

Russian-American cooperation in Central Asia.119 President Akaev 

insists that his country has no intention playing Russia and United 

States against each other, and that, to the contrary, Kyrgyzstan has 

an interest in friendly relations both with Russia and the United 

States.120 Despite Russian concerns about its declining influence 

in Central Asia against a background of rising U.S. clout, CSTO 

Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha pledged his intention to 

cooperate with NATO, the UN, and the Organization for Security 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in regional antiterrorism and drug 

interdiction activities and proposed that Kyrgyzstan could be a 

model for such security cooperation.121 The United States and Russia 

already cooperate in the region via the Caucasus and Central Asia 

subgroup of the U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism.

China, the Uighur Issue, and the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization.

 While Russian-American competition for influence is a relatively 

new phenomenon in Central Asia, China and Russia have been 

eyeing each other warily in the region for decades. Even as RussianChinese relations evolved into a strategic partnership by the 

mid-1990s and the need for confidence-building along the border 

between China and the countries of the former Soviet Union led 

to the creation of the Shanghai 5 mechanism (the precursor to the 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization formed in 2001 by Russia, China, 
26

and its three Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and 

Tajikistan, plus Uzbekistan), Russian officials have reacted coolly to 

China’s attempts to expand its influence in Central Asia. 

 Now that its borders with its Central Asian neighbors have been 

demarcated, for the most part, China has two primary interests 

in Central Asia: economic cooperation, particularly in the energy 

sector, and antiterrorism--both of which have important political, 

economic, and security implications for the development of China’s 

West, particularly Xinjiang province. Trade between China and 

Central Asian states has grown steadily during the past decade, but 

remains small--total turnover between China and all five Central 

Asian states was less than $30 billion in 2000.122 Cooperation in the 

energy sector, however, promises to create long-term economic links 

between China and Kazakhstan, in particular. China has been a net 

energy importer since 1993 and is seeking to diversify its supply. 

While projects in Kazakhstan have faced many obstacles, Chinese 

companies are seeking to expand their investments in the country 

and to move forward with long-standing pipeline projects. In an 

indication of Kazakhstan’s importance to Chinese foreign policy, the 

country was one of the three that China’s new president Hu Jintao 

chose to visit during his first foreign tour in June 2003.123

 Since the Central Asian states achieved independence, Chinese 

policymakers have been concerned that Uighur separatists, 

struggling for greater autonomy in Xinjiang, would seek to use 

neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as staging grounds for 

their activities, and that Islamist militants in the region would 

radicalize the Uighur opposition movement. Consequently, even 

before 9/11, Chinese leaders made cooperation against terrorism, 

separatism, and religious extremism a fundamental aspect of 

bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Central Asian states. 

These efforts have found resonance with Central Asian leaders, 

who define radical Islamic opposition movements broadly to justify 

crackdowns on domestic dissent.

 Since 9/11, however, Chinese officials have sought to gain 

greater international legitimacy for their efforts to crack down on 

Uighur separatists. On December 15, 2003, the Chinese Ministry of 

Public Security formally identified four Uighur organizations as 
27

terrorist as well as the names of 11 wanted Uighur terrorists, the 

first such “terrorist list” provided by the agency. The list includes 

the Xinjiang-based Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (which the 

United States and the UN agreed last year to designate as a terrorist 

organization at China’s behest), the Eastern Turkestan Liberation 

Organization (founded in Turkey in 1996), the World Uighur Youth 

Congress (founded in Munich, Germany, in 1996), and the East 

Turkestan Information Center (also founded in Munich in 1996, 

with an office in Washington, DC).124 Many international observers 

dispute Chinese claims linking these groups to terrorism.125 For their 

part, Uighur activists contend that Chinese ambitions in Central 

Asia pose the greatest threat to the region, not Islamic militants.126

To refute such claims, in May 2003 the Chinese government issued a 

White Paper on Xinjiang, which denounces separatist claims, while 

asserting the legitimacy of China’s sovereignty over the province 

and portraying the region’s inhabitants as living in prosperity and 

ethnic harmony.127

 International observers have speculated for some time about 

China’s purpose in raising the alarm about Uighur terrorism since 9/

11. According to retired GRU (the Soviet military’s main intelligence 

service) officer Vladimir Suvurov, Kazakhstan allows some Uighur 

separatist organizations to operate legally as a hedge against possible 

future Chinese territorial ambitions. He noted that the Soviet Union 

helped set up the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan in 

Almaty in 1975--during the heyday of Sino-Soviet confrontation--as 

a means of subverting Xinjiang.128 Other analysts argue that China 

exaggerates the connections between Uighur groups and terrorist 

activities as a means of preventing them from attracting sympathy 

in Central Asia and pressuring the leaders there to crack down on 

the organizations.129

 According to the Hong Kong Economic Journal, Beijing has come 

to view the Uighur movement as a threat to its political security 

because these groups, many of which are based overseas, have the 

potential to question the legitimacy of ethnic integration in China. 

While questions remain regarding the intensity of the terrorist 

threat the Chinese government claims the aforementioned Uighur 

organizations pose, there is no denying the seriousness with which 
28

Beijing approaches the issue. In response to the “Uighur threat,” 

the Ministry of Public Security has established three criteria for 

identifying a terrorist organization (which may be based in China 

or overseas): 1) using violent means to harm national security; 

2) disrupting social stability; and, 3) harming the lives, property, 

and security of the Chinese people. Chinese intelligence services 

reportedly have also stepped up their efforts to infiltrate the Uighur 

groups in Xinjiang.130

 China views its bilateral relations with its Central Asian states 

as a key component of its antiterrorism strategy. The Chinese 

government has signed agreements with all of its Central Asian 

neighbors pledging cooperation in fighting terrorism, extremism, 

and separatism. On October 10-11, 2002, China participated in joint 

antiterrorism exercises in Kyrgyzstan, the first time the Chinese 

military has ever taken part in such an activity on foreign soil. China 

also has begun providing military aid to Kazakhstan, pledging 

$3.5 million to the country’s army in December 2002, as well as 

more limited aid to Kyrgyzstan. In December 2002, China and 

Kazakhstan also signed an agreement on preventing dangerous 

military activities near their borders. Displaying Chinese concern 

regarding the expansion of U.S. and NATO security interests in the 

region, this agreement obligates China and Kazakhstan to share 

information regarding the conduct of military exercises and other 

military activities on their borders.131

More than any other member, China has pinned its hopes of 

regional influence, particularly over the development of a regional 

antiterrorism capacity, on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 

(SCO). According to Pan Guang, Director of the Center of Shanghai 

Cooperation Organization Studies of the Shanghai Academy of 

Social Sciences, the SCO’s failure thus far to meet expectations 

was the logical outcome of a number of factors. He noted that it 

was understandable that the United States sought leadership of 

the antiterrorism struggle in Central Asia in response to an attack 

against American interests. Furthermore, Pan Guang pointed out 

that the SCO was not yet operational on 9/11 and, in any case, is not 

a military organization. Moreover, SCO members belong to different 

collective security organizations, including the CIS and NATO, and 
29

faced different requests for assistance from the United States.132

Despite its marginal contribution to the antiterrorism struggle 

to date, Chinese officials and scholars continue to hail the SCO’s 

promise as a regional security organization.

 After signing a charter in June 2002 and agreeing in June 2003 

to set up a permanent secretariat in Beijing and an antiterrorism 

center in Bishkek (since transferred to Tashkent), the SCO has finally 

moved forward with some activities. In January 2004 the Secretariat 

formally opened in Beijing and the executive committee for the 

regional antiterrorism center also began work in Tashkent, although 

the official opening will not be until later in the spring.133

 On August 6-13, 2003, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 

and Tajikistan held a two-phase joint military exercise in 

Kazakhstan’s Ucharal, on the Chinese border, and in Ili, in China’s 

Xinjiang province. More than 1,000 troops from the five countries 

took part in “Coalition 2003,” the first multilateral military exercise 

carried out by the SCO.134 Uzbekistan declined to participate, 

focusing instead on its own exercises in the Surkhandarya region, 

near the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.135 Kazakhstan, 

which also took part in the Steppe Eagle-2003 exercises with NATO, 

has stated that it opposes further large-scale military exercises under 

the auspices of the SCO, which may create a “mistaken impression” 

in the international community.136

A New Role for India.

Great power competition for influence in Central Asia is nothing 

new, but since 9/11 the number of participants in the “Great Game” 

has increased. Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are members of the Central 

Asian Economic Cooperation Organization, which is focusing on 

rebuilding Afghanistan. India has emerged as a new player in 

Central Asia’s regional security and is building its first military 

base outside the subcontinent, 10km northeast of the Tajik capital 

of Dushanbe. Indian troops will be stationed at the base to provide 

training and protect India’s expanding energy interests in Central 

Asia.137 On August 2-5, 2003, India and Tajikistan conducted their 

first joint staff and airborne military antiterrorism training exercises 
30

at the Fakhrobod training camp south of Dushanbe.

 India first became involved in Central Asian security during the 

2001 war in Afghanistan by opening a hospital in Farkhor, Tajikistan, 

which was later moved to Afghanistan after the establishment of the 

Karzai government. As a result, Tajikistan became India’s point of 

entry into the region and Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes 

has sought to build on the relationship to develop military-tomilitary ties.138

 There are some natural affinities since Tajikistan uses Soviet 

military equipment, long the staple of the Indian military, and the 

two countries share overlapping geopolitical concerns regarding 

neighboring Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan. In the coming 

year, India will train more of Tajikistan’s military personnel 

than will Russia. While 600 cadets from Tajikistan now study in 

Russia; in 2004, just 30 will be sent there, compared to 40 in India. 

Nevertheless, Tajikistan’s Defense Minister Zarubiddin Sirodzhev 

claims that Russia remains his country’s strategic partner,139 and, 

in fact, both India and Russia now point to Central Asia as an area 

of cooperation. During the Russian President’s December 2002 visit 

to India, Vladimir Putin and Atal Behari Vajpayee decided to form 

a joint working group on terrorism and noted the importance of 

stability in Central Asia.

 Despite its initial focus on Tajikistan, India is interested in 

expanding its security cooperation with other Central Asian states. 

India and Kazakhstan signed an inter-governmental agreement 

on fighting terrorism. Uzbekistan produces and repairs Il-78 MAR 

transport aircraft for the Indian military. India has also been lobbying 

for membership in the SCO, with Russia’s support.

 While India and China have been improving their relations 

in recent months, China has not welcomed Indian efforts to join 

the SCO, and, in many respects the two neighbors are squaring 

off as competitors in Central Asia. Indian business views the 

region as a potential market for India’s strongest sectors, such as 

pharmaceuticals and information technology, as well as consumer 

goods, which would provide an alternative to the widely available 

low-end Chinese products. India’s political leaders also are keen to 

promote their model of democratic development in Central Asia both 
31

to prevent the spread of Islamist terrorist movements, with roots in 

Pakistan, and to counter Chinese efforts to encircle India through 

strategic cooperation with its neighbors. Russia has supported 

greater Indian involvement in Central Asia, in part to check China’s 

effort to expand its economic and political influence in the region.

THE BROADER POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. SECURITY 

COOPERATION WITH CENTRAL ASIA

 Expanding U.S. engagement with Central Asia has done little 

to promote democratization in the region. To the contrary, Central 

Asian governments (especially Uzbekistan) have interpreted their 

new significance to the war on terrorism as carte blanche to repress 

domestic opponents. Commitment to democratization in Iraq, while 

relying on authoritarian Muslim regimes elsewhere to prosecute 

the war on terrorism, reveals inconsistencies in U.S. policy that 

have not been lost on increasingly skeptical Central Asian publics. 

While Central Asian support for operations in Afghanistan remain 

important for antiterrorism operations in that country, human 

security problems are the most significant for regional stability 

within Central Asia and the U.S. Army should do more to address 

these needs.

Human Rights Implications.

In contrast to previous administrations, which have viewed the 

resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as the key to fundamental 

change in the Middle East, the Bush administration has focused on 

antiterrorism and nonproliferation, with the broader aim of spurring 

a process of democratization throughout the region. The Muslim 

states of Central Asia have played an important supporting role, by 

facilitating the routing of al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, but because of 

their strategic importance in this respect, their own serious lapses in 

human rights largely have been overlooked. Much like the Cold War 

era, when the United States cooperated with authoritarian states 

against communist regimes, today the United States distinguishes 

between rogue states, destined for regime change and requiring 

democratization, and coalition partners, such as the Central Asian 
32

states, equally far from the democratic standard. 

 Uzbekistan has been an especially egregious example of the 

double standard in U.S. foreign policy. By law, the State Department 

must demonstrate that Uzbekistan is making progress in human 

rights and democratization for it to continue to receive U.S. 

assistance. Human rights organizations such as Human Rights 

Watch have sharply criticized the State Department’s evaluation 

of progress in Uzbekistan and pointed out that significant setbacks 

outweigh limited progress achieved, particularly regarding the use 

of torture and religious and political persecution.140

 In recognition of Uzbekistan’s failure to improve its human rights 

record, in January 2004 the State Department refused, for the first 

time, to provide the certification required to release assistance for 

nonproliferation programs under the Nunn-Lugar Act, a move that 

reportedly angered the Karimov government. Although the State 

Department finally called attention to Uzbekistan’s lack of progress 

towards its human rights commitments, this was largely a formality 

because the Nunn-Lugar legislation included a provision for a 

waiver in case national security considerations outweighed human 

rights concerns. Since Uzbekistan produces uranium, necessary for 

nuclear weapons production, President Bush waived the human 

rights certification.141 The remainder of security assistance programs 

for Uzbekistan, provided under other legislation, require additional 

State Department certification in the spring of 2004, which is likely 

to be granted.

 Other states have followed the U.S. lead in focusing on 

antiterrorism in policy towards Central Asia. British Ambassador 

Craig Murray found himself in political trouble in London after 

making a controversial speech accusing President Karimov’s 

government of boiling two political opponents to death.142 Murray 

returned to London briefly, allegedly for medical reasons, amid 

reports that the British government wanted him to resign because 

his straight talk was causing tensions with Washington. Ultimately 

Murray returned to his post in Uzbekistan. 

 Now that the United States and the UN have recognized the 

East Turkestan Liberation Movement as a terrorist group, Chinese 

authorities have been pursuing Uighur activists within Central Asia 
33

as a part of their crackdown on Uighur terrorism. Human rights 

groups contend that Central Asian governments have allowed the 

Chinese to deport Uighur residents without due process. While the 

Central Asian states have signed extradition treaties with China, 

deported Uighurs are likely to be subject to unfair trials, and possibly 

torture and execution.143

 Central Asian leaders learn from such behavior that as long as 

they can play a key part in the struggle of the great powers against 

terrorism, their patrons will pay lip service to democratization and 

will not require them to carry out their pledges for political reform. 

This carries a political price--if Central Asian elites expressed some 

skepticism about the real motivations of the United States in the 

Iraq war, in part this can be attributed to the inconsistency between 

stated U.S. policy goals of economic and political reform in Central 

Asia and the realpolitik driving relations. According to a December 

2003 International Crisis Group study, few in Central Asia believed 

that bringing democracy to Iraq was a real goal of the U.S.-led war 

(6.4 percent in Uzbekistan, 11.6 percent in Tajikistan, and 4.3 percent 

in Kyrgyzstan).144 Thus, 2 years into the war on terrorism, Central 

Asians have concluded that the U.S. commitment to democracy lags 

far behind the priority placed on antiterrorism cooperation with 

authoritarian leaders in the region and on its own strategic interests 

in securing access to oil supplies.145

A REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR HUMAN SECURITY 

 While the Bush Administration continues to view its Central 

Asia policy within the prism of the global war on terrorism, many 

U.S. experts dispute that terrorism is the primary security concern 

in the region. Instead of focusing on the potential for a resurgent 

IMU or a violent Hizb-ut-Tahrir, they note that underlying 

problems in Central Asia, particularly severe poverty in Tajikistan 

and Kyrgyzstan, narcotics trafficking fueled by corrupt regimes 

throughout the region, the potential for conflict among the Central 

Asian states themselves over scarce water supplies and other 

resources, and the prospect of radicalized populations in the face of 

the refusal of regional governments to allow citizens greater public 

participation and accountability could create the conditions for state 
34

failure in which terrorist groups thrive.146

 Phil Williams, contributing to a RAND study on faultlines 

in Central Asia, writes of a “criminalizing syndrome” that risks 

radicalizing an increasingly impoverished and alienated population. 

The criminalization of the socio-economic environment results from 

the involvement of the Central Asian states in drug trafficking, the 

intrusiveness of organized crime in these societies, the scale of the 

shadow economies in the region, and the prevalence of corruption.147

The Central Asian states rank among the most corrupt, according 

to Transparency International’s 2003 survey of 133 countries. 

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rank 100th, while Kyrgyzstan is 118th, 

and Tajikistan is 124th.148

 While the U.S. Government does provide assistance for a variety 

of socio-economic programs for Central Asia, this has not translated 

into greater influence over political and economic change in these 

governments.149 Moreover, Central Asians remain skeptical that 

such assistance will benefit them given the pervasive corruption and 

lack of accountability of their governments. The December 2003 ICG 

study notes that disappointment with donor aid fuels anti-Western 

feeling in the region. The group’s public opinion polling reveals that 

significant numbers of Central Asians fear that Western assistance 

has little positive impact or is being misappropriated (30.1 percent in 

Uzbekistan, 54 percent in Tajikistan, 27 percent in Kyrgyzstan.)150

 The focus of U.S. security cooperation, on bilateral relations 

with the five Central Asian states, faces a conceptual problem. On 

the one hand, U.S. policy is too narrow, failing to take into account 

the interconnection between these states and their neighbors in the 

south Caucasus, South Asia, Iran, Turkey, and western China. In 

effect, a “greater Central Asia” needs to be the focus of U.S. policy 

efforts.151 Thus, without rebuilding the economy of Afghanistan, 

narcotics trafficking will continue to threaten Central Asian regimes. 

Sanctuaries for terrorists in Pakistan will destabilize Afghanistan, 

as well as its Central Asian neighbors. Lack of progress towards 

democracy in China will reinforce similar trends in Central Asia.

 On the other hand, U.S. policy falls short of addressing the real 

security needs of Central Asian citizens, typically left unprotected 

from the predation of their own rent-seeking regimes. In contrast to 
35

the U.S. focus on terrorist threats to the Central Asian states, placing 

a priority on cooperation with the leadership of these countries, the 

UN Commission on Human Security advocates a policy framework 

that pays attention to the security of individuals and communities. 

Based on the principles of the 1994 UN Human Development Report, 

calling for freedom from fear and freedom from want, the UN 

commission notes that Central Asians face a series of simultaneous, 

interrelated political, economic, social, environmental, and military 

security threats. To address the region’s human security needs, 

the commission argues that the policy agenda must recognize the 

interconnectedness of these threats and take a long-term holistic 

approach to them.152

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

 Prior to 9/11, former CENTCOM head General Anthony Zinni 

found himself advocating greater involvement in Central Asia than 

policymakers in Washington were prepared to accept, because he saw 

the importance of stability in these states for the region as a whole.153

Currently, as American and NATO operations in Afghanistan 

continue, the United States faces an open-ended commitment to the 

stability of the Central Asian region.154 This is part of general trend 

toward an expansion of the military’s role in regional diplomacy. 

Increasingly the U.S. military finds itself employed in ostensibly 

political-diplomatic missions, leading the Pentagon to consider 

creating a military force dedicated to stability and reconstruction 

operations.155

 Notwithstanding the strategic importance of Central Asia as a 

frontline for operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. military presence 

in the Central Asian states has consequences of its own for regional 

stability. The Manas base was already the target of a terrorist attack, 

foiled by security authorities in Kyrgyzstan in November 2003.156

 The Iraq War complicates the U.S. military’s task in Central Asia 

by undermining support for the United States among Central Asian 

publics and elites, and by reducing resources available to complete 

the mission in Afghanistan, the success of the latter itself of critical 

importance for Central Asian security. To avoid contributing to the 
36

further radicalization of the population, the U.S. military needs to 

focus more attention and resources on regional human security 

needs.157 While there are limits to what can be done in the absence of a 

policy framework that is more attuned to the societal underpinnings 

of terrorism and state failure, the U.S. Army could devote greater 

attention and resources to two programs with important human 

security consequences: demining and training in drug interdiction.

 In response to attacks by the IMU in 1999 and 2000, Uzbekistan 

unilaterally mined its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 

Another 16,000 mines were emplaced in Tajikistan during the 1992-

97 civil war.158 The mines along the borders between Uzbekistan and 

its neighbors pose a direct threat to civilians living in impoverished 

peripheries such as Kyrygzstan’s Ferghana valley, where radical 

Islamist groups have made inroads. Civilians require access to these 

areas for pastureland and wood, as well as to visit relatives across 

the border. The economic damage is estimated to be almost $150,000, 

according to the United Nations.159 The mines have killed more than 

200 civilians since 2000, while maiming hundreds more.

 The OSCE and the Swiss Foundation for mine action have just 

initiated a project in Tajikistan to clear mines from 2,500 square km 

of land and 700 km of roads at a cost of 500,000 euros.160 Tajikistan 

estimates that it would require an additional $13.6 million to 

eliminate the remainder of the mines on its territory.161

 The United States does not yet offer humanitarian mining 

assistance to Central Asia. The U.S. Army’s participation in such a 

program would contribute greatly to human security in the region 

and provide tangible evidence to the population of the positive role 

the U.S. military can play in improving regional stability for ordinary 

citizens.

 Moreover, a demining program focusing on the mines unilaterally 

laid by Uzbekistan on the borders with its neighbors would 

demonstrate to the Karimov government that it cannot achieve its 

own security at the expense of its neighbors. Some experts note 

that Uzbekistan’s heavy-handed interventions in the region and 

repression of political opponents at home have contributed to the 

radicalization of opposition movements in the region.162

 In addition to demining, the U.S. military should do more to 
37

address the problem of drug trafficking in the region. Since terrorist 

movements earn their revenues from criminal activities, such as 

narcotics production and trafficking, such efforts are directly linked 

to antiterrorism goals. In 2002, the United States allocated $22 million 

for antitrafficking initiatives. While the United States continues to 

fund programs for interdiction, experts contend that Washington 

could do more.163 Because the United States has small embassies in 

Central Asia, Washington relies on other organizations such as the 

UN Office on Drugs and Crime to take the lead.164 Nevertheless, the 

U.S. Army could expand its training programs for drug interdiction 

as a part of its other military-to-military cooperation programs in the 

region.

ENDNOTES

1. Central Asia Report, October 11, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 12, http://www.rferl.org. 

According to an October 12, 2001 U.S.-Uzbekistan joint statement, the two states 

would “consult on an urgent basis about appropriate steps to address the situation 

in the event of a direct threat to the security or territorial integrity of the Republic 

of Uzbekistan.” “Joint Statement between the Government of the United States of 

America and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan, October 12, 2001,” 

http://usinfo.state.gov; Eric Schmitt and James Dao, “U.S. Is Building Up Its Military 

Bases in Afghan Region,” The New York Times, January 9, 2002, p. A10.

2. Tamara Makarenko and Daphne Billiouri, “Central Asian States to 

Pay the Price of US Strikes,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 19, 2001, http:

//www.janes.com.

3. Sergeant John Sayas, “Supporting America’s Newest War MACS-4 Keeps 

Marksmanship Skills on Target,” Marine Corps News, December 17, 2002, http:

//www.globalsecurity.org.

4. Fact Sheet on Coalition Partners’ Contributions in War on Terrorism, U.S. 

Department of State, February 26, 2002, http://usinfo.state.gov.

5. Press conference with CENTCOM CINC General Tommy Franks, Tashkent, 

Uzbekistan, January 24, 2002.

6. Todd S. Purdum, “Uzbekistan’s Leader Doubts Chances for Afghan Peace,” 

The New York Times, March 14, 2002, p. A18.

7. Antonia Blua, “Central Asia: Robertson Urges Closer Ties with NATO,” 

RFE/RL, July 11, 2003, http://www.globalsecurity.org. (Hereafter Blua, “Central 

Asia.”)
38

8. Interview on Russian television, cited in Pierre L’Huillery, “RAAF Off to 

Battle as Kyrgyzstan Offers Base,” The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), December 7, 2001, 

p. 4.

9. Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Flag], December 25, 2003, p. 3.

10. “International Contributions to the War on Terrorism,” http://www.centcom.mil/

Operations/Coalition/joint.htm. 

11. Ibid.

12. Jim Nichol, Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications 

for U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service (CRS) IB93108, April 1, 2003, 

p. 3.

13. “Kazakhstan: US Command Organizes Central Asia Anti-Disaster 

Conference,” Asia-Plus News Agency (Dushanbe), September 30, 2003.

14. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, September 28, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 10; http://

www.rferl.org; and Idem., October 11, 2001, Vol. 1, No. 12, http://www.rferl.org.

15. Lieutenant Colonel Iskandar Dadabaev, Senior Tajik representative to U.S. 

CENTCOM, “Tajik-Afghan Officers Training,” Coalition Bulletin, Vol. 8, 2003, pp. 

5-6.

16. A. Elizabeth Jones, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, 

Testimony before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, House 

International Relations Committee, October 29, 2003, http://www.state.gov. For 

background on the evolution of U.S. policy toward Central Asia, see Elizabeth 

Wishnick, Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia, Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, October 2002, pp. 3-9.

17. Jim Nichol, Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and Implications 

for U.S. Interests, April 1, 2003, CRS IB93108, p. 16.

18. U.S. Department of State, “Freedom Support Act (FSA) Funding 

Levels: Outline of Funding Request for Fiscal Year 2004,“ February 6, 2003, http:

//www.state.gov. Also see Charles Ries, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for European and Eurasian Affairs, Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee, Washington, DC, April 2, 2003, http://www.state.gov.

19. 2002 Annual Report to the President and Congress by the Secretary of Defense 

Donald H. Rumsfeld, p. 30, http://www.defenselink.mil.

20. Ibid., p. 12.
39

21. “President’s State of the Union Message to Congress and the Nation,” The 

New York Times, January 21, 2004, p. A18.

22. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003, p. 18, http://

www.defenselink.mil.

23. U.S. Army Transformation Roadmap 2003, November 1, 2003, p. 1, http:

//www.defenselink.mil.

24. Sergeant First Class Marcia Triggs, “Army Theme Changes to Focus on 

War,” Army News Service, November 6, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil; Thom 

Shanker, “New Army Chief Sets Out to Redesign a Stretched-Thin Army,” The 

New York Times, January 28, 2003, p. A19.

25. 2003 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and Congress, p. 8, 

http://www.defenselink.mil.

26. U.S. Policy in Central Asia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the 

Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House 

of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session, June 6, 2001, Serial No. 107-21, 

p. 10, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees.

27. Edward Schatz, “Islamism and Anti-Americanism in Central Asia,” 

Current History, October 2002, p. 338. It is likely that the IMU’s political leader, 

Tohir Yuldash, survived, though he may have fled to Pakistan. The IMU and the 

Hizb-ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign, International Crisis Group, 

January 30, 2002, p. 2, http://www.icg.org.

28. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 3, No. 23, July 7, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org. 

29. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 230, Part I, December 9, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

30. Blua, “Central Asia,” http://www.globalsecurity.org.

31. Nina Serafino, Peace-Keeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, CRS Issue 

Brief, IB94040, August 6, 2003, p. 4.

32. “Russia Stengthens Military Presence in Central Asia,” Deutsche-Presse 

Agentur, January 10, 2004.

33. Agence France-Presse, January 14, 2004.

34. Christopher Marquis, “General Urges NATO to Send Afghanistan More 

Troops,” The New York Times, January 28, 2004, p. A11.
40

35. Agence-France Presse, January 10, 2004.

36. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. Policy, CRS Report 

RL30588, August 1, 2003, p. 9.

37. Ahmed Rashid, “Musharraf’s Morass,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June, 

19, 2003, http://www.feer.com.

38. K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report 

RL 31624, March 28, 2003, p. 21.

39. Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan: Beset on All Sides,” Far Eastern Economic 

Review, May 15, 2003, http://www.feer.com.

40. K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, CRS, Issue Brief, IB94041, 

December 2, 2003, p.6.

41. Ahmed Rashid, “Danger Mounts for Embattled General,” The Far Eastern 

Economic Review, January 8, 2004, http://www.feer.com.

42. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan’s Premier Visits Afghanistan and Pledges 

Cooperation,” The New York Times, January 13, 2004, p. A6.

43. K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, CRS Issue Brief IB94041, 

September 3, 2003, p. 11.

44. “Not a Dress Rehearsal,” The Economist, August 16, 2003, p. 37.

45. Antonio Maria Costa, “Afghanistan’s Battle with the Opium Poppy: The 

Thriving Drug Trade,” The International Herald Tribune, November 8, 2003, p. 8.

46. U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report, Unfinished Business in Afghanistan: 

Warlordism, Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony, April 2003, p. 3.

47. “Not a Dress Rehearsal,” The Economist, p. 36. 

48. Carlotta Gall, “More G.I.’s to Go to Insecure Afghan Areas to Permit Aid 

Work,” The New York Times, December 22, 2003, p. A10.

49. Joseph Biden, Jr., “Don’t Forget Afghanistan,” The New York Times, October 

1, 2003, p. A23.

50. David Rohde, “U.S. Said to Plan Bigger Afghanistan Effort, Stepping Up 

Aid,” The New York Times, August 25, 2003, p. A3.
41

51. Ahmed Rashid, “Afghanistan Is Waiting for This,” Far Eastern Economic 

Review, August 7, 2003, p. 13.

52. “Not a Dress Rehearsal,” The Economist, p. 35.

53. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “Aftereffects: Bases,” The New York 

Times, April 27, 2003, p. A1.

54. Eric Schmitt, “Aftereffects: The Pullout; U.S. To Withdraw All Combat 

Units from Saudi Arabia,” The New York Times, April 30, 2003, p. A1.

55. Associated Press, December 8, 2003.

56. Speech by Under Secretary for Policy Douglas J. Feith to the Center for 

Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, “Transforming the U.S. 

Global Defense Posture,” December 3, 2003, http://www.defenselink.mil. 

57. Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Iraq Bases Could Be a Key to Strategic 

Revolution,” The New York Times, April 22, 2003, p. 1.

58. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 3, No. 12, March 21, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

59. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 72, Part I, April 15, 2003, http://www.rferl.org.

60. Ahmed Rashid, “War in Iraq: What Do You Think of America Now?” Far 

Eastern Economic Review, April 3, 2003, http:// www.feer.com.

61. Egamberdy Kabulov, “Concern Rising in Kyrgyzstan about U.S.-Led War 

in Iraq,” Eurasia Insight, April 7, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org.

62. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 58, Part I, 26 March 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

63. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 66, Part I, April 7, 2003, http://www.rferl.org.

64. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, CIS Opinion Alert, Diverse 

CIS Publics Oppose U.S.-Led War in Iraq, L-19-03, April 9, 2003, p. 2.

65. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 63, Part I, April 2, 2003, http://www.rferl.org. 

66. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 3, No. 12, March 21, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

67. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 63, Part I, April 2, 2003, http://www.rferl.org.
42

68. Ibid.

69. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 158, Part I, August 20, 2003, www.rferl.org.

70. Office of Research, U.S. Department of State, Central Asian Urbanites 

Willing to Help in Iraq, but Feel UN Should Oversee Reconstruction, Opinion Analysis 

M-94-03, August 7, 2003, p. 3.

71. Ibid., p. 2.

72. “Central Asia: Is the IMU Still a Threat to Regional Security?” Eurasia 

Insight, January 24, 2004, http: //www.eurasianet.org.

73. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 130, Part I, July 11, 2003, http://www.rferl.org.

74. Tamara Makarenko, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the Rise in Central Asia,” Jane’s 

Intelligence Review, December 2002, p. 31.

75. International Crisis Group, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizbut-Tahrir, ICG Asia Report No. 58, June 30, 2003, p. 24; Alisher Khamidov, “Hizbut-Tahrir Faces Internal Split in Central Asia,” Eurasia Insight, December 16, 2003, 

http://www.eurasianet.org.

76. Makarenko, “Hizb-ut-Tahrir on the Rise,” p. 31.

77. Ibid., p. 31. Regarding possible ties to other Islamic movements in 

the region, the ICG further states that Hizb-ut-Tahrir is critical of the Islamic 

Renaissance Party in Tajikistan, which it considers to have capitulated to 

government demands, and overtly hostile to the Wahabbi views of the Taliban, 

al-Qaeda and other similar groups, which also oppose the Hizb-ut-Tahrir for their 

“secular modernism.” 

78. Radical Islam in Central Asia, pp. 16-17, 33.

79. Human Rights Watch, In the Name of Counter-Terrorism: Human Rights 

Abuses Worldwide, Briefing Paper for the 59th Session of the U.N. Commission on 

Human Rights, March 25, 2003, http://www.hrw.org.

80. Radical Islam in Central Asia, p. 17.

81. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 189, Part I, October 3, 2003, 

http://www.rferl.org. 

82. ITAR-TASS, June 29, 2003.
43

83. RIA Novosti, November 9, 2003.

84. Radical Islam in Central Asia, p. 17.

85. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 72, Part I, April 15, 2003, http://www.rferl.org.

86. Radical Islam in Central Asia, p. 17.

87. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 194, Part I, October 10, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

88. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 3, No. 29, August 29, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

89. Ibid.

90. “Open Letter to Mr. Askar Akayev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic,” 

June 24, 2003, http://www.omct.org.

91. U.S. Department of State, Office of Research, Opinion Analysis, Central 

Asian Elites Content with Islam’s Current Role in Their Countries, M-48-03, April 17, 

2003.

92. Central Asia: Islam and the State, ICG Asia Report No. 59, July 10, 2003, p. 5; 

Makarenko, p. 30; “Central Asia: Is the IMU Still a Threat to Regional Security?” 

Eurasia Insight, January, 24, 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org.

93. Simon Saradzhyan, “Powell: No Plan to Encircle Russia,” The Moscow 

Times, January 28, 2004.

94. Putin’s speech at Columbia University, ITAR-TASS, September 26, 2003. 

On the discussion of Russia’s declining influence in Central Asia, see “Rossiya 

izpol’zuet SShA v kachestve bufera v Tsentral’noi Azii,” [Russia Uses The USA 

as a Buffer in Central Asia], Nezavisimaya Gazeta [Independent Newspaper], April 

30, 2003; Dmitry Trenin, “Russia Enters a New Period of Isolation,” Nezavisimaya 

Gazeta–Dipkurier [Independent Newspaper-Diplomatic Courier], No. 8, December 

2003, pp. 1, 13, translated by WPS Defense and Security, December 15, 2003.

95. Thom Shanker, “Russian Official Cautions U.S. on Use of Central Asian 

Bases,” The New York Times, October 9, 2003, p. A9.

96. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 40, Part I, March 3, 2003, http://www.rferl.org.

97. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, “Vneshnepoliticheskii front Rossii,” [Russia’s 

Foreign Policy Front] Nezavisimaya Gazeta [Independent Newspaper], September 

15, 2003. 
44

98. Agence France-Presse, June 21, 2003.

99. Roman Kupchinsky, “The Putin Doctrine,” RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 

204, Part I, October 27, 2003.

100. ITAR-TASS, December 9, 2003.

101. Krasnaya Zvezda, October 28, 2003, translated by BBC Monitoring.

102. Colonel Vladmir Mukhin (ret.), “Rossiya vernulas’ v Tsentral’noi Azii: 

Doktrina o preventivnykh udarakh nachinaet podkreplyats’ya novoy voennoi 

infrastrukturoi,” [Russia Has Returned to Central Asia: Doctrine on Preemptive 

Strikes Is Bolstered by New Military Infrastructure], Nezavisimaya Gazeta

[Independent Newspaper], October 24, 2003, p. 2.

103. CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha suggested that the force could 

be increased by 100-200 percent within a few hours. Interview with Bordyuzha, 

Trud [Labor], November 14, 2003. Another military observer suggested that the 

base could accommodate a force level of 10,000-100,000, if such a need arose. See 

Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star], October 28, 2003.

104. Russia also agreed to grant Kyrgyzstan an additional 20 years to pay off 

its $160 million debt.

105. RIA-Novosti, October 22, 2003.

106. Nikolai Poroskov, “A New Military Union,” Vremya Novostei [Time for 

News], June 9, 2003.

107. Mukhin, p. 2.

108. Vladislav Vorobyov and Toris Talov, “They’ve Left for the Base,” 

Rossiiskaya Gazeta [Russian Newspaper], September 23, 2003, pp. 1-2.

109. Tolkun Namatbayeva, “Putin Opens Russia’s New Military Base in 

Kyrgystan,” Agence France-Presse, October 23, 2003.

110. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 3, No. 36, October 24, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

111. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 241, Part I, December 29, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

112. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 180,September 22, 2003, http://www.rferl.org.
45

113. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 214, Part I, November 12, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

114. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 3, No. 34, October 10, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

115. RFE/RL Central Asia Report, Vol. 2, No. 41, October 24, 2002, http://

www.rferl.org.

116. Vitaly V. Naumkin, “Russian Policy toward Kazakhstan,” in Robert 

Legvold, ed., Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central 

Asian Nexus, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003, pp. 41-43.

117. Nikolai Poroskov, “A New Military Union,” Vremya Novostei [Time for 

News], June 9, 2003.

118. Agence France-Presse, August 6, 2003. On Karimov’s reaction to plans for 

the Kant base, see RFE/RL Newsline, December 13, 2002, http://www.rferl.org.

119. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 231, Part I, December 10, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

120. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 241, Part I, December 30, 2002, http://

www.rferl.org.

121. RIA News Agency, July 30, 2003.

122. Xing Guangsheng, “China’s Policy toward Kazakhstan,” in ed. Legvold, 

pp. 120-121.

123. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda [Kazakhstan Truth], August 13, 2003, p. 3.

124. Xinhua, December 15, 2003. The East Turkestan Information Center can 

be reached at http://www.uygur.org.

125. See, for example, Tim Luard, “China Changes Its View of Terrorism,” 

BBC News, December 18, 2003, cited in Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network 

Daily Report, http://www.nautilus.org.

126. See, for example, Kakharman Khozhamberdi, Chairman of the 

Uighurstan People’s Party, “Only the West Can Protect Central Asia from Chinese 

Oppression,” Dozhivem do ponidel’nika (Almaty) [We Will Survive until Monday], 

September 20, 2002, translated in BBC Monitoring, September 20, 2002.
46

127. Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, White Paper on the 

History and Development of Xinjiang, Xinhua, May 26, 2003.

128. Interview with Vladimir Suvurov, Karavan (Almaty)[Caravan], November 

29, 2002, p. 7, translated in BBC Monitoring, November 29, 2002.

129. See, for example, Ibragim Alibekov, “Uighur Issues May Become Factor 

in China-Kazakhstan Relations,” January 2, 2003, http://www.eurasianet.org.

130. Hua Chu, “Beijing Using International Channels to Eradicate ‘East 

Turkestan’,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, December 19, 2003, p. 15, translated by 

the BBC Monitoring, December 19, 2003.

131. Kazakh Commercial TV, December 23, 2002, in BBC monitoring, 

December 23, 2003.

132. Pan Guang, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges, 

Opportunities, and Prospects,” International Studies (China Institute for 

International Studies), No. 13-16, 2002, pp. 30-31.

133. RIA Oreanda, January 14, 2004, http://www.oreanda.ru. 

134. “Shanghai Five Fight Terrorism,” Cbnet-China Daily, August 12, 2003.

135. Vladimir Mukhin, “Political Context of Military Exercises. Troops in 

Central Asia Learning Not Only How to Fight Militants but How to Pacify Civilian 

Population,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 8, 2003.

136. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 170, Part I, September 8, 2003, http://

www.rferl.org.

137. “Foothold in Central Asia: India Gets Own Military Base,” The Indian 

Express, November 13, 2003.

138. “India Gets Military Partner in Central Asia,” Indian Express, February 12, 

2003.

139. “Tajik Cadets Sent to Indian Military Schools for Training,” Asia-Plus 

News Agency (Dushanbe), July 8, 2003.

140. Human Rights Watch, “Progress on Paper Only: Analysis of the U.S. 

State Department’s Certification of Uzbekistan,” June 3, 2003, http://www.hrw.org.

141. Peter Slevin, “U.S. Gives Uzbekistan Failing Grade on Rights,” The 

Washington Post, January 11, 2004, p. A18.
47

142. “Our Man in Tashkent in Trouble,” The Economist, November 1, 2003, p. 

52; Agence France-Presse, September 30, 2003, and November 17, 2003.

143. Antoine Blua, “Kyrgyz Rights Activists Call for End to Deportation of 

Uighurs to China,” Eurasia Insight, January 25, 2004, http://www.eurasianet.org.

144. Is Radical Islam in Central Asia Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities for 

Engagement, ICG Asia Report No. 72, December 22 2003, p. 22.

145. James Morrison, “Central Asian Angst,” The Washington Times, January 9, 

2004, p. A14.

146. See, for example, testimony by Stephen Blank, Fiona Hill, and Martha 

Brill Olcott to the Middle East and Central Asia Subcommittee of the House 

International Relations Committee, October 29, 2003. In the United Nations 

Human Development Index for 2003, annual ranking of 175 countries according 

to their socio-economic indicators, Uzbekistan is in 101st place, Kyrgyzstan 

comes in 102nd, and Tajikistan takes 113th. Due to it success in attracting foreign 

investment, Kazakhstan ranks 76th. See http://www.undp.org.

147. Phil Williams, “Criminalization and Stability in Central Asia and South 

Caucasus,” in Olga Oliker and Thomas S. Szayna, eds., Faultlines in Central Asia 

and the Caucasus: Operational Environment and Paths to Conflict, RAND MR-1598-A, 

2003, pp. 77-78.

148. Transparency International, International Corruption Perceptions Index 

2003, http://www.transparency.org.

149. Martha Brill Olcott, “Taking Stock of Central Asia,” Foreign Affairs, Spring 

2003, Vol. 56, Issue 2, p. 17.

150. Is Radical Islam in Central Asia Inevitable, December 2003, p. ii.

151. Rajan Menon, “The New Great Game in Central Asia,” Survival, Vol. 45, 

No. 2, Summer 2003, p. 201.

152. Commission on Human Security, Round Table on Transition and Human 

Security in Central Asia, Ashgabad, Turkmenistan, April 22-24, 2002, p. 8.

153. Dana Priest, The Mission, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2003, pp. 

108-109.

154. Jeremy Shapiro and Lynn E. Davis, “The New National Security 

Strategy,” in Lynn E. Davis and Jeremy Shapiro, eds., The U.S. Army and the New 
48

National Security Strategy, Santa Monica: RAND, 2003, p. 11.

155. Paul Stone, “DoD Considers Creating Stability and Reconstruction 

Force,” American Forces Press Service, http://www.defenselink.mil.

156. RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 225, Part I, December 2, 2003, http:

//www.rferl.org; RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 7, No. 210, Part I, November 5, 2003, http:

//www.rferl.org. 

157. P. H. Liotta, “Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and 

Human Security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2002, p. 473.

158. Tajikistan: ICRC Community-Based Mine/Unexploded Ordinance 

Awareness Programme, May 22, 2002, http:// www.icrc.org.

159. UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, “Central Asia: 

Land Mines Conference Highlights Ongoing Danger,” November 6, 2003, http:

//www.irinnews.org.

160. Salla Kayhko, “Clearing the Way for a Mine-Free Tajikistan,” OSCE 

Newsletter, Vol. XI, No. 7, November-December 2003, pp. 18-19.

161. RFE/RL Newsline, Part I, Vol. 8, No. 22, February 4, 2004, http://

www.rferl.org.

162. Fiona Hill, “Central Asia and the Caucasus: The Impact of the War 

on Terrorism,” in Nations in Transit, New York: Freedom House, 2003, http:

//www.freedomhouse.org. Uzbekistan failed to attend Central Asia’s first conference 

on landmine use in November 2003 in Bishkek. Thus far, only Tajikistan and 

Turkmenistan have ratified the 1997 Ottawa convention, “Banning Landmines.”

163. Ted Weihman, “U.S. Focus in Central Asia Is Inadequate to Meet 

Drug Trafficking Challenge,” Eurasia Insight, September 23, 2003, http://

www.eurasianet.org.

164. Ibid. In June 2003 UNODC announced it would give Tajikistan’s Drug 

Control Agency $17 million and help set up similar programs in Kyrgyzstan and 

Uzbekistan.