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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

JAMI CLAIRE, KATHRYN LANE, 

and AHMIR MURPHY 

Plaintiffs, 

v. CASE NO. 4:20-cv-0020-MW-CAS 

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

MANAGEMENT SERVICES and 

PEDRO ALLENDE, in his official 

Capacity as Secretary of the Florida 

Department of Management Services. 

Defendants. 

________________________________ 

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES,

and PEDRO ALLENDE in his official capacity as Secretary of the Florida 

Department of Management Services (collectively, “Defendants”), by and through 

undersigned counsel and pursuant to this Court’s order (Doc. 166), hereby respond

to Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

(Doc. 170) as follows:

I. Murphy and Claire lack standing on their equal protection claims.

To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy 

must exist at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed. Preiser 

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v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975). Based on Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief (Doc. 

170 p. 3), which notified Defendants for the first time of Claire and Murphy’s 

voluntary resignation from public employment, it appears that their equal protection 

claims have been rendered moot. “Past exposure to [alleged] illegal conduct without 

more, does not give a plaintiff standing to pursue prospective relief against a repeat 

of the illegal conduct, absent a sufficient likelihood that the plaintiff will again be a 

victim of the illegal conduct.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 111 

(1983). Because they have lost a direct stake in the outcome of this case, Claire and 

Murphy do not have a present case or controversy against Defendants with respect to 

their claim for equitable relief under the equal protection clause. See Arizonans for 

Official English v. Arizona. 520 U.S. 43, 44 (1997). Article III standing “represents 

a jurisdictional requirement which remains open to review at all stages of the 

litigation.” Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255 (1994).

(Emphasis added.)

II. Lange’s holding that classification based on medical condition is facially 

discriminatory ignores the plain language of Title VII and Supreme Court 

precedent.

Plaintiffs, relying on Lange, assert that Bostock’s clarified definition of 

“because of sex” includes discrimination on the basis of a medical condition that 

uniquely affecting transgender persons. (Doc 170 p. 3-4.) Presumably based on their

understanding that classification based on certain medical treatments constitutes 

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facial sex discrimination, Plaintiffs erroneously claim that transgender status was the 

basis for their coverage denials. (Doc. 170 p. 5.)

Contrary to what Plaintiffs or the Lange Court may suggest, Bostock, Copeland

and Brumby do not hold that classification based on a medical condition affecting 

transgender individuals is facially discriminatory based on sex. The analysis in these 

cases is no different from the analysis in cases like Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 

U.S. 228, 232 (1989), in which sex-stereotyping evidenced the defendant’s

discrimination against women because of sex. Bostock applied the well-established 

principle that discrimination on the basis of sex can encompass stereotypes about 

gender non-conformity in the context of discrimination against transgender 

individuals. See Bostock, 590 U.S. at 660. But the majority opinion in Bostock

stressed that the Court was not changing or amending the meaning of “because of 

sex” under Title VII. Id. at 669. Bostock ensures that transgender individuals are on 

equal footing with women – they cannot be intentionally discriminated against in the 

workplace because of their biological sex or because of stereotypes about their 

biological sex.

But Lange skips a vital step in the analysis, and does not explain how, in light 

of Dobbs, Geduldig, Bray, Gilbert and Eknes-Tucker, exclusion of a medical 

condition related to transgender status constitutes facial discrimination because of 

sex. In this regard, Plaintiffs Claire, Lane and Murphy are no different from the 

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women in Gilbert, Geduldig, and Dobbs who challenged regulation of medical 

conditions only impacting women. Women are clearly within a protected class 

because of sex, but excluding medical conditions solely impacting women is not 

facial sex discrimination. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said so. Geduldig, 417 

U.S. at 496 n.20; Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125; Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 236; Bray, 506 U.S. at

270. Likewise, excluding coverage for certain medical treatments impacting

transgender persons is not facial sex discrimination. Lange’s holding to the contrary

is wrongly decided and ignores both Supreme Court precedent and the history of the 

language of Title VII itself.

Furthermore, evidence of intent to discriminate because of sex is required to 

find a violation of Title VII. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1223 (11th 

Cir. 2019)1; Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 

852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016). A showing of intent to discriminate is also 

required to find that the exclusion of treatment for medical conditions unique to

transgender persons violates Title VII. Here, Plaintiff has failed to proffer any 

evidence of intent to discriminate. On the contrary, the record evidence actually 

establishes that transgender individuals are entitled to the same coverage as all other 

1 The Eleventh Circuit has previously found that “discrimination claims under the 

Equal Protection Clause and discrimination claims under Title VII “have the same 

requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework.” Thompson v. Sec’y of 

State for the State of Alabama, 65 F.4th 1288, 1321 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Lewis v. 

City of Union City, 918 F.3d at 1220 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc).

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State Health Plan members, and the exclusion which has always existed, is applicable 

to all Plan members regardless of sex or gender.

III. Lange’s interpretation of “because of sex” ignores the plain language and 

amendment history of Title VII.

As much as this Court is bound by Bostock, it is bound by the express language of 

Title VII. In Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976), the Supreme Court 

interpreted “because of sex” under Title VII and, applying the rationale of Geduldig, 

held that excluding coverage for certain medical conditions uniquely affecting 

women did not violate Title VII. Gilbert constituted the final word on what “because 

of sex” under Title VII meant at the time. AT & T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 

712 n.5 (2009). The Supreme Court subsequently confirmed that Gilbert declared the 

scope and meaning of “because of sex” under Title VII as it was originally written:

Although certain Courts of Appeals had previously concluded that 

treating pregnancy leave less favorably than other disability leave 

constituted sex discrimination under Title VII, this Court

in Gilbert clearly rejected that conclusion. . . . Gilbert declared the 

meaning and scope of sex discrimination under Title VII and 

held that previous views to the contrary were wrong as a matter 

of law. And ‘[a] judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative 

statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the 

decision of the case giving rise to that construction.’ It is therefore 

to no avail to argue that the pregnancy leave cap was unlawful 

before Gilbert and that the PDA returned the law to its prior state.

Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

This means that, before Title VII was amended, “because of sex” was 

interpreted in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause’s meaning of 

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“because of sex” in the context of medical conditions. Under Geduldig and Gilbert 

“because of sex” did not include on the basis of sex-specific medical conditions 

without evidence of intent to discriminate because of sex. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 

497 n.20; Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 140.2

Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s holding in Gilbert, Congress amended the 

definition of “because of sex” under Title VII to include an express list of pregnancyrelated medical conditions. 42 U.S.C § 2000e(k). Abortion – a medical treatment 

unique to women – is partially excluded under the amended definition (health plans 

are only required to cover abortion in certain contexts). Had medical conditions 

unique to sex been inherent in the meaning of “because of sex” under Title VII - a

contention the Supreme Court unequivocally denounced in Hulteen - the amendment

to include pregnancy-related medical conditions would not have been necessary, and 

arguably, partial exclusion of a particular condition like elective abortion would have 

been improper. Rather, certain medical conditions are included within the meaning 

2 Title VII derives its authority from the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitpatrick v., Bitzer

427 U.S. 445 (1976). Interpreting Title VII inconsistently with the Equal Protection 

Clause could have Eleventh Amendment implications. See e.g., Bd. of Trustees of

Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Title I of the ADA 

did not validly abrogate eleventh amendment immunity); Coleman v. Court of

Appeals of Maryland, 566 U.S. 30 (2012) (holding that congress did not validly 

abrogate states’ sovereign immunity from suits for money damages in enacting 

FMLA’s self-care provision.).

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of “because of sex” under Title VII solely by virtue of amendment to the statutory 

language. 

If Lange were correct about its expansive definition of “because of sex” under 

Title VII, it would render the listing of pregnancy-related medical conditions in 

section 2000e(k) meaningless. “The canon against surplusage is strongest when an 

interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme.” 

See Marx, 568 U.S. at 386 (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 

162, 185-186 (2011); See also Brown v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Services, 4 F.4th 1220 (11th Cir. 2021), vacated on other grounds, 20 F.4th 1385 

(11th Cir. 2021). (Emphasis added). Courts should be hesitant to adopt an 

interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another 

portion of that same law.” Marx, 568 U.S. at 386 (quoting Mackey v. Lanier 

Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837, (1988). This principle is 

confirmed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Hulteen that before the definition of

“because of sex” under Title VII was amended, disparate treatment of pregnancyrelated benefits was not prohibited by the statute. Hulteen, 556 U.S. at 712 n.5.

Because Title VII was amended to include specific medical conditions, 

medical conditions unique to one sex are only included within the definition of 

“because of sex” if the statutory language says so. Title VII has never been amended 

to include gender dysphoria or related medical conditions. As such, Lange improperly 

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extends the holding of Bostock beyond the statutory language of Title VII. If gender 

dysphoria is to be included within the phrase “because of sex” under Title VII, 

Congress must amend Title VII to expressly include gender dysphoria, just as 

Congress amended Title VII to include pregnancy-related medical conditions.

IV. Eknes-Tucker controls the Equal Protection Clause analysis.

Eknes-Tucker controls3and comports with binding Supreme Court precedent. 

Plaintiff is correct that Eknes-Tucker understood the statute at issue to target specific 

medical interventions for minors and therefore made classifications on the basis of 

age and not sex. 80 F.4th 1205, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 2023). Nonetheless, Eknes-Tucker

is directly applicable because the Eleventh Circuit conducted an analysis of a statute

regulating treatments for gender dysphoria and conclusively determined that “the 

regulation of a course of treatment that only gender nonconforming individuals can 

undergo would not trigger heightened scrutiny unless the regulation were a pretext 

for invidious discrimination against such individuals.” Id. at 1229 (citing Dobbs v. 

Jackson Women’s Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 235 (2022)). In so doing, the Eleventh 

3 Similar to Lange, the mandate in Eknes-Tucker has been withheld, and a petition 

for rehearing was filed on September 11, 2023. However, this Court need not delay 

ruling on the Equal Protection Clause issue because Eknes-Tucker simply follows the 

binding Supreme Court precedent of Geduldig and Dobbs, and because the rationale 

of Eknes-Tucker is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc holding in Adams, 

which also affirmed the viability of Geduldig. See Adams, 57 F.4th at 809.

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Circuit once again adopted the rationale of Geduldig and its progeny. See Adams v.

Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 57 F.4th 791, 809 (11th Cir. 2022).

The Court in Eknes-Tucker explained that the statute at issue did not establish 

an unequal regime for males and females, reasoning that heightened scrutiny applies 

to government action that “denies an opportunity to women (or to men).” Id. at 1228. 

(Citing United, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit 

explained that the statute at issue referred to sex only because the medical procedures 

it regulated were themselves sex based. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found it difficult to 

even imagine how a state might regulate medical procedures it found sex based 

without referencing sex in some way. Id. at 1228. As a result, express reference to 

sex or gender does not necessarily constitute direct evidence of a sex-based

classification scheme under the equal protection clause. Cf. Nguyen v. I.N.S. 553 U.S. 

53 (2001). Rather, evidence of invidious discrimination is required. Eknes-Tucker,

80 F.4th at 1230.

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, Defendants’ Plan exclusion is not dissimilar 

to the exclusions present in the Alabama statute, which also classified based on 

medical diagnosis, not sex. The fact that Alabama’s law imposed criminal penalties 

is irrelevant to the Equal Protection Clause or to the Court’s analysis of the 

appropriate scrutiny to apply to such a statute or regulation. Finally, the differences 

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in language between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause have no bearing on 

the application of Eknes-Tucker to the facts of this case.

a. Eknes-Tucker, not Kadel v. Folwell, is binding on this Court.

The Fourth Circuit’s holding in Kadel v. Folwell, 100 F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2024) 

is not binding on this Court and reaches a holding directly contrary to the Eleventh 

Circuit’s holding in Eknes-Tucker. Specifically, the Kadel Court dismissed the 

rationale of Geduldig and Dobbs and found that “discriminating on the basis of 

diagnosis is discriminating on the basis of gender identity and sex.” 100 F.4th at 141. 

Judge Richardson’s dissent in Kadel points out the flaws in the majority’s opinion 

and is more consistent with the analysis articulated by the Eleventh Circuit on a nearly 

identical legal issue in Eknes-Tucker. See Kadel, 100 F.4th at 164-92.

Further, the court in Kadel, much like the district court in Doe, reached the 

inexplicable conclusion that gender dysphoria – a medical condition experienced by 

men, women, and some but not all transgender persons (Doc. 125 p. 6), is somehow 

a closer proxy for biological sex than pregnancy. Kadel, 100 F. 4th at 146. In reaching 

this conclusion, both courts ignored the elephant in the room i.e., that only biological 

women can become pregnant, and that women have been fighting the persistent sexbased stereotype that pregnancy and motherhood will or should prevent them from 

functioning in society on equal footing with men, for centuries. See generally, 

Hulteen, 556 U.S. at 725-726 n. 6-8 (Ginsberg J. dissenting). Pregnancy is as 

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synonymous with sex, and as loaded with sex-based stereotypes, as any medical 

condition can get.4 The privilege to overlook this reality may reflect how far women 

have come in recent years, but it ignores decades of civil rights advocacy and the 

basis for including sex within Title VII to begin with. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.,

Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 722 (2020).

In light of the Supreme Court’s rulings in Geduldig, Bray and Dobbs, the 

holding in Kadel that classifications based on gender dysphoria are facial sex 

discrimination requiring intermediate scrutiny, while classifications based on medical 

conditions uniquely affecting women are not, effectively gives transgender persons

greater rights under the Equal Protection Clause than biological women. This Court 

should reject such a holding.

b. Dekker and Doe are not binding on this Court.

Central to Plaintiff’s claim under Title VII, Defendants “liability depends on 

whether the protected trait ... actually motivated the employer’s decision.” Hazen 

Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). This Court must analyze the record 

evidence specific to this case for evidence of invidious discriminatory intent. Both 

Dekker and Doe are non-binding district court opinions involving facts and evidence 

4 See Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,419 n.1 (1908) (upholding disparate 

work hours restrictions for all women regardless of their actual pregnancy or 

motherhood status based on assumptions about women’s physical characteristics, 

women’s maternal functions, and their role in rearing and educating children.)

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distinct from the present action. Specifically, the statutes at issue in these cases were

either created or amended in 2022 and 2023. See Fla. Admin Code. 59G-1.050 

(2022); § 286.31 Fla. Stat. (2023); § 456.001 Fla. Stat. (2023), amended by ch. 2023-

90, § 4 Laws of Fla; § 456.52 Fla. Stat. (2023), amended by ch. 2023-90, § 5 Laws 

of Fla.). In contrast, the Plan exclusion at issue in this case has been in place since 

the 1970s, when gender reassignment surgeries were universally considered 

experimental (Doc. 125 p. 9.)

i. The analysis of Geduldig in Doe and Dekker is flawed.

Defendants have demonstrated that transgender persons regardless of their 

natal sex do not all experience gender dysphoria, just as not all women experience 

pregnancy or pregnancy-related disabilities. (Doc.125 p. 6-7.) Moreover, the record 

is clear that transgender individuals are entitled to the same coverage as any other 

Plan member, regardless of their natal sex or transgender status. 

In Doe, the district court attempted to distinguish Geduldig by asserting that 

the exclusion in Geduldig treated male and female plan members the same (both did 

not have coverage for pregnancy-related disability) and that, while there were women 

on both sides of the exclusion in Geduldig, the same was not true for the transgender 

plaintiffs in Doe. The court explained:

Cisgender individuals can be and routinely are treated with GnRH agonists, 

testosterone, or estrogen, when they and their doctors deem it appropriate. Not 

so for transgender individuals—the challenged statute and rules prohibit it. To 

know whether treatment with any of these medications is legal, one must know 

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whether the patient is transgender. And to know whether treatment with 

testosterone or estrogen is legal, one must know the patient’s natal sex.

(Doe v. Ladapo, No. 4:23-cv-00114-RH-MAF at * 37-38 (N.D. Fla. June 11, 2024); 

See also, Dekker v. Weida, 679 F. Supp 3d. 1271, 1291-92 (N. D. Fla 2023)

These analyses do not appear to consider the fact (or perhaps the record did not 

contain evidence showing) that transgender persons receive hormone therapy for 

lawful, qualifying medical reasons. (See e.g., Doc. 125 p. 14-15.) In that regard, the 

court’s attempt to distinguish Geduldig is flawed, as the application of an exclusion 

for both conditions – pregnancy and gender dysphoria – is similar. In fact, gender 

dysphoria possesses less connection to biological sex because it impacts both sexes

equally. The fact that specific treatments (like testosterone and estrogen) are sexspecific speaks to biological realities, not discriminatory intent. Eknes-Tucker, 80 

F.4th at 1234 (“recognition of biological reality is ‘not a stereotype.’) (citing Nguyen 

v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001).

Moreover, the Doe rationale for distinguishing Geduldig fails on the facts of 

the present case. Under the Plan, a transgender male (natal female) can receive 

coverage for hormone therapy to treat an endocrine disorder or other covered 

condition; in fact, Plaintiffs Lane and Murphy received coverage for hormone therapy

and related blood work under the Plan. (Doc. 125 p. 14-15 citing Doc.118-19. Lane 

19:7-21, 20:15-25, Doc.118-23.Murphy 21:4-22:3, 23:25-24:6.) A transgender male

(natal female) is also entitled to receive covered gynecological services if medically 

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necessary, notwithstanding their male gender identity. This is because the Plan does 

not make coverage decisions based on sex markers. (Doc. 125 p. 8-9.) Just as in 

Geduldig, there are indisputably transgender persons on both sides of the coverage 

decisions at issue under the Plan.

In the surgical context, if a transgender male (natal female) sought coverage 

for a penile prosthesis for treatment of gender dysphoria, he would be denied 

coverage just as a non-transgender male would be denied coverage if he sought 

coverage for a penile prosthesis to treat a psychiatric condition. (Doc. 125 p. 5, 25-

26.; Doc. 121-4 p.56; Doc 121-18 p.2) Similarly, transgender women and all other 

plan members, would be denied coverage for facial feminization surgery to treat a 

non-covered condition. And, transgender women along with all other Plan members, 

would be entitled to coverage for facial plastic surgery to treat a covered condition.

(Doc 121-4 p. 43, 59) Again, in both cases, there would be transgender persons on 

both sides of the coverage decisions. Plaintiffs have not and cannot present any

evidence demonstrating that the Plan exclusion deny a transgender person coverage 

for a qualifying medical condition because of their gender non-conformity or 

transgender status.

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ii. Doe acknowledges that courts evaluating classifications based on 

medical conditions must examine the record for evidence of 

invidious discrimination as set forth in Arlington Heights.

Despite suggesting that the statute at issue in Doe was not facially neutral, the 

court nonetheless acknowledged that Eknes-Tucker presently controlled and 

conducted the fact-based inquiry described in Arlington Heights. See Doe v. Ladapo, 

No. 4:23-cv-00114 at 39-52 (N.D Fla. June 11, 2024). The district court’s analysis of 

the record for evidence of sex-based animus reveals the types of evidence necessary 

to create an issue of fact as to the existence of invidious discrimination. By contrast, 

Plaintiffs have wholly failed to present similar evidence of invidious discrimination 

in this case.

c. The Plan exclusion satisfies rational basis scrutiny.

As set forth at length in Defendants’ motion and prior briefs (Doc. 125 p. 30-

32; Doc. 135 p. 33-36; Doc. 141 p. 14-15; Doc. 171 p.14-14), the Plan exclusion 

satisfies rational basis scrutiny. Rational basis scrutiny does not require an analysis 

of the actual motivations of the government in creating a classification; only analysis 

of what rational basis they may have had. See Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children 

and Family Services, 377 F.3d 1275, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2004). Here it is undisputed 

that the Plan requires legislative approval to add coverage, and that DMS is required 

to run the plan in a cost-effective manner. There is no evidence that DMS advocated 

for this exclusion; much less that it did so with a discriminatory purpose. Moreover, 

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eliminating the exclusion would easily add over a million dollars in costs to the Plan.

(Doc. 118-9 p.25:25-26:12, 83:16- 84:20.) This, along with the reasons articulated in 

previous briefings, are rational bases for the exclusion. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495-

96; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977).

Plaintiffs rely on City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 

(1985) to assert that the Plan cannot survive a “meaningful” rational basis review. 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, Cleburne does not change the meaning of rational 

basis review. Rather, Cleburne stands for the basic proposition that under the rational 

basis test, a state’s proffered rational for its conduct cannot be found irrational. The 

burden remains on the Plaintiff5to demonstrate that “the varying treatment of 

different persons or groups is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of 

legitimate purposes that a court can only conclude the legislature’s actions were 

irrational.” Jones v. Governor of Florida, 950 F.3d 795, 809 (11th Cir. 2020). 

Meanwhile, governmental entities routinely survive rational basis scrutiny 

with regard to their statutory and regulatory policies on the basis of cost savings and 

the financial health of state programs and economy. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495-

96 (finding rational basis for state health plan to not cover pregnancy related 

5

“Those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the 

legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably 

be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” Minnesota v. Clover 

Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (applying rational basis scrutiny).

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disabilities on the basis of state health plan’s self-sufficiency under equal protection);

Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138–40 (finding rational basis for state health plan to not cover 

pregnancy related disabilities on the basis of state health plan’s self-sufficiency under 

Title VII); Demaree v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 515 Fed. Appx. 859 (11th Cir. 2013)

(finding rational basis for difference in treatment of teachers and paraprofessionals 

on the basis of cost savings to defendant school district). The Plan clearly survives 

rational basis scrutiny. 

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein, and in Defendants’ previous 

memoranda in support of summary judgment (Docs. 125, 126, 135, 140, 141,160, 

and 171), this Court should grant dismiss Plaintiffs Claire and Murphy’s Equal 

Protection claims for lack of standing; grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant 

Allende on the remaining Equal Protection claim; and withhold ruling on the Title 

VII claim until mandate is issued in Lange.

Respectfully submitted this 21st day of June 2024.

HENRY BUCHANAN, P.A.

/s/ Miriam R. Coles

MIRIAM R. COLES

Florida Bar No. 58402

mcoles@henryblaw.com

J. STEVEN CARTER

Florida Bar No. 896152

Post Office Drawer 14079

Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4079

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(850) 222-2920: Telephone

(850) 224-0034: Facsimile

Counsel for Defendants 

CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT

Pursuant to Local Rules 5.1 and 7.1, undersigned counsel certifies that this 

motion consists of 4,203 words and is typed in Times New Roman, font size 14.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been 

electronically filed via the CM/ECF system which will send electronic notification to 

all counsel of record on this 21st day of June 2024.

/s/ Miriam R. Coles

ATTORNEY

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