United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on African 

Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, 

U.S. Senate 

April 2004 FOREIGN 

ASSISTANCE 

U.S. Anticorruption 

Programs in 

Sub-Saharan Africa 

Will Require Time and 

Commitment 

GAO-04-506 

a
Highlights of GAO-04-506, a report to the 

Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, 

Subcommittee on African Affairs, 

Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 

Senate 

In October 2000, Congress passed 

the International Anticorruption 

and Good Governance Act (P.L. 

106-309). The purpose of this 

legislation is to promote good 

governance by helping other 

countries combat corruption and 

improve government transparency 

and accountability. U.S. agencies 

spent about $33 million per year in 

fiscal years 2001–2002 providing 

anticorruption assistance to 22 subSaharan African countries. The U.S. 

Agency for International 

Development (USAID) provided 

the majority of this assistance, 

along with the Departments of the 

Treasury, Justice, Commerce, and 

State. 

To help Congress oversee 

management of anticorruption 

programs in sub-Saharan Africa, 

GAO was asked to examine (1) 

what is known about the extent of 

corruption in the region, (2) the 

factors that give rise to corruption 

in this region, (3) the 

anticorruption assistance U.S. 

agencies have provided, and (4) the 

lessons about anticorruption 

assistance that U.S. agencies and 

other international organizations 

have learned. 

USAID provided written comments 

on a draft of this report and the 

Departments of the Treasury, 

Justice, and State provided 

informal comments. These 

agencies generally agreed with our 

presentation of the issues and 

conclusions. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-506. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David Gootnick 

at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. 

April 2004 

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 

U.S. Anticorruption Programs in SubSaharan Africa Will Require Time and 

Commitment 

Indexes, surveys, and studies indicate that corruption in sub-Saharan Africa 

is pervasive, but assessing it is inherently difficult. Indexes published by the 

World Bank Institute and Transparency International have limitations; for 

example, both focus on perceptions of corruption, and both recognize their 

measures to be imprecise. Regional surveys indicate that many businesses 

are affected by corruption, although perceptions of corruption levels vary 

among countries (see figure). According to country-level surveys and other 

information, households view corruption as rooted in the police, judicial 

system, and health services, although perceptions of the most and least 

corrupt institutions vary by country. 

Sub-Saharan African countries share some fundamental challenges that can 

give rise to corruption. According to studies and U.S. agency officials, these 

challenges include low civil service salaries, a lack of transparency and 

accountability in government operations, ineffective legal frameworks and 

law enforcement, weak judicial systems, and tolerant public attitudes. 

U.S. anticorruption programs cover a range of issues. Funding for these 

programs represented about 2.4 percent of U.S. assistance to sub-Saharan 

Africa in fiscal years 2001–2002. The programs have focused on supporting 

civil society; encouraging legal, judicial, and regulatory reform; privatizing 

government functions; enhancing government accountability; supporting 

elections; establishing anticorruption agencies; and providing law 

enforcement assistance. However, U.S. legislative restrictions on foreign law 

enforcement assistance limited agencies’ activities in this area. These 

programs are relatively new and early evaluations and our analysis suggest 

prospects for sustainability are unclear. 

Lessons learned from anticorruption efforts include the importance of (1) 

political will from public and private leaders; (2) widespread public support; 

(3) programs tailored to country conditions; (4) multipronged efforts that 

incorporate prevention, education, and law enforcement; (5) access to 

government information; and (6) time and commitment to address the 

difficult nature of these problems. 

Businesses Reporting That Bribes Are Essential to “Get Things Done” in Sub-Saharan 

Africa, All of Africa, and the World 
Contents 

Letter 1 

Results in Brief 2 

Background 4 

Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa Is Pervasive but Difficult to 

Measure 6 

Sub-Saharan African Countries Share Some Underlying Factors That 

Give Rise to Corruption 11 

U.S. Anticorruption Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa Were Broadly 

Integrated and Received Limited Funding 14 

Anticorruption Efforts Have Identified Some Lessons Learned 32 

Conclusions 34 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34 

Appendixes 

Appendix I: 

Appendix II: 

Appendix III: 

Appendix IV: 

Appendix V: 

Appendix VI: 

Appendix VII: 

Scope and Methodology 36 

International Agreements Addressing Corruption in

Sub-Saharan Africa 38 

Characteristics of WBI and TI Corruption Indexes 41 

Analysis of Corruption and Economic Development 44 

World Business Environment Survey 51 

Comments from USAID 56 

GAO Comments 63 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 64 

GAO Contact 64 

Staff Acknowledgments 64 

Bibliography 

Tables Table 1: Characteristics of the WBI and TI Corruption Indexes 42 

Table 2: Correlation between 2002 WBI Index and Selected 

Development Indicators 45 

Table 3: Summary of Regression Analysis Using 2002 WBI 

Index 47 

Figures Figure 1: 2002 WBI Corruption Index Rankings for 47 Sub-Saharan 

African Countries 7 

Page i GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 

65 
Contents

Figure 2: 2003 TI Corruption Perception Index Rankings for 24 

Sub-Saharan African Countries 8 

Figure 3: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 

Responding “Always, Usually, or Frequently” to WBES 

Statement “It Is Common for Firms in My Line of Business 

to Have to Pay Some Irregular ‘Additional Payments’ to 

Get Things Done” 10 

Figure 4: Annual Averages of U.S. Anticorruption Assistance to 

Sub-Saharan Africa, Fiscal Years 2001–2002 16 

Figure 5: Sub-Saharan African Countries or Programs Receiving 

U.S. Anticorruption Assistance in Excess of $1 Million, 

Fiscal Years 2001-2002 17 

Figure 6: U.S. Anticorruption Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 

Fiscal Years 2001–2002 22 

Figure 7: Relation of WBI Index to Percentage of Population with 

Access to Improved Drinking Water Sources 50 

Figure 8: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 

Responding “Moderate or Major Obstacle” to WBES 

Question “How Problematic Has Corruption Been for the 

Operation and Growth of Your Business?” 52 

Figure 9: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 

Responding “Always, Usually, or Frequently” to WBES 

Question “Do Firms Like Yours Typically Need to Make 

Extra, Unofficial Payments to Gain Government 

Contracts?” 53 

Figure 10: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 

Responding “Never, Seldom, or Sometimes” to WBES 

Question “How Often Do You Associate ‘Honest/ 

Uncorrupt’ as Description of the Court System in 

Resolving Business Disputes?” 54 

Figure 11: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 

Responding “Minor, Moderate, or Major Obstacle” to 

WBES Question “To What Extent Has Corruption of Bank 

Officials Had an Impact on Your Business?” 55 

Page ii GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 
Contents

Abbreviations

AU African Union 

BPE Bureau of Public Enterprises 

FCPA Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 

ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program 

IDA International Development Association 

INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

MCA Millennium Challenge Account 

NGO nongovernmental organization 

NSC National Security Council 

OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 

OPDAT Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and 

Training 

SADC Southern African Development Community 

TI Transparency International 

UN United Nations 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

WBES World Business Environment Survey 

WBI World Bank Institute 

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Page iii GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 
Page 1 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 

A

United States General Accounting Office 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

April 26, 2004 

The Honorable Lamar Alexander 

Chairman 

The Honorable Russell D. Feingold 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on African Affairs 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

United States Senate 

In Africa, the world’s poorest continent, high levels of corruption hinder 

economic and political development, diverting funds that could be used for 

education, investment, and public infrastructure. Corruption—the misuse 

of public office for private gain—is perpetrated by government officials 

engaging in embezzlement and nepotism; it can also take place between 

public officials and private citizens in the form of bribery, extortion, 

influence peddling, and fraud. Corruption varies in scale: grand corruption 

involves the loss of large amounts of money at high levels of government, 

while petty corruption involves the payment of small amounts of money for 

favors or preferences. 

In October 2000, Congress passed the International Anticorruption and 

Good Governance Act.

1

 The purpose of this legislation is to ensure that U.S. 

anticorruption assistance programs promote good governance by helping 

other countries to combat corruption throughout society and to improve 

transparency and accountability at all levels of government and throughout 

the private sector. The legislation established anticorruption as one of five 

major U.S. foreign policy goals but did not provide new funding for 

anticorruption initiatives. The recently initiated Millennium Challenge 

Account (MCA) assistance program proposes to reward good governance 

and to use a measure of corruption as a key indicator of a country’s 

eligibility for assistance. The MCA initiative, funded at $1 billion in fiscal 

year 2004 with significant increases proposed by fiscal year 2006, has 

increased interest in country eligibility for these funds, the steps that subSaharan African governments have taken to address corruption, and U.S. 

efforts to assist these nations. In response to your request that we review 

U.S. anticorruption assistance to sub-Saharan Africa, this report examines 

(1) what is known about the extent of corruption in sub-Saharan African 

countries, (2) the factors that give rise to corruption in this region, (3) the 

1

P.L. 106-309, Title II. 

Page 1 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 
anticorruption assistance that U.S. agencies have provided to these 

countries, and (4) the lessons about anticorruption assistance that U.S. 

agencies and other international organizations have learned. 

To address these issues, we analyzed data on corruption compiled by the 

World Bank Institute (WBI) and the nongovernmental organization 

Transparency International (TI). We also analyzed country-level surveys 

and studies focused on corruption and governance in the region. We 

reviewed documents and interviewed key officials from the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) and the Departments of the Treasury, 

Justice, Commerce, and State, and we examined the results of a recent 

USAID survey of its anticorruption programs in fiscal years 2001–2002. In 

addition, we analyzed program documents from the six countries in subSaharan Africa—Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia, and 

Benin—in which the U.S. government undertakes the largest 

anticorruption programs, and we obtained more detailed information from 

the USAID missions in these countries. We obtained perspectives on 

multilateral efforts and country-level programs from officials of the World 

Bank and the UN Development Program. In addition, we visited Nigeria and 

Mozambique to meet with U.S. and host government officials, other donors, 

and representatives from civil society to review past and ongoing 

anticorruption efforts there. We conducted our review from March 2003 to 

March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. (See app. I for additional information on our scope and 

methodology.) 

Results in Brief Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is widespread, but measuring its extent is 

inherently challenging. The WBI and TI indexes rank many sub-Saharan 

African nations among the most corrupt worldwide; however, both indexes 

assess perceptions rather than actual incidences of corruption, and both 

institutions recognize that these indexes are imprecise. In addition, we 

found no statistically significant differences in corruption scores between 

countries that are closely ranked in the indexes. Regional surveys indicate 

that many businesses are affected by corruption, although perceptions of 

corruption levels vary among countries. According to country-level surveys 

and other information sources, households see corruption as rooted in 

police, the judicial system, and health services, although perceptions of the 

most and least corrupt institutions vary among countries. 

Several factors in sub-Saharan Africa give rise to corruption. First, low civil 

service salaries often lead employees to solicit bribes or embezzle funds. In 

Page 2 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 
addition, a lack of transparency and accountability in government 

operations creates opportunities for corruption. Also, ineffective legal 

frameworks and weak enforcement of laws impede attempts to investigate 

and prosecute corruption. Further, most of the countries lack an effective 

judicial system to prosecute and sanction corrupt officials. Finally, public 

tolerance of corruption is common and, in some countries, corruption is 

expected. 

The United States has taken a broad approach to addressing corruption in 

sub-Saharan Africa. Funding for U.S. anticorruption programs developed 

by USAID, as well as the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, Commerce 

and State, represented about 2.4 percent of U.S. assistance to the region in 

fiscal years 2001–2002. In general, these programs have addressed 

corruption directly or indirectly by working to create an environment not 

conducive to corruption. Although USAID lacks a strategic plan for its 

anticorruption efforts, it has coordinated its programs through an internal 

working group. Interagency coordination has been led by the National 

Security Council and the Department of State (State). U.S. anticorruption 

assistance has focused on developing civil society programs; encouraging 

legal, judicial, and regulatory reform; privatizing government functions; 

enhancing government accountability; supporting elections; establishing 

anticorruption agencies; and providing law enforcement assistance. 

However, law enforcement assistance has been limited by legislative 

restrictions on the use of foreign assistance funds for training and financial 

support of police or other foreign law enforcement entities. Finally, USAID 

has conducted a limited number of evaluations of anticorruption programs 

in the region and has found unclear results and objectives. These early 

evaluations and our work suggest that programs are relatively new and 

prospects for sustainability are unclear. 

Anticorruption efforts have produced some lessons learned about the 

conditions and components necessary for programs to succeed. First, 

political will and commitment from a country’s leadership are essential. 

Second, widespread public support is necessary. Third, the programs must 

be tailored to each country’s unique historical and economic conditions. 

Fourth, programs should take a multipronged approach emphasizing 

prevention, education, and law enforcement. Fifth, transparency and public 

access to information are important to ensure adequate oversight of 

government. Finally, because corruption cannot be eradicated quickly and 

simply, anticorruption efforts require long-term commitment to gain public 

confidence. 

Page 3 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 
USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report and the 

Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and State provided informal 

comments. These agencies generally agreed with our presentation of the 

issues and conclusions. We were also provided technical comments from 

the World Bank Institute that were discussed with officials and included in 

this report where appropriate. 

Background International donors believe that corruption is a challenge to political 

stability, hampers sustainable growth, distorts prices, undermines legal and 

judicial systems, and prevents public services from reaching those most in 

need. At its worst, poor governance and corruption also help create the 

economic and social conditions that can lead to disillusionment and 

nurture fanaticism, according to State. 

Sub-Saharan Africa contains multiple examples of alleged corruption, 

particularly in nations with extractive industries such as oil, natural gas, 

and precious gems. For example, a Nigerian case of grand corruption 

involved a former military ruler, Sani Abacha, who, according to press 

accounts, is alleged to have transferred tens of billions of dollars out of the 

country during his 1993-1998 rule.

2

 In Angola, government mismanagement 

of oil revenue was reported in the press to have resulted in the 

disappearance of $4.2 billion between 1997 and 2002. In Benin, the Minister 

of Finance estimated in 2001 that $68 million is lost to corruption every 3 

years. Petty or administrative corruption, involving lesser amounts of 

money, has also been shown to affect the poor adversely by increasing the 

price of, and restricting access to, public services. For example, the poor in 

Sierra Leone pay a disproportionately higher percentage of their incomes 

on bribes for health, education, and courts than do wealthier citizens, 

according to recent analysis by the government of Sierra Leone. A 2003 

Nigerian government study described the “10 percent syndrome,” a 10 

percent unofficial “tax” paid to public servants to ensure that they perform 

their official functions.3 

Concern that corruption impedes development in Africa and other regions 

began to emerge among donor nations and multilateral organizations in the 

2

Nambibian.com (July 7, 2000). 

3

Government of Nigeria, Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Study (Abuja, Nigeria: 

2003). 

Page 4 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 
mid-1990s. Previously, government corruption in the region was often 

considered a taboo subject in U.S. bilateral and multilateral discussions, 

according to USAID officials. The creation of international 

nongovernmental organizations concerned with transparency increased 

awareness about the insidious impact of government corruption. 

International efforts to address corruption began in the mid-1990s. (App. II 

contains additional information on international and regional agreements 

addressing corruption.) 

U.S. anticorruption efforts in sub-Saharan Africa began with a few efforts 

between the 1960s and 1980s with USAID’s government reform programs in 

Liberia, the Sahel Region, and Niger. During the mid-1990s, building on 

“windows of opportunity,” USAID began incorporating anticorruption 

activities into new and existing programs and, since 2000, USAID’s 

programs promoting transparency have evolved to include surveys, media 

campaigns, anticorruption commissions, and support for host government 

legislatures. According to USAID officials, its assessment of political will is 

a critical element on which it bases country programming decisions. In 

addition, the Departments of the Treasury, Justice, Commerce, and State 

have provided specialized legal, law enforcement, and financial assistance 

that include anticorruption elements. 

To assess corruption, researchers and policy analysts have developed 

broad indexes, conducted regional or sectoral surveys, and undertaken 

country-level surveys and studies. WBI and TI publish two well-known 

indexes that gauge perceived corruption. The WBI index is one of 16 

performance indicators that will be used to determine eligibility to apply 

for funds from the newly established MCA. To be eligible for MCA 

assistance in 2004, countries must rank above the median in relation to the 

pool of candidate countries4 on at least half of the indicators in each of the 

three policy categories—ruling justly, encouraging economic freedom, and 

investing in people—and be ranked in the top half of the WBI index. In 

addition, countries must have inflation rates under 20 percent. The MCA 

board may also consider data from the TI Corruption Perception Index and 

the Department of State’s Human Rights Report in assessing just and 

democratic governance. 

4

For fiscal year 2004, the candidate pool of countries must be (1) eligible for assistance from 

the International Development Association (IDA), (2) have a per capital income equal to or 

less than $1,415, and (3) not be subject to legal provisions that prohibit them from receiving 

U.S. economic assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act. These criteria are expected to 

change in future years. 

Page 5 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 
Corruption in Sub- Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa is perceived to be widespread, but 

measures are imprecise. The WBI and TI indexes measure perceptions of Saharan Africa Is corruption rather than actual incidences. Regional business surveys also 

Pervasive but Difficult indicate that high levels of corruption affect business development, 

to Measure although perceptions of corruption’s effect vary. Country-level surveys and 

studies show that, while some perceptions of corruption are similar among 

countries, generalizing about its causes and incidence is difficult. 

Broad Indexes Show 

Extensive Corruption but 

Have Weaknesses 

The WBI and TI indexes show high levels of corruption in sub-Saharan 

Africa: in its 2002 index, the WBI index ranked 36 of the 47 sub-Saharan 

African countries it surveyed below the worldwide median, and 22 of these 

countries in the bottom 25th percentile (see fig. 1). The TI index ranked 20 

of 24 sub-Saharan African countries it surveyed in the bottom half of its 

index (see fig. 2). However, both indexes gauge survey respondents’ 

perceptions of corruption rather than directly measuring the incidence of 

corruption, and both recognize their measures of corruption to be 

imprecise (see app. III for further details). We identified the following 

additional limitations: 

• In the WBI and TI indexes, individual country measures of corruption 

are associated with a range of uncertainty or confidence interval 

(depicted by the vertical lines in figs. 1 and 2). No statistically significant 

differences in relative country corruption rankings may exist when 

vertical lines overlap, as is the case for many low-income sub-Saharan 

African countries, because country scores with overlapping 

measurement errors cannot be differentiated.5 

• Fifty percent (median) of the 195 countries ranked by the WBI index 

have corruption scores of –0.25 or higher. As figure 1 shows, 11 subSaharan African countries’ (23 percent) have corruption scores above 

the worldwide median, while 36 (77 percent) sub-Saharan African 

countries have scores below the worldwide median. However, when 

measurement error is taken into consideration, only 6 countries have 

corruption scores that are significantly above the median (at 90 percent 

statistical confidence). Twenty-four countries have scores statistically 

below the median, and 17 countries have scores that do not differ 

statistically from the median. Therefore, the 6 sub-Saharan Africa 

5

WBI staff and others also identified this limitation. 

Page 6 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa 
Page 7 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

countries that have scores statistically above the WBI median can 

clearly be differentiated from the 24 counties that have scores 

statistically below the median. 

Figure 1: 2002 WBI Corruption Index Rankings for 47 Sub-Saharan African Countries 

Note: For each country, the vertical line indicates a 90 percent confidence interval around its estimated 

corruption score. The index ranges from 2.5 (low corruption) to –2.5 (high corruption). Country 

corruption scores are not statistically different when confidence intervals overlap. The horizontal lines 

separate the 195 countries, ranked by WBI, into quartiles, each containing approximately 49 countries.
Page 8 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 2: 2003 TI Corruption Perception Index Rankings for 24 Sub-Saharan African Countries

Note: For each country, the vertical line indicates a 90 percent confidence interval around its estimated 

corruption score. The index ranges from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt). Country corruption 

scores are not statistically different when confidence intervals overlap. The horizontal lines separate 

the 133 countries in the TI index into quartiles, each containing approximately 33 countries.

• In the WBI index, a statistically significant association exists between 

levels of corruption and selected development indicators when all 

countries are considered together.6

 In general, higher levels of 

corruption are associated with lower development outcomes. However, 

when we analyzed the countries’ data by income level (low, middle, and 

high, as defined by the World Bank), we found a statistically significant 

6

These indicators include 12 Millennium Development indicators, as well as five key 

performance indicators. 
Page 9 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

association for far fewer of the indicators than when we considered all 

of the countries together. (See app. IV for more details of our analysis.) 

In this context, a senior World Bank official working on corruption has 

observed that although the WBI and TI indexes are useful as a broad gauge 

of corruption, they are not intended to guide specific program or policy 

decisions.7

Regional Business Surveys 

Show Negative Effects, 

Varying Perceptions of 

Corruption

Regional and sectoral survey instruments that measure governance, the 

business environment, and corruption are often used to gain insight into 

corruption in economic sectors and geographic regions. One of the more 

comprehensive surveys is the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 

(see app. V for more information).8

 WBES results indicate that high levels 

of corruption negatively affect business development in sub-Saharan 

Africa. However, the perceived effect of corruption varies among countries. 

In addition, the WBES report noted that the response rates for the African 

countries, and for questions on corruption, are relatively low. Because of 

the response rates and the numbers of respondents, differences between 

some countries may not be significant.

The WBES reported that about 64 percent of businesses it surveyed in 16 

sub-Saharan African countries considered corruption to be a serious 

constraint. This compares with 17 percent of businesses surveyed in OECD 

countries and approximately half of businesses worldwide. The survey also 

found that, on average, more than half of businesses operating in subSaharan Africa believe that irregular payments are essential to “get things 

done” (see fig. 3). Specifically, nearly 70 percent or more of businesses in 

Nigeria, Tanzania, Madagascar, and Uganda reported this belief, compared 

with less than 25 percent in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia. In 

addition, Madagascar, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria had the highest 

percentage of businesses stating that unofficial payments are required to 

gain government contracts. (See app. V for additional analysis of WBES 

data.)

7

D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi, Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators 

for 1996-2002 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Institute, 2003).

8

The WBES queried 10,032 businesses in 81 countries, including 1,629 in 16 African 

countries in 1999 and 2000.
Page 10 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 3: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries Responding “Always, Usually, or Frequently” to WBES Statement “It 

Is Common for Firms in My Line of Business to Have to Pay Some Irregular ‘Additional Payments’ to Get Things Done”

Notes: Response options were “always,” “usually,” “frequently,” “sometimes,” “seldom,” and “never.”

Figures in parentheses are the number of firms that responded in each country.

Country-Level Surveys and 

Studies Show That 

Corruption Is Seen as 

Rooted in Public 

Institutions 

Country-level public perception surveys and corruption studies play an 

important role in providing information about the nature, magnitude, and 

location of corruption within a country (see the bibliography for a list of 

the surveys and studies we reviewed). These sources suggest that 

households in most of the countries we reviewed see corruption as rooted 

in institutions that have the greatest contact with the public, namely the 
Page 11 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

police, the judicial system, and health services.9 For example, police 

corruption is considered to be a serious problem in Nigeria, South Africa, 

Zambia, Mozambique, and Uganda. However, the institutions considered 

least corrupt varied considerably. In Zambia, commercial banks and 

anticorruption commissions are considered to be least corrupt, whereas in 

Uganda, local councils and primary schools are considered least corrupt. In 

addition, for some countries, the data suggest a gap between personal 

experiences with corruption and perceptions of corruption. For example, a 

2001 household survey in South Africa found that although 11 percent of 

those surveyed had direct experience with corruption, 41 percent of 

respondents perceived it to be one of the country’s most important 

problems. 

Sub-Saharan African 

Countries Share Some 

Underlying Factors 

That Give Rise to 

Corruption

Although it is difficult to generalize about corruption in sub-Saharan Africa, 

the six countries we reviewed share some factors that are perceived to give 

rise to corruption. These include (1) low civil service salaries, (2) a lack of 

transparency and accountability, (3) ineffective legal frameworks, (4) an 

ineffective judicial system, and (5) tolerant attitudes and lack of public 

awareness about the costs and consequences of corruption.

Low Civil Service Pay 

Contributes to Corruption

In the countries we examined, low and untimely payment of salaries was 

cited as a significant and leading root cause of corruption. To augment their 

incomes, civil servants may solicit bribes, embezzle funds, or engage in a 

second job or private business during government working hours. In a 2003 

Ugandan survey, 51 percent of the respondents identified low civil service 

salaries as a main cause of corruption. The same study quoted one 

respondent asking rhetorically, “How can one refuse $257 to allow a 

prisoner to escape when one is earning only $97 per month?” According to 

analysts in Uganda, corruption in the magistrate courts is attributed in part 

to low salaries for court clerks and registers who seek extra payments to 

expedite cases. A 2003 Nigerian corruption and governance survey ranked 

the police as the most corrupt institution in the country. A U.S. official 

stated that one of the root causes of police corruption in Nigeria is that 

9

In five of the countries that we reviewed—Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, and 

Zambia—some level of survey or assessment was conducted in the past 5 years. No 

assessment or survey was conducted in the sixth country, Benin, despite the presence of 

ongoing U.S. anticorruption programs.
Page 12 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

police often do not receive their full salaries or per diems for months at a 

time. In addition, a 2003 TI study states that in Zambia, the police live in 

very poor accommodations, lack basic facilities such as sanitation, water, 

and electricity, and earn $25 to $63 per month. While country-level studies 

and surveys consistently cite low civil service wages as a major cause of 

corruption, USAID officials and studies by other donors state that 

increasing civil service pay does not necessarily reduce corruption. They 

suggest that wage increases must be accompanied with other reforms to be 

effective. 

Lack of Transparency and 

Accountability Increases 

Corruption Opportunities

Surveys, studies, and donor documents all cited lack of transparency and 

accountability in government systems, including procurement and budget, 

as creating considerable opportunities for corruption in the countries we 

reviewed. According to the 2003 Nigerian corruption survey, the struggle to 

secure government contracts is intense, and public officers involved in the 

process are often tempted to interfere with the process to their own 

advantage. The same study reported that 30 percent of firms pay between 6 

and 10 percent of a contract’s value to cover kickbacks for patrons in 

Nigeria. While the assessment affirms that public procurement in Nigeria 

has been considered a significant problem, according to a government 

official we interviewed in 2003, the government has made recent efforts to 

increase the credibility of the process by streamlining it to include widely 

advertised tenders and making timely and rational decisions. 

Legal Frameworks Fail to 

Address Corruption 

Adequately

Weak legal frameworks also hinder attempts to investigate and prosecute 

corruption. Although anticorruption laws exist in all of the six countries 

that we reviewed, in many cases, these laws do not address important areas 

of concern or they have been weakened by legal challenges. According to 

USAID officials, in Mozambique, the government recently passed an 

anticorruption law that requires government decision-making officials to 

declare their assets, offers whistleblower protection, imposes sentences 

for government officials requesting bribes, and mandates fines for auditors 

who do not inform the anticorruption unit of corrupt practices they may 

uncover. While this law is a move toward international best legal practices 

for combating corruption, it does not allow undercover operations and 

procedures such as plea bargaining in corruption investigations; nor 

increase penalties for corrupt officials; or require that all civil servants 

publicly disclose assets. 
Page 13 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

According to U.N. documents, South Africa’s 2002 Prevention of 

Corruption Bill establishes legal frameworks to address corruption that are 

modeled on international best practices. Prior to this legislation, however, 

it was very difficult to prosecute individuals, because South Africa’s 

previous 1992 Corruption Act abolished the common law crime of bribery 

and made it difficult to fulfill the evidence requirements for prosecution of 

corruption. In Nigeria, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other 

Related Offenses Act of 2000 is considered to be based on best practices; 

however, it has been weakened by numerous legal challenges from the 

courts and National Assembly, particularly regarding the anticorruption 

agency’s mandate.

Ineffective Judicial Systems 

Hamper Prosecution of 

Corrupt Officials

Most of the countries that we reviewed also lack an effective system for 

publicly prosecuting or sanctioning corrupt officials. Corruption in the 

judiciary, combined with other weaknesses such as poor legal training, an 

insufficient number of prosecutors, limited resources, and weak 

enforcement of laws impedes attempts to investigate and prosecute 

corruption cases and results in considerable delays in prosecuting such 

cases. In Zambia, a 2003 survey suggested that, by not prosecuting and 

convicting public officials for corrupt practices, governments demonstrate 

a lack of political will to address corruption. For example, a 2003 South 

African study reports that long court delays and a high rate of withdrawal 

of cases have conveyed the message that corrupt officials can act with 

impunity. 

According to a 2000 USAID governance study in Uganda, from 1996 to 2001, 

only 10 of the 16,361 new corruption-related cases handled by the Inspector 

General of the Government from 1996 to 2001 resulted in convictions. In 

Mozambique, data provided by USAID indicate that during a 12-month 

period that ended in October 2003, the anticorruption unit based in the 

Attorney General’s office investigated 116 cases and convicted three 

individuals. According to a USAID official, corruption charges in 

Mozambique have been particularly difficult to prosecute owing to 

resistance by the court.

Public Tolerance of 

Corruption Is Common

According to government officials, corruption assessments, and donor 

documents, public acceptance or tolerance of corruption is common in 

many of the countries that we reviewed. While the public generally 

perceives corruption to have a negative impact on society, in some 

countries, people have become accustomed to it. For example, although 
Page 14 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

both the WBI and TI indexes rank South Africa’s corruption level as 

relatively low, a 2003 study by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime found that 

corruption in that country has become a part of the “national psyche.” In 

addition, other documents state that corruption is often tolerated in certain 

forms, such as nepotism: in many African countries, it is expected that 

those in a position to help family or tribal members and other associates 

will do so by providing jobs, contracts, or other opportunities. In Zambia, a 

2003 TI study states that the widespread public acceptance of corruption is 

one of its main causes. 

A 2000 USAID assessment of democracy and governance in Uganda states 

that the public commonly expects that people in power will take advantage 

of their positions. Another recent study in Uganda reported that 39 percent 

of the respondents agreed with the following statement: “It is acceptable to 

bend the law as long as one does not break it.” In addition, the head of 

Nigeria’s anticorruption commission told us that the level of corruption in 

the country had led to a change in the nation’s moral fabric, so that it is 

considered acceptable to use one’s position to increase his or her income. 

U.S. Anticorruption 

Programs in SubSaharan Africa Were 

Broadly Integrated and 

Received Limited 

Funding 

The United States has taken a broad approach to addressing corruption in 

sub-Saharan Africa. Funding for U.S. anticorruption programs represented 

about 2.4 percent of U.S. assistance to the region in fiscal years 2001–2002. 

In general, these programs have addressed corruption both directly and 

indirectly by working to create an environment not conducive to 

corruption. U.S. agencies’ anticorruption assistance has been coordinated 

formally and informally and has included a wide range of programs. 

However, U.S. law enforcement assistance programs have been limited by 

legislative restrictions. Few U.S. anticorruption programs have been 

evaluated, often only as components of larger programs. 
Page 15 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

U.S. Programs in SubSaharan Africa Received 

Limited Funding

In fiscal years 2001–2002, U.S. funding for anticorruption assistance to subSaharan Africa averaged about $33 million per year,10 a small portion of the 

more than $1.4 billion in average annual U.S. assistance to the region. 

Programs were implemented by USAID and the Departments of the 

Treasury, Justice, Commerce, and State, with USAID’s programs 

accounting for about 84 percent of the funding (see fig. 4). U.S. programs 

operated in 22 countries, with budgets ranging from $50,000 to $7.6 million. 

The largest programs were in Nigeria and South Africa, with reported 

annual funding of $7.6 million and $3.9 million, respectively. Ten countries, 

plus regional programs, each were reported to have received more than $1 

million in anticorruption assistance (see fig. 5).11 USAID’s civil society 

programs constituted the largest number of the agency’s anticorruption 

programs, with average annual funding of nearly $6.7 million in fiscal years 

2001–2002. As shown in figure 6, there are a wide range of anticorruption 

programs in the region, many of which receive relatively small amounts of 

funding. Decisions about programming are made by the U.S. personnel 

working in the region. 

10A 2003 USAID inventory of its fiscal years 2001–2002 global anticorruption programs 

requested missions to estimate the portion of programs that were related to anticorruption 

activities. The Department of State provided funding data for anticorruption projects and 

diplomacy for fiscal years 2001-2002. The program funding data we obtained for the 

Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and Commerce did not indicate which parts of the 

agencies’ programs were tied to anticorruption objectives. 

11In the following 12 countries, the average annual amount of annual anticorruption 

assistance was less than $1 million: Mali, Angola, Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo, 

Malawi, Rwanda, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Chad, Guinea, and Botswana. 
Page 16 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 4: Annual Averages of U.S. Anticorruption Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa, 

Fiscal Years 2001–2002
Page 17 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 5: Sub-Saharan African Countries or Programs Receiving U.S. Anticorruption 

Assistance in Excess of $1 Million, Fiscal Years 2001-2002 

In June 2003, USAID’s Africa Bureau established a $7.5 million annual 

anticorruption initiative to fund new anticorruption programs proposed by 

USAID missions that were reviewed and selected by Washington 

headquarters staff. USAID anticipates that this initiative will allow it to 

pilot innovative approaches that will contribute to an emerging set of best 

practices for improving transparency and accountability in Africa. USAID 

also expects this initiative to capitalize on what the agency considers its 

comparative advantage within the development community—having staff 

in countries to work on developing civil society organizations to advocate 
Page 18 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

for, monitor, and help sustain anticorruption efforts. According to a USAID 

official, nine countries received funding from this initiative in 2003.12

U.S. Agencies Addressed 

Corruption Directly and 

Indirectly

The United States pursues a mix of programmatic and diplomatic efforts to 

address anticorruption goals. U.S. anticorruption programs developed in 

sub-Saharan Africa were intended to address corruption both directly and 

indirectly. According to USAID anticorruption specialists, USAID programs 

directly addressed corruption through work with civil society to promote 

advocacy, legislative initiatives to promote transparency and 

accountability, support for supreme audit agencies, and work with 

anticorruption commissions. The agency indirectly addressed corruption 

by supporting elections and privatization. (The direct and indirect 

approaches sometimes overlap, however, and certain programs such as the 

drafting of legislation may fall into either category depending on the 

program’s focus.)

The Department of State has promoted efforts considered to directly 

address corruption by negotiating international agreements to establish 

legal frameworks to combat corruption13 and supporting the participation 

of African representatives in developing such agreements. In addition, 

State has addressed corruption indirectly through its public diplomacy 

programs in the region, which included presentations and conferences to 

local officials on corruption and related issues such as privatization and 

investigative reporting. 

The Department of Justice, with funding from State and USAID, has 

indirectly addressed corruption by providing law enforcement assistance 

through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

Program (ICITAP) and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development 

Assistance and Training (OPDAT). ICITAP provides technical advice, 

training, mentoring, equipment donations, and internships with model 

criminal justice organizations to enhance the capabilities of police 

organizations in emerging democracies. OPDAT develops and implements 

criminal law assistance programs to enhance the ability of selected foreign 

12These countries include Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, 

Tanzania, Zambia, and Nigeria. 

13See appendix II for a description of key international anticorruption agreements that relate 

to sub-Saharan Africa.
Page 19 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

countries to investigate and prosecute criminal offenses effectively and 

cooperate with the United States more fully in combating transnational 

crime. 

Other U.S. efforts to address corruption indirectly have included the 

Department of the Treasury’s provision of advisers from the Office of 

Technical Assistance to assist with debt and financial management, budget 

transparency, tax systems, and financial crimes. In addition, the 

Department of Commerce provided training and consultation to local 

lawmakers and lawyers to evaluate, revise, and implement laws related to 

investment and trade, focused on Nigeria and Angola as well as West Africa 

and Southern Africa regional programs. 

U.S. Programs Lack a 

Comprehensive 

Anticorruption Strategy 

USAID has conducted its anticorruption activities in sub-Saharan Africa to 

date without the benefit of a comprehensive strategy and has relied on 

mission program strategies that have sometimes included anticorruption 

objectives. USAID anticorruption programs are generally developed at its 

missions. In 2003, the Africa Bureau prepared an Africa Anti-Corruption 

Initiative for anticorruption programs that are proposed by the missions 

and selected by Washington headquarters staff. USAID said it would 

develop performance monitoring plans to evaluate performance, record 

results, and formulate lessons learned for the programs that will be funded 

under this initiative. 

USAID’s Inspector General, reporting on the agency’s worldwide 

anticorruption efforts in 1998, found that its anticorruption activities in 

Africa were less developed than in other geographic regions.14 The report 

recommended that USAID set program priorities and performance 

measures in order to develop a strategy for implementing its anticorruption 

programs. Since 1998, USAID has issued a number of resource documents, 

a handbook, and an analysis of its worldwide anticorruption work that 

identified how the agency has approached anticorruption activities. 

However, 5 years after the Inspector General’s report, USAID still lacks a 

comprehensive strategy for all anticorruption assistance, although we were 

told in March 2004 that a draft strategy was prepared and being reviewed. 

USAID officials stated that the agency has nearly completed its review of 

14U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the 

Status of USAID’s Anti-Corruption Efforts in Assisted Countries, 9-000-98-002-P 

(Washington, D.C.: 1998).
Page 20 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

the draft strategy, which will then be provided to other U.S. agencies and 

implementing partners for comment. USAID officials said they expected 

the strategy to be issued later this year.

Coordination of U.S. 

Anticorruption Assistance 

Has Been Both Formal and 

Informal 

Coordination of U.S. anticorruption assistance has been both formal and 

informal and has been conducted in various forums that included 

coordination (1) in USAID headquarters, (2) between U.S. agencies in 

Washington, (3) between U.S. agencies at the missions, and (4) between 

U.S. agencies and other donors in the field.

Since 1998, USAID has convened an informal headquarters working group 

on corruption issues that is open to all of its bureaus. Representatives of 

State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 

(INL) and USAID’s Office of the Inspector General have participated in 

these meetings. 

Since 2002, interagency coordination in Washington has been conducted by 

the National Security Council (NSC) and the Department of State through 

ad hoc interagency meetings, according to Department of State and USAID 

officials. Prior to September 2001, interagency anticorruption coordination 

was linked to democracy development and counterterrorism. According to 

State officials, in 2002, the NSC directed INL to survey how foreign 

governments and assistance programs were addressing corruption. 

However, this effort was never completed. In 2003, State coordinated 

interagency support for a U.S. anticorruption initiative focused on budget 

transparency that was adopted by the Group of Eight (G8) at its June 2003 

meeting.15 This initiative was intended to mobilize G8 countries’ efforts to 

fight corruption and mismanagement of public resources. 

According to USAID, interagency coordination at missions has involved 

interagency committees to coordinate policy concerning anticorruption or 

related programs. However, since anticorruption programs in sub-Saharan 

Africa are limited, and the majority are implemented by USAID, the need 

for interagency coordination is also limited. USAID officials reported 

generally good coordination between the embassies and USAID missions 

on anticorruption programs and objectives and that Ambassadors often 

15Group of Eight, Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency: A G8 Action Plan, 

http://www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/fighting_cor

ruption_and_improving_transparency_-_a_g8_declaration.html.
Page 21 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

paid close attention to anticorruption programs. Further, USAID’s 

programs are subject to a formal State approval as part of the embassy’s 

Mission Policy Plan. 

In the countries we visited, we observed that U.S. agencies use various 

means, as follows, to coordinate their anticorruption activities among 

themselves and with other donors. 

• In Nigeria, USAID and the UN Development Program cochair donor 

governance activities, which are the chief coordinating mechanisms for 

international anticorruption assistance. USAID and other donors closely 

coordinated their activities during the 2003 elections by jointly funding 

an election results management center and a public Web site to promote 

transparency of election results. USAID and other donors also 

participated in a cooperative review of the 2003 elections. However, in 

the area of court administration, USAID’s contractor told us that he did 

not know how the United Kingdom was planning to carry out its 

program and that he had not been informed for at least 2 months about a 

breakdown in the electronic court reporting system in Lagos (where 

donors had some court administration activities).

• In Mozambique, USAID, State, and Department of Justice officials have 

worked together to coordinate their assistance to the anticorruption 

unit in particular and to the judicial and law enforcement sectors in 

general. USAID and donor representatives told us that overall 

coordination among donors was good, particularly in the area of 

democracy and governance, which includes anticorruption activities. 

Donors, whose contributions totaled about $800 million in 2003, play an 

influential role in the country, because they finance more than 50 

percent of the national budget. At least six donor working groups were 

used to coordinate government reforms addressing corruption issues, 

but there were no formal mechanisms for coordinating anticorruption 

programs. 

U.S. Anticorruption 

Assistance Covers a Wide 

Range of Programs 

U.S. anticorruption programs generally fall into one or more of the 

following categories: (1) strengthening civil society; (2) promoting legal, 

judicial, and regulatory reform; (3) privatizing government functions; (4) 

enhancing government accountability; (5) providing election assistance; (6) 

supporting anticorruption agencies; and (7) assisting law enforcement (see 

fig. 6).
Page 22 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 6: U.S. Anticorruption Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, Fiscal Years 2001–2002

Strengthening Civil Society The most widespread U.S. anticorruption initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa 

are civil society programs that work to increase public awareness and 

knowledge about the impact of corruption, decrease public acceptance of 

corrupt behaviors, and encourage the citizens to become involved in 

government oversight. USAID has included civil society programs in 15 of 

the 22 countries in sub-Saharan Africa where the United States has 

implemented anticorruption programs (see fig. 6). USAID has also 

supported the start-up and strengthening of nongovernmental 
Page 23 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

organizations (NGO) to build advocacy, administrative, and research skills. 

Examples of USAID’s programs include the following:

• In Mozambique, a local NGO called Etica issued a 2001 report on an 

anticorruption survey followed by a public awareness campaign. 

According to U.S., donor, and Mozambican officials, the survey raised 

public awareness of corruption but this did not result in support from 

the Government of Mozambique. 

• In Ghana, USAID implemented a program called Government 

Accountability Improves Trust to increase the capacity of civil society 

organizations to advocate for the interests of their members to local 

government and improve governance, transparency, and accountability 

at the local level. According to USAID, public budget meetings were 

held in 10 of the 110 administrative districts of Ghana, affording citizens 

the opportunity for the first time to view their district’s budget and pose 

questions to their representatives. In four districts, 692 people 

participated in meetings where citizens queried the electricity, water, 

and telephone companies about corruption, inadequate services, and 

rates. USAID said that district assembly officials were subsequently 

more open to considering the concerns raised by civil society.

• In Uganda, USAID reported that it provided training in advocacy and 

effective lobbying in Parliament to 32 civil society organizations to 

increase their oversight of national government programs. USAID also 

trained an additional 80 NGOs at the district level to provide oversight 

for local governments.

• In Madagascar, USAID provided training and the administrative and 

logistical costs associated with its start-up to individuals who 

established a national TI chapter.

Supporting Legal, Judicial, and 

Regulatory Reforms 

U.S. anticorruption assistance has supported a broad range of programs to 

help reform legislatures, judicial and court administration, financial 

sectors, commercial law, international anticorruption agreements, and 

customs, as well as to help decentralize government services. U.S. 

assistance included the following programs:

• In several African countries, USAID worked with the World Bank to 

analyze obstacles to private sector investment and reduce red tape. In 

Tanzania, the Investor Roadmap study decreased the number of 

clearances required for work permits and reduced the number of 
Page 24 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

months before a company could start business operations. In 

Mozambique, USAID support for a business association and its 2001 

study of government efforts to reduce red tape contributed to the 

passage of new laws and revised regulations that simplified the business 

registration process and import and export controls. As a result, 

opportunities for corrupt officials to solicit bribes were reduced and, 

according to the business association, the time required to register a 

business dropped from about 18 months to 6 months. 

• In Mozambique, USAID supported the country's Legal and Judicial 

Training Center to provide short- and long-term training to the staff of 

the Attorney General's Anti-Corruption Unit and other government 

personnel. This support covered expenses for course participants and 

trainers, equipment, and curriculum development. However, the center’s 

financial sustainability was not ensured. The center has been supported 

by donors since it opened in 2000, and the director was uncertain 

whether it would be able to continue operations if donor funding 

decreased. However, USAID officials believed that without donor 

assistance, the center could still maintain basic operations because it 

receives partial government funding. 

• In Nigeria, the Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law 

Development Program provided technical assistance and training to the 

government on intellectual property, public procurement, ethics, project 

finance, and regulatory reform through workshops in Nigeria and the 

United States. 

• In South Africa, the U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust division and 

the Federal Trade Commission provided technical assistance and 

training to the South African Competition Commission to limit 

anticompetitive behavior. The USAID mission reported that pricing 

collusion had been uncovered and prosecuted successfully.

Privatizing Government 

Functions 

U.S. assistance has helped support privatization processes to allow for 

greater transparency and to build trust that the process was fair. According 

to USAID, privatizing government-owned assets in addition to supporting 

economic growth is a recognized method of limiting officials’ opportunities 

to seek bribes and promote special interests. Following are examples of 

U.S. assistance programs: 

• In Nigeria, USAID advised, trained, and subsidized the salaries of private 

sector experts in the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) and provided a 
Page 25 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

computer database to support privatizing state-owned enterprises. The 

Nigerian government adopted a three-phase program and a review 

process for enterprises that were to be privatized. According to USAID, 

BPE’s goal was to privatize 44 enterprises in 2001 and 2002, but only 15 

enterprises were privatized during those years. BPE has become an 

established government agency and received World Bank support to 

continue the privatization process. 

• In South Africa, USAID provided assistance for restructuring and 

privatizing state-owned telecommunications, ports, ecotourism 

projects, and mining companies by keeping the public informed of the 

projects’ progress and developing policies for employee stock 

ownership. Another initiative helped create public–private partnerships 

in hospitals, schools, and transportation to deliver cost-effective 

services. 

• In Uganda, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Technical 

Assistance, placed an adviser within the Central Bank to assist with 

privatizing the Uganda Commercial Bank. This also resulted in a system 

for asset management. 

Enhancing Government 

Accountability 

U.S. agencies have supported reforms and provided technical training and 

advice to enable governments to better account for public funds and 

establish standards for public servants. Following are examples of U.S. 

assistance programs:

• In Chad, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Technical 

Assistance provided an adviser to assist the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline 

Committee, an oversight body formed in 2001, responsible for 

overseeing distribution of revenue from Chad’s newly discovered oil 

reserves.16 The Treasury adviser provided the committee logistical and 

technical assistance that included developing a manual on reviewing 

public expenditure. Treasury officials told us that the committee is 

operational, and that the agency will consider sending another adviser 

to Chad to assist with its operations.

16The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Committee represents one of the first efforts in Africa to 

ensure that extractive industry revenue is spent on development projects and not 

misappropriated for corrupt purposes. It is estimated that oil revenues could provide Chad 

and Cameroon with $2 billion and $500 million, respectively, over the next 25 years. 
Page 26 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

• In Nigeria, USAID’s objective was to train Budget Office of the 

Federation staff in planning and budget classifications. Initially, the 

project had few results, because contractor staff failed to keep their 

commitment to work with high-level Nigerian government officials. 

Support within the government has also been mixed, because vested 

interests oppose changes that could improve government transparency 

and accountability. However, according to USAID, despite initial 

difficulties, this project has begun to realize improvements in budget 

formulation and management.

• In Mozambique, USAID has collaborated with other donors and the 

government since 1999 in developing a common set of agriculture 

policies and programs to restructure the Ministry of Agriculture and 

Rural Development. The objective of these programs is to link budget 

and planning information, the release of donor funds, and financial 

reports. According to USAID’s agriculture adviser in Mozambique, it 

took 3 years to install the new financial management system, indicating 

that the Ministry’s systems had been weaker than anticipated. As a result 

of the program, financial transparency in the Ministry was improved. 

This program served as a pilot for similar multidonor, sectorwide 

programs that are being developed in Mozambique’s health and 

education sectors. It was also a model for a donor–funded, 

governmentwide financial management system. 

• In Benin, USAID provided training, computers, and equipment to the 

Chamber of Accounts of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of 

Economics and Finance’s Office of the Inspector General of Finance. 

The assistance helped these institutions create an audit manual and 

initiate new audits including a review of electoral campaign expenses. 

USAID reported that these agencies exceeded the number of audits they 

had planned, and that their findings have resulted in prosecutions.

• In South Africa, USAID worked with the Parliament’s Public Accounts 

Committee to help members understand auditor-general reports, 

conduct investigations, and handle public testimony to determine 

whether public officials should be cited. USAID reported that hearings 

and trials of corrupt officials resulted, and that similar training was later 

provided by professional associations to legislators in nine provinces. 

Providing Election Assistance The U.S. government provided assistance in a few instances to strengthen 

the national elections and the role of NGOs during elections. Examples of 

U.S. assistance include the following:
Page 27 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

• In Nigeria, USAID election assistance over the past 5 years has 

supported preparing manuals, providing materials to safeguard ballots, 

developing strategic logistic plans, training officials, and helping draft a 

new election law. For the 2003 national and state elections, USAID 

provided about $625,000 to lease communications equipment for the 

rapid transmittal of results from some of Nigeria’s polling stations and 

$1.3 million for materials designed to reduce ballot fraud. However, U.S.-

provided training did not reach some of the wards, and on election day, 

nontrained workers were substituted for trained workers, according to 

an NGO official. Also, materials to secure ballot boxes and tamper-proof 

envelopes were not distributed by the Electoral Commission in time to 

be used, and 70 percent of these materials remained in warehouses in 

the capital during the election. Election observers noted numerous 

violations, could not determine the validity of the election, and could 

not attest to the impact of the violations on the final election results.17

An Electoral Commission official told us that, as of September 2003, 917 

of the approximately 1,600 elections conducted in 2003 had been 

disputed and taken to the Electoral Tribunal for resolution. 

• In Benin, as part of its civil society development programs, USAID 

supported civil society organizations that trained poll watchers and 

political party representatives in election procedures. 

• In Uganda, USAID provided training to the NGO Election Monitoring 

Group that enabled it to monitor and report on local trends and issues in 

the local elections held in February 2002.

Supporting Anticorruption 

Agencies 

USAID has concluded that supporting anticorruption agencies is warranted 

if the agencies have a mandate for reform and involve the public in 

monitoring and reporting on the agency activities. Although a number of 

African governments18 have established anticorruption agencies, many of 

these agencies have not been able to fulfill their mandates. Some 

anticorruption agencies have encountered legal challenges when they 

17Peter Lewis, “Nigeria: Elections in a Fragile Regime,” Journal of Democracy 14 (July 

2003): 131.

18A 2002 Department of State survey found that 14 of 29 sub-Saharan African countries that 

responded had established some form of anticorruption agency, such as a special court or 

commission, that may have multiple mandates including law enforcement, prevention, and 

education. 
Page 28 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

began to prosecute government officials.19 In addition, some commissions 

have operated under the executive branch of government, calling into 

question their political independence and authority.20 Further, some 

commissions lacked resources and were too understaffed and underfunded 

to be effective.21 U.S. assistance included the following programs: 

• In Mozambique, USAID and OPDAT have provided technical assistance 

and training to help the Attorney General’s office create an 

Anticorruption Unit staffed by four principal prosecutors and an 

assistant prosecutor. U.S. support also included purchasing office 

equipment and furniture, providing funds to rent office space, training 

prosecutors, and supporting study tours abroad to meet with foreign 

officials running similar programs. OPDAT also provided a series of 

training programs on techniques to investigate allegations of public 

corruption. According to a U.S. official, from November 2002 to October 

2003, the Anticorruption Unit received 116 crime reports—which the 

official interpreted as a sign of public confidence in the unit—11 of 

which resulted in formal charges and three sentences. In November 

2003, the unit also sponsored a public exercise to discuss its work to 

date, a step toward transparency typically not seen in the Mozambican 

justice sector. The head of the unit works at great personal risk, having 

survived an attempt on her life.

• In Nigeria, Justice’s OPDAT provided prosecutorial and investigative 

training to the anticorruption commission. However, the National 

Assembly challenged the commission’s authority in 2003, thereby 

delaying further U.S. assistance. By September 2003, commission 

officials stated they had conducted 56 prosecutions, resulting in no 

convictions. The commission’s administrators said that they had 

received only 25 percent of the budget they requested. According to 

OPDAT officials, additional factors that hinder the commission’s 

19In 2000, the Kenyan Anti-Corruption Authority was ruled unconstitutional and dissolved by 

the High Court and a police antigraft unit formed to undertake some of the authority’s 

anticorruption activities accomplished very little. The Kibaki administration, elected in 

December 2002, created a new Kenyan Anti-Corruption Commission.

20In Benin, the anticorruption commission has low credibility and a poor record of 

anticorruption investigations and operates under the jurisdication of the executive branch, 

according to USAID. 

21In Uganda, an Anticorruption Commission was created in the mid 1990s but lacked 

sufficient funding to undertake its work, according to a 2000 USAID assessment.
Page 29 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

effectiveness are that certain high-level officials are immune from 

prosecution for public corruption while holding office and that it is not 

permitted to initiate investigations. 

• In Namibia, USAID helped the Office of the Ombudsman, which USAID 

regards as an anticorruption unit, collaborate with civil society 

organizations in a national integrity promotion campaign.

Strengthening Law Enforcement To strengthen law enforcement agencies, the United States, primarily 

through the Department of Justice, has performed needs assessments and 

provided technical training in the investigation and prosecution of 

corruption-related crimes. An integral part of the training has involved 

building respect for human rights. 

• In Nigeria, ICITAP’s in-country representative stated that assistance has 

indirectly addressed corruption and included training on community 

policing techniques for more than 450 constables.22 In addition, ICITAP 

provided election security training and equipped and trained police 

squads, primarily from the states of Kaduna, Kanu, and Lagos, in civil 

disorder management. Both U.S. officials and the Nigerian police told us 

that these squads deterred violence during the 2003 elections. 

• In South Africa, with USAID funding, OPDAT worked with the National 

Prosecuting Authority and its subsidiary, the Directorate of Special 

Operations, an agency that investigates and prosecutes serious 

corruption. OPDAT funded an organizational workshop, helped develop 

guidelines to prosecute organized crime cases, trained prosecutors to 

investigate complex financial fraud, and provided expertise on applying 

a new organized crime statute. As a result of this training, the 

Directorate of Special Operations developed a national screening and 

approval process for prosecuting organized crime cases. 

• In Uganda, Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance provided training 

and assistance on money laundering and worked with the Ugandan 

Office of the Inspector General. 

22We were unable to obtain reliable information on the number of Nigerian national police. 

However, according to the Department of Justice, the police force is currently estimated to 

number 300,000.
Page 30 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Restrictions on Law 

Enforcement Assistance 

and Funding Flow Affect 

Program Development

U.S. government anticorruption law enforcement programs are limited by a 

restriction on law enforcement assistance imposed by section 660 of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.23 This provision prohibits the use of foreign 

assistance funds, including funds transferred by USAID to the Department 

of Justice, to finance ICITAP and OPDAT activities for training and 

financial support of police or other law enforcement forces of foreign 

governments. 

USAID can develop assistance programs for law enforcement agencies only 

if such programs qualify for funding under one of several exceptions to the 

section 660 prohibition24 or if Congress specifically exempts them from 

section 660. For example, in 1999, USAID began to operate in Nigeria under 

an exception (22 U.S.C. 2420(b)(6)) that allows for certain types of police 

assistance to countries emerging from conflicts. Later, after USAID 

determined that the exception no longer applied because Nigeria could no 

longer be classified as emerging from instability, USAID redesigned its 

anticorruption program and did not implement a planned community 

policing program in that country.

The USAID mission in South Africa reported that the restrictions on foreign 

law enforcement assistance limited its ability to support South African 

government agencies involved in fighting corruption. In addition, some U.S. 

agencies evidenced confusion about the type of assistance that could be 

provided. For example, USAID’s General Counsel determined that the 

South African Special Investigating Unit was a law enforcement agency and 

that consequently USAID was restricted from working with it; meanwhile, 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) home office determined that the 

unit was not a law enforcement agency and therefore did not qualify for 

FBI funding. In Zambia, USAID was unable to work with the anticorruption 

unit. The USAID Administrator initially offered the agency’s assistance to 

help support investigations by a Task Force on Corruption. However, while 

the program was getting under way, USAID determined that it would not 

23P.L. 93-559, sec. 30(a); 22 U.S.C. 2420.

24Exemptions include (1) assistance to countries emerging from instability, (2) spending 

related to international narcotics control, (3) programs to enhance professional capabilities 

to carry out investigative and forensic functions conducted under judicial or prosecutorial 

control (22 U.S.C. 2346c), (4) programs to assist in developing academic instruction and 

curricula for training law enforcement personnel (22 U.S.C. 2346c), and (5) assistance to 

customs authorities for customs law enforcement and improving customs laws, systems, 

and procedures.
Page 31 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

fund this work because the Task Force and the Anticorruption Commission 

had police powers and thus were ineligible for the agency’s assistance. 

According to USAID, the mission was able to use the Administrator’s grant 

to fund work with the Director of Public Prosecutions, whereas assistance 

to the Task Force on Corruption was provided by Treasury’s Office of 

Technical Assistance. 

The Department of Justice’s ICITAP also said that the slow transfer of 

funds it received from State for its law enforcement work hindered its 

efforts to develop integrated police training programs and, as a result, its 

assistance ended up being piecemeal.25 According to Department of Justice 

officials, uncertainty about the amount of funding ICITAP would receive 

made it difficult for them to plan the bureau’s work in sub-Saharan Africa. 

For example, in Nigeria, ICITAP had to wait 1 year for funds to begin a 

program with the Police Service Commission. State officials were unable to 

provide data on the department’s funding of justice programs in subSaharan Africa. USAID officials stated that certain budgetary accounts are 

funded only once a fiscal year, creating delays in program implementation.

Few Evaluations of 

Anticorruption Programs 

Have Been Conducted; 

Program Results Unclear 

USAID provided eight program evaluations of its anticorruption activities 

in sub-Saharan Africa and these evaluations showed limited and unclear 

results.26 For example, an evaluation of a USAID government 

accountability program in Ghana showed that the program had increased 

the level of trust between civil society and the district government but that 

the program’s final goals and sustainability were not clear. An evaluation of 

democracy and governance assistance to Benin showed that an NGO 

supported by USAID had been successful in raising public awareness of 

corruption. However, an evaluation of an economic rehabilitation program 

in Sudan, which included an objective to increase good governance and 

institute accountability and transparency measures into government 

practices, found no evidence that government officials implemented any of 

25GAO has previously reported on problems coordinating U.S. rule-of-law assistance. For 

example, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule of Law 

Program Coordination, GAO/NSIAD-00-8R (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 13, 1999).

26These evaluations were conducted between February 1991 and December 2003; 6 of the 8 

evaluations were completed since 2000. The Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and 

Commerce told us that they monitor their anticorruption activities with periodic and end-ofprogram reports but have not evaluated their programs. 
Page 32 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

the measures. According to USAID officials, their work in Sudan was 

impeded by a lack of a viable civil administration. 

Further, in several cases, the evaluations provided incomplete information. 

In reviewing the evaluations, we found it difficult to identify the programs’ 

anticorruption objectives, the degree to which the objectives were met, and 

the degree to which the programs were sustainable. 

Anticorruption Efforts 

Have Identified Some 

Lessons Learned 

Anticorruption efforts in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere have shown 

that success in such efforts depends on (1) political will, (2) widespread 

public support, (3) country-specific programs, (4) multipronged strategies, 

(5) transparency and access to information, and (6) time and commitment.

Political Will Is Key to 

Fighting Corruption

Donors and international groups generally agree that political will and 

commitment from a country’s leadership are instrumental to implement 

and sustain anticorruption reform efforts. However, maintaining political 

will may be difficult for elected officials, because their ability to stay in 

office may be challenged by those with vested interests in the current 

system. While political will can be uneven across government, working 

with leaders who are committed to sustaining and advancing reform is 

crucial. 

Widespread Support Is Key 

to Advancing Reform

In addition to clear and unambiguous commitments from key political 

figures, widespread support for change is necessary to advance 

comprehensive anticorruption reforms, according to Transparency 

International. According to USAID, public-private partnerships that include 

government, the private sector, civil society, and the media have proven to 

be successful in identifying governance problems, agreeing on solutions, 

and implementing reforms. In addition, campaigns by civil society groups 

to raise awareness of corruption problems or mobilize the public to 

support specific reform agendas have been the starting point for 

developing political will in many countries. 

Anticorruption Programs 

Must Be Tailored to Local 

Conditions

For anticorruption programs to be effective, they must be tailored to each 

country’s unique historical and economic conditions, including the legacy 

of colonial and socialist governments in some sub-Saharan African 

countries. According to the World Bank and USAID, a baseline assessment 
Page 33 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

of the nature, extent, and root causes of corruption in a country is a critical 

first step to planning and implementing anticorruption activities. Based on 

this information, both government and donors can develop reform 

strategies and priorities. In addition, the results of anticorruption 

assessments should be widely disseminated to clarify the nature and extent 

of the problems, mobilize support, and develop action plans. 

Multipronged Strategy Is 

Key to Anticorruption 

Efforts

Prevention, education, and law enforcement are considered to be equally 

important components of a multipronged strategy to comprehensively 

address corruption, according to the UN, the World Bank, and national 

anticorruption institutions. 

• Prevention measures include increasing transparency and oversight of 

government functions; eliminating opportunities for corruption; 

improving incentives for good performance in public office; and 

simplifying procedures for basic services such as granting permits, 

licenses, bank loans, and passports. 

• Education measures include informing citizens about how corruption 

lowers their standard of living and about their role in monitoring 

government performance and reporting abuses. Without such 

information, citizens may not understand their role in addressing 

corruption. 

• Law enforcement activities include prosecuting, fining, or imprisoning 

corrupt officials. (Law enforcement, while key to this approach, is most 

effective when combined with prevention and education, according to 

the World Bank.) 

Transparency and Access to 

Information Is Important

Transparency and access to information are also indispensable tools for 

enabling the public to identify and report corruption. According to USAID, 

without public access to information about government decision-making 

processes, anticorruption efforts will fail. Information about government 

policy, programs, budgets, fees for services, and performance should be 

available, permitting citizens to oversee government, hold it accountable, 

and ensure that their rights are respected 
Page 34 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Controlling Corruption 

Requires Time and 

Commitment

Because addressing corruption is a complex political endeavor requiring 

governmentwide reform, corruption cannot be controlled quickly. As a 

result, long-term commitments are required to gain public confidence in 

efforts to prevent and control corruption. TI states that countries and 

donors should be wary of any single action billed as a “quick fix,” even if it 

is a sensible step in itself, such as increasing public sector wages, enacting 

anticorruption laws, prosecuting many corrupt officials, or relying on civil 

society organizations to drive change. 

Conclusions In sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is a daunting problem associated with 

underdevelopment, lack of government accountability, and limited capacity 

of public institutions; it has also become widely tolerated by the public of 

that region. U.S. government anticorruption programs in sub-Saharan 

Africa are relatively new, have received limited funding, and are broadly 

targeted across a number of areas. While few anticorruption programs in 

the region have been evaluated systematically, such analysis could be used 

in developing future programs and strategic plans. Evaluations could also 

help officials refine anticorruption objectives and performance measures. 

Although U.S. programs have made some progress in addressing and 

highlighting corruption problems facing the region, major challenges 

remain that appear to exceed the scope of what donors alone can achieve. 

Ultimately, U.S. anticorruption efforts, along with the efforts of other 

donors, will succeed only with long-term commitment and political and 

financial support from host governments, the private sector, and the public.

Because it is difficult to measure corruption directly, the World Bank 

Institute and TI indexes capture perceptions of corruption. In the context 

of the new Millennium Challenge Account, it is important to recognize that 

these indexes, although useful in showing broad differences across the 

globe, should be used with caution, particularly when attempting to 

differentiate among closely ranked countries.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

GAO received written comments on a draft of this report from USAID, 

which are reprinted in appendix VI. This appendix also contains GAO 

responses to the comments. In its formal comments, USAID highlighted 

additional information on its efforts to coordinate anticorruption 

assistance, lessons learned, and the sustainability and impact of this 

assistance, some of which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. 

The Departments of the Treasury, Justice, and State provided informal 
Page 35 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

comments that we incorporated into the report as appropriate. The 

agencies generally agreed with our presentation of the issues and 

conclusions. We were also provided technical comments from the World 

Bank Institute that were discussed with officials and included in this report 

where appropriate.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees as well as the Attorney General, the Secretary of 

the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the 

USAID Administrator. We also will make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3149 or at gootnickd@gao.gov. Other contacts and staff 

acknowledgments are listed in appendix VII.

David Gootnick

Director, International Affairs

and Trade
Page 36 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

To assess what is known about the nature and extent of corruption in subSaharan Africa, we analyzed the indexes compiled by the World Bank 

Institute (WBI) and Transparency International (TI). We examined the data 

sources and methodologies used to construct each index and the statistical 

limitations inherent in each approach. To assess the reliability of the WBI 

and TI corruption indexes, we (1) interviewed WBI officials, (2) reviewed 

the methodology used to compile both indexes, (3) reviewed professional 

literature on measuring corruption, (4) compared the indexes against each 

other, and (5) performed some advanced statistical tests. In our report, we 

note the difficulties of measuring corruption and the limitations of both 

indexes. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to provide a 

broad gauge of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa and demonstrate that 

levels of corruption vary among sub-Saharan African countries. (See app. 

III for additional details of our analysis of the WBI and TI indexes.) In 

addition, we reviewed the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 

and analyzed data for companies from sub-Saharan Africa that participated 

in the survey. To assess the reliability of the WBES survey, we reviewed the 

documentation provided by, and analyzed the data we obtained from, the 

World Bank Web site. The World Bank reported a number of quality control 

procedures, such as pretesting of instruments. However, the World Bank 

also noted that the response rates for African countries and for questions 

on corruption are relatively low. In addition, only 16 African countries were 

included in the survey. The survey questions we used had between 40 and 

120 respondents per country. Because of the response rates and the 

numbers of respondents, differences between countries may not be 

significant. We determined that the WBES data were sufficiently reliable to 

report that corruption was perceived to be a problem for many of the 

African businesses responding to the survey and that perceptions of 

corruption varied by country. 

To identify the factors that give rise to corruption in this region, we 

reviewed country surveys and studies funded by TI, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), WBI, the United Nations (UN), and 

others since 2000. Our analysis of these documents focused on identifying 

broad themes and challenges facing sub-Saharan African nations. (See the 

bibliography for a list of documents used in this review.)

To determine the types of U.S. government programs providing 

anticorruption assistance in sub-Saharan Africa, we reviewed documents 

and interviewed key officials from USAID and the Departments of the 

Treasury, Justice, Commerce, and State in Washington, D.C. We also 

obtained the results of a 2003 USAID global survey that asked missions 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

about their anticorruption programs from 2001 and 2002 and the funding 

allocated to these efforts. To assess the reliability of USAID’s data on its 

anticorruption programs, we (1) interviewed USAID officials about their 

data collection procedures, (2) reviewed their data collection instrument, 

and (3) examined the data collected using the instrument.1

 Our assessment 

showed that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

identifying which agencies provide funding on anticorruption programs, 

identifying the countries that receive the most anticorruption funding, and 

establishing that anticorruption programs in sub-Saharan Africa receive 

limited funding.

In addition, we analyzed program documents and assessments from six 

countries in sub-Saharan Africa in which the U.S. government has 

undertaken anticorruption programs (Benin, Mozambique, Nigeria, South 

Africa, Uganda, and Zambia). We obtained more detailed information from 

the USAID missions in these countries. We also interviewed World Bank 

and UN Development Program officials to obtain their views on 

multilateral efforts in the region. Further, in September 2003, we spent a 

week in both Nigeria and Mozambique where we met with key U.S. and 

host government officials and with representatives from civil society and 

other donors to review past and ongoing anticorruption efforts. We also 

obtained funding data for programs implemented by the Departments of 

the Treasury, Justice, Commerce, and State.2

 The information on foreign 

law in this report does not reflect our independent legal analysis, but it is 

based on interviews and secondary sources. 

To identify lessons learned regarding implementing anticorruption 

programs, we reviewed a wide range of documents and materials. These 

included USAID’s policy guidance for its African programs as well as 

toolkits, handbooks, and other materials prepared by the World Bank, TI, 

the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 

Development Assistance Committee, and the UN Office on Drugs and 

Crime. We also interviewed USAID and other donor officials working in the 

countries we visited and in Washington, D.C.

1

USAID’s data derive from a self-reported survey. USAID headquarters officials reviewed the 

survey responses to ensure that these meet their criteria for anticorruption; the officials 

accept that the data may somewhat overstate the amount of funding directed to 

anticorruption activities. 

2

Because the information provided by the agencies did not isolate the components tied to 

anticorruption objectives, the data may overstate anticorruption funding.
Page 38 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Appendix II

International Agreements Addressing 

Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa ApendxiI

Multilateral organizations have adopted agreements that prohibit the 

payment of bribes to government officials (the “supply” of corruption) and 

the solicitation of bribes or diversion of public funds by government 

officials (the “demand” for corruption). The Organization for Economic 

Cooperation and Development (OECD) has addressed the supply of 

corruption by adopting an agreement governing the conduct of the 

convention’s 35 industrialized signatories. Two African multilateral 

organizations, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 

the African Union (AU), have adopted agreements addressing supply and 

demand, but neither regime has entered into force. In 2003, the United 

Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a convention that also addresses 

supply and demand. The Department of State expects that this convention 

will be the first anticorruption treaty applied on a global level.

OECD Convention The OECD adopted its Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 

Officials in International Transactions in 1997. The convention requires its 

35 signatories to adopt common rules to punish companies and individuals 

who offer or promise a bribe to foreign officials to obtain or retain business 

or other improper advantage in international business deals. Unlike the 

Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which the United States enacted in 

1977,1

 the convention does not apply to payments to campaigns or political 

parties. According to government officials with whom we spoke, this 

omission can be problematic when applied to parliamentary systems in 

which political parties exert significant control over government 

appointments and actions. Also, the laws that the convention requires 

member states to enact are not easily applied to legally distinct foreign 

subsidiaries of a corporation unless their actions can be imputed to their 

parent.

According to U.S. government officials and experts, the key element of the 

OECD convention is a peer-review mechanism, organized by the OECD 

Secretariat but implemented through teams drafted from signatory 

countries. The reviews, which are intended to continue indefinitely on a 5- 

to 8-year cycle, are conducted in two phases. The first phase is intended to 

ensure that OECD members have enacted laws satisfying the requirements 

of the antibribery convention. The second phase examines the extent to 

which OECD members are enforcing their antibribery laws and examines 

1

15 U.S.C. 78 dd-1, et seq.
Appendix II

International Agreements Addressing 

Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa

Page 39 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

both the efficiency of the procedures employed by the member and the 

member’s commitment to enforce its antibribery law. The initial round of 

first-phase reviews is complete when all signatories have attained the 

OECD standard. OECD members are currently engaged in second-phase 

reviews, having issued five second-phase reports as of December 13, 2003, 

including a review of the United States’ application of antibribery 

legislation issued in October 2002.2

African Regional Initiatives SADC and AU3

 have adopted anticorruption regimes in an effort to 

harmonize the laws of their member states. However, neither regime has 

entered into force, so neither legally binds its signatories.4

 These regimes 

are intended to criminalize, among other things, the solicitation of bribes 

and diversion of public funds by government officials. Both the SADC 

Protocol Against Corruption, agreed to in 2001, and the AU Convention on 

Preventing and Combating Corruption, agreed to in 2003, can be seen as 

expressions of their signatories’ political will. To enter into force, the SADC 

protocol requires the deposit of 10 instruments of ratification; as of January 

9, 2003, eight states had ratified the agreement. Three states had ratified the 

AU convention, with 15 ratifications required for entry into force. 

UN Convention Against 

Corruption

In October 2003, the UN General Assembly adopted5 the UN Convention 

Against Corruption. The convention addresses prevention, criminalization, 

and asset recovery, as follows:

• Prevention. The convention contains provisions designed to prevent 

corruption, including a requirement that signatories establish public 

procurement systems “based on transparency, competition, and 

objective criteria in decision making.” It also contains public finance 

2

For OECD reports see: http://www.oecd.org.

3

SADC represents 14 nations in southern Africa; its objective is to harmonize its members’ 

laws and policies in an effort to promote economic development in the region. The AU is the 

successor organization to the Organization of African Unity.

4

Parties to an international treaty generally adopt the form and content of an agreement by 

signing it. It is common practice to sign the agreement subject to ratification, the 

international act by which a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty. 

5

UN Doc. A/Res/58/4.
Appendix II

International Agreements Addressing 

Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa

Page 40 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

measures with procedures for the adoption of a national budget; timely 

reporting on revenue and expenditure; and accounting systems, auditing 

standards, risk management, and internal controls. 

• Criminalization. The convention requires its signatories to criminalize 

a wide range of acts of corruption, including payment and receipt of 

bribes; diversion of public funds by public officials; concealment, or 

“laundering,” of proceeds of corrupt acts; and obstruction of justice. 

• Asset recovery. The convention’s provisions on asset recovery were of 

particular interest to foreign government officials with whom we spoke. 

Public funds that are embezzled would be returned to the state 

requesting their return. Proceeds from any other offense covered by the 

convention would be returned to the requesting state once the state 

reasonably establishes its prior ownership of the property or when the 

requested state recognizes damage to the requesting state as a basis for 

returning the confiscated property. 

The convention has been open for signature since December 9, 2003 and, as 

of February 19, 2004, 100 countries, including the United States and 23 subSaharan African countries, had signed it.6

 The convention requires 30 

ratifications to take effect. As of February 19, 2004, only Kenya had ratified 

the convention. Although the UN convention contains provisions 

establishing a Conference of States Parties to facilitate implementation of 

the convention, it is not clear whether such a conference will include the 

vigorous reviews associated with the OECD convention. According to U.S. 

government officials, extrapolating the OECD peer-review model to the 

relatively large number of UN convention signatories would require a 

significant financial and organizational commitment.

6

The UN convention sub-Saharan Africa signatories include Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, 

Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 

Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 

Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.
Page 41 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Appendix III

Characteristics of WBI and TI Corruption 

Indexes ApendxiI

The World Bank Institute (WBI) and Transparency International (TI) 

publish indexes that attempt to measure perceptions of corruption across a 

large number of countries. WBI produced its first corruption index in 1996 

and updates it every 2 years; TI first published its Corruption Perception 

Index in 1995 and updates it annually. The two indexes share fundamental 

characteristics but also have significant differences.

TI and WBI Indexes Have 

Important Similarities

The WBI and TI indexes have much in common (see table 1 for a summary 

of the indexes’ characteristics). Both are based on the results of surveys of 

business people and citizens and analysis by country experts. In addition, 

both indexes rank countries by the degree of corruption perceived to exist 

in countries rather than by actual corruption, which is difficult to directly 

measure. Further, each index is constructed of a number of different 

sources, about half of which come from the same institutions.1

 (We 

reviewed and analyzed the methodologies used to generate the WBI and TI 

indexes, conducted analyses to check internal consistency, and determined 

their general reliability.) Each index also uses surveys and assessments that 

rank a number of countries. These sources generally assess several areas, 

including the quality of governance, overall business environment, 

democratic institutions, and levels of corruption. Both indexes incorporate 

responses to specific questions considered to provide insight into a 

country’s perceived corruption; frequently the indexes include responses to 

the same questions. 

1

For information on the sources used, see the World Bank Institute’s Web site at 

http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002 and Transparency International’s 

Web site at http://www.transparency.org.
Appendix III

Characteristics of WBI and TI Corruption 

Indexes 

Page 42 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Table 1: Characteristics of the WBI and TI Corruption Indexes 

Sources: GAO analysis of WBI and TI data. 

Note: The WBI index uses the latest information for 14 sources, including 2 from Business 

Environment Risk Intelligence. The TI index uses 17 sources, including surveys for 2001, 2002, and 

2003 from both the World Economic Forum and the Institute for Management Development.The 

unobserved component is a statistical technique that makes it possible to infer the distribution of 

corruption conditional on the observed data for a country.

An index using several sources (1) spans a larger set of countries than any 

individual source; (2) reduces the impact of outlier observations by 

providing a more reliable measure of corruption than any individual 

source; and (3) provides a more reliable point estimate and measure of 

precision, or standard deviation, of its estimate. The smaller the standard 

deviation, the more precise the estimate. 

Because of the similarity in data sources used to measure perceived 

corruption, there is a high correlation between the TI and WBI indexes 

across the 133 countries included in both (0.97, with 1.00 indicating perfect 

linear correlation).

Characteristics WBI index, 2002 TI index, 2003

Number of countries covered

 High income

 Middle income

 Low income

 Sub-Saharan Africa

195

48

83

64

47

133

34

63

36

24

Number of source institutions 13 13

Minimum number of sources per 

country 1 3

Maximum number of sources 

per country 12 16

Range (higher value implies less 

corruption) -2.5 to 2.5 0 to 10

Methodology Uses an unobserved 

components model to 

compute a country score 

and unbiased measure of 

precision even when only 

one source is available.

Computes an average 

score and a measure of 

precision for each country. 

The index includes a 

country only when three 

or more sources are 

available. 
Appendix III

Characteristics of WBI and TI Corruption 

Indexes 

Page 43 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

WBI and TI Indexes Differ 

Significantly in 

Methodologies Used

Differences in the methodologies used to construct each index result in 

divergent country coverage and rankings. WBI uses an unobservedcomponents methodology that enables it to compute a score and measure 

of precision (standard deviation) for each country even with only one 

source for the country. This methodology enables the WBI index to include 

a larger number of countries for which it has few sources of information. 

For an individual country, the standard deviation is smaller the more 

sources are used and the more that information from each source 

corresponds with information from other sources. For some countries, the 

imprecision is quite large relative to the point estimate score. 

In constructing its composite corruption index, TI uses a methodology 

different from WBI’s that also generates for each country a point estimate 

for corruption and a measure of precision. TI includes a country in its index 

only if it has three or more sources of information for that country. 

Requiring three or more sources ensures greater reliability of the estimate. 

However, it also limits the number of countries that are included in the 

index.2

 The TI index for 2003 includes 133 countries, compared with 195 

countries for the WBI index (see table 1). 

The difference between country coverage in the two indexes is more 

pronounced for low-income and sub-Saharan African countries. The WBI 

index covers almost twice as many sub-Saharan African countries as the TI 

index, 47 versus 24. Similarly, WBI covers 64 low-income countries, 

whereas the TI covers 36.3

 Because the WBI index covers more countries, 

we chose to use it in assessing the relationship between corruption and the 

Millennium Development Goals and other development indicators.

2

TI also computes corruption scores for 62 additional countries. Because there were less 

than three sources available, these 62 countries are measured less reliably and not included 

in the index. 

3

The correlations of the corruption scores between the two indexes are 0.90 and 0.69 for all 

sub-Saharan African countries and low-income sub-Saharan African countries, respectively.
Page 44 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Appendix IV

Analysis of Corruption and Economic 

Development ApendxiIV

To analyze the effect of corruption on development, we obtained 

corruption perception data from the World Bank Institute (WBI) for 195 

countries in 2002 (the latest available). We also collected data, representing 

averages for 1997–2001, from the United Nations (UN) on development 

indicators collectively known as the Millennium Development Goals, which 

are commonly used to gauge countries’ development progress.1

 We 

selected 11 representative indicators for our analysis. We also chose 6 

indicators representing countries’ broad economic achievements from the 

World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.2

 (See tables 2 and 3 

for the selected goals and economic indicators.) We performed a series of 

correlation and regression analyses to identify statistically significant 

associations between the WBI corruption index and the selected 

indicators.3

 The relationship between corruption and development 

indicators is complex, and the results presented here are an initial step 

toward understanding this complexity. Further insight into the evolving 

complexity of corruption and development indicators may be obtained 

through a more comprehensive analysis that, among other things, 

addresses interrelationships among development indicators, the possible 

influence of measurement errors on estimated parameters, and the 

accuracy of the corruption measurements, which are based on perceptions.

1

The Millennium Development Goals commit the international community to the promotion 

of human development as the key to sustaining social and economic progress in all 

countries by creating a global partnership for development. 

2

The database, generated by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and various 

UN agencies, is routinely and widely used in economic analysis of development issues. For 

this reason, we did not assess the data’s reliability.

3

A regression analysis is a statistical method of measuring the extent to which variations in 

one variable are associated with variations in other variables. 
Appendix IV

Analysis of Corruption and Economic 

Development

Page 45 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Table 2: Correlation between 2002 WBI Index and Selected Development Indicators

Legend

* Indicates statistical significance of at least 90 percent confidence

N= number of countries for which data were available

GDP=gross domestic product

Sources: GAO analysis using UN data and World Bank data for 1997–2001.

a

The correlation coefficient measures the linear relationship between the corruption index and each 

indicator. It ranges between –1 and +1, where –1 indicates a perfect inverse relationship, 0 indicates 

no relationship, and +1 indicates a perfect direct relationship.

b

Across countries.

Our correlation analysis showed that, for all 195 countries in the WBI 

index, a statistically significant association exists between corruption and 

the selected development indicators. As table 2 shows, the indicators show 

significant statistical association, at a 90 percent confidence level, with the 

WBI index for all but five variables. We found that lower levels of 

corruption are associated with higher primary education enrollment ratios, 

literacy rates, girls-to-boys ratios in primary school enrollment, 

Development indicators

Correlation 

coefficienta

Proportion of 

variationb

explained by 

corruption N

Millennium 

Development 

Goals

Proportion of population below $1 a day -0.31 * 10% 88

Income share held by lowest 20% 0.05 0 70

Poverty gap at $1 a day -0.27 * 7 88

Education enrollment ratio, net, primary level 0.37 * 14 141

Literacy rates, aged 15-24 0.34 * 11 119

Girls-to-boys ratio, primary level enrollment 0.29 * 9 155

Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births -0.64 * 40 166

Children under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births -0.6 * 36 166

Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births -0.51 * 26 154

Percentage of rural population with access to improved drinking water 

sources 0.49 * 24 128

Debt service as percentage of exports of goods and services -0.13 2 96

Broad indicators Trade (% of GDP) 0.19 * 4 154

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 0.63 * 40 164

Real GDP growth rate -0.09 1 155

Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) 0.36 * 13 145

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 0.15 2 147

Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 0.05 0 152
Appendix IV

Analysis of Corruption and Economic 

Development

Page 46 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

percentages of population with access to improved drinking water sources, 

trade, life expectancy at birth, and total public spending on education. 

Furthermore, lower corruption is statistically associated with decreased

proportions of population living on less than $1 a day, depth of poverty 

(poverty gap at $1 a day), infant mortality rate, mortality rate of children 

younger than 5 years, and maternal mortality ratio.

Our correlation and regression analysis also showed that the proportion of 

variation across countries that is associated with corruption fluctuates 

depending on the indicators chosen. For example, as table 2 shows, 

corruption “explains” approximately 40 percent of the variance of infant 

mortality among countries but only 1 percent of the variance in real GDP 

growth rate.4

We also performed a regression analysis for subgroups of countries 

classified according to per capita income—high, middle, and low, as seen in 

table 3. To highlight the effect of corruption in sub-Saharan African 

countries, we created an additional variable to represent low-income subSaharan African countries. In table 3, “all countries” refers to the regression 

analysis for all 195 countries in the WBI index and assumes that corruption 

has the same effect on each country. In contrast, the regression analysis of 

countries grouped by income allows for the possibility that the effect of 

corruption may vary for countries in different income groups.5

4

Our analysis highlights an association between corruption and the development indicators. 

It does not imply a cause-effect relationship.

5

Our regression analysis for all countries used Yi= α + β * WBI, where Yi is a development 

indicator, α is the intercept, β is the effect of the corruption index, and WBI is the 2001 WBI 

corruption index. Our regression analysis by income group used Yi

= α + (β1* WBI ) + (β2* 

low-income Africa indicator) + (β3* middle-income country indicator) + (β4* high-income 

country indicator) + (β5 * low-income Africa countries’ WBI scores) + (β6 * middle-income 

countries’ WBI scores) + (β7 * high-income countries’ WBI scores), where Yi

 is a 

development indicator; α is the intercept; βi = 1,..,7 indicates the effects of variables in the 

model; and WBI is the 2001 WBI corruption index.
Appendix IV

Analysis of Corruption and Economic 

Development

Page 47 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Table 3: Summary of Regression Analysis Using 2002 WBI Index 

Legend

Symbols indicate direction and significance of the estimated coefficient: 

+++/- - - Statistically significant at 99 percent of confidence 

++/- - Statistically significant at 95 percent of confidence 

+/- Statistically significant at 90 percent of confidence 

No symbol Statistically insignificant 

Sources: GAO analysis of 1997–2001 UN and World Bank data and 2002 WBI Corruption Index.

Notes: Results for “low-income ” were obtained from a separate analysis that grouped low-income, 

middle-income, and high-income countries. The results shown have been corrected for possible 

heteroscedasticity, when necessary. Heteroscedasticity refers to a statistical problem, which, if not 

corrected, may lead to an association appearing to be statistically significant or insignificant when it 

may actually be. For low-income countries, the estimates for proportion of population living on less 

than $1 a day and for the poverty gap at $1 a day were found to be heteroscedastic, but corrections 

could not be made due to data limitations.

According to the World Bank, in 2002, per capita income for high-income countries was greater than 

$9,075; for middle-income countries, between $735 and $9,075; and for low-income countries, $735 or 

less.

Low income

Development indicators

All 

countries

High 

income

Middle 

income All

SubSaharan 

Africa

Millennium 

Development 

Goals

Proportion of population living on less than $1 a day --- +

Income share held by lowest 20% 

Poverty gap at $1 a day --

Education enrollment ratio, net, primary level +++ ---

Literacy rates, aged 15-24 +++

Girls-to-boys ratio, primary-level enrollment +++

Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births --- - --

Mortality rate for children under five per 1,000 live births --- --

Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births --- -

Percentage of rural population with access to improved 

drinking water sources +++

Debt service as percentage of exports of goods and services

Broad 

indicators

Trade (% of GDP) ++ ++

Life expectancy at birth, total (years) +++ ++

Real GDP growth rate 

Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) +++ ++ ++

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) + ++ +

Gross capital formation (% of GDP)
Appendix IV

Analysis of Corruption and Economic 

Development

Page 48 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

In general, when all countries are pooled together our analysis of the effect 

of corruption shows that most conclusions regarding the adverse effects of 

corruption on development are supported, that is, lower levels of 

corruption are associated with better development outcomes. However, 

these conclusions depend on the assumption that corruption has the same 

effect across all countries.

For most of the development indicators, we tested and rejected, with at 

least 90 percent statistical confidence, the assumption that corruption has 

the same effect for all countries. We found instead that the effect of 

corruption varies by countries’ income levels.6

 Using regressions that 

allowed for such variation, we analyzed the relationship of corruption to 

development indicators for income groups and found corruption to be 

statistically significant for far fewer indicators than when all countries are 

pooled together (see table 3). 

For high-income countries, lower levels of corruption are associated with 

lower infant mortality rates and higher net inflows of foreign direct 

investment. Variations in corruption do not appear to be associated with 

any other development indicators for high-income countries. For middleincome countries, lower levels of corruption are associated with lower 

maternal, infant, and children under 5 years mortality rates. They are also 

associated with higher trade, life expectancy at birth, public spending in 

education, and net inflows of foreign direct investment. 

For low-income countries, some of corruption’s statistical associations 

with development indicators were as we expected. For instance, lower 

levels of corruption are associated with higher public spending on 

education. On the other hand, corruption is associated with some 

development indicators in unexpected ways. For example, for all lowincome countries, less corruption is associated with a higher poverty rate 

and lower educational enrollment. For low-income sub-Saharan African 

countries, variation in corruption across countries appears not to be 

associated with any of the development indicators. There are a number of 

possible explanations for some of these counterintuitive results. For 

example, the small size of the subgroups makes statistical significance hard 

to achieve. Also, as explained previously, relatively large amounts of 

6

We rejected this assumption with at least 90 percent confidence for all development 

indicators except debt service as percentage of exports of goods and services, real GDP 

growth rate, and net inflows of foreign direct investment.
Appendix IV

Analysis of Corruption and Economic 

Development

Page 49 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

imprecision and measurement error exist in the point estimates of 

corruption for each country. The development indicators themselves may, 

in addition, be imprecisely measured. It is also possible for the causal 

direction to be from corruption to income than vice versa, such that higher 

corruption leads to lower income.

As table 3 shows, the regression results for all countries may be misleading 

if not corroborated by the results for the income subgroups. This is 

particularly true when the regression for all countries shows the effect of 

corruption on a development indicator while the subgroup regressions do 

not. For example, when we analyzed all countries together, we found that 

less corruption is associated (at a 99 percent confidence level) with an 

increase in the percentage of population with access to improved drinking 

water sources when all countries are pooled together. However, when we 

analyzed the countries by income level, we did not find this effect (see fig. 

7). This result suggests that the apparent association of less corruption 

with improved development indicators may be simply the effect of higher 

income. 

Figure 7 shows the results of our regression analysis for rural access to 

improved drinking water countries by income group and for all countries. 

The horizontal line indicates corruption’s lack of statistical significance at a 

minimum of 90 percent confidence. In high-income countries, an average of 

97 percent of the population has access to improved water, unrelated to 

country levels of corruption. Similarly, in middle- and low-income countries 

and in low-income sub-Saharan African countries, an average of 77 percent, 

62 percent, and 49 percent, respectively, have access to improved water, 

unrelated to country levels of corruption in each group. The slope of the 

line representing the analysis for all countries appears to be a result of 

moving along successive higher income levels.7

 

7

The horizontal line is drawn at the level of the average value of the development indicator 

for that subgroup.
Appendix IV

Analysis of Corruption and Economic 

Development

Page 50 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 7: Relation of WBI Index to Percentage of Population with Access to 

Improved Drinking Water Sources 
Page 51 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Appendix V

World Business Environment Survey ApendxiV

This appendix highlights data from the World Business Environment 

Survey (WBES), focusing on results for sub-Saharan Africa.1 The survey 

covered 10,032 businesses in 80 countries, including 1,629 businesses in 16 

countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, 

Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, 

South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The purpose of 

the survey was to better understand constraints that hinder private 

business development throughout the world. 

The survey covered quality and integrity of public services, rules and 

regulations, bureaucratic practices, and corruption (our analysis focused 

on questions related to corruption). Sectors in sub-Saharan Africa 

represented included manufacturing, services, agriculture, and 

construction. Businesses responding were grouped into three categories: 

small (50 or fewer employees), medium (51 to 500 employees), and large 

(501 or more employees). The firms responding included sole 

proprietorships, partnerships, cooperatives, privately held corporations, 

corporations listed on stock exchanges, and others not specified; about 27 

percent of these firms operated in other countries as well. The World Bank 

noted that the response rate for Africa was “among the lowest” of the nine 

regions surveyed. 

More than 60 percent of businesses that responded to the survey from the 

region stated that corruption is a major constraint to their business. Figure 

9 shows the responses of businesses from individual African countries (for 

comparative purposes, we also included the average for the region and for 

the 80 countries in which the survey was conducted). As figure 8 shows, 

Namibia and Botswana had the lowest number of complaints, while 

Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar, and Nigeria had the highest 

proportion of businesses claiming corruption was problematic.

1

The survey was a collaborative effort of the World Bank Group, the European Bank for 

Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Bank, and Harvard 

University. Because of the response rates and the numbers of respondents, differences 

between some countries may not be significant.
Appendix V

World Business Environment Survey

Page 52 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 8: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries Responding “Moderate or Major Obstacle” to WBES Question “How 

Problematic Has Corruption Been for the Operation and Growth of Your Business?”

Notes: Response options were “no obstacle,” “minor obstacle,” “moderate obstacle,” and “major 

obstacle.” Because of the response rates and the numbers of respondents, differences between some 

countries may not be significant.

Figures in parentheses are the number of firms that responded in each country.

Further, the extent to which corruption influences government 

transactions may be inferred from a question that asked businesses if they 

typically needed to make extra, unofficial payments to gain government 

contracts. On average, about 26 percent of sub-Saharan African businesses 

surveyed responded affirmatively. Businesses in Madagascar, Senegal, 

Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Nigeria had the highest rate of responses 

indicating that illegal payments are required to gain government contracts 

(see fig. 9).
Appendix V

World Business Environment Survey

Page 53 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 9: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries Responding “Always, Usually, or Frequently” to WBES Question “Do 

Firms Like Yours Typically Need to Make Extra, Unofficial Payments to Gain Government Contracts?”

Notes: Response options were “always,” “usually,” “frequently,” “sometimes,” “seldom,” and “never.” 

Because of the response rates and the numbers of respondents, differences between some countries 

may not be significant.

Figures in parentheses are the number of firms that responded in each country.

Another consequence of corruption is the erosion of trust among 

businesses, courts, and banks. More businesses stated that courts are 

dishonest and corrupt in the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, 

Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (see fig. 10). Relatively large proportions of 

businesses in Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Madagascar, Nigeria, 

Tanzania, and Uganda stated corruption of bank officials is an obstacle to 

their businesses (see fig. 11).
Appendix V

World Business Environment Survey

Page 54 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 10: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries Responding “Never, Seldom, or Sometimes” to WBES Question 

“How Often Do You Associate ‘Honest/Uncorrupt’ as Description of the Court System in Resolving Business Disputes?”

Notes: Response options were “always,” “usually,” “frequently,” “sometimes,” “seldom,” and “never.” 

Because of the response rates and the numbers of respondents, differences between some countries 

may not be significant.

Figures in parentheses are the number of firms that responded in each country.
Appendix V

World Business Environment Survey

Page 55 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Figure 11: Firms in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries Responding “Minor, Moderate, or Major Obstacle” to WBES 

Question “To What Extent Has Corruption of Bank Officials Had an Impact on Your Business?”

Notes: Response options were “no obstacle,” “minor obstacle,” “moderate obstacle,” and “major 

obstacle.” Because of the response rates and the numbers of respondents, differences between some 

countries may not be significant.

Figures in parentheses are the number of firms that responded in each country.
Page 56 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Appendix VI

Comments from USAID ApendxiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix VI

Comments from USAID

Page 57 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa
Appendix VI

Comments from USAID

Page 58 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa
Appendix VI

Comments from USAID

Page 59 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix VI

Comments from USAID

Page 60 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

See comment 3.

See comment 4.
Appendix VI

Comments from USAID

Page 61 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

See comment 5.
Appendix VI

Comments from USAID

Page 62 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa
Appendix VI

Comments from USAID

Page 63 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated April 2, 2004.

GAO Comments 1. Based on informal comments from USAID, we added information on 

formal and informal coordination of U.S. anticorruption assistance on 

pp. 20-21.

2. We agree with USAID that political will is important. See our discussion 

on p. 3 in the results in brief and on p. 5 in background, and in the 

lessons learned section on p. 32 of the report.

3. We appreciate USAID’s further elaboration on conditions required to 

make anticorruption agencies effective. We did not modify the text, 

since we believe we adequately addressed these conditions on pp. 27-28 

of the report. 

4. USAID cites examples already included in this report. We encourage 

USAID to increase the regularity and focus of evaluation of its 

anticorruption efforts to provide meaningful and quantifiable 

assessment of the programs’ performance and results.

5. We agree with USAID that high level diplomatic and coordinated policy 

dialog are key to anticorruption efforts. For that reason, we discussed 

the MCA initiative on pp.1 and 5 and the G-8 initiative on p.20, and 

provided a summary of key ongoing diplomatic efforts to establish 

international agreements addressing corruption in sub-Saharan Africa 

in appendix II.
Page 64 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

Appendix VII

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiVI

GAO Contact Phillip Herr (202) 512-8509

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the individual listed above, Nima Patel Edwards, Maria 

Oliver, Bruce Kutnick, Gezahegne Bekele, Ann Baker, Mark Dowling, 

Martin de Alteriis, and Reid Lowe made key contributions to this report.
Page 65 GAO-04-506 Anticorruption Assistance to Africa

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