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Consolidated Case No. 4:20cv236-RH-MJF

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

KIRK NIELSEN et al.,

Plaintiffs,

CONSOLIDATED

v. CASE NO. 4:20cv236-RH-MJF

RON DESANTIS et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________________________/

ORDER DENYING A PRELIMINARY 

INJUNCTION ON ALL ISSUES BUT ONE

The plaintiffs in these consolidated actions challenge Florida voting 

procedures. Three sets of plaintiffs have filed separate motions for a preliminary 

injunction. This order denies the motions on all issues but one and provides an 

abbreviated explanation. A more complete explanation is unnecessary because trial 

is imminent. Findings of fact and conclusions of law will be announced after the 

trial.

I. Governing Standard

As a prerequisite to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish a 

substantial likelihood of success on the merits, that the plaintiff will suffer 

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Consolidated Case No: 4:20cv236-RH/MJF

irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue, that the threatened injury 

outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause a defendant, and 

that the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. See, e.g., Charles H. 

Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005); Siegel v. 

LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

II. Likelihood of Success

This order addresses likelihood of success on the merits for only some of the 

claims and expresses no opinion on the others. The parties should draw no 

inference one way or the other about likely success on items not addressed in this 

section of this order. The ruling does not limit the evidence that may be presented 

or foreclose a contrary ruling at the forthcoming trial on the merits. 

First, the plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim that the 

defendants must provide postage for mailing in a ballot. The Twenty-Fourth 

Amendment prohibits a state from denying or abridging the right to vote in a 

federal election by reason of failure to pay “any poll tax or other tax.” The 

amendment means what it says. See Jones v. DeSantis, No. 4:19cv300, 2020 WL 

2618062 at *27-29 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2020). Postage charged by the United States 

Postal Service—like the fee charged by any other courier or the bus fare for getting 

to the polls to vote in person—is not a tax prohibited by the Twenty-Fourth 

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Amendment. And the requirement to pay postage also does not violate any other 

federal provision.

Second, the plaintiffs have not established that they are likely to succeed on 

their challenge to the election-day deadline for receipt of a mailed ballot. See 

VoteVets Action Fund v. Detzner, No. 4:18-cv-524-MW/CAS (N.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 

2018); see also Friedman v. Snipes, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1376-77 (S.D. Fla. 

2004). The plaintiffs say a Supervisor of Elections should accept ballots 

postmarked on or before election day, even if received later at the Supervisor’s

office. A state could reasonably so provide; some do. But at least as shown by this 

record, a state could also reasonably decide, as Florida has, to require receipt on or 

before election day. This eliminates the problem of missing, unclear, or even 

altered postmarks, eliminates delay that can have adverse consequences, and 

eliminates the remote possibility that in an extremely close election—Florida has 

had some—a person who did not vote on or before election day can fill out and 

submit a ballot later. 

Third, the Williams plaintiffs have not established likely success on some of 

the many items on their list of challenged provisions. See ECF No. 68 (also 

docketed in Case No. 1:20cv67 as ECF No. 108). This is so for items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 

6, 7, 15, 17, 18, 25, 30, and 33. The Williams plaintiffs have not established likely 

success on items 3, 4, and 5 because the claims are unlikely to succeed on the 

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Consolidated Case No: 4:20cv236-RH/MJF

merits based on the existing declarations of the covid-19 emergency, and the 

possibility of a different emergency declaration is too speculative to constitute an 

injury in fact.

III. Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiffs

The relevant time frame for analyzing irreparable harm is from now until 

issuance of a ruling after the July 20 trial. With one exception addressed below, the

plaintiffs have failed to show that they will suffer irreparable harm during that 

period in the absence of a preliminary injunction. Part of the explanation is that no 

elections will occur during that period—with the possible exception of one local 

election the plaintiffs have not even mentioned—and the plaintiffs can work 

around the alleged registration deficiencies.

This is an alternative basis for the denial of a preliminary injunction on the 

claims for which, as set out in section II above, the plaintiffs have not shown likely

success on the merits. This is the sole basis for the denial of a preliminary 

injunction on other claims. This makes it unnecessary to address the other 

prerequisites to a primary injunction: damage the proposed injunction may cause a 

defendant and the public interest. 

The exception is the claim that blind individuals have a right to cast a remote 

secret ballot. The Grubb plaintiffs say at least 45 days will be required for the State 

to order and put in place the system they say is necessary to redress the denial of 

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this right. The defendants have not yet responded to the Grubb motion. This order 

expresses no opinion on any of the four prerequisites to a preliminary injunction on 

this claim.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Williams plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion, ECF No. 86, is 

denied in part and remains pending in part.

2. The Nielsen plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion, ECF No. 89, is 

denied. 

3. The Grubb plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion, ECF No. 230,

remains pending.

SO ORDERED on June 24, 2020.

s/Robert L. Hinkle

United States District Judge

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