2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

9-25-2002

USA v. Shreffler

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 02-1062

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Shreffler" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 612.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 ___________ 

 No. 02-1062 

 ___________ 

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

 

 v. 

 SCOTT SHREFFLER, 

 Appellant 

 

 ___________ 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

 District Court Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell 

 (Criminal Action No. 01-cr-215) 

 ___________ 

 Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

 September 10, 2002 

 Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 

 (Opinion Filed: September 25, 2002) 

 ________________________ 

 OPINION OF THE COURT 

 ________________________ 

FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 

 Appellant Scott Shreffler ("Shreffler") challenges the District Court’s denial of his 

motion to dismiss the indictment. For the following reasons, we find that the substantive 

offenses with which Shreffler has been charged are not barred under the Double Jeopardy 

Clause as a result of his prior prosecution for conspiracy to commit the same offenses. 

Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Shreffler’s motion to dismiss the 

indictment. 

 On September 28, 1999, a jury found Shreffler and a co-defendant guilty of 

conspiracy to distribute in excess of 100 grams of heroin in violation of 18 U.S.C. 846. 

This court reversed Shreffler’s conviction because the Government had failed to prove the 

existence of an agreement necessary for conviction of conspiracy. United States v. Pressler, 

256 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2001). On July 11, 2001, the Government filed an indictment 

charging Shreffler with distribution of heroin, a crime not charged in the previous 

indictment. On October 15, 2001, Shreffler moved to dismiss the indictment on double 

jeopardy grounds. On December 12, 2001, the grand jury returned a more specific, 

superseding indictment charging Shreffler with twenty counts of distribution of heroin. On 

December 17, 2001, the District Court denied Shreffler’s motion to dismiss the indictment. 

Shreffler’s timely interlocutory appeal followed. 

 We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291. Pretrial 
orders denying motions to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds fall within the 

’collateral order exception’ to the final-judgment rule, and are thus ’final decisions’ within 

the meaning of 1291. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); 

Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977); United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 

61-62 (3d Cir. 1990). The applicable standard of review is plenary. United States v. 

Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 1986). 

 Shreffler argues that the indictment must be dismissed because the crimes charged: 

1) are based upon the same evidence presented in the earlier conspiracy prosecution; 2) were 

lesser included offenses of the charge previously prosecuted; and 3) were previously 

adjudicated by the District Court in computing his base offense level in the prior prosecution 

under a preponderance of the evidence standard. As a result, Shreffler argues, the charges 

are barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

 The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the duplicative prosecution of a defendant for 

the "same offence." U.S. Const., Amdt. 5; see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 

299 (1932). The Court has explained that "the introduction of relevant evidence of 

particular misconduct in a case is not the same thing as prosecution for that conduct," 

leading to the conclusion that "a mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not 

establish a double jeopardy violation." United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 387 (1992) 

(finding no double jeopardy violation where two of nine overt acts supporting conspiracy 

charge were previously prosecuted as substantive crimes); see also Esposito, 912 F.2d at 64- 

65 (finding no double jeopardy problem where the evidence to be introduced in narcotics 

prosecution was, in part, the same evidence introduced during earlier RICO conspiracy). 

Here, the superseding indictment charges Shreffler with the illegal conduct of distributing 

heroin. The prior indictment charged him with the illegal conduct of conspiring to distribute 

heroin. The fact that the same evidence will be used to prove that Shreffler actually 

distributed heroin as was used to prove that he conspired to distribute heroin does not bar 

the second prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

 It is true that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if one of the 

two offenses is a lesser included offense of the other, Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 519 

(1990), but the conspiracy to commit an offense and the offense itself are separate offenses 

for double jeopardy purposes. Felix, 503 U.S. at 390-91. In fact, the Court has said that 

"the same overt acts charged in a conspiracy count may also be charged and proved as 

substantive offenses, for the agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself." Unite

States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947). The Government charged Shreffler with 

engaging in a conspiracy to distribute heroin in the first prosecution. In the instant 

prosecution, however, the Government is charging Shreffler with the actual distribution of 

heroin. Underscording this point, this court noted in reversing the conspiracy conviction 

that the evidence at trial was more than sufficient to convict Shreffler of the crime of 

distribution of heroin even though the proof of an agreement was insufficient. Pressler, 256 

F.3d at 156-57. It is clear that the distribution charges are not lesser included offenses of 

the conspiracy charge, but rather, entirely distinct crimes. 

 Shreffler’s final argument on appeal is that the District Court’s finding at sentencing, 

by a preponderance of the evidence, that Shreffler had distributed the heroin that caused the 

overdose injuries of Joseph Stoner and Scott Knouse, amounted to a finding that there was 

not proof of the same beyond a reasonable doubt. The District Court’s determination at 

sentencing that the preponderance of the evidence burden was met is not equivalent to a 

finding that the reasonable doubt burden could not be met at trial. Shreffler’s argument is 

purely conjectural, and, therefore, meritless. 

 We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the indictment is not barred by the 

Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, for the reasons substantially set forth in the written 

opinion of the District Court, we will AFFIRM. 

 

 

 /s/ Julio M. Fuentes 

 Circuit Judg