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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

FLORIDA 

Tallahassee Division 

HOWARD L. TAYLOR, Sr. 

and SONYA R. TAYLOR, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. CASE NO: 4:20-CV-00059-AW-MJF 

FARM CREDIT OF NORTHWEST 

FLORIDA, ACA 

Defendant. 

 / 

PLAINTIFFS’ COMBINED RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO FARM 

CREDIT OF NORTHWEST FLORIDA, ACA’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT, RULE 56(D) MOTION TO DENY OR DEFER SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT AS PREMATURE AND INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM 

OF LAW 

Plaintiffs, HOWARD L. TAYLOR, SR. and SONYA R. TAYLOR, file this 

combined Response in Opposition (“Response”) to Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) [Doc. No. 49], Rule 56(d) Motion to Deny or Defer 

Summary Judgment as Premature (“Motion”) and Incorporated Memorandum of 

Law (“Motion”) and say: 

INTRODUCTION 

The Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims, alleging that 

the undisputed material facts show that the Taylors: 1) cannot establish that they 

were qualified for the loan sought from Defendant; 2) cannot identify comparators 

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who were treated more favorably; 3) cannot establish discriminatory animus; 4) 

cannot establish damages; and 5) cannot obtain relief because the loan transaction is 

not governed by Chapter 760.20 et seq. Florida Statutes. ...” [Doc. No. 49]. 

Although the Taylors assert that Rule 56(d) applies to the MSJ, in toto, the Taylors 

bifurcate and respond as set forth below rather risk partial summary judgment 

entered against them based on a finding that some portions of the MSJ did not fall 

under the ambit of the Motion. 

Rule 56(d) Motion to Deny or Defer Summary Judgment as Premature 

Standard 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), provides “[i]f a nonmovant shows by affidavit or 

declaration1

 that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its 

opposition, the court may ... defer considering the motion or deny it[.]” To defeat 

the MSJ, the Taylors must present affirmative evidence showing a genuine issue of 

material fact, “even where the evidence is likely to be within the possession of the 

defendant.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). However, 

this general rule only holds true so “long as the plaintiff has had a full opportunity 

to conduct discovery.” Id. see also Snook v. Tr. Co. of Georgia Bank of Savannah, 

N.A., 859 F.2d 865, 870 (11th Cir. 1988) (“This Court has often noted that summary 

judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an 

1

 The Declaration of the undersigned is attached as Exhibit E. 

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adequate opportunity for discovery.” “[T]he whole purpose of discovery in a case in 

which a motion for summary judgment is filed is to give the opposing party an 

opportunity to discover as many facts as are available and he considers essential to 

enable him to determine whether he can honestly file opposing affidavits.” Jackson 

v. Red Hills Oral & Facial Surgery, PA, Jackson v. Red Hills Oral & Facial Surgery, 

PA, 4:19-CV-88-AW/MJF, 2020 WL 1124764 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2020), report and 

recommendation adopted sub nom. Jackson v. Red Hills Oral & Facial Surgery, 

P.A., 4:19-CV-88-AW-MJF, 2020 WL 1078760 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2020). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) is liberally construed to allow district courts to ensure 

the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to make their record complete 

before ruling on a motion for summary judgment and it is within the sound discretion 

of the district judge to grant a continuance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). Wallace v. 

Brownell Pontiac-GMC Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 525, 528 (11th Cir. 1983). To invoke the 

protection of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), the nonmoving party must explain: “(1) what 

facts are sought and how they are to be obtained; (2) how those facts are reasonably 

expected to create a genuine issue of material fact; (3) what effort the affiant has 

made to obtain them; and (4) why the affiant was unsuccessful in these efforts.” 

Hickman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 152 F.R.D. 216, 221 (M.D. Fla. 1993), aff'd, 58 

F.3d 640 (11th Cir. 1995). Finally, “there is nothing to suggest that Plaintiff's failure 

to conduct discovery was due to inactivity or delay.” Estate of Todashev by Shibly 

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v. United States, 815 Fed. Appx. 446, 454 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing to Walters v. City 

of Ocean Springs, 626 F.2d 1317, 1321 (5th Cir. 1980))(“Unless dilatory or lacking 

in merit, [a Rule 56(d)] motion should be liberally treated.”); Id. at 1322 (“The most 

common situation in which Rule 56[ (d) ] will not be applied to aid a nondiligent 

party arises when the nonmovant has complied with Rule 56[(d)] but has failed to 

make use of the various discovery mechanisms that are at his disposal or seeks a 

continuance of the motion for that purpose.”). 

Argument 

On May 12, 2020, the Taylors’ initial complaint was dismissed with leave to 

file an amended complaint. [Doc. No. 18]. In dismissing, the Court referenced that 

the complaint only “included vague and general claims that minority credit 

applicants do not fare well with Farm Credit Florida; that the Taylors do not know 

of any non-minority potential borrowers denied under the same circumstances.” 

[Doc. No. 18:8]. The Court referenced Arafat v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, 549 

Fed. Appx. 872 (11th Cir. 2013), to identify the need for valid comparators as the 

case proceeds. See Arafat, 549 Fed. Appx. at 874. Farm Credit moved to dismiss the 

Taylors’ amended complaint on June 16, 2020 [Doc. No. 22] arguing: 

“The Taylors assert loans made to white borrowers far exceed loans made to black 

borrowers based on the number of successful loans made to white borrowers versus 

black borrowers. However, the statistics relied upon by the Taylors are 

meaningless without knowing the number of applications Farm Credit received 

for loans from both non-black borrowers and black borrowers. ... Because the 

Taylors have failed to identify the number of black and non-black applicants who 

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applied for loans in 2018, 2019, and 2020, no reasonable inferences can be drawn 

from the number of loans actually made by Farm Credit. ... Further, in the 

absence of any comparators, the Taylors may be able to establish a viable claim if 

they can show the identified decision-maker had a discriminatory motive. 

[Doc. No. 22] 

Meanwhile before the Court ruled on the Defendant’s second motion to 

dismiss, the parties engaged in discovery via interrogatories and requests for 

production. On September 18, 2020, Plaintiffs served their First Request for 

Production To Defendants (“First RFP”), attached as Exhibit A. The First RFP 

specifically included a request for comparator information. On October 30, 2020, 

Defendant's served their response to the First RFP which stated: 

“Farm Credit objects to the request on grounds that the request is vague, 

overbroad, and unduly burdensome. The request is vague with respect to the portion 

seeking “all documents necessary to fully understand the contents of all electronic 

data produced,” which is subjective and does not reasonably advise as to the 

documents sought. The request is overbroad and unduly burdensome as Plaintiffs 

appear to ask for data related to every loan originated over the last three years 

without regard to whether or not the loan has anything to do with the pleadings, 

whether or not the individuals are comparators to Plaintiffs, whether or not the 

individuals are similarly situated to the Plaintiffs, whether or not the individuals had 

prior bankruptcies like the Plaintiffs, whether or not the individuals had similar 

credit scores to the Plaintiffs, whether or not the individuals debt to income ratio was 

similar to the Plaintiffs, or whether the amount of the loan relative to the individual’s 

income was similar to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the breadth of 

the documents sought are relevant to a claim or defense, the documents have a 

tendency to make a fact more or less probable, or the request is proportional to the 

needs of the case.” 

While the parties attempted to resolve Defendant’s objection to this request at 

a good faith conferral, the parties could not reach an agreement. To the Defendant’s 

credit, though, some documents were produced, including items such as documents 

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and applications that the Taylors provided to the Defendant, bits and pieces 

(generous characterization) of the Defendant’s credit and underwriting policies; and 

a handful of internal emails. On January 6, 2021, the Court entered an Order 

Granting in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 27]. The Court noted that 

the amended complaint alleged new facts, notably that the Taylor’s alleged that 

“although Farm Credit told the Taylors their past bankruptcies were problematic, it 

made loans to white borrowers with past bankruptcies (identifying several 

examples). And, it alleges, the vast majority of all Farm Credit’s loans are to white 

borrowers ...” [Doc. No. 27:2-3]. The Court then informs that comparator evidence 

is part of the Taylors’ prima facie case and not considered at the pleading stage. On 

February 3, 2021, the Taylors filed their second amended complaint [Doc. No. 36] 

comprised of three counts: Count I- Violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 

of 1972; Count II – Violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; and Count III – Violation of § 

760.20, Fla. Stat. Ann.. et seq. which, amongst other things, added significant 

statistics the Taylors derived directly from public records showing an undeniable 

imbalance in loans made to white borrowers versus loans made to every other racial 

group the Defendant made real estate loans to since January 1, 2010. The Taylors 

alleged that between January 1, 2010 and May 4, 2020, the Defendant loaned: 

“$346,560,713 to borrowers where the loans were secured by real estate 

mortgages. The loans were made to 2011 white or white owned 

business borrowers and 38 black or black owned business borrowers. 

The 2011 white borrowers borrowed $339,881,949 (98.07% of the total 

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amount loaned) while the 38 black borrowers borrowed $2,320,370

(.67% of the total amount loaned). 

[Doc No. 30:22]. 

When asked in deposition about its specific denial to this allegation in its 

answer, the Defendant admitted that it had no facts or documentation evidencing that 

the allegation was false, nor did it have any documents supporting the contention 

that the allegation was false. [Doc. No. 48-9:83, 84-86]. 

On April 9, 2021, the Taylors served their second request for production on 

Defendant attached as Exhibit B. The Taylors narrowed their request and requested 

certain account and underwriting data for loan applicants going back five years. The 

request asked for the following information as to each loan applicant: 

a. the date of the Loan Applicant’s application; 

b. The Loan Applicant’s credit score and/or credit tier assigned; 

c. The Loan Applicant’s bankruptcy history; 

d. The Loan Applicant’s race or ethnicity; 

e. The Loan Applicant’s combined debt-to-income ratio; 

f. The Loan Applicant’s combined loan-to-value ratio; 

g. The Loan Applicant’s “Equity Ratio” 

h. The Loan Applicant’s total gross monthly income; 

i. The Loan Applicants collateral and statement of value; 

j. The Loan Applicant’s education; 

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k. The Loan Applicant’s occupation or profession; 

l. Whether the Loan Applicant’s Loan was approved or denied; 

m. Whether the Loan Applicant was an existing patron or customer or 

account holder at the time the Loan Applicant’s Loan application; 

n. Whether the Loan Applicant’s Loan application contained any 

exceptions to any of Farm Credit’s lending policies and procedures or 

credit weakness as defined in Farm Credit’s lending policies and 

procedures; and how such exceptions were mitigated or not mitigated; 

and 

o. If under paragraph n immediately above, Farm Credit mitigated any 

exceptions to any of Farm Credit’s lending policies and procedures or 

credit weaknesses as defined in Farm Credit’s lending policies and 

procedures, how such exceptions or credit weaknesses were mitigated. 

On May 10, 2021, the Defendant served its response to the Taylors’ second 

request for production asserting that the request was overbroad, unduly burdensome 

and not proportional to the case and further that the information sought was 

irrelevant. See Exhibit C. The Defendant did not try to respond to any of the requests.

On May 13, 2021, the Taylors filed a Motion to Compel Discovery [Doc. 41] 

explaining that they have been frustrated in their attempts to obtain proper discovery 

to locate, among other things, proper comparator evidence. The Taylors explained 

why they needed the information and why it was discoverable. Finally, the Taylors 

advised the Court that numerous depositions, including those of corporate 

representatives, were scheduled for completion before the discovery cutoff of June 

7, 2021 and that the documents were necessary for meaningful depositions. The 

Taylors requested an expedited hearing and that the Defendant be ordered to produce 

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all responsive documents, along with an extension of the discovery cutoff date 

proportionate to the time taken by the Defendant to make proper production plus 

sufficient time afterward to prepare for the depositions. Despite the Taylors’ efforts 

to explain why their requests were necessary and the Defendant’s objections 

unconvincing, the Motion to Compel was denied on June 15, 2021, seven days after 

the expiration of the discovery deadline and the completion of the depositions. 

In denying the Motion to Compel, the Court found the Taylors’ production 

request was “overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of 

the case.” The Taylors respectfully disagree. Here, the Taylors must make a 

sufficient factual showing to permit a reasonable jury to rule in their favor. Proving 

discrimination, particularly in credit transactions, may be done in a variety of ways: 

a. Through the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme 

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 

L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1217 

(11th Cir. 2019); Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 

2011) (“establishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and 

never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary 

judgment motion in an employment discrimination case.”). As the en banc Eleventh 

Circuit has explained, when proceeding under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff 

bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by 

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showing (1) that she belongs to a protected class, (2) that she was subjected to an 

adverse employment action, (3) that she was qualified to perform the job in question, 

and (4) that her employer treated “similarly situated” employees outside her class 

more favorably. This last prong, in vernacular, is comparator evidence. The standard 

for comparator evidence is similarly situated in all material respects, which is “to be 

worked out in a case-by-case basis.” Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 

1213 (11th Cir. 2019); 

b. Through a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence. Lewis v. 

City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Among other 

things, a proper comparator simply may not exist in every workplace. Accordingly, 

a “plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he presents ... ‘a convincing 

mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional 

discrimination.’”) Id. “A ‘convincing mosaic’ may be shown by evidence that 

demonstrates, among other things, (1) ‘suspicious timing, ambiguous statements ..., 

and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be 

drawn,’ (2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated employees, and (3) 

that the employer’s justification is pretextual.” Lewis, 934 F.3d at 1185. 

c. Other courts have thrown wrinkles into McDonnell Douglas designed 

specifically for credit discrimination cases. Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 

1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (using the effects test for disparate impact framework, which 

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the Taylors may utilize); Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 

2010): 

“In order to make out a prima facie case of lending discrimination in 

a § 1981 case, a plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a protected 

class, (2) that he applied and was qualified for credit that was available 

from the defendant, (3) that his application was denied or that its 

approval was made subject to unreasonable or overly burdensome 

conditions, and (4) that some additional evidence exists that establishes 

a causal nexus between the harm suffered and the plaintiff's 

membership in a protected class, from which a reasonable juror could 

infer, in light of common experience, that the defendant acted with 

discriminatory intent.” 

Accord BNT Ad Agency, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 837 Fed. Appx. 962 (4th Cir. 

2020) (“Having considered the applicability of various burden-shifting frameworks 

utilized in the lending context, we conclude that the district court properly held 

that 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 sets forth the nature of the showing to be made to establish 

a prima facie case in a § 1981 lending discrimination case.”) see also Sallion v. 

SunTrust Bank, Atlanta, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (“When adjusted to 

fit the context of the case sub judice, the framework is as follows: [Sallion] must 

first make out a prima facie case by showing: “1) that [s]he is a member of a 

protected class; 2) that [s]he applied for and was qualified for a loan from the 

defendant; 3) that the loan was rejected despite h[er] qualifications; and 4) that the 

defendant continued to approve loans for applicants with qualifications similar to 

the plaintiffs.”). For their § 1981 claim, the Taylors have the additional burden of 

showing that race was a but-for cause of the discrimination, not merely a motivating 

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factor. Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 

1014 (2020). 

Each of the foregoing require the Taylors to prove they were qualified for the 

loan they sought and some level of comparator evidence, thus the Court should have 

ordered production of the loan files for three primary reasons, the first and second 

of which are more fully explained in the undersigned’s Declaration: First, to locate 

comparator evidence. Second, to obtain proof that the Taylors were qualified for the 

loan they sought by eliminating the ambiguous and ever-changing (depending on 

who is giving the explanation) reasons for denial. Third, to validate the statistical 

evidence compiled by the Taylors and establish their statistical significance to show 

discriminatory intent and/or to utilize the statistics under Lewis II, Cherry, Andersen 

or BNT as additional evidence. At deposition, the Defendant admitted it retained 

loan applicant files where the loan request was at some point denied, “Q. What’s in 

the files?” “A. We do keep a database of all of the adverse actions that go out, the 

actual form, files, what all would be in our regular loan files.” “Q. So if there was 

an application, that would be in there?” “A. Yes.” [Doc. 48-9:91-96]. These files 

were never produced to the Taylors despite their relevance and informational value. 

The Defendant also admitted at deposition that it had files for all loans made since 

2015, at which time the Defendant enacted a policy which required a copy of photo 

identification for real estate loans. [Doc. 48-9:81-85]. These files were also never 

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produced to the Taylors despite their relevance and informational value. The two 

sets of files, when coupled, form the universe of documents that the Taylors need to 

prove their case. As the Court noted, “The raw figures [statistics alleged by the 

Taylors in their amended complaint] do not report, for example, what percentage of 

loan applicants [emphasis in original] were black. So despite the relatively small 

number of black borrowers, it may be that black applicants are approved as a higher

[emphasis in original] rate than white applicants – the numbers simply don’t say.” 

[Doc. No. 27:4]. The Court is spot-on and the only way to satisfy the Court’s open 

observation is through the analysis of the applicant and loan files in the sole custody 

and control of the Defendant. There is no other possible way to do it. If the 

Defendant is to be believed when it says that blacks do not apply for loans, the 

applicant files and the loan files should bear that out. The Court may be right, that 

is, blacks may not apply or may get approved at a rate higher than whites or some 

other explanation may exist. But, what if the reverse is true and fifty, or sixty or 

eighty or ninety percent of the denied applicants were black or some other minority. 

The only way to confirm that is to review the loan and applicant files. At deposition, 

the Defendant made much to-do about having the files the Taylors needed, but there 

was no racial data in them. Even if that were true, which it is not, it does not matter 

because there is more than one way to skin that cat. The Taylors viewed every single 

mortgage recorded where the Defendant was a lender since January 1, 2010. From 

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those public documents, the Taylors derived the loan amount, the location of the 

collateral, the borrower’s address, the corporate structure and officers of corporate 

borrowers and most important the race of every single borrower that has ever held a 

drivers license in the State of Florida. Thus, the Defendant is not to be believed when 

it says that none of the files are of any value because there is no box to be checked 

on any document which indicates race or that a closing agent may have forgotten to 

get a copy of a photo identification when documents were being notarized. 

 Through no fault of their own, the Taylors have been denied the opportunity 

to fully and fairly discover material directly relevant to and necessary for their claims 

because of the Defendant’s refusal to produce documents. The discovery process 

depends on the parties participating in good faith, which the Defendant has not done. 

“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 

any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(b)(1). Although the Court found differently, the Taylors do not believe their 

requests overbroad, unduly burdensome or out of proportion. Based on the 

information that the Taylors have compiled, the Defendant has nearly exclusively 

loaned to whites only during the past ten years. In fact, there are several years where 

the Defendant did not make a real estate loan to a single black borrower, full stop. 

This is especially suspect given that some counties where the Defendant does 

business have a majority population made up of racial minorities. Thus, the Taylors 

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requests should not strike the Court as offensive because if the Court looks at what 

the Taylors actually asked for, it will see that the substance of each request and how 

it applies. For example, the Taylors learned at deposition that not every “ratio” 

applies to every loan or every borrower. But, there is no way to tell how and which 

“ratios” were properly applied to the Taylors, in terms of being qualified for the loan 

they sought, without looking at other loan files. That is the type of information that 

goes directly to the elements that the Taylors bear the burden of proving at trial. Over 

the course of a week, the Taylors deposed (without the benefit of discovery) two 

corporate representatives, the chief lending officer, the chief credit officer, the east 

region lending manager, a member of the board of directors that served as the chief 

executive officer of the Credit Review Committee, a loan underwriter and a lending 

officer. Essentially the who’s who of the Defendant and between those witnesses 

hardly a consistent answer on loan policy, underwriting guidelines and criteria, 

borrower eligibility, and the interplay between the Defendant and guaranteed 

lending was given. The Supreme Court has stressed on multiple occasions the need 

to construe the Rules liberally to allow for robust discovery. Akridge v. Alfa Mut. 

Ins. Co., 1 F.4th 1271 (11th Cir. 2021) citing 

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947) (advising that “the discovery 

provisions are to be applied as broadly and liberally as possible”); see 

also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114 (1964) (beginning its analysis “with 

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the basic premise ‘that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and 

liberal treatment’ ”). And since the Rules “strongly favor full discovery whenever 

possible,” Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, 741 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2013), a 

civil litigant is generally entitled to “any information sought if it appears reasonably 

calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Degen v. United States, 

517 U.S. 820, 825–26 (1996) (internal quotation mark omitted). Information “need 

not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Because 

“[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts ... is essential to proper litigation ... 

either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his 

possession.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. But “discovery, like all matters of 

procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries.” Id. The Taylors have been 

honorable and patient litigants, never pestering the Court to complain about every 

nit and noid that arises. Their requests for production were legitimate and brought in 

good faith seeking to secure only the documents necessary to support their claims. 

To be sure, this was no fishing expedition by the Taylors and they should not have 

been denied discovery. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both 

parties is essential to proper litigation.” Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. The Defendant 

has admitted under oath that it has the documents requested by the Taylors. Any 

burden brought about by having to produce them must be viewed as outweighed by 

the benefit of obtaining a full and accurate understanding of the facts in the pursuit 

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of a just result. See Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir. 1960) (“The 

[discovery] rules are in the interest of the administration of justice and transcend in 

importance mere inconvenience to a party litigant.”). 

 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs HOWARD L. TAYLOR, SR. and SONYA R. 

TAYLOR request an Order denying Defendant, Farm Credit of Northwest Florida, 

ACA’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Alternatively, Plaintiffs request an Order 

deferring ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, reopening 

discovery to compel Defendant to produce the documents requested under Plaintiffs’ 

Second Request for Production and allowing the taking or retaking of depositions 

based on evidence discovered. 

RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Plaintiffs, HOWARD L. TAYLOR, SR. and SONYA R. TAYLOR, respond 

in opposition to Defendant, FARM CREDIT OF NORTHWEST FLORIDA ACA’s, 

Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 49] and say: 

INTRODUCTION 

The Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims, alleging that 

the undisputed material facts show that the Taylors: 1) cannot establish that they 

were qualified for the loan sought from Defendant; 2) cannot identify comparators 

who were treated more favorably; 3) cannot establish discriminatory animus; 4) 

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cannot establish damages; and 5) cannot obtain relief because the loan transaction is 

not governed by Chapter 760.20 et seq. Florida Statutes. ...” [Doc. No. 49]. As 

briefed above, the Taylors assert that Rule 56(d) applies to the Defendant’s motion, 

in toto, the Taylors bifurcate and respond as set forth below rather risk partial 

summary judgment entered against them based on a finding that some portions of 

the Defendant’s motion did not fall under the ambit of Rule 56(d). 

STANDARD 

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Defendant, as the party seeking summary 

judgment, bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 

for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which 

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Clark v. Coats 

& Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing 

on an essential element of his case with respect to which it has the burden of proof—

that a genuine dispute of material fact exists—the moving party is entitled to 

summary judgment. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. “In reviewing whether the 

nonmoving party has met its burden, the court must stop short of weighing the 

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evidence and making credibility determinations of the truth of the matter...the 

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 

drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998–99 (11th 

Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). An issue is genuine if “a 

reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the nonmoving party.” Miccosukee 

Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48). A fact is material if it “might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

247–48). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury 

could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. A 

self-serving and uncorroborated affidavit can create a genuine dispute of material 

fact (United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 858 (11th Cir. 2018)), but “[c]onclusory 

allegations and speculation are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 

fact.” Glasscox v. Argo, City of, 903 F.3d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 2018). “If more 

than one inference could be construed from the facts by a reasonable fact finder, and 

that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the district court 

should not grant summary judgment.” Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 

F.2d 989, 996 (11th Cir. 1990). 

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20 

Genuine issues of material facts exist such that the Defendant has not carried 

its burden and is not entitled to summary judgment. In addition, for those issues 

identified below for which the Taylors cannot formulate a response because of the 

unavailability of facts, the Taylors incorporate the facts and argument of their Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(d) motion, above, into this response in opposition. 

DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT 

B. The Taylors Cannot Establish Discrimination Via Statistics 

The Defendant’s argument here is difficult to discern. The Defendant alleges 

that to prove discriminatory intent based on “statistics alone”, the statistics must be 

statistically significant in the mathematical sense and then cites to the same case 

cited by the Court in Doc. No. 27. The problem with this argument is threefold. First, 

the cited case is a pattern and practice case which stands for the proposition that to 

establish a plausible inference of discriminatory intent under § 1981 by using 

statistics alone, the statistics must not only be statistically significant in the 

mathematical sense, but they must also be of a level that makes other plausible nondiscriminatory explanations very unlikely. Burgis v. New York City Dept. of 

Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2015). The record is devoid of any evidence that 

that is what the Taylors are attempting to do. Statistics may be used under the 

McDonnell Douglas construct to support a finding of pretext. 

Mitchell v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach County, Florida, 19-CVCase 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 20 of 36
21 

81534, 2021 WL 1381325 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2021), report and recommendation a

dopted, 19-CIV-81534-RAR, 2021 WL 1381257 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2021) citing 

Roberson v. Snow, 404 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D.D.C. 2005) and Cook v. Boorstin, 763 

F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Similarly, nothing prevents statistics as part of the 

convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence under Lewis v. City of Union City, 

Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019). Likewise, statistics could be 

included in the additional evidence discussed in Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. 

Corp., 621 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2010) and BNT Ad Agency, LLC v. City of 

Greensboro, 837 Fed. Appx. 962 (4th Cir. 2020). As the Court noted in it Order 

[Doc. No. 27], which was rendered before the Taylors’ second amended complaint 

which alleged even more facts and statistics, “If the Taylors relied on these statistics 

alone, I would have no trouble concluding that it was not enough. ... But the figures 

here were accompanied by other facts that – taken all together – nudged things across 

the line. Again, just barely.” The Defendant next argues that the Taylors have no 

“admissible record evidence” of any statistics that establish the Defendant’s 

“discriminatory animus”. The Defendant is wrong. The Taylors alleged that between 

January 1, 2010 and May 4, 2020, the Defendant loaned: 

“$346,560,713 to borrowers where the loans were secured by real estate 

mortgages. The loans were made to 2011 white or white owned 

business borrowers and 38 black or black owned business borrowers. 

The 2011 white borrowers borrowed $339,881,949 (98.07% of the total 

amount loaned) while the 38 black borrowers borrowed $2,320,370

(.67% of the total amount loaned). 

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[Doc No. 30:22]. 

In it answer, the Defendant denied this allegation. However, when asked in 

deposition about its specific denial to this allegation in its answer, the Defendant 

admitted that it had no facts or documentation evidencing that the allegation was 

false, nor did it have any documents supporting the contention that the allegation 

was false. [Doc. No. 48-9:83, 84-86]. Those answers on behalf of the Defendant bind 

the Defendant and establish that the Defendant has no defensible basis for 

challenging the Taylors statistical allegations. This is both a genuine issue and a 

material fact that is in dispute. The Defendant then objects to the Taylors’ lack of 

expert testimony on statistics and the lack of statistical analysis. As has been hashed 

and rehashed from the outset, The statistics alleged by the Taylors are one-half of 

the picture. Only the Defendant has the information to complete the picture and it 

has refused to produce the information. Only when that information is produced and 

analyzed can the statistical analysis be performed by the Taylors’ expert. The cases 

cited by the Defendant in support of their argument on this actually support the 

Taylors’ position here and in their Rule 56(d) motion, above, in that until the 

Defendant produces the information it admitted it has on hand, it remains unknown 

how blacks and other minority applicants were treated by the Defendant. What is 

known, though, is that the Defendant admitted that it has no evidence to rebut the 

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Taylors’ statistical allegations, no matter how flawed or meritless the Defendant 

believes they are. 

C. The Taylors Cannot Establish a Prima Facie Claim Under McDonnell 

Douglas 

i. The Taylors Cannot Identify a Valid Comparator 

 For the reasons set forth above in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) motion, the 

Taylors admit that they cannot identify a valid comparator because the Defendant 

has refused to produce the any information or a single document which would allow 

the Taylors to at least attempt to locate comparator evidence. Moreover, in denying 

the Taylors’ Motion to Compel [Doc. No. 45] after the discovery cutoff, the Court 

foreclosed any opportunity the Taylors may have had to locate any comparator 

evidence. That said, the Court found in its Order [Doc. No. 27] that the comparators 

that the Taylors identified at the pleading stage helped nudge the Court into a finding 

of plausibility. The remainder of the Defendant’s argument on this point is 

misguided. 

 Troubling, the Defendant has misrepresented the Taylors’ discovery 

responses regarding comparators. Simply, the Defendant raised an issue regarding a 

response to an interrogatory which, at best, was ludicrous. Aside but important, the 

interrogatory and the Taylors’ response was directed at the Taylors’ amended 

complaint which, as the Court knows, was superseded by the Taylors’ second 

amended complaint which the Defendant answered. Notwithstanding, the Defendant 

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believed that the Taylors waived all of their claims because “they do not contend 

that similarly situated individuals were treated differently by the Defendant.” That 

is not what the Taylors said. In the abundance of caution, the Taylors supplemented 

their interrogatory response to make abundantly clear the import of their original 

response. Exhibit D. 

ii. The Taylors fail to identify the decision-maker who was aware of any 

comparators 

For the reasons set forth above in their Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) motion, the 

Taylors admit that they cannot identify a valid comparator, or a decision-maker who 

was aware of any comparators, because the Defendant has refused to produce the 

any information or a single document which would allow the Taylors to at least 

attempt to locate comparator evidence. Moreover, in denying the Taylors’ Motion 

to Compel [Doc. No. 45] after the discovery cutoff, the Court foreclosed any 

opportunity the Taylors may have had to locate any comparator evidence. 

iii. The Taylors cannot show they were qualified for the loan 

The Defendant cites only two reasons supporting its contention that the 

Taylors were not qualified for the loan. The Defendant cites the Taylors’ bankruptcy 

as the first reason. In support, the Defendant analogizes between its lending policy 

and the “identical polic[y]” of its sister institution, Farm Credit of Southwest 

Georgia (“SWG”), and says that the reason the Taylors’ loan was denied there was 

because of bankruptcy. That is untrue and not supported by the record. During his 

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25 

deposition, Tarrell Bennett, a 49 year employee, current chief lending officer of 

SWG who had “held just about every position there is in the Association from time 

to time” was specifically asked about the effect of the bankruptcy on the Taylors’ 

original loan request (which was transferred to the Defendant and denied) and on 

their second loan request (which SWG approved after the Defendant denied the 

Taylors’ original loan request): 

Q I will ask you one quick question about these two documents again. Is it 

your understanding from exhibit 2 and 3 that the reason that the Taylors were 

denied was the existence of a bankruptcy? 

A That's the reason that's on the exhibits. 

Q Okay. We established earlier on that the Taylors are current customers of 

Southwest Georgia of the loan you said you worked on. What changed? Let 

me withdraw. They applied for the first loan, apparently they were denied 

because bankruptcy existed. Did the bankruptcy disappear? 

A No. 

Q It still existed then at the time of the second loan? 

A I am not sure. I am not sure whether it had been discharged, I don't 

remember whether it had been discharged, or whether it was prior to discharge. 

I don't remember that sequence of events. 

Q But to your knowledge, working on their second loan, do you have any 

reason to believe that the bankruptcy was off of their credit history? 

A No. 

[Doc. 48-5:19-2-24] 

Q Understood, okay. When you were working with the Taylors, did you find 

them to be responsive to all Southwest Georgia's requests? 

A Very. 

Q Did you find them to be honest? 

A Yes. 

Q Are they timely honoring their pending obligations? 

A Very. 

Q Did they ever explain their bankruptcy to you? 

A They did. 

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Q Did you believe them? 

A I did. 

Q Have you ever made loans to borrowers that have had bankruptcies in the 

past? 

A I have. 

Q So bankruptcies, then, are not an automatic exclusion, at least as far as 

Southwest Georgia; is that accurate? 

A I would say the answer to that would be partially depending on the Chapter 

or the bankruptcy that they filed. A reorganization type bankruptcy that I think 

was what they filed, a Chapter 13, I think is what they filed. We take the 

position that if they have reestablished credit, good credit after the bankruptcy, 

or during the bankruptcy and after the bankruptcy, we will consider a loan. 

Q Okay. And I guess it's fair to say that because the Taylors ultimately got a 

loan, that they established their good credit after the bankruptcy, enough to 

satisfy Southwest Georgia? 

A That, along with the explanation of why they filed bankruptcy in the first 

place, the most recent 

bankruptcy. 

Q In your experience as an underwriter and a lending officer and chief lending 

officer, have you ever had a situation where you have used the existence of a 

bankruptcy that is 30 years old to deny someone credit? 

A Not to my memory. 

[Doc. 48-5:23-8-25; 24-1-25; 251-4] 

On cross, Defendant’s counsel attempted to lock Mr. Bennett into the bankruptcy 

response, but was unable to. 

Q Why was the initial loan decision upheld after the Credit Review 

Committee convened? 

A Because there was no reason to change the decision. 

Q Is that because the bankruptcy was still on their record? 

A I don't know. 

Q You sat on the committee that made the decision, correct? 

A That's correct, that upheld the original decision, because there was no 

reason to change the 

decision. 

Q Why was there no reason to change the decision? 

A The committee makes its determination based on the information that had 

already been presented. 

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MR. KENDRICK: (Indicating.) 

THE WITNESS: Ask me that, again, please. 

BY MS. BOYD: 

Q Did the attorney just provide you with information that would give you a 

different answer? 

MR. KENDRICK: No, I wanted him to tell y'all whether he knew during that 

time period that the Taylors lost their deal they had applied for through 

Northwest Florida. When did he know that. I think there is something off 

within the record, and if that is something I could assist him with. And he may 

not have known. 

THE WITNESS: I did know. And because of that, there was no reason to -- 

that loan could not be made as requested, because the property that was applied 

for was no longer available to purchase. 

[Doc. 48-5:30-16-25;31-1-22] 

 The Defendant has also misstated the record concerning Janus, one of the 

three lenders specializing in agricultural loans. Janus, contrary to the Defendant’s 

assertion, did not deny the Taylors’ loan application because of bankruptcy: 

Q· · So it's my understanding Janus denied your · ·loan because of your 

bankruptcy; is that right? 

A· · No.· She said I had to wait another three or ·four months for it to clear. 

Q· · Because you couldn't get the underwriting ·because of the 

bankruptcy; correct? 

A· · The criteria called for 48 months to be ·discharged, but everything else 

looked good.· And if I ·wanted to continue after those months, we could. 

Q· · As of June 2019, Janus told you they could not make the loan because 

of your bankruptcy; correct? 

A· · I disagree with that, because in another three or four months that wouldn't 

have been an issue. 

Q· · I'm not asking about three or four months later.· In June of 2019, 

Janus Mortgage could not make your loan because of your bankruptcy; 

correct? 

A· · I disagree. 

[Doc. No. 48-1:218-24-25; 219-1-15] 

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28 

While it is undisputed that the Taylors’ had a bankruptcy on their record, the 

record evidence shows that neither of the lenders cited by the Defendant denied 

the Taylors’ loan application because of bankruptcy. 

 The second reason the Defendant gives in support of the Taylors not being 

qualified for the loan is “the Taylors failed to meet other Farm Credit underwriting 

criteria that would allow for an exception.” Even if the Taylors understood what 

the Defendant was saying here, which they do not, the allegation is insufficient to 

require a response. When the nonmoving party, here the Taylors, has the burden 

of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to “support its motion with 

affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's 

claim,” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, in order to discharge this “initial 

responsibility.” Instead, the moving party simply may “ ‘show[ ]’—that is, point[ 

] out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 317. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. 

In the Eleventh Circuit, though, “[e]ven after Celotex, it is never enough simply 

to state that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at 

trial.” Clark, 929 F.2d 604; Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J., 

concurring) (“it is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting 

the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no 

evidence to prove his case”). Simply saying that the Taylors failed to meet 

Case 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 28 of 36
29 

underwriting criteria doesn’t carry the Defendant’s burden. Instead, the moving 

party must point to specific portions of the record in order to demonstrate that the 

nonmoving party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 

2553 (“a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility 

... of identifying those portions of the materials on file which demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue of material fact” (emphasis added)).

iv. The Taylors cannot show any evidence of pretext 

Like the above assertion, the Taylors can make no sense of this argument. 

Likewise, the Defendant’s case citations do not remotely stand for the propositions 

loosely advanced. The Am Dental case is a RICO and Racketeering case dealing 

with the pleading standard under Twombly about whether factual allegations were 

sufficiently pled under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Likewise, the Molina case has absolutely 

nothing to do with evidence of pretext or burden shifting. In fact, the word “pretext” 

does not appear anywhere in the case, let alone at the pin citation. Absent any legal 

authority whatsoever, and for the reasons set forth directly above, the Defendant’s 

allegations here cannot satisfy its burdens on summary judgment. 

D. The Taylors cannot show a convincing mosaic of discrimination 

With nothing further than recitation of the law, the Defendant next alleges that 

the Taylors cannot satisfy the alternative McDonnell Douglas framework under 

Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019). Like 

Case 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 29 of 36
30 

the two immediately above arguments, the Defendant cannot carry its burden on 

summary judgment merely by saying that the Taylors cannot prove something. 

Clark, 929 F.2d 604; see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J., 

concurring) (“it is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting 

the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no 

evidence to prove his case”). The Defendant has repeated the requirement that a 

decision-maker is required for an intentional discrimination case, the Taylors almost 

began believing it. Lewis has no requirement that a decisionmaker be identified as 

part and parcel of the “convincing mosaic” construct. Instead, Lewis stands for the 

proposition that: 

“Not every employee subjected to unlawful discrimination will be able 

to produce a similarly situated comparator. Among other things, a 

proper comparator simply may not exist in every work place. 

Accordingly, a “plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he 

presents ... ‘a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would 

allow a jury to infer intentional 

discrimination.’ ” Id. (quoting Silverman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Ch

icago, 637 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled by Ortiz v. Werne

r Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (footnote omitted)). A 

“convincing mosaic” may be shown by evidence that demonstrates,

among other things, (1) “suspicious timing, ambiguous statements ..., 

and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory 

intent might be drawn,” (2) systematically better treatment of similarly 

situated employees, and (3) that the employer's justification is 

pretextual. Silverman, 637 F.3d at 733–34 (quotations omitted).

To boot, the Defendant goes back to terms such as “similarly situated borrowers” 

“pretext” “protected class” concluding with the assertion that the Taylors cannot 

Case 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 30 of 36
31 

prove “a plausible prima facie case of racial discrimination.” Indeed, the Taylors are 

not bound to establish a convincing mosaic under Lewis if they are able to identify 

suitable comparator evidence. The Taylors’ present inability to present comparator 

evidence has been briefed above in the Taylors’ Rule 56(d) motion. The Defendant 

has provided no case which designates what types of evidence would comprise a 

convincing mosaic of evidence under a lending discrimination case under the ECOA 

and § 1981. Imaginably, some circumstantial evidence could be the disparate lending 

statistics the Defendant admitted; that the key decisionmaker and CEO (who had the 

final say-so over the loan approval) admitted at deposition to making offensive racial 

comments [Doc. No. 48-11:47-48] which had the effect of making the Taylors 

feeling demeaned, angry, the butt of a joke to the point of saying that “Because its 

[discussing irrelevant topics that carry racial overtones such as Terry’s discussion of 

chitlins and collard greens] demeaning. It’s used in way to demean people. Its like -

--I was saying. I think is a way its worse than calling me the N word. I would prefer 

(talkover) to call me a nigger. I really would have.” [Doc. 48-1:292-11-18]. Other 

circumstantial evidence could be the manufactured credit scores, the increasing 

down-payments, and the inexplicable “ratios” which have never been explained by 

any witness or produced as loan or credit policy. 

E. The Taylors cannot establish discrimination under a mixed-motive theory 

Case 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 31 of 36
32 

 The Taylors have not alleged a cause of action under the mixed motive theory 

and thus cannot respond other than to say that Richard Terry was the key 

decisionmaker, the CEO and Chairman of the Credit Review Committee. He 

testified that his committee had the authority recommend overturning the Taylors’ 

loan denial. [Doc. No. 48-11:18-20-25]. Richard Terry, as the key decisionmaker 

also had final sign-off authority on the final determination of the Taylors’ appeal. 

[Doc. No. 48-11:39 – 1-25]. 

F. The Taylors claim under the FHA also fails because the loan applied for 

was for vacant property 

 § 760.25, Fla. Stat. Ann. provides: 

760.25 Discrimination in the financing of housing or in residential real estate 

transactions.— 

(1) It is unlawful for any bank, building and loan association, insurance company, 

or other corporation, association, firm, or enterprise the business of which consists 

in whole or in part of the making of commercial real estate loans to deny a loan or 

other financial assistance to a person applying for the loan for the purpose of 

purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling, or to 

discriminate against him or her in the fixing of the amount, interest rate, duration, or 

other term or condition of such loan or other financial assistance, because of the race, 

color, national origin, sex, disability, familial status, or religion of such person or of 

any person associated with him or her in connection with such loan or other financial 

assistance or the purposes of such loan or other financial assistance, or because of 

the race, color, national origin, sex, disability, familial status, or religion of the 

present or prospective owners, lessees, tenants, or occupants of the dwelling or 

dwellings in relation to which such loan or other financial assistance is to be made 

or given. 

(2)(a) It is unlawful for any person or entity whose business includes engaging in 

residential real estate transactions to discriminate against any person in making 

available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, 

because of race, color, national origin, sex, disability, familial status, or religion. 

Case 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 32 of 36
33 

(b) As used in this subsection, the term “residential real estate transaction” means 

any of the following: 

1. The making or purchasing of loans or providing other financial assistance: 

a. For purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling; 

or 

b. Secured by residential real estate. 

2. The selling, brokering, or appraising of residential real property. 

Likewise, § 760.22(5), Fla. Stat. Ann. defines a “dwelling” as: “Dwelling” means 

any building or structure, or portion thereof, which is occupied as, or designed or 

intended for occupancy as, a residence by one or more families, and any vacant land 

which is offered for sale or lease for the construction or location on the land of any 

such building or structure, or portion thereof. 

 The Defendant appears to say here that because the land being purchased by 

the Taylors was vacant, Chapter 760 does not apply. The Defendant is incorrect 

because the definition of a “dwelling” includes “any vacant land which is offered for 

sale or lease for the construction or location on the land of any such building or 

structure, or portion thereof.” The Defendant was aware that the Taylors wanted to 

build their homestead on the land: 

Q· · Did you tell them that you wanted to do anything else with the property? 

A· · Just general -- general-type farming and homestead.· I'm sorry.· Of course 

homestead was the real big thing for me. 

Q· · Meaning you wanted to build a home on the property? 

A· · I wanted to build a home on it and be out by ourselves. 

Q· · Did you attempt to obtain a construction loan as part of the financing? 

A· · No. 

Q· · What did you tell Northwest Florida about what you wanted to do with the 

property? 

A· · I told them the same thing I told Georgia, I mean, what we were attempting to 

do with the property and so forth. 

[Doc. 48-1:206] 

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34 

G. The Taylors cannot establish damages under any theory 

 The Defendant is incorrect. As an initial matter, under the ECOA it is not 

necessary to prove actual damages to be entitled to relief. Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 

490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (“The Act did not envision the necessity of proof 

of actual damages as a prerequisite to entitlement to punitive damages, equitable or 

declaratory relief, or attorney's fees. Section 1691e(d) provides that “in the case of 

any successful action under subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section, the cost of the 

action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the Court, shall be 

added to any damages awarded by the court under such subsection.”); Slicker v. 

Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2000) (“We add, however, that even if Slicker 

were unable to demonstrate that he suffered any actual injury, under controlling case 

law the district court erred in not allowing Slicker to seek nominal damages. We 

have held unambiguously that a plaintiff whose constitutional rights are violated is 

entitled to nominal damages even if he suffered no compensable 

injury. See Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994)(holding that a § 

1983 plaintiff alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and illegal detention is 

entitled to receive nominal damages if he demonstrates that the defendants violated 

his constitutional rights even if he is unable to prove that he suffered a specific, 

actual injury as a result of the defendants' 

conduct); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).”) Thus, the Taylors can 

Case 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 34 of 36
35 

establish damages in any event as a matter of law. Beyond that, though, Howard 

Taylor gave extensive testimony in his deposition of the damages he suffered as a 

result of losing the land because the loan was improperly denied by the Defendant. 

The damages, which he is qualified and permitted to testify to under Tampa Bay 

Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2003) 

include compensatory, economic and non-economic damages in the form of 

emotional pain, suffering and distress. See generally [Doc. 48-1:beginning at 241]. 

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs Howard L Taylor Sr. and Sonya R. Taylor request 

an Order denying Defendant, Farm Credit of Northwest Florida ACA’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment and for such other relief deemed necessary and proper. 

Dated: August 2, 2021 

Respectfully submitted, 

BERGER SINGERMAN LLP 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

 /s/ Joseph P. Jones 

Joseph P. Jones, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 0191604 

Terron L. Clark, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 104944 

Michael J. Niles, Esq. 

Florida Bar No. 107203 

313 North Monroe Street, Suite 301 

Tallahassee, Florida 32301 

(850) 510-3010 

and 

1450 Brickell Ave., Suite 1900 

Miami, FL 33131 

(305) 755-9500 

Case 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 35 of 36
36 

jjones@bergersingerman.com 

mniles@bergersingerman.com 

tclark@bergersingerman.com

Drt@bergersingerman.com 

CERTIFICATION OR WORD LIMIT 

 I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Response in Opposition and Rule 56(d) 

Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, inclusive of the case style, signature 

block and certificate of service contains 4,696 words. 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 2, 2021 the foregoing was served 

electronically through the Court’s CM/ECF system upon all parties on the attached 

Service List. 

 /s/ Joseph P. Jones 

Joseph P. Jones, Esq. 

 

SERVICE LIST 

Ginger Barry Boyd (FBN 0294550) 

John F. Loar (FBN 110386) 

NELSON MULLINS BROAD AND CASSEL 

215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 

Tallahassee, Florida 32301 

Telephone: (850) 681-6810 

ginger.boyd@nelsonmullins.com 

john.loar@nelsonmullins.com 

Case 4:20-cv-00059-AW-MJF Document 53 Filed 08/02/21 Page 36 of 36