[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Gerrity v. Chervenak , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6705.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -6705
G ERRITY , A PPELLANT , v. C HERVENAK , T RUSTEE , A PPELLEE , ET AL
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Gerrity v. Chervenak , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6705.]
Dormant Mineral Act

— Notice to holders of mineral interests

— Reasonableness of search for owners

— After reasonable, unsuccessful search for holders, surface owners may provide notice by publication. (No. 2019-1123—Submitted June 17, 2020— Decided December 17, 202 0.)

A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Guernsey County, No. 18 CA 26,
2019-Ohio-2687.

_____________________ F RENCH , J. {¶ 1} This appeal calls upon this court to once again address provisi ons of the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act, R.C. 5301.56. In particular, we now consider the reach of the notice requirement s that R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) impose s as prerequisites to deeming a severed mineral in terest abandoned and vested in t he owner of the land subject to the mineral interest.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 Facts and Procedural Background {¶ 2} Unlike many cases concerning mineral interests, this case’s fac ts are neither disputed nor complicated. Appellee, John E. Chervenak, trustee of the Chervenak Family Trust (“Chervena k”), owns approximately 108 ac res of land in Guernsey County, Ohio. The rights to the minerals underlying t hat property were severed in a warranty deed, f iled in November 1961, in which T. D. Farwell transferred the surface rights but reserved to himself “all min erals (coal, oil and gas) underlying” the property. John and Gloria Chervenak acqui red the surface estate by warranty deed recorded in November 1999. They transf erred the property to the Chervenak Family Trust by quitclaim deed recorded in Mar ch 2015. {¶ 3} In 2012, a title search for the Chervenak property identified J ane F. Richards, Farwell’s daughter, as the owner of the severed miner al rights, as evidenced by a certificate of transfer filed with the Guernsey County Recorder in October 1965. The certificate of transfer lists a Cleveland, O hio address for
Richards. The Chervenak chain of title contained no other reco rds regarding ownership of the severed mineral interest. {¶ 4} Richards died in 1997. At the time of her death, she was a Flo rida resident. Appellant, Timothy Ge rrity, is Richards’s son and so le heir. He claims that he is the rightful owner of the mineral rights underlying the Chervenak property as a result of the probate of Richards’s estate in Florida. Th e records filed with the Guernsey County Recorder, however, contain no evidence of Richa rds’s death or of Gerrity’s inheritance of the mineral interest. {¶ 5} In June 2012, seeking to reunite the severed mineral interest w ith the surface estate pursuant to the D ormant Mineral Act, the Cherven aks recorded with the Guernsey County Recorder an affidavit of abandonment of the severed mineral interest. As relevant here, the affidavit stated that notice o f abandonment had been sent by certified mail to Richa rds at her last known address—th e Cleveland address
listed in the 1965 certificate of transfer—but had been returne d, marked “Vacant-January Term, 2020

3 Unable to Forward.” It also st ated, “Richards, her unknown hei rs, devisees, executors, administrators, relic ts, next of kind [sic] and assi gns” had been served notice of abandonment by publication on May 4, 2012. In July 2 012, the
Chervenaks filed with the Guernse y County Recorder a notice of the mineralinterest holder’s failure to file a contrary claim and requested that the recorder note in the margins of the 1961 deed and the 1965 certificate of tra nsfer that the mineral
interest had be en abandoned. {¶ 6} Five years later, in August 2017, Gerrity filed this action in the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas to quiet title and for a declaratory judgment that he is the exclusive owner of the mineral rights. Gerrity claims that the Chervenaks’ purported use of the Dormant Mineral Act was in effective because they did not comply with the act’s notice requirements. Cherve nak filed a counterclaim to quiet title and for a declaratory judgment that by operation of the Dormant Mineral Act, the trust i s the owner of the mineral righ ts. {¶ 7} Gerrity and Chervenak each move d for summary judgment. Without any written analysis of the parties’ arguments or the applicabl e law, the trial court entered summary judgment for Chervenak and declared the trust t he owner of the mineral rights. In a split decision, the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judg ment. 2019-Ohio-2687, 140 N.E.3d 164. This court has accepted Gerrity’s discretionary appeal. 157 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2019-Ohio -4211, 132 N.E.3d
700. Analysis {¶ 8} We have previously recognized the common practice in mineralproducing regions of severing the rights to subsurface minerals from the rights to
the surface of land. Dodd v. Croskey , 143 Ohio St.3d 293, 2015-Ohio-2362, 37 N.E.3d 147, ¶ 7. We have further recognized that as severed mi neral interests are divided or transferred, often ove r long periods of time, it can become “difficult, or even impossible, to find the owners of such severed mineral rig hts.” Id. ; see alsoS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. , 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, ¶ 16. The General Assembly enacted the Dormant Mineral Act in 1989 as a supplement to the Ohio Marketable Title Act, R.C. 530 1.47, et seq., to address that challenge and to provide a mechanism for reuniting abandoned,
severed mineral interests w ith the surface estate. Dodd at ¶ 7-8. {¶ 9} As amended in 2006, the Dormant Mi neral Act provides that unles s a severed mineral interest is in co al or is coal related, the int erest is held by the United States, the state or any other political body described in the statute, or a saving event enumerated in R.C. 5301.56(B)(3) has occurred within the preced ing 20 years, the
mineral interest “shall be deemed abandoned and vested in the o wner of the surface of the lands” if the surface owner has satisfied the requiremen ts of R.C. 5301.56(E). R.C. 5301.56(B). R.C. 5301.56(E) states:

Before a mineral interest becomes vested under division (B)
of this section in the owner of the surface of the lands subjec t to the interest, the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the interest shall do both of the following: (1) Serve notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each holder or each holder’s successors or assignees, at the last known address of each, of the own er’s intent to declare the min eral
interest abandoned. If service of notice cannot be completed t o any holder, the owner shall publish not ice of the owner’s intent to declare the mineral interest abandoned at least once in a newsp aper of general circulation in each county in which the land that is subject
to the interest is located. The notice shall contain all of th e information specified in di vision (F) of this section. (2) At least thirty, but not later than sixty days after the da te on which the notice required unde r division (E)(1) of this sect ion isJanuary Term, 2020

5 served or published, as applicable, file in the office of the c ounty recorder of each county in which the surface of the land that i s subject to the interest is locat ed an affidavit of abandonment that
contains all of the information specified in division (G) of th is
section.

{¶ 10} A surface owner’s failure to satisfy R.C. 5301.56(E) precludes application of the Dormant Mineral Act and renders unnecessary any further analysis. Albanese v. Batman , 148 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-5814, 68 N.E.3d 800, ¶ 20. {¶ 11} The question here is whether the Chervenaks satisfied R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). The Fifth District majority held that the Cherv enaks complied with the statute by (1) sending by certified mail to Richards’s last -known address a letter containing the notice of abandonm ent, which had been returned a s undeliverable, (2) unsuccessfully searching Cuyahoga and Guernsey County recor ds for further information, and (3) then publishing notice to Richards and her unknown heirs. 2109-Ohio-2687, 140 N.E.3d 164, at ¶ 25-26. {¶ 12} Gerrity asks this court to reverse the Fifth District’s judgmen t and to adopt two propositions of law regarding R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). Fi rst, he asks the
court to hold that the Dormant M ineral Act requires strict comp liance, such that a surface owner must identify and attempt service by certified ma il on every holder of a mineral interest. He argues that the act does not apply u nless all holders are identified. Second, if the court disagrees with his position t hat the act requires the identification of every holder of a severed mineral interest, G errity asks the court
to hold that a surface owner must use certain specified search methods designed to locate all holders of the severed mineral interest to satisfy d ue process and the reasonable-diligence requirement underlying R.C. 5301.56(E).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 Application of the Dor mant Mineral Act is not limited to circum stances in which every holder of a severed mineral interest has been ident ified {¶ 13} Gerrity argues under his first proposition of law that the Dorm ant Mineral Act requires a surface o wner to both identify all holde rs of the severed mineral interest and attempt to serve notice of abandonment to all holders by certified mail before resorting to notice by publication. He m aintains that the
severed mineral interest here c ould not be deemed abandoned and vested in the
Chervenaks under the Dormant Mineral Act because R.C. 5301.56(E )(1) required the Chervenaks to identify and attempt to serve him, as a holde r under the statute, with notice of abandonment by certified mail. But reading R.C. 5301.56 as a whole and in light of the General Assembly’s codified legislative int ent, we reject Gerrity’s arguments. {¶ 14} To determine the meaning of a statute, we look first to the sta tutory language. Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. , 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 20. We read statutory words and phrase s in the context of the whole statute and presume that the General Assembly intende d the whole statute
to be effective. Commerce & Industry Ins. Co. v. Toledo , 45 Ohio St.3d 96, 102, 543 N.E.2d 1188 (1989); R.C. 1.47(B). When the meaning of the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we apply it as written; only if the language is ambiguous will we look to additional means of statutory interpr etation. Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox, L.L.C. , 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, 900 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 9, 13. {¶ 15} Gerrity first maintains that app lication of the Dormant Mineral Act
is limited to those circumstances in which the owner of the sur face estate identifies every holder of the severed mineral interest. R.C. 5301.56(A)( 1) broadly defines
“holder” to include “the record holder of a mineral interest, a nd any person who derives the person’s rights from, or has a common source with, the record holder
and whose claim does not indicate * * * that it is adverse to t he interest of the recordJanuary Term, 2020

7 holder.” As Richards’s sole heir and as successor to her inter est in the mineral rights, Gerrity qualifies as a “holder” under R.C. 5301.56(A)(1 ). But Gerrity’s
status as a “holder” under R. C. 5301.56(A)(1) does not resolve his first proposition of law, which more broadly ques tions whether the Dormant Minera l Act applies only to circumstances in which a surface owner identifies every holder. Answering that question requires us to revie w the statute as a whole, eva luating words in their context in order to arrive at a fair reading of the text. See Great Lakes Bar Control,
Inc. v. Testa , 156 Ohio St. 3d 199, 2018-Ohio-5207, 124 N.E.3d 803, ¶ 9. {¶ 16} Because Gerrity is a “holder” under the Dormant Mineral Act, he argues that the Chervenaks would be in compliance with the stat ute’s requirements only if Gerrity were identified in the notices required by R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). Again, R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) requires that prior to filing the aff idavit of abandonment, the Chervenaks, as the owner s, should have done the following:

Serve notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to each holder or each holder's successors or assignees, at the la st known address of each, of the owner's intent to declare the min eral
interest abandoned. If service of notice cannot be completed t o any holder, the owner shall publish notice of the owner's intent to declare the mineral interest abandoned at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in each county in which the land that is su bject
to the interest is located. The notice shall contain all of th e information specified in di vision (F) of this section.

Gerrity contends that because R.C. 5301.56(F)(1) states that th e notice required under R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) “shall contain * * * [t]he name of eac h holder and the holder's successors and assignees , as applicable,” the only way that an interest can
be abandoned is if eac h holder is specifically named in the not ice.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 {¶ 17} We cannot, however, read R.C. 5301.56(F)(1) in isolation. Its mandate must be understood in lig ht of the rest of the statutor y scheme, including R.C. 5301.56(E)(1), which contains an express provision for not ice by publication when service of notice by certified mail “cannot be completed t o any holder.” Plainly, when a holder cannot be identified, service by mail ca nnot be completed on that holder. At that point, notice by publication is permit ted under the express terms of R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). It would strain credulity to read R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) to allow notice by publication when a holder cannot be identifi ed, but at the same time to require identification of the holder in the notice itse lf. {¶ 18} On the other hand, reading the provision to not require identif ication
of an unidentified holder is cons istent with the qualifier in R .C. 5301.56(F)(1) that the notice shall identify “each holder and the holder's successors and assignees , as applicable .” (Emphasis added.) When noti ce is being provided through publication because a holder ca nnot be identified, the identity of the holder is “not applicable.” {¶ 19} Considering R.C. 5301.56(F)(1) in the context of R.C. 5301.56(E)(1)’s explicit grant of authority for notice by publi cation, we think the best reading of the statute is that a surface owner need not sp ecifically identify by name every holder, as broadl y defined in R.C. 5301.56(A)(1). {¶ 20} Such a reading is consistent with the General Assembly’s codifi ed legislative intent that the Dormant Mineral Act “be liberally c onstrued to effect the legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title.” R.C. 5301.55. Wi th an eye toward the development of Ohio’s mineral resources, the General Assembly e nacted the Dormant Mineral Act to address the difficulty (and sometimes im possibility) of identifying the owners of severed mineral interests and to enco urage reliance on
record chains of title. Dodd , 143 Ohio St.3d 293, 2015-Ohio-2362, 37 N.E.3d 147, at ¶ 8; Corban , 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 2016-Ohio-5796, 76 N.E.3d 1089, at ¶ 27.January Term, 2020

9 {¶ 21} Construing the Dormant Mineral Act as ineffective unless the surface owner identifies every mineral-interest holder, includi ng every successor or assignee of a record holder, would negate the express legislati ve purpose of the act. No matter the effort expended, a surface owner can never be cer tain that he has identified every successor and assignee of every holder who app ears in the public
record. Limitation of the Dormant Mineral Act in the manner Ge rrity proposes would lead to uncertainty and would open every reunification un der the act to a later challenge—and perhaps undoi ng—by a previously unknown hei r or assignee who did not appear in the public record. That uncertainty woul d inhibit the General Assembly’s stated intention to promote the development of the s tate’s mineral resources. By authorizing notice by publication, as opposed, f or example, to service by ordinary mail when s ervice by certified mail cannot be completed, the General Assembly has at least tacitly acknowledged that not all heirs of a party who has reserved a mineral interest may be identifiable or locatabl e. And again, nothing in the statutory text precludes the use of publication to notif y classes of unknown or potential holders. Consistent with the codified and undispu ted purpose of the Dormant Mineral Act, we reject Gerrity’s argument that the act operates only when the surface owner specifically identifies by name every holder, as broadly defined in R.C. 5301.56(A)(1). {¶ 22} We also reject Gerrity’s related argument that a surface owner must
attempt service of notice by certified mail on every holder before the surface owner may resort to notification by publication under R.C. 5301.56(E) (1). R.C. 5301.56(E) mandates that a surface owner “shall” comply with R. C. 5301.56(E)(1) and (E)(2) before a severed miner al interest may vest in the su rface owner. {¶ 23} Read together, the introductory language of R.C. 5301.56(E) and the first sentence of R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) provide that a surface own er “shall” serve
notice of the owner’s intent to d eclare the mineral interest ab andoned “by certified mail * * * to each holder or each holder’s successors or assign ees, at the last knownS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 address of each.” A statute’s u se of “shall” connotes a mandat ory obligation unless other statutory language clear ly indicates a contrary intent. Wilson v. Lawrence , 150 Ohio St.3d 368, 2017-Ohio-1410, 81 N.E.3d 1242, ¶ 13. But the second sentence of R.C. 5301.56(E)(1), with its express acknowledgemen t that certifiedmail service to each holder may not be possible, indicates that the legislature did

not intend service by certifie d mail to be mandatory. Id

. {¶ 24} The language of R.C. 5301.56(E)(1 ) does not manda te an attempt at service by certified mail when it is apparent that such service cannot be completed. The statute does not identify circumstances in which service of notice by certified mail will be deemed incapable of completion, nor does it limit itself to those circumstances in which notice by certified mail has been return ed as undeliverable. Rather, by its plain language, the statute operates anytime service of notice by certified mail “cannot be complete d to any holder.” This inclu des circumstances in which a holder’s identity or address is unknown. “It would be absurd to absolutely require an attempt at notice by certified mail when a reasonabl e search fails to
reveal addresses or even the name s of potential heirs who must be served.” Shilts
v. Beardmore , 7th Dist. Monroe No. 16 MO 0003, 2018-Ohio-863, ¶ 15. When i t appears from the outset that ser vice of notice cannot be comple ted by certified mail, as when a holder is unidentified or unlocatable, R.C. 5301.56(E )(1) permits service of notice by publication.
A surface owner must use reaso nable diligence to identify and l ocate holders

of a severed mineral interest, but what constitutes reasonable diligence will vary, based on the fac ts of each case {¶ 25} Having rejected Gerrity’s arguments that the Dormant Mineral Ac t applies only when a surface owner specifically identifies every holder and additionally attempts to serve all such persons with notice by certified mail, we must consider what R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) does require of a surface owner. We therefore turn to Gerrity’s second proposition of law, under wh ich he maintains thatJanuary Term, 2020

11 a surface owner must employ “reasonable search methods * * * de signed to locate” all holders before using notice by publication under R.C. 5301. 56(E)(1). {¶ 26} Before getting to the heart of his second proposition of law—th at a surface owner must employ reasonable search methods to identify all holders— Gerrity first likens the publication provision in R.C. 5301.56( E)(1) to Civ.R. 4.4(A)(1) and R.C. 2703.24 and urges this court to import the r equirements of those provisions into the Dormant Mineral Act. Both Civ.R. 4.4. and R.C. 2703.24 involve service of process—a prer equisite for a trial court’s e xercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. See Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader , 165 Ohio St. 61, 64, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956) (“It is a xiomatic that for a court to acquire jurisdiction there must be a proper service of summons or an entry of appear ance”). Civ.R. 4.4 requires a party who is reques ting service of process by public ation to file an affidavit that “aver[s] that ser vice of summons cannot be made because the residence of the party to be s erved is unknown to the affiant, all of the efforts made on behalf of the party to ascertain the residence of the party to be served, and that the residence of the party to be served cannot be ascertained w ith reasonable diligence.” And R.C. 2703.24, which governs when an action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown, requi res the plaintiff to reques t a court order authorizing publication of notice by filing an affidavit statin g that a necessary party’s name and address is unknown to the plaintiff. {¶ 27} The Dormant Mineral Act’s extrajudicial process for reuniting severed mineral interests does not implicate the jurisdictional concerns underlying Civ.R. 4.4 and R.C. 2703.24. Nevertheless, Gerrity suggests th at R.C. 5301.56(E)(1), to the extent that it may be used at all with re spect to an unidentified holder of a severed mineral interest, be read in pari materia w ith R.C. 2703.24, so as to require the surface owner to file a judicial action and t o request a court order authorizing publication by filing an affidavit setting out the surface owner’s efforts to identify and locate unknown or unlocatable holders. The Gen eral Assembly hasS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 not incorporated the requireme nts of Civ.R. 4.4 or R.C. 2703.24 —or any similar requirements—into the D ormant Mineral Act as prerequisites for using notice by publication, and this court may not do so by judicial fiat. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Porterfield , 24 Ohio St.2d 24, 27-28, 263 N.E.2d 249 (1970) (this court ma y not “legislate to add a re quirement to a statute enacted by the Gen eral Assembly”). {¶ 28} Gerrity goes on to argue that at a minimum, a surface owner who
wishes to utilize the Dormant Mineral Act must exercise reasona ble diligence to identify all holders of the severed mineral interest. The Seve nth District Court of Appeals has recently evaluated efforts to identify heirs to a m ineral interest using a
reasonableness standard. Sharp v. Miller , 2018-Ohio-4740, 114 N.E.3d 1285 (7th Dist.), ¶ 17; Shilts , 7th Dist. Monroe No. 16 MO 0003, 2018-Ohio-863, at ¶ 15. It
has held that when “a reasonable search fails to reveal the nam es or addresses of potential heirs who must be served,” a surface owner need not a ttempt to provide notice by certified mail under R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). Sharp at ¶ 16, citing Shilts at ¶ 15. The court refused, however, to create a bright-line rule as to what constitutes reasonable diligence: “Because the standard relies on the reaso nableness of any party’s actions, whether that party’s efforts constitute ‘due d iligence’ will depend
on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.” Sharp at ¶ 17. {¶ 29} Shilts involved the ownership of mineral rights reserved by ten grantors in a 1914 deed. Shilts at ¶ 2. The appellant, an heir of one of the original grantors, challenged the surface owner’s publication in 2012 of notice of an intent
to declare the mineral interest abandoned. The Seventh Distric t rejected that challenge because it concluded that the surface owner had made reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, efforts—including a search through public records , coupled with an Internet search—to locate the original grantors’ heirs. Id. at ¶ 12. It stated, “When
counsel’s search did not reveal i nformation regarding these hei rs, it became clear that service could not be completed through certified mail.” Id

. at ¶ 15. The court held that the surface owner therefore appropriately used notice by publication,January Term, 2020

13 naming the original reserving parties “and their unknown heirs, devisees, executors, administrators, relicts, and next of kin.” Id. at ¶ 14. Although the surface owner in
Shilts did conduct an Internet search as part of his search for the he irs, nothing in the Seventh District’s opinion s uggests that an Internet search is required to demonstrate reasonable diligence, and Gerrity misconstrues the opinion by suggesting otherwise. {¶ 30} In Sharp , the Seventh District reitera ted, “An attempt to provide notice by certified mail is unnecessary where a reasonable sear ch fails to reveal the
names or addresses of potential heirs who must be served.” Sharp at ¶ 16, citing
Shilts at ¶ 15. The surface owner in Sharp unsuccessfully searched available public records, including probate record s and recorded deeds, but not the Internet, for heirs
to a 1944 mineral reservation. Id. at ¶ 21. Consistent with its refusal to create a bright-line rule, the Seventh Di strict clarified that an Intern et search is not a necessary component of reasonable diligence. Looking to the fa cts and circumstances of that case, the court found no evidence that “a simple Internet
search” would have revealed the heirs. Id. {¶ 31} Gerrity and Chervenak both encourage this court to do what the
Seventh District has refused to do—adopt a br ight-line rule tha t defines the steps a surface owner must take to identify and locate holders of a sev ered mineral interest to comply with R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). The bright-line rules they propose, however,
could not be more different. G errity proposes a rule that woul d require a surface owner to search not only public records but also online resourc es, including subscription-based genealogy services, and to document those ef forts. Chervenak, on the other hand, advances a rul e that would require a surface owner to search only the surface owner’s own record chain of title for the identity of mineral-interest holders. We decline to adopt either proposed rule. Instead, b ecause every case will be different, we agree with the Seventh District that whether a party has exercised reasonable diligence will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. SeeS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 Sharp , 2018-Ohio-4740, 114 N.E.3d 1285, at ¶ 17. If there is to be a bright-line rule delineating what a surface-owner must do to comply with th e Dormant Mineral Act, it should come from the Gene ral Assembly, not from this co urt. 1 Nevertheless, without drawing a bright line, we can provide guidance in the c ontext of the facts before us, and we turn to those facts now. {¶ 32} In support of his motion for summary judgment, Chervenak submitted an affidavit from Barbara K. McCombs, the paralegal w ho performed the title search of the Chervenak property in 2012. McCombs’s revi ew of the
Chervenak chain of title identified Richards as the sole holder of the severed
mineral estate and listed a Cleve land address for Richards. Mc Combs conducted a broader search of public records from the Guernsey County Recor der’s Office and the Guernsey County Probate Court, but that search did not reve al a more recent address, an estate or any heirs for Richards. McCombs did not stop her search there, however. Because the certificate of transfer that memor ialized Richards’s acquisition of the mineral interest listed a Cuyahoga County ad dress for Richards, McCombs searched in the Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office and t he Cuyahoga County Probate Court for records that would establish an estate for Richards, name any heirs for Richards or provide a more recent address for Ric hards. As with her search of the Guernsey County pub lic records, McCombs’s search of the Cuyahoga County public records offered no i ndication that Richards had d ied or had
transferred the mineral interest. Neither did it uncover a mor e recent address for
Richards.

1. There is currently pending before the General Assembly legis lation to amend the Dormant Mineral Act. See 2019 H.B. 100. As relevant here, the proposed legislation woul d allow service by publication when a surface owner cannot attempt or complete notice by certified mail after conducting a search of public records, and it would define “pub lic record” as “any document pertaining to a mineral interest filed or recorded with the aud itor, recorder, and all courts situated within each county in which the lands subject to the mineral in terest are located.” Id.January Term, 2020

15 {¶ 33} Having uncovered no address for Richards more recent than that
listed in the 1965 certificate of transfer and no information r egarding successors, heirs or assigns of Ric hards’s interest in the mineral rights, the Chervenaks sent notice by certified mail, directed to Richards at the Cleveland address. When that
notice was returned as undeliverab le, the Chervenaks published notice of their
intent to declare the mineral interest invalid in The Jeffersonian , a newspaper of general circulation in Guernse y County. Like the Fifth Distric t majority, see 2019- Ohio-2687, 140 N.E.3d 164, at ¶ 25, under the facts of this cas e, we conclude that the Chervenaks exercised reasonable diligence to identify holde rs of the severed
mineral interest. {¶ 34} Gerrity criticizes the Chervenak s for not searching the Interne t for a
more recent address for Richards to determine whether Richards was still living and to identify any heirs. Gerrity has suggested that the Cher venaks could have located Richards’s obituary onlin e and could have identified hi m as Richards’s heir by conducting a genealogy search f or Farwell, who originally re served the mineral interest, using the subscription databases on Ancestry.com. Th e record, however, contains no specific evidence of what an Internet search would have revealed in 2012, when the Chervenaks followed the Dormant Mineral Act. We decline to impose the requirements that Ge rrity has proposed as a matter o f law. The everchanging quantum and quality of information available on the In ternet, the inconsistent reliability of tha t information, and the variabili ty of Internet-search results all weigh against a bright-line requirement for online searches, let alone a bright-line requirement that a surface owner consult any partic ular paid subscription services, to identify heirs to a severed mineral i nterest. {¶ 35} The surface owner’s chain of title is the necessary starting po int for determining the applicability of the Dormant Mineral Act. Befo re issuing notice of
an intent to declare a severed mineral interest abandoned, the surface owner must first determine whether the Dormant Mineral Act applies. A sev ered mineralS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 interest may not be deemed abandoned and vested in the owner of the surface of the lands subject to the interest if any of the six saving even ts set out in R.C. 5301.56(B)(3) has occurred within the previous 20 years. Four of those saving
events—each one that does not involve actual use of the mineral interest—requires a filing, recording or notation in the property records of the county in which the surface property is located. See R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(a), (d), (e), and (f). Accordingly, the surface owner must consult the public-property records in the county in which the surface property is located to determine wh ether a saving event has occurred. If no saving event is evident, the surface owner must also consult the
chain of title to determine the record holder or record holders of the mineral
interest—the startin g point for determinin g who the surface own er must attempt to notify pursuant to R.C. 5301.56(E)(1). In addition to property records in the county in which the land that is subject to the mineral interest is lo cated, a reasonable search for holders of a severed mineral interest will generally also include a search of court records, including prob ate records, in that county. {¶ 36} Review of public-property and court records in the county where the land subject to a severed mineral interest is located will gene rally establish a baseline of reasonable diligence in identifying the holder or h olders of the severed mineral interest. There may, however, be circumstances in whic h the surface owner’s independent knowledge or information revealed by the su rface owner’s review of the public-property a nd court records would require t he surface owner, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, to continue looking el sewhere to identify or locate a holder. But whether that additional search is require d will depend on the circumstance of each case, and it was not required in this case . McCombs’s diligent search of the public records in both Guernsey County and Cuyaho ga County
revealed no indication that the sole record holder was deceased and offered no clue as to the identity of any pot ential successors or assigns.January Term, 2020

17 {¶ 37} Finally, to the extent that Ge rrity raises a due-process challe nge to R.C. 5301.56(E)(1) or its application when a mineral-interest h older cannot be identified, we reject that challenge based on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Texaco v. Short , 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982). {¶ 38} In Texaco , the Supreme Court rejected constitutional challenges to Indiana’s Dormant Mineral Interests Act, which operated to auto matically extinguish a severed mineral interest after a 20-year period of nonuse unless the mineral-interest holder filed a claim to preserve the interest. Id. at 518-519. The self-executing Indiana statute di d not require a surface owner to take any action or to provide any notice to the min eral-interest holder before the mineral interest lapsed and reunited w ith the surface estate by operation of law

. Id. at 520. {¶ 39} The appellants in Texaco unsuccessfully claimed, in part, that the lack of direct notice prior to the lapse of their mineral inter ests deprived them of property without due process of law. Id. at 522. The Supreme Court disagreed and held that a state may condition the permanent retention of a pr operty right “on the performance of reasonable conditions that indicate a present in tention to retain the
interest.” Id. at 526. In rejecting the appellants’ due-process argument that they were entitled to specific notice that their interests were abou t to expire, the court stated, “Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than ena ct and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to famil iarize itself with its terms and to comply.” Id. at 532. It reasoned that mineral -interest holders may be presumed to have knowledge of th e terms of the act and that pur suant to the act, “an unused mineral interest would lapse unless they filed a sta tement of claim.” Id.
at 533. It held that the state provided all constitutionally r equired notice by enacting
a statute that informed mineral-interest holders that their int erests would be extinguished after 20 years of nonuse. Id. at 537. {¶ 40} The version of the Dormant Mineral Act at issue here has been i n effect since 2006, and Gerrity may be presumed to have had noti ce of the act’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 provisions, including the statuto ry actions he could have under taken, either before or after the Chervenaks filed their notice of abandonment, to p revent the mineral interest from being deemed abandoned and vested in the Chervena ks. Given that
the Indiana statute at issue in Texaco, which permitted the extinguishment of a mineral interest without any prior notice to the holder besides the existence of the statutory scheme itself, passes constitutional muster, Ohio’s D ormant Mineral Act, which affords the additional safeguards of notice by certified mail when possible and notice by publication when certified-mail service is not po ssible, cannot be said to violate Gerrity’s due-process rights.
Conclusion {¶ 41} A surface owner attempting to comply with R.C. 5301.56(E) must exercise reasonable diligence to identify all holders of the se vered mineral interest, but the inability to identify or locate all such holders does n ot, in itself, preclude application of the Dormant Miner al Act. When a surface owner’s reasonable search
fails to reveal the names or addresses of holders of the minera l interest, the surface owner may provide notice by publication, pursuant to R.C. 5301. 56(E)(1), and need not attempt to serve the unknown or unlocated holders by certif ied mail. Because
we conclude that the Chervena ks satisfied R.C. 5301.56(E), we a ffirm the judgment
of the Fifth Distric t Court of Appeals. Judgment affirmed.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , and S TEWART , JJ.,

concur. D ONNELLY , J., concurs in judgment only.

_________________ Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, and James F. Mathews; a nd Finnucan & Associates, L.L.C., and John C. Finnucan, for appell ant. Kravitz, Brown & Dortch, L.L.C., Michael D. Dortch, and Richard R. Parsons, for appellee.January Term, 2020

19 Yukevich, Marchetti, Fischer, Zangrilli, P.C., and Mark Fischer , urging reversal for amici curiae Harry A. Fonzi III and Linda Grimes. Scullin and Cunning, L.L.C., and Sean Richard Scullin, urging r eversal for amici curiae Jeffrey H. Sharp, Bradley W. Sharp, Gregory C. Smi th, J. Kent Smith, Jeffrey S. Smith, Lelah Clin e Smith, and Scott Johnson. Theisen Brock, L.P.A., and Daniel P. Corcoran, urging affirmanc e for amici curiae Allen B. Miller, Matilda J. Miller, Craig M. Miller, Tin a E. Miller, Brenda D. Thomas, Kevin M. Thomas, Gary Brown, the Billiter Family Lan d Trust, Kerry R. Hartline, Mary E. Hartline, Doris Craig, Paul Craig, Eleanor Craig, Nina Ice, Terry Ice, Sheila Stollar, Roger Stollar, Lisa Meyer, Kenneth M eyer Jr., Helen Craig, Evelyn Craig, Carissa R . Baker, and Corey A. Stollar. Chad A. Endsley, Leah F. Curtis, and Amy Milam, urging affirman ce for
amici curiae Ohio Farm Bureau F ederation and Guernsey County Fa rm Bureau. Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Gregory W . Watts, and Matthew W. Onest, urging affirmance for amici curiae Cassan dra Ridenour, Senterra, Ltd., Natalia Toma Trus t, (by Stefan Toma, Trustee), Pora Putney Ridge Properties, L.L.C., and P aines Run, L.L.C. Emens, Wolper, Jacobs & Jasin L aw Firm Co., L.P.A., Sean E. Jac obs, and Cody R. Smith, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio River C ollieries Company.

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