IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

In re Parentage of:

I.D.O.†

Minor child,

SHAWN M. JETT,

Appellant,

v.

JASMINE R. CAREY,

Respondent.

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No. 39222-8-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LAWRENCE-BERREY, A.C.J. — Shawn Jett appeals four contempt orders, premised 

on his violations of a parenting plan. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and 

the trial court’s failure to include a purge provision in each order. We affirm and award 

Jasmine Carey her reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal.

 

† To protect the privacy interests of the minor child and because the minor child 

prefers to use the name “J[ ], we shall use that initial throughout this opinion. Gen. Order 

for Court of Appeals, In re Changes to Case Title (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2018) 

(effective September 1, 2018), http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts.

FILED

JANUARY 23, 2024

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 39222-8-III

In re Parentage of I.D.H.O.

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FACTS1

First contempt order

Shawn Jett (Father) and Jasmine Carey (Mother) are the parents of J., a young 

teenager. The parties’ parenting plan orders joint decision-making for all nonemergency 

healthcare decisions. In June 2020, the parties mediated issues related to the parenting 

plan. While they discussed counseling for J., Father’s only stated basis for counseling 

was he thought J. had ADHD.2 Mother and Father agreed to counseling with a specified 

provider and Mother made J. an appointment. Father cancelled that appointment. The 

parties did not discuss counseling again. Unbeknownst to Mother, Father unilaterally 

changed J.’s primary care provider in December 2020. 

In February 2021, the parties again mediated parenting issues. Father did not tell 

Mother he thought J. needed counseling, nor did he disclose that he had changed J.’s 

primary care provider or that the new provider recommended counseling. 

In March 2021, J. started seeing a mental health counselor. Father did not share 

this information with Mother. 

 

1 The parties agree that the challenged findings of fact must be sustained if they are 

supported by substantial evidence. Given that the trial court found Mother’s evidence 

credible, we take the statement of facts from her declarations.

2 Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
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On August 8, 2022, Mother brought her first motion against Father for contempt. 

The trial court found Father in contempt, ruling that he violated the parenting plan by 

“failing to notify/inform/involve the mother in the child’s mental health counseling and 

medical decision making.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 58. It additionally found that Father 

was capable of following the parenting plan and that his failure to do so was intentional, 

where Father “secreted the knowledge that the child was in counseling . . . from the 

mother.” CP at 58. This concealment was intentional notwithstanding the parties’ earlier 

discussions about the possibility of J. entering counseling. Being intentional, the court 

deemed the concealment in bad faith. The court found that Father was able but unwilling 

to follow the parenting plan, as he “continue[d] to fail to notify the mother of counseling 

appointments and [was] not involving her in the process.” CP at 59. Pursuant to its 

contempt finding, the court ordered Father to pay a $100 civil penalty into the court’s 

registry and awarded Mother $835 in attorney fees and costs. 

Second contempt order

After abiding by the parenting plan’s visitation schedule for several years, Father 

filed for a domestic violence protection order against Mother. Although the court denied 

Father’s request, J. began refusing to attend visits with Mother. 
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Mother was scheduled to pick up J. on August 4, 2022, at 5:00 p.m. at an Ace 

Hardware parking lot. Mother arrived early, between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m. When J. told 

her that he needed to use the restroom inside the store, Mother agreed. When Mother 

began to follow J. into the store, Father’s brother stopped her to serve her with court

papers. It was then that Mother saw J. run to an adjacent parking lot where he got into a 

car with an 18-year-old female, Aurora. Father watched the two drive off and then left. 

Mother had previously expressed concern about J. spending time with Aurora. 

Acting on that concern, Mother called the police, who told her to wait in the parking lot. 

She then texted Father, asking for J.’s and Aurora’s cell phone numbers. Father did not 

respond. When Mother texted again to ask Father if he knew where J. had gone, he said 

he did not know. When Mother again asked for the cell phone numbers, Father again did 

not respond. Mother again texted Father, stating that if he did not know where Aurora 

had taken J., then this was a kidnapping and they should pursue charges. Father texted a 

screen shot of the message back to Mother, apparently thinking he was sending it to J. 

Father claimed he was out looking for J. but when Mother drove by his home, his van and 

truck were parked in the driveway. 

At 8:46 that evening, Father texted Mother that J. had returned home and he would 

take J. to his counselor the next day. Father asked Mother if she would be willing to 
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come to the appointment, and Mother responded that she would take J. since it was her 

residential time, and she still wanted J. to be with her. She offered to meet with them 

both to assure J. he was not in trouble and to express both parents’ mutual support. She 

asked that Aurora not be at the drop-off and asked for the counselor’s telephone number. 

Father did not respond. 

Mother texted Father the following morning to ask when and where she should 

pick up J. for his counseling appointment. Father never responded. Mother missed her 

entire long-weekend visit. 

The parties did not communicate until Mother’s next regular long-weekend visit, 

beginning August 11, 2022. Two-and-one-half hours before the scheduled exchange, 

Father texted Mother, claiming J. was sick, but negative for COVID. Mother told Father 

she would be at the Ace Hardware at 5:00 p.m. 

When Father arrived with J., J. sat on a cart rack in the parking lot, insisting he did 

not have to visit Mother because he was sick. J. told Mother he was not going with her

because “he was told that he did not need to [go],” and because Father “told him that 

there was nothing the police would do to make him [go].” CP at 29. J. “insisted his dad 

told him that he should not have to come over because he was sick.” CP at 29.
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Mother and Father then began discussing J.’s counseling and medications, but 

Father claimed he did not know the name of the counselor or what medications J. took. 

After Mother reassured J. that both parents loved and supported him, even suggesting a 

joint weekly dinner, J. again refused to comply with visitation and said because he was 

14, “he [got] to make all of the decisions for himself and . . . [could] do whatever he 

want[ed].” CP at 30. Father did not refute J.’s statement. 

After talking to Serenity, Mother’s daughter, J. agreed to come over. Yet after 

briefly being alone with Father, J. changed his mind, again insisting he would not go with 

Mother. Father never encouraged J. to go with Mother and excused J.’s behavior as 

“stubborn.” CP at 30. 

J. then insisted Mother take him to lunch instead of their court-ordered visit. 

Father told Mother that he too would be available for lunch any day over her residential 

time. Father and J. insisted they would only do lunch, no visitation. Father and J. resisted 

the visitation for more than five hours before Father left with J.

Mother texted Father the next day, a Friday, stating she would meet Father and J.

at noon to take them both to lunch, while making clear the lunch would not substitute for

her weekend visit. Father agreed, but arrived 45 minutes late. J. then insisted he was not 

going with Mother. After 30 minutes, J. again left with Father, who never once 
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encouraged J. to go with Mother. Father instead claimed he was “doing the right thing as 

a parent by telling [J.] not to [go] over.” CP at 30. 

On August 23, 2022, Mother brought her second contempt motion against Father.

The trial court declined to find Father in contempt for when J. left with Aurora, finding

insufficient evidence of collusion between Father and J. However, the court found Father 

in contempt for his behavior the following weekend, when he remained in the Ace 

Hardware parking lot for a six-hour “standoff,” “not doing anything to disabuse [J.] of the 

notion that [he] gets to dictate visitation.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 34. By failing to correct 

J.’s mistaken belief that J. had the right to refuse visitation, Father was “implicitly 

encouraging [J.] to defy visitation” and contributing to his “bad attitude.” RP at 34. 

Simply stated, Father failed to “explicitly tell the child, ‘You must go.’” RP at 34. 

The court’s contempt order found that Father was able to follow the parenting plan 

but was unwilling to do so, and found bad faith where Father knew J. was hesitant to 

attend visits, but made no effort to encourage J. to attend. The court ordered Father to 

pay $250 into the court registry, and awarded Mother $835 in attorney fees and costs, 

along with compensatory visitation. 
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Third contempt order

On August 18, 2022, Mother arrived at Ace Hardware for another visitation 

exchange. J. got out of Father’s van and told Mother he would not go with her. Father 

sat in his van, waiting, and did not encourage J. to leave with Mother. J. eventually left 

with Father. 

On September 8, 2022, Mother brought her third contempt motion against Father. 

The court again found Father in contempt, ruling that he “made no effort to encourage [J.] 

to attend visitation . . . .” CP at 167. Again, the court found Father able but unwilling to 

follow the parenting plan. The court concluded that Father acted in bad faith where he 

knew J. was hesitant to attend visits but made no effort to encourage J. to attend. It 

ordered Father to pay $250 into the court registry and awarded Mother $835 in attorney 

fees and costs, along with compensatory visitation.

Fourth contempt order

On September 9, 2022, the parties arrived at Ace Hardware for another visitation 

exchange. J. got out of Father’s truck and sat in the cart return area near Mother’s car. 

The two talked for a while, and Mother asked J. a few times to leave with her. J. refused. 

During the entire time, Father sat in his truck without encouraging J. to leave. J. returned 

to Father’s truck, where they laughed together and left. 
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On September 22, 2022, Mother filed her fourth contempt motion against Father. 

The court again found Father in contempt. Specifically, the court found that Father just 

“sat in his vehicle nearby,” making no effort to encourage visitation. CP at 203. The 

court found that Father was able but unwilling to follow the parenting plan. It concluded 

that Father’s actions were in bad faith, where he knew J. was hesitant, but rather than 

ensure the visit, he did the opposite. The court ordered Father to pay $250 into the court 

registry and awarded Mother $835 in attorney fees and costs, along with compensatory 

visitation.

ANALYSIS

Father raises three arguments on appeal: (1) he made reasonable efforts to comply 

with the parenting plan, and substantial evidence does not support the findings of bad 

faith, (2) Mother failed to show that J. desired his counseling information to be released 

to her, and (3) the contempt orders should have included a purge provision.

1. Sufficient evidence supports the second, third, and fourth findings of 

contempt

3

This court reviews a trial court’s contempt rulings for abuse of discretion. In re 

Marriage of James, 79 Wn. App. 436, 439-40, 903 P.2d 470 (1995). A trial court 

 

3 Father’s sufficiency challenge to the first finding of contempt is discussed in the 

next section. 
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operates within its discretion when its findings derive from the factual record, its 

conclusions apply sound law, and its decisions are not manifestly unreasonable. In re 

Marriage of Bowen, 168 Wn. App. 581, 586-87, 279 P.3d 885 (2012). 

Where a trial court reviews competing declarations in determining the underlying 

facts, its findings of fact will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. In 

re Marriage of Rideout, 150 Wn.2d 337, 350-51, 77 P.3d 1174 (2003); see also In re 

Determination of Rights to Use of Surface Waters of Yakima River Drainage Basin, 

177 Wn.2d 299, 340, 296 P.3d 835 (2013) (applying substantial evidence standard after 

trial court made factual findings from documentary evidence). Substantial evidence is 

that quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the 

premises. Surface Water Rights, 177 Wn.2d at 340. 

Both parties agree that Marriage of Rideout controls the disposition of the 

first issue. There, the court held that a “parent may be held in contempt, pursuant to 

RCW 26.09.160, for failure to make reasonable efforts to require a child to visit the other 

parent as required by a parenting plan.” 150 Wn.2d at 341.

Here, the second, third, and fourth contempt orders are supported by evidence 

sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person that Father failed to make reasonable efforts 

to require J. to visit Mother, as required by the parenting plan. Father contests Mother’s 
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evidence by citing his own declarations. However, the trial court already weighed the 

parties’ competing declarations and found Mother’s credible. Once the trial court weighs 

evidence, our court will neither reweigh that evidence nor reassess its credibility.

In Mother’s declarations, she stated that Father failed to facilitate visitations when 

he did nothing at the Ace Hardware exchanges to encourage J. to leave with her.

4

 

According to Mother, Father on one occasion even obstructed her visitation by expressly 

supporting J.’s decision to dictate the terms of visitation himself. On another occasion, 

Father laughed with J. before leaving the parking lot with him. We conclude that the trial 

court’s challenged findings are supported by substantial evidence.

2. Sufficient evidence supports the first finding of contempt, notwithstanding 

that J. may have initiated mental health treatment on his own 

A parent who refuses to comply with a parenting plan has acted in bad faith 

and shall be held in contempt of court. RCW 26.09.160(1). A parent with a 

reasonable excuse for not complying with a parenting plan or who is not able to 

comply must demonstrate that excuse or inability by a preponderance of the evidence. 

 

4 Father argues that statements made by J. to Mother are inadmissible hearsay. 

Father does not identify which of J.’s statements he challenges on appeal nor does he 

meaningfully argue this point. We decline to review this issue due to a lack of reasoned 

argument. Timson v. Pierce County Fire Dist. No. 15, 136 Wn. App. 376, 385, 149 P.3d 

427 (2006).
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RCW 26.09.160(4). 

Father argues he was excused from notifying Mother of J.’s mental health 

counseling because there is no evidence J. desired to have his counseling information 

released to her. In support of his argument, Father cites RCW 70.02.265(1)(a), which 

prevents providers from releasing, without patient consent, the medical information of 

adolescents who seek their own treatment. This statute does not support Father’s 

argument. RCW 70.02.265(1)(a) binds only providers. It does not empower a parent to 

withhold medical information from another parent in violation of a parenting plan. 

Here, Father withheld from Mother the fact that J. was receiving counseling, 

including the name of the counselor. This violated the parenting plan, and the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by finding Father in contempt.

3. Purge provisions were not required

Father argues the trial court’s failure to include purge provisions in its coercive 

contempt orders invalidated those orders. Because purge provisions do not apply to 

compensatory contempt sanctions, such as those here, we affirm.

The determination of whether contempt orders under RCW 26.09.160 require 

purge provisions is a question of statutory interpretation we review de novo. In re 

Parentage of J.D.W., 14 Wn. App. 2d 388, 396, 471 P.3d 228 (2020).
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Chapter 7.21 RCW distinguishes between punitive contempt, which upholds a 

court’s authority, and remedial contempt, which coerces compliance from the contemnor. 

RCW 7.21.010(2), (3). When a court imposes remedial contempt, the contemnor “can 

avoid the sanction by doing something to ‘purge’ the contempt.” In re Interest of 

Mowery, 141 Wn. App. 263, 275, 169 P.3d 835 (2007). However, a court imposing 

remedial contempt may separately order the contemnor to compensate another party for 

losses suffered as a result of the contemptuous behavior. RCW 7.21.030(3); see also

Gronquist v. Dep’t of Corr., 196 Wn.2d 564, 571-72, 475 P.3d 497 (2020) (A court may 

impose compensatory sanctions irrespective of whether it imposes remedial sanctions.).

Because the attorney fees and costs provided for in RCW 26.09.160(7) inure to the 

aggrieved parent, they are compensatory sanctions. In re Marriage of Lesinski, 21 Wn. 

App. 2d 501, 514-15, 506 P.3d 1277 (2022). A trial court imposing compensatory 

sanctions under RCW 26.09.160 need not preserve the contemnor’s opportunity to purge 

those sanctions. Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by omitting purge provisions 

from the contempt orders it imposed on Father. 

4. Attorney fees and costs

In her responsive brief, Mother devotes a section to supporting her argument for 

reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. She cites RCW 26.09.160 and decisional 
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In re Parentage of lD.H 0. 

authority in support of her argument. 

RCW 26.09.160(1) provides in relevant part: 

An attempt by a parent ... to refuse to perform the duties provided in the 

parenting plan ... shall be deemed bad faith and shall be punished by the 

court by holding the party in contempt of court and by awarding to the 

aggrieved party reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incidental in bringing a 

motion for contempt of court. 

In Rideout, the Supreme Court concluded that this subsection, and a similar 

subsection, RCW 26.09.160(2)(b)(ii), requires a contemnor to pay reasonable attorney 

fees and costs even on appeal, notwithstanding the failure of the statute to say so 

expressly. 150 Wn.2d at 358-59. We conclude that Mother is entitled to recover her 

reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

• c.. .. 'j. 

WE CONCUR: 

Staab, J. Cooney, J. 

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