1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 08 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s UNITE D STATE S v . D E NE DO CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES No. 08–2 67. Ar g u ed M a r c h25, 200 9—Dec i ded Ju n e8, 200 9 Military authorities char ged respondent, a native N i gerian serving in

the U. S. Navy, with violating of th e Uniform Code of Mili tary Justice (UCM J). Withc o u n s el’ s ass i st an ce, re spondent agreed to plead guilt y t ored u ced c h a r ges . The s p ecial court-martial accepted the plea and convicted and sentenced resp ondent; the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal App e als (NMCC A ) affirmed; and he was dis

c h ar g e d fr om th e Navyin2 000. In2006, th e Depar tmen tof Home

la nd S e curit ycom m e nced rem o va l proceedings a g a i nstres p ondent basedon the conviction. To avoid de portat ion, he filed a petition for a writ of co ram nob i sunder th e authority o f th e All Writs Act, asking the NMCCA to v a cate the conv iction it had earlier affirmed on the grou nd t h a this guilt y pleares u lt edfrom ineffective assistance o f couns el, w h o ha d a s s u red him his plea b a rga i n ca r r ied no ris kof de

port a t ion. Thoughrej e ct ing t h e Gov e rnment’ s c o ntention that i t lacked jurisdiction to gr antth e writ, the NMCCA denied relief for lac kof mer i t. Agr eeingthat the NM CCA has jur i sdic t i o n , the Cour t of Appeal s for the Armed F o rces (CAAF) remanded for further pro

ceedings on the merits. Held: 1. This Cour t has subjec t- mat t er jurisdiction unde r2 8U. S. C. §125 9(4), w h ic hper m its itto r e v i ewCAAF dec i sion s inc a ses “in which [tha t co urt] gra n ted r e lief.” Res p ondent’s pa rs imonious view that the C A A Fdid not “ ‘ gr a n[t] r e lief’ ” i nthis c a se, b u t simp lyr e manded to th e NM CCA, i s r ejec t ed. Though§1259 do es not defin e “r elief,” the wor d ’ s famili a rme an in gen c o mpasse s an yr e dr ess or benefit prov ided bya court. The CAAF’s judg ment rev e rsingthe NM CCA sa tisf ies that definit i on. Pp. 4–5. 2. Article I military courts have jurisdiction to entertain coram no -2 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Sy llabu s bispetitions t oc o nsideralleg a tions that a near lierjudgment of c o n v i c t ionwas flawed ina fun d amen tal r e spe c t. Pp. 5–13. (a) Military courts’ power to i ssue extraor d inary writs under the All Writ s Act, see Noydv. Bond , 395 U. S. 683, 6 95, n

. 7, does n o t de

termine the anterior questi on whethe r those courts hav ejurisdiction to enter t ain a coram nob i s petition

. As recognized by the All Writ s Ac t—whic h per m its “c our t s establi s hed byAc t of Congr e ss” to i ssu e “ a ll writ s neces s a ry or a ppro p ria t e in a i d of t h eir res p ect ive j u ris d ic

tion s,” 28 U. S

. C. §1651(a) —a c o u r t’ s powerto issu e an yfor mof r e lief, extraordinary or otherwise, is conti n gent on its subject-matter j u ris d ict i on over t h e ca s eor cont rove rs y. S u ch j u ris d ict i on is det e r mined b yCongres s . Bowlesv. Ru sse ll , 551 U. S. 205, 2 12. Th u s , to issue respondent a writ of co r a m n o b i son remand, the NMCCA must have ha d s t atutory s u bj ect-ma tter jurisdiction over respondent’s or igin al ju dg men tof c o n v ic ti on . Pp. 5–8. (b) Pursuant to the UCMJ, the NMCCA and the CAAF hav esub

j e ct -m a t t e r j u ris d ict i on over t h is case. Th e NMCCA has jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s coram nob i sreq u es tunder UCMJArt i cle 66, which provides: “For the purpose of revi ewing cou r t

- m a rt ial ca s e s, the [NM CCA] maysi t .

. . .” 1 0 U. S. C. §866( a). Bec a use r e spon dent’s coram nob i s r e quest is si mplya fur t her“step in [ h is] c r i minal” appeal, United Statesv. Morga n , 346 U. S. 50 2, 505 n . 4, th e NMCCA’s juri sdiction to i s s u e the wr it deriv e s from the earlier juris

dic t ionit ex er c i sed u n d er§866( a) to h e aran d deter m in e th e c o n v ic

t i on’s va lidit y on directrevie w. Res p ondent’s coram nob i s request i s not barred bythe requirem ent that the NMCCA “act only with re spec t to the fi nding s and sentenc e as app r oved by the convening au

th or ity

. ” §866(c )

. An alleg e d er r o r inthe or igin al ju dg men tpr edi

cated on ineffective-assistance-of-co unsel challenges the conviction’s validity, see Knowlesv. Mirzayance , ante, at ___, so respondent’s Six t h Amend m ent c l aim i s “with r e sp ec t to” the spec ial-c o ur t

martia l’s “findings” of guilty

. Because the NMCCA has jurisdiction, the CAAF has jurisdiction to rev i ew the NMCCA’s denial of respon

dent’s petitio nchallenging the valid ityof his original conviction. Tha tt h e CA AF’s a u t h ori t y is confi n ed “to matters of l a w” connected to “the finding s and sentenc eas a pproved by the conveni n g authority an d as affir m ed orset a s i d e byth e Co u r t of Cr imin al Appe als,” §867(c ) , poses n oobstac le to r e spon den t ’ s r e qu ested r e v i ew. Hi s Six t h Amendment c l aim pr esents a “m at t e [r] of law” “with r e spec t to the [guilty] fi ndings

. . . asapprov ed by the [spec i al c o ur t-mar t ia l ] and as affirme d. . . by” the NMCCA. Pp. 8–1 0. (c ) Th e Gov e rn men t ’ s ar g u men tth at UC M JAr tic l e 76 affir m a tively prohibits the type of collatera l review res p ondent s eeks errs in “conflating the jurisdiction al ques tion w i th the mer i t s ” of r e s p on -3 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Sy llabu s dent’s petition , A r t h urAn ders e nLLP v. C a rlisle , ante, a t___. Article 76 provides fo r the finality of judgme n t s inmili tar yc a ses. Ju s t a s the finality principle did not juri sdic tionall ybarthe c o ur t in Morgan, supra, from e x amining its earlier judgment, neither does itb a r th e NMCCA from doingso here. The Gov e rnment’s contention that co ram nob i sper m it s acourtt ocorre ctit s ownerro rs, not those of an in

fer i orc o u r t, is disposed of onsimi largr ou nds. Pp. 10–12. 66 M

. J. 114, affir m ed an d r e man d ed.

K ENNEDY , J., delivered the opinion of theCourt, in which S TEVENS , S OUTER , G IN S B U R G , and B REYER , JJ., joined. R OBERTS , C. J., filed an opinion conc u rring in pa rt a n d dissent ing in part, in which S CALIA , T HOMAS , and ALITO , JJ., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–2 67 UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JACOB DEN E DO ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE ARME D FORCES [Ju n e8, 2009] J USTICE K E NNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. The case b e fore us presents asi ngle issue : whether an Article I military appellate cou rt has jurisdiction to enter

tain a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to challenge its earlier, and final, decision affir m ing a criminal convic

tion. The military court which had affirmed the conviction and where the writ of coram nobis was sought is the NavyMarine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA). It s ruling that it had juris d iction to g r ant the wr it, but then denying its issuance for lack of merit, was a p pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAA F). Af ter the C AAF a greed that the NMCC A h a s jurisdiction to issue t h e writ, it remanded for further proceedings on the merits. The Government of the Unite d States, contending that a writ of co ram nobis d i rected to a final judgment of conviction is beyond the jurisdiction of the military courts, now brings the case to us. I Respondent Jacob Denedo came tothe United States in 1984 from his native Nigeria. He enlisted in the Na vy in 1989 and b e came a la wful permanent resident in 1990. In 1998, milit ary authori ties charged him with conspiracy,2 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of theCourt larceny, an d forgery—i ncontraven t ion of Arti cles 81, 121, and 123 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCM J), 10 U. S. C. §§881, 921, 923—all for his role in a scheme to defraud a community college. Wit hthe assistance of both military and civilian counsel, respondent made a pl ea bargain to plead guilty to reduced charges. In exchange for his plea the convening aut hority referred respondent’s case to a special court-martial, §819, which, at that time, could not i m pose a sentence gr eater thansix month s ’ confinemen t. The special court-mart ial, consisting of a single militar y judge, acce pted respondent’s guilt y plea after determining that it was both knowing and vol untary. Th e court con

victed respondent of c o nspiracy a n d larceny. It sentenced him to three months’ confinement, a bad-conduct dis

charge, anda reduction to the lowest enlist e d pay gra d e. Respondent appealed on the groun dthat his s e ntence was unduly severe. The NMCCA affi rmed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 64a–67a. Respon dent did not seek further review in the CAAF, and he was dischargedfrom the Navy on May 30, 2000. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security co m menced removal proceedings against respondent based upon his special court-martial conviction. To avoid depor

tation, resp ondent decided to chall e nge his conviction once more, though at this point it hadbeen final for eight years. He maintained, in a petition for a writ of cora m nobisfiled with the N M CCA, tha tthe convi ction it ha d earlier af

firmed must be deeme dvoid because his guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent alleged tha the inform ed his civilian attorney during plea negotiations that “ ‘hi s primary concern an d objective’ ” was to avoi d deportati on and that he was wil ling to “ ‘risk

. . . going to jail’ ” to av ert separation from his family. 66 M. J. 114, 118 (C. A. Armed Forces 2008). On respon

dent’s account, his attorney—analcoholic who was n o t3 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt sober during the cours e of the special court-martial pro

ceeding—erroneously a ssured him that “ ‘if he agreed to plead guilty at a special-court-martial he would avoid any risk of deportation.’ ” Ibid. Pet i tioner argued that the NMCC A co uld set aside its earlier decision by issuing a writ of cora m nobis under the authority of the All Writs Act, 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). The Government filed a motion to dismiss f o r want of jurisdiction. It contended that the NMCCA ha d no author

ity to conduct postconvi ction pr oceedings. Inaterse, four

sentence or der, the NMCCA sum m arily denied both the Government’s motion and respon dent’s petition for a writ of coram n o bis

. App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. Responde nt appealed and the CAAF, dividin g3 to 2, affirmed in pa rt and reversed in part. The CAA F agreed withthe NMCC A that standi n g military courts have jurisdiction to conduct “collateral review und er the All Writs Act.” 66 M. J., at 119. This is so, the CAAF expl ained, because “when a petitioner seeks collateral relief to modify anaction tha t was taken within the subject matter jurisdi ction of the military justice system .

. . a writ that is necessary or appropriate may be iss u ed under the All Writs Act ‘in aid of’ the cour t’s existing jurisdiction.” Id., at 12 0 (citing 28 U. S. C. §1651(a)). Satisfied that it had ju risdiction, the CAAF n e xt turn e d to whether the writ of coram nobi sshould issue. It held that a nondefaulted, in effective-assistance cla i m that was yet to receive a full a n d fair review “within the military justice system” could justify issuance of the writ. 66 M. J., at 125. Finding that respondent’s ineffecti ve-assistance claim satisfied “the threshold criteria for coram nobis review,” th e CAAF remanded to the NMCC A so it coul d ascertain in the first instance “whether th e merits of [respondent’s] petition can be reso lved on the basis of th e written sub m issions, or whether a factfindin ghearing i s required.” Id. , at 126, 130.4 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of theCourt Judge Stucky filed a dissenting opinion. Ass u ming tha t the majorit yhadcorr ectly deter m ined its j u risdiction to grant the requested relief, h e conc luded that respondent’s ineffective-assistance claim lacked merit. Id. , at 131

. Judge Rya nalso dissented. Rea s oning that the majori ty had misapplied this Court’s holding in Cli n ton v. Gol d

smith, 526 U. S. 529 (1 999), she concluded tha tthe UCMJ does not c o nfer jurisdiction upon military tribunals to conduct “po s t-finality collateral review.” 66 M. J., at 13 6. We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2008), and now affirm. II Before we address another court’s subject-matter juris

diction we must first determine our own. S ee Ashcroftv. Iqbal , ante, at 6 (“Subj ect-matterju risdiction .

. . should be considered when fairly in doubt”). The Gove rnment, upon which the burden to demonstra te subject-matter jurisdi c tion lies, DaimlerChry s ler Corp. v. Cuno, 5 47 U. S. 33 2, 342 (2006), claims that our power to hear this appeal rests on 28 U. S. C. §1259(4). That jurisdictional provision permits us to review CAA F dec i sions in “ ‘cases

. . . in which the Court of Ap peals for the ArmedForces .

. . granted relief.’ ” Res p ondent maintains that we lack jurisdiction because the CAAF didnot “ ‘grant relief ’ ”; “all it did was r e mand” to t h e NMCC A

. Brief for Respondent 6–7 (bracke t s omitted). Respondent’s parsimonious construction of the wo r d “relief” need not detain us long. Though §1259 does n o t define the term, its familiar meaning encompasses a n y “redress or benefit” provided by a court. Black’s La w Dictionary 1317 (8th ed. 2004). The CAAF’s judgme nt reversing t h e NMCC A satisfies that definition. The NMCCA de nied respon dent’s petition for a writ of cora m nobis, while the CAA F’s decision reversed a n d remand ed so that the NMCC A c o uld determine anew if the wri t5 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt should issu e. That decision conferred a palpable ben e fit on respondent; for a chance of success on th e merits, how

ever slight, is superior to no possib i lity at all. To be sure, respondent would have preferred the CAAF to issue a writ of cora m nobisor to direct th e NMCCA t o do so rather than rem anding for the NMCCA to condu c t further pro c eedings. We have j u risdiction, however, to review any decision granting “relief,” not just t h ose provid

ing “ultimate relief” or “complete relief.” Indeed, appellate courts reve rse and remand lower court jud g ments—rat h er than issuing complete relief—with regularity. See, e.g . , ArthurAnd ersenLLP v. Carlisl e , ante, at ___; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, In c. , ante, at ___. There is no merit to the view th at a decision granting partial relief should be construed as granting no relief at all. Because the CAAF “ g ranted relief” to respondent, the text of §12 59 is satisfied here. We have j u risdiction to determine whether th e CAAFwas correct i nruling th at the NMCC A had auth o rity to entertain the petition for a writ of cora m nobis

. III A The writ of coram n o bisis an ancient common-law remedy designed “to co rrect er rors of fact.” Unit e dSt at es v. Morgan , 346 U. S. 5 02, 507 (1954). In Am erican juris

prudence the precise contours of coram nobishave not been “well defined,” Bronsonv. Schulten , 10 4 U. S. 410 , 416 (1882), but the writ traces i t s origins to the King’s Bench and the Court of Common Pleas. Uni t ed Sta t esv. Plumer , 27 F. Cas. 561 , 573 (No. 1 6 ,056) (CC Mass. 1859) (opinion for the court by Cliffo rd, Circuit Justice); see also Morgan , su pra, at 507, n. 9 (citing 2 W. Tidd, Practi ce of Courts of King’s Benchand Common Pleas *1136–*1137). In English prac tice t h e office of the writ was to fost er respect for judicial rulings by enabling the same court6 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of theCourt “where the action wa s commenced and wh ere the jud g ment was r e ndered” to avoid the rigid st rict ures of jud g ment finality b ycorrecting technical errors “such as ha p pened thro ugh the fa ult of the c l erk in the record of t h e proceedings prior to the judgment.” Plum er , sup ra , at 572–573. Any ra tionale confining the wri tto techni cal errors, however, has been superseded; for in its modern iteration coram nobisis broader than its common-law predecessor. This is confirmed by our opinion i n Morgan

. In that cas e we found that a writ of coram nobiscan issue to redress a fundamental error, th ere a deprivation of counsel in viola

tion of the Sixth Amendment, as opposed to m e re technic a l errors . 346U. S., at 5 13. The potential univ e rse of cases that range from technical errors to fundamental ones perhaps illustrates, in the case o f coram nobis , the “te n dency of aprinciple to expand i t self to the limit of it s logic.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judic ial Process 51 (1921). To confine the use of coram nobisso that finality is not at ris kin a great numbe r of cases, we were careful in Morgan to limit the availabilit y of the writ to “extraor

dinary” cas e s presenti ng circumstances compelling its us e “to achieve justice.” 3 46 U. S., at 511. Another limit, of course, is that an extraordinary remedy ma y not issue when alternative rem e dies, such as habeas corpus, a r e available. See id., at 510–511. In federal c o urts the authority to grant a wri tof coram nobisis conferred bythe All Writs Act, which permits “courts esta blished by Act of Cong ress” to issue “all writs necessary or app r opria t e in aid of their respec tive jurisdic

tions.” 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). Though military courts, li ke Article III tribunals, are empowered to issue extraordi

nary writs under the All Writs Act, Noydv. Bond , 3 95 U. S. 683, 6 95, n. 7 (1969), that a u thority do es not deter

mine the anterior question wh ether military courts have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for coram no bis. A s t h e7 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt text of the All Writs Act recogni z es, a cour t’s power t o issue any f o rm of reli ef—extraordinary or otherwise—is contingent on that court’s subject- matter juri sdiction over the case or controversy

. Assuming no constraints or limit ations grounded in the Constitution are implicated, it is for Congress to deter

mine the subject-mat t er jurisdic tion of federal courts. Bowles v. Russell , 55 1 U. S. 20 5, 212 (20 07) (“Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have ju risdictionto consider”). This rule applies with added force to Arti cle I tribunals, such as the NMCC A a n d C AAF, which owe their exist e nce to Co n gress’ auth o rity to enact legisl ation pursuant to Art. I, § 8 of the Constitution. Goldsmith , 526 U. S., at 53 3–534. Our decision in Golds m ith demonstrates these teach

ings. There an Air F o rce officer, James Goldsmith, wa s convicted of various crimes bygeneral court-martial and sentenced to six years’ confinement. Id., at 531. Follow

ing his conviction, Congress enacted a statute authorizin g the President to drop convicte d officers from the rolls of the Armed Forces. When the Air Force notified Goldsmith that he would be dropped from th e rolls, he lodged a peti

tion before the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFC CA) cl aiming that the proposed action contravened the Ex Post Facto Clau se of the Constitution. Id., at 532– 533

. Goldsmith sought extraordi nary relief as authorized by the All Writs Act t o enjoin the President from removing him from the rolls. The AFCCA denied relief, but t h e CAAF gran ted it. Concluding that the UCMJ does not authorize military courts to re view execut ive action—i ncluding adecision to drop an officer from the rolls—we held that the AFCC A and the CAAF lack ed jurisdiction over Goldsmith’s case. Id., at 535. This was so, we unequivocally found, irrespec

tive of the military court’s aut hority to issue extraordinary relief pursuant to the All Writ s Act and its previous juris

-8 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of theCourt diction over Goldsmith’s criminal proceeding. The powe r to issue relief depends upon, ra ther than enlarges, a court’s ju risdiction. Id., at 536–537. That princi ple does not control th e question before us. Because coram nobis is but an extraordinary tool to cor

rect a legal or factual error, an application for the writ is properly viewed as a belate d extension of the original proceeding during which the erro r allegedly transpired

. See Morga n, supra, a t505, n. 4 ( coram nobis is “a step in the crimina l case and not, like ha beas corpus where relief is sought in a separate case and re cord, the be ginning of a separate civil proceeding”); see al so United Sta t esv. Be g gerly , 524 U. S. 38, 46 (1998) (citing Pacific R. Co. of Mo. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co

. , 111 U. S. 505, 522 ( 1884) (noting that an“in d ependent action”—which, like coram nobis , is an equitable means to obtain relief from a judgment—
“ ‘may be regarded as ancillary tothe prior sui t , so that the relief asked may be granted by th e court which made th e decree in that suit .

. . . The bill, though an original bill in the chancery sense of the word, is a continu a tion of th e former suit, on the question of the jurisdiction of the [court]’ ”). It follows t hat to issue respondent a writ o f coram nobi son remand, the N M CCA mu st have ha d statutory s ubject-matter juri sdiction over respondent’s original judgment of conviction. B In the critic a l part of it s opinion discussing th e jurisdic

tion and authority of the NMCCA to issue a writ of cora m nobisin an appropriat e case, the CAAF desc ribes respon

dent’s request for review as one “under the All Writs Act.” 66 M. J., a t119. This is correct, of course, if it simply confirms that the Act authorizes federal courts to issu e writs “in aid of” their j u risdiction; but it does not advance the inquiry into whether jurisdictio nexists. And there are limits to the use of coram nobis to alter o r9 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt interpret earlier judgments. As Goldsmith makes pla i n, the All Writs Act and the extraor dinary relief the statute authorizes are not a s o urce of subject-matte r jurisdiction. 526 U. S., at 534–535. Statutes which address the power of a court to use cert ain writs o rremedies or to dec r e e certain forms of relief, for in stan ce to award damages in some specif ied measur e, in s o me circumstances might be construed a l so as a grant of juris d iction to h e ar and de

termine the underlying cause of action. Cf. Marbury v. Madison , 1 Cranch13 7 (1803). We have long held, ho w ever, that the All Writs Act sh ould not be interpreted in this way. Goldsmith, supra, at53 6 ; Plumer , 27 F. Cas., at 574 (jurisdiction cannot be acquired “by means of the writ to be issu ed”). The authority to issue a writ under the All Writs Act is not a font of jurisdiction. See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Hen s o n , 537 U. S. 28, 31 (2002). Quite apart from the All Writ s Act, we conclude that th e NMCC A has jurisdiction to en tertain respondent’s reques t for a writ of coram nobis

. Article 66of th e UCMJ pro

vides: “For the purpos e of reviewing court-m a rtial cases, the [Court of Criminal Appeals] may sit .

. . .” 10 U. S. C. §866(a). Because respondent’s re quest for co ram nobis is simply a further “step in [his] criminal” appeal, Morgan , 346 U. S., a t505, n. 4, the NMCCA’s ju risdiction to issue the writ derives from th e earli e r jurisdiction it exercised to hear and determine the validity of the conviction on direct review. As even the Government concedes, the textual authority under the UCMJ to “ ‘re vie[w] court-mar t ial cases’ ” pro vided the NMCC A wi th jurisdicti on to hear an appeal of respondent’s judgment of conviction. See Brief for United States 17–18. That jurisdiction is sufficient to permit the NMCC A to entertainrespondent’s petition for coram nobis

. See also Courts of Criminal Appeals Rule of Practice an d Procedur e 2(b) (recognizing N M CCA disc re tionary aut hority to entertainpetitions for extraordina ry writs).10 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of theCourt It is true t hat when exercising its jurisdicti on under §866(a), the NMCCA “may act o n ly with re spect to th e findings and sentence as approve dby the co nvening au

thority.” § 866(c). Th at limitation does not bar respo n dent’s request for a writ of coram nobis

. An alleged error in the original judgment predicated on ineffective

assistance-of-counsel c hallenges t h e validity of aconvic

tion, see Kn owlesv. Mi rzayance , ant e, at 3, so respondent’s Sixth Ame n dment claim is “with respect to” the special

court-marti al’s “findings of guilty,” 10 U. S. C. §866(c). Pursuant to the UCMJ, the NMCCA has s ubject-matter jurisdiction to hear res p onde nt’s request for extraordinary relief. Because th e NMCC A had jurisd iction over re spondent’s petition for coram no bis , the C AAF hadj u risdiction to entertain respondent’s appeal from the NMCCA’s judg

ment. When exercising its juris d iction, the CAAF ’s a u thority is c o nfined “to matters of law” conn ected to “t he findings and sentence as approve dby the co nvening au

thority and as affirmed or set aside .

. . by the Court of Criminal Appeals,” §867(c), but these limita t ions pose no obstacle to respondent’s requested review of the NMCCA’ s decision. Respondent’s Sixth Ame n dment claim presents a “matte[r] of law” “wit h respect to the [guilty] findings .

. . as approve dby the [special court-martial] and as affirm ed

. . . by the Court of Criminal Appeals.” Ibid

. The CAAF had subject-matter jur i sdiction to review the NMCCA’ s denial of respondent’s petition challenging the validity of his original conviction. C The Govern ment counters that Article 76 of the UCMJ, 10 U. S. C. §876, “affirmatively prohibit[s] the type of collateral review sought byrespondent.” Bri e f for Unite d States 18. That is incorrect. The Government’s argumen t commits the error of “conflatingthe jurisdictional questionCite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) 11 Opinion of theCourt with the me rits” of resp ondent’s petition. Arth ur Andersen LLP, ante, at 3. Articl e 76 states in relevant part: “The appellate review of records of trial provi d ed b y this chapter, the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courts-martial as approved, re viewed, or affirmed as required by this ch apter, and all dismiss a ls and discharges carried into execution under sentences by courts-martial followin g approval, review, or affirma

tion as required by thi s chapter, a r e final and conclu

sive. Orders publishing the pro c eedings of courts

martial and all actiontaken pursuant to those pro

ceedings are binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States .

. . .” 10 U. S. C. §876. Article 76 c o difies the common-law rule thatrespects the finality of judgments. Schl esin gerv. Councilman , 42 0 U. S. 738, 7 49 (1975). Just as the rules of fin a lity did not jurisdictionally bar th e court in Morgan fro m examining its earlier judgment, neither does the principle of finality bar the NM CCA f r om doing so here. The Government may ultima tely be correct that the facts of respondent’s c a se ar e insufficient to set aside the final judgment that Article 76 makes binding. No doubt, judgment fi nality is not to be lightly cast aside; and court s must be cautious so that the extraordina ry remedy of coram nobisissues on l yin extreme cases. B u t the long

recognized authority o f a court to protect the integrityof its earlier judgments impels the conclusion t hat the final

ity rule is not so infl exible that it trumps each and every competing consideration. Our holding all o ws milita r y courts to protect the integrit y of their dispositions an d processes b ygranting relief from final judgments in ex

traordinary cases when it is shown that there were fun

damental flaws in the proceedings leading to their issu

ance. Th e Government remains free to argue that12 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of theCourt respondent’s is a merely ordinar y case that is not entitle d to extraord i nary relief. But respondent’s entitlement to relief is a merits question outside the scope of the jurisdic

tional quest ion present e d. The Govern ment’s cont ention that coram nobispermi t s a court “ t o correct its ownerrors, not .

. . those of an infe

rior court, ” Brief for U n ited Sta t es 36, can b e disposed of on similargrounds. Just as respondent’s request for coram nobi sdoes not confer subj ect-matterjurisdictio n , the Government’s argument that the relief should n o t issue “in l i ght of the writ’s traditional scop e” does not undermine it, ibid. ( e m p h a s i s d e l e t e d)

. I ns u m , t h e G o v ernment’s argument s p eaks to the scope of t h e writ, not the NMCC A’s jurisdic tion to issue it. The C AAF rejec t ed the former argument. Only the latter one is b e fore us. We hold th at Article I military courts have jurisdiction to entertain coram no bispetitions to consider allegations that an earlier judgm e nt of conviction was flawed in a fundamental respect. That concl u sion is consistent with our holding that Article III co urts have a like authority. Morgan, 34 6 U. S., at 5 08. The result we reach to day is of central importance for military courts. The military jus

tice system relies upon courts tha t must ta ke a ll appropri

ate means, consistent with their statutory ju risdiction, to ensure the neutrality and integrity of their jud g ment s. Under the premises and statutes we have relied up on here, the jurisdiction and the re sponsibilityof military courts to r eexamine judgments i nrare cases where a fundamental flaw is alleged and other judi cial processes for correcti on are unavailable are consistent with th e powers Con gress has g r anted thos e courts un der Ar ticle I and with the system Congress has designed. * * * We do not prejudge th e merits of respondent’s petition

. To be sure, the writ of error cora m nobisis an extraordi

-13 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt nary writ; a n d “an extraordinary remedy .

. . should not be granted in the ordinary case.” Nke nv. Ho ld er , ante, at 1 (K ENN E DY , J., concurring). The relative strength of re

spondent’s ineffective-assistance claim, his delay in lodg

ing his petition, when he learned or should have learned of his counsel’ s alleged deficiencies, and the effect of the rule of judgment finality expressed in Article 76 are all factors the NMCCA can explore on rem and. We h o ld only that the military appellate courts had jurisdicti on to hear respondent’s request for a writ of coram nobis

. The judg

ment of the CAA F is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so orde red.Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. 

## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________ No. 08–267

_________________ UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JACOB DENEDO ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES [June 8, 2009] C HIEF J USTICE R OBERTS , with whom J USTICE S CALIA , J USTICE T HOMAS , and J USTICE ALITO join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. The Court’s approach is si mple: Jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobisis a “belated extension” of a court’s original, statutory jurisdiction. Ante , at 8. The military courts here had original jurisd iction over Denedo’s case.Those courts therefore have implicit “extended” jurisdiction to consider Denedo’s coram nobispetition. The flaw in this syllogism is at the first step: The only arguable authority for the proposition that coram nobisjurisdiction marches hand in hand with original jurisdiction is a footnote in United Statesv. Morgan , 346 U. S. 502 (1954), and that case concerned Article III courts. The military courts are markedly different. They are Article I courts whose jurisdiction is precisely limited at every turn. Those careful limits cannot be overridden by judicial “extension” of statutory jurisdiction, or the addition of a “further step” to the ones marked out by Congress. Ante , at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).I agree with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision be low, but respectfully dissent from its holding that military courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis

.2 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. I “Traditionally, military justice has been a rough form of justice emphasizing su mmary pro c edures, speedy convic

tions and stern penalties with a view to maintaining obedience a n d fighting fitness in t h e rank s.” Reidv. Cov

ert , 354 U. S. 1, 35–36(1957) (plu rality opinion). Courts

martial are composed of active se rvice members who sit only to hear the particular case before them. Once a court-marti al reaches a judgment and imposes a sentence, it is dissolved, and it s members return to their regular duties. Prior to th e Uniform Code of Military Justic e (UCMJ), military co urts of appeals did not exist. If a service mem

ber wantedto challenge a court- martial conviction, he pursued a collateral att a ck in an Article III court. There, review was limited to whether t h e conviction was void “because of lackof jurisdiction or some other equally fun

damental d e fect,” Schl esinger v. Councilman , 420 U. S. 738, 747 (1975); beyond that, Arti cle III court s adhered to “the genera l rule that the acts of a courtma rtial, withi n the scope of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot b e controlled or reviewe din the ci vil courts,” Smithv. Whitn e y , 1 16 U. S. 167, 177 (1886). The UCMJ establisheda “com plete system of [military] review,” Bu rnsv. Wilson , 346 U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plu

rality opinion), includi n g direct review in what are now the Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). But in keeping with the historical backdrop agai nst which these courts were created, Congress did no t grant military courts o f appeals “broad responsibility with respect to administra

tion of military justice”; on the contrar y , their jurisdiction is “narrowly circumsc r ibed” by t h e governing statutes

. Clintonv. Goldsmith , 526 U. S. 5 29, 534, 535 (1999) (in

ternal quotation marks omitted).3 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. The CCAs provide dir e ct, record- based review of cour t

martial judgments, but they may only review cases re

ferred by t h e judge advocate ge neral, who in turn refers only those cases in which specific sentences a r e imposed. 10 U. S. C. §§866(b), (c). Whenr e viewing that subset of court-marti al judgmen t s, a C C A “may a ct o n ly withre spect to th e findings and sentence as approved by th e convening a u thority.” § 866(c). If a case is revi ewed by the CCA, the CCA’s decision may t h en be reviewed by the CAAF. §867(a). But that court, too, conducts limited direct review: It “mayact only wit hrespect to the finding s and sentence as approved by the convening authority an d as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law by the [CCA]. ” §867(c). Once direct review in th e CCA an d the CAAF i s complete, and review i nthis Court is exhausted or waived, a judgmentas to the legality of th e court-mar t ial proceed

ings is fina l, and the s e ntence im posed may be executed. §871(c)(1). The UCMJ provides only one aven ue for reconsideration of a final c o urt-martia lconviction: a petition for a new trial under Article 73. See §873. AnArticl e 73 petition may be bro u ght “withi n two years after approval by th e convening authority of a court-martial sentence,” meaning it may be brought before or after a conviction becomes final. Ibid. If direct review is still pending before a CCA or the CAAF when the petition is filed, the judge advocate general (to whom the petition mus tbe directe d) will refer the petition to that cou rt. Ibid. But once the conviction is final, only the judge advocate general may act on an Arti

cle 73 petition. Ibid. Article 76 “ ‘describ[es] the terminal point for proceed

ings withi nthe court-martial system.’ ” Councilm an , supra , at 7 50 (quoting Gusikv. Schilder , 3 40 U. S. 12 8, 132 (1950)). Under that provision, final court-martia l judgments are “binding upon alldepartme n ts, courts, agencies, and officers of the United States, subject onlyto4 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. action upon a petition for a new trial [under Article 73],” or to action by the appropriat e Secretary or the Presiden t. 10 U. S. C. §876 (emp hasis added). Once an Article 73 petition is denied, a service member has no relief left to seek within the court-martial system. See Gusik , sup r a , at 133–134. 1 Federal courts are authorized to issue extraordinar y writs such as coram n o bisonly as “necessary or appropri

ate in aid of their respective juri sdictions.” 28 U. S. C

. §1651(a). The All Writs Act “con f ine[s] the power of th e CAAFto issuing process ‘in aid of’ its existing statutor y jurisdiction” and “does not enlarge that jurisdiction. ” Goldsmith , supra , at 5 34–535; see also Noydv. Bond , 395 U. S. 683, 695, n. 7 (1969) (although military courts ca n issue extraordinary writs in aid of their direct review jurisdiction, “[a] different question would, of course, arise in a case which the [courts are] n o t authoriz e d to revie w under the governing statutes”). The UCMJ grants mili

tarycourts of appeals no jurisd iction over final cour t

martial jud g ments, so there is no jurisdictio nfor a post

conviction extraordina ry writ to “ a id.” A petition for co ram nobisby its nature seeks postconvictionreview; it is therefore beyond the scope of these courts’ “narrowly circumscrib e d” statuto r y jurisdic t i on. Goldsmith , sup r a , at 535. II The majority overrides these careful limits on military court jurisd iction by m a intainin g that later ju risdiction t o

——————

1 A court-martial conviction may st ill be c o llateral l y at t a cked in an Article III court, but that is because thosec o ur ts posse ss ju r i sdic tion bey o n dth at gr an ted byth e UCM J

. See, e. g . , 28 U. S. C. §§2241, 1 331. We have repea t edly held tha tArticl e 76 “does not expressly effect an y c h ang ei nthe subjec t-m a tte rjurisdiction of Art. III co urt s .” Schlesi nge r v. Councilman , 420 U. S. 73 8, 749 (1 97 5). Ou r c a ses h av en e v e rqu es tioned that Ar tic l e 76 lim its the jurisdiction of military cou r ts.5 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. issue coram nobisis a “belated extension” of t h e statutory jurisdiction, that“juris diction to i ssue [ cora m nobis ] de

rives from the earlier jurisdiction.” Ante , at 8, 9. The authority the Court cites for this key jurisdictional analy

sis is—a footnote. See ante , at 8 (citing Morgan , 346 U. S. , at 505, n. 4) ; ante , at 9 (same). N o w, footnotes are part of an opinion, too, even if not the most lik ely place to lookfor a key jurisd ictional ruling. Bu t since footnote 4 plays such an indispensable role in the majority’s analysi s , it must b e read with c a re. The first th ing you noti ce in doing so is that th e footnote does not m e ntion the word “juris diction” at all. That is because it has nothing to do with jurisdicti on. The issue addressed in the para graph to which the footnote was appended was “choice of remedy. ” 346 U. S. , at 505. The Court concluded that coram nobi swas the appropriate one. The footnote sim p ly addressed the concern that the remedy might not be a v ailable because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had abolished c o ram nobisas a remedy ; the concernwas dismissed because the Court con c luded the criminal rules, not the civil rules, applied. Id. , at 505, n. 4; see also United Sta t esv. Ke ogh , 391 F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J.) (“The problem to which th e footnote wa s addressed was that F. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ha d abolished w r its of error coram nobis ”). The point is further confirmed by the text in the body of the opinion : The Court’s conclusion in the paragraph in which the footnote appears is that since the rem e dy sought was “in the nature of .

. . coram nobis ,” the trial court could“properly exercis eits jurisdiction.” 346 U. S. , at 505 (emphasis added). The issue was not the existence of jurisdiction, but whether the court had the authority t o exercise it. The Courtin the present case recognizes the distinction. See ante , at 10 (“When exercisin gits jurisdic

tion, the CAAF’s au thority is confined to matters of law” (internal q u otation m a rks omitted)); ante , a t9 (“The au

-6 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. thority to is sue a writ under the Al l Writs Act is not a font of jurisdiction”). Even accep t ing the ma jority’s read ing of Morgan ’s hith

erto obscure footnote, that readin g would on ly establish the “belated jurisdiction” theory for Article III courts. The military courts are Article I courts. The distinction has direct perti nence to the point at issue in this c a se. Legal doctr ines “must be placed in their hist orical set

ting. They cannot be wrenched from it and mechanically transplanted into an alien, un related context withou t suffering mutilation or distortion.” Reid , 354 U. S., at 50 (Frankfu rte r, J., concurring in result). The Article III courts have been given broad jurisdiction. I can under

stand, if not necessarily agree with, the notion that they might enjoy some im plicit “l ong-recognized authority” t o correct thei r earlier judgments. See ante , a t11. But not so for Ar ticl e I courts. The princip l e that Con gress defines the jurisdic tion of the lower feder a l courts “ a pplies wit h added force to Arti cle I tribunals.” Ante , at 7. That i s especially true with re spect to military courts. The mili

tary justice system is the last place courts sho u ld go about finding “extensions” of jurisd iction beyond that conferred by statute. As we expressly recognized in Goldsmith , “there is no source of c o ntinuing j u risdiction for the CAAF over all actions administering sentences that the CAAF atone timehad th e power to review.” 52 6 U. S., at 536 (empha

sis added). Since th e UCMJ grants military courts no postconvicti on jurisdict i on, conferring on them perpetua l authority t o entertain coram nobispetitions plainly con

travenes th at basic principle. 2

——————

2 O n c ey o ug e tin to th e bu sin e ss of extending jurisdiction, it can be hard to stop. Denedo is no l o nger in the milit ary. An t e , at 2. Military courts lack jurisdictionover “civilian ex-sol dier s who ha[ve] severed all relationship with the milita r y and its institutions.” U n it e d St at es ex rel. Tothv. Qu ar les , 350 U. S. 11, 14 (1 95 5). Inth e ev en t coram nob i s7 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. III Even if the majority’s r e ading of Mo rgan ’s foot note could be transplanted to the military context, th e majority’s conclusion would still not follow. “ ‘[T]he All Writs Act is a residual source of authority to is sue writs that are no t otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specificall y addresses the particul a r issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.’ ” Carli s lev. United Sta t es , 517 U. S. 416, 429 (1996) (quoting Pennsyl

vania Bu re au of Corr ectionv. Unit e dSt at es Mars hals Servi c e , 474 U. S. 34, 43 (1985)). The UCMJ contains not one, but t w o provisions specifi

cally limiting the ci rcumstances under which postconvi c tion relief (other than action by the appropriate Secreta ry or the P r esident) mayb e obtained within the c o urt-martia l system. Fi rst, Article 73 provides that, “with i n two year s after appro v al by the convening authority of a court

martial sentence, the accused may petiti on the Judg e Advocate General for a new tri al on the grounds of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court.” 10 U. S. C. §873. The only relief available under this “special post

conviction remedy” is a new trial, Burns , 346 U. S., at 141 (plurality opinion), an d even that may be granted only in an expressly circumscribed timefr ame (two years) and s e t of circumstances (newly discov ered evidenceor fraud o n the court). Article 73 stands in stark contr a st to cora m nobis , which the majority characterizes as a w r it infinitely available “t o redress a[ ny] fundamental error.” Ante , at 6; see Morgan , supr a , at 512 (“funda m ental error” not lim

ited to jurisdictional defects or errors on the face of the

—————— does issue with respect to a form er service member, th e Government mainta ins i t would lac kju r i sdic tion to r e tr y . Tr . of Or al Ar g . 56– 57; see 10 U. S. C

. §§802– 803. Av oidin gth at ex tr aor d in aryr e su lt wou l d require another “belated extension” of th e original court-martia l pro

ceeding, expanding thejuri sdiction of mil i tar yc o ur ts to tr yindiv i dual s who havelong since severed their ties to the milit ary.8 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. record). To be sure, the lim ited nature of relief available under Article 73 might lead one to ques t ion whether that is tru ly the only postconvictionrelief the UCMJ per m its. “You’re in the Arm ynow” is asufficient answer to s u ch concern s ; the relief available looks positively extravagant in light of the prior hi story and tradition of military justice. In an y event, as t h e majority recognizes, see ante , at 11, Article 76 makes clear that all court-martial judgments “carried into execution” after co mpletion of direct revi ew are “fin al and conclus i ve,” 10 U. S. C. §876. Contrary to the major

ity’s assertion, that language does not simply “codif[y] th e common-law rule that respects the finality of judgments. ” Ante , at 11. In fact, Article 76 does not stop there. It goes on to instruct that f i nal court-martial judgments a r e binding “ subject onlyto action upon a petition for a new trial [under Article 73],” or acti on by the appropriate Secretary or the President. 10 U. S. C. §876 (emphasis added). In light of these provisi o ns, only Article 73 provides any authority to the CCAs o rthe CAAF, and even that narro w authority is limited to pending cases. Once a conviction is final, only the judge a dvocate ge neral can provide relief. See supra , at 3; 10 U. S. C. §873. To the extent the CCAs or the CAAF could be deemed to have some inheren t continuing authority to issue writs of coram nobis , Articles 73 and 76 extinguish it. IV The Government goes on to argue that even if military courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis , a n d even if Articles 73 and 76 do not bar such relief, the courts still lack authority to issue coram nobis , because the wri t is neither “necessary” nor “appr o priate” to the court

martial system of justice. See 28 U. S. C. §1651(a) (federal courts “ma yissue all writs necessary orapp r opriate in ai d9 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. of their respective jurisdictions”). Coram nobisallows th e court tha ti ssued a jud g ment to c o rrect its o w n errors o f fact. See Morgan , 346 U. S., at 507, n. 9 (“ ‘If a judgment in the King’s Bench be erroneous in matter of factonly, .

. . it may be reversed in the same court , by writ of error coram nobis ’ ” (quoting2 W. Tidd, Practice of the Courts of King’s Bench, and Com m on Pleas 1136 (4th Am. ed. 1856); some emph asis added)); see a l so ante , at 11 (referring to “authority of a courtt o protectth e integrity of its earlier judgments” (emphasis added)). But a court-martial is not a standing court. On a case-by-case basis, “ [ i]t is called into existence for a special purpose and to perform a par

ticular dut y . When t h e object of its creation has been accomplished it is diss olved.” Runklev. Uni t ed Sta t es , 122 U. S. 543, 555–556 (1 887); see a l so 66 M. J. 114, 12 4 (CAAF 2008) (a court-martial “does not have independent jurisdiction over a case after the military judge authenti

cates the record and th e convening authority f o rwards th e record after taking ac tion”). Because the c o urt-martia l that issues the conviction no longer exists once the convic

tion is final, there is no court to which ap o stconviction petition for coram nobiscould be directed. The absence of standing courts-ma rtial is no mere tech

nicality, but rather an integral and intention a l part of the military justice system. “ C o u r t

- m a rti a l j u ri s di c ti on s p r a ng from the be lief that within the military ranks there is need for a prom pt, rea dy-at-han d mean s of compell i ng obe dien c e and o r de r. ” United S t a t es ex rel. Tothv. Quar les , 350 U. S. 11, 22 (195 5). But meeting that need requir e s expending significant military re sources, and “[t]o the extent that those responsible for perform ance of [the military’s] pri

mary funct i on are div e rted from it by the necessity of trying cases, the basicfighting p u rpose of armies is not served.” Id. , at 17. Ac cordingly, c o urts-marti al, composed of active duty military personnel, have always been called into existence for a limited purpose and durati on.10 UNITED STAT ES v. DENEDO Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. It is no answer tha tth e CCAs andthe CA AF are stand

ing courts that could act as substitutes for coram nobis purposes. As this case illustrates, those courts are not equipped to handle the kind of factfinding necessary to resolve claims that might be brought on coram nobis

. Instead, the CCAs wil lhave to resort to the procedures invented by United Sta t esv. DuBa y , 17 U. S. C. M. A. 147, 37 C. M. R. 411 (1967), under which a new convenin g authority will refer acase to anew court-martial, and task various mil i tary personnel wh o h a ve no prior familiarity with the ca se to conduct an out-of-court evide n tiary hear

ing on the merits of the petitioner ’s claim. Id

. , at 149, 3 7 C. M. R., at 413. This “unwieldy and imperfect system ” will undoubtedly dive rt valuable military resources, 6 6 M. J., at 13 6 (Ryan, J., dissenting), all in aid of postconvic

tion relief C o ngress specifically withheld. The Court expressly d e clines to consider the Govern

ment’s “necessary or appropriate” argument: “[T]he Gov

ernment’s argument s p eaks to the scope of t h e writ, not the [CC A’s] jurisdictionto issue it. The C AAF rejected the former arg u ment. On ly the latte r one is before us.” An te , at 12. The Court may well be correct in dividing the ques

tions into separate pigeonho les. But the Government’s argument, even if anargument about authority rath er than jurisdi ction, applies to every coram nobi s case, give n the nature of the milit ary justice system. It is curious to conclude that military courts have jurisdiction, while not considering a raised a n d briefed argument that they may never exercise it. * * * Since the adoption of the UCMJ, “Congress has gradu

ally changed the system of mili tary justice so that it has come to more closely r e semb le the civilian sys t em.” Weis s v. Uni t edS t ates , 510 U. S. 163, 1 74 (1994). “But the mi li

tary inimportant respects remai n s a specialized society11 Cite as: 55 6 U

. S. ____ (2009)

Opinion of R OBERTS , C. J. separate from civiliansociety.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omit ted). Neith e r the juris d iction nor the powers of Article III courts are necessarily appropriate for military courts, andCongress’s contrar y determinations in this area are entitled to “the highest deference.” Loving v. UnitedS t a t es , 517 U. S. 748, 76 8 (1996). Rather tha n respect the rule that military courts have no jurisdiction to revisit final convictions, the majority creates an exception that swallows it. Because I wouldhold the m ilitary courts to the statu t ory restraints that go vern them, I respectfully dissent.