alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Subchapter C of Chapter II
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to subchapter C appear by Amdt. 381, 65 FR 64586, Oct. 30, 2000.

Editorial Note on Part 276
Editorial Note: OMB control numbers relating to this part 276 are contained in § 271.8.

§ 276.1 Responsibilities and rights. ( a ) *Responsibilities.* ( 1 ) State agencies shall be responsible for establishing and maintaining secure control over coupons and cash for which the regulations designate them accountable. Except as otherwise provided in these regulations, any shortages or losses of coupons and cash shall strictly be a State agency liability and the State agency shall pay to FNS, upon demand, the amount of the lost or stolen coupons or cash, regardless of the circumstances.
( 2 ) State agencies shall be responsible for preventing losses or shortages of Federal funds in the issuance of benefits to households participating in the Program. FNS shall strictly hold State agencies liable for all losses, thefts and unaccounted shortages that occur during issuance, unless otherwise specified. Issuance functions begin with the State agency's creation of a record-for-issuance to generate each month's issuances from the master issuance file. Shortages or losses which result from any functions that occur prior to the creation of the record-for-issuance are subject to either paragraph (a)(3) of this section or subpart C—Quality Control (QC) Reviews, of part 275—Performance Reporting System.
( 3 ) State agencies shall be responsible for preventing losses of Federal funds in the certification of households for participation in the Program. If FNS makes a determination that there has been negligence or fraud on the part of a State agency in the certification of households for participation in the Program, FNS is authorized to bill the State agency for an amount equal to the amount of coupons issued as a result of the negligence or fraud.
( 4 ) State agencies shall be responsible for efficiently and effectively administering the Program by complying with the provisions of the Act, the regulations issued pursuant to the Act, and the FNS-approved State Plan of Operation. A determination by FNS that a State agency has failed to comply with any of these provisions may result in FNS seeking injunctive relief to compel compliance and/or a suspension or disallowance of the Federal share of the State agency's administrative funds. FNS has the discretion to determine in each instance of noncompliance, whether to seek injunctive relief or to suspend or disallow administrative funds. FNS may seek injunctive relief *and* suspend or disallow funds simultaneously or in sequence.
( b ) *Rights.* State agencies may appeal all claims brought against them by FNS and shall be afforded an administrative review by a designee of the Secretary as provided in § 276.7. State agencies may seek judicial review of any final administrative determination made by the Secretary's designee, as provided in § 276.7(j).
[54 FR 7016, Feb. 15, 1989]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Gerald Calhoun, Appellant.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered March 15, 1967, affirmed. (See *People*v. *King,*30 A D 2d 776 [appeal by codefendant].) Beldock, P. J., Christ, Brennan, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### In the Matter of Eden Park Health Services, Inc., Doing Business as Eden Park Nursing Homes, Petitioner, v Robert P. Whalen, as Commissioner of Health of the State of New York, et al., Respondents.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this court by order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the respondents which imposed a fine in the amount of $41,374 upon petitioner. When this matter was previously before us, we remitted the matter to the Director of the Office of Health Systems Management for particularization of the fine assessed for each of the 10 charges of which petitioner was found guilty *(Matter of Eden Park Health Servs. v Whalen,*73 AD2d 993). Now that the record contains a breakdown of the penalties imposed in addition to an explanation as to how those penalties were computed, the respondents’ determination must be confirmed. Petitioner argues that respondents violated the provision of subdivision 6 of section 2803 of the Public Health Law, which sets a maximum penalty of $1,000 per day for continuing violations of departmental rules and regulations. We need not, however, decide whether respondents may impose penalties exceeding $1,000 for multiple violations of the same regulation on a given day since the record demonstrates that petitioner was not fined an amount exceeding $1,000 per day for any of the regulations it was found guilty of violating. Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Staley, Jr., and Mikoll, JJ., concur.
###### Editorial Note on Part 1951

#### Editorial Notes:

1. Some of the exhibits referenced in this part 1951 are not published in the Code of Federal Regulations. Exhibits are available in any Rural Development office.

2. Nomenclature changes to part 1951 appear at 80 FR 9890-9894, Feb. 24, 2015.

#### §§ 1951.156-1951.200 [Reserved]
§ 254.5 Household eligibility. ( a ) *Certification procedures.* All applicant households shall be certified in accordance with the eligibility and certification provisions in §§ 253.6 and 253.7.
( b ) *Urban places.* No household living in an urban place in Oklahoma shall be eligible for the Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations. However, an ITO can request the Department to grant individual exemptions from this limitation upon proper justification submitted by the ITO as determined by FNS.
( c ) *Eligible households.* Only Indian tribal households, as defined in § 254.2, may be eligible for the Food Distribution Program in FNS service areas.
(The information collection requirements contained in paragraph (a) were approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 0584-0316) [49 FR 32756, Aug. 16, 1984, as amended at 64 FR 1098, Jan. 8, 1999]
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

)

INDEPENDENT PARTY OF )

FLORIDA and PARTY FOR )

SOCIALISM AND LIBERATION, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:20-cv-00110-MW-CAS

)

LAUREL M. LEE, Florida )

Secretary of State, in her official )

capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

)

JOINT RESPONSE TO COURT’S

ORDER DATED AUGUST 10, 2020

The Parties, through their respective counsel of record, jointly file 

this response to the Court’s Order dated August 10, 2020 which orders 

that, after conferral, the Parties notify this Court whether they intend 

to proceed as scheduled or on an expedited basis. (DE 51.)

The Parties have conferred by telephone on August 12, 2020 and 

they intend to jointly move to amend the scheduling order, but not to 

expedite the matter. They believe the issues can be resolved on cross 

motions for summary judgment after the General Election and will 

Case 4:20-cv-00110-MW-MAF Document 52 Filed 08/14/20 Page 1 of 3
2

propose a schedule that allows for that, without changing the currently 

scheduled trial date. Part of that request will be to extend discovery, as 

relevant facts have yet to arise.

Dated this 14th day of August, 2020.

Respectfully submitted,

THE BERNHOFT LAW FIRM, S.C.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By: /s/ Daniel J. Treuden

Daniel J. Treuden

Admitted pro hac vice

1402 E. Cesar Chavez Street

Austin, Texas 78702

telephone: (512) 582-2100

facsimile: (512) 373-3159

djtreuden@bernhoftlaw.com

Case 4:20-cv-00110-MW-MAF Document 52 Filed 08/14/20 Page 2 of 3
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The foregoing document was served on the Defendant by the ECF 

system at the time of filing:

ashley.davis@dos.myflorida.com

Deputy General Counsel Ashley E. Davis

brad.mcvay@dos.myflorida.com

General Counsel Brad R. McVay

Attorneys for:

Laurel M. Lee, Florida Secretary of State

R.A. Gray Building, Suite 100

500 S. Bronough Street

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Signed this 14th of August, 2020.

 /s/ Daniel J. Treuden

Daniel J. Treuden

Case 4:20-cv-00110-MW-MAF Document 52 Filed 08/14/20 Page 3 of 3
I 

113TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 2177 

To eliminate the application of sequestration to unemployment benefits, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 23, 2013 

Ms. KAPTUR (for herself, Mr. GRIJALVA, Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, Ms. 

MCCOLLUM, and Mr. POCAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Budget 

A BILL 

To eliminate the application of sequestration to 

unemployment benefits, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Unemployment Res5 toration Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ELIMINATING APPLICATION OF 251A SEQUESTRA7 TION TO CERTAIN UNEMPLOYMENT BENE8 FITS. 

9 (a) FISCAL YEAR 2013.—Notwithstanding the presi10 dential order issued on March 1, 2013, under section 


pwalker on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 2177 IH

1 251A of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 

2 Control Act of 1985, the budgetary resources sequestered 

3 under that order for any Federal payments to a State 

4 under section 204 of the Federal-State Extended Unem5 ployment Compensation Act of 1970 and for any Federal 

6 payments to a State under section 4003(a) of title IV of 

7 the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, pursuant to 

8 a Federal-State agreement under section 4001 of such 

9 title, shall be available for obligation in the same amount 

10 and manner as if such order had not been issued. 

11 (b) FISCAL YEARS 2014 THROUGH 2021.—Section 

12 255(i)(2) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 

13 Control Act is amended to read as follows: 

14 ‘‘(2) The reduction ordered under section 254 

15 shall not apply to— 

16 ‘‘(A) any Federal payments to a State 

17 under section 204 of the Federal-State Ex18 tended Unemployment Compensation Act of 

19 1970; or 

20 ‘‘(B) any Federal payments to a State 

21 under section 4003(a) of title IV of the Supple22 mental Appropriations Act, 2008, pursuant to a 

23 Federal-State agreement under section 4001 of 

24 such title.’’. 

Æ 


pwalker on DSK7TPTVN1PROD with BILLS
Document No. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS CASE NO. 3:96cr80LAC

STEVEN ANTHONY GRAHAM

REFERRAL AND ORDER

Referred to Judge Lacey Collier on APRIL 4, 2008 

Motion/Pleadings: MOTION UNDER FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b)(4) 

Filed by DEFENDANT PRO SE on 3/14/2008 Doc.# 182

RESPONSES:

on Doc.#

on Doc.#

Stipulated Joint Pldg.

Unopposed Consented

WILLIAM M. McCOOL, CLERK OF COURT

s/Mary Maloy

LC (1 OR 2) Deputy Clerk: Mary Maloy

ORDER

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED this 7th day of

April, 2008, that:

(a) The relief requested is DENIED.

(b) 

 s/L.A. Collier

LACEY A. COLLIER

Senior United States District Judge

Entered On Docket: By: 

Rules 58 & 79(a) FRCP or 32(d)(1) & 55 FRCRP

Copies sent to:

Case 3:96-cr-00080-LC-CJK Document 183 Filed 04/07/08 Page 1 of 1
#### Fortunato Scimeca, Respondent, v Arnold Polection, Defendant and Vincenzo Realmuto, Appellant. (And Two Other Actions.)

In consolidated negligence actions to recover damages for personal injuries, defendant Realmuto appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated August 8, 1979, which granted a special preference for the trial of the actions. Order reversed, without costs or disbursements, and preference vacated. On this record, the court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting a special preference. "A court cannot make a finding of bad faith under CPLR 3403 simply because it disagrees with the amount which the defendant has offered for settlement” *(Turturro v Stevens,*58 AD2d 601). Hopkins, J. P., Lazer, Gibbons and Gulotta, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York ex rel. Edward S. McCaulley, Appellant, v. J. Edwin La Vallee, as Warden of Auburn Prison, Respondent.

Order unanimously reversed and matter remitted to Cayuga County Supreme Court for further proceedings in accordance with memorandum. Memorandum: Appellant’s application for a writ of habeas corpus was erroneously denied and should be now granted. Issues were presented by the petition that required a hearing. Upon such hearing relator, if he so requests, is entitled to assignment of counsel. (Appeal from order of Cayuga Special Term denying writ of habeas corpus.) Present — Bastow, J. P., Goldman, Henry, Del Vecehio and Marsh, JJ.
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 23-1423

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Joseph R. Flying Horse

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Western

 ____________

 Submitted: June 6, 2023

Filed: June 9, 2023

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Joseph Flying Horse appeals after the district court1 revoked his supervised

release and sentenced him to 4 months in prison and 30 months of supervised release. 

1The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota.
His counsel has moved for leave to withdraw, and has filed a brief challenging the

sentence. Flying Horse has filed several pro se motions challenging his underlying

conviction and seeking the return of property.

As to the argument in counsel’s brief, after careful review of the record, we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Flying Horse,

as it properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; there was no indication that

it overlooked a relevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing

relevant factors; and the sentence was below the advisory Guidelines range and the

statutory limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (maximum revocation prison term is 2 years for

Class D felony; maximum supervised release term is 3 years, less any previous and

current revocation prison terms); United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 915-18 (8th

Cir. 2009) (substantive reasonableness of revocation sentence is reviewed under

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. White Face, 383

F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004) (district court need not mechanically list every

§ 3553(a) factor when sentencing defendant upon revocation; all that is required is

consideration of relevant matters and some reason for court’s decision).

As to Flying Horse’s pro se arguments, we conclude that he may not challenge

his original conviction or seek the return of property in this proceeding. See Miller,

557 F.3d at 913 (defendant may not challenge validity of his underlying sentence

through collateral attack in supervised release revocation proceeding); see also Fed.

R. Crim. P. 41(g) (providing procedure for seeking return of property).

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny Flying Horse’s

pending motions, and affirm.

______________________________

-2-
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 1:03-cr-00051-MP

PRINCE ALBERT REID,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

O R D E R

This matter is before the Court on Doc. 35, Motion for Early Termination of Supervised

Release filed by Defendant Prince Albert Reid. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), the Court may

“terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the

expiration of one year of supervised release . . . if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by

the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice . . . .”

Defendant’s term of supervision commenced on July 13, 2007 and is scheduled to expire

on July 12, 2012. Defendant lives in Miramar, Florida and reports to the United States Probation

Office in the Southern District of Florida. Consideration for early termination in the Southern

District of Florida requires the Probation Office to clearly identify documented unusual

circumstances or hardships upon the life of the individual before making a favorable

recommendation to the Court. Defendant is seeking an early termination based merely on

compliance with the sentence imposed by the Court. Defendant’s Probation Officer recommends

that the Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release be denied for failure to identify any

exceptional circumstances warranting early termination. The Court agrees. Accordingly it is
Page 2 of 2

Case No: 1:03-cr-00051-MP

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release, Doc. 35, is

DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 14th day of January, 2011

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge
#### KLETZING v. YOUNG et al.

No. 11845.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Dec. 8, 1953.

Decided Feb. 18, 1954.

*730Mr. David Cobb, Washington, D. C.t for appellant.

Mr. Donald B. MacGuineas, Attorney, Department of Justice, of the Bar of the Supreme Court of Illinois, *pro hac vice,*by special leave of Court, with whom Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., and Edward H. Hickey, Attorney, Department of Justice, were' on the brief, for appellees.

Before EDGERTON, WILBUR K. MILLER, and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

With the aid of readers the appellant, who is blind, passed Civil Service examinations for certain government positions the duties of which he would not have been able to perform without employing readers. The Civil Service Commission, after entering his name on the resulting registers of eligibles,'told him his eligibility was being cancelled because of his handicap. He asserted a right to be restored to the registers, and asked for injunctive and declaratory relief. His complaint alleged, among other things, that the cancellation of his eligibility violated 62 Stat. 351, 5 U.S. C.A. § 633(2)9, which forbids the Commission to discriminate against a physically handicapped person “with respect to any position the duties of which, in the opinion of the Civil Service Commission, may be efficiently performed by a person with such a physical-handicap, # * *»

- Since the registers to which appellant seeks to be restored have expired under the Commission’s usual practice, - the District Court rightly dismissed the, complaint as moot. The fact that the legal question appellant seeks to raise may recur in the future does not defeat the defense of mootness. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 341 U.S. 901, 71 S.Ct. 613, 95 L.Ed. 1341, reversing 87 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 185 F„2d 426.

Affirmed.
exv10w53



 






Exhibit 10.53




SUMMARY OF NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION




     Each non-employee director, other than a non-employee director serving as Chairman of the
Board, receives an annual retainer of $30,000, and the Chairman of the Board, if a non-employee
director, receives an annual retainer of $50,000. In addition to the annual retainer, non-employee
directors who serve as the Chairman of the Audit Committee or the Venture Committee receive an
annual fee of $40,000, and non-employee directors who serve as the Chairman of the Compensation
Committee or the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee receive an annual fee of $20,000.
Non-employee directors are also paid $2,000 for each Board or committee meeting attended in person
and $1,000 for each Board or committee meeting attended by telephone. No additional compensation
is paid when the Board of Directors or a committee acts by unanimous written consent in lieu of a
meeting. Non-employee directors are eligible for reimbursement of their expenses incurred in
connection with attendance at Board meetings in accordance with Cadence policy.



     Under Cadence’s 1995 Directors Stock Option Plan, each non-employee director is automatically
granted an option upon joining the Board of Directors to purchase the number of shares of Cadence
common stock equal to 6,250 multiplied by the number of full calendar quarters between the date the
director’s service begins and the next April 1st. A director is considered to have served the
entire calendar quarter if he or she becomes a director at any time during the first half of the
quarter. These initial grants vest and become exercisable in full on the March 31st following the
grant date and have an exercise price equal to the fair market value of Cadence common stock on the
grant date. In addition, every April 1st, each non-employee director is automatically granted an
option to purchase 25,000 shares of Cadence common stock and a non-employee director serving as
Chairman of the Board is automatically granted an additional option to purchase 25,000 shares of
common stock. These annual option grants vest and become exercisable in full on the March 31st
following the grant date and have an exercise price equal to the fair market value of Cadence
common stock on the grant date.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

VS CASE NO. 3:98cr67-01/RV

ROGER PROPHETE 

REFERRAL AND ORDER

Referred to Senior Judge Roger Vinson on February 19, 2009

Motion/Pleadings: Motion to Dismiss Indictment 

Filed by United States on 2/18/2009 Doc.# 206

RESPONSES:

 on Doc.# 

on Doc.#

Stipulated Joint Pldg.

Unopposed Consented

WILLIAM M. McCOOL, CLERK OF COURT

 s/Jerry Marbut

LC (1 OR 2) Deputy Clerk: Jerry Marbut

ORDER

Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is ORDERED this 19th day of

 February , 2009, that:

(a) The relief requested is GRANTED, without prejudice.

(b) 

/s/ Roger Vinson

ROGER VINSON

Senior United States District Judge

Case 3:98-cr-00067-RV Document 207 Filed 02/19/09 Page 1 of 1