J-S01039-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEVEN R. KARSTETTER 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 909 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 18, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-44-CR-0000592-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2024

Appellant, Steven R. Karstetter, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his convictions of multiple crimes that stemmed from a 

November 5, 2021, altercation with members of the Lewistown Police on his 

front porch. Upon careful review, we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand.

The incident surrounding Appellant’s convictions commenced from the 

custody exchange of a minor child pursuant to a custody order. Custody had 

been awarded to the child’s paternal grandmother. Appellant was the 

boyfriend of the child’s maternal grandmother. The trial court summarized 

the facts of the incident as follows:

According to the witnesses for the Commonwealth, on the 

date in question, [Paternal Grandmother] had agreed to bring the 

child to [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence for a visit. This was 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S01039-24

- 2 -

with the understanding that [Paternal Grandmother] would 

remain during the visit. Upon arriving, [Paternal Grandmother] 

was met by [Appellant] who told [Paternal Grandmother] that she 

must leave without the child and that she would not be getting 

her grandson back. [Paternal Grandmother] then contacted the 

Lewistown Police Department and was initially advised that the 

department would not enforce the custody order. [Paternal 

Grandmother] was also advised that she could contact the 

department later to see if another officer would assist. Eventually, 

Lewistown Police Officer [Matthew] Lynch agreed to intercede and 

went to [Maternal Grandmother’s] residence. There he was met 

by [Appellant] who had stepped outside the front door and closed 

it behind him. [Appellant], acknowledging the existence of the 

court order, indicated that [Paternal Grandmother] should file a 

contempt petition and that, in the meantime, he had no intention 

of returning the child. [Appellant] then attempted to enter the 

residence but was prevented from doing so by Officer Lynch. 

Officer Lynch then informed [Appellant] that he was under arrest 

for interfering with the custody of a child and detained [Appellant] 

who was attempting [to] reenter the residence. Officer [Bruce] 

Mann arrived on the scene and, thereafter, a substantial struggle 

ensued between [Appellant] and the police officers. The struggle 

involved, among other things, an attempt by the police to employ 

a taser gun without any effect except that the defendant grabbed 

the gun and attempted to take it away from the Officer Lynch.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/23, at 1-2.

In a criminal information filed on December 30, 2021, Appellant was 

charged with interference with custody of children, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2904(a); 

disarming law enforcement officer without lawful authorization, 18 Pa.C.S. § 

5104.1(a)(1); flight to avoid apprehension/trial/punishment, 18 Pa.C.S. § 

5126(a); resisting arrest, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104; and disorderly 

conduct/unreasonable noise, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(2). On November 7, 2022, 

the day of trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress his arrest and evidence 

obtained in this case. See Motion to Suppress, 11/7/22, at 3 (unnumbered). 
J-S01039-24

- 3 -

The trial court held a hearing, denied the motion, and commenced trial. See

N.T., 11/7/22, at 3-10.

At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of all charges

except the crime of interference with custody of children. On January 12, 

2023, the court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of 

incarceration of four to eight years. However, near the completion of the 

sentencing hearing, Appellant became disruptive and was removed from the 

courtroom in cuffs. Subsequently, on January 18, 2023, the sentencing court 

reconvened, and Appellant was apprised of his post-sentence and appellate 

rights.

Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion on January 30, 2023, and 

the trial court held a hearing on April 27, 2023. On June 1, 2023, the Clerk 

of Courts of Mifflin County entered an order denying the post-sentence motion 

by operation of law. This timely appeal was filed on June 26, 2023. Both 

Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant 

now presents issues challenging (1) whether the trial court properly denied 

his motion to suppress, and (2) whether there was sufficient evidence to 

support his conviction of flight to avoid apprehension, trial, or punishment. 

See Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.

Appellant first argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion 

to suppress. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-22. Further, Appellant posits that 

“the Suppression Motion argues that there was an illegal seizure of Appellant, 
J-S01039-24

- 4 -

it is Appellant’s position that all evidence obtained as a result of that unlawful 

seizure, which includes the interaction between Appellant and the officer, must 

be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Due to the Commonwealth’s 

failure to carry its burden, the only conclusion is that Appellant was unlawfully 

seized, and the question is what conduct thereafter should be suppressed ....” 

Id. at 20.

Questions of the admission and exclusion of evidence are within the 

sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent 

an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Freidl, 834 A.2d 638, 641 

(Pa. Super. 2003). Moreover, we note that our scope of review from a 

suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at the 

suppression hearing. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013). “It is 

within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the 

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” 

Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa. Super. 2006). Also,

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H) provides that “The Commonwealth shall have the burden 

... of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation 

of the defendant’s rights.”

Our review of Appellant’s motion to suppress confirms the observation 

that Appellant has failed to specify what evidence he sought to have 

suppressed as a result of his allegedly illegal arrest. In his motion, Appellant 

asked the trial court to simply “suppress [his] arrest and evidence obtained in 
J-S01039-24

- 5 -

this case.” Motion to Suppress, 11/7/22, at 3 (unnumbered). This lack of 

specificity compelled the trial court to state, at the start of the hearing 

addressing the motion to suppress, “I need to know what evidence you want 

to be suppressed because that’s what you called [the motion].” N.T., 11/7/22, 

at 3. When pressed by the trial court concerning what evidence was 

inadmissible, defense counsel gave a nonspecific reply of “[s]tatements ... that 

[Appellant] made, actions that [Appellant] took while in custody or on the 

porch ... .” Id. at 5. Subsequently, in its written opinion, the trial court 

observed that “[h]ere, however, there is no evidence which was seized as a 

result of the arrest, unlawful or otherwise. Therefore, we are at a loss to know 

what it is that [Appellant] seeks to ‘suppress.’” Trial Court Opinion, 8/25/23, 

at 3.

Upon review, we do not discern an abuse of discretion by the trial court 

in reaching its conclusion to deny the motion to suppress.1 Rather, we agree 

____________________________________________

1 To the extent Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present 

evidence at the time of the suppression hearing, which was held immediately 

before the start of trial, we observe that the District Attorney, Christopher R. 

Torquato, Esq, stated:

“We would be glad to put Officer Lynch on the stand, he would –

and I would submit the testimony you would hear is that he 

responded. He advised [Appellant that] he is going to be placed 

under arrest for interfering with custody of a child, which is a 

felony. He advised [Appellant] to comply with the arrest and 

things kind of went downhill from there. So our position is the 

arrest is legitimate because it’s a felony and it’s being committed 

in the presence of the officer.”

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S01039-24

- 6 -

with the trial court that Appellant’s imprecise request to suppress does not 

merit relief. Therefore, the trial court was within its sound discretion in 

making its determination. Accordingly, this claim lacks merit.

Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth failed to establish beyond 

a reasonable doubt that he committed the crime of flight to avoid 

apprehension. See Appellant’s Brief at 22-25. Appellant points out that his 

conduct in question, i.e., stepping from the front porch into his residence, 

does not qualify under the statute because Appellant had not been charged 

with a crime. We are constrained to agree.

We analyze arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under 

the following parameters:

Our standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences 

derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish all 

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not 

weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any 

doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of 

fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When 

evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the factfinder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. For 

____________________________________________

N.T., 11/7/22, at 8. This submission by the Commonwealth, coupled with the 

affidavit of Officer Samuel Snyder of the Lewistown Police Department, which 

was appended to Appellant’s motion to suppress, presents ample evidence to 

the trial court to have a full understanding of what transpired between the 

police and Appellant on the evening in question.
J-S01039-24

- 7 -

purposes of our review under these principles, we must review the 

entire record and consider all of the evidence introduced.

Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations omitted).

Our Crimes Code defines the offense of flight to avoid apprehension as 

follows:

A person who willfully conceals himself or moves or travels within 

or outside this Commonwealth with the intent to avoid 

apprehension, trial or punishment commits a felony of the third 

degree when the crime which he has been charged with or has 

been convicted of is a felony and commits a misdemeanor of the 

second degree when the crime which he has been charged with or 

has been convicted of is a misdemeanor.

18 Pa.C.S. § 5126(a).

In Commonwealth v. Phillips, 129 A.3d 513 (Pa. Super. 2016), this 

Court determined that “the plain language of [section 5126(a)] requires that 

a person have been charged with a crime. This language is simply not 

ambiguous.” Id. at 518. Therefore, our Court vacated the defendant’s 

conviction of flight to avoid apprehension because the Commonwealth failed 

to prove that Phillips had been charged with a crime when he fled from law 

enforcement. Consequently, an element of flight to avoid apprehension is the 

requirement that an individual has already been charged or convicted of a 

crime.

In reviewing this issue, the trial court determined that it “agree[d] with 

[Appellant] that the evidence at the trial of this case was not sufficient to 

support a conviction for a violation of [flight to avoid apprehension].” Trial 
J-S01039-24

- 8 -

Court Opinion, 8/25/23, at 3-4. The trial court aptly reasoned that 

“[Appellant] had not yet been charged with a crime when he attempted to 

reenter his residence. Thus, the evidence does not establish a violation of 

flight to avoid apprehension.” Id. at 4. The trial court ultimately suggests 

that Appellant’s conviction of this crime should “be set aside.” Id. To its 

credit, the Commonwealth concedes the meritorious nature of Appellant’s 

issue and notes that it “will not brief or oppose the [trial c]ourt’s findings.” 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. 

Upon review of the record before us, we conclude that the 

Commonwealth did not establish that Appellant had been charged with a crime 

when he attempted to enter his residence. Consequently, we agree with the 

trial court and the parties that Appellant’s conviction for flight to avoid 

apprehension must be vacated. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment 

of sentence to the extent he was convicted of flight to avoid apprehension and 

discharge him solely on that count. Because our determination disrupts the 

sentencing court’s overall sentencing scheme, Appellant must be resentenced.

Judgment of sentence vacated in part. Case remanded for resentencing. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.
J-S01039-24

- 9 -

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/24/2024