[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 18-11977

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-00852-TCB

MUNICIPAL COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

COBB COUNTY, GEORGIA, 

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF COBB COUNTY, GEORGIA, 

MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF 

COBB COUNTY, GEORGIA, 

 Defendants-Appellants.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(January 8, 2020)

Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:

Cobb County, Georgia, the Cobb County Board of Commissioners, and the 

members of the Board of Commissioners (collectively “the County”) appeal the 

grant of summary judgment in favor of Municipal Communications, LLC. This 

case stems from the Board’s decision to grant Municipal a special land use permit 

to construct a telecommunications tower; the permit was granted on the condition 

that Municipal move the tower 300 feet east of the proposed location. Municipal 

filed suit arguing that the County’s decision was effectively a denial of the permit 

because the County’s proposed site is unavailable. Municipal also argued that the 

decision was not supported by substantial evidence as required by the 

Telecommunications Act of 1996.1 Conversely, the County argued that Municipal 

failed to prove that the new site is unavailable and that the County’s decision to 

require relocation of the tower was supported by record evidence. The district 

court granted summary judgment in favor of Municipal. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Cobb County’s Zoning Ordinance. 

1 As relevant to this appeal, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides that “[a]ny 

decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, 

construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by 

substantial evidence contained in a written record.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii).

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Cobb County’s zoning ordinance provides that before constructing a 

wireless tower over 35 feet in height, a person must apply for and obtain a special 

land use permit. Cobb County Code § 134-273(1)-(2). The local Zoning Division 

may retain the services of “consultants, engineers, or other experts in the area of 

radio frequency engineering or other relevant fields to assist the county in 

analyzing the application.” Id. § 134-273(3)(m). Then, the planning division and 

zoning division staff analyze the application and recommend either granting or 

denying the application. Id. § 134-122. The Cobb County Planning Commission2

then holds a public hearing and makes a recommendation to the Board of 

Commissioners. Id. § 134-123(b). Finally, the Board of Commissioners holds a 

public hearing and votes on whether to grant the application. Id. § 134-124. The

county code lists fifteen factors that the Board of Commissioners must consider 

when deciding whether to grant the permit. Id. §§ 134-37(e), 134-273.

3

2 The Planning Commission is an advisory commission that assists the governing 

authority (the Board of Commissioners) in administering and enforcing the Zoning and Planning 

Act. See Cobb County Code §§ 134-61, 134-64, 134-65.

3 The fifteen factors are: “(1) Whether or not there will be a significant adverse effect on 

the neighborhood or area in which the proposed use will be located; (2) Whether or not the use is 

otherwise compatible with the neighborhood; (3) Whether or not the use proposed will result in a 

nuisance as defined under state law; (4) Whether or not quiet enjoyment of surrounding property 

will be adversely affected; (5) Whether or not property values of surrounding property will be 

adversely affected; (6) Whether or not adequate provisions are made for parking and traffic 

considerations; (7) Whether or not the site or intensity of the use is appropriate; (8) Whether or 

not special or unique conditions overcome the board of commissioners' general presumption that 

residential neighborhoods should not allow noncompatible business uses; (9) Whether or not 

adequate provisions are made regarding hours of operation; (10) Whether or not adequate 

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B. Municipal’s Application for a Special Land Use Permit. 

On August 25, 2015, SouthernLINC Wireless, Inc. submitted an application

for a special land use permit with the Zoning Division to build a cellular tower on a 

site that it was leasing on the property of Wildwood Baptist Church. The church 

was surrounded by residential properties and an elementary school. While the 

application was pending, SouthernLINC assigned its rights, title, and interest in the 

lease to Municipal, and Municipal became the applicant.

The County hired CityScape Consultants to conduct an independent 

evaluation of the application. At CityScape’s suggestion, SouthernLINC, and later 

Municipal, agreed to reduce the height of the tower from 190 feet to 165 feet and 

to camouflage it to look like a pine tree. In its final report, CityScape concluded 

that Municipal’s application met the relevant zoning ordinance requirements and 

recommended approval. 

controls and limits are placed on commercial and business deliveries; (11) Whether or not 

adequate landscape plans are incorporated to ensure appropriate transition; (12) Whether or not 

the public health, safety, welfare or moral concerns of the surrounding neighborhood will be 

adversely affected; (13) Whether the application complies with any applicable specific 

requirements set forth in this chapter for special land use permits for particular types of uses; 

(14) Whether the applicant has provided sufficient information to allow a full consideration of all 

relevant factors; (15) In all applications for a special land use permit the burden shall be on the 

applicant both to produce sufficient information to allow the county fully to consider all relevant 

factors and to demonstrate that the proposal complies with all applicable requirements and is 

otherwise consistent with the policies reflected in the factors enumerated in this chapter for 

consideration by the county.”

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After Municipal amended its application to reflect the changes 

recommended by CityScape, the County’s planning division and zoning division 

staff reviewed the application. The staff concluded that the application satisfied all 

of the applicable zoning ordinance requirements and recommended approval. 

However, the staff also proposed that the County attach a condition to the permit 

requiring Municipal to move the tower 300 to 400 feet to the east, which would 

place it in a thick grove of trees near the center of the property. On February 10, 

2016, Municipal filed a supplement to its application informing the zoning 

department that the staff’s proposed location was unavailable because the church 

would not lease the site. Municipal explained that the church would not allow the 

tower on that site because it would create a large area in the center of the property 

that could not be developed in the future. Municipal further explained that moving 

the tower would make it less visible for neighbors to the west, but more visible for 

neighbors to the east and for travelers on Wade Green Road. Municipal also 

explained that the move was unnecessary because the proposed site was already 

farther away from the nearest neighbors than many other towers the County had 

previously approved. 

On February 2, 2016, the Planning Commission held a public meeting on 

Municipal’s application. At the meeting, Municipal’s attorney reiterated 

Municipal’s objections: the proposed condition to move the tower 300 feet to the 

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east would not make the tower less visible and the church would not allow 

Municipal to move the tower. 4 She further explained that the church would not 

allow Municipal to move the tower because it would preclude development of that 

area in the future. Finally, she noted that moving the tower 300 feet would require 

Municipal to start the process of receiving other regulatory approvals—including

approval from the Federal Communications Commission—all over again. 

The expert consultant from CityScape explained at the meeting that the 

tower was necessary to fill a cellular service coverage gap in the area, and the 

County’s zoning division manager explained that Municipal had satisfied all of the 

zoning ordinance requirements. Eighteen local residents attended the meeting in 

opposition to the tower, and six of those residents spoke, disputing the existence of 

a coverage gap and expressing general aesthetic concerns5 and the potential for the 

4 Although Municipal’s attorney did, early in her remarks before the Planning 

Commission, say, “Number one, we can, but number two, it’s not going to achieve anything if 

we did move it,” in context it is clear this was a misstatement. The attorney clarified moments 

later that requiring Municipal to move the tower “ensures essentially a denial of [the] application 

because the current property owner will not allow us to move [the tower] to that location.” Then, 

in response to a question from the Planning Commission’s chairman, the attorney explained that 

“one of the main reasons” for Municipal’s objection to the condition is the fact that “the church 

has said no, emphatically no.” This reading of the attorney’s statements is also consistent with 

Municipal’s written objections to the condition. 

5 The first resident to speak, C.N., stated that he represented residents of seven 

neighborhoods, and explained that the residents opposed the tower because “such a tower would 

inflict an unsightly and wholly adverse impact on the aesthetics and character of the 

neighborhood. . . . This is a view the residents and visitors to Cobb County will see. Welcome 

to Cobb County, home of the mega tree.” Another resident, E.W., stated that her yard is a 

private, “real-world escape place to relax and enjoy the natural beauty around us. . . . This tower 

will be visible from our entire yard. There will be no escaping this totally unnatural towering 

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tower to impact property values negatively. Prior to voting on the recommendation 

to make to the Board, one of the planning commission members posed the question 

“whether or not as a community you-all have looked at the staff recommendations 

and had any thoughts about whether or not moving it to a different location on the 

property would change your feelings about the request.” Resident C.N., who was 

the spokesperson for seven neighborhoods, stated “[w]ell without appearing to be 

very rigid, we don’t want a tower, no way, no how between—in our seven 

residential neighborhood area from the Cherokee County line on Wade Green to 

Wooten Lake Road.” The commissioner stated that her understanding then was 

that the community did not want the tower anywhere on the church property, even 

if it was moved 300 feet to the east and was less visible, and resident C.N. 

confirmed that was correct. During their deliberations, the planning 

commissioners acknowledged that Municipal had demonstrated the tower was 

needed and met all of the applicable zoning requirements. The planning 

commissioner from the relevant district questioned whether moving the tower

would make any difference to the tower’s visibility. Nevertheless, she moved for a 

vote to recommend granting the application subject to the relocation condition. The 

Planning Commission unanimously approved the recommendation. 

fake pine tree.” Resident J.C., noted that “[i]t’s important to protect the quality of life and the 

aesthetics of residential neighborhoods.” 

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The Board held a hearing on Municipal’s application on February 16, 2016.

Twenty-eight residents attended the hearing in opposition to the application. 

Municipal’s attorney explained the need for the tower to provide greater cell 

coverage in the area. She also described an appraiser’s report that had been 

submitted to the County, which explained that the tower would not harm property 

values and discussed nearby towers that had not caused a reduction in property 

values. Municipal’s attorney further explained that moving the tower would 

increase visibility for some neighbors and that, in any event, the church would not 

allow the tower to be placed on the alternative site. Two of the residents spoke in 

opposition to the application at the hearing. One asserted that there was no 

demonstrated gap in coverage and the tower was not necessary. The other resident 

urged that if the Board “must approve” the application that it do so with the 

condition that the tower be moved 300 feet to the east so that they would not “have 

to look at it every time we walk out of our house.” Additionally, a local realtor 

spoke on behalf of the residents in opposition to the application and expressed a 

generalized concern that the tower would impact property values negatively. 

The independent consultant from CityScape spoke and supported the 

conclusion that the tower was necessary. Specifically, he confirmed that there was 

a “substantial gap” in coverage in the area, and that other siting areas had been 

considered but were not adequate to meet the service goals. When asked whether 

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moving the tower 300 feet to the east would harm the applicant, the consultant 

explained he perceived no engineering or coverage issues related to moving the 

tower. The consultant observed that moving the tower into more tree cover would 

“shield the portion of the tower that’s in the trees,” although a large, unshielded 

portion would still remain above the tree cover. He also noted that “[i]f you’re 

moving away from the homes 300 feet, . . . you’re going to probably reduce the 

visibility because you’re moving further away. Of course, you’re moving towards 

others, so . . . that’s kind of more of . . . an opinion for you, [the Board] to assess.” 

Finally, the members of the Board spoke. Commissioner Birrell concluded 

that the tower was necessary to fill a gap in coverage and that it met all zoning 

requirements, but she also acknowledged the general aesthetic and property value 

concerns that had been raised. With respect to property values, Birrell said, the 

effect of cell towers on property values “is really subjective.” As an example, she 

noted that despite the presence of one very prominent tower in the area, homes 

surrounding it were still “million-dollar homes and some more.” She stated that “it 

does depend on, you know, the buyer, and I just—I mean, it’s subjective. And we 

can’t really say that it definitely impacts one way or the other. And there are cases 

where it does affect.” Birrell then stated that she believed moving the tower 300 

feet would reduce visibility, which “would help preserve the neighborhood and 

address some of the aesthetic concerns that the neighbors have[.]” Accordingly, 

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she made a motion to approve Municipal’s application subject to the condition that 

the tower be moved 300 feet to the east. Commissioner Cupid acknowledged that 

the proposed tower would impact residents’ views, but emphasized that it was not 

like traditional cell towers, and because it is to be designed to look like a tree, “it’s 

not going to bear that same detriment in your view as you might associate with the 

traditional cell phone tower.” Commissioner Weatherford stated that he did not 

see any reason to move the tower, noting that “[i]t seems to do nothing, except 

change a different view and closer to the road.” He noted that he had approved a 

cell tower near his own home, and “you can barely see it, and it becomes invisible 

after a while.” He explained he supported the tower “as it meets some of the best 

qualifications I’ve seen in my years of doing this as far as fall zone and impacting 

of neighbors[,] . . . but I really don’t see a reason to move it 300 feet.” The Board 

then unanimously voted to approve the application with the relocation condition.

The Board did not issue any additional formal writing explaining its decision. 

On March 16, 2018, Municipal filed its complaint in the district court 

alleging that the Board’s decision was effectively a constructive denial of 

Municipal’s application and was unsupported by substantial evidence in violation 

of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The parties filed cross-motions for 

summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Municipal, concluding that the Board’s approval of the permit with the condition 

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attached constituted a denial of the permit and was unsupported by substantial 

evidence. The district court ordered the County to issue Municipal a special land 

use permit without the relocation condition. The County appeals. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion for summary 

judgment and construe “all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the nonmovant.” Browning v. Payton, 918 F.2d 1516, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting 

Tackitt v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 758 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir. 1985)). We 

also review de novo the district court’s determination that the Board’s decision was 

not supported by “substantial evidence” and apply the same standard—§ 332’s 

“substantial evidence” standard—that the district court applied. Am. Tower LP v. 

City of Huntsville, 295 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2002). 

III. DISCUSSION

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 “generally preserves ‘the traditional 

authority of state and local governments to regulate the location, construction, and 

modification’ of wireless communications facilities like cell phone towers, but 

imposes ‘specific limitations’ on that authority.” T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of 

Roswell, 574 U.S. 293, 300 (2015) (quoting Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 

U.S. 113, 115 (2005)). One of those limitations is that “[a]ny decision by a State 

or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, 

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or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by 

substantial evidence contained in a written record.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). 

Although a locality must make its reasoning available in writing, there is no 

specific requirement regarding the format that writing must take, and a locality can 

rely on a detailed hearing transcript in order to support its decision as the County 

did here. T-Mobile S., 574 U.S. at 303.

The substantial evidence standard under 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) is the 

same as the substantial evidence standard used by courts to review agency 

decisions. Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. Of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 762 (11th 

Cir. 2005). “Substantial evidence” is defined as “more than a mere scintilla but 

less than a preponderance.” Id. As the party seeking to overturn the Board’s

decision, Municipal bears the burden of proving that the decision was not 

supported by substantial evidence. Id.

It is well-established in this Circuit that “[a] blanket aesthetic objection does 

not constitute substantial evidence under § 332. Such a standard would eviscerate 

the substantial evidence requirement and unnecessarily retard mobile phone service 

development.” Id. Nevertheless, we have noted that “[a]esthetic objections 

coupled with evidence of an adverse impact on property values or safety concerns 

can constitute substantial evidence.” Michael Linet, 408 F.3d at 762; see also 

Preferred Sites, LLC v. Troup Cty., 296 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2002)

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(explaining that “[a]esthetic concerns may be a valid basis for denial of a permit if

substantial evidence of the visual impact of the tower is before the board”).6

 Thus, 

while in certain circumstances particularized aesthetic concerns may be a valid 

basis for the denial of an application, “[m]ere generalized concerns regarding 

aesthetics . . . are insufficient to create substantial evidence justifying the denial of 

a permit under [the Telecommunications Act].” Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1219.

In this case, the County raises two arguments on appeal. First, the County 

argues that its decision to deny the application was justified because Municipal did 

not meet its burden of providing sufficient information to show that the alternate 

site was unavailable. Second, the County argues that the Board’s decision to deny 

Municipal’s application was supported by substantial record evidence as required 

by the Telecommunications Act. We address those arguments in turn. 

A. Whether Municipal Provided Sufficient Information. 

The County argues that it was justified in denying Municipal’s application 

because Municipal failed to meet its burden of producing sufficient information to 

show that the alternative site was unavailable. Cobb County’s zoning ordinance 

provides that “[i]n all applications for a special land use permit the burden shall be 

on the applicant both to produce sufficient information to allow the county fully to 

6 Because the case at hand concerns only those general aesthetic concerns, we do not 

reach the question of the extent to which particularized aesthetic objections could suffice in a 

different case.

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consider all relevant factors and to demonstrate that the proposal complies with all 

applicable requirements and is otherwise consistent with the policies reflected in 

the factors enumerated in this chapter for consideration by the county.” Cobb 

County Code § 134-37(e)(15).

The district court concluded that it is “undisputed that Municipal 

substantially complied with the requirements of the local zoning ordinance.” 

However, the County did argue in its motion for summary judgment that Municipal 

failed to meet its burden of providing sufficient information because it did not 

submit documentation showing the proposed site was unavailable. Thus, we 

disagree that it is undisputed that Municipal “substantially complied.” What is 

undisputed, however, is that Municipal repeatedly represented throughout the 

application process that the church would not lease the new location to it and it 

could not move the tower, and no County representative, Board Commissioner, or 

Planning Commission member or staff person, ever alleged, or even remotely 

suggested, that Municipal had failed to meet its burden of providing sufficient 

information in compliance with the County’s zoning ordinance.7

 Indeed, the 

7 In fact, the CityScape consultant, the County’s planning division and zoning division 

staff, the County’s zoning division manager, the Planning Commissioners, and at least two Board 

members unequivocally stated that Municipal met all applicable zoning requirements.

Additionally, the fact that the County did not question the representation that the cell tower could 

not be moved despite numerous opportunities to do so further undermines its argument. 

Specifically, after the planning and zoning division staff proposed moving the tower, Municipal 

filed a supplement to its application informing the County that the proposed location was 

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County did not articulate this reason as a basis for its decision until after the 

commencement of this action in the district court.8

 The County cannot “rely on [a] 

rationalization[] constructed after the fact” and then cherry-pick from the record 

evidence that supports it. See Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1220 n.9 (rejecting the 

appellant’s stated reasons for denial of an application where the “reasons . . . were 

not espoused prior to the commencement of [the] action,” as the “[a]ppellant may 

not rely on rationalizations constructed after the fact to support the denial of 

[a]ppellee’s application”); see also T-Mobile S., 574 U.S. at 304 n.3 (noting that a 

process in which the locality could wait until a lawsuit is commenced to proffer 

reasons for its decision is unworkable and would “turn judicial review on its 

head”).

9

 Accordingly, the County cannot now rely on Municipal’s alleged failure 

unavailable because the church would not lease it. Then at the Planning Commission meeting, 

Municipal explained again that the church would not allow it to move the tower. Finally, at the 

Board hearing, Municipal reiterated that the church would not lease the new location. At any of 

these points, had the County been concerned about the veracity of Municipal’s representation 

that it could not move the tower, the County could have requested documentation. And even if 

the Board did not consider the issue until it was raised by residents at the Board meeting, it still 

could have at that point requested documentation. 

8 The County asserts that the record as a whole demonstrates that from the beginning the 

Board disputed Municipal’s representation that the new location was unavailable because the 

church was not willing to lease it, citing statements made by residents at the Board hearing, 

which indicated that a lease between the church and Municipal had not been finalized. However, 

the record as a whole demonstrates that, notwithstanding the residents’ comments, no 

Commissioner ever questioned Municipal about its representation that the proposed relocation 

site was unavailable or even remotely suggested that Municipal needed to require proof of such. 

9 The County argues that an applicant “cannot make a naked request to construct a 

telecommunications tower, i.e., appear empty-handed before the zoning authority, and then 

complain that the zoning authority’s simple ‘no’ answer is not supported by substantial 

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to produce evidence concerning the unavailability of the new location as a basis for 

its decision. 

B. Whether the County’s Decision is Otherwise Supported by 

Substantial Evidence. 

The County argues that the district court erred in its determination of 

whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence because the district 

court considered only the statements of members of the Board, instead of the 

record as a whole. Specifically, the County maintains that when the record is 

considered as a whole, substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision to attach 

the condition that Municipal move the tower 300 feet to the east, referring to letters 

submitted from neighboring residents expressing aesthetic concerns, as well as 

concerns that the tower would decrease property values and impact the 

neighborhood’s safety. The County correctly notes that when assessing if 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, we are required to look at the 

whole record, but we do so only in light of the locality’s stated reasons for its 

decision. Am. Tower, 295 F.3d at 1209 n.8; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 

U.S. 80, 95 (1943) (holding that “an administrative order cannot be upheld unless 

the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon 

evidence.” AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Town of Porter, 203 F. Supp. 2d 985, 994 (N.D. Ind. 

2002). But Municipal did not appear empty-handed. It submitted an extensive application and 

supplemented that application with new information numerous times, including by informing the 

County about the unavailability of the proposed site. 

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which its action can be sustained”). Here, the County proffered a transcript of the 

minutes from the Board hearing as the reasoning for the Board’s decision. The 

transcript reveals that the Board acknowledged in passing that numerous residents 

had submitted letters and expressed various concerns surrounding the tower.

When explaining his or her decision, however, no Commissioner indicated that 

they specifically relied on those letters or concerns or specified what other record 

evidence they found persuasive. Rather, each Commissioner focused on the 

aesthetic concerns that were a focal point of the planning commission meeting and 

the Board hearing. Although the County urges us to consider additional evidence 

in the record which could have otherwise supported the Board’s decision, we 

cannot do so.10 Like the district court, our review, is circumscribed by the 

applicable standard of review. To be clear, although “[w]e look at the whole 

record . . . we cannot displace the Board’s fair estimate of conflicting evidence and 

cannot freely re-weigh the evidence. We only determine whether substantial 

evidence exists to support the local board’s decision.” Am. Tower, 295 F.3d at 

1209 n.8; see also Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1220 n.9 (explaining that the 

“[a]ppellant may not rely on rationalizations constructed after the fact to support 

the denial of [a]ppellee’s application”). 

10 We express no opinion as to whether the record evidence not clearly relied upon by the 

Board would have constituted substantial evidence.

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For the reasons that follow, the Board’s decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence. Commissioner Birrell stated that the tower was necessary to 

meet a gap in cell coverage and that Municipal met all applicable zoning 

requirements. But she also noted the community’s general aesthetic concerns and 

concerns about a possible decrease in property values. As to the property values 

issue, she ultimately concluded that the Board of Commissioners could not 

determine one way or the other the tower’s effect.

11 Nevertheless, she stated that 

she believed moving the tower 300 feet would reduce visibility, which “would help 

preserve the neighborhood and address some of the aesthetic concerns that the 

neighbors have[.]” 

Similarly, Commissioner Cupid stated that she “support[ed] Commissioner 

Birrell’s analysis” and “under[stood] the concerns of the neighbors.” However, 

she also noted that the proposed tower was “not the traditional cell phone tower 

that we typically see on the side of the interstate” and would not “bear that same 

detriment in your view as you might associate with the traditional cell phone 

tower.” Commissioner Weatherford emphatically supported the need for the 

11 The County disputes the district court’s finding that Commissioner Birrell dismissed 

adverse effects on property values, arguing that Commissioner Birrell actually stated that the 

tower would affect property values. However, read in context, what Commissioner Birrell said 

is that “there are cases where [a tower] does affect” property values but because purchasing 

decisions are subjective, the Board could not make a determination one way or the other as to the 

effect of this tower. 

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tower, but dismissed aesthetic concerns, explaining that in his experience with a 

similarly designed tower, “you can barely see it, and it becomes almost invisible 

after a while.” He also unequivocally stated that he saw no “reason to move it 300 

feet.” In light of the Commissioner’s statements, the only reasons clearly 

expressed by the Board that could support denying Municipal’s application were 

generalized aesthetic concerns. While the County’s local zoning laws permit it to 

consider aesthetic impact of the tower, we have held that blanket generalized 

aesthetic objections, standing alone—like those proffered here—are not enough to 

constitute substantial evidence under § 332. See Preferred Sites, 296 F.3d at 1219. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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