THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs November 1, 2022

RAYMOND WATISON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County

No. 16-04907 James M. Lammey, Jr., Judge

No. W2022-00069-CCA-R3-PC

The Petitioner, Raymond Watison, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree 

premeditated murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court 

erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel. The Petitioner argues that counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to keep out 

hearsay evidence at the suppression hearing regarding how the Petitioner was established 

as the suspect, (2) insufficiently challenging the probable cause determination in this case, 

(3) not calling necessary witnesses at the suppression hearing, and (4) failing to make 

contemporaneous objections at the trial. Additionally, the Petitioner argues that the postconviction court erred by entering a written order that contained no findings of fact or 

conclusions of law. We reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment and remand the case 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Reversed; 

Case Remanded

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY,

JR., and J. ROSS DYER, JJ., joined.

James Shae Atkinson, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Raymond Watison.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Samantha L. Simpson, Assistant 

Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; Greg Gilbert and Shelby 

Patrick, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

12/06/2022
-2-

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January 2018, a jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree premeditated murder

for the shooting of the victim, Juan Jackson. State v. Raymond Watison, No. W2018-

00552-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 4165282, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 30, 2019), perm. 

app. denied (Jan. 17, 2020). The Petitioner received a life sentence. Id. The Petitioner 

appealed, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by not suppressing his two police statements

because the police lacked probable cause, (2) the trial court erred by not excluding a 

witness’s Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) testimony about prior altercations between

the Petitioner and the victim, (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during 

closing argument, and (4) the cumulative effect of the errors entitled the Petitioner to a new 

trial. Id. On appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner’s conviction.

The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. Appointed counsel 

filed an amended petition, and a post-conviction hearing was held on December 26, 2021. 

The Petitioner alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he represented the 

Petitioner. Counsel said that he met with the Petitioner at the jail and that his investigator 

also met with the Petitioner. Counsel said that these meetings lasted for approximately 45 

minutes to one hour. Counsel said that he reviewed the Petitioner’s charges and the 

discovery materials with the Petitioner. Counsel explained that the State’s theory was that 

the Petitioner and Tierra Patterson were driving through a neighborhood, the Petitioner saw 

the victim walking, the Petitioner exited the car holding a shotgun, and the Petitioner shot 

the victim and fled the scene. Counsel said that he did not recall challenging the probable 

cause determination that the Petitioner shot the victim. 

Counsel testified that he filed a motion to suppress two statements the Petitioner 

made to officers and that during the suppression hearing, counsel learned that there were 

additional witnesses. Counsel explained that he then moved to suppress evidence related 

to an officer’s testimony regarding a 9-1-1 call and his testimony that neighborhood witness 

statements, which identified the Petitioner as the shooter, were collected. Counsel stated

that the officer said that there were several people in the neighborhood and near the crime 

scene. Counsel explained the officer said that the Petitioner was present at the scene and 

that officers took statements from these witnesses, and it was through these eyewitness 

accounts that the officers determined the Petitioner was the shooter. Counsel said that 

following the suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the 

Petitioner’s statements to police. Counsel said that he also made a motion to have the trial 

continued, but the court denied that motion. Counsel said he filed a Rule 10 appeal, but 

that was also unsuccessful. 
-3-

Trial counsel identified a copy of the crime scene investigation report related to this 

case. Counsel said that the document inferred that there were no witnesses to the victim’s 

shooting; however, the document was changed shortly before trial to indicate that there 

were witnesses to the shooting. Counsel said that the document did not have much effect 

on the defense strategy, which was self-defense. Counsel explained that the defense theory 

was that the victim had made death threats to multiple people in the neighborhood; that on 

the night of the shooting, the Petitioner believed the victim had shot towards him; and that 

the Petitioner shot back in self-defense. 

Trial counsel testified that he hired an investigator to work on the Petitioner’s case. 

Counsel said that every person the Petitioner named and every person who became relevant 

during the review of the discovery was investigated. He said that during this process, 

approximately eight or nine people were interviewed. Counsel said that initially Ms. 

Patterson gave a recorded statement to an investigator but that she refused to cooperate 

when counsel and a new investigator attempted to conduct a follow-up interview. He 

explained that she gave her initial statement before counsel was assigned to the Petitioner’s 

case, that her statement was recorded and given to him, and that her statement was helpful 

and used in the Petitioner’s defense. Counsel said that a few of the individuals he attempted 

to interview were uncooperative. 

Trial counsel testified that the hired investigator interviewed Antwan Walker, who 

provided information that the victim had repeatedly made death threats against the 

Petitioner, that the victim was mentally unstable, and that the victim had a history of violent 

interactions related to his mental health. Counsel said Mr. Walker’s statement corroborated 

the Petitioner’s self-defense claims. Counsel explained that the Petitioner said the victim 

had fired a gun at the Petitioner’s mother’s house and that the investigator interviewed 

Officer Braxton to obtain information regarding this incident. Counsel said that Officer 

Braxton did not remember the Petitioner or an incident in which someone fired a gun at the 

Petitioner’s mother’s house. Counsel said that the investigator interviewed Regina 

Blakely, the victim’s aunt. Counsel said that Ms. Blakely discussed the victim’s mental 

health and his related aggression. Counsel said her testimony supported the defense theory 

that the victim had violent tendencies. Counsel said that the investigator interviewed

Shirley Jackson and that she provided information regarding the Petitioner’s mental health. 

Counsel said that Ms. Jackson indicated the victim was not as aggressive as others she 

knew. 

Trial counsel identified the original affidavit of complaint and the subsequent 

affidavit of complaint, which contained additional handwritten comments. Counsel said 

that he recalled seeing the original affidavit and the affidavit of complaint with the 

handwritten comments in the discovery materials and that he discussed the documents with 

the Petitioner. Counsel explained that he thought the subsequent affidavit was improper 

because the original affidavit was dated and signed by a judge but that the documents did 

not change anything in his representation of the Petitioner. Counsel said that it was clear 
-4-

that an officer had written a note on the subsequent affidavit but that he never learned which 

officer wrote the note. Counsel said that he did not recall having a specific hearing 

regarding the subsequent affidavit but that he addressed it at trial during the officers’ crossexaminations. Counsel said that the affidavits were not discussed at the suppression 

hearing. 

Trial counsel testified that he spoke with Dontray Robertson. Counsel recalled that 

Mr. Robertson gave a statement to the investigator. Counsel said that Mr. Robertson 

corroborated the fact that the victim had “some mental instability.” Mr. Robertson said 

that the victim was known in the area for “not being right in the head” and having erratic 

behavior, occasionally claiming gang affiliation when he was not affiliated with any gangs. 

Counsel explained that Mr. Robertson said there was conflict between the Petitioner and 

the victim and that Mr. Robertson believed he needed to intervene in the conflict. Counsel 

said that he planned to use Mr. Robertson’s testimony to establish that there was a serious 

conflict between the Petitioner and the victim based on the Petitioner’s belief that the 

victim wanted to kill the Petitioner. Counsel explained that during the trial, the State called 

Mr. Robertson to testify about the Petitioner’s having gone to the victim’s home or place 

of work, while possessing a gun, to confront the victim about their conflict. Counsel said 

that he was able to cross-examine Mr. Robertson and emphasize that the Petitioner 

attempted to deal with the conflict with the victim rather than waiting on the victim to leave 

and confronting him with a gun. A transcript of Mr. Robertson’s interview was entered as 

an exhibit.

Trial counsel testified that he did not recall the Petitioner’s having received a guilty 

plea offer from the State. Counsel explained that self-defense was always the defense 

strategy. Counsel said that he discussed with the Petitioner whether the Petitioner should 

testify at the trial and that he asked the trial court for a self-defense jury instruction.

Trial counsel testified that Ms. Patterson’s trial testimony was inconsistent with her 

initial statement to the defense investigator. Counsel explained that Ms. Patterson was the 

State’s primary witness and that she implicated the Petitioner in premeditated murder. 

Counsel explained that Ms. Patterson was also charged in connection with the victim’s 

death and that it was apparent, based on his experience in cases with codefendants, the 

State would likely reduce or dismiss her charges if she testified at the trial. Counsel said 

that Ms. Patterson had not received an official offer from the State at the time of the 

Petitioner’s trial. 

Trial counsel testified that he objected to evidence the State introduced during its 

rebuttal. He said that during a jury-out hearing, he argued that the State’s introduction of 

the Petitioner’s two statements and the 9-1-1 call log was not rebutting any defense 

testimony and that the evidence was improper. Counsel said that the Petitioner’s first 

statement denied all involvement in the victim’s death and that the second statement 
-5-

admitted participation in the victim’s death but explained it was self-defense. Counsel said 

that, despite his objection, the State’s evidence was entered into evidence. 

Trial counsel testified that he did not represent the Petitioner on appeal. He 

explained that he discussed the appeal with the Petitioner and attempted to represent the 

Petitioner. Counsel said that the Petitioner declined and insisted on representing himself 

on appeal. 

On cross-examination, trial counsel confirmed that an anonymous 9-1-1 caller 

contacted an investigating officer and provided the officer with information that the 

Petitioner was the victim’s shooter. Counsel said that the officer could not provide the 

caller’s name, social media pages, or any other identifying information about the 

anonymous caller. Counsel explained that this was the basis of his motion to continue the 

trial, which the trial court denied. 

The Petitioner testified that he received the discovery related to his case and that he 

discussed the discovery with trial counsel. The Petitioner explained that he had an issue 

with how trial counsel handled the officer’s testimony that the Petitioner was the primary 

suspect based on hearsay. The Petitioner explained that counsel was unable to establish 

the identities of the anonymous caller or the witnesses from whom the caller obtained 

information about the Petitioner. 

The Petitioner testified that he gave two different statements regarding the victim’s 

death. The Petitioner said that he wanted to challenge the voluntariness of his statements

but that this was unsuccessful. 

The Petitioner testified that he challenged the validity of the affidavit of complaint. 

He explained that when he was represented by a public defender, and before he was 

represented by trial counsel, he filed a pro se motion to suppress the affidavit. The 

Petitioner explained that there were two affidavits of complaint, and one had handwritten 

notes. He said the handwritten note indicated Ms. Patterson identified the Petitioner as the 

victim’s shooter. The affidavit with the handwritten note was entered as an exhibit. 

The Petitioner testified that he heard trial counsel’s hearing testimony and that he 

was unaware that counsel had spoken to different witnesses. The Petitioner said that he 

was aware that Ms. Patterson’s statement to the defense investigator was inconsistent with 

her trial testimony. The Petitioner said that before trial counsel represented him, he had 

filed a motion to compel the State to disclose the “existence and substance of promises and 

leniency or preferential treatment.” The Petitioner said that the State responded and said 

that there were no agreements with any potential witnesses, but the Petitioner reasoned that 

the State had given Ms. Patterson an agreement “automatically.” He said that he told 

counsel about this deal but that nothing further happened. The Petitioner identified a copy 

of Ms. Patterson’s testimony from the Petitioner’s trial, a copy of the transcript of Ms. 
-6-

Patterson’s guilty plea hearing, and a copy of the judgment in Ms. Patterson’s case. The 

Petitioner said that he received these documents after his conviction and filed a writ of 

error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence. 

The Petitioner testified that he and trial counsel discussed whether he should testify 

at the trial. The Petitioner said that he told counsel he did not want to testify and that it 

was his decision not to testify. 

The Petitioner said that he had an issue with how probable cause was established in 

his case. He explained that the initial affidavit of complaint explained that the officer

learned from an anonymous source that the Petitioner shot the victim. The Petitioner said 

that the second affidavit had a handwritten note saying that Ms. Patterson identified the 

Petitioner as the victim’s shooter and that this was the basis for the probable cause. The 

Petitioner said that Ms. Patterson testified at the trial that the Petitioner shot the victim 

twice in the back. The Petitioner explained that this was untrue and that trial counsel did 

not object to this testimony. He said that a pathologist testified that it was possible the 

victim was shot in the back but that counsel did not object to this testimony.

The Petitioner testified that during closing argument, the State used “bits and 

pieces” of evidence and argued that the Petitioner jumped out from behind some bushes 

and shot the victim in the back. The Petitioner said that counsel did not object to the State’s 

argument but that counsel did argue the State was relying on “bits and pieces.” The 

Petitioner testified that he did not receive any guilty plea offers from the State. 

On cross-examination, the Petitioner said that he shot the victim twice in selfdefense. The Petitioner agreed the discovery materials revealed that the victim did not 

have a weapon but said that the discovery was not completely accurate. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court made the following oral 

findings:

But when [trial counsel] was up here, I was, like, what exactly is it 

they say you didn’t do? I still haven’t really found that out. So I know that 

[counsel] was very conscientious of [the Petitioner] and trying to protect his 

rights and investigated the case. He brought up every issue that should have 

been brought up. He objected to everything that should have been objected 

to. We had hearings. We had [a] . . . motion to suppress. I guess the only 

complaint I would think [the Petitioner] would have had that’s really without 

merit, [counsel] wasn’t able to convince me of various things that I ruled 

against him.

Other than that, I really didn’t see any deficient performance at all. 

Without deficient performance, we can’t really get to the second prong of the 
-7-

two-prong test, whether he was prejudiced from that deficient performance. 

I don’t know. I guess if [the Petitioner] had taken up [counsel’s] offer to help 

him on appeal, maybe something else would have come up. I don’t know.

So based upon what I’ve heard today, there’s no deficient 

performance and because of that, there’s no prejudice. Assuming that there 

were deficient performances in something, I don’t see how [the Petitioner] 

was prejudiced at all. So for those reasons, I’ll let the record reflect that I 

don’t believe that to be so and the petition for post[-]conviction relief is

denied. 

In a written order filed on December 6, 2021, the post-conviction court incorporated its 

oral findings from the hearing but made no further findings. This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying 

his four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that 

trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to keep out hearsay evidence at the suppression 

hearing regarding how the Petitioner was established as a suspect, (2) failing to properly 

challenge the probable cause determination that led to the issuance of his arrest warrant, 

(3) failing to call necessary witnesses during the suppression hearing, and (4) failing to 

make necessary objections during the trial. Additionally, the Petitioner argues that the 

post-conviction court erred by entering a written order that contained no findings of fact or 

conclusions of law. The State responds that the court did not err by concluding that the 

Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel and that the court’s order is sufficient to 

allow for meaningful appellate review.

Post-conviction relief is available when a “conviction or sentence is void or 

voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of 

Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. 

Criminal defendants are constitutionally guaranteed the right to effective assistance of 

counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9; see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 

335, 344 (1980); Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 293 (Tenn. 2009). When a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel is made under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, the burden is on the petitioner to show (1) that counsel’s performance was 

deficient and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1993). “Because a 

petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or 

prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance 

claim.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). The Strickland standard has 

been applied to the right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee 

Constitution. State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989). 
-8-

Deficient performance requires a showing that “counsel’s representation fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness,” despite the fact that reviewing courts “must 

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. When a court reviews 

a lawyer’s performance, it “must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s conduct, and to evaluate the 

conduct from the perspective of counsel at that time.” Howell v. State, 185 S.W.3d 319, 

326 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). We will not deem counsel to have 

been ineffective merely because a different strategy or procedure might have produced a 

more favorable result. Rhoden v. State, 816 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). We 

recognize, however, that “deference to tactical choices only applies if the choices are 

informed ones based upon adequate preparation.” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)).

As to the prejudice prong, the petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Vaughn v. State, 202 S.W.3d 106, 116 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “That is, the petitioner must establish that his 

counsel’s deficient performance was of such a degree that it deprived him of a fair trial and 

called into question the reliability of the outcome.” Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 869 

(Tenn. 2008) (citing State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 463 (Tenn. 1999)).

The burden in a post-conviction proceeding is on the petitioner to prove allegations 

of fact by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(1); see Dellinger, 

279 S.W.3d at 293-94. “Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and 

value to be given their testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be

resolved” by the post-conviction court. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456 (Tenn. 2001). 

On appeal, we are bound by the post-conviction court’s findings of fact unless we conclude 

that the evidence in the record preponderates against those findings. Id. Because they 

relate to mixed questions of law and fact, we review the post-conviction court’s 

conclusions as to whether counsel’s performance was deficient and whether that deficiency 

was prejudicial under a de novo standard with no presumption of correctness. Id. at 457.

As a threshold issue, we must first address the Petitioner’s contention that the postconviction court erred by failing to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

When determining the merits of a post-conviction petition, the Post-Conviction Procedure 

Act requires the post-conviction court to make written findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. A trial court’s final disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief “shall set forth 

in the order or a written memorandum of the case all grounds presented, and shall state the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each such ground.” Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-30-111(b) (emphasis added); see also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 9(A). The use of the 

word “shall” clearly indicates the Tennessee General Assembly intended that the duty of 
-9-

the post-conviction court to make findings of fact is mandatory. Donald Mays v. State, No. 

W2003-02761-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 2439255, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 28, 2004). 

Not only do the post-conviction court’s findings of fact facilitate appellate review but, in 

many cases, they are necessary for such review. Id. Where the post-conviction court fails 

to make “a clear and detailed finding of fact,” either orally or on the record, the appellate 

court is “at a complete loss to know the basis of the trial judge’s decision and judgment; 

assignments of error and appellate review are seriously frustrated if not completely 

thwarted by lack of a definitive finding of fact by the trial judge.” Brown v. State, 445 

S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).

Here, the post-conviction court incorporated its hearing findings into its written 

order denying the Petitioner relief. At the hearing, the court made general findings that 

trial counsel “brought up every issue that should have been brought up” and “objected to 

everything that should have been objected to.” The court found that counsel was 

“conscientious” of the Petitioner’s rights and investigated the case. The court noted that a 

suppression hearing was held and that the Petitioner’s only complaint might be that counsel 

was unsuccessful in changing the court’s mind regarding “various things.” However, the 

court did not meet the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b) 

because it failed to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the 

Petitioner’s specific grounds for relief. The “absence of findings of fact and conclusions 

as to all issues prevents this court from discharging its duties of appellate review.” Darrell 

A. Cooper v. State, No. E2019-02132-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 6112987, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Oct. 16, 2020) (remanding case because the post-conviction court failed to make any 

findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the issues raised). 

We take this opportunity to point out that “findings of fact” are the post-conviction 

court’s opportunity to fulfill its responsibility to sort through all the evidence and set forth 

what actually happened, as opposed to just each witness’s version of what 

happened. See Charles Bradford Stewart v. State, No. M2015-02449-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 

WL 2645651, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2017). Without sufficient factual findings 

and conclusions of law, we are unable to properly address the merits of Petitioner’s 

claims. See, e.g., Casey Colbert v. State, No. W2019-00383-CCA-R3-PC, 2020 WL 

2394141, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2020); Steven Tyler Nabi v. State, No. M2017-

00041-CCA-R3-PC, 2018 WL 1721869, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2018) (both 

reaching a similar conclusion).
-10-

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and this case is 

remanded for the post-conviction court to enter a written order that complies with 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, 

section 9(A). 

 

KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE