(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2008 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE ARMED FORCES 

No. 08–267. Argued March 25, 2009—Decided June 8, 2009 

Military authorities charged respondent, a native Nigerian serving in

the U. S. Navy, with violating of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

(UCMJ). With counsel’s assistance, respondent agreed to plead 

guilty to reduced charges. The special court-martial accepted the

plea and convicted and sentenced respondent; the Navy-Marine

Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA) affirmed; and he was discharged from the Navy in 2000. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against respondent

based on the conviction. To avoid deportation, he filed a petition for a 

writ of coram nobis under the authority of the All Writs Act, asking 

the NMCCA to vacate the conviction it had earlier affirmed on the 

ground that his guilty plea resulted from ineffective assistance of

counsel, who had assured him his plea bargain carried no risk of deportation. Though rejecting the Government’s contention that it

lacked jurisdiction to grant the writ, the NMCCA denied relief for 

lack of merit. Agreeing that the NMCCA has jurisdiction, the Court 

of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) remanded for further proceedings on the merits. 

Held: 

1. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. 

§1259(4), which permits it to review CAAF decisions in cases “in

which [that court] granted relief.” Respondent’s parsimonious view 

that the CAAF did not “ ‘gran[t] relief’ ” in this case, but simply remanded to the NMCCA, is rejected. Though §1259 does not define 

“relief,” the word’s familiar meaning encompasses any redress or

benefit provided by a court. The CAAF’s judgment reversing the 

NMCCA satisfies that definition. Pp. 4–5.

2. Article I military courts have jurisdiction to entertain coram no-
2 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Syllabus 

bis petitions to consider allegations that an earlier judgment of conviction was flawed in a fundamental respect. Pp. 5–13.

(a) Military courts’ power to issue extraordinary writs under the

All Writs Act, see Noyd v. Bond, 395 U. S. 683, 695, n. 7, does not determine the anterior question whether those courts have jurisdiction

to entertain a coram nobis petition. As recognized by the All Writs

Act—which permits “courts established by Act of Congress” to issue

“all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions,” 28 U. S. C. §1651(a)—a court’s power to issue any form of relief, extraordinary or otherwise, is contingent on its subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the case or controversy. Such jurisdiction is determined by Congress. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 212. Thus, to 

issue respondent a writ of coram nobis on remand, the NMCCA must 

have had statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over respondent’s

original judgment of conviction. Pp. 5–8.

(b) Pursuant to the UCMJ, the NMCCA and the CAAF have subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. The NMCCA has jurisdiction 

to entertain respondent’s coram nobis request under UCMJ Article 

66, which provides: “For the purpose of reviewing court-martial cases,

the [NMCCA] may sit . . . .” 10 U. S. C. §866(a). Because respondent’s coram nobis request is simply a further “step in [his] criminal” 

appeal, United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502, 505 n. 4, the 

NMCCA’s jurisdiction to issue the writ derives from the earlier jurisdiction it exercised under §866(a) to hear and determine the conviction’s validity on direct review. Respondent’s coram nobis request is

not barred by the requirement that the NMCCA “act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority.” §866(c). An alleged error in the original judgment predicated on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel challenges the conviction’s 

validity, see Knowles v. Mirzayance, ante, at ___, so respondent’s 

Sixth Amendment claim is “with respect to” the special-courtmartial’s “findings” of guilty. Because the NMCCA has jurisdiction,

the CAAF has jurisdiction to review the NMCCA’s denial of respondent’s petition challenging the validity of his original conviction. 

That the CAAF’s authority is confined “to matters of law” connected

to “the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority 

and as affirmed or set aside by the Court of Criminal Appeals,”

§867(c), poses no obstacle to respondent’s requested review. His 

Sixth Amendment claim presents a “matte[r] of law” “with respect to

the [guilty] findings . . . as approved by the [special court-martial]

and as affirmed . . . by” the NMCCA. Pp. 8–10. 

(c) The Government’s argument that UCMJ Article 76 affirmatively prohibits the type of collateral review respondent seeks errs in 

“conflating the jurisdictional question with the merits” of respon-
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

Syllabus 

dent’s petition, Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, ante, at ___. Article 

76 provides for the finality of judgments in military cases. Just as 

the finality principle did not jurisdictionally bar the court in Morgan, 

supra, from examining its earlier judgment, neither does it bar the

NMCCA from doing so here. The Government’s contention that coram nobis permits a court to correct its own errors, not those of an inferior court, is disposed of on similar grounds. Pp. 10–12. 

66 M. J. 114, affirmed and remanded. 

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, 

SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an 

opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which SCALIA, 

THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 08–267 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JACOB DENEDO 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

[June 8, 2009]

 JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The case before us presents a single issue: whether an 

Article I military appellate court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of error coram nobis to challenge

its earlier, and final, decision affirming a criminal conviction. The military court which had affirmed the conviction 

and where the writ of coram nobis was sought is the NavyMarine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (NMCCA). Its 

ruling that it had jurisdiction to grant the writ, but then 

denying its issuance for lack of merit, was appealed to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

(CAAF). After the CAAF agreed that the NMCCA has 

jurisdiction to issue the writ, it remanded for further

proceedings on the merits. The Government of the United 

States, contending that a writ of coram nobis directed to a 

final judgment of conviction is beyond the jurisdiction of

the military courts, now brings the case to us. 

I 

Respondent Jacob Denedo came to the United States in 

1984 from his native Nigeria. He enlisted in the Navy in

1989 and became a lawful permanent resident in 1990. In 

1998, military authorities charged him with conspiracy, 
2 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of the Court 

larceny, and forgery—in contravention of Articles 81, 121,

and 123 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 

10 U. S. C. §§881, 921, 923—all for his role in a scheme to

defraud a community college. With the assistance of both 

military and civilian counsel, respondent made a plea

bargain to plead guilty to reduced charges. In exchange 

for his plea the convening authority referred respondent’s

case to a special court-martial, §819, which, at that time, 

could not impose a sentence greater than six months’ 

confinement. 

The special court-martial, consisting of a single military

judge, accepted respondent’s guilty plea after determining

that it was both knowing and voluntary. The court convicted respondent of conspiracy and larceny. It sentenced

him to three months’ confinement, a bad-conduct discharge, and a reduction to the lowest enlisted pay grade. 

Respondent appealed on the ground that his sentence was

unduly severe. The NMCCA affirmed. App. to Pet. for

Cert. 64a–67a. Respondent did not seek further review in 

the CAAF, and he was discharged from the Navy on May 

30, 2000. 

In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against respondent based

upon his special court-martial conviction. To avoid deportation, respondent decided to challenge his conviction once

more, though at this point it had been final for eight years. 

He maintained, in a petition for a writ of coram nobis filed 

with the NMCCA, that the conviction it had earlier affirmed must be deemed void because his guilty plea was 

the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent

alleged that he informed his civilian attorney during plea

negotiations that “‘his primary concern and objective’” 

was to avoid deportation and that he was willing to “‘risk 

. . . going to jail’” to avert separation from his family. 66 

M. J. 114, 118 (C. A. Armed Forces 2008). On respondent’s account, his attorney—an alcoholic who was not 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

sober during the course of the special court-martial proceeding—erroneously assured him that “‘if he agreed to 

plead guilty at a special-court-martial he would avoid any

risk of deportation.’” Ibid. Petitioner argued that the 

NMCCA could set aside its earlier decision by issuing a

writ of coram nobis under the authority of the All Writs

Act, 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). 

The Government filed a motion to dismiss for want of 

jurisdiction. It contended that the NMCCA had no authority to conduct postconviction proceedings. In a terse, foursentence order, the NMCCA summarily denied both the

Government’s motion and respondent’s petition for a writ

of coram nobis. App. to Pet. for Cert. 63a. Respondent 

appealed and the CAAF, dividing 3 to 2, affirmed in part 

and reversed in part. The CAAF agreed with the NMCCA

that standing military courts have jurisdiction to conduct 

“collateral review under the All Writs Act.” 66 M. J., at 

119. This is so, the CAAF explained, because “when a 

petitioner seeks collateral relief to modify an action that

was taken within the subject matter jurisdiction of the 

military justice system . . . a writ that is necessary or 

appropriate may be issued under the All Writs Act ‘in aid 

of’ the court’s existing jurisdiction.” Id., at 120 (citing 28 

U. S. C. §1651(a)).

Satisfied that it had jurisdiction, the CAAF next turned

to whether the writ of coram nobis should issue. It held 

that a nondefaulted, ineffective-assistance claim that was 

yet to receive a full and fair review “within the military 

justice system” could justify issuance of the writ. 66 M. J., 

at 125. Finding that respondent’s ineffective-assistance

claim satisfied “the threshold criteria for coram nobis 

review,” the CAAF remanded to the NMCCA so it could 

ascertain in the first instance “whether the merits of 

[respondent’s] petition can be resolved on the basis of the

written submissions, or whether a factfinding hearing is

required.” Id., at 126, 130. 
4 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of the Court 

Judge Stucky filed a dissenting opinion. Assuming that

the majority had correctly determined its jurisdiction to

grant the requested relief, he concluded that respondent’s

ineffective-assistance claim lacked merit. Id., at 131. 

Judge Ryan also dissented. Reasoning that the majority 

had misapplied this Court’s holding in Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U. S. 529 (1999), she concluded that the UCMJ

does not confer jurisdiction upon military tribunals to 

conduct “post-finality collateral review.” 66 M. J., at 136. 

We granted certiorari, 555 U. S. ___ (2008), and now 

affirm. 

II 

Before we address another court’s subject-matter jurisdiction we must first determine our own. See Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, ante, at 6 (“Subject-matter jurisdiction . . . should be 

considered when fairly in doubt”). The Government, upon 

which the burden to demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction lies, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U. S. 332, 

342 (2006), claims that our power to hear this appeal rests

on 28 U. S. C. §1259(4). That jurisdictional provision

permits us to review CAAF decisions in “‘cases . . . in

which the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces . . . 

granted relief.’” Respondent maintains that we lack 

jurisdiction because the CAAF did not “‘grant relief’”; “all 

it did was remand” to the NMCCA. Brief for Respondent 

6–7 (brackets omitted). 

Respondent’s parsimonious construction of the word

“relief” need not detain us long. Though §1259 does not 

define the term, its familiar meaning encompasses any 

“redress or benefit” provided by a court. Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1317 (8th ed. 2004). The CAAF’s judgment 

reversing the NMCCA satisfies that definition. The 

NMCCA denied respondent’s petition for a writ of coram 

nobis, while the CAAF’s decision reversed and remanded 

so that the NMCCA could determine anew if the writ 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

should issue. That decision conferred a palpable benefit 

on respondent; for a chance of success on the merits, however slight, is superior to no possibility at all. 

To be sure, respondent would have preferred the CAAF 

to issue a writ of coram nobis or to direct the NMCCA to 

do so rather than remanding for the NMCCA to conduct 

further proceedings. We have jurisdiction, however, to 

review any decision granting “relief,” not just those providing “ultimate relief” or “complete relief.” Indeed, appellate

courts reverse and remand lower court judgments—rather

than issuing complete relief—with regularity. See, e.g., 

Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, ante, at ___; FCC v. Fox 

Television Stations, Inc., ante, at ___. There is no merit to 

the view that a decision granting partial relief should be 

construed as granting no relief at all. 

Because the CAAF “granted relief” to respondent, the 

text of §1259 is satisfied here. We have jurisdiction to

determine whether the CAAF was correct in ruling that

the NMCCA had authority to entertain the petition for a 

writ of coram nobis. 

III 

A 

The writ of coram nobis is an ancient common-law 

remedy designed “to correct errors of fact.” United States 

v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502, 507 (1954). In American jurisprudence the precise contours of coram nobis have not 

been “well defined,” Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 

416 (1882), but the writ traces its origins to the King’s 

Bench and the Court of Common Pleas. United States v. 

Plumer, 27 F. Cas. 561, 573 (No. 16,056) (CC Mass. 1859) 

(opinion for the court by Clifford, Circuit Justice); see also 

Morgan, supra, at 507, n. 9 (citing 2 W. Tidd, Practice of 

Courts of King’s Bench and Common Pleas *1136–*1137). 

In English practice the office of the writ was to foster

respect for judicial rulings by enabling the same court 
6 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of the Court 

“where the action was commenced and where the judgment was rendered” to avoid the rigid strictures of judgment finality by correcting technical errors “such as happened through the fault of the clerk in the record of the 

proceedings prior to the judgment.” Plumer, supra, at 

572–573. 

Any rationale confining the writ to technical errors,

however, has been superseded; for in its modern iteration 

coram nobis is broader than its common-law predecessor.

This is confirmed by our opinion in Morgan. In that case 

we found that a writ of coram nobis can issue to redress a 

fundamental error, there a deprivation of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, as opposed to mere technical 

errors. 346 U. S., at 513. The potential universe of cases

that range from technical errors to fundamental ones

perhaps illustrates, in the case of coram nobis, the “tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its 

logic.” B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 51 

(1921). To confine the use of coram nobis so that finality

is not at risk in a great number of cases, we were careful

in Morgan to limit the availability of the writ to “extraordinary” cases presenting circumstances compelling its use 

“to achieve justice.” 346 U. S., at 511. Another limit, of 

course, is that an extraordinary remedy may not issue 

when alternative remedies, such as habeas corpus, are 

available. See id., at 510–511. 

In federal courts the authority to grant a writ of coram 

nobis is conferred by the All Writs Act, which permits

“courts established by Act of Congress” to issue “all writs

necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U. S. C. §1651(a). Though military courts, like 

Article III tribunals, are empowered to issue extraordinary writs under the All Writs Act, Noyd v. Bond, 395 

U. S. 683, 695, n. 7 (1969), that authority does not determine the anterior question whether military courts have

jurisdiction to entertain a petition for coram nobis. As the 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

text of the All Writs Act recognizes, a court’s power to

issue any form of relief—extraordinary or otherwise—is 

contingent on that court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over

the case or controversy.

Assuming no constraints or limitations grounded in the 

Constitution are implicated, it is for Congress to determine the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal courts. 

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 212 (2007) (“Within

constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the 

federal courts have jurisdiction to consider”). This rule 

applies with added force to Article I tribunals, such as the 

NMCCA and CAAF, which owe their existence to Congress’ authority to enact legislation pursuant to Art. I, §8

of the Constitution. Goldsmith, 526 U. S., at 533–534. 

Our decision in Goldsmith demonstrates these teachings. There an Air Force officer, James Goldsmith, was 

convicted of various crimes by general court-martial and

sentenced to six years’ confinement. Id., at 531. Following his conviction, Congress enacted a statute authorizing

the President to drop convicted officers from the rolls of 

the Armed Forces. When the Air Force notified Goldsmith 

that he would be dropped from the rolls, he lodged a petition before the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals

(AFCCA) claiming that the proposed action contravened

the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Id., at 532– 

533. Goldsmith sought extraordinary relief as authorized 

by the All Writs Act to enjoin the President from removing

him from the rolls. The AFCCA denied relief, but the 

CAAF granted it. 

Concluding that the UCMJ does not authorize military 

courts to review executive action—including a decision to 

drop an officer from the rolls—we held that the AFCCA

and the CAAF lacked jurisdiction over Goldsmith’s case. 

Id., at 535. This was so, we unequivocally found, irrespective of the military court’s authority to issue extraordinary 

relief pursuant to the All Writs Act and its previous juris-
8 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of the Court 

diction over Goldsmith’s criminal proceeding. The power 

to issue relief depends upon, rather than enlarges, a 

court’s jurisdiction. Id., at 536–537. 

That principle does not control the question before us.

Because coram nobis is but an extraordinary tool to correct a legal or factual error, an application for the writ is

properly viewed as a belated extension of the original 

proceeding during which the error allegedly transpired.

See Morgan, supra, at 505, n. 4 (coram nobis is “a step in

the criminal case and not, like habeas corpus where relief 

is sought in a separate case and record, the beginning of a

separate civil proceeding”); see also United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38, 46 (1998) (citing Pacific R. Co. of Mo. v. 

Missouri Pacific R. Co., 111 U. S. 505, 522 (1884) (noting 

that an “independent action”—which, like coram nobis, is 

an equitable means to obtain relief from a judgment—

“‘may be regarded as ancillary to the prior suit, so that the 

relief asked may be granted by the court which made the 

decree in that suit . . . . The bill, though an original bill in 

the chancery sense of the word, is a continuation of the

former suit, on the question of the jurisdiction of the

[court]’”). It follows that to issue respondent a writ of 

coram nobis on remand, the NMCCA must have had 

statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over respondent’s 

original judgment of conviction. 

B 

In the critical part of its opinion discussing the jurisdiction and authority of the NMCCA to issue a writ of coram 

nobis in an appropriate case, the CAAF describes respondent’s request for review as one “under the All Writs Act.”

66 M. J., at 119. This is correct, of course, if it simply 

confirms that the Act authorizes federal courts to issue 

writs “in aid of” their jurisdiction; but it does not advance 

the inquiry into whether jurisdiction exists. 

And there are limits to the use of coram nobis to alter or 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

interpret earlier judgments. As Goldsmith makes plain, 

the All Writs Act and the extraordinary relief the statute 

authorizes are not a source of subject-matter jurisdiction.

526 U. S., at 534–535. Statutes which address the power

of a court to use certain writs or remedies or to decree 

certain forms of relief, for instance to award damages in 

some specified measure, in some circumstances might be 

construed also as a grant of jurisdiction to hear and determine the underlying cause of action. Cf. Marbury v. 

Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). We have long held, however, that the All Writs Act should not be interpreted in

this way. Goldsmith, supra, at 536; Plumer, 27 F. Cas., at 

574 (jurisdiction cannot be acquired “by means of the writ

to be issued”). The authority to issue a writ under the All

Writs Act is not a font of jurisdiction. See Syngenta Crop 

Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U. S. 28, 31 (2002).

Quite apart from the All Writs Act, we conclude that the

NMCCA has jurisdiction to entertain respondent’s request

for a writ of coram nobis. Article 66 of the UCMJ provides: “For the purpose of reviewing court-martial cases, 

the [Court of Criminal Appeals] may sit . . . .” 10 U. S. C.

§866(a). Because respondent’s request for coram nobis is 

simply a further “step in [his] criminal” appeal, Morgan, 

346 U. S., at 505, n. 4, the NMCCA’s jurisdiction to issue 

the writ derives from the earlier jurisdiction it exercised to 

hear and determine the validity of the conviction on direct

review. As even the Government concedes, the textual 

authority under the UCMJ to “‘revie[w] court-martial 

cases’” provided the NMCCA with jurisdiction to hear an 

appeal of respondent’s judgment of conviction. See Brief 

for United States 17–18. That jurisdiction is sufficient to 

permit the NMCCA to entertain respondent’s petition for 

coram nobis. See also Courts of Criminal Appeals Rule of 

Practice and Procedure 2(b) (recognizing NMCCA discretionary authority to entertain petitions for extraordinary

writs). 
10 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of the Court 

It is true that when exercising its jurisdiction under

§866(a), the NMCCA “may act only with respect to the 

findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority.” §866(c). That limitation does not bar respondent’s request for a writ of coram nobis. An alleged error

in the original judgment predicated on ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel challenges the validity of a conviction, see Knowles v. Mirzayance, ante, at 3, so respondent’s

Sixth Amendment claim is “with respect to” the specialcourt-martial’s “findings of guilty,” 10 U. S. C. §866(c).

Pursuant to the UCMJ, the NMCCA has subject-matter 

jurisdiction to hear respondent’s request for extraordinary 

relief. 

Because the NMCCA had jurisdiction over respondent’s 

petition for coram nobis, the CAAF had jurisdiction to 

entertain respondent’s appeal from the NMCCA’s judgment. When exercising its jurisdiction, the CAAF’s authority is confined “to matters of law” connected to “the 

findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority and as affirmed or set aside . . . by the Court of 

Criminal Appeals,” §867(c), but these limitations pose no

obstacle to respondent’s requested review of the NMCCA’s

decision. Respondent’s Sixth Amendment claim presents 

a “matte[r] of law” “with respect to the [guilty] findings . . .

as approved by the [special court-martial] and as affirmed 

. . . by the Court of Criminal Appeals.” Ibid. The CAAF 

had subject-matter jurisdiction to review the NMCCA’s

denial of respondent’s petition challenging the validity of 

his original conviction. 

C 

The Government counters that Article 76 of the UCMJ, 

10 U. S. C. §876, “affirmatively prohibit[s] the type of 

collateral review sought by respondent.” Brief for United 

States 18. That is incorrect. The Government’s argument

commits the error of “conflating the jurisdictional question 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

with the merits” of respondent’s petition. Arthur Andersen 

LLP, ante, at 3. Article 76 states in relevant part: 

“The appellate review of records of trial provided by

this chapter, the proceedings, findings, and sentences

of courts-martial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed 

as required by this chapter, and all dismissals and 

discharges carried into execution under sentences by 

courts-martial following approval, review, or affirmation as required by this chapter, are final and conclusive. Orders publishing the proceedings of courtsmartial and all action taken pursuant to those proceedings are binding upon all departments, courts, 

agencies, and officers of the United States . . . .” 10 

U. S. C. §876. 

Article 76 codifies the common-law rule that respects the 

finality of judgments. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 

U. S. 738, 749 (1975). Just as the rules of finality did not 

jurisdictionally bar the court in Morgan from examining 

its earlier judgment, neither does the principle of finality 

bar the NMCCA from doing so here. 

The Government may ultimately be correct that the

facts of respondent’s case are insufficient to set aside the 

final judgment that Article 76 makes binding. No doubt, 

judgment finality is not to be lightly cast aside; and courts

must be cautious so that the extraordinary remedy of 

coram nobis issues only in extreme cases. But the longrecognized authority of a court to protect the integrity of

its earlier judgments impels the conclusion that the finality rule is not so inflexible that it trumps each and every 

competing consideration. Our holding allows military 

courts to protect the integrity of their dispositions and 

processes by granting relief from final judgments in extraordinary cases when it is shown that there were fundamental flaws in the proceedings leading to their issuance. The Government remains free to argue that 
12 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of the Court 

respondent’s is a merely ordinary case that is not entitled

to extraordinary relief. But respondent’s entitlement to 

relief is a merits question outside the scope of the jurisdictional question presented. 

The Government’s contention that coram nobis permits 

a court “to correct its own errors, not . . . those of an inferior court,” Brief for United States 36, can be disposed of

on similar grounds. Just as respondent’s request for 

coram nobis does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction, 

the Government’s argument that the relief should not 

issue “in light of the writ’s traditional scope” does not 

undermine it, ibid. (emphasis deleted). In sum, the Government’s argument speaks to the scope of the writ, not 

the NMCCA’s jurisdiction to issue it. The CAAF rejected 

the former argument. Only the latter one is before us. 

We hold that Article I military courts have jurisdiction 

to entertain coram nobis petitions to consider allegations

that an earlier judgment of conviction was flawed in a

fundamental respect. That conclusion is consistent with 

our holding that Article III courts have a like authority. 

Morgan, 346 U. S., at 508. The result we reach today is of 

central importance for military courts. The military justice system relies upon courts that must take all appropriate means, consistent with their statutory jurisdiction, to 

ensure the neutrality and integrity of their judgments.

Under the premises and statutes we have relied upon 

here, the jurisdiction and the responsibility of military 

courts to reexamine judgments in rare cases where a 

fundamental flaw is alleged and other judicial processes

for correction are unavailable are consistent with the 

powers Congress has granted those courts under Article I 

and with the system Congress has designed. 

* * * 

We do not prejudge the merits of respondent’s petition.

To be sure, the writ of error coram nobis is an extraordi-
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 13 

Opinion of the Court 

nary writ; and “an extraordinary remedy . . . should not be 

granted in the ordinary case.” Nken v. Holder, ante, at 1 

(KENNEDY, J., concurring). The relative strength of respondent’s ineffective-assistance claim, his delay in lodging his petition, when he learned or should have learned of 

his counsel’s alleged deficiencies, and the effect of the rule

of judgment finality expressed in Article 76 are all factors 

the NMCCA can explore on remand. We hold only that 

the military appellate courts had jurisdiction to hear 

respondent’s request for a writ of coram nobis. The judgment of the CAAF is affirmed, and the case is remanded 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
 Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 1 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ 

No. 08–267 

_________________ 

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. JACOB DENEDO 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES

[June 8, 2009] 

 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, with whom JUSTICE SCALIA, 

JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, concurring in 

part and dissenting in part. 

 The Court’s approach is simple: Jurisdiction to issue 

writs of coram nobis is a “belated extension” of a court’s 

original, statutory jurisdiction. Ante, at 8. The military 

courts here had original jurisdiction over Denedo’s case. 

Those courts therefore have implicit “extended” jurisdiction to consider Denedo’s coram nobis petition. 

 The flaw in this syllogism is at the first step: The only 

arguable authority for the proposition that coram nobis

jurisdiction marches hand in hand with original jurisdiction is a footnote in United States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 

(1954), and that case concerned Article III courts. The 

military courts are markedly different. They are Article I 

courts whose jurisdiction is precisely limited at every turn. 

Those careful limits cannot be overridden by judicial 

“extension” of statutory jurisdiction, or the addition of a 

“further step” to the ones marked out by Congress. Ante, 

at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 I agree with the majority that this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision below, but respectfully dissent 

from its holding that military courts have jurisdiction to 

issue writs of coram nobis. 
2 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

I 

“Traditionally, military justice has been a rough form of 

justice emphasizing summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties with a view to maintaining 

obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, 35–36 (1957) (plurality opinion). Courtsmartial are composed of active service members who sit 

only to hear the particular case before them. Once a 

court-martial reaches a judgment and imposes a sentence,

it is dissolved, and its members return to their regular

duties. 

Prior to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),

military courts of appeals did not exist. If a service member wanted to challenge a court-martial conviction, he

pursued a collateral attack in an Article III court. There, 

review was limited to whether the conviction was void 

“because of lack of jurisdiction or some other equally fundamental defect,” Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 

738, 747 (1975); beyond that, Article III courts adhered to 

“the general rule that the acts of a court martial, within

the scope of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled

or reviewed in the civil courts,” Smith v. Whitney, 116 

U. S. 167, 177 (1886).

The UCMJ established a “complete system of [military] 

review,” Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion), including direct review in what are now 

the Courts of Criminal Appeals (CCAs) and the Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF). But in keeping

with the historical backdrop against which these courts

were created, Congress did not grant military courts of

appeals “broad responsibility with respect to administration of military justice”; on the contrary, their jurisdiction

is “narrowly circumscribed” by the governing statutes. 

Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U. S. 529, 534, 535 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 3 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

The CCAs provide direct, record-based review of courtmartial judgments, but they may only review cases referred by the judge advocate general, who in turn refers 

only those cases in which specific sentences are imposed. 

10 U. S. C. §§866(b), (c). When reviewing that subset of 

court-martial judgments, a CCA “may act only with respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the 

convening authority.” §866(c). If a case is reviewed by the 

CCA, the CCA’s decision may then be reviewed by the 

CAAF. §867(a). But that court, too, conducts limited 

direct review: It “may act only with respect to the findings

and sentence as approved by the convening authority and 

as affirmed or set aside as incorrect in law by the [CCA].”

§867(c). Once direct review in the CCA and the CAAF is 

complete, and review in this Court is exhausted or waived,

a judgment as to the legality of the court-martial proceedings is final, and the sentence imposed may be executed. 

§871(c)(1).

The UCMJ provides only one avenue for reconsideration 

of a final court-martial conviction: a petition for a new 

trial under Article 73. See §873. An Article 73 petition 

may be brought “within two years after approval by the 

convening authority of a court-martial sentence,” meaning 

it may be brought before or after a conviction becomes

final. Ibid. If direct review is still pending before a CCA

or the CAAF when the petition is filed, the judge advocate 

general (to whom the petition must be directed) will refer 

the petition to that court. Ibid. But once the conviction is 

final, only the judge advocate general may act on an Article 73 petition. Ibid. 

Article 76 “‘describ[es] the terminal point for proceedings within the court-martial system.’” Councilman, 

supra, at 750 (quoting Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 128, 

132 (1950)). Under that provision, final court-martial

judgments are “binding upon all departments, courts,

agencies, and officers of the United States, subject only to 
4 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

action upon a petition for a new trial [under Article 73],” 

or to action by the appropriate Secretary or the President. 

10 U. S. C. §876 (emphasis added). Once an Article 73 

petition is denied, a service member has no relief left to

seek within the court-martial system. See Gusik, supra, 

at 133–134.1 

Federal courts are authorized to issue extraordinary

writs such as coram nobis only as “necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U. S. C. 

§1651(a). The All Writs Act “confine[s] the power of the 

CAAF to issuing process ‘in aid of’ its existing statutory 

jurisdiction” and “does not enlarge that jurisdiction.” 

Goldsmith, supra, at 534–535; see also Noyd v. Bond, 395 

U. S. 683, 695, n. 7 (1969) (although military courts can 

issue extraordinary writs in aid of their direct review

jurisdiction, “[a] different question would, of course, arise

in a case which the [courts are] not authorized to review

under the governing statutes”). The UCMJ grants military courts of appeals no jurisdiction over final courtmartial judgments, so there is no jurisdiction for a postconviction extraordinary writ to “aid.” A petition for coram nobis by its nature seeks postconviction review; it is

therefore beyond the scope of these courts’ “narrowly

circumscribed” statutory jurisdiction. Goldsmith, supra, 

at 535. 

II 

The majority overrides these careful limits on military 

court jurisdiction by maintaining that later jurisdiction to 

—————— 

1A court-martial conviction may still be collaterally attacked in an 

Article III court, but that is because those courts possess jurisdiction 

beyond that granted by the UCMJ. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. §§2241, 1331.

We have repeatedly held that Article 76 “does not expressly effect any

change in the subject-matter jurisdiction of Art. III courts.” Schlesinger 

v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738, 749 (1975). Our cases have never questioned that Article 76 limits the jurisdiction of military courts. 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 5 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

issue coram nobis is a “belated extension” of the statutory 

jurisdiction, that “jurisdiction to issue [coram nobis] derives from the earlier jurisdiction.” Ante, at 8, 9. The 

authority the Court cites for this key jurisdictional analysis is—a footnote. See ante, at 8 (citing Morgan, 346 U. S., 

at 505, n. 4); ante, at 9 (same). Now, footnotes are part of 

an opinion, too, even if not the most likely place to look for 

a key jurisdictional ruling. But since footnote 4 plays such 

an indispensable role in the majority’s analysis, it must be

read with care. 

The first thing you notice in doing so is that the footnote

does not mention the word “jurisdiction” at all. That is 

because it has nothing to do with jurisdiction. The issue 

addressed in the paragraph to which the footnote was

appended was “choice of remedy.” 346 U. S., at 505. The 

Court concluded that coram nobis was the appropriate 

one. The footnote simply addressed the concern that the 

remedy might not be available because the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure had abolished coram nobis as a remedy;

the concern was dismissed because the Court concluded 

the criminal rules, not the civil rules, applied. Id., at 505, 

n. 4; see also United States v. Keogh, 391 F. 2d 138, 140 

(CA2 1968) (Friendly, J.) (“The problem to which the 

footnote was addressed was that F. R. Civ. P. 60(b) had 

abolished writs of error coram nobis”).

The point is further confirmed by the text in the body of 

the opinion: The Court’s conclusion in the paragraph in 

which the footnote appears is that since the remedy 

sought was “in the nature of . . . coram nobis,” the trial 

court could “properly exercise its jurisdiction.” 346 U. S., 

at 505 (emphasis added). The issue was not the existence 

of jurisdiction, but whether the court had the authority to

exercise it. The Court in the present case recognizes the 

distinction. See ante, at 10 (“When exercising its jurisdiction, the CAAF’s authority is confined to matters of law”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); ante, at 9 (“The au-
6 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

thority to issue a writ under the All Writs Act is not a font 

of jurisdiction”).

Even accepting the majority’s reading of Morgan’s hitherto obscure footnote, that reading would only establish

the “belated jurisdiction” theory for Article III courts. The 

military courts are Article I courts. The distinction has 

direct pertinence to the point at issue in this case. 

Legal doctrines “must be placed in their historical setting. They cannot be wrenched from it and mechanically 

transplanted into an alien, unrelated context without 

suffering mutilation or distortion.” Reid, 354 U. S., at 50 

(Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). The Article III 

courts have been given broad jurisdiction. I can understand, if not necessarily agree with, the notion that they 

might enjoy some implicit “long-recognized authority” to

correct their earlier judgments. See ante, at 11. But not 

so for Article I courts. The principle that Congress defines 

the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts “applies with 

added force to Article I tribunals.” Ante, at 7. That is 

especially true with respect to military courts. The military justice system is the last place courts should go about 

finding “extensions” of jurisdiction beyond that conferred 

by statute.

As we expressly recognized in Goldsmith, “there is no 

source of continuing jurisdiction for the CAAF over all 

actions administering sentences that the CAAF at one 

time had the power to review.” 526 U. S., at 536 (emphasis added). Since the UCMJ grants military courts no

postconviction jurisdiction, conferring on them perpetual 

authority to entertain coram nobis petitions plainly contravenes that basic principle.2 

—————— 

2Once you get into the business of extending jurisdiction, it can be 

hard to stop. Denedo is no longer in the military. Ante, at 2. Military

courts lack jurisdiction over “civilian ex-soldiers who ha[ve] severed all 

relationship with the military and its institutions.” United States ex 

rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 11, 14 (1955). In the event coram nobis 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 7 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

III 

Even if the majority’s reading of Morgan’s footnote could 

be transplanted to the military context, the majority’s 

conclusion would still not follow. “‘[T]he All Writs Act is a 

residual source of authority to issue writs that are not 

otherwise covered by statute. Where a statute specifically

addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority,

and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling.’” Carlisle v. 

United States, 517 U. S. 416, 429 (1996) (quoting Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals 

Service, 474 U. S. 34, 43 (1985)). 

The UCMJ contains not one, but two provisions specifically limiting the circumstances under which postconviction relief (other than action by the appropriate Secretary 

or the President) may be obtained within the court-martial 

system. First, Article 73 provides that, “within two years 

after approval by the convening authority of a courtmartial sentence, the accused may petition the Judge

Advocate General for a new trial on the grounds of newly 

discovered evidence or fraud on the court.” 10 U. S. C. 

§873. The only relief available under this “special postconviction remedy” is a new trial, Burns, 346 U. S., at 141 

(plurality opinion), and even that may be granted only in 

an expressly circumscribed timeframe (two years) and set 

of circumstances (newly discovered evidence or fraud on

the court). Article 73 stands in stark contrast to coram 

nobis, which the majority characterizes as a writ infinitely 

available “to redress a[ny] fundamental error.” Ante, at 6; 

see Morgan, supra, at 512 (“fundamental error” not limited to jurisdictional defects or errors on the face of the 

—————— 

does issue with respect to a former service member, the Government

maintains it would lack jurisdiction to retry. Tr. of Oral Arg. 56–57; 

see 10 U. S. C. §§802–803. Avoiding that extraordinary result would

require another “belated extension” of the original court-martial proceeding, expanding the jurisdiction of military courts to try individuals

who have long since severed their ties to the military. 
8 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

record).

To be sure, the limited nature of relief available under 

Article 73 might lead one to question whether that is truly 

the only postconviction relief the UCMJ permits. “You’re 

in the Army now” is a sufficient answer to such concerns; 

the relief available looks positively extravagant in light of 

the prior history and tradition of military justice. In any 

event, as the majority recognizes, see ante, at 11, Article 

76 makes clear that all court-martial judgments “carried

into execution” after completion of direct review are “final

and conclusive,” 10 U. S. C. §876. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, that language does not simply “codif[y] the 

common-law rule that respects the finality of judgments.” 

Ante, at 11. In fact, Article 76 does not stop there. It goes

on to instruct that final court-martial judgments are

binding “subject only to action upon a petition for a new

trial [under Article 73],” or action by the appropriate

Secretary or the President. 10 U. S. C. §876 (emphasis 

added).

In light of these provisions, only Article 73 provides any

authority to the CCAs or the CAAF, and even that narrow 

authority is limited to pending cases. Once a conviction is 

final, only the judge advocate general can provide relief.

See supra, at 3; 10 U. S. C. §873. To the extent the CCAs 

or the CAAF could be deemed to have some inherent 

continuing authority to issue writs of coram nobis, Articles 

73 and 76 extinguish it. 

IV 

The Government goes on to argue that even if military 

courts have jurisdiction to issue writs of coram nobis, and 

even if Articles 73 and 76 do not bar such relief, the courts 

still lack authority to issue coram nobis, because the writ 

is neither “necessary” nor “appropriate” to the courtmartial system of justice. See 28 U. S. C. §1651(a) (federal 

courts “may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 9 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

of their respective jurisdictions”). Coram nobis allows the 

court that issued a judgment to correct its own errors of

fact. See Morgan, 346 U. S., at 507, n. 9 (“‘If a judgment 

in the King’s Bench be erroneous in matter of fact only, . . . 

it may be reversed in the same court, by writ of error 

coram nobis’” (quoting 2 W. Tidd, Practice of the Courts of 

King’s Bench, and Common Pleas 1136 (4th Am. ed. 1856); 

some emphasis added)); see also ante, at 11 (referring to 

“authority of a court to protect the integrity of its earlier 

judgments” (emphasis added)). But a court-martial is not 

a standing court. On a case-by-case basis, “[i]t is called

into existence for a special purpose and to perform a particular duty. When the object of its creation has been 

accomplished it is dissolved.” Runkle v. United States, 122 

U. S. 543, 555–556 (1887); see also 66 M. J. 114, 124 

(CAAF 2008) (a court-martial “does not have independent 

jurisdiction over a case after the military judge authenticates the record and the convening authority forwards the

record after taking action”). Because the court-martial 

that issues the conviction no longer exists once the conviction is final, there is no court to which a postconviction

petition for coram nobis could be directed. 

The absence of standing courts-martial is no mere technicality, but rather an integral and intentional part of the

military justice system. “Court-martial jurisdiction sprang

from the belief that within the military ranks there is need

for a prompt, ready-at-hand means of compelling obedience

and order.” United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U. S. 

11, 22 (1955). But meeting that need requires expending 

significant military resources, and “[t]o the extent that 

those responsible for performance of [the military’s] primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of

trying cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not

served.” Id., at 17. Accordingly, courts-martial, composed 

of active duty military personnel, have always been called 

into existence for a limited purpose and duration. 
10 UNITED STATES v. DENEDO 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

It is no answer that the CCAs and the CAAF are standing courts that could act as substitutes for coram nobis 

purposes. As this case illustrates, those courts are not 

equipped to handle the kind of factfinding necessary to

resolve claims that might be brought on coram nobis. 

Instead, the CCAs will have to resort to the procedures

invented by United States v. DuBay, 17 U. S. C. M. A. 147, 

37 C. M. R. 411 (1967), under which a new convening 

authority will refer a case to a new court-martial, and task 

various military personnel who have no prior familiarity 

with the case to conduct an out-of-court evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petitioner’s claim. Id., at 149, 37 

C. M. R., at 413. This “unwieldy and imperfect system” 

will undoubtedly divert valuable military resources, 66

M. J., at 136 (Ryan, J., dissenting), all in aid of postconviction relief Congress specifically withheld. 

The Court expressly declines to consider the Government’s “necessary or appropriate” argument: “[T]he Government’s argument speaks to the scope of the writ, not 

the [CCA’s] jurisdiction to issue it. The CAAF rejected the 

former argument. Only the latter one is before us.” Ante, 

at 12. The Court may well be correct in dividing the questions into separate pigeonholes. But the Government’s 

argument, even if an argument about authority rather 

than jurisdiction, applies to every coram nobis case, given 

the nature of the military justice system. It is curious to 

conclude that military courts have jurisdiction, while not

considering a raised and briefed argument that they may 

never exercise it. 

* * * 

Since the adoption of the UCMJ, “Congress has gradually changed the system of military justice so that it has 

come to more closely resemble the civilian system.” Weiss 

v. United States, 510 U. S. 163, 174 (1994). “But the military in important respects remains a specialized society 
Cite as: 556 U. S. ____ (2009) 11 

Opinion of ROBERTS, C. J. 

separate from civilian society.” Ibid. (internal quotation

marks omitted). Neither the jurisdiction nor the powers of 

Article III courts are necessarily appropriate for military 

courts, and Congress’s contrary determinations in this

area are entitled to “the highest deference.” Loving v. 

United States, 517 U. S. 748, 768 (1996). Rather than 

respect the rule that military courts have no jurisdiction to

revisit final convictions, the majority creates an exception

that swallows it. Because I would hold the military courts 

to the statutory restraints that govern them, I respectfully

dissent.