U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

96–473 PDF 2004

CATHOLICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA

ROUNDTABLE

BEFORE THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 17, 2004

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate

JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman

DAVID DREIER, California

FRANK WOLF, Virginia

JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

DAVID WU, Oregon

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman

CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas

GORDON SMITH, Oregon

MAX BAUCUS, Montana

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State

GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce

JAMES KELLY, Department of State

STEPHEN J. LAW, Department of Labor

JOHN FOARDE, Staff Director

DAVID DORMAN, Deputy Staff Director

(II)

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

STATEMENTS

Madsen, Richard, professor of sociology, University of California at San Diego,

San Diego, CA ...................................................................................................... 2

Carroll, Sister Janet, program associate, U.S. Catholic China Bureau, South

Orange, NJ ........................................................................................................... 5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS

Madsen, Richard ...................................................................................................... 28

Carroll, Sister Janet ................................................................................................ 30

(1)

CATHOLICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2004

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION ON CHINA

Washington, DC.

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in

room 2515, Rayburn House Office Building, John Foarde [staff director] presiding.

Also present: David Dorman, deputy staff director; Erin

Mewhirter, office of Grant Aldonas, Under Secretary of Commerce

for International Trade; Susan Weld, general counsel; and Mark

Milosch, special advisor.

Mr. FOARDE. Good morning to everyone, and thank you for coming to this issues roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. My name is John Foarde. I am the staff director

and represent Chairman Jim Leach.

We will have some other CECC staff, and we hope some personal

staff from some of our commissioners, coming in due course to attend this morning. I would like to thank everybody who has come

out on this cloudy, rainy day to join us.

We are here this morning to examine Catholics and civil society

in China. Most experts agree that Chinese citizens will not enjoy

substantial religious freedom until they are free to form unsupervised religious associations and organizations. Between 1949 and

1978, the Chinese Government destroyed China’s relatively underdeveloped civil society. But since 1978, the Chinese people have

rebuilt some of the institutions of civil society, despite strict government limits.

The government generally gives little latitude to religious believers to form private voluntary associations, but in recent years has

permitted the formation of a network of Catholic social services,

while tightening restrictions on Catholics in other areas.

This morning we want to examine recent developments in Catholic institutions of civil society in China, and assess in what areas

there might be some scope for future liberalization, or might be the

possibility of additional restrictions.

We have two distinguished panelists to help us this morning.

Richard Madsen is professor of sociology at the University of California at San Diego, and we are grateful for him coming all this

way to share his expertise with us, and Sister Janet Carroll, the

program associate with the U.S. Catholic China Bureau, who is

here on the east coast, but also had to travel to Washington to join

us, and we are grateful for that as well.

2

As we have at our roundtables over the last three years, we will

give each panelist 10 minutes for an opening presentation, and

then launch a round of questions from the staff panel until we either run out of steam or get to 11:30, whichever comes first.

So, without further ado, let me recognize Professor Madsen for

his presentation, please.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD MADSEN, PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SAN DIEGO, SAN

DIEGO, CA

Mr. MADSEN. It is a great honor for me to speak at this roundtable and to have a chance to share what expertise I have on the

situation of the Catholic Church in China.

The first thing I would say, very briefly, is that the Catholic

Church in China in many ways is an extremely vital institution.

Many people had pretty much given it up for dead after the Communists took over in China in 1949, including many foreign missionaries who thought that many of their Catholics were basically

‘‘rice Christians,’’ poorly educated in the faith, who would not stand

up to the tremendous persecution they ended up facing. So it was

to the surprise even of Catholic missionaries, I think, as well as to

secular scholars and to other people, to see how, in the 1980s, the

church rebounded and has become a very dynamic, very vital institution.

The Catholic Church in China is characterized in many places by

enormous fervent devotion and commitment to the faith, sometimes, of course, under daunting obstacles. The church is developing new forms of organization of social services, as we are going

to talk about later, and is ordaining a steady stream of new priests;

religious sisters are being professed; and the numbers of Catholics

are steadily, although somewhat slowly, growing. There are approximately 12 million Catholics in China today.

At the same time, the church is faced with some severe problems.

There is a problem of factionalization between the so-called underground church and the official church, and also problems related to

the lack of numbers of new priests that would be needed to fill the

gap caused by the retirements and deaths of an older generation

of priests, because there were not that many priests ordained in

the middle period during the repressive Mao Zedong years. So,

there is a lack of priests, a lack of money, and factionalism.

Over and above that, there is a problem, I think, with the capacity of the church to sometimes adapt itself to the dynamic secularizing influences of modernization and of urbanization in the coastal

areas of China.

The Catholic Church is strongest in China in the countryside, in

the hinterlands. In major cities like Shanghai, even though the city

is a site of a long-lasting Catholic community, the number of young

people willing to become priests and the level of commitment begins to pale in comparison with the countryside, because for some

reason the way the faith has been formulated and organized does

not seem to match the experience and aspirations of people who are

caught up in modernizing or urbanizing society. So, these are challenges that the Catholic Church faces, daunting challenges.

3

But in my written statement, I mentioned that in some respects

the Catholic Church in China is more dynamic, flourishing, and in

better shape than, say, the Catholic Church in America or Europe,

where, by many measures, the Church is in somewhat of a decline,

reeling from scandal in the United States, whereas in China, it is

on an upward trajectory, in spite of all its problems.

Comparing the Church in China with the Church in America is

like comparing apples and oranges. But there is no reason to say

that the Catholic Church in China is in terrible shape, especially

in comparison with us. In many ways, it is an inspiration to us all.

The development of the Catholic Church in China is part and

parcel of very dynamic development of civil society in China. The

way I defined civil society in my written statement is a very simple, basic kind of definition: whenever you have a market economy,

whenever you have mobility and the capacity of people to transcend

family and local community, and form new kinds of associations,

whenever you have these kinds of opportunities created by a dynamic market economy, you are going to have a civil society. You

are going to have all sorts of new forms of organizations. And you

have this in China.

The classic problem of western social theory has been how you

take a civil society, which is an inevitable thing, and make sure

that this works toward stability, justice, and peace. All our great

thinkers, from John Locke to Alexis de Tocqueville and even to

Karl Marx tried to deal with this problem. In China, they are wrestling with this problem, too. In an earlier period, the basic instinct

of the Chinese Government was to suppress civil society. The government saw this as a fundamental problem. Now, they basically,

I think, have come to the point where they realize that you cannot

suppress it. The issue is how they channel it. To do that, they are

going to have a rule of law. They are going to have to have a

framework within which a civil society can be set free, but also regulated so that it works for the common good.

The framework through which the Chinese are going to do this

is inevitably going to be different from the one in our society. I

gave a talk about civil society, kind of a testimony to the Political

Consultative Congress of Shanghai, which is a quasi-legislative

body—I was the first foreigner to do this two years ago. After the

talk, one of the members came up to me and said, ‘‘I think I misunderstood you. It sounded to me like you said that in America the

laws and the government allow groups in civil society to do whatever they want as long as they do not hurt anybody, and they make

no effort to make sure they cohere into the common public good.’’

I said, ‘‘That is exactly what I said.’’ And she said, ‘‘This cannot

be.’’ This was totally outside the orbit of her way of thinking. She

assumed that the government has the responsibility to make these

groups work together for the common good.’’

So the fundamental mentality we have at work here is different

from ours. I think it is very possible that this mentality will

change, but as China develops a framework for civil society, it

would probably be more directive and more corporatist than we

have here. However, I think it may eventually allow for a greater

degree of flexibility and freedom than we have today. So the Catholic Church is part of the civil society.

4

Because civil society in China is both very active, but poorly regulated and poorly protected, because guarantees of freedom of association are not truly guaranteed under the law—there are no rights

of association that are firmly guaranteed in the law; and because

civil society flourishes in an ambiguous legal limbo—because of all

this, very messy kind of tendencies develop. For one thing, groups

in civil society establish themselves and maintain themselves only

through sometimes extra-legal means, and even corrupt means, by

buying off people so as to gain freedom to act. The capacity of such

groups to organize themselves and to keep going is always contingent on very particularistic and complicated kinds of events.

The religious organizations in China are part and parcel of this

whole situation. So, religious organizations in China lead a very

perilous kind of existence. There are areas of freedom, but they can

be arbitrarily taken away. This creates, sometimes, paranoid and

closed attitudes. Sometimes they get involved in complicated,

messy sorts of compromises.

What I would say, therefore, is that religious organizations in

China, including the Catholic Church, are part and parcel of this

kind of civil society. You cannot see the Church as kind of an island of moral and religious purity in the midst of a corrupt, messy

society. The Church is part of the world. The world is complicated

and messy, and the Church engages in all that messiness. At the

same time, Catholics, like other non-Christian people in China, are

searching for new ways to live a decent life and to serve people in

new ways. I am sure Sister Janet will talk about all the new

Catholic organizations that are being created with the social service organizations.

The Catholic Church in China is faced with particular challenges

that maybe are somewhat special to the Catholic Church in comparison, say, with certain kinds of Protestant communities. One

issue is that the Catholic Church tends to be more rooted in local

village and family organizations, and has a more difficult time

transcending these. Another problem is that, because of the situation with the Vatican, it is very difficult for the Catholic Church

to organize itself and speak with one voice.

Because of all this, you cannot have a unified Catholic presence,

and it would be more difficult to develop large-scale civil society organizations, such as Catholic Charities, in China. So this makes

the Catholic situation in China somewhat special, but in general it

is part of the overall situation about a messy, but emerging, civil

society.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Madsen appears in the appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you for giving us a good start and a lot of

food for thought as we go into the question and answer session a

little later.

Let us go on. Let me recognize Sister Janet Carroll. Sister Janet

served as the executive director of the U.S. Catholic China Bureau

from 1989 to 2003, and continues to serve as a program associate.

She is widely published on Church and China issues, and has been

a panelist and lecturer on these subjects, and we are delighted to

have her with us this morning.

Please go ahead.

5

STATEMENT OF JANET CARROLL, M.M., PROGRAM ASSOCIATE,

U.S. CATHOLIC CHINA BUREAU, SOUTH ORANGE, NJ

Sister JANET CARROLL. Thank you, Mr. Foarde. Let me also express my gratitude to be able to be here this morning. We have

been aware of the work of this Commission for several years and

been in contact previously during the hearings and other things

that we follow very closely.

I would like to certainly commend the Commission for that work.

In the words of your co-chair, Senator Hagel, this idea that, as the

United States Government and the Government of China, we can

work closely together for the common good and common interest,

not only of our own national interests, but also for the people. Second, as I have said as a caveat, that it is also important for the

American people and the Chinese people to work together. That is

where I think the civil society issue is best engaged.

Professor Madsen has already sketched out the background on

the Church situation, and the Church, as it struggles forward in

China today, as it does, indeed, in many lands, our own included.

My experience has always been grounded in my own personal experience of having worked in the field, albeit not in China proper,

but rather in Taiwan, many years in the mid-1950s, 1960s, and

into the 1970s. But that experience of working with the people at

the grassroots level colors everything I do, and even today when I

visit China, my interest is always just to be with the ordinary

folks. I think it is there that the hope lies for the future of the

Church, indeed, for the future of the country.

I will try to stick more closely to the statement I prepared and

simply lift up a few aspects of it that perhaps will complement

what Mr. Madsen has already shared with us. I think, as he has

indicated, no matter how you construe the developments in the last

quarter century, the signs of renewed opportunities for social services and civil society certainly exist. I use these two words interchangeably in the sense that, insofar as the Church will organize

social services and social welfare programs, that is in my view the

contribution for the moment that the Church will make to civil society. It is always important to remember that in China, everything

you hear is true in one place and in one time, but may not be true

in the next place and the next time, which makes it difficult sometimes for us to deal with all that ambiguity. There are a lot of contextual perspectives which we have to bear in mind when we are

going to look at the situation, and I think Dick has already raised

some of them.

But I would just highlight that the cultural and social traditions,

as they are evolving in China, give an opportunity for Christianity,

in general—certainly the Catholic Church—to also engage in providing new ethical and moral foundations for the emergence of a

civil society. The civil society has to be grounded in these

underpinnings. While there is cause for concern and caution about

the situation, there certainly are these unparalleled opportunities

which the churches can take. Christianity can make an important

contribution to a life ethic, as a philosophy, but also through the

very services that the churches can render.

Many of us would be familiar with the extensive program of

social services: schools, hospitals, clinics, all manner of social minVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Nov 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96473.TXT China1 PsN: China1
6

istries, orphanages, and so forth, that the missionary church provided in China until the 1950s. Today, of course, the local Catholic

Church in China has the prerogative to establish its own ministries

in that regard. I think that, given the limited resources, both material resources as well as human resources, they are doing an outstanding job in getting started. I have left, on the distribution table

for people to take, four or five samples of so-called Catholic social

service centers which are already functioning in China today, some

of them more or less developed. Perhaps the best known one, with

the most structure, is the Beifang Jinde Center in Hebei Province

in northern China, about three hours from Beijing. They work extensively throughout the country trying to respond to rescue and

relief needs when there are tragedies like flooding and earthquake

and other disasters. They are trying to make an effort to respond

to the HIV/AIDS crisis, and other programs of interest, and they

are doing quite well.

There is another center getting under way in the northeast of

China in the city of Shenyang, organized by the Liaoning Diocese.

You can read about their programs and what they are envisioning,

and the perspective they take on engaging in the society and in

service. I also brought along a copy of a newsletter of another very

well-established social service agency in the diocese of Xi’an in

western China, which has quite a bit of work underway, spread out

very extensively in the village areas of Shaanxi Province. I’ve already brought to your attention the well-known Catholic Intelligentsia Association of Shanghai. Under a rather archaic title they have

existed in Shanghai since the mid-1980s—soon after the Church

there reopened. A small group of Catholic professionals came together to offer pro bono services in the fields of legal, medical, and

social service.

Another area in which I think the Catholic Church can contribute in China, where they are indeed struggling, is to look at the

culture as it engages with modernity and the whole new development of a market economy. How can Christianity become a living

interlocutor with Chinese culture, and help it to reinterpret its history, prepare for the New China that the government is seeking to

bring into existence? A famous slogan that Chinese political leaders

use as a challenge to the people is ‘‘to create a new spiritual civilization.’’ This is our kind of religious language, yet it is interesting

to hear this kind of language coming from the so-called atheistic

authorities in China. So I would say that the post-1978 People’s

Republic of China, the ‘‘New China,’’ already now passing its first

quarter century of existence, is facing this challenge of creatively

reinventing its traditional value system and its moral categories

in order to have new interpretive models. With these models, they

can not only make sense of their past and find common ground in

the present for the good of the people, but also can move toward

the future, which will enable them to play their rightful role in the

international community.

Civil society will be an integral part of the transformation that

is happening in China. It has to be structured in a manner consistent with the values, virtues, and cultures of that ancient and

great civilization. One of the things those of us who have tried to

engage and work with the Chinese churches must remember, and

7

I think it is one of the ways you will see organizations working in

China, is to give priority to the principles of harmony and right relationships that are central to the Chinese psyche. Those two elements of seeking harmony and the smooth way to go, and of being

in right relationships, whether it is with the government or one’s

peers, or caring for the needy and the poor in society, have to bear

great weight in the restructuring of China’s civil society. It is time,

I think, for a new dialogue, not only within China, but internationally with China, to move in this direction.

Finally, I would like to speak a little bit about the needs that are

out there, about how the programs are organized, and why these

programs have the character that they do when you look at the literature.

There are many needs and many ways that the Church could

serve if it had the resources, if it had the support and assistance

from sister churches, and from other organizations in the social

services sector.

Before our roundtable this morning, we were talking about developments in the field of law. The Chinese welcome and are open to

work together with those who can assist them in preparing their

own human resources to meet the goal of creating a rule of law.

In the field of general education, while the churches are not yet

permitted to sponsor schools as such, a great deal of work is being

done in the field of informal and supplementary education. Similarly, collaborative efforts would be welcome in the social and medical fields. I mention the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which necessarily

needs help from every quarter. The churches are already playing

a tremendous role—both Catholic and Protestant groups—in trying

to respond to this crisis, mainly by training personnel and collaborating with local health bureaus in designing programs.

I have included in the packet of materials on the distribution

table for those who may find it of interest, a response to some questions that might be asked as we think about religiously sponsored

social service projects in China. How do these organizations function? What kinds of limitations do they struggle under?, and so

forth.

I think direct responses are always valuable: verbatim from one

of the directors of such programs regarding these concerns. What

sorts of supervision and restrictions that these agencies work under

simply because they are church sponsored? My interluctor noted

that strictly speaking, there were no written rules that make them

any different from other organizations. But they indeed are supervised, especially those agencies and organizations that try to relate

internationally and have funding from foreign contacts and foreign

personnel coming in to assist them with their programs. These are

delicate areas, and there is a lot of government supervision when

a social service agency in China functions in that way. Other people may ask if it depends on who’s in charge? Indeed, it does. My

source mentioned that, again, harmony and right relationships are

very important. When there are competent people in both a local

government ministry as well as in the Church side of the organization and they can discuss and agree on common concerns, things

go well.

8

Another question that is asked is, ‘‘What is the primary concern

that the government might have about these kinds of religiously affiliated organizations? ’’ I would say, as the Xi’an director said, that the primary concern—and this is something we have certainly not been shy about

in the past—is that these programs would be used for what they

would judge to be ulterior purposes. In other words, to put it very

bluntly, a social service program whose real goal was to proselytize

or convert people to Christianity rather than to just altruistically

serve the people. We know that, unfortunately, some overly zealous

groups use these methods. Regrettably, the Chinese Government

perceives them as detrimental to its interests.

If I might, just one final comment in terms of what kind of restrictions, perhaps, these groups appear to be under. I interviewed

a young woman doctor who is currently doing her studies at Pace

University in hospital administration and has been working in the

diocese in Hebei. She mentioned that, coming up now, it appears

that there is much stricter control in terms of the objectivity of the

social services that I already alluded to, but more importantly, that

standards are rising all the time. In the old days, the missionaries

could do whatever as long as they were doing good deeds. But now

it is not sufficient that the Church just have a clinic that perhaps

is not staffed with personnel with high professional standards, and

does not use up-to-norm methods, pharmaceuticals, or clinical

tests, and so forth. So she mentioned to me that more and more

small clinics run by the churches in the countryside are being

closed because they lack these standards and capacities to follow

the local norms. She was of the opinion that this situation was

probably good, because the churches need to bring them up to modern standards. In fact, her being here finishing her degree in this

field is a function of her local bishop’s concern about having adequately credentialed professional staff who will administer these

social service programs for that diocese.

Thank you very much for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Sister Janet Carroll appears in the

appendix.]

Mr. FOARDE. Sister Janet, thank you very much. Both presentations have given us a lot of ideas and concepts to discuss. I will

let you both rest your voices for a minute while I make an administrative announcement or two. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China will have a formal hearing on Thursday,

September 23, beginning at 10:30 a.m. in this room, 2255. The subject will be the situation in Hong Kong after the Legislative Council

elections on September 12. We will try to take a look at constitutional development and universal suffrage in Hong Kong, and what

the prospects are for that.

The Commission will meet in a closed session in this room at 10

a.m. on that same day, and so we will not admit people to the room

until just before the 10:30 hearing begins. But you are all welcome

to come, and we would very much like to see you there.

The Commission is charged by statute to issue a report each

year, which may contain recommendations to the President and to

the Congressional leadership. In keeping with that statutory mandate, we will release the annual report for 2004 on Tuesday, OctoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Nov 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96473.TXT China1 PsN: China1
9

ber 5. The room, I think, will be room 1116 Longworth, but please

look at the Web site. Of course, we will send out an announcement

in a couple of weeks to remind people about that date and time for

the Annual Report press conference.

Chairman Leach and Co-Chairman Hagel will preside at the

hearing next week, and also at the press conference to introduce

the report on October 5.

With that, let us go to the question and answer session. I will

exercise the prerogative of the chair to leap right into it.

Our Commission members are very interested in the dynamics

between the underground Church and the open Church. We wondered if communities of underground believers have tried to form

any voluntary associations or band together to do the sort of social

service work that is apparently being done in the open Church by

the groups that Sister Janet and Dick alluded to during their presentations. Can you comment on that?

Mr. MADSEN. First of all, I would say they have a tremendous,

quite sophisticated capacity for organization that transcends just

local villages and communities. There is an underground Catholic

bishops conference that gets interrupted by the police. Over and

above that, if by civil society you include all sorts of voluntary organizations, they do lots of work in getting the money together to

build churches and other buildings in places such as Wenzhou.

There are all these beautiful churches that they have built. Some

of them have been destroyed recently, but there is the capacity to

get themselves organized to build the churches and to raise money,

sometimes from foreign sources. A lot of that kind of activity goes on.

I think, because they are not officially registered, they are under

pressure and are more concerned about survival than about expanding social services such as works of charity, although I think

there is a fair amount of work that goes on in helping each other

in local communities. But they would have a difficult time doing so

in the formalized way that the official Church can do it.

Mr. FOARDE. Useful. Sister Janet, please.

Sister JANET CARROLL. I would also—and Dick, in his own paper

made a point on this which I would respond also to—say, just to

clarify that these, these hard-line distinctions that we make between underground and open, or whatever terms you want to use,

registered and unregistered is what I prefer to use, are not always

useful. None of the activities we have been talking about happened

without the acquiescence, formal or informal, of the local authorities. So in our understanding, there is no such thing as things happening that nobody knows about.

However, to address your question, would a church in a given

city or a countryside area that is not registered—could that church

start a social service program? Maybe not formally, I think, in the

sense of having it have a name like Catholic Social Service Center

of x location, but in fact they are doing it. The work is going on.

More importantly, a lot of these organizations that are formally

established—and I would say that there are probably more than

just the four or five that we have illustrated here this morning—

the people working in them are Catholics who belong, across the

board, to different communities which choose one position or the

other. I know, myself, for many of the young sisters, for example,

10

that would be doing a lot of this ministry, their natural sympathies

would be with the unregistered communities because their families

belong to those traditions and that is where they come from. But

in terms of the objective work they do, they are there working in

the structures that enable them to do the ministry.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you. And thank you for bringing up another

point which I would like to follow up on a little bit, and that is the

blurring distinction between registered and unregistered Catholics,

open or underground, or however we might describe them. That is

something that we on the Commission staff have only begun to understand a lot better this year. I am glad you brought that up.

I am very short on time, so I think I am just going to pass the

questioning on to my friend and colleague, Dave Dorman, who represents Senator Chuck Hagel, our Co-chairman.

Dave.

Mr. DORMAN. Well, first of all, thank you, to both of you, for coming today. The issues of religious freedom, freedom of association,

and civil society in China are all ones that I know Senator Hagel

considers very important, and very important to the Commission.

I am sure that all of our Commissioners share this view. I do not

think you have testified before the Commission before, and we

always try to draw the greatest variety of viewpoints and the

greatest variety of expertise that we possibly can. So, thank you for

coming today.

I had the opportunity to read your written statement last night,

Professor Madsen. I wanted to ask you something that has been

puzzling many of us here on the dais for quite some time. You mention in your written statement that many of the activities of the

Church would not be possible without the informal acquiescence of

government officials. This is something that many of us here have

actually experienced during travel in China: the differences between provinces, the differences between regions, sometimes subtle,

sometimes quite apparent.

We have our own theories of why that, in fact, is the case. But

I wonder if you could give us your views on whether you believe

there are variations from province to province and from region to

region regarding the degree of control, the degree of regulation, and

the degree of harassment, and if so why these variations exist.

Mr. MADSEN. Again, this speaks to a point that Sister Janet just

made about the way in which underground and above-ground factions in the Church blend together. There is a huge gray area between the extreme members of either side.

If you look at the formal structures of China at provisions guaranteeing the hegemony of the Communist Party, and even look at

the Constitution, on paper it looks like a classic totalitarian system. But in reality, the capacity of the central government to control the society is rather weak and becoming weaker all the time,

partly because of the dynamism of this market economy, partly because of corruption and other factors. So there is a lot of practical

space for people in different places to organize themselves in ways

that go beyond the government’s written regulations. People

throughout China find ways to make their own kinds of peace with

the system. The capacity to do this varies with many different facVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Nov 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96473.TXT China1 PsN: China1
11

tors involved, one of which is distance from Beijing. But other factors enter in as well.

So what you get is enormous variability across China, and in

some places, as far as religious groups are concerned, there is tremendous freedom to practice whatever you want, underground or

above-ground.

With respect to these so-called underground churches, in many

places people are not living in the catacombs, you know. They are

not doing what they are doing in hiding. They are building beautiful churches that everyone can see. They are publicly visible, even

though they are not officially registered. To make this all happen,

you have to have local officials at least be willing to look the other

way. Sometimes it is done through bribery, pay offs, and so forth.

Sometimes it is done simply because local officials do not have the

energy to go after some of these churches. They have other priorities. Sometimes a combination of the above. But this happens in

contingent ways, in ways that are variable across the board. The

problem however, is that none of this activity is protected by rights

under the law, so that if local officials change, if the national situation changes for some reason, this can be taken away from them.

So that is why you get this tremendous instability.

But, in general, there is enormous variation in China and enormous areas of practical freedom, although freedom is not guaranteed under the law. That, itself, causes problems.

Mr. DORMAN. Thank you.

Sister JANET CARROLL. If I might build on that response. I think

that it is the old ‘‘glass half empty or half full’’ paradigm that

comes into play. I think that my experience with the young people,

meaning the new younger leadership among the clergy, religious,

and the laity who are taking the leadership in the churches, they

tend to be future-oriented people. They are not looking back, or

even being constricted by present realities. But they are trying to

prepare themselves for the future. It is much more important that

they be given the capacity to act and enabled so that when, indeed,

a more viable field for them to function comes into the rule of law

in China, they will be ready to do it. So, they make the necessary

adjustments.

I would not say it is all being opportunistic or pragmatic, or anything like that, or just compromising, but they try to work realistically in that situation. Thus, they are less concerned about what

they are not able to do, and they are much more concerned—as I

remember Father Chen said to me when I recently visited the Social Service Center at Xi’an—there is so much to do that they can

do, that they really are not going to get themselves all in a snit

about what they cannot do.

Mr. FOARDE. Useful. Thank you. I would like to recognize Susan

Roosevelt Weld, the general counsel of the Commission, for some

questions.

Susan.

Ms. WELD. My first question has to do with what Sister Janet

said about a person from a traditionally Catholic family, which is

unregistered, deciding to register and serve in some of the official

organizations. Is that typical? It seems to me that is one reason,

12

a very strong reason, why there would be blurring of the two communities.

Sister JANET CARROLL. Absolutely. And, strictly speaking, individuals—and Dick can correct me on this if necessary—do not have

to register, in other words, the average Catholic who just wants to

go to Mass on Sunday or take part in some activity. It is the leadership and those who are responsible for the Church in an institutional, juridical sense, and the Church itself as a place of worship,

and so forth. But an average Catholic does not even necessarily

have to belong to the Catholic Patriotic Association, although obviously they are encouraged to join.

So that explains it. Many of the young graduate students that we

now are sponsoring in this country for studies—there are quite a

few of them here right in the Washington area—clergy, religious,

and others, come from those types of families. But they know that

the future requires them to be prepared. And the way they can

have that opportunity for preparation is to go through the system

and seize the opportunity. So, yes, it is quite common, I would say.

Mr. MADSEN. I would just reiterate what Sister Janet said, that

as far as individuals are concerned, they do not have to be registered. It is just the institution that has to be registered. And individuals have different approaches to this. Some people in the

so-called underground faction of the Church would not be caught

dead inside an official Church, and that is all there is to it. But

others want to receive the sacraments and want to be part of it,

so they would attend if it were convenient and available. Sometimes they make distinctions. For instance, I think when I did a

research project in the 1990s—it may have changed in the last few

years—sometimes Catholics, for instance, go to confession. They

might not want to go to confession to a priest in the official church

because they might be afraid that the priest might be under pressure to tell somebody, and so forth. They could not trust them. But

they would go to Mass, maybe, in an official church, but not to confession. And in some cases, if someone were dying and wanted to

receive the Last Rites, they would want to be 100 percent sure that

the Rites were going to be sacramentally effective, and thus they

might go to an underground priest rather than an above-ground

priest. But then in the other circumstances they would go into the

official Church, et cetera. So, individual Catholics would span the

spectrum and there would be a lot of gray areas, and very complicated sorts of things that would go on.

Ms. WELD. Thank you. I am also interested in another thing. Is

there great suspicion of either unregistered or registered Church

members who have links, strong links, with, for example, people

from abroad who are working in China? I ask this question because

of that case recently in which communications abroad were found

to be a violation of laws against disclosing state secrets. Is that a

common situation? What is meant by ‘‘state secrets’’ in those cases?

Do you know the cases I am talking about? From Zhejiang Province.

Mr. MADSEN. Communication abroad is always a sensitive issue.

You are not supposed to have communications abroad without

being officially supervised and receiving permission. People have

them anyway, of course. But that is one thing that can always be

used against you, so everyone violates that in a way, but that gives

13

government officials leverage to get rid of anybody they do not like.

Many of the underground and official churches still depend a lot

on foreign donations and foreign help in various ways. They get a

lot of help that comes from different sources, sometimes from Taiwan, the Philippines, and of course the United States. However,

because of the way China is set up, there is always an inherent

suspicion about foreign contacts, and they can be used against you.

Sister JANET CARROLL. Yes. Of course, some of this is grounded

in history and the experience—even our Holy Father himself has

apologized for certain excesses in the past where, you know, apparently missionaries operating in good will were also compromised in

their way of functioning in China. We frequently visit China. We

take study groups over, what we call religious study groups. I have

led nine of them myself in the last 10 or 12 years. We visit the

churches. We spend time with people there. It is very open, very

above-board. To my knowledge—I am certain they would tell us if

it was the case—that does not compromise our friends and those

we meet with locally. So, we have those kinds of contexts and communications.

Nowadays, we regularly receive invitations to attend church ceremonies, the taking of vows of sisters, dedication of new churches,

all these normal activities that churches have, and we are invited

to participate, and so on. So, I do no think that they are penalized

for being in contact with us. I think those areas that you refer to

are more a reaction by authorities who were aware of things that

were being done. As we know, long documents governing foreigners’ activities in the field of religion in China have been elaborated, describing who can preach, and so forth. And if those rules are violated, well, then of course you then lend yourself to problems. In

many cases, as is true in every country, there are many laws on

the books that we do not like, but it does not mean that we can

violate them with impunity. So, you have to wait until the law gets

changed, and work for the change.

Mr. FOARDE. Again, very useful. I would like now to recognize

our colleague who is responsible for organizing this roundtable this

morning and who has been looking at Catholicism in China this

past year for us, Mark Milosch, for some questions. Mark.

Mr. MILOSCH. Sister Janet and Professor Madsen, I am very glad

to have met both of you today. My question is about civil society

as much as religion. I think many of us are concerned with this

issue because we want to learn the lessons from the decline of

Communism in eastern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, and its fall

in 1989. I am wondering if you could compare the position of civil

society in China today, with particular reference to the Catholic

Church in China, with its position in eastern Europe, particularly

Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia, in the 1980s.

Mr. MADSEN. I think, around 1989, there were some people in

the Catholic Church, especially in the underground part of it, who

thought that they could make a contribution similar to that of the

church in Poland and perhaps in Hungary, in the 1980s. That is,

the church could bring down Communism. Some of them—at least

a few of them—thought that way. They had almost apocalyptic understandings of this. This is one reason why the government was

so eager to crush them when it cracked down in the early 1990s.

14

I think that idea was certainly unrealistic, because the Catholic

Church in China is a small entity, 1 percent of the population, perhaps. In eastern Europe, in Poland, especially, it was very large

and identified closely with Polish nationalism. The Catholic Church

is too small in China to really be a force that could totally transform the Communist system.

But perhaps the problem is that Chinese society is somewhat

fragile these days. I think social stability and government control

are increasingly tenuous. In some respects, the government is

afraid that even little things can help breakdown occur. ‘‘A single

spark can light a prairie fire,’’ as Mao Zedong said. So, they are on

the lookout for any kinds of signs of independent activity that

would have the capacity to be a nucleus of resistance of disaffected

people. Since so much of the Chinese Catholic Church is rural, and

since the farmers have so many reasons to be discontented, and

there are thousands of peasant riots every year, the government is

afraid that groups like the Catholic Church that do have the capacity to organize beyond villages could be the nucleus of trouble.

As a matter of fact, although there have been literally thousands

of these peasant riots and disturbances in the last several years,

in no instance have Catholic organizations directed them. So, while

the government has lots of reasons to fear instability, the Church

generally has not been one of them, but I think the authorities are

wary and they are on the lookout. I think this dynamic leads you

to this situation, that in general the authorities have not bothered

the Church as much as they might because they have other problems to deal with. But if they have reason to be suspicious, then

they can move in, so you have an ebb and flow of repression and

loosening up.

Sister JANET CARROLL. The only thing I would add, perhaps, to

that, Mark—and I addressed this issue on the bottom of page 8 in

my statement—is I think the Chinese Government is at pains to

learn the lessons from eastern Europe, certainly not to repeat the

political mistakes that were made. To my understanding, the authorities are concerned about learning the socio-economic lessons,

to avoid the fragmentation and the terrible factionalism, the ethnocentricity, and so forth, that has exploded all over eastern Europe

and is causing such grief. They want to ensure that it not happen

in a country such as China, which could lend itself to that type of

tension, and to the great detriment of everyone concerned. On the

economic side, the government has made such progress, relatively

speaking, in the economic area, that they want to be sure that it

not all be lost or destroyed.

Frankly, I think what we often label as repression of religious

movements, even such as Falun Gong and so forth—although I do

not recognize Falun Gong as a religious movement myself—should

more properly be labeled as much more official concern about the

organizing capacity of those groups. It has very little to do with religion and ideology. It has everything to do with the fact that

churches and spiritual groups can organize vast numbers of people

who could be used for something other than the religious or spiritual purpose for which they are initially organized.

Mr. FOARDE. Really useful. Let me pick up the questioning now.

I want to go back to a couple of things that each of you said in your

15

opening statements. Sister Janet, you alluded to the contribution

of the missionary Church before the Revolution in 1949 in building

the institutions of civil society. But can you tell us what happened

to those institutions? Did they disappear entirely? Are there

vestiges of them today that were picked up and invigorated in the

1970s? What was the dynamic of that?

Sister JANET CARROLL. Probably the most obvious would be

schools and a few hospitals. Let me say that, from the Catholic

side, the Catholic Church in China, as Dick has said many times,

was much more rural, and therefore was not as known for large

institutions in the major cities, with the exception of Fudan University in Shanghai, and so forth. However, there are more institutions in the countryside. I think a lot of those, when the properties

were taken, and so forth, they just all went away.

A lot of those properties are what is now being recovered, actually through the services of the Catholic Patriotic Association. So

I think maybe it applies more to Protestant Christianity, which

had far more established colleges, universities, and hospitals, and

so forth. For example Peking Medical College was originally a

Protestant institution. A lot of the buildings, of course, are back

being what they were, hospitals and schools. For example, the famous School of the Sisters of the Sacred Heart, who were very famous for their work. That school is still a school, but it is not any

longer a Catholic school. One of my very favorite ones, though, is

the very large building that the Franciscan Missionaries of Mary

had quite close to Tiananmen Square, a building that is now a

McDonald’s.

Let me add one more point, though, about reparations. I work

with the United Board for Christian Education in Asia on the China

subcommittee, and I understand that a lot of reparations were received for Christian colleges that had been confiscated in China. I

do not know if ‘‘reparations’’ is the correct word. Nonetheless,

money was received by the sponsoring agencies among Protestant

groups—which was held in trust and is being used for programs to

strengthen and develop tertiary education all over the country

today.

To my knowledge, and maybe Dick could speak to that, I know

certainly speaking for the Maryknoll Congregation now—I belong

to the Maryknoll order—we never received any funds or anything

like that for the properties that were taken. But we are happy now

that a lot of them are reverting to the Church and the properties

are being used again by the Church.

Mr. FOARDE. If you have a comment, Dick, I would love to hear it.

Mr. MADSEN. One issue that also sometimes becomes a bone of

contention with the official and underground churches has to do

with the recovery of property that was confiscated in the 1950s by

the Communists. As part of the new policies on religion, some of

that property is supposed to come back to the churches. The

churches are being rebuilt and they are supposed to get some of the

property. Of course, the property, if it goes anywhere, is going to

go to registered churches, the official churches. Sometimes the underground feels that it ought to be getting this property instead. It

is complicated, because some of this property has become very valuable. For instance, the property around the main cathedral in

16

Shanghai was basically a rural area in the early 20th century, but

now it is the heart of the commercial district of Shanghai. The real

estate is worth a fortune there. If the Church in Shanghai got all

the property back that it owned before 1949, it would be fabulously

wealthy. Even so, it has gotten a portion back and actually it is

quite well off because it has developed that into office buildings,

and so forth. The government is not going to give it all back because it has become too valuable now, but then there is contention

about how much it should give back, and so forth. This is one

source of some of the controversies that you have over the church

money.

Mr. FOARDE. Interesting.

Sister JANET CARROLL. Frequently they will trade properties, too.

At Fushun in Liaoning Province, they have just traded what had

been Maryknoll property located in the heart of the city for a large

tract of land on the edge of town, given to the Community of Sisters where they have now just built a monumental building. They

had to do that because the scope of the land dictates the size of the

building. So they built a center, a home for their elderly sisters,

and a formation and training center for the young sisters, and so

on. It was a tradeoff. In fact, it was of interest to them. They really

did not want to be in the hubbub of the downtown market, anyway,

so they were glad to be rid of the property.

Mr. FOARDE. Interesting. Let me go to Dave Dorman for more

questions.

Dave.

Mr. DORMAN. Sister Janet, I wanted to refer to your written

statement. I appreciate your introduction and your reference to the

importance of seeking ways to build bridges and opportunities with

the Chinese Government and the Chinese people, and to use these

bridges in a constructive and cooperative way to help China realize

a democratic future. I am sure that Senator Hagel would agree as

well. I use that as an opening because this Commission is dealing

with some of the most difficult and contentious issues in the U.S.-

China relationship. Some of those fall within the area of religion.

In your written statement, you build a very nuanced argument that

I found interesting.

In one paragraph, in particular, you refer to times where Chinese

Christians and other believers find themselves in political conflict

with the state, and then suggest that their actions are too

confrontational. Now, it seems to me—and I emphasize the word

‘‘seems’’—that this sort of argument does not take into account individuals in China who peacefully express their religious views and

find themselves in prison. This is a difficult issue for the Commission. As both of you have pointed out today, there are positive developments in China regarding Catholics. At the same time, many

religious believers in China are suffering severe repression.

How would you add this piece to the argument that you present

in your written testimony? Also, I would ask, could you offer some

guidance to the Commission in terms of building opportunities and

bridges with China on the issue of religious freedom.

Sister JANET CARROLL. Well, it is very broad. Anyway, let me

just try to speak to a few things. Thank you for acknowledging

that. Again, one cannot say everything that one wants to say, so

17

I sometimes tend to want to say the things that I feel have not

been said clearly enough, in place of other things that are said

often.

First of all, let me make this clear: No one wants, in any sense

of the word, to gainsay the sufferings and the difficulties of any

people in China—religious believers certainly among them—who

have suffered simply because of their conscience and their beliefs.

We all know that this repression is something that is just outright

reprehensible, and people should not be held in any way and made

to suffer for their beliefs.

It is not my intention ever to gainsay any of that. Indeed, no

matter how you got there, if you are the one that is in these dire

straits, there is nothing else that matters but that, so you cannot

really relativize it and say, ‘‘Oh, well, but on the large scale of

things, you know. . .’’ So I do not mean in any way to imply that

view.

But what I am talking about is this—and I think Dick made a

reference to it—I mean the poles that tend to exist in the Catholic

communities on the two ends of the spectrum, which is this whole

large thing called the Catholic Church in China, where you have

very recalcitrant groups on both ends of the spectrum. It is not just

that they are on the side of the very hard core ideologues among

Chinese authorities who take a dim view of anything, religion or

whatever, that they are not controlling. On the side of the church,

there are also those who say, even if the Holy Father himself comes

out and makes a statement, they say he is misinformed.

So, you have these two extremes. Leave those aside. But in the

middle, I think, you have all of the gray area that we constantly

talk about, and I think that is the way to go. We need more gray

area. We need more people who are kind of trying to find a way

in the gloaming, in the fog, and to come together.

You have heard this before, there are rights and there are rites.

R-I-G-H-T-S, which in the West we are very strong about, and in

China and in the East, R-I-T-E-S is much more important. In other

words, the way something is done is almost as important as what

is done.

When Senator Hagel was talking about building bridges, to me,

that is a coming together. You do not build a bridge by throwing

it over there and standing on this side and waiting for everybody

to cross over. That is not reconciliation or bridging differences. It

is something coming together in the middle. So, that is what I

mean. I think there are ways. We see this.

I use this analogy a lot: In the West, there is a river, and it is

not running very smoothly, so you want to have it go straight to

its outlet, so you go in there and you dynamite out the rocks, and

it goes right straight through. But if you look at a Chinese painting, the water is always going around, over, and under, and

around, and over, and under. It finds a way. It gets there in the

end, but it does not cause such damage in the process. So maybe

that is a little simplistic way of thinking about it, but there is

something there that I am trying to say. The way we do it could

achieve the same ends. It might take longer, and in taking longer,

if people are languishing in prison or languishing and suffering,

that is not good.

18

We do not want to compromise them in any way. But I think

marching out in the streets and demonstrating, things like that— I worked for a number of years, as some of you know, at the Holy

See Mission to the United Nations. I will never forget Monsignor

Giovanni Calli, who was the head of the mission at the time, saying, what goes on at the United Nations is a world of diplomacy

in which, behind the scenes, quietly, people can find ways to come

together to find their common interests. Once it blows out in the

public, nothing is going to be achieved because neither side can

back down publicly. So that is the way of thinking of the school I

come out of. There are ways to do the same thing. It takes longer,

maybe, and it might be more difficult, and it is not always as satisfying as being able to make a big statement.

Mr. DORMAN. Good. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. Susan, do you want to pick up the questioning?

Ms. WELD. Sure. I guess one aspect of my question has to do

with civil society and the reason the government sees the organization of entities in civil society as so dangerous, when now there is

such a need, especially in the countryside where the church is the

strongest. So, that is one part of it. But the other is this: the reasons the government feels that religion is dangerous and backward.

One reads a lot of things that they put out saying it is anti-science,

asking, how can you have religion in a country that wants to develop?

Do you think there is movement there in the government for

changing this view of religion? Because you can prove that in the

West that science and religion are very happy partners in development. So, that is part of my question.

The other is that in some of your writings you say the Christian

villages are stable. They have little crime and everybody has a

great, strong community feeling. It seems to me the government

now fears instability so much, that that would be a model they

should try to work with rather than fight. Is there any chance that

that might happen?

Mr. MADSEN. I think that what Christians do, and should do, is

point to all the positive things that religion can bring. People in

China, researchers for instance, the Academy of Social Sciences— have also pointed to that. Religion brings good things, such as social stability. Social stability lowers crime rates, et cetera. So, obviously it has positive social functions.

In the government in China itself, as in any government, there

are different factions, different sides, hard-liners, soft-liners: some

would accentuate the positive, some would be worried more about

negative consequences. The negative consequences are the possibilities of linking up and communicating across wide areas that

then could channel discontent. Religion brings those things, too.

Also, of course, now I think globally, there is a more global atmosphere of being aware of the downside of religion, the fanaticism, and so forth. This problem has been accentuated, of course,

since September 11th. So, the government also draws upon that

sometimes.

I was in a meeting last year in Shanghai, and one person there

was from the Religious Affairs Bureau who in many ways was very

reasonable. But then at the end he talked about the need to fight

19

terrorists, he said, like bin Laden and the Dalai Lama. I and my

colleagues said, ‘‘Wait a minute! Do you really want to equate the

Dalai Lama and bin Laden? ’’ He said, ‘‘Yes, yes, they are both terrorists. They both want to split China. They are dangerous.’’ So,

that was the mentality that can get generated in these times. Yet

the same person was willing to recognize various positive things

that religious communities can do. So, we are living in the stage

of ambiguity right now.

In terms of science and religion, I think, in general, there are old

textbooks and old thinking in China from probably the early part

of the 20th century, that said that advanced countries in the world

to replace religion with science. This was part of the ideology of the

May 4th Movement. In fact, you saw the same thing with the Kuomintang in Taiwan. To some degree, more sophisticated people in

China and elsewhere are developing a more subtle understanding

of this, but there is still this kind of popular legitimation through

science that has a very strong foothold. But it does not map onto

reality. So, I think that the prejudice against religion will change

as the level of education begins to rise in China.

Sister JANET CARROLL. Interestingly, we were recently contacted

by some scholars and academics in China asking if we could supply

them with copies of the Vatican documents which had been translated into Chinese. Of course, they have been translated into classical Chinese in greater China. The reason they gave for their

interest in these documents is that they are interested in doing

commentaries on these documents which would ‘‘help,’’ exactly as

they said, their government and people in authority to revise their

understanding of the role of religion in society and the Church in

the modern world. They were interested in, as it were, the policies

coming out of the Second Vatican Council about the Church’s social

role, its importance in that way, and not this old mentality that

you referred to, this sort of superstitious type of thing that you can

dismiss easily. I thought that was a very interesting development,

that also echoes the keen interest about the role of religion in society among young scholars today in China.

In fact, the Chinese Government is sending many young scholars—I know we even received one that the State Department was

facilitating a few years ago from People’s University to come and

have experience and exposure in the States at the request of the

State Department to help him understand how religion functions in

our society. So they are very keen and interested in that. Some

years ago, we had a delegation from Shanghai also at the time

when Jiang Zemin was still mayor of Shanghai, coming to try to

understand that issue. In fact, we met here at the law school. I do

not recall if it was at Catholic University, or where it was. Anyway,

there is a keen interest.

I think that those in China today that have that very old ideological fixation of the non-compatibility of religion and science, or religion and modernity, even, are few. However, it does not take many,

if they are in positions of influence, they can certainly still have an

impact. But I think the more balanced leadership, the more rational contemporary leaders in China today, are certainly more open in

their view of the role of religion in society. I mean, not to deny that

they see a very utilitarian role.

20

Mr. FOARDE. Let me recognize Mark Milosch again for more

questions. Mark.

Mr. MILOSCH. It seems to me that one could say that the Chinese

Government permits quite a few Catholic civil society organizations—for example, the parish itself, which, for most Catholics in

the world, is Catholic civil society. Of course, there are also Catholic social service organizations in China. And there are orders of

sisters in China and there are seminaries. But it seems that the

point, for the Chinese Government, is always to keep Catholic civil

society organizations local, rather than national, or even provincial.

Are there informal networks whereby Catholics try to link up

across diocesan and provincial boundaries? How do they do that

and how does the State try to frustrate that?

Mr. MADSEN. Well, there are both formal and informal networks,

of course. There are national publications, like the magazine published under the auspices, ultimately, of the so-called Patriotic Association. The Patriotic Association tries to monopolize the formal

interconnections. It calls for national bishops meetings, and so

forth. So there is a formal organization of the church. At the same

time, there are a lot of informal connections, although they are

sometimes truncated, made difficult, because of government supervision. So people around China know what is going on in various

ways, sometimes through rumor, sometimes through word of

mouth, sometimes through passages of mimeographed materials.

And people travel. In the old days, it was very difficult to travel

from place to place in China, but now people travel to different

Catholic centers from around the country. For instance, I was doing

a little study project of a pilgrimage site of Catholics in Sheshan

near Shanghai, and people come from all over China. They come

from Xinjiang, they come from Inner Mongolia. They come on long

distance buses, especially in the month of May. So, they know

when this is happening. They can organize themselves to come. Obviously when they come, it is a chance for them to mingle and to

learn things.

So there are networks that are difficult to see from the outside

because they are not formalized and they are not very visible, but

there is a lot of intercommunication that goes on, maybe because

some of it is not official. It is more difficult, therefore, to separate,

fact from rumor. So you get variations in quality and quantity of

information, which causes its own difficulties and problems sometimes.

Mr. MILOSCH. If I could follow up right away. What about Internet sites being used to create these networks? I hear about the underground and official Catholic communities setting up Internet

sites—that these are always popping up and being closed down,

and popping up again.

Mr. MADSEN. I do not know about underground Internet sites.

They are making a major effort to keep those under control. There

are above-ground Internet sites, for example in the Shanghai Diocese, and this Beifang Jinde has a good Internet site. Catholics,

like many other groups in China, are developing and starting to get

used to using the Web. Underground sites, I do not know of. If they

do surface, the government will shut them down, I am sure. Do you

know, Sister Janet?

21

Sister JANET CARROLL. No. I would not know of any. I am not

sophisticated in that area, myself. But, as you mentioned, I know

the public ones. Two other points I would mention in terms of national networking channels. Not only does Beifang Jinde Social

Center do the social program, but they also have a national Catholic newspaper—Faith Fortnightly—which circulates about 50,000

copies biweekly. You can subscribe to it right here in the United

States, and so forth. It really is published there by the people. It

carries world Church news, local Church news, and has sections on

spirituality, devotionals, and a lot of local Church news. It goes out

all over the country.

There are also a couple of Catholic presses that transcend their

dioceses—like Guangqi Publishers in Shanghai, which serves the

whole country. Beijing has a press. I believe it is called Wisdom,

or something like that. Then Xi’an has a smaller one, and they do

a lot of publishing of books, mainly in the area of theology, scripture, spirituality, and devotional literature for the people.

Then, I do not know if this would fit in this category or not, but

there is a recent development of post-ordination courses being organized for young clergy. They even welcome foreign ‘‘professors’’ to

give short courses within those programs. Clergy from around the

country go to the National Seminary in Beijing for several months

of study, while others go to the Major Seminary at Shanghai and

also Shijiazhuang. This latter program receives professors from

Fudan University in Shanghai to help with the teaching, as well

as having visiting professors from abroad. Of course, there is also

a mix of other ‘‘education’’—history, politics, and social studies

required by the government as components of these programs.

Nonetheless, these programs are definitely helping to develop the

ministerial life of the young clergy. It is also a chance for them to

meet and form friendships and to mutually encourage and support

each other.

Finally, mentioning the Internet, I would say that we should not

just think of the old models of parish or maybe diocese. Today

young people in China, like everyone else, network through the

Internet. Everybody has an e-mail address in China and cell

phones are everywhere. Young people especially are in touch with

each other all the time. So there is a lot of networking going on

that transcends what we would think of as traditional church networks. The parish structure in China, except in the major cities

such as cathedral parishes, is not as clearly defined as we would

think of it here in the United States, but they may be organized

as dioceses, and the bishop is central to the leadership of those

groups in each province.

Mr. FOARDE. More useful information and ideas. Thank you both

for those comments. Dick, I wanted to go back to something that

you said in your opening remarks. I was very taken with your

anecdote about your briefing for the Chinese officials where you

were talking about regulation of civil society in the United States,

and being told, in effect, ‘‘No, we could never do that here.’’ I am

wondering if this sort of directed, corporatist approach that you

were talking about toward which they seem to be moving in China

is prevalent anywhere else in the world, in Europe, in Latin AmerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Nov 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96473.TXT China1 PsN: China1
22

ica, or Africa, for example, or would this be something that is

unique to China as it develops?

Mr. MADSEN. I think there are different models for how to regulate and organize civil society. There is the Anglo-America liberal

model. There is a European model which you see coming from the

German tradition, or from France. To some degree, in the early

part of the 20th century, insofar as China got ideas about organizing civil society, they came from such European sources, often

via Japan. To some degree, that more corporatist approach may fit

Chinese culture better and Japan might be a model. Japan is not

liberal and democratic in the sense that it is here, but there is a

lot of openness for civil society. In Japan, if you know how that

works, civil society groups have to be registered and organized. It

is much more controlled than it would be here.

Mr. FOARDE. So there is more structure.

Mr. MADSEN. There is much more structure to it. But there are

still quite a lot of democratic freedoms. We rightly consider Japan

a democratic society. If China keeps on evolving, it might evolve

into that general model of institution, perhaps, based on European

civil law, not on Anglo-American common law. So, that is one speculation. As it is now, the problem with China is there is not any

law. It really is just a work in progress, so it is hard to know where

it is going to end up.

In the government, there are people who want to move toward

a more real rule of law and those who do not, and they are struggling. It is hard to know what the outcome will be in the short

term. In the long term, I think, it has to develop a legitimate rule

of law or else it will come apart.

Mr. FOARDE. Interesting. Useful. I guess I would ask both of you,

we have gone around a couple of times on different aspects of it.

But I would like your views more directly on the specific question

of why the Communist Party and the government permit these

sorts of social service organizations to come up and operate, albeit

unevenly at different times in different places. What interest does

a party that really wants to control everything have in doing that?

Mr. MADSEN. The Party is not trying because it does not have

the capacity to provide social services for people throughout China

any more. The old ‘‘iron rice bowl,’’ the old state-run enterprises,

that is all gone. There is an enormous problem being created, with

laid-off workers, people lacking social services such as basic health

care. So they are under tremendous pressure to provide substitutes

for what they provided before. This is their dilemma. If they do not

provide these services, all sorts of terrible things can happen, including social unrest. But not just social unrest. Basic health care,

for instance. Even in the most dim realization of self interest, they

have to provide things like inoculations for people coming into cities like Shanghai, or else epidemics such as SARS are going to get

out of control. So they have to make these services available, even

though they do not have the capacity to do so in a structured way.

So they have to allow various kinds of groups the leeway to do this.

At the same time, they are worried about the chaos that can come

from social fragmentation, so they are between a rock and a hard

place and they are trying to find their way through. Again, it is difVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Nov 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96473.TXT China1 PsN: China1
23

ficult to know where it will end up because there are so many contingencies there, that there is no clear path to the future.

Sister JANET CARROLL. I would just reinforce that idea, the notion of China’s absolutely sheer need. Again, I do not think it is

entirely just utilitarian in that sense of the word. I think the government is genuinely concerned to try to meet the tremendous social needs. Having shredded the social safety net that existed in

the old structured socialism and the ‘‘Big Brother,’’ or the ‘‘danwei,’’ the government has left people on their own. We just saw in the

New York Times in the past couple of days several terribly moving

articles about the plight of migrant workers and the poor and

struggling people in different parts of the country. Migrant workers

are contributing so much to the economy of China, but at the same

time placing these tremendous burdens on social services. Just

when they have shredded the social safety net, these problems are

multiplying like crazy. I think I cited in the paper about the president of the World Bank. Mr. Wolfensohn has just taken China on

right at this conference that was held in May in Shanghai—on the

need to address poverty, the need to reduce poverty, and that they

are facing this income gap. That is the issue that I want to speak

to, this tremendous gap that is growing up—it would have been unheard of in the period of high Communist China when for a time

all boats were rising together even if they were rising ever so slowly. Now we have this fabulous wealth alongside of outright

degradating poverty. Mr. Wolfensohn warned the Chinese Government that this is grist for the mill of social instability. As I said

in my paper, a more serious challenge, that lay in the lap of the

government than to suggest that religious groups are going to

cause social instability.

So the Chinese people are desperately in need of the assistance,

as many governments in the world are, of all the sectors in society.

All should be able to contribute. I hope it will be able to be done

harmoniously. It is not always easily done.

I remember from my time with the United Nations, when I

worked on NGO issues, the Non-Governmental Organizations Committee, there were very few non-governmental organizations anywhere in the world, in our experience, except mostly in the West.

But GONGOs, Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organizations, were common all over the world, and I think this will be

the model in China, too. But I hope that the needs will be able to

be met before the situation deteriorates any further.

Mr. FOARDE. Thank you. Very useful. We have a few minutes

left. Dave, do you want to pick up a question?

Mr. DORMAN. Sure.

Sister Janet, I want to thank you for bringing in a variety of literature today. I picked up a Beifang Jinde brochure on the way in.

It is so beautifully designed, it just draws your eye, so I have to

admit to you that I have actually looked through it while sitting

here. I would like to ask you a few questions about Beifang Jinde

if I could. First, the brochure says ‘‘since 1998.’’ So I think, as you

have mentioned, we are really not talking about history, we are

talking about a current event. The brochure also says ‘‘the first

Catholic nonprofit, non-governmental social services organization.’’ I am just guessing that the group or person that is responsible for

24

setting up Beifang Jinde could be easily described as devout, hardworking, and very savvy. I am wondering if you could enlighten us

to the work that was done to put this organization together. I am

also guessing that because the brochure says ‘‘the first,’’ there is

also a second and third organization now? Could you also comment

on the extent to which the lessons learned from setting up Beifang

Jinde were shared with these organizations?

Sister JANET CARROLL. Yes. I think ‘‘the first’’ has to do with the

fact that they are probably the first one that registered as an NGO

and are able to function as such. Of course, this organization is like

groups such as the Amity Foundation on the Protestant side which

have been in existence for a long time.

Yes, like many things in China, a lot depends on the personalities involved. The social centers I have spoken of rely on the shoulders of gifted young priests like Father Jean-Baptiste Zhang at

Shijiazhuang and Father Steven Chen at Xi’an, who are able to do

these things. Both of them are movers and shakers. It is not easy.

They deal with a lot of difficulties along the way, but they get up

and over them. However, before these centers were actually formally registered, the programs were already quite well established.

Credibility is very important. For the center for which the newsletter is available—that one I am sure is also registered, because

they receive funding from outside and they have a lot of collaborative projects with groups like Caritas, operating out of Hong

Kong, and so on. And I believe the one at Shenyang, if it has not

already received it, it is seeking registration and recognition as official. In fact, I think it is. We were there in June, and I remember

now seeing this large bronze placard that they had ready to go up

on the wall of the building announcing this Catholic Social Service

Center, which would mean that they would have local approval. As

I said, I would not doubt that there are other places that also are

moving in this way. China is a big place.

In these three cases, I know the three priests who are involved

in the direction and they tend to be very gifted, talented young

men who, as I alluded to before, see the opportunity and say,

‘‘There is lots to be done, let us get in and do what we can do within the confines of the situation, and more will come later.’’ All three

of them happen to have had opportunities for study abroad, and I

think that helps a lot, as it does for any group, to have chances to

be exposed to wider realities. Most recently, Father Joseph Zhang

of Shenyang led a team of sisters and laity to Thailand, where they

participated in an HIV/AIDS training workshop for several weeks.

Now they are doing that sort of work in that northeast China area.

Let me tell you that that brochure is even nicer looking than this.

This is just a Xeroxed copy of a glossy folder that they have.

Mr. DORMAN. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. We are very short on time, so I think I would give

the last set of questions to Mark Milosch, if you have questions.

Mark, please.

Mr. MILOSCH. Yes, I do. Thank you. It is perhaps not such a

short question, but maybe you will be able to give it a short answer. I am wondering if there are characteristic Catholic attitudes

that affect how Chinese Catholics come together, or how they approach civil society, whether in formal associations or informally in

25

the Catholic underground? I am thinking of sociologists who have

written about Catholics as being different from non-Catholics,

about the idea that the Catholic religion creates a kind of ‘‘Catholic

personality.’’ Is that good or bad for civil society? Do Chinese

Catholics even have this ‘‘Catholic personality? ’’ Or are Chinese

Catholics very much like other Chinese people because they have

been socialized in an overwhelmingly non-Catholic society?

Mr. MADSEN. Well, basically I think they are like other Chinese

people, although, because of the rural bias of the church, they are

more like rural Chinese people than modern urban Chinese people,

although that may be changing. In general, the Catholic organization is, of course, hierarchical. The Protestants are congregational,

so it is a grassroots kind of organization. The Catholics still look

to the priest and bishop, and things coming from the top down. The

Church is organized that way. Catholics do not grow quite as fast

as the Protestants, I think, because Protestants rely upon lay people, lay preachers, and the Catholics still rely on the priest.

To some degree—and this is an impression—the Catholics in

China, somewhat the same as in other parts of the world, expect

funds to come more from the top down than raising them themselves. You have more of that horizontal organization with Protestants. A place like Shanghai has lots of services because it has that

real estate that I mentioned that has been developed, and so the

money comes from the top down. It is not people putting money in

the collection plate and organizing themselves. Those are Catholic

characteristics which I think that you still see in China, although

things are changing.

One thing that has paved the way for some of this change is the

way in which, when the church was suppressed during the Maoist

years, Catholics had to organize themselves locally without priests,

so there were lay leaders and local organization. To some degree,

that has been supplanted now during this reform period by the

more traditional forms of organization. But there is this move toward local independence. There is a little bit of protestantization,

perhaps, going on, although its intent is consistent with this other

hierarchical principle, which is also being changed as they get influence from the Second Vatican Council. So, it is a dynamic mix.

Sister JANET CARROLL. I would just add two things. One, our colleague, a good friend of both Dick and me, Dr. Jean-Paul Wiest,

has said that the expulsion of the missionaries in the 1950s was

sort of a ‘‘happy fault’’ for the Church in China, because for the

first time in its history it had to stand on its own two feet and act

autonomously within the confines of being a local church, and assume leadership. In some ways, the fact that the Vatican Council

passed China by, somehow the Holy Spirit was working there, to

let the laity get involved, which, of course, in the West we took as

a great development in the Catholic community after the Vatican

Council. So, the Holy Spirit found a way to do it in China without

having the Council’s conclusions be promulgated there.

The other point I want to make is more to the point. I think the

character of the way Catholics can function in civil society in the

Catholic Church—and it is only starting to get under way in China

because they have to know more about it—is we have, in Catholicism, a great body of social thought. I think that is a great groundVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Nov 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96473.TXT China1 PsN: China1
26

ing for the activity which can underpin our call to work for justice

and peace. That message, I think, the Catholic social teachings,

would be very welcome by the authorities in China if indeed it

could inform the way Catholics are able to engage in the civil society.

Mr. MILOSCH. Thank you.

Mr. FOARDE. We have run out of time for this morning, but it

was a fascinating conversation and discussion. We very much appreciate both of you coming from a great distance, and a shorter

but not inconsiderable distance, to Washington to share your expertise with us.

So on behalf of Chairman Jim Leach and Co-Chairman Senator

Chuck Hagel and all the Members of the Congressional-Executive

Commission on China, thanks to our two panelists, and to all who

came and attended today.

I would remind our guests about the hearing on Hong Kong next

Thursday the 23rd, and then the presentation of the Annual Report

in a press conference over in the Longworth Building on October

5.

For today, then, we will bring the gavel down on this one. Thank

you all very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m. the roundtable was concluded.]

(27)

A P P E N D I X

28

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD MADSEN

SEPTEMBER 17, 2004

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN CHINA

Although faced with severe challenges, the Catholic Church in China is flourishing. It has at least 12 million members (a four fold increase from the three million Catholics in 1949), many of whom exhibit extraordinary amounts of devotion

and commitment to their faith. There has been a steady increase in construction of

new Church facilities and a steady stream of new candidates for the priesthood and

religious life. There are active interchanges between Chinese Catholic leaders and

leaders of the worldwide Church. A significant number of newly ordained Chinese

priests, seminarians, and sisters have been able to study abroad. Chinese church

leaders regularly receive visits from priests, bishops, and even cardinals from

abroad, and Chinese churches receive economic help from sister churches around

the world. The Chinese Catholic Church is on an upward trajectory of growth in

numbers and in the size and quality of its institutions. By some measures, one could

argue that it is flourishing to a greater degree than the Church in Europe and the

United States.

At the same time, the Catholic Church in China faces severe problems. The most

troublesome is the split between ‘‘underground’’ and ‘‘official’’ factions. Catholics in

the official Church carry out their religious practices within venues officially registered with the government and subject to government regulation and supervision.

Sometimes out of principle, sometimes out of necessity (because of a lack of officially

approved Church facilities), underground Catholics practice their religion outside of

the officially approved framework. In many places, underground and official Catholics get along quite well. Under some circumstances, however, they become bitterly

at odds, with underground Catholics accusing the leaders of the official Church of

having fatally compromised their faith by collaborating with a Communist government and betraying their bonds of loyalty to the Holy See.

Apart from these serious and widely publicized problems of conflict, there are

more subtle, and perhaps in the long run more difficult to resolve problems. One

is the lack of clergy. Although there is a steady stream of new priests, it is not large

enough to meet the needs of a church that, because of inability to ordain significant

numbers of new priests during the repression of the Mao years, is top heavy with

old priests who are rapidly reaching the end of their lives. Another set of problems

stems from the difficulty of formulating versions of the faith that would appeal to

urban people. The great majority of Catholics are rural and their beliefs and practices reflect the values of a rural lifestyle. This form of faith is less comprehensible

and attractive to urban people. The Catholic seminary in Shanghai, for example, has

few students who actually come from Shanghai—most come from small villages in

the hinterlands. As China becomes increasingly urbanized, it may become harder for

the Catholic Church to grow—unless of course it adapts its theology and organization to a modernizing world, which may be difficult for a leadership already

stretched thin by the demands of ordinary pastoral care.

THE CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH AS PART OF CIVIL SOCIETY

In both its strengths and weaknesses, the Catholic Church reflects the overall development of civil society in China during the reform era (i.e., 1979 to the present).

By civil society, I simply mean the array of social groups formed by voluntary association, which is made possible by the opportunities for mobility that are the consequence of a modern market economy. The marketization of the Chinese economy

has loosened the ties of dependency that bound peasants to their people’s communes

and workers to their State owned enterprises. People now move around looking for

work. They form new groups for economic help and social support. They need such

groups because the government no longer has the will nor the way to provide social

security through its State controlled institutions. Such voluntary associations form

the beginnings of a civil society, which is an almost automatic byproduct of a market economy. But by itself such a civil society does not lead to a stable, just, and

peaceful society. Western political philosophies offer various visions for how to make

modern civil societies stable and peaceful. These involve the construction of a rule

of law that guarantees citizens the right to form free associations while regulating

these associations so that they contribute to a common good. But the Chinese govVerDate 11-MAY-2000 10:48 Nov 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 96473.TXT China1 PsN: China1
29

ernment has not yet developed a stable rule of law that would guarantee the right

of association while regulating such associations in a way that would seem legitimate to most of their members.

Under these circumstances there has been a great flourishing of new forms of

association. But many of these associations exist in a legal limbo. They can be arbitrarily closed down. Because of this lack of security, they have to adopt self-protective measures that may cause negative consequences for society at large. Sometimes

they have to conceal their activities. Sometimes they cultivate particularistic relationships (often lubricated with bribes) with powerful people who can protect them.

Sometimes they develop paranoid attitudes toward the government and one another.

Because of lack of oversight, sometimes their leaders abuse money and power. The

Catholic Church is not immune to these problems that afflict Chinese civil society

as a whole.

Much of Catholic activity exists in a legal limbo. The government specifies that

Church activities must take place under the auspices of the Catholic Patriotic Association, which is supervised by the State Agency for Religious Affairs. But only a

few Catholic apparatchiks are fully committed to this institutional framework. Most

Catholics, including most bishops and priests, who work within the officially approved framework ignore much of the spirit if not the letter of its regulations. For

example, although they are not supposed to have direct relationships with the Vatican, a large majority of bishops within the ‘‘official’’ church have received ‘‘apostolic

mandates’’ from the Holy See, that is, they have gotten Vatican approval to be

bishops. This would be possible on such a large scale only through informal acquiescence from government officials responsible for regulating and controlling religion.

On the other hand, most underground Catholics carry out their activities in a very

visible manner, in full view of government officials. This is also possible only because of informal acquiescence from agents of the state.

Since such activities are not protected as rights under the law, however, they can

be suddenly suppressed. Thus in recent years we have seen waves of arrests and

church demolitions followed by periods of relaxation—all in ways that from the

point of view of people in the grass roots must appear unpredictable and arbitrary.

This in turn fuels the anxiety and paranoia that lead to factionalism. But such factionalism affects all areas of Chinese civil society, not just the Catholic Church.

THE CHINESE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND INHIBITION OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Although the Catholic Church reflects many of the characteristics of Chinese civil

society in general, the Church has some particular features deriving from its unique

history, organization, and theology that place it partially in opposition to the development of a modern civil society.

As modern civil societies develop, they usually produce associations of national

and international scope that transcend the interests of particular localities and help

solve problems of national importance. Thus, the American Catholic Bishops conference speaks out on problems of national relevance and Catholic Charities distributes

aid to people across the world. At present it would be hard to imagine the Chinese

Catholic Church producing such organizations. Because the Vatican has not established diplomatic relations with China, it is unable to openly regulate China’s

Catholics. There is no Vatican nuncio in Beijing to help make sure that Chinese

bishops are following papal directives. Communications between the Vatican and

China’s Catholics have to be indirect and irregular. This gives local Chinese Catholics—especially perhaps those in the underground—a great deal of practical autonomy, more even than they would have in the United States or Europe. This, in turn,

leads to a great many local varieties of Catholic practice. Nowhere in the world does

the Catholic Church act as a unified force, but in China it is even less unified than

most places. This, of course, fits nicely with a government agenda to block the emergence of large scale organizations that could conceivably challenge Communist Party

hegemony.

The fragmentation of Catholic social organization affects not just the standardization of teaching about faith and morals and the mobilization of a Catholic voice on

matters of national importance, but the provision of social services. There are some

well run Catholic charitable associations in China, particularly Jinde in

Shijiazhuang (Hebei Province) and the various associations of the Shanghai diocese.

But some of these have ambitions to expand, it is unclear that they will be able to

realize these ambitions because they are deeply embedded in their local social ecology. Unless the Sino-Vatican relations were greatly improved, it would be difficult

to imagine the development of national charitable institutions like Catholic Charities in the USA—or even organizations like the Three-self Protestant Amity Foundation, which has a wide national reach.

30

Another important feature of the Chinese Catholic Church is its embedding in traditional institutions of village and family. In the nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, Catholic missionaries made great efforts to convert not individuals but

whole extended families. They attempted to build little ‘‘christendoms,’’ whole villages where social, economic, and cultural institutions were intertwined with Catholicism. This is indeed the pattern in those parts of China where Catholic practice

is strongest: whole lineages, whole villages, and even whole counties are Catholic.

The faith is thus identified with and supported by the non-voluntary, traditional

institutions of family and community. This familism and localism pull against the

mobility and voluntary association that constitute modern civil society. Catholic villages are said to be places with especially strong moral solidarity, where crime is

low and mutual cooperation is high. But, if it stays confined to family and neighbors, the spirit of love and solidarity does not really contribute to the building of

a civil society. In large cities like Shanghai, places filled with the loose, relatively

impersonal relationships that form the building blocks of civil society, the Church

seems to be losing ground. Protestant spirituality indeed seems more conducive to

such society, which may be one reason why Protestant growth is outstripping Catholic growth in China today.

In some respects, then, the Catholic Church in China does indeed contribute to

the constitution of a civil society. In some respects it mirrors both the positive and

the negative characteristics of Chinese society in this time of transition. In other

respects, however, it stands apart from and even resists the formation of a mature

civil society—and is challenged to reform its theology and practice so as to adapt

to a modernizing China.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JANET CARROLL, M.M.

SEPTEMBER 17. 2004

Senator Chuck Hagel, at a session of this Committee last June, astutely noted

that ‘‘China’s future is also important to America’s future. It is in our interest to

work broadly and deeply with the Chinese Government using all the bridges and

opportunities available to us to help shape and ensure a democratic future for

China.’’ [CECC Hearing—June, 4, 2004]

I would like to key my remarks here this morning to this challenge set before us

by Senator Hagel—with the important caveat that I believe we must also work

‘‘broadly and deeply’’ with the Chinese people toward these noble ideals. The efforts

in the field of social services and charitable works of compassion and mercy that

have been very courageously and patiently initiated by religious believers [including

Catholics and Christians of all persuasions in China today]—in the past decade and

more, call upon us all to cross many bridges and reach out in solidarity and support.

I have made available to this Committee through the Staff, a packet of materials

for anyone here who wishes to have evidence of this development [albeit only a

small sample] of Social Services programs and projects which are slowly, but steadily contributing to the emergence in China of a Civil Society—embryonic as it may

appear at present.

THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT FOR CATHOLICS IN CHINA: SERVING THE PEOPLE

In the past decade or so, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the

demise of Communism as a credible ideology worldwide, the Openness and Reform

Policy pursued by China, has led to spectacular economic growth and development.

Some observers [including David Aikman in his new book Jesus in Beijing; and the

eminent China historian Daniel Bays, at the Bartlett Lecture given at Yale University last spring]—think that Christianity in China, at least Protestant Christianity,

may well be on the verge of entering its ‘‘golden age.’’ For the first time in their

history, Chinese Christians had to find their own self-sufficiency, employ their own

initiatives, and choose their own leadership.

However you choose to construe developments in the past quarter century in

China, from the perspective of the Churches—[1979–2004]—signs of renewed opportunities for service to society and the propagation of Christianity are certainly abundant today. However, a maxim you should always bear in mind when thinking about

China goes something like this:

‘‘Everything you hear about China is true . . . at some time and in some place;

but NOT true in another time or another place.’’

To fully understand the status of the Catholic Church in China within the State

apparatus, to say nothing of the vicissitudes of the way religious policies are implemented by the Beijing Regime [which has recently reverted to stricter enforcement

31

of rules and regulations for religious organizations]- is well beyond the limitations

of our time here this morning. In the Q&A period I will be glad to respond to specific questions you may have about these and other issues.

By way of addressing the subject of this Roundtable today, I would like to offer

some contextual perspectives on the engagement of Chinese Catholics and Churchsponsored social ministries in recent years. In nearly three astonishing decades

since the opening of the Churches, Christian believers in China have struggled to

re-invigorate and extend local communities of Faith, to restore and re-build not only

churches, but seminaries and convents, to train new generations of leadership, and

subsequently to establish centers for social and medical ministries to the society;— all with only the barest of resources—but with vast stores of enduring courage and

commitment. As it continues this journey—even greater challenges are before the

Church to take its witness out beyond the sanctuary and into the public square.

Chinese Christians are challenged to take up the immense task of giving prophetic

witness and service to the rapidly developing and radically changing Society that

is China today—an economic and political power already playing a major role in the

world community.

As cultural and social traditions evolve, Christianity is poised to provide new ethical and moral foundations for the emergence of a modern Civil Society and State.

While there is cause for caution and concern among friends of the Chinese people

and the Church in China, at the same time, there is are unparalleled opportunities

for Christianity, to once again offer valuable contributions to the Chinese people, by

sponsoring medical and social projects and educational programs (if not yet formal

academic institutions)—not on the scale that existed during the modern missionary

period [1850—1950];—but commensurate with the material resources and human

capabilities of the Chinese Local Church.

When Daniel Bays spoke at Yale last spring he addressed prospects for Chinese

Christians, albeit constrained by limited human rights and religious freedoms, to

make significant contributions to the up-building of Civil Society in China. In another lecture entitled ‘‘China in Transition,’’ by Roderick MacFarquhar [Professor of

History and Political Science at Harvard and one of the world’s most respected

China scholars] this topic of civil society was also addressed, thought interestingly,

he never mentioned Religion as such. In an otherwise very insightful and creative

analysis of ‘‘whither China’? at this juncture in its quest for modernity,

MacFarquhar presented a scenario of the crisis China faces in the near term—as it struggles to transition to what he called ‘‘a new transnational Chinese civilization’’. His remarks pointed to important issues to bear in mind in considering the

prospects for Chinese Christians, and indeed all religious believers in China today,

to contribute to the emergence of a viable Civil Society.

While MacFarquhar seemed somewhat pessimistic about developments in China

in the near term, Dan Bays projected a rather positive view of the potential for Chinese Christians, in particular the new and more educated entrepreneurs in urban

settings—[whom Bays identified as ‘‘ a significant sub-set of the emergent middle

class’’]—to play a catalyzing role in this crucial transition. Looking from the perspective of Catholics in China today, and reflecting on Catholicism’s call to ‘‘prophetic servanthood’’ on behalf of the common good and well-being of the peoples,

there are several possibilities that present themselves which just might reconcile

these contrasting views.

A contemporary Jesuit China scholar, [Benoit Vermander SJ—Director of the

Ricci Institute in Taipei, Taiwan]—has elucidated the challenge and opportunity for

Christianity in China today—as presenting Christianity as a living interlocutor with

Chinese culture—a force capable of contributing to the redefinition of Chinese Culture, that both the leadership and the people require in order to re-interpret their

history—and ultimately rid themselves of the disappointments and disillusionments

of their past attempts to make the transition to become a modern Nation State. [The

MacFarquhar Lecture also dealt with this issue of a revised understanding of their

history by the Chinese themselves]. Only then will they be enabled to assume roles

of influence and authority appropriate to a people with a civilization and culture—

rich with gifts and insights essential for the achievement of prosperity, justice and

peace for themselves and the global community.

New China—the Peoples Republic of China—already in the latter half of its first

century of existence—urgently needs a creative re-invention of its traditional value

system and moral categories; and to employ new interpretive models by which to

make sense of the past, find common ground in the present and develop a sense

of shared purpose and meaning for the future. On a mutually acceptable basis of

equality, reciprocity and respect, Christianity can offer much to China in its quest

for a ‘‘new spiritual civilization’’—[a term now even used by the Chinese regime to

galvanize the masses under the rubric of the United Front.]

32

This new spiritual civilization is perhaps another way of describing the new

transnational civilization,’’ which MacFarquhar noted was MAO TzeTung’s visionary

ideal from the early years of the Communist revolution which the Chinese people

tragically failed to realize due to Mao’s turn to brutal dictatorship.

After some 20 years of the Reform and Openness policies—initiated by DENG following Mao’s death in 1976—China still stands in need of a second generation of

transformation—ideally, one that will be consistent with its culture, virtues and values. Among these harmony and right relationships are central to the Chinese psyche and must bear great weight in structuring a Civil Society in China.

Regrettably, many Chinese Christians, both Protestant and Catholic, as well as

other religious and quasi-religious movements (like Falun Gong), are often sadly

been in conflict with the political authorities—who like the emperors of the Dynastic era—continue to have an almost ‘‘sacral sense’’ of themselves as the final arbiters

of China’s political and legal culture. While our Christian creeds and confession

stress harmony and peace, sometimes our actions tend too much toward dissidence

and confrontation—even if justified in principle and validly grounded in human and

natural rights. While bearing in mind the Gospel admonition to ‘‘render to Caesar

the things that are Caesar’s; and to God the things that are God’s’’—in China we

also need to respect relationships and observe Rites—that is the manner and the

way things are done; these dynamics and principles count every bit as much as the

‘‘Rights,’’ to which we in the West hold so tenaciously. It takes great patience and

perseverance to remain in dialog—while ‘‘seeking the common ground’’ [to quote the

well respected Protestant sinologist Phillip Wickeri in his book by that title.]

A NEW DIALOGUE BETWEEN RELIGION AND SOCIETY

Those seeking to partner with China in pursuit of social goals, must be willing

to listen and discern with sensitivity and respect; be able to tolerate frustrations

and the ambiguities of living with constraints and limitations; and be people with

a capacity to risk difficulties and misunderstandings. Only in this manner, can we

seize and exploit the many opportunities that actually exist for religious believers

to give witness to their beliefs and share their ‘‘good news’’ with the Chinese people,

in a manner wholly appropriate and relevant to the culture and social ethos of the

times.

This next point may seem a digression, but I believe it is very relevant to the subject of this discussion this morning. There are two important issues to bear in mind

in this dialog—both of words and actions: one is the need mutual respect between

sovereign states; and the other is the moral weight attached to leading by example.

I find it lamentable that (under the present administration, the United States, increasingly tends to be very selective in choosing when to be domestically bound by

international law in general, and human rights in particular. In Chinese terms this

is known as ‘‘resisting intrusion into internal affairs.’’ Ironically, recent actions of

the US Government in this regard have undercut the credibility of this country as

the champion of internationally recognized human rights and freedoms.

I refer specifically to the failure of the USA to become signatory to several of the

International Covenants and treaties on human rights and freedoms, and more regrettably to withdraw from those previously ascribed to. This seriously undermines

confidence other weaker States may accord to the Rule of Law; and signals to the

world that powerful leaders can withdraw from such obligations—as different leaders come and go.

This is a penchant that Communist Party leaders in China have been disposed

for years—arbitrarily opting for rule by man, as opposed to the ideal of Rule by

Law. It is ironic that the USA is now perceived as taking such a reprehensible

stance in international affairs. The world stands sorely in need of moral leadership

based on example, not on force. We cannot call others to adhere to international

laws and covenants which we ourselves selectively disregard.

THE NEED FOR A NEW SOCIAL ETHIC

Today, the literally tens of millions of religious believers in China—including a

growing number of young scholars, who have taken a keen interest in Christianity

as a life philosophy and as an ethical and moral code, may succeed in re-imagining

and re-creating a new Civil Society in China that can appropriately take up its

rightful role in the global family of nations. These challenges toward which Christians in China need to direct their energies and resources, also suggest to those of

us who are concerned about China’s future and our own future in the global community, possibilities of reaching out in solidarity, supporting all those in China who

are struggling to rise to the occasion and seize the opportunity to minister to the

social well-being of their own people—especially the poor and marginalized.

33

We all need to get beyond the headlines and sound bytes of the media and the

overly simplistic approaches of some agencies in the USA—with their own agendas

for China. The lived reality for Chinese people today is a far cry from what is reported or extrapolated from given events or incidents in the Media. There are numerous ways to partner with Christians in China. There are actually many areas

of service open to expatriates—both in the fields of education and social and medical

work Both human and financial resources are in demand for supportive services in

Church sponsored social and medical ministries,—as well as directly with such programs in the public domain. HIV/AIDs is a rampant and growing problem in

China—one vastly under acknowledged by the authorities. Slowly government

health ministries are starting to welcome training and assistance to prepare and

equip themselves to deal with this pending tragedy of already crisis proportions.

RESPONSES FROM THE CHURCH

Regarding the government’s response to initiatives from the Catholic Church in

the field of Social Service, I have included in the packet of materials submitted, a

brief memo—addressing some of the concerns which may be on the minds of the

committee members. [cf. Memo of the Director, Xian CSSC]. In sum, it notes that

as long as local governmental policies, procedures, and requirements are carefully

complied with, activities and programs of civil service and for the social welfare of

the people are welcomed and appreciated by the Chinese authorities.

In so far as there is coordination and/or cooperation with international contacts

in these fields, there is usually closer supervision—especially regarding the role of

foreign nationals in the projects and regarding use of funds received. Not surprisingly—when there are amenable relations between the authorities on both sides

(Church and government) trust is established and things work smoothly.

TWO AREAS AFFECTING THE INTEGRITY OF THE CHURCH-SPONSORED PROGRAMS:

1. Services provided must be offered on objective and unbiased terms: [i.e. not as

a cover for evangelization or other subjective interests] and be without inappropriate

requirements or expectations of any reciprocity to the advantage of the service provider.

2. Social Service projects, especially medical services (hospitals and clinics) must

comply with standards established by local health authorities: e.g. qualifications of

professional staff, use of appropriate procedures and medicines, and adherence to

acceptable standards of care, and so forth. Increasingly, especially in rural areas,

some small church-run clinics have been closed due to failure to meet these standards.

[Interview with Dr. WU Gui Xian, Hebei/XianXian Catholic Diocese MBA Cand.

In Hospital Administration at Pace Univ./NYC]

Developments in the Not-for-Profit and Non-Governmental Social Services Sector

in China—as an integral part of the emergence of a Civil Society—have come a long

way in barely a quarter of a century. This view is further validated if we acknowledge the absence of any semblance of a Civic Society in either the Dynastic or the

Republican Eras, nor after the establishment of the Peoples’ Republic in 1949.

Therefore, little if any foundation exists upon which a Civic Society in China might

be built—neither in China’s past politico-social structures nor in the socio-cultural

traditions of the Chinese people. Rather than decrying what is not yet, we might

more generously assess all that has been accomplished by our Chinese brothers and

sisters in initiating relevant works of social and civil service in their communities.

CHALLENGES IN THE NEAR TERM

China’s income disparity is worse than that of other Asian countries like South

Korea, Japan and India—this despite the fact that under Mao (between 1950 and

1980) China had achieved one of the most even distributions of wealth—with all

boats rising together. For several years running, China has maintain economic

growth at about 9 percent per annum. This has brought a level of wealth to urbanites and younger elites never dreamed of before, reflected in their choice housing,

style of clothing, and tastes in food; as well as in less material ways such as education, entertainment and travel.

The dark side of China’s new wealth really is a widening disparity between rich

and poor continuing unabated. Luxury gated communities are surrounded by poorer

shanty towns filled with illegal migrant workers and displaced citizens scraping by

on US$50 per month. Millions of Chinese are left unemployed from their abandoned

unprofitable state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Rural poor continue to struggle to provide for their families with little more than a sixth grade education. Prostitution in

cities has become one of the few ways that women with little or no education can

eke out a living.

34

By contrast, some 70 percent of China’s peoples still live in rural villages, where

they are less touched by modern life and increasingly dependent on wealth trickling

down from the cities. The average income inland is said to be only a third of that

on the coast. This year the threat of 4–5 percent inflation has prompted authorities

to try to damp down the economy, but only enough not to bring on a crash.

So eminent an expert in such matters as the President of the World Bank—at a

Conference on Poverty Reduction last in May in Shanghai, warned China that the

growing gap between the wealthy and progressive coastal provinces and the still

generally poor interior is grist for widespread social instability—and threatens the

undoing of all the social and material progress of this past decade. It would be hard

to find a more dire and ominous threat to lay in the lap of China’s leadership!

There is a great irony in the fact that in the international market place, many

concerns are expressed about China’s overheated economy. Frequently, many US

corporations and workers, especially those in unions, express fears and frustration

with the impact of China’s economic growth, not only on the global economy, but

on the US domestic economy. We ought not to miss the point however, that the fate

of hundreds of millions of ordinary working poor in China is also at issue. As cited

in an article in the NY Times many credit China’s vast numbers of migrant workers

with that country’s astonishing and prolonged economic growth. As they increasingly flood into urban regions, migrant workers add value to the economy. [NYT

9–12–04 Week in Review Pg. 5]. That is the good news. At the same time, these

millions of migrant workers also add a tremendous burden of demands for social

services upon the governmental sector—just when such social safety nets as had

existed during the era of the centrally managed economy have been shredded to

pieces.

The difficulty facing China’s leaders is to provide these millions of migrant workers,

and by extension their desperately poor families and dependents, with affordable

housing, access to schooling, health care, legal protections and so forth. Obviously,

social service agencies and organizations have a major and crucial role to play in

helping to construct the social safety net required to meet these demands. As in

other developing countries—and even in our own country—government turns to the

voluntary and religious sector for assistance. Not unexpectedly, as is our common

experience, governmental vis-a-vis non-governmental sector relationships are never

as smooth and unambiguous as the situation would seem to warrant.

In sum, China is undergoing unparalleled economic growth bringing with it consequences that could lead to depression and disaster. The values of a structured socialism have receded and the differences between rich and poor, whether one speaks

of individuals or of sectors of society, have surged. Westerners generally are concerned with individuals’ rights, whereas traditionally, these have been limited in

China, where the perceived welfare of the group—family, village, or society in general—has always had priority. Today, however, many observers generally agree that

people in general, and the single individual, have never had more freedom in China.

A person can be an atheist or a believer. The thing he/she must not do is to participate individually or within a group in activities that may in any way be seen as

a threat to the power of the state.

ROLE OF NON-PROFIT (NPO) AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL (NGO) ORGANIZATIONS

Long gone is the ‘‘Iron Rice Bowl’’ era (circa 1950–80), when ‘‘Big Brother’’ took

care of social welfare needs. China today is tending toward what some term a ‘‘small

government, big community’’ system. Traditionally, Chinese normally cared for their

family members and those within their ‘‘connections network’’ (guanxi) One rarely

helped an acquaintance, let alone a total stranger. Charity and volunteerism were

unknown concepts up until the past decade.

The NPO/NGO sector, including equivalent social and civil programs of the

churches are increasingly necessary to bridging the socio-economic gaps between

haves and have-nots. China rapidly adopted the Western capitalist model without

acknowledging the important underpinnings of capitalist society: those Judeo-Christian principles which provided a moral compass and safety net for the weak and disadvantaged. China’s materialism—and we should be quick to acknowledge, western

and American capitalist and materialist development, is increasingly based on a desire for profit in a moral vacuum, where anything goes. By contrast, corporate social

responsibility (CSR) should rather play a key role in helping domestic and multinational for-profit businesses invest in China’s social capital—and not just crassly

exploit its vast means of production. In this context, China desperately needs to continue to develop its non-profit sector and find ways to encourage citizens to broaden

the horizons of their civic responsibilities.

35

For Christian and other religious believers in China today, the current Chinese

milieu may prove to be an opportune time to offer a re-evaluation of Chinese society

and to work toward the articulation of a new social ethic and a new morality. While

the Constitution of the PRC is a finely worded document espousing many virtuous

ideals, and while the Party continually devises idealistic slogans to galvanize the

masses for the common good, China’s movement toward a ‘‘rule of law’’ and a return

to a more equitable distribution of material wealth system has a long way to go.

Religiously motivated organizations can make an important contribution.

China’s government however, remains particularly sensitive to uncontrolled religious movements, although not without reason. In the nation’s history politico-religious movements have more than once brought down a dynasty. Interestingly,

many, if not most, Chinese Christians have no quarrel with the idea of government

supervision of religion. What they object to is the abuse of this right of oversight.

Nonetheless, while repression or harsh mistreatment of unregistered religious group

leaders (Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Falun Gong) continues to take place, longtime observers find the situation improving. No longer ideologically anti-religious,

many Chinese authorities increasingly see the social benefits of religion. But due

to historical experiences, they are also sensitive, perhaps overly so, to the dangers

real, imagined or imputed of unregulated (even simply unregistered) religious movements.

CONCLUSION

I’d like to conclude my statement with an challenging reflection by Aldo Caliari,

Coordinator of the Rethinking Bretton Woods Project at the Center of Concern here

in Washington DC:

‘‘The human rights system envisioned in the mid twentieth century placed on

nation-states the ultimate responsibility for the human rights of individuals in

their jurisdiction. The system rested on the assumption that states have the

power, resources and policy space to fulfill such a mission. Nowadays, while it

is true that nation-states continue to bear this responsibility, it is important to

recognize the changes in the global political economy that have taken place in

the years since. These changes have significantly undermined the ability of nation-states, especially those within the developing world, to fulfill their human

rights responsibilities.’’

We ought not to ignore these realities, as we look to China to develop a viable

Civil Society in which the private, volunteer sector, including those of religious motivation, will thrive. Difficult as it is for us as Americans, we need large doses of humility and respect to abide within the legal framework prescribed for the work of

Christian ministry and witness in China today—all the while working and praying

with the Christians in China for a more favorable time. Those of good will and courageous and creative imagination will already find multiple opportunities to serve.

Together all of us can be empowered to work for global justice in economic and social relations; for integrity and harmony with all facets of Creation; and toward a

world of Peace and prosperity for God’s people everywhere.

To return to Senator Hagel’s admonition, cited at the opening of my statement,

‘‘It is in our interest to work broadly and deeply with the Chinese Government (and

the Chinese people) using all bridges and opportunities available to us . . .’’ I urge

this committee to call upon our government to ensure that its actions, both bi-laterally and through its behavior in international finance and trade institutions,

respect and support the ability of China, and many other developing countries, to

fulfill their commitments under international human rights law.

Again, in Caliari words:

‘‘A significant forward move would be for the US to incorporate as a key dimension of its foreign policy the notion that international organizations and

industrial countries are co-responsible for human rights violations in developing

countries on whose domestic policy choices they have had (either by action or

omission) an influence.’’

David Lampton, President of the US-China Committee sums up my own counsel

best:

‘‘Americans must balance the impulse to treat China as it is—with the foresight to recognize China for what it may become.’’

National Interest [Fall 2003]

Æ