J-S41029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM DARWIN THOMPSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 111 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 21, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-07-CR-0001230-2003

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 13, 2024

Appellant, William Darwin Thompson, appeals from the order entered 

on December 21, 2022, dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. “[F]ollowing a jury trial [on May 4, 2007, the jury] convicted 

Appellant of two counts of second[-]degree (felony) murder [and one count 

each of] robbery, aggravated assault, theft by unlawful taking and receiving 

stolen property for his involvement in the robbery and brutal murder of 

Raymond and Marjorie Bracken in their home on March 19, 2002.” 

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 23 A.3d 586, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(unpublished memorandum). On June 26, 2007, the trial court imposed two 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the two counts of second-degree 

murder with an additional consecutive term of 20 to 40 years of incarceration 

for robbery. We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence in an unpublished 

memorandum on December 17, 2010. Id. On September 14, 2011, our 

Supreme Court denied further review. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 

29 A.3d 797 (Pa. 2011). On October 18, 2011, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA 

petition. On October 31, 2011, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent 

Appellant. Following the appointment of new counsel and the filing of various 

amended PCRA petitions, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on May 

29, 2018. In an opinion and order entered on December 21, 2022, the PCRA 

court denied relief and this timely appeal resulted.1 

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues2for our review:

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1

 Hiram A. Carpenter, III, the PCRA court judge who authored the opinion 

and order denying relief on Appellant’s claims for collateral relief, has now 

retired. On January 18, 2023, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. 

Thereafter, we received a letter from the Blair County Court of Common Pleas 

President Judge Elizabeth A. Doyle notifying this Court that the case was now 

reassigned to her and she intended to rely on Judge Carpenter’s December 

21, 2022 opinion instead of filing an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). 

As such, the PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

2

 We note that Appellant originally presented two additional issues to the 

PCRA court that were later withdrawn. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/21/2022, 

at 4 and 16. Thus, we conclude that Appellant abandoned his ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims pertaining to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 and chain of 

custody and find them waived. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 

915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted) (“[W]here an appellate brief fails to 

provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to 

develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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A. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object [or] 

otherwise challenge the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the 

plea offer made to witness Stephen Espenlaub?

B. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

challenge the credibility of witness Nicole Allhouse?

C. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

challenge the autopsy report?

D. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to be capital 

qualified at the time of trial?

E. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

challenge scientific evidence offered against [Appellant]?

F. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

challenge [or] object to the admission of unreliable DNA 

evidence?

G. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to tell 

[Appellant] he could be convicted as an accomplice?

H. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

cross[-]examine Commonwealth witnesses [to elicit] the 

Commonwealth’s efforts to coerce them into testifying falsely, 

and failing to preserve it for appellate review?

I. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 

admission of evidence of a bloody shoeprint, and failing to 

preserve the issue for appellate review?

J. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

cross[-]examine an expert regarding tool marks?

K. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call [Billie Jo 

Tashe] as a witness[?]

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is waived.”); see also Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 912 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (an issue identified on appeal but not developed in the 

appellant's brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived).
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Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

We adhere to the following legal precepts:

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited 

to examining whether the evidence of record supports the court's 

determination and whether its decision is free of legal error. This 

Court grants great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA 

court if the record contains any support for those findings. We 

review the court's legal conclusions de novo.

* * *

Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of 

the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the 

following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 

action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of 

counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Washington, 269 A.3d 1255, 1262–1263, appeal 

denied, 283 A.3d 1249 (Pa. 2022) (internal citations, quotations and brackets 

omitted).

Based upon review of the certified record, the parties' appellate briefs, 

the PCRA court's opinion,3 and applicable law, we find that the PCRA court 

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3

 Here, the PCRA court determined that trial counsel was effective. Regarding 

Appellant’s claims pertaining to trial witnesses, the PCRA court first 

determined that Stephen Espenlaub testified at trial that “his plea deal [on 

unrelated charges] was sweeter than it actually was [and, therefore,] counsel 

could not possibly help his credibility with the jury” and Espenlaub’s testimony 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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thoroughly and accurately addressed the merits of Appellant’s issues in its 

opinion. Consequently, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court opinion and 

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actually “provided more reason [for him] to lie[.]” PCRA Court Opinion, 

12/21/2022, at 6. Regarding trial witness, Nicole Allhouse, the PCRA court 

first noted that she “was an important witness at trial and that her credibility 

was very much at issue” but determined that trial counsel thoroughly 

cross-examined her and, “unequivocally” concluded that “no one hearing her 

testimony [] could fail to conclude that [Allhouse] had repeatedly been an 

unabashed liar [] on numerous occasions leading up to trial.” Id. at 10 

(emphasis omitted). Regarding Billie Jo Tashe, the PCRA court noted that 

she was Appellant’s “girlfriend at the time of these homicides” but “clearly 

made herself unavailable; was clearly unwilling to cooperate as demonstrated 

by her disappearance; and offered the defense no testimony which would have 

been particularly helpful at trial.” Id. at 22. Moreover, the PCRA court was 

unable to find anything “in the record where there [wa]s any showing or even 

suggestion that the Commonwealth attempted to coerce any witness [or] that 

suggested anyone testified falsely.” Id. at 19. The PCRA court also 

determined that Appellant failed to plead and prove that trial counsel was not 

capital qualified at the time of trial and, instead, only offered evidence that 

trial counsel “was not qualified (for a period of time) in 2012” or “six or seven 

years after this trial.” Id. at 11-12 (emphasis in original). The PCRA court 

further found that there was no merit to claims that trial counsel failed to 

properly challenge the admission of evidence, including the autopsy report, 

DNA and other scientific evidence, and expert testimony regarding a bloody 

footprint and tool marks. The PCRA court recognized that challenging the 

autopsy report was meritless because “the cause of death for both [] victims 

was abundantly clear from the photos of the scene – namely their throats 

were cut and [one victim] was also stabbed numerous times.” Id. at 11. 

Moreover, the PCRA court noted that the DNA and scientific evidence entered 

into evidence at trial “was inconclusive and was the best evidence available to 

the defense to support a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 13. Further, the PCRA 

court recognized that “no matter the strength (or weakness) of the DNA 

evidence, it was going to be admissible in this (or any) trial.” Id. at 16. 

Finally, because Appellant always “denied any involvement” in the crimes and 

both the trial court and this Court on direct appeal concluded that a jury 

instruction regarding accomplice liability was appropriate and necessary in this 

case, the PCRA court determined that Appellant did not show how he was 

prejudiced or “how the case could have been tried differently.” Id. at 18. 
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adopt it as our own. The parties are instructed to attach a copy of the PCRA

court's December 21, 2022 opinion to all future filings regarding this appeal.

Order affirmed.

FILED: 2/13/2024