UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-2184

GEORGIA FRANKTON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. 

(1:08-cv-02209-JFM)

Argued: January 26, 2011 Decided: May 23, 2011

Before WILKINSON and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and Irene C. 

BERGER, United States District Judge for the Southern District 

of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Jason Ehrenberg, BAILEY & EHRENBERG, PLLC, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellant. Clifford Russell Scott, METROPOLITAN LIFE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, New York, New York, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Adam H. Garner, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Georgia Frankton, a former employee of Constellation Energy 

Group, Inc. (Constellation), brought this action against 

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), the administrator 

of Constellation’s long-term disability plan. Frankton alleges 

that Metropolitan violated the Employee Retirement Income 

Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., by 

terminating Frankton’s long-term disability benefits. The 

district court awarded summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan 

and, upon our review, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

I.

In 1976, Frankton began her employment with Baltimore Gas & 

Electric Company, now a subsidiary of Constellation. As a 

“financial reconciler” for Constellation, Frankton participated 

in the Constellation Energy Group Long Term Disability Plan (the 

Plan), which is an employee benefits plan governed by ERISA. 

MetLife, the Plan’s claim administrator, has discretion and 

authority to make benefits determinations under the Plan. 

In November 2002, after Frankton stopped working for 

Constellation due to multiple medical diagnoses, she timely 
3

filed an application for long-term disability benefits.1

MetLife initially denied Frankton’s disability benefits 

claim. After Frankton timely appealed the decision, MetLife 

approved her claim retroactive to June 1, 2003. 

To 

support her benefits claim, Frankton included a “personal 

profile,” in which she described having to lie down “a good part 

of [the] day” to take pressure off her spine. Her “personal 

profile” also stated that she only drives when necessary and 

performs light housework in short increments. 

On December 1, 2004, as part of MetLife’s ongoing 

obligation to review claims under the Plan, MetLife requested 

additional documentation from Frankton to evaluate whether she 

continued to qualify as “disabled” under the Plan. MetLife 

explained in a letter to Frankton that the Plan’s definition for 

“disabled” changes after a participant receives benefits for 

twenty-four months.2

 1 At the time Frankton applied for disability benefits, she 

had been diagnosed with thoracic outlet syndrome, disk 

instability, cervical radiculopathy, cervical and lumbar facet 

syndrome, hyperthyroidism, coccydynia, and “TMJ.” 

 As relevant to this appeal, after twenty2 The relevant language of the Plan states: 

‘Disability’ or ‘Disabled’ means that, due to an 

Injury or Sickness, you require the regular care 

and attendance of a Doctor and: 

1. you are unable to perform each of the 

material duties of your job, as set forth in the 

(Continued)
4

four months, the determination whether a claimant is “disabled”

shifts from an evaluation of the claimant’s ability to perform 

her “regular job,” to an evaluation of the claimant’s ability to 

perform “any occupation.” 

In response to MetLife’s request for additional 

information, Frankton sent several documents to MetLife, 

including medical records from Frankton’s treating physician, 

Dr. Nelson Hendler. According to a letter written by Dr. 

Hendler, Frankton was “temporarily totally disabled.” 

MetLife reviewed the claim file, including the documents 

submitted by Dr. Hendler. Based on conflicting medical reports 

in the file, MetLife concluded that Frankton should undergo an 

independent medical examination. 

On March 14, 2005, Dr. John Parkerson conducted an

independent medical examination of Frankton. Based on this

examination and on Dr. Parkerson’s review of Frankton’s claim 

 

Employee’s job description that is maintained by 

the Employer; and 

2. after the first 24 months of Monthly Benefit 

payments, you must also be unable to perform each 

of the material duties of any occupation for 

which you are reasonably or may reasonably become 

qualified taking into consideration your prior 

training or training available through a 

rehabilitation program offered to you and 

approved by us, your education, your experience 

and your past earnings. (MET 1037-38). 
5

file, Dr. Parkerson created a report for MetLife. MetLife sent 

a copy of the report to Dr. Hendler and asked that he indicate 

any disagreement with Dr. Parkerson’s findings and provide 

MetLife with objective evidence supporting such disagreement. 

Dr. Parkerson’s report included a description of Frankton’s 

medical history and symptoms, and a list of the various medical 

records that Dr. Parkerson reviewed before examining Frankton. 

The report indicated that three of Frankton’s treating 

physicians had opined that her symptoms had a significant

psychiatric component. The report listed Dr. Parkerson’s 

diagnoses of Frankton, including “[s]tatus post instrumented 

cervical fusion C4-6,” possible vascular thoracic outlet 

syndrome, lumbar degenerative disc disease, and “depressive 

disorder vs. somatoform disorder.” 

Despite these various diagnoses, Dr. Parkerson’s report 

stated that Frankton “could return to work at her regular job 

without any specific restrictions,” and that “[t]he restrictions 

provided by the attending physician are not fully supported by 

the physical examination.” The report stated that Frankton was 

not “temporarily totally disabled on a physical basis,” and that

her limitations “either have a primary psychiatric basis . . .

or possibly a consciously self-limiting condition.” The report

stated that her “objective examination” was “not consistent with 

her reported functional status.” 
6

MetLife also hired a private investigator, who conducted 

video surveillance of Frankton both on the day of her 

examination and on the two days following that examination. The

investigator observed Frankton walking with an “obvious limp” 

while entering the office for her medical examination, but later 

walking with a normal gait without any apparent discomfort. The 

investigator observed Frankton bending at the waist several 

times, loading groceries into her vehicle, pushing a grocery 

cart, carrying clothing to a dry cleaner, retrieving packages 

from her vehicle, and entering and exiting her vehicle without 

any assistance. 

A few weeks after Dr. Parkerson’s examination, Frankton 

informed MetLife that she had been awarded Social Security 

disability insurance benefits by the Social Security 

Administration (Agency). MetLife instructed Frankton to send 

MetLife a copy of the award letter. 

MetLife never received a copy of the letter. After 

reviewing Frankton’s claim file, MetLife determined that 

Frankton was no longer “disabled” within the meaning of the 

Plan. Accordingly, MetLife terminated Frankton’s long-term 

disability benefits. 

MetLife sent a letter to Frankton that explained the basis 

for MetLife’s decision terminating her benefits. The letter 

listed the various documents that MetLife reviewed before 
7

terminating Frankton’s benefits, including the medical documents 

submitted by Dr. Hendler and a statement and personal health 

profile completed by Frankton. The letter explained that 

MetLife had concluded that the independent medical examination 

was inconsistent with Frankton’s self-described physical 

limitations. The letter also indicated that Dr. Hendler had not 

responded to Dr. Parkerson’s report. 

Frankton appealed the decision terminating her benefits 

under the Plan’s provisions. After Frankton submitted her 

appeal, Dr. Hendler sent MetLife a letter dated May 4, 2005. In 

the letter, Dr. Hendler indicated that he agreed with Dr. 

Parkerson’s diagnoses, but that he disagreed with Dr. 

Parkerson’s conclusion that Frankton’s diagnoses did not 

preclude her from returning to work. 

In October 2005, MetLife submitted Frankton’s claim file, 

including her medical records and the May 2005 submission from 

Dr. Hendler, to Dr. Dennis Gordan, an independent physician 

consultant. After submitting the claim file to Dr. Gordan, 

MetLife received additional documents from Dr. Hendler. MetLife 

determined that these documents were largely duplicative of 

other documents in Frankton’s claim file and, for that reason, 

did not send them to Dr. Gordan. Based on a review of the 

documents that MetLife submitted in the claim file, Dr. Gordan 

concluded that many of Frankton’s complaints lacked any 
8

psychological basis, and that the medical documentation was

insufficient to support Frankton’s claim that that she was

unable to function in a sedentary job. 

In November 2005, MetLife upheld its decision terminating

Frankton’s benefits. In a letter to Frankton, MetLife explained 

that Frankton’s claim file lacked sufficient medical 

documentation to support an impairment that would have prevented 

Frankton from working in her most recent position, or at a

position that required “sedentary type work.” 

In her complaint filed in the district court, Frankton 

alleged that MetLife failed to consider relevant medical 

information when reviewing Frankton’s claim for benefits. After 

the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the 

district court awarded summary judgment in favor of MetLife. 

The district court held that MetLife used a “full and fair 

reasoning process” in reviewing Frankton’s claim by collecting

medical reports from Frankton’s numerous health care providers, 

by seeking independent evaluations of Frankton’s medical records 

and physical condition, by considering non-medical evidence, and 

by considering documents prepared by Frankton describing her 

symptoms. The district court also held that MetLife’s decision 

was supported by substantial evidence, including the reports of 

an independent medical examiner, an independent physician 
9

consultant, and a private investigator. Frankton timely 

appealed to this Court. 

II.

In an appeal under ERISA, we review a district court's 

decision de novo, employing the same standards governing the 

district court's review of the plan administrator's decision. 

Williams v. Metro. Life Ins., Co., 609 F.3d 622, 629 (4th Cir. 

2010). When, as here, an ERISA benefit plan vests with the plan 

administrator the discretionary authority to make eligibility 

determinations for beneficiaries, a reviewing court evaluates 

the plan administrator's decision for abuse of discretion. Id.

at 629-30.

Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we will not disturb 

a plan administrator's decision if the decision is reasonable, 

even if we would have come to a contrary conclusion 

independently. Id. at 630. Thus, we may not substitute our own 

judgment in place of the judgment of the plan administrator. 

Id. To be deemed reasonable, the administrator's decision must 

result from a “deliberate, principled reasoning process” and be 

supported by substantial evidence. Id. (quoting Guthrie v. 

Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Assoc. Long-term Disability Plan, 509 

F.3d 644, 651 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
10

In our decision in Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 

Associates Health & Welfare Plan, 201 F.3d 335, 342-48 (4th Cir. 

2000), we set forth eight nonexclusive factors that courts 

should consider in reviewing the reasonableness of a plan 

administrator's decision. These factors include:

(1) the language of the plan; (2) the purposes and 

goals of the plan; (3) the adequacy of the materials 

considered to make the decision and the degree to 

which they support it; (4) whether the fiduciary's 

interpretation was consistent with other provisions in 

the plan and with earlier interpretations of the plan;

(5) whether the decisionmaking process was reasoned

and principled; (6) whether the decision was 

consistent with the procedural and substantive 

requirements of ERISA; (7) any external standard 

relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (8) the 

fiduciary's motives and any conflict of interest it 

may have.

Id. A reviewing court’s assessment of the reasonableness of an 

administrator’s decision is limited to a review of the documents 

in the administrative record. Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hosp., 

Inc. v. Travelers Ins., Co., 32 F.3d 120, 125 (4th Cir. 1994). 

III.

A.

On appeal, Frankton raises three arguments concerning the 

reasonableness of certain actions taken by MetLife. The 

district court addressed each argument in its summary judgment 
11

order.3

According to Frankton, MetLife acted unreasonably in 

failing to send Dr. Hendler’s most recent medical records to Dr. 

Gordan. However, as the district court explained, MetLife did 

not receive the medical records until after MerLife had sent the 

claim file to Dr. Gordan. Even though MetLife did not later 

send these documents to Dr. Gordan, the documents were included 

in Frankton’s claim file when MetLife conducted its final 

administrative review. 

Upon considering the district court’s analysis described 

below, we agree with the district court’s disposition on these 

issues.

According to the district court, the documents were 

duplicative of other documents in Frankton’s claim file. The 

district court found that the only document that contained new

information was Dr. Hendler’s most recent “office note.” The 

district court observed that Frankton did not indicate what 

substantive information that the note would have added to the 

 3 In the district court, Frankton argued that MetLife failed 

to take into consideration Frankton’s job description that 

entailed “a significant amount of standing and lifting over ten 

pounds, as well as pushing and pulling carts and bending over.” 

Frankton now argues that the district court failed to consider 

the sitting requirements of the position. Because Frankton did 

not challenge MetLife’s failure to consider those sitting 

requirements in the proceedings before the district court, the 

argument is waived. See United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 

236 n.5 (4th Cir. 2005).
12

record. Therefore, the district court held, and we agree, that 

MetLife’s failure to forward the “office note” was a “minor 

procedural violation [] not sufficient to undermine the 

reasonableness of MetLife’s conclusions.” 

Next, Frankton argued in the district court that MetLife

erred in failing to consider the fact that she had been awarded 

Social Security disability insurance. However, as found by

district court, there was no evidence in the administrative 

record indicating that MetLife had received the letter from the 

Agency confirming the award of these benefits to Frankton. 

Therefore, the district court properly held that it would not 

consider the award letter in determining the reasonableness of 

MetLife’s denial of benefits decision. See Sheppard, 32 F.3d at 

125. 

Although MetLife conceded that it was aware that the Agency 

had awarded benefits to Frankton, the district court concluded 

that MetLife did not abuse its discretion by reaching a 

different decision than the Agency’s decision, because the 

Agency’s standard for awarding disability differs from the 

Plan’s definition of “disability.” As the district court 

explained, MetLife is not obligated to weigh the Agency’s 

disability determination more favorably than the other evidence 

in the record. See Gallagher v. Reliance Std. Life Ins., Co., 

305 F.3d 264, 275 (4th Cir. 2002). 
13

Frankton also argued in the district court that MetLife

failed to accord the proper weight to Dr. Hendler’s medical 

reports. However, as the district court explained, although 

plan administrators may not arbitrarily ignore reliable 

evidence, ERISA does not require that administrators accord 

special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. See

Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 

(2003). Upon reviewing the medical reports, the district court 

stated that the reports of Dr. Parkerson and Dr. Gordan are 

“replete with references to and criticism of Dr. Hendler’s 

records and diagnoses.” Accordingly, the district court held 

that MetLife acted reasonably in relying on the reports of Dr. 

Parkerson and Dr. Gordan and in rejecting the opinion of Dr. 

Hendler. For the same reason given by the district court, we 

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in making 

this determination.

B.

Finally, we address one additional argument raised by 

Frankton on appeal. According to Frankton, the district court 

erred by failing to consider MetLife’s conflict of interest in 

determining whether MetLife acted reasonably. 

The presence of a conflict of interest is one fact, among 

many, that a reviewing court may consider in evaluating the 

reasonableness of a plan administrator’s decision. Williams, 
14

609 F.3d at 630. A conflict of interest exists in this case 

because MetLife, as the plan administrator, has authority both 

to evaluate benefit eligibility and to pay benefit claims. Id.

at 630-31. In reviewing the reasonableness of an 

administrator’s decision, we consider an administrator’s 

conflict of interest because of the administrator’s financial 

incentive to deny coverage in its claims processing. 

Metropolitan Life Ins., Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 114-15

(2008). 

The record shows that MetLife attempted to make an accurate 

claim assessment by hiring an independent medical examiner and 

an independent physician consultant to review Frankton’s entire 

claim file. According to the district court, those physicians

reached “reasoned and principled conclusions.” Both physicians 

prepared detailed reports and justified their conclusions in 

light of contrary reports from Dr. Hendler. Thus, we conclude 

that Frankton has failed to show that MetLife’s conflict of 

interest is sufficient to outweigh the evidence of MetLife’s 

effort in assuring an accurate claim assessment.

IV.

In conclusion, we agree with the analysis of the district 

court and hold that Frankton failed to raise a genuine issue of 

material fact regarding the reasonableness of MetLife’s decision 
15

to terminate Frankton’s long-term disability benefits. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

AFFIRMED