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THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE

LAW OF THE SEA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 12, 2004

Serial No. 108–136

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

JONATHAN R. SCHARFEN, Chief Counsel 

MARILYN C. OWEN, Senior Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State .. 20

Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Department 

of the Navy ........................................................................................................... 29

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., President, The Center for Security Policy ....................... 44

Baker Spring, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, The 

Heritage Foundation ............................................................................................ 49

Peter M. Leitner, Ph.D., Author, Reforming the Law of the Sea Treaty: Opportunities Missed, Precedents Set, and U.S. Sovereignty Threatened .................. 54

Kathy J. Metcalf, Director, Maritime Affairs, Chamber of Shipping of America .......................................................................................................................... 65

John Norton Moore, Walter L. Brown Professor of Law, and Director, Center 

for Oceans Law and Policy, University of Virginia School of Law ................... 68

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. 

House of Representatives: Prepared statement ................................................. 2

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar, a U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana, 

and Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 6

Rear Admiral William L. Schachte, U.S. Navy, Retired: Prepared statement ... 14

The Honorable Tom Lantos, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Reprint of an advertisement from Citizens for Global Solutions ....................................................................................................................... 19

The Honorable William H. Taft IV: Prepared statement ..................................... 23

Admiral Michael G. Mullen: Prepared statement ................................................. 31

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 47

Baker Spring: Prepared statement ........................................................................ 51

Peter M. Leitner, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ....................................................... 55

Kathy J. Metcalf: Prepared statement ................................................................... 66

John Norton Moore: Prepared statement and addendum .................................... 70

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Roy Blunt, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Missouri: Prepared statement ............................................................................. 93

Letter addressed to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist from a number of 

organizations concerning the Law of the Sea Treaty, submitted for the 

record by Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. ........................................................................... 94

Letters from Admiral James D. Watkins, U.S. Navy, Retired, Chairman, 

U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, addressed to: 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde (including enclosure) ........................................ 96

The President of the United States (including enclosure) ................................ 102

The Honorable Joseph Biden, Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ................................................................................................................... 104

The Honorable Jesse Helms, a U.S. Senator from the State of North Carolina ..................................................................................................................... 106

Letters addressed to Admiral James D. Watkins from: 

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell ...................................................................... 108

Admiral Vern Clark, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy ............................ 110

Page

IV

Paul L. Kelly, Senior Vice President, Rowan Companies, Inc., and Member, 

U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy: Statement given before the U.S. Senate, 

March 23, 2004 ..................................................................................................... 111

Additional material submitted for the record by Peter M. Leitner, Ph.D. .......... 116

(1)

THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 

LAW OF THE SEA 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:38 a.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. Brigadier 

J.D. Hittle, of the U.S. Marine Corps, delivered a speech in Philadelphia on October 28th, 1961, in which he said that the pathway 

of man’s journey through the ages is littered with the wreckage of 

nations, which in their hour of glory forgot their dependence on the 

sea. 

Clearly, the United States is in no danger of forgetting our dependence on the sea. To the contrary, for years the United States 

has made great diplomatic investments in the law of the sea, in 

general, and in the Law of the Sea Convention, in particular. 

Recently, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings and unanimously reported favorably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1994 Agreement Relating 

to the Implementation of Part XI on the U.N. Convention on the 

Law of the Sea. Subsequently, the Senate Armed Services and the 

Environment and Public Works Committees held hearings on the 

subject, and at all three hearings, Administration officials, including leaders from the uniformed services, testified in support of accession to the Convention and ratification of the agreement. 

The Law of the Sea Convention established a sweeping legal regime that, in the words of one author, governs activities on, over, 

and under the world’s oceans. As the greatest maritime nation in 

the world, the significance of such a treaty to our national interests, whether military, diplomatic, or economic, can’t be overstated. 

These issues demand our serious attention, and today we will 

hear testimony from proponents and opponents of the treaty. National security interests are central to the proponents’ arguments 

in favor of accession. 

Proponents of the treaty have testified that since September 11th 

our mobility requirements as a naval power have never been greater. They argue that it is in our national interests to accede to the 

Convention because it supports vital transit rights necessary for 

our strategic mobility. 

These rights are essential for projecting military power, or ensuring freedom of navigation for commercial interests. The Convention 

2

codifies these essentials. Proponents also argue that the United 

States can better protect its national interests from within the Convention’s institutions than from without. 

As a party to the Convention, the United States could nominate 

members for the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea as advocates for legal interpretations favorable to the United States’ interests. 

I anticipate Administration witnesses will testify on these key 

national security issues, among others. Today’s witness from the 

commercial sector will undoubtedly testify to the economic interests 

that will be advanced through accession. She will champion the opportunity to challenge claims of excessive sovereignty within the 

Law of the Sea Tribunal. 

Today, we will also hear from opponents of the treaty, and they 

have raised a number of fundamental questions as to the wisdom 

of accession. Among these is whether accession is necessary. If the 

Convention codifies existing customary international law with regard to navigational rights, the argument runs that the United 

States benefits from it, whether the U.S. is a party to the treaty 

or not. 

Opponents have also questioned whether the 1994 agreement 

fixes the deep seabed mining provisions that led President Reagan 

to oppose Part XI of the Convention in the first instance. The 

agreement, for example, leaves in place an international bureaucracy that includes an International Seabed Authority to administer 

mineral resources in the seabed located in areas beyond national 

jurisdiction. It also provides for administrative fees for deep seabed 

mining operations and establishment of an economic assistance 

fund for those developing countries that incur economic losses to 

their land-based mining operations caused by seabed mining. 

Opponents have also expressed both practical and sovereignty 

concerns over the Convention’s mandatory dispute resolution provisions. We look forward to hearing our two panels of distinguished 

witnesses discuss these and other issues. 

And I would ask them if any implementing legislation would be 

necessary should the United States accede to the treaty. With the 

help of our witnesses, my hope is that we Members of the Committee will become better informed today on the complex Law of 

the Sea Treaty, and its impact on the economic, diplomatic, and national security interests of the United States. 

I now turn to my friend and colleague, Tom Lantos, the Ranking 

Democratic Member, for his opening remarks. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The pathway of man’s journey through the ages is littered with the wreckage of 

nations, which, in their hour of glory, forgot their dependence on the sea. 

BGen J.D. Hittle, USMC speech in Philadelphia, 28 Oct 61

Clearly, the United States is in no danger of forgetting our dependence on the sea. 

To the contrary, for years, the United States has made great diplomatic investments 

in the Law of the Sea in general and in the Law of the Sea Convention in particular. 

Recently, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings and unanimously reported favorably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

3

and the 1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Subsequently, the Senate Armed Services and the 

Environment & Public Works Committees held hearings on the subject. At all three 

hearings, Administration officials, including leaders from the uniformed services, 

testified in support of accession to the Convention and ratification of the Agreement. 

The Law of the Sea Convention established a sweeping legal regime that, in the 

words of one author, governs activities on, over, and under the world’s oceans. As 

the greatest maritime nation in the world, the significance of such a treaty to our 

national interests, whether military, diplomatic, or economic, can not be overstated. 

These issues demand our serious attention. 

Today we will hear testimony from both proponents and opponents of the treaty. 

National security interests are central to the proponents’ arguments in favor of 

accession. Proponents of the treaty have testified that since September 11 our mobility requirements as a naval power have never been greater. They argue that it is 

in our national interests to accede to the Convention because it supports vital transit rights necessary for our strategic mobility. These rights are essential for projecting military power or ensuring freedom of navigation for commercial interests. 

The convention codifies these essentials. 

Proponents also argue that the United States can better protect its national interests from within the Convention’s institutions than without. As a party to the Convention, the United States could nominate members for the International Tribunal 

for the Law of the Sea as advocates for legal interpretations favorable to U.S. interests. 

I anticipate that Administration witnesses will testify on these key national security issues, among others. 

Today’s witness from the commercial sector will undoubtedly testify to the economic interests that will be advanced through accession. She will champion the opportunity to challenge claims of excessive sovereignty within the Law of the Sea Tribunal. 

Today, we will also hear from opponents of the Treaty. These opponents have 

raised a number of fundamental questions as to the wisdom of accession. Among 

these, is whether accession is necessary. If the Convention codifies existing customary international law with regards to navigational rights, the argument runs, 

the United States benefits from it, whether the United States is a party to the treaty or not. 

Opponents have also questioned whether the 1994 Agreement fixes the deep seabed mining provisions that led President Reagan to oppose Part XI of the Convention in the first instance. The Agreement, for example, leaves in place an international bureaucracy that includes an International Seabed Authority to administer 

mineral resources in the seabed located in areas beyond national jurisdiction. It also 

provides for administrative fees for deep seabed mining operations and establishment of an economic assistance fund for those developing countries that incur economic loses to their land-based mining operations caused by seabed mining. 

Opponents have also expressed both practical and sovereignty concerns over the 

Convention’s mandatory dispute resolution provisions. 

I look forward to hearing our two panels of distinguished witnesses discuss these 

and other issues. I would ask them if any implementing legislation would be necessary should the United States accede to the treaty. With the help of our witnesses, 

my hope is that Members of the Committee will become better informed today on 

the complex Law of the Sea Treaty and its impact on the economic, diplomatic, and 

national security interests of the United States. 

I now turn to my friend and colleague, Tom Lantos, the Ranking Democratic 

Member, for his opening remarks.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

this important hearing on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 

and its impact on America’s national interests. This is yet another 

milestone along your statesmanlike leadership of this Committee. 

Mr. Chairman, the global war on terrorism will be a generationslong struggle to dismantle the global terrorist network, and as we 

have discovered, there is no silver bullet. We must use every diplomatic, economic, and military tool at our disposal in concert with 

our allies to prevail over the cowardly terrorists who wish to destroy us. 

4

Mr. Chairman, the Law of the Sea Treaty is precisely such a tool. 

This important treaty will increase the strategic mobility of our 

military, and it will ensure that the United States and its allies 

can respond quickly in times of crisis. 

By guaranteeing the rights of our naval and air forces to transit 

through the seas of other countries and key straits, the treaty 

makes a critical contribution to U.S. security. It is therefore no surprise, Mr. Chairman, that a broad bipartisan consensus exists for 

immediate ratification of the Law of the Sea. Both President Bush 

and Senator Kerry strongly support ratification, along with the 

Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs, and the Chief of Naval Operations. 

I am therefore perplexed as to why the Senate Republican leadership has yet to schedule a vote on a treaty directly related to our 

national security. I can only come to the conclusion, Mr. Chairman, 

that some in the Senate who fundamentally distrust 

multilateralism in all its manifestations, and who have fought 

against almost every international treaty, simply cannot bear the 

fact that their own Administration, together with our Nation’s most 

senior military officials, believe that the Law of the Sea advances 

America’s national security interests. 

I would urge all Members of the other body to listen to the words 

of General Richard Myers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, who wrote that this treaty remains, and I quote: ‘‘A top national priority,’’ and: ‘‘It supports efforts on the war on terrorism 

by providing much-needed stability and operational maneuver 

space, codifying essential navigational and over-flight freedoms.’’

Mr. Chairman, our men and women in uniform, who are on the 

front lines on the war on terrorism, deserve farsighted legislators 

who can put aside past prejudices to do what is essential on the 

war on terrorism. 

Representing San Francisco and the peninsula south of San 

Francisco, areas on the West Coast for which this treaty is particularly significant, I want to emphasize the critically important environmental effects of the Law of the Sea Treaty. In short, this treaty 

represents a landmark development in our efforts to end marine 

pollution and conserve the fragile ecosystems in our seas. Recently, 

the President’s National Commission on the Oceans issued its preliminary report. 

The conclusions are startling. Simply put, our oceans are dying. 

Unless we take steps immediately, whole species may vanish and 

fishing industries in the United States and around the world are 

going to face collapse at terrible human costs. 

The Law of the Sea Treaty establishes basic obligations for all 

nations to protect and to preserve the marine environment, and to 

conserve marine species. The treaty requires enforcement of international rules designed to limit pollution from ships and seabed development, and it mandates coastal countries to conserve the living 

resources up to 200 miles offshore, to ensure that they are not endangered by over-exploitation. 

And as we will hear in this hearing, U.S. economic interests are 

protected by this treaty. But these sound national security, economic, and environmental benefits apparently do not convince the 

sharpest opponents of Senate ratification of this treaty. 

5

They suggest that the treaty will restrict our intelligence gathering and block the Administration’s proliferation security initiative. They argue that the treaty remains unchanged from 1982, 

when President Reagan refused to let the United States become a 

party to it. 

These charges, Mr. Chairman, are utter nonsense. In 1983, President Reagan issued a proclamation providing that the United 

States would accept and act in accordance with all provisions of the 

Convention, except for those relating to deep seabed mining. As a 

result, the United States has been fully implementing every one of 

the provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty that the critics are now 

condemning without any loss to our national security interests. 

Indeed, under a previous treaty from the 1950s, we are under 

these very same legal obligations today. The provisions on deep 

seabed mining, the only provisions that President Reagan objected 

to, were comprehensively revised to remove all of our objections in 

1994. 

If the Senate gives its advice and consent to the treaty, the 

United States will have achieved, at the table, future changes to 

its provisions, and we will obtain a veto on critical matters that 

come before the governing council established by the Convention. 

Mr. Chairman, the Law of the Sea Treaty fundamentally promotes America’s national security interests, as well as the global 

environment, and it accomplishes these important tasks without infringing on our sovereignty, or costing the taxpayers billions of dollars. 

By ratifying the treaty the United States will obtain a key role 

in its implementation, and other countries will be required to respect and ultimately to protect key U.S. national security, economic 

and environmental interests. 

U.S. ratification will undoubtedly further expand the number of 

countries who will join the treaty, thereby increasing its value to 

our Nation. Mr. Chairman, later today you and Senators Lugar and 

Biden, and I, will be visiting with the President, and it is my hope 

that we will have an opportunity to discuss with him the importance of his weighing in with the Senate Republican leadership on 

behalf of this treaty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. Without objection, the 

prepared statements of our colleagues, Senator Lugar, and Admiral 

Schachte, will be inserted at this point in the record. 

[The statements of Senator Lugar and Admiral Schachte follow:]

6

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD G. LUGAR, A U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

U.S. SENATE


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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM L. SCHACHTE, U.S. NAVY, RETIRED

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is an honor for me to discuss 

the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention and the need for the United States, as the 

Convention’s primary author and proponent, to take a leadership position in joining 

145 other parties in a stable legal framework for the oceans. 

The Convention and the fundamental changes from the 1994 Agreement constitute a huge success for the U.S. Today’s military operations—from Operation Enduring Freedom to Operation Iraqi Freedom to the Global War on Terrorism—place 

a premium on the Navy’s strategic mobility and operational maneuverability. The 

Convention enhances access and transit rights for our ships, aircraft, and submarines, and reinforces the nation’s ability to conduct these operations. The critics 

of the Convention fail to understand, or even acknowledge, that since President Reagan’s 1983 ocean policy statement, we have conducted and continue to conduct all 

of our operations in accordance with the LOS Convention. From the navigation 

standpoint we got everything we needed. We will never get as favorable of an international agreement on navigational rights again. We cannot avoid a multilateral approach when it comes to determining rules for the high seas where no one nation 

has sole jurisdiction. The issue is not whether the LOS Convention provisions are 

adequate, but whether we can keep them in place in the face of increasing coastal 

state pressure. The best of all options would be to freeze them in their current form. 

We cannot continue to rely on customary international law for our navigation rights 

and freedoms indefinitely. In November, the Convention will be open to amendment 

and possible change. The United States should accede to the Convention immediately as a means to assure access to the oceans and take a leading role in the 

future developments in the law to ensure they continue to further our national security interests. 

The United States’ interests as a global maritime nation was a prime impetus for 

the negotiations of the Convention from 1973 to 1982, as well as later to obtain 

changes to the deep seabed mining provisions to which President Reagan correctly 

objected. President Reagan did not reject to the Convention in its entirety as has 

been misstated by the naysayers. In fact his Oceans Policy Statement of 1983 required that the U.S. operate consistent with the Convention’s provisions except for 

deep seabed mining. Experienced, career Naval officers were integral members of 

the U.S. delegations during the negotiations, which were hugely successful in securing and protecting all navigational rights necessary for our Navy. Then, due to the 

hard work of successive administrations, the U.S. was also able to obtain necessary 

changes to the deep seabed mining provisions to address all of the concerns raised 

by President Reagan. 

Let me put this in proper perspective to better understand what is really at stake 

by quoting from President Reagan’s Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. John Whitehead, 

from his op/ed piece in the Washington Times of July 28, 1994: ‘‘One cannot dispute 

the reminiscence that ‘some of us in the Reagan administration thought we had 

slain it for good.’ But that was personal, not administration policy. The fact is that 

the Reagan White House and State Department never questioned the need for international law to codify a 12-mile limit to coastal sovereignty, naval rights of passage, 

prohibitions on maritime pollution and protections of fisheries. All of these advance 

interests important to Americans.’’

‘‘The administration objected, very specifically and strenuously, to the section of 

the treaty establishing an international seabed mining authority that would have 

subjected American mining companies to onerous controls dictated by a Third World 

majority. It singled out these provisions as ‘not acceptable,’ but insisted that if they 

were satisfactorily revised, ‘The Administration will support ratification.’ ’’

Mr. Whitehead concluded: ‘‘Immediately after the U.N. General Assembly promulgates the new agreement this week, all the major industrialized countries will sign 

the convention. It is vital for America’s interests that we are among them. We have 

no need to fear prudent use and protection of the world’s oceans and seas under 

rule of law.’’

We continue to hear that the Part XI seabed mining provisions were not fixed because the 1994 Agreement is not an amendment to the LOS Convention. But, just 

read the text of the 1994 Agreement. It says, and I quote, ‘‘The provisions of this 

Agreement and Part XI shall be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and Part XI, the 

provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.’’ It is clear that the fundamental fixes 

made by the 1994 Agreement absolutely prevail. A specific issue in this area that 

continues to be wrongly stated is that the U.S. will be subject to mandatory requirements for transfer of technology. In regard to the LOS Convention’s technology 

15

transfer provisions found in Annex III, article 5, the 1994 Convention provides, and 

again, I quote, ‘‘The provisions of Annex III, article 5, of the Convention shall not 

apply.’’ Even such plain language is not good enough for some critics, who even 

though they begrudgingly acknowledge what the words say, have in the next 

breadth complained that you cannot believe the words. I cannot conceive any treaty 

that could satisfy such criticism. 

Despite its benefits, the Convention continues to be criticized because of the erroneous belief that the Convention will adversely affect U.S. sovereignty, inhibit our 

military operations including submarine and intelligence gathering activities, and 

hamper the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative. These criticisms could not 

be further from the truth. Although the Convention recognizes the right of innocent 

passage and what activities constitute innocent passage in the territorial sea, the 

Convention imposes no obligation on parties to refrain from activities, such as intelligence gathering, that do not qualify for the right of innocent passage. Thus, Article 

20 of the Convention merely states what a submarine must do to qualify for innocent passage in the territorial sea. This article merely repeats the rule concerning 

submerged transits from the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea, a convention 

to which the U.S. is a party. This rule has been the consistent position of nations, 

including the United States, for more than 70 years and it has never been interpreted as prohibiting or otherwise restricting intelligence collection activities or submerged transits in the territorial sea for purposes other than innocent passage. In 

short, if or when the need arises to collect intelligence in a foreign territorial sea, 

it will be business as usual for the Navy and nothing in the LOS Convention will 

prohibit that activity. 

In fact, from a navigational rights standpoint, the LOS Convention is more helpful 

than the 1958 Conventions to which the United States is currently a party. Submarines gain the right of submerged passage through international straits overlapped by territorial seas. More than 135 straits are affected, including strategically 

critical straits like Gibraltar, Hormuz and Malacca. The LOS Convention guarantees our armed forces a non-suspendable right of transit passage in, over and under 

these straits in the ‘‘normal mode’’ of operation. The same guaranteed, nonsuspendable rights apply to warships, military aircraft and submarines transiting 

through archipelagoes, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. That means that our 

submarines can transit submerged, military aircraft can overfly in combat formation 

with normal equipment operation, and warships can transit in a manner necessary 

for their security, including launching and recovering aircraft, formation steaming 

and other force protection measures. Without question, accession to the LOS Convention will enhance U.S. national security and economic interests. Military planners have long sought international respect for the freedoms of navigation and overflight that are set forth in the LOS Convention. 

The Convention guarantees our right to exercise high seas freedoms of navigation 

and overflight and all other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to those 

freedoms within the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of other nations. This includes 

the right to engage in military activities, such as:

• launching and recovery of aircraft, water-borne craft and other military devices;

• operating military devices;

• intelligence collection;

• surveillance and reconnaissance activities;

• military exercises and operations;

• conducting hydrographic surveys; and

• conducting military surveys (military marine data collection).

By codifying these important navigational rights and freedoms, the Convention 

provides international recognition of essential maritime mobility rights used by our 

forces on a daily basis around the globe. It establishes a legal framework for the 

behavior of its 145 parties and provides the legal predicate that enables our armed 

forces to respond to crises expeditiously and at minimal diplomatic and political 

costs. Today, more than ever, it is essential that key sea and air lanes remain open 

as an international legal right, and not be contingent upon approval by nations 

along the route. Anything that might inhibit these inherent freedoms is something 

we must avoid. The stable legal regime for the world’s oceans codified in the LOS 

Convention will guarantee the legal basis for the global mobility needed by our 

armed forces. And I might add that the navigational provisions of the Convention 

must continue to be exercised by our operational forces, particularly in the maritime 

16

environment of the global commons, an environment that has traditionally been one 

of claim and counterclaim. 

The U.S. has conducted maritime intercept operations (MIO) and MIO-type operations since we first declared our independence and the LOS Convention will not 

have any adverse impact to continuing those activities. The U.S. has conducted 

these operations under a variety of legal bases that are consistent with customary 

international law and our treaty obligations as a party to the 1958 Geneva Conventions. The provisions of the 1958 Geneva Conventions are mirrored in the LOS Convention. 

The LOS Convention also will not prohibit or impede the President’s Proliferation 

Security Initiative (PSI). The Statement of Interdiction Principles for PSI explicitly 

states that interdiction activities under PSI will be taken ‘‘consistent with national 

legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.’’ This includes the 

LOS Convention. Further, all of the U.S. partners to PSI are parties to the LOS 

Convention. The bottom line is that the Convention provides a solid legal basis for 

taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft suspected of engaging in proliferation of WMD, including: exclusive port and coastal state jurisdiction in internal 

waters, territorial seas and national airspace; coastal state jurisdiction in the 24 nm 

contiguous zone; flag state jurisdiction over its vessels on the high seas; and universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels. Ultimately, the U.S. always has the right 

to exercise self-defense, unaffected by the LOS Convention. The Convention’s preamble is quite clear in this regard—that is, ‘‘matters not regulated by the Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international 

law.’’ Thus, matters such as self defense under the UN Charter and belligerent 

rights under the law of armed conflict are unaffected by the Convention. 

Despite claims of critics, the Treaty does not give the United Nations authority 

to levy taxes. The LOS Convention does not authorize taxation of individuals or corporations. There are revenue provisions for deep seabed mining operations and for 

oil and gas activities on the continental shelf beyond 200 miles. Under the terms 

of the LOS Convention none of the revenues go to the United Nations or are subject 

to its control. Another shibboleth being spread about the LOS Convention is that 

it will subject our military activities to some sort of world court to settle disputes. 

Again, this is absolutely wrong and misleading. With respect to the dispute settlement provisions of the LOS Convention, the Convention does establish the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). However, the Convention also 

permits parties to choose other methods of dispute settlement. The U.S. has indicated it will elect two forms of arbitration rather than the Tribunal. Further, the 

Convention permits parties to exclude from dispute settlement certain types of actions such as military activities. Thus, the U.S. declaration opting out of dispute settlement for military activities is consistent with the Convention and disputes concerning military activities would not be subject to dispute settlement under the Convention. What constitutes a U.S. military activity is a matter solely for the U.S. to 

determine. Some have also accused ITLOS of over-reaching, citing the UK-Ireland 

MOX case as an example. The fact is that the UK did not avail itself of available 

opportunities to avoid jurisdiction of ITLOS and that the ITLOS provisional measure only directed that the two countries consult with each other. 

The LOS Convention protects our sovereignty by recognizing our 12 nautical mile 

(nm) territorial sea and a 200 nm exclusive economic zone. The Convention provides 

for widely accepted navigational and overflight freedoms that allow our Armed 

Forces to get to the fight rapidly and with maximum maneuverability. The Convention also provides for warship sovereign immunity. Although the LOS Convention 

was drafted over twenty years ago, it supports U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism. 

The Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Navy have consistently 

supported the navigation provisions of the Convention. The combined weight of the 

knowledge and experience of the Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNOs) consistently 

supporting the navigation provisions of the LOS Convention ought not be dismissed 

derisively as some so-called defense experts have done. Those esteemed naval officers have been on the front lines and understand how vital are the navigational provisions of the Convention now and in the future. Following the fixes in 1994 for the 

Reagan Administration objections to the deep seabed mining provisions, there has 

been no good reason to not move forward on U.S. accession. In fact, in 1998 all living CNOs endorsed the LOS Convention and urged Senate leadership to take positive action on U.S. accession. Future threats are likely to emerge in places and in 

ways that are not known. In order to be prepared to handle these challenges, the 

U.S. must be able to take maximum advantage of the navigational freedoms that 

the Convention codifies in order to get the armed forces to the fight rapidly. As the 

current Chief of Naval Operations has said, when sailors are sent out on dangerous 

missions around the world, they want assurance that not only are they supported 

17

by military force, but that they have the full backing of the law. We owe that to 

them. 

Some have argued that joining the Convention is not necessary because the navigational rights and freedoms codified in the Convention already exist as customary 

international law and are therefore binding on all nations. That premise is flawed 

for a number of reasons. 

While it is true that many of the Convention’s provisions are reflective of customary international law, others, such as the rights of transit passage and 

archipelagic sea lanes passage that I previously discussed, are creations of the Convention. Additionally, if you examine the evolution of customary international law 

in the 20th Century, you’ll find that it evolved the erosion, not the preservation, of 

navigational rights and freedoms. In the mid 1950’s it was concluded by the major 

maritime powers that the best way to stop that erosion was through the adoption 

of a universally recognized treaty that established limits on coastal nation jurisdiction and preserved traditional navigational rights and freedoms. 

It is also important to note that not everyone agreed with our ‘‘customary international law’’ interpretation announced by President Reagan in his 1983 Ocean Policy Statement. However, our ability to influence the development of customary law 

changed dramatically in 1994 when the Convention entered into force. As a nonParty, we no longer had a voice at the table when important decisions were being 

made on how to interpret and apply the provisions of the Convention. As a result, 

over the past 10 years, we have witnessed a resurgence of creeping jurisdiction 

around the world. Coastal States are increasingly exerting greater control over waters off their coasts and a growing number of States have started to challenge US 

military activities at sea, particularly in their 200 nautical mile (nm) EEZ. 

For example, as I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, Malaysia has closed the strategic Strait of Malacca, an international strait, to ships carrying nuclear cargo. Chile and Argentina have similarly 

ordered ships carrying nuclear cargo to stay clear of their EEZs. These actions are 

inconsistent with the Convention and customary law, but will other nations attempt 

to follow suit and establish a new customary norm that prohibits the transport of 

nuclear cargo? Will attempts be made to expand such a norm to include nuclearpowered ships? 

China, India, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Brazil, Malaysia and others, have directly challenged US military operations in their EEZ as being inconsistent with the 

Law of the Sea Convention and customary international law. Again, the actions by 

those countries are inconsistent with the Convention and customary law, but will 

other nations follow suit and attempt to establish a new customary norm that prohibits military activities in the EEZ without coastal State consent? 

It is extremely shortsighted to argue that, if the customary law system somehow 

breaks down, the United States, as the world’s pre-eminent naval power, wouldn’t 

have any trouble enforcing it. Clearly, our Navy could engage in such an effort. 

However, enforcing our navigational rights against every coastal nation in the event 

the Convention and customary law systems collapse would be too costly, both politically and economically. Moreover, it would divert our forces from their primary missions, including the long-term global war on terrorism. Excessive coastal nation 

claims are the primary threat to our navigational freedoms. Those claims can spread 

like a contagious virus, as they did in the 20th Century. The added legal security 

we get from a binding treaty permits us to use our military forces and diminishing 

resources more efficiently and effectively by concentrating on their primary missions. 

If we are going to successfully curtail this disturbing trend of creeping jurisdiction, we must reassert our leadership role in the development of maritime law and 

join the Convention now. The urgency of this issue is highlighted by the fact that 

under its terms, the Convention can be amended after this November. As a party, 

the US could prevent any attempt to erode our crucial and hard won navigational 

freedoms that are codified in the Convention. 

Few treaties in U.S. history have undergone the level of scrutiny that the LOS 

Convention has undergone. Every aspect of the Convention was painstakingly reviewed and analyzed during its 9-year negotiation. Since 1982, it has been exhaustively considered, analyzed and interpreted by every relevant agency in the U.S. 

government. As you know, the Reagan administration gave it a long, careful review 

and decided not to sign it solely because of the flaws in Part XI concerning deep 

seabed mining. The Convention was again closely scrutinized from 1990 to 1994 as 

Part XI was being renegotiated to fix the problems identified by the Reagan Administration. I would note, in this regard, that the efforts to renegotiate Part XI commenced under the first Bush Administration. After the Part XI Agreement was successfully negotiated in 1994 to fix the problems identified by President Reagan, the 

18

Convention was again reviewed and analyzed when the Clinton Administration sent 

the Convention and the Part XI Implementing Agreement to the Senate for advice 

and consent. The Convention was again extensively reviewed and analyzed in 2001 

after 9/11, and again this year. Initial hearings on the Convention were held by the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1994, and again in 2003. Additionally, there 

have been hearings this year before the Senate Committee on Environment and 

Public Works and Committee on Armed Services. Finally, the Convention has been 

the topic of debate and discussion at countless academic conferences hosted by numerous prestigious institutions such as Brookings as well as: Georgetown University, University of Virginia, Duke University, Center for Ocean Law and Policy, Law 

of the Sea Institute, and National Academy of Sciences. 

Just as important as those examples of extensive scrutiny, the Convention is put 

to the test numerous times each day around the world by the U.S. Navy. I ask you 

to give more credence to our men and women who go in harm’s way on Navy vessels 

far from home than to the theories of so-called defense experts. Every time a U.S. 

submarine makes a submerged transit of the Strait of Gibraltar and every time a 

U.S. aircraft carrier transits the Strait of Hormuz with its planes and helicopters 

flying, the Convention is used and validated. 

There is now almost universal adherence to the LOS Convention, with 145 parties, including all of our major allies and important non-aligned nations. The Convention establishes a stable and predictable legal framework for uses of the oceans 

that will benefit our armed forces. As a matter of substance, all of his successors 

have agreed with President Reagan that the Convention sets forth the appropriate 

balance between the rights of coastal nations and the rights of maritime nations. 

The United States is both and will benefit two-fold by becoming a party. The Convention is good for America—good for our economy, good for our well-being and, 

most importantly, good for our national security. It is time that we reassert our position as the pre-eminent maritime nation of the world and take our rightful place 

as a party to the Convention.

Chairman HYDE. And if there are any further opening statements, they will also be without objection inserted in the record. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANTOS. May I ask that an ad from today’s Roll Call, entitled, ‘‘The Law of the Sea,’’ in support of ratification, be included 

in the record? 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information referred to follows:]

19

Chairman HYDE. We open our testimony today with two witnesses from the Administration. It gives me great pleasure to welcome William H. Taft IV, who has served as Legal Adviser to the 

Secretary of State since April 2001. He is the principal advisor on 

all documents of international legal matters to the Department of 

State, the Foreign Service, and diplomatic and consular posts 

abroad, as well as the principal advisor on legal matters relating 

to the conduct of foreign relations to other agencies, and through 

the Secretary of State, to the President and National Security 

Council. 


93660z.eps
20

In the remarkable legal career prior to joining the State Department, Mr. Taft has been a litigation partner in Fried Frank’s 

Washington, DC office, concentrating on government contracts and 

counseling on international trade. And spanning the years from 

1981 to 1989, he served as U.S. Permanent Representative to 

NATO, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, as Acting Secretary of Defense, and as General Counsel for the Department of Defense. 

Mr. Taft entered private law practice in 1977 after serving in 

various positions at the Federal Trade Commission and other Federal Government agencies. He received his JD from Harvard, and 

his BA from Yale. We are truly pleased to have you appearing before us today, Mr. Taft. We look forward to hearing your statement. 

As our second witness, we welcome the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen. A 1968 graduate of the United 

States Naval Academy, Admiral Mullen has wide-ranging experience as a commander in both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, and 

as a flag officer, he has held many shore assignments, including 

the U.S. Naval Academy, the Surface Warfare Officer School Command, the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and at the Pentagon on the 

staffs of the Secretary of Defense and Chief of Naval Operations. 

Prior to his current assignment, he served as Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments. 

A graduate of the Naval Post-Graduate School, with a Master of 

Science degree in Operations Research, Admiral Mullen also attended the Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program. 

He assumed his current duty as Vice Chief of Naval Operations 

in August 2003. We welcome you today, Admiral Mullen, and certainly look forward to hearing your statement. We will ask you to 

begin, Mr. Taft, with a summary of your statement. Your written 

statement, as well as that of all of our witnesses, will be made a 

part of the record. Mr. Taft. 

Mr. TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Until today, my life has not 

included the privilege of appearing before this Committee, and so 

I am delighted to add that. 

Chairman HYDE. We are sort of rounding out your resume. 

Mr. TAFT. Thank you. 

Mr. LANTOS. We all reach a highlight at a certain point in our 

life. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. TAFT IV, LEGAL 

ADVISER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Administration strongly supports the Convention, and I have testified in favor of it before 

two Senate Committees. Today, I want to focus on the benefits of 

U.S. accession and respond to various arguments being made 

against accession. 

As the world’s preeminent maritime power, the United States 

has had a longstanding and consistent interest in achieving international agreement on rules that protect freedom of navigation. It 

has been the common objective of every successive U.S. Administration for the last 30 years to nail down our navigational and 

other ocean rights through a widely accepted and comprehensive 

21

Law of the Sea Treaty. The Convention before you does that, and 

is strongly in our national interests. 

Turning specifically to the Convention’s navigational benefits, 

joining the Convention will advance the interests of the United 

States. It preserves and elaborates the rights of our military to use 

the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements; for example, by stabilizing the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles, by enshrining the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea and the 

right of transit passage through straits; and by reaffirming the 

freedom of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic 

zone, and the high seas beyond, including the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines. 

U.S. Armed Forces rely on these rights daily and their protection 

is of paramount importance for our security. This can be done by 

becoming a party to the Convention. As the country with the longest coastline and the largest exclusive economic zone, the United 

States will gain economic and resource benefits from the Convention. 

It accords the coastal State sovereign rights over living marine 

resources, including fisheries, out to 200 miles, and it accords that 

same State sovereign rights over non-living resources, including oil 

and gas, found in the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf, 

and it does so in a manner that improves on the 1958 treaty. It 

also establishes a legal framework for the protection and preservation of the marine environment from pollution from vessels, from 

activities in the seabed, from ocean dumping and other sources. 

Concerning mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction, that 

is, those that are not subject to the sovereignty of the United 

States or any other country, the 1994 agreement meets our goals 

regarding access by U.S. industry, free market principles, and decision-making. 

Now, let me turn to dispute settlement, Mr. Chairman. As sought 

by the United States, the Convention establishes a dispute settlement system to promote compliance with its provisions and the 

peaceful settlement of disputes. These procedures are flexible, providing options both as to the forum for resolving disputes, and as 

to the subject matter. Parties are expressly permitted to exclude 

matters of vital national concern from dispute settlement, including 

disputes concerning military activities, and we will do that. 

Disputes concerning military activities, including intelligence activities, will not be subject to dispute settlement under the Convention as a matter of law, or U.S. policy. 

Regarding disputes that are subject to resolution by arbitration 

under the Convention, it is very much in our national interests 

that this is provided for. Some disputes simply can’t be resolved by 

negotiation, but they do need to be settled. I would like to address 

some of the criticisms of the Convention that have been made, and 

I would say that they leave me puzzled, particularly those relating 

to national security. 

I have been familiar with the Convention for more than 20 years, 

including during my tenure as General Counsel of DoD in 1982, 

when we rejected Part XI of the treaty, but accepted the rest, and 

later for 5 years, as Deputy Secretary of Defense. In all that time 

I have never heard a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) or a ChairVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
22

man of the Joint Chiefs suggest that the United States would be 

better off from a national security point of view as a non-party to 

the Convention. 

The criticisms of the Convention fall into roughly five sorts. One 

criticism is based on a misreading of the Convention. For example, 

the assertion that the International Seabed Authority has jurisdiction over the oceans generally is manifestly incorrect. The Authority deals only with the sea floor beyond national jurisdiction, and 

there only with mineral activities. 

The second criticism would have been correct in 1982, but ignores the fundamental overhaul effectuated by the 1994 agreement. For example, the assertion that joining the Convention 

would result in mandatory technology transfer. 

A third criticism creates the impression that joining the Convention would be a radical departure from the status quo. It isn’t. We 

have been operating consistent with the Convention for many 

years. Another kind of criticism seems to be based on mischaracterizations of our situations as a non-party, suggesting that we would 

be able to enjoy the benefits that we have today, even if we stay 

as a non-party. 

The alternative to the Convention is not that we can engage in 

deep seabed mining without going through the Convention’s institutions. We need them in order to go ahead with that. 

The alternative is not full exploitation of the outer reaches of our 

continental shelf without fees. Rather, the inability to get legal certainty in this area will stymie those activities. The U.S. oil and gas 

industry participated in negotiating the relevant provisions and 

has testified in support of the Convention. 

And the fifth criticism concerns multilateral institutions. Here, 

however, the commission created by the Convention to recommend 

outer limits of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles is a necessary institution for us to get legal certainty in oil and gas exploitation off-shore. 

Let me try and conclude, Mr. Chairman, simply by saying that 

it is strongly in our interests to join the Convention because of national security, economic, environmental, and foreign policy benefits. 

Among other things, U.S. adherence would promote the stability 

of the legal regime of the oceans, which is vital to our U.S. global 

mobility and national security; and we recommend and have recommended to the Senate that it give its advice and consent to accession to the treaty on the basis of the resolution of advice and 

consent which was supported unanimously by the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee this year. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for including my prepared written statement, which I have tried to summarize here for 

the record. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Taft. Admiral Mullen. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Taft follows:]

23

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. TAFT IV, LEGAL ADVISER, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACCESSION TO THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AND RATIFICATION OF THE 1994

AGREEMENT AMENDING PART XI OF THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

[SENATE TREATY DOCUMENT 103–39; SENATE EXECUTIVE REPORT 108–10]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the 1982 United Nations Convention 

on the Law of the Sea (‘‘the Convention’’), which, with the 1994 Agreement relating 

to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea of 10 December 1982 (‘‘the 1994 Agreement’’), was reported favorably by the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 11, 2004. The Administration strongly supports the Convention. I have testified in support of it before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 21, 2003, as well as before the Senate Armed 

Services Committee on April 8, 2004. This testimony will focus on the benefits of 

U.S. accession to the Convention and respond to various arguments being made 

against accession. 

BACKGROUND: 

The achievement of a widely accepted and comprehensive law of the sea convention—to which the United States can become a party—has been a consistent objective of successive U.S. administrations for the last thirty years. The United States 

is already a party to a series of conventions from 1958 regarding various aspects 

of the law of the sea. While a step forward at the time as a partial codification of 

the law of the sea, those conventions left some unfinished business; for example, 

they did not set forth the outer limit of the territorial sea, an issue of critical importance to U.S. freedom of navigation. The United States played a prominent role in 

the negotiating session that culminated in the 1982 Convention, which sets forth a 

comprehensive framework governing uses of the oceans that is strongly in the U.S. 

interest. 

When the text of the Convention was concluded in 1982, the United States recognized that its provisions supported U.S. interests, except for Part XI on deep seabed 

mining. In 1983, President Reagan announced in his Ocean Policy Statement that 

the United States accepted, and would act in accordance with, the Convention’s balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans. He instructed the Government to abide by, or, as the case may be, enjoy the rights accorded by, the provisions of the Convention other than those in Part XI. 

Part XI has now been fixed, in a legally binding manner, to address the concerns 

raised by President Reagan and successive Administrations. We also worked closely 

with the Senate to ensure that the proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent satisfies the concerns and issues identified by the Administration, including those relating to U.S. military interests. We have urged the Senate to give its advice and consent to this Convention, to allow us to take full advantage of the many benefits it 

offers. 

NAVIGATIONAL ASPECTS: 

Joining the Convention will advance the interests of the U.S. military. As the 

world’s leading maritime power, the United States benefits more than any other nation from the navigational provisions of the Convention. Those provisions, which establish international consensus on the extent of jurisdiction that States may exercise off their coasts, preserve and elaborate the rights of the U.S. military to use 

the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements. They achieve this, among 

other things, by stabilizing the outer limit of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles; 

by setting forth the navigation regime of innocent passage for all ships in the territorial sea; by protecting the right of passage for all ships and aircraft through, 

under, and over straits used for international navigation, as well as archipelagoes; 

by reaffirming the traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight in the exclusive 

economic zone and the high seas beyond; and by providing for the laying and maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines. U.S. Armed Forces rely on these navigation and overflight rights daily, and their protection is of paramount importance to 

U.S. national security. 

ECONOMIC/RESOURCE ASPECTS: 

The United States, as the country with the longest coastline and the largest exclusive economic zone, will gain economic and resource benefits from the Convention:

24

• It accords the coastal State sovereign rights over living marine resources, including fisheries, in its exclusive economic zone, i.e., out to 200 nautical miles 

from shore.

• The Convention also accords the coastal State sovereign rights over non-living 

resources, including oil and gas, found in the seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf. The Convention improves on the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, to which the United States is a party, in several ways: by replacing the 

‘‘exploitability’’ standard with an automatic continental shelf out to 200 nautical miles, regardless of geology; by allowing for extension of the shelf beyond 

200 miles if it meets certain geological criteria; and by establishing an institution that can promote the legal certainty sought by U.S. companies concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf.

The Convention also establishes a legal framework for the protection and preservation of the marine environment from a variety of sources, including pollution from 

vessels, seabed activities, and ocean dumping. The provisions effectively balance the 

interests of States in protecting the environment and natural resources with their 

interests in freedom of navigation and communication. With the majority of Americans living in coastal areas, and U.S. coastal areas and EEZ generating vital economic activities, the United States has a strong interest in these aspects of the Convention. 

Concerning mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction, i.e, not subject to the 

sovereignty of the United States or any other country, the 1994 Agreement meets 

our goal of guaranteed access by U.S. industry on the basis of reasonable terms and 

conditions. The Agreement restructures the deep seabed mining regime along freemarket principles. It also overhauls the decision-making procedures to accord decisive influence to the United States and others with major economic interests at 

stake. The United States is guaranteed a seat on the critical decision-making body, 

and no substantive obligation can be imposed on the United States, and no amendment can be adopted, without its consent. Joining the Convention would facilitate 

deep seabed mining activities of U.S. companies, which require legal certainty to 

carry out such activities in areas beyond U.S. jurisdiction. 

As to actual costs of being a party, our annual contributions to the Convention’s 

institutions would be about three million dollars, paid to the International Tribunal 

for the Law of the Sea and the International Seabed Authority from the State Department’s Contributions to International Organizations. These costs are not included in the Administration’s budget request for FY 2005. If we accede to the Convention, the State Department will assess options for addressing these requirements 

in FY 2005 or future budgets. 

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: 

The Convention establishes a dispute settlement system to promote compliance 

with its provisions and the peaceful settlement of disputes. These procedures are 

flexible, providing options both as to the appropriate means for resolution of disputes and as to subject matter. In terms of forum, a State is able to choose, by written declaration, one or more means for the settlement of disputes concerning the 

interpretation or application of the Convention. The Administration is pleased that 

its recommendation that the United States elect arbitration under Annex VII and 

special arbitration under Annex VIII is included in the proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent. 

In terms of subject matter, the system provides Parties with means of excluding 

matters of vital national concern from the dispute settlement mechanisms. Specifically, the Convention permits a State, through a declaration, to opt out of dispute 

settlement procedures with respect to one or more enumerated categories of disputes, including disputes concerning military activities and certain law enforcement 

activities. The Administration is similarly pleased that the proposed Resolution of 

Advice and Consent follows its recommendation that the United States elect to exclude all optional categories of disputes from dispute settlement mechanisms. 

A concern raised by Administration witnesses last fall regarding resolution of disputes concerning military activities has been satisfactorily addressed by the proposed Resolution. As I testified before the Foreign Relations Committee, the ability 

of a Party to exclude disputes concerning military activities from dispute settlement 

has long been of importance to the United States. The U.S. negotiators of the Convention sought and achieved language that creates a very broad exception, successfully defeating attempts by certain other countries to narrow its scope. The United 

States has consistently viewed this exception as a key element of the dispute settlement package, which carefully balances comprehensiveness with protection of vital 

national interests. 

25

This Administration reviewed whether the U.S. declaration on dispute settlement 

should in some way particularly highlight the military activities exception, given 

both its importance and the possibility, however remote, that another State Party 

might seek dispute settlement concerning a U.S. military activity, notwithstanding 

our declaration invoking the exception. As a result, the Administration recommended, and the proposed Resolution includes, a statement that our consent to 

accession to the Convention is conditioned on the understanding that each State 

Party has the exclusive right to determine whether its activities are or were ‘‘military activities’’ and that such determinations are not subject to review. Disputes 

concerning military activities, including intelligence activities, would not be subject 

to dispute settlement under the Convention as a matter of law and U.S. policy. 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: 

The question has been raised whether the Convention (in particular articles 19 

and 20) prohibits intelligence activities or submerged transit in the territorial sea 

of other States. It does not. The Convention’s provisions on innocent passage are 

very similar to article 14 in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 

Contiguous Zone, to which the United States is a party. (The 1982 Convention is 

in fact more favorable than the 1958 Convention both because the list of non-innocent activities is exhaustive and because it generally uses objective, rather than subjective, criteria in the listing of activities.) A ship does not, of course, enjoy the right 

of innocent passage if, in the case of a submarine, it navigates submerged or if, in 

the case of any ship, it engages in an act in the territorial sea aimed at collecting 

information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal State, but such 

activities are not prohibited by the Convention. In this respect, the Convention 

makes no change in the situation that has existed for many years and under which 

we operate today. 

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE: 

I would also like to address the relationship between the Convention and the 

President’s Proliferation Security Initiative, an activity involving the United States 

and more than sixty other countries. The Convention will not affect our policies and 

practices in carrying out maritime-related PSI activities to interdict vessels suspected of engaging in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means 

of delivery and related materials. The PSI requires participating countries to act 

consistent with national legal authorities and ‘‘relevant international law and 

frameworks,’’ which includes the law reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention’s navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of the sea 

conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also reflect customary international law accepted by the United States. As such, the Convention will not affect 

applicable maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. Like the 1958 conventions, the 

Convention recognizes numerous legal bases for taking enforcement action against 

vessels and aircraft suspected of engaging in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for example, exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal waters and national airspace; coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and contiguous zone; exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas (which 

the flag State may, either by general agreement in advance or approval in response 

to a specific request, waive in favor of other States); and universal jurisdiction over 

stateless vessels. Further, nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of 

individual or collective self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent). 

REASONS TO JOIN: 

As a non-Party to the Convention, the United States has actively sought to 

achieve global acceptance of, and adherence to, the Convention’s provisions, particularly in relation to freedom of navigation. As noted, President Reagan’s 1983 Oceans 

Policy Statement directed the United States to abide by, and enjoy the rights accorded by, the non-deep seabed provisions of the Convention. Abroad, the United 

States has worked both diplomatically and operationally to promote the provisions 

of the Convention as reflective of customary international law. 

While we have been able to gain certain benefits of the Convention from this approach, formal U.S. adherence to the Convention would have further national security advantages:

26

• The United States would be in a stronger position invoking a treaty’s provisions to which it is party, for instance in a bilateral disagreement where the 

other country does not understand or accept them.

• While we have been able to rely on diplomatic and operational challenges to 

excessive maritime claims, it is desirable to establish additional methods of 

resolving conflict.

• The Convention is being implemented in various forums, both those established by the Convention and certain others (such as the International Maritime Organization or IMO). While the Convention’s institutions were not particularly active during the past decade since the Convention entered into 

force, they are now entering a more active phase and are elaborating and interpreting various provisions. The United States would be in a stronger position to defend its national security and other interests in these forums if it 

were a party to the Convention.

• Becoming a party to the Convention would permit the United States to nominate members for both the Law of the Sea Tribunal and the Continental Shelf 

Commission. Having U.S. members on those bodies would help ensure that 

the Convention is being interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with 

U.S. national security interests.

• Becoming a party to the Convention would strengthen our ability to deflect 

potential proposals that would be inconsistent with U.S. national security interests, including those affecting freedom of navigation.

Beyond those affirmative reasons for joining the Convention, there are downside 

risks of not acceding to the Convention. U.S. mobility and access have been preserved and enjoyed over the past twenty years largely due to the Convention’s stable, widely accepted legal framework. It would be risky to assume that it is possible 

to preserve indefinitely the stable situation that the United States currently enjoys. 

Customary international law may be changed by the practice of States over time 

and therefore does not offer the future stability that comes with being a party to 

the Convention. 

RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST U.S. ACCESSION: 

I would now like to respond to arguments that are being made against U.S. accession to the Convention. I will address them in turn: 

President Reagan thought the treaty was irremediably defective. 

• President Reagan expressed concerns only about Part XI’s deep seabed mining regime.

• In fact, he believed that Part XI could be fixed and specifically identified the elements in need of revision.

• The regime has been fixed in a legally binding manner that addresses each of the 

U.S. objections to the earlier regime.

• The rest of the treaty was considered so favorable to U.S. interests that, in his 

1983 Ocean Policy Statement, President Reagan ordered the Government to abide 

by and exercise the rights accorded by the non-deep seabed provisions of the Convention. 

U.S. adherence to the Convention is not necessary because navigational freedoms are 

not threatened (and the only guarantee of free passage on the seas is the power 

of the U.S. Navy). 

• It is not true that our navigational freedoms are not threatened. There are more 

than one hundred illegal, excessive claims affecting vital navigational and overflight rights and freedoms.

• The United States has utilized diplomatic and operational challenges to resist the 

excessive maritime claims of other countries that interfere with U.S. navigational 

rights under customary international law as reflected in the Convention. But 

these operations entail a certain amount of risk—e.g., the Black Sea bumping incident with the former Soviet Union in 1988.

• Being a party to the Convention would significantly enhance our efforts to roll 

back these claims by, among other things, putting the United States in a far 

stronger position to assert our rights and affording us additional methods of resolving conflict. 

27

The Convention was drafted before—and without regard to—the war on terror and 

what the United States must do to wage it successfully. 

• It is true that the Convention was drafted before the war on terror. However, the 

Convention enhances, rather than undermines, our ability to successfully wage 

the war on terror.

• Maximum maritime naval and air mobility that is assured by the Convention is 

essential for our military forces to operate effectively. The Convention provides 

the necessary stability and framework for our forces, weapons, and materiel to get 

to the fight without hindrance—and ensures that our forces will not be hindered 

in the future.

• Thus, the Convention supports our war on terrorism by providing important stability for navigational freedoms and overflight. It preserves the right of the U.S. 

military to use the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements. It is 

essential that key sea and air lanes remain open as an international legal right 

and not be contingent upon approval from nations along the routes. A stable legal 

regime for the world’s oceans will support global mobility for our Armed Forces. 

Obligatory technology transfers will equip actual or potential adversaries with sensitive and militarily useful equipment and know-how (such as anti-submarine 

warfare technology). 

• No technology transfers are required by the Convention. Mandatory technology 

transfers were eliminated by Section 5 of the Annex to the Agreement amending 

Part XI of the Convention.

• Article 302 of the Convention explicitly provides that nothing in the Convention 

requires a party to disclose information the disclosure of which is contrary to the 

essential interests of its security. 

As a nonparty, the U.S. is allowed to search any ship that enters our EEZ to determine whether it could harm the United States or pollute the marine environment. Under the Convention, the U.S. Coast Guard or others would not be able 

to search any ship until the United Nations is notified and approves the right 

to search the ship. 

• Under the Convention, the UN has no role in deciding when and where a foreign 

ship may be boarded.

• Under applicable treaty law—the 1958 conventions on the law of the sea—as well 

as customary international law, no nation has the right to arbitrarily search any 

ship that enters its EEZ to determine whether it could harm that national or pollute its marine environment. Nor would we want countries to have such a blanket 

‘‘right,’’ because it would fundamentally undermine the freedom of navigation that 

benefits the United States more than any other nation.

• Thus, the description of both the status quo and the Convention’s provisions is 

incorrect. The Convention makes no change in our existing ability or authority to 

search ships entering our EEZ with regard to security or protection of the environment. 

Other Parties will reject the U.S. ‘‘military activities’’ declaration as a reservation. 

• The U.S. declaration is consistent with the Convention and is not a reservation. 

The 1994 Agreement doesn’t even pretend to amend the Convention; it merely establishes controlling interpretive provisions. 

• The Convention could only have been formally ‘‘amended’’ if it had already entered into force. We negotiated the 1994 Agreement as a separate agreement in 

order to ensure that the Convention did not enter into force with Part XI in its 

flawed state. The 1994 Agreement made explicit, legally binding changes to the 

Convention and has the same legal effect as if it were an amendment to the Convention itself.

• It would not have been in our interest to wait until the Convention entered into 

force before fixing Part XI concerns, as it would have been more cumbersome to 

get the changes that we sought. 

The problems identified by President Reagan in 1983 were not remedied by the 1994 

Agreement relating to deep seabed mining. 

• Each objection has been addressed.

• Among other things, the 1994 Agreement:

— provides for access by U.S. industry to deep seabed minerals on the basis 

of non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions;

28

— overhauls the decision-making rules to accord the United States critical influence, including veto power over the most important future decisions that 

would affect U.S. interests and, in other cases, requires supermajorities that 

will enable us to protect our interests by putting together small blocking minorities;

— restructures the regime to comport with free-market principles, including 

the elimination of the earlier mandatory technology transfer provisions and 

all production controls. 

The Convention gives the UN its first opportunity to levy taxes. 

• The Convention does not provide for or authorize taxation of individuals or corporations. It does include revenue sharing provisions for oil/gas activities on the 

continental shelf beyond 200 miles and administrative fees for deep seabed mining operations. The amounts involved are modest in relation to the total economic 

benefits, and none of the revenues would go to the United Nations or be subject 

to its control. (U.S. companies applying for deep seabed mining licenses would pay 

the application fee directly to the Seabed Authority; no implementing legislation 

would be necessary.) U.S. consent would be required for any expenditure of such 

revenues. With respect to deep seabed mining, because the United States is a nonparty, U.S. companies currently lack the practical ability to engage in such mining under U.S. authority. Becoming a Party will give our firms such ability and 

will open up new revenue opportunities for them when deep seabed mining becomes economically viable. The alternative is no deep seabed mining for U.S. 

firms, except through other nations under the Convention. These minimal costs 

are worth it. 

The Convention mandates another tribunal to adjudicate disputes. 

• The Convention established the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 

However, Parties are free to choose other methods of dispute settlement. The 

United States would choose two forms of arbitration rather than the Tribunal.

• The United States would be subject to the Sea-bed Disputes Chamber, should 

deep seabed mining ever take place under the regime established by the Convention. The proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent makes clear that the Seabed Disputes Chamber’s decisions ‘‘shall be enforceable in the territory of the 

United States only in accordance with procedures established by implementing 

legislation and that such procedures shall be subject to such legal and factual review as is constitutionally required and without precedential effect in any court 

of the United States.’’ The Chamber’s authority extends only to disputes involving 

the mining of minerals from the deep seabed; no other activities, including operations on the surface of the oceans, are subject to it. 

U.S. adherence will entail history’s biggest voluntary transfer of wealth and surrender of sovereignty. 

• Under the Convention as amended by the 1994 Agreement, there is no transfer 

of wealth and no surrender of sovereignty.

• In fact, the Convention supports the sovereignty and sovereign rights of the 

United States over extensive maritime territory and natural resources off its 

coast, including a broad continental shelf that in many areas extends well beyond 

the 200-nautical mile limit, and would give us additional capacity to defend those 

claims against others.

• The mandatory technology transfer provisions of the original Convention, an element of the Convention that the United States objected to, were eliminated in the 

1994 Agreement. 

The International Seabed Authority has the power to regulate seven-tenths of the 

earth’s surface, impose international taxes, etc. 

• The Convention addresses seven-tenths of the earth’s surface. However, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) does not.

• The authority of the ISA is limited to administering mining of minerals in areas 

of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, generally more than 200 miles 

from the shore of any country. At present, and in the foreseeable future, such 

deep seabed mining is economically unfeasible. The ISA has no other role and has 

no general regulatory authority over the uses of the oceans, including freedom of 

navigation and overflight.

• The ISA has no authority or ability to levy taxes. 

29

The United States might end up without a vote in the ISA. 

• The Council is the main decision-making body of the ISA. The United States 

would have a permanent seat on the Council, by virtue of its being the State with 

the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product on the date of entry into 

force of the Convention, November 16, 1994. (1994 Agreement, Annex Section 

3.15(a)) This would give us a uniquely influential role on the Council, the body 

that matters most. 

The PRC asserts that the Convention entitles it to exclusive economic control of the 

waters within a 200 nautical-mile radius of its artificial islands—including waters transited by the vast majority of Japanese and American oil tankers en route 

to and from the Persian Gulf. 

• We are not aware of any claims by China to a 200-mile economic zone around its 

artificial islands.

• Any claim that artificial islands generate a territorial sea or EEZ has no basis 

in the Convention.

• The Convention specifically provides that artificial islands do not have the status 

of islands and have no territorial sea or EEZ of their own. Sovereignty over certain Spratly Islands (which do legitimately generate a territorial sea and EEZ) is 

disputed among Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. China 

has consistently maintained that it respects the high seas freedoms of navigation 

through the waters of the South China Sea. 

CONCLUSION: 

Mr. Chairman, it is in the U.S. interest to join the Convention because of the national security, economic, environmental, and foreign policy benefits to the United 

States. Among other things, U.S. adherence would promote the stability of the legal 

regime of the oceans, which is vital to U.S. global mobility and national security. 

The Administration recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to accession to the Convention and ratification of the Agreement, on the basis of the proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, VICE CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

Admiral MULLEN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and other Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today on the Law of the Sea Convention. I am here today as this 

is an important matter for all military departments. 

Mr. Chairman, your Navy’s and your military’s ability to operate 

freely across the vast domain of the world’s oceans, in peacetime 

and in war, makes possible the projection of American influence 

and power, and do that without a permission slip. 

The ability of the U.S. military forces to operate freely on, over, 

and above the vast military maneuver space of the oceans is critical to our national security interests, the military in general, and 

the Navy in particular. 

Today, I want to reemphasize to you that I, as well as the Chief 

of Naval Operations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

combatant commanders, and the military departments all support 

accession to the Law of the Sea Convention by the United States. 

This is a considerable body of war-fighting experience and knowledge. 

The military basis for support of the Law of the Sea Convention 

is broad because it codifies fundamental benefits important to our 

operating forces as they train and as they fight. It codifies essential 

navigational freedoms through key international straits and archipelagos in the exclusive economic zone and on the high seas. It 

supports the operational maneuver space for combat and other operations of our warships and aircraft. 

30

It enhances our own maritime interests in our territorial sea, 

contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone, and so that our people know when they are operating in defense of this nation far from 

our shores as we are today, they have the backing and the authority of widely recognized and accepted law to look to, rather than 

depending only on the threat of the use of force. 

You see, this is for me not just an operational issue, but it is also 

a people issue. As Navy leaders, we are entrusted to lead America’s 

sons and daughters who are serving our country at the tip of the 

spear 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. 

And they are willingly conducting our Nation’s business, sometimes in harm’s way. For the many years that we have remained 

outside the Convention, we have asked our young men and women 

to conduct freedom of navigation and other operations, sometimes 

at great risk, to challenge the excessive maritime claims of other 

States to prevent those claims from becoming customary international law. 

We don’t need to do that. The CNO and I are looking for every 

possible guarantee to ensure our sailors’ safety, and to keep them 

from needlessly going into harm’s way. That is why we need to join 

the Law of the Sea Convention. 

Finally, accession to the Law of the Sea Convention is consistent 

with our indispensable leadership role in maritime matters in the 

future. Admiral Clark has testified in both open and closed sessions 

for Congress about this issue. These provisions and others are important, and it is preferable for the United States to be a party to 

the Convention that codifies the freedom of navigation and overflight needed to support U.S. military operations. 

Likewise, it is beneficial to have a seat at the table to shape future developments of the Law of the Sea Convention, which is open 

for amendment, as I understand it, this November. 

Becoming a party, on the other hand, gives us an important seat 

at the table to ensure the Law of the Sea continues to protect our 

people and maritime interests, both economic and military, prevent 

excessive claims that attempt to restrict access, preserve the critical navigation freedoms and freedom of the seas essential to our 

national security. 

It is beneficial for the United States to be in a position of leadership on these issues, continuing to work to preserve the key navigation provisions in the Convention, and shape its future. 

In closing, let me just add that the Navy has been reviewing the 

Law of the Sea Convention for 25 years. Indeed, we currently operate—willingly because it is in our national security interests—within the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention in every area 

related to navigation. 

We would not recommend an international commitment that 

would require us to get a permission slip from anyone to conduct 

our operations, or restrict our intelligence activities. 

Simply, the Convention does not require a permission slip or prohibit these activities. We would continue operating our military 

forces as we do today. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for your time today on this important issue, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]

31

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL

OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Chairman Hyde, Representative Lantos, Members of the Committee on International Relations, good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today in 

support of the Law of the Sea Convention. I am Admiral Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy, 

the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for the Department of the Navy. 

Although I am presently the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, I previously commanded the Navy’s Second Fleet and NATO’s Striking Force Atlantic, was privileged to command the George Washington Carrier Battle Group, and was commanding officer on and served aboard a number of cruisers, destroyers and other 

ships in our Fleet. The Administration, including the Military Departments, the 

Joints Chiefs of Staff, and the Combatant Commanders, all strongly support U.S. 

accession to the Convention. The Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

the Navy have consistently supported the navigation provisions of the Convention 

over the years. Following the 1994 deep seabed mining fixes, all former living Chiefs 

of Naval Operations endorsed the Convention in a 1998 letter urging Senate leadership to take positive action on U.S. accession. 

General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated, 

‘‘The Convention remains a top national security priority . . . It supports efforts in 

the War on Terrorism by providing much-needed stability and operational maneuver 

space, codifying essential navigational and overflight freedoms.’’ Admiral Vern 

Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, has testified that the Convention supports 

U.S. efforts in the War on Terrorism and will not negatively affect or impair our 

ability to collect intelligence, interdict suspect vessels, or in other ways prosecute 

the war. I, too, believe that to be true. 

The collective knowledge and experience of our nation’s military leaders supporting U.S. accession to the Convention is a considered body of warfighting experience and knowledge. 

Entry into force for the United States will enhance the worldwide mobility our 

forces require and our traditional leadership role in maritime matters, as well as 

better position us to initiate and influence future developments in the Law of the 

Sea.

As the Chief of Naval Operations has testified on numerous occasions, your Navy 

is built to take persistent, credible combat power to the far corners of the earth, 

extending the influence of the United States of America as may be necessary, anywhere and at any time we choose to do so. It is our ability to operate freely across 

the vast expanse of the world’s oceans that makes this combat power possible and 

makes it a force in peace and war. 

In my view, the Law of the Sea Convention supports our ability to operate in this 

manner under the authority of widely recognized and accepted law. For that reason, 


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I, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, 

strongly support the Law of the Sea Convention. 

I: PROJECTING DECISIVE JOINT POWER ACROSS THE GLOBE

Today’s military operations—from Operation Enduring Freedom to Operation 

Iraqi Freedom to the Global War on Terrorism—place a premium on our strategic 

mobility and operational maneuver. U.S. Forces are forward deployed worldwide to 

deter threats to our national security and can surge to respond rapidly to protect 

U.S. interests, either as part of a coalition or, if necessary, acting independently. 

In addition to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, our ships and 

aircraft have been and are deployed overseas to interdict terrorists across the globe. 

They have also been deployed to the Pacific and Indian Oceans to ensure security 

in vital sea lines of communication in Southeast Asia, and are conducting operations 

in the waters off Central and South America to interdict the flow of illicit drug traffic from that region. 

We are also laying the groundwork for further implementation of the President’s 

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 

Chief of Naval Operations, and I are convinced that our work with our international 

partners in PSI is critical in helping to disrupt the flow of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials throughout the world. 

Some critics have argued that U.S. accession to the Convention will somehow prohibit or impede the PSI. It will not. It should be noted that the international partners assembled as part of the PSI are all parties to the Law of the Sea Convention 

and, to my knowledge, have not expressed concerns that the Convention and the 

PSI are incompatible. Furthermore, the Statement of Interdiction Principles for the 

PSI published by the White House explicitly states that interdiction activities will 

be taken ‘‘consistent with international law and frameworks.’’ This includes relevant 

provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention as reflected in customary international 

law. 

As we look to the future, Sea Power 21 will provide sea basing from which to 

project joint forces and joint firepower. It will provide joint logistics and project defensive power in an environment where access to land bases is increasingly denied 

by foreign governments or put increasingly at risk by asymmetric threats. These capabilities are important to us because they will result in a leaner footprint for joint 

forces ashore and will minimize the vulnerabilities tied to foreign bases and access 

rights. The Convention will help preserve our ability to provide these capabilities 

wherever and whenever needed well into the future. 

II: PRESERVING OUR FREEDOMS

The basic tenets of the Law of the Sea Convention are clear. It codifies the right 

to transit through essential international straits and archipelagic waters. It reaffirms the sovereign immunity of our warships and other public vessels. It provides 

a framework to counter excessive claims of states that seek illegally to expand their 

maritime jurisdiction and restrict the movement of vessels of other States in international and other waters. And it preserves our right to conduct military activities 

and operations in exclusive economic zones without the need for permission or prior 

notice.

33

Most importantly, the entry into force of the Law of the Sea Convention for the 

United States will support both the worldwide mobility of our forces and our traditional leadership role in maritime matters. The customary international law we’ve 

relied upon for our navigation freedoms is under challenge, and in some respects 

so is the Law of the Sea Convention itself. Our participation in the Convention will 

better position us to initiate and influence future developments in the Law of the 

Sea. 

I know there are some who have expressed concern about whether the Law of the 

Sea Convention prohibits our naval operations, including the boarding and search 

of ships and our maritime intelligence activities. It does not. The Convention’s rules 

in this regard do not change the rules the Navy has operated under for over 40 

years under the predecessor 1958 treaties to which the United States is a party, 

governing the territorial sea and high seas. We would not, for example, need permission from the United Nations to board and search ships. There simply is no such 

requirement anywhere in the Convention. Likewise, the Convention does not prohibit our intelligence collection activities. 

Last year, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Administration officials expressed a concern about whether the Convention’s dispute resolution process 

could possibly affect U.S. military activities. A review was conducted within the Executive Branch on whether a Law of the Sea tribunal could question whether U.S. 

activities are indeed ‘‘military’’ for purposes of the Convention’s military activities 

exception clause. Based on the Administration’s internal review, it is clear that 

whether an activity is ‘‘military’’ is for each State party to determine for itself. The 

declaration contained in the current Resolution of Ratification, stating the U.S. understanding that each Party has the exclusive right to determine which of its activities are ‘‘military activities’’ and that such determinations are not subject to review, 

has appropriately addressed this issue. 

Mr. Chairman, since 1983, the Navy has conducted its activities in accordance 

with President Reagan’s Oceans Policy statement to operate consistent with the 

Convention’s provisions on navigational freedoms. If the U.S. becomes a party to the 

Law of the Sea Convention, we would continue to operate as we have since 1983, 

and would gain support for our leadership role in Law of the Sea matters. I am convinced that joining the Law of the Sea Convention will have no adverse effect on 

our operations or intelligence activities, but rather, will support and enhance ongoing U.S. military operations, including the continued prosecution of the Global War 

on Terrorism. 

III: CONCLUSION

Future threats will likely emerge in places and in ways that are not yet fully 

clear. For these and other undefined future operational challenges, we must be able 


93660e.eps
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to take maximum advantage of the established and widely accepted navigational 

rights the Law of the Sea Convention codifies to get us to the fight rapidly. 

Strategic mobility is more important than ever. The oceans are fundamental to 

that maneuverability; as the CNO and I have both previously testified in our support of the Convention, joining the Convention supports the freedom to get to the 

fight, twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, without a permission slip. 

The Convention provides a stable and predictable legal regime within which to 

conduct our operations today, and realize our vision for the future. It will allow us 

to take a leading role in future developments in the law to ensure they are compatible with our vision. 

Again, I wish to thank the Committee for offering me the opportunity to appear 

before you here today. I support the Law of the Sea Convention. I am happy to answer any questions that you may have.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Admiral. As you know, we invite 

questions from Members in the order in which they arrive for the 

hearing. So if it appears that we jump around, that is the rules, 

or that is the rule. So, first, Mr. Blumenauer. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity for this hearing, and hearing from our witnesses. I appreciated, Admiral, in particular your focus on the impact on the people under your command, particularly when we 

have this cloud that I think affects us all: Questions about what 

is going on in Iraq right now, questions about the transparency of 

our activities, chains of command, whether or not we are adhering 

to international conventions dealing with prisoners. 

I wonder if you could elaborate for a moment on what impact the 

approval of this Convention would have on the men and women 

who are currently operating under difficult situations at sea. 

Admiral MULLEN. In my statement, I spoke to the compliance 

that we have exhibited since the 1983 time frame, and part of that 

deals with something that, when we go to sea, we call freedom of 

navigation. 

We have operated in areas of the world, in the Mediterranean, 

for example, off the coast of Libya, for many years, and where 

there were claims which were excessive from an international 

standpoint. 

I have personally done this also in the economic zone off of North 

Korea, and in those situations, because there is no codified set of 

rules, if you will, to which those that sign up to this treaty would 

conform, we are in a position to ask our sailors—and what we try 

to do in those circumstances in what we call freedom of navigation 

operations—is assert what we understand to be the well-understood international law at the time, customary law. 

And in doing that, we have on more than one occasion put our 

ships, and the sailors, the men and women who man them, in a 

more dangerous position because of where that maneuver space is, 

well outside our country’s territorial seas, and well inside the exclusive economic zone, for instance, of a country that might claim 

a wider area, for whatever reason. 

We have routinely asserted that over the years to make sure that 

the Law of the Sea Convention and that which is understood internationally around the world, that freedom of navigation, and freedom of the seas, the rights of passage, those things are in fact asserted. 

There would not be a guarantee that, if this passed, that that 

same country wouldn’t act belligerently, but it clearly brings in my 

35

view a body of significant beliefs, and certainly the international 

views and the pressures associated with that, to hopefully put 

them in a position where they would be a little more reticent in 

terms of what they might do. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just would like 

to put on the record, and I will submit a formal opening statement 

at your invitation, but there are two points I guess I would just put 

in closing here. I think this would be an important action by this 

Congress at this time when we are committed to international cooperation. 

I think it would have salutary effects that go far beyond what 

we are talking about in terms of the Law of the Sea. Second, we 

have actually a greater threat to the future of humankind than this 

struggle against terrorism that we are involved with now, and that 

is what we can do to the environment. 

Global climate change, warming, pollution, the two national reports—one private, and one federal—that have been released about 

the health of the oceans, that paint a picture of putting at risk this 

center of the food chain and protection of the environment. 

And so this would also I think be a powerful signal and a mechanism for us to be able to work cooperatively to protect the environmental health of the oceans, and just as importantly, for our international security. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. I thank the 

gentleman for his sound thinking. Mr. Tancredo of Colorado. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but I believe my colleague preceded me here. 

Mr. PAUL. That is okay. 

Mr. TANCREDO. I believe that my colleague, Mr. Paul, preceded 

me here. 

Chairman HYDE. You can’t believe it is your turn? 

Mr. TANCREDO. Right, it is amazing. 

Chairman HYDE. Are you willing to yield your turn? 

Mr. TANCREDO. I am willing to yield to Mr. Paul if he requires 

it or requests it. 

Mr. PAUL. I am patient. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. All right. Mr. Paul has adopted a new mantle 

of patience. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are a couple of questions that come to mind as a result of your testimony, 

and especially that of Admiral Mullen. My questions are with respect specifically to the fact that we are operating apparently, the 

Navy is apparently operating under the provisions of the treaty, because, as you say, it is in our interest to do so. 

You are operating in a way that would fulfill the requirements 

of this treaty. I understand that you are saying that this is acceptable to the Navy. 

But there are, of course, a lot of other provisions of this treaty 

that don’t deal specifically with military issues, but that are disconcerting to several of us. I am just wondering why I should feel 

better about the treaty when you say that you are doing it and it 

doesn’t matter? 

36

I mean, there are other things that I don’t like, and if you can 

continue to do it, and if the military, if the Navy says that the provisions don’t stop them from doing what they need to do, and in 

fact you even can make use of them, that is fine. Go ahead. Why 

do we need a treaty beyond that. You just continue doing what you 

are doing. 

Admiral MULLEN. As this treaty has evolved over the years, in 

terms of the debate and discussion, I have been focusing on it, or 

have focused on it certainly very much this last year. I spend a lot 

of my time, as I think we all are doing, worrying about the future, 

and how you predict that, project it. The thing that this treaty 

brings me from the military standpoint, and from the Navy standpoint in particular, is the ability to better leverage the maneuver 

space in the oceans that are out there. 

And that mobility I believe also is going to—if you accept that 

it will allow me to do that—it is my belief and the belief of many, 

many senior military officers, that acceding to this will give me 

that leverage. And that mobility, and that maneuver space is more 

important than it has ever been and will continue to be, particularly as we struggle with rights in certain parts of the world to create a footprint. 

To make sure that we have the access that we need under accepted law, and the codification of that obviously, it also would 

allow us—again from the military standpoint—to take a considerable leadership role. This is the seat at the table discussion, which 

gets back to really two principal pieces for me. 

One is my ability to do this from a war fighting standpoint, and 

the current regime which routinely puts my people in a position 

that doesn’t—if they do not have to be there, from the standpoint 

of exerting, asserting the freedoms that are currently there. There 

are those that argue that you can do this from outside. Really, it 

is the opinion of a considerable number of senior military officers, 

that it is better to do that from inside. 

In looking at the future, and this goes to the comment that was 

made earlier in testimony, this is a generational war. This is a long 

war. We are uncertain as to obviously when it is going to end, this 

global war on terrorism. We believe this treaty will better support 

our ability to fight that war because of the ability to maneuver in 

that operational space than we are able to do now. And I don’t reject that there is clearly—you know, we have conformed to it—

there is an operational aspect which we conform to right now. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, Mr. Taft, why should I feel any better 

about this, I suppose, considering the fact that we will still be subject to this compulsory dispute resolution process, which we have 

learned by now seldom results in anything that accrues to our benefit in this country, just because of the nature of the world that we 

live in and the resentment that many people have for the United 

States and what we represent. 

I certainly do not feel comfortable at all putting this country into 

that kind of a situation, compulsory dispute resolutions, giving a 

certain degree of our sovereignty over to another entity. 

Mr. TAFT. Well, Congressman, I would just say that I think we 

need to focus on exactly what the subjects would be that would be 

affected by this compulsory dispute mechanism. First of all, we are 

37

excluding from the dispute mechanism any military activities, and 

matters that affect our vital interests as we are permitted to do 

under the Convention. 

And that is in the resolution of advice and consent proposed by 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—the things that are left 

that are subject to dispute resolution. I think it is important to 

wonder what would happen in the absence of a dispute resolution 

mechanism. 

These concern things such as a claim where we have perhaps a 

pipeline or a cable that is interfered with by another State or we 

have a ship which is perhaps taken into a port and arrested improperly, and we want compensation for that. 

We have a number of areas where it will be very much to our 

advantage if we are unable to negotiate with the other State a resolution, that we are able to get a settlement of those through these 

processes. 

There really isn’t anything that is subject to the dispute resolution that affects our vital national interests. Most of these things 

will be economic, seeking compensation for damages that the other 

States have done, and that has been the record of the very small 

number of cases that have been brought by the existing parties to 

the treaty under the dispute resolution thing. 

There was one, or the most prominent case, was a case where the 

State of Guinea arrested a ship belonging to St. Vincent and the 

Grenadines, or registered there, and it was improper that they did 

that. They were unable to resolve it amongst themselves, although 

they tried, I guess, but not hard enough. They went to dispute resolution, compensation was paid, and the ship had already previously 

been ordered released, and that was right, too. This is a good thing 

to have available where your ability to negotiate a solution fails. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. 

Delahunt. 

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one question 

about the treaty itself. Recently, Admiral and Mr. Taft, there was 

a report put out by the Oceans Commission, and I don’t know if 

either one of you are necessarily familiar with all of its recommendations. 

Would there at some point in time be a divergence, or is there 

any impact whatsoever, or what would be the context of those recommendations in terms of the Convention? Is there a certain synergy if those recommendations were adopted in toto, or is there a 

potential conflict? That is the only question I have. Thank you. If 

you could answer. 

Mr. TAFT. I guess I would only say that I am not familiar with 

all of the details of that report. It is quite an extensive report, but 

I do know that one of the recommendations in the report was that 

we should accede to the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

So in that sense at least the people who are writing it thought 

that it was consistent, and indeed that their recommendations, 

other recommendations, would be benefited by joining. 

Admiral MULLEN. And, John, I have not gone through the report 

in detail either, but to specifically answer your question, I see it 

as a convergent path, as opposed to a divergent path, for the same 

reasons that Mr. Taft talked about. 

38

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Paul. 

Mr. PAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is for Mr. 

Taft. Is it not true that a treaty is the supreme law of the land; 

that if we pass a treaty, it becomes the supreme law of the land? 

Mr. TAFT. That is what the Constitution says, Congressman, yes, 

sir. 

Mr. PAUL. Do you believe there are any limitations on what can 

be done with a treaty? Anything that happens in a treaty, does it 

become the supreme law of the land, or is it unlimited? 

Mr. TAFT. No, there are treaties, or there are limitations on the 

kinds of treaties that the country can enter into. They must be——

Mr. PAUL. No, I am saying what if we get into them, what happens? Are there any limits to what we can do? What I am referring 

to is can a treaty amend the Constitution? 

Mr. TAFT. No, sir. 

Mr. PAUL. It could not. But in many ways I think this is what 

we do too often, and this is what we are attempting to do now, because we give up our sovereignty. You know, we have done it numerous times already. 

We have a WTO that dictates trade policy, and tax policies. We 

have the IMF that dictates monetary policy to us, and here we 

have a Law of the Sea Treaty that will be dictating policies to us, 

and actually introduces the notion of a tax. 

So I see this as a contradiction, and something that is out in 

limbo. We have been too careless about it over the last several decades by passing these treaties that literally change our Constitution. And it seems like we should not enter into any treaty that 

could possibly undermine our constitutional rights. 

Mr. TAFT. Well, Congressman, I would agree with you that we 

should not enter into any such treaty. This treaty does not have 

that effect. We have looked very carefully at that in crafting the 

resolution with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and we 

have included in there a number of provisions which address precisely that concern, sir. 

Mr. PAUL. Okay. I think I want to go on, because I think it is 

something that we should continue to think about, because we have 

a disagreement there. I disagree with the process also because of 

the nature of our wanting to resolve differences by always expanding the size and role of government. 

A hundred years ago or so, we introduced the automobile to this 

country, and we didn’t have a law of highway treaties among the 

50 States so cars can drive in and out of different States. What we 

had were agreements between all the States, and a license works 

in every State. That principle recognized the notion of State sovereign rights in working out treaties and agreements among the 

States, so-called treaties. 

And we more or less have been doing this with the seas as well, 

and all of a sudden we are claiming that it does not work anymore. 

We have to have a treaty, which to me is a great threat. It is a 

threat to our liberties and our Constitution. 

Yet, we have a pretty good history. I would suggest that you—

and especially the Navy—are about 180 years too late, because this 

was a question that came up in our early history. 

39

Jefferson worried about the Barbary Pirates, and Madison worried about the British. And it seems to me like we have had pretty 

much freedom of the seas ever since. But you claim now that we 

need our navy to go in certain tight areas and not be kept from 

going where we want to go. 

I see that as a two-edged sword. One is that there is a narrow 

sea lane, and the two countries that are involved have agreements, 

and they let commercial ships go in and out and have agreements 

with all the people in the world, and most of the time trade is 

going. 

And all of a sudden there is a treaty, and we, now being the most 

powerful nation in the world, we have the clout, that we can say 

that no matter what you say about armed vessels going in and out 

of here, we, because we belong to the treaty, we will go in. 

I think you are stirring up a hornet’s nest. You are saying we 

will do it because we are the biggest and the toughest. The other 

question is, and this is a prospective question, what happens when 

we are not king of the hill? 

What happens if our empire dies. What happens if the Chinese 

come in and under the Law of the Sea Treaty want to put their 

navy in the Gulf of Mexico, and the Chesapeake Bay? They could 

argue this. 

No, it is not going to happen now, but what are you setting up 

for the next generation? Those are the things that I am concerned 

about, and I would like to have our Admiral address that. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. You said this is a two-edged sword. 

The other side is that in my view the Law of the Sea Treaty gives 

us the opportunity and codifies the ability to do that in these in 

particular critical international States—I am sorry, international 

straits. 

And that the longstanding ability to do that with respect to—and 

as I talked earlier, about our future, we really think is critical 

operationally. It puts us in a position inside the treaty, a position 

of leadership to better guarantee that than we have right now, 

should someone else choose to oppose that view in a certain strait 

in that part of the world. 

I have spent most of my life at sea, and most of my life around 

the world, and from the international connection standpoint and 

from the operations of navies worldwide, these critical nodes, and 

the understandings of what we need to operate in, around, and 

through them, I think are better served with the provisions of this 

treaty than not being there. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for holding 

this hearing on an issue of enormous national significance. I appreciate the esteemed witnesses that are here. 

By way of full disclosure, although I lack probably the 

caffeinated intensity of the preceding speaker, I am not a fan of 

multi-national solutions as a rule, and so my concern about this 

issue has to do largely with the way this Law of the Sea Treaty 

either does or does not infringe on the ability of the United States 

of America to prosecute our national security in the seven seas. 

40

And so I am tempted to use a little bit of my time to ask Mr. 

Taft about the resolution of the deep seabed mining regime, which 

was the reason why President Reagan refused to sign this two decades ago. My understanding is that has been resolved very much 

as the United States had hoped, and so I want to focus on national 

security, if I may, with the Admiral. We have even in our folder, 

and we will hear later from someone that I greatly respect, the 

President for the Center for Security Policy, who says that this 

treaty is not in our national security interests. 

And, Admiral, I find that as kind of an interesting assertion, because according to my research, and correct me if I am wrong, the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and of course our 

Commander-in-Chief, believe that this treaty would benefit our 

ability to pursue our national security on the open seas. 

And I wonder if you might speak to the assertion, however briefly, that this does not in fact erode, but in fact may enhance our 

ability to pursue our national interests in the world on the ocean. 

Admiral. 

Admiral MULLEN. One of the issues that gets discussed around 

law of the sea is the sovereignty issue. It is my view that in fact—

and I have sailed on many ships—that this improves and sustains 

the sovereign rights that we have when we take literally American 

territory on ships around the world. 

And that is a conclusion that I come to very easily with respect 

to this treaty. I am not concerned about that piece of it at all. I 

talked about the future and the ability to support what we see as 

an expanding and a difficult challenge with respect to the prosecuting of global war. 

In some ways, it boils down to codification, and whether we think 

that is helpful or not. In my experience, dealing in areas around 

the world, having rules to which we can cite doesn’t mean that everybody is going to comply with them. 

But having that is very impactful, as opposed to not having it. 

In our discussions, or in our involvement in various places around 

the world, going into an area where we know it is contested, in my 

view it is much different than going into an area that is not or that 

we know is not contested. 

Mr. PENCE. Admiral, if I may, is it your assertion, as my colleague, Senator Lugar has made as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that this actually may result in American naval 

personnel being safer——

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Mr. PENCE [continuing]. Operating where we now have to use the 

threat of force to ensure access to certain disputed areas? The Law 

of the Sea Treaty would clarify within a 200-mile limit where we 

can operate? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, it truly is, and in the discussion earlier, I talked in terms of freedom of navigation, and where it is contested, we do go in with the threat of force, and we are certainly 

ready for that. 

Mr. PENCE. Let me ask one other question if I may, Admiral, and 

Mr. Taft can speak to this as well as the legal expert here. Is it 

accurate to say that this, the Law of the Sea Treaty, does not in 

41

any way affect intelligence collection by the United States of America? And is it your position that military activities and disputes are 

excluded from the conflict resolution forums created by this treaty? 

Either witness. 

Mr. TAFT. Congressman, the answer is yes to both of your questions. Intelligence activities have been conducted for the last 20 

years, consistent with the provisions of the treaty, and are unaffected. If we become a party, they would just go in the way that 

they have been carried out. 

And as to military activities being subject to dispute resolution, 

in the resolution of advice and consent that the Senate Committee 

has put forward, we have taken the option, which is available in 

the treaty, to exclude those activities from the dispute resolution 

mechanism, and more than that, we have assured that it will be 

we who identify those military activities, and when we do that, 

they are out. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from American Samoa, Mr. 

Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I offer my apologies. I had to take in another hearing this morning and so I was 

unable to be here on time for this hearing. But I do want to thank 

you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing, and especially for having such a distinguished panel to offer their testimony about this 

important issue concerning the Law of the Sea Convention Treaty. 

I have been tracking this issue for so long, Mr. Chairman, that 

I think it was about 100 years ago that we began playing with this 

thing. In fact, my understanding is that we drafted most of the provisions of this proposed treaty that has been approved by several 

other nations, except for ourselves. 

And so I am happy to hear that the Administration does support 

the proposed treaty, which I think is a very, very dynamic part of 

the equation. And because I am from the Pacific, Mr. Chairman, 

I guess it is a natural thing to take a very strong interest in this 

issue. 

When we talk about seabed minerals, like manganese nodules, 

and lending security to some of these raw metals, I think in the 

years to come this is going to be a very sensitive issue, not only 

to our security, but for our economic interests. 

I would like to ask Secretary Taft, basically in terms of the overall position of the Administration, are there any other areas in the 

proposed treaty where you feel that there are some concerns in the 

Administration? 

My understanding is that you do support—the Administration 

does support—the proposed treaty, but I am just curious if there 

are any areas in the treaty where you feel maybe we need to beef 

it up a little bit, or however else we may want to take a position? 

Mr. TAFT. Congressman, I think our assessment is that we did 

very well in the negotiation leading up to the treaty as it was 

drafted in 1982. Our military, economic interests, and our interests 

in preserving the environment, were very effectively addressed 

there. 

42

The only reservation that we had, and it was a substantial one, 

that prevented us from becoming a party at that time had to do 

with the seabed mining provision, Part XI. Now that that has been 

fixed—and Congressman Pence, I think, is correct in his statement 

that it has been fixed—we do not have any reservations about the 

treaty’s provisions. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I want to hope that some day maybe the 

distinguished Chairman and I will visit one of these islands called 

the Cook Islands. A recent survey was conducted by one of the Norwegian companies, in terms of the potential seabed minerals, manganese nodules, that are contained in this little island nation, 

which has probably only 20,000 people, but covers 3 million square 

miles of ocean. 

According to the best estimates, the contents of these manganese nodules in this little island country is well over $200 billion worth, 

and that is the very, very least estimate in terms of the value of 

these manganese nodules that are in the Pacific Ocean. 

And that is just one little island nation, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully 

it is not just a tremendous value economically, but as it was mentioned earlier by Mr. Pence, and others may have already asked 

the question, Mr. Taft, and Admiral Mullen, there are security interests. Are we absolutely assured that we are not going to have 

any problems with our national security, whether it be under the 

ocean, on the ocean, or in the air, if the provisions of this treaty 

are to be implemented? 

Mr. TAFT. I will defer to the Admiral on that. 

Admiral MULLEN. Absolute certainty about the future is certainly 

difficult to guarantee, but from my point of view, and my boss’ 

point of view, and that of other military leaders, we are very comfortable with the provisions. We think they will enhance our national security, and not detract from it. From the Navy’s point of 

view, we think they are critical to our ability to maneuver and operate in the future. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I recall, Mr. Chairman, when the little island nation of Carbost had a special fishing treaty with the then 

Soviet Union, and so the Soviet Union sent this ship that sat right 

on the borderline of Carbost, but this fishing vessel never went 

fishing. It just stood there watching the missiles that we were firing from Vandenberg toward the Bikini atoll. 

You know, that was the kind of security issues that we were 

looking for as far as the Pacific Ocean is concerned, and I am sure 

that the Admiral is very familiar with the issues that we faced 

there. What is the time line of the Administration’s——

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. I would like 

to state that we expect six votes to be bunched together when they 

reach the votes, and so I would like to finish with this panel and 

really hear the testimony from the next panel before we disperse. 

So I will thank this panel for your instructive, illuminating statements, and answers to the questions. We are most appreciative, 

and we will now invite the second panel to the table. 

Mr. TAFT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Taft, and thank you, Admiral 

Mullen. Our second panel is led by Frank Gaffney, Junior, Founder 

43

and President of the Center for Security Policy, a not-for-profit, 

non-partisan education corporation, established in 1998. 

Under Mr. Gaffney’s leadership the center has been nationally 

and internationally recognized as a resource for timely, informed, 

and penetrating analysis of foreign and defense policy matters. 

Mr. Gaffney contributes actively to these debates as a columnist 

for The Washington Post, The Jewish World Review, and other publications. Mr. Gaffney has served as Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for International Security Policy under President Reagan, among 

other appointments, and has been a staff member of the Senate 

Armed Services Committee. 

He holds degrees from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and Georgetown University’s School 

of Foreign Service. 

Our next panelist is Baker Spring, an F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at the Heritage Foundation, where 

he examines the threat of ballistic missiles from third-world countries, arms control, and U.S. national security issues. 

Mr. Spring is a student of the treaty-making process and is focused on the Senate’s role in advising and consenting to the ratification of treaties. Mr. Spring has previously served as a defense 

and foreign policy expert for two U.S. Senators, and holds degrees 

from Washington and Lee University, and Georgetown University. 

We will next hear from Dr. Peter M. Leitner, a widely published 

author, who is President of the Higgins Counterterrorism Research 

Center, and is President of the Washington Center for Peace and 

Justice, a non-profit organization representing victims of child abduction by foreign spouses. 

Dr. Leitner is also a professor at George Mason University, and 

an adjunct faculty member with the graduate schools of George 

Mason, the University of Northern Virginia, Mount Vernon College, 

and Southeastern University. He is co-editor-in-chief of the Journal 

of Power and Ethics, and is the author of two books on strategic 

technology and the law of the sea, as well as numerous journal articles. 

Dr. Leitner has appeared several times before Congress, and has 

been featured on radio and television programs, such as 60 Minutes. 

Kathy Metcalf is the Director of Maritime Affairs for the Chamber of Shipping of America, a maritime trade association representing a significant number of U.S. based companies that own, 

operate, or charter ocean-going tankers, container ships, and other 

merchant vessels engaged in domestic and international trade. 

Ms. Metcalf represents maritime interests before Congress, Federal and State agencies, and in international forums. She came to 

her present position with experience in various positions in the energy industry, including aboard large ocean-going vessels, and has 

covered marine safety and environment issues, corporate, regulatory, and compliance and State government affairs. She is a graduate of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, and holds a JD from 

the Delaware School of Law. 

Our second panel will conclude with testimony from John Norton 

Moore, a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School, 

and Director of their Center for National Security Law, and the 

44

Center for Oceans and Law Policy. Viewed by many as the founder 

of the field of national security law, Professor Moore has chaired 

the American Bar Associations’s Standing Committee on Law and 

National Security for four terms. 

He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the American Law Institute, and many other professional and honorary organizations. Professor Moore has served under a total of seven 

Presidential appointments, including as the Senate-confirmed 

Chairman of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute 

of Peace. 

He has served as the Counselor on International Law to the Department of State, and as Ambassador and Deputy Special Representative of the President to the Law of the Sea Conference. He 

also has been a member of the Director of Central Intelligence’s 

Historical Review Board. 

We welcome each of you to today, and ask that you summarize 

your statements if you can in about 5 minutes. Your written statements will be a part of the record, and we will begin with you, Mr. 

Gaffney. 

STATEMENT OF FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR., PRESIDENT, THE 

CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY 

Mr. GAFFNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be as brief 

as I can given the complexities of this treaty. First of all, I appreciate very much your leadership in taking up this matter, even 

though some would have said that it is all the Senate’s business. 

You will almost certainly be responsible for implementing legislation, including I suspect some that will deal with matters that have 

to originate in the House in light of some of the revenue-generating 

aspects of this treaty. 

I hope other Committees of this body will take note of your leadership and follow it, and if I may, Mr. Chairman, we have an open 

letter that several organizations have joined me in sending to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, asking that he assure that there is 

time for your deliberations and other Committees here, as well as 

in the Senate. 

And if I may make that a part of the record at this point, I would 

be very grateful. There may also be a few other signatories that 

come in shortly, which I would like to be able to add as well if I 

may. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. GAFFNEY. Thank you, sir. 

[The information referred to appears in the Appendix.] 

Mr. GAFFNEY. I have to issue a disclaimer at the beginning, unlike some of the panel members here, and elsewhere in this town. 

I do not consider myself an expert on this treaty. 

I have spent the better part of 28 years trying to evaluate the 

national security implications of various treaties, and have on the 

basis of that background concluded that this one is not as it has 

been described to you, which is to say that I think not entirely consistent with our national security interests, and the commonweal 

of the Nation more generally. 

45

It is not to say that there aren’t specific parts of this treaty that 

are unobjectionable, or even desirable, from the standpoint of certain interests, special or governmental. 

I believe, however, from a net assessment point of view, the treaty is defective and not in the interests of the United States. If I 

leave you with only one point, Mr. Chairman, it would be this. 

It seems generally agreed, at least implicitly, by even the proponents of this treaty that the part of the treaty that President 

Reagan most expressly objected to, Part XI, which created a new 

supranational governmental entity, called the International Seabed 

Authority, was defective. 

In fact, you get that because everybody points quite happily to 

the 1994 agreement, which supposedly fixed that part of the treaty. 

I believe close inspection will raise questions in your mind, as they 

have in mine, as to whether the 1994 agreement does fix anything. 

Not least because though there is frequently reference made to 

the fact that it amended the objectionable parts of the original 

treaty, that can’t be done under the terms of this treaty until November of this year. 

The reason that I emphasize this is that, even if it were the case 

that somehow an agreement that doesn’t amend the treaty, and 

that hasn’t been ratified by almost 20 percent of the signatories of 

the treaty, were actually effective in fixing that particular part of 

the treaty, you would still have two things at work here that I suggest are going to cause us grave problems down the road—two 

things that contributed to the creation of Part XI in the first place, 

and that will haunt us hereafter. 

One is the ill-concealed hostility of a majority of the participating 

nations to American economic and military power, and the determination of that majority to use treaties like the Law of the Sea 

Treaty in a sort of lilliputian effort to confine or constrain this 

country’s power in both economic and military senses. This agenda 

was reflected in what was called, at the time this treaty was created, the ‘‘New International Economic Order.’’ It sought to redistribute wealth from developed countries, like ours, to undeveloped 

ones. 

The second problem is the one-country-one-vote mechanism, 

which largely operates in this treaty. In some places, there are consensus arrangements. In some places, people will tell you that constitutes a veto. 

But in some places we are not even guaranteed a seat. We are 

talking about a seat at the table, for example, on the international 

tribunal. But the problem is there is almost certainly going to be 

more of this kind of animus, more of this kind of eroading of the 

United States’ position taking place if we become a party. 

And the treaty, even if it is, as it has been described to you, as 

pretty good, will become less and less good over time. It is one of 

the reasons why I think you are hearing this sense of urgency. 

As the treaty is supposedly going to be open for amendment, it 

may get uglier from the U.S. point of view. If so, it will be because 

of these two phenomena that caused President Reagan to be right 

in rejecting this treaty early on. 

46

Another point which I hope you will take away is this treaty has 

problems not only in its own right, but as a precedent for how others would like to see us deal with other international ‘‘commons.’’

I happen to be particularly concerned about the notion that we 

need a similar kind of regime to govern space. I think it entirely 

likely that people will turn around once we are a party to this treaty and say, well, now we want to do that for outer space, governing 

the access and use thereof. 

Mr. Chairman, in my prepared remarks, I talk about the veto. 

I think that is something that also warrants some close attention. 

Let me just close by saying on the question that I think Mr. 

Pence mentioned, my concern, my differing view from these respected military leaders as to why this treaty is not in our national 

security interests, is that if you simply look at a number of the provisions of this treaty, for example—and I go through them in my 

testimony—article 88, article 301, article 19, article 20, article 110, 

article 144, all have language that is not consistent with how we 

do business as the leading naval power in the world. 

Now, some will tell you, as they have told me, never mind. We 

simply won’t pay attention to those provisions; or never mind, we 

have already agreed to those sorts of provisions elsewhere. 

The thing that is different this time around, Mr. Chairman, and 

why the precedents are so important, there will be a court, an 

international tribunal, that will be able perhaps to issue rulings, 

and certainly to issue advisory opinions, and maybe over time to 

have them enforced. 

That is a very different deal, and I think we ought to be very 

chary of getting into these kinds of arrangements when we think 

it will apply. And on that point—very quickly, a last point, sir. I 

appreciate your indulgence, because this is directly relevant to an 

area that I know of that is of great interest to you. 

The increasing encroachment of so-called customary international law, of precisely the kind that this international tribunal 

will be spawning, is manifesting itself as Judge Robert Bork, 

among others, have pointed out in our own jurisprudence. 

And Mr. Paul talked about amending our Constitution. I don’t 

know if that is overstating it, but we are certainly seeing people 

say on the basis of advisory opinions, and not even by courts, but 

by international commissions, that now we have to do thus and 

such in our own domestic legal proceedings. 

In short, this treaty I believe is not in our interests. We will continue, as we saw when it was negotiated, to be outvoted, to be outmaneuvered, to be disserved by those dynamics that I mentioned 

a moment ago—the hostility on the one hand and the one-countryone-vote principle, which will apply all too often. Thank you for 

your attention to this, sir, and I hope that you will join us in opposing this treaty’s ratification. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Gaffney. Your time has expired. Mr. Spring. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gaffney follows:]

47

PREPARED STATEMENT OF FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR., PRESIDENT, THE CENTER FOR

SECURITY POLICY

‘THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY: TRIUMPH OF THE LILLIPUTIANS’

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Let me say at the outset how much 

I appreciate the interest you are taking in the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST). It 

would have been easy enough for this Committee to have declined to do so on the 

grounds that the House of Representatives is not, under the Constitution, directly 

involved in the treaty-ratification process. Yet, you clearly will have responsibilities 

for producing implementing legislation—some of which, involving granting for the 

first time an international agency the right to raise revenues, may even have to 

originate in the House. 

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, to paraphrase Senator Vandenberg, it is absolutely imperative that you and your colleagues be involved in the take-off of this dubious venture—not simply what is likely to be its subsequent crash landing. I very much hope 

that other House committees—including Intelligence, Armed Services, Finance, Government Relations, Commerce and Energy—will follow your lead before the resolution of ratification is scheduled for action in the Senate. 

Let me begin with a disclaimer. I do not consider, nor want to represent, myself 

an expert in the Law of the Sea Treaty. I have, however, spent a considerable part 

of the last twenty-eight years examining the national security implications of various international agreements. And, despite representations to the contrary by other 

witnesses today, I have concluded that LOST will have a number of adverse implications for U.S. security interests and the national commonweal more generally. 

This is not to deny that some parts of the Treaty are unobjectionable and possibly 

even desirable for certain American special and government interests. That can be 

true and still have a net assessment come out negative from the standpoint of the 

country as a whole. I will confine these brief remarks to the reasons why I believe 

such a net assessment to apply and why the United States should not become a 

party to the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

ERODING U.S. SOVEREIGNTY

I am struck by the fact that proponents of the Law of the Sea Treaty agree, at 

least implicitly, that President Ronald Reagan was right to refuse to sign this accord 

over his objections to Part XI—the section that established a supranational agency 

charged with regulating seven-tenths of the world’s surface. This agency, known as 

the International Seabed Authority (ISA), has the exclusive right to regulate what 

is done, by whom, when and under what circumstances on and beneath the sea-floor 

in international waters. As with all such organizations, it is staffed by unelected 

and unaccountable international bureaucrats. 

The proponents would have you believe that the problems associated with Part 

XI have been fixed to the United States’ satisfaction through an accord negotiated 

by the Clinton Administration in 1994. This is surely untrue. After all, serious questions exist about the extent to which the so-called ‘‘Agreement’’ actually changes the 

underlying Treaty. For example, it has not amended LOST since—by the Treaty’s 

own terms—it cannot be amended until November of this year. What is more, nearly 

20% of LOST’s States Parties have not ratified the 1994 document. 

Even in the absence of such uncertainties, the larger point is that the original 

Part XI did not just happen. It was the product of extended negotiations and determined haggling, not least that precipitated by President Reagan’s efforts to fix this 

and other unacceptable aspects of the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

What the International Relations Committee, and the Congress more generally, 

needs to appreciate is that Part XI turned out to be so defective thanks to two things 

that applied when the Treaty was being negotiated—and that, in important respects, 

still apply today: 1) The ill-concealed hostility of an overwhelming majority of the 

participating nations to American economic and military power and its determination to use agreements like LOST as part of a Lilliputian-like strategy to constrain 

our sovereignty and strength and redistribute the industrial world’s wealth—and 

ours—to undeveloped states. And, 2) the one-country-one-vote decision-making 

mechanism by which that strategy was repeatedly translated into arrangements 

that will diminish our sovereignty and complicate our ability to act in our self-interest on, in and even above the world’s oceans. 

It is against this backdrop that the powers vested in the International Seabed Authority (ISA) must be considered. For the first time in history, we are being asked 

to submit to a supranational agency that has all the trappings of a world government—an executive, a legislative assembly, a court, the ability to raise revenues and, 

in due course, perhaps the means to enforce its decisions. 

48

Worse yet, should the United States become a State Party to LOST, the ISA will 

become a model for arrangements to govern other so-called ‘‘commons,’’ notably, outer 

space and perhaps Antarctica. The implications for U.S. security and commercial interests of a world government entity dictating to us our use of and access to space 

could make the concerns raised by the ISA pale by comparison. Yet, there has been 

scarcely any discussion of the precedential implications of the Law of the Sea Treaty. 

Mr. Chairman, to all those who blithely say we need not worry about the Law 

of the Sea Treaty—and the institutions and regime it spawns—becoming even less 

friendly to us in the future, I would simply say: The folks who brought us the defective Part XI will dominate the LOST-mandated proceedings and decision-making 

mechanisms. To those who say we will be able to prevent bad things from happening if only we are ‘‘at the table,’’ I would point out that things as bad as Part 

XI happened when we were fully engaged in the negotiations. To those who contend 

we will be able to exercise a veto, I would say that our practice in other international forums is rarely to do so, even where we clearly have the right. And in 

some LOST-spawned organizations that will certainly not be the case—notably, in 

the Treaty’s International Tribunal, on which the United States may not even be 

represented, let alone able to block problematic decisions. 

THE U.S. AS GULLIVER

From a national security perspective, I am particularly concerned that the International Tribunal will be in a position to issue rulings, provide advisory opinions 

and perhaps enforce a series of obligations that are simply incompatible with our 

Nation and Navy’s traditional practice of Freedom of the Seas. These include:

• Article 88: This provision declares that the high seas are ‘‘reserved’’ for peaceful purposes.

• Article 301: This provision obliges States Parties to refrain from ‘‘the threat 

or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 

state.’’

• Article 19: This provision is intended to proscribe the use of territorial waters 

to collect intelligence and conduct other operations (for example, the ‘‘launching, landing or taking on board of any military device’’).

• Article 20: This provision dictates that submarines are ‘‘required to navigate 

on the surface and show their flag’’ in territorial waters.

• Article 110: This provision lists the circumstances under which ships can be 

intercepted and boarded on the high seas. Suspicion of involvement in terrorism and the shipment of weapons of mass destruction—the focuses of 

President Bush’s new Proliferation Security Initiative—are not among them.

• Article 144: This provision obligates States Parties to ‘‘cooperate in promoting 

the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge’’ without regard to the fact 

that at least some could be highly militarily relevant and used against us for 

submarine and/or anti-submarine purposes. 

Proponents claim that this obligation has been rendered harmless by the 

1994 Agreement. Yet, that accord’s Section 5 still says that ‘‘As a general 

rule, States Parties shall promote international technical and scientific cooperation’’ by, among other things, ‘‘developing training, technical assistance 

and scientific cooperation programs in marine science and technology.’’ What 

is more, this Section introduces these responsibilities by declaring them to be 

‘‘in addition to the provisions of Article 144’’ (emphasis added).

Mr. Chairman, in my professional judgment, these provisions are simply not compatible with U.S. national security interests or practices. Some LOST proponents 

have said that we have already agreed to these or similar commitments elsewhere. 

Whether that is literally true or not, it would be inadvisable for us to be signing 

up to them in this context. 

THE RULE OF WHOSE LAW?

For one thing, the United States generally does not long engage in activities that 

are prohibited by its treaty obligations. Lawyers in various government agencies, including the U.S. Navy, can be expected to argue against our doing so in cases like 

the foregoing. 

For another, even if our own legal system interposes no objections to, for example, 

impermissible intelligence collection in or submerged transit of territorial waters, it 

is a safe bet that the Law of the Sea Treaty’s International Tribunal will be asked 

to rule against such practices or, at the very least, to issue advisory opinions against 

49

them. This will, in due course, translate into additional pressure and perhaps domestic court rulings and injunctions that will constrain, and possibly preclude, activities in which we simply must engage—especially in the midst of the present War 

on Terror. 

Let me underscore that last point, Mr. Chairman, since I am sure you are as 

seized as anyone with the ominous implications of a phenomenon to which Judge 

Robert Bork, among others, has recently called attention: the growing practice of 

U.S. courts and jurists to inject under the rubric of ‘‘customary international law’’ 

the decisions of international judges and even non-judicial multilateral bodies (such 

as UN commissions) into domestic legal proceedings. LOST and its tribunal could 

advance this trend, corroding one of our Republic’s most fundamental principles—

namely, that American laws duly fashioned by Congress and signed by the President form the ambit within which U.S. jurisprudence predictably operates. 

AN INVITATION TO WORLD-CLASS GRAFT?

Finally, let me note the commendable work being performed by this Committee 

to examine evidence of systemic corruption and malfeasance on the part of senior 

UN personnel—and, in the case of the Secretary General, one of his relatives—in 

connection with the notorious Iraq Oil-for-Food program. 

At the very least, I would respectfully submit that—even if there were no other 

grounds for rejecting ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty—that step would be 

ill-advised so long as there is reason to believe that its international bureaucracy 

will not similarly abuse the authority to make decisions about, and generate revenues from, what could be billions of dollars worth of ocean-related commerce. Knowing what we do at the moment about the Oil-for-Food Program, it would be irresponsible to extend to the ISA what could amount—literally—to a license to steal on an 

unprecedented scale. 

THE BOTTOM LINE

In short, Mr. Chairman, the people, institutional arrangements and practices that 

brought us the defective Part XI will dictate how that section and the International 

Seabed Authority it mandates, the 1994 Agreement and other problematic parts of 

the Law of the Sea Treaty actually operate. Were the United States to become a 

party to the LOST, we can be assured that we will routinely be outvoted, outmaneuvered and disserved by an agreement that was defective when President Reagan refused to sign it and that can only get worse, given the dynamic that first gave rise 

to this Lilliputian initiative for advancing the long-discredited ‘‘New International 

Economic Order’’ and that is, if anything, even more virulently anti-American today 

than it was in 1982.

STATEMENT OF BAKER SPRING, F.M. KIRBY RESEARCH FELLOW IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. SPRING. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor 

for me to testify before this distinguished Committee, and I will 

summarize my remarks as much as I possibly can. 

I see four major problems with the Convention. The overarching 

one is the matter of state sovereignty. The Convention establishes 

open-ended procedures for administering its myriad provisions that 

could lead to negative outcomes for the U.S. that are all but impossible to predict by simply reading its text. 

It cedes power to international authorities that are unaccountable, and whose behavior individual states cannot predict. If the 

U.S. becomes a participant in this treaty following a move by the 

Senate to approve ratification, it may well regret it in the years 

ahead. 

Prior to any vote by the Senate to consent to the ratification of 

the Convention, I believe that all interested people should fully understand the dangers that are posed by the relinquishment of State 

sovereignty. 

50

Interestingly, proponents of the Convention acknowledge the far 

reaching political and legal ramifications of U.S. adherence to the 

treaty. The University of Virginia School of Law Professor John 

Norton Moore, who is testifying here today, testified before the 

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 14th, 2003, that 

he sees it as: ‘‘One of the most important law-defining international 

conventions of the 20th century.’’

This is quite an assertion. While drafting language promoting 

the rule of law in international relations, in reality it represents 

the establishment of the rule of law over sovereign States more 

than establishing a rule of law made by them. 

The second issue concerns the Convention’s bias in favor of redistributing global economic resources. The Convention was drafted at 

a time when the failed policies of state control over-resources, to 

meet demand for retribution of those resources, were in vogue. 

Specifically, article 140 of the treaty states that all activities outside the jurisdictional waters of individual states be carried out for 

the benefit of mankind, while taking into particular consideration 

the interests and needs of developing states. It is unclear why the 

U.S. should accept a treaty that is so explicitly biased against its 

interests when it comes to access to resources. 

Third, the Convention contains an ill-advised revenue-sharing 

provision that is applied to income derived from oil and gas production, among other things, outside the EEZ. The U.S. will be forced 

to pay a contribution to the International Seabed Authority created 

by the treaty based on a percentage of the production. 

By any reasonable definition, this provision would allow a U.N.-

affiliated international authority to impose a tax directly on the 

U.S. for economic activity. 

Finally, the Convention poses a significant risk to national security. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for Negotiations Policy, Mark T. Esper, who testified in favor of the Convention, told 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 21, 2003 that 

the mandatory dispute resolution mechanism could be used by 

states unsympathetic to the United States to interrupt its military 

operations, even though such operations are supposed to be exempt 

from the mechanism. 

This is because it is unclear by the terms of the treaty what activities will be defined as military. While the Administration believes that it will be up to each state party to determine for itself 

what activities are military, it is uncertain enough about the issue 

that it is recommending that the U.S. submit a declaration reserving its right to determine which activities in fact are military. 

Unfortunately, it is not at all certain that a declaration will suffice to protect U.S. vital national security interests. Other states 

may choose to accept or ignore the declaration. 

In this context a future Administration may accept jurisdiction 

of a tribunal, and be surprised if precedent-setting decisions go 

against U.S. interests. While in the future the Navy may recommend that the U.S. reject a claim of jurisdiction for a tribunal, 

civilian authorities, both inside and outside the Department of Defense, may overrule the Navy. 

So those are the four concerns that I have, and when you wrap 

them all together in the broader language of the treaty, which is 

51

primarily driven by procedure and process over substance, the outcomes in my judgment will be utterly unpredictable, uncontrollable. 

Obviously, we find this lack of predictability in any authority 

that is established by procedures. We don’t know, for example, 

what would happen even with an august piece of political documentation, like the U.S. Constitution, and what the Supreme 

Court, for example, may do under any particular circumstances, 

and whether it may exceed its authority. Similarly, Congress may 

exceed its authority, vis a vis the limitations that are imposed on 

government, for example, by the Bill of Rights. When you have 

these open-ended procedures, I think that the lack of predictability 

is a fatal flaw in this treaty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Spring. Dr. Leitner. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Spring follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BAKER SPRING, F.M. KIRBY RESEARCH FELLOW IN

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as individuals discussing their own 

independent research. The views expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.

Mr. Chairman, those who founded our nation recognized the power to make treaties is an extremely important power. In their wisdom, they sought to ensure that 

treaties would serve the national interest by dividing that power between the executive branch and the Senate. Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution states that the 

president ‘‘shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to 

make Treaties.’’ Further, Article II establishes a two-thirds voting requirement for 

the approval of treaties by the Senate. Clearly, they intended to place the burden 

on the proponents of a treaty to demonstrate its value to the United States. The 

far-reaching provisions of the treaty that is the subject of this hearing amply demonstrate why the nation’s founders divided the treaty-making power. There are compelling reasons why the Senate should take the time and care necessary to review 

this treaty and understand all its implications. While the House of Representatives 

does not have a role in the advice and consent process, its members can and should 

contribute to the debate over whether the United States should ratify a treaty such 

as this one. 

In March 23rd testimony before the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, International Environment, and Scientific Affairs John F. Turner confirmed that the administration supports Senate 

approval for the ratification of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea (hereinafter referred to as the Convention). The Administration’s position 

is puzzling to me because the United States had considered and rejected the Convention during the Reagan Administration. I do not see a compelling reason to revisit the issue today. 

While proponents of the Convention argue that the Clinton Administration resolved the problems with the treaty that led to its rejection in the 1980s, through 

renegotiation in 1994, the fact remains that it represents a potential turning point 

for the U.S. in the history of international relations. The Convention presents the 

U.S. with a stark choice. On the one hand, the U.S. may enter into this treaty and 

proceed on a path that cedes U.S. sovereignty to executive and quasi-judicial international authority with compulsory powers or reject the treaty and stick to the tried 

and true international system where relations are established between and among 

sovereign states. 

While the Convention contains a wide variety of questionable provisions, its real 

danger stems from the fact that the treaty represents more than the sum of its 

questionable provisions. It establishes open-ended procedures for administering 

these provisions that could lead to negative outcomes for the U.S. that are all but 

impossible to predict by simply reading its text. If the U.S. becomes a participant 

in this treaty, following a move by the Senate to approve ratification, it may regret 

it in the years ahead. 

Myriad Problems. The Convention has a variety of problems. This is not surprising given that the treaty takes up more than 150 pages. What is surprising is 

that even the proponents of the treaty both inside the Administration and outside 

it have publicly acknowledged a number of the dangers associated with several speVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
52

cific provisions. Prior to any decision to ratify the Convention, the public should 

fully understand the dangers posed by these provisions. The review process, however, should not stop there. Interested citizens need to take the additional step of 

understanding each of these provisions in the context of the open-ended and in some 

instances compulsory dispute settlement and other procedures found in the Convention, over which the U.S. will only have limited control and that could produce adverse outcomes that are all but impossible to predict. The following represents four 

general shortcomings of the Convention: 

Problem #1: Loss of Sovereignty. Traditionally, treaties, with only narrow exceptions, have been defined as formal agreements between and among sovereign states 

that help define their relations to each other as sovereign states. They are inherently political agreements. The option to change such relations and the concomitant 

power to discontinue adhering to the terms of a treaty is solely the prerogative of 

the sovereign. 

First and foremost, the Convention represents a departure from that tradition. It 

establishes institutions with executive and judicial powers that in some instances 

are compulsory. For example, Section 4 of the Treaty establishes the International 

Sea-Bed Authority. The authority basically is given the power to administer to the 

‘‘area’’ under the jurisdiction of the treaty, which includes all the world’s oceans and 

seabed outside national jurisdiction. This is a granting of executive powers to the 

authority that supersedes the sovereign power of the participating states. Of even 

greater concern, Part XV of the Convention establishes dispute settlement procedures that are quasi-judicial and mandatory. Once drawn into this dispute settlement process, it will be very difficult for the U.S. extricate itself from it. 

Proponents of the Convention acknowledge the far-reaching political and legal 

ramifications of U.S. adherence to the treaty. University of Virginia School of Law 

Professor John Norton Moore, a supporter of the Convention who is also testifying 

today, stated that he sees it as a means for fostering the rule of law in international 

affairs. In fact, he has stated that adherence to the Convention is ‘‘one of the most 

important law-defining international conventions of the Twentieth Century.’’

This is quite an assertion. In fact, it is the most troubling aspect of the Convention because the conduct of international relations for centuries has been a more a 

political than a legal process. Unacknowledged in the language about fostering the 

rule of law in international relations is the reality that in this particular case it entails subordinating the powers of the participating states to the dictates of an international authority. When it comes to the essential powers for the conduct of international relations, the use of force, and the exercise of diplomacy, they are not readily divisible but they are readily transferable. The Convention is a vehicle for transferring these essential powers from the participating states to the international authority established by the treaty itself. It represents the establishment of the rule 

of law over sovereign states more than it is establishing a rule of law made by them. 

Former Secretary of State George Shultz provides a succinct rejoinder to those 

who envision the rise of the ‘‘rule of law’’ in international relations in the way it 

is devised in this Convention. Speaking at the Library of Congress on February 11, 

2004, Secretary Shultz stated:

First and foremost, we must shore up the state system. The world has worked 

for three centuries with the sovereign state as the basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and responsible for their well-being. In this 

system, states also interact with each other to accomplish ends that transcend 

their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends, not 

govern them.

Problem #2: Unnecessary limitations on the exploitation of resources. The Convention was drafted at time when the failed policies of state control over resources to 

meet demands for the redistribution of those resources were in vogue. Specifically, 

Article 140 of the Convention states that all activities outside the jurisdictional waters of individual states ‘‘be carried out for the benefit of mankind’’ while ‘‘taking 

into particular consideration the interests and needs of developing States.’’ These 

international waters and the accompanying seabed are defined as those outside the 

200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) the treaty leaves within the jurisdictional control of participating states. 

It is unclear why the U.S. should accept a treaty that is so explicitly biased 

against its interests when it comes to the access to resources. This is particularly 

so when this bias reflects a policy preference for the redistribution of resources that 

the world abandoned over a decade ago. The world economy is now organized 

around the requirements of the market. As elsewhere, the application of market 

principles regarding the exploitation of sea-based resources will ensure the effective 

53

and efficient use of those resources. U.S. adherence to the Convention, therefore, 

would represent a step backward. 

Problem #3: A step in the direction of international taxing authority. The Convention contains an ill-advised revenue-sharing provision that is applied to income derived from oil and gas production outside the EEZ. The general bias in the Convention, as I indicated earlier, is in favor of the redistribution of seabed resources. This 

bias is codified in the area of oil and gas revenues. The U.S. will be forced to pay 

a contribution to the International Sea-Bed Authority created by the treaty based 

on a percentage of its production in the applicable area beyond the 200-mile limit. 

While he asserted the argument against this revenue-sharing provision was unconvincing, State Department Legal Advisor William H. Taft IV acknowledged it 

was an argument that could be made in the course of October 21, 2003 testimony 

before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Taft understates the problem. 

By any reasonable definition, this provision would for the first time allow a U.N.-

affiliated international authority to impose a tax directly on the U.S. for economic 

activity. At least, I am unaware of any precedent for this kind of international taxing authority. Shoring up the state system, as recommended by former Secretary 

of State Shultz, means that international institutions should be funded by the voluntary contributions of their member states. The extent to which these international 

institutions are allowed access to independent streams of revenue is the extent to 

which they will seek to obtain governing authority at the expense of the state system. While the revenue-sharing provision related to oil and gas production in the 

Convention is a relatively modest step in this direction, it is still a step in the wrong 

direction. 

Problem #4: Unnecessary Risks to National Security. Proponents of the Convention 

argue that it promotes U.S. security by codifying a variety of rights to navigate the 

world’s oceans that are valued by the Navy. While the Navy, quite appropriately, 

seeks the codification of these rights, it should be pointed out that a significant portion of these rights are already established by a series of four 1958 ‘‘Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea’’ and customary international practice. 

On the other hand, the risks to national security posed by the Convention are 

often understated. For example, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy Mark T. Esper, who testified in favor of the Convention, told the Senate 

Foreign Relations Committee in an October 21, 2003, hearing that the mandatory 

dispute resolution mechanism could be used by states unsympathetic to the U.S. to 

curtail its military operations even though such operations are supposed to be exempt from the mechanism. This is because it is unclear by the terms of the treaty 

what activities will be defined as military. While the Bush Administration believes 

that it will be up to each State Party to determine for itself what activities are military, it is uncertain enough about the issue that it is recommending the U.S. submit 

a declaration reserving its right to determine which activities are military. Unfortunately, it is not at all certain that a declaration will suffice to protect vital U.S. national security interests. Other states may choose to accept or ignore the declaration, or a future administration may accept the jurisdiction of a tribunal and be surprised if precedent-setting decisions go against U.S. interests. While in the future 

the Navy may recommend that the U.S. reject a claim of jurisdiction for a tribunal, 

civilian authorities both inside and outside the Department of Defense may overrule 

the Navy. Amending the text of the treaty may be the only certain way to protect 

U.S. interests against overreaching by other states regarding the mandatory dispute 

resolution mechanism. This is my view, in part, because I am not aware of a precedent for such a mandatory dispute settlement mechanism that could extend to such 

sensitive areas. 

Members of the House of Representatives have a role in the debate over the Convention. The four general shortcomings with the Convention that I have described are 

derived from a longer list of specific shortcomings in a variety of the specific provisions it contains. While the House of Representatives will not consider the matter 

of granting consent to ratification, House member should participate in the general 

debate over the Convention. I believe that House members should take the opportunities that are presented to them to communicate with their Senate colleagues both 

formally and informally on this matter. Generally, they should point out to the Senate that there is no pressing need for rushing to judgment on ratification. The Convention is a long and complex agreement and an informed judgment on granting 

consent to ratification will necessarily involve a broad debate in the Senate. 

Conclusion. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is a modest 

step toward the creation of an international sovereign authority unchecked by the 

governed. Nevertheless, it is a significant one. Given that modern states, including 

the one envisioned for a united Europe, are the product of a combination of just 

such steps, it is one the United States should not be taking. Further, the treaty conVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
54

tains a number of specific provisions in such areas as regulation, energy, the environment, national security, and constitutional law that are deeply troubling. 

National leaders in Europe seem to aspire to relegating their nations to the status 

of provinces inside a supranational European authority. In this context, it is not 

surprising that some outside the United State see this move in the direction of 

broader authority for international entities, which Secretary Shultz has warned 

against, as desirable. 

As for America’s leaders, they should firmly reject such aspirations for their nation now. Insofar as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea seeks 

to move the United States in this direction and serves as an indicator of steps yet 

to come, it poses a danger to the vision America’s fathers had for the nation they 

founded in 1776. 

Mr. Chairman, I again thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy 

to answer any questions the Committee may have regarding the Convention.

STATEMENT OF PETER M. LEITNER, PH.D., AUTHOR, ‘‘REFORMING THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY: OPPORTUNITIES 

MISSED, PRECEDENTS SET, AND U.S. SOVEREIGNTY THREATENED’’

Mr. LEITNER. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, I 

really appreciate the opportunity to be before you today in what I 

see as the democratic process actually working now, unlike what 

happened initially in the Senate regarding this treaty. 

First, I would like to issue a brief caveat just to my appearance. 

I also am an employee of the Department of Defense, speaking here 

as a private citizen, and I am not representing the Department of 

Defense, or the U.S. Government, in my capacity. So the remarks 

that I have are my own. 

I have a much longer statement, which is submitted for the 

record, and I will just summarize here. I would also say that I hope 

that we have the opportunity to address some of the statements 

that were made by the prior panel, particularly statements regarding the freedom of navigation programs, and other issues of national security concern, which I think were either a distortion or 

a misunderstanding of what the treaty does, in terms of facilitating 

or alleviating our responsibilities in the freedom of navigation assertions. 

To begin with, the American people have little to gain and much 

to lose by acquiescing and supporting the creation of a new super 

government, the International Seabed Authority, which is embodied in this treaty. 

It is composed of a legislative, an executive, a judiciary, a secretariat, and several powerful sub-commissions. The existence of such 

a new force, dominated by nations hostile to American interests, is 

a fact that we must consciously reckon with and not capitulate in. 

The benefits of the United States participating in the treaty cannot be denied. They include guidelines on the management of fisheries, the environment, some dispute settlement issues, and marginal improvements in freedom of navigation and overflight. 

While such issues seem impressive on the surface, their resolution and achievement was not a herculean effort, nor were they 

critical to the economic health or physical security of the United 

States. They fall into the category of nice-to-have issues, which are 

outbalanced by the national security and other economic implications of this treaty. 

55

The real issues presented by accession to the Law of the Sea 

Treaty, unfortunately, I think, have been still little discussed since 

1982, and are being side-stepped today in an effort to sell the 1994 

agreement as a panacea that purportedly fixes what was wrong 

with the treaty. 

And unfortunately this panacea is in reality a smoke screen. 

Treaty supporters within the U.S., which now include a number of 

former treaty opponents, appear to have resigned themselves to 

this as the best deal what we are likely to achieve philosophically 

after the Clinton Administration’s failure to press hard for real 

change during the 1993–1994 renegotiations, so-called renegotiations. 

To cite the Administration, that prior Administration’s weak negotiating skill, or its failures to argue on behalf of basic U.S. national security interests in an international forum, makes a poor 

rationale for ratification of a treaty. 

And I think with several people that is where we are today. I 

want to add a little remark about the openness of the debate, and 

the fact that we still have not heard from—and hopefully we will 

in the future, but I am prepared to represent their view today—

the nascent U.S. ocean mining community, the actual people who 

invested hundreds of millions of dollars into developing a type of 

technology that will allow manganese nodules to be dredged up 

from the water, 12,000 or 18,000 feet deep in the middle of the central Pacific Ocean. 

In 1994 when this agreement, which purportedly changes the 

Part XI of the treaty, the ocean mining provisions, when it was 

coming out, the ocean mining at the time was flat out against this 

amendment, saying that it was inadequate, that it did not purport 

to change the disincentives to investment, and create an investment climate necessary for ocean mining to take place. 

At that time one particular company, the Lockheed Corporation, 

was one of the leaders in ocean mining technology and the development. They had a facility in Sunnyvale, California, that was the 

technological leader in the world in developing ocean mining technology and the processes to extract the minerals. At an interagency 

meeting in 1994, people within the Department of Defense, and the 

interagency process, were very concerned that Lockheed was making a lot of very public noise about its rejection of its 1994 renegotiation, saying that it does not the cure the problems in the treaty 

and would not allow an ocean mining industry to be born. 

At that time a naval officer stood up and said, don’t worry, I will 

take care of Lockheed. Lockheed at that time, if we recall, was in 

the middle of a very delicate merger with Martin Marietta, and 

what later became the Lockheed-Martin Corporation. And there 

was an awful lot of vulnerability there for a government objection 

to the merger, and basically resulted in them keeping their mouths 

quiet. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leitner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER M. LEITNER, PH.D., AUTHOR, ‘‘REFORMING THE LAW

OF THE SEA TREATY: OPPORTUNITIES MISSED, PRECEDENTS SET, AND U.S. SOVEREIGNTY THREATENED’’

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I would like to thank you for providing me the opportunity to testify before you today concerning the dangerous moVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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mentum to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This seriously flawed document was rightly rejected by President Reagan as it embodies a 

wide range of precedents, obligations, and restrictions that are deleterious to American national and economic security interests. Indeed, the Treaty and its many 

precedent setting provisions is a direct assault on the sovereignty of the United 

States and the supremacy of the Nation State as the primary actor in world affairs. 

I am appearing before you today as a private citizen and author. Although I am 

a Senior Strategic Trade Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense my views 

and statements are my own and do not represent the views of the Department or 

the U.S. government. I have also submitted to the Committee additional supplementary material regarding this complex and wide-ranging Treaty having been assured that it will be published as part of the record of this hearing. 

Before I begin I would like to explain my bona fides. I became involved in Law 

of the Sea issues first as a student in 1973 and I have pursued the topic ever since. 

My first master’s thesis was entitled: The Future of the Nation State (1975) an 

analysis of threats to sovereignty posed by the direction the Treaty was beginning 

to take as well as the rise of multinational corporations. The second thesis was entitled: The Impact of Manganese Nodule Exploitation Upon Less Developed Mineral 

Exporting Nations. This economic & engineering analysis was well received as a 

scene-setter for the struggles that were to come. The third thesis was a quantitative 

analysis entitled: Determinants of National Claims to Territorial Seas. This collection of analytical approaches to the Law of the Sea Treaty and its impacts landed 

me a job with the U.S. General Accounting Office where I was hired to be their expert on the treaty. 

In 1976 GAO was requested by several Committee Chairmen to independently report on the status of negotiations as they were deeply distrustful of the official delegation reports authored by the State Department. As a result, I attended many of 

the negotiating sessions in New York and Geneva as an observer attached to the 

US delegation. I joined the U.S. delegation in 1977 and reported regularly to Congress on the state of negotiations through 1982. I was present in New York when 

the Reagan Administration’s good faith attempt to make the Treaty acceptable was 

roundly rejected by a coalition of Developing and Communist nations. 

Since that time I have closely tracked the accession process and the development 

of the International Seabed Authority. Having long since left the General Accounting Office and transferred to the Department of Defense I became deeply involved 

in the Export Licensing process. In this capacity I was assigned a case whereby the 

People’s Republic of China was using their status as a so-called ‘‘pioneer investor’’ 

in ocean mining to justify the acquisition of strategic/export-controlled technology 

under the guise of prospecting for manganese nodules in the mid-Pacific. Unfortunately, the level of technology they were attempting to acquire greatly exceeded the 

level of capability that either the United States or our industrialized allied used in 

undertaking such work. The quality of the side-scanning sonar, deep-ocean bathymetric equipment, cameras, lights, remotely operated vehicles, and associated submersible technology provided them the capability to locate, reach, and destroy, or 

salvage early-warning and intelligence sensors vital to our national security. Additionally, such technology also imparted an offensive capability to our chief potential 

military adversary by enabling them to map any portion of the ocean or continental 

shelves to determine submarine routing schemes or underwater bastions where missile-launching or intelligence gathering submarines may operate undetected just off 

the U.S. coast. 

The ultimate nightmare would be a close-in submarine launched cruise missile attack upon the continental U.S. to which we are completely vulnerable and defenseless. I fought a long and lonely battle to prevent the Chinese from acquiring this 

technology but the zealous advocates of the treaty in several government agencies 

saw to it that the technology was provided to the PRC so as not to undermine the 

‘‘spirit of the treaty.’’ This experience prompted me to write the book: Reforming the 

Law of the Sea Treaty: Opportunities Missed, Precedents Set, and U.S. Sovereignty 

Threatened. This volume is an analysis of the Treaty, the placebo 1994 Agreement, 

and the military, political and technological implications arising from them. I followed this publication with an article in World Affairs entitled: ‘‘A Bad Treaty Returns: The Case Against the Law of the Sea Treaty.’’

The American people have little to gain and much to lose by acquiescing in and 

supporting the creation of a new supergovernment—The International Seabed Authority (ISA)—empowered to control access to the resources on and below the seabed, previously freely available to us under customary international law. American 

foreign policy suffered a self-inflicted wound by taking the initiative, in 1970, by 

proposing the creation of this seagoing government that is now composed of a legislature, an executive, a judiciary, a secretariat, and several powerful commissions. 

57

The existence of such a new force, dominated by nations hostile to American interests is a fact that we must consciously reckon with not capitulate in. 

The International Seabed Authority

The benefits to the United States of UNCLOS participation cannot be denied. 

They include guidelines on the management of fisheries, the environment, dispute 

settlement, and marginal improvements in freedom of navigation and overflight. 

While such issues seem impressive on the surface, their resolution was not a Herculean achievement nor are they critical to the economic health or physical security 

of the United States. Treaty supporters have trumpeted these successes as justification for U.S. accession to UNCLOS, while they have ignored or downplayed serious 

precedential and strategic issues, engaging in what theologians call adiaphora—or 

dwelling on things that are unimportant. A good rhetorician will attempt to sidetrack a discussion away from substantive issues if they do not support his argument 

and onto adiaphorous issues. The ‘‘real’’ issues presented by accession to UNCLOS 

have been little discussed since 1982, and they are being sidestepped today in an 

effort to ‘‘sell’’ the 1994 Agreement as a panacea that purportedly ‘‘fixes’’ what was 

wrong with the treaty. Unfortunately, this panacea is in reality a smokescreen. 

Treaty supporters within the United States now include a number of former treaty opponents who appear to have resigned themselves to a ‘‘this is the best deal we 

are likely to achieve’’ philosophy after the Clinton administration’s failure to press 

hard for real change during the 1993–1994 ‘‘renegotiations’’. To cite that administration’s weak negotiating skill or its failures to argue on behalf of basic U.S. national 

security interests in international fora makes a poor rationale for ratification of a 

treaty. 

ONE-SIDED HEARINGS

The one-sided hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier this 

year are the continuation of the undemocratic lengths Treaty supporters are willing 

to go, in order to secure ratification of this treaty. A similar anti-democratic tactic 

was employed in 1994 when Congress was about to review the infamous 1994 

Agreement. At that time significant political pressure was applied to the Lockheed 

Corporation to force it to silence its opposition to the treaty and the 1994 Agreement. Lockheed, at that time, was one of the pre-eminent world leaders in the design and development of ocean mining technology and systems. As the story goes, 

at a 1994 interagency meeting where irritation was expressed over vocal treaty opponents, a naval officer volunteered to ‘‘take care’’ of Lockheed. At that time Lockheed was at a very delicate stage of its controversial merger with Martin-Marietta 

and extremely sensitive to external factors that could raise government objections 

to the merger. Reportedly, Lockheed personnel summoned by senior management 


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were ordered to cease public criticism of the treaty. Congressional review could uncover the truth behind this scandal and expose the parties involved. 

Supporters of the Treaty choose their witnesses well. Interestingly, the most vigorous supports of the Treaty are largely a constellation of narrow single interest 

groups who are willing to overlook Treaty shortcomings so long as their pet rock 

is included. Last week, in a debate sponsored by the Brookings Institution, we heard 

a representative of the petroleum industry, in part, explain their support for ratification of LOST. Simply stated it boiled down to this: 

Under existing US law companies operating on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 

pay approximately 16% in taxes to the USG while the tax rate for onshore production 

is 12 %. Under LOST, as currently written, a 7% tax will be assessed on production 

originating on the OCS beyond 200 nm from the coast. The oil industry sees this 

fact as one of the most compelling reasons for them to support ratification. What 

they failed to point out was that this ‘‘royalty’’ or tax assessed by the ISA will not 

fall directly upon them but instead the US taxpayer is presented with the bill. 

Given the multinational character of many oil companies and the fact that the Treaty doesn’t recognize coastal state sovereignty beyond 200 NM it is questionable 

whether the US will have a legal basis to tax entities operating in these areas and 

recoup monies paid to the ISA as a result of their activities. In addition, given the 

capability to engage in ‘‘slant’’ and ‘‘horizontal’’ drilling it is conceivable that resources within 200 nm of the US coast can be illegally tapped from operations conducted in areas under ISA jurisdiction. 

The failure to adequately vet opposing points of view by credible witnesses still 

belies Senate claims to having held ‘‘comprehensive’’ hearings. Key companies with 

a direct stake in acquiring access to the hard minerals of the seabed were not heard 

from. These representatives of the US mining industry had profound concerns over 

the inadequate 1994 Agreement as it was nearing completion. 

WHERE DOES THE US OCEAN MINING INDUSTRY STAND ON LOST?

The concerns that Lockheed was prevented from expressing were, at least in part, 

covered by this overwhelmingly negative assessment of the Treaty put forth by the 

US ocean miners themselves after reviewing the final draft of the 1994 Agreement. 

On March 15, 1994, they stated:

‘‘The ‘‘Agreement’’ text does nothing to change industry’s assessment that the 

trend in the negotiations will fail to produce a regime that can attract private 

investment in ocean mining. 

From an investor’s standpoint, the ‘‘Draft Agreement on Matters Relating to 

Implementation of United Nations convention on the Law of the Sea’s’’ proposed 

‘‘fixes’’ to the problems of the convention are far too limited in scope. While the 

fixes attack a number of important problems, they leave the fundamental ideology, shape and policies of Part XI intact. The convention, even if the provisions of the ‘‘Draft Agreement’’ were controlling, would:

fail to provide assured access to qualified applicants because of ambiguities;

create a privileged class of investor for pioneers and discourage new entrants;

impose up-front training obligations on United States licensees;

create the risk that unreasonable fees may be imposed on private investors;

establish the International Seabed Authority, a novel, untested international 

organization possessing very broad discretionary powers. The Seabed Authority will be the first international organization with control and regulatory powers over a resource and with taxing powers over private persons.

It will be partially controlled by countries whose interest is to make seabed 

mining impossible;

establish an unnecessarily large and unwieldy bureaucracy, which is not 

subject to checks and balances;

rely on decision making mechanisms that will promote gridlock;

fail to provide investors with judicial and administrative due process;

maintain the ideologically bankrupt concepts and policies of the so-called 

New International Economic Order;

encourage discrimination in favor of developing countries, which presumably 

includes joint ventures among and with developing countries;

provide for the creation of an ‘‘in-house’’ competitor, the ‘‘Enterprise,’’ which 

would be the mining company operating arm of the Seabed Authority,

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impose political and economic burdens on industry to assist in the establishment of competitors through the so-called ‘‘banking system’’ under which a 

miner must give half of its mine site to the Seabed Authority to be given to 

the Enterprise and developing countries;

provide advantages such as technology transfer to the Enterprise and developing country competitors, which could give them cost advantages over private investors; and

commit the United States to participation in the implementation of the convention regime and possibly major changes in the United States seabed mining law and program some years before the United States has decided to ratify or reject the convention.

Industry further stated: ‘‘Because of the overwhelming number of fixes that would 

be required, the licensees recommended in 1992 that the United States seek complete overhaul of Part XI. This approach was rejected by United States negotiators 

and by the U.N. process. The result is that the Secretary General’s process is 

hurrying to adopt an approach that is at best ambiguous in form and substance. 

It is the view of the United States licensees that, if the present course is maintained, there will be no private investment in ocean mining exploration or production under the convention.’’ They further noted: The ‘‘Draft Agreement’’ would resolve many of the ‘‘government issues,’’ that is, the issues of concern primarily to 

governments, relating to control, governance, and precedent. These include financing of the Seabed Authority and decision-making in that organization, and production controls and government assistance, and amendment of the regime, but it 

leaves untouched the fundamental problem for the prospective investor, that is: the 

convention seabed mining regime continues to be a system of government ownership 

and political control over economic activity at a time when the world is turning 

away from centrally managed economics toward privatization and market oriented 

policies. Thus, the convention regime remains the victim of’’ ‘‘old think,’’ which by 

its very nature would put privately financed seabed mining at a disadvantage in 

competition with both its regulator and land based mining. 

NEGOTIATING FAILURES AND AMBIGUITIES

While UNCLOS has effectively codified many aspects of traditional law and has 

successfully incorporated several modern issues, such as environment, fisheries, and 

coastal zone management, these can be regarded as ‘‘nice to have’’ accomplishments 

but are by no means essential to the political, economic, or military security of the 

United States. In fact, one of the principal reasons for the establishment of 

UNCLOS III was to resolve U.S. conflicts with several Latin American states over 

territorial sea claims in the Pacific Ocean and the repeated seizure of U.S. tuna 

boats and their crews. After more than ten years of UNCLOS III negotiations, and 

over twenty years of post-UNCLOS III experience, Nicaragua, Peru, Ecuador, and 

El Salvador still claim 200-mile territorial seas and refuse to become parties to the 

Convention. 

What the convention actually means is problematic and engulfed in vast uncertainty and intentional ambiguity. Numerous ratifiers have entered reservations and 

interpretations that either suspend key provisions or impose their own selfish interpretation on the meaning of key concepts. In addition, 28 nations that have ratified 

the Treaty have not ratified the 1994 Agreement—that is a 20 percent failure rate 

at the outset. When one combines the reservations, interpretations, and lack of unanimity of the 1994 Agreement, and the impossibility of any effective US control over 

the behavior of the ISA at best you are left with anarchy. These developments do 

not serve the national, economic, or political security interests of the American people. 

On the other hand, the regulatory, political, technological, economic, and possibly 

military concessions embedded in the treaty represent a set of potential threats and 

traps that the United States should not walk blithely into. 

A SEAT AT THE TABLE

The United States has once again approached a negotiation by ‘‘giving or offering 

a concrete, positive, material advantage in exchange for hypothetical concession of 

a negative activity; a tangible asset is sacrificed for a promise not to make trouble 

in the future; something measurable and manifest is traded for the promise of something unmeasurable and unverifiable.’’ (Revel 1983, 249)

This negotiating principle is part of a wider technique: prior concession. It consists of ceding in advance, even before negotiations begin, what should be the 

subject of the negotiations and which the West should propose at the end of the 

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talks, not at the start, and then only in exchange for a carefully weighed and 

at least equivalent counterconcession. (Revel 1983, 249)

As with so many instances of profound diplomatic and intelligence failures, the 

United States is afflicted by the need for instant gratification, a blinding failure to 

recognize that many adversaries have a longer-term world view and are willing to 

accept incremental victories and absorb losses on the way toward their overall objective, a paralyzing State Department mindset that still sees a bad agreement as 

being preferable to no agreement, and a ‘‘through the looking glass’’ notion that defines leadership within the ISA as the casting of vetoes while trying to constrain 

anti-American excesses. These are the politics of defeat that will add more problems 

of survival to the long list being cowardly bequeathed to our next generation. 

The current slogan being echoed by Treaty supporters is that ‘‘we need to have 

a seat at the table’’ to influence developments. Somehow supporters ignore the math 

of one ‘‘seat’’ among 150 seats, the power of the ‘‘one-nation one-vote’’ principle, and 

the overwhelmingly anti-American agenda of at least 120 of the 150 ‘‘seats’’. Having 

a ‘‘seat at the table’’ of a kangaroo court is not in the US national interest—it will 

not buy security, it will not buy good government, and it will not dissuade enemies 

of this nation from using yet another international forum and court system to weaken us further and it will not make the noose any less deadly. 

CREATING A GLOBAL FRANKENSTEIN

The many precedents embodied in the existence of the International Seabed Authority, the creation of an international bureaucracy with powers to tax, regulate, 

and enforce its will are perhaps the most dramatic and, in the long term, the most 

dangerous. The granting of what are essentially sovereign powers is unprecedented 

and unfortunately fits within a larger pattern of U.N. behavior—that being, to free 

itself from the political domination of the five permanent members of the Security 

Council as well as to insulate itself from the uncertainties and political limitations 

accompanying the traditional state-sponsored financing of U.N. operations. 

You may recall that during the 1990’s, Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali 

proposed to establish a ‘‘world tax’’ on airline tickets and currency exchanges as an 

independent means of financing the U.N. ‘‘Faced with $2.3 billion in arrears from 

member nations that failed to pay their assessments—including $1.2 billion owed 

by the United States—U.N. officials and others have long sought an independent 

means to raise money for the organization’s annual budget of roughly $3 billion.’’ 

(Barber 1996) Disclosure of this plan provoked an immediate negative response in 

the U.S. Senate when then-majority leader Bob Dole stated ‘‘the United Nations 

continues its out-of-control pursuit of power’’ and along with colleagues called for 

an immediate investigation. (Barber 1996) 

Unfortunately, the Law of the Sea Treaty goes far beyond the Ghalli plan and 

may indeed be viewed as a harbinger of future U.N. efforts to spin-off or reformulate 

its activities in such a way as to insulate itself from, and possibly become ascendant 

to, the sovereign character of nation-states. In fact, the unprecedented opportunities 

for the ISA to raise capital directly are depicted below: 

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Capital Flow of Authority/Enterprise

TECHNOLOGY AT RISK

Although the 1994 treaty modifications have toned down some of the most direct 

mandatory technology transfer requirements, the treaty still places at risk some 

very sensitive, and militarily useful, technology which may readily be misused by 

the Navy’s of ocean mining states. The military application of these technologies 

would provide new anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, strategic deep-sea 

salvage abilities, and deep-water bastions for launching sub-surface ballistic missiles (SSBM’s). 

Three classes of technology would be placed at risk by U.S. accession to UNCLOS: 

1) deep-water bathymetric and high-resolution mapping systems including advanced 

deep ocean visual surveillance systems; 2) sophisticated vessel station-keeping and 

navigation systems critical to ASW and strategic salvage operations; and 3) stateof-the-art robotics and remotely operated vehicle technology. Much of the data associated with these technologies is classified for national security reasons and is also 

at risk. 

With or without the mandatory technology transfer provisions contained in the 

UNCLOS U.S. participation would provide a ‘‘legal’’ conduit and cover to justify the 

acquisition of state-of-the-art deep ocean devices and technology which have profound national security implications. Ocean mining activities by the Enterprise or 

third world nations, such as China or India, can provide plausible justification for 

successfully purchasing technologies which, in the absence of ocean mining, would 

likely be denied on national security grounds. 

In 1995, for instance, the PRC—a nation self-sufficient in the domestic production 

of the principal metals derived from manganese nodules—sought and obtained sophisticated micro-bathymetry equipment from the United States, along with 6,000 

meter capable video and side-scan sonar systems. This equipment may easily be 

misapplied by the PRC to help advance its meager ASW capability (see capability 

Charts 8.2 and 8.3) in support of its attempts to develop a ‘‘Blue Water’’ navy. This 

equipment can also be used to help the PRC locate undersea bastions, even within 

the U.S. EEZ, for their missile launching submarines. 


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1For example, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) enforces U.S. federal 1aw on the high seas, interdicts smugglers moving drugs and illegal migrants, and enforces fisheries regulations and U S. 

Law and protects U.S. interests in the exclusive economic zone claimed by the U S Further. 

the USCG has cutters involved in detection, monitoring interdiction and operational support of 

third-country drug operations, and conducts joint counter narcotics training and patrols with 

several countries. The USCG has agreements with Japan and Hong Kong and experience in sea 

lines of communication (SLOC) through cooperation with the U.S. Navy. 2For example, the Convention addresses the dangers of pollution from vessels exercising the 

right of freedom of navigation, and strengthens the powers of littoral states against polluters. 3Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs (the U.N. 

peacekeeping post), has written that the U.N. needs ‘‘a system like this: A convention exists on 

tankers not being allowed to clean their tanks at sea. So tank cleaning should be monitored, 

and once you’ve caught a tanker doing it at sea, and issued a couple of warnings, somebody 

goes out and drops a very small bomb down a funnel: ’That’s it, boys, you’ve had two warnings 

The justification used by the PRC is its pioneer investor status awarded by the 

UNCLOS PrepCom in 1993. Ostensibly the equipment will be used for manganese 

nodule exploration within the Clarion/Clipperton fracture zone. Unfortunately, such 

surveys should only take for several months at sea to accomplish. In part this is 

due to the rapid wide-swath capability of the system they purchased and to their 

choice of minesite locations on, or adjacent to, heavily prospected and claimed nodule fields. 

How will the PRC choose to utilize this equipment over the 95 percent of its productive life when it is not involved in nodule exploration? ASW and military submarine mapping are overwhelmingly the most likely applications. An additional factor to consider is the U.S. government’s policy of imposing security classifications 

on many types of microbathymetry data while indiscriminately selling the equipment which is used to generate such data. 

LOST MILITARY POWER

In a well-timed contribution to the debate on UNCLOS the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) published a strong analysis on the potential for the International Seabed 

Authority to take on a blue water police/enforcement role in support of treaty provisions. CNA demonstrated that there is ample precedent and existing regulatory 

flexibility whereby, if States parties cooperate, the ISA may develop a military arm 

which may not only radically extend the functions and purposes envisioned for it 

by the U.S. and its industrialized allies but may one day directly threaten U.S. high 

seas and economic zone interests as well.

The development of international maritime law, especially the Third U.N. convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), has established a legal environment in which the U.N. could take on a variety of new low-intensity policing 

functions in support of international agreements. This is especially important 

in areas of international straits because attempts to police straits could lead to 

disputes, perhaps even conflicts. For many nations, this mission area could involve coast guards as well as civilian maritime agencies. (Sands) 1

Given the ambiguity embedded in the charter, rules, regulations, and scope of the 

ISA as well as the highly uncertain ability of the U.S. or its allies to significantly 

influence events within the new organization the potential of the ISA becoming a 

runaway train cannot be dismissed. Some of the most likely areas where the ISA 

may attempt to apply naval power, according to CNA, are summarized below:

1. Enforcement of fisheries regulation, EEZ arrangements and archpelagic waters. Under UNCLOS, coastal nations have sovereign rights within 200-n.m. 

exclusive economic zones (EEZs). In many cases, the added responsibilities 

of protecting the EEZs may be beyond the capabilities of smaller navies, thus 

increasing the possibility of disputes. When disputes arise and when adjudication fails, or disputes involving the use or threat of force erupt, naval 

forces could be called on to establish U.N. maritime peacekeeping operations 

or to carry out Security Council-mandated Chapter VII enforcement measures.

2. Measures to protect the marine environment. Many of the obligations undertaken under UNCLOS concern the protection of the marine environment.2

There is a growing understanding that military as well as commercial activities can produce adverse consequences for the maritime environment. Given 

the dearth of technical and financial resources military environmental issues 

may be ripe for international cooperation. (Miller 1993) The current laissezfaire approach to enforcement may not work, and naval forces may be asked 

to do more, including enforcement through the threat of the use of force.3 BeVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
63

to stop it. The third time down you go.’ The moment that one tanker, after three warnings, goes 

to the bottom, I don’t think there will be any more tanks cleaned at sea.’’ 4The Antarctic Treaty internationalized and demilitarized the Antarctic continent and provided for its cooperative exploration and future use. Several countries have claimed sovereignty 

over areas of Antarctica, claims the United States and the former Soviet Union did not recognize. Rivalry backed by the threat or use of military force for control of exploitable economic 

resources is still only a theoretical possibility, and one that still looms small given past scientific 

cooperation and the continent’s isolation. Resource exploitation could in the near term raise environmental protection concerns, about which naval forces operating under a U.N. aegis could 

be called on to respond because of the Antarctic Treaty and the continent’s location and isolation. For a text of the Antarctic Treaty, see United States (1982). 5With the approval of the U.S. regarding the security plan (U.S. approval is required for fuel 

and byproducts of U.S. origin, and U.S. warships, planes, and military intelligence satellites 

monitored the voyage), the first of 45 shipments over the next seven yrs left France in November 1992. The ship carrying the plutonium casks, Aka∼suki Maru, was escorted by the Japanese 

Maritime Safety Agency’s new 6,500-ton escort ship, Slu’kish∼’ma Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have expressed concerns about an unspecified ‘‘mishap’’ involving the shipments, arguing that the fissile material should not be transported through busy waterways or near densely 

populated areas. To date, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Uruguay, and, in a way that has caught the attention of the 

Japanese media, the Republic of Nauru has told Japan to keep the shipments out of its territorial waters. The United States has ruled out its passage through the Panama Canal. Others, 

such as the members of the South Pacific Forum, have urged that the shipments be stopped. 

See also (Reid; Associated Press; Sanger; Waxman; and Offley).

sides enforcement, there may be roles for naval forces in surveillance and in 

establishing better communication for these purposes between authorities 

ashore and merchant vessels. Naval forces could also be called on by the 

United Nations to enforce the Antarctic Treaty provisions, should more be 

violated.4

3. Protect Sea and Air Traffic. With the reemergence of piracy in littoral waters, terrorism on the high seas, and the draw-down of national naval forces, 

multinational naval presence and crisis response for the protection of economic resources and trade may become more important. This is true especially in the world’s main navigational straits and passages, which are also 

its major trade routes. The sovereign immunity of warships is already questioned in some quarters. Moreover, the potential for interfering with customary international law by unilateral threats to close straits is always 

there. At times, multinational cooperation in this traditional naval mission 

area may include surveillance, mine sweeping, and convoy and escort operations, even in areas of armed conflict. It may also include greater use of 

maritime interception operations and the establishing of maritime exclusion 

zones, or blockades.

4. Convoy and escort of selected traffic on the high seas. As a result of increased 

sensitivity following revelations in Iraq, for example, the United Nations 

could become involved in protecting the transport of fissile material on the 

high seas now that Japan is shipping weapons-grade plutonium from Europe 

to Japan for use in its breeder reactor program. Although the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency is now operating a new escort ship designed specifically 

for fissile material escort, some have argued that this step alone may be insufficient for adequate protection. Several states have expressed concern 

about the safety of this shipment as it is transported through the Straits of 

Malacca, and others have told Japan that shipments will be barred from 

passing through their territorial waters. (Sands) 5

5. ISA protection of offshore assets, primarily petroleum production platforms 

and deep-water off-shore port facilities such as pipeheads and ocean mining 

claims and operations.

64

REALITY CHECK URGENTLY NEEDED

Treaty supporters keep attempting to throw up a smokescreen of empty arguments intended to mislead congress. I would go so far as to call these arguments 

fraudulent assertions as they are made by people who know full well that they are 

diversionary tactics that sound good in a hearing but do not stand up to probing 

or scrutiny. 

The International Seabed Authority and the Law of the Sea Treaty represent the 

surrender, with little or no compensation, of a variety of tangible U.S. security and 

sovereignty equities over a geographic area encompassing 70 percent of the Earth’s 

surface. Treaty supporters are attempting to bind this nation to a treaty and a bureaucratic organization whose basic operating principles are inimical to U.S. interests and whose political orientation views the United States as an objective to be 

undermined, constrained, and eventually destroyed. 

Finally, I urge all Members of Congress and Committee Chairmen to exercise 

their inherent oversight rights and responsibilities and fully vet this Treaty for its 

manifold impacts upon the United States. The Treaty contains taxation, legal, borrowing, natural resource, military, and intelligence issues that need to be explored 

in depth by the Finance, Judiciary, Interior, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees. In addition, I would further recommend a mandatory review by Homeland 

Security and law enforcement interests.

Barber, Ben. ‘‘Dole Bill Threatens Funding for U.N.’’ Washington Times (January 

18, 1996), 1. 

Revel, Jean-Franc ̧ois. How Democracies Perish. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & 

Company, 1983. 

Sands, Jeffrey I. Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations, CNA CRM 93–40 (July 1993). 

Barber, Ben. ‘‘Dole Bill Threatens Funding for U.N.’’ Washington Times (January 

18, 1996), 1.

Chairman HYDE. Doctor, I am going to have to interrupt you. We 

have—the best estimate is—six votes, but it could be four. I think 

the best thing to do is to recess for an hour. It will give you an 

opportunity to walk around the deck, and get some lunch, and then 

come back. 

We want to finish this and we surely want to hear the testimony 

from all of you. So, at 1 o’clock, let us be back. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Committee recessed, to reconvene 

at 1:20 p.m., the same day.] 


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Mr. HOUGHTON [presiding]. The Committee will come to order. 

Thank you very much for being patient with us. We have had a few 

little things like votes, and so now we are back in session, and I 

thank you very much for your patience. Ms. Metcalf, we would now 

like to hear your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF KATHY J. METCALF, DIRECTOR, MARITIME 

AFFAIRS, CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF AMERICA 

Ms. METCALF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today I have the privilege of appearing before this Committee, but I wanted to make one 

preliminary comment, and that is today I sit before you to talk 

about the ‘‘what is’’ and not the ‘‘what ifs.’’

The Chamber of Shipping of America is very pleased to testify 

before your Committee concerning and supporting ratification of 

the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We realize 

that you and your colleagues in the Senate have already heard testimony in support of ratification, and we are pleased to add our 

support to that list. 

We represent 22 American entities which own and operate oceangoing vessels, vessels which carry both U.S. and foreign flags and 

trade in both the domestic and international trades. 

Mr. Chairman, today we consider the Law of the Sea, which has 

been referred to as the fundamental framework governing obligations and the rights of states; flag states, coastal states, and port 

states. We have also heard the Convention referred to as the most 

comprehensive constitution for the oceans. Viewing the Convention 

in conjunction with the many other maritime conventions shows 

the detailed interest our country and the world has in maritime 

trade. 

From our inception in 1914, we have been involved in the development of every maritime treaty produced to date and, we are 

proud to say, at the pleasure of the State Department, we serve 

also on the U.S. delegation to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as an industry advisor. And this organization, sir, these 

conventions, both this one and specific ones from IMO, address 

safety of life at sea, and freedom of navigation, and environmental 

concerns. 

And most of these were undertaken at the urging, and with the 

leadership, of the United States, because UNCLOS provides the 

very framework for the protection of the marine environment under 

these treaties. 

Again, we have recently provided testimony to your colleagues in 

the Senate, not only of this Convention, but also annex VI of the 

Convention to Prevent Pollution from Ships, which covers the 

issues of air pollution. 

Also applied under the broad umbrella of UNCLOS, this provides 

a method and a critical international baseline from which technical 

issues such as this can be regulated. Mr. Chairman, this Convention and those of IMO involve vital U.S. interests. 

The world looks to our leadership in these matters, and we must 

respond, and respond vigorously and positively to that expectation. 

You have heard a number of reasons why the U.S. benefits from 

the ratification of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, including 

freedom of navigation. Quite incidentally, the legal basis of the sovVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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ereignty, this freedom of navigation issue, arose from the legal 

basis of sovereignty, which was being applied in a very questionable, to put it kindly, method by certain countries. 

In recent months, we in the maritime industry have witnessed 

other nations taking actions to forcibly remove commercial ships 

compliant with all regulations from their exclusive economic zones. 

Mr. Chairman, we don’t carry armament like the grey hulls do, 

and that is a very disquieting aspect to be standing as I have on 

the bridge of a ship, and to see a military vessel approach you 

when you are compliant with all regulations, and engaged in what 

is known in areas of freedom of navigation, the right of innocent 

passage. 

Another example, sir, is the Prestige, which was forced to go out, 

further out to sea, in extremely dangerous conditions. And in that 

case, our organization wrote to Secretary Powell expressing our 

grave concern in this incident, which as most of us are aware, resulted in horrible environmental impacts. 

The U.S., sir, cannot afford to be shut out of this accepted and 

appropriate process for the litigation of claims of this nature. Mr. 

Chairman, these are not theoretical concepts or law school questions. They are not what if’s. They are what is. 

We must rely on our Nation to call these actions to account, and 

be in a position to be the effective force for adherence to treaty obligations by all. It is also interesting to note that this is quite a 

measure of deja vu, as similar actions led to the initiative that resulted in the Law of the Sea Convention to begin with. 

We also have to be vigilant concerning recent actions purported 

by their adherents to be in concert with the Convention. One example, sir, of this is that nations are beginning to feel comfortable in 

stretching the interpretations of the customary law of the sea into 

unrecognizable forms. 

It is time the U.S. decides that such antics are unacceptable, and 

ratify the Convention on the Law of the Sea so that our Nation can 

play a leadership role in preventing further encroachments. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HOUGHTON [presiding]. Thank you very much, Ms. Metcalf. 

Mr. Moore. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Metcalf follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHY J. METCALF, DIRECTOR, MARITIME AFFAIRS, CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF AMERICA

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. The Chamber of Shipping of America is very pleased to testify before your committee today concerning 

U.S. ratification of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We realize 

that you have heard testimony in support of ratification and are very pleased to add 

the Chamber of Shipping of America (CSA) to that list of supporters. 

The Chamber of Shipping of America represents 22 American entities which own 

and operate ocean-going vessels. Our members operate both US and foreign-flag 

ships in the domestic and international trades. While we have undergone a number 

of name changes over the years, CSA proudly traces its founding to 1914 when the 

British Government invited a small group of countries to develop the first international treaty regarding safety at sea. The American ship owners were involved 

in that first maritime treaty and we continue our involvement to this day serving 

on the US delegation to the International Maritime Organization. That first maritime treaty was prompted by a legendary incident—the sinking of the steamship 

‘‘TITANIC’’. While that treaty failed due to World War I, it plotted the course of 

future maritime treaties. Today, the safety, security and protection of the environment are all subjects of maritime treaties. World War I blocked the first try at a 

67

safety treaty although it led directly to development of treaties covering maritime 

labor conditions which were and are still to this day developed at the International 

Labor Organization (ILO). The ILO exists today under the UN umbrella although 

it was founded in 1919 as part of the League of Nations, the brain-child of our President Woodrow Wilson. 

Mr. Chairman, today we consider the Law of the Sea Treaty. It has been referred 

to as the fundamental framework governing obligations and rights of states—flag 

states, coastal states and port states. Viewing it in conjunction with the many other 

maritime conventions shows the detailed interest the world has in the maritime industry. An important aspect of that interest is that shown by the United States. 

From 1914 through today, we do not know of any maritime treaties developed in 

any fora that did not have the active involvement of the United States. Indeed, 

many of the conventions, particularly those addressing safety of life at sea, freedom 

of navigation and environmental concerns, were undertaken at the urging of and 

subsequent leadership by the United States. Because UNCLOS provides the framework for the protection of the marine environment, among a number of other important protections, we have recently provided testimony to your colleagues in the Senate supporting ratification not only of this convention, but also of Annex VI of the 

Convention to Prevent Pollution from Ships, an International Maritime Organization convention, which covers the issue of air pollution from ships. As with 

UNCLOS, the US led the effort on the development of Annex VI and while we all 

recognize, and by all, I mean the private sector and government, that it can be further improved, it, as applied under the broad reaching provisions of UNCLOS, provides a critical international baseline from which this issue can be addressed 

through enforceable emissions requirements from large vessels worldwide. And I 

would stress the fact suggested above that Annex VI is not perfect. It can and will 

be strengthened over time through the amendment process. However, as is also the 

case with UNCLOS, we must not let perfect become the enemy of the good. Ratification of both of these conventions is critical to establishing a global framework and 

process through which the United States can exercise its progressive leadership for 

the overall good of the marine environment, freedom of navigation and protection 

of vital and irreplaceable marine resources. 

UNCLOS, Annex VI of the pollution treaty and the newly adopted amendments 

to the safety of life at sea treaty (SOLAS) dealing with maritime security involve 

vital US interests. The world looks to our leadership in these matters. We must respond, and respond vigorously and positively, to that expectation. The credibility of 

the United States in all international fora where these agreements are made depends on it. 

There are reasons why the US benefits from ratification of the UN Convention 

on the Law of the Sea. It provides the framework for the essential concepts of freedom of navigation. The origination of the process leading to the treaty was occasioned by states exercising sovereignty in waters where the legal basis of that sovereignty was questionable to put it kindly. In recent months, we in the maritime 

industry have witnessed other nations taking actions to forcibly remove commercial 

ships compliant with all regulations, from their exclusive economic zones. It was 

also reliably reported that the vessel ‘‘PRESTIGE’’, listing and in imminent danger, 

was forced to go further out to sea in extremely dangerous conditions. We considered this very important and wrote to Secretary of State Colin Powell expressing 

our grave concern. Nations can claim to interpret the law of the sea. Those claims, 

unless challenged, stand to the detriment of freedom of navigation principles and 

the marine environment. The Law of the Sea Tribunal, as established under 

UNCLOS, is the appropriate place to adjudicate these claims. The US can not afford 

to be shut out of this accepted and appropriate process for the litigation of claims 

of this nature. Such would be the case should we fail to ratify the convention. 

Protection of the crew is also a vital component of the treaty. The Master of the 

‘‘PRESTIGE’’, after taking heroic steps to save his ship, was imprisoned by coastal 

state authorities when the all-too-predictable pollution occurred when the vessel 

broke up after being forced out to sea by the coastal state in heavy weather and 

sea conditions. After months of captivity, he was freed on bail that the press reported at over three million dollars; once again, an action which we believe conflicts 

with provisions of this treaty. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, these are not theoretical concepts 

or law school questions. These are topical circumstances involving developed nations. We must rely on our nation to call these actions to account. The US should 

place itself in a position to be the effective force for adherence to treaty obligations 

by all. The only way we can do that is by ratifying this convention. It is certainly 

unfortunate that nations have taken dramatic steps to control ships off their coasts. 

68

It is also a measure of ‘‘de ́ja` vu’’ as similar actions led to the initiative that resulted 

in the Law of the Sea Convention to begin with! 

We also have to be vigilant concerning recent actions which are purported by their 

adherents to be in concert with the law of the sea. As an example, under the framework of UNCLOS and other maritime conventions, the International Maritime Organization developed the concept of ‘‘particularly sensitive sea areas’’ or PSSAs. 

There are areas which a state can declare as eligible for special protection subject 

to approval by the IMO Member States. At the July 2003 meeting of the Marine 

Environment Protection Committee, it was determined that the entire sea area off 

Western Europe from the upper reaches of the English Channel to the Straits of 

Gibraltar qualified for designation as a PSSA in principle, leaving the discussion as 

to appropriate protective measures for upcoming meetings of the Committee. We 

will be involved in these deliberations and believe that any measure is inappropriate 

as we believe the important role of PSSAs in the protection of the marine environment has been intentionally diluted by the proposing nations in order that a few 

nations may impose unacceptable restrictions on the well established freedom of 

navigation. It is clear that nations are beginning to feel comfort in stretching the 

interpretations of the law of the sea into unrecognizable forms. It is time the US 

decides that such antics are unacceptable and ratify the UN Convention on the Law 

of the Sea so that our nation can play a leadership role in preventing further encroachments. 

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to testify and would be pleased to 

respond to the questions of you and your colleagues.

STATEMENT OF JOHN NORTON MOORE, WALTER L. BROWN 

PROFESSOR OF LAW, AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR OCEANS 

LAW AND POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF 

LAW 

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, it 

is a special pleasure to testify on behalf of submission of the Law 

of the Sea Treaty to the Senate by the Bush Administration. 

In my judgment it is a compelling national interest of the United 

States to adhere promptly to this Convention. This is indeed, Mr. 

Chairman, one of those extraordinarily rare settings in which there 

are no serious interests of the United States on the other side. 

There is emphatically no United States interest that is going to 

be better off if we do not adhere to this treaty, and there are many 

that will be better off if we do adhere. 

Now, I think rather than going through my written testimony, it 

might be useful if I simply responded briefly to some of the arguments that I have heard, and since there won’t be fully enough 

time to do that, I stand ready to respond to any questions on any 

of the elements that I have heard in opposition. 

Let me just indicate, Mr. Chairman, that I am very sorry to say 

that the kinds of arguments that I am hearing against this Convention; I have never in my professional life heard a series of arguments so exaggerated, so mistaken, on an issue of public importance such as this. 

Let us just look at a few of these arguments one at a time and 

some of the myths that one keeps hearing. And let me suggest to 

you that these are not simply myths, but they are 180 degrees 

wrong. 

The first is the notion of sovereignty, that somehow we would 

give up sovereignty by adhering to this treaty. There is not an 

ounce of United States sovereignty lost by this treaty. 

But to the contrary, this treaty is going to protect an extension 

of United States sovereignty over resources in an area that is 

equivalent to the entire continental land mass of the United States 

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of America. This treaty belongs in the honor roll of actions assisting the sovereignty of the United States of America. 

The second myth is a set of arguments about national security: 

That somehow the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and every single 

one of the combatant commanders that have addressed it, and 

every single one of the Chiefs of Naval Operation in over 30 years 

that have addressed it have somehow gotten it wrong, and those 

who admit they are not experts on the Law of the Sea have gotten 

it right. 

Let me suggest to you that these national security arguments are 

absolutely wrong. They are wrong on each of the issues they raise, 

but most importantly they are wrong on the overall national security interests of the United States. 

We won big in the negotiations leading to the 1982 treaty. We 

don’t want to lose those treaty wins. Let me just give you one example—the argument they throw up with respect to article 20 on 

submerged transient. 

They don’t tell you that that article is already binding on the 

United States under the 1958 LOS Convention. We have been able 

in this new 1982 treaty to get a complete, very important new exception for straits that was critical to our interests which has no 

such restriction on submerged transient. But if we don’t adhere to 

the treaty, we don’t have that provision. 

Third, if we were to go to the question of whether Part XI is not 

binding, as is being asserted; that is complete nonsense, Mr. Chairman. It is not just wrong. It is nonsense. 

Article 2 could not be clearer. It says in the event of an inconsistency between this agreement and Part XI, the provisions of this 

agreement shall prevail. In addition to that, the Authority has operated for its first decade based on the new agreement. 

The Authority has a chambered voting system in the council that 

is only permitted under the new agreement. It has a finance agreement only permitted under the new agreement. It has all of the 

contracts drawn up only under the procedures of the new agreement, and the parties have overwhelmingly endorsed it. 

And not only that, if for some reason out of all of that we were 

really wrong, this of course would be a reason the United States 

could quickly withdraw from the treaty under article 317, because 

that would be a fundamental move back. 

But there is not the slightest chance of that happening, Mr. 

Chairman. Then there is a set of arguments with respect to onecountry-one-vote, and the treaty is a triumph for the new international economic order. 

Again, this argument is 180 degrees wrong. This treaty is about 

as clear a repudiation of the new international economic order as 

we have ever seen in negotiation, and I would be happy to go 

through all the details of what was done in the renegotiation in 

1994 to show that. One-nation-one-vote, absurd. This is a setting 

in which we not only got chambered voting, we get a system in 

which the United States of America has the only permanent seat 

on the council and is guaranteed a veto over all rules and regulations, over any effort to amend the treaty and over all disposition 

of financial activities. And in the Finance Committee the U.S. has 

a veto over all financial elements. Let me just conclude, Mr. ChairVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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1 A good compendium of current support can be found at http://lugar.senate.gov/sfrc/colleague.html. The letters from every living former Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, the Navy 

League and the Chief of Naval Operations should be particularly noted in support of the Convention. 2On April 29, 2004, the National President of the Navy League urged the Senate to act favorably on the Law of the Sea Convention. The Navy League represents nearly 70,000 members 

dedicated to supporting the men and women of the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S. 

flagged Merchant Marine. 

man, by answering the very excellent question that a number of 

Members of this Committee have asked, and that is, why is it necessary, what are the costs really for us if we don’t adhere to this 

treaty? 

And the answer is really very stark and very clear, Mr. Chairman. Reasons supporting the treaty are, first, the security interests 

of the United States, particularly on the war on terrorism, will be 

harmed if we do not adhere. We will, and make no mistake, we will 

be putting United States service personnel more in harm’s way. 

And as my colleague has just testified, we will be putting United 

States mariners more in harm’s way. 

Further, the United States will be killing the deep seabed mining 

industry of the United States permanently. There will be no mining 

under the United States flag for deep seabed minerals that were 

indicated to be very important here. Oil and gas development will 

not take place beyond the 200 miles for years and years if we don’t 

go forward with this. There will have to be a definite legal regime 

to resolve those issues. We will be basically saying that we are not 

going to be interested in trying to move forward with oil and gas 

domestically. 

We will have a risk of amendments being adopted to a treaty in 

which we won the issues. For example, under article 317 right now, 

by not being a party, we could have others agree to amendments 

that we would have no ability to stop; and otherwise by being a 

party to this treaty, we would have the veto ability. In addition, we 

have no voice right now in the continental shelf commission in considering an extraordinarily broad arctic claim of Russia with respect to the United States of America. 

And, Mr. Chairman, if I had more time, I would I would go on 

and on, but the point is this is a slam dunk. This is not close like 

many other issues. This doesn’t have tradeoffs like most legislation. 

Adherence to this treaty is a slam dunk in the interests of the 

United States of America. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Moore follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT AND ADDENDUM OF JOHN NORTON MOORE, WALTER L. BROWN

PROFESSOR OF LAW, AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW

CHAIRMAN HENRY J. HYDE, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER TOM LANTOS 

AND HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE—

United States accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention is a compelling 

national interest of the United States. Ratification of the Convention will secure 

United States sovereign rights in the oceans, enhance United States national security, restore United States oceans leadership, protect United States oceans industry, 

serve our environmental interests, and enhance United States foreign policy. For 

these reasons the Convention is broadly supported 1 by the United States Navy (one 

of the strongest supporters over the years), the Navy League,2 the National Ocean 

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3On June 6, 2001, the National Ocean Industries Association submitted a resolution to the 

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee declaring: ‘‘The National Ocean Industries 

Association (NOIA) is writing to urge your prompt consideration of the Convention on the Law 

of the Sea. . . . The NOIA membership includes companies engaged in all aspects of the Outer 

Continental Shelf oil and natural gas exploration and production industry. This membership believes it is imperative for the Senate to act on the treaty if the U.S. is to maintain its leadership 

role in shaping and directing international maritime policy.’’ 4On May 24, 2001, the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Policy Committee adopted the following 

recommendation: A[T]he OCS Policy Committee recommends that the Administration communicate its support for ratification of UNCLOS to the United States Senate. . . .’’ 5See the statement of Ms. Genevieve Laffly Murphy on behalf of the American Petroleum Institute at the recent oceans forum of the Center for Oceans Law and Policy, October 1, 2003. 

Ms. Murphy stressed the energy security interest of the American petroleum industry both in 

access to the continental shelf beyond 200 miles and in protection of navigational freedom. See 

also the letter from the president of the American Petroleum Institute to the Chairman of the 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations of October 1, 1996, which states: ‘‘The American Petroleum Institute wishes to express its support for favorable action by the Senate on the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). API favors ratification of the revised 

treaty because it promotes unimpeded maritime rights of passage; provides a predictable framework for minerals developed; and sets forth criteria and procedures for determining the outer 

limit of the continental shelf. The latter will be accomplished by the soon-to-be established Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.’’ 6 In a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of May 26, 1998, 

the president of the Chamber of Shipping of America writes: ‘‘[t]he Chamber of Shipping represents 14 U.S. based companies which own, operate or charter oceangoing tankers, container 

ships, and other merchant vessels engaged in both the domestic and international trades. The 

Chamber also represents other entities which maintain a commercial interest in the operation 

of such oceangoing vessels. Over the past quarter century, the Chamber has supported the 

strong leadership role of the United States in the finalization of the UN Convention on the Law 

of the Sea (UNCLOS) into its final form, including revision of the deep seabed mining provision. 

We believe the United States took such a strong role due to its recognition that UNCLOS is 

of critical importance to national and economic security, regarding both our military and commercial fleets. . . . Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your consideration of these issues and strongly 

urge you to place the ratification of UNCLOS on the agenda of your Committee. The United 

States was a key player in its development and today, is one of the few industrialized countries 

who have not yet ratified this very important Convention. The time is now for the United States 

to retake its position of leadership.’’ 7On May 26, 1998, the Director of the Center for Seafarers’ Rights wrote the following in a 

letter addressed to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: ‘‘The 1982 United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea creates a legal framework that addresses a variety 

of interests, the most important of which is protecting the safety and well-being of the people 

who work and travel on the seas. I urge you to support ratification of the 1982 United Nations 

Convention on the Law of the Sea.’’ 8 In a July 17, 1998 letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the 

President of the Chemical Manufacturers Association wrote the following: ‘‘The Law of the Sea 

Convention promotes the economic security of the United States by assuring maritime rights 

of passage. More importantly, the Convention establishes a widely-accepted, predictable framework for the protection of commercial interests. The United States must be a full party to the 

Convention in order to realize the significant benefits of the agreement; and to influence the 

future implementation of UNCLOS at the international level. On behalf of the U.S. chemical 

industry, I strongly encourage you to schedule a hearing on UNCLOS, and favorably report the 

Convention for action by the Senate.’’ 9On November 14, 2001, the National Commission on Ocean Policy adopted a resolution B 

its first on any subject—providing: ‘‘The National Commission on Ocean Policy unanimously recommends that the United States of America immediately accede to the United Nations Law of 

the Sea Convention. Time is of the essence if the United States is to maintain its leadership 

role in the ocean and coastal activities. Critical national interests are at stake and the United 

States can only be a full participant in upcoming Convention activities if the country proceeds 

with accession expeditiously.’’

Industries Association,3 the United States Outer Continental Shelf Policy Committee,4 the American Petroleum Institute,5 the Chamber of Shipping of America,6

The Center for Seafarers’ Rights,7 the Chemical Manufacturers Association,8 the 

congressionally established National Commission on Ocean Policy and a broad coalition of environmental groups.9 This testimony will briefly explore reasons for United 

States adherence to the Convention. First, however, it will discuss the criteria for 

appraising United States adherence to an international agreement and will then set 

out a brief overview of the Nation’s oceans interests and history of the Convention. 

I. APPRAISING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Clearly, a position that the United States should be unable to enter into international agreements is unacceptable. Such a position would deprive the United 

States of a fundamental sovereign right. Indeed, it would treat the United States 

like a child unable to enter into contracts. Nor would such a position be consistent 

72

10 Roosevelt’s famous ‘‘four freedoms’’ speech lists ‘‘freedom from fear’’ as the fourth freedom. 

with the Constitution of the United States, which clearly envisages that the United 

States will be able to enter into international agreements. And, of course, such a 

position would be absurd in relation to the conduct of international relations by this 

great Nation. For example, the ability of the United States to enter into the NATO 

Treaty was of enormous importance to this country. Indeed, NATO may well have 

prevented World War III. Similarly, with respect to the war for the fourth freedom 

(the war against terror) 10 the United States is a party to many important multilateral anti-terror treaties which delegitimate terrorist activity. In fact, the United 

States is, as part of the national effort with respect to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), seeking to strengthen one of those, the Convention for the Suppression 

of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (the SUA Convention), 

to assist our PSI effort. In relation to oceans issues alone, the United States is party 

to many multilateral agreements concerning such issues as protection of the marine 

environment, the protection of whales and fish stocks, and the safety of life at sea. 

I doubt anyone would suggest that United States leadership in negotiating and adhering to these, or many other such agreements, was wrong. 

As such, the criteria for appraising United States adherence to an international 

agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, must be the national interest of the 

United States in relation to the specifics of the agreement being considered and the 

great principles which have empowered this Nation. Moreover, such an appraisal, 

to be useful, must be informed—it must describe the agreement and its affect on 

our national interests accurately. And it must include the alternative reality that 

will govern if we do not adhere. 

Similarly, our Nation, as a global leader, must effectively engage in international 

affairs. Surely this Nation learned at great cost from Pearl Harbor that isolationism 

is not the answer. Hopefully, no one in a post-9/11 world would seek to turn back 

to isolationism or seek to deny the United States the fundamental tools for effective 

international engagement. Such an approach would be folly at any time, but particularly so during the war on terror when coordination with our allies is of special 

importance. 

I am pleased to report to this Committee that the Law of the Sea Convention is 

strongly in the national interest of the United States. As such, I wholeheartedly 

support the judgment of President Bush in seeking to move the Convention forward. 

Indeed, this Convention is compellingly in our national interest and adherence is 

overdue. Most remarkably, unlike most treaties, there is no trade off for the United 

States in adhering to this Convention. The Convention powerfully serves our security interests and no United States oceans interest is better served by non-adherence. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe there is also a special obligation in speaking to the national interest of the United States to learn the facts and present accurate information. I have been particularly troubled in the recent debate about the Law of the 

Sea Convention to see wildly erroneous allegations about the Convention, particularly charges that it would be giving away the sovereignty of the United States 

when the reality, diametrically opposed, is that this Convention solidifies the sovereign rights of the United States over resources in an area approximately the size 

of the continental United States. I am also troubled by charges that it would undermine the security interests of the United States when the reality, diametrically opposed, as attested by every Chief of Naval Operations, and every Combatant Commander to have considered the issues, is that the Convention strongly supports the 

security interests of the United States. Another troubling charge is that some 

unnamed ‘‘bureaucracy’’ is pushing the Convention. Having chaired the National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the Sea under Presidents 

Nixon and Ford, I can attest, to the contrary, that the Convention is overwhelmingly 

in the national security interest of the United States as determined by repeated 

hard-headed interagency review within the United States Government under multiple Presidents. It is not surprising that past Legal Advisers of the Department of 

State and past Chiefs of Naval Operations have recently sent letters in support of 

United States adherence. 

II. BACKGROUND OF THE CONVENTION

As the quote by Thomas Jefferson which began my testimony illustrates, the 

United States, surrounded by oceans and with the largest range of oceans interests 

in the world, has a vital national interest in the legal regime of the sea. Today those 

interests include naval mobility, navigational freedom for commercial shipping, oil 

and gas from the continental margin, fishing, freedom to lay cables and pipelines, 

73

11The reason supporting this is most easily understood as the high cost of organization of 

those affected by illegal oceans claims; claims which were externalizing costs on the international community. A multilateral strategy of response to such illegal claims, far from being 

simply a fuzzy effort at cooperation, effectively enabled coordination of nations to promote the 

common interest against such illegal claims. Counter to the perception of some that a unilateral 

U.S. response is always the best strategy, a multilateral forum was indeed the most effective 

forum for controlling such threats to our navigational freedom. Moreover, since a majority of 

coastal nations are completely ‘‘zone locked,’’ that is, they have no access to the oceans without 

traversing the 200 mile economic zones of one or more neighboring states, a multilateral strategy continues to offer an important forum for rebutting illegal unilateral oceans claims threatening navigational freedom. The fact is, because of this ‘‘zone locked’’ geography, a majority of 

nations should never favor extending national jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles or permit 

interference with navigational freedom in the 200 nautical mile economic zone. 12The Convention powerfully supports United States control of its fisheries resources. Indeed, 

with respect to fisheries, the United States is already a party to the ‘‘Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,’’ a treaty that implements certain fisheries provisions of the Law of 

the Sea Convention. Senator Ted Stevens provided crucial leadership in Senate advice and consent to this implementing Convention. 

environmental protection, marine science, mineral resources of the deep seabed, and 

conflict resolution. Consistent with these broad interests the United States has been 

resolute in protecting its ocean freedoms. Indeed, the Nation has fought at least two 

major wars to preserve navigational freedoms; the War of 1812 and World War I. 

In point II of his famous 14 Points at the end of World War I, Woodrow Wilson said 

we should secure ‘‘[a]bsolute freedom of navigation upon the seas . . . alike in peace 

and in war.’’ And the Seventh Point of the Atlantic Charter, accepted by the Allies 

as their ‘‘common principle’’ for the post World War II world, provided ‘‘such a peace 

should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.’’

In the aftermath of World War II the United States provided leadership in the 

First and Second United Nations Conferences to seek to protect and codify our 

oceans freedoms. The first such conference, held in 1958, resulted in four ‘‘Geneva 

Conventions on the Law of the Sea’’ which promptly received Senate Advice and 

Consent. One of these, the Convention on the Continental Shelf, wrote into oceans 

law the United States innovation from the 1945 Truman Proclamation—that coastal 

nations should control the oil and gas of their continental margins. During the 

1960s a multiplicity of illegal claims threatening United States navigational interests led to a United States initiative to promote agreement within the United Nations on the maximum breadth of the territorial sea and protection of navigational 

freedom through straits. This, in turn, led some years later, and with a broadening 

of the agenda, to the convening in 1973 of the Third United Nations Conference on 

the Law of the Sea. In this regard it should be clearly understood that the United 

States was a principal initiator of this Conference, and it was by far the preeminent 

participant in shaping the resulting Convention. Make no mistake; the United 

States was not participating in this Conference out of some fuzzy feel good notion. 

Its participation was driven at the highest levels in our Government by an understanding of the critical national interests in protecting freedom of navigation and 

the rule of law in the world’s oceans. Today we understand even more clearly from 

‘‘public choice theory,’’ which won the Nobel Prize in economics, why our choice to 

mobilize in a multilateral setting all those who benefited from navigational freedom 

was a sound choice in controlling individual illegal oceans claims.11 And the result 

was outstanding in protecting our vital navigational and security interests. Moreover, along the way we solidified for the United States the world’s largest offshore 

resource area for oil and gas and fishery resources over a huge 200 nautical mile 

economic zone, and a massive continental shelf going well beyond 200 miles.12

Despite an outstanding victory for the United States on our core security and resource interests, a lingering dispute remained with respect to the regime to govern 

resource development of the deep seabed beyond areas of national jurisdiction. Thus, 

when the Convention was formally adopted in 1982, this disagreement about Part 

XI of the Convention prevented United States adherence. Indeed, during the final 

sessions of the Conference President Reagan put forth a series of conditions for 

United States adherence, all of which required changes in Part XI. Following adoption of the Convention without meeting these conditions, Secretary Rumsfeld served 

as an emissary for President Reagan to persuade our allies not to accept the Convention without the Reagan conditions being met. The success of the Rumsfeld mission set the stage some years later for a successful renegotiation of Part XI of the 

Convention. In 1994, Part XI dealing with the deep seabed regime beyond national 

jurisdiction was successfully renegotiated, meeting all of the Reagan conditions and 

then some. Subsequently, on October 7, 1994, President Clinton transmitted the 

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13For the letter of transmittal to the Senate and official United States Government articleby-article commentary on the Convention, see SEN. TREATY DOC. 103–39, reprinted in U.S. Department of State Dispatch Supplement, Law of the Sea Convention: Letters of Transmittal and 

Submittal and Commentary (Feb. 1995, Vol. 6, Supp. No. 1). For the most authoritative articleby-article interpretation of the Convention, see the multi-volume Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, prepared under the auspices of the Center for 

Oceans Law and Policy of the University of Virginia School of Law. MYRON H. NORDQUIST (ED.), 

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY (1985–2003 

Martinus Nijhoff Publishers). 

Convention to the Senate for advice and consent.13 Since that time no administration, Democratic or Republican, has opposed Senate advice and consent—and United 

States ratification. 

At present the Convention is in force; and with 145 states parties it is one of the 

most widely adhered conventions in the world. Parties include all permanent members of the Security Council but the United States, and all members of NATO but 

the United States and Denmark. The Convention unequivocally and overwhelmingly 

meets United States national interests—indeed, it is in many respects a product of 

those interests. 

If one were to travel back in time and inform the high-level members of the eighteen agency National Security Council Interagency Task Force which formulated 

United States oceans policy under Presidents Nixon and Ford during the principal 

formative Convention process—an effort never matched before or since in the care 

with which it reviewed United States international oceans interests—that the Convention today in force, powerfully meeting all United States oceans interests, would 

not yet be in force for the United States nine years after being submitted to the 

Senate, the news would have been received with incredulity. As this suggests, the 

Congress should understand that United States oceans interests, including our critical security interests, are being injured—and will continue to be injured—until the 

United States ratifies the Convention. Among other costs of non-adherence we have 

missed out in the development of rules for the International Law of the Sea Tribunal and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and in ongoing 

consideration of cases before the Tribunal as well as ongoing consideration of the 

Russian continental shelf claim now before the Continental Shelf Commission; we 

have had reduced effect in the ongoing struggle to protect navigational freedom and 

our security interests against unilateral illegal claims; and we have been unable to 

participate in the decisions of the meetings of States Parties. These are not just my 

conclusions. They are the conclusions of every Chief of Naval Operations and every 

Secretary of State who has considered these issues and of all the law of the sea experts I work with on a continuing basis. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, it is for the reasons expressed in 

the last paragraph that I welcome consideration by this Committee of the United 

States posture with respect to the Law of the Sea Convention. Our Nation is now 

almost a decade overdue in adhering to this Convention. I believe it would be helpful if this Committee were to recommend to the Senate that it move forward as expeditiously as possible with advice and consent. That is the action from this Committee that would serve the national interest with respect to the Law of the Sea 

Convention. 

III. REASONS FOR UNITED STATES ADHERENCE TO THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION

Why should the United States adhere to the Law of the Sea Convention? The 

most important reasons are summarized under the following nine headings: 

A. Solidifying and Protecting Sovereign Rights of the United States 

The Law of the Sea Convention provides ‘‘sovereign rights’’ over the natural resources off the coasts of the United States in an ‘‘economic zone’’ of 200 nautical 

miles and even beyond where our continental margin goes beyond 200 miles. As 

such, United States adherence to the Convention will solidify and protect an extension of United States sovereign rights over the living and non-living natural resources off our coasts in an area roughly equal to our continental land mass. Indeed, 

the size of this resource area for the United States under the Convention is greater 

than that for any other nation in the world. In the history of actions affecting 

United States sovereign rights, this Convention would be on the honor roll in its 

dramatic recognition of an expansive area of sovereign rights over resources. 

Of further great importance, this Convention protects the sovereign rights of the 

United States over our military and commercial vessels; rights that are critical to 

the economic and security interests of our Nation. In the ongoing struggle for oceans 

law, these are our sovereign rights that are at the greatest risk, and adherence to 

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the Convention will unequivocally serve this national interest in protecting navigational freedom. The Convention not only protects navigational freedom through an 

improved regime of innocent passage in the territorial sea and full freedom of navigation in the new economic zone, but it creates a critical new regime of straits transit passage permitting our submarines to transit straits submerged and our aircraft 

to enjoy overflight rights over such straits. And it recognizes immunity for our warships and government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. 

In contrast, quite to the contrary of arguments advanced against the Convention 

by some opponents, the Convention does not remove United States sovereignty or 

sovereign rights over the resources of the deep seabed. Neither the United States 

nor any other Nation has now, or has ever had, sovereignty over the mineral resources beyond the continental margins. In fact, it has been a consistent position 

of the United States and other developed nations to oppose any extension of national sovereignty into this area. Indeed, it is precisely because no nation in the 

world controls the mineral resources of the ocean basins that the Convention has 

created a narrowly limited international mechanism to permit mining of these resources. For without such a regime, industry simply cannot obtain the legal rights 

necessary for the over billion dollar cost of a deep seabed mining operation. 

B. Protecting the National Security Interests of the United States 

The most important interests for the United States in the LOS negotiations were 

our national security interests, particularly our protection of navigational freedom 

on the world’s oceans against unilateral coastal state claims. The Law of the Sea 

Convention powerfully serves these interests. This is reflected in the strong and consistent support for the Convention from the United States Navy. To my knowledge, 

every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, every Chief of Naval Operations, and every 

Combatant Commander of the United States to consider the Convention has urged 

prompt United States adherence. This is not simply an accident. The National Security Council Interagency Task Force that I chaired during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, which developed what became the principal negotiating instructions 

for the United States, had vigorous representation from both the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) throughout the development of instructions and throughout the negotiations. When I engaged in negotiations as a United States Ambassador and Deputy Special Representative of the 

President I was accompanied literally around the world by superbly capable representatives of OSD and OJCS. The treatment of national security interests of the 

United States in this Convention is not some marginal on balance win, it was a decisive victory for the United States, our ocean allies, and, indeed, the community 

common interest. In this respect, make no mistake, the United States was the single 

most influential nation in the world in the negotiations leading to this Convention. 

But we coordinated closely with other principal developed and maritime nations, 

and the final victory was a victory for all who believe in freedom and the rule of 

law. 

Each and every one of the arguments I have heard advanced on security grounds 

against this Convention by some of its recent critics is, I believe, in error. I look 

forward to an opportunity before this Committee to respond to questions about any 

of these topics. But the greatest error of these critics is that they do not even remotely understand the overall importance of this Convention for our oceans security 

interests. That is, even if these critics were correct on some of their isolated points, 

they would still miss the big picture that must provide the overall basis for assessment. 

C. Protecting United States Industry 

It is no accident that the representatives of the National Oceans Industries Association, the American Petroleum Institute, the Chamber of Shipping of America, the 

Chemical Manufacturers Association, and the Congressionally established National 

Commission on Oceans Policy support United States adherence to this Convention. 

The Convention provides a strong legal basis for development of ocean resources and 

it provides strong guarantees of navigational freedom so vital to United States trade 

around the world. To my knowledge, no United States industry association has opposed moving forward with the Convention. 

With respect to our oil and gas and deep seabed mining industries, however, there 

are especially compelling reasons why the United States needs to promptly adhere 

to the Convention. Our oil and gas industry is simply unlikely to move forward in 

development of the continental margin of the United States in areas beyond 200 

nautical miles until United States adherence solidifies the legal regime for them in 

such areas. And our deep seabed mining industry is now moribund, and will remain 

so, absent United States adherence to the Convention. The United States led the 

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world toward development of the technology for the recovery of deep seabed minerals. Our industry collectively expended more than $200 million to identify and obtain international recognition for five prime mine sites. At present three of those 

sites lie abandoned and the other two are on hold with zero chance of activity absent United States adherence. The Congress should clearly understand that accepting the arguments of the critics and opposing moving forward with the Convention 

is to permanently put the innovative United States deep seabed mining industry out 

of business, and to accept a reality that only the firms of other nations will be able 

to mine the deep seabed. 

D. Protecting United States Mariners and Fishermen 

For many years the United States has been concerned about the fate of United 

States mariners or fishermen arrested and imprisoned in other nations around the 

world. This is an issue both of human rights in protecting our citizens and an issue 

of conflict avoidance with other nations. The Law of the Sea Convention takes the 

lead in this matter in providing that for fishermen ‘‘[a]rrested vessels and their 

crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security,’’ and ‘‘[c]oastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations 

in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of 

agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal 

punishment.’’ Similarly, with respect to mariners the Convention restricts certain 

non-serious violations to ‘‘[m]onetary penalties only’’ and provides in all cases for 

‘‘the observance of recognized rights of the accused.’’ These are important provisions 

in protecting United States citizens. They are provisions that should be of considerable concern to maritime unions and American distant water fishermen. 

E. Protecting Environmental Interests 

The Law of the Sea Convention provides strong protection for the marine environment. Indeed, the Rio Conference on the Environment accepted Part XII of the Convention as the core environmental provisions for the world’s oceans. Not surprisingly, American environmental groups overwhelmingly support adherence to the 

Convention. Indeed, in one case, that of the protection of marine mammals, the Convention embodies the initiative of a United States environmental NGO. Thus, Article 65 of the Convention on the protection of marine mammals was negotiated following important work done by the Connecticut Cetacean Society. United States influence was also felt in requirements concerning monitoring, publication of reports, 

and assessment of potential effects of activities. The United States was further successful in avoiding any environmental double standard in the world’s oceans. 

Remarkably, the important new environmental provisions of the Convention are 

sufficiently balanced that they enjoy the support of all United States oceans interests. Support for this Convention is that rare public policy issue on which both industry and environmental groups strongly agree. 

F. Encouraging Good Organizational Precedents 

One of the original concerns of the United States with respect to Part XI of the 

Convention prior to its renegotiation was the precedential effect of what was then 

a very poor international organization for the regulation of seabed mining in areas 

beyond national jurisdiction. For example, the original organization had three seats 

that would have been controlled by the former Soviet Union to one that could have 

been rotated off for the United States. And there was substantial concern that the 

International Authority was to be controlled by developing countries on a one nation, one vote basis. Following the renegotiation based on the Reagan conditions, 

however, the Seabed Authority that has emerged sets a strong precedent for international organization in the interest of the United States. Points of particular benefit to the United States in the renegotiated Part XI include:

• The Authority is a small, narrowly mandated specialized agency with regulatory authority only over the mining of deep seabed minerals of the seabed 

beyond areas of national jurisdiction. It is not in the slightest some new international authority that will control the oceans that would, for example, have 

jurisdiction over navigation, fishing or military activities;

• As a first level of protection for the United States and other developed nations it is directed that as a general rule, decision making in the Authority 

should be by consensus. This consensus procedure was pioneered in the LOS 

negotiations and has been of substantial benefit within international organizations subsequently using it. My understanding is that it is working quite 

well in the Authority and that in the almost ten years of the work of the Authority, decisions have been on the basis of this consensus procedure;

77

• The United States is provided a permanent seat on the Council of the Authority. Indeed, the United States is the only nation in the world assured such 

a permanent seat, as the nation with the ‘‘largest economy’’ on the date of 

entry into force of the Convention;

• As a member of the Council the United States will have a veto over the adoption of rules and regulations for seabed mining, the distribution of any revenues collected by the Authority, and any amendments concerning the Authority;

• The United States would also have the ability as a member of the Finance 

Committee, which adopts all rules of substance by ‘‘consensus,’’ to veto financial decisions of the Authority;

• The Council of the Authority is set up on a chambered voting system in which 

any three developed nations, from among the five principal mineral consumers, will be able to exercise a veto over non-consensus actions of the Authority. Thus, in areas where the United States would not have a consensus 

veto, as set out above, the United States and any two other developed nations 

from among the five principal consumers of the minerals in Chamber A of the 

Authority would be able to block action. The Authority is thus quite the opposite of a ‘‘one nation one vote’’ system dominated by developing countries;

• The Authority is directed to operate on market principles. Thus the renegotiation specifies variously that the Authority will operate on the basis of ‘‘commercial terms and conditions,’’ and ‘‘sound commercial principles.’’ Further, it 

is specifically prohibited for the Authority to provide preferential access, including through the use of ‘‘tariff or non-tariff barriers;’’

• The Authority is itself directed to be ‘‘cost effective.’’ Indeed, for ten years the 

Authority has had only about 37 employees. This is hardly an earth-shaking 

bureaucracy; and

• Miners will have assured access under a first-come system for mining the 

deep seabed. Private industry will be able to directly mine the seabed and 

will have first refusal in any joint venture with the Authority itself.

Why do we need a specialized agency to regulate deep seabed mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction? Quite simply, no nation owns or has sovereign rights 

over these resources, as they are beyond national jurisdiction. Perhaps if a ‘‘fishing 

approach’’ would work in mining these minerals, no such Authority would have been 

necessary. But our industry has emphatically told us that they can not mine under 

a ‘‘fishing approach’’ in which everyone simply goes out to seize the minerals. To 

mine the deep seabed requires security of tenure for the billion dollar plus costs of 

such an operation. And the size of the area of a mine site is approximately that of 

the State of Rhode Island. As such, an international authority of strictly limited 

functional regulatory authority is needed to provide security of tenure for mining 

to take place whenever the price of the minerals justifies it. After more than a quarter of a century of negotiations, the United States was able to obtain such an Authority to enable mining to take place, while simultaneously meeting our requirements for good organizational precedents. To turn the Convention down after this 

considerable success is not in the interest of our nation or our industry. 

G. Restoring United States Oceans Leadership 

Until our prolonged non-adherence to the 1982 Convention, the United States has 

been the world leader in protecting the common interest in navigational freedom 

and the rule of the law in the oceans. We have at least temporarily forfeited that 

leadership by our continued non-adherence. United States ratification of the Convention will restore that leadership. Specifically, ratification will have the following 

effects, among others:

• The United States will be able to take its seat on the Council of the International Seabed Authority. The authority is currently considering a mining 

code with respect to polymetallic sulfides and cobalt crusts of the deep seabed. 

Council membership will also give us important veto rights over distribution 

of any future revenues from deep seabed exploitation to national liberation 

groups;

• The United States should, at the next election of judges for the International 

Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, see the election of a United States national 

to this important tribunal. Since this Tribunal frequently considers issues relating to navigational freedom and the character of the 200 mile economic 

zone, it is a crucial forum for the development of oceans law;

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14The best general discussion of these illegal oceans claims and their effect on United States 

interests is J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS, 66 U.S. Naval 

War College International Law Studies (1994), and J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH , 

UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (2d ed. 1996). 15 It should be clearly understood that these United States ‘‘understandings’’ under Article 310 

are not ‘‘reservations’’ altering the correct legal meaning of the Convention. Such reservations 

or exceptions are barred by Article 309 of the Convention except as specifically permitted by 

the Convention, as, for example, in Article 298 of the Convention concerning optional exceptions 

to the compulsory dispute settlement provisions.

• The United States should, at the next election of members of the Commission 

on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, see the election of a United States expert to the Commission. This Commission is currently considering the Russian 

claim in the Arctic that is of real importance for the United States (and Alaska) and for appropriate interpretation of the Convention respecting continental margin limits. Over the next few years the Commission will begin to 

consider many other shelf limit submissions, beginning next with Australian 

and Brazilian claims. This is also the Commission that ultimately must pass 

on a United States submission as to the outer limits of our continental shelf 

beyond 200 nautical miles. The early work of the Commission, as it begins 

to develop its rules and guidelines, could significantly affect the limits of the 

United States continental shelf. To not actively participate in the work of this 

Commission could result in a loss of thousands of square kilometers of resource-rich United States continental shelf;

• The United States will be able to participate fully in the annual meeting of 

States Parties that has become an important forum for ongoing development 

of oceans law. Of particular concern, United States presence as a mere observer in this forum has in recent years led to efforts by some to roll back 

critical navigational freedoms hard won in the LOS negotiations where we 

were a leader in the negotiations and our presence was powerfully felt; and

• The United States will be far more effective in leading the continuing struggle 

against illegal oceans claims through our participation in specialized agencies 

such as the International Maritime Organization; in bilateral negotiations 

such as those with the archipelagic states; in acceptance by other states of 

our protest notes and our ability to coordinate such notes with others; and 

generally in organizing multilateral opposition to threats to our oceans interests and the rule of law in the oceans. 

H. Protecting United States Oceans Interests 

A further set of important reasons for United States adherence to the Law of the 

Sea Convention, many of which overlap with earlier points, relate to the particularized protection of United States oceans interests. I have added this crosscut by way 

of partial demonstration of the remarkable reality with respect to this Convention: 

that no United States oceans interest will be better served by non-adherence. Some 

of the more important and immediate assists to our oceans interests from United 

States adherence include:

• More effectively engaging in the continuing struggle to protect our naval mobility and commercial navigational freedom. Protecting the ability of the United 

States Navy to move freely on the world’s oceans and the ability of commercial shipping to bring oil and other resources to the United States and for us 

to participate robustly in international trade overwhelmingly carried in ships 

is the single most important oceans interest of the United States. This interest, however, is also the single most threatened interest; the continuing 

threat being the historic pattern of unilateral illegal oceans claims. As of June 

22, 2001, there were at least 136 such illegal claims.14 This struggle has been 

the key historic struggle for the United States over the last half century and 

gives every indication of continuing. Adhering to the Convention provides numerous ways for the United States to engage more effectively in protecting 

these interests. An immediate and important effect is that we are able, on acceding to the Convention, to attach a series of crucial ‘‘understandings’’ under 

Article 310 of the Convention as to the proper interpretation of the Convention, as have many other nations—too many of which have made erroneous 

interpretations as yet unrebutted by United States statements.15 Moreover, 

as a party we will be far more effective in multiple fora in protecting the 

many excellent provisions in the Convention supporting navigational freedom. 

Indeed, much of the struggle in the future to protect our vital oceans interests 

will be in ensuring adherence to the excellent provisions in the Convention. 

Having won in the struggle to protect these interests within UNCLOS we now 

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16For a state-of-the-art assessment of the extent of the United States continental shelf beyond 

the 200 mile economic zone, see the work of Dr. Larry Mayer, the Director of the Center for 

Coastal and Ocean Mapping at the University of New Hampshire. As but one example indicating the great importance of performing this delimitation of the shelf well B and the importance of the United States participating in the resulting approval process in the Commission 

on the Limits of the Continental Shelf B Dr. Mayer=s work shows that sophisticated mapping 

and analysis of the shelf would enable the United States to claim an additional area off New 

Jersey within the lawful parameters of Article 76 of the Convention of approximately 500 square 

kilometers just by using a system of connecting seafloor promontories. The work of Dr. Mayer 

has been funded in part through an innovative forward-looking grant supported by Senator Judd 

Gregg of New Hampshire. This work, however, is important for the Nation as a whole, and particularly for Alaska, which has by far the largest shelf beyond the 200 mile economic zone.

have a substantial advantage in the continuing struggle—we need only insist 

that others abide by the nearly universally accepted Convention. Obviously, 

that is an advantage largely thrown away when we ourselves are not a party. 

And for our commercial shipping we will be able to utilize the important Article 292 to obtain immediate International Tribunal engagement for the release of illegally seized United States vessels and crew. It should be emphasized that the threat from these illegal claims is that of death from a thousand pin pricks rather than any single incident in response to which the 

United States is likely to be willing to employ the military instrument. Moreover, some of the offenders may even be allies of the United States, our 

NATO partners, or even over zealous officials in our own country who are unaware of the broader security interests of the Nation; 

• More effective engagement with respect to security incidents and concerns resulting from illegal oceans claims by others. Examples include the new law 

of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) providing that Chinese civil and military authorities must approve all survey activities within the 200 mile economic zone; the PRC harassment of the Navy’s ocean survey ship, the USNS 

Bowditch, by Chinese military patrol aircraft and ships when the Bowditch

was 60 miles off the coast; the earlier EP–3 surveillance aircraft harassment; 

Peruvian challenges to U.S. transport aircraft in the exclusive economic zone, 

including one aircraft shot down and a second incident in which two U.S. C–

130s had to alter their flight plan around a claimed 650 mile Peruvian ‘‘flight 

information area’’; the North Korean 50-mile ‘‘security zone’’ claim; the Iranian excessive base line claims in the Persian/Arabian Gulf; the Libyan ‘‘line 

of death’’; and the Brazilian claim to control warship navigation in the economic zone;

• More rapid development of the oil and gas resources of the United States continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The United States oil and gas industry is poised in its technology to begin development of the huge continental 

shelf of the United States beyond 200 miles (approximately fifteen percent of 

our total shelf). But uncertainties resulting from U.S. non-adherence to the 

Convention will delay the substantial investment necessary for development 

in these areas. Moreover, U.S. non-adherence is causing the United States to 

lag behind other nations, including Russia, in delimiting our continental 

shelf. Delimitation of the shelf is an urgent oceans interest of the United 

States;16

• Reclaiming United States deep seabed mineral sites now virtually abandoned. United States firms pioneered the technology for deep seabed mining and 

spent approximately $200 million in claiming five first-generation sites in the 

deep seabed for the mining of manganese nodules. These nodules contain attractive quantities of copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese and would be a 

major source of supply for the United States in these minerals. Paradoxically, 

‘‘protecting’’ our deep seabed industry has sometimes been a mantra for nonadherence to the Convention. Yet because of uncertainties resulting from U.S. 

non-adherence these sites have been virtually abandoned and most of our 

nascent deep seabed mining industry has disappeared. Moreover, it is clear 

that without U.S. adherence to the Convention our industry has absolutely 

no chance of being revived. I believe that as soon as the United States adheres to the Convention, the Secretary of Commerce should set up a working 

group to assist the industry in reclaiming these sites. This working group 

might then recommend legislation that would deal with the industry problems in reducing costs associated with reacquiring and holding the five 

United States sites until deep seabed mining becomes economically feasible;

• Enhancing access rights for United States marine scientists. Access for United 

States marine scientists to engage in fundamental oceanographic research is 

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a continuing struggle. The United States will have a stronger hand in negotiating access rights as a party to the Convention. As one example of a continuing problem, Russia has not honored a single request for United States 

research access to its exclusive economic zone in the Arctic Ocean from at 

least 1998, and the numbers of turn-downs for American ocean scientists 

around the world is substantial. This problem could become even more acute 

as the United States begins a new initiative to lead the world in an innovative new program of oceans exploration;

• Facilitating the laying of undersea cables and pipelines. These cables, carrying phone, fax, and internet communications, must be able to transit 

through ocean jurisdictions of many nations. The Convention protects this 

right but non-adherence complicates the task of those laying and protecting 

cables and pipelines; and

• It should be emphasized again with respect to this Convention that no U.S. 

oceans interest is better served by non-adherence than adherence. This is a 

highly unusual feature of the 1982 Convention. Most decisions about Convention adherence involve a trade off of some interest or another. I am aware 

of no such trade off with respect to the 1982 Convention. United States adherence is not just on balance in our interest; it is broadly and unreservedly in 

our interest. 

I. Enhancing United States Foreign Policy 

The United States would also obtain substantial foreign policy benefits from adhering to the 1982 Convention; benefits going quite beyond our oceans interests. 

These benefits include:

• Supporting the United States interest in fostering the rule of law in international affairs. Certainly the promotion of a stable rule of law is an important goal of United States foreign policy. A stable rule of law facilitates commerce and investment, reduces the risk of conflict, and lessens the transaction costs inherent in international life. Adherence to the Law of the Sea 

Convention, one of the most important law-defining international conventions 

of the Twentieth Century, would signal a continuing commitment to the rule 

of law as an important foreign policy goal of the United States;

• United States allies, almost all of whom are parties to the Convention, would 

welcome U.S. adherence as a sign of a more effective United States foreign policy. For some years I have chaired the United Nations Advisory Panel of the 

Amerasinghe Memorial Fellowship on the Law of the Sea in which the participants on the Committee are Permanent Representatives to the United Nations from many countries. Every year our friends and allies ask when we 

will ratify the Convention, and they express to me their puzzlement as to why 

we have not acted sooner. In my work around the world in the oceans area 

I hear this over and over—our friends and allies with powerful common interests in the oceans are astounded and disheartened by the unilateral disengagement from oceans affairs that our non-adherence represents;

• Adherence would send a strong signal of renewed United States presence and 

engagement in the United Nations, multilateral negotiation, and international 

relations generally. At present those who would oppose United States foreign 

policy accuse the United States of ‘‘unilateralism’’ or a self-proclaimed ‘‘American exceptionalism.’’ Adhering to the Law of the Sea Convention will demonstrate that America adheres to those multilateral Conventions that are 

worthy while opposing others precisely because they do not adequately meet 

community concerns and our national interest;

• Efforts to renegotiate other unacceptable treaties would receive a boost when 

an important argument now used by other nations against such renegotiation 

with us is removed. This argument now used against us, for example, in the 

currently unacceptable International Criminal Court setting, is: ‘‘[W]hy renegotiate with the United States when the LOS renegotiation shows the U.S. 

won’t accept the Convention even if you renegotiate with them and meet all 

their concerns?’’ Let me emphasize this point. The United States will be severely damaged in its international engagement if other nations believe that 

we will not adhere to agreements, whether they are in our interest or not. 

And this is particularly true after other nations accommodate the United 

States in all that it asks in a renegotiation and then see United States inaction toward the renegotiated agreement. If we are to maintain our negotiating 

leverage we must demonstrate that we distinguish between good and bad 

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17The 1994 submission of the LOS Convention to the Senate recommended that the United 

States accept ‘‘special arbitration for all the categories of disputes to which it may be applied 

and Annex VII arbitration [general arbitration] for disputes not covered by . . . [this],’’ and that 

we elect to exclude all three categories of disputes excludable under Article 298.’’ See U.S. Department of State Dispatch IX (No. 1 Feb. 1995). This recommendation has been accepted by 

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 18 According to the Department of State, the United States is already a party to more than 

85 agreements (most of them multilateral in nature) that provide for the resolution of disputes 

by the International Court of Justice. More than 200 treaties—including civil air transport 

agreements and various types of investment treaties—provide for mandatory arbitration at the 

request of a party. In addition, there are a number of international organizations that include 

dispute resolution mechanisms, including the U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal, and the International 

Civil Aviation Organization. The acceptance of arbitration in the Law of the Sea Convention is 

hardly a departure for the United States. Moreover, unlike most such dispute settlement provisions, the Law of the Sea Convention specifically permits the United States to not accept submission of disputes concerning military activities. This provision was insisted on by the United 

States in the negotiations leading to the Convention and was supported by navies all over the 

world. 

international agreements and that we accept the good while rejecting the bad; 

finally

• The United States would obtain the benefit of third party dispute settlement 

in dealing with non-military oceans interests. The United States was one of 

the principal proponents in the law of the sea negotiations for compulsory 

third party dispute settlement for resolution of conflicts other than those involving military activities. We supported such mechanisms both to assist in 

conflict resolution generally and because we understood that third party dispute resolution was a powerful mechanism to control illegal coastal state 

claims. Even the Soviet Union, which had traditionally opposed such third 

party dispute settlement, accepted that in the law of the sea context it was 

in their interest as a major maritime power to support such third party dispute settlement.17 International arbitration, which the President has recommended for the United States in this case, is about as American as apple 

pie. Indeed, George Washington took great pride in the initiative that led to 

the Jay Treaty and settlement through arbitration of disputes we had with 

the United Kingdom. This Convention, negotiated by the first Chief Justice 

of the United States and one of the principal draftsmen of the Federalist Papers, may well have avoided a second war with Britain at a time the new Nation could ill afford it. And, following the Civil War, the United States again 

led the world to arbitration in the Alabama Claims Arbitration that resulted 

in substantial net payments to the United States. Modern international arbitration owes its existence to these important American initiatives.18

IV. SOME POINTS OF CONFUSION TO AVOID IN CONSIDERING UNITED STATES ADHERENCE

Unfortunately, some of the criticisms directed against the Law of the Sea Convention fail to understand the full context for consideration of the Convention. A few 

points are particularly worth noting in this connection. These are:

• Some critics, while singling out particular articles that concern them in the 

1982 Convention, fail to note that the United States is currently bound by the 

1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea that are considerably less favorable to United States oceans interests than the 1982 Convention, in which 

the United States was particularly able to offer greater protection to its security, resource, and environmental interests. Thus, inaction with respect to 

United States adherence to the 1982 Convention simply leaves these less favorable treaties binding on the United States. Once the United States becomes a party to the 1982 Convention, however, under Article 311 of the Convention the 1982 Convention will take precedence over these less protective 

1958 Conventions;

• Paradoxically, the critics seem not to have noticed that the less protective 1958 

Conventions already binding on the United States, unlike the 1982 Convention, contain no denunciation clause. Unless the United States adheres to the 

1982 Convention, which would automatically supercede our obligations under 

the 1958 Conventions, we would be faced with substantial uncertainty about 

revision or withdrawal from the 1958 Conventions. Under the 1958 Conventions, a request for revision of the Conventions would simply be referred to 

the United Nations General Assembly, which would then ‘‘decide upon the 

steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such requests.’’ And, in the absence 

of a denunciation clause in the 1958 Conventions, it would be unclear under 

82

international law whether the United States would be able to lawfully withdraw at all from these Conventions. In sharp contrast, not only will adherence to the 1982 Convention automatically supercede outmoded United States 

obligations under the 1958 Conventions, but the 1982 Convention does contain a denunciation clause. Under Article 317 of the Convention the United 

States may leave the Convention after one year following a simple denunciation. Thus, if the horribles espoused by the critics were to occur, the United 

States could simply denounce the Convention and withdraw;

• Some critics seem also to act as though United States non-adherence would 

prevent the Convention from coming into effect, that we can engage in further 

renegotiation, or that we can simply ignore the Convention in our relations 

with other nations. None of these assumptions is true. The 1982 Convention 

is in force for 145 nations and is today the basic legal regime for the world’s 

oceans. For example, whether or not the United States adheres to the Convention, the Seabed Authority will remain in place. The only difference will 

be that the United States will gratuitously deprive itself of its deep seabed 

mining industry and our ability to control the rules and regulations, amendments and any distribution of revenues to states parties in the actions of the 

Authority. And following a major renegotiation at United States insistence before the Convention went into force (a renegotiation that met all United 

States conditions established by President Reagan for United States acceptance) there is zero possibility of further renegotiation. Any amendments from 

this point forward can only come from the participation of states parties using 

normal Convention provisions for amendment. Similarly, whether or not we 

are a party to the Convention, when the United States seeks to mobilize its 

allies around an important initiative such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, it will quickly find, as it has, that our allies will insist on compliance 

with the Convention provisions;

• Some critics seem to believe that there would be a negative sea change in the 

ability of the United States to protect its interests were we to adhere to the 

Convention. But to the contrary, pursuant to an order by President Reagan, 

the United States for over two decades has been complying with the provisions of the Convention other than deep seabed mining, which were not yet 

renegotiated at the time of Reagan’s order. And from 1994 to 1998—until our 

right to participate on the Council of the Authority under provisional application ran out—the United States took its seat on the Council of the Authority 

and participated in adopting the budget of the Authority and formulating 

rules and regulations for seabed mining. The horribles summoned up by the 

critics simply have not occurred;

• Some critics seem not to understand the critical United States interest in protecting its sovereign rights in freedom of navigation on the world’s oceans. I 

have been particularly troubled by criticisms that seem to assume that an absence of rules, or oceans anarchy, would somehow be in our interest. But to 

the contrary, the United States sought, and is protected by, rules that limit 

the ability of other nations to control our shipping and that provide a balanced rule of law in the oceans. Any other understanding of this nation’s 

oceans interests is completely naive in failing to understand the death by a 

thousand pin pricks nature of the challenge to our freedoms; and

• Some critics seem unaware of other articles in the Convention that negate an 

argument they are making. Admittedly, the Convention, with 320 articles and 

numerous annexes, is complex. That, however, is no excuse for failing to accurately understand the Convention as a whole. 

V. A FEW EXAMPLES OF THESE CONFUSIONS IN CRITICISMS OF THE CONVENTION

Examples of the above, and other confusions in recurrent criticisms of the Convention, include the following:

• Criticisms that the United States will be required to turn over security information without noting Article 302 of the Convention negating any obligation 

‘‘to supply information the disclosure of which is contrary to the essential interests of its security;’’

• Criticisms that under Article 20 of the 1982 Convention submarines are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag, without noting that 

this obligation is already binding on the United States under Article 14 of the 

1958 Territorial Sea Convention. Nor does this criticism even bother to mention the critical difference between the 1958 and 1982 Conventions, that 

under the 1982 Convention, this obligation no longer applies in straits used 

83

19The core legal bases for PSI include actions by states within their territory, actions by 

states within their national airspace, actions by port states in internal waters, actions by coastal 

states in territorial waters, actions by flag states over their flag vessels, actions based on flag 

state or master’s consent, actions based on rights concerning stateless vessels, actions based on 

universal crimes, actions based on rights of individual or collective defense, and actions based 

on belligerent rights. None of these legal bases require violation of the 1982 Convention or actions inimical to the crucially important United States security interest in the protection of freedom of navigation.

for international navigation. In such straits there is a right under the 1982 

Convention of ‘‘transit passage,’’ permitting transit in the normal mode; which 

includes submerged transit and overflight.

• Criticisms that the United States should not commit to provisions in the 1982 

Convention to the effect that the high seas are ‘‘reserved’’ for peaceful purposes and that parties to the treaty shall refrain from ‘‘any threat or use of 

force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,’’ 

without noting that these obligations simply parallel the obligation in the 

United Nations Charter, already binding on the United States and every 

other nation in the world banning the aggressive use of force. These obligations, as those in the United Nations Charter, do not in any way inhibit either the right of individual or collective defense or otherwise lawful military 

activities. If these provisions did in any way inhibit such activities in the 

world’s oceans there would have been no agreement on the Convention. This 

is abundantly evident in the robust naval activity of nations for which the 

Convention has been in force;

• Testimony of at least one critic before the Senate Committee on Environment 

and Public Works setting out a number of articles from the 1982 Convention, 

without notifying the Committee that those articles were either taken verbatim from the 1958 Conventions currently binding on the United States, or 

that the version in the 1958 Conventions now binding on us was even more 

restrictive than the provision cited from the 1982 Convention;

• Arguments concerning the PSI as though that initiative, developed with ten 

other countries, required breach of the 1982 Convention. To the contrary, the 

statement of principles agreed upon and released by the PSI parties in September 2003 is fully consistent with the 1982 Convention, and it is highly 

likely that the United States would not obtain agreement on some other 

basis. Indeed, this PSI argument of the critics, which is not consistent with 

the official position of the United States in the PSI initiative, seems also to 

fail to understand both the great United States interest in protecting freedom 

of navigation of United States shipping and our traditional rights of individual and collective defense that are an overlay over the 1982 Convention. 

The Law of the Sea Convention guarantees our vessels will be permitted to 

get on station, which is essential before any issue even arises about boarding. 

Moreover, we emphatically do not want a legal regime that would permit any 

nation to seize United States vessels anywhere in the world’s oceans. The PSI 

was carefully constructed, using flag state, port state and other jurisdictional 

provisions of the 1982 Convention and general international law precisely to 

avoid this problem.19 The PSI argument is one of the areas, in which critics 

have complained about articles in the 1982 Convention without noting that 

they are already binding on the United States, in a more restrictive fashion, 

in the 1958 Convention. Thus, critics have cited in connection with PSI Article 110 of the 1982 Convention concerning the right of visit, without noting 

that a more restrictive version of this article is already binding on the United 

States in Article 22 of the 1958 High Seas Convention. Indeed, the 1982 Convention adds several new bases for boarding, including that a ship is ‘‘without 

nationality.’’

• A variety of arguments asserting interference with United States intelligence 

activities without noting that the United States has been operating under the 

rules objected to by the critics since Ronald Reagan’s order; that the intelligence community does not share the critics’ concerns; and that the concerns 

of the critics, if valid at all, may already be engaged with the 1958 Geneva 

Conventions binding on the United States that would remain in force for the 

United States were we to fail to adopt the less restrictive 1982 Convention. 

Having chaired the eighteen Agency National Security Council Interagency 

process that drafted the United States negotiating instructions for the Convention, I found these recent arguments of the critics so bizarre that I recently checked with the Intelligence Community to see if I had missed someVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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20 International Seabed Authority, The Law of the Sea: Compendium of Basic Documents 191

(2001).

thing. The answer that came back was that they, too, were puzzled by these 

arguments and that they were not opposing United States adherence to the 

1982 Convention;

• The argument that perhaps the renegotiation of Part XI won’t be binding 

after all and that we will be stuck with the old Part XI. This argument, of 

course, is flatly at odds with Article 2 of the renegotiation agreement which 

provides ‘‘[i]n the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and 

Part XI, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.’’ It is at odds with the 

experience of the United States from 1994 through 1998 when we participated 

in the Authority on a provisional basis. It is at odds with the practice of the 

International Seabed Authority toward nations which had adhered to the Law 

of the Sea Convention before the renegotiation in treating them as fully 

bound by the renegotiation agreement. It is further at odds with the practice 

of the Authority in establishing a chambered voting system, a Finance Committee, and mining contracts, all of which are based on the renegotiation 

agreement. And it is at odds with the official Compendium of Basic Documents: The Law of the Sea published in 2001 by the Seabed Authority that 

not only has an extensive section rewriting Part XI to fully take account of 

the renegotiation, but which begins this section by noting: ‘‘[i]n the event of 

any inconsistency between the Agreement and Part XI, the provisions of the 

Agreement shall prevail.’’ 20 To my knowledge, not a single nation in the 

world has advanced this argument asserted by critics. More importantly, on 

an issue of such importance, the United States would have not only the legal 

right to leave the Convention, but given our insistence on the renegotiation 

we would be expected to exercise our denunciation right under Article 317, 

should a serious effort be made to set aside the renegotiation of Part XI. This 

argument, then, simply throws up another horrible without noting that the 

alternative recommended, not moving forward with adherence, will immediately have continuing substantial costs for the United States, which, unlike 

the imagined horrible, are neither contingent nor imaginary; 

• Assertions that the Convention will create authority for an international organization to tax American citizens. The Convention does nothing of the kind. 

It does provide for payments on ‘‘commercial terms’’ to mine deep seabed minerals that do not belong to the United States. This is similar to payments to 

Indonesia or Chile for the ability to have access to resources in those countries. We would not remotely regard payments for such access as authority 

for taxation of American citizens by Indonesia or Chile. Moreover, unlike arrangements for minerals mining access in foreign countries, in the new deep 

seabed Authority United States firms will have assured access to mine, and 

the disposition of payments as well as the rules and regulations for such mining will be subject to a United States veto. Moreover, that veto is exercisable 

with respect to the distribution of revenues from firms of all other nations 

mining the deep seabed—thus effectively multiplying the ability of the United 

States to ensure that the distributions to states parties are put to a good use. 

Similarly, the Convention provides for minimal revenue sharing for oil and 

gas development in areas beyond the 200 mile economic zone. Such revenues, 

which would amount to an average of two to five percent over the life of a 

well, were an enormous bargain for the United States as payment in return 

for our obtaining sovereign rights over resources in an area of the continental 

shelf beyond 200 nautical miles that is roughly equivalent to the size of California. That is, we retain ninety-five to ninety-eight percent of the value of 

the future resources in this area beyond the 200 mile economic zone placed 

under United States resource jurisdiction by the Convention. Indeed, the revenue sharing system adopted was drafted by a representative of an American 

oil company on our law of the sea industry advisory group and has been perfectly acceptable to the oil industry. And even beyond the great bargain that 

was the purchase of Alaska, in this case not a penny is due until seven years 

after production begins. Moreover, once again, the distribution of any such 

revenues to states parties, including revenues from this small royalty from all 

production beyond 200 miles from other nations, would be subject to a United 

States veto; and

• Allegations that the Convention ‘‘is designed to place fishing rights, deep-sea 

mining, global pollution and more under the control of a new global bureaucracy. . . .’’ This is so in error as to be humorous if it were not seriously adVerDate Mar 21 2002 10:28 Oct 18, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\051204\93660.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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21See ‘‘Bottom-of-the-Sea Treaty,’’ The Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2004.

vanced in a respected national newspaper.21 As has been seen, the new international organization to be set up to provide security of tenure for deep seabed mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction has regulatory authority 

only over the mining of minerals from the sea floor beyond national jurisdiction. And even then it would be subject to a United States veto with respect 

to the adoption of rules and regulations for mining, allocation of any revenues 

from mining, and any amendments relating to such organization. The suggestion that this organization may someday set up its own navy to enforce its 

will on the world, in the face of a United States veto, is particularly imaginative fantasy. 

Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee, should we not recognize that the 

advice from those who proffer such arguments is not more reliable than that from 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, successive Chiefs of Naval Operations, the Combatant Commanders, Presidents of both parties, United States oceans industries, 

United States environmental groups, a unanimous Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the United States Arctic Commission, and the unanimous opinion of the 

Congressionally established National Commission on Ocean Policy? 

CONCLUSION

Adherence to the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is strongly in the national interest of the United States. There are powerful reasons supporting United 

States adherence to the Convention; reasons rooted in protecting U. S. sovereign 

rights, protecting U. S. national security interests, protecting U. S. industry, protecting U. S. mariners and fishermen, protecting our environmental interests, encouraging strong precedents for international organization, restoring U.S. oceans 

leadership, protecting U.S. oceans interests, and enhancing U.S. foreign policy. I 

would urge this Committee to suggest that the Senate support advice and consent 

to the 1982 Convention at the earliest possible time.

86

Mr. HOUGHTON. Well, thank you for that ambiguous testimony. 

I wondered how you really feel about this. Thank you very much. 

Very clear, and very understandable, and thank you, Ms. Metcalf. 

Mr. Gaffney, and Mr. Spring, and Dr. Leitner, I am sorry that I 

didn’t get a chance to hear your testimony. 

But let us go on with some of the questions. I may have one or 

two questions, and I know that Mr. Faleomavaega has some. This 

is, of course, as you know, a hearing. This is not a decision-making 

process. We want to get all the facts out, and after we get the facts 

out, we can face the facts. 

And I am inclined to agree with you, but I think we have got to 

walk around this thing a little carefully. I guess the question you 

always ask is what is the downside, what are the dangers. 


93660bv.eps
87

I know that you have talked a little bit about them, but maybe 

you could sum up, any one of you, the thing that not only in your 

mind, and in your background, but in your gut you feel is really 

a possible danger here in advocating this Law of the Sea. 

Mr. GAFFNEY. Any particular order, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Yes. 

Mr. GAFFNEY. Just walk our way down the aisle? 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Absolutely. 

Mr. GAFFNEY. Well, as has been famously said in the past in 

other contexts, I guess John Norton Moore’s remarks are fighting 

words. I feel as though on a number of points I have been rather 

directly challenged, and I would simply say this treaty does change 

the nature of our relationship to the world’s oceans. 

It does. It simply does. There will be, if we become a party to it, 

new mechanisms under which we will be obliged to interact with 

a host of issues, ranging from undersea exploration, and research, 

and oil and gas development, and mineral recovery, and fisheries, 

and so on. These are routinely cited as among the attributes and 

benefits of this treaty, and as I said in my opening statement, Mr. 

Chairman, I think from some points of view those could in fact be 

seen as benefits of the treaty. 

I simply think you can’t have it both ways and say that does not 

at some point constitute an infringement upon our current sovereignty. But my larger concern is, I personally think, where you 

see the United States Government entering into treaty obligations, 

even if it has said similar things in the past, even if it has made 

formal commitments as we have seen in the arms control world—

and John Norton Moore and I are usually on the same side on 

those treaties. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. We have got to go through a whole list of people. 

Mr. GAFFNEY. Where those commitments—this is a narrow point, 

Mr. Chairman—where those commitments are at odds with our actual practice, you have people say, well, we will simply continue 

our existing practice not withstanding these new treaty commitments, and not withstanding the fact that we are agreeing to become bound by an international tribunal that will be able to impose, at minimum, advisory opinions, and maybe regulations or 

rules, over which we will not have a veto. I submit to you, sir, that 

is an infringement on our sovereignty and can have deleterious impacts on our national security as well. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you, Mr. Gaffney. Mr. Spring. 

Mr. SPRING. Mr. Chairman, my primary concern is that the bulk 

of this treaty is really about process and procedure as much as it 

is about substance, and that process and procedure are ultimately 

uncontrollable. The reason that I am so concerned about this treaty, particularly now, is that we had an unambiguous U.S. veto in 

the United Nations Security Council regarding Iraq. But in order 

to do what we had to do for the vital interests of the United States, 

we had to take positive action there. 

It was an exercise in frustration. It has its political sources, but 

it also has its legal sources, and as we go down this path of openended international procedures, our ability, our freedom to navigate politically, not physically on the ocean even so much here, but 

to navigate politically on the shores of an ambiguous international 

88

situation, becomes less and less apparent. And our ability to withdraw from this process without extensive political damage in my 

judgment is very, very limited. So that in a sense I would say that 

what we are doing here is buying into a procedure where we really 

don’t know what the outcomes will be, and in the end I think that 

it will have many regrettable consequences. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very much. Dr. Leitner. 

Mr. LEITNER. Thank you. There is a long list of reasons, and I 

will go through a few of them as to why this treaty is iatrical to 

the United States national interests. 

One of the issues that was heard earlier by the Admiral was basically an incorrect assertion that the treaty would obviate the 

need for freedom of navigation assertions. But where we go and 

make challenges to coastal state claims that we think are excessive, and that are drawn incorrectly, or claims to historic waters, 

or bays, or other things, the treaty does very little, if anything, in 

that regard. States are still holding on to their own interpretations 

of how they are drawing baselines. They are still closing off areas. 

They are still claiming historic waters where they claimed them 

prior to the treaty, and they are still holding on to their claims 

now. 

The assertion that this is going to make the guy on the ship any 

safer by not having to challenge these claims I think is completely 

false, or a misreading of the treaty. 

Issues such as taxation and sovereignty; taxation and sovereignty are inextrinsicably linked in areas of the high seas, beyond national jurisdictions, particularly on the continental shelf, 

and in the margin area, that will come under the purview of the 

International Seabed Authority. 

The Seabed Authority now has the ability under this treaty to directly tax a sovereign state for production activities, royalties, for 

the extraction of oil that is done in that area that it allows to happen. It is not the vendor or the contractor who is assessed this tax. 

It is taxed to the state government. The United States will be assessed the tax, and then the United States will try to figure out 

how to collect that tax, or have it recouped to the taxpayer, based 

upon activities operating beyond its national jurisdiction, which 

would be extremely problematic. 

So it will be a tax assessed directly on the state, and that is unprecedented in international activities, and international law. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Is that it, because we have got to move along 

here. 

Mr. LEITNER. I have a couple of rather quick points. One is there 

is the inherent possibility in the treaty, and this was demonstrated 

by the Center for Naval Analysis in a report done several years 

ago, that there is ample place and ambiguity in the treaty that will 

allow the treaty organization to actually raise a military force, or 

some sort of an enforcement body, to enforce its edicts and the rulings of its various tribunals and bodies. 

That is a possibility. In addition, I think there is a fundamental 

problem here, and it is almost a fruit-of-the-looking-glass effect, 

where we have leadership being characterized as the casting of vetoes. 

89

In this new body that has been created, the U.S. role in terms 

of leadership will be basically trying to throw chairs in the path of 

an onslaught of countries who do not share U.S. interests on any 

particular issue. This is not leadership in any sense of the word, 

and so binding the United States to a treaty where we will have 

to basically be fighting a rear-guard action on a regular basis, is 

not necessarily in the United States interests, and finally——

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very much. We really have to move 

it along here, because there are other people who are going to testify. Can you get to your final point? 

Mr. LEITNER. Yes. One final point. There is a real substantial 

concern about the U.S. ability to wage war on terrorism because of 

the treaty, in terms of the proliferation of security initiatives of the 

President. It is an excellent policy, but one which is not allowed 

under the treaty the way the treaty reads. 

There are several very strict forms of authorization for making 

visits to ships on the high seas beyond national jurisdiction. 

Counterterrorism, and looking for weapons of mass destruction, 

and other things that involve ships in transit passage that are exactly the kinds of ships we need to interdict, are not allowed under 

the treaty. And several states, members of the treaty organization, 

have come out and stated that the PSI is barred under this treaty. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Okay. Thank you very much. Ms. Metcalf. 

Ms. METCALF. Sir, I have nothing to say that would be a negative 

at ratifying this treaty. I would say, if you will permit me just a 

couple of seconds, that my father, God rest his soul, once asked me 

in law school why we needed 10 million laws to enforce 10 basic 

commandments. 

And after I thought, I recalled that no matter what we do, there 

are rogue nations, and rogue individuals, and rogue is defined as 

those who either intentionally or through ignorance, violate accepted norms of behavior. And what we find as we codify those norms 

of behavior, the general public, or the world in this case, becomes 

better educated, and then the U.S. can lead the world into a more 

appropriate and more predictable state of world affairs. 

The last thing I would say, sir, is that I have much more faith 

I suppose in the diplomatic capabilities of the United States. I see 

the veto power in this Convention as a fallback that we could use 

if our ordinary, and as documented by history, diplomatic skills do 

not effect our ultimate goals. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thank you very much. Dr. Moore. 

Mr. MOORE. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. There are quite 

simply no costs for the United States in adhering to this treaty, 

and there are substantial costs for the United States in not adhering to this treaty promptly. 

And I would suggest to you it is one of the reasons that, what 

has come out of my good colleagues who are my friends but are unfortunately on the wrong side of this issue, what is coming out of 

them is a very high-level generalization, by the way, of many 

issues which have been refuted on many occasions. Let me just give 

you one of those. 

I am hearing once again that somehow the treaty is inconsistent 

with PSI when the core members of PSI are all members of the 

90

Law of the Sea Treaty. Indeed, we could not engage in something 

in PSI that was not consistent with the treaty. 

They also keep throwing up article 110 in relation to this PSI argument without noting that article 110 is basically nothing more 

than a broader version of a provision that is binding on us already 

in article 22 of the high seas convention. 

One of the real difficulties and frustrations here, Mr. Chairman, 

is that the critics seem not to be aware that the United States is 

bound today by the four 1958 Geneva Conventions that are more 

restrictive in many ways than the 1982 Convention. 

This is why we wanted to get into the renegotiation. It is what 

we did in the National Security Council task force under Nixon, 

and Ford, and later under Reagan. It is why our Government for 

30 years has supported this. So we are simply hearing a series of 

individual arguments that I am afraid don’t make sense on their 

merits, and certainly not when we put it together in the overall 

U.S. national interests. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Well, thank you very much. Now I am going to 

ask Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to 

ask Professor Moore if he could clarify a little more what I think 

Mr. Spring mentioned on the fact that we do have a veto vote on 

the Security Council of the United Nations. I suppose that kind of 

extends our sovereignty and the right to unilaterally undo something that may not necessarily be in our national interests. And I 

wanted to ask Professor Moore if you could clarify again the voting 

rights of our country within the provisions of the treaty as it is proposed. I just want to make a comparison whether the integrity of 

our national interests is still preserved in that context. 

Mr. MOORE. Congressman, I very much appreciate that question, 

which I think is very important. If we look at the issues in Law 

of the Sea for a moment other than deep seabed mining, what we 

find is that there is no new creation of some kind of governmental 

structure. There is no kind of creation here of something taking 

away from coastal nations’ or high seas’ freedoms. We were trying 

to do something that basically would promote freedom, and would 

promote efficient management by states around the world. 

It is not any kind of accident, for example, that all the oil and 

gas of the continental margins is placed under coastal nation jurisdiction. In contrast, there is an international authority only on an 

extremely narrow area of deep sea minerals. 

This, in turn, is nothing more than trying to obtain security of 

tenure for mineral resources, the kinds exactly you talked about 

that were so important in areas beyond national jurisdiction, because no one owns those. We don’t own them. 

And the notion of saying that when we go out there and we have 

to pay something to get those, we are having a tax, is about like 

saying that Indonesia is taxing the United States when Exxon has 

a joint venture to obtain oil from Indonesia. It is just simply silly. 

It is not true. 

Now, when this was initially set up in the 1970s and 1980s, we 

had a system that was basically under NIEO, one nation, one vote, 

all of the kinds of things that the critics are telling you. 

91

But the treaty was completely redone. Every single one of the 

Reagan conditions was met and then some. The United States had 

enormous influence in negotiations, and we ended up with the following provisions that are extremely helpful precedently in international organizations. In fact, I don’t know of another international organization the United States is a member of in which 

it has provisions that are this good. Let us look at them. 

It is the only nation in the world singled out for a permanent 

seat in the council of the authority that will exercise the basic control. 

Under that it has the veto on virtually all of the important 

issues, and by the way, any of these revenues that they are talking 

about, not just from the U.S., but anywhere else in the world, the 

United States has a veto over where they go. 

We have the ability to multiply the sovereignty and power of the 

United States in the use of those funds. In addition to that, we 

have a veto over any amendment. The notion that somehow you 

are going to have a blue-helmeted navy spring out of this is absolute fantasy, Mr. Chairman. It would have to be over the veto of 

the United States of America, and I might add probably threequarters of the rest of the world. It just is not going to happen. So 

we have got a very powerful setting, and we have a chambered voting system on everything that we don’t immediately have a veto on. 

By the way the Authority is also proceeding even under consensus. There has not been a single substantive decision made in 

this authority in the first 10 years that was not done under the 

consensus procedure. 

And finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just suggest something that 

the critics never tell you. The United States was a party from 1994 

until 1998 under provisional application. We participated in the 

budget of the organization and drafting of rules and regulations. 

This ‘‘huge bureaucracy’’ that the critics tell you about is 37 employees, indeed 37 employees for 10 years; a tiny budget, et cetera. 

I could go on and on. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Moore, I know that my time is just 

about to be up. I know as a matter of observation certainly your 

expertise, and then in fairness also to Mr. Gaffney and Mr. Spring, 

I have whole loads of questions, but we are pressed for time. Of the 

issues raised by Mr. Spring and Mr. Leitner, as well as Mr. 

Gaffney, about sovereignty and national security, my basic observation is the fact that this Administration is about as conservative as 

we could ever be, which is positive I think. 

But given the fact that it does meet with the full approval of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Administration, I 

have to give credence to the fact that the experts and the gentlemen involved in the whole advent of looking at every provision, and 

every letter, and every phrase of the provisions of the treaty, have 

ensured that our national interests are being protected. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Thank you. 

Mr. HOUGHTON. Thanks very much everybody. We certainly appreciate this. The hearing is over. 

[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the Committee meeting was adjourned.] 

(93)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROY BLUNT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Mr. Chairman, Let me start by thanking you for holding this very important hearing. The treaty we are here to discuss today holds enormous ramifications for our 

nation’s sovereignty. At stake is everything from access to the deep seabed mineral 

resources of our coastal regions to our ongoing ability to guarantee the security of 

our shipping routes. 

This treaty was rejected more than 20 years ago by the Reagan administration. 

Among the reasons cited for rejecting the treaty were an unacceptable decision-making process, stipulations mandating the transfer of private technology, incorporation 

of economic principles inconsistent with free market philosophy, and no assured access to future deep seabed mineral resources. 

The early years of the Clinton administration were spent trying to fix this treaty. 

In 1994, an ‘‘annex’’ to the treaty was announced. However, I am concerned that 

many of President Reagan’s initial complaints about the treaty have not been fully 

addressed in the annex. For example:

• Under the revised treaty, ‘‘sponsoring states’’ (those nations where mining 

companies are based) are still required to facilitate transfers of mining technology to Third World countries;

• The International Seabed Authority, the treaty’s primary agency responsible 

for mining approval, remains a hugely-complicated international bureaucracy 

in which mining approval would likely be politicized, discriminatory, and expensive;

• The U.S. would still be responsible for around 25% of the Seabed Authority’s 

budget, but have no proportional representation in terms of setting its agenda 

or impacting its decisions;

• The treaty still attempts explicitly to regulate intelligence and submarine activities in what are defined as ‘‘territorial’’ seas. These are activities vital to 

U.S. security that we should ensure remain unrestricted at all costs.

Mr. Chairman, both houses of Congress have a responsibility for examining the 

impacts that this treaty would have on national security and commercial access to 

our own resources. As with any treaty, certain aspects of U.S. law will likely have 

to be altered for compliance if this treaty is ratified by the other body. So we should 

not take our responsibility in the House lightly. If this treaty commits the United 

States to expend funds and provide personnel for action not approved by Congress, 

then it is important we are fully aware of what we are getting ourselves into. Forgive me for sounding cynical if I don’t take at face value the line in the annex stating that ‘‘all organs and subsidiary bodies to be established under the Convention 

and this Agreement shall be cost-effective.’’ International institutions are rarely, if 

ever, held to such a standard. 

Mr. Chairman, let me thank you again for holding this hearing today. The witnesses we have here represent both proponents and skeptics of the treaty’s effects. 

It is my hope that this hearing will allow House lawmakers to be better-informed 

about this treaty and whether or not it is in our national interest to be bound by 

it. 

94

LETTER SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY FRANK J. GAFFNEY, JR., PRESIDENT, THE

CENTER FOR SECURITY POLICY


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LETTERS FROM ADMIRAL JAMES D. WATKINS, U.S. NAVY, RETIRED, CHAIRMAN, U.S. 

COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY


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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY PETER M. LEITNER, PH.D., 

AUTHOR, ‘‘REFORMING THE LAW OF THE SEA TREATY: OPPORTUNITIES MISSED, 

PRECEDENTS SET, AND U.S. SOVEREIGNTY THREATENED’’


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Æ


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