U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

23–694PDF 2006

UNITED NATIONS RHETORIC OR REFORM:

OUTCOME OF THE HIGH–LEVEL EVENT

HEARING AND BRIEFING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 28, 2005

Serial No. 109–131

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

RENEE AUSTELL, Professional Staff Member 

JEAN CARROLL, Full Committee Hearing Coordinator 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

The Honorable John R. Bolton, United States Permanent Representative 

to the United Nations, U.S. Department of State ............................................. 4

BRIEFER 

Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, Chief of Staff to the Secretary-General, United 

Nations .................................................................................................................. 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable John R. Bolton: Prepared statement ............................................ 8

Mr. Mark Malloch Brown: Prepared statement .................................................... 40

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 51

(1)

UNITED NATIONS RHETORIC OR REFORM: 

OUTCOME OF THE HIGH–LEVEL EVENT 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:36 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. Today the 

Committee will conduct a hearing and subsequent briefing on the 

outcome of the United Nations High-level Event held in New York 

2 weeks ago. 

In addition to commemorating the 60th anniversary of the UN, 

a central focus of the High-level Event was reform of the United 

Nations, a subject that the Committee has been closely following. 

This is the third hearing on UN reform held by the Full Committee this year. The Subcommittees have held numerous hearings 

on various aspects of reform and twice now the House has passed 

the UN Reform Act of 2005, once as a stand alone bill and the 

other as an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 

of 2006. 

This should send a clear and resounding message to the UN on 

where the House of Representatives stands on reform of the institution. 

In addition, earlier this month the Ranking Democratic Member 

of this Committee, Mr. Lantos and I traveled to New York with our 

UN congressional delegates, Mr. Royce and Mr. Payne, on the eve 

of the High-level Event to conduct meetings and raise congressional 

concerns with the Secretary-General and various permanent representatives. 

Although my good friend, Mr. Lantos and I may differ on the 

means necessary to implement reforms, we are of like mind on the 

substance of reforms needed for the UN to regain its credibility and 

live up to its charter goals. 

Two weeks ago, an agreement was reached on an outcome document, which is viewed as the roadmap for reforming the United 

Nations. This document is a consensus one and as such, it contains 

broad statements on reform, at less in the way of specifics. 

Certain language is welcome, such as the call to create a Human 

Rights Council and the support of the Democracy Fund. Other language, such as the call for the Secretary-General to submit an independent external evaluation of the UN’s auditing and oversight 

mechanisms, the request for the review of and recommendations on 

2

all mandates older than 5 years, and the request for the SecretaryGeneral to submit detailed proposals for the creation of an Independent Oversight Advisory Committee and Ethics Office are welcomed, but tempered by the realization that calling for additional 

input and proposals and actually implementing those proposals are 

two distinct things. 

Despite the yeoman’s work of our new permanent representative—and he truly deserves our commendation for his tireless work 

in the run-up to the High-level Event—there are many items and 

details that were either unaddressed or left for a future General 

Assembly consideration. 

The outcome document’s lack of detail and definitive statements 

on critical areas, such as oversight, accountability management, 

and budgeting do not inspire confidence. 

For example, on accountability, the document states that, ‘‘We 

emphasize the importance of ensuring the operational independence of the Office of Internal Oversight Services,’’ but it is silent 

on budgetary and staffing independence. Without these two critical 

factors, OIOS is not truly independent. 

Regarding the proposed Human Rights Council, the document 

states, ‘‘We resolve to create a Human Rights Council.’’ Although 

this is welcomed, the fact that an agreement could not be reached 

on minimal membership criteria gives me pause. 

After reviewing the outcome document, I am more convinced 

than ever that our congressional efforts are on the right track. 

We must do everything in our power to ensure that reform occurs 

and that the UN agenda in general, under reform agenda in particular, are not hijacked. 

The United Nations Reform Act of 2005, that twice has passed 

in the House, must be enacted into law. Good stewardship of the 

organization is owed, not only to the American taxpayers, who fund 

22 percent of the organization’s expenses, but also to millions of 

people who the United Nations serves. 

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished guests, United 

States permanent representative to the UN, John Bolton and Mr. 

Mark Malloch Brown, Chief of Staff to the Secretary-General, on 

their views of the outcome document and the outlook for forward 

movement on those items addressed in the document and more importantly, those that were left unaddressed, but which will be pursued in the 60th session of the General Assembly. 

I now turn to my good friend and colleague, Tom Lantos, for any 

remarks he may wish to offer. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, both for holding this important hearing and for your continuing focus on the 

need to reform the United Nations. 

Mr. Chairman, the Cold War ended almost 15 years ago, but incredibly the politics of the United Nations are still crippled by an 

anachronistic block of nonaligned nations whose mission in life is 

to castigate Israel and the United States and to undermine all of 

the important work the United Nations should be doing for peace 

and global security. 

Mr. Chairman, this nonsense has to stop. Our UN diplomacy has 

to change permanently. We must make war on the culture of hate 

3

and corruption that infects the halls of the United Nations in New 

York. 

It is time for the United States to make it clear that no nation 

can continue to pretend that it is a friend of the United States, 

while its missions in New York and Geneva continue to stab us in 

the back. 

Ironically, Mr. Chairman, it has become increasingly clear that 

if we want to save the United Nations and all that is constructive 

and essential about multilateralism, we need to apply quid pro quo 

diplomacy to engender consistent support for U.S. and global interests. 

Let me be specific. The Administration came up with a proposal 

not long ago to provide India with all the assistance it needs in the 

field of nuclear energy development. 

I indicated to the Administration that I will strongly support this 

proposal, which I believe is in our national interest. 

But then it became clear that India will fight against one of the 

prime U.S. foreign policy objectives, namely to put an end to Iran’s 

development of nuclear weapons, and India was going to vote 

against us at the IAEA in Vienna on this matter. 

At the hearing involving Undersecretary of State, I made it clear 

that India cannot expect to accommodate herself, while she totally 

disregards our interests. I indicated great displeasure with India’s 

policy. 

There was a tremendous hubbub in the Indian media and the 

government reacted strongly, but last Saturday India voted with us 

in Vienna, because it decided it is more important to maintain its 

relationship with us than to accommodate the Ayatollah in Tehran. 

This is a good object lesson and I think it is important for all of 

our friends and other countries abroad to understand that there 

will be a growing emphasis on quid pro quo in U.S. foreign policy. 

The age of naive idealism I think is over. 

I would like to say at this stage, Mr. Chairman, that I was particularly pleased to see both Undersecretary Burns and Secretary 

of State Rice express their support for and confidence in SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan. 

Undersecretary Nicholas Burns stated and I quote:

‘‘Kofi Annan initiated the reforms we agreed to today and he 

championed those reforms and we found him to be over the 

last year one of our most stalworth allies in pushing nations 

around the world for these reforms.’’

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent a clear and unambiguous signal of U.S. support for the Secretary-General by stating 

and I quote:

‘‘I have never had a better relationship with anyone than with 

Kofi Annan.’’

Mr. Chairman, I agree with Dr. Rice. Kofi Annan is a friend and 

ally of the United States and I hope the irresponsible conversation 

calling for his resignation will have come to an end. 

I very much look forward to listening to Ambassador Bolton and 

to our friend from the United Nations, Mr. Malloch Brown and I 

want to commend you again for holding this hearing. 

4

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

Normally we try to recognize each Member for at least 1 minute 

to make an opening statement, but today we will have to forego 

that because of time constraints. We will try to make up for it in 

our next hearing. 

I would like to welcome Ambassador John R. Bolton. He was appointed as U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations by 

President Bush on August 1, 2005. 

Before assuming his position, Ambassador Bolton served as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 

from May, 2001 to May, 2005. 

Prior to this, he was the Senior Vice President of the American 

Enterprise Institute. Also served as Assistant Secretary of State for 

International Organizational Affairs. 

Ambassador Bolton comes to his position with a wealth of knowledge and a wealth of experience. John, we are glad you are representing us at the UN. We know that U.S. interests could not be 

in more capable hands and we welcome your statement now. Thank 

you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON, UNITED 

STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Lantos, other Members of the Committee. It is a pleasure 

to be back. 

This Committee’s leadership in oversight matters concerning our 

policy in the United Nations is well-known and I think very important and I would say in that regard that the visit that the Chairman and Mr. Lantos and Congressman Royce and Congressman 

Payne have made up to New York in the past couple of weeks was 

an example of that kind of involvement with UN related issues and 

very important. 

I believe that is sincerely one of the reasons, I think, that the 

American tradition of having two Members of Congress, one from 

each party on a rotating basis between the House and the Senate, 

is such an important part of our representation in New York. 

To have officials who are elected by real voters, real people come 

and say what they think is a measure, I think, of the strength of 

our system and the interest that people have in it. 

As I said to Congressman Royce and Congressman Payne when 

they were up there, we are going to take advantage of every moment of their time that they can get and look forward to working 

together with them. 

Mr. Chairman, I have kind of a lengthy prepared statement that 

I would like to submit for the record. We have had some production 

problems last night, but we will get a copy up here as promptly as 

possible today and I hope—just to summarize some of the points 

I made in the testimony—that is acceptable to you. 

Mr. Chairman, we had nearly a year-long process of negotiation 

in preparation for the High-level Event that produced the outcome 

document that you referred to earlier. 

It was an effort really involving all parts of the United States 

Government. Certainly before my arrival in New York, there were 

5

extensive efforts, people coming up from Washington to work on 

the issue and as you know, we supported the outcome document 

with one reservation. 

We adjoined in the consensus. We said at the time and we believe now that it was an important first step in a process of UN 

reform. It was not the alpha and the omega, but we never thought 

it would be the alpha and the omega. 

I think that our attitude toward where we have been and where 

we go next could not have been summed up better than by Secretary Rice in her address to the opening of the 60th General Assembly when she said and I quote: ‘‘The United Nations must 

launch a lasting revolution of reform.’’

That is our approach and that is the objective that we are seeking. 

I thought I would start off by just discussing two of the issues 

that we considered in the outcome document and have been and 

will remain important priorities for the United States. 

The first is terrorism and the second is management reform. We 

felt that the language in the outcome document on terrorism was 

positive. We were extremely pleased that the President, during his 

trip, could participate in a Security Council summit, where the 

council unanimously adopted Resolution 1624, dealing with terrorist incitement and terrorist safe havens. 

We think that this resolution was an important step forward and 

we believe that there is a larger potential role for the Security 

Council in the counterterrorism area, which we are going to be pursuing vigorously in the next several months. 

In addition, the heads of government agreed in the outcome document that we wanted the prompt conclusion of negotiations on the 

Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism. That has 

been a priority of the United States for some time. 

We believe in the wake of the summit meeting that negotiations 

will move forward quickly and we hope that that is going to be another positive aspect of the summit meeting. 

I will say though and really following on to what Congressman 

Lantos said about some of the internal politics in the UN that it 

was unfortunate that we had an extended debate as we went over 

the terrorism section in the outcome document about the role of national-liberation movements and whether there are two kinds of 

terrorism, sort of good terrorism in one capacity and bad terrorism 

in another. 

There isn’t any distinction here. All terrorism is bad, no matter 

whom it is directed against or for whatever purported justification 

and we thought we arrived at a satisfactory resolution of that issue 

in the outcome document and I hope that we can carry that 

through into the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism as well. 

Second, in the area of management reform, it is true, Mr. Chairman, as you said, we didn’t get everything we wanted, but we 

made progress and I would like to offer up to the Committee a list 

that I brought of about three pages long that we are going to be 

using—a little bit over two pages I should say—as a checklist of 

requirements for the UN Secretariat that come out of the outcome 

document. 

6

These are specific tasks for follow-up on the management reform 

area that we expect the Secretariat will undertake and we will, of 

course, work very closely with them and with the other interested 

member governments, because this is a matter of such importance 

and urgency for us. 

One of the critical things here is the speed with which we follow 

up. Everybody on this Committee is familiar with the budget cycle 

of Congress. The UN has a budget cycle too. 

This fall we will approve a budget for the next biennium, for the 

next 2-year period, in the United Nations. I think it is very important, as a signal of commitment to management reform, that what 

was agreed to in the outcome document is implemented in time and 

reflected in the budget document so that the budget for the next 

2 years reflects what governments agreed to and we don’t lose 2 

years, in effect, of waiting to implement some of these reforms. We 

will be working closely with the Secretariat on that point. 

There are, of course, a range of things that were accomplished 

in the outcome document. A lot of additional work that remains to 

be done, as the Secretary-General himself said as recently as yesterday. 

But this alone, of course, is not the end of reform as such. There 

are a variety of other things that we need to look at, not just management reform and the Secretariat, but I would describe it as governance reform within the UN system itself. 

You know back in the Administration of the first President Bush, 

we had a concept we called the ‘‘Unitary UN.’’ It was designed to 

provide an analytical framework for addressing questions of overlapping responsibilities and duplication in the UN system and looking at questions of appropriate funding. 

I am very familiar with the bill that the House has passed. I am 

well aware of the distinction that was represented by Congressman 

Lantos’ substitute and I have to say one of the things that was 

most impressive to our foreign colleagues—when you were up in 

New York—was that as the two of you, in the most cordial way, 

discussed this important substantive difference. This substantive 

difference, as you know Mr. Chairman, the Administration has 

with your version of the bill. 

What was impressive to our foreign colleagues was that you 

spoke with one voice on the critical point of the need for UN reform. There was a significant difference in how to achieve that, but 

no disagreement on the broad point about the need for reform. 

I think one other area of agreement that we want to look at is 

exploring ways in which we can find to use funding advantageously 

for the whole UN system, looking at the experience of different 

agencies that are funded in different ways. 

I thought one of the most insightful comments that I have ever 

seen, frankly, on UN funding was made before this Committee last 

May by Cathy Bertini, 10 years the Executive Director of the World 

Food Program, who also served for, I think, 21⁄2 years as Undersecretary General for Management in the UN. 

I will just recall her comment for you, as she reflected on the differences between her days at the World Food Program, funded entirely by voluntary contributions and her days at the UN, funded 

of course by assessed contributions. 

7

Ms. Bertini said and I quote:

‘‘Voluntary funding creates an entirely different atmosphere at 

WFP than at the UN. At WFP, every staff member knows that 

we have to be as efficient, accountable, transparent and results 

oriented as is possible. If we are not, donor governments can 

take their funding elsewhere, in a very competitive world 

among UN agencies, NGO’s and bilateral government programs.’’

There are a variety of other suggestions that are out there as 

well and I think the prepared testimony refers to the current example of the International Fund for Agricultural Development, a UN 

specialized agency that uses a system of replenishment funding, 

not dissimilar from the replenishment mechanism of the multilateral development banks that has proved very successful for IFAD. 

I think, as we have said in our Statement of Administration Position on the bill that this Committee recorded, what we are really 

looking for is results based budgeting and accountability in the UN 

system and that will remain our touchstone. 

We want to continue to work with the Committee and Congress 

as we discuss some of these questions. 

In addition to finance, a broad area that we need to look at in 

the future involves decisionmaking within the UN system itself is 

not a Secretariat or management question. 

This is a question for member governments as to how we go 

about making decisions in the various UN bodies. Senator Luger, 

for example, has asked whether we need all of the current committees of the UN General Assembly. 

Others have asked whether the committees of the General Assembly ought to be committees of the whole. Should the UN General Assembly try to do all of its business constantly in committees 

of the whole? 

We need to look at governing bodies and decisionmaking systems 

throughout the UN and all of its specialized agencies. 

Of course, the most important body of all to us, the Security 

Council and the continuing question whether the United Nations 

should change the composition of the permanent membership of the 

council, whether it should add additional non-permanent seats. 

These are issues that are not resolved in the outcome document, 

but of critical importance to the United States. 

As the Committee knows, the United States has been a long and 

consistent supporter of making Japan a permanent member of the 

Security Council, a position that we remain committed to. 

Other governments have expressed interest as well and it is 

probably no accident that in the public debate in countries like 

Japan and Germany, the issue has been raised that if they don’t 

become permanent members of the Security Council, what will that 

do to support for their funding levels, if you consider Japan as the 

second largest contributor of the UN system, after the United 

States? 

On regular budgets, we contribute about 22 percent. Japan contributes slightly over 19 percent. Germany is the third largest contributor. 

8

This is one of the reasons why we focus and concentrate our efforts in trying to find a way to make Japan a permanent member, 

because of the implications it will have in Japan—as it does in this 

Congress—on questions of funding for the organization as a whole. 

I think in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, there is obviously a substantial amount of work to do. We are committed to following up 

on it. 

We are committed to working with this Committee and your colleagues in the other Body to try and make this successful so that 

we can have a stronger, more effective United Nations and a 

stronger, more effective American role in the institution. 

I would be delighted to answer any questions Members of the 

Committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bolton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Hyde and distinguished members of this Committee, thank you for inviting me here today to discuss a subject that I know has been of profound interest 

to you all. I can assure you that we deeply appreciate and support the work this 

Committee has done to help strengthen and reform the United Nations. Many representatives of member governments and Secretariat officials have echoed this support because they recognize correctly that the United Nations is at a historic turning point—and that the inquiries by this Committee and others in Congress reflect 

an interest in making the United Nations stronger and more effective, so that it can 

carry out the mandate set forth in its Charter 60 years ago. 

I would like to take this opportunity today to provide you with our initial assessment of the recent High Level Event in New York, and the opening of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, and also preview strategies we are 

considering to lay the foundation for lasting reform to make the UN more transparent, efficient, stronger, and accountable. While it is easy to blame the UN as an 

institution for some of the problems we confront today, we must recognize that ultimately it is member states that must take action, and therefore bear responsibility. 

As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States is and 

must remain a driving force in this effort. I look forward to working closely with 

this Committee and hearing your views on this matter. 

UNITED NATIONS REFORM: A STATUS REPORT

Our overall assessment of the recent High Level Event is that it served as an important next step in the long process of reforming the UN in accomplishing key U.S. 

objectives. Following the High-Level Event in which approximately 170 heads of 

state and government participated, the United Nations 60th General Assembly 

adopted an Outcome Document on September 18, 2005. The final document was the 

product of nearly a year of discussion and a fortnight of intensive negotiations. It 

is clear that more work remains to be done, but we are proud of the results and 

strongly supported the adoption of this document. As Secretary Rice said in her recent speech to the General Assembly, ‘‘The United Nations must launch a lasting 

revolution of reform.’’

The work preceding the start of this High Level Event crystallized around this 

Document, which represented an ambitious effort on the part of the General Assembly and the laudable efforts of President Jean Ping of the 59th General Assembly, 

as well as President Jan Eliasson to discuss a wide range of issues. 

To be sure, there were elements we wish had been preserved in the final text but, 

broadly speaking, we got much of what we wanted in the document and succeeded 

in keeping out some elements that directly conflicted with key U.S. policies and 

jeopardized our long-term interests. 

Before discussing the discrete subject matters addressed in the Outcome Document, I would like to take a moment to thank Ambassador Anne Patterson and the 

entire staff of the U.S. Mission in New York for their excellent efforts during the 

period before I arrived and the assistance they have provided me since. 

I would like to explain the process that played out over the past year. First, while 

it was natural that negotiations became more intense as the September 14 deadline 

9

of 170 world leaders convening in New York approached, I want to stress here today 

that it was truly ‘‘a year’’ of difficult negotiations. Throughout that year beginning 

even before the release of the High Level Panel’s report, the Administration had 

been articulating long-standing United States’ positions and promoting areas of reform we deemed most critical to strengthening the UN and making it more effective. 

Throughout the year, we were engaged in efforts to build support for our reform 

priorities in New York, and national capitals. Our focus included reforms such as 

the improvement of management of the organization, better use of UN resources, 

reforms to make the institution more effective in protecting human rights, and reforms to make the UN more effective in moving countries from conflict to peace. The 

Secretary was thoroughly engaged in this process herself and discussed these issues 

with her counterparts in several countries as well as with the Secretary General 

and President Ping. 

For the first few months of this process, discussions of the Outcome Document 

were handled through a ‘‘facilitator process’’ managed by President Ping and select 

member states’ representatives as facilitators. These were not direct, multilateral 

negotiations in a traditional sense; rather, on each of the subject matters that were 

to serve as discrete sections of the Outcome Document, one Permanent Representative was chosen to gather the views of all 191 UN members and attempt to synthesize these views into one text. Without a doubt and to a person, the facilitators 

worked assiduously and did the best job possible under difficult circumstances. 

When texts were circulated, individual countries, including the United States in 

some cases, were forced to point out that core redlines contravening national policy 

were sometimes crossed, and that it would be impossible to ask our respective heads 

of state to endorse the draft document without substantial modification. In other 

cases, compromise language was found which on its face was acceptable. The problem, of course, was that all member states knew full well that different delegations 

had markedly different interpretations of that compromise text. 

As a result, we and almost all other delegations strongly supported President 

Ping’s decision to move to a more direct negotiation process between key representatives from member states. However difficult this was, it was the only realistic way 

forward. Some have since commented that the result was a watered-down version 

of the Outcome Document and that many important and ambitious reforms were left 

unheeded. No doubt there is more the United States wanted in the document, but 

critics of our approach should recognize that the alternative was to pay lip service 

to reform, something we would not do. Would it have been better for countries to 

agree and sign on to an Outcome Document knowing full well it would never be implemented because of disagreements over interpretation on fundamental points? The 

answer is unequivocally ‘‘no.’’ Whatever flaws the Outcome Document may have, we 

now have a much clearer and transparent picture about not only what challenges 

we confront, but what opportunities we have to move forward. 

One particular challenge for this document was the difficulty of negotiating in one 

lengthy document a whole waterfront of issues that the international community 

faces. This is by no means to discredit the goal or suggest that individual topics 

should not be negotiated in proper forums. It is to suggest, however, that the utility 

of mass conferences is limited. Let me give you a case in point. As many of you 

know, finance officials from around the world have just converged in Washington 

for the World Bank—IMF Meeting to negotiate a number of specific issues related 

to debt relief. Some delegations at the UN attempted to replicate those negotiations 

in New York over the course of the past year. In so doing, they were attempting 

to hard-wire or lock-in national positions prior to the negotiations here in Washington. It was important that we resisted language that would have hampered U.S. 

negotiators by allowing other countries to point to language that we had just agreed 

to up in New York. 

Another reason we should question the process itself is that too often, vague compromise language is quoted back against the United States, year after year, in subsequent negotiations. Sometimes national positions change, and too often we are 

confronted with the argument that if we accepted certain language before we are 

required to accept it again. This sometimes even occurs when confronted with what 

seemed at the time to be boilerplate declarations on unrelated subjects. Of course, 

the UN itself has rejected this notion, as is evident by the successful repeal in 1991 

of the abominable ‘‘Zionism is Racism’’ Resolution. Nonetheless, the negotiation 

problem for the United States, especially in the ‘‘facilitator’’ process, was real 

enough. Moreover, it is in the long term, not enough for the United States to accept 

questionable language that we attempt to put in the proper context through ‘‘reservations’’ or explanations of votes. As we found in the past few weeks, too often 

the objectionable language survives, and the reservations are lost or forgotten. 

10

Let me now turn to specific subject areas that the Outcome Document addressed, 

or in some cases, failed to address. For the record I am attaching to this testimony 

copies of the letters pertaining to these subjects that we sent to all delegations on 

the different subjects. I hope this information will provide Members and staff with 

important background on how some of these debates played out. 

Terrorism 

Both President Bush and Secretary Rice focused the first portion of their respective remarks to the UN General Assembly on terrorism. Threats to peace and security in 1945 emerged mostly between states and were largely defined by borders. 

That is not the primary threat we face today. Today we live in a world where terrorists preach hatred and rogue states harbor these terrorists and threaten the entire 

civilized world with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

It is for this reason that President Bush voiced our strong support for Security 

Council Resolution 1624, sponsored by the United Kingdom, which condemns the incitement of terrorist acts and calls on states to take appropriate steps to end such 

incitement. It is the reason the President was very pleased to sign the International 

Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and called for the 

General Assembly to complete the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). And it is for this reason he spoke of new measures we have developed in close cooperation with our allies to drain terrorist networks of their financial 

support, and called upon others to join us in the Proliferation Security Initiative 

(PSI). As he noted in his remarks to the Security Council that day, ‘‘We have a solemn obligation to stop terrorism at its early stages. We have a solemn obligation 

to defend our citizens against terrorism, to attack terrorist networks and deprive 

them of any safe haven, to promote an ideology of freedom and tolerance that will 

refute the dark vision of the terrorists.’’

One of the challenges we faced in negotiating the text on the Outcome Document, 

was on something so basic but critical as how to define terrorism. We wanted to 

make sure the text in the Outcome Document focused on true terrorist actions, and 

not those legitimate military activities appropriately governed by international humanitarian law. In so doing we were able to excise portions of the text which could 

have been interpreted by some as granting legitimacy to the International Criminal 

Court to govern actions such as those conducted by the U.S. military in pursuit of 

our legitimate operations. Other delegations attempted to argue that national liberation movements should be an exception to sanctions for terrorist activity or that 

there were times when even civilians might be targeted by national liberation movements. We took the position, which ultimately prevailed, that there was no justification, and there could never be a justification for an act of terrorism, whether ideological or political. 

The movement toward a common definition of terrorism, though not accomplished 

in this round of discussions, is a goal we think is achievable with the adoption of 

the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT). This is precisely 

why the President challenged the international community and said, ‘‘We must complete the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism that will put every 

nation on record: The targeting and deliberate killing by terrorists of civilians and 

non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimized by any cause or grievance.’’

Human Rights and Democracy 

While countering specific terrorist threats and activities is a priority, there are 

other components of a longer-term strategy in winning the global war on terrorism 

that entail the promotion of liberty and democracy. As you know, the promotion of 

freedom through democracy and the protection of human rights and human dignity 

is a high priority for the President and all of us in the Administration. It was with 

this in mind that President Bush emphasized the point that, ‘‘We must change the 

conditions that allow terrorists to flourish and recruit, by spreading the hope of freedom to millions who’ve never known it. We must help raise up the failing states 

and stagnant societies that provide fertile ground for the terrorists.’’

The promotion of democracy and human rights is another area where we feel important progress was made, at least in principle, during the High Level Event. The 

UN Charter specifically states that a central goal of the institution is ‘‘to develop 

friendly relations among nations, based on equal rights and self-determination of all 

peoples.’’ Too often, however, not enough has been done in practice. One notable success in practice is the recently established U.N. Democracy Fund and the growing 

support for it. Countries such as India, the world’s largest democracy, with its 

pledge of $10 million have taken a leadership role to help promote the view that 

every free nation has a responsibility in advancing the cause of liberty. We were 

pleased that the Outcome Document contained explicit language endorsing this 

11

Fund that President Bush called for at the last UNGA in 2004. We were pleased 

to achieve as well a strong statement on gender equality and women’s empowerment 

while avoiding language that could be read to constitute an endorsement or promotion of abortion. 

We were also pleased that member states ultimately agreed to language in the 

Outcome Document on the principle of the need to establish a new Human Rights 

Council, which is indeed progress. We should bear in mind that many delegations, 

not surprisingly a group comprising some of the world’s most notorious human 

rights abusers, fought to delete this section in its entirety. An immediate priority 

for the United States during the 60th UNGA session will be passing a detailed resolution establishing the new Council. The U.S. position remains, as Secretary Rice 

noted, that it ‘‘must have fewer members, less politics, and more credibility. . . . 

It must have the moral authority to condemn all violators of human rights—even 

those that sit among us in the hall. . . . And it should never—never empower brutal 

dictatorships to sit in judgment of responsible democracies.’’ The Outcome Document, though limited in detail on this matter, does clearly establish that the Council’s mandate should focus on ‘‘grave’’ human rights ‘‘situations’’ in specific countries. 

Based on the Outcome Document, that central emphasis is a very good place to start 

and must be retained. 

Peace Building 

Another area that relates to the promotion of peace and democracy was the agreement to establish a new Peace Building Commission to advise on post-conflict resolution and reconciliation. In advising on reconstruction and institution building in 

the immediate aftermath of a conflict, we must be certain that the Commission 

functions in an accountable and transparent manner. This is an admirable goal. The 

work still ahead in the upcoming months, however, is to define how the Commission 

will provide its advice and, more importantly, how to ensure that creation of this 

Commission ensures Security Council oversight, guidance and control of this intergovernmental advisory body. The goal of having this Commission established by the 

end of this year is ambitious, but still possible. 

Responsibility to Protect 

We also made important progress in the section on the ‘‘Responsibility to Protect’’ 

which moves us toward a new strengthened international consensus on the need for 

the international community to deal with cases where states are engaging in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. We were successful 

in making certain that language in the Outcome Document guaranteed a central 

role for the Security Council. In fact, we underscored the readiness of the Council 

to act in the face of such atrocities, and rejected categorically the argument that any 

principle of non-intervention precludes the Council from taking such action. 

Nonproliferation and Disarmament 

Given the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, we were 

disappointed that member states were not able to agree on text that we felt addressed the most pressing threats the international community faces. As many of 

you know, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference was held in May 

2005 and failed to reach consensus on these issues as well. In many ways the discussions over the summer on this section of the Outcome Document were simply a 

repetition of the discussions at the NPT Review Conference. Assiduous efforts by 

many countries such as Norway to find acceptable language failed, but we will continue to do our part to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 

through such activities as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 

The lack of consensus on any text on this subject shows, though, how much work 

we have to do. Ignoring the positive steps we have made on disarmament such as 

through the Treaty of Moscow, many countries rejected language on the mechanisms 

we proposed to help counter the true threat facing the international community 

today—the nexus between terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While we have made progress on UNSCR 1540, many countries have yet 

to enact the laws necessary to implement their obligations under that resolution in 

their territories. We are not giving up on these matters, and we are trying to get 

other member states to join us in activities such as the G–8 Global Partnership 

Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. 

Development 

We succeeded in incorporating development language in the Outcome Document 

that recognizes actions and commitments made by the donors since the Millennium 

Summit and the Monterrey Consensus and were especially pleased that the final 

12

version also included numerous provisions highlighting the measures that developing countries must take to promote their own growth and development. 

The negotiations on this section of the Outcome Document did, however, become 

a hodgepodge of other issues, many of which should have been discussed in other 

fora or venues. We were able to revise language on climate change that over-emphasized the role of the Kyoto Protocol. We were also able to resist efforts by the French 

to secure international endorsement for a global tax on airplane tickets to finance 

development, noting only that some national governments intended to impose such 

taxes. 

On the subject of development itself, the negotiations were hamstrung because 

some delegations wanted to lock-in guarantees on how much financial assistance 

they would receive while ignoring what we considered to be the most important 

issue: economic policy in developing countries. Prosperity requires policies and institutions at the national level that generate wealth and enable countries to participate in the global economy. Rich countries and successful developing countries have 

diverse traditions and institutions, but all rest on basic building blocks of a market 

economy, respect for property rights, enforcement of contracts, and the rule of law. 

As Secretary Rice noted in her remarks to the General Assembly, ‘‘Donor countries 

have a responsibility to increase their assistance to developing nations. And developing nations have a responsibility to govern justly, to advance economic liberty, 

and to invest in their people.’’

Our team in New York emphasized, and both the President and the Secretary reiterated, that the United States is committed to the Millennium Development Goals 

as well as consensus established in Monterey in 2002. We also reaffirmed our support for concluding a successful Doha round on international trade. It was important, however, to define and clarify what that support meant. Some delegations attempted to interpret that support in creative ways by inserting language into the 

text that was tantamount to locking in guaranteed shares of markets in international trade. Even in the late stages of the negotiation of the Outcome Document, 

there was language that some would interpret as requiring nations such as the 

United States to give technology and intellectual property rights to other nations. 

We were able to fix these problems. 

I think that part of the reason we were successful in getting as much as we did 

was because of the Administration’s strong record in assisting developing countries. 

The position of some delegations that the United States was not living up to its end 

of the bargain was untenable. The United States has nearly doubled Official Development Assistance from $10 billion in 2000 to $19 billion in 2004. We have launched 

new initiatives such as the Millennium Challenge Account. This account is increasing U.S. aid for countries that govern justly, invest in their people, and promote economic freedom. We have also enacted the President’s Emergency Plan for HIV/AIDS 

Relief and supported the G8 Gleneagles Summit’s significant focus on the special 

needs of Africa. As the President noted in his remarks, the United States agreed 

with other G8 leaders to cancel 100% of the multilateral debt for those eligible 

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). This is a top priority for the President because, as he noted before the General Assembly, ‘‘We have a moral obligation to 

help others—and a moral duty to make sure our actions are effective.’’

Management Reform 

In the Outcome Document, member states took important first steps in approving 

concrete reforms. The Document calls on the Secretary General to put forward specific proposals on reforms, including a UN system-wide code of ethics, stronger whistleblower protection, more extensive financial disclosure for UN officials, creation of 

an independent ethics office, review of mandates that are more than five years old, 

and independent oversight of internal UN operations. 

Further steps are needed, however, and we will work diligently to ensure that the 

institution follows through on these important reforms. Part of the problem stems 

from the different ways that delegations frame the debate. For many within the 

Group of 77 (G–77), the central struggle is over the allocation of power between the 

General Assembly and the Secretary General, the chief administrative officer of the 

institution. The more important question to ask and answer, however, is: how can 

member states which are ultimately responsible best ensure that the UN reforms 

itself into an efficient, effective, transparent and accountable institution? 

We were disappointed, for example, that we were unable to agree on language in 

the Outcome Document that would have granted the Secretary General the authority to adopt more flexible policies regarding the deployment and hiring of personnel. 

Too many countries have personnel in cherished positions that they are desperate 

to hold on to, regardless of qualifications. Some delegations insisted that language 

be inserted on ‘‘equitable geographic distribution’’ with regard to hiring conditions, 

13

as opposed to the language of the actual Charter we insisted on, emphasizing competence and integrity. 

The key of course is what steps need to be taken to see that these goals are fulfilled. It was for this reason the President applauded the initial effort but emphasized that these are only the ‘‘first steps.’’ In his own words, ‘‘The United Nations 

has taken the first steps toward reform. The process will continue in the General 

Assembly this fall, and the United States will join with others to lead the effort.’’

We have seen some concrete steps being taken. We are pleased, for example, that 

Under Secretary General Chris Burnham is reviewing the fundamental assumptions 

regarding cost assessment of the Capital Master Plan. More broadly, however, we 

must change the culture at the UN that allowed scandals like Oil for Food to occur 

in the first place. This is why it is so important for delegations to be so vocal in 

their condemnation of these activities. This is not so much a criticism of the Secretariat, but rather, of ourselves and other member states, for ultimately the UN Secretariat works for member governments, a fact we must leverage in the future as 

we chart a course for a reform. As President Bush remarked, ‘‘the process of reform 

begins with members taking our responsibilities seriously.’’ But we must remember 

that reform is not a one-night stand. We must lay a new foundation for fundamental 

change if we are to fulfill the Secretary’s goal of ‘‘launching a lasting revolution of 

reform.’’

Allow me now to take this opportunity to explore some ideas that are being discussed in New York and capitals around the world and ways we might think about 

advancing UN reform even further. It is important to do so and goes back to what 

I mentioned earlier about the somewhat false debate over whether power should lie 

with the Secretary General or the General Assembly. 

As the UN’s largest financial contributor, with our annual assessment constituting 22 percent of the regular budget, the United States bears special responsibility because we are in the position best suited to advance reform. Over the years, 

those who have worked in or studied the UN system have tried to ascertain which 

agencies, funds, or programs were viewed most favorably in terms of their management, efficiency and operation and asked if there were any common themes. 

What is striking is the myriad, almost bewildering range of UN governing councils, executive boards, assemblies, commissions, committees, conferences, ‘openended working groups,’ panels of ‘independent’ experts, subsidiary bodies, not to 

mention the proliferation of agencies, programs, funds, organizations, missions, secretariats, offices, tribunals, facilities, institutes, representatives, envoys and observers. One initial question that must be asked is how many of these entities have 

overlapping jurisdictions and how they are funded. There is no doubt that the activities of many of these institutions can be rationalized, and that some of them can 

be merged or eliminated, having outlived whatever usefulness they might once have 

had. 

I also note, as this Committee has observed, that there are differences in performance based on the way different entities were funded. UN agencies are primarily 

funded through assessed contributions while funds and programs are typically funded through voluntary contributions. Catherine Bertini, former UN Under Secretary 

General for Management and former head of the World Food Program (WFP), noted 

that, ‘‘Voluntary funding creates an entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at 

the UN. At WFP, every staff member knows that we have to be as efficient, accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as is possible. If we are not, donor governments can take their funding elsewhere in a very competitive world among UN 

agencies, NGOs, and bilateral governments.’’

Another idea we should consider is establishing contribution levels for a fixed period of time, and then renegotiating those levels for purposes of subsequent replenishments. There will never be a substitute for quality personnel and effective leadership, but it seems there are some steps we should consider to help break the sense 

of entitlement that is pervasive in some quarters. 

Another factor that plays a role in the effectiveness of agencies and programs 

within the UN system is the size and composition of their respective governing 

councils. Having just participated in an exercise negotiating a text with 190 counterparts, I can assure you I know first hand the difficulty some agencies must face in 

their day-to-day operations. Simply put, in many cases, the bodies’ governing agencies are unwieldy because they have too many members. This is why the United 

States has and will continue to push to limit the size of UN bodies. There are many 

other possible reforms we need to consider as well, such as changes in the committee structures of the UN General Assembly, and in other UN agencies as well. 

Nowhere is this issue more salient than in the case of Security Council reform. 

We all recognize that the Council created in 1945 represents a world very different 

from today, which is why we will continue to actively support permanent memberVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:26 May 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\092805\23694.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
14

ship for Japan. Some proposals that are being considered in New York at this time, 

however, would undermine the Council’s effectiveness, something we cannot support. Indeed, we should work on strengthening the effectiveness of the Security 

Council which means not only changing its composition to more accurately reflect 

realities of the day, but increasing its oversight and supervision of activities such 

as peacekeeping operations. 

CONCLUSION

Earlier, I observed that one lesson of the process that led to the summit’s Outcome Document is the limited utility of mass conferences. I know that this Committee has been concerned with the costs of UN conferences. I share that concern. 

The pressure for ever more conferences is due in part to the plethora of UN bodies 

and mandates, all of which at some point seek high level affirmation through conference. Another factor is that most member states, as well as the UN Secretariat, 

bear little or no financial cost for staging conferences. 

None of this is to deny that it is sometimes necessary to hold high-level conferences when transnational problems require us to push the frontiers of cooperation. Where conference agendas conflict or overlap with the mandates of other institutions or simply review outcomes of earlier conferences, however, their costs—both 

financial and political in terms of re-opening issues—far outweigh the benefits. 

In summation, let me say that the recent High Level Event was successful in that 

the United States followed the most important rule: first do no harm. Moreover, 

there is a renewed understanding and recognition that the first steps toward true 

reform will require a true revolution and that a corporate culture change is in the 

offing. This will require active engagement of member states. Evidence of this is the 

progress we made in some key areas such as terrorism, human rights and management reform, though we will need to see effective implementation in the months 

ahead. 

Clearly there is much work that remains to be done, and I look forward to working with this Committee to achieve those objectives. As the Secretary and others 

have said, we greatly appreciate your commitment to UN Reform, and remain committed to work with you to that end. With great respect, we oppose mandatory withholding of US dues. Let me again thank this Committee for its diligence and focus 

on issues so critical to making the United Nations stronger and more effective. We 

believe the UN community as well understands the central role that the U.S. Congress rightly plays in the debate. I am happy to answer any questions you might 

have and look forward to hearing your thoughts both now and in the future as we 

chart the course forward for reforming the United Nations.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Bolton. I would like to propose 

two questions to you at the outset. The outcome document is 

viewed as the first step on the journey to UN reform. What do you 

think the best strategy is for moving from this first step and how 

confident are you that actual reform will be realized? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think, Mr. Chairman, that the most important thing is for everyone who is concerned with UN reform, 

member governments and the Secretariat, to move very quickly. 

If we simply act in due course—if I can put it that way—we will 

lose momentum, we will lose the confidence that I think we have 

generated on the need for this reform so that moving as fast as we 

can and trying to get as many reforms implemented as speedily as 

we can is important. 

There are a range of other issues that I haven’t discussed here 

in the oral testimony, such as the creation of a new Human Rights 

Council and the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission that are 

very important for us as well. 

I think that what was not accomplished in the outcome document 

represents a large amount of work that we have to move forward 

on quickly, but I don’t think there should be any misunderstanding. 

15

One of the reasons we didn’t reach agreements on some of these 

areas in the outcome document is because there was not agreement 

among the member governments. 

Now the next step on some of these issues is with the Secretariat, others are with the General Assembly and an important fact 

about General Assembly resolutions is you don’t need unanimity. 

The effort in the outcome document was to have it done by consensus, which is to say essentially unanimously and that has its 

obvious implications. 

But General Assembly resolutions can be adopted either by a 

two-thirds or by a majority vote, depending on the seriousness of 

the issue and that means we don’t have to get consensus of all the 

outlying states. 

But I think moving quickly, affirmatively and decisively is perhaps the single most important element of that strategy. 

Chairman HYDE. You mentioned in your testimony the shifting 

of funding mechanisms from regular budget to voluntary funding 

for some programs. This is a critical part of our legislation. What 

are your thoughts on advancing this concept among your colleagues 

at the UN? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think one of the observations that a number of people have made and it has been a view within the United 

States Government for quite some time, is that in looking at the 

performance of some of the agencies in the UN system that are 

funded by voluntary contributions, they tend to be most efficiency 

and most responsive to the priorities of the major contributors. 

You think of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN 

Development Program, the World Food Program that I think it is 

worth careful study on a results oriented basis of agencies funded 

by assessed versus voluntary contributions. 

I know again in the Hyde version of your bill and the Lantos 

version of the bill, there are some differences as to how you look 

at that and I don’t think we are proposing any kind of precipitous 

action at all. 

I think this is something that we want to work with Congress 

on and look to see where there might be agreement in the allocation of the funding, but as Ms. Bertini said and this is somebody 

with 12 or 13 years experience at the most senior level in the 

United Nations, this is a phenomenon that others have mentioned 

as well and I think Congress and the Administration should look 

at this and study it very carefully. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. Without objection, the 

list that you have agreed to supply shall be made a part of the 

record. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I hope we have given copies up to you and 

if we haven’t, we will get you copies here shortly. 

Chairman HYDE. We only have one copy. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think we have some more. 

Chairman HYDE. Okay. Mr. Lantos? 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. One of the 

things, which is obvious to all of us who have been students of the 

UN for decades, is that the United Nations is a derivative reality. 

It is derived from the actions of its 191 members and it is very 

important that we keep the UN responsible for its own mistakes 

16

and for its own shortcomings, but not for the shortcomings and 

mistakes and deliberate obstructionism of some of its 191 members. 

In that connection, my first question, Mr. Ambassador, relates to 

the group of nations that led the anti-U.S. effort to clean up the 

United Nations. 

My understanding is that these nations included Egypt, Cuba, 

Venezuela, Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iran, Nigeria, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Burma. Would you agree with that list 

and would you add any? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think it is a very long list on different 

issues, includes those that you have mentioned and plenty others. 

Mr. LANTOS. This is basically the core of the opposition? 

Ambassador BOLTON. The opposition varies from issue-to-issue. I 

guess I would just make that one point. 

On some of these questions, I would have to say I would refer 

back to the point you made in your opening statement that there 

are cases where you feel like you are in a bubble up there, debating 

issues from the 1970s and even before and some of the issues we 

debated in the outcome document had that flavor. 

I think it is unfortunate and it is one reason why I think the notion that the UN is a derivative reality while true it is a derivative 

reality that lags a little bit and maybe more than a little bit and 

that is something that I think all of us in the United States have 

a responsibility to try and overcome. 

Mr. LANTOS. I realize that many of the problems we have with 

the UN we also have with other international agencies. For instance, Cuba and Belarus are about to joint the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and we can well imagine 

what Cuba’s position or the remaining Stalinistic dictatorship and 

what Belarus’ position will be on referring Iran to the Security 

Council for action. 

My question is what are you doing? What is realistic on our part 

to do to build an effective caucus of political democracies within the 

UN, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BOLTON. You know, Congressman, you are familiar 

with the regional group structure within the United Nations’ system. 

The selection of countries for memberships on governing councils 

or individuals for high level bodies and a variety of other decisions 

are made on the basis of the regional group. The Latin American 

countries caucus to decide who they will nominate for the Human 

Rights Commission is an example. The African countries will caucus. The Asian-Pacific countries will caucus. 

The pattern has been that if a regional group, let us say offers 

up an uncontested slate for the allocated seats of the Latin America region on the Human Rights Commission, that the General Assembly or the Ecosoc, or whatever the decisionmaking body, as a 

whole will simply ratify that slate of countries. 

So that if Cuba, as an example, persuades the Latin American 

group that it wants to be on the Human Rights Commission and 

there is no other opposition from other Latin American countries, 

if it is three seats or whatever, there are only three candidates, 

Cuba gets elected and this is a very strong phenomenon within the 

17

UN system, because it is a way of ensuring that memberships and 

candidacies are shared around. 

It is that regional group system, as much as anything, that leads 

to the circumstances, the anomalies that I think everybody on this 

Committee has observed. For example, how some of the worst 

human rights offenders in the world somehow get seats on the UN 

Human Rights Commission or how countries that have, such as 

Iran, that have poor records, to say the least, on nonproliferation 

matters can find themselves—as Iran was up until recently—on 

the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

I think one of the central insights of the caucus of democracy approach is to try to break through that regional group stranglehold 

on the way countries are allocated seats. 

I think it is a difficult struggle. I think it is a difficult struggle 

and I would just give you one more example in the case of Israel, 

which for many years didn’t have any regional group at all. It was 

just excluded from its natural geographic region. 

We found a home for it in the Western European and others 

group, but even then, up through currently, Israel has never been 

a non-permanent member of the Security Council. 

Others have said, you know there are actually at the current 

time three categories of members of the United Nations. There are 

five permanent members of the Security Council. There are the 

non-permanent members of the Security Council. Then there is one 

permanent non-member and that is Israel. 

Israel has now declared its candidacy for the next uncontested 

non-permanent seat in the Western Group, which is 2018 and perhaps at that point that deficiency will be remedied. 

But I give you that as an example, not only of about treatment 

of Israel, but of the strength of the regional group system. 

The question whether that system, which came about during the 

Cold War period, whether that still makes sense in a post Cold 

War period, I think is an issue we need to debate at the UN. 

Chairman HYDE. Do you have more? 

Mr. LANTOS. May I just ask one more quick question? 

Chairman HYDE. Sure. 

Mr. LANTOS. I really didn’t want to put you on the spot for obvious reasons. You made the point in your opening remarks that the 

reform legislation that our Chairman proposed and the substitute 

that I and my colleagues on my side of the aisle, joined by some 

of our friends on the Republican side, proposed has one basic difference. 

Both Chairman Hyde and I want all of the reforms that are listed, over 40 of them. His version calls for an automatic 50 percent 

cut in U.S. contributions to the United Nations, if not every single 

one of them is enacted over a period of time. 

My version provides for discretion for our Secretary of State to 

determine the extent and severity of the cut. Are you in a position 

to comment as to which would be more acceptable to you as our 

working representative at the UN? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Absolutely. The Administration supports 

the discretionary version and I do too. I have been an Executive 

Branch official my entire public career and for both constitutional 

and historical reasons, the Executive Branch appropriately has 

18

typically opposed automatic non-discretionary directions from all of 

you esteemed ladies and gentlemen and that is our position. I support it emphatically. 

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador BOLTON. You knew it was coming. 

Chairman HYDE. There is something sticking in my back. 

Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, 

I just want to note for the record and perhaps for some of our 

newer Members, that in late 1980s I, along with former Congressman Sam Gedjenson, served as a congressional delegate to the UN 

and was deeply impressed with the professionalism, integrity and 

honesty we saw being demonstrated and the competence of I.O. Assistant Secretary John Bolton. He was in charge of the I.O. Bureau 

and we worked very closely with him. 

I would note parenthetically that when I and others were pushing for cartage of tranquility for Ethiopia, John helped us set up 

many of the meetings, including the meeting with Secretary-General Javier Prez de Cuellar, to push for that. 

There has been a longstanding effort made by Ambassador 

Bolton to promote and remove transparency. 

I would just note also for the record that given his exemplary 

quarter of a century of service from AID general counsel, back in 

1981, to most recently Undersecretary of State for Arms Control 

and International Security, Ambassador Bolton is the right man at 

the right time and at the right place to press for transparency and 

accountability. 

He is seasoned and he is very, very tough, and I think Members 

should realize that and we need that kind of man working for us 

at the United Nations. 

Just two very quick questions on human rights, Mr. Ambassador. 

The outcome document, as you know, does not explicitly abolish the 

Human Rights Commission. I would note parenthetically that 

Mark Malloch Brown, in his briefing, will say that the commission’s days are numbered and I think a major step has been taken 

to finally get rid of that Orwellian group of individuals that is 

made up of rogue nations that sit in judgment of human rights. 

It is a very, very unseemly situation. If you could tell us briefly 

what we are doing on that? Are we going to see another session of 

the Human Rights Commission in March or will we have a replacement by then? 

Will they stick to content and not bleed from that, because very 

often things that are not human rights abuses are included? 

Secondly, on peacekeeping the document points out, the outcome 

document in paragraph 96, the need to reform the sexual abuse 

and exploitation by UN peacekeepers. 

My Subcommittee has held two very enlightening hearings on 

the issue of peacekeeping reform. We have heard from Jean Hall 

Lube, who I think did an exemplary job herself on saying that the 

black and blue helmets need to be restored and the UN peacekeeping mission needs to be significantly reformed and Prince Zeid, 

I think, has a very good list of recommendations that he has made. 

Will that be voted upon soon by the General Assembly? 

19

Finally, the code of conduct. Will troop contributing countries 

prosecute violations of code of conduct? Will that be a prerequisite 

to being members of peacekeeping deployments? Thank you very 

much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you very much, Congressman. On 

the Human Rights Commission, it is our objective to create a new 

Human Rights Council before the Human Rights Commission’s 

next scheduled meeting in Geneva early next year. 

So our hope is that we can have the new body created and in 

place before another meeting of the commission. 

I would say that there is no disagreement, at this point, with the 

proposition that the human rights, the inner-governmental decisionmaking machinery on human rights at the UN is broken. That 

is a good place to start. 

The difficulties that we ran into in the negotiation of the outcome 

document though were over some pretty important points. One of 

the things that I think Americans just can’t understand is how 

countries with abysmal human rights records get elected to the 

Human Rights Commission. 

We have proposed and we are exploring a number of procedural 

and substantive ways so that the new council would not suffer from 

that same problem, because the worst outcome would be to go 

through a series of changes that turn out to be only cosmetic and 

we expend a great deal of effort and we end up with a new body 

that is just as problematic as the existing one. 

Countries that opposed our approach to this, however, said that 

our concern about the membership of human rights abusers was a 

way of politicizing the Human Rights Commission. 

That is to say, turning our argument back against us and I think 

as Congressman Lantos was indicating, that has been part of the 

problem. So we have got to overcome that. 

I think there is a lot of sentiment to do it. We were disappointed 

we didn’t make as much progress as we wanted in the outcome document, but it is a very high priority and a personal priority of 

mine. We are going to spend a lot of time on it. 

In terms of the question of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN 

peacekeepers, this has to be one of the most disheartening things 

that I have encountered in close to 25 years of working with and 

studying the United Nations, the notion that the people sent in to 

protect populations that are at their most vulnerable and post conflict situations would take advantage of the people they are there 

to protect. It is just unspeakable. 

One of the first people I visited was Prince Aede, because of his 

work on the subject. It remains a very high priority for the Administration and I am hoping we are going to get a number of issues 

resolved so that either the troop contributing countries or the UN 

or the two working together will be able to deal with this problem 

of sexual exploitation of abuse, not only by the peacekeepers, but 

by, I am said to say, UN civilian personnel as well. 

It is a problem that transcends just the military side and something that we need to continue to work on. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Berman of California. 

20

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, I will 

ask you a few questions about UN Security Council Resolution 

1559. 

A year ago September, the UN Security Council adopted that resolution, which in part calls upon all remaining foreign forces to 

withdraw from Lebanon. 

In May, the UN released a verification report on the withdrawal 

of Syrian forces from Lebanon, concluding that with the exception 

of one Syrian battalion deployed along the Lebanese/Syrian border, 

no Syrian military forces, assets or intelligence apparatus were 

found in Lebanese territory. 

What Syrian presence exists in Lebanon today? To what extent 

does Syria still exert political influence throughout that country? If 

you could answer that, I would like to ask you then a couple of 

other questions about the resolution. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Right. I think we have said previously that 

while there has been a withdrawal of Syrian military, there is undoubtedly a Syrian intelligence presence that remains in Lebanon. 

I don’t really have anything new or different to add to that. I 

think the question of Syrian influence over the Lebanese Government, however, is a matter that is under evolution and I would just 

say, without getting into a lot of specifics in an open hearing, the 

ongoing investigation by the Independent International Investigatory Commission, headed by Mr. Melice into the Kariri assassination is proceeding in a very professional way and there have been 

some substantial developments on that. 

I think we are awaiting the final report by Mr. Melice on his investigation and I think that this is something that is the subject 

of considerable conversation in New York and with other governments. 

We have worked very effectively with France and others, like the 

United Kingdom, to support the Melice investigation, to find out, 

to let the chips fall where they may, to proceed wherever the facts 

take the investigator. I think that is something that, within the 

next couple of months to be sure, we are going to hear a lot about 

and I think that could have a potential substantial impact on the 

situation in Lebanon. 

Mr. BERMAN. What about Iran, in terms of its presence in Lebanon? We know they maintained in the past a large cajolery of revolutionary guards in Lebanon. That also would violate the terms of 

1559. 

Is there still such a presence and does Iran still support and supply Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I am not sure I can say anything on the 

question of presence, in terms of support for Hezbollah, there is no 

question that continues. It is a very serious matter. 

Until we have the Lebanese people back in full democratic control of their government, the situation is not acceptable, but we 

have made progress and are hoping for further progress. 

Mr. BERMAN. On the issue of a potential IAEA referral to the Security Council, give us a sense of what—for some of us we try to 

understand what the dynamic is that gets members of the Security 

Council, particularly Russia and China, to engage and have the SeVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:26 May 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\092805\23694.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
21

curity Council proceed down a course, which discourages Iran from 

pursuing its present course, in terms of its nuclear program. 

How do you think this will play out? Have you engaged in discussions with the Russians and the Chinese on this issue? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes. I mean this has been a subject we 

have discussed here in the Committee over a number of hearings, 

in my previous capacity in particular, and what we have been 

doing, over the last nine or 10 months, is supporting in a very vigorous way the efforts by the European Union, the EU–3 as we call 

them, and their efforts to try to convince Iran to make a strategic 

decision to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

The thinking that has gone into that has involved what would 

happen when or if the IAEA formally reports noncompliance by the 

Iranians with their NPT obligations, their safeguards, obligations 

and others. 

We have been thinking about that. We have discussed it with 

friends and allies as well, what steps would be taken. 

The decision by the IAEA last Saturday was a decision to find 

Iran in noncompliance. That was a very significant vote and I think 

if you look at the vote, it was a clear majority of the IAEA board 

of governors in favor. 

As Congressman Lantos said, that included India. Only one country voted against it, Venezuela and 12 others abstained. 

Mr. BERMAN. Russia and China? 

Ambassador BOLTON. Including Russia and China. I think the 

ball is very much in Iran’s court now and you know there is zero 

disagreement among all of the five permanent members, zero disagreement that Iran has to give up the pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

The question of how to deal with it has been a question of 

lengthy diplomatic discussions and it is going to continue, but I 

think right now in the aftermath of the IAEA resolution, it is unmistakably up to Iran to decide whether it is going to continue a 

policy of pursuing nuclear weapons or whether it is going to give 

it up, as did the Government of Libya. 

I think Secretary Rice pointed out a few days ago that the precise timing of how this happens is a matter of diplomatic tactics, 

but the direction we are moving in I think is clear. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I can’t tell you how happy we are to have you here with us today. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I am happy to be here, too. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. The investigations of the United 

Nations Oil-for-Food Program uncovered billions of dollars in kickbacks in funds, channeled by Saddam Hussein, to bribe foreign officials and to bolster his own brutal regime. 

In fact, we found some indication that the Oil-for-Food Program 

had actually been used as a conduit for Saddam Hussein to send 

money to an assassin that had murdered the father of the woman 

who was there with us for the President’s State of the Union message. 

All of this of course was accomplished through a manipulating a 

humanitarian program managed by the United Nations. 

My question to you is: Was this an anomaly or was this travesty 

a manifestation of fundamental flaws in the United Nations, such 

22

as the corrupt and tyrannical nature of so many of the governments of member states of the UN, who vote in the United Nations, 

who have to be taken into consideration when building these type 

of programs? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think it is a critical question as we look 

ahead at UN reform and I would have to say that the mismanagement and corruption of the Oil-for-Food Program obviously didn’t 

spring out of nowhere. 

They had to come from the culture in which the program was 

embodied and in that sense, the Oil-for-Food scandal is a tangible 

representation of what needs to be changed in the system and why, 

as the Secretary said, we really need a lasting revolution of reform. 

In addition though, I would have to say that the member governments created the Oil-for-Food Program and there is an element of 

politics, international politics in this as well. 

You know during the immediate aftermath of the first Persian 

Gulf War, the Security Council created a model of an Oil-for-Food 

Program in Resolution 706 and 712 that would have had very extensive international involvement in both the sale of the oil, the 

handling of the proceeds and the distribution of humanitarian assistance that was rejected by Saddam Hussein. 

Rejected again and again until 1995, when the present Oil-forFood Program was put into place, which he accepted and which he 

then turned not only to his own advantage in financial terms, but 

to his own advantage in taking a humanitarian aid program and 

using it to increase his own political control over the people of Iraq. 

I think that is something that we need to focus on when we engage in these kinds of programs, as a matter of United States decisionmaking, that we are not creating something that somebody like 

Saddam Hussein can turn to their own advantage. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Should we then in the future be more inclined to acting directly and perhaps unilaterally or in perhaps cooperation with a voluntary association of other countries that agree 

with us on certain goals, rather than going through the United Nations and expecting them to manage efficiently and effectively certain types of operations that are consistent with what we are trying to do internationally? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think we need to make a cost-benefit 

analysis of any decision like that. I think we have got a variety of 

tools in our kit and I think that we look at the options that are 

available and try to pick the one that we think is going to be most 

effective in implementing American objectives and interest. 

I would say, you know a number of very senior UN officials have 

said, we never want anything like the Oil-for-Food Program again. 

We never want to be burdened with this. We don’t want it. 

I have to say, I disagree with that. There may be an occasion 

where we want the United Nations to undertake a program like 

this and we want it run effectively and we want it run honestly 

and I don’t see why that is so hard to ask. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. In the past, when we have confronted the 

United Nations with certain problems and what we considered to 

be corruption in their programs, it has taken a long time for them 

to get the message and we withdrew I think Brenesco and other 

examples. 

23

Do you think the people at the United Nations have gotten the 

message now finally after the Oil-for-Food, all of this attention they 

have received on this scandal? Have they got the message? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I hope so. Certainly I am doing everything 

I can to reinforce it. I think the continued involvement of this Committee and Congress is extremely important in that, and if repetition has any value, I think it might have value here. 

It is not something that we are going to be satisfied with. We are 

not going to say we are finished with reform at the end of this 

year. 

That is what the Secretary means by a lasting revolution of reform. Reform is not a one-night stand. Reform is forever. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The fact that you couldn’t answer that question yes should alert us to be very diligent. Thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and our Ranking 

Member for calling this important hearing this morning. 

I do welcome Ambassador Bolton for his appearance to testify before our Committee and I also offer my personal welcome this 

morning to Mr. Mark Malloch Brown, the Chief of Staff for Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the United Nations. 

At the outset, Mr. Chairman, I thank Mr. Brown for personally 

delivering letters to me and to my colleague, Mr. Payne, sitting 

next to me, as a response to a petition letter that was signed, some 

5 months ago, by 37 Members of my colleagues in the U.S. House 

of Representatives. 

The petition requested Secretary Annan to conduct a thorough 

review of the 1969 Act of No Choice for which some 1,000 West 

Papain elders were randomly selected under one of the most brutal 

and repressive military regimes ever known and that was under 

the Indonesian military dictator Soharto. 

Not surprising to anyone, not one West Papain elder voted 

against joining Indonesia’s quest for colonialism, as it was done by 

the other former Dutch and Portuguese colonies at the time. 

Under threat of cutting off their tongues and their ears, intimidating and threatening the lives of their families, it is no surprise 

at all that 100 percent of these elders voted in favor of Indonesia. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that Secretary Annan has 

stated that the matter has to be brought before the United Nations 

General Assembly before his office can review the matter again and 

we will now proceed accordingly. 

Mr. Chairman, a similar letter was also submitted to Secretary 

Rice about 5 months ago and I guess it must have gotten lost in 

the paper shuffle and I would respectfully like to request Ambassador Bolton, I happen to have a copy of the letter to Secretary 

Rice, if somebody could help me here and could personally give it 

to Ambassador Bolton to make sure that Secretary Rice gets the 

petition letter. I would really appreciate it, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I would be happy to do that, Congressman. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Mr. Ambassador, the term ‘‘reform’’ has become synonymous with the current functionings of the United Nations and you are in a very unique position representing our nation 

before 109 other countries with which you have immediate access 

to these countries. 

24

Last week there was a New York Times article written by a 

former United Nations official, Mr. Navier Masonesave, who mentioned with the main structure like the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretary, it is a mess. 

We can all agree that the weakest link within the United Nations’ structure in its activities is always to resolve arms conflict, 

but there are other semi-independent organizations within the 

United Nations that Mr. Masonesave said the UN has done an outstanding job trying to combat disease and poverty and hunger, 

human suffering due to national and natural disasters, like the 

tsunami and the UNDP, the World Health Organization, Unesco, 

the United Nations commission on refugees. 

All these are very positive aspects of the United Nations and I 

would like to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, I know you are reform 

minded and I think those of here in the Committee think likewise. 

To what extent, is the question. I think there are some very positive responses, in terms of your personal efforts in reaching out to 

your fellow colleagues within the United Nations that you mean 

well and all you want is better accountability. Who would be 

against that? 

I would like to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, where are we now in 

terms of the reforms? As you know, our Chairman and our Ranking 

Member have a slight difference of opinion on how much we should 

cut as far as funding goes to the United Nations, if there are no 

positive results of the reforms that are now being discussed. 

There is a native Hawaiian term that I always love to use, Mr. 

Ambassador. It is called ‘‘waha,’’ which means, ‘‘a lot of hot air.’’

I would like to ask you, Mr. Ambassador, if you could help us. 

Where exactly are we as far as reform is concerned with the United 

Nations? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think that is obviously a critical question 

and I believe that the recent summit represented an important 

first step, but as in many other cases, there is both the implementation of what was agreed to a couple of weeks ago, as well as larger questions that still need to be addressed. 

I think that the answer still awaits us. In other words, until we 

get implementation of what was agreed to, I think it would be premature to declare a victory and go home, because I think that has 

happened too many times before. 

I remember in the first Bush Administration, when SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Chali came in. One of the very first 

things he did was to reduce the number of high level positions. He 

cut the number of undersecretaries general. He cut the number of 

assistant secretaries general. He combined some departments. 

It was really a significant effort at reform in those days and we 

said at the time it was a good first step, but then in subsequent 

years the positions were recreated, the number has gone up. 

I haven’t compared 2005 to 1992, but I have a sinking feeling the 

number of high level positions is now larger. We have had experience of taking the first step, but not following through on it. 

If I sound a little cautious, it is only because of the Yogi Berra 

phenomenon of ‘‘deja vu all over again.’’ I want to avoid that. I 

want to see if we can get what Secretary Rice was talking about, 

when she talked about a lasting revolution of reform and I say 

25

again and I believe this very sincerely, I think we can accomplish 

that, if Congress and the Executive work together. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, welcome once again to our Committee. When I 

told my office staff that you were going to be testifying, they all 

wanted to come out here and shake your hand. So you have rock 

star status with many of our congressional offices. 

I wanted to ask you three questions. The first one has to do with 

the United Nations Development Program and the funding of antiIsrael propaganda. The second one dealing with Syria and Lebanon 

and the third one dealing with merging UNHCR with UNRWA. 

On the UN Development Program, in August, we saw that the 

United Nations Development Program had funded materials produced by the Palestinian authorities, celebrating Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and the material on the banners read, ‘‘Gaza 

today, the West Bank and Jerusalem tomorrow.’’

In response, you had said correctly, funding this kind of activity 

is inappropriate and unacceptable. I agree. 

What steps can be taken to ensure that this does not occur again 

and do you see any indication from any of the UN bodies that anything is going to be rectified in the future to prevent this from happening? 

On Syria and Lebanon, I believe an indication of the persistent 

deficiencies in the UN system is in the failure of the UN Security 

Council to fully enforce all aspects of the resolutions that they 

pass, specifically, 1559 relating to Syria and Lebanon. The only aspect of 1559 that has been complied with is the withdrawal of the 

Syrian military from Lebanon, but even of greater concern is the 

failure of the UN to disarm and to demand Hezbollah disarmament. 

Do you think that this failure undermines the UN statements relating to terrorism, specifically the UN Security Council Resolution 

1624, on incitement and terrorism? 

My third question, Mr. Ambassador, is about merging the United 

Nations UNRWA with UNHCR. Do you agree that the functions of 

these two bodies are duplicative and that funding does not appear 

to correspond to the needs of these organizations? 

In your discussion in New York, have you raised the possibility 

of changing the interpretation and the application of the 1951 refugee convention to include Palestinians with other refugee groups? 

Do you think that it would make sense for the UNHCR to provide the services that are now provided by UNRWA, to merge these 

two? Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you. With respect to the UNDP materials, right after the letter was sent that they referred to, I met 

with the new administrator of UNDP, Mr. Kamal Dervis and we 

discussed this question, among others. 

I said, ‘‘You know this was kind of a self-inflicted wound by 

UNDP.’’ I believe that he understood the nature of the problem and 

will take steps to correct it. 

The problem of anti-Israel bias in the United Nations, I am sad 

to say, continues. It is a fact. There are a number of things that 

26

we need to do on that score and I think for the present time that 

although this one incident, I believe will be resolve satisfactorily, 

I don’t think you can therefore say that the issue is resolved. It will 

require a continuing vigilence. 

On the Syria/Lebanon question, the disarming of Hezbollah, 

turning it into a political faction or party is something that is obviously critical to restoring Lebanon to a full-functioning democracy. 

In a somewhat different context of the Israeli/Palestinian matter, 

this was something that the quartet discussed last week. Secretary 

Annan talked about the importance ultimately of groups like that 

giving up their weapons. 

In a democratic society, ultimately that is what has to happen. 

You can’t have groups that declare themselves participants in the 

electoral process one day and armed insurrectionists the next, if 

they don’t like the outcome. 

As part of the ongoing effort that we are making in Lebanon with 

respect to Syria, that remains a priority. You have described the 

factual situation accurately and it is something that we continue 

to press on. 

On UNRWA, you know this is actually a subject of discussion 

and I think it is appropriate now that we begin to think about 

what to do with UNRWA, as we get to a two-state solution and 

there is certainly no fixed position on it, but I recall the somewhat 

analogous situation of Cambodian refugees in Thailand, when a 

separate UN agency, UNBRO (UN Board of Relief Organization), 

was created to deal with that problem. 

When the status of Cambodia was resolved in the early 1990s, 

all the refugees went back into Cambodia and UNBRO was abolished. 

The question whether it is UNDP, for example, as an arm of the 

UN that provides development assistance to a new Palestinian 

state or whether it is some other combination is something that 

needs to be addressed and we have discussed that in New York. 

I discussed it myself with Alva de Soto, the Secretary-General’s 

Middle East represent. I think it is time now to consider it. We 

don’t have a view as to what it should be, but it is a question that 

is legitimate to raise and that would benefit from some thought by 

everybody as the Palestinians move hopefully toward a democratic 

Palestinian state. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for the welcoming that you have done for Congressman Royce and myself as 

the representatives from the House to the UN and the fine luncheon given by your Assistant Ambassador Patterson. 

I served previously and I must say the cooperation from your office has certainly been much improved over previous offices, I have 

to say that. However, you have to be careful when people give you 

a compliment. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I know that that always happens. 

Mr. PAYNE. Let me just say that, it is really not directed to you, 

but I totally oppose the Hyde bill. I think we all know that the UN 

27

needs reform. I don’t think anybody up here would be opposed to 

that. 

However, to say that we will reduce 50 percent of our funding 

in 2 years if 39 reforms are not made is totally impractical. 

Secondly, the Secretary-General does not have executive authority. It has to go through the General Assembly and so there is no 

way that those goals could be achieved. 

Third, actually we are 22 percent, as you mentioned. Japan is up 

to about a little bit above 19 percent. Japan is 14 percent of GDP 

in the world. We have 34 percent. 

If we did a 50 percent cut, we would be doing 11 percent of UN 

dues. Japan would go up to about 25 percent. We would be doing 

about a third of what our obligation is. I think the Senate, where 

there are wise men, will take care of that proposal. 

I just have a couple of quick questions. One, I was pleased that 

the position of the Responsibility to Protect was restored. 

Congressman Wolf, Congressman Tancredo and Congressman 

Napolitano and I sent a letter to your office asking for the restoration of the Responsibility to Protect Civilians from Genocide and 

Crimes Against Humanity and I am glad that at the end of the day 

it was restored. 

The question that I have is, one, there is a reform move and the 

General Assembly said that they would review progress on reforms 

and above by the end of the year. 

I just wonder what your position is on the G–4—which the African Union rejected—led by Japan and Brazil and others. 

Number two, I wonder if you could just quickly let us know 

where the U.S. stands on trying to weigh in on our allies in Pakistan who refused to support the comprehensive nuclear test ban, 

which was surprising to us. 

Just finally, with that U.S. and UN cooperate with the investigation on Darfur we know that the U.S. has supported the international criminal tribunals in Yugoslavia, in Iran and Sierra Leone 

and we appreciate the abstention on the ICC referral on Darfur. 

The U.S. has done 1,300 interviews of victims in Darfur and in 

Chad region. Will the U.S. cooperate and actually turn over the tremendously important information to assist in the prosecution of 

persons accused of crimes against humanity? Genocide really was 

what we declared in the House. Thank you. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you. On the subject of the G–4 proposal that we had a chance to discuss in New York, the way the 

outcome document reads basically is that there will continue to be 

consultations on the subject, with a view to seeing what might happen by the end of the year. 

It is very hard to predict what the next step that the G–4 are 

actually going to undertake. It is not a proposal that we support. 

It would result in a Security Council with four new permanent 

members, absent the veto, but still four new permanent members 

and perhaps as many as five or six new non-permanent members, 

which would take you to a council size notionally of 24, 25 countries. 

The G–4 together thought that they might have a chance at getting the two-thirds vote they need in the General Assembly to get 

their proposal accepted, some time over the summer. That obviVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:26 May 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\092805\23694.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
28

ously didn’t happen, in part because of the position taken by the 

African Union. 

The G–4 lobbied the African Union very intensively. The African 

Union has gone through a series of decisions that have led it to the 

conclusion, the position it now holds, that it does not accept the G–

4 approach or the modifications that they were trying to work out. 

At this point, I would say it is hard to predict what the G–4 

themselves might do. I think, just a tactical judgment, I think the 

moment for that proposal may have passed. 

We are committed, as I have mentioned at the outset, to working 

with the Japanese very intensively and Secretary Rice raised this 

with foreign minister Macha Mora during their discussions in New 

York and were charged with discussing with Japan, at a number 

of different levels, what the next steps on that will be. 

So therefore, I would have to say it remains and the issue remains in play. The question of finding a Security Council that is 

more reflective of the situation in 2005, rather than 1945, when the 

existing five permanent members were named, is something we are 

going to continue to pursue. 

On the CTBT, of course the U.S. position is we are not going to 

seek gratification of the CTBT and under the terms of the treaty, 

it will not enter into force, unless all five of the legitimate nuclear 

weapons states ratify it. 

That is one reason, since we are not supporting it, we have not 

pressed India or Pakistan. 

On the situation in Darfur, obviously the President himself has 

been very personally involved in our policy in that regard. 

We face statutory prohibitions concerning cooperation with the 

ICC, but there is no question in the President’s mind or in Secretary Rice’s mind, and therefore in all of our minds, that we want 

to stop what is going on and find a way to hold those who perpetrated these crimes against humanity accountable and that remains our position. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentlemen’s time has expired. 

Before recognizing Mr. Issa, the Chair would just like to interject 

a mild defense of his bill, which has been under vicious attack by 

some Members of this Committee and the witness. 

I stipulate that the establishment opposes my bill. I will stipulate that the notion of withholding dues from the UN is abhorrent 

to many people. 

I will also assert that withholding dues is a wonderful way to get 

their attention and that my bill, which provides for the automatic 

withholding of dues should reform fail, passed the House of Representatives, the people’s body, twice. 

You may have the establishment. I have the membership and 

maybe the twain shall meet. I am not sure. 

Mr. Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and on that note, I would 

like to echo my support for the Chairman’s position for two reasons. 

One, there does need to be a strong message sent to the UN. I 

believe the President sent a strong message, when he sent you to 

the UN, Ambassador. I have actually no doubt that it has been 

noted. 

29

But I do believe that, with all due respect to the Executive 

Branch, the purse strings do not belong to you. They belong to the 

people and they are determined from here. 

I support the Chairman’s determination that what we give to the 

UN is a gift. It is not, in fact, a tax from a body that has a right 

to tax us. Just a little separation of powers there for just a moment, Ambassador. 

I certainly would like to echo every Member who has called for 

the, if you will, the reform portion of that agenda, the Independent 

Oversight Board, management controls and so on, but as a former 

businessman, I would like to talk about the front part of the horse 

for a change, instead of the back. 

What is it the UN has done for us lately? I would like to assert 

that the front part of the horse is the part of the horse that needs 

the most work and I would hope that in addition to making the 

‘‘train run on time,’’ you would make sure that the train pulls 

something in the way of coal or something else that would have a 

value, taken to the rest of the world, because it does seem like it 

is often an empty train, particularly when the UN was impotent in 

Iraq. 

They went in. Somebody shot at them. Somebody had the audacity to in fact attack them and they turned tail and left saying that, 

you know, essentially it could only be there if our forces could guarantee their absolute protection. 

I think that says a great deal about the front end of the horse 

at the UN peacekeeping forces, this is one Member that would have 

a hard time suggesting peacekeeping forces go anywhere, even at 

the invitation of a state, if there is any need for peacekeeping 

forces. 

The only place the UN today is effective is in those places in 

which there is no real need for the UN, from the standpoint of blue 

helmets with, if you will, weapons. 

One of the most important things that makes the UN different 

than its predecessor is its ability to assert, with force if necessary, 

its will. 

Going to 1559, which doesn’t require force today, but as you so 

rightfully said, there is an investigation underway. It undoubtedly 

will reach into governments around the world. 

My friend, Rafi Kariri, was not assassinated as an individual. He 

was not assassinated as a successful businessman. He was assassinated as a former prime minister in the process to return to 

power, with the support of his people, for the purpose of insisting 

that foreign forces leave his country and that his democracy be allowed to be truly independent. 

I congratulate the United Nations, because I do believe that in 

harmony with other world powers, they are the reason that Syria 

has left. 

They are the reason that when I was with the prime minister in 

Lebanon, for the first time ever in prime minister Kariri’s General 

Assembly, former General Assembly, we actually had a conversation in which we didn’t have to go to a room with loud music playing and whisper, because there was no concern that security forces 

were going to, every minute, monitor even the prime minister. 

30

I would say though that my biggest concern that we will discover 

that high-ranking officials in or in neighboring countries were responsible for the assassination of the prime minister and I would 

like your commitment today to, in the strongest way, insist that 

the UN be responsible to bring those who committed this crime to 

trial, no matter what level of government they come from. 

One last echoing and that is that I appreciate that you spoke 

about the need for Hezbollah to give up its guns and to become 

part of political society, but I would ask in your response, what is 

the UN prepared to do to force or to assist in that disengagement 

and disarmament? 

Ambassador BOLTON. There is a lot in your question. I guess 

what I would say in response to the first part is that I really think 

most Americans view the UN in very practical terms. 

If they think it works, they are prepared to support it and where 

they get frustrated is when it doesn’t seem to work for reasons that 

we can’t understand. 

It is not an ideological perspective or anything else. It is just a 

practical question of: Can this organization do good work and 

where it does, why shouldn’t we support it? In fact, we do support 

it. 

As I mentioned in the World Food Programme, the U.S. for probably for the World Food Programme’s entire existence, has been far 

and away the biggest contributor. 

What we aim to do, not only in the management reform area, but 

in the overall governance, is to try and make the various agencies 

and pieces of the UN system accomplish what they were set up to 

do, where those purposes are valid. 

That is really the test we are trying to follow. Can we make it 

effective for those purposes? 

In the case of Lebanon, I think that this is an example where, 

because of excellent cooperation among the permanent members, 

the Security Council has played a very useful role. The matter is 

far from resolved and 1559 has not been fully implemented. 

There is some back sliding in the sense that we hear talk in New 

York of some countries saying that the Shaba farms issue is now 

to be reopened, even though the Secretary-General years ago had 

said that in fact Israel withdrew from all Lebanese territory and 

that that eliminates any colorable argument that any so-called militia has to continue to maintain weapons in Lebanon to repel the 

Israeli’s, when the Israeli’s are gone. 

I think, as I said earlier, the outcome of the Melice investigation 

is now the next most significant event, the results of that investigation will be announced I think when they are ready. 

I have confidence and I think it is broadly shared confidence in 

New York, that Melice is not intimidated by anybody and that he 

‘‘calls them as he sees them’’ and that we are going to get a very 

straight report. 

I think when we get that report, then we can react to it and I 

think pursuing his conclusions is something that we are very 

strongly committed to. 

Chairman HYDE. Ms. McCollum. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

31

Mr. Ambassador, I believe at various times during the 109th 

Congress six or seven Committees and Subcommittees have held 

hearings on the UN Oil-for-Food Program, investigating the corruption. Likewise, the abuse by UN peacekeepers has been a subject 

of congressional hearings. 

Unfortunately, the level of UN security far exceeds a level of 

oversight of this Congress and this Committee provides for many 

of our own Government foreign policies. 

For example, Iraq. It is not our foreign policy that we have many 

countries criticizing, confused and taken back by our actions. 

Mr. Ambassador, when you are forward in the UN, U.S. credibility is on the line and you advocate for needed reforms. 

The State Department condemns Sudan for state sponsored genocide, for hijacking the UN Human Rights Commission and then the 

same State Department in this very room commends Sudan. Congratulates them in fact for their collaboration and partnership on 

counterterrorism. 

Similarly, going back to the UN Oil-for-Food Program, we condemn it for its corruption and I agree. There was corruption, but 

then we have recently learned that the United States, when it appointed officials in the Iraqi interim government, those officials engaged in massive corruption, a theft that may have exceeded $2 billion, but most of it is from the Ministry of Defense hiding the fact 

that U.S. officials were involved. 

They were assigned to monitor the situation in the Ministry of 

Defense. There are many examples like I have given. 

There is the Bush doctrine of preemptive war. Premeditated war 

with no weapons of mass destruction found. The prison torture 

scandal. Guantanamo Bay. There are others that come to mind. 

We are all aware of this and we know that you are and I mean 

this sincerely, an advocate for accountability, for transparency and 

for anti-corruption measures. You and I might disagree on how to 

go about those, but you are very sincere about this. 

Certainly I know, from my encounters internationally with international parliamentarians, that there are challenges in working in 

the international community right now. 

What are the challenges and obstacles you are encountering, as 

you advocate for UN reforms, when the contradictions of the 

United States’ foreign policy are all too obvious to the world community? What are some of the challenges you are facing? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think that in the discussions in New 

York, one in dealing with the other governments, one could spend 

a lot of time talking about their faults and a lot of other governments do spend some time talking about our faults, domestically 

and as you have pointed out, we certainly have them. 

But I think the real issue is not that there are private or governmental officials in the United States that may have engaged in corruption, or that we have followed policies that have not eventuated 

in the outcomes that we expected, but what we are going to focus 

on at the United Nations. 

I think that the level of discussion that we have had in New 

York has really been on that basis and I say in New York. I should 

say on the level of discussion we have had in Washington and capitols around the world, too, that it is not an inhibition to us in adVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:26 May 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\092805\23694.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
32

vocating the reforms that we seek, that we have had our own problems in the United States, because we are not alone in that. 

The question is not is there a human fallibility, which there is 

everywhere, but what we can do in the specific context of the UN, 

to try and bring standards of accountability and transparency up 

to higher levels. 

It is not to say there is not work that still needs to be done within the United States. I have no doubt that there is, but the fact 

that we haven’t achieved necessarily the end of the road is not an 

excuse for not trying to improve the UN. 

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Barrett. 

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you. 

Mr. BARRETT. It is an honor to have you here today. I want to 

tell you I couldn’t be more pleased to have you, where you are. I 

think you are going to be a breath of fresh air for us and going to 

do us a fantastic job. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BARRETT. Simple question. I am going to read you something 

right quick first. September 14, opening session, 60th UN General 

Assembly, President Bush and I quote:

‘‘To help make these promises real, the United Nations must 

be strong and efficient, free of corruption and accountable to 

the people it serves. The United Nations must stand for integrity.’’

I think my colleagues have beat around the bush to the issue and 

I want to ask you a simple question. We have talked about reform, 

budgeting, oversight, management, peacekeeping, terrorism, 

human rights, proliferation, disarmament. I mean the whole 

gamut. 

But my daddy said something to me very simple when I was a 

boy, ‘‘If you deal with bad people, you get bad results.’’ So my question is: All these issues deal with people and there is a perception 

out there, whether it is real or perceived, that we have got bad people in the UN. Where are we with the ethics process? 

What is happening? When my people come to me and say, Congressman, we want to get out of the UN, because we are dealing 

with folks that we cannot trust, what do I say to them? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think that there is a substantial improvement in the internal ethics system at the UN and I think the Secretary-General is committed to trying to get that done. 

Chris Burn and the American who recently came in as Undersecretary General for Management are committed to getting it done 

and it is long overdue. 

There is just no way you can say that everything is fine and that 

we are just making a couple of modifications, when you have, for 

years, an absence of any kind of effective conflict of interest regulations. 

I remember when Dick Thornberg became Undersecretary General for Management in 1992. He had been a governor of the state 

of Pennsylvania. He had been Attorney General of the United 

33

States. He went to New York. He couldn’t believe it. Couldn’t believe it. 

He couldn’t believe what an absence of these kinds of standards 

existed. Now some have been put in place in part because of his 

efforts. More are on the way and I think it is a matter that does 

go critically to the integrity of the organization and to its reputation. 

That is why we are going to make a major effort to see that it 

happens, because people are entitled to the highest standards, as 

the President said. 

No institution is perfect and it contains human beings. So there 

are always going to be difficulties, but we have seen recently the 

arrest of two senior officials by Federal authorities in New York. 

We have the report of the Volcker Committee and the work that 

a number of congressional Committees are still undertaking and I 

don’t think we are at the end of that process yet. 

It is something that we are going to continue to pursue and I 

think this is one where there is no disagreement in principle in 

New York. It is a question of getting it implemented in a way that 

is satisfactory and that people can have confidence that the highest 

standards of integrity are being applied. 

Mr. BARRETT. If I can just leave you with one thing, Mr. Ambassador, from the people of South Carolina, clean it up. Thank you, 

sir. 

Chairman HYDE. If I might intervene, because that was a very 

provocative question from Mr. Barrett, the challenge, the drama of 

foreign policy is that you can’t pick the people that you are dealing 

with. 

Other countries have other cultures, other interests, other history, and they are represented by people who have a very different 

perspective and you have to play the hand that you are dealt, and 

that is the great challenge of foreign policy. 

The stronger your own people are, the more integrity-laden they 

are, the more they will be able to withstand the buffets of corruption and lack of integrity, but you have to deal with the people 

other countries put forward to represent them. That is the great 

fascination to me of foreign policy. 

Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Ambassador, I want to ask you about your prior 

work on the area of nonproliferation and your current focus on that 

issue as well. 

On numerous occasions through the course of his time in office, 

the President has called the danger of nuclear terrorism the number one national security threat the country faces and I could not 

agree more. 

In a speech at National Defense University in February 2004, 

the President called for strengthening the nonproliferation treaty 

by closing the loophole in the NPT that has enabled countries like 

Iran to acquire dual-use facilities capable of producing bomb-grade 

plutonium and highly enriched uranium, under the guise of a civil 

nuclear energy program. 

The President also called on countries to adhere to the IAEA additional protocol, which requires the parties to provide the IAEA 

34

with more extensive information about their nuclear programs, and 

allow more intrusive inspections. 

The President acknowledged this would not be easy. He said:

‘‘There is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot 

be tolerated, yet this consensus means little unless it is translated into action.’’

In a speech the NPT prep com in April 2004, you echoed the 

President’s words and called for the delegates, ‘‘to devise ways to 

ensure full compliance with the treaty’s nonproliferation objectives.’’

This past May, the U.S. had the opportunity to translate this 

consensus into action at the NPT review conference held at the UN 

in New York. 

Unfortunately, the conference ended in failure and the U.S. and 

the global nonproliferation regime is now, I believe, in a far weaker 

position, even as we confront Iran and North Korea over their 

weapons programs. 

During the conference, Newsweek Magazine ran a story that laid 

significant responsibility for the failure at the conference on your 

doorstep. 

According to several colleagues in the Administration, who were 

quoted in the article, your office did almost no diplomatic groundwork for the NPT conference. 

Former Administration officials also asserted that you and your 

office were absent without leave, never knew when the conference 

was coming and it would be contentious, but the diplomacy was 

stopped 6 months before the conference. 

I would like to know what steps were taken to prepare for success at that conference. Why it ended with no consensus. Whether 

this will be a priority of yours in your new responsibility. 

Also, what role the U.S. nuclear deal with India may have, had 

that came later. Was there a sense that pushing for strong provisions at the NPT conference would undercut the later agreement 

with India, providing benefits of NPT membership without India in 

fact being a part of the NPT? That is what I would like you to respond to. 

Ambassador BOLTON. To answer the last part first, the question 

of India really didn’t factor in one way or the other in the subject 

of the arrangement that has been recently been made between the 

United States and India was not any part of the 2004 NPT Review 

Conference issue. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Bolton, there are two votes pending, a 15-

minute vote and a 5-minute vote. I hate to interrupt your testimony, but we are being pulled in two directions. 

If we can stand in recess, as soon as the second vote is over, we 

will hurry back to get the finish of your answer and then any more 

questions for Mr. Bolton will be submitted in writing and answered 

later, so that we can get to the next witness’ briefing, which is very 

important. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible to merely have 

the Ambassador’s answer to this question that we have 15 minutes 

to get to the Floor? 

35

Chairman HYDE. You may stay and listen and I am going to get 

over and vote. It is just awkward, but we have two votes. It takes 

some of us longer to get over there than others, but we will come 

back. 

Mr. SCHIFF. However you decide, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. If you want to stay and Mr. Bolton wants to answer you, you go ahead and then when you are through——

Ambassador BOLTON. I will be happy to answer, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Sure. When you are through, we will recess. 

Ambassador BOLTON. I will turn the lights out I guess. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador BOLTON. We had very extensive diplomatic preparation for the NPT Review Conference and the fact is that in the 5-

year run-up to that review conference, with three preparatory conferences over the 5-year period, at the end of the three preparatory 

conferences the parties had not even been able to agree on an agenda. Five years of preparation, no agenda. 

The question of the outcome of the conference depended on disagreements over the highest priority and the greatest threat to the 

nonproliferation regime. 

We believed that the greatest threat to the nonproliferation regime was proliferation. Where it states that, ‘‘We are pursuing 

strategic decisions to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities that had 

to be stopped.’’

Other countries insisted that the real problem in the world was 

in the United States and the allegedly inadequate efforts by the 

United States for nuclear disarmament. 

I thought our record on that score was quite good. The President, 

in May 2002, signed the treaty in Moscow, which provides over a 

10-year period for the reduction of operationally deployed strategic 

nuclear warheads from their levels at that time of roughly 6,000 

to a range of between 17 to 2,200 at the final date of the treaty. 

That is a two-thirds reduction. 

A number of other steps that the United States was undertaking, 

through non-luger programs and others, we thought our disarmament record was quite good and we were prepared to defend it 

and we did. 

The notion that there was inadequate preparation, or that somehow it was a problem largely caused by the United States I think 

was simply not correct. 

It is a fact that the——

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Ambassador——

Ambassador BOLTON [continuing]. Nonproliferation regime is 

under pressure and that is——

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Ambassador, why did the conference fail then? 

If the United States can’t lead it to a successful result, is there any 

other country that can? 

Ambassador BOLTON. I think we tried very hard at that conference. We tried very hard at the recent High-level Event to get 

language, on which there would be consensus concerning the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

The fact that consensus was not obtained indicates I think the 

lack of agreement on what we consider the central threat and that 

is the threat posed by WMD proliferation, but certainly not 

36

through lack of effort by the Administration or by others like-minded and concerned about that threat, the proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction by states and into the hands of terrorist organizations. 

That is where the risk comes from. That is where the threat 

comes from, not from the policies of the United States and we were 

not——

Mr. SCHIFF. I agree with you. 

Mr. SMITH. We have several other Members. Chairman Royce? 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCHIFF. I don’t know if my 5 minutes was exceeded. 

Mr. SMITH. It was exceeded by almost 2 minutes. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Ambassador Bolton. We are enthusiastic about the 

vigor with which you have approached this task. In New York, you 

and I had a conversation about one of the key concerns that Congress has in these reforms and that particular issue is the intention to finally get a definition of the word terrorism. 

You were effective in getting this raised to the high-level panelist. The Secretary-General has spoken out. Yet in the language 

this outcome document worked, there is the ability of countries to 

sort of veto your effort to do this. 

This is why I think this is important. We had a Subcommittee 

on Terrorism and Nonproliferation hearing that I chaired here in 

which the witnesses basically said that the absence of an internationally agreed upon definition has provided countries with wiggle room to avoid taking on their international responsibilities to 

combat terrorism. 

As long as suicide bombing isn’t defined as terrorism per se, 

when it is directed against civilians, there is this loophole. 

In Chairman Hyde’s bill, one of the efforts that we are pushing 

up at the UN for reform, this becomes crucial. I wanted to ask you 

about the next step. 

Is there a role then that through the General Assembly or 

through referring this to the Security Council for a resolution, is 

there a way outside of the ability in the outcome document, for a 

veto to get that done? 

Second, I wanted to ask you specifically about a concern we have. 

I am a former controller and the outcome document calls for operational independence of the Office of Internal Oversight Services. 

The need for its budgetary independence. 

I wanted to ask you how you interpreted that. Is achieving budgetary independence for the IAOS possible in the political climate 

that we have got right now at the General Assembly? 

Lastly, let me just say what the NPT, from our view, is about. 

There are several states that would prefer that it collapsed, but it 

is the most powerful norm inducement for proliferation we have, 

and we are at a critical time and I hope we do all we can to salvage 

what we can of this treaty. Thank you again, Ambassador. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you, Congressman. On the definition of terrorism, there are a couple of ways to go about that. 

One is through the Comprehensive Convention on International 

Terrorism, which won’t be a universal definition, but will certainly 

provide a more specific offense and go a long way, I think, to closVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:26 May 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\092805\23694.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
37

ing some of the gaps that we feel in the range of International Terrorist Conventions that are now out there. 

But second, as you put your finger on, the possibility of additional security action in the field, this is something that we think 

we have had some success in the Security Council on, although we 

do believe we could do more. I expect that that is going to be an 

area of activity over the next several months. 

In terms of the question of independence for the audit unit and 

the series of related questions to that and that has been highlighted by the Volcker Committee as well, which has pointed out 

that the number of times that the audit efforts inside the United 

Nations on Oil-for-Food were compromised. 

That is not something that we got resolved completely satisfactorily in the outcome document, but obviously it is critical to understand that if you don’t have an audit function that has the resources and the independence, ultimately its findings are not going 

to be effective. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Just in wrapping up, it would be helpful 

for us to know which countries specifically objected and tried to 

stop us from arriving at a definition of terrorism when it is attacks 

against civilian populations. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Yes. A lot of it came out of the non-aligned 

movement and it is a phenomenon in New York. You will get used 

to it as you work with us up there this fall, but sometimes the most 

radical states spin up some of the others and they don’t want to 

appear soft or squishy on some of these questions and it is very unfortunate. 

It is a kind of old-think in UN politics that we ought to work to 

change, but that is basically how it happened. The ultimate language in the document, we think, didn’t go beyond things that we 

have agreed to before and we think, in fact, it may provide a basis 

for resolving this same problem in the context of the negotiations 

over the Comprehensive Convention. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador Bolton. 

The hearing portion now stands in recess. We will reconvene for 

a briefing with Mr. Malloch Brown after votes and we appreciate 

very much your appearance here today. 

Ambassador BOLTON. Thank you very much. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. Today’s 

hearing is concluded and we will proceed with a briefing by Mr. 

Mark Malloch Brown, Chief of Staff to the Secretary-General of the 

United Nations. 

Mr. Malloch Brown was appointed January 2005 by SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan to serve as his Chief of Staff. In this capacity, 

he assists the Secretary-General in initiatives to improve the performance and overhaul the management of the United Nations. 

Prior to this appointment, Mr. Malloch Brown served as administrator of the United Nations Development Program and Chair of 

the United Nations Development Group, a committee consisting of 

the heads of all UN funds, programs and departments working on 

development issues. 

Mr. Malloch Brown, we welcome you back to the Committee and 

we look forward to your comments. 

38

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK MALLOCH BROWN, CHIEF OF 

STAFF TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, UNITED NATIONS 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you particularly for your taking the time to come visit us in New York, with 

Congressman Lantos and your other colleagues. We really appreciate the interest and attention you have given this issue of UN reform. 

Let me also extend the Secretary-General’s regrets to you and 

through you to and sympathies to the whole American Congress 

and Administration for the tragedy of Katrina. 

Just to point out, as I think you may have learned when you 

were in New York, that over 136 countries offered support to the 

United States after the hurricane disaster and our own agencies, 

UNICEF, led by the wonderful American executive director Ann 

Venemon, produced two plane loads of schools-in-a-box and other 

materials for displaced children, and the World Health Organization sent in medicines and the UN as a whole, sent disaster teams, 

the same teams that had been deployed in the tsunami and in 

many other emergencies around the world. 

I mention this because that UN idea, which I think motivates all 

of us to work in the organization or to support it as solidarity for 

those in trouble is as applicable, even when it is the richest, most 

powerful country in the world, which is subject to such a terrible 

act of nature as a hurricane of this kind. 

Perhaps, in the domestic focus on what happened, perhaps Americans missed the fact that the world responded to America at that 

moment, much as it did on 9/11. 

People’s hearts everywhere went out to Americans in need and 

that is the spirit in which the United States created the United 

Nations, that it would be a place where that support could be felt 

by peoples and between peoples everywhere. 

With that, let me just turn to the reform package. Ambassador 

John Bolton, your wonderful new representative in New York, went 

through the scorecard, if you like. So let me just very quickly add 

just a couple of further comments to what he said. 

Just to remind you, as I said, when you were kind enough to invite me down in to testimony to fill you in earlier in the year, the 

whole purpose of this Reform Summit Document was to try and 

align the United Nations with what people everywhere, here in the 

United States, but also the citizens of some of the poorest and 

smallest countries in the world, all equally want from the UN. 

They want a UN aligned, we believe, behind those basic, core 

needs that we have from a multilateral system in today’s world. It 

will allow us to cooperate together to take on the challenges of development around the world and of humanitarian response. 

In that I think the summit did very well. We got these famous 

Millennium Development Goals endorsed by everybody, and President Bush’s endorsement of them at the summit was one of the 

high points for many governments and was hugely appreciated, but 

so was America going along with this ambitious effort to resource 

the efforts to meet those goals in the coming years. 

We also moved for arrangements for much quicker humanitarian 

response, whether it is hunger in Africa, or a tsunami in Asia, we 

39

can deploy emergency support in a quick way, with funds available 

on hand and people on hand. 

I think America itself saw the need for that with Katrina, that 

you have to be well-prepared. The U.S. has the capacity to do for 

itself for the most part, but other countries need this international 

support quickly available when it is needed. 

On the second pillar of the summit, security, mixed results. Yes, 

common action against terrorism, but real difficulty getting the 

clear, unambiguous definition that John Bolton wanted and Kofi 

Annan wanted and so many others wanted. 

A handful of countries held out against a strong enough definition I think, but it was still a big step forward. 

We also got the critical Peacebuilding Commission, an effort to 

make sure that there is a way of really pulling together a strategy 

to build peace in a country, after the fighting stops. 

With it, the responsibility to protect, something that Congressman Smith with his visits to Darfur and elsewhere knows is so important, this concept now in international law we hope that countries can’t stand by, as a genocide takes place in another nation. 

There is a need to respond and respond adequately to stop that 

happening. 

A great setback, as has already been observed, on weapons of 

mass destruction, where we were disappointed by the outcome on 

that. 

On human rights, a critical foot in the door. We have got a doubling of the budget for the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

and we have got in principle the agreement for a Human Rights 

Council. 

It was asked earlier, will the Human Rights Commission, which 

everybody so rightly agrees is such a tarnished, compromised body, 

will it meet again? Will it ever again have a vote? 

Well, in the eyes of the Secretary-General, I think it should have 

one more vote, a vote to put itself out of business as a new Human 

Rights Council takes over. 

That is a huge burden on John Bolton and his colleagues to complete the debates about the design of that to make sure that it is 

ready to be up and running by the spring of 2006. 

That is something that we the Secretariat can’t do for governments. This is going to be an inter-governmental negotiation and 

agreement. 

The final pillar was the management reform. Pleased to say that 

in the areas where the Secretary-General can now act on his own 

authority, we are moving. He yesterday approved a plan designed 

by Chris Burnam, our excellent American Undersecretary General 

for Management, who John mentioned, we approved the plan for 

an Ethics Office. Now we will be pushing ahead with that. 

We are pushing ahead too with the door that was opened by the 

Summit Document to let us redesign Oversight, to create a rational 

strengthened oversight system, under an independent committee 

that reports to governments and certainly, in terms of Congressman Royce’s question of earlier, it must have authority to vote the 

budgets for Oversight that are needed and not have to go through 

the executive side of the UN to do that. 

40

Perhaps for those of us in management in the UN, critically too 

the summit has authorized us to come back with a radical reform 

of the personnel and financial rules and the old, old mandates, 

some of them up to 55 years old, which still govern so much of the 

work of the organization, we believe we can sweep all that out and 

with the support of governments, get things changed. 

Just one very final observation. The talk today has been about 

the summit and that is a key motivation for these changes, but so 

is Paul Volcker and the Oil-for-Food inquiry that he led. 

He exposed institutional and managerial failings in the UN, 

which have to be corrected and I just want to assure you, Mr. 

Chairman, that we take his findings very, very seriously. 

They are an exhaustive, blue ribbon critique of the fact that the 

UN’s management and institutional arrangements have not kept 

up with the vast new operational challenges we face around the 

world. 

I agree with John Bolton. We must be ready to take on new Oilfor-Food Programs. We must be a tool that is useful to the United 

States and other governments, but to do that, we have got to push 

through a reform in our culture and a new system of management, 

tools and arrangements to equip us to take on those same tasks. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. MARK MALLOCH BROWN, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE

SECRETARY-GENERAL, UNITED NATIONS

I’m very grateful for this opportunity to brief the Committee on what was and was 

not achieved at the UN summit two weeks ago, and how the Secretary-General sees 

the way ahead on reform. Mr. Chairman, we deeply appreciate the interest that you 

and your colleagues, particularly Congressman Lantos, have shown in helping us to 

make the UN a stronger and more effective instrument in the hands of the world’s 

peoples. 

I’m also very glad to be following Ambassador Bolton, with whom—as with representatives of other member states—the Secretary-General has been working very 

closely on all these issues. 

Let me begin by expressing my sympathy, which I know is shared by all my colleagues at the UN, for all the many Americans who have suffered bereavement, injury or hardship as a result of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The entire international 

community has been saddened by the loss of life and devastation. 

The American people have always been generous in helping the victims of disasters in other parts of the world, and now the world has responded in kind. Offers 

of assistance came in from more than 136 countries. During the UN summit there 

were many expressions of sympathy and solidarity from the leaders of other countries. Even some very poor countries offered what they could, out of solidarity and 

concern for those affected, and the UN itself has contributed to the humanitarian 

effort. UNICEF provided two planeloads of education and recreation kits for children. Experts from the World Health Organization worked with their counterparts 

at the Centers for Disease Control to register displaced persons and track the support provided to them. And logistics staff have served in Baton Rouge, Denton, Little Rock, Arlington and other staging areas, including the U.S.S. Iwo Jima, in part 

to coordinate the reception and dispatch of international assistance. 

In short, we have been doing whatever we can to help, and we wish the American 

people strength and courage as they continue the recovery and reconstruction effort. 

But let me return to today’s agenda. The UN summit was noteworthy, not because 

of the record attendance of heads of state, or the ambitiousness of the agenda, but 

rather because of what was achieved, and what was started. 

In March, when the Secretary-General proposed an agenda for the summit, he deliberately set the bar high, since in international negotiations you never get everything you ask. He also presented the reforms as a package, meaning not that he 

expected them to be adopted without change but that advances in all the four main 

areas—development, security, human rights, UN reform—were more likely to be 

41

achieved together than piecemeal, precisely because states have different priorities, 

and are more likely to overcome their reservations on some issues if they see serious 

attention being given to others to which they assign a higher priority. To be quite 

specific, the US and others who share the same reform agenda were not going to 

get what they wanted on management reform, on human rights or on terrorism, unless they showed sensitivity to the views of those many governments for whom development is the overriding priority—and vice versa. 

In the end that did happen, but not to the extent that we originally hoped. On 

many issues there are substantive differences among member states which are still 

unresolved; and there is also a regrettable amount of mistrust, which often makes 

it hard to reach consensus on language even when there is really not much of substance in dispute. Even the phrase ‘‘UN reform’’ sometimes arouses suspicion among 

many of the moderate, democratic governments who in fact support most of the specific items on our agenda. 

But after some very tense negotiations in the weeks and days before the summit, 

we came out with a document which does mark an important step forward, and is 

a good basis for further progress, in areas to which the US government, and this 

Committee in particular, rightly attach importance—I am thinking especially of 

management reform, human rights, and terrorism. 

MANAGEMENT REFORM

Secretary-General Kofi Annan has said many times that ‘‘reform is a process, not 

an event’’, and Ambassador Bolton has now given us his own, pithier version of that 

aphorism: ‘‘reform is not a one-night stand’’. 

So it was probably never realistic to imagine that we would get all the necessary 

reforms enacted at one sitting. We would have liked an explicit sentence, spelling 

out that the Secretary-General needs the authority and flexibility to manage the Organization within his budget, and within a clear political mandate given to him by 

member states, so that he can be held meaningfully responsible and accountable for 

the results. We didn’t get that, but we did get a request for him to come back to 

the General Assembly with proposals on the conditions and measures necessary for 

him to carry out his managerial responsibilities effectively, and we did get a green 

light to move ahead on virtually all the specific changes that he had requested:

1. The Secretary-General was given a clear instruction by the summit to scrupulously apply the existing standards of conduct, and develop a code of ethics which will extend beyond the Secretariat to embrace the entire UN system.

2. His intention to create an independent ethics office was recognized—and 

I’m glad to tell you that just yesterday he formally approved this.

3. Member states committed themselves to additional reforms to ensure that 

the UN makes more efficient use of its financial and human resources.

4. They asked the Secretary-General to make recommendations to ensure that 

the policies and rules governing the UN’s budgetary, financial and human 

resources respond to the Organization’s current needs and enable it to work 

efficiently and effectively.

5. They undertook to review all mandates more than five years old, and have 

asked the Secretary-General for an analysis and recommendations to enable 

both the review itself and the decisions arising from it to be taken during 

2006.

6. They also asked him for a framework for a one-time buyout of staff.

7. They resolved, as a matter of urgency, to significantly strengthen the UN’s 

internal oversight body and ensure its operational independence.

8. They asked the Secretary-General to submit an independent external evaluation of the entire oversight and management system of the UN, including 

its specialized agencies, so that measures to improve it can be taken by the 

General Assembly during its current session ‘‘at the earliest possible stage’’.

9. They also asked him to make detailed proposals for a new independent 

oversight advisory committee.

10. And they gave strong support to his policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN personnel, while encouraging him to submit proposals for a comprehensive approach to assistance for the victims of such 

abuse by the end of this year.

In short, they have given us a lot to do in a short time, and we have already started work. Just yesterday, the Secretary-General chaired the first joint meeting of the 

42

Policy and Management committees—the two bodies that I told you he was setting 

up the last time I had the opportunity to brief you, and which are both now up and 

running. The purpose of that joint meeting was to draw up a plan and a timetable 

for implementing and following up all the instructions that member states have now 

given us. So in the next few weeks we will be working hard to review almost sixty 

years of mandates, and all the budget and human resource rules and regulations. 

Amazing as it may seem, such reviews have never been done before in the history 

of the UN. I believe if we do them properly, and if member states who really care 

about reform play their full part when the Secretary-General comes back to the Assembly with recommendations, we will now achieve a long overdue house-cleaning 

of the Organization. 

If all these reforms are carried out, they should enable us to streamline and 

prioritize all our activities, deploying resources where they are most needed to carry 

out today’s most urgent tasks, and recruiting staff with the skills to carry out those 

tasks, while also backing up the measures that are already in hand to enforce greater accountability and transparency, with more rigorous standards of ethics, throughout the Organization. 

The lessons of the Oil for Food Program, the exhaustive and unprecedented review by the Volcker Inquiry, this Committee and others here in the Congress, and 

bipartisan initiatives such as the Gingrich/Mitchell report, have served to galvanize 

the reform efforts the Secretary-General has attempted to advance throughout his 

tenure. Many of the changes already made by the Secretary-General on his own authority—such as the creation of an ethics office, the new rules to protect whistleblowers, improving procurement practices, and the creation of separate policy and 

management committees at the top—are aimed precisely at remedying the deficiencies revealed by the oil-for-food scandal. 

The same goes for the decisions of the summit. Indeed, I doubt if we would ever 

have got the majority of member states to accept the urgency of management reform 

without the scandal and the various investigations into it. As the Secretary-General 

himself told the Security Council on September 7—the day it was published—Mr. 

Volcker’s fullest and most recent report ‘‘ripped away the curtain, and shone a harsh 

light into the most unsightly corners’’ of the UN. 

Earlier this year, this House adopted your legislation which included a call for 

creation of a new Chief Operating Officer. This idea was echoed in Paul Volcker’s 

report, and the Secretary-General has indicated his support for it. I am sure the 

US and other countries will take it up, and we may well see a specific proposal to 

create such a post brought forward during the current session of the General Assembly. 

Let me assure you, in any case, that we in the Secretariat will follow up on every 

one of Mr. Volcker’s recommendations, and will propose measures either to implement them directly, or, where appropriate, to ensure that we reach the same objective by other means. 

But management reform is, of course, only a means to an end. I know you are 

also interested in the UN’s substantive agenda. Let me now say a few words about 

the summit’s outcome in some of the other areas that I know are of interest to you. 

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

Last March, when the Secretary-General decided to recommend that the Commission on Human Rights be replaced by a new Human Rights Council, some greeted 

his proposal as bold and visionary, while others called it unrealistic. So the summit 

took a major step forward, by agreeing on the need to establish the Council as soon 

as possible. The Commission’s days are numbered. 

That said, member states have left themselves a lot of work in the coming months 

to define the specific parameters of the new Council. It is vital that nations which 

really care about human rights, including of course the US, be fully engaged in negotiations to see this through. 

Meanwhile, please don’t overlook the very important progress the summit did 

make on other areas of human rights—notably the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’. For 

the first time the entire UN membership, at the highest level, has accepted clearly 

that it has a collective responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war 

crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. I believe this is a historic decision, which can help us to respond more rapidly, and more effectively, to the Bosnias and Rwandas, and indeed the Darfurs, of the future. 

Of course it’s a decision in principle. An enormous political effort will still be 

needed to ensure that we act on this principle in specific situations. But no one can 

argue any longer that such horrific crimes are internal affairs, which concern only 

43

the people and government of the nation in which they happen. In that respect, at 

least, we have entered a new and better era. 

I should like to thank members of this Committee, particularly yourself, Mr. 

Chairman, and members such as Congressman Lantos and Congressman Smith, for 

the untiring support you have given to the principle of strengthening the UN’s commitment to the protection of fundamental human rights. What this body says on 

human rights echoes across the world. And as a result of the summit, member countries also took the decision to double the capacity and budget of the UN’s human 

rights machinery, which was previously only 2 per cent of the UN budget as a 

whole. I think if we all keep our eye on the ball and do not relax our vigilance, there 

is real hope that in the coming years the UN will remove the blemish that has disfigured its otherwise valuable work in this area, and at last come to be seen as the 

effective force for human rights around the world that its founders intended it to 

be. 

Let me also remind you that the UN Democracy Fund, which President Bush first 

suggested when he spoke in the General Assembly last year, has now been set up 

and has already received pledges of over $42 million from 15 countries, including 

$10 million from the US. This will enable the UN to do much more to help create 

and strengthen democratic institutions in countries making the difficult transition 

from civil conflict, or authoritarian rule. 

PEACEBUILDING

In that context I should also mention another important decision of the summit—

the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission. I believe this body will be of great 

value to the US, since it will make it easier for you to share with other countries 

and institutions the burden of supporting reconstruction and recovery, and preventing a relapse into violence, in places like Liberia, Haiti and Sudan where peace 

and stability are not only a crying human need but also an important security interest for America and the rest of the world. This Commission will be operational by 

the end of the year. 

TERRORISM

Let me also remind you that, although we still do not have, as we had hoped, universal agreement on a definition of terrorism, the summit did produce—and this too 

is a first in the UN’s history—a clear, unqualified condemnation, by all Member 

States, of terrorism ‘‘in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, 

wherever and for whatever purposes’’. This is an important step towards the comprehensive convention on terrorism—which I know is a high priority for the US government, as it is for many other governments, and which all member states have 

now committed themselves to conclude within the coming year. In addition, the 

summit agreed on the need for a global counter-terror strategy—based on the elements set out by the Secretary-General when he spoke to the Madrid conference on 

terrorism last March. I think we all understand that this is an area where it is imperative to have all countries cooperating, not just a few. So this is an area where 

the UN must deliver, and those most concerned with the threat of terrorism must 

make the biggest effort to enlist other countries in the common effort. 

DEVELOPMENT

Finally, let me observe that in the area of economic and social development the 

summit did not call for specific actions by the UN itself. But it did stimulate important commitments, from both donor and developing nations, to take actions in their 

own right to advance the Millennium Development Goals adopted five years ago, 

thereby rolling back poverty and disease, enabling women to play their essential 

role in development, and also safeguarding our global environment. As a former Administrator of the UN Development Program, I particularly appreciated President 

Bush’s speech to the summit, in which he strongly endorsed the MDGs (as we call 

them), and also made a potentially historic offer to give poor countries the chance 

to trade their way out of poverty through a successful Doha Round that would eliminate tariffs on their goods and end unfair agricultural subsidies. In this connection, 

I would draw your attention also to what Tony Blair said to his party conference 

yesterday: ‘‘When we resume the talks on world trade this December, our job, Europe’s job, America’s job, is to be on the side of opening the markets of the rich to 

the poorest of the world.’’

So you see, Mr. Chairman, that the summit has given the new session of the General Assembly a great deal of work to do. I think we are lucky to have Jan Eliasson 

of Sweden—a man known to many of you from his recent term as his country’s ambassador to the US—as president of the Assembly during this crucial session. He 

44

will have a key role to play in the coming months, helping to steer the process that 

will have to deliver on the many issues decided but not completed at the summit. 

In closing, let me add that I believe one important consequence of the reforms 

now under way must be to allow Israel to play its full part as a member state in 

all the UN’s affairs, and no longer to be judged by harsher standards than those 

applied to other member states. As you know, this is something that the SecretaryGeneral has consistently advocated throughout his time in office, and his role was 

handsomely acknowledged by Israel’s foreign minister, Silvan Shalom, when he 

spoke in the General Assembly last week. I believe it is an encouraging sign of the 

new atmosphere that Israel’s ambassador, Dan Gillerman, has been elected as one 

of the Assembly’s vice-presidents for the current session—the first time this has 

happened since Abba Eban in the 1950s. 

Meanwhile, the UN will of course continue its work, with its partners in the 

Quartet, for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The nearer we get to that 

goal, the more obvious it will be to all UN members that Israel has exactly the same 

rights as any other state. 

But my main message to you this morning is that, while the summit’s outcome 

was a major step forward in several key areas, much work needs to be done to follow it up in the coming weeks and months. And in that work, it goes without saying 

that constructive US engagement and leadership will continue to be absolutely essential. 

We are all grateful for the efforts made by the Administration, particularly the 

Secretary of State and Ambassador Bolton, that have helped us to come this far. 

But there is still a tremendous amount of work to be done to get other countries 

on board to push through the detailed decisions. 

I know, Mr. Chairman, that this House has passed a bill bearing your name, intended to ensure that reform of the United Nations moves ahead. I hope it’s by now 

clear that we in the Secretary-General’s office fully share that intention. But I hope 

you might now also understand why we respectfully disagree with the method that 

you adopted, which mandates withholding of US dues from the United Nations if 

certain benchmarks and deadlines are not met. I fear that this would provoke a 

backlash among other member states, whose effect would be not to advance but to 

set back the priorities that you and we share—such as an effective Human Rights 

Council, the extensive reform of UN management, a clear definition of terrorism—

because it would shatter the pro-reform coalition among UN members. 

The key to success, on the contrary, lies in working with, and broadening, the coalition of friends and allies who are already committed to reform. In this effort, the 

US is an essential player, but by no means the only one. It has to be the work of 

a coalition, and holding that coalition together is the surest way to success. 

To help achieve this we rely on our friends not only in the Administration, but 

also here in Congress. There is much that you can do in the coming months—in 

your contacts with foreign leaders and your travels to foreign capitals—to communicate to your friends and allies abroad how serious is the need for UN reform. You 

can help to energize those who already support reform, and to win over those who 

are more reluctant. You, after all, have the power of the purse, and that ensures 

you an attentive audience wherever you go. Please use it to make the case for a 

stronger, more efficient UN—one that can carry the torch for peace, development 

and human rights throughout the world. 

Thank you very much.

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much for a very helpful statement. Mr. Brown, what lessons have been learned from the Secretary-General’s previous reform efforts? How will these lessons 

learned be applied in the coming months as resolutions on specific 

reform are negotiated? 

Mr. BROWN. The previous reform efforts have largely concentrated on institutional realignment, getting some critical pieces 

to work more closely together, Humanitarian and Development and 

both with the political side and have been enormously important 

in rationalizing the structure of the United Nations. 

But where they have been less successful, with hindsight, is taking on the management systems and the culture of the organization to transform it into a kind of flexible, accountable organization 

that can take on complex global tasks efficiently and quickly. 

45

I think we need to completely get at this core set of rules, regulations, the business model if you like, of how the UN operates, 

which has not been changed enough by earlier reforms. 

Chairman HYDE. The outcome document tasks the SecretaryGeneral to submit various proposals and recommendations on a 

wide range of management issues. 

How robust will the Secretary-General be in response to these requests? If you can, provide some specific examples, including management programmatic reform and prioritizing of mandates. 

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to. First, I 

think he will be very robust. I mean speaking very frankly to you, 

I think that Kofi Annan recognizes that his huge successes of the 

early period of his time as Secretary-General have currently been 

overshadowed by the Oil-for-Food scandal and he believes the lesson of that scandal and the opportunity that this summit has provided and the interest of Committees like yours, reinforces that, it 

has given him a chance to push through a fundamental management change of the organization, which will then become a critical 

part of his legacy and an answer to those who said that Oil-forFood represents a management failing by him. 

I think he really looks for this opportunity to kind of get the 

record straight. 

Now specifically what does that mean? It means pushing through 

a set of reforms on the management side, which enhances management’s authority over the deployment of people and resources, 

which creates a much more merit-based staff. That is one critical 

set. 

Second, that that greater freedom to manage is controlled by a 

new set of accountability instruments and oversight tools available 

to member states, so that they can see that they are getting the 

results that they are paying for. 

Programmatically I would just again stress two issues, the new 

Peacebuilding Commission, which will be up and running, if the 

summit result is to be respected, by December, which will be a 

major new effort to take on the peacebuilding task after conflicts 

and secondly, the whole human rights machinery, which again will 

be extremely tangible and will deliver on a key issue that the U.S. 

wants and perhaps just a third one, the Democracy Fund. 

That secured $42 million of commitments, it was a proposal of 

President Bush, you will recall, but he was joined in its first pledging session at this summit by governments such as India and 

South Africa and others, and so the U.S.’s pledge has been equalled 

many times over now by other pledges and it will start dispensing 

monies, we hope, by the end of this year to support democratic development around the world. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McCotter. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In building the reforms, it seems to me that one of the things 

that I am curious to hear is a specific mission of the United Nations. 

In many instances, it seems as if the UN does everything and 

nothing at the same time, except that in either event, it becomes 

very expensive. 

46

Is the UN going to continue to try to be an international security 

agency? Is it going to be an international court of law? Is it going 

to be an international social service agency? Is it going to be all of 

the same? 

I would be very interested in the response, because one of the 

things stemming from the Oil-for-Food scandal that I find absolutely amazing is that in the wake of that, the UN is proposing a 

global tax upon nations to get a steady revenue stream outside of 

any bill, be it the Chairman’s or be it Mr. Lantos’ version, that they 

can then spend at will. 

Is it the intent of the United Nations to be essentially an international governmental body with a tax dedicated to it with its General Assembly and its Security Council acting in many ways as a 

parliament or a senate and a house? 

What is the long-term goal of the UN and what is the status of 

the proposed global tax? 

Mr. BROWN. Very properly, the long-term goals of the UN will be 

defined by President Bush, Secretary of State Rice and John 

Bolton, not by me, because this is an inter-governmental body 

where the goals are set by governments, not by the Secretariat. 

But let me just say that this summit endorsed a four, if you 

would like, a three-pronged programmatic set of priorities for the 

UN, development and the humanitarian, security and then human 

rights and democracy. I think there is broad global support for that 

from the U.S. Government and from many others. 

Now you say that, Mr. McCotter, that we do everything and 

nothing and do it expensively. I would just really urge you to look 

at the 16 peacekeeping operations around the world, which involve 

80,000 troops, and a very large civilian contingent as well, and you 

will see that any comparison of unit costs, and I think particularly 

of comparisons made by the Rand Corporation here in the U.S. to 

unit costs of that versus U.S. peacekeeping, and you will find that 

we are actually the Filene’s Basement of peacekeeping. 

We are extremely cheap and in fact, some of us think we probably need to invest a bit more in it to do it better, but we are not 

expensive at what we do and I think if the U.S. and others were 

obliged to take on these different peacekeeping operations directly, 

the financial and political costs would be many times greater. 

Let me also just very clearly, unambiguously and for the record 

say that the United Nations is proposing no global tax. 

This Congress, both this House and the other House, has made 

it clear that this would be considered a huge overreach by the 

United Nations to seek some independent source of revenue and we 

haven’t and we won’t. Thank you very much. 

Mr. MCCOTTER. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Malloch Brown, thank you for again honoring us with both 

your presence and with your patience. Those intervening votes obviously put back your time here and it is very gracious of you to 

not only brief us, but to do it on a continuous basis. I, for one, and 

I know that I speak for others, am very grateful for that. 

Let me just ask you a couple of questions. First, in the outcome 

document in the Item No. 58—and I appreciate what you just said 

47

about the tax—not ambiguously, very clearly there is no effort for 

a global tax. 

I would ask if you could, to provide us with equally a nonambiguous, very straightforward answer to the issue under the heading, 

Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women. 

As you may or may not know, both Chairman Hyde and I have 

been for years leading an effort to try to enfranchise unborn children for the persons that they truly are. We now know without any 

shadow of a doubt that we can treat unborn children with microsurgery. We can do all kinds of diagnostic techniques and we treat 

them as patients. 

Their personhood is really more and more self-evident, and especially owing to ultrasounds, real time ultrasounds, where the baby 

can be seen moving and sucking his or her thumbs with unbelievable clarity. 

My question, and I know this was something of some controversy 

at the UN again as it was in Beijing, Cairo and virtually every 

other meeting where it has been held, under 58[c], where it says, 

‘‘Ensure equal access to reproductive health.’’

You know whenever we write a law or a bill, we always have a 

definition section, where we make it very clear so there is no ambiguity as to what we mean by that. 

As you know, our EOP, which was delivered by John Bolton, Ambassador Bolton, made it very clear that it is our understanding 

that that in no way, shape or form includes abortion. 

We know that in Cairo, because I was there for 7 days, there was 

a major effort to enshrine an international right to abortion and it 

was defeated. It was defeated by the delegates and reproductive 

health is something that I don’t think—and this is what I am asking you—can be construed to be abortion. 

I have spoken to hundreds of individual delegates over the years, 

over the last 10 years, from Latin America, Africa, Asia and Europe, who say their definition of reproductive health is not abortion 

and yet the NGO’s, after a document like this is agreed upon, I 

think misconstrue what it is that the delegates did and what the 

leaders did, when they put together a document of this comprehension and this is a comprehensive document, a first step as you and 

others have said, but it is not about abortion, which I think is violence against children. 

When you talk about literally dismembering a baby or chemically 

poisoning a baby, I don’t know how anyone says that is benign, 

compassionate or anything but the killing of a child and the 

wounding of a mother. 

I just say just for the record there is a growing movement in this 

country, as you probably know, a group called Silent No More, 

made up of women, all of whom have had abortions, who now 

speak out passionately in favor of life and say, with every abortion 

there is one dead baby, two if it is twins, but there is also a wounded woman. 

Martin Luther King’s niece, Alveta King, has had two abortions. 

She is one of the spokeswomen now for Silent No More campaign. 

She has said that what she and so many others who favored abortion rights earlier have missed, which is the horrific impact aborVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:26 May 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\092805\23694.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
48

tion has on a woman, and she now speaks out passionately, like I 

said, in favor of life. 

My first question is, that language, does Kofi Annan consider 

that to mean abortion or not? 

Mr. BROWN. Congressman, I am very well aware of your position 

on this issue. As a former head of UNDP, I had cause to see you 

in action on this and I have a huge respect for your position and 

your commitment on this issue. 

You have been a strong voice on it at all times and you know 

very well, therefore, that the United Nations has on this to try and 

find a way to respect different national policies, which in the case 

of the U.S. means a very clear determination that U.S. donated 

funds not be used in any way for programs which promote or use 

abortion as a reproductive health service. 

As you equally know, there are other countries and other individuals with very strong views on the other side. 

I think for the UN, the broad issue on this is that these are 

issues of conscience and choice, which ultimately cannot be decided 

by the Secretariat of the UN of the United Nations. They have to 

be decided between governments and they have to be decided in 

families and by women and individuals. 

What I would say about this language is that it is very certainly 

an effort not to change the current status quo on this. This is no 

effort to slip a widened-right to abortion in under the door here. 

It is intended as a restatement of the existing, I admit, unhappy 

truths between the different parties to this debate, but it doesn’t, 

I think, move the ball forward, but nor does it move it back as I 

understand it. 

Mr. SMITH. Again, given your position as Chief of Staff, do you 

define reproductive health to include abortion and does Secretariat 

Kofi Annan as well? 

Mr. BROWN. As you know, the UN Fund for Population Activities, 

which is a fully fledged part of the UN family—and I think you 

have had occasion to discuss with Thoria Abay the head of the fund 

this and obviously you and she do not agree completely—but as in 

all of these things, I suspect you agree more than probably at times 

you both admit, because you are both people who believe profoundly in the sanctity of life and the importance of these issues. 

I really must defer to her to answer that question. I just don’t 

think it is appropriate for me to answer on behalf of the executive 

head of a program specifically designed to deal with these issues. 

Mr. SMITH. I am talking about, if I could, Mr. Chairman, about 

the UN itself, not UNFPA, but whether or not in an action item 

document like this, where very strong principles are enunciated, 

whether or not you interpret that language, reproductive health, to 

mean abortion? 

Mr. BROWN. We do not interpret it as being abortion. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. 

If I could, Mr. Chairman, I know I have exceeded my time. 

Chairman HYDE. Does the gentleman need another couple of 

minutes? 

Mr. SMITH. Just two. 

Chairman HYDE. Without objection, the gentleman has two more 

minutes. 

49

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that so much, Mr. Chairman. 

If I could, on Item No. 160, where in the General Assembly and 

the President will be working to construct the Human Rights 

Council or to establish it, is there a sense as to the time? 

I know on the peacekeeping there is a date given for victim’s 

compensation of December 31, which I am so glad to see. Those 

poor battered young girls especially, are certainly in need of help, 

but do you have a sense of time? 

Again, I laud you on your statement regarding the Human 

Rights Council that their last vote should be the one to go out of 

business. Thank you for that and thank you for your leadership on 

that, but if you could. 

Mr. BROWN. If I could say on the High Commissioner’s Office, we 

have got a budget for a plan now which we will present before December for the first step in this next biennium toward a doubling 

over 5 years. 

These issues you mention are exactly the ones which will be 

given more vigor by a bigger office driving these issues. 

On the council itself, I met with John Bolton just yesterday in 

New York and with other Ambassadors who share his urgency 

about getting the council up, and for it to be up with the next 

Human Rights Commission meeting in the early spring of 2006, 

they have to have finished agreement on the design of it by December. 

It is an extremely urgent issue, if we are to kind of make sure 

this is the last meeting of the commission. 

Chairman HYDE. I want to thank you very much, Mr. Brown, for 

a very helpful briefing. I am sorry there weren’t more Members 

here, but it has been reduced to writing and it will be read and 

studied. 

We look forward to another encounter. Thank you so much and 

thank you, Mr. Smith, for your persistence and being here. 

The Committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:27 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(51)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFF FORTENBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

Ambassador Bolton, Mr. Brown, thank you for taking the time to appear before 

this Committee to address issues of grave importance to the future of both the 

United Nations and the terms of U.S. participation in the United Nations. 

In the 60 years since the ratification of the UN Charter in 1945, the UN has 

served as the preeminent forum for international dialogue and collaboration on 

issues of international peace and security, economic and social development, and 

human rights. While the UN has discharged many of its duties admirably, it has 

experienced grievous failures and much work remains to be done. 

In addition to the concerns of member government about UN accountability and 

transparency, we have witnessed in recent years a disturbing trend of serious 

abuses of power by UN officials, which must not go unanswered. Specific, measurable and immediate institutional reforms must be undertaken. 

I look forward to hearing your testimony and would welcome evidence of the UN’s 

seriousness of purpose and follow-through on pending reform initiatives. Congress 

is committed to providing stringent oversight and to holding the United Nations to 

the highest standards. The Outcome Document is a step in the right direction. However, I am not convinced that it goes far enough. Having said that, we need to make 

sure that the reforms outlined in the Outcome Document are implemented without 

delay and to close any gaps that remain to achieving substantive change. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for your leadership in addressing the matter of UN 

oversight and reform. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. When we look 

at the outcomes from the UN General Assembly meeting earlier this month in New 

York, I see a combination of missed opportunities and setbacks in terms of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, in terms of genuine attempts at reforming 

and strengthening peace, security, development and human rights. And I see missed 

opportunities to strengthen the world body itself. 

I am encouraged by the commitments made by world leaders to the Millennium 

Development Goals to alleviate extreme poverty, halt the spread of HIV/AIDS and 

to providing universal primary education by 2015. These are important targets and 

sustained international cooperation and coordination will be required to meet these 

targets. 

One hundred and fifty heads of state and government gathered in New York to 

take action on a range of pressing issues, from boosting development and fighting 

poverty, combating terrorism, forging more effective peace-building mechanisms and 

human rights protection. Yet the structure of the key agencies of the United Nations 

itself is partly to blame for the failure to achieve progress at this most recent gathering. The United Nations archaic structure reflects the world at the end of the Second World War. The time for reform is now. And rightly justified, this is the top 

priority of our Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton. Mr. Ambassador, 

I support the efforts you have and continue to make in New York. 

The lack of transparency and accountability at the UN will be remedied only with 

leadership within that body and when pressure is sufficiently applied from its members. 

52

We face enormous foreign policy challenges now and there are great opportunities 

for the international community to support change, and to build and strengthen 

democratic institutions in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Latin America. There 

is a role for the UN to play. 

The important role the United Nations can play in conflict situations and humanitarian interventions was detailed by Secretary Rice in her testimony before this 

committee. She said ‘‘When they engage effectively, multilateral institutions can 

multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.’’

In order to be effective, the UN must reform. The UN was created to solve international disputes before they flare into war. For many years, critics, and I have 

been one of those critics, have argued that in discharging this mission, the U.N. has 

often been feckless and even irrelevant. If the UN is to have any future legitimacy 

it must address quickly, honestly and effectively the administrative and oversight 

problems. 

Our investigation of the UN Oil-for-Food Program is the most vivid example of 

systemic mismanagement and lack of control at the UN. Through our investigation 

we have shed light on the problems in order to justify steps to be taken to rehabilitate the UN to restore its credibility. 

Mr. Chairman, to increase accountability, transparency, and oversight at the 

U.N., I support calls on Kofi Annan to resign because of his leadership failure. I 

have also supported calls to withhold dues to the organization while the audit of 

the Oil-for-Food Program is being conducted. I fully support your initiative to support the creation of an independent Office of Internal Oversight (OIOS) within the 

UN and creating an Ethics Board within the OIOS. I also support creation of an 

external body to oversee U.N. operations. An external watchdog, completely independent of the U.N., should be established to oversee major U.N. operations, including humanitarian programs. 

UN oversight bodies have failed in the past to report in a timely manner on serious management problems and have also failed to take corrective actions when 

needed. 

Finally, on structural reforms, I support a major overhaul of the UN Human 

Rights Commission. With some of the most egregious violators of basic human 

rights like Sudan and Cuba sitting on the commission it is impossible for the existing forum to serve as a credible monitor of human rights. Reform of the UN’s 

human rights oversight mechanisms should be implemented as quickly as possible. 

I also support your proposal to prevent any country that is subject to sanctions by 

the Security Council from sitting as a member of a body tasked with oversight of 

human rights. Thank you. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES PERMANENT

REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE RON PAUL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Question: 

On September 14, 2005, the United Nations (U.N.) released an initial cost estimate 

indicating that $80 million is needed to implement new initiatives created in the 

Outcome Document. What options does the Administration have at its disposal to ensure that new requirements generated by the Outcome Document are funded through 

existing resources? 

Response: 

The Department will insist in negotiations that costs resulting from implementation of the Outcome Document be absorbed within existing budget levels. However, 

absorption will require reductions in programs or activities that could be important 

to other nations. Reaching agreement on reductions will require a concerted effort 

to obtain support from other nations for specific reductions. 

In the context of the 2006–2007 biennial budget, the Department is pressing the 

Secretariat to expedite a review of mandates older than 5 years, such that budget 

decisions for the 2006–2007 biennium could derive tangible savings from the reduction or termination of older, low-priority mandates. The Department is strongly urging the other thirteen large contributors to the UN in the Geneva Group to press 

the Secretariat to identify cost savings in the 2006–2007 budget. These potential 

cost savings could offset the likely additional costs of U.N. reform activities in 2006–

2007. 

53

Regarding the existing estimate of $80 million, it is preliminary only. The Secretariat intends to produce additional, more detailed estimates in the near future. 

Thus, the total cost of reforms could exceed $80 million. 

Question: 

The current U.N. regular assessed budget is approximately $1.8 billion a year. This amount excludes peacekeeping, which is about $5 billion a year. The U.S. pays 

22 percent, or approximately $440 million a year, to the regular assessed budget. Of 

the $1.8 billion in the regular budget, how much is necessary, and how much could 

be eliminated? What steps are you taking to press for the elimination of wasteful 

spending? 

Response: 

The Department is pressing for an expedited review of U.N. mandates older than 

5 years, with the objective being reduction or termination of mandates that have 

outlived their usefulness, are low priorities, or have otherwise resulted in an ineffective use of resources. We want the review of mandates to result in more efficient 

use of U.N. resources, and consequently less spending that could be described as 

wasteful. 

While a thorough review needs to be done by the Secretariat to increase the 

chances of getting necessary approval from Member States, the U.S. and other large 

contributors to the U.N. (such as those in the Geneva Group) need to consult and 

work together to study U.N. mandates and programs and identify targets for 

downsizing and elimination. For our part, we have already identified a few, as Deputy PermRep Patterson mentioned in a speech before the U.N. General Assembly’s 

Fifth Committee on October 27, 2005: e.g., reducing the cost, frequency and duration 

of conferences and meetings by at least 5% initially; reducing excessive travel allowances; and, rationalizing the use of consultants and information technology among 

the various U.N. agencies. 

In another major focus of our reform effort, the Department is working to establish oversight processes and mechanisms, such as a more effective Office of Internal 

Oversight Services and an Independent Oversight Advisory Committee, which would 

give the U.N. greater capacity to prevent instances of waste and fraud, and to promote effectiveness. 

Question: 

I am also concerned about the ‘‘Democracy Fund of the United Nations’’ that will 

be created by this resolution. Will this fund be used to undermine or overthrow elected governments that do not meet some U.N.-created ‘‘democratic’’ criteria? Will it be 

used to further the kinds of color-coded revolutions we have seen from East Europe 

to the Middle East, which, far from being organic manifestations of popular will, are 

in fact fomented with outside money and influence? Could it eventually be used 

against the United States, if the U.S. is determined to not be living up to its U.N.-

defined democratic responsibilities, like providing public housing or universal 

healthcare? If so, and I believe it will, then I hope American citizens will at least 

note the irony in the mis-naming of this fund. 

Response: 

President Bush has identified active promotion of democracy and the ‘‘non-negotiable demands of human dignity’’ as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. In a 

speech to the 2004 UN General Assembly, President Bush called for the establishment of a UN Democracy Fund. After receiving expressions of support from other 

leading democracies, Secretary-General Annan opened the Fund on July 4, 2005. At 

their meeting in Washington, D.C. in July, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh announced that the United States and India would each make a major 

contribution. At this time, 15 countries have pledged a total of $43.37 million. 

The Terms of Reference call for an Advisory Board whose membership will consist 

of the six Member States that are the largest donors plus an additional four countries from different geographic regions active in promoting democracy. The U.S., 

India, Qatar, Australia, Italy and Germany are the six largest donors. The structure 

of this key decision-making body reflecting top donors and other nations with a 

record on democracy-promotion—was expressly designed not to give prevalent decision-making power to the UN General Assembly, its Members with autocratic governments, or the UN Secretariat. This aim of this structure of the voluntarily—rather than assessment-funded—body is to avoid perversion of its intended aims. 

The objective of the Fund is to strengthen the UN’s capacity to support democracy 

and to complement, not duplicate, the democracy programs already being carried 

out by the UN. The Fund will assist nations transitioning to democracy by helping 

to strengthen their democratic institutions through grants to non-governmental orVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:26 May 17, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\FULL\092805\23694.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
54

ganizations, regional/international organizations and UN agencies. Grants approved 

by the Fund will support rule of law, civil society, good governance and capacitybuilding programs, but only in countries that seek this kind of assistance. 

RESPONSE FROM THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES PERMANENT

REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE ELIOT L. ENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Question: 

Ambassador Bolton, many of us are aware that the UN retains a particularly vitriolic and archaic bias against the State of Israel. There exists an unparalleled obsession with international denunciation of a member nation. While the UN attempts to 

reform, its structures which unfairly treat Israel must be dismantled. 

As we speak, three unique entities are central to the problem. The first is an office 

of the UN Secretariat entitled, ‘‘The Division for Palestinian Rights.’’ The second and 

third are committees of the UN General Assembly called the ‘‘Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,’’ and the ‘‘Special Committee 

to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People 

and other Arabs in the Occupied Territories. There is no place for these entities in 

the United Nations. 

Ambassador Bolton, under Article 18, Section 2 of the UN Charter, ‘‘decisions of 

the UN General Assembly on important questions [including] budgetary questions 

. . . shall be made by a 2/3 majority.’’ Therefore, am I correct to say that these committees require a 2/3 majority of the members of the General Assembly, present and 

voting, to be reauthorized with funding for the next year? 

What initiatives has the United States taken or does the U.S. plan to take to roll 

back the reauthorization of these committees? Specifically, the European Union has 

generally abstained as a block on these resolutions. What have we done to convince 

the EU and its member states to vote against these resolutions, instead of abstaining? 

Response: 

As part of our overall strategy for combating one-sided Middle East resolutions 

in the UNGA, the United States opposes both the extension of the mandate and 

funding for the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP), Division of Palestinian Rights (DPR), and Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories (SCIIPHR) in the UNGA 

Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization). The United States believes 

that these three bodies are biased against Israel, do not contribute to peace between 

Israel and the Palestinians, and should be abolished. 

In October 2005, we demarched numerous countries including all EU countries 

urging them to oppose the renewal of the mandates of these UN bodies. We also 

include this issue in consultations with the EU. 

While the EU abstains on votes regarding funding for these committees, we continue to urge them to shift their votes to ‘‘no.’’ We stress that these entities are inconsistent with the Road Map endorsed by the Quartet (U.S., UN, EU, and Russia) 

of which the EU is a part. 

Funding for these UN bodies comes from the overall UN regular budget, which 

the UN General Assembly generally adopts by consensus. Only in the event there 

is no consensus, Article 18 of the UN Charter requires the decision of the General 

Assembly to be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. 

The next UN budget will cover the biennium 2006–2007. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES PERMANENT

REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Question: 

Can you explain the reason for the United States to push for Morocco’s inclusion 

in this group (nb. The Community of Democracies Convening Group)? . . . Are we 

not recreating the shortcomings of the U.N. within the group that is supposed to 

bring reform? 

55

Response: 

The Community of Democracies (CD) established basic criteria for participation 

in September 2000. At the Santiago Ministerial in 2005, the CD decided to expand 

the 10-person Convening Group up to 16 countries and to reflect geographic, historical and economic balance. Despite democracy deficits in the region, there was consensus that including a country from the Middle East was important, and Morocco 

could help the Community promote democratic principles in that region. 

The strength of the Community is that governments at various levels are brought 

together to focus and dialogue on democracy. We believe that Morocco can play a 

valuable role in the CD’s dialogue on democracy, even as the United States continues to raise human rights concerns with the Government of Morocco. 

The United States is a strong supporter of the CD forum as it brings together nations committed to promoting and strengthening democracy worldwide. Indeed, this 

is the only global forum singularly dedicated to the promotion of democracy. 

Question: 

Furthermore, last session of Congress, we voted to create a free-trade agreement 

with Morocco. It seems to me that U.S. Policy is rewarding Morocco for bad behavior. 

Are we giving some countries a pass while we have righteous indignation against 

others who are just as guilty? 

Response: 

The Department of State promotes U.S. business interests across the globe by reducing barriers to trade and investment. We strive to ensure that economic and 

legal frameworks protect American intellectual property and international commerce. Free-trade agreements are a key way to advance America’s trade interests 

and competitiveness in a world of global commerce and fast-paced change. 

The Bush Administration has announced a plan for a Middle East Free Trade 

Area by 2013. As part of this plan, free-trade agreements across the Middle East 

will foster and expand economic freedoms that pave the way for greater social and 

democratic reform. The Moroccan free-trade agreement will help a long-standing 

ally strengthen its role as a moderate, modern Islamic state and will bolster significant ongoing reforms. The agreement provides the building blocks of a strong democracy, promotes American values, and offers mutual economic benefit for citizens 

of both countries. 

56

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JOHN R. 

BOLTON, UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE


236940001.eps
57


236940002.eps
58


236940003.eps
59


236940004.eps
60


236940005.eps
61


236940006.eps
62


236940007.eps
63


236940008.eps
64


236940009.eps
65


236940010.eps
66


236940011.eps
67


236940012.eps
68


236940013.eps
69


236940014.eps
70


236940015.eps
71


236940016.eps
72


236940017.eps
73


236940018.eps
74


236940019.eps
75


236940020.eps
76


236940021.eps
77


236940022.eps
78


236940023.eps
79


236940024.eps
80


236940025.eps
81


236940026.eps
82


236940027.eps
83


236940028.eps
84


236940029.eps
85


236940030.eps
86


236940031.eps
87


236940032.eps
88


236940033.eps
89


236940034.eps
90


236940035.eps
91


236940036.eps
92


236940037.eps
93


236940038.eps
94


236940039.eps
95


236940040.eps
96


236940041.eps
97


236940042.eps
98


236940043.eps
99


236940044.eps
100


236940045.eps
101


236940046.eps
102


236940047.eps
103


236940048.eps
104


236940049.eps
105


236940050.eps
106


236940051.eps
107

Æ


236940052.eps