1 The Honorable Howard F. Sachs, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, adopting the repor t and recommendation of the Honorable John T. Maughmer, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-3366

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. Jamil V. Mackey, also known as * Shakur, * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: April 15, 2009 Filed: June 9, 2009

___________ Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Jamil V. Mackey conditionally pleaded gu ilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1 ). He now appeals the district court’s 1 order denying his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.2 Also described in the record as a “blue tub” and “blue bin.” -2- I. On April 30, 2007, Sergeant Satter and Sergeant Gardner of the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department responded to a call from the manager of a local apartment complex that reported possible drug activity in Apartment 104. When the officers arrived at the scene, the manage r informed them th at Apartment 104 was leased to Crystal Brown. The officer s ran a background check on that name and learned that Brown had a warra nt outstanding for her arrest. The officers proceeded to the apartmen t, where they encountered Brown and her boyfriend, Mackey. After the officer s placed Brown under arrest, they asked Mackey for identification. Mackey told the officers thathis name was Jamil Shakur and indicated that he had previously been arrested. The officers suspected that this was a false name because a background check did not reveal a criminal record. Sergeant Satter took Brown out of th e apartment and questioned her about Mackey’s name. Brown statedthat Mackey’s name was Jamil Shakur. In response to Satter’s question whether there was anything in the apartment that would verify Mackey’s identity, Brown stated that th ere was probably some paperwork in the bedroom and suggested that Satter look in a blue tote. 2 Brown then consented to Satter’s request for permission to go into the bedroom and look for something with Mackey’s name on it. Sergeant Satter walked into the bedroom and began searching the tote. Finding nothing, he turned his attention to the adjacent area, which in cluded an unmade bed. Satter looked under the mattress and found a gun, a bag of marijuana, and a marijuana pipe. He then looked through the sheets and found some paperwork with the name Jamil Mackey. A search unde r that name revealed that Mackey had a prior felony-3- conviction, whereupon Mackey was placed unde r arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm.

II. On an appeal from a denial of a moti on to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo . United States v. Lopez-Vargas , 457 F.3d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 2006). Itis undisputed that Brown, as the apartment’s only leaseholder, had authority to consent to a s earch of the bedroom. The sole issue in this appeal is whethe r Sergeant Satter’s search exceeded the scope of Brown’s consent. “The scope of a consensual search is determined by what ‘the typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.’” Id. (quoting Florida v. Jimeno , 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). If it is objectively reasonable for an officer to conclude that the search was within the scope of a suspect’s consent, the Four th Amendment is not violated. Id. Mackey contends that Brown’s referen ce to the blue tote should have been reasonably understood to limit her consent to that area of the bedroom. We disagree. Although Brown indicated that the tote was one place where Sergeant Satter could look for an item with Mackey’s name, she did not express certain ty that he would locate anything there, nor did she direct him to a particular form of identification. A reasonable person would have understood Br own’s statement as suggesting one area to search, without excluding others. More over, Brown answered in the affirmative Satter’s general questi on requesting permission to search the bedroom. Accordingly, it was objectively reasonable for Satter to be lieve that a search of the entire bedroom was within the scope of Brown’s consent. Mackey argues that this conclusion is inconsistent with parts of Satter’s testimony. On cross-examination, Satter re sponded to several lead ing questions in a manner that seemed to emphasize the tote as the focus of Brown’s consent. The-4- magistrate judge considered Mackey ’s argument on this point and found it unpersuasive, observing that the uncertainty was eliminated when the testimony was viewed in its entirety. The magistrate judge also noted that a broader view of Brown’s consent was consistent with Satter’s contemporaneous statements in his police report. The district court adopted these factual findings, and we cannot say that they were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Mackey’s motion to suppress. The judgment is affirmed.

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