United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 23, 2015*

Decided March 2, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 14-2821

ELOUISE BRADLEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER SABREE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin.

No. 14-CV-429-JPS

J.P. Stadtmueller,

Judge.

O R D E R

Elouise Bradley appeals the dismissal of her lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

alleging that she was denied due process when her license to operate a childcare center 

was revoked. We affirm.

 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 14-2821 Page 2

Although her complaint is difficult to follow, the crux of her claim is that officials 

from the Wisconsin Department of Children and Families revoked her license without 

providing her a hearing to contest the revocation. Bradley alleged that she ran a day-care 

program (for eight children) until 2012. That year, she says, a former employee (whom

Bradley had reported for mistreating a child) called the DCF to report that Bradley was 

running an “illegal day care.” Based on that allegation and photographs of the center 

that were taken by a DCF employee without Bradley’s permission at a time when the 

space was being reorganized, her license to operate a childcare center was revoked. The 

reason given for the revocation was unsafe conditions. 

Bradley responded by filing the first of two suits challenging the revocation of her 

license. In 2012 she sued the DCF, alleging racial discrimination in connection with the 

revocation. We upheld the district court’s dismissal of the suit because the DCF is not a 

person subject to liability under § 1983. See Bradley v. Wis. Dep’t of Children & Families, 528 

F. App’x 680 (7th Cir. 2013); Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

In 2014 Bradley filed this suit against three DCF officials and three employees of 

Lutheran Social Services, alleging that they denied her due process by revoking her 

license without a hearing and failed to comply with WIS. STAT. § 227.51(3), which 

requires notice and an opportunity to show compliance before a license can be revoked.

Both sets of defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 

claim, and the district court granted the motions. The court determined that Bradley 

failed to state a claim against the DCF defendants because her exclusive remedy to 

challenge the DCF’s actions was through the state’s Administrative Procedure Act, 

see WIS. STAT. §§ 48.72, 227.42–.58, and in any event she did not allege any ground on 

which relief could be granted. As for the non-DCF defendants, the court explained that 

Bradley did not assert any claims against them in her complaint (their names appeared 

only as signatories on attachments related to her foster-care provider’s license).

On appeal Bradley ignores the court’s conclusion that the state’s APA provides 

the only means of challenging the DCF’s actions and continues to assert that she stated a 

due-process claim when she alleged that the defendants violated WIS. STAT. § 227.51(3)

by revoking her license without giving her an opportunity to show compliance with 

state regulations. But to the extent she argues that the DCF defendants did not follow 

state procedures, she cannot succeed. It is well established that “a state’s violation of a 

state statute does not, as such, violate the federal Constitution.” Commonwealth Plaza 

Condo. Ass’n v. City of Chi., 693 F.3d 743, 749–50 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing cases); Domka v. 
No. 14-2821 Page 3

Portage Cnty., Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2008). To the extent she argues that the 

DCF defendants violated her due process rights because of random and unauthorized 

conduct, once again she misses the point. In order to state a claim, she would need to 

suggest some inadequacy in Wisconsin’s process for reviewing the revocation of a 

license, but she has not done so. See WIS. STAT. §§ 48.72, 227.42–.58; Michalowicz v. Vill. of 

Bedford Park, 528 F.3d 530, 534 (7th Cir. 2008); Doherty v. City of Chi., 75 F.3d 318, 323–24 

(7th Cir. 1996). 

Bradley next generally challenges the district court’s dismissal of the non-DCF

defendants from the lawsuit. The district court’s order dismissing those parties 

considered both a possible failure to state a claim, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6), and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(1). Jurisdiction comes first, 

however, and so we begin (and end) with the dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Bradley did 

not mention the non-DCF defendants in her complaint, and in any event, we can discern 

no basis for federal jurisdiction over any claims she may have against them. She did not 

allege diversity of citizenship, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and her complaint reveals no 

possible non-frivolous federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Crosby v. Cooper B-Line, Inc.,

725 F.3d 795, 800 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1298 (2014). Further, Bradley does 

not develop any argument on appeal suggesting how the district court erred in 

dismissing these defendants. Although we construe pro se filings liberally, pro se litigants 

still must give some reason to disturb the district court’s decision. See FED. R. APP. P.

28(a)(8)(A); Anderson v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001).

We have reviewed all of Bradley’s remaining contentions, and none has merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment.