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U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, TRUSTEE v.

CHRISTOPHER M. FITZPATRICK ET AL.

(AC 44143)

Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, as trustee, sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real

property owned by the defendant F. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment as to liability only and rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which F appealed to this court, which

affirmed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case to that

court to set a new sale date. The trial court ordered a new sale date

and waived newspaper advertisements. The committee filed a motion

to approve the sale and the trial court rendered judgment approving

the sale and deed, from which F appealed to this court. Thereafter, the

court granted the plaintiff’s motion to terminate the appellate stay and,

although F objected to the motion, he did not file a motion for review

of the trial court’s order granting that motion. Held that F’s appeal was

moot and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed; because F failed to

seek review of the court’s order terminating the appellate stay, the

judicial sale became final, and title vested in the plaintiff and F’s right

of redemption was extinguished.

Argued May 11—officially released August 3, 2021

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the named defendant, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Fairfield, where the court, Truglia, J., granted the

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability;

thereafter, the court, Hon. Alfred J. Jennings, Jr., judge

trial referee, rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale,

from which the named defendant appealed to this court,

DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Eveleigh, Js., which

affirmed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the

case for the purpose of setting a new sale date; subsequently, the court, Spader, J., ordered foreclosure by

sale and waived newspaper advertisements; thereafter,

the court, Spader, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to

approve the sale and committee deed, from which the

named defendant appealed to this court; subsequently,

the court, Spader, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion to

terminate the appellate stay. Appeal dismissed.

Ryan P. Driscoll, for the appellant (named defendant).

Jeffrey M. Knickerbocker, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. In this foreclosure action, the defendant Christopher M. Fitzpatrick1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court approving the sale of the mortgaged property, on the motion of the committee of

sale (committee), following the court’s rendering of a

judgment of foreclosure by sale in favor of the plaintiff

mortgagee, U.S. Bank, National Association, as Trustee

for MASTR 2007-2. On appeal, the defendant argues

that his objection to the motion for approval of committee sale, which was based on a lack of newspaper advertisements, should have been sustained. The plaintiff

argues that this appeal is moot because the defendant

failed to seek review of the court’s termination of the

appellate stay and, thus, title to the subject property

has vested in the plaintiff. We agree with the plaintiff

that this court can provide no practical relief on appeal,

and, therefore, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In May, 2016, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant to foreclose

a mortgage on property he owned in Stratford. The

plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to

liability on December 22, 2017, which the court subsequently granted. The court then rendered a judgment

of foreclosure by sale on March 22, 2018, from which

the defendant appealed to this court. This court

affirmed the foreclosure judgment and remanded the

case for the purpose of setting a new sale date. U.S.

Bank, National Assn. v. Fitzpatrick, 190 Conn. App.

773, 794, 212 A.3d 732, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 916, 217

A.3d 1 (2019).

On December 30, 2019, in accordance with this

court’s opinion, the trial court ordered a foreclosure

by sale with a sale date of February 22, 2020, and waived

newspaper advertisements. The defendant did not

object to that order.2 The court determined that the fair

market value of the property was $610,000, which was

confirmed by an appraisal. The committee received only

one bid, from the plaintiff, to purchase the property for

$433,500. On February 24, 2020, the committee filed a

motion to approve the sale. The defendant objected to

that motion, arguing that the lack of newspaper advertisements had prejudiced him. On June 3, 2020, the

court entered an order overruling the defendant’s objection and rendered judgment approving the sale and

deed, from which the defendant appealed to this court.

Subsequently, the plaintiff moved to terminate the

appellate stay, arguing that the appeal was without

merit. On September 16, 2020, the court granted the

plaintiff’s motion to terminate the appellate stay,

explaining that ‘‘[t]he court believes that it is unlikely

that the defendant will prevail on appeal.’’3 The defendant objected to the plaintiff’s motion to terminate the
appellate stay but failed to seek review by this court of

the trial court’s order granting the motion. This appeal

followed.

The defendant’s principal argument is that the court

erred by granting the committee’s motion to approve

the sale without any newspaper advertisements. This

issue is moot. Because title has vested in the plaintiff

and the defendant’s rights in the property have thus

been terminated, this court can provide no practical

relief to the defendant.

The question of mootness implicates our subject matter jurisdiction. ‘‘It is a [well settled] general rule that

the existence of an actual controversy is an essential

requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province

of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the

determination of which no practical relief can follow.

. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the

time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ocwen Federal Bank, FSB v. Charles, 95 Conn.

App. 315, 325, 898 A.2d 197, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 909,

902 A.2d 1069 (2006). ‘‘When, during the pendency of an

appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate

court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . .

Mootness implicates this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, raising a question of law over which we exercise

plenary review.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View

Associates, 278 Conn. 672, 679–80, 899 A.2d 586 (2006).

A brief review of the basic legal principles regarding

mortgages and foreclosures by sale informs our conclusion. ‘‘Connecticut follows the title theory of mortgages,

which provides that on the execution of a mortgage on

real property, the mortgagee holds legal title and the

mortgagor holds equitable title to the property. . . .

As the holder of equitable title, also called the equity

of redemption, the mortgagor has the right to redeem

the legal title on the performance of certain conditions

contained within the mortgage instrument. . . . The

mortgagor continues to be regarded as the owner of

the property during the term of the mortgage. . . . The

equity of redemption gives the mortgagor the right to

redeem the legal title previously conveyed by performing whatever conditions are specified in the mortgage, the most important of which is usually the payment of money. . . . Generally, foreclosure means to

cut off the equity of redemption, the equitable owner’s

right to redeem the property.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ocwen Federal Bank,

FSB v. Charles, supra, 95 Conn. App. 322–23. ‘‘Simply

put, once title has vested absolutely in the mortgagee,

the mortgagor’s interest in the property is extinguished

and cannot be revived by a reviewing court.’’ Id., 324.
‘‘In a foreclosure by sale, a mortgagor may exercise

his rights of redemption until such time as the judicial

authority approves the foreclosure sale. The [judicial]

sale is not absolute until confirmed. The order of confirmation gives the judicial sanction of the court, and

when made it relates back to the time of the sale . . . .

Generally, once a court has approved the foreclosure

sale and the applicable appeal period has elapsed, the

mortgagor’s right of redemption is extinguished and the

court’s jurisdiction to modify that judgment ends. . . .

Accordingly, after the sale is approved and the relevant

appeals periods have expired, any action by the mortgagor to redeem should be dismissed as moot.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank of Minnesota, N.A.

v. Morgan, 98 Conn. App. 72, 79–80, 909 A.2d 526 (2006).

The defendant filed a timely appeal of the court’s

order granting the motion to approve the sale, but he

failed to file a motion for review of the order terminating

the appellate stay. ‘‘Practice Book § 61-14 provides that

the sole remedy for review of a court’s granting of a

motion to terminate a stay of execution is to file a

motion for review.4 Under this section, the court’s order

granting the motion to terminate the stay is stayed for

ten days from the issuance of the order to permit a

party to file a motion for review. The [defendant], therefore, had ten days from the court’s . . . ruling in which

to file a motion for review.’’ (Footnote in original.)

Lucas v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 103 Conn.

App. 762, 767–68, 931 A.2d 378, cert. denied, 284 Conn.

934, 935 A.2d 151 (2007).

Because the defendant failed to file a motion for

review, the judicial sale became final. The defendant’s

right of redemption was extinguished as soon as the

ten day period expired.5 Thus, title passed to the plaintiff

on June 5, 2020, when the committee filed the deed of

sale with the court. Accordingly, this appeal is moot,

and we therefore do not reach the defendant’s arguments on their merits.

The appeal is dismissed.

1

In its complaint, the plaintiff also named the Department of Revenue

Services and the Internal Revenue Service as defendants, but these governmental entities are not participating in this appeal. We, therefore, refer in

this opinion to Christopher M. Fitzpatrick as the defendant.

2 The listing was posted on the Judicial Branch website. The court later

explained in its memorandum of decision on the plaintiff’s motion to terminate the appellate stay that ‘‘the defendant did not object to the court’s

order not requiring newspaper advertising when the order was issued and, in

reality, newspaper advertisements are not the place where serious potential

foreclosure purchasers learn of foreclosure sales. The Judicial Branch has

developed a ‘foreclosure listings’ website where all foreclosure sales are

advertised. This property was so listed.’’ (Emphasis in original.)

3 The plaintiff first filed a motion to terminate the stay on July 6, 2020,

pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (g), which the court denied without

prejudice. The plaintiff then filed another motion to terminate the stay

pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11 (d) and (e), which the court granted after

a hearing.

4

‘‘Practice Book § 61-14 provides in relevant part: ‘The sole remedy of

any party desiring the court to review an order concerning a stay of execution
shall be by motion for review under Section 66-6. Execution of an order of

the court terminating a stay of execution shall be stayed for ten days from

the issuance of notice of the order, and if a motion for review is filed within

that period, the order shall be stayed pending decision of the motion, unless

the court having appellate jurisdiction rules otherwise. . . .’ ’’ Lucas v.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 103 Conn. App. 762, 767 n.7, 931 A.2d

378, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 934, 935 A.2d 151 (2007).

5 Our Supreme Court recently opined that in ‘‘rare and exceptional cases’’

equitable claims may still be made after title has passed in a foreclosure

matter. U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel, Conn. , A.3d

(2021). We do not view the holding in Rothermel as applicable to the factual

and procedural history of this case as the underlying circumstances are

neither rare nor exceptional.