[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-14278

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

DEREK MORALES-FIGUEROA, 

Defendant- Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cr-00144-WWB-LHP-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14278

Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Derek Morales-Figueroa appeals his 235-month sentence 

imposed after pleading guilty, pursuant to a written plea 

agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five 

kilograms or more of cocaine. Morales-Figueroa argues that the 

district court (1) erred in applying a three-level enhancement under 

the sentencing guidelines based on the determination that he had a 

leadership or supervisory role in the crime; and (2) abused its 

discretion in denying his request for a downward variance sentence 

in light of mitigating factors. The government moves to dismiss 

this appeal pursuant to the sentence-appeal waiver in MoralesFigueroa’s plea agreement. 

In response, Morales-Figueroa argues that the appeal waiver 

is unenforceable because the district court failed to adequately 

convey during his plea colloquy the circumstances under which he 

was waiving his right to appeal. Furthermore, he states that the 

court’s explanation was inadequate because he may have forgotten 

the contents of the waiver. He also argues that the government 

never stated in the plea agreement that it would be seeking (or that 

Morales-Figueroa agreed to) a sentencing enhancement for being a 

leader in the conspiracy, and therefore, he could not “blindly 

waive” his right to appeal that issue. Finally, he argues that appeal 

waivers do not prevent the correction of a miscarriage of justice, 

which includes the incorrect application of the Sentencing 

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22-14278 Opinion of the Court 3

Guidelines and the law. After review, we conclude that the 

sentence-appeal waiver is valid and enforceable. Therefore, we 

grant the government’s motion to dismiss. 

“We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de 

novo.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). 

We enforce appeal waivers that are made knowingly and 

voluntarily. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th 

Cir. 2006); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 

1993). To demonstrate that a waiver was made knowingly and 

voluntarily, the government must show that either (1) the district 

court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver 

during the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the 

defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. 

Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.

Paragraph B7 of Morales-Figueroa’s plea agreement 

contained the following sentence-appeal waiver:

The defendant agrees that this Court has jurisdiction 

and authority to impose any sentence up to the 

statutory maximum and expressly waives the right to 

appeal defendant’s sentence on any ground, including 

the ground that the Court erred in determining the 

applicable guidelines range pursuant to the United 

States Sentencing Guidelines, except (a) the ground 

that the sentence exceeds the defendant’s applicable 

guidelines range as determined by the Court pursuant to 

the United States Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the 

ground that the sentence exceeds the statutory 

maximum penalty; or (c) the ground that the 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-14278

sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the 

Constitution; provided, however, that if the 

government exercises its right to appeal the sentence 

imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), then 

the defendant is released from his waiver and may 

appeal the sentence as authorized by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742(a).

(emphasis in original). 

Morales-Figueroa initialed each page of the agreement and 

signed the plea agreement, including the certification that he had 

read the entirety of the agreement (or alternatively, that it had been 

read to him) and that he fully understood its terms. 

At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court informed 

Morales-Figueroa that he faced a mandatory minimum of ten 

years’ imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment, and 

Morales-Figueroa stated that he understood. Morales-Figueroa

then confirmed that he had initialed the plea agreement at the 

bottom of each page and signed it at the end, and that he had read 

and reviewed the plea agreement with his counsel. He confirmed 

that he did not need any more time to review the agreement, and

that his counsel had answered all of his questions regarding the 

agreement. The district court then reviewed the terms of the plea 

agreement with Morales-Figueroa. In particular, the district court 

asked whether Morales-Figueroa understood that, as part of his 

plea agreement, he agreed to “expressly waive the right to appeal 

[his] sentence in accordance with the limitations set forth in 

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22-14278 Opinion of the Court 5

paragraph B7 of [the] plea agreement,” and Morales-Figueroa

confirmed that he understood. 

Morales-Figueroa’s argument that the sentence-appeal 

waiver is unenforceable because it was not explained to him 

adequately is refuted by the record. Although the district court did 

not review the specific exceptions to the waiver during the plea 

colloquy, that fact alone does not render the appeal waiver invalid. 

See United States v. Boyd, 975 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (11th Cir. 2020) 

(holding appeal waiver valid even though district court did not 

review the waiver’s exceptions during the plea colloquy). Rather, 

in assessing whether an appeal waiver is knowing and voluntary, 

the question is whether the record demonstrates that it was 

“clearly conveyed to the defendant that he was giving up his right 

to appeal under most circumstances.” Id. at 1192 (alterations 

adopted) (quotations omitted). In this case, the appeal waiver 

stated unequivocally that Morales-Figueroa was waiving the right 

to appeal his sentence on “any ground” unless one of the following 

occurred—(1) the sentence exceeded the guidelines range as 

determined by the district court at sentencing; (2) the sentence 

exceeded the statutory maximum; or (3) Morales-Figueroa sought

to challenge the sentence as violating the Eighth Amendment. 

Morales-Figueroa initialed each page of the plea agreement, 

including the page containing the appeal waiver, signed the 

agreement, and confirmed during the plea colloquy that the 

agreement was read to him and that he understood it. And during 

the plea colloquy, the district court orally explained to MoralesFigueroa that he was waiving his right to appeal except for under 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-14278

the narrow set of circumstances specified in paragraph B7 of the 

plea agreement, and he stated he understood. Thus, the record 

supports the conclusion that the waiver was clearly conveyed to 

Morales-Figueroa and that he understood the waiver.

Contrary to Morales-Figueroa’s argument, there is no 

exception to appeal waivers based on (1) the likelihood that he may 

have forgotten the contents of his appeal waiver; (2) the fact that 

he did not know that the government intended to pursue a 

supervisory role enhancement; or (3) his belief that the district 

court committed an error in applying the guidelines. See United 

States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005) (“An 

appeal waiver includes the waiver of the right to appeal difficult or 

debatable legal issues or even blatant error.”). Likewise, this 

“Circuit has never adopted a general ‘miscarriage of justice’ 

exception to the rule that valid appeal waivers must be enforced 

according to their terms.” King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363, 1368 

n.3 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1771 (2023).

Consequently, the record establishes that MoralesFigueroa’s sentence-appeal waiver was knowingly and voluntarily 

made and is enforceable. Boyd, 975 F.3d at 1192; see also United 

States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (enforcing an 

appeal waiver where “the waiver provision was referenced during 

[the defendant’s] Rule 11 plea colloquy and [the defendant] agreed 

that she understood the provision and that she entered into it freely 

and voluntarily”). Because his claims concerning the guidelines 

enhancement and the downward departure do not fall within any 

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22-14278 Opinion of the Court 7

of the limited exceptions to the valid sentence-appeal waiver, the 

waiver forecloses his appeal. Accordingly, we GRANT the 

government’s motion to dismiss.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

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