This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 LINDA R. GHAFFARI, ALI M. 7 GHAFFARI, SR., M.D., BLUE AND 8 RED BIRD CORPORATION, P.C., 9 a New Mexico Corporation and 10 RENAISSANCE LABOR MANAGEMENT, 11 INC., a New Mexico Corporation, 12 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 13 v. No. 29,917 14 ROBERT JOHN “ROCKY” BENARD, 15 SARAH BENARD, ROCK RANCHES, INC., 16 MARY WANDA ROBERTS REED, a/k/a 17 WANDA REED, MARY WANDA ROBERTS 18 REED REVOCABLE TRUST, STATE OF NEW 19 MEXICO (TAXATION AND REVENUE 20 DEPARTMENT), UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 21 and all other unknown Claimants, 22 Defendants-Appellants. 23 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY 24 David P. Reeb, Jr., District Judge 25 Mark S. Sweetman 26 Clovis, NM 27 for Appellees 282 Eric D. Dixon 1 Portales, NM 2 for Appellants 3 MEMORANDUM OPINION 4 SUTIN, Judge. 5 Defendants appeal from the district c ourt’s order denying Defendants’ motion 6 to set aside default judgment. This Court issued a calendar notice proposing to 7 dismiss Defendants’ appeal for lack of a final order. Defendants have filed a 8 memorandum in opposition to this Court’s proposed disposition. Having given due 9 consideration to Defendants’ arguments, we dismiss. 10 In this Court’s calendar notice, we pointed out that “our appellate jurisdiction 11 is limited to review of any final judgment or decision, any interlocutory order or 12 decision which practically disposes of the merits of the action, or any final order after 13 entry of judgment which affects substantial rights.” Capco Acquisub, Inc v. Greka 14 Energy Corp ., 2007-NMCA-011, ¶ 17, 140 N.M. 920, 149 P.3d 1017 (filed 2006) 15 (alteration omitted) (internal quotation mark s and citation omitted). We noted that, 16 generally, an order or judgment is not considered final unless all issues of law and fact 17 have been determined and the case disposed of by the district court to the fullest extent 18 possible. Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison , 113 N.M. 231, 236, 824 P.2d 1033, 19 1038 (1992). 203 We also pointed out that Defendants had filed a counterclaim for malicious 1 abuse of process which appeared to still bepending. We noted that Rule 1-054(B)(1) 2 NMRA provides that “when morethan one claim for relief is presented in an action, 3 whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-clai m or third-party claim, the court may enter 4 a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims only upon the 5 express determination that there is no just reason for delay.” Thus, this Court proposed 6 to dismiss for lack of a final order because the counterclaim appeared to still be 7 pending and because the district court’s order did not contain the certification 8 language required by Rule 1-054(B)(1). 9 Defendants have responded to this Court’s proposed disposition by arguing that 10 the district court order denying their motion to set aside the default judgment disposed 11 of their counterclaim by not allowing Defendants to plead at all. [MIO 2-3] We 12 understand Defendants to argue that by denyi ng their motion to set aside the default 13 judgment the district court rejected their counterclaim. Defendant cites no authority 14 for the proposition that by rejecting Defendants’ motion, the district court 15 automatically struck Defendants’ counterclaim. See In re Adoption of Doe , 100 N.M. 16 764, 765, 676 P.2d 1329, 1330 (1984) (stating that where a party cites no authority to 17 support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists); see also Hennessy v. 18 Duryea , 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 754, 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have 194 repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing 1 the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”). 2 Moreover, Plaintiffs did not move to strike the answer and counterclaim. 3 Instead, Plaintiffs filed an an swer to the counterclaim. Thus, the parties treated this 4 matter as though it was a live controversy befo re the district court. We therefore 5 conclude that the counterclaim was before the district court at the time it entered its 6 order refusing to set aside the default judgment. The district court order fails to 7 address the counterclaim and does not explicitly strike the answer or counterclaim. 8 Thus, in the absence of certification languagepursuant to Rule 1-054(B)(1) the district 9 court’s order is non-final. We note, however, that Defendants may appeal the district 10 court’s denial of their motion to set aside the default judgment after the district court 11 either (1) addresses the merits of Defendant s’ counterclaim, (2) dismisses or strikes 12 the counterclaim, or (3) enters an order st ating that there is no just reason for delay 13 pursuant to Rule 1-054(B)(1). 14 For the reasons stated in this opinion and in this Court’s notice of proposed 15 disposition, we dismiss Defendants’ appeal for lack of a final order. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17

__________________________________ 18 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 1956 WE CONCUR: 1

_______________________________ 2 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Chief Judge 3

_______________________________ 4 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Judge 5