Opinion filed December 14, 2023

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-23-00144-CV

__________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.V. AND J.M.R., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 318th District Court

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. AD33600

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated 

the parental rights of the mother, Appellant, to her two children, A.V.1 and J.M.R.

2

 

Appellant presents three issues on appeal in which she challenges the legal and 

1

We use pseudonyms to protect the identities of the children. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).

2

The trial court also terminated the parental rights of A.V.’s acknowledged father and J.M.R.’s 

unknown father. A.V.’s biological father’s parental rights were not terminated. No appeal has been filed 

on behalf of the fathers. 
2

factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings, and the trial 

court’s admission of hearsay statements. We affirm the trial court’s order. 

I. Termination Findings and Standards

The termination of one’s parental rights must be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2023). To 

terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–

(U)3 and that termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. Clear and convincing 

evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier 

of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be 

established.” FAM. § 101.007 (West 2019). 

In this case, after a bench trial, the trial court found that Appellant committed 

the act listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(C): that Appellant voluntarily left the children

alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support of the 

children and remained away for a period of at least six months. See FAM.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(C). The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), 

that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the

children. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether a 

reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding 

3

We note that the legislature recently amended Section 161.001 to include additional requirements 

for trial courts to consider in termination suits filed by the Department of Family and Protective Services 

(the Department) and a new ground for termination that relates to convictions for the solicitation of a minor; 

however, these amendments only apply to suits filed on or after September 1, 2023. Act of May 26, 2023, 

88th Leg., R.S., ch. 728, §§ 1, 3, 2023 2023 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1770, 2177 (codified at FAM.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(V)); Act of May 29, 2023, 88th Leg., R.S., ch. 675, §§ 1, 8, 2023 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 

1646–47 (codified at FAM. § 161.001(f), (g)). The original petition to terminate the parent-child 

relationship in this case was filed on August 11, 2022. We therefore apply the law in effect on the date the 

suit was filed. 
3

was true. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022); In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 

336, 344 (Tex. 2009). “Bearing in mind the required appellate deference to the 

factfinder, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, 

assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable 

factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could 

have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard undisputed 

facts that do not support the finding,” and the factfinder is the sole arbiter of the 

witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. Id. (quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 

312 (Tex. 2021)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh disputed 

evidence contrary to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. In re 

A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). Giving due deference to the finding, we

determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could have reasonably 

formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against the 

parent. J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In 

re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied). 

With respect to the best interest of a child determination, no unique set of 

factors need be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 

266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest 

determination does not restrict proof to any specific factor or factors. In re D.M., 58 

S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). However, courts may use 

the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 

S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the 

desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the 

future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; 
4

(4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs 

available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the 

plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the 

stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent 

that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and 

(9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove 

each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one 

factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. 

App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one 

or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative 

evidence illustrating that termination is in the children’s best interest. C.H., 89 

S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.

The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the 

factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that 

termination is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates 

that the parental relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and 

well-being of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. Thisis so because the best interest 

analysis evaluates the best interest of the children, not the parent. In re E.C.R., 638 

S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 

S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).

In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or 

her past conduct and determine whether termination is in the children’s best interest. 

In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied); In re 

D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may 

infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the 
5

children may recur in the future if the children are returned to the possession of the 

parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no 

pet.); May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, 

writ denied). Further, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet 

the children’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the 

parent to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 

S.W.3d at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 

(Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). 

II. Evidence Presented at Trial

In August of 2021, the Department investigated Appellant for neglectful 

supervision of A.V. and J.M.R., who were with Appellant’s mother at the time. 

When the caseworker arrived to investigate, Appellant was “nowhere to be found.” 

On August 5, 2021, Appellant spoke to the caseworker and the Department 

supervisor, but “wasn’t coherent” because she was under the influence of alcohol, 

heroin, and methamphetamine. Due to Appellant’s intoxicated state, the Department 

placed A.V. and J.M.R. with Appellant’s cousin, Irma Marquez, and her husband, 

Jose Abelardo Marquez, Petitioners in the trial court below. 

When Petitioners took possession of the children, one-year-old J.M.R. was 

not current on her vaccinations, had not been to her wellness checkups, and could 

not crawl, stand, speak, or eat solid food. Six-year-old A.V. was “scared of 

everything,” shy, and was “far behind in her learning abilities.” According to Irma, 

A.V. needed “a lot of counseling” because Appellant “did so much harm to her.” By 

the time of the final termination hearing, A.V. was a straight-A student, and J.M.R. 

was learning English and Spanish. The children call Petitioners “Mom” and “Dad.”

Appellant executed an affidavit relinquishing her parental rights to A.V. and 

J.M.R on November 16, 2021. On August 11, 2022, after being A.V.’s and J.M.R.’s 
6

caregiversfor over a year, Petitioners filed suit to adopt the children, and to terminate 

Appellant’s parental rights. At the hearing, Appellant initially disputed signing the 

affidavit of voluntary relinquishment. She later said she did not remember signing 

it. Ultimately, Appellant acknowledged it was her signature, but argued that the 

affidavit of relinquishment was not the document she signed at the notary’s office. 

Gordon Lee Daman, Jr. testified that he notarized the affidavit of 

relinquishment that Appellant signed on November 16, 2021. The trial court 

determined that Appellant was not a credible witness, and that she indeed signed the 

affidavit admitted at the termination hearing.

Petitioners also elicited testimony showing that the Department had been 

involved with Appellant and her children since her arrest on October 11, 2017 for 

leaving her then-infant son, P.V.J.,

4 alone in her car. Appellant was placed on 

deferred adjudication community supervision for abandoning a child with the intent 

to return, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041 (West Supp. 

2023). Appellant’s community supervision was later revoked in July of 2022 

because of her drug use and failure to report to her probation officer. 

The Department intervened again in July of 2020 after P.V.J. and four-yearold A.V. were injured in a motor vehicle accident. While Appellant and her exboyfriend, P.V.,

5 were “highly intoxicated and under the influence,” P.V. crashed 

their car with A.V. and P.V.J. inside. 

Appellant testified and admitted to using methamphetamine while pregnant 

with J.M.R. and that she continued to use drugs after J.M.R. was born. Appellant

explained that throughout 2019, 2020, and 2021, she left her children with family 

4

P.V.J. was the subject-child of a separate termination suit and is not involved in this appeal.

5

A.V.’s acknowledged father’s rights were terminated, and Appellant revealed the identity of 

A.V.’s biological father prior to trial. His rights were not terminated, and he is not a party to this appeal.
7

members for six-month periods while she struggled with her drug addiction. 

Appellant also used drugs while caring for her children, and after A.V. and J.M.R. 

were placed with Petitioners. 

In addition to Appellant’s drug use, A.V. witnessed acts of domestic violence 

between Appellant and P.V. In July of 2020, while Appellant was pregnant with 

J.M.R., P.V. held Appellant, A.V., and P.V.J. hostage in a room. Appellant, who was

under the influence of methamphetamine and marihuana at the time, stabbed P.V. as 

she attempted to escape. A.V. and P.V.J. were temporarily placed with Appellant’s 

aunt and needed counseling after the automobile accident and P.V.’s unlawful 

restraint. See PENAL § 20.02. A.V. and P.V.J. were later returned to Appellant upon 

her completion of family-based services through the Department. 

The trial court took judicial notice of Appellant’s multiple cases involving her 

children, including the present case. Prior to the trial court making its ruling in this

case, Appellant testified and stipulated that she (1) left A.V. and J.M.R. in Petitioners’

possession without providing adequate support and (2) remained away from the 

children for at least six months. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C). Appellant asked the 

trial court to terminate her parental rights only on that basis, rather than making

express findings of endangerment under Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). In 

accordance with the agreement between Appellant, her trial counsel, the trial court, 

and the parties, the trial court terminated Appellant’s rights under subsection (C) and 

found that termination was in the children’s best interest.

III. Analysis

A. Abandonment

In her first issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the 

evidence to prove that she abandoned A.V. and J.M.R. under subsection (C). See 

FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C). Appellant does not dispute that she remained away from 
8

her children for at least six months. Rather, she argues that she did not voluntarily

leave her children with Petitioners because she was “forced” to do so by the 

Department. Appellant further asserts that she provided adequate support for her 

children. 

A finding of abandonment under subsection (C) requires a showing that a 

parent has “voluntarily left the child . . . in the possession of another without 

providing adequate support of the child and remained away for a period of at least 

six months.” FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C). A parent has “remained away” if the parent 

did not visit the child for six consecutive months from the date the parent voluntarily 

left the child with another. In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 727 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). 

The element of “voluntariness” goes to whether the parent voluntarily left the 

child with another person. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(C); see J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 

115–16 (citing In re J.K.H., No. 06-09-00035-CV, 2009 WL 2948575, at *1, *3 

(Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 16, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Compliance with a 

court order that grants one parent the right to designate the child’s residence does 

not ordinarily constitute voluntarily leaving the child with another by the other 

parent. See J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d at 116; see also J.K.H., 2009 WL 2948575, at *3; 

cf. In re H.S., No. 05-16-00950-CV, 2016 WL 7163864, at *5 & n.3 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Dec. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the evidence was legally 

and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the father voluntarily 

left the child in the grandmother’s possession where evidence showed that the father 

indicated his agreement with the court order).

Predicate ground (C) does not necessarily require that the parent personally 

support the child; rather, the parent only needs to “make arrangements for the 
9

adequate support” of the child. See Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 21 (Tex. 1985); 

Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 727–28 (affirming termination under predicate ground (C) 

where the mother did not ensure that the child was adequately supported and there 

was no evidence of an understanding that the mother would not be sending support);

In re J.E.R., No. 04-19-00566-CV, 2020 WL 690642, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

Feb. 12, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re C.J.A., No. 13-16-00635-CV, 2017 WL 

2200301, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. 

op.) (holding that there must be evidence of an agreement for one parent to support 

the child on the other’s behalf to demonstrate that a parent “made arrangements” for 

adequate support for the child); see also In re A.R., No. 02-18-00311-CV, 2019 WL 

1186963, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 14, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) 

(affirming termination under predicate ground (C) where “there [was] no evidence 

that when Father left the children with Mother, she was able to support them or 

expected to do so without his assistance.”).

Here, the evidence supporting the trial court’s termination finding under 

subsection (C) consisted of Appellant’s stipulation, which the trial court accepted 

without objection and which was supported by the testimony of other witnesses. 

Appellant neither renounces her stipulation nor challenges the voluntariness of her 

statements. Instead, she claims only that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

specific findings that she requested the trial court should make—termination based 

on a finding under subsection (C) only. 

We conclude that Appellant’s testimonial declaration constitutes a judicial 

admission. A judicial admission is an assertion of fact that acts as a formal waiver 

of proof. Mendoza v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692, 694 

(Tex. 1980). As long as it is clear and unequivocal, and stands unretracted, it has 

conclusive effect and bars the admitting party from later disputing it. Holy Cross 
10

Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. 2001); Lee v. Lee, 43 

S.W.3d 636, 641 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). This rule is based on the 

public policy that it would be absurd and manifestly unjust to permit a party to 

recover after she has sworn herself out of court by a clear and unequivocal statement. 

In re A.E.A., 406 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.); Lee, 43 

S.W.3d at 641.

Courts treat testimony as a judicial admission if: (1) the testimony relied upon 

was made during the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) the testimony is contrary to 

an essential fact embraced in the theory of recovery or defense asserted by the person 

giving it; (3) the testimony is deliberate, clear, and unequivocal, and not merely a 

mistake or slip of the tongue; (4) giving the testimony conclusive effect would be 

consistent with the public policy that it would be unjust to allow a party to recover 

after she has sworn herself out of court; and (5) the testimony is not also destructive 

of the opposing party’s theory of recovery. Mendoza, 606 S.W.2d at 694; Khan v. 

GBAK Props., Inc., 371 S.W.3d 347, 357 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no 

pet.); Lee, 43 S.W.3d at 641–42.

Appellant, under oath during a judicial proceeding “stipulate[ed] and 

admit[ed] that [she] voluntarily left the children in the possession of another,” 

specifically, Petitioners, for at least six consecutive months without providing 

adequate support. Petitioners’ first allegation in their petition to terminate tracked

the language of Section 161.001(b)(1)(C), as did Appellant’s testimonial admission. 

The trial court further clarified: “[Y]ou’re stipulating to the first ground so that I can 

terminate your parent/child relationship existing between you and [A.V.] and you 

and [J.M.R.]?” Appellant replied that she was “agreeing to the first ground.” 

This clear, unequivocal, unretracted judicial admission precludes Appellant

from now asserting on appeal that there is insufficient evidence to terminate her 
11

parental rights under subsection (C). See In re V.K.H.H., 647 S.W.3d 476, 479 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.). We cannot entertain Appellant’s argument that 

her sworn testimony is insufficient, especially when she did so to avoid unfavorable 

findings under subsections (D) and (E). It would be “absurd and manifestly unjust”

to consider reversing the trial court’s “agreed” termination finding after Appellant

“has sworn [herself] out of court by a clear and unequivocal statement.” See A.E.A., 

406 S.W.3d at 410. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually 

sufficient to support the trial court’s termination finding under subsection (C).

Nonetheless, even without Appellant’s judicial admission, the trial court could 

have reasonably concluded that Appellant voluntarily left her children with 

Petitioners. Appellant claimed that she was forced to place her children with 

Petitioners on August 5, 2021, and that she only acquiesced because she “was 

drunk,” does “not really remember,” and “didn’t understand what was going on.” 

A person’s actions while voluntarily intoxicated are, with few exceptions,

considered knowing and voluntary under Texas law. See, e.g., PENAL § 8.04 (West 

2021), § 49.11 (West 2016); J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 308 (finding endangerment after 

the father crashed a vehicle while driving intoxicated, killing his son, and injuring 

another child). But we need not decide whether Appellant’s inability to care for her 

children due to her intentional intoxication constitutes voluntary abandonment. 

While it is undisputed that on August 5, 2021, the Department determined that 

Appellant would be prohibited from having possession of and access to the children, 

Appellant made no effort to initiate the return of her children until over a year later.

Appellant acknowledged that she was not legally prohibited from contacting 

A.V. and J.M.R. prior to August of 2022. To the contrary—substantial evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant signed an affidavit of relinquishment 

of her parental rights on November 16, 2021. We will thus not disturb the trial 
12

court’s determination that Appellant voluntarily left A.V. and J.M.R. with 

Petitioners. See, e.g., H.S., 2016 WL 7163864, at *5 (finding that the father 

voluntarily left the child with the grandmother because his conduct in the 

conservatorship proceedings indicated his agreement that the grandmother would 

care for the child).

The trial court could have also formed a firm belief or conviction that 

Appellant did not provide her children with adequate support. In June of 2022, 

Appellant offered Irma money, food stamps, and insurance cards for the children. A 

month later, she expressed a willingness to buy A.V.’s school supplies. Petitioners 

declined Appellant’s offers, and Appellant never provided anything for the children. 

Appellant’s infrequent bids or random offers to contribute a form of support for the 

children are not tantamount to adequate support. See In re D.D.V., No. 04-21-00159-

CV, 2021 WL 3887710, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 1, 2021, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (“occasional gifts are insufficient to fulfill a parent’s obligation of 

support”) (quoting In re B.T., 954 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, 

pet. denied)). 

Moreover, Appellant failed to ensure that Petitioners could adequately support 

A.V. and J.M.R. prior to voluntarily abandoning them, and she made no 

arrangements for their support. Appellant claimed that she never believed it was in 

A.V.’s and J.M.R.’s best interest to be placed with Petitioners. When asked whether 

she was certain that the children “were being taken care of,” Appellant responded: 

“No.” Therefore, according to Appellant, she believed that her children were not 

being adequately supported. Yet, and despite this, Appellant made no arrangements 

for the children’s support and allowed them to remain with Petitioners. See In re 

J.R., 319 S.W.3d 773, 776–77 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.); In re K.M.B., 91 

S.W.3d 18, 26 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.); see also A.R., 2019 WL 
13

1186963, at *4; In re A.T.C., No. 07-08-00258-CV, 2008 WL 5204747, at *3 (Tex. 

App.—Amarillo Dec. 12, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op). Because the record 

overwhelmingly supports the trial court’s termination finding under subsection (C), 

we overrule Appellant’s first issue. 

B. Best Interest of the Children

In her second issue, Appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of 

the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights 

would be in the best interest of A.V. and J.M.R.

After Appellant stipulated to the termination of her parental rights pursuant to 

subsection (C), her attorney asked: “[A]nd you understand the judge will find that 

it’s in the children’s best interest. Correct?” Appellant replied: “Yes, I understand.” 

Neither she nor her attorney expressly admitted that termination was in A.V.’s and 

J.M.R.’s best interest. While this weighs heavily in favor of the trial court’s findings, 

it is not dispositive. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 632–33; In re J.H. III, 538 S.W.3d 

121, 125 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (“the paramount concern is the best 

interest of the child, and the niceties of the procedural rules of pleading will not be 

used to defeat that interest”) (quoting Green v. Green, 850 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tex. 

App.—El Paso 1993, no pet.)). After considering the evidence as set forth above

and the Holley factors, we conclude that the trial court’s best-interest finding is 

supported by clear and convincing evidence.

We note that an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment waiving one’s parental 

rights itself “can be ample evidence to support a best-interest determination.” In re 

K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. 2017). “A parent’s willingness to voluntarily 

give up her child, and to swear affirmatively that this is in her child’s best interest, 

is sufficient, absent unusual or extenuating circumstances, to produce a firm belief 

or conviction that the child’s best interest is served by termination.” Id. at 112. Here, 
14

the trial court found that Appellant, with knowledge of the consequences, signed the 

affidavit voluntarily, and sufficient evidence corroborates that finding.

Nevertheless, evidence apart from the affidavit of relinquishment justifies the 

trial court’s best-interest finding. Appellant engaged in a pattern of misconduct—

she endangered the children, neglected their physical, emotional, and medical needs,

and exposed them to her ongoing drug use and unstable or unpredictable living 

conditions. Nothing in the record, including Appellant’s testimony, shows that she 

ever maintained a safe and stable environment for her children. 

A.V., who was six years old when she began living with Petitioners, endured 

years of Appellant’s drug abuse and the acts of domestic violence between Appellant 

and P.V. A.V. sustained a fractured collarbone when P.V. crashed their car while he 

and Appellant were using drugs. She was behind in school, fearful all the time, and 

needed counseling. When asked about Petitioners adopting her, A.V. expressed 

excitement, and “believe[d] that this adoption [would] be in her best interest.”

The record shows that the children are in a safe and stable home with 

Petitioners, who have tended to their needs and will continue to do so. Both A.V. 

and J.M.R. have flourished and improved physically, mentally, and emotionally 

since living with Petitioners. Petitioners have provided ample emotional and 

monetary support for A.V. and J.M.R. and have sought to adopt the children after 

one and one-half years of caring for them. 

Appellant, by contrast, has not demonstrated an ability or a willingness to put 

the children’s needs before her own, nor has she shown that she can provide a safe, 

stable home and environment for the children. In fact, Appellant’s immediate plan 

for the children if she was awarded possession did not even involve them living with 

her—Appellant testified that she envisioned (1) her children staying with her aunt, 

(2) having “regular visits,” and (3) the children “eventually transition[ing] home.” 
15

A.V. and J.M.R. were cared for by either Appellant’s aunt or mother throughout 2019 

and 2020, and the future would apparently be no different were they returned to 

Appellant. 

Based on the desires of the children (one of whom is too young to express a 

preference), the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, 

the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future, Appellant’s 

lack of parental abilities, Petitioners’ plans for the children, Appellant’s history of

domestic violence and drug abuse, her inability to provide a safe and stable 

environment for the children, and the lack of justification for her misconduct, we 

hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s

finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of A.V. 

and J.M.R. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.

Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s second issue. 

C. Evidentiary Ruling: Hearsay

Appellant contends in her third issue that the trial court erroneously admitted 

statements made by A.V., which Appellant contends are hearsay, “without showing 

each of the prerequisites of the Texas Family Code.” Beyond this conclusory 

statement, Appellant points to nothing in the record to clarify this issue or to support 

her argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g)–(i). 

Although briefs are to be “liberally, but reasonably, construed so that the right 

to appellate review is not lost by waiver,” an issue is only sufficient if it directs the 

reviewing court’s attention to the error about which the complaint is made.

Horton v. Stovall, 591 S.W.3d 567, 569 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (citing TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.9); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38(i) (requiring “appropriate citations to 

authorities and to the record”). “[W]e do not and cannot assume the responsibility 

of doing the parties’ briefing for them.” De Los Reyes v. Maris, No. 02-21-00022-
16

CV, 2021 WL 5227179, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 10, 2021, no pet.) 

(mem. op.) (citing Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 

895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.)). Simply put, we are not advocates for any 

of the parties, even when a party is pro se. Id.

Because Appellant has not directed us to any of the trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings of which she now complains, she presents nothing for our review. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1. Accordingly, Appellant’s third issue is overruled.

IV. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the order of the trial court. 

W. STACY TROTTER

JUSTICE

December 14, 2023

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.