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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

October 16, 2018

v No. 339216

Delta Circuit Court

RAYMOND KEITH DISHNO, LC No. 16-009380-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and RIORDAN and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was convicted of one count of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 

grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual 

offender, MCL 769.12, to serve 32 months to 20 years in prison.1 On appeal, he argues (1) the 

prosecution’s expert on drug slang was not properly qualified, and (2) the trial court should have 

provided an adverse-inference instruction to the jury because the police interrogation video was 

unavailable. We affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

During the summer of 2016, Escanaba Public Safety (“EPS”) officers received 

information from Nathan Gartland, a former friend of defendant, that defendant was selling 

cocaine. Gartland provided the information while enrolled in a local police-sanctioned substance 

abuse assistance program. Gartland informed police that defendant drove a “blue Chevy pickup 

with a ladder rack, [with] loud exhaust[,] . . . containing a large amount of cash and drugs,” and 

that defendant stored the cocaine in a green “safety kit box.” 

On August 13, 2016, Gartland went to defendant’s house and purchased a half gram of 

cocaine from defendant and apparently used all of the cocaine while at defendant’s house. Later 

that evening, Gartland and defendant drove to a grocery store in defendant’s vehicle. While the 

men were driving, EPS Officer Kyle Piatt was conducting traffic patrol and had received 

 1 Defendant was also convicted of maintaining a drug vehicle, MCL 333.7405(1)(d), and was 

sentenced to time served. Defendant does not appeal this conviction.
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information regarding Gartland’s tip. Piatt observed the distinctive features of defendant’s 

vehicle, pulled behind it to check its plates, and stopped the vehicle after learning that it 

belonged to defendant. Piatt called for backup, and a canine sniff was conducted around 

defendant’s truck. The dog alerted officers to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle. 

The officers searched defendant’s truck and discovered, among other things, a metal 

tobacco can underneath the driver’s side seat. The can contained six individual packages of 

suspected cocaine. The officers also seized from the inside of defendant’s wallet a small “drug 

ledger” with small amounts, names, and times written on it, plus a large quantity of three-inch by 

three-inch plastic bags, and about $2,310 in cash. Laboratory results confirmed that the 

substance was cocaine and weighed approximately four grams. The officers also seized 

defendant’s cell phone for forensic analysis. 

After defendant was in custody, he was taken to an interview room at the EPS 

department. The interview room was equipped with an audio and video recording device. The 

officers read defendant his Miranda2 warnings, to which defendant responded that he wanted a 

lawyer and that he did not want to speak to the officers. The police stopped the interview; 

however, defendant made several unsolicited statements. The officers testified that defendant 

stated “something to the effect of, ‘I only buy the cocaine. I buy it as it was as you found it. I’m 

a recreational user, and I only sell a little.’ ” The statements reportedly made by defendant were 

automatically erased because the police did not preserve the recording within 14 days of the 

interview. 

At trial, Detective/Sergeant Anthony LaPlant was qualified as an expert witness in the 

field of cell phone forensics and “in the field of drug profiling related to communications 

associated therewith.” He testified that his forensic examination of defendant’s cell phone 

revealed “[t]ransactional sounding text messages,” which meant “that they’re talking in drug 

slang.” According to LaPlant, it is uncommon for people to communicate using the names of the 

drugs that they were using or selling; rather, they used slang words. He testified about several 

text messages found on defendant’s phone, received and sent during the summer of 2016, which 

used coded terminology to refer to several controlled substances, including marijuana, cocaine, 

and various pills. For instance, defendant used terms like “full T” to reference 

methamphetamine, “orange” to reference Suboxone, and “go-go” to reference cocaine. 

At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, defendant called several witnesses

who suggested defendant regularly kept large amounts of cash on him because he performed 

home repair work and often received payments in cash. Additionally, the mother of defendant’s 

children testified that when she saw defendant in his truck on August 13, 2016, she did not see 

any drugs or paraphernalia and that, although she knew defendant had occasionally used cocaine,

she never saw defendant sell cocaine. 

When defendant testified, he denied ever selling cocaine and denied ownership and 

knowledge of the cocaine found under his car seat. Defendant theorized that the cocaine could 

 2 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). 
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have belonged to or been planted by Gartland. Moreover, according to defendant, the ledger in 

his wallet was something he used to note personal loans and some marijuana sales, and the coded 

text messages that LaPlant had testified about were all references to marijuana, not cocaine. 

Additionally, defendant denied telling the officers that he used cocaine or sold cocaine, and 

testified that he told them he sold only “a little bit of marijuana.”

II. ANALYSIS

A. MRE 702 

Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously qualified LaPlant as an expert witness in 

“drug slang,” allowing LaPlant to interpret defendant’s coded text messages. We disagree. 

This Court reviews a trial court’s “determination regarding the qualification of an expert 

and the admissibility of expert testimony” for an abuse of discretion. People v Murray, 234 

Mich App 46, 52; 593 NW2d 690 (1999). “At its core, an abuse of discretion standard 

acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which there will be no single correct outcome; 

rather, there will be more than one reasonable and principled outcome.” People v Babcock, 469 

Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). “When the trial court selects one of these principled 

outcomes, the trial court has not abused its discretion . . . . An abuse of discretion occurs, 

however, when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside this principled range of 

outcomes.” Id. 

Defendant does not challenge the interpretation of drug slang as a recognized discipline; 

rather, defendant asserts that LaPlant was not qualified to interpret the drug slang used in the text 

messages because his experience in this area was too stale. Testimony from an expert witness is 

governed by MRE 702, which provides: 

If the court determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 

fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise if 

(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the 

product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 

principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 

“An expert witness may offer an opinion only if he or she has specialized knowledge that will 

assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence.” People v Carll, 322 Mich App 690, 699; 915 

NW2d 387 (2018). “[A] proposed expert should not be scrutinized by an overly narrow test of 

qualifications.” People v Whitfield, 425 Mich 116, 123; 388 NW2d 206 (1986) (quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “The determinative inquiry in qualifying an expert is the nature and extent 

of knowledge and actual experience[.]” Carll, 322 Mich App at 699 (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Michigan courts have generally accepted that drug-related law enforcement 

officers possess specialized knowledge from their training and experience that can assist a lay 

jury’s understanding of evidence in a controlled substance case. See, e.g., People v Williams 

(After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 542; 499 NW2d 404 (1993) (finding no error where police 
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officer was qualified as an expert witness and explained how innocuous household items can 

have an alternative use in illicit drug trade).

In this case, LaPlant’s knowledge, experience, and training in narcotics linguistics were

properly established. Specifically, from 2005 to 2008, LaPlant served in a specialized drug 

enforcement unit where he gained experience managing informants and investigating drug 

crimes. While working with this unit, LaPlant was personally in charge of more than 200 

narcotic investigations, “dealt with people all the time that have talked this way,” received 

specialized controlled substance training, and participated in about 12 undercover controlled 

drug buys. Additionally, LaPlant testified that during his years with the unit, he purchased 

narcotics directly from dealers and through informants, using email, text messaging, and face-toface contact with suspects. LaPlant characterized the linguistics he observed in his experience as 

“typical street talk.” Notably, LaPlant’s familiarity and expertise with narcotics linguistics is 

supported in his statement that “you have to sell that you’re involved in this stuff, so you have to 

look and sound like they do,” because suspected drug dealers typically will not sell narcotics to 

others who do not “refer to it how they refer to it.” 

Prior to his three years with the specialized drug unit, LaPlant served five years working 

on road patrol from 2000 to 2005 investigating close to 100 cases involving controlled 

substances, and he attended drug interdiction and awareness training as recently as the year 2012. 

LaPlant testified that he routinely attended annual legal updates regarding narcotic trafficking. 

Moreover, LaPlant affirmed that as a detective, he continued to assist other officers with 

investigating narcotics cases using mobile forensics and surveillance, and that he routinely 

reviewed cellular phone records relating to controlled substances. Defendant’s contention that 

LaPlant’s experience with language used in drug transactions was outdated is not supported by 

the record, which indicates that LaPlant was continuously involved in narcotics cases to some 

extent, and he was fluent in the language used in drug transactions. Therefore, LaPlant’s 

experience in dealing with narcotics linguistics was both extensive and current. 

Considering LaPlant’s testimony regarding his 17-year career in law enforcement and the 

years he spent working with and learning the linguistics associated with narcotics sales, he was 

properly qualified as an expert, Murray, 234 Mich App at 53, because his knowledge, 

experience, and training established that his testimony was “based on sufficient facts” and was 

the product of reliable principles and methods that were reliably applied to the facts of the case

as required under MRE 702. 

Defendant claims that LaPlant’s testimony was inadmissible because he was addressing 

communications that were “within common knowledge,” and the jury was just as capable of 

considering the evidence and arriving at its own conclusion. Defendant’s argument is without 

merit because LaPlant’s testimony was highly relevant to the case. LaPlant’s specialized 

knowledge assisted the jury in understanding defendant’s coded text messages, i.e., it “serve[d] 

to give the trier of fact a better understanding of the evidence or assist in determining a fact in 

issue.” Murray, 234 Mich App at 53 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also MRE 702.

Without LaPlant’s testimony, the jury would have been left to interpret terms like “full T” and 

“orange” without any guidance. Moreover, the testimony established “that defendant intended to 

sell the drugs and not simply use [them] for personal consumption.” People v Ray, 191 Mich 

App 706, 708; 479 NW2d 1 (1991). 
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Finally, contrary to defendant’s claim, MRE 403 would not exclude the admission of 

LaPlant’s testimony. MRE 403 provides that a trial court may exclude relevant evidence “if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.” LaPlant’s testimony was highly probative of defendant’s 

intent to deliver cocaine because the testimony identified and explained a series of 

“[t]ransactional sounding text messages,” which helped prove defendant knowingly possessed, 

and intended to deliver, the cocaine. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that LaPlant’s 

testimony could not “be used to determine whether the defendant committed the crimes 

charged,” and that it could consider the testimony “only as an aid with respect to the text 

messages.” The jury presumably followed the court’s instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 

476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). 

In sum, the trial court’s determination that LaPlant was qualified to testify as an expert in 

narcotics linguistics was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, Babcock, 469 

Mich at 269, because his testimony was based on sufficient facts and was the product of reliable 

principles that, under MRE 702, were applied reliably to the facts of the case. Therefore, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting LaPlant to testify as an expert witness and 

decode defendant’s text messages.

B. MCL 763.9 

Next, defendant claims that he was entitled to an adverse-inference instruction under 

MCL 763.9 and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial attorney’s failure to 

request such an instruction. We disagree. 

Defendant failed to preserve this issue because it was not raised in the trial court. See 

People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Therefore, this Court’s review is 

for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 

124-125; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Further, because he failed to raise it in either a timely filed 

motion for a new trial, People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000), or a 

motion for a Ginther3 hearing, People v Hurst, 205 Mich App 634, 641; 517 NW2d 858 (1994), 

our review of defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “is limited to errors apparent 

on the record.” People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). 

MCL 763.9 provides:

Any failure to record a statement as required under [MCL 763.84] or to 

preserve a recorded statement does not prevent any law enforcement official 

 3 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 

4 MCL 763.8(2) provides in part that “[a] law enforcement official interrogating an individual in 

custodial detention regarding the individual’s involvement in the commission of a major felony 

shall make a time-stamped, audiovisual recording of the entire interrogation.”
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present during the taking of the statement from testifying in court as to the 

circumstances and content of the individual’s statement if the court determines 

that the statement is otherwise admissible. However, unless the individual 

objected to having the interrogation recorded and that objection was properly 

documented under [MCL 763.8(3)5], the jury shall be instructed that it is the law 

of this state to record statements of an individual in custodial detention who is 

under interrogation for a major felony and that the jury may consider the absence 

of a recording in evaluating the evidence relating to the individual’s statement. 

[Emphasis added.] 

MCL 763.7 gives the following relevant definitions:

(a) “Custodial detention” means an individual’s being in a place of 

detention because a law enforcement official has told the individual that he or she 

is under arrest or because the individual, under the totality of the circumstances, 

reasonably could believe that he or she is under a law enforcement official’s 

control and is not free to leave.

(b) “Interrogation” means questioning in a criminal investigation that may 

elicit a self-incriminating response from an individual and includes a law 

enforcement official’s words or actions that the law enforcement official should 

know are reasonably likely to elicit a self-incriminating response from the 

individual. [MCL 763.7(a), (b).]

Defendant was not “under interrogation” within the meaning of MCL 763.9 when he 

uttered incriminating statements that were subsequently and inadvertently purged. The

undisputed testimony of the EPS officers who interviewed defendant indicates that after 

defendant requested an attorney, questioning ceased, and the incriminating statements that 

followed were unsolicited. In short, there is no indication in the record that defendant made the 

incriminating statements during “questioning in a criminal investigation that [might have] 

elicit[ed] a self-incriminating response” or that they were given in response to “words or actions 

that the law enforcement official should [have known were] reasonably likely to elicit a selfincriminating response from the individual.” MCL 763.7(b). Consequently, defendant was not 

entitled to an adverse-inference instruction under MCL 763.9. Further, defense counsel’s failure 

 5 MCL 763.8(3) provides: 

An individual who believes the individual’s interrogation is being recorded may 

object to having the interrogation recorded. The individual’s objection shall be 

documented either by the individual’s objection stated on the recording or the 

individual’s signature on a document stating the objection. If the individual 

refuses to document the objection either by recording or signature, a law 

enforcement official shall document the objection by a recording or signed 

document. A major felony recording may be made without the consent or 

knowledge of, or despite the objection of, the individual being interrogated.
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to request such an instruction did not render her performance ineffective. People v Ericksen, 288 

Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010) (“Failing to advance a meritless argument or raise a 

futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron