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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37173

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TRACY MICHAEL TWISS,

Defendant-Appellant.

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2010 Unpublished Opinion No. 673

Filed: October 15, 2010

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge. 

Order revoking probation and requiring execution of modified unified ten-year

sentence, with four-year determinate term, for felony driving under the influence, 

affirmed.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

______________________________________________

Before GUTIERREZ, Judge; GRATTON, Judge;

and MELANSON, Judge

PER CURIAM

Tracy Michael Twiss pled guilty to felony driving under the influence. I.C. §§ 18-8004, 

18-8005(5). In exchange for his guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district 

court imposed a unified ten-year sentence with a five-year determinate term, but after a period of 

retained jurisdiction, suspended the sentence and placed Twiss on probation. Subsequently, 

Twiss admitted to violating several terms of the probation, and the district court consequently 

revoked probation and ordered execution of Twiss’s sentence. However, the district court 

reduced Twiss’s sentence to a unified term of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement 

of four years. Twiss filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district 
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court denied. Twiss appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking 

probation and that the sentence is excessive.

It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 

Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 

P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 

1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation 

is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v.

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 

P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation 

has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the 

court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 

326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). A 

decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court 

abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328.

Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review 

and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well 

established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 

P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-

73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 

When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. 

Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 

When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of 

probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original 

judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our 

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring 

between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. 

Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot 

say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering 

execution of Twiss’s modified sentence. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing 

execution of Twiss’s previously suspended sentence is affirmed.