### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 478 -CV

Er ic Re d, A ppe lla nt
v. John Doh ert y and Doh ert y & Catlow, A Law Corporat ion, App ellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-05- 0016 64 , HO NORAB LE SUZ ANNE COVINGTO N , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Th e tr ia l c ourt

g ra nte d th e sp e c ia l a

pp e ara nc e of a pp e lle e s John Do he rt

y and Do he rt y & Catlow, A L aw Corporation, and dismissed appellant Er ic Red’s c laims ag ainst them for lac k of persona l jurisdiction. I n one issue, Red c ontends that the trial court er re d in ruling that it did not have pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a pp e lle e s. We a ff

ir m. I n May 2000 in L os Ang eles, California, Red dr ove his vehicle into a crow ded bar , kil l i n g t w o i n d i v i d

u a l s . F am i l y

m e mb e r s o f

t h o s e t w o i n d i v i d

u a l s f i l e d w r o n g f u l d e a t hc l a i ms ag ainst Red in Ca lifornia state c ourt, and John Doherty of the California

law firm Dohe rty

& Catlow was hire d to defe nd Red ag ainst those claims under a $30,000 automobile insuranc e policy issued by Merc ury I nsuranc e Gr oup. After the wrong ful death claims wer e filed a g ainst Red, he brie fly moved to Austin, Te xas, wh e re he fi le d f

or ba nk ru ptc y pr ote c tio n. He so ug ht a

nd re c e ive d a

sta y of th e Ca lif

or nia2

state c ourt

wr on g fu l de a th l aws uit
. Re d re ta ine d Aus tin a tto rn e y Ste ve n Hake to re pr e se nt himin the bankr uptcy . Red soug ht to discharg e all of his debts, includingany conting en t l iability

to the wrong ful death cl ai m ants, but the wrong ful death claimants filed an a dversa ry proce edingin the bankruptc y

objecting to the discharg e of t h ei r cl ai m s . On the advic e of H ake, Re d hired a nother T e x a s a t t o r

n e y , S t e p h e n S a t h e r , t o r e p r e s e n th i mi nt h e a dv e r s ar y p r o c e e d i n g i nt h e b an kr u p t c y. After a trial, the bankruptcy court determined that the wr ong ful death claims qualified as e x ceptions to discharg e under

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) beca use the collision wa s the result of Red’ s willful and
ma lic iou s c on du c t. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt a ff ir me d th e ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt ’s de c isi on

on sim ila r gro un ds , and the F ifth Circuit Court of Appeals aff irmed that dec ision. See I n re Red, 96 F. App’ x . 229, 230 (5th Cir. 2004).

Af te r the Te xas ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt re nd e re d it s d e c isi on , th e Ca lif or nia state c ourt

in wh ic h th e wr on g fu l de a th c la ims we re pe nd ing ru le d that the Te xas c ourt ’s de c isi on wa s r e s ju dic a ta as to Red’s liability

for the wrong ful death cl ai m s . The c ourt direc ted a ve rdict in favor of the claimants on the issue of liability , and the issue of damag es was tried to a jury , which re turned
a ve rd ic t awa

rd ingsli g htl y

ov e r $ 1, 00 0, 00 0 to the pla int if fs . T hat ju dg me nt w a s a ff ir me d o n a pp e a l. See R oos v. Red, 1 3 0 Ca l. A p p . 4 th 8 7 0 , 8 7 4 ( Ca l. Ct
. Ap p. 2005), ce r t. denied , 5 46 U. S. 1174 (2006). I n May 2006, Red sued S ather in Texas state court for leg al malpra ctice in c onnection with the adver sary

proce eding in the Texas bankruptcy . He late r ame nded his petition to add as defe ndants J ohn Doher

ty , the law f

irm Doherty

& Ca tlow, Mercur

y I nsuranc e Gr oup, and an employ ee of

Merc ury I nsuranc e Group. Ag ainst these defenda nts, Red asserte d claims for br eac h3

of c on tr a c t, c ivi l c on sp ir a c y , f ra ud , b re a c h o f f

idu c iary duty and the duty of go od

fa ithand fa ir de a lin g , n e g lig e nt m isr e pr e se ntatio n, le g a l ma lpr a c tic e , a nd DT PA v iol a tio ns . Appellee s J ohn Doher

ty and Dohe rty

& Catlow f

i led a spe cial appe ara

nce a rg uing that the Texas court did not have persona l jurisdiction over them. After an evide ntiary

hear ing, the trial court g rante d appellee s’ spec ial appea ranc e and dismissed Re d ’s claims ag ainst them. The cour t issued finding s of fa ct and c onclusions of law. This appe al followed.

The e x istence of

persona l jurisdiction is a question of law, but proper e x erc ise of that jur isd ic tio n mu st s ome tim e s b e pr e c e de d b y the re so lut ion

of un de rl ying fact ual dis pu te s. Goodenbour v . Goodenbour , 64 S.W. 3d 69 , 75 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 01 , pe t. d e nie d) . A n a pp e llate court de termines the appropriate ness of the t rial court’s resolution of t hose di sputes by an ordina ry sufficie ncy

of the e vidence revie w base d on the entire rec ord. Id. Red conten d s that sever al of the tria l court’s finding s of fa ct ar e not supported by leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt evidence
. A leg al sufficie ncy challeng e fa ils if there is more tha n a scintilla of evidenc e to support the finding
. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W .3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002). More tha n a scintilla of evide nce e x ists when the evidenc e rises to a level that
w o u ld e n a

b le r e a s o n a

b le an d f a ir

- mi n d e d p e o p le to d if f e r in th e ir c o n c lusions. Me rrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v . Havne r , 953 S.W .2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). When review i n g a cha lleng e to the fa c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , w e e xami ne the e nti re re c or d, c on sid e ri ngbo th t he e vid e nc e in favor of, and c ontrary

to, the challeng ed finding
. Al e nia Sp az io, S. P. A. v . R e id , 130 S.W .3d 201, 209 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 03 , no pet .). We s e t a sid e the fa c t f ind ingon ly

if it i s so contra ry to the overw helming w eig ht of the evide nce a s to be clea rly wrongand unjust. Id.4 Although Re d does not enumer ate whic h of t he trial c ourt’s finding s of fa ct he challeng es on appeal, he a lleg es in his brief that the tr ial court ha d jurisdiction over appe llees beca use Dohe rty

“ transac ted business within the State of Texas in the course of the Te x as bankr uptcy proce eding ” and “ had numer ous signific ant contac ts with Tex as re sident domiciled citiz ens,” a nd beca use “a ll o r m o s t o f t he eve nts that caused the bring ing of this suit took place in Te x as in the
course of those Te x as bankr uptcy proce eding s.” Red also a ll eges that appellee s “hired” Sather, direc ted Sather “ in the course of appellees’ repre sentation of [ Red] in the Tex as bankr uptcy ,” and “p ai d ” S at h er

fo r h i s wo rk
. W e i n t er

p re t t h es e a l l ega t i o n s as ch al l en ges t o t h e t ri al co u rt ’s fi n d i n gs that: ( 1) a

pp e lle e s d id n ot p e rform any act or omi ssi on in T e xas t

hat r e late s to Re d’ s a lle g a tio ns ; (2) a ppellees did not ag ree or conse nt to act as Red’ s co-c ounsel in the Texas bankruptcy case ; (3) appellees did not ente r into a joint repre sentation ag ree ment with Sather; (4) a ppellees did not contra ct with, reta in, or rec ruit Sather to repre sent Red; (5) Ha ke re commended to Red that Sather be re t ai n ed ; (6) appellees ne ver solicited or promoted business in Texas; (7) appe llees did not perf orm any act or leg al work in Te x as on Red’s behalf , but pe rfor

med such work only

in California; and (8) appellee s’ mail and telephone contac ts with S ather wer e minimal and not the re sult of purp os e fu lly

c on du c tin g a c tiv iti e s w ith in t he State of

Te xas. We conclude that more than a scintilla of evidenc e exists t o support the trial cour t’s finding s of fa ct. At the hea ring on appellee s’ spec ial appea ranc e, the trial court considere d, among
o t h e r t h i n g s , a f

f i d av i t s f r o m b o t h R e d

an d D o h e rt y, c o r

r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e nH a k e a n d D o h e rt y,
corr espondenc e betwe en Dohe rty and Sather, and live testimony from Hake. The trial c ourt is the
s ole judg e of w itness cre dibilit y and the we ight to be g iven to testimony
. Na v a s o ta Res., Ltd.5

v. Heep Petroleum, I

nc. , 212 S.W .3d 463, 468 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). We may not disturb a trial cour

t’s resolutions of evidentiary conflicts that turn on cre dibilit y deter minations or the weig ht of the evide nce. Id. On e of Do he rt y ’s a ff ida vit s st a te s, in r e le va

nt p art :
Neither D & C nor Iag ree d, consente d or we re awar e that we were desig nated a s coc ouns e l in

the ba nk ru ptc y pr oc e e din g fo r Pla int if f. Ne ith e r D & C no r I

e nte re d into any joint represe ntation ag ree ment with Plainti ff’ s Texas counsel. Neither D & C nor I contra ct e d

w it h , r e ta in e d , o r

r e c r u it e d St e v e nR. H a k e o r

St e p h e nW. Sath er (collec tively ref

err ed to as P laintiff’s “Texas Counsel”) to re prese nt Plainti ff in the Te xas p ro c e e din g s. Whil e D & C re pr e se nte d Pla int if f in Ca lif or nia , Pla int if

f e le c te d to re loc a te to T e xas. When in Tex as, Plaintiff reta ined Mr. Hake to re prese nt him in t he bankr uptcy proce eding . On ce Mr. Hake deter mined that a bankr

uptcy litigator w as nee ded, Mr. Hake rec ommended that Mr. S ather be re tained to re prese nt Plainti ff. . . . At no time d i d ei t h er D & C or I provide a

ny input into t he sele ction of Plaintiff’s Texas c ouns e l. I n a dd iti on , at no tim e did e ith e r D & C or I make any pr omi se s o r r e pr e se ntatio ns to Plaintiff that we would per form any act in Te x as. D & C and Ialso neve r solicited or pr omo te d b us ine ss i n Te xas. F ur the rm or e , ne ith e r D & C no r Ipe rf or me d a ny a c t, leg al work, or otherwise, in T exas on Plaintiff’s behalf . Idid not visi t Texas or travel to Texas for any

acti vity connec ted direc tly

or indirec tly

to Plainti ff’ s Texas leg al pr oc e e din g s. Th e on ly

le g a l w or

k t hat D & C or

Ipe rf or me d o n Pl a int if

f’ s b e ha lf was in California.
Th e c or re sp on de nc e be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s is c onsi st ent with D oh e rt y ’s ve rs ion

of e ve nts . B e c a

us e
mor e tha n a sc int ill a of evi den ce sup po rt s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t, t he e vid e nc e is l e g a lly
su ff ic ie nt t o s up po rt

tho se fi nd ing s. We also conclude that the evidenc e is fac tually sufficie nt to support the finding s of fac t. Red contends that the f ollowing e vidence , which wa s considere d by the trial court in rulingon the sp e c ia l a

pp e ara nc e , c on tr a dic ts the fi nd ing s o f f a c t: ( 1) a F e br

ua ry 6, 20 02 le tte r f

ro m H a ke to6

Doher ty in which Hake rec ommends that Merc ury I nsuranc e Group re tain Sather to re prese nt Red in t he Te xas p ro c e e din g s; ( 2) a F e br ua ry 13 , 20 02 le tte r fr om Do he rt y to S a the r “ a s a

fo llo w u p to
our conve rsations reg ardingthe re prese ntation of Eric Red ” i n which Dohe rty states that “you [S ather ] send y our billings to me and I will forwar d them immediately to Mercur

y I nsu rance for pa y me nt. Th e ir

pa y me nt w ill be se nt d ir e c tly to you .” ; ( 3) a May 14 , 2 00 2 le tte r f ro m D oh e rt

y to Sa the r i nq

uir inga s to wh e the r S a the r c ou ld i nc lud e “ any po te nti a l c la im o f Dr . Rubi n ag a ins t E ri c [R ed], as an item to be protec ted by the bankruptc y action”; ( 4) an invoice for Ha ke’s leg al servic es ref lecting sever al conf

ere nce c alls with Doher

ty ; and (5) testimony

from Hake to the ef

fec t that he advised Doherty to have Me rcur y I nsuranc e hire Sather a

nd that Red ac tually

hired Sather . Howeve r, thi s e vid e nc e is n ot c on tr ary to the tr ial co ur

t’ s f ind ing s th a t a

pp e lle e s a c te d o n Re d’ s b e ha lf on ly in California, did not consent to ac t as Red’s co-counsel in the Tex as bankruptcy case , did not hire Sather to re prese nt Red, did not soli cit or promote business in Tex as, and ha d contac ts with Tex as only as nec essar

y to coordinate t he defense of Red in the California a nd Texas proce eding s. The trial court’s f indings of f

act a re suppor ted by fac tually sufficie nt evidence
. We now turn to whether

the trial cour

t corre ct l y ru led that it did not have per sonal jurisdiction over appe llees. A plai n t i ff s u i n g a nonre sident defe ndant bea rs the initial burden of pleadingsufficie nt alleg ations to satisfy the Texas long -ar m statute, which authorizes a tria l court to e x erc ise jurisdiction over a nonr esident who “ does business” in Te x as. BM C So ftwa re , 83 S.W .3d
a t 79 5; see Te x. Civ. Pra c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 1 7. 04 2 ( Wes t 19 97 ). Te xas c ourt s ma y e xer c ise personal j u ri s d i cti on over a nonresident if it is authorized by the Texas long- arm statute a nd7

comports wit h constitutional gua rante es of due proce ss. Sc hlo bo hm v . S c ha piro , 784 S.W .2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990).

Under the fe dera l c onstitut ional test, a state may asser t personal jurisdiction over a
no nr e sid e nt d e fe nd ant i f: (1 ) t he de fe nd ant h a s p ur

po se fu lly est abl is hed min imum c on ta c ts w ith the forum state ; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice. Burger King Cor

p . v. R u d z ewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 (1985). When a pply ing the minimum contac ts analy sis, we focus on appellee s’ intentional activities and e x pectations in deciding whether it is proper to ca ll them before a Te x as cour t. See W orld-W ide Volkswagen Corp. v. W oodson , 444 U.S. 286, 291-292 (1 9 8 0 ). To esta blish mi nimum contacts with Texas, appellee s must have purpos efully

availed the mselves of the pr ivilege of conduc ting a ctivities within t he state, the reby
rec eiving the bene fit and protec tion of Texas l aws. See B urger King , 471 U.S. at 474-75. The activities must be substantial e noug h to justify a conclusion that appellee s rea s o n ab l y anti cipated being called into a T exas court. Id. The prese nce of sufficie nt minim um contacts may support either g ener al or spec ific jurisdiction. Gu ar dia n R oy al Exch

. As suran c e, Lt d. v . E ng lis h Ch ina Cla

y s, P. L.C. , 815 S.W .2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1991). Red contends that Texas c ourts have spe cific jurisdiction
ov e r a pp e lle e s. Whe n s pe c if

ic jur isd ic tio n is a sse rt e d, the c a us e of a c tio n must ari se out of o r r e late to t he no nr e sid e nt d e fe nd ant’ s c on ta c t w ith the fo rum sta te in or de r to s a tis fy the min imum c on ta c ts require ment. Id. Howeve r, the c ontact must have res u l t ed fr om the nonresident de fenda nt’s purposef ul conduct and not the unilate ral a ctivit y o f t h e plainti ff or others. Id. Whe n s pe c if ic8

jurisdiction is asserted, the minimum contacts anal y s i s focuse s on the relationship among the defe ndant, the for

um and the litigation. Id. Red contends that the phone c alls and cor responde nce be tween a

ppellees a nd Texas
a tto rn e y s H ake and

Sa the r w e re su ff

ic ie nt c on ta c ts t o a

uth or ize pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n o ve r a pp e lle e s. Howeve r, long

d istance te lephone c alls to the forum state, e ven couple d with written corr espondenc e and isolated trips to the for um state, are g ener ally not, w ithout more , considere d purposef ul activities dir e c te d to wa

rd re si den ts of

the fo rum st a te . La ng

v . Ca pit al R es. In v

s. , I & II , LLC , 102 S.W .3d 86 1, 86 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 3, no pe t.) ; Ea k in v . A c os ta , 21 S.W .3d 405, 409 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.), dis ap pr ov e d o f on oth e r g

ro un ds by BM C So ftwa re , 83 S.W .3d at 194 n.1. T h e fa ct s of this case are simil ar to Be rge nh olt z v . Ca nn ata , 2 0 0 S. W. 3 d 287 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pe t.). I n that case , Be rg enholtz, a Texas resident, was r epre sented by Texas attorney s in a Tex as bankruptcy proce eding and C alifornia attorney s in a lawsuit in California. Id. a t 29 0. B e rg e nh olt z sue d h is C a lif or nia a tto rn e y s in

Te xas s tate c ourt

for le g a l ma lpr a c tic e in
connec tion with the California lawsuit. Id. The trial c ourt g rante d the California attorney s’ spec ial appea ranc e. Id. On appe al, B erg enholtz arg ued that the Califor nia attorne y s purposefully availed themselves of the j u ri s diction of Texas courts whe n they enter ed into contra cts to repr esent Be rg enholtz, bil led B erg enholtz in T ex as , and acce pted pay ment from B erg enholtz mailed from T e x a s . T h e c o u rth e l d

t h a tT e x a s c o u rt s l a c k e d

p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o no v e r t h e C a l i f o r n i a a t t o r n e ys be c a us e the Ca lif

or nia a tto rn e y s’ re pr e se ntatio n o f B e rg e nh olt z wa s li mit e d to the C a l i f o r n i a l aws uit , was not the re sult of seekingclients in T exas, a nd did not involve any

contac ts with Tex as other tha n9

c omm un ic a tio n w iththe ba

nk ru ptc y a tto rn e y s a

bo ut t he Ca lif or nia laws uit . A lth ou g h o ne Ca lif or nia attorney made a n appea ranc e in the Te x as bankr

uptcy proce eding , the cour

t stated:
The fa ct that the bankr

uptcies we re pe nding in T exas, however , was for tuitous rather than the re sult of [ the California attorney ’s] “ purposef ul a vailment” of the benef

it of Te xas law; [the Ca lif

or nia a tto rn e y ] u

nd e rt oo k to r e pr e se nt a

pp e lla nts in C a lif

or nia an d agr ee d as p ar to f t h at re p re s en t at i o n t o co o p er at e i nb an krup t cy p ro ce ed i n gs a lr e a dy pe nd ingin T e xas.
Id. at 296. The c ontacts alleg ed in this case are even mor e attenuated than the one s found to be insuffici en t t o authorize persona l jurisdiction over the nonre sident defe ndants in Be rge nh olt z. Appellee s were hired to re prese nt Re d befor e he moved to T exas. They did not contac t Red in Texas to repre sent him in the California litigation or ha ve contacts with the Tex as attorne y s hired by Red except as nec essar

y to coordinate t he defense of Red in the C alifornia litig ation. I t is undisput ed that Doher ty never trave led to Texas to perfor m leg al wo rk
. Al though H ake a dvised Doher ty that M er cu ry I nsuranc e should hire Sather to repre sent Red, there is no evidence that Doher ty hired Sa t h e r o r e xe r c i s e d

c o n t r o l o v e r

S a t h e r ’ s h an d l i n g o f

t h e l i t i g a t i o ni nT e xa s . Ap p e l l e e s ’ c o n t a c ts wi t h t h e T ex as attorne y s were limit ed to long distance te lephone c alls and cor responde nce
c oo rd inatin g Re d’ s d e fe ns e in t he Ca lif or nia and Te xas s tate c ourt

pr oc e e din g s. Red contends that this Court’s opinion in Rowland & Row l a n d , P

. C . v. Texas Employe rs Indemnity Co. supports the exercise of per s o n al j urisdiction. See 973 S.W .2d 432 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). In t h at ca s e, a Tenne ssee law firm wrote a letter

to a Texas company repr esentingthat the firm would prote ct the company ’s intere st in a pending Tenne ssee10

wrong ful death case
. Id. a t 43 4. Re lyingon tha t le tte r, the Te xas c omp any did no t inter vene i n the Tenne ssee litigation. Id. At the conc lusion of the litigation, the Te nnessee firm distributed the entire r ecove ry

to the wrong ful death claimants to the exclusion of the Texas company , which then sued the Tenne ssee firm in T exas f or brea ch of contra ct, conver sion, f raud, and ne gl i gent misrepre sentation. Id. This Court deter mined that the Texas c ourt had spec ific jurisdiction over the Tenne ssee firm based on two purposef ul c ontacts with T exas: (1) the letter to the T exas company confirmingthat the firm would repr esent it in the l itigation, and (2) the Te nnessee firm’s unilater al deci s io n to d is tr ib u te th e e n ti r e r e c o v e r y to th e w r o n g f

u l d e a th c la im an ts an d th e ir la w y e r s , a ll of whom wer e Te x as re sidents. Id. at 435-36.

The fa cts of this case are differ ent from the f acts pre sented in Rowland . As discussed above, a ppellees did not conta ct Red in T exas to repr esent him in the California litig ation or have contac ts with the Tex as attorney s hired by Red except as nec essar y to coordinate the def

ense of Red in the California litigation. Red contends that the F ebrua ry 13, 2002 letter fr om Doherty to Sather in wh ic h Do re rt

y state s “ y ou [Sat

he r] se nd y our b ill ing s to me and Iwi ll f or wa rd the m im me diate ly to Mercur y I nsuranc e for pay

ment. Their pa

y ment will be sent direc tly

to y ou” is compar able to the letter sent f

rom the Tenne ssee law firm to the Texas company in Rowland. W e d i s agr ee . Al t h o u gh the cor responde nce w as init i at ed b y Doher ty , it states “[t] his is a follow-up on our c onversations
re g ard ingthe re pr e se ntatio n o f E ri c Re d. ” We a re of the vie w that a

pp e lle e s d id n ot p ur

po se fu lly avail themselve s of the privileg es and be nefits of conducting business in T exas by sending this one11

letter c oordinating the pay ment betwee n Merc ury

I nsuranc e Gr oup an d Sather. The trial court
corr ectly dismiss ed Red’s c laims ag ainst appellee s for lac k of per sonal jurisdiction. Affir med.

__________________________________________ G. Alan Waldrop, Just ice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: Jul y

20, 2007