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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 

August 2006 

3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 

Final Report 

August 1999 – August 2004 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 

Highway Rail-Grade Crossing Safety Research: Railroad Infrastructure Trespassing 

Detection Systems Research in Pittsford, New York 

5. FUNDING NUMBERS 

RR97/CB069 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

Marco P. daSilva, William Baron, and Anya A. Carroll 

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Research and Innovative Technology Administration 

John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 

55 Broadway 

Cambridge, MA 02142-1093 

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 

REPORT NUMBER 

DOT-VNTSC-FRA-05-07 

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Federal Railroad Administration 

Office of Research and Development 

Office of Safety 

1120 Vermont Avenue, NW 

Mail Stop 20 

Washington, DC 20590 

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 

AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 

DOT/FRA/ORD-06/03 

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 

This document is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service, 

Springfield, Virginia 22161. 

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) 

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, under the direction of the Federal 

Railroad Administration, conducted a 3-year demonstration of an automated prototype railroad infrastructure security system on a 

railroad bridge. Specifically, this commercial-off-the-shelf technology system was installed at a bridge in Pittsford, New York, 

where trespassing is commonplace and fatalities have occurred. This video-based trespass monitoring and deterrent system had 

the capability of detecting trespass events when an intrusion on the railroad right-of-way occurred. The interactive system 

comprised video cameras, motion detectors, infrared illuminators, speakers, and central processing units. Once a trespass event 

occurred, the in-situ system sent audible and visual signals to the monitoring workstation at the local security company where an 

attendant validated the alarm by viewing the live images from the scene. The attendant then issued a real-time warning to the 

trespasser(s) via pole-mounted speakers near the bridge, called the local police, and then the railroad police, if necessary. All 

alarm images were stored on a wayside computer for evaluation. The system was installed in August 2001 and evaluated over a 3-

year period ending in August 2004. This report describes the results of this research endeavor. Topics addressed include the 

project location, system technology and operation, system costs, results, potential benefits, and lessons learned. The results 

indicate this interactive system can serve as a model for railroad infrastructure security system for other railroad ROW or bridges 

deemed prone to intrusion. 

14. SUBJECT TERMS 

Right-of-way, trespass detection, deterrent system, railroad, railroad bridge, security, security 

system, motion detectors, infrared illuminators, central processing units. 

15. NUMBER OF PAGES 

48 

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1 inch (in) = 2.5 centimeters (cm) 1 millimeter (mm) = 0.04 inch (in) 

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1 square inch (sq in, in2) = 6.5 square centimeters 1 square centimeter (cm2) = 0.16 square inch (sq in, in2) 

(cm2

) 

1 square foot (sq ft, ft2) = 0.09 square meter (m2) 1 square meter (m2) = 1.2 square yards (sq yd, 

yd2

) 

1 square yard (sq yd, yd2) = 0.8 square meter (m2) 1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.4 square mile (sq mi, mi2) 

1 square mile (sq mi, mi2) = 2.6 square kilometers 10,000 square meters (m2) = 1 hectare (ha) = 2.5 acres 

(km2

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1 ounce (oz) = 28 grams (gm) 1 gram (gm) = 0.036 ounce (oz) 

1 pound (lb) = 0.45 kilogram (kg) 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2 pounds (lb) 

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(lb) = 1.1 short tons 

VOLUME (APPROXIMATE) VOLUME (APPROXIMATE) 

1 teaspoon (tsp) = 5 milliliters (ml) 1 milliliter (ml) = 0.03 fluid ounce (fl oz) 

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1 fluid ounce (fl oz) = 30 milliliters (ml) 1 liter (l) = 1.06 quarts (qt) 

1 cup (c) = 0.24 liter (l) 1 liter (l) = 0.26 gallon (gal) 

1 pint (pt) = 0.47 liter (l) 

1 quart (qt) = 0.96 liter (l) 

1 gallon (gal) = 3.8 liters (l) 

1 cubic foot (cu ft, ft3) = 0.03 cubic meter (m3) 1 cubic meter (m3) = 36 cubic feet (cu ft, ft3) 

1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd3) = 0.76 cubic meter (m3) 1 cubic meter (m3) = 1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd3) 

TEMPERATURE (EXACT) TEMPERATURE (EXACT) 

[(x-32)(5/9)] °F = y °C [(9/5) y + 32] °C = x °F 

QUICK INCH - CENTIMETER LENGTH CONVERSION

0 1 2 3 4 5

Inches 

Centimeters 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

QUICK FAHRENHEIT - CELSIUS TEMPERATURE CONVERSION 

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For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NIST Miscellaneous Publication 286, Units of Weights and 

Measures. Price $2.50 SD Catalog No. C13 10286 Updated 6/17/98 

ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

Under sponsorship from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Office of Safety, the 

Research and Innovative Technology Administration Volpe National Transportation Systems 

Center (Volpe Center) demonstrated an automated prototype railroad infrastructure security 

system on a railroad bridge. The authors of this report are Marco P. daSilva, William Baron, and 

Anya A. Carroll. The authors wish to thank Ron Ries, FRA Office of Safety, for his guidance 

and support, Mark McKeon, FRA Region 1 Administrator for his direction, and Dee Chappell, 

formerly of the Volpe Center and currently with the Federal Highway Administration, for her 

initial planning on this project. The authors gratefully acknowledge the overall direction 

provided by Anya A. Carroll, Principal Investigator of Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety 

Research at the Volpe Center. 

The authors also wish to thank the various stakeholders and support contractors in this project. 

Appreciation is due to Ed Sheehy, CSX Public Safety Officer, for his cooperation and ideas. 

Special thanks is also given to Alan Kauffman, Computer Sciences Corporation, for his technical 

expertise, as well as Doyle Security Company, which provided monitoring services for the insitu system. 

Thanks are also extended to Nathan Grace, Dartanyan Danier, and Cassandra Oxley of CASE, 

LLC, the onsite Volpe Center contractor team, for their layout, design, and editing work on this 

report. 

iii 

Table of Contents 

1. Introduction................................................................................................................ 1 

1.1 Location ............................................................................................................ 2 

1.2 Project Stakeholders and Contractors ............................................................... 3 

2. System Technology and Operation............................................................................ 5 

2.1 System Costs......................................................................................................7 

2.2 Three-Year Results ........................................................................................... 8 

2.2.1 Trespassing Event Data......................................................................... 9 

2.2.2 False Alarm Reduction ....................................................................... 12 

2.2.3 Other Observations ............................................................................. 13 

2.3 Potential Benefits............................................................................................ 13 

2.4 Reliability and Redundancy Issues ................................................................. 16 

3. Lessons Learned....................................................................................................... 17 

3.1 Technical Lessons Learned............................................................................. 17 

3.2 Operation and Evaluation Lessons Learned ................................................... 18 

3.3 Stakeholder Lessons Learned ......................................................................... 19 

4. Conclusions.............................................................................................................. 21 

References......................................................................................................................... 23 

Appendix A. Trespassing Events................................................................................... A-1

Appendix B. Sample Alarm Event Pictures....................................................................B-1 

Appendix C. Acronyms ..................................................................................................C-1 

v 
List of Figures 

Figure 1. Railroad Trespassing/Crossing Fatalities (1990-2004) .......................................1 

Figure 2. Railroad Bridge Chosen for Demonstration Project............................................2 

Figure 3. Location of the Railroad Bridge on the Erie Canal, Pittsford, New York...........3 

Figure 4. Project Stakeholders and Support Contractors....................................................3 

Figure 5. Illustration of the Surveillance System Technology ...........................................6 

Figure 6. Pole Configured with Monitoring and Detection Components...........................6 

Figure 7. Trespassing Events by Time of Day..................................................................10 

Figure 8. Yearly Trespassing Rate per Common Online Periods.....................................10 

Figure 9. Event Type Distribution per Common Online Periods .....................................11 

Figure 10. Trespassing Events per Month (3 years) .........................................................11 

Figure 11. Number of False Alarms per Year...................................................................12 

Figure 12. Event Type Distribution of System Hardware/Software Configuration 

 per Year............................................................................................................13 

Figure 13a. Two Trespassers at 1:40 p.m. ........................................................................14 

Figure 13b. Train at 1:41 p.m. ..........................................................................................14 

Figure 14a. Two Trespassers at 9:11 p.m. ........................................................................14 

Figure 14b. Police at 9:28 p.m..........................................................................................14 

Figure 14c. Train at 9:33 p.m............................................................................................15 

Figure 15. Trespasser Detected at 6:28 p.m......................................................................15 

vi 
List of Tables 

Table 1. System Component Costs .....................................................................................7 

Table 2. Yearly Operating and Maintenance Costs ............................................................8 

Table 3. Event Type Distribution........................................................................................9 

vii 

1. Introduction 

A June 1997 incident in which two teens were fatally injured by a train on a bridge in Pittsford, 

New York, spurred the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Railroad 

Administration’s (FRA) Office of Safety to conduct research into trespass prevention at railroad 

right-of-ways (ROW). The DOT’S Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe 

Center), under the direction of FRA, was tasked with demonstrating an automated prototype 

railroad infrastructure security system on that site just outside of Rochester, in the State of New 

York. The main objective was to demonstrate a stand-alone video-based trespass monitoring and 

deterrent system for railroad infrastructure applications using Commercial-of-the-Shelf (COTS) 

technology. The system, initially intended to run for 1 year, was extended for an extra 2 years 

for evaluation purposes. 

Trespassing on railroads’ ROW has long been a safety concern, especially since many tragic 

incidents involve children and young adults. While railroad crossing-related incidents have been 

on a recent declining trend, trespassing fatalities have been holding steady at an average of just 

over 500 per year. As seen in Figure 1, the trespassing problem actually surpassed the crossing 

problem in 1996, the first year in which trespass-related fatalities outnumbered crossing-related 

fatalities [1]. Railway security is another developing concern, which has been gaining much 

more scrutiny since the terrorist events of September 2001, as well as the recent Madrid, 

Moscow, and London train bombings. Securing rolling stock, as well as the infrastructure (track 

and signals/switches, bridges, tunnels, and facilities), has become a top issue within the rail 

industry, as well as within all levels of government. Fatalities 

800 

700 

600 

500 

400 

300 

200 

100 

0 

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 

Year 

Trespass Fatalities 

Crossing Fatalities 

Figure 1. Railroad Trespassing/Crossing Fatalities (1990-2004) 

1 
1.1 Location 

A through-truss railroad bridge built in 1918 and owned by CSX Transportation was chosen for 

this demonstration project and is shown in Figure 2. The selection of this bridge, located in 

Pittsford, New York, was based both on the 1997 incident resulting in two trespass fatalities, as 

well as the bridge’s prior trespassing history. Although not documented, teenagers have been 

historically known to use this railroad bridge as a meeting place, and locals were using it as a 

shortcut. A pedestrian walkway that passes under the bridge on the eastern approach provides 

easy access to the bridge. The bridge is also often used as a fishing spot. The bridge itself lies 

about 800 feet east of the Monroe Avenue railroad crossing and spans the Erie Canal (see Figure 

3). It is situated at CSX Milepost 353.4, and the nearest crossing is designated identification 

number 521097M. The bridge was originally double-tracked, but only one track remains in 

place. The route serves as a mainline bypass around the city of Rochester and has centralized 

traffic control. An average of approximately nine freight trains travel over the bridge per day at 

speeds up to 60 mph. No regular passenger service exists on this line. The canal carries light 

boat traffic from May through November. 

Figure 2. Railroad Bridge Chosen for Demonstration Project 

2 
Figure 3. Location of the Railroad Bridge on the Erie Canal, Pittsford, New York 

1.2 Project Stakeholders and Contractors 

The Honorable Louise Slaughter, Pittsford’s representative in the U.S. House of Representatives, 

initiated the drive for the selection of this particular site for the FRA trespasser detection 

demonstration project. FRA tasked the Volpe Center with the design, installation, maintenance, 

and evaluation of a prototype system. The Volpe Center project staff then contacted the 

remaining stakeholders to develop a project team consisting of the major players. This list 

included the Village of Pittsford, the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office, and the CSX railroad 

company. Figure 4 lists the project’s major stakeholders and contractors. 

Stakeholders Support Contractors 

⇒ The Honorable Louise Slaughter >Doyle Security 

U.S. House of Representatives >Lauterborn Electric 

⇒ Federal Railroad Administration 

Office of Safety/Office of R&D >Winter’s Rigging 

⇒ Volpe Center Divisions >Frontier Communications 

Railroad Systems >Rochester Gas & Electric 

Infrastructure Protection and Operations 

 Advanced Safety Technology 

>Parsons Brinckerhoff 

⇒ CSX Transportation >Computer Sciences Corporation 

Don Lubinsky (Volpe in-house contractor) 

 Ed Sheehy >Transit Surveillance Systems 

⇒ Monroe County Sheriff’s Office >Telesite Systems 

⇒ Village of Pittsford, New York >Extreme CCTV 

Figure 4. Project Stakeholders and Support Contractors 

3 

2. System Technology and Operation 

The objective of this research project was to demonstrate a stand-alone video-based trespass 

monitoring and deterrent system for railroad infrastructure applications using COTS technology. 

Two major constraints existed: that the system be located out of the railroad’s ROW and not tie 

into any track-related circuitry. These restrictions prevented the usage of track-running signals, 

as well as mounting equipment on the bridge. The system was also initially expected to be 

operational for 1 year. The expected outcomes were as follows: 

• Detection of trespass events within a finite distance of the approach to a bridge. 

• Technology system interacting with a Doyle Security attendant. 

• An attendant on duty 24/7 to determine the nature of a trespasser alarm. 

• Attendant invoking steps necessary to reduce the likelihood of an incident. 

Planning and design began in 1999, and the system was installed in August 2001. Several 

surveillance approaches were extensively researched, and a potential system was drawn up as 

shown in Figure 5. The system was composed of video cameras, motion detectors, infrared 

illuminators, magnetometers, and speakers mounted on two poles, one on each end of the bridge 

monitoring the bridge entrance. A central processing unit (CPU), located on one of the poles and 

equipped with a remote video surveillance software package, received all of the inputs from 

these components and served as a communication point to the monitoring station as well as a 

repository for alarm images. Figure 6 shows a picture of one of the poles along with a brief 

description of each component. 

The system digitally recorded pre-alarm and post-alarm video on the pole-mounted CPU and 

transmitted video and data via a telephone line to the monitoring station upon alarm activation. 

A rebooting switch, connected to another telephone line, was located along the main power 

supply feed to the system components. In case of a malfunction, simply dialing in to the 

switch’s telephone number and entering a numeric code rebooted the whole system. 

Doyle Security developed an incident detection procedure. Such a procedure was necessary to 

ensure that the response by Doyle Security to a trespassing event was always appropriate. This 

was especially important if Doyle Security experienced a high level of employee turnover. The 

following lists the incident detection procedure developed for this project: 

1. Trespasser approaches bridge and trips motion sensors. 

2. System dials Doyle Security (if not already connected). 

3. Alarm sounds and Doyle Security attendant observes video screen. 

4. Attendant determines if a trespasser is present. 

5. If trespasser is present, attendant speed-dials the bridge loudspeakers and says: 

“WARNING. YOU ARE TRESPASSING ON PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ARE IN 

DANGER OF BEING STRUCK BY A TRAIN. LEAVE THE AREA 

IMMEDIATELY.” 

5 
110 VAC

110 VAC

BridgeDeck

6. If trespasser leaves, the incident is merely documented in Doyle Security’s record 

keeping system; otherwise the local sheriff and CSX police are notified, and the 

trespasser is warned again. 

7. Doyle Security sends weekly event logs to the Volpe Center (for evaluation purposes). 

Data 

Legend 

Camera Speaker Motion 

Detector 

Pole-mounted 

computer 

Phone line 

for voice, video 

or data 

Schematic not to scale. 

Video Data Voice

Magnetometer Power Supply 

Power 

Meter and 

Breakers 

Data Data

Legend

Camera Speaker Motion

Detector

Pole-mounted

computer

Phone line

for voice, video

or data

Schematic not to scale.

110 VAC 

110 VAC 

Bridge Deck 

Video Data Voice

Magnetometer Power Supply

Power

Meter and

Breakers

Data

Figure 5. Illustration of the Surveillance System Technology 

System Components 

Video Camera: daytime color and nighttime black and white. 

Infrared Illuminator: floods the scene with infrared lighting during 

nighttime, triggered by photoelectric sensor, invisible to human eye. 

Speaker: connected to a telephone line so that an authorized official can 

dial in and warn the trespassers via the amplified speaker system. 

Motion Detector: dual-technology motion detector combining stereo 

Doppler microwave technology (motion detection) with a dual element 

passive infrared sensor (heat detection). 

Magnetometer: used to screen out trains. 

Figure 6. Pole Configured with Monitoring and Detection Components 

6 
2.1 System Costs1 

System costs can be divided into five categories: design, installation, component, maintenance, 

and operating costs. Table 1 shows each system component’s cost. The complete system costs 

approximately $13,500, including the installation of two poles onto which the equipment was 

mounted. Table 2 shows the yearly operating and maintenance costs. The operating costs 

(security, telephone, and power) remained stable at a combined $2,660 per year, but increased to 

$5,020 in year three when the system was converted from dial-up video transmission to 

broadband Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL). The maintenance cost fluctuated, primarily due to 

unforeseen hardware breakdowns, but averaged $10,000 per year. A significant portion of this 

resulted from travel costs, as the system was remotely maintained from the Volpe Center in 

Cambridge, Massachusetts. It is estimated that, had a local contractor maintained the system, the 

maintenance costs would have been approximately $5,000 per year, or about half the actual 

maintenance cost. The other two types of system costs, those for design and installation, are very 

hard to estimate for a prototype. 

The cost of prototype development is usually significantly higher than just the combined cost of 

design and installation. This is mostly due to the extra work involved (and costs incurred) within 

the research and evaluation process. Since this prototype railroad infrastructure security system 

was the first of its kind, no similar research had been previously conducted. The true design and 

installation costs for this prototype trespasser deterrent system were approximately $200,000. 

Design and installation costs for other similar systems, however, could be reduced to an 

estimated $40,000 per site, far less than the cost of the prototype system. 

Table 1. System Component Costs 

Item Cost 

Video Recorder $ 2,500 

Video Camera (2) $ 2,000 

Infrared Illuminator (4) $ 3,000 

Speaker (2) $ 1,000 

Motion Detector (2) $ 1,400 

Magnetometer (2) $ 600 

Housing Enclosure $ 1,000 

Monitoring Computer $ 2,000 

Pole, Installed (2) $ 2,000 

Miscellaneous $ 1,000 

Total $ 13,500 

( ) indicates number of units 

1

 All monetary values are given in terms of year 2002 U.S. dollars. 

7 
Table 2. Yearly Operating and Maintenance Costs 

Service Cost 

Security $ 860

 Telephone (3 lines) $ 1,000

 Power $ 800

 Maintenance $ 10,000

 Total $ 12,660 

2.2 Three-Year Results 

The trespassing detection system installed at the bridge location was evaluated for a period of 3 

years starting in August 2001 and ending in August 2004. Some components were replaced, and 

others were added for extra detection capabilities throughout this period. The major 

configuration change occurred after the first year of operation when a decision was made to 

replace the original video recording component due to its high failure rate. The original 

configuration included a CPU and software from the Transit Surveillance Systems (TSS) 

Company. This arrangement, referenced as configuration 1, was used for about 1 year starting 

on August 16, 2001, and ending on July 3, 2002. It was in operational status for approximately 

143 days out of a total of 322 days before it was replaced (45 percent availability). 

Configuration 1 experienced many problems, including a complete hard drive crash forcing the 

system offline for about 2 months while the CPU was returned to the manufacturer for repair. 

The replacement hardware/software assembly, referenced as configuration 2, consisted of a CPU 

from Telesite and video surveillance software from QSR Visual Technologies Ltd. This second 

configuration went online on July 24, 2002, and remained until the end of the 3-year 

demonstration period. Configuration 2 was in operational status for 668 days out of the 754 

remaining days of the 3-year period (89 percent availability). Overall, the detection system was 

operational for a total of 811 days out of 1,095 days over the 3-year period (74 percent 

availability). The system was offline 112 days out of the 284 days, which occurred from 

December 2001 to March 2002 when the video recording system had to be returned to the 

manufacturer for repair. 

A total of 3,726 alarm events were recorded during the 3-year operational period, as shown in 

Table 3. These were separated into the following four different event categories for 

classification purposes: 

• Positive Detection–Alarm triggered by the presence of people 

• Railroad Operations–Alarm triggered by maintenance vehicles or trains traversing the 

bridge 

• Other–Alarm triggered by animals (birds, rats, cats, squirrels, dogs, or deer) or boats 

traveling in the canal 

• False Alarm–Alarm triggered by something not seen either in the pre-alarm or postalarm video images 

8 
Table 3. Event Type Distribution 

Event Type 

Breakdown (811 days online) 

Total % Avg./day 

Positive Detection 335 9 0.4 

 Railroad Operations 1,058 28.4 1.3 

Other 1,700 45.6 2.1 

False Alarm 633 17 0.8 

Total # Alarms 3,726 100 4.6 

Overall, the prototype railroad infrastructure security system detected nearly 4,000 events, or 4.6 

events per day, while the system was online. The presence of people was detected in 335 events, 

comprising 9.0 percent of all events detected by the system. These positive detection events 

included trespassing, as well as the detection of maintenance personnel on the bridge. 

Maintenance workers, who were mostly CSX employees, triggered 163 of the 335 alarms. A 

further 172 events involving around 280 people recorded over the 3-year evaluation period 

involved actual trespassing by people on or near the bridge. Appendix A details these events. 

The event type labeled Railroad Operations accounted for about 28 percent of all alarm events, 

including alarms triggered by the presence of maintenance vehicles and trains on the bridge. 

Event types known as Other equaled almost half of all recorded alarms, including alarms set off 

by the presence of animals and boats. It should be noted that large animals (dogs, deer, etc.) 

triggered many of these alarms, and these would have been difficult to mask without 

compromising the system’s trespassing detection capabilities. False Alarm events included all 

other alarms that could be deemed false since nothing out of the ordinary was seen in the video 

record for those alarms. Appendix B contains snapshots of a range of alarm events, including 

trespassing examples. 

2.2.1 Trespassing Event Data 

This section contains an analysis of the 172 trespassing data set, which Appendix A also records 

and details. Almost half of these occurred in the time period between 12 and 6 p.m., as shown in 

Figure 7. Although local officials assumed teenage trespassers triggered many events, most 

actually involved adults or a combination of adults and children. It takes well over 1 minute to 

walk briskly across the length of the bridge. Although any trespassing on rail property is 

considered dangerous, the most serious safety zone at this particular site is within the bridge 

itself. While 120 events involved trespassing at just the entrance of the bridge, a total of 52 

events involved an actual crossing of the bridge span by the trespasser(s). 

9 
0-6 AM 6 AM-12 PM 12 PM-6 PM 6 PM-12 AM 

Time of Day

Figure 7. Trespassing Events by Time of Day 

0 

10 

20 

30 

40 

50 

60 

70 

80 

90 

 Number of Trespassing 

Normalizing the yearly trespassing data gives yet another look at the final results. There were 

129 days in common within each year in which the system was in operational condition. There 

were 46 trespassing events for the first year, 18 for the second year, and 38 for the third year 

during the 129 days in common for each. Figure 8 shows these results normalized by train 

movements, assuming an average of 10 trains per day. A significant drop in the trespassing rate 

is clearly seen in Year 2, amounting to a reduction of over 60 percent from the first year. This 

trend, however, did not continue into the third year. The trespassing rate did increase from the 

Year 2 level but still showed a reduction from Year 1 of over 17 percent. Overall, this location 

experienced approximately 3 trespassing events per 100 train movements. 

0.0 

0.5 

1.0 

1.5 

2.0 

2.5 

3.0 

3.5 

4.0

Trespassing Rate per 100 Trains 

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 

Figure 8. Yearly Trespassing Rate per Common Online Periods 

(normalized per 100 train movements) 

10 
Figure 9 shows the normalized distribution (per 100 train movements) of the four event types per 

Common Online Periods encompassing 129 days in each of the 3 years. This shows a dramatic 

decrease in false alarm events over time. It also reflects the overall alarm event rate decrease 

achieved by the third year. When comparing Year 1 to Year 3, the overall alarm rate was 

reduced by roughly half, from 52 to 28 alarm events per 100 train movements. 

0 

5 

10 

15 

20 

25 

30 

35 

40 

45 

50 

E

vent Rate per 100 Trains 

Positive Detection 

Railroad Operations 

Other 

False Alarm 

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 

Figure 9. Event Type Distribution per Common Online Periods 

(normalized per 100 train movements) 

Figure 10 shows the monthly trespassing event rate over the 3-year period. As shown in Figure 

10, the period from April to October contained the highest number of trespassing events. 

9 

N

u

m

ber of Tres

p

assin

g E

vents 

8 

7 

6 

5 

4 

3 

2 

1 

0 

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 

Month 

Figure 10. Trespassing Events per Month (3 years) 

11 
0 

50 

100 

150 

200 

250 

300 

350 

400 

Number o

f False Alar

ms 

2.2.2 False Alarm Reduction 

Significant steps were taken throughout the evaluation period to reduce the false alarm rate. 

False alarms accounted for about one-third of all recorded alarm events in the first year of 

operation. This rate was successfully reduced to approximately 10 percent by the third year. 

Figure 10 shows the decrease in the number of false alarms throughout the evaluation period 

from 346 in Year 1 to 114 in Year 3. 

1 2 3 

Year 

Figure 11. Number of False Alarms per Year 

A wide variety of tools were used to address the false alarm rate issues. Other techniques were 

also applied to reduce the number of other non-positive detection events. In one instance, the 

sensitivities of the motion detectors were changed so that small animals would not trigger an 

alarm. After many iterations, a configuration was obtained that resulted in reducing animaltriggered alarms from over two per day to about three per month. Similarly, the range of the 

motion detectors was changed to minimize coverage of the canal. This had a greater effect on 

the east end of the bridge, since vessels pass under the bridge near the west side. Train events, 

comprising roughly 22 percent of all events, were almost eliminated by the end of the second 

year by rewiring the magnetometers and inserting a delay circuit (to hold the initial 

magnetometer signal even if subsequent faltering occurred). The magnetometers initially 

screened out most trains but usually had difficulties (signal faltering) with very slow moving 

trains, as well as railroad flat cars or lumber shipments/spine cars. Most of these modifications 

were made at the beginning of the third year of operation, and therefore their benefits are not 

clearly reflected when grouped with the data from the first 2 years for the overall results 

presented in this report. These modifications dramatically changed the makeup of the event 

distribution in the third year. The average number of total events was reduced to a bit over two 

per day in the third year, a vast improvement from the value of 5.9 per day during the first 2 

years. In addition, over 16 percent of all third-year events involved people trespassing within the 

detection area. 

12 
2.2.3 Other Observations 

First, an overall decrease in trespassing events was experienced over time. Given that the 

product used in configuration 2 was over 4.7 times operational compared to the product used in 

configuration 1, the trespassing rate actually decreased. An average of 0.4 trespassing events per 

day for configuration 1 occurred as compared to an average of 0.2 trespassing events per day for 

configuration 2, totaling a 50 percent reduction from the first year to the rest of the evaluation 

period. This observation reflects public awareness of the system and is independent of the 

hardware/software configuration. Secondly, animal detection capability increased with 

configuration 2 because this product’s configuration allowed for better pre-alarm recording, thus 

increasing the categorization of animal events and reducing the number of false alarm events. 

Figure 11 shows the percent distribution of the event types for the two hardware/software 

configurations over the 3-year period. 

0% 

10% 

20% 

30% 

40% 

50% 

60% 

Relative Frequency 

Configuration 1 (Year 1) 

Configuration 2 (Year 2) 

Configuration 2 (Year 3) 

Positive Detection Railroad Operations Other False Alarm 

Alarm Type 

Figure 12. Event Type Distribution of System Hardware/Software Configuration 

per Year 

Other key observations were made that were not scientifically studied as part of this project. 

First, the most active period of media coverage about the project occurred in June 2002, the time 

that marked the 5-year anniversary of the fatal trespassing incident involving two teens. The 

media exposure from that time could very well have contributed to public awareness of the 

dangers involved with trespassing on the bridge and therefore significantly lowered the 

trespassing rate for the second year (August 2002 to August 2003). In addition, the increase in 

trespassing rates in the third year could be attributed to the waning effect of the media exposure 

1 year earlier. Secondly, many trespassing events were triggered by repeat offenders who might 

have become desensitized to the warning system over the first 2 years, knowing that the police 

would not be called if they were there for only a brief period of time. 

2.3 Potential Benefits 

Potential benefits can be calculated by estimating the number of lives that were potentially saved 

due to the presence of the prototype railroad infrastructure security system. If the system 

functioned properly and the trespassers obeyed the warning to leave the bridge just before a train 

13 
Trespassers

Police 

Officer

arrival, it could be argued that lives could potentially have been saved. At least two events in 

which a total of four trespassers were removed from the bridge just minutes from a train arrival 

occurred during the 3-year evaluation period. These comprised over 1 percent of the 173 logged 

trespassing events. A third event involving one trespasser occurred just after the conclusion of 

the evaluation period. The following summarizes these close calls. 

Event 1: At 1:40 p.m. on October 20, 2001, two teens were detected on the east end of the 

bridge and were subsequently warned by the Doyle Security attendant (Figure 13a). They left 

the scene, and the system recorded the presence of an eastbound train 1 minute later (Figure 

13b). 

Figure 13a. Two Trespassers at 1:40 p.m. Figure 13b. Train at 1:41 p.m. 

Event 2: At 9:11 p.m. on June 20, 2002, two trespassers were detected on the east end of the 

bridge (Figure 14a). They were immediately warned by the Doyle Security attendant but did not 

leave the area. The attendant followed procedures and notified the local police who responded to 

the scene and physically removed the trespassers from the bridge at 9:28 p.m. (Figure 14b). The 

detection system then recorded the presence of a train 5 minutes later (Figure 14c). 

Trespassers 

Police 

Officer 

Figure 14a. Two Trespassers at 9:11 p.m. Figure 14b. Police at 9:28 p.m. 

14 
Figure 14c. Train at 9:33 p.m. 

Event 3: At 6:28 a.m. on September 8, 2004, one person was detected on the east end of the 

bridge and proceeded to walk across the bridge. The Doyle Security attendant subsequently 

warned the trespasser. He/she left the scene and the Doyle Security attendant noted the presence 

of a train immediately after. 

Figure 15. Trespasser Detected at 6:28 a.m. 

Since this trespasser warning system was built to screen out trains, a vast majority of train 

arrivals were not detected or recorded. Therefore, other high-risk incidents might have occurred 

uncomfortably close to a train crossing the bridge. 

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) calculated the value of a human life to be 

equivalent to $3 million, in terms of 2002 U.S. dollars [2]. The benefits gained from using this 

prototype system can be stated as “up to four lives or serious injuries saved in 3 years,” based on 

the two close-call events within the evaluation period detailed above. Using these values, 

savings of up to $12 million over 3 years could be achieved. 

15 
Additional potential benefits were demonstrated following the conclusion of the evaluation 

period when another close-call event involving one trespasser occurred. Furthermore, other 

benefits resulting from the potential incident preventions should be taken into account. These 

range from cost savings to the railroad company (temporary loss of track, public relations, and 

legal cost) and local government (emergency crews, coordination). These costs could be very 

significant especially if the incident resulted in the derailment of the train and/or spillage of 

hazardous materials in transport. In contrast, the system cost approximately $213,000 (prototype 

cost), with an annual maintenance and operation expense of under $13,000. 

2.4 Reliability and Redundancy Issues 

As noted by the high frequency of system downtime, this prototype configuration was plagued 

with reliability problems. This was especially true during the first year of operation. Since both 

the safety and security of the railway asset is at stake, any operational intrusion detection system 

should have a high degree of reliability, which includes the use of redundant components. Such 

a system should include backup or redundant components, such as an extra sensor, that could be 

used temporarily in case the primary sensing component failed. Infrared lighting was a 

component in the prototype system that regularly failed (lamp burning out). This issue was 

resolved by adding a second infrared light to each pole so that nighttime events could still be 

captured on video if one light was out. Failsafe operation should also be incorporated into any 

operation system so that if any component of the system experiences a possible failure, the 

appropriate warnings are transmitted to the appropriate channels. Self-diagnostic routines should 

be incorporated into these systems, periodically checking all sensory and communication 

components for failures and relaying any failure information to the appropriate monitoring 

stations (control center, maintenance personnel, wayside warning system, or oncoming train). 

These methods, combined with the use of high quality devices already proven in operational 

situations, should decrease system downtime and therefore increase reliability. 

The original system configuration was drawn up in 1999 and installed in 2001 before the 

September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These attacks spurred the acceleration of security-related 

technology innovation, which flooded the market with a host of new surveillance and detection 

systems. Much more integration currently occurs at the manufacturing level than just a few 

years ago. Many newer systems integrate various functions into complete sensor packages. One 

such example is the integration of radar sensors with video cameras and infrared lighting into a 

single package. In addition, many of these newer systems have since been proven in operational 

situations. As a result, many more reliable solutions exist now than in the period when the 

prototype system was first installed. 

16 
3. Lessons Learned 

Various issues not originally envisioned were identified throughout the project evaluation period. 

These issues range in scope from technical aspects of the system to operation and evaluation 

techniques and stakeholder issues. Some of these were addressed during the evaluation period, 

while others were simply noted as lessons learned from carrying out this project. Most of these 

added valuable insight to the project team, and these lessons should be carried through to other 

similar projects. 

3.1 Technical Lessons Learned 

The main objective of this research project was to demonstrate an automated video-based 

prototype railroad infrastructure security system using COTS technology mounted outside of the 

railroad ROW and not tied into railroad track circuitry in any way. Many technical lessons were 

learned throughout the evaluation period. Some of these issues were based on current railroad 

operation procedures. 

Probability of success increased with the use of proven technology. At the start of this project, 

no proven railroad infrastructure security system existed operationally. Most of the relevant 

technology had been specifically designed for either perimeter security applications or 

surveillance on moving vehicles (buses and light rail vehicles). Some of this technology had 

been used in operational situations but not in scenarios such as the one present in this project. In 

addition, given the existing security industry climate at the time of project initiation in 1999, 

only a few potential solutions existed. The original scope called for an evaluation period of 1 

year and so the system was designed accordingly for a temporary installation. This period was 

eventually extended to 3 years after system deployment, and, since most system components 

were only designed for temporary application, many of the components failed and had to be 

replaced throughout the evaluation period. The intrusion detection and warning system 

underwent several upgrades throughout its operational life, including the use of more reliable 

components, addition of backup sensory equipment, and upgrading of communication lines. 

Broadband video increases the probability of detection. It was noted in many instances that 

trespassing events were missed by the security monitoring company during the test period. In 

many cases, a trespasser would enter the restricted area, then depart the camera’s view within a 

few seconds. Because the original configuration for this system involved dial-up video 

transmission, about 25 seconds existed between the time the sensors detected an intruder and the 

time the first images were displayed to the monitoring company. In addition, it took several 

seconds to refresh each image, so fast moving objects were sometimes missed. Often, the report 

logs would describe “nothing seen,” when a review of the locally recorded video clearly showed 

a trespasser. These issues were resolved in the final configuration because the broadband 

connection enables constant live surveillance and instantaneous alarm notification, and the image 

refresh rate is greatly improved. 

Redundancy should be incorporated into as many components as possible. The security system 

depended on various sensors and other components that were each an integral part of the overall 

17 
system. Failure in any of these parts rendered the whole system inoperable. One such instance 

that occurred with great frequency throughout the 3-year period was the failure of the infrared 

lighting system on the west side of the bridge. Although the overall system was still able to 

detect and communicate alarm information, this failure resulted in obscured nighttime alarm 

images being sent to Doyle Security. The attendant was therefore unable to correctly determine 

the cause of the alarm in most nighttime events on the west side when infrared lighting was 

unavailable. This problem was addressed by the addition of a backup infrared lighting source 

(LED-based) on each side of the bridge. Incorporating redundant sensors and other components 

would ultimately increase reliability of the overall system. 

Failsafe design. The system should have automated failure notification capability. The tested 

system did not incorporate such a failsafe design. System abnormalities were detected either by 

the Doyle Security attendant when viewing alarm images or by Volpe Center evaluation 

personnel. The wayside system experienced failures that went undetected by this manual method 

for multiple days at a time. An automated failure detection capability would have reduced 

downtime by timely notification of system malfunction. Any similar system should incorporate 

a form of automatic routine that would generate and transmit a maintenance call if any abnormal 

condition is detected. 

System design should incorporate local recording as well as video transmission. Many instances 

occurred during this test where the locally recorded video revealed events and anomalies that 

would otherwise have gone undetected. While each of the configurations used in this test 

included local video recording which proved invaluable through the course of this project, it is 

possible to design a similar system that does not incorporate this feature. This capability is 

critical in order to review activity, to analyze system performance, or to perform forensic 

research. Fortunately, digital video recorder technology has improved immensely in recent 

years, enabling this feature to be included at a lower cost and with improved performance. 

3.2 Operation and Evaluation Lessons Learned 

Historically anecdotal information is not necessarily correct. All anecdotal information 

gathered from the local police, town representatives, and even the local media indicated that 

local teenagers used this particular site as a gathering place. As a result, most community efforts 

in the area were aimed at educating young people of the dangers of trespassing on railroad 

property. As evidenced by the 3-year evaluation period, most of this anecdotal information was 

a misconception. In fact, a great number of trespassing incidents on the bridge involved either 

adults or a combination of adults and small children. In addition, most used the bridge as a 

shortcut over the Erie Canal and not as a loitering spot. 

Local maintenance contractor decreases time-to-repair. Volpe Center personnel and contractor 

staff based out of Cambridge, Massachusetts, performed all of the repairs done on the wayside 

system. Thus, time-to-repair was usually measured in days (and sometimes weeks) since a trip 

had to be planned and potential repair scenarios had to be developed in advance. A contract with 

a local security systems vendor/integrator would have potentially decreased downtime 

significantly. This might not be a viable option, however, for remote locations and could also 

add significant maintenance costs. 

18 
Clear operation and maintenance plans must be developed and implemented. Protocols must be 

developed to address the range of operational situations from the positive detection of intruders 

or obstacles on the ROW to false detection or failure of the warning system. All affected parties 

(monitoring station, police, and evaluation team) should provide input to the operational plans 

and understand the entire realm of possible situations. A playbook covering all possible alarm 

types must be in place so that the monitoring attendant or any other designated authority initiates 

and documents the correct emergency action. Since some situations might only become apparent 

once they occur, the protocols should be adjusted accordingly. Feedback about the system from 

the affected parties, especially the monitoring station, should also be collected and analyzed 

regularly. This feedback could provide insight into issues that might necessitate creation of new 

protocols. 

3.3 Stakeholder Lessons Learned 

Cooperation between public and private stakeholders is essential. The major stakeholders must 

stay actively involved throughout the entire design, installation, and operational phases of the 

project. Initial enthusiasm must carry through and not wane as the project moves along. Regular 

meetings should be held with all primary stakeholders and constructive feedback collected. The 

high employee turnover rate at Doyle Security became a particular concern to the project 

evaluation team. This issue was not discussed with Doyle Security, and this decision was 

reflected in the results. Doyle Security’s alarm logbooks reflected this failure since the 

attendants were not following the same deterring and documenting procedure as originally 

planned. 

System costs. This project was fully funded by the FRA Office of Safety. Initial planning did 

not account for the eventual multiyear evaluation period nor did it include a realistic assessment 

of maintenance costs. Non-recurring costs, or one-time investments usually for hardware and 

installation expenses, were fairly understood from the beginning of the project. However, 

recurring costs, which include expenses related to operations, maintenance, and product 

replacement throughout the life of the project, were seriously underestimated. Maintenance costs 

were the biggest surprise, and much of it had to do with the unforeseen unreliability of many 

system components. Each maintenance call was very expensive because of unreliable 

components coupled with the decision not to have a local contractor service the system. 

19 

4. Conclusions 

The main objective of this prototype intrusion detection system was to provide an active layer of 

safety by allowing real-time monitoring of the railroad bridge and providing warnings to 

trespassers. The demonstration project proved that this could be accomplished using standard 

non-intrusive COTS components positioned outside the railroad’s ROW and not tied into track 

circuitry. Moreover, the results show that this prototype system might have helped save at least 

five lives from three separate trespassing incidents. The false alarm rate remained a particular 

problem throughout the 3-year period, although several remediation measures lowered these over 

time. In addition, component reliability became a major concern due to the long downtime 

periods generated by most component failures. 

The original prototype system dates back to 1999, which is a very long time when you consider 

how significantly the technology used in this project has changed over this 5-year period. The 

basic technology (magnetic, infrared, ultrasonic, acoustic, radar, and CCTV) has not changed 

much in the past few years. However, many new technologies, such as intelligent video, digital 

video recording, and broadband communications, have evolved significantly over this period. In 

addition, entire integrated detection systems have been developed within the past few years 

mainly for emerging applications related to Homeland Security. Much of today’s driving force 

behind railroad asset monitoring, both fixed and moving, stems from security concerns related to 

high-risk shipments and routes. Although not specifically designed for pedestrian or trespasser 

safety, most of these systems have the ability to address this safety issue. 

The results obtained from the testing of this prototype trespasser detection and warning system, 

aside from the false alarm rate, were very favorable in terms of the safety benefits accumulated 

over the 3-year evaluation period. This study also provided valuable lessons learned including 

information on a wide variety of maintenance, cost, and stakeholder cooperation issues. Another 

extremely favorable indicator was the technology transfer agreement achieved between FRA and 

CSX upon the conclusion of the evaluation period. This agreement effectively transferred the 

wayside system to CSX control, effectively extending the safety service it demonstrated during 

the 4-year period under Volpe Center control. The transfer occurred in September 2005. 

Ultimately, this prototype system could be used as a template for future railway asset monitoring 

systems. This platform could be adapted for use with new technologies and components to form 

next-generation intrusion detection and warning systems. This project demonstrated that 

monitoring, relaying real-time information to safety officials, and warning trespassers could be 

achieved by the use of COTS components. Furthermore, it showed that this could be 

accomplished off the railroad’s ROW, meaning that it could not only be installed and used by 

railroad companies, but also by local governments or other public entities whose interests include 

higher railroad safety, security, and mobility. The authors strongly recommend that a set of 

performance guidelines be established for these types of railway safety/security systems. 

21 

References 

1. Railroad Safety Statistics–Final Report 2001 (July 2003), Federal Railroad 

Administration, United States Department of Transportation, Washington, DC. 

2. Kirk, V.T., Lawson, L., Memorandum: Revised Departmental Guidance–Treatment of 

Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic Evaluations, Office of the Secretary of 

Transportation, United States Department of Transportation. January 29, 2002. 

Washington, DC. 

23 

Appendix A. 

Trespassing Events

Table A-1. 2001 Trespassing Events 

Date Time Comment Camera Doyle Information 

08/21 15:40 TX on east side 2 no record of alarm 

08/21 19:20 TX on east side 2 no record of alarm 

08/21 19:28 TX on east side 2 no record of alarm 

08/24 06:42 TX on west side 1 logged as “all ok”–TX not detected 

08/25 15:11 TX on west side 1 no record of alarm 

08/25 22:31 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

08/27 17:56 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/01 17:40 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/02 12:22 3 TXs on west side 1 logged as nothing seen–TX not detected 

09/03 17:28 3 TXs on west side 2 no record of alarm 

09/04 13:42 TX walk EW across 1-2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/04 20:26 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/08 17:56 2 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/13 07:56 2 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/15 14:56 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/18 21:30 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/21 12:36 TX on west side 1 logged as nothing seen–TX not detected 

09/22 12:32 TX on west side 1 nothing seen on vid but Doyle reported TX 

10/09 14:04 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/19 17:56 TX on east Side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/20 13:34 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/21 10:24 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/22 18:07 TX on east side 2 Doyle log missing for this date 

11/08 14:13 2 TXs on east side 2 System Down–Doyle not notified 

11/24 09:17 3 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

12/04 13:14 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

A-1 
Table A-2. 2002 Trespassing Events 

Date Time Comment Camera Doyle Information 

02/07 09:05 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

03/24 08:40 2 TX Xing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

03/27 14:00 1 TX Xing westbnd on 

ATV trackside 

2 logged as nothing seen 

03/27 14:04 1 TX Xing eastbnd on 

ATV trackside 

1 logged as nothing seen 

04/11 13:22 2 TX Xing eastbnd on 

bicycles 

1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/11 13:22 2 TXs Xing eastbnd 1/2 

04/12 14:12 1 TX Xing westbnd 2/1 alarm not recorded 

04/12 14:46 2 TX Xing eastbnd 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/21 01:30 1 TX Xing eastbnd 

with flashlight 

1/2 logged as nothing seen 

04/21 01:49 1 TX Xing eastbnd 

with flashlight 

1 logged as nothing seen 

05/04 08:43 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1/2 logged as nothing seen 

05/15 16:27 1 TX on east side 2 logged as nothing seen 

05/16 18:13 3 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

05/17 18:58 2 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

05/24 17:00 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded but warned by Doyle 

(as seen on video) 

05/25 07:33 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1/2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/25 16.47 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1/2 alarm not recorded but warned by Doyle 

(as seen on video) 

05/25 17:12 2 TXs on east side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/27 13:25 1 TX on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

05/28 19:03 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/28 20:14 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

06/17 16:19 3 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

06/18 08:23 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1 alarm not recorded 

06/19 11:45 3 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed (but 

speakerphone not working) 

06/19 12:46 7 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed (but 

speakerphone not working) 

A-2 
Table A-2. 2002 Trespassing Events (continued) 

06/20 21:17 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed (but 

speakerphone not working)-Doyle called 

PD and police officer responded and told 

them to leave; train passed through about 4 

minutes later 

07/28 19:27 2 TXs Xing westbnd 1 alarm not recorded 

07/28 19:34 2 TXs Xing eastbnd 1 alarm not recorded 

08/04 21:26 3 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

08/04 21:34 3 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

08/04 21:42 3 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

08/22 17:42 2 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

08/23 21:57 4 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/07 10:02 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/07 10:26 1 TX Xing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/12 14:14 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/14 19:21 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/21 13:07 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/26 12:46 1 TX crossing eastbnd 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/26 12:50 1 TX crossing eastbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/30 13:47 2 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

11/13 18:16 1 TX crossing eastbnd 2 alarm not recorded 

12/02 18:34 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed-PD 

contacted 

12/02 18:44 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

12/13 13:19 11-15 TXs east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

12/24 10:12 2 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

A-3 
Table A-3. 2003 Trespassing Events 

Date Time Comment Camera Doyle Information 

02/16 16:03 2 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

03/06 22:16 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

03/07 14:12 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

03/08 14:56 2 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

03/15 07:17 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

03/19 15:52 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/26 07:59 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/27 10:30 2 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/30 23:09 2 TXs on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

04/30 23:24 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

05/13 09:26 2 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed (911) 

05/14 18:54 1 TX crossing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/22 15:15 2 TXs crossing 

westbnd 

2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/22 15:26 2 TXs crossing 

westbnd 

1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/26 18:37 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/26 18:54 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/26 18:56 3 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

06/14 08:05 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

06/17 17:21 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

06/19 21:05 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

07/07 20:05 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/11 16:45 1 TX on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

07/12 03:23 3 TXs crossing 

westbnd 

2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/12 03:30 1 TX crossing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/17 16:54 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/18 20:52 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/19 22:01 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/20 19:20 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/22 19:48 2 TXs crossing 

westbnd 

2/1 alarm not recorded 

A-4 
Table A-3. 2003 Trespassing Events (continued) 

Date Time Comment Camera Doyle Information 

08/16 19:18 2 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

08/17 13:40 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

08/22 12:37 1 TX crossing eastbnd 1/2 alarm not recorded 

08/23 20:36 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

08/24 08:29 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

08/24 14:07 1 TX on west side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

08/24 15:18 1 TX crossing eastbnd 1/2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/03 06:38 1 TX crossing eastbnd 1/2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/12 19:41 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/13 09:07 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/21 11:55 3 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/27 12:11 3 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/28 13:44 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

09/29 15:07 1 TX on east side 2 alarm not recorded (but did receive alarm) 

10/03 12:05 1 TX on east side 2 alarm not recorded (but did receive alarm) 

10/11 14:23 2 TXs crossing eastbnd 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/11 15:03 2 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/11 15:22 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/12 18:27 1 TX on east side 2 alarm not recorded (but did receive alarm) 

10/13 11:15 3 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/13 17:48 1 TX on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

10/21 17:30 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

11/22 09:42 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

11/23 16:12 1 TX crossing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

11/26 13:05 3 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

12/02 17:16 1 TX crossing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

12/22 18:14 1 TX on east side 2 alarm not recorded 

12/24 21:41 1 TX crossing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

12/28 15:38 2 TXs crossing eastbnd 1/2 logged as TX/procedure followed-Police 

A-5 
Table A-4. 2004 Trespassing Events 

Date Time Comment Camera Doyle Information 

01/01 11:37 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

01/03 04:22 1 TX crossing westbnd 2/1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

01/04 01:31 1 TX crossing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

01/09 08:44 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded 

01/21 13:33 1 TX Xing 

eastbnd/westbnd 

1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

01/24 23:05 1 TX crossing westbnd 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

02/12 13:59 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

02/29 07:42 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

02/29 17:11 2 TXs Xing 

eastbnd/westbnd 

1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

02/29 17:48 2 TXs Xing westbnd 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/01 20:17 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/03 07:11 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/05 16:44 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/09 19:35 2 TXs Xing eastbnd 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/11 12:19 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/15 14:26 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1 alarm no recorded 

04/21 10:54 1 TX Xing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/21 11:03 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1 logged as possible CSX worker 

04/21 15:26 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

04/23 14:37 1 TX on east side 2 alarm no recorded 

04/24 14:19 1 TX on east side 2 alarm no recorded 

04/28 06:44 1 TX on west side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/08 18:03 1 TX Xing westbnd 2/1 alarm not recorded on Doyle’s Log 

05/16 06:57 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/16 11:11 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/16 15:12 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/22 03:21 1 TXs Xing eastbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/23 02:25 1 TXs Xing westbnd 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

05/25 15:17 1 TX Xing eastbnd 1 alarm not recorded on Doyle’s Log 

A-6 
Table A-4. 2004 Trespassing Events (continued) 

Date Time Comment Camera Doyle Information 

06/12 20:56 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

06/14 13:41 3 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded on Doyle’s Log 

06/29 00:16 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/11 14:32 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/12 02:50 3 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded on Doyle’s Log 

07/12 03:34 3 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded on Doyle’s Log 

07/17 21:20 2 TXs on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/28 13:53 1 TX on west side 1 alarm not recorded on Doyle’s Log 

07/28 15:05 2 TXs on east side 2 alarm not recorded on Doyle’s Log 

07/30 16:58 2 TXs on east side 2 logged as TX/procedure followed 

07/31 18:15 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

08/05 21:50 1 TX on west side 1 logged as TX/procedure followed 

08/15 16:15 3 TXs on east side 1 alarm not recorded on Doyle’s Log 

A-7 

Appendix B. 

Sample Alarm Event Pictures 

The following images depict actual alarm events (positive detection). 

Figure B-1. Trespassing Event (people on tracks) 

Figure B-2. Trespassing Event (people on tracks) 

B-1 
Figure B-3. Trespassing Event (people on tracks) 

Figure B-4. Trespassing Event (person on tracks) 

Figure B-5. Trespassing Event (people on tracks) 

B-2 
Figure B-6. Trespassing Event (people on tracks) 

Figure B-7. Trespassing Event (person on tracks) 

Figure B-8. Trespassing Event (people on tracks) 

B-3 
Figure B-9. Trespassing Event (people on tracks) 

Figure B-10. Trespassing Event (person on tracks) 

Figure B-11. Trespassing Event (people on tracks) 

B-4 
Figure B-12. Maintenance Worker on Track (Positive Detection) 

Figure B-13. Maintenance Worker on Track (Positive Detection) 

Figure B-14. Maintenance Vehicle (Railroad Operations) 

B-5 
Figure B-15. Train (Railroad Operations) 

Figure B-16. Animal (Other) 

Figure B-17. Boat (Other) 

B-6 
Appendix C. 

Acronyms 

CCTV Closed Circuit Television 

COTS Commercial-off-the-shelf 

CPU central processing unit 

DOT Department of Transportation 

DSL Digital Subscriber Line 

FHWA Federal Highway Administration 

FRA Federal Railroad Administration 

LED light emitting diode 

RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration 

ROW right-of-way 

TSS Transit Surveillance Systems 

TX Trespasser 

C-1