U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

96–314 PDF 2004

DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS: WHAT IS CONGRESS

GETTING FOR ITS MONEY?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 21, 2004

Serial No. 108–208

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

——— ———

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director

NICHOLAS COLEMAN, Professional Staff Member and Counsel

TONY HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 21, 2004 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

O’Connell, Tom, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Rear Admiral David Kunkel, U.S.

Pacific Command; and Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon, U.S. Southern Command ................................................................................................ 14

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................ 11

Kunkel, Rear Admiral David, U.S. Pacific Command, prepared statement

of ..................................................................................................................... 31

Mixon, Brigadier General Benjamin, U.S. Southern Command, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 37

O’Connell, Tom, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, prepared statement of ..................... 16

Souder, Hon. Mark E., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Indiana:

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 4

Prepared statement of General Sattler ................................................... 55

(1)

DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS: WHAT IS

CONGRESS GETTING FOR ITS MONEY?

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND

HUMAN RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Cummings, and Norton.

Staff present: J. Marc Wheat, staff director and chief counsel;

Nicholas Coleman, professional staff member and counsel; John

Stanton and David Thomasson, congressional fellows; Malia Holst,

clerk; Tony Haywood, minority counsel; and Cecelia Morton, minority office manager.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee hearing will come to order.

Good morning. Because of the consistent jurisdictional focus of

this subcommittee on the President’s National Drug Control Strategy, we pay very close attention to demand reduction, treatment,

and drug supply and interdiction initiatives. Our oversight activities continually evaluate departmental authorizations, appropriations, and the efficiency and effectiveness of departmental efforts.

The President’s budget request, now before Congress, asks for approximately $12.6 billion for the Strategy in 2005. The Department

of Defense is to be appropriated almost 15 percent of that sum.

The most compelling reason for my tenacity in this regard is the

loss of life due to drugs in my district and all over this great Nation. This year, more than 21,000 Americans died from drug-related causes. We have never lost this many Americans annually to a

single military or terrorist campaign. This staggering statistic is

significant when placed in perspective: we have lost in excess of

600 brave Americans in Iraq since Operation Enduring Freedom

began, which is about 2.9 percent of those lost to drugs over the

same period of time. We have lost more Americans to drugs than

were killed in any single terrorist act to date. It is vitally important that we maintain vigorous efforts to control the sources of supply for narcotics and to interdict them before reaching the United

States.

The Department of Defense has been appropriately authorized to

conduct counternarcotics missions and was designated the lead department for many counternarcotics command, control, detection,

monitoring, and training responsibilities in the 1989 DOD authorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
2

ization bill, among other authorities. The Department has been appropriately funded in fiscal year 2003 with a final budget authority

for DOD narcotics activities of $905.9 million. Fiscal year 2004 saw

an increase in the narcotics budget to $908.6 million but the fiscal

year 2005 budget request is $852.7 million. In addition, the Department requested and received $73 million in supplemental funds for

counternarcotics activities in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility. It remains unclear to me how that appropriation has

reduced the growth, processing, transshipment, and availability or

street price of drugs from Central Asia.

A significant problem is the allocation of national resources to

counternarcotics missions. Many of our most significant interdiction assets are operated by the Department of Defense. The subcommittee staff received briefings at the Joint Interagency Task

Force South in Key West and at the U.S. Southern Command that

suggest that the redirection of national resources away from drug

control missions in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility to combat missions in the CENTCOM area of responsibility have had dire

negative impacts on drug interdiction in the Western Hemisphere.

Some detection and interception programs have only a minuscule

proportion of the amount of resources that Government experts

have deemed necessary for an adequate detection and interdiction

program. This allocation of resources must be addressed vigorously

and quickly by the Department of Defense.

Our witnesses today have some of the significant responsibilities

for operational matters relating to narcotics supply reduction and

interdiction, and I appreciate very much the opportunity to have

them here to survey the status, effectiveness, and spending priorities of these critical programs. For example, many of these responsibilities are carried out in the U.S. Southern Command area of responsibility and specifically in the Andean Region. For several

years, the U.S. Southern Command personnel have been training

Colombian military pilots and the Counternarcotics Brigade. The

expanded authorities in Colombia allow personnel and equipment

to be employed against both narcotics and terrorist threats. This

year, the Department has requested an increase in the personnel

limitation in Colombia, to facilitate greater training opportunities,

among other things. It is clear that we are seeing real and tangible

successes in Colombia, and I very much appreciate the Command’s

efforts to support the counternarcotics efforts of President Uribe

and Vice President Santos, with whom I have had the opportunity

to spend a significant amount of time. The attorney general of the

United States has indicted members of both the FARC and the

AUC for using drug proceeds to support their terrorism.

I want to add one thing we learned just yesterday morning in

Detroit, as we held a hearing on meth. At one point two big busts

in Detroit were 40 percent of the meth precursors in the United

States being shipped to California for the super labs, but the feeling of our Federal agencies is that the meth precursor chemicals,

trafficking has shifted—not that the production has changed from

Belgium and the Netherlands—but it has shifted to the south and

to the west, coming from Asia and back up through the south. So

when we effectively try to do homeland security at the borders,

looking more closely for other things, and as we have transferred

3

agents up to the north, nearly a 50 percent increase in the Department of Homeland Security to the north border and those big crossings, we have another impact on counternarcotics, which puts more

pressure on the two commands we have here today if it is coming

through the Asian side or up through the southern side, and now

not down through Canada. We are not absolutely convinced of that

trend, but that is what we heard from the major Federal agencies

yesterday in Detroit.

We will consider the Department’s response to rapidly emerging

new threats such as the connection between terrorist and drug trafficking organizations. The resumption of large-scale heroin production in Afghanistan breeds instability and directly funds terrorist

groups. The President has announced to the world that terrorists

and sponsoring nations are our enemies. What efforts are underway to destroy the funding source of these enemies? The eradication of opium poppy, the interdiction of precursor chemicals traffickers, and the destruction of the stockpiled drugs and processing

facilitates in Afghanistan directly carry out the intent of the Commander in Chief’s National Drug Control Strategy.

Today we will try to determine more precisely what has been the

focus of effort and the effect of the Department’s counternarcotics

program worldwide and what steps can be taken to ensure the adequacy of interdiction resources, and determine whether resources

will ever return to previous levels. Clearly, our plate this morning

is very full, and I welcome our witnesses. From the Department of

Defense we have Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Mr. Thomas O’Connell, who also

recently testified before the subcommittee on the Andean

Counterdrug Initiative, and we welcome you back. The second

panel, actually, we have combined you into one panel and appreciate Mr. O’Connell accommodating that. We have here representing the Combatant Commands, where most of our supply reduction

is authorized and appropriated. Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon

will speak for the U.S. Southern Command and Rear Admiral

David Kunkel will speak for the U.S. Pacific Command. Unfortunately, our invited witnesses from the U.S. Central Command,

which would include Afghanistan, was not available to testify, so

we look forward to receiving the testimony separately in the future.

Certainly there is no lack of important issues for discussion, and

I expect today’s hearing to cover a wide range of pressing questions. We welcome all of you and I look forward to discussion.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]

4

5

6

7

8

9

Mr. SOUDER. I now yield to our ranking member, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In both the past and the current fiscal year the Department of Defense received more than $900 million for counter and drug activities that support the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy. Roughly half of this money supports international interdiction

efforts, mainly focused on stopping the flow of cocaine and heroin

from the Andean Region and Mexico into the United States.

Another important geographic area of focus is Afghanistan, the

world’s leading producer of heroin and the primary source of heroin

destined for Europe. In both the Andean Region and Afghanistan,

proceeds from drug cultivation, production and trafficking have

been linked to terrorists, insurgent and criminal activities that aim

to undermine efforts to achieve and sustain democracy and the rule

of law abroad, and to harm American civilians at home.

Imported legal drugs destroy thousands of lives each year and

destroy communities throughout these United States. The attacks

on September 11 brought home the fact that foreign drug proceeds

helped to advance the murderous objectives of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda. DOD counterdrug programs provide vital support for U.S. counterdrug and counternarco-terrorism activities in

the areas of interdiction, intelligence, and detection and monitoring

of drug smuggling routes and transit zones, often working in conjunction with Federal law enforcement agencies and allied militaries through task forces like the Joint Interagency Agency West.

DOD also provides important support to domestic drug control efforts such as through its internal demand reduction efforts and by

providing training and other support to State and local law enforcement through the National Guard. Both domestically and internationally, the drug trade threatens stability, security, and the rule

of law. And in both contexts, the post-September 11 focus on terror

poses challenges that affect the way Federal dollars and resources

are allocated to fight the war on terror and the war on drugs.

In Afghanistan, where opium production has skyrocketed since

American forces removed the Taliban from power, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes has stressed that the war on terror and the war on drugs are in effect the same war, that the drug

trade is the primary threat to security and stability in Afghanistan.

If the Afghan drug trade is not attacked aggressively, UNODC has

warned that Afghanistan could evolve again into a failed state, controlled this time by drug cartels and narcoterrorist organizations.

Such an outcome would be disastrous not only for Afghanistan and

its neighbors, but for the United States and our allies who are in

the cross hairs of the terrorist organizations that would benefit

from a lawless Afghanistan.

A similar situation exists in Colombia, where we have in effect

collapsed the distinction between terrorist and drug organizations

because of the interdependency that exists between the drug trade

and the terrorists. A key distinction, however, is that as deeply as

we have become involved in supporting Colombia’s fight against

narcoterrorism, American troops in Afghanistan are on the front

lines, and this is unequivocally our war.

Mr. Chairman, the U.S. military faces a difficult challenge in

managing its overlapping mandates to fight war on terror and the

10

war on drugs on the same geographic fronts. The witnesses before

us today are charged with managing that important challenge. I

look forward to hearing their testimony concerning the role of the

Department of Defense on fighting the war on drugs, and I am interested in hearing their views on how the military can or should

adapt to fight the war on drugs and the war on terror in a more

synergistic fashion in light of the clear linkages that have been established between the two.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me express my gratitude to the men

and women in uniform who are charged with carrying out the military’s mandates to protect our Nation from the twin threats of

drugs and terrorism. We are deeply indebted to them for their courageous service to our Nation, and we thank them.

Thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

11

12

13

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.

Before we move forward, I want to take a point of personal privilege and salute an important member of my staff, John Stanton.

John came to our staff in December 2002 as a congressional fellow

from what was then the U.S. Customs Service. It is now the U.S.

Immigrations and Customs Enforcement [ICE] Bureau of the Department of Homeland Security. As our staff expert on narcotics

interdiction and related issues, John has provided us with excellent

analysis and a wealth of experience. His assistance in setting up

our subcommittee’s hearings and briefings, his depth of knowledge

of source zone issues in Colombia, Central Asia, and other regions,

and perhaps, most important, his kindness and generosity to all of

us who work with him have been invaluable.

John’s career of public service began in 1979 with the U.S. Marine Corps, with whom he served 6 years. In 1989, he joined U.S.

Army Special Forces and attained the rank of Captain. A graduate

of the Emory-Riddle Aeronautical University, John flew with Eastern Airlines, then joined the U.S. Customs Service as a law enforcement officer and pilot in 1991. He has flown missions in nearly

every type of aircraft owned by U.S. law enforcement and in such

diverse locations as El Paso, TX; Tucson, AZ; Puerto Rico, Panama,

Mexico, Colombia, and Peru.

Prior to joining our subcommittee staff, John was assigned to the

operational staff of U.S. Customs headquarters. During his time

there, John was placed in charge of air security for the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City, UT, coordinating between headquarters and

agents in the field. Earlier this month, John was recalled for duty

as a member of the U.S. Army Reserve and will be reporting to

base next week. He is scheduled to serve in Iraq as part of our Nation’s ongoing efforts to establish peace, justice, and democracy in

that troubled region of the world.

John, it has been an honor to work with you. Please accept our

heartfelt thanks for your service to this subcommittee and our best

wishes for your continued success and our prayers for your safe return home.

I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative

days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing

record, and that any answers to written questions provided by the

witnesses also be included in the record. Without objection, it is so

ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and

other materials referred to by Members and witnesses may be included in the hearing record, and that all Members be permitted

to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, so ordered.

As you all know, it is our standard practice to ask witnesses to

testify under oath. Would you please rise so I can administer the

oath?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that each of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

We begin today with Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas

O’Connell. Welcome back to our subcommittee. We very much were

thrilled that your position was filled. We are glad you are at the

14

Department of Defense working with these issues and glad you

could come again to talk today. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENTS OF TOM O’CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT; REAR ADMIRAL DAVID KUNKEL,

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN MIXON, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

Mr. O’CONNELL. Chairman Souder, Representative Cummings, it

is my pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense programs and policies that assist nations around

the world in their battle against narcoterrorism. I have a longer

statement to be placed in the record, but I would like to briefly

touch on the Department’s counternarcotics efforts at home and

abroad.

Chairman Souder and Representative Cummings, let me thank

you for the excellent impressions of your opening remarks; both of

you were right on the mark. And I would like to also thank you,

Mr. Chairman, for allowing us to join together as one panel, and

it is indeed a pleasure to serve with these two distinguished flag

officers.

Fighting narcotics is a complex process that requires coordination and funding from all levels of government agencies, local and

State, law enforcement, and the foreign countries we assist. We are

increasingly aware of linkages between terrorist organizations, narcotics trafficking, weapons smuggling, kidnapping rings, and other

transnational networks. Terrorist groups such as the FARC in Colombia, al Qaeda in Afghanistan, and groups around the world can

finance key operations with drug money.

The Department of Defense, with our counterparts in the Department of State and other Government agencies, seeks to systematically dismantle drug trafficking networks both to halt the flow of

drugs into the United States and bolster the broader war on terrorism. The Department has requested roughly $853 million for these

efforts in fiscal year 2005. While this is lower than the total $908

million appropriated in fiscal year 2004, this is due primarily to the

$73 million in funding added to this year’s emergency supplemental to support our efforts in Afghanistan and in neighboring

nations, and that is much appreciated. Our baseline fiscal year

2005 counternarcotics budget request includes resources to continue and sustain these efforts.

The Department is bolstering border security by providing communications systems for the border police, building police infrastructure in the border regions and improving information between

law enforcement and military intelligence. Our activities are fully

coordinated with, and in support of, the United Kingdom and the

State Department. To support similar efforts in Colombia, the Department forwarded to the Congress a request for reprogramming

$50 million during this fiscal year. I am pleased to report that the

Department will maintain its emphasis on Colombia by increasing

our efforts in Colombia in fiscal year 2005 by $43 million. This support will help President Uribe and his military execute Colombia’s

Plan Patriota as they extend a government presence in areas that

have been isolated for decades. The Colombian military is now exeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
15

cuting a well coordinated and joint military campaign against the

FARC. As you know, to better assist the Colombians, we and the

State Department have asked for congressional support in raising

the current personnel cap in Colombia.

In the Pacific Region, we are bolstering an already well established counternarcotics program in Southeast Asia, where our

Asian partners face a challenging combination of terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and a serious need for increased maritime

security.

Our international counternarcotics support is predominantly in

response to requests from our principal partners, the Department

of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration. It includes deployments and programs to train and furnish intelligence and operational support for drug detection monitoring and provide equipment to partnering counterdrug forces.

Domestically, the Department continues to work through the

U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard with the Department of Homeland Security and law enforcement agencies to coordinate counternarcotics efforts in the United States. The National Guard is an exceptional partner to law enforcement in domestic counternarcotics missions, requiring militarily-unique skills,

including air-ground recognizance, intelligence analysis, and training for law enforcement agencies. The Department is maintaining

our National Guard support to law enforcement along the southwest border and adding linguist translation centers in California

and Washington to capitalize on the language skills of our guardsmen in those areas.

In terms of the Department’s demand reduction efforts, it is our

continuing view that illegal drug use is incompatible with a service

member’s sensitive and dangerous duties. The Department’s demand reduction policy sets minimum testing rates at 100 percent,

meaning each service member is tested at an average of once per

year. Increased drug testing began in fiscal year 2005, with a goal

of reaching 100 percent testing for all military and civilian personnel by fiscal year 2006. This cost-effective drug testing, along with

punitive consequences for service members who are identified as

drug users will continue to deter drug use amongst military personnel and help ensure the readiness of our armed forces.

I would like to thank you, Chairman Souder, Representative

Cummings and members of the committee, for the tremendous support you have provided to the Department. I look forward to answering your questions. And as an aside, I would just like to add

my personal thanks and best wishes to John Stanton, who will be

joining the Special Operations community. We salute his past service and wish him well as he goes in harm’s way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Connell follows:]

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Admiral Kunkel.

Admiral KUNKEL. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cummings,

and distinguished members of the committee.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on the Joint Interagency

Task Force West’s counterdrug initiatives and the role we play in

helping the U.S. Pacific Command, USPACOM, achieve enhanced

security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Joint Interagency Task Force West stood up in 1989 as a subordinate command to USPACOM serving as its executive agent in

counterdrug programs. The command has a distinguished record of

providing DOD unique resources to Federal law enforcement agencies in support of their efforts to detect and monitor drug shipments and providing actionable intelligence, enabling U.S. law enforcement to interdict those shipments. Specifically, the command

has directly contributed to the seizure or disruption of over 240

metric tons of cocaine with an estimated value of $5 billion. During

fiscal year 2003, a ASPIC/USSOUTHCOM agreement realigned responsibilities allowing JIATF West to relinquish its counterdrug efforts in the eastern Pacific to JIATF South in order to focus our

resources entirely toward Asia.

JIATF West provides support to various U.S. Country Teams in

embassies throughout the Asia-Pacific region. This support includes unique analytical capability, as well as training and facility

improvements which enhance the professionalism and capabilities

of partner nation police and military units with a counterdrug mission. Our goal is to facilitate effective interagency cooperation and

multilateral application of effort to reduce and contain drug trafficking.

To further integrate JIATF West programs with other

USPACOM components, Admiral Fargo directed the relocation of

JIATF West to USPACOM headquarters during fiscal year 2004.

This relocation is ongoing and the JIATF West command staff will

be in place in June. We expect JIATF West to achieve full operational capability in Hawaii by December of this year.

Let me conclude these remarks by saying we anticipate the activities of JIATF West will expand significantly over the next 5

years in conjunction with USPACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan and Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and these activities will complement Department of State programs in the region.

Thank you for your support and the opportunity to testify before

your committee.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Kunkel follows:]

31

32

33

34

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

General Mixon, Southern Command.

General MIXON. Yes, sir. Thank you. If I may make an off-thecuff comment in reference to the effect of drugs on the United

States per your comment. We at U.S. Southern Command view

drugs and its movement into the United States as a weapon of

mass destruction, and we treat it accordingly. And I think my comments will focus on that particular aspect.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cummings, distinguished members

of the committee, thank you for allowing me a few minutes to make

some opening comments.

We at U.S. Southern Command are fully committed to meeting

DOD’s responsibilities in the fight against drugs and

narcoterrorists. We fulfill these responsibilities through detection

and monitoring programs, close interagency coordination, and military support to partner nations. Our programs cover the entire

SOUTHCOM area of responsibility, including Central and South

America and the Caribbean Basin.

Our principal agent in the planning and execution of the detection and monitoring effort leading to the end game, that being

interdiction and apprehension, is the National Joint Interagency

Task Force South, or JIATF South. JIATF South is a one-of-a-kind

premier organization of excellence for multiservice, multination,

and multiagency support to the counterdrug mission. Their operations in conjunction with USSOUTHCOM deliver an integrated

approach to meeting DOD mission sets in the war against drugs

and narcoterrorists.

Colombia is the source zone of 90 percent of the cocaine and 70

percent of their heroin here in the United States, and much of our

efforts are necessarily centered there. Still, we recognize the importance of the transient zones of Central America, the Pacific and the

Caribbean, as well as the source zones in Bolivia and Peru as our

other focus areas. Our efforts in Central America include daily

interdiction efforts, where we have conducted 18 major surge

counterdrug operations last year.

We remain strong partners with our Caribbean friends. We have

also deployed counterdrug training teams to Ecuador, Bolivia and

Peru as the primary source countries assisting Colombia in their

fight continues to be in the United States’ best interest and a top

priority for U.S. Southern Command. In close coordination with the

U.S. Department of State, we continue to provide a full range of

support to the Colombian Government, its security forces and its

people. This includes training and equipping of both the military

and police, assisting the Ministry of Defense with development of

a modern budget and logistic organizations, assisting them in their

narcoterrorist demobilization programs, and providing humanitarian assistance to populations most dramatically affected by this

narcoterrorist war.

Two of our most successful training and equipment programs remain the extensive support we have provided the Colombian

Army’s Counternarcotics Brigade and the Infrastructure Security

Strategy Program, which has dramatically reduced the number of

narcoterrorist attacks on Colombia’s northern oil infrastructure. I

would like to emphasize that all of our training and advising proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
35

grams operate under strict rules of engagement that prohibits U.S.

military personnel from actually participating in combat operations. In other words, they operate from a secure base.

The continuation of expanded authorities is the single most important factor for us to continue building success in Colombia. This

legislation has allowed us to use funds that were once only available for strictly defined counterdrug activities to provide assistance

to the government of Colombia for a coordinated campaign against

the narcoterrorist and its legal eagle armed groups who fuel the

drug trade. The granting of expanded authority was an important

recognition that no meaningful distinction can be made between

the terrorists and drug traffickers in our region. All three of Colombia’s terrorist groups are deep into the illicit narcotics business.

Measures of effectiveness are very difficult to gage in the

counterterrorist mission, but over the last several years we have

seen some encouraging results. As you know, we recently restarted

the Air-Bridge Denial Program in Colombia. Since the program restarted, there have been 14 aircrafts forced down, 11 of those destroyed on the ground, and 7.9 metric tons of drugs seized.

In Colombia, the primary source zone country, our support to the

Colombian security forces has also resulted in good results. Using

calendar year 2002 and 2003 data, which roughly corresponds to

the inception of expanded authorities, the Colombian security

forces have experienced dramatic successes in all fronts. A few examples: In 2003, the homicide rate has been the lowest since 1987,

approximately 52 per 100,000 capita; the capture of over a dozen

mid-level members and one senior level member of the FARC leadership; restoration of the Government of Colombia’s presence in all

of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities; and a 48 percent reduction in

the terrorist attacks on Colombia’s infrastructure. Most important,

the people of Colombia feel free to move about their country under

this new level of security.

As these indicators demonstrate, we have been increasingly successful; however, we have been able to achieve these results with

a decrease in both surface and air interdiction and detection assets

due to the demands in prosecuting the global war on terror worldwide. We have continued to be increasingly successful due to a better information sharing, better information flow, and improved

granularity of information coming from United States, European,

Latin American law enforcement agencies. Also, our European allies have provided air and maritime assets to offset some of our

shortfalls.

In conclusion, we continue to press forward successfully in our

fight against narcoterrorists in the drug trade. We are encouraged

by Colombia’s success and recognize that they are at a critical point

in their history, which is central to our counternarcotics fight.

Under the leadership of President Uribe, who enjoys a very high

approval rating, approximately 75 to 80 percent of the population,

the military and police have regained areas long held by the

narcoterrorists. They have also dealt serious blows to the leadership of these groups and have embarked on a strategic offensive to

dismantle the FARC. Our commitment to support them at this

juncture is critical. We will also continue our efforts in the rest of

SOUTHCOM’s AOR, understanding that despite our focus on CoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
36

lombia, our other missions in the transient and remaining source

companies will be key to success.

I appreciate this opportunity to highlight the great counternarcotics work done by the men and women at U.S. Southern Command and all they are doing in the interest of regional and United

States and national security. I look forward to answering your

questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Mixon follows:]

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

Mr. SOUDER. I want to thank each of you, and directly through

you, to thank the men and women in our armed forces who are assisting us in these efforts. We very much appreciate the successes

we have seen in Colombia. In fact, Colombia, in many ways, is a

model for what we would hope would happen in Iraq; that as we

move in the development of a stable nation and a democracy there,

that our forces would, if anything, be supplemental, supporting

local police and military forces that we supply our allies, rather

than having to fight the battles for freedom. And in Colombia, unlike what we saw in Vietnam in many cases, or in Iraq right now,

they are actually on the front lines fighting and dying because of

our narcotics use, and it is our brave men and women providing

the assistance and technical training to do that, and it is a model

really of how it should work, and it is why we are at least seemingly turning the corner in Colombia.

General MIXON. Sir, if I can make a comment on that. In my visits down there, and I average about once a month going to Colombia to work with their military, it is clear to me that their military

and their civilian administration does not want the United States

to pursue this fight. They appreciate the assistance, they need the

assistance and the expertise that we bring to the battlefield, but

they understand this is their fight to win, and they want to be the

ones that win the fight, and not have U.S. forces doing the fighting

for them.

Mr. SOUDER. I am going to ask unanimous consent to insert into

the record an unclassified statement from Major General John

Sattler, U.S. Marine Corps, Director of Operations U.S. Central

Command. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The prepared statement of General Sattler follows:]

55

56

57

58

59

60

Mr. SOUDER. We are disappointed that CENTCOM couldn’t be

here today, and I want to start this part of the questioning with

some questions to Mr. O’Connell regarding Afghanistan.

We recently held a hearing where we called in the Department

of State because our understanding was that we are on the verge

of the largest production of heroin that has ever come out of Afghanistan. If this occurs on our watch, and we understand that

Britain has the primary responsibility for eradication, it would be

a shame. One of the things that came forth at that hearing was a

memo and guidelines. But first I want to know, from the best you

can say, how many labs and warehouses with heroin have been destroyed in Afghanistan, and where and when have we been aggressively pursuing that?

The eradication is under Britain, and that is what we covered in

our last hearing. Much of this gets stockpiled and is in different

places, and we at times know where it is, and the question is what

are we doing about it.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Thank you, Chairman Souder, for your question.

It is not an easy one to answer with any great accuracy, but I can

tell you that we have recently queried U.S. Central Command, and

I do regret also that Central Command could not be represented.

General Sattler could not be released from theater, and his deputy

has a seriously ill father, but they had every intention to appear

and have in fact appeared before.

I have met with General Sattler and, in fact, received responses

last night specifically to a listing of which labs have been hit, on

what date, and what amounts have been confiscated to date. They

go back into the early March timeframe, so that is all the information I have insight into. I will tell you that some of these lab attacks have been extremely successful. The problem I have is that

they have classified their list of successes, and I would be happy

to provide that to the committee in either a closed session or

through the appropriate security procedures.

But we do have a procedure that has now been placed in

CENTCOM that has specific requirements for CENTCOM forces

that requires them to do certain things during discovery of drugs

during normal operations. As you know, we are not involved in the

eradication. They have a policy now where the DEA will be notified, certain intelligence fusion centers will be alerted, drug caches

over 10 kilograms will kick into action several activities by the intelligence fusion center there, the DEA and UK forces, and they are

encouraged and have specific procedures to follow when encountering drugs and drug labs.

And I think I need to leave it there, again due to the classification of the response from CENTCOM, but I would be happy to provide that to you, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. I appreciate that. And we will look for such a closed

session. Let me ask a brief question, because I want to do two followup questions with this.

Do we classify in Colombia where we have blown up storehouses

or warehouses, or is that information that is available in a public

forum?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Sir, there are certain portions of that information that we do in fact classify, simply to protect where those locaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
61

tions were and where future operations might be conducted. We do

have unclassified versions of those briefings that we do present to

folks that come through U.S. Southern Command that have an interest in drug interdiction, but to answer your question, we generally do classify those, at least initially.

Mr. SOUDER. Even if the operation is complete?

Mr. O’CONNELL. To my knowledge, that is correct.

Mr. SOUDER. Because there is not one of us that doesn’t understand the continuing operations problem. I have reserve forces

front deployed in Afghanistan from my home district, a whole unit.

I have just had more come back, people from my own church, who

were based there and are commanders, and I have no desire to put

anybody at risk. And I understand it is politically difficult, but this

is a different type of battle than Colombia. At the same time, it is

very hard for us to do oversight and to make arguments. We can

see information, but some of this information would seem to be

public. Yes, it is politically sensitive when you attack these different labs or destroy different areas, but so is it in Colombia politically sensitive, because when we go in and remove a lab area or

move in, it creates farmers who are displaced, it creases people who

are displaced, and causes political problems for governments that

are supportive. And this is a fine balance and we are trying to respect that balance. At the same time, we are concerned and will

look at the classified as to what our policies exactly are here, and

if in the classified briefing we are not feeling that there is an aggressiveness with it, we will back in a public forum to try to figure

out how to balance the continuing operations in what is perceived

right now, at least in the pass, a lack of aggressiveness on these

issues.

Now, first off, we are very pleased to hear that there have been

some, and that is why I say we will do this in a classified setting.

But in your testimony, Mr. O’Connell, you stated that terrorist

groups such as the Taliban and other extremist groups in Afghanistan support their operations with drug money. By operations, do

you mean buying weapons to kill American soldiers? And how else

would they be financed other than narcotics? It is not by bake

sales. In other words, part of our argument is, look, obviously this

heroin is part of the war. And you seem to agree with that in your

statement.

Mr. O’CONNELL. I do, Chairman Souder. The one thing I would

like to indicate in terms of the Central Command data, you are exactly right, if a lab was destroyed, if drugs were seized, there is no

reason that should be classified. The problem with this information

is that in some cases the source or the tip for the actual operation

is in fact included in the entire paragraph or the results. We could

certainly extract that out, and we will go ahead and do that. As

I mentioned, this information was received last night. It is classified in a way that we are not used to in that some paragraphs are

classified appropriately, others seem to stamp the whole page, and

we will get to the bottom of that and provide you with the data.

Additionally, it will not be difficult to incorporate. In fact,

CENTCOM has already incorporated a reporting requirement that

will give you the type of data that General Mixon is able to in

62

SOUTHCOM. So bear with us. I understand the requirement, and

we will move toward that.

Mr. SOUDER. And this is tough stuff, and nobody on this committee wants to endanger any sources, or put any of our troops at risk.

What we want to make sure, and this is very difficult for the Department of Homeland Security and the military right now, is

whether you have multiple missions, and as Ranking Member

Cummings has said repeatedly, too, there is narcoterrorism and

there are other forms of terrorism, and we have all these priorities

as we have said in the statement, and we can’t put so much of our

focus on one that we neglect the other.

Now, you were about to answer my question. When you say operations, you mean they are buying weapons. If they are supporting

their continuing operations, they are buying their weapons and

supporting their troops. Is that not true? And is it not integrated

with the military battle?

Mr. O’CONNELL. It is true, sir, and it is just a fact of life in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, as people have said before, was made by

God for growing poppies. If you take any number of figures with

respect to the economic statistics in Afghanistan, there are guesses

or estimates anyplace between $4 and $14 billion for the total GNP

of the country. There are estimates concurrent with that that go to

almost 60 percent of the actual cash that is flowing through the

economy, legal or illegal, comes from poppy cultivation.

So with that nexus and the Taliban certainly previously involved

and certainly current involved, to some estimate, yes, you cannot

escape the statement that you just made, that Taliban, al Qaeda

and others derive some support from the narcotics trade. To the extent, as you and I have discussed, some of the intelligence estimates are just not as accurate as we would like them to be, but

certainly I would concur with your statement.

Mr. SOUDER. And if they would have their largest in record that

would come out, because our problem in Afghanistan is not that

dissimilar to Iraq; it hasn’t exploded, but it is starting to.

Let me say for the record, too, yes, it is true some of this information is coming through last night, but this hearing has been

scheduled for months, and we delayed it at one point at the request

of the Department of Defense and the military to try to accommodate the questions. Then we sent these questions in advance several weeks ago, only to be told yesterday that the responses were

going to be classified. I understand that we don’t want to have information get out to compromised sources, but it is not like we suddenly dropped this hearing in the last 48 hours on the Department

of Defense.

It is also true that there are other things going on in that region,

and we understand and appreciate that, but this is a primary narcotics subcommittee, and we are trying to make sure that this

doesn’t get lost. Having been on the ground in Afghanistan, I know

that, for a fact, there was not as much focus as in my opinion there

should have been on the heroin interconnection. Now we see in different parts where some of the warlords who are not necessarily

the Taliban, but who have historically helped us to some degree,

much like what we see in Iraq, where different subgroups are tryVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
63

ing now to clink. They don’t want democracy; they want to overthrow democracy.

And in talking to President Karzi, one of his concerns and the

reason he is now seeing this interconnection is initially we didn’t

want to be particularly disruptive of some of these zones where the

poppy was growing because we thought, well, maybe these people

will go along. Now we are finding out they won’t disarm. They shot

the interior minister and one of the cabinet ministers in Afghanistan. Where are they getting their weapons from? Some of these

people aren’t classified as Taliban, and by having a very tight definition here that says, well, how much is Taliban funded, it is also

the thugs who don’t want democracy there, and they are almost

completely funded with the heroin.

And while America is watching over in Iraq, we have a similar

problem developing in the outer zones outside of Kabul in Afghanistan, that as they try to figure out how are we going to have a census, how are we going to get a count for people to vote, that if you

can’t get some semblance of order there and get these groups disarmed who are buying their stuff with heroin, we have to figure

out how to get control of their sources of money, as the President

has said, not just that. And I appreciate that the military is moving

forward, but there is really no difference, in our opinion, between

a stash of weapons and a stash of heroin, because they don’t have

the stash of weapons if they don’t have the heroin.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Chairman Souder, you are exactly right, and I

take full responsibility for I guess the nonresponse on the

CENTCOM questions. I will say that I could have come forward

with the CENTCOM information I had 2 weeks ago when I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the same

question; however, this data is heartening to me because it is the

first time that we have seen this degree of granularity into what

is going on with respect to CENTCOM. And I think they are getting the message. We are doing this together, and soon they will

be as good as Southern Command, I hope.

Mr. SOUDER. One last thing. And I apologize that some of this

information hasn’t been shared with the committee, but some of

this we have been getting even late last evening. We got this last

night, this new counternarcotics directive. We will insert this into

the record. I may have an additional question, but I would now like

to yield to the distinguished ranking member. This is the unclassified version of the guidelines for the Department of Defense and

CENTCOM on narcotics.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir. And the classified version is much more

specific and I think you would find moves us in the right direction.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you all for being here. And, Admiral

Kunkel, I just want to, first of all, thank you for acknowledging

that these drugs, when they hit neighborhoods like mine, are indeed weapons of mass destruction. You couldn’t have said anything

more brilliant. In Baltimore, where I live, we have 300 murders a

year, and I would guess that 90 percent of them have something

to do with drugs. These are young black men, for the most part,

usually under 20, dead. We have 50 percent of our young men

64

dropping out of school between the 9th and 12th grades. They then,

many of them, go to selling drugs.

I visit our shock trauma unit at the University of Maryland,

which is located at downtown Baltimore, one of the best in the

world, and there are literally 1,000 to 2,000 young people shot but

lives spared only because they have shock trauma, and 95 percent

of those had something to do with drugs. I see neighborhoods

where property values plummet, where people can buy a house for

$75,000 10 years ago, put $75,000 in it in renovations, and can’t

sell it for $50,000 5 years later because of drugs. And that doesn’t

even begin to deal with the families that are destroyed, the court

costs, the cost for trying to repair lives. It just goes on and on and

on. So I really do appreciate your saying that.

I am just wondering, Admiral, what is the greatest challenge to

the Joint Interagency Task Force West? What is your biggest challenge?

Admiral KUNKEL. Our biggest challenge at JIATF West?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes.

Admiral KUNKEL. Well, right now our challenge is our move,

moving and focusing entirely in the Western Pacific and, of course,

getting involved, totally engrossed in the initiatives out in the

Western Pacific, Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and working with the Department of State on IAI, Illicit Activities Initiative,

putting that together and then targeting the countries, specifically

Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, all of which have

groups of terrorists involved with a drug connection.

Mr. CUMMINGS. General Mixon, I am sorry, I was directing my

prior comments to you. I took my glasses off; I guess I need to put

them back on. But my comments were to you. And again I thank

you, General. General, have the expanded authorities granted to

the U.S. forces in Colombia enhanced our effectiveness in fighting

the drug trade in Colombia?

General MIXON. Yes, sir, absolutely. And I take your initial comments to heart. The effects of drugs in this country poses a significant challenge, and I view it myself as a loss of treasure. These are

young people that have potential, and we in the military have capabilities that can interdict and at least stop some of the drug flow

coming into this Nation. So we view it at U.S. Southern Command

as an appropriate and important Department of Defense mission

that we pursue aggressively.

To answer your question specifically, those expanded authorities

pertain exactly to the comments that both you and the chairman

made. There is a tight nexus between drugs, money, terrorists, and

all that activity. So with the expanded authorities, it allowed us to

go after those groups, the AUC, the ELN, and the FARC in Colombia specifically, by assisting the Colombian military to take the

fight to them to take away their resources, that first being the ability to produce, move, and make money off of cocaine; but at the

same time take away and destroy those forces that are protecting

those individuals that are growing the coca. And we don’t do this

alone, we do it in conjunction with the Department of State, which

has oversight over the eradication program in Colombia, and we

have seen significant success in the eradication effort. So expanded

65

authorities have in fact enabled us to be more effective against the

narcoterrorists.

Mr. CUMMINGS. With regard to cooperation from the Colombian

Government, how is that coming?

General MIXON. My view is that the cooperation is very good.

They cooperate closely with Department of State in their efforts.

The counternarcotics brigades provide security and military operations in the vicinity of the spray operations. In addition to that,

they are also intimately involved with their police in doing independent operations against the narcoterrorists and their drug production capabilities. Also, the Colombian Navy has been very, very

active along the coast of Colombia in the transient zone, either

with operations done with U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy or unilateral operations in pursuing the drug traffic. They fully recognize

that they have to take the FARC’s and the other enemy forces’ ability to fund themselves away in order to win this war against democracy in Colombia.

Mr. CUMMINGS. One of the things that has always concerned this

subcommittee is the whole idea that drugs produce so much money.

And we have seen it in Mexico and other places, where, because

of that money, a lot of times the local law enforcement folk get involved in situations where they are being paid off by some of these

major drug producers and, as a result, make it very difficult at

times for our forces to be effective, and in many instances put their

lives in danger because of information flowing to the wrong people.

Have you seen any of that or much of that, or do you think that

is something that does not happen too often now?

General MIXON. There is no question that there are huge sums

of money involved in this illicit business, and that certain individuals within the various enforcement agencies of these other countries could in fact be paid off, and I am sure have been paid off.

I would be foolish not to believe that. But in my discussions with

the DEA in Colombia specifically, they are very careful in how they

plan and conduct the operations in conjunction with the police and

who gets information. In other words, they protect the information.

As a result of that, they have had better success over the last year

to 18 months in the destruction of labs and the interdiction of these

drugs.

The narcoterrorists in this region are well financed and well

funded. They have the latest in equipment, global positioning systems, satellite telephones, go-fast boats that can just about outrun

any other boat on the commercial market, and when these boats

make their way across the Pacific and the Caribbean, if they simply make it to the in-state, they simply destroy the boat and move

the cocaine over. An organization that can do that has a lot of

money, so they can buy influence and protection.

But I think we are making progress in Colombia. We need to

make better progress in Central America, and one way we can do

that is by building those institutions of democracy within those nations to include the police force.

Mr. CUMMINGS. How is that coming, your last statement? Do you

see strong police force, strong enforcement agencies?

General MIXON. I do within Colombia for sure. I do not have as

good a feel for the other nations of the specifics, but I believe they

66

are making progress. And certainly it is the focus of every one of

our agencies at work within those countries. Working with the police forces and so forth is sort of on the edge of what we do in the

U.S. military, but my indications are that they are improving. A

long way to go, though, for sure.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you find a similar situation, Admiral?

Admiral KUNKEL. Yes, sir. In fact, we have been working with

the Thais for at least the last 5 years. At a very low level corruption is pervasive. And not only in Thailand, especially in the Philippines. Our activities in the Philippines, I would say of the lower

levels we have to be very careful how we approach the law enforcement agencies. However, I would say this, and I seem to spend

more and more time in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia

than I care to, but the higher levels, with the authorities they

have, I am talking about the law enforcement, and especially the

Philippine DEA, recently established, the people that I have met

are very committed and dedicated to eradicating the drug problem,

because they certainly see connection to the Abu Sayyaf, the terrorist organizations in their country, which affects their national security, which in turn concerns the United States, of course. So they

are committed to working with us and receiving our training to

fight the narcoterrorists.

Our efforts, I believe, are paying benefits. We are hoping to establish Coast Guard-like authorities in these nations. Their ability

to counter the threat, especially from the sea, is very limited. They

have no common operating picture. They look to us for advice and

training, and we are looking to assist them as necessary.

I only mentioned two countries there, the Philippines and Thailand, but we are doing the same efforts in Cambodia and Indonesia, especially. However, those are long, long journeys, and it will

take time. And we are just now beginning to get into the Philippines, which I see, and according to Admiral Fargo, anyway, we

are looking for a 20-year plan. This is not an easy road.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I just have one more question, but, Mr. Chairman, I am just curious. I heard your comments to the Assistant

Secretary. Do you plan to bring the Assistant Secretary back at

some other time?

Mr. SOUDER. What our intention is, is to work with some sort of

a classified briefing to see what kind of information we get on the

classified briefing. And then if that is sufficient, we won’t have another hearing; but if need be, CENTCOM and the Assistant Secretary would come in for another hearing.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Well, then I have just have one other

question of the two military gentlemen.

We in the Congress are always trying to figure out how we make

sure that the taxpayers’ dollars are spent effectively and efficiently,

and that is one thing I think we all agree on. And at the same

time, we try to figure out is there something that you need from

us that would help you to be more effective and efficient in what

you do. Do you feel like you are getting the support you need and

the authority you need to accomplish what you are trying to accomplish? General?

General MIXON. Yes, sir. There is, of course, nobody in the military or other places who would not like to have more resources.

67

But having said that, we live in a real world and we have a global

threat that we are dealing with. So I believe that the amount of

funding that we have been provided, for U.S. Southern Command,

for the mission is appropriate, and we are making good use of the

taxpayers’ money.

We are working closely with DOD as they reposition assets that

have been involved in the global war on terrorism in other regions,

to provide those assets to us so that we can prosecute the end game

more effectively against the narcoterrorists as they move drugs up

both the Caribbean and the Pacific. That is an asset that DOD will

work out with us.

But we appreciate the money that has been provided to us, and

we believe it is adequate. Most importantly, the expanded authorities that Congress has granted have been key in the successes that

have been achieved. Those expanded authorities, along with the authority, when approved, to increase the cap to an additional 400,

will put us in good shape, I think, to continue to pursue the war

on drugs in Colombia.

And I emphasized the word authority as it pertains to the cap.

We certainly do not foresee immediately advancing the numbers of

U.S. military in Colombia to the requested authority of 800. We

went forward with a number of 400 so that in the eventuality we

foresee additional support to the Colombians under the existing

ROE, that we would have that flexibility and would not have to

continue to come back to the Congress incrementally and ask for

numbers.

In the best of circumstances, if we were to supply the maximum

amount of support to the Colombians, that expanded authority

number would only go to 723, anyway. At the present time we are

slightly below 300 U.S. military in the country. Expanded authority, the additional cap, adequate money, all of those things, we believe we have the resources available to do our mission.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Admiral.

Admiral KUNKEL. Thank you. That was a question I was not

really anticipating, but in our focus coming out to the Western Pacific, we found that Admiral Fargo has looked to JIATF West because of what we bring to the fight; it is a joint work all services,

interagency, of course, the law enforcement, and we are trying to

put in place a model like that into these countries. So as we go into

the countries, working with their law enforcement agencies, doing

some mill-to-mill, but mainly law enforcement agency work, that

we find that our business is expanding. And that would be in the

future that we may be requesting further fiscal authorities.

But when I talk about fiscal authorities, what I am really talking

about here is you use counternarcoterrorism. As the money comes

from Congress down to eventually JIATF West, we are looking for

detection and monitoring of counterdrug flow, and how do you use

that money to do your mission. And when you are looking to build

intelligence fusion centers, for instance, in the Philippines and Indonesia, Thailand, you know, we are doing brick and mortar work.

Some of our drug money is using brick and mortar work applied

toward that. And when you talk about the payback to the United

States, that measure of effectiveness is not as easy to put on the

table as we did in the Eastern Pacific with cocaine flow.

68

But our measure is just as important in fighting the global war.

If we can combine those countries’ intelligence centers, have them

work together in these countries, and create a common operating

picture so that we know where these drug boats are going and we

have the ability to stop them, the partner nation or the United

States can stop them and keep the drugs eventually from coming

to the United States, that is what we are about. So we need to, I

guess, clarify those lines of authority.

Congress, of course, gives us the money and we look at it—I

should say some of us in Pacific Command look at it you can only

spend it on drugs. Well, it is more than drugs. It is about

counternarcoterrorism. It is not just drugs. And sometimes we look

down that soda straw saying it is only drugs. Well, it is not. It is

money laundering, as the general said. It is a weapons trafficking.

Certainly it is drugs, and it feeds them all. We need those expanded authorities. That would say to JIATF West that would be

the key.

I wouldn’t want to come back here and have to testify and say

I spend my money on brick and mortar, and someone tell me what

about drugs, and then try to explain that nexus, because it is certainly there.

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you all very much.

Mr. SOUDER. Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your calling this hearing.

Gentlemen, the stakes have been raised tremendously in your

work. The stakes were already very high with the work you were

doing, simply to keep narcotics from flowing into this country and

flowing worldwide. Now with a focus on narcoterrorism, the stakes

are higher than anyone could have anticipated just a few years ago.

Now, we have terrorists who can get us both ways: they can get

funds for their own operations and they can import poison into our

country to debilitate mostly young people. You have really got us

at both ends now; you are financing your own operations and you

are debilitating the population through drugs. That must be a lovely set of conditions for them.

Mr. Cummings spoke about the effects in his own community.

The effects are nationwide. Kids in suburban affluent communities

look like they are as much in love with drugs as desperate kids

who are into drugs for money, and in the inner cities of the United

States there is no economy. The grandfathers and the fathers of

these young men that Mr. Cummings spoke about had manufacturing jobs. Well, particularly their cities are without jobs. Men without jobs will create their own economy, and the economy in many

of our inner cities is a drug economy, a gun economy, and they are

killing the inner cities of the United States. They have murdered

the African-American family. The mandatory minimums that come

out of the drug wars are largely responsible for the fact that 70

percent of Black children are born to never-married women, and

men without jobs, of course, do not raise families, they do not father children that they own. It is an absolute catastrophe in the

inner cities of the African-American communities.

It is difficult to know how much the Taliban and other terrorist

forces are funded through the narcotics trade, I understand that.

69

But we in this country, with our own efforts since September 11,

and I want to commend the administration for the efforts it has

taken to close off the usual bank and other monetary transfers. For

example, in this city Riggs Bank, a very distinguished bank, now

is on the carpet because of its relationship with Saudi Arabia,

which of course it has had for decades. But finally there is a crackdown on just letting the Saudis do with money whatever they want

to do, because we don’t know where in the world that money gets.

But as we close off the usual funnels for money, does this not

make drugs perhaps the most commodity available for terrorists

today, given the high demand for drugs, particularly in advanced

societies? If you want to get money for terrorism, I am asking, isn’t

the best target the drug trade?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Ms. Norton, was that question directed at me?

Ms. NORTON. I think all of you are qualified to answer the question.

Mr. O’CONNELL. OK. Let me commend you on your statement. I

don’t know if you were here to listen to the opening statements of

both the chairman and Representative Cummings, but yours was

equally as excellent and as prescient about how critical this problem is to our Nation.

You can talk about the tragedy that is taking place in the inner

city and even in suburban locations. I had occasion, prior to taking

this job, to do work in North Dakota and noticed the tremendous

problems they are having there with crystal meth, a whole new difficulty that the country has not faced before. But there are faces

and real people on the other end of this war, the brave men and

women, as an example, in U.S. Southern Command, that are in the

jungles in Colombia that have gone to extraordinary lengths to

train the Colombian forces so that they can be effective against the

traffickers and against the terrorists; the young Coast Guardsmen

who are out in extremely dangerous conditions, my son included,

to try to do the best they can and interdict this flow that comes

to our shores. It is nearly an impossible task, and very frustrating.

And for me as a public servant, to listen to you, and I understand, having lived in this area for a long time, the misery that the

District and Baltimore and other places go through. It is a tremendous scourge on our society. I don’t know the answer, I am not a

social scientist, but my heart goes out to you. I feel proud that the

Department, I think, is turning the corner and will make a much

more concerted effort to look at how we can actually play as full

team members, use our resources wisely, and get at this effort.

Ms. NORTON. I am on the Homeland Security Committee as well,

and I appreciate very much the needle in the haystack problem

that we have given to all of those who are involved in your work

and your efforts, but what I am trying to get at is focus. The focus

was, I think, legitimately on closing off the usual funnels of money.

And I think we have begun to do that, and that is why I pointed

to Riggs Bank. And I am wondering now whether the focus, if we

are interested in funding alone. Let us just look at the question of

funding of terrorism, shouldn’t it be on narcotics.

Mr. O’CONNELL. I think you are exactly right, ma’am, a large

portion of it should be. Is our intelligence into those transactions

as good as it should be? Probably not. On the Islamic side, I am

70

sure you are aware of the HAWALAs, the secret transfer that takes

place in certain parts of Islamic society, which makes it extremely

difficult to track these essentially credit schemes that are done

with a wink and a nod and really done by tradition. We are making

some progress there.

As you know, there are assets of the Department of Defense that

have been directed to work this particular issue. Certainly NSA

has been extremely successful. We have had good success working

with the CIA’s crime and narcotics centers. We work closely with

DEA. So as we move forward, are certainly recognize, in fact the

Secretary of Defense has specifically asked me to look at those

things that we are currently doing, what can we do more effectively

on that side; and we have given him answers back. We are participating. We have to be careful about the legal restrictions imposed

on the Department of Defense. But you are exactly right, and I am

pleased at the direction we are moving; I think it is the direction

you are urging us to move, ma’am.

Ms. NORTON. I think we are going to be more and more dependent on the work you do. I don’t see why terrorists should bother

with anything but narcotics these days, given the demand.

I have one more question, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

I was very impressed when I was briefed by SOUTHCOM. I was

on a congressional delegation to Guantanamo. We stopped in

Miami and we were briefed by SOUTHCOM, and I was just astonished at the progress that has been made in Colombia. I remember

how controversial Colombia was, and all kinds of concerns about

what the military was doing in Colombia. And if ever there was a

story of success, it seemed to come out of SOUTHCOM; the expanded authority, to be sure, the coordinated campaign. What was

most impressive is somehow how the military is working with, and

here is where leadership becomes important, with the leadership in

the country and with the new institutions that apparently the

country is building from the ground up, the new democratic institutions. So that you see a transformation in the country itself on the

ground, which in turn leads to the defeat of the narcotics culture.

This was so impressive. Whenever you see anything impressive

like that has come out of a lot of controversy and yet proved itself

as successful as our briefing indicated, one cannot help but ask

how much of this is transferrable, for example, to Afghanistan,

where you similarly have a country that needs to be rebuilt from

the ground up in all of its democratic institutions. It took us some

time to understand that is where you had to be, you had to be with

the political institutions, you had to be with the local institutions

on the ground. And now that we are there, and not simply treating

this as a military matter, we are seeing, apparently, in Colombia,

something that can only be called a success.

Is this something we can expect perhaps to be transferred in

other parts of Latin America, but not to Afghanistan? Is this capable of being replicated in Afghanistan, where we are now having

such trouble?

Mr. O’CONNELL. I would like to be able to tell you yes, we can

take that wonderful work done by U.S. Southern Command, take

those principles, and transfer them over there, but I am afraid that

is not the case, ma’am. There are many, many differences, some

71

you are certainly aware of that you learned when you were down

in Colombia. And I echo your comments about the wonderful work

done by Southern Command, by President Uribe, the Colombian

military.

But we face a different set of circumstances. Certainly, in terrain, the type of drugs grown, the nature of the central government, the nature of the surrounding countries and their particular

interests, the almost total dependence on narcotics in terms of the

economic flow in Afghanistan, some of the religious aspects all tend

to argue against being able to transfer those things. But there are

certain basic things, such as the work by U.S. Special Forces, the

reconstruction teams in Afghanistan that have made a difference.

I would like to say yes, but I am afraid in most cases it is not.

The one common denominator is going to be our courage and our

skill, and I think our military is up to the task. In the case of Afghanistan, we have a major ally that we are supporting in the case

of the UK, who are the lead for counternarcotics in Afghanistan.

We also work closely with the Germans as they train the police,

with the Italians as they work on the court system, and other countries.

So certainly a different model, but we will do our best. It is an

excellent question, not easily understood as to why you just can’t

take success in one country and transfer it to another.

Ms. NORTON. I appreciate the thoughtfulness of your answer. The

last thing we need, particularly as Americans, who perhaps are accused of this as a kind of cookie cutter approach, you know, what

works here, let us take it to Iraq, let us take it worldwide. We can’t

even take our version of democracy worldwide. I would urge you all

to look at what in fact is genuinely transferable, though. I certainly

believe the whole notion of working with indigenous institutions

and political institutions is important. We do have in Afghanistan

the kind of leader that you have in Colombia, so at the top you are

all right, it is just all that is in between.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thanks. And to reiterate that point, I think in

President Karzi and his cabinet, what we don’t have is a 200 year

democracy like we have in Colombia. What we have as commonality, however, is their narcotics ability to undermine that democracy. We don’t have as much economic diversity as Colombia has.

But Afghanistan has had periods in time where they haven’t had

narcotics dependency, and it is how to get them weaned, and not

let them get hooked on heroin again, so to speak.

I have a series of questions that are very important for this hearing to get into the record. I am not going to get through all these.

We will have some written followup questions to build this, but let

me approach a couple. I often say if you are not ADD when you

become a Congressman, you are one after you are done. So even

in this sphere I am going to be covering a number of types of questions, but they are things that we have been working on in this

community and they are very important to the narcotics efforts.

First let me sort through a little bit of the JIATF changes. As

I understand, JIATF West moving to Hawaii from Alameda in

northern California, that there has also been some changes in

72

transfer of how the zone of the eastern Pacific will be handled.

Could you explain that briefly?

Admiral KUNKEL. Yes, sir. It is pretty complicated even to explain, but——

Mr. SOUDER. The bottom line is the area around Mexico and

California are going to be still under JIATF West or will that

be——

Admiral KUNKEL. No, sir. The bottom line is that in the past it

was basically the eastern Pacific was divided along the 92 longitude; anything east of 92 was JIATF South, anything to the west

of 92 was JIATF West. And it was an agreement between

USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM that that 92 line would basically

disappear, and at that point JIATF South would have the entire

vector coming from south to north into the United States ceded to

them. And then, of course, NORTHCOM plays as far as their AOR

and the unified command plan. So JIATF West is basically now focused entirely to the west; JIATF South has all of the cocaine flow

coming from south.

Mr. SOUDER. So we won’t have the problem of a boat coming off

Colombia and how the pass-off is going to come when they go out

and get something in the eastern Pacific, whether they land in

Mexico or California.

How will it work west to east? Now if heroin is coming across,

you have them in Hawaii. Where does the transshipment point

pass-off occur going from JIATF West to JIATF South?

Admiral KUNKEL. It is now delineated basically 500 miles offshore, to put it bluntly, 500 miles offshore. So my common operating picture, once it is established, coming from Southeast Asia, I

am aware of a boat or whatever. If I cannot have interdiction forces

in place, detect and monitoring, if I can’t get the interdiction forces

in place, of course, we pass them off to JIATF South, and that

should board JIATF North, if there is one, NORTHCOM, and it

should be seamless.

Mr. SOUDER. Now, my understanding is based on the success of

what we have seen with JIATF South and West, is that JIATF

North is looking at a similar system. Do you know where that

stands or what is happening with NORTHCOM?

Admiral KUNKEL. It is not my lane of the road, so I don’t know.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. O’Connell, do you know anything on that?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir. We are working with Assistant Secretary McHale, the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense in

the Defense Department and General Eberhart as to exactly how

that will work. I think part of that equation, sir, is the move of

JIATF West, the integration of JTF Bravo and their efforts. Any

changes in the unified command plan will certainly come into that,

and that is currently under discussion. We will certainly, to the extent that we are intimately involved with JIATF South and JIATF

West, will do everything we can to facilitate General Eberhart’s decision, and Secretary McHale and Secretary Rumsfeld as to whether or not JIATF North is stood up, where it is, and what specifically its responsibilities are, because it will overlap with some of

the Homeland Defense responsibilities of U.S. Northern Command.

As you know, sir, the Defense Department is charged to use its

C4I networks to conduct our monitoring and detection, and, again,

73

that is out of my lane but in my area of familiarity, and we will

do everything we can do make sure that effort by Northern Command and by the Department is as seamless as it can possibly be.

Mr. SOUDER. Admiral Kunkel mentioned Indonesia, Philippines,

Malaysia, and Thailand in particular. If it comes north, through

Korea or Japan or Russia, and up over the top to Alaska or toward

Seattle, who will be watching? Is that what NORTHCOM would

stand up? Are you currently watching that zone if it is transiting

through the ocean or by air over the top of the ocean?

Admiral KUNKEL. Mr. Chairman, in fiscal year 2003 we were directed by DASDE to establish a technical analysis team in Japan,

which JIATF West has stood up, along with the DIA, to start focusing our collection efforts toward North Korea, and working with the

Japanese, especially the Japanese Coast Guard. We are there now,

we are starting those efforts, but I must say we are really taking

baby steps at this point. We are aware of that vector going north,

and to pass it off to law enforcement agencies, especially the DEA

in the United States, or Customs, those two agencies in particular,

and then eventually, of course, to NORTHCOM. So JIATF West

has it to the west, and as it approaches we pass that off.

Mr. SOUDER. My philosophy, and pretty much the philosophy of

those who have been involved in the narcotics efforts for some time,

which includes Speaker Hastert and others who have been focused

on this, such as Congressman Kolbe Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, get it where we can eradicate, which is predominantly State Department backed up with resources from

SOUTHCOM and the training. If you can’t get it there, as it starts

to move through, get it before it hits our shores. You know, it gets

wider and wider, and the intelligence is absolutely critical in this

process. Also, just like in Homeland Security Committee, as we

work, as you harden one target, they move to a more vulnerable

entry point, as I mentioned about Detroit.

Also, it isn’t necessarily true that it is always going to be cocaine

or heroin, or this HIBC stuff that is coming in. Now we are seeing

the crystal meth particularly in the rural areas, but seeing the first

signs of it hitting our urban areas, which could become like a crack

epidemic, just like that. We held a hearing in Orlando, FL on

OxyContin, and oxycodone, which showed we actually have more

deaths from overuse of prescription drugs than we do from cocaine

and heroin. We are trying to concentrate on that because these big

shipments coming in from people who are overproducing it, it is

going to be just like variations of tracking cocaine and heroin, but

a different type of challenge.

Just like as if you are fighting war, it is clear that men and

women in the armed forces will crush anybody who stands up to

fight them right now, so the enemy is not fighting regularly. Well,

the drug guys are doing similar type of things. Now, part of that,

a critical part, is intelligence. And I wanted to ask a couple questions about these TARS and the aerostats. So if I could ask Mr.

O’Connell first, because the JIATFs don’t work if we don’t get the

intelligence.

The Tethered Aerostat Radar System is an example of the detection system now run by Department of Defense. The system was

originally authorized in 1986 Omnibus Drug Act and was enviVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
74

sioned for 14 unit picket line on the southern approaches. Unfortunately, it was only implemented to a maximum of 12 and has now

been withered down to 7, leaving key southern approaches unprotected. In fact, the Defense Department suggested it only benefits

from a single balloon located in the Florida Keys.

Why has TARS capability slipped to half of the congressional authorization, and what has been done with the appropriated funds

for the other half?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Once again, I wish I can give you a snap, precise

answer, Mr. Chairman. As you cited, the program was originally

scheduled for, I believe, 14 sites. I think 12 were eventually done;

the systems were up and the maintenance and connectivity were

there. I believe it was determined that only 8 sites would cover the

desired area. That included, I believe, the site in Puerto Rico as

well.

Right now there was a cut last year that Congress directed I think of $6 million to the Tethered Aerostat Program. I will be brutally honest and tell you that we are in the middle of I don’t want

to say a spat in the Defense Department, but an honest disagreement between U.S. Northern Command, who has one sense of how

the tethered aerostats ought to be used and my department and

the JIATF South into who should operate those, maintain, and

fund those, where do those funding lines go. Should it better go to

Department of Homeland Defense? I don’t know. I have my opinion, the Department perhaps has a different opinion. But we hope

to have a resolution shortly so that we are not sending an internal

Defense spat up to the Hill.

So that is about the best I can give you on that, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, let me say that I appreciate the openness and

honesty on that answer, because that is not easy for a person in

your position to say that. But if it is about to come here, we need

to be prepared, and my guess is is that as we improve a porous border on the southwest, which we have no choice of doing if we are

really going to have a Department of Homeland Security. It is not

that our men and women aren’t working hard there, but the fact

is if a million illegal immigrants can get through a year, probably

some terrorists can, too. As we try to improve that border and the

holes in that border in southwest Arizona, some of the other sections of Texas and other places, it becomes apparent that it isn’t

going to be able to be controlled just by land border system or a

high flying system, in that the low-flying planes and other ways of

getting in are critical.

Also, we have, in my opinion, without getting too specific, from

the land border, if you take the water border looping over to Florida, some questions in there that are very difficult for us to get answers to as far as what is coming in. And if we don’t have this aerostat system, we need other questions of what is happening as we

track the people, or have a tip coming out of Colombia, or out of

Mexico. We need to be able to see them before it hits my hometown.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Sir, I am going to impose on my colleague the

Admiral here in a moment, but there are lots of issues here. We

have other capabilities which are the relocatable over the horizon

radar, which look farther out. As you know, the aerostats generally

75

look out to approximately 250 miles. If they are at 10,000 feet, they

are looking down. So that is one segment of the airspace you certainly want to cover. There are other alternatives in the segment

you just talked about. There are always tradeoffs in terms of expense, reliability.

And I would ask the Admiral, since he is not only a skilled aviator, but has worked these issues before, if he would have any comment on that particular segment that you described geographically.

Admiral KUNKEL. Thank you, sir.

I will revert to my Coast Guard, put my Coast Guard hat on,

away from the JIATF director. When I flew out-bat missions several years ago, we need that picture, to have that common picture.

If you have a radar picture out there, in order to get the interdiction assets to the right spot, it is a needle in a haystack. You know,

we have Coast Guard ships and aircraft out there now, and if you

don’t have an overhead either aircraft platform or have an aerostat

or something to give you that picture, it is a needle in the haystack. And I have done that too many times to where you go out

on patrol and you find nothing. I have also done it very effectively

given the proper resources like an aerostat or an overhead E3 or

P3.

Mr. SOUDER. Continuing along this line, we had a big discussion

about what to do after we lost Panama, and then compounded by

moving out of Roosevelt Roads Air Station in Puerto Rico. The F16

Coronet Nighthawk was supposed to be part of the justification for

moving into Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. Apparently it isn’t anymore, and it is unclear to us what is being done

on Curacao in an interdepartmental narcotics base, because many

of the things being based there aren’t being used necessarily for

surveillance at this point.

Mr. O’Connell, General Mixon, whoever would like to comment

on this, I would like to hear what type of aircraft you have there,

what do you see replacing the Nighthawk; do we have adequate resources right now, given the changes that are occurring, and a little bit of that evolution.

General MIXON. I am not intimately familiar with the Nighthawk

capability other than to say that I have been told that it was not

as effective as they thought it would be, and so it was not actually

present when I assumed my responsibilities last summer as the J3

U.S. Southern Command. But having said that, we have other assets from all agencies, DOD, BICE, and also foreign militaries that

work out of those what used to be called FOLs, now CSLs, Coordinated Security Locations.

We fly approximately 400 sorties of all types out of those three

locations and about 1,500 on-station hours. Results from flying

from those locations, about 56 metric tons of cocaine and about 3

metric tons of marijuana either seized or disrupted. So those locations meant Curacao and Cumpala have been key to the replacement of that capability out of Howard Air Force Base in Panama.

From the standpoint of assets, I mentioned earlier that what we

are looking for now is a reinvigoration of the assets from DOD,

P3s, and we expect potentially AWACS to be available this summer, after they have recouped from the global war on terrorism,

that will enhance our interdiction effort. Once we put all of the asVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
76

sets together, both an aerial platform for interdiction and a surface

ship that has rotary wing aircraft on it, and we tie those together,

we call that MPA, our chances of interdiction goes up to about 70

percent.

So the answer to your question specifically, good use out of the

CSLs, large numbers of sorties coming out of there, and we believe

even more effective use of those once DOD assets are returned to

the full drug end game effort.

Mr. SOUDER. So in banking on the return of those assets from

the war on terrorism, do we have additional assets coming in to replace the diverted assets over on the war on terrorism, or are you

banking that things are calming down in Afghanistan and Iraq?

General MIXON. I didn’t mean to imply that things were calming

down in those two theaters of operation, because they are out of my

area, obviously, but we have seen the return of the AWACS aircraft, they have been refitted over the last year and we do expect

the return of that asset this summer. The other assets pertain, the

P3 in particular, to the overall life of the aircraft, and the Department of Defense has come up with a plan for the use of those aircraft.

Fortunately, during the interim we have received excellent support from BICE and also from other nations participating in the

interdiction effort, and we have been able to at least sustain a good

interdiction program, but we believe it will be much better once we

see these assets returned. And we also have good commitment from

both U.S. agencies involved in drug interdiction and other governments that are involved in that to sustain the effort in our area

of responsibility.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, we will continue to follow this up as we have

the various meetings, as we visit SOUTHCOM and so on, but I

want to put on the record with this hearing, because it may be a

while until we get into that again, this committee historically,

under the past administration as well as this administration, has

expressed its concern about diversion of assets. We understand

that there are very critical problems around the world that you

have to deal with, but this comes back to why it is so important

to have Mr. O’Connell, in his position, to be an advocate inside the

Department of Defense to say remember narcotics is part of the

mission too. As Ms. Norton said, we don’t see this going down, and

particularly in the type of narcotics funding terrorism. This idea

that we are going to have traditional war fronts, rather than rogue

nations or terrorist groups that don’t have national boundaries. It

is a different type of warfare. If we don’t cutoff their funding and

their places that you can’t do that if you don’t get at the narcotics.

We can’t constantly have narcotics be number 21 in mission and

have the intelligence resources pulled away and then think that we

are going to catch the people. At some point Congress has to say,

and you have to help take the lead and say look, we don’t have

enough resources to do your missions. And that part of the focus

of this hearing is to call attention to those resource requirements.

I have severe doubts that resources are sufficient, even if there is

no diversion on domestic soil that needs an AWACS. Assuming

that there is no outbreak in North Korea or Indonesia that needs

an AWACS, assuming things go reasonably well in Iraq and AfVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
77

ghanistan that we don’t need an AWACS, that we will get something back this summer. And the question is at some point we can’t

always be the junior partner in this. AWACS were diverted in the

last administration for an oil spill in Alaska, they were diverted for

Bosnia.

This isn’t new under the Bush administration. It is a problem of

saying look, maybe we don’t have enough of these things to help

get a dedicated AWACS to the narcotics effort because we have all

this money being spent on JIATF, East, West, now maybe North,

but if you don’t have the data, what in the world are we doing?

What if you have gaps in the data and you are trying to follow

somebody?

Now, I know everybody is working hard to fill the gaps, but now

let me ask another question, along similar lines, but a different

type of question. Has anybody requested more oilers? Part of the

problem is that if these guys float in the water and out-wait us?

I can’t even think of the magnitude of the problem in the Pacific,

let alone the Caribbean. One question is if we can see them? If we

are following, do we have our data to feed into JIATF? OK, now

let us say we have the data sources to see them. Do we have

enough resources on the water and in the air to do that? And one

key element of it is refueling with adequate oilers, both in the East

Pacific and in the Caribbean.

General Mixon.

General MIXON. Yes, sir. If I may go back just a moment to the

question you made in your earlier comment. Certainly, Mr.

O’Connell is our strongest advocate in DOD. Since his arrival

there, we have been open and frank in our discussions with him,

and he has gone forward numerous times to support our mission.

And I am confident in telling you today that if in fact we see a depletion of assets to be a threat to our mission, I am convinced that

General Hill will bring it to the attention, to include your own. So

I am confident in that.

Mr. SOUDER. Because we are spending over $1 billion right now

in the Andean Region. And if we are spending all that money down

in Colombia and it gets out because we didn’t put the in-between

in, we are wasting a fair share of that.

General MIXON. Yes, sir.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Mr. Chairman, if I could sort of take the heat

off General Mixon. We are keenly aware in the Department of the

strain on resources, particularly ISR resources. You asked particularly about what we used to call the forward operating location at

Curacao. And we have closed Roosevelt Roads. That creates a singular problem in how we used to address the whole surveillance

issue in the Caribbean Basin. We have a capability there of 12 aircraft, various mixes, 2 large, 4 medium, 6 small, that all perform

counternarcotics missions, either detection monitoring, intelligence

surveillance, and recognizance. But this can include a mix of P3s,

EP3s. We have Air Force E3s, the AWACS that you just described,

KC135 tankers, EC130’s, Coast Guard HC130’s, Immigration Customs small jets, C12s, and other antisubmarine patrol aircraft. In

addition, we are certainly relying on assets from some of our allied

nations: U.K., the Dutch, in some cases the French.

78

It is a difficult mix. I have specifically addressed this with the

J3 of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant General Schwartz. He has carefully looked at our requirements for this summer against what we

think will be needed in other theaters. Additionally, the Deputy J3

of the Joint Staff accompanied me to JIATF South, where we met

with General Hill, Commandant of the Coast Guard, and looked

specifically at how we can maximize our intelligence, surveillance,

and recognizance capabilities as a government, as a team, particularly for the summer season.

I am not convinced that we have the maximum solution possible,

but I am convinced that with the current constraints we are under,

we are doing the best we can. And that is my best call on that one,

sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

General Mixon.

General MIXON. Yes, sir. Getting to the specific question about

the refueling operations you asked in your second comment, the

Navy has supplied refueling ships, they have been made available

because there are refueling operations and long legs that the drug

traffickers will use. In addition to that, the United Kingdom has

apportioned one of its top-of-the-line oilers for the refueling effort,

and also we are doing work and have agreements with the Peruvian Navy to also provide oiler capabilities. So we try to get a balance. And I think what is important about this is not only the U.S.

effort, but also the effort of the other nations involved in drug

interdiction so that they carry a portion of the burden.

So I hope that answers the question on refueling operations that

you asked a moment ago.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me raise two more things. We held a hearing

in Arizona, and staff has been down that section of Arizona from

Tucson west, probably all the way over to Yuma, maybe even El

Centro, is one of our more vulnerable segments in the United

States because it is so desert: not as many traditional roads, hard

to patrol. But the Barry Goldwater Range covers approximately the

western third of the land border of Arizona and Mexico. The Range

also claims significant land north of the border. This Range is used

for air-to-air and air-to-ground testing. As the U.S. Border Patrol

has become more effective preventing and intercepting illegal immigration in the buildup areas, more and more human and contraband smuggling has migrated to the austere areas such as the

Goldwater Range.

Apparently the DOD agents for the range, the U.S. Air Force and

the U.S. Marine Corps, have refused to allow Federal law enforcement agencies access to air and land along the border. As a result,

we haven’t been able to control the illegal immigrants and drugs

entering that area as effectively as others. We held a hearing in

Arizona, as I mentioned. Some of the DHS witnesses testified at

the magnitude of the smuggling problem and how critical access to

the border area is. They also informed me about a phenomenal

number of people who die in this area from exposure.

I understand briefly from our discussion, Mr. O’Connell, that

there has been some negotiation and movement, but up until now

the Luke Air Force Base and the Pentagon refuse to promulgate a

memorandum of understanding between DOD and DHS for law enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:53 Oct 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\96314.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
79

forcement access to the Range in the immediate area of the border,

for example, allowing a fly zone for the planes that we move along

the border, which, by the way, our fighter jets aren’t supposed to

be down in that section anyway. Are you prepared to take responsibility at the Department of Defense if you don’t allow us to go

after the flow across the border? In other words, is it going to be

farther into the Range before there is some sort of a way to do the

intercept?

Mr. O’CONNELL. I thank you for your question, sir. I was alerted

last night by members of my staff that this was an issue, and in

terms of the research that I have been able to do, we did check

with Northern Command, we checked with JTF6, the operational

alliance in El Paso, we checked with the Border Patrol office in

Yuma, and we asked to speak to both Air Force and Marine Corps

representatives and asked specifically has there been any refusal

to allow Federal law enforcement on the Range, or are there any

specific restrictions. With the exception of a minor safety belt that

I am not specifically familiar with in terms of the depth, the people

in Yuma say that there is now not a problem, that there is cooperation.

I certainly am sensitive how you, as a representative, would be

very upset if this were the case. I can only tell you that my limited

investigation has indicated that if there was a problem, it is solved.

And if that is not the case, I will personally get back to you. But

that is the best information that I have at this time.

Mr. SOUDER. Part of the problem in that area is there aren’t

roads, so there is a minimal way to get there, even in the area

where Organ Pipe National Monument is, where we had the ranger

killed and where they had to shut down the third best hiking trail

in that whole region because so many drug runners are going

through the park. That area is comparatively developed, compared

to over where we practice bombing, as it should be. The problem

is, as we seal these areas, we are not only going to have the drug

smugglers moving over to where there is no resistance, they are

going to be walking in the middle of the bombing range, and all

of a sudden we are going to have public hearings about whether

we are, in our testing, hitting illegal immigrants, who will be portrayed in the most sympathetic ways, not as narcotraffickers. And

one way to do this is to have, like the rest of the border, a fly zone

where we can put the ICE planes to be able to track that, because

I know the military wants a flexibility maximum, but this is an

international border. They can’t come up that close to the border,

anyway, without risking international law violations.

Obviously, we don’t want to have our own planes colliding. We

don’t want to have our drug enforcement and immigration people

running around and restricting our ability in one of the premier

places with which to train our military personnel. But you can’t

have a border with gaps in it. We are having similar problems with

the National Park Service, with the Fish and Wildlife Service in

parts of this, because if we harden one target, they are going to

move to the softer target. And if you will look at this and continue

to work so that we can make it a continued thing. I know there

have been discussions, but we have to get some kind of resolution.

I know the Arizona delegation is really nervous about this issue.

80

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir. If you would allow me to take that as

a question, I promise Mr. Newbury of my staff will be back to you

and your staff on what specifically we know, what things we can

do. I share your concern, and we have it for action.

Mr. SOUDER. And I want to thank all of you. We will probably

have some additional written questions, and, as you know, we have

an interactive relationship, and try to both get staff and members

to each of your JIATFs and SOUTHCOM because you are so critical.

One thing I want to add for Mr. O’Connell is one of our concerns,

and you can hear the frustration here. It is a kind of a battle that

has to be continued, especially with all the challenges that you

have, that in the White House National Drug Control Strategy it

mentioned DOD twice on counternarcotics, on page 31 and 51. Yet

you have one-twelfth of the counternarcotics budget and you have

174 percent of the budget in counternarcotics that ONDCP has to

do the national ad campaign, to do all the HIDTAs, to do all that

side of the stuff. You are a major player in counternarcotics, and

we need that acknowledgment out of the Department of Defense

and out of the White House of how major a player it is.

And I have one question I didn’t get asked that we definitely will

put forth, but it has so many parts to it. I(n my area I don’t have

an active base, but I have tons of Guard and Reserve, and National

Guard has been doing lots of missions in drug support and other

types of things, and as we increasingly use our Guard and Reserve

like they are regular military—I mean, I have one Guard unit deployed in Iraq, 750 people for 15 months. I have a Reserve unit

going over right now to Afghanistan that hasn’t been deployed

since Leyte Gulf, and they are going to be gone for over a year.

Most of these people had other jobs, they were doing partial support of other things, and part of the thing is how is that impacting

the narcotics area. I don’t think these things are fully thought

through as a national strategy, that, oh, this is how we were using

them over here because we see this crisis over here, and we just

need to make sure that narcotics is at the table. JTF6 in El Paso

has historically done a military training mission, and it is a great

way for Guard-Reserve units to be trained all over the country, but

while they are training, they are doing narcotics missions and border missions, so it’s a twofer: we are training and fighting narcotics. And to make sure that that stays in the mix. We are banking

on you in your position.

Also, if you can help us with the Secretary of Defense Office and

Legislative Affairs to make it a priority that we can work with

CENTCOM here on the narcotics efforts. It is a major concern of

this committee, myself and the ranking member and the other

members of this committee, that the heroin boost out of Afghanistan does not come on our watch, and that, second, we don’t believe

that we can stabilize Afghanistan unless we are aggressively understanding that the heroin is interrelated with the subgroups in

Afghanistan. And it is not just the Taliban, it is any group that

wants to challenge the authority of a democratic institution, including crooks on the street, regional thugs, anybody that is interrelated.

81

We look forward to getting the classified briefings. But the one

thing you are hearing about the 9/11 Commission, which I voted

against and do not support, at the same time, what the American

people are hearing is that we don’t preplan enough. In Afghanistan, we can see this coming. It is absolutely happening on the

ground. The focus right now is on Iraq, but they are farther along

in some ways in democracy in Afghanistan, but it, in many ways,

is an even tougher country than Iraq. They don’t have oil, they

have narcotics. Heroin is their oil. And that whole region of this

country, we were depending on the good faith of regional sublords

to dominate, and they aren’t cooperating all of a sudden, they are

fighting Karzai. You have religious and ethnic divisions in Afghanistan that are just as tough, if not tougher, than we have in Iraq,

and all of a sudden, if the attention turns back over there and they

say to us in Congress, where were you? How did these people get

these guns? How did these people get this set up? How come we

have these armed insurgents here who are attacking and killing

our men and women from back home, and we say, well, they get

their money from heroin. Well, what were you doing when they

produced the crop? What were you doing when you had them in

their warehouses and you didn’t hit them? That has to be made

clear to our military.

I believe there has been tremendous progress. In the last stretch

here we need to accelerate that process. I know that the State Department is focused, DEA is on the ground now. It isn’t just a military question. You can’t do it all, the Brits need to be focused more

on it, and we put a little pressure on them as well. And we will

continue to work with you, but we are really banking on you to

help us with some of that too inside the Department of Defense.

Mr. O’CONNELL. I feel the responsibility, believe me.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you all for coming, and thank you for your

leadership. We very much appreciate it. The job of an oversight

hearing is to try to identify some of the gaps, but we are really trying to help you make sure you have adequate resources in the

areas of your responsibility and will continue to do so.

With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at

the call of the Chair.]

[Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

110

111

112

113

114

115

116

117

118

119

120

121

122

123

124

125

126

127

128

129

130

131

132

133

134

135

136

137

138

Æ