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THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO PEACE

ACCORDS: ONE YEAR LATER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 22, 2004

Serial No. 108–132

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

Vacancy 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota 

THOMAS P. SHEEHY, Subcommittee Staff Director 

NOELLE LUSANE, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

MALIK M. CHAKA, Professional Staff Member 

GREG GALVIN, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Constance Berry Newman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ......................................................... 6

The Honorable Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group (Former 

Foreign Minister of Australia) ............................................................................ 20

Learned Dees, Senior Program Officer, National Endowment for Democracy ... 30

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 2

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of New Jersey: Prepared statement .......................................................... 5

The Honorable Constance Berry Newman: Prepared statement ......................... 8

The Honorable Gareth Evans: Prepared statement .............................................. 24

Learned Dees: Prepared statement ........................................................................ 32

APPENDIX 

En Avant Congo: Prepared statement ................................................................... 41

Responses from the Honorable Constance Berry Newman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Questions 

Submitted for the Record by the Honorable Betty McCollum, a Representative in Congress from the State of Minnesota ................................................... 43

(1)

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 

PEACE ACCORDS: ONE YEAR LATER 

THURSDAY, JULY 22, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce 

(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will 

come to order. The Democratic Republic of Congo is in a challenging and a very troubled political transition. Its peace process, 

several years in the making, is set to lead to national elections next 

June. Progress in setting the stage for elections, however, has been 

very slow. The power-sharing government established last year has 

been fractious, failing to produce legislation required to conduct 

elections most Congolese view as essential to establishing a legitimate national government. 

Little progress has been made disarming and integrating rebel 

factions into the national army, and there have been two coup attempts against President Joseph Kabila this year. Violence continues to plague eastern Congo, where rebel groups have clashed 

with United Nations peacekeepers and with government forces. 

This turmoil has perpetuated the grave humanitarian conditions 

that have existed since the Rwandan genocide erupted 10 years 

ago. An estimated 3.5 million Congolese, mainly in the east, have 

perished over the last 6 or so years due to war-related starvation 

and disease. Yes, that is 3.5 million who have died. 

The MONUC peacekeeping operation in the DRC has grown in 

size and in scope. It currently fields over 10,000 troops. MONUC 

has been rightly criticized for failing to protect civilians, most recently in Bukavu, and failing to disarm and reintegrate rebel 

forces. The MONUC mandate is up for renewal at the end of the 

month. We can renew MONUC, and perhaps we should even increase its size, but we had better ask ourselves some challenging 

questions impacting its effectiveness. 

A United Nations Panel of Experts report issued this week concludes that Rwanda directly backed the rebel group that seized 

Bukavu. This is serious. Ugandan military involvement in the DRC 

was also flagged. The United Nations report also found that Rwanda maintains military positions in North Kivu. This is the latest 

indication that the Rwandan government is disregarding its 2002 

commitment to keep its military out of eastern DRC. The humaniVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:53 Sep 15, 2004 Jkt 094990 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\AFRICA\072204\94990.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
2

tarian situation there is horrific. Are we playing all our cards with 

Rwanda to end its meddling in eastern Congo? I don’t think we are. 

MONUC is looking to establish joint border patrols with DRC 

government forces. A brilliant idea. Border security has been a 

problem for years. Why is a plan still on the drawing board? 

Rwanda’s true security interest lies with a unified and stable DRC, 

not a decayed state. 

This conflict, I am afraid, is driven by natural resource exploitation. This was a theme of the DRC hearing this Subcommittee 

held last year. United Nations and other reports have identified 

Rwanda and other countries as maintaining considerable illicit 

commercial interests in the DRC. Rwandans recently instigated 

clear cutting in Virunga National Park, according to the recent 

United Nations report. What are the United States and the United 

Nations doing to deter this scramble for resources in the DRC? 

I am interested in hearing from the Administration also about 

the Skinkolobwe mine. United Nations investigators this week 

warned that massive illicit digging at this mine, which supplied the 

Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombs, threatens to put nuclear ore into 

terrorist hands. 

With MONUC, the United States and the international community are making a substantial commitment to the Congolese people. 

With competing demands for United Nations peacekeeping resources throughout the world, progress is expected and urgently 

needed. Yet, it is unclear to me—and I was in the DRC several 

weeks ago—it is unclear to me whether the country’s political class 

is willing to seize this opportunity and forge a stable country, despite the humanitarian suffering of their fellow countrymen. 

Talk of delayed elections, which I heard in Kinshasa, is a nonstarter. Ambassador William Swing, the United Nations representative to the DRC, has been telling the Congolese that they will not 

see another MONUC-like investment should it fail. I think he is 

right. Should MONUC fail, the DRC is likely to remain a divided 

country and it is likely to remain devastated well into the future 

with grave humanitarian consequences for the Congolese people. 

This may be the DRC’s last chance. Flaws and all, MONUC is certainly its best chance for peace. 

I will now turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne of New Jersey, for his opening statement. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the opening statement of Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA–40) at this afternoon’s hearing on the peace 

accord in the Democratic Republic of Congo: 

‘‘The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is in a challenging, and troubled, political transition. Its peace process, several years in the making, is set to lead to national elections next June. Progress in setting the stage for elections, however, has 

been very slow. The power-sharing government established last year has been fractious, failing to produce legislation required to conduct the elections most Congolese 

view as essential to establishing a legitimate national government. Little progress 

has been made disarming and integrating rebel factions into the national army, and 

there have been two coup attempts against President Joseph Kabila this year. Violence continues to plague eastern Congo, where rebel groups have clashed with U.N. 

peacekeepers and government forces. This turmoil has perpetuated the grave huVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:53 Sep 15, 2004 Jkt 094990 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\072204\94990.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

manitarian conditions that have existed since the Rwandan genocide erupted ten 

years ago. An estimated 3.5 million Congolese, mainly in the east, have perished 

over the last six or so years due to war-related starvation and disease. Yes, 3.5 million dead. 

‘‘The MONUC peacekeeping operation in the DRC has grown in size and scope, 

so that it currently fields over 10,000 troops. MONUC has been rightly criticized 

for failing to protect civilians, most recently in Bukavu, and failing to disarm and 

reintegrate rebel forces. The MONUC mandate is up for renewal at the end of the 

month. We can renew MONUC, perhaps we should even increase its size. But, we 

had better ask ourselves some challenging questions impacting its effectiveness. 

‘‘A U.N. Panel of Experts report issued this week concludes that Rwanda directly 

backed the rebel group that seized Bukavu. This is serious. Ugandan military involvement in the DRC was also flagged. The U.N. report also found that Rwanda 

maintains military positions in North Kivu. This is the latest indication that the 

Rwandan government is disregarding its 2002 commitment to keep its military out 

of eastern DRC. The humanitarian situation there is horrific. Are we playing all our 

cards with Rwanda to end its meddling? I don’t think so. 

‘‘MONUC is looking to establish joint border patrols with DRC government forces. 

Border security has been a problem for years. Why is a plan still on the drawing 

board? Rwanda’s true security interest lies with a unified and stable DRC, not a 

decayed state. 

‘‘This conflict is driven by natural resource exploitation. This was a theme of the 

DRC hearing this Subcommittee held last year. U.N. and other reports have identified Rwanda and other countries as maintaining considerable illicit commercial interests in the DRC. Rwandans recently instigated clear cutting in Virunga National 

Park, according to the recent U.N. report. What are the U.S. and the U.N. doing 

to deter this scramble for resources? I am interested in hearing from the Administration about the Skinkolobwe mine. U.N. investigators this week warned that massive illicit digging at this mine—which supplied the Nagasaki and Hiroshima 

bombs—threatens to put nuclear ore into terrorist hands. 

‘‘With MONUC, the U.S. and the international community are making a substantial commitment to the Congolese people. With competing demands for UN peacekeeping resources throughout the world, progress is expected, and urgently needed. 

Yet, it is unclear to me—and I was in the DRC late last month—whether the country’s political class is willing to seize this opportunity and forge a stable country, 

despite the humanitarian suffering of their fellow countrymen. Talk of delayed elections—which I heard in Kinshasa—is a non-starter. Ambassador William Swing, the 

U.N. representative to the DRC, has been telling the Congolese that they will not 

see another MONUC-like investment, should it fail. He is right. Should MONUC 

fail, the DRC is likely to remain a divided country and devastated well into its future, with grave humanitarian consequences for the Congolese people. This may be 

the DRC’s last chance; flaws and all, MONUC is certainly its best chance for peace.’’

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think that 

the topic is very appropriate at this time. Of course, as you have 

indicated, the window of opportunity is passing by, and I couldn’t 

agree more with Ambassador Swing, as you quoted, saying that 

there may not be another opportunity for a peacekeeping operation 

that we see now. 

But let me thank you for calling this important hearing today 

and of course for your strong leadership on the Africa Subcommittee. Because of your support, we were able to have a debate 

on the resolution calling genocide in the Sudan something that 

there were many, many doubters that that would ever come out of 

the sense of the House. And with your leadership and Mr. 

Tancredo and Mr. Wolf and others on our side we were able to debate it last night and it will be voted on today. So I appreciate that 

also. 

I know, as you have indicated, you were recently in the DRC, 

and I am sure that your first hand account of the situation there 

will help us understand the challenges more thoroughly that we 

face in that very important country. 

4

I would also like to express my appreciation to you and other 

Members of the Subcommittee for their continued engagement, as 

I mentioned, in exposing genocide in Darfur, Sudan. 

The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, like Sudan, 

has been in critical turmoil for years. As you all are aware, May 

1997 the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the 

Congo-Zaire, ADFL, marched into Kinshasa and ousted long-time 

dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. But within a year prospects for a better 

future for the people of the DRC collapsed, and by August 1998 

open conflict erupted between President Kabila and the Congolese. 

Forces supported by Rwanda and Uganda had this conflict moving 

on. Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe joined in the fighting, and, as 

you know, we had a mini-continent war going on. 

Despite numerous efforts to end the war and to bring stability 

into DRC, this strategically important country plunged into further 

chaos and instability. In July 1999, the Lusaka agreement did little 

to end the chaos but offered a framework for a political settlement. 

By late 2002, after a series of South Africa United Nations-sponsored talks, foreign troops in the DRC withdrew their forces, although some Ugandan and Zimbabwean troops remain, in part, 

with the consent of the Kabila government. 

In December 2002, the inter-Congolese dialogue achieved a major 

breakthrough when President Kabila and the parties to the conflict 

agreed to a transitional government. The global all-inclusive agreement was signed in Pretoria South Africa by the DRC government. 

The Congolese democratic rallied RCD-Goma, the Movement for 

the Congolese Liberation, MLC, and representatives of the unarmed political groups in civil society. 

The agreement included a 2-year transition headed by President 

Kabila and four Vice Presidents who are in charge of four commissions. In July 2003, these four Vice Presidents were sworn in, 

bringing hope to this tormented land and many of them being in 

Kinshasa for the first time in their lives haven’t live in the eastern 

provinces. 

I visited Kinshasa and Eastern DRC last August. I was cautiously optimistic then, perhaps this time around that the DRC will 

make serious challenges to stability remains. The Kinshasa government still does not have political and security control outside the 

capital, and that is very essential for elections to happen, especially 

in the eastern part of the country, as we know which has been controlled, in many instances, by negative forces from outside the border. 

In early June 2004, rebel groups led by General Laurent Nkunda 

and Colonel Jules Mutebutsi attacked and captured the eastern 

town of Bukavu, killing many civilians and forcing MONUC forces 

to flee the town. And General Nkunda argues that he attacked the 

town in order to protect civilians of Tutsi origin who had been targeted by pro-government forces. The rebel forces were forced out of 

Bukavu, but the incident there demonstrated how fragile the nature of this transitional peace process is and why it is so important 

that we really kind of zero in on these negative forces and the 

whole fragile government structure that we have. 

As many of you would predict, the Bukavu incident intensified 

tension between Rwanda and the DRC and seeing that the DRC 

5

might once again plunge itself into a major conflict with their 

neighbor. In late June, however, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda and President Joseph Kabila of DRC met in Nigeria under the 

auspices of President Obasanjo of Nigeria, and the parties agreed 

to set up a joint verification committee to ensure border security, 

hopefully another committee but hopefully it will work. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I must say that I was disturbed to 

read in the July 2004 United Nations Expert Panel report, which 

documented violations of the arms embargo imposed on negative 

forces in the DRC. We cannot continue to have arms embargoes 

violated. 

On a positive note, though, let me express my appreciation to the 

State Department, specifically the Africa Bureau, for facilitating 

two rounds of talks among the parties in the Great Lakes region. 

This is the kind of proactivity engagement that will help confront 

the serious challenges we are facing in that part of that country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman let me first thank you for calling this important hearing and for 

your strong leadership of the Africa Subcommittee. I know you were recently in the 

DRC and I am sure your first hand account of the situation there will help us understand the challenges we face in that important country. I also like to express my 

appreciation to you and other members of the subcommittee for their continued engagement in exposing the genocide in Darfur, Sudan. 

The Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire, like Sudan, has been in political turmoil for years. As you are all aware, in May 1997, the Alliance of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL) marched into Kinshasa and 

ousted longtime dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. But within a year, prospects for a better future for the people of Congo collapsed. And by August 1998, open conflict 

erupted between Kabila and Congolese forces supported by Rwanda and Uganda. 

Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe joined the fighting in support of Kabila. 

Despite numerous efforts to end the war and bring stability to Congo, this strategically important country plunged into further chaos and instability. The July 1999 

Lusaka agreement did little to end the chaos, but offered a framework for a political 

settlement. By late 2002, after a series of South African-U.N.-sponsored talks, foreign troops in DRC withdrew their forces, although some Ugandan and Zimbabwean 

troops remained, in part with the consent of the Kabila government. 

In December 2002, the Inter-Congolese Dialogue achieved a major breakthrough 

when President Kabila and the parties to the conflict agreed to a transitional government. The Global All-Inclusive Agreement was signed in Pretoria, South Africa, 

by the DRC government, Congolese Democratic Rally (RCD-Goma), the Movement 

for the Congolese Liberation (MLC), and representatives of the unarmed political 

groups. The agreement included a two-year transition headed by President Kabila 

and four Vice Presidents, who are in charge of four commissions. In July 2003, these 

four Vice Presidents were sworn in, bringing hope to this tormented land. 

I visited Kinshasa and eastern Congo last August. I was cautiously optimistic 

then that perhaps this time around the Congolese will make it. But serious challenges to stability remain. The Kinshasa government still does not have political 

and security control outside the capital and especially in eastern part of the country. 

In early June 2004, rebel groups led by General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Jules 

Mutebutsi attacked and captured the eastern town of Bukavu, killing many civilians 

and forcing MONUC forces to flee the town. General Nkunda argues that he attacked the town in order to protect civilians of Tutsi origin, who had been targeted 

by pro-government forces. The rebel forces were forced out of Bukavu, but the incident in Bukavu demonstrated the fragile nature of the transitional peace process. 

As many of you would predict, the Bukavu incident intensified tensions between 

Rwanda and Congo and seemed the DRC might once again plunge into a major conflict. In late June, however, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda and President JoVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:53 Sep 15, 2004 Jkt 094990 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\072204\94990.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

seph Kabila of Congo met in Nigeria under the auspices of President Obasanjo of 

Nigeria and the parties agreed to setup a Joint Verification Committee to ensure 

border security. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I must say I was disturbed to read the July 2004 

U.N. Expert Panel Report, which documented violation of the arms embargo imposed on negative forces in Congo. On a positive note, let me express my appreciation to the State Department, specifically the Africa Bureau, for facilitating tworounds of talks among the parties in the Great Lakes region. This is the kind of 

pro-active engagement that will help confront the serious challenges we are facing 

in that part of the country. Thank you Mr. Chairman and look forward to hearing 

the testimonies of our witnesses.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

As Mr. Payne mentioned, we have a new Assistant Secretary of 

State for African Affairs to welcome to this Subcommittee, Constance Newman, and we want to indicate congratulations, Secretary, on your recent confirmation and your swearing in. 

Secretary Newman is not new to us, of course. She has had a distinguished career, most recently serving as the Assistant Administrator for Africa for USAID where she was responsible for many innovative programs on the continent. Ms. Newman worked extensively throughout Africa before that, including serving as a private 

consultant to South African leaders on affirmative action and diversity and representing the World Bank as a liaison to the South African National Congress and to other organizations. 

Secretary Newman, we welcome you, and I look forward to continuing our relationship in your new post as the State Department’s top official for Africa. We have many challenges to face together, including the grave challenges in Congo that we will be discussing today. And, Secretary Newman, what we would like to do 

is just have our witnesses summarize their testimony and sort of 

speak off the cuff, because we have read the written statements, 

and we again welcome you here. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. NEWMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Payne. 

I would like to thank you for calling this hearing. I think that we 

all recognize the importance of DRC and understand how fragile 

the country has been since 1996. I think that what has happened 

now is a feeling that some parts of the country are relatively tranquil, but the other parts, particularly in the east, give us all concern. 

Now, we do recognize that rebuilding a country that has been 

steeped in the type of conflict that has been the case there for such 

a long period of time is a daunting task. You have already mentioned the peace agreements, and they are outlined again in my 

testimony, and I think it is very important that people pay attention to those, because as far as we are concerned, they are the 

basis for any action that the international community should be 

taking at this time. And any communication and leaning on the 

participants needs to be in the context of those agreements. 

And it is perfectly clear from those agreements that it is intended that troops be withdrawn, that there be no support of rebels 

or insurgency and that there be support for a transitional government moving to an election. 

7

A moment about the United States and the international role in 

all of this. As you know, the signatories to the final act agreed to 

establish a support committee, and the United States, through our 

Ambassador to the DRC, has played a leadership role in that committee. We have provided roughly over $100 million in annual assistance to the DRC, some which is directed toward democracy and 

human rights. 

We continue to support MONUC. Its mandate, as you have stated, has modified over time to include assistance to the transitional 

government. Still, the situation remains fluid, the possibility of disaster ever-present. The recent violence in Bukavu is illustrative of 

the ongoing problems faced by the people of the DRC. This force 

of MONUC is only 10,000 peacekeepers; 1,000 of them went into 

that area. That indicates to us that this all needs to be reviewed, 

and I will mention that just as I close. 

Despite some progress in relations between Rwanda and the 

DRC government, mistrust still persists, and we recognize that it 

goes in both directions. It is our view, however, that it is very important that we continue to work with the DRC, with Rwanda and 

the other regional leaders to build a climate of trust in the Great 

Lakes region. And in addition to that, though, it can’t be with allowing impunity of those who are violating the agreements. 

One other point that I know we are in agreement about, and that 

is the importance of the Congo’s vast rainforest, and it is important, in large part, because of the potential for recognizing the economic growth of the area. But it is also important that we pay attention to it because in the near-term it has been used as unauthorized sanctuary for the rebels. 

We do, as a nation, have a great interest in seeing a stable and 

prosperous DRC, and that is because of our interest, generally, in 

stability around the world. Yes, we mentioned in the statement our 

interest in the need for recognizing a natural wealth but it is mainly the wealth of the people and the need for stability that drives, 

I think, our participation here. 

I will end, because I know you have questions, with just a few 

statements about our present and future efforts. Congressman 

Payne did mention our inviting the ministers of Rwanda, Uganda 

and the DRC here, and I might say to you that this followed on 

tough discussions that the African leaders had with these leaders 

in Addis at the African Union Summit. 

And as a personal note, prior to our meeting here in Washington, 

I spoke to the leaders in Addis to be certain of their comfort level 

that the United States was playing the role that we intended to 

play, and each indicated to me that they felt having their foreign 

ministers and their defense ministers meeting together here in 

Washington furthered their own goal of bringing about greater 

ability for them to build trust and resolve the conflict. 

Congressman Payne mentioned President Obasanjo. He was another person that I spoke with prior to our meeting here, and he 

again reinforced that the United States can help in resolving the 

conflict there so long as we continue to communicate with him and 

with the AU about the direction in which we are moving. 

I will just end by saying I did meet with the Secretary General’s 

Special Representative, Ambassador Swing, when he was here. He 

8

is still here, I think, and I know he is been speaking with you, and 

he is provided, not in depth, but I think that will come, some of 

his perspective on MONUC’s role and its needs. We look forward 

to the full report to help guide us in determining what to recommend in the United Nations Security Council when MONUC’s 

mandate expires. 

We are profoundly concerned about the Congo and its people. 

However, I believe there is hope that with effort and patience and 

wisdom we can make a difference there. The situation remains serious and we can’t pretend that it doesn’t, but the essential prerequisites for a peaceful solution are in place, and I know that with 

your continued support, your pushing of us also, that will make a 

difference in ensuring that we can improve the lives of the people 

in that region. So with that, I will end my testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Newman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to 

testify on the transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). And thank 

you Mr. Chairman for your recent trip to Kinshasa. The situation in the DRC has 

been fragile since the country tumbled into political chaos in 1996. In what has been 

deemed Africa’s first world war, at least five neighboring countries sent their military forces to the Congo in 1998. The nearly five year conflict there resulted in at 

least three and a half million civilian deaths—the highest death toll of any conflict 

since 1945—and virtual destruction of the country’s economic infrastructure. The 

Congo River, the symbol of national unity and a key economic link in the country, 

was closed to commercial traffic for five years. A number of armies and semi-organized groups of bandits, some of them enjoying foreign support, have emerged from 

the strife. While some parts of the country are now relatively tranquil, other areas, 

particularly in the east, remain strife-torn. 

Rebuilding a country that has been steeped in conflict for such a protracted period 

is a daunting task indeed. When Belgium granted independence in 1960, by one account there were only 17 university graduates in the entire country. Most people 

had only a fourth grade education, if that. It is not surprising that civil strife afflicted the DRC from the time of its inception. There are literally hundreds of ethnic 

groups inhabiting the Congo’s vast territory. They speak some 300 languages. Unifying them is no simple task. As is often the case in Africa, ethnic groups have been 

divided by national boundaries imposed by the colonizers. This has served to exacerbate the international border conflicts from which the DRC suffers today. 

THE PEACE AGREEMENTS

Over the past five years, the regional protagonists, assisted by strong regional and 

international mediation efforts, signed four major agreements designed to bring 

peace in the DRC. The Lusaka Agreement of 1999 was the first comprehensive 

agreement aimed at ending the wars in the Congo. It was signed by all of the belligerent parties, including both recognized governments and rebel groups. It called for 

a cease-fire, inter-Congolese political negotiations, disarming militias and armed 

groups, including the Rwandan Hutu rebels present in the Congo, and the normalization of the security situation along common borders. 

In July 2002, in Pretoria, the DRC and Rwanda signed the watershed Pretoria 

Agreement, whereby Rwanda agreed to withdraw its troops from the DRC, the 

Congo agreed to assist in dismantling the Rwandan Hutu rebels in its territory, and 

the two countries agreed to work together to facilitate repatriation of Rwandans in 

the Congo and to establish a mechanism for the normalization of the security situation along their common border. 

Then, in September 2002, in Luanda, Angola, the DRC and Uganda signed an 

agreement calling for the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from the Congo and the 

establishment of a pacification committee for Ituri Province of the DRC. Both sides 

agreed to refrain from military support for armed groups on the other’s territory, 

9

and to cooperate in defense and security to include the establishment of a border 

security mechanism. 

Lastly, the Final Act of the inter-Congolese political negotiations was signed in 

April 2003 in Sun City, South Africa. This agreement was the culmination of the 

Congolese political negotiations that commenced in October 2001. The Final Act 

comprises the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC, 

signed in December 2002 in Pretoria, the Transitional Constitution, the memorandum on military and security issues of March 2003, and the 36 resolutions 

adopted by the inter-Congolese dialogue in April 2002. The Accord called for a President supported by four vice-presidents. 

In effect, a framework for peace is in place in the form of these agreements, and 

this framework has been strongly supported by the international community. At the 

request of the signatories to the Final Act, the international community agreed to 

establish a support committee to assist in encouraging formation of a transitional 

government and the extension of state authority throughout the DRC, culminating 

in the holding of national elections in 2005. Our Ambassador in the DRC plays a 

leadership role on this committee, and we remain committed to re-establishment of 

the Congolese government throughout the entire territory of the DRC, democratic 

elections, the resumption of relief and development work. What is required now is 

consistent hard work to see through the re-establishment of government throughout 

the entire territory of the DRC, democratic elections, the resumption of relief and 

development work, and the completion of other critical tasks such as the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups that pose a threat to the Congo and 

its neighbors. 

U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Over the course of the past decade of conflict, the United States has worked closely with the United Nations, our friends and allies in the region and the Congolese 

people to try to bring peace and stability to this potentially very rich land. We have 

embarked on this path because of the critical importance to Central Africa of peace 

in the Congo—it is by far the region’s largest country, bordering nine other countries in the heart of the continent. We currently provide roughly $100 million in annual assistance to the DRC, of which some is directed towards programs supporting 

democracy and human rights. 

The United Nations, with our support, has established a UN peacekeeping force, 

the UN Mission for the Congo (MONUC). MONUC was originally designed to monitor the cease-fire among signatories to the Lusaka Agreement and to assist in the 

disarmament and demobilization of Rwandan Hutu rebels in the DRC. Its mandate, 

over time, has been modified to meet changing circumstances. The mandate has 

been expanded to include assisting the DRC’s transitional national government in 

the extension of state authority throughout the country, some disarmament and demobilization assistance for Congolese armed groups, civilian police training and in 

elections preparation. MONUC is one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations in 

existence, but it is not a large force when one considers that the DRC is equal in 

size to the United States east of the Mississippi. MONUC’s maximum authorized 

size is 10,800 troops, essentially the same number of troops it has on the ground 

now. 

Despite these considerable challenges, the transitional national government has 

had some success. The fact that much of the country has been peaceful for the past 

year-and-a-half denotes the progress that has been made compared to the preLusaka period when a number of foreign armies from neighboring states were fighting in the DRC. Factions that were fighting one-another just two years ago are now 

participating in the same government and are talking to one another instead of killing. The national parliament, with over 600 members, includes virtually every significant interest group. 

CONTINUING PROBLEMS

Still, the situation remains fluid and the possibility of disaster ever present. The 

recent violence in the eastern city of Bukavu, near the Rwandan border, is illustrative of the ongoing problems faced by the people of the DRC. A renegade Congolese Lieutenant Colonel Jule Mutebusi took over the city on May 26 with a force 

of several hundred men. Another rebel, General Nkunda, with a force of several 

thousand, joined him. MONUC, with a force of only one thousand men, chose not 

to play an aggressive role in attempting to repel Nkunda’s and Mutebusi’s militias. 

Following strong international pressure, Mutebusi and Nkunda withdrew their 

forces from Bukavu, and the DRC transitional government re-entered Bukavu on 

June 25. Mutebusi and a number of his forces have been disarmed and are now deVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:53 Sep 15, 2004 Jkt 094990 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\072204\94990.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
10

tained in Rwanda; Nkunda remains in the DRC some 100 miles north of Bukavu, 

where he is allegedly seeking new recruits. Added to the general instability in eastern Congo is the presence of Mai-Mai and Rwandan Hutu rebels. 

Despite some progress in relations between Rwanda and the DRC governments, 

mistrust still persists. When the DRC army retook Bukavu, Rwanda accused it of 

massing troops on the border in preparation for an invasion. The Congolese are convinced that Rwanda supported Mutebusi and Nkunda, and continue to provide military assistance to dissident groups. We continue to work with the DRC, Rwanda, 

and other regional leaders to build a climate of trust in the Great Lakes region. For 

without such trust the civilian population in the Congo and elsewhere in the region 

will surely suffer. Reports from eastern Congo indicate that during their occupation 

of Bukavu these rebels raped and pillaged at will; there are some reports indicating 

that elements within the national army behaved as badly as the rebels when the 

city was retaken. It is our hope and determination that the perpetrators of these 

crimes be held responsible for their actions. 

The fighting in the east provoked the flight of over 30,000 people to sanctuary in 

Burundi and Rwanda. The occupation of Bukavu caused a break in humanitarian 

efforts in eastern Congo. Many non-Congolese relief workers fled the fighting, although most Congolese workers remained and minimal services continued. With the 

national army now in control of Bukavu, most relief workers have returned and 

services have been resumed. 

The Congo’s vast rain forests have also provided unauthorized sanctuary for 

rebels fighting against the Ugandan government. The Ugandans moved troops into 

the DRC during the 1996 and 1999 wars, and they are impatient with the DRC government for not having brought the northeastern part of the country under control 

(i.e. to control the Ugandan rebels). In fact we have seen reports that Uganda provides arms to militias in the region. 

I’m sure you agree with me Mr. Chairman when I say the United States has real 

interests in seeing a stable and prospering DRC. As I’ve noted, stability in the DRC 

is key to regional stability, as it borders nine other countries. Conflict there cannot 

help but spill over to neighboring countries, impacting their political and economic 

development as well. 

The presence of significant deposits of uranium has the potential to make the 

DRC a point of interest for those who would develop nuclear capabilities illicitly. 

Its lack of internal controls and vast forests make it a place where armed groups 

can hide. 

The structure of the transitional national government is unwieldy. In order to 

bring in all of the warring factions, an agreement was reached to allow for four vicepresidents. Two of the vice-presidents have private armies, and it is difficult to get 

agreement on many key issues. 

A history of assassinations keeps all senior government officers on guard. President Kabila’s father was assassinated in 2001. In April and June of this year there 

were two unsuccessful coup attempts in Kinshasa by dissident military officers. Although no one was killed in either attempt and the government remains in place; 

they nonetheless added to an aura of instability. The coup attempts have also forced 

MONUC to move more troops to the capital to protect senior government officials, 

leaving fewer men available in the provinces. 

We are also concerned about the long-term ecological effects of the strife in the 

DRC. The Virunga National Park is the world’s largest habitat of mountain gorilla, 

an endangered species. Recent refugee movements brought hundreds of families into 

the Park where they burned down forest to allow their cattle to graze. Following 

our protests, this movement of people seems to have stopped; but great damage was 

done. Through the Congo Basin Forest Partnership, a project you have supported 

Mr. Chairman, we are working to preserve the ecology of the huge watershed of this 

major river. But until there is effective government control of the entire country, 

illegal foresting and mining will continue to take a toll. 

U.S AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS

Instability in such a large country is a threat to the Central African region, and 

to the entire world. The country is amazingly wealthy in terms of natural resources. 

There are huge deposits of copper, cobalt, coltan and industrial diamonds. There are 

also significant deposits of gold, oil and uranium. The DRC’s hydroelectric potential 

may be the world’s greatest and there is considerable agricultural wealth. There is 

enormous potential for foreign, including American, investment. However, despite 

the country’s natural wealth, the DRC’s annual per capita income is $99, one of the 

world’s lowest. Much of the country’s wealth is being exploited by unscrupulous 

business people who often export diamonds and other minerals via neighboring 

11

countries that profit from their middleman role. We have worked closely with states 

in the neighborhood to improve conditions in the Congo. 

Last week the Foreign Ministers of the DRC and Rwanda and the Defense Minister of Uganda met with us in Washington in the second of what we hope will be 

monthly meetings to resolve their differences peacefully with the United States as 

a neutral facilitator. All three nations have reason to be concerned about events in 

eastern Congo. Rwanda has a well-justified concern regarding the presence in eastern Congo of armed Rwandan Hutu rebels, some of whom participated in the 1994 

genocide in Rwanda. Rebellious movements from Uganda also find refuge in the 

DRC’s forests from which they periodically launch raids on Uganda. The Congolese, 

in turn, hope that their central government in Kinshasa can re-establish security 

and calm in the eastern part of the country, that they can establish a secure frontier, and that they can resume the work of providing for their population. These 

goals are threatened by the presence of armed groups in the east of the country. 

To address these concerns, we invited ministers of the Congolese, Rwandan and 

Ugandan governments to Washington in May. My Deputy, Donald Yamamoto, led 

a delegation to Kinshasa and Kigali last month, and as I mentioned, we hosted the 

three ministers again last week in Washington. We have issued a communique ́ regarding the shared commitments of these three countries and expect to meet again 

in August to pursue the shared objectives that have been agreed to. Nigerian President Obasanjo recently hosted the Presidents of Rwanda and the DRC in Abuja for 

meetings that contributed to a commitment to find ways to build confidence between 

the Rwandan and DRC governments. Obasanjo appealed to the leaders to cease hostilities and focus their attention on full implementation of the 2002 Pretoria Agreement. The Presidents of the DRC and Rwanda agreed to re-dedicate themselves to 

the Pretoria agreement and are working with MONUC to establish a Joint 

Verification Mechanism which will support efforts to control the border and the security situation in eastern Congo. 

NEXT STEPS

We will continue to offer our facilitation to the ministers of DRC, Rwanda and 

Uganda to address the issues. We will continue to support the DRC with humanitarian and development assistance, particularly focused on the plight of the people 

in the east, development of democratic institutions, and improving health care and 

addressing food security and economic growth issues. 

Most immediately, we are currently looking at means of ensuring that MONUC, 

the key international organization in the DRC, plays as constructive a role as possible. The Secretary General’s Special Representative, Ambassador William Swing, 

has been in Washington this week for detailed discussions of the situation in the 

Congo. He is providing his perspective on MONUC’s role and its needs, as we consider what to recommend in the U.N. Security Council when MONUC’s mandate is 

considered following an expected three-month technical rollover at the end of July 

and issuance of a report by the Secretary General in late August. I understand he 

met with some of you and your staff members. 

Mr. Chairman, though we are profoundly concerned about Congo and its people, 

I believe that there is hope that with effort, patience, and wisdom, we can make 

a difference there. As I said at the outset of my testimony, the situation in the DRC 

remains very serious, but the essential prerequisites for a peaceful solution are in 

place. We hope you will continue your strong support for the process.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Secretary Newman. In your statement, 

you testify regarding last month’s attack on Bukavu and you say:

‘‘A renegade lieutenant colonel, Jules Mutebusi, perhaps with 

Rwandan backing, took over the city on May 26 with a force 

of several hundred men.’’

On Tuesday, a United Nations Panel of Experts released a report 

stating that the Rwandan government backed this force. Is the 

United Nations report authoritative, in your view? 

And I will share with you, I have seen first hand the engagement 

of Rwandans on the ground in Kinshasa and in the DRC. In 1997, 

less than 24 hours after the government fell, I was in neighboring 

Angola, so we flew into the airport, and my first experience there 

was in having armed soldiers, who turned out to be Rwandan 

12

Tutsis with machine guns, climb into the jeeps and they went with 

us when we were meeting with the ministers and seeking to meet, 

we subsequently met with Laurent Kabila at the time. So I knew 

the role they played then all the way in Kinshasa. 

And so I wanted to know, is the United Nations report authoritative when they say the Rwandan government backed this force. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know for certain the details. 

I know this: That Rwanda knows what commitments it has made, 

and Rwanda knows what it has and has not done. I think that it 

is important—and this may be a tactic that you may not agree 

with—but I think it is important for those of us who are trying to 

bring them together to make clear what is expected of all of them. 

Mr. ROYCE. I understand that, Secretary Newman, but at this 

point, we need Rwanda to understand that at this juncture they 

need to be part of the solution again——

Ms. NEWMAN. I agree. 

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. Not part of the problem. And when the 

DRC army took Bukavu back, Rwanda accused it of massing troops 

on the border in preparation for an invasion. Is this Rwandan 

charge of DRC’s aggressive intentions remotely possible, given the 

Rwandan supremacy in terms of military equipment and personnel 

and training? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I mean, I am probably about to say something that 

is not diplomatic, but it is entirely possible that each and every one 

of the actors here can behave badly, and I do include Rwanda. But 

I, again, am saying to you in bringing together the ministers and 

all, it is my hope that we can keep the door open to all of them. 

We have had conversations with Rwanda, with the DRC, with 

Uganda about the charges that have bee made against each and 

every one of them and what is expected of them based on their own 

agreements. But I don’t know if it is wise of me and whether I personally have enough documentation to say that they in particular 

behaved in a certain way on a certain date. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, then let me just cite the United Nations report 

of its Panel of Experts that cites Uganda and Rwanda for arming 

and supporting factions in Congo, and let me ask, did the Administration raise this issue when the Uganda minister of defense and 

the Rwandan foreign minister and the DRC foreign minister met 

last week with the State Department. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes. And I attended part of it, and I can have 

those who attended the entire meeting brief you. But during those 

meetings, there was an honest discussion, not just on the part of 

the United States but the other participants there, charging one 

another of what it is they believe they have done in violation of the 

agreements so that the communique that came from that meeting 

came after a discussion by the various participants of their disagreement with and their charges with regard to the other participants. But I will be more than happy to give more of a transcript 

if that is what you care for. 

Mr. ROYCE. That would be helpful, and I want to reestablish the 

point that we have a plan on the drawing boards for joint border 

patrols on the DRC with Rwanda and DRC forces. I think that if 

Rwanda is serious, they will subscribe to this plan, and we will 

begin to solve this problem, and I think that really isn’t that long. 

13

This is something that can be addressed and solved, and if we want 

to end the pillaging of natural resources and if we want to create 

some sense of calm on that border, this is the way to do it. 

And my hope is that Rwanda will take that action and the DRC 

will take that action soon, because I am mindful that in 2002 the 

United States threatened Rwanda with withholding support for its 

IMF loan unless it withdrew its troops in the DRC, which it did 

soon after. That is a lever that I assume the United States would 

use again on Rwanda if we do not get compliance, and let me ask 

you that question. 

Ms. NEWMAN. I can’t speak yet for the government, but I certainly personally would support it if that were clear and if it were 

clear that it would be necessary in order to bring about the kind 

of results that I think we all want. 

Mr. ROYCE. I appreciate that. Now, the last question I want to 

ask you goes to the nonchalance on the part of the Congolese government with respect to the uranium mining that is occurring in 

terms of allowing inspectors, United Nations inspectors, to go in 

and seal off and cement down that mine. The presence of significant deposits of uranium, as you say in your report and your testimony, has the potential to make the DRC a point of interest for 

those who would develop nuclear capabilities illicitly. As I said in 

my statement, United Nations investigators this week warned that 

massive digging at this mine threatens to put nuclear ore into terrorist hands. 

So the point I want to make is with regard to the DRC government we would like to see support for the international community 

going in and cementing down this mine and solving a problem before it becomes something that we can’t solve. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Mr. Chairman, I agree with that. What I need to 

do also is to share with you a report of some experts that went into 

that area and who found no evidence that the miners were seeking 

or mining uranium. 

Mr. ROYCE. I know that argument is made. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Okay. 

Mr. ROYCE. But this is the mine that produced the ore that was 

used in Nagasaki. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Right, for the Manhattan project. 

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, the Manhattan project. And, frankly, the 

amount of activity that is going on in that mine where some 15,000 

miners work that area primarily for cobalt, probably for other minerals, but they have the ability to extract this ore as well. 

And I would just share with you, I have had this discussion with 

Laurent Kabila years ago about this particular site and securing 

this site and a problem we were having at that time with the fact 

that he had a contract with the North Koreans for security purposes that we were concerned where they might have an interest 

in this particular material. And given the fact that the ore is there 

and given the amount of activity that occurs there and given the 

fact that there is no organized effort, there isn’t a business in 

charge of this, this is clandestine operations that go on there, so 

we have got various interpretations of what could or could not be 

going on, but the fact is that because the DRC government is not 

open to allowing access, it remains something of a mystery. 

14

So I am just saying it should be a priority dropping cement down 

that shaft and ending the possibility for anybody to access it, and 

to do that we have got to get the DRC compliance, so I wanted to 

urge that. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much, Secretary Newman, and we 

will go to Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. I think that we really have 

to try to ensure that the border is secure, and I agree, we have 

heard reports back and forth about Rwandan forces being in Uganda. And if they indeed are, and reports seem to indicate that they 

may still have some influence, I think that certainly needs to end. 

But when I went to eastern Congo last year, I questioned some 

of the United Nations observers to ask them how were you sure 

that these people they saw were Rwandan military people or Rwandan military officials maybe out of uniform, and after some questioning it was pretty clear that it is very difficult to identify very 

specifically and assured who is a Rwandan and who is a eastern 

Congolese who may be the Banyamulenge people who have been 

there for the last 100 years; they really look alike. And you have 

got to be kind of sharp to be able to delineate who is whom. And 

so I know that that has been a question about sitings and interpretation of exactly who is really who. 

I just have a question about the elections. Do you see much activity going on in the central government regarding the possibility of 

elections and things that have to be done in order to be ready for 

an election? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I would put on my old hat and say that USAID 

has been funding activities in order to prepare for the elections. 

However, I am not comfortable, and some of it has to do with the 

conflict that makes it more difficult to really prepare for elections, 

but I am not comfortable that given the time table—unless there 

is a real stepping up of activity, they are going to be ready. 

And one thing that concerns me, not just here but in other parts 

of Africa where elections are to come up, is that there may be factions that don’t want the election and therefore don’t assist in the 

preparation. I don’t think we can give excuses to anybody who has 

agreed to the elections to delay them. And we need to give more 

technical assistance and resources. 

So the answer is I don’t think enough is being done. 

Mr. PAYNE. And what about the question of debt relief that has 

been questioned——

Ms. NEWMAN. Question of what, I am sorry? 

Mr. PAYNE. Debt relief. When I met with President Kabila on his 

last trip here, he was very anxious to talk about the possibility of 

debt relief for the Congo, DRC. Do you know whether Treasury or 

anyone in State or the Administration is looking at that? 

Ms. NEWMAN. I know the subject has come up, and I know it is 

a tough subject every time it comes up, and I know that there 

needs to be assurances that where there is debt relief that the 

money is applied to making a difference in terms of the lives of the 

people. And I am not sure that comfort level is there at this time, 

but I will get back to you. I don’t know, they may be talking about 

it in Treasury. I have to get back to you. 

15

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. I think that it is something that I would really 

like to see this fledgling government have, have some assurances 

or even have some debt support. There is no way they can pay the 

debt that they owe. Of course, we know it came from the Mobutu 

regime. They have to assume it, it is unfair, and we ought to look 

at ways not only for bilateral debt but for the multinationals. 

Let me just get back to this question about Rwandan forces in 

Uganda, and I know this is something that has come about, and 

I know the Chairman has some very strong positions on it, but I 

too wonder about the 8,000 to 12,000 Hutus with the FDLR that 

are allegedly still in the Congo. President Kabila continues to say 

that there are still Interahamwe, Ex-FAR, and it is verified that 

they are there. 

What about their potential for cross-border? I mean it is a twoway street, it is a two-way border, and it is almost like what comes 

first, the chicken or the egg. Kabila says:

‘‘We will turn them all over and then we won’t have to worry.’’

The government of Congo says:

‘‘They are all around. It is difficult to get them.’’

And so as long as this—as you mentioned, there are enough bad 

guys to go around, and as long as this 10,000 to 15,000 troops who 

left Rwanda who were the genocidiares and the Interahamwe, et 

cetera, are in the Congo, there is going to be a problem. And it is 

not simplistic just to say, ‘‘Rwanda, you stay over there,’’ if they are 

concerned that there will be some cross-border things. What is your 

take on that? 

Ms. NEWMAN. You know, the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe is a 

problem in and of itself. The agreement in Pretoria was that they 

would begin to repatriate those troops. What has to happen, and 

this can be separate and apart from the Rwandan problem, there 

are people there who need alternative ways of making a living or 

they are continuing to stir up trouble. And right now it is my understanding that there is not enough being done to address that 

problem. President Kagame says that all the time. But that should 

be no excuse—that is no excuse—for violating the border. It is a 

separate problem that has to be dealt with separately. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, my time is about up, but I think that we really 

have to somehow get these again to talk about the rumors that go 

on, the rumors that the DRC is supplying arms to the Mai-Mai and 

the fact that Kabila says that he doesn’t have troops there in the 

DRC when sometimes we know that they come across the border. 

And so, like I say, we need to really come up with some solutions. 

And, finally, about the uranium mines and other things, I think 

that what we should try to do—if I were the country of the Congo, 

I would not want a valuable resource to be cemented over. I think 

that what we ought to try to do is to have some kind of organization, whether it is the International Atomic Energy people or if it 

is some United Nations, some responsible organization to go and 

monitor the area to try to see if there can then be some responsible 

people that are going to be responsible for the resources. Because 

the answer to a country that may have a resource that is valuable, 

it needs to be contained. 

16

I don’t want uranium to be in the hands of terrorists, that is for 

sure, however, it is kind of simplistic to—diamonds are used some 

places for terrorists, and we don’t say, ‘‘Well, just stop the diamonds totally.’’ I mean, in other words, I know the Chairman is not 

saying that, but there has to be a way to let a country be able to 

benefit from its natural resources but it has to be done—and I 

agree wholeheartedly, there has to be some organized, some United 

Nations, some international atomic energy. It can’t just be, as he 

said—and this was 15,000 people digging around a place, coming 

up with all kinds of resources. The government has to get control 

over its resources so that it can then go to benefit the people in 

that country who are suffering from poverty and malnutrition and 

AIDS deaths and all the rest. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Now we will go to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Tancredo—Colorado, I am sorry. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one 

quick question. We have been talking about the kinds of consequences that we would like to see if in fact Rwanda does not respond to our requests, and the Chairman mentioned earlier on 

about interrupting their ability to access economic aid. But on the 

13th of July, General Charles Wald, the Deputy Commander for 

the European Command, signed an agreement with the Rwandan 

government normalizing a military-to-military relationship, and 

that was just a month after Rwanda was widely reported to be supporting Congolese rebels who captured Bukavu. 

Now, at the signing, General Wald lauded the Rwandan government for exercising restraint, and a week later a United Nations 

Panel of Experts issued a report confirming the allegation that 

Rwanda had troops in the DRC on a semi-permanent basis, even 

against its own commitments to the contrary. 

So the question, of course, is what are the messages that we are 

sending here, and how can they rely upon our commitment to a 

particular course of action that is designed to extricate them from 

the DRC? 

Ms. NEWMAN. First of all, I am not going to defend General 

Wald. You have probably met him. He doesn’t need anybody defending him. But that agreement was played up, frankly, much 

more than it really is. That agreement is primarily one that is used 

in I think over 77 countries, and it is an agreement to allow for 

in-kind materials to be substituted for supplies and training. So it 

made sense that there was a vehicle to use to move goods and services. That wasn’t your point, but I wanted to make that point. 

Your point was are we sending mixed messages, and I would 

hope not, and I would think that the message that is being given 

by the African Union and by us in calling together the stakeholders 

here, the message is that it is everybody’s intent and even mandate, the international community’s mandate that the parties live 

up to the agreement. And so any message that does not support 

that is not a message that the United States intends to give. So 

I wasn’t there, but I do know that that particular agreement is not 

really as military-to-military as that sounds, but it was an acquisition agreement. 

17

Mr. TANCREDO. That is, of course, good to hear in terms of exactly the nature of the agreement, but beyond it, it still is disconcerting that the Europeans have not entered into this discussion, I think, to the extent we would hope. Or do you think they 

have? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Well, when we were all in Addis at the African 

Union Summit, and I met many of the European colleagues there, 

there was very strong talk about all of the parties complying with 

the agreement. And there was strong talk at separate meetings 

that the African Union Summit leaders had with the three Presidents—well, President Kabila wasn’t there but his foreign minister 

was. So that I don’t see how they could be confused that people are 

not noting their behavior, that people are not expressing, will not 

express strong views against their violation of the agreements. I 

think they understand that. 

But if there is any confusion, what I would like to do is share 

the communique that came out of the meeting that we had with 

the foreign ministers and the defense ministers, which highlighted 

a recognition on their part that they are to disarm the armed 

groups, that they are to enhance the efforts to prevent the use of 

their territories to arm and support negative forces. The conversations that we are having with the leaders seem each time to 

strengthen, from my point of view, the point that bad behavior is 

not going to be rewarded by the international community. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Did anybody take notice of—any European take 

notice of what Wald said when he was praising the——

Ms. NEWMAN. I don’t know. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Not the fact that they signed but what he said 

at the signing. 

Ms. NEWMAN. I haven’t had any conversation with anybody since 

then, but I am going to have a meeting with General Wald this 

afternoon and I will ask him if he is gotten any——

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. Well, it was bad timing, to say the least. 

Mr. ROYCE. Share with him our concern. 

Ms. NEWMAN. I will. 

Mr. ROYCE. I meant to call him about it. 

Ms. NEWMAN. Okay. But I will. I will see him this afternoon. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have nothing else. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Tancredo. 

We will go to Mr. Flake from Arizona. 

Mr. FLAKE. No questions right now. 

Mr. ROYCE. All right. 

Mr. Meeks? 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize for being 

late and missing some of the testimony, so I hope I am not repeating something that you may have already discussed. Clearly, we 

know this is a very important hearing, and seeing a Democratic Republic of Congo become a secure nation with a strong and stable 

economy is tremendously important, I believe, particularly to the 

entire continent of Africa. 

That being said, let me just ask these quick questions. If there 

were elections to be held in 2005, I believe there is still a lot that 

18

needs to be done, especially on the security front. And I am told 

from reading that there has been some progress made. The transitional constitution and a transitional government and a transitional parliament, an electoral commission all have been created. 

Independent media and the growing participation of civil society 

with the help of entities such as the NED are also taking place. 

However, without the basic security and a firm commitment to 

support the creation of transparent economic structures and entities, the efforts could be wasted. 

And so my first question is with the transitional government on 

schedule for holding elections in 2005 and given that the country 

remains divided, essential legislation hasn’t been passed, and there 

are multiple armed forces operating throughout the country, can 

we have these elections, fruitful elections, in 2005, your estimation? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Well, my experience in other places leads me to 

say the following: First of all, a government that is distracted with 

conflict is not doing a very good job of planning for elections. That 

is the first thing. 

The second thing is that if there is a lack of security in the country and there are parts of the country that are not safe, it is going 

to be very difficult to run an election there. 

The third is that the Congo is huge, as everybody knows, and in 

the discussions that I have had with people about having enough 

resources there in order to cover the election, has not led to enough 

resources. I mean I have been talking to Europeans and others 

about the cost of preparing for the election, and the money isn’t 

there yet. 

I think that what will happen, though, is a step up on the part 

of the international community and hopefully the government 

itself, recognizing it really doesn’t have a lot of time and there are 

many steps that they have to go through to get to the election, and 

at this pace, it will be very difficult. 

Mr. MEEKS. I understand this, but do you think that there needs 

to be additional troops? There is not 1 single army now, and I 

think, what is it, 10,800 troops that are there currently. Is that the 

right number? Should there be more? Can we help, can we 

strengthen MONUC? 

Ms. NEWMAN. You know, there will be the reports coming from 

MONUC. I have had several conversations with the United Nations 

Secretary General’s Special Representative. He has, and I am sure 

you know this, implied that one of the concerns they have is level 

of troops and the mandate. But this is something the United States 

will have to look into after receiving his report to see whether we 

agree. And to answer that question whether we agree, we also have 

to answer the question are we prepared to come up with the necessary resources if there is an increase. That is not easily come by. 

Mr. MEEKS. Last question would be, just simply, again, I am just 

trying to—do you see cooperation in the region? I mean all of the 

time the problem has been with reference to Uganda, Rwanda and 

people saying they are crossing the border, et cetera. Where do you 

see those governments, are they going to be cooperative still or will 

that be a continuing problem? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Well, you know, countries that have been in conflict for long periods of time don’t become buddies overnight. And 

19

I think that everybody’s trying to ensure that their representatives 

are speaking in the context of the agreement. These four agreements that are outlined were not come by easily, and then implementation is difficult. There is limited trust as between the parties, 

and that makes it all the more difficult. 

And then I don’t know who is to say that the parties themselves, 

the leadership of the countries involved have control over all of the 

people within their countries; they don’t. So this, I think, the reason we are all continuing to talk about this. It is very complicated, 

and we are nowhere near where we need to be to have a whole 

Democratic Republic of the Congo with people being safe and the 

borders being secure. We are not there. 

Mr. MEEKS. Last question, Mr. Chairman, is about the underground economy. I am told that there is this huge underground 

economy for some of the natural resources there, and foreign businesses, in the mining areas in particular, have monopolies, et 

cetera, that are going on. What do you see about this underground 

economy, and is there anything that can or will be done in that regards to help bring this government together? 

Ms. NEWMAN. Well, an underground economy can exist in an environment of a weak government, and the government, though it 

is trying to become strong, is not there. And, therefore, there are 

the loopholes and there is the rule of law and the failure of the policing entity to get on to of the underground economy. But I think 

everybody understands that for the people to benefit from the 

wealth of the nation, they have to get on top of this, but this isn’t 

the only place that this is a problem. 

Mr. MEEKS. But can we do something with reference to some of 

the U.S. companies that may be involved? 

Ms. NEWMAN. We should. I don’t know which ones. I don’t know 

which ones. I know what is rumored, but I don’t know which ones. 

I think we should look into that. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I would just make the point that I had 

an opportunity to talk to Ambassador Swing, the Special Representative of the Secretary General, while I was in Kinshasa a 

couple of weeks ago, and he said that the June deadline is the only 

thing driving democracy forward, the only thing putting pressure 

on the Congolese government to produce legislation that was required to conduct elections and that, in his view, this was essential 

to establishing a legitimate national government. Ambassador Aubrey Hooks, on the ground, agreed with that assessment when I 

talked with him about it. 

And so I think it is very important that we keep the pressure on 

this government to end its fractious in-fighting and to pass this legislation and to move forward with democracy, because I think the 

Congolese people need to feel that they have a legitimate national 

government. And even if there is one province, because of unrest, 

not everybody gets to the polls, it is absolutely essential that we 

not keep putting off the process. 

I remember having this conversation with Laurent Kabila when 

I first met with him. I remember all the excuses about elections 

and they never came. And if we want order to come and stability 

to come to Congo, people have to have the feeling that it is a legitiVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:53 Sep 15, 2004 Jkt 094990 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AFRICA\072204\94990.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
20

mate state. And I don’t think we can make excuses for their putting off the process. That is my view. 

I also just wanted to again thank you for your testimony today. 

I think we have learned a great deal, and I appreciate very much 

your commitment to this conflict in Congo, and I think the continent has many challenges, and we look forward to working with 

you, Secretary Newman, to confront these challenges in the years 

ahead. Thank you so much. 

Before proceeding, this is the Subcommittee’s last hearing before 

the fall, so I would like to recognize the outstanding work of the 

Subcommittee’s three interns, and I would like to ask them to 

stand at this time. Hunter Strupp, if you would stand; Kathryn 

Bohannon, Kathryn, please; Mark Naylor, if you would stand. We 

very much appreciate all of your good work here. Thank you. 

I would also like to, if there is no objection, submit testimony for 

the record by En Avant Congo, which is a Washington-based NGO 

that is committed to benefiting suffering Congolese and committed 

to improving political conditions in the DRC. And so, without objection, we will include that in the record. 

As we go to our second panel, I am going to ask Gareth Evans 

and Learned Dees to come forward. Gareth Evans has been the 

President of the Brussels-based International Crisis Group since 

January 2000. Prior to his involvement with ICG, Mr. Evans spent 

21 years in Australian politics, 8 of which as foreign minister, becoming his country’s longest-serving foreign minister. Mr. Evans 

has written and edited 8 books, including, Cooperating for Peace, 

and has published over 80 journal articles. I should say that over 

the last few years I have come to very much appreciate ICG’s work, 

which is a tribute to your leadership, Mr. Evans. 

We also have Mr. Learned Dees. He is the senior program officer 

for Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy. Mr. Dees is 

responsible for program development, assessment and monitoring 

of projects supporting non-governmental organizations. Prior to his 

work with NED, with the National Endowment for Democracy, he 

was a journalist in Africa covering political events in Congo 

throughout the early 1990s. 

And both you gentlemen, frankly, are uniquely qualified to shed 

light on developments in the Congo, so we appreciate your testifying here today and ask you to summarize and we will hold you 

5 minutes, and we appreciate your written copy. 

We will begin, Mr. Evans. We need you to push that red button. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARETH EVANS, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (FORMER FOREIGN 

MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA) 

Mr. EVANS. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce and Ranking 

Member, Congressman Payne, for inviting me to testify on behalf 

of the International Crisis Group on the currently extremely fragile 

situation in the DRC. 

I might say that, though I did spend 21 years in Australian politics on both sides of this particular kind of table, this is my first 

experience of testifying here in the United States, and I particularly appreciate the opportunity to do so on such a vital issue. 

21

The timing of the hearing is particularly appropriate, coming 2 

weeks, as it does, before the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC) is due for review in the Security Council. 

It is now a year since the principal Congolese opponents signed 

agreements, giving us all hope that the appalling violence and misery and misgovernment that has characterized so many of the Congo’s 44 years of independence was at last behind us. But as Chairman Royce said in his opening statement, a year later, President 

Kabila’s government of transition is barely intact, little has been 

done to draw up a new constitution, even less to prepare for the 

elections scheduled for next year, and minimal progress has been 

made in creating a new national army. 

As we all know, the country is the size of the U.S. east of the 

Mississippi, and the government simply has not been able to extend its authority throughout it. And on top of all these general 

concerns, we now have the specific alarm bells rung about the 

whole future of the transition by the recent fighting for control of 

Bukavu, which MONUC proved powerless to prevent or control. 

There are three immediate areas of policy concern that are crucial to the success of the political transition in the Congo. There is 

security, there are regional relations and there is political capacity, 

and my written testimony addresses each of those, in turn. But the 

bottom line, I would suggest, is whether the U.S. and other governments, with all their other current priorities and distractions, have 

the will to give sufficient support, both to MONUC and to the 

equally important political side of the transition. 

I would also suggest that it is certainly important to move quickly to address these issues. The current position, as I understand it, 

of the U.S. to support a 2- to 3-month rollover in the first instance 

of consideration of MONUC’s mandate, renewed mandate, might 

just put this process at an unnecessary and unfortunate degree of 

risk. There really is an element of urgency about moving fast on 

this broad range of issues. 

I think we are all acutely conscious of the scale of the security 

problem, with approximately 300,000 Congolese still under arms as 

members of various armed groups and armies of the parties to the 

relevant peace agreements. We have, in addition, the 8,000 to 

12,000 Rwandan Hutu rebels from the FDLR, Democratic Forces 

for the Liberation of Rwanda, a number of whom did, of course, 

participate in the 1994 genocide, and between 500 and 1,000 rebels 

perhaps from Uganda. They also need to be disarmed and repatriated to country of origin, but achieving this will require a great 

deal of cooperation and action by the respective governments. 

In the short term, a degree of security is notionally provided with 

MONUC’s military forces present, but this force with its present 

authorized strength of just 10,800 is impossibly thinly stretched, 

and I draw attention to the contrast between the situation in the 

DRC and in West Africa where in the 3 contiguous countries of Liberia, Syria and in the Ivory Coast, an area just about a quarter 

of the size of the Congo, we have there presently a total of 30,000 

troops. 

The three big issues which have to be addressed for the MONUC 

mission, first of all, is the number of troops. To enable MONUC to 

22

really begin to perform its proper range of functions including border monitoring, which has been emphasized in the previous discussion, the number of troops must be increased, at a minimum by another brigade of 4,000 to 5,000 but preferably doubled to 20,000 

plus, with a strong, highly mobile rapid reaction capability being 

part of that. 

A second concern is the capacity of the troops that are there on 

the ground. Virtually all of the United Nations forces come from 

developing nations that have, it has to be said, demonstrated varying degrees of capability and application. It will be very helpful in 

the Congo as elsewhere if more highly trained and well supplied 

troops were to be contributed by the developed countries to United 

Nations missions, this one in particular. At the very least, countries like the U.S. can make other contributions, including improvement of the technical surveillance and intelligence capabilities of 

MONUC, whether that is provided on the ground or through national assets. 

Thirdly, there is the question of the scope of the mandate. The 

mandate, as outlined, in the present Security Council resolution, 

1493, and endorsed in 1533, is barely sufficient to make clear beyond argument MONUC’s obligation to maintain security to the absolute extent of its capacity, especially in relation to its obligation 

to protect civilians from physical violence. And the mandate, as 

presently crafted, gives no real encouragement at all to MONUC 

acting proactively to generally support the transition and, as necessary, to support the armed forces of the transitional government. 

Adjusting MONUC’s mandate in any formal way will, of course, 

be difficult and contentious. Use-of-force mandates always are, but 

I would like to make the point that the risks are huge of MONUC 

not having the authority, not having the capacity, not having the 

will to judiciously use force where this does become necessary to 

crush those who would be spoilers of this peacebuilding process. 

As to improving regional relationships, we all know that the critical player here is Rwanda, which does remain legitimately interested in the continued presence of the Hutu rebels of the FDLR. 

We believe that the FDLR forces in fact—and this is partly in response to your earlier question—no longer constitute a strategic 

threat to Rwanda in the sense that, in our judgment, they don’t 

have the capacity to actually invade Rwanda or to threaten its 

army. But they can certainly mount small-scale incursions, and 

they certainly can be regarded as a threat to civilians on both sides 

of the border. 

The current DDR Program, Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, has not the desired impact. MONUC states that it has 

repatriated 3,000 to 4,000 Rwandans, but it is difficult to say how 

many of these were actual fighters. Regardless of how many have 

gone back to Rwanda, the key problem is how to deal with those 

that remain in the DRC. And part of the answer here has to be for 

the international community to apply, again, pressure on the transitional government in Kinshasa to muster the necessary political 

will and required resources to disarm the renegade forces in the 

eastern Congo with assistance from MONUC. 

But persuasion also requires some carrots as well as sticks. 

There must be incentives for the FDLR to disarm and return to 

23

Rwanda, something the government of Rwanda has to assist by 

launching a genuine process of political dialogue and national reconciliation with its exiled enemies, as tough a call as that might 

be. 

Rwanda’s role, generally, remains very controversial. As I have 

said, it does have legitimate security interests and certainly has 

considerable influence in the eastern DRC, but other motives do 

appear to be impeding a rather more cooperative approach, not 

least its interest in exploiting to the country’s advantage Congo’s 

resource riches and maintaining influence on its national government. 

The report of the United Nations group of experts, which was released just yesterday, has examined the role of the regional actors, 

not least Rwanda, in supplying arms and giving other support to 

parties in the DRC and has come out with some quite explicit conclusions to the effect of there being both direct and indirect support 

certainly to the renegade troops of Mutebusi and Nkunda during 

their operations recently against the transitional government army. 

We urge the U.S. to support the recommendations of that inquiry, also the earlier conclusions of the panel on economic exploitation, and to continue to exercise your country’s influence in the 

eastern DRC—sorry, to continue to encourage Rwanda to exercise 

its influence in a responsible manner, with the United States reminding it that sustainable peace in the DRC is the best way to 

protect its own interests. 

It can certainly be argued that improving the relationship between Kigali and Kinshasa will be best achieved through direct 

dialogue and diplomatic means, which the U.S. Government, which 

has good relations, of course, with both sides and Uganda as well, 

is very well placed to encourage and facilitate. If this behavior that 

has been documented pretty plausibly by the United Nations group 

of experts does, however, continue and the dialogue route fails, 

then it will obviously be necessary to consider a more robust range 

of responses. 

In terms of finally building political capacity, the transitional 

government is, of course, meant to be doing just that. It is meant 

to be transitional. But one of the problems facing the DRC has 

been rather too much politics within the transitional government 

and not enough actual governing, something to which, I suppose, 

those of us who have been in this business are not all together immune from understanding. 

But while the transitional government is limited both by resources and capacity, it has to be said that any improvement on 

those fronts is being impeded by the major players who are continually jockeying with advantage with an eye on the forthcoming 

elections. 

We see a particularly important role in response to this reality 

for the International Committee Assisting the Transition, CIAT, 

which is made up of the Ambassadors of interested countries, including the U.S., which we see as being in a fairly unique position, 

not only to identify the needs of the transitional government but 

also to hold it to account, cautioning the governments and the more 

difficult individuals within it when their actions are inconsistent 

24

with the undertakings they have made on security sector and judicial and general governmental and political reform. 

The CIAT hasn’t, in our judgment, been active enough in representing its views, the views of its member countries and in providing a forum for cooperation by Kinshasa’s major international 

partners. It needs to do much more. 

So, in summary, we are calling on the U.S., along with others, 

to do the following things. First of all, with respect to security, to 

support a substantial increase in the troop level for MONUC, at 

least another brigade, preferably a doubling; secondly, to assist 

MONUC in improving its technical capabilities for surveillance and 

intelligence-gathering; and, thirdly, to support, if possible, a more 

robust mandate for MONUC that will in fact allow it and encourage it to use force where necessary. 

With respect to regional relationships, we do support and urge 

that the U.S. support the recommendations of the Panel of Experts, 

both on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the just 

published group of experts on the question of arms embargo and 

its penetrability. We strongly encourage direct dialogue between 

Kigali or continuing direct dialogue of the kind that has been facilitated by the United States, Kigali, Kinshasa and Kampala. And, as 

I said, we encourage Rwanda to create internally the political and 

social conditions that will encourage those Rwandans still in the 

DRC to return home. 

And on the subject of strengthening political capacity, we need 

to work to strengthen CIAT’s role in assisting and, where appropriate, guiding the transitional government as well as providing 

support for independent government and non-governmental organizations and supporting in particular the work of bodies on the justice and reconciliation front. 

My final word is simply this: The transition in the DRC is not 

irreversible, and recent events have shown how easily this whole 

process can be derailed. The consequences of that derailing should 

be apparent to anyone who has followed the history over the last 

10 years in the Great Lakes. The United States has very greatly 

increased its focus on Africa, and that is much to be admired for 

a whole variety of reasons in recent times. It does have strong relationships with most of the countries that are here involved. 

It is in the interest of the United States to promote peace and 

stability in Africa, but this can’t be achieved with this continued 

conflict and instability in the very heart of the continent, and the 

U.S., as a result, has a particular responsibility, I believe, to do its 

absolute utmost to change the situation in the way that we have 

indicated. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Evans follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARETH EVANS, PRESIDENT, 

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA) 

I thank Chairman Royce and the ranking member, Congressman Payne, for inviting me to testify on behalf of the International Crisis Group on the current very 

fragile situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The timing of this hearing 

is absolutely crucial, coming two weeks before the mandate of the U.N. Mission in 

the Congo (MONUC) comes up for review in the Security Council. That mission 

risks failure if it is not strengthened and supported. 

The Congo still bears both colonial scars and the consequences of more than three 

decades in the iron grip of an accomplished kleptocrat, President Mobutu—aided 

25

and abetted largely by the West during the Cold War, then unceremoniously 

dropped. The policy objective for the international community is to make it possible 

for the Congolese to finally take control of their own lives and resources. 

A year ago, the international community joined the citizens of Congo in welcoming 

a transitional coalition government that seemed to represent an end to the 1998–

2002 civil war in which more than 3 million people lost their lives, mostly through 

war-induced disease and starvation. The principal Congolese opponents signed 

agreements to adopt a post-transition constitution; to hold the first democratic elections in Africa’s third-largest nation; to establish a truly national army; to disarm, 

demobilize and resettle or repatriate both irregular Congolese fighters and Rwandan 

Hutu rebels in the east of the country; and, for the first time since Congo’s independence from Belgium 44 years ago, to work for the good of Congo’s long-suffering 

but incredibly resilient people. 

A year later, President Joseph Kabila’s government of transition is barely intact, 

little has been done to draw up a new constitution, and even less to prepare for elections scheduled for next year. Although some effort has been made to establish an 

integrated high command, the creation of the new Armed Forces of the Democratic 

Republic of Congo—through successfully integrating the previous government army, 

former rebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda and former Mai-Mai tribal fighters—

has not succeeded. In part this results from lack of funds but also because the government has not been able to extend its authority throughout a country the size of 

the United States east of the Mississippi. Fighting last month for control of the eastern city of Bukavu, as well as renewed clashes between tribal militia in the northeastern district of Ituri, have raised serious concerns about the future of the transition. And although Congo is now—according to Victor Kasongo of the country’s Center for Evaluation, Expertise and Certification—producing $1 billion a year in diamonds, most Congolese continue to endure conditions of extreme poverty, deprived 

of even the most basic protection and social services. 

The current situation in Congo has its roots in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide 

of minority Tutsis and political moderates from the Hutu majority in neighboring 

Rwanda: two subsequent wars that began in eastern Congo in 1996 and 1998 destabilized the entire Great Lakes region of central Africa. Last year’s agreement ended 

the four-year conflict and the international community has supported its implementation principally through the peacekeeping operation, UN Mission in the Congo 

(MONUC), created by the UN Security Council in 2000. The Council has extended 

MONUC’s mandate each year since, with the most recent authorization, on 28 July, 

2003 in Resolution 1493, granting MONUC a partial mandate under Chapter VII 

of the UN Charter. On July 30 the mandate for MONUC will expire: the US mission 

to the UN currently favours a two-month extension in the first instance, in the hope 

that an agreed strategy will materialize by the end of September. 

The International Crisis Group has been working in Congo since 1998 and has 

five field-based analysts in the region. Our latest Africa Briefing, published 7 July 

2004 and entitled Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, deals with the events 

last month in Bukavu. Our research indicates that the immediate areas of concern 

that are crucial to the success of the political transition in Congo are security, regional relations and political capacity, and this testimony focuses on each of these 

in turn. The key questions are whether the United States and other governments, 

with their other current preoccupations and priorities, have given sufficient support 

both to MONUC, and to the equally important political side of the transition. 

ENHANCING SECURITY

There are approximately 300,000 Congolese under arms—members of the various 

armed groups and armies of the parties to the relevant peace agreements. There are 

at least 40,000–50,000 others in different parts of the country who are armed but 

not party to any peace agreement and who remain a threat to peace and stability. 

Controlling them all and ensuring that they ultimately are disarmed and demobilized or incorporated into the new legitimate national army is crucial to the security 

not only of the DRC, but of the region as a whole. In addition to these Congolese 

there remain 8,000–12,000 Rwandan Hutu rebels from the FDLR (Forces for the 

Liberation of Rwanda), a number of whom participated in 1994 genocide, and between 500 and 1,000 rebels from Uganda. These also need to be disarmed and repatriated to the country of origin, but achieving this also requires cooperation and action by their respective governments 

In the short term, a degree of security is provided where MONUC’s military force 

is present., However, this force, with an authorized strength of just 10,800, is thinly 

stretched across a vast country. In contrast, the three UN missions in the contiguous West Africa countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, an area about 

26

a quarter of the size of the DRC, have a total of 30,000 troops. As we saw during 

the recent capture of Bukavu, 600 UN troops were no deterrent to the 2,000–3,000 

renegades confronting them. Similarly, despite having 4,000 troops in the district 

of Ituri, a focus of international attention last year, MONUC has been unable to 

intervene to stop the fighting that recently broke out between militias, causing at 

least 50 deaths. Hundreds of civilians have fled across the border into Uganda, and 

this could lead to an escalation of conflict across the entire district. 

While the presence of UN troops in the DRC has allowed a degree of progress towards stability, the mission suffers from a number of weaknesses that limit its ability to deal with the apparent threats. Issues which have to be addressed are the 

number of troops, the quality of the troops and the nature of the mandate itself, 

as well as the effectiveness of the DDR program. 

Number of Troops. At present the majority of the force is configured with a brigade in Ituri, a smaller brigade in the provinces of North and South Kivu and two 

remaining battalions providing security as a ‘neutral force’ in Kinshasa. These 

troops are barely sufficient to provide security in these three main areas, let alone 

deal with an increase in conflict within these regions or elsewhere in the DRC. The 

mission has no rapid reaction force either within or from outside the DRC to reinforce its deployed forces or to meet any contingencies. Clearly the number of troops 

must be increased at a minimum by another brigade of 4,000–5,000. Given the size 

of the country, the range of tasks and the threats, a doubling of the force to some 

20 000 would not be unreasonable. But even a relatively modest increase of one brigade would allow the mission to constitute a reaction force and expand its operations to control the borders in the east of the country where there is movement 

of arms, exploited resources and rebel or renegade forces. 

In addition to the troop increase within the DRC, a ‘strategic’ reserve needs to 

be made available to meet any escalation beyond MONUC’s capacity that could endanger the lives of Congolese civilians, UN and international staff and the peace 

process. The existence of this reserve would greatly improve the resolve of the mission to meet its tasks. The EU-led Operation Artemis to Ituri from July to September last year provided just such a force, allowing for the stabilization of the UN 

mission and bringing a degree of normalization that has largely continued and has 

allowed MONUC to expand its influence. In light of recent events, a similar force 

needs to be identified and made available through standby arrangements; such a 

force would best come from either NATO or the EU. 

Capacity of Troops. Virtually all the UN forces come from developing nations and 

have demonstrated varying degrees of capability and application. It would be very 

helpful, in the Congo as elsewhere, if more highly-trained and well-supplied troops 

were contributed by developed countries to UN missions. If this is unlikely to occur, 

then there are other areas in which nations like the United States can make invaluable contributions, including the improvement of the technical surveillance and intelligence capabilities of MONUC. Such capabilities, whether provided ‘on the 

ground’ or through national assets, would greatly enhance MONUC’s capabilities to 

anticipate and respond to threats, as well as its ability to interdict the movement 

of troops and material across borders as mandated under UN Security Council Resolution 1553 of 12 March 2004. Better equipment—including night vision and thermal imagery equipment for both aerial and ground use—would also significantly enhance MONUC’s capability. 

Scope of Mandate. The mandate outlined in Security Council Resolution 1493, and 

endorsed in resolution 1533, is barely sufficient to make clear beyond argument 

MONUC’s obligation to maintain security to the absolute extent of its capacity, especially in relation to its obligation ‘to protect civilians and humanitarian workers 

under imminent threat of physical violence’. The use of force by UN troops is always 

a contentious issue for many member states and within the UN. However, the risks 

of not judiciously using force where needed jeopardizes not only lives but the mission itself. A collapse of MONUC—like that which nearly occurred for the UN mission in Sierra Leone in 2000, before outside assistance from the UK saved it and 

stiffened its resolve—would not only be an enormous setback for the DRC but a severe blow to peacekeeping in Africa and elsewhere. While the use of force cannot 

solve all the problems in the DRC, it should be an option available to MONUC as 

needed, with MONUC given sufficient resources to make the option deliverable. A 

strengthened MONUC mandate has the additional benefit of promoting a higher degree of mission accountability, eliminating alibis for inaction in the face of imminent 

loss of civilian life or grave threats to the peace process. 

DDR. The long-term resolution of the DRC’s security needs lies in an enduring 

political solution within the country and good relationships with its neighbors. As 

part of the former, progress needs to be made in the disarming and return of most 

of the former Congolese combatants to civilian life as part of the wider process of 

27

Security Sector Reform. The current focus is on the Disarmament, Demobilisation 

and Reintegration (DDR) of 200,000 of those troops that make up the former armies 

of the participants in the Transitional Government. The World Bank has provided 

$200 million to fund this program, but a shortfall of $61 million persists. The remaining 100,000 ex-combatants are to be retrained and integrated into the new 

Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the FARDC, which are 

to gradually assume responsibility for the DRC’s security needs. While funding is 

available to disarm 200,000 former fighters and send them home, little bilateral or 

multilateral funding is available to establish the FARDC. The US government and 

military can play a vital role in providing funding and direct assistance to allow the 

Congolese to assume responsibility for their own security. 

IMPROVING REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The 1996–97 and 1998–2002 conflicts in the DRC drew in at least seven other African countries, and a number of foreign rebel groups as well as allied Congolese 

factions. What happens in the DRC is of direct concern to all its neighbors, particularly Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi along its eastern border. 

Rwanda. At the core is the relationship with Rwanda whose main concern is the 

continued presence of Hutu rebels of the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or 

FDLR, many of whom participated in the 1994 genocide. ICG estimates that Congo 

is at present home to some 8,000–12,000 such fighters under arms. Rwanda continues to assert that their presence constitutes a threat and objects to what its sees 

as the failure of the Congolese, MONUC and the international community in general to deal with the issue. As long as this presence remains Rwanda will continue 

to assert its right to self-defense. ICG believes that the FDLR forces no longer constitute a strategic threat to Rwanda, i.e. they do not have the capacity to invade 

Rwanda or threaten its army. However, they do represent a threat to civilians on 

both sides of the border. The current DDR program for foreign combatants facilitated by MONUC and funded by the World Bank and the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) is based on voluntary participation; it has 

not had the desired impact. MONUC states that it has repatriated 3,000–4,000 

Rwandans but it is difficult to say how many of these were actual fighters, partly 

because, as MONUC acknowledges, many were without arms prior to being sent 

home. It is also difficult as the issue itself is tied up in regional politics and is often 

used for rhetorical purposes. Regardless of how many have gone back to Rwanda, 

the key problem is how to deal with those who remain in the DRC. 

How to remove the FDLR from DRC territory is a difficult and complex problem, 

but one that is at the core of improved regional relationships and security. The solution lies in the use of carrots as well as sticks: there must be incentives for the 

FDLR to disarm and return to Rwanda, something the government of Rwanda must 

assist by launching a process of political dialogue and national reconciliation with 

its exiled enemies. 

In addition, there must be disincentives to the FDLR to discourage them from remaining on Congolese territory. Both an enhanced MONUC and the transitional 

government can take appropriate actions to achieve this. As pointed out in the report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, published on 15 July 2004, the Transitional Government of the DRC provided weapons to FDLR units ‘‘until at least October 2003.’’ The international community must apply pressure on the Transitional 

Government in Kinshasa to muster the political will and required resources to disarm renegade forces in Eastern Congo, with assistance from MONUC. 

In addition to its concern about the FDLR, Rwanda asserts that it is the guardian 

of those Congolese Tutsis who have their origins in Rwanda but who have been in 

the Congo for generations. Members of this group have in the past been Rwanda’s 

strongest allies in the DRC, although the main political party that now represents 

their interests, RCD-Goma, is a participant in the Transitional Government. But the 

fighting last month in Bukavu was carried out by RCD-Goma dissidents and eight 

of their representatives in parliament have just withdrawn and returned to Goma, 

their stronghold in the east. Moreover, some Congolese of Tutsi origin have increasingly dissociated themselves from Rwanda in recent months. As it is the case in 

many places, issues of citizenship and ethnicity are easily manipulated by ambitious 

politicians and are dangerous fuel to add to any fire. All parties in the DRC and 

Rwanda must be encouraged to desist from using ethnic-based rhetoric to achieve 

political or military ends. The Transitional Government has presented draft legislation establishing the conditions of citizenship of all Congolese, but it has already 

raised concerns among the Rwandophones in the east. 

Rwanda has legitimate interests and considerable influence in the eastern DRC. 

However, other motives appear to impede a more cooperative approach, such as its 

28

interest in exploiting to its advantage Congo’s riches and maintaining influence in 

its national government. The UN Panel on Economic Exploitation in the DRC has 

already identified some factors that warrant consideration. Additionally, the report 

by the UN Group of Experts released just yesterday has examined the role of Congolese and regional actors in supplying arms to the parties in the DRC, determining 

that Rwanda provided both direct and indirect support to the renegade troops of 

Jules Mutebutsi and Laurent Nkunda during their operations against the FARDC. 

We urge the US to support the recommendations of these inquiries and encourage 

Rwanda to exercise its influence in the Eastern DRC in a responsible manner and 

remind it that a sustainable peace in the DRC in the best way to protect its interests. 

Improving the relationship between Kigali and Kinshasa will be best achieved 

through direct dialogue. The meeting on 25 June between Presidents Joseph Kabila 

and Paul Kagame, hosted in Abuja by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and 

strongly backed by the US and the UK, was a step in the right direction. However, 

such dialogue should not be the consequence of extraordinary events or external 

pressure but a normal and regular process to deal with bilateral and regional issues. 

In this respect the US government, which has good relationships with the DRC and 

Rwanda—and Uganda—is strongly placed to facilitate the necessary confidencebuilding dialogue and measures. 

Uganda. As the UN Security Council has stated, most recently in its Presidential 

Statement of 22 June 2004, Uganda should not interfere in the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo. President Museveni has assured Western diplomats that Uganda 

would not intervene militarily in the DRC and Kampala has declared its support 

for the Congolese Transitional Government and MONUC. However, some suspect 

that Uganda continues to provide both political and logistical support to several militia groups in Ituri, using them as proxy forces. Among the key Ituri militias that 

continue to receive support from Uganda are Jerome Kakwavu’s Forces Armees du 

Peuple Congolais (FAPC), Chief Kahwa Mandro’s Parti Pour l’Unite et la 

Sauvegarde de l’Integrite du Congo (PUSIC) and lately Ndjabu Ngabu’s Front des 

Nationalistes et Integrationistes (FNI). As demonstrated by the early July clashes 

between FNI and FAPC, these militias engage in activities that undermine the fragile peace process in the DRC. Allegations of human rights abuses by MONUC forces 

in Ituri could also provoke attacks on MONUC installations by the Ituri militias. 

Uganda has an interest in maintaining and expanding its influence over control 

of natural resources in the DRC and securing positions in the Transitional Government for its allied militias. While it is unlikely that Uganda would risk international furor by reoccupying Ituri, refugee flows and instability on its border will 

encourage it to take a greater interest in influencing events in the DRC. If the crisis 

in the Kivus remains unresolved and if Uganda-backed Ituri militias continue to be 

excluded from the Transitional Government, greater Ugandan involvement in the 

DRC would become more likely. The future possibility of armed Ugandan intervention in the Congo, therefore, cannot be ruled out. 

Uganda is also concerned about continued presence of Ugandan rebel groups in 

southern Ituri and northern North Kivu. Any deterioration of the security environment in eastern Congo may encourage UPDF cross-border operations aiming to deactivate the danger posed by these Ugandan rebels. 

Burundi. Burundi has also been warned by the UN Security Council not to provide any support to armed groups in the DRC. Burundi is rightfully concerned about 

incursions into its territory by Rwandan rebels based in eastern Congo but should 

not engage in any cross-border belligerent activities aiming to neutralize these 

forces. As encouraged by the Security Council, the Transitional Government in 

Bujumbura should facilitate the provision of international humanitarian assistance 

for Congolese refugees in Burundi. Direct dialogue is the best means to secure and 

maintain friendly relations between Burundi and Congo. The two latest meetings 

of the Foreign Ministers of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi (11 July in Brussels and 

14–15 July in Washington) are a welcome step in that direction. 

BUILDING POLITICAL CAPACITY

The agreements which led to the establishment of the Transitional Government 

in June 2003 were in many respects a series of tenuous compromises by the signatories, and while there has been power-sharing at the upper levels of political and 

military power in accordance with the ‘‘1+4’’ formula, much of the machinery of governance remains unchanged since major hostilities ceased. The Transitional Government has little capacity to actually govern or to deliver public administration, particularly in the distant east. While this is partly the result of the security environment it is also caused by the destruction of infrastructure and the loss of experiVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:53 Sep 15, 2004 Jkt 094990 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\072204\94990.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
29

enced civil servants, including police and the judiciary. For instance, the Transitional Government has just appointed a District Commissioner and subordinate Territorial Commissioners for the troubled Ituri district, but they have no capacity to 

take up their assignments in any substantive way, even in areas where MONUC 

has a presence, because of a lack of resources. Similarly the local police in the district who have been trained by MONUC are unpaid and ill-equipped. The cost of 

rehabilitating public administration in the DRC will be high, but it is, after the provision of security, the process that will most enhance the lives of ordinary Congolese. 

The Transitional Government is meant to be just that—transitional. But one of 

the problems facing the DRC is the excess of politics within the Transitional Government, and not enough actual governing. While the Transitional Government is 

limited both by lack of resources and capacity, any improvement in these is impeded 

by the major players who continually jockey for advantage with one eye on the elections that are supposed to take place next June. 

The International Committee Assisting the Transition (CIAT), made up of the ambassadors of interested countries, including the US, is in a unique position not only 

to identify the needs of the Transitional Government but also to provide guidance 

on overcoming the considerable difficulties it faces. This should include cautioning 

the Transitional Government or individuals within it when their actions are inconsistent with the undertakings they have made: the reunification, the pacification, 

the reconstruction, the restoration of the integrity and the authority of the state 

over all the country; national reconciliation; the formation of a national, unified and 

restructured army; the organization of free and transparent elections at all levels 

and the establishment of a democratic and constitutional regime; and, the establishment of structures for a new political order. However, the CIAT has not been active 

enough in representing its views and in providing a forum for cooperation by 

Kinshasa’s major international partners. Security Sector Reform, which has to date 

and is likely to continue to be provided on a bilateral basis, is one area where greater consensus on policy and action by the body would have an exponential effect. As 

always all assistance and support must be contingent upon meeting reasonable 

standards of transparency and democratic accountability. A key objective of the 

international community must also be to support the institutions that will contribute to a sustainable democracy in the DRC. These include an independent electoral commission, human rights organizations and the judiciary. 

On the issue of justice, all parties to recent conflict have been associated to one 

degree or another with crimes against the Congolese people, and the Congolese expect justice to be both seen and done. The agreements establishing the Transitional 

Government have granted a degree of impunity to members, but this should not be 

immutable. At some time in the future those charged with crimes will have to account for them, and appropriate bodies such as the moribund Truth and Reconciliation Commission need to commence their work. In addition to the processes of Congolese justice, the International Criminal Court will have a role to play. In April 

this year President Kabila referred events in the DRC to the ICC, and while its jurisdiction only covers crimes committed since 1 July 2002, there are ample cases, 

such as massacres in Ituri in mid-2003, that warrant investigation and prosecution. 

ICG strongly supports the principles of the ICC not only because we believe in justice but also because we believe that the prosecution of those that have perpetrated 

crimes will act as a deterrent to others and therefore contribute to conflict prevention and resolution, which is ICG’s primary concern. 

CONCLUSION

In short, we are calling on the United States, along with others to do the following: 

With respect to security:

1. Support a more robust mandate for MONUC that will allow it to use force 

where necessary.

2. Support an increase in the troop level for MONUC of, as a minimum, another three battalions and associated support elements.

3. Assist MONUC in improving its technical capabilities for surveillance and 

intelligence gathering.

4. Both through MONUC and CIAT, support the Security Sector Reform program in the DRC, especially the integration and retaining of the new DRC 

army.

5. Support the integration and retraining of the new Congolese army.

30

With respect to the regional relationships:

1. Support the recommendations of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC and 

the UN Group of Experts on the DRC

2. Strongly encourage direct dialogue between Kigali, Kinshasa and Kampala.

3. Encourage Rwanda to create the political and social conditions within Rwanda that will encourage those Rwandese still in the DRC to return home.

With respect to helping strengthen the DRC’s political capacity:

1. Work to strengthen CIAT’s role in assisting, and where appropriate, guiding 

the Transitional Government.

2. Promote greater coordination within CIAT and between CIAT and MONUC.

3. Provide support for independent governmental and non-governmental bodies 

and organizations.

4. Support the workings of bodies pursuing justice and reconciliation in the 

DRC

The transition in the DRC is not irreversible, and recent events have shown how 

easily the process can be derailed, the consequences of which should be apparent 

to anyone who has followed the history of the last 10 years in the Great Lakes region of Africa. The United States has greatly increased its focus on Africa for a variety of reasons over the last few years and has strong relationships with many of 

the countries involved in recent conflicts in the DRC. It is in the interest of the 

United States to promote peace and stability in Africa, but this cannot be achieved 

if there is continued conflict and instability in the heart of the continent.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Evans. 

Mr. Dees? 

STATEMENT OF LEARNED DEES, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER, 

NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 

Mr. DEES. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I would 

like to thank you, personally, Chairman Royce, and also you, Congressman Payne, for holding this hearing today on a very important issue. 

I think we can say fairly that Congo is at its crossroads, and it 

is a crisis before us. And I think we should examine the situation 

in that context. Many of the points that I made in my longer prepared statement have already been repeated and expounded on by 

the participants today. I do want to accent a number of things. 

I would like to accent the fact that Congo’s problem has internal 

and external causes, and both are equally important. The report 

that came out by the United Nations Panel of Experts this week 

spoke about the external problems, particularly the meddling of 

Uganda and Rwanda. That Panel of Experts used satellite, on-theground interviews, and the American expert who is part of that 

panel, is perhaps the most foremost expert on small arms transfer 

into Africa. So I think it is important to accept the reality in that 

report, that Rwanda in fact has command and control support over 

the troops that took over Bukavu. I think we have to accept that 

as fact. 

The internal problems in Congo are also significant. Congolese 

politicians and their entourages profit from the delay. Clearly, the 

report in its detail shows you how much is available in terms of 

resources in Congo. There is a lot at stake. Thus the proliferating 

militias, more than two dozen at last count, have no political agenda but continue to prey on innocent civilians, and they control the 

vast resources of the eastern Congo. This remains perhaps the 

most significant cause of violence and instability in the Congo. 

31

I think it is also worth nothing there is a great irony in the allinclusive peace agreement, which we are trying to implement. Indeed, the success or failure of the accord depends largely on getting 

those responsible for war to reinvent themselves as patrons of 

peace. That stark irony promoted considerable skepticism about 

whether in fact a peace accord was therefore workable. 

Yet despite these doubts, there has been progress. The progress 

has been slow and torturous in Kinshasa. The instruments of the 

transition are very, very, very slow, but I think we face the reality 

that, generally, looking at Congo has been seen as a can’t-do situation, a pessimistic situation, but the reality shows something different. 

One of the main reasons for the progress in the transition is the 

work of civil society, for example. Congo is known for its civil society, and the pressure it puts on politicians is significant. I refer to 

civil society as really the constituency for peace in Congo. 

I think in looking at the crisis currently, we have to look at the 

role of MONUC. There has been repeated confusion over the 

group’s mandate and how aggressively to enforce it. Within Congo, 

this has only solidified the perception that MONUC is at best a 

paper tiger and at worst a Trojan horse. As the instrument intended to enforce the will of the international community, MONUC 

has been woefully inadequate. 

To be fair, they are undermanned, but I think what is more important is looking at what their political strategy is and what they 

have done well. My grandfather used to say if you are driving a 

car and you are having problems, you need to pull it over and take 

up the hood and look at what the problem is. I think the renewal 

of the MONUC mandate gives us an opportunity to look at what 

has been done well and what the problem is before we get into 

whether we need more troops. 

One of the things that is necessary is to develop and have the 

resources to implement a strategy to have peace in the East. The 

question has arisen whether elections are possible if MONUC continues to work in the West as it has on getting the transition, that 

is one-half of the equation, but having peace in the East is an 

equal and important part of the equation. 

I will just conclude by mentioning some recommendations. As a 

staff member of the National Endowment for Democracy, it is not 

in that context except as a personal observer, long-time personal 

observer of the situation in Congo. I would suggest treating the 

current situation in Congo as a crisis. The situation in Darfur has 

focused attention on immediate crisis and a long-term problem. The 

situation in eastern Congo, in general, and Goma, specifically, 

threatens to produce a Darfur-like crisis with similar humanitarian 

and political implications. 

I would also suggest using the situation in Goma as a test case 

for crisis management. If MONUC is there to manage crisis, there 

is no better place to start than the reality in Goma today. Use the 

upcoming discussion of the Security Council on the renewal of 

MONUC’s mandate to examine the mission and the performance of 

MONUC in order to improve its performance. 

I think it has been mentioned before that there is a collaborative 

link between the U.S. Government in terms of military cooperation 

32

with both Uganda and Rwanda. Those also offer levers to influence 

their behavior. Lack of cooperation in Congo should result in termination of the bilateral cooperation agreement. 

As part of the strategy for the east of the Congo, the international community should focus on two issues: General demobilization and repatriation of the FDLR forces in Congo. It is my understanding that the Pentagon has done a study on the FDLR 

Interahamwe situation in the East. 

It would be useful to see what the conclusions to that study were: 

Identify and pressure spoilers or other negative forces who may be 

working against the aims of the transition; make an explicit link 

between culpability, amnesty and cooperation, especially against 

those individuals who block the process; be willing to consider 

United States military assistance in helping reform the Congolese 

army; and last but not least, expand support for civil society to initiate, sustain crucial interventions, promoting peace, putting an 

end to impunity, reducing ethnic tension and, most importantly, 

preparing the Congolese for their first democratic election in 4 decades. 

I thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dees follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEARNED DEES, SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER, NATIONAL

ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee: 

I welcome the opportunity to be here to testify at today’s hearing on The Democratic Republic of Congo Peace Accords: One Year Later. I would also like to thank 

you Chairman Royce and also you Congressman Payne and all of the members of 

the Committee for holding today’s timely hearing and for your concern about the 

crisis in the Congo. I would also like to thank you both for your support for the National Endowment for Democracy over the years. 

As the members of the panel are aware, the transition in the Democratic Republic 

of Congo is at a crossroads. Fighting in Bukavu in May and June of this year provided proof that the transition, in the words of a recent International Crisis Group 

briefing, is not synonymous with peace. Indeed, the virus of violence is still prevalent in Eastern Congo, especially in Ituri, where despite the efforts of a beefed up 

presence of UN peace keepers with an expanded mandate, militias continue to kill 

at will, and in North Kivu, panic about a return to war has led to an ongoing mass 

evacuation of Goma. 

The crisis in Congo is exacerbated by a long list of well known problems, both 

internal and external. Internally, Congolese spoilers—politicians and their entourages who profit from a lack of progress in the transition—continue to find ways 

to block the process, including surreptitious arming of militias. In many ways, the 

zone of conflict in the Kivu regions is a proxy fight which serves to protect the interests of those who benefit from the status quo. Thus the majority of the proliferating 

militias, more than two dozen in the east of the country at last count, have no political agenda, but continue to prey on innocent civilians and fight for control of the 

vast supply of natural resources in the hinterland of Congo. This remains a significant catalyst for violence. 

Externally, neighboring countries, Uganda and Rwanda, continue to sponsor the 

renegade forces within Congo which are at the root of much of the violence. A draft 

report by a UN appointed group of experts, leaked last week, asserted that Rwanda 

actively recruited, trained and sheltered the renegade soldiers who staged last 

month’s violent take over of Bukavu. According to the report, Rwanda provided both 

a rear base for Congolese militias, and exerts command and control over some of 

the same forces. One of the leaders of the take-over of Bukavu, Jules Mutebutsi, 

and many of his troops, have been granted refugee status in Rwanda, and are protected by Rwandan troops. Laurent Nkunda, another one of the leaders of the recent 

Bukavu violence, is still on the loose in North Kivu, and threatening to wreak havoc 

there. 

In response to the takeover of Bukavu and the military impotency of both the UN 

peacekeepers and the Congolese national army, President Joseph Kabila sent 10,000 

33

troops to the east of the country. The resulting tensions with neighboring Rwanda 

raised concerns that a return to all out war was imminent. Critical diplomacy by 

the US government and by the Africa Union helped lower the temperature, but did 

not extinguish the flame that ignited the fire. 

The latest conflict has exposed major weaknesses in the transition and raised 

doubts about its viability. The resulting crisis has also had political ramifications 

across the country and may have been a factor in the alleged coup attempt last 

month in Kinshasa. Only decisive action combining domestic and international pressure targeting those blocking the process or promoting conflict can save the transition and avert war. 

ARRIVING AT THE CROSSROAD: THE TRANSITION ONE YEAR LATER

I would like to focus my comments on how we arrived at this crossroad and what 

we can do to salvage the transition. In assessing the trajectory of the progress of 

the peace process in the last 12 months, it is worthwhile remembering a bit of relevant history. Fourteen years have passed since the late President Mobutu Sese 

Seko’s famous speech in which he acknowledged that the one-party system had been 

a failure and henceforth he would begin a transition to democracy. 

Today, a decade and a half later, the latest chapter in the Congo’s transition without end could rightfully be called a dream deferred. The country’s already fragile 

societal and political fabric has been repeatedly shredded by a deadly cycle of political crises, ethnic conflicts, humanitarian disasters and war. Without going into the 

well-known details it is worth remembering that the conflict in the Congo has led, 

directly and indirectly, to the deaths of more than an estimated 3.5 million people, 

the displacement of millions more and the outright destitution of the majority of the 

nation’s 60 million people. Bluntly speaking, the situation in Congo currently remains calamitous and is, indeed, the world’s worst long-term humanitarian disaster. 

It is in this context that the breakthrough represented by last year’s peace agreement offered both a rationale and a roadmap for optimism. The agreement sought 

to bring together the armed belligerents, the non-armed opposition, and civil society, 

in order to create a transitional arrangement leading to elections within 36 months. 

It is worth noting that accord was signed as a result of intensive internal pressure 

from ordinary Congolese citizens fed up with war, and consistent pressure from the 

international community, led by South Africa the African Union, and the United 

States anxious to put an end to a conflict known as Africa’s first World War. 

Last year, the United Nations Security Council strengthened the mandate for the 

Military Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). It increased the 

size of the force to 10,800 soldiers and included a provision allowing for the unambiguous use of force in fulfilling its mandate. 

The complex agreement, a power sharing arrangement in which a president would 

share power with four vice presidents, was predicated on the cooperation and good 

will of all the actors. Indeed, the success or failure of the accord depends largely 

on getting those responsible for war to reinvent themselves as patrons of peace. 

Given this stark irony, there was considerable skepticism about whether, in fact, the 

peace accord was workable. 

EARLY SIGNS OF PROGRESS

Despite the doubt, one year later we can say that substantive progress has been 

made. Indeed, a transitional constitution was signed into law, a transitional government sworn in, and a transitional parliament with more than 500 members was has 

begun promulgating legislation to enable the transition, and an electoral commission began laying the groundwork for elections. 

In Kinshasa, a vibrant, independent media is playing an important watchdog role 

and there are almost as many media outlets: radio, television and newspapers as 

there are opinions. Indeed the capital, Kinshasa, is a vibrant political city filled with 

the normal intrigue one would expect in a country which is now in its 14th year 

of political transition. 

In the interior, local governors and military commanders were named and assumed their duties, often after a protracted series of give and take negotiations. The 

moves have, in many cases, extended the authority of the Congolese state to areas 

where it had been absent for the better part of the last decade, although in other 

areas nominations have only solidified a status quo hostile to reunification and political change. 

Another positive change has been the re-establishment of key economic and transportation links severed because of the war. Air traffic now links all the major cities 

of the country, with private companies now plying many of the routes. River traffic 

along the Congo river reconnected Kisangani with the capital Kinshasa and just this 

34

month the vital rail connection between Kindu, one of the country’s most isolated 

regional capitals, and Lubumbashi was re-established. 

Congolese civil society has exerted internal pressure on issues ranging from advocacy on election legislation, initiating discussion on strategies to end impunity for 

human rights abuses (now supported by promises of prosecution by the International Criminal Court), peace education, and insuring the free flow of information 

via a vibrant independent media. Civil society has played a key role in keeping politicians aware of the desire for peace and provided a mass-based momentum for moving the transition forward. 

External pressure, both bilateral and multilateral, has also contributed to 

progress. The two main international institutional levers of pressure have been the 

Comite International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (CIAT) which includes representatives of all the member countries of the security council, Belgium, South Africa, Zambia, and Angola and the European Union has used the carrot and stick 

approach to encourage progress, and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic 

Republic of Congo (MONUC), which, most successfully, has made progress in dampening down the levels of violence in Ituri province where violence has directly to 

led to more deaths than anywhere in the conflict. 

This tangible progress, especially late last year, created a sense of momentum crucial to overcoming inertia and pessimism. 

THE GENESIS OF A CRISIS

But despite the progress the most recent news is bad. The recent events in 

Bukavu, which were preceded earlier in the year by multiple discoveries of arms 

caches, shoot-outs by competing regiments of soldiers, brazen arms smuggling and 

overt threats of violence, have left the impression that not only was war imminent, 

but that preventative action would at best be pro-forma. In the same way political 

progress in Kinshasa created momentum for peace, ignoring violence and rising political tensions in the east of Congo has led to a fatalistic climate of pessimism and 

deja vu. The same situation is repeating itself today in Goma. Local officials, civilian 

and military are threatening members of civil society, soldiers are infiltrating the 

city, and the free flow of arms continues in the region and in the city. 

There has been, I think, inordinate focus on the technical mechanisms of the transition, particularly the elections, at the expense of solving the crisis of violence in 

the east. While extensive attention of the Kinshasa-based international community 

has been paid to the details and speed of the parliament’s enabling legislation about 

the transition, equal amounts of time and political capital have not been spent on 

stopping the rampant arms smuggling, stopping recruitment and training of militias 

in North Kivu and South Kivu, and ways to jump start a moribund demobilization 

program. The strategy seems to have been that peace in the east of Congo would 

come from political progress in the west. Focus on elections seems to have become 

an end rather than a means to an end. 

Another key link in the chain of crises affecting the Congo’s transition is the woefully inadequate crisis performance of MONUC. The revamped and reinforced contingent of peace keepers has been slow and indecisive. Nowhere is this more evident 

than in its performance before and during the crisis in Bukavu. Repeated confusion 

over the group’s mandate and how aggressively to enforce it has only solidified the 

perception in Congo that MONUC is at best a paper tiger, at worst a Trojan Horse. 

As the instrument intended to enforce the will of the international community, 

MONUC has been woefully inadequate. 

To be fair, MONUC is undermanned at its currently mandated level of 10,800 soldiers, but it could bolster its efficiency by developing and implementing, in collaboration with the international community and the Congolese Transitional Government, a political strategy aimed at sorting out the problems of violence in the Kivus. 

In that context enforcement of its already robust mandate to lead the demobilization 

process, monitor the movement of armed groups in North and South Kivu, track the 

movement of weapons, and to inspect and seize any illegal weapons which contravene UN resolution 1493 would thus be an extension of a comprehensive plan 

of not only what could be done, but a strategy of how to do it. 

The legacy of seven years of war in Congo has left the Congo on the verge of collapse. Only a strong desire for peace and a strong sense of Congolese national identity have prevented moves toward secession. Yet, despite these realities, ethnic tensions are at an all time high, and xenophobia directed, especially, though not exclusively, at the Hutu and Tutsi communities present a particular challenge. These 

issues risk being exploited by politicians during any future electoral period, as well 

as a pretext for outside intervention by Congo’s neighbors. 

35

Congo is also host to thousands of Rwandan soldiers and militia members responsible of genocide. Although they have coalesced into a group which now includes 

members not culpable for genocide, they present a particular challenge for the international community which bears a good deal of responsibility for their presences in 

Congo. The Rwandan government regards them alternately as perpetrators of genocide, mortal enemies seeking to reverse the current political order in Rwanda, and 

as a convenient pretext for involvement in Congolese internal affairs. Thus these 

soldiers are seen by the government of Rwanda as a foil and a foe, and by the 

Kinshasa government as an occasional ally. It is ordinary Congolese, however, who 

are the foremost victims of these marauding militiamen. 

NED SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

Congo is known for its vibrant civil society, which encompasses NGOs, religious 

institutions, trade unions and independent media. In a country where many of the 

prominent politicians are associated with the era of independence, NGOs in particular have proven to be an important training ground and reservoir for emerging 

political leadership. This role was explicitly acknowledged when civil society was 

designated as an equal partner in the peace talks and a quota of seats in the government was actually set aside for their representatives. As a result, at least five 

key transitional institutions including the election commission, the media oversight 

commission, the upper and lower house of parliament, and the truth and reconciliation commission are all headed by well-known members of Congo’s long established 

and well organized civil society. 

For many years now, NED has been one of the foremost international donors supporting Congo’s democracy movement, and the DRC remains NED’s number one priority in Africa. NED’s first grant was made to a human rights group, La Voix des 

Sans Voix, in 1991. Last year NED made 38 new direct grants to Congolese groups 

concerned with human rights, free press, democracy education, and conflict resolution. The American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS) also received 

a NED grant to help revitalize Congo’s trade union movement. In fact, NED supported the NGO efforts of three of the five civil society leaders named to head key 

transitional institutions. 

Civil society NGOs continue to play a major role across the country. Often, they 

represent local initiative in the face of crisis. Other times they have become the 

leading agents of social change and development. In eastern Congo, where the devastation has been the worst, civil society is the leading voice for peace and non violence. In Kisangani, a coalition of human rights organizations, many of which are 

NED grantees, including Groupe Lotus, Les Amis de Nelson Mandela, Groupe 

Lufalanga, Justice et Liberation, and several others, have joined forces to resist ethnic scapegoating and have preserved a climate of ethnic tolerance in the face of political volatility. In Butembo, civil society members, led by local businessmen, intellectuals, NGO leaders and religious figures have negotiated local ceasefires, and 

even taxed themselves to raise enough money to build a university, construct a dam 

to provide electricity to the city, build a teaching hospital and numerous other major 

projects in the face of war. These efforts provide both an example of the leadership 

and vision which civil society is capable of providing in Congo. 

Supporting such efforts can never completely replace the efforts of a state, but the 

cost benefit ratio suggests that these efforts are well worth the investment. Thus, 

whether negotiating a ceasefire, working to resolve ethnic conflict, reporting human 

rights violations, or improving the lives of their fellow citizens, Congolese civil society groups are likely to continue to play a vital role in strengthening the demand 

for peace and working to make elections possible. 

In conclusion it is clear that despite progress towards peace, that a return to war, 

with all the political and humanitarian consequences, is quite likely. Identifying and 

coercing cooperation from all the negative forces trying to block or stall the transition is critical in putting the transition back on track. Elections can only happen 

if this important groundwork is done, and even then sticking to the timetable will 

require a cohesive and well planned strategy to overcome the logistical challenges 

in organizing elections. Thus, a focus on stopping violence by isolating the perpetrators and their sponsors as well as assisting the institutions of the transition will 

lead to an end of Congo’s perpetual transition and bring it back from the brink. 

Taking of my hat as a staff member of the National Endowment for Democracy, 

which does not make policy recommendations and putting on my hat as a long-term 

watcher of events in Congo, I would like to conclude by offering some personal recommendations. 

36

THE CRISIS AT HAND: RECOMMENDATIONS

• Treat the current situation in Congo as a crisis and respond accordingly. The situation in the Darfur region of Sudan has helped focus attention on an immediate 

crisis and longer term issues involving the sincerity of all actors in the search for 

peace. The situation in eastern Congo in general and in Goma specifically threatens to produce a Darfur-like crisis with similar humanitarian and political implications.

• Use the situation in Goma as a test case for crisis management. Publicly identify 

the destabilizing forces in Goma by name, apply pressure to encourage their cooperation, and clearly signal the will of the international community to apply appropriate sanctions against individuals (including the potential for prosecution of 

the International Criminal Court) and countries which promote or support armed 

factions or conflict. This formula can be applied generally to all of the negative 

actors within Congo as well governments outside of Congo, especially Rwanda and 

Uganda.

• Use the upcoming discussion at the Security Council on the renewal of MONUC’s 

mandate to examine the mission and performance of MONUC. Clarify questions 

about when and how MONUC can intervene. Provide additional resources, both 

human and logistical to implement the provision on weapons monitoring and seizure, as a priority. Compel MONUC’s leadership to develop, in collaboration with 

the transitional government of DRC, a strategy for pacifying eastern Congo.

• Use the collaborative link of USG direct military cooperation with Uganda and 

Rwanda as a direct lever to influence their behavior in Congo. Continued cooperation should be explicitly and publicly linked with cooperation from both countries 

in stopping direct and indirect support for armed factions and individuals in the 

Congo. Lack of cooperation should result in a termination of the bi-lateral cooperation agreement.

• As part of a strategy for the east of the Congo, the international community 

should focus on two key issues: general demobilization and identification, and repatriation of the FDLR forces in Congo. By encouraging Rwanda to create an environment conducive to their return, identify those FDLR forces willing to return 

and isolate those unwilling to return.

• Continue to encourage the transitional institutions to efficiently complete their 

tasks. Encourage expeditious passage of legislation on elections, amnesty and nationality to clear the way for movement toward meeting the goal of elections. 

Identify and pressure spoilers, or other negative forces who may be working 

against the aims of the transition. Be willing to make an explicit link between 

culpability, amnesty and cooperation against individuals who block the process.

• Be willing to consider allowing the US military to play a leading role in reforming 

and training the Congolese Army.

• Expand support for local civil society efforts to initiate and sustain crucial interventions promoting peace, putting an end to impunity, reducing ethnic tensions, 

and preparing the Congolese people for their first democratic elections in four

decades.

Mr. ROYCE. We thank you for your analysis there and your suggested action items, Mr. Dees. 

When I was there in Kinshasa, we saw some demonstrations that 

became rather heated over MONUC’s perceived lack of protection 

for some of the Congolese, but nobody that I talked to wanted to 

see them leave. Their presence there was understood to be very important in terms of protection of the people in eastern Congo. 

You rightly, I think, point to the importance of political will of 

the main Congolese political actors, and so I would ask you what 

sticks and carrots we have to use then on those who are often unwilling to move forward, enact the legislation necessary to set the 

conditions for the election? None of these individuals have been 

elected by Congolese citizens, so what carrots and sticks do we use 

to get them to move forward in preparation for elections? 

Mr. DEES. I think there are both internal and external carrots. 

One carrot that was very effective in getting the accord signed 

originally was the domestic pressure within Congo directly on the 

actors. I think we can’t underestimate they live in Congo, they live 

37

originally was the domestic pressure within Congo directly on the 

actors. I think we can’t underestimate they live in Congo, they live 

next to these people who want peace, and supporting that sort of 

constituency for peace, which will put pressure on, is significant. 

More sort of heavy-handed, I think we have to realize that a lot 

of people in the transitional government are culpable for war 

crimes. There is a direct lever between amnesty, future prosecutions and cooperation. I think that should be individually put forth 

for individuals, particularly, who are blocking the process in 

Kinshasa. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Dees, what steps do you think can be taken to 

stop the struggle for control of the very abundant natural resources 

in the Congo, because, in my view, I think this is fueling and financing conflict. 

And I was going to ask you and Mr. Evans also, in your research, 

who is benefiting from the illegal exploitation of these natural resources? 

Mr. Dees? 

Mr. DEES. I would say to the question of who is benefiting, there 

are countries that are benefiting. Clearly, the country of Rwanda 

is benefiting, the country of Uganda is benefiting, and individuals 

within those countries are benefiting. I think one of the solutions 

is to follow the money directly back to where it leads. 

The report that was released this week goes into great detail 

about individual commanders, particularly in the Ugandan army, 

who are benefiting and control certain resources in eastern Congo. 

I think we have to trace the line of responsibility from the mine 

to the bank account, and I think those bank accounts have names. 

Mr. ROYCE. And do you think there would be a way to get the 

transparency involved to look at these bank accounts maybe worldwide if we worked in concert with the United Nations or with the 

EU? 

Mr. DEES. I think the actors are very aware of who is watching 

and what the consequences might be. If the consequences are 

seized bank accounts, people will pay attention. I think it is an important lever that must be considered if we want to disentangle the 

economic incentive from the conflict. 

Mr. ROYCE. So maybe some smart sanctions focused on just that 

and empowering institutions or empowering governments through 

the Security Council or some action that we could take to achieve 

that? 

Mr. DEES. I think they are long overdue. 

Mr. ROYCE. All right. Well, thank you, Mr. Dees. 

Mr. Evans? 

Mr. EVANS. Well, there are plenty of trails to follow, and most 

of them lead back to Uganda and Rwanda, and they lead back 

through a number of different kinds of players—military personnel, 

commercial opportunists of one kind or another. It is quite difficult 

to track this stuff down because so much of it is straight physical 

transactions, cash economy stuff, without the usual paper trail that 

does help. 

I know the International Criminal Court, if that is not too 

neuralgic a reference to make on this occasion, is certainly devoting 

quite a bit of its current investigative attention to the Congo, in 

38

Ituri and the eastern Kivus to try to work out the significance and 

implications of these illegal resource exploitation issues. And I 

think all of the resources that we can put internationally in this 

would be very well spent. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me go to Mr. Payne for some of his questions, 

because we are getting short on time here. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much. Let me ask both of you, do 

you think that the resources are directed from the presidential palaces or do you think that it is some persons working on their own 

or a combination of both? Either one of you. Both of you, please. 

Mr. EVANS. Well, it is very hard to find the smoking guns of this 

kind of personal accountability and responsibility, but it is difficult 

to believe there is not a higher level of awareness as to what is 

going on. It is not necessarily to be assumed that that is endorsement, but nobody could be immune from some sense of the scale 

of the economic depredation that has been going on and the nature 

of the interests that are involved here. 

Mr. DEES. I would agree. I think what we have seen in the reports that have documented specific names, we are looking at a 

free-for-all. Anybody and everybody who can is in on it. 

Mr. PAYNE. You mentioned Rwanda and Uganda. Therefore, I assume that Zimbabwe has no resources that they are profiting from 

or nor have they profited from this conflict. Both of you, could you 

respond to that? 

Mr. DEES. I didn’t see anything in the current report about 

Zimbabwe, but, as I suggested, it is a free-for-all. And one of the 

interesting things that I saw in the report that I wasn’t aware of 

was that the SPLA is also involved in the pillaging in Congo. So 

I am sure everybody who has any connection is doing the same 

thing. 

Mr. EVANS. I think there was a pretty big payoff for Zimbabwe 

in the 1998 to 2002 period, which President Mugabe was certainly 

conscious of in diverting his generals there to benefit from. I don’t 

think that has persisted since the Zimbabwe withdrawal, but it 

was certainly a serious phenomenon at that time, and it is part of 

the explanation for why the political dynamics are as they are in 

Zimbabwe at the moment. 

Mr. PAYNE. And just real quick, there will be an election. Currently, there are 4 Vice Presidents and about 50 ministers. That 

can’t be the way the government’s going to be in the future, so how 

do you see the convergence of a workable government of 15 or so 

ministers that most governments have, or 20, and maybe 1 Vice 

President or 2? Do you feel that once it gets closer to that day, that 

you will find more conflict? 

I think it is amazing that President Kabila’s been able to manage 

as well as he has with Vice Presidents from competing groups who 

probably would like to be President. So I think that a masterful job 

has been done, even though it looks extremely bad, but under the 

circumstances, I think he has to be commended. What do you think 

when they start to break and bring the government closer together 

where people are then going to be left out? 

Mr. EVANS. Well, there is always a tension between good governance imperatives and political imperatives, and we are going to see 

this in spades in this particular context. The difficulty is that the 

39

formal vehicle for resolving these tensions is the constitution-making process, and we really haven’t seen that getting to first base 

at the moment. 

And that is one of the things on which we are saying the internationals should be putting real pressure on the players to really 

move forward effectively. And part of that pressure should address 

the substantive issue that you just have, because it would be a 

nightmare to create an all-in kind of government. In the future, 

you have got to have some more rational representative structures 

embodied in it if this country is ever going to be viable. 

Mr. ROYCE. We will go to Mr. Meeks from New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. I will be real quick because I know we have a vote 

on, but let me ask Mr. Dees, what role, if any—government, I believe, comes from the ground up—has the Congolese civil society 

played in the transitional government and how widespread is it? Is 

it throughout the country or in just one area? How much political 

space do you believe exists? 

Mr. DEES. Well, I think given the history of the Congo with the 

collapse of potential government in the nineties, a civil society is 

everybody else and all their efforts, whether they are organized 

through NGOs or whether they are religious institutions like the 

Catholic or Protestant or Kimbangist Church, business people. So 

their efforts have been significant. 

In my testimony, I highlighted the efforts in Butembo, which is 

in the corner, near Uganda. They have built hospitals, they have 

built roads, they have electrified the city. That represents what 

people who are forward-thinking in the Congo have done. They realize the state’s not going to provide certain things for them, and 

they have done it themselves. That has also been replicated in 

things related to conflict resolution, preparation for the elections. 

So it is quite extensive, and it varies from region to region, but everybody realizes they have to look out for themselves. 

Mr. MEEKS. Last question and then we will run. Let me just ask, 

those that are there on an interim basis, none of them have been 

elected by the people, et cetera, are there sticks and carrots that 

we are able to utilize now to compel them to do the right thing by 

way of civil society and others while they are in there or is there 

anything that we can do or any pressure that is being applied them 

currently? 

Mr. DEES. I think the Congolese politicians keep any eye out for 

the mood on the street, because they can become victims of that 

mood. I think they are very aware of the Congolese people’s desire 

for peace, and I think there is a very real desire for these elections 

to happen. I think what you will see as people put forth reasons 

for delaying elections, you will see a lot of direct pressure from individuals about getting that back on track. 

Mr. MEEKS. That is very interesting. Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROYCE. I want to thank our witnesses for making the trip 

down here. Mr. Dees, Mr. Evans, thank you. Again, Secretary Newman, thanks for being with us today. 

And this meeting stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(41)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EN AVANT CONGO

CONGO NEEDS GREATER U.S. ENGAGEMENT

As the Democratic Republic of Congo commemorates the 44th anniversary of its 

independence from Belgium, the country is all but free. For the last thirty-nine 

years, the Congolese have toiled under various dictatorial and brutal regimes. Since 

1998, more than 3.5 million Congolese have died from war, starvation and disease. 

Eastern Congo remains the bastion of foreign-backed militias and ragtag armed 

groups that have committed unspeakable atrocities on a helpless population. Congo’s neighbors and multinational companies systematically loot and plunder its natural resources, while the people suffer. The United States can do more to help the 

Congolese free their country. 

Like in June 1960, when the country gained elusive independence from Brussels, 

the Congolese people hope this year will bring real freedom. June 30, 2004 marked 

the beginning of the most critical year of the transition from war to peace: Congo 

is to hold its first free and fair elections in forty-four years in exactly one year. At 

this juncture, failure is not an option, as the future of the entire central African region depends on the outcome of the Congolese transition. Congo is to Central Africa 

what South Africa is to the southern region, what Nigeria is to West Africa, and 

Egypt to North Africa. None of Congo’s nine neighbors will know real peace and 

prosperity if Congo’s transition fails. 

Under the leadership of South Africa in 2001, the African Union brokered a peace 

deal in Pretoria that brought various belligerents into a transitional government, inaugurated in June 2002. The Pretoria agreement, which was based on the Lusaka 

Accords, was an African success. But despite its political will, the African Union 

lacks the financial and military means to see Congo’s democratic transition to fruition. The moment has come for the international community, particularly the 

United States, to show greater commitment for peace in Central Africa. 

The people of Congo rest their hope in long-awaited elections, currently scheduled 

for June 2005. It is the promise of elections that makes the Congolese tolerate the 

current transitional government, with all of its faults. Failure to keep the promise 

of elections will constitute a major breach of social contract with dire consequences 

for Congo and its neighbors. Considering the ineffectiveness of the 1+4 formula, the 

international community should hold the transition government to the elections 

deadline of June 30, 2005. The international community should help pave the way 

for these elections, recognizing that there are significant obstacles and that the Congolese people need help from the United States and other allies to achieve this goal. 

First, the international community should exert greater pressure on the powersharing government to stay the course to elections. The transitional government has 

not performed well during its first year, lagging behind schedule on all major initiatives proscribed in the Pretoria Accords. Most transition government leaders do not 

have the people’s interest at heart. They continue to behave as rebels, using their 

new positions in the national government as cover. At best, they seek to delay the 

democratic transition and bide their time in a position of power. At worst, they intend to derail the process completely, forcing a return to pre-war arrangements and 

the division of the country. Some transition leaders are guilty of war crimes and 

great atrocities against the very citizens they are supposed to protect, and thus have 

no chance in winning in elections. 

The United States must identify those within the transition government who are 

actively and egregiously stalling the process. The U.S. should use credible threats 

of targeted individual sanctions, such as visa/travel bans or freezing of international 

42

bank accounts. When applicable, the U.S. should support the efforts of the World 

Court’s Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Campo, to bring war criminals to justice. A 

successful prosecution of a handful of militia leaders or former rebels in the current 

government will send a powerful message to those intent on playing the spoiler for 

elections. 

To reach elections, the transitional government also needs extensive structural 

support, beginning with an independent, paid, and professional civil service to carry 

out government functions. Civil servants have not been paid in years and are forced 

to live off the very population they are supposed to serve. The transitional government should take steps to control corruption and mismanagement and use its limited revenue to pay civil servants. 

Through bilateral assistance, the United States could provide the transitional government with additional grants or loans for this purpose until elections. An independent U.S.-Congolese commission could monitor salary distribution. USAID could 

work with the World Bank and other partners to help Congo update its salary distribution mechanism from easily stolen cash handouts to automatic deposits into individual bank accounts. Without a paid and professional civil service, government 

reforms will not be implemented. 

For a successful transition to free and fair elections, Congo must also have a minimum level of security and stability. Without a strong national security structure, 

Congo remains a source of regional insecurity and a target for armed opportunists 

exploiting Congo’s resources. If the current lack of stability persists, Congo will remain in a state of emergency, making it impossible to hold the much-needed elections. Congo needs a unified, well-trained, and paid army and police to protect its 

citizens and allow them to vote freely. As shown by recent events in Bukavu, various militia and rebel groups continue to defy the orders of the transition government with impunity and with support from neighbors Rwanda and Uganda. A capable Congolese national army is essential to put an end to regional instability, to enforce the decisions of the transition government, and to protect Congolese citizens 

from atrocities and exploitation. 

At the signing of the Pretoria Accords and the beginning of the transition, the 

United States made a commitment to Congo to work with European allies to help 

train national security forces and police under the auspices of the transition government. To date, only Belgium has followed through on this commitment in terms of 

actual training of integrated army units. The United States can do more to provide 

logistical and programmatic expertise required for this crucial endeavor. The U.S. 

Congress should request a full accounting from the Department of Defense and the 

State Department of current activities to help rebuild Congo’s security forces. Until 

Congo has a professional army and national police firmly in place, the region will 

not know peace. 

The United States has a greater role to play in the Great Lakes beyond Congo’s 

borders. For peace and stability in the region, a fully integrated U.S. foreign policy 

is needed. U.S. missions in New York (USUN), Kinshasa, Kigali and Kampala 

should implement complementary recommendations that support inclusive peace efforts in the region. 

Last year’s report by the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources accused both Rwanda and Uganda of prolonging the war so they 

could siphon off Congo’s wealth with the help of multinational corporations. Neither 

Uganda nor Rwanda have significant deposits of gold, diamond and coltan, but both 

countries have become important exporters of these minerals. The Security Council, 

however, refused to release the report in its entirety or to take any measures to 

punish those named. By classifying the most damning portions of the report, the 

United Nations has become an accomplice to those who are guilty of atrocities and 

human rights violations. The United States should pressure the Security Council to 

declassify the report. In addition, the U.S. should open independent Congressional 

inquiries into U.S. companies named in the report and reevaluate our bilateral assistance to Uganda and Rwanda in light of these illegal activities. 

Arms trafficking feeds the cycle of violence in eastern Congo. The United States 

should fully support and help enforce the UN embargo on the flow of illegal arms 

into Congo. The U.S. must support the findings of the UN Panel of Experts that 

was established by the Security Council to examine illegal arms transfers in the region. Given evidence in the Panel’s July 2004 report, the U.S. government ought to 

reinstate its own bilateral arms embargo on Rwanda and Uganda, two of the main 

sources of illegal arms flow into Congo. The U.S. Congress should condition all bilateral assistance to both of these countries on their ceasing to arm these militias. The 

U.S. Congress should also urge the State Department to cooperate with initiatives 

before the Security Council to put ‘‘teeth’’ into the UN Panel of Experts report, including smart sanctions against those who are in violation of UN resolutions. ImpuVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:53 Sep 15, 2004 Jkt 094990 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AFRICA\072204\94990.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
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nity is not a democratic value, and failure to hold accountable those responsible for 

illegal arms trafficking in the Great Lakes region will only perpetuate the violence. 

The Congolese people have sacrificed much the last forty-four years. Yet their desire for freedom has never dwindled. Their hope for a free and independent country 

rests on the upcoming elections. With a greater commitment, the United States can 

help Congolese reclaim their sovereignty and contribute to a lasting and stable 

peace in the Great Lakes region. 

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CONSTANCE BERRY NEWMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE BETTY MCCOLLUM, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA


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