IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER “CHRISSY”

SHORTER,

Petitioner,

v. Case No.: 4:20cv223-MW/MAF

BRYAN DOBBS,

Defendant.

______________________________/

ORDER ACCEPTING IN PART REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This Court has considered, without hearing, the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation, ECF No. 32. Upon consideration, no objections having been 

filed by the parties,

IT IS ORDERED:

The report and recommendation is accepted in part, rejected in part, and 

adopted as this Court’s opinion, except to the extent it conflicts with this Order.

This case originated in the Southern District of Florida, where it was 

dismissed as moot without reaching the merits of Petitioner’s claim. The Eleventh 

Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, finding error in the 

mootness determination. While on remand, the case was transferred to this Court. 

This Court accepts the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations that this Court 

should excuse the exhaustion requirement for Petitioner, and that Petitioner is not 

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entitled to shorten her period of supervised release based on good-time credit that 

she says should have been applied toward her term of imprisonment. This Court’s 

finding regarding the merits of the § 2241 petition differs from the Magistrate 

Judge’s, in that this Court recognizes the First Step Act’s amendments regarding

good-time credit apply retroactively, see, e.g., Bottinelli v. Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196, 

1198 (9th Cir. 2019), but the amendments did not go into effect until months after 

Petitioner satisfied her prison sentence. And, as the Government asserts, nothing in 

the First Step Act mandates the revision of good-time credit as applied to a prison 

sentence that has been satisfied before the effective date of the First Step Act’s 

amendments. 

Indeed, Petitioner did not suffer from the wrongful deprivation of good-time 

credit prior to her release from prison on February 14, 2019, because the additional 

credit she asserts she was entitled to did not exist until the amendments went into 

effect months after she was released from prison. In other words, Petitioner was not 

entitled to additional good-time credit pursuant to the First Step Act prior to July 19, 

2019, because the good-time credit amendments were not yet effective, and she is 

not entitled to good-time credit now since she is no longer “serving a term of 

imprisonment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b).

This Court rejects the recommendation that Petitioner’s claim should be 

dismissed as moot, given the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis in this case on appeal.

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Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for judicial notice, ECF No. 31, is GRANTED in 

part, to the extent this Court addressed the issue remanded by the Eleventh Circuit 

Court of Appeals. Petitioner’s motion, ECF No. 31, is DENIED in part, to the 

extent she continues to seek release from supervised release pursuant to the First 

Step Act. Petitioner is not entitled to additional good-time credit. The Clerk shall 

enter judgment stating, “Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is 

DISMISSED.” The Clerk shall close the file. 

SO ORDERED on January 12, 2021.

s/Mark E. Walker 

Chief United States District Judge

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