Underground Transportation 

Systems in Europe:

Safety, Operations, and Emergency Response

INTERNATIONAL

TECHNOLOGY 

SCANNING PROGRAM

IN COOPERATION WITH:

American Association of

State Highway and

Transportation Officials

National Cooperative Highway

Research Program

June 2006

SPONSORED BY:

U.S. Department

of Transportation

Federal Highway

Administration
NOTICE

The Federal Highway Administration provides

high-quality information to serve Government,

industry, and the public in a manner that promotes

public understanding. Standards and policies are

used to ensure and maximize the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of its information. FHWA

periodically reviews quality issues and adjusts its

programs and processes to ensure continuous

quality improvement.
1. Report No.

FHWA-PL-06-016

2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient’s Catalog No.

Technical Report Documentation Page

4. Title and Subtitle Underground Transportation Systems in Europe: 

Safety, Operations, and Emergency Response

7. Author(s)

Steven Ernst, Mahendra Patel, Harry Capers, Donald Dwyer, 

Chris Hawkins, Gary Steven Jakovich, Wayne Lupton, 

Tom Margro, Mary Lou Ralls, Jesus Rohena, Mike Swanson

9. Performing Organization Name and Address

American Trade Initiatives

P.O. Box 8228

Alexandria, VA 22306-8228

12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address

Office of International Programs

Office of Policy

Federal Highway Administration

U.S. Department of Transportation

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

National Cooperative Highway Research Program

5. Report Date

June 2006

6. Performing Organization Code

8. Performing Organization Report No.

10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)

11. Contract or Grant No.

DTFH61-99-C-005

13. Type of Report and Period Covered

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. Supplementary Notes

FHWA COTR: Hana Maier, Office of International Programs

16. Abstract

The United States has limited guidelines, standards, and specifications related to safety, operations, and

emergency response in underground transportation systems. The Federal Highway Administration, 

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, and National Cooperative Highway

Research Program sponsored a scanning study of equipment, systems, and procedures used in tunnels in

Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.

The scan team learned that Europeans are conducting research to develop innovative design and emergency

management plans that consider how people react in tunnel emergencies. Because motorist behavior is

unpredictable in tunnel incidents, Europeans make instructions for drivers, passengers, and tunnel operators

as straightforward as possible to reduce required decisionmaking.

The team’s recommendations for U.S. implementation include conducting research on tunnel emergency

management that includes human factors, developing tunnel design criteria that promote optimal driver

performance during incidents, developing more effective visual, audible, and tactile signs for escape routes,

and using a risk-management approach to tunnel safety inspection and maintenance.

17. Key Words

Emergency response, incident management, 

maintenance, safety, tunnel, underground 

transportation system

18. Distribution Statement

No restrictions. This document is available to the

public from the: Office of International Programs,

FHWA-HPIP, Room 3325, U.S. Department of

Transportation, Washington, DC 20590

international@fhwa.dot.gov

www.international.fhwa.dot.gov

19. Security Classify. (of this report)

Unclassified

20. Security Classify. (of this page)

Unclassified

21. No. of Pages

64

22. Price

Free

Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The success of this scan was a result of the knowledge and experience shared by representatives

of the host transportation agencies, researchers, associations, and private firms during the scan

meetings. Scan team members thank their hosts for their gracious hospitality and for taking 

the time from their busy schedules to meet and discuss the latest technological developments in

their countries. Each country provided information that expanded the knowledge of scan team

members, and team members look forward to continued interaction and partnership with 

the hosts in the advancement of safety, operations, and emergency response in underground

transportation systems.

The scan team also thanks the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the FHWA Office 

of International Programs, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 

Officials, and the National Cooperative Highway Research Program for their leadership and 

support of the scan.
Underground Transportation 

Systems in Europe:

Safety, Operations, and Emergency Response

Steven Ernst (Co-Chair)

FHWA

Mahendra Patel (Co-Chair)

Pennsylvania DOT

Harry A. Capers

New Jersey DOT

Donald Dwyer

New York DOT

Chris Hawkins

Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc.

Gary Steven Jakovich

FHWA

Wayne Lupton

Colorado DOT

Tom Margro

Bay Area Rapid Transit District

Mary Lou Ralls (Report Facilitator)

Ralls Newman, LLC

Jesus M. Rohena

FHWA

Mike Swanson

Massachusetts Turnpike Authority

and

American Trade Initiatives, Inc.

for

Federal Highway Administration

U.S. Department of Transportation

American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials

National Cooperative Highway Research Program

June 2006

PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL SCANNING STUDY TEAM:
The International Technology Scanning Program, 

sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA), the American Association of State Highway

and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), and the

National Cooperative Highway Research Program

(NCHRP), accesses and evaluates innovative foreign technologies

and practices that could significantly benefit U.S. highway transportation systems. This approach allows for advanced technology to be

adapted and put into practice much more efficiently without 

spending scarce research funds to re-create advances already 

developed by other countries.

FHWA and AASHTO, with recommendations from NCHRP,

jointly determine priority topics for teams of U.S. experts to study.

Teams in the specific areas being investigated are formed and sent to

countries where significant advances and innovations have been

made in technology, management practices, organizational structure,

program delivery, and financing. Scan teams usually include representatives from FHWA, State departments of transportation, local

governments, transportation trade and research groups, the private

sector, and academia. 

After a scan is completed, team members evaluate findings and

develop comprehensive reports, including recommendations for 

further research and pilot projects to verify the value of adapting

innovations for U.S. use. Scan reports, as well as the results of pilot

programs and research, are circulated throughout the country to State

and local transportation officials and the private sector. Since 1990,

approximately 70 international scans have been organized on topics

such as pavements, bridge construction and maintenance, contracting,

intermodal transport, organizational management, winter road maintenance, safety, intelligent transportation systems, planning, and policy.

The International Technology Scanning Program has resulted in

significant improvements and savings in road program technologies

and practices throughout the United States. In some cases, scan studies have facilitated joint research and technology-sharing projects with

international counterparts, further conserving resources and advancing the state of the art. Scan studies have also exposed transportation

professionals to remarkable advancements and inspired implementation of hundreds of innovations. The result: large savings of research

dollars and time, as well as significant improvements in the Nation’s

transportation system.

Scan reports can be obtained through FHWA free of charge by 

e-mailing international@fhwa.fhwa.dot.gov. Scan reports are also 

available electronically and can be accessed on the FHWA Office of

International Programs Web site at www.international.fhwa.dot.gov.

International Technology

Scanning Program

iv
Safety

 Safety Applications of Intelligent Transportation Systems in

Europe and Japan (2006)

 Traffic Incident Response Practices in Europe (2006)

 Underground Transportation Systems in Europe: Safety, Operations,

and Emergency Response (2006)

 Roadway Human Factors and Behavioral Safety in Europe (2005)

 Traffic Safety Information Systems in Europe and Australia (2004)

 Signalized Intersection Safety in Europe (2003)

 Managing and Organizing Comprehensive Highway Safety

in Europe (2003)

 European Road Lighting Technologies (2001)

 Commercial Vehicle Safety Technology and Practice in

Europe (2000)

 Methods and Procedures to Reduce Motorist Delays in

European Work Zones (2000)

 Innovative Traffic Control Technology and Practice in

Europe (1999)

 Road Safety Audits—Final Report and Case Studies (1997)

 Speed Management and Enforcement Technology:

Europe and Australia (1996)

 Safety Management Practices in Japan, Australia,

and New Zealand (1995)

 Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety in England, Germany,

and the Netherlands (1994)

Planning and Environment

 Managing Travel Demand: Applying European Perspectives to 

U.S. Practice (2006)

 Transportation Asset Management in Australia, Canada,

England, and New Zealand (2005)

 Transportation Performance Measures in Australia, Canada, Japan, and

New Zealand (2004)

 European Right-of-Way and Utilities Best Practices (2002)

 Geometric Design Practices for European Roads (2002)

 Wildlife Habitat Connectivity Across European Highways (2002)

 Sustainable Transportation Practices in Europe (2001)

 Recycled Materials in European Highway Environments (1999)

 European Intermodal Programs: Planning, Policy, and

Technology (1999)

 National Travel Surveys (1994)

Policy and Information

 European Practices in Transportation Workforce Development (2003)

 Intelligent Transportation Systems and Winter Operations

in Japan (2003)

 Emerging Models for Delivering Transportation Programs

and Services (1999)

 National Travel Surveys (1994)

 Acquiring Highway Transportation Information from Abroad (1994)

 International Guide to Highway Transportation Information (1994)

 International Contract Administration Techniques for Quality 

Enhancement (1994)

 European Intermodal Programs: Planning, Policy, and Technology (1994)

Operations

 Managing Travel Demand: Applying European Perspectives to 

U.S. Practice (2006)

 Traffic Incident Response Practices in Europe (2006)

 Underground Transportation Systems in Europe: Safety, Operations, and

Emergency Response (2006)

 Superior Materials, Advanced Test Methods, and Specifications

in Europe (2004)

 Freight Transportation: The Latin American Market (2003)

 Meeting 21st Century Challenges of System Performance Through Better

Operations (2003)

 Traveler Information Systems in Europe (2003)

 Freight Transportation: The European Market (2002)

 European Road Lighting Technologies (2001)

 Methods and Procedures to Reduce Motorist Delays in 

European Work Zones (2000)

 Innovative Traffic Control Technology and Practice in Europe (1999)

 European Winter Service Technology (1998)

 Traffic Management and Traveler Information Systems (1997)

 European Traffic Monitoring (1997)

 Highway/Commercial Vehicle Interaction (1996)

 Winter Maintenance Technology and Practices—

Learning from Abroad (1995)

 Advanced Transportation Technology (1994)

 Snowbreak Forest Book—Highway Snowstorm Countermeasure Manual

(translated from Japanese) (1990)

International Technology

Scan Reports

UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE v

International Technology Scanning Program:

Bringing Global Innovations to U.S. Highways
vi

Infrastructure—General

 Construction Management Practices in Canada and Europe (2005)

 European Practices in Transportation Workforce Development (2003)

 Contract Administration: Technology and Practice in Europe (2002)

 European Road Lighting Technologies (2001)

 Geometric Design Practices for European Roads (2001)

 Geotechnical Engineering Practices in Canada and Europe (1999)

 Geotechnology—Soil Nailing (1993)

Infrastructure—Pavements

 Quiet Pavement Systems in Europe (2005)

 Pavement Preservation Technology in France, South Africa, and Australia

(2003)

 Recycled Materials In European Highway Environments (1999)

 South African Pavement and Other Highway Technologies

and Practices (1997)

 Highway/Commercial Vehicle Interaction (1996)

 European Concrete Highways (1992)

 European Asphalt Technology (1990)

Infrastructure—Bridges

 Prefabricated Bridge Elements and Systems in Japan and Europe (2005)

 Bridge Preservation and Maintenance in Europe and South Africa

(2005)

 Performance of Concrete Segmental and Cable-Stayed 

Bridges in Europe (2001)

 Steel Bridge Fabrication Technologies in Europe and Japan (2001)

 European Practices for Bridge Scour and Stream Instability 

Countermeasures (1999)

 Advanced Composites in Bridges in Europe and Japan (1997)

 Asian Bridge Structures (1997)

 Bridge Maintenance Coatings (1997)

 Northumberland Strait Crossing Project (1996)

 European Bridge Structures (1995)

All publications are available on the Internet at:

www.international.fhwa.dot.gov
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE vii

Acronyms

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials 

APTA American Public Transportation Association

CCTV Closed-circuit television

CETU Tunnel Study Centre at the French Ministry of 

Transport, Equipment, Tourism, and Sea

CFD Computational fluid dynamics

CO Carbon monoxide

DOT Department of transportation

EU European Union

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

FM Frequency modulation

HF High-frequency

HSCOBS Highway Subcommittee on Bridges and 

Structures

LED Light-emitting diode

LPG Liquid propane gas

L-surF Design Study for a Large-Scale Underground 

Research Facility on Safety and Security

LTDS Linear temperature detection system

MTTF Mean time to failure

MW Megawatt (energy release rate of a fire)

NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NO Nitric oxide

NOK Norwegian kronor

PIARC World Road Association (previously the Permanent 

International Association of Roadways Congress)

SEK Swedish kronor

SINTEF Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research 

at the Norwegian Institute of Technology

SINTEF NBL Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory

SP Swedish National Testing and Research Institute

STUVA German Research Association for Underground 

Transportation Facilities

T–20 AASHTO HSCOBS Technical Committee for Tunnels

TBM Tunnel boring machine

TNO Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research

TRB Transportation Research Board

UPTUN Cost-effective, Sustainable and Innovative Upgrading 

Methods for Fire Safety in Existing Tunnels

WMD Weapons of mass destruction
viii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi

Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi

1. Develop Universal, Consistent, and More Effective Visual, 

Audible and Tactile Signs for Escape Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi

2. Develop AASHTO Guidelines for Existing and New Tunnels . . . . . . . .xii

3. Conduct Research and Develop Guidelines on Tunnel Emergency 

Management that Includes Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xii

4. Develop Education for Motorist Response to Tunnel Incidents . . . . . .xii

5. Evaluate Effectiveness of Automatic Incident Detection Systems . . . . . .

and Intelligent Video for Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xii

6. Develop Tunnel Facility Design Criteria to Promote Optimal 

Driver Performance and Response to Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xii

7. Investigate One-Button Systems to Initiate Emergency Response 

and Automated Sensor Systems to Determine Response . . . . . . . . . . . .xii

8. Use Risk-Management Approach to Tunnel Safety Inspection 

and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii

9. Implement Light-Emitting Diode Lighting for Safe Vehicle 

Distance and Edge Delineation in Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii

Implementation Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xiii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Amplifying Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Host Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Team Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

CHAPTER 2: FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND 

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Countries and Organizations Visited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

SINTEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

SINTEF NBL—Fire Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management . . . .5

Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Copenhagen Driverless Metro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Rambøll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Oresundsbro Konsortiet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Oresund Fixed Link Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Citytunnel Railway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Runehamar Tunnel Fire Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 

Table of Contents

3

6
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE ix

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

A86 West Beltway Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Cofiroute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

East Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Citilog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

CETU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Mont Blanc Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

STUVA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Gotthard Road Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Loetschberg Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Plabutsch Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Key Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Major European Tunnel Research Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

UPTUN (http://www.uptun.net/) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

L-surF (http://www.l-surf.org/) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Planning and Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Standards, Safety Approaches, and Design Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

2004 European Commission Directive on Tunnel Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Integrated Safety Philosophy in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Integrated Safety Plan for the Westerschelde Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Copenhagen Metro Safety Approach in Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Rambøll Risk-Management Approach to Design in Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Citytunnel Safety Approach in Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Standards for Tunnel Safety in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Tunnel Design Standards in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Tunnel Design Standards in Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Design Issues in Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Design Issues in Plabutsch Tunnel in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Escape Route Signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Mont Blanc Tunnel Between France and Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Plabutsch Tunnel in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

LED Lights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Grilstad Tunnel in Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Escape Doors in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Mont Blanc Tunnel Between France and Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Design Fire Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

Fire Suppression Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

The Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

9

11
x TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ventilation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Mont Blanc Tunnel Between France and Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Gotthard Tunnel in Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Loetschberg Tunnel in Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Plabutsch Tunnel in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Air Curtain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Incident Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

SINTEF in Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Copenhagen Metro in Denmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Oresund Tunnel Between Denmark and Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Citytunnel Railway in Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

CETU in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

STUVA in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

Mont Blanc Tunnel Between France and Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

Gotthard Tunnel in Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Loetschberg Tunnel in Switzerland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Plabutsch Tunnel in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Maintenance and Safety Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Rambøll Risk-Management Approach to Safety Inspection 

and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Oresund Tunnel Maintenance Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

CETU Tunnel Maintenance Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Project Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

New E39 Highway in Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Citytunnel Railway in Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

CHAPTER 3: RECOMMENDATIONS AND 

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

1. Develop Universal, Consistent, and More Effective Visual, 

Audible, and Tactile Signs for Escape Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

2. Develop AASHTO Guidelines for Existing and New Tunnels . . . . . . .31

3. Conduct Research and Develop Guidelines on Tunnel 

Emergency Management that Includes Human Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

4. Develop Education for Motorist Response to Tunnel Incidents . . . . . .32

5. Evaluate Effectiveness of Automatic Incident Detection 

Systems and Intelligent Video for Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

6. Develop Tunnel Facility Design Criteria to Promote 

Optimal Driver Performance and Response to Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

7. Investigate One-Button Systems to Initiate Emergency Response 

and Automated Sensor Systems to Determine Response . . . . . . . . . . . .32

8. Use Risk-Management Approach to Tunnel Safety 

Inspection and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

9. Implement Light-Emitting Diode Lighting for Safe Vehicle 

Distance and Edge Delineation in Tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

APPENDIX A: AMPLIFYING QUESTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

21

26
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE xi

APPENDIX B: CONTACTS IN HOST COUNTRIES . . . .37

APPENDIX C: TEAM MEMBERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

APPENDIX D: BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Figures

Figure 1. Scan team in front of Mont Blanc Tunnel firefighting truck. . . . . . . .1

Figure 2. Gotthard Tunnel fire in October 2001. (SINTEF) . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Figure 3. EU pamphlet for motorists in tunnels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Figure 4. Oresund fixed link between Copenhagen, Denmark, and Malmo, 

Sweden. (Oresundsbro Konsortiet) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Figure 5. A86 West Beltway project. (Cofiroute) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Figure 6. Tunnels on the A86 West Beltway project: West and East tunnels 

and cross section of tunnels. (Cofiroute) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Figure 7. A86 West Beltway East Tunnel emergency facilities: cross section 

of emergency facilities and example of emergency alcove. (Cofiroute) . . . . .10

Figure 8. Special emergency vehicles for the A86 East Tunnel: firefighting 

vehicle and ambulance. (Cofiroute) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Figure 9. Model of A86 twin roadway tube: full-size model of one section 

and scale model of twin tube. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Figure 10. Scenarios for evacuation safety in tunnels: sudden stop, gradual 

stop, sudden lane clearing, and gradual lane clearing. (Dutch Ministry) . . . . .14

Figure 11. Ventilation to support self and aided rescue (FEDRO). . . . . . . .16

Figure 12. Sensory combination for location of escape doors. 

(Dutch Ministry) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Figure 13. Examples from the Mont Blanc Tunnel: tunnel escape route and 

tunnel escape route sign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Figure 14. LED lights on roadway edges in the Grilstad Tunnel. (SINTEF) . .20

Figure 15. LED lights in the Mont Blanc Tunnel: yellow for edge delineation 

and blue for vehicle spacing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Figure 16. Air curtain for smoke control in tunnels. (SINTEF NBL) . . . . . .21

Figure 17. Truck thermal detector at the Mont Blanc Tunnel entrance. . . . .26

Figure 18. “One-button” response for incident management in the Mont 

Blanc Tunnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Figure 19. Emergency pullout area across from refuge room in the Mont 

Blanc Tunnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Figure 20. Mont Blanc refuge room: inside refuge room and instructions 

posted on wall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Figure 21. High-tech firefighting trucks for the Mont Blanc Tunnel. . . . . . . .29

Table

Table 1. Scan itinerary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

28

29
xii
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE xiii

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

I

ncreasing traffic congestion in urban areas and growing land

values in the United States make underground structures

increasingly attractive for highways and transit compared to

other options. A tunnel can preserve the land above for

parks, buildings, homes, and other uses while providing an

efficient, cost-effective underground corridor to move people and

goods. Unfortunately, only limited national guidelines, standards, or

specifications are available for tunnel design, construction, safety

inspection, traffic and incident management, maintenance, security,

and protection against natural or manmade disasters. 

An 11-member team was formed to study European practices

on the aforementioned topics. This team consisted of three representatives from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), four

representatives from State departments of transportation (DOTs),

one representative from the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART),

one representative from the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority who

also represented the International Bridge, Tunnel, and Turnpike

Association (IBTTA), one tunnel engineering design consultant, and

the report facilitator. The scan was sponsored by FHWA, the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

(AASHTO), and the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP). During late September and early October 2005,

the team visited Denmark, France, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. In addition, the team had meetings with representatives from

Austria, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. These countries were

selected on the basis of desk scan findings that showed they are

innovators in underground transportation systems.

The objectives of the scan were to learn what is being done

internationally for underground transportation systems in the areas

of safety, operations, and emergency response.

The focus of the scan was on equipment, systems, and procedures incorporated into modern underground and underwater tunnels by leading international engineers and designers. The study

considered the following: 

 Tunnel systems and designs that provide fire protection, blast protection, and areas of refuge or evacuation passages for users.

 Arrangements of the various components to maximize their effectiveness, assure inspectability and maintainability, and promote

cost savings.

 Tunnel operations, including incident detection and deterrent

technology, and incident response and recovery planning. 

 Specialized technologies and standards used in monitoring or

inspecting structural elements and operating equipment to ensure

optimal performance and minimize downtime during maintenance or rehabilitation. 

Regarding the safety and security aspects, the team was interested in learning about planning approaches, standards, manpower

roles and responsibilities, communication techniques, and state-ofthe-art products and equipment used to deter, detect, deny, defend,

respond to, and recover from both natural and manmade disasters

and other incidents.

Team members were interested in not only tunnel practices and

innovations for highways, but also those for passenger and freight rail.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Team members identified a number of underground transportation

system initiatives and practices that varied from those in the United

States in some respect. The team recommended that nine of these

initiatives or practices, briefly described below, be further considered

for possible implementation in the United States. Little was discovered related to the threat from terrorism to underground structures,

perhaps because of the confidential nature of this information or the

lack of perceived need for such measures. The scan team learned

that the Europeans consider response and safety measures already

in place for crashes and other incidents to also be applicable for

many terrorist actions.

The Europeans are doing extensive research resulting in innovative design and emergency management plans that consider how people react in tunnel emergencies. Because motorist behavior is unpredictable in tunnel incidents, Europeans make instructions for drivers,

passengers, and tunnel operators as straightforward as possible to

reduce required decisionmaking during an incident such as a tunnel

fire. The nine initiatives and practices listed below relate to human factors, planning, design, and incident and asset management. 

1. Develop Universal, Consistent, and More Effective 

Visual, Audible, and Tactile Signs for Escape Routes 

The scan team noted that the signs Europeans use to indicate emergency escape routes are consistent and uniform from country to

country. Emergency escape routes are indicated by a sign showing a

white-colored running figure on a green background. Other signs

that indicate the direction (and in tunnels, the distance in meters) to

the nearest emergency exit also have the white figure on a green

background, as used in European buildings and airports. All SOS stations in the tunnels were identified by the color orange. This widespread uniformity promotes understanding by all people, and helps

assure that in the event of an emergency, any confusion related to

the location of the emergency exit will be minimized. In addition,

the team learned that combining the use of sound that emanates

from the sign, such as a sound alternating with a simple verbal mes-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

xiv

sage (e.g., “Exit Here”) with visual (and, where possible, tactile) cues

makes the sign much more effective. 

The U.S tunnel engineering community relies on National Fire

Protection Association (NFPA) 130, Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit

and Passenger Rail Systems, and NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels,

Bridges, and Other Limited Access Highways, for fire protection and fire

life safety design standards. These standards should be reviewed and

revised as necessary to incorporate the most current technology and

results of recent human response studies on identification and design

of escape portals, escape routes, and cross passages.

2. Develop AASHTO Guidelines for Existing and New

Tunnels

Single-source guidelines for planning, design, construction, 

maintenance, and inspection of roads and bridges have been in

place for many years. NFPA has developed standards for safety in

highway tunnels and passenger rail tunnels. The American Public

Transportation Association (APTA) has general safety standards and

guidelines for passenger rail operations and maintenance that 

incorporate some of the NFPA standards by reference. However, 

AASHTO does not have standards or guidelines specifically for 

highway or passenger and freight rail tunnels. Recently, the 

AASHTO Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures created a new

committee, the Technical Committee on Tunnels (T–20), to help

address this problem. T–20 should take the lead in developing

AASHTO standards and guidelines for existing and new tunnels,

working with NFPA, APTA, FHWA, and the appropriate TRB 

committees on standards and guidelines for highway and 

passenger and freight rail tunnels. T–20 should consider tunnel 

safety measures such as the Mont Blanc Tunnel emergency 

pullout area and variable message sign showing maximum 

speed limit and required vehicle spacing, as well as 

refuge room requirements.

3. Conduct Research and Develop Guidelines on Tunnel

Emergency Management that Includes Human Factors

Tunnel design solutions may not anticipate human behavior, and

consistently predicting the way people will behave in an incident is

not easy. During emergency situations, human behavior is even

harder to predict as the stress of the situation replaces intellect with

curiosity, fear, or even panic. During a tunnel emergency, people

often must be their own first rescuers and must react correctly within a few minutes to survive. Tunnel emergency management scenarios and procedures must take human behavior into account to be

fully effective in saving lives. The European experience in human factor design provides a good basis for the United States to discover

and include more effective measures for tunnel planning, design, and

emergency response. 

4. Develop Education for Motorist Response to Tunnel

Incidents

During an emergency situation, most people do not immediately

know what to do to save themselves and others. Motorists are their

own first rescuers, and European studies indicate that self-rescue

may be the best first response for a tunnel incident. For this to be an

effective strategy, it is important to educate the public about the

importance of reacting quickly and correctly to a tunnel incident,

such as a fire.

5. Evaluate Effectiveness of Automatic Incident Detection

Systems and Intelligent Video for Tunnels

The scan team learned of sophisticated software that—using a computer system interfacing with ordinary video surveillance cameras—

automatically detects, tracks, and records incidents. As it does so, it

signals the operator to observe the event in question and allows the

operator the opportunity to take the appropriate action. This concept can also be applied to detect other activities and incidents in

areas besides tunnels, including terrorist activities, crashes, vandalism

and other crimes, fires, and vehicle breakdowns.

6. Develop Tunnel Facility Design Criteria to Promote

Optimal Driver Performance and Response to Incidents

The Europeans found that innovative tunnel design that includes

improved geometry or more pleasing visual appearance will

enhance driver safety, performance, and traffic operation. For example, the full-size model of one section of the twin roadway tube for

the A–86 motorway in Paris demonstrates the effectiveness of good

lighting and painting to improve motorist safety. It is a particularly

important consideration for a tunnel roadway section designed with

limited headroom. Tunnel designers should evaluate the materials

and design details that are incorporated to reduce risks to ensure

that they do not pose other unacceptable hazards. For example,

paint used to enhance the visual experience should not produce

toxic fumes or accelerate fire. 

7. Investigate One-Button Systems to Initiate Emergency

Response and Automated Sensor Systems to Determine Response

The European scan revealed that one of the most important 

considerations in responding to an incident is to take action immediately. For this to be effective, the operator must initiate several

actions simultaneously. An example of how this immediate action is

accomplished is the “press one button” solution that initiates several

critical actions without giving the operator the chance to omit an

important step or perform an action out of order. On the Mont

Blanc Tunnel operations center control panel, operators can initiate

several actions by moving a yellow line over the area where a fire

incident is indicated on a computer screen. This “one-button” action

reduces the need for time-consuming emergency decisions about

ventilation control and operational procedures.

The Europeans observed that tunnel operations personnel have

difficulty keeping up with events like tunnel fires, and they believe
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE xv

that an automatic system using devices like opacity sensors can help

determine the correct response. A closed-loop data collection and

analysis system that takes atmospheric conditions, tunnel air speed,

and smoke density into account may best control fans and vents. 

8. Use Risk-Management Approach to Tunnel Safety

Inspection and Maintenance

The scan team learned that some organizations use a risk-based

schedule for safety inspection and maintenance. Through knowledge

of the systems and the structure gained from intelligent monitoring

and analysis of the collected data, the owner can use a risk-based

approach to schedule the time and frequency of inspections and

establish priorities. It makes more sense to inspect less critical or

more durable portions of the system on a less frequent basis, and

concentrate inspection efforts on the more critical or more fragile

components. A risk-based assessment of the condition of facilities

also can be used to make optimal decisions on the scope and timing

of facility maintenance or rehabilitation. This method offers a statistical process to manage the tunnel assets.

9. Implement Light-Emitting Diode Lighting for Safe Vehicle Distance and Edge Delineation in Tunnels

The scan team noted that in several European tunnels, light-emitting

diode (LED) lights were installed along the edge of the tunnel at regular intervals of approximately 10 to 20 meters (m) (33 to 66 feet

(ft)) to clearly identify the edge of the roadway. These lights were

either white or a highly visible yellow color. In some tunnels, spaced

among these edge-delineation lights were blue lights at 150-m (490-

ft) intervals. Motorists are instructed through formal (for truck and

bus drivers) and informal driver education to keep a safe distance

between them and the vehicle in front, and that distance is indicated

by the spacing of the blue lights. This visual cue is more reliable than

asking motorists to establish distance between vehicles using speedbased guidelines, such as maintaining one car length spacing for

every 16 kilometers per hour (10 miles per hour) of speed. The

LED markers are also less susceptible to loss of visibility because of

road grime and smoke during a tunnel fire.

IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

The scan team has developed a detailed implementation plan for the

nine recommended initiatives and practices. Included in the plan are

a number of technical presentations and written papers at national

meetings and conferences sponsored by FHWA, AASHTO, and

other organizations to disseminate information from the scan. Also

included in the plan is coordination with AASHTO, FHWA, NFPA,

and APTA to advance these initiatives and practices, including assisting with the development of AASHTO standards and guidelines for

highway tunnels and passenger and freight rail tunnels. Considerations for outreach to the public include the development of

brochures and radio and television announcements. These and

other planned activities are discussed in Chapter 3.
xvi
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 1

Introduction

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND

Increasing traffic congestion in urban areas and growing land values

in the United States make underground structures increasingly

attractive for highways and transit compared to other options. 

A tunnel can preserve the land above for parks, buildings, homes,

and other uses while providing an efficient, cost-effective underground corridor to move people and goods. The United States 

has about 500 highway, passenger rail, and freight rail tunnels,

according to the Blue Ribbon Panel on Bridge and Tunnel Security

sponsored by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 

(AASHTO), and the Transportation Research Board (TRB). 

Unfortunately, only limited national guidelines, standards, or 

specifications are available for tunnel design, construction, safety

inspection, traffic and incident management, maintenance, security,

and protection against natural or manmade disasters.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the scan were to learn what is being done 

internationally for underground transportation systems in the areas

of safety, operations, and emergency response. The focus of the

scan was on equipment, systems, and procedures incorporated into

modern underground and underwater tunnels by leading international tunnel experts. The study considered the following: 

 Tunnel systems and designs that provide fire protection, blast protection, and areas of refuge or evacuation

passages for users.

 Arrangements of the various components

to maximize their effectiveness, assure

inspectability and maintainability, and 

promote cost savings.

 Tunnel operations, including incident detection and deterrent technology, and incident

response and recovery planning.

 Specialized technologies and standards used

in monitoring or inspecting structural elements and operating equipment to ensure

optimal performance and minimize downtime during maintenance or rehabilitation. 

Regarding the safety and security aspects,

the team was interested in learning about planning approaches, standards, manpower roles

and responsibilities, communication techniques,

and state-of-the-art products and equipment

used to deter, detect, deny, defend, respond

to, and recover from both natural and 

manmade disasters and other incidents.

Team members were interested in not only tunnel practices and

innovations for highways, but also those for passenger and freight rail. 

AMPLIFYING QUESTIONS

Amplifying questions were developed to help the foreign experts

more fully understand the topics of interest to the scan team members. These questions, listed in Appendix A, were provided to the

host countries before the scan. 

HOST COUNTRIES

The scan team met with representatives from nine countries from 

September 23 to October 9, 2005. The team visited Denmark,

France, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. While in Norway, the

team also had meetings with a representative from the Netherlands.

While in France the team had meetings with representatives from 

Germany and Italy, and while in Switzerland it met with a representative from Austria. These nine countries were selected on the basis of

desk scan findings that showed they are innovators in underground

transportation systems. The contacts in each country are listed in

Appendix B, and the scan itinerary is in table 1 on the following page.

TEAM MEMBERS

The scan was sponsored by FHWA, AASHTO, and the National

Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP). The 11-member

Figure 1. Scan team in front of Mont Blanc Tunnel firefighting truck. Standing (left to right)

are two Mont Blanc hosts, team member Chris Hawkins, Mont Blanc host, and team members

Mike Swanson, Mary Lou Ralls, M.G. Patel, Steve Ernst, Jesus Rohena, Harry Capers, 

Tom Margro, and Gary Jakovich. Kneeling are team members Don Dwyer and Wayne Lupton.
introductiion

2 CHAPTER 1

team consisted of three representatives from FHWA, four 

representatives from State departments of transportation (DOTs),

one representative from the Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART),

one representative from the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority who

also represented the International Bridge, Tunnel, and Turnpike

Association (IBTTA), one tunnel engineering design consultant, 

and the report facilitator. Team member contact information and

biographical sketches are in Appendix C. 

DAY, 2005 DATE LOCATION ACTIVITIES

Monday,

September 26

Tronheim,

Norway

Meeting with Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research at the Norwegian 

Institute of Technology (SINTEF) and with representative from Center for Tunnel 

Safety at Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and Water Management

Tuesday, 

September 27

Tronheim,

Norway

Meeting with Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory (SINTEF NBL) and tour of E39

Motorway tunnels 

Wednesday,

September 28

Copenhagen,

Denmark

Meeting with Copenhagen Metro 

Thursday,

September 29

Copenhagen, Denmark

and 

Larnecken, Sweden

Meeting with Rambøll in Copenhagen, meeting with Oresundsbro Konsortiet and

tour of Oresund Fixed Link tunnel, and tour of Oresund Operations Center in 

Larnecken

Friday,

September 30

Malmo,

Sweden

Meeting with Citytunnel, tour of Citytunnel Exhibition Center, and meeting with

Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP)

Monday,

October 3

Paris,

France

Meeting with Cofiroute, tour of A86 Exhibition Center, tour of A86 East Tunnel, tour

of A86/A13 tunnel interchange, and meeting with Citilog

Tuesday,

October 4

Lyon,

France

Meeting with Tunnel Study Centre (CETU) at French Ministry of Transport, 

Equipment, Tourism, and Sea, and with representative from German Research 

Association for Underground Transportation Facilities (STUVA)

Wednesday,

October 5

Mont Blanc,

France

Meeting with Italian representatives of Mont Blanc Tunnel Corporation and tour of

Mont Blanc Tunnel

Thursday,

October 6

Berne,

Switzerland

Meeting with Swiss Federal Roads Authority and representative from University of

Graz of Austria

Friday,

October 7

Mitholz,

Switzerland

Meeting with Berne-Loetschberg-Simplon (BLS) AlpTransit and Schneller Ritz & 

Partner, and tour of Loetschberg Base Tunnel

Table 1. Scan itinerary.
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 3

Findings on Underground 

Transportation Systems

CHAPTER 2

I

n Europe, a tunnel is defined as an enclosed structure of 100

meters (m) (328 feet (ft)) or more in length. European countries have no definition of a “long” tunnel, but an approximate

cutoff for routine tunnels is about 5 kilometers (km) (3 miles

(mi)); longer tunnels are considered special tunnels. The

United States National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard

502 defines a highway tunnel as “an enclosed roadway for motor

vehicle traffic with vehicle access that is limited to portals,” and 

provides minimum fire protection requirements for tunnels that are

90 m (300 ft) and longer. 

Major tunnel incidents since 1995 have killed 713 people worldwide. From 1999 to 2001, several tunnel fires with multiple deaths

occurred in Europe: 39 people died in the fire in the Mont Blanc

Tunnel between France and Italy in March 1999, 12 people died in

the fire in the Tauern Tunnel in Austria in May 1999, and 11 people

died in the fire in the Gotthard Tunnel in Switzerland in October

2001 in which the temperature reached 1,000 degrees Celsius (°C)

(1,832 degrees Fahrenheit (°F)) within a few minutes (see figure 2).

These incidents caused significant concern about tunnel safety,

resulting in half a dozen large European projects, including UPTUN

(Cost-effective, Sustainable, and Innovative Upgrading Methods for

Fire Safety in Existing Tunnels). One project, called SafeT (for “Safety

in Tunnels”), is determining complementary aspects of the various

projects and ensuring minimum duplication among the projects.

Fire in tunnels continues to be a major area of concern worldwide. Figure 3 (see next page) shows a portion of a pamphlet that

gives general details on how to respond if a motorist encounters a

fire in a tunnel. This pamphlet has become an official European

Union (EU) document and is based on text by PIARC, the World

Road Association (see http://www.piarc.org). PIARC is a nonprofit,

nonpolitical association, previously known as the Permanent International Association of Roadways Congress. It has a number of technical committees and focuses on the exchange of knowledge on roads

and road transport policy and practices within an integrated sustainable transport context.

Other safety concerns that continue to be investigated for 

solutions include dew and ice on windshields at portals that cause

braking and rear-end crashes and lack of respect for stop lights at

tunnel portals. The EU has a common incident reporting format 

for data collection.

Countries and Organizations Visited

Norway

According to the Norwegian Tunneling Society (www.tunnel.no),

Norway has 881 road tunnels with a total length of 843 km (524

mi) and 700 railway tunnels with a total length of 316 km (196 mi).

All are in rock. The majority of Norwegian road tunnels have one

tunnel tube with two-way traffic. 

The mountains and fjords of western Norway make tunneling a

logical solution for routing motorways across this rugged terrain. The

scan team learned that even with the recent tunnel fires in Europe,

Norway continues to build tunnels because motorists welcome

them because of their better driving conditions and increased safety

compared to the alternatives of ferries, roads exposed to avalanches, roads closed during winter, longer driving distances, and driving

in bad weather. However, a recent Gallup poll by an insurance 

company found that 500,000 Norwegians hesitate to use tunnels

and 30,000 Norwegians never drive through tunnels. The reasons

cited include darkness, narrowness, perception of limited vertical

clearance, steepness, length, monotonous driving, fear of being

underwater, and poor markings. Of those driving in the tunnels, 

15 percent find it unpleasant and 60 percent do not know how to

react to a tunnel fire incident.

From this poll it is apparent that the main challenges in Norway

related to tunnels are to reduce the risk of critical events, construct

tunnels to limit fear and worry, develop preparedness plans to minimize the consequences when incidents occur, and inform motorists

Figure 2. Gotthard Tunnel fire in October 2001. (SINTEF) in advance to increase the possibility of appropriate behavior. The
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

4 CHAPTER 2

decisions and behavior of the motorists themselves are of vital

importance in a tunnel fire incident. More specific information needs

to be communicated to motorists because a better understanding

among motorists will ensure more appropriate behavior. 

The traffic crash rate in Norwegian tunnels is 0.13 incidents per

million vehicle-kilometers, compared to 0.30 incidents per million

vehicle-kilometers outside tunnels. The entrance-exit zones 

(portal areas) are the least safe areas of the tunnel. Norway has

well-developed tunnel design specifications, and tunnels over 500 m

(1,640 ft) long require a specific response plan for tunnel incidents.

For more information, see the Project Delivery section for 

discussion on the new E39 highway in Norway.

SINTEF

The Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research

at the Norwegian Institute of Technology (SINTEF),

founded in 1940, is a nonprofit multidisciplinary

research foundation with offices in Trondheim (headquarters) and Oslo. SINTEF has 1,810 employees

and is the fourth-largest independent research 

institute in Europe. It has considerable experience

and expertise in traffic management, traffic safety

analysis, survey techniques, and human factors, and

has a strong affiliation with the University of Oslo and

the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

Public and private research contracts generate more

than 90 percent of SINTEF’s revenues. It has several

departments working in the transportation area, 

including Transport Safety and Informatics, the scan

team’s host in Trondheim. SINTEF is an active 

member of the research teams for UPTUN in the

human response area and L-surF (feasibility study for

a Large-Scale Underground Research Facility on

Safety and Security).

Activities include collecting various data for use in

evaluating legislation, actual field performance data,

and effects of design on motorist behavior. Safety in

transport is related to the road user, who may be

exposed as a pedestrian, bicyclist, or driver, all subjects of SINTEF’s research to find a link between the

road user and safety. Most SINTEF reports are 

public, and some are on the Internet. These reports

are typically in Norwegian, although some have a

short summary in English.

SINTEF has done extensive work in tunnel traffic

management. Its research includes the adjacent network, since an incident in a tunnel has an impact outside the tunnel. Traffic management systems are used

to monitor and control traffic in a tunnel and to manage the response to incidents. Researchers clarify and

specify the different traffic constraints that should be

used for planning and operating the system. They

also enable different management schemes for 

different conditions, and enable a categorization of

scenarios as the basis for automatic incident detection. The number of scenarios considered for use in traffic management systems needs to be a minimum to ensure manageability of

gathering necessary data and developing responses. SINTEF

researchers believe that automatic control of tunnel equipment

should be used only for no-disturbance or periodic-disturbance 

scenarios; all other cases need human intervention using detailed

response plans. Parallel and backup systems are required that will

operate in various conditions, including smoke, high heat, and 

moisture. Response plans need to be made uncomplicated for the

user in an emergency since drivers will act differently than expected.

Because people panic in a fire, input from experts in human 

behavior is also needed.

Figure 3. EU pamphlet for motorists in tunnels.
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 5

SINTEF recommends that a variety of specialties be used in the

process of designing a tunnel. Multidisciplinary teams are essential for

good, safe designs. Fire brigades and the directorate of public roads

both have input and different philosophies. Fire brigades want failsafe systems resulting in zero risk, while the directorate, because of

economic restraints, believes that the design must be based on an

acceptable level of risk. The contingency plan for each tunnel is

linked with the traffic management system.

SINTEF makes use of driving simulators to help determine driver

reaction in various situations, including driving through tunnels. In 

addition, traffic simulation tools are useful in modeling traffic responses

to various situations. Models of scenarios can be developed to show

traffic reactions to different designs and to verify traffic scenarios. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section for

discussion on the use of LED lights in the Grilstad Tunnel and the

Incident Management section.

SINTEF NBL—Fire Laboratory

The Norwegian Fire Research Laboratory (SINTEF NBL) is an 

international leader in full-scale fire tests. In operation since 1934, 

it is the only fire research laboratory in Norway that does small to

large and full-scale fire tests (see http://nbl.sintef.no/). Its focus is on

fire safety testing. It has a large fire testing hall measuring 36 m 

(118 ft) long by 18 m (59 ft) wide by 28 m (92 ft) high for testing

large objects. This testing hall can withstand the heat and smoke

load of a 12-m2 (129-ft2

) gasoline fire and 18-m (59-ft) high flames.

The walls are specially designed for a continuous temperature 

load of 700 °C (1,292 °F).

The fire laboratory conducts tests on the fire resistance properties of various commercial products. These include materials such as

surface coating and linings and building components such as wood

and plastic pallets. Researchers perform fire suppression testing and

have applied it on all types of objects, including buildings, boats, and

planes. They have experimented with fires up to 40 megawatts

(MW) in size with a temperature of up to 1,400 °C (2,552 °F). 

Most testing is done according to standards developed under the

European Building Directive, which focuses on providing uniform

performance standards, specifications, and test procedures for 

application across Europe. 

Some Norwegian tunnels have been built with a polyurethane

layer on the face of the concrete tunnel lining to minimize the 

accumulation of frost. Testing at SINTEF has shown that the insulation can be a fire hazard, so the insulation is being covered with

shotcrete in some tunnels to mitigate this hazard.

For more information, see the Planning and Design section 

for discussion of SINTEF NBL work on fire suppression and 

experiments using an air curtain to control smoke.

The Netherlands

Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works, 

and Water Management

While in Norway, the scan team met with Evert Worm, head of 

the Center for Tunnel Safety. The center is part of the Tunneling

Department in the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works, and

Water Management. Worm is also the chair of PIARC C3.3 Working

Group 3 on Human Factors for Tunnel Safety. 

The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research

(TNO) is an independent research and development organization

with 5,000 staff members and 14 institutes in various specialties that

do contract research for industry and government, including the

Dutch Ministry. TNO is a member of UPTUN and L-surF, and was

a project leader for the September 2003 fire tests in the Runehamar

Tunnel in Norway in collaboration with UPTUN partners SP and

SINTEF NBL. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section for

discussion of the Dutch Integrated Safety Philosophy expected to

become law in 2006 and the integrated safety plan for the 

Westerschelde Tunnel. See also the discussion on Dutch escape

route signs, LED lights, design fire size, and fire suppression systems.

Denmark

In 1990, Denmark embarked on an ambitious plan to improve

Copenhagen’s economy and make the region a center for European

transportation. To accomplish this, it is taking the following steps:

 It constructed a fixed link between Copenhagen and Malmo,

Sweden, to enhance the mobility and economic strength of the

Oresund region.

 It is developing a new town area (Oresund) on undeveloped land

on the south side of Copenhagen. The railway and motorway

between the two countries will pass through this area.

 It is constructing a Metro in Copenhagen to serve the new town

area.

These projects were financed by bonds, and it is expected that

an increase in adjacent property values will pay for the infrastructure

improvements. The payoff period was assumed to be 40 years.

Construction loans for the Metro are repaid by income from the

Oresund fixed link and the Metro, land sales, land taxes, and a small

amount from partners.

Copenhagen Driverless Metro

The Copenhagen Metro concept originated in 1990. The transit

project, a government-owned operation, aims to lower the traffic

volume in urban areas, allowing more pedestrian uses. Aesthetics

was a significant consideration for the project to help promote 

higher land values and tax base. The vision of the system was that it

would be fast, reliable, safe, and clean.

A fully automatic system (driverless) vehicle was selected. 

Metro personnel assist users, collect fees, and provide a sense of

safety. Separate tunnels are constructed for bidirectional traffic and

escape doors are provided every 600 m (1,970 ft).

The project has two contracts for each of the three phases: one

contract for the civil work and one for the stations. The stations

were built first, and the tunnels were then constructed to connect

the stations. The contract was design-build with operation for 5

years, plus maintenance for the civil work. The project started in

October 2002 and is scheduled to be completed October 2007.

Tunnels were standard bored 4.9-m (16-ft) diameter bore tunnels with 70-centimeter (28-inch) walkways with handrails. Station
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

6 CHAPTER 2

placement was determined largely by surrounding development.

Station construction was done top down to minimize community

impact. The construction sequence was top slab, walls, excavation,

and cast bottom slab. All but two stations are about 20 m (65 ft)

below street level. Almost the entire length of the tunnels was

bored through the limestone layer that underlies the city, minimizing

the impact of this work on the community. Hands-on inspections

are typical, with service vehicles and inspection platforms provided.

In addition, standard details are available for typical repairs such as

spalls and cracks. Standard inspection manuals are provided that also

specify required inspector qualifications.

Consideration will be made in future work to provide more

inspection access, as some details now require demolition to access.

More attention will also be paid to water intrusion. Future contracts

will also better define quality assurance responsibilities for inspectors.

Watertightness of stations will be an item of larger focus.

Two train lines are now operational. The time interval between

trains is 200 seconds, with a train in the station every 100 seconds

during rush hour. Operations standards are governed by incentivedisincentive, with 98 percent reliability as the standard for satisfactory

performance.

The Copenhagen Metro is open and proactive with the media.

Its communications department is the biggest group in the company. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section and

the Incident Management section.

Rambøll

Rambøll Denmark is part of the Rambøll Group, a consulting group

with more than 4,000 employees at more than 70 offices covering

the Nordic region and 50 additional locations outside the region.

Rambøll Denmark provides technical consulting services in various

fields, including infrastructure, transport, and traffic. Its services

include operation and maintenance systems and risk management

for tunnels. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section and

the Maintenance and Safety Inspection section. 

Oresundsbro Konsortiet

Oresundsbro Konsortiet is a company jointly owned by the Danish

and Swedish governments. It owns and operates the Oresund 

Fixed Link, the 16-km (10-mi) coast-to-coast highway and 

passenger and freight rail link connecting Copenhagen, Denmark,

and Malmo, Sweden. The link, which includes an 8-km (5-mi) 

long bridge and 4-km (2.5-mi) long tunnel, opened in 2000 and is

jointly owned by the Danish and Swedish governments (see figure

4). Rail traffic is operated by the rail authority and is monitored 

by the train stations in Malmo and Copenhagen. Oresundsbro 

Konsortiet operates and maintains the nonrail portion. The link is

critical to the Oresundsbro Konsortiet vision to see the Oresund

Region emerge as a new European powerhouse in cultural as 

well as economic terms.

Oresund Fixed Link Tunnel—The tunnel portion of the

Oresund link is located on the Copenhagen end. Because of concerns that a bridge close to Copenhagen’s Kastrup Airport might

present an obstacle to air traffic, the decision was made to construct

a tunnel at the east end of the link. The immersed tunnel consists of

two rail tubes, two two-lane road tubes, and a service/escape 

corridor. A 4-km (2.5-mi) long artificial island was built from dredging

the channel and has an entrance to the tunnel. The tunnels typically

carry 12,000 to 21,000 vehicles per day. A speed of 110 kilometers

per hour (km/h) (68 miles per hour (mi/h)) in the open is normal,

including in urban areas. The speed limit is restricted to 90 km/h 

(56 mi/h) in the tunnels. By law, no bicycles or pedestrians are

allowed in the tunnels. 

Oresundsbro Konsortiet does not have its own fire brigade or

police; it depends on the local authorities for these services. Police

patrol the entire link. Joint Swedish-Danish teams patrol two days a

week, while on other days teams from one country or the other

patrol. 

The police have control authority over dangerous goods on the

railway. Explosives are allowed through the tunnel if under 1 ton.

The Economic Council of Europe is developing new categories for

hazardous loads through tunnels that are scheduled to become

effective July 1, 2007. If site personnel see dangerous goods markings, they will attempt to make the vehicle turn around, and will

report it to the police if they fail.

Many safety considerations were included in the formal risk

analysis for the tunnel design. Eight years before commissioning the

link, an advisory group was formed to provide advice on safety

issues and how to build and operate the link. The advisory group

included the fire brigade. Oresundsbro Konsortiet has its own safety

pamphlet.

In response to the Madrid and London incidents, Oresundsbro

Konsortiet plans to examine its entire procedures for security 

(e.g., the card access system, locations where terrorists could place 

explosives, and how to apply elevated alert levels). Danish authorities are assisting with this effort.

For more information, see the Incident Management section and

the Maintenance and Safety Inspection section.

Figure 4. Oresund fixed link between Copenhagen, Denmark,

and Malmo, Sweden. Shown is the island portal and

bridge approach looking toward Sweden.
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 7

Sweden

Citytunnel Railway

The Citytunnel (Citytunnelln) Railway is a Swedish National Rail

Administration project that includes 17 km (10.5 mi) of electrified

two-track railway and provides the Swedish link to the Oresund

Fixed Link. The Citytunnel will connect the Malmo area of Sweden

with the train that crosses the Oresund Link from Copenhagen.

(The entire Oresund region has about 3.5 million people. Twothirds are on the Danish side and one-third in Sweden.) This passenger rail project includes both commuter rail and intercity rail

service and is anticipated to impact the entire Oresund region. The

trains are electric only, no diesel. The tunnel geometry is designed

for 200 km/h (120 mi/h). The slowest section has a design speed of

80 km/h (50 mi/h), increasing to 160 km/h (100 mi/h). 

The total project cost is SEK9.45 billion (US$1.19 billion) in

2001 value. Originally the city of Malmo, the third-largest city in

Sweden with a population of 270,000, funded SEK1 billion (US$125

million). The Skane region and the Swedish Railway Authority were

the other two original funding sources, while EU made a small contribution. These funding sources were later rolled into the Swedish

National Rail Administration. Construction of Citytunnel will take 6

years. Construction started in March 2005 and is scheduled to end

in 2011. In addition to the railway, three new stations will be constructed: a below-ground extension of the existing Malmo Central

Station, the below-ground Triangeln Station, and the above-ground

Hyllie Station. When completed, Malmo Central Station tubes will

carry 34,000 travelers per day, Triangeln Station will serve about

37,000 riders per day, and Hyllie Station will serve about 16,000

riders per day.

Citytunnel encountered community resistance to the project

because of concerns about potential damage to existing infrastructure caused by the new facilities. Because of these concerns, Citytunnel added an extensive exhibition center for community outreach

to educate the public on the reason for and the scope of the project. The project will increase competitiveness of the area, renew

vitality, ease traffic congestion, reduce pollution by reducing cars on

the road, and provide a safe, efficient, environmentally friendly, and

sustainable transportation system. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section and

the Incident Management section.

Swedish National Testing and Research Institute

The Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP) is a wholly

government-owned institute that does commercial testing and has a

10 percent taxpayer subsidy. It has 830 employees in Sweden who

work in a variety of technical disciplines. The Fire Laboratory has a

staff of 50 and conducts research and testing both nationally and

internationally (in approximately equal portions). Its tunnel fire

research began in 1993 as part of the Eureka tests started in Norway involving a number of organizations. SP projects include

UPTUN, FIT (Fire in Tunnels), and L-surF. The scan team’s host was

a research scientist with SP Fire Technology.

The industry focus for tunnel fire safety is on both technical

aspects and emergency response. SP officials believe that more

emphasis is needed on driver behavior and vehicle performance to

focus on prevention instead of reaction. 

SP officials emphasized these findings from their tunnel fire research:

 Vehicles burn, not tunnels.

 People do not behave as engineers would like them to behave.

 Fires can “jump” from one vehicle to another and involve more

vehicles (and therefore more fuel) than expected.

 Although the severity of fires is normally discussed in terms of fire

size (heat release rate measured in megawatts), the rate of fire

growth is equally or even more important and must be evaluated.

 The height of the tunnel ceiling affects the rate of fire growth.

Low ceilings increase heat.

 Semi-trailer cabins must be built of noncombustible material 

(as is more common in the United States).

 Ventilation promotes the spread of fire, and longitudinal ventilation can promote the spread of fire longitudinally in the tunnel.

 Fire departments need clear response plans supplemented by

training and drills.

 Intentional acts of destruction are considered a new threat.

Frequently asked questions are the following:

 What design fire should be used—5, 15, 30, 100, or 200 MW?

 Are standard temperature curves a better way to define tunnel

fires?

 When should ventilation be started, how much should be used,

and in what direction should it be applied?

 What is the required distance between escape routes?

 How large a fire can the fire department handle?

 Where should spray or water mist systems be introduced? What

type of system should be used?

SP recommends the following action:

 Improve the fire resistance of heavy trucks.

 Take into account the unpredictable behavior of people in a fire

situation.

 Design escape routes that people can easily understand and educate them on their use.

 Use transverse exhaust vent systems instead of longitudinal ventilation for improved smoke control.

 Consider installing simple and robust suppression systems in hightraffic tunnels.

 Make sure tunnel design features provide the fire brigade with a

reasonable chance of success in a fire situation.

A report comparing fire evaluation methods will be available

soon at the FIT Web site at www.etnfit.net.

Runehamar Tunnel Fire Test—In September 2003, four

large-scale fire tests using wood and plastic pallets were conducted

in the abandoned Runehamar Tunnel owned by the Norwegian

Public Roads Administration on part of a road system destroyed in a

landslide. SP led the testing in collaboration with UPTUN partners

TNO and SINTEF NBL. Different semi-trailer fire loads were used,

and the highest peak heat release rate ever measured in a tunnel fire

test was registered at higher than 200 MW. Gas temperatures in the

vicinity of the fire registered above 1,350 °C (2,460 °F). The objec-
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

8 CHAPTER 2

tive was to observe the rate of fire growth and evaluate how the

use of fire suppression or ventilation fans would affect the ability of

users inside the tunnel to escape. 

Observations included the following:

 The level of smoke rises very rapidly. In 5 minutes the area is

completely engulfed in smoke. People have very little time, only 

1 or 2 minutes, to get away.

 Smoke will flow in the direction of natural ventilation.

 The probability of misunderstanding the direction of airflow in the

tunnel is high.

 If fire suppression is used to keep the fire below 30 MW, it is 

likely that people will be able to escape.

The following conclusions are drawn from these observations:

 If the expectation is that the users will evacuate immediately, the

fans should be turned on to full power.

 If the expectation is that users will stay in their vehicles, it is best

to use fire suppression. Human behavior studies have shown

that, contrary to responses on surveys, people tend to stay in

their vehicles much longer than they should.

For more information, see the Planning and Design section for

discussion on SP work on design fire size, fire suppression systems,

and ventilation systems.

France

A86 West Beltway Tunnels

The A86 West project is the missing link that will complete the second beltway around the city of Paris (see figure 5). The existing beltway is called the “Peripherique.” The goals of the A86 West project

are to complete the second beltway, improve the commute

between suburbs, and reduce congestion. The project is expected

to reduce surface traffic by 15 percent. No public funds are being

used for the project.

The project was originally proposed in 1988. Major construction

began in 1997, but the project was challenged and construction was

stopped in 1998. The project encountered opposition from public

officials who were concerned about the safety of the tunnel after the

Mont Blanc Tunnel fire. It was decided that the project would use

new French tunnel safety regulations developed after the Mont Blanc

fire (e.g., the tunnels will include twice the number of refuge

rooms). Construction began again in 2000 after officials were 

satisfied that the tunnels would be safe. The project includes an 

East Tunnel available to cars only and a West Tunnel (see figure 6)

available to both cars and trucks. The scan team meetings focused

on the East Tunnel only.

Cofiroute—Cofiroute is the operator and SOCATOP is the

design-build contractor for the A86 West project, a €1.7 billion

(US$2 billion) project. Cofiroute, created in 1970, was the first private

highway operator in France and now operates 885 km (550 mi) of

French highways. It has a contract with the French Highway agency to

operate the A86 West project for 70 years. Tolls will vary during the

day according to congestion, with high tolls during rush hour.

East Tunnel—The first phase of the East Tunnel is scheduled to

open in 2007 and the second phase in 2009. The tunnel has two

levels, one for each direction of travel, and is for passenger cars

only. Each level will have two traffic lanes and a breakdown lane.

The ceiling height in each level is 2.54 m (8.33 ft) and the clearance

is 2 m (6.5 ft). The tunnel is being built using an 11.5-m (37.7-ft)

diameter tunnel boring machine (TBM). To protect the environment, a very compact underground interchange with up to three

levels of ramps was designed. The project will include tree planting

at the ground surface in this area.

The tunnel will have pressurized refuge rooms for up to 50

people every 200 m (656 ft). See figure 7 (on page 10). Each level

of the tunnel will have independent ventilation. The ventilation 

system is longitudinal during normal operation with extraction 

capability for smoke management during a fire in the tunnel. 

Well-marked exits and refuge rooms with bright colors and lights are

used to attract the driver’s attention in the tunnel. The tunnel will

have one emergency access every 800 m (2,620 ft) for firefighters.

A water mist sprinkler system is being considered for the tunnel. 

The tunnel will be monitored 24-7 by a staff of 15. More than

400 cameras will be located inside the tunnel and at the access

ramps. Cameras will be fitted with automatic incident detection and

permanent digital recording. The tunnel will be illuminated with 10.5

candelas per square meter to improve safety. Current French regulations require 6 candelas per square meter. The operator will control the traffic inside the tunnel by detecting incidents, informing 

drivers what to do during incidents, and activating the emergency

response plan. Emergency vehicles with a 2-m (6.5-ft) height have

been ordered for fighting fires and assisting motorists inside the tunnels. Three ambulances with a 2-m (6.5-m) height will be parked at

the three operation centers. See figure 8 (on page 10).

An exhibition center was created to explain the tunnel project

to local citizens and public officials, who were initially opposed to

the project. The full-size model of one section of the twin roadway

Figure 5. A86 West Beltway project. (Cofiroute) tube allows users to experience the tunnel and demonstrates the 

Second beltway: “A86”

First beltway: “Peripherique”
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 9

effectiveness of good lighting and painting (see figure 9 on

page 11).

Citilog—Citilog is a private company based in Paris that

was formed by researchers in 1997 to provide technology solutions for use in tunnels and other transportation operating environments. Its services are being used on the A86 West project. 

The A86 West project will use cameras with an automatic

detection system that allows the tunnel operator to be proactive. The technology precisely interprets video images, discerns anomalies, and alerts transportation professionals to

events occurring in the tunnel. It provides both the most current image of the area of an incident and images of activities

that occurred just before the event. The system captures the

information the operator needs to make the correct response

decision. The images can be used for timely response to

emergencies and can provide enhanced security at critical

locations. This system can be used to detect a person walking

in the tunnel after the train has entered or departed the tunnel. It also can be used to detect a package or object that has

fallen from a moving vehicle and smoke inside the tunnel.

When the camera detects an object or smoke, the system

sounds an alarm to attract the operator’s attention.

Concern has been expressed about the impact of cameras

on the privacy of drivers. If used to read licenses plates in a

crash, the cameras will zoom in to recognize the plates but not

the drivers’ faces.

The company can perform some system maintenance

from a remote location. The system cost is about €4,230

(US$5,000) per camera for software installation.

CETU

In Lyon the scan team met with representatives from the 

Tunnel Study Centre (CETU) of the French Ministry of 

Transport, Equipment, Tourism, and Sea. CETU, which is 

part of the Road General Directorate, has seven departments

with 90 staff members. The expertise of the multidisciplinary

staff ranges from research engineering to equipment and

operations. CETU’s basic mission is to develop methodology

and regulations for road tunnels based on the complementary

functions of research, engineering, and coordination 

with various professional associations. CETU’s efforts include 

issuing technical reports and recommendations, drafting 

regulations and standards, applying regulations, checking 

projects for conformance with regulations, and serving 

as the Secretariat of the National Commission for Safety 

in Road Tunnels.

CETU officials offered that they did not have good information on human factors behavior to incorporate in tunnel design

or operations emergency response procedures. They said they

were undertaking studies in human behavior to integrate into

the planning and design process for tunnel safety as well as to

develop driver education tools. This includes using sound, visual

means, and real-time information transmission via changeable

message signs. In the area of driver education, CETU has been

Figure 6. Tunnels on the A86 West Beltway project. 

Top: West and East tunnels. 

Bottom: cross section of tunnels. (Cofiroute)

CROSS SECTIONS

West 

Tunnel 

East 

Tunnel 
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

10 CHAPTER 2

in the Alps at 4,807 m (15,771 ft). Opened in

1965, the Mont Blanc Tunnel brings together two

Alpine regions, the Arve Valley in France and the

Aosta Valley in Italy. The tunnel is 11.6 km (7.2 mi)

long and 8.6 m (28 ft) wide and has over 2 km

(6,500 ft) of mountain above it. It averages more

than 4,000 vehicle crossings per day. 

In March 1999, a fire in the Mont Blanc Tunnel

left 39 dead. Immediately after this disaster, a

French-Italian steering committee was formed to

develop new rules and designs. From 2000 to

2002, the tunnel was redesigned and rebuilt and

tunnel management was restructured. Before the

fire, the Italian and French companies each managed its own half of the tunnel. Now one company, the European Economic Interest Group 

(EEIG-TMB), manages the entire tunnel, combining both French and Italian interests with one 

control room and one incident commander. 

EEIG-TMB has 180 employees, half French

and half Italian. It has three members on its board

of directors: one from France, one from Italy, and

a general manager who changes every 30 months.

The general manager was initially from France and

is now from Italy.

EEIG-TMB has four departments with 40 to

50 employees in each: administration, toll and 

customer relations, safety (in charge of safety and traffic management

inside and outside the tunnel), and maintenance (in charge of routine

maintenance and new projects and investments). EEIG-TMB 

emergency response procedures were used to develop the French

regulations.

The EEIG-TMB safety department is in charge of the control

room, safety team, and traffic management with real-time 

information system. Shifts work 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 

and each shift has 14 employees, including 10 firefighters. The 

tunnel has three fire stations: one at each portal and one in the 

middle. Maintenance systems are tested every day, and a fire 

test is conducted weekly.

Full-scale safety exercises are conducted every 3 months in conjunction with CETU. For this exercise, the tunnel closes Monday at

7:30 p.m. and opens Tuesday at 6 a.m. The public is notified of the

Figure 8. Special emergency vehicles for the A86 East Tunnel: (left) firefighting vehicle and (right) ambulance. (Cofiroute)

Figure 7. A86 West Beltway East Tunnel emergency facilities. Top: cross section of

emergency facilities. Bottom: example of emergency alcove. (Cofiroute)

 <<Two tunnels in one >>

One-way traffic

 Independent Ventilation 

for each level

 Emergency alcoves and 

shelters every 656 feet

asked to evaluate a film prepared for drivers of heavy vehicles.

CETU officials provided an explanation of their approach to 

tunnel data acquisition, monitoring, control, and communication.

The tunnel operator receives information through two linked but

separate fiber-optic communication trunk networks. Each trunk network is a dual redundant loop system. One network provides security-related information such as telephone, radio, and video surveillance. The other network is used primarily for maintenance purposes and provides information on electrical, mechanical, and information system status. 

For more information, see the sections on Planning and Design,

Incident Management, and Maintenance and Safety.

Mont Blanc Tunnel

Located on the French-Italian border, Mont Blanc is the highest peak
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 11

closing dates in the newspaper and on the Internet. The exercise

consists of two parts, one for training and one for routine maintenance. The training, which is videotaped, is done to improve

organization and cooperation among the rescue services, including

firefighters, paramedics, and police from both countries. This training improves cooperation since the two countries have different

procedures and may uncover problems with the systems and the

response organization. A typical exercise includes 100 emergency

response personnel, 40 vehicles, and 30 people with simulated

injuries. Participants do not know the specifics of the simulated incident beforehand. A yearly fire exercise is conducted in collaboration with CETU. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section

for discussion on escape routes, LED lights, and ventilation systems. See also the Incident Management section.

Germany

STUVA

Joining the meetings with CETU in Lyon was Dr. Alfred Haack of

the German Research Association for Underground Transportation Facilities (STUVA), the research arm of the German government. STUVA is a nonprofit, private organization with 225 corporate members, including contractors, suppliers, consultants, academia, and railway and metro operators. STUVA has two departments, one for operations and one for structural issues. Operations department activities include managing ventilation, accommodating disabled passengers, and managing transit operations.

Structural department activities include those related to design, construction, and quality assurance. STUVA has also become involved

with many international working groups and professional associations, including the International Tunneling Association, German Tunneling Association, and UPTUN. It is involved in several projects,

including SafeTunnel, L-surF, and the European Safety Tunnel.

Haack offered that the question of how humans react in emergency situations is a significant issue and that we do not have definitive information to use in tunnel design and operations for emergency incidents. All agreed that human factors behavior is important

for tunnel design and operation and that much more information is

needed in this area.

Haack suggested that further work should be done to improve

the fire resistance of heavy vehicles (trucks). He noted the lack of

progress in this area for trucks compared to the European Norms

(Standards) and German standards for the construction of rail rolling

stock. Material composition and fire rating are included in these rail

standards. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section and

the Incident Management section.

Switzerland

In Berne, the scan team was hosted by representatives of the Swiss

Federal Roads Authority (FEDRO), the Swiss equivalent of FHWA.

FEDRO is responsible for administration of the highway program in

the country. FEDRO developed the Switzerland tunnel ventilation

directive published in 2004.

In Mitholz, the scan team was hosted by representatives of BLS

AlpTransit AG, the main contractor for the Loetschberg Base Tunnel

construction, and by representatives of Schneller Ritz & Partner, the

design firm for the project. Schneller Ritz & Partner was instrumental

in developing the 2004 Swiss Standards Association (SIA) design

codes for road and railway tunnels.

For more information, see the Planning and Design section for

discussion on the Swiss design codes.

Gotthard Road Tunnel 

The Gotthard Road Tunnel is part of the A2 Motorway in the Swiss

Alps, which serves heavy goods traffic between Germany and Italy. It

eliminates 30 km (18 mi) of a twisting mountain pass that is closed up to

6 months of the year because of weather conditions. The tunnel, 16.9

km (10.5 mi) long, is one of the longest road tunnels in the world. 

Construction began in 1969 and the tunnel was opened in 1980. It

quickly attracted 6.8 million vehicles per year. For more information, 

visit www.gotthard-strassentunnel.ch. Information is also in English. 

Several fires in the Gotthard Tunnel have resulted in people staying in cars and dying in as little as 10 minutes, tunnel roof collapse,

flashover from vehicle to vehicle, and confusion in getting to refuge

rooms. These incidents show the importance of self-rescue.

For more information, see the Planning and Design section and

the Incident Management section.

Loetschberg Tunnel

In 1998 the Swiss voted to modernize their rail system and shift

Figure 9. Model of A86 twin roadway tube. Top: full-size model

of one section. Bottom: scale model of twin tube.
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

12 CHAPTER 2

transalpine transit traffic from road to railway. Funding was allocated to

build the Loetschberg base tunnel, a rail tunnel intended for all types

of trains, including high-speed passenger trains with speeds up to 250

km/h (155 mi/h) and transport of all types of goods and materials. The

tunnel will extend from Frutigen in the Kander Valley to Raron in the

Rhone Valley in the southwestern part of Switzerland. The tunnel

length will be 34.6 km (21.5 mi), with a total length of all rail, service,

and connecting tunnels of 88 km (54.7 mi). The tunnel will have a

capacity for 110 passenger and freight trains per day. 

When complete, the tunnel will have dual tubes for its entire

length to maintain efficient two-way traffic flow. However, when it

first opens in 2007 after the completion of Phase 1, the tunnel will

have only one tube for a portion of its length. Traffic will have to be

reversed in this portion as necessary to enable the single tube to

accommodate bidirectional traffic.

Passenger trains using the tunnel are specially made and have

pressure control in the cars to maintain passenger comfort. The

trains will run on electricity power by two separate systems. One

will operate at 16.7 Hertz (Hz) and feed power to the train itself.

The other system will operate at 50 Hz to feed power to all tunnel

systems except the train. Each power system will have two supply

sources so that power can be supplied from either the north end of

the tunnel or the south end. This redundancy will enable shutdown

for maintenance or switching in case of malfunction of one supply.

The control center for the tunnel is located 10 km (6.2 mi) away

from the north end of Thun.

The tunnel drainage system incorporates sedimentation or cooling ponds to ensure that water draining from the tunnel system does

not have adverse environmental effects on the Rhone River.

Requirements for construction safety and security are given high

importance. The Swiss National Insurance Company insures workers against injury. General requirements provide guidance to the

contractor for developing a comprehensive safety program to safeguard workers. The employer has the primary responsibility to take

all necessary measures and establish worksite rules to protect

employees, and employees are obliged to follow the employer’s

rules. Construction safety features include the following:

 Electronic information tags on hardhats to ensure that all 

employees who have entered the tunnel are accounted for.

 A control room to provide complete oversight of the tunnel 

construction alarm systems.

 Underground medical posts.

 Emergency breathing apparatus that employees can keep near

their work locations.

 Safety containers in the work area that can hold up to 12 people

and provide air for up to 4 hours. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section and

the Incident Management section.

Austria

Austria has almost 100 road tunnels longer than 1,000 m (3,280 ft)

and half a dozen of the world’s longest railway tunnels ranging to

over 12.5 km (7.7 mi). When the average number of daily vehicles

per lane crossing an Austrian tunnel is greater than 10,000, a separate tube is constructed, as defined in the European Directive on

Minimum Requirements for Safety in Road Tunnels (2004/54/EG).

Joining the scan team meetings in Berne, Switzerland, to discuss

ventilation issues was a professor-researcher from the University of

Graz in Austria. The scan team learned of a recent incident in an 

Austrian road tunnel in which a fire on a tanker truck in the tunnel

demonstrated the unpredictability of human behavior as well as the

rapid growth of a vehicle fire. In this instance, even trained police 

officers did not show familiarity with the tunnel fire safety equipment.

Shortly after the incident was identified, the operations center stopped

traffic entering the tunnel and opened cross tunnels to evacuate those

already inside. The driver tried ineffectively to extinguish the fire using

extinguishers from his vehicle and from the pullout area. Police

responded but did not attempt to extinguish the fire. Tunnel maintenance staff eventually extinguished the fire with the available tunnel fire

hoses. The fire brigade response time was 26 minutes. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section 

for discussion on design fire size, fire suppression systems, and 

ventilation systems.

Plabutsch Tunnel

The Plabutsch Tunnel is Austria’s second-longest road tunnel. It is

located in the southeastern region of Austria, in the province of 

Styria next to the region’s capital, Graz. The tunnel is one of several

major tunnels along the A9-Pyhrnautobahn motorway, which links

central and southeastern Europe. The 10-km (6.2-mi) long tunnel

opened in 1987 as a single-bore tunnel with bidirectional traffic. In

2004 a second bore was opened and the first bore was refurbished.

Safety features used in the tunnel include fireproofing for all energy

supply cables inside the traffic room and traffic monitoring by closedcircuit television (CCTV) with tunnel information displayed in fully

graphical mode. 

For more information, see the Planning and Design section.

KEY OBSERVATIONS

Major European Tunnel Research Programs

The scan team met with representatives working on two major

European tunnel research projects, UPTUN and L-surF. These 

projects are described below.

UPTUN (http://www.uptun.net/)

UPTUN (2001–2006) is the acronym for Cost-effective, Sustainable

and Innovative Upgrading Methods for Fire Safety in Existing Tunnels, a

large European project funded by the European Commission to find

cost-effective means to upgrade tunnel safety. The project involves 42

EU partners and has a budget of US$19.3 million. UPTUN partners

include scan team hosts SINTEF, SP, CETU, and STUVA.

The two main outputs of UPTUN are 1) development of innovative, cost-effective technologies and assessment of existing technologies for tunnel applications, with a focus on technologies in the

areas of detection and monitoring, mitigation measures, influencing

human response, and protection against structural damage; and 2)

development, demonstration, and promotion of a risk-based 
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 13

evaluating and upgrading model for safety level evaluation, decision

support models, and knowledge transfer. The spinoff desired from

this work is the restoration of faith in tunnels as safe parts of the

transportation system, the leveling of trade barriers imposed by supposedly unsafe tunnels, and an increased awareness by stakeholders

of the necessity to develop initiatives to link all relevant research.

UPTUN has seven work packages (WP):

 WP 1—Prevention, detection, and monitoring

 WP 2—Fire development and mitigation measures

 WP 3—Human response

 WP 4—Fire effects and tunnel performance: system structural

response

 WP 5—Evaluation of safety levels and upgrading of existing 

tunnels

 WP 6—Fire effects and tunnel performance: system response

 WP 7—Promotion, dissemination, education/training, and 

socioeconomic impact

WP 1 (prevention, detection, and monitoring) has five products.

The database of European tunnels produced in WP 1 is ready. Since

it is difficult to describe incidents uniformly, one must be careful using

the data. It has technical systems and recent incidents. Reports are

scheduled to be published in September 2006. The second and

third products—incident analysis and recommendations for 

prevention solutions, and detection and monitoring systems—

are completed. The last two products—new technology and

improvements in existing techniques and tests on new technologies

and reports—are scheduled to be ready in a few months.

WP 2 (fire development and mitigation measures) also has five

products. The design fire scenarios and the acceptance criteria for

engineering are ready and are scheduled to be available next year.

The efficiency of current fire mitigation equipment, the models

describing major influences of mitigating measures on design scenarios, and the guide for engineering cost-effective mitigation systems

are scheduled to be ready in 2006. 

WP 3 (human response) has four products. Current knowledge

and measures, the role of human response in tunnel incidents, and

methodologies and systems for handling critical situations are ready.

Crisis management of rescue teams is the only work not yet completed. Some EU projects have U.S. participation, but this one does

not. The United States, Japan, China, South America, and Australia

have exchange through PIARC.

WP 4 (fire effects and tunnel performance: system structural

response) has six products. The critical evaluation of burnt tunnel

structural data, damage investigation methods, and structural fire test

data are ready. The evaluation of spalling risk, repair and recovery

procedures, and safety level definition are ongoing work.

WP 5 (evaluation of safety levels and upgrading of existing 

tunnels) will combine the outputs of other work packages to get a

procedure for formulating a new level and describe how to achieve

it. Other countries are also bringing in their views; it will be a mix.

The five products are a comprehensive inventory of tunnel safety

features, criteria to evaluate tunnel safety levels, a procedure for 

the holistic evaluation and upgrading of safety levels, upgrading 

recommendations, and the financial and socioeconomic impact of

upgrading the tunnels. This work is ongoing.

WP 6 (fire effects and tunnel performance: system response) 

has four products: full-scale tests, test data on tunnel performance, 

a validation report on the theoretical model of WP5, and 

recommendations on upgrading of existing tunnels. The full-scale

tests took place in February 2005 in Italy. 

WP7 (promotion, dissemination, education/training, and socioeconomic impact) has six products: a report on economic impact; 

cooperation with running and future (extra) European projects; a

European Tunnel Safety Board; criteria for informing (non) governmental bodies, institutions, and tunnel owners; layout for training and

education programs; and promotion material. Some reports are

ready; two will follow. One interesting development is that discussions

are ongoing to develop European safety laws.

All deliverables are scheduled to be available in September 2006.

L-surF (http://www.l-surf.org)

The L-surF group (feasibility study for a Large-Scale Underground

Research Facility on Safety and Security) is a new 3-year

(2005–2007) initiative that will be Europe’s future core of tunnel

research and development. The objective is to build a strong new

European organization dealing with tunnel testing, research, training,

and development of different products. It is a major EU-supported

activity focused on safety and security in underground infrastructures

within the Sixth Framework Programme of research funding. It has a

budget of 3.3 million (US$3.9 million), with the goal of harmonizing safety and security in Europe, bringing research and development to the forefront with large full-scale tests, and providing a

means to promote tunnel research on safety and security internationally. After 3 years, the plan is to have a set of drawings that show

how a center with all tunnel research in Europe will look. 

The L-surF design study includes work packages with different

partners responsible for different tasks, such as the following:

 Describe the facility construction plan based on a new concept

for easily creating contours, shapes, and sizes of needed enclosed

spaces and other aspects such as installations and environmental

impacts.

 Describe the latest available sensor technologies.

 Evaluate the research needs and outline the research and 

development activities.

 Develop an integration process for the existing and projected

national facilities with competence and researchers, thus 

restructuring and improving the relevant EU competence while

simultaneously showing ways to more efficiently use research

and development funds.

 Describe the budget and fundraising plans for the different stages

in setting up the facility.

 Include a business plan for a new legal entity dedicated to 

establishing L-surF.

Core member organizations for this initiative are the following:

 VSH, Versuchsstollen Hagerbach AG, Hagerbach Test Gallery

Ltd., Sargans, Switzerland, the leading partner.

 SP Fire, Swedish National Testing and Research Institute, Boras,

Sweden.
14 CHAPTER 2

 STUVA, German Research Association for Underground 

Transportation Facilities, Cologne, Germany.

 TNO, Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research,

Delft, Netherlands.

 NBL, SINTEF NBL, Trondheim, Norway.

 INERIS, Institut National de l‘environnement industriel et des

risques, Verneuil en Halatte, France.

Planning and Design

Standards, Safety Approaches, and Design Issues

2004 European Commission Directive on Tunnel Safety—

The EU has agreements governing road signage, including signage

standards for tunnels, through an affiliated group, the European

Commission. As a result of the Mont Blanc and Tauern tunnel fires,

the commission launched two initiatives. The first initiative was

research projects for road tunnel safety. The second was legislation

via a 2004 directive that applies to tunnels longer than 5 km (3 mi)

on the trans-European road network.

The directive provides the following:

 Assigns responsibility for safety to the road tunnel manager and

administrative authority for safety compliance to the local governing authority. For France, this authority is the prefecture. Included

in the directive are requirements for safety inspections and a 

safety officer appointed by the tunnel operator.

 Defines procedures for road tunnel operation. For new road 

tunnels, these procedures require the tunnel operator to seek

permission from an administrative authority during the 

design and construction phases and before placing the tunnel in

operation. Permission also has to be obtained both before and

after major changes to a tunnel, and a safety inspection report

must be provided every 6 years. These procedures also apply 

to existing road tunnels, but a timeframe of 10 to 15 years has

been granted for compliance. The process for the required safety

analysis was not specifically defined, but required that each 

country have a standard methodology and report to the 

European Commission. The directive does not require risk 

analyses for all tunnels.

 Establishes safety measures. Tunnel operators must meet both

the requirements of the European Commission Directive on 

Tunnel Safety and their own national standards.

Integrated Safety Philosophy in the Netherlands—

The Dutch integrated approach for tunnel design is being used 

as a guideline in the Netherlands and can be accessed at 

www.tunnelsafety.nl. Developed in 2001, the guideline will be 

part of a law scheduled to be discussed in the fall 2005 in the 

Dutch Parliament and to become effective in 2006 if passed. 

In the late 1970s the Netherlands shifted from practical tunnel

design to a probabilistic design approach. This approach is largely a

result of lessons learned when much of Holland was flooded in

1953. The approach determines the risk in a tunnel based on a

quantitative risk analysis that considers probability and likely consequences of a particular type of incident, given a set of predictable

safety measures. This work formed the basis for Holland’s tunnel

design standards. 

In the mid-1990s, the probabilistic design approach was 

questioned. While it gave a level of expected safety, it did not

address what happens or should happen when a disaster actually

occurs. The scenario analysis, a deterministic approach, considers

tunnel emergencies in the design phase. For this method the 

emergency response plan, incident scenarios, and safety design 

features are defined and then evaluated. The probabilistic approach

and scenario analysis resulted in similar designs.

Several serious tunnel incidents across Europe in the late 1990s

to early 2000s and increasing surface land development resulted in

pressure to develop a framework in which all safety issues could be

described. This integrated safety philosophy provides a structure to

solve problems and allows the objective comparison of alternate

tunnel designs. It is “integrated” because it was developed in cooperation with all relevant parties. It covers both the construction

phase and the operating phase, and it addresses all safety aspects in

the tunnel and its immediate environment. It distinguishes between

proactive, preventive, preparatory, repressive, and followup 

measures, and the tasks and responsibilities of all those involved are

clearly defined.

Several terms are used in the probabilistic approach to the safety

issue, where a large number of incident scenarios are analyzed for

probability and associated consequences. The Dutch use the term

“risk” to dissociate safety from its emotional association, and differentiate between “external” safety and “internal” safety. External safety is

related to the risks of individuals or groups of individuals in the 

vicinity of a source of danger such as a highway crash. An extra risk

is created when the road is underground, producing extra dangers

internally. An example is a tunnel fire where motorists are exposed

to heat, smoke, toxic fumes, and possibly explosions from which

they cannot easily escape. This is referred to as internal safety. 

In addition to the probabilistic approach, a limited number of

scenarios can be systematically analyzed in more detail. In this case,

actual incidents and associated rescue options are examined. The

scenario analysis in this deterministic approach includes the concept

of self-rescue, in which emergency services have not yet arrived and

individuals must rely on themselves to survive the emergency. 

Of course, other emergency response measures aside from 

self-rescue are also considered.

A third approach is the ALARA principle. ALARA stands for 

“As Low As Reasonably Achievable.” In this approach, the designer

uses common sense to determine where extra safety benefits can

be achieved in a practical way at minimum cost.

Project safety can be evaluated using the Safety Chain. The basic

structure of this chain is as follows:

 Prevent dangerous situations (proactive).

 In cases where danger cannot be prevented, attempt to decrease

the likelihood of an incident and to limit its potential consequences

(preventive).

 Should something occur, ensure that measures are in place to

provide those present with optimal possibilities to escape 

(corrective). An often-used term in this situation is “self-rescue”

(something occurs, emergency services have not yet arrived, and

road users have to help themselves).

FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 15

 For cases in which emergency response is required, ensure that

response measures are as good as possible (repressive).

 Restore the situation to its original condition (followup care).

With the safety philosophy, intervention should occur as high up

in this chain as possible to prevent the incident. This philosophy can

be used on all types of tunnels, although the details will vary

depending on the individual type. An example of its use is the 

integrated safety plan developed for the Westerschelde Tunnel.

Integrated Safety Plan for the Westerschelde Tunnel—

The Westerschelde Tunnel is a 6.62-km (4.11-mi) twin-bore tunnel

60 m (200 ft) maximum below sea level with two lanes each and

12-m (39-ft) cross tunnels every 250 m (820 ft). It crosses the

Westerschelde River to connect the southern part of the Zeeland

Province to the rest of the Netherlands; the only connection 

previously was provided by two ferries. Safety measures cost €160

million (US$190 million), or 30 percent of the total €550 million

(US$650 million) construction cost.

This project was the first use of an integrated safety plan for a

large project. It was jointly developed by the Ministry of Transport,

Public Works, and Water Management and the Ministry of the 

Interior. The integrated safety plan took more than 2 years to 

develop because of the large number of participants.

The integrated safety plan is divided into the following components:

 A safe work plan based on the Dutch legislation on health and

safety at work.

 An incident support plan during the construction activities.

 A traffic management plan for normal traffic management.

 An incident support plan.

 A safe maintenance plan for the operating period.

Each component addresses the safety aspects specific to that

plan, the overall safety chain, and the tasks and responsibilities of the

relevant parties.

The most significant safety measures in the proactive stage were

the following:

 Unidirectional traffic, which means that frontal collisions are 

virtually impossible and an important element of the crash 

probability is reduced to zero. Furthermore, good conditions 

for ventilation are created so that the consequences in the event

of a fire are reduced.

 Prohibiting the carriage of certain hazardous substances (e.g., 

liquid propane gas (LPG) and highly toxic materials). This also

eliminates certain types of incidents.

The most significant safety measures in the preventive stage

were the following: 

 Reversible longitudinal ventilation along the tunnel.

 Carbon monoxide (CO) and visibility monitoring.

 Traffic guidance and monitoring (e.g., CCTV and velocity 

monitoring).

 Thermal protective lining.

 Communication systems (e.g., intercom, loudspeakers, 

high-frequency (HF) radio system, telephone).

 Prohibition on truck passing.

 Automatic lighting control system for the transition from daylight

into the tunnel.

 Electric power supply with a no-break system.

The most significant safety measures in the corrective and

repressive stages were the following: 

 Fire detection systems.

 Cross passages every 250 m (820 ft).

 Firefighting systems.

 Ventilation system that starts automatically.

 Disaster plans.

 Clear and straightforward operator instructions.

 Separate service roads to the tunnel entrances and exits for

emergency services.

The safe maintenance plan was completed shortly before the

opening of the tunnel so that the latest information could be included. It includes descriptions of the various maintenance operations,

conditions for safe maintenance, and implementation of the maintenance operations.

TNO believes that this philosophy and the corresponding safety

management system guarantee a high level of safety, with the residual risk reduced to an acceptable level.

Special consideration in the overall safety analysis was given to

the situation in which an incident forces road users to flee from an

affected bore to an unaffected bore. The scenario is as follows:

 The emergency is detected.

 In one single action, the operator does the following:

– Stops new traffic entering each bore.

– Closes the left-hand lane of each bore to traffic.

– Imposes speed restrictions in each bore.

– Starts the ventilation system of the affected bore.

– Switches the tunnel lighting to the maximum level.

– Unlocks the escape doors in both bores (doors are normally 

locked for security).

– Activates the lighting of the escape route indicators.

– Activates the overpressure ventilation of the cross passages.

– Switches on a special “pedestrians on the road” sign in the 

unaffected bore.

– Activates firefighting pumps.

 The emergency is of such nature that road users are instructed to

escape to the unaffected bore.

 Road users enter the escape passages and reach the safe bore

through the door on the other side.

To avoid road user panic, it was decided to unlock the doors in

both bores at the same time. This meant that those escaping to the

safe bore might reach it when cars are still passing through it. To

increase safety, a traffic information system for the unaffected bore

was developed, and the following four options (see figure 10) were

considered:

1. Stopping the traffic in the unaffected bore using an “accident” sign

and flashing amber lights immediately followed by red lights 

(sudden stop approach).

2. Stopping the traffic in the unaffected bore using an “accident” sign

and lowering the limits from 70 to 50 to 30 km/h (from 40 to 30

to 20 mi/h) and then to red lights (gradual stop approach).

3. Clearing the left lane of the unaffected bore using an “escaping

pedestrians” sign and presenting red crosses above the left lane
16 CHAPTER 2

and imposing a speed limit of 70 km/h (40 mi/h) in the right lane,

followed by reducing the speed to 50 km/h (30 mi/h) and then to

30 km/h (20 mi/h) in 10-second intervals (sudden lane-clearing

approach).

4. Clearing the left lane of the unaffected bore using an “escaping

pedestrians” sign and lane-change arrows and imposing a speed

limit of 70 km/h (40 mi/h) in the right lane, followed after 

10 seconds by red crosses and 50 km/h (30 mi/h), and followed

after another 10 seconds by 30 km/h (20 mi/h) (gradual 

lane-clearing approach).

These four approaches were tested in a simulator. The major

conclusions from this test were that lane clearing proceeds smoothly

but stopping traffic does not, and that the gradual lane clearing

approach is most compatible with the signaling used outside the tunnel and most effectively clears the unaffected bore for emergency

services. Individuals in the test said that the gradual lane clearing was

good because they recognized the arrow from its other uses; this

shows that users do not pay attention to red crosses or lights, but

do pay attention to established signage. If the evacuation is successful, the situation is considered satisfactory because human life has a

higher value than cars and facilities.

Copenhagen Metro Safety Approach in Denmark—The

design process and criteria for safety-related features in the Copenhagen Metro are based on European standards and modern European installations. It begins with the concept and proceeds to system

definition and application conditions, to risk analysis (which may be

repeated at several stages of the life cycle, depending on modification and retrofit), to system requirements, to apportionment of 

system requirements, to design and implementation. The process

further considers manufacture, installation, system validation 

(including safety acceptance and commissioning), system acceptance,

operation and maintenance, performance monitoring and modification/retrofit, and decommissioning and disposal.

This is the first project of this complexity in Danish railway 

history, and at the start of the project there was no established set of

standards. Subsequently, many standards from a variety of sources

were adopted for the project. The main ones are mentioned here.

The German code, BOStraB, was used as the overall code and

standard framework. Compliance with Danish building regulations,

Eurocode EN50126, and NFPA 130 (as a supplement to BOStraB)

were required. Vulnerability assessment was done by the consultants

as part of the design.

The Metro safety requirements were defined by the employer

in agreement with the Ministry of Traffic and encompass quantitative

risk acceptance criteria, norm-based requirements, and contributions

by emergency services. The Metro risk acceptance criteria must

have the same level of safety as other systems in Europe. Statistics

from Skytrain, Vancouver, VAL, LuL, DSB S-tog, etc., were used for

analysis because they were believed to be similar systems. A hazard

identification and analysis document was used to develop design 

criteria. As risk changes, these assumptions must be revisited 

occasionally and possible new countermeasures introduced. 

The ventilation system was designed to provide redundant 

airflow paths to provide for the loss of a vent shaft. Ventilation 

initially works automatically but has a manual override/backup.

Cut-and-cover sections use stainless steel mesh to reinforce and

minimize spalling. Strain in the lining and corrosion and lining distortion are all monitored by instrumentation and imbedded sensors.

Fire protection is provided by a sacrificial stainless steel-reinforced

protective lining inside the tunnel.

The codes take accidental loads into account (e.g., derailment

and fires). There are no specific codes for concrete lining damage,

flooding, or blast design. The level of blast is chosen by the owner.

Sweden limits the amount of explosive goods that can be taken on

one train and will not allow dangerous cars during the day (on a

case-by-case basis).

The following are some of the safety features in the system:

 Sensors to address traditional hazards, including a sophisticated

system for fire detection.

 Passenger information systems.

 Remote cameras to watch stations and cars.

 A redundant control system (though in the same building).

 An obstacle detection device to prevent passengers from getting

hit by trains.

 Intrusion detection devices.

Emergency drills are planned with emergency services to test

and verify response plans. Mutual aid agreements exist for the region

for response, but interoperability of communications equipment

does not exist.

FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

Figure 10. Scenarios for evacuation safety in tunnels:

sudden stop, gradual stop, sudden lane clearing,

and gradual lane clearing. (Dutch Ministry)
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 17

Rambøll Risk-Management Approach to Design in

Denmark—Rambøll uses risk management as the basic approach

to designing railway infrastructure safety systems. The European

community establishes standards for a process to perform risk analysis of safety systems. The owner determines the design criteria to be

used. Rambøll develops the risk analysis by breaking the project into

its components and presenting them in matrix format. It develops a

mathematical model of the system and uses the results to provide

the client with the information to assess the various options on the

basis of cost versus risk. An example of the type of input for the risk

analysis is the modeling for a fire on a subway train. Computational

fluid dynamics (CFD) was used to evaluate the spread of smoke 

versus time. All materials used in the train construction were incorporated in this model, but it did not incorporate fire suppression.

Another example is the safety analysis for the design of the

Copenhagen Metro in the 1990s. The focus of the analysis was on

train-related passenger safety and structural reliability. The analysts

did not focus on an explosion in the tunnel in developing the design

because they believed explosive forces could not be designed for

cost effectively.

Rambøll also did design work on the Oresund Link tunnel. The

design was based on European codes rather than specific codes

from either Denmark or Sweden, as a way of being neutral. The

basic approach was to look at bridge design guidance and adapt

appropriate provisions to tunnel design. Specific design requirements

were developed as needed where no guidance was available. For

fire design, the company developed a project-specific level of risk for

different scenarios. This led to the installation of fireproofing liner to

protect the concrete from spalling.

Future trends in risk analysis include developing models that

incorporate health, safety, environmental factors, and quality into a

single model. An increased focus on terrorism is also a future trend,

as is the protocol for facility inspection based on risk analysis.

Citytunnel Safety Approach in Sweden—The safety policy

for Citytunnel is that it will meet strict requirements on safety for people, properties, and the environment. High accessibility and safety are

important aspects for increased use of railway traffic. A high level of

safety is achieved by attaching safety to planning, design, and construction and getting continuous feedback from other interested parties. 

The four ruling laws that govern the design and construction are

the Planning and Building Act, the Swedish Environmental Code, the

Railway Construction Act, and the law on technical requirements for

buildings and plant structures. Checks are made through risk analyses; meetings with the fire brigade, police, and others to discuss

safety problems and solutions; scenario staging; and annual reports

to authorities on current and planned safety measures. However, no

specific laws or regulations govern underground railroad operations. 

The project safety objectives were to conform to the methodology and acceptance criteria contained in BVH585.30. This meant

that the tunnel operation was to be as safe as open, at-grade track

operation from derailment, collision, fire, etc. The stations were

required to be as safe as any other building used for public assembly; building codes are used even though the existing building regulations were not designed to apply to tunnels. The evacuation goal

was to have safe evacuation without assistance. The safety concept

included an emergency evacuation procedure, a rescue operation

procedure, a risk analysis, and safety systems. Highlights for specific

criteria that resulted include the following:

 Trains should be evacuated at stations or outside the tunnel if possible, with emergency braking blocked out when in the tunnels.

 Only passenger trains were allowed in the tunnel.

 Scenario designs through tabletop exercises were conducted.

 Separate fire curves were developed for rolling stock and 

structures.

 CFD fire calculations were performed.

 Safety refuge staircases in stations should have positive air pressure.

Normal ventilation is caused by train movement. The jet fans

are used only in an emergency to control smoke and fire. The fans

are along the entire system and have pressure relief vents to reduce

wind on the platform to an acceptable level. The stations have 

chimneys to release smoke. 

There are also requirements for rescue services and environmental regulations. Many of these building code requirements do

not necessarily comport with specific considerations for tunnels. The

government is working with the planning and building authority, fire

brigade, and others to determine whether special tunnel regulations

are needed. 

Citytunnel met with the fire brigade and relied on the Eureka

tests and the Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP)

for guidance. From the safety concept, Citytunnel evaluated other

work, including fire simulations, evacuation simulations, and crash

safety evaluations for tunnels and stations to develop risk analyses.

From this it developed Safety in Technical Systems (SITS).

Fire brigade intervention should be possible for certain, but not

all, scenarios. The 15-MW fire is the standard because the concern

is that the fire brigade would be able to extinguish only relatively

small fires. Citytunnel developed a matrix of responsibilities and 

calculated fire evacuation times. From the analysis of the matrix, it

was determined that by the time the fire is at the 50-MW stage, the

fire should be left to burn, and the response should emphasize

search and rescue. 

Fire smoke simulations were done for fires up to 15 MW for 

the performance-based design. Time-temperature curves and temperature resistance requirements were developed with help from

SP. Researchers simulated fires and evaluated various evacuation 

patterns. The current risk analysis for passengers being evacuated is

an acceptance matrix from the rail authority, and Citytunnel is

replacing the matrix with a new frequency curve. 

This work resulted in identifying many safety systems. To limit

disruption and increase safety, Citytunnel installed various equipment

(e.g., CCTV) for the full length of the tunnel to allow the control

center to determine whether a disruption is required. Discussion is

ongoing on the use of CCTV, however, and some do not favor

camera use. Staircases are enclosed with fire-resistant glass and

designed for over-pressure. The fire brigade has access routes that

are separate from the evacuation route. 

General requirements are that the evacuation time determines

the maximum capacity needed, with 60-minute functionality and
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

18 CHAPTER 2

120 minutes for rescue operations. When feasible, emergency 

systems should be combined with normal operating functions. 

Automatic operation is recommended since many scenarios are too

complicated for manual operations. 

Standards for Tunnel Safety in France—CETU officials

explained that France had been working on technical standards for

new tunnels and the standards existed in draft form in 1999. As a

result of the tunnel fires in Mont Blanc and Tauern (Austria) in 1999,

the French launched two initiatives. The first was a 3-month joint

French-Italian investigation and report on the Mont Blanc Tunnel fire.

The second initiative was a safety check of the 40 road tunnels

longer than 1 km (3,280 ft), with general recommendations for 

safety of all tunnels and specific recommendations for each one that

could go as far as closing the tunnel completely or closing the tunnel

to heavy vehicle traffic.

Also, new regulations were issued in 2000 that included technical aspects covering minimum safety standards, operations (new to

tunnel standards), and safety procedures for both new and existing

road tunnels. These regulations as well as all subsequent French 

regulations cover road tunnels longer than 300 m (984 ft).

In addition, a circular provides enforcement power for all 

government-owned tunnels, requiring owners and operators to get

authorization from the local governing authority (prefecture) to

operate existing road tunnels. Owners must get advice from the

prefecture to operate existing tunnels. The prefecture uses a

National Evaluation Committee for technical advice. Determining

safe operation is based on a safety analysis of each tunnel consisting

of a review of likely scenarios, an evaluation in detail of three or four

specific scenarios for safety risk and mitigation measures, and a

report to the prefecture on safety. This safety analysis is called 

“specific hazard investigation” and has been incorporated in the

European Directive 2004/54/EC (see below).

A law on safety of transport infrastructures and systems was

passed in 2002 and made applicable in 2005 for nongovernmentowned road tunnels. The law made it compulsory to carry out a

safety examination every 6 years, have new road tunnels adhere to

the standards, and have owners of existing road tunnels set the 

goal to achieve compliance. This does not imply applying strictly 

recommended safety measures; different measures are acceptable

as long as the same level of safety is achieved.

The French method for tunnel safety risk analysis is basically the

aforementioned deterministic specific hazard investigation involving

scenarios and mitigations. A different risk analysis method is used to

decide whether dangerous goods should be allowed in a tunnel. It

uses the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) model jointly developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Road Association (PIARC), and sold

by the latter. As a first step, the average number of fatalities per year

in the tunnel due to dangerous goods incidents is calculated, supposing all dangerous goods are allowed. If this figure is below 10-3 

fatalities per year, dangerous goods are not considered significant in

terms of risk, and the decision is based on other criteria. If not, the

method employed involves a quantitative analysis to calculate risk for

travel routes through the tunnel as well as alternate travel routes.

The risks are then compared for the various routes. The first criterion used is the average number of fatalities per year on each route:

 If risk is 10 times greater, choose a lower risk route.

 If risk is between 3 and 10 times greater, then perform a sensitivity analysis to check whether risk will remain at least 3 times

greater under all hypotheses.

 If risk is 3 times or less, then look at other risk indicators and

other factors to determine the travel route.

Existing road signs banning all or part of dangerous cargoes are

used for enforcement. A new European classification is under preparation and should make it possible to differentiate among five groupings

of dangerous goods labeled A to E. In a very few tunnels, the toll gate

facilities can be used to stop the passage of hazardous and dangerous

goods. Regulations can range from allowing all or some categories of

dangerous goods to pass through, to pass through under prescribed

circumstances, or not to pass through under any circumstance.

Tunnel Design Standards in Germany—Germany had

standard regulations for the design of new tunnels, entitled RABT,

that had been updated in the 1980s. New standards were published

in 2004 after the Mont Blanc and Tauern tunnel fires. The new standards raised the design fire scenario from 15 to 20 MW to 30 MW,

with provision for 50 MW for tunnels with a high number of heavy

vehicles (e.g., 4,000 per day). The new standards are compulsory

for new federal roads and for state and urban road tunnels using

federal funds. Germany will spend €600 million (US$709 million)

over 10 years to upgrade tunnels to the new standards.

Tunnel Design Standards in Switzerland—Swiss tunnel

design codes adopted in 2004 are now available in English. The set is

produced by the Swiss Standards Association (SIA). The previous edition, SIA 198—Underground Construction (1993), covered regulations

on execution, with design mentioned only briefly. The current codes

are directed toward design engineers, owners, operators, and those

involved in site supervision and execution of construction works. 

SIA 197—Design of Tunnels, Basic Principles covers the basic 

principles to take into consideration in designing traffic tunnels 

(railways or roads), including the aspects of safety and environmental

impact. It also includes the regulations dealing with the design of an

underground structure following the SIA structural codes. The 

special features to consider in the case of road and rail tunnels are

covered in the two specialized codes, SIA 197/1—Design of Tunnels,

Railway Tunnels and SIA 197/2—Design of Tunnels, Road Tunnels. The

three copyrighted documents, published by SIA, and are available by

writing PO Box CH–8039, Zurich, Switzerland.

Design Issues in Switzerland—The tunnel designer needs

to design the tunnel for the next generation’s tunnel managers. 

Systems should provide for responses that are as simple as possible. 

The primary purpose of ventilation is to support self-rescue and

aided rescue within 8 minutes (see figure 11). Influences on the

design fire include buoyancy, critical velocity, and smoke production.

For tunnels with two tubes, an escape passage should be provided

every 300 m (980 ft) between tubes and every third should allow

for access by emergency vehicles. For tunnels with a single tube, an

escape gallery leading to the open should be provided every 500 m

(1,640 ft) at 1 percent roadway grades to every 300 m (980 ft) at 5
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 19

percent and greater roadway grades. A parallel safety gallery

should be provided for long tunnels. These requirements are

now part of the Swiss standards. The new directive sets a

standard and defines minimal requirements. The main goal

of the tunnel ventilation requirements is the rapid control of

the longitudinal flow. Ventilation and escape routes must be

coordinated into one concept.

Current standards require an automatic linear temperature

detection system (LTDS) video including incident detection.

Fundamental requirements are detection of a fire within 

1 minute, start of ventilation within 1 minute, and system 

reaction within 3 minutes. Requirements for smoke detection

are to locate hot and cold smoke within 60 seconds and within 100 m (330 ft), or possibly up to 300 m (980 ft), depending

on type of traffic, with a very low rate of false alarms. 

Measurable items include smoke (opacity), CO, video optical 

detection, linear temperature, and local temperature.

Fire in tunnels always means smoke. Experiences from fires

greater than 30 MW, such as in the Gotthard Tunnel, indicate 

opacity much greater than reported by the LTDS. For the 2004

Baregg Tunnel fire, the LTDS took 7 minutes to detect the fire. 

Design Issues in Plabutsch Tunnel in Austria—Lighting

improvements include 25 percent increased efficiency in portal

zones and traffic-dependent adjustment of the illumination level.

Temperature resistance of the lamp is 250 °C (480 °F) for over 

1 hour. “Awareness rising zones” in special areas of the tunnel 

provide up to 10 times normal illumination. Emergency niches and

awareness rising zones are provided with emergency phones, 

water supply, and other safety equipment. 

Escape Route Signs

The Netherlands—New escape route signing to enhance 

self-rescue was developed for the Dutch Ministry by TNO. The key

to enhancing self-rescue is to let motorists know what to do and

how to do it, and to emphasize that they need to leave the event

area as soon as possible. 

Simulation studies have indicated the following:

 People are passive and do not take action.

 People miss the emergency doors in the smoke.

 People become disoriented along the wall or road surface.

 Uncertainty about what to do is common.

 Sound support (where people are guided by sound to an 

evacuation route) is typically poor.

To assist users, TNO did research to make signs that are visible,

clear, and logical. Now the Netherlands has a sign standard that 

consists of a pictogram with a white running figure on a green background. Signs are installed on and near the escape doors. 

See figure 12. In case of an emergency, LED lighting at the escape

doors increases the visibility of the escape route. Pictograms with

white lettering on a green background showing the direction and

distance to the escape doors are required on walls every 25 m (82

ft). Much discussion occurred on which languages to use for the

signs; it was decided to use Dutch and English. Another idea, which

has become standard, is to put arrows on the pavement at escape

doors. The arrows are raised so they can be felt and laminated for

long-term wear.

The standard also includes sound. The Dutch initially used a

chirping alarm as an effective audible device. It was audible and

locatable, but frightening. In early 2005 TNO developed an

enhanced system with the addition of spoken words in Dutch and

English to give directions. The revised sound-voice combination to

help motorists locate the escape doors is now the standard in the

Netherlands.

Mont Blanc Tunnel Between France and Italy—

As designated elsewhere in Europe, refuge room doors are green

with prominent display of white running figures, and similar signs are

Figure 12. Sensory combination for location of escape doors. (Dutch Ministry).

Figure 11. Ventilation to support self and aided rescue (FEDRO).
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

20 CHAPTER 2

installed along the tunnel length to show the direction and distance

to the refuge rooms (see figure 13).

Plabutsch Tunnel in Austria—The tunnel has fully automatic

escape route signals with selective display of escape direction determined by the emergency. 

LED Lights

Grilstad Tunnel in Norway—Several years ago, the Norwegian

Public Roads Administration hired SINTEF to study the use of LED

lights in the Grilstad Tunnel near Trondheim. The tunnel, 700 m

(2,300 ft) long, consists of two tubes with two unidirectional lanes

per tube and has an average of 10,000 vehicles per day in each

direction. Its posted speed is 80 km/h (50 mi/h). It has ordinary roof

lighting and LED lights at 20-m (66-ft) spacing at each outside edge

of roadway (see figure 14) and 15 m (49 ft) at both ends. The

objective of the project was to obtain driver opinions on security,

safety, and comfort and to study driver behavior as a result of 

different light intensities.

A week-long testing program was conducted in which LED-light

intensity was varied at different times of the day, but with 100 

percent ordinary lighting on the roof. Driver opinions were solicited

to determine lighting level and spacing adequacy. The most satisfying

LED-light level was found to be 47 percent intensity with 100 percent ordinary roof lighting. The normal 100 percent LED-light level

was perceived to have too much glare.

Driving behavior under various lighting levels was also evaluated.

Speed was not significantly impacted. The LED lighting, however, did

influence the vehicle’s lateral position, with optimum position at 

100 percent LED lighting. Drivers felt safer and moved closer to the

shoulder as the LED intensity increased.

A fire drill was conducted in the tunnel before it was opened,

and the fire department found the LED lighting useful for evacuation.

LED lights are favored in Norway because in the winter, reflective

striping becomes covered with snow spray within 2 weeks while

LED lighting remains visible. 

Escape Doors in the Netherlands—In the Netherlands, 

the use of LED-lighted escape doors has become the standard 

(see figure 13) because officials believe this makes escape routes

more visible in an emergency. Strobe lighting was tested but is not

used because flashing pathway lights can be confused with the lights

used on first-responder vehicles. 

Mont Blanc Tunnel Between France and Italy—LED

lights were installed along the edge of the tunnel at regular intervals

of about 10 m (33 ft) to clearly identify the edge of the roadway.

The majority of these lights were a highly visible yellow color.

Spaced among the yellow lights at 150-m (490-ft) intervals were

blue lights. See figure 15. Motorists are instructed through formal

(for truck and bus drivers) and informal driver education to keep a

safe distance between them and the vehicle in front, and that 

distance is indicated by the spacing of the blue lights. This visual cue

is more reliable than asking motorists to establish distance between

vehicles using speed-based guidelines.

Design Fire Size

European countries differ on their design fire size (e.g., Sweden 

uses 15 MW and Austria and Switzerland use 30 MW). The 2004

German standards raised the design fire scenario from 15 to 20

MW to 30 MW, with provision for 50 MW for tunnels with a high

number of heavy vehicles (e.g., 4,000 per day). 

For the design fire scenarios in the Netherlands, TNO did tests

to develop time-temperature curves for fires that last 2 hours. As a

result, the Dutch standard now is for every tunnel in the basic road

network to resist a 2-hour fire at 1,350 °C (2,460 °F). TNO found

fires as high as 1,400 °C (2,550 °F).

Sweden uses a design fire of 15 MW. SP reports that large fires

from semi-trucks and tankers can cause another truck to ignite as far

away as 100 m (328 ft). SP research shows that the fire brigade 

cannot handle large semi-truck or tanker fires, and that for 

high-megawatt levels, they are considered “fire zones” in which 

no one can survive.

In Switzerland, a design fire of 30 MW represents a loaded

truck. Temperature rise is 65 degrees Kelvin over a distance of 800

m (2,600 ft) within 10 seconds. Influences on the design fire include

buoyancy, critical velocity, and smoke production.

Figure 13. Examples from the Mont Blanc Tunnel.

Top: tunnel escape route. Bottom: tunnel escape route sign.
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 21

A 100-MW design fire is recommended in the annex to NFPA

502. Fires greater than 100 MW have been documented with heavy

goods vehicles. 

Fire Suppression Systems

The UPTUN project is putting a large amount of effort into 

developing methods to achieve fire suppression in tunnels. Fire 

suppression systems now vary in European countries.

Norway—SINTEF NBL has the capacity to create full-size

mockups to test fire suppression. Testing of water mist systems has

produced good results but requires that the system have the proper

design to work properly. Water is good because it absorbs heat

well. Full-scale testing is required. 

Fixed water-based fire suppression systems for tunnels are found

in very few countries. Japan uses sprinkler systems, typically 6 liters

per square meter per minute. Water-based fire suppression systems

have the following potential advantages:

 Cool the tunnel around the fire.

 Suppress the fire, significantly lowering the rate of heat release.

 Greatly reduce smoke.

 Reduce toxicity.

 Prevent spread of the fire.

 Keep temperatures in structural members from reaching the 

elevated temperatures that cause permanent damage.

Water mist fire suppression systems (e.g., 2 liters per square

meter per minute) reduce the fires to 30 to 60 percent of their 

original size but do not put them out; the intent is to keep the

smoke and heat down. These fire suppression systems have high

installation and maintenance costs. 

The Netherlands—The Dutch Ministry has a pilot project

using a compressed air foam system in the Roertunnel on the A73

motorway in the Netherlands. The tunnel will have this additional

safety installation because traffic includes liquid propane gas (LPG)

tankers. The Dutch believe that in this typical application (LPG

tankers), compressed air foam is better than a sprinkler system,

although more expensive. 

Sweden—The September 2003 Runehamar Tunnel fire tests of

semi-trailer loads were conducted with a fire size up to 200 MW. 

SP observed that if users are expected to stay in their vehicles, it is

best to use fire suppression. People have a high probability of escape

if fire suppression is used to keep the fire below 30 MW. Human

behavior studies have shown that people tend to stay in their 

vehicles much longer than they should.

If suppression systems are installed in high-traffic tunnels, SP 

recommends that they be simple and robust with an emphasis on

both performance and maintenance. 

Figure 14. LED lights on roadway edges in the Grilstad Tunnel.

(SINTEF).

Figure 15. LED lights in the Mont Blanc Tunnel: yellow for edge

delineation and blue for vehicle spacing.
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

22 CHAPTER 2

France—CETU discussed the use of water deluge systems,

either the mist or sprinkler type, as a means to contain fire and

improve safe evacuation. CETU officials indicated that they are 

considering this and believe that more study is required. 

Germany—STUVA provided information on Japanese practice,

where water suppression is used for tunnels over 10 km (6 mi) long

or over 3 km (2 mi) with high use. However, STUVA noted that

there are issues with water suppression. Current practice assumes

that well-designed ventilation systems without suppression are best,

until further research shows otherwise. Water systems can compromise the stratified smoke layer and in some cases make evacuation

more difficult. STUVA indicated that while some advocate mist systems, many are awaiting the results of further research from studies

by the UPTUN and L-surF projects.

Austria—The purpose of water-based fire suppression systems

is to reduce the heat load. It is also easier to breathe moist smoke.

Another advantage of using a sprinkler system is that the chance of

flashover from one vehicle to another is reduced. Structural damage

from a fire is also typically less when a water-based fire suppression

system is used.

However, water-based fire suppression systems destroy the

smoke layering, and smoke layering can allow users adequate time

to evacuate in a fire incident. It is desirable to keep the smoke layering system as long as needed to allow everyone to evacuate. The

smoke would need to be reduced by 95 percent to have adequate

visibility after the smoke layering is destroyed. 

The use of water sprinklers is a big debate in PIARC. Japan and

Australia mandated use of sprinkler systems. Europe does not have a

regulation that requires a water system. Austria has concerns about

the use of sprinklers in tunnels, and currently does not allow them to

be used automatically. Austria has two tunnels with sprinkler systems:

one in a very short tunnel with manual activation only, and a second

one in a 5.4-km (3.4-mi) long tunnel that is in the installation phase.

Austrian regulations say that the operator must evaluate the situation.

If there is no smoke layering, then a water mist system can be used; if

there is layering, the operator must wait to use the water mist system

until everyone has evacuated. The decision is based on the air speed

and the sprinkler system. The sprinkler must be above the fire to be

effective. A water-based fire suppression system is allowed in the first

10 minutes only if everyone has evacuated the tunnel. An Austrian

guideline defines the minimum requirement of fire suppression 

systems and the operation procedures for the ventilation.

Water mist has the advantage that small droplets reduce heat

better, but water mist also reduces smoke layering and visibility. 

An advantage of water mist over sprinklers is that it uses less water.

One disadvantage is that the water mist system can freeze (heating

has to be provided at the portal regions). A problem in the Alps is

that water may not be available in the required amount and it is 

difficult to bring water to the site, store it, and distribute it. As a

result, Austrians have little to no experience with water-based fire

suppression systems.

Ventilation Systems

Over the recent past in Europe, interest in fresh air and the environmental impacts of ventilation has decreased, but interest in safety has

increased as a result of the many tunnel fires that have occurred.

Currently, ventilation design criteria vary throughout Europe and

elsewhere. PIARC is working to develop a harmonized approach to

tunnel ventilation. Under PIARC’s guidelines (now a working document, but scheduled to be converted into guidelines in 2007), for a

tunnel with unidirectional traffic flow, ventilation airspeed is maintained at between 1.5 to 2 meters per second (m/s) (4.9 to 6.5 feet

per second (ft/s)) in the same direction as traffic. For bidirectional

traffic, air speed is maintained at 1 to 1.5 m/s (3 to 4.9 ft/s) in the

same direction of travel except to within 500 m (1,640 ft) of the

portal, depending on the evacuation procedure.

In Europe ventilation is controlled in normal mode mainly by

opacity (the spacing of the optical sensors varies). In incident mode,

various detection systems are used. Heat detection (either by linear

heat sensors or laser systems) provides the main information. Some

countries include opacity, with optical sensors in very short intervals

of 100 to 200 m (328 to 656 ft). CCTV has proven to give very fast

detection. Because the rate of wrong signals is still very high, 

however, this system is used mainly for information (alert) and the

operator has to confirm and trigger the fire alarm manually.

Sweden—SP is experimenting with ventilation systems to control smoke and remove the heat to prevent the fire from spreading. 

Sweden does not recommend installing water sprinklers in tunnels. SP speculated that in 10 years Europe may go to transverse

ventilation with water spray, rather than longitudinal ventilation, to

handle the bigger fires that can result from high congestion. An

exhaust vent stack may be a better system than blowing smoke 

longitudinally throughout the tunnel; a water spray could be used in

the duct work to keep it cool. 

Passenger rail cars burn at 10 to 35 MW. If the windows break

or fall out or if the doors are left open, the fire is ventilated and will

burn faster and hotter. To control smoke and prevent the fire from

spreading from such occurrences, ventilation from both sides is

needed.

The September 2003 Runehamar Tunnel fire tests of semi-trailer

loads had fire size up to 200 MW. Researchers observed that if the

expectation is that the users will evacuate immediately, the fans

should be turned on to full power. The smoke level rises very rapidly, and in 5 minutes the area is completely engulfed, providing very

little time to escape (as little as 1 or 2 minutes).

Mont Blanc Tunnel Between France and Italy—The

Mont Blanc Tunnel has semitransverse ventilation, with air pushed

into the tunnel. Eight fresh air longitudinal ducts are under the roadway, four on each end to push air. The first duct pushes air the first

1,500 m (4,900 ft), the second air duct pushes air the next 1,500 m

(4,900 ft), and this pattern continues to the tunnel center. The 76 jet

fans and 20 wind meters in the tunnel provide constant air velocity

in the tunnel. An air speed of 8 m/s (26 ft/s) is the maximum velocity

permitted at the exit portals. A display shows the air speed inside

the tunnel. In normal operations, the air flow curve is a straight line

and the point of zero velocity is at the approximate center of the

tunnel. If a fire occurs in the tunnel, the operator moves the point of

zero velocity to the fire location, and seven dampers at the crown
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 23

of the tunnel open to extract smoke. Changes in barometric 

pressure can move the zero-velocity point outside the tunnel 

entirely. In severe conditions, the zero-velocity point cannot be

managed and the tunnel is closed.

Gotthard Tunnel in Switzerland—The original ventilation

was provided by four shafts in the mountain and two at the portals.

Fresh air is supplied through an overhead gallery on the left side of

the tunnel roof to ducts in the lower part of the tunnel walls. Ducts

are on the same side as the refuge rooms, which are located every

250 m (820 ft). Exhaust is provided on the right gallery in the roof.

The ventilation design is transverse.

Traffic type (density and volume) will drive the choice of the system (see Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels, PIARC 05–05–B).

The basic type is longitudinally ventilated with jet fans, quite 

common in shorter tunnels. Most new tunnels longer than 2 km

(1.2 mi) use systems with controllable extraction, with or without

extraction ducts, and with air galleries and ducts. 

The old concept was vertical smoke extraction. The idea was to

add fresh air from below from the secondary ducts and extract the

smoke through the ceiling ducts. Air was uniformly applied from the

tunnel floor to the ceiling to force smoke out. The fear in the past

was that it would be too dangerous if the wrong damper were

opened. Advancements have allowed the use of dampers in newer

systems to allow local smoke extraction through local air pressure

adjustment. With such a damper system, an air quantity of up to

three times the tunnel cross section can be extracted at a rate of 

1.5 m2

/s (16 ft2/s). 

Loetschberg Tunnel in Switzerland—A ventilation system

is installed in the Loetschberg Tunnel, although this is a new practice

for rail tunnels in Switzerland. The system has a maximum flow

capacity of 200 m3

/s to enable the system to maintain a higher 

pressure in the escape/rescue tunnels than in the main

tunnels and keep escape routes smoke free. The 

ventilation is mainly provided for the emergency stop

stations inside the tunnel.

Austria—Expected response time to a tunnel fire

for fire brigades is 10 minutes. The expected selfrescue time is also the first 10 minutes after the event.

During this time, tunnel operators in Austria decrease

the ventilation velocity to a maximum of 1.5 m/s (4.9

ft/s) to facilitate the possibility of self-rescue in tunnels

with bidirectional traffic. In tunnels with unidirectional

traffic, the air speed in the tunnel is set at 2 m/s (6.5

ft/s). The ventilation procedure in incident cases runs

on a controlled mode that is fully automatic. After the

fire brigade approaches, the ventilation strategy may

be changed on the brigade’s advice.

All long Austrian tunnels, those more than 5 km

(3 mi) are transverse ventilated except one. 

Transverse ventilation is now required for tunnels

longer than 3 km (2 mi). 

Plabutsch Tunnel in Austria—In an incident

case, the extraction capacity of the ventilation is 

120 m3

/s. Smoke is extracted through one open

damper with a cross section of 12 m2 (130 ft2

). The damper closest

to the fire location is opened (depending on wind direction at incident detection). The smoke/airflow inside the tunnel is controlled so

that in unidirectional traffic two-thirds of the volume comes from the

incident side, while one-third comes from the opposite direction. In

bidirectional traffic mode, the split is 50 percent from each side of

the open damper. The volume flows are controlled by a closed loop

proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller.

Adjustable exhaust air dampers have an open cross section up to

12 m2 (130 ft2

) and are located every 50 to 100 m (164 to 328 ft).

During an incident, one to three dampers are opened. During 

normal operations, the open section of the dampers is enough to

maintain uniform air flow at full load. The system is designed as a

closed loop to ensure backup in the event of a fan failure.

Fan specifications include volume flow of approximately 200 m3

/s

per 2-km (1.2-mi) ventilated section, a power requirement of 450

kilowatts (kW), fans resistant up to 400 °C (750 °F) over 2 hours,

and fully adjustable blade angles.

Air Curtain

SINTEF NBL is conducting research on air curtains. Air flow of 

1 m/s (3 ft/s) is typically required to escape smoke. Installing an air

curtain enables a small flow of injected air to redirect the movement

of smoke away from the escape pathway. With an air curtain, the

smoke can be stopped by an air velocity of 0.25 m/s (0.82 ft/s),

one-quarter the typical required velocity (see figure 16).

An air curtain is to be tested in the Oslo central subway station

Stortinget in the near future to determine its effectiveness. The 

testing will be done in conjunction with a fire created for the fire

department to do its training. Air curtains will be installed about 2 m

(6.6 ft) from the entrance of each escape route. The strategy when

Figure 16. Air curtain for smoke control in tunnels. (SINTEF NBL)
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

24 CHAPTER 2

a fire occurs is to push one button to initiate automatic emergency

response (e.g., extract fans go at maximum speed and air curtains

are activated). The reason for using an air curtain rather than a 

physical barrier is to avoid interfering with people leaving and the fire

brigade entering. First the physical barrier is made as low as possible

from the ceiling, and then an air curtain is installed to produce a

lower air barrier. The first test, scheduled for the end of 2005, will

include computational aerodynamic analysis and an oil fire. SINTEF

NBL is continuing its air curtain research and plans future testing.

Air curtains may be more appropriate for rail tunnel stations than

for the main tunnels, since a closed system with doors in the tunnel

where trains enter and exit the station is required for an air curtain

to work. The concern is that the doors may accidentally deploy and

trains could hit them.

Incident Management

The management of incidents to reduce their duration and impact is

a priority for the European countries the scan team visited. These

countries have undertaken a variety of activities to effectively manage

incidents in tunnels by reducing the time to detect and verify that an

incident has occurred, by providing the appropriate response, and

by safely clearing the incident while managing traffic flow.

SINTEF in Norway

SINTEF described the Norwegian evacuation strategies for road

tunnels. These strategies focus on issues from the recent Mont

Blanc, Tauern, and Gotthard tunnel fires. In addition, in London in

1987 an event occurred at King’s Cross Rail Station that contributed

additional data. A modest fire in an escalator developed into a disaster in which 31 people died. Norway has had several tunnel fires in

the past few years without loss of life from fire.

In Norway, single-tube tunnels with two-way traffic typically

have natural ventilation. In general, portals are the only possible

evacuation directions. If on the wrong side of a tunnel fire, a

motorist’s only chance is to turn the car around and leave. 

However, airflow direction may dictate the direction of evacuation.

A frequent problem is that motorists do not recognize the seriousness of a fire; they are worried about possessions and make bad

decisions on what to do. The high-traffic tunnels in Oslo and Bergen

have systems that can override vehicle radios, but radios must be

turned on to receive the messages. A question has arisen on

whether more information would increase user anxiety about 

tunnels. Simulations also raise the question of whether people 

follow posted instructions or a leader. 

The Norwegian crisis management procedure for tunnels is to

immediately close all tubes when a crash occurs. Users at the incident location must decide whether to sound the alarm, provide first

aid, assist in fighting the fire, leave the car and evacuate on foot, or

evacuate by car. Rescue personnel must find their way to the right

tunnel entrance. Drivers outside the tunnel must find an alternate

route. For all events, motorists in the tunnel are their own first 

rescuers, and self-rescue provides the most effective evacuation

strategy. To be able to rescue themselves, motorists need to know

the location of emergency exits and should be guided to the direction of the fresh air supply. Preparedness plans should incorporate

these considerations.

Copenhagen Metro in Denmark

The overall safety description for the Copenhagen Metro includes

planning, heat load calculations and simulations, laws and regulations,

and escape route planning below and above the ground. Detailed

discussions with emergency professionals and tabletop exercises

have taken place to evaluate plans and provide training. Protocol is

that the transit system investigates, determines the emergency, and

then sends the alarm. Police are the overall incident commanders.

Additional ventilation is provided by louvers in station ceilings

that are tied to the ventilation system and can be opened in an

emergency. Counterterrorism and threat support are provided by

police; weapons of mass destruction (WMD) plans are also being

developed. Emergency rescue equipment is pre-positioned at 

stations; weather services provide warnings where necessary. Fire

detectors, smoke detectors, and CCTV are in place. Emergency

recovery plans are in place for terrorist events, tunnel collapse,

crashes, and removal of failed vehicles by tow, rescue train, or automatic operation. The target detection time is less than a minute for a

failed or stranded train, with a maximum 20-minute service interruption. The target response time is 5 to 7 minutes from the time

an incident is reported until the response team is onsite. Fencing is

provided for access control. An intrusion detection system and

CCTV are also used. Data are being collected to review operations

and look for needed improvements.

Oresund Tunnel Between Denmark and Sweden

The control room has two operators around the clock: one 

responsible for the technical installation and road operations and the

other responsible for toll station operations and customer assistance.

The operators are cross trained. A backup control room is located

at the Danish police station in Copenhagen and is being moved to a

new location. 

Communication is by frequency modulation (FM) radio in the

tunnel and trains. The operations center can interrupt the radio

channel for emergency announcements. Rescue services have their

own radio communication that is common to both Swedish and

Danish forces.

For traffic monitoring and control, the Oresund tunnels have

fixed cameras every 60 m (200 ft) and portal cameras every 500 m

(1,640 ft), for a total of 250 cameras in the open. Barriers are used

to close the link, with dynamic signs that give directions for speed,

lane use, and messages. No cameras are in the rail side and the

shipping lanes are not monitored. Over-height vehicles hit the 

tunnel about twice a year. Oresundsbro Konsortiet has an agreement with the local coast guard for inspecting areas away from the

bridge/tunnel. 

Vehicles are monitored with cameras. Images are sent to a 

server and processed, and an incident can alarm the operator. The

camera will automatically switch to the zone in the tunnel where the

incident is occurring. The action must be something that moves and

then stops; the camera will not find small objects such as bags. 
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 25

A Belgian company makes the hardware and software that connects

to the cameras to identify an incident. The system can produce false

alarms near the tunnel entrance. Noise, mast pole vibration, or

even an insect on a camera lens can trigger a false alarm. These

problems require the operator to concur that the alarm is because

of a real incident before action occurs to mitigate. This system has

been in place for 5 years and is being continually improved to get

better performance, but it is considered unlikely that it will soon be

practical to alarm for automatic action. The tunnels have about 10

stopped vehicles per month and these are considered a source for a

potential crash since the tunnel has no emergency lanes. The goal is

to remove such vehicles within 20 to 30 minutes. So far, no crashes

have resulted from stopped cars. 

Previously the evacuation concept was to evacuate passengers

from an incident train to the opposite railway tube. The new 

concept to be implemented in 2006 is to evacuate passengers to

the motorway tube.

Jet fans in the tunnel system are designed to operate in lines of

fans called line control. When a fire occurs, the control room 

activates more fans. In December 2004, this was changed to group

control of fans. Now if a fire occurs, a group of fans on the output of

the affected tunnel are turned on to make an over-pressure to keep

the smoke in the original tube and the entrance fans in the unaffected tunnel are turned on. This also eliminates the fan noise to

improve emergency crew operations. 

Escape doors in the tunnel are spaced at 88 m (290 ft). These

doors are left unlocked between highways and railway, although

there is no handle on the highway side; originally electronic locks

were installed but these have been removed. Fire hydrants are also

spaced every 88 m (290 ft). On the wall opposite the door is an

emergency panel with a fire extinguisher, telephone, and alarm.

Users can open the door by pressing a button; when the door is

opened, an alarm goes off in the control center directing CCTV to

the door. The automatic fire alarm system provides gas extinguishing, water spray, and foam. The tunnel has a fireproof layer on the

ceiling and 1 m (3 ft) down the walls. To date, the tunnel has had

some smoke from damaged cars and tires but no large fire incident. 

Movable barriers are 300 m from the portals and are used for

changing traffic direction if one of the tubes is closed for cleaning or

an emergency.

Oresundsbro Konsortiet works with three levels in rescue 

operations. Level 1 is the lowest and has the least needs: Danish

assistance only for Denmark and Swedish assistance only for 

Sweden (e.g., for a small single-car crash). Level 2 is a two-way

response; emergency services are needed at the incident as fast as

possible. Level 3 is the highest level (e.g., train crash fire or two-way

turnout). Several hundred scenarios have been classified into 11

broad scenarios. A car fire on the artificial island would be Level 1,

and smoke in the tunnel would be Level 3. No Level 1 is specified

for trains.

Language and cultural differences exist between Sweden and

Denmark. To make an alarm based on a telephone call and alarm

12 stations is significant. Therefore, Oresundbro Konsortiet bought a

computer system in Sweden and loaded 11 incident scenarios. The

operator does not determine Level 1, 2, or 3; instead, the operator

answers four questions on a dropdown menu and pushes a button.

The computer will sequence the equipment, depending on the

given scenario. It takes less than 3 minutes for the alarm to be sent

out in both languages, saving time and confusion between languages

and cultures.

Special rescue equipment needs were assessed. It was determined that a need exists for water systems, infrared cameras for

smoke, a fire brigade using motor bikes and water mist tanks to 

easily get to the fire, and medical assistance.

The 2 years of planning resulted in four books. One book has

drawings of the entire link shown from the perspective of rescue

workers. The second book has the emergency plan with details on

the 11 scenarios, as well as a description of how to organize

response to an incident. The third book is an education catalog. The

fourth book is for equipment and evaluation of all full-scale exercises.

Their first priority is to save lives.

Citytunnel Railway in Sweden

The Citytunnel will have the first underground railway stations in

Sweden, and for these stations emergency evacuation plans and regulations will be developed. Because the system will also use Danish

trains, Danish regulations were considered along with Swedish regulations. The standards now are to evacuate trains at the stations or

outside the tunnel, if possible. Evacuation must be completed before

critical conditions are met. Critical conditions are defined as smoke,

radiation, and temperature not to exceed a certain limit and visibility

to 10 m (33 ft). If the train must stop in the tunnel, the evacuation is

to be completed before lethal conditions are met. “Lethal” is defined

as conditions not conducive to supporting life. Smoke and fire calculations are compared to the evacuation simulations for the design

basis. The intent is for 800 passengers to be able to evacuate to the

other track tunnel via the 1.2-m (3.9-ft) wide walkways before lethal

conditions occur. A new European standard for high-speed trains is

for the train to be able to travel 15 minutes at 80 km/h (50 mi/h)

with a fire on board. 

Discussions on safety regulations include what circumstances

required special traffic restrictions, such as evacuation capacity is 

limited, control center is down, electrical current is disrupted, or

communication systems have failed. Communications are by radio

and mobile, regular, and emergency phone systems.

Terrorism and intentional acts of destruction are just now being

discussed. 

CETU in France

CETU described the approaches used for evacuation of people in

French tunnels. The approaches varied with the type of tunnel construction, including cut-and-cover construction, in which stairs could

be used to provide cost-effective evacuation and emergency access;

two-tube tunnels, in which the adjacent tube provides a means for

evacuation through connecting cross passages; tunnels with separate

evacuation tube/gallery; and single-tube tunnels. The single-tube 

tunnel is a much more difficult situation and is generally dictated by

the type of tunnel ventilation design. For transverse ventilation,
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

26 CHAPTER 2

refuge/shelter rooms are built and the fresh air gallery can be used

by emergency services for evacuation of users from the shelters; for

longitudinal ventilation, no good solution exists. Long single-tube

tunnels with longitudinal ventilation are not allowed in France. CETU

noted the importance in all instances of adequate signage and other

means, such as visual and audio notification, to direct people to the

nearest evacuation route. The French directive is to provide 

emergency exits at 200-m (656-ft) intervals in urban tunnels and

400-m (1,312-ft) intervals in other tunnels. 

Video surveillance, used in all manned tunnels, monitors tunnel

activity and automatically detects stopped vehicles. Tunnel operations

also monitor sensors for nitric oxide (NO), carbon monoxide (CO),

airflow, and opacity. Regulations on safety in tunnels provide thresholds for safe operation.

Communication problems between tunnel operators and 

emergency response agencies include the loss of radio and phone

communications in the tunnel because of fire damage to communication facilities (radiating cable) or the effects of ionization of the air. Also,

a common problem encountered was the use of different radio systems by emergency response agencies. Harmonization of frequencies

or other means need to be provided to ensure communication

among all agencies. Also, means must be provided, such as 

emergency phones, for informing drivers of emergency information,

particularly in the event of a fire incident in a tunnel.

CETU has developed a process for safety procedures and 

documentation that provides a common understanding of the analysis and evaluation required, continuing feedback from tunnel operators, and an upgrade program for existing tunnels. This is provided

as a Guide to Road Tunnel Safety Documentation.

CETU officials indicated that they do not consider terrorist

threats a significant issue. They look at this in the design phase to see

what can be done to detect and deter such incidents. Their primary

interest is to detect or, if not possible, to respond quickly, using 

formal emergency response plans. They developed the following

procedures to respond to explosive threats, although it was not

clear whether all tunnel operators have adopted them:

 Call-in procedure for a bomb threat: The operator takes and

records information, closes the tunnel to traffic, and calls the

police to check out the threat.

 Suspicious object in tunnel: Traffic should be stopped at least

1,200 m (0.75 mi) from the object while the police respond.

 Car stopped in tunnel: Stop all traffic and direct drivers and 

passengers to enter the emergency shelters.

CETU has not included provisions or requirements related to

radiological, chemical, or biological incidents, apart from those 

related to dangerous goods incidents. Further studies are required 

in this area. 

STUVA in Germany

The German practice is to provide security or refuge stations at

300-m (984-ft) spacing.

STUVA noted that before the terrorist incidents in New York,

Madrid, and London, little attention was given to explosive incidents

but that consideration is now given for mass transit applications.

There is some application for flood control measures in mass transit

tunnels in England and Germany but, because of the expense, not

for long-distance train tunnels.

Mont Blanc Tunnel Between France and Italy

The tunnel has one control room in each portal. Only one control

room operates at any one time, and the other is on standby. If a

problem occurs at the control room, the control can be instantly

changed to the other control room. Two operators are in the active

control room and one operator is in the other control room.

Generally, power is supplied to half the system from each end.

In the event of a power failure from one end, power can be provided from the other end. The tunnel has an uninterrupted power supply system with no backup generators. Sensors detect the levels of

CO, NO, and opacity, with 20 sensors for each.

A space between vehicles of 150 m (490 ft) is mandatory; violators are fined. On a typical day, 1,600 trucks cross the tunnel. Traffic

regulations exclude trucks with dangerous goods and trucks made

before 1993 because of pollution controls. Checks are made at 

regulation areas for these exclusions and also to check the truck size.

A ticket shows that the size and pollution level are acceptable to

cross the tunnel. Truck controls are at both portals. A laser system

determines the truck size. The trucks also pass through a thermal

detector to identify any unusual heat (see figure 17). If a problem is

detected, the truck will not be allowed to enter the tunnel, and it

must be towed. Truck volume is regulated by law, with not more

than 240 trucks per hour allowed to cross the tunnel. When the

tunnel must be evacuated, the toll operators are in charge of taking

small minivans into the tunnels to pick up individuals.

The velocity of air inside the tunnel can be controlled and a

zone of zero velocity can be set using the automatic system. A yellow vertical line on the screen in the control room shows air speed

equal to zero (see figure 18). This point can be placed anywhere in

the tunnel in 2.5 to 3 minutes to change the location of zero air

Figure 17. Truck thermal detector at the Mont Blanc Tunnel. 
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 27

flow, safely extract smoke, and make emergency evacuation and 

rescue easier. 

Along the tunnel length are 37 refuge rooms at 300-m spacing,

all on one side with a pullout area across from each refuge room

(see figure 19). The refuge rooms are equipped with a video phone

and written instructions in three languages that inform individuals that

they are safe, that fresh air is being provided, and that the operators

know their location (see figure 20 on page 28). Signs direct individuals to remain inside the refuge room and not return to the tunnel.

Refuge rooms can provide 2-hour protection; escape from the

refuge rooms is possible through the fresh air plenum. When there

is a fire, overpressure will be initiated in the refuge rooms so that

smoke cannot enter. The air exchange in the refuge rooms is 20

m3

/h (540 ft3/h). The difference in air pressure between the refuge

room and the tunnel is 80 pascals. Smoke is extracted by a longitudinal duct under the roadway.

Eighteen variable message signs are located at 600-m (1,970-ft)

intervals to direct people to refuge rooms; the messages are in

French, Italian, and English. About 20 barriers are also equipped with

small variable message signs. FM radio override is available in the

tunnel for the 12 radio stations, 6 French and 6 Italian. 

A unique air duct below the roadway is reserved for extraction.

Extraction ducts are positioned along the curb line. During a fire,

dampers are activated. Four fans are needed and an additional two

fans are for backup. Temperature is measured along the entire

length of the tunnel with fiber-optic sensors; a red horizontal curve

on a screen in the control room shows the temperature curve of

the air inside the tunnel in real time. The middle of the tunnel is

always at 25 °C. The system will detect a rapid increase in 

temperature and automatically activate the emergency systems. Jet

fans are single speed and reversible. Wet standpipes are used, and a

system is in place to keep the pipes warm. There are 200 cameras

in the tunnel. 

Security procedures now include three blast scenarios:

 An operator, secretary, or other personnel gets a bomb threat:

The individual receiving the threat completes a form to try to

identify the caller. The tunnel is closed. The police are called and

they initiate their procedures.

 A suspect or suspicious activity is seen: Traffic is stopped 1,200 m

(0.75 mi) short in both directions to empty the tunnel on either

side of the suspect or suspicious activity. A small bus is sent to

pick up motorists from the refuge rooms. 

 A car is stopped in the tunnel: If an explosion is possible, traffic is

stopped and motorists are sent into the passageways from the

refuge areas not in the blocked area. People are told via variable

message signs and radio to access the refuge areas. Automatic

incident detection video can help operators make the proper

judgment.

Currently the scenarios look only at explosives; no WMD 

procedures have been developed.

Special high-tech trucks protect the Mont Blanc Tunnel in the

event of a fire (see figure 21 on page 29). These trucks have a

steering configuration that allows lateral movement and an extremely small turning radius. Foam can be released from the bottom of

the truck, and a hose positioned on its roof can propel water a 

significant distance. A video camera is mounted on the front of the

truck, and the truck is loaded with a variety of safety and firefighting

equipment. These trucks, unique to the Mont Blanc tunnel, cost

about €450,000 (US$540,000) each.

Gotthard Tunnel in Switzerland

As a result of growing traffic, the sense was that risk was growing

and actions were required to address fire issues in the Gotthard

Tunnel. Incident management also is a major factor with driver

behavior such as U-turns. Firefighting equipment includes trucks with

a turntable that can be lowered to reverse engine direction in the

tunnel. Smaller equipment is also used for tight situations. Traffic

control in Switzerland is handled strictly by Swiss police. Exercises

are extremely important and should be conducted in the tunnel.

The Gotthard Tunnel incident plan covers 18 scenarios ranging

from minor crashes to leakage of hazardous materials, but none that

deal with terror attacks.

Crashes decreased significantly when limits were put on the 

Figure 18. “One-button” response for incident

management in the Mont Blanc Tunnel.

Figure 19. Emergency pullout area across from

refuge room in the Mont Blanc Tunnel.
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

28 CHAPTER 2

volume of traffic that can be in the tunnel at any one time. This was

done by instituting criteria for distance between vehicles. A minimum spacing of 150 m (490 ft) between trucks and 50 m (160 ft)

between cars was effective in reducing traffic crashes from 35 to

about 10 per year. Sensors are used to assess the composition of

the incoming traffic to control the volume. 

Loetschberg Tunnel in Switzerland

Cross passages 40 m (130 ft) long are constructed at 333-m 

(1,090-ft) intervals. The cross tunnels are separated from the rail

tunnels by sliding doors rated for 1,000 °C (1,820 °F) for 90 

minutes. If an emergency incident in a rail tunnel makes it necessary

for people to escape, they make their way to these cross passages.

A metal handrail attached to the tunnel wall on the cross passage

side is installed to help people find their way to the cross passage. In

general, the rail tunnels are not lighted but they do have emergency

lights mounted at eye level and spaced at 12.5 m (41 ft) to help

guide evacuees.

Evacuees will be transported out of the tunnel by an evacuation

train, which is available on standby for this purpose, or buses,

depending on where the evacuees have taken refuge. Until the dual

tubes are fully constructed, buses will be used in the incomplete

(carcass) tube where available. In another section, the exploratory

tunnel that was bored to determine geologic conditions before the

main construction began will be used for evacuation. 

Plabutsch Tunnel in Austria

Two redundant operations centers are provided for data transfer

and operations control. Tunnel operators are required to be competent electricians and go through a training program of 1 to 2 weeks

in the control room and 1 to 2 weeks in the tunnel as part of a

maintenance crew before they can work a shift on their own. To

prevent data overload for the system and operators, data are sent

by exception for changes in baseline condition only; this also speeds

up alerts since it reduces processing time.

Firefighting water supplies are located at 106-m (348-ft) intervals

throughout the tunnel. Fire extinguishers are located at each water

supply box along with a hydrant and in each emergency call box,

located every 212 m (696 ft). Hoses with tube length of 100 m

(328 ft) are located in all emergency parking niches.

Fire detection is based mainly on a linear heat detector. Smoke

detection is automatic via a proprietary system. Automatic detection

with CCTV and automatic gas detection are obtained with alarms at

the control center that, if confirmed, result in manual activation of

fire protocols. Information from an emergency call box, voice, or

button, if confirmed in the control center, results in manual activation

of the fire alarm. Automatic notification when a fire extinguisher is

taken from its holding device, if confirmed in the control center,

results in manual activation of the fire alarm.

Two emergency escape exits are located at third points. Cross

tunnels are provided every 424 m (1,390 ft) for people and at 

1.6 km (1.0 mi) for vehicles. It was again stressed that self-rescue

and human behavior in the first 10 minutes of the incident are 

critical for survival. 

Maintenance and Safety Inspection

Rambøll Risk-Management Approach to Safety 

Inspection and Maintenance

Rambøll uses a risk-based approach to safety inspection and 

maintenance. The trend is to use ongoing monitoring of structural

condition. Rambøll staff track the data from their principal (comprehensive) periodic inspections. They accurately record what was

done (type of equipment used, etc.) in the inspection so they can

evaluate the results properly. With this approach, started in the

1990s, they are accumulating records of the progression of structural deterioration. They are using the data to develop deterioration

modeling to determine the existing safety level and ensure that a

minimum required level is maintained. The purpose is to optimize

Figure 20. Mont Blanc refuge room. Top: inside refuge room. 

Bottom: instructions posted on wall.
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 29

the use of available funds, extend the service life of the facility, and

minimize traffic disruption.

Nondestructive testing for corrosion is an important method

for obtaining data to use for deterioration modeling. Corrosion

sensors in combination with online monitoring systems are being

used to enable better assessments of condition and also provide

the ability to monitor areas of the structure that are difficult or

impossible to access.

Oresund Tunnel Maintenance Plan

The police authority has responsibility for road traffic and 

restrictions for maintenance. Oresundsbro Konsortiet made an

agreement with the police authority on how to restrict traffic for

maintenance that allows the organization to apply its own traffic

restrictions. 

The primary maintenance plan is the Link Works Programme

(LWP). The LWP is updated every week. The traffic department

maintains the plan and keeps track of the number of people onsite.

Access is allowed only with a job number from LWP. A crew member notifies traffic control when the crew leaves the site. Traffic costs

are related to job numbers. All money related to work can be related to this job number. 

Oresundsbro Konsortiet is now putting all maintenance planning

into a central database called Maximo developed by Maintec, a Danish

company. The database has 5,000 objects, but not all objects from all

contractors are identified. Inputting costs is not required because of

the concern that other contractors might see the numbers.

One-lane closure is used for maintenance work. Skylifts are not

allowed in the tunnels. Only scissor lifts are allowed. Twice a year,

the tunnel is closed and 150 people work at night. Inside and 

outside, variable message signs are used for lane closures.

The motorway tunnels are washed every 3 months, one side 

at a time. The process takes 2 weeks. Sensors in the pavement

monitor the temperature, which is typically 8 to 10 °C (46 to 50

°F). Weather stations with pavement sensors are at portals.

CETU Tunnel Maintenance Approach

Maintenance is performed with the help of automated data management systems that record and save specified information for status

and analytical purposes and that also provide self-diagnostic functions

to identify and locate faulted devices. The goal is to establish a 

preventive maintenance program using information on mean time to

failure (MTTF) for systems, subsystems, and components. CETU

indicated that this was difficult to apply because of the vast number

of different devices and suppliers as well as the general lack of MTTF

information for application in road tunnels.

Project Delivery

New E39 Highway in Norway 

A public-private partnership made the new E39 highway near 

Tronheim in Norway possible. The route has six rock tunnels and

one cut-and-cover tunnel. Video surveillance is used in the two

longest tunnels. Speed sensors are installed in the tunnels, and one

operations center enables operators to monitor all of the tunnels

and control tunnel access from one location. The tunnel has had

zero lost time because of crashes.

This public-private partnership enabled the project to be constructed in 26 months. It was estimated that if the project had been

done under the normal method with the Norwegian Public Roads

Administration proposing, designing, and contracting the construction, it would have taken perhaps 5 years longer. The partnership—

including the Public Roads Administration; Orkdalsvegen AS, the

financier operator; and Skanska, the constructor—uses the unique

capabilities of each to carry the elements of risk in those parts of the

work where each has the greatest ability to limit the risk. Sharing risk

allows for greater innovation and flexibility to deal with problems as

they arise. 

Orkdalsvegen will operate the facility for 25 years. The Public

Roads Administration will collect toll revenues and make large payments to Orkdalsvegen for the first 3 years and lesser ones for the

remaining 22 years. The payment plan allows Skanska to be paid for

the construction, Orkdalsvegen to receive a positive return on its

investment, and the Public Roads Administration to meet the public’s

demand for an improved highway system. The arrangement also

encourages quality in workmanship; Orkdalsvegen is responsible 

for maintenance for 25 years, so it benefits greatly from sound 

construction and low life-cycle costs.

Citytunnel Railway in Sweden

The Citytunnel E201 Tunnels and Triangeln Station in Malmo are

owned by the National Rail Administration and operated by private

companies. Different packets of work are split up among different

contractors. It is a SEK2.4 billion (US$300 million) design-build 

contract with schematic design by the client. 

For the construction procurement, the owner will purchase two

tunnel boring machines that the civil works contractor will use to

simultaneously drive two tunnel bores. One civil works contractor is

responsible for all of the civil works and coordination with the other

train operation contractors. 

The civil works contract will be a design-build contract with a

shared-risk approach to the geotechnical conditions, which are 

Figure 21. High-tech firefighting truck for Mont Blanc Tunnel.
FINDINGS ON UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

30 CHAPTER 2

supplied by the owner. A negotiation process for additional payment

will take place if conditions change significantly. No independent

engineering checks are required, although an independent checker

reviews drawings and methods for temporary works that could

result in damage. The contractor will prepare his own construction

schedule and is responsible for quality control. The owner audits the

paperwork but does almost no quality assurance. Payment is made

as the contractor reaches milestones, with very few measurements

taken. The owner puts its trust in the suppliers. 

Partnering is limited under legislation for public procurement.

However, the owner has participation in procurement of key 

equipment, a joint seminar for risk identification, input on temporary

works designed to minimize risks, and regular joint construction

meetings on critical activities such as water drawdown. The primary

construction risks are expected to be groundwater, settlement, and

delays due to environmental concerns about chemicals used on the

project. The risk-management principles are in accordance with an

EU and United Kingdom document entitled A Code of Practice for

Risk Management of Tunnel Works, as done for the Oresund Link.
CHAPTER 3

Recommendations and 

Implementation Strategy

UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 31

Team members identified a number of underground

transportation system initiatives or practices that varied from those in the Unites States in some respect.

The team recommended that nine of these initiatives

or practices be further considered for possible implementation in the United States. 

Little was discovered related to the threat from terrorism to

underground structures, perhaps because of the confidential nature

of this information or the lack of perceived need for such measures.

The scan team learned that the Europeans consider response and

safety measures already in place for crashes and other incidents to

also be applicable for many terrorist actions.

The nine initiatives and practices the scan team identified are

described below. Included are the team’s assessment of the benefits of

each initiative or practice and the planned implementation strategy. 1

Develop Universal, Consistent, and More Effective 

Visual, Audible, and Tactile Signs for Escape Routes 

The scan team noted that the signs Europeans use to indicate emergency escape routes are consistent and uniform from country to

country. Emergency escape routes are indicated by a sign showing a

white-colored running figure on a green background. Other signs

that indicate the direction (and in tunnels, the distance in meters) to

the nearest emergency exits are similarly indicated by a white figure

on a green background, as used in European buildings and airports.

See figure 13 for examples. All SOS stations in the tunnels were

identified by the color orange. This widespread uniformity promotes

understanding by all people, and helps assure that in the event of an

emergency, any confusion related to the location of the emergency

exit will be minimized. In addition, the team learned that the use of

sound that emanates from the sign, such as a sound alternating with

a simple verbal message (e.g., “Exit Here”), when combined with

visual (and, where possible, tactile) cues, makes the sign much more

effective. 

The U.S tunnel engineering community relies on NFPA 130,

Standard for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, and

NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited

Access Highways, for fire protection and fire life safety design 

standards. These standards should be reviewed and revised as 

necessary to incorporate the most current technology and results of

recent human response studies on identifying and designing escape

portals, escape routes, and cross passages. 

Implementing this practice will provide the benefits of reducing

the time it takes for motorists to get to a safe location during the 

initial stages of a tunnel emergency and improving the efficiency of

the evacuation process.

The implementation strategy includes promoting the use of

easy-to-recognize multisensory signs that are uniform and consistent,

and providing input and assistance for inclusion of these signs in 

tunnel design manuals and standards.

Develop AASHTO Guidelines for Existing and 

New Tunnels

Single-source guidelines for planning, designing, constructing, 

maintaining, and inspecting roads and bridges have been in place for

many years. NFPA has developed standards for safety in highway

tunnels and passenger rail tunnels. APTA has general safety standards

and guidelines for passenger rail operations and maintenance, with

incorporation of some of the NFPA guidelines by reference. 

However, AASHTO does not have standards or guidelines specifically for highway or passenger and freight rail tunnels. Recently, the

AASHTO Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures created a new

committee, the Technical Committee on Tunnels (T–20), to help

address this problem. T–20 should take the lead in developing

AASHTO standards and guidelines for existing and new tunnels,

working with NFPA, APTA, FHWA, and the appropriate TRB committees on standards and guidelines for highway and passenger and

freight rail tunnels. T–20 should consider tunnel safety measures

such as the Mont Blanc Tunnel emergency pullout area and variable

message sign showing maximum speed limit and required vehicle

spacing, as shown in figure 19, as well as refuge room requirements,

as shown in figure 20.

Implementing this initiative will provide the benefits of creating a

single-source AASHTO reference for use by tunnel engineers and

operators. This reference will facilitate the use of consistent criteria

in U.S. tunnels.

The implementation strategy includes review of the ongoing

FHWA Tunnel Design Manual project, and coordination with AASHTO, FHWA, NFPA, APTA, and TRB on standards and guidelines for

highway tunnels and passenger and freight rail tunnels. 

Conduct Research and Develop Guidelines on Tunnel

Emergency Management that Includes Human Factors

Tunnel design solutions may not anticipate human behavior, and

consistently predicting the way people will behave in an incident is

not easy. During emergency situations, human behavior is even

harder to predict as the stress of the situation replaces intellect with

curiosity, fear, or even panic. During a tunnel emergency, people

often must be their own first rescuers and must react correctly within a few minutes to survive. Tunnel emergency management scenarios and procedures must take human behavior into account to be

2

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1
RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

32 CHAPTER 3

fully effective in saving lives. The European experience in human factor design provides a good basis for the United States to discover

and include more effective measures for tunnel planning, design, and

emergency response. 

Implementing this initiative will provide improved emergency

response plans to enable response teams to better handle situations,

thereby mitigating the consequences of an incident. Its implementation will also improve the ability of planners and designers to address

security and safety issues in tunnel design, and improve the ability of

tunnel owner-agencies to provide training and guidance to the public

on how to respond when an incident occurs in a tunnel. 

The implementation strategy includes working through the

AASHTO HSCOBS Technical Committee for Tunnels (T–20) to

fund and develop guidance for tunnel emergency management. Part

of this effort will be to reach out to academia to perform studies on

human response in tunnel incidents. The work done by the Europeans (PIARC Working Group 3) in this area can be used to promote the importance of human response studies in the United

States.

Develop Education for Motorist Response to Tunnel 

Incidents

During an emergency situation, most people do not immediately

know what to do to save themselves and others. Motorists are their

own first rescuers, and European studies indicate that self-rescue

may be the best first response for a tunnel incident. For this to be an

effective strategy, it is important to educate the public about the

importance of reacting quickly and correctly to a tunnel incident,

such as a fire.

Road crashes are the consequence of one or more faults in a

complex system involving drivers, vehicles, the road, and its surroundings. Nevertheless, the major factor in road crashes is human

error, so efforts to increase the level of road safety must be aimed

primarily at preventing these human errors. The main benefit of this

initiative is to avoid loss of lives by making motorists aware of safety

features in U.S. tunnels and how to react properly in case of an incident in a tunnel. Also, proper education will help motorists avoid

human errors that can lead to incidents. 

The implementation strategy includes working with AASHTO,

NFPA, the American Automobile Association (AAA), and TRB on

outreach, including preparing brochures, articles, and presentations

for conferences, schools, and other venues. Other efforts under

consideration are development of television and radio public

announcements, a video for professional drivers, and a pilot tunnel

safety program with the States.

Evaluate Effectiveness of Automatic Incident Detection

Systems and Intelligent Video for Tunnels 

The scan team learned of sophisticated software that, using a computer system interfacing with ordinary video surveillance cameras,

automatically detects, tracks, and records incidents. As it does so, it

signals the operator to observe the event in question and take the

appropriate action. This concept can also be applied to detect other

activities and incidents in areas besides tunnels, from terrorist activities to crashes, vandalism and other crimes, fires, and vehicle breakdowns.

Widespread public use of CCTV is not as readily accepted in the

United States as in other countries because of privacy concerns.

However, people are entitled to security, and the implementation of

this technology in the United States is expected to provide the benefits of defining the usefulness of the technology and, if practical,

encouraging its adoption by tunnel operators and engineers in their

tunnel operations. The goal is to decrease the time it takes to detect

an incident and respond to it.

The implementation strategy includes outreach to describe the

technological capabilities now available and to explain the safety benefits and possibilities of using this technology.

Develop Tunnel Facility Design Criteria to Promote Optimal Driver Performance and Response to Incidents

Europeans found that innovative tunnel design that includes

improved geometry or more pleasing visual appearance will

enhance driver safety, performance, and traffic operation. For example, the full-size model of one section of the twin roadway tube for

the A–86 motorway in Paris, shown in figure 9, demonstrates the

effectiveness of good lighting and painting to improve motorist safety.

It is a particularly important consideration for a tunnel roadway section designed with limited headroom. Tunnel designers should evaluate the materials and design details used to reduce risks to ensure

that they do not pose other unacceptable hazards. For example,

paint used to enhance the visual experience should not produce

toxic fumes or accelerate fire.

Implementing this practice will provide tunnel designers, owners,

and operators with guidelines for tunnels that will ultimately result in

improved tunnel safety.

The implementation strategy includes conducting an internal

U.S. tunnel scan, and working with AASHTO T–20, FHWA, NFPA,

and TRB to develop standards and guidelines for road tunnel emergency response management.

Investigate One-Button Systems to Initiate Emergency Response and Automated Sensor Systems to Determine Response

The European scan revealed that one of the most important considerations in responding to an incident is to take action immediately.

For this to be effective, the operator must initiate several actions

simultaneously. An example of how this immediate action is accomplished is the “press one button” solution that initiates several critical

actions without giving the operator the chance to omit an important

step or perform an action out of order. On the Mont Blanc Tunnel

operations center control panel shown in figure 18, operators can

initiate several actions by moving a yellow line over the area where

a fire incident is indicated on a computer screen. This “one-button”

action reduces the need for time-consuming emergency decisions

about ventilation control and operational procedures.

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5

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UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 33

The Europeans observed that tunnel operations personnel have

difficulty keeping up with events like tunnel fires, and they believe that

an automatic system using devices like opacity sensors can be helpful

in determining the correct response. A closed-loop data collection and

analysis system that takes atmospheric conditions, tunnel air speed,

and smoke density into account may best control fans and vents. 

Implementing this technology will provide the benefits of reducing the time required to start tunnel ventilation and traffic control

systems and reducing the need for an operator to make subjective

decisions on emergency operations.

The implementation strategy includes reaching out to planners of

new or upcoming major tunnel projects, describing through presentations and training efforts the technological capabilities now available, and promoting the potential safety benefits from using this

technology.

Use Risk-Management Approach to Tunnel Safety

Inspection and Maintenance

The scan team learned that some organizations use a risk-based

schedule for safety inspection and maintenance. Through knowledge

of the systems and the structure gained from intelligent monitoring

and analysis of the collected data, the owner can use a risk-based

approach to schedule the time and frequency of inspections and

establish priorities. It makes more sense to inspect less critical or

more durable portions of the system on a less frequent basis, and

concentrate inspection efforts on the more critical or more fragile

components. A risk-based assessment of the condition of facilities

also can be used to make optimal decisions on the scope and timing

of facility maintenance or rehabilitation. This method offers a statistical process to manage the tunnel assets. 

Implementing this practice will help tunnel operators establish

risk-based maintenance and safety inspection procedures to help

maximize their resources without compromising safety to the public.

The implementation strategy includes promoting the use of tunnel management systems, and working with AASHTO and FHWA

to establish guidelines for conducting and reporting tunnel safety

inspections on a routine basis.

Implement Light-Emitting Diode Lighting for Safe Vehicle Distance and Edge Delineation in Tunnels

The scan team noted that in several European tunnels, LED lights

were installed along the edge of the tunnel at regular intervals of

about 10 to 20 m (33 to 66 ft) to clearly identify the edge of the

roadway (see figure 14). These lights were either white or a highly

visible yellow color. In some tunnels, blue lights were spaced among

these edge-delineation lights at 150-m (490-ft) intervals. See figure

15 for examples. Motorists are instructed through formal (for truck

and bus drivers) and informal driver education to keep a safe distance between them and the vehicle in front, and that distance is

indicated by the spacing of the blue lights. This visual cue is more

reliable than asking motorists to establish distance between vehicles

using speed-based guidelines (i.e., maintain one car length spacing

for every 16 km/h (10 mi/h) of speed). The LED markers are also

less susceptible to loss of visibility because of road grime and smoke

during a tunnel fire.

Implementing this technology will provide the benefit of increasing driver awareness of the roadway/tunnel limits, thus increasing

safety. While driving in tunnels, motorists typically and unconsciously

move away from the edge of the tunnel and crowd the centerline.

In bidirectional tunnels, this means opposing vehicles pass dangerously close to one another. Also, following too closely is an endemic

problem on our Nation’s highways, but the risks increase significantly

when vehicles follow too closely in tunnels. Using blue LED lights at

a given spacing will make it easier for drivers to gauge the distance

to the vehicle in front and help them maintain safe spacing. Future

guidelines should include recommending to designers that white or

yellow LED lights be established as roadway edge delineation and

blue LED lights be established at the recommended following distance, which will vary with the tunnel design, traffic count, and

speed limit.

The implementation strategy includes working with AASHTO

and FHWA on outreach to tunnel owners to advocate installing such

devices and to drivers to educate them on what the LED lights

mean and how to use them to gauge the lateral location of a vehicle

in its lane and the distance between vehicles. This training could be

incorporated into driver education. 

8

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34
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 35

Amplifying Questions

APPENDEX A

Planning approaches, standards, manpower roles and

responsibilities, and communication techniques to

deter, detect, defend, respond to, and recover from both

natural and manmade disasters and other incidents

1. Does your country have a national standard for tunnel design? 

2. What variation in types of tunnels exists with respect to crosssectional dimensions, presence of lining, type of lining, and level

of mechanical systems such as ventilation, fire suppression, and

tunnel monitoring systems?

3. How does adjacent infrastructure, land use, or topography 

influence planning and design?

4. What guidance and standards are provided to planners and

designers to address vulnerabilities to natural and manmade 

disasters for new and retrofitted tunnels? Is blast design included?

5. Are you moving toward performance-based design rather than

the prescriptive approach and, if so, how are you addressing

issues such as life safety, acceptable risk, and fire size?

6. Are risk assessments addressed programmatically for highway

and rail/subway tunnels and, if so, how are the programs 

developed and funded? Do you use an all-hazards approach,

and how do you handle specific risks that cannot be mitigated?

7. What traffic management and safety innovations are deployed or

planned to minimize or eliminate problems such as congestion

at highway tunnel toll collection locations?

8. What are your protocols for tunnel operation center management? Our interest includes the role of law enforcement and laws

or regulations that promote effective response and recovery. 

Also of interest are human factors that influence your procedures.

9. How are communication procedures, equipment, and 

jurisdictional issues integrated among law enforcement, 

emergency responders, and operation control center 

personnel? Which agency has the role of incident commander?

10. Are there laws or regulations in place or under consideration 

for motorist identification, cargo tracking and control, criminal

investigation, or other purposes aimed to deter terrorist actions?

11. Do you actively screen or otherwise monitor truck cargoes

entering your tunnels and, if so, how do you screen them 

without disrupting the flow of traffic? What dangerous cargo is

acceptable, and how is this enforced?

12. What protocols do you use to vary responses to hazards

depending on different types of indicators (e.g., weather alerts

or changes to threat levels)?

13. What best practices can you share in the areas of prevention,

mitigation, response, and recovery from manmade and natural

disasters?

14. How are staffing and equipment needs established for normal

work and for emergency work?

15. What processes and standards are employed to conduct background checks on employees and vendors and ensure confidentiality of information pertaining to assets?

16. What types of exercises and other training are provided to staff

and first responders to ensure proficiency in response to an incident, and how is this training evaluated?

17. What notification are motorists given as they approach a tunnel,

and what safety training are they given on driving through a tunnel?

18. How does your agency interact with the media?

Available state-of-the-art products and equipment

used to deter, detect, defend, respond to, and

recover from tunnel incidents

1. What communication systems are used (e.g., to communicate

with rescue personnel inside a tunnel)?

2. Are you using human behavior recognition technology in 

conjunction with video surveillance and intrusion detection 

technology and, if so, where and how are you using it?

3. Have you developed recovery strategies for possible tunnel wall

breach (as from an explosive), particularly for those tunnels 

subject to flooding? Have you considered any measures to 

mitigate such a breach or lessen its impact?

4. What innovations are you using for emergency egress and for

effectiveness to deter, detect, defend, deny, respond to, and

recover from terrorist actions or other incidents (e.g., robotic 

or other automated technologies, lighting, cameras, sensors,

structural configuration, ventilation control, communication 

technology, weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) detection 

technology, and fire suppression technology for both new and

retrofitted tunnels)?

5. What vehicle identification technologies and cargo tracking 

technologies are used in your facilities?

6. What equipment and materials are pre-positioned for response

and recovery to an incident (e.g., for quick removal of a disabled

vehicle), and what is considered acceptable response time?

7. What technology is used to control access to or create buffer

zones for critical details and areas? 

8. How are access control and surveillance handled under normal

operations? Are your tunnels monitored around the clock and, if

not, what equipment and methods do you use to secure the 

facilities during off-hours?

TOPIC

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TOPIC

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AMPLIFYING QUESTIONS

36 APPENDIX A

9. What types of sensors are in use and for what types of hazards?

Has an evaluation of sensor effectiveness been done (e.g., 

sacrificial heat sensors in new construction, water intrusion/level

sensors, fire sensors, explosion sensors, WMD sensors)?

10. What types of technology are in place to ensure proper 

command and control and interoperability of equipment 

for first responders?

11. How do you detect over-height vehicles before they enter 

tunnels, and do you use cameras to automatically fine vehicles

that have damaged your facilities?

12. What new materials are being used to protect your tunnels

(e.g., concrete with plastic fibers), and how have these new

materials performed?

13. What has been the performance of refuge rooms?

14. What technology is used to detect tunnel fires (e.g., linear heat

detectors, carbon monoxide monitors, traffic camera feeds, fire

alarm call boxes, or some combination of these devices)?

15. How are jet fans protected from fire and other attacks?

16. Have you identified gaps in research for tunnel safety, security,

or other areas? Can you suggest strategies for cooperative

efforts in research to solve common problems and 

promote safety?

Specialized technologies and standards used in monitoring

or inspecting structural elements and operating equipment

to ensure optimal performance and to minimize downtime

during their maintenance or rehabilitation

1. Do you have a maintenance management system to manage 

all of the electrical/mechanical systems required to operate your

tunnels? If so, is it capable of assigning preventive maintenance

tasks to your maintenance forces, and does it track actual 

performance against the manufacturer’s recommended 

maintenance schedule?

2. What inspection and rating programs do you have in place to

detect potential performance issues and to help plan maintenance

and preservation activities?

3. What are your protocols for periodic inspections for security and

other hazards (e.g., how often and by whom are your mechanical systems inspected)?

4. How quickly are you able to detect and clear routine traffic crashes inside your tunnels? Do you have emergency response platforms or stations strategically located along the alignment? If so,

are the tow truck operators your own employees, or do you

contract out for these services? 

5. What equipment is provided in each tunnel for inspection, maintenance, and emergency response? How is this equipment maintained and tested?

6. How often are tunnels inspected for structural condition, who

does the inspection, and what equipment is used (e.g., lift bucket

for access to the ceiling)? 

7. What methods are used to inspect the structural integrity of the

concrete and the steel, both routinely and after a fire, and what

materials are used to repair concrete after a fire?

8. What innovations do you use to prolong service life and reduce

operational costs, particularly those that may provide multiple

benefits related to safety and security?

9. If you had your wish to start a new tunnel project, what key 

elements would you incorporate in its design and construction

to aid you in maintenance and operation of the tunnel as well as

traffic and incident management?

10. What is your business plan for the upgrade or replacement of

the equipment and information technology devices, and what

do you use to schedule and track their maintenance? 

11. How is maintenance or rehabilitation work performed (e.g.,

under full closure, under partial closure, during specific times 

of the year)?

12. What details are used to prevent water leakage through the 

lining, and what remedial measures are taken if there is leakage?

How do you handle the effects of corrosion caused by such

leaks?

13. Are the lighting and emergency communication systems

designed to survive major fires and blasts? If not, what types 

of mitigations are planned to ensure safe evacuation during an

incident that involves major fires or explosions? 

14. What are the operational protocols for the use of the ventilation

system during a WMD event?

TOPIC

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UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 37

Contacts in Host Countries

APPENDIX B

NORWAY

SINTEF

Trond Foss

Research Director

Transport Safety & Informatics

SINTEF

NO–7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 73–59–79–47

Fax: (011–47) 73–59–46–56

E-mail: trond.foss@sintef.no

Gunnar Jenssen

Roads and Transport

SINTEF

NO–7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 73–59–46–66

Fax: (011–47) 73–59–46–56

E-mail: gunnar.d.jenssen@sintef.no

Marianne Flo

Transport Safety and Informatics

SINTEF

NO–7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 73–59–77–51

Fax: (011–47) 73–59–46–56

E-mail: marianne.flo@sintef.no

Terje Giaver

Roads and Transport

SINTEF

NO–7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 73–59–46–69

Fax: (011–47) 73–59–46–56

E-mail: terje.giaver@sintef.no

Dag Bertlesen

Transport Safety and Informatics

SINTEF

NO–7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 73–59–46–60

Fax: (011–47) 73–59–46–56

E-mail: dag.bertlesen@sintef.no

Norwegian Fire Laboratory

Svein Baade

SINTEF NBL

NO 7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 7–359–1078

Fax: (011–47) 7–359–1044

E-mail: svein.e.baade@nbl.sintef.no

Kristen Opstad

SINTEF NBL

NO–7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 7–359–1078

Fax: (011–47) 7–359–1044

E-mail: kristen.opstad@nbl.sintef.no

Anders Beitnes

SINTEF NBL

NO–7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 73–59–1078

Fax: (011–47) 73–59–1044

E-mail: anders.beitnes@nbl.sintef.no

Hakon Skistad

SINTEF NBL

NO–7465 Trondheim

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 73–59–1078

Fax: (011–47) 73–59–1044

E-mail: hakon.skistad@sintef.no

Norway—Road 

Administration (tunnel visit)

Ole Witso

Norwegian Public Roads

Brynsengfaret 6A

P.O. Box 8142 Dep

N–0033 Oslo

NORWAY

Phone: (011–47) 72–87–5590

Fax: (011–47) 72–87–5591

E-mail: ole.witso@vegvesen.no

THE NETHERLANDS

Evert Worm

Head, Centre for Tunnel Safety

Griffioenlaan 2

PO Box 20.000

3502 LA Utrecht

THE NETHERLANDS

Phone: (011–31) 30–285–7903

Fax: (011–31) 30–289–7418

E-mail: e.w.worm@bwd.rws.minvenw.nl

DENMARK

Copenhagen Metro

Anne-Grethe Foss

Vicemanaging Director

Orestad Development Corporation

Arne Jacobsens Alle 17

DK–2300 Copenhagen S

DENMARK

Phone: (011–45) 33–11–1700

Fax: (011–45) 33–11–2301

E-mail: agf@orestad.dk

Torben Johansen

Technical Director

Orestad Development Corporation

Arne Jacobsens Alle 17

DK–2300 Copenhagen S

DENMARK

Phone: (011–45) 33–11–1700

Fax: (011–45) 33–11–1705

E-mail: tj@orestad.dk

Aage Jonasen

Chief Consultant

Bane Bureauet ApS

Erantishaven 106

2765 Smerum

DENMARK

Phone: (011–45) 44–97–6858

Fax: (011–45) 44–97–6858

E-mail: aage.jonasen@banebureauet.dk
CONTACTS IN HOST COUNTRIES

38 APPENDIX B

Anders Odgard

Project Director

Orestad Development Corporation

Strandlodsvej 67

DK–2300 Copenhagen S

DENMARK

Phone: (011–45) 33–69–3600

Fax: (011–45) 33–84–1054

E-mail: aso@orestad.dk

Nils Verner Andersen

Operations Manager

Orestad Development Corporation

Arne Jacobsens Alle 17

DK–2300 Copenhagen S

DENMARK

Phone: (011–45) 33–11–1700

Fax: (011–45) 33–11–2301

E-mail: nva@orestad.dk

Rambøll

Asger Knudsen

Bridge Management & Materials

Rambøll

Bredevej 2

DK–2830 Virum

DENMARK

Phone: (011–45) 4–598–6134

Fax: (011–45) 4–598–6302

E-mail: akn@ramboll.dk

Torben Arnbjerg-Nielsen

Rambøll

Bredevej 2

DK–2830 Virum

DENMARK

Phone: (011–45) 4–598–6576

Fax: (011–45) 4–598–6937

E-mail: tan@ramboll.dk

Oresundbro Konsortiet

Ulla V. Eilersen

Health and Safety Manager

Oresundbro Konsortiet

Vester Sogade 10

DK–1601 Copenhagen V

DENMARK

Phone: (011–45) 3–341–6000

Fax: (011–45) 3–341–6102

E-mail: uve@oresundbron.com

Lars Fristrup

Oresundbro Konsortiet

Vester Sogade 10

DK–1601 Copenhagen V

DENMARK

PHONE: (011–45) 3–341–6000

Fax: (011–45) 3–341–6102

E-mail: lf@oresundbron.com

SWEDEN

Citytunneln

Bo Nilsson

Design Coordinator

Citytunneln

Lilla Nygatan 7

PO Box 4012

SE–203 11 Malmo

SWEDEN

Phone: (011–46) 4032–1400

Fax: (011–46) 4032–1500

E-mail: bo.nilsson@citytunneln.com

Henrik Christensen

Technical Manager

Citytunneln

Lilla Nygatan 7

PO Box 4012

SE–203 11 Malmo

SWEDEN

Phone: (011–46) 4032–1400

Fax: (011–46) 4032–1500

E-mail: henrik.christensen@citytunneln.com

Johan Brantmark

Construction Manager

Citytunneln

Lilla Nygatan 7

PO Box 4012

SE–203 11 Malmo

SWEDEN

Phone: (011–46) 4032–1400

Fax: (011–46) 4032–1500

E-mail: johan.brantmark@citytunneln.com

Bo Wahlstrom

Managing Director

Brandskyddslaget

Hornsbruksgatan 28

Box 9196

SE–102 73 Stockholm

SWEDEN

Phone: (011–46) 8–442–4257

Fax: (011–46) 8–442–4262

E-mail: bo.wahlstrom@brandskyddslaget

Haukur Ingason

Senior Research Scientist

SP Fire Technology

Brinellgatan 4

Box 857

SE–501 15, Boras

SWEDEN

Phone: (011–46) 33–16–5000

Fax: (011–46) 33–41–7759

E-mail: haukur.ingason@sp.se

FRANCE

Paris—Cofiroute

Lauriane Chappe

Manager

Cofiroute, A86 West Information Center

6 a 1- rue Troyon

F–92316 Sevres Cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 1–5547–2161

Fax: (011–33) 1–5547–2168

E-mail: lauriane.chappe@cofiroute.fr

Julien Chappert

Charge d’etudes

Cofiroute, A86 West

6 a 1- rue Troyon

F–92316 Sevres Cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 1–4114–7272

Fax: (011–33) 1–4114–7000

E-mail: julien.chappert@cofiroute.fr
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 39

Christian Bouteloup

Charge de Mission

Cofiroute, A86 West

6 a 1- rue Troyon

F–92316 Sevres Cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 1–4114–7331

Fax: (011–33) 1–4623–0730

E-mail: christian.bouteloup@cofiroute.fr

Paris–Citilog

Samuel Sellam

Chairman

Citilog

5, avenue d’ Italie

75013 Paris

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 1–5394–5394

Fax: (011–33) 1–5394–5399

E-mail: ssellam@citilog.com

Erwan Michel

Sales Engineer

Citilog

5, avenue d’ Italie

75013 Paris

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 1–5394–5395

Fax: (011–33) 1–5394–5399

E-mail: emichel@citilog.com

Lon Adams

General Director

Citilog

5, avenue d’ Italie

75013 Paris

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 1–5394–5394

Fax: (011–33) 1–5394–5399

E-mail: ladams@citilog.com

Lyon–CETU

Didier Lacroix

Research Manager

CETU

25, ave Francois Mitterrand

Case no. 1

69674 Bron cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 4–7214–3385

Fax: (011–33) 407214–3430

E-mail: didier.lacroix@equipement.gouv.fr

Bruno Brousse

Ventilation Expert

CETU

25, ave Francois Mitterrand

Case no. 1

69674 Bron cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 4–7214–3423

Fax: (011–33) 407214–3470

E-mail: bruno.brousse@equipement.gouv.fr

Marc Tesson

Safety Group

CETU

25, ave Francois Mitterrand

Case no. 1

69674 Bron cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 4–7214–3476

Fax: (011–33) 407214–3470

E-mail: marc.tesson@equipement.gouv.fr

Nicolas Farges

CETU

25, ave Francois Mitterrand

Case no. 1

69674 Bron cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 4–7214–3420

Fax: (011–33) 407214–3434

E-mail: nicolas.farges@equipement.gouv.fr

Daniel Lamarche

CETU

25, ave Francois Mitterrand

Case no. 1

69674 Bron cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 4–7214–3420

Fax: (011–33) 407214–3434

E-mail: daniel.lamarche@equipement.gouv.fr

Bruno Wattrigant

CETU

25, ave Francois Mitterrand

Case no. 1

69674 Bron cedex

FRANCE

Phone: (011–33) 4–7214–3418

Fax: (011–33) 407214–3434

E-mail: bruno.wattrigant@equipement.gouv.fr

ITALY

Mont Blanc Tunnel

David Giuliani

Departement Securite Trafic

Tunnel du Mont Blanc

Plateforme du Tunnel du Mont Blanc

11013 Courmayeur (AO)

ITALY

Phone: (011–33) 4–5055–5500

Fax: (011–33) 4–5055–5736

E-mail: d.giuliani@tunnelmb.com

Joel Doucet

Sede legale

Tunnel du Mont Blanc

Plateforme Sud du Tunnel du Mont Blanc

11013 Courmayeur (AO)

ITALY

Phone: (011–33) 4–5055–5500

Fax: (011–39) 0165–890–591

E-mail: geie-tmb@tunnelmb.com

GERMANY

Dr. Alfred Haack

STUVA

Mathias-Brueggen-str 41

50827 Koln

GERMANY

Phone: (011–49) 221–597–950

Fax: (011–49) 221–597–9550

E-mail: a.haack@stuva.de

SWITZERLAND

Walter Steiner

Baudirektion Amt fuer Tiefbau

Kanton Uri

6487 Goeschenen

SWITZERLAND

Phone: (011–41) 886–8251

Fax: (011–41) 886–8200

E-mail: walter.steiner@ur.ch
CONTACTS IN HOST COUNTRIES

40 APPENDIX B

Felix Buser

Bundesamt fuer Strassen

Worblenstr 68, Ittigen

CH–3003 Bern

SWITZERLAND

Phone: (011–41) 31–324–7108

Fax: (011–41) 31–323–4321

E-mail: buser@astra.admin.ch

Franz Zumsteg

US+FZ

Bahnhofstr 3

CH–5600 Lenzburg

SWITZERLAND

Phone: (011–41) 62–892–8802

Fax: (011–41) 62–892–8804

E-mail: ing.fz@tiscali.ch

Loetschberg Tunnel

Markus Aeschbach

Schneller Ritz & Partner

Nordstr 16

CH–3900 Brig

SWITZERLAND

Phone: (011–41) 27–922–0200

Fax: (011–41) 27–922–0205

E-mail: aeschbach@smile.ch

Ernst Mannes

Vice Executive Director

BLS AlpTransit, Loetschberg

Aarestr 38B

CH–3601, Thun

SWITZERLAND

Phone: (011–41) 33–225–7979

Fax: (011–41) 33–225–7980

E-mail: ernst.mannes@blsat.ch

Peter Ritz

Schneller Ritz & Partner

Nordstr 16

CH–3900 Brig

SWITZERLAND

Phone: (011–41) 27–922–0200

Fax: (011–41) 27–922–0205

E-mail: peterritz@bluewin.ch

AUSTRIA

Peter-Johann Sturm

Institute for Internal Combustion Engines

Technische Universitat Graz

Infeldgasse 21A

8010 Graz

AUSTRIA

Phone: (011–43) 316–873–7584

Fax: (011–43) 316–873–8080

E-mail: sturm@TUGraz.at
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 41

Team Members

APPENDIX C

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Steve Ernst (FHWA co-chair) is a senior engineer for safety and

security with the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Office of

Bridge Technology. Ernst is responsible for safety and security technology programs, policies, standards, and practices and for training

and research activities related to bridge and tunnel security and safety. He was the FHWA lead for the FHWA and American Association

of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Blue Ribbon Panel on Bridge and Tunnel Security. He leads an engineering

assessment team that evaluates critical U.S. bridges and tunnels for

security, and developed with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers a

workshop to train engineers to understand and mitigate threats and

vulnerabilities to bridges and tunnels. Ernst is a registered professional engineer in Virginia. He has a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from the University of Arkansas and a bachelor’s degree in English from Arkansas State University. His 20 years with FHWA include

9 years as a bridge design engineer. He is the FHWA liaison to the

AASHTO Technical Committee on Security and the AASHTO Special Committee on Security and is active in cooperative efforts with

Steven L. Ernst

(FHWA Co-Chair)

Senior Engineer, Safety and Security 

FHWA, Office of Bridge Technology

HIBT–1, Room 3203

400 Seventh St., SW.

Washington, DC 20590

Phone: (202) 366–4619

Fax: (202) 366–3077

E-mail: steve.ernst@fhwa.dot.gov

Mahendra G. Patel 

(AASHTO Co-Chair)

Chief Engineer, Highway Administration

Pennsylvania DOT 

Commonwealth Keystone Building, 

8th Floor

Harrisburg, PA 17120

Phone: (717) 787–6898

Fax: (717) 346–0346

E-mail: mahpatel@state.pa.us

Harry A. Capers

Manager

Office of Transportation Security

New Jersey DOT

PO Box 600

Trenton, NJ 08625–0600

Phone: (609) 530–2558

Fax: (609) 530–5151

E-mail: harry.capers@dot.state.nj.us

Donald Dwyer

Technical Services Division

GeoTech Engineering Bureau, Mailpod 3-1

NYDOT

50 Wolf Rd.

Albany, NY 12232

Phone: (518) 457–4724

Fax: (518) 457–0282

E-mail: ddwyer@dot.state.ny.us

Chris Hawkins

Senior Supervising Engineer

Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc. 

One Penn Plaza

New York, NY 10119

Phone: (212) 465–5538

Fax: (212) 465–5583

E-mail: hawkins@pbworld.com

Gary Steven Jakovich

FHWA

400 Seventh St., SW.

Washington, DC 20590

Phone: (202) 366–4596 

Fax: (202) 366–3077

E-mail: gary.jakovich@fhwa.dot.gov

Wayne Lupton

Supervisor

Maintenance and Operations

Colorado DOT

15285 South Golden Rd., Building 45

Golden, CO 80401

Phone: (303) 273–1840

Fax: (303) 273–1854

E-mail: wayne.lupton@dot.state.co.us

Tom Margro

General Manager

Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART)

300 Lakeside Dr., 23rd Floor

Oakland, CA 94612

Phone: (510) 464–6060

Fax: (510) 464–6009

E-mail: tmargro@bart.gov

Mary Lou Ralls 

(Report Facilitator)

Ralls Newman, LLC

2906 Pinecrest Dr.

Austin, TX 78757

Phone: (512) 422–9080

Fax: (512) 371–3778

E-mail: ralls-newman@sbcglobal.net

Jesus M. Rohena

Senior Tunnel Engineer

FHWA Office of Bridge Technology

HIBT–10, Room 3203

400 Seventh Street, SW.

Washington, DC 20590

Phone: (202) 366–4593

Fax: (202) 366–3077 

E-mail: jesus.rohena@fhwa.dot.gov

Mike Swanson 

(representing IBTTA)

Chief Operating Officer

Massachussetts Turnpike Authority

694 Haverhill St.

Rowley, MA 01969

Phone: (617) 248–2824

Fax: 617) 248–2916

E-mail: mike.swanson@mta.state.ma.us
TEAM MEMBERS

42 APPENDIX C

the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, State, and

local agencies on bridge and tunnel security issues.

M.G. Patel (AASHTO co-chair) is the chief engineer for the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). He is responsible

for developing, implementing, and evaluating policies, standards, criteria, and procedures for highway and bridge design, construction,

maintenance, public safety, and operation. Patel is a registered professional engineer in Pennsylvania and has a master’s degree from

Brigham Young University in Utah. He has more than 30 years of

tenure with PennDOT, including 8 years as chief bridge engineer

and more than 4 years as director of the Bureau of Design. He is a

member of the AASHTO Standing Committee on Highways, which

is responsible for approving national standards, criteria, and policies

on highway transportation.

Harry Capers is the manager of highway, bridge, and tunnel critical infrastructure in the New Jersey Department of Transportation

(NJDOT) Office of Transportation Security. He is responsible for

coordinating critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment efforts;

developing, evaluating, and recommending new security standards

and procedures for highways, bridges, and tunnels; and developing

and implementing best practices and other highway, bridge, and tunnel transportation security programs for NJDOT. Previously, Capers

served as State bridge engineer and manager of the Bureau of Structural Engineering for NJDOT. He was responsible for directing all

matters pertaining to highway structures and geotechnical engineering, including bridge management, design and inspection of fixed and

moveable bridges, policies and design standards, scopes of work,

and capital investments. Capers earned bachelor’s and master’s

degrees in civil engineering from Polytechnic University in Brooklyn,

NY, and a master’s degree in public administration from Rutgers

University in Newark, NJ. He is a licensed professional engineer in

New Jersey and New York and a certified public manager in New

Jersey. He chairs the AASHTO T–20 Subcommittee on Tunnels and

serves on the Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures. He also

serves that group as chair of the Loads Committee, vice chair of the

Seismic Committee, and a member of the Moveable Bridge and

Bridge Security Committees. He chairs the Transportation Research

Board (TRB) Committee on General Structures and Subcommittee

on Bridge Safety and Security and is a member of the Committee

on Bridge Management Systems. Capers has published and presented more than two dozen state-of-the-practice papers on bridge

management, construction and design, and transportation security at

various conferences in the United States, Japan, and China.

Don Dwyer is an associate soils engineer for the New York State

Department of Transportation (NYSDOT). Dwyer is head of the

Highway Design and Construction Section, which provides geotechnical support and quality assurance for all NYSDOT projects, from

scoping through design and construction. He and his staff also provide geotechnical support and technical assistance for emergency

repairs after floods, highway washouts, etc., as well as for routine

maintenance. Dwyer is spearheading the beneficial use of recycled

materials in highway construction in New York State, including the

use of recycled scrap tires. Dwyer has a bachelor’s degree in civil

engineering from the State University at Buffalo. He is a licensed

engineer in New York, and serves on several technical committees

of the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP),

as well as on two technical committees of the AASHTO Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures: T–15 (Substructures and Retaining

Walls) and T–20 (Tunnels). 

Chris Hawkins is a senior supervising engineer with the engineering firm Parsons Brinckerhoff Quade & Douglas, Inc. Working as

project manager and engineer, he has gained broad experience in

the design and installation of underground life safety systems and

mechanical/electrical support systems. The scope of his work

includes metropolitan subway systems, highway tunnels, railroad

tunnels, and water/sewage tunnels. He has worked onsite at major

underground transportation projects in Europe, Asia, and the United

States. This experience encompasses new facility work as well as

rehabilitation of existing works. In addition, his design and construction experience includes facility layout, code compliance, cost estimating, equipment selection, and complete contract documents. He

has held key positions of responsibility during all phases of underground construction and mining, from conceptual design to project

commissioning. Hawkins is a graduate of West Virginia University

with a degree in mining engineering and a master’s degree in business administration. He is a licensed professional engineer in New

York, Massachusetts, and Texas.

Gary Jakovich is a structural engineer with FHWA. Since completing the FHWA Highway Engineer Training Program in 1979, he has

been assigned to the Eastern Federal Lands Highway Division in

Sterling, VA. As a Bridge Design Team leader, Jakovich is responsible

for directing the development of plans and specifications for the construction and rehabilitation of federally owned highway structures in

the United States. Over the years, he has participated in the design

and construction of numerous projects, including the Linn Cove

Viaduct in North Carolina and the Arch Bridge carrying the Natchez

Trace Parkway over Tennessee Route 96. His design experience

with tunnels has involved the rehabilitation of existing structures on

National Park Service roads in Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. He is a graduate of Renssalear Polytechnic Institute and a

registered professional engineer in Virginia, and serves as an FHWA

liaison to the AASHTO Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures.

Wayne Lupton is the director of maintenance operations for the

Colorado Department of Transportation (CDOT). Lupton directs

the maintenance and operations programs for CDOT and his

responsibilities include emergency preparedness coordination for

CDOT. In the past, he was the maintenance superintendent for the

Hanging Lake Tunnels in Glenwood Springs, CO. During his 31-year

tenure with CDOT, Lupton has used different types of highway

maintenance techniques, including 6 years of tunnel maintenance

and operations. Lupton has been involved in the use of intelligent

transportation system (ITS) technologies for the past 11 years. He
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 43

has worked on FHWA’s Lead State program, two Highway Innovative Technology Evaluation Center panels, and FHWA’s Peer-to-Peer

Program for ITS, and is now on three NCHRP panels. He holds

degrees in electronic technology and computer maintenance.

Tom Margro is the general manager of the Bay Area Rapid Transit

District (BART). Margro is responsible for managing the entire BART

rapid transit (heavy rail) system, which encompasses 169 route kilometers (105 route miles) and 43 stations and carries more than

300,000 passengers daily. Before becoming general manager, he

was assistant general manager of transit system development,

responsible for implementing the BART Extensions Program. Before

coming to BART, Margro was with the Southeastern Pennsylvania

Transportation Authority for 18 years, working in engineering, operations, and capital projects. During his time with the authority, he

served as manager of facilities engineering, senior program manager

of electrical facilities, chief engineer, and assistant general manager of

engineering and construction. He also worked for the New Jersey

Turnpike Authority, where he was director of maintenance and engineering services and chief engineer. Margro has a bachelor’s degree

in electrical engineering from Syracuse University and a master’s

degree in systems engineering from the University of Pennsylvania.

He also completed additional postgraduate studies in systems engineering. He is a registered professional engineer in New Jersey and

Pennsylvania and has served on several American Public Transportation Association (APTA) committees.

Mary Lou Ralls (report facilitator) is an engineering consultant and

principal of Ralls Newman, LLC in Austin, TX, specializing in the

advancement of structural engineering technologies including accelerated construction and transportation security. Before becoming an

independent consultant in late 2004, Ralls was a structural engineer

with the Texas Department of Transportation for 20 years, the last 5

years as State bridge engineer and director of the bridge division. In

this position, Ralls was a member of the AASHTO Highway Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures and was chair of the Technical

Committee for Security and vice chair of the Technical Committee

for Research. She was also a member of the AASHTO Task Force

on Transportation Security. Ralls earned her bachelor’s and master’s

degrees in civil engineering from The University of Texas at Austin in

1981 and 1984, respectively, and became a licensed professional

engineer in Texas in 1987. Since 2003, Ralls has served as chair of

the TRB Structures Section, which includes the Tunnels and Underground Structures Committee, and is a member of the TRB Critical

Transportation Infrastructure Protection Committee. She is also a

member of several NCHRP panels on transportation structures and

security.

Jesus M. Rohena is the senior tunnel engineer for the FHWA

Office of Bridge Technology in Washington, DC. Rohena is responsible for managing FHWA’s Federal-aid tunnel program for all States,

the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Before joining the Office

of Bridge Technology in 2005, he served as the complex structures

specialist at the FHWA Resource Center in Baltimore, MD. Rohena

has worked with FHWA in the field of tunnel engineering since

1990. He has a bachelor’s degree in civil engineering from the University of Puerto Rico and a master’s degree in structural engineering

from the George Washington University in Washington, DC. He is a

licensed professional engineer in Virginia. He serves on the TRB

Tunnels and Underground Structures Technical Committee, and is a

member of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the

World Road Association (PIARC) Technical Committee C3.3 on

Road Tunnel Operation, and the International Tunneling Association

(ITA). He serves as an FHWA liaison to the AASHTO Subcommittee

T–20 on Tunnels.

Michael W. Swanson is the chief operating officer and chief engineer of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA), where he is

responsible for managing the Engineering, Construction, Toll Collection, and Maintenance Divisions and the activities of Troop E of the

Massachusetts State Police. Swanson directed the transition process

for Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel Project to ensure that all Central

Artery elements turned over to MTA for operation, maintenance,

and ownership were constructed properly and that the facilities

were safe to open and operate. He also directed the staffing assessments necessary to ensure that MTA had the human and equipment

resources necessary to safely operate the new tunnel and highway

elements. From 1993 to 1996, Swanson served as the deputy secretary for capital and transportation planning, where he managed the

capital and transportation planning programs of the Executive Office

of Transportation and Construction. He is a registered engineer in

Massachusetts.
44
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE

45

Bibliography

APPENDIX D

Austria

Unpublished Documents

“Austrian tunnels—general information,” P. J. Sturm, Graz University

(presentation)

“Safety features in Austrian tunnels,” P. J. Sturm (presentation)

Video clips, P. J. Sturm

Denmark

Published Documents

“Crossing the Oresund,” Oresundsbron, Oresundsbro Konsortiet,

January 2005 (brochure)

“An introduction to Copenhagen’s new traffic system, Metro,”

Orestad Development Corporation, ISBN: 87-90143-44-2,

2002 (brochure)

“MSURR: Overall MSURR Safety Description,” Orestadsselskabet

I/S–Metro, Report No. 80-4-01-034, February 2004 (brochure)

“Orestad Expanding Copenhagen City,” Orestad Development 

Corporation, ISBN: 87-90143-33-7, 2001 (brochure)

“Protect Your Investment—Bridges Forever,” Rambøll (brochure)

“SMART Monitoring System—Knowledge taking people further,”

Rambøll Denmark (brochure)

“The Traffic Centre and Toll Station,” Oresundsbron (brochure)

“Two countries—one plan, Joint Danish-Swedish contingency plan

for the Oresund Fixed Link,” Oresundsbron (brochure)

“Welcome to the Oresund Bridge,” Oresundsbron (brochure)

Unpublished Documents

“Copenhagen Metro Operation and Maintenance Aspects” 

(presentation)

“Copenhagen Metro, Safety Approach for transportation system

with tunnel and underground stations, 28-9-2005 AAJ” 

(presentation)

“Monitoring Structures and Deterioration,” Rambøll (presentation)

“Oresund Bridge and Safety,” Oresundsbron (presentation)

“Oresund Maintenance,” Oresundsbron (presentation)

“Q&M—Infrastructure Systematic Maintenance and Management,”

Rambøll (presentation)

“Rambøll Group—Knowledge taking people further” (presentation)

“Risk Management, Rambøll Denmark” (presentation)

France

Published Documents

“A86—Drive comfortably below and live better above,” Cofiroute

(brochure)

“The A86 West Tunnel,” Cofiroute (CD)

“Architecture of Communication Systems,” CETU (graphic)

“Contributions from the Feedback on Experience to Improve Safety

in Road Tunnels,” M. Tesson and S. Lingelser, CETU, 2nd 

International Conference on Traffic and Safety in Road Tunnels,

May 2003 (paper)

“Discover the alignment of A86 West,” Cofiroute (map)

“Fire Behavior in Road Tunnels,” CETU

“Guide to Road Tunnel Safety Documentation: Booklet 2, Tunnels 

in Operation ‘from the existing condition to the reference 

condition,’” Tunnel Study Centre, June 2003

“Guide to Road Tunnel Safety Documentation: Booklet 4, Specific

Hazard Investigations,” Tunnel Study Centre, September 2003

“Guide to Road Tunnel Safety Documentation: Safety 

Documentation Objectives,” Tunnel Study Centre, March 2003

“An integrated safety study for the use of Fixed Fire Fighting Systems,” P. Carlotti, CETU, NFPA World Safety Conference, Las

Vegas, June 2005 (paper)

Below is a list of the resource materials made available to the scan team before, during, and after the scan. Additional

information on these documents may be obtained by contacting a member of the scan team.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

46 APPENDIX D

“Recommendations for Tunnel Design Specifications,” CETU

“Reference Guide for Inspection of Road Tunnels,” CETU

“Tunnel boring machine specifications—A86 West Underground

link-up,” Cofiroute (brochure)

“Ventilation Software, for examining and simulating various 

scenarios,” (not a CFD analytical tool), CETU

“Video image processing for traffic management and safety, Video

Detection Systems,” Citilog (brochure)

Unpublished Documents

“The A86 West Tunnels,” Julien Chappert, Cofiroute (presentation)

“Integration of human behavior in the improvement of safety in

French road tunnels,” M. Tesson and S. Lavedrine, CETU (paper)

“Safety procedures and documentation,” Marc Tesson, 

CETU (presentation)

“A Training Centre for Tunnel Safety: TUTOR (Tunnel Training 

Operation Centre),” P. Merand, J. Martin, and V. Aurand, CETU

(paper)

“Video image processing for traffic management and safety,” 

Citilog (presentation)

Germany

Published Documents

“Catastrophic Tunnel Fires—What have we learnt?” A. Haack,

STUVA (paper)

“Emergency Scenarios for Public Commuter Transportation 

Tunnels,” A. Haack and J. Schreyer (paper)

“Fire Protection Concepts for Traffic Tunnels,” A. Haack (paper)

“Fire Protection in Vehicles and Tunnels for Public Transport,”

STUVA, ISBN: 3-87094-664-4, 2005

“Latest Achievement and Perspectives in Tunnel Safety,” A. Haack,

STUVA (paper)

“Standardisation and Research about Fire Safety in European Traffic

Tunnels,” A. Haack, STUVA (paper)

“Technical Options for Fireproof Tunnel Linings—Limits, Advantages

and Disadvantages of the Various Solutions,” A. Haack, STUVA

(paper)

“Tunnels: Challenges of Today and Tomorrow,” A. Haack, STUVA

(paper)

“Tunnel Fixed Fire Suppression Systems—Symposium Introduction

and Overview,” A. Haack, STUVA (paper)

Italy

Published Documents

“A New Look at the Mont Blanc Tunnel,” GEIE TMB (brochure)

The Netherlands

Published Documents

Fire Resistance of Road Tunnels, G. M. Wolsink, Ministry of Transport,

Public Works and Water Management, September 2005 (report)

“A guideline for scenario analysis,” E. Worm, Center for Tunnel 

Safety (paper)

“Human behaviour influencing tunnel safety,” Stockholm 310103, 

E. Worm (paper)

“Introduction to an integrated safety philosophy,” E. Worm, 

Center for Tunnel Safety (paper)

“The principle of the quantitative risk analysis (appendix 1 at the 

integrated safety philosophy),” E. Worm (paper)

“Safety concept of the Westerschelde Tunnel,” E. Worm, 

Center for Tunnel Safety (paper) 

Unpublished Documents

“A guideline for scenario analysis,” E. Worm, Center for Tunnel 

Safety (presentation)

“An integrated safety philosophy,” E. Worm, Center for Tunnel Safety

(presentation)

“New Escape route signposting,” E. Worm (presentation)

“Pilot Project Compressed Air Foam in Roertunnel A73,” E. Worm

(presentation)

“The principle of a Quantitative Risk Analysis,” E. Worm, 

Center for Tunnel Safety (presentation)

“Road Tunnel Accident Scenario Analysis,” D. deWeger, et al., 

Center for Tunnel Safety (presentation)

“Rules relating to the safety of tunnels accessible to road traffic 

(Road Tunnel Safety (Supplementary Rules) Act),” (bill)

“Explanatory memorandum” on bill (handout)
UNDERGROUND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN EUROPE 47

“Safety concept of the Westerschelde Tunnel,” E. Worm, 

Center for Tunnel Safety (presentation and text) 

“UPTUN,” E. Worm, Center for Tunnel Safety (presentation)

Norway

Published Documents

“Air curtain assisted smoke control system,” H. Skistad, SINTEF

(presentation)

“Laerdalstunnelen, The Laerdal tunnel,” Statens vegvesen, 

September 2000 (brochure)

“Leading R&D to increase fire safety,” SINTEF Norwegian Fire

Research Laboratory (brochure)

“New road between Klett and Bardshaug,” New E39 European

highway, Norway (brochure)

“Road tolling in Norway,” Norwegian Public Roads Administration

(brochure)

“Technology for a better society,” SINTEF, ISBN: 82-14-02777-2

(brochure)

Unpublished Documents

“Evacuation Strategies for Road Tunnels,” D. Bertelsen, SINTEF

(presentation)

“Fire suppression in tunnels,” SINTEF (presentation)

“LED-lights for Safety, Comfort and Evaluation,” T. Giaever, SINTEF

(presentation) 

“NBL—Large Scale Fire Test Hall,” SINTEF (information sheet)

“SINTEF Driving Simulator,” G. Jenssen, SINTEF (presentation)

“Snakefighter,” SINTEF (presentation)

PIARC Publications 

(see http://www.piarc.org/en/publications/)

Classification of Tunnels, Existing Guidelines and Experiences, 

Recommendations, 05.03.B, 1995

Cross Section Design of Bidirectional Road Tunnels, 05.12.B, 2004

Cross Section Geometry in Unidirectional Road Runnels, 05.11.B, 2002

Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels, 05.05.B, 1999

The First Road Tunnel—A Planner Guide for Countries Without Previous

Experience of New Road Tunnels, 05.01.B, 1995

Good Practice for the Operation and Maintenance of Road Tunnels,

05.13.B, 2005

Road Safety in Tunnels, 05.04.B, 1996

Road Tunnels (XIIth World Congress), 12.05.B, 1967

Road Tunnels (XVIth World Road Congress), 16.05.B, 1979

Road Tunnels (XVIIth World Road Congress), 17.05.B, 1983

Road Tunnels (XVIIIth World Road Congress), 18.05.B, 1987

Road Tunnels (XIXth World Road Congress), 19.05.B, 1991

Road Tunnels (XXth World Road Congress), 20.05.B, 1995

Road Tunnels (XXIst World Road Congress), 21.05.B, 1999

Road Tunnels (XXIInd World Road Congress), 22.05.B, 2003 

Road Tunnels: Emissions, Environment, Ventilation, 05.02.B, 1996

Road Tunnels: Reduction of Operating Costs, 05.06 B, 1999

Road Tunnels: Vehicle Emissions and Air Demand for Ventilation, 

05.14.B, 2004

Systems and Equipment for Fire and Smoke Control in Road Tunnels,

05.16.B, 2006

Traffic Incident Management Systems Used in Road Tunnels, 05.15.B,

2005

Sweden

Published Documents

“The Baku Subway Fire,” B. Wahlstroem and P. Rohlen, Sweden

(paper)

“Brand Posten, News from Fire Technology, SP,” No. 29, February

2004 (brochure)

“Brand Posten, News from Fire Technology, SP,” No. 32, 2005

(brochure)

“Bridges and tunnels on the threshold of the 21st century,” Swedish

National Road Administration, 2001: 18E, December 2001,

ISSN: 1401-9612 (brochure)

“CityLine, Stockholm,” Banverket, September 2004 (brochure)
BIBLIOGRAPHY

48 APPENDIX D

“A Complex Construction that will Simplify Rail Travel,” Citytunneln

(brochure)

“Experience from the Stockholm Ring Road Project,” B. Wahlstroem

(paper)

Proceedings of the International Symposium on Catastrophic Tunnel Fires,

20-21 November 2003, SP Swedish National Testing and

Research Institute, SP Report 2004:05

“Ringen—The Stockholm Ring Road Implementation Plan,” 

Stockholmsleder AB, December 1992 (brochure)

“Technology and Environment,” Citytunneln (brochure)

Unpublished Documents

“Citytunneln,” B. Nilsson, Citytunneln (presentation)

“E201 Tunnels and Triangel Station,” Citytunnel (presentation)

“SP Tunnel Fire Activities,” H. Ingason, SP (presentation)

Switzerland

Published Documents

“2004 Annual Report of the Swiss Federal Roads Authority

(FEDRO),” 2005 (brochure)

“The Fire in the Gotthard Tunnel of October 24, 2001,” 

M. Bettelini, H. Neuenschwander, A. Henke, M. Gagliardi, and

W. Steiner, Lombardi Engineering Ltd., 102.2-R-150, April 2003

(paper)

“The Gotthard Road Tunnel” (brochure)

“Loetschberg base tunnel, Sonderdruck/Reprint Tunnel,” BLS AlpTransit, June 2002 (brochure)

“Loetschberg base tunnel, The Swiss construction project of the

century takes shape,” BLS AlpTransit (brochure)

“Methodology and Tools for Risk Based Evaluation of Safety Measures for an Existing Road Tunnel,” H. Merz, M. Bertogg, and W.

Steiner (paper)

Roads and Traffic: Facts, Figures and Tendencies—2004 Annual Report

“Safe Driving In Road Tunnels for Professionals” (brochure)

SIA 197, “Design of Tunnels, Basic Principles,” Swiss Standards 

Association, 2004

SIA 197/1, “Design of Tunnels, Railway Tunnels,” Swiss Standards

Association, 2004

SIA 197/2, “Design of Tunnels, Road Tunnels,” Swiss Standards

Association, 2004

“Upgrading the Ventilation Of The Gotthard Road Tunnel,” Bettelini,

et al.

Unpublished Documents

“Construction Site of BLS AlpTransit in Mitholz,” E. Mannes 

(presentation)

“Fire Detection,” FEDRO (presentation)

“Gotthard-Strassentunnel,” W. Steiner (presentation)

“Loetschberg Basis Tunnel Safety in Construction Engineering,” M.

Aeschbach (presentation)

“Ventilation of Protected Areas in Road Tunnels,” FEDRO 

(presentation)

“Ventilation of Road Tunnels—The Swiss Directive,” FEDRO 

(presentation)

United States

Published Documents

American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning

Engineers, Inc., (ASHRAE) 2003 ASHRAE Handbook, Chapter 13,

“Enclosed Vehicular Facilities”

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 130, Standard for Fixed

Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems

NFPA 502, Standard for Road Tunnels, Bridges, and Other Limited Access

Highways

Recommendations for Bridge and Tunnel Security, FHWA/AASHTO

Report of the Blue Ribbon Panel on Bridge and Tunnel Security,

September 2003

Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP) J-10G and National

Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) 20-77, 

Making Transportation Tunnels Safe and Secure, final report 

pending, January 2006
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