Page 1 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

November 19, 2004 

The Honorable Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Projection Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Information on Options for Naval Surface Fire Support

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Land-, air-, and sea-based components form the “fires triad” that is used to 

support Marine Corps amphibious assault operations. The sea-based part 

of the fires triad is referred to as Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS). From 

World War II until the Persian Gulf War in 1991, NSFS resided mainly in 

the capability of the 16-inch guns on the Navy’s Iowa class battleships. The 

thick armor of these battleships and the 24-nautical-mile range of their 

16-inch guns gave the battleships increased survivability in high-threat 

scenarios. The last Iowa class battleship was decommissioned in 1992. 

Their retirement left a void in the NSFS part of the fires triad. To field a 

replacement NSFS capability, the Navy developed a two-phased plan in 

1994. In the near-term to midterm, it would modify the capability of 5-inch 

guns on existing destroyers and cruisers, and develop extended-range 

guided munitions for the modified 5-inch gun. In the far term, it would 

field a sufficient number of new destroyers fitted with an even-longerrange advanced gun system and ultimately a very-long-range 

electromagnetic gun or “Rail Gun.” 

However, in 1996, congressional authorizers became concerned that the 

Navy would not be able to produce a replacement NSFS capability 

comparable to the battleships until well into the twenty-first century. In 

that year’s Defense Authorization Act,1

 the Congress directed the Secretary 

of the Navy to restore at least two Iowa class battleships to the naval 

vessel registry until a capability was developed equal to or greater than 

that provided by the battleships. By 1999 the Navy had placed the Iowa

and Wisconsin battleships back on the naval vessel registry and has been 

maintaining them in an inactive state since then. 

 1

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, Sec. 1011. 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

In recent years, the Navy’s efforts to develop a NSFS replacement 

capability have not progressed as quickly as planned. Given concerns 

about the gap in NSFS capability, you requested that we review (1) the 

validated requirements for NSFS, (2) the estimated cost and schedule for 

reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class battleships to provide NSFS, 

and (3) the status of Navy efforts to develop a replacement NSFS 

capability. This letter summarizes our findings and transmits the detailed 

briefing that we prepared for your staff. (See encl. I.) 

To address our engagement objectives, we interviewed responsible 

officials and reviewed official documents, including internal memos, 

operational requirements documents, and related studies, from the Marine 

Corps Combat Development Command, the Navy’s Inactive Ships Program 

Office, the Navy’s Surface Warfare Directorate, the Navy’s Guided 

Projectile Office, the Joint Staff (J-8) Force Application Assessment 

Division, and the U.S. Naval Fire Support Association. We also toured the 

Battleship Wisconsin (BB-64) and the USS Winston Churchill (DDG-81). 

We conducted our work from April through September 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

The Navy and Marine Corps have only recently begun the process to 

establish validated NSFS requirements that address the overall capabilities 

needed and the balance between different systems that will be required to 

provide effective, continuous, and sustaining support fire for forces 

operating ashore. Validated requirements for some specific systems have 

been established, however. 

The cost and schedule for reactivating and modernizing two Iowa class 

battleships have not been fully developed. However, the Navy believes that 

reactivation of the battleships should not be pursued for a number of 

reasons. These include, among other things, manpower requirements and 

modernization needed to integrate the battleships into today’s modern 

Navy. Therefore, the Navy has no plans to conduct the detailed studies 

needed to identify the full extent of needs and costs. 

The Navy’s fielding of a replacement NSFS capability has been delayed. 

The near-term and midterm efforts to extend the range of munitions fired 

from the 5-inch guns on its cruisers and destroyers have been delayed 

from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011, but other program options have 

been discussed including the option of canceling or reducing the 

extended-range munitions program to fund development of another gun 

system. Far-term plans to help fill the NSFS gap by 2015 using a new 

destroyer with advanced gun systems were revised in 2001 to employ a 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

different destroyer concept—the DD (X). The Navy currently expects 

sufficient numbers of DD (X) destroyers to be ready to help fill the NSFS 

gap by 2018 at the earliest. 

The role of naval surface fire support has been evolving in tandem with the 

Navy’s amphibious assault doctrine, and for well over a decade, since the 

decommissioning of the last of the Iowa class battleships, both the Navy 

and Marine Corps have strived to address the specifics of how to fulfill 

NSFS requirements. Until recently, these services have had difficulty with 

reconciling their respective positions. Operational requirements 

documents for several systems, such as the new destroyer, that will 

contribute to the NSFS mission have been developed. On several 

occasions, the Marine Corps has specified to the Navy what they believe 

the replacement NSFS capability should be and the timing of the 

capability. However, no single document has ever addressed the overall 

capabilities and the balance between different systems that will be 

required to provide effective, continuous, and sustainable supporting fire 

for increasingly capable expeditionary forces operating ashore. 

Although no formal NSFS requirement currently exists, in August 2004, the 

Navy and Marine Corps agreed on an approach to correct the problem by 

formally agreeing to develop an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that 

would address the overall capabilities needed for naval fire support. The 

goal of this ICD is to document and address the overall capabilities 

required of naval fire support. This will assist in determining the most 

effective and efficient balance of capabilities and in determining the 

cumulative offensive power that naval forces must be capable of 

generating. An integrated product team chaired by the Marine Corps’ 

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development office, in coordination 

with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, will conduct the required 

analyses, develop the ICD, and endeavor to gain the Department of 

Defense’s approval for the ICD. 

Validated 

Requirements for 

NSFS Overall Have 

Not Been Established 
Page 4 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

To reactivate two Iowa class battleships to their decommissioned 

capability, the Navy estimates costs in excess of $500 million. This does 

not include an additional $110 million needed to replenish gunpowder for 

the 16-inch guns because a recent survey found that it is unsafe. In terms 

of schedule, the Navy’s program management office estimates that 

reactivation would take 20 to 40 months, given the loss of corporate 

memory and the shipyard industrial base. 

Reactivating the battleships would require a wide range of battleship 

modernization improvements, according to the Navy’s program 

management office. At a minimum, these modernization improvements 

include command and control, communications, computers, and 

intelligence equipment; environmental protection (including ozonedepleting substances); a plastic-waste processor; pulper/shredder and 

wastewater alterations; firefighting/fire safety and women-at-sea 

alterations; a modernized sensor suite (air and surface search radar); and 

new combat and self-defense systems. Although detailed studies would be 

needed to identify the full extent of modernization needs and costs, the 

Navy has no plans to conduct these studies. 

The Navy’s program management office also identified other issues that 

would strongly discourage the Navy from reactivating and modernizing the 

battleships. For example, personnel needed to operate the battleships 

would be extensive, and the skills needed may not be available or easily 

reconstituted. Other issues include the age and unreliability of the 

battleships’ propulsion systems and the fact that the Navy no longer 

maintains the capability to manufacture their 16-inch gun system 

components and ordnance. 

Following the retirement of the last Iowa class battleship in 1992, the Navy 

laid out a two-phase plan to provide a replacement NSFS capability: 

• The near-term and midterm phases called for modifying the 5-inch guns on 

the current class of destroyers and cruisers planned for production and 

developing extended-range guided munitions (ERGM) to be used in the 

upgraded guns for improved range. 

• The far-term phase called for developing a longer-range advanced gun 

system to be fitted on a new destroyer and eventually a Rail Gun with even 

greater range. 

In the near-term and midterm, expected fielding of the ERGM system for 

use in upgraded 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers has been 

delayed from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011. Technical and design 

Full Cost and 

Schedule for 

Reactivating and 

Modernizing 

Battleships Have Not 

Been Analyzed 

Delays in Fielding 

Replacement NSFS 

Systems After 

Retiring Battleships 

Extend Gap in NSFS 

Capability 
Page 5 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

problems on the ERGM, which has been under development since 1996, 

have led to test failures and delays.2

 The Navy has awarded a contract to a 

different company for developing an alternative technology. The Navy now 

intends to issue a solicitation in 2005 to hold full and open competition for 

development and low-rate production for the extended-range munitions 

for the 5-inch gun. Other program options have also been discussed to 

include canceling or reducing the extended-range munitions program to 

fund the development of another gun under consideration for the future 

destroyer called the “hypersonic naval rail gun.” Also, the Navy is 

considering the benefits of installing modified 5-inch guns on the current 

cruisers to fire the extended-range guided munitions. However, if 

undertaken, the Navy does not intend to use these platforms in an NSFS 

role. This decision will reduce the number of ships able to provide NSFS 

by 41 percent in those scenarios where a 25-nautical-mile standoff range of 

the ships from the shore is needed to protect them from shore-based 

threats. Without the 5-inch gun modification to handle the extended-range 

guided munitions, the range of the cruisers’ guns is only 13 nautical miles. 

In the far term, the fielding of an advanced gun system has been delayed. 

Initial plans called for fielding 32 new destroyers, designated the DD 21, 

with advanced gun systems between 2008 and 2020 to fill the NSFS gap. In 

2001, the Navy announced that it would replace the DD 21 with another 

destroyer concept called the DD(X). The Navy now expects to field 24 

DD(X) destroyers between 2011 and 2023. A sufficient number of DD(X) 

destroyers to help close the NSFS gap will not be available until 2018. 

We reported that the ship’s construction plan was risky because some 

technologies are unproven and the design is not yet stable. 

DOD provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated in our 

letter where appropriate. 

As agreed with your staff, we plan no further distribution of this letter 

until 14 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this 

letter to other congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the 

Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. 

Copies are available to others upon request. The letter will also be 

available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

 2

 For more details on these problems, see our report, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of 

Major Weapon Programs (GAO-04-248, Mar. 31, 2004), pp. 57 and 58. 

Agency Comments 
Page 6 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

Should you or your staff have questions on the matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me on (202) 512-4841 or Jim Morrison, Assistant 

Director, at (202) 512-7078. Contributors to this report include Jerry Clark, 

Robert Swierczek, and Martha Dey. 

Robert E. Levin 

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Enclosure 
Enclosure I 

Page 7 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

Enclosure I 

DRAFT 1

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

Briefing to the Staff of the

Subcommittee on Projection Forces,

Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives

Information on Options for

Naval Surface Fire Support
Enclosure I 

Page 8 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 2

Naval Surface Fire Support

QUESTIONS

1. What are the validated requirements for naval surface 

fire support (NSFS)?

2. What are the estimated cost and schedule for 

reactivating and modernizing two of the Iowa Class 

battleships to conduct naval surface fire support?

3. What is the status of the Navy’s efforts to develop a 

replacement NSFS capability?
Enclosure I 

Page 9 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 3

Naval Surface Fire Support

BACKGROUND

• “Fires TRIAD” supports Marine Corps amphibious assault 

operations

• Fires TRIAD composed of complementary land (artillery/rockets), air 

(aircraft), and sea (surface ship) components

Artillery/Rockets

Aircraft

Surface Ships (NSFS Component)

Fires

TRIAD
Enclosure I 

Page 10 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 4

Naval Surface Fire Support

BACKGROUND (cont.)

• Iowa Class battleships with their 16-inch guns were used for NSFS 

between WWII and the 1991 Persian Gulf War

• 1992 -- Navy decommissioned last Iowa class battleship

• FY92-93 -- National Defense Authorization Act directs Secretary of 

Navy to establish naval surface fire support R&D program

• Navy states that shift away from large caliber guns, the 

retirement of the last battleships, and the current emphasis on 

amphibious assault from over the horizon eroded capability to 

provide fire support for forces ashore

• According to Navy this trend resulted in the congressional 

direction that the Navy establish an NSFS R&D program

• 1994 -- Navy develops near-/mid- and far-term phased approach to 

address current shortfalls in NSFS capability 
Enclosure I 

Page 11 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 5

Naval Surface Fire Support

BACKGROUND (cont.)

• 1995 -- Navy removes the Navy’s four inactive Iowa class battleships from the naval vessel registry (NVR)

• NVR is the official inventory of ships and service craft in custody or titled to the U.S. Navy

• Ships remain on the NVR until they are disposed of

• 1996 -- Congressional authorizers were concerned that Navy’s future years defense program could not produce a replacement fire support capability 

comparable to the battleships until well into the next century. The National 

Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1996 directed the Secretary of the 

Navy to restore at least two Iowa class battleships to the NVR

• Two battleships must be retained until the Secretary of the Navy certifies that the Navy has within the fleet an operational surface fire support 

capability that equals or exceeds the capability that the battleships could 

provide if returned to active service

• 1998/1999 -- Navy placed the battleships Iowa and Wisconsin back on the NVR 

• According to Navy program management officials, maintenance costs for the Iowa and Wisconsin totaled over $7 million for fiscal years 2000-

2004
Enclosure I 

Page 12 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 6

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #1 NSFS Requirements

Question #1 - What are the validated requirements 

for naval surface fire support (NSFS)?
Enclosure I 

Page 13 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 7

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #1 NSFS Requirements (cont.)

Past efforts to address NSFS requirements 

• May 1992 -- Navy’s NSFS Mission Need Statement identified NSFS shortfalls and listed several alternatives to address them

• February 1993 -- Navy begins development of Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) for NSFS 

• Navy plans called for COEA to be followed by an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) to provide detailed NSFS characteristics

• October 1994 -- Navy concludes that the assumed NSFS requirements needed to be reevaluated and updated to guide NSFS plans

• December 1994 – Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) approves revised NSFS plan and in January 1995 directs that Navy initiate upgrades to the 5-inch gun and develop 

precision-guided munitions for use in the modified 5-inch gun. 

• Initial operational capability before 2001

• December 1994 – Navy signs memo transmitting COEA stating that retirement of the battleships with their large caliber guns had eroded Navy’s capability to provide NSFS 

for forces ashore

• COEA proposed a variety of gun and missile weapon systems as solutions to the NSFS requirement
Enclosure I 

Page 14 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 8

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #1 NSFS Requirements (cont.)

Past efforts to address NSFS requirements (cont.)

• November 1995 – Operational Requirements Document for an extended range guided munitions for use in existing 5-inch guns signed

• October 1996 --The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory published NSFS Road Map Study Phase1report 

• Report concludes that there was a need for a new vision to convey the evolving role of NSFS--recommends that the Navy with the Marine Corps and Army 

establish requirements for Navy fire support for the joint land battle

• December 1996 -- Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) memo to CNO outlining NSFS requirements and their milestones

• NSFS is essential to augment organic fire support during the critical early phases of an amphibious operation 

• NSFS initial operational capability by 2010 and a fully operational capability by 2014 

• December 1996 MCCDC memo was followed by June 1999 and March 2002 memos to the CNO. The March 2002 memo

• reemphasized the Marine Corps requirements for NSFS stated in the December 1996 and June 1999 memos

• recommended establishment of a Capstone Requirements Document to address NSFS requirements
Enclosure I 

Page 15 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 9

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #1 NSFS Requirements (cont.)

Past efforts to address NSFS requirements (cont.)

• November 1997 -- DD 21 ORD signed

• One of the primary missions identified for the DD 21 was to conduct NSFS 

• The first of 32 DD 21s to be procured in 2005 and entered into service in 2010

• In 2001 the DD 21 was replaced by the DD(X) destroyer

• Delivery of the first DD(X) has slipped to 2011 

• Marine Corps believes DD(X) with its Advance Gun Systems will help meet their NSFS performance requirements

• April 2002 -- Navy informed Senate Armed Services Committee that they concur with the Marine Corps position on NSFS requirements stated in the March 2002 MCCDC 

memo 

• August 2002 -- CNO reports to Congress that a dramatic improvement in sea-based fires capability is required to align NSFS with Marine Corps doctrine

• Report updates Navy’s two-phased approach to provide NSFS support

• Near/mid term phase is projected to deliver the initial operational capability of the ERGM for the 5-inch gun in 2005

• Far-term approach is to develop a more robust set of NSFS weapon systems for installation in the DD(X) 
Enclosure I 

Page 16 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 10

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #1 NSFS Requirements (cont.)

Current efforts to address NSFS requirements

• February 2004 -- ORD for Extended Range Munitions (ERM) signed

• February 2004 – ORD for DD(X) destroyer signed 

• August 2004 -- Marine Corps issues charter for an integrated process team for development of the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) – “Joint Fires In Support Of 

Expeditionary Operations In The Littorals.” Charter states that

• A significant gap exists in Joint and Service capabilities associated with naval fires and expeditionary warfare

• No single document has ever addressed the overall capabilities – nor the balance between different systems – that will be required to provide effective, continuous, 

and sustainable supporting fires for increasingly capable expeditionary forces 

operating ashore

• Formally stating the overall capabilities required of naval fires will assist not only in determining the most effective and efficient balance of capabilities but 

ultimately in determining the cumulative offensive fire power that naval forces 

must be capable of generating

• Navy and Marine Corps agree that the ICD will be the basis for resolving NSFS requirements issues

• Marine Corps representatives believe that validated requirements will help them compete with other programs for funding
Enclosure I 

Page 17 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 11

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #2 Battleship reactivation

Question #2 - What are the estimated cost and schedule 

for reactivating and modernizing two of the Iowa Class 

battleships to conduct naval surface fire support?
Enclosure I 

Page 18 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 12

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #2 Battleship reactivation (cont.)

Full reactivation and modernization costs have not been analyzed

• Navy’s 1999 estimate for reactivation cost was $430 million for both ships

• Reactivation would return the ships to their decommissioned capability

• Current cost to reactivate estimated to be in excess of $500 million 

for both ships

• Cost assumption based on 1999 estimate with a 4% annual inflation rate

• Cost assumption does not consider availability of shipyard space to complete the reactivation

• $500 million reactivation cost does not include estimated $110 

million needed to replenish gun powder for battleships’ 16-inch guns

• Recent survey found powder to be unsafe 
Enclosure I 

Page 19 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 13

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #2 Battleship reactivation (cont.)

Full reactivation and modernization costs have not been analyzed

(cont.)

• The Navy has not conducted and does not plan to conduct studies to define battleship modernization needs and costs

• Navy program management office has identified the following as the minimum battleship modernization improvements they believe would be 

needed 

• C4I (Command & Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) equipment,

• environmental protection (including ozone depleting substances)

• plastic waste processor

• pulper/shredder and gray (waste) water alterations

• normal firefighting/safety and women-at-sea alterations

• sensor suite (air and surface search radar)

• combat systems

• self defense systems 
Enclosure I 

Page 20 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 14

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #2 Battleship reactivation (cont.)

According to the Navy program management office, 

reactivation time has increased

• 1999 estimate to reactivate battleships was 14 months 

• Current estimate of 20 to 40 months to reactivate the battleships

• Increased reactivation time due in part to 

• Loss of corporate memory 

• Shipyard industrial base

Time to modernize has not been estimated
Enclosure I 

Page 21 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 15

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #2 Battleship reactivation (cont.)

• Navy program management office lists reasons that would discourage the Navy from battleship reactivation and modernization

• Personnel – reactivation would require additional personnel that 

the Navy does not have as well as significant training costs

• Self Defense/C4SI – operation within modern battle group 

structure would require significant upgrades

• Propulsion – System is old, unreliable, potentially unsafe and lacking skilled personnel

• Ordnance – Navy no longer maintains capability to manufacture 16-inch gun system components and ordnance

• Cost – Estimate to reactivate both ships to their decommissioned capability would increase to address modernization needs

• Schedule – Loss of corporate memory and shipyard industry 

base expected to increase reactivation time 

• Marine Corps supports the strategic purpose of reactivating two battleships in accordance with the National Defense Authorization 

Act of 1996 and supports the Navy’s modernization efforts to deliver 

a sufficient NSFS capability that exceeds that of the Iowa class

battleships
Enclosure I 

Page 22 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 16

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #3 Replacement Capability

Question #3 - What is the status of the Navy’s efforts to 

develop a replacement NSFS capability?
Enclosure I 

Page 23 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 17

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #3 Replacement Capability(cont.)

In 1994 Navy developed plan to field replacement NSFS capability

• Near-/mid-term plan:

• Modify capability of 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers 

• Develop extended range guided munitions to fire in upgraded 5-inch 

guns

• Develop a long range land attack missile

• Far-term plan: 

• Develop and produce a new destroyer fitted with an advanced gun 

system

• Pursue electromagnetic technology (Rail Gun) with an even greater 

range for the new destroyer
Enclosure I 

Page 24 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 18

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #3 Replacement Capability(cont.)

Near-/mid-term plans to field replacement NSFS capability have changed

• 1994 -- Navy proposed a near-/mid-term NSFS plan that would upgrade their 5-inch guns on current destroyers and cruisers and fit it with 

extended range guided munitions

• 1996 – Navy awards contract to develop extended range guided munitions (ERGM) system.

• Initial plans to field near/mid term replacement NSFS capability by 2001 were not realized on expected timeline because of technical

and design problems with the ERGM system.

• 1998 – Navy pursues development of a Land Attack Standard Missile (LASM) to provide a long range missile capability by FY04 but the 

program was terminated during FY03 budget development

• October 2003 – Navy issues solicitation for alternative precision guided munitions concept

• May 2004 -- Navy awarded a contract to a different company to develop an alternative extended range munitions technology.
Enclosure I 

Page 25 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 19

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #3 Replacement Capability(cont.)

Near-/mid-term plans to field replacement NSFS capability have changed (cont.)

• June 2004 – Navy discusses options for accelerating Rail Gun development to meet DD(X) schedule 

• According to Navy officials funding for Rail Gun research is deficient

• Options discussed to address funding deficiency included canceling or descoping the extended range munitions program

• August 2004 – Navy again modifies plans for extended range munitions for 5-inch 

gun

• Navy notifies industry of intent to issue a solicitation in 2005 for System Development and Demonstration with a low rate initial production option of 

precision-guided, extended range munitions to be fired in the Navy’s 5-inch 

gun 

• According to program official, depending on which system is selected, initial operational capability could be as late as 2011

• October 2004 – Navy is currently reconsidering decision to not put 5-in guns on cruisers

• Even if cruisers receive new gun, the Navy does not intend to use them in the NSFS role

• Will reduce available NSFS capable platforms by 41 percent if 25 nautical mile stand-off range is adhered to
Enclosure I 

Page 26 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 20

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #3 Replacement Capability(cont.)

Concerns have been raised about sufficiency of far-term plans to 

field replacement NSFS capability

• 1994 -- Navy identified the need for a far term NSFS plan

• Plan evolved from the DD 21 to the proposal to develop the DD(X)

destroyer with advance gun systems

• Current production plans call for sufficient DD(X) destroyers in

combination with DDG destroyers outfitted with extended range 

munitions to fill NSFS gap by 2018

• September 2004 GAO reported (GAO-04-973) that there is risk to the 

DD(X) construction plan

• Program plans to award the contract for detail design and 

construction of the lead ship before the technologies are proven

and the design is stable
Enclosure I 

Page 27 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 21

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #3 Replacement Capability (cont.)

Current NSFS gun range capability falls short of Marine Corps 

stated range requirement 

• Marine Corps 2002 memo to CNO lists the following near term NSFS gun range requirement

• Desired/Objective – 63 nautical miles from ship to shore 

• Minimal Acceptable/Threshold – 41 nautical miles from ship to shore 

• Current NSFS guns are not able to achieve Marine Corps stated NSFS gun range requirements when ships are positioned 25 nautical miles from shore due to 

increased land based threats

• The 5-inch guns with a range of 13 nautical miles currently in use on destroyers and cruisers unable to meet range objective

• Desired/Objective range could be met with anticipated increase in range using ERGM currently in development

• The 16-inch guns with a range of 24 nautical miles used on battleships unable to meet range objective when 25-nautical-mile standoff range is required 

• Minimal Acceptable/Threshold range to target could be achieved if battleships operated closer to shore

• Desired/Objective range to target could be achieved with previously tested but not fielded advanced projectiles
Enclosure I 

Page 28 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 22

Naval Surface Fire Support

Question #3 Replacement Capability(cont.)

Recent Navy analysis found that the need for replacement NSFS 

capability continues to exist

• Navy officials stated that their analysis confirms a capabilities 

gap exists during the early stages of a conflict

• Analysis confirms that ships are best gap filler based on

• Immature theater

• Lack of air superiority

• Capacity

• Number of people placed in danger

• All weather

• Capability (24 hours/7 days per week)

• Cost 
Enclosure I 

Page 29 GAO-05-39R Options for NSFS 

DRAFT 23

Naval Surface Fire Support

Summary

• Marine Corps and Navy have had difficulty reconciling their positions for formalizing NSFS requirements

• Recent agreement to have a Navy/Marine Corps developed Initial Capabilities Document expected to eventually result in validated NSFS 

requirements

• Full battleship reactivation and modernization costs have not been analyzed

• Gap in NSFS capability since retirement of the battleships expected to continue until end of next decade or later

• NSFS replacement capability has not progressed as quickly as planned

• Plans for improved 5-inch gun near/mid term NSFS replacement capability delayed from 2001 to possibly as late as 2011

• Marine Corps states that DD(X) with advance gun systems will help meet their NSFS needs

• Plans for DD(X) far-term NSFS replacement capability will not be achieved until 2018 or possibly later

(120343) 
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