NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0355n.06 F iled: May 25, 2007 No. 06-1070 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. CH ARLES J . M ITC HELL , Defendant-

Appellant
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A PP E A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E WE STE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COLE, CLAY, and GILMA N, Circ uit Jud ges . R. G UY COLE, JR., Ci rc u i t Ju dge
. C h ar l es J el m al M i t ch el l p l ea d edgu i l t y t o b ei n g a felon in possession of a firea rm, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g )(1) , and wa s sentence d to fifty -one months of imprisonment. On appe al, Mitchell cha lleng es the re asonable ness of his se ntence and the district court’s imposition of a four- level enhance ment, under U.S. SentencingGuidelines (“ U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines” ) § 2K2.1(b)(5), f or possessing a fire arm in conne ction with another f elony offe nse. For the following rea sons, we AF F IRM the district court’s a pplication of the § 2K2.1( b)(5)
e nh anc e me nt t o in c re a se Mit c he ll’ s o ff e ns e le ve l, b ut VA CA TE the def end an t ’s sentenc e and REMAND fo r r es en t en ci n g. I. BACKG ROUND I n Fe bruar

y 2003, the Metropolitan Enforc ement Team ( “MET” ), a multi-jurisdictional drugNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 2 - ta sk fo rc e in K e nt C ounty , M ic hig an, re c e ive d inf or matio n re g ard ing an unus ua l a mou nt o f t ra ff ic
aro un d 1 09 5 St ok e s Str e e t N E, Gr and Ra pid s, Mic hig an. B e lie vin g tha t th e tr a ff ic aro un d th e ho us e could be drug related, on Marc h 6, 2003, a Mi chig an poli ce trooper c onducted a “tra sh pull” at the residenc e. T h e o ff

i cer discover ed (1) “stems and se eds of a g ree n and brow n materia l that tested positive for marijuana ”; (2) eleve n plastic sandwich bag s “with the bottoms cut off” which, base d on his training a

nd experience , the offic er be lieved we re use d to packa g e “dime ba g s of marijuana fo r s a le ” ; and

(3 ) p a pe rw or k a dd re sse d t o She lly

Ha ll, 10 95 Sto ke s Str e e t N E. (Joi nt A pp e nd ix (“JA”) 115

. ) The of

fice r re turned for

a sec ond trash pull and this time found paper work a ddresse d to both Shelly

Hall and Char les Mitchell at 1095 Stokes Street NE. On Marc h 14, 2003, MET office rs and office rs from the Grand Rapids Poli ce D epar tment’s Special Response Team e x ecute d a sear ch wa rra nt at the re sidence . Duringa sea rch of Mitchell’s bedroom, the of

fice rs found (1) one thirty -six -inch-ta ll marijuana plant in t he bedr oom closet; (2) an unloaded Rossi .44 caliber handgun, with an obliterate d serial number , in the pocket of a coat found in the closet; (3) marijuana stems in s i d e a shoe box under the bed; (4) marijuana seeds a nd
sma ll i nd ivi du a l pa c ka g e s o f m ari jua na ins ide a sh oe bo x und e r t

he be d; ( 5) ind ivi du a lly

fi lle d p la sti c bag s of marijuana , empty plastic bag s, a Pring les-potato- ch ip container with smoked marijuana cig are ttes inside, and a shoe box containing a pair of scissors under

the bed; and ( 6) pape rwork addre ssed to Mitchell at 1095 Stokes Street NE. ( Id. 116.) Mitchell admitted to living in the house since 2001 with his g irlfriend, Shelly Hall ; Hall’s brother, Jason Hall; and Jason’s gir l fr i end, Heather Essenmac her. Mitche ll told pol ice that he
smo ke d ma

ri jua na , but that he “c omm on ly purc ha se d it

in t he ne ig hb or

ho od ,” and

that he ha d o nlyNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 3 - two ounces f

or per sonal use. Althoug h Mitchell admitted that the marijuana plant, the shoe boxes full of marijuana

and plastic ba g s, and the ha ndg un wer e his, he de nied selling drug s and cla imed that the marijuana

was for persona l use. Mitchell also admitted that he ha d fac ilitated purcha ses of marijuana for f ri en d s b y i ntroducingthem to J ason and to B randon D ietrich, who w ere the ones br ing ingpo un ds of

mari jua na to t he ho us e . M itc he ll c la ime d th a t he purc ha se d t he gun, fo un d in his closet, two wee ks ear lier for protec tion because “people had been looking in his windows.” ( Id. 11 6. ) T he tot a l we ig ht of mari jua na fo un d ins ide the ho us e wa s 23 0. 61 7 g ra ms, of wh ic h 1 00 g ra

ms
wa s attr ibuta

ble to t he mari jua na pla nt. Mit c he ll p le a de d guil ty

to b e inga

fe lon in pos se ssi on of a fi re arm in vio latio n of 1 8 U .S. C. § 922(g )(1)
. Mitchell was first sentenc ed in 2004 to fifty -one months of imprisonment—a sente nce at the bottom of the fifty -one to sixty -three months a dvisory Guidelines ra ng e. The court de termined that Mitchell’s offe nse leve l was twenty -three and his criminal history cate g ory was I I
. Mitchell’s of fe ns e le v e l i n c l u d e d

a f o u r - l e v e l e n h an c e m e n tu n d e r U
. S
. S
. G
. § 2 K 2
. 1 ( b ) ( 5 ) b e c a u s e M i t c h e ll possessed a f

irea rm in connec tion with another fe lony , i.e., distribution of narcotics. In addition, a two-leve l enhanc ement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4) was a dded beca u s e t he fire arm ha d an ob lit e rate d s e ri a l numbe r. Mit c he ll o bje c te d to the c ourt ’s imp os iti on of the fo ur -l e ve l e nh anc e me nt. Mitchell appea led his sentenc e to this Court, a nd we va cate d the sentenc e and r emande d for
rese n t en ci n g i n light of the Supreme Court’s de cision in United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005). At his sec ond sentenc ing he aring , Mitchell rene wed h i s o b j ec t ion to the district court’s imp os itionof

the fo ur -l e ve l e nh anc e me nt u nd e r § 2K 2. 1( b) (5 ), arguin g that th e fa c ts n e c e ssa ry to apply the enha nceme nt were found by

the district court judg e under a pre pondera

n c e - o f

- th e -evide nceNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 4 - s t an d ar d r a t h e r t h ant h e b e yo n d

- a - r e a s o n a b l e - d o u b ts t an d ar d

r e qu i r e d b y Booke r . The district cour t conclude d that Mitchell had waived his obje ction to the court’s application of th e e n h an ce m ent b ec au s e h e h adn o tra i s edi to nap p ea l
. Al t ern at i v el y , t h e c o u rt co n cl u d edt h at t h e f ac tu al fi n d i n gs
nece ssary to apply the four- level enha

nceme nt had to be found by a prepondera nce of the evide nce,
and no t, as Mi tch ell argue d, be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. T he c ourt

de te rm ine d th a t th e fa c ts i n Mitchell’s ca se did support an e nhance ment under § 2K2.1(b)( 5). The c ourt ca lculated the sa me Guidelines ra

ng e—fift y -o n e t o six ty -three months of imp ri so nme nt—

that a pp lie d at Mi tc he ll’ s f

ir st s e nte nc inghe a

ri ng . M itc he ll a sk e d th e cou rt to
c on sid e r “hi s ag e and

the a g e a t w hic h h e c omm itt e d h is p ri or pr e dic a te fe lony

of fe ns e ” in deter mining whe ther to apply

a sente nce be low the advisory rang e. (JA 105-06.) The c ourt found Mitchell’s argument for a

lower s e ntence unpersua sive and Mitchell wa s ag ain sentenc ed to fifty -one months of imprisonment and three y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Mitchell filed this tim ely appea l. We have jurisdiction over Mi t ch el l ’s appe al under 28 U. S.C. §1 29 1 b e c a

us e Mit c he ll i s a

pp e a lin g fr om a

fi na l ju dg me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review Mitchell’s cha lleng e to the constitutionality of t he district cour

t’s use of a

preponde ranc e-of

the-e vidence stan d ar d i n m aking its factual f indings pre sents a question of law that we r eview de
novo. Un ite d States v . B e v e rly , 369 F.3d 516, 536 (6th Cir. 2004). In revie wing a district cour t’s sentenc ing de cisions, the standard of revie w is g overne d by

statute: Th e c ourt of a pp e a ls s ha ll g ive du e re g ard to the op po rt un ity of the dis tr ic t c ourt

toNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 5 - ju d g e th e c r e d ib il it

y o f th e w it n e s s e s , a n d s h a ll a c c e p t t

h e f in d in g s o f

f a c t o f the district c ourt unless they are clea rly err oneous and
. . . shall g ive due def ere nce to the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he g uid e lin e s to the fa c ts. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). We “w ill disturb the [district court’s] underly ing f actua l findings only

if they
are clea rly err oneous.” United States v. Enne nga , 2 6 3 F. 3 d 4 9 9 , 5 0 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g United Sta te s v . H

ill , 79 F.3d 1477, 1481 ( 6th Cir. 1996)). “Onc e we conclude that the district court ha s proper ly consulted the SentencingGuidelines, . . . the sente nce [is review ed] for re asonable ness.” United States v. Gibson , 409 F.3d 325, 338- 39 (6th Cir. 2005). B. A pplic at ion of t he § 2 K2. 1( b) (5 ) E nhanc e m e nt Mitchell argues that his due-pr ocess r ights we re violate d when the district court found the fac ts nece ssary

to a pply the four- level enhanc ement under § 2K2.1(b)( 5) by a pre pondera

nce of the
e vid e nc e rathe r tha

n be y on d a re a so na

ble do ub t. (A

pp e lla nt’ s B r. 12 -1 7. ) Al te rn a tiv e ly , M itc he ll argues that, eve n under the preponde ranc e-of -the-e vidence standard, the evidenc e bef ore the sentenc ing judg e wa s insufficient to suppor t a pplication of the four- level enhanc ement. ( Id. 17-18.) 1. Mitchell waived his objec tion to the dist rict cour t’s application of the § 2K2.1(b)( 5) enha

nceme nt Mitchell objected to the imposition of the four- level enha nceme nt at t h e first sentenc ing h ea ri n g. S p ec i fi ca l l y , M i t ch el l o b j ec t ed t o t h e p re s en t en ce re p o rt ’s re co m m en d at i o nt h at t h e d ru gs found in his po s s es s ion were for sa le or distribution. The district court, howe ver, de nied the objection, conc luding that the la rg e quantity

of marijuana , plus the fac t that it was packa g ed for sale, indicated that Mitche ll was intending to sell it. Mitchell appea led hi s sentenc e and w e re manded f orNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

Ou r r em an d

o rd er co mp ri s edt wo p ar agr ap h s an d s t at edt h e f

o l l o wi n g: 1 The de fenda

nt appea ls the judgme nt of sentenc e ente red on April 28, 2004, on his g uil ty

ple a to p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm by a felon
. Hi s o pe nin g br ie f i n th is court c halleng es the sente nce pur su ant t o Blakely v. W ashington . The g overnme nt and the defe ndant now jointly move to r emand this matter for r esente ncing in light of United States v. Book

er . Up on re vie w, the mot ion is GR AN TE D, and the jud g me nt of sent ence is VA C AT E D. T h i s m at t er i s R E M AN DE D t o t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt fo r f u rt h er p ro ce ed i n gs in light of Booke r . (JA 42 (citations omit ted).) - 6 - rese ntencingin light of Booke r . 1 Our re mand orde r did not state whether Mitchell challeng ed his sentenc e for rea sons apar

t fr om h is Bo ok

e r objections. Mitchell, howeve r, does not cha lleng e the g overnme nt’s argument that he did not raise his obje ction to the enhanc ement in his prior appea l. Rather, Mitchell ar g ues that
on rema nd, a trial c ourt ca

n “re visit and corre ct g uidelines issues, even if t h ey wer e not ra ised on appea l” bec ause Bo ok

e r re mand s are g e ne ra l re mand s, wh e re the dis tr ic t court is f re e to r e c a lc ulate the applica

ble Guidelines ra

ng e. (Appe llant’s Reply Br
. 6.) He contends that his obje ction to the district court’s use of t he enhance ment was not waived beca use i n a gene ral remand the Guide lines rang e is rec alculate d by

the district court a

nd there fore his objection can be made a new. Mitchell’s argument is in co rr ec t
. Mitchell could have raised his objec tion to the dist rict
c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n of the § 2 K2 .1 (b )( 5) e nh anc e me nt a lon g wi th h is Bo ok e r c la im i n h is f

ir st a pp e a l, g iving us the oppor

tunity to dispose of t he is sue, and there by fore closing any further appea ls based
on t h at i s s u e. See United States v. Mc Kinley , 227 F.3d 716, 718 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (explaining thatNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 7 - “whe n a par

ty fails to seek r eview of

a district cour

t’s final order , it is barr ed from rea sserting that iss ue in a ny su bs e qu e nt a

pp e a l[]”) ; United States v. Ade sida , 129 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 1997) (“A party who could have soug ht reviewof an issue or a rulingduring a prior appe al is deeme d to have waived the rig ht to challeng e that dec ision thereaf ter.” ). B eca

use Mitchell did not o b

ject to the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a

pp lic a tio n of the e nh anc e me nt und e r § 2K2 .1 (b )( 5) in his pr ior a pp e a l, Mitc he ll i s fore closed fr om raising the objection now. Fur ther, we need not de cide whether our rema nd order in Mitchell’s first appea l was a limited or g ener al re mand bec ause the issue is not dispos itive in this case . Even if we wer e to conclude that
a re mand for r esente ncing in light of Bo ok e r wa s a ge ne ra l re mand , as Mitc he ll ar g ue s, Mit c he ll s til l
wa ive d h is o bje c tio n to the fo ur -l e ve l e nh anc e me nt be c a us e , e ve n un de r a

g e ne ra l r e mand , a

pa rt y
c ann ot r a ise c lai ms it c ou ld h a ve ra ise d in a pr ior a pp e llate pr oc e e din g . T his wa s ma de c le ar i n McKinley : “ Whil e the dis tr ic t c ourt may e nte rt a in a

ny issues it f

e e ls a re re le va nt t o th e ov e ra ll sentenc ing de cision (following a g ener al re mand), this does not g ive the par ties license to re-a ssert iss ue s th a t th e y

sh ou ld have ra ise d dur ing an e arl ie r a pp e a l.” 22 7 F .3 d at 71 8. Ac c or din g ly , M itc he ll
wa ive d h is o bje c tio n to the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a pp lic a tio n o f t

he § 2 K2 .1 (b )( 5) e nh anc e me nt. 2. The district cour

t properly applied the § 2K2.1( b)(5) enhanc ement Ev e n if Mit c hell ha d n ot w a ive d h is o bje c tio n to the imp os iti on of the e nh anc e me nt, Mitchell’s argument still fails bec ause ( 1) the district cour t did not err in using a pre pondera nce- ofthe-e vidence standard to find the fac ts nece ssary to support the enhanc ement under § 2K2.1(b)( 5), and (2) the fa cts support the district court’ s use of the e nhance ment. First, so long as the sente nce does not exceed the statutory maxi mum, the district court ca nNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 8 - find fac ts to enhance a def endant’ s sentence by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. See United States v. Gates , 461 F.3d 703, 70 8 (6 t h Cir. 2006) (conc luding that “ judicial fac t-finding in sentencing pr oc e e din g s u sin g a

pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e sta

nd ard po st- Booke r

does not v i o l ate [the de fe nd ant’ s] F if

th A me ndme nt d

ue pr oc e ss r ig hts ” ); United St ates v. Corrado , 227 F.3d 528, 542 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) (h old ingthat Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U. S. 466 , 542 (2 00 0) , all ow s judi c ia l f a c tfinding by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e if the sentenc e does not e x cee d the statutory maxi mum). Se c on d, the dis tr ic t c ourt wa s c or re c t th a t a

pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e su

pp or ts imp os iti on

of the e nh anc e me nt. A f

e lon c on vi cte d un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 2( g )( 1) fo r b e ingin possession of a fir ear

m can r ece ive a f

our-leve l enhanc ement to hi s offe nse leve l if “the de fenda nt used or possesse d an y firea rm or ammunition in connection with another felony offe nse; or possessed or transfer

red a ny firea rm or ammunition with knowledg e, intent, or re ason to believe that it would be used or possesse d in connec tion with another felony offe nse.” U.S.S .G. § 2K2.1(b) (5) (2003). To justify

an enha nceme nt under § 2K2.1( b)(5) , the g overnme nt must establish that there
was more than just a coincide ntal nexus between the f irea rm and the other felony offe nse. United States v. Huffman , 461 F.3d 777, 788 ( 6th Cir. 2006). The g overn m en t h as the burde n of
e st a bli sh ing“ by

a pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e that th e de fe nd ant p os se sse d o r u se d a g un in
connec tion with another f elony .” Un ite d S

tates v . H ar din , 2 4 8 F
. 3 d

4 8 9 , 4 9 5 ( 6 th

Ci r . 2 0 0 1 )
. We have r ecog nized that “proof that narc otics and firea rms wer e prese nt in the same re sidence , or eve n in the same room” does not a utomatically “support the application of the 2K2.1(b)( 5) enha nceme nt.” Id. at 495-96.No. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

We adopt ed the fortr ess theory to determine w hether

a fire arm c an be sa id to facilitate a n 2 offe nse and justify

an enha nceme nt under § 2K2.1( b)(5)
. See Un ite d S tates v . H e nr y , 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 1989) (e x plaining that “cour ts have de veloped a

‘for tress ana logy ’ theory , which holds t h a t i f i t r e a s o n a

b l y a p p e ar s t h a t t h e f

i r e ar m s f o un d o n t h e p r e m i s e s c o n t r o l l e d o ro w n e d b y a de fe nd ant a

nd in his a c tua l or

c on str uc tiv e po sse ssi on

are to b e us e d to pr ote c t th e dr ug s o r o the rw ise fac ilitate a drug transac tion, then such firea rms are used ‘during and in re lation to’ a drugtraff icking cr i m e” ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . M atra , 841 F.2d 837, 843 ( 8th Cir. 1988)).

- 9 - Th e fo rt re ss t he or y a pp lie s “ wh e re a

de fe nd ant has us e d a

fi re arm to p ro te c t th e dr

ug s, 2 fac ilita t e a d rugtransac tion, or embolden himself while pa rticipating in felonious conduct.” Huffman , 461 F.3d at 788. Under the fortre ss theory , “a su ff i ci en t co nnection is established [between the f

irea rm and the felonious conduct] if it r easona bly appea rs that the fire arms found . .

. are to be used to protec t the drugs or otherwise f acilitate a drugtransac tion.” United States v. Clay , 3 4 6 F. 3 d 1 7 3 , 1 7 9 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Ennenga , 263 F.3d at 503 (internal quotation mar ks omitted)). I n Ha rd in , f or ins tanc e , w e c on c lud e d th a t th e § 2 K2 .1 (b )( 5) e nh anc e me nt a pp lie d b e c a

us e
coca ine was f

ound in Hardin’s r oom and a gun was found in the sa me room on his night stand. 248 F.3d at 492. We ex plained that Ha rdin’s ar g ument, that the g un was used to pr otect his w ife, did not neg ate a pplication of the e nhance ment: “I t is possi ble that the gun was used both to pr otect his wife and to furthe r his drugbusiness.” Id. a t 49 8. We not e d that app lic a tio n of t he e nh anc e me nt c ou ld be su pp or te d b y the fo rt re ss t he or y : The de fenda

nt, an admitted distributor of drug s in small amounts, kept hi s stash of coca ine and his 9MM g un in the bedroom; and the g un was rig ht ne x t to the bed, f or easy acc ess. Gra

nted that there was no e vidence that Def endant sold coc aine f

rom the bedr oom; however , it cannot be denied that the bedroom was the stash loc ation for the c ocaine , and that a r eadi l y ac cessible firear m was there if nee ded to protec t the coc aine.No. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 10 - Id. at 500. Ultimately , we c oncluded that “ [t ]he fact that the fire arm wa s found in the same r oom wh e re the c oc a ine wa s st or e d c an le a d to the jus tif ia ble c on c lus ion

that th e g un

wa s u se d in
connec tion with the felony .” Id. at 498-99. Additionally , in Ennenga , we e x plained that “[w]hen
on e is i n p os se ssi on

of a larg e and va lua

ble sta shof

dr ug s, the de sir e to p ro te c t th e se ill ic it substances c an be c ompelling.” 263 F.3d at 504. I n concl u d i n g t h at an enhance ment under § 2K2.1(b)( 5) to Mitchell’s offe nse leve l was appropr iate, the district court wa s persua ded that the dr ug quantity

at issue (c alculate d by

the district court to be a

pproxi mately

six ounces) “constitute[s] drug traff icking .” (JA 104.) Acc ording to the
c ourt, th e qu anti ty

in M itc he ll’ s p os se ssi on wa s su ff

ic ie ntl y larg e to “ ind ic a te [] an

int e nt t o distribute.” (

Id. ) The district c ourt was a lso persuade d that sandwich ba g s (which the c ourt noted
wer e “c ommonly

used to pac kag e mar ijuana”) in close proximi ty to the marijuana

also indicated a

n intent to dist ri b u t e. (

Id. 10 4- 05 .) Spe c if

ic a lly , th e c ourt

state d th a t “ [o]ne wo nd e rs why wo uld marijuana be pac kag ed? The a

nswer is in orde r to distribute it.” ( Id. 105.) Her e, Mitchell wa s found in possession of a sig nificant qua ntity of marijuana , which the district court noted ha d an appr ox im ate street value of “seve ral hundre d dollars.” ( Id. 103.) L ike the situation in Ha rd

in , Mitchell’s g un was found in the same room a s the marijuana and next to the marijuana plant. Additionally , the marijuana and the gun wer e both found in Mitchell’s bedr oom and Mitchell himself admitted to f acilitating drugpurcha ses for his fr iends. Thus, the district court could have rea sonably

conclude d that Mitchell’s bedroom was wher e his drug s wer e sol d and that the g un was ther e for

protec tion. See Ha rd

in , 248 F.3d at 499 (stating that firea rms “ar e ‘tools of the trade ’ in drugtransac tions”). Fur ther, Mitchell’s a dmission t hat the gun was for protec tion, likeNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 11 - the defe ndant’s admission in Ha rd in , is not dispositi ve because , as we explained in Ha rd in , the g un could be use d for multiple purposes, includingto further the sale of

drug s. Although Mitche ll waived his ch al l en g e to the district cour t’s application of the § 2K 2. 1( b) (5 ) e nh anc e me nt, Mit c he ll’ s argume nts fa il on the me ri ts. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a pp ly the wrongstandard in f inding the f

acts ne cessa

ry to support the enhanc ement and f urther, a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e supports application of the § 2K2.1(b)( 5) enha nceme nt to Mit chell’s offe nse leve l. C. P r oc e dur al a nd Subs ta nt ive Re as ona ble ne ss Booke r require s us to revie w a defenda nt’s sentenc e for

rea sonablene ss. See United States

v . D av is , 458 F.3d 505, 510 ( 6th Cir. 2006). I n deter mining whe ther a

sentenc e is reasona

ble, we look to whether “ the district court’s se ntence is a rea sonable a pplication of Section 3553(a). ” Id. A s entenc e that is within t he Guidelines r ang e is presumptively rea sonable. Id. But cf. United States

v . H us e in , 4 7 8 F. 3 d

3 1 8 , 3 3 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) (s t at i n g t h at a s en t en ce “o u t s i d e o f t h e G u i d el i n es ra n ge

– ei t h er h i gh er o r l o we r –

i s [ n o t ] p re s u mp t i v el y

u n re as o n ab l e” ) ( em p h as i s o m i t t ed ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Collington , 461 F.3d 805, 808 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). B e c a us e Mitchell’s sentenc e of f ifty -one
mon ths ’ i mpr iso nme nt i s w ith in t he Gu ide lin e s r ang e , it

c arr ie s a pr e sumpt ion

of re aso nab len ess. “This pre sumption i s rebutted, howe ver, w hen ther e is an ‘a bsence of evide nce in the r ecor d that the district court consider ed all of the rele vant sec tion 3553(a) f actor s.’” D av is , 4 5 8 F. 3 d at 510 (q u o t i n g United States v. Fore man , 436 F.3d 638, 644 ( 6th Cir. 2006)). When the district court selec ts a sentenc e th at d ev i at es (upwards or dow nwar ds) from the advisory Guidelines ra

ng e, we apply

“propor tionality re v i ew : ‘t he fa

rther the judge ’s sentenc eNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 12 - de pa rt s f ro m th e g uid e lin e s se nte nc e . . . th e mor e c omp e lli ngthe jus tif ic a tio n b a se d o n f

a c tor s in section 3553(a )’ must be.” Un ite d Sta te s v . W il li am J . Da vis , 458 F.3d 491, 496 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (q u o t i n g United States v. De an , 414 F.3d 725, 729 ( 7th Cir. 2005)). L astly , “we may conclude that
a s en t en ce i s u n re as o n ab l e wh en t h e di s t ri ct j u d ge fa i l s t o ‘c o n s i d er ’ t h e ap p l i cab l e G u i d el i n es ra n ge
or ne g le c ts to ‘c on sid e r’ the oth e r fa c tor s liste d in 18 U.S. C. § 3553 (a ), and ins te a d simp ly se le c ts what the judge deems a

n appropr iate sente nce w ithout such require d consideration.” United States v. W ebb , 403 F.3d 373, 383 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I n United States v. Richardson , 43 7 F .3 d 55 0, 55 4 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) , w e e xpla ine d th a t me re ly sentenc ing a

defe ndant to a ter

m of imprisonment that falls with i n t h e Gui delines ra ng e does not relieve the district court of its re sponsibili ty to expl ain its reasons f

or imposing a

sentenc e. The district court has a

n “oblig atio n t o ex p l ain t o the par ties and the re viewing court its rea sons for imposing a particula

r sentence.” Id. “W h er e ad ef en d an tra i s es a p ar t i cu l ar

ar gu m en ti ns ee k i n g a lower s e n te n c e , th e r e c o r d

mu s t r e f le c t b o th th a t t h e d is tr ic t j u d g e c o n s id e r e d th e d e f e n d an t’ s argument and that the j udg e ex plained the basis for r ejec ting it.” Id. I n Richardson , we c oncluded that the sen t en ce i mp o s edwa s re as o n ab l e b ec au s e “ [ t ] h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g t ra n s cr i p treveal[ed] that the di strict court articulated a nd explained its reasons for se ntencingRichardson . . . .” Id. We were
c on vin c e d th a t “ ” [t]he [dis tr ic t] c ourt did no t ‘ sim ply se le c t’ wh a t it

vie we d a s ‘ an a

pp ro pr iate sentenc e.’” Id. (q u o t i n g W ebb , 403 F.3d at 383). I n United States v. J

ackson , 4 08 F .3 d 3 01 , 3 05 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) , w e he ld t hat a de fe nd ant i s entitled to resente ncing if the district court mer ely provides a list of the de fenda nt’s various char acte ristics that it considered dur ing se ntencing “ w it h o ut a ny a c company

ing a naly sis.” The CourtNo. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 13 - in Jack son he ld that mer e ly pr ov idi ng a lis t wa s “in su ff ic ie nt to just if

y the se nte nc e imp os e d, a s it
re n d er s our re asonable ness re view impossible.” Id. “In our view, Booke r r e qu ir e s an acknow ledg ment of the de fenda nt’s applicable Guidelines ra ng e as w ell as a discussion of the
rea sonablene ss of a va

riation from that ra

ng e.” Id. We state d that “ we a s an a pp e llate c ourt

mus t still have the articulation of t he reasons t he dis trict court reac hed the sentenc e ult imately imposed.” Id .; ac c or d United States v. W

illiams , 4 32 F .3 d 62 1, 62 2 (6 th Cir
. 20 05 ) (“ I n or de r f or an a pp e llate court to ef fec tively revie w the re asonable ness of the sentenc e, there must be an a dequate explanation of the district cour

t’s rea sons for imposing the sentenc e.”)
. He re , th e dis tr ic t c ourt g a ve the fo llo wi ngra tio na le fo r i ts i mpo sit ion

of a fi ft y -o ne mon th sentenc e: [C ]onsi deringthe ca lcu lated guideline ra ng e, as w ell as the fa ctors in Title 18, Section 3553(a) . . . and par ticularly taking into a ccount the proper conce rns of the de fe nd ant .
. . , n oti ngde fe nd ant i s a y oungof fe nd e r; ha s le arn ingdis a

bil iti e s; i t is claimed ha d a prior f

elony conviction when he was 17 y ear s of age; wa s immature at that time, and that retribution and dete rre nce lose some of their f orce when a

pplied to such persons; that the gun was unloaded, and that the defe ndant had it for pe rsonal pr ote c tio n, a lth ou g h it se e ms to me that tho se tw o th ing s are so me wh a t at od ds wi th eac h other . . . . [I ]t ’s noted fur

ther that the defe ndant committed this offe nse, and then found and held a job. Finally , that the unre lated drugchar g es pending ag ainst him in Grand Rapids were , in fac t, dismi ssed . . . . B ut t hinkin g a bo ut a ll o f t

he se thi ng s, and

tr yingto as c e rt a in a

re a so na ble sentenc e for

the def endan t , specific ally

whether it’s nece ssary

to vary from the g uid e lin e ra

ng e in o rd e r t o f

ind a re a so na ble se nte nc e , it is my vie w that th e re is f ir st no rea son to, in fact, depa rt from the c alculate d g uideline rang e, for rea sons stated within the guide lines manual. Fur ther, a nd finally , Ifind that there ’s no persua sive rea son to va ry from the g uideline ra

ng e for , among other thing s, rea sons of per sonal cha rac teristics under [§]No. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 14 - 3553 as par

ticularly expressed in the conc lusion of the defen d an t ’s s entenc ing me mor and

um. An d I

int e nd to i mpo se a

se nte nc e that is e qu iva le nt t o th a t or ig ina lly imp os e d, sp e c if

ic a lly 51 mon ths
. (JA 106-07.) Mitchell urg ed the district cour t to deviate downwa

rd fr o m t he Guidelines r ang e base d on his ag e at the time he committed the crime, twenty -two, and his ag e at the time of his prior felony offe nse, seve nteen. Th e co u rt did not ex plain why it was reje cting Mitchell’s argument for a sentenc e below the Guidelines ra ng e; its only

explanation was that it found “no pe rsuasive r eason” to depar t. ( Id. at 107.) Her e, the district court did littl e more than list Mitchell’s char acte ristics, such as his a g e and le arn ingdis a

bil ity , w hic h c ou ld h a ve jus tif ie d a do wnwa rd va ri anc e un de r § 35 53 (a ), bu t f a ile d to explain why these char acte ristics did not justify a below- Guidelines sentenc e. In essenc e, the district court did what we admonished in Jack son and Richardson : the court listed Mitchell’s cha rac teristics without any

acc ompanying r ationale f or imposing the fifty -one month sentence . Simpl y stating that there is “no persua sive rea son” t o depar t from the Guidelines ra

ng e is insufficient unde r Richardson and Jack son . See R ichardson , 43 7 F .3 d a t 55 4 ( e xpla ini ngthat th e dis tr ic t c ourt mus t “ c omm

un ic a te
c le arl y its ratio na le fo r i mpo sin g the sp e c if ic se nte nc e ” ); Jack

son , 408 F.3d at 3 0 5 (st ating that
me re ly pr ov idi nga

lis t of de fe nd ant’ s c ha

ra c te ri st ics , “wi tho ut a

ny a c c omp anyingana ly sis , is insufficient” ). I nstead, we require some demonstration that the court analy zed the § 3553(a) fac tors in relation to this particular de fenda nt and some evide nce of

a desc riptive link betwee n the def endant
and the se nte nc e imp os e d. A b are re fe re nc e to th e Gu ide lin e s o r t o a se nte nc ingme mor and

um, without some ex planation of their sig nificanc e or r eleva nce in this particular c ase, w ill not s uffice
.No. 06-1070

Un ite d S tat es v . M itc he ll

- 15 - We rec og nize that this is a very close c ase. L ittle more would be ne eded to satisfy our require ments for proc edura l rea sonablene ss. For the rea sons st at ed above , howeve r, we conclude that the district court fell just short of complying with our controlling prec edents. Ac cording ly , we
rema nd this case to the district c ourt for rese ntencing
. I n particula r, the district c ourt should provide its rationale for why a sentenc e of fifty -one months of imprisonment is appropr iate based on the § 35 53 (a ) f a c tor s. III . C ON CL USI ON For th e for eg oing r easons, we AF F IRM the district court’s use of the § 2K2.1( b)(5) enh ance me nt b ut VA CA TE Mitchell’s sentenc e and REMAND Mit c he ll’ s c a se for r esente ncing consistent with this opi nion.