a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2004 FEDERAL ADVISORY 

COMMITTEES

Additional Guidance 

Could Help Agencies 

Better Ensure 

Independence and 

Balance

GAO-04-328
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-328.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Robin Nazzaro 

at (202) 512-3841 or NazzaroR@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-328, a report to

congressional requesters 

April 2004

FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Additional Guidance Could Help 

Agencies Better Ensure Independence 

and Balance 

Federal advisory committees play an important role in shaping public policy 

by providing advice on a wide array of issues, such as stem cell research, 

drinking water standards, space exploration, drug approvals, and federal 

land management. About 950 advisory committees perform peer reviews of 

scientific research; offer advice on policy issues; identify long-range issues; 

and evaluate grant proposals, among other functions. 

Additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure the 

independence of members—that is, that they are free from significant 

conflicts of interest—and balance of federal advisory committees. For 

example, current limitations in the Office of Government Ethics’ (OGE) 

guidance are a factor in at least three agencies’ continuing a long-standing 

practice of appointing most or all members as “representatives”—expected 

to reflect the views of the entity or group they are representing and not 

subject to conflict-of-interest reviews—even when the agencies call upon the 

members to provide advice on behalf of the government. Such members 

would be more appropriately appointed as “special government employees,” 

who are reviewed for conflicts of interest. OGE officials agreed with GAO 

that these agencies’ appointments of some members as representatives of 

their fields of expertise are not appropriate, and this practice avoids using 

the special government employee category that was created to help the 

government hire experts in various fields for such purposes. OGE guidance 

that representatives may speak for, among others, any recognizable group of 

persons should be clarified to state that they generally are not to represent 

an expertise. Also, to be effective, advisory committees must be, and be 

perceived as being, fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions 

to be performed. However, the General Services Administration’s (GSA) 

guidance on advisory committee management does not address what types 

of information could be helpful to agencies in assessing the points of view of 

potential committee members, nor do agency procedures identify what 

information should be collected about potential members to make decisions 

about committee balance. Consequently, many agencies do not identify and 

systematically collect and evaluate information pertinent to determining the 

points of view of potential committee members, such as previous public 

positions or statements on matters being reviewed. 

GAO identified promising practices and measures that can better ensure 

independence and balance and promote transparency in the federal advisory 

committee system, such as obtaining nominations from the public and 

making public information about how members are identified and screened. 

Wider use of these practices—particularly for committees addressing 

sensitive or controversial topics—could reduce the likelihood that 

committees are, or are perceived as being, biased or imbalanced. 

Because advisory committees are 

established to advise federal 

decision makers on significant 

national issues, it is essential that 

their membership be, and be 

perceived as being, free from 

conflicts of interest and balanced 

as a whole. GAO was asked to (1) 

describe the role of federal 

advisory committees in the 

development of national policies, 

(2) examine the extent to which 

existing guidance and policies and 

procedures for evaluating 

committee members for conflicts 

of interest and points of view 

ensure independent members and 

balanced committees, and (3) 

identify practices and measures 

that could help ensure 

independence and balance. 

GAO recommends that GSA and/or 

OGE, as appropriate, give direction 

to agencies on: the proper use of 

representative appointments; 

information that would help ensure 

committees are, and are perceived 

as, balanced; and practices that 

would better ensure independence 

and balance and enhance 

transparency in the advisory 

committee process. GSA agreed 

with GAO’s findings and agreed to 

work with OGE to implement the 

recommendations. OGE agreed 

that representative appointments 

need review but disagreed that its 

guidance has limitations. GAO 

continues to believe the guidance 

could be improved to better ensure 

that agencies are appropriately 

appointing committee members. 
Page i GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

Advisory Committees Play an Important Role in the Development of 

Federal Policies 14

Federal Guidance Could Better Ensure Independence and 

Balance 17

Promising Practices Could Better Ensure Independence and 

Balance 41

Conclusions 50

Recommendations for Executive Action 52

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 54

Appendixes

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 60

Appendix II: Federal Advisory Committees, by Authorizing Mechanism 

and Type, in Fiscal Year 2003 64

Appendix III: Information on the Department of Agriculture’s National 

Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods 67

Appendix IV: Information on the Department of Energy’s Biological and 

Environmental Research Advisory Committee 70

Appendix V: Information on the Environmental Protection Agency’s 

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 

Scientific Advisory Panel 73

Appendix VI: Information on the Department of Health and Human 

Services’s Advisory Committee on Human Research 

Protections 77

Appendix VII: Information on the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention’s Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead 

Poisoning Prevention 80

Appendix VIII: Information on the Food and Drug Administration’s Food 

Advisory Committee 82

Appendix IX: Information on the National Institutes of Health’s Scientific 

Advisory Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods 86
Contents

Page ii GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix X: Information on the Department of the Interior’s U.S. 

Geological Survey’s Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory 

Committee 90

Appendix XI: Information on the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s Space Science Advisory Committee 92

Appendix XII: Comments from the General Services Administration 94

Appendix XIII: Comments from the Office of Government Ethics 101

GAO Comments 108

Appendix XIV: Comments from the Department of Health and Human 

Services 112

GAO Comments 116

Appendix XV: Comments from the Department of the Interior 118

GAO Comments 124

Appendix XVI: Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 130

GAO Comments 132

Appendix XVII: Comments from the Department of Energy 134

GAO Comments 138

Appendix XVIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 141

GAO Contacts 141

Staff Acknowledgments 141

Tables Table 1: Documentation That Agencies Systematically Collected on 

Potential Members of Selected Committees 35

Table 2: Factors Used by Agencies to Balance Selected 

Committees 39

Table 3: Authorizing Mechanism for Active Federal Advisory 

Committees in Fiscal Year 2003 64

Table 4: Active Federal Advisory Committees, by Type, in Fiscal 

Year 2003 65

Table 5: Roster of the National Advisory Committee on 

Microbiological Criteria for Foods with the Primary 

Employers and Areas of Expertise as of December 2003 68

Table 6: Roster of the Biological and Environmental Research 

Advisory Committee with the Primary Employers and 

Areas of Expertise as of December 30, 2003 71

Table 7: Roster of the Standing FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel 

with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 

December 2003 75
Contents

Page iii GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Table 8: Roster of the Temporary (Ad Hoc) Members Serving on the 

June 17 to 20, 2003, Meeting on Atrazine 76

Table 9: Roster of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human 

Research Protections with the Primary Employers and 

Areas of Expertise as of December 2003 79

Table 10: Roster of the Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead 

Poisoning Prevention with the Primary Employers and 

Areas of Expertise as of December 2003 81

Table 11: Roster of the Food Advisory Committee with the Primary 

Employers and Areas of Expertise as of June 3, 2003 84

Table 12: Roster of the Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative 

Toxicological Methods with the Primary Employers, and 

Areas of Expertise as of December 30, 2003 89

Table 13: Roster of the Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory 

Committee with the Primary Employers and Areas of 

Expertise as of December 2003 91

Table 14: Roster of the Space Science Advisory Committee Members 

with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 

December 30, 2003 93
Contents

Page iv GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Abbreviations

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CODEX Codex Alementarius Commission

CV curricula vitae

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FACA Federal Advisory Committee Act

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FDA Food and Drug Administration

FIFRA Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1977

FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service

GSA General Services Administration

HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

ICCVAM Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of 

Alternative Methods 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NIEHS National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences

NIH National Institutes of Health

OGE Office of Government Ethics

USDA United States Department of Agriculture

USGS United States Geological Survey

WHO World Health Organization

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Page 1 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

April 16, 2004 Letr

The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee

 on Research

Committee on Science

House of Representatives

The Honorable Brian Baird

House of Representatives

Federal advisory committees have been called the “fifth arm of 

government” because of the significant role they play in advising federal 

agencies, the Congress, and the President on important national issues.1

 To 

be effective, these advisory committees must be—and, just as importantly, 

be perceived as being—independent and balanced. Specifically, individual 

committee members who provide advice to the government must be free 

from significant conflicts of interest—that is, they must be “independent.” 

In addition, while it may be desirable to include experts on committees 

who have particular viewpoints, federal law requires each committee, as a 

whole, to be balanced in terms of the points of view and the functions to be 

performed. Recently, some appointments to scientific and technical 

advisory committees have generated controversy because of the 

perception by some scientists and others that these appointments were 

based on ideology rather than expertise or were weighted to favor one 

group of stakeholders over others.

In 1962, the Congress established the category of “special government 

employee” and made the conflict-of-interest rules for such employees less 

restrictive than for regular federal government employees to overcome 

obstacles in hiring outside experts for occasional service, such as on 

federal advisory committees. Members of federal advisory committees are 

often appointed as special government employees to provide advice on 

behalf of the government on the basis of their best judgment. In contrast, 

members may also be appointed to federal advisory committees as 

“representatives” to provide stakeholder advice—that is, advice reflecting 

1

In this view, federal advisory committees follow the executive, legislative, judicial, and 

regulatory “arms” of government. Hearings on S. 1637, S. 2064, S. 1964 before the 

Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Committee on Government 

Operations, 92nd Congress, 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 12 (1971).
Page 2 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

the views of the entity or interest group they are representing, such as 

industry, labor, or consumers. 

Federal advisory committee members who are employees of the federal 

government must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom from 

conflicts of interest—which we refer to in this report as independence—

and the committees as a whole must meet requirements pertaining to 

balance. Federal conflict-of-interest statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 201), including 

the principal criminal financial conflict-of-interest statute (18 U.S.C. § 208), 

apply to regular and, in large part, special government employees. The 

Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is responsible for developing 

regulations and guidance for these statutory provisions. The criminal 

financial conflict-of-interest statute and related OGE regulations prohibit 

regular and special government employees from participating in a 

“particular matter” 2

 that may have a direct and predictable effect on their 

financial interest, unless granted a waiver. Members appointed as 

representatives who are neither regular nor special government employees 

are not subject to statutes regarding conflicts of interest. The Federal 

Advisory Committee Act3

 (FACA) requires, among other things, that 

committee memberships be “fairly balanced in terms of points of view 

presented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee.” 

Courts have interpreted this requirement as providing agencies with broad 

discretion in balancing their committees. The General Services 

Administration (GSA) is responsible for developing regulations and 

guidance regarding the establishment of advisory committees under FACA. 

In addition to OGE and GSA regulations and guidance, federal agencies 

have their own policies and procedures to establish and manage advisory 

committees.

You asked us to examine several issues regarding federal advisory 

committees. As agreed with your offices, this report (1) describes the role 

of federal advisory committees in the development of national policies; (2) 

examines the extent to which governmentwide guidance and agencyspecific policies and procedures for evaluating committee members for 

conflicts of interest and points of view ensure independent members and 

balanced federal advisory committees; and (3) identifies practices that 

2

A particular matter is one that involves deliberation, decision, or action that is focused on 

the interests of specific people or a discrete and identifiable class of people. 5 C.F.R. § 

2640.103(a)(1).

3

Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972) (classified at 5 U.S.C. app. 2).
Page 3 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

could better ensure that committees are, and are perceived as being, 

independent and balanced.

To address these objectives, we reviewed OGE regulations and guidance to 

federal agencies regarding federal conflict-of-interest provisions and GSA 

regulations and guidance to federal agencies regarding FACA. We reviewed 

the policies and procedures at six federal departments and agencies that 

make extensive use of scientific and technical advisory committees—the 

Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy, Health and Human Services 

(HHS), and the Interior; the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 

Because HHS entities sponsor 26 percent of all federal advisory 

committees and 36 percent of all scientific and technical advisory 

committees, we also reviewed the policies and procedures at three HHS 

agencies that sponsor many advisory committees—the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 

and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). We reviewed the procedures 

used by these nine departments and agencies to identify, screen, and 

appoint members for committees so as to ensure that members are free of 

conflicts of interest (where conflict-of-interest requirements apply) and 

that committees are balanced. To better understand how agencies 

implement OGE and GSA governmentwide regulations and guidance as 

well as their own policies, we examined the management of one committee 

at each agency.4

 We reviewed the confidential financial disclosure forms of 

the committee members who were appointed as special government 

employees, along with other information, and discussed with staff how the 

committees used this information. We did not, however, make any 

judgments on whether conflicts of interest existed or whether these panels 

were properly balanced. To identify practices that promote independence 

and balance, we examined the relevant policies and procedures of the 

National Academies;5

 the nine committees and agencies examined in this 

review; and EPA’s Science Advisory Board, which made a number of 

4

We selected a nonprobability sample of nine committees that address scientific and 

technical issues using criteria described in appendix I. Results from nonprobability samples 

cannot be used to make inferences about a population because some elements of the 

population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of 

the sample.

5

The National Academies consist of four private, nonprofit organizations that advise the 

federal government on scientific and technical matters: the National Academy of Sciences, 

the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National Research 

Council. 
Page 4 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

changes to its policies and procedures in response to our June 2001 report.6 

We conducted our review from January 2003 through March 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. For 

more details on the scope and methodology of our review, see appendix I.

Results in Brief Approximately 950 federal advisory committees with about 62,000 

members play an important role in shaping public policy by advising 

policymakers on a wide array of important and challenging issues. For 

example, advisory committees provide advice in the form of peer reviews 

of scientific research that may be used to support health, environmental, 

and safety regulations; recommendations about specific policy decisions; 

identification of long-range issues facing the nation; and evaluations of 

grant proposals, among other functions. Federal advisory committees have 

been established to work in broad areas of public policy, such as national 

security, the economy, the environment, and public health. Illustrative of 

the range of issues addressed by federal advisory committees are the 

current committees that advise agencies on matters related to AIDS 

research, food safety, hazardous waste cleanup, trade policy, and homeland 

security. Advisory committees are sometimes established specifically to 

address controversial issues about which the government believes it is 

beneficial to solicit the advice of individuals with the relevant background 

and/or expertise from outside the government. For example, some of the 

issues addressed by advisory committees are inherently controversial 

because they deal with sensitive personal and ideological matters, such as 

stem cell research and genetic engineering. Other committees address 

issues that are controversial because of their potential regulatory impact, 

such as food and drug approvals or environmental regulations. 

Additional governmentwide guidance could help agencies better ensure the 

independence of federal advisory committee members and the balance of 

federal advisory committees. For example, OGE guidance to federal 

agencies has shortcomings and does not adequately ensure that agencies 

appoint individuals selected to provide advice on behalf of the government 

as special government employees subject to conflict-of-interest 

regulations. In addition, GSA guidance to federal agencies and agencyspecific policies and procedures could be improved to better ensure that 

6

U.S. General Accounting Office, EPA’s Science Advisory Board Panels: Improved Policies 

and Procedures Needed to Ensure Independence and Balance, GAO-01-536 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 12, 2001).
Page 5 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

agencies collect and evaluate information that could be helpful in 

determining the viewpoints of potential committee members regarding the 

subject matters being considered and in ensuring that committees are, and 

are perceived as being, balanced. Specifically, we found the following:

• OGE guidance on the appropriate use of representative or special 

government employee appointments to advisory committees has 

limitations that we believe are a factor in three of the agencies we 

reviewed continuing the long-standing practice of essentially appointing 

all members as representatives. That is, we found that USDA, Energy,

and Interior have appointed most or all members to their federal 

advisory committees as representatives—even in cases where the 

members are called upon to provide advice on behalf of the government 

and thus would be more appropriately appointed as special government 

employees. Because conflict-of-interest reviews are only required for 

federal or special government employees, agencies do not conduct 

conflict-of-interest reviews for members appointed as representatives. 

As a result, the agencies cannot be assured that the real or perceived 

conflicts of interest of their committee members who provide advice on 

behalf of the government are identified and appropriately mitigated. 

Further, allegations that the members have conflicts of interest could 

call into question the independence of the committee and jeopardize the 

credibility of the committee’s work. 

• FACA requires that federal advisory committees be fairly balanced in 

terms of the points of view and the functions to be performed, and 

courts have interpreted this requirement as providing agencies with 

broad discretion in balancing their committees. In addition to the legal 

requirement for balance, it is important that committees are perceived 

as balanced in order for their advice to be credible and effective. 

However, GSA guidance does not address what types of information 

could be helpful to agencies in assessing the points of view of potential 

committee members, nor do agency procedures identify what 

information should be collected about potential members to make 

decisions about committee balance. Consequently, many agencies do 

not identify and systematically collect and evaluate information 

pertinent to determining the points of view of committee members 

regarding the subject matters being considered. For example, of the 

nine departments and agencies we reviewed, only EPA consistently (1) 

collected information on committee members appointed as special 

government employees that enabled the agency to assess the points of 

view of the potential members and (2) used this information to help 
Page 6 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

achieve balance. Without sufficient information about prospective 

committee members prior to appointment, agencies cannot ensure that 

their committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced. 

We identified several promising practices for forming and managing federal 

advisory committees that can better ensure that committees are, and are 

perceived as being, independent and balanced. These practices include (1) 

obtaining nominations for committees from the public, (2) using clearly 

defined processes to obtain and review pertinent information on potential 

members regarding potential conflicts of interest and points of view, and 

(3) prescreening prospective members using a structured interview. In our 

view, these measures reflect the principles of FACA by employing clearly 

defined procedures to promote systematic, consistent, and transparent 

efforts to achieve independent and balanced committees. Some of the 

practices, such as seeking public comment on proposed committees, are 

particularly relevant to those committees addressing sensitive or 

controversial topics. In addition, we identified selected measures that 

could promote greater transparency in the federal advisory committee 

process and improve the public’s ability to evaluate whether agencies have 

complied with conflict-of-interest requirements and FACA requirements for 

balance, such as providing information on how the members of the 

committees are identified and screened and indicating whether the 

committee members are providing independent or stakeholder advice. 

Implemented effectively, these practices could help agencies avoid the 

public criticisms to which some committees have been subjected. That is, 

if more agencies adopted and effectively implemented these practices, they 

would have greater assurance that their committees are, and are perceived 

as being, independent and balanced. 

Because the effectiveness of competent federal advisory committees can 

be undermined if the members are, or are perceived as, lacking in 

independence or if committees as a whole do not appear to be properly 

balanced, we are making 12 recommendations to GSA and OGE to provide 

additional guidance to federal agencies. The broad categories of these 

recommendations include (1) clarifying the appropriate use of 

representative appointments; (2) systematically obtaining information that 

could help ensure committees are, in fact and in perception, balanced; and 

(3) adopting certain practices that can better ensure independent and 

balanced committees and increase transparency in the federal advisory 

process. While our report focuses primarily on scientific and technical 

federal advisory committees, the limitations in guidance and the promising 

practices we identified pertaining to independence and balance are 
Page 7 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

pertinent to federal advisory committees in general, and thus our 

recommendations are directed to GSA and OGE because of their 

responsibilities for providing guidance to federal agencies on these 

matters.

GSA reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with the findings 

relating to the areas directly under its purview. The agency committed to, 

among other things, continuing to work in partnership with OGE to address 

those areas under OGE’s jurisdiction relating to FACA. GSA outlined a 

proactive approach to responding to the report’s recommendations, 

including making changes to its on-line FACA database. OGE reviewed the 

draft report and also generally agreed with the problems we identified 

regarding appointments to federal advisory committees, but the agency 

disagreed that there are any limitations in its guidance that contribute to 

the problems and also reiterated the measures that OGE has taken to 

address this issue (most of which were highlighted in the draft report). 

OGE believes the agencies making inappropriate appointments are 

disregarding, rather than misinterpreting, the OGE guidance. While we 

recognize that there may be other reasons as well, we have identified the 

limitations in OGE’s guidance as one factor in some agencies’ continuing 

the long-standing practice of essentially appointing all committee members 

as representatives. We believe the effectiveness of OGE’s and GSA’s efforts 

to ensure that agencies make appropriate appointment decisions for 

members of their federal advisory committees will not improve until the 

limitations we identified in OGE’s guidance on appointments are 

addressed. Our view is also that clear, unambiguous guidance would make 

it more difficult for agencies to misapply the guidance. GSA’s and OGE’s 

written comments are discussed further at the end of this report and their 

letters are provided in appendixes XII and XIII. Overall, the comments 

from the agencies whose advisory committee management policies and 

procedures we reviewed—EPA; Energy; HHS (and component agencies 

CDC, FDA, and NIH); Interior; NASA; and USDA—were generally positive 

about the draft report, viewing it as providing helpful information on 

federal advisory committee management. Four of these agencies also cited 

some specific concerns about, for example, the requirements for 

independence and assessing prospective members’ points of view. We 

address these issues at the end of this report and provide the pertinent 

letters from these four agencies in appendixes XIV through XVII. 

Background In recent years, controversies regarding the federal advisory committee 

system have included concerns about the appointment of specific 
Page 8 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

individuals to committees and agency decisions to create or terminate 

some committees. Although a variety of concerns have been raised, the 

overarching concern was that ideological bias was influencing the selection 

of experts for scientific and health advisory panels. Publications such as 

Science, The Lancet, and Chemical and Engineering News have published 

editorials and articles containing criticisms of decisions seen as injecting 

ideology into a committee system that should be nonideological. Further, 

some current and potential federal advisory committee members reported 

being asked about their political views in the context of decisions regarding 

their appointment or reappointment to committees.

A number of recent articles and editorials identified specific concerns 

about HHS committees that address controversial scientific and technical 

issues. Observers have alleged that some appointees either were 

unqualified for the position, had extreme views that were outside the 

mainstream of scientific thinking, or had personal conflicts of interest that 

should have disqualified them from serving on particular committees. 

Further, observers alleged that HHS has replaced large portions of the 

membership of ongoing committees as a way of obtaining committees that 

shared the administration’s viewpoint about particular issues. Finally, 

concerns were raised that HHS had terminated some advisory committees 

with which the administration allegedly had ideological differences and 

replaced them with committees that had different charters and a largely 

new membership. 

In 2003, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report on 

organizational issues within NIH that included a discussion of the 

perceived politicization of the advisory committee appointment process. 

The report noted that these concerns had recently arisen within the 

scientific and health advocacy communities and were similar to concerns 

that were raised in the early 1970s. In response to the most recent 

concerns, the academy recommended, among other things, that 

appointments to NIH advisory committees be based solely on a person’s 

scientific or clinical expertise or his or her commitment to and involvement 

in issues of relevance to the mission of the institute.

Also in 2003, the Center for Science in the Public Interest sent a letter to the 

director of OGE about its concerns that conflicts of interest were 

introducing biases into the federal advisory committee process at HHS,
Page 9 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Interior, and other agencies.7 The center’s letter, signed by 21 individuals, 

including public health advocates and members of academia, made a 

number of recommendations to OGE aimed at strengthening 

independence, transparency, and public trust in the federal advisory 

committee process. Further, the National Academies is examining the 

selection of scientists, engineers, and health professionals to federal 

advisory committees addressing science-based policy or reviewing 

research proposals. This study stems from its regular review of senior 

scientific technical appointments in the federal government as well as from 

concerns that scientists and others have raised to the academies about 

some federal advisory committee appointments and the appointment 

practices used by some agencies. A report is planned for November 2004.

The Federal Advisory 

Committee Act Sets Broad 

Requirements and 

Guidelines for Advisory 

Committees 

The Congress enacted FACA in 1972 in response to two principal concerns: 

(1) that federal advisory committees were proliferating without adequate 

review, oversight, or accountability and (2) that certain special interests 

had too much influence over federal agency decision makers. In this act, 

the Congress articulated certain principles regarding advisory committees, 

including broad requirements for balance, independence, and transparency. 

Specifically, as previously discussed, FACA requires that the membership 

of committees be fairly balanced in terms of points of view and functions to 

be performed. Further, FACA requires that any legislation or agency action 

that creates a committee contain provisions to ensure that the advice and 

recommendations of the committee will be independent and not 

inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority (the agency) or any 

special interest. Finally, FACA generally requires that agencies announce 

committee meetings ahead of time and give notice to interested parties 

about such meetings. With some exceptions, the meetings are to be open 

to the public, and agencies are to prepare meeting minutes and make them 

available to interested parties.8

FACA also set broad guidelines for the creation and management of federal 

advisory committees, most of which are created or authorized by the 

7

The Center for Science in the Public Interest is a consumer advocacy organization that 

conducts research and advocacy programs on health and nutrition.

8

The President or head of an agency may determine that a meeting be closed if, for example, 

the meeting will include discussions of classified information, reviews of proprietary data 

submitted in support of federal grant applications, or deliberations involving considerations 

of personal privacy. 
Page 10 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Congress. Agencies also establish committees using general statutory 

authority, and some are created by presidential directives (see app. II). 

Further, the act requires that all committees have a charter, and that each 

charter contain specific information, including the committee’s scope and 

objectives, a description of duties, the period of time necessary to carry out 

its purposes, the estimated operating costs, and the number and frequency 

of meetings. As required by FACA, the advisory committee charters 

generally expire at the end of 2 years unless renewed by the agency or by 

the Congress.9

 The requirement encourages agencies to periodically 

reexamine their need for committees.

GSA, through its Committee Management Secretariat, is responsible for 

prescribing administrative guidelines and management controls applicable 

to advisory committees governmentwide. However, GSA does not have the 

authority to approve or deny agency decisions regarding the creation or 

management of advisory committees. To fulfill its responsibilities, GSA has 

developed regulations and other guidance to assist agencies in 

implementing FACA requirements, provides training to agency officials, 

and was instrumental in creating the Interagency Committee on Federal 

Advisory Committee Management. GSA also has created and maintains an 

on-line FACA database (available to the public at

www.fido.gov/facadatabase) for which the agencies provide and verify the 

data, including committee charters, membership rosters, budgets, and in 

many cases links to committee meeting schedules, minutes, and reports. 

The database also includes information about a committee’s classification 

(i.e., scientific and technical or national policy issue). According to the 

database, 208 committees with 7,910 members were classified as scientific 

and technical committees. In addition, 131 committees with over 41,000 

members were classified as grant review committees—a category that also 

often addresses scientific and technical issues. Appendix II provides data 

on the classifications of the federal advisory committees in fiscal year 2003. 

While the GSA’s Committee Management Secretariat provides FACA 

guidance to federal agencies, each agency also develops its own policies 

and procedures for following FACA requirements. Under FACA, agency 

heads are responsible for issuing administrative guidelines and 

management controls applicable to their agency’s advisory committees. 

Generally, federal agencies have a reasonable amount of discretion with 

9

Several of Interior’s committees do not expire because the legislation creating them 

exempts them from the biennial charter expiration.
Page 11 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

regards to creating committees, drafting their charters, establishing their 

scope and objectives, classifying the committee type, determining what 

type of advice they are to provide, and appointing members to serve on 

committees.10 However, when the Congress authorizes an agency to 

establish a particular committee or a President establishes a committee, 

the agency may have less flexibility in establishing and managing the 

committee because such things as the committee’s objectives, the types of 

expertise and backgrounds of members, and even the type of advice that is 

to be provided may be specified by the Congress or the President.

Finally, to assist with the management of their federal advisory 

committees, agency heads are required to appoint a committee 

management officer to oversee the agency’s compliance with FACA 

requirements, including recordkeeping. Agency heads must also appoint a 

designated federal official for each committee to oversee the committee’s 

activities. Among other things, the designated federal official must approve 

or call the meetings of the committee, approve the agendas (except for 

presidential advisory committees), and attend the meetings.

Criminal Financial Conflictof-Interest Statute Applies 

to Some Advisory 

Committee Members

OGE is responsible for issuing regulations and guidance for agencies to 

follow in complying with the statutory conflict-of-interest provisions that 

apply to all federal employees, including special government employees 

serving on federal advisory committees. A special government employee is 

statutorily defined as an officer or employee who is retained, designated, 

appointed, or employed by the government to perform temporary duties, 

with or without compensation, for not more than 130 days during any 

period of 365 consecutive days. Many agencies use special government 

employees, either as advisory committee members or as individual experts 

or consultants. Special government employees, like regular federal 

employees, are to provide their own best judgment in a manner that is free 

from conflicts of interest and without acting as a stakeholder to represent 

any particular point of view.11 Accordingly, special government employees 

appointed to federal advisory committees are hired for their expertise and 

skills and are expected to provide advice on behalf of the government on 

10In response to Executive Order 12838 directing agencies to reduce by at least one-third the 

number of discretionary committees, the Office of Management and Budget established a 

maximum number of discretionary advisory committees for each agency. 

11Office of Government Ethics Letter to the Chairman of a National Commission, June 24, 

1993 (93 x 14).
Page 12 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

the basis of their own best judgment. Special government employees are 

subject to the federal financial conflict-of-interest requirements, although 

ones that are somewhat less restrictive than those for regular federal 

government employees. 

The criminal financial conflict-of-interest statute (18 U.S.C. § 208) and 

related OGE regulations prohibit federal employees, including special 

government employees, from participating in “particular matters” that may 

have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interests or those 

interests of a spouse, minor child, or general partner. A particular matter is 

defined as one involving a deliberation, decision, or action that is focused 

on the interests of specific people or an identifiable class of people. 

Special government employees serving on federal advisory committees 

thus are prohibited from participating when the subjects they consider are 

particular matters in which the member has a financial interest. However, 

special government employees serving on federal advisory committees are 

provided with an exemption that allows them to participate in particular 

matters that have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interest 

if the interest arises from their nonfederal employment and the matter will 

not have a special or distinct effect on the employee or employer other than 

as part of a class. This exemption does not extend to the committee 

member’s personal financial and other interests in the matter, such as stock 

ownership in the employer. If a committee member has a potential 

financial conflict of interest that is not covered under this or other 

exemptions, a waiver of the conflict-of-interest provisions may be granted 

if the appointing official determines that the need for the special 

government employee’s services outweighs the potential for conflict of 

interest or that the conflict is not significant. This standard for granting 

waivers is less stringent than the standard for regular government 

employees. 

The principal tool that agencies use to assess whether nominees or 

members of advisory committees have conflicts of interest is the OGE 

Form 450, Executive Branch Confidential Financial Disclosure Report, 

which special government employees are required to submit annually. The 

form 450 requests financial information about the committee member and 

the member’s spouse and dependent children, such as the sources of 

income and the identification of assets, but it does not request filers to
Page 13 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

provide the related dollar amounts, such as salaries.

12 For committees 

addressing broad or general issues, rather than particular matters, 

committee members hired as special government employees are still 

generally required to complete the confidential financial disclosure form.13 

Agencies appoint ethics officials who are responsible for ensuring agency 

compliance with the federal conflict-of-interest statutes. OGE conducts 

periodic audits of agency ethics programs to evaluate their compliance 

and, as warranted, makes recommendations to agencies to correct 

deficiencies in their ethics programs. 

Under administrative guidance initially developed in the early 1960s, a 

number of members of federal advisory committees are not hired as special 

government employees, but are instead appointed as representatives.

Members appointed to advisory committees as representatives are 

expected to represent the views of relevant stakeholders with an interest in 

the subject of discussion, such as an industry, a union, an environmental 

organization, or other such entity. That is, representative members are 

expected to represent a particular and known bias—it is understood that 

information, opinions, and advice from representatives are to reflect the 

bias of the particular group that they are appointed to represent.14 Because 

these individuals are to represent outside interests, they do not meet the 

statutory definition of federal employee or special government employee 

and are therefore not subject to the criminal financial conflict-of-interest 

statute. According to GSA and OGE officials, reliable governmentwide 

data on the number of representative members serving on federal advisory 

committees are not available. However, data that agencies report to OGE 

on special government employees serving on federal advisory committees 

and to GSA on the number of federal advisory committee members indicate

12Some agencies, such as EPA and FDA, have developed alternative confidential financial 

disclosure forms that request additional information on activities and affiliations, such as 

expert legal testimony.

13Special government employees who serve in excess of 60 days above a certain salary level, 

however, must file a public disclosure form.

14EPA noted in its comments on our draft report that in the case of a small category of 

advisory committees that EPA uses, known as regulatory negotiation committees, 

representative members may bind their organization to take a course of action.
Page 14 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

that only about 35 percent of the government’s federal advisory committee 

members are appointed as special government employees.15

Advisory Committees 

Play an Important Role 

in the Development of 

Federal Policies 

Generally composed of individuals from outside of the federal government, 

federal advisory committees play an important role in the development of 

public policy and government regulations by providing advice to 

policymakers on a wide array of issues. In fiscal year 2003, 54 agencies 

sponsored approximately 950 committees with about 62,000 members to 

provide advice by performing peer reviews of scientific research; 

developing recommendations on specific policy decisions; identifying longrange issues facing the nation; and evaluating grant proposals, among other 

functions. Their advice—on issues such as stem cell research, space 

exploration, trade policy, drinking water standards, and drug approvals—

can enhance the quality and credibility of federal decision making.

Advisory committees have been and continue to be involved in issues of 

great importance to the advancement of knowledge and the development 

of national policies and regulations. For example, Energy’s decision to 

undertake the Human Genome Project was based in part on the 1987 

recommendation of the department’s Health and Environmental Research 

Advisory Committee.16 As a result, Energy, working with NIH, successfully 

coordinated the multibillion-dollar research effort that succeeded in 

identifying all of the genes on every chromosome in the human body and 

determining their biochemical nature—leading the way to numerous 

advances in medical science. 

Advisory committees provide agencies with advice in a variety of broad 

areas of federal policy, such as the environment, public health, and the 

economy. Committees provide agencies with advice about a wide array of 

15The estimate of the percentage of special government employees is based on data that 

agencies (1) provide to OGE regarding the number of special government employees serving 

on federal advisory committees and (2) provide on the GSA FACA database on the total 

number of federal advisory committee members. This estimate does not include advisory 

committee members serving on NIH “special emphasis panels,” which are not standing 

committees but rather involve one-time reviews of various science and technical funding 

applications to NIH (grants, cooperative agreement applications, etc.). If these individuals 

were included in the estimate above, the percentage of advisory committee members 

appointed as special government employees would be reduced to about 25 percent.

16This committee is currently called the Biological and Environmental Research Advisory 

Committee.
Page 15 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

specific issues, such as the management of federal lands, the development 

of alternative sources of energy, guidelines for assessing cancer risks, risk 

assessments of toxic chemicals, hazardous waste cleanup, the 

establishment of new standards for food safety, the delivery of health care 

services, and the effectiveness of new prescription drugs and medical 

devices. Recently, federal advisory committees were established to help 

agencies marshal the facts and weigh options in response to new national 

issues, such as information security and terrorist attacks.

Federal advisory committees are sometimes established specifically to 

address controversial issues about which the government believes it is 

necessary to solicit the advice of individuals with the relevant background 

and/or expertise from outside of the government. Some of the issues 

addressed by advisory committees are controversial because they touch 

upon inherently sensitive personal, religious, or ideological matters, such 

as stem cell research and genetic engineering. Other committees address 

issues that are controversial because of their potential regulatory impact 

on industries or consumers, such as in the case of food and drug approvals 

or environmental regulations.

To address controversial and other important matters, scientific and 

technical advisory committees—which are the primary focus of this 

report—play a number of different roles on behalf of agencies. One role of 

science committees is to advise agencies on how to address a set of 

particular problems. For example, the Advisory Committee on Foreign 

Animal and Poultry Diseases gives the Secretary of Agriculture information 

and advice on measures necessary to prevent and combat such threats as 

foot-and-mouth disease. The charter also charges the committee with 

providing advice on the prevention or management of other threats from 

foreign animal or poultry diseases. Recent recommendations from the 

committee addressed coordination between USDA and the Department of 

Homeland Security and support for a national food animal identification 

work plan.

In 1990, the Congress authorized the creation of the Aquatic Nuisance 

Species Task Force to, among other things, coordinate federal efforts to 

address the threats posed by nonnative aquatic plants and animals.17 The 

task force operates as a federal advisory committee and is composed of 7 

17The Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 codified at 

16 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4741.
Page 16 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

federal agency representatives and 13 nonfederal members in an ex officio 

status. It reports to the Departments of the Interior and Commerce. 

Among the task force’s accomplishments are a number of reports and 

publications on risk assessment, prevention initiatives, and control 

programs for such nonnative species as the brown tree snake and the green 

crab.

Some science advisory committees offer advice to agencies on specific 

regulatory decisions. For example, FDA established science advisory 

committees that offer advice on the licensing of specific drugs and on the 

safety and effectiveness of medical devices. These committees play an 

important role in determining whether drugs and other medical products 

make it into the marketplace and can therefore have a significant impact on 

specific manufacturers as well as potential patients and consumers.

Other science advisory committees make recommendations to agencies on 

strategic planning efforts needed to address long-range issues facing the 

nation. Existing committees are exploring efforts to chart new directions 

in research in biology, physics, astronomy, and space exploration, to name 

just a few. For example, Energy’s Basic Energy Sciences Advisory 

Committee issued a report in February 2003 entitled Basic Research Needs 

to Assure a Secure Energy Future.

18 In that report, the committee stated 

its belief that a new national energy research program is essential and must 

be initiated with the intensity and commitment of the Manhattan Project. 

The report included a lengthy list of proposed research topics. 

Advisory committees may be established to provide a peer review function. 

For example, a peer review group could be asked to review a body of 

scientific literature and offer its opinion on the adequacy of the scientific 

data that may be used to support regulatory actions. As an illustration, in 

2001, EPA revised its standards for safe levels of arsenic in drinking water 

using, in part, the analysis and recommendations of two federal advisory 

committees—the National Drinking Water Advisory Council and the EPA’s 

Science Advisory Board. This revised standard will have a far-reaching 

effect on both human health and the operation of public drinking water 

systems. Other peer review groups are asked to judge the merits of 

proposals submitted to national grant competitions. For example, the 

18Basic Research Needs to Assure a Secure Energy Future: A Report from the Basic Energy 

Sciences Advisory Committee, prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge, TN: 

February 2003).
Page 17 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

National Science Foundation, NIH, and other agencies use such groups to 

evaluate proposals submitted for possible funding by academic or clinical 

researchers covering a wide range of subject matter. After the peer review 

groups evaluate the proposals, other science advisory committees may 

make recommendations to the agencies regarding which proposals to fund. 

Federal Guidance 

Could Better Ensure 

Independence and 

Balance

OGE and GSA governmentwide guidance and the policies and procedures 

of the nine departments and agencies we reviewed have limitations that 

reduce their effectiveness in ensuring that advisory committee members 

are independent and that advisory committees are, and are perceived as 

being, balanced. First, with respect to independence, OGE guidance on 

whether to appoint members to advisory committees as special 

government employees or representatives—a decision that determines 

whether an agency conducts a conflict-of-interest review—has limitations 

that we believe are a factor in three agencies’ continuing their longstanding practice of essentially appointing all members as representatives. 

We found that USDA, Energy, and Interior appoint all or almost all 

members to their federal advisory committees as representatives, even 

when the members are called on to provide advice on behalf of the 

government on the basis of their best judgment.19 Because such members 

are not providing stakeholder advice, they would be more appropriately 

appointed as special government employees, subject to reviews for 

conflicts of interest. However, because conflict-of-interest reviews are only 

required for federal or special government employees, agencies do not 

conduct conflict-of-interest reviews for members appointed as 

representatives. As a result, the agencies cannot be assured that the real or 

perceived conflicts of interest of their committee members’ providing 

advice on behalf of the government are identified and appropriately 

mitigated. Further, allegations that the members have conflicts of interest 

could call into question the independence of the committee and jeopardize 

the credibility of the committee’s work. Second, with respect to balance, 

GSA guidance does not address what types of information would be helpful 

in assessing the points of view of potential committee members with regard 

to the matters the committees will consider, nor do agency procedures 

19OGE data indicate that some other agencies, such as the Small Business Administration 

and the Department of Justice, also rely exclusively on representative appointments to 

federal advisory committees. OGE staff told us the agency did not examine whether 

representatives appointed to those agencies’ committees provided independent or 

stakeholder advice.
Page 18 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

identify what information the agencies believe should be collected about 

potential members—an important step that can help agencies ensure 

committees are, and are perceived as being, balanced. We found that many 

agencies do not consistently request information that would be helpful in 

assessing the overall balance of committee members’ viewpoints—such as 

previous public positions the members may have taken on the matters 

being reviewed. Without adequate policies and procedures, agencies are 

vulnerable to allegations that committee members have conflicts of interest 

and that committees are imbalanced. Such allegations may call into 

question a committee’s legitimacy and may jeopardize the work of 

otherwise credible and competent committees.

Reviews for Conflicts of 

Interest Are Not Always 

Performed 

Some agencies appoint most or all members to their advisory committees 

as representatives, rather than as special government employees. 

However, some of these committee members appointed as representatives 

are asked to provide agencies with advice on behalf of the government 

without representing any particular point of view, and thus it appears that 

the members would be more appropriately appointed as special 

government employees. Because only regular and special government 

employees are subject to the conflict-of-interest statutes, agencies do not 

conduct conflict-of-interest reviews for members appointed as 

representatives. Some committees thus have members who had they been 

appointed as special government employees would have undergone 

reviews for conflicts of interest, but they have not been reviewed for 

potential conflicts of interest because they were appointed as 

representatives.

Representative members and special government employees are supposed 

to serve different functions on advisory committees. In 1962, the Congress 

established the category of special government employee and amended the 

federal conflict-of-interest laws to overcome obstacles in hiring outside 

experts for occasional service. Special government employees are 

appointed to federal advisory committees to provide advice on behalf of 

the government on the basis of their best judgment. Representative 

members, in contrast, are generally considered as those members of 

advisory committees who are “chosen for committee membership only to 

present the views of a private interest.”20 

20See Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 219 to 

Representative Members of Federal Advisory Committees (Sept. 15, 1999). 
Page 19 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

In 1982, in response to uncertainties regarding when agencies should 

appoint members to their advisory committees as special government 

employees or representatives, OGE developed guidance on the appropriate 

use of these two appointment categories for federal advisory committees.21 

In this guidance, OGE noted that it disagreed with “an occasional flat 

assertion” by agencies that advisory committee members are never subject 

to the federal conflict-of-interest laws. The 1982 guidance, which is still 

OGE’s principal guidance on this issue,22 states that a “consultant or 

advisor whose advice is obtained by a department or agency from time to 

time because of his individual qualifications and who serves in an 

independent capacity is an officer or employee of the government”—that 

is, this person is a regular federal employee or a special government 

employee. In contrast, a consultant or advisor “who is requested to appear 

before a government department or agency to present the views of a nongovernmental organization or group which he represents, or for which he is 

in a position to speak, does not act as a servant of the government and is 

not its officer or employee” but is a representative member. The OGE 1982 

guidance concludes by noting that if language used in the enabling 

legislation, executive order, charter, or other pertinent document does not 

specify whether the members are functioning as special government 

employees or representatives, it is fair to conclude that the member is a 

special government employee because this is the usual status of those 

appointed by agencies to serve the government. 

OGE’s most recent guidance that addresses representative appointments to 

advisory committees is its February 2000 summary of ethical requirements 

applicable to special government employees. This summary includes a 

paragraph discussing representative appointments, highlighting the fact 

that unlike special government employees and other federal employees, 

representatives are not expected to render disinterested advice to the 

government but are expected to “represent a particular bias.” This 

document explains that representatives are described more fully in OGE’s 

1982 guidance and also refers readers to two 1993 advisory letters that (1) 

conclude that representatives can make policy recommendations to the 

21Memorandum 82 x 22, Members of Federal Advisory Committees and the Conflict-ofInterest Statutes, July 9, 1982.

22This guidance has been amplified by several other documents in later years including 

Advisory Letter 93 x 14 to the Chairman of a National Commission, June 24, 1993; Advisory 

Letter 93 x 30 to the Executive Director of a Federal Commission, October 22, 1993; and 

Advisory Opinion 00 x 1, Memorandum dated February 15, 2000.
Page 20 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

government and (2) explain the difference between the two types of 

appointment as follows: representatives are asked to represent a particular 

bias, while special government employees are asked to provide their own 

best judgment without representing any particular point of view and in a 

manner that is free from conflict of interest. 

In addition to developing the 2000 guidance on special government 

employees, OGE has taken steps to educate agencies about special 

government employee and representative appointments by participating in 

GSA’s FACA management course that includes a session on ethics, conflictof-interest, and financial disclosure issues. According to GSA, this class is 

conducted five times each year, reaching about 300 advisory committee 

staff. According to OGE, the ethics training begins with a discussion of the 

special government employee/representative designation issue. The 

course material includes a discussion of representatives and also refers 

readers to OGE’s 1982 guidance. Further, OGE provides training at annual 

ethics conferences for ethics officials in the executive branch. 

Despite these efforts, a recent OGE staff study on agency management of 

federal advisory committees, summarized in a November 2002 

memorandum, indicates that some uncertainties about appointments to 

federal advisory committees may continue to exist. That is, OGE found 

that four of the seven agencies it reviewed—Energy, Interior, the 

Commission on Civil Rights, and the Small Business Administration—

appointed all, or nearly all, members as representatives.23 Further, the OGE 

memorandum expressed concern that these agencies may be purposely 

designating their committee members as representatives to avoid 

subjecting them to the financial disclosure statements required for special 

government employees and may not be conducting conflict-of-interest 

reviews for some committee members when they should have been 

conducted. The OGE memorandum concluded that further scrutiny and 

education about the proper designation of committee appointments was 

warranted. As a result, at the next annual conference for agency ethics 

officials in March 2003, OGE included a session, Ethics Management Tools 

for Your Federal Advisory Committee, which was principally devoted to 

“designation” issues involving appointments to federal advisory

23OGE reviewed the management of advisory committees at the Departments of Energy, the 

Interior, the Army, and Education; the Commission on Civil Rights; the National Endowment 

for the Arts; and the Small Business Administration.
Page 21 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

committees.24 In addition, in May 2003, OGE issued new audit guidelines 

for its periodic reviews of agency ethics programs that provide for 

additional focus and review of appointment designations for individuals 

serving on committees, councils, boards, and commissions. Finally, as 

previously mentioned, OGE officials conduct a segment on ethics that 

addresses the appointments of representatives and special government 

employees during GSA’s FACA management course.

Nonetheless, three of the agencies we reviewed—USDA, Energy, 25 and 

Interior—appoint most or all of the members to their federal advisory 

committees as representatives.26 Upon examining some of the specific 

committees at these agencies, we found that these agencies appoint 

members as representatives even when the members are called on to 

provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis of their best 

judgment, rather than to represent views of outside organizations. 

Specifically, USDA, Energy, and Interior have committees comprised 

entirely of representative members where, on the basis of the agencies’ 

descriptions of the type of advice that the members are to provide, the use 

of special government employees seems more appropriate, such as in the 

following cases:

• USDA’s National Advisory Committee for Microbiological Criteria for 

Foods. 27 According to its charter, the purpose of the committee is to 

provide impartial, scientific advice to federal food safety agencies on the 

development of an integrated national system to monitor food safety 

from farm to final consumption in order to ensure the safety of 

domestic, imported, and exported foods. 

24OGE also addressed the designation issue at a session of its 2004 annual conference.

25In April 2003, Energy’s Acting Assistant General Counsel for General Law told us that all 

but one of the department’s committees use only representative members. The one 

committee that appointed special government employees was the National Nuclear Security 

Administration Advisory Committee, which was established in June 2001 and expired in 

June 2003.

26Coincidentally, our review included two of the departments (Energy and Interior) included 

in OGE’s staff study. OGE found that the Small Business Administration and the 

Commission on Civil Rights also appoint most or all committee members as representatives. 

OGE data indicate that some other agencies, such as the Departments of Justice and State, 

also rely primarily on representative appointments to federal advisory committees.

27According to USDA, the committee is cosponsored with HHS, the Department of Defense, 

and Commerce but is managed by USDA. 
Page 22 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

• Energy’s Biological and Environmental Research Advisory 

Committee. According to the committee’s designated federal official, 

the department uses the committee to obtain independent scientific 

advice on Energy’s Biological and Environmental Research Program. 

The committee addresses issues such as genomics, the health effects of 

low-dose radiation, DNA sequencing, medical sciences, environmental 

remediation, and climate change research. In addition to reviewing 

scientific issues, the committee provides advice on long-range research 

plans and priorities and appropriate levels of funding. 

• Interior’s Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee. 

According to the committee’s designated federal official, members are 

selected to provide their independent advice to the U.S. Geological 

Survey (USGS) on matters relating to the survey’s role in the National 

Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program, which is a multiagency 

strategic program to reduce risks to lives and property resulting from 

earthquakes. The committee is to review the USGS National Earthquake 

Hazards Reduction Program’s roles, goals, and objectives; assess its

capabilities and research needs; provide guidance on achieving major 

objectives; and establish and measure performance goals. (As 

discussed below, in January 2004, Interior officials determined that the 

members of this committee should be appointed as special government 

employees, and the officials said that the committee would not meet 

again until the appointments as special government employees have 

been made.)

In contrast, we found that EPA, HHS, and NASA appoint members as 

special government employees to committees that provide advice on behalf 

of the government about scientific and technical issues similar to those 

addressed by the committees discussed above. Consequently, these 

agencies do evaluate committee members who provide advice on behalf of 

the government for potential conflicts of interest. 

USDA, Energy, and Interior have 30 other committees with about 750 

members that are classified as scientific and technical committees.28 In 

addition, some committees in other categories, such as national policy 

advisory committees, also address scientific and technology issues—

subject matters for which advice on behalf of the government on the basis 

of members’ best judgment, rather than stakeholder advice, is typically 

28In total, these agencies have 189 federal advisory committees with 4,517 members.
Page 23 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

sought. In speaking with USDA, Energy, and Interior officials about the 

basis for their decisions to essentially appoint all advisory committee 

members as representatives, we learned that this practice is long-standing 

and firmly rooted in agency cultures—that is, it represents the way these 

agencies have traditionally staffed their federal advisory committees. The 

agencies we reviewed generally have not developed sufficient policies, 

procedures, or guidance for their staff to use when determining which type 

of appointment is appropriate for individual committees. For example, the 

guidance of some agencies, such as USDA and Interior, does not address 

the types of appointments that may be made. Others, such as NASA and 

Energy, recognize in agency policies and procedures that members can be 

either special government employees or representatives. However, few of 

the agencies that have policies identifying the types of appointments 

specify criteria that should be used when deciding whether the members 

should be appointed as either special government employees or 

representatives.

In our view, shortcomings in the OGE 1982 guidance regarding members of 

federal advisory committees and the conflict-of-interest statutes may (1) 

contribute to the agencies’ overreliance on representative appointments to 

their advisory committees and (2) limit the effectiveness of OGE’s and 

GSA’s education efforts on appointments to advisory committees. 

Specifically, we found the following shortcomings in the 1982 guidance, 

which OGE cites as its most complete discussion on the use of 

representative appointments:

• The OGE guidance is overly broad in describing the groups for which 

representatives may speak. That is, the guidance indicates that 

representatives may speak for firms or an industry; for labor or 

agriculture; or for “any other recognizable group of persons including, 

on occasion the public at large.” We found that Energy, Interior, and 

USDA appoint some members to their committees on the basis that they 

represent various scientific or technical fields, such as biology or 

toxicology. However, appointing individuals as representatives of a 

broad category of people, such as a field of expertise, appears to 

generally be more consistent with providing advice on behalf of the 

government on the basis of the individual’s best judgment, rather than 

acting as a stakeholder to represent the views of a nongovernment 

entity or group with an interest in the matter. At our exit conference, 

OGE officials agreed that, generally, it is not appropriate to appoint 

committee members as representatives on the basis of their expertise. 

Further, this approach to classifying members does not recognize and 
Page 24 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

essentially avoids using the special government employee category, 

which was specifically created to facilitate the government’s ability to 

retain the services of experts in various fields for such purposes as 

temporary service on federal advisory committees. 

• The conclusion section of the OGE guidance implies that when the term 

“representative” is used in authorizing legislation, or other such 

documents, members should be classified as representatives, despite 

the fact that this term may be used for more generic purposes, such as to 

direct the balance of a committee. The guidance states that the decision 

to make representative appointments to federal advisory committees 

can be indicated in enabling legislation, executive orders, committee 

charters, or other pertinent documents by “the use of words to 

characterize [committee members] as the representatives of individuals 

or entities outside the government who have an interest in the subject 

matter assigned to the committee.” However, the use of some form of 

the terms “represent” or “representative” in these documents does not 

always clearly indicate that the members are to be appointed to serve as 

representatives; sometimes these terms are used to define committee 

composition or balance. For example, some of the documents use the 

term “representative” to identify fields of expertise or employment 

background needed—specifying, that is, the expertise and points of 

view deemed pertinent. Some of the documents do not state that the 

representatives identified have an interest in the matter (as the guidance 

quoted above calls for) or that they are to speak for their organizations; 

thus the documents using the term “representative” are sometimes 

ambiguous. Unlike the guidance on identifying committee members 

appointed as special government employees—“by the use of words to 

command the members to exercise individual and independent 

judgment”—the guidance on identifying representative members does 

not specify the nature of the advice to be provided (e.g., stakeholder 

advice).

• The OGE guidance states that the fact that someone is appointed to a 

committee on the recommendation of an outside organization tends to 

support the conclusion that the person has a representative function. 

However, a number of committees solicit recommendations from 

outside organizations when appointing special government employees 

in order to achieve appropriate balance and expertise on their 

committees. Thus, the guidance does not take into account a common 

practice that agencies use to identify potential committee members and 
Page 25 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

may overemphasize the weight that agencies should give to this factor 

when determining what constitutes a representative appointment. 

Officials at EPA and NASA also said that the OGE guidance on 

representative appointments is ambiguous in some respects. They believe 

it would be very helpful for agencies to have clear criteria for 

representative appointments. Further, the officials said that training on the 

issue of appointments to advisory committees has limitations. Specifically, 

the EPA and NASA officials said that, in their view, the FACA management 

course does not sufficiently clarify when appointments should be made as 

special government employees and when they should be made as 

representatives. These officials also noted that the agencies’ ethics 

officials generally are not the ones who make decisions on the appropriate 

appointment category; rather, appointment type is viewed more as a FACA 

management issue. Thus, agency officials managing federal advisory 

committees may look to GSA more than to OGE for clarification on 

appointment questions. For example, an official at EPA who has served a 

detail at GSA said that GSA regularly receives calls from agencies with 

questions about the distinction between the two types of appointments. 

We believe these circumstances highlight the importance of both the 

coordination between GSA and OGE to ensure that GSA is prepared to 

respond to questions about appointments and the GSA FACA management 

training directed at agency staff who manage federal advisory committees. 

Although the FACA management course manual provides useful 

information on appointments to committees, we identified some 

limitations in this material as well. For example, the introductory sentence 

on appointments states that determining the status of an individual serving 

on a federal advisory committee is “largely a matter of personnel 

classification and should be coordinated with an agency’s personnel 

office.” In our view, this statement minimizes the importance of examining 

the type of advice that the individual is being asked to provide as a key 

determinant of the status of an individual (i.e., the type of appointment to 

be made). In this regard, in December 2003 officials at OGE told us that 

they have now concluded (1) that agencies should decide at the outset 

whether the members of each committee are going to be representatives or 

special government employees and (2) that this decision should be part of 

the chartering process. In addition, the GSA manual is not clear and 

unambiguous on the role of representative members, stating that, in 

general, representative members of advisory committees “serve as 

representatives of outside entities and may [emphasis added] represent the 

views of a particular industry or group (e.g., labor, agriculture or other 
Page 26 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

similar group of interests).” In contrast, OGE guidance states that 

representatives are to represent the views of identified entities or groups. 

Finally, the GSA manual highlights some OGE criteria from its 1982 

guidance document that, as discussed above, we believe need clarification.

The consequences of appointing advisory committee members as 

representatives when they are in fact asked to provide advice on behalf of 

the government without representing any particular outside entity’s or 

group’s point of view exposes the relevant committees to potentially 

serious problems. Because representative members are not subject to 

reviews for potential conflicts of interest, allegations of conflicts of interest 

may call into question the integrity of the committee and jeopardize the 

credibility of the committee’s work.

Some agencies do address the potential conflicts of interest of their 

representative members to some extent. For example, Interior’s Bureau of 

Land Management prohibits its advisory committee members from 

participating in any matter in which they, a spouse, or dependent child have 

a direct interest and requires the members to disclose any direct or indirect 

interest in leases, licenses, permits, contracts, or claims and related 

litigation that involve lands or resources administered by the bureau. 

However, this policy does not require the representative members to 

identify any other financial interests. Interior officials also told us that the 

department has begun inserting standard language into its committee 

charters briefly stating the ethics obligations of the members, whether they 

are special government employees or representatives. The charters for 

committees with representative members will include a statement that “a 

member may not participate in matters that will directly affect, or appear to 

affect, the financial interests of the member or the member’s spouse or 

minor children, unless authorized by the designated federal official.”29 

In January 2004, Interior officials also said that the department has begun 

working with its committee management officers to develop training and 

distribute materials to heighten committee members’ awareness of 

applicable ethical obligations and to develop and institute the appropriate 

screening mechanisms. Similarly, Energy does not require representative 

29The charters will also state that compensation from employment does not constitute a 

financial interest of the member so long as the matter before the committee will not have a 

special or distinct effect on the member or the member’s employer, other than as part of a 

class. 
Page 27 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

members to provide information on their financial interests and affiliations 

but does tell representative members in letters appointing them to 

committees that they “are required to recuse themselves from participating 

in any meeting, study, recommendation, or other committee activity that 

could have a direct and predictable effect on the companies, organizations, 

agencies, or entities with which they are associated or in which they have 

financial interest.” Interior and Energy policies thus rely on committee 

members’ correctly identifying and voluntarily disclosing such 

circumstances. In contrast, USDA requires its representative members to 

provide information about their employment and sources of income in 

excess of $10,000 but does not ask for information about other financial 

assets that may affect impartiality, such as stock holdings. However, if 

these members should have been, and actually were, appointed as special 

government employees, none of these approaches would be adequate to 

ensure that the members did not have conflicts of interest requiring 

mitigation.

At the start of our review, Interior officials told us that they had begun to 

review their appointment classifications for their 115 advisory committees 

as a result of the November 2002 OGE study. The officials noted that many 

of their committees addressing federal land management issues are not 

scientific and technical in content and, in their view, are appropriately 

staffed with representative members. In January 2004, Interior officials 

acknowledged that it was appropriate to change the nature of some 

committee members’ appointments upon reexamination of any underlying 

legislation and the purpose of the committees. The officials said the 

department has been reviewing the appointments to committees as their 

charters expire, and that the department has appointed special government 

employees to a few advisory committees during the past year.30 Regarding 

the earthquake studies committee discussed above, in January 2004 the 

department examined the appointments while renewing the charter and 

determined, on the basis of its review of the committee’s authorizing 

legislation, that the members of this committee should properly serve as 

special government employees. This committee has been operating for 2 

years with members appointed as representatives. Interior officials said 

the change in appointments will be reflected in the charter and in the 

30The department appointed members of the Flight 93 Advisory Commission and the Jimmy 

Carter National Historic Site Advisory Commission as special government employees in 

September 2003 and January 2004, respectively.
Page 28 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

pending appointment letters, and the committee will not be active again 

until these changes are made.

While noting that it now believes the authorizing language for the 

earthquake committee clearly calls for the appointment of the members as 

special government employees, the officials said that other committees 

that address scientific and technical issues specifically call for the 

appointment of representatives, such as Interior’s National Cooperative 

Geologic Mapping Advisory Committee. This committee, comprised 

primarily of officials from five federal agencies, is to review and provide 

advice on a 5-year plan for the geologic mapping program that the 

Secretary of the Interior is required to prepare. In our view, while the 

statute calls for the committee to include two representatives from the 

state geological surveys and one each from “academia” and “the private 

sector,” it does not clearly and unambiguously call for these individuals to 

be appointed as representative members rather than special government 

employees. As previously discussed, the term “representative” may be 

used in a variety of ways and may be used in a more generic manner to 

describe a committee’s composition. The term “representative” does not 

necessarily indicate that members should be stakeholders speaking for 

entities with an interest in the matter, nor is it clear in this case that 

academia or the private sector would have a specific point of view that 

could be represented. We believe the department could choose to appoint 

these members as special government employees to obtain their advice, if 

Interior decided that nonstakeholder advice was appropriate in light of the 

committee’s function. On the other hand, if the department wants to obtain 

stakeholder advice from the nonfederal committee members regarding the 

government’s 5-year geologic mapping program plan, the representative 

members should be clearly informed about the specific interest and points 

of view they are to represent. 

On this point, Interior officials acknowledged that their advisory 

committee members themselves are not always clear on whether they are 

to provide stakeholder advice or advice on behalf of the government. For 

example, during our review we learned that this question was raised at the 

initial meeting of the earthquake committee in 2001, at which point in time 

the representative members were told that they were charged with 

providing advice on behalf of the government, guidance indicating that the 

representative members were to function as special government 

employees. To be certain that committee members are clear on their roles 

in the future, Interior officials said that the department has begun to ensure 

that letters appointing individuals to advisory committees clearly inform 
Page 29 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

the member of their status as either a special government employee or a 

representative. Further, if the members are to serve as representatives, 

they are to be clearly informed of the constituencies they are to represent 

before the committee. Clearly, this is an important fact to communicate to 

the committee members. 

GSA officials also told us that appointment information is relevant and 

important to understanding the work of the various committees. The 

officials agreed that information on the nature of the advice being 

provided—and, in the case of representative appointments, of the entities 

or groups represented—that is not currently available to the public would 

be useful and informative. They further indicated that the GSA FACA 

database, which is available to the public and which identifies the members 

of the advisory committees, could be expanded to include, for each 

committee member, the type of appointment and the entity or group 

represented. 

Information That Can Help 

Agencies Ensure 

Committees Are Balanced Is 

Not Systematically 

Gathered and Evaluated

Many agencies do not identify and systematically collect and evaluate 

information that can help them determine the points of view of their 

potential committee members regarding the subject matters the 

committees will consider and thus better ensure that committees are, and 

are perceived as being, balanced. FACA requires that committees be fairly 

balanced both in terms of the points of view represented and the functions 

to be performed. Courts have interpreted the FACA requirement for 

committee balance as providing agencies with broad discretion in 

balancing their committees. In addition to the legal requirement for 

balance, it is important that committees are perceived as being balanced in 

order to be credible and effective. However, GSA guidance does not 

address what types of information could be helpful to agencies in assessing 

the points of view of potential committee members, nor do agency 

procedures identify what information should be collected about potential 

members to make decisions about committee balance. Many agencies do 

not identify and systematically collect and evaluate information that would 

be helpful in determining the points of view of committee members 

relevant to the subject matters the committees will consider. For example, 

of the nine departments and agencies we reviewed, only EPA consistently 

collected information on committee members who were appointed as 

special government employees in order to assess the points of view of the 

potential members and used this information to help achieve balance. 
Page 30 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Assessing the points of view of individual members is fundamental to 

ensuring that committees as a whole are, and are perceived as being, fairly 

balanced in terms of points of view because agencies must first know 

whether the members have particular viewpoints or whether they may 

have—or may reasonably be perceived as having—certain biases. For 

example, only financial interests and affiliations during the prior year are 

considered pertinent for conflict-of-interest purposes, but financial and 

other relevant affiliations—extending beyond the 12-month period—may 

identify a potential bias or point of view that agencies should consider both 

in selecting individual members and balancing the committees as a whole. 

Even when a legal conflict of interest does not exist, a committee member 

may be so closely aligned with a point of view or an organization that his or 

her ability to provide objective and impartial advice is impaired or appears 

to be impaired. Such circumstances in which a person’s impartiality may 

be called into question, sometimes referred to as an “apparent conflict of 

interest” and a “perceived conflict of interest,” are important for agencies 

to be aware of because the perception of bias that can harm the reputation 

of advisory committees is independent of the legal definition of a conflict of 

interest.31 In some cases, however, agencies may find it helpful to include 

individuals with known biases, perspectives, or affiliations to serve on 

certain advisory committees in order to ensure that the relevant points of 

view are considered.32 In these cases, the issue of the overall balance of 

viewpoints on the committees is heightened in the sense of an agency’s 

ability to ensure that the committee is balanced with respect to points of 

view. When agencies are unaware of the viewpoints and biases of its 

members, they cannot adequately ensure that the committees are, and are 

perceived as being, balanced as a whole.

31Under 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502, impartiality is considered in some cases in conjunction with 

particular matters. For example, a special government employee should not participate in a 

particular matter involving a specific party where the employee knows the matter will have 

a direct and predicable effect on the financial interest of a member of their household and 

where the employee determines that the circumstances would cause a reasonable person 

with knowledge of the relevant facts to question their impartiality in the matter, unless the 

employee has received authorization from an agency designee.

32For scientific committees, the relevant points of view may be different scientific 

perspectives.
Page 31 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Agencies typically rely on two sources to collect data about committee 

members who were appointed as special government employees: curricula 

vitae (CV) or résumés and the OGE form 450, the confidential financial 

disclosure form. Agencies generally collect CVs33 or résumés that may 

provide some information pertinent to assessing points of view, such as 

professional affiliations and published articles. Some agencies may also 

perform Internet searches for background information on candidates. 

However, these sources vary in content and reliability and may not be 

sufficient to consistently provide the information needed to assess for 

points of view.34 

The form 450, which does collect specific information in a systematic 

manner, was developed specifically for reviews for potential financial 

conflicts of interest. Some of the information on this form, however, also is 

relevant to assessing the overall balance of viewpoints on a committee. 

The form 450 requires potential committee members (and returning 

members at least annually) to provide information on sources of income 

and assets, liabilities, and outside positions during the prior year and on 

existing employment agreements or arrangements, such as promises of 

future employment and leaves of absence.35 The information on income 

sources, honoraria, and outside positions held during the prior year may be 

important to assessing for points of view.36 For example, a university 

professor who is also an official of an environmental advocacy organization 

may reasonably be viewed by a sponsoring agency and others as 

representing an environmental rather than an unaligned “academic” 

perspective. Similarly, a university professor who is also an official of a 

33CVs are most pertinent to assessing expertise, generally providing information on 

education, employment experience, professional memberships, service on boards or 

journals, and publications and presentations.

34Typically, members are rotating off committees periodically and thus issues of overall 

balance need to be revisited whenever membership changes are made. While special 

government employees serving on advisory committees are required to provide forms 450 at 

least annually, CVs and résumés may be collected once and not updated over the years that 

the members serve on the committees.

35Income includes salaries, fees, and honoraria of the individual and his or her spouse and 

dependent children. Assets producing more than $200 in income during the prior year also 

are to be reported, such as rent, interest, dividends, and capital gains. Information is 

requested on the sources of income and the identification of assets but not on the related 

dollar amounts.

36Some relevant affiliations would not be identified because the form 450 only requests 

information covering the immediate prior 12 months. 
Page 32 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

toxicology institute that receives funding from chemical companies or who 

provided expert legal testimony for a corporation may reasonably be 

viewed by a sponsoring agency and others as providing an industry 

perspective. 

Importantly, while the form 450 can provide some pertinent information for 

assessing points of view, it was neither designed for nor does it provide 

sufficient information for this purpose. Specifically, as our review of EPA’s 

Science Advisory Board demonstrated,37 the form 450—designed for 

financial conflict-of-interest reviews—solicits information covering only 

the prior year and does not request other information relevant to assessing 

points of view, such as 

• previous public statements or positions on the matter being reviewed, 

including statements in articles, testimony, or speeches; 

• positions taken in various legal forums, particularly in providing expert 

legal testimony, on the matter; 

• research conducted on the matter;

• interests of their employers or clients in the matter; and

• sources of funding for research or other activities. 

However, such information is helpful to understand the points of view of 

potential committee members and therefore to assess how an individual 

member’s participation on the committee would affect overall committee 

balance. For example, it is helpful for agencies to be aware of public 

pronouncements that candidates have made on matters relevant to their 

committees so that they can assess how such individuals may be viewed in 

terms of impartiality. In those instances where an agency selects a member 

for their expertise who may have a viewpoint that is aligned with an 

industry or environmental interest, without the information that would 

reveal the existing viewpoint, the agency would not be aware of whether 

including a member with a different viewpoint would be beneficial in terms 

of the public’s perception of committee balance.

37GAO-01-536.
Page 33 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

In addition, the extent to which a committee member’s employment is 

funded by a grant or grants from the sponsoring agency is a reasonable 

factor to consider in assessing the member’s impartiality in terms of 

independence from the agency. On this point, the Office of Management 

and Budget recently highlighted in its proposed rule on peer review 

procedures that the independence of scientists conducting peer reviews for 

agencies while at the same time receiving funding from these agencies 

might be called into question. Similarly, the 2003 report by the National 

Academies on organizational issues within NIH recommended that a 

substantial portion of a committee’s scientific membership should consist 

of persons whose primary source of research support is derived from a 

different NIH center or institute or from outside of NIH in order to achieve 

sufficient independence from the agency.38 Officials at EPA and FDA told 

us that they try to avoid appointing to committees members who receive 

agency grants for work that is related to matters before the committee. In 

contrast, Energy and NASA officials said it would be difficult for them to 

find for some committees the scientific and technical experts they need 

who do not also receive grants from their agencies. We are not suggesting 

that having grants or contracts with the sponsoring agency should 

disqualify individuals from serving on federal advisory committees, but 

rather that agencies should consider the support they provide to potential 

members since this does present potential issues of independence from the 

agency.

Agencies generally have even less information to evaluate the viewpoints of 

their representative members because representatives are not required to 

complete the form 450. Consequently, agencies generally do not collect 

information relating to the financial interests of the representative 

members. Although representatives are not subject to the financial 

conflict-of-interest rules, their financial interests could affect their 

viewpoints. An EPA official acknowledged that for some representative 

committees, it may be important to consider this information, depending 

on the work of the committees. However, another EPA official expressed a 

concern that asking representative members—who are not paid for their 

services—for financial information, such as is obtained from those retained

38National Research Council, Institute of Medicine, the National Academies, Enhancing the 

Vitality of the National Institutes of Health: Organizational Change to Meet New 

Challenges, 2003.
Page 34 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

as special government employees, could have a chilling effect on the 

willingness of people to serve on advisory committees as representatives.39

Regarding special government employees, we found that although agencies 

have generally collected forms 450 from these employees, the forms are not 

always collected in time for them to be of any use in also evaluating the 

points of view of potential committee members. For example, some 

agencies, such as NASA and CDC, do not collect the form 450 until the 

agency has made decisions about appointments. (We recognize that the 

form 450 was designed to assess for conflicts of interest and that agencies 

are not required to also use it to assess for points of view; however, as 

previously discussed, the form nonetheless can provide some valuable 

information to agencies regarding the viewpoints of an individual.) 

Of the nine committees we reviewed, only EPA’s Federal Insecticide, 

Fungicide, and Rodenticide (FIFRA) Scientific Advisory Panel consistently 

collected information relevant to assessing the points of view of 

prospective members and considered this information in selecting 

members for its peer review panels.40 Agencies with committees served by 

special government employees generally collected information from CVs 

and résumés and on the form 450, which, as discussed above, has 

limitations in terms of assessing the points of view of committee members. 

Agencies with representative members either collected only CVs or, in the 

case of USDA, collected some additional information about sources of 

income. (See table 1.) 

39Special government employees may or may not be paid for their services, depending on the 

policy of the agency that is sponsoring the committee.

40In January 2004, FDA officials said the agency uses a standard form to collect information 

from potential appointees early in the selection process that provides information similar to 

what EPA collects. We reviewed the form and its instructions and note that this effort is 

directed at potential conflicts of interest; it is not clear the extent to which the information 

is used to balance points of view. Further, FDA officials said they could not provide copies 

of the forms for the FDA committee we reviewed because the designated federal official had 

left the agency.
Page 35 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Table 1: Documentation That Agencies Systematically Collected on Potential Members of Selected Committees

Sources: Data collected from agencies’ committee management offices, designated federal officials, or other agency officials responsible for nominating members of committees.

a

USDA requires members of its advisory committees to file a USDA form AD-755. This form requests 

information on the individual’s primary employment, sources of income over $10,000, and other 

matters related to the individual’s background in agriculture.

b

Members were appointed as representatives not subject to conflict-of-interest reviews.

c

The EPA FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel uses the EPA form 3110-48 in lieu of the OGE form 450. 

The EPA form requests more detailed information from members about their affiliations and 

association with the work of the committee.

d

FDA requires members of its Food Advisory Committee to file a form 450 during the appointment 

process. However, if the Food Advisory Committee, or any other FDA advisory committee, plans to 

discuss “particular matters” of specific applicability, the agency will require members to file an FDA 

form 3410 prior to the meeting. The form 3410 requests more specific information about a member's 

Department/Agency Committee name

Documentation that agencies systematically collected on potential 

members of selected committees

Curriculum 

vitae or résumé

Conflict-of-interest financial 

disclosure form

Other data 

collection 

OGE form 450 instrument

Alternative form 

approved by 

OGE

Agriculture/Food Safety and 

Inspection Service

National Advisory Committee 

for Microbiological Criteria for 

Foodsb

X USDA form AD755a

Energy Biological and Environmental 

Research Advisory 

Committeeb

 X

Environmental Protection 

Agency

Federal Insecticide, 

Fungicide, and Rodenticide 

Act Scientific Advisory Panel

 X Xc Structured

telephone 

interview

Health and Human Services Secretary’s Advisory 

Committee on Human 

Research Protection

 X X

Health and Human 

Services/Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention

Advisory Committee on 

Childhood Lead Poisoning 

Prevention 

 X X

Health and Human 

Services/Food and Drug 

Administration

Food Advisory Committee X X Xd Structured 

telephone 

interviewe

Health and Human 

Services/National Institutes of 

Health

Scientific Advisory 

Committee on Alternative 

Toxicological Methods

 X X

Interior/U.S. Geological 

Survey

Scientific Earthquake Studies 

Advisory Committeeb

 X

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

Space Science Advisory 

Committee

 Xf Xf
Page 36 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

affiliation with particular companies identified by FDA that might be affected by the committee's 

deliberations during a specific meeting.

e

See footnote 40.

f

The designated federal official for the NASA Space Science Advisory Committee requests short 

biographical sketches from prospective members. Agency officials consider these sketches when 

deciding whom to appoint. After the agency has decided to appoint an individual, it requests a copy of 

a curriculum vitae and a completed form 450.

Regarding the EPA FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel, this advisory 

committee convenes about six panels annually to address scientific and 

technical issues. For example, we reviewed one such panel that was (1) 

evaluating the range of developmental effects associated with the exposure 

of amphibians to the pesticide atrazine and (2) determining the significance 

of these effects for risk assessment and the likely threshold exposure value 

for eliciting these effects. The executive director of this committee said 

that candidates with known positions or biases generally are not selected 

for the panels—that is, the agency does not select individuals previously 

associated with the agency, regulated industries, or stakeholder 

communities. In addition, the agency generally does not select individuals 

with a stated position on the particular matter being reviewed. The FIFRA 

Scientific Advisory Panel defines balanced membership as including the 

necessary areas of technical expertise, different scientific perspectives 

within each technical discipline, and the collective breadth of experience 

needed to address the agency’s charge. In order to evaluate potential 

members, the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel uses CVs and the EPA 

alternative disclosure form that asks committee members to provide 

information needed to assess impartiality, such as information about 

compensated expert testimony and sources of research and project funding 

during the prior 2 years. The form also asks candidates to consider all 

relevant information over the past 5 years and to identify and describe any 

reason that they may be unable to provide impartial advice on the matter to 

be considered by the panel. 

The executive secretary of the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel told us that 

EPA’s alternative financial disclosure form—developed to address the 

limitations we identified in our report on EPA’s Science Advisory Board—

has greatly facilitated their ability to consistently obtain relevant 

information. The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel also asks potential 

members several standard questions that we identified in our prior report 

as relevant to assessing impartiality, such as whether they have made any
Page 37 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

oral or written public statement on the issue before the panel.41 As a result 

of obtaining and reviewing this information in order to select members and 

ensure appropriate committee balance overall, the FIFRA Scientific 

Advisory Panel is in a position to make informed choices. By 

systematically collecting relevant background information on all 

candidates, the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel is in a position to ensure 

that its panels are balanced in terms of the points of view represented. We 

also found that FDA often collects similar information on an alternative 

form that provides some pertinent information for assessing points of view, 

but the agency does not use this information to assess the overall balance 

of the committees. That is, FDA generally uses the form 450 in reviewing 

candidates for appointments to committees and uses the alternative form 

to review for conflicts of interest for specific meetings that involve 

particular matters.

In addition, agencies that have collected forms 450 for special government 

employees for the purpose of conflict-of-interest reviews may not use the 

information available to them on the forms that—although designed for 

conflict-of-interest reviews—could also be helpful in evaluating the points 

of view committee members may have. For example, the Director of the 

White House Liaison Office at HHS, who developed the committee roster 

for the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections 

that the Secretary of HHS approved, said that she did not review the forms 

450 in selecting members.42 She viewed the task of reviewing the forms 450 

as the purview of the agency ethics officials who would determine whether 

financial conflicts of interest existed. In response to our questions about 

whether affiliations with law firms, identified by some members on the 

forms 450, may be relevant to consider in terms of their points of view, she 

said that she did not need to know the particulars about the legal work 

since she did not consider such information relevant to selection decisions. 

Further, she said that she did not consider particular points of view 

candidates may have in making selections. For example, we asked her if 

she considered the point of view of one member who had publicly stated 

disagreement on religious grounds with certain research that is included in 

the committee’s charter, and she said she did not. The Director stated that 

41These questions were not added to EPA’s confidential financial disclosure form, the 

purpose of which is to support reviews for potential financial conflicts of interest.

42This committee replaced a committee established by the prior administration. In this case, 

HHS did not renew the committee charter when it expired in 2002, instead HHS opted to 

create a new committee with a revised charter.
Page 38 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

she nominated members to the Secretary for his approval primarily on the 

basis of their expertise and also considering several demographic factors 

(gender, race, and geographic location) to the extent these additional 

factors did not impinge on the department’s ability to pick qualified 

members. She noted that these factors reflect the department’s written 

policies and procedures.43

Officials at other agencies said they considered similar factors in balancing 

the other eight committees we examined. Specifically, officials indicated 

that they focused on expertise, demographic characteristics, and 

employment history as factors to assess points of view as it affects balance. 

(See table 2.) As previously discussed, FACA does not elaborate on how 

agencies are to ensure that advisory committees are fairly balanced in 

terms of the expertise and the points of view of the members, nor does it 

provide criteria for assessing balance.44 Thus, agencies have considerable 

discretion in determining how they will meet the requirement for achieving 

balanced committees. 

43The Director of the White House Liaison at HHS also managed the appointments to 

another committee we reviewed, the CDC Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead 

Poisoning Prevention. She recommended 10 new members to the Secretary for 

appointments made in 2002 and 2003 to replace members with expiring terms.

44In its July 19, 2001, final rule on advisory committee management, GSA did provide a list of 

factors to consider in achieving a balanced advisory committee membership, such as the 

advisory committee’s mission and the geographic, ethnic, social, economic, or scientific 

impact of the advisory committee’s recommendations. 
Page 39 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Table 2: Factors Used by Agencies to Balance Selected Committees

Sources: Information on the criteria considered to balance committees came from designated federal officials, committee management officials, or other agency officials responsible for nominating or 

appointing members of committees.

In discussing their selection criteria, most officials reported that in 

selecting members for these science and technical committees, they 

focused first and foremost on expertise. Some agency officials said that 

they do not consider a balance of points of view as relevant to science and 

technical committees, believing that the appropriate focus for such 

committees is obtaining the appropriate balance of required expertise. We 

do not disagree that this focus is appropriate, particularly for committees 

that address scientific and technical issues. While courts have interpreted 

FACA as giving agencies broad discretion in how to balance their 

committees, in our view, the integrity of these committees’ advice would be 

better served if agencies were to consider additional information about 

potential members’ points of view. For example, experts in a given field of 

expertise may have varying scientific perspectives that agencies could 

consider for balancing the committee. Along these lines, the FIFRA 

Department/Agency Name of committee Expertise Ethnicity Gender Geography

Employment 

sector

Agriculture/Food Safety 

and Inspection Service

National Advisory Committee on 

Microbiological Criteria for Foods

X X X X X

Energy Biological and Environmental Research 

Advisory Committee

X X X X X

Environmental Protection 

Agency

Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 

Rodenticide Act Scientific Advisory Panel

X X X

Health and Human 

Services

Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human 

Research Protections 

X X X X

Health and Human 

Services/Centers for 

Disease Control and 

Prevention

Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead 

Poisoning Prevention

X X X X

Health and Human 

Services/Food and Drug 

Administration

Food Advisory Committee X X X X X

Health and Human 

Services/National 

Institutes of Health

Scientific Advisory Committee on 

Alternative Toxicological Methods

X X X X X

Interior/U.S. Geological 

Survey

Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory 

Committee

X X X X

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration

Space Science Advisory Committee X X X X X
Page 40 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Scientific Advisory Panel defines balance as including different scientific 

perspectives within each technical discipline. 

Second, the officials most commonly related “points of view” to 

demographic factors, such as race, gender, or geographic locations—that 

is, defining a balance of points of view in terms of demographic diversity. 

While important, these criteria alone do not provide a robust understanding 

of the points of view and potential biases the members may bring to the 

committee vis-à-vis the specific matters the committees will address. That 

is, these approaches may achieve demographic diversity, but they cannot 

ensure an appropriate balance of viewpoints relative to the matters being 

considered by the committees. Third, some of the officials also identified 

the primary employment affiliation as a factor relevant to achieving a 

balance of points of view. For example, a factor in committee balance for 

one committee is the breakdown of members employed by universities, 

private industry, and federal and state agencies. We agree the primary 

employment affiliation may be an important consideration for a number of 

committees to ensure a balance of points of view. However, as we 

illustrated in our work at EPA’s Science Advisory Board, the staff director 

of the board viewed some academics as aligned either with industry or 

environmental perspectives and some experts affiliated with industry as 

representing an environmental perspective on the basis of information 

about their other affiliations. Additional information about the candidates’ 

viewpoints and potential biases would better ensure that the committees 

are, and are perceived as being, fairly balanced in terms of points of view—

and that no one interest or viewpoint dominates. Along these lines, NIH 

officials told us that the information EPA collects to evaluate potential 

committee members would be very helpful to them in selecting members 

and ensuring that committees are balanced as a whole.

Finally, we note that other practices agencies use in forming new 

committees and in selecting replacement members for existing committees 

can help them better ensure that their committees are appropriately 

balanced. These include steps agencies take to identify potential 

candidates and to seek feedback on proposed committee membership. 

Appendixes III through XI provide information on the nine committees we 

reviewed, including how the agencies identified candidates and whether 

they requested public comments on the committee membership. These 

and other practices are discussed in the next section. 
Page 41 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Promising Practices 

Could Better Ensure 

Independence and 

Balance

Some agencies use practices when forming and managing their committees 

that can better ensure that federal advisory committee members are 

independent and that committees are balanced. These practices include 

(1) obtaining nominations for committee members from the public, (2) 

using clearly defined processes to obtain and review pertinent information 

on potential members regarding potential conflicts of interest and 

impartiality, and (3) prescreening prospective members using a structured 

interview. In our view, these measures constitute promising practices 

because they reflect the principles of conflict-of-interest provisions and 

FACA by employing clearly defined procedures to promote systematic, 

consistent, and transparent efforts to achieve independent and balanced 

committees. Although these practices for obtaining and reviewing 

pertinent information to assess for conflicts of interest and impartiality are 

broadly applicable, some of the practices, such as seeking public comment 

on proposed committees, are most particularly relevant to those 

committees addressing sensitive or controversial topics. If more agencies 

adopted and effectively implemented these practices, we believe they 

would have greater assurance that their committees are, and are perceived 

as being, independent and balanced. In addition, we have identified 

selected measures that could promote greater transparency in the federal 

advisory committee system. 

Obtaining Nominations 

from the Public

When seeking to appoint members to their federal advisory committees, 

agencies often use a combination of methods to obtain nominations for 

potential committee members. Agencies typically rely on relevant program 

officials in the agency, officials from other agencies, members of 

professional organizations, and authors of relevant scientific and technical 

literatures as ways to identify potential committee members. Some 

agencies also seek nominations from the public by using widely available 

resources, such as the Federal Register and agency Web sites, to broaden 

the pool of candidates from which committee members may be drawn. The 

latter approach is a systematic and transparent method of obtaining
Page 42 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

nominations and can provide agencies with greater assurance that a range 

of relevant experts and/or stakeholders capable of creating impartial and 

balanced committees are identified.45

In addition to their other methods of obtaining nominations from 

colleagues, professional associations, and the like, we believe agencies 

should also routinely consider obtaining nominations from the public 

because this practice can both (1) help agencies identify qualified 

candidates and (2) alleviate any perception that they are choosing from a 

narrow pool of candidates that may not provide the appropriate expertise 

and points of view. It may be particularly relevant to solicit nominations 

from the public for committees that address sensitive or controversial 

issues. Obtaining nominations from the public may require more time and 

effort than less formal approaches to identifying committee members and 

may also involve a publishing cost. However, by actively engaging the 

public and all interested parties in the process in an open and transparent 

manner, the agency’s credibility may be enhanced. 

Using Clearly Defined 

Processes to Screen for 

Conflicts of Interest and 

Points of View

As previously discussed, many agencies do not consistently collect 

information that could be helpful in determining the viewpoints of potential 

members and ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as being, 

balanced. However, the National Academies and EPA have developed clear 

processes that, if effectively implemented, can provide them with greater 

assurance that relevant conflicts of interest and biases are identified and 

addressed, and that committees are appropriately balanced in terms of 

points of view because they have identified and evaluated the necessary 

information before committees are finalized.

45Some of the committees and agencies that publish Federal Register notices seeking 

nominations include EPA’s Science Advisory Board; EPA’s FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel; 

all committees managed by FDA, such as the Food Advisory Committee; and a number of 

committees managed by USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service, such as the National 

Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods. USDA also sought nominations 

using an announcement on the agency and advisory committee Web pages and in a weekly 

newsletter sent to interested organizations and individuals. EPA’s Science Advisory Board 

also uses its Web site as a vehicle for soliciting nominations to its peer review committees.
Page 43 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Specifically, the processes used by the National Academies and EPA’s 

Science Advisory Board clearly and consistently

• identify the information they deem necessary to assess candidates for 

independence and to balance committees,

• explain to the candidates why the required information is important to 

protect the integrity of the committee’s work, 

• request public comment on proposed committee membership, and 

• require evaluation of the overall balance of committees before 

committees are finalized.

Overviews of the processes used by the National Academies and the 

Science Advisory Board are provided below.

The National Academies In 2001, we reported that to help balance their committees and safeguard 

their credibility, the National Academies provide prospective members 

with a document that offers a succinct, straightforward discussion of what 

constitutes potential conflicts of interest and biases and explains what 

information they are required to provide to the National Academies on a 

standard form.46 In 2003, the National Academies updated their procedures 

covering conflicts of interest and bias, issuing their Policy on Committee 

Composition and Balance and Conflicts of Interest for Committees Used 

in the Development of Reports. In explaining the need for obtaining 

background information about prospective members, the National 

Academies emphasize that the work of their committees must be, and must 

be perceived as being, free of any significant conflict of interest47 and 

uncompromised by bias. The National Academies state that allegations of 

conflict of interest or lack of balance and objectivity can undermine the 

46GAO-01-536.

47Members of committees of the National Academies are not subject to the same conflict-ofinterest provisions as are members of FACA committees sponsored by federal agencies. 

The National Academy of Science is required to make its best effort to ensure that no 

committee member has a conflict of interest that is relevant to the functions to be 

performed, unless the conflict is publicly disclosed and the academy determines that it is 

unavoidable. The academies define a conflict of interest as any financial or other interest 

that conflicts with the service of an individual because it (1) could impair the individual’s 

objectivity or (2) could create an unfair competitive advantage for any person or 

organization.
Page 44 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

conclusions of fully competent committees. The academies continue to 

request the following information from potential members on a standard 

form:48

• organizational affiliations, 

• financial interests, 

• research support, 

• government service, and

• public statements and positions. 

In addition, prospective committee members are asked to identify and 

describe any other circumstances in their background or present 

connections that might reasonably be construed as unduly affecting their 

judgment or that might be reasonably viewed as creating an actual or 

potential bias or conflict of interest or the appearance of a bias or conflict 

of interest. Further, the National Academies post information about panel 

candidates on a Web site for public comment, allowing the public the 

opportunity to identify any real or perceived conflicts or biases associated 

with individual members and the ability to raise issues regarding the 

balance of viewpoints on the proposed committee. Lastly, the National 

Academies do not finalize their committee selections until officials have 

reviewed and evaluated information provided by prospective members and 

comments received from the public regarding the proposed makeup of the 

committee. As we previously reported, this process has proven beneficial 

to the academies in selecting balanced peer review panels.49

EPA’s Science Advisory Board EPA’s Science Advisory Board staff office has also developed a systematic 

process to obtain and evaluate the information it needs to assess potential 

members for potential conflicts of interest and to properly balance the 

range of expertise and viewpoints on the board. As previously discussed, 

federal committee members serving as special government employees are 

48Potential members complete one of three similar forms covering background information 

and confidential conflict-of-interest disclosure, depending on the type of study involved: 

program reviews and evaluations, general scientific and technical studies and assistance, 

and studies related to government regulations.

49GAO-01-536.
Page 45 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

subject to the criminal financial conflict-of-interest statute. The staff office 

uses the alternative form that EPA developed, form 3110-48, for special 

government employees serving on advisory committees to collect 

information that enables the agency to evaluate potential members for legal 

conflicts of interest and also helps the agency in assessing for impartiality 

and points of view. The staff office also contacts prospective panelists and 

asks them five standard questions to help the office assess the panelists’ 

points of view, such as whether they have made any public statements on 

the issues that the panels will consider. The staff office uses this 

information to help ensure that any legal conflicts of interest are identified 

and appropriately mitigated and to help ensure that committees as a whole 

are balanced in terms of points of view. 

EPA’s form 3110-48 explains that the information being requested is needed 

so that EPA ethics officials can make an informed judgment regarding any 

conflict of interest or appearance of lack of impartiality. The Science 

Advisory Board staff office further explains how it uses the information 

that it collects in its brochure entitled Overview of the Panel Formation 

Process at the Environmental Protection Agency Science Advisory Board. 

As previously discussed, the information that EPA collects on the form 

3110-48 includes sources of income and assets, liabilities, outside positions, 

consulting activities, sources of research support or project funding, and 

compensated expert testimony. Further, similar to the National 

Academies, EPA requests potential members to identify and describe on 

the form any reason they may be unable to provide impartial advice on 

matters before the committee and any reason their impartiality in the 

identified matter might be questioned. The Science Advisory Board staff 

office also searches independently for background information on 

prospective members to understand their qualifications and points of view. 

Also, like the National Academies, EPA uses a public notice process to 

obtain comments on proposed candidates for its Science Advisory Board. 

That is, the staff office publishes the names and biographical sketches of 

candidates for its committees on the board’s Web site, requesting the public 

to provide information, analysis, or documentation that it should consider 

in evaluating the candidates. The staff office does not finalize their 

committee selections until officials have reviewed and evaluated the 

information provided by the candidates, any other information the public 

may have provided, and information gathered by the staff independently on 

the background of each prospective member. According to a designated 

federal official for the board, the public comment period is a last check in 

the screening process that can identify information about prospective 

candidates, such as publicly stated positions on matters related to the 
Page 46 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

committee, that the staff office would want to verify and evaluate prior to 

making panel selections. He said the staff office has received feedback that 

the biographical sketches are helpful, and he believes this practice 

enhances the public’s perception of the board’s panel formation process.

Prescreening Prospective 

Members Using a Structured 

Interview

EPA’s FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel has a committee formation process 

similar to that of the Science Advisory Board that also identifies the 

specific information the staff will discuss in interviews with prospective 

members. Although the purposes of the structured interview include 

assessing the interest, availability, and expertise of the potential member, a 

primary focus is on evaluating potential financial conflicts of interest and 

biases. In addition, the interview provides EPA with the opportunity to 

explain the ethical obligations of committee members and discuss in detail 

the information that members would have to provide on the EPA form 

3110-48 before they could be appointed to the committee. This process is 

efficient because it enables the panel to quickly identify those individuals 

who meet its criteria for independence and impartiality.50 Further, 

prospective members who subsequently complete the form 3110-48 will be 

better prepared to complete the form accurately. We note that the panel’s 

interview protocol, including the structured interview itself, is available on 

its Web site. Thus, prospective members and the public are informed of the 

processes and the issues that will be discussed with all prospective 

members. The panel’s approach to obtaining relevant information from 

prospective committee members is systematic, consistent, and transparent. 

Further, we believe it unlikely that agencies formalizing and publicizing 

their processes for obtaining information from prospective committee 

members would approve questions that are generally inappropriate in a 

professional working environment, such as questions about party 

affiliation or political viewpoints that some committee members at other 

agencies have reported being asked.

50FDA also has a form that agency staff may use to conduct a preliminary interview “to 

identify obvious conflicts of interest that may preclude appointment.” This form is called 

the Prospective Special Government Employee Personal Data Sheet (Preliminary Informal 

Interview), form FDA 2725a (July 1992).
Page 47 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Selected Measures Could 

Promote Greater 

Transparency in the Federal 

Advisory Committee System

In light of recent controversies surrounding the perceived politicization of 

federal advisory committees, we identified several other measures to 

improve transparency in the federal advisory committee system. Although 

none of these measures can ensure that committee members are 

independent and that committees are balanced, we believe each of these 

alternatives has the potential to increase public understanding of the 

process of appointing advisory committee members and make more 

transparent the operations of federal advisory committees. 

In the interest of transparency, agencies could make public the following 

information about each of their advisory committees:

• The committee formation process: how members are identified and 

screened, and how committees are assessed for balance.

• Whether members are appointed as special government employees and 

are speaking as independent experts, or whether members are 

appointed as representatives and speaking as stakeholders.

• Whether committees arrive at decisions through a voting process or by 

consensus.

There are several contexts in which agencies could make this information 

available to the public. Specifically, the information could be

• written in the committee’s charter;

• posted on the GSA on-line database;

• posted on the agency or committee’s Web site;

• announced at committee meetings; or

• identified on committee work products (reports, studies, or 

recommendations).

It is in the public interest to disclose such basic information about federal 

advisory committees. Further, we believe that taking such measures to 

make information about committees available to the public would help 

educate interested parties about the formation of committees and better 

enable them to evaluate whether agencies have complied with conflict-ofinterest requirements and the FACA requirements for balance. Given 
Page 48 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

recent well-publicized accusations of biases and conflicts of interest, 

efforts to improve the transparency of the federal advisory committee 

system can only serve to inspire greater public trust in the process and 

enhance the credibility of committees’ work.

Along these lines, we have identified two additional measures to promote 

transparency that may warrant consideration: (1) public disclosure of 

information concerning conflict-of-interest waivers and (2) internal 

disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and sources of bias among 

committee members prior to the initiation of committee work.

Agencies may grant waivers to special government employees who have 

potential conflicts of interest if the agency determines that either (1) the 

conflict is insignificant or (2) the need for the member’s expertise 

outweighs the conflict. The financial conflict-of-interest statute requires 

that agencies provide limited information to the public about waivers upon 

request; namely, that an agency has granted a waiver and the basis on 

which it was granted. The statute does not require, however, that agencies 

proactively notify the public about waivers, either during advisory 

committee meetings, in meeting minutes, or in committee products. Our 

review of selected committees found that agencies typically did not 

disclose this information. In contrast, FDA has had a practice of providing 

at the beginning of meetings a summary disclosure of any waivers granted 

to members for that meeting. The disclosure identifies which members 

have received waivers and whether the waivers were granted on the basis 

that conflict was insignificant or that the need for the expertise outweighed 

the potential conflict. Because information about the conflicts pertained to 

information that members provide to agencies on confidential financial 

disclosure forms that are protected under the Federal Privacy Act, details 

about the conflicts were not provided. Thus, the public and others could 

not evaluate the impact of the conflict on a person’s ability to provide 

impartial advice. In February 2002, as a result of a statutory requirement, 

FDA issued for public comment a draft guidance document describing its 

policy of disclosing specific information with respect to waivers granted 

for particular matters of specific applicability—that is, when members 

have a direct relationship with the products, interests, and issues under the 

review of the committee. Under this policy, FDA discloses not only the 

existence of a waiver but also information on the committee member’s
Page 49 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

interests that constitute a conflict.51 To address the constraints imposed by 

the Federal Privacy Act, FDA requires committee members to sign a 

consent form giving FDA permission to publicly disclose this information 

before members receive a waiver. According to FDA officials, committee 

members have generally been willing to sign the consent forms and to 

disclose this information. We believe the practice of publicly disclosing the 

issuance of conflict-of-interest waivers to committee members increases 

transparency and can also increase the credibility of the committee process 

by allowing the public to know when a potential conflict exists and why the 

agency saw fit to grant the member a waiver. Further, the application of 

this practice could be expanded to include not only particular matters of 

specific applicability (in which a particular company or individual is likely 

to be affected by the matter) but also to other particular matters (in which, 

for example, an industry or group of persons is likely to be affected).

The National Academies have a policy of asking their committees to engage 

in an internal discussion about members' work experiences, affiliations, 

and other circumstances that might pose a potential conflict of interest. 

The academies believe that an internal disclosure of this information 

promotes transparency and serves to increase the credibility of the 

committees' work. We agree that a confidential discussion among 

committee members regarding real or perceived conflicts of interest and 

biases can provide committee members with important background 

information that can enable them to better evaluate the perspectives of 

their fellow committee members. Understandably, extending such a 

practice to federal advisory committees, and in particular to members 

appointed as special government employees, raises privacy questions 

because special government employees are under no obligation to disclose 

such information to fellow committee members or the public. However, we 

believe that the possibility of requiring members to disclose background 

information, affiliations, and other sources of potential conflicts of interest 

and biases among individual committee members at an internal disclosure 

session prior to the committee’s beginning its work warrants study. 

51According to EPA, the staff office for the Science Advisory Board actively avoids granting 

waivers, preferring to choose another panelist instead. However, in the event that EPA 

grants a waiver, the designated federal official discloses that information at the start of 

meetings. EPA would disclose only the name of the individual and the type of waiver 

granted—not the details of the conflict.
Page 50 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Conclusions For federal advisory committees to be successful, the members must be 

independent and the committees balanced—that is, they must be able to 

provide, and be perceived as providing, credible and balanced advice. A 

spectrum of scientists and other experts perceive recent appointments to 

some science and technical committees as being influenced more by 

ideology than expertise. Independent of the facts and specific issues 

involved, this perception alone is problematic. The perception of the 

federal advisory committee system as politicized can jeopardize the value 

of an individual committee’s work; discourage the participation of 

scientists, experts, and other potential members on future advisory 

committees; and call into question the integrity of the federal advisory 

committee system itself. Because allegations of conflict of interest and 

bias can undermine the work of otherwise credible and competent 

committees and threaten the integrity of the federal advisory committee 

system, the best interests of the government are served by governmentwide 

guidance and agency-level policies and procedures for addressing potential 

conflicts of interest and ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as 

being, balanced. However, federal guidance in these key areas has 

limitations that reduce its effectiveness. 

First, OGE guidance on representative appointments can be strengthened 

to better ensure that agencies are appropriately appointing committee 

members. Unless certain ambiguities in the guidance are clarified, some 

agencies may continue to appoint members providing advice on behalf of 

the government as representatives and not conduct reviews of potential 

conflicts, thereby leaving the specific committees and the federal advisory 

committee system itself vulnerable to potential criticism if potential 

conflicts of interest are identified. Clarifications that are needed to ensure 

that representative appointments are made only when the individuals are, 

in fact, asked to provide advice representing the positions of the 

stakeholders they are representing include specifying that representative 

appointments generally are not appropriate for individuals who are to 

provide advice on the basis of their expertise. Justifying representative 

appointments on this basis avoids using the special government employee 

category, which was specifically created to facilitate the government’s 

ability to hire various experts for just such a purpose as serving on federal 

advisory committees. The guidance should also clarify that the use of the 

term “representative” in a statute or charter may be used in a generic sense 

and does not necessarily mean the members are to be appointed as 

representatives who are to provide stakeholder advice. Again, in 

considering which type of appointment is appropriate, the focus should be 
Page 51 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

on the nature of the advice to be provided. That is, individuals who are 

appointed to federal advisory committees to provide advice on behalf of 

the government (i.e., individuals who are not providing stakeholder advice) 

should be appointed as special government employees. Finally, one of the 

first steps agency officials should take in establishing new committees is to 

determine, in consultations with agency ethics officials, the appropriate 

appointment category for members. These decisions should be reviewed 

as committee charters are renewed every 2 years.

Second, GSA could provide guidance that would assist agencies in 

identifying the kinds of information they should systematically collect in 

order to determine the viewpoints of prospective committee members for 

the purpose of ensuring that committees are, and are perceived as being, 

balanced. Although the type of information relevant to each committee 

might differ in some respects, more systematic information collection and 

evaluation can support better, and more informed, committee 

appointments. 

Improving existing federal guidance and agency procedures and 

incorporating the revised guidance into the FACA management course 

should enable federal agencies to better ensure that (1) potential conflicts 

of interest of committee members have been identified and appropriately 

mitigated upfront and (2) committees are appropriately balanced in terms 

of points of view and functions to be performed. Along these lines, 

alternative procedures used to create and manage advisory committees at 

some federal agencies and the National Academies constitute promising 

practices that can better ensure independence and balance. Procedures 

such as obtaining nominations for committee members from the public, 

reviewing more pertinent information regarding members’ points of view, 

and prescreening prospective members using a structured interview would 

help agencies establish more systematic and consistent methods of 

achieving independent and balanced committees. Consistent with FACA’s 

principle of transparency, agencies could also adopt selected measures to 

make public more information regarding how they form and manage their 

committees. We believe it is in the best interest of both the public and the 

government to disclose more information about the formation and 

operation of the advisory committees—for example, how the members are 

identified and screened, and whether members are serving as 

representatives of an identified interest or as special government 

employees to provide independent advice. In light of recent concerns 

about biases and conflicts of interest, adopting more clearly defined 

procedures to screen and appoint committee members and to increase 
Page 52 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

transparency in the advisory committee process would constitute 

important steps toward protecting the integrity of the federal advisory 

committee system and maintaining public confidence in the work of federal 

advisory committees.

Because this report identifies improvements to guidance and promising 

management practices that generally apply to all federal agencies that 

sponsor advisory committees and not just to the nine agencies addressed in 

this report, we are directing our recommendations to OGE and GSA in their 

roles as providers of governmentwide guidance on federal ethics and 

advisory committee management requirements. Our expectation is that all 

54 federal agencies that currently sponsor federal advisory committees 

could benefit from the improved guidance and management practices.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To better ensure that federal agencies correctly and consistently comply 

with federal requirements when appointing federal advisory committee 

members, we recommend that the Director of the Office of Government 

Ethics revise its 1982 guidance to federal agencies defining representative 

appointments to federal advisory committees. The guidance should 

• clarify that classes of expertise generally are not a “recognizable group 

of persons” for purposes of making representative appointments; 

• consistently state that appointments as representatives are limited to 

circumstances in which the members are speaking as stakeholders for 

the entities or groups they represent; and

• clarify that the term “representative” in statutes and charters may also 

be used more generically to identify the appropriate balance of points of 

view or expertise and may not be specifying that representative 

appointments be used, and revise the directions on specifying 

representative appointments to focus on the type of advice 

representatives are to provide—that is, stakeholder advice. 

To ensure that agencies’ appointments to federal advisory committees are 

appropriate, we further recommend that the Director of the Office of 

Government Ethics and the GSA Committee Management Secretariat 

• direct federal agencies to review their representative appointments to 

federal advisory committees either as the 2-year charters expire or, for 

those committees with indefinite charters, within 1 year to determine if 
Page 53 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

the appointments are appropriate and to reappoint members as special 

government employees, where appropriate, and 

• direct agency committee management officials to consult with agency 

ethics officials in making decisions about the type of appointments that 

should be made for each committee. 

To better ensure that the agency staff managing federal advisory 

committees understand when to appoint committee members as 

representatives and when to appoint them as special government 

employees, we recommend that GSA and OGE revise the training materials 

for the FACA management course, incorporating the additional OGE 

guidance as recommended above, and ensure that the course materials 

highlight the fact that appointment decisions should be based on the type 

of advice the committee members are to provide. 

To better ensure that federal advisory committee members providing 

stakeholder advice, and thus serving as representative members exempt 

from federal financial conflict-of-interest statutes, do not have other 

unknown points of view or biases, we recommend that OGE and GSA 

direct agencies to determine, for each relevant committee, the potential for 

such other biases and to take the appropriate steps to ensure their 

representative members do not have such biases. At a minimum, 

representatives should receive ethics training and be asked whether they 

know of any reason their participation on the committee might reasonably 

be questioned—for example, because of any personal benefits that could 

ensue from financial holdings, patents, or other interests. 

To better ensure that agencies have robust information to establish 

committees that are balanced in terms of points of view and the functions 

to be performed, we recommend that GSA provide guidance to agencies 

regarding what background information might be relevant in assessing 

committee members’ points of view. Relevant information for these 

purposes could include previous or ongoing research, public statements or 

positions on the matter being reviewed, the interest of the employer or 

clients in the matter, participation in legal proceedings, and work for 

affected entities. In addition, potential committee members should be 

asked if there is any reason they might be unable to provide impartial 

advice on the matter or matters before the committee, or if they know of 

any reason their impartiality on the matter or matters might be questioned. 
Page 54 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

To better ensure that the committee members, agency and congressional 

officials, and the public understand the nature of the advice provided by 

federal advisory committees, we recommend that GSA issue guidance that 

agencies should

• identify the committee formation process used for each committee, 

particularly how members are identified and screened and how 

committees are assessed for overall balance;

• state in the appointment letters to committee members whether they are 

appointed as special government employees or representatives; in cases 

where appointments are as representatives, the letters should further 

identify the entity or group that they are to represent;

• identify each member’s appointment category on the GSA FACA 

database; for representative members, the entity or group represented 

should also be identified; and

• state in the committee products the nature of the advice provided—that 

is, whether the product is based on independent advice or consensus 

among the various identified interests or stakeholders.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided copies of a draft of this report to the two agencies, GSA and 

OGE, to whom we address our recommendations to provide additional 

guidance to federal agencies, and to the agencies whose advisory 

committee management policies and procedures we reviewed: EPA; 

Energy; HHS (with copies to CDC, FDA, and NIH); Interior; NASA; and 

USDA. 

In commenting on the draft report, GSA agreed with the findings relating to 

those areas under its purview. Further, GSA generally agreed with our 

recommendations to OGE and GSA and outlined a proactive approach to 

addressing those that pertain to GSA, including making changes to its online FACA database, and to working with OGE on those that pertain to 

OGE’s responsibilities. GSA stated that it expects to complete all 

necessary actions directly under its purview and those to be achieved 

collaboratively with OGE and other agencies during fiscal year 2005. GSA’s 

comments are provided in appendix XII.

In its comments, OGE acknowledged that some agencies may be 

inappropriately using representative appointments. Further, in responding 
Page 55 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

to our finding that several agencies believe representatives may be 

appointed to represent their fields of expertise, OGE agrees with us that 

such appointments are inappropriate—but does not agree that any 

limitations in its guidance are a factor in the misuse of representative 

appointments. Instead, OGE believes some agencies may be purposely 

designating their committee members as representatives to avoid 

subjecting them to the financial disclosure statements required for special 

government employees—that is, agencies understand the guidance and are 

simply disregarding it. Thus, OGE disagrees with us that its guidance 

should directly address this apparent misinterpretation of its guidance by 

clarifying, for example, that classes of expertise are not a “recognizable 

group of persons” for purposes of making representative appointments. 

OGE states that its 1982 guidance accurately represents a decades old, 

executive branch interpretation of the definition of special government 

employees, and that our report does not provide adequate support for a 

recommendation that the guidance be modified. We disagree. Unless OGE 

clarifies the issues our report has identified, progress will likely continue to 

be slow or nonexistent—remembering that the 1982 guidance itself was 

developed to address uncertainties regarding the appropriate uses of 

representative and special government employee appointments. We 

believe that clearer guidance would make it more difficult for agencies to 

misapply the guidance. Further, unambiguous guidance would better assist 

agency staff managing committees and better support oversight by agency 

ethics officials, OGE, and others, such as inspectors general and GAO. In 

addition, OGE’s response that clarifications are not needed does not 

acknowledge the views of other federal agencies, presented in the draft 

report, that OGE guidance is ambiguous in some respects. For example, 

EPA and NASA officials stated that having clear criteria for representative 

appointments would be helpful to agencies. In addition, we note that 

Interior states in its comments to us on the report that “GAO’s 

generalization that representation of fields of expertise is not appropriate 

ignores the importance of such representation to some committees.” On 

the basis of this statement, we do not believe Interior appreciates that 

expert advice can be appropriately obtained by the appointment of special 

government employees. In addition, NASA’s and Energy’s comments on the 

report also support the appointment of representatives to represent fields 

of expertise. We believe these statements illustrate the need for 

clarifications to OGE guidance on representative and special government 

employee appointments to federal advisory committees. Finally, in our 

view, if agencies are continuing to make inappropriate appointments 

decades after criteria and guidance were developed, it is not unreasonable 
Page 56 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

to take another look at the guidance. OGE’s comments and our evaluation 

of them are discussed in more detail in appendix XIII.

In commenting on the draft, officials from EPA and USDA agreed with the 

substance of the report, providing only technical comments that we 

incorporated into the draft as appropriate. USDA indicated that the report 

is a helpful and comprehensive review of issues that can be used as a 

resource for agencies that rely on the advice of federal advisory 

committees. 

HHS provided consolidated written comments (including its component 

agencies CDC, FDA, and NIH). HHS said the report will be useful in 

evaluating current practices for appointing members to serve on federal 

advisory committees and also noted that the report provides a number of 

interesting ideas for determining balance in points of view and ensuring 

transparency in the committee process. HHS said that it finds the report’s 

recommendations of great value and indicated that NIH has volunteered to 

work with GSA to assist them in implementing the recommendations. At 

the same time, HHS expressed its belief that members of scientific advisory 

committees should be selected because of their expertise, background, and 

personal experience, rather than through a “process seeking out some 

indefinable range of personal opinion”—characterizing points of view as 

both undefinable and open to misinterpretation. However, the draft and 

final reports do not espouse a “process seeking out some indefinable range 

of personal opinion” but rather identify processes that include an 

evaluation of potential members’ points of view relevant to the subject 

matters advisory committees will consider while focusing on the relevant 

expertise needed. The examples of agency processes provided in the 

report include targeted evaluations of points of view by asking potential 

members a few questions, such as whether they have made public 

statements or taken public positions on the issue or matters the committee 

will consider. They also ask potential members to identify and describe 

any reason they may be unable to provide impartial advice on matters 

before the committee and any reason their impartiality in the identified 

matter might be questioned. In our view, agencies that do not proactively 

and transparently address the relevant points of view of prospective 

committee members regarding the matters the committees will consider 

are more likely to be subject to questions about committee balance from 

the public and potential users of the committees’ products than those 

agencies that use such processes. We continue to believe that the 

credibility of advisory committees, in particular those that address 

sensitive and controversial issues, depends in part upon agencies’ ability to 
Page 57 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

identify and balance points of view held by members and prospective 

members that are relevant to the work of the committee. HHS’s comments 

and our evaluation of them are discussed in more detail in appendix XIV.

In written comments, Interior agreed with much in the report and indicated 

that it contains many useful recommendations that can be used to enhance 

the successful use of advisory committees. Interior identified one 

overarching concern with the draft report, however. That is, Interior said 

our report gave the incorrect impression that FACA requires individuals on 

committees to be free of conflicts of interest, noting that FACA requires 

that committees, rather than individuals, not be inappropriately influenced 

by the appointing authority or any special interest. The draft and final 

reports acknowledge this FACA requirement in the background section. 

However, the draft and final reports also explicitly state that our focus was 

on (1) the requirements regarding individual conflicts of interest that are 

included in federal conflict-of-interest statutes and (2) the FACA 

requirement for committee balance. Further, in the introduction, we state 

that “federal advisory committee members who are employees of the 

federal government must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom 

from conflicts of interest—which we refer to in this report as 

independence—and committees as a whole must meet the requirements 

pertaining to balance.” We further highlight the key provisions of the 

federal conflict-of-interest statutes that must be complied with unless 

granted a waiver in one section of the report and the FACA requirements 

for balance in another. Interior’s comments and our evaluation of them are 

discussed in more detail in appendix XV.

In commenting on the draft report, NASA said that our conclusion that 

agencies could benefit from additional guidance to better ensure 

independence, balance, and transparency is sound. However, NASA 

supports the appointment of federal advisory committee members as 

representatives of their fields of expertise on the basis that some experts 

would not be able to serve as special government employees due to 

financial conflicts of interest. We believe this perspective provides 

additional support for our view that OGE needs to provide additional 

guidance on the appropriate use of representative appointments, including 

clarifying that fields of expertise generally are not a recognizable group of 

persons for purposes of making representative appointments. NASA’s 

comments and our evaluation of them are discussed in more detail in 

appendix XVI. 
Page 58 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

In commenting on the draft report, Energy’s Office of Science expressed its 

concern that we were recommending a “one-size-fits-all” approach that 

would diminish the effectiveness of the office’s advisory committees. In 

addition, the office said that our interpretation of the term “representative” 

is unpersuasive and would be an unsound basis of guidance for the 

department. We do not believe that we are recommending a “one-size-fitsall” approach to advisory committee management. We recognize that there 

are many types of committees that serve different functions. Nevertheless, 

we believe that there are certain requirements in FACA and the conflict-ofinterest statutes that must be met by all committees. With regard to the 

suggestions we made for selecting committee members, we note that they 

were described as “promising practices” that could be useful to agencies. 

They were not recommendations. As for the term “representative,” we 

continue to believe that our interpretation of the OGE guidance is correct 

and that our interpretation is supported by OGE’s comments on our draft 

report. In particular, we believe that it is inappropriate for agencies to 

appoint members as “representatives” of a field of expertise, as Energy’s 

Office of Science indicates it will continue to do. Energy’s comments and 

our evaluation of them are discussed in more detail in appendix XVII.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we will plan no further distribution until 30 days from 

the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other 

interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Agriculture, 

Energy, Health and Human Services, and the Interior; the Administrators of 

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services 

Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 

and the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. We will make copies 
Page 59 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at 

no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-3841. 

Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix XVIII. 

Robin M. Nazzaro

Director, Natural Resources

 and Environment 
Page 60 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ApApenednxidexiIs

This report (1) describes the role of federal advisory committees in the 

development of national policies; (2) examines the extent to which 

governmentwide and agency-specific policies and procedures for 

evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of view 

ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees; and (3) 

identifies practices that could better ensure that committees are, and are 

perceived as being, independent and balanced.

To describe the role of federal advisory committees in the development of 

national policies, we reviewed committee charters, reports, and Web pages 

available through the General Services Administration’s (GSA) on-line 

Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) database. We discussed the 

FACA database with the GSA staff that developed and maintain the 

database. Our discussion included issues such as data entry access, quality 

control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We 

determined that the data on the overall universe of advisory committees 

were reliable for the purposes of this report, including describing the 

variety of issues the committees address. 

To examine the extent to which current policies and procedures for 

evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and points of view 

ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees, we 

reviewed the relevant policies and procedures at six federal departments 

and agencies that make extensive use of federal advisory committees—the 

Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Energy, Health and Human Services 

(HHS), and the Interior; the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA); and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 

These agencies were among the 11 that used the most science and 

technical committees in 2003.1

 Because HHS entities manage 26 percent of 

all federal advisory committees and 36 percent of the scientific and 

technical committees, we also reviewed the policies and procedures at 

three HHS entities that sponsor many federal advisory committees—the 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Food and Drug 

Administration (FDA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH). We 

reviewed the policies and procedures used by these nine departments and 

agencies to manage federal advisory committees. These policies, in some 

cases, address appointments of committee members as special government 

employees or representatives and address how agencies identify, screen, 

1

In fiscal year 2003, the six agencies we reviewed sponsored 477 of 948 active federal 

advisory committees. They sponsored 126 of the 208 scientific and technical committees.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 61 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

and appoint members so as to ensure that they are free of conflicts of 

interest and that the committees are balanced. We interviewed committee 

management officials, designated federal officials, and agency staff on 

committee management issues. 

Further, to better understand how the agencies implement their policies 

and procedures as well as the Office of Government Ethics’s (OGE) and 

GSA’s governmentwide regulations and guidance, we examined the 

management of one committee at each of the nine departments and 

agencies. We selected a nonprobability sample2

 of nine committees that 

address scientific and technical issues using the following criteria: 

selected committees had to examine issues that are national in scope and 

scientifically complex, could have regulatory implications, and/or could be 

potentially controversial either because of the issues that they address or 

because the committee had been the subject of allegations regarding 

membership. For these nine committees, we reviewed the confidential 

financial disclosure forms of the committee members appointed as special 

government employees and discussed with staff how the committees used 

this information with respect to conflict-of-interest and/or balance 

determinations. To learn more about how agencies screen individuals for 

membership, we also examined other materials that agencies collected 

about them, such as their curricula vitae (CV) and résumés. The focus of 

our review was on the adequacy of federal policies and procedures to 

ensure independence and balance, and we did not make any judgments on 

whether conflicts of interest existed or whether the committees we 

examined were properly balanced. The way in which the agencies 

managed these particular committees cannot be generalized to represent 

the way in which the agencies manage all of their committees. 

To determine if conflict-of-interest evaluations were performed as required 

by OGE guidance, we reviewed the relevant guidance and discussed with 

agency officials their use of representative and special government 

employee appointments. The purpose of the discussions was to determine 

whether the representative appointments were appropriately used because 

representative members are not required to undergo conflict-of-interest 

reviews. For the three departments that used representative appointments 

almost exclusively, we identified the committees the agencies categorize as 

2

Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 

population. This is because, in a nonprobability sample, some elements of the population 

being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 62 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

addressing scientific and technical matters for which advice on behalf of 

the government on the basis of best judgment is often sought, rather than 

stakeholder advice. For the individual committees selected for review at 

each agency (described above), we examined the committee statutes and 

charters and interviewed agency officials to determine whether the 

representative members were asked to provide stakeholder or 

nonstakeholder advice.

To determine if agencies collect sufficient information to assess the points 

of view of its committee members appointed as special government 

employees, we assessed whether agencies systematically collected 

background information on committee members in addition to the OGE 

form 450 used to evaluate for potential financial conflicts of interest and 

CVs or résumés. We identified other information that is helpful in assessing 

points of view and thus to ensuring that the committees achieve a proper 

balance of viewpoints.

Further, in examining the extent to which the regulations and guidance on 

evaluating committee members for conflicts of interest and impartiality 

ensure independent and balanced federal advisory committees, we 

reviewed the OGE regulations and guidance to federal agencies regarding 

federal conflict-of-interest provisions and GSA regulations and guidance to 

federal agencies regarding FACA. We interviewed OGE staff who are 

responsible for auditing agencies’ ethics programs and who assist agencies 

in resolving conflict-of-interest issues. These staff members also address 

issues related to the appointment of special government employees and 

representative members to federal advisory committees. We interviewed 

the director and other officials from GSA’s Committee Management 

Secretariat to learn about FACA requirements, GSA regulations, and other 

GSA guidance documents designed to assist agencies in managing their 

committees. We also discussed with GSA officials how agencies use the 

GSA FACA database to provide information to the public about committee 

membership and activities. 
Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

Page 63 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

To identify practices that could better ensure that committees are, and are 

perceived as being, independent and balanced, we examined the relevant 

policies and procedures of the National Academies;3

 the nine committees 

and agencies examined in this review; and EPA’s Science Advisory Board, 

which had implemented a number of relevant changes to its policies and 

procedures in response to our June 2001 report.4

We conducted our review from January 2003 through March 2004 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

3

The National Academies consist of four private, nonprofit organizations that advise the 

federal government on scientific and technical matters: the National Academy of Sciences, 

the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, and the National Research 

Council.

4

U.S. General Accounting Office, EPA’s Science Advisory Board Panels: Improved Policies 

and Procedures Needed to Ensure Independence and Balance, GAO-01-536 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 12, 2001).
Page 64 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix II

Federal Advisory Committees, by Authorizing 

Mechanism and Type, in Fiscal Year 2003 ApendxiI

This appendix provides information on the ways that advisory committees 

have been authorized, the functional categories of the committees as 

reported by agencies to GSA, and the number of federal advisory 

committee members.

Presidents, the Congress, and federal agencies can create federal advisory 

committees. As shown in table 3, most of the federal advisory committees 

operating in fiscal year 2003 were required or authorized by the Congress, 

some were created by the agencies, while the fewest committees were 

created by presidential directives. 

Table 3: Authorizing Mechanism for Active Federal Advisory Committees in Fiscal 

Year 2003

Source: GSA FACA database.

Sponsoring agencies broadly classify their advisory committees according 

to the types of issues they address, using one of the following seven general 

categories defined in GSA’s federal advisory committee database: scientific 

and technical program, nonscientific program, national policy issue, grant 

review, grant review-special emphasis panel,1 regulatory negotiation, and 

“other.” According to GSA’s fiscal year 2003 database (see table 4), 208 of 

the 948 active committees were categorized as scientific and technical 

committees. However, in addition to these, committees in other categories 

also address scientific and technical issues, particularly the grant review 

committees. There were 131 grant review committees with over 41,000 

Authorizing mechanism Number of committees

Required or authorized by the Congress

Required by the Congress via statute 421

Specifically authorized by statute but created at the 

discretion of an agency

213

Subtotal 634

Created by an agency under general statutory 

authority

271

Presidential directive 43

Total 948

1

HHS uses the term “special emphasis panel” for some of its grant review panels at NIH. Of 

the 29 special emphasis panels in fiscal year 2003, NIH sponsored 24 panels.
Appendix II

Federal Advisory Committees, by 

Authorizing Mechanism and Type, in Fiscal 

Year 2003

Page 65 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

members in 2003. Further, some committees placed in the national policy, 

regulatory negotiation, and “other” categories also address scientific and 

technical issues. 

Table 4: Active Federal Advisory Committees, by Type, in Fiscal Year 2003

Source: GSA FACA database.

a

NIH defines a special emphasis panel as a committee that functions both as an initial review group 

performing the scientific and technical peer review of applications and cooperative agreement 

applications and as reviewers of contract proposals and concept reviews. The membership is fluid, 

and individuals are designated to serve for only the meeting they are requested to attend.

The committees in fiscal year 2003 had more than 62,000 members, the 

majority of whom were members of grant review and special emphasis 

panels.2

 Overall, federal advisory committees range in size from under 10 

members to over 9,000, with an average of about 48 members.3 The 

committees classified as scientific and technical had 7,910 members and an 

Type of committee Number of committees Number of members

Grant review 102 22,517

Grant review – special 

emphasis panela 29 19,226

National policy issue 

advisory board 152 3,834

Nonscientific program 

advisory board 298 5,470

Other 152 3,323

Regulatory negotiation 7 217

Scientific and technical 

program advisory board 208 7,910

Total 948 62,497

2

Although these panels may have several hundred members and may hold dozens or more 

meetings in a year, the members do not all attend all of the panels’ meetings. Instead, each 

member might be called upon to attend one meeting per year to review a narrowly focused 

set of grant proposals. This practice is in contrast to the practice of other categories of 

committees in which the members are invited to attend each of a generally small number of 

meetings held each year.

3

This average was calculated after subtracting the 6 largest committees, including HHS’s 

Center for Scientific Review Special Emphasis Panel, which in fiscal year 2003 maintained a 

roster of 9,080 members and held over 1,100 meetings. Five other advisory committees had 

over 1,000 members. If those committees are counted, the average size of the committees is 

about 66 members.
Appendix II

Federal Advisory Committees, by 

Authorizing Mechanism and Type, in Fiscal 

Year 2003

Page 66 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

average committee membership size of about 22 members.4 Federal 

advisory committee members come from a wide range of professional 

backgrounds and include scientists, medical doctors and other health care 

professionals, academics, lawyers, engineers, corporate executives, state 

and local government officials, members of nongovernmental 

organizations, community activists, and representatives from the public at 

large, among others. Some members are federal employees, often from 

agencies other than the sponsoring agency. 

4

This average was calculated after subtracting the membership of the 2 largest science 

committees, both sponsored by the Department of Transportation—RTCA, Inc. (with 2,718 

members) and the Intelligent Transportation Society of America (with 570 members).
Page 67 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix III

Information on the Department of 

Agriculture’s National Advisory Committee on 

Microbiological Criteria for Foods ApendxiI

This appendix contains information about the National Advisory 

Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods. Although this committee 

is cosponsored by USDA, HHS, and the Departments of Defense and 

Commerce, USDA is responsible for the overall management of the 

committee. Within USDA, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) 

manages this committee, and the Secretary of Agriculture appoints the 

members.

Purpose of the committee: According to its charter, the purpose of the 

committee is to provide impartial, scientific advice to federal food safety 

agencies for use in the development of an integrated national food safety 

systems approach from farm to final consumption to ensure the safety of 

domestic, imported, and exported foods.

Number of members: 29 (see table 5).

Type of appointment: Representative.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: The members are appointed as 

representatives and are not required to file OGE financial disclosure forms 

for USDA review for potential conflicts of interest. USDA does, however, 

require all committee members to submit a USDA form AD-755, which is to 

provide information about members’ current employment and sources of 

income greater than $10,000 in the last calendar year, other than their 

primary employment. 

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Not applicable.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable. 

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to 

FSIS officials, the agency solicits nominations through notices in the 

Federal Register, FSIS Constituent Updates (an electronic newsletter sent 

to over 300 organizations and individuals), the FSIS Web site, and press 

releases. Officials said these notices serve to reach interested parties and 

stakeholders—that is, persons from state and federal governments, 

industry, consumer groups, and academia. 

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to FSIS officials, 

the most important factor used to balance the committee is the expertise 

identified in the charter: microbiology, risk assessment, epidemiology, 

public health, food science, and other relevant disciplines. Membership is 
Appendix III

Information on the Department of 

Agriculture’s National Advisory Committee 

on Microbiological Criteria for Foods

Page 68 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

also balanced in terms of points of view by the approximately equal 

proportions of members appointed from government, industry, and 

academia. Committee staff also tries to balance committee membership in 

terms of demographic indicators, such as ethnicity and gender, as well as in 

terms of geographical distribution. 

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None 

sought.

Table 5: Roster of the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods with the Primary Employers and Areas 

of Expertise as of December 2003

Committee member Primary employer Areas of expertise

Academic institutions

Dr. Larry Beuchat University of Georgia, Center for Food Safety and Quality 

Enhancement

Food science

Dr. Catherine Donnelly University of Vermont, Department of Nutrition and Food 

Science

Food microbiology and Listeria

Dr. Stephanie Doores Pennsylvania State University, Department of Food Science Food science, especially dairy 

science

Dr. Lee-Ann Jaykus North Carolina State University Microbiology and microbial risk 

assessment

Dr. Carol Maddox University of Illinois, College of Veterinary Medicine Veterinary microbiology

Dr. Eli Perencevich University of Maryland School of Medicine Public Health

Dr. John Sofos Colorado State University, Department of Animal Science Microbiology and E. coli

Companies or industry-affiliated organizations

Dr. Gary Ades Most recently employed by Foster Farms Food safety and quality assurance

Mr. Dane Bernard Keystone Foods LLC Food production, food processing, 

CODEX,a

 and HACCPb

Dr. Peggy Cook Tyson Foods, Inc. Food microbiology, food chemistry, 

serology, microbial genetics, and 

management

Dr. Mahipal Kunduru Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc. Food safety and microbiology

Dr. Roberta Morales Research Triangle Institute Microbiology, veterinary medicine, 

and risk assessment

Ms. Virginia Scott National Food Processors Association Foodborne disease bacteria, 

microbiology, extended shelf life of 

refrigerated foods, and food safety

Dr. Robert Seward American Meat Institute Food microbiology

Dr. Katherine Swanson Most recently employed by General Mills, Inc. Food production and food 

microbiology

Dr. David Theno Jack in the Box, Inc. HACCPb and animal science
Appendix III

Information on the Department of 

Agriculture’s National Advisory Committee 

on Microbiological Criteria for Foods

Page 69 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Source: USDA.

a

CODEX: Codex Alimentarius Commission. The Codex Alimentarius Commission was created in 

1963 by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) of the 

United Nations to develop food standards, guidelines, and related texts, such as codes of practice 

under the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Program. The main purposes of this program are 

protecting the health of consumers and ensuring fair trade practices in the food trade and promoting 

coordination of all food standards work undertaken by international governmental and 

nongovernmental organizations.

b

HACCP: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point. HACCP is a systematic program for preventing 

hazards that could cause foodborne illnesses by applying science-based controls from raw material to 

finished products. The program was first developed for the space program and currently is being 

adopted by FDA and USDA.

Dr. R. Bruce Tompkin ConAgra Refrigerated Foods (retired) Microbiology and food safety

Federal, state, and foreign government agencies

Dr. David Acheson U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and 

Drug Administration

E. coli, public health, and medicine

Dr. Frances Downes Michigan Department of Community Health Public health and laboratory food 

testing

Dr. Daniel Engeljohn U.S. Department of Agriculture

Food Safety and Inspection Service

Animal science, meat science, and 

HACCPb

Dr. Jeff Farrar California Department of Health Services Public health, epidemiology, and 

veterinary medicine

Mr. Spencer Garrett U.S. Department of Commerce

National Marine Fisheries Service

Food hygiene, HACCP,b and 

seafood public health

Dr. Patricia Griffin U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Epidemiology

Dr. Robin King U.S. Army Veterinary Corps Veterinary science and food 

microbiology

Dr. John Kvenberg U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and 

Drug Administration

HACCP,b risk management, and 

Listeria control

Dr. Anna Lammerding Health Canada Risk assessment

Dr. John Luchansky U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service Food microbiology and toxicology

Ms. Angela Ruple U.S. Department of Commerce

National Seafood Inspection Laboratory

Food science and microbiology

Dr. Donald Zink U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and 

Drug Administration

Food microbiology, food science, 

food safety, infectious diseases, 

and epidemiology

(Continued From Previous Page)

Committee member Primary employer Areas of expertise
Page 70 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix IV

Information on the Department of Energy’s 

Biological and Environmental Research 

Advisory Committee ApendxiIV

This appendix contains information about the Biological and 

Environmental Research Advisory Committee, which is managed by 

Energy staff in the Office of Biological and Environmental Research. The 

members are appointed by the Secretary of Energy.

Purpose of the committee: The advisory committee reviews and makes 

recommendations on Energy’s biological and environmental research 

program, addressing issues such as genomics, the health effects of lowdose radiation, DNA sequencing, medical sciences, environmental 

remediation, and climate change research. In addition to reviewing 

scientific issues, the committee provides advice on long-range plans and 

priorities and the appropriate levels of funding.

Number of members: 23 (see table 6). 

Type of appointment: Representative.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: Because the members are appointed as 

representatives, they are not required to file OGE financial disclosure 

forms for Energy review for potential conflicts of interest. 

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Not applicable.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to 

the committee’s designated federal official, the department received 

nominations from agency staff in the Office of Science.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the committee’s 

designated federal official, the primary criterion used to balance the 

committee is expertise. He also considers gender, ethnicity, and geography 

and tries to achieve a balance of representatives from industry, academia, 

and the national laboratories. 

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None 

sought.
Appendix IV

Information on the Department of Energy’s 

Biological and Environmental Research 

Advisory Committee

Page 71 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Table 6: Roster of the Biological and Environmental Research Advisory Committee with the Primary Employers and Areas of 

Expertise as of December 30, 2003

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise

Colleges, universities, and medical centers

Keith Hodgson, Ph.D (chair) Stanford University Structural biology

James Adelstein, Ph.D. Harvard Medical School Education, health risk, and medicine

Michelle Broido, Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh Atmospheric science, ecology, education, 

environmental remediation, global change, 

and structural biology

David Burgess, Ph.D. Boston College Developmental and molecular biology and 

education

Carlos Bustamante, Ph.D. University of California at Berkeley Bioengineering and molecular and structural 

biology

Charles DeLisi, Ph.D. Boston University Bioengineering, biomedical science, 

biotechnology, computational and molecular 

biology, education, genomics, mathematics, 

and informatics

Raymond Gesteland, Ph.D. University of Utah Biotechnology, education, genomics, and 

molecular biology

Willard Harrison, Ph.D. University of Florida Analytical chemistry

Steven Larson, M.D. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center Biomedical science, education, and 

medicine

Jill Merisov, Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center 

for Genome Research

Computational biology, computer modeling, 

genomics, mathematics, and informatics

Louis Pitelka, Ph.D. University of Maryland Center for 

Environmental Science

Ecology and global change

Janet Smith, Ph.D. Purdue University Computational and structural biology

James Tiedje, Ph.D. Michigan State University Environmental remediation, biotechnology, 

microbiology, and molecular biology

Barbara Wold, Ph.D. California Institute of Technology Biotechnology, developmental and molecular 

biology, and genomics

Companies

Jonathan Greer, Ph.D. Abbot Laboratories Biotechnology and computational and 

structural biology

James Mitchell, Ph.D. Lucent Technologies Analytical chemistry

Nonprofit research institution

Leroy Hood, Ph.D. Institute for Systems Biology Bioengineering, biomedical sciences, 

biotechnology, developmental and molecular 

biology, and genomics

Professional associations

Eugene Bierly, Ph.D. American Geophysical Union Atmospheric science and global change

Richard Hallgren, Ph.D. American Meteorological Society Computer modeling and global change
Appendix IV

Information on the Department of Energy’s 

Biological and Environmental Research 

Advisory Committee

Page 72 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Source: Department of Energy.

Roger McClellan, D.V.M. Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology Health risk and toxicology

DOE national laboratory

Lisa Stubbs, Ph.D. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Biotechnology, genomics, and molecular 

biology 

Federally funded research organization

Warren Washington, Ph.D. National Center for Atmospheric Research Computer modeling and global change

Other

Robert Fri Resources for the Future; National Academy of 

Sciences

 Education and global change

(Continued From Previous Page)

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise
Page 73 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix V

Information on the Environmental Protection 

Agency’s Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 

Rodenticide Act Scientific Advisory Panel ApendxiV

This appendix contains information about the Federal Insecticide, 

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) Scientific Advisory Panel. The 

committee is managed by EPA staff, and the members are appointed by the 

Deputy Administrator of EPA.

Purpose of the committee: The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel 

provides advice, information, and recommendations on pesticides and 

pesticide-related issues regarding the impact of regulatory actions on 

health and the environment of regulatory actions. The objectives include 

providing advice and recommendations on (1) scientific studies and issues 

in the form of a peer review, (2) methods to ensure that pesticides do not 

cause “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,” and (3) 

guidelines to improve the effectiveness and quality of scientific testing and 

of data submitted to EPA.

Number of members: There are 7 permanent members on the standing 

committee (see table 7). These members are appointed for 4-year terms 

and serve on a number of individual peer review panels. The FIFRA 

Scientific Advisory Panel establishes between 5 and 7 peer review panels 

each year to address a variety of specific topics.1

 These committees are 

comprised of permanent members and ad hoc expert consultants. Meeting 

panels typically consist of approximately 15 members.

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 

committee members are required to file financial disclosure forms. As 

discussed in this report, the EPA form 3110-48, an OGE-approved 

alternative disclosure form, is used. In addition, as also is discussed in this 

report, FIFRA staff interview potential candidates using a structured 

interview format to assess the interest, availability, and appropriateness of 

candidates to serve on individual committees. The structured interview 

includes a discussion of financial conflicts of interest (statutory conflicts 

and appearance problems), impartiality, and a review of the information 

that is requested on the form 3110-48. 

Conflict-of-interest waivers: No waivers have been granted to current 

members. 

1

In this review, we examined the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel on atrazine (see table 8).
Appendix V

Information on the Environmental 

Protection Agency’s Federal Insecticide, 

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Scientific 

Advisory Panel

Page 74 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable. 

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: The Federal 

Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1977 requires the EPA 

Deputy Administrator to select the 7 members of the standing Scientific 

Advisory Panel from nominees provided by NIH and the National Science 

Foundation. The committee’s management also routinely solicits 

nominations for ad hoc expert consultants on the agency's Web site and 

through notices in the Federal Register.

Criteria used to balance the committee: Technical expertise is the 

primary criterion used to balance the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel 

committees. The FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel defines balanced 

membership as including the necessary areas of technical expertise, 

different scientific perspectives within each technical discipline, and the 

collective breadth of experience needed to address the agency’s charge. 

External feedback on proposed committee membership: As required 

by statute, the advisory committee’s management posts the names, 

professional affiliations, and selected biographical data of nominees 

proposed for appointment as permanent members in the Federal Register

and on its Web site for public comment, providing instructions on how to 

submit comments regarding the nominees. Unlike the standing committee, 

nominees considered for temporary service at particular meetings are not 

subject to public comment prior to their appointment.
Appendix V

Information on the Environmental 

Protection Agency’s Federal Insecticide, 

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Scientific 

Advisory Panel

Page 75 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Table 7: Roster of the Standing FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 

December 2003

Source: EPA.

a

Members participated in the June 17 to 20, 2003, meeting on atrazine.

Committee member Primary employer Areas of expertise

Universities and medical centers

Stuart Handwerger M.D. Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center Endocrinology, toxicology, and 

veterinary medicine

Steven G. Heeringa, Ph.D.a University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research Biostatistics

Gary E. Isom, Ph.D.a Purdue University, School of Pharmacy and Pharmacal 

Sciences

Neurotoxicology and clinical pediatric 

research

Fumio Matsumura, Ph.D.a University of California at Davis, Institute of Toxicology and 

Environmental Health

Biochemical toxicology

Mary Anna Thrall, D.V.M.a Colorado State University, Department of Microbiology, 

Immunology and Pathology

Veterinary pathology and veterinary 

clinical pathology

Stephen Roberts, Ph.D.a University of Florida, Center for Environmental & Human 

Toxicology

Human toxicology

Federal agency

Christopher Portier, Ph.D. National Institutes of Health, National Institute of 

Environmental Health Sciences

Human health risk assessment
Appendix V

Information on the Environmental 

Protection Agency’s Federal Insecticide, 

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Scientific 

Advisory Panel

Page 76 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Table 8: Roster of the Temporary (Ad Hoc) Members Serving on the June 17 to 20, 2003, Meeting on Atrazine

Source: EPA.

a

Xenopus laevis is a species of frog that, along with the mouse, rat, fruit fly, and other species of 

animals and plants, serves as a model organism for biomedical research.

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise

Universities

Joel Coats, Ph.D. Iowa State University, Department of Entomology Environmental toxicology (fate and 

effects of pesticides in environment)

Robert J. Denver, Ph.D. The University of Michigan, Department of Ecology and 

Evolutionary Biology

Amphibian development

James Gibbs, Ph.D. State University of New York - Syracuse Amphibian biological monitoring, 

conservation biology, and herpetology

Sherril L. Green, D.V.M, Ph.D. Stanford University School of Medicine Xenopus husbandrya

Darcy B. Kelley, Ph.D. Columbia University Developmental biology

Gerald A. LeBlanc, Ph.D. North Carolina State University Aquatic toxicology

Carl Richards, Ph.D. University of Minnesota Duluth, Minnesota Sea Grant 

College Program 

Aquatic biology

David Skelly, Ph.D. Yale University, School of Forestry and Environmental 

Studies

Field amphibian ecology 

Foreign organizations

Peter Delorme, Ph.D. Health Canada (Canadian Federal Government) Environmental toxicology (aquatic) and 

environmental risk assessment

Werner Kloas, Ph.D. Department of Inland Fisheries, Leibniz-Institute of 

Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries, Berlin, 

Germany

Xenopusa development and anuran 

(frog/toad) endocrinology
Page 77 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix VI

Information on the Department of Health and 

Human Services’s Advisory Committee on 

Human Research Protections ApendxiVI

This appendix contains information about the Secretary’s Advisory 

Committee on Human Research Protections. The committee replaced the 

National Human Research Protections Advisory Committee, established in 

2000, whose charter HHS did not renew when it expired in 2002.1

 HHS 

officials chose to revise the charter of the initial committee primarily by 

adding populations potentially affected by human research protections, 

appointing new members to provide advice to the Secretary. The 

committee is sponsored and generally managed by the Office of Public 

Health Service, but the members are appointed by the HHS Secretary.2

 The 

nominating and selection processes in 2002 and 2003 were managed by the 

HHS Office of White House Liaison.

Purpose of the committee: According to its charter, the committee is to 

advise the HHS Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Health on matters 

pertaining to the continuance and improvement of functions within the 

authority of HHS directed toward protections for human subjects in 

research. Specifically, the committee is to provide advice relating to the 

responsible conduct of research involving human subjects with particular 

emphasis on

• special populations, such as neonates and children, prisoners, and the 

decisionally impaired;

• pregnant women, embryos, and fetuses;

• individuals and populations in international studies;

• populations in which there are individually identifiable samples, data, or 

information; and

• investigator conflicts of interest.

In addition, the committee is responsible for reviewing selected ongoing 

work and planned activities of the Office of Human Research Protections 

1

As noted in this report, FACA requires that advisory committee charters expire at the end of 

2 years unless renewed by the agency.

2

HHS and its components, such as CDC, FDA, and NIH, had 247 federal advisory committees 

in fiscal year 2003. While the heads of the various component agencies generally appoint 

committee members, according to the Director of the Office of the White House Liaison, the 

HHS Secretary appoints the members to about 30 percent of the committees. 
Appendix VI

Information on the Department of Health and 

Human Services’s Advisory Committee on 

Human Research Protections

Page 78 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

and other offices/agencies within HHS that are responsible for human 

subjects protection. These evaluations may include but are not limited to a 

review of assurance systems, the application of minimal research risk 

standards, the granting of waivers, education programs sponsored by the 

Office of Human Research Protections, and the ongoing monitoring and 

oversight of institutional review boards and the institutions that sponsor 

research.

Number of members: 11 (see table 9).

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 

committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms for 

HHS’s review for potential conflicts of interest. These forms were 

reviewed by the cognizant committee management officer who consulted 

with the designated federal official and the Office of General Counsel 

ethics division. In June 2003, after the members had been appointed to the 

committee, the committee management officer identified some potential 

conflicts of interest stemming from investments that she and the Office of 

General Counsel believed required mitigation, such as waivers. She also 

requested that the designated federal official determine whether other 

potential conflicts required waivers if the appointed members work for 

institutions involved in research activities/studies/projects that may impact 

human research protections.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Waivers were not issued before the 

committee’s first meeting in July 2003. The nine waivers granted were 

finalized on January 16, 2004.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: HHS policies and procedures do 

not address the disclosure of waivers to the public. HHS does not 

proactively disclose the issuance of waivers to the public at committee 

meetings. 

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to 

the Director of the Office of White House Liaison, she asked a couple of 

individuals at the Association of American Medical Colleges for 

nominations for this committee. The Director said that an Office of Public 

Health Service staff member familiar with the previous committee also 

assisted in identifying nominees from the previous slate to serve on the 

new committee. In addition, she said that HHS received self-nominations 
Appendix VI

Information on the Department of Health and 

Human Services’s Advisory Committee on 

Human Research Protections

Page 79 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

and also used names from NIH’s database, particularly the group that was 

solicited for the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and 

Society. 

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the agency 

official responsible for nominating members for the committee, the factors 

she considered in balancing the committee were expertise along with 

geographic, gender, and racial diversity. After HHS announced the 

committee membership in January 2003, the National Organization for Rare 

Disorders and some members of the predecessor advisory committee 

expressed concern that the regulated research industry was 

overrepresented and that there were no consumer or patient advocates on 

the committee. A week later, HHS added a member with a background in 

patient advocacy.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None 

sought.

Table 9: Roster of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Human Research Protections with the Primary Employers and Areas 

of Expertise as of December 2003

Source: HHS.

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise

Medical and academic institutions

Dr. Celia B. Fisher Fordham University Bioethics

Dr. Nigel Harris Morehouse School of Medicine Rheumatology and antiphospholipid research

Dr. Robert G. Hauser Abbott Northwest Hospital Cardiology

Dr. Nancy L. Jones Wake Forest University School of Medicine Biochemistry and pathology

Ms. Susan Kornetsky Children’s Hospital, Boston, MA Clinical research compliance and public health

Dr. Mary Lake Polan Stanford University School of Medicine Reproductive endocrinology and infertility

Dr. Ernest D. Prentice University of Nebraska Medical Center Cell biology, anatomy, and regulatory Compliance

Company, law firm, and professional organization

Mr. Thomas Adams Association of Clinical Research 

Professionals

Medical trade association management

Mr. Mark Barnes Ropes & Gray Law Firm Health care law and Health Insurance Portability and 

Accountability Act of 1996 regulation and compliance

Dr. Felix A Khin-Maung-Gyi Chesapeake Research Review, Inc. Human subject protection, bioethics, and pharmacy

Patient advocacy organization

Dr. Susan L. Weiner The Children’s Cause, Inc. Developmental psychology
Page 80 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix VII

Information on the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention’s Advisory Committee 

on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention ApendxiVI

This appendix contains information about the Advisory Committee on 

Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention. The committee is sponsored and 

generally managed by CDC, but the members are appointed by the HHS 

Secretary.1

 The nominating and selection processes in 2002 and 2003 were 

managed by the HHS Office of White House Liaison.

Purpose of the committee: The Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead 

Poisoning Prevention provides advice and guidance to the Secretary; the 

Assistant Secretary for Health; and the CDC Director, regarding new 

scientific knowledge and technological developments and their practical 

implications for childhood lead poisoning prevention efforts. The 

committee also reviews and reports on childhood lead poisoning 

prevention practices and recommends improvements in national childhood 

lead poisoning prevention efforts.

Number of members: 12 (see table 10).

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 

committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms for 

HHS and CDC review for potential conflicts of interest. CDC’s designated 

federal official, a conflict-of-interest specialist in the CDC’s Committee 

Management Office, and the director of CDC’s Management Analysis and 

Services Office reviewed the completed forms for the current members of 

the committee. 

Conflict-of-interest waivers: None granted to current members.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to 

the Director of the Office of White House Liaison and the designated 

federal official for the committee, nominations were generally solicited 

informally, such as during conversations. According to the Director, HHS 

received nominations from the Dean of the St. Francis Hospital in Tulsa, 

Oklahoma; the Chancellor of Columbia University; Senator Thad Cochran; 

and the Deputy Secretary’s office. They also used the Internet to search for 

1

See appendix 6, footnote 2. 
Appendix VII

Information on the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention’s Advisory 

Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning 

Prevention

Page 81 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

candidates associated with successful lead poison reduction programs in 

large cities.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the Office of 

White House Liaison, the department and agency worked to find potential 

appointees and balance the committee on the basis of expertise as well as 

gender, ethnicity, and geography to the extent these additional factors did 

not impinge on the department’s ability to pick qualified members.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None 

sought.

Table 10: Roster of the Advisory Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention with the Primary Employers and Areas of 

Expertise as of December 2003

Source: HHS.

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise

Medical institutions

William Banner, M.D. The Children's Hospital at St. Francis in Tulsa OK Toxicology, critical care medicine, and 

pediatrics

Helen Binns, M.D., M.P.H. Feinberg School of Medicine, Northwestern University Pediatric lead poisoning detection and public 

health

Carla Campbell, M.D., M.S. Children's Hospital of Philadelphia Lead poisoning and toxicology

Ing Kang Ho, Ph.D. University of Mississippi Medical Center, School of 

Graduate Studies in the Health Sciences

Pharmacology and toxicology

Sergio Piomelli, M.D. Columbia University College of Physicians and 

Surgeons

Pediatrics

State and local health agencies

Walter S. Handy, Jr., Ph.D. Cincinnati Health Department Clinical psychology and public health policy

Jessica Leighton, Ph.D., M.P.H. New York City Department of Health and Mental 

Hygiene

Public policy and childhood lead poisoning

Tracey Lynn, D.V.M., M.S. Alaska Department of Health Services Environmental public health

Kevin U. Stephens, Sr., M.D., 

J.D.

Department of Health, City of New Orleans, LA Obstetrics and gynecology, public health, 

medicine, and law

Private medical practice

Catherine M. Slota-Varma, M.D. Pediatrician in private practice Pediatrics

Private nonprofit organization

Richard Hoffman, M.D. Director, Planned Parenthood of Rocky Mountains Public health

University

Kimberly Thompson, Sc.D. Harvard University School of Public Health Risk analysis and health policy
Page 82 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix VIII

Information on the Food and Drug 

Administration’s Food Advisory Committee ApendxiVI

This appendix provides information about the Food Advisory Committee. 

The committee is managed by FDA. The members are appointed by FDA’s 

Associate Commissioner for External Relations. 

Purpose of the committee: The committee is to provide advice to the 

Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, and to the 

Commissioner of Food and Drugs and other appropriate officials as 

needed, on emerging food safety, food science, nutrition, and other foodrelated health issues that FDA considers of primary importance for its food 

and cosmetics programs. The committee may be charged with reviewing 

and evaluating available data and making recommendations on matters 

such as those relating to the following: broad scientific and technical foodor cosmetic-related issues, the safety of new foods and food ingredients, 

the labeling of foods and cosmetics, nutrient needs and nutritional 

adequacy, and safe exposure limits for food contaminants. The committee 

may also be asked to provide advice and make recommendations on ways 

of communicating to the public the potential risks associated with these 

issues and on approaches that might be considered for addressing the 

issues.

Number of members: 25 (see table 11).

Type of appointment: With the exception of nonvoting industry 

representatives, all committee members are special government 

employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 

committee members are required to file the OGE confidential financial 

disclosure form 450. Members are required to update this form annually. 

In addition, for meetings that involve particular matters of general or 

specific applicability, members also complete an FDA form 3410, which 

requires them to report interests directly related to the topic of discussion. 

The designated federal official does an initial screening and officials from 

FDA’s Ethics and Integrity Branch clear the members for conflicts of 

interest. 

Conflict-of-interest waivers: During the last year, waivers were granted 

seven times for members to participate in specific meetings. FDA granted 

the waivers on the basis that the need for these individuals’ expertise 

outweighed the potential conflicts of interest.
Appendix VIII

Information on the Food and Drug 

Administration’s Food Advisory Committee

Page 83 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Disclosure of waivers to the public: The type of waiver and the names 

of members who have received waivers for particular meetings are read 

into the record by the designated federal officer at the beginning of the 

public meeting. Public disclosure of the substance of waivers issued is 

only required in cases where the meetings deal with particular matters of 

specific applicability. When such waivers are issued, the members who 

receive them are asked to sign a consent document authorizing FDA to 

provide a description of the nature and the magnitude of the financial 

interests being waived for the public record.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: FDA solicits 

nominations through notices in the Federal Register. According to the 

committee’s designated federal official and an agency document identifying 

the sources of the nominations, the agency obtained nominations from (1) 

FDA and HHS officials; (2) interest groups and trade associations and other 

interested parties, including the American Society for Nutritional Services, 

the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the Association of Food and 

Drug Officials, and officials at the Center for Health Policy at the University 

of Oklahoma and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and (3) 

individuals who nominated themselves in response to the Federal Register

notice. 

Criteria used to balance the committee: Committee managers 

reported the following five criteria used to achieve balance: (1) scientific 

expertise representing a range of scientific interpretation; (2) demographic 

characteristics, including geographic distribution, gender, and ethnicity; (3) 

differing levels of experience on advisory committees; (4) stakeholder 

representation (e.g., consumers, industry, and academicians); and (5) 

membership on advisory committees that is used to help ensure that the 

agency has balance by not repeatedly appointing a limited set of people 

either for a particular committee or for various committees the agency has 

on related topics. Temporary voting members may be added to enhance 

balance. 

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None 

sought.
Appendix VIII

Information on the Food and Drug 

Administration’s Food Advisory Committee

Page 84 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Table 11: Roster of the Food Advisory Committee with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of June 3, 2003

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise

Universities and medical centers

Alex D.W. Acholonu, Ph.D. Alcorn State University Microbiology and parisitology

Douglas L. Archer, Ph.D. University of Florida, Department of Food Science & 

Human Nutrition

Microbiology, food science, and food law

Jonathan A. Arias, Ph.D. University of Maryland, Center for Biosystems Molecular biology

Fred McDaniel Atkins, M.D. National Jewish Medical

and Research Center

Pediatrics and allergies

Jeffrey Blumberg, Ph.D. Tufts University Pharmacology and biostatistics

Bob B. Buchanan, Ph.D. University of California, Berkeley, Department of Plant 

and Microbial Biology

Molecular plant biology

Francis Fredrick Busta, Ph.D. University of Minnesota, Department of Food Science 

and Nutrition

Food science and microbiology

Nancy M. Childs, Ph.D. Saint Joseph's University Food marketing

Johanna Dwyer, Ph.D. Tufts University

Schools of Medicine and Nutrition

Public health and nutrition

Lawrence J. Fischer, Ph.D. Michigan State University, Institute for Environmental 

Toxicology

Toxicology

George M. Gray, Ph.D. Harvard University, School of Public Health Risk analysis and toxicology

Rachel K. Johnson, Ph.D., 

M.P.H., R.D.

University of Vermont, Department of Nutrition and 

Food Sciences

Pediatrics and nutrition

Anne R. Kapuscinski, Ph.D. University of Minnesota, Department of Fisheries and 

Wildlife

Conservation biology

Ken Lee, Ph.D. Ohio State University, Department of Food Science Food science and processing

Harihara Mehendale, Ph.D. University of Louisiana at Monroe, College of 

Pharmacy

Toxicology

Sanford A. Miller, Ph.D. (Chair) Virginia Polytechnic and State University Chemistry, toxicology, and food science

Abigail A. Salyers, Ph.D. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Microbiology and gene transfer

Michael W. Shannon, Ph.D. Children's Hospital, Boston, MA Pediatrics and toxicology

J. Antonio Torres, Ph.D. Oregon State University Food science and processing

Steven Zeisel, MD, Ph.D. University of North Carolina, School of Health & 

Medicine

Pediatrics

Nonprofit associations

Annette Dickinson, Ph.D. 

(industry representative)

Council for Responsible Nutrition Dietary supplements

Goulda Angella Downer, Ph.D. 

(consumer representative)

Metroplex Health and Nutrition Services Nutrition and epidemiology

Douglas Gurian-Sherman, Ph.D. 

(consumer representative)

Center for Science in the Public Interest Genetic engineering
Appendix VIII

Information on the Food and Drug 

Administration’s Food Advisory Committee

Page 85 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Source: USDA.

State agency

Marion H. Fuller, D.V.M. Florida Department of Agriculture, Division of Food 

Safety

Veterinary medicine federal-state relations

Industry association

Brandon Scholz Wisconsin Grocers Association Industry representative

(Continued From Previous Page)

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise
Page 86 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix IX

Information on the National Institutes of 

Health’s Scientific Advisory Committee on 

Alternative Toxicological Methods ApendxiIX

This appendix contains information about the Scientific Advisory 

Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods, which is sponsored and 

managed by NIH. Members are appointed by the Director of the National 

Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. 

Purpose of the committee: The committee provides advice to the 

Director of the National Institute of Environmental Heath Sciences 

(NIEHS); the Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of 

Alternative Methods (ICCVAM); and the National Toxicology Program 

Center regarding statutorily mandated functions, including

• reviewing and evaluating new; revised; or alternative test methods, 

including batteries of tests and test screens that may be acceptable for 

specific regulatory uses;

• facilitating appropriate interagency and international harmonization of 

acute or chronic toxicological test protocols that encourage the 

reduction, refinement, or replacement of animal test methods; 

• facilitating and providing guidance on the development of validation 

criteria; validation studies; and processes for new, revised, or alternative 

test methods and helping to facilitate the acceptance of such 

scientifically valid test methods and awareness of accepted test 

methods by federal agencies and other stakeholders; and

• submitting ICCVAM test recommendations for the test methods 

reviewed by ICCVAM, through expeditious transmittal by the HHS 

Secretary (or the designee of the Secretary), to each appropriate federal 

agency, along with the identification of specific agency guidelines; 

recommendations; or regulations for test methods, including batteries 

of tests and test screens, for chemicals or a class of chemicals within a 

regulatory framework that may be appropriate for scientific 

improvement, while seeking to reduce, refine, or replace animal test 

methods. 

The committee also provides advice to the Director of the NIEHS and the 

National Toxicology Program Center on activities and directives relating to 

the National Toxicology Program Center, such as on priorities and 

opportunities for alternative test methods that may provide improved 

prediction of adverse health effects compared with currently used methods 

or advantages in terms of reduced expense and time, reduced animal use, 

and reduced animal pain and distress.
Appendix IX

Information on the National Institutes of 

Health’s Scientific Advisory Committee on 

Alternative Toxicological Methods

Page 87 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Number of members: 15 (see table 12).

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: As special government employees, 

committee members are required to file OGE financial disclosure forms for 

review for potential conflicts of interest. The NIH committee management 

officer performed a first-level review of the financial disclosure forms, 

followed by a second-level review by the designated federal officer. The 

NIH’s Deputy Ethics Counselor performed the final review. 

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Fourteen of 15 members received waivers 

because NIH determined that the need for their expertise outweighed the 

potential conflicts. One of the 15 members received a waiver because the 

conflict was deemed not significant. 

Disclosure of waivers to the public: According to the designated 

federal officer, the issuance of waivers to committee members was not 

disclosed to the public. For example, the waivers were not discussed at 

any committee meetings. According to the NIH committee management 

officer, the agency sends its waivers to the HHS Ethics Counsels assigned 

to NIH, who then sends them to OGE. 

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: The Director 

of the Environmental Toxicology Program, NIEHS, asked the members of 

the ICCVAM for nominations to the advisory committee and also asked for 

nominations from former members and ad hoc advisors of the committee. 

The Director also requested nominations from two stakeholder groups that 

regularly attend committee meetings, the Doris Day Animal League and the 

People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals.

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the committee 

management officer and the designated federal officer, the legislation that 

created the committee gives direction regarding membership that focuses 

on expertise and work affiliations, and NIH uses these factors to achieve 

committee balance. Specifically, the legislation calls for members to come 

from an academic institution; a state government agency; an international 

regulatory body; or any corporation developing or marketing new, revised, 

or alternative test methodologies, including contract laboratories. The 

legislation also specifies that there shall be at least one knowledgeable 

representative having a history of expertise, development, or evaluation of 

new, revised, or alternative test methods from each of the following 
Appendix IX

Information on the National Institutes of 

Health’s Scientific Advisory Committee on 

Alternative Toxicological Methods

Page 88 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

categories: (1) personal care, pharmaceutical, industrial chemicals, or 

agricultural industry; (2) any other industry that is regulated by one of the 

federal agencies on ICCVAM; and (3) a national animal protection 

organization established under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 

Code of 1986. The committee management officer also told us that NIH 

considered ethnicity, gender, and geography in balancing the committee 

membership.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None 

sought.
Appendix IX

Information on the National Institutes of 

Health’s Scientific Advisory Committee on 

Alternative Toxicological Methods

Page 89 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Table 12: Roster of the Scientific Advisory Committee on Alternative Toxicological Methods with the Primary Employers, and 

Areas of Expertise as of December 30, 2003

Source: HHS.

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise

Universities

Dr. Daniel Acosta, Jr. University of Cincinnati, College of Pharmacy In vitro toxicology, pharmacology, and 

development of in vitro cellular models

Dr. Nancy Flournoy University of Missouri-Columbia, Department of 

Statistics

Biostatistics, applied stochastic processes, and 

statistical theory

Dr. Alan M. Goldberg Johns Hopkins University, Center for Alternatives to 

Animal Testing, Bloomberg School of Public Health

Neurotoxicology, in vitro toxicology, and 

alternative models

Dr. Sidney Green, Jr. Howard University, Department of Pharmacology, 

College of Medicine

Pharmacology, genetic toxicology, and regulatory 

toxicology

Dr. A. Wallace Hayes Harvard University, School of Public Health General toxicology, biochemical toxicology, and in 

vitro models

Dr. Nancy A. Monteiro-Riviere North Carolina State University, Department of 

Clinical Sciences, College of Veterinary Medicine

Dermal toxicology, biochemical toxicology, and in 

vitro models

Dr. Steven H. Safe Texas A & M University, Departments of Veterinary 

Physiology and Pharmacology, College of Veterinary 

Medicine 

Environmental estrogens, toxicology, and 

biochemistry

Dr. Carlos Sonnenschein Tufts University School of Medicine, Department of 

Anatomy and Cellular Biology

Environmental toxicology, medicine, 

environmental estrogens, and reproductive 

toxicology

Companies

Dr. Jack H. Dean Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc. Molecular biology, regulatory toxicology, 

toxicogenomics, and immunotoxicology

Dr. Rodger D. Curren Institute for In Vitro Sciences, Inc. In vitro toxicological testing

Dr. Jacqueline H. Smith Chesapeake Consulting Team Pharmacology, environmental toxicology, 

regulatory toxicology, and the petroleum industry

Nonprofit associations

Dr. Martin L. Stephens The Humane Society of the United States Animal welfare and environmental toxicology

Dr. Peter Theran Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 

to Animals/American Humane Education Society

Internal medicine, laboratory animal medicine, 

animal welfare, and comparative medicine

State agency

Dr. Calvin C. Willhite State of California, Department of Toxic Substance 

Control 

Reproductive toxicology, pharmacology, risk 

assessment and management, and regulatory 

toxicology

Other

Dr. Katherine A. Stitzel Veterinarian (Retired) Acute toxicity, in vitro methods, and regulatory 

toxicology
Page 90 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix X

Information on the Department of the 

Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey’s Scientific 

Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee ApendxiX

This appendix provides information about the Scientific Earthquake 

Studies Advisory Committee. The committee is managed by the U.S. 

Geological Survey (USGS), and members are appointed by the Secretary of 

the Interior.

Purpose of the committee: The advisory committee was established 

under the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Authorization Act of 2000 (Pub. 

L. No. 106-503, Title II) to advise the Director of USGS on matters relating 

to the USGS’s participation in the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction 

Program, a multiagency strategic program to reduce risks to lives and 

property resulting from earthquakes. The committee is to provide advice 

on the USGS Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program’s roles, goals, and 

objectives; capabilities and research needs; guidance on achieving major 

objectives; and establishing and measuring performance goals.

Number of members: 9 (see table 13).

Type of appointment: Representative.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: In 2001, the committee members were 

appointed as representatives and were not required to file OGE financial 

disclosure forms for Interior review for potential conflicts of interest. In 

January 2004, Interior reevaluated the appointments and determined that 

the members should be appointed as special government employees. 

Interior said that the committee would not conduct further meetings until 

the appointments had been changed.

Conflict-of-interest waivers: Not applicable in 2001.

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable. 

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: The 

Earthquake Hazards Reduction Authorization Act of 2000 requires the 

Director of USGS to obtain nominations from the National Academy of 

Sciences, professional societies, and other appropriate organizations. The 

Director obtained nominations from the academy, the Geological Society of 

America, the Seismological Society of America, the American Society of 

Civil Engineers, the American Institute of Professional Geologists, the 

American Geophysical Union, and the Earthquake Engineering Research 

Institute. 
Appendix X

Information on the Department of the 

Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey’s Scientific 

Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee

Page 91 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Criteria used to balance the committee: According to the statute that 

established the advisory committee, the selection of individuals for the 

committee is to be based solely on established records of distinguished 

service and the USGS Director is required to ensure that “a reasonable 

cross-section of views and expertise is represented.” According to the 

designated federal official, the primary factor for selection was expertise in 

fields such as geology, seismology, engineering, and public safety. In 

addition, according to department officials, the agency also considered 

gender, geography, and employment sector.

External feedback on proposed committee membership: USGS 

sought feedback from the National Academies on its slate of proposed 

members.

Table 13: Roster of the Scientific Earthquake Studies Advisory Committee with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise 

as of December 2003

Source: Interior.

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise

Universities

Dr. Daniel P. Abrams University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Engineering 

Dr. Thomas H. Jordan University of Southern California, Department of 

Earth Sciences

Seismology, geodynamics, tectonics, geodesy, 

and marine geology 

Dr. Paul Segall Stanford University, Department of Geophysics Earthquake physics

Dr. Robert B. Smith University of Utah, Department of Geology and 

Geophysics,

Geology

Dr. Sharon L. Wood University of Texas, Ferguson Structural 

Engineering Laboratory

Engineering 

Companies

Dr. Lloyd Cluff Pacific Gas and Electric Company Earthquake hazard assessment 

Mr. Ronald T. Eguchi ImageCat, Inc. Earthquake risk analysis 

State agencies

Ms. Mimi Garstang Missouri Geological Survey Earthquake hazard analysis in the eastern United 

States and state-level mitigation policy

Dr. Jonathan G. Price Nevada Bureau of Mines and Geology Seismology and earthquake hazard analysis in 

the western United States.
Page 92 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix XI

Information on the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration’s Space Science 

Advisory Committee ApendxiXI

This appendix provides information about the Space Science Advisory 

Committee. The committee is managed by the Office of Space Science, and 

members are appointed by NASA’s Associate Administrator for Space 

Science.

Purpose of the committee: The NASA Space Science Advisory 

Committee is to draw on the expertise of its members and other sources to 

provide advice and make recommendations to the Administrator of NASA 

on plans, policies, programs, and other matters pertinent to the agency’s 

space science responsibilities.

Number of members: 17 (see table 14).

Type of appointment: Special government employees.

Conflict-of-interest reviews: NASA uses the OGE form 450 to collect 

financial information from committee members. The forms are collected 

and reviewed after the Associate Administrator has concurred with the 

appointment decisions. The forms 450 are reviewed and approved by the 

committee’s designated federal official and the Office of General Counsel. 

On the basis of these reviews, the Office of General Counsel sometimes 

sends cautionary letters to members indicating that they may need to 

recuse themselves if the committees address matters that relate to their 

financial interests. 

Conflict-of-interest waivers: No current members have waivers.1

Disclosure of waivers to the public: Not applicable.

Steps taken to gather nominations for the committee: According to 

the committee’s designated federal official, NASA gathered nominations 

from staff within the agency’s Office of Space Science.

Criteria used to balance the committee: The committee’s designated 

federal official told us said that in addition to considering the nominees’ 

areas of expertise relative to the four themes of the Office of Space 

Science, he also considers their gender, ethnicity, geography, and 

institutional affiliation. 

1

According to an ethics official in NASA’s Office of General Counsel, NASA issues very few 

(five or fewer) waivers each year. 
Appendix XI

Information on the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration’s Space Science 

Advisory Committee

Page 93 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

External feedback on proposed committee membership: None 

sought.

Table 14: Roster of the Space Science Advisory Committee Members with the Primary Employers and Areas of Expertise as of 

December 30, 2003

Source: NASA.

Committee member Primary employer Area of expertise

Universities

Dr. David Deamer University of California at Santa Cruz Astrobiology

Dr. Jonathan Grindlay Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics Astrophysics

Dr. Fiona Harrison California Institute of Technology Astrophysics

Dr. Roderick Heelis University of Texas at Dallas Solar physics

Dr. Garth Illingworth University of California at Santa Cruz Astrophysics

Dr. Andrew Klein Oregon State University Nuclear engineering

Dr. Jonathan Lunine University of Arizona Planetary exploration

Dr. John Mustard Brown University Astrobiology

Dr. David Spergel Princeton University Astrophysics

Federal research facilities

Dr. Judith Karpen U.S. Naval Research Laboratory Solar physics

Dr. Edward Kolb Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory Astrophysics

Dr. Jeremy Mould National Optical Astronomy Observatory Astrophysics

Dr. Michelle Thompson Los Alamos National Laboratory Sun-earth connections

For profit company

Dr. Andrew Christensen (chair) Northrop Grumman Space Technology Sun-earth connections

Private, nonprofit research organizations

Dr. Heidi Hammel Space Science Institute Planetary science

Mr. Martin Kress Battelle Memorial Institute Space policy

Private museum

Dr. Paul Knappenberger Adler Planetarium Education and public outreach
Page 94 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix XII

Comments from the General Services 

Administration ApendxiXI
Appendix XII

Comments from the General Services 

Administration

Page 95 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Appendix XII

Comments from the General Services 

Administration

Page 96 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Appendix XII

Comments from the General Services 

Administration

Page 97 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Appendix XII

Comments from the General Services 

Administration

Page 98 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Appendix XII

Comments from the General Services 

Administration

Page 99 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Appendix XII

Comments from the General Services 

Administration

Page 100 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Page 101 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics ApendxXiI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 102 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 103 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 1.

See comment 4.
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 104 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 5.
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 105 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 106 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 10.

See comment 11.
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 107 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 12.

See comment 13.
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 108 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

The following are GAO’s comments on the Office of Government Ethics 

letter dated March 17, 2004.

GAO Comments 1. We continue to believe that OGE’s ongoing efforts to encourage 

agencies to evaluate whether appointments should be made as special 

government employees or representatives would prove more effective 

if clear, unambiguous guidance addressing the limitations we identified 

were available to agency staff.

The draft and final reports present the OGE guidance as a factor in 

some agencies’ inappropriately appointing some members as 

representatives and acknowledge OGE’s concern that some agencies 

may be doing so to avoid the conflict-of-interest reviews. Unless OGE 

clarifies the limitations in the guidance identified in our report, we 

believe progress in moving agencies toward appropriate appointments 

will likely continue to be slow or nonexistent—remembering that the 

1982 guidance was issued because of confusion over the proper use of 

representative appointments. Unambiguous guidance would help all 

agencies implement it; would support more effective oversight by 

ethics officials, including OGE, and by Inspectors General; and would 

make it more difficult for any agency to misapply the guidance and 

misidentify certain advisory committee members as “representatives.”

2. The clarifications we identified do not change the criteria but rather 

amplify them to address areas where continued confusion or misuse 

has occurred. The 1982 guidance was developed to address 

uncertainties regarding when agencies should appoint individuals as 

either special government employees or representatives. In our view, 

the findings in our report indicate that additional clarifications are 

warranted. Along these lines, we note that when OGE’s staff 

determined in 2002 that some agencies use only representative 

appointments, they suggested that additional training materials may be 

appropriate. The staff suggested a communication to agency ethics 

officials to assist them in making the determination for their committee 

members. Our draft and final reports recommend revisions to the 

guidance and the training materials.

3. Given that agencies are appointing representatives to represent their 

individual fields of expertise and that OGE agrees this use of 

representative appointments is not appropriate, we believe OGE should 

revise its guidance to clarify that such appointments generally are not 
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 109 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

appropriate. (We note that an exception would be if a committee were 

considering an issue that would impact a particular group, for example, 

physicists or biologists—a case in which a group of experts would be 

stakeholders in the matter being considered.) Instead, OGE’s response 

is to state that it is not logical to say that a field or area of expertise is a 

“group of persons” and to disagree that clarification to its guidance may 

be warranted to eliminate this practice. It is possible, as OGE suggests, 

that some agencies understand the guidance and are simply 

disregarding it. However, we believe ambiguities in the OGE guidance 

may provide agencies with some “cover” to support their 

interpretations. In such cases, clear guidance would make it more 

difficult for them to continue to misapply it. In addition, we direct 

OGE’s attention to the responses to this report from Interior, NASA, 

and Energy (see apps. XV, XVI, and XVII), which suggest that 

clarifications to the guidance regarding the appointment of 

representatives to represent fields of expertise may be necessary.

4. On the basis of our work at several agencies and our review of the OGE 

guidance, we continue to believe some clarification is needed vis-à-vis 

the use of the term “represent” and its cognate forms. As the draft and 

final reports state, OGE’s direction to agencies in making decisions 

regarding representative appointments is to use “words to characterize 

them as the representatives of individuals or entities outside the 

government who have an interest in the subject matter assigned to the 

committee.” Notably missing from OGE’s specific direction to agencies 

is a focus on the nature of the advice they will be giving—that is, that 

they are to represent stakeholder views. This is in contrast to OGE’s 

direction to agencies regarding special government employees that 

does focus on the fact that they are to exercise individual and 

independent judgment. Although OGE’s guidance does provide helpful 

examples to agencies in examining statutory language to determine 

whether committee members are actually intended to serve as 

representatives of interest groups, we believe that language in the 

conclusions section of the guidance that directs agencies how to 

indicate the type of appointment contradicts the examples that OGE 

cites. We have clarified the final report to indicate that we were 

specifically discussing the conclusions section of the OGE guidance. 

We also note that OGE developed these conclusions in 1982—that is, it 

is not citing the 1962 guidance the agency is hesitant to revise. Overall, 

we believe that clarifications, but not departures from the criteria 

regarding appointments, are needed. 
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 110 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

We point OGE also to the comments from the Interior (see app. XV) on 

the matter of the term representative. Interior stated that “GAO agrees 

that the statute authorizing the National Cooperative Geologic Mapping 

Advisory Committee’ calls for the committee to 

include...representatives,’ but then goes on to say that the statute does 

not “clearly and unambiguously call for these members to be appointed 

as representatives rather than special government employees.’.” 

Interior then characterized our statements as a contradiction and said 

that the Secretary of the Interior “reasonably may interpret such a 

statute by relying on its plain language....”. In our draft and final 

reports, we indicate that it is not clear what point of view the private 

sector and academia members could be called upon to provide if 

appointed as representatives, and the statute did not appear to clearly 

mandate that they be appointed as representatives—that is, it may be 

using the term generically. We continue to believe that the statute does 

not clearly and unambiguously call for representative appointments 

and that this example underscores the need for OGE clarification as we 

recommend. 

5. Seeking recommendations for advisory committee members from 

outside groups or organizations does not tend to support either 

representative or special government employee status. As noted in the 

draft and final reports, obtaining outside nominations is a common 

practice for committees appointing special government employees; 

thus, it is not used only for representative appointments. We think it 

would be appropriate for the OGE guidance to reflect current practices 

regarding nominations to federal advisory committees and avoid the 

potential of agencies’ giving undue weight to this criterion.

6. We are only recommending clarifications to OGE’s guidance, not 

changes to the fundamental principles or criteria upon which OGE 

based its guidance. See also comment 2 above.

7. Our draft and final reports highlight the various efforts OGE discusses 

below. However, we believe the effectiveness of these efforts will 

continue to be reduced until OGE’s guidance on appointments is 

clarified.

8. OGE has subsequently clarified this comment. The program review 

cited in the comment led to a recommendation that an agency reassess 

the status of employees serving on a federally chartered corporation 

and not on a federal advisory committee.
Appendix XIII

Comments from the Office of Government 

Ethics

Page 111 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

9. We have not evaluated the template that was still in draft form during 

our review.

10. OGE does not explain its view that the clarifications to the GSA FACA 

management training course that we identified in the report represent 

an unreasonable interpretation of OGE guidance. We continue to 

believe the suggestions our draft and final reports highlight would 

improve the effectiveness of the training sessions. For example, the 

GSA materials state that representatives may (emphasis added) 

represent the views of a particular industry or group. It is not clear to 

us why OGE would object to revising the FACA training materials to be 

consistent with OGE’s guidance that representatives are expected to 

“represent a particular bias.”

11. The draft and final reports identify the session at the 2003 OGE Ethics 

Conference cited in OGE’s letter.

12. The draft and final reports cite the most significant and comprehensive 

OGE guidance documents addressing representative appointments, 

including OGE Informal Advisory Opinion 00 x 01 highlighted by OGE 

in its comments. (In the report text, we refer to this guidance as OGE’s 

February 2000 guidance, and we have added a legal citation to it in a 

footnote.) We note that this opinion includes one paragraph addressing 

representative appointments and states that representatives are 

described more fully in OGE Informal Advisory Letter 82 x 22, the 

guidance document cited in our draft and final reports as OGE’s 

principal guidance on the issue of appointment categories for federal 

advisory committees.

13. We support OGE’s commitment to monitor and comment on 

appointments to newly created committees. However, in light of 

evidence that some appointments to existing committees are 

inappropriate, we believe it is appropriate to also review the 

appointments for approximately 950 advisory committees that are 

currently active.
Page 112 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix XIV

Comments from the Department of Health and 

Human Services ApendxXiIV

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix XIV

Comments from the Department of Health 

and Human Services

Page 113 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 1.

See comment 1.
Appendix XIV

Comments from the Department of Health 

and Human Services

Page 114 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

See comment 5.
Appendix XIV

Comments from the Department of Health 

and Human Services

Page 115 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Appendix XIV

Comments from the Department of Health 

and Human Services

Page 116 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Health and 

Human Services’s letter dated March 19, 2004.

GAO Comments 1. The draft and final reports identify processes that include an evaluation 

of potential members’ points of view relevant to the subject matters 

advisory committees will consider while focusing on the relevant 

expertise needed. Thus, it is not accurate to characterize the report as 

espousing “a process based on seeking out some indefinable range of 

personal opinion.” The examples in the report of agency processes 

include targeted evaluations of points of view that ask potential 

members if they have made public statements or taken positions on the 

issue or matters the committee will consider, including expert legal 

testimony on the issue or matters. The processes cited also ask the 

potential members to identify and describe any reason they may be 

unable to provide impartial advice on matters before the committee and 

any reason their impartiality in the identified matter might be 

questioned. We have added the phrase “regarding the subject matters 

being considered” in several other places in the final report in which we 

discuss determining the viewpoints of potential members for further 

clarity on this point. The report also points out that if agencies use a 

systematic, consistent, and transparent approach to obtaining relevant 

information from prospective committee members, it is unlikely they 

would approve questions that are generally inappropriate in a 

professional working environment, such as questions about party 

affiliations or political viewpoints that some committee members have 

reported being asked. In our view, agencies that do not proactively and 

transparently address the relevant points of view of prospective 

committee members regarding the matters the committees will 

consider are more likely to be subject to questions about committee 

balance from the public and users of the committees’ products than 

those agencies that use such processes. That is, even if agencies 

choose to either not identify or acknowledge relevant public positions 

its committee members have taken on matters the committees will 

consider, others are often aware of such positions and are likely to raise 

questions about them. Such circumstances can have a negative impact 

on the credibility of the specific committees involved and on federal 

advisory committees overall. We believe this practice has been the case 

regarding some HHS federal advisory committees about which 

scientists and others have expressed concerns. Finally, in terms of 

HHS’s concern that obtaining information on relevant points of view 

might not be acceptable to the nation’s scientific community, our report 
Appendix XIV

Comments from the Department of Health 

and Human Services

Page 117 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

shows that both the National Academies and EPA routinely obtain such 

relevant information from its prospective members. 

2. The report identifies the practice of soliciting public input on 

nominations to advisory committees, used by the National Academies 

and some federal advisory committees, as one that can be helpful in 

ensuring an appropriate balance of points of view of committees, 

particularly those that address sensitive and controversial matters. 

Agencies can determine whether to use this tool on a case-by-case 

basis. Thus, we do not disagree with HHS’s comment that obtaining 

comments on proposed candidates might be feasible for some HHS 

committees but not workable for all of them.

3. Although we agree with HHS that FDA should emphasize technical 

qualifications when selecting advisory committee members, we also 

believe that it is important for agencies to assess prospective members 

for viewpoints that they have that are relevant to the work of the 

committee (see also comment 1). HHS says that FDA follows the 

National Academy of Sciences’ recommendation that the appointment 

of members to scientific advisory committees be based primarily on 

expertise and involvement in relevant issues. This report notes that the 

academies also seek to determine, through a few simple questions, 

whether there is any reason to believe that the impartiality of members 

or prospective members might be questioned.

4. EPA made changes in how it manages the Science Advisory Board in 

response to the specific recommendations in our 2001 report.1

 We did 

not attempt to determine any role FDA may have had in assisting EPA, 

but we note that EPA, unlike FDA, revised its processes for achieving 

overall balance in terms of points of view, expressly integrating it with 

its reviews for potential conflicts of interest and obtaining relevant 

information prior to the appointment of committee members. 

5. We agree that FDA provides useful information about its selection 

process, but we continue to believe that FDA and the other agencies 

could improve their processes for balancing committees. The draft and 

final reports highlight FDA policies for public notice of waivers. We 

note that the selection and waiver processes used by FDA are not used 

by HHS, CDC, and NIH.

1

GAO-01-536.
Page 118 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior ApendxiXV

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 119 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 2.
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 120 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 2.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comments 3 and 4.
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 121 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 2.

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

See comment 7.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

See comment 10.
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 122 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 11.

See comment 12.

See comment 13.

See comment 14.

See comment 15.

See comment 16.
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 123 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 124 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of the Interior’s 

letter dated March 18, 2004.

GAO Comments 1. This report states, as did the draft, that while our report focuses 

primarily on scientific and technical federal advisory committees, the 

limitations in guidance and the promising practices we identified 

pertaining to independence and balance are pertinent to federal 

advisory committees in general. This report and the draft also 

identified the wide range of issues addressed by federal advisory 

committees, including managing federal lands and natural resources. 

2. The background section of the report and the draft acknowledged the 

FACA requirement that committees not be inappropriately influenced 

by the appointing authority or any special interest. However, the draft 

report also clearly stated that in addressing independence, our focus 

was on the requirements regarding individual conflicts of interest that 

are included in federal conflict-of-interest statutes, unless specifically 

noted otherwise. In our introduction, we state that “federal advisory 

committee members who are employees of the federal government 

must meet federal requirements pertaining to freedom from conflicts of 

interest—which we refer to in this report as independence—and 

committees as a whole must meet the requirements pertaining to 

balance.” Thus, we use the term “independence” as shorthand for the 

conflict-of-interest requirements to which individual committee 

members must adhere. We further highlight the key provisions of the 

federal conflict-of-interest statutes that must be complied with, 

including a description of the ability of an individual who has a conflict 

of interest to nonetheless participate on a committee if granted a 

waiver. Alternatively, an individual may divest the financial interest.

We note that all federal employees are prohibited not only from holding 

financial interests that conflict with the conscientious performance of 

duty, as Interior suggests in its comments, but also from engaging in 

outside employment or activities that conflict with their official duties 

and responsibilities. See 18 U.S.C. § 208, 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.101(b)(2), and 

2635.101(a)(10). Further, employees are also required to avoid any 

action that creates the appearance that they are violating the law or 

ethics standards. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(14). It is precisely because 

these obligations are imposed only on employees that it is crucial to 

ensure that FACA committee members are appropriately characterized 

as “representatives” or special government employees. Both special 
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 125 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

government employees and representatives should be evaluated for 

biases to ensure that the FACA committees as a whole are balanced. 

Special government employees must also be subject to a conflict-ofinterest review, including an analysis of whether their nongovernment 

activities and employment present a conflict or create “the appearance 

that they are violating...ethics standards.” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)(14). 

3. We agree that the question of whether a member should participate in a 

particular committee function (or whether they should be appointed to 

a particular committee) is properly resolved on a case-by-base basis, 

evaluating the nature of the committee action or work and the nature of 

the financial interest involved. Further, the draft and final reports 

recognize that agencies may grant waivers to members to serve on 

advisory committees upon determining that either (1) the conflict is 

insignificant or (2) the need for the member’s expertise outweighs the 

conflict. The draft and final reports also discuss some promising 

practices regarding the disclosure of such waivers to the public and 

among committee members.

4. The draft and final reports discuss in considerable detail information 

that can help agencies ensure committees are balanced and provide 

examples of promising practices that would better ensure the balance 

of advisory committees.

5. We agree that a relevant question for federal advisory committees is 

whether a committee has balance in terms of points of view to be 

represented and the functions to be performed. Our report provides 

examples of promising practices used by other agencies and the 

National Academies that can help agencies define and achieve an 

appropriate balance of points of view. 

6. Our draft and final reports state that at the start of our review, Interior 

officials told us that they had begun to review their appointment 

classifications for the 115 advisory committees as a result of the 

November 2002 OGE study. The draft and final reports also state that 

the department has been reviewing the appointments to committees as 

their charters expire. We do indicate that in January 2004, Interior 

officials acknowledged that it was appropriate to change the nature of 

some appointments upon reexamination. This was the first time any 

results of the reviews were communicated to us. Further, Interior 

notified us of the decision to change the appointments to the 
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 126 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

earthquake studies committee on January 16, 2004, subsequent to our 

meeting on January 12, 2004.

7. We revised the report to indicate that agencies do not conduct conflictof-interest reviews for members appointed as representatives because 

conflict-of-interest reviews are only required for federal or special 

government employees. Thus, we removed any unintended implication 

that other agencies do more than the three we are reporting on in this 

report in terms of representative appointments. In our draft and final 

reports we indicate that the ethics screening vis-à-vis representatives 

done by one bureau of the department (Bureau of Land Management) is 

not sufficient to constitute a conflict-of-interest review for those 

appointed as special government employees. In this section, we are 

discussing those members who were appointed as representatives but 

who would be more appropriately appointed as special government 

employees. 

8. We modified the language in the report to more clearly describe the 

authorities under which committees may be formed. 

9. The draft and final reports define the two categories of appointments 

on page 1.

10. The draft and final reports state on page 1 that members of federal 

advisory committees may be appointed as (1) special government 

employees to provide advice on behalf of the government on the basis 

of their best judgment or (2) representatives to provide stakeholder 

advice. We do not take issue with representative appointments when 

the members are, in fact, appointed to represent a particular interest or 

view of an entity or group with an interest in the matter before the 

committees, and they are fully informed as to the point of view or 

interest they are to represent. Further, the reports state that Interior 

officials noted that many of their committees addressing federal land 

management issues are not scientific and technical in content and, in 

their view, are appropriately staffed with representative members. The 

reports do indicate that committees classified as scientific and 

technical, as well as others that address scientific and technical issues, 

are those for which advice on behalf of the government on the basis of 

members’ best judgment is typically sought, rather than stakeholder 

advice. Interior has 11 committees with 288 members that are 

classified by the agency as scientific and technical committees in GSA’s 
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 127 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

FACA database, and some other committees not so classified also 

address scientific and technical issues. 

11. We are not certain what Interior means in stating that “GAO’s 

generalization that representation of fields of expertise is not 

appropriate ignores the importance of such representation to some 

committees.” However, the comment does suggest that Interior 

continues to believe that it is appropriate to appoint members to 

represent their field of expertise as representatives, rather than as 

special government employees. We and OGE disagree with this 

interpretation of OGE’s guidance on appointments to advisory 

committees. Representatives are to espouse a particular point of view 

of a party with an interest in the matter, whereas experts having 

specific expertise provide advice on behalf of the government on the 

basis of their best judgment. Thus, experts in various fields are more 

appropriately appointed as special government employees. 

(Subsequent to sending its comment letter, Interior clarified that the 

second sentence of this comment should read “However, we agree that 

agencies should have proper guidance in how and when to use such 

expertise.”.)

12. We have removed the reference to January 2004 in this instance, 

reporting that Interior officials told us that they have begun to insert 

standard language in the charters regarding the ethics obligations of the 

members. See also comment 6. 

13. On the basis of a January 2004 discussion with Interior officials, we 

understood the officials to say that in reviewing their appointment 

designations as committee charters expire, the agency was erring on 

the side of representative appointments when the information relevant 

to the committee was ambiguous on the issue of appointments. 

However, in its comments, Interior officials said they disagreed with 

our characterization of their previous comments, and we have deleted 

the statement from the report. In its comments, Interior officials said 

that the agency was likely to continue to appoint representatives to 

committees whose purpose is to advise the Secretary on the 

management of public lands or other resources as they are seeking the 

views of local stakeholders in these instances. As noted above, we do 

not take issue with representative appointments when the members 

are, in fact, appointed to represent a particular interest or view of an 

entity or group with an interest in the matter before the committees, 
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 128 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

and they are fully informed as to the point of view or interest they are to 

represent. 

14. Interior states that “GAO agrees that the statute authorizing the 

National Cooperative Geologic Mapping Advisory Committee ‘calls for 

the committee to include...representatives,’ but then goes on to state 

that the statute does not ‘clearly and unambiguously call for these 

members to be appointed as representatives rather than special 

government employees.’.” Interior then characterizes our statements 

as a contradiction and said that the Secretary of the Interior 

“reasonably may interpret such a statute by relying on its plain 

language....”. In our draft and final reports, we indicate that the statute 

did not appear to clearly mandate that the members be appointed as 

representatives—that is, it may be using the term “representative” 

generically—and we further noted that is not clear what point of view 

the private-sector and academia members could be called upon to 

provide if appointed as representatives. We continue to believe this 

statute does not clearly and unambiguously call for representative 

appointments and that this example underscores the need for OGE 

clarification regarding the use of the term representative, as we 

recommend.

15. As the draft and final reports state, FACA requires that all committees 

be balanced overall in terms of both points of view represented and the 

function to be performed. In our view, in order for advisory 

committees to be effective, it is important that they are, and are 

perceived as being, balanced. The draft and final reports identify 

processes that include an evaluation of potential members’ points of 

view relevant to the subject matters advisory committees will 

consider while focusing on the relevant expertise needed. The 

examples in the reports of agency processes that include such targeted 

evaluations of points of view ask potential members if they have made 

public statements or taken positions on the issue or matters the 

committee will consider, including expert legal testimony on the issue 

or matters. They also ask the potential members to identify and 

describe any reason they may be unable to provide impartial advice on 

matters before the committee and any reason their impartiality in the 

identified mater might be questioned. We disagree with Interior’s view 

that these inquiries would be intrusive, of little practical utility, and 

would turn qualified individuals away from government service. We 

also disagree with Interior’s view that we are saying that agencies need 

to understand all perceived biases of advisory committee members. As 
Appendix XV

Comments from the Department of the 

Interior

Page 129 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

shown above, the information identified as relevant to members’ points 

of view is targeted and focuses on their points of view relevant to the 

subject matter to be considered. We disagree that such inquiries will 

turn qualified individuals away from government service, evidenced by 

the fact that the National Academies and EPA routinely obtain such 

relevant information from its prospective members. Finally, we 

recognize that representatives are placed on committees because of 

their stated stakeholder interests and do not assert that participation of 

representatives is improper. 

16. We agree that committees, whether composed of representatives or 

special government employees, may invite outside experts to provide 

information or guidance. However, that does not affect the obligation 

agencies have to make appropriate decisions about appointing 

members as either representatives or special government employees.
Page 130 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix XVI

Comments from the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration ApendxXiVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.
Appendix XVI

Comments from the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration

Page 131 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees
Appendix XVI

Comments from the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration

Page 132 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

The following are GAO’s comments on the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration’s letter dated March 26, 2004.

GAO Comments 1. NASA’s comments support the appointment of federal advisory 

committee members as representative of their fields of expertise on the 

basis that some experts would not be able to serve as special 

government employees due to financial conflicts of interest. First, this 

view conflicts with OGE’s and our view that representatives are not 

appropriately appointed to represent fields of expertise (see comment 

2 below). Second, this view does not recognize that agencies may grant 

waivers to members to serve on advisory committees upon determining 

that either (1) the conflict is insignificant or (2) the need for the 

member’s expertise outweighs the conflict.1

 Our draft and final reports 

discuss waivers and some promising practices regarding the disclosure 

of such waivers to the public and among committee members.

2. NASA also recommends that the OGE guidance allow for the 

appointment of representatives of “stakeholder communities” as well 

as individual stakeholder organizations. NASA identifies those that 

may represent a community as industry, education, or a particular field 

of expertise. We note that OGE guidance on representative 

appointments states that representatives may speak for stakeholders—

that is, firms or an industry, labor or agriculture, or for any other 

recognizable group of persons with an interest in the matter under 

consideration. Thus, we believe that NASA can appoint experts as 

representatives to provide the views of, for example, the aerospace 

industry—if these experts are to provide stakeholder advice on matters 

in which the aerospace industry has an interest. If, however, NASA 

wants such experts to provide advice on behalf of the government on 

the basis of their individual and expert judgment, the appointments 

would be appropriately made as special government employees. These 

individuals would then be reviewed for potential financial conflicts of 

interest; if conflicts were identified, the conflicts would require 

mitigation. Regarding NASA’s support for representatives providing the 

views of “stakeholder communities,” we continue to believe that fields 

of expertise generally are not appropriately considered to be 

1

This view also provides support that OGE clarification on this issue is needed so that 

agencies can make appropriate decisions regarding representative appointments to federal 

advisory committees.
Appendix XVI

Comments from the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration

Page 133 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

stakeholder communities. Specifically, fields of expertise may be 

defined as a stakeholder community only in instances where the 

subject matter a committee is addressing would have a particular 

impact on a field of expertise—for example, biologists, teachers, or 

doctors—but not in cases where the experts are called upon to provide 

expert advice on the basis of their individual judgment.
Page 134 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix XVII

Comments from the Department of Energy ApendxiXVI

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in 

the report text appear 

at the end of this 

appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

See comment 3.

See comment 1.
Appendix XVII

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 135 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 1.

See comment 4.
Appendix XVII

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 136 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 2.
Appendix XVII

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 137 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

See comment 3.
Appendix XVII

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 138 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Energy’s letter 

dated April 1, 2004.

GAO Comments 1. The first issue that Energy identifies as being of concern vis-à-vis its 

perception of “GAO’s advocacy of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach” is, in 

essence, the governmentwide application of OGE’s criteria for 

representative appointments. That is, while Energy does not disagree 

that it may be generally inappropriate to appoint advisory committee 

members to represent various fields of expertise, the department 

believes it is appropriate for its Office of Science to do so on the basis 

of the agency’s “unique structure.” Specifically, Energy says that the 

Office of Science’s advisory committee members are inherently 

representative because the department’s basic research portfolio is 

managed according to scientific disciplines (physics, chemistry, 

mathematics) and the related advisory committees are “focused on the 

health of specific scientific disciplines.” In our view, the department’s 

research structure is not unique and does not provide a basis for 

appointing experts providing advice on the basis of their best judgment 

as representatives. For example, both the National Science Foundation 

and NASA manage research portfolios by scientific disciplines, and 

they generally appoint members to their scientific and technical 

advisory committees appropriately as special government employees.1

We believe Energy’s comments support our view that OGE needs to 

clarify its guidance on representative appointments.

2. The second issue that Energy views as our advocacy of a “one-size-fitsall” approach concerns obtaining input on the “selection of committee 

membership.” Energy does not specify whether it is addressing (1) 

nominations for committee membership from the public, (2) comments 

on proposed committee membership, or (3) both of these practices. In 

any event, the draft and final reports identify these as promising 

practices that are particularly relevant to those committees addressing 

sensitive or controversial issues, and not as practices that should be 

applied to all committees. 

1

NASA's comments in response to this report indicate that NASA does, at least in some 

cases, appoint members to represent their expertise. Unlike Energy, NASA cites issues 

related to conflicts of interest as a basis for doing so.
Appendix XVII

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 139 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

3. Energy states that our interpretation of the term representative is 

unpersuasive and would be an unsound basis of guidance for the 

department. In elaborating on this perspective, the department makes 

two points. First, the department states that it has certain advisory 

committees, such as the National Coal Council and the National 

Petroleum Council, that it views as clearly representational in that the 

members do speak for energy companies or entities that have an 

organizational interest in the matter. Energy expresses concern that 

the report inadvertently and unnecessarily calls into question the use of 

representatives on these committees. We disagree. The draft and final 

reports state on page 1 that members of federal advisory committees 

may be appointed as (1) special government employees to provide 

advice on behalf of the government on the basis of their best judgment 

or (2) representatives to provide stakeholder advice. We do not take 

issue with representative appointments when the members are, in fact, 

appointed to represent a particular interest or view of an entity or 

group with an interest in the matter before the committees, and they 

are fully informed as to the point of view or interest they are to 

represent. Second, Energy questions our view that use of the terms 

“represent” or “representative” regarding the membership of advisory 

committees does not always clearly indicate that the members are to be 

appointed to serve as representatives. In its comments on the draft 

report, OGE stated that its guidance does not imply that any use of the 

word “represent” or its cognate forms in a statute or other document 

means that the members of the committees are not special government 

employees. Further, OGE stated that its guidance makes clear that 

careful attention to all relevant factors is required in order to determine 

whether the committee members are actually intended to serve as 

representatives of interest groups. While OGE disagreed with our 

recommendation that its guidance needed to be clarified to state that 

the term representative in statutes and charters may be used more 

generically to identify the appropriate balance of points of view or 

expertise and may not be specifying that representative appointments 

be made, we believe Energy’s comments on this point provide 

additional support for our recommendation.

4. The draft and final reports state that USDA, Energy, and Interior 

appoint most or all of the members to their federal advisory 

committees as representatives. We believe this statement accurately 

describes Energy’s appointments. For example, our draft and final 

reports state that in April 2003, Energy’s Acting Assistant General 

Counsel for General Law told us that all but one of the department’s 
Appendix XVII

Comments from the Department of Energy

Page 140 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

committees use only representatives members; we indicated that this 

one committee expired in June 2003. In its comments on the draft 

report, Energy identifies another committee for which DOE appointed 

several members in 2004 as special government employees. 
Page 141 GAO-04-328 Federal Advisory Committees

Appendix XVIII

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiXVI

GAO Contacts Robin Nazzaro, (202) 512-3841

Christine Fishkin, (202) 512-6895

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to those individuals named above, Lindsay Bach, Ross 

Campbell, Bernice Dawson, John Delicath, Judy Pagano, and Amy Webbink 

made key contributions to this report.

(360290)
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