United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Aviation, Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, 

House of Representatives 

AVIATION SECURITY 

Progress Made to Set 

Up Program Using 

Private-Sector Airport 

Screeners, but More 

Work Remains 

March 2006 

 

GAO-06-166 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

March 2006

AVIATION SECURITY

Progress Made to Set Up Program Using 

Private-Sector Airport Screeners, but 

More Work Remains 

Highlights of GAO-06-166, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, 

Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure, House of Representatives 

In November 2004, as required by

law, the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) began 

allowing all commercial airports to 

apply to use private screeners in 

lieu of federal screeners as part of

its Screening Partnership Program

(SPP). GAO’s prior work found that 

airports and potential private 

screening contractors had 

concerns about the SPP, including

whether they would be liable in the 

event of a terrorist attack and how 

roles and responsibilities would be 

divided among TSA airport staff 

and private screening contractors.

This report addresses TSA’s efforts 

to (1) provide liability protection to 

private screening contractors and

airports and address other SPP 

stakeholder concerns; (2) achieve 

cost-savings through the SPP; and 

(3) establish performance goals 

and measures for the SPP.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that the 

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) direct TSA to document and

communicate roles and 

responsibilities for managing

screener operations under the SPP,

and establish a time frame for 

finalizing the SPP performance 

measures and targets. 

DHS reviewed a draft of this report

and generally concurred with

GAO’s findings and 

recommendations. 

DHS and Congress have begun to address whether liability protection may 

be offered to current and prospective private screening contractors and 

airports using private screeners. DHS has already provided some liability 

protection to three of the four current private screening contractors. 

However, DHS officials stated that they cannot provide additional coverage, 

which would render contractors virtually immune from all pertinent claims, 

because TSA has not finalized performance standards that would allow DHS 

to determine if contractors will perform as intended—a criterion that must 

be satisfied before providing such additional protection. Recently enacted 

legislation shields airports from virtually all liability resulting from the 

negligence or wrongdoing committed by a private screening company or its 

employees. TSA has also taken action to improve the screener hiring process 

by granting contractors and TSA airport officials more input and flexibility in 

the hiring process. Additionally, TSA has defined the roles and 

responsibilities for SPP stakeholders—TSA airport staff and private 

screening contractors, among others—in its August 2005 SPP transition plan. 

However, the details in this plan have not been shared with private screening

contractors, and all four contractors we interviewed were unclear about TSA 

staff roles and responsibilities at the airports they served. 

TSA has stated that the SPP will operate at a cost that is competitive with 

equivalent federal operations and will achieve cost-savings where possible. 

Over the last 3 years, TSA has awarded cost-reimbursement contracts with 

an award fee component for screening services at four of the five airports 

currently using private screeners. The award fee is based, in part, on 

contractor cost-savings. However, opportunities for TSA cost-savings may be 

limited because under the cost-reimbursement contracts TSA bears most of

the cost risk—the risk of paying more than it expected. TSA plans to shift 

more cost risk to contractors by competitively awarding fixed-price-award 

fee contracts for screening services at the four smallest airports that will 

participate in the SPP. TSA also plans to competitively award fixed-price 

contracts for screening services at larger airports, but stated that they 

cannot do so for up to 2 years—when officials believe that screening costs at 

larger airports will be better known. 

TSA has developed performance goals and has begun drafting related 

measures and targets to assess the performance of private screening 

contractors under the SPP in the areas of security, customer service, costs, 

workforce management, and innovation. For example, one of the measures 

would require contractors to ensure that new hires receive required training.

TSA’s related target for this measure is that 100 percent of new hires will 

complete required training. These same measures and targets will also be

used by DHS to assess whether to award full liability coverage under the 

SAFETY Act. TSA officials stated that DHS must approve the draft 

performance measures and targets before they can be finalized. As of 

January 2006, DHS had not yet completed its review.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-166.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Cathleen 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or

berrickc@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 4

Background 7

DHS and Congress Have Begun to Address Liability Protection 

Issue at Airports Using Private Screeners, but Stakeholder 

Concerns about Liability and Other Program Issues Remain 15 

TSA Provides Some Incentives to Contractors to Achieve CostSavings and Plans to Shift More Cost Risk to Contractors at 

Larger Airports in 1 to 2 Years 24 

Performance Goals and Measures Developed by TSA to Assess SPP 

Contractors Have Not Been Approved by DHS 30 

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 36 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 37 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 39 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 42 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45 

Related GAO Reports 46 

Tables 

Table 1: Airports That Participated in the 2-Year Private Screener 

Pilot Program 8 

Table 2: Non-Pilot Program Airports That Applied to Use Private 

Screeners to Conduct Screening Operations from 

November 2004 through January 2006 10 

Table 3: Type of Contract and Contract Amount for the Four 

Private Screening Contractors for the Period November 19, 

2004, through May 18, 2006 27 

Table 4: TSA Performance Measures for Evaluating SPP 

Contractors 32

Page i GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Abbreviations 

ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FSD Federal security director 

GPRA Government Performance Results Act 

SAFETY Act Support of Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 

 Technologies Act 

SPP Screening Partnership Program 

TIP threat image projection 

TSA Transportation Security Administration 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

March 31, 2006 

The Honorable John L. Mica 

Chairman 

Subcommittee on Aviation 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted after the 

terrorist attacks of 2001, required the federal government to take over the 

job of screening airline passengers and their checked baggage from the 

private sector.1

 Among other things, ATSA further required that the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) initiate a 2-year security 

screening pilot program at up to five commercial U.S. airports. The 

purpose of this pilot program, as defined by TSA, was to test the feasibility 

of utilizing private-sector screeners to screen passengers and their 

checked baggage in a post-9/11 environment, by allowing private-sector 

screeners—hired and managed by private screening companies under 

contract to TSA—to provide screening services in lieu of federal screeners 

at selected airports, with TSA oversight. The pilot program ran from 

November 2002 to November 2004. During that time, four private 

screening contractors served the five pilot program airports (one 

contractor served two airports). 

In November 2004, as the private screener pilot program concluded, ATSA 

required that TSA begin allowing all commercial airports to apply to TSA 

to transition from a federal to a private screener workforce. To support 

this effort, TSA created the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) to allow 

all commercial airports an opportunity to apply to TSA for permission to 

use qualified private screening contractors and private-sector screeners. 

Currently, the four contractors that participated in the private screener 

pilot program are under contract to TSA to provide screening services at 

the five airports they have already been serving, and all five airports that 

participated in the pilot program have applied and been accepted to 

participate in the SPP. In February 2006, TSA competitively awarded a 

new contract for screening services for one of the five pilot program 

 1

Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

Page 1 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
airports. Also, during the 16 months since the SPP was initiated, two 

additional airports have applied to the SPP. TSA approved one of these 

airport’s application and in December 2005 awarded a contract to a private 

screening contractor—a contractor currently providing screening services

at two of the five pilot program airports—that enabled this airport to 

transition from federal to private screeners in February 2006. The other 

airport withdrew its application. 

In November 2004, we reported on TSA’s preliminary efforts to allow 

airports to apply to use private screening contractors to perform 

passenger and checked baggage screening services through the SPP, and

how private screening contractors would compete to provide those 

services. We reported that key stakeholders we interviewed—private 

screening contractors, airport operators, and aviation associations—were 

concerned about several aspects of the program. Specifically, stakeholders

expressed concerns about liability protection—whether and to what 

extent private screening contractors and airports would be liable in the 

event that threat objects or weapons were not detected at passenger 

screening checkpoints or in checked baggage, leading to a terrorist 

incident. At issue was whether the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering 

Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (the SAFETY Act) would offer private 

screening contractors and airport operators federal protection from 

potential lawsuits arising out of or resulting from aviation-related acts of

terrorism.

2

 These stakeholders also were concerned about the degree of 

management control they would have over various aspects of screening 

services, including how roles and responsibilities would be divided among 

Federal Security Directors (FSD)3

 and their staff and private screening 

contractor managers and staff.4

In this report, we address (1) TSA’s and the Department of Homeland 

Security’s efforts to determine whether and how liability protection will be 

provided to private screening contractors and airports that participate in 

the SPP, and actions taken on other stakeholder concerns related to 

participation in the SPP; (2) how TSA has determined it will achieve costsavings goals for screener operations through the SPP, specifically with 

 2

Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 861-65, 116 Stat. 2135, 2238-42 (2002); 6 C.F.R. §§ 25.1-25.9 (2005). 

3

FSDs are the ranking TSA authorities responsible for leading and coordinating TSA 

security activities at the nation’s more than 440 commercial airports. 

4

GAO, Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow Airports

to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services, GAO-05-126 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 19, 2004). 

Page 2 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
respect to the choice of contract used, and contract terms; and (3) TSA’s 

progress in developing and implementing performance goals, measures, 

and targets to assess the performance of the private screening contractors 

who will participate in the SPP. 

To satisfy our objectives, we analyzed documentation related to TSA’s SPP 

and the 2-year private screener pilot program that preceded the SPP and 

interviewed various officials. Specifically, we interviewed 24 federal 

aviation officials within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

TSA, including FSDs at seven airports (the five pilot program airports and 

two airports that applied to participate in the SPP, namely, Elko Regional

Airport in Elko, Nevada, and Sioux Falls Regional Airport in Sioux Falls, 

South Dakota); airport operators at all five airports with private screeners 

and the private screening contractors at these airports; officials with the 

two airports that have applied to participate in the SPP; officials with two 

aviation associations that represent hundreds of airports, including many 

large commercial airports; and a major liability insurance provider. To 

determine how TSA responded to stakeholder concerns about liability 

protection and other issues related to participation in the SPP, we 

reviewed SPP program guidance developed for airports, the SAFETY Act, 

and related documents obtained from DHS. Additionally, we reviewed 

ATSA provisions related to the SPP and our related reports, and 

interviewed DHS officials about the SAFETY Act’s applicability to the SPP. 

To assess the status of TSA’s efforts to achieve cost-savings in screener 

operations through the SPP, we reviewed the contracts and pilot program 

extension contracts TSA executed with the current private screening 

contractors, TSA’s contracting policies and guidance, and the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation. We also reviewed an independent consultant’s 

study prepared for TSA that evaluated the costs of screening at 15 airports,

including all 5 pilot program airports. In addition, we interviewed TSA 

officials about their choice of contract type to award for the SPP. To 

assess TSA’s progress in developing and implementing performance goals

and measures to assess the performance of the private screening 

contractors that participate in the SPP, we reviewed TSA’s draft 

performance quality assurance surveillance and award fee plan for the 

SPP. We also reviewed our work on the Government Performance and 

Results Act (GPRA) and on TSA’s private sector screening pilot program 

and its efforts to implement the SPP. We also interviewed TSA officials 

about their efforts to develop performance goals, measures, and targets for 

the SPP. Additional information on our scope and methodology is 

contained in appendix I.

We conducted our work from March 2005 through March 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 3 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
DHS and Congress have begun to address whether and how liability 

protection may be offered to three of the four current private screening 

contractors (the fourth has not applied for coverage) and airports, at 

airports where private screeners are used. Specifically, DHS has provided 

contractors with some of the liability protections available under the 

SAFETY Act, including a limit on the damages a plaintiff may recover to 

the extent of the contractor’s insurance coverage.5

 DHS SAFETY Act 

officials stated that the department cannot provide the most extensive 

level of protection available under the SAFETY Act, rendering contractors 

virtually immune from all pertinent claims, because DHS cannot ascertain 

whether contractors are performing as intended—a criteria that the 

SAFETY Act requires before awarding such coverage. DHS officials stated 

they could not determine this because---as we discuss below---TSA has not 

yet finalized a standard of performance that would serve as the basis for 

DHS’s evaluation. While none of the private screening contractors we 

interviewed stated that the lack of this additional coverage would preclude 

their participation in the SPP, all four stated that some form of SAFETY 

Act coverage was an essential supplement to their commercial liability 

insurance policies. Regarding airport liability under the SPP, Congress has 

granted airports legal protection from lawsuits. Specifically, under the 

fiscal year 2006 DHS Appropriations Act, airport operators are shielded 

from virtually all liability resulting from the negligence or wrongdoing 

committed by a private screening company, its employees, or federal 

screeners. On an additional issue of concern to stakeholders—the 

screener hiring process—TSA has made an effort to improve this process 

by granting contractors and FSDs more input and flexibility in the process, 

such as providing two options for assessing screener candidates and 

conducting more frequent screener assessments. Although TSA made 

improvements to the hiring process, however, some stakeholders, as well 

as FSDs at airports with federal screeners, remain concerned about the 

timing of the assessments and the length of time the assessment process 

takes. Stakeholders also expressed concern about the roles and 

responsibilities of federal and private-sector staff at airports using private 

screeners. TSA has since defined roles for FSDs, their staff, and private 

screening contractors, among others, in its August 2005 SPP transition 

plan, though TSA has not communicated to or shared the details of the 

plan with private screening contractors. TSA headquarters officials stated 

that they presumed that FSDs had communicated this information to 

private screening contractors. Furthermore, TSA officials stated that they

communicated stakeholder roles in the SPP’s June 2004 guidance. 

Results in Brief 

 5

The SAFETY Act does not provide insurance; rather, sellers are required to purchase

liability insurance from the commercial market in an amount determined by DHS. 

Page 4 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
However, our review of the guidance found that it did not clearly delineate 

the roles and responsibilities of TSA airport staff and the private screening 

contractors. For example, the guidance did not provide any information on 

the roles and responsibilities of some TSA airport staff, such as screening 

managers and training coordinators, or clarify how their roles and 

responsibilities would differ from those of the private screening 

contractors. Additionally, the four private screening contractors we 

interviewed stated that the roles of TSA staff had not been clearly defined,

and 18 of 25 FSDs we interviewed in the past, as well as an independent 

consulting firm hired by TSA to assess the pilot program, have concurred.6

According to our standards for internal controls, agency management 

should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with external 

stakeholders on issues that may have a significant impact on the agency’s

ability to achieve its goals. By not sharing detailed information on the roles 

and authorities described in the SPP transition plan with private screening 

contractors, TSA may be missing an opportunity to support the effective 

performance and management of essential functions related to the 

screening process. TSA officials stated that they plan to clearly delineate 

roles and responsibilities of the FSD, FSD staff, and private screening 

contractors in future SPP contracts.

TSA has documented its intention that the SPP will operate at a cost that is

competitive with equivalent federal operations and will achieve costsavings where possible. TSA’s cost reimbursement-based contracts for 

screening services at four of the five airports currently using private 

screeners provide some cost incentives in the form of an award fee tied in

part to the contractor’s ability to achieve cost efficiencies and innovations. 

TSA could shift more cost risk from the government to the contractors, as 

federal acquisition policy suggests, by competitively awarding a different

type of contract—specifically, a fixed-price contract—which provides for 

a price based on the contractor’s cost experience and is not subject to any 

adjustment. To this end, TSA is in the process of awarding or planning to 

award fixed-price contracts to the contractors that will provide screening 

services at three of the four smallest airports that will participate in the 

SPP (and has already done so at the forth airport on a non-competitive 

basis). TSA officials stated that they cannot award this type of contract for 

screening services at larger airports for another 1 to 2 years because they

stated that they do not know the costs of screening at these airports. 

Officials stated that TSA would therefore be at greater risk of awarding a 

fixed-price contract for a higher cost than might actually be incurred. TSA 

 6

See GAO, Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of 

Federal Security Directors Is Needed, GAO-05-935 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005). 

Page 5 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
officials acknowledged that TSA had already identified and collected some 

cost and performance data on passenger and checked baggage screening 

operations at 15 airports with private and federal screeners, including all 

five pilot airports, and completed a study in 2004 that estimated how much 

TSA spent for screening operations at each of the five pilot screening 

program airports. However, they stated that additional cost information 

based on the actual costs of participating in the SPP is needed for larger 

airports because the SPP contracts differ from the pilot and extension 

contracts that TSA previously awarded. For example, the SPP contracts 

will allow for contractors to recommend and, if approved, implement 

innovations, and to select among options for assessing screener 

candidates and training screeners. TSA officials said that it would be 

difficult for prospective SPP contractors for larger airports to accurately

estimate the costs of providing screening services for a fixed-price 

contract. As a result, TSA plans to continue using cost-reimbursement 

contracts for screening services at the two largest airports for up to 

2 additional years in order to determine estimated costs under the SPP 

contracts. 

TSA developed performance goals and began drafting related measures 

and targets to assess the performance of private screening contractors 

under the SPP in the areas of security, customer service, costs, workforce 

management, and innovation. However, DHS, which is currently reviewing 

the performance goals, measures, and targets developed by TSA, has not 

yet completed its review nor set a time frame for doing so. According to 

TSA’s draft quality assurance and award fee plan for the SPP, 14 separate

performance measures have been established and performance targets—a 

tangible objective against which actual achievement will be compared—

have been developed for 10 of the 14 measures. For example, 1 of the 

14 measures would require contractors to ensure that new hires receive

required training before assuming screener duties. TSA’s related target for 

this measure is that 100 percent of new hires will receive required training. 

TSA officials stated that contractors will be required to meet the 

performance targets set by TSA specific to the airports they serve. 

Working with these airports, TSA stated that it has already established a 

baseline describing how federal screeners or private screening contractors 

have actually performed at individual airports, and these baseline data are

being used to set performance targets for each airport. Officials further 

stated that TSA is considering providing financial incentives to contractors 

for a limited time in an effort to move their airports to meet TSA’s baseline 

performance level. In March 2005, TSA officials stated that they had

recently submitted the performance goals, measures, and targets to DHS. 

However, as of January 30, 2006, DHS had not yet approved the SPP 

performance metrics, and had not set a deadline for doing so. We asked 

Page 6 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
TSA and DHS officials which office within DHS was responsible for 

approving these performance metrics, but the officials were not able to 

provide us with this information. Until these goals, measures and targets

are approved by DHS, TSA will not be able to implement performance 

measures to evaluate private screening contractors under the SPP. 

Further, these same measures and targets will be used by DHS to 

determine whether to award private screening contractors with 

certification status, the highest level of liability protection available under 

the SAFETY Act. Until the SPP measures and targets are finalized, DHS 

officials stated that they cannot determine whether contractors will 

perform as intended—a criterion that must be satisfied before awarding 

certification status. 

To help address stakeholder concerns, we are recommending that the 

Secretary of DHS direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to formally 

document and communicate to federal and private-sector stakeholders the 

roles and responsibilities for managing screener operations under the SPP. 

In addition, to help ensure the completion of a performance management 

framework for the SPP and to promote accountability of SPP contractors 

for achieving desired program outcomes, we recommend that the 

Secretary of DHS establish a time frame for completing its review of the 

performance goals, measures, and targets for the SPP so that TSA may 

apply them at the earliest possible opportunity. 

We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its 

written comments, generally concurred with our findings and 

recommendations and stated that efforts to implement our 

recommendations will help to develop a more effective, efficient, and 

economical administration of TSA’s SPP. The full text of DHS’s comments 

is included in appendix II. 

ATSA was enacted on November 19, 2001, in response to the September 

11, 2001, terrorist attacks. ATSA established the TSA and charged it with 

responsibility for strengthening security in all modes of transportation, 

including aviation. One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA 

was the shift from the use of private-sector screeners to perform airport 

screening operations to the use of federal screeners. Prior to ATSA, 

passenger and checked baggage screening had been performed by private 

screening companies under contract to airlines. ATSA required TSA to 

create a federal workforce to assume the job of conducting passenger and 

Background 

Statutory Provisions 

Related to SPP 

Page 7 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
checked baggage screening at commercial airports. The federal workforce 

was to be in place by November 2002. At the same time, ATSA mandated 

that TSA establish a 2-year pilot program using qualified private screening 

companies to screen passengers and checked baggage, with TSA 

oversight.7

 Pursuant to section 108 of ATSA, TSA selected five airports, 

one from each airport security category, to participate in the pilot 

program.8

 TSA also competitively selected four contractors (one 

contractor serves two airports) to conduct screening at the pilot airports. 

Table 1 lists the airports and private screening contractors that 

participated in the pilot program. 

Table 1: Airports That Participated in the 2-Year Private Screener Pilot Program 

Airport and location 

Security 

category Contractor

San Francisco International, Calif. X Covenant Aviation Security 

Kansas City International, Mo. I FirstLine Transportation Security 

Greater Rochester International, N.Y. II McNeil Security International

Jackson Hole Airport, Wyo. III Jackson Hole Airport Board 

Tupelo Airport, Miss. IV Covenant Aviation Security 

Source: TSA. 

Section 108 further permitted the more than 400 commercial airports using 

federal passenger and checked baggage screeners to apply to TSA to use 

private rather than federal screeners at the conclusion of the pilot.9

Beginning on November 19, 2004, all commercial airports with federal 

security screening became eligible to apply to opt-out of using federal 

screeners through the newly established SPP. An airport operator may 

submit to TSA an application to have the screening of passengers and 

checked baggage at an airport be carried out by the screening personnel of 

a qualified private screening company, under a contract entered into 

 7

The 2-year pilot concluded on November 18, 2004. For purposes of this report, we refer to 

these five airports as the pilot program airports. 

8

TSA classifies the over 400 commercial airports in the United States into one of five 

security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the total 

number of takeoffs and landings annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at 

the airport, and other special security considerations. In general, category X airports have 

the largest number of passenger boardings and category IV airports have the smallest. 

9

ATSA codified the requirements that TSA institute a pilot program at 49 U.S.C. § 44919 and 

that an opt-out option be available under the SPP at § 44920. 

Page 8 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
between the private screening contractor and TSA. In addition to assessing 

airport applications for using private screeners, as part of the SPP, TSA 

plans to select qualified private screening companies that apply and meet

ATSA and TSA requirements to conduct screening, including airports that 

seek to apply to serve as the private screening contractor. 

The five airports selected to participate in the pilot program have applied 

and been accepted to the SPP. TSA awarded, on a non-competitive basis, 

new extension contracts (that replaced the original pilot program 

contracts) to the incumbent private screening contractors at the five pilot

program airports effective November 19, 2004. The contracts enable the 

four private screening contractors to continue performing screening 

operations through May 18, 2006.10 As in the original pilot program 

contracts, the new contracts require private screening contractors to 

adhere to several ATSA provisions, including that: 

• the level of screening services and protection provided at the airport 

under the contract will be equal to or greater than the level that would 

be provided at the airport by federal government personnel; 

• the private screening company be owned and controlled by a citizen of 

the United States; 

• the private screening company, at a minimum, meet employment 

standards, compensation and benefits rates, and performance 

requirements that apply to federal screeners; and

• all private screener candidates meet the same minimum qualifications 

as federal screeners, including U.S. citizenship (or being a national of 

the United States), high school diploma or equivalent, English 

proficiency, and pass a criminal background check. 

TSA will make the final decision to approve any application submitted for 

participation in the SPP and reserves the right to consider airport specific

threat intelligence and an airport’s record of compliance with security 

regulations and security requirements to determine the timing of any 

transition to private screening. TSA may also impose a delay on when an 

airport can transition to private screening based on such factors as peak 

travel season and the total cost of providing screening services at an 

airport. 

 10The base period of these new contracts expired on September 30, 2005; an option period 

was exercised by TSA to extend them through May 18, 2006. 

Page 9 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
During the period November 2004 through January 2006, 7 out of the more 

than 400 commercial airports had applied to participate in the SPP. In 

addition to the five airports that participated in the pilot program, as of 

January 30, 2006, two additional airports that did not participate in the

pilot program had applied to use private screeners—Elko Regional Airport 

in Nevada and Sioux Falls Regional Airport in South Dakota.11 However, 

after discussions with TSA officials, Elko Regional Airport submitted a 

letter to TSA on September 30, 2005, seeking to withdraw its application 

on the grounds that the City of Elko could not qualify as a private 

screening company, thereby mooting its intention that the airport would 

serve as the contractor.12 On October 17, 2005, TSA replied back to Elko, 

acknowledging Elko’s withdrawal of its application to participate in the 

SPP. Table 2 provides information on the two airports that applied to the 

SPP, as of January 2006.

Applicants to the SPP as of 

January 2006 

Table 2: Non-Pilot Program Airports That Applied to Use Private Screeners to Conduct Screening Operations from November

2004 through January 2006 

Selected airport characteristics Elko Regional Airport Sioux Falls Regional Airport 

Security category III II

Screeners authorized in FY 2005a 17 37

Application date November 2004 April 2005 

Reason for applying To act as provider of private screening 

services to achieve cost-savings and staff 

efficiencies. 

To have a private screening company 

provide screening services to enhance 

customer service. 

Status of application Application withdrawn Application approved and contract awarded

Source: TSA. 

a

The number of screeners authorized is based on full-time equivalents (FTE). One FTE is equal to 

1 work year or 2,080 non-overtime hours. 

 11Elko Regional Airport applied with the intention of serving directly as a private screening 

contractor. Sioux Falls Regional Airport applied to have screening carried out separately by

a private screening contractor. 

12TSA interprets “private screening company,” as utilized in 49 U.S.C. § 44920, to exclude

public companies that do not possess the attributes of a private company or corporation 

and that are not independent from the city or county in which it operates. TSA officials

stated that under this interpretation, affiliates established by airports to provide private 

screening services cannot compete for and obtain screening contracts let by TSA if TSA 

determines that they do not possess the above attributes. TSA officials also stated that 

whether or not an airport qualifies as a private screening company depends upon a case-bycase factual analysis as well as the application of state law. 

Page 10 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
We did not attempt to identify the reasons that only 7 of more than 

400 commercial airports that were eligible to participate in the SPP had 

submitted an application. However, in our November 2004 report on the

SPP, we reported that of the 26 airport operators we interviewed, 20 said 

their airport would not apply to participate in the SPP in the first year of 

the program, 5 were uncertain whether to apply for the 2004 cycle, and 

1 said his airport planned to apply, but only for its international passenger

terminal.13 Among the 20, 16 said they were satisfied with federal screeners 

or did not see any benefit to applying to participate in the SPP and 13 cited 

concerns about airport liability in the event of a terrorist attack.14

In May 2005, TSA approved the SPP application for the Sioux Falls airport, 

and in December 2005, TSA awarded a contract for passenger and checked 

baggage screening services at Sioux Falls to a private screening 

contractor. In February 2006, this award enabled Sioux Falls airport to 

transition from TSA federal screeners to private screeners employed by 

the contractor. According to the contractor, it will use 30 FTEs, 7 less than 

TSA’s screener allocation for Sioux Falls airport, without compromising 

security or customer service. The contractor expects to achieve 

operational efficiencies and cost savings for its screening operations at 

this airport due to the reduction in FTEs.15 

In addition, during February 2006, TSA awarded a contract to a private

screening contractor at one of the five pilot program airports.16 TSA is in 

the process of awarding contracts to the remaining four airports that 

applied to use private screeners. As of February 28, 2006, TSA received

proposals from private screening companies for the Greater Rochester 

International, Tupelo, Kansas City, and San Francisco International 

airports. TSA also released the request for proposals for San Francisco 

International airport. 

 13The 26 airport operators we interviewed do not include the 7 airport operators that

applied to participate in the SPP.

14GAO-05-126. 

15We did not verify that the contractor is actually using seven fewer FTEs than TSA’s 

screener allocation for Sioux Falls. 

16At the time we interviewed this contractor, TSA had not awarded the contract to conduct 

private screening in the SPP. Thus, the contractor’s responses are based on its experiences 

prior to this contract award. 

Page 11 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
TSA also approved 34 private screening companies for listing on a 

qualified vendors list, which identifies that these companies are eligible to

perform passenger and checked baggage screening services in the SPP. 

DHS’s fiscal year 2006 appropriations provides nearly $2.54 billion to fund 

the screener workforce—about $2.4 billion for federal passenger and 

checked baggage screener full-time equivalents17 and an additional 

$139.6 million to pay for screening contractors at the five pilot program 

airports. In accordance with its appropriations, TSA plans to fund the SPP

from the same budget line item as federal screening operations to provide 

flexibility on the number of airports that can participate in the program. In 

this manner, the costs for contracts with private screening contractors are 

to be funded by the cost of the federal operations that are being displaced.

The SAFETY Act, enacted as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

offers liability and other protections to sellers of qualified anti-terrorism 

technologies.18 According to DHS, services, such as screening services, are

eligible to receive liability protection under the SAFETY Act if designated 

as qualified anti-terrorism technologies, thus limiting liability risks for the 

private screening contractor and its subcontractors, suppliers, vendors, 

and customers.19 SAFETY Act protection pertains to “claims arising out of, 

relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism” where qualified antiterrorism technologies have been deployed.20 According to DHS, the 

SAFETY Act reflects the intent of Congress to ensure that the threat of 

liability does not deter the potential manufacturers or sellers of antiterrorism technologies from developing and commercializing technologies 

that could significantly reduce the risks or mitigate the effects of largeOverview of TSA Budget 

for SPP 

Overview of the SAFETY 

Act 

 17A statute caps the number of full-time equivalent screeners available to TSA at 45,000. See 

Pub. No. 109-90, 119 Stat. 2064, 2070 (2005). According to TSA, this cap does not include 

screeners at the five pilot program airports. 

18Aside from its liability protections, the SAFETY Act limits the types of damages available 

to a plaintiff and establishes the venue in which a plaintiff may raise such claims. 

19The amount of liability will be capped at an amount equal to the level of insurance DHS 

requires the service contractor to purchase. 

20DHS only recognizes an anti-terrorism technology as a “qualified antiterrorism

technology” if designated under the SAFETY Act, which requires that DHS evaluate the 

technology against criteria set out in § 862 (b) the act. 

Page 12 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
scale acts of terrorism.21 The SAFETY Act does not offer indemnification 

(compensation for losses incurred) to sellers of qualified anti-terrorism 

technology but rather limits, and in some instances may completely bar,

claims brought against sellers of anti-terrorism technologies that have 

been deployed in defense against or response or recovery from a terrorist 

incident.22 If a seller of a potential anti-terrorism technology wishes to be 

awarded SAFETY Act protections, the seller must formally apply to the 

department using the forms provided by DHS, furnish the entire requisite 

supporting data and information, and successfully demonstrate 

compliance with the act’s requirements. 

Types of Contracts

Awarded by TSA 

TSA awarded one of two types of contracts for extending contractor 

performance at the five pilot program airports. Both these types of 

contracts were awarded on a non-competitive basis to the private 

screening contractors. TSA awarded the first type of contract—cost-plusaward-fee contracts (a type of cost-reimbursement contract)—to the four 

private screening contractors providing screening services at four of the 

five pilot program airports. These contracts, which are generally used 

when the costs are not known, provide for payment of allowable incurred 

costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract. A cost-plus-award-fee 

contract provides for a fee consisting of (1) a base amount that is a 

percentage of the estimated cost fixed at inception of the contract and 

(2) an award amount that the contractor may earn in whole or in part 

during the contract period and that is sufficient to provide motivation for

excellence in such areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and 

cost-effective management. The actual award amount is based upon an 

evaluation by TSA compared against criteria spelled out in the contract. 

This determination and the methodology for determining the award fee are 

unilateral decisions made solely at the discretion of the government. 

TSA awarded the second type of contract—a fixed-price-award-fee 

contract—to one private screening contractor. This type of contract is 

generally used when the requirements are reasonably known and a 

reasonable basis for firm pricing by the contractor exits. A fixed-price 

 21The SAFETY Act defines “act of terrorism” as an unlawful act causing harm to a person,

property or entity in the United States (or, in the case of a domestic U.S. air carrier, in or 

outside the U.S.) by using or attempting to use instrumentalities, weapons or other

methods designed or intended to cause mass destruction, injury or other loss to citizens or 

institutions of the United States. 

22According to DHS, the SAFETY Act does not limit liability for harm caused by antiterrorism technologies when no act of terrorism has occurred. 

Page 13 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
award fee contract establishes a fixed price (including normal profit) for 

the effort, which will be paid for satisfactory contract performance, and an 

award fee. The award fee earned (if any) will be paid in addition to that 

fixed-price based on periodic evaluations of the contractor’s performance 

against an award-fee plan. TSA awarded a fixed-price-award-fee contract 

to a private screening contractor at Tupelo airport, a security category IV 

airport, the smallest airport. 

According to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which generally

governs federal government procurement activities, the negotiation of 

contract type and price (or estimated cost and fee) should result in 

reasonable contractor risk and provide the contractor with the greatest 

incentive for efficient and economical performance.23A firm-fixed-price 

contract, which best utilizes the basic profit motive of a business 

enterprise, shall be used when the contractor risk involved is minimal or 

can be predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty. The FAR provides 

that when a reasonable basis for firm pricing does not exist, other contract 

types (such as cost reimbursement) should be considered, and 

negotiations should be directed toward selecting a contract type that will 

appropriately tie profit to contractor performance.24 As a service continues 

to be contracted over time, however, and after experience provides a basis 

for firmer pricing, the FAR advises that cost risk should shift to the 

contractor and a fixed-price contract should be considered.25 The FAR 

specifically states that contracting officers should avoid protracted use of

a cost-reimbursement contract after experience provides a basis for firmer 

pricing. Additionally, under the FAA acquisition policy followed by TSA, 

“[t]he use of fixed-price contracts is strongly encouraged whenever 

appropriate.”

26 

 23FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 16.103. TSA is exempt from the FAR and most acquisition laws. Instead, 

ATSA directed TSA to adopt the Federal Aviation Administration’s acquisition management

system and authorized TSA to modify it as appropriate. 49 U.S.C. § 114(o) (Supp. II 2002). 

The FAA's management system, which establishes policy, processes, and guidance for all 

aspects of the acquisition life cycle, and authorized TSA to modify it as appropriate. See 49 

U.S.C. § 114(o). The acquisition laws from which FAA is exempt are listed at 49 U.S.C. § 

40110(d)(2). While TSA is exempt from the FAR, the FAR provides useful guidance for our

analysis of TSA’s contracting approach. The SPP transition plan states that the criteria 

contained in FAR, and the size of the airport choosing to apply to use private screeners,

dictate the type of contract vehicle.

24FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 16.103(b). 

25FAR, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.103(c), 16.104(d). 

26FAA Acquisition Management System policy 3.2.4.2.

Page 14 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
DHS awarded some of the liability protections available under the 

SAFETY Act to three of the four private screening contractors that applied 

for it and stated that it will decide the status of future applications on a 

case-by-case basis in accordance with criteria described in the act. 

However, DHS cannot award the most extensive level of protection under 

the SAFETY Act, certification status, until it can determine whether 

contractors will perform as intended—a criterion that must be satisfied 

before awarding such coverage. DHS officials stated that DHS has not 

been able to award SAFETY Act certification status to contractors because

TSA has not yet finalized performance standards for assessing whether 

contractors have performed as intended. While all four current screening

contractors we interviewed stated that SAFETY Act protection was 

important, they did not state that they would be unwilling to participate in

the SPP without certification under the SAFETY Act. For example, one 

contractor said it had too much time and money invested in providing 

private screening services to not participate in the SPP. Congress has since 

granted legal protection from lawsuits to all airports where TSA conducts 

or oversees passenger and checked baggage screening. Specifically, the 

fiscal year 2006 DHS appropriations act shields airports from, among other 

things, virtually all liability related to negligence or wrongdoing by private 

screening contractors, their employees, or federal screeners. In addition, 

TSA made an effort to improve the screener hiring process by granting

contractors and FSDs more input and flexibility in the hiring process, 

though some contractors, as well as FSDs at airports with federal 

screeners, remain concerned about the timing of the assessments and the 

length of time the assessment process takes. TSA has also taken steps to 

clarify SPP roles and responsibilities between federal and private sectors,

but the four private screening contractors we interviewed still had 

questions about the roles and responsibilities of TSA staff at the airports 

they served.

Officials at DHS’ Science and Technology Division stated that all antiterrorism technologies submitted to the department for protection under 

the SAFETY Act are evaluated—including screener services—on a caseby-case basis, in accordance with the criteria defined by the act’s twotiered protection status, as follows: 

Designation status. Designation status protects a seller of anti-terrorism 

technology in the event the technology fails to thwart an act of terrorism 

by limiting the type and amount of damages a plaintiff may recover such

that a seller’s potential liability cannot exceed the amount of insurance 

DHS and Congress 

Have Begun to 

Address Liability 

Protection Issue at 

Airports Using Private 

Screeners, but 

Stakeholder Concerns 

about Liability and 

Other Program Issues 

Remain 

DHS Has Provided 

SAFETY Act Protection to 

Three of the Four Current 

Private Screening 

Contractors and Will 

Decide Future Coverage 

on a Case-by-Case Basis 

Page 15 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
coverage maintained by the seller.27 To receive designation status, antiterrorism technologies, including screening services, must be evaluated by

DHS against the seven criteria set out in the SAFETY Act: (1) prior U.S. 

government use or demonstrated substantial utility and effectiveness; 

(2) availability of the technology for immediate deployment in public and

private settings; (3) existence of extraordinarily large or unquantifiable 

risk of exposing the seller or other provider of such anti-terrorism 

technology to potential liability; (4) substantial likelihood that the 

technology will not be deployed unless the risk management protections

of the SAFETY Act (limited liability) are conferred; (5) the magnitude of 

risk to the public if the technology is not deployed; (6) evaluation of all 

scientific studies that can be feasibly conducted to assess the capability of

the technology to substantially reduce risks of harm; and (7) anti-terrorism 

technology that would be effective in facilitating the defense against acts 

of terrorism, including technologies that prevent, defeat or respond to 

such acts.28

Certification status. Once designated, qualified anti-terrorism 

technologies become eligible for certification under the SAFETY Act, 

which gives the seller the legal status of a government contractor and 

renders the seller virtually immune from any claims that might arise in the 

event the technology fails to thwart an act of terrorism, provided the seller 

does not act fraudulently or with willful misconduct in submitting 

information to DHS.29 To certify, DHS must determine if the qualified antiterrorism technology will (1) perform as intended, (2) conform to the 

 27Qualifying for protection under the SAFETY Act requires that the seller obtain liability 

insurance at a level determined by DHS to satisfy otherwise compensable third-party

claims but that would not exceed the maximum amount of liability insurance reasonably 

available from private sources at prices and terms that will not unreasonably distort the 

sale price of the seller’s antiterrorism technology. The SAFETY Act does not provide 

insurance; rather, sellers are required to purchase liability insurance from the commercial 

market in an amount determined by DHS.

28According to DHS, the department applies the criteria flexibly, assigning different weights

depending on the circumstances, and may consider additional relevant facts if necessary. 

29The United States Supreme Court, in Boyle v United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 

(1987), articulated the “government contractor defense,” which, in general and in certain 

circumstances, shields government contractors from liability for design defects in 

equipment if (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications, (2) the 

equipment conformed to those specifications, and (3) the supplier warned the United 

States about dangers in the use of the equipment known to the supplier but not to the

United States. The SAFETY Act essentially codifies and makes applicable the government 

contractor defense to sellers of certified qualified anti-terrorism technologies that have

been deployed in defense against or response or recovery from and act of terrorism and 

from which claims that result or may result in loss to the seller arise. 

Page 16 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
seller’s specifications, and (3) be safe for use as intended. Certification 

status cannot be awarded unless these three criteria have been met. DHS 

places certified anti-terrorism technologies and services on an Approved 

Product List for Homeland Security.30

DHS determined that the four private screening contractors serving the

five pilot program airports were eligible for SAFETY Act protection. Once 

this determination was made, after November 2004, three of the four 

current private screening contractors applied for and were provided 

designation status under the SAFETY Act.31 Contractors that apply to the 

SPP in the future are to be evaluated individually, as their applications to

the program are processed. TSA awarded a contract for private screening 

services at Sioux Falls and Jackson Hole airports. The status of SAFETY 

Act coverage for these airports, if the contractors apply for coverage, will 

be determined at a later point in time. 

Contractors’ Concerns 

about Liability Not Yet 

Resolved 

As of January 2006, one issue pertaining to how the SAFETY Act would be 

applied to contractors remained unresolved and is a cause for concern for 

one of the four contractors we interviewed. Specifically, DHS officials 

stated that they have not been able to award SAFETY Act certification 

status to contractors because TSA has not yet finalized performance 

standards for assessing whether contractors have performed as intended.

DHS SAFETY Act officials stated that once TSA finalizes its performance 

standards, the contractors that previously received designation status may 

submit an application for SAFETY Act certification. The application is to 

include evidence demonstrating that they are meeting the TSA-defined 

performance standards. DHS will evaluate the material submitted by the 

applicant against the TSA standards. According to DHS officials, assuming 

the applicant is able to demonstrate that it is performing as TSA intends, 

there should be no impediment to granting certification. When the three 

contractors that already have SAFETY Act designation status were asked 

to comment on whether they would continue to participate in the SPP 

without certification status, two contractors told us they would. One of 

these two contractors said it had too much time and money invested in 

providing private screening services to not participate in the SPP. The 

 30Technologies and services designated for protection pursuant to this evaluation become 

known as “qualified anti-terrorism technologies.” Only qualified anti-terrorism technologies

are eligible for certification. 

31One of the four current private screening contractors—Jackson Hole Airport Board—has

not applied for SAFETY Act protection. 

Page 17 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
third contractor said that its company’s $50 million in general liability 

insurance coverage excludes acts of terrorism,32 thus the company 

believed it “would remain exposed to serious liability concerns related to 

terrorist threats [or] risks.” This contractor did not, however, explicitly

state that it would not participate in the SPP going forward, if certification 

status were not awarded. 

In general, contractors may offset potential liability arising from acts of 

terrorism by purchasing commercially available liability insurance.33 Two 

of the four private screening contractors currently under contract to TSA 

purchased insurance policies that protect them from acts of terrorism. 

Both contractors stated that their policies were inadequate to cover the 

liability resulting from a major terrorism attack and that SAFETY Act 

protection was, therefore, additionally necessary to provide protection to

the contractor.34 As to the importance of SAFETY Act protection to 

potential future participants in the SPP, in November 2004, we reported 

that five of six prospective SPP private screening contractors we 

interviewed—those not currently serving airports—stated that the issue of 

whether they would receive liability protection was important and would 

greatly affect whether they would participate in the SPP if selected by TSA 

as a qualified contractor.

35 In addition, officials with two aviation 

associations representing hundreds of airports, whom we interviewed, 

stated that their members believed that SAFETY Act protection—both 

designation and certification—was necessary for contractors to 

participate in the SPP. 

 32This policy reportedly excludes acts of terrorism, such as “any act of one or more 

persons, whether or not agents of a sovereign power, for political or terrorist purposes and 

whether the loss or damage therefrom is accidental or intentional.” 

33According to TSA, the premiums paid for insurance are considered an allowable cost for

reimbursement under the contracts, assuming the costs are reasonable and allocable in 

accordance with TSA cost principles. 

34The two contractors purchased insurance without the protections of the SAFETY Act or 

the promise of indemnification at the time of purchase. 

35According to TSA, the premiums paid for insurance are considered an allowable cost for

reimbursement under the contracts, assuming the costs are reasonable and allocable in 

accordance with TSA cost principles. 

Page 18 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
The status of SAFETY Act coverage for airports, and liability coverage in 

general for airports using private screeners, differs from coverage for 

contractors. While DHS has determined that contractors performing 

screening services are eligible to receive liability protection under the 

SAFETY Act, the department has not determined whether airports that do 

not perform screening services are eligible for liability coverage under the 

act. In October 2005, however, Congress enacted legislation that granted 

airports legal protection from lawsuits. Specifically, section 547 of the 

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, shields 

airport operators from virtually all liability relating to the airport 

operator’s decision on whether or not to apply to opt-out of using federal

screening, and any acts of negligence, gross negligence, or intentional 

wrongdoing by either a qualified private screening company under 

contract to DHS, its employees, or by a federal screener.36 Prior to the 

enactment of this act, three of the seven airport operators we interviewed 

expressed concerns about whether the government would extend liability 

protection to them.37 They were concerned that if a security incident arose 

that resulted in litigation, they may become a party to a lawsuit. Officials 

with two aviation associations, whom we also interviewed at that time, 

also expressed concerns about airport liability. After the enactment of the 

2006 appropriations act, one of the three airport operators that had 

expressed concerns about liability told us that the protection available 

under section 547 of the act had addressed its concerns about its airport’s 

liability. A second airport operator that we contacted after enactment of 

section 547 had not yet reviewed the provision and stated that it could not 

confirm whether its airport would be protected from liability.38

DHS Appropriations Act 

Addresses Airports’ 

Concerns about Liability 

Exposure Issue 

 36Codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44920(g). This provision does not relieve an airport operator from 

liability for its own acts or omissions related to its security responsibilities. 

37The seven airports include the five airports that participated in the pilot program and the 

two airports that applied to the SPP, but did not participate in the pilot program. One of the 

two airports that did not participate in the pilot program, Elko Regional Airport, has since 

withdrawn its application to the SPP. 

38We did not ask the third airport operator whether the 2006 appropriations act had

addressed its concerns about liability because it had withdrawn its application. 

Page 19 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
TSA made an effort to improve the screener hiring process by granting

contractors and FSDs more input and flexibility in the hiring process, 

including more frequent assessments of screener candidates and two 

options for performing these assessments. Prior to November 2004, TSA 

had scheduled candidate assessment forums on a regional basis 1 to 

2 times a year to evaluate a pool of candidates interested in screener 

positions. At that time, private screening contractors, like FSDs at airports 

with federal screeners, had to rely on TSA to authorize the hiring of 

screeners and establish candidate assessment forums—a process that 

could take several months.39 Beginning in November 2004, as part of the 

contract extensions, TSA began requiring the pilot program private 

screening contractors to submit annual hiring plans to TSA for review, 

indicating their anticipated screener staffing needs. The intention was to 

use this information to plan for more frequent and timely screener 

assessments conducted regionally and locally—up to 6 times a year. 

Despite TSA’s planned increase in the frequency of assessments, private 

screening contractors, as well as FSDs at airports with federal screeners, 

remain concerned about their inability to conduct hiring on an as needed 

basis because TSA still controls the scheduling of assessment forums.40

One contractor, for example, stated that despite the scheduling of more 

frequent assessment forums, it still could not fully implement its hiring 

plan because the assessments did not necessarily coincide with its hiring 

periods. 

TSA Granted Private 

Screening Contractors 

Flexibility in Hiring 

Process, but Contractor 

Concerns Remain 

In response to contractor concerns about the candidate assessment 

process, in November 2004, TSA began allowing private screening 

contractors two options for evaluating screener candidates:41 

 39At these forums, screener candidates undergo a credentialing process consisting of a 

series of physical and mental exams, drug tests, and a preliminary background check,

among other things. 

40Concerns about the screener hiring process are shared by some FSDs at airports using 

federal screeners. In our September 2005 report on the ability of FSDs to address airport

security needs, we reported that most of the 25 FSDs interviewed were satisfied with TSA’s

hiring process, which provided more options for FSDs to be involved in hiring screeners,

and most stated that the hiring process in place was better than the centralized process 

that existed previously. Nevertheless, 7 of the 25 FSDs said they were not satisfied because, 

among other things, the hiring process continues to take too long. See our report 

GAO-05-935. 

41TSA officials said they are working on two additional options for contractors to assess

screener candidates and will notify contractors when the options are available so that

contractors may submit a proposal to change the option they selected. 

Page 20 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
• Option 1: Contractors may draw screener candidates from a pool 

developed by a private company under contract with TSA, which is 

responsible for assessing potential screener candidates. This company 

administers a computer-based aptitude test, mental and physical tests, 

and conducts background checks at regional assessment centers. The 

contractor is under no obligation to accept these applicants.

• Option 2: Contractors may use TSA’s assessment company for the 

aptitude test alone, and develop and implement additional assessment 

activities on their own, provided they meet ATSA requirements and 

TSA guidance.

42

According to TSA officials, all four private screening contractors have 

selected from these two options for hiring screeners. The contractors’ 

views about the hiring process were mixed. For example, one contractor 

we interviewed said that because TSA has allowed it to conduct its own 

assessments, the length of the entire assessment process has been reduced 

from several months to 2 weeks. This contractor, which was using option 

two, is now conducting key parts of the assessment process. According to

this contractor, its use of option two has resulted in a more efficient, 

effective, and significantly less costly process. A second contractor using 

option two stated that it had established a new hire recruitment, 

assessment, and training program. According to this contractor, its use of 

option two has resulted in its ability to identify more qualified screener 

candidates, improve screener retention, and fill screener vacancies on an 

as needed basis. However, the other two contractors remained concerned

about the length of time the assessment process lasts. One of these 

contractors stated that the duration of the process was still so long that 

potential screeners found other jobs first and dropped out of 

consideration. This contractor, which was using option two, proposed 

using FSD staff to conduct the assessments to streamline and shorten the 

assessment process. 43 According to TSA officials, TSA did not accept this 

suggestion because TSA’s Office of Human Resources determined it would 

have been too costly to allow FSD staff to conduct the assessments. TSA 

officials stated that they offered the contractor the same assessment 

options that are available to all airports with federal screeners. Officials 

 42These guidelines describe working conditions that passenger and checked baggage 

screeners must be willing and able to function in, physical requirements of the job (lifting 

heavy objects, for example), and a requirement that applicants successfully complete a

background investigation. 

43At the time we interviewed the contractors, the remaining contractor was using option 

one. 

Page 21 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
further stated that they will continue to examine all aspects of the 

assessment process in an effort to offer greater efficiency and flexibility in

screener hiring for both federal and contract screeners. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to 

Clarify SPP Roles and 

Responsibilities between 

Federal and Private 

Sectors, but Questions 

about Division of Labor 

Remain 

While TSA has defined the roles and responsibilities for FSDs, FSD staff, 

and private screening contractors, among others, in its August 2005 SPP 

transition plan, the details contained in this plan have not been

communicated to or shared with private screening contractors.44 TSA and 

SPP procurement officials stated that they consider the transition plan to 

be an internal document that TSA does not intend to distribute outside of

the agency. However, officials stated that the information on roles and 

responsibilities under the SPP would be available to prospective private 

screening contractors as part of the SPP contracting process. Additionally, 

TSA SPP officials stated that they presumed that FSDs had communicated 

this information to the current private screening contractors. Further, TSA 

officials stated that TSA’s June 2004 guidance on the SPP provides 

information on roles and responsibilities of SPP stakeholders. However, 

our review of the guidance found that it did not clearly delineate the roles

and responsibilities of TSA airport staff and the private screening 

contractors. For example, the guidance did not include any information on 

the roles and responsibilities of some TSA airport staff, such as screening 

managers and training coordinators, and did not clarify how their roles 

and responsibilities would differ from those of the private screening 

contractors. Additionally, the four private screening contractors we 

interviewed had questions about the roles and responsibilities of TSA staff 

at the airports they served, including screening managers and stated that, 

in their view, TSA had not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of 

TSA staff at airports participating in the SPP.45 When asked whether FSD 

and FSD staff roles and responsibilities were clear, one contractor stated 

that he did not believe that TSA had recognized that the roles of training 

managers and screening managers at airports using federal or private 

screeners are different. A second contractor stated that, in his view, TSA 

had not standardized the roles and responsibilities of TSA airport staff 

across the five airports currently using private screeners. Similarly, a third 

 44TSA provided an early draft of the transition plan to the FSD and FSD staff at four of the

five pilot program airports. 

45Screening managers at airports with federal screeners are responsible for (1) managing

screener operations; (2) ensuring quality and consistency of screening procedures; 

(3) scheduling screening personnel to screening operations; (4) managing overall screening 

work force issues; (5) managing external relationships; and (6) interpreting technical 

aspects of TSA policies, regulations, and directives. 

Page 22 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
contractor stated that TSA roles and responsibilities need to be more welldefined, particularly the role of FSD airport staff and TSA local contract 

staff. Finally, the fourth contractor stated that the separation of roles and

responsibilities has been a major challenge on a daily basis in part because

TSA staff at screening checkpoints assert control and impose operational 

changes at the checkpoints—tasks that the contractor believes it is 

responsible for, rather than TSA staff. This contractor identified the need

for TSA to clearly define the roles of the various stakeholders involved in

the SPP and to establish guidelines on TSA’s oversight and regulatory 

responsibilities at airports participating in the SPP. 

In September 2005, in reporting on the ability of FSDs to address airport 

security needs, we stated that TSA airport stakeholders (including airport 

operators)46 at some of the airports we visited stated that the FSD’s role 

was not sufficiently clear, and at least one stakeholder at every airport we 

visited said such information had never been communicated to them.47 We

recommended that DHS direct TSA to communicate the authority of the 

FSD position, as warranted, to FSDs and all airport stakeholders. In 

response, TSA agreed to update the role of the FSD and communicate this 

information to airport stakeholders. As of December 2005, however, TSA 

had not yet implemented this recommendation, but stated that the matter 

is being considered by a TSA steering committee. In addition, a consulting

firm that evaluated the private screening pilot program in April 2004

recommended that TSA clearly delineate the roles and responsibilities 

among federal and private screening managers and their staff and include 

this information in its contracts with the private screening contractors. 

Based on our review of the June 2004 guidance on the SPP and the 

contracts awarded to the current private screening contractors in 

November 2004, TSA had not included this information. TSA officials 

stated that they plan to clearly delineate roles and responsibilities of the 

FSD, FSD staff, and private screening contractors in the forthcoming SPP 

contracts. 

According to our standards for internal controls, agency management 

should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with external 

stakeholders on issues that may have a significant impact on the agency’s

 46Airport stakeholders interviewed for this report were airport managers, airport law

enforcement, station managers representing air carriers, and FBI airport liaison airports, 

among others. 

47GAO-05-935. 

Page 23 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
ability to achieve its goals.48 By not sharing detailed information on roles, 

responsibilities, and authorities described in the SPP transition plan with 

all FSDs and private screening contractors, TSA may be missing an 

opportunity to support the effective performance and management of 

essential functions related to the screening process. Additionally, without

clear and specific information on roles and responsibilities under the SPP, 

it may be difficult for prospective SPP contractors to develop an informed 

estimate of the costs of providing screener services. 

Through its contracts, TSA offers the private screening contractors some 

incentives to decrease costs. Specifically, TSA’s cost reimbursement 

contracts for screening services at four of the five airports currently using 

private screeners provide some incentives in the form of an award fee tied

in part to the contractor’s ability to achieve cost efficiencies and 

innovations. However, despite TSA’s use of cost-savings as a basis for a 

portion of the award fees, opportunities for government cost-savings may 

be limited because under the cost-reimbursement contracts the 

government bears most of the cost risk—the risk of paying more than it 

expected. TSA plans to shift more cost risk to contractors by competitively 

awarding fixed-price-award fee contracts for screening services at the four 

smallest airports that will participate in the SPP. TSA officials said they 

also plan to competitively award fixed-price contracts for screening 

services at larger airports, but will not do so for another 1 to 2 years—

when they believe that screening costs at larger airports will be better 

known. 

TSA expects that the SPP will operate at a cost that is competitive with 

equivalent federal operations and will achieve cost-savings, where 

possible. However, opportunities for cost savings are somewhat limited 

because of various requirements that contractors must meet in performing 

the contract. Specifically, under ATSA, private screening companies must 

provide compensation and other benefits to contract screeners at a level 

not less than that provided to federal screeners.49 Further, the contracts 

require that contractors ensure that security checkpoints are staffed in 

accordance with TSA’s standard operating procedures and other 

TSA Provides Some 

Incentives to 

Contractors to 

Achieve Cost-Savings 

and Plans to Shift 

More Cost Risk to 

Contractors at Larger 

Airports in 1 to 2 

Years

TSA Plans to Transition 

from Cost-Reimbursement 

to Fixed-Priced Contracts, 

but Stated That an 

Additional 1 to 2 Years Was 

Needed to Do So at Larger 

Airports 

 48GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

49Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 108, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44919(f) (screening pilot program) and 

49 U.S.C. § 44920(c) (opt-out program). 

Page 24 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
government requirements and that the screeners have the qualifications 

and training established by the government. While these government 

airport security standards must be met, TSA has structured its existing 

contracts to provide some incentives to contractors for cost savings. 

Specifically, over the last 3 years, TSA has awarded cost-reimbursement 

contracts with an award fee component for screening services at four of 

the five airports currently using private screeners.50 These contracts 

provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed 

in the contract (typically up to a specified cost ceiling). In addition, the 

government also agrees to award a separate amount (base fee) fixed at 

inception of the contract and an award amount (award fee) that the 

contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance that is 

sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such areas as quality, 

technical approach, and cost-effective management. The amount of the 

award fee to be paid is determined by the government’s judgmental 

evaluation of the contractor’s performance in terms of the criteria stated 

in the contract. 

Because cost-savings and contract management account for 20 percent of 

the award fee determination for the current screening services contracts, 

these contracts do provide some incentive for contractor cost efficiency. 

Specifically, the award fee plan establishes the expectation that 

contractors will provide screening services with cost efficiencies and 

innovation, while meeting the security standards, mission objectives, and 

compensation levels required by ATSA and TSA, respectively.

51 These cost 

and contract management factors include: 

• Overtime/personnel costs-–evaluates the contractor’s ability to control 

overtime and personnel costs. 

• Innovation/continuous improvement-–evaluates the contractor’s ability 

to build on previous experiences/accomplishments and utilize 

innovative approaches, techniques and tools. 

• Other direct/indirect cost

52-–evaluates the contractor’s ability to control 

direct labor cost and overtime costs and its ability to effectively 

 50All five contracts awarded to private screening contractors to date were awarded and

extended as part of the original private screener pilot program, not as part of the SPP. 

51According to TSA, contractors must ensure that security checkpoints are staffed in 

accordance with TSA’s standard operating procedures and other government requirements, 

and that screeners meet government qualifications and training requirements. 

52Indirect costs include the contractor’s overhead costs. 

Page 25 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
manage its subcontract costs through use of competition to the 

greatest extent practicable and through documented cost analysis 

substantiating the reasonableness of subcontract costs. Indirect cost 

control evaluates the contractor’s ability to control its indirect costs.53

Despite TSA’s use of cost-savings as a basis for a portion of the award 

fees, opportunities for government cost-savings may be limited in part 

because under the cost-reimbursement contracts the government bears 

most of the cost risk—the risk of paying more than it expected. 

Specifically, under cost-reimbursement contracts, the government must 

reimburse the contractor for all allowable costs as provided in the 

contract. TSA plans to shift most cost risk to its contractors by moving to 

a fixed-price-award fee contract in the next 1 to 2 years. A fixed-price type

of contract places upon the contractor the maximum risk and full 

responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss, providing maximum 

incentive for the contractor to control costs and perform efficiently. 

Further, in a competitive environment, pricing by contractors for a fixedprice contract would be subject to marketplace pressures that would 

provide incentives for the contractor to control costs and reduce prices in

order to win the contract. The award fee component of a fixed-price 

contract is used to motivate the contractor by relating the amount of profit 

or fee payable under the contract to the contractor’s performance in the 

areas of operations, management, contract compliance, and human 

resources. Because the contract is fixed-priced, the award fee portion 

does not assess cost management. 

TSA has awarded a fixed-price-award-fee contract to the contractor 

providing screening services at the smallest of the five airports using 

private screeners, while the contracts for screening services for the other 

four airports remain as cost-reimbursement contracts. TSA officials stated 

that the fixed-price contract was awarded for the one airport (on a 

noncompetitive basis) because costs there were considered predictable 

and therefore a reasonable basis for firm pricing by the contractor existed. 

Table 3 provides information on TSA’s contracts with current private 

screening contractors. 

 53An additional contract management factor not listed above is the contractor’s compliance 

with the contract’s terms and conditions. 

Page 26 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Table 3: Type of Contract and Contract Amount for the Four Private Screening Contractors for the Period November 19, 2004, 

through May 18, 2006

Type of contract Contract amount

a

Private screening contractor

Cost-plusaward-fee Fixed-priceaward-fee Base year

b

Option periodc

Airport 

security 

category 

Covenant Aviation Security 9 $79,423,995 $58,354,170 X

Covenant Aviation Security 9 698,005 506,168 IV 

FirstLine Transportation Security 9 34,574,108 25,933,623 I

McNeil Security International 9 8,983,957 6,793,001 II

Jackson Hole Airport Board 9 3,601,457 2,484,297 III

Source: TSA. 

a

The contract amounts include base fees and potential award fees and are estimated amounts, not 

actual costs incurred under the cost-plus award fee contracts. 

 bThe base year is the first year of the contract. 

c

The option period is for year 2-5 of the contract. 

TSA officials stated that as of February 2006, TSA had awarded, was 

planning to award, or was in the process of awarding, additional fixedprice contracts on a competitive basis for screening services at three other 

small airports (categories II, III, and IV) under the SPP.54 TSA officials 

acknowledged that cost-reimbursement contracts place most of the cost 

risk on the government, rather than the contractor, but said the agency 

would not award fixed-price contracts for screening services at the two 

larger airports using private screening contractors for another 1 to 2 years. 

TSA officials stated that they would not award fixed-price contracts to 

these contractors because they did not know the costs of screening at the 

larger airports, where they believe costs are variable, and therefore they 

believe that TSA would be at greater risk of awarding a contract for a 

 54The draft SPP contracts for Jackson Hole airport (category III) and Sioux Falls (category 

II) airport state that TSA will award a combination cost-plus-fixed-fee and fixed-priceaward-fee contract for these airports. Specifically, the pre-transition and transition phases,

such as screener assessments, leasing, travel, consumables, uniforms, and other direct 

costs will be performed under the cost-plus-fixed-fee portion of the contract. Once the SPP 

contractors have attained full operational capability—full transition to private-sector 

screeners—the screening services will be performed under a fixed-price award fee

contract. In December 2005, TSA awarded such a contract to a private screening contractor 

to provide screening services at Sioux Falls airport. On February 5, 2006, the contractor

received a certificate of full operational capability from TSA. 

Page 27 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
higher cost than might actually be necessary.55 TSA officials acknowledged 

that TSA already had, through an independent cost-data study, identified 

and collected some cost and performance data on passengers and checked

baggage screening operations at 15 airports with private and federal 

screeners, including four category X and four category I airports and all 

five pilot program airports.56 This study, which was completed in October

2004, looked in particular at cost drivers—factors that contribute to 

overall expenses.57 Moreover, an April 2004 study58conducted for TSA by a 

consulting firm estimated how much TSA spent for screening operations at 

each of the five pilot program airports—including contract payments as 

well as costs borne by TSA—and compared the results with estimates of 

how much TSA would have spent had it actually conducted the screening 

operations at those airports. 

TSA officials stated that the cost information identified in these two 

studies provided useful data to help determine the costs of screening at 

airports currently using private screeners, but said additional information 

is needed to assist in transitioning to fixed-price contracts for screening 

 55TSA officials stated, however, that they are considering adding some fixed-price line 

items to the new cost-reimbursement contracts that will be awarded at the two larger 

airports. 

56TSA plans to gather cost data at up to 15 additional airports with federal screeners, but no 

deadline has been set. These airports could be, but are not necessarily, future SPP

participants. Additionally, TSA’s SPP transition plan indicates that TSA has developed a

model they plan to use to estimate the federal costs of screening at specific airports for 

comparison purposes. The costs included in this model are the federal costs associated 

with those tasks that the private contractor would perform at a specific airport, such as 

screener labor costs, including overtime; and uniforms, consumables, recruiting, 

assessment, credentialing, training, and workers compensation. The data for this model 

will be obtained from TSA’s Office of Budget and Performance for each specific airport 

that applies to participate in the SPP. 

57The cost drivers included in the study were redundant screenings, equipment availability, 

absenteeism, and training effectiveness. According to TSA, redundant screening occurs 

when a passenger undergoes secondary screening but does not possess a prohibited item. 

Reducing the number of redundant screenings will improve screening capacity and lower 

the cost of the passenger screening process. Equipment availability is the availability of 

screening machines. Screening cannot work effectively when a machine is down or not

working efficiently. High absenteeism is a major cost driver; it requires TSA to employ a 

larger work force than would otherwise be required. Training effectiveness is characterized 

by mission focus, content, and minimum standards of the amount of time each employee

must devote to it. Effective training results in high prohibited item detection rates, 

according to TSA. 

58Private Screening Operations Performance Evaluation Report, Summary Report; 

Transportation Security Administration; April 16, 2004. 

Page 28 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
services at larger airports. Specifically, TSA officials stated that additional

cost information based on the actual costs of participating in the SPP is 

needed for the larger airports because the SPP contracts differ in two key 

ways from the pilot and extension contracts that TSA previously awarded. 

First, the SPP contracts will include specific performance measures and 

targets that the contractors must meet. Second, the contracts will allow 

for contractors to recommend and, if approved, implement innovations, 

and to select among options for assessing screener candidates and training

screeners. The officials stated that it would therefore be difficult for 

prospective SPP contractors for the larger airports to accurately estimate 

the costs of providing screening services for a fixed-price contract for 

larger airports. As a result, TSA officials stated that they needed up to 

2 additional years to determine estimated costs in order to potentially 

transition to fixed-price contracts, and therefore would continue using 

cost-reimbursement contracts with the largest airports (categories X and

I) for that period.59 By using competitive bidding procedures to award 

fixed-price contracts to qualified firms, as TSA contemplates, TSA will also 

help to bring marketplace pressures to bear on competitors’ proposed 

costs and fees or prices and could enable TSA to maximize contractors’ 

incentives to control costs and ensure that the contractor, rather than the 

government, will bear more of the cost risk associated with performance 

of private screening operations. 

 59The contracts with the current four private screening contractors expire in May 2006, 

after which TSA intends to competitively award new cost-plus-award-fee contracts at the 

larger airports.

Page 29 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
TSA has developed performance goals and draft measures and targets to 

assess the performance of private screening contractors under the SPP, 

but DHS has not yet approved them or established a time frame for doing 

so.60 Until DHS approves these measures, TSA cannot finalize and 

implement them to assess performance. Performance goals are 

measurable objectives against which actual achievement can be 

compared. Performance measures are the yardsticks to assess an agency’s 

success in meeting performance goals, while a performance target is a 

desired level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable 

objective, against which actual achievement will be compared. Together, 

these performance metrics are used to assess an agency’s progress toward 

achieving the results expected. We reported in April 2004 that without data 

to assess the performance of private screening operations, TSA and airport 

operators have limited information from which to plan for the possible 

transition of airports from a federal screening system to a private system. 

In our November 2004 report, we stated that TSA had begun drafting 

performance measures for this purpose. In the current contracts that TSA 

awarded to the four private screening contractors, TSA established an 

award fee process to motivate contractor performance.61 These contracts 

were modified in February and March 2005 to implement the award fee 

process. 

Performance Goals 

and Measures 

Developed by TSA to 

Assess SPP 

Contractors Have Not 

Been Approved by 

DHS 

TSA Has Developed 

Performance Measures to 

Evaluate Security, Cost, 

Innovation, and Other 

Facets of Contractor 

Performance under the 

SPP, but DHS Has Not 

Approved These Measures 

TSA’s draft quality assurance surveillance and award fee plan for the SPP, 

dated October 2005, identifies the performance measures TSA plans to use

 60TSA officials stated that these same performance goals and measures would be used to 

assess overall SPP program management as well. 

61TSA awarded the contracts to the four private screening contractors in November 2004. 

The contractors were extended in November 2005 for an additional 6 months, in 

accordance with the terms of the contracts. 

Page 30 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
to assess the performance of private screening contractors against TSA’s 

major goals for the program.62 According to TSA, the five goals for the SPP 

in the areas of security, customer service, costs, workforce management, 

and innovation, are: 

• Ensure security. 

• Provide world class customer service. 

• Implement cost efficiencies. 

• Respect the screening workforce. 

• Create a partnership that leverages strengths of the private and public 

sector. 

TSA’s draft quality assurance surveillance and award fee plan for the SPP 

includes planned performance measures in 14 areas that are to be applied 

to all private screening companies that participate in the SPP. These 

performance measures, in addition to an innovation measure, are to be 

used to determine the award fee provided to contractors that participate in

the SPP.63 Table 4 describes the performance measures. 

 62In March 2005, TSA officials said they had recently submitted SPP performance measures 

to DHS. TSA officials were not able to provide the date the performance measures were 

submitted to DHS. 

63As part of TSA’s draft award fee plan for the private screening contractors that participate 

in the SPP, there is an award fee pool available for optional contractor-provided innovation

submissions. Specifically, the contractor may submit innovative ideas that will improve 

security effectiveness, cost-efficiency, or customer satisfaction through the development of

screener innovation submissions under the contract. The plan states that contractor

submissions will be evaluated on a recurring basis by the airport FSD and submitted to the

SPP program management office on a bi-annual basis. 

Page 31 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Table 4: TSA Performance Measures for Evaluating SPP Contractors

Performance measure Description Performance target 

1. Maintenance Equipment, property, and materials are well kept and 

operational. 

95% of inspected equipment, property, 

or materials are well kept, operational, 

and recorded 

2. Reporting Reports and notifications are accurate and submitted in a 

timely fashion.

95% of the reports submitted within 

5 days of the due date 

3. FSD evaluation Contractor supports the FSD in ensuring an efficient, effective, 

and responsive operation. 

Score of 50 or above out of a total 

possible 100 points 

4. Demonstrate 

compliance with pretransition activities 

Contractor complies with pre-transition tasks, such as 

completing recruiting activities, providing preferential treatment 

for federal screeners, and completing assessments of screener 

candidates. 

100% compliance

5. Demonstrate 

compliance with transition 

activities 

Contractor complies with transition tasks, such as verifying that 

all equipment is fully functioning and ensuring that screeners 

completed all required on-the-job training. 

100% compliance

6. Assessment All persons designated to be deployed as screeners meet all 

statutory requirements for employment. 

100% of screener personnel employed 

meet statutory assessment 

requirements 

7. Credentialing All persons meet TSA specified requirements for employment. 100% of contractor personnel meet 

credentialing requirements for 

employment 

8. New hire training New hires receive the required training before assuming 

screening responsibilities. 

100% of new hires meet required 

training before assuming screening 

responsibilities

9. Recurrent training Screeners must meet the minimum requirement of 3 hours of 

training per screener, per week, averaged over a calendar 

quarter. 

100% of screeners meet recurrent 

training requirements 

10. Remedial training Screeners receive a minimum of 3 hours of remediation, 

provided by the contractor, for failing a national or local covert 

test (unannounced, undercover test). 

100% of screeners who fail a covert test 

meet remedial training requirements 

11. Passenger screening 

Threat Image Projection

(TIP) detection

TIP systems project images of threat objects on an x-ray 

screen during actual operations and records whether screeners 

identify threat objects. 

Target to be set by TSA 

12. Passenger screening 

TIP false alarm rate 

Measure of the rate of recognition of objects incorrectly 

detected during TIP testing. 

Target to be set by TSA 

13. Screener recertification 

pass rate (first attempt) 

Measure of the percent of screeners passing, on their first 

attempt, TSA’s annual screener recertification test, which 

assesses, among other things, screeners’ ability to perform 

TSA’s passenger and checked baggage screening standard 

operating procedures. 

Target to be set by TSA 

14. Customer satisfaction Measure of performance on TSA’s customer satisfaction 

surveys, which measure customer service and public 

confidence associated with TSA’s aviation screening functions. 

Target to be set by TSA 

Source: TSA. 

Page 32 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
a

TIP projects images of threat objects on an x-ray screen during actual operations and records 

whether screeners identify threat objects. 

TSA established draft performance targets for 10 of the 14 measures, 

which all SPP contractors will be required to meet. TSA officials said 

individual contractors that are accepted as SPP participants in the future

will be required to meet TSA’s performance targets for the remaining four 

measures—passenger screening threat image projection (TIP) detection 

rate; passenger screening TIP false alarm rate; screener recertification 

pass rates; and customer satisfaction. The performance indicators for the 

four measures for which targets have not yet been set by TSA are to be 

specific to each airport participating in the SPP. TSA stated that it has 

established baseline data for these four performance measures describing 

how federal screeners or private screening contractors have actually 

performed at individual airports, over time, as well as an overall average of

performance. Using the baseline data as a starting point, performance 

targets would then be set for each airport. For example, if a baseline 

shows that historically, all airports met the performance measure for 

screener recertification pass rates 70 percent of the time, TSA would set 

the target measure at or above 70 percent. TSA officials stated that they

are currently working to identify incentives to encourage better results at 

airports that have historically not met TSA’s performance standards for 

passenger and checked baggage screening. TSA is considering providing

financial incentives for a limited time in an effort to quickly move its 

airports to meet TSA’s baseline level of performance. 

TSA officials stated that DHS must approve the draft performance goals, 

measures, and targets before they can be finalized, but as of January 2006, 

DHS had not yet done so, and had not set a deadline for doing so. We 

asked TSA and DHS officials which office within DHS was responsible for 

approving these performance metrics, but the officials were not able to 

provide us with the information. Until the draft performance measures are 

finalized by DHS, TSA will not be able to implement its performance 

measures for the SPP. According to our standards for internal controls, 

agencies must have systems in place for measuring, reporting, and 

monitoring program performance.64 In addition, as we have reported in our 

prior work on the importance of using the Government Performance 

Results Act (GPRA) to assist with oversight and decision making, credible

performance information is essential for the Congress and the executive 

branch to accurately assess agencies’ progress toward achieving their 

 64GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 33 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
goals.65 Further, the draft measures and targets TSA developed for the SPP 

will also be used by DHS to determine whether to award private screening 

contractors certification status under the SAFETY Act. Until the SPP 

measures and targets are finalized, DHS officials stated that they cannot 

determine whether contractors will perform as intended—criteria that 

must be satisfied before awarding certification status. 

Since initiating the SPP in November 2004, DHS and TSA have taken steps 

to develop a legal, contractual, and programmatic framework that enables 

the private sector to provide passenger and checked baggage screening 

services, with federal oversight in place to help ensure that security and

screener performance is consistent and comparable at airports, whether 

federal or private screeners are used. As of January 2006, only 7 of over 

400 airports that were eligible to apply to participate in the SPP had 

submitted an application. While we did not attempt to identify the reasons 

for the small number of applicants to the SPP, a contributing factor may be

airports’ concerns about liability. In November 2004, we reported that half

of the airport operators we interviewed (13 of 26) were concerned about

airport liability in the event that a private screener failed to detect a threat

object that led to a terrorist incident. Aviation associations that represent 

hundreds of airports have also identified liability as a major concern 

among airports. Although Congress’ recent effort to shield airports from 

liability in the fiscal year 2006 DHS appropriations act may address this 

concern, there have been no additional applicants since the act was 

passed. Furthermore, by extending a level of federal liability protection 

through the SAFETY Act to current private screening contractors, DHS 

has laid the groundwork for future contractors to potentially receive 

comparable protection. Ongoing concerns among prospective participants

in the SPP regarding the availability of the most extensive level of 

protection under the SAFETY Act—certification—may be alleviated once

TSA finalizes a standard of performance for private screening contractors 

that DHS can utilize to determine if contractors have demonstrated that 

they will perform as intended. 

Conclusions 

 65GAO, Managing for Results: Using GPRA to Assist Oversight and Decisionmaking, 

GAO-01-872T (Washington, D.C.: June 2001).

Page 34 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
As TSA moves forward with implementing the SPP, several opportunities 

exist for strengthening the management and oversight of the program. 

First, SPP applicants need clear information on what their roles and 

responsibilities are to be at airports where a privatized screener workforce 

operates with federal oversight. The absence of such guidance may affect 

the ability of responsible officials to effectively and efficiently manage 

screening checkpoints and the screener program in general. Additionally, 

without clear and specific information on roles and responsibilities of 

private screening contractors under the SPP, it may be difficult for 

prospective SPP contractors to develop an informed estimate of their 

personnel needs and associated costs under the SPP—information that is 

needed for the competitive bidding process. 

Second, in addition to concerns about liability protection, airports in the 

past expressed concerns about the degree of management control they 

would have over various aspects of screening services. Since then, TSA 

has provided additional operational flexibilities to private screening 

contractors, such as granting contractors and FSDs more input and 

flexibility in the screener hiring process. Contractors have reported 

efficiencies they have achieved as a result of these flexibilities, including 

using fewer screeners than authorized by TSA. Although steps have been 

taken to address concerns regarding airports’ liability and the need for 

contractors to have additional management control over various aspects 

of screening services, only two additional airports, in addition to the five 

pilot program airports, applied to participate in the SPP. We believe that 

identifying the underlying reasons for the small number of applicants to 

the SPP may be helpful to TSA and others in assessing what, if any, 

changes may be needed to the program. 

Third, while TSA is not required to adhere to the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation with respect to contracting practices, it has acknowledged the 

advantages of fixed-price contracts in situations where costs are 

reasonably understood. To this end, TSA has begun the contract award 

process for the four smaller airports using a fixed-price type of contract. 

TSA has decided to continue to use cost-plus-award-fee contracts rather 

than fixed-price contracts with private screening contractors providing 

services at the larger airports for at least an additional 1 to 2 years so that 

it can continue to collect information on the costs of screening operations

at these airports. Using fixed-price contracts, as TSA plans to do, would 

result in the contractors assuming substantial cost responsibility from the 

government related to screener operations and help ensure that private 

screening contractors deliver the most cost-effective services, while 

ensuring that TSA and ATSA requirements related to maintaining airport 

security are met. The use of competitively awarded fixed-price contracts 

Page 35 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
should provide a built-in incentive for contractors to identify cost-saving 

opportunities and innovations, which in turn may help reduce costs of 

screening contracts at the larger airports using private screeners. TSA 

could make these cost-savings opportunities available to airports with 

federal screeners, as appropriate, thereby transferring the efficiencies 

identified by the private sector to the federal government. 

Finally, until DHS approves the performance goals, measures, and targets 

for the SPP, it will not have a mechanism in place beyond the ongoing 

contracts for assessing the performance of private screening contractors. 

Without these performance goals, measures, and targets it may be difficult 

for TSA to identify areas of screener operations that contractors may be 

able to improve. 

To strengthen its administration of the SPP and to help address 

stakeholder concerns, we recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct the 

Assistant Secretary, TSA, to take the following actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• Formally document and communicate with all FSDs, current private 

screening contractors, and entities that apply to the SPP, the roles and 

responsibilities of all stakeholders that participate in the SPP,

pertaining to the management and deployment of screening services. 

To help ensure the completion of a performance management framework 

for the SPP so that TSA can assess SPP contractors and to promote 

accountability of SPP contractors for achieving desired program 

outcomes, we recommend that the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security take the following action: 

• Establish a time frame for completing its review of the performance 

goals, measures, and targets for the SPP so that TSA may apply them at 

the earliest possible opportunity. 

Page 36 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and TSA for review and 

comment. On March 10, 2006, we received written comments on the draft

report, which are reproduced in full in appendix II. DHS generally 

concurred with the findings and recommendations in the report, and 

stated that efforts to implement our recommendations will help them 

develop a more effective, efficient, and economical administration of 

TSA’s SPP. With regard to our recommendation that TSA formally 

document and communicate with all FSDs, current private screening 

contractors, and entities that apply to the SPP, the roles and 

responsibilities of all stakeholders that participate in the SPP pertaining to

the management and deployment of screening services, DHS identified 

steps that TSA is taking to this end. Specifically, DHS stated that TSA 

updated its SPP transition plan, which, among other things, further 

clarifies the relationships among the FSD, FSD staff, and private screening 

contactors, and other stakeholders as they relate to SPP program 

management. DHS also stated that TSA has assembled a transition team to 

work closely with SPP stakeholders to foster awareness and ensure 

communication regarding the roles and responsibilities of all involved

parties working under the SPP. TSA’s successful implementation of these 

ongoing efforts should address the concerns we raised regarding 

documenting and communicating roles and responsibilities under the SPP. 

In addition, regarding our recommendation that DHS establish a time 

frame for completing its review of the performance goals, measures and 

targets for the SPP so that TSA may apply them at the earliest possible 

opportunity, DHS stated that TSA had established performance metrics 

and had provided it to DHS for its review. However, DHS did not specify a 

time frame for completing its review. We continue to believe that it is 

important for DHS to establish a time frame for completing its review of 

the performance goals, measures, and targets for the SPP. Without these 

performance metrics, TSA will not have a mechanism in place beyond the 

ongoing contracts for assessing the performance of private screening 

contractors. Further, until performance metrics are finalized, it remains 

unlikely that DHS will award such contractors certification under the 

SAFETY Act. 

DHS also provided updated information on the status of the SPP, which 

we incorporated where appropriate.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 7 days from the 

date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Administrator 

of the Transportation Security Administration and interested 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 37 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be made available at no charge 

on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Cathleen A. Berrick 

Director, Homeland Security and 

 Justice Issues 

Page 38 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To assess the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to 

implement the Screening Partnership Program (SPP), we analyzed (1) the 

status of federal efforts to determine whether and to what extent liability 

protection will be provided to private screening contractors and airports, 

and actions taken on other stakeholder concerns related to participation 

in the SPP; (2) how TSA has determined it will achieve cost-savings goals 

for screener operations through the SPP, specifically through choice of

contract used and contract terms; and (3) TSA’s progress in developing

and implementing performance goals, measures, and targets to assess the 

performance of the private screening contractors who will be participating 

in the SPP. 

To assess the status of federal efforts to determine whether and to what 

extent liability protection should be provided to private screening 

contractors and airports, and actions taken on other stakeholder concerns 

related to participation in the SPP, we reviewed Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and TSA documentation on the Support of Anti-terrorism 

by Fostering Effective Technologies Act (SAFETY Act) and the SPP. 

Specifically, we reviewed DHS guidance posted on its Web site related to 

the SAFETY Act and other DHS documentation on this act. We also 

reviewed TSA’s written responses to stakeholders frequently asked 

questions about the SPP, including information on liability protection; 

TSA’s transition plan for the SPP, which documents internal guidance on 

transitioning an airport from a federal screener workforce to a private 

screener workforce; TSA’s communications plan for the SPP; airport 

applications to the SPP; and other guidance-related materials TSA 

developed for airports and private-screening contractors. Additionally, we 

reviewed relevant legislation, such as Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act and the SAFETY Act, our prior reports that addressed issues

related to the SPP and the use of private sector screeners, and testimony 

at congressional hearing on the SPP. Further, we interviewed DHS 

officials regarding the SAFETY Act and TSA headquarters officials 

responsible for implementing the SPP to determine efforts underway to 

address stakeholder concerns regarding the SPP. We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with the four private screening 

contractors currently providing passenger and checked baggage screening 

services, the airport directors at the seven airports that applied to 

participate in the SPP (the five pilot program airports and two airports 

that applied to participate in the SPP, namely, Elko Regional Airport in 

Elko, Nevada and Sioux Falls Regional Airport in Sioux Falls, South 

Dakota), and the federal security directors (FSD) at each of these airports 

to obtain their views on TSA’s efforts to implement the SPP and to address 

stakeholders concerns. Finally, we interviewed officials from two aviation 

associations—the American Association of Airport Executives and the 

Page 39 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Airports Council International, and a major liability insurance provider—

to obtain information on the type of insurance available to private 

screening contractors. 

To assess the status of TSA’s efforts to achieve cost-savings in screener 

operations through the SPP, specifically with respect to the choice of 

contract used, and contract terms, we reviewed TSA’s contracts for 

screening services for the four contractors currently providing passenger

and checked baggage screening services. We did not review the contracts

that TSA awarded in early 2006 to two contractors to provide private 

screening services in the SPP. Additionally, we reviewed TSA’s acquisition 

policies and procedures, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the 

Federal Aviation Administration’s acquisition management system, to 

identify standards and guidance for contracting practices of TSA and the

federal government. Further, we reviewed TSA’s transition plan and other 

SPP guidance to identify TSA’s current and planned approaches for 

identifying screening program costs. We also reviewed TSA’s activitybased costing study that assessed the cost of passenger and checked 

baggage screening operations at 15 airports, including the 5 that 

participated in the 2-year pilot program using private screeners. We 

determined that the results of the activity-based costing study were 

sufficiently reliable for the purpose of our review. Finally, to gather 

perspectives on opportunities for cost-savings under the SPP, we 

interviewed TSA SPP and contracting officials, the four contractors 

currently providing screening services, the seven airport directors who 

applied to the SPP and the FSDs at these airports, and representatives of 

the American Association of Airport Executives and the Airports Council 

International. We did not review TSA’s actual determination of the amount 

of contractor award fee. Nor did we review the conduct of TSA’s 

performance evaluation boards or fee determining official in evaluating 

contractor performance against award fee criteria (including cost-savings) 

and determining the amount of the contractors’ award fee. However, we 

did verify that TSA had evaluated contractor performance (including costsavings) in making award fee determinations. 

To assess TSA’s progress in developing and implementing performance 

goals, measures, and targets to assess the performance of the private 

screening contractors who will be participating in the SPP, we reviewed 

the terms of TSA’s award fee process specified in the current contracts 

and TSA’s draft quality assurance surveillance and award fee plan. We also 

reviewed TSA’s June 2004 guidance on the SPP, other guidance-related 

material TSA developed for private screening contractors and airports 

regarding the SPP, TSA’s contracts for the private screening contractors 

currently providing screening services, TSA testimony at congressional 

Page 40 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

hearings, and our prior reports that addressed issues related to the SPP 

and the use of private-sector screeners. A listing of our prior reports is 

contained in appendix IV. Additionally, we interviewed TSA headquarters 

officials responsible for the SPP. 

We performed our work from March 2005 through March 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 41 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security

of Homeland Security 

Page 42 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 43 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 44 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 45 GAO-06-166

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-3404 

In addition to the contact named above, David Alexander, C. Jenna 

Battcher, Chuck Bausell, Amy Bernstein, David Hooper, Lara Laufer, 

Thomas Lombardi, Hugh C. Pacquette, Lisa Shibata, Maria Strudwick, and 

Adam Vodraska made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Aviation Security
Related GAO Reports

Page 46 GAO-06-166

Related GAO Reports 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 

Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 

Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: 

November 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 

Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005. 

Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority 

of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.: 

September 23, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 

Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. 

GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not 

Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight 

Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps

to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 

2005. 

Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of 

Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 13, 2005.

Aviation Security: TSA Screener Training and Performance 

Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. 

Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, 

but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. 

GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 

Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using 

Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. 

Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005.

Aviation Security
Related GAO Reports 

Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize 

Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow 

Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. 

GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004. 

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but 

Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term 

Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 

Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. 

Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. 

Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed 

to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May 

28, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. 

GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to 

Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519. 

Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility 

to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 22, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation 

Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of ComputerAssisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 17, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial 

Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 

Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, 

D.C.: February 13, 2004. 

Page 47 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Related GAO Reports 

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 

Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington,

D.C.: February 12, 2004. 

The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a 

Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development 

Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 

Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 

of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 

GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 

Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress 

Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: 

September 24, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11, 2001, and the 

Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 

Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address 

Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. 

Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides 

Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover 

Airports Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 25, 2003. 

Page 48 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Related GAO Reports 

Transportation Security Administration: Action and Plan to Build a 

Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: January 17,

2003. 

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and 

DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: January 10,

2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerability of Commercial Aviation to Attacks by 

Terrorists Using Dangerous Goods. GAO-03-30C. Washington, D.C.: 

December 3, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 

Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: November 22, 

2002. 

Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has 

Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: 

October 15, 2002. 

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses 

Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 2, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 25, 2002.

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial

Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 

Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 

Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 21, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s 

Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 

Page 49 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
Related GAO Reports 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 

Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 

Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

(440393) Page 50 GAO-06-166 Aviation Security
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