UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

MATHEW SELOVER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20cv4698-TKW-HTC

ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS and RAYME

EDLER,

Defendants.

________________________________/

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY

This case is before the Court on Defendant Rayme Edler’s motion to stay 

discovery (Doc. 9) and Plaintiff’s response in opposition (Doc. 18). Upon due 

consideration of these filings and the case file, the Court finds that the motion to stay 

is due to be denied.

This suit arises out of alleged adverse employment actions taken against 

Plaintiff while he was working as a paramedic for Escambia County. The nowoperative amended complaint asserts seven counts against the County and Dr. Edler 

under both federal and state law. Some of the claims against Dr. Edler name her in 

her official capacity as Escambia County Medical Director, and others name her in 

her individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Dr. Edler filed an amended motion 

to dismiss in which she raised the defense of qualified immunity as to the individualCase 3:20-cv-04698-TKW-HTC Document 33 Filed 05/19/20 Page 1 of 4
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capacity claims, see Doc. 32, and she sought a stay of discovery pending the Court’s 

ruling on her qualified immunity defense.1

Although “district courts [have] broad discretion over the management of pretrial activities, including discovery,” Johnson v. Bd. Of Regents, 263 F.3d 1234, 

1269 (11th Cir. 2001), “motions to stay discovery are disfavored . . . because stays 

typically delay resolution of a case and extend the life of a case beyond an acceptable 

time period,” McMillan v. Dep’t of Corr., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191249, at *4 

(N.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2013). When ruling on a motion to stay discovery pending 

disposition of a motion to dismiss, “[t]he Court must balance the harm produced by 

[the] delay against the possibility that the motion will be granted and entirely 

eliminate the need for discovery.” Id. That said, if the claim that is subject to the 

motion to dismiss is “especially dubious” or “significantly enlarges the scope of 

discovery,” the district court should rule on the motion to dismiss before entering 

discovery orders. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1368 (11th 

Cir. 1997); see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009) (explaining 

that “the ‘driving force’ behind creation of the qualified immunity doctrine was a 

1

 Dr. Edler filed the motion to stay in advance of filing her motion to dismiss the original 

complaint because of the impending deadline for her to respond to Plaintiff’s outstanding 

discovery requests. The Court tolled the deadline for Dr. Edler to respond to the discovery requests 

until it ruled on the motion to stay. See Doc. 14. Then, after Plaintiff filed an amended complaint 

that rendered Dr. Edler’s original motion to dismiss moot, see Doc. 21, the Court deferred ruling 

on the motion to stay until Dr. Edler responded to the amended complaint. Because Dr. Edler

again raised the defense of qualified immunity in her motion to dismiss the amended complaint, 

the motion to stay is now ripe for a ruling.

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desire to ensure that ‘“insubstantial claims” against government officials [will] be 

resolved prior to discovery’”) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 

n.2 (1987)) (alternations in original).

Here, the individual-capacity claims against Dr. Edler do not appear to be 

especially dubious because they are based, in part, on Dr. Edler allegedly acting in 

contravention of a legal opinion issued by the County Attorney, a copy of which was 

attached to the amended complaint.2 Nor do the individual-capacity claims against 

Dr. Edler appear to significantly enlarge the scope of discovery because there is a 

substantial overlap between these claims and the official-capacity claims against Dr. 

Edler and the claims against the County. 

Moreover, as the proponent of the motion to stay, Dr. Edler did not establish 

that her motion to dismiss the individual-capacity claims against her is likely to be 

granted or that the possibility of the motion being granted would outweigh the harm 

resulting from a stay of discovery. Indeed, based on the Court’s preliminary review 

of the pending motions to dismiss (Docs. 31, 32), the prospect that all the claims in 

2

 The Court has not overlooked Dr. Edler’s argument that the County Attorney’s opinion 

notwithstanding, she had the authority to take the actions she did regarding Plaintiff under 

§401.265, Fla. Stat., and the administrative guidance interpreting that statute. Even so, the 

individual-capacity claims appear to be at least colorable because, among other things, they 

challenge the process by which Dr. Edler took the statutorily-authorized actions. See Doc. 20, at 

33-38 (¶¶100-110) (alleging that Plaintiff was not provided meaningful notice of, and thus

opportunity to be heard at, the quality assurance meeting).

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the amended complaint will be dismissed seems unlikely,

3

and because Dr. Edler is 

a central figure in the events giving rise to the claims, she cannot avoid discovery 

altogether if some claims survive even if the individual-capacity claims against her 

are dismissed.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that:

1. Dr. Edler’s motion to stay discovery (Doc. 9) is DENIED.

2. Dr. Edler shall respond to the outstanding discovery requests within 14 

days of the date of this Order, unless the parties agree to a later deadline.

DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of May, 2020.

T. Kent Wetherell, II 

T. KENT WETHERELL, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3

 This preliminary view is obviously subject to change after closer review of the parties’ 

filings.

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