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[Senate Report 106-347]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

106th Congress                                                   Report
 2d Session                      SENATE                         106-347
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

                             SPECIAL REPORT

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                                 ON THE
 
             GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT OF 1993

                  July 18, 2000--Ordered to be printed

                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                     TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi            ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico         ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri        PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington             FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky            TOM HARKIN, Iowa
CONRAD BURNS, Montana                BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama           HARRY REID, Nevada
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire            HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah              PATTY MURRAY, Washington
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado    BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho                   DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas          RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
JON KYL, Arizona
                   Steven J. Cortese, Staff Director
                 Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
               James H. English, Minority Staff Director

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
I. Introduction..................................................     1
    Legislative History..........................................     1
    Implementation...............................................     3
II. Statement of Purpose.........................................     7
III. Subcommittee Analysis.......................................     8
    Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development and Related 
      Agencies...................................................     8
    Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary and 
      Related Agencies...........................................    17
    Subcommittee on Defense......................................    23
    Subcommittee on Military Construction........................    33
    Subcommittee on District of Columbia.........................    34
    Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development.................    39
    Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and 
      Related Agencies...........................................    42
    Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies................    46
    Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and 
      Education, and Related Agencies............................    52
    Subcommittee on Transportation...............................    63
    Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government..............    67
    Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban 
      Development and Independent Agencies.......................    82
IV. Program Duplication and Overlap..............................    90
V. Observations and Conclusion...................................    95

                            I. INTRODUCTION

   legislative history of the government performance and results act

    The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, 
commonly referred to as ``GPRA'' or the ``Results Act,'' was 
enacted with the broad, bipartisan support of both Congress and 
the Executive Branch. The Results Act originated from Senate 
Bill No. 20, introduced by Senator Roth and co-sponsored by 
several other Senators during the 103rd Congress. The Senate 
Governmental Affairs Committee favorably reported the bill by 
voice vote on June 16, 1993 (S. Rept. No. 103-58). Both the 
Senate and House of Representatives passed the bill by 
unanimous consent, and it was signed into law by the President 
on August 3, 1993 (Public Law 103-62).
    The Act is designed to respond to widespread concern that 
the Federal Government has not been held accountable for 
delivering the level and quality of results anticipated by the 
American people. The Governmental Affairs Committee report 
which accompanies S. 20 evidences this concern as follows:

          ``a recent public opinion poll * * * shows that 
        Americans, on average, believe that as much as 48 cents 
        out of every Federal tax dollar is wasted. In other 
        words, the public believes that it is not getting the 
        level and quality of government service for which it is 
        paying.'' \1\
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    \1\ S. Rept. No. 103-58 at p. 2.

    Thus, the first Congressional statement of purpose of the 
Act was ``to improve the confidence of the American people in 
the capability of the Federal Government, by systematically 
holding Federal agencies accountable for achieving program 
results.'' \2\
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    \2\ Section 2(b)(1) of Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285.
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    The three cornerstones of the Results Act are strategic 
plans, annual performance plans, and annual performance 
reports:
  --Strategic plans.--Agencies, in consultation with Congress, 
        are required to develop 5-year strategic plans that 
        must contain: (1) a comprehensive mission statement for 
        the agency and (2) long term results-oriented goals 
        covering each of its major functions. The initial 
        agency strategic plans were submitted to the Office of 
        Management and Budget [OMB] and Congress in September 
        1997.\3\ Strategic plans must be updated at least every 
        3 years. The first updates are due in September 
        2000.\4\
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    \3\ While the Results Act was enacted in August 1993, it provided a 
long lead time for agencies to prepare for its implementation. For 
example, during the period between August 1993 and submission of the 
first round of strategic plans in September 1997, agencies conducted 
performance measurement pilot programs to test the Act's concepts. 
Agencies also consulted with Congress on their draft strategic plans 
during the Spring and Summer of 1997.
    \4\ 5 U.S.C. 306.
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  --Annual performance plans.--Agencies are required to prepare 
        annual performance plans that: (1) establish 
        performance goals for the applicable fiscal year, which 
        generally must be expressed in an objective, 
        quantifiable, and measurable form; (2) briefly describe 
        the means and strategies needed to meet the goals; and 
        (3) describe the means used to verify and validate 
        performance. In addition to the agency plans, OMB 
        submits an annual government-wide performance plan as 
        part of the President's budget. The first round of 
        agency performance plans and the first government-wide 
        performance plan were submitted in February 1998 and 
        apply to fiscal year 1999.\5\
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    \5\ 31 U.S.C. 1115.
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  --Annual performance reports.--Agencies are required to 
        prepare annual performance reports that review the 
        agency's success in achieving its performance goals for 
        the applicable fiscal year and explain and describe 
        where performance goals have not been met. The first 
        round of annual performance reports is due by March 31, 
        2000, and will cover the agency performance goals for 
        fiscal year 1999.\6\
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    \6\ 31 U.S.C. 1116.
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    Collectively, the strategic and performance plans and the 
performance reports establish a comprehensive system of 
accountability through which agencies articulate what they are 
trying to accomplish, how they will accomplish it, and how 
Congress and the public will know whether they are succeeding. 
The emphasis of the Results Act is on shifting performance 
measures from process (e.g., number of regulations issued) to 
results (e.g., safer workplaces). Without results measures, it 
is impossible to determine which programs are working and which 
are not.
    One fundamental purpose of the Results Act is to link 
Federal funding decisions to program performance. The 
Appropriations Committee has a key role and responsibility to 
help ensure that this purpose of the Act is fulfilled. 
Accordingly, the Committee intends to conduct active oversight 
of the implementation of the Results Act. In his opening 
statement at a June 24, 1997 joint hearing on implementation of 
the Results Act before the Senate Appropriations and 
Governmental Affairs Committees, Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, emphasized the 
potential that the Results Act holds and the determination of 
Appropriations Committee Members to see it realized:

          ``The American public has demanded an end to 
        inefficient and wasteful spending by the Federal 
        government. The American public has demanded a balanced 
        budget. Our responsibility on the Appropriations 
        Committee is to provide adequate funding for those 
        programs that are a proper responsibility of the 
        Federal government. With the Results Act, we can ask 
        other important questions about Federal programs, such 
        as what will the program accomplish, what will it cost 
        to accomplish it, how will the results be achieved, and 
        how will the agency monitor the program's 
        effectiveness. If properly implemented, the Results Act 
        can assist Congress in identifying and eliminating 
        duplicate or ineffective programs. Congress intends to 
        monitor compliance with the Results Act every step of 
        the way to ensure that agencies are providing us with 
        the information necessary to do our job of safeguarding 
        the taxpayers' money.''

    This report, which evaluates agency performance plans for 
fiscal year 2000, is issued in furtherance of the Committee's 
commitment to monitor agency compliance with the Results Act.

                             implementation

    Although the Results Act was enacted in August 1993, its 
first major implementation step, submission of the initial 
round of strategic plans, did not occur until September 1997. 
The Act provided this long lead time to give agencies the 
opportunity to prepare for the many implementation challenges. 
Unfortunately, few agencies took advantage of the opportunity. 
A GAO report issued on the eve of the strategic plan 
submissions found that:

          ``many agencies did not appear to be well positioned 
        to provide in 1997 a results-oriented answer to the 
        fundamental Results Act question: What are we 
        accomplishing?'' \7\
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    \7\ The Government Performance and Results Act: 1997 Governmentwide 
Implementation Will Be Uneven, GAO/GGD-97-109 (June 1997), at p. 5.

    Draft strategic plans.--This assessment was confirmed when 
agencies submitted their draft strategic plans for 
Congressional consultations, in accordance with the Results 
Act.\8\ With GAO's assistance, cross-jurisdictional, bipartisan 
Congressional teams set up to facilitate consultations reviewed 
the draft plans. The results were very disappointing. Most of 
the plans reviewed did not even contain the minimal six 
elements expressly required by the law.
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    \8\ The Act specifically requires agencies to consult with 
Congress, as well as other agency stakeholders, when developing their 
strategic plans. 5 U.S.C. 306(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The seeming inattention to the draft plans was particularly 
surprising since Congress had signaled the high priority it 
attached to them. Specifically, the leaders of both Houses of 
Congress stressed the importance of the strategic plans and 
laid out detailed expectations for them in a letter to the 
Director of OMB dated February 25, 1997. With respect to agency 
performance plans, the letter emphasized that, in order to be 
useful to Congress, the plans should be timely and ``should 
provide a complete and clear picture of what an agency intends 
to accomplish with a given level of resources.''
    Final strategic plans.--The final strategic plans submitted 
in September 1997 produced both good and bad news. The good 
news was that most agencies responded to the Congressional 
critiques and made significant improvements in their drafts. 
All of the final plans reviewed by GAO and the Congressional 
teams complied with the minimal legal requirements of the 
Results Act.
    The bad news was that the final plans remained, in the 
words of GAO, ``very much a work in progress.'' \9\ 
Furthermore, because of the extreme deficiencies of the draft 
plans, the Congressional consultation process with agencies had 
been diverted from the substantive policy dialog that the Act 
envisioned to a major effort simply to ensure that the plans 
complied with the technical requirements of the law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Managing For Results: Agencies' Annual Performance Plans Can 
Help Address Strategic Planning Challenges, GAO/GGD-98-44 (January 
1998), at p. 3.
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    Fiscal year 1999 performance plans.--The first round of 
performance plans, which covered fiscal year 1999, were 
submitted in February 1998 as scheduled. However, GAO and 
Congressional evaluations of those performance plans found they 
tended to repeat, instead of rectify, the shortcomings of the 
strategic plans. A June 9, 1998 letter from Congressional 
leaders to the Director of OMB listed the following major 
recurring problem areas in the plans:
  --The strategic plans did not lay a good foundation for the 
        performance plans.
  --The depth and breadth of data problems facing most agencies 
        became even more pronounced in the performance plans.
  --Performance goals and measures were not as results-oriented 
        as they should have been; some goals were not even 
        objective, quantifiable, or measurable.
  --The plans failed to link performance goals and measures to 
        individual programs and day-to-day agency activities.
  --The performance plans showed little evidence of 
        coordinating cross-cutting programs and activities.
  --Few agency performance plans dealt effectively with major 
        management problems.
    A subsequent GAO report on its evaluations of the fiscal 
year 1999 performance plans reiterated the same concerns:

          ``Most of the plans that we reviewed contained major 
        weaknesses that undermined their usefulness in that 
        they (1) did not consistently provide clear pictures of 
        agencies' intended performance, (2) generally did not 
        relate strategies and resources to performance, and (3) 
        provided limited confidence that agencies' performance 
        data will be sufficiently credible.'' \10\
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    \10\ Managing for Results: An Agenda to Improve the Usefulness of 
Agencies' Annual Performance Plans, GAO/GGD-AIMD-98-228 (July 1998), at 
p. 3.

    Fiscal year 2000 performance plans.--In February 1999, 
Federal agencies submitted their second round of annual 
performance plans, which cover fiscal year 2000. GAO once again 
reviewed the performance plans for the 24 Cabinet departments 
and major independent agencies and reported its findings.\11\ 
GAO found that, on the whole, the fiscal year 2000 plans showed 
``moderate improvements'' over the fiscal year 1999 plans and 
contained better information and perspective. However, 
according to GAO, ``key weaknesses'' remain and important 
opportunities exist to improve future plans. Specifically, GAO 
listed the following key weaknesses in the plans:
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    \11\ Managing for Results: Opportunities for Continued Improvements 
in Agencies' Performance Plans, GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-215 (July 1999).
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  --Attention to mission-critical management challenges and 
        program risks is not consistent.
  --Coordination of crosscutting program areas needs additional 
        effort.
  --Presentations of how agencies' human capital and management 
        resources and strategies will be used to achieve 
        results are insufficient.
  --Confidence that performance data will be credible is 
        limited.
    It is a positive sign that most agencies are improving 
their plans and moving in the direction of becoming more 
performance-based. However, the key weaknesses in most of this 
year's plans are largely the same ones as last year--lack of 
credible performance data, lack of specific commitments to 
solve major management problems, and failure to coordinate 
overlapping programs.
    With respect to data reliability, GAO found that 20 of the 
24 major agencies' fiscal year 2000 plans provided little 
confidence that they could produce credible performance data. 
Even for the other four agencies, GAO expressed less than full 
confidence in the credibility of their performance data. The 
GAO report stresses the seriousness of this problem:

          ``The inattention to ensuring that performance data 
        will be sufficiently timely, complete, accurate, 
        useful, and consistent is an important weakness in the 
        performance plans. Ultimately, performance plans will 
        not be useful to congressional decision makers unless 
        and until this key weakness is resolved.''\12\ 
        (emphasis added)
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    \12\ Id. at p. 7 (Emphasis supplied.)

    The same data problems associated with the performance 
plans threaten to undermine the usefulness of the upcoming 
Results Act performance reports. Therefore, it is essential 
that these problems be remedied if the Results Act is to 
accomplish its fundamental purpose of demonstrating to the 
American people what the Federal government is accomplishing in 
a concrete and credible way.
    With respect to major management problems, GAO found that 
agency fiscal year 2000 plans adopted specific and measurable 
performance goals to address only about 40 percent of the core 
management problems in their fiscal year 2000 performance 
plans. Core management problems seriously undermine the Federal 
government's performance and leave it vulnerable to billions of 
dollars in waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. The GAO 
report noted that these problems ``must be addressed as part of 
any serious effort to fundamentally improve the performance of 
Federal agencies.'' \13\ The key to addressing them is for 
agencies to adopt specific performance commitments for which 
they can be held accountable under the Results Act. There is 
much room for improvement here.
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    \13\ Id., p. 13.
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    The Federal government is rife with overlapping agencies 
and multiple programs directed at the same problems. Congress 
has emphasized the need for agencies to develop complementary 
performance goals and measures, both to ensure consistency 
among overlapping programs and to provide a basis for comparing 
performance results. Yet, GAO found that few of the fiscal year 
2000 performance plans discussed strategies for coordinating 
overlapping programs and establishing complementary performance 
goals and measures. The Results Act strategic and performance 
planning requirements offer the ideal opportunity to develop 
shared performance goals and indicators and provide an 
excellent venue for coordinating crosscutting programs.
    Need for OMB leadership.--Congress has repeatedly stressed 
the need for greater leadership by OMB to strengthen 
implementation of the Results Act and enhance the usefulness of 
Results Act plans and information. However, leadership by OMB 
has not been forthcoming. Indeed, quite the opposite has 
occurred. One example of this is OMB's failure to meet its 
specific statutory obligations with regard to performance 
budgeting pilots. Section 6(c) of the Results Act, codified at 
31 U.S.C. 1119, required the Director of OMB to designate not 
less than five agencies as pilot projects in performance 
budgeting for fiscal years 1998 and 1999. Despite the specific 
requirements of the law, OMB informed Congressional leaders in 
a letter dated May 20, 1997, that it was ``delaying the start'' 
of the pilots until 1999 in order to ``allow agencies to 
concentrate on the more immediate task of developing their 
performance plans.'' OMB did not designate the pilots in 1999 
either, and now says they will be designated in fiscal year 
2000.
    This Committee wishes to reiterate the need for OMB to 
provide strong leadership and support to agencies in 
implementing the Results Act. The Committee also wishes to 
express its specific concern over OMB's failure to meet its 
statutory obligations for the performance budgeting pilots. As 
discussed previously, linking funding decisions to program 
performance is a key purpose of the Results Act. This is also a 
very challenging task. The performance budgeting pilots 
constitute the important first step for testing different 
approaches to this task--and a step that cannot be delayed 
further.

                        II. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

    This special report by the Senate Appropriations Committee 
analyzes the impact of the Results Act on the appropriations 
process. The report addresses by subcommittee the following :
  --An evaluation of agency goals and measures for its key 
        programs and activities to determine whether the goals 
        and measures are results-oriented, reasonably 
        challenging, and subject to reliable measurement;
  --An examination of cross-cutting programs and activities and 
        duplicative programs and activities;
  --An analysis of agency information sources and agency data 
        reliability;
  --An examination of the status of high risk problems within 
        certain agencies;
  --A review of the consultation process between agencies and 
        the Appropriations Committee staff; and
  --An evaluation of the usefulness of the performance plans to 
        the Committee staff.
    The report does not cover every Federal entity covered by 
the Results Act. However, it does review those agencies which 
are responsible for major Federal programs and activities and, 
as a result, have sizable budget requests presented to 
Congress.
    The production of this report has given Committee staff an 
opportunity to better understand the purpose and requirements 
of the Results Act. Its production has further served as an 
incentive for Committee staff to communicate with agency 
personnel on agency compliance with the Results Act's 
requirements. And, finally, both Committee members and staff 
have engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the impact of the 
Results Act on the appropriations process.

                       III. SUBCOMMITTEE ANALYSIS

  SUBCOMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RELATED AGENCIES

                       DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

                     Agricultural Research Service

    The Agricultural Research Service [ARS] has developed an 
outcome oriented strategic plan and, in accordance with GPRA 
workgroup recommendations, streamlined its more than 1,100 
research projects into 23 integrated National Research Programs 
in order to more effectively manage the research program. The 
principal tool for moving the agency towards a greater focus on 
performance management is the full development and 
implementation of these National Programs.
    This organization of National Programs represents a 
complete change in the way ARS manages its research program. In 
the ARS Annual Performance Plan covering fiscal years 1999 and 
2000, the Agency specifically identifies performance measures 
that will be met if Congress concurs with the budget request.
    The 23 new National Programs are the principal components 
of the Agency's approach to programmatic accountability. The 
National Programs support the ARS Strategic Plan and are 
focused on specific short and long term goals. Performance 
information is the basis of the Annual Performance Report. The 
National Programs unit also plans to comprehensively review its 
performance information data gathering efforts before it begins 
to collect information on fiscal year 1999 performance.
    The goals and measures of the ARS are focused on the most 
important objectives of the agency. For example, one of the 
agency's goals is to ensure an adequate food supply and 
improved detection, surveillance, prevention, and educational 
programs for the American public's health, safety, and well-
being. Through this goal ARS will work to improve vegetable 
oils, decrease dependence on herbicides, improve crop 
pollination, and develop a vaccine for bloodborne bacterial 
disease or farm raised foodfish. These goals and measures are 
results-oriented to help improve the safety and health of 
agricultural products. These goals are challenging and can 
realistically be met and are subject to reliable measurement.
    As far as cross-cutting programs and activities, the ARS 
will develop scientifically defensible guidelines and 
decisionmaking tools to assist the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service [NRCS] in developing nutrient management 
plans for phosphorus and animal manure application. Tools will 
be provided to establish agronomically and environmentally 
sound threshold soil phosphorus levels, determine phosphorus-
based manure application rates, and select effective remedial 
strategies to minimize phosphorus loss to surface waters. This 
will assist States and national regulatory agencies in meeting 
their mandates to revise the nutrient management planning 
process of Confirmed Animal Feeding Operations and provide 
criteria for managing nutrients in water bodies as requested in 
the Clean Water Action Plan. Also, ARS will finalize the 
development of methods with NRCS to reduce the transport of 
weed seeds, microbes, and pathogens in water flocculants.
    The performance goals specified in the Annual Performance 
Plans are directly linked to the agency's Strategic Plan in 
order to develop a consistent internal movement towards more 
outcome-oriented research. ARS has demonstrated its commitment 
to programmatic accountability through this internal change as 
well as its action in developing an Annual Performance Plan for 
fiscal years 1999 and 2000, one year ahead of the statutory 
requirement.
    After considerable internal studies and discussions with 
other Federal research agencies, ARS determined that it could 
not effectively display its research accomplishments or the 
reliability or credibility of its research through empirical or 
numerical metrics as sought by GPRA. These methods were 
attempted, but the results did not remotely address the intent 
of GPRA. After arriving at this conclusion, ARS requested a 
waiver under GPRA in order to use a narrative approach to 
demonstrate this information. This request was approved by OMB. 
The result was the identification of approximately 150 specific 
anticipated accomplishments for each year that, if achieved, 
will allow ARS to meet its performance goals.
    The creation of National Programs as well as the other 
performance goals of ARS will prove useful in strengthening the 
interaction between ARS and its customers, partners, and 
stockholders. This process of goal setting and achievement will 
also be key in demonstrating to the Subcommittee the value of 
funding and dedication of the ARS to progress through the 
agency's specific request and demonstration of need.
    Although ARS is an agency making strides to comply with 
GPRA regulations, its performance plan, when evaluated, left 
some things to be desired. While its report contained 
objective, measurable, and quantifiable goals, it lacked the 
means to measure progress in certain areas. The plan lacked 
baseline and interim performance data needed to ascertain 
progress toward meeting goals. One example of this is the 
clarity of the linkage between performance and strategic goals. 
In addition to these shortcomings, ARS's performance in the 
areas of consultation and interaction with the Subcommittee 
have been less than satisfactory.

                          Farm Service Agency

    The goal of the Farm Service Agency's [FSA] is to provide 
an economic safety net through farm income support to eligible 
producers, cooperatives, and associations to: (1) help improve 
the economic stability and viability of the agricultural 
sector, and (2) ensure the production of an adequate and 
reasonably priced supply of food and fiber. In addition, FSA 
works to enhance the economic safety net for farmers and 
ranchers and to open, expand, and maintain global market 
opportunities for agricultural producers. The goals and 
measures are results-oriented because FSA is working to improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of commodity acquisition, 
procurement, storage, and distribution activities to support 
domestic and international food assistance programs, and to 
administer the U.S. Warehouse Act. These goals are reasonably 
challenging and can be realistically met.
    FSA's performance plan provided a clear picture of the 
Agency's intended performance across the agency, including a 
means to measure progress towards expected performance. This 
agency was also recognized for its crosscutting effort with the 
Commodity Credit Corporation to protect communities' water 
supplies against chemical contamination; to this end, both FSA 
and the Corporation operate hazardous waste management 
programs. Although FSA's performance plan briefly discusses 
both programs, the plan does not address whether or how 
activities under these programs will be coordinated to ensure 
that the programs work in concert to achieve their common goal. 
In a similar fashion, FSA and the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service [NRCS] each administer programs designed 
to take environmentally sensitive lands out of production to, 
among other things, conserve soil, protect water quality and 
provide habitat for wildlife. Once again, while each agency's 
performance plan describes these programs, neither of the two 
describes the correlation between the two.
    The FSA has taken several specific steps to comply with the 
Results Act. One of its major steps has been the installation 
of the Senior Management and Controls Committee [SMCC]. This 
committee provides leadership, commitment, and guidance to the 
agency's strategic planning program. The committee also 
provides strategic direction for the agency by establishing 
strategic goals; overseeing development and implementation of 
Agency Strategic and Annual Performance Plans; and 
communicating GPRA results to Congress, the Administration, 
customers, and other stakeholders.
    The Agency also established the Strategic Management and 
Corporate Operations Staff within the Office of the 
Administrator, which works closely with the SMCC to carry out 
the Agency's strategic management initiatives. The FSA 
established key contacts in each program and administrative 
area that are responsible for developing, implementing, and 
monitoring performance goals and measures. In compliance with 
GPRA requirements, FSA developed a Strategic Plan for fiscal 
years 1997-2002 and Annual Performance Plans for fiscal years 
1999 and 2000.
    The Farm Loan Program annual performance goals and measures 
are reflected in the goals for each State. These goals and 
measures were developed to achieve the desired results outlined 
in the strategic plan. The State Executive Director for each 
State is held responsible for achieving these goals. This is 
just one example of FSA practicing performance-based business.
    Another example is the complete review of the Agency's 
commodity procurement and licensing and examination procedures 
being conducted by the Deputy Administrator for Commodity 
Operations. This review involves industry and customer 
interviews, development and analysis of alternative ways of 
conducting these functions, and cost analysis of such 
alternatives. This review will result in recommendations to 
improve the efficiency and performance of the licensing and 
procurement operations, and the review team will learn the 
importance of knowing what customers want and being pro-active 
in meeting customers' needs.
    Additionally, FSA's Administrator has a separate 
performance agreement on Equal Employment Opportunity/Civil 
Rights [EEO/CR] which includes specific goals and measures by 
which the Administrator will be rated. The Agency's Deputy 
Administrators' Performance Plan contains a performance element 
and standards directly linked to accomplishment of the 
Administrator's EEO/CR goals.
    Performance information is being used to manage this 
agency. Starting in June 1999, program managers were 
responsible for monitoring performance data and submitting 
quarterly reports to the Strategic Management and Corporate 
Operations Staff. Monitoring performance on a quarterly basis 
allows the Agency to make adjustments in a timely manner, 
helping to ensure achievement of performance goals.
    The FSA has become a more performance-oriented agency, as 
evidenced by the amount of direct program changes it has made 
in both farm and commodity related programs. In addition to 
these changes, FSA has gone to great lengths to install 
internal systems to achieve these performance goals.
    The Annual Performance Plan encompasses all program 
activities included in the agency's budget request and reflects 
the program activities associated with identified goals. This 
linkage enables decision makers to assess the full time 
equivalent positions and funding requirements of achieving 
annual performance goals. Performance goals were developed for 
each FSA budget account. These measures are incorporated in 
budget material to indicate expected performance to be achieved 
based on available funding. The FSA has no plans to make 
changes to this structure in the near future since this direct 
linkage is sufficient to analyze performance and meet GPRA 
requirements.
    FSA was not able to report the balance of its data by the 
deadline specified by GPRA for the fiscal year 2000 performance 
plan. The areas where data is not specified and a reason for 
the lack of data are going to be included in the Annual 
Performance Report, accompanied by an explanation supporting 
the reason data is unavailable and anticipated time frames to 
obtain the data.
    During the period that the Subcommittee was making funding 
decisions, there was no consultation or interaction with FSA 
staff. There was no agency input to help the Subcommittee 
understand FSA's reasoning for funding requests or intentions. 
The information provided in the performance plan was moderately 
useful but had minimal influence on funding decisions.

                      Food and Drug Administration

    The Food and Drug Administration [FDA] has focused on the 
most important objectives of its programs by its strategic goal 
to reduce the possibility of food-related injuries and improve 
the health and well being of consumers by ensuring that 
decisions related to approving petitions and notifications are 
scientifically justified and benefit the public health. One of 
the most important program strategic goals of the FDA is to 
reduce human suffering and enhance the quality of public health 
by providing quicker access to important, lifesaving drugs, and 
to assure the American public of the availability of safe and 
effective drugs. The goals and measures are results-oriented 
because they seek to improve the safety of foods, human drugs, 
and medical devices. The goals and measures are challenging 
because of the complexities faced in making available a safe 
and effective drug supply. The goal of ensuring timely review 
for medical devices can be met, but a backlog of drug approvals 
still exists. The goals and measures are subject to reliable 
measurement and are also balanced among competing demands. The 
FDA and the Food Safety and Inspection Service [FSIS] 
demonstrate cross-cutting programs and activities as they both 
safeguard the public interest in food safety.
    The FDA expects to have reliable data for each performance 
goal. Depending on the nature of the goal statement, either 
metric, milestone or system improvement, the data will be 
presented either numerically or descriptively. Strengths, 
weaknesses, or other qualifying statements will provide 
additional information about the agency's performance toward 
the goal. FDA's Office of Planning and Evaluation produces 
guidance documents and training programs and arranges 
individual consultations with program managers to promote good 
performance planning practices. An important aspect of that 
guidance has been information about data reliability, 
verification and validation. Since March 2000 will be the first 
time that results will be reported, there was a considerable 
amount of discussion during calendar year 1999 on strategies to 
assure data reliability. FDA acknowledges that by the time they 
report on the fiscal year 2000 performance goals in 2001, they 
expect to be more proficient at managing and reporting 
performance information. The agency did not consult with the 
Subcommittee on its performance plan. The FDA's performance 
plan is more informative than other performance plans that have 
been reviewed. However, much information is presented, and it 
is a bit overwhelming.

                       Food and Nutrition Service

    The Food and Nutrition Service [FNS] has a Strategic Plan 
which outlines the goals it plans to achieve incrementally by 
fiscal year 2002. The agency has also developed the fiscal 
years 1999 and 2000 Annual Performance Plans, which support the 
Strategic Plan and specify annual goals and objectives.
    FNS has incorporated most program and policy changes into 
its annual performance plan. Goals are results-oriented and 
linked to the specific budget requests. The resources required 
to achieve these goals are provided in the Annual Performance 
Plans at the strategic goal level. A matrix format is used to 
link these resources to the major program activities outlined 
in the Program and Financing schedules.
    The agency's performance goals show that coordination 
exists among other agencies in USDA and the Government 
regarding its programs and activities. These include the 
project FNS is coordinating with the States and the Electronic 
Benefits Transfer Council of the National Automated 
Clearinghouse Association, and the Social Security 
Administration to ensure that food stamp benefits are not 
issued to the deceased, and the Economic Research Service [ERS] 
which manages the research programs for the food assistance 
programs at FNS. FNS has made a strong effort not to duplicate 
research programs performed by the ERS.
    FNS uses data such as Food Stamp Program participation, 
school lunch and breakfast meal service data, general economic 
indicators, and demographic data as the basis for budget 
projections. The program performance data generates the 
necessary information to support its performance plan and 
budget requests. However, FNS does have a number of performance 
indicators for which reliable data will not be available for 
inclusion in the first Annual Performance Report because 
validation of administrative data is not possible by using 
evaluations or other independent mechanisms. The agency is 
working to revise its strategic plan to better reflect its 
unifying mission and purposes and to make the plan more useful 
as a strategic management tool. The agency claims that the loss 
of funding for studies and evaluations to ERS has significantly 
hampered its ability to develop new analytical and evaluation 
tools to measure and report performance.
    FNS has faced the task of cracking down on fraud, waste, 
and abuse associated with the Food Stamp Program for many 
years. Several reports from the Office of Inspector General and 
the GAO have addressed this problem. The agency faces this 
fraud and waste by overpayments to food stamp recipients and by 
food stamp trafficking. The agency's performance goals include 
an increase of 38 States delivering food stamp benefits through 
the Electronic Benefits Transfer which is thought to decrease 
the trafficking of food stamps. The performance goals also 
reflect the agency's dependence on grocery stores to properly 
handle food stamps as an external factor that affects the 
agency's ability to achieve this goal. To address this, the 
plan cites that the agency promulgated rules for participating 
stores to follow and instituted a system of sanctions that may 
be applied to stores that violate the rules.
    The Subcommittee was not consulted regarding the agency's 
performance plan. The agency is currently integrating all of 
its current planning activities, including the development and 
execution of strategic and annual performance plans, into a 
single process that will involve all FNS staff including the 
budget staff. This will ensure that all the employees involved 
with Federal nutrition assistance will understand and achieve 
the agency's key goals and objectives.
    The agency does not plan to make any changes in the account 
structure since the current budget structure is set up by major 
program and account activity. The performance plan is 
informative to the Subcommittee and is useful in providing 
oversight and making budget decisions for the FNS because the 
linkage with the goals and plan cross-link to the budget 
priorities presented in the President's budget request.

                 Natural Resources Conservation Service

    One of the main performance goals of the Natural Resources 
Conservation Service [NRCS] is a healthy and productive land 
that sustains food and fiber production and functioning 
watersheds and natural systems, enhances the environment, and 
improves urban and rural landscapes. The achievement of these 
performance goals supports achievement of USDA's goal to 
promote sustainable production of food and fiber products while 
maintaining a quality environment and strong natural resource 
base. The goals and measures are results-oriented through 
assistance to producers to: (1) plan and apply systems to 
protect and enhance cropland and grazing lands, (2) protect 
water against agricultural nonpoint sources of pollution, (3) 
protect watersheds against flood damages, and (4) preserve land 
for agricultural use. All of NRCS's goals are challenging and 
can be realistically met.
    The performance goals established in the agency performance 
plan are cross-cutting goals that are supported by multiple 
activities in the budget structure. The performance goals 
provide a way for managers and the public to see the outcome on 
the landscape that results from the agency's services that are 
funded through separate accounts. This comprehensive view of 
agency performance is not possible when performance is measured 
program-by-program.
    The agency performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 
include a summary table that quantifies the relationship 
between each program and resource objective in the agency 
strategic plan. For programs that support multiple objectives, 
however, allocation among objectives is only estimated. The 
combined data that will be available from the new time and 
attendance reporting system, the performance measurement system 
and the workload analysis activity will provide information for 
planning and will be the basis for allocation of funds, 
enabling managers to ensure that funds and time are expended on 
the objectives that were intended.
    In addition to the cross-cutting goals, each program in the 
budget structure continues to set program-specific goals for 
activities and outputs that must be achieved in order to attain 
the higher-level performance measures.
    The Chief of the NRCS has ensured that there is a clear 
focus on performance-based management at the highest level. The 
Chief realigned the headquarters structure, consolidating 
responsibility for strategic planning, performance planning and 
measurement, budget allocation, and oversight and evaluation 
under a Deputy Chief for Strategic Planning and Accountability. 
The new Deputy Chief was directed to develop and implement a 
new accountability system that would provide a balanced, 
reliable, and timely picture of the agency's performance. The 
system will enable agency managers to estimate the effect of 
programs on the condition of natural resources systems, assess 
the cost-effectiveness of service delivery, identify 
opportunities for process improvement, and respond to 
customers' needs with strategies and assistance tailored to 
local conditions. Also, action has been taken to ensure that 
reliable high quality information is available to achieve 
performance-based management within NRCS. In fiscal year 1999, 
the agency began implementation of the new accountability 
system, which includes data in three major categories.
    Action has been taken to ensure that funding is linked to 
performance. New procedures are being implemented to define 
performance expectations when budgets are allocated to 
managers.
    Agency-wide goals for key performance measures are set in 
the agency performance plan, based on the long-term goals in 
the strategic plan. In addition, goals for program-specific 
activities or outputs are established. As the performance 
measurement system becomes fully operational, specific State 
goals will be established for each performance measure. An 
appropriate element will be included in State and regional 
conservationists' individual performance appraisals. The 
regional conservationists will monitor the progress of States 
for which they are responsible and hold State conservationists 
accountable for meeting goals. The Deputy Chief for Strategic 
Planning and Accountability will monitor performance nationally 
and report to the Associate Chief, who will hold Deputy Chiefs 
and regional conservationists accountable.
    Measurable long-term outcome strategic objectives that 
support the agency's mission are established in the strategic 
plan. Annual performance goals are set to move toward 
achievement of the strategic goals and objectives. Line 
managers will be assigned responsibility for specific portions 
of each agency goal when they receive their allocation for a 
fiscal year. They will develop operating budgets that use their 
funds and staff to meet the established goals and conduct all 
activities needed to achieve the goals. Employees will report 
their accomplishments on key performance measures on a 
continuous basis and will report how their time was spent by 
program and major activity. Data will be available on a real-
time basis so that employees and first-line supervisors can 
monitor progress. Senior managers will review performance and 
financial data periodically to ensure efficient and effective 
use of resources and to take corrective action when necessary.
    In addition to the changes in management information 
systems, NRCS has established a team to analyze field office 
operations and identify internally-imposed requirements and 
procedures that add little value and reduce the time that front 
line staff can devote to direct services to customers. NRCS is 
implementing the team's recommendations, thus allowing 
employees to focus more attention on directly serving customers 
and completing high priority conservation work.
    NRCS is developing plans to ensure that all agency 
personnel maintain the level of technical expertise essential 
to meeting goals. An interdisciplinary team conducted a review 
of how the agency delivers appropriate conservation technology 
to field personnel and made recommendations for improvement, 
which NRCS is implementing. A separate review of training for 
the field offices has resulted in a comprehensive catalog of 
available training, including self-paced, satellite, agency-
provided formal course-work, and non-agency training. The 
review made further recommendations for improving technical 
training.
    When NRCS's accountability system is fully implemented, it 
will have more detailed information on results achieved and the 
time required to achieve them by geographic area. NRCS will be 
able to more accurately estimate expected performance at 
alternative levels of funding than was possible with 
information available earlier, which generally supported only 
generalized national estimates. NRCS will be able to identify 
the causes of any shortfall in expected performance and to 
determine corrective action needed. Where reliable information 
demonstrates that performance shortfalls result from 
insufficient resources directed to a problem, NRCS will provide 
Congress with a firm basis for making its decisions on future 
funding.
    The fiscal years 1999 and 2000 performance plans include a 
summary table that attempts to allocate all agency funds among 
the natural resources objectives established in the strategic 
plan, thereby indicating the full costs associated with the 
objective. NRCS time and financial systems in the past have not 
been designed to track costs by resource outcome. Therefore, at 
present NRCS can only estimate full costs of objectives.
    NRCS has had two Results Act briefings for the Subcommittee 
over the last fiscal year. The performance plan is informative 
and will be extremely useful as a tool to pinpoint the agency's 
use of salaries and expenses, which is not specifically 
addressed in past budget submissions.

   SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND 
                            RELATED AGENCIES

                     TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

    The Justice Department is responsible for the investigation 
and prosecution, the detention of those accused, and the 
imprisonment of those convicted of Federal crimes. Justice also 
distributes billions of dollars in grants to State and local 
law enforcement agencies.
    Justice has aggressively pursued the development of 
performance measures. GPRA performance measures are a routine 
part of annual budget submissions. Component agency strategic 
plans, which lay out core missions and goals, are used to 
formulate individual ``contracts'' for key managers. These 
contracts describe agency expectations for a given manager and 
are the basis upon which a manager's competence is judged.
    The Subcommittee should exercise judgment in using GPRA-
inspired performance measures to judge the success or failure 
of an agency. Oftentimes, the easiest factors to quantify are 
the least revealing. For example, the number of arrests made by 
an agency is easy to count and catalog. However, total arrests 
provide no insight as to the quality of those arrests. To be of 
value, total arrests must be cross-referenced with total 
successful prosecutions. Similarly, performance measures can 
generate perverse outcomes at odds with agency goals. In 
counting successful prosecutions, for example, were tough but 
far-reaching prosecutions avoided in favor of easy but 
insignificant cases in order to boost a score? Does counting 
prosecutions prompt a ``win at all cost'' mentality among 
attorneys that has nothing to do with the pursuit of justice? 
GPRA will not eliminate the need for careful analysis on the 
part of the Subcommittee.
    GPRA-generated data may also fail to address key 
Subcommittee concerns. The single biggest concern the 
Subcommittee has with Justice is the inability to get clear 
insight into the details of billions of dollars of ``base'' 
funds included in the Department's budget. Performance measures 
matter little when the Subcommittee is unable to ascertain how 
money is being spent beyond vague ``object classes'' that 
obscure as much as they illuminate. For example, though 
counter-terrorism is a core mission for Justice, though reams 
of material on the strategies and tactics of combating 
terrorism have been generated, and though very definite 
measures of effectiveness exist, the Subcommittee still cannot 
determine how much money the FBI is spending on Special Weapons 
and Tactics and sniper teams in its field offices and on the 
Hostage Rescue Teams in Quantico, Virginia. GPRA is not well-
suited to identify budget issues.

         TITLE II--DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND RELATED AGENCIES

                     International Trade Commission

    The International Trade Commission (the Commission) is a 
nonpartisan, quasi-judicial agency that serves as a fact-
finder, investigator, and adjudicator with regard to Federal 
trade practices. The Commission's performance plan is 
comprehensive and includes many good ideas on improving the 
Commission's method of conducting its investigations and 
providing information to its users. The goals stated in the 
plan do focus on the two most important functions the Agency 
has: its adjudicative/investigative function and its research/
fact finding function. However, the performance plan divides 
the Agency's functions into five groups. The performance 
indicators for these groups seem to overlap for the 
investigations and then again for the research program, trade 
information services, and trade policy support.
    The performance goals are reasonably challenging and 
reflect a balance among competing demands upon the Agency; yet, 
they do not sufficiently link individual employee performance 
to the obligations of the Commission. The Results Act was 
implemented as a means for government agencies to re-evaluate 
programs for effectiveness and efficiency. The performance 
measures are to be linked to results of individual's efforts. 
The Commission's plan is not totally in-step with this vision.
    One performance measurement the Commission proposes is to 
track how long an investigation takes. The length of time that 
a case or investigation remains open does not necessarily 
indicate the Commission's efficiency or effectiveness in 
working on it. Performance may be better linked to hours each 
individual spends working on a task and the number of employees 
needed to accomplish each activity.
    The Subcommittee noted that the performance indicators as 
stated do not seem to include quality control mechanisms while 
emphasizing timeliness. It is desirable to shorten procedures 
as long as the integrity of the outcome is not jeopardized. The 
Commission's intention to maintain the quality of its products 
has been mentioned to the Subcommittee, although not explicitly 
in the strategic plan. The Commission found that the Results 
Act focuses on objectively measurable goals, and it had 
difficulty in structuring its plan because statutory 
requirements direct how investigations are conducted, thus 
limiting the Commission's ability to make meaningful goals.
    According to the plan, the Commission intends to measure 
its performance results in part by providing surveys to 
participating individuals and commissioners to get those 
individuals' subjective feedback on how the Commission is doing 
and what would be more useful to the Commission's consumers. 
Although this type of input is worthwhile, its subjective 
nature may make the data's reliability questionable. The 
Subcommittee was informed by the Commission that it believes 
that it will have reliable data for all performance measures 
for trade information services by March 2000.
    The Subcommittee would be interested to learn more about 
how the Commission incorporates similar activities within the 
different investigations it undertakes to make the processes 
more effective.
    The Subcommittee is concerned by the Commission's third 
strategic goal of obtaining increased use of its research 
products. The Subcommittee endorses making trade information 
more readily available to those individuals who request it. 
However, the Commission's choice of measurement is perplexing 
since it requires obtaining software (which the Commission is 
not sure is available at a reasonable cost) that will allow the 
Commission to search for mentions of its name and trade reports 
in Congressional debates. This is not an effective use of the 
Commission's scarce resources. Another stated performance 
indicator of this goal is to count the number of Members of 
Congress that testify as witnesses in hearings. Because Members 
of Congress are not employees of the Commission, their 
testimony is not indicative of the Commission's performance. 
This does not seem to be relevant to how accurate the 
Commission's trade reports are or whether its investigations 
and adjudications are fair.
    The Commission's plan is clear and coherent so that it 
informs the reader. The plan's annual performance goals, the 
mission, and the strategic plan reflect the same concepts and 
ideas. The creation of the strategic plan forced the Commission 
to reevaluate its objectives and formally establish goals and 
measurements. However, in discussions with the budget staff, it 
appears that true linkage of the performance plan, strategy, 
and goals with daily activities and the budget process has not 
occurred. Compliance seems to generate more work and additional 
paper that were not previously part of the Commission's working 
framework.
    The Subcommittee notes that the Commission staff has made 
extra efforts to consult with this Subcommittee about how it 
can improve its budget presentation to better meet the needs of 
Congress. Currently, the strategic plan is helpful to the 
Subcommittee in giving an overview of how the Commission 
intends to function. The strategic plan would be of more 
assistance to appropriators if it provided more details, such 
as how many investigations would be completed within a given 
quarter of time. This is information that a budget office 
usually compiles as part of its budget formulation process, and 
it would be relevant to both the budget and the strategic 
plans. Overall, the Subcommittee would like to see the 
Commission perfect its goals by focusing more on items it 
currently documents without having to implement new systems 
with possibly unreliable results.

                         DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

    The Department of Commerce Annual Performance Plan (Plan) 
for fiscal year 2000 outlines 3 strategic themes. Given the 
diverse missions of the Department's myriad agencies, the Plan 
is stronger in some areas than others. For example, it is 
easier to quantify and measure increased lead time for severe 
weather warnings than it is to determine whether the Department 
is successful in advancing ``the public interest in 
telecommunications, mass media and information.'' In general, 
the Department's Plan presents reasonable programmatic goals 
and adequate means to measure their achievement. However, the 
portions of the Plan describing the Department's management 
strategy seem to lack the detail and focus found in the Plan's 
programmatic activities.
    For example, the Subcommittee continues to be concerned 
about the Department's ability to manage its finances. The Plan 
does not provide sufficient detail about steps the Department 
plans to take in fiscal year 2000 to improve its financial 
management systems. Millions of dollars have been appropriated 
to assist the Department in updating its financial management 
systems, and little detail is provided in the Department's Plan 
to outline how these funds were spent and what steps will be 
taken to improve the management and control of the significant 
resources provided by Congress for Departmental programs. It is 
reasonable for the Subcommittee to expect the Plan to provide a 
timetable for the deployment of a new Department-wide financial 
management system by agency. It is not enough for the 
Department to say that its goal is clean financial audits as if 
such audits are in and of themselves sufficient proof of 
improved financial management. The Department's need for 
improved financial management has been a concern of the 
Subcommittee for the past 3 fiscal years, and was the subject 
of an Inspector General report in fiscal year 1997. The failure 
of the Department to outline specific goals and procedures to 
implement improved financial management and controls undermines 
the credibility of its detailed programmatic performance goals. 
In short, if the Department cannot account for funds it is 
given to conduct programs, how can the Subcommittee determine 
if the goals are being effectively and efficiently achieved?
    Of particular concern in this regard is the decennial 
census. The Plan states that a new pilot financial management 
system was implemented at the Bureau of the Census in fiscal 
year 1998. The only information provided in the Plan about the 
pilot was that a major accounting firm ``completed an 
Independent Verification and Validation * * * of the pilot.'' 
The decennial census has been identified by the GAO as a high-
risk program which could have problems. The financial 
management of the decennial census is given inadequate 
attention in the Department's Plan, which is unacceptable to 
the Subcommittee.
    The Subcommittee expects the Department's future Plans to 
more fully integrate financial management and controls with 
programmatic goals. Program goals and the funds to achieve 
these goals are not mutually exclusive concepts, and the 
Department would do well to recognize this.

                        TITLE III--THE JUDICIARY

    While the Federal judiciary is not covered by GPRA, it does 
incorporate many GPRA tenets into its budget planning 
procedures and has responded to the Subcommittee in that 
context. The judiciary's goals are results-oriented. The annual 
statistics provided to the Subcommittee about the number of 
cases adjudicated, appeals heard, etc., tell little as to 
efficiency of the Federal judiciary. It would be helpful if 
GPRA tenets were used by the judiciary to demonstrate to the 
Subcommittee how it is making strides in controlling what it 
believes to be uncontrollable costs, such as rental payments 
and staffing. For example, the Subcommittee has difficulty 
understanding substantially increased staff requests every year 
when computer modernization and other technological advances 
should have made court procedures much more efficient.
    The judiciary's workload is largely controlled by what 
crimes the Congress federalizes. Since the judiciary has no 
control over what crimes will be committed in the next fiscal 
year, it must rely on estimates for its budget requests. In 
many instances the judiciary has done a good job of estimating 
future requirements. The Subcommittee believes that this 
intense focus on planning for unknown budget scenarios has 
distracted the judiciary from another important goal of 
ensuring that the cases it administers are handled in an 
expedient and efficient manner.

                     TITLE IV--DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    The State Department (State) is responsible for the conduct 
of foreign affairs. State is struggling to develop meaningful 
performance measures. Not only is the art of diplomacy nearly 
impossible to quantify, but the conduct of American foreign 
policy is subject to so many outside influences--the President, 
Congress, interest groups, other nations, international, non-
governmental, and transnational organizations, and 
international business--that attributing success or failure 
solely to State in any overseas endeavor is misleading at best.
    This will prove frustrating to the Subcommittee. GPRA-
related measures of effectiveness will be most beneficial in 
judging administrative support: information technology, 
construction and maintenance, security, and the like. Judgments 
regarding United States interactions with other nations will 
likely remain highly subjective. Partisan differences will 
further complicate a clear-eyed analysis of the effectiveness 
of State initiatives.

                       TITLE V--RELATED AGENCIES

                       Commission on Civil Rights

    The Commission on Civil Rights has had some difficulties in 
the past with program planning and budgeting. The agency seems 
to be making a concerted effort to improve financial management 
and control by requiring more in-depth management reports which 
tie current activities to resources used according to project 
plan and to link account and activities to budget 
justifications.

                   Federal Communications Commission

    The Federal Communications Commission [FCC] is in the 
process of updating its financial management systems and its 
cost accounting system to permit the agency to more efficiently 
capture performance management data. The FCC has held several 
hearings with industry, consumers, State and local governments 
and other interested parties to gauge improvements which could 
be implemented to improve agency performance.
    The Subcommittee observes that whether or not Congress 
approves any future restructuring of the agency, it is critical 
that the FCC continue to make improvements in its operations 
based on its current structure, particularly with regard to 
backlogs in consumer complaints and pending applications. The 
Subcommittee further notes that the FCC has indicated 
difficulty in using the Results Act as a basis for funding 
requests because the ``timing between the assessment of 
performance and the submission of an agency's budget is not 
synchronized.'' The Subcommittee considers this a good 
observation and raises a question about whether the Results Act 
can be used uniformly as a management tool government-wide.

                        Federal Trade Commission

    The Federal Trade Commission [FTC] has instituted quarterly 
reviews of its performance measures and its budgetary 
resources. The agency appears to have institutionalized these 
reviews to be able to use information gained in its annual 
budget process. The FTC has advised the Subcommittee that it 
has used the process to streamline agency operations. The 
agency's budget submission effectively tied its strategic plan 
to its request.

                        Maritime Administration

    The Maritime Administration [MARAD] in the Department of 
Transportation is responsible for administering several 
programs for the maritime industry relating to U.S. foreign and 
domestic commerce and for national defense purposes. These 
include operating the Maritime Security Program, the Merchant 
Marine Academy, and the Title XI loan guarantee program.
    MARAD appears to be moving in the direction of results-
oriented goals, and its mission and goals are relatively easy 
to meet. One measure of MARAD's effectiveness is the Title XI 
loan program. The Subcommittee can easily observe the program's 
operation, and it appears to be working efficiently and as 
designed.
    While MARAD does have a different jurisdiction than the 
Federal Maritime Commission, it would seem that these two small 
agencies could be combined, and perhaps some budgetary savings 
and efficiencies might be realized.

                      Federal Maritime Commission

    The Federal Maritime Commission (the Commission) is an 
independent regulatory agency charged with administering 
several laws relating to the waterborne domestic and foreign 
offshore commerce of the United States.
    The Commission's goals are fairly well defined and can be 
met, and its programs and goals are oriented toward meeting 
those objectives. Recently, its main focus has been on 
implementing the Ocean Shipping Reform Act. This implementation 
is not easily observed by the Subcommittee, and the Results Act 
might be better used by the Commission to demonstrate to the 
Subcommittee the problems with this implementation. 
Furthermore, the Commission could show how it is meeting the 
goals of the statute and how it plans to avoid unintended 
consequences in the process.
    While the Commission does have a different jurisdiction 
than the Maritime Administration, it would seem that these two 
small agencies could be combined, and perhaps some budgetary 
savings and efficiencies might be realized.

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The Department of Defense [DOD], in its Results Act 
Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000, has compiled a 
comprehensive plan designed to implement a management strategy 
based on the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] submitted to 
Congress in May of 1997.
    In 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced some 
specific goals of the QDR when he unveiled the plan to the 
press:

          ``First, that the defense strategy developed in the 
        QDR process must be the basis for all other QDR 
        decisions and analyses. The success of the QDR is 
        directly a result of our ability to adhere to the 
        principle that the QDR be strategy-based.
          ``Second, that we should not make any unrealistic 
        assumptions about the threat, about operations, about 
        support costs which have been consistently 
        underestimated in recent years, and about those program 
        schedules and costs as well, so I wanted realistic 
        assumptions.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ DOD News Briefing, Monday, May 19, 1997--2:30 p.m. Subject: 
Quadrennial Defense Review. http://www.defenselink.mil:80/news/May 
1997/t051997__t0519qdr.html.

    DOD is in a unique situation when it comes to projecting 
plans into the future. DOD budget submissions are based on 
Five-Year Defense Plans [FYDP]. The Results Act Performance 
Plan for fiscal year 2000 should be nothing more than a road 
map on how to implement that budget, using the QDR as a 
parallel document.
    The QDR sets out very clear, specific goals for DOD's long-
term strategy and mission goals. According to the report 
submitted to Congress, ``Building on the President's National 
Security Strategy, we determined that U.S. defense strategy for 
the near and long term must continue to shape the strategic 
environment to advance U.S. interests, maintain the capability 
to respond to the full spectrum of threats, and prepare now for 
the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, William S. Cohen, 
Secretary of Defense. May 1997. p.2. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/
qdr/msg.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DOD, in its fiscal year 2000 report, has revised prior 
goals from a series of six corporate goals into two corporate 
goals. The stated reason is to ``more accurately reflect the 
necessary resource trade-offs between current and future 
needs''.
    The two corporate goals presented in the report are 
consistent with the QDR. The goals of the fiscal year 2000 
report are to ``shape and respond'', and to ``prepare''.
    Each executive agency covered by the Results Act must 
develop a multi-year strategic plan that identifies the 
fundamental mission of the agency, general goals that would be 
used to achieve the mission, and resources needed to accomplish 
the mission.
    DOD does a good job of complying with this requirement. The 
goals and measures focused on in the report are those that are 
the most important to DOD's overall mission. The report states 
very clearly the Department's missions and roles.
    However, the missions presented in the report are somewhat 
vague and do not present a clear, specific focus. Rather, they 
are sufficiently vague and all-encompassing to allow any action 
taken by the Department to be fit into the stated strategy 
after-the-fact. This would seem to be an enormous burden to 
managers in developing strategic plans based on finite goals 
with which to compare their progress.
    DOD's goals and measures are output-oriented. The goals are 
clear, objective results which in many cases, will be easily 
identifiable. For example, the plan includes goals to maintain 
specific numbers of troop strength and ensure the quality of 
those personnel. This goal can be assessed based on 
quantifiable analysis through the Department's ``Active 
Component Enlisted Retention Rates'', as well as through 
``Quality Benchmarks for Enlisted Recruits''.
    The goals are clear cut and well-defined. However, the 
means of achieving these goals is somewhat ambiguous. While DOD 
has crafted well-thought out objective measures of achieving 
its goals, its mission statement makes it difficult to achieve 
those goals.
    In the area of Army deployment tempo, for example, DOD sets 
out an admirable goal of moving from 18 units deploying more 
than 120 days per year to 0, but its mission statement does not 
give great confidence that it will be able to meet this goal. 
DOD claims it will be able to go everywhere and anywhere, and 
it seems that in fact it does.
    According to DOD's report, ``Today's security environment 
presents the same pressing needs for military forces as existed 
when the QDR was conducted. The force-level objectives for 
fiscal year 2000 are, therefore, largely the same as the goals 
set in the QDR. The intent of these goals is to provide forces 
that can fight and win two major theater wars nearly 
simultaneously. At the same time, the goals reflect the fact 
that the United States must remain prepared to respond to 
smaller-scale contingencies. Although they are much less 
demanding than major theater wars, smaller-scale contingencies 
can become a very high priority, particularly when swift 
intervention of military forces is needed to contain, resolve, 
or mitigate the consequences of a conflict that could otherwise 
become far more costly and deadly.
    ``Because crises can arise quickly, U.S. military forces 
must be continuously ready to respond * * *. In recognition of 
the need to more closely monitor tempo across the force, the 
Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services, has instituted 
a tempo management process. The metric, for each Service, is 
the number of units exceeding its tempo goal.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Government Performance and Results Act Performance Plan for 
Fiscal Year 2000, Department of Defense, p. 7. http://www.dtic.mil/
execsec/adr1999/apdx__j.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, if the Pentagon has had this difficult of a time 
meeting these goals to date, how will they change? The report 
does not explain how the herculean task of reducing deployment 
tempo will be accomplished--only that it will be accomplished. 
The report defines the metric to evaluate whether or not the 
goal is being met, but does not describe what is going to 
change to make meeting these goals likely. Will there be some 
sort of policy change? Or perhaps, there will be some other 
fundamental change in the way DOD deploys troops so that these 
goals will be met. The goals are very aggressive, and without 
some description of how they will be met, these goals are 
nothing more than good intentions.
    As the United States military is tasked with many more and 
new humanitarian missions, it is essential to define when, 
where and how troops will be used. The ``calculus'' which is 
referred to in the DOD report must be clear cut and objective, 
not subjective criteria used after forces are already committed 
to justify the action rather than being the guidance for the 
decision to commit or not commit forces.
    The report states that ``In all cases where the commitment 
of U.S. forces is considered, determining whether the 
associated costs and risks are commensurate with the U.S. 
interests at stake should be the central calculus of U.S. 
decisions. Such decisions should also depend on the United 
States' ability to identify a clear mission, the desired end 
state of the situation, and the exit strategy for the forces 
committed.'' \4\ However, the report never defines that 
``calculus'' in a significant, objective way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Government Performance and Results Act Performance Plan for 
Fiscal Year 2000, Department of Defense, p. 2. http://www.dtic.mil/
execsec/adr1999/apdx__j.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The goals and measures in the report are well-defined and 
laid out. The measurement criteria are also well defined. Among 
others, the plan includes goals to maintain specified levels of 
forces, flying hours, tank miles and steaming days, personnel 
force levels as well as numbers of units deploying for more 
than a specified time period. This data will prove useful in 
determining whether or not DOD has met its stated goals.
    However, the report does not explain in detail how certain 
measurement data will be derived. Specifically, the report 
refers to associated costs and risks as the central calculus of 
U.S. decisions and as the determining factor in deciding 
whether or not to deploy U.S. forces. Unfortunately, this 
subjective measurement is neither fully developed nor explained 
anywhere in the report.
    Additionally, when asked about the involvement of senior 
executives and other key managers being held accountable for 
achieving results, the Department of Defense responded as 
follows:
    ``DOD component heads are held accountable by a number of 
management processes used within the Department. Each year when 
the components submit budget proposals to the Secretary, the 
objectives that the Secretary has set for each component are 
compared with the performance levels that would be achieved in 
the next budget and the five years that follow. Additionally, 
in the context of GPRA, senior managers are responsible for 
reporting results against the performance goals set in the 
annual performance report. Senior managers are also responsible 
for verifying and validating the results that they report. The 
acquisition system holds managers accountable with periodic 
reviews of the progress of major acquisition programs and major 
reviews that coincide with each milestone in the acquisition 
process. The Defense Management Council [DMC] monitors the 
progress of management reforms instituted in the Defense Reform 
Initiative [DRI]. One of the mechanisms used by the DMC to 
define goals and monitor progress is the performance contracts 
that have been established for defense agencies. Another 
example is the management of force readiness. The Department 
monitors day-to-day readiness of its forces through two senior 
forms: the Joint Monthly Readiness Review [JMRR] and the Senior 
Readiness Oversight Council [SROC]. The detailed work reflected 
in the JMRR is summarized in a Department-wide readiness review 
presented monthly to the SROC. The key results of these reviews 
are forwarded to the Congress in the form of the Quarterly 
Readiness Report to Congress [QRRC]. The QRRC will also include 
the classified readiness measures that have been developed for 
the GPRA annual performance plan and report.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 4, 1999, response 
of Mr. James L. Johnson, Deputy Director, Theater Assessments and 
Planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Department of Defense's Results Act Performance Plan 
for fiscal year 2000 notes that ``there are several national 
security issues that the Department addresses as part of an 
interagency team. * * * DOD provides technical support to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in its efforts to combat 
terrorism, including potential terrorist use of weapons of mass 
destruction. DOD likewise works closely with the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to ensure 
the security of the increasingly interconnected and vulnerable 
U.S. infrastructures against physical or cyber attack. DOD also 
works closely with FEMA to prepare for and respond to natural 
disasters. Finally, DOD conducts airborne and seaborne 
surveillance of high-intensity drug-trafficking routes in 
support of the White House Office of National Drug Control 
Policy.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Government Performance and Results Act Performance Plan for 
Fiscal Year 2000, Department of Defense, p. 2. http://www.dtic.mil/
execsec/adr1999/apdx__j.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The DOD report does not do an adequate job of addressing or 
explaining its coordination for cross-cutting efforts.
    According to the GAO, ``the plan does not sufficiently 
explain coordination with other agencies that conduct related 
activities. For example, it does not discuss how DOD 
coordinates with State and other agencies that cooperate in a 
number of programs and activities aimed at helping to shape the 
international environment.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Observations on the Department of Defense's Annual Performance 
Plan for fiscal year 2000. General Accounting Office. April 22, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          ii. data reliability

    The report leaves cause for concern with regard to the 
credibility of data from DOD's financial, accounting, and other 
information systems. The Pentagon's plan does not provide 
detail on how improvements will be made to existing systems and 
what new systems will be implemented. GAO notes that ``while 
DOD's performance plan discusses data verification and 
validation for some performance measures and indicators, and it 
acknowledges that data for certain measures and indicators come 
from financial and accounting systems that have experienced 
problems, it provides only limited confidence that the 
performance information will be credible. To remedy accounting 
systems shortcomings, DOD has developed a financial management 
improvement plan. However, as we reported, the improvement plan 
has several critical omissions which, unless they are 
effectively addressed in the near term, will impair the 
implementation of a sound foundation for fundamentally 
reforming DOD's financial management operations.''
    GAO also noted that ``DOD Inspector General and service 
audit organizations have reported that DOD's financial systems 
are not in compliance with Federal systems requirements and 
applicable Federal accounting standards. These problems limit 
the reliability and timeliness of currently available financial 
information needed to effectively manage operations. Moreover, 
the audit organizations have repeatedly found systems to be 
inadequate for measuring the cost of operations and programs.''
    Additionally, GAO notes that ``although the plan states 
that there are no known data deficiencies for some performance 
measures and indicators audits continue to identify significant 
problems with the data integrity of DOD financial systems and 
supporting cost, logistical, and operations information 
systems. For example, the plan states that there are no known 
deficiencies in the data collection process related to the 
performance measure for the disposal of unneeded government 
property held by contractors. That measure supports the annual 
performance goal to meet combat forces' needs `smarter and 
faster'. However, accurately accounting for and controlling 
contractor-held assets has been a long-standing issue at DOD. A 
1997 report by the DOD Inspector General recommended that DOD 
develop short- and long-term solutions to the financial 
accountability and reporting problems regarding government 
property in the possession of contractors. In response the 
Department has set out an action plan with action steps for 
this area scheduled to be completed by October 1999.
    ``This year's plan is moderately improved over last year's 
in that it demonstrates some degree of progress in addressing 
credibility of performance information weaknesses we and others 
identified in last year's plan. Specifically, last year's plan 
did not address known data and systems deficiencies, the degree 
to which these deficiencies affect specific performance 
information, or planned actions to address these deficiencies. 
Furthermore, the plan did not identify the extent to which 
external evaluations such as audits would be used in the 
performance information validation process.
    ``Improvements in this year's plan in this area include 
discussions on (1) verifying and validating data such as that 
generated by the components' automated inventory data 
collection systems; (2) known data and systems limitations for 
performance metrics, such as using Selected Acquisition Reports 
data as an absolute measure of research and development and 
procurement cost performance; and (3) planned actions to 
address data or systems deficiencies such as enhancing the 
interface among the military services and defense agencies to 
overcome data systems interoperability problems related to the 
location of inventory. However, this year's plan does not 
address how external evaluations will be used.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Observations on the Department of Defense's Annual Performance 
Plan for fiscal year 2000. General Accounting Office. April 22, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The success of performance-based management hinges on the 
quality of information an organization produces to manage 
programs and measure success. Unfortunately, the inadequacy of 
information systems at the Department, according to GAO, 
provides limited confidence that performance information will 
be credible. The report falls short on the explanation of 
methodologies and ``metrics'' which serve as the basis for the 
criteria used to evaluate the goals set forth in the report. It 
would be helpful if the report explained in greater detail how 
those metrics were going to be built and provided greater 
detail on the source of the raw data.
    It is important to keep in mind the amount of information 
that confronts DOD as an organization each month. Nonetheless, 
financial and information systems at DOD remain flawed, and 
cannot produce verifiable performance information in most 
areas. DOD must redouble efforts to ensure that its data 
capacity meets the tremendous need outlined in its performance 
plan.

                        iii. high risk problems

    In January 1999, GAO submitted a report which addresses 
DOD's major performance and management challenges. The various 
challenges addressed by GAO were categorized into two areas: 
(1) systemic management challenges dealing with financial 
management, information management, weapon systems acquisition, 
and contract management; and (2) program management challenges 
dealing with infrastructure, inventory management, and 
personnel.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Major Management Challenges and Program Risks--Department of 
Defense. GAO/OCG-99-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The DOD report included performance goals, measures, and 
indicators related to six of nine major management challenges 
identified by the GAO and/or the DOD Inspector General.
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE:
    1. Financial Management.--GAO reported that DOD's problems 
range from being unable to properly account for billions of 
dollars in assets to being unable to produce reliable and 
timely information needed to make sound resource decisions. The 
DOD Inspector General reported that DOD remains unable to 
comply with laws requiring auditable financial statements for 
its major funds and for the Department as a whole.
    There was no goal in the plan which addresses this 
challenge. However, in late October 1998, DOD issued its first 
Biennial Financial Management Improvement Plan, which 
established DOD's strategy for managing financial management 
operations. According to the Secretary, the plan sets out DOD's 
first ever attempt to describe the overall concept for its 
future financial management operations.
    2. Information Management and Technology.--The GAO reported 
that information management and technology issues are key DOD 
management challenges. A primary short-term concern centers on 
the implementation of the year 2000 conversions of date-
sensitive information on computer systems.
    There was no goal in the plan which addresses this 
challenge; however, the plan notes that DOD works with other 
Federal agencies to ensure the security of the increasingly 
interconnected and vulnerable U.S. infrastructures against 
physical or cyber attack. Additionally, the Clinger-Cohen Act 
of 1996 requires DOD to establish goals for improving the 
efficiency and effectiveness of its operations through the use 
of information technology. It also requires DOD to include an 
annual report with the submission of its budget to the Congress 
on its progress in achieving the goals. The current report is 
Appendix K in DOD's 1999 Annual Report to the President and the 
Congress. The goals are to: (1) become a mission partner; (2) 
provide services that satisfy customer needs; (3) reform 
information technology management processes to increase 
efficiency and mission contribution; and (4) ensure vital 
information resources are secure and protected. Appendix K 
discusses progress toward achieving these goals and efforts to 
meet the technical challenges related to year 2000 compliance.
    3. Weapon System Acquisition.--GAO reported that 
effectively managing the weapon systems acquisition process 
continues to be a concern. Although DOD has increased its 
procurement budget, it consistently pays more and takes longer 
than planned to develop systems that do not perform as 
anticipated.
    The DOD IG also reported a compelling need to accelerate 
the weapon systems acquisition cycle and reduce per unit costs. 
The IG further reported that a significant gap exists between 
weapon systems modernization requirements and planned funding. 
DOD has a goal to further increase procurement spending, but 
the goal relies on shifting about $10 billion of spending a 
year from other areas. The IG doubts that planned actions will 
free up that amount of funds.
    The Performance Plan includes a performance goal to ``meet 
combat forces' needs smarter and faster, with products and 
services that work better and cost less, by improving the 
efficiency of acquisition processes''. The plan includes two 
related performance measures: (1) Major Defense Acquisition 
Program cost growth; and (2) Successful completion of weapon 
system operational test and evaluation events. The plan also 
includes a related performance indicator-Major Defense 
Acquisition Program cycle time.
    4. Contracting.--DOD spends over $100 billion a year 
contracting for goods and services. Over the last few years, 
several broad-based changes have been made to acquisition and 
contracting processes to improve DOD-contractor relationships 
and rules. But GAO and the DOD IG continue to identify risks in 
contracting, including erroneous, fraudulent, and improper 
payments to contractors; payment of higher prices for 
commercial spare parts than necessary; and the award and 
administration of health care contracts. The DOD IG reported 
that the sheer volume and great variety of the contracting 
activity make it a high-risk area. The IG also reported a lack 
of good cost information and significant levels of fraud, 
mostly by providers, in the Defense Health Program.
    The Performance Plan includes three performance indicators 
that relate to some aspects of contracting: (1) the percentage 
of purchases made by purchase card; (2) the percentage of 
paperless transactions; and (3) the percentage of paperless 
acquisition transactions.
    5. Defense Infrastructure.--GAO reported that although DOD 
has substantially downsized its force structure over the past 7 
to 10 years, it has not reduced operations and support costs--
the costs for its supporting infrastructure--commensurately. A 
key reason is that the services are reluctant to consolidate 
activities that span service lines and reduce capacity as 
necessary. The DOD IG reported that key infrastructure areas 
such as transportation, maintenance, facilities, and supply 
offer opportunities to reduce costs. The IG noted, however, 
that many logical measures are highly controversial and that 
the Congress and DOD disagree over additional base closures and 
the distribution of workload between DOD and private sector 
maintenance facilities.
    The Performance Plan includes a performance goal to 
``streamline the infrastructure by redesigning the Departments 
support structure and pursuing business practice reforms.'' Key 
related performance measures include: (1) the number of 
positions subject to A-76 competition studies; (2) logistics 
response time; (3) the dollar amount of National Defense 
Stockpile disposals and reductions in the supply inventory; and 
(4) disposals of excess real property.
    Other key related performance indicators include: (1) the 
percentage of budget spent on infrastructure; (2) the 
percentage of materiel assets that are visible and accessible 
to its Integrated Materiel Managers; and (3) the net operating 
results of working capital funds.
    6. Inventory Management.--GAO reported that DOD's inventory 
management practices continue to be ineffective and inefficient 
and are not well-suited to meet new missions and war-fighting 
strategies. As a result, DOD spends more than necessary to 
procure inventory, yet items are not available when needed. The 
DOD IG also reported shortages of spare parts and that war 
reserves are overstocked in some locations but short of 
critical items in others. The IG additionally reported problems 
with fraud and inappropriate practices in the disposal process.
    The Performance Plan includes two performance measures 
related to inventory management: (1) logistics response time; 
and (2) the dollar amount of National Defense Stockpile 
disposals and reductions in the supply inventory. The plan also 
includes two related performance indicators: (1) the percentage 
of materiel assets that are visible and accessible to its 
Integrated Materiel Managers; and (2) the dollar amount of 
unfunded depot maintenance requirements.
    7. Military Personnel.--GAO reported that DOD's personnel 
programs to recruit, train, and retain a high-quality active-
duty enlisted workforce have not received the management 
attention needed to ensure their successful operation. The 
military services recruit tens of thousands of new enlistees 
each year who fail to complete their contracts. The Performance 
Plan includes a performance goal to ``recruit, retain, and 
develop personnel to maintain a highly skilled and motivated 
force capable of meeting tomorrow's challenges.'' The plan 
includes three related performance measures: (1) the number of 
enlisted recruits inducted into the Active Force and into the 
Selected Reserve; (2) the Active Force components enlisted 
retention rates; and (3) the Selected Reserves' enlisted 
attrition rates. The plan also includes a related performance 
indicator. It is the percentage of enlisted recruits that meet 
quality benchmarks (high school diplomas, etc.) for such 
recruits.
    8. Military Readiness.--The DOD IG reported that DOD has 
difficulties in maintaining sufficient military readiness. The 
IG reported a concern about the accuracy of reporting for unit-
level readiness; weaknesses in chemical and biological defense 
preparedness and in communications capability; impact of 
changes in the threat environment; and impact of currently 
approved budget levels.
    The Performance Plan includes a performance goal to 
``maintain ready forces and ensure they have the training 
necessary to provide the United States with the ability to 
shape the international environment and respond to the full 
range of crises.'' The plan includes classified measures for 
the readiness of each service's forces.
    The plan also includes several related performance 
indicators, including: (1) the amount of time military 
personnel are deployed; (2) number of flying hours per month, 
by service; (3) number of tank miles per year; (4) number of 
steaming days per quarter; and (5) classified indicators for 
the percentage of billets filled in each service.
    9. Turbulence From Change.--The DOD IG reported that all 
functional areas within DOD are engaged in fundamental reform 
and process reengineering efforts at the same time, causing 
turbulence. The turbulence brings with it several additional 
difficult challenges such as conflicting priorities, 
downsizing, outsourcing, dependence on new and unproven systems 
or processes, and de-emphasis on management controls and 
oversight, all of which are putting considerable strain on DOD. 
The IG noted that DOD confronts a huge task in coordinating and 
integrating its hundreds of reform initiatives so that they do 
not work at cross purposes with each other.
    There was no goal in the report which addressed this 
challenge; however, the plan and the Secretary's annual report 
discuss human capital management issues such as recruiting, 
training, operating tempo, and military retention. The 
Secretary's annual report also includes chapters on initiatives 
such as acquisition reform, financial management reform, and 
infrastructure.

                           iv. consultations

    Both DOD and GAO provided consultations with the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee. These consultations were very 
useful. DOD also provided written responses to a series of 
questions related to the GPRA report submitted to Congress. The 
responsibility for responding to Congress was through Mr. James 
L. Johnson, Deputy Director Theater Assessments and Planning. 
Mr. Johnson and his staff were very helpful.

                             v. usefulness

    The DOD plan is clear, cogent and coherent. It does a good 
job of laying out the specific goals of the Department. The 
goals are reduced to 2 major ``corporate goals'', and the 
report breaks them down into useful sub-categories. The 
explanations make clear what the specific goals are aimed at 
doing and ties them in well with the QDR. While clearly stating 
goals and measures, the plan lacks information on how DOD will 
use performance information to assess mission outcomes.

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

    The Military Construction Appropriations Subcommittee has 
reviewed the DOD Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000. 
Further, the Subcommittee evaluated the performance done by GAO 
to assess compliance with the Results Act. The Subcommittee 
commends the assessment and recommendations presented by GAO 
and endorses the more detailed report provided by the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee.
    With respect to military construction, the Department does 
not clearly articulate how it intends to modernize, renovate 
and improve an aging defense infrastructure as the United 
States transitions into the next century. DOD's plan provides 
only a partial picture of intended performance across the 
Department. For example, it does not include any performance 
measures and associated target levels to help decision makers 
assess progress toward DOD's goal to achieve a 21st century 
infrastructure. The key objective should be to reduce costs 
while maintaining military capabilities. The plan notes, 
however, that the total dollars spent on infrastructure and 
infrastructure costs as a percentage of total defense spending 
are metrics used to gauge success in infrastructure reduction. 
DOD could improve its plan by using these metrics as 
performance measures and establishing associated target 
performance levels.
    The Subcommittee encourages the Department to establish in 
its fiscal year 2001 submission to Congress specific 
performance goals and measures that address key indicators 
concerning military infrastructure and construction. These 
measures should include reduction of real property maintenance 
backlogs, improvement of family housing, reduction of family 
housing deficits, modernization of unaccompanied personnel 
housing, and efforts to address critical shortfalls of quality 
of life facilities.

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Legislative History
    On October 19, 1994, the District of Columbia Self-
Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Home Rule Act) 
was amended by Public Law 103-373, the Federal Payment 
Reauthorization Act of 1994 (Reauthorization Act), to include 
performance and financial accountability requirements for the 
District government. The amendment required the District 
government to devise, implement, and submit to the Congress 
comprehensive financial and performance standards. The purpose 
of the legislation was to encourage District government 
accountability by requiring systematic goal-setting, 
measurement and reporting of program performance and financial 
management.
    At the time of enactment of the performance standards, the 
District government was on the verge of financial collapse. A 
June 22, 1994 GAO report found that the District of Columbia 
faced cash problems and a long-term imbalance of revenues and 
expenditures. The GAO report further found that the District 
government had attempted to balance its books with short-term 
actions that both exacerbate cash problems and postpone 
financial solutions. To aid the District government in 
addressing its financial problems and to encourage performance-
based government planning, Congress enacted legislation for 
performance-based planning and reporting. The legislation was 
based on the Federal Government Performance and Results Act of 
1993.
    By the close of fiscal year 1994, the District's financial 
condition was so critical that Congress passed, and the 
President signed into law, Public Law 104-8, the District of 
Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act 
of 1995 (the Act). The Act established the D.C. Financial 
Responsibility and Management Assistance Authority (the 
Authority) and the Office of Chief Financial Officer [OCFO] and 
gave these offices oversight responsibility for the District's 
budget.
Performance Accountability Reporting Requirements
    The Reauthorization Act included a reporting schedule to 
ensure accountability for program performance. Not later than 
March 1 of each year, beginning in 1995, the Mayor was required 
to develop and submit to Congress and the Comptroller General 
of the GAO a performance accountability plan for all 
significant activities of all departments, agencies and 
programs of the District government for the subsequent fiscal 
year.
    Each plan was required to include performance goals that 
were measurable and objective, for both the quantity and 
quality of the activities, and to include measures of program 
outcomes and results. The manager most responsible for 
achieving each goal and that person's immediate supervisor were 
to be identified. To measure the effectiveness of program 
management, each significant activity was to have two goals: 
one for an acceptable level of performance and one for a 
superior level.
    Not later than March 1 of each year, beginning in 1997, the 
Mayor was required to develop and submit to Congress and the 
Comptroller General a performance accountability report on 
District government activities for the fiscal year ending on 
the previous September 30. The report was required to include: 
(1) for each stated goal of the submitted plan, a statement of 
the actual level of performance achieved compared to the stated 
goal for an acceptable level of performance and the goal for a 
superior level of performance; (2) identification of the 
manager and that person's immediate supervisor; and (3) a 
statement of the status of any court orders for the District 
government and steps taken towards compliance with the court 
orders.
District Government Compliance with the Performance Accountability 
        Requirements
    As of January 1, 1997, Congress had not received a 
performance accountability plan from the District government. 
On July 10, 1997, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on the 
District of Columbia held a hearing on the District's fiscal 
year 1998 budget request. At the hearing, the Mayor was 
questioned on the status of the District government's 
performance accountability plan. Testimony established that the 
Mayor had not complied with the law. Following the shift in 
control of nine District agencies from the Mayor to the 
Authority by the Management Reform Act of 1997, Congress 
amended the law to require the Authority to prepare the report.
    On March 2, the Authority submitted its ``Report On A 
Comprehensive Performance Management System.'' This report 
provided a conceptual framework for the District government's 
Comprehensive Performance Management System. However, it lacked 
the quantitative measures and time lines expected by Congress.
    On September 30, 1998, Dr. Camille Barnett, the District's 
Chief Management Officer [CMO], submitted the District's Fiscal 
Year 1999 Performance Accountability Plan to Congress. In the 
development of the plan, each agency worked to: (1) clarify its 
mission; (2) describe key programs, projects and initiatives; 
and (3) identify measures of services and functions deemed in 
support of its commitment to its customers, the residents of 
the District of Columbia. The plan stated that the most 
significant challenges facing the District government were 
those related to measuring performance in ways that are 
reliable, valid and truly useful for management improvement.
    In November 1998, the District elected a new Mayor, Anthony 
A. Williams, and in January 1999, Dr. Barnett resigned as CMO. 
On March 5, 1999, the District of Columbia Management 
Restoration Act of 1999, Public Law 106-1, was enacted. The act 
repealed the District of Columbia Management Reform Act of 1997 
(Subtitle B of Title XI of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 
Public Law 105-33), thus restoring to the Mayor management 
authority for the daily operation of the District's nine 
largest departments.
    As the first step in the new administration's approach to 
performance-based government, the Mayor announced a short-term 
action agenda. Under this agenda, certain agencies embarked on 
an aggressive effort to eliminate problems responsive to 
immediate corrective action. On March 24, 1999, the Mayor 
delivered to Congress a draft project plan for the Performance 
Accountability Work Plan. The final work plan, entitled 
``District of Columbia Management Report,'' was submitted to 
Congress on June 1, 1999, as part of the District government's 
consensus budget for fiscal year 2000.
District of Columbia Management Report
    The District of Columbia Management Report establishes 
baseline measures for performance-based management for results 
in the District government. The report includes a range of 
measures for all levels of government. The efforts of all 
District agencies are framed by four strategic goals: (1) 
improvement of government services; (2) an expanded economy; 
(3) support for the District's children; and (4) a rebuilding 
of the human services network. Agencies have now embarked on an 
effort at long-term strategic planning, and agency directors 
are currently developing performance measures, with a focus on 
the agency's mission and organizational objectives.
Performance Measures and Performance Assessment
    Performance measures are expected to help monitor and 
improve the long-term strategic planning effort and to indicate 
how well structural changes within an agency are improving the 
quality and delivery of services to District residences. The 
Mayor selected 17 agencies to develop outcome and customer 
service measures. Thirteen of the targeted agencies provide 
direct services to District residents and significantly impact 
the quality of their lives on an ongoing basis. The remaining 4 
agencies are relied upon by the direct service agencies to 
support their daily operations. High impact agencies were 
identified in the following six areas:
  --Economic Development and Regulation.--Department of Housing 
        and Community Development; Department of Employment 
        Service; Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs.
  --Public Safety and Justice.--Metropolitan Police Department; 
        Fire and Emergency Services Department; Department of 
        Corrections.
  --Public Education Systems.--D.C. Public Schools; D.C. Public 
        Library.
  --Public Works.--Department of Public Works; Department of 
        Motor Vehicles.
  --Government Support.--Office of Personnel; Office of 
        Contracting and Procurement; Office of the Chief 
        Technology Officer; Office of Property Management.
    In the fiscal year 2000 budget submission, these agencies 
presented a mission statement, performance measures and target 
dates. In addition, the Mayor and designated agencies have 
entered into performance contracts that outline the agency's 
mission, goals and measures and establish a time line for major 
agency initiatives. The Office of the Mayor issues interim 
reports to the general public to inform residents of the 
government's efforts to measure customer service and 
satisfaction. To verify results of the performance measurement 
system, the Mayor's Director of Customer Service has formed a 
task force to document agencies' data collection practices and 
self-testing. Additionally, the District's independent Office 
of the Inspector General will perform performance audits of 
agency outcome measures to ensure an objective analysis.
    The District assesses performance on 4 criteria: customer 
perspective; financial accountability; internal business 
processes; and learning and growth. Based on the District 
government's own observations, agencies need to develop better 
measures in the areas of financial accountability; learning and 
growth; and employee training.
Analysis of District's Progress as a Performance Based Municipal 
        Government
    Mayor Williams previously served as the District's Chief 
Financial Officer [CFO] from 1995 until 1997. During his tenure 
as CFO, Mr. Williams used results-based practices to bring the 
District's budget into balance and, ultimately, generate a 
surplus. Now, as Mayor, Mr. Williams has designed a framework 
for performance measurement in the District of Columbia. The 
task facing the new administration is twofold: (1) the 
development of goals and measures for the various agencies; and 
(2) holding District employees and managers accountable for the 
achievement of those goals.
    Successful implementation of a District-wide performance 
management system will require a major paradigm shift among 
District employees at all levels of responsibility, but 
foremost by agency supervisors, who are responsible for 
articulating the administration's goals and objectives. The 
staff of the Office of the City Administrator, which has 
responsibility for District government management policies, 
recently articulated eleven recommendations for the development 
and implementation of performance measures:
  --Insure that all agency directors and CFO's are aware of the 
        requirements concerning performance plans.
  --Clearly, consistently and frequently communicate the 
        vision.
  --Separate the types of measures and define responsibility 
        for their development and tracking.
  --Implement a comprehensive change management program.
  --Align the change management and performance measurement 
        activities to the Mayor's strategic priorities.
  --Appoint the Directors of Personnel and Collective 
        Bargaining and Labor Relations as co-champions for the 
        implementation.
  --Define an aggressive implementation schedule, but initially 
        tie it to existing or soon to be started projects.
  --Clearly define who develops and reviews measures.
  --Allocate sufficient human and fiscal resources for bench 
        marking activities.
  --Require high levels of data quality.
  --Align information and personnel systems.
Analysis of Performance Measures
    The District of Columbia Budget for fiscal year 2000 
included performance measures for 17 agencies. The format for 
the presentation of the agency measures is consistent and 
included: (1) a statement of the agency's mission; (2) a list 
of performance measures; (3) actual performance data for fiscal 
year 1998; (4) target performance measures for fiscal year 
1999; and (5) target performance measures for fiscal year 2000.
    Generally, the mission statement for each agency is 
straightforward, concise and agency-appropriate. Overall, the 
performance measures for the various agencies are specific and 
measurable. In some instances, however, an agency performance 
measure is not clearly linked to the agency's stated mission. 
For example, although the Department of Motor Vehicles stated 
mission is to foster ``the safe operation of motor vehicles on 
the District's streets in accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations,'' none of the performance measures related to this 
mission.
    Implementation of performance accountability requirements 
by the District government has been long-delayed, in part by 
the major management changes in the District government during 
the past 6 years. The initial efforts of the Mayor and his 
administration indicate a commitment to performance 
accountability. However, the Subcommittee expects improvements 
in the District's adherence to the spirit of the 
Reauthorization Act through the development of performance 
measures and their clear linkage to the stated mission of 
District agencies in fiscal year 2001. The District government 
should more clearly articulate agency goals. Without clear 
goals, the District and Congress cannot assess the success of 
agencies in achieving performance-based governance.
    Likewise, the Subcommittee expects the District government 
to more fully comply with the letter of the law. Specifically, 
the District has not provided performance accountability plans 
for all departments, agencies and programs of the District 
government. In fact, the Subcommittee has received the required 
plans for only 18 agencies. Additionally, the District has 
failed to identify all managers and that person's immediate 
supervisor. Finally, the Reauthorization Act requires the 
District government to provide a comprehensive report on all 
District activities subject to court order, including the 
requirements of the court order. To date, the District has 
failed to provide Congress with this information, even though 
court orders and receiverships cost the District government 
millions of dollars each year.

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT

                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The Results Act requires agencies to develop tri-annual 
strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annually report 
results beginning with the fiscal year 1999 budget cycle. The 
Department of Energy [DOE] has met all three of those 
requirements. The Department's performance of those 
requirements has been evaluated by both GAO and the 
Subcommittee. While a tri-annual strategic plan, an annual 
performance plan, and an annual report are the legislated 
requirements of the Results Act, they are not the Act's 
objective. The Results Act's objectives are to shift the focus 
of government agencies from a preoccupation with actions 
taken--such as grants dispensed or inspections made--to a focus 
on the results of those activities, such as real gains in 
employability, safety, responsiveness, or program quality.
    A review of the implementation of the Results Act, 
conducted in accordance with the spirit of the Act, asks a 
single question, ``Is the Department of Energy achieving 
desirable results?'' The answer to that question varies 
tremendously across the Department.
    DOE historically has a poor record for completing large 
projects. From 1980 through 1996, the Department terminated 31 
of 80 major system acquisitions (mission-critical projects 
costing over $100 million) after expenditures of over $10 
billion, and completed only 15 of the 80, most of which were 
behind schedule and over budget. For example, DOE spent $6.5 
billion over 15 years for a permanent disposal facility for 
spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The project, 
which was supposed to open in 1998, is currently 12 years 
behind schedule. In recent years, the Department has recognized 
its project management weaknesses and sought to improve. The 
DOE, which contracts for over 90 percent of its work, has had 
problems managing those contracts and overseeing the technical 
aspects of its contracts. For example, DOE routinely turns to 
contractors to review proposals and work performed by other 
contractors. The result is that, within the closely knit 
contractor community in which contractors frequently 
subcontract with one another (sometimes through many layers on 
a single task), it is not clear that the Government's interests 
prevail over those of the contractors.
    DOE's management structure does not effectively solve 
agency problems. The Department continues to exacerbate this 
weakness by adding layers of management onto the Department in 
response to specific issues, such as the creation of security 
and counter-intelligence ``czars'' in response to recent 
allegations of espionage. In a report mandated by this 
Subcommittee, the Institute for Defense Analysis found that:

          ``Many DOE and contractor-officials describe Defense 
        Programs oversight as creating an inverted management 
        pyramid, because the number of reviewers exceeds the 
        number of hands-on workers. For example, contractors 
        have cited examples where work done by two or three 
        people becomes the subject of review meetings involving 
        40 or more Defense Programs officials.''

    That example cites only the problem internal to Defense 
Programs. The problem expands when reviewers from other 
oversight functions are included. The Department has programs 
within one office, complying with policies set by a second 
office, in accordance with procedures set by a third office, 
verified by a fourth office. This myriad of oversight and 
review does not improve performance. To the contrary, in some 
cases it diminishes performance. As overseers have multiplied, 
the line between oversight and responsibility has been blurred 
and sometimes disappears. The frequent result is that, when 
mistakes are made, all parties contend they are overseers, and 
no one takes responsibility.
    Successive Secretaries have sought to address this issue 
and have had limited success. An earlier review chaired by Bob 
Galvin, the Chairman of Motorola, found that:

          ``There have been many studies of the Department of 
        Energy laboratories. As one reads these reports, one 
        recognizes that the items which were recommended in 
        previous reports are for the most part recommended in 
        most subsequent reports. As each past study has taken 
        place, people of good intention make sincere efforts to 
        `fine tune' the system. However, the Department and the 
        Congress should recognize that there has been little 
        fundamental improvement as a function of past studies * 
        * *.''

    While DOE has had problems fulfilling many of its 
objectives, it has successfully met others. For example, 3 
years ago, the programs of the Department's Office of Energy 
Efficiency and Renewable Energy were inappropriately dominated 
by the interests of non-governmental organizations, and there 
was little or no coordination in the development of various 
renewable energy technologies. The current Assistant Secretary 
has effectively returned decision making and priority setting 
to the cognizant Federal officials, has greatly reduced the 
``stove-pipes'' that allowed different renewable energy 
technologies to proceed without consideration to their relative 
merits, and has implemented a merit-based procurement process.
    The Office of Defense Programs [ODP] has taken its broad 
responsibility to maintain the Nation's nuclear weapons 
stockpile through science and developed detailed tasks and 
schedules for each weapons system through the ``Green Book'' 
process. The ``Green Book'' is suitable as a detailed 
performance plan for ODP. Unfortunately, ODP's ability to meet 
the schedules of the ``Green Book'' is in question. While part 
of the problem is due to issues internal to Defense Programs, 
because of the Department's ``matrix'' management structure, 
issues outside of ODP have previously contributed to problems 
within ODP. Legislation has been enacted to create a semi-
autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration within DOE 
to manage its national security functions in an effort to 
address this issue.
    The Department's problems in ``achieving desirable 
results'' exist in part because a number of the Department's 
missions are controversial and among the most difficult tasks 
the Government has before it. For example, the Department is 
struggling within its Environmental Quality programs to comply 
with myriad environmental laws and regulations developed prior 
to their application to departmental facilities. In many cases, 
waste streams from departmental facilities contain material or 
combinations of material not found in the private sector, for 
which the respective laws and regulations require contradictory 
remedies. Due to the unforeseen application of these laws to 
departmental sites, DOE has been forced to enter into 
compliance agreements with States and Federal regulators that 
include milestones the Department knows it will be unable to 
meet and milestones that must be met using unproven or even 
unknown technologies.

                           ii. consultations

    The Department has assigned responsibility for compliance 
with the Results Act to the Office of the Chief Financial 
Officer [OCFO]. In recent years, OCFO, with the support of the 
Subcommittee, has substantially expanded its financial and 
program management capability. However, OCFO has less technical 
ability to oversee contracts than the program offices and has 
no greater ability to address management and other issues 
within DOE.
    The Department's annual performance plan has improved 
substantially since its inception, when the Subcommittee found 
``considerable inconsistency among the quality of information 
provided by the program offices,'' and that many of the goals 
provided ``no basis for the evaluation of performance, and, as 
a result, in no way assist in the purposes of the Government 
Performance and Results Act.'' The annual performance plan for 
fiscal year 2000 clearly details goals for the coming year as 
components of the goals included in the tri-annual strategic 
plan.
    The refinement of the annual performance plan reflects the 
full and frank relationship between the Subcommittee and the 
OCFO. Communications on the plan's development have aided the 
Department in responding to the desire of the Subcommittee with 
regard to the plan and have kept the Subcommittee apprised of 
issues as goals have changed due to unforeseen circumstances.

                            iii. usefulness

    It is the Subcommittee staff's view that the Results Act 
provides a useful tool for evaluating agency goals and 
measuring progress. Today, DOE is generally confounded by a 
management maze, irreconcilable regulatory requirements, and 
insufficient skills in critical areas necessary to solve its 
own dilemmas. In such an environment, the usefulness of the 
Results Act is limited.

   SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED 
                                PROGRAMS

                   i. performance goals and measures

    In 1997, the United States Agency for International 
Development [USAID] created an Agency Strategic Plan which 
presented six strategic goals in development and humanitarian 
assistance and one management goal as the basis for measuring 
the effectiveness of its programs. These 6 development and 
humanitarian assistance goals are to: (1) encourage broad-based 
economic growth and agricultural development; (2) strengthen 
democracy and good governance; (3) build human capacity through 
education and training; (4) stabilize and protect world 
population and human health; (5) protect the world's 
environment for long-term sustained ability; and (6) increase 
the numbers of lives saved, reduce suffering associated with 
natural or man-made disasters, and reestablish conditions 
necessary for political and/or economic development. The 
management goal is that USAID remain a premier bilateral 
development agency.
    The Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan uses the goals 
described in the Strategic Plan to provide details as to how 
USAID will achieve its quantitative development goals and 
indicators that will be used for the coming year.
    USAID's measures are results oriented and are not based on 
the number of activities such as grants awarded or persons 
trained. However, the goals are too ambiguous to lend 
themselves to credible evaluations of success or measurement of 
benchmarks toward that success. USAID needs to develop regional 
performance plans tailored to local requirements that spell out 
expectations for performance as well as 5 year trends.
    Though subject to past criticism for its methods of 
assessment, USAID continues to rely on country level statistics 
obtained from secondary sources, mostly international 
institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for its 
data. In responding to Subcommittee inquiries, USAID stated:

          ``USAID is largely dependent upon secondary data 
        generated at the country level. It is difficult for 
        USAID program staff to evaluate the reliability of all 
        of the data in their annual performance reports. 
        Primary data collection (e.g. through surveys) is 
        costly and usually occurs on a bi-annual basis or less 
        frequently. Thus data reporting generally lags by at 
        least 2 years. USAID's Performance Plan reporting is 
        based on `projected actuals' which are derived by using 
        trend lines. USAID is continuously assessing the costs 
        of data collection versus the benefits of alternative 
        uses for these funds.''

    USAID noted that it continues to consult with other U.S. 
Government foreign affairs agencies within the framework of the 
International Affairs Strategic Plan. At the start of this 
interchange in 1998, coordination on sustainable development 
issues was considered by USAID as low to medium. USAID stated 
that they expect this level to improve to medium to high by the 
end of the 1999 fiscal year.
    The Subcommittee continues to urge USAID and the State 
Department, as the principal agents for the U.S. Government in 
international affairs, to work together to ensure that they are 
coordinating policy and program efforts. The Subcommittee 
understands that consultations have been ongoing between the 
department and the agency, and the Subcommittee encourages the 
rapid creation of a quantitative mechanism to ensure that these 
tools are in place.
    Many U.S. Government departments and agencies are involved 
in international programs that can be related to USAID's goals 
and objectives. For example, the GAO noted that in fiscal year 
1998, Congress authorized the Department of Defense to provide 
about $50 million in overseas humanitarian, disaster and civic 
aid.
    In addition to the State Department, the Subcommittee also 
has oversight over some of the programs which exist in the 
following agencies which do not coordinate their efforts on a 
regular basis with USAID: Department of Commerce; Department of 
Energy; Department of Treasury through the African Development 
Bank and Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the Asian Development Bank, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the International 
Development Association and the International Monetary Fund; 
the African Development Foundation; the Inter-American 
Foundation; and the Peace Corps.

                          ii. data reliability

    USAID does not have the resources or capacity to be the 
sole source of information for its agency data. In its Fiscal 
Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan, USAID cites the use of 
statistics from World Bank, United Nations and other 
international organizations for the data for future reports.
    USAID acknowledges the concerns expressed by those within 
the Agency, at OMB and from Capitol Hill about the reliance on 
external sources for validation of their programs. USAID states 
in its plan that it will continue to work to identify 
performance goals and indicators that better measure annual 
performance levels.
    The Subcommittee appreciates the long term aspects of 
USAID's programs and its limited ability to obtain statistics 
for assessment of benchmarks for its programs, especially in 
the areas of humanitarian assistance, democracy and governance, 
and environmental programs. The Subcommittee hopes to work with 
USAID to create the tools for assessing its goals.

                        iii. high risk problems

    The GAO identified the following specific areas of concern 
for USAID:
  --(A) USAID has not implemented a comprehensive information 
        management system; and
  --(B) USAID's financial management information is unreliable.
    GAO noted that ``while an acknowledgement of a major 
management challenge is a good first step, there is concern 
about the absence or vagueness for goals in certain areas. 
Without specific and measurable performance goals, it is 
difficult, if not impossible to assess progress in addressing 
problems and to hold agencies accountable.''
    USAID provided the Subcommittee with an update of the 
status of the high risk problems. The following is a summary of 
USAID's assessment:
    (A) New Management System.--USAID is still working to 
implement a New Management System [NMS]. In 1994, NMS was 
designed as a custom built set of modules which were to provide 
enhanced program management capabilities. Unfortunately, in 
USAID's own words, ``NMS failed to perform as planned because 
of communication, technological and management problems.''
    NMS will be implemented over the next 3 fiscal years and 
will support accounting, procurement, budgeting and program 
operating functions. The Subcommittee will continue to closely 
monitor the Agency's progress and its attempts to complete 
renovation and implementation of the system as projected in 
fiscal year 2000.
    (B) Financial Management.--USAID's vulnerabilities in 
financial management were addressed in the Fiscal Year 1999 
Annual Performance Plan. USAID's Office of Financial Management 
has created a strategic plan to move USAID, in their words, to 
``a more responsive, effective, collaborative, and customer-
oriented financial management system.''
    GAO noted in its review of the Annual Performance Plan that 
``USAID's effort to correct design and implement problems with 
its financial and management system reflected consistence 
between their strategies and goals.''

                           iv. consultations

    USAID staff did not consult with the Subcommittee on its 
performance plan. USAID states that ``the traditional budget 
structure does not link resources to performance goals. The 
Agency does a `cross walk' where it assigns resources from all 
of the Agency's program budget accounts to specific goals.'' 
USAID has been criticized for its inability to provide a 
stronger link between performance goals and budgetary 
priorities.

                             v. usefulness

    USAID went through each of its goals and described the 
methods USAID would use to assess achievement of its 
performance goals. The Annual Performance Plan varied in its 
assessment of USAID's ability to reach its goals; at times the 
reader felt that the determination was more optimistic than 
realistic. The Subcommittee looks forward to the Fiscal Year 
2000 Performance Report to fully analyze USAID's ability to 
make and achieve its goals.
    By its own admission, there is a decline between funding 
assessments and performance by USAID. The Agency has a three 
tiered system of performance assessment and budgetary priority: 
the individual units of operation, the field mission and 
finally, Washington headquarters. The individual units and 
field missions continually monitor performance of each of their 
programs. Washington also monitors performance and holds formal 
reviews of bureau-wide performances in conjunction with 
budgetary requests.
    USAID takes performance and goals and budgetary 
capabilities into consideration at annual budget reviews. With 
each of these tiers, though, priorities can be altered from 
initial performance assessments, and normally the rating 
declines in ranking. GAO noted that USAID should also develop a 
clear linkage between broad development goals and specific 
USAID country program goal results.
    The Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan provided the 
Subcommittee with an impression of how USAID will attain their 
goals within the next year. The Subcommittee will find it 
difficult to assess USAID's specific contribution to enhancing 
global sustainable development programs while relying on 
secondary sources or dated information as its primary tools for 
analysis.
    The Subcommittee urges USAID to formulate a more detailed 
approach in the creation of its Annual Performance Plan. USAID 
should develop regional performance plans tailored to local 
requirements that spell out expectations for performance as 
well as five year trends.

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES

                       DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The various bureaus within the Department of the Interior 
[DOI] have generally taken steps to focus their goals and 
performance measures on the most important objectives. For 
example, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service reduced its annual 
performance goals from 45 to 15, and the Bureau of Land 
Management reduced the number of its annual performance goals 
from 61 to 46. The U.S. Geological Survey now has two broad 
annual performance goals and ten quantitative performance 
measures that cover all program activities relative to the 
agency's mission. This streamlining has had an effect of 
tightening the performance plans and making them more 
understandable. It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
aggregation or merging of performance goals will lead to a 
lessened sense of accountability or accomplishment, and, in 
turn, reduced performance on the part of programs within the 
agency that are now only part of a broader, more generic 
performance goal. It is critical that there be awareness at the 
field station level of the broader agency goals as well as the 
specific contribution of each field station to the furtherance 
of these goals.
    In general, the DOI bureaus have been successful in 
developing relevant, outcome oriented goals. The performance 
plans of various agencies such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service still contain output-related measures, but the 
occurrence of such measures has diminished.
    The majority of goals and measures established in the 
performance plans of DOI bureaus appear to be realistic and 
reasonably challenging based on available data. In many cases, 
however, it remains difficult to evaluate whether agency goals 
and measures are appropriate due to the limited baseline data 
available for many programs and activities. Some of the agency 
goals reveal planning problems. For example, a part of one of 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service goals states, ``80 percent 
of the contaminated cleanup projects will be completed 
according to their original schedule''. If a goal is only to 
meet a certain percentage of an originally scheduled plan, then 
it is very possible that the original planning/scheduling 
targets were unreasonable.
    Given that the accuracy and reliability of performance data 
are critical to the successful evaluation of agency 
performance, DOI bureaus have not made sufficient progress in 
describing data verification and validation processes as part 
of their performance plans. While some improvements have been 
made, many bureau plans do not sufficiently identify data 
limitations or data system requirements and how such 
limitations or systems availability would impact performance 
measures. To demonstrate to the Subcommittee that bureau or 
program level performance is not being ``gamed,'' the 
Department must make further efforts to ensure the accuracy, 
consistency and reliability of performance data, and to convey 
this information in its performance plans. It should be noted, 
however, that data collection bearing on performance 
measurement is not without cost. The Subcommittee recognizes 
that additional resources have been sought by a number of 
bureaus in fiscal year 2000 to initiate or enhance performance-
related data collection, and that the Subcommittee has not been 
able to provide these additional resources in all cases. The 
Subcommittee will continue to work with the bureaus to 
prioritize data collection needs and make data collection more 
efficient and less expensive where possible.
    The performance goals of each agency appear to be broadly 
representative and balanced in the treatment of competing 
demands within each agency, and appear to reflect the statutory 
missions of the various agencies.
    The DOI bureaus' fiscal year 2000 performance plans provide 
somewhat improved treatment of cross-cutting initiatives, 
particularly with respect to intra-agency cross-program 
initiatives. The Department's plan as a whole does not, 
however, attempt to reexamine the fundamental organization and 
functions of the natural resource agencies as the GAO has 
suggested is warranted as part of performance planning. Neither 
do the plans tend to contain sufficient substantive discussion 
of inter-bureau or inter-departmental work in pursuit of common 
goals. While the Department's performance plan does identify 
and discuss four specific crosscutting efforts, it does not 
attempt to address the much broader array of programmatic areas 
in which the DOI bureaus and/or other Departments would seem to 
have common goals and performance measurement requirements.
    The Forest Service is currently undergoing public review of 
its draft revised GPRA strategic plan which is scheduled for 
completion in September 2000. The new draft plan focuses more 
on outcomes or results which are absent from its current plan. 
Due to this omission, the current plan does not enable the 
agency to objectively evaluate annual accomplishments and link 
them to its strategic plan. For fiscal year 2001 and beyond, 
the agency plans to provide this link in large part through 
proposed new performance measures which are included within the 
framework of a new streamlined budget structure. Each of the 
performance measures within the annual budget is linked to 
specific goals and objectives contained in the strategic plan.
    The Subcommittee is reviewing with great concern the 
agency's proposed new budget structure and related performance 
measures. Given the longstanding difficulties with the agency's 
fiscal accountability, drastically reducing the number of the 
agency's line items in order to provide ``big bucket'' 
financing of its programs could lead to less accountability 
rather than more. The performance measures which the agency 
claims will provide accountability are new, and little 
historical data is available to assess how the agency's current 
performance based on these measures compares to previous years. 
Moreover, many of the performance measures do not appear to be 
performance measures so much as workload measures. That is, 
they only indicate what the agency will do with appropriated 
dollars, not how well they will do it. The Subcommittee expects 
to have a lengthy dialogue with the Forest Service on the use 
of performance measures in its budget and for use in assessing 
the achievement of GPRA strategic plan goals and objectives.

                          ii. data reliability

    The DOI's fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan provides 
a standard format for identifying data collection methodology 
and sources, as well as validation of this data among the 
different bureaus. While this format provided a valuable 
overview of the different systems being developed or currently 
in use by the department to provide and ensure credible 
performance-related data, it was relatively broad and non-
specific in its treatment of the systems.
    The Subcommittee is nevertheless aware that the Department 
and several individual bureaus are attempting in several 
instances to upgrade or modify information systems in order to 
better support their performance plans. Collection of specific 
performance data and the information systems required to manage 
such data may often require additional resources. The 
Subcommittee will continue to work with the bureaus to 
prioritize information system needs necessary to produce 
credible performance reports, but is mindful that the 
usefulness of a data set or information system often does not 
correlate to its size, complexity, or expense.
    The DOI performance plans do not address in great detail 
the weaknesses or limitations of the performance data that is 
being collected, though the plans of the Bureau of Land 
Management and the Fish and Wildlife Service have improved in 
this regard.
    The Forest Service has proposed a multitude of new 
performance measures as part of its fiscal year 2001 budget. 
These measures are linked to the agency's revised GPRA 
strategic plan goals and objectives. Since these measures are 
new, it is unclear whether the data necessary to determine 
these measures is unreliable. However, the agency has 
recognized problems with data collection and reliability in a 
number of areas which would appear to call into question 
performance measures based on such information. For example, 
some performance indicators related to programs under the 
National Forest System appropriation will rely on data 
collected through the agency's Management Attainment Reporting 
[MAR] system. Current checks are not in place to ensure that 
this data is complete, accurate and consistent with other data 
sources. Another significant problem with data collection in 
the agency has been the interpretation of definitions used for 
individual data elements, such as ``deferred maintenance.'' The 
agency needs to do a better job of ensuring that definitions 
are consistently applied and interpreted across all regions and 
levels of the agency.

                        iii. high risk problems

    In January 1999, GAO published a report identifying high-
risk problems in Federal agencies. GAO identified as a high-
risk management problem DOI's management of the $3 billion 
Indian trust fund, which has long been characterized by 
inadequate accounting and information systems, untrained and 
inexperienced staff, poor record keeping and internal controls, 
and inadequate written policies and procedures. The Office of 
the Special Trustee was created specifically to ensure that the 
Department establishes appropriate policies and procedures, 
develops necessary systems, and takes affirmative action to 
reform the management of Indian trust funds. Thus, each of the 
agency's performance goals addresses the problem highlighted by 
GAO.
    GAO identified as an additional high-risk management 
problem DOI's distribution of about $800 million each year in 
Tribal Priority Allocations [TPA] in a manner which does not 
take into consideration the tribes' changing needs, the tribes' 
own revenues, or the funds necessary to fund fully the tribal 
programs. The Bureau of Indian Affairs' [BIA] performance goals 
do not address the problem highlighted by GAO. Indeed, BIA 
recently provided a report to the Congress on TPA in which it 
explicitly rejected any consideration of tribal revenues and 
any redistribution of TPA ``base'' funds in response to 
changing needs. This continues to be a matter of great concern 
to the Subcommittee as a matter of both GPRA planning and 
fundamental fairness.
    The Forest Service has had persistent problems with respect 
to its financial systems. The agency's financial statements 
have been subject to annual audit by the USDA Inspector General 
and GAO since fiscal year 1991. However, the agency has yet to 
receive a clean audit opinion, despite repeated promises to 
improve its performance. GAO added the Forest Service to its 
list of agencies at ``high risk'' of waste, fraud, abuse and 
mismanagement due to the unreliability of the agency's 
financial statements. The Forest Service has implemented a new 
accounting system designed to cure these problems. In addition, 
the agency also believes that its proposed new budget structure 
and performance measures will help ameliorate its fiscal 
accountability problems. Even if true, it is unlikely that the 
agency can obtain a clean opinion for several years. The 
Subcommittee remains very concerned about financial management 
and accountability at the Forest Service.

                           iv. consultations

    The Department and its individual bureaus have generally 
been forthright and timely in their consultations with the 
Subcommittee on performance plans.
    The Department of Energy programs within the Subcommittee's 
jurisdiction have done a less thorough job of consultation.
    Consultations with the Department have in some instances 
resulted in changes in specific performance goals or 
measurements, but have been primarily useful in providing a 
forum in which to convey to the Department ways in which the 
performance plans can be made more understandable and more 
useful to the Subcommittee.
    All agencies must do a better job of continuing 
consultations with the Subcommittee regarding changes in goals, 
performance plan structure and performance measurements. The 
agencies must also do a better job of discussing annual budget 
requests in relation to individual performance plans.
    The Department has a planning office that is separate from 
the Office of Budget, but both report to the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Budget and Finance. This is also the typical 
design for DOI bureaus (i.e. separate offices reporting to the 
same higher authority), although the BIA has planning and 
budget staff in the same office, and Geological Survey has at 
least one person in the budget office who works on GPRA issues.
    The existence of two separate offices has at times impeded 
effective cooperation and consultation in the development of 
GPRA plans. In a number of cases, information contained in 
fiscal year 2000 budget documents does not match information 
contained in performance plans. The National Park Service is 
one example. The Department is encouraged to emphasize closer 
working relationships between budget and planning offices.
    The Forest Service has attempted to actively consult with 
the Subcommittee concerning its proposed budget structure 
changes and related performance measures. However, despite the 
Subcommittee's request to have this information provided well 
before the fiscal year 2001 budget submittal, the agency was 
unable to do so. This delay will hamper the Subcommittee's 
ability to fully consider these proposed changes and to work 
with the agency on how improvements could be made in this 
regard. Timely responses to the Subcommittee's requests will 
better facilitate the achievement of GPRA goals in the future.

                             v. usefulness

    While the Department's bureau sub-plans make for a lengthy 
annual performance plan, most of the individual bureau plans 
have made significant improvements in terms of user-
friendliness. The Department has developed a relatively 
consistent format for each of the bureau plans and has 
streamlined the plans so that there are fewer, more focused 
goals and measures. In most cases, one need not read the 
individual performance plans in conjunction with the budgets, 
as there has been an attempt to link the performance plans to 
budgetary information. In some cases there are inconsistencies 
with the agency budget and the performance plans.
    The DOI bureaus have generally tried to link funding 
resources to performance goals. The component plans, however, 
did not always clearly relate the program activities in the 
President's budget to performance goals. For example, it was 
not always clear how the funding for budget program activities 
would be allocated to performance goals in the plans of BIA, 
the Bureau of Land Management and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service. The U.S. Geological Survey, on the other hand, was 
relatively successful in showing the relationship between 
performance goals and budget activities. For the performance 
plans to be truly useful to the Subcommittee in evaluating 
agency budget requests, this linkage must be more clearly and 
carefully established across all Department bureaus.
    The Department of Energy programs under the Subcommittee's 
jurisdiction have fallen short in linking performance goals to 
budget activities. While the Department has shown some 
improvement by more consistently stating the reasons for annual 
increases or decreases requested for particular budget 
activities, the relationship between these budgetary changes 
and annual performance goals is not clearly established. The 
budget justification is replete with statistics on energy 
savings, emissions reductions and other performance measures 
for specific programs, but there is little or no discussion of 
whether the budget requests for these programs are driven or 
influenced by these measures. In short, it is difficult to tell 
whether the Department is directing resources to the programs 
that get the ``biggest bang for the buck,'' or, if not, why 
not.
    Given the general lack of baseline data for many 
performance measures and the still shaky linkage between most 
agency performance plans and budget documents, the performance 
plans are generally not yet useful for making funding 
decisions. There are exceptions, however, and most of the plans 
demonstrate potential to become valuable decision-making tools 
once reliable baseline data is developed and once clearer 
relationships are established to agency budgets.
    Any improvements to the plan that allow the Subcommittee to 
focus on the most critical issues in the plan would be 
valuable. The Subcommittee will benefit from the streamlined 
performance goals that many agencies adopted, as well as the 
consistent format that was developed to make the plans more 
user-friendly. While there is the benefit of more focused, 
streamlined information in the plan, it is only useful if there 
is an underlying dedication to ensuring the accuracy of the 
data from the field to the regional and national offices. The 
credibility of the performance plans over time will further be 
measured by the openness of the agencies in assessing the 
strengths and weaknesses of their respective plans (e.g. data 
measurement, validation, choice of goals, etc.), and providing 
that information to the Subcommittee. These documents are not 
solely intended to be a mechanism for justifying budgetary 
increases, but rather to provide an accurate picture of agency 
performance that will serve as the guide for future direction.

 SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, AND EDUCATION, AND 
                            RELATED AGENCIES

                          DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The goals and measures of the Department of Labor [DOL] are 
focused on important objectives of its programs and activities 
and cover key aspects of performance. In general, the 
performance goals are comprehensive and explicitly cover all 
program activities in the Department's budget, as required 
under the Results Act and related guidance.
    The Department's plan includes several goals and measures 
that are expressed as outcomes as well as several measures that 
are expressed as processes or activities. In several instances, 
the Department has developed outcome goals where it is logical 
to do so. Also, its fiscal year 2000 performance plan is an 
improvement over its 1999 plan in that some prior goals were 
modified to better focus on outcomes. While some of the 
Department's goals and measures are focused on processes or 
activities, the use of such goals and measures is not 
necessarily inappropriate. One such goal, for example, is 
meeting or exceeding standards for promptness in paying worker 
claims for unemployment insurance and deciding appeals.
    The levels of performance DOL seeks to attain, as reflected 
in its plan, are understandable in light of, among other 
things, what is known about past program performance. However, 
it is difficult to judge how challenging all of the goals and 
measures are without past performance information for each 
goal. The first agency annual performance reports (based on 
their fiscal year 1999 performance plans) are due this spring. 
As agencies begin reporting on the actual levels of performance 
they have achieved, determining how challenging performance 
goals are will become easier. Another complicating factor is 
that DOL lacks baseline data against which to measure some 
goals.
    In general, the Department's performance goals are 
objective, measurable, and quantifiable. While baseline data 
are shown for most indicators that can be used to compare past 
performance with projected performance, baseline data have not 
been established for several performance goals. For example, 
one performance goal is to increase by 2 percent over fiscal 
year 1999 the percent of those leaving the Trade Adjustment 
Assistance and the North American Free Trade Agreement-Trade 
Adjustment Assistance programs that: (1) get a job immediately; 
and (2) still have jobs 13 weeks later. The plan notes, 
however, that a 1999 baseline will be established when a new 
reporting system under development provides data on 
performance. Another problem is that some goals and measures 
are based on old data and thus do not depict current 
conditions. For example, one performance goal is to reduce 
three of the most prevalent workplace injuries and causes of 
illnesses by 7 percent from baseline levels in selected 
industries and occupations. However, the baseline data for 
assessing workplace injuries are over 4 years old, raising 
concerns that some of the Department's performance measures may 
not provide timely assessments of performance.
    One of the improvements in the Department's fiscal year 
2000 plan over its 1999 plan is the elimination of some 
performance goals that were of limited value or questionable 
validity because they did not sufficiently measure performance 
and/or could lead to unintended consequences. In the 1999 plan, 
for example, DOL presented performance goals that used the 
number of complaints received as indicators of compliance with 
worker protection and civil rights laws. Such measures could 
have the unintended consequence of encouraging management to 
discourage the filing of otherwise meritorious complaints. In 
the fiscal year 2000 plan, DOL eliminated such measures.
    Although the Department's goals discuss efforts to work 
with other Federal agencies, the plan does not identify 
specific actions DOL will take to ensure effective interaction 
with other Federal agencies. Specifically, the plan does not 
identify common or complementary performance goals and measures 
elsewhere in the Federal government that relate to the 
Department's goals and measures. For example, although two 
performance goals relate to helping veterans find jobs, no 
mention is made of how DOL will work with other Federal 
agencies, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs. In 
addition, to assist youth in making the transition from school 
to work, DOL stated in its plan that, working with the 
Department of Education [DOE], it will continue to expand 
school-to-work activities and will build partnerships at the 
State and local levels that include employers, organized labor, 
community leaders, educators, and parents. However, the plan 
provides no information specifying what is being done with DOE 
to jointly achieve these goals and how all these partnerships 
will help DOL achieve its goal of engaging youth in school-to-
work activities.
    While mission fragmentation and program overlap are 
relatively straightforward to identify, determining whether 
overlapping programs are actually duplicative requires a much 
more in-depth analysis of program goals, the means to achieve 
them, and the targeted recipients. While this task is 
difficult, DOL could use its Results Act plans as a mechanism 
to address such challenges. But, as noted above, the 
Department's fiscal year 2000 plan does not adequately describe 
how it will actively work with other agencies to ensure that 
the Department's goals are achieved. This is a challenge for 
DOL, especially in light of the Department's decentralized 
structure and the numerous Federal, State, and local partners 
that share responsibility for its programs. For example, not 
only does DOL itself have 22 offices, many with overlapping 
responsibilities, but for many of its programs, such as job 
training, enforcement of workplace standards, and collection of 
economic and workforce statistics, DOL must work with State and 
local governments or nongovernmental organizations that often 
manage the Department's programs on a day-to-day basis. The 
1996 welfare reform legislation and the Department's welfare-
to-work grant program created in 1997, combined with the 
passage of the Workforce Investment Act in 1998, have affected 
the nation's job training system in ways that are now just 
beginning to become apparent. The developments require DOL to 
re-evaluate its approach and reach out more effectively to 
other departments, especially the Department of Health and 
Human Services.

                          ii. data reliability

    The Department lacks adequate information to assess whether 
many of its programs are operating efficiently and are 
producing intended results. In its plan, DOL recognizes that it 
faces challenges in overcoming three performance measurement 
issues: (1) lack of data, (2) insufficient data, and (3) 
untimely reporting. The Department further notes that data are 
missing in some areas and that data integrity is an issue in 
other areas where existing measures are insufficiently precise 
or are unreliable. These problems raise concerns about the 
Department's ability to accurately measure the extent to which 
performance goals are achieved. The Department identifies some 
activities planned to address the quality of its data. It will, 
for example, develop a departmentwide information technology 
architecture as well as departmentwide data standards to 
facilitate the efficient collection of timely and reliable 
program data by the DOL components. However, DOL does not 
provide enough specific information on the details of its 
efforts to provide readers a clear understanding of how or when 
such efforts will improve the quality of its performance 
information.
    While DOL identifies data system shortcomings in one 
section of its plan, it states in another section that these 
same data systems are reliable. Overall, the Department's plan 
does not adequately describe how the lack of complete, timely, 
and reliable data may affect its ability to assess its 
performance goals. For example, DOL notes that GAO and the 
Office of Inspector General have raised concerns about Job 
Corps data, but there is no discussion of how these concerns 
affect the measurement of the performance goal related to the 
Job Corps program. While the plan discusses some strategies for 
overcoming data weaknesses and limitations, the plan does not 
provide sufficient information on how or when these limitations 
will be overcome.

                           iii. consultation

    The Department did conduct a series of formal consultations 
with the House and the Senate Subcommittees on its current 
strategic plan.

                             iv. usefulness

    The Department's plan is fairly well organized and in many 
cases effectively uses graphics to inform the reader. In its 
plan, DOL presents 42 performance goals and 122 means and 
strategies with which to achieve its goals. This number of 
goals and strategies strikes a balance between presenting so 
few as not to provide a comprehensive picture of agencywide 
performance and presenting so many that a reader is 
overwhelmed. In some instances, the means and strategies 
presented do not identify how they would help achieve the 
stated goal. For example, one performance goal states that 60 
percent of local employment and training offices will be part 
of one-stop career center systems. In a related strategy, DOL 
states that it will ``continue its support of the adoption and 
implementation of continuous improvement initiatives throughout 
the workforce development system,'' but does not indicate how 
these efforts will help achieve the one-stop career center 
performance goal.
    In general, the Department's performance plan clearly 
aligns the agency's annual performance goals and its current 
strategic goals. To establish the connection between annual and 
longer-term strategic goals, DOL links multiple annual goals to 
intermediate goals, referred to as ``outcome goals'' in the 
plan. These intermediate goals describe the anticipated results 
of the agency's programs and activities relative to the 
strategic goals. Each strategic goal is linked to multiple 
intermediate goals. The plan also incorporates an appendix that 
shows the relationship among all of the Department's program 
and budget activities and its strategic goals.
    The Department's plan provides a generally clear picture of 
intended performance across the agency and provides a general 
discussion of strategies and resources the agency will use to 
achieve its goals. In general, the performance goals and 
measures are objective, clear, and measurable. In these 
respects, the plan is a useful document.
    The Department could improve its plan by showing how 
specific program activities and their funding relate to more 
discrete sets of performance goals. For example, the plan 
explicitly describes incremental funding requests for new 
initiatives by strategic goal, but broadly aggregates the 
Department's total budget across the three strategic goals. In 
addition, DOL needs to improve the quality of data being used 
to measure performance and state in its plan when it will do 
so. The Department could also improve its plan by better 
explaining how its stated strategies will help DOL achieve 
individual performance goals.

                DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

        background on the hhs fiscal year 2000 performance plan

    The Health and Human Services [HHS] Fiscal Year 2000 Annual 
Performance Plan, which was submitted to the Congress as a 
component of the Justification of Estimates of the President's 
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget, consists of several documents: the HHS 
Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan Summary and the HHS Operating 
Division performance plans, which are incorporated directly 
into the fiscal year 2000 budget documents. A description of 
the information contained in these documents follows:
  --The Performance Plan Summary provides the overall 
        Departmental context for the plans, demonstrates how 
        HHS' performance goals and measures support the HHS 
        strategic plan, and addresses performance measurement 
        challenges for HHS.
  --The Operating Division annual performance plans include 
        performance goals and measures for all of HHS' program 
        activities and provide the linkage to the budget that 
        is critical to the GPRA requirements for annual 
        performance plans.

                   i. performance goals and measures

    As required by the Results Act, HHS has established a 
strategic plan that identifies the critical and fundamental 
long-term performance objectives that HHS seeks to achieve with 
funds appropriated for HHS and its programs. In turn, the HHS 
operating divisions establish annual goals and targets for 
their program activities that are consistent with the program's 
budget request, the legislative intent of the program and the 
relevant long-term goals set out in the strategic plan. In this 
way, the goals and measures established by the Operating 
Divisions are not only focused on the objectives of the program 
activity, but also on the long-term goals the Department hopes 
to achieve.
    For the most part, the Department's goals are results-
oriented. Throughout its agencies and programs, HHS has defined 
a balance of outcome, output and process measures in its 
performance plan. While HHS seeks to measure its results with 
measures of program outcomes as a matter of routine, in some 
cases it is not able to include these because of the lack of 
data to measure performance, or because of the need to work 
with performance partners (such as States) to develop mutually 
agreed upon outcomes. When using capacity and process measures, 
HHS programs have provided clear linkage between the 
achievement of these measures and longer-term outcome 
objectives as appropriate.
    HHS has set goals and measures that are consistent with the 
legislative intent of its programs and of the Results Act, as 
well as with the long-term outcomes the agency hopes to 
achieve. HHS has attempted to set goals and targets that are 
challenging, but could realistically be met.
    Reliability of data was a key criterion in the selection of 
performance goals for the HHS fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 
2000 performance plans. Any limitations on the reliability of 
the data used to measure goals are discussed in the appropriate 
sections of the performance plan. The Department's performance 
goals and measures for programs administered by performance 
partners rely for the most part on data sources that have 
supported program decision-making for many years. Where it is 
appropriate, standards for the validation and verification of 
data from such performance partners will be consistent with the 
intended purpose of the data, which is to ``inform'' decision-
making processes. The HHS Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan 
Summary includes a Department-wide discussion of the data 
challenges faced by HHS programs and their implementation 
partners. More detailed, program-specific discussions of data 
issues are included in the individual performance plans of the 
HHS agencies.
    HHS and its Operating Divisions have made an effort to 
ensure that performance goals will be high-quality indicators 
of performance. Because of the way that HHS programs intersect 
with those of State and other non-Federal partners, HHS pursues 
program performance measurement with the cooperation and 
authoritative participation of its partners. HHS has developed 
performance goals and measures with a focused outcome in mind. 
HHS seeks to identify high-quality performance data that will 
inform deliberations of HHS and other decision-makers in 
improving the programs that serve the health and human service 
needs of the public.
    Throughout the implementation of the Results Act, HHS has 
encouraged its programs to coordinate with other programs, both 
within and outside the Department, that share objectives or 
serve similar customer groups and to briefly discuss this 
coordination in their performance plans. Due to the extensive 
involvement and authority of non-Federal partners in program 
implementation and management, HHS programs have consulted 
significantly with their program partners and stakeholders in 
the identification of program outcomes and the development of 
goals and data sources to measure progress towards those 
outcomes. For example, the Health Care Financing Administration 
has led negotiations with the States to develop a goal and 
targets pertaining to the Children's Health Insurance Program. 
The Health Resources and Services Administration and Office of 
Public Health Service have agreed to use the same goal.
    Evidence of the coordination of crosscutting activities can 
be found in both the Performance Plan Summary and in the 
Operating Divisions' annual performance plans. The Summary 
serves as the source document for understanding the cross-
cutting, coordinated nature of HHS approaches to meeting the 
long-term objectives of the Department. The Summary also 
highlights coordination efforts across the Federal government. 
Program-specific discussions of coordination activities can 
also be found in the Operating Division annual performance 
plans.
    Many of the programs administered by HHS involve goals and 
objectives that are shared by other programs within the 
Department and by other agencies and departments within the 
Federal government. The overlap between these programs could be 
viewed as being duplicative and redundant. However, they often 
involve a range of interventions that are dissimilar and 
represent complementary--rather than duplicative--approaches. 
For example, in the tobacco programs, several agencies 
contribute to the Department's goals to reduce tobacco use, 
especially among youth. The Food and Drug Administration and 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 
[SAMHSA] programs limit tobacco access to minors with an 
emphasis on enforcement, National Institutes of Health conducts 
research on nicotine addiction, and Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention promotes smoking cessation and prevention 
programs directed at youth. In some cases, the programs differ 
from one another because of uncertainty about what will work. 
In such cases, the range of interventions represents natural 
experiments and provides information to society about the most 
effective approach.

                            data reliability

    For the most part, HHS agencies collect data from reliable 
data systems that have informed decision-making for several 
years. However, the reporting requirements of the Results Act 
do not adequately accommodate the needs of States, local 
governments, universities, other grantees and other performance 
partners in reporting about program performance. Traditionally, 
reporting of program data by such entities requires 
significantly longer time frames than those defined in GPRA. 
Non-Federal program performance partners participate in GPRA 
voluntarily because they are not specifically required by GPRA 
to be held accountable for the performance reporting required 
under the Act. Because they are often the sole sources for the 
information on outcomes that is most valuable for GPRA 
assessment, HHS has pursued voluntary cooperation of 
performance partners in providing data to assess program 
performance under GPRA.

                         ii. high-risk problems

    In January 1999, GAO published a report identifying high-
risk problems identified in Federal agencies. In his letter to 
Secretary Shalala on the matter, Senator Thompson, chairman of 
the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, acknowledged the 
positive efforts of HHS to develop performance goals for 
management challenges identified by the GAO and the HHS Office 
of the Inspector General. In its fiscal year 2000 plan, HHS had 
direct goals for 12 of 14 areas identified as weaknesses. The 
Subcommittee will continue to monitor HHS' efforts to rectify 
these high-risk problems.

                           iii. consultations

    GPRA requires consultation with Congress on strategic 
plans. HHS did conduct a series of formal consultations with 
committees of the House and the Senate on its current strategic 
plan, and will do so in the upcoming revision. HHS did not 
consult formally on performance plans, since the Act does not 
require it.
    The Budget Office within the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Management and Budget has the lead for the 
implementation of GPRA across HHS. Given the decentralized 
structure of the separate components of HHS and the 
disaggregated nature of its performance plan, HHS relies 
primarily on its Operating Divisions to develop annual goals 
and measures for individual programs.

                             iv. usefulness

    HHS and its Operating Divisions have worked to make the HHS 
Performance Plan Summary and the Operating Division performance 
plans clear, coherent and user-friendly. HHS has attempted to 
make its presentation of performance as informative and useful 
as possible to a wide array of audiences.
    The HHS Performance Plan consists of the HHS Performance 
Plan Summary and the individual Operating Division Performance 
Plans. The HHS Performance Plan Summary provides the linkage 
between the Departmental strategic objectives and the annual 
performance measures used by each operating division and 
program to achieve these longer-term objectives. The Operating 
Divisions base the annual goals and targets for each program 
activity on the longer-term objectives established in the 
strategic plan, the legislative intent of the program activity 
(i.e. its programmatic intent and daily operations), and the 
budget request for the program activity. Each Operating 
Division Performance Plan provides detailed performance 
information by program activity that addresses these linkages.
    As greater amounts of reliable and valid performance 
information become available, the Performance Plan may become 
more useful as a tool for making budget decisions. However, 
until performance information matures over time, the utility of 
the performance plans will be somewhat limited. In addition, 
observations of performance data for a single year will not be 
particularly definitive or valuable in making decisions about 
program improvements or funding levels.
    Over the last year, HHS has responded to valid OMB 
criticisms that plans across HHS lacked standardization. As a 
result, the HHS-wide GPRA Management Team developed a 
standardized presentation format that all HHS components will 
apply to fiscal year 2001 performance plans and reports. It is 
anticipated that these changes will make the plans more useful 
and informative.

                        DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

                   i. performance goals and measures

    In general, the performance goals and measures for the 
Department of Education [DOE] are fairly comprehensive and 
relate to nearly all of the Department's budgeted programs and 
activities.
    In general, DOE's performance objectives and measures are 
results-oriented. They focus on improving conditions or 
expanding opportunities for students and other stakeholders 
such as teachers or DOE employees. For example, one DOE 
objective is to have a talented and dedicated teacher in every 
classroom in America. One of the performance measures states 
that throughout the nation, the percentage of secondary school 
teachers who have at least a minor degree in the subject they 
teach will increase annually. Another objective states that 
greater public school choice will be available to students and 
families. Performance measures provide that by 2003, 25 percent 
of all public school students in grades 3-12 will attend a 
school that they or their parents have chosen.
    It is difficult to judge how challenging all of the goals 
and measures are without past performance information for each 
goal. As required for all agencies, DOE's first annual 
performance report is due this spring. Once agencies begin 
reporting on the actual levels of performance they have 
achieved, determining how challenging performance goals are 
will become easier.
    Many of the performance goals and measures in the 
agencywide performance plan were generally objective, 
measurable, and quantifiable, but many in the individual 
program performance plans were not. The Subcommittee noted that 
many of the performance measures for individual programs lacked 
quantifiable baselines or targeted levels of performance for 
the fiscal year, which could hinder the Department's ability to 
assess its performance.
    The plan calls for the supporting and funding of education 
programs in the States, localities and universities, and 
effectively managing the use of these resources, thereby 
creating the potential for competing demands. The Subcommittee 
believes there is a sense of balance in how the plan approaches 
these potential competing demands. As an example, one objective 
discusses how DOE will provide greater flexibility to State and 
local educational agencies while maintaining accountability for 
program performance.
    Nearly all objectives in DOE's plan include a discussion of 
the coordination the Department will need with other Federal 
agencies to achieve the objective and, in general terms, 
describe the issues or efforts that require this coordination. 
But the plan does not identify or describe common or 
complementary performance goals and measures elsewhere in the 
Federal government that relate to DOE's goals and measures; nor 
do the individual program performance plans discuss 
coordination or complementary goals and measures.
    In its effort to identify duplicate programs, DOE's 
performance plan includes a separate appendix listing agencies 
with overlapping or similar programs with which DOE will need 
to coordinate.

                          ii. data reliability

    Data reliability continues to be a problem for DOE. Since 
the early 1990s, DOE has been challenged to fully develop 
accounting and financial information management systems that 
would generate complete and accurate data to support its 
performance plans and performance reports. DOE's OIG reported 
in its fiscal year 1997 audit report that the Department's 
financial management systems did not substantially comply with 
the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996. For 
example, DOE does not have a subsidiary ledger to track 
guaranty agency activity for both loans receivable and reserves 
held by guaranty agencies. In addition, although it began to 
use a new integrated financial management system in May 1998, 
the Department continues to experience difficulties in 
implementing and operating this system.
    More recently, DOE's preparation of the fiscal year 1998 
financial statements and the related audit were delayed until 
the Department reconciled the general ledger data and resolved 
significant differences between the general ledger and other 
related information. The independent auditor rendered a 
disclaimer of opinion on DOE's fiscal year 1998 financial 
statements because of serious deficiencies in the Department's 
systems, recordkeeping, documentation, financial reporting, and 
controls.
    In general, the DOE performance plan describes the 
limitations of its performance data and its efforts to verify 
the reliability of performance measures. For example, for one 
performance indicator--to annually increase the percentage of 
students and their parents who obtain information on the 
academic requirements for college or other postsecondary 
education--the Department acknowledges that no data currently 
exist on the extent to which students obtain this information. 
The plan also says that DOE will supplement any data 
limitations with the results of evaluation studies it conducts 
or contracts out as well as with the results of onsite reviews 
or routine monitoring by Department staff.
    The plan also recognizes that the large number of 
individual education programs in States, communities, and 
schools makes it even more difficult to create sound 
measurement systems, due to differences in their data 
collection and reporting techniques, and that it may take 
several years to fully develop and implement measures to 
improve reliability.
    There are instances, however, where the plan recognizes 
data limitations, but does not indicate how some of them will 
be resolved. For example, there is an objective to ensure that 
postsecondary students receive the financial aid and support 
services they need to complete their education. One indicator 
for this objective states that the Department will assess 
whether the gap in college graduation rates between low-income 
and high-income, and minority and nonminority students is 
decreasing. The Department expects to acquire these data from 
the Beginning Postsecondary Students Study, which is conducted 
only once every 8 years. Until these data are available, DOE is 
using data from another source. But these data do not capture 
differences in graduation rates by income level, and the plan 
does not note how DOE will acquire these data.

                        iii. high risk problems

    Of the five major management challenges GAO identified in 
the Department, three are addressed through performance 
objectives in the plan. For the other two, the plan describes 
steps DOE will take to address the challenges, but does not 
outline specific goals or objectives to do so.
    The Subcommittee believes DOE is committed to addressing 
these challenges and has made some progress in addressing 
management shortcomings, such as reducing the default rate on 
Federal student loans. The performance plan addresses these 
challenges; however, progress since its issuance has been 
sparse. For example, there is a debate within the Department as 
to the best strategy for integrating the information systems 
supporting the student aid programs. DOE received a disclaimer 
of opinion on its fiscal year 1998 financial statement audit 
because of weaknesses in a new automated accounting system, 
inadequate account reconciliations, and insufficient 
documentation for transactions.

                             iv. usefulness

    Although it is voluminous (2 volumes totaling around 500 
pages), the Department's performance plan is generally helpful, 
informative and relatively easy to navigate. It is well 
organized--the descriptions for each goal and objective 
consistently follow the same format. The plan shows clear 
linkages between annual goals and objectives and the strategic 
plan, the Department's budget, and its mission statement. 
However, the large number of performance objectives and 
indicators make the plan more difficult to comprehend.
    Generally, DOE provides clear linkages between and among 
the plan's annual performance goals, the mission and goals 
established in the strategic plan, the budget program 
activities, and its day-to-day operations. The order in which 
performance goals and objectives are described in the 
performance plan mirrors the organization in the strategic 
plan. It contains a separate appendix that generally relates 
each of the Department's budgeted program activities to one or 
more strategic plan goals and objectives. However, the 
Subcommittee found a few program activities that were not 
included in this appendix--in particular, the departmental 
management account that funds agency operations. Another plan 
appendix shows the funding and staffing resources associated 
with each objective, but it does not explain how these resource 
levels were determined from the program activities in DEO's 
budget request.
    The description for each strategic objective includes a 
fairly lengthy discussion of key strategies for achieving that 
objective, including the role of budgetary resources and 
legislative initiatives. The descriptions also list Department 
programs that support the objective.
    DOE's plan provides a general picture of intended 
performance across the agency, a general discussion of 
strategies and resources the agency will use to achieve its 
goals, and general confidence that agency performance 
information will be credible. In these respects, the plan is a 
useful document. The plan includes tables linking performance 
goals and measures to most budgeted programs and activities. In 
addition, the plan includes baseline or trend data for most 
performance indicators, discusses need for coordination with 
other Federal agencies, describes data limitations and 
verification of the reliability of performance measures, and 
shows how evaluations will be used to supplement for 
performance measurement shortcomings.
    DOE's plan could be improved by more completely discussing 
coordination of specific programs with similar programs in 
other agencies, as well as coordination of complementary 
performance goals and measures, including separate discussions 
of how capital assets, mission critical management systems, or 
human capital will support achievement of program results, and 
indicating how existing data limitations will be resolved.

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION

                   i. performance goals and measures

    Generally, the Department of Transportation's [DOT] 
performance goals and measures focus on several of the most 
important challenges facing the Department. However, one of the 
weaknesses cited by the GAO in its review of the Department's 
performance plan was the lack of a consistent link of the 
performance goals to the strategic outcomes and the lack of 
consistent inclusion of goals and measures for addressing the 
management challenges facing the Department. The Office of 
Inspector General [OIG] identified the lack of accountability 
for financial activities as a key challenge for DOT. It is too 
early to tell whether the Department's recognition of this 
continuing deficiency has been adequately addressed by the 
steps taken in response to the OIG recommendations. Many of the 
challenges identified by the GAO and the OIG are long-standing 
and will require sustained attention by DOT and the Congress.
    The Department's goals and measures are result-oriented, 
with the caveats noted above. The plan's goals and measures are 
objective, quantifiable, and measurable. For all except a few 
performance goals, the Department's plans describe target 
levels of performance in both annual and multi-year terms.
    The Department's goals and measures vary depending on the 
likelihood of meeting the challenge. Almost invariably, the 
goals and measures move the Department toward qualitative or 
quantitative improvement in the safety and performance 
challenges generally considered to be the primary Federal 
issues relating to transportation.
    Tradeoffs between competing goals are not readily obvious, 
and the Subcommittee has not identified any unintended or 
perverse effects from the articulated goals or measures. A more 
relevant concern might be the myriad activities to address a 
specific initiative, i.e., the identified high-risk information 
technology initiative for the Federal Aviation Administration's 
[FAA] air traffic control modernization program. The DOT plan 
could be focused and significantly improved in this specific 
area by consistently including goals and measures for 
addressing endemic, long-term problems facing the Department in 
the procurement, information technology, and financial 
management arenas.
    The DOT performance plan notes the obvious cross-cutting 
activities at other Federal agencies, but the Subcommittee 
believes that cross-cutting issues present an area ripe for 
efficiencies or for goal specialization. For example, the plan 
states that both the FAA and the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration have similar performance goals in the area of 
aviation fatalities. However, the plan is thin on the nature of 
the coordination or in describing the relative roles played by 
the respective agencies in meeting that goal. Further, several 
possible shared goals with other agencies are either not 
articulated at this point or are not areas in which DOT 
envisions management or programmatic advantages from greater 
coordination. Another danger of plans built with substantial 
cross agency participation and support is that, unless the 
additional agencies share the Department's enthusiasm for the 
program the Department can quickly find itself the single 
parent of a very resource-demanding program in its infancy. 
Greater coordination and reconciling of plans and budget 
submissions should help foster cross-departmental initiatives.
    The current plan does not identify crosscutting programs.

                          ii. data reliability

    In most of the general goal and performance measures, DOT 
has information sources available to generate reliable data to 
support the performance plan and to credibly report to Congress 
on the status of progress toward identified goals. However, a 
continuing deficiency for DOT generally has been a lack of 
accountability for the Department's financial activities and an 
impaired ability to manage programs, procurements, and 
activities in an effective and efficient manner. Since the 
early 1990s, when the OIG began auditing the financial 
statements of certain agencies within DOT, the OIG has been 
unable to determine whether the reported financial results are 
correct and has accordingly been unable to clear the statement 
with an unqualified opinion. The main deficiencies have been 
the Department's inability to reliably determine the 
quantities, the locations, and the value of property, plant, 
equipment and inventory. Financial management weaknesses at the 
FAA contribute significantly to this problem. The Department 
lacks a cost accounting system or an alternative system for 
reporting project and activity costs. This deficiency generally 
makes it questionable whether DOT can adequately link costs 
factors with performance measures in any area of financial, 
procurement, or cost effectiveness.
    The Department notes that it is pursuing cost accounting 
improvements, but the Subcommittee is concerned that any real 
improvement in this risk area is at least two years off. In 
addition, the plan acknowledges identified concerns about 
limitations and expresses a willingness and intent to remedy 
shortcomings. However, on an anecdotal basis, it is difficult 
to identify actions taken toward those ends at this time.
    The GAO does note that the 2000 performance plan made 
substantial improvements over the 1999 plan in the area of 
performance measures to address the data issue weaknesses. 
Whether these measures remedy the current weaknesses is still 
an open question.

                        iii. high risk problems

    The Department continues to have substantial problems in 
two major risk areas identified by GAO: (1) significant cost 
overruns, schedule delays and performance shortfalls 
experienced by the air traffic control modernization program; 
and (2) serious financial management weaknesses at the FAA. 
These problems have been documented and identified by the OIG, 
GAO, the Department and Congress, and solutions have been 
suggested. Although some actions have been taken to address 
these recommendations, major performance and management 
challenges persist.
    These high risk areas are not new to the agencies or DOT. 
Solutions have been elusive, but the Subcommittee has no reason 
to question the Department's commitment to finding long term 
solutions for any of the GAO or IG identified problems.

                           iv. consultations

    The Subcommittee staff has maintained an ongoing dialogue 
with Department officials involved with the Results Act 
requirements and effort. The benefit of consultations is more 
relevant as the performance plan elements migrate into budget 
formulation and execution within DOT and the individual modal 
administrations. That evolution has yet to fully be embraced by 
the entire Department, even though Results Act integration 
responsibilities are vested in the Office of Budget and 
Programs. Concurrent responsibility for budget formulation in 
the Office of the Secretary by itself does not insure 
individual modal attention to performance goals or guarantee 
that OMB will respect the programmatic requirements of those 
goals as annual budgets are formulated and reviewed.

                             v. usefulness

    A second printing of the Department's performance plan was 
required due to other agency interest in the Department's 
innovative plan approaches. The plan is clear, concise and well 
organized, and it warrants favorable comparison to other recent 
publications by transportation officials and opinion-makers.
    The Department's plan provides the necessary linkages 
between performance goals and mission statements. However, the 
Department's ability to implement performance management is 
limited by the lack of a reliable cost accounting system and 
the management problems in procurement and personnel 
management. Clearly, DOT has made major strides with its 
performance plan, but that plan has yet to penetrate the day-
to-day operations of the Department, the modal administrations, 
or the procurement or personnel processes.
    The plans are very useful documents for determining how DOT 
views the relative and absolute importance of its disparate 
goals. In addition, it is a valuable gauge of whether the 
Departmental leadership is serious about remedying identified 
deficiencies or inconsistencies in programs, activities, 
management, or direction.
    The Department has been recognized as a leader in 
implementing the Results Act. GAO noted that the Department's 
Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Plan should be a useful tool for 
decision makers. It provides a clear picture of intended 
performance across DOT, a specific discussion of the strategies 
and resources that DOT will use to achieve its goals, and 
general confidence that the Department's performance 
information will be credible.
    However, GAO also noted improvements that could be made to 
the Department's plan. Two of the recommended improvements 
relate to the critical management challenges identified by GAO 
and DOT's OIG. GAO suggested that consistently including goals 
and specific measures for addressing these challenges and a 
full explanation of how the Department will address certain 
financial management challenges would improve the plan. Other 
GAO suggestions include: (1) including at least one annual 
performance goal for each strategic outcome; (2) describing the 
nature of the coordination with other Federal agencies that 
have outcomes in common with DOT and consistently discussing 
the Department's contribution to the crosscutting programs; and 
(3) improvements in data systems.

            SUBCOMMITTEE ON TREASURY AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT

                       DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The Department of the Treasury has four key missions in 
fiscal year 2000. Fulfillment of these missions requires 
actions by all agencies and entities within the Department. 
However, the Department has also developed the following 
additional performance goals and outcomes for each mission:
    (1) Promote a prosperous and stable American and world 
economy (economic mission);
    (2) Effectively manage the Government's finances (financial 
mission);
    (3) Protect our financial systems and our nation's leaders, 
and foster a safe and drug-free America (law enforcement 
mission); and
    (4) Continue to build a strong institution (management 
mission).
    As reflected in individual agency performance measures, 
measures are expressed both as outcomes (maintain or improve 
economic conditions in developing countries) and as processes 
or activities (Customs Service air travel compliance rate of 
97.7 percent). Because of the wide-ranging jurisdiction, this 
appears to be appropriate.
    As a reflection of individual agency goals, most are 
reasonably challenging, in some cases (such as Customs Service) 
the result of the fine-tuning of measures. There is a 
combination of recurring measures, discontinued measures, and 
new measures, which leads to the conclusion that the 
performance plan is an evolving document.
    Reliable measurement is dependent upon the individual 
agency or bureau. The Department required each agency or bureau 
to rate its performance data as having either reasonable 
accuracy or as having questionable or unknown accuracy. Those 
isolated measures which were identified as questionable or 
unknown are being evaluated to determine what needs to be done 
to improve the reliability of the data.
    Several agencies contribute to each mission statement. 
Because the Department's performance measures reflect 
individual agency measures, it appears that great care has been 
taken by the Department to ensure balance.
    There are some cross-cutting programs and activities 
similar to those in other areas of the Federal Government, such 
as the mission to ``foster a safe and drug-free America''. 
While these relationships are not specifically addressed in the 
Department's performance goals, in practice the agencies have 
formed close cooperative working relationships with other 
entities, and these relationships are reflected in their 
individual plans.

                          ii. data reliability

    Because the Department's performance plan relies heavily on 
individual agency performance, the level of data reliability 
varies. For example, statistical agencies such as the Bureau of 
Public Debt have extremely reliable data, and the Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing has the ability to track items such as 
manufacturing costs for currency. On the other end of the 
spectrum, the Internal Revenue Service [IRS] is currently 
struggling with development of a new information technology 
modernization project and must rely upon outmoded technology 
for data collection. The Department's performance plan does not 
address any potential data limitations or weaknesses.

                        iii. high risk programs

    GAO highlighted four general challenges facing the 
Department of the Treasury: (1) IRS management and performance 
issues, (2) Customs Service financial management, (3) Financial 
Management Service financial management issues, and (4) 
department-wide financial management weaknesses. The 
performance plans for individual agencies reflect efforts to 
address these issues. The Department's performance plan 
contains a performance measure regarding the audit opinion on 
consolidated Treasury-wide financial statements.
    The Department's performance measures for the goal to 
``Continue to build a strong institution'' contain the measure 
of an unqualified audit opinion in fiscal year 2000. Since 
there have been qualified opinions since fiscal year 1998, 
reaching that indicator will require a serious commitment on 
the part of Treasury.

                           iv. consultations

    Individual agency performance plans were discussed with 
Subcommittee staff during the annual budget briefings. This is 
also the case with the Departmental offices' performance 
proposals. Over the past couple of years, the various agencies 
have incorporated the results of these consultations into 
subsequent submissions, making the consultations effective from 
the Subcommittee's point of view.
    Until recently, there were two separate staffs responsible 
for budget and Results Act implementation, with the budget 
staff overseeing the evaluation and linkage issues. The 
Department recently merged these responsibilities under one 
deputy assistant secretary who is responsible for both budget 
and planning. While having separate staffs did not actually 
impede effective consultation, the merging of responsibilities 
will result in a more streamlined effort and information flow.

                             v. usefulness

    The Department's concise summary of performance measures 
delineates the agency measures which impact a particular 
mission statement. If any additional information or explanation 
is required, it can be found in the individual agency's plan.
    The performance measures are listed as supporting a 
particular mission statement which shows a clear link to that 
mission. However, because this is a concise summary of 
individual agency measures, it does not include references to 
budget program activities or day-to-day operations. Those 
linkages should be contained in the individual agency plans.
    A summary of the Department-wide missions is extremely 
useful in seeing the big picture and as a measure of the role 
of the entities contained in the Departmental offices account. 
It is particularly useful because it shows the evolution of the 
measures for a particular mission by the inclusion of 
continuing measures, discontinued measures, and newly added 
measures. The Department further required individual agency and 
bureau plans to be integrated with the budget justification 
documents, which has been especially useful.

                            Customs Service

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The Customs Service has reorganized its operations around 
the following 3 core business processes which enable Customs to 
manage its programs and activities: (1) trade compliance (the 
commercial importation of merchandise), (2) passenger 
processing (the processing of passengers entering and leaving 
the U.S.), and (3) outbound processing (the commercial 
exportation of merchandise). In addition to these core 
processes, the enforcement systems area, when combined with the 
business processes, encompass all of Customs' operational 
activities. From these processes, Customs has developed 39 
performance measures.
    Customs' mission is to ensure that all goods and persons 
entering and exiting the United States do so in compliance with 
all laws and regulations. Customs, in conjunction with other 
Federal agencies, represents one of the Nation's principal 
means of border enforcement. Customs is establishing a 
framework for seeking improvements in organizational 
performance by focusing on improving service to its compliant 
customers while enhancing effective enforcement against willful 
violators.
    Customs' goals and measures are reflected in terms of 
general policy statements such as ``maximizing trade 
compliance'', whereby the agency tries to measure the 
compliance level. The goals are not always inherently 
quantifiable. The majority of the goals and measures are 
expressed in terms of processes and activities and not as 
outcomes.
    Customs has found, through the evaluation of its fiscal 
year 1998 performance plan, that many of its commercial targets 
were overly aggressive and resulted in Customs achieving only 
11 of its 28 performance goals. Customs has achieved high 
levels of compliance in its air and land passenger processes 
and in revenue collection compliance. To improve trade 
compliance, Customs continues to pursue modernization efforts 
and will implement a formal set of trade surveys to assess 
customer perceptions and attitudes, while implementing more 
aggressive enforcement measures when necessary.
    Throughout this process, Customs has realized that some of 
its original measures were not sufficient to achieve the goals 
set forth. Therefore, the agency has worked to modify or 
eliminate the ineffective measures through a formal evaluation 
process. In addition, Customs is implementing new means by 
which to receive critical performance information, particularly 
relating to the impressions of those that interact and are the 
``customers'' of the Customs Service.
    The largest difficulty Customs faces in terms of measuring 
performance is that Customs' mission of compliance and drug 
interdiction does not have defined scope upon which success or 
failure can be statistically based. For example, Customs can 
state how many pounds of drugs it has interdicted in any given 
year, but it cannot estimate the amount of drugs that are not 
interdicted or detected at the border. The biggest challenge 
for Customs is to translate an undefinable environment into 
effective, measurable goals and performance measures.
    Of those which are quantifiable, Customs' performance 
measures have undergone major changes during the last few 
fiscal years. The agency recognizes that there is still much 
work to be done, as is evident in the development of several 
baseline measures and the discontinuation of other measures. 
The 1998 fiscal year for Customs was a continuous process of 
improving measures, evaluating how data was captured and 
validated, and how to more accurately capture the outcome and 
impact of mission related information. One example is that 
Customs is working to develop a new set of narcotic and money 
laundering outcome measures, which, when viewed in conjunction 
with the traditional outputs, paint a better portrait of the 
organization's impact.
    Customs will continue the process of identifying and 
improving measures and better defining what should be measured 
within the organization. The real challenge for Customs is to 
determine if it is measuring what it should be measuring, to 
develop new measures or refine existing measures, to ensure 
data integrity of the new measures, and ultimately to use the 
data to assist in making sound resource decisions.
    The Customs Service is in a unique position because its 
role at the border is shared with the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service [INS], and the inspectors for both 
agencies work side by side. Currently, the Customs Service and 
INS are carrying out the Border Coordination Initiative, a 
long-term effort to improve cooperation and performance of INS 
and Customs resources. Customs contemplates instituting another 
intensive narcotics enforcement effort. It will further refine 
the operations of its field intelligence teams for both 
agencies. The Border Coordination Initiative is specifically 
mentioned in Customs' performance plan.

                          ii. data reliability

    Customs is developing tools to ensure performance 
measurement data integrity. For most of the data elements used 
in measuring performance, Customs has designated a data owner 
for that element. The owner of the data element is responsible 
for ensuring the quality and validity of the data and for 
assigning a ``quality rating'' for its respective element.
    In general, Customs verifies and validates its data using 
an array of methods. These include management inspections, 
headquarters and field reviews, automated edits, program 
reviews, other agency validation, private sector feedback, and 
IG and GAO audits. An overriding concern continues to be the 
ability of the agency to establish mechanisms which can 
effectively and reliably collect the data being sought.
    There is an inherent weakness with the data because Customs 
operates in an environment that cannot always be quantified. 
The primary example is that it is impossible to estimate and 
measure the amount of drugs that cross the border undetected. 
Customs acknowledges this weakness and continues to work with 
other agencies in a Federal effort to work toward better 
identification of the size of the drug problem.
    In aspects where Customs can quantify the data, Customs is 
improving data collection by developing new baselines and using 
technology to assist the data collection and improve the 
validity of the data collected.

                        iii. high risk programs

    The asset forfeiture program, administered by Customs and 
the Justice Department, was on GAO's high-risk list since the 
inception of the list in 1990. Since the publication of the 
list in early 1999, Customs has been removed from the GAO high-
risk list. The Department of Treasury, however, does remain on 
the list for seized asset management. There were no specific 
goals or measures included in the fiscal year 2000 performance 
plan for this issue. There are, however, action items in the 
Commissioner's Action Plan relating to this problem.

                           iv. consultations

    During the first year of reporting, fiscal year 1998, the 
Customs Service provided extensive briefings to get input and 
feedback from the Subcommittee. In addition, during this 
process Customs shared the means by which it was building its 
plans and how it wanted to proceed. As the plans have become 
more refined over time, the Customs Service has consulted with 
the Subcommittee on its performance plans concurrently with the 
Subcommittee's review of Customs' budget.
    As a result of the consultations, the Customs Service and 
the Department of the Treasury as a whole have completely 
integrated their performance plans into their budget 
submission. Customs has taken each budget initiative and 
presented it in terms of its performance plan, which provides 
the Subcommittee the ability to validate the budget requests 
against the performance measures, and vice versa.
    The budget document is the vehicle for the performance 
measures. The agency's performance plan is contained within the 
agency's budget submission, but the work is done by a separate 
planning staff that is closely linked with the budget office.

                             v. usefulness

    Customs' performance plan is very clear and concise. It 
provides the Subcommittee with sufficient detail without 
providing too much information.
    There are definitive links between the plan's goals and the 
mission. In fact, the primary component of the plan is the 
section titled ``Relationship between the strategic plan and 
the annual performance plan,'' whereby each strategic goal and 
objective are laid out against the performance goal to which 
they are linked. In addition, the plan includes a section which 
lists those measures currently under administrative review 
because they are being either considered or validated. Finally, 
the most informative section of the plan is the ``Definitions 
of Performance Measures'' section which sets out each budget 
activity, defines all of the 39 performance measures, the 
accuracy and means by which the measure will be verified, and 
any current data available.
    The performance plan enables the Subcommittee to evaluate 
the importance of the budget requests by how well they coincide 
with the performance plan. The plan has been a useful tool 
because, as a result of the Subcommittee's oversight, the 
agency has begun to ask itself the same questions of relevancy 
and relation to mission with respect to initiatives of interest 
to the Subcommittee. As a result, the agency and the 
Subcommittee are streamlining the requests put forth and 
validating their merit based on the agency's ability to stress 
the initiative's importance in relation to the agency's 
mission. Those initiatives that cannot be sufficiently 
justified are eliminated, and those that are meritorious can be 
promoted throughout the appropriations cycle.
    One critical piece that is missing from the plan is a 
section on those programs which were eliminated because a 
duplication of effort was found as a result of implementing the 
performance plan. Also, the Subcommittee would find it very 
useful to have information about those initiatives which were 
eliminated or phased out as a result of the implementation of 
the performance plan, i.e., an initiative that was found to 
underperform because the plan was used.

                        Internal Revenue Service

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The Internal Revenue Service [IRS] has been undergoing a 
massive restructuring effort in recent years. This has resulted 
in the creation of a new mission statement, goals, and guiding 
principles. The mission of the new IRS is to ``provide 
America's taxpayers with top quality service by helping them 
understand and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying 
the tax law with integrity and fairness to all.'' To implement 
this mission, IRS has developed three goals: (1) service to 
each taxpayer, (2) service to all taxpayers, and (3) 
productivity through a quality work environment.
    Each of the four major components of the IRS has its own 
set of performance plans, some carried forward from fiscal year 
1996. However, the vast majority of the new measurements for 
fiscal year 2000 are still under development, and outcomes for 
specific measures have not been articulated.
    There has been criticism in the past of an apparent lack of 
balance between customer service and tax law enforcement. The 
IRS believes it has now struck a balance by emphasizing three 
major areas: (1) customer satisfaction, (2) employee 
satisfaction, and (3) business results. Whether this is 
actually the case remains to be seen.
    The vast majority of the measurements contained in the IRS 
performance plans are measured by quality and quantity. For 
example, the Processing, Assistance, and Management component 
is focused heavily on the customer service aspects of the IRS 
and includes such measurements as refund timeliness (percentage 
of refunds issued in less than 21 days) and accuracy rates for 
taxpayer inquiries.
    Most of the existing and continuing measures anticipate a 
steady but gradual improvement, and some expect the IRS to 
maintain existing performance. For example, availability of 
data to front-line employees 99 percent of the time has been 
the goal since fiscal year 1996 and will continue to be so in 
fiscal year 2000. Outcomes expected from the new measurements 
will be based upon fiscal year 1999 performance and have not 
yet been determined. However, the Subcommittee expects the IRS 
to continue to strive for improvement in each and every 
category.
    Because the operations of the IRS are based upon numbers--
taxpayers, refunds, examinations, collections--most of the 
objectives can be reliably measured, subject to the 
availability of necessary technology. However, the most 
important goals--customer satisfaction and employee 
satisfaction--are much harder to measure. Unfortunately, for 
purposes of this review, those performance measures are among 
the many still to be determined.
    The IRS must continue to balance taxpayer satisfaction with 
its collection responsibilities. Unfortunately, there are many 
times when taxpayers are not satisfied when the IRS informs 
them that they owe additional taxes under existing tax laws. As 
a result of Congressional oversight during the recent past, 
emphasis seems to have shifted to customer satisfaction, which 
has resulted in a reduction in enforcement collections. The IRS 
believes its fiscal year 2000 performance plan strikes an 
appropriate balance.
    The IRS is solely responsible for the enforcement of 
internal revenue laws and statutes, and for the collection of 
income taxes, social insurance and retirement taxes, as well as 
excise, estate, and gift taxes. The other entity with tax-
collection responsibility is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, which collects taxes on alcohol, tobacco, firearms, 
and explosives. Because their responsibilities are clearly 
delineated in statute, there are no cross-cutting programs or 
activities.

                          ii. data reliability

    The IRS has been relying upon older information systems for 
tracking both revenue and performance measurements. This 
fulfills the agency's requirement that all measures must have 
reasonable accuracy. However, it should be noted that after a 
somewhat shaky start, the IRS has taken positive steps to 
ensure that the ongoing information technology modernization 
project continues to move forward at a deliberative, albeit 
slow, pace. In order to ensure that funds are spent wisely, 
which has not been the case in the past, Congress has required 
that the IRS outline expenditures before funding is released.
    As a result of careful oversight by Congress, GAO, OMB, and 
the IRS Management Board at the Treasury Department, the 
project appears to be back on track. While there could be early 
positive results in some specific programs, the entire project 
will take at least 10 years to complete. The IRS will continue 
to use the existing legacy systems to track performance 
measurements.

                        iii. high risk programs

    Unfortunately, GAO has identified seven issues which are 
described as ``formidable challenges'' facing the IRS which 
should be addressed separately.
  --Restructuring the IRS organization and business practices 
        to better balance its efforts between taxpayer 
        assistance and enforcement.--As outlined by the summary 
        of its plan, the IRS has moved forward to redesign the 
        business practices of the agency into 4 operating 
        divisions, each with responsibility for a specific 
        segment or segments of taxpayers. Once this transition 
        is complete, the IRS believes that this redesign will 
        help it to meet all 3 major goals of the agency.
  --Correcting management and technical weaknesses in its 
        systems modernization efforts.--As previously stated, 
        the IRS is in the process of implementing its 
        information technology modernization efforts. A big 
        step forward was the awarding of the PRIME contract 
        late last year to serve as the developer and integrator 
        for this project. The lines of responsibility are being 
        defined but have not yet been completed.
  --Resolving financial management and control weaknesses that 
        affect its ability to adequately manage its financial 
        operations.--Because of the age of the existing 
        information technology infrastructure, the only way to 
        resolve these problems is with an entirely new, 
        modernized, replacement system. While those efforts are 
        underway, it is a long process.
  --Addressing problems relating to its ability to collect 
        Federal tax receivables and other unpaid assessments.--
        The performance indicators for the collection activity 
        for the Tax Law Enforcement account are still under 
        development, which shows that the IRS is aware of the 
        problems and working to develop the necessary 
        performance measures. Fulfilling many of the 
        performance measures is dependent upon completion of 
        information technology applications.
  --Assessing the impact of various efforts IRS has under way 
        to reduce filing fraud.--Unfortunately, the fiscal year 
        2000 performance plan does not mention this problem. 
        The IRS acknowledges that its plan does not address 
        this issue directly, but assures staff that it will do 
        so in the future.
  --Improving security controls over information systems to 
        address weaknesses that place taxpayer data at risk to 
        both internal and external treats.--Security is a 
        continuing concern for the IRS and has been part of the 
        IRS performance plan since fiscal year 1998. While 
        there have been some improvements over time, inclusion 
        of this concern on the GAO high-risk list shows that 
        much more needs to be done. The explanation of the 
        proposed performance plan for the Information Systems 
        account indicates that as Y2K efforts wind down, staff 
        will be redirected to work on the management of the 
        huge information technology infrastructure contract. 
        Security should be an integral part of that contract.
  --Modifying information systems to properly function in the 
        year 2000.--This has been the top priority for the IRS. 
        While the written performance plan does not include 
        specific measures, it is obvious that the IRS must 
        ensure the continued operation of the information 
        systems into the next century. This is clearly 
        articulated in the fiscal year 2000 proposed 
        performance plan explanation.
    The IRS is taking each of the items seriously and has been 
working with GAO to address its concerns. The Subcommittee will 
carefully monitor IRS's efforts and progress in rectifying 
these problems.

                           iv. consultations

    The IRS is a huge agency with numerous serious problems. As 
a result, the performance plan contains descriptions of several 
ongoing major efforts. The IRS has consistently kept the 
Subcommittee informed of its plans and progress. The 
Subcommittee expects consultation efforts to continue as the 
IRS moves forward with specific, incremental expenditure plans 
which must be approved before funds can be released.
    Consultations with IRS management representatives have been 
informative for the Subcommittee, and feedback useful for IRS 
management.
    The Results Act and budget staffs have been separate 
entities for the development of existing performance and 
strategic plans. Each was handled by a different group, which 
resulted in some disconnects between the strategic plan and 
performance plans. As part of the ongoing IRS modernization 
plan, these entities have been merged into a Strategic Planning 
and Budgeting group. This merger should result in a closer 
coordination of strategy and performance and eliminate problems 
(such as no performance plan to address the need to reduce 
filing fraud).
    The split responsibilities resulted in large numbers of IRS 
staff briefing appropriations staff. The new merged 
responsibility should make subsequent consultation much easier 
and informative.

                             v. usefulness

    The IRS performance plan is well presented. It starts with 
the overall mission statement, proceeds to the three major 
goals and the 5 guiding principles, and then to the 5 levers of 
change. This is followed by specific performance for the IRS as 
a whole, as well as the 4 major appropriated accounts. Each is 
clearly stated and presented in such a way that it does, in 
fact, inform rather than overwhelm.
    Although the measurable goals of some of the performance 
plan expectations are still being developed, the actual 
performance measures are articulated, which gives the 
Subcommittee a clear understanding of how each performance 
measure contributes to one of the 3 major goals.
    The IRS performance plan is a useful tool for realizing the 
magnitude of the task ahead of the new IRS. It clearly shows 
the intended use of requested funding levels. The fiscal year 
2001 performance plan, which is expected to have greater 
detailed indicators for specific measures, will be even more 
useful in determining whether this year's funding decisions 
were appropriate.
    The IRS has done a good job of presenting the formidable 
tasks facing this evolving entity. The Subcommittee understands 
that not all of the newly developed performance measures have 
defined indicators, especially considering that the fiscal year 
1999 performance will be the baseline for future performance 
indicators. It is therefore difficult to get a clear picture of 
the existing performance and the steps needed to improve in 
those areas.

                    GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The General Services Administration [GSA] has 4 strategic 
goals that are directly linked to the agency objective to 
provide, as cost effectively as possible, the space, supplies, 
and services Federal employees need to do their jobs. GSA 
provides these services through the Public Building Service 
[PBS], the Federal Supply Service, the Federal Technology 
Service, and the Office of Government-wide Policy. GSA has the 
following 4 strategic goals which pervade all of its functions: 
(1) to promote responsible asset management, (2) to compete 
effectively for the Federal market, (3) to excel at customer 
service, and (4) to anticipate future workforce needs.
    GSA's goals and measures are evenly mixed among outcomes 
and processes and activities, for the agency's role is 
inherently activity-based. Agency management is focused on 
defining and adapting in a rapidly changing environment. GSA is 
in the process of refocusing its activity-based measures and 
goals so they are more outcome based. For example, the plan now 
includes goals and related targets for assessing the level of 
satisfaction among GSA's federal customers. GSA is evolving 
from an operations-based organization that performs services 
for Federal agencies to a procurement and contract management 
organization that provides goods and services for its Federal 
customers.
    The goals and measures set out in GSA's performance plan 
are reasonably challenging and realistic in that they include 
items such as ``Hold annual increases in per mile charges for 
interagency fleet vehicles close to inflation.'' However, there 
are a few goals which are not as reasonable. For example, 
``Complete all construction projects on time'' is a laudable 
but unrealistic goal. GSA is reevaluating all of its goals and 
measures on a regular basis so they can be modified when the 
goals are either unreasonably challenging or unrealistic. This 
is evident in the amount of modification the strategic plan has 
undergone since 1998. GSA goals in the fiscal year 2000 plan 
are more quantifiable than previous years.
    GSA's purpose and functions are inherently measurable 
because the agency's work is process-oriented. For fiscal year 
2000, 48 of the 58 goals have measures, baselines, and targets 
which are quantifiable. For some of the goals and measures, GSA 
plans to benchmark itself against the private sector in areas 
such as travel and leasing costs. These types of goals and 
measures should be especially useful in gauging GSA's future 
performance.
    GSA's plan did not include any instances of unintended 
effects that were avoided.
    The 2000 plan shows improvement in its discussion of cross-
cutting issues. In the 2000 plan, GSA mentions the cross-
cutting nature of its activities. In addition, GSA has an 
office, the Office of Government-wide Policy [OGP], which is 
singly responsible for interagency coordination. GSA, through 
OGP, is authorized to provide for a Government-wide system for 
procurement and supply of personal property and management 
services utilization of available property disposal of surplus 
property and records management. By this authority, GSA 
develops, facilitates and interprets Government-wide policies 
in these areas. GSA collaborates with the Federal community and 
others to develop policy and guidelines, to provide education 
and training, and to identify best practices in the areas where 
GSA has or supports policymaking authority. OGP provides 
guidance, information and performance measures to make the 
Federal Government's administrative processes more efficient 
and effective.

                          ii. data reliability

    The 2000 plan discusses the importance of having the 
technological capacity to maintain good data, and the plan's 
section on PBS discusses the importance of reliable information 
and PBS' implementation of a new system for tracking real 
property data. All but 9 of the performance goals have 
subsections entitled ``Verification/Validation.'' These 
subsections generally identify the source of the data that will 
be used as a measure, with some identifying actions to be used 
to identify data problems, such as audits of financial records 
and systems.
    However, the information on data reliability is too general 
and does not list GSA's planned actions to verify and validate 
the data that will be used to monitor progress and gauge 
results. As with many agencies, GSA is struggling to identify 
the most effective and efficient means to collect this data and 
analyze how it compares with its current data collection 
systems. In addition, GSA is still refining what data to 
collect. In its plan, GSA does not address how it will meet 
these shortfalls until it has a sufficient data collection 
system in place; however, GSA does acknowledge the importance 
of data reliability.
    The plan acknowledges the weakness of data, which is 
important, but does not delve into how the agency plans to 
change its approach in order to sufficiently verify and 
validate its data and the limitations of the current data 
collection systems. There is no specific mention of the actions 
or the need for a plan to fully address how the agency will 
overcome this weakness. In addition, the agency does not 
currently have all the necessary systems in place needed to 
accurately assess the data collected. However, GSA is fortunate 
because it is a process-oriented agency which lends itself 
naturally to data collection and systems.

                        iii. high risk programs

    GSA is not on the GAO's high-risk list.

                           iv. consultations

    During the first year of reporting, fiscal year 1998, GSA 
provided extensive briefings to get input and feedback from the 
Subcommittee. In addition, GSA shared during this process the 
means by which it was building its plans and how it wanted to 
proceed. As the plans have become more refined over time, GSA 
has consulted with the Subcommittee on its performance plans 
concurrently with the Subcommittee's review of GSA's budget.
    As a result of the consultations, GSA has made the plan 
available for discussion simultaneous with the Subcommittee's 
review the agency's budget. Unfortunately, the agency has not 
completely integrated its performance plan into its budget 
submission; the documents are provided separately.
    A separate person is responsible for developing the 
performance plan. This person coordinates the planning staffs 
and the work they do in the 4 services of GSA and reports 
directly to the head of the agency budget office.

                             v. usefulness

    The plan is very clear and concise. It begins with an 
overview and a clear, charted section on the performance 
measures. Most importantly, in a detailed section on 
performance measures, it includes a breakout of strategy and 
verification/validation and their relationship to each 
strategic goal and objective.
    The plan does not always show a clear connection between 
the performance goals and the specific funding and program 
activities in the budget. Without such linkages, decision-
makers will have difficulty relating the performance goals in 
the plan to the program activities in the budget. In addition, 
it will be difficult for GSA to allocate its anticipated 
budgetary resources among its performance goals. Less than half 
of the performance goals contain a direct, identifiable link to 
the budget; and, beyond that, there are some goals which are 
not linked to any performance goals at all. However, there are 
instances in which the direct connection of the budget to a 
performance measure is made. For example, the goal to reduce 
the amount of non-revenue producing space identified 
$77,000,000 from the Basic Repair and Alterations program 
activity.
    From the Subcommittee's perspective, the linkage of the 
plan to the budget is the most critical component in order for 
the plan to be useful to budgetary decisions made throughout 
the fiscal year. Such a plan would enable the agency and the 
Subcommittee to streamline the requests put forth and validate 
their merit based on the agency's ability to stress the 
initiatives' importance in relation to the agency's mission. 
Those initiatives that could not be sufficiently justified 
would be eliminated and those that are meritorious could then 
be promoted throughout the appropriations cycle. That is not to 
say that the current plan is not useful without this 
information; however, the information is much more difficult 
and time consuming to garner without this linkage. In general, 
the plan enables the Subcommittee to ask relevant questions 
about performance that would not otherwise be a topic of 
oversight.
    The plan would be more useful if every aspect of the budget 
were linked to the plan and vice versa. In addition, it would 
be useful to have a section on cost-savings resulting from the 
use and implementation of the plan. This section should not 
only include the under-performance of some of the agency's 
activities, but also the elimination of duplicative efforts 
carried out both within GSA and within the Federal Government 
as a whole.

                     OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The Office of Personnel Management [OPM] is divided into 10 
separate components: Office of Merit Systems Oversight and 
Effectiveness, Employment Service, Retirement and Insurance 
Service, Workforce Compensation and Performance Service, 
Investigations Service, Office of Workforce Relations, 
Executive Resources, Administrative Services, Executive and 
Other Services, and Office of Inspector General.
    OPM has developed 5 separate overarching Strategic Goals, 
with objectives which span several agency divisions and 
functions. As the Federal Government's personnel office, those 
responsibilities are wide-ranging, which results in many shared 
goals. To achieve the Strategic Goals, each individual division 
has its own set of performance goals. For example, Employment 
Service has 24 goals, and Retirement and Insurance Service has 
16 goals. While each performance goal is an important objective 
for the individual division, the total number of performance 
goals for the agency is voluminous.
    There is a mixture of measures. For example, OPM relies 
upon the annual Customer Satisfaction Survey of client agencies 
to determine whether they are meeting Goal I: ``Provide policy 
direction and leadership to recruit and retain the Federal 
workforce required for the 21st Century.'' On the other hand, 
Goal IV: ``Deliver high quality, cost-effective human resources 
services to Federal agencies, employees, annuitants and the 
public'' is measured by accuracy of payments and response 
times.
    The goals and measures are, on the whole, reasonably 
challenging. While the Strategic Goals state the obvious 
functions of the agency, the performance goals articulate the 
steps the agency plans to take, or continues to take, to reach 
that goal. In some instances, it appears that OPM has developed 
a performance goal to simply continue to do what it has always 
done. At the other end of the spectrum, the goal of 
implementing a long term care program for Federal employees is 
totally dependent upon enactment of legislation.
    OPM relies upon customer satisfaction surveys and employee 
surveys to determine whether most performance goals are 
realized. The reliability of that measurement depends upon the 
reliability of the responses to the surveys and the actual 
response rates.
    The individual program performance goals identified with 
each of the 5 Strategic Goals appear to result in a balanced 
approach.
    OPM is the Federal Government's personnel office and has 
the statutory responsibility and authority to ensure 
government-wide adherence to civil service principles and laws. 
The performance goals in these areas clearly outline ongoing 
and continuing outreach and oversight of Federal agencies. As 
outlined above, the objectives of each of the 5 Strategic Goals 
clearly show the responsibilities of each division of the 
agency in reaching that goal.

                          ii. data reliability

    OPM relies heavily upon the information received from 
various surveys, the reliability of which is questionable. 
Additional information is provided through the use of outside 
audits of various accounts. The plan does not appear to 
recognize the potential inadequacies of survey results.

                        iii. high risk programs

    The GAO High-Risk Update issued in January 1999 included a 
section regarding basic financial accountability, which noted 
that OPM's retirement fund and life insurance fund each 
received unqualified audit opinions. This achievement was noted 
as a performance result in OPM's fiscal year 2000 Plan. 
However, GAO also noted that the revolving funds, health 
benefits account, and salaries and expenses account audits 
received disclaimers. While none of these audit reports reached 
the level of inclusion on the GAO high-risk list, unqualified 
audit opinions in these accounts in fiscal year 2000 are 
important performance goals (Retirement and Insurance Service 
Goal 5).
    OPM's fiscal year 2000 Plan contains an update on efforts 
to resolve this problem, leading the Subcommittee to conclude 
that there is indeed a serious commitment.

                           iv. consultations

    OPM's Strategic Plan was developed in fiscal year 1997 to 
span fiscal years 1998 through 2002 as a result of formal and 
informal discussions with both authorizing and appropriating 
committees of Congress. It is updated annually. Various aspects 
of the plan are discussed with the agency representatives 
during briefings on the budget request.
    Subcommittee staff has noted that requests for expanded 
information during budget briefings result in improvements in 
the subsequent Strategic Plan update.
    OPM has established an integrated GPRA working group 
consisting of representatives of each function of the agency. 
At last count, there were 24 staff on this permanent working 
group.

                             v. usefulness

    While overwhelming in its volume, the performance plan is 
set up in a logical and informative manner. Each strategic goal 
is listed with references to individual division performance 
goals in subsequent pages.
    The OPM plan clearly establishes the annual performance 
goals, Strategic Plan mission goals, and budget program 
activities. However, day-to-day operations are much less 
apparent.
    The Strategic Plan and performance goals are of great help 
in understanding the totality of the responsibilities and 
functions of the agency. Of particular usefulness is the 
notation of the resources provided for each activity.
    Huge responsibilities result in huge explanations. The 
combined Strategic Plan/performance plan/budget justification 
document is 365 pages long. However, it is difficult to know 
how to reduce the size of the document and still be responsive 
to the statutory requirements and GAO recommendations.

SUBCOMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND 
                          INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

              DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

                   i. performance goals and measures

    The Results Act is an important management tool for the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD], which 
continues to face a number of critical management and program 
issues that undermine the capacity of the agency to meet its 
many program responsibilities.\1\ In particular, HUD is the 
principal Federal agency responsible for programs and 
activities designed to meet the Nation's housing needs, promote 
community development and assist in the economic development of 
States and communities. In carrying out these programs and 
activities, HUD administers: (1) mortgage and loan insurance 
programs that assist families to become homeowners and 
facilitate the construction of affordable rental housing; (2) 
rental and homeownership subsidy programs, such as the Section 
8 and Public Housing programs, that provide rental assistance 
for low-income families who otherwise could not afford decent 
housing; (3) programs to combat housing discrimination and 
which affirmatively further fair housing opportunities; (4) 
programs designed to ensure the availability of an adequate 
supply of mortgage finance credit; and (5) programs that aid 
neighborhood rehabilitation, community and economic 
development, and that preserve and revitalize distressed urban 
areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ HUD has been designated, most recently in 1999, as a high risk 
area by GAO vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement; the 
only agency ever designated as high risk on an department-wide basis. 
In addition, at various times, GAO, the HUD Inspector General and NAPA 
have identified substantial concerns with HUD's ability to administer 
its programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because of HUD's broad and far-reaching responsibilities, 
the Results Act is a very important tool for linking housing 
and community development programs with funding decisions to 
ensure a comprehensive and focused approach to these issues. To 
meet the requirements of the Results Act, HUD adopted a 5-year 
strategic plan on September 30, 1997, which covered fiscal year 
1998 through fiscal year 2003. Since that time, HUD has 
continued to refine its strategic planning process through its 
business and operating plans and through its annual performance 
plans [APPs], with the Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan 
as its most recent Results Act strategic planning document. And 
while the fiscal year 2000 APP reflects a growing 
sophistication by the Department in implementing the Results 
Act, HUD has not made the necessary connections between the 
strategic plan and the allocation of resources, as provided in 
HUD's annual budget request. These connections are critical to 
ensure that HUD decisionmaking is based on measurable goals and 
outputs.
    HUD also has been in an almost constant state of 
reinvention over the last 6 years, most recently in July, 1997, 
when Secretary Cuomo released the HUD 2020 Management Reform 
Plan which announced a set of major initiatives, including 
changes designed to reduce the number of HUD programs; reduce 
the number of staff; reorganize HUD's 81 field offices; 
modernize and integrate the financial, management, and data 
information systems; and restructure program and activity 
authority in a manner designed to integrate more fully HUD 
programs and activities.
    As part of HUD's reinvention process, HUD contracted with 
the National Academy of Public Administration [NAPA] for an 
assessment of HUD's implementation of the Results Act. In 
response, NAPA issued a report entitled GPRA in HUD: Changes 
for the Better (July 1999). While the NAPA report credits HUD 
with using the Results Act as a primary tool for management 
reform and decisionmaking, the report also raises significant 
concerns about HUD's failure to link output data with output 
targets in its APPs, including the fiscal year 2000 APP. In 
addition, the NAPA report advises that HUD's business and 
operating plans still focus on program specific outputs and not 
in the multi-disciplinary cross-cutting outcome terms which are 
needed to strategically manage HUD. Also, while the Department 
is developing a Resource Estimation Allocation Process [REAP] 
system to help measure HUD's resource efforts per specific work 
requirements, there remain serious concerns regarding the 
availability of accurate and timely performance measurement 
data which meets sound data quality standards. As a result, 
data reliability is an area of paramount concern to the 
Congress. Finally, the NAPA report concludes that HUD now needs 
to link its management activities more directly to outcomes 
included in its strategic and annual performance plans.

                           ii. consultations

    While HUD's progress in implementing the Results Act is 
positive, it remains very difficult to assess the degree or the 
effectiveness of the Department in implementing the Results 
Act. In particular, the fiscal year 2000 APP fails to make 
HUD's mission, goals, and objectives adequately outcome-
oriented in a meaningful way and, more importantly, it fails to 
make the necessary connection between the APP and funding 
decisions, which for the Subcommittee is the primary criteria 
for the successful implementation of the Results Act. This also 
underlies the Subcommittee's concern that the Department has 
not worked adequately with the Congress on the implementation 
of the Results Act.
    For example, HUD's fiscal year 2000 Budget Justifications 
identified 3 performance indicators for the Housing Certificate 
Fund, which is the primary appropriation account for the 
funding of the Section 8 rental assistance programs. These 3 
performance indicators set goals: (1) to increase the 
percentage of section 8 families with children living in low-
poverty census tracts; (2) to increase the percentage of the 
head of households with children who move from welfare to work 
while assisted by tenant-based section 8; and (3) for the 
Section 8 Management Assessment program, to improve the 
performance of the agencies that administer section 8 
assistance. While these issues are important as indicators, 
there are larger and more important issues which underlie this 
account that need to be addressed. For example, there is 
significant evidence that many low-income families with section 
8 vouchers have a difficult time in finding (or are unable to 
find) affordable and available housing in many areas of the 
United States. This is a very significant issue that goes to 
the heart of the Section 8 program, one that is as important or 
more important than the issues identified by HUD in its 
performance indicators.

                            iii. usefulness

    Finally, it is still too early to evaluate adequately the 
implementation and usefulness of the Results Act as both a 
budget tool and as a measure and benchmark for the 
effectiveness of an agency in fulfilling its mission. While 
there is a significant disconnect between HUD resource 
allocations and program benchmarks and goals, it is only 
beginning on March 31, 2000 that agencies are to prepare annual 
performance reports covering the preceding 3 fiscal years, 
including performance measurement data. At that time HUD is 
expected to describe its performance indicators in its 
performance plan and assess its performance with respect to 
these indicators.

                     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

    The mission of the Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] to 
care for and serve veterans is clear, and its performance plan 
explicitly describes VA's plans to fulfill that mission. VA 
offered consultations with the Subcommittee on its performance 
plan; however, its usefulness to the Subcommittee has been 
limited, as the budget justification continues to be the key 
agency document for the Subcommittee's deliberations regarding 
VA programs. Because the budget office is largely responsible 
for overseeing implementation of the Results Act, there is a 
connection in the development of VA's budget with the 
attainment of performance measures.
    VA's goals and objectives are results-oriented; the plan 
explains where the Department is coordinating with other 
agencies, particularly the Department of Defense, in running 
its programs. In addition, the plan describes how VA is working 
to coordinate better within the Department, acting as ``one 
VA'' rather than 3 individual agencies as has been its 
tradition.
    VA's critical role as a health care provider and benefits 
deliverer to veterans makes it quite difficult to withhold 
funding owing to poor performance. In fact, poor performance at 
the VA often spurs quite the opposite effect: more funding is 
often provided when performance lags because interest groups 
virtually always cite inadequate funding as the reason for 
performance problems, such as poor quality of care or slow 
delivery of benefits. This makes it quite difficult for the 
Subcommittee to use the budget as a tool to ensure 
implementation of a performance-based system at the Department.
    Implementation of the Results Act is well underway within 
the Veterans Health Administration [VHA], which has undergone a 
significant reorganization, including the implementation of 
numerous ``management efficiencies'' aimed at reducing 
redundancies and improving the use of health care dollars. In 
addition, managers are being held to results-oriented 
performance measures with retention and promotions at risk. 
Hundreds of millions of dollars have been saved over the past 
few years while more veterans are being provided health care, 
and quality of care indicators have improved. However, given 
the size of the system and its decentralization, there is a 
wide variety in the degree of ``success.'' Moreover, there 
remains much to be done to continue to improve the system, 
eliminate inefficiencies, and improve quality. Momentum may be 
lagging in eliminating remaining redundancies and in 
redirecting savings to health care.
    With respect to the Veterans Benefits Administration [VBA], 
far more needs to be done to develop a results-oriented system. 
VBA has put together a new way of measuring its results--called 
``the balanced scorecard''--which moves toward a performance-
based system of measuring its activities. Yet its 59 regional 
offices are far from meeting the goals the Department has set 
forth, and a culture which has consisted of 59 largely 
autonomous regional offices has been slow to adapt to change. 
Most of the goals it has set forth are currently not being met 
within VBA.
    While there is strong support for the Results Act at the 
top level within the budget office, continued successful 
implementation of GPRA is currently at-risk at the Department 
owing to the lack of leadership within the Department and 
within VHA.

                    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

    The Environmental Protection Agency's [EPA] progress in 
implementing the Results Act has been mixed. EPA has taken some 
notable steps in attempting to move toward a performance-based 
system, such as developing a new system to improve its working 
relationship with States, establishing a new Office of 
Information aimed at improving the quality of EPA data, and 
initiating pilot projects aimed at providing flexibility in 
exchange for accountability to regulated entities in meeting 
environmental requirements. However, much of EPA's activities 
aimed at performance-management have been at the margins of 
EPA's activities and have not resulted in changes to core EPA 
activities. According to GAO, participants in EPA's ``common 
sense'' initiative--the centerpiece of EPA's regulatory 
``reinvention'' initiatives--spent much of their time on 
process-related issues.
    EPA did have multiple consultations with the Subcommittee 
as it developed its strategic plan and reoriented its budget 
structure, with some useful changes made as a result of these 
consultations. The agency also established an Office of 
Planning and Analysis, with implementation of GPRA as its key 
function. This office reports directly to the Chief Financial 
Officer, ensuring a linkage between the budget process and 
implementation of the Results Act.
    EPA's mission is wide-ranging, and with its responsibility 
to implement 12 major environmental statutes, a simple 
performance plan would be nearly impossible. Even so, EPA's 
performance plan is extremely cumbersome, containing far too 
many objectives and sub-objectives. Moreover, a number of its 
10 goals are questionable. For example, EPA cites ``a credible 
deterrent to pollution'' as one of its 10 goals. Yet most 
analysts agree that enforcement should be a policy tool, not a 
goal in and of itself.
    In addition, it is not clear whether many of EPA's 
performance measures are appropriate, and whether these 
measures represent a ``stretch'' or whether they would be met 
under ``status quo'' circumstances. For example, EPA has a goal 
of preventing harmful pesticides exposure, and one of its 
measures is a 5 percent decrease in incidences in pesticide 
poisonings. Why 5 percent? This is not explained or justified.
    In addition, EPA's performance measures are replete with 
process-oriented ``bean counts'', such as the number of permits 
to be issued. Indeed, only about 12 percent of EPA's 
performance measures are true results-oriented measures. Moving 
to true performance measures is difficult because, as EPA 
acknowledges in its annual plan, factors other than EPA 
activities--such as State and local agency activities--often 
play a direct role in whether performance measures are met. In 
the limited instances where EPA uses true performance measures 
as opposed to traditional bean counts, it is not at all clear 
that EPA activities can be linked directly to the performance 
measures it has set forth. Also, assessing the effectiveness of 
its activities has not been one of EPA's strong points as the 
agency lacks a program evaluation capability.
    With respect to data reliability, as mentioned earlier EPA 
has taken the first step of establishing a new Office of 
Information. However, the quality of information continues to 
be a major management weakness identified by the Inspector 
General, and far more needs to be done to ensure that the data 
EPA uses to measure its effectiveness are accurate and 
reliable. This will be a multi-year effort and will require 
significant action on the part of State environmental agencies 
as well.
    EPA's budget process illustrates the difficulties EPA has 
had in implementing the Results Act in a meaningful manner. On 
the one hand, EPA has taken significant steps to link its 
budget with its strategic plan. Beginning in fiscal year 1999, 
EPA restructured its entire budget process consistent with its 
strategic plan, including in the budget justification 
appropriation requests for each of the myriad goals, objectives 
and sub-objectives. Yet in restructuring the budget, key 
program information has been lost and must be obtained through 
a series of complicated budget crosscuts. Unfortunately, the 
usefulness of the budget document has declined because 
appropriation decisions are made primarily on the basis of 
program information rather than objectives and sub-objectives. 
Moreover, attributing agency program activity to sub-objectives 
is an inexact and subjective process. EPA admitted that ``the 
resources under each goal do not and cannot reflect all 
resources that could be reasonably associated with achieving 
the goal.''
    And, the new budget process has not resulted in any 
significant change in the allocation of EPA resources to ensure 
that dollars are allocated to those activities yielding the 
largest results--the largest reduction in risk to human health 
and the environment. The strategic plan does not address the 
need to prioritize activities according to risk, despite the 
fact that this has been an issue of chief concern to this 
Subcommittee.
    Finally, one of the largest EPA programs, the Federal toxic 
waste cleanup program known as Superfund, continues to be 
designated by GAO as a high-risk program subject to fraud, 
waste and abuse. It has held this designation for a decade, 
despite EPA claims that it has reformed the program. EPA's 
performance plan does not directly address the key problems 
identified by GAO, such as the need to control Superfund 
contractor cleanup costs.

                  FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

    The Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] has made 
some important strides in moving toward a performance-based 
system as envisioned by the Results Act, including 
``reengineering'' its public assistance program to streamline 
the process by which disaster relief funds are allocated for 
municipal infrastructure projects, and implementing a new 
teleregistration process for providing benefits to disaster 
victims. These initiatives are resulting in lower 
administrative costs and improved customer satisfaction.
    However, FEMA has not linked its budget to its strategic 
plan, and it is not clear how the development of FEMA's budget 
would be impacted if performance measures are not met. The 
Agency's budget staff is not involved in preparation of the 
annual plan or oversight of the Results Act. Moreover, there 
continue to be significant concerns with the management and 
allocation of FEMA's disaster relief fund, such as whether 
hazard mitigation grant funds are being spent on the most cost-
effective projects.
    FEMA's goals and measures are results-oriented and seem to 
be reasonably challenging. FEMA is working to improve its 
information systems, an area of concern identified by the IG. 
FEMA is expanding the use of information systems to capture 
performance information to help manage its programs. While FEMA 
does identify activities that cut across other Federal 
agencies, it does not address the need to eliminate duplication 
in such areas as anti-terrorism and hazard mitigation.
    The plan does address major management challenges, and 
FEMA's efforts to implement improvements in such areas as 
developing disaster declaration criteria are commendable. 
However, while FEMA has proposed using emergency management 
performance grants as the means of providing pre-disaster 
assistance to States--a more flexible and streamlined means of 
providing this assistance than the traditional multi-grant 
process--it is not clear that FEMA is doing enough to hold 
States accountable in the use of these funds, e.g., improving 
their preparedness for disaster events. Also, while FEMA 
acknowledges that disaster cost containment is a key concern 
and has taken some steps to reduce costs, it has not done 
enough in this area. The fundamental mission of FEMA's disaster 
relief program as envisioned by the Stafford Disaster Relief 
Act is to supplement, and not supplant, State and local 
capability. The strategic plan and annual plan do not 
adequately affirm this or address the need to limit FEMA's role 
to a supplemental one.

          NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION [NASA]

    The National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA] is 
making good progress in implementing the Results Act. Beginning 
in October 1996, NASA issued a Strategic Management Handbook 
which documented management policies, procedures, guidelines 
and the responsibility for strategic management. The first 
Strategic Plan was issued in September 1997 and covered fiscal 
year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. Subsequently, NASA issued 
Annual Performance Plans [APP] for both fiscal year 1999 and 
2000. In each case NASA has made progress in effectively 
implementing the Results Act.
    Nevertheless, there is still progress to be made, and in 
many ways, it is premature to evaluate adequately the 
implementation and usefulness of the Results Act as both a 
budget tool and as a benchmark to measure the effectiveness of 
NASA in meeting its mission. A number of these concerns will be 
addressed on March 31, 2000, when agencies are required to 
submit annual performance reports covering the preceding 3 
fiscal years, including performance measurement data.
    In addition, the Subcommittee believes a recent GAO report 
on NASA's Fiscal Year 1999 APP as well as an audit by NASA's 
Inspector General on NASA's implementation of the Results Act 
remain useful and accurate assessments of the strengths and 
weaknesses of NASA's implementation of the Results Act. In 
brief, NASA's APP reflect NASA's mission statement and goals as 
stated in its strategic plan, and link strategic goals with 
NASA's performance plans' goals and performance targets; 
incorporate performance measures that are generally objective, 
able to be quantified, and useful for assessing progress in 
meeting the APP performance objectives; and provide for annual 
external reviews by the Advisory Council and semiannual 
internal reviews by the Senior Management Council to validate 
NASA's progress in meeting its goals and objectives.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The NASA IG indicates that the Senior Management Council did 
not assess NASA progress in achieving the established goals and targets 
until August 1999. The IG advises that the Council assessments need to 
occur earlier and that NASA needs to establish formal procedures and 
schedules to ensure that assessments are accomplished in a timely 
manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the other hand, NASA's annual performance plans must 
better connect performance goals and measures to the program 
activities in NASA's budget; more fully explain NASA's 
procedures for verifying and validating the data used to assess 
performance to ensure that the data is accurate, complete and 
credible; and provide more insight into the development of 
NASA's goals and performance measures. NASA also needs to work 
more closely with the Congress in implementing the Results Act. 
In particular, the Senate Committee on Appropriations needs to 
be consulted on the implementation of the Results Act since the 
primary criteria for its successful implementation is the 
connection between NASA's strategic plan and the APP to 
resource allocation, as provided in NASA's annual budget 
request.
    Moreover, NASA is converting its budget to full cost 
accounting by fiscal year 2001. This revised accounting 
structure should provide more clarity to the budget process and 
resource allocation. However, the principles of full cost 
accounting must be tied into the Results Act procedures.
    Finally, NASA has traditionally used performance-based 
decisionmaking in the development of NASA's many highly 
technical and specific deliverables (from satellites to space 
shuttles to new propulsion systems). The more difficult issue 
is how NASA can use the Results Act to match the often highly 
uncertain research and development goals with a process that is 
intended to link funds expended today with an outcome that may 
not occur for a decade or more.

                      NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

    The National Science Foundation [NSF] has made significant 
progress in implementing the Results Act, in spite of difficult 
challenges in developing performance outcomes that are 
measurable due to the nature of the agency's mission of 
advancing basic scientific research and promoting education in 
science and math. The Fiscal Year 2000 Annual Performance Plan 
lists five outcome goals, which are generally consistent with 
the mission of the agency: (1) discoveries at and across the 
frontier of science and engineering; (2) connections between 
discoveries and their use in service to society; (3) a diverse, 
globally-oriented workforce of scientists and engineers; (4) 
improved achievement in mathematics and science skills needed 
by all Americans; and (5) relevant, timely information on the 
national and international science and engineering enterprise.
    Despite the challenge in developing performance 
measurements, NSF has made significant progress in meeting the 
goals of the Results Act by using more qualitative performance 
goals instead of quantitative performance targets. 
Specifically, NSF, as permitted by the GPRA statute, 
established performance goals in the form of statements that 
describe ``successful'' and ``minimally effective'' 
performance. The use of this alternative format allows for 
expert judgment, i.e., expert peer review, to consider both 
quantitative and qualitative information on performance. The 
scientific community strongly believes in this approach since 
many believe that outcomes of basic research cannot be captured 
by quantitative measures alone.
    Reviews by the Congressional Research Service and GAO have 
generally praised the Foundation's efforts in developing its 
performance plan, but both have pointed out the need for 
further improvement in order for the plan to be useful to 
policy-makers. Two of the major deficiencies in NSF's plan are: 
(1) NSF's failure to provide clear information on the linkages 
between its budget and its performance goals, and (2) limited 
confidence that the information it provides will be credible. 
Resolving the first deficiency will be of special interest to 
the Subcommittee since it is important to understand the 
rationale for how NSF's resources contribute to accomplishing 
the expected level of performance.

                  IV. PROGRAM DUPLICATION AND OVERLAP

    In order to ensure that Federal taxpayers get the most 
``bang for their buck,'' not only must Congress and the 
Administration ensure that programs achieve their desired goals 
through measurable performance objectives, but they must 
eliminate duplication of effort. Unfortunately, for a variety 
of reasons, many Federal programs perform essentially the same 
function.
    For example, the Rural Development Administration, through 
the Rural Community Advancement Program \1\, operates a water 
and sewer improvement program in isolated Native villages in 
Alaska and remote colonias along the United States-Mexico 
border. The Environmental Protection Agency runs nearly 
identical programs through its State and Tribal Assistance 
Grants Program.\2\ Both agencies require a 25 percent local 
match and have similar program requirements.
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    \1\ The Fiscal Year 2000 Agriculture and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act provided $20,000,000. Title III of H. Rept. 106-354.
    \2\ The Fiscal Year 2000 Housing and Urban Affairs, Veterans, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act provided $30,000,000. H. Rept. 106-
379.
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    The good news is that double the resources have been 
dedicated to provide running water and flush toilets for a 
forgotten segment of Americans. The bad news is that two 
separate agencies are running the same program with two sets of 
rules, two sets of applications required, two sets of personnel 
processing paperwork, and two sets of reporting requirements. 
The Indian Health Service also provides resources for rural 
water and sewer programs, as does the Army Corps of Engineers.
    Fortunately, at least in Alaska, the Federal agencies have 
worked together with the State of Alaska to form a Village Safe 
Water Program which administers all the funds once they are 
transferred to Alaska. One priority list is established, and 
projects are funded off that list regardless of which agency 
provides the funds. Unfortunately, two agencies still must 
process the paperwork to make it work, while a third, the 
Indian Health Service, helps implement the program.
    An even more glaring example arises with respect to housing 
programs. The Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] 
is the lead agency responsible for providing affordable housing 
in the nation.\3\ Yet, over the years a number of other 
agencies have assumed segments of that mission. For example, 
the Veterans Department operates the Veterans Housing Benefit 
Program, an indirect and guaranteed loan program, a Native 
American Veterans Housing Loan Program, and a Guaranteed 
Transitional Housing Loan Program for veterans \4\ of the Armed 
Forces that mirror HUD programs. In addition, the Rural 
Development Administration, an arm of the Department of 
Agriculture, operates the Rural Housing Service, a 
$4,600,000,000 housing loan program.\5\ The Department of 
Defense has a separate military housing program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ The Fiscal Year 2000 Housing and Urban Development, Veterans 
Department, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act provided 
$11,376,695,000 for housing activities.
    \4\  H. Rept. 106-379.
    \5\ The total subsidy required to support the program in fiscal 
year 2000 is $181,560,000. Conference Report on the Fiscal Year 2000 
Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, H. Rept. 106-354.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With respect to homeless programs alone, there are 50 
separate programs run by 8 different Federal agencies according 
to GAO.\6\ A February 1999 GAO Report noted that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional 
Committees, February 1999. ``Homelessness: Coordination and Evaluation 
of Program are Essential'', page 2.

          ``in some cases, programs operated by more than one 
        agency offer the same type of service. For example, 23 
        programs operated by four agencies offer housing, such 
        as emergency shelter, transitional housing, and other 
        housing assistance. Twenty-six programs administered by 
        six agencies offer food and nutrition services, 
        including food stamps, school lunch subsidies, and 
        supplements for food banks.'' \7\
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    \7\ Id.

    Some programs have separate eligibility criteria, separate 
intake workers, separate personnel to process applications, and 
separate rules and regulations. So instead of providing 
services to the homeless, the Federal Government spends a 
substantial portion of its resources providing resources for 
paper pushing.
    Economic development offers yet another example. The 
Commerce Department's Economic Administration \8\ is very 
similar to HUD's Economic Development Initiative.\9\ A similar 
program, the Rural Business-Cooperative Service, only with a 
rural flavor, can be found within the Rural Development 
Administration.\10\ Both the Department of Housing and Urban 
Affairs \11\ and the Department of Agriculture \12\ offer 
enterprise zone programs, and the Small Business Administration 
funds Hub Zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The Economic Development Administration was funded at 
$361,879,000 in the Fiscal Year 2000 Commerce, Justice, State, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. H. Rept. 106-398.
    \9\ The Economic Development Initiative was funded at $275,000,000 
in the Fiscal Year 2000 Housing and Urban Development, Veterans 
Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act. H. Rept. 106-379.
    \10\ The Rural Business-Cooperative Service was funded at 
$16,615,000 which supports a loan program of $38,256,000 for fiscal 
year 2000. H.Rept. 106-354.
    \11\ The Fiscal Year 2000 Housing and Urban Development, Veterans 
Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act provided $55,000,000 
for urban empowerment zones and $15,000,000 for rural empowerment zones 
which was transferred to the Secretary of Agriculture.
    \12\ The Fiscal Year 2000 Agriculture, Rural Development, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act provided $45,245,000 for 
empowerment zones, enterprise communities, and Rural Economic Area 
Partnership Zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Why do these duplications occur? Because both Congress and 
the Administration want to do what is right. When the 1996 Farm 
Bill came to the Senate floor, the Alaska Congressional 
Delegation amended it to ensure that rural Alaska received the 
same treatment as the colonias. When the Environmental 
Protection Agency was reauthorized along with its urban water 
and sewer program, the border States amended the bill to make 
sure that their unique needs received the same treatment as 
urban locales.
    Likewise, with respect to homeless programs, the 
proliferation of programs came out of a strong desire by both 
branches of Government to help homeless people. The 
Administration looks for every opportunity, both in the Federal 
budget process and as agency programs are reauthorized, to 
ensure that a particular issue like homelessness receives 
attention. Members of Congress, depending on their committee 
assignments, look for similar opportunities. A member of the 
Appropriations Committee might approach homelessness one way 
while a member of the Veterans Affairs Committee may focus on 
homelessness among veterans, while the Indian Affairs Committee 
may focus on Native housing programs. All have the best of 
intentions.
    This phenomenon reached its zenith with respect to job 
training programs. Before the recent and massive 
reorganization, there were over 200 separate job training 
programs in nearly every agency of the Government.\13\ All, no 
doubt, were good ideas at the time and when considered in 
isolation. But in the aggregate, the system made no sense at 
all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Pub. L. 105-220, the Workforce Investment Partnership Act of 
1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee 
undertook a major overhaul of Federal job training programs, 
with the support of and in cooperation with the Administration, 
and consolidated them into one stop job services. Instead of 
visiting dozens of job training programs or even bouncing from 
program to program, a person seeking training now makes only 
one visit to access all Federal job training programs. 
Resources can now be focused on training instead of 
bureaucracy.
    This model should be used in other areas where collective 
efforts to do right have gone very wrong. For example, the 
internet and other high technology solutions have become the 
hot new trend in providing both health and educational 
services. A virtual bidding war has ensued to see which branch 
can do more in these rapidly emerging fields.
    Dozens of Federal agencies now provide such services 
including the Distance Learning and Telemedicine Program in the 
Department of Agriculture \14\, the Public Telecommunications 
and Facilities Program within the Department of Commerce \15\, 
the Coast Guard health program within the Department of 
Transportation, the Veterans Department,\16\ the Indian Health 
Service,\17\ the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Department of Defense \18\, and even independent agencies like 
the Federal Communications Commission's schools and libraries 
program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ The Distance Learning and Telemedicine Program was funded at 
$20,700,000 in the Fiscal Year 2000 Agriculture, Rural Development, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act. H. Rept. 105-354.
    \15\ The Public Telecommunications Facilities, Planning and 
Construction Program was funded at $26,500,000 in the Fiscal Year 2000 
Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act. H.Rept. 106-398.
    \16\ The Veterans Administration budget included $750,000 to 
develop a telemedicine network for veterans. H. Rept. 106-379.
    \17\ The Indian Health Service budget included $5,500,000 to 
develop a telemedicine network for Indians. H. Rept. 106-406.
    \18\ The Department of Defense budget included $3,800,000 to 
develop a telemedicine network for members of the Armed Services. H. 
Rept. 106-244.
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    There is tremendous duplication of effort, both within 
departments and even within single agencies. There are 174 
education programs just within the Department of Education. The 
President has proposed eliminating 18 of those programs when 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is reauthorized, but 
adding 19 more. One of those 174 education programs awarded 
grants to nearly a dozen separate graduate equivalent degree 
[GED] programs to enable high school drop-outs to earn their 
high school diplomas through the internet. If the programs are 
universally available on the internet, how many GED programs do 
we need?
    In Alaska, this issue is being addressed in two ways. 
Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee, advised his constituents that Congress would provide 
no money for telehealth in Alaska unless all the interested 
parties worked together to develop one statewide initiative. 
Prior to that, telemedicine projects were developing across the 
State with no rhyme nor reason. For example, in the remote 
community of Dutch Harbor, two separate and competing 
telehealth clinics were built in a town of 1,000 people while 
other communities had no clinic at all.
    With a $100,000 planning grant, the State Commissioner of 
Health and Social Services, Karen Perdue, worked with all 
affected Federal, State, and local agencies and private 
caregivers to develop a comprehensive, unified statewide 
telemedicine network. It is being funded through the 4 Federal 
agencies whose clients will benefit from Coast Guardsmen to 
veterans to Indians to servicemen and women. But one agency is 
administering the program.
    A similar effort is currently underway in Alaska to develop 
one statewide teleeducation network which will include local 
school districts, all colleges and universities in the State, 
the National Guard, the Department of Defense, and various 
segments such as hospitals which require a training component 
to make their programs function.
    To maximize economies of scale, this effort must become a 
national initiative. The Senate Health, Education, Labor, and 
Pensions Committee plans to require a comprehensive approach in 
its reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act. Chairman Jim Jeffords should be commended for his 
foresight in developing this legislation, which will make the 
full range of services available to every American and will do 
so in a much more cost effective way.
    Alaska has worked to save money by consolidating other 
services. For example, Indian Health Service clinics in rural 
Alaska provide medical care to veterans and are reimbursed by 
the VA, assist poor people and are reimbursed by Medicaid, 
provide health care to the elderly and are reimbursed by 
Medicare. Similarly, the Department of Defense, working in 
conjunction with the Veterans Department, reserved 10 beds in 
its new regional medical hospital for Alaska's veterans who had 
no hospital to make specialty medical care affordable.
    Another effort underway in the State's capital city of 
Fairbanks would consolidate Federal, State, and social service 
delivery mechanisms. One-stop shopping centers would be 
established for parents and their children. One case worker 
would provide access to whatever services were needed from 
child care assistance to Head Start to immunizations to 
nutrition counselling. One common application form would be 
used to avoid multiple agencies processing multiple 
applications.
    To assist in this effort to consolidate social services, 
the Senate Appropriations Committee included a provision in the 
Fiscal Year 2000 Treasury and General Government Appropriations 
Act \19\ directing OMB to submit an inventory of grant programs 
to the Committee along with relevant eligibility guidelines. 
That information will assist in the effort to consolidate 
programs, or at a minimum, consolidate their administration. 
The Women, Infants, and Children's Program is a good model. 
Case workers not only provide nutrition services and 
counseling, but access to immunizations, lead screening, and 
other services for babies and young children.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Section 515 provides: ``The Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget shall prepare an inventory of existing Federal 
grant programs including formula funds, competitive grant funds, block 
grant funds, and direct payments. The inventory shall include the name 
of the program, a copy of the relevant statutory and regulatory 
guidelines, the funding level in fiscal year 1999, a list of 
eligibility criteria both statutory and regulatory, and a copy of the 
application form. The Director shall submit an inventory no later than 
6 months after enactment to the Committee on Appropriations and 
relevant authorizing committees.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    More needs to be done. The new President will have a 
tremendous opportunity to make recommendations to Congress to 
eliminate duplication, consolidate programs, and form 
interagency collaborative partnerships to streamline 
administration and maximize coordination. With the support of 
Congress, services could be improved, duplication eliminated or 
at least reduced, and more Federal resources could be devoted 
to providing services. The taxpayers deserve no less.

                     V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Observations
    Successful implementation of the Results Act depends upon a 
transformation in the methods used by the Executive and 
Legislative branches to formulate and evaluate budget requests 
for Federal agencies. Because implementation is an evolutionary 
process, this report assesses only the current cycle in which 
performance plans were delivered to Congress in conjunction 
with the President's fiscal year 2000 budget. As this report 
illustrates, the quality and usefulness of the performance plan 
is directly impacted by the following factors: (1) the quality 
of the agency's goals and measures; (2) an agency's 
vulnerability to external factors in achieving its goals; (3) 
the accuracy of agency data; (4) agency responsiveness to GAO 
and Congressional concerns and/or recommendations, such as GAO 
high risk areas; (5) the quality and frequency of the 
consultation process between the agency and Congressional 
staff; and (6) the commitment of agency staff to comply with 
the Results Act's requirements. A brief discussion of these 
factors follows.
    The quality of the agencies' goals and objectives varies 
both among agencies and within a single agency. For example, 
the Department of Justice performance plan for fiscal year 2000 
outlines 3 strategic themes. The Subcommittee evaluation 
determined that some aspects of the plan are stronger than 
others. An uneven performance plan results in uneven agency 
performance. Across agencies, the Department of Agriculture 
generally presented clear, realistic goals that were capable of 
measurement. On the other hand, the goals for USAID were 
evaluated as ``too ambiguous to lend themselves to credible 
evaluations of success or measurement of benchmarks toward that 
success.'' Similarly, the performance indicators for the 
International Trade Commission did not include quality control 
mechanisms. The usefulness of an agency performance plan to the 
Appropriations Committee is commensurate with its clarity, 
reliability and goal achievability. The Appropriations 
Committee anticipates that the performance plans will improve 
with subsequent budget submissions as the agencies benefit from 
performance plan evaluations by Congress, GAO, other entities, 
and the agency itself.
    A performance plan is only as reliable as the agency's 
information sources and data reliability. Likewise, a 
performance plan is useful to the Appropriations Committee only 
if it is based on reliable data. In most performance plans, 
data reliability was described as a major agency concern. For 
example, with respect to DOD data, the Defense Subcommittee 
expressed concern for ``the credibility of data from DOD's 
financial, accounting, and other information systems.'' The 
Interior Subcommittee noted that DOI and several bureaus within 
its purview ``are attempting in several instances to upgrade or 
modify information systems in order to better support their 
performance plans.'' Improved data reliability requires the 
allocation of adequate resources in the agency budget process 
and careful consideration of the requested funds during the 
appropriations process.
    Most Federal departments and agencies are at a disadvantage 
in achieving their stated goals because they are highly 
vulnerable to outside influences. For example, the Department 
of State faces a challenge in developing dependable performance 
measures because American foreign policy is subject to the 
actions of other nations, transnational organizations and 
international business.
    Imperative to the success of the Results Act is the 
consultation process between Federal agencies and Congressional 
staff. There is no substitute for dialogue to ensure that 
information is both shared and explained to the satisfaction of 
the Committee prior to the passage of the appropriations bill. 
Since time is a precious commodity for both agency and 
Congressional staff, consultation should occur simultaneous 
with the agency's presentation of its budget request. This 
coordinated effort will encourage the integration of the 
Results Act with the budget process and facilitate an 
understanding of the link between performance plans and budget 
requests.
    The Results Act is a tool for Federal agencies, Congress 
and other entities that use Results Act information in making 
funding or other agency-related decisions. Thus, the agency's 
responsiveness to Congressional, GAO or other entity concerns 
is critical to the success of the Results Act. The high risk 
areas GAO has identified in many Federal agencies are examples 
of the types of problems the Results Act was designed to 
prevent or eliminate. Within the Department of the Interior, 
GAO has highlighted several management problems that cost the 
Federal Government and American taxpayers over $3,800,000,000. 
An agency's performance plan should provide goals and measures 
for remedying any verifiable high risk area.
    An obvious key to the success of the Results Act is 
compliance with the Act's requirements. For example, timely 
delivery of the required performance plans ensures that the 
Subcommittee staff will have ample opportunity to review and 
use the information. The plan itself should contain the 
information the Act was designed to elicit, and the information 
should be presented in a clear and usable format. Compliance is 
evidence of an agency's commitment to the Results Act and the 
goal of performance-based governance.
Conclusion
    The Senate Appropriations Committee, like the Federal 
agencies, has begun to integrate performance plans into the 
appropriations process to provide adequate funding for those 
programs and projects properly within the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Government. This integration is an ongoing process, and 
its success depends largely on the quality of information 
contained in the performance plans and performance reports. The 
Committee has and will continue to monitor agency compliance 
with the Results Act in an ongoing effort to streamline 
agencies and eliminate waste, thereby achieving efficiencies 
within the Federal Government. The robust economy will not 
deter the Committee in this endeavor. As David M. Walker, 
Comptroller General, testified before the Senate Budget 
Committee on February 1, 2000:

          ``* * * [E]ven if the budget surplus continues, it 
        does not signal the end of fiscal challenges. Nor does 
        it eliminate the need for prudent stewardship of our 
        national economy. Projected surpluses do not absolve 
        government of its responsibility to make good use of 
        taxpayer dollars.''

    Only through a continued Congressional commitment to 
holding Federal agencies accountable to performance-based 
budgeting can the goals of continued prosperity and an 
efficient, effective Federal Government be achieved.

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