NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 12a0625n.06 No. 11-1312 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. HENRY JAMES WOODBU RY, Def endant- Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

Be fore : GUY and COO K, Circuit J udg es; GRAHAM, District Judge. * COOK, Circuit J udg e. Henr y J ames Woodbury appea ls his convic t i o ns, following a conditional g uilty plea, of conspirac y to posse ss w ith intent to distribute 50 g rams or more of cra ck
coca ine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)
. The district court sentenc ed Woodbury to 240 months in prison. Woodbury

pleade d g uilty to the char g e, admitting that he and a codef endant, Da

rnell B oy d, distributed a total of 280 g rams of cra ck coca ine. He acknowledg ed that, althoug h his Sentencing Guidelines imprisonment rang e was 151 to 188 months, he fac ed a statutor y m an d at o ry minimum sentenc e of 240 months. W oodbury ’s conditional plea r etained his rig ht to appeal the de nial of his

The Honora

ble J ames L
. Gra

ham, United States Senior District J udg e for the S o u t h ern * District of Ohio, sitting by desig nation.No. 11-1312

United States v. W

oodbury
motion to suppress the results of the sear ch of his apar tment o n S o u th J ackson Street in J ackson, Michig an. He waived his a ppellate r ights in all other r espec ts. Woodbury joined a motion to suppre s s fi l ed by his codef endant Boy

d. The suppression motion arg ued that the sear ch war rant for the South J ackson house was invalid beca use it purported to support a sear ch for the entire building when the South J ackson house was in fac t a two-apa rtment duplex. The motion contende d that the two doorbells and two separ ate mailbox es outside the home’s front door should have aler ted the office rs ex ecuting the war rant of its invalidity under the Four th Amendment “bec ause the of f ic e r s s h o u ld have been immediately awa re that [t he home] contained two apar tments.” The motion elabor ated on the interior lay out that the office rs encounte red at the house, explaining that the building’s entra nce opened into a comm o n h al l wa y with one door leading to a first-floor apar

tment and a sta i rw ay l ea ding to a second- floor apar tment. I ndia Sims , a non-par ty , owned the residenc e in question, and no aspec t of the rec ord disclosed that Boy d occupie d either unit at the addre ss. The motion ac knowledg es that the prope rty had just one addr ess. And Exhibi t C to the Gover

nment’s Response to the motion to suppress descr ibes the addre ss as a “R es idential Building ,” occ upancy

as “Sing le Fa

mily ” and “ Sty le” a s “Duplex.”
On appea l, Woodbury primarily relies upon this court’s opinion in Ramirez v. W ebb , 835 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1987), and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Maryland v. Garrison , 480 U.S. 79 (1987). Garrison dictates a two-step analy sis for challeng es to the execution of a sear ch war rant: 1) examine

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the validity of the war

rant itself, and 2) examine the rea sonablene ss of the man n er b y wh i ch the
war rant wa s executed. See Garrison , 480 U.S. at 84.
The sear ch war

rant at issue here withstands constit u t i o n al scrutiny beca use it specifie s a particula r place t o b e sear ched: the residenc e at “XXX South J ackson Street,” descr ibed as “a two story single family home.” The war rant extends to “all lock box es or safe s within said residenc e [and a]ny and all out buildings, g ara g es, and storag e sheds located within the curtilag e of the residenc e.” The acc ompany ing aff

idavit states that the probable cause for sear ching the residenc e stems from the cond u ct of Woodbury ’s co-de fenda nt, Boy d. On two occa sions over a six -day period, the aff iant detec tive perf

ormed underc over controlled buy s of heroin from Boy d. During eac h of these buy s, the detec tive observe d Boy d enter the residenc e throug h the front door and later walk out the front door
car ry ing a plastic sandwich bag containing “an off white chunky substance” that tests show ed to be
coca ine. He then would sell that coca ine to the detec tive. Plainly , these observa tions supplied police with probable c ause to be lieve that the South J ackson Stree t residenc e conta ined contra band. Woodbury arg

ues, howeve r, that the police should have st o p p ed the sear ch and obtained a
more specific war

rant once they discovere d that the South J ackson S t re et re sidence contained two living units. Woodbury is incorre ct. The office rs’ observa tions of Boy d provided them with probable
ca u s e to believe that he obtained the coca ine from inside the house. That probable cause did not dissipate once police rea liz ed that the inter ior of the house, which their investig ation indicated wa s
a single -family residenc e, contained two living units. T h e cr i t i ca l fac t rema ined: Boy d appar ently
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obtained illega l drug s from a residenc e owned and occupie d by a third party located inside the front door of “XXX South J ackson St ree t.” The warr ant prope rly extended to separate structure s within the curtilag e of the residenc e, and the police did not err in rely ing on the war

rant to conduct a sear ch of the subunits within the residenc e itself.
I n both Ramirez and Ga r rison , upon which Woodbury relies, the courts aff irmed the
rea sonablene ss of the office rs’ conduct. See Ramirez , 835 F.3d at 1158; Garrison , 480 U.S. at 88-89. As the Garrison court explained, “the validity of the sear ch of responde nt’s apar tment pursuant to a
war rant authorizing the sear ch of the entire third floor depends on whether the o ff i ce rs ’ failure to
rea liz e the overbr eadth of the war rant was objectively understanda ble and rea sona

b le
. ” G a r r ison , 480 U.S. at 88. Her e, the war rant was not even over b ro ad , b ec ause probable cause extended to the entirety of the So u th J ackson Street proper ty , including “all out buildings, g ara g es, and storag e sheds.” T h e o ff

i ce rs’ decision to continue their sear ch despite the internal subdivision of the residenc e into two units was, as in Garrison , “objec tively understanda

ble and r easona

ble.”
I f any thing, the rea sonablene ss of the police’s conduct in this case appea rs even strong er than in Garrison , wher e the war rant provided for the sear ch of both the person of L awr ence McWebb and his “third floor apar

tment.” 480 U.S. at 80. Records available to the police in that case sug g ested that McWebb was the sole occu p an t o f t he third floor. See id. at 86 n.10. During their sear ch, the i n v est igating office rs rea liz ed that the third floor of the building was divided into two apar tments; McWebb occupie d one and Gar rison, who was not a subject of the war rant, occupie d the other. Id.
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at 80. By contra st, the office rs here had no rea son to believe that Boy d resided at the South J ackson Street residenc e at all; proper ty rec ords ref

lected owner ship by a third party
. All the police knew was that Boy d had enter ed the house in the midst of a controlled buy and exit ed with illega l drug s in hand. That suffic ed to authorize a se arc h of the e ntire prope rty
. The de terminative issue is not whether the pol ice could have handled the se arc h differ ently upon discovery of the division of the house. We decide only whether the war rant was constitutionally valid and its execution constitutionally rea sonable under the circ umstances. T h e sear ch war rant descr ibed with sufficie nt particula rity the place to be sear ched (the residenc e at “XXX South J ackson Street”) and the items to be seized (controlled substances and rela ted para pherna lia and proc eeds)
. The fac ts stated in the aff idavit establish probable cause to sear ch the residenc e and surrounding curtilag e. Under t h es e ci rcumstanc es, discovering upon execution that a “two story single family home,” as specifie d in the warrant affidavit, contained t wo l iving units did not d i s t u rb t he poli ce’ s probable cause to sear ch the entire property
. The ex ecution o f t h e wa rr an t thus did not violate t he Four th Amendment.
For these re asons, we a ffirm.

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oodbury GRAHAM, District Judge, concur ring in pa rt and dissenting in pa

rt. Although I ag ree with the majority ’s conclusion that the sear ch war ran t wa s s u pported by probable cause and was valid when issued, I believe that this case should be rema nded for an evidentiar

y hear ing under Maryland v. Garrison on the issue of whe ther the e x ecution of the war rant wa s overbr oad.

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