alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
DISMISS and Opinion Filed June 25, 2019 

# S

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-01536-CV IN THE INTEREST OF K.S., A CHILD On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-09-05189 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Bridges, Brown, and Nowell Opinion by Justice Bridges Appellant’s brief in this case is overdue. By postcard dated M ay 9, 2019, we notified appellant the time for filing her brief had expired. We direct ed appellant to file a brief and an extension motion within ten days. We cautioned appellant that failure to file a brief and an extension motion would result in the dismissal of this appeal w ithout further notice. To date, appellant has not file d her brief nor other wise corresponded wi th the Court regarding the status of this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.8(a)(1); 42.3(b), (c).

181536F.P05 /David L. Bridges/ DAVID L. BRIDGES JUSTICE–2– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
IN THE INTEREST OF K.S., A CHILD
No. 05-18-01536-CV On Appeal from the 254th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DF-09-05189. Opinion delivered by Justice Bridges. Justices Brown and Now ell participating. In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this app eal is DISMISSED

. Judgment entered June 25, 2019
THIS AGREEMENT is dated for reference the 10th day of August, A.D. 2009.








BETWEEN:





Cascade Technologies Corp., a company incorporated in the State of Wyoming and having its offices at 1530-9th Avenue S.E., Calgary, Alberta T2G 0T7





(hereinafter referred to as the “Company”)





OF THE FIRST PART





AND:





Dave Harding, an individual with an address at





(hereinafter referred to as the “Creditor”)





OF THE SECOND PART





WHEREAS the Company is indebted to the Creditor and the Creditor is willing to accept certain assets of the Company, as detailed on Schedule A appended hereto,  in full and final settlement  of the indebtedness between the Company and the Creditor , subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth in settlement of the Company’s indebtedness to the Creditor.





NOW THEREFORE THIS AGREEMENT WITNESSETH that in consideration of the premises and of the mutual covenants hereinafter contained, the parties hereto agree as follows:





1.                      The Company confirms and acknowledges its indebtedness to the Creditor in an amount of $15,000.00 as of August 10, 2009, net of accrued interest, which accrued interest shall be included in this settlement amount (the “Indebtedness”).





2.                      The Creditor agrees to accept the assets as set forth on Schedule A appended hereto in full and final settlement of the Indebtedness.





3.                      Each of the parties hereto agrees to execute such further and other deeds, documents and assurances and do such further and other acts as may be necessary to carry out the true intent and meaning of this Agreement fully and effectually.





4.                      Time shall be of the essence of this Agreement.





5.                      This Agreement shall enure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto, their heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns.


1


IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have executed this Agreement as of the day and year first above written.





CASCADE TECHNOLOGIES CORP.





By:/s/ Jacqueline Danforth








Witnessed by:





/s/ Dave Harding                                                                                                   s/ Josh White


DAVE HARDING                                                                                                  Signature





Josh White


Name





6358 Powell Road, Peachland, B.C.V0H1X8


Address


2


SCHEDULE A




1.           $10.00 and other good and valuable consideration.
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 204 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 204

 To authorize the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
 to waive any emission standard or other requirement under section 112 
  of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412) applicable to the control of 
   asbestos emissions in the demolition or renovation of a condemned 
  building for which there is a reasonable expectation of structural 
                                failure.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 2013

  Mr. Owens introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To authorize the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
 to waive any emission standard or other requirement under section 112 
  of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7412) applicable to the control of 
   asbestos emissions in the demolition or renovation of a condemned 
  building for which there is a reasonable expectation of structural 
                                failure.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Common Sense Waiver Act of 2013''.

SEC. 2. WAIVER FROM ASBESTOS NESHAP REQUIREMENTS FOR DEMOLITION OR 
              RENOVATION OF CONDEMNED BUILDINGS.

    (a) Waiver.--At the request of a State or local government, the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (in this section 
referred to as the ``Administrator'') may waive any emission standard 
or other requirement under section 112 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 
7412) applicable to the control of asbestos emissions in the demolition 
or renovation of a building.
    (b) Standard for Approval.--The Administrator may approve a request 
for a waiver under subsection (a) only if the request demonstrates 
that--
            (1) the building has been condemned; and
            (2) there is a reasonable expectation of the building's 
        structural failure.
    (c) Time Period for Approval or Disapproval of Request for 
Waiver.--The Administrator shall approve or disapprove a request for a 
waiver under subsection (a) within 90 days after the date on which the 
request is received by the Administrator. If the Administrator fails to 
approve or disapprove such a request by the end of such 90-day period, 
the request is deemed to be approved.
                                 <all>
```
.........-- May 3, 1982

...

, '"

APPLICATION - STATE OF WASHINGTON

INTERIM AUTHORIZATION, I, IIA &B

Governor's Submission

\

v'Septemoer 28, 1982

...........-·November 5, 1982

vN0vember 19, ,.982

March 15, 1983

'~~ program description, forms, checklists - MOA . / :"' ".) ')

.~~- Authorization Plan ~- Draft Attorney General's Statement

Supplemental Information

Signed Attorney General's Statement -- Addenda to program description, MOA

authorization plan

S~pplemental Attorney General Information

Supplemental Information - EFSEC ~- MOU ~- emergency rules (subsequently permanently , ?/t ·Q-i.~o ~~0adopted)

Supplemental Information - Program (MOA ~authorization plan)

../ June Supplemental Attorney General information and

EFSEC MOA
§ 249.21 Procurement and property management. ( a ) *Requirements.* State agencies must comply with the requirements of 2 CFR part 200, subpart D, and USDA implementing regulations 2 CFR parts 400 and 415 for procurement of supplies, equipment and other services with SFMNP funds. These requirements are adopted for use by FNS to ensure that such materials and services are obtained for the SFMNP in an effective manner and in compliance with the provisions of applicable laws and executive orders.
( b ) *Contractual responsibilities.* The standards contained in 2 CFR part 200, subpart D; Appendix II Contract Provisions for Non-Federal Entity Contracts Under Federal Awards; and USDA implementing regulations 2 CFR part 400 and part 415 do not relieve the State agency of the responsibilities arising under its contracts. The State agency is the responsible authority, without recourse to FNS, regarding the settlement and satisfaction of all contractual and administrative issues arising out of procurements entered into in connection with the SFMNP. This includes, but is not limited to, disputes, claims, protests of award, source evaluation, or other matters of a contractual nature. Matters concerning violation of law are to be referred to such local, State or Federal authority as may have proper jurisdiction.
( c ) *State regulations.* The State agency may use its own procurement regulations provided that: ( 1 ) Such regulations reflect applicable State and local regulations; and
( 2 ) Any procurements made with SFMNP funds adhere to the standards set forth in 2 CFR part 200, subpart D, and USDA implementing regulations 2 CFR parts 400 and 415.
( d ) *Property acquired with program funds.* State and local agencies shall observe the standards prescribed in 2 CFR part 200, subpart D and USDA implementing regulations 2 CFR part 400 and part 415 in their utilization and disposition of real property and equipment acquired in whole or in part with SFMNP funds.
[71 FR 74630, Dec. 12, 2006, as amended at 81 FR 66497, Sept. 28, 2016; 83 FR 14174, Apr. 3, 2018]
#### In the Matter of Terrace West, Inc., Petitioner, v City of Plattsburgh, Respondent.

Proceeding instituted in this court, pursuant to subdivision (A) of section 207 of the Eminent Domain Procedure Law, to review the determination and findings of the City of Plattsburgh relative to the public need for, and environmental and other effect of tbe Sandra Avenue Improvement Project. At issue in this proceeding is whether the proposed taking of a paved driveway owned by petitioner to facilitate the development of six privately owned building lots at the northern terminus of that driveway is for a public or private use. At the required public hearing, the City of Plattsburgh presented its plan for the establishment of a water line and vehicular access to the area to be developed. Following the hearing, findings and a determination providing for such a project were duly published (EDPL, §§ 201-204). It is petitioner’s contention, upon review of those findings and determination, that the taking of this property is only for the benefit of private builders who own the lots to be developed (EDPL, § 207). The acquisition of land for a street and water system is a constitutionally permissible taking for a public purpose *(Denihan Enterprises v O’Dwyer,*302 NY 451; *Evans v State of New York,*34 AD2d 1007, affd 28 NY2d 844). The fact that incidental private profit may accrue is insufficient to defeat the condemnation *(Murray v La Guardia,*291 NY 320, cert den 321 US 771). *764Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, with costs. Mahoney, P. J., Sweeney, Kane, Staley, Jr., and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
##### 



AMENDMENT ONE TO AMENDED AND RESTATED
AGENTED CREDIT AGREEMENT
 ORCHIDS PAPER PRODUCTS COMPANY BANK OF OKLAHOMA, N.A. BANCFIRST COMMERCE BANK, N.A. BANK OF OKLAHOMA, N.A.
 RECITALS
   AGREEMENT
  Amendments to the Credit Agreement
  Funded Debt to EBITDA minus
 Conditions Precedent




---



##### 



Borrower Ratification
 Governing Law and Binding Effect
 Costs, Expenses and Fees
 Multiple Counterparts
 Further Assurances
 [Signature Pages to Follow]
 2




---



##### 



BorrowerORCHIDS PAPER PRODUCTS COMPANYBy

/s/
Keith R. SchroederKeith R. Schroeder, Chief Financial Officer 3




---



##### 



BanksBANK OF OKLAHOMA, N.A., as a Bank and AgentBy

/s/
Marc MaunMarc Maun, Senior Vice President 4




---



##### 



BANCFIRSTBy

/s/
Elisabeth F. BlueElisabeth F. Blue, Senior Vice President 5




---



##### 



COMMERCE BANK, N.A.By

/s/
R. David Emley, Jr.R. David Emley, Jr., Vice President 6
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

NOE RODRIGUEZ-AVILA, §

No. 08-14-00267-CV

Appellant, §

Appeal from the

v. §

County Court at Law No. 3

§

PATRICIA SILIS,

Appellee.

§

§

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC# 2013-DCV4560)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to 

TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(a)(1) because Appellant no longer desires to prosecute the appeal. We grant 

the motion and dismiss the appeal. Costs of the appeal are taxed against Appellant. See

TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(d).

October 29, 2014

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, J., and Barajas, C.J. (Senior Judge)

Barajas, C.J. (Senior Judge, sitting by assignment)(Not Participating)
#### Sprague *vs.*Sprague &c.

Chancery. Case 107.

Appeal-rom ihe Uni-o Ciro ii ; McLean J U'lge.

*Chancery practice. Non-resident defendant. Order of publication.*

Order of pub.'¡cation is re,, -erttfiM!°byC the printer not the editor otthePaPer*

Answer puf in waivesiiregude/of pubHcation.

If *wt*„ to answer"11' bil] of revivor vs. A. B. tratorofa" defendant to original bill g^fr^af ministrator, the fact must ^ °° admití hirófailinÉj to answer.

May 4.

Judge Underwood

deliw red the opinion of the court.

William Sprague filed his bill against John Sprague and Dunning McNair for the purpose of collecting from John Sprague, a resident, a debt which he owed. McNair, a non-resident, alleged to be insolvent, and against whom William Sprague asserted a claim. Pending the suit McNair died, and there was an attempt made to revive it against his representatives. The order of publication against *them is*insufficient because certified by an editor instead of printer as required by the statute; But the persons named in the bill of revivor as administraío rs, filed their answer, admitting the right of the complainant to recover. There is no proof, however,' that, they are the administrators of McNair, and If the filing of the answer was sufficient to cure the illegality of the order of publication as certified, still if it be indispensable that it should have been proved that they were administrators, the decree must be reversed.

Judge Underwood thinks that the complainant was bound to show, before he-was entitled to a decree, that D. R. McNair and Scott were really the administrators of D. McNair, and, notwithstanding the bill of revivor against them as administrators was not answered by John Sprague. Whether they were *or*were not administrators’was a fact which cannot be presumed to be withirf the knowledge of J. Sprague, and as he had an'answer in, denying his liability altogether, Judge Underwood thinks it was the duty of the complainant to file the record of their qualification. But the chief justice and Nicholas are of opinion, that as John Sprague failed to answer the bill of revivor, though filed subsequent to the time his answer was put in to the original bill, that the facts stated in the bill of revivor should be taken as admitted by John Sprague, and therefore it sufficiently appears that, D. R. - cNair and Scott were the administrators, anti as they filed *332their answer, it cured the defect in the authentication of the order of publication.

Statute authorizing trial of right of property under xeoutio->, era *pais,*on!> applies, when claimed by stranger.

Replication, th it plaintiff was a “h'-use keeper” and

Crittenden, for appellant; *Brown*for appellee.

The whole court is of opinion that, the heirs of D. McNair were not necessary parties, and that John Sprague owed at least as much as has been decided against him.

Wherefore, the decree must be affirmed with cost? and damages.
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 
 FORM 20-F/A
 (Amendment No. 2)
  o
    
    Registration statement pursuant to section12(b)or (g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934þ
    
    Annual Report pursuant to Section 13 or15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
  o
    
    Transition Report pursuant to Section 13 or15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
 
 o
    
    Shell Company Report pursuant to Section 13 or15(d)of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
 Date of event requiring this shell company report
 Commission File Number 001-16139
 WIPRO LIMITED
  Not Applicable
 
 Bangalore, Karnataka, India
 
 Doddakannelli
Sarjapur Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560035, India
+91-80-2844-0055
 
 Suresh C Senapaty, Chief Financial Officer and Director
Phone: +91 80 28440055; Fax: +91 80 28440104
  
 Securities registered or to be registered pursuant to Section 12(b) of the Act:
 Title of each class
    
    Name of each exchange on which registeredAmerican Depositary Shares, each represented by one
    
    New York Stock ExchangeEquity Share, par value Rs. 2 per share.
 Securities registered or to be registered pursuant to Section 12(g) of the Act:
 None
 
  Securities for which there is a reporting obligation pursuant to Section 15(d) of the Act:
 Not Applicable
 
 Equity Shares.
  þ o
  o þ
   þ o
  o o
  Large Accelerated Filer   þ
    
    Accelerated Filer   o
    
    Non-Accelerated Filer   o
  U.S. GAAP   o
    
    International Financial Reporting Standards   þ
    
    Other   oas issued by the InternationalAccounting Standards Board
  o o
  o þ




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##### 



TABLE OF CONTENTS
 Part III
 Exhibits
 12.1 Certification of Chief Executive Officer under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200212.2 Certification of Chief Financial Officer under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200213.1 Certifications of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer under Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002




---



##### 



EXPLANATORY NOTE




---



##### 



SIGNATURES
   Bangalore, India
Date: June 2, 2011
    
    /s/ Azim H. Premji

Azim H. Premji,
    
    
    
    /s/ Suresh C. Senapaty

Suresh C. Senapaty,Chairman and Managing Director
    
    
    
    Chief Financial Officer and Director
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

CD o STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, No. 69961-0- m ^ CD O o DIVISION ONE
3» EDWARD FULTON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant. FILED: February 10,2014 no



### PerCuriam

—Edward Fulton appeals the sentence imposed following his 

### guiltypleas to reckless endangerment, attempting to elude a pursuing police 

### vehicle, second degree malicious mischief, and thirddegree malicious mischief. He contends the court's boilerplatefindingthat he "has the present or likely future 

### abilityto pay the legal financial obligations imposed" is notsupported by the record. He does not challenge the financial obligations imposed bythe court— 

### i.e., the victim's penalty assessment and DNA collectionfee—but instead seeks 

### onlyto strike the court's finding regarding his ability to pay. Because Fulton did not raise this issue below, he is barred from raising it forthe first time on appeal. State v. Calvin. 176Wn. App. 1, 302 P.3d 509 (2013). 

### Even ifthe argument could be raised, the challenged finding is immaterial 

### and thus provides nobasis forrelief. Atrial court is not required to enterfindings regarding a defendant's ability to pay before itorders the defendantto pay 

### financial obligations. State v. Blank. 131 Wn.2d 230, 241-42, 930 P.2d 1213 (1997); State v. Curry. 118Wn.2d911, 916, 829 P.2d 166 (1992). The proper 

### time forfindings "is the point ofcollection and when sanctions are sought for 

### nonpayment." Blank. 131 Wn.2d at242; Statev. Crook. 146Wn. App. 24, 189 o—P.3d 811 (2008). While sentencing courts must considerthe defendant's financial situation before imposing non-mandatory costs, see RCW 10.01.160(3), State v. Baldwin. 63 Wn. App. 303, 308-12, 818 P.2d 1116 (1991), such consideration is not necessary at sentencing when, as here, the financial obligations imposed are mandatory. See e.g., State v. Thompson. 153 Wn. App. 325, 336-38, 223 P.3d 1165 (2009)(DNA fee is mandatory and imposed regardless of hardship); State v. Williams. 65 Wn. App. 456, 460, 828 P.2d 1158 (1992)(victim penalty assessment "is mandatory and requires no consideration of
a defendant's ability to pay" at sentencing); Curry. 62 Wn. App. 676, 682-83, 814 P.2d 1252 (1991); RCW 43.43.690(1) ("the court shall levy a crime laboratory analysis fee. . . ."). Inthese circumstances, the challenged finding is immaterial 

### surplusage and does not warrant relief. State v. Caldera. 66 Wn. App. 548, 551, 832P.2d 139(1992). Fulton's pro se Statement ofAdditional Grounds for Review fails to articulate any additional basis for relief.
Affirmed.
§ 2710.2 Public inspection and copying. ( a ) *Background.* 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(2) required that each agency make certain kinds of records available for public inspection and copying.
( b ) *Procedure.* Persons wishing to gain access to OIRM records should contact the Information Access & Disclosure Officer by writing to the address shown in 2710.4(b)(2).
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

 PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

vs. CASE NO. 3:96cr65LAC

MARCUS TALLEY

___________________________________________/

ORDER DENYING RECUSAL AND STAY

Defendant seeks to have this Judge recuse himself from this case and to stay the order of 31

October 2006 requiring defendant’s further commitment under 18 U.S.C. §4241 pending the

resolution of his motion for recusal. He claims because his brother, Virgil Talley, has been

indicted for allegedly trying to harass, defraud and/or cause financial harm to this Judge, that

this Court’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned requiring recusal under 28 U.S.C.

§455(a). This Court disagrees and DENIES the motion for recusal and denies the motion for

a stay as moot.

The basis for the motion is that the defendant’s brother, Virgil Talley, has been indicted for

trying to harass, defraud and/or cause financial harm to this Judge. This defendant, Marcus

Talley, is not alleged to have participated in any way in the acts of his brother. As cited by

the Government, courts have concluded that personal attacks against a judge, written

criticism regarding a judge, instituting legal proceedings against a judge, and even

threatening to kill a judge, do not warrant recusal of the judge. Certainly then, this Court

is not required to recuse itself when it is a brother of the defendant—not the defendant

himself—who is alleged to have harassed this judge by instituting legal proceedings against

him. 

Case 3:96-cr-00065-LC-MD Document 652 Filed 01/09/07 Page 1 of 2
The standard for recusal under §455(a) is “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer

fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would

entertain a significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality.” In this case, any objective,

disinterested, lay observer would know that this judge was not harmed in any way, physically

or financially, by the actions of Virgil Talley and was not even required to respond to the

bizarre claims asserted. No fully informed observer would entertain a significant doubt about

this judge’s impartiality in the case of Marcus Talley.

ORDERED this 9th day of January, 2007.

s/L.A. Collier 

LACEY A. COLLIER

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:96-cr-00065-LC-MD Document 652 Filed 01/09/07 Page 2 of 2