U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

65–201 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

DEMOCRACY IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC AND

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 2000

Committee on International Relations

Serial No. 106–116

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.international—relations

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ELTON GALLEGLY, California

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

PETER T. KING, New York

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

AMO HOUGHTON, New York

TOM CAMPBELL, California

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio

GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

PAT DANNER, Missouri

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

BARBARA LEE, California

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania

RICHARD J. GARON, Chief of Staff

KATHLEEN BERTELSEN MOAZED, Democratic Chief of Staff

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska, Chairman

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

PETER T. KING, New York

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina

MATT SALMON, Arizona

JOHN MCHUGH, New York

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina

PAUL GILLMOR, Ohio

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California

JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana

TOM LANTOS, California

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida

JIM DAVIS, Florida

EARL POMEROY, North Dakota

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

MICHAEL P. ENNIS, Subcommittee Staff Director

DR. ROBERT KING, Democratic Professional Staff Member

MATT REYNOLDS, Counsel

ALICIA A. O’DONNELL, Staff Associate

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina

PETER T. KING, New York

MATT SALMON, Arizona

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa

EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

BRAD SHERMAN, California

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York

GROVER JOSEPH REES, Subcommittee Staff Director

DOUGLAS C. ANDERSON, Counsel

PETER HICKEY, Democratic Staff Director

NICOLLE A. SESTRIC, Staff Associate

(IV)

C O N T E N T S

WITNESSES

Page

Donald L. Pressley, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Europe and Eurasia,

U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................... 5

Dr. Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Professor of Political Science, Colgate University ........... 15

Mr. Paul Goble, Director of Communications, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ........................................................................................................................ 21

Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh, Researcher, Human Rights Watch .......................... 25

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:

Mr. Donald L. Pressley ............................................................................................ 42

Dr. Martha Brill Olcott ........................................................................................... 54

Mr. Paul Goble ......................................................................................................... 71

Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh ..................................................................................... 78

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from

New Jersey ........................................................................................................... 82

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from California ..................................................................................................................... 83

Additional material:

A letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Korbel Albright submitted to the

by Hon. Christopher H. Smith ............................................................................ 86

Documents submitted to the record by Ms. Cavanaugh ....................................... 91

A statement for the record submitted by Hon. Eni Faleomavaega, a Delegate

from American Samoa ......................................................................................... 85

(1)

DEMOCRACY IN THE CENTRAL ASIAN

REPUBLICS

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 12, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA

AND THE PACIFIC, JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 P.m., in

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Bereuter

and Hon. Christopher Smith [Chairmen of the Subcommittees] presiding.

Mr. BEREUTER. The Subcommittees will come to order. I am

going to proceed with an opening statement, assuming that the

Ranking Democrat Member, Mr. Lantos, will be here shortly, and

in order to expedite the process today, I will begin.

The Asia and the Pacific Subcommittee meets today together

with representatives of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights in open session to receive testimony in

the progress toward democracy in the Central Asian Republics,

after which we will move to a markup of H. Con. Res. 295, a resolution regarding Vietnam’s human rights and political opposition

which was introduced by Mr. Rohrabacher and many of our colleagues.

In March of last year, the Asia Subcommittee held a hearing on

the challenges facing U.S. foreign policy in the Central Asian Republics. Today’s hearing will examine how U.S. policy has been implemented and the effectiveness of our efforts to bring democracy

to a region that has a history of authoritarian rule.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, five independent

states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

Uzbekistan—rose in Central Asia. The desert’s mountain steppes

and river valleys in this region are home to 50 million people. State

borders which were imposed by Stalin artificially partition and

breed resentments among various large ethnic groups, principally

the Russians, Uzbeks, and Tajiks.

Long-term uncertainties and incomplete understanding of the region, uneven political and economic progress in the five republics,

other global exigencies, and, I believe, indecision regarding the real

import of U.S. interests vis-a-vis other priorities have resulted in

a largely fractured U.S. policy toward the region and the relegation

of these states to a policy backwater.

2

However, America’s relative inattention to Central Asia, I think,

appears to be slowly changing. At the end of this week, the Secretary of State embarks on her first trip to the region.

The Central Asian states are at a critical juncture in their political and economic development, balanced between democracy and

authoritarianism, between free market economy and systemic corruption, between cooperation with or resistance to the West. In

short, the region is poised between merging into or retreating from

the Free World.

Of all of the Soviet republics, it is certainly arguable that those

in Central Asia were least prepared for independence. Indeed, each

state today still faces three fundamental challenges. First, they

must forge a shared national identity from a legacy of intermingled

ethnic and religious groups and convoluted borders.

Second, the Central Asian republics must institutionalize both at

and below the national level political and legal structures and attitudes that are compatible with democracy.

Third, they must create a free and open economic system, a radical departure from the Soviet past.

Unfortunately, Central Asia appears to be moving along the path

of authoritarianism. While in recent months each of the five countries have conducted general elections, these elections varied in the

degree of electoral freedom, however, in no case did any of these

elections adhere to internationally accepted norms. Indeed, most

remained reminiscent of Soviet-style elections.

The world has witnessed the decertification of opposition parties

and, in some cases, the apprehension of opposition leaders. The

State Department’s current reports on human rights practices for

1999 concluded that Presidential power in Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan overshadows legislative and judicial powers, and that

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have lost ground in democratization and respect for human rights.

This continued decline is very disturbing and raises questions

about the ability of the United States to successfully encourage

true democratic institutions and the rule of law in the region.

It is primarily for this reason that I have scheduled this hearing.

This is not a human rights hearing, yet fundamental human rights

are a key component of any progressive democratic country.

We look forward to testimony which will address not just the current state of democracy in the region, but what, in the witness’

opinion, the Federal Government and the Congress can do to reverse these negative trends that are so prevalent in the Central

Asian republics.

I would tell our witnesses that the Subcommittee comes to this

hearing with no specific prescriptions. The purpose is not to focus

criticism on the Administration for any particular action it may or

may not have taken. Rather, this is part of our duty to conduct our

congressional oversight responsibilities where the executive

branch’s efforts are not yielding the desired results. It is simply

that Central Asia has been too long neglected or ignored.

This hearing seeks, in part, to remedy that shortcoming and

begin to put American foreign policy for the region on a more appropriate course.

3

The Subcommittee is privileged today to have two excellent panels of experts on Central Asia. Testifying for the Administration is

Mr. Donald Pressley, Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency

for International Development for Europe and Eurasia.

A career Foreign Service officer, Mr. Pressley has served the

Agency for International Development in a number of capacities in

a career that has extended over 25 years. Mr. Pressley is uniquely

positioned to explain how the United States has sought to promote

democracy in the region, where we have been most successful and

where we have failed.

Mr. Pressley, I am particularly interested in your assessment of

what the impact of the passage of the so-called ‘‘Strategy of 1999’’

has had on U.S. policy toward the Central Asian region. I imagine,

since it was passed so recently, it will be relatively small, but perhaps you could give us an indication of what you expect.

We are also honored to have a second panel of imminently qualified witnesses. I am also pleased then, therefore, to introduce Dr.

Martha Olcott. She is a Professor of Political Science at Colgate

University. Dr. Olcott is a specialist in Central Asian affairs and

inter ethnic relations in the Soviet successor states, and a Senior

Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr.

Olcott co-directs the Carnegie Moscow Center’s Project on Ethnicity

and Politics in the former Soviet Union. As such, she organizes

seminars, conferences and publications on the ethnic conflicts in

the Soviet successor states and on regional conflicts within Russia.

It is my understanding that Dr. Olcott has only recently briefed

Secretary Albright regarding her upcoming visit to the region.

Next, Dr. Paul Goble, Director of Communications and Technology at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Earlier, he served as

a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace. Special Advisor for Soviet Nationality Problems and Baltic

Affairs at the State Department, Director of Research at Radio Liberty, and Special Assistant for Soviet Nationalities in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Dr. Goble has

appeared before the International Relations Committee before on a

number of occasions, but this is his first appearance, I believe, before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.

Finally, Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh served on the staff of the

New York office of Human Rights Watch where her responsibilities

extended to the Caucasus and Central Asia. Ms. Cavanaugh is a

doctoral candidate at the Columbia University, and has previously

served as Program Officer for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for the

International Research and Exchange Board.

As is consistent with the policy of the Subcommittee, in both

panels, your entire statements will be made a part of the record,

and we will appreciate if you could proceed in approximately 10

minutes or so. You may read or summarize your presentations as

you see fit.

I would turn next to the Ranking Member from California, but

he is not here at this point. He will be joining us as soon as possible. We do have another Californian here, a senior colleague on

the Subcommittee, Mr. Rohrabacher of California. Do you have any

opening comments?

4

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will make it short, but when you said Ranking Member from California, I thought I had been both promoted

and demoted at the same time.

I have spent considerable time in this part of the world, and I

frankly am disappointed at what has happened in these last 8

years. I think that what we have now in Central Asia is opportunity lost and, if not lost, almost lost.

Obviously, the people on the scene did not take our admonitions

about free elections and human rights seriously because they have

all slipped back into their old ways—if not all the way back, at

least they are going in that direction. That is what it seems from

a distance. I am looking forward to your testimony on this.

But the last round of elections in the region were insulting. They

were insulting to us who have tried to work with the various governments in the region to try to establish personal rapport with

some of the leaders and, instead, for lack of a better word, they

‘‘shined’’ us on, and it was a total disregard for honesty and the

basic fundamentals of democratic and free elections.

This area will not prosper and it will not live in peace if it does

not have freedom. If there was anything we learned during the

Reagan years, it is that freedom and peace go together, and if you

have despots continue to dominate these countries that have such

incredible potential, you will not have the prosperity and the stability which we seek for the region and which the people there have

longed for, for so long.

One last element is, of course, the element of Afghanistan, which

I think, if you take a look at that map, the entire Central Asia is

pivoting right there on Afghanistan, and I will renew my charge

that there has been a covert policy by this Administration of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan despite their brutality and their

violations of the rights of women, despite the fact that they harbor

terrorists. This Administration has refused to give me the documents necessary to prove or disprove this charge, but in the documents, Mr. Chairman, that I have examined, there has already

been clear evidence that the charge that I made was accurate and

yet they still kept away from my office the records of 2 full years

of communications, which are the central years that I have been

asking. For several years now I have been making this request as

a senior Member of International Relations Committee. They have

kept those documents from that time slot away from my office and

prevented us from doing the oversight we feel is necessary.

With a regime in Afghanistan like the Taliban—anti-Western,

making hundreds of millions of dollars off the drug trade, involving

the training and base areas for terrorists—that is a destabilizing

force for the whole region, and this Administration, I think, bears

full responsibility for whatever deals it has cut with whichever

powers, whether they be Pakistan or Saudi Arabia or whoever the

deal was cut with for this Taliban policy. The historians will note

that it is this Administration’s fault for cutting such a corrupt deal.

So, with that said, I look forward to your testimony as to the status quo, and some predictions about what is going to happen in the

future there in Central Asia.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher.

5

As we begin, I should explain that I am involved in a contentious

markup in the Banking Committee that is going on simultaneously,

and if I leave here abruptly it is only to go cast a recorded vote

and I will have to turn it over to Mr. Rohrabacher or someone else.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Then you are really in for it.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Pressley, we are very pleased that you accepted our invitation to testify today. You may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF DONALD L. PRESSLEY, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY

FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

Mr. PRESSLEY. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rohrabacher, thank you for

inviting me here today to discuss USAID’s efforts in democracybuilding in Central Asia. I have submitted my prepared testimony

for the record and will just summarize my remarks.

Without question, promoting democracy in the five Central Asian

Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and

Turkmenistan is one of the most difficult challenges USAID faces

in Europe and Eurasia. Still, the difficulty of the challenge should

not deter us—I am sure that you agree that democracy in and of

itself is a worthy goal. In Central Asia, it is also of particular important to U.S. national interests.

Mr. Chairman, 2 years ago, I testified before this Subcommittee

on the then-pending Silk Road Strategy legislation, which authorizes support for the economic and political independence of the

countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

I said then, and it is just as true today, that the overarching goal

of U.S. foreign policy with regard to the five republics is to promote

stable, democratic, market-oriented development, so that these

independent states are able to prevent conflict and the expansion

of global threats, and to ensure fair access to the region’s substantial oil, gas and mineral resources.

Moreover, we continue to believe that as these countries become

more democratic and prosperous, commercial opportunities will increase, and we expect inclinations toward civil strife, and arms and

drug trafficking will decrease. Widespread citizen participation in

the economic, political, and social aspects of these societies is fundamental to achieving and maintaining such democracy and prosperity.

Unfortunately, there have been mixed results in achieving the

laudable goals of the Silk Road Strategy. Transition to democracy

and open markets in the Asian republics of the former Soviet

Union has proven to be a very complex undertaking.

Democratic progress has been uneven, at best. People, used to

fearing their government, do not yet trust it.

While civil society and the nongovernmental sector are growing,

there are still no guarantees of freedom of speech and association.

There are still insufficient transparent and democratic processes to

support the rights of citizens as opposed to suppressing the rights

of citizens.

Parliamentary and Presidential elections in each country have

been severely flawed. Electoral institutions, such as they are, have

not contributed to democratic reform in a substantial way. This situation is exacerbated by pervasive corruption and the widespread

6

abuse of human rights. Even so, we still believe U.S. assistance

programs can accomplish significant results.

Past experiences in Bulgaria and Romania and more recent

events in Slovakia and Croatia tell us that grassroots initiatives

can create a demand for reform.

The most important aspect of our strategy for Central Asia is an

increased emphasis on individuals and communities and the institutions that nurture and serve them. We are working hard to instill democratic skills and practices in local organizations and governments. We are trying to reach the younger generation through

civic education.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, as Mr. Rohrabacher has just pointed out, the human rights records of the Central Asian governments

are poor, especially those of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Therefore, our work with human rights NGO’s emphasizes developing

the skills to fight for increased government accountability. For instance, we share information on international human rights norms

in NGO civic education classes, and we educate women in their

legal rights.

Corruption is another deep-seated problem in Central Asia.

USAID’s approach to combating corruption is primarily ‘‘bottom

up’’, i.e., starting with citizen awareness and participation and

working up to someday hope for real policy change. It cuts across

all sectors of assistance. Our primary thrust is to introduce the

modern concepts of accountability and transparency. These two

concepts, of course, go hand-in-hand with democracy.

On page 6 of my written statement, I note more specifically what

we are doing in this area. But, basically, within our modest means,

USAID’s efforts to address corruption in Central Asia are broad

and multifaceted, befitting the depth and pervasiveness of the

problem. As with so many other aspects of our program, it is a

long-term endeavor.

USAID’s core strategy in democracy-building includes strengthening the political process, and civil society, promoting an independent media and, as I have said, making governments more accountable to the people. But our other work in economic reform, enterprise development, health care, et cetera, also has the impact of

fostering democratic values and practices. For example, a microcredit council learns organization, consensus-building, accountability through voting, leadership skills and other important skills

that are integral to a functioning democracy. Local water associations or self-regulating organizations also incorporate all the elements that open people’s eyes to what it really means to function

as a democracy.

While there is clearly much more to do, at USAID we are proud

of what our programs have been able to accomplish despite the

many challenges we face in Central Asia. On page 8 of my written

statement, I have included several examples. But for now let me

just say that civil society is growing in magnitude and sophistication in all five countries, with citizens’ organizations now numbering over 3,000. Over 100 independent TV stations have increased the professional quality and quantity of news reporting.

Local governments, particularly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,

are learning to be more responsive and accountable to their citiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
7

zens. All types of groups are organizing and solving problems locally. People are learning about their rights and developing the

skills to take appropriate action. These are the building blocks for

change. These activities are creating a culture for democracy.

Mr. Chairman, as I have indicated, USAID is making headway

in supporting civil society in Central Asia. But we must be realistic. This is a tough place to work. The dismal human rights

records of this region underscores the autocratic nature of these

governments; corruption levels suggest how little respect there is

for the rule of law. Change in Central Asia is a long-term process

as these countries are still grappling, as you noted earlier, with the

realities of being new nations while simultaneously addressing the

basic issues of development—poverty, declining health standards,

and a lack of economic growth.

Still, this region is important to the United States and, therefore,

it is important to stay engaged. Our experience tells us it is worth

the effort. The grassroots approach embodied in the USAID assistance strategy is making a difference in the lives of individuals and

communities. Progress comes one step at a time, but in the end we

believe true reform will arrive. Until then, we must keep working.

Thank you, and I welcome your comments and questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pressley appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Pressley. I think that,

since we only have two of us here at this moment, we are going

to proceed under the 10-minute rule so we can develop any kind

of thought process a little bit better.

Mr. Pressley, I wonder if you would tell me, or reiterate for me

for the record here, what are the primary objectives of USAID at

this moment for the five Central Asian republics?

Mr. PRESSLEY. Our strategy for Central Asia focuses on four

areas—broad economic growth through private enterprise development; instilling democratic values and principles and developing

the NGO’s, the nongovernmental organizations to set that out;

working with those countries to develop their water and energy resources which are so important in that part of the world for them

to develop their own economic well being; and developing at the

local government level those skills and those practices that in turn

should some day lead to the kind of democracy that we believe are

important in that part of the world.

Mr. BEREUTER. Since we start here with no tradition or no substantial tradition of democracy and democratic participation, the

later point, of course, would seem to be an appropriate place—the

‘‘bottoms up’’ effort in where you are starting basically with no substantial democratic tradition.

It would seem to me that ability to communicate with the population, diverse points of view would be essential. Tell me what the

situation is, in your judgment, and what, if any, concentration of

resources there are. Address, too, an open and uncontrolled media.

Mr. PRESSLEY. The situation with an independent media in Central Asia is quite sad, actually. We have seen in all five countries

that there is interference with media, that the countries and governments still do not respect the rights of the media and do not understand the important role that they can play.

8

Through one of our nongovernmental organizations, Inter News,

we have mounted a major program. In each country Inter News

has legal advisors who are helping these media outlets to exercise

the rights that they do have, and to push and advocate and urge

for additional freedom of expression and the ability to work in a

broad way.

Here, as in other cases, we are working with these independent

media outlets so that they can develop the skills to associate

among themselves, to form consensus, to speak out and advocate

for change. So, we have mounted an intense program to support

independent media in Central Asia.

Mr. BEREUTER. To what extent are international or locally developing NGO’s active in that area?

Mr. PRESSLEY. It is still an area that is quite nascent but, as I

mentioned earlier, now we have over 100 independent TV stations

that are operating in the region. These are quite small and quite

unsustainable, I must say, in many ways, but they are developing

and we are seeing progress over the years, and we think this is in,

again, an area where we should really stay the course and continue

to support them.

Mr. BEREUTER. That is encouraging to hear. I have had a delegation visiting with me about the print media and the difficulties of

actually getting the printing presses necessary to distribute their

version of the news, their political agenda on a newspaper basis in

at least one of these countries, and I suspect it is a more common

problem than just one country. What do we do about the situation

where they simply lack the ability to take the printed word to the

population of the region?

Mr. PRESSLEY. Again, we have programs that support print

media. I don’t know the specific instance that you are referring to,

sir, but in some ways the electronic media seems to be the area

where we have the greatest opportunity and, on balance, we have

emphasized our programs more with radio and TV because of the

widespread ability to get out to the rural areas that those two approaches have. So we have put the relative emphasis on those

kinds of programs.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Pressley, moving to another area, one of the

things we hear from these governments and people in those countries is the urgency of having foreign, especially in American investment in the region. But so many American and foreign firms

have had difficulty with the violation of the contracts in very obvious and costly ways.

With corruption so endemic in the region, do you think there is

some way to effectively convince countries—and I will just say

Kazakhstan is one where we have a particular problem—and to understand that what they do and how they treat foreign firms, including American firms—which has a big impact on the willingness

of other firms to make investments—and to establish an ongoing

trade relationship? What do we do. Do we condition aid in any

fashion? How do we get the point across? It seems like we are not

having much success with the normal kind of discussions and negotiations.

Mr. PRESSLEY. Actually, the level of assistance that we are able

to provide to Central Asia is quite small in terms of their econoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
9

mies and the areas that they are focusing in. Kazakhstan, as a

prime example, is very interested in the oil wealth that it potentially has and is working with American companies in that sector,

and so in some ways, being open to private investment in the oil

sectors where they are focusing most of their attention. I honestly

don’t think conditioning the kinds of levels of assistance that we

are able to provide will work very well there.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would it be more appropriate, if we decided to do

this, to focus on resources from some of the multilateral institutions because we don’t have that much involved ourselves—the

IMF, for example, the World Bank in particular?

Mr. PRESSLEY. Throughout this region, we have worked very

closely with the IMF and the World Bank to come up with appropriate conditions that do make sense for those multilateral organizations, and I think that is an area where conditions do make

sense and where you have the kind of government and government

programs that you get the leverage that you are looking for.

If I could just continue, one of the lightning rods that we have

supported is the Central Asia-American Enterprise Fund which is

investing in these countries, and it has been a tremendous struggle, but through its struggles we have learned where the points of

interface and problems are, and we have been able to go back to

these governments and to urge the kind of policy change that

would allow the Enterprise Fund to try to attract more investment

and to try to operate better.

Out of the five countries, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have the

best opportunity for that. We have been virtually unable to operate

in Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in a way that really

makes sense. So we are trying to focus in Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan, but even there it is a tough environment for American

investment, and the Enterprise Fund stands out as an example of

where Americans are trying to use actual investments to make policy change.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Pressley, I want to mention at this point that

I would like to ask about an opposition leader in Kyrgyzstan. I

think you are not the right person to address this to, but a man

named Kulov was actually apparently taken from a hospital room

and imprisoned. I am going to ask the State Department to give

us an account of that.

My final question is an open-ended one for you, Mr. Pressley, and

that is if you could make a change or give an additional priority

to a particular program that is aimed at our broad agenda of promoting democracy, rule of law, and human rights in that region,

what would you recommend to the Congress? What changes would

you like to see made?

Mr. PRESSLEY. I believe that we do have the best opportunity in

the grassroots approach in the civil society work. If I could emphasize the role that nongovernmental organizations play in that part

of the world, that is where I would put the emphasis.

It doesn’t require necessarily a lot more funding because there is

an absorptive issue here and you have to take it step-by-step. But

in terms of the support that the Congress gives to the work that

USAID and the U.S. Government is doing, I think your acknowledgement that it is a long-term issue, that grassroots does make

10

sense, would be very helpful to us as we deal with those governments and continue to push for allowing that kind of civil society

to grow and foster in that part of the world.

Mr. BEREUTER. My red light has not come on yet, so I want to

ask you, to what extent the European Union is putting in aid now

as compared to our own and your own impressions, and to what extent we coordinate our effort?

Mr. PRESSLEY. The European Union has not focused very much

on Central Asia. I work very closely with the European Union’s assistance program in this part of the world, it is called TACIS, and

I was just in Brussels 3 weeks ago meeting with the Director of

this organization, and they do have programs there and we do coordinate but, relatively speaking, they are focusing much more on

Central Europe and the countries that are closer to accession into

the European Union. So once again, the United States is the donor,

is the country that these countries are looking to for assistance and

support and helping them make these changes.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. The gentleman from California, Mr.

Rohrabacher, is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Let us talk a little bit

about China and Russia’s influence in this region, and as we know

that this was the area where a century and a half ago they used

to call it the ‘‘playing field of the great game’’, Britain and Russia

seeking influence.

Is Russia now engaged in trying to dominate these former territories that it has dominated for the last 70 or 80 years?

Mr. PRESSLEY. Mr. Rohrabacher, I am probably not the best witness to speak definitively on Russia’s intentions. I can tell you that

from my perspective of seeing the assistance activities that are carrying out in Central Asia, that Russia remains very engaged in this

area, it regards it as an area that is of extreme importance to its

own national interest.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Do you see Russia as a positive force or negative force?

Mr. PRESSLEY. I think that there an attempt to be sure to continue the domination of these countries because it has been such

an important part of their economy. I have seen, for example, that

as Kazakhstan is talking about joining the WTO, they are very

nervously watching what Russia is doing and trying to get guidance from that, and trying to understand the impact this would

have on their economy. That is only understandably so, from my

perspective.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The people I met from the region, a lot of

them believe that Russia is engaged in destabilizing the region intentionally. Would you say that the Russians, for example—one example I have always heard is that they are trying to keep the war

going between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Is there any validity to

that, do you think?

Mr. PRESSLEY. I am not aware of any validity to that. That might

be a question I could take back to the State Department with me.

We have the contact group, the Group of Five, that have been

working to resolve—help resolve the issues between Azerbaijan and

Armenia. Russia is a member of that group, and the reports that

I get from our representative on that group is that there is coordiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
11

nated effort to try to resolve those issues. But, as I say, I may not

have the full information on that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Is there Chinese immigration evident in

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, perhaps Tajikistan?

Mr. PRESSLEY. I cannot answer that question. I would be happy

to take it for the record and check with my colleagues in the State

Department on this.

[This information was not submitted at the time of printing]

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Two years ago when I visited the region,

there were complaints in Kazakhstan, in particular, that there

seemed to be an intentional illegal immigration of Chinese Nationals into the country, and you haven’t seen any evidence of that?

Mr. PRESSLEY. I have not seen that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. The Uzbekis seem to be, just from

my perspective, more sophisticated in their leadership. Of the various leaders I met in the region, Karimov and his group seemed to

be much more sophisticated and even pro-Western than the others

who I met, especially this guy from Turkmenistan, the guy who has

his picture all over the place, with the big hat on and everything.

That is really strange.

Mr. PRESSLEY. Niyazov.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But even in Uzbekistan where they seem to

be sophisticated and pro-Western, in the last elections they let everybody down. In Uzbekistan, they are very suspicious of Russians.

Their rhetoric has been certainly pro-Western. So, for people who

seem to understand, have an understanding, they seem to be sophisticated, yet they make a travesty out of the electoral process.

How do you explain that?

Mr. PRESSLEY. As we mentioned earlier, these are new nations.

These are leaders who had not come from any sense of change.

They are former Communist leaders who——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All of them are. Are we just going to have to

wait it out for a generation or two, for all these people to die off

either naturally or otherwise?

Mr. PRESSLEY. I certainly hope not, but we are going to have to

work away at the citizen level, and work with these nongovernmental groups that I have been talking about.

I think that the leaders of this region feel that they are under

a variety of pressures, including those coming from Afghanistan

and other parts, that lead them to believe incorrectly that they

need to maintain that ‘‘iron fist’’, that they need to be in charge

and not let people speak out against them, and not allow the kind

of dissent that is so healthy.

So, I think it is going to have to come up from the bottom, and

that is where we are working.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. From what you have said, I take it the National Endowment for Democracy and other of our pro-human

rights institutions in the United States have been active in the region and have done a fairly good job, from what you can see?

Mr. PRESSLEY. Yes, that is right. I can’t speak specifically to the

National Endowment for Democracy in this part of the world, although they are working in this region more broadly. But I think

that there are a variety of human rights groups that have had proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
12

grams there, and we have supported them, and we think they are

doing the right thing and are trying their best.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You agree with my assessment that unless

there is some kind of change in Afghanistan, that it will continue

to be a source of instability for the region as a whole?

Mr. PRESSLEY. I do.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again,

for the record, I am very deeply disappointed in this last 8 years.

I really believe that if we would have been more forceful in that

region, we could have had more progress toward a truly democratization; instead—and I have met almost all of these leaders, and

some are more sophisticated, like in Uzbekistan, and others are

less sophisticated perhaps, like in Kazakhstan or in Turkmenistan,

but whatever their level of sophistication, they seem to have not

made the progress that we felt was potential 8 and 10 years ago

and, without that success on the political end, we are not going to

have the economic success that we all know is the potential of Central Asia.

So, thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I agree with your

assessment.

The gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. SANFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I might, I am gathering a few thoughts, would the gentleman from New Jersey like

to go? If not, I will go, but——

Mr. BEREUTER. I am pleased to yield to the Chairman of the

International Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee, the

gentleman from South Jersey?

The gentleman from New Jersey, who Chairs the International

Relations Operations and Human Rights Subcommittee.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank

Mr. Pressley for his testimony and regret that I was not here earlier. I was one of the speakers at the rally on PNTR and had to

wait my turn, and finally got up there and it set me back time

wise. So, I do apologize for not hearing your testimony.

I would like to make a very brief opening statement and then

submit some questions to our very distinguished witness.

I am very pleased that we are able to conduct this joint hearing

on the state of democracy in the Central Asia Republics. As you

know, Mr. Chairman, I introduced last fall, H.Con.Res. 204, voicing

concern about the serious violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in most states of Central Asia.

Much has transpired in the region since the time of introduction,

and I am eager for us to schedule a markup and Floor consideration on the measure as soon as we return from the Easter recess.

As we all know, the Secretary of State is traveling to

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in the coming days, and

members of the Helsinki Commission, which I chair, joined me just

recently in sending a letter to the Secretary of State urging her to

raise a number of very specific human rights and democratization

issues in her talks with authorities in the region, and I would ask

that that letter be made a part of the record.

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection, that will be the order.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

13

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. In general, the state of democratization

and human rights in the countries of Central Asia is a source of

serious concern, frustration and disappointment.

Over the past year, the Commission has conducted a series of

hearings on the countries in the region. The five newly independent

States of Central Asia were admitted to the OSCE in 1992, after

freely accepting all commitments contained in the 1975 Helsinki

Final Act and subsequent OSCE documents.

Let us not forget that each of the leaders, having signed the

OSCE documents, have personally acknowledged ‘‘democracy is the

only system of government for our Nations’’, and committed themselves to foster democratization by holding free and fair elections,

to promote freedom of the media, and to observe human rights.

Some 8 years later, these countries remain independent sovereign entities, but in much of Central Asia the commitments have

been slighted. Central Asian leaders give every indication of intending to remain in office for life, and Western Capitals, though

dutifully pressing their leaders to observe OSCE commitments,

seem to have accepted this unpleasant reality as unalterable.

Throughout the region, fundamental freedoms are ignored while

leaders entrench themselves and their families in power and in

wealth.

Mr. Chairman, the deterioration of democracy, the lack of the

rule of law, and the violations of human rights seriously jeopardize

genuine stability in the region and are contrary to U.S. interests.

I would strongly suggest that our interests could only be advanced

through the promotion of democratic principles where officials are

accountable to the electorate and justice is administered impartially.

I want to thank you again, and I look forward to our second

panel, and I will, again, Mr. Pressley, read your statement very

carefully. Yield back.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith.

Is the gentleman from South Carolina prepared to proceed? The

gentleman is recognized.

Mr. SANFORD. I was looking through notes—and, again, I apologize for being late as well. I would simply say this, I guess I have

two questions—one on the role of Islam in the region. What are

your thoughts on radical Islamic faith versus not? Is that increasingly becoming a problem point? If you already covered this in your

testimony, just say so.

The second question I would have would be exactly how much do

we give in aid to that region, because I missed it, and it may be

in your notes.

Mr. PRESSLEY. Thank you, sir. On your first point, I did not talk

about the role of Islam. Central Asia has a form of Islam that varies across the countries, and we have seen in some countries that

there is a great comfort level there, if you will, with that religion.

In others, there is considerably more tension. Tajikistan, for example, unfortunately, is an area of civil strife, and the various warring factions that are there are influenced by their various views

on religion.

As we mentioned earlier, there are radical elements of Islam that

are very interested in expanding their role and influence and conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
14

trol in this part of the world, and the leaders of these countries are

quite determined to keep that radical element out.

So, it is an area where unfortunately this major religion is being

used by various groups for their own means and devices, and they

are using this as a way to stir up the people, and it has caused

both unrest and great conflict in this region.

In terms of the budget, if I could just put this in perspective, the

level of assistance that was appropriated under the FREEDOM

Support Act that covers the NIS, over all the years that we have

been there is approximately $7.5 billion. Out of that, we have allocated approximately $900 million to the Central Asia Republics.

Mr. SANFORD. For some reason, I thought it was more in the neighborhood of like $400 million a year that was going to—us that

the neighborhood, or that is high?

Mr. PRESSLEY. That is high. For Kazakhstan, in this fiscal year, the amount allocated for USAID programs is $27 million;

Kyrgyzstan is approximately $21 million; Tajikistan is $7 million;

Turkmenistan is $4 million, and Uzbekistan is $9 million.

Mr. SANFORD. So I am mixing up former Soviet republics to the

east when I get to that. Yes. If you look at the configuration of the

presidency, in essence, for instance, in Kazakhstan, as I understand, power is very centrally located in the executive branch as

opposed to other branches of government. Is America getting a

good return on—in essence, you have a king over there, as I understand. Is that not the case?

Mr. PRESSLEY. You have a very authoritarian government, there

is no doubt that. We have seen that elections are severely flawed,

and that power remains very heavily centralized.

Our approach to deal with that issue, as I mentioned earlier, is

to work at the grassroots, to promote civil society, to promote citizens’ awareness, to cause them to understand the benefits of democracy and want to advocate for change themselves. This is a

long-term strategy but, as we have all indicated, over the past 8

years we have been disappointed in the level of reform and the

movement toward democracy, and we think this kind of grassroots

approach has to be the one that will pay off for us in the end.

Mr. SANFORD. I am burning through my time, but you would say

that that $23 million a year that the taxpayer is sending, for instance—and I am not picking on Kazakhstan other than the fact

that you mentioned it, you could pick each of the different countries—but you would say that could be an exceedingly long-term investment by the American taxpayer—several generations is essentially what you are saying.

Mr. PRESSLEY. I would hope not several generations.

Mr. BEREUTER. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Thank you, Mr. Pressley, for appearing here today and for your

testimony.

Mr. BEREUTER. If our second panel would come forward, we are

going to hear from Dr. Paul Goble, Director of Communications for

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty; Dr. Martha Olcott, Professor, Department of Political Science, Colgate University; and Ms.

Cassandra Cavanaugh, Researcher for Human Rights Watch in

New York City. As I mentioned, your entire statements will be

made a part of the record. You may proceed as you wish. I would

15

like to see if you could summarize your comments in about five or

6 minutes, if possible, or give us that part that you would like to

supplement your prepared remarks, and then we will move to the

questions.

First, we will call on Dr. Martha Olcott, Professor at Colgate

University.

Dr. Olcott, you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL

PEACE, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLGATE UNIVERSITY

dR. OLCOTT. I apologize that I am going to have to leave after

my testimony and any questions that are directly for me because

I am testifying in the Senate subcommittee at exactly the same

time as I am here.

Mr. BEREUTER. I understood that you were not going to be there

until 3:30.

Dr. OLCOTT. They moved the hearing back to 2 and they wanted

me there at 3, if I could.

Mr. BEREUTER. It is very difficult for us to intervene and have

members ask questions of just you without listening the other panelists. We will see as we go.

Dr. OLCOTT. Then, am I excused to leave after my testimony?

Mr. BEREUTER. That is not too helpful to the members. We like

to be cooperative with the Senate, but I believe you were scheduled

to come here to the House of Representatives. We will see if we can

work something out as we proceed.

Dr. OLCOTT. Because I feel really awkward, but that was the negotiation with the staff. I am sorry.

Mr. BEREUTER. Staff is not authorized to give way to the Senate.

Doctor, you may proceed.

Dr. OLCOTT. I am going to summarize part of my testimony.

The Central Asian region has been a disappointing one from the

point of view of democracy-building. In fact, the situation appears

to grow worse with every passing year. Initially, Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan seemed to be making steady progress toward the development of democratic or quasi-democratic politics, but in the past

2 years the regimes in each country have become more autocratic.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have had strong man rulers from

the outset. Hopes for achieving a political opening in the former

case were largely dashed after the February 1999 bombings in

Tashkent.

The one ‘‘bright light’’ is Tajikistan, where part of the opposition

has been brought into government and the role of nongovernmental

groups has expanded in recent years. However, the government in

Dushanbe is not yet in control of this war-torn country, and leaders

in neighboring states see the ‘‘victories’’ of democracy in Tajikistan

as further destabilizing the situation in their own countries.

The main reason why democracies have not developed in Central

Asia is that the region’s leaders don’t want them to. However, the

region’s rulers would like us to believe that the failure of democracy-building in the region is a good thing, not a bad one. They portray their populations as unready for democracy, politically immaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
16

ture, and capable of being swayed by extreme ideologies. In addition, they say that their people respect strong rulers, and as traditional Asians they are ill-disposed to democracy.

Most importantly, they argue that their neighborhood is too dangerous to allow them the risk of empowering the people. The latter

explanation has become more popular over time, given the obviously deteriorating security situation in the countries in and

around the region. Decisions about economic reform and political

institution building are regularly subjected to the litmus test of

whether policy initiatives are likely to help the government keep

the peace.

Invariably, though, those in power view their continuation in office as inseparable from the cause of stability. Partly this is because they view themselves as most fit to rule, but in many cases

it is also because they do not want to lose the perquisites of power.

The latter has allowed these men to enrich themselves, their families and their cronies, although the abuse is varied from country

to country.

For now, the population of the region generally tolerates the actions of their leaders, but this does not mean that they are unprepared for democracy, or that they will forever accept the current

situation.

The level of preparedness for democratic institution building and

level of public engagement on civil society issues varies dramatically from country to country. Unfortunately, many of the support

structures necessary for democracy-building are disappearing in

these countries with each passing year, this includes a committed

elite and the institutions necessary to sustain pluralistic or democratic societies.

Decisions to restrict democratization have reduced the number of

political stake holders in each of these societies. There is also an

implicit relationship between political and economic reform. Economic reform also creates new political stake holders, and the pattern of economic restructuring has varied considerably. So, too,

have decisions about the empowerment of traditional institutions

and local governments. Thus, the potential consequences of the current failures in democratic institution building vary from country

to country. There are also interdependencies throughout the region,

and failures in one state can create problems in another.

These patterns of interdependency make Uzbekistan a critical

nation to watch. Developments here will influence those in neighboring states.

In this regard, the political map of Uzbekistan was quite similar

to that of Tajikistan, although the economic, political and social

structure of the Uzbeks was more complicated than that of the

Tajiks. Political unrest in Uzbekistan has never reached that same

fevered pitch. At the same time, the government has pursued a

highly focused campaign against secular and religious political activists.

In many ways, Uzbekistan has the most thought-out model of

state-building in the region, although it is far from clear that it is

able to meet the challenges that this state faces. Karimov has

looked to institutionalize a system where there is a strong man on

top, who chooses regional rulers and then allows a certain range

17

of autonomous action and functioning of re-empowered traditional

institutions. This model is designed to create a wide range of stake

holders in the regime, particularly at the local level. Key to the

model is Karimov’s support for the maintenance of a strong social

welfare net, which is designed to stimulate mass political allegiance. Local institutions are charged with the supervision of this

net and this makes local officials important stake holders. At the

same time, though, it allows the Karimov regime someone to blame

when things go wrong.

The system, however, is directly linked to the state maintaining

a certain threshold of economic productivity. While official Uzbek

figures on GDP suggest that the country has not suffered the same

precipitous economic decline as neighboring states, conditions on

the ground tell a different story. The Uzbek government has managed to maintain a minimum standard of living across society by

sharply restricting the convertibility of the national currency.

These decisions about economic reform are creating their own political risk. However, economic conditions in the country in recent

years have led to the thwarting of many thousands of these potential entrepreneurs at all levels. In other words, the number of potential economic stake holders in the country has been sharply reduced, and with them the number of potential political stake holders. This has increased elite dissatisfaction in favor of meeting a

perceived mass demand. It is not clear if the regime has set up the

conditions necessary to meet mass demand in the future, they may

simply have transferred the period of maximum political risk from

the years just after independence to a period down the road.

Islamic opposition groups have been forced underground or to

flee the country. The nature of religious opposition is such that

anti-regime groups have been able to better position themselves

than have their secular counterparts. The number of Muslim followers of fundamentalist ideologies has increased in the past several years, but it should not be presumed that all Islamic activists

are potential terrorists, they obviously are not, but a serious Islamic threat now exists in Uzbekistan. Given the level of elite dissatisfaction and the continued presence of religion, religious

themes are far more likely to be used as a way to mobilize popular

opposition to the regime than might otherwise have been the case,

and it is not beyond the realm of the possible that secular and religious opponents could make common cause.

The longer economic reform is postponed, the more difficult it

will be for an alternative political elite to find an independent

power base.

Kyrgyzstan. The situation in Uzbekistan has had an obvious influence on developments in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The risks associated with this permeability were clearly demonstrated in the

Batken hostage crisis last summer when a group of Uzbek fighters

held Kyrgyz and Japanese hostages for several months.

These actions occurred at a time when the Kyrgyz government

was in the process of backing away from its commitment to democratic principles, and provided a further justification for them to do

so.

President Akaev used to be an ardent supporter of democratic

principles that worked well for him. Kyrgyzstan was the model in

18

the region, and it led to a much higher than average per capita foreign assistance in the country. However, the standard of living in

Kyrgyzstan continues to deteriorate. This has made President

Akaev far more unpopular. This unpopularity as well as growing

corruption tied to the official family has made him very suspicious

of political opposition.

At the same time it has become more difficult to complain about

these abuses. Formal and informal restrictions on the press have

increased, and most serious of the abuses is to the electoral system,

particularly the treatment of opposition politicians, including most

recently the arrest of Feliks Kulov.

Political crack down in Kyrgyzstan need not be a recipe for civil

war or civil unrest, but it certainly makes a poor country poorer

and more dependent upon powerful neighbors as well as a growing

drug trade.

The current pattern in Kyrgyzstan is similar to that of

Kazakhstan, where there has also been a crack down on political

opposition and jailing of figures that contested the authority of

Nazarbayev and corrupt parliamentary elections. However, in

many ways, the crack down in Kazakhstan is less troubling than

that in Kyrgyzstan. The problem is that the nature of stake holding

in Kyrgyzstan is much more restrictive. Kazakhstan is implicitly

pluralistic, given the country’s enormous size, economic complexity,

and ethnic diversity.

This informal pluralism is not a substitute for formal pluralism,

but it does help keep alive the potential for democratic development in the absence of a supportive environment. The supportive

environment is no longer present in Kazakhstan. Although economic reform has been episodic, it has been largely linear, and it

has led to the empowerment of some independent economic stake

holders. Regional economies are also beginning to develop. These

are still too small and those tied to them too cautious to actively

seek political power, but they are likely to become a force that will

need to be reckoned with at the time when power begins to ebb

away from President Nazarbayev.

Just a few comments about Turkmenistan. It is the most opaque

of the Central Asia societies. It has an anachronistic political system, media is tightly controlled, and there is no intellectual life to

speak of in the country.

In the first years of independence, when it looked like oil and gas

wealth was around the corner, the peculiarities of the Turkmen political system were less troubling to potential political and economic

stake holders. Now, the crack down in Turkmenistan’s political life

combined with the closing down of economic prospects mean that

there will be no democratic institutions to be used by increasingly

more thwarted political and economic stake holders.

In many ways, Tajikistan has made the most strides toward

achieving a civil society, in part because a coalition seemed the

only way out of the crisis engendered by the civil war. At the same

time, Tajikistan has the most criminalized economy in the region,

creating a state within a state. Drugs dominate in the border areas

with Afghanistan, and the mayor of Dushanbe is said to meet his

municipal needs by taxing the drug trade. The pervasive atmosVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
19

phere of lawlessness in Tajikistan makes other Central Asian leaders frightened of the Tajik example.

What lessons can we draw from the past 9 years of U.S. policy?

I would argue that these dismal results do not mean that U.S. efforts have been for naught. There is a tradition of independent

media developing in most of the countries of the region, even if

what they can broadcast is still restricted. A new generation of lawyers and other legal experts is receiving training, and with time

they should be able to provide a more forceful lobby for the need

for legal reform. the number of people with formal training in business and economics is also increasing, and they too seem certain

to push for the need for legal reforms in the area of protection of

property. The next generation of administrators throughout the region should be better trained than the current one, and they will

be able to draw on the expertise and involvement of those active

in the NGO sector.

The U.S. should continue to make an investment in the human

capital of Central Asia, however, we shouldn’t exaggerate the influence that these training programs are likely to have. Young people

with knowledge of the West are likely to make more effective interlocutors when they come into positions of importance, but they

need not make better or more dependable partners for the U.S.

Thank you.

[The statement of Dr. Olcott appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. We are going to bend our rules and we will call

on Mr. Rohrabacher for a question, and then we will proceed to the

other two gentlemen for a question each.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The real trouble is that you have got every

one of those countries is being run by a very strong individual who

doesn’t want to give up power. Am I being too simplistic there?

Dr. OLCOTT. No.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Because if it wasn’t that, there is a good possibility that we would have some evolution, but we are not seeing

this evolution because of the strong individuals.

Maybe a policy I suggested to Hun Sen down in Cambodia might

be an idea, and that is to say if we are going to have a relationship

with you, we have got to know that you are not going to try to be

the strong man and the power in this country forever, for as long

as you are alive, and suggested that there be a voluntary term

limit agreement that these tough guys, for us to even have any relations with them, have to agree to announce that after a certain

number of years—4, 8, or 10 years, whatever that is—that they

will no longer be the head of their country and they will leave

power. What do you think about that?

Dr. OLCOTT. I think it is a great idea, but I don’t think you would

find any takers in the region.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. It depends on what the price was for not

agreeing to that. Certainly, if we just continue to treat them as a

legitimate government—I made it very clear to Hun Sen that I

wasn’t going to treat him like legitimate head of state and that I

would be a royal pain if he continued to act as if he was going to

control that country forever. But what if our whole government was

telling Hun Sen and these various dictators that and just walk

away from them if they don’t agree to that?

20

Dr. OLCOTT. I would say that as bad as these regimes are, most

of them aren’t on the short list of the most horrible regimes in the

world, which is probably why it would be hard to totally walk away

from the regimes.

The big problem is that the leaders of the countries are really

greedy and the problem of official corruption is really a serious one,

and they are not going to walk away easily. But I would say where

the U.S. has to put its influence is to work with these people to

create institutions necessary to support the inevitable political successions that are going to occur, that even though it is harsh to say

we have to take the hit on the next 5 or 10 years, I think what

we have to do is begin working toward the transfer of power, and

to try to keep things from deteriorating even further.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Pressley recommended that we try to set

up and support these alternatives from the ground up. Frankly, I

don’t think that the problem is with the grassroots in these societies. I think it is the other way around, and no matter how much

money and effort we put in trying to convince the people to develop

democratic institutions, they are ready for it. It is these tough guys

that are the real problem.

Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions I have.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Sanford, one

question for the Professor.

Mr. SANFORD. My one question would be regarding the number for Turkmenistan it was around $5 million or something that we

sent there. In politics, if you don’t have a certain level of saturation

in advertising, frankly, it is a waste of time. Are we at that waste

of time level with some of these countries?

Dr. OLCOTT. Honestly, I think we are with some of them. I don’t

think we can make a dent in Turkmenistan’s domestic politics and

their decision to go back to selling gas through Moscow, I think, is

proof of the fact that they have options. They may not be options

we like, but I think engagement with Uzbekistan is really critical

because they create a security risk for the whole region. I think engagement with Kazakhstan is really critical because I think, as I

say in my formal remarks at greater length, that Kazakhstan is

implicitly a pluralistic society even though it is not legally or explicitly a pluralistic society, and I think by really engaging in

Kazakhstan today, we can help ensure the chance that when

Nazarbayev passes from the scene, Kazakhstan will become a more

attractive place to do business with. It is not lost, it really isn’t.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Good question, Mr. Sanford.

Dr. Cooksey.

Dr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is it correct that most

of our aid is going to Kazakhstan?

Dr. OLCOTT. I think so, yes. I think that Kazakhstan receives

more monetarily and Kyrgyzstan receives more per capita.

Dr. COOKSEY. Where did you say you would place that aid, if you

were to place it?

Dr. OLCOTT. I would continue with what we are doing in

Kazakhstan, and even upgrade. I think the money we are spending

on economic restructuring, which is really where a lot of this is

going, is really having an impact. I think that economics will help

lead Kazakhstan out of its political mire. It is a large, complex

21

country, and the degree to which they create an independent entrepreneurial class, which is beginning to be formed, I think is really

the hope of the future. Unfortunately, we can’t engage in the same

way in Uzbekistan because their currency is not convertible. Even

though I am a political scientist, I think in the long-run money

spent on economics in these transition societies will contribute

more. We have to keep working with the NGO’s. We obviously have

to keep defending human rights and human rights activists, but I

think that the future of transition will really only occur if there can

be the creation of a new, independent entrepreneurial class and if

local governments can begin to function in a more or less quasi-pluralistic way.

Dr. COOKSEY. Elaborating on your last comment, Dr. Olcott, is

there a meaningful way for American business and American businesswomen and businessmen to participate in this economic growth

development that we are helping support in Kazakhstan, for example?

Dr. OLCOTT. There is, especially in Kazakhstan where the currency is freely exchangeable. The two problems with business in

Kazakhstan—and I serve as one of the directors of the Central

Asian American Enterprise Fund, as its Vice Chair in fact—the

problem that we encounter with our investments is that the market is really still very small. That is one of the problems, how big

a prize is the capture a market of only 18 million people, as Central Asia is not yet a whole single functioning economic region. The

second is the dependability of contract, and the second is one I

think that we can really continue to work with the Kazakh government to increase training of economic judges. I think these are all

things that we really can do and where AID is really making a real

and important contribution.

Dr. COOKSEY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Dr. Olcott.

Dr. OLCOTT. May I be excused?

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes.

Dr. OLCOTT. I am really sorry, I apologize. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Goble and Ms. Cavanaugh, we are pleased to

hear from you.

Mr. Goble, you are listed first, you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF MR. PAUL GOBLE, DIRECTOR OF

COMMUNICATIONS, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY

Mr. GOBLE. I am pleased to be speaking before this Subcommittee for the first time because I think it represents a major

step forward—not that I am invited—but that Central Asia is being

focused on by something other than the European aspect of looking

through Moscow to get to Central Asia, and I want to commend you

for the reorganization which, unfortunately, has not been paralleled everywhere else in this city.

The governments of post-Soviet Central Asia are producing what

they say they most want to avoid—growing instability and the rise

of a radical Islamist opposition. Moreover, the two more important

outside actors in the region, Russia and the West, are unintentionally encouraging this process, in the first case so as to extend Moscow’s influence and in the second in the name of maintaining staVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
22

bility, and imposing an Islamic threat which, in fact, the approach

that has been adopted is producing rather than containing.

But as a result of all this, the prospects for democracy and the

stability that democracy can bring in these countries in this region

are now far worse than they have been at anytime since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

That sobering conclusion is one that suggests that these countries may, in fact, in the upcoming leadership transition, go in the

direction of the authoritarian, anti-Westernism pursued by Iran,

Algeria and several other Islamic countries. It in turn reflects the

nature of the post-communist regimes in these countries, the nature of Islam as it has evolved there first under the Soviet system

and now in post-Soviet times, and finally the nature of the involvement of outside powers. I would like to comment briefly on those

three topics, and I have spoken more fully in my written presentation.

In his classic essay of the early 1970’s, ‘‘Will the Soviet Union

Survive until 1984?’’, Andrei Amalrik predicted that the countries

of post-Soviet Central Asia were far more likely to continue Soviet

patterns of behavior long after communist power fell than any

other countries to emerge from a post-USSR environment.

He argued that the congruence, even fusion of the traditional patriarchal forms of rule with Marxist-Leninist methods would have

the effect of preserving the Soviet system in important ways, and

that preservation of the past, he concluded, would mean that when

change did come to the region, it was likely to be more radical,

more anti-Western, and hence more dangerous than anywhere else.

I believe that is true.

Tragically, as so often happens to a prophet, Amalrik’s words on

this point have been ignored even after his fundamental prediction

about the demise of the USSR proved true. Even more tragically,

his prediction about Central Asia are proving to be true right now.

Overwhelmingly, as has already been noted, the Soviet-era leadership of these countries remains in place. Three of the five presidents were first secretaries of the Communist Party and the apparatus is more than 80 percent holdovers from the Communist Era.

It is going to take more than a couple generations to change that

because we are already watching the nomenclature reproduce itself

with people accepting the values of their bosses from Soviet times

because no one is being sufficiently critical of what they are doing.

What we have seen in the last few years, after a great deal of

optimism in the early 1990’s, is that Kazakhstan President

Nursultan Nazarbayev has become ever more authoritarian, and

Kyrgyzstan President Asker Akayev, in whom so many placed so

much hope, has become as authoritarian as anyone else.

Turkmenistan cannot begin to be called a democracy; indeed, it is

very difficult to speak of it as a legitimate state. Uzbekistan, the

joke in Uzbekistan is that Uzbekistan did not leave the Soviet

Union, the Soviet Union left Uzbekistan, and much of it has been

preserved.

Still worse, the leaders of these countries have done everything

they can to prevent the emergence of a genuine civil society that

could simultaneously support their governments over time, and

produce a new generation of leaders. Precisely because so many

23

people in the West have defined the emergence of NGO’s as being

the equivalent of the emergence of democracy, what we have seen

is the restoration of a Soviet-era pattern, namely, government organized nongovernmental organizations, or ‘‘GONGO’s’’, which can be

trotted out to visiting Congressmen and others to demonstrate that

somehow democracy is happening.

But to compound this problem, the leaders, compelled largely by

us, have used the vocabulary and occasionally the forms of democracy, while draining both of any real content. That combination has

produced a fragile authoritarianism, one that is likely to meet its

demise with the passing of this generation of leaders.

Who is going to come next? Unfortunately, the post-Soviet leaders of these countries are producing their own nemesis, namely, a

kind of fundamentalist Islam. Islam, by itself, does not represent

a threat to either the social order or to the political arrangements

in Central Asia, but Islamist politics do to both.

This paradox reflects three important things. First, Soviet policies in the region had the effect of removing the content of Islam

while leaving the label as an important marker of identity, thus

opening the way for its fundamental redefinition by opposition political entrepreneurs, particularly when they were deprived of the

possibility of speaking anywhere else. It is truly tragic that large

numbers of people in this city have accepted Russian characterizations of Muslims as being fundamentalists, when they are not even

good Muslims.

I once had the opportunity to speak to President Djokhar

Dudayev from Chechnea, and Mr. Dudayev told me, ‘‘Mr. Goble, I

am a good Muslim, I pray three times a day‘‘. A good Muslim would

know that you pray 5 times a day. But having been a member of

the Communist Party since age 18, he was not totally familiar with

the religion he was being blamed as a spokesman for.

Second, the post-Soviet regimes in this region have continued the

Soviet practice in dealing with Islam, officializing part of it and

suppressing much of the rest, which has the effect of making the

suppressed part of Islam that which is most attractive to political

opponents.

Third, precisely because these regimes have been able to contain

most of the elements that could provide for the emergence of an

independent civil society but refused to deal with Islam in that

way, these governments have put themselves at risk of going the

way of the Shah of Iran. In other words, if you destroy all other

parts of civil society or prevent their emergence, all political opposition is just placed on Islam, and that radicalizes Islam which is

more possible because of the denaturing of Islam that took place

during Soviet times and is continued under post-Soviet times.

I could say a great deal more about those things. Let me only

add that it is equally unfortunate that people see the Taliban of Afghanistan as threatening Moscow. The Taliban is a PASHTO—

based organization. The instability related to Islam in Central Asia

is generated in Central Asia, not by the Afghan model, with the exception partially of Tajikistan, because the spillover is caused only

as a model, not as an export of the organizational structure. I think

that is important that we get that.

24

What has happened and what has made it more dangerous is

that all five of the regimes in post-Soviet Central Asia have sought

to enlist the support of Islamic identity making it possible to talk

about it even as the organizations are structured. Islam has become more dangerous, not less, but it is because of the way the regimes have behaved and the failure of the criticism of the West.

Meeting these challenges, creating a civil society which would

allow for the transition from one generation of leaders to another

would be difficult in the best of cases if nobody was doing anything

from outside.

Unfortunately, the challenges that the Central Asian countries

have been compounded by the policies adopted by the two actors

who matter most. On the one hand, the Russian government is

ever more interested in winning back the positions it lost in the region in 1991 by playing up to the current leaders—in other words,

the Commonwealth of Independent States is routinely described as

a ‘‘Club of Presidents’’—and by positing threats to them so that the

region will turn again to Moscow for aid. Ten days ago, the Russian

government organized a meeting of Security Council Chiefs in

Dushanbe to talk about the possibility of cooperation and signed an

agreement where the Russians will rebuild the security agency of

Tajikistan. If you think that Tajikistan is going to have an independent security organization after that, I will have to disagree

with you.

But it is not only the Russian effort to posit an Islamic threat

and therefore justify more repression and keep these countries

from evolving in the direction of civil society, it is also the case that

Western governments have generally adopted a very short-term approach supporting, or at least avoiding, too open criticism of the

harshly authoritarian regimes in this region either in the name of

stability or to allow for economic development, which is supposed

to cure everything, or to promote geopolitical goals.

The Russian behavior is getting worse, and let me tell you that

it is not just the older generation. A poll published in Moscow on

Monday of this week shows that more than 50 percent of high

school students in the city of Moscow—supposedly the most reformist-minded part of the Russian Federation—more than 50 percent

of high school students believe that the proper borders of the Russian Federation should be those of the Soviet Union, or even more,

those of the Russian Empire before 1914. So, Poland and Finland

had better worry, too, in the future.

Happily, we have begun to see some more criticism of these regimes. I believe that the failure to be critical about this is a big

problem. I also believe that the way in which we choose to measure

how much democracy there is, counting GONGO’s or only surveying elections, is problematic.

One American official in the region noted privately not long ago

that the only reason people in Washington think Kyrgyzstan is

more democratic than Kazakhstan is because the Kyrgyz government had not conducted an election as recently, and therefore we

had not been able to see just how repressive Asker Akayev had

been.

All of this—the support of authoritarian regimes in the name of

temporary stability, the belief that that is enough, and that ultiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
25

mately something will turn up to allow there to be a reasonable

transition—recalls the Western approach to the Shah of Iran, to

the uncritical support of his openly authoritarian regime and creating a situation in which, when he fell, the only available force to

replace him was a radicalized Islamic Ulemah (phonetic), and now

we have had to deal for very much too long with a theocratic and

anti-Russian tyranny.

The governments in Central Asia unfortunately are breading Islamic fundamentalism even as they talk to us about democracy,

however modified, and the historical record suggests that a failure

by us or by others to speak up on this will have the most serious

consequences for the people of this region and for the interests of

the United States as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. Goble appears in the appendix.]

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Goble, your comments are always

interesting, worth waiting for.

Next we would like to hear from Ms. Cassandra Cavanaugh,

from Human Rights Watch. Thank you for your patience. We look

forward to your testimony. You may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF CASSANDRA CAVANAUGH, RESEARCHER,

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Ms. CAVANAUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to Chairman

Smith as well, for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. Coming as it does on the eve of the Secretary of State’s trip, it is a very

important opportunity to review both the political development of

this region, but U.S. policy over the past decade as well.

Since 1990, Human Rights Watch, which is a nongovernmental,

nonprofit organization, has closely monitored human rights in the

five former Soviet Central Asian republics and we have had researchers stationed in Dushanbe, Tajikistan since 1994, and in

Tashkent, Uzbekistan since 1996.

Nearly a decade ago, the dissolution of the Soviet Union raised

hopes that vast new areas of the globe would come under democratic forms of governance. The five states of former Soviet Central

Asia have done the most, I think, to dash these hopes. Once known

as countries in transition, at the turn of the new century the Central Asian states, I would argue, have largely seen their political

transitions from communism completed, the transition is over, but

it was a transition to authoritarianism, not to democracy.

The United States has pursued an integrated policy toward the

region, correctly recognizing that democratization, economic development and stability are inseparable. Now that progress toward democratization in the region has decisively stalled, or even gone

backward, the U.S. has continued to advance other aspects of bilateral relations, such as economic support and security assistance,

without linking them to the third prong, to political reform. A short

summary of the political developments of the past year will demonstrate, I hope, how integrally democratization and stability in

the region are linked, and that they should be pursued in tandem

and with equal vigor.

From 1991 to 1999, the states of Central Asia made some

progress, as my fellow members of this panel have argued, in creVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
26

ating the outward trappings of democracy. All of the countries have

elected legislatures and enacted constitutions which enshrine popular sovereignty, the rule of law and the separation of powers. All

states but Kazakhstan have signed the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights.

Despite these innovations, substantive democratization was highly uneven, to say the least. Throughout this period, the international community waited patiently for democracy to take hold in

the region, and supplied millions of dollars in technical assistance

and aid aimed at building democratic institutions, as Professor

Olcott has emphasized. The elections scheduled in each of the countries over the past 2-year period, however, were viewed as a test

of those states’ commitment to democratic reform. It is a test that

all five states have failed miserably and predictably, not for lack

of knowledge of democratic procedures or lack of desire on the part

of the population, but, as Mr. Rohrabacher has pointed out, because the leaders did not want it.

Presidential and parliamentary elections in 1999 took place

amidst coordinated government efforts to limit freedom of speech,

assembly, and association, which prevented citizens from making

free and informed decisions on voting day. Each government kept

would-be candidates off the ballot by questionable means. Flagrantly violating their own election laws, local government authorities, which Mr. Pressley has asserted were becoming more accountable to citizens, used all means at their disposal to promote government-favored candidates, to block any opponents from campaigning

effectively, and to falsify counts where necessary, as documented by

local and international monitors in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and

Tajikistan. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, the OSCE considered

elections to be so meaningless as to not merit full fledged observer

missions.

The elections of 1999 and 2000 occasioned massive and systematic violations of citizens’ rights. But even more troubling, the consolidation of authoritarian rule in each of these states has complicated efforts to find solutions to deep social crises, deteriorating

economies, and to ward off external threats that each country in

the region faces.

So, briefly, I will summarize the aftermath of the elections in

each of the five countries.

In Turkmenistan, the virtual one-man government of President

Niazov has intensified pressure against the few frail expressions of

civil society, particularly Protestant and other nontraditional religious groups. Niazov continues to jail the few remaining government critics that he has, and has presided over the removal of all

term limits in order to become president for life, which raises interesting implications for the Hun Sen policy that you mentioned.

In Tajikistan, elections were accompanied by state-condoned violence. The effective exclusion of most opposition factions from the

legislative and executive branches continues to threaten the fragile

peace accord.

In Uzbekistan, as I think my co-panelists agree, is in many ways

the most troubling case. The government blamed bombings in the

capital Tashkent last year on a conspiracy of outlawed secular and

religious opposition leaders. Over the course of 1999, thousands of

27

their supporters were arrested, tortured, and jailed. Hundreds fled

the country, and some joined armed bands calling themselves the

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan based in neighboring Tajikistan.

In August, those bands staged an incursion into neighboring

Kyrgyzstan, and are said to be planning further military actions.

Only state-sponsored parties were allowed to take part in November’s elections. In the Presidential vote, even the one alternative

candidate, the head of the successor to the Uzbek Communist

Party, admitted voting for President Karimov. Arrests of all those

still accused on ill-defined charges of religious extremism for discussing ideas inimical to the government have not flagged in 2000.

Violations of due process rights, vicious torture, long periods of incommunicado pre-trial detention, and sham trials clearly flaunt

international human rights guarantees and are threatening

Uzbekistan’s stability not from without, but from within.

In Kazakhstan, the government of President Nazarbayev continues to harass and suppress the few remaining independent

media outlets not controlled by the president’s family. It uses

criminal liable suits to close independent newspapers, and has engineered the dismissal of critical journalists using threats and intimidation. All those who take to the streets in public protest face

the risk of prison.

In Kyrgyzstan, which has experienced the most dramatic regression to the most repressive practices of its neighbors, Presidential

elections still scheduled for October, in advance of these elections

President Akaev has imprisoned one of his leading opponents,

former Vice President Feliks Kulov, and ensured that the other one

will be disqualified from the ballot. Independent media and NGO’s

continue to be harassed, severely harassed, while demonstrators

protesting electoral fraud have been arrested and beaten.

What has been the U.S. response so far. If 1999 was a test of the

Central Asian countries’ commitment to democracy, it was also a

test of U.S. Central Asia policy.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, democracy promotion,

coupled with economic development, particularly in the oil and gas

sector, and security assistance has been the Administration’s recipe

for stability.

After the elections last year, however, the impasse in democratization has not been accompanied by a parallel slowdown in other

areas of these bilateral relationships. The case of Kyrgyzstan, I

think, demonstrates how this failure to maintain the linkage between all facets of U.S. policy works against the very progress the

U.S. is trying to promote.

Just after the arrest of Mr. Kulov, whom I have just mentioned,

one of Kyrgyzstan’s most respected journalists, Zamira Sydykova,

reported on her conversation with a senior Kyrgyz government official. This official, who is an advisor to President Akaev, dismissed

OSCE and U.S. criticism of Kyrgyzstan’s electoral violations. He

gave the rationale that during the elections last year in

Kazakhstan, that country was also criticized but suffered no concrete ill effects. In addition, this official cited continued U.S. aid

flows to Kyrgyzstan at the same time as critical statements were

emanating from the Department of State as proof that there was

no consistent U.S. policy toward human rights violations in the reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
28

gion. Surely this reasoning must have played a role in President

Akaev’s decision to jail his major opponent.

We draw the conclusion that critical rhetoric alone, which I must

say over the past year has been increasing from the State Department, is not sufficient to promote real change, especially when criticism is undercut by the extension of significant benefits, whether

through aid, taxpayer-funded Eximbank loan guarantees, or support for international lending institutions’ activity. I should say

that the aid is considerable, not only the Freedom Support Act tens

of millions of dollars that was cited by the previous witness, but

in the hundreds of millions of dollars for Eximbank loan guarantees. Uzbekistan alone has received over $950 million in Eximbank

loan guarantees, $250 million last year alone when it was engaged

in this bloody crack down.

The U.S. must make continued economic and political support to

the countries of Central Asia conditional on their introduction of

real democratic reform. In this regard, we welcome the linkage between corruption and assistance which came out of report language

from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last Friday, on the

Technical Assistance Trade Promotion and Anti-Corruption Act. We

would even welcome this language becoming statutory and its expansion to address not only corruption, but other aspects of the

rule of law, such as independence of the judiciary, freedom of the

media, and transparency.

The current Administration, however, sadly, seems to be moving

farther away from aid conditionality on human rights grounds.

Military and security issues are beginning to take center stage, as

the recent visits by FBI and CIA Directors to the region attest. The

Secretary of State’s trip to the region has been presented as the inauguration of a new expanded relationship with the countries of

the region. Rumors suggest that all of the countries the Secretary

will visit will be certified by the State Department to receive military assistance under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program,

although the Department of State itself recognizes that Uzbekistan

systematically and egregiously violates its citizens’ basic rights.

The sad irony is that, as many observers of the region and political scientists note, neither the thorough-going market reforms nor

the external and internal stability which the U.S. aims to support

with this enhanced assistance can be achieved without democratization and respect for the rule of law.

The U.S. must reject the arguments of Central Asian states requesting indulgence of their anti-democratic practices, pleading

dangers of Islamic radicalism and other risks to security, because

these are self-serving and counterproductive explanations. Citizens

will reject the call of extremism only in societies where broad sectors of the population feel that the government is responsive to,

and adequately protects their interests.

In conclusion, Central Asia’s democratization and progress toward the protection of human rights is in the U.S.’ best interest,

not only because these are the core values of this nation, but also

because democracy and the rule of law are necessary for lasting development and stability.

Human Rights Watch urges Congress to ensure that U.S. economic assistance, particularly those forums requiring consideration

29

of human rights grounds, such as Eximbank, will be tied in the future to genuine democratic reform in Central Asia.

Thank you.

[The statement of Ms. Cavanaugh appears in the appendix.]

Mr. SMITH [presiding]. Thank you very much, Ms. Cavanaugh,

for your excellent testimony. I think, for the record, it should be

known that both in my Subcommittee and I am sure Mr. Bereuter’s, and in previous times with the Helsinki Commission, both of

you have been invited to testify on a host of issues. I was just looking at the record, whether it be the situation in Uzbekistan last October, both of you testified on that before the OSCE on

Turkmenistan. Ms. Cavanaugh, you testified just a couple of weeks

ago on March 21st, and it is precisely because we so value your

opinion and the credibility of your remarks that you continually get

invited to appear before these Committees and before the Helsinki

Commission. You really do raise a number of critical issues that

are largely ignored by Congress, by the executive branch, at least

by certain members of the executive branch, as we strive toward

stability and a sense of glossing over or papering over certain

issues.

I joined you, Ms. Cavanaugh, when your organization was crying

out for withholding of that tranche to Russia because of the

Chechnea conflict. Many of us saw Chechnea I coming. Paul Goble

was outspoken, as was Human Rights Watch, about the miscues

that led to the, what, 80,000 people who were butchered in that

horrific battle or war, and Chechnea II was also on the radar

screen, and regrettably there has been no penalty whatsoever imposed by the West, by the United States and by the lending institutions that you just mentioned, whether it be World Bank, IMF, or

anyone else.

Wage your wars, do so with impunity—not a peep other than

some rhetorical reaction from the West, and they see right through

that. Money talks. It is just like one of the reasons why I was late,

I was speaking out against PNTR, and reasonable men and women

can differ as to whether or not that is the way to go. I happen to

believe we are supporting dictatorship in our policy. They have

gone from bad to worse over the last 7 years, when Mr. Clinton

wisely, at first, had an MFN linkage to human rights, and if you

read it—and I went back and reread his Executive Order and his

speech of that day in 1993—it was a brilliant speech, a brilliant

Executive Order. One year later, when they went from bad to

worse, from significant progress, as spoken of in that Executive

Order as well as his statement, to significant regression in every

single solitary category. That sends a message to others, like in

Central Asia, like in North Korea, and every other despotic or near

despotic country around the world.

Just let me ask, if you would, Ms. Cavanaugh—and, Mr. Goble,

you might want to speak to this as well—this issue of withholding

Eximbank credits and really getting serious—it is as if these people

just see us as business-as-usual types. We will say something, we

will put out a very accurate human rights report—and Harold Koh,

I think, does a magnificent job as Assistant Secretary for Labor

and Democracy and Human Rights—and it is as if none of that

30

matters when it comes to implementation. There is a disconnect, as

Amnesty International says over and over.

What should be done? What do you think should be Congress’

role? It is as if these countries are not on too many people’s radar

screen, regrettably, but if you could speak to that, because I think

we are at a crucial time, with the pipeline and all those other

issues, and now with the prospects of military assistance to a dictatorship, that is outrageous.

Ms. CAVANAUGH. In the report language for the House Foreign

Appropriations Act, there was language introduced by Congresswoman Pelosi that instructed Eximbank to beef-up its human

rights assessment procedures. At the current time, Eximbank refers projects of over $10 million

to the State Department for what its own language here is ‘‘State

Department clearance’’, political clearance and human rights clearance.

We have requested these clearances again and again through the

Freedom of Information Act, and we continue to see that with

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan they are completely cursory. I have

copies of them here that you are welcome to take a look at. They

are signatures.

Mr. SMITH. Without objection, I would like to make them a part

of the record.

[The information referred appears in the appendix.]

Ms. CAVANAUGH. I will submit them. They are completely cursory

and meaningless. We feel that it would be a marvelous step forward if Congress were to mandate that Eximbank increase this

procedure for examining the human rights effects of extending hundreds of millions of dollars to these corrupt and abusive states.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Mr. Goble.

Mr. GOBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Like any other country,

the United States has three competing sets of interests in these

countries—economic, geopolitical, and political transformation in

the direction of democracy and human rights.

I am absolutely convinced that the focus on economics and geopolitics alone is counterproductive, and it is driven by a short-term

approach to life. It is sometimes called in the region the policy of

‘‘stabil ‘nost’ u ̈ber alles’’, from the Russian, that the idea is that if

we can just hold on for another year, another 2 years, and it will

be stable.

But by failing to address the political problems—and these are

structural political problems—by failing to be honest constantly

with ourselves and with the governments of these countries—and

that is the top of these governments where the repression is the

greatest—what we are doing is creating a situation where we may

have stability now, but where the coming instability will be far

worse.

It is my view that the single most important thing that we can

do is to first off make it very clear that we are consistent acrossthe-board. If people are doing bad things, they should not receive

assistance. But we should also label what they are doing very

clearly.

It is, I think, unfortunate in many ways that the only assessment

we give of democratic process on a regular basis is when elections

31

are held. Delegations go in for 1 or 2 weeks and they come back

and they say, technically, it was a fine election, or it wasn’t.

Most of these countries know what you have to do to do it technically right so you don’t get criticized too much. But if the government controls almost all of the electronic media, if it controls almost all of the print media, if it intimidates and locks up journalists as the governments of this region and across the former Soviet

space do, then it is not possible to have an open democratic competition. We have seen that in the Russian Federation, we have

seen that in the Caucasus, we have seen that in Central Asia, and

all too often we have not labeled that behavior as anti-democratic.

We have, to my mind, been much too accepting of the idea that

if there is enough economic change, there will be political change

that will follow. It seems to me that if you want political change,

you have to address the political questions. Economics can be a

lever, but it has to be used as such. The self-confidence of some

that if there is just a rising amount of economic wealth, that that

by itself will produce democracy, I am afraid is not confirmed by

the historical record across the world.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask with regards to Kazakhstan, which

many of us thought was on the right track in the 1990’s. President

Nazarbayev has flagrantly, as you know, flouted OSCE commitments on holding free and fair elections, while his family members

seized control of the country’s media outlets.

With cycle of farcical elections over for the foreseeable future, we

believe—and we have conveyed this to the Administration, we did

so in a letter to Secretary of State Albright just recently and it was

signed by Steny Hoyer, my Ranking Member on the Commission—

that one of the best ways of promoting this would be a very modest

move, and that would involve setting up an independent printing

press.

I would appreciate your thoughts on that, and also the issue of

the upcoming may round table meetings that the Kazakh officials

have announced. Many of us would like to see the Kazakhgeldin as

a part of that. If these things have any kind of credibility at all,

an opposition leader ought to be a participant.

Ms. CAVANAUGH. Certainly, the issue promoting the independent

media is the key one in this interim before elections are to come

again for 5 or 7 years. I think it is wonderful that Congress is promoting this idea of creating an independent printing press in

Kazakhstan. You will know that USAID supported the creation of

a privately owned printing press in Kazakhstan, but privately

owned doesn’t mean independent because that was soon taken over

by people close to Nazarbayev, and we know that it doesn’t print

anymore opposition or critical material after that buy out.

So, to have a printing press owned by a third party really is the

only to ensure its independence in Kazakhstan. I certainly hope

that the aid organizations and the Administration will find a way

to do that.

With respect to the round table in Kazakhstan, I am not sure

where negotiations between the government and the OSCE and

various opposition groups stand on that issue right now, but I

think the example of Kyrgyzstan is an interesting one.

32

A coalition of Kyrgyz NGO’s and opposition groups just recently

called on the OSCE in that country not to hold such a round table

because they felt the government was using it as a way to excuse

what they had done in the parliamentary elections. They felt the

government was going to be able to get away without discussing

the key issues on the table, and that is continued repression and

actually revoking or redressing some of the fraud that went on in

the elections. They felt that it would be an easy way out for the

government.

I would feel that it would be important for the U.S. Government

to look to what the opposition and the broad segment of the

Kazakh opposition, not just one or two groups, feels about holding

this round table, and make sure that it is not an easy way out for

the Kazakh government as well.

Mr. GOBLE. Could I just add very briefly two thoughts? The first

is that I would certainly urge—I am delighted to see the print

media grow, as I tend to be a print person, no matter what—but

I would tell you that I think it would be far better to invest in the

electronic media.

In most of these countries, upwards of 75 percent of people get

their news from radio or television because they can no longer afford to buy the newspapers. In most of these countries, people must

choose between buying a loaf or bread or buying a newspaper.

Guess what they choose most of the time?

The electronic media, and especially television, is the best possible way to get to these people. Increasingly, the Internet plays a

role, but in the short-term it is the electronic media that is a bigger

deal, and I would urge consideration of supporting that because,

right now, the so-called ‘‘privately owned’’ media is mostly in the

hands of the old party nomenklatura, or even the family members

of the dictators. That is just the reality in this region. The people

can count how many privately owned radio stations or TV stations

there are, but the reality is most of those are owned by the old

nomenclatura, or in Kazakhstan in particular, by members of

Nazarbayev’s family.

With respect to a round table, I am very skeptical, too, because

I think it does allow these dictators to get off the hook for not allowing elections. On the other hand, round tables coupled with a

constant monitoring not just by Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, but

by U.S. Government officials who will then speak out could make

a difference.

At present, we have essentially privatized the monitoring of what

goes on in this part of the world, and if it could be re-officialized—

that is, that there would be very tough statements—we have journalists beaten up, we have people being arrested for talking—talking—to Western journalists. We have people being arrested, as you

said, out of their hospital room, Feliks Kulov in Kyrgyzstan. We

have people disappearing, and all too often nothing gets said except

by groups like Human Rights Watch/Helsinki. As important as

they are, they tend to be ignored by many of these governments

much of the time.

When the U.S. Government speaks, there is usually a reaction

with one of these convoluted explanations of why it is justified, but

33

it is a different thing, it is to officialize the criticism of what is

going on.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Goble, thank you. I have some additional questions, but I will them for the second round. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney and I

have a piece of legislation that I believe now is signed into law,

called ‘‘A Code of Conduct’’, that we are not going to be selling

weapons to dictatorships, and by your analysis we wouldn’t be selling—we shouldn’t be selling weapons to any of these countries in

Central Asia, is that correct?

Mr. GOBLE. That is correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That sounds right. Is the National Endowment for Democracy and the ACYPL [Council for Young Political

Leaders] are they reaching out to try to find young, perhaps more

liberal, for lack of a better word, people in those countries?

Mr. GOBLE. I think that they have made some progress. I think,

however, as has been pointed out before, these are extremely difficult countries to work in, and sometimes the people who were presented as options for these exchanges and these activities are, in

fact, selected by the government. That is why I made reference to

GONGO’s. We really have the government organizing these NGO’s.

The rate of exchange is not yet so massive, especially from these

states, that we have been able to break through necessarily the old

nomenclatura. I think there is some hope because there were some

people who were fed up with the old nomenclatura system even

though they were inside it.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me ask you a question. In an ideal

world—I am not talking about right now because we may not even

have an ideal government here in the United States in terms of the

policies that we would like to see—clearly, the U.S. Government

does not make human rights and democracy a priority. That is

clear. This particular government and this Administration has

made a mockery of that standard. I know my Democratic friends

aren’t here to defend the government, but that is my honest assessment. I wish it was different. In fact, when President Clinton became president, I said to myself, ‘‘well, gee, at least I am going to

be able to work with this fellow on things like China and other

issues where he is going to be a little bit more oriented toward

human rights than George Bush was’’ and, boy, was I disappointed.

In an ideal world, would you have the CIA and the U.S. Government undermining dictatorial regimes like this? Would you have

the CIA going into Burma and perhaps Turkmenistan and trying

to find a democratic, potentially democratic clique in the military

or something like that?

Mr. GOBLE. Congressman, I think that the problem with trying

to do that is you sometimes end up installing people who rapidly

become as bad as the people that they are replacing simply because

of the way they would be installed. It requires a much broader approach to transform these societies and to transform these political

leaders.

I will tell you that I am more worried about the day after these

five dictators die than I am about the days now, as bad as things

are, because there has been absolutely no preparation for that

transition. That would create challenges, and I am afraid and—inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 07:18 Jul 20, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 65201 HINTREL1 PsN: HINTREL1
34

deed, I believe it is Russian state policy—that when one of these

leaders dies and when there is instability, that the Russian government will attempt to introduce troops in the name of peace keeping. It will be peace keeping, but they will be spelling it differently

than we do.

But I would like to go back to what you said earlier about the

human rights component. The human rights component is absolutely essential to American foreign policy. We have watched the

citizens of a large number of the countries in the former Soviet

space become something that Stalin was never able to achieve,

namely, anti-American, because the perception is growing that we

will support dictators, that we will support those who repress

them. That is true in the Russian Federation, it is true across Central Asia. Those people were looking to the United States as the

archetypical first new nation.

I had the privilege in 1991 of leading some of the leaders of the

Baltic countries around this town, and I will tell you, the proudest

moment in my life, in many ways, was taking the former president

of Estonia to the Lincoln Memorial, Arnold Ruutel with his two Orders of Lenin. I was translating the Gettysburg Address into Russian, because that was our best common language, and the National Park Ranger came up and said to me, ‘‘What language are

you speaking?’’ I said Russian. He said, ‘‘Are these people from

Russia?’’ I said, ‘‘No, these people are from Estonia’’. This National

Park Ranger who wanted to give us a folder said, ‘‘Oh, I have

heard of Estonia. It is just a little country that wants to be free’’.

Let me tell you something. That kind of popular American attitude is what the peoples of this region expected from this country

in 1991. When we have supported dictators, it has undercut that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. To be fair, I think the American people still

have their idealism, this idealism. I think that the cynicism found

in our business community in the fact that they would make a

buck off selling torture equipment to Nazis if they could, as I see,

I do not find any moral standards for which our business community will not sink in order to make a quick buck, and that has only

been surpassed by this Administration’s ability to just totally make

a mockery of any human rights standards of other countries, and

it is unfortunate.

But on the bright side, I think the American people, both Democrats and Republicans, have a love of liberty in their heart that has

a side with little guys who want freedom in their countries. One

prediction for this region—and, again, I agree with you folks on

what is our long-term goal, we are people who promote liberty and

justice and treating people decently and are against the bad guys—

but in the long-run, I think that we are going to face some very

strategic maneuvering around Central Asia that is very similar

perhaps to what the maneuvering was a century and a half ago,

only England is not going to be the player. The other player is

going to be China. I would predict that within 10 years you will

see a major competition going on in this region between China and

Russia, and I will even go further, that I would predict that within

10 years you will see incursions by China into Kazakhstan, and

that will change the whole formula. Unfortunately, this area, these

people, deserve better than just being pawns in a strategic game

35

between huge players. They deserve like people anywhere else, to

be able to control their own destiny and, if they were able to do

so through the democratic process, I think the world would be a

safer place because this would be less susceptible to that type of

outside coercion and outside targeting.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just

ask a few followup questions. Kyrgyzstan’s President Akaev, once

on of the fondest hopes of reformers, orchestrated the recent parliamentary elections and demonstrated his determination to eliminate any challengers.

The recent arrest, however, of Feliks Kulov as well as the violent

dispersion of demonstrators signals an attempt to intimidate society in advance of the upcoming Presidential elections.

Given Kyrgyzstan’s previous record and the hopes it engendered,

no country in Central Asia is more disappointing. The FebruaryMarch parliamentary election made plain that the president’s intention to pursue a regional pattern of falsifying and keeping noncommunist parties and rivals from running against him ala

Nazarbayev.

Let me just ask you on the arrest of Kulov and Uzanov, who we

in the Commission have spoken out a number of times in recent

days about, if Secretary of State Albright was sitting up here, not

me or Dana Rohrabacher or Tom Lantos who was here just a moment ago, and Chairman Bereuter, what would you tell her about

those issues, especially as it relates to—when you take a man from

his hospital bed, as Feliks was taken—cardiac problems, in an exhaustion state, and the Minister of Interior scoops him up and

takes him to one of their cells—what does that say on the eve of

a trip of our very distinguished Secretary of State? What would you

advise her in terms of when she meets face-to-face with the leadership there?

Ms. CAVANAUGH. In Human Rights Watch’ letter to the Secretary

of State, we supported the CSCE’s call to make the release of

Feliks Kulov a nonnegotiable condition of the Secretary of State’s

trip. We think it is a real slap in the face to the United States that

Mr. Kulov was arrested on the verge of this trip being announced.

It was a real throwing down of the gauntlet, just the kind of attitude that I described in my testimony, that we know nothing is

going to be done, so we are going to do whatever we want.

I think it is interesting to note that Mr. Kulov, former mayor of

Becshkek, former head of the MVD, former vice president, is genuinely very popular in Kyrgyzstan, and it is indicative to me that

Mr. Akaev fears him probably the most because there is no opponent like someone who used to be so close to you, but obviously the

trip of the Secretary is happening anyway. We seriously hope that

there will be distinct and definite conditions placed on all forms of

assistance to Kyrgyzstan predicated on Mr. Kulov’s release.

Kyrgyzstan is a ward of the international financial institutions.

Its loans and assistance from the IMF and the World Bank exceed

its GDP. The kind of language that is in this bill coming out of the

Senate could really place pressure on Kyrgyzstan, and I hope that

it really comes to pass.

36

Mr. GOBLE. Since the trip appears to be going ahead, I would

hope that the Secretary of State would demand to meet with Mr.

Kulov publicly and make it very clear that the United States supports democracy and opposes this kind of abuse, and that is the

kind of thing Secretaries of State have done, and it would be a very

powerful signal if the trip is going ahead. I think you have to do

that in addition to the conditionality. It is the symbolism of doing

these things that are often more important given the relatively limited financial exposure we have in some places.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you again, in Kyrgyzstan, the issue—

there are a number of ways you can silence your critics. You can

arrest them. You can torture them. You can shut down their printing presses. You can also initiate a series of libel suits, and we

know that Milosevic in Serbia used this against a number of the

independent media, and we know that Akaev is using that device

as well to shut down a number of the independents.

Again, in speaking to us and hopefully by amplification to the

Secretary of State—because we are grateful that her representatives have stayed here—what would you say with regard to that

issue, that it is not so subtle just shut down the media by suing,

and by way of theft taking their ability to give an independent

voice?

Ms. CAVANAUGH. You are well aware that it is happening in

Kyrgyzstan, and it is happening in Kazakhstan as well. The recent

case of the newspaper ‘‘Let’s begin on Monday’’, they have 14 libel

suits pending against them, over $2 million U.S. dollars in damages. They will be bankrupt for the rest of their natural lives, and

never dare so much as to start another newspaper again.

I think it is very important for the Secretary to express that she

sees through this tactic that is being used in both of these countries, and that it does constitute—using the legal system in this

way does constitute a violation, a clear violation of rights, of bilateral commitments, of international commitments, and that—again,

not to be a one-trip ponier—but that there will be consequences for

this.

Mr. GOBLE. I think that it is terribly important that a country

which really got its start by the John Peter Zanger case in the

1750’s where the principle, the truth, was a defense against a

charge of libel, should be very clear that all the laws in all of these

countries—and they exist in varying form in all 12 member states

of the Commonwealth of Independent States—against attacks

against the president, slandering the president, where truth is not

a defense under the available legal system, that the elimination of

those laws should be a major item on the American agenda with

these countries precisely because it is our position, going back to

the Zanger case, that is at the foundation of what makes American

democracy possible.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you with regards to Uzbekistan, President Karimov made a president to Audrey Glover, then Director of

ODER—this was back in 1996—to register the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan. So far, he has not done so.

Today, the society, as well as the independent human rights organization, exists through their functioning, though their function

has been impaired by a series of arrests and beatings.

37

Again, Secretary Albright will be there. Here we have a situation

where the human rights monitors—and I will never forget one of

the most moving meetings I have ever had was with members of

Charter 77 in the former Czechoslovakia—and when Steny Hoyer

and I tried to meet with a larger number of groups, several of those

people were arrested en route to our meeting. Fr. Amali came and

a few other people came who were able to get through the secret

police net, but others were detained.

Human rights monitors have always been the people that we

have got to put the sandbags around. As a matter of fact, several

of them, including Ishmael Adelov, Makubov Kasimova and Mile

Kobilov have been arrested—and, again, these are the people who

are the salt of the earth in Uzbekistan—and our Secretary of State

is going there. She has got to demand that they be released immediately, and everyone else who has been put in prison, has been

tortured due to trumped up charges. But with regards to the monitors, if you could speak to that. Again, this is a president who freely made a promise to the ODER representative back in 1996.

Ms. CAVANAUGH. The case of the human rights monitors, as you

rightly pointed out, is the pivotal one. It exposes the essence of

these governments’ policies with clarity that is just unsurpassed in

any other way.

We understand that there will be a round table so that the Secretary of State can meet with representatives of NGO’s—we hope

with some real NGO’s, not just GONGO’s—as well as the representatives of some of these unregistered human rights groups

that remain unregistered to this day. But I hope that the Secretary

makes it perfectly clear that she understands that there are two

people missing—three people missing in this room, and those are

the ones that you have mentioned. Their prison sentences of 5, 6,

and 7 years, in conditions of Uzbekistan, may very well be tantamount to death sentences, and we hope that there will be the

strongest pressure exerted on Uzbekistan to release these people

and to live up to the commitments, as you mentioned, that they so

freely made a few years ago.

Mr. GOBLE. I would add only that it is terribly important not

only to seek the release of these individuals, but to demand the creation of the conditions which will allow human rights monitors to

work.

One of the things that is a trap in dealing with dictators is that

dictators frequently arrest people so that they can then free them

and this is proclaimed a major step forward. But if there is not an

additional step, which is to create the conditions under which the

human rights monitors can do their jobs, what we will see is more

of them will be arrested as soon as a Western leader has left the

airport.

Mr. SMITH. If I could ask you with regards to religious freedom

issues in Uzbekistan, while we were all happy in September 1999

when five evangelical Protestants and one Jehovah’s Witness was

released, Tashkent’s policies have always been of concern. We

raised this at our hearing recently, as you might recall.

Again, what should be the message of the U.S. Government, of

our Secretary of State, when she does indeed meet with the leaders

in Uzbekistan with regard to religious freedom issues? I think, Mr.

38

Goble, you made a very good point, you arrest people and you release them and you are supposed to get kudos for it. Don’t arrest

them in the first place. We have seen some very riveting testimony,

or heard riveting testimony about the repression of religion in

Uzbekistan, and it is very, very significant, but if you could respond.

Mr. GOBLE. I would only urge that we should raise the possibility

that religious groups should not be subject registration because as

long as there are subject to state registration, they can be subject

to state interference.

It is an unfortunate reality of the post-Soviet states that laws on

religion which were supposed to open the door to greater religious

freedom, created a variety of institutions not only in Uzbekistan

but elsewhere, for interference and for selective prosecution. It is

precisely the fact that it is inevitably selective that it is repressive

against those who are unfavored at the moment, which exercises

a chilling effect on any possibility of religious freedom.

This is not just a problem in Uzbekistan, this is a problem across

all 12 countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States, and

it is something that has to be addressed constantly. The mistake

is to demand registration because that is the beginning of the slippery slope down to control and what it is doing.

Let me just end with this one thought. The most dangerous reality that these governments are creating—Karimov of Uzbekistan,

in the first instance—is by having an official church—be it official

Islam, official Pentecostals, official Presbyterians, whatever—you

inevitably create an underground church in all of those cases by

people who are unwilling to participate in the charade of ‘‘religious

registration’’. Those underground groups, by shifting into that underground mode, become politicized—not only do they become victimized, but they become radicalized, and they are then in the business of trying to overthrow the government.

So, we need to explain to the governments of these countries that

they are generating this time bomb under them in the name of

short-term control.

Mr. SMITH. I want to thank our very distinguished witnesses,

and Mr. Bereuter may have some questions as well, and just say

that we are planning a hearing on Kyrgyzstan in the very near future in the Helsinki Commission, and we will do a review—especially post-Secretary of State Albright’s trip—a public hearing to

determine what was said, how was it said, and in keeping with our

very important role of oversight. I do believe we are on the same

page, but this has to be promoted not only robustly, but also with

linkages because, without it, it could be ‘‘in one ear, out the other’’

on the part of these offending governments.

So, I want to thank you very, very much for your very fine testimony, and yield to Chairman Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER [presiding]. Thank you very much. There are

some days when hearings don’t work out, at least for the Chairman, and this was one of those days. But I very much appreciate

the testimony that you have given, and the responses you have undoubtedly given to my colleagues’ questions.

39

I think now, in light of the votes that are here and the need to

move to a markup immediately, I will just express again my appreciation to both of you for your testimony. I thank you.

The joint hearing of the Subcommittees is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.]

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