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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

TAMARA FILAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED March 10, 2015

v No. 317972 Wayne Circuit Court
KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT and EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC., LC No. 13-000652-NI

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: G LEICHER , P.J., and C AVANAGH and F ORT H OOD , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

Plaintiff appeals as of right a n order dismissing her third-pa rty no-fault insurance case against defendants, Kevin Thomas Culpert and Efficient Design, Inc., after she refused to provide signed authorizations for the release of her records du ring discovery. We affirm.

In January 2013, plaintiff filed this action alleging that, in January 2010, she sustained serious injuries when she was rear-ended by a vehicle being dri ven by Culpert in the course of his employment with Efficient Design. In March 2013, plaintiff terminated her attorney and filed a “motion for continuance,” requesting the trial court to grant her extensions of time to complete discovery requested by defendants and to extend the sc heduling order dates. At oral argument on plaintiff’s motion, which was heard in May, the tri al court advised plaintiff that her deposition and other discovery requests would be stayed for 30 days or until an attorney filed an appearance on her behalf, whiche ver was sooner. During the cou rse of that hearing, the trial court referenced plaintiff’s refusal to sign record release aut horizations that had been requested by defendants, noting that the case had already been dismissed once because of her refusals and “[t]here’s going to come a point where if I’ve dismissed the ca se twice, it’s going to be with prejudice, and then you’re not goi ng to be able to bring a laws uit again, so this is something you have to do.” The court further advised plaintiff: “This is wh at the law requires. I understand you don’t want to do it, but in order to bring such a lawsuit, you have to do it.” Plaintiff responded: “But I’m being asked to give records to a third par ty, not just the attorneys. I’m being asked to give them to this deposition service, and I just wanted to clarify that it was just going to the one attorney.” The c ourt responded: “It goes thr ough Record Copy Service. They don’t care about your medical record s, but that’s the way it’s done, okay. That’s the way it’s done. That way they know they get all your records and that yo u’re not keeping any back.”-2- Thereafter, on May 3, 2013, the trial court entered an order de nying plaintiff’s motion for continuance, but staying discovery for 30 days or until plainti ff retained new counsel.

In May 2013, Culpert and Efficient Design filed re-notices of hearing for their previously filed motions to compel certain d iscovery that had been request ed from plaintiff in February 2013. In June 2013, plaintiff, in propria persona , responded to their motions to compel. In her answer to Efficient Design’s mo tion, plaintiff contended “that until it is established through discovery that Efficient Design is liable for harm caused by Ke vin Culpert while in the course and scope of his employment, Plaintiff should not be required t o release her medical information to Defendant, Efficient Design Inc.” Plaintiff requested 28 da ys “to prepare interrogatories and requests for admissions for [defendant] to attempt to determine the liability of Efficient Design Inc., in the third party tort case.” Plaintiff further argued that she “does not believe it is reasonable for the Court to require her to provide medical reco rds to Efficient Design Inc., a party that has not yet admitted any responsibility in the case. ”

During oral arguments on the motions held on Friday, June 21, 2013, counsel for Efficient Design advised the court that plaintiff continued to refuse to provide signed authorizations releasing her r ecords, as she had since 2010. P laintiff responded that she had requested more time “to investigate whether or not they’re even liable because right now they’re not even admitting that Mr. Culpert - - that they are the emplo yer of Mr. Culpert.” Plaintiff also argued that she should not have t o give records to a party that has not admitted any liability. The trial court advised plaintiff that her argument had no merit an d that if she did not provide the requested authorizations, the case would be dismissed. Plainti ff responded: “Okay, it’s just that Efficient Design hasn’t said they were liable, so.” Again the trial court advised plaintiff that she had to provide the requested authorizations and asked her if sh e was going to do so. Plaintiff said that she would provide the authorizations and, although th e trial court wanted her to do so while they were in court, plaintiff declined saying that “it ta kes a lot more time than that.” Thereafter, the trial court advise d plaintiff that if defense c ounsel did not get the requested
authorizations—without amendme nt or alteration—by Monday, eithe r outside of court or at a 2:00 p.m. court hearing, her case would be dismissed.

On Monday, June 24, 2013, oral argument on defendants’ motions was continued with regard to plaintiff’s refusal to provide the requested authoriz ations. Counsel for Efficient Design advised the trial court that p laintiff had stopped by his offic e and provided only about half of the requested authorizations. And th ey were altered. Plaintiff wa s not in court, but the court noted on the record that plaintiff kne w about the hearing and an atte mpt to reach her by telephone was unsuccessful. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the case w ithout prejudice and requested that a seven-day order be submitted.

Subsequently, plaintiff filed an objection to Efficient Design ’s proposed order of dismissal without prejudice, ar guing that she did not receive a n email by 5:00 p.m. on the date of the first hearing, June 21, with the desired authorizations, so she filled out some SCAO medical
authorizations and hand-delivered them to defense counsel on Mo nday, June 24, before the 2:00 p.m. court hearing. She subsequently checked her email and fou nd that defendant had, in fact, emailed her the requested author izations on June 21, but it was after 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff denied
that she altered the authoriza tions or that she failed to provi de the requested authorizations.-3- Efficient Design responded to plaintiff’s objection, arguing t hat the authorizations it sought were sent by email to plaintiff as directed by the court , and plaintiff failed to check her email for those expected authori zations. Instead, plaintiff fi lled out some SCAO forms, which are not accepted by many medical providers, and she limited the authorizations to records for specific treatment dates. Furth er, plaintiff did not provide n umerous other authorizations that had been requested and, to date, still had not provided the aut horizations. Efficient Design noted that plaintiff’s first-party no-fault insurance lawsuit had bee n dismissed because of her failure to provide signed authorizations, an d requested that the trial cou rt strike plaintiff’s objection and

enter an order of dismissal. 1 Culpert filed a concurrence in Efficient Design’s response to plaintiff’s objection to the proposed order of dismissal.

On August 9, 2013, oral arguments were held on plaintiff’s obj ection to the proposed order of dismissal. At the begi nning of the hearing, the trial court advised plaintiff that if she wanted to proceed with her case and have the court reinstate he r case, she would have to sign the
authorizations that were there in court at that time. Plaintif f responded: “I have a problem with some of the clauses.” The trial court advised plaintiff that i t had already ruled on the language of
the authorizations and that this was her last chance; if she si gned the authorizations, her case would be reinstated and, if she did not, the case would be dism issed. Plaintiff again responded: “I have some problems with some of the clauses t hey’re asking f or in the forms.” The trial court, again, requested that plaintiff sign the authorizations and pla intiff refused, stating: “Not for some of the things that they’re asking.” Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the case.

Plaintiff then filed this appeal. Culpert filed a motion to a ffirm pursuant to MCR 7.211(C)(3), arguing that many of the issues raised by plaintif f in this appeal were raised and rejected by this Court in plaintiff’s appeal related to the dis missal of her first-party insurance case. This Court granted the motion in part, holding that this appeal could proceed only with respect to Issue IV, regarding the motion to compel, and Issue V, regarding the dismissal of the case against both defendants. Filas v Culpert , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 25, 2014 (Docket No. 317972). And plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration
was denied. Filas v Culpert , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 27

, 2015 (Docket No. 317972). Accordingly, we first turn to Issue IV.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it ordered he r to sign record release authorizations provided to her by Efficient Design after the Ju ne 21, 2013 hearing on its motion to compel discovery without first requiring Efficient Design to file a second motion to compel discovery. We disagree.

“It is well settled that Michigan follows an open, broad disco very policy that permits liberal discovery of any matter, not privileged, that is releva nt to the subject matter involved in the pending case.” Reed Dairy Farm v Consumers Power Co , 227 Mich App 614, 616; 576 NW2d 709 (1998). Plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she “sustained injur ies or aggravation of pre-existing conditions constituting serious impairment of a body function.” Those alleged

1 See Filas v MEEMIC Ins Co , unpublished opinion per curiam o f the Court of Appeals, issue d October 14, 2014 (Docket No. 316822).-4- injuries were “to her head, neck, back and other parts and port ions of her body all of which did cause her pain, suffering and limitations in use, function and enjoyment.” Plaintiff also alleged that she suffered “[a] work loss and loss of earnings and earni ng capacity.” And plaintiff alleged that “some or all of the injuries [she] sustained are permanent .” Because of these claimed injuries, plaintiff sought a judgment against defendants “in ex cess of $25,000.00 plus costs, fees

and interest.”

Plaintiff apparently believes, however, that defendants are re quired to “simply take her
word for it” that she suffered these purported numerous and egr egious injuries. But as the trial court repeatedly explained to p laintiff, she i s wrong. Plaint iff’s proffered reasons for refusing to sign record release authorizations included that: the requeste d records would be going to a thirdparty for copying; Efficient De sign did not admit liability; sh e had “a problem with some of the clauses” on the authorizations; and she did not want some of he r records provided to defendants. None of these reasons have merit. Again, defendants are entitl ed to “liberal discovery of any matter, not privileged, that is relevant” to defending against and disproving plaintiff’s numerous allegations made in support of her request for a substantial ju dgment in her favor. See id . Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court’s decision to c ompel plaintiff to comply with the discovery requested, i.e., to si gn record release authorization s, without requiring Efficient Design to file a second motion to compel discovery did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 2 See

Ghanam v Does , 303 Mich App 522, 530; 845 NW2d 128 (2014).

Next, in Issue V, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed her case against both defendants because only one of the attorneys for E fficient Design requested dismissal as a discovery sanction. We disagree.

“Discovery sanctions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Dean v Tucker , 182 Mich App 27, 32; 451 NW2d 571 (1990). A n abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision results in an outcome falling outside the range of rea sonable and principled outcomes.

Maldonado v Ford Motor Co , 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).

Plaintiff argues that her “case involves three separate insura nce companies and three separate insurance policies---one for Kevin Culpert and two for Efficient Design.” She states: “Plaintiff-Appellant does not believe her entire case against a ll three insurance companies representing both Kevin Culpert and Efficient Design should hav e been be dismissed.” Plaintiff argues that only one attorney for Efficient Design requested th at her case be dismissed, but not the other attorney representing Efficient Design and not Culper t’s attorney so her case should not
have been dismissed.

First, Efficient Design is a na med defendant in this case, not an insurance company. That is, plaintiff sued Efficient De sign. Efficient Design was enti tled to conduct discovery. Because plaintiff repeatedly refused to provide the requested record re lease authorizations, Efficient Design sought dismissal of plaintiff’s claim against it. Secon d, Culpert is a named defendant in

2 We note that plaintiff does not e ven claim on appeal that she would, in fact, have signed record
release authorizations if the y were the subjec t of a second mot ion to compel.-5- this case, not an insurance company. Culpert’s attorney repeat edly requested that the trial court dismiss plaintiff’s case “for h er continued refusal to engage i n meaningful discovery” and, as plaintiff notes in her response to Culpert’s motion to compel d iscovery, Culpert also requested signed record release authorizations be provided by plaintiff. Further, at oral argument conducted on May 2, 2013, Culpert’s attorney requested signed a uthorizations from plaintiff. At oral argument conducted on June 21, 2013, Culpert’s attorney ag ain requested signed authorizations from plaintiff. C ulpert also filed a concurrenc e in Efficient Design’s response to plaintiff’s objection to the pr oposed order of dismissal, which requested that plaintiff’s objection be stricken and that an order of dismissal be entered by the tr ial court. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument that her case should not have been dismissed as a disc overy sanction because only one attorney for Efficient Design re quested its dismissal is withou t merit.

Affirmed.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood