F ile Nam e: 09a0657n.06 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION Case No. 08- 5524 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT ANDERSON-TULLY COMP ANY, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. F EDERAL INSURANCE COMP ANY, Defendan t, AO N RISK

SER VI CE S OF M ISSO URI, IN C. , A ON F IN AN CI AL SER VI CE S GR OUP , INC., De fend ant s- App e lle e s.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE WE STE RN DI STR IC T OF TEN NE SSEE

BEF OR E: BA TC HELD ER , C hie f Judg e ; N ORRI S and K ETHL ED G E, C ir c uitJudg e s. ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Chief Ju dge. I n th is s tate -l aw t or t c la im b y an in sure d a g a ins t its insurance br oker — w hich ar ises in the context of an insuranc e-c overa g e dispute — the district

c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f t he br ok e r. F or

the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e a ff

ir m. I. Ander son Tully Company (ATCO) is a larg e, privately owned lumber compa n y ; i t owns tho us and s o f a c re s o f h ard wo od tim be rl and and op e rate s sev e ra l saw mil ls in T e nn e sse e , M iss iss ipp i,T her e a r e a ct ual l y t wo A o n d efen d an t s : Ao n Ri s k Ser vi ces of M i s s our i , I nc. , an d A on Fi nan ci al Ser vi ces 1 G ro u p . B u t, fo r p u rp o se s o f t h is a p p e a l, the d iff e re n c e is i m m a te ria l an d the y a re re fer re d to c o llec tive ly as “A o n .” 2 L ouisiana, and A rkansa s. Aon is an insuranc e broke r and F eder al Insuranc e C o . i s an insurer

. 1 F e de ra l pr ov ide d A TCO (v ia Ao n) wi th a

c la ims -m a de po lic y

for Di re c tor s & Of

fi c e rs L ia bil ity Coverag e, for

the period from J une 1, 2002 to J uly 1, 2003. Two provisions in the policy war rant mention. First, the “Relate d Claims” pr ovision states that “[a]l l Related Claims will be treated a s a si ng le C laim made when t he earliest of such R elated Claims was fir st made.” The policy define s

“ Re la te d Cl a ims ” a s: [A] ll Cl aims or Wrong ful ac ts based upon, ar ising fr om, or in conseque nce of the same or related facts, circ umstances, sit uation, transac tions or events or the same or re la te d s e ri e s o f f

a c ts, c ir c ums tanc e s, sit

ua tio ns , tr ans a c tio ns or

e ve nts

. Second, the “ I nsured vs. Insured” (“I v. I ”) pr ovis i o n ex cl u des any claim broug ht by

an office r/direc tor ag ainst another officer/direc tor, unless the ac cuser /claimant had not bee n an of fi c e r/ dir e c tor

fo r at le a st f

our y e ars pr e c e din g the c la im. Th re e of AT CO ’s of

fi c e rs re sig ne d duri ng 19 99 : B art le tt Tu lly L e wi s (v ice- pr e sid e nt)

re sig ne d o n Jan

ua ry 1, 19 99 ; Parn e ll S. L e wi s Jr. (p re sid e nt) re sig ne d on J un e 22 , 199 9; a nd Mart in S. L e wi s ( vic e -p re sid e nt) re sig ne d o n Augus t 26 , 1999 . T he se thr e e , la te r d ub be d “ the L e wi s Plaintiffs,” wer e not mere ly office rs, they

wer e brothers from one of A TCO’s foundingfamilies, and the y did no t g o q uie tly . A s e arl y

a s 20 01 , the y be g an wr iti ng le tte rs to the ne w o ff ic e rs and dir e c tor s, criticizing their pe rfor

mance , reque sting propr ietary information, and e x pressin g co ncer ns about d i v i d e n d d i s t r i b u t i o nan d

t h e v a l u e o f

t h e i r s t o c k

. B e c a

u s e A T C O w a s a

p r i v a t e l y h e l d

c o mp an y, its sto c k w a s n ot t

ra de d o n a

mark e t and

the pr ic e of

that st oc k w a s n ot r e a dil y a pp are nt.N o t e that t his was w i t hin t he claim s- m ad e p o l i cy t erm (J un e 2 0 0 2 t o Ju l y 20 0 3 ). N o t e a l so t ha t t his was less 2 t han f o ur y ears af

t er ei t her P arnel l or M art i n had res i gned (June 22 , 19 9 9 , and A ugust 26 , 19 9 9 , res p ect i vel y ). N ot e t hat t hi s was out s i de of t he cl ai ms- mad e pol i cy t er m (Ju ne 20 02 t o Jul y 200 3). N ot e a l s o t hat t hi s was 3 m o re t han f

o ur y ears af

t er M art i n — t he l ast of t he p l ai nt i f f s t o res i gn — had res i gned (August 26 , 19 9 9 ). 3 On April 14, 2003, an attorne y named J oseph Sulli van, repr esenting Ba rt L ewis, sent a letter 2 (the “ Sulli van L etter” ) to ATCO, re iteratingthe criticism of ATCO’s ma nag ement and de manding financ ial information nec essar y to value the AT CO stock. Sulli van also thre atene d litigation base d on the new of

fice rs’ a nd direc tors’ alleg ed mismanag ement. ATCO sent the Sullivan L etter to Aon, but, for re asons that re main unclea r, Aon did not send the letter along to Fede ral at that time. On S eptember 24, 2004, an attorne y named William Frulla, re prese nting B art, Mar tin, and 3 Parnell L ewis (a long w ith the Helen Tully L ewis Trust), se nt a letter ( the “F rulla L etter” ) to ATCO,

c omp la ini ngthat A TCO ha d f a ile d to pr ov ide “ su ff

ic ie nt inf or matio n a bo ut t he c or po ra tio n [so a s] to e sta bli sha fa ir and fu ll v a lue fo r t

he ir sh are s o f A TCO sto c k” and de mand ing$1 5 mi lli on . F ru lla attache d a dra ft complaint naming ATCO direc tors and off icer s as def

endants. On O ctober

7, 2004, ATCO sent the F rulla L etter ( and a c opy of the Sullivan L etter) to Fede ral a s “notice of a cla im.” On No ve mbe r 2 9, 20 04 , F ru lla fi le d th e c omp la int

in s tate c ourt , initia tin g the L e wi s Plaintiffs’ lawsuit ag ainst ATCO. ATCO soug ht cover ag e fr om Fede ral unde r th e policy , but F e de ra l de nie d c ov e ra g e on the ba sis that the no tic e of the c la im w a s unti me ly , in a smu c h a s A TCO had made the claim on October 7, 2004, but the policy

had expired on Jul y

1, 2003. Aon interve ned and explained that ATCO had submitt ed the Sulli van L etter, and hence filed a notice of cla im, back in May 2003 , s o th e o r ig in a l n o ti c e o f c la im w a s w it h in th e p o li c y p e r io d

. O n M ar c h 2 4 , 2005, F e de ra l re ve rs e d its (u

n) tim e lin e ss de c isi on

and de e me d th e Sul liv an L e tte r a tim e ly no tic e of c la im. But F eder al denied c overa g e nonethe less, on the basis of the I nsured vs. Insured Exclusion.4

On J uly 29, 2005, ATCO filed the pr esent law suit in st ate c ourt, naming Fe dera l and Aon a s de fe nd ants and se e kin g de c larator y jud g me nt to es ta

bli sh c ov e ra g e un de r the po lic y . T he de fe nd ants

remove d the ca se to fede ral c ourt on diversity g rounds, ATCO ame nded its complaint (see king damag es for

neg lige nce, br eac h of contra ct, bre ach of fiduciar y duty , and var ious other state-la w claims), and A on moved to dismiss . Meanw hile, in October 2005, ATCO was sold for $465 million

— a pp ro xima te ly

$5 00 ,0 00 pe r s ha

re — a nd so me tim e the re a

bo ut, AT CO se ttled wi th the L e wi s Plaintiffs for $9.9 million. On Ap ri l 27 , 2 00 6, the dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d A on ’s mot ion

to d ism iss the ne g lig e nc e c la im, finding that, althoug h Aon had had a duty to notify Fe dera l of t he S ullivan L etter a nd Aon had f

ailed in that duty , Aon’s fa ilure t o fulfill that duty was not the prox imate cause of the denial of cover ag e. T h e r e f o r e , t h e c o u rtc o n c l u d e d , A o nc o u l d n o tb e h e l d

l i a b l e u n d e r t h a tn e g l i g e n c e t h e o r

y. Fe d er al t h er ea ft er

m o v edfo r s u m m ary

j u d gm en t , wh i ch t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt d en i ed. In so doing, the cour t stated three conclusions: (1) the Sulli van L etter was a “cla im” as def ined in the policy ; (2) the three claims — the Sullivan L etter, the Fr ulla L etter, a

nd the complaint — wer e to be tre ated a s a sing le claim made on the date of the ea rliest of them (i.e., on A pril 13, 2003, the date of the Sulli van L etter) , pursuant to the Related Claims provision; and (3) g enuine issues of fac t e x isted as to wh e the r AT CO ’s c la ims we re pr op e rl y e xclu de d by the I ns ur e d vs . I ns ur e d p ro vis ion . F or the se

same re asons, the cour

t corre spondingly

denied a summary -judg ment motion by ATCO. Shortly there afte r, Aon moved for summary judgme nt on the rema inder of its cla ims, which prompted ATCO to fil e a cr o s s -m otion for summary judgme nt ag ainst Aon on those claims. On September 24, 2007, the district cou rt gra n t ed Aon’ s motion for summary judgme nt (and de nied ATCO’s re ciproc al motion) on the basis that — even acc epting ATCO’s fac tual acc usations a s true5

— Aon’s ac tions were not the pr ox imate cause of ATCO’s damag es. The court reiter ated that a ny neg lige nce by

Aon in failin g t o s en d t he Sullivan L etter to F eder al had be en har mless beca

use, ultimately , Fe dera l had denied the claim pursuant to the I vs. I Ex clusion, not beca use t he cla im was

u n t i m e l y. But, if F eder al h ad d eemed the Sullivan L etter a “notice of

circ umstances,” rathe r than a claim (a nd the Fr u l l a L etter the “cla im”), ATCO pe rsisted, then ATCO’s c laim would be dated September 24, 2004, a

time at which the L ewis Plaintiffs wer e all outside the Ivs. IEx clusion’s foury ear window, and F eder al could have had no basis on which to deny cover ag e. ATCO then a ccuse d Aon of c onvincing Fe dera l to accept the Sullivan L etter a s a cla im rather tha n a notice of

c ir c ums tanc e s, wh ic h A TCO c on te nd s w a s a br e a c h o f Aon’s fi du cia ry du ty . In r e

je c tin g thi s

a c c us a tio n, the c ou

rt e xpla ine d that th is c la im, lik e the ne g lig e nc e c la im, wa s u lti mate ly ha rm le ss, even if true. Finally , ATCO ac cused A on of ac tively colluding w ith Fe dera l to have the claim denied on th e b a s is o f

th e Iv s . IE xc lu s io n . B u t t h e d is tr ic t c o u rt f

o u n d th a t A T CO h a d

n o t p r e s e n te d

any evidenc e of a

ny such a c ollusion, wherea s Aon had prese nted evidenc e that there had bee n no such

c oll us ion . Co ns e qu e ntl y , th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt t o A on

on the se c la ims

. On November

29, 2007, the district court a dminist ratively closed the c ase, notingthat “the parties have not i fi ed t h e C ourt that they have r esolved their dispute [but] have not c ompleted the paper work to memorialize the re solution.” Otherwise state d, the cour t noted that ATCO and F eder al had ag ree d to a settlement, but could not execute the se ttlement until after the f irst of the y ear . On Janu ary 14 , 2 00 8, the a tto rn e y s f

or AT CO and F e de ra l move d the c ourt to re op e n th e c a se

an d f i l e d a “ J o i n tS t i p u l a t i o no f

D i s m i s s a l w i t h P r e

j u d i c e . ” T h i s s t i p u l a t i o ns t a t e s , i ni t s e n t i r e t y:A T C O m i st akenl y ci t ed t he f o rme r rul e. T he R ul es were ame nd ed , ef f ect i ve D ecem b er 1, 2 0 0 7

. I n am end i ng 4 the R u le s, this p ro v isio n w a s re fo rm a tted a n d nu m b e re d a s R u le 4 1 (a )( 1 )( A )( ii), b u t wa s n o t alte re d su b sta n tive ly. 6 Pursuant to Rule 41(a)( 1)(ii) of t h e Feder al Rules of Civil P roce dure, Plaintiff, [4] Ander son-Tully

Company

(‘AT CO’), and Defe ndant, Fe dera l I nsuranc e Company (‘F ede ra l’), file this Stipulation of Dismi ssal, and jointly reque st that the Court dismiss all claims and causes of action that wer e asserted by ATCO ag ainst Fe dera l wi th p re jud ic e , w ith ne ith e r pa

rt y to be ob lig a te d to the oth e r fo r i ts f e e s a nd c os ts. A pr o p o s ed Agr ee d Or d er o f Di s m i s s al h as b ee ns u b m i t t edat t h e t i m e o f t h i s fi l i n g. So, while purporting to act pursua nt to Fede ral Rule of Civil P ro ce dure 41( a)( 1)(A) (ii) (dismissal without a cour t order) , the par

ties actua lly

“re quest[ed] t h at t h e [ c]ourt dismi ss [ the] claims” and

e ve n atta c he d a dr a ft or de r fo r the c ourt ’s c on ve nie nc e . O n th a t sa me da y (Jan. 14 , 2 00 8) , A TCO also moved the c ourt to rec onsider its September 24, 2007, gr ant of summary judgme nt to Aon, and

mov e d the c ourt fo r le a ve to a me nd its c omp la int

a g a ins t A on , e sse nti a lly

se e kin g to p ro c e e d a g a ins t Aon to rec over attorney s’ fe es and the costs of the just-conc luded litigation. On Marc h 25, 2008, the district court de nied ATCO’s motions, explaining that Aon w as not liable to ATCO under

any set of cir cumstance s, and ref using to pe rmit amendment of the c omplaint or to rec onsider the g rant of summar y judgme nt. Mor eover , the court explained that ATCO had not ide n ti f ie d an y s tatuto r

y o r c o n tr a c tu a l b a s is u

p o n w h ic h it c o u ld ju s ti f

y th e r e c o v e r

y of costs and

a tto rn e y s’ fe e s, pa

rt ic ula rl y in l ig ht o f t

he fa c t th a t A TCO ha d n ot p re va ile d o n it s cla im s ag a ins t Aon. On

Ap ri l 18 , 2 00 8, AT CO a pp e a le d, and on

De c e mbe r 5 , 2 00 8, Ao n mo ve d th is c ourt to dismiss the appe al as untimely and ther efor e beyond our j urisdiction. We address Aon’ s jur isd ic tio na l mo tio n b e fo re pr oc e e din g to c on sid e r t he me ri ts o f A TCO ’s a

pp e a l. II. A o nh a s m o v e d t o d i s m i s s t h i s a p p e a l , ar g u i n g t h a t A T C O ’ s n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w a s u n t i m e l y.AT CO a l s o poi n t s out t h at , bas ed on t h e l an g u ag e of t h e s t i pu l at i on i t s el f

, t h i s w as f

ar f r om a c l ea r e x pr es s i on 5 o f a R u le 4 1 (a )( 1 )( A )( ii) d ism issa l-witho u t-a-c o u rt o rd e r, ina sm u c h a s this stip u la tio n e x p re ssly “re q u e st[e d ] th a t t he C o u rt di s mi s s [ t h e] c l ai ms ” an d i n cl u ded an a ppen ded dr af t or der f or t h e cou r t ’ s u s e or a s s i s t an ce i n doi n g s o. 7 See Fe d. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (A) ( an appe llant ge nera lly has 30 day s to file an appe al in a civil ca se). Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) (1)( A)(ii), a “plaintiff may

dismiss an ac tion without a court orde r by filing . . . a

stipulation of di s m issal signe d by all parties who ha

ve appea red.” And, on J anuar

y 14, 2008, ATCO and Fe dera l — the onl y two parties r emaining in the

a c tio n — fi le d a “ Joint Stip ulatio n o f D ism iss a l,” wh ic h e ve n be g an with the ph ra se : “Pur su ant t o Rul e 41 (a )( 1) (i i) [sic ] of

the F e de ra l Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e dure , . . . .” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt e nte re d it s next order on M arc h 25, 2008 (whe n it denied AT CO’s outstanding motions), and A TCO appea led from that orde r on April 18, 2008 — 24 day s after Marc h 25, but 95 day s after J anuar y 14. Aon contends that, even without a c ourt order , the ca se wa s final on J anuar y 14, 2008, and the re fo re , A TCO’s no ti c e of a pp e a l — f

ile d 9 5 d ay s late r —

wa s unti me ly . A on

re lie s o n Ru le 41(a) (1)( A)(ii) f

or the proposition that the ca se c o u ld b e c o n cluded ( dismiss ed) w ithout a court orde r, and points to the “Joi nt Sti pulation of Dismissal” as p ro o f t h at it was. ATCO re sponds that the dismiss al was not e ffe ctive without a cour t order be cause it did not i nclude the sig nature s of “ all part ie s who have appe ared , ” w h ic h w o u ld in c lu d e A o n . Co n f r o n te d w it

h th e f a c t th a t it had 5 appea red but ha d not sig ned the stipulation, Aon contends that, beca use the word “par

ti es , ” w h en

us e d in the F e de ra l Rul e s, ty pic a lly me ans on ly

tho se e nti tie s r e ma ini ngin t he a c tio n, it w a s n ot a “par ty ” — havingalre ady

been removed from the ac tion by the summary

judgme nt — and, conseque ntly , was not re quired to sig n the stipulation in order to satisfy the Rule and complete the dis mis sa l. Ne ith e r A TCO no r A on pr ov ide s c on tr oll ing c a se law and , in fa c t, b oth sid e s su g g e st that th is8

is a matter of

first impression. So, we beg in at t he beginning and “the starting point in int erpr eting statutes and rule s is alway s the plain words themselve s,” see M arek v . Chesny , 473 U.S. 1, 16 (1985) — h e re : “ a ll p art ie s w ho have a pp e are d. ” An d w e are min df ul t hat th e dr a ft e rs c ou ld jus t as e a sil y have wr itt e n “ a ll existing

pa rt ie s w ho have a

pp e are d, ” or

“ a ll remaining

parties who ha

ve appe are d.” I n fac t, give n Aon’s ar g ument, we note that the draf ters could have just written “ parties,” without any qualifier a

t all. They

did not. The draf

ters wr ote “ all

parties who have appe ared .” Aon ar g ues that “a ll . .

. who have appea red” does not enlar g e the c overe d g roup to include those who were parties but have since bee n dismiss ed, excused, or r emoved f rom the ac tion; rather, Ao n a rgue s, it l imi ts the c ov e re d g ro up to t ho se wh o a

re c ur re ntl y pa rt ie s and h av e ap p eared. As support for this argument, Aon explains that the word “pa rties” is a term of art, as used i n the Fe dera l Rules, that ge nera lly

means only

those entities that are c urre ntl y pa rt ie s to the a c tio n. B ut wh a t is g ener ally true is not alway s true. I n Rule 19(b), for ex ample, the draf ters used the phrase “existi ng parties” to describe those parties c urre ntly in the action, and in Rule 25(a )(2) , the dra fters use d the ph ra se “ re ma ini ngpa

rt ie s. ” I f “ pa

rt ie s” we re a

te rm of art

that always me ant “ pa

rt ie s c ur re ntl y in t h e a c t i o n , ” t h e s e qu a l i f

i e r s — “ e x i s t i n g ” an d

“ r e m a i n i n g ” —

w o u l d n o tb e n e c e s s ar

y. Moreove r, it bear s at least brief mention that the termination of the litigation stag e is also the initiation of the appea l stag e — two sides of the same coin, as it were . I ndeed, in the pr esent c ase, it is onl y the latter that conce rns Aon; havingbeen r emoved f ro m t h e l i tigation via summary judgme n t, A o n h a d n o in te r e s t in th e e n s u in g li ti g a ti o n b e tw e e n A T CO an d F e d e r a l. B u t, a s the prese nt motion makes clear, the other side of that coin — the initiation of the appe al stag e — wa s (and is) of signific ant conc ern to Aon, inasmuch as Aon was li kely to be a party to that appea l. And it is that point that bear s mention — that, once the litig ation has terminate d and the a ppeal stag e has9

be g un , the wo rd “ pa

rt ie s” un qu e sti on a

bly me ans tho se e nti tie s th a t we re parties to the litigation, no mat ter whe n (or

ho w) the y

we re re mov e d f

ro m th e lit ig a tio n. So, fo r p ur po se s o f R

ule 41(a) (1)( A)(ii), w hich is clear ly one mea ns of cr ossing the thr eshold betwe en the two stag es, the appea l-stag e side of the threshold clea rly favor s our construing t h e p hrase “all par ties who have

a pp e are d” (a

nd the wo rd “ pa rt ie s” in p art ic ula

r) a s in c lud ingbo th c ur

re nt a nd fo rm e r p art ie s. L ackingcompelli ng contra ry authority , we f

ind the more prude nt course is to dec line the inv itatio n to qu a lif

y the me anin g of

the word “par ties ” wh e n th e dr a ft e rs c ou ld h a ve do ne so themselves — such as in Rule 19(b) a nd 25(a) (2) — but did not. I nstead, we find the plain mea ning of “ a ll p art ie s w ho have a

pp e are d” to inc lud e a ll e nti tie s wh o have a pp e are d in the a c tio n a s p art ie s. We note that this li bera l construction of the Rule inf l i cts no signific ant pre

judice on a pla intiff seekingto voluntarily

dismiss an ac tion. I f, for whateve r re ason, the plaintiff c annot obt ain the signatures of a ll those who have a ppear ed in the ac tion as parties, that plaintiff ne eds only to move for a nd obtain a cour

t order f ormally dismiss ing the case , as is provided for in Rule 41(a)( 2). I n this case, the a

ttempted Rule 41(a) (1)( A)(ii) dis m i s s al was ineffe ctive due to AT CO’s fa ilure to p ro c ur e Ao n’ s si g natur e , s o th e pr e se nt c a se wa s no t fi na l un til the dis tr ic t c ourt iss ue d it s

o r d e r o nM ar c h 2 5 , 2 0 0 8

. A s a r e s u l t , t h e A p r i l 1 8 , 2 0 0 8 n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w a s t i m e l y. III . ATCO pre sses three arguments on appea l: (1) that it has a valid cla im ag ainst Aon for br eac h of fiducia ry d u t y , s u ch t hat the district cour t erre d by g rantingsummary

judgme nt to Aon on that claim; (2) that it is entitled to lit igation costs and at t o rn ey s ’ fe es i n this action; and (3) that it has oth e r v a lid

c la ims a g a ins t A on , s uc h th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d b y re fu sin g to a llo w i t to a me nd its complaint. But, be cause there is no mechanism by which a losing p ar t y ca n o b tain costs and10

attorney s’ fe es fr om the winning pa rty , the second argument is de pendent on ATCO’s pre vailing on its fi rs t argume nt h e re and then p reva il in g in

its c a se a g a ins t A on

on re mand to t he dis tr ic t c ourt

. Simi larly , beca

use there is no means by which a losingplaintiff ca n amend i t s co m p l ai nt after judgme nt has bee n enter ed ag ainst it, the third a rg ument is also depende nt on the first. Ther efor e, th e f ir s t ( an d u lt im a te ly th e o n ly ) qu e s ti o n in th is a

p p e a l is w h e th e r th e d is tr ic t court erred by g ra nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt t o Aon on AT CO ’s br e a c h of fi du c iary du ty c la im. An d th e ans we r i s “no.” The district cour

t gr anted summary

judgme nt to Aon upon finding that, even thoug h Aon had br e a c he d it s f

idu c iary du ty to AT CO by fa ili ng to sub mit the Sul liv an L e tte r time ly , that f a ilure did not cause ATCO’s har

m. Rather, the sole c ause of ATC O’s harm (the abse nce of cover ag e) w as F e d e r a l ’ s d e c i s i o n t o d e n y c o v e r a g e b a s e d o n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n an d a

p p l i c a t i o n o f

t h e p o l i c y, specific ally

the I v. IEx clusion. Moreove r, as the c ourt found, Aon did not af fec t this decision. ATCO contends that the district court misunderstood the nature of its harm and, the ref ore, the nature of i ts claim. ATCO contends (1) that the harm in question is not the absenc e of insura nce

cover ag e but rather the c ost of bring ing this lawsuit (i.e., litig at i o n co s ts and attorney s’ fe es); and (2 ) t hat it wa s A on ’s br e a c h o f f

idu c iary du ty th a t ne c e ssi tate d A TCO ’s br ing ingthi s la ws uit

. Otherw ise stated, ATCO c ontends that it would not ha ve had to f

ile this law suit if Aon had a rg ued on its behalf as, A TCO insists , Aon was le g ally oblige d to do as ATCO’s fiduc iary repr esentative. Wit hout belaboringthe point, we find both of these contentions incorr ect. F irst, to the ext ent t h a t i t i s a c tu a l l y a h ar

m a ta l l , t h e c o s to f

b r i n g i n g t h i s l aw s u i ti s s i mp l y part of the har m resulting fr o m Fe d er al ’s denial of c overa g e; it is not a separate or diff ere nt harm just beca

use ATCO late r obtained cove rag e throug h its settlement with F ed er al

. I f ATCO wa nted to rec over the costs of11

bring ing this litigation, it needed to pursue this ca se to judg ment or neg otiate these c osts into t he settlement with F eder al. Second, ATCO has produce d no evidenc e to support its claim that Aon’s brea ch of duty

nece ssitated this lawsuit. That is, ATCO has offe red no e vidence whatsoeve r to show that Aon aff

ecte d Fe dera l’s decision to de ny cover ag e, and Aon has produce d substantial evidence that it did no t. I n its brief, ATCO re peate dly asser ts two premises that have been pr oven (a g ain and a g ain) to be untrue: (1) that this case a rose f rom Aon’s fa ilure t o send the Sullivan L etter to F eder al, and (2) that the district c ourt held t hat the cla im was not barr ed by the I v. IEx clusion. I n rea lity , Aon’s failure to send the Sullivan L etter ha s no bear i n g o n t h i s ca se; this case a rose f rom Fe dera l’s

asser tion that the claim was barre d by the I v. I Ex clusion. And, t he dis trict court did not hold that Fe dera l was incorr ect a

bout t h e I v . I E x cl u sion; the district court held that there was a g enuine question as t o whether

the I v. IEx clusion was applica ble. That is, may

be F eder al was r ight, may be not — a jury

would have to de cide. Bu t AT C O s et t l ed with Feder al, and that e nded the matter

. AT CO ’s pr e mis e s are inc or re c t, a nd its c la im m e ri tle ss.

IV. For all of the for eg oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

.