TOGETHER IN ORBIT 

The Origins of International The Origins of International

Participation in the Space Station Participation in the Space Station

John M. Logsdon 

Monographs in Aerospace History #11 
TOGETHER IN ORBIT 

The Origins of International The Origins of International

Participation in the Space Station Participation in the Space Station

John M. Logsdon

NASA History Division

Office of Policy and Plans

NASA Headquarters

Washington, DC 20546

Monographs in Aerospace History #11 

November 1998 
i 

Foreword Foreword

interest to many people, particularly as the initial 

launches of space station elements draw near and 

the process of assembling and then beginning to 

use the International Space Station is imminent. 

Logsdon has made revisions to the text as it stood 

in 1991, adding a concluding analysis that brings the 

study to the present, inserting recent publications into 

the footnotes, and fixing a few grammatical or linguistic infelicities. It seemed especially appropriate to 

recognize that the partnership begun in 1984 and 

described in this account had been augmented by the 

1993 invitation to Russia from the original partners to 

join them in the station enterprise, but other than that 

Logsdon let the study stand. 

This is the eleventh in a series of monographs 

prepared under the auspices of the NASA History 

Division. The Monographs in Aerospace History 

series is designed to make available a wide variety 

of investigations relative to the history of aeronautics and space. These publications are intended to 

be tightly focused in terms of subject, relatively 

short in length, and reproduced in an inexpensive 

format to allow timely and broad dissemination to 

researchers in aerospace history. Suggestions for 

additional publications in the Monographs in 

Aerospace History series are welcome. 

Roger D. Launius 

Chief Historian 

National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 

June 24, 1998 

FROM VIRTUALLY THE BEGINNING of the twentieth 

century, those interested in the human exploration 

of space have viewed as central to that endeavor 

the building of an Earth-orbital space station that 

would serve as the jumping-off point to the Moon 

and the planets. Always, space exploration supporters believed, a permanently occupied space 

station was a necessary outpost in the new frontier 

of space. The more technically minded recognized 

that once humans had achieved Earth orbit about 

250 miles above the surface—the presumed location of any space station—the vast majority of the 

atmosphere and the gravity well would have been 

conquered, and then human beings were about 

halfway to anywhere they might want to go. 

Space station advocates also recognized that the 

scientific and technological challenge of building 

an Earth-orbital space station was daunting and 

that pooling the resources of many of the spacefaring nations of the world would maximize the probabilities of success. Thus, when the space station 

project was born in the in the mid-1980s, it almost 

immediately became an international program. 

This monograph describes the process of conceptualizing the international partnership and crafting 

its contours. 

This study was completed by John M. Logsdon 

of George Washington University in late 1991, but 

it was not published in a form suitable for wide circulation. With the January 29, 1998, signing ceremony for the revised international agreements that 

brought the Russian Federation into the space station partnership, it occurred to Dr. Logsdon that a 

full account of the origins of international involvement in the space station program might be of 
iii 

Table of Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Origins of the U.S. Invitation to Cooperate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Laying the Foundation for International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Space Station Task Force and International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

The Allies Are Interested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Mission Requirements Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Making the Space Station International . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Resistance to International Involvement Surfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15


The Space Station Decision Process and International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Adding the International Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Extending the Invitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

The Partners Accept the Invitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Early Agreement Sought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Europe Charts Its Future in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

ESA Planning Includes a Cooperative Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

Developing Political Support for Station Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

ESA Ministers Approve Long-Range Plan, Station Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

Japan Determined Not to “Miss the Boat” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36


Canada Sets Its Space Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Monographs in Aerospace History 
v 

Acknowledgments Acknowledgments

THIS STUDY TOOK a long time to complete, for a 

variety of justifiable and not so reasons. Along the 

way, the number of people who have helped has 

become very large, and I am sure that I will fail to 

give due credit and thanks to all who deserve it. 

The study was carried out under contract to the 

NASA History Division, using funds provided by 

the Office of Space Station. Robert Freitag and 

Terence Finn, of the latter office, recognized the 

historical significance of the space station program 

and were willing to support outside, independent 

scholars to track the evolution of the program in 

near to real time. They also supported the creation 

of a Space Station Historical Archive; its manager, 

Adam Gruen, and his assistants did a superlative 

job of assembling documents and other materials 

from the early days of the program, from which I 

have drawn extensively in preparing this study. 

Freitag and Finn also read several drafts of the 

study and provided their on-the-spot perspectives 

on how events unfolded. Overseeing the space station historical effort and this study until she moved 

to the Administrator’s office was NASA Historian 

Sylvia Fries, who provided gentle but firm guidance and insightful comments on early drafts of the 

study. Roger Launius was Sylvia’s successor as 

Director of the History Division, and he was 

understanding as I pushed to finish the study. 

Of the many others within NASA who helped 

me locate documents, provided essential corrective comments as I went along, and encouraged 

me to get the job done, I owe particular thanks to 

Peggy Finarelli. She trusted me enough to provide 

access to material not often available to an outside 

scholar, and then worked with me to make sure 

that I had not inadvertently violated her trust. Dick 

Barnes provided extensive insights and comments 

and, with Peggy, was instrumental in opening 

NASA files for my use. Al Condes worked with me 

on document access, and Lyn Wigbels and Ken 

Pedersen read the manuscript and provided helpful 

comments. 

Individuals from U.S. station partners who went 

out of their way to be helpful include George van 

Reeth, Ian Pryke, Gabriel Lafferanderie, and Jean 

Arets of the European Space Agency; Mac Evans, 

Karl Doetsch, and Bill Cockburn of Canada; and 

Masanori Nagatomo, Shinichi Nakayama, and 

Yasahiro Kawasaki of Japan. Of course, the study 

would not have been possible without the willingness of many in the United States and overseas to 

take time for an interview. 

At George Washington University, Henry 

Hitchcock provided valuable research assistance as 

he pushed to complete his own dissertation on the 

space station project. Lois Berdaus and Paul 

McDonnell typed early drafts of the study until I finally learned to use a word processor (and spell check!). 

Underpinning this whole effort is an attitude within NASA that what the agency does is of lasting significance, is paid for by public funds, and should be 

open for scrutiny by outsiders such as me. Colleagues 

from abroad are amazed at the openness and accessibility of U.S. government officials and the willingness of government agencies to open all but their 

most sensitive files to external examination, if the purpose for doing so is valid. NASA has been a model 

within the government in this respect, at least as far as 

my experience is concerned. 

When I prepared the manuscript for publication in 

this monograph series, Kerry Murray, a graduate 

research assistant at the Space Policy Institute, mastered the modern technology of a scanner so that 

there was no need to retype major portions of the 

manuscript, and she otherwise was of great assistance 

in getting the document ready for publication. She 

has my thanks. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
vi Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

I am grateful for the assistance offered by all The time when the space station experiment in 

those mentioned above and by others who international cooperation can be tested in practice 

contributed to this study. It goes without saying that is fast approaching. It certainly has been a long 

I alone am responsible for all errors of fact and time in coming! 

interpretation in this work and that the conclusions 

and findings are mine and do not necessarily John M. Logsdon 

reflect the views of the National Aeronautics and March 1998 

Space Administration or George Washington 

University. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 1 

Introduction Introduction

ON JANUARY 25, 1984, in his annual State of the 

Union address to a joint session of Congress, 

President Ronald Reagan announced that “tonight, 

I am directing NASA to develop a permanently 

manned space station and to do it within the 

decade.” A few moments later, he added: “We want 

our friends to help us meet these challenges and 

share in their benefits. NASA will invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, 

build prosperity, and expand freedom for all who 

share our goals.” 1 Just over a year later, during the 

April–June 1985 period, Canada, Japan, and 

Europe accepted in principle the U.S. invitation to 

participate in the space station program. Thus was 

initiated the most extensive experiment in international technical cooperation ever undertaken. 

This essay is a history and analysis of the steps 

leading to the origins of the space station partnership between the United States and its closest 

allies. It traces the process that led to the decision 

to invite other countries to participate in the project and their reasons for accepting that invitation. 

Not covered in this account are the difficult negotiations during the 1984–1988 period that led first 

to an initial set of agreements that allowed the 

prospective partners to work together during the 

early stages of the space station program and then 

to the final set of agreements creating the original 

space station partnership. Also, the 1993 invitation 

to the Russian Federation to join the original partners is not discussed, nor are the subsequent negotiations to revise the 1988 agreements. 

International cooperation has been a hallmark 

of the U.S. civilian space program since its inception. It is fair to view that program not only as one 

pressing the frontiers of science and technology 

but also as an extremely important tool of U.S. propaganda; the cooperative aspects of the program 

were an important part of its propaganda aspects. 

The term propaganda has a somewhat negative 

connotation, but properly interpreted it means an 

attempt to project—to propagate—a positive message. The message sent to the world by the willingness of the United States to share the exploration of 

space with others is that of an open, dynamic, pioneering society, eager to share its capabilities and 

achievements with others. When that message was 

supplemented by the demonstration of technological and organizational skill that was Project 

Apollo, the space program clearly was a powerful 

means of validating the U.S. claim to world leadership. 

Using the space program as an instrument of U.S. 

foreign policy was relatively easy when only the 

United States and the Soviet Union possessed the 

capability to put humans and their machines into 

orbit and beyond, particularly when the Soviet 

Union had a space program characterized by secrecy and by limited contact with countries other than 

its socialist allies. In the aftermath of the initial lunar 

landing, however, the United States recognized that 

other countries were seeking their own means of 

access to space and that the Cold War competition 

between the United States and the Soviet Union 

might be replaced by an era of détente. Faced with 

these emerging realities, during the 1969–1972 

period, the United States consciously changed its 

approach to space cooperation from one that 

stressed data exchange, working together on scientific projects and providing launch services for the 

scientific satellites of other countries, to one that 

involved direct foreign participation in the human 

spaceflight program. 

For the Soviet Union, this meant the highly symbolic Apollo-Soyuz Test Project that led to a 1975 

“handshake in space.” For traditional U.S. allies 

around the world, this meant an invitation to cooperate with the United States in the development of 

post-Apollo systems for human spaceflight.2 For reasons described in detail in Chapter 2, this invitation 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
2 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

resulted in Canada developing an essential hardware element for the Space Shuttle—the Remote 

Manipulator System—and Europe building a laboratory for use in the Shuttle’s payload bay— 

Spacelab. These cooperative engagements were 

very different in character from any that had taken 

place before. They raised concerns about whether 

Europe and Canada had the technological capabilities to build sophisticated, highly reliable 

“human-rated” hardware, or whether the United 

States would have to provide them access to sensitive or proprietary technology for them to be successful in their projects. A contrary concern was 

whether the U.S. invitation would stimulate its 

partners to develop indigenous technological 

capabilities that then would be competitive with 

those possessed by the United States. Clearly, this 

was a form of cooperation qualitatively different 

from that involving a foreign scientist participating 

in an experiment flown aboard a U.S. spacecraft! 

During the 1970s, both the United States and its 

partners went through a sometimes difficult period of 

learning to work together in developing new hardware for use by humans in space. The United States 

still was by far the dominant partner in the postApollo cooperative relationship. It was the United 

States that established the basic design of what would 

be developed and, more or less on a “take it or leave 

it” basis, told its potential partners what an acceptable 

contribution might be. As their confidence in their 

own capabilities increased during the 1970s, largely 

as the result of their success in the post-Apollo 

coopera-tion, this attitude was becoming unacceptable to Europe and Canada. If they were to be 

involved with the United States in future expensive 

and challenging hardware development projects, it 

would have to be on a more equitable basis. 

This then was the context in which the United 

States took the initiative as the 1980s began to discuss 

with Europe, Canada, and Japan (which had not been 

able to participate in the post-Apollo program) possible cooperation in the “next logical step” in the development of space—the creation of a human outpost in 

Earth orbit, a space station. Once again, a major 

space undertaking was being put forth as a tool of 

U.S. policy—a policy that for more than two decades 

had used the space program to demonstrate what was 

best about American society. As the following pages 

suggest, embodying that objective and the recognition of U.S. leadership that accompanies it in a stable, 

harmonious space station partnership has proven no 

easy task. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 3 

Origins of the U.S. Origins of the U.S.

Invitation to Cooperate Invitation to Cooperate

Background 

WHILE THE HIGHLY VISIBLE personal endorsement by 

President Reagan of foreign participation in the U.S. 

space station program may have come as a surprise to 

many in the United States and in potentially collaborating countries, the notion that the United States 

would welcome some form of international cooperation in the program certainly was not unexpected. 

During 1982 and 1983, as NASA had tried to lay the 

basis within the U.S. government for approval of its 

space station proposal, possible international involvement had been a subject of extensive discussion both 

within the United States and between the United 

States and its potential partners. That discussion itself 

built on a record of cooperation that extended back 

to the early years of the U.S. civilian space program 

in the late 1950s.3 

The 1958 Space Act had set as one of NASA’s 

objectives “cooperation by the United States with 

other nations and groups of nations.”4 NASA’s cooperative activities were limited primarily to space science programs during the 1950s and 1960s, but as a 

post-Apollo program was being planned during the 

1969–1971 period, there was a decision to broaden 

the basis of cooperation to include involvement in the 

development of hardware, particularly systems related to the human spaceflight program.5 

NASA asked Europe, Canada, and Japan in late 

1969 to consider ways of participating in its proposed post-Apollo program, which at that point was 

centered on an orbiting space station and a totally 

reusable launch vehicle called the Space Shuttle. 

Japan was just initiating its own general-purpose 

space agency (although it had had an active space 

science program for a decade). It took Japan some 

time to decide whether it wanted to respond to the 

U.S. invitation, particularly because its own space 

capabilities were at such an early stage of development. By the time that a response to the U.S. invitation was agreed on within Japan, the United States 

had so changed the possibilities for international 

participation that there was no basis for Japanese 

involvement. Canada was eager to be involved. 

Several years of discussions led to an agreement that 

Canada would provide the Remote Manipulator 

System for the Space Shuttle. The Shuttle had turned 

out to be the only element of NASA’s ambitious 

post-Apollo plans for human spaceflight that was 

approved by the Nixon administration.6 

Negotiations between the United States and 

Europe on post-Apollo cooperation proved contentious and left many in Europe ultimately unsatisfied with the bargain struck.7 Once it had been 

established, by 1971, that the Space Shuttle was 

the only major NASA project for the 1970s likely 

to receive funding, NASA and European space 

leaders agreed that Europe would examine three 

options for involvement in the Shuttle program: 

1.	 Teaming between European and U.S. industry to develop specific parts of the Shuttle 

orbiter—for example, the tail and payload 

bay doors 

2.	 European development of an orbital transfer 

vehicle, known as the “Tug,” to move payloads 

from the Shuttle payload bay to other orbits 

3.	 A Research and Applications Module, also 

called the “sortie can,” to provide additional 

pressurized and unpressurized volume within 

the Shuttle payload bay for experimentation 

During the 1971–1973 period, Europe spent 

approximately $20 million on studies of these 

alternatives; by 1972, Tug development had 

emerged as the preferred European contribution. 

As the European studies progressed, however, 

the U.S. position with respect to the level and kind 

of European participation it wanted crystallized. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
4 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

“NASA’s View: The Next Logical Step”—In 1982, with the successful completion of the four Space Shuttle orbiter flight tests, NASA 

began planning activity to define a possible space station. The station was viewed as the next logical step in space. It built on the 

nation’s past experience in space and provided, for the first time, the capability for permanent use of the space environment. 

(NASA photo 83-H-368). 

First, the Nixon administration’s interest in cooperating was later interpreted by the White House as an 

interest in European involvement in the use of space 

rather than in joint engineering projects. Second, 

NASA found that the European aerospace industry 

lagged approximately five to ten years behind U.S. 

industry. Therefore, NASA dropped the idea of joint 

development of technology, speculating that the 

United States might stand to lose more than it would 

gain. Third, NASA also decided that it did not want to 

depend on other countries for critical items on the 

Space Shuttle so that the Shuttle could fly independent of foreign activities. Fourth, NASA decided that, 

for safety reasons, it did not want to fly a Tug using liquid propellants, the only type Europe was studying. 

Moreover, there was real concern that Europe did not 

have all the technology to develop a Tug. 

Furthermore, the Tug was to be used to lift national 

security satellites to higher orbits, and the notion of 

non-U.S. involvement with these highly classified 

satellites was not welcome to the national security 

community. 

The U.S. government thus found itself in the position of having to walk back from the European perception of the cooperative possibilities in post-Apollo 

activities that had been encouraged by the way the 

United States and Europe had proceeded to define 

that cooperation.8 By the time the U.S. position had 

been clarified in 1972, all Europe was offered, more 

or less on a “take it or leave it” basis, was the development of the Research and Applications Module. 

(The module was renamed Spacelab in 1973.)9 

Some in Europe, particularly in France, were 

skeptical of the wisdom of close collaboration with 

the United States on expensive projects, preferring 

to concentrate on developing European capabilities 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 5 

for independent action. However, other countries, led 

by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, had 

become eager to become involved in developing 

hardware qualified for human spaceflight, thereby 

gaining skills in systems engineering and quality control. After hard negotiations within Europe, a “package 

deal” was agreed to in which funds were made available to develop a French-supported European launch 

vehicle (Ariane), to participate in the U.S. post-Apollo 

program through Spacelab development, and to 

develop a maritime communications satellite of primary interest to the United Kingdom. As part of the 

package deal, a new cooperative organization, the 

European Space Agency (ESA), was created to pool 

the technical and financial resources of European 

countries and to manage Ariane and Spacelab development and other cooperative projects.10 

The U.S.-European agreement on the Spacelab 

project became a source of tension between the 

partners. At the time it was negotiated, NASA was 

projecting fifty or more Space Shuttle flights a year, 

at a cost per flight of less than $10 million; many 

of these flights were expected to require Spacelab 

use. Thus the thought was that about six sets of 

Spacelab hardware would be needed. Europe 

agreed in 1973 to develop the first Spacelab at its 

own expense and then transfer ownership to 

NASA; NASA agreed to purchase any additional 

Spacelabs required, with a minimum of one such 

purchase guaranteed. 

By the time Spacelab was ready for use, its 

development costs had risen to almost $1 billion, 

rather than the approximately $250 million 

This designer’s conception shows some of the applications of an advanced Space Operations Center, which was studied by Boeing 

Aerospace Company for NASA. This advanced version of the “spaceport” shows the Space Shuttle unloading some of the modules that 

would comprise the system, including living and command control quarters; warehouses for food, water, and hydrazine; and service areas 

containing batteries and other necessary supplies. Other areas of this advanced concept include hangars for spacecraft, solar panels to provide power for the station, and construction equipment to handle large structures. The large structure containing several antenna reflectors 

is a communications platform that is about to be assembled to an Orbital Transfer Vehicle for a flight to a higher orbit in space. 

(NASA photo 81-H-793). 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
6 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

originally estimated. Projections of Space Shuttle 

usage had dramatically shrunk, and the United 

States decided to purchase only the one additional 

Spacelab it was obligated to buy, at a cost of $128 

million. Any chance for Europe to recoup some of 

its development costs through Spacelab production thus vanished. The agreement provided for 

one joint U.S.-ESA Spacelab mission at no launch 

cost to ESA. After that, ESA would have to pay 

launch costs for any Spacelab missions it wanted 

to undertake. By the early 1980s, the combined 

costs of preparing the experiments for a Spacelab 

mission and paying Shuttle launch fees exceeded 

ESA’s resources, and the agency was left in a position of not being able to afford the use of the system it had developed. (Germany undertook two 

Spacelab missions of its own—one in October 

1985 and the second in April 1993.) 

The U.S.-European interaction in the postApollo period has been described in some detail 

because it provided much of the context for U.S.-

European discussions on potential space station 

cooperation.11 In hindsight, some top European 

space officials described themselves as “stupid” in 

accepting the U.S. terms for involvement in its 

post-Apollo program, attributing their weakness to 

an early 1970s lack of confidence in European 

capabilities and to a belief that only through 

cooperation with the United States could those 

capabilities be improved.12 Thus, according to this 

analysis, Europe was willing to pursue cooperation 

on almost any terms, no matter how one-sided. By 

contrast, in the early 1980s, with the completion of 

Spacelab and the successful development of the 

Ariane booster, Europe approached possible space 

station cooperation with a strong sense of its own 

capabilities and a determination to accept only an 

arrangement that recognized its position as a major 

spacefaring actor. 

It is clear that Europe received substantial benefits from its post-Apollo cooperation with the 

United States. In particular, Europe gained experience in the systems-level management of complex 

space projects—an experience that was quickly 

applied to other European projects such as Ariane. 

The upgrading of Europe’s management, technical, 

and human systems know-how obtained from the 

Spacelab experience was an important positive 

factor as the United States assessed possible international participation in the space station program. 

Another positive byproduct of the post-Apollo 

cooperation between the United States and Europe 

and between the United States and Canada was a 

set of personal and organizational relationships 

biased toward continued cooperation. Those who 

had been most directly involved, by and large, found 

the experience programmatically productive and personally rewarding. Also, Canada successfully completed its contribution to the Space Shuttle and in the 

process earned the confidence of NASA engineers at 

the Johnson Space Center, some of whom were skeptical about the wisdom of non-U.S. involvement in 

America’s human spaceflight efforts. Japan, forced to 

sit on the sidelines during Shuttle development, was 

determined not to be left out of the next major cooperative opportunity. As NASA began to explore the 

possibility of international involvement in the space 

station, there was a basis of positive experience and 

expectations among potential partners from which to 

proceed. 

Laying the Foundation for International 

Cooperation13 

The proposal to make a space station the central 

project in NASA’s post-Apollo program had been 

decisively rejected by the Nixon administration 

during the 1969–1970 period. The concept that 

some kind of crewed orbital facility was an essential element of any plan for extensive space development did not die, however; during the 1970s, 

NASA sponsored a number of advanced studies of 

possible space station missions and configurations.14 By early 1981, as the new administration of 

President Ronald Reagan took office, NASA’s two 

major human spaceflight centers—the Johnson 

Space Center in Houston, Texas, and the Marshall 

Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama—had 

each developed a preferred space station concept. 

The two concepts were very different in approach. 

The Marshall station began with a modest, humantended platform that would gradually evolve into a 

permanently occupied facility; its primary mission 

was as a research laboratory. The Johnson concept 

was a large facility primarily intended to support 

space operations, such as in-orbit construction, 

fueling of spacecraft, and the preparation for 

human missions to the Moon and Mars. The two 

centers were traditional rivals within the decentralized NASA organization, and each was pushing 

NASA Headquarters to adopt its own approach to 

the agency’s next major project. 

Space Shuttle development was phasing down in 

1981; the first flight of the Shuttle was scheduled for 

April. If NASA was to maintain its identity as an engineering organization responsible for developing large 

and complex hardware systems, particularly for 

human missions, it was clear that the agency needed 

to get a new post-Shuttle project approved soon. 

It was in this context that the Reagan administration choices as NASA Administrator and Deputy 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 7 

Administrator, James Beggs and Hans Mark, 

respectively, appeared before a Senate confirmation hearing on June 17, 1981. Beggs had served 

briefly in NASA in the late 1960s and then had 

become under secretary of the Department of 

Transportation; during the late 1970s, he had risen 

to a senior position with General Dynamics, a 

major aerospace corporation. Mark had been 

director of NASA’s Ames Research Center in the 

early 1970s and had served as under secretary and 

then secretary of the Air Force during the Carter 

administration. Both were intimately familiar with 

space policy and program issues. They had actually been selected for their NASA positions in midMarch, and shortly thereafter Beggs had obtained 

Mark’s agreement that “we would try to persuade 

the new administration to adopt the construction 

of a permanently manned orbiting space station as 

the next major goal in space.”15 Beggs and Mark 

announced that intent to the senators at their confirmation hearing. 

It would take some time to develop the case for 

the space station and to convince Ronald Reagan 

to approve the project.16 Before they could concentrate on station advocacy, Beggs and Mark had 

to bring the Space Shuttle into what could be characterized as operational status. They also had to 

fend off, as best they could, 1981 attempts by the 

new director of the Office of Management and 

Budget (OMB) to make major cuts in NASA’s existing budget.17 Thus, even though the two top NASA 

officials had publicly strongly endorsed the station 

as “the next logical step” in space, the station program took some time to pick up momentum, 

although early planning activities began almost 

immediately. An initial Space Station Conference 

was scheduled for November 1981 to inform individuals throughout NASA and the U.S. government 

of NASA’s thinking to date and to lay the basis for 

the more intensive planning effort that all knew 

was required. 

From the start, the possibility of international 

involvement in any station program that might be proposed was part of that planning. As mentioned earlier, a bias toward international involvement in its 

activities had been part of the NASA culture since the 

organization’s inception. To those in charge of planning for the space station program, it was inconceivable that the United States would go forward with a 

major effort in space and not include some form of 

international cooperation. Typical of those who held 

this perspective was Robert Freitag, Deputy Director 

of the Advanced Program Office in the Office of 

Manned Space Flight, who had been one of the primary architects of NASA-European post-Apollo cooperation and saw international cooperation in the 

space station, particularly with Europe, as a productive continuation of the relationship established during the 1970s. 

Kenneth Pedersen, the Director of NASA’s Office of 

International Affairs, was another advocate of international cooperation. Unlike Freitag, Pedersen was not 

a long-time NASA employee; he had come to the 

space agency in 1979 from his position as head of 

policy analysis and evaluation at the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. Pedersen’s position, as the 

policy-level advisor on international affairs to the 

NASA Administrator and as NASA representative in 

discussions of international space matters with the 

White House and other executive branch agencies, 

gave him and his staff a different perspective than that 

held by people such as Freitag, who was working on 

international programmatic and technical issues in 

one of the line offices of the agency. While Freitag 

and his associates were enthusiastic advocates of 

cooperation within and outside NASA, Pedersen had 

to take a more cautious approach. He was fully aware 

of the skepticism about the benefit-risk ratio of largescale international technological interactions that was 

widespread among key members of both the career 

national security community and the new Reagan 

administration. 

If there was skepticism and even opposition 

within the space agency about the value of international involvement in NASA’s major programs, it 

resided primarily in the field center people who 

had to deal with the added managerial complexity 

inevitably introduced by such involvement. While 

many at the Marshall Space Flight Center who had 

been involved with cooperation in the Spacelab 

program were receptive to international involvement in the space station, staff at the Johnson 

Space Center tended to be more dubious about the 

wisdom of intimate international partnerships. 

When NASA convened the initial agencywide 

workshop on space station planning in November 

1981, international involvement was a prominent 

agenda item, and the report of the workshop 

noted that: 

There appears to be substantial foreign interest in 

NASA’s future plans for its manned space 

activities. In some cases, this interest derives from 

existing contributions to NASA’s Space 

Transportation System [STS]. Extending this 

cooperation by participating in a NASA space 

station seems a logical step to some countries 

and space agencies. 

NASA can derive significant benefits from 

international participation in its programs if they 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
8 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

are properly structured and controlled. These 

benefits may include economic cost sharing, 

access to unique or otherwise valuable expertise, 

and improvements in the linking of foreign 

programs to STS utilization. 

The subject of potential international 

participation in a U.S. space station program 

must be approached carefully and proceed under 

clear assumptions and guidelines. A fundamental 

ground rule should be that planning for a space 

station will be conducted as if the entire project 

is to be developed as a wholly U.S. effort. 

Planning should proceed, however, on the basis 

that it does not foreclose international 

cooperation. Potential foreign participants should 

be encouraged to fund and undertake parallel 

studies of space station requirements and 

concepts which could benefit NASA in its design 

of the space station. Procedures should be 

developed to facilitate controlled exchanges of 

study results. All potential partners should be 

clearly informed that such exchanges during 

Phase A do not represent a commitment on the 

part of NASA to foreign involvement in the actual 

development of the station.18 

These 1981 perspectives guided NASA’s approach 

to possible international involvement in the station 

over the subsequent several years. Indeed, those within NASA responsible for technical-level liaison with 

Europe for some time had been discussing with their 

European colleagues the possibility of a U.S. space 

station program and of European involvement in it.19 

The approach articulated at the November conference reflected those discussions. 

Another agenda item at the workshop was potential Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in the 

space station. The support of the national security 

community had been essential to gaining White 

House approval for the Space Shuttle, but a fair 

degree of tension in the NASA-DOD relationship had 

risen in the decade since. However, the workshop 

report noted that “the climate for initiating major new 

NASA/DOD space endeavors is improving.” The 

report also recognized that “national security interests 

may have considerable impact on the feasibility or 

nature of international participation in a Space Station 

program.”20 NASA hoped to find a way to reconcile 

both DOD involvement and international participation, and thereby keep two influential 

constituencies involved as it attempted to gain political support for its plans. 

Once a general approach to international involvement in station planning had been developed, the 

next step was to inform potential partners what it was. 

For this purpose, NASA’s international affairs chief 

Kenneth Pedersen convened a meeting at the Johnson 

Space Center on January 13, 1982. Pedersen called 

this meeting on his own authority, although he 

informed NASA Administrator Beggs that he was 

doing so. Pedersen had been one of the first senior 

NASA staff members to work closely with Beggs 

after he had been selected to head NASA. Beggs 

attended the Paris Air Show in June 1981 as NASA 

Administrator-designate, and he and Pedersen met 

with representatives of other countries to discuss 

NASA’s future. These meetings and frequent oneon-one discussions made it clear to Pedersen that 

Beggs was an internationalist in orientation and, 

based on his experience with international cooperation and co-production of the General Dynamics 

F-16 fighter, understood the value to the United 

States of involving allies in major U.S. programs.21 

While there had been no formal decision by Beggs 

to begin the process of soliciting international participation in the space station, Pedersen in early 

1982 felt on safe grounds in calling together representatives of potential partners from Europe, 

Canada, and Japan for a status report on space station planning and a discussion of the approach that 

NASA would take to assessing potential international involvement. 

NASA’s international partners during the preceding two decades had been critical of the organization for deciding by itself on the objectives and 

design of projects and only then inviting foreign 

involvement, on terms largely dictated by NASA. 

Pedersen’s major point at the January meeting was 

that there would be a shift in NASA’s approach; 

potential partners were being invited to become 

involved at a very early stage in program definition, 

so that their inputs could help influence NASA’s 

choices and they could understand from the start 

options for their participation. This approach, he 

stressed, had risks as well as benefits. Pedersen told 

the foreign representatives at this and subsequent 

meetings: “[T]his is going to be for you an exciting 

and a frustrating process: exciting because I think 

you will see just how a program like this gets put 

together from the nuts and bolts stage; frustrating 

because you’re going to suffer the stops and starts 

and uncertainties that all programs like this go 

through in the early stages.”22 As long as this situation was understood, said Pedersen, NASA was 

eager, under the guidelines articulated at the 

November 1981 meeting, to have its foreign counterparts begin to study possible ways of becoming 

involved as NASA’s station plans took form.23 

Not only its potential partners, but also NASA, 

were taking some risks in this new approach. Since 

its inception, NASA had structured its international 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 9 

cooperative programs under a set of guidelines that 

provided the agency almost total control over the 

character of those activities. Key to those guidelines were the notions of cooperative projects 

being undertaken only when they were clearly of 

mutual interest, no exchange of funds or unwarranted transfer of technology, “clean” technological interfaces, and NASA as overall project manager. While these guidelines were not explicitly modified as station planning began in earnest, the very 

fact of involving non-U.S. entities in that planning 

implied that other changes in the NASA approach 

to international cooperation were possible. To a 

slight but perceptible degree, NASA was recognizing the need to share with others control over 

shaping potential partnerships. 

Space Station Task Force and International 

Cooperation 

In February 1982, NASA Associate Deputy 

Administrator Philip Culbertson created an informal task force on the space station. This task force 

was organized around a nucleus of people from 

the Advanced Programs Office of the Office of 

Manned Space Flight, in addition to several individuals from elsewhere in NASA. Administrator 

Beggs on May 20, 1982, formalized the existence 

of the Space Station Task Force. A major purpose 

for creating the task force was to make space station planning an agencywide process operating in 

direct contact with NASA’s most senior management, thereby both minimizing the MarshallJohnson rivalry that had previously pervaded the 

planning process and involving other NASA centers in defining the organization’s next major project. Named to head the task force was John 

Hodge, a British-born veteran of the Mercury, 

Gemini, and Apollo programs who had spent the 

previous decade working for the Department of 

Transportation. Hodge had been working with the 

informal task force members since he had returned 

to NASA; he had already indicated that he was a 

strong proponent of international cooperation in 

the station program. 

While the task force had the responsibility for 

planning the programmatic aspects of the space 

station, NASA’s Office of International Affairs was 

in charge of developing the policies to guide discussions of international participation in the program. A May 25, 1982, briefing for NASA 

Headquarters officials captured the state of thinking on international involvement in the space station. Pedersen identified four “key questions to be 

answered”: 

•	 Can such a major project as a space station 

be undertaken on an international basis and 

still be effectively managed? 

•	 Don’t major international space projects just 

result in technology leakage abroad? 

•	 Is international involvement consistent with possible U.S. military utilization of the space station? 

•	 What are the quids pro quo for foreign contributions to a space station?24 

This 1982 artist’s conception depicts a 

mature space station configuration, which 

includes two solar panels to provide 

power; several modules for command, 

habitation, and experimental activity; a 

Shuttle-sized unpressurized rack for the 

storage of payloads; advanced remote 

manipulator systems for the assembly of 

large structures and the servicing/storage 

of satellites and instruments; and a docking/utility hub that might serve in addition 

as a “safe haven” in case of emergency. 

Attached to the station in this picture is a 

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10 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

During the early days of task force operations, 

Hodge created a number of informal working 

groups. Most addressed technical issues, but two 

had as their focus more programmatic concerns. 

One was a “Program Planning Working Group” 

and was chaired by Robert Freitag. The other was 

the “International Cooperation Working Group.” It 

also was initially chaired by Freitag, but was soon 

taken over by Robert Lottmann, although Freitag 

stayed closely involved. These working groups had 

as members not only individuals from the task 

force, but also people from other offices at NASA 

Headquarters and from various field centers. 

Throughout the period covered in this study, the 

International Cooperation Working Group brought 

together people at the working levels of NASA to 

discuss international cooperation issues. 

Freitag and Lottmann used the working groups as 

tools for articulating the benefits of cooperation to 

working-level skeptics throughout the agency. They 

stressed that the additional financial contribution 

from potential partners would enhance the scope of 

the station and that the possibility of international 

cooperation would increase support for the program 

overall in the administration and Congress. They also 

argued that learning to work together on long-term 

complex projects could form the basis for cooperation on even more ambitious programs in the future. 

A series of interactions with potential partners 

during May and June 1982 had emphasized to 

John Hodge the high international interest in station involvement. In a July 30 memorandum to 

Kenneth Pedersen, Hodge noted that “international interest in our space station planning activity is 

now relatively high. Recent actions by ESA, 

Canada, and Japan suggest that this interest will be 

pursued. . . .” Hodge laid out a series of questions 

that had to be addressed to develop a task force 

approach to international cooperation, and he 

asked Pedersen for his ideas on them.25 

Pedersen’s response was a fourteen-page, singlespaced strategy memorandum. In it, he highlighted 

many of the issues that NASA would have to 

address in crafting its approach to space station 

cooperation. Among them were: 

1.	 When to Involve Other U.S. Government 

Agencies Interested in International Affairs. 

Pedersen noted that “NASA is responsible 

for making sure that all U.S. Government 

agencies or portion thereof that have foreign 

policy responsibilities are kept informed of 

activities.” In carrying out this responsibility, 

reported Pedersen, NASA was already keeping relevant State Department and 

Department of Defense offices informed, and 

had begun to brief the export control community on NASA’s planning. He noted that 

“other agencies such as [the Office of 

Science and Technology Policy], OMB, 

DOD, NSC [the National Security Council], 

and ACDA [the Arms Control and 

Disarmament Agency] are probably interested in the international aspects as well as the 

programmatic ones,” and he suggested that 

the Space Station Task Force include those 

aspects in its briefings to these organizations. 

2.	 Foreign Reaction to Military Involvement. 

Pedersen noted that “this is an important 

issue, since the interest and debate over the 

militarization of space is at an all-time high.” 

He thought that it was important for NASA 

“to be fairly straight forward at all times on 

the probability and level of DOD involvement expected. . . . We should be working 

to accommodate both civil and military uses 

within the basic design of the space station, 

so that one does not make the other impossible.” 

3.	 Technology Transfer. Pedersen noted that 

historically NASA’s cooperative programs 

had been structured carefully to avoid 

unwarranted technology transfer, particularly by avoiding relationships between U.S. 

and foreign industry that could lead to such 

transfers. He thought that “if we carefully 

choose the cooperative arrangements—for 

example, we might make sure that they are 

discrete hardware pieces with minimal interfaces—we can minimize the potential for 

technology transfer.”26 But Pedersen also 

noted “growing interest” in the Reagan 

administration in the topic of technology 

transfer.27 He saw “evidence of closer application of existing export guidelines and 

review of appropriate future steps in stanching the flow of advanced technology,” and 

he recognized the need for NASA to “maintain close and continuing contacts with the 

export control community.”28 

Pedersen also noted in his memorandum that 

foreign involvement in the station program would 

be certain to broaden the project’s base of support 

within both the administration and Congress. 

The Allies Are Interested 

Even before the formal kickoff of the Space 

Station Task Force’s international activities at a 

September 13, 1982, “International Orientation 

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Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 11 

These briefing slides show the space station program elements and the complex as envisioned for 1990. (NASA photo). 

Briefing,” a substantial amount of non-U.S. planning related to the space station had begun. NASA 

had adopted a strategy for its own planning efforts 

of not preparing any particular station design until 

both the missions such a station would carry out 

and the capabilities needed to implement those 

missions were identified.29 In January, Pedersen, in 

response to foreign inquiries about how best to 

proceed, had suggested to potential station partners that they adopt a similar approach. 

The response was not long in coming. On May 1, 

1982, Japan announced its intent to establish a 

Space Station Task Force reporting to the top-level 

Space Activities Commission as its link to the NASA 

station planning effort; that task force would involve 

other Japanese organizations as well as the Japanese 

National Space Development Agency (NASDA) in 

putting together a plan for Japanese involvement in 

the station.30 A mission requirement study was its initial activity.31 Top-level endorsement of the Japanese 

effort was provided during a June 1982 meeting in 

Washington between NASA Administrator Beggs 

and Minister Nakagawa of Japan’s Science and 

Technology Agency. 

On June 17, NASA Administrator Beggs met in 

Paris with ESA Director General Erik Quistgaard. 

Among the products of the meeting was an understanding that “ESA will fund, manage, and conduct 

a first study entitled ‘European Utilization Aspects 

of a U.S. Manned Space Station.’ This study will be 

requirements-oriented.”32 Canada’s National 

Research Council also initiated a governmentindustry study of possible Canadian missions that 

could be carried out aboard a station, but it did not 

get under way until several months later. 

NASA was not totally successful in keeping foreign attention focused on station missions rather 

than on station hardware. The June NASA-ESA 

understanding noted that “ESA will fund, manage, 

and conduct a second study with parallel 

European contracts, to investigate the European 

architectural and implementation implications of 

those requirements identified in the first study,”33 

and Japan and Canada began to study potential 

hardware contributions as well as mission requirements. In addition, both France and a GermanItalian team were studying, independent of ESA, 

future hardware concepts for a European manned 

program that could also form the basis for U.S.-

European cooperation. This was understandable, 

noted Pedersen in his August strategy memorandum to John Hodge, because of “‘political realities’; they have to justify spending their resources 

on a space station not only on potential space station utilization but on potential industrial return as 

well.” Nevertheless, urged Pedersen, “we must not 

let the emphasis on requirements get lost.”34 

Mission Requirements Studies 

In August 1982, NASA awarded eight contracts 

to U.S. aerospace firms to conduct independent but 

parallel requirements analysis studies. NASA’s plan 

was to combine the results of these eight studies 

and those being carried out by potential partners to 

help make the case that a station was justified. 

Pedersen addressed the September 13 

“International Orientation Briefing” at NASA 

Headquarters both on NASA’s general approach to 

space station cooperation and its plans for interactions during mission requirements studies. With 

respect to the former, he noted that the general 

principles that had guided NASA’s international 

activities in the past, appropriately modified, 

would apply to the station situation. With respect 

to the schedule for the mission analysis studies, 

Pedersen noted that “the mid-term contractors’ 

summaries would be closed reviews. They will be 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
12 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

conducted individually with each contractor 

because NASA does not want the studies to contaminate one another.” For this reason, he said, “the 

reviews will be restricted to NASA personnel.” 

However, immediately following these reviews, 

NASA would invite “foreign space agency representatives” to hear a NASA summary of the U.S. 

mid-term results and to present a mid-term status 

report on their own studies. The final review of the 

U.S. studies in February and March 1983 would be 

open, said Pedersen, and he invited the foreign 

study teams to attend and to present their final 

results at the same time. Final written reports 

would be exchanged among all study contractors, 

U.S. and foreign, in April. In adopting this 

approach, NASA was hoping to keep not only U.S. 

but also foreign study teams isolated from each 

other in the early stages of their efforts. In that way, 

the thinking went, NASA and the sponsoring nonU.S. space agencies would get the benefit of the 

independent ideas of all contractors, rather than 

have the various U.S. and non-U.S. study teams 

unduly influence one another.35 

Pedersen also announced that NASA would welcome at any time visits of foreign space agency 

representatives to NASA Headquarters (but not to 

NASA field centers) to discuss space station planning. He characterized as “premature” any discussion on potential foreign hardware contributions 

and modes of cooperation beyond the Phase A 

planning period.36 

There were several reasons for NASA deciding to 

deal only with representatives of foreign governments, and not individuals from non-U.S. industry.37 

For one thing, it was industrial contacts that were 

perceived as the most likely source of technology 

transfer. Also, from the start of station planning, 

NASA wanted to discourage the notion of international teaming during the design and development 

phases of the program. In the post-Apollo period, 

U.S. and European industries had teamed to study 

cooperative possibilities. While such transnational 

industrial teams, with each firm funded by its own 

government, ultimately did not emerge in the postApollo period, NASA believed that this could have 

limited its flexibility in structuring the post-Apollo 

cooperation. While European contractors were 

selected by ESA in large part to fulfill the requirement 

that national contributions to ESA be returned to that 

nation in approximately the same proportion, NASA 

may not have wanted to select the U.S. partner of a 

particular European firm as its contractor. The prohibition against foreign visits to NASA centers, even by 

government representatives, was intended to keep 

NASA’s possible partners from getting involved in 

intercenter conflicts over station concepts and to 

maintain Headquarters control over the international 

dimensions of the program. 

Several aspects of NASA’s posture at this time 

were troubling to potential partners, particularly in 

Europe. The principles for cooperation spelled out 

by Pedersen seemed to reflect the same “NASA as 

managing partner” approach that had been traditional. Europe believed that its accomplishments 

during the 1970s had earned it a larger voice in 

future cooperative undertakings. The exclusion of 

representatives of foreign industry from direct dealings with NASA and the prohibition against visits 

to field centers to discuss station planning were 

annoying. NASA’s European representative, 

Richard Barnes, who was sensitive to foreign perceptions, cabled a cautionary message to Pedersen 

in early September 1982: 

The history of the post-Apollo U.S./European 

dialogue, as well as more recent experience, 

suggests that there will be many occasions when 

a NASA action, taken for legitimate internal 

programmatic reasons, will be perceived by some 

Europeans as “evidence” of NASA lack of interest 

in European involvement. And of course those 

who want to see European space programs 

proceed in a direction independent of the U.S. 

are already looking for such evidence. Let’s give 

them as little opportunity as possible.38 

However, the undertone of skepticism in Europe 

regarding NASA’s seriousness about desiring significant space station cooperation was not pervasive, 

nor did it extend to other potential U.S. partners. 

During the rest of 1982 and early 1983, parallel 

mission requirements studies went on in the 

United States, Europe, Canada, and Japan. In addition, the general concept for the space station— 

known as “distributed architecture”—emerging 

from studies by NASA and its contractors was particularly congenial to international cooperation. In 

this concept, the space station would not be a single, large facility, but rather a complex of modules, 

trusses, and platforms to carry out various space 

station missions. This made it easier for a foreign 

partner to contribute a separate space station element that met the criterion of a “clean interface” 

with other aspects of the station. 

A major public symposium was held in mid1983 to review the status of space station planning. This symposium, organized by the American 

Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics for the 

Space Station Task Force, brought together members of the NASA planning groups, DOD, interested U.S. and foreign industrialists, the press, and 

representatives from Congress and foreign space 

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Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 13 

agencies. The main purpose of the symposium was 

to get everyone interested in the station program 

exposed to the most up-to-date information. In his 

keynote address, Administrator Beggs noted that the 

purpose of developing a space station “is, of course, 

to maintain our leadership.” But such leadership 

would be through cooperation, he suggested, saying 

that “the space station lends itself uniquely to 

international cooperation. If we can attract that 

international cooperation, then other nations will be 

cooperating with us in the resources that they 

spend, rather than competing with us.”39 

Summarizing NASA’s view of the international 

dimensions of space station planning to date, 

Kenneth Pedersen noted that: 

[W]e all recognize that the very scope and 

complexity of the space station process tends to 

suggest that foreign participation, if it takes place, 

is going to entail fairly sizeable financial and 

political commitments on their part. . . . I believe 

that when and if the time comes that we have the 

opportunity to proceed “full steam ahead” with 

the space station, they and their countries are 

going to be in a better position as a result of this 

[early involvement in NASA’s planning] activity 

to know what their interests are, to know what 

their level of participation might be, and in what 

areas that participation might be most mutually 

beneficial.40 

While his assessment of the status of international involvement was positive, Pedersen also 

added a caution. He noted that “NASA has been 

aware throughout this space station study that we 

do not have an approved program. . . . Thus we 

have not wanted to create unnecessary and unwarranted expectations that would come back to 

haunt us. . . . We at NASA and the countries that 

have been working with us have tried to be as open 

and candid with one another as we could in terms 

of the state of play, the current situation with 

respect to the decision-making process, and what 

we believed a realistic schedule would be.”41 

In mid-1983, this caveat was quite in order. 

President Reagan in April had directed his top policy-making body for space, the Senior Interagency 

Group (Space), to prepare over the summer a recommendation on whether he should approve the 

space station program and include funding for it in 

the fiscal year 1985 budget.42 NASA had found few 

allies within the U.S. government in support of the 

station; the interagency process was not producing 

the hoped-for endorsement of the station. The issue 

of potential international cooperation in a space 

station was not being addressed at the top levels of 

the U.S. government; the focus was on the more 

fundamental policy issue of whether there would 

be a space station program at all. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 15 

Making the Making the

Space Station International Space Station International

Resistance to International Involvement 

Surfaces 

By mid-1983, it had become clear to those leading 

NASA’s effort to gain support for the space station 

among other government agencies that the potential 

for international involvement was not a strong selling 

point. From the start, Pedersen and others had recognized that the possibility of technology transfer associated with such involvement would be of concern to 

the national security community and to administration 

appointees at DOD. However, they were surprised to 

discover that the individuals within the Department of 

State overseeing the foreign policy aspects of science 

and technology were not enthusiastic about the potential of international cooperation in the space station 

program to serve broader, foreign policy objectives. 

The technology transfer issue first surfaced in terms 

of 1982 requests by U.S. firms carrying out the space 

station mission requirements studies to exchange 

information with their European counterparts. 

Approval of these requests required the issuance of a 

Technical Data Exchange Agreement under the provisions of the Munitions Control Act, which was administered by the Department of State. DOD was also 

closely involved in the approval process. 

To lay the basis for the anticipated approval of 

these requests and to make sure that concerned 

offices within DOD and the State Department were 

aware of the overall context of planning for international involvement in the space station program, 

Robert Freitag briefed officials from DOD’s Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering and the State Department’s Office of 

Oceans, Environment, and International Science and 

Technology in mid-1982. The reception to the briefings was reported to be “very good,” at least in terms 

of a willingness to listen to what NASA had to say.43 

However, approval for the data exchanges was not 

forthcoming. NASA tried to push the process along in 

late 1982 by appealing to higher level officials in the 

State Department and DOD. Talking points prepared 

for a meeting with DOD noted: 

•	 There is no need to transfer any sensitive 

technology at this point. . . . We are not 

funding sensitive technology such as design 

details, fabrication or procurement 

information. 

•	 In the RFP [Request for Proposals for the 

mission requirements studies], even though 

we did not envision sensitive technology 

transfer, we wanted to make it clear that the 

NASA contract award did not constitute 

approval for any technology transfer. We 

stated in the RFP that U.S. companies must 

follow normal export control procedures. 

•	 . . . We understand that several U.S. proposals to 

exchange basic mission needs and general 

systems information have not yet been approved 

despite more than four months of review. 

•	 Some concerns have been expressed within 

DOD that consideration of these concerns 

now is “premature”: 

–	 The U.S. has no commitment to a space 

station program; 

–	 The U.S. has no policy regarding 

international involvement in a space 

station program; 

–	 Approval would be a “blank check” for 

technology transfer.44 

NASA believed that the reason for DOD concern 

was that there had been a change in the individuals 

controlling the approval process. Apparently, the 

export licenses had been recommended for 

approval by the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Research and Technology, Richard DeLauer, but that 

recommendation had been rescinded as new 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
16 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

At this meeting of the White House Cabinet Council of Commerce and Trade on December 1, 1983, approval of space station 

development was the major agenda item. Key personnel in attendance are: Budget Director David Stockman (second from left), 

Vice President George Bush (fourth from left), Science Advisor George Keyworth (center), President Ronald Reagan (second from 

right), Secretary of Commerce Malcom Baldridge (third from right), Presidential Advisor Ed Meese (fourth from right), and Gil Rye of 

the National Security Council (near door). (White House photo C18695-11). 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Richard 

Perle and his deputy, Stephen Bryen, had been successful in wresting export control responsibility 

away from DeLauer.45 Both Perle and Bryen were 

known as “hard-liners” on technology transfer; 

having them involved in approving international 

involvement in the space station did not bode well. 

On November 3, 1982, NASA appealed for help 

to the Under Secretary of State for Security 

Assistance and Science and Technology, William 

Schneider, making essentially the same points as 

had been made to DOD.46 What the space agency 

discovered in these and other interactions with the 

State Department was that neither Schneider nor 

the Assistant Secretary for Oceans, Environment, 

and International Science and Technology, James 

Malone, were supporters of the space station program or of international cooperation in it, and they 

shared Perle’s and Bryen’s concerns regarding technology transfer.47 

Ultimately, DOD’s reservations blocked the 

issuance of export licenses. NASA wrote to the 

eight mission requirements contractors on 

December 14, noting that “consideration of these 

cases within the export control community has 

become an extended process—the principal concern being that since a space station program has 

not yet been given a new start, it would be premature to have any formal arrangements with foreign 

industry.” Given this situation, NASA suggested 

that “in the short time remaining until the final 

report is due in February 1983, we suggest that you 

restrict your contacts with foreign sources to information which does not require a license.”48 

The recognition that plans for international 

cooperation could be torpedoed by the opposition 

of people such as Bryen, Schneider, and Malone 

was sobering to the advocates of such cooperation, 

and particularly to Kenneth Pedersen and his top 

staff person on the space station, Margaret (Peggy) 

Finarelli. Finarelli had joined NASA in 1981 after 

tours of duty in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 17 

the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the 

Carter administration’s White House Office of 

Science and Technology Policy. She was thus very 

sensitive to the concerns of the national security community and their potential for posing an insuperable 

barrier to NASA’s plans. Her sensitivities were viewed 

as excessive by long-time advocates of cooperation 

within NASA, and this became a source of some tension between the Space Station Task Force and the 

Office of International Affairs as the station decision 

process unfolded in 1983.49 

The April–December 1983 period was recognized as critical by both advocates of the space station overall and those who wanted the station to be 

international. Recognizing that strong advocacy of 

the latter could jeopardize getting approval to go 

ahead with the station at all, during this period, 

those heading NASA’s interactions with the White 

House and other agencies chose not to emphasize 

the international potentials of the program. This 

approach troubled some of the members of the 

Space Station Task Force, but it was seen as a tactical necessity by Beggs, Pedersen, and Finarelli.50 

The Space Station Decision Process and 

International Cooperation 

NASA’s first attempt to gain President Reagan’s 

approval for the space station had come in mid1982. An interagency study of space policy, which 

began in late 1981 under the leadership of the 

White House Office of Science and Technology 

Policy, was nearing completion, and Ronald 

Reagan was being asked to approve a new statement of national space policy. In addition, Reagan 

had agreed to attend the landing of the fourth 

Space Shuttle mission in California on July 4; this 

would provide an occasion for a presidential statement on space policy. In attempting to convince 

the White House to announce station approval as 

part of its new space policy on the occasion of the 

Shuttle landing, NASA Administrator Beggs wrote 

Presidential Advisor Edwin Meese in late May. His 

case for the station stressed its use as both a laborato-ry and an operations base. He noted the challenge to U.S. space leadership from Soviet, 

European, and Japanese accomplishments. He 

argued that a major new project was needed to 

maintain the human spaceflight development skills 

of NASA and its industrial partners. As a final argument, Beggs noted that “the space station could 

also have major foreign policy advantages for the 

U.S. Both the European Space Agency and the 

Japanese are interested in participating in its development and would contribute substantial funding 

if they are given a significant role.”51 

NASA’s attempts to gain Reagan’s endorsement 

of the station at this early point were not successful; his advisors thought such a decision was premature. Thus, Reagan’s July 4 speech at the Shuttle 

landing said only that “we must look aggressively 

to the future by . . . establishing a more permanent 

presence in space.”52 The station per se was not 

mentioned. 

Perhaps the most important feature of the new 

National Space Policy announced on July 4 was 

the transfer of leadership responsibility for developing space policy within the Reagan administration from the Office of Science and Technology 

Policy to the National Security Council. The policy 

directive established a Senior Interagency Group 

(SIG) on Space, chaired by the Assistant to the 

President for National Security Affairs, “to provide 

a forum to all Federal agencies for their policy 

views, to review and advise on proposed changes 

to national space policy, and to provide for orderly and rapid referral of space policy issues to the 

President for decisions as necessary.”53 The space 

station became one of the early items on the SIG 

(Space) agenda. 

Responsible for space policy matters within the 

National Security Council staff at this time was Gil 

Rye, an Air Force colonel who had worked on 

space issues within the Pentagon before being 

detailed to the White House. While still at the 

Pentagon, Rye had been the Air Force representative at the NASA space station planning workshop 

in November 1981, and by 1982, he had become 

personally convinced that it was in the U.S. national interest to develop a space station. This view was 

at variance with the Air Force position, which was 

very skeptical of the value of humans in space and 

which was centered on making the NASA Shuttle 

responsive to DOD requirements before any major 

new NASA initiatives were begun. Having Rye as 

an ally in the White House proved invaluable to 

NASA during the 1982–1984 period, both in getting Reagan’s approval for the space station and in 

making international participation a major feature 

of the station initiative. 

Following its inability to gain an early space 

station endorsement by the White House, NASA 

decided to wait until 1983 for its next attempt at 

program approval. A dual strategy was devised. 

NASA would work through the prescribed SIG 

(Space) process to attempt to gain the support of 

other government agencies for the station project, 

while at the same time NASA’s leadership would 

try to reach the President Reagan and his top 

advisors directly to convince them of the merits of 

the undertaking.54 Meanwhile, the Space Station 

Task Force would continue its programmatic liaiMonographs in Aerospace History 
18 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

son activities with potential partners, so that there 

was a basis for collaborative action should a station program with international involvement be 

approved. 

In support of this strategy, the task force formed 

a unit called the Concept Development Group. Its 

task was to integrate the results of field center studies, the eight industry studies of space station 

requirements, and any input from potential international partners. The chair of the group was 

Luther Powell of the Marshall Space Flight Center, 

who had had extensive experience in cooperation 

with Europe during the Spacelab program. 

International representatives participated in the 

activities of the Concept Development Group and 

were involved in many of the studies of requirements and of systems and subsystems carried out 

during 1982 and 1983. 

In the fall of 1982, SIG (Space) formed a working 

group on the space station. This group was chaired by 

NASA’s John Hodge, and it consisted of representatives from the State Department, DOD, the 

Department of Commerce, the CIA, and the Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency. Individuals from 

the Office of Management and Budget and the Office 

of Science and Technology Policy participated as 

observers. That group first met in October 1982, and 

it laid out a schedule that called for a report to SIG 

(Space) on policy options for the space station no later 

than November 1983.55 

It did not take long to discover that there was 

substantial skepticism among some members of 

the working group regarding the wisdom of international participation in the station; this skepticism 

reflected the general attitudes of those at the policy level in DOD and the State Department. The 

discussion at the group’s second meeting on 

November 22 turned to the issue of State 

Department approval of exchanges of requirements data between U.S. and European firms carrying out mission analysis studies (as discussed 

earlier). The State Department representative noted 

that approval was being delayed even though 

“there do not appear to be any objections to the 

merits of the cases,” but because “DOD has a concern which it has not yet resolved regarding the 

broad policy issue of whether there should be 

international participation in a Space Station.”56 

Most of the SIG (Space) working group’s time 

between October 1982 and April 1983 was spent in 

developing the specific terms of reference for its 

study. Once that agreement was reached, Rye decided to elevate the political pressure behind the study 

request by having President Reagan, rather than the 

chair of SIG (Space), sign the terms of reference. 

The directive by Reagan that set the guidelines for 

the formal SIG (Space) study of the space station, 

signed on April 11, 1983, called out “the foreign 

policy implications, including arms control implications, of a manned Space Station” as one of five policy issues for examination; international cooperation 

was not explicitly mentioned.57 A few days earlier, 

James Beggs had met with Reagan in a session 

arranged by Rye. The purpose to alert President 

Reagan of issues involved in the decision on whether 

to develop a station. The briefing prepared for 

Reagan noted that the space station “provides broad 

opportunity for international cooperation,” but this 

was only one of seven benefits identified as flowing 

from the station program.58 

As the study process proceeded in the late 

spring, it became clear that the Hodge interagency 

group had become bogged down in technical 

details and multiple options and was unlikely to 

produce a policy paper suitable for SIG (Space) 

consideration. Recognizing this, Gil Rye created a 

smaller group to develop such a paper.59 The NASA 

member of the group was Peggy Finarelli. She continued the approach of downplaying the international aspects of the program; her approach was 

not totally appreciated by Hodge and others in the 

Space Station Task Force, who also may have resented her taking over the NASA lead in White House 

deliberations on the station. While Robert Freitag 

may have been the most influential of the veteran 

NASA staffers in pushing for making the space station international and Kenneth Pedersen was the 

conceptualizer of NASA’s approach to station cooperation, Finarelli’s tactical efforts over the May 

1983–January 1984 period were crucial to creating 

the domestic basis for the station partnership.60 

In August, the SIG (Space) process resulted in an 

options paper for President Reagan on the station 

program; however, the opponents of the program 

would not agree to sending the paper forward for 

presidential decision. Given Reagan’s aversion to 

addressing nonconsensus recommendations, this 

effectively blocked a presidential decision. In particular, vigorous opposition by Secretary of 

Defense Caspar Weinberger made it clear that 

DOD not only would not participate in the station, 

but also would actively oppose allocating substantial budget resources to a NASA station aimed at 

civilian uses. The schedule for SIG deliberations 

had been accelerated to reach a recommendation 

in time for fiscal year 1985 budget submissions in 

September, but after a meeting of SIG on August 

12, it became evident that a positive recommendation to Reagan to proceed with the station was not 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 19 

likely to emerge from the group. 

Given this situation, Rye decided to seek other 

means of gaining presidential approval. During the 

September–November 1983 period, NASA’s assessment of the prospects for gaining White House permission to move ahead with its highest priority 

project were very pessimistic, even through the 

agency had included start-up funds for the project in 

its fiscal year 1985 budget submission.61 

Ultimately, NASA’s second approach to gaining 

space station approval—convincing Reagan and his 

advisors of the merits of the program—bore fruit. Still, 

international considerations did not play a visible 

role. President Reagan, through an October 4 

National Security Council memorandum, requested 

NASA to identify its priorities in meeting the goal of 

space leadership that had been set in the 1982 

National Space Policy statement. In his reply, James 

Beggs said that he was “absolutely convinced that a 

space station is the next bold step in space. . . . It is

an essential piece of our long range plan to reap the 

full commercial and scientific benefits of space.” 

Nowhere in the response were the benefits of international cooperation mentioned.62 

Reagan’s decision to approve the space station was 

finally made in early December. Wanting to involve a 

broader range of agencies in the discussions than just 

the members of SIG (Space), thereby outflanking station opponents in that body, Rye and another station 

supporter on the White House staff, Cabinet Secretary 

Craig Fuller, scheduled a December 1 meeting of the 

Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade to discuss 

the station in Reagan’s presence. The model of the 

space station that NASA prepared for the meeting did 

not show any foreign contributions to the project. 

The meeting went well, and a few days later, NASA 

learned that President Reagan had given his blessing 

to the station. However, the issue of whether the 

space station should be an international effort was not 

addressed. 

Adding the International Element 

Although Reagan approved the space station in 

early December, the question of how that approval 

would be announced was not decided at that time. 

Within a few weeks, however, White House political 

advisors concluded that the station was the kind of 

long-range initiative that fit into the Reagan’s plans for 

his State of the Union address scheduled for late 

January. Suggestions on what he should say about the 

station were solicited by the White House speech 

writing office, and Rye, Finarelli, and others saw an 

opportunity to link a presidential invitation for international participation with the announcement of station approval. 

NASA was ready to seize that opportunity. 

Pedersen and Hodge had met as long ago as July 

1983 to identify the policy issues that had to be 

addressed for NASA to proceed with international 

participation, once presidential approval for the station program was obtained. In a follow-up memorandum, Pedersen had noted the major issues: 

1.	 What space station “components” are not


eligible for cooperation?


Discussion . . . NASA still needs to decide 

whether certain elements, while requiring a clean 

interface, may still be elements which the U.S. 

should build. 

2.	 Foreign Involvement in Phase B 

Discussion . . . Should NASA undertake Phase 

B’s on all space station elements, while foreign 

space agencies fund independent parallel Phase 

B studies on space station elements in which 

they have a particular interest? Should NASA 

entertain Joint Phase B studies?. . . At what point 

does NASA begin to drive individual countries to 

particular ele-ments, or should we encourage 

multiple approaches by all so that natural “fits” 

fall out? 

3.	 Guidelines for international participation 

Discussion . . . To what extent do we want to 

establish de facto minimum contributions (either 

in terms of funding or in elements)? 

4.	 Study Agreements, MOUs, and Quids Pro Quo 

Discussion . . . Phase B study agreements would 

be desirable from the viewpoint of our partners 

and NASA for several reasons: a) they would 

provide the framework for information exchange 

and industry-to-industry relationships; and b) 

they could strengthen foreign space agencies’ 

position . . . for funding and support. 

. . . One major element that must be reviewed 

now are potential quids pro quo that NASA will 

want to offer in exchange for hardware 

contributions. NASA’s experience with the [Space 

Transportation System] program suggests some 

very good examples that would be appropriate to 

a space station: NASA commitment to buy 

additional hardware, preferred access to the 

space station on a variety of uses, reduced (or 

no) costs for utilization, and opportunities for 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
20 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

flight of foreign personnel. Of course, formulas 

for these would have to be worked out so that 

the benefits match the size of the contributions. 

. . . In addition, I think NASA should consider 

international cooperation on the operation of the 

space station, as NASA and ESA have agreed to 

do on the Space Telescope, and consider how 

that should be factored into the equation. 

5. Technology Transfer and DOD Concerns 

Discussion . . . Prior to Phase B, NASA needs to 

develop a set of ground rules for both 

Headquarters and the Centers on information 

exchange with our foreign partners. These will 

not only be useful for reference for NASA 

employees, but will also demonstrate to the 

export control community that NASA is aware of 

the current technology transfer concerns, and 

doing something about them.63 

At some point in the fall of 1983, the foreign 

policy potential of the space station had come to 

the attention of individuals in the Office of the 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Bureau 

of European and Canadian Affairs of the State 

Department. There was more receptivity to that 

potential among these individuals than there had 

been from the science and technology elements of 

the State Department. As plans for announcing the 

space station in the 1984 State of the Union 

address moved forward, Finarelli at NASA and 

State Department officials Thomas Niles and 

Arnold Kanter were actively discussing the benefits 

of station cooperation in the context of broader foreign policy concerns. 

These discussions, and the recognition that the 

issue of international cooperation had to be 

addressed in some way before approval of the 

space station program was announced by 

President Reagan, led to a January 18 meeting convened by the chair of SIG (Space), Special Assistant 

to the President for National Security Affairs Robert 

McFarlane, and his deputy, Admiral John 

Poindexter. Attending the meeting were NASA 

Administrator James Beggs, Under Secretary of 

State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleberger, 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle, 

and CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates. This highlevel group not only decided to solicit international participation in the space station; they also 

chose to have the invitation to participate come 

from President Reagan as he announced his 

approval of the station program in the State of the 

Union address seven days later. The top-level 

group decided that Beggs, acting as the Reagan’s 

personal emissary, would travel to key foreign capitals to extend the presidential invitation in person. 

The text of the invitation as it was to appear in the 

State of the Union address was hurriedly drafted on 

the evening of January 18 and approved by the 

meeting participants the next day. There were no 

interagency meetings or policy papers devoted to 

the cooperative proposal, nor any formal assessment of the risks associated with international 

cooperation. This was a decision made by top policy officials, not a ratification of staff proposals. The 

issue of international participation was not separately raised with President Reagan; his approval 

came in the form of overall approval of the speech 

text.64 

Before he made the State of the Union speech, 

Reagan sent a personal message to Chancellor 

Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, 

President Francois Mitterrand of France, Prime 

Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom, 

Prime Minister Bettino Craxi of Italy, Prime 

Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan, and Prime 

Minister Pierre Trudeau of Canada: 

During my State of the Union address this 

Wednesday, January 25, I will be announcing the 

United States’ intention to proceed with 

development of a manned Space Station 

program. It is my hope that we can work together 

on this project. To develop this cooperative effort 

I have asked James M. Beggs, the Administrator 

of the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA), to act as my personal 

emissary and meet with senior officials of your 

government in the near future.65 

Thus when Ronald Reagan went before Congress on 

January 25, 1984, and invited other countries to participate in the space station project he had just 

announced, that presidential invitation came as no surprise to the leaders of those countries that the United 

States hoped to engage in the station partnership. 

Extending the Invitation 

The first step in arranging the trip of Administrator 

Beggs was to develop “terms of reference” to guide 

him in his meetings. These guidelines were drafted by 

NASA and circulated for comment by the National 

Security Council to other agencies that were members of SIG (Space). The staffs of those agencies, 

which had been bypassed in the rapid process of 

approving President Reagan’s invitation, used this 

opportunity to make sure that they would be 

involved in preparing a “report on approaches to 

international cooperation” for Reagan’s approval 

after the Beggs trip was completed.66 

The approved terms of reference for the Beggs trip 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 21 

were issued by the President’s Special Assistant for of a permanently manned space station, with 

National Security Affairs, Robert McFarlane, who was emphasis on expected capabilities, modular 

also chairman of SIG (Space). McFarlane wrote Beggs design, anticipated availability, and relationship 

on February 25, saying that “the President would like with the President’s overall civil and 

for you to travel as soon as possible to appropriate for- commercial space program. 

eign capitals as his personal emissary and meet with 

senior officials to discuss potential international • Assess the extent of foreign interest in program 

cooperation” in the space station, with the objective participation. The assessment should include the 

being “to agree upon a framework for collaboration level of overall interest, the expected benefits to 

on this program which could be announced at the be achieved, and the foreign resource 

London Summit in June 1984.”67 The idea of includ­ contributions that might be forthcoming. 

ing station cooperation as an agenda item on the 

annual seven-nation economic summit had come • During the discussions with foreign officials, 

from Peggy Finarelli and Thomas Niles and had been the Administrator should avoid making specific 

embraced by those within the State Department commitments regarding international 

responsible for summit planning.68 cooperation until other U.S. government 

agencies have had the opportunity to review 

The terms of reference for the trip specified that in the implications.69 

his discussions with foreign officials, Beggs should: 

• Explain NASA’s current plans for development 

President Ronald Reagan announcing the decision to build a space station during the January 25, 1984, “State of the Union 

Address,” while Vice President George Bush and House Speaker Thomas “Tip” O’Neill look on. (NASA photo). 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
22 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

The original plans for the Beggs trip called for the 

use of commercial airlines. Vice President George 

Bush, who had offered quiet support for the international initiative all along, suggested to the NASA 

Administrator that he request the use of one of the Air 

Force planes available to the White House; Bush indicated that he would support such a request.70 

Accordingly, on February 19, Beggs wrote White 

House Chief of Staff James Baker requesting the use of 

a government airplane, arguing that it was “justified 

and appropriate” because of “the President’s direct 

instruction, the extremely tight timetable, and the 

importance which space station has assumed here 

and abroad as a central feature of this 

Administration’s leadership program.”71 

The plane was provided by the White House, and 

Beggs and an entourage that included Gil Rye from 

the National Security Council staff, Phil Culbertson, 

John Hodge, Ken Pedersen, Peggy Finarelli, and Lyn 

Wigbels from NASA, and Mark Platt and Michael 

Michalik from the State Department left Washington 

on March 3. They traveled to London, Bonn, Rome, 

and Paris and flew directly from Paris to Tokyo, returning to Washington on March 13. After a few days 

home, the group visited Ottawa. At each stop, Beggs 

formally reiterated Reagan’s invitation to consider 

participation in the U.S. space station program, and 

he tried to respond to questions and concerns. 

At every stop, Beggs and his group met with space 

officials and with the highest ranking nonspace officials available, as follows: 

•	 London—with the minister of state for industry 

and information technology and the science 

advisor (Prime Minister Thatcher and the foreign secretary were meeting outside of London 

with French President Mitterrand) 

•	 Bonn—with the minister for research and technology and the under secretary of the foreign 

ministry (Prime Minister Kohl and the foreign 

minister were in Washington) 

•	 Rome—with Prime Minister Craxi, the science minister, and the head of the National 

Research Council. 

• Paris—with President Mitterrand, the foreign 

minister, and the minister of industry and 

research (Beggs also met with ESA executives 

and addressed a meeting of that agency’s 

political governing board, the ESA Council.) 

• Tokyo—with Prime Minister Nakasone, the 

foreign minister, and the minister for science 

and technology (Beggs also spoke to the 

Keidanren, the influential federation of 

Japanese industries.) 

•	 Ottawa—with the minister of state for science 

and technology, the science advisor, and the 

president of the National Research Council 

One issue in every discussion was the size and cost 

of the contribution for which NASA was hoping. 

Beggs had asked Ken Pedersen in January for an estimate of what a reasonable expectation might be. 

Pedersen’s response noted that Europe had contributed approximately 12 percent of the costs of 

developing the Space Transportation System and that 

it was “reasonable to expect similar percentage contributions from these countries to Space Station.” He 

noted that the German estimate for a potential space 

station contribution was $1.5 billion and that Canada 

was considering a station contribution that “would 

cost roughly the same” as the $100 million Canada 

had spent on the Space Shuttle remote manipulator 

system. Pedersen thought that “it is probably not realistic” to expect Japan’s contribution to be half that of 

Europe, but he noted that the pressurized module that 

Japan was considering “would cost Japan at least 

$500 million to develop given their current lack of 

related [research and development] experience.”72 

Upon his return from Europe and Japan, Beggs 

wrote to Secretary of State George Shultz on March 

16, which summarized his assessment of the trip to 

date. He told the Shultz that: 

The reaction so far to the President’s call for 

international cooperation has been both strongly 

positive and openly appreciative. It has been 

positive in the sense that our principal Allies are 

moving quickly, or have already moved, to take 

political decisions to participate. And their 

reactions clearly show appreciation for the major 

foreign policy benefits that will flow from open 

and collaborative cooperation on such a bold, 

visible and imaginative project.73 

On the basis of the March trips, NASA judged 

that Italy, Germany, and Japan had in essence 

already made the political decision, at least in 

principle, to participate and that France was also 

likely, after tough bargaining, to be involved. The 

reception in Great Britain had been the coolest on 

the trip, and the uncertainty of an upcoming 

national election made it impossible for Canada to 

indicate its commitment to cooperation. It seemed 

as if European cooperation would be organized 

through ESA, rather than on the basis of bilateral 

relationships between the United States and specific European countries.74 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 23 

After his round of visits to foreign capitals was 

over, James Beggs wrote a letter to each country he 

had visited to summarize his understandings, clarify issues that had been raised, and lay out the next 

steps. He reiterated the basic U.S. position that: 

President Reagan has committed the U.S. to 

building an $8B fully functional space station to 

be operational by the early 1990s, but has also set 

the stage for working together to develop a more 

expansive international space station with even 

greater benefits and capabilities for all to use. 

Thus, we are inviting your Government to take a 

close look at our plans and concepts and then, 

based on your long-term interests and goals, share 

with us your ideas for cooperation that will 

expand the capabilities of the space station.75 

In person and in writing, the United States had 

now extended an invitation for international participation in the space station. Such cooperation had 

been escalated from a possibility discussed among 

space agencies to a highly visible initiative of the 

U.S. president. In the months ahead, the United

States would discover whether a framework for 

accepting that invitation could be developed. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 25 

The Partners The Partners

Accept the Invitation Accept the Invitation

Introduction 

In the first months of 1984, the hope of the 

United States was that its invitation to participate 

in the space station program would be quickly 

accepted, at least in principle, by political leaders 

in Europe, Japan, and Canada. It was also hoped 

that detailed negotiations on the terms and conditions of that participation could then commence, 

leading to the signing of initial cooperative agreements by the end of 1984. The terms of reference 

for the trip of James Beggs directed him to seek 

agreement on “a framework for collaboration” on 

the space station, “which could be announced at 

the London summit” in June 1984.76 Such early 

agreement was not feasible, however; it took until 

the first months of 1985 for the political foundation 

for the station partnership to be established. This 

section describes the steps that led to European, 

Japanese, and Canadian acceptance of the U.S. 

invitation to consider engaging themselves with 

the space station program. 

Early Agreement Sought 

The idea of including the station invitation as an 

agenda item for the London Economic summit 

arose out of conversations between NASA’s Peggy 

Finarelli and Thomas Niles of the State 

Department’s Bureau of European-Canadian 

Affairs, after the basic decision to invite international participation in the station had already been 

taken. Niles remembers that: 

Having seen this proposal, my colleagues and I 

in the State Department who were responsible 

for the Department’s participation in planning for 

the Summit concluded that this was an 

appropriate initiative. We based this conclusion 

on the obvious need for initiatives in connection 

with the Summit, the fact that the Summit 

participants were the obvious choices to join 

with us in the space station, and the reality that 

kicking a proposal of the magnitude of the space 

station up to the Head of State/Government level, 

through the Summit process, is often the best 

way to get a decision.77 

At a January 30 planning meeting for the 

London Economic Summit, President Reagan 

approved the notion of asking other summit participants to issue a statement indicating their intent to 

participate in the space station program. The head 

of summit preparations in the United States was H. 

Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for 

Economic Affairs. He and his colleagues in the 

other six summit countries were known as 

“Sherpas.” The Sherpas met on February 17–19; all 

seemed open to the idea of having the summit 

partners declare that they “agree in principle to 

cooperate in the development of an international 

space station, demonstrating that free nations will 

continue to use outer space for peaceful purposes 

and for the benefit of mankind.”78 

The results of the NASA Administrator’s rapid 

trip, however, suggested that much work would 

have to be done if any agreement were to be 

reached in time for the summit. Beggs wrote Wallis 

that he had come to understand during his trip 

that: “the Summit declaration is . . . extremely 

important to NASA’s counterpart technical agencies in these other countries. To them it represents 

the political underpinnings necessary to proceed— 

analogous to the President’s State of the Union 

guidance to us.”79 

In addition to time needed for each potential 

partner to develop domestic political support for 

participation in the space station program, two 

issues of concern emerged at almost every stop on 

the Beggs trip. While not insurmountable obstacles 

to collaboration, they suggested that tough negotiations would be required before final commitment 

to international participation could be obtained. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
26 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

One was technology transfer. In his follow-up letter to those he had met on his trip, Beggs recognized that “technology transfer has been an 

increasing concern on all our parts in the past few 

years, and we will need to work together to make 

sure we are protecting our mutual technology 

bases in this partnership.”80 The other issue of general concern was the extent of U.S. military 

involvement in the space station. Here, the U.S. 

position had been carefully crafted to reflect both 

anticipated foreign sensitivities and to be acceptable within the U.S. government. Beggs told potential partners that: 

The U.S. space station program is a civil program 

which will be funded entirely out of NASA’s 

budget, with no national security funds used. . . .

The space station that the President directed 

NASA to build is a civil space station. Of course, 

like the shuttle, the space station will be 

available to users. If there are any national 

security users, like national and international 

users, they will be able to use the facility. As 

provided in the Outer Space Treaty, however, all 

activity on the space station will be limited to 

peaceful, nonaggressive functions.81 

Beggs also reported that “our principal allies are 

moving quickly, or have already moved, to take 

political decisions to participate.”82 This may have 

overstated the situation somewhat. On one hand, 

having the invitation to participate come from the 

U.S. President and be extended to other heads of

government had changed the stakes. The preceding 

two years of discussions at the technical level, and 

the biases toward collaboration that had emerged 

from those discussions, were transformed into an 

issue high on the policy agenda. No ally wanted to 

be in a position, without compelling reasons, to 

refuse President Reagan’s public invitation. On the 

other hand, all three potential partners—Japan, 

Canada, and Europe—were in the midst of their 

own internal debates over the future direction of 

their space efforts. Accepting the U.S. invitation, 

even in principle, implied that a significant share of 

their space budgets over the coming decade would 

have to be channeled into a partnership with the 

United States. Beggs had made it clear that the U.S. 

desire was for significant contributions to the station, roughly equivalent to 10 to 20 percent of the 

partners’ overall space budgets for the next decade. 

Whatever their leanings toward accepting Ronald 

Reagan’s invitation, in few of the potential partners 

had there yet been enough discussion to make their 

leaders willing to make a firm political commitment 

to collaboration of that character and scope.83 

As a followup to the Beggs trip and in preparation for the summit, Gil Rye, Peggy Finarelli, and 

Robert Freitag made an April trip to Europe, meeting with both space agency officials and summit 

Sherpas. Their discussions reinforced the sense that 

some in Europe would be cautious about making a 

commitment to cooperation at the summit. They 

also found that the smaller member states of ESA, 

which were not part of the summit process, were 

concerned about a summit declaration that could 

commit them to additional contributions to ESA. 

There was limited enthusiasm for the station proposal in some of these states, both because their 

industries did not see the prospect for significant 

business in the undertaking and because finance 

ministries, almost always opposed to increasing 

space budgets, had more influence than space 

advocates in smaller ESA member countries. 

The potential for international participation in 

the U.S. space station was a “talking point” on 

President Reagan’s agenda for his private meetings 

with each of the other six leaders at the London 

Economic Summit, which took place June 7–9; the 

issue was not discussed during the formal plenary 

sessions of the summit leaders. However, as they 

emerged from one of those meetings, the seven 

leaders encountered a large model of the station 

that (unlike the model that NASA had brought to 

the White House the preceding December) included representations of potential foreign contributions; this was a carefully staged opportunity for 

President Reagan to discuss his invitation to participate. NASA’s Langley Research Center had prepared the detailed station model, which the U.S. 

summit delegation (including Gil Rye and Peggy 

Finarelli) had carried to London; twenty to thirty 

minutes of lively discussion and a “photo opportunity” ensued as the summit leaders gathered 

around the model. 

The summit communiqué was cautious in its language, saying (in its final substantive paragraph) that: 

We believe that manned space stations are the 

kind of programme that provides a stimulus for 

technological development leading to 

strengthened economies and improved quality of 

life. Such stations are being launched in the 

framework of national or international 

programmes. In that context each of our 

countries will consider carefully the generous 

and thoughtful invitation received from the 

President of the United States to participate in 

the development of such a station by the United 

States. We welcome the intention of the United 

States to report at the next Summit on 

international participation in their programme.84 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 27 

The London Economic Summit of June 7–9, 1984, during which the space station was a major topic of discussion. Left to right: 

President Reagan (United States), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom), Foreign Minister Graf von Lambsdorf 

(Germany), and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone (Japan). (NASA photo). 

While this statement was less of an endorsement 

than had been proposed to the summit Sherpas in 

February, the noncommittal language of the communiqué accurately reflected the state of affairs in 

June 1984.85 Even so, it was an endorsement of the 

station concept and thanked Ronald Reagan for his 

invitation. The inclusion of station cooperation on 

the agenda for the 1985 summit was particularly 

significant. It was intended to encourage speedy 

decision-making in Europe, Japan, and Canada, 

because any delays or breakdowns in discussions 

over acceptance of President Reagan’s invitation 

would have to be reported back to the summit 

leaders at their next get-together. Although more 

time would be needed to find ways in which the 

U.S. invitation and the separate space goals and 

ambitions of Europe, Japan, and Canada could be 

combined in ways acceptable to all partners, there 

was now a deadline to provide a focus for deliberations around the world. 

Even creating an initial agreement to work together in seeking such a melding of interests, capabilities, and programs would require separate negotiations between the United States and each of its 

potential partners. Europe, Japan, and Canada had 

been engaging in informal discussions with the 

United States regarding possible space station cooperation since January 1982. However, as they made 

their own space plans, they certainly had not been 

able to count on the station gaining the early and 

unambiguous approval of the Reagan administration 

that was communicated by including approval of 

the program in Reagan’s State of the Union message. 

President Reagan’s approval of the station and his 

invitation to participate changed the context in a 

major way. Europe and its major countries active in 

space—France, West Germany, Great Britain, and 

Italy—as well as other potential U.S. partners were 

making their own plans and decisions based on 

their own interests, and the role of large-scale collaboration with the United States had to be evaluated in terms of those interests. As one close observer 

of the European space scene remarked (and his 

remarks were in many ways applicable to Japan and 

Canada as well): 

The dilemma which faces countries of Europe as 

America’s space station program begins to get 

underway concerns chiefly priorities, both 

national and European. To maintain Europe’s 

existing space programs and take on a new space 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
28 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

station activity would require a major increase in 

space-related expenditures and thus a reappraisal 

of national priorities. 

To some, it might appear that the U.S. would be 

called upon to provide guarantees and accept 

dependence in excess of what Europe’s share of 

the common burden will be worth. But the 

imbalance is the other way: Any substantial 

European involvement in a U.S.-led space station 

program would absorb so much of the space 

budget that Europe would forfeit the ability to 

create a similar but independent capability.86 

The invitation by Reagan to participate in the 

space station program had been a true leadership 

initiative; it was now up to the potential partners as 

to whether they chose to follow the U.S. lead. 

Europe Charts Its Future in Space87 

Much had changed in Europe since the postApollo agreement to develop Spacelab as part of 

the U.S. Space Transportation System. European 

commitment to the German- and Italian-led 

Spacelab program had been part of a “package 

deal” among countries interested in space. Other 

elements of that deal were multilateral funding of 

a French-led program to develop an independent 

launcher for Europe, Ariane, and a British-led program to develop a maritime communications satellite. In addition, eleven European nations had 

agreed to create a single organization to manage 

programs in science, applications, and infrastructure development. By the time the U.S. invitation 

for space station participation was extended, 

Spacelab had had a successful first flight aboard 

the Space Shuttle. Ariane was in service and successfully launching both government and commercial payloads, and the maritime satellite was in 

operation, serving as the initial basis for the 

INMARSAT organization. ESA had developed into 

an effective means of combining the resources of 

member states to support programs that not one of 

them was able to carry out on a unilateral basis; 

ESA programs combined with national efforts had 

led to the emergence of a vigorous space industrial base in Europe. 

ESA Planning Includes a Cooperative Option 

Considerations of future programs were very 

much on the European agenda in the early 1980s, as 

the efforts begun on the basis of the 1973 package 

deal approached completion and European industry, national space agencies, and ESA assessed ways 

of building on past achievements. The possibility of 

European involvement in a U.S. space station program was part of these considerations from the start. 

Indeed, as long ago as 1976, being aware of early 

U.S. space station studies, the ESA Council (the

organization’s “Board of Directors” composed of 

representatives from its member states) had resolved 

that ESA should “examine the questions connected 

with a possible participation by Europe in the Space 

Station programme.”88 

In February 1982, NASA Administrator James 

Beggs and ESA Director General Erik Quistgaard 

discussed potential NASA-ESA cooperation on the 

station program; each directed their head of 

advanced planning (Ivan Bekey for NASA and 

Jacques Collet for ESA) to work together as station 

planning gained momentum.89 Based on this guidance, a detailed plan for NASA-ESA coordination 

and joint activity regarding station planning was 

quickly developed; Europe was thus given the 

opportunity to be involved in the station program 

almost from its inception.90 By June 1982, ESA and 

NASA had agreed on an approach in which ESA 

would carry out two sets of space station–related 

studies. One, to be called “European Utilization 

Aspects of a U.S. Manned Space Station,” would 

be conducted in parallel to U.S. mission requirements studies; other ESA studies would investigate 

the architectural and implementation implications 

of European requirements—that is, what hardware 

made sense for Europe to contribute to a station 

program. In September 1982, ESA awarded the 

contract for the utilization study to the German 

aerospace research establishment, DFVLR, and initiated four contracts with European industry 

regarding potential hardware contributions. 

These initial steps in European consideration of 

station participation were taken in anticipation of 

ESA member-state approval of a “Space 

Transportation Systems Long-Term Preparatory 

Programme” (STSLTPP) that would provide the overall context for charting Europe’s future plans in the 

area of launch and in-orbit systems. The STSLTPP 

had been approved in principle by the ESA Council 

in June 1982.91 It was intended to provide member 

states “the elements necessary for making decisions 

on the selection of a long-term policy and on the 

start of new programmes” to follow Ariane and 

Spacelab. Among the options to be analyzed by the 

STSLTPP were “investigation and preparation of the 

necessary decision elements on: maintaining in 

Europe an independent launch capability, developing a European in-orbit infrastructure, and pursuing 

transatlantic cooperation through participation in 

the future United States space station programme.” 

One of the three “themes” to be investigated was 

how to “provide Europe with a capability of carrying out orbital operations (including return to Earth) 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 29 

by means of in-orbit infrastructures developed independently or by cooperation with NASA in the 

future U.S. space station activities.”92 

While staff members of ESA may have welcomed the possibility of continued cooperation 

with the United States, their attitude was not universally shared in Europe. It proved difficult to get 

member-state commitment to the STSLTPP, in large 

part because of skepticism in some countries 

regarding the wisdom of continuing intimate cooperation with the United States. NASA European 

Representative Richard Barnes reported in 

December 1982 that the ESA Council had “again 

deferred, this time for a month, the deadline for 

member states adherence to the . . . STSLTPP 

which includes funding for Ariane 5 and Space 

Station studies. So far only Sweden, Belgium, 

Denmark, and Germany have formally signed up, 

with Germany the only strong supporter of Space 

Station studies.”93 

In the weeks following the December ESA Council 

meeting, advocates of at least examining cooperation 

were able to gather the support needed for carrying 

out the STSLTPP. France agreed to support the study 

program on December 22, Italy on January 6, 1983, 

and the United Kingdom on January 14. With the four 

major ESA members signed on, study efforts were 

able to go forward during 1983 and 1984. 

Commenting on the adoption of the program, the 

leading French newspaper, Le Figaro, noted: 

The old continent is preparing its space activity for 

the next century: we will undoubtedly have then 

our space-men, orbital infrastructure and maybe, 

also a mini-shuttle to fly on our own. At least that’s 

what ESA—who is initiating an important 

engineering program in this regard and has already 

signed the first industrial study contract—thinks. 

Hopefully, we will know between now and 1985. 

At the same time we will know who will influence 

this long-term policy: Germany who favors 

complete cooperation with NASA, or France, more 

favorable to independent solutions. 

At the moment, two philosophies are possible. On 

the one hand, the one of German industrialists 

that consider that Europe should work in full 

cooperation with the U.S. . . . From there, 

however, opinions diverge: The French, in fact, 

would like to keep a certain “independence” as 

far as manned flights are concerned and thus 

conduct studies in such a manner as to preserve 

the means to equip Europe with a complete 

[Space Transportation System] to embark men. The 

problem is, one can imagine, that it would be very 

expensive. . . .

Thus, the main task is to convince our European 

partners of the value of those expenses. However, 

in order to succeed, France will first have to 

resolve its own contradictions: Some of us still 

believe that the space exploitation will be a 

reality by the end of the century without any 

human presence, which is counter to the future 

outlook on both the American and Soviet sides. 

As long as such opinions carry weight in France, 

it will certainly be difficult to claim to be able to 

influence ESA’s decisions.94 

Not all early thinking about space station cooperation was carried out within the ESA framework. 

Another focus for considering potential European 

contributions to the U.S. space station emerged 

from studies carried out by Germany and Italy. 

Interest within the two countries in using Spacelab 

hardware as the basis for future programs dated 

back to the late 1970s. Advocates of continued 

cooperation with the United States, particularly 

within Germany, sought an approach that would 

preserve the option of cooperation, either through 

ESA or outside of it. In 1983, the German firm, 

MBB/ERNO, and the Italian firm, Aeritalia, under 

the respective supervision of DFVLR and the Italian 

CNR (the national research agency in charge of the 

Italian space plan), began intense studies of the use, 

either in conjunction with the U.S. space station or 

as an independent European-controlled orbital 

complex, of an orbital infrastructure consisting of 

Spacelab-derived pressurized modules, unmanned 

platforms, support modules, and service vehicles. 

The name given to this orbital complex was 

Columbus; the program was “viewed by some 

countries as a German/Italian effort to secure the 

lead role in Europe’s space station development.”95 

The French space agency, Centre Nationale 

d’Études Spatiales (CNES), and the French aerospace industry also were studying future space 

efforts in the early 1980s. One focus of attention 

was a new high-thrust rocket engine, designated 

HM60, designed to use liquid hydrogen and liquid 

oxygen as fuels; such an engine would be used to 

develop a new generation of the Ariane launcher, 

designated Ariane 5. In other studies, attention was 

given to an automated or human-tended space station concept called Solaris and to a small winged 

spaceplane called Hermes. As NASA began space 

station studies in 1982, CNES set up its own examination of station mission requirements. The goals 

of this study were to allow CNES “to determine 

independently its interest in cooperating with 

NASA on a future space station; but also to determine whether it is in their best interest to cooperate through ESA or directly with NASA.”96 Although 

the French government had traditionally been 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
30 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

A late 1984 graphic on the rationale for building the space station. (NASA photo HQ S84-2032A(3)). 

skeptical of the importance of human spaceflight 

activities, this attitude shifted 180 degrees following President Francois Mitterrand’s decision to 

accept a Soviet invitation to fly a Frenchman 

aboard the Soviet Salyut space station. That flight 

took place in June 1982. France from this time on 

increasingly argued that independent European 

capabilities in all areas of space activities, including human access to orbit, were essential; the term 

“autonomy” was used to describe this ability to act 

without dependence on others. The appropriate 

balance between European autonomy and intimate engagement with the United States became a 

major issue in the 1983–1985 debate over 

European space policy. 

In 1984, Germany and Italy proposed to their 

ESA partners that Columbus be considered as an 

optional program97 to be carried out within the ESA 

framework; France did the same for the HM60 

engine. These proposals were approved in principle by the ESA Council on June 28, 1984. ESA was 

authorized to attempt to gain member-state financial commitments for preparatory studies, prior to 

a final decision to proceed, on the development of 

the large cryogenic HM60 engine and on a “space 

station related programme based on the proposal 

by the German and Italian delegations . . . this programme will be defined with a view to ensure progressively the European autonomy in the field of 

manned space station compatible with the future 

European launching systems.” The Columbus 

preparatory programme would also include “consideration of the invitation received from the 

President of the U.S.”98 

The ESA staff spent the remainder of 1984 incorporating the Columbus program and plans for a new 

European launcher into an overall long-range 

European space plan. (They were also working 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 31 

closely with the NASA space station planners to stay 

abreast of U.S. activity, now that the space station 

had received President Reagan’s approval.) Other 

inputs into this plan came from the results of the 

STSLTPP and from the planning activities of other 

offices within ESA concerned with science and 

applications programs. That long-range plan was 

ready for initial consideration by ESA member countries in November. The introduction to the plan 

noted the need to find the right balance between: 

1.	 Science and applications—between cultural 

and economic rewards 

2.	 Payloads and launchers/in-orbit infrastructure—between ends and means 

3.	 Launcher development and manned space 

flight—between major technological 

avenues, that of propulsion and that of 

human-in-orbit 

4.	 Manned space systems and automated space 

systems—between humans and robots 

5.	 ESA program and national program— 

between centralized and decentralized 

activities 

6.	 Purely European program and cooperative 

ones, in particular with the United States— 

between achieving space autonomy and 

undertaking large-scale programs and their 

operation 

The ESA executive alerted member states that 

“the present scope of the overall ESA programme 

will have to be enlarged, making it necessary to 

increase the funding at an average rate of 12 percent a year over 5 years.”99 

The plan recommended that Europe develop a 

new launcher, Ariane 5, based on the HM60 

engine, to become operational by the end of 1995. 

It noted that the U.S. space station was a “major 

step in space capability which Europe cannot 

afford to ignore” and recommended “until about 

1995, to improve through cooperation with NASA 

the existing European manned flight operations.” 

To this end, the plan proposed approval of the 

Columbus program, “involving cooperation with 

the U.S. in the development, operation and utilization of an international space station, subject to 

negotiation with NASA of satisfactory terms and 

conditions for such cooperation.” In conclusion, 

the ESA plan suggested that “the most urgent task 

ahead is for Member States to reach a broad consensus, within the ESA forum, on a well-balanced 

and ambitious programme for the next ten years, 

derived from a shared vision of Europe’s future in 

space.”100 

Developing Political Support for Station 

Cooperation 

In fact, the elements of such a consensus had 

been emerging in Europe during 1984. The June 

ESA Council decision to approve the HM60 and 

Columbus preparatory programs had foreshadowed a new “package deal” to guide Europe’s next 

decade in space. While studies sponsored by ESA 

and national space agencies defined possible hardware elements of the next generation of European 

space capabilities and of potential European contributions to the U.S. space station, political-level 

discussions among the leading European countries—particularly France, Germany, the United 

Kingdom, and Italy—were leading to agreement 

on how those elements could be combined in an 

acceptable fashion. A key to these discussions, in 

addition to agreement on the hardware elements to 

be included, was developing an understanding on 

how various ESA member states would distribute 

among themselves the costs, and the proportional 

industrial involvement, in the various elements of 

the ESA plan. 

The major difference of view that had to be 

resolved in these discussions was between the 

long-standing French preference for an emphasis 

on improved launch systems and for an approach 

that stressed European autonomy and the German 

and Italian preference for both continued development of human spaceflight capability and continued 

close cooperation with the United States in that 

development. Another consideration was the British 

preference for ESA to undertake applications programs that produced tangible benefits, rather than 

research or exploration-oriented activities. For most of 

the smaller ESA member states, a primary concern 

was a program with enough diversity and breadth to 

allow meaningful opportunities for their scientific and 

industrial participation. These differing preferences 

had been accommodated in the 1973 package deal 

that had guided European space activities for a 

decade; during 1984, the political support for a similar combination grew. The need to respond to the U.S. 

invitation to participate in its space station program 

certainly accelerated the process of agreement and 

shaped its content, but the desire for a new European 

commitment to its future in space was an equally 

influential stimulus. 

A meeting of the ESA Council, at which each 

member state would be represented by its cabinet 

minister responsible for space activities, was schedMonographs in Aerospace History 
32 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

uled for the end of January 1985. This was the first 

European space meeting at the ministerial level 

since the 1973 gathering that had created ESA and 

approved the Ariane and Spacelab programs. The 

purpose of the January 1985 meeting was to consider the long-range plan proposed by ESA. In the 

course of putting together that plan, there had 

been close consultation among the ESA Director 

General101 and senior members of the ESA executive staff and policy-level officials within the governments of ESA member states. The European 

aerospace industrial organization, Eurospace, had 

put together a proposed long-term European 

space program that reflected the views of its 

industry members; it was in essence the same as 

the proposed ESA long-range plan, suggesting that 

European industry was ready to lend its support to 

the ESA proposals.102 The major unresolved question as 1984 drew to a close was whether those 

proposals would receive the political and financial support needed to move ahead. Ultimately, it 

was up to the individual ESA member states—and 

particularly France, Germany, and the United 

Kingdom (Italy had already answered in the positive)—to decide whether they wanted to increase 

their financial and political commitment to space, 

and to ESA, to the levels required to carry out the 

program that ESA was proposing. 

The British Position. At the time that President 

Reagan first invited international participation in 

the station program, the United Kingdom was perhaps the most skeptical of the major ESA member 

states regarding both a significant increase in the 

ESA budget and significant European engagement 

in the U.S. space station effort. These would 

require additional funds at a time when the 

Thatcher government was giving overriding priority to cutting the U.K. budget. In addition, early discussions of potential European contributions to the 

U.S. space station had not clearly identified any 

element or activity of particular interest to Britain. 

This latter issue was resolved during 1984. The 

concept of the German-Italian Columbus program 

included one or more automated platforms to carry 

scientific and applications instruments. The leading U.K. space firm, British Aerospace, became 

interested in having the lead role in supplying 

these platforms—particularly an Earth-observing 

platform in polar orbit to complement a similar 

polar platform that was part of the “distributed 

architecture” of the U.S. station concept.103 An 

important feature of European space planning is 

the ability to reach informal agreements on which 

a country’s firms would act as prime and secondary contractors for various ESA programs in 

advance of their actual approval. Germany and 

Italy agreed to allocate to Britain and to British 

Aerospace the lead role in the platform aspects of 

the Columbus program, and this provided the 

incentive the British government needed to go 

along with the proposed ESA long-range plan and 

European participation in the U.S. space station 

program. Even so, some degree of skepticism 

about the appropriate priority of space activities 

overall and of ESA programs in particular lingered 

among some in the Thatcher government and the 

British bureaucracy, although Thatcher herself was 

visibly enthusiastic about the station program, 

once she had been briefed on it in preparation for 

the London Economic Summit. In fact, at the summit meeting, it was Thatcher who had taken the 

lead in the discussion as the seven leaders gathered around the space station model.104 

To build a broader base of support for the space 

station program within Britain, the U.K. 

Department of Trade and Industry, under whose 

auspices the space program operated, organized 

an October 4, 1984, meeting on the station program. The new Minister of Trade and Industry, 

Geoffrey Pattie, told the meeting that the government “had no preconceptions” and thus was very 

interested in the opinion of attendees on whether 

Great Britain should support station cooperation 

within ESA; the tone of Pattie’s remarks to the symposium, however, were quite positive toward station participation. A summary of the meeting noted 

general agreement that “the Space Station is a logical development” and “surprising unanimity that 

we should go ahead via ESA.”105 One NASA official 

visiting the United Kingdom in the fall of 1984 

reported that top British space officials “appeared 

optimistic about Cabinet approval for a major 

British contribution to the ESA Space Station program.”106 When the U.K. cabinet did meet in late 

1984, it decided to provide those funds and to 

make the accompanying commitment to cooperation with the United States on the station program. 

The French Position. Italian support for station 

cooperation and for the ESA long-range plan incorporating it had never been in question. What was 

uncertain as the January 1985 ESA ministerial 

meeting grew closer was whether France and 

Germany could find an approach to Europe’s 

future in space that reflected the interests of both 

countries. Earlier, the outlines of a French-German 

compromise that would enable agreement on 

future ESA programs had been evident in the June 

1984 ESA Council approval of preparatory programs for the HM60 cryogenic engine and for the 

Columbus program. The proposed ESA long-term 

plan was based on these central features. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 33 

France complicated the situation in late 1984 by 

requesting “Europeanization” of its Hermes spaceplane, arguing that just completed internal French 

studies had demonstrated the feasibility of the concept and that the goal of European autonomy was not 

achievable unless Europe had its own means of 

access to space for human crews. This last-minute 

push for Hermes was a surprise to most and was not 

well received by space advocates in other major 

European countries, particularly Germany and Great 

Britain, because it implied a higher cost for the overall space “package” that they were already having 

some difficulty selling to their finance ministries. In 

France, by contrast, strong support for space came 

from Francois Mitterrand, who had early on in his 

presidency accepted the Gaullist notion of space as 

an arena in which to demonstrate French grandeur. In 

addition, the French Minister of Research, Hubert 

Curien, had been head of CNES before being 

appointed as Minister, and he was actively pushing 

his counterparts in other countries for approval of the 

Hermes concept. 

France had been advocating Hermes since the 

middle of 1983; the Mitterrand government had 

decided to make the space plane a key element of 

a plan for French space preeminence in Europe. 

One justification for Hermes was that it could give 

Europe independent crew access to the space station, so that Europe did not have to be totally 

dependent on the Space Shuttle. This was part of a 

more general French strategy of offering Europe an 

alternative to dependence on a close alliance with 

the United States as a key to its space future, 

should discussions on station cooperation falter. 

When France pushed its partners during 1984 to 

include Hermes development in the package to be 

considered by the January 1985 ministerial meeting, both the United Kingdom and Germany resisted, believing that there had been inadequate study 

of the concept to justify a commitment to its development and being less committed to the politically driven concept of European autonomy in space 

than was France.107 France continued to advocate 

Hermes right up to the time of the ESA ministerial 

meeting. During January 1985, Fredric d’Allest, 

CNES Director General, made a tour of European 

capitals in an attempt to increase support for the 

concept. On January 29, just two days before the 

meeting convened, a column by d’Allest titled “A 

Space Policy for Europe” appeared in the influential French paper Le Monde. In it, d’Allest argued: 

Participation—with conditions yet to be 

negotiated—in the American space station 

through the Columbus project would allow 

Europe to benefit earlier from the use of the 

space station by conducting experiments that she 

would find useful and at low cost. 

However, the sour experience of Spacelab 

cooperation, as well as the U.S. policy to limit 

technology and technical information transfer to 

the bare essentials to insure the compatibility of 

European and U.S. elements, indicate the 

limitation of such a cooperation. That is why a 

European policy in this field cannot count 

heavily on cooperation with the U.S. 

Because of the major stakes involved, France has 

the same determination as she did 10 years ago 

in Brussels when she convinced her European 

partners to build Ariane. France proposes a 

fundamental new step forward in European space 

programs by deciding, right now, to acquire its 

autonomy in manned space flight and the 

progressive establishment of a European Space 

Station.108 

The German Position. While support for space 

station cooperation with the United States had 

always been strong among German space officials 

and in the German aerospace industry, during the 

1982–1983 period, political support for the undertaking was not yet assured. However, events in late 

1983 changed this situation. 

One of those events was the visit to Washington 

of Dr. Heinz Riesenhuber, German Minister for 

Research and Technology. Prior to Riesenhuber’s 

meeting with James Beggs, Ken Pedersen told the 

NASA Administrator that the minister “was reportedly very favorably impressed with the amount of 

public interest in space which was generated by 

the visit of the [Shuttle test vehicle] Enterprise to 

Bonn in May 1983.” Pedersen noted that “one purpose of discussions with Riesenhuber is to promote 

station activities, especially international cooperative activities.”109 

Based on his discussions in Washington, 

Riesenhuber became an enthusiastic advocate of 

station cooperation; during the following years, he 

became an essential U.S. ally in securing European 

participation in the station program. Returning to 

Bonn, he wrote James Beggs on October 27 that: 

While I am aware that there is no approved 

program, I am interested in coordinating with 

you as early as possible, even prior to the final 

decision, the possibilities of a European 

participation in a space station in the now 

ongoing preparatory phase. I would be quite 

willing to take the initiative as to the point that 

the Federal Republic of Germany, based on her 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
34 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

coordinating responsibility in the Spacelab 

cooperation, will provide the necessary political 

and programmatic prerequisites for a European 

participation in the space station.110 

The support of Riesenhuber, and indeed of 

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for continued 

space cooperation with the United States was reinforced by the first successful Spacelab flight in late 

November 1983. President Reagan and Kohl 

engaged in a three-way live conversation with the 

Spacelab crew, which included the first ESA astronaut, German citizen Ulf Merbold. After the mission, Kohl wrote Reagan that the mission should be 

seen “as a symbol of our joint future.”111 

The importance placed by Riesenhuber on 

assuring political support within Europe for station 

cooperation was a critical factor in the European 

decision-making process during 1984. Late in 

1984, Riesenhuber and French Minister of 

Research Hubert Curien came to agreement on 

German support for Ariane 5 and French support 

for Columbus, if only their respective governments 

would approve the budgets required; this “space 

summit” was a critical step in clearing the path for 

the Rome ESA ministerial meeting. 

However, even with Riesenhuber’s strong support 

and the long-term bias toward cooperation with the 

United States in space, German support for the ESA 

long-range plan was not assured as the Rome ministerial meeting drew near. A major sticking point was 

budget. A German commitment to the large programs proposed by ESA—Columbus and Ariane 5— 

implied either an increase in the German space 

budget overall or a reallocation of the resources of 

Riesenhuber’s Research and Technology Ministry. 

German space scientists (echoing their U.S. colleagues) were skeptical of the scientific value of the 

space station and strongly opposed to a reduction in 

the space science budget as a means of financing it. 

German Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, on 

the other hand, resisted increasing the Research and 

Technology Ministry’s budget to allow for the additional funding required. Another factor that came 

into play was the preference of Foreign Minister 

Genscher for closer Franco-German ties rather than 

continued emphasis on the transatlantic GermanU.S. alliance.112 

This potential deadlock within the government of 

the strongest European supporter of station cooperation was worrisome to the United States. On 

December 13, President Reagan wrote Chancellor 

Kohl, reiterating U.S. hopes that Germany would 

agree to participate in the station project.113 

The controversy was settled in early January when 

Riesenhuber and Stoltenberg agreed to a compromise. Enough additional funds would be provided to 

the Research and Technology Ministry to cover half 

of the costs of German participation in the 

Columbus and Ariane 5 programs; the Ministry 

would reprogram some of its existing budget to support the rest of the cost of those programs. The U.S. 

Embassy in Bonn reported that the German cabinet 

would “make a final decision on space station participation at a January 16 meeting. This will be little 

more than a formality, since the Chancellor is 

known to be in favor of the Space Station and has 

only been waiting for his ministers to agree on a 

financing plan.”114 The cabinet did meet on January 

16 and agreed to German participation. A press 

release announcing the cabinet decision noted that 

“our cooperation in space research is an important 

step on the way toward European integration and 

continuous improvement of transatlantic friendship.” Prerequisites for successful cooperation, 

noted the statement, included: 

•	 assurance of an appropriate relation between 

give and take, 

•	 guarantees for access and necessary services, 

such as transport with the space shuttle, 

support and data transmission under 

nondiscriminatory conditions, 

•	 guarantee of unlimited scientific and 

commercial utilization of results gained, 

unrestricted technology transfer for the 

development of ESA’s own contribution and 

for the commercial utilization of 

instrumentation and results, and options for 

the utilization of European launcher 

capabilities.115 

The reference to the use of European launchers 

did not imply German support for Hermes. In a 

press conference following the cabinet meeting, 

Riesenhuber said that it was “premature” to decide 

on a commitment to Hermes, but that Germany 

had not ruled out participating in the program 

sometime in the future.116 

ESA Ministers Approve Long-Range Plan, Station 

Cooperation 

Despite this rejection of French aspirations, at 

least for the time being, by the beginning of January 

1985, the U.K., French, and Italian governments had 

indicated their intent to approve the ESA-proposed 

plan, which at the time included no mention of 

Hermes. With the German approval of its participation in the Ariane 5 and Columbus projects, the last 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 35 

obstacle to approval of the ESA long-range plan, and 

to political agreement to the principle of European 

participation in the space station program, had been 

cleared. The ESA Council met in Paris on January 23 in 

preparation for the ministerial-level meeting the following week, and it discovered that the agency’s 

member states were in agreement on all essential 

decisions to be taken at Rome. 

Meeting in Rome at the ministerial level on January 

30–31, 1985, the ESA Council accepted the proposals 

of the ESA executive for a long-range European space 

plan and agreed to the initial two-year commitment of 

funds required to carry out that plan. In so doing, it 

approved a statement of objectives for the ESA program that included, among other goals, the intent: 

•	 to strengthen European space transportation 

capacity, meeting foreseeable user 

requirements within as well as outside 

Europe, and remaining competitive with 

space transportation systems that exist or are 

planned elsewhere; 

•	 to prepare autonomous European facilities


for the support of man in space, for the


transport of equipment and crews and for


making use of low Earth orbit; and


• 	to enhance international cooperation and in 

particular aim at a partnership with the United 

States through a significant participation in an 

international space station.117 

Although the French proposal to include 

Hermes in the approved ESA program at the same 

level of commitment as Ariane 5 and Columbus 

was rebuffed, the ministers left the door to future 

Europeanization of Hermes wide open, taking note 

with interest of the French decision to undertake 

the spaceplane program and the proposal by 

France to associate her European partners interested in this program. The ministers invited France 

and associated partners to keep the agency 

informed of progress of these studies with the view 

of including this program, as soon as feasible, in 

the optional program of the agency.118 

With these decisions, Europe committed itself to 

an ambitious future space program of its own and 

accepted, subject to the negotiation of acceptable 

terms and conditions, the U.S. invitation to participate in what ESA insisted on describing as an 

“international space station,” rather than a U.S. station with foreign participation. (The differences in 

these two characterizations were more than 

semantic, because the degree of non-U.S. participation and the consequent share in the content 

and control of station development and operations 

were unsettled issues as far as Europe and other 

participants were concerned, while within the 

United States a decision that America must have 

the dominant station role had already been made.) 

With respect to what acceptable terms and conditions of a space station partnership might be, there 

had been, at least since 1983, clear indications of 

the European position. Preliminary discussions on 

a NASA-ESA agreement had been under way for 

several months in anticipation of a positive outcome at the ministerial meeting. 

The European ministers at Rome went on record 

as to the objectives that had to be met if the space 

station partnership were to be viable in European 

eyes. Those objectives were stated in the form of an 

ESA resolution that was not made public until it had 

been delivered to both President Reagan and NASA 

Administrator Beggs. The resolution noted, with 

respect to the U.S. invitation, that the ESA Council: 

Accepts that offer—with a view to contributing 

and strengthening a genuine partnership in the 

space field with the United States of America . . . 

subject to the achievement of the following 

fundamental objectives: 

– 	to seek an appropriate European participation 

by the Agency in the space station programme; 

–	 to give Europe responsibility for the design, 

development, exploitation and evolution of one 

or several identifiable elements of the space 

station together with the responsibility for their 

management with the aim of increasing the 

overall capability of the space station; 

– 	to ensure that Europe may have access to and 

use, on a nondiscriminatory basis, all elements 

of the space station system on terms that are as 

favourable as those granted to the mostfavoured users and on a reciprocal basis; 

– 	to reach a satisfactory agreement on the share 

of the operation costs of the station; 

– 	to reach a satisfactory agreement on the level


and conditions for the appropriate transfer of


technologies;


– 	to ensure that supplies and services provided 

by the United States industry and NASA for 

European requirements are offset by European 

supplies and services; 

– 	to ensure maximum legal security and an 

identical level of the commitments entered into 

by the European Governments and the United 

States Government; 

– 	to guarantee the availability of American 

transportation and communication facilities 

required for the programme and the possibility 

of using the European facilities as they 

become available for the programme.119 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
36 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

This statement of objectives identified almost all 

of the issues that would have to be resolved in 

what turned out to be three more years of detailed 

and difficult negotiations between the United 

States and Europe—and also with Japan and 

Canada—in creating the final framework of agreements for the original station partnership. 

Because U.S.-European space cooperation in the 

space station would be based on a longer, more 

intense, and sometimes difficult history than with 

other prospective partners,120 and because the anticipated European contribution to the partnership 

would be approximately twice (in financial terms) 

that expected from Japan and more than four times 

that expected from Canada, European acceptance of 

the U.S. invitation was an important achievement 

for those within the United States advocating the station partnership. Without European involvement, 

the partnership they had in mind would have been 

much different in character. 

Even after the Rome meeting, there was lingering opposition to station cooperation in Europe. 

France made it clear that it was ready to take the 

lead in a program leading to European autonomy, 

should space station negotiations run into major 

obstacles. Smaller ESA member states, who in general did not see industrial return proportionate to 

the costs to them of station participation, remained 

skeptical. However, the political strength of an 

invitation from the U.S. President kept this opposition muted in character. Only if the terms laid 

down by the United States for participation were 

unacceptable was it likely that Europe would 

refuse to be the primary partner of the United 

States in the space station program. 

Japan Determined Not to “Miss the Boat”121 

Once the United States had formally invited 

Japan to participate in the space station program, 

there was little doubt that invitation would be 

accepted. During the 1969–1970 period, the 

United States had asked Japan to become involved 

in the planned post-Apollo program of manned 

spaceflight. At that time, Japan was just getting 

started on a large-scale space program, even 

though it had been carrying out small scientific 

space activities throughout the 1960s. It took Japan 

some time to form the internal consensus required 

to respond positively to the U.S. invitation; by the 

time its response came, the conditions for postApollo cooperation had so changed that the 

opportunity Japan had decided to pursue was no 

longer available.122 So Japan was excluded from 

any opportunity to work with the United States in 

the human flight area during the 1970s. When the 

chance to become involved in the space station 

appeared, according to one informed observer, 

“Japan—politicians included—does not want to 

miss the boat. The Japanese space community 

wants to participate.”123 

President Reagan’s invitation to participate in 

the U.S. space station program came at a difficult 

time for Japan, however. The country’s space budget, after rising rapidly during the 1970s, had 

shown a slight decrease in 1983 over 1982, and no 

meaningful growth was planned for 1984.124 Even 

so, a revised space development policy for Japan 

had just been proposed, and an implication of that 

policy was an increased Japanese commitment to 

space over the longer term. A central guideline of 

that policy was “establishment of autonomy.” The 

policy proposal noted that: 

In the space technology field, Japan has been 

relying on advanced foreign nations in its large 

portion because of her later starting, and the 

activities have been under the great influence of 

such advanced nations. 

Japan should, however, establish its own 

technological capacity for its space development in 

the future so that its broad and diversified space 

development activities can be performed in a steady 

manner. 

At the same time, Japan should possess advanced 

capability in order to implement space 

development activities properly at its discretion.125 

The “advanced nation” referred to in the policy 

proposal was the United States, and the “technological capability” important to Japanese autonomy included both an indigenous launcher and an 

indigenous satellite bus incorporating advanced 

technologies. The United States had helped Japan 

develop launch vehicles and satellites during the 

1970s by licensing U.S. industry to sell various 

technologies to its Asian ally, but those licenses 

carried limits on how advanced the technology 

thereby transferred could be. The objective was to 

license only that technology less advanced than 

the current U.S. “state of the art.” In addition, 

Japan could not launch non-Japanese payloads 

using the boosters employing licensed U.S. technology without explicit U.S. permission to do so.126 

Japan recognized, as had Europe a decade earlier, that its independent access to space was a precondition for any degree of autonomy and, in early 

1984, was in the final stages of deciding to develop a new launch vehicle, to be called the H-II, 

based totally on Japanese-developed technology. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 37 

The H-II program was aimed at a first launch in 

1991, and it was estimated to cost almost $1 billion to develop.127 To accept President Reagan’s 

invitation meant that Japan would have to commit 

itself to even more increases in its space budget, 

because the kind of contribution the United States 

was asking would be as expensive, if not more 

expensive, than the projected cost of the H-II program. While space advocates in Japan were enthusiastic about the possibility, the space program did 

not have a high priority outside of the science and 

technology community, and it was uncertain 

whether the government would be willing to make 

the financial commitment required to carry out 

both the H-II and space station programs. 

The Japanese space community had been considering its response to a possible U.S. invitation 

since NASA had raised that possibility in early 

1982. In August of that year, it had established an 

Ad Hoc Committee on Space Station Programs, 

reporting to the blue-ribbon Space Activities 

Commission that advised the prime minister on 

space policy. In typical Japanese style when considering a new area of activity, the membership of 

this committee included representatives from various government ministries and their national 

research institutes, Japanese industry, and academic institutions with potential interest in the space 

station program. This step was also taken to indicate that Japan considered the space station to be 

a project of government-wide interest, not just the 

concern of one Japanese agency. 

Japanese space activities were carried out by 

two separate organizations. One, the Institute of 

Space and Astronautical Sciences (ISAS), was totally devoted to space science; it had evolved from a 

University of Tokyo group and was still quite academic in style. ISAS received its relatively modest 

funding from the Ministry of Education, and it 

cherished its independence from the rest of 

Japanese space efforts. The bulk of Japanese space 

work was carried out under the management of the 

National Space Development Agency (NASDA), 

which was a public corporation operating under 

the policy guidance of the Science and Technology 

Agency (STA), although it received funding from 

other government ministries and public corporations as well as from STA. In mid-1982, the Space 

Activities Commission formally designated NASDA 

as the lead agency in Japan for space station planning.128 

On an informal basis, Japan had been examining 

possibilities for involvement in the space station program from the start of 1982. On July 16 of that year, 

the government established a space station task force; 

that group managed Japan’s mission requirements 

studies that were carried out in parallel with similar 

NASA studies and other station-related investigations.129 By October 1982, NASDA was able to join 

with several other organizations to sponsor a space 

station symposium in Tokyo; almost 400 attendees 

heard 92 papers presented.130 

Japanese industry was quick to get involved. By 

September 1982, the Mitsubishi Group had briefed 

the government on its concepts for participation, 

which included an “Experiment Module” consisting of “a manned pressurized module and an 

unpressurized pallet.” According to Mitsubishi, 

Japanese participation would: 

•	 Establish a Japanese base for future space activities by participating in the U.S. Manned 

Space Station . . . Program 

•	 Enlarge the field and scale of Japanese space 

utilization activities 

• 	Invest and participate in the rapidly


progressing advanced space technology


•	 Contribute to the international society in a 

worldwide cooperative space development era 

•	 Activate and promote Japanese manned


space activities.131


(The Mitsubishi presentation so impressed NASA 

Administrator James Beggs that he sent a copy to 

Secretary of State George Shultz as an example of 

the benefits of international cooperation in the 

space station, which would “provide an opportunity to attract foreign research and development 

funds into a program which is perhaps uniquely 

mutually beneficial. . . .”132) Other space industries 

in Japan also studied the concept of an attached 

experimental module; also under investigation was 

a Japanese contribution in the form of a free-flying, 

unmanned experimental platform. 

In March 1983, the Space Activities Commission 

and its Ad Hoc Committee on Space Station 

Programs met with a NASA delegation led by 

Associate Deputy Administrator Philip Culbertson 

(to whom the NASA Space Station Task Force reported). The NASA team also met with people from STA, 

NASDA, and ISAS. The main purpose of these meetings was to provide Japanese officials concerned 

with the space station an in-person, top-level view 

of NASA’s space station planning activities and to 

indicate how Japanese activities fit into those plans. 

The NASA delegation stressed at every opportunity 

that the station program had not yet been fully 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
38 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

defined, much less approved by the White House 

and Congress. With regard to specific Japanese 

hardware contributions to the station, the NASA 

representatives noted that the Japanese “still had a 

lot of work ahead to prove to themselves—and 

us—that they should undertake developments of 

this scope.”133 

On June 15, 1983, the Ad Hoc Committee on 

Space Station Programs of the Space Activities 

Commission issued an interim report that identified 

materials processing, life science, and advanced 

technology development as the uses most likely to 

benefit from the existence of a space station. The 

committee thought that a module attached to the 

space station was the best site for work in these 

areas, and it concluded that “a very large space system can be built” and that “the space station is the 

first step of the enlargement of the living space of 

human being[s].”134 Throughout the year, Japanese 

interest in station participation continued to 

increase. For example, in October the influential 

paper, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, reported that: 

Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. will participate in the U.S. 

space station program in collaboration with 

Hitachi, Ltd. and Fuji Heavy Industries, Ltd. . . .

The Mitsubishi Group of firms have already 

announced their policy of actively participating in 

the program. . . .

The Japanese government plans to participate in the 

space station project from the beginning, that is, 

even as the project is in the development stages.135 

By the time that James Beggs formally extended 

President Reagan’s invitation to participate to 

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in March 

1984, acceptance of that invitation was a foregone 

conclusion, if acceptable terms for that participation 

could be developed and if the Japanese Finance 

Ministry and the Diet (the Japanese legislature) could 

be convinced to provide the additional funds 

required to support the cooperative undertaking. In 

the revision of Japan’s space development plan 

unveiled in late February 1984, which gave the goahead to the H-II rocket, the Space Activities 

Commission had also indicated Japanese intent to 

participate in the station program. At the time of the 

Beggs visit, the Prime Minister Nakasone and the science and technology minister made it clear that Japan 

would participate in a meaningful way, but that government statements in support for the program would 

remain low-key until the process of developing consensus within Japan had taken place. 

As part of the process of consensus-building within Japan, during 1984, five industrial groups within 

Japan—Mitsui, Fuyo, Sumitomo, Mitsubishi, and 

Nisho-Iwai—formed teams to study station utilization and hardware development opportunities. 

Within the government, the influential Ministry of 

International Trade and Industry (MITI) became 

involved in space station–related activities by creating its own study committee on space environment 

utiliza-tion. Both of these developments caused 

conflict. Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that there 

was disagreement within the private sector over 

which industrial group should have the lead in 

Japan’s involvement in the space station and that the 

MITI move into space was viewed by STA as an 

incursion into its area of jurisdiction.136 

In reaction to this situation, on November 19, 

the powerful Keidanren (a federation of Japanese 

industries) formed a fifty-four-member Ad Hoc 

Committee for Promotion of Japanese Participation 

in the Space Station Program. The purposes of this 

group were “(1) to unify the space station use 

research groups . . .; (2) to coordinate the views of 

the private sector; and (3) to coordinate information with the . . . STA and the . . . MITI.” This move 

toward creating consensus was seen as essential if 

STA was to get the budget allocation required to participate in Phase B definition studies for the station.137 

Indeed, it was the approval of this budget, rather 

than any formal announcement, that would signal 

Japan’s acceptance of the U.S. invitation. By mid1984, STA had decided that Japan’s contribution to 

the space station should be an Experiment Module, 

and studies of several other possible hardware elements were halted. In December, NASA confirmed 

to STA that such a module would be an acceptable 

Japanese contribution.138 After negotiations with the 

Ministry of Finance that had begun in August, on 

December 28, STA “with great pleasure” notified 

NASA that the budget for Phase B station activities 

had been approved within the government and 

would be sent to the Diet in January.139 

Members of the Keidanren space station study 

committee visited the United States in February 

1985 to hear for themselves U.S. responses to a 

variety of questions that had been raised about the 

station program. They were apparently satisfied 

with what they heard. Upon his return to Japan, the 

leader of the team, Tadahiro Sekimoto, President of 

NEC (Nippon Electric Company), wrote 

Administrator Beggs, telling him that “as the Space 

Station Program is an international project under 

your initiative, I hope you would go ahead with it 

by way of cooperation . . . between the two countries. We will, of course, do our best on our side to 

promote the Space Station Program.”140 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 39 

The Japanese Diet approved the funds for Japanese 

Phase B station activities in April 1985; with that 

approval, Japan became the last of the three potential 

U.S. partners to make the political commitment to

attempt to find an acceptable framework for cooperation. (Canada had announced its intention to participate on March 18.) In its final report, issued in the 

spring of 1985 and reflecting the thinking that led to 

the Japanese acceptance of the U.S. invitation, the Ad 

Hoc Committee on Space Station Programs of the 

Space Activities Commission identified the benefits 

Japan saw in participating in the station: 

1.	 Acquisition of highly advanced technology: It 

is expected that the space station will utilize 

highly advanced technologies in broad areas 

and, therefore, through the program Japan 

will acquire extremely advanced 

technologies such as manned support 

technology, assembly technology for a large 

structure in space, etc., and also will 

encourage development of various advanced 

technology areas in robotics, computers and 

communications. This effort is expected to 

contribute to the advancement of technical 

standards not only in space but in many 

other technical fields. 

2.	 Promotion of the next generation science


and technology coupled with expansion of


space activities scope. . . .

3.	 Contribution to international cooperation: 

Japan’s space development policy attaches 

importance to harmonizing Japanese national 

space development activities with 

international space activities. . . . Japan’s 

participation and co-operation in the [space 

station] program will be quite effective in 

maintaining and further promoting the 

friendship between the United States and 

Japan, coupled with contributing to the 

elevation of Japan’s own technology, by 

working with the space development 

activities of the free world. 

4.	 Encouragement of practical use of space 

environment: The realization of the space 

shuttle regular flights in the United States has 

strongly pushed forward experiments in the 

space environment for the production of 

materials and pharmaceutical products using 

the microgravity of space. . . . The expansion 

of commercial activities to space is now a 

target of various overseas countries as well as 

the United States and, therefore, this aspect 

has significance.141 

As with Europe, then, Japan’s decision on its participation in the U.S. space station was part of a 

larger set of decisions on future Japanese interests 

in space overall. Also similar to Europe, Japan recognized that it could not both accept the U.S. offer 

and satisfy its other space objectives without 

increasing its financial commitment to space. 

Finally, as with Europe, Japan saw as its ultimate 

goal autonomy defined in terms of independence 

of action in critical areas of space activity. But 

unlike Europe, there were no influential skeptics 

within Japan regarding the wisdom of accepting 

the U.S. invitation, although the Japanese space 

science community expressed little interest in 

becoming involved with the station program. The 

intense consultations and analyses within and 

between government and industry from 1982 to 

1984 had produced a consensus in support of intimate collaboration with the United States in 

exploring the potentials of human spaceflight. 

Canada Sets Its Space Priorities142 

Although Canada had been actively involved in 

space since the 1960s and had provided the Remote 

Manipulator System (also called the Canadarm) as an 

integral element of the Space Shuttle, the country in 

the early 1980s had no central space agency. Also, 

since the 1960s, it had renounced any ambitions 

related to independent access to space through a 

Canadian launch vehicle. Thus one of the considerations influencing European and Japanese evaluation 

of the U.S. space station invitation—the desire to 

achieve substantial autonomy—was not relevant to 

the Canadian situation. Canada, to be active in space, 

had to cooperate; the issues were with whom and on 

what projects. 

Planning for Canada’s space activities was the 

responsibility of an Interdepartmental Committee 

on Space, chaired by the Ministry of State for 

Science and Technology. It included as members 

those ministries that were potential developers and 

users of space capabilities. Many space-related 

research activities were funded and managed 

through the National Research Council of Canada, 

a quasi-independent government corporation. The 

National Research Council had been Canada’s link 

to NASA for the Remote Manipulator System project. The Ministry of Communications and the 

Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Resources also had 

substantial space involvement. 

When the United States invited Canada in 1982 

to begin to think about participation in the space 

station program, other projects seemed to the 

members of the Interdepartmental Committee on 

Space to have higher priority as Canada shaped its 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
40 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

space plans for the second half of the 1980s and 

beyond. In particular, two large (for Canada) projects directly related to Canadian needs—a Mobile 

Communication Satellite for links among Canada’s 

widely dispersed population and a Radarsat for 

Earth observations through cloud cover—were toppriority projects. In its initial evaluations, the 

Interdepartmental Committee on Space gave 

potential Canadian involvement in the U.S. space 

station the lowest priority among these projects. 

The factors that changed this ranking were primarily political in character. The intense public interest in the visit of the Space Shuttle test vehicle 

Enterprise to Canada in June 1983 demonstrated to 

Canadian politicians the symbolic importance of 

involvement in human spaceflight. At the same time, 

the Canadian government announced that it would 

accept the U.S. invitation to have a Canadian astronaut fly aboard the Space Shuttle.143 While within the 

Interdepartmental Committee on Space the Ministry 

of Energy, Mines, and Resources continued to advocate the Radarsat program and the Ministry of 

Communications continued its support of the Mobile 

Satellite Program, from mid-1983, the Ministry of 

State for Science and Technology had the political 

advantage through its link to human spaceflight. 

In contrast to the U.S.-European experience with 

Spacelab cooperation, U.S.-Canadian cooperation 

on the Remote Manipulator System had been a very 

satisfactory experience on both sides. Karl Doetsch 

of the National Research Council, who had managed 

the Remote Manipulator System project for Canada 

and was one of those supporting station cooperation, 

remarked in mid-1983 that “there’s a good feeling 

that comes to the fore immediately, which says that 

the space station is great, we want to be a part of it. 

. . . However . . . one needs a little more than that. 

One needs to find good reasons for it.”144 

To this end, the National Research Council of 

Canada sponsored station utilization studies, as had 

other potential station partners. Two studies were 

conducted, one by Spar Aerospace Ltd. and the other 

by a consulting group, Philip A. Lapp Associates. The 

studies concluded that “Canada could benefit scientifically, technologically, economically and socially 

through participation in the development of the 

Space Station.”145 Particularly attractive to many 

Canadian users was the existence of a polar orbiting 

Earth observation platform as part of the station program, because data from remote sensing was important to many Canadian applications. Also, Canada 

saw the station, with its requirements for in-orbit 

assembly and operations, as an opportunity to build 

on the Remote Manipulator System program and 

to develop further Canadian industrial capabilities 

in automation and robotics.146 Summarizing the 

position of station advocates within Canada, 

Doetsch said: 

We also think that the space station as a development and as a technological stimulant has strong 

justification in its own right. This is coupled with 

the needs of the users, but it mustn’t be forgotten. 

The rate of return on investment is important, but 

the strategic benefits are also important.147 

Canadian-U.S. coordination at the technical level 

continued during 1983 and 1984, but the political 

decision on whether to accept President Reagan’s 

invitation to participate had to be put on hold. At the 

time that James Beggs and his entourage visited 

Ottawa in March 1984, Liberal Prime Minister Pierre 

Trudeau had announced that he would leave office, 

and Minister of State for Science and Technology 

Donald Johnston told the U.S. delegation that a 

Canadian response to the Reagan’s invitation could 

not be given until the elections were over, because it 

was the next government that would have to make 

the financial commitment to back up an acceptance 

of the invitation.148 

A Progressive Conservative government headed by 

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was elected in 

September 1984; that government was philosophically more attuned to the Reagan administration than 

had been its liberal predecessor and thus was more 

likely to be positive toward accepting the U.S. offer as 

a means of strengthening U.S.-Canadian relations. 

Canadian astronaut Marc Garneau flew as a payload 

specialist aboard an October 1984 Shuttle mission, 

further reinforcing the Canadian desire to be involved 

in future manned activities. 

In a paper prepared for a December 1984 NASA 

international workshop on the station program, Karl 

Doetsch summarized the “principal issues governing 

Canadian participation”: 

•	 Importance to Canada of the use of the space 

station. 

• 	Importance to Canada of the privileged access 

to the infrastructure which will accrue to 

participating nations. 

•	 Desirability of maintaining and enhancing


Canada’s existing area of industrial space


leadership.


• 	Importance of spinoff to Canadian industry in


the chosen areas of development.


•	 Extent of the return on investment to be derived 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 41 

from participation. 

•	 Desirability of cooperating with other major 

nations in a major international venture which 

will have a profound effect on man’s ability to 

exploit the space environment.149 

These were clearly very different considerations 

than had stimulated Europe and Japan to consider 

participating in the station project. 

The technical and the political arguments in 

support of accepting the U.S. invitation proved ultimately persuasive, but only after lengthy and intense 

discussions within the Interdepartmental Committee 

on Space. As one individual closely involved in both 

the internal Canadian discussions and those between 

the United States and Canada commented: 

It was a judgment call. It was the result of endless 

discussions. . . . There was certainly a fair amount of 

unhappiness that it [the station participation] was 

going to run away with all the funds. . . . It was a 

matter of visibility. If the space station was going to 

there Canada had to be part of it. This was the line 

of argument that was used. And the potential 

benefit to industry—that helped push it through.150 

One factor influencing at least the timing of the 

Canadian decision on whether to accept the U.S. 

invitation was the first summit meeting between 

President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney, 

scheduled for Quebec City on March 17–18, 1985. In 

late January, the top Canadian space policy official, 

W.M. “Mac” Evans, was optimistic that there would 

be a positive decision on the part of the Canadian 

cabinet by that time.151 The U.S. Department of State 

welcomed this news; it noted that it and other agencies were involved in an “exercise pointing towards 

achievements that can be realized before or during 

the March 17–18 summit in Quebec. Canadian 

cooperation on the [manned space station] would be 

such an achievement. . . . But we have not discussed 

the possibility with the Government of Canada.” The 

State Department noted that “an announcement at 

the summit need not necessarily be lengthy.”152 

The Canadian cabinet’s Committee on Economic 

and Regional Development did approve a recommendation for Canadian participation in the space 

station on March 5; full cabinet approval followed 

quickly thereafter. The approval came in the context 

of an endorsement of “Canada’s Interim Space Plan, 

1985–1986,” a document that had been prepared by 

the Interdepartmental Committee on Space. This plan 

noted that: 

The government has decided to accept the 

invitation of the United States to participate in the 

Space Station Program. . . .

Space Station will be the predominant civilian 

space initiative of the remainder of the century 

and will alter dramatically many of the 

established ways of operating in space. Canadian 

participation would permit us to maintain and 

improve our competitiveness in a number of 

leading-edge space technologies. All of our 

international partners have decided to participate 

which will offer us further opportunities to 

develop new business relationships and 

cooperative programs with the world’s major 

space nations.153 

When Ronald Reagan and Brian Mulroney completed their “Shamrock Summit” on March 18, their 

joint communiqué announced that “the Prime 

Minister informed the President that Canada has 

accepted the U.S. invitation to participate in the 

space station project.”154 

The overall Interim Space Plan was announced on 

March 20. Its interim nature was very evident; it provided funding for the three potential major space projects (mobile satellite, Radarsat, and the space station) 

only for the 1985–1986 period. It noted that “final 

decisions” on these projects would be taken at the 

end of 1985, when a long-term strategic plan for 

Canadian space efforts would be issued. Future funding for the three major space projects would be determined in accordance with “strategic thrusts” set out 

in the long-term plan.155 

The development of the Canadian long-range 

space plan and the assignment of priorities to the 

three competing projects proved very contentious, 

although Canadian involvement in the space station would eventually gain top priority. But that 

was in the future. With the March 18 announcement of the Canadian decision to accept the U.S. 

invitation, all three partners—Europe, Japan, and 

Canada—had made the initial political commitment required. Now it was up to representatives of 

the prospective partners to determine whether a 

framework for cooperation acceptable to all could 

be developed. 

Conclusion 

Creating that framework eventually required three 

rounds of international negotiations. One created a 

set of three memoranda of understanding (MOU) 

that would govern interactions between NASA and 

its prospective partners during the preliminary design 

phase (Phase B) of the station program, while more a 

permanent framework for those interactions was 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
42 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

created. This round of negotiations was completed on June 3, 1985, when NASA and ESA signed 

their Phase B MOU at the Paris Air Show. Japan 

and Canada had agreed to similar MOUs earlier 

in the spring of 1985. These negotiations were not 

particularly contentious; NASA and its partners 

agreed to defer to the next negotiating round 

attempts to resolve the kind of difficult issues that 

had been identified in the January 31, 1985, ESA 

Resolution 2 on space station cooperation discussed above. 

The second round of space station negotiations 

was highly contentious, and on several occasions 

its successful outcome was in doubt. However, on 

September 29, 1988, the United States, a number 

of European countries, and Canada signed an 

intergovernmental agreement on station cooperation (Japan signed the agreement later), and NASA 

signed more specific MOUs with its counterpart 

space agencies in Europe, Japan, and Canada for 

cooperation during the detailed design, development, and operation and utilization phases of the 

space station program. 

Five years later, in December 1993, the original 

space station partners decided after the end of the 

Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union to 

invite the Russian Federation to join the station 

partnership. There followed another four years of 

difficult discussions to revise the station intergovernmental agreement and MOUs to accommodate 

a major new partner; the new agreements were 

finally signed by all partners except Japan on 

January 29, 1998. (The approval processes within 

Japan again were not completed in time for Japan 

to sign the agreements at that time.) 

This account does not cover the space station 

negotiations between 1985 and 1998. It is perhaps 

too soon to trace the various compromises that 

were made by all parties to the discussions in order 

to reach understandings to which all could agree, 

and it of course is too early to make a definitive 

judgment on the success of the partnership.156 

When the United States and its closest allies 

began, in the early 1980s, to consider an ambitious 

international partnership to design, develop, operate, and utilize a permanent space laboratory— 

what has become known as the International 

The Space Station Plan, as proposed in 1986, at the time of the initial agreements for international participation. 

(NASA photo 86-H-324). 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 43 

Space Station—they could not possibly have anticipated the twists and turns in the road to making 

that partnership a reality. When President Ronald 

Reagan announced his approval of the space station 

program in January 1984, he directed NASA to complete the undertaking within a decade. It is likely to 

be two decades after Reagan’s announcement before 

all elements of the International Space Station are in 

place and ready for use. One can only hope that the 

results of the partnership that began with both high 

anticipation and mixed feelings, in what was a different era in space development, justifies all the time 

and effort to make it a success. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 45 

Notes

1. White House, “Address by the President on 

the State of the Union,” January 25, 1984. 

2. See Chapter One of John M. Logsdon, gen. 

ed., with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. 

Launius, Exploring the Unknown: Selected 

Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil 

Space Program, Volume II: External 

Relationships (Washington, DC: NASA 

SP-4407, 1997), for a discussion of this 

change in strategy and for documents related to NASA’s international space activities. 

3. On the evolution of NASA’s	 international 

activities, see Logsdon, gen. ed., Exploring 

the Unknown, Volume II, Chapter One. 

Other related sources include Arnold 

Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space 

(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 

pp. 3–165; John M. Logsdon, “U.S.-

European Cooperation in Space: A 25-Year 

Perspective,” Science, Vol. 223, January 6, 

1984, pp. 11–16; Kenneth Pedersen, “The 

Global Context: Changes and Challenges,” 

in Molly McCauley, ed., Economics and 

Technology in U.S. Space Policy 

(Washington, DC: National Academy of 

Engineering, 1987; and Task Force on 

International Relations in Space, NASA 

Advisory Council, International Space 

Policy for the 1990s and Beyond, October 

12, 1987. 

4. National 	Aeronautics and Space Act of 

1958, Public Law 85–568, Sec. 102(c)(7). 

5. Arnold Frutkin, “International Cooperation 

in Space,” Science, Vol. 169, July 24, 1970, 

pp. 333–39. 

6. For a discussion of the decision to proceed 

with the Space Shuttle, see John M. 

Logsdon, “The Space Shuttle Program: A 

Policy Failure?,” Science, Vol. 232, May 30, 

1986, pp. 1099–1105. 

7. See 	Arturo Russo, Big Technology, Little 

Science, European Space Agency (ESA) 

HSR-19 (Noordwijk, Neth.: ESA, August 1997), 

and Logsdon, “U.S.-European Cooperation in 

Space,” for discussions of this dissatisfaction. 

8. Memorandum 	from LI-15/Director of 

International Affairs to MFA-13/Director, Space 

Station Task Force, “Strategy for International 

Cooperation in Space Station Planning,” 

undated but August 1982 (hereafter referred to 

as Pedersen Strategy Memor-andum). Robert 

Freitag, who was intimately involved in developing U.S.-European cooperation in the postApollo period, suggests that “the major reason 

for not involving Europe in joint development 

of the Shuttle was complexity of management 

which would have been exacerbated by the 

differences in technology experience.” Letter 

to author, November 17, 1989. Another 

reviewer of an earlier draft of this section noted 

that the Department of Defense (DOD) intervened to block the possibility of European 

development of the Tug when it became clear 

that many highly classified U.S. national security missions would be using the Shuttle and 

would require an orbital transfer capability. To 

DOD, the use of a non-U.S. system for such a 

purpose was not acceptable. See Lorenza 

Sebesta, United States-European Cooperation 

in the Post-Apollo Programme, ESA HSR-15 

(Noordwijk, Neth.: ESA, February 1995), for a 

fuller account of the events summarized here. 

9. For a history of the Spacelab project that 

stresses its international aspects, see 

Douglas B. Lord, Spacelab: An International 

Success Story (Washington, DC: NASA 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
46 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

SP-487, 1987). For a European perspective, 

see Lorenza Sebasta, Spacelab in Context, 

ESA HSR-21 (Noordwijk, Neth.: ESA, 

October 1997). 

10. For a discussion of the evolution of European 

space activity, see John Krige and Arturo 

Russo, Europe in Space, 1960–1973, ESA SP1172 (Noordwijk, Neth.: ESA, September 

1994). 

11. One of the readers of an early draft of this section has commented: “The scars on both sides 

left by that (Spacelab) experience were a major 

factor all during the [space station] negotiations and still color working relationships. 

Attitudes about whether Europe did or did not 

make shrewd agreements, or get its money’s 

worth, vary from one senior official to another. 

Still, Europe’s regional attitude about ‘never 

again’ really drove a lot of things about the 

sharing arrangements and the legal regime 

agreed for the station. The experience was put 

to good use by Europeans selling the program 

at home.” Comments were transmitted in a letter from NASA Historian Sylvia Fries to the 

author, November 27, 1989. 

12. See Sebasta, Spacelab in Context, and 

Russo, Big Technology, Little Science, for 

discussions of the European assessment of 

Spacelab cooperation. 

13. The remainder of this section is based on, in 

addition to the sources cited, interviews with 

Robert Freitag, May 31, 1988; Kenneth 

Pedersen, June 15, 1989; James Beggs, 

February 12, 1989, and April 27, 1990; Hans 

Mark, December 10, 1988; Margaret Finarelli, 

June 13, 1989; Lyn Wigbels, June 15, 1989; Gil 

Rye, June 19, 1989; Philip Culbertson, April 

4,1990; John Hodge, May 4, 1990; and Luther 

Powell, March 26,1990. The author has also 

profited from several conversations with 

Terence Finn and Robert Lottmann regarding 

issues discussed in this section and from 

reviewers’ comments on an earlier draft of this 

section as transmitted by the previously cited 

Fries letter of November 27, 1989, as well as 

comments on the draft by Robert Freitag and 

Richard Barnes. 

14. For a discussion of this evolution, see John 

Logsdon and George Butler, “Space Station 

and Space Platform Concepts: A Historical 

Review,” in Ivan Bekey and Daniel Herman, 

eds., Space Stations and Space Platforms— 

Concepts, Design, Infrastructure, and Uses 

(New York: American Institute of Aeronautics 

and Astronautics, 1985). See also Howard E. 

McCurdy, The Space Station Decision: 

Incremental Politics and Technological Choice 

(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1990), for a history of the space station 

concept and of space station–related decisions 

within the United States throughout the period 

up to 1984. 

15. Hans Mark, The Space Station: A Personal 

Journey (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 

1987), p. 121. The Mark book is a fascinating, 

highly personal account of the events leading 

to the approval of the space station. 

16. This monograph is not a comprehensive history of the process leading to a decision to 

proceed with the space station. For such an 

account, see Howard E. McCurdy, Space 

Station Decision. 

17. One product of the attempts in the first 

month of the Reagan administration to cut 

the NASA budget that had a significant 

effect on the development of space station 

cooperation was the cancellation in 

February 1981 of the U.S. spacecraft 

planned to be part of a joint NASA-ESA 

International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM). 

This cancellation was decided on without 

consultation with ESA, and it was met with 

outcries from ESA and European scientists 

and diplomatic protests from several 

European countries. Coupled with the 

Spacelab experience, canceling the ISPM 

spacecraft raised serious doubts in Europe of 

whether the United States was a dependable 

cooperative partner. 

18. Advanced 	Programs, Office of Space 

Transportation Systems, NASA Headquarters, 

“Proceedings of Space Station Planning 

Workshop Held at the Michoud Assembly 

Facility in New Orleans, Louisiana on 

November 18, 19, and 20, 1981,” undated. 

19. A primary forum for these discussions was a 

joint NASA-ESA study group chaired by Ivan 

Bekey and Robert Freitag of NASA’s Office 

of Manned Space Flight and Jacques Collet 

of ESA’s Space Transportation Directorate. 

According to Freitag, James Beggs was fully 

aware of these discussions as he thought 

about international involvement in his space 

station initiative. Freitag letter to author, 

November 17, 1989. 

20. “Proceedings of Space Station Planning 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 47 

Workshop.” 

21. Interview with Kenneth Pedersen. 

22. Pedersen’s remarks appear in Mireille 

Gerard and Pamela Edwards, eds., Space 

Station: Policy, Planning, and Utilization 

(New York: American Institute of 

Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1983), p. 

116. 

23. Interview with Kenneth Pedersen. On 

changes needed in NASA’s approach to 

international space cooperation, see 

Kenneth Pedersen, “The Changing Face of 

International Space Cooperation,” Space 

Policy, May 1986, pp. 123–30, and Kenneth 

Pedersen, “The Global Context.” 

24. “Space Station Briefing to Headquarters 

Officials,” May 25, 1982. 

25. Memorandum from MFA-13/John Hodge to LI15/Kenneth Pedersen, “Strategy for 

International Cooperation in Space Station 

Planning,” July 30, 1982. 

26. Pedersen Strategy Memorandum, pp. 8–12. 

27. Ibid., p. 12. For an overview of the technology transfer controversy, see National 

Academy of Sciences, Balancing the 

National Interest: U.S. National Security 

Export Controls and Global Economic 

Competition (Washington, DC: National 

Academy Press, 1987). This study contains 

an extensive bibliography on export control 

and technology transfer issues. 

28. Pedersen Strategy Memorandum, p. 12. 

29. See McCurdy, Space Station Decision, Chapter 

9, for a discussion of the task force approach. 

30. It is interesting to note that Japan created a 

Space Station Task Force before the United 

States did; this was one indication of how eager 

the Japanese were to participate in the program. 

31. Kenneth Pedersen, “Note for John Hodge— 

Space Station Efforts in Japan,” May 5, 1982. 

32. “Meeting of NASA Administrator and ESA 

Director General, June 17, 1982, ESA Head 

Office,” Annex 3, ESA/NASA Space Station 

Planning Coordination. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Pedersen Strategy Memorandum, p. 3. 

35. Interview with Robert Freitag. 

36. Lyn D. Wigbels, Memorandum for the Record, 

“Space Station International Orientation 

Briefing,” December 3, 1982. 

37. Interviews with Kenneth Pedersen, Peggy 

Finarelli, and Robert Freitag and conversations 

with Robert Lottmann. 

38. Telex from R.J. Barnes to Pedersen (LI-15), 

“European Participation in Space Station Study 

Kickoff Meetings—Sept. 13–15,” undated. 

Among the major European countries, it was 

France that took the lead in pushing for an 

independent European approach to space; for 

all ESA members, the memory of the 1981 

withdrawal of the U.S. spacecraft from the 

cooperative ISPM was still very much fresh. 

39. Gerard and Edwards, eds., Space Station, p. 4. 

Particularly galling to space station partners 

throughout the period covered by this study, 

and even afterward, were the U.S. insistence of 

coupling its goal of leadership with invitations 

to others to cooperate (presumably as followers) and the explicit acknowledgment that one 

reason for inviting cooperation was to divert 

foreign resources from programs that might be 

competitive with the United States. 

40. Ibid., p. 117. 

41. Ibid., p. 122. 

42. See McCurdy’s Space Station Decision for a 

detailed discussion of SIG (Space) activity 

on the space station during 1982 and 1983. 

43. Douglas R. Norton, “Technology Transfer and 

Space Station Planning,” September 13, 1982. 

Norton was the person within NASA’s Office of 

International Affairs who was responsible for 

interactions with the export control community. 

44. NASA Space Station/Mission Analysis Studies, 

“Proposed Talking Points for DOD,” undated 

but probably November 1982. 

45. Ibid. For a review of various perspectives on 

the need to increase protection of technical 

information from unwanted transfer, see 

Harold Relyear, ed., Striking a Balance: 

National, Security and Scientific Freedom 

(Washington, DC: American Association for 

the Advancement of Science, 1985). 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
48 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

46. NASA Space Station/Technology 	Transfer, 

“Proposed Talking Points for Schneider-Meeting 

(Nov. 3, 1982).” 

47. Interviews with Kenneth Pedersen and 

Peggy Finarelli. 

48. Letter from Kenneth Pedersen to Gordon 

Woodcock of Boeing Aerospace, December 

14, 1982. Similar letters were sent to the other 

seven mission requirements contractors. 

49. Interviews with John Hodge, Phil Culbertson, 

and Robert Freitag. 

50. Interviews with Pedersen and Finarelli. 

51. Letter from James Beggs to Edwin Meese III, 

May 21, 1982. 

52. Reagan’s speech is reprinted in Mark, Space 

Station, p. 249. The Mark book contains a 

description of this early attempt to gain presidential endorsement for the space station. 

53. Ibid., p. 247. 

54. Ibid., p. 162. 

55. “SIG 	Working Group Talking Paper,” 

November 30, 1982. 

56. Memorandum 	from MFA-13/Executive 

Secretary, SIG-Space Station Working Group, to 

SIG-Space Station Working Group Members, 

“Record of SIG-Space Station Working Group 

Meeting, November 22, 1982.” 

57. Mark, Space Station, p. 251. 

58. “Space Station Presentation to the President,” 

April 7, 1983. 

59. McCurdy, Space Station Decision, Chapter 

17. McCurdy’s book contains a detailed 

account of the steps in the summer and fall 

of 1983 leading to the presidential decision 

to approve the space station. 

60. Mark, Space Station, pp. 164–65, and interviews with James Beggs and Hans Mark. 

61. Ibid., pp. 178–80. 

62. Letter from James Beggs to Robert C. 

McFarlane, October 31, 1983. 

63. Memorandum 	from LI-15/Director of 

International Affairs to FA-13/Deputy Director, 

Space Station Task Force, “Policy on 

International Involvement in a Space Station,” 

July 20, 1983. 

64. Interviews with James Beggs, Gil Rye, and 

Peggy Finarelli. 

65. Letter from the President of the United States, 

January 25, 1984. 

66. The draft terms of reference as circulated by 

Gil Rye on February 6, 1984, said that NASA 

“would take the lead” in preparing this report 

and that “other U.S. Government agencies will 

be invited to participate in the report’s preparation.” The final terms of reference issued on 

February 25 said that “NASA will take the 

report” and specified that the Department of 

Commerce, the Department of Defense, and 

the Director of Central Intelligence would also 

be involved in its preparation. Letter from 

Robert McFarlane to James Beggs, 

February 25, 1984. 

67. Ibid. 

68. Interview with Peggy Finarelli and letter to 

author from Thomas Niles, May 1, 1990. See 

the subsection in this monograph titled “The 

Partners Accept the Invitation” for more details 

on the link between space station cooperation 

and summit activities. 

69. “Terms of Reference” attached by McFarlane 

to Beggs letter, February 25, 1984. 

70. Interview with James Beggs. 

71. Letter from James Beggs to James A. Baker III, 

February 19, 1984. 

72. Memorandum 	from LI/Director of 

International Affairs to A/Administrator, 

“Potential Foreign Contributions to a U.S. 

Space Station,” January 24, 1984. 

73. Letter from James Beggs to George Shultz, 

March 16, 1984. 

74. Ibid. and interviews with James Beggs, 

Kenneth Pedersen, and Peggy Finarelli. 

75. Letter from James Beggs to Kenneth Baker, U.K. 

Minister of Trade and Industry, April 6, 1984. 

Similar letters were sent to top-ranking individuals in other countries that Beggs had visited. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 49 

76. Letter from Robert C. McFarlane to James 

Beggs, February 25, 1984. 

77. Letter from Thomas Niles to the author, 

May 1, 1990. 

78. Memorandum 	from LI/Director of 

International Affairs to Administrator, “Space 

Station at the London Economic Summit,” 

February 28, 1984. 

79. Letter from James Beggs to Honorable H. 

Allan Wallis, March 29, 1984. 

80. Letter from James Beggs to U.K. Minister of 

Trade and Industry Kenneth Baker, April 6, 

1984. A similar letter was sent to other top 

officials met during the trip. 

81. Ibid. 

82. Letter from Beggs to Shultz, March 16, 1984. 

83. One potential partner had already,	 and 

enthusiastically, made the decision to participate. Even before NASA Administrator 

Beggs arrived in Rome, Italian President 

Craxi wrote to President Reagan, telling him 

that a March 5 meeting of the Italian cabinet 

had decided that “Italy . . . is quite ready to 

study the terms of significant cooperation.” 

Letter from B. Craxi to Ronald Reagan, 

March 6, 1984. 

84. Economic Summit Communiqué, June 9, 1984. 

85. Commenting on an earlier draft of this section, former NASA European representative 

Richard Barnes remarked that “the watering 

down of the language on Space Station [in 

the Summit communiqué] was a direct 

result of last minute intervention by Jacques 

Attali, the French Sherpa and President 

Mitterrand’s right hand man at the Elysee. 

This was the first, but by no means the last, 

example of behind-the-scenes maneuvering 

by the French aimed at impeding the dialogue on cooperation.” Personal communication to the author, April 5, 1991. 

86. Hubert Bortzmayer,	 “Space Station Poses 

Dilemma for Europe,” Aerospace America, 

February 1984, p. 26. 

87. In addition to the specific sources cited 

below, this account of European decisionmaking is based on interviews with Jean 

Arets, Head of International Affairs, ESA, 

and Gabriel Laferranderie, Legal Counsel, 

ESA, respectively, on January 6, 1989, and 

February 16, 1990, Jacques Collet, Space 

Transportation Systems Directorate, ESA, on 

January 7, 1989, and Roger Bonnet, Director 

for Science, ESA, on January 7, 1989, as well 

as on several conversations with Reimar Luest, 

Director General, ESA, and George van Reeth, 

Director for Administration, ESA. The author 

also was helped by conversations with officials 

of the French space agency (CNES), including 

Daniel Sacotte, Director for International and 

Industrial Affairs, Isaac Revah, Director of 

Programs, and Alain Dupas, Long-Range 

Program Planning, as well as with Hans 

Hoffman of MBB/ERNO, Gottfreid Greger of 

the German Ministry for Research and 

Technology, and James Zimmerman, NASA 

European Representative. Finally, the author 

benefited from comments on earlier drafts of 

this section by Richard Barnes, former NASA 

European Representative, Peggy Finarelli, and 

Robert Freitag. 

88. Resolution ESA/C/X/Res. 2, October 8, 1976. 

89. Kenneth Pedersen, “Memorandum for the 

Record,” February 19, 1982. 

90. Jesco von Puttkamer, “Memorandum for the 

Record: Results of NASA–ESA Advanced 

Programs Coordination Meeting, February 

10–11, 1982, NASA Headquarters,” 

February 11, 1982. 

91. Resolution Concerning the Space Transportation Systems Long-Term Preparatory 

Programme,” ESA/C/LIV/ Res. 1, June 22, 1982. 

92. Annex 	A to “Declaration Concerning a 

Preparatory Programme for Long-Term Space 

Transportation Systems,” ESA/C/LV/Dec. 

(Final), October 6, 1982, updated on 

February 23, 1983. 

93. Memorandum to Director of International 

Affairs from NASA European Representative, 

“Highlights of December 8–9 ESA Council 

Meeting,” December 23, 1982. 

94. Translation of Le Figaro article (undated) by 

NASA European Representative, February 9, 

1983. 

95. Jeffrey Lenorovitz, “Germany,	 Italy Propose 

Space Station, Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, February 20, 1984, pp. 55–56. 

Quote is on p. 55. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
50 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

96. For background on French planning, see 

Jeffrey Lenorovitz, “French Plan Unmanned 

Space Station,” Aviation Week and Space 

Technology, August 3, 1981, pp. 49–51, and 

David Dickson, “France Pushes Europe 

Toward Manned Space Flight,” Science, 

January 17, 1986, pp. 209–10. The quote is 

from a NASA memorandum from James 

Morrison, Deputy Director of International 

Affairs, to Director of Space Station Task 

Force, August 16, 1982. 

97. ESA efforts are divided between mandatory 

programs, to which member states must contribute according to a preset formula, and 

optional programs, to which member states 

contribute based on their political and industrial interest. Scientific programs are part of 

the mandatory portion; most large system 

development activities such as Spacelab and 

Ariane were optional programs. 

98. ESA Resolution ESA/C/LXIV/Res. 4 (Final), 

June 28, 1984. 

99. European Space Agency, “Outline of a LongTerm European Space Plan,” ESA/C (84) 46, 

Rev. 1, November 21, 1984, pp. 2–3. 

100. Ibid., pp. 16, 17, 22. 

101. Erik Quistgaard had been replaced in mid1984 by Reimar Luest, a German 

scientist/administrator. It was Luest who took 

the lead for ESA in rallying member-state support behind the agency’s long-range plan. 

102. Eurospace, Towards a European Long-Term 

Space Programme, 1985. 

103. In an attempt to gain the support of some in the 

space science community for the space station, NASA had included as part of its station 

program several large automated Earth observation platforms in a polar orbit quite separate 

from the core station complex. The logic for 

this inclusion was somewhat tenuous; scientists were told by NASA managers that the 

chance of getting approval for these observation platforms would be enhanced by associating them with the politically strong space station. The reality turned out to be somewhat different, and the platforms were separated from 

the station program in the late 1980s. 

104. This discussion is based on an interview 

with Peggy Finarelli, a NASA memorandum 

from Deputy Director, Policy and Plans 

Office, Office of the Space Station, to 

Director, Policy and Plans Office, Office of 

the Space Station, “London Trip,” November 

5, 1984, and a letter from Jack Leeming, 

Department of Trade and Industry, to John 

Hodge, NASA, August 16, 1984. 

105. Summary of meeting attached to a memorandum from Robert Freitag, “UK Policy on Space 

Station,” November 2, 1984. 

106. Memorandum from Deputy Director to 

Director, “London Trip,” November 5, 1984. 

107. Dickson, “France Pushes Europe.” 

108. Frederic d’Allest, “A Space Policy for 

Europe,” Le Monde, January 29, 1985, as 

translated by NASA European 

Representative Richard Barnes. 

109. Memorandum from Director of International 

Affairs to Administrator, “Visit of Dr. Hans 

Riesenhuber,” October 14, 1983. 

110. Letter from Hans Riesenhuber to James Beggs, 

October 27, 1983, as translated by the 

German embassy in Washington, DC. 

111. Translation of the Kohl letter (undated) is 

attached to a memorandum from Director of 

International Affairs to Administrator, “Reagan 

Letter to Kohl,” January 20, 1984. 

112. Personal communication from Richard Barnes, 

April 5, 1991. 

113. Note to Otho Eskin, Department of State, from 

Margaret Finarelli, NASA, “Kohl Letter to the 

President,” February 6, 1985. 

114. Cable from Ambassador Arthur Burns to 

Secretary of State, “Research and Finance 

Ministers Agree on Space Station Financing: 

Final Roadblock to German Participation 

Removed,” January 1985. 

115. Cable from Ambassador Arthur Burns to 

Secretary of State, “Press Release on German 

Participation in U.S. Manned Space Station,” 

January 1985. 

116. Cable from Ambassador Arthur Burns to 

Secretary of State, “FRG Cabinet Gives GoAhead to Space Station and Ariane 5 

Program,” January 1985. 

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117. Council, European Space Agency, 

“Resolution on the Long-Term European 

Space Plan,” ESA/C-M/LXVII/Res. 1 (Final). 

118. Ibid. 

119. ESA Council, “Resolution on Participation in 

the Space Station Programme,” ESA/ 

C-M/LXVII/Res. 2 (Final), January 31, 1985. 

120. For a discussion of this history, see Logsdon, 

“U.S.-European Cooperation in Space 

Science.” 

121. In addition to the sources cited below, this 

account of Japanese consideration of the U.S. 

invitation to participate in the space station 

program is based on interviews with Kaoru 

Mamiya and Masahiro Kawasaki of the 

Science and Technology Agency and 

Masatoshi Saito and Masafumi Miyazawa of 

NASDA, May 15, 1991. 

122. See the earlier section titled “Origins of the 

U.S. Invitation to Cooperate” for an account of 

how the United States, during the 1970–1972 

period, changed the conditions under which 

foreign participation in the post-Apollo program was acceptable. These changes applied 

to Japan as well as to Europe. 

123. “Japan’s Space Program: A National Priority,” 

interview with Nobuytki Arino, Executive 

Managing Director, TRW Overseas, Aerospace 

America, March 1985, p. 65. 

124. National Space Development Agency, NASDA 

185-186, September 1985, p. 8. 

125. Space Activities Commission, “Outline of 

Japan’s Space Development Policy,” revised on 

February 23, 1984 (unofficial translation), p. 7. 

126. Andrew Pollack, “Japan’s Space Race Struggle,” 

New York Times, August 24, 1984, pp. D1, D5. 

For an overview of U.S.-Japanese space relations, see John M. Logsdon, “U.S.-Japan Space 

Relations at the Crossroads,” Science, Vol. 225, 

January 31, 1992, pp. 294–300 and John M. 

Logsdon, Learning from the Leader: The Early 

Years of Japanese-U.S. Space Relations 

(Washington, DC: Space Policy Institute, 

George Washington University, 1998). 

127. Ibid. 

128. Memorandum from Director of 

International Affairs to Director, Space 

Station Task Force, “Japanese Space Station 

Planning,” July 15, 1982. 

129. Telegram from A. Kubozono, NASDA, to K. 

S. Pedersen, NASA, “NASDA Space Station 

Task Force,” July 27, 1982. 

130. NASA, “Space Station Planning Activities in 

Japan,” December 8, 1982. 

131. Mitsubishi Group, “Proposed Japanese 

Participation in the U.S. Space Station 

Program,” presented to Japanese government, September 1982. 

132. Letter from James Beggs to George Shultz, 

January 4, 1983. 

133. Philip Culbertson and Terence Finn, “Visit to 

Japan—March 6–11, 1983,” p. 2. 

134. The subcommittee’s conclusions were 

reported by Masatoshi Saito of NASDA at an 

American Institute of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics Symposium in July 1983. See 

Gerard and Edwards, eds., Space Station, 

pp. 120–22. 

135. Informal U.S. Embassy translation of Nihon 

Keizai article of October 17, 1983, contained in cable from Ambassador Mansfield 

to Secretary of State, October 1983. 

136. Translation of article that appeared in Nihon 

Keizai Shimbun, November 21, 1984, p. 3 

(JPRS-JST-85-018-L). MITI had been trying to 

get involved in various areas of space activity 

that NASDA viewed as its “turf” since 1980. 

137. Ibid. 

138. Letter from Philip Culbertson to Makoto 

Miura, December 6, 1984. 

139. Cable from Makoto Miura to Philip 

Culbertson, “Japanese Space Station Phase 

B Budget,” December 28, 1984. 

140. Letter from Tadahiro Sekimoto to James 

Beggs, March 6, 1985. 

141. Ad Hoc Committee on Space Station 

Program, Space Activities Commission, 

“Basic Plan for Japanese Participation in the 

Space Station Program” (Final Report—unofficial translation), April 10, 1985, pp. 14–16. 

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52 Together In Orbit: The Origins of International Participation in the Space Station 

142. In addition to the sources cited below, this 

account of Canadian consideration of the 

U.S. invitation to participate in the space 

station program is based on interviews with 

Mac Evans and Karl Doetsch, respectively, 

Canadian Space Agency, on June 10, 1989, 

and March 13, 1990, and with William 

Cockburn, then Counsellor for Science and 

Technology, Embassy of Canada, on 

August 10, 1988. 

143. “Canadian Astronaut Program Announced,” 

Press Release, Ministry of State for 

Economic Development, Science and 

Technology, June 8, 1983. 

144. Doetsch’s remarks are in Gerard and 

Edward, eds., Space Station, p. 118. 

145. National Research Council of Canada, 

“Canadian Participation in Space Station, in 

John Kirton, ed., Canada, the United States, 

and Space (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 

International Affairs, 1986), p.110. 

146. Ibid. and interview with William Cockburn. 

147. Doetsch in Gerard and Edwards, eds., Space 

Station, p. 118. 

148. Memorandum from Kenneth Pedersen, “Results 

of Space Station Trip,” March 21, 1984. 

149. Karl Doetsch, “Space Station-Canadian 

Considerations for Participation,” paper 

enclosed with a letter from Doetsch to P.E. 

Culbertson, NASA, December 20, 1984. 

150. Interview with William Cockburn. 

151. Cable from Ambassador Robinson to 

Secretary of State, “Canadian Manned Space 

Station Considerations,” January 1985. 

152. Cable from Secretary of State Shultz to 

American Embassy, Ottawa, “Canadian 

Contribution to the Manned Space Station,” 

February 1985. 

153. Canada’s Interim Space Plan, 1985–1986, 

reprinted in Kirton, Canada, the United 

States, and Space, p. 101. 

154. Summary, “The Quebec Summit,” March 

18, 1985. 

155. Quoted in Kirton, Canada, the United 

States, and Space, p. 100. 

156. See, however, John M. Logsdon, “International Cooperation in the Space Station 

Programme: Assessing the Experience to 

Date,” Space Policy, February 1991, 

pp. 35–46. 

Monographs in Aerospace History 
TOGETHER IN ORBIT

The Origins of International The Origins of International

Participation in the Space Station Participation in the Space Station

John M. Logsdon

Monographs in Aerospace History #11