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ANDEAN COUNTERDRUG INITIATIVE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 2, 2004

Serial No. 108–186

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

——— ———

——— ———

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

——— ———

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Staff Director

DAVID MARIN, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

——— ———

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

J. MARC WHEAT, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

NICOLE GARRETT, Clerk

TONY HAYWOOD, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on March 2, 2004 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Charles, Robert, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, International

Narcotic and Law Enforcement Affairs; and Tom O’Connell, Assistant

Secretary, Department of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict ................................................................................................... 35

Walters, John, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy ................. 5

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Charles, Robert, Assistant Secretary, Department of State, International

Narcotic and Law Enforcement Affairs, prepared statement of ............... 40

Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Virginia, prepared statement of ................................................................... 76

O’Connell, Tom, Assistant Secretary, Department of Defense, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, prepared statement of ..................... 52

Walters, John, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 8

(1)

ANDEAN COUNTERDRUG INITIATIVE

TUESDAY, MARCH 2, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY AND

HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in room

2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mark E. Souder (chairman of the subcommittee) Presiding.

Present: Representatives Souder, Ruppersberger and Norton.

Staff present: J. Marc Wheat, staff director and chief counsel;

John R. Stanton, congressional fellow; Nicole Garrett, clerk; Tony

Haywood, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant

clerk.

Mr. SOUDER. The subcommittee will come to order.

Good afternoon. This is the second in a series of concise hearings

on our Nation’s drug policy. Today we will examine the critical

issues of the drug supply in the Andean region and will provide

members with an opportunity to focus on the President’s 2005

budget request for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. We will

have the opportunity to discuss a wide range of drug policy strategy and implementation issues with Director Walters on his own

panel. We will then seat Assistant Secretary of State Charles and

Assistant Secretary of Defense O’Connell on the second panel.

ONDCP has broad authority within the executive branch to coordinate national drug policy and budgets for Federal drug control

agencies. Under existing law, the Director reviews the annual

budget requests for each Federal department and agency charged

with implementing a Federal drug control program. If the budget

is deemed inadequate to fulfill the President’s strategy, the Director is empowered to propose funding levels and initiatives he believes are sufficient to do so, which generally must then be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget in lieu of the agency

request. The certification authority is a powerful tool to enable the

Director to exercise control over individual Federal departments

and agencies to ensure the adequacy and coordination of national

resources to fight drug abuse in America.

I believe that ONDCP has generally been highly successful in

keeping the Nation’s focus and resources on the critical priority of

reducing the supply and reducing drug use in America. The many

positive signs and trends that Director Walters reported this past

year, after the negative trends during the previous administration,

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clearly demonstrate the difference that an office can make when

strong and effective leadership combines with sound policy.

For example, the 2003 Monitoring the Future survey showed an

11 percent decline in drug use by 8th, 10th, and 12th grade students over the past 2 years. The finding translates into 400,000

fewer teen drug users over 2 years, confirming that President

Bush’s 2-year goal has been exceeded. Similarly, the 2003 Teens

Partnership Attitude Tracking Study [PATS], survey corroborated

the earlier reports that showed an 11 percent drop in youth drug

use. We are beginning to see reductions in coca cultivation in Colombia.

These victories are very encouraging to American families, treatment professionals, and law enforcement personnel who are working so hard to prevent drug use in America. However, significant

challenges remain in virtually every area of coca and opium poppy

producing regions in the Andean region.

The fiscal year 2005 request for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative will fund projects needed to continue the enforcement, border

patrol, crop reduction, alternative economic development, and

democratic institution building and administration of justice and

human rights programs in the region. The ACI budget provides

support to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and

Panama. The subcommittee is concerned, however, that the 13 percent reduction between 2003 and the administration’s 2005 request

for the initiative, from $841 million to $731 million, stifles the

hard-earned successes that have recently become evident. Of the $731 million requested, $463 million will be used to continue to support Colombia’s unified campaign against drug trafficking and narcoterrorists. Funds will maintain support to the Colombian Army’s aviation program and drug units, as well as the Colombian National Police in the areas of aviation, eradication, and

interdiction.

It is important to understand that Plan Colombia is an initiative

of the Colombian Government and the Colombian people. The solution must come from within Colombia, and the plan is an effort to

address a broad spectrum of social, economic, and political issues

that cannot be resolved in any other way.

I have met with President Uribe several times, and he is committed to this. It is equally apparent, however, that American assistance to and cooperation with the plan is critical to make it work

and that the full support and commitment of the administration

and Congress is essential.

Along the same line, the plan is not just about Colombia but is

representative of an approach that we hope we can reinforce to

spread throughout the entire Andean region. I met with Peruvian

officials and learned of many difficulties their government is facing.

I have met with Ecuadorian officials as well who are concerned

about traffickers moving over the border along the Putumayo. We

must consider the great potential and the great challenge as well

as the constant need to consider the big picture as we proceed.

Today, we have invited witnesses from the administration to discuss the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the efforts and results so

far, the strategy in the coming year, and the adequacy of the resources requested. Appearing first from the Office of National Drug

3

Control Policy, we have Director John Walters. After the first

panel, from the Department of State we will hear from Assistant

Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,

Robert Charles. And from the Department of Defense, we have Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Thomas O’Connell.

Our thanks to all of you for your willingness to testify and for

accommodating us into your schedule. I look forward to the opportunity to discuss our progress and how best to meet the counternarcotics challenges today.

Now I would like to yield to Ms. Norton, if she has any opening

statement.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I do.

I have just come back from Guantanamo, a trip to Guantanamo,

but we stopped in Florida and visited and were briefed by the

Southern Military Command. I must say I was impressed by what

they had to say about the Colombian effort, offering statistics, offering maps and graphs for the proposition, documenting the proposition that we are making progress in Colombia.

Much of that progress—of course, we have limited number of

troops there. I think 400 is the absolute number we can have there.

But they gave great credit to civil society, to the leaders of Colombia for developing the civil society in that region actually for the

first time, including crop development initiatives, saw apparently

far fewer human rights violations, so that people are less afraid,

far less afraid of the military than they were before. I can only

hope that we will see comparable success on our end of the drug

traffic, which has been so elusive to us for so many decades.

I note that the President’s budget includes a 9.6 percent increase

over 2004 for drug treatment. I am not sure where that money

goes. I will be most interested in it. But I was pleased to see it,

especially at a time when we are all ready for substantial cuts.

I am very concerned, continue to be very concerned about treatment, especially as the money or funds available goes up. Because

anybody can pop up and say they do drug treatment. There are almost no standards for deciding whether or not any civilian in society with no training can come up and claim to do drug treatment.

It is so urgently needed. Particularly is drug treatment key to reducing crime in big cities.

Essentially what you have, when you see all of this crime in big

cities, what you are seeing is nothing more and nothing less than

the development of the drug economy, which has replaced the jobs

economy in those cities. Grown men and young men especially are

growing up where there is no economy. They do not say, well, I

guess I am going to sit here and see if I can find myself a minimum

wage job. They go out looking for jobs that they believe are comparable to the jobs in the rest of society; and what they do in many

of our communities is to bring their own economy, with all of the

violence and all of the conduct and family disintegration that comes

with a drug economy.

So I am very pleased to see some increases, and I will be very

interested to see how we are going to use the drug treatment

money. I just wanted to report that when there is progress and you

4

see that kind of progress, you are heartened, particularly in a hardcore area like this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Ruppersberger, do you want to make an opening statement?

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon.

Well, we have talked about it a lot, but I am sure that the facts

and statistics show that drugs still—drugs are the biggest threat

to our society. I think the statistics now, and correct me if I’m

wrong, are that almost all violent crime, about 90 percent of it, is

drug-related. Is that correct? Is that close to where the numbers

are?

Mr. WALTERS. Well, it would include—you include people who

are under the influence of drugs when they commit their crime,

yes. Ninety percent is not involved with violence in protection of

the drug business but under the influence. It may not be quite that

high, but it is in the 70 to 80 percent range.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. OK. First, it is important we take this fight

to the source of production before the drugs reach our borders. By

stemming the production of illegal drugs at their source, we decrease the spreading of our local law enforcement resources even

further. We need to ensure that there is an appropriate amount of

resources.

One of my biggest concerns is that we do have to deal with the

issue of terrorism. It is very serious, and we are dealing with that

issue, but that we don’t take away the resources from our fight

against the war on drugs, both at a local, State, and Federal level.

I think we are going to have to keep our eye on that ball on a continuing basis. I am sure you are coming here today and you will

tell us where the administration thinks they are, but I am just very

concerned.

My colleague, Congresswoman Norton, was right about the issue

of the drug treatment. You are never going to really resolve the

problem unless you deal with the actual drug treatment itself, and

that is something very important.

One thing, I always like to promote my district. We have to stay

involved in resources and technology; and, right now, I would

think, especially in the area that we are going to talk about today,

the use of the unmanned air vehicles like the Shadow—and why

I am saying that, that is manufactured in my district, in Maryland,

Maryland’s second congressional district. But I want to maybe develop some of those issues in this hearing, too, about the resources

that are there, what the needs are, to make sure that we can continue to stay on top of this issue.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative

days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing

record and that any answers to written questions provided by the

witnesses also be included in the record.

Without objection, it is so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and

other materials referred to by Members and the witnesses may be

included in the hearing record and that all Members be permitted

to revise and extend their remarks.

5

Without objection, it is so ordered.

As you know, it is standard practice in this committee to ask witnesses to testify under oath. So Mr. Walters, if you would stand

and raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much. Let the record show that the

witness has responded in the affirmative.

We thank you very much for your leadership in the office of National Drug Control Policy and look forward to your statement.

STATEMENT OF JOHN WALTERS, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF

NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

Mr. WALTERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ms. Norton

and Mr. Ruppersberger.

Without objection, I would ask that my written statement be included in the record, and I will just cover briefly a few of the highlights and then follow the interests and the issues you have with

your questions.

I want to thank you all for the attention that you have paid to

this issue. I see that in Congresswoman Norton’s visit to the facilities in Florida, which allow us to give I think a better indication

of what is going on with more detail, as you said. It is an impressive group of people working very hard.

Chairman Souder and I have traveled long distances together to

not very exotic or nice places, and he has been tireless in working

with these issues and has been willing to tell the truth when some

people that we met with didn’t want to hear it. I appreciate that

and am grateful for the relationship that we have been able to cultivate since I took this position.

The central focus of the Andean initiative, as you know, is to attack the major source of cocaine and heroin and a major source of

heroin consumed in the United States. The United States and the

Government of Colombia, which has been the principal focus of this

effort, although it involves, as you mentioned in your opening

statement, multiple nations. The Colombia strategy focuses on

three parts: eradicating almost the entire illegal drug crop each

year, regardless of replanting efforts; second, interdicting and arresting drug shipments and traffickers involved in shipping these

substances; and, third, pressuring trafficking organizations through

extraditions and other organizational attack initiatives.

There is good news I think on all of these fronts, although there

certainly is more that we obviously have to do. Thanks to truly unprecedented efforts by the Uribe administration in Colombia and

funding by the U.S. Congress for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, as the administration has requested, we have made much

progress in all of these areas.

Due to an aggressive aerial spraying campaign, coca cultivation

and production in Colombia dropped 15 percent in 2002. This is the

first such decrease in over a decade. As you mentioned, the

Putumayo region, which in 2001 produced almost 20 percent of the

world’s coca, there was left only 1,500 hectors of coca in April 2003

when we surveyed. This is a number down 96 percent from the

nearly 40,000 hectors of coca 2 years before.

6

Opium poppy cultivation in Colombia we estimate dropped as

well in 2002 by 25 percent. The effect of massive aerial eradication

continued in 2003 and is being evaluated, but we anticipate a further significant impact driving down cocaine cultivation and production even more.

Most importantly, the same is holding true throughout the Andean region. I am pleased to report that even with the monumental

results that we see in Colombia we are not seeing a resurgence of

coca in Peru and Bolivia. Coca cultivation actually dropped in Peru

in 2003, and slight increases in coca cultivation in Bolivia in 2003

did not translate into an increase of cocaine production potential

since the new fields there did not reach maturity. Moreover, coca

cultivation in both of these countries remains dramatically lower

than we saw during most of the last decade. Overall, coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia combined declined by 1,400 hectors between 2002 and 2003, countering any significant concerns regarding the so-called balloon effect.

Interdiction is also an area where we think we have made remarkable progress, although more needs to be done. Colombian

interdiction efforts were strengthened again under President Uribe.

Colombian forces destroyed 83 cocaine production labs in 2003, surpassing their previous record by over 30 percent. They also captured more than 48 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base, 1,500

metric tons of precursor substances and 75,000 gallons of precursor

chemicals calls.

Interdiction efforts continued to meet with success at sea as well

in 2003. Colombian forces increased their success rate against gofast boats, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s use of force helicopters continue to play a crucial role countering the go-fast threat as well.

Overall, 2003 U.S. support and interdiction activities in the transit zone resulted in the seizure of 140 metric tons of cocaine. I

should add here for context that we estimate U.S. consumption at

250 metric tons roughly, so we are making a significant blow and

causing significant costs to meet that demand of flow.

The reintroduced Colombian Air Bridge Denial program in August 2003 ensured that air traffic would not easily make up for the

interruption in maritime smuggling. In 6 months since it started,

16 suspicious aircraft have been intercepted, 10 aircraft were

forced to land, and 8 of these aircraft were destroyed on the

ground. No one was killed. Mexico and several of our partner nations in Central America also took significant steps to increase the

difficulty of smuggling illegal drugs through their airspace. In addition, organizational attack efforts under the Uribean administration have resulted in an unprecedented number of extraditions; 104

narcotraffickers have been extradited to the United States since

August 2002 when President Uribe took office.

The Uribe administration has produced all of these accomplishments while also making the most significant advance in human

rights in Colombia in a generation. As you indicated, Congresswoman Norton, the Government of Colombia reported significant

reductions in all indicators regarding human rights abuses in 2003.

For example, homicides were down 20 percent, massacres down 33

percent, victims of massacres down 38 percent, and number of

kidnappings down 26 percent. Enforced displacements of individVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:52 Sep 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\95530.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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uals were cut by 49 percent. For the first time in history, the Government of Colombia has a presence in all of Colombia’s 1,098 municipalities, extending the protection of rule of law throughout the

countryside. As a result of these advances, the Uribe administration has created a Colombia which is safer and more democratic

and more a government of rule of law.

If we can continue our successes with eradication and maintain

our interdiction performance, keep pressure on major traffickers,

and reduce the attractiveness of the drug business, we will create

and continue to strengthen a disruption of the market. That is our

goal.

In conclusion, the good news is that we have seen in the Andean

region a particularly robust and growing effort against the major

sources of supply and those groups that engage in the production

of drugs and violence that is a part of the drug and it funds—the

drug trade funds in other areas of domestic life in this region.

Domestically, as you mentioned, we have also seen good news.

We have reduced demand by young people, exceeding the President’s 2-year goal of a 10 percent reduction by reducing it 11 percent for young people. We are impatient for more progress. That is

why we set, as you know, with the support of this committee, a 5-

year goal of a 25 percent reduction in drug use in the United

States. We believe in a balanced strategy. We have to have both

treatment and prevention as well as supply control, foreign and domestic. We believe that thanks to the cooperation of our institutions in the United States as well as governments like that of the

Governments of Colombia and Mexico, we have made progress and

we have the hope that will be the basis for continuing progress.

Thank you. I will be happy to take your questions.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walters follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Obviously, in the course of a year, we try not to

have you come up here every 2 weeks, but you have so many different areas that overlap with our subcommittee, and today we are

focusing on the Andean Counterdrug Initiative in particular. I am

thrilled that Assistant Secretary of the Department of Defense, Mr.

O’Connell, is here, because we have a number of things that overlap in his area. We are first thrilled that they kept the post and

that he is there, and we will be looking to ask some questions.

But I wanted to address a few questions toward you regarding

the budget, because the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security are absolutely critical when you get

into source interdiction areas. I sit on the Homeland Security Committee, partly because the Speaker has been very concerned about

whether sources would be diverted. So let me ask you a series of

questions and then you kind of relate to some of these, and we can

follow up in writing, if necessary.

In the report that you just released yesterday, you had the following: Interdiction forces from the Department of Defense and

Homeland Security registered impressive interdiction successes

during 2003. But you didn’t have any details listed or explained in

the report. The next reference to the Department of Defense is on

page 51 in the appendix where we see a single line that the administration’s request for the Department of Defense drug control

funding is down from $852.7—it was down $50 million, from $908.

Now how does the Department of Defense strategy relate to your

national drug control strategy? Because two brief references for

something, an agency that is spending at minimum $852 million a

year is pretty significant.

We had a hearing on Afghanistan last week. Clearly, Afghanistan is a huge problem. We know we have multiple problems there

with terrorism and heroin going to Europe, but our heroin is coming from Colombia and Mexico. Our cocaine is coming from there.

Much of the marijuana is coming from there. We have this huge

amount of money being spent. What do they do with almost $1 billion in the name of drug control strategy?

Then if I can give you the other one with the Coast Guard, and

then relate these two things together. We are very concerned about

and would like some specific data on the HITRON helicopters being

pulled back into the ports, that certain things, even though there

has been—it says that the HITRON helicopters and go-fast interdiction were 35 percent of the go-fast interdictions. We bought

these helicopters and these boats specifically for counternarcotics,

and most of them have now been pulled into the harbors.

What we would like is some specific data on the number of hours

and ship days, how this arrival and transit zone is being impacted.

I understand that you get certain benefits from having things at

the harbor, at the arrival zones, assuming that they arrive right at

the harbor and don’t find somewhere away from the harbor. But,

clearly, if we can catch them before they get on our soil, there is

less space to work with. Clearly, if we can get them in the source

zone, we are in a tighter area as they move out to water and as

they move out to land and as they go into every city in the United

States.

21

So I know that is a complex question, but I am curious as to why

there wasn’t more about the Department of Defense and how you

think we should work with the Department of Homeland Security

in budgeting questions. Because we can’t give up the war on narcotics, where we know we have 20,000 dead a year, for potential

losses in homeland security.

Mr. WALTERS. Let me try to take those parts and create a better

context. Some of this we will have to supply for the record in terms

of utilization of HITRON systems and so forth, but let me give

some context of what we are trying to do.

I certainly hope that nothing in the drug control strategy suggests that the contribution made by the Department of Defense

isn’t central and critical as well as the Department of Homeland

Security. It is. And that has been a principal reason I think why

we have been able to do such a good job with interdiction.

Let me back up and say that when I took over this job a little

over 2 years ago I think the general concern was that the war on

terror inevitably would cause a degrading of the war on drugs, both

in terms of its priority in people’s minds for both demand, reduction, and supply activities at home and internationally, particularly

in interdiction, but also internationally. I think that what I have

seen over the last 2 years is exactly the reverse. We have had,

frankly, some of the biggest declines in demand we have had in a

decade. I actually think from my—you talk to as many people

around the country as I do, it is easier to talk to young people

about responsibility now. They are aware that the things that we

used to take for granted can’t quite be taken for granted and that

people are making sacrifices every day, and for most of them it is

easier to link what we ask them to do to what is healthy for them

I think and have that connection. It is not universally true, but I

think it is more likely and I think that environment on the domestic side is helpful.

What we have done on terror, in fact, we have gotten a great

deal more cooperation from a lot of the foreign governments. I

think we have new tools that you have given us in working on

sharing intelligence from national security forces with law enforcement. Some of these were modeled in the case of terror on things

that we have done in the drug arena, and they have worked. But

I think also what we have had in the specific case of the movement

of drugs in this hemisphere from south to north is a building on

institutional structures that have been put in place with a lot of

hard work over a number of years.

Today, we have the ability in the interdiction realm to identify

more real targets with places and movements that we can interdict,

as you probably saw at the Southern Command just recently, than

we always have resources to go after and take down those targets.

The reason is that we have been able to be smarter. We do not

have to spend hours and hours and huge sums of money patrolling

random areas. We have an idea of where they are and we can go

try to interdict them, and that is why interdiction rates are up with

less money.

Now we still have to maintain some of those systems, and DOD

does spend a lot of money, but, again, they are a critical partner

for us in interdiction, but they are also a critical partner in a lot

22

of domestic activities. They support things like domestic marijuana

eradication. They support—they provided for years a lot of support

in law enforcement in terms of translators and linguists. In fact,

we have tried to work with the Department of Defense on recently,

as we have put more demands on our uniform personnel for other

national security functions, they rightly had to pull some of these

people or had them pulled in two directions. We are trying to work

to make sure we support ongoing operations, that we improve our

effectiveness and respect the multiple needs that you know and

that I know you have supported as a Congress that we have in

other realms.

In the area of the HITRON specifically, they have been an enormously valuable tool, as you know. The reason is that the previous

means by which interdiction forces in some cases were circumvented were the so-called go-fast boats, high-speed, mediumsized or small surface craft who could outrun interdiction forces.

What the HITRON does is provides a helicopter-based platform, as

you know, to go out and interdict the ship, the boat, not allow them

to outrun and, if necessary, to use disabling fire to stop the boat

by disabling the engine fired from the aircraft.

A couple of months ago, the last time I checked, every time a

HITRON packaged engaged a target, there was a 100 percent

interdiction rate. I don’t think it gets any better than that, obviously.

Now these packages have in some cases had to be pulled back

because of demands for security in our ports during heightened levels of alert.

Again, part of what we are doing here with DOD as well as with

some special homeland security forces is blending our capacities to

take multiple threats and to use resources as we can. Sometimes

we have to make some compromises. But, again, last year we had

a record level of seizures in the transit zone, and we have improved

with Department of Defense through providing equipment, including some high-speed surface boats, to the Colombians their ability,

as you mentioned, to go out and interdict ships as they come off

the Colombia coast.

What we are trying to do is add layers of power against

vulnerabilities that traffickers have, and I think what you see as

a result of that is the higher levels of interdiction. Part of what we

need here is to blend long-range maritime patrol aircraft that help

the vector surface forces into the final closure and takedown and

the maintenance, obviously, of radar platforms to do this. But it is

not a perfect system, but never has the cost of doing business from

South America been higher, and we believe we can accelerate this

to the levels which we all want, which we all set as a goal, is reducing the availability on our streets so that we can help reduce

demand and reduce the consequences. Our goal is not to cope with

the drug problem, as you know; our goal is to reduce it both on the

demand side and the supply side.

So we can give you some of the specifics. There have been some

compromises made, but I think overall, thanks to a lot of people

working a lot of extra hours, we can be proud of the job that has

been done by management and consolidation and the powers and

the resources that we have been given.

23

Mr. SOUDER. You fundamentally agree, though, that there has

been a reduction in DOD and Department of Homeland Security resources in the source zone and transit zone areas?

Mr. WALTERS. At times there has been a reduction. I would have

to actually look back to see over the whole year, because we have

had quite an enormous willingness where they can to lean forward,

to provide equipment and aircraft. I know there are been press reports that there have been some reductions or some people complaining, but I would not be surprised if in fact, when you add it

all up, there hasn’t been. But I haven’t added it up for the whole

year, but we will be happy to provide that information.

Mr. SOUDER. We would like in specific detail, especially if the

counternarcotics budgets remain roughly the same but their expenditures are less in the area where the counternarcotics are. The

question is, what are the dollars being used for? Yes, there are efficiencies, but part of our responsibility as an oversight committee

and yours is, in effect, overseeing the entire narcotics policy, is to

make sure we fight aggressively for that share of funds, or come

to Congress, as we do appropriations, and say, look, in order to address this question, this is what we have to do, and not have a reduction in one area while we are, say, spending a disproportionate

amount in Afghanistan, which is a problem but not as much of a

domestic problem.

Mr. WALTERS. Let me just mention in that regard, I noted in

your opening remarks a reference to decline in the actual Andean

budget. That is not what my budget numbers show, so I would like

to work with your staff and make sure that I either figure out what

I don’t understand about your baseline here or that we get you information that we have that we haven’t done before.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Ms. Norton.

Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question, again, coming out of the briefing that we had

in Southern Command. What was new to me and a bit frightening

were the links that appear to be in the Caribbean and in South

America between terrorist groups and narcotics traffic, money

laundering. They had maps that showed us where terrorist

groups—that doesn’t mean that they are like al Qaeda, all of them

plotting with a plane to come over us. They may be collecting

money to send places. They range from Hezbollah to, you know,

several different kinds of terrorist groups. What was frightening

was the clear link, though, between these groups and the money

they get, how they use it, and narcotics traffic itself.

I would be interested in what you know about that and what you

think you can do about it, particularly given the Andean effort and

the good work that is going on in Colombia.

Mr. WALTERS. Yes. I think that maybe the simplest way to put

it that I think engages both our own domestic reality and what is

going on in these countries is, of course, the drug business depends

on two things, we know from long history. It depends on initiating

young people of teenage years to the use of dangerous addictive

substances, and the largest buyers are those who are dependent. So

it depends on selling, dependency, and addiction, and selling essentially poison to our children. That business is antithetical to a free

24

government, rule of law, democracy opportunity. So I think that is

the basic and underlying reason why these organizations have to

use violence and terror to carry out their business. Because no decent society, no government that cares about democracy and opportunity can tolerate it.

So these businesses—and they do it in our own streets, as you

know, as well as in these countries—have not shied away from

using intimidation, violence and, when they become strong enough,

to use them against institutions of government, as well as whole

communities, villages, and others.

As the consumption increased in some areas, including the

United States, we have provided a lot of money to these groups. As

the President has said, it is not acceptable that the American drug

consumer is the single largest funder of antidemocratic forces in

this hemisphere. We had made some progress against a larger——

Ms. NORTON. I am not nearly as interested in antidemocratic

forces. We have seen them all along. I am trying to find out how

terrorists have linked into the narcotics traffic and the money laundering traffic, what kinds of real seams exist among these forces,

or if you have seen them.

Mr. WALTERS. Well, the reason I said that is much of what we

have seen is these forces have become a merged group in most

areas, not in all areas. Some of them do a kind of taxing of drug

flows through their area, some of them may facilitate parts of the

drug trade, but large groups that are terrorist forces are also now

involved in simply drug trafficking as a principal—if not the principal—way in which they raise money for guns and ammunition,

they keep people in the field, they engage in bribery, intimidation,

and violence.

So my comment was meant to indicate that what has happened

is in some cases what may have been differences of ideology or purpose have now in many, many cases been mingled into simply violent trafficker organizations and the wealth from those organizations have become largely dependent on crime—drugs certainly,

kidnapping, bank robbery. As we have ended kind of state sponsorship of some groups as the cold war ended and some of these

groups which may have gotten support from other nations in the

past, what has happened increasingly is that the funding for such

wide-scale violence as well as particular organizations that want to

use terror for some political ends have become increasingly involved in the drug trade.

Ms. NORTON. Most frightening was to hear how you come from

some South American countries without a visa and end up in the

United States and then come straight up into the rest of—because

of the way in which traffic, legitimate traffic flows, you get yourself

into a car—we are looking for people to come at us with an airplane, looking more closely at simply the way—the transit between

Latin America and the Caribbean and here.

One further question. I was interested in your testimony at page

11, 104 traffickers under this President—under President Uribe,

104 traffickers have been extradited to the United States, 68 in

2003 and 14 already this year. I didn’t know what to compare that

to. That sounded good to me.

25

Under this regime, has it been easier to get extradition? Is there

any barrier to extradition? What about prosecuting these foreign

nationals when you get here in the United States? Are we getting

indictments?

Mr. WALTERS. Yes.

Ms. NORTON. I mean, are we getting convictions?

Mr. WALTERS. There were extraditions under President Uribe’s

predecessors, but the number and rate of extradition has increased

under President Uribe. We, of course, have indictments as a prerequisite for requesting the extradition, but I believe the last time

I checked that for all extradition from Colombia we have a 100 percent conviction rate. So we don’t extradite on cases that we do not

have a strong case.

Ms. NORTON. Is that generally a problem in those——

Mr. WALTERS. No, there has not been a problem. We have

worked very well with the Colombian Government. In years past,

there was a difficulty. Extradition is always somewhat tricky with

individual sovereignty.

Ms. NORTON. Do they have the death penalty?

Mr. WALTERS. They do not.

Ms. NORTON. So when we extradite, we promise not to——

Mr. WALTERS. We extradite under conditions that limit the sentence. We had one problem with an individual that was extradited

in New York, as you may be remembering, for, among other things,

killing a police officer, and that is a mandatory life sentence minimum, and that person was convicted. I spoke to President Uribe,

as did other U.S. officials, because we try to indict under conditions

that have extensive sentences but not life. They understand that

in that case we had a bit of a problem, but that conviction stands.

Ms. NORTON. I am very pleased to see you getting around it. It

was kind of terrible to let the fact that most of the world doesn’t

have the death penalty interfere with our getting hold of these nationals because we are so rigid that we don’t want them. And so

this common-sense notion, go get them, throw the book at them

here, seems to me to be far more realistic, practical and in keeping

with doing justice in these cases.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The purpose of the hearing today is the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, and since the initial funding, which

was about $1.3 billion for the ACI in fiscal year 2000 emergency

supplemental, has there been a reduction in the amount of drugs

coming into the United States from Colombia and the Andean

Mountain region? You made some comments earlier in your statement. I wasn’t sure whether they related to that. Do you have any

figures as it relates to that issue?

Mr. WALTERS. Let me be clear how we can measure this. We

measure three things, essentially. We measure the area under cultivation each year. We produce an estimate, and we haven’t had

the 2003 estimate done for Colombia yet, but in my oral remarks

I referred to the estimate that is done for Bolivia and Peru. We

should have the Colombian estimate in the next couple of weeks.

So we measure the area of land under cultivation from year to

year.

26

We then also provide an estimate of what we think that area

could produce in total drugs, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana, and

we compare them from year to year. We have seen a decline and

we have seen a substantial decline equivalent in the last year we

have a comparison—that is 2001, 2002—of 100 metric tons of processed cocaine. We also saw a substantial reduction in the cultivation of heroin poppies in Colombia between these 2 years, but I

hasten to add the heroin poppy problem is smaller. We don’t have

vast fields.

Last year, in 2002, we had an estimate of approximately 140,000

hectors of coca growing in Colombia. In comparison, there was an

estimated roughly 2,500 hectors of poppy in small plots. It is less

than 2 percent of what we see with regard to coca. So some of these

things, as they get smaller, obviously it is a little harder for us to

detect.

Second, we produce a report about interdiction between these

production countries and our coast and what we believe is an estimated flow and how much we take in in interdiction. We do not

have precise information on the so-called pipeline; that is, how

much time it takes from growth to the final processing and movement. We have not seen a dramatic decline in the flow, although

we have seen, as I say, a decline in the cultivation and we believe

that affects the processing. But if we understand this, if these

numbers are in the ball park, we should begin to see flow changes

in the coming months. We have not seen that yet.

Finally, what we measure is availability on our streets in the

form of largely price and purity. Generally what happens is, when

drugs are more plentiful, the price sometimes goes down, but the

purity goes up. When they are not plentiful, generally the first

thing you see is the purity goes down. Because most of the users,

because they are addicted, are basically spending their disposable

income on the drug. If you jack the price up, they go into crisis and

start detoxing, so you lose your customers. So basically what happens is the purity will generally decline.

We are not, because we have not seen in a broad way a change

on the street. But, again, consistent with what we know, about 6

to 9 to 12-month delay times in processing and flow and stockpiling, we should be seeing that in the coming year. We think this

is a critical year.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. But those numbers aren’t there, but you

are waiting to see it. Isn’t the vulnerability of the cocaine industry,

though, at the cultivation process?

Mr. WALTERS. It is one of the vulnerabilities. The danger has

been that because it goes over a wide area and because, unlike the

success we are having in Colombia, governments have been reluctant to use massive spraying because it disrupts a large part of the

population frequently in poorly governed areas. So what we have

done is gone after also the organizations and gone after the structures that link them in transit and distribution to the United

States.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Because, basically, I would say almost all

of the cocaine that comes to the United States comes through Colombia and then through Mexico, is that correct? And then about

75 percent of it goes to Mexico?

27

Mr. WALTERS. About 70, 75 percent of it.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And then goes to our street. And we are

trying to get to the bottom line to stop it getting to our street as

much as we can.

We had a hearing last week about Afghanistan and the heroin

issue there; and again eradication, or whatever you want to call it,

was a major issue there. And the Karzai—I was over there about

a week and a half ago, and that is one of Karzai’s biggest issues,

because the warlords and the other people are making so much

money and that undermines their economy also and their ability to

create other jobs.

Do you think—how would you compare Afghanistan to Colombia

as far as our eradication and our plans for successes between Colombia and Afghanistan?

Mr. WALTERS. The biggest difference is we don’t have a security

situation in Afghanistan where we could conduct programs with

the kind of robustness you have in Colombia, as you probably saw

when you were there. The security situation, because we still have

al Qaeda, Taliban elements that we are trying to bring to justice,

have created a problem of extending governmental authority out to

those areas.

Now Afghanistan doesn’t have the institutions that Colombia

does and the army, the police, the institutions of justice. We are

trying to stand those up. So we are trying, essentially, as the British sometimes say about Afghanistan, it is sometimes hard to find

things to bolt on to. You are trying to build, but you haven’t got

much as a foundation.

The difference is we can go faster because of the leadership in

Colombia and because there is more robust infrastructure there.

We are trying to build that in Afghanistan, but I will say, as you

no doubt know, we are now at a time where, for the first time in

modern history, we can actually change the world dynamic of world

opium. That is not coming here, but it is poisoning a lot of people,

a lot of instability, lot of violence. It will not be easy. We have to

be patient. But with the help of some allies we have the chance of

going after the remaining bread basket of opium poppy. It will be

a struggle, but it has never been possible before.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I see my time is up. Can I have one more

question?

Mr. SOUDER. Sure.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. You mentioned pipeline. I am going to talk

to you about a different pipeline, because I am little concerned

about this issue, the importance of a Cano Limon wall pipeline as

it relates to the United States. Why are we spending $98 million

of HCI funding to protect military funding that has nothing to do

with the war on drugs?

Mr. WALTERS. Well, this was originally put forward by both the

Colombians and our personnel in the country because it is a major

source of revenue for the government. We are trying to help the

government there take over more of the financing and operations.

The pipeline was under attack principally because it is a revenue

source for the legitimate Colombian Government. It also was a target of some of the guerilla groups in the area that was contested.

So the effort is to both provide greater security and to provide a

28

means for legitimate business to provide taxes and support for the

Colombian Government. It is a small part of what we do, as you

know, but it was——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Well, it is $98 million.

Mr. WALTERS. I haven’t been watching in so long, I don’t think

that is real money. I understand.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I know we deal in billions and trillions

around here, but $98 million is still a lot.

Following up to that question; is reducing the supply of the drugs

reaching the United States the primary goal of the ACI or is it preserving democracy and security in the Andean region? And are

these to any extent, these two, competing objectives? And that ties

into what I asked the question about the pipeline.

Mr. WALTERS. Right. We think they are necessarily complementary objectives. There is no such thing as a narcodemocracy. There

are tyrannical, unstable, violent forces that are involved with drugs

that attack institutions of democratic order and remove the possibility of legitimate economic development and opportunity.

We need to work together. Now we don’t believe that necessarily

allows us to use all counternarcotics money for a variety of security

interests, but in Colombia and in this program specifically we have

asked and Congress has given us authority to work with the Colombians under specified limitations to work on counterterror activities as well as counternarcotics activities. You gave us the ability to overcome the fact that, because the paramilitaries and the

FARC were both traffickers and terrorists, that they got protection

that they wouldn’t have gotten if they were just traffickers. So we

corrected that difficulty. But we understand we have to balance

and we have to be able to show that the moneys are being used,

and I think the Colombians have been pretty good about showing—

they understand that the U.S.’ interest of the people is to expect

to reduce the flow of drugs here as well as reducing the harm drugs

do there.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. And terrorism, too, will benefit us in a lot

of ways, and maybe we can get some of that money over to the

drug side.

Mr. WALTERS. Thank you.

Mr. SOUDER. Just a few followup questions.

Last week, I asked Karen Tandy from DEA this question and Mr.

Charles. Have you assisted in the formation or do you have a copy

of any written Department of Defense policy and guidance to troops

deployed in the Andean region and other source countries like Afghanistan with respect to discovering poppy and coca fields, labs,

warehouses and drug shipment convoys in the Andean region? We

understand that there at least was such a Department of Defense

policy, but we wondered whether you have seen a copy of such a

policy.

Mr. WALTERS. I haven’t. I want to make sure when I answer this

I understand what you are asking. I have not seen a separate policy stating to DOD personnel you can do this or should do this and

shouldn’t do that. Now it is possible that there is some kind of

operational guidance or instructions for rules of engagement that

I wouldn’t have necessarily reviewed, but I certainly don’t remember discussions of this, and—I want to be clear.

29

The issue is that, as some people have asserted to the press, that

people in DOD have been told, do not do counternarcotics things.

I am not aware that that has been the case. That has not been the

character of my discussions with the senior members of the Department of Defense. And while we are clear that Congress and policy

set certain limits on what personnel from various agencies do and

we abide by them, I think it is unfair to suggest that the Department of Defense is somehow inappropriately turning a blind eye.

They have been very, very important and very, very willing to help

us in these areas, but especially in places like Afghanistan, it is

difficult. And in Colombia we have tried to maintain the limits that

Congress has put on us about what U.S. personnel do and what

they should not do from various agencies.

So I want to be clear and fulsome in answering your question.

I am not aware that we have done anything with the Defense Department or the leadership of the Defense Department. I think it

is completely unfair to say that they have said, don’t do things that

are connected with counternarcotics.

Mr. SOUDER. What our frustration is, and this is—I mean, I

know what the Department of Defense’s frustration is, is that they

are trying to tackle Afghanistan, Iraq. Haiti explodes, and all of a

sudden they need to put people in Haiti. They have tremendous demands on the Department of Defense. I am not trying to criticize

that. But we can’t function in the war on narcotics without the Department of Defense. Without SOUTHCOM, there is no Andean

initiative to speak of, without JTF–6 and training and helping on

the border, without defense surveillance access.

Let me just say I was pretty hard on the last administration

about diverting resources to Bosnia and the Balkans and about

taking surveillance planes up for oil spills.

If you are going to say it, you ought to say it: We are taking

these resources because we are not focused on the war on narcotics.

But if you’re going to say there is $850 million in the budget, the

question is, has that been consulted and worked with ONDCP,

which is supposed to be coordinating national drug control policy

with the Department of State in the Andean region with DEA, that

are supposed to be our counternarcotics enforcement people around

the world. Are you all working together?

Mr. WALTERS. I think there is even more accountability at the

Department of Defense. The Department of Defense from before

this administration created a central transfer to account for the

funds that are directed to counternarcotics. When you appropriate

money to that account, they go for counternarcotics, and we work

with them. Sometimes there are stresses and strains on that budget. In fact, as you probably are aware, we have inserted that same

system on some other multifunction agencies’ top, with some of

their complaints, but we have inserted that system as a way of controlling accounts so our drug budget now reflects what you really

spend on drugs. And we took out accounts largely that we could not

tell you that, when you appropriated the dollar, it was going for either a demand or supply reduction purpose.

I think there were concerns about the priority that counternarcotics played in some agencies, including Defense, when the administration started. They have stepped up and spent the money;

30

they have been there, and they have helped us solve problems.

They have been aggressive in this area despite all the other tasks

they have had.

I think that some of those concerns, whatever they may have

been, sourced—I can’t speak of before I took office, but I don’t have

those concerns. The Department of Defense is a good ally and they

have helped us solve problems. Now they are going to face issues,

as other agencies have—FBI, for example—of being called away on

some other things and trying to readjust resources.

We have tried to help work with the Department of Homeland

Security, for example, in providing aircraft and other support that

are necessary, that may substitute for some of the activities the

Department of Defense is doing. We ought to continue to do that,

just as we backfilled FBI’s positions with our requests for DEA to

maintain pressure. It takes some time and there may be a gap.

We are mindful of the need to have—that is why my office exists.

There is no department of drug control. There are multiple agencies that have to work together because they can’t all be combined.

And so the only way we can get a united effort is that we work together well. My office has been charged with that responsibility.

We work with others in carrying it out. I take your point very seriously and understand it to be our responsibility to get at that issue.

I do not believe the Department of Defense in any way, shape or

form is failing to carry out its responsibilities here. It will continue

to have to be something that we look at day by day because of the

demands placed on them and the demands placed on some of the

other agencies.

The reason we have the results that, as you know, Congresswoman Norton talked about, at JTF SOUTH is that DOD has

stepped up and helped us get some of those resources there, and

they have helped us work with some of our allies to strengthen the

overall system that gives us hope that this year is going to be a

very important year in the effort.

Mr. SOUDER. I very much appreciate in your announcements yesterday and the President’s announcements that we are going to go

after the steroid type of abuse in America. He said that in the

State of the Union.

And look at the abuse of prescription drugs. We just did a subcommittee hearing on OxyContin and other prescription drug abuse

in Florida; and clearly, it needs to be a major focus because there

are more deaths and more problems from any of the prescription

drugs than there are from cocaine and heroin combined.

You referred in your written testimony as well as, briefly, in your

verbal about the problems with Canada, the problems with socalled ‘‘medicinal marijuana’’ in the United States and how that is

breaking up even our drug-testing laws and our ability to enforce

worker protection laws and the transportation industry with this

ruling in Oregon that could undermine these things.

We have many different fronts we are battling, but the reason

the Department of Defense question looms here is that when we

are doing interdiction, we have to be coordinated among those

agencies because—and I didn’t even mention meth, which is what

is obsessing most Members of Congress in our districts. If it gets

into our urban areas, it will be like a crack cocaine epidemic. Right

31

now, it is more in the rural areas and it can be produced domestically, which is a whole other challenge. We have to have that kind

of coordination at the international level.

The second thing is, in your answer to Congressman

Ruppersberger’s question, that one of the challenges here is that

we have been spending a lot of money in the Andean region, and

we all agree that Uribe seems to be our best hope. It appears that

it hasn’t spread as much as we feared into the other countries.

It is perplexing to figure out why, if our interdiction is up and

our eradications up, that we haven’t moved the price and supply.

Yet we are all trying to figure out if there are stockpiles.

And it is a great goal to have democratization; it’s in our region,

stability in Colombia, and we have been putting a lot in their legal

system. But ultimately, the reason the American taxpayer has supported this is to see some reduction in the United States.

And I understand what you said about Afghanistan not having

certain regions that were secure, which is certainly true in the

eastern half of Colombia, in their jungles, too, as they move farther

out. And we don’t have forward landing locations and they are

harder to get, but then we ought to see price increases.

Something on the street is very troubling in this process, and

part of the question comes, are we missing more than we thought

we were missing, in which case, we come back to the resource question again about diverting resources. Because if we are, in fact—

and we can see from the spring that we are covering a higher percentage of the fields—something’s missing in this equation.

Mr. WALTERS. We are working on that part of the problem because I, too, have the concern that we need to make a better case

not only to Congress, but also others that have to make funding decisions and live with supporting these policies.

Let me point out one of the things we are looking up, because

I think we should talk to you and your staff in more detail on what

we think is happening here, once we get the latest survey number

for Colombia, which is due out in a couple of weeks: The United

States is the largest market. But of the roughly 250 metric tons of

cocaine we think is coming to the United States, roughly 150 is

going to Europe now and maybe 50 is going into Brazil, and then

there are some other substantial amounts that may be consumed

in the region because the region is developing a consumption problem.

That means that overall effects, 15, 20 percent, can be spread

across a couple of markets. And while those are rapid and we want

to accelerate them, with the pipeline you have to be reasonable

about how much buffering there can be in the final ability to take

it at the end stage of the pipeline. That, I think, though, is an argument for maintaining and increasing the pressure on the market

as rapidly as possible, which is what we are trying to do with interdiction, what we are trying to do with the attack on the organizations and what we need to maintain with regard to the eradication.

We don’t want to go to stasis because that will encourage a ballooning; it will encourage what we have seen before. If we let this

cancer continue, it metastasizes into other areas and establishes

itself. So when we kill it in one place, it moves around.

32

Our goal is not to chase this around like mercury on the top of

a desk. Our goal is to shrink it and crush it and crush it at various

stages so it can’t regenerate the supporting loop of production and

consumption. That is why we believe we have to have balance in

both prevention and treatment.

But also in the law enforcement realm, we must do a better job

on money and do a better job on domestic enforcement. We have

created—and I don’t want to go too far afield. We have created for

the first time a consolidated, organizational targeting list, as you

know, with DEA, FBI and our intelligence services. We have created the organizations that market to the United States as major

producers. We are trying to make sure we keep that current.

And our most important task for the future, that is new, is that

we want to take those organizations down rapidly. I will call it

‘‘harvesting.’’ The longer they exist—and we have very good people

providing indictments, but our view—and I know what Administrator Tandy’s view is, that after we indict them for 300 years of

offenses, indicting them for 600 years of offenses does not help us.

Let us go get them.

Some of that requires our cooperation with other governments.

Some of that requires coordinated operations here.

We are working, as you know, with the HIDTA program,

OCDETF program, to create a combined picture of what this enemy

on the battlefield looks like and then act on it as rapidly as is necessary to cause significant business collapse. This year, I believe is

critical in that regard, too. We have created this structure. We

have law enforcement, and the Justice Department has never been

in the position it is now in to aggressively and committedly go after

these groups.

We have to use these programs and this relationship and this

plan to take the structure of the business of drugs and drive it into

recession.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. That’s a good plan, and I really think you

are working hard and you have a lot of competent people that are

fighting this war.

You talked about the issue of balance between what you are

doing, say, in Colombia on eradication and going after the major

dealers and then the issue of drug addiction and treatment. How

would you balance those two out as far as reaching our ultimate

goal?

Mr. WALTERS. If we don’t reduce both supply and demand, we

have basic failure, what everybody talks about, but they don’t really sometimes appreciate. If we simply reduce demand and don’t reduce supply, we have cheaper, more potent drugs that are available

to addict more people more easily. If we simply reduce supply and

not demand, we have money chasing scarce drugs that encourages

production to grow or new sources of drug abuse to develop.

What we have to do if we are going to reduce and maintain reductions is reduce them together and put institutions in place that

will maintain those reductions. That is why we asked for and we

just got from Congress an additional $100 million to add to the $2

billion in block grant treatment money that we have already programmed and have on board. We have asked for $200 million——

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Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Is that money getting to the streets?

Mr. WALTERS. We are about to release the new treatment money

in the next week—the proposals for that money. We are seeking $200 million for next year. We have to make a

case, you know, in this budget environment. We asked for more

money for drug courts and we got less last year. And we are coming back and asking for even more this year. We also want to continue to strengthen prevention. And as the President said—I recognize it’s controversial, but he asked me what was the single biggest

additional thing—after last year’s talk about treatment, what was

the single biggest contribution we could make institutionally to improve the declines and accelerate them.

I told him that I thought it probably was too controversial, but

I recommend student drug testing. And then he said, we are going

to do it. He mentioned it in the State of the Union.

The biggest opposition I have seen to this so far is a misunderstanding of what it is. It cannot be used to punish. It must be used

confidentially. It must be used to get young people help. And what

it does do is, it takes and gives young people permission to do what

many of them want to do and are afraid to do now because they

think the cultural pressures—they are expected, as teenagers, to

try dangerous addictive substances.

If you go to schools that have testing, the biggest thing you see

when you visit other schools that I have seen is that kids feel safer.

And what we are allowing; we are not mandating, as you know, we

are allowing institutions to come forward so that those places that

have seen—and you have talked to them, as well as I have, have

seen kids die of overdoses, die of drug-impaired accidents, and feel

they don’t have any choice, but to watch more young people be victims and more families and communities suffer.

I tell them; you’ve got a choice: Test. It changes what happens

in private business. It has changed what happens in the military

and effects changes in safety-sensitive positions. But, it will not

automatically eliminate all substance abuse, but it will dramatically reduce it and it will stay low.

It is a public health measure that we have used to change the

face of childhood disease in the United States. Nobody considers a

tuberculosis test as a requirement to begin school to be a human

rights violation or a civil rights violation; they consider it to be

sound public health policy.

We understand addiction is a disease. The way it is transmitted

in child; from child to child, it is a behavior that causes, the younger it starts, the greater risk of addiction and dependency later on.

We can change the future of the drug problem for generations to

come on the demand side by simply seeing that significantly fewers

number of our children begin using these substances in their teenage years.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I agree with you. It’s going to take a lot of

education, and where is the President on that issue?

Mr. WALTERS. He said in the State of the Union he was for drug

testing. Nobody would say that because we’re third rail. We have

had remarkably little criticism because, I think, people have connected the dots between taking addiction as a disease and understanding the public health measures that we use that are confidenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:52 Sep 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\95530.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tial, that are used to get help and are not punitive to go after disease.

The excuse about, ‘‘Well, it seems to be too harsh,’’ it is not a

harsh method.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. My concern, always, whenever Federal

money comes to local government, is by the time it goes to the Federal bureaucracy, State bureaucracy and gets to the local, half the

money is gone. And if we are going to develop a program like that,

to have a program where the money goes directly to the local

schools and develop that program, then you need people who are

there, probably health officers or whatever, to develop the program

to identify how we are working with that program.

Mr. SOUDER. An administrative person.

Mr. WALTERS. I agree with you, and we made $2 million worth

of grants last year, directly to school districts. We have asked for

a total of $25 million for the next fiscal year; we would like to do

another $2 million.

There has been an issue about the program that is being earmarked. We are going to try to work with the Department and with

the Congress to get those resources there, but we are making this

direct funding.

It is true that the Federal block grant for Safe and Drug-Free

Schools, over $500 million, allows testing as an expense. My office

is now going into, in addition, to other parts in the country to look

at how we can help make sure the resources that you appropriate,

most of which the $12.5 billion my office is responsible for goes to

States and localities.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Why not pick some major cities for a pilot

program to show successes? I guarantee the mayor of the city of

Baltimore, Martin O’Malley, has made it one of his highest priorities, and I’m sure they would volunteer. You have to start somewhere.

And pilot programs, you can show that helps you get things

through Congress and gets you more funding because, look, it isn’t

working. We are impacted all the time and we are working hard.

Competent people like you are doing everything you can, but the

system isn’t working to do what we need to do.

And I think what you just said was very relevant. How can we

help you, maybe persuade the President, to get this moving? And

again, my suggestion would be a pilot program, and I am sure the

chairman, who cares very much about this issue, would very much

try to take leadership in that role and pick one or two areas to

move forward.

Mr. WALTERS. The President is ready. He wants to move it so

much that he raised this to the level of one of the programs he

mentioned in the State of the Union.

We are doing four drug testing summits around the country this

month to help to inform people about both the money we want to

make available, the state of the law and the technology. We would

like to work with Members of Congress and your district to get

more places. If they want to go now, Safe and Drug-Free Schools

money can be used for this purpose. We want people to apply for

the money.

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Mr. SOUDER. We will do some hearings on drug testing. Today,

we are trying to focus on Andean. And yesterday with the big

statement, as the director knows, I have been active in drug testing

issues for over 15 years and the Souder amendment on the higher

ed bill has been one of the more controversial pieces of legislation

in America.

So we will continue to look at how to make that effective because

prevention efforts need an accountability with it. Treatment efforts

need an accountability effort.

But you can’t just do the testing. We have to make sure that if

they are tested that we have ways to help them, and it is a supplemental effort as well.

I thank you for your testimony today. We may have some additional written questions on the Andean. In particular, it is very important because we cannot forget that is where the source of most

of our at least external narcotics are coming from into the country;

and we thank you for your efforts.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that both witnesses responded

in the affirmative, and it is almost 5 days since Mr. Charles has

been here. I appreciate the willingness of both of you to come; and

we are pleased to welcome a former staff director of this subcommittee, who originally developed much of the antinarcotics

strategy for this subcommittee, Mr. Charles, at the State Department.

And we are pleased that Mr. O’Connell is at the Defense Department in the position he is in. As you have heard before, and again

today, my concerns are not directed at your office, but trying to

strengthen and make sure your office has the power and influence

in the Department of Defense and to work with the other agencies

in a coordinated fashion like it historically has.

I am looking forward to both your testimonies.

Mr. Charles, we will start with you.

STATEMENTS OF ROBERT CHARLES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC AND

LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS; AND TOM O’CONNELL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SPECIAL

OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mr. CHARLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to say it is

always a pleasure to be here in front of you because you care so

deeply and have led for so long this overall fight. I feel like I’ve

stepped up to a smorgasbord every time we talk about these things.

I will launch here into something that I think is extremely important and that is the supply side in the Andean region initiative.

Mr. Chairman and members here and not here, thank you for inviting me to discuss the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and the

State Department’s continued efforts in this critical program. The

initiative represents a significant investment by the American people in a region that produces the vast majority of the drugs arriving here in the United States.

If this initiative were targeted just at saving some of the 21,000

lives lost to drugs last year, it would have been and would be the

right thing to do. But there is more to this bipartisan, multiyear

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initiative than even that noble aim. It is also a bulwark against the

threat of terrorism in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela,

Ecuador, Panama and here at home. In short, it is a regional hemispheric and national security program with direct implications for

homeland security and for our well-being here in the continental

United States.

One need look only as far as Haiti to see that drug money and

the instability that follows it can be institutionally coercive to the

point of breakdown. In Colombia and elsewhere in this hemisphere,

the link between drug money and terrorism is incontrovertible. All

this reinforces the wisdom of Congress in empowering the State

Department, and INL in particular, to protect Americans and our

allies in this hemisphere by strengthening the rule of law, building

law enforcement and justice sector capacity, cultivating nondrug

sources of income and stopping heroin and cocaine from being produced and shipped to our shores.

In the future, as in the past, strong congressional support will

be critical to fully achieving the end game. The end game is a

hemisphere free of drug-funded terrorism, free from drug-funded

corruption, and young and old democracies subject to less drug violence and increasingly free from the scourge of drug abuse. That

end game or goal applies as plainly to Baltimore as to Bogota. It

applies because it matters.

I am here to tell you that the climb is steep. I will not give you

all good news, but I will tell you that the climb is steep and, at

the same time, we are gaining altitude. We are making real

progress toward that end state. And the Andean Counterdrug Initiative is a major part of that palpable progress.

Let me pause here to say something else a little unexpected.

Management of these programs is also essential. Congress provides

the money, but we at INL must provide the proper management of

these program dollars.

I have a special duty as the custodian of these dollars to make

sure they go where they were intended. Accordingly, I have ordered

a top-to-bottom program review of the entire stable of INL programming, beginning with the largest programs. I have put penalties on government contracts; moved from cost-plus to performance contracting, insisting that bonus justifications in this region

match the awards; imposed new performance measures; moved to

multiple contracts, where possible; and had staff senior executives

of these contracting companies down to readjust their thinking and

begin reviewing past financial practices.

All of this is basic oversight, and it guarantees, or hopes to guarantee, that we will make the best possible use of dollars to stop

drug production and drug-funded terrorism before these menaces

reach U.S. soil.

The investment you have made is bearing fruit. Drug production

is down. Traffickers are being arrested and extradited. Legitimate

income streams are being institutionalized. And the rule of law is

expanding. Our security development and institutional assistance

to the judicial and law enforcement sectors are having a genuine

measurable, positive impact. While the results are coming in, it is

my view that we are approaching what could be called a tipping

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point in Colombia, in the Andean region and ultimately in this

hemisphere.

The strategic centerpiece of the Andean Counterdrug Initiative is

INL programming in and related to Colombia, the source, as was

indicated earlier, of roughly 90 percent of all the cocaine reaching

the United States. Colombia provides upwards to 70 percent of the

heroin reaching our streets and is also a leading supplier of cocaine

to Brazil, Europe and points east.

Besides being a producer of the raw material for cocaine and heroin, Colombia is a major manufacturer of refined drugs. It is the

headquarters of major criminal and narcoterrorist organizations.

What we do in Colombia affects us here in the United States, but

also affects regional security and the growth of economic opportunities for those in these democracies.

So the big picture is this: Over the past 2 years, long-awaited

ACI funding has hit the ground and it is making a difference. With

INL support, the Colombian Government has eradicated both coca

and heroin poppy to paste. That should begin to seriously deter future growing even as it wipes out larger and larger percentages of

the crops currently turning into cocaine and heroin.

The physical risks associated with this program have been great,

but the strategy is proving successful. Colombians and we have lost

assets and personnel to this enemy. Three American hostages still

in Colombia, though not INL employees, are a continuing reminder

that we are dealing with a dangerous group of terrorists who do

not respect the rules or principles of civil society.

In 2003, INL and the Colombians worked closely together to

bring 127,000 hectares, at a 91.5 percent effectiveness, for a net result of 116,000 hectares eradicated. At the same time, alternative

programs in Colombia resulted in manual eradication of an additional 8,441 hectares.

Similarly, we sprayed 2,821 hectares in opium regions, with

1,009 hectares manually eradicated, in short, significant progress.

And in 2002, our efforts reduced coca cultivation by 15 percent and

poppy cultivation by 25 percent. As Director Walters mentioned a

moment ago, we are waiting for the 2003 numbers, but we have

other reasons to believe that these, too, will be good numbers.

Our efforts have brought us close to the tipping point where sustained suppression of illegal crops, growing regional interdiction

and law enforcement, as well as the seeding of these alternative

streams of income, will convince growers that further cultivation is

a course with increasing costs and risks and diminished profitability.

Predictably, it is also true that the work is getting more dangerous. In 2003, INL aircraft took more than 380 hits. We lost four

planes. So far this year, we have taken 29 hits on our assets. I am

fully reviewing the INL air wing operations to make the most effective use of our resources and to plan for the future.

But the security environment, frankly, is ugly. Security of our air

fleet is the highest priority. We are increasing intelligence coordination and protective measures to make sure each spray mission

is as safe as humanly possible. If it is not safe to launch a mission,

the mission does not fly.

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Protecting the lives of the brave pilots who fly this program,

knowing the risks, is essential. Getting results from their outlay of

bravery is our second but sustaining mission. I want there to be

no question about one thing: This is a first-rate group of pilots

whose mission matters to all of us and I am determined to protect

them and the mission so long as the mission calls us out.

This year as of February 29, 2004, we had sprayed 29,000 hectares of coca and 691 hectares of poppy. That exceeds by 84 percent

the amount of coca eradicated during the same timeframe in 2003.

Our eradication goal for this year was initially set high and, frankly, if it needs to be adapted to be higher, it can be adapted to be

higher.

We have worked out a spray program in full coordination with

the Colombian police and armed forces. Depending on the 2003

final spray results, we will review the spraying targets and adjust

accordingly. Killing coca and deterring cultivation is the twin aim;

and again, the aim behind that is to tip the balance as fast as that

tip will occur. Within 18 to 24 months, I would say, we expect to

enter a maintenance phase where we are spraying smaller, more

isolated coca fields instead of larger fields as we have in the past.

Make no mistake, in Colombia, ACI funds have been the vital

strength that has helped a strong president, President Uribe, to secure his democracy and security. We helped to fund the establishment of police in 158 municipalities, many of which have not seen

any government security presence in years. For the first time in

history, there is now a police presence in all 1,098 Colombia’s municipalities. This is an enormous step forward and it reinforces everything that we are doing on the counterdrug side. To demonstrate or to give you an example of the hunger for security, I

throw out just one recent event.

San Mateo is a municipality that last had a real Colombian national police presence in June 1, 1999, when FARC killed seven

San Mateo police. In April 2003, our program installed a new 46-

man police department. San Mateo school children formed a human

corridor and cheered as the police passed by. San Mateo declared

a day of holiday and fireworks went off through the day.

There is both hope and appreciation for what you are doing in

Colombia. And the U.S. Congress, through its leadership, is getting

and should be getting the credit for having initiated this. Results

were mentioned earlier by the director, but I want to highlight a

couple: Colombia’s murder rate, down by 20 percent, lowest figure

since 1986; Colombia’s illegal armed groups committing 73 massacres, which sounds terrible, and it is, but it is compared to 115

massacres in 2002; the number of victims affected by those massacres down 38 percent from 680 in 2002 to 418 in 2003; in 2003,

there were 2043 cases of kidnapping registered, 32 percent fewer

than in 2002; and finally, terrorist incidents, 846 in 2003, but down

49 percent from the 1,645 in 2002.

On the interdiction side throughout the region and in Colombia

there has been a significant movement forward also. Colombian

forces seized 70 metric tons of cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride in 2003. In addition, 126 metric tons of cannabis were

seized. We have an Air Bridge Denial program which, in short, was

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bians and with coordination internationally. Since that time, it has

caused; 10 planes suspected of drug trafficking have been forced

down; 8 have been destroyed. The program has resulted in 6.9 metric tons of drugs being seized regionally.

As of March 1, 2004, the Colombian air force and its regional

partners have already seized another metric ton of illicit drugs. In

Peru and Bolivia, where one might expect some kind of balloon effect, we are, in fact, showing a significant movement forward.

Everything is not rosy, and I don’t want to paint the picture that

we are done and we can go home. While Peru represents a 15 percent reduction in cultivation, which is marked and shows demonstrated progress on both eradication and alternative development, all the parallel pieces of this puzzle, it is also true that in

Bolivia, where the Chapare was always the engine driving the illegal drugs into our market and into regional markets, drug production cultivation is down by 15 percent.

It is true where legal cocaine is permitted, you had an increase

of 26 percent. We have now to turn the canons back on the idea

of how do you look at this legal production and prevent diversion

into the illegal market? To their credit, the Bolivian Government

sees that as a real challenge and is up to the task and is pushing

forward.

Peru, again, enormous movement——

Mr. SOUDER. You need to get to a summary. We have given you

flexibility with your time.

Mr. CHARLES. We are making significant progress. But we are

making enough progress that at the end of the day, I think the investment is paying off and we will see it here on the streets of the

United States.

Mr. SOUDER. We will put your full statement in the record, and

if there are charts and things you want to put in, you may do so.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Charles follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. Mr. O’Connell.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the

subcommittee, it is my distinct pleasure to appear before you today

to discuss the President’s budget request for 2005 as it relates to

the Department of Defense with respect to our programs and policies that support the National Drug Control Strategy and to provide a current assessment of this strategy’s effectiveness in the Andean region. I have a written statement that I will submit for the

record and open with a short oral summary with your approval, sir.

First, with respect to Colombia, sir, over 75 percent of the world’s

coca is grown in Colombia, and nearly all of the cocaine consumed

in the United States is produced and shipped from Colombia. Colombia narcoterrorists receive a large majority of their funds from

protecting, taxing and engaging in this illegal drug trade. These

narcoterrorists seek to overthrow the freely elected Colombian Government, which is the oldest democracy in Latin America.

Recently, the Secretary of Defense promised Colombian President

Uribe increased support to the Colombian narcoterrorist effort, and

I had the privilege of traveling to Colombia this summer with the

Secretary and was witness to many of these one-on-ones between

President Uribe and Secretary Rumsfeld.

Colombia has made exceptional progress in fighting drug traffic

and terrorism while improving respect for human rights. Colombian security policies have diminished the National Liberation

Army and put the FARC on the defensive and pushed the United

Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, also known as AUC, to the negotiating table. And these are extraordinary events.

In order to maintain the momentum, we provided U.S. military

assistance teams to help the Colombians fuse intelligence and operations, and we intend to expand this program this year. This is an

increased effort to capitalize on the commitment by President

Uribe in the fight against narcoterrorism.

Other Defense counternarcotics programs supporting Colombia

include the following: training; logistics; maintenance support; construction; radar support; intelligence collection, which is critically

important; command and control systems; and equipment. We focus

our joint programs on the development, equipping and training of

strategically focused units within the Colombian military. These

units include the Colombian Counternarcotics Brigade rapid deployment force, national urban assault unit, Marine riverine units

and the LANCERO and COMMANDO battalions, which make up

the largest portion of the Colombian special forces.

The Counternarcotics Brigade provides security for eradication

operations and conducts raids on drug labs and facilities. This unit

has been extremely successful in the southern region of Colombia

and has now expanded their operations throughout the country.

Riverine combat elements patrol the vast river network in Colombia that is constantly used for trafficking illicit drugs. The training

of the Counternarcotics Brigade and the COMMANDO battalion to

pursue enemy leadership has already produced significant results.

In order to support these new forces, we are assisting both the

Colombian army and air force with mobility, including aviation

training, logistics and maintenance support. Department support

for the Colombian C–130 fleet has increased their operational readVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:52 Sep 09, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\95530.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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iness by over 60 percent. We plan on consolidating the Colombian

helicopter logistics and maintenance under a joint program, allowing the Colombian military to increase their operational readiness

by having a centralized repair parts inventory and a pool of qualified mechanics.

I am extremely optimistic about the potential results in Colombia. Though much remains to be done, I do believe we are on the

right path. Our continued support to President Uribe during this

window of opportunity is critical.

Quickly, the Andean region. While success in Colombia is essential, we cannot risk winning the battle in Colombia and losing the

war in the region. The Department continues to fund the tactical

analysis teams to the Andean region countries of Peru, Ecuador,

Colombia and Bolivia. The tactics play a critical role in facilitating

the timely and accurate flow of actionable counternarcotics intelligence between Department elements, United States and foreign

drug law enforcement forces.

With your permission, sir, I was going to address Ecuador, Peru

and Bolivia. Since Mr. Charles has done that and Mr. Walters has,

let me go to my conclusion. I do have comments relative to those

countries in my written statement.

I was privileged to spend some of my time in the military actually conducting clandestine and other counternarcotics operations

in Colombia. It is tough and thankless work, and I recognize the

difficulty that many of our colleagues at State and Defense have

in this arena.

We appreciate, sir, your continued support of our counternarcoterrorism initiatives, most notably the granting of expanded

authority for Colombia. These initiatives play a great role in our

efforts to aid key allies around the world in their fight against

narcoterrorism.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for

your tremendous support. I look forward to answering your questions.

I would like to make three quick observations, sir, from a personal standpoint. I would like to recognize several stalwarts in this

war: the work that Ambassador Bill Wood has done in Colombia;

his colleague, General Tom Hill, from Southern Command has done

yeoman work in orchestrating the ONDCP and State in defense efforts in Colombia. And it has been a pleasure to watch them.

I would like to publicly acknowledge the work of Special Operations, Command South, and the Seventh Special Forces Group.

Much of the success that you don’t see that is taking place in the

jungles of Colombia is due directly to the ability of the State Department to set up people who are superb trainers, who have gone

in and improved the Colombian Armed Forces, and you are seeing

specifically the successes against the counter—against the

narcoterrorists and, particularly, the FARC.

And one thing I would like to add in terms of an observation. In

my time in Colombia, I have come to be quite familiar with the tremendous destructive effect that the drug production has had in Colombia and neighboring countries. The fact that for every kilo of cocaine that comes out of the country, we pour 6 or 7 gallons of kerosene into the ecosystem is, to me, beyond belief and needs some

51

type of publication; and the fact that 6 million acres of the rain forest have disappeared because of the cultivation of coca is something

I think the press needs to publicize and Congress needs to make

known to the American people.

That concludes my statement, and I would be happy to answer

any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Connell follows:]

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Mr. SOUDER. I thank you both for your statements and comments, and we will make sure full statements are in the record, as

well as any other materials that you want to insert today or in the

next few days after you go through the hearing.

I am going to start with some questions for Mr. Charles, and I

yield to Mr. Ruppersberger and then back to Mr. O’Connell. Let me

start with just a general—because you sat with me in meetings 10

years ago, where we saw the charts of the eradication and how we

were tackling this and how we are making it, it starts to feel, as

a baby boomer, a little like blowing up the bridges in Vietnam.

And I understand that you are in the middle of this program now

and you are trying to do an analysis, but it always seems like we

are eradicating more coke every year and we are interdicting, most

years, more than we previously interdicted; and yet the price isn’t

going down and the purity isn’t going down, and that becomes troubling when we have to sell this program year after year.

We have less terrorist incidents in the country. We are getting

control of villages that previously didn’t have control. People are

less terrorized in the country. And, by the way, those villages

wouldn’t have been lost to control if it hadn’t been for our cocaine

and heroin habits.

They had a small revolution going on, but it was a controllable

one. We made it an uncontrollable one and we almost toppled this

democracy. I am not saying we don’t have a role in that; but ultimately, for the American taxpayers, one of the questions is—it is

a sign we are hurting them, or they wouldn’t be shooting down airplanes as much. But we need, particularly if we are going to continue the levels of effort in the Andean area, some sort of an explanation that was kind of hinted at by Director Walters.

How much, for example, is Brazil starting to consume? Have they

developed other markets that are taking some of the price and supply pressure off the United States, that have complicated this variable? And it would be nice to have it, if you don’t have it today,

for the record.

We know consumption has gone up in the Andean region. Brazil

would be a huge potential consumer. We have talked about Europe,

but we just heard last week that almost all Afghan heroin is going

into Europe and they have an increasing supply going into Europe.

Any elementary logic would say that if their heroin is going into

Europe, the supply shouldn’t be increasing in Colombia. But one of

the things that we are hearing is that one of the areas that we

have been concerned about, although it has been difficult to prove

in the maps, is that Colombian heroin is increasing. They aren’t

selling it to Europe if Afghan heroin is flooding Europe because the

European demand hasn’t gone up enough to absorb both markets.

So would you kind of give a big picture of that as someone who

sat in year after year, presentations from SOUTHCOM, from General Wilhelm and McCaffrey and General Hill, all very committed

to this effort, all showing how we were going to do this, talking

about the difficulty. Command and control systems, which our military has really helped them establish, but seemingly still facing the

same problems.

Mr. CHARLES. Let me give you an abbreviated answer, or let me

try to abbreviate a long answer.

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Mr. Chairman, you are right. You and I have traveled all over

the world together on this for more than 10 years. It is my assessment that this can be done. We have a historical precedent. When

we tried to solve something, like curing polio, we didn’t have a

precedent per se. We do have a precedent here. In the late 1980’s,

when we did everything right, when we pushed the supply and the

demand pieces together between 1985 and 1991, when you were

working with Senator Coats and other missions and cared about

this, we drove the use of cocaine in this country down by 72 percent; and we dropped the number of people using marijuana from

21 million to 8 million, and we began to drive purity levels down

and prices up. And all of a sudden it caught fire, and we were

doing it.

My candid analysis, which may kill me in the interagency process, but I will tell you, is that we let our guard down badly in the

1990’s. And those meetings we were sitting in in 1995 were meetings which described that nobody had ever funded the PDD, the

Presidential Decision Directive, that was supposed to have provided source country support. And we also learned that the interdiction effort had essentially not been properly funded up, and we

saw a backing down on these very important things that Congressman Ruppersberger has been talking about, the treatment piece

and the prevention piece.

And then, all of a sudden, you, with your leadership and others,

began to push the envelope and said, we’ve got to get back in this

business again.

What happened is, around 1997 or 1998, the sort of critical mass

occurred where you could get everybody involved and you got Plan

Colombia funded. Plan Colombia is a major undertaking. Those

moneys came online only about 21⁄2 years ago. It took that much

time to take the political will and drive it into the budget and drive

it to this point. We are now only refining the significance of this

message, as we lose more kids every year, that the prevention piece

and the drug testing piece, these pieces that are so critical to really

winning, are things that don’t happen by themselves; that parents,

by themselves—parents are one of the great drivers, but if we don’t

help them and reinforce this message publicly, we lose.

What is happening? Why have I just changed my uniform? I am

completely convinced of all the same things I have ever been convinced of, that we sat with together on. What I see happening is

that for the first time last year—not last year; not in 2003, but in

2002—this enormous up-tick in production, which we could not get

our hands on—we were chasing the truck, we knew we needed to

catch it and get on top of this supply stream, but it took that long

for us to get there.

In 2002, we got there. We suddenly reduced across the entire region, by 8 percent, the production of cocaine. We also began to

tackle for the first time with great vigor, the idea that heroin poppies are coming out of Colombia. And 6, 7, 8 years ago there

weren’t heroin poppies in any quantity coming out of Colombia.

The heroin was coming from other parts of the world. So what did

we do? We started to get serious.

In 2003, what we see in Peru is a significant reduction. What we

see in Bolivia, despite all the political turmoil that country is going

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through, we see that your leadership and the leadership of the administration saying, whatever else you do, do not let down your

guard on this topic, this matters to us, it matters to you, and matters to the future of the region, is producing the level of conviction

in the Meza government that is keeping that one under control.

And now we see this other piece of leadership happening in Colombia, this idea that a president is willing to risk his life again

and again and again to restabilize a country and wring out of it

this ugly—in effect, this weapon of mass destruction on his own

soil. To get rid of this stuff and get rid of these organizations, just

as they got rid of the Medellin cartel. We are seeing suddenly the

critical mass for that again.

So why am I optimistic? Because that is why I use this phrase

‘‘tipping point.’’ It is the only way I can think of to express the fact

that for 10 years we have sat frustrated, unable collectively to get

our act together and tackle this. And now we are beginning with

Congress, Republicans and Democrats, and the interagency—and

all of us are committed to this—taking all the other priorities of

the world and the counterterrorism piece on top of it, and we are

saying we must take this moment and do this.

On the counterterrorism piece, if I could just add this last point.

I think in a way that helps us to articulate why this is so important, because throughout this hemisphere—and I can name them

for you, and I will name them if you ask me—there are four, five

terrorist organizations afoot. And I think the fact that drugs fund

these organizations, as Congresswoman Norton said, makes it doubly important that we win this time.

If I were a betting man, I would say, we will win with your

added support, but it is not going to happen in just 1 year, but is

going to take several years.

Mr. SOUDER. Part of the problem could be that, as we have established more control—and maybe, Mr. O’Connell, you can comment

on this as well, and then we will go to Congressman

Ruppersberger—that one of the things here that may be happening, which will be difficult for us, quite frankly, to pick up and do

much about right now, is that we have been establishing more control in the traditional areas of Colombia, where the cities are, in

establishing; and they have moved farther out in the jungle, destroying more rain forests, more of the Amazon basin where we

don’t have forward landing locations, and instead of moving where

we are getting reasonably successful in the inner part of the Caribbean by moving to Surinam or over to Venezuela, where we have

had our problems, or through Brazil and somewhat moving through

different tracking routes in areas where we don’t have as much

coverage. If so, are we doing anything about it?

Mr. O’CONNELL. I would be happy in a classified session to talk

about some specific routes and specific intelligence operations that

are taking place.

But with respect to the interagency, we have recently in conjunction with Mr. Charles’ office, DEA, Southern Command, JTF

SOUTH and everybody that is involved in this to include the Navy,

SOCSOUTH, our Colombian counterparts, have looked at how we

approach a campaign season. And I think without going public, we

have made significant strides, and they are looking at how we can

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better coordinate our activity. For every action we take, we know

our adversary is going to take an opposite action, and we want to

be prepared for that.

With respect to the question of, are the Colombians taking control of previously ungoverned areas. Absolutely. Working in conjunction with State, the Department of Defense personnel down

there have basically given the Colombians, through very superb

training, the confidence to go out farther, to take the next step, to

conduct the successful ambushes that have caused them to knock

out FARC leadership.

Once you have done that in combat, the people you are training

and advising are much more likely to take the next step and say,

we can use the stealth and we can beat this enemy. And consequently you have a lot of FARC walking in and a lot of AUC that

have come to the table.

And yes, the point you made may be absolutely true. It is pushing them to areas that previously were basically totally

ungoverned; now they can move in, but they have to start from

scratch, cutting and fertilizing and bringing in their precursor

chemicals. I don’t know what is going to happen with respect to

that, but I do know we are making it more difficult.

If I could answer the previous thing you made, does the Department of Defense have any instructions on what to do with labs,

bear in mind that we are out there as advisers and not on-theground interdictors. But we help locate those labs, we describe how

to destroy them and we assist as the Colombians do that. And the

numbers that Director Walters gave and Assistant Secretary

Charles gave, I think, are impressive in terms of what we have

been able to at least put under wraps and interdict this year.

So it is not U.S. forces doing that, but we play a very, very big

role, as do our intelligence, surveillance capabilities and assets.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What you are both saying is very relevant.

To begin with, your comment about when the program worked,

and I think one of the reasons why there was good team work, the

resources were there. You can’t solve this problem. It has to be

from where the crop is grown, to the street, to the user; and there

has to be a coordinated effort there, too. Most of what we are talking about here today in the Andean issue is that 90 percent of all

of our cocaine and heroin comes into the United States from this

area, correct?

Mr. CHARLES. Ninety percent cocaine and 70 percent heroin on

the East Coast.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I want to get to Mexico. When you talk

about why we are so concerned—and I think every time we have

a hearing like this, we talk about the issue, are the resources

there? We know you represent the administration and have to

watch what you say. But, bottom line, once we get it started, this

is just as serious as terrorism.

Maybe we don’t know it, but we have marketed terrorism. And

part of our role is to oversee, do you have the resources to do the

job that they will hold you accountable for doing the job? And

where my concern is that the resources—and I am on the House

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sources in South America are not the same resources that are

going to Iraq or Afghanistan.

So it is our job on this subcommittee to make sure we can work

with you and find out what your needs are, so we can advocate for

the end game, and we know what the end game is, the National

Drug Control Strategy and what those priorities are.

Let me ask you some specifics. We know that about 75 percent

of the drugs are going through Mexico; is that correct? And they

are going through the drug cartels or gangs, whatever you want to

call them. What efforts are we doing, are you using to follow the

drugs? And, first, are we having political issues with respect to corruption or priorities in Mexico, and what do you think we need to

do to stop that chain in Mexico? We have to stop it where it grows,

but we have to deal with the issue of transportation.

Mr. CHARLES. I will try to take a crack at that. We are working

very closely with Mexico, more closely by far than we were 5 years

ago when we sat in rooms like this and beat up the Mexican Government for being unable to work with us and us, unable to work

with them. I am thinking in terms of a DEA Director, for example,

who said very vigorous things about his inability to work directly

with them.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mostly because of corruption.

Mr. CHARLES. Yes. We are in a different world today. The Mexican Government has taken very seriously their own national security risks. In fact, they have made not only pronouncements, but

they have established a high-intensity law enforcement group. The

Attorney General’s office has been completely reorganized. There is

border coordination of the kind that involves data bases.

Is it perfect? It is not. Is corruption a problem? It continues to

be; wherever there is drug money in the world, there will be the

high potential for significant corruption. But I will tell you that we

are in a very different world, and I will detail to you in some afterquestions that I will do in writing for you—what we are doing with

Mexico and why it is leading us down the right path.

I think the Fox administration, and I think I said this in one of

my first opportunities to testify before Congress, the Fox administration is showing enormous courage in tackling the drug cartels,

just as the Uribe administration in Colombia is showing enormous

courage in tackling their problem. And we have to be up to the

task, as you just alluded to, of supporting them. We have to be

willing to work with them and drive forward intelligence sharing

and a number of other things that we feel we can do.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Normally, you find when you do better in

war or this war against drugs, you have to have good intelligence.

And a lot of times that intelligence comes from the streets.

I think it is the same analogy with Iraq. We are going to get our

men and women out of Iraq once we liberate that country and we

train the men and women over there to secure their country. It’s

the same thing here. And you’re telling me now that you feel good

about Colombia and Mexico, their ability not to do it themselves,

with our assistance and with our resources, but it is still an issue.

Years ago, I was an investigator and prosecutor and did a lot of

drug work. And we would have big wiretap investigations and conspiracies. But you take one out and there are two right behind.

66

And sooner or later—and you piqued my attention when you talked

about your numbers in 1986 to 1992.

And again, I talked about a pilot program before, we need to look

at what we did and find out what we did and why it was successful. The numbers show the results.

Mr. CHARLES. Cornerstone issue was leadership. And one of the

other things you saw then was interagency cooperation and coordination at an unprecedented level, with Admiral Yost at the Coast

Guard and a whole range of other people.

I think you have the configuration now with a new DEA administrator and a lot of really committed people and the congressional

leadership to make that kind of thing happen again.

And on Mexico, while we do give them resources and work with

them, their own conviction, I would tell you straight out, their own

conviction is very high. I was really shocked when I read how much

marijuana and heroin they eradicate by hand every year. It’s really

incredible numbers. And our big challenge in Mexico is to institutionalize the gains we’ve made. We are playing on a muddy ball

field and we are pushing the ball together up that field, but we

cannot lose yardage. We have to institutionalize the yardage we’ve

gained and keep working harder.

I just would add two other quick things. One is, direct response

to actually—the question I believe you had asked about indictments, I actually went to track. On the 70 percent increase in indictments out of Colombia that we got this last year, what happened to them? Every one of them who was extradited was

charged, prosecuted and indicted.

And a 70 percent increase in extraditions out of Colombia. Five

years ago you couldn’t have gotten anybody out of Colombia. We

have seen a sea change in the willingness and the desire and the

push to do that. Panama is following and others are following.

The point I am trying to make on that point, you have an enormous wave of recognition coming that this is affecting their country, it’s affecting their futures; and we are living up to our obligations in making it clear it is affecting us.

On price and purity, this is a vexing issue. It has vexed me from

the minute I got in here. And I will get to both of you, if you don’t

have them already, two studies before I took this job. One was on

pure economics, showing that legalization simply will not work on

pure economics and also showing that treatment is extremely important to the ultimate outcome for help.

The second thing is a book that I wrote on narcotics and terrorism. And I think they are rock solid.

The thing that vexes us all is why we are not seeing now as we

begin to move into this new phase, essentially 10 to 15 years later

driving the ball up the field again and getting yardage and getting

first downs and driving toward the goal line to keep more of these

kids alive. Because 21,000 kids dying in a year is terrorism.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. This is one frustration, sitting here. In

order to be able to take the administration’s point of view that if,

in fact, we don’t have the resources or we don’t have the leadership

that we had in the 1980’s, we need to know that. It is too serious

of an issue.

67

You have people come up and you ask specific questions, and

they are reluctant, it seems to me, to really say it like it is. This

is just as serious as the war against terrorism. We have to be direct and honest with ourselves and have the courage to stand up

and say, this is what we need.

Mr. CHARLES. I will say to that, you are absolutely right. When

I first spoke with Secretary Ridge about this issue—and the number wasn’t 21,000, it was 19,000. He said oh, my gosh, he said that

is six Twin Towers in a year.

This is an amazingly devastating problem. It is its own form of

terrorism. So I agree with you completely on that.

And I would note, on price and purity, I believe that what the

director said is right, that there is a pipeline there. And as we

wring excess capacity out of this market, there is excess capacity

in this market, there’s excess production.

I’m not even saying it’s in stockpiles. It is the fact that the capacity to respond to the eradication exists. At a certain point, you

drain the pool and you begin to see a shape, and that shape is a

drug-free hemisphere. You begin to see the beginning of it. And the

further you drain, the more the shape you see until eventually you

get it down. You may not eliminate drugs completely from the

hemisphere, but you will eliminate them down to a point where you

manage crime the way you do in Los Angeles or Washington.

Until you get that excess capacity out of the system, which is

what we are about to do now, thus, the tipping point, that is why

I think we are headed there—until you get there, you will not see

palpable gains, and all of a sudden you will begin to see palpable

gains; and that is what we saw in the late 1980’s.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. When do you think that will be? If things

are going the way they’re going now, when do you anticipate that

will be?

Mr. CHARLES. I think every life doesn’t repeat itself in perfect

patterns, but I think that within the next 18 to 24 months, we

should begin to see something.

Mr. SOUDER. I have a few specific questions I wanted to get on

the record.

On the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, there has been threequarters of a million dollars requested. Do you know how much

each country is getting? Do you have that with you?

Mr. CHARLES. We do, and I can get that for you. I don’t have it

at my fingertips, but we can get that for you.

Mr. SOUDER. If we could have that, for the record.

Also, kind of the subdivision of how you see that. I know this is

going to appropriations and will continue to work, and also how

you see the split in cocaine and heroin, to the degree that is split,

but there are some specialty units that we work with on that, and

how you see the split between what we give to the Colombians,

what we pay for contractor support, and what goes to your State

Department air wings and so on, so we can kind of get that read

here of what is going to eventually come through the appropriations process.

Also, if you—I was just down at Patrick with the INL wing, some

of your thoughts for how you are going to assign, what is going to

be assigned to the Andean region, if there will be changes in the

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upcoming year, or at least that you are considering; plans for recapitalization of the assets, and how you are going to use the wing.

Similar for Mr. O’Connell. I am trying to decide which questions

to pursue here.

Mr. O’CONNELL. I can answer two that you directed to Mr. Walters, sir, and I think Mr. Ruppersberger and Ms. Norton both

asked the same thing, and that basically was, you know, do we

have a down-swing in DOD counternarcotics funding history which,

of course, ultimately affects——

Mr. SOUDER. And while you do that, you also said that 200 million, I believe, of our 850, is for Andean; is that changing inside

that?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Approximately it will stay the same. And because the CTA—and the CTA is a good thing, and thank you for

setting it up. It allows us remarkable flexibility. But when you

have a fairly constant figure, or even a figure that is slightly decreasing, it becomes very difficult for myself and General Hill in

particular, as a combatant commander, when he has a tipping

point in Colombia as Assistant Secretary Charles indicated, when

he has a requirement, and I bounce up against the zero sum game,

I then am forced to go to the National Guard Bureau and say,

sorry, I have to take $5 million across the board, and I have 100

angry Senators, I don’t know how many angry Representatives,

and 50 angry Governors because I have stripped National Guard

money. Or, I go to another theater. So I am playing a zero sum

game, and that is difficult. But those are decisions made in the Department over the years and accepted by Congress.

But I would like to point out, particularly in response to your colleague and to Ms. Norton, in fiscal year 2003, the DOD request

was $848 million, which was a slight increase over 1995, 1996, all

the way up to fiscal year 2003. That did drop in fiscal year 2004

to $817, but in fiscal year 2005, our request, the DOD request is

up significantly from $817 to $852.

Now, historically in those years, there was an appropriation action in fiscal year 2003 that added $23 million, in fiscal year 2004

that added $18.2, and then there were supplementals. And I don’t

know if the Department, in their logic, is relying on these

supplementals and saying, well, we will get to around a figure of

$900, because you did add $34 million for Colombia, specifically in

fiscal year 2003, $73 million specifically for Afghanistan last year.

I don’t know that is a defense strategy. Maybe that is not the best

way to do business, but I am not in the comptroller business.

But to answer Ms. Norton’s question and Mr. Ruppersberger’s

question, the request in the last year has actually gone up. That

may not be anything to hail as sufficient, but the answer is, we are

going the other way.

Mr. SOUDER. Can I do a followup on that part?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. If 200 is going to Andean out of your 850, is a big

percentage of that 650 for JTF and things like that that would still

cover that region some?

Mr. O’CONNELL. The JTF would be in a different line from the

Andean support. Andean support is, if my folks back here feel that

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ties in Colombia, and it goes for a whole range of activities that are

tied into our State helicopter efforts, our maintenance efforts, etc.

JTF is a separate line, as is JTF west.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you have a rough idea out of that 850 how much

are things, for lack of a better word, within our northern and

southern hemisphere, out of that, and how much is Afghanistan or

regions outside? In other words, if most of our narcotics problems

are in north and south.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, I can give you a breakdown and I will submit that directly to you, my staff will, and there are some classified

intelligence figures that we pay for out of that CTA as well. And

I will give you, without going into specifics, we work very closely

with the British as the lead as we testified 2 weeks ago in Afghanistan. We go into various intelligence communities and provide capabilities within NEMO and national geo—or national geospatial

agencies so that we can use those capabilities specifically for the

commitments we have made with the U.K. in Afghanistan. We

have those same types of accounts with NSA, with NGA, and others, and we work very closely with CIA’s Counternarcotics Center

to integrate our intelligence effort, and much of that is shared and

fused directly with the Colombians.

So I think that is a success story, and one of the reasons you are

seeing more successful seizures of various labs and more successful

interdiction.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to ask you about the aerostats. That has declined in south Florida, and then there has been a cutting back

from the Rio Grande over in the other part of the Gulf of Mexico.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you see this as something that is a less of a priority for the Department of Defense; it is clearly being reduced, and

should there be another agency that takes that over? How should

we do that? Because many of us feel that is a very critical part of

providing the intelligence.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir. Let me be blunt. We are struggling

with that issue right now and we are doing negotiations with General Everhart at Northcom, with Assistant Secretary McHale in

terms of his homeland defense responsibilities. There was a congressional reduction of $6 million last year which has caused me

again to come up against this ceiling and try to make decisions as

to which aerostats are old, will DOD make a bold commitment for

the future to recapitalize these things. Some are in need of repair.

It does cost money to store, and so we have had to make some

tough decisions, and we have also had to go to the Intelligence

Community and say, what really is the threat? What are we looking for? Counternarcotics tracks, defense against rogue aircraft terrorism? How can we integrate with our other air assets?

So I will admit that we are struggling and, hopefully, we will

have a coherent answer back for the Congress and placed in the

DOD budget.

Mr. SOUDER. Are you saying that Congress cut the administra- tion request $6 million, or are you saying it was——

Mr. O’CONNELL. I believe it was a congressional—I will go back,

but I think there was a congressional——

Mr. SOUDER. Underneath the administration’s budget request.

70

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir. Specifically, $6 million, I think which

caused us to take a decision on a specific aerostat that I would

rather not discuss right now.

Mr. SOUDER. Let me ask one last specific question on North Command.

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Every time I go to the JTFs, it is very confusing to

somebody who has lots of other things in their head as well and

isn’t full-time into this, which is to be expected.

Mr. O’CONNELL. At JTF south?

Mr. SOUDER. At JTF south. It is unclear to me what exactly is

in North Command, but to me, North Command is in the southern

sphere, it is relatively confusing. I am wondering—my understanding is you are looking at more along the north border and if so, will

that have a counternarcotics mission, and will that change as far

as the south?

Mr. O’CONNELL. Yes, sir. It is my understanding that the current

plans—that the location of JTF north would be in its current location in El Paso, that may be the central hub. It may not move to

the center part of the country or collocated with Northern Command.

With respect to the responsibility of JTF south, which basically

went up to the southern boundaries of California and then were

taken over by JTF west, that is being shifted by Admiral Fargo,

and we are paying that bill or at least a good portion of that bill

to Hawaii.

It is interesting that in talking to the combatant commanders,

particularly central command, the deputy command, the European

command and the commander in the Pacific, they are looking to

the JTFs as a model where they can not only looking at their

counternarcotic mission, and they are taking that much more seriously. They see the nexus between counternarcotics and terrorism;

they see the fact that they can consolidate surveillance capabilities

that many of the authorities that our forces and Coast Guard have

for interdiction are similar, whether it is counternarcotics, WMD,

smuggling, personnel or whatever, and as these problems merge,

our surveillance efforts are going to merge and our authorities will

become a little bit tighter.

And I think you will see a little more models in Central Command, and perhaps in the U.S.-European command, because JTF

south has been very, very successful. It is a model for the future.

And as we integrate new technologies such as over-the-horizon

radar, which will lessen the strain on our maritime hours and

things like that, and our response capability becomes more robust

with HITRON, etc., I think you will see a much more successful approach and a more integrated approach from DOD. That is just my

expectation from looking at how the military leadership is responding to counternarcotics.

Mr. SOUDER. We want to followup on this, and some of this obviously would be a classified brief, but we need to keep track of this,

because without good intelligence, all system falls apart because

you are just looking for needles in haystacks, and how these models

can be further developed with the Department of Homeland Security as we look at similar things on north and south border, and

71

as it hits the border, there will be more overlap. There is less overlap sometimes in the eradication efforts.

Mr. O’CONNELL. If I could add one thing not quite related. State

Department and Special Operations Low Intensity Conflict Assistant Secretary have cognizance over something called the Technical

Support Working Group. While we have some technical R&D in

counternarcotics activities, we have a very successful program that

I am trying to merge to make sure those technologies that are

counterterrorist in nature that have application in the counternarcotics field, in fact, get looked at. It is a success story. I would

invite you or any of your members over to get a briefing on the

technical support working group to see 82 government agencies actually working together.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. It is a miracle.

Mr. O’CONNELL. It is. It absolutely is a miracle. But I think as

Members of Congress, would you be shocked and astonished at how

well State and Defense run this particular program today, and it

has application for the counternarcotics field and we are moving in

that direction.

Mr. CHARLES. If I could just support this point a little more

broadly, Mr. O’Connell’s office and SOUTHCOM have been highly

supportive, in my view, of what you want and what we would like

to be doing down country. General Hill has been down there, I

think, 18 or 20 times. I don’t know of any head of SOUTHCOM

that has ever been down there in this space of time that number

of times. He is clearly committed, and in no way do any of the

things that I was sort of alluding to suggest that those two offices

in any way are not working in sync.

I go back in time to that moment 10 years ago or so when we

were working on these things, and what we were finding is, for example, that at that moment in time the deployment of AWACS was

what was happening, and it was too expensive, so they were pulling them out, they had pulled them out in the first Gulf war, so

there was no overhead. There was no eye in the sky. Customs and

others worked these issues.

I think the challenges now are more aggressively on the ground

supporting the Colombian Government and doing some things that

are really high intensity on the ground, and in those ways, I think,

separate from our discussion on Afghanistan last week, in those

ways, this is really happening. The training on the ground, which

is so critical is happening, the Intel sharing, the interagency cooperation, that stuff is really happening. I do think we are going

to have to see results out of it, but I think we are beginning to see

results out of it.

The other thing is you asked to break out——

Mr. SOUDER. But we are still struggling.

Mr. CHARLES. We are struggling.

Mr. SOUDER. A statistic that we have been given is 396 identified

go-fast shipments and we have only gotten 59.

Mr. CHARLES. Can I give you an answer to that? I was talking

with a Coast Guard officer that you and I both know very well the

other day, and I said, how is it that we can see a spike in interdiction, but we are not showing the kind of results that we did in the

late 1980’s when there was a surge that was constantly being used

72

in a large square and the square shifted. He said, let me explain

it to you. I drive a 378 around called the Bear throughout the region. He said, I take out a map and I drop a dime on the map and

I say, that’s the total area that I can get to with my boat. I can’t—

that is what I—I mean I am one of a very few cutters that are

down there. Then he dropped an index card on the map and he

said, that’s what I can do with a helicopter, and if that helicopter

is a disabling helicopter, I can do other things. And with State Department and DOD and other support, again with Coast Guard,

you can move to control that zone.

Mr. SOUDER. So the bottom line is that you are only getting 59

for 396 because they are not there. They are up in port.

Mr. CHARLES. Well, I don’t know about that, because I am not

a Coast Guard person, and I don’t want to get out of my lane, but

I will say——

Mr. SOUDER. But we are not in disagreement that the one boat

that is out there can’t find all this. This is not what our dispute

is.

Mr. CHARLES. Well, the point I would say is, if you remember

back to the 20 percent figure, 15 to 20 percent, and in Afghanistan

we are talking 10 to 20 percent, if you can hit hard interdiction at

that level, with 10 to 15, maybe 20 percent, what you find is you

have created enough disruption in the market that they do something—they go a different direction or they make mistakes that

allow you to catch them.

I think that our mission is to get back to that point in time when

the interagencies are cooperating really effectively. Because I push

hard on the source countries. I push hard on the judicial capacity.

I push hard on the eradication, and I push hard on getting the extraditions and things like that. DOD pushes hard to try to get all

of the end game that they are accountable for. But in fact, interdiction, this interdiction in the transit zone is also critical and is doable at a very high level of force multiplication. Because that is the

point at which in a go-fast, both they are least well protected, they

are most vulnerable, they are in the highest density, they are not

in retail on the street in the United States, and they are not out

in the field in one plant at a time.

So if you are high intensity in that area, you can also—and this

is one of the reasons we are at a tipping point. At the USIC conference recently, the point came around that not only are we winning on source country stuff and beginning to just hit the balance,

and we are doing that strongly in the interagency, but we are also

beginning to win in interdiction. So if we can also do the parts that

you were talking about, Congressman, and work aggressively on

the prevention piece, the drug testing piece, I think you are going

to see something in 5 years, 3 years, 2 years that looks very different from what you are looking at right now.

Mr. SOUDER. We have to be careful that we are not paying millions of dollars to get good intelligence and paying all of these people to be on the ground and identify it, and then when they leave

the country, we don’t get them. That is why we have to have all

of the pieces there and that was part of the round of my questions,

because it is good to know that if we have the intelligence, that is

good because we have been concerned about that. If we get enough

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agents on the ground to identify, work at the eradication, but when

they are coming out, it is a little disturbing right now that we are

not getting enough and whether we have, in effect, boosted that

zone, which is an argument for the Coast Guard.

Mr. CHARLES. I think it would be a very interesting thing some

day, not to suggest a hearing context, but to have all of us lined

up at once, DEA and Coast Guard and all of us able to tell you our

pieces, because in fact——

Mr. SOUDER. OMB can do your testimony.

Mr. CHARLES. Yes, it will all be the same. Anyway——

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Ruppersberger.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The chairman alluded to it: it is the same

issue; it is a matter of prioritizing the resources. And when it is

still coming out, because your boats or whatever are not there and

they are in port or whatever, that is a matter of resources, and the

lives and the money, you talked about how many people have been

killed as a result of this, we still haven’t gotten to where we need

to be.

I alluded to it and it was kind of in a joking way that you always

look after your district, but the unmanned air vehicles have been

extremely successful in Iraq and it allowed our military to see 8

miles ahead and they couldn’t shoot it down. What about that

issue? I mean, have you made any requests or have the requests

been made? Where are we going with respect to that? Or is it we

can’t get them built fast enough to use them over in Iraq?

Mr. O’CONNELL. There are—well, I won’t speak for the Coast

Guard, but we do have a very robust, integrated UAV program.

The research and development is in both the counternarcotics side

and the U.S. Special Operations Command side. It is a question of

the resources and the applicability and does the combatant commander want that particular asset for that particular area. And

some of the sensors that we might use in the Middle East are not

necessarily particularly effective against what we are looking for in

Latin America capability. We also have a very different type of terrain, as I am sure you are well aware. So there are some particular

problems.

But we are looking at that. And to answer your question about

coordination and synergy, to answer both of your questions and

your concern, I would be happy to discuss with your staffers a recent initiative that was taken, interagency that we can’t discuss

here that I think would answer some of your questions and shock

you at the level of cooperation that we are having as an interagency. Mr. Walters couldn’t allude to it, but I would be happy to

speak to your staff director and give you a quick briefing on what

actually took place.

Mr. CHARLES. I would just augment this on UAVs by saying that

again, mission—it is not a matter of resources so much for us. It

is really mission. You have an environment where UAVs have to

work, and the environment is tough on some of these UAVs from

our perspective. The other perspective is we have 152 operational

aircraft right now. Their mission is to spray and to protect. We

send T 65 spray planes, 802 spray planes, and the OV 10’s into this

environment, and they hold large quantities of glyphosate, they

spray on a computerized grid.

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At the same time, our protective assets are two helicopter gun

ships and two Huey 2s with 10 to 15-man fast reaction teams and

one SAR with every mission so that they are protected. UAVs just

don’t match yet. I mean I will go back and look at it, but I don’t

think——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Let me suggest this to you. You can build

things to specifications. I don’t want to get into a lot of this, but

it is a matter of prioritizing where you are going to put your

money. You can do this, and I have heard testimony in other committees about that. So look into it. That’s all.

Mr. O’CONNELL. I would be happy to talk UAV applications and

special operations forces, sir, at any time.

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I just got briefed on it a week ago, but we

do still have the three Americans who work for a company that is

in my district, and they are always asking me for an update. I assume there is nothing new; the same situation. Other than I know,

based on what you said about the Government in Colombia is becoming a lot more aggressive and making a lot more inroads dealing with the terrorists, especially the parks.

Mr. CHARLES. I can’t speak to it on the ground, and I will leave

that to others, but I will tell you that I have spoken with all three

families, and in an odd twist, one of the sisters of one of the hostages is a close friend of my sister. So I am deeply concerned about

what is happening and would have been regardless and was regardless. But we monitor it closely, the State Department does. I

can’t tell you—it is over 100, I think it is over 160 contacts that

have been made with the families to try to be sure that they understand everything we know.

Mr. O’CONNELL. And to the extent that the Department has collection assets and is working with the Colombian Government, obviously they have the lead as does State in terms of how they are

going to approach this. And all I can say is that there is a delicate,

very delicate balance of what do you do any time there is an increased likelihood that the location could be known, how far are we

away from a negotiated release, and all of the difficult issues that

come. Yes, there may have been times when you might have been

able to do something——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Just too risky.

Mr. O’CONNELL. I wouldn’t say that, because——

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I mean for the hostages.

Mr. O’CONNELL. And General Hill, the combatant commander, it

is a subject that takes an enormous amount of his time and capability, and I will tell you that even if location is known, that doesn’t

always equate to an ability to immediately react and become successful, and leave it at that. But we do pay a heck of a lot of attention to that, as does State, and as does CIA.

Mr. CHARLES. And I would suggest maybe calling for at the Intel

Committee or in some other forum, an updated brief on that, because it changes regularly and it is something that you probably

would learn a lot more in that environment.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you both. I want to thank again Mr.

O’Connell who, at a time when you are getting all kinds of pressure

all over the country for military assets, and I have supported those

efforts around the world, we just need to make sure that there is

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a dedicated, aggressive defense of the narcotics effort and battling

over those resources at the department level, because there has

never been a questioning of General Hill who is enthusiastic and

supportive, or any of the people we have met over the years in

SOUTHCOM, understand the risks there, understand the importance there. The people on the ground understand it, but there is

such a competition at headquarters, we really need your office to

be a strong advocate and we need the drug czar, Director Walters,

to also be backing up inside the cabinet meetings that this is a critical issue, which is why I was asking him his questions, and the

coordination with the State Department which has similar pressures all over the world.

I thank both of you for your leadership. If you have additional

things you want to insert for the record or followup on some of

those questions, and we may have a few specific questions as well.

With that, I thank you both, I thank Congressman

Ruppersberger and, with that, the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

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