J-A16005-19

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JEANNE R. HEYMANN

v.

ANDY L. MILLER AND IDA A. MILLER, 

AND DAVID M. DECRISTO AND AMY 

DECRISTO, HIS WIFE, AND RANDY 

L. CASTLE AND DARLENE J. CASTLE, 

HIS WIFE

APPEAL OF: ESTATE OF JEANNE R. 

HEYMANN

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2084 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 14, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Civil Division at No(s): 

2008EQ0659

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: AUGUST 20, 2019

The Estate of Jeanne R. Heymann1 (“Heymann”) appeals from the 

judgment, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County, following 

a non-jury trial where judgment was entered in favor of Andy L. Miller and Ida 

A. Miller (“Miller”), as well as David M. DeCristo, Amy DeCristo, Randy L. 

Castle, and Darlene J. Castle (“Additional Defendants”). After careful review, 

we affirm. 

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1 Heymann passed away in 2017. Her estate has continued to prosecute her 

appeal.
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In August 2008, Miller sought bids for the purchase of 301 Main Street, 

Towanda, PA (“the Farm”), one of two properties he owned in Bradford 

County. Heymann submitted a written bid of $285,000, which Miller rejected. 

Heymann then increased her bid to $300,000, which Miller also rejected. 

Heymann met Miller at the Farm, and increased her bid to $305,000, to which 

Miller orally agreed. The parties discussed and agreed to additional terms, 

including the removal of a grave, the closing date, transfer of possession, and 

division of costs. Miller’s attorney drafted a sales agreement containing the 

terms to which Miller and Heymann orally agreed. Miller and his wife signed 

the agreement and faxed it to Heymann on September 5, 2008. The sales 

agreement described the property as “all that certain lot or piece of ground 

located in Leroy Township, Bradford County, PA.” On September 6, 2008, 

Heymann purchased a smaller property owned by Miller’s son, near the Farm. 

Heymann stated that she purchased Miller’s son’s property to support the 

Farm, and would not have done so if not for her agreement with Miller. 

On September 8, 2008, Heymann expressed concerns with the Farm’s 

sales agreement, and requested it be updated to include a more detailed 

description of the property, provisions concerning the refund of a $500 

deposit, payment for utilities, and the removal of the agreement’s time-ofthe-essence clause. Miller responded by informing Heymann that he would 

not be proceeding with the sale. 
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On September 12, 2008, Heymann filed a Praecipe for Writ of Summons 

and a lis pendens against Miller and the Farm, seeking specific performance 

of the oral agreement. Miller subsequently sold the Farm to Additional 

Defendants, subject to the outcome of this action. 

Initially, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Miller on 

December 14, 2010, based on Heymann’s failure to join Additional Defendants

as indispensable parties. This Court reversed and remanded on October 16, 

2011, with leave to join additional parties. Heymann v. Miller, 37 A.3d 1246 

(Pa. Super. 2011). On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment in 

favor of Heymann on December 17, 2013. On November 18, 2015, this Court 

reversed and remanded the case, finding there existed an issue of material 

fact regarding whether the oral agreement between Heymann and Miller 

constituted a meeting of the minds. Heymann v. Miller, 95 MDA 2014 (Pa. 

Super. filed Nov. 18, 2015) (unpublished memorandum). Following a nonjury trial on December 22, 2017, the trial court entered judgment in favor of 

Miller, finding there was no meeting of the minds.

2

 The trial court denied 

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2 We disagree with the trial court’s finding that there was no meeting of the 

minds between Miller and Heymann. The parties agreed upon the essential 

terms of the contract, and all that remained was reduction of the agreement 

to writing. See Trowbridge v. McCaigue, 992 A.2d 199, 202 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (“It is well-settled in Pennsylvania that where the parties have settled 

upon the essential terms and the only remaining act to be done is the 

formalization of the agreement, the latter is not inconsistent with the present 

contract.”). We, however, may affirm the trial court’s decision on any valid 

basis. Plasticert, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 489 (Pa. Super. 
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Heymann’s motion for post-trial relief on November 19, 2018, and Heymann 

timely filed this appeal. Instantly, Heymann raises the following issues for our 

review:

1. Whether an agreement for the sale of real estate is enforceable 

when the owner of the real estate has negotiated a detailed oral 

agreement and has placed all of the terms of the agreement into 

a written sales agreement which is signed by the owner?

2. Whether the trial court, in considering the enforceability of an 

agreement, should have taken into consideration the fact that the 

buyer expended $190,000.00 to purchase another parcel of real 

estate in reliance upon the agreement signed by the owners 

setting forth the terms of the agreement for sale?

Brief of Appellant, at 2.

Heymann’s claims, requesting specific performance, sound in equity. 

See Barnes v. McKellar, 644 A.2d 770, 776 (Pa. Super. 1994). Our review, 

therefore, “is limited to a determination of whether the [trial judge] committed 

an error of law or abused his discretion. The scope of review of a final decree 

in equity is limited and will not be disturbed unless it is unsupported by the 

evidence or demonstrably capricious.” Rosen v. Rittenhouse Towers, 482 

A.2d 1113, 1116 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citations omitted). 

Heymann’s first claim, arguing evidence of the oral agreement 

reinforces the written sales agreement, implicates the statute of frauds.3 The 

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2007). In this instance, evidence of the oral agreement is barred by the 

statute of frauds, which fundamentally undermines Heymann’s claim. See 

infra pp. 4-6.

3 33 P.S. §§ 1-8. 
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statute of frauds requires contracts for the sale of real estate to be in writing

and signed by the party creating the interest, for the purpose of preventing 

fraud and perjury by the assertion of verbal agreements. Fannin v. Cratty, 

480 A.2d 1056, 1058-59 (Pa. Super. 1984) (citation omitted). To satisfy the 

statute of frauds in a real estate transaction, a writing must include an 

adequate description of the property, the purchase price, and the signature of 

the party creating the interest. Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990, 994 

(Pa. Super. 1989). The land being conveyed must “be described with such 

certainty and definiteness as to avoid the necessity of resorting to parol proof 

to determine the property the parties intended should be transferred.” Shaw 

v. Cornman, 114 A. 632 (Pa. 1921); see also Zuk v. Zuk, 55 A.3d 102, 107 

(Pa. Super. 2012) (requiring conveying party to “describe a particular piece 

or tract of land that can be identified, located, or found.”). A description such 

as “my farm” may be sufficient to describe a property where the seller owns 

only one property to which this description could apply. Suchan v. Swope, 

53 A.2d 116, 118 (Pa. 1947). However, a description too indefinite to locate 

the subject real property is invalid. See Pierro v. Pierro, 264 A.2d 692, 694 

(Pa. 1970) (holding a written description where “the land is not described, but 

the agreement contains the condition that no more than 50% of the parcel 

would front on either Poor House or Dark Hollow Road” insufficient under 

statute of frauds); see also Barnes v. Hustead, 68 A. 839, 942 (Pa. 1908) 

(holding inadequate description naming township, county, and state, without 
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indicating boundaries of tract to be conveyed); see also Weisenberger v. 

Huebner, 107 A. 763, 764 (Pa. 1919) (finding description which stated

property was located at an intersection, without indicating property’s location

in relation to that intersection, insufficient). 

Here, the parties’ of the sales agreement, signed by Miller merely 

describes a tract of land in a named township, county, and state, without any 

mention as to the metes and bounds identifying the property. It is, therefore,

inadequate. See Exhibit 5, at 1 (“all that certain lot or piece of ground located 

in Leroy Township, Bradford County, PA”); see also Barnes, supra, at 942

(requiring indication of boundaries of property in addition to township, county, 

and state). The description also fails to state the address of the property. 

Exhibit 5, at 1; see also Hessenthaler, supra, at 994. The fact that Miller 

owned two properties in the township, county, and state described

exacerbates the confusion. See N.T. Heymann Deposition, 10/8/09, at 37-38 

(“I felt that there was a mistake in the way the contract was written[,] because 

it made no mention of lot or block or parcel number[.] It referred to the 

property. I knew that there were two parcels and that concerned me 

greatly[.]”). Because the written description in the sales agreement was 

inadequate, the statute of frauds does not permit parol evidence of the verbal 

agreement. See Pierro, supra, at 695 (holding parol evidence may not 

reinforce inadequate written description of real property in sales agreement 

to satisfy statute of frauds). The alleged agreement between Heymann and 
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Miller fails to satisfy the writing requirement of the statute of frauds, and is 

therefore unenforceable. See Fannin, supra, at 1160 (“Because of the 

provisions of the statute of frauds, an agreement for the sale of land cannot 

be specifically enforced unless in writing signed by the parties to be charged 

or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing[.]”) (citations 

omitted). 

Heymann’s second claim alleges the trial court erred in failing to 

consider her claim of equitable estoppel. Brief of Appellant, at 23. However, 

equitable estoppel may not be invoked against the operation of the statute of 

frauds. Target Sportswear, Inc. v. Clearfield Foundation, 474 A.2d 1142, 

1151 (Pa. Super. 1984). “The statute is not a mere rule of evidence, but a 

limitation on judicial power to order specific performance of a contract in the 

absence of a writing.” Id. at 1147. Because Heymann invoked equitable 

estoppel against the operation of the statute of frauds, her second claim fails. 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date:8/20/2019