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U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 22, 2004

Serial No. 108–138

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

ENI F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

JAMES W. MCCORMICK, Subcommittee Staff Director 

LISA M. WILLIAMS, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

DOUGLAS ANDERSON, Professional Staff Member & Counsel 

TIERNEN MILLER, Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Christina B. Rocca, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South 

Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................ 8

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable James A. Leach, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Iowa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 2

The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress from 

American Samoa: Prepared statement ............................................................... 4

The Honorable Christina B. Rocca: Prepared statement ..................................... 12

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana: Prepared statement .......................................................................... 35

Additional information supplied to the Committee in writing by the Honorable Christina B. Rocca in response to questions asked by Members during 

the hearing ........................................................................................................... 36

Responses from the Honorable Christina B. Rocca to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ............................................... 38

(1)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA 

TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in Room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James A. Leach (Chairman of the Subcommittee), presiding. 

Mr. LEACH. The Committee will come to order. On behalf of the 

Subcommittee I would like to express a welcome to Assistant Secretary Rocca. We are pleased you are appearing before us again 

today, and we appreciate the public service that you have provided, 

and your cooperation with this Committee. 

The hearing today is intended to provide an overview of significant recent developments in South Asia and their implications for 

the United States policy. South Asia’s region, which has seen a 

sharply, or seen a sharp rise in prominence for American foreign 

policy in this region, which will likely increase in importance in the 

years ahead. Although the region remains potentially volatile, the 

ongoing diplomatic process that is engaged in India and Pakistan 

provides a credible prospect for strengthening mutual security in 

the subcontinent. 

From a legislative perspective, the remarkable election won by 

India’s congress party is a reflection of the vibrancy of Indian democracy. The new government, led by Prime Minister Manmohan 

Singh, appears to be focused on a domestic agenda designed to ensure that the benefits of India’s market-focused reforms and a 

strong economic growth are shared more widely among its people. 

In terms of foreign policy, my sense is that Indian diplomacy will 

largely be hallmarked by continuity in that the new government is 

committed to further deepening United States-Indian relations as 

well as a dialogue with Pakistan. 

I am sure I speak for all Members when I say that Congress 

would welcome a visit by the Prime Minister at his earliest convenience. 

As we all understand, the United States has embarked on a new 

partnership with Pakistan that continues to be critical both for the 

campaign against terrorism as well as bringing greater stability to 

Afghanistan. In recent months following two attempts on the life 

of President Musharraf, welcome signs have emerged that 

Islamabad has rededicated itself to thwarting international as well 

as domestic terrorist groups that have taken refuge in Pakistani 

soil. 

2

With respect to the A.Q. Khan affair, Congress takes note of 

Deputy Secretary Armitage’s statement that United States intelligence agencies are receiving the cooperation they need to role up 

this unprecedented proliferation network, and we certainly expect 

the full cooperation of authorities in Islamabad. Likewise, we hope 

and expect the Administration will continue to work closely with 

the government and people of Pakistan to realize the vision of a 

modern, tolerant, democratic Islamic country. 

Elsewhere in the region, one can only express dismay at the ongoing brutal Maoist insurgency in Nepal and the lack of political 

unity in Katmandu that continues to undermine the prospects for 

stable democratic governance. We hope to learn from the Assistant 

Secretary whether the time is right for any new and more concerted international efforts to help facilitate peace in Nepal. 

In Sri Lanka, we hope that the new government in Colombo will 

be able to break the current stalemate with the Tamil Tiger guerrillas and revive the peace process the country so clearly wants and 

needs. 

Finally, the Committee looks forward to increased cooperation 

between the United States and Bangladesh, the world’s fourth 

most populous Muslim state. 

In any regard, we look forward to the testimony of Assistant Secretary Rocca and the discussion that follows. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND

THE PACIFIC

On behalf of the Subcommittee, I would like to express a warm welcome to Assistant Secretary Rocca. We are pleased you are appearing before us again. We appreciate your public service and your cooperation with this Committee. 

The hearing today is intended to provide an overview of significant recent developments in South Asia and their implications for United States policy. South Asia 

is a region which has sharply risen in prominence for American foreign policy and 

which will likely only increase in importance in the years ahead. Although the region remains potentially volatile, the ongoing diplomatic process between India and 

Pakistan provides a credible prospect for strengthening mutual security on the subcontinent. 

From a U.S. legislative perspective, the remarkable election win by India’s Congress Party is a reflection of the vibrancy of Indian democracy. The new government, led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, appears to be focused on a domestic 

agenda designed to ensure that the benefits of India’s market-based reforms and 

strong economic growth are shared more widely among its people. In terms of foreign policy, my sense is that Indian diplomacy will be largely hallmarked by continuity and that the new government is committed to further deepening U.S.-Indian 

relations as well as dialogue with Pakistan. I am sure I speak for all Members when 

I say that the Congress would welcome a visit by the Prime Minister at his earliest 

convenience. 

As we all understand, the U.S. has embarked on a new partnership with Pakistan 

that continues to be critical both for the campaign against terrorism as well as in 

bringing stability to Afghanistan. In recent months, following two attempts on the 

life of President Musharraf, welcome signs have emerged that Islamabad has rededicated itself to uprooting the international as well as domestic terrorist groups 

that have taken refuge on Pakistani soil. 

With respect to the A.Q. Khan affair, Congress takes note of Deputy Secretary 

Armitage’s statement that U.S. intelligence agencies are receiving the cooperation 

they need to ‘‘roll up’’ this unprecedented proliferation network. We certainly expect 

the full cooperation of the authorities in Islamabad. Likewise, we hope and expect 

that the Administration will continue to work closely with the government and PakVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:09 Oct 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\062204\94506.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

istani people to realize the vision of a modern, tolerant, democratic, Islamic Pakistan. 

Elsewhere in the region, one can only express dismay at the ongoing brutal 

Maoist insurgency in Nepal and the lack of political unity in Katmandu that continues to undermine prospects for stable democratic governance. We hope to learn 

from the Assistant Secretary whether the time is ripe for any new and more concerted international efforts to help facilitate peace in Nepal. In Sri Lanka, we hope 

that the new government in Colombo will be able to break the current stalemate 

with the Tamil Tiger guerrillas and revive the peace process that the country so 

clearly wants and needs. 

Finally, the Committee looks forward to increased cooperation between the United 

States and Bangladesh, the world’s fourth most populous Muslim state. 

In any regard, we look forward to the testimony of Assistant Secretary Rocca and 

the discussion to follow.

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I too would 

like to offer my personal welcome to Assistant Secretary Rocca for 

being here this morning, and her staff. 

Mr. Chairman, we are at a point in our history where we have 

the opportunity for great change. We are working to bring peace 

to foreign nations and put an end to terrorism. Yet we are concerned that one of our allies has supplied uranium enrichment 

technology to North Korea, and other countries. This is not a new 

issue. However, it is still a potential and serious threat to world 

peace. 

Nuclear proliferation threatens all of us. North Korea has announced publicly its capability to produce an atomic weapon, and 

we cannot move to peace when threats like this remain and the 

trading of uranium enrichment technology still exists. 

I submit that our most important responsibility is to do all in our 

power to further peace and there can be no peace without accountability. This is why in May of last year I introduced an amendment 

to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act which places conditions 

on future aid to Pakistan and sends a signal that one support war 

on terrorism does not negate a government’s responsibility to be accountable for its choices. 

If we are serious about peace, Pakistan must be accountable for 

transferring nuclear technology to terrorist nations. February of 

this year, Pakistan’s most prominent nuclear weapons scientist, 

Abdul Qadir Khan, admitted that he provided nuclear know-how to 

Iran, Libya and North Korea on who’s who is the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. 

According to the Washington Post in February of this year, Mr. 

Khan initially told investigator that Pakistan’s President General 

Musharaff—who came into power in 1999 in a military coup—knew 

about and approved of his efforts. The next day Mr. Khan changed 

his story and said that he provided nuclear expertise and equipment to nations promoting terror without authorization from the 

Pakistani government. 

In exchange for his statement and in appreciation for it, Pakistan’s President pardoned Mr. Khan, although a week earlier Pakistan had assured the International Atomic Energy Agency that it 

would take strong legal action against the culprits. 

New claims continue to surface, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Khan’s colleagues reportedly have stated that Mr. Khan had made over 40 

visits to Dubai the last 3 years, and during this time he met with 

Iraqi intelligence officials who sought his help in having some of 

4

the weapons of mass destruction material of Iraq lifted from Syria 

to Pakistan. 

Sunday of June, just this past week, the Los Angeles Times reported that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan let terrorists flourish before 

9/11, apparently in return for the protection from attacks by alQaeda, and that Pakistan provided even more direct assistance to 

military and intelligence agencies, often coordinating efforts with 

the Taliban and al-Qaeda. 

Yet for fiscal year 2002 and 2003, Pakistan received more than 

$1.5 billion in United States assistance with no strings attached. 

June of last year President Bush pledged to work with Congress 

in establishing a 5-year $3 billion aid package for Pakistan to begin 

in fiscal year 2005, stated that he supports conditions, but conditions have not yet been imposed. 

As a Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, I 

submit I believe the time for conditions is now, and I would like 

to clearly state that I do not believe we will see an end to terrorist 

and nuclear proliferation until the U.S. Congress imposes restrictions on United States aid to Pakistan. 

In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt said, and I quote:

‘‘No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it,’’

and such is the case, I believe, is the United States-Pakistan relations. 

As for the United States-India relations, I believe we must take 

notice of the sweeping changes that took place during India’s national elections. We saw a huge reversal of the incumbent party, 

and this has been seen by many to show evidence that India’s role 

in urban poor were not persuaded by the India Shining campaign 

which sought to highlight India’s economic gains. 

I believe also we need to, due to the fact that some 700 million 

Indians took to the polls is a classic demonstration of the largest 

democracy of the world showing that this can be done. 

I am not sure what the implication of this decision will be in the 

coming months and the coming years, but I believe we must 

strengthen our bilateral ties with India. We must encourage 

growth and expand trade with the world’s largest democracy. We 

must also work to reduce the threats of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 

India. 

Our Nation has the responsibility to do the job at hand by the 

potential threat of escalating terrorism in a time when the international terrorist and rogue regimes seek to acquire weapons of 

mass destruction. We must find ways to work together to use common sense approaches to protect the interests of our own Nation 

and our allies. 

I welcome the comments of our Assistant Secretary, and look forward to her testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Faleomavaega follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM AMERICAN SAMOA

Mr. Chairman: 

We are at a point in our history where we have the opportunity for great change. 

We are working to bring peace to foreign nations and put an end to terrorism. Yet 

we are concerned that one of our allies (Pakistan) has supplied uranium enrichment 

5

technology to North Korea. This is not a new issue. However it is still a potential 

threat to the peace process. 

Nuclear proliferation threatens all of us. North Korea has announced publicly its 

capability to produce an atomic weapon and we cannot move to peace when threats 

like this remain and the trading of uranium enrichment technology still exists. 

I submit that our most important responsibility is to do all in our power to further 

peace and there can be no peace without accountability. This is why in May 2003 

I introduced an amendment (Sec 709) to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act 

(H.R. 1950) which places conditions on future aid to Pakistan and sends a signal 

that one’s support for the war on terrorism does not negate a government’s responsibility to be accountable for its choices. 

If we are serious about peace, Pakistan must be accountable for transferring nuclear technology to terrorist nations. In February of this year, Pakistan’s most 

prominent nuclear-weapons scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, admitted that he provided nuclear know-how to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, the who who’s of the 

world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. 

According to the Washington Post (February 3), A.Q. Khan initially told investigators that Pakistan’s President, General Musharraf (who came into power as a result 

of a 1999 military coup), knew about and approved of his efforts. The next day, Mr. 

Khan changed his story and said that he provided nuclear expertise and equipment 

to nations promoting terror without authorization from the Pakistani government. 

In exchange for his statement or in appreciation for it, Pakistan’s President pardoned Mr. Khan, although a week earlier Pakistan had assured the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it would take strong legal action against the culprits (Washington Post, January 23, 2004). 

New claims continue to surface. Khan’s colleagues reportedly have stated that 

A.Q. Khan made over 40 visits to Dubai in the last three years and during this time 

he met with Iraqi intelligence officials who sought his help in having some of the 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material of Iraq airlifted from Syria to Pakistan. 

On Sunday June 20, 2004, the Los Angeles Times reported Saudi Arabia and 

Pakistan let terrorists flourish before 9/11 apparently in return for protection from 

attacks by Al Qaeda and that Pakistan provided even more direct assistance, ‘‘its 

military and intelligence agencies often coordinating efforts with the Taliban and Al 

Qaeda.’’

Yet, for FY2002 and FY2003, Pakistan received more than $1.5 billion in U.S. assistance, with no strings attached. In June 2003, President Bush pledged to work 

with Congress on establishing a five-year, $3 billion aid package for Pakistan to 

begin in FY2005 and stated that he supports conditions but conditions have not 

been imposed. 

As the Ranking Member of the International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and 

the Pacific, I believe the time for conditions is now and I would like to clearly state 

that I do not believe we will see an end to terrorism or nuclear proliferation until 

the U.S. Congress re-imposes restrictions on U.S. aid to Pakistan. In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt said, ‘‘No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking 

it’’ and such is the case, I believe, with U.S.—Pakistan relations. 

As for U.S.—India relations, I believe we must take notice of the sweeping 

changes that took place during India’s national elections. We saw huge reversals for 

the incumbent party and this was seen by many to be evidence that India’s rural 

and urban poor were not persuaded by the NDA’s ‘‘India Shining’’ campaign which 

sought to highlight India’s economic gains. 

I am not sure what the implications of this election will have in the coming 

months and the coming years but I believe we must strengthen our bilateral ties 

with India and we must encourage growth and expand trade with what is the 

world’s largest democracy. We must also work to reduce the threat of the HIV/AIDS 

epidemic in India. 

My friends, we are pushed to do the job at hand by the potential threat of escalating terrorism. In a time when international terrorists and rogue regimes seek to 

acquire weapons of mass destruction, we must find ways to work together use common sense approaches to protect the interests of the United States and our allies. 

I welcome the comments of our witnesses and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 

holding a hearing regarding U.S. policy toward South Asia.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Yes, of course. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for scheduling this 

morning’s hearing. South Asia presents the United States with a 

6

full range of policy challenges from combating terrorism and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to fighting Maoist 

insurgencies and strengthening democratic institutions. 

This weekend brought some good news from the region with the 

announcement that India and Pakistan had agreed on a series of 

confidence-building measures with respect to each other’s nuclear 

arsenals, and that the respective foreign secretaries would meet 

next week for further talks. 

But this bit of good news following closely on the heels of India’s 

successful free and fair elections still leaves the United States confronting one of its most central foreign policy dilemmas: What to 

do about Pakistan. 

The Bush Administration would have us believe that General 

Musharraf is the pied-piper of enlightened moderation, as he described himself in the Washington Post earlier this month, a babbler of extremism, a bringer of democracy, the very soul of moderate Islam. 

Others, generally outside the Administration, hold a very different view of General Musharraf, arguing essentially that he does 

not practice what he preaches; that he battles extremists and terrorist only in a limited way; that he has in reality strengthened the 

military’s role in Pakistani governance rather than bring democracy; and has done little to cut the ties that his military and intelligence services have to extremist and terrorists in Pakistan. 

This portrait of General Musharraf says nothing about his governments or his own capacity or complicity in the nuclear ‘‘WalMart’’ that A.Q. Khan was running ‘‘unbeknownst’’ to Musharraf, 

if you believe the Administration’s version of events. 

I continue to believe that our Administration is ignoring the law 

by failing to make a determination on the application of sanctions 

against Pakistan for the transfer of nuclear weapons designs and 

related technologies to terrorist states. Until someone in the Administration provides a detailed explanation of why Pakistan 

should not be sanctioned under either Glenn or Symington Amendments, I will continue in this belief and will continue to raise it at 

every appropriate opportunity. 

The Administration is making a very bad bargain with Pakistan. 

In exchange for perceived cooperation on al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 

the Administration is giving Pakistan a pass on nuclear proliferation issues. To my knowledge, neither we nor the IAEA have had 

direct access to A.Q. Khan or any of his associates. Despite Pakistan’s claims to the contrary, and our apparent acquiescence, this 

is not an internal Pakistani matter. Once Pakistan decided to sell 

its wares internationally, it became a matter for the international 

community, and for us. 

If trading efforts against terrorism for turning a blind eye to nuclear proliferation were a good deal, which it is not, I do not think 

we are getting a 100 percent effort on terrorism from General 

Musharraf. It has been some time since Pakistan captured Khalid 

Shaikh Mohammed. The most recent defensive in the tribal areas 

netted only low-level fighters; that is, with the exception of those 

who escaped while General Musharraf’s army was negotiating with 

tribal leaders. Where is Osama bin Laden? Where is Ayman AlZawahiri? Where is Mullah Omar? 

7

Besides helping us capture these guys, General Musharraf is 

supposed to be rolling up the Kashmiri terrorist groups too, but as 

near as I can tell, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are 

alive and well, if operating under different names. 

The very fact that General Musharraf has been the subject of repeated assassination attempts shows that his lip service to reform 

will be his undoing. By threatening Jihads without actually following through on reforms, he makes enemies among extremists 

without garnering any support among the moderate Pakistanis he 

claims to represent. In Pakistan, we are hitching our wagon to a 

very questionable horse. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not say a word of congratulations to India’s new Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, and 

note again the stark contrast that India’s peaceful handover of government presents to many of its immediate neighbors. As we struggle to build democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think we need 

only to look as far as India for lessons on how to make a multiethnic, multi-religious, multi-linguistic democracy work. 

And I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward 

very much to hearing from Assistant Secretary Rocca. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Yes, of course, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had not planned on 

making an opening statement, but if I could just very briefly just 

comment perhaps. 

Relative to my friend from New York’s comments about Pakistan 

in particular, I would just say that I would urge the Administration 

to continue to work with Pakistan and with President Musharraf 

in particular. I was in Pakistan, I believe it was in January, and 

we met with the President. This was several weeks after the second assassination attempt on his life. 

I think it is critical that we continue—in fact, one of the problems that the Pakistanis have is equipment, and they need things 

like helicopters in order to be able to move their troops around, I 

think, more efficiently and more quickly. The problem is when they 

get word where Osama bin Laden or one of his cohorts might be, 

by the time they can get their troops up there, word has gotten to 

them and they are gone. 

I just think that the best thing that we can do right now is continue to work with Pakistan, with President Musharraf in particular, and urge them to do everything within their power to put 

pressure on the terrorists and Osama bin Laden, and bring them 

to justice, which ultimately means that he will probably be eliminated. 

But I just would be very wary of sending the wrong message out 

to Pakistan, and I think we need to continue to work with them. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. If there are 

no further statements, let me welcome Secretary Rocca. 

By background, prior to joining the Department the Secretary 

was a Foreign Affairs Advisor to our distinguished colleague, Senator Sam Brownback. From 1982 to 1997, she was an intelligence 

officer with an American agency. A native of Washington, Mrs. 

Rocca holds a B.A. in History from King’s College, London. 

8

Welcome, Mrs. Rocca. Please proceed as you see fit, and without 

objection your full statement will be put in the record. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINA B. ROCCA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. ROCCA. Thank you very much, Congressman. I will shorten 

my statement so that we have more time for questions, and I appreciate the full statement being put in the record. 

Thank you also very much for inviting me here today to talk 

about our policy priorities in South Asia. 

September 2001 placed a South Asia riven by conflict and division on the front lines of the global war on terror. Not quite 3 years 

later—with the support of the American people, the American Congress, the Administration—the region stands on the verge of a 

number of potential breakthroughs. 

The next few years will provide a crucial opportunity for the 

United States to help South Asia become a peaceful democratic and 

prosperous region, free from terror and nuclear threat. We are winning in consolidating the peace in Afghanistan, and while that is 

not a focus of my testimony today, success in Afghanistan is crucial 

to long-term regional stability. 

Over the last year, and especially in recent months, momentum 

for positive change has increased. The United States and India are 

working to formally expand strategic cooperation while deepening 

their partnership along multiple fronts. Pakistan continues as a 

major ally in the war on terror. Al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives 

continue to be captured there, and the government has recently intensified its operations around the country and near the western 

border. 

The recent rapprochement between India and Pakistan has enabled a new composite dialogue and given a new boost to regional 

cooperation meetings—in stark contrast to the threat of a possible 

nuclear confrontation in 2002. 

The suspension of the Sri Lankan peace negotiations last year 

did not end the cease-fire or informal cooperation between the government and the LTTE. 

In Bangladesh and throughout the region we continue to advocate and assist progress toward accountable democratic governance, sustainable development, and mutual understanding in order 

to address the underlying causes of extremism and instability. 

Nepal, as you mentioned, Congressman, is a country of concern. 

It is a fragile democracy that is at risk there where Maoist urgency 

has unraveled the weak political and economic threads that held it 

together, and the United States must help South Asia avoid the potential humanitarian crisis and instability that this could cause as 

well as avoiding the emergence of a failed and authoritarian state. 

I will start with India. With the newly elected government taking 

office in India, we are continuing cooperation on regional and bilateral issues. External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh visited Washington recently and had excellent meetings with Secretary Powell. 

Our defense—our Bilateral Defense Policy Group—met 3 weeks ago 

in New Delhi, and joint exercises and military exchanges continue 

to increase our security cooperation. 

9

In January 2004, we announced our Next Step in Strategic Partnership, an initiative designed to deepen the United States-India 

relationship, and this week Bangalore is hosting the U.S.-India 

Space Conference. 

We will also be increasing our efforts to strengthen the economic 

and commercial side of our relationship, which is growing but not 

nearly as fast as it could, and the high-technology cooperation 

group is advancing trade and investment. 

The United States assistance programs, including our ESF initiative targeting areas of special concern to the government, are helping India to complete financial, trade, energy, water, and agricultural reforms to improve economic stability and reduce poverty. 

Our programs also promote better access to education, justice, 

and services by women and vulnerable groups. Our health programs support the prevention of HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other 

diseases, and increased child survival—issues also addressed 

through a bilateral Global Issues Forum whose concerns range 

from trafficking in persons and human rights to environment, 

science and health. 

And finally, but certainly not least, the United States and India 

share a fundamental commitment to democracy. We hope to work 

more closely together to promote democracy, especially in problematic countries like Burma. 

In Pakistan, all our policies and programs support our primary 

goal of helping Pakistan reach its objectives of becoming a moderate, prosperous, stable state, and preventing terrorism—directly 

through security programs and also through democracy, development and outreach program that combat extremism and instability. 

As our FMS programs facilitate the capture of al-Qaeda and 

Taliban remnants and strengthen our military ties with Pakistan, 

we help to tackle the conditions that breed terror by providing substantial amounts in ESF for macro-economic stabilization and 

growth, and support for social sector programs. 

We also continue to support grassroot economic development and 

health programs visible to ordinary Pakistanis through our USAID 

programs, and we are helping to provide substantial support to the 

Pakistani government’s efforts to pursue education reform aimed at 

preparing young Pakistanis to gain employment and compete in 

the global marketplace. 

A return to full democracy in Pakistan is central to long-term 

stability. After a prolonged impasse, Parliament is beginning to 

function, and a devolution program has begun to revitalize local 

government. U.S. democracy programs and exchanges are assisting 

in the development of accountable, responsive democratic institutions and practices, including effective legislators and local councils 

that respond to citizens and play a positive role in governance. We 

are vigorously engaging educators, the media, and civil society 

leaders, as well as younger, non-elite Pakistanis in communities resistant to democratic values. 

Terrorist attacks in Pakistan over the last year, including the 

two attempts on the life of President Musharraf, remind us that 

progress hangs in the balance, while underscoring the need to shut 

down terrorist organizations and the networks that support them; 

something the government is working to do. 

10

Seventy-seven Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives in anti-terror operations in the tribal areas since the beginning of this year. 

Other security personnel have been killed in Karachi and elsewhere, and numerous Pakistani civilians have been murdered in 

terrorist attacks. We offer our sincere condolences to the families 

and friends of those lost on the Pakistani front of the global war 

on terror. 

On the issue of nonproliferation, given the realities we face in 

South Asia, we are also focused on preventing actions that would 

undermine the global nonproliferation regime and regional stability. Thus, we are working to prevent an open-ended nuclear and 

missile arms race in the region, discouraging nuclear testing, and 

prevent onward proliferation to other countries. 

We are working with both India and Pakistan to strengthen nonproliferation export controls, and in Pakistan the government has 

just introduced a bill into Parliament that, if enacted, would significantly strengthen Pakistan’s existing export control regime. 

This is important, especially in the wake of the A.Q. Khan case. 

The public exposure of A.Q. Khan’s activities and investigations 

by various government has disrupted his black-market proliferation 

network. It is now in the process of being dismantled, and Pakistan 

is taking these investigations seriously. 

A stable South Asia is an important interest we share with the 

nations of the region. The recent agreement between India and 

Pakistan to pursue a wide-ranging composite dialogue with the objective of reaching a peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, is a real breakthrough. We are encouraged by the 

confidence-building measures agreed upon in recent months and 

days, and hope that they will be implemented quickly, and that 

there will be further progress along these lines. 

Democratic Bangladesh, which has the fourth-largest Muslim 

population in the world, is a valued partner in the war on terror 

also. It is a moderate voice in regional and international fora, and 

a leading contributor to U.N. peacekeeping missions. Political rivalries and one of the most significant corruption problems in the 

world threaten democratic stability and impede economic growth 

there, however. 

The challenges that lead to extremism—poverty, lack of education, and endemic corruption, combined with porous borders and 

lack of public faith in elected government—could increase the 

attractiveness of radical alternatives. We are pleased to see that 

the opposition party has returned to Parliament in recent days. 

This was an important step forward toward finding a way out of 

the political gridlock that has plagued the country and it is also an 

important step toward maintaining its democracy. 

In Sri Lanka, the President has stated that talks with the LTTE 

are her top priority. Meanwhile, the cease-fire is holding and an informal peace process continues, bringing increased interaction 

among the ethnic communities, and growing trade and economic 

opportunities. 

As we press the government and the LTTE to return to talks, our 

programs are providing an incentive to peace and a boost to reconstruction and reconciliation in war-torn areas. We will not remove 

our designation of the LTTE as a terrorist organization until it has 

11

firmly and decidedly given up terrorism and such policies as the recruitment of child soldiers. 

I should also mention the Islamic nation of Maldives, where we 

are encouraged by the proposed sweeping constitutional changes 

designed to strengthen democratic institutions and human rights 

and to head off radicalism. 

We have worked closely with the United Kingdom and India to 

support Nepal and Nepal’s democracy and its confrontations with 

the Maoists. Our assistance includes military equipment badly 

needed by the army, economic and development assistance to address root causes of insurgency and anti-terrorism training for the 

army and the police. 

The preservation of Nepal’s constitutional monarchy and system 

of multi-party democracy is key to defeating the challenge. Political 

rivalries have undercut resistance to the Maoists, and the King and 

the parties must unify—urgently to confront the insurgents. The 

King’s recent appointment of Mr. Deuba as Prime Minister and the 

call for elections within a year is a welcome development, but all 

must work harder. 

The United States, India, and the U.K. and others stand with the 

government, but we also share the view that there is no military 

solution to the conflict. 

East of Nepal and between India and China is Bhutan, a small 

country seriously pursuing a peaceful transition to a constitutional 

monarchy. It is in our interest to support this democratization 

process. Despite its small size, Bhutan, too, struggles against instability. During the past year its military has taken action against 

camps of ethnic insurgents who have sought to use it as a base of 

operations against North East Indian states. 

We are encouraging both Bhutan and Nepal to resolve a long-festering problem of 100,000 refugees in Nepal who claim Bhutanese 

citizenship, and this is a humanitarian problem that can and 

should be solved. 

As we pursue the above priority policy goals, our ongoing programs also address other issues of regional concern. Our diplomatic 

efforts and programs aimed at combating trafficking in persons 

have been refocused and intensified to raise the performance of 

South Asian governments in accord with the criteria of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. We are combating HIV/AIDS 

through the region, as well as in India where the numbers are the 

largest. 

Corruption lies at the nexus of the government and economic 

failures in South Asia. Our development, democracy, and law enforcement programs combat corruptions by promoting transparency, accountability and efficiency, including through strengthened private sector, civil society and independent media involvement. 

Finally, we remain ever-mindful of the plight of women throughout South Asia, and our programs across the board have integrated 

components to improve literacy, education, health, and economic 

and legal rights for women and girls. 

Mr. Chairman, I have only been able to touch on our priority concerns very lightly, our concerns about stability and security in 

South Asia. On the whole, while the region faces many challenges, 

12

I believe there is reason for confidence that the countries and peoples of South Asia will be able to build a secure, peaceful, and prosperous future. 

Thank you, and I welcome any questions from you and Members 

of the Committee. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rocca follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTINA B. ROCCA, ASSISTANT

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN SOUTH ASIA

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to come 

here today to talk about our policy priorities in South Asia. September 2001 placed 

a South Asia riven by conflict and division at the front lines of the global war on 

terrorism. Not quite three years later, with the support of the American people, the 

Congress, and the Administration, the region stands at the verge of potential breakthroughs. The next few years will provide a crucial opportunity for the United 

States to help South Asia become a peaceful, democratic and prosperous region, free 

from terror and nuclear threat. We are winning and consolidating the peace in Afghanistan—and while not a focus of my testimony today, success in Afghanistan is 

critical to long term regional stability. Our commitment to assist Pakistan’s full 

transformation into a modern and moderate Islamic democracy remains a pillar of 

our long-term strategy in the war on terrorism. As India increases its global reach, 

we are working to build an effective strategic partnership. Strong U.S. engagement 

is vital to ensure that Bangladesh does not fall back into poverty and fall victim 

to extremism. Due to its location, aspirations and capabilities, the future of Sri 

Lanka is assured, if it can achieve a lasting peace, and our long term strategic interests dictate that we pursue this goal. A fragile democracy is at stake in Nepal, 

where a Maoist insurgency has unraveled the weak political and economic threads 

that held it together, and the United States must help South Asia avoid the potential humanitarian crisis and instability this could cause as well as the presence of 

another failed or authoritarian state. 

Over the last year, and especially in recent months, the momentum for positive 

change has increased. Pakistan continues as a major ally in the war on terrorism. 

Al-Qaida and Taliban operatives continue to be captured there, and the government 

has intensified its operations around the country and near the western border. Pakistan’s economy has moved from crisis to stabilization and growth, and the impasse 

between President Musharraf and the legislature was resolved in December with his 

agreement to step down as head of the army at year’s end. The public exposure of 

A.Q. Khan’s activities and investigations by various governments has 

severelydisrupted his black market proliferation network. It is now in the process 

of being dismantled. It appears that Pakistan is taking these investigations seriously. The recent rapprochement between India and Pakistan has enabled a new 

composite dialogue and given a new boost to regional cooperation meetings—in 

stark contrast to the threat of a possible nuclear confrontation in 2002. The United 

States and India are also working to formally expand strategic cooperation while 

deepening their partnership across multiple fronts. The suspension of Sri Lankan 

peace negotiations last year did not end the ceasefire or informal cooperation between the government and the LTTE. In Bangladesh and throughout the region, we 

continued to advocate and assist progress towards accountable democratic governance, sustainable development, and mutual understanding in order to address the 

underlying causes of extremism and instability. 

An Ever-Growing Partnership with India 

With the newly elected government taking office in India, we are continuing cooperation on regional and bilateral issues. In January 2004, we announced our Next 

Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), an initiative designed to deepen our U.S.-

India relationship. Expanded cooperation under the NSSP on civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programs, high technology trade, and an expanded dialogue on 

missile defense will bring significant economic benefits to both sides, and improve 

security in South Asia and beyond. The United States and India share a fundamental commitment to democracy. We hope to work more closely together to promote democracy, especially in problematic countries like Burma. 

Our bilateral Defense Planning Group, joint exercises, and military exchanges 

have greatly increased security cooperation. A High Technology Cooperation Group 

is advancing trade and investment. 

13

U.S. assistance programs, including our ESF initiative targeting areas of special 

concern to the government, are helping India to complete financial, trade energy, 

water, and agriculture reforms to improve economic stability and reduce poverty. 

Our programs also promote better access to education, justice, and services by 

women and vulnerable groups. In addition, our programs strengthen law enforcement capability. Our health programs support the prevention of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other diseases, and increased child survival—issues also addressed 

though a bilateral Global Issues Forum whose concerns range from trafficking in 

persons and human rights abuses to environment, science and health. 

We will also be working to strengthen the economic and commercial side of our 

relationship, which is growing, but not nearly as fast as it could. 

Pakistan: Frontline State in the War on Terrorism 

In Pakistan, all our policies and programs support our primary goal of helping 

Pakistan reach its objective of becoming a moderate, prosperous state, and preventing terrorism—directly through security programs and also through democracy, 

development and outreach programs that combat extremism and instability. In 

other words, the funding we are requesting for Pakistan in FY 2005 directly helps 

the United States in the Global War Against Terror and Operation Enduring Freedom. 

As our FMF programs facilitate the capture of al-Qaida and Taliban remnants 

and strengthen our military ties with Pakistan, we help tackle the conditions that 

breed terror by providing substantial amounts in ESF for macroeconomic stabilization and growth, and support for social sector programs. The government’s ongoing 

pursuit of structural reform, prudent economic policy initiatives, and effective macroeconomic management have impressed the IMF and donor community. As we assist this positive momentum with ESF, we also continue to support grassroots economic development and health programs visible to ordinary Pakistanis through 

USAID programs. We are also providing substantial support to the Pakistani government’s efforts to pursue education reform, including for madrassahs, aimed at 

preparing young Pakistanis to gain employment and compete in the global marketplace. 

A return to full democracy in Pakistan is central to long term stability. National 

elections in October 2002, although flawed, restored a Prime Minister, a National 

Assembly and four Provincial Assemblies, and President Musharraf has indicated 

he will step down as head of the military by the end of 2004. After a prolonged impasse, Parliament is beginning to function, and a devolution program has begun to 

revitalize local government. U.S. democracy programs and exchanges are assisting 

the development of accountable, responsive democratic institutions and practices, including effective legislatures and local councils that respond to citizens and that 

play a positive role in governance. Our programs also support much needed political 

party reform, the development of an independent media that provides balanced information, and effective civil society advocacy. We are also vigorously engaging educators, the media, and civil society leaders, as well as younger, non-elite Pakistanis 

in communities resistant to democratic values. 

Terrorist attacks in Pakistan over the last year, including two attempts on President Musharraf’s life, remind us that progress hangs in the balance, while underscoring the need to shut down terrorist organizations and the networks that support 

them; something the government is working to do. Seventy-seven Pakistani soldiers 

have lost their lives in anti-terror operations in the tribal areas since the beginning 

of the year. Other security personnel have been killed in Karachi and elsewhere, 

and numerous Pakistani civilians have been murdered in terrorist attacks. We offer 

our sincere condolences to the families and friends of those lost on the Pakistani 

front of the Global War on Terror. 

Regional Stability: Nonproliferation and Indo-Pakistan Ties 

Given the realities we face in South Asia, we are also focused on preventing actions that would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and regional stability. Thus we are working to prevent an open ended nuclear and missile arms race 

in the region, discourage nuclear testing, and prevent onward proliferation to other 

countries. Our actions with both India and Pakistan are consistent with our obligations under the NPT and with our commitment to the Nuclear Suppliers guidelines. 

We are working with both to strengthen non-proliferation export controls through 

our Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program. In Pakistan, the Government has just introduced a bill into Parliament that, if enacted, would significantly 

strengthen Pakistan’s existing export control regime. 

A stable South Asia is an important interest we share with the nations of the region. The recent agreement between India and Pakistan to pursue a wide-ranging 

14

composite dialogue with the objective of reaching a peaceful settlement on all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, is a real breakthrough. We are encouraged by the 

confidence-building measures agreed upon in recent months, and hope they will be 

implemented quickly. India is also conducting a dialogue with the Kashmiri All Parties Hurriyat Conference. We will continue to watch closely and encourage positive 

steps. Our public diplomacy funds are used to help facilitate deeper ties and understanding. 

Supporting a Moderate Bangladesh 

Democratic Bangladesh, with the fourth largest Muslim population in the world, 

is a valued partner in the war on terror, a moderate voice in regional and international fora, and a leading contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. Bangladesh’s 

economy remains stable. Yet political rivalries and one of the most significant corruption problems in the world threaten democratic stability and impede economic 

growth. The challenges that lead to extremism—poverty, lack of education, and endemic corruption, combined with porous borders and lack of public faith in elected 

government—have increased the attractiveness of radical alternatives. Bangladesh 

recently passed legislation authorizing an anti-corruption commission, which we 

hope will be effective. Regional INCLE funds support anti-corruption efforts and law 

enforcement capacity. U.S. democracy programs seek to increase the accountability 

and transparency of democratic institutions, thereby assisting to defuse bitter rivalries and support civil society advocacy groups such as Transparency International 

Bangladesh. To promote sustainable development, our programs continue to improve 

basic education, foster scientific cooperation, assist economic growth and trade, combat trafficking in persons and increase health services for women and children. 

Sri Lanka and the Maldives 

In 2003, peace talks that began a year earlier between the Sri Lankan government and the separatist Tamil Tiger (LTTE) guerillas were suspended. By October, 

the LTTE had proposed an interim administration in predominantly Tamil areas as 

a way to re-engage, but a standoff between the Prime Minister and President prevented consideration of their proposals. In November 2003 the President suspended 

the Parliament. Elections called for April 2004 increased representation by the 

President’s party, and brought the appointment of a new Prime Minister. The President has stated that talks with the LTTE are her top priority. Meanwhile, the 

ceasefire is holding, and an informal peace process continues, bringing increased 

interaction among the ethnic communities and growing trade and economic opportunities. As we press the government and LTTE to return to the talks, our programs 

are providing both an incentive to peace and a boost to reconstruction and reconciliation in war-torn areas. Our nationwide development and health programs support 

the government’s economic growth and anti-poverty efforts, while our democracy 

programs promote human rights and political reintegration and reconciliation. Regional INCLE funds support law enforcement institutional capacity and reform, and 

counternarcotics coordination. We will not remove our designation of the LTTE as 

a terrorist organization until it has firmly and decidedly given up terrorism and 

such policies as the recruitment of children as soldiers. 

I should also mention the Islamic island nation of Maldives, where we are encouraged by the proposed sweeping constitutional changes designed to strengthen democratic institutions and human rights and head off radicalism. 

Nepal and Bhutan 

We have worked closely with the United Kingdom and India to support Nepali 

democracy in its confrontation with the Maoists. Our assistance includes military 

equipment badly needed by the army, economic and development assistance to address root causes of insurgency and anti-terrorism training for the army and police. 

While the government needs to be able to counter the Maoist armed threat, this conflict cannot be resolved solely through military force. The preservation of Nepal’s 

system of constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy is key to defeating 

the challenge. Political rivalries have undercut resistance to the Maoists, and the 

King and the parties must unify—urgently to confront the insurgents. The King’s 

recent appointment of Mr. Deuba as Prime Minister and call for elections within a 

year is a welcome development, but all must work harder. 

In 2003, the Maoist insurgents in Nepal ended a seven-month ceasefire and resumed military attacks and terrorist activity, leading us to impose financial sanctions against the Maoists as a terrorist organization. The United States, India, the 

UK, and others stand with the Government, but we also share the view that there 

is no military solution to the conflict. As we continue to provide security assistance 

for the Government of Nepal, we are making our concerns known regarding suspenVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:09 Oct 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\AP\062204\94506.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
15

sion of the electoral process and numerous human rights abuse allegations against 

the government security forces and Maoists alike. 

East of Nepal and between India and China is Bhutan—a small country seriously 

pursuing a peaceful transition to a constitutional monarchy. It is in our interest to 

support this democratization process. Despite its small size, Bhutan, too, struggles 

against instability. During the past year, its military has taken action against Indian Maoist groups who had sought to use it as a base of operations against northeastern Indian states. We are encouraging both Bhutan and Nepal to resolve a longfestering problem of 100,000 refugees in Nepal who claim Bhutanese citizenship. 

This is a humanitarian problem that can and should be solved. 

Other Issues of Regional Concern 

As we pursue the above priority policy goals, our ongoing programs also address 

other issues of regional concern. Our diplomatic efforts and programs aimed at combating trafficking in persons have been refocused and intensified to raise the performance of South Asian governments in accord with criteria in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. We are combating HIV/AIDS throughout the region as well as 

in India, where the numbers are the largest. Corruption lies at the nexus of the governance and economic failures in South Asia. Our development, democracy and law 

enforcement programs combat corruption by promoting transparency, accountability 

and efficiency, including through strengthened private sector, civil society and independent media involvement. Finally, we remain ever mindful of the plight of women 

throughout South Asia, and our programs across the board have integrated components to improve literacy, education, health, and economic and legal rights for 

women and girls. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, I have only been able to touch our priority concerns about stability 

and security in South Asia. On the whole, while the region faces many challenges, 

I believe there is reason for confidence that the countries and people of South Asia 

will be able to build a secure, peaceful and prosperous future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome questions from you and the Members of the 

Committee.

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much, Madam Secretary. It appears the region is racked by a lot of internal division that, to some 

degree, is under control, and to some degree can explode at any 

point in time. 

In Sri Lanka country, that everything is largely internal, in Bangladesh, with internal problems, but the two external circumstances are the India-Pakistan situation, and then the Pakistani everything-else situation. 

First, with regard to India and Pakistan and their ongoing—their 

lasting disputes, what role is the United States Government playing on the Kashmir issue? Do you see any serious prospect for resolution of it in the nearby time frame? 

Ms. ROCCA. First, let me say that at this moment, first of all, the 

United States is very much there to support both India and Pakistan as these two countries are coming together to try to find a 

peaceful solution to the problems that divide them, and they are 

numerous. We are not mediating in this dispute at all, but we are 

showing support for both nations. 

The recent detente, or I should say improvement in relations that 

started with the bold step of Prime Minister Vajpayee last April, 

is a very heartening sign and it is something which we very much 

want to encourage. The prospects of resolution, I think, I do not 

have a crystal ball and I cannot really predict what will happen, 

but certainly it appears that both governments are entering the 

current composite dialogue with a very positive frame of mind, and 

we have heard comments from the Pakistani and the Indian foreign ministers who met yesterday in China on the margins of an 

international meeting. 

16

They are certainly saying things which have not been said in the 

last 3 years, and so whether—certainly the mood is good and concrete steps were taken in the talks that have taken place so far, 

and I am speaking specifically of drugs and the nuclear CBMs. 

The timeframe, I think, is unpredictable because this is a very 

complicated problem, and there are probably going to be bumps in 

the road, but at the moment things are looking very bright. 

Mr. LEACH. Let me just turn then to Pakistan for a second. It 

strikes me that there are three circumstances, one relates to weapons of mass destruction and the A.Q. Khan affair. The second relates to the non-weapons of mass destruction, but possibly more 

dangerous circumstance of everything to do with terrorism. And 

then the third relates to the long-term issue that our Government 

had put almost no attention of until 2 or 3 years ago, and that is 

this issue of education and the question of the madrassas and what 

is being taught, and how it is being taught in many countries in 

the world. 

Would you address each of those issues? 

Ms. ROCCA. Okay. On the issue of WMD, as you know, the A.Q. 

Khan affair broke open in recent months, and we have had, as Mr. 

Armitage said, we have had very good cooperation from the government of Pakistan in breaking apart this network. It is a major goal 

of this Administration to break up this network and go after absolutely every single corner of it in order to make sure that it cannot 

be reconstituted either by someone in Pakistan, A.Q. Khan or 

someone else, or anybody else in the world, and we have had great 

cooperation from a number of countries that have been helping us 

on this front. 

Meanwhile, we are also working very hard with Pakistan to increase their export control regimes, to tighten these up. They recently introduced a bill in their Parliament which, if passed, would 

go a long way toward meeting the standards that we are encouraging them to reach. 

On the issue of terrorism, I think there are a number of issues 

here. You have the internal sectarian violence, which has been 

going on for 20 years now, if not longer. You have the issue of alQaeda and Taliban where we have had excellent support from the 

government of Pakistan. In fact, they are the front line of the war 

on terror, and we recently had the arrest of Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s 

nephew in Karachi, and others, a number of others. They have 

gone after the terrorists wherever they have found them, and we 

have had excellent cooperation there. 

The dealing with the domestic terror is something which I think 

is more—is rather complicated, and that they are going about in 

their own fashion. We obviously—I do not believe there is an easy 

solution to it because it is—there is a battle going on for the soul 

of Pakistan at the moment between extremists and moderates. 

And on the issue of education, the United States is providing a minimum of at least $25 million a year over the next 4 years—5 

years, it was a 5-year commitment, to help Pakistan rebuild its 

education system, which was desperately broken, and is one of the 

things that gave the rise to the madrassas in the first place. 

The government is going after—not going after, but is working 

on getting madrassas registered in order to, first of all, find out 

17

1See the Appendix for additional information supplied to the Committee in writing by Ms. 

Rocca in response to Mr. Faleomavaega’s question. 

how many there are. Not to go too deep into history, but there was 

a ban on registering madrassas back in the eighties, so there are 

a lot of them that have grown up that need to be identified. They 

are getting them registered and try to widen the syllabus, but really the real solution to the problem, if there is a solution to this 

problem, is long term because it needs to be a—Pakistan needs to 

have an education system that provides an alternative to the 

madrassas, and right now that does not exist everywhere. 

They are working on it. They are putting an awful lot of their 

own funds in it as well as ours and the international communities, 

but it is a long-term project, and it is not something that we are 

going to see fixed overnight. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, you know that weeks and weeks and months 

there has been a lot of, I should say, bashing of India by the media, 

and of course, some of our leaders also now are very critical of this 

problem that are—we call it outsourcing. 

Ms. ROCCA. I am sorry. Media bashing of? 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. India. 

Ms. ROCCA. Of India. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. The issue of outsourcing of jobs to India by 

a lot of American companies, and I was wondering not only to 

know what the Administration’s position on these accusations, but 

the reality. 

What are we talking about in terms of jobs? Does this really have 

a very serious impact economically in our country of what is happening? 

I mean, these are American companies now doing business with 

Indian companies, and in reading reports in the media it seems 

that there is a whole problem where outsourcing to imply millions 

of jobs. But I just wanted to know what is the Administration’s position on this, and is it really true in what the media says about 

this outsourcing issue that has been—I just want to know, in fairness to India’s efforts to do the close trade and commercial relationship with our country, is India the only country that American 

companies are doing this? 

Ms. ROCCA. Congressman, I think, first of all, I do not know the 

numbers, so you will have to forgive me. I take that question in 

terms of how many jobs are actually outsourced, I do not have the 

latest numbers at my finger tips, and certainly India is not the 

only country to which the United States outsources jobs—U.S. companies outsource jobs. 

I think the U.S. Trade Representative has made it clear that we 

do not oppose the outsourcing. What we would like to see in exchange is an opening of markets in India and other countries 

which, in turn, provide more jobs in the United States. That is sort 

of the way it has been formulated, but I do not think you have 

heard any India-bashing on the part of the Administration with respect to outsourcing of jobs.1

18

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. I think one of the reasons why India is such 

an attractive climate is because of its vast number of professional 

workers, especially in technology and all of this. 

Is the fact that the largest or most is an English-speaking country, unlike China or maybe other countries that compete, commercial and all of this in the trade? I just wanted to set the record 

straight. There has been so much, as I said earlier, bashing of 

India, and it is so unfair to say that outsourcing 100,000 jobs, and 

yet we are losing 2 million for other reasons, and not because of 

the outsourcing of these jobs as the media has made such a big 

thing over. 

Ms. ROCCA. But just to reiterate the point I made earlier, if there 

was more opening of markets in India, it would also help the furor 

die down because it would—by its nature would create—increase a 

lot of jobs here and elsewhere as well. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Now, maybe for the record also if you can 

clarify. You know that we had a duly-elected, democratically-elected President of Pakistan in Mr. Sharif, and of course there was a 

coup d’etat where General Musharraf had apparently a distinctively different opinion of how the government should be run, so 

there was a coup. And I would like to know what the status of 

former President Sharif is right now. 

Secondly, I would like to know—I think President Musharraf has 

made promises that there will be national elections in Pakistan, 

and that there will be a democratically-elected President, and I 

would like to know where are we on that issue. 

Ms. ROCCA. I believe Nawaz Sharif is living in Saudi Arabia. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Okay. 

Ms. ROCCA. And that is according to a deal that he cut with the 

government of Pakistan. 

With respect to the return to democracy in Pakistan, I think it 

is on course, we are not there yet, but certainly there is now a 

democratically-elected Parliament, and a Prime Minister, and there 

is a functioning Parliament, which is a big step forward. 

President Musharraf has said he would take off his uniform by 

the end of the year, and we see all these things as good signs. 

Meanwhile, the devolution progress continues, and you are seeing 

more grassroots efforts to elect people at the grassroots level, and 

by the way, a lot of our programs are going into helping strengthen 

that. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. One of the ironies in our relationship with 

this important region of the world is that there are more Muslims 

living in India than there are in Pakistan, and the irony is also, 

and I think a lot of the people in America do not realize that the 

Pakistanis and Indians are the same people. The only thing that 

separates them is the politics and the religion, and this is one of 

the things that is striking and somewhat very ironic in this part 

of the world. 

Let me ask you, Madam Secretary—one more question, Mr. 

Chairman. I know we have——

Mr. LEACH. If you do not mind, we do have a second round. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. All right, I will wait for the second round, 

Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

19

Mr. LEACH. I do not want anyone to think that Democrats or Republicans are the same people. [Laughter.] 

We are close, we are close. 

Mr. Weller, please. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam Secretary. 

Welcome this morning. It is good to have you with us. Appreciate 

your testimony. 

I would like to focus my questioning on the small but strategically important nation of Sri Lanka, and a nation with pretty vibrant history, and an interesting history. And as I look back over 

the last few years, there has been growing recognition of the potential for Sri Lanka, and many believe there is potential to play a 

role similar to what Singapore did with Asia; in this case with the 

Indian subcontinent. 

Prior to this year’s elections, there was a—the previous government was actually working toward that goal simultaneously pursuing a free trade agreement with the United States, and also at 

the same time working to resolve the longstanding conflict with the 

Tamil separatists, the LTTE. 

I was wondering, could you share with us a sense of your assessment of where things are today, and not only our relationship with 

Sri Lanka, but the status of the peace process in Sri Lanka, and 

what the role of the United States and the international community is with this process? 

Ms. ROCCA. Thank you very much. 

We agree with your assessment on the potential of Sri Lanka, 

and its potential importance. And it is a country that we have very 

close relationships with and want to continue to do so. 

On the issue of the economic relationship, I will touch on that 

briefly. The commerce and trade minister was just here. We will 

revive our talks on the FTA. We currently have a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with Sri Lanka, and our hopes 

are, and he was able to clarify the continuation of, or at least the 

continuation of the aspects of the economic relationship which 

made the TIFA possible with the new government with that of the 

old. 

So it looks as if, on the economic front, we are certainly getting 

assurances that Sri Lanka wants to continue to move forward and 

take its place in the global marketplace as it was moving before, 

and we very much welcome that. 

On the status of the peace process, while the President has said 

that this is her first priority, it is a little bit in a state right now 

over a disagreement on exactly how it should begin because the 

LTTE want the negotiation to start with an interim administration 

for them, for them to have an interim administration, and the position of the government is a little doubtful on that. Though they are 

willing to negotiate, they do not want to create a de facto separate 

state going into the negotiations, so that is sort of where, in a very 

broad brush, where the negotiations stand right now. 

The Norwegians continue to play a heroic role in mediating between the government and the LTTE, and though we do not really 

expect to see talks start before August, we are hopeful that they 

will start some time soon because there definitely is the will on the 

part of the government to move forward on this. 

20

Mr. WELLER. Yes. Madam Secretary, in June 2003 at the Tokyo Donor’s conference, there was about $4.5 billion in development assistance that was promised by the countries that were participating 

in that Tokyo conference. What is the status of that development 

assistance, and is that a significant inducement for the government 

to move forward with the peace process? 

Ms. ROCCA. Thank you for asking. We recently had a meeting of 

the donor Co-Chairs in Brussels on the first of June to discuss exactly the status of the commitments that were made in Tokyo, and 

how we would proceed. 

The donors came out with a very strong statement. The money 

is contingent on a peace process moving forward, and so the donors, after the meeting in Brussels, made a very strong statement 

about the need to move forward and to move forward quickly in 

order for them to be able to release these funds, and to make sure 

that the funds do not go elsewhere. 

Mr. WELLER. Yes. The United States designates Sri Lanka’s 

LTTE, it is on our list of foreign terrorist organizations. I am not 

suggesting this, but from the standpoint of our policy, what is our 

view of perhaps some day taking them off the list of terrorist organizations, what would be required, and is that in inducement for 

the LTTE to participate in productive peace negotiations that 

produce real results? 

Ms. ROCCA. Well, Congressman Weller, we look forward to the 

day when the LTTE will take the steps necessary to get off the foreign terrorist organizations list. At the moment there is no plan to 

take them off. They continue to recruit child soldiers. They continue to conduct extra-judicial assassinations of politicians who disagree with them. They are continuing to stockpile weapons. These 

are all things which they will have to—they will need to renounce 

terrorism in word and in deed in order to be taken off the list, and 

we look forward to the day when they can do that. 

Mr. WELLER. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I see my time has 

expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Weller. 

Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Rocca, 

thank you very much. It is good to see you again. Thanks for your 

testimony. 

Madam Secretary, in March of this year, Undersecretary Bolton 

appeared before our Full Committee, and he testified at that point 

that there was insufficient evidence to sanction Pakistan under either the Glenn Amendment or the Symington Amendment. Subsequent to that, Deputy Secretary Armitage told the Intelligence 

Committee that we were getting all of the cooperation we need 

from Pakistan with regard to A.Q. Khan. 

Specific questions: Has the United States Government had direct 

access to A.Q. Khan or any of his associates? Has the IAEA had 

any direct access to A.Q. Khan or any of his associates? And if not, 

how do we know that the information that we are getting from 

Pakistan—filtered through them about Khan’s network—is accurate? 

And I say this fully appreciating the importance of Pakistan and 

their cooperation in areas of critical concern, and the delicate balVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:09 Oct 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\062204\94506.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
21

ance between being critical of Pakistan and keeping the current 

government bolstered, but I think that there are overriding longterm interests at stake here. 

Ms. ROCCA. I understand your concern, Congressman. A lot of—

I can only answer in very abbreviated form in this forum. As you 

know, it is an extremely sensitive matter. 

To my knowledge, we have not had access to A.Q. Khan, and I 

do not know whether IAEA has done so, but I do not believe they 

have. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Have we asked? 

Ms. ROCCA. In this forum, I cannot answer. I cannot answer that 

question, sir. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You cannot answer whether or not——

Ms. ROCCA. Not in this forum. 

Our concern with——

Mr. LEACH. If the gentleman will yield. 

Ms. ROCCA. Yes. 

Mr. LEACH. Perhaps you could meet with several of us on the 

subjects. 

Ms. ROCCA. Well, the leadership has been briefed and there are 

certain Members that have been briefed, and I do not——

Mr. LEACH. Fair enough. Fair enough. Thank you. 

Ms. ROCCA. Okay. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I, on behalf of whoever else 

would be interested, will request a briefing. 

Mr. LEACH. I think that is fair, and we will go to the Department 

to see if the Department——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The third part of the question was how do we know that the information that we are getting is accurate. 

Ms. ROCCA. And on this one, once again, I will have to touch on 

very lightly, but I think that it is being borne out by some of the 

investigations that we are seeing elsewhere in the world as well. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Has any new information emerged from Pakistan regarding the Pakistani government’s official complicity in 

transferring nuclear weapons technology to terrorist states sufficient to warrant sanctions, sanctions determination that the President would determine? 

Ms. ROCCA. No, sir, we have no information to contradict the previous assessments. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Are we going to continue to ask the government 

of Pakistan for information or is this investigation over as far as 

the Administration is concerned? 

Ms. ROCCA. Oh, no, it continues. It continues, and we are working very closely with the government of Pakistan in the investigation. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. When the President announced the 5-year $3 billion assistance package for Pakistan, the Administration officials 

suggested that Congress would be looking closely at Pakistan’s 

progress on nonproliferation, anti-terrorism cooperation, and democratization. These comments were broad hints that some sort of 

conditionality on this assistance would be welcome. 

What is the Administration’s view on formally linking any or all of the $3 billion package on progress to these three items? And if 

22

you are opposed to formal conditionality on the assistance, how are 

we to leverage the assistance in a way that might serve our interests? 

Ms. ROCCA. I think that we have—I mean, we have had very 

close cooperation with Pakistan on all of those issues that you 

raised, WMD, and the war on terror. We expect that to continue. 

We do not see any reason—there has been no cause at all for us 

to have second thoughts about providing that assistance to Pakistan, which as I mentioned in my statement, continues to be very 

cooperative on all the fronts of national—of vital national interest 

to the United States. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You have not mentioned in that list democratization which I mentioned. 

Ms. ROCCA. Oh, democratization. Well, I think we are on track 

there. The President has said that—President Musharraf has said 

he will take off his uniform in the fall. We have a working Parliament. There are steps that have been taken and we are continuing to work with them on that. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Dictator Mengistu took off his uniform also, and 

had his civilian clothes painted on all the posters on every street 

corner. 

Ms. ROCCA. Well, I do not know what will happen at the end of 

the——

Mr. ACKERMAN. So the Emperor has no uniform. What does that 

mean? 

Ms. ROCCA. What it means is that he will not be the Chief of 

Army Staff at the same time as he will be President. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Does that indicate that it, you know? 

Ms. ROCCA. Well, it——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Our President is the Commander and Chief. 

That does not mean we do not have a democracy. That is not necessarily the sign of what a democracy is. 

Ms. ROCCA. It is a different system. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. The question, if I could fine-tune it, is Pakistan 

more democratic than when Musharraf overthrew the duly-elected 

government? 

Ms. ROCCA. Yes, it is. There is a functioning Parliament with a 

Prime Minister that is passing legislation. There are grassroots, 

there have been grassroots elections that went very well. There will 

continue to be elections, and we hope—they are definitely moving 

on the right path, so much so——

Mr. ACKERMAN. He did not rewrite the constitution and fire the 

supreme court before that? 

Ms. ROCCA. He certainly did work to amend the constitution, and 

I think we will probably see more amendments——

Mr. ACKERMAN. It was not a hard lift for him. 

Ms. ROCCA. I beg your pardon? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It was not a hard lift for him to amend the constitution. 

Ms. ROCCA. I cannot comment on that. 

Mr. LEACH. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Ms. ROCCA. Okay. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank the Chairman. 

23

Ms. ROCCA. Could I just point one last thing? I just want to say 

that the assessment of the Commonwealth was that they are moving back toward democracy, and that is why the Commonwealth allowed Pakistan back in. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. 

Let me just note that there was a meeting in Brussels in order 

to discuss a meeting that was in Tokyo in order to issue a statement. That does not give me reason for celebration. It seems to me 

that our allies are shirking their duty, and if we find that as something to celebrate about, they are having to issue a strong statement after a meeting and to discuss the last meeting. All I can say 

is I am disappointed in that. 

The Administration should be tougher on our allies, whether it 

is the Japanese or the Germans or the French or the Belgiums, and 

Asia is going through a crisis, and we need to—the Western democracies need to stand together and need to operate together in order 

to support those people in Asia and South Asia in particular who 

would like to be friends of the Western world, would like to be part 

of a global system that has some sort of consistent view of democracy and human rights, and international trade, and treating people decently. 

Let me note that India has had an election since the last time 

you were here, and I think that India can be very proud of the fact 

that it again demonstrated that it is a democracy, and we had a 

change of party. 

What is our assessment as to what that change of party will do 

to Indian policy, and where it will take India and that region? 

Ms. ROCCA. If I could just address your first comment. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure. 

Ms. ROCCA. I want to make sure I did not misspeak when I was 

answering Congressman Weller’s question. 

The meeting in Brussels was called specifically because commitments had been made in Tokyo. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, I know. Yes. 

Ms. ROCCA. And the peace process had broken down in November 

after the Tokyo meeting, and the condition—the money that was 

pledged was conditioned on the peace process. 

So while there was no peace process and while there was this 

government—and it was because of the change of government within the Sri Lankan government—there was not really anywhere for 

the money that was pledged for the peace process to go. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I guess what——

Ms. ROCCA. The bilateral assistance continues from all the countries involved. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I guess I am just noting that whenever our 

friends, our friends do not seem to be stepping up to the plate in 

whatever theatre we are talking about. I do not think our European friends are doing enough. Wherever there is a crisis, they are 

not. 

Now, they are relying on the United States as if we can bear the 

burden. Just let us note that Europe has a GNP that is, you know, 

very comparable to the United States. They have resources that are 

24

available, and they claim that—they are always pointing their finger at us about that we do not give enough foreign aid. 

Well, during the crisis time we are the ones who step up to the 

plate, and I do not think that they do. So there is always a reason. 

Ms. ROCCA. Okay. But in this instance, I just want to say in——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Ms. ROCCA [continuing]. Everybody’s defense, it was tied to the 

peace process——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. 

Ms. ROCCA [continuing]. Which needs to move forward. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Got you. 

And then about India? 

Ms. ROCCA. India, obviously, the Indian election pointed toward 

changes that will take place in internal Indian policies with respect 

to how they handle a number of issues. But I think what affects 

the—the affect of the election on the United States-India relationship is that it is not going to change. We have certainly had very, 

very positive comments on the part of almost all the new leaders 

in India that they want to continue this relationship, that they 

want to continue to move it forward as fast as it was moving before. We are very encouraged by that and we hope that that will 

continue like that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I think that it is very symbolic that 

India, this large, huge country has had a change of leadership that 

is basically a peaceful change of leadership. I believe that for that 

same reason Pakistan needs to make sure that they work on their 

democracy if they could follow suit. 

Talking about Pakistan, we sort of put Pakistan in a very bad 

situation about 15 years ago when they gave us hundreds of millions of dollars for some airplanes, the F–16s, and then not only did 

we not give them the airplanes, but we kept their money. 

Has that been resolved? 

Ms. ROCCA. Yes, it was resolved in the previous Administration. 

They came to an agreement. There was a payment, and I want to 

say a $750 million in cash, but I am not sure of the exact numbers, 

and I will go back and get that for you. But they were paid in cash. 

They were also paid, and the difference was made up in P.L. 480. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let me just note that we can praise 

India for its election, and perhaps they should permit a free election by the people of Kashmir in order so the people of Kashmir—

through a democratic process—can determine their own destiny 

rather than limited only to issues that are not going to determine 

the fundamental status of the country. As fundamental an issue 

that is, that is why you have democracies. You let people determine 

those fundamental issues. 

So with that, are you allowing a last question, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. LEACH. If you could withhold. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. 

Mr. LEACH. We are trying to do a second round. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Pardon me. I was going to say you are optimistic at all about Kashmir, but thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you. 

Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

25

2See the Appendix for additional information supplied to the Committee in writing by Ms. 

Rocca in response to Mr. Tancredo’s question. 

Secretary Rocca, the issue that was developed earlier by Mr. 

Faleomavaega with regard to outsourcing of jobs, I would like to 

pursue that a little more. 

In my mind, anyway, the major concern that I have had has not 

been necessarily with the outsourcing of jobs, although that is definitely disconcerting, but it is also very worrisome that there is an 

apparent disregard for the integrity of the visa process for which 

the State Department has some responsibility. 

Specifically in regards to the H1B and L1 categories, the real 

problem, from my point of view, is that there is widespread, has 

been widespread misuse and abuse of those two categories. Right 

now there are somewhere near a million people, although we do not 

know exactly because the old INS never kept track of how many 

people overstayed those particular visas, but we think there is 

around a million people here who came originally on H1B and have 

long since had that category of visa time limit been—has, you 

know, run its course. But also, they were fraudulent in terms of 

their reasons for coming, and this is where the State Department 

has the responsibility. 

Many of the people who came under that, as you probably know, 

came not because they were in fact, as the category demands, 

uniquely qualified, but because they would work for less. That is 

it. I mean, everybody knows that. There is no reason to argue 

whether or not that is accurate. The whole world knows that that 

is the truth. The Indian government has agreed that that is the 

case. 

Now the same thing is happening with L1, because the cap has 

gone down on H1B and because there has been a lot of attention 

focused on it. A shift has occurred into the L1 category, so that—

because it has no cap, first of all, but it still has some requirements 

that I hope the State Department is paying attention to. But we 

are seeing, of course, an explosion in the number of L1 category 

visas. 

Now, although you do not have the responsibility to see what 

happens after they come here, and whether or not they overstay, 

you do have a responsibility for the validity of the process leading 

up to their coming here through that visa process. 

So I would like to know what the State Department is doing in 

order to essentially firm up that process, or make sure that this 

misuse of the visa process does not go on anymore. 

Ms. ROCCA. I am only going to be able to answer your question 

very superficially, but I will get you a much more comprehensive 

answer when I go back. My colleague, Maura Harty, is very focused 

on this, and just came back from a trip to India, and so she may 

have more up-to-date information on this. 

Mr. TANCREDO. All right, I understand. 

Ms. ROCCA. And I will get back to you.2 Other than I would just 

like to say that I think our consular people are taking visa fraud 

issue very, very seriously, and——

Mr. TANCREDO. This is a new development. That is good. I am 

glad to hear it. 

26

Ms. ROCCA. No, I mean—I do not want to say that they did not 

always. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Well, let me say it for you. 

Ms. ROCCA. No, I did not mean to imply that at all. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Oh, I did. 

Ms. ROCCA. India is one of those countries where the visa request 

is booming. We have an extremely high number of Indians coming 

to the United States, and I will get more information for you on 

the specifics of L1 versus H1B. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you, because there was a whole industry 

developing in India to provide the kind of documentary evidence 

needed to assure that somebody could show that they had some 

sort of background in the area and all that sort of thing, body 

shops, you know, it was, again, widely known, yet we were not 

doing very much about it. 

The last question I have for you is about the change of leadership 

now, the change of parties in India. In the past there was growing 

discrimination and persecution of religious minorities in the country. It was happening as a result of a lot of reasons, but nonetheless I am wondering if you could tell me what you think will be 

the change, if any, in the attitude of the new government vis-a-vis 

their religious minorities, christian and the like. 

Ms. ROCCA. I think India as a nation has always prided itself on 

its secular character, and I think the Congress Party, in particular, 

has made a point of reaching out to minorities, to all minorities, 

and of wanting to maintain the secular character of the Indian nation. And I think we will see—that will probably—I am sure that 

will be the policy, they have enunciated it has such. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you, Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 

Faleomavaega for allowing me to participate, not as a Member of 

the Subcommittee, but as a Member of the whole Committee to be 

here today and participate. I appreciate it. 

Secretary Rocca, good to see you again. Thank you for your testimony today, and first let me thank you for your attention to this 

so vital important area of the world today, South Asia, and for the 

work that you are doing and engaged in. It is not easy, to say the 

least. 

I did read with interest on your trip to Bangladesh, your speech 

before the American Chamber of Commerce, and was pleased with 

your remarks. I, myself, was in the region in January. I was in 

India and in Bangladesh, and I have to also comment on the work 

of Ambassador Thomas in Dhaka, and the staff there; incredibly 

helpful to our delegation and our trip. So if you can relay that to 

him as well. 

When I was in Bangladesh, I was impressed by the American 

Center. The American Center is how the United States, I believe, 

should be getting our message of tolerance and democracy out to—

all throughout Bangladesh and beyond. But it seem that, in my 

opinion, that the staffing levels need attention, at least from what 

I could see. 

27

My question, my first question to you is, how can Congress help 

our Embassy get out the message besides just by increasing in 

funding for the American Center, or is there anything else we 

should be doing to help that process throughout Bangladesh? 

Ms. ROCCA. Well, Congressman, I think Congress and you personally, by your trips out to Bangladesh, are helping immensely because you are conveying a very important message, and there is an 

awful lot of coverage when you go to Bangladesh, and I think the 

more people who can go, the more Congressmen who can go, the 

more CODELs there are, frankly, the more STAFFDELs there are, 

the more understanding, and the more public comments you can 

make when you are out there is extremely helpful. 

It is also extremely helpful to talk to the Bangladesh-American 

community in the United States, because word does get back. So 

we appreciate what you have done so far and we hope that you will 

continue to show that support. 

Mr. CROWLEY. I would also point out, at least to my knowledge, 

for the record, that in the past 3 years there have only been two 

congressional delegation trips to Bangladesh, and only three Members of Congress, if I count myself twice. In fact, there have only 

been two Members of Congress in the last 2 years that have been 

to Bangladesh. I think it is important for Members as well, I agree 

with you 100 percent. 

Could you just comment, I think there has been a lot of progress 

in Bangladesh as well. I mean, in terms of what they are doing to 

combat the corruption, the recent legislation that their Parliament 

passed into law, can you comment on that at all? 

Ms. ROCCA. Yes. First of all, the setting up of a commission, of 

a corruption commission I think is extremely important. I will get 

the exact name of it. I am sorry, it has suddenly gone out of my 

head. 

Mr. CROWLEY. It is the Independent Anticorruption Commission. 

Ms. ROCCA. Thank you. 

The Independent Anticorruption Commission, setting it up was 

extremely important. Making sure that it has teeth, that it is independent, and that it actually has the capability to implement 

anticorruption measures, I think is extremely important, and we 

will be looking very carefully and encouraging the government of 

Bangladesh to make sure that that happens, because corruption, as 

you mentioned, is an enormous problem in the country. It is something that affects everything—the economy, social life. I mean——

Mr. CROWLEY. Foreign aid and assistance. 

Ms. ROCCA. Foreign aid, assistance, trafficking in women and 

children, everything is affected by corruption, and going at it is extremely important. I think the government has indicated that it is 

going to. 

One other positive sign, I think, is the fact that the opposition 

came back to Parliament. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Yes, that is true too. 

Ms. ROCCA. This is something that we have been encouraging, 

and we are very happy to see it because Bangladesh had reached 

a point of political gridlock with the opposition staying away from 

Parliament, and essentially voicing its differences through strikes, 

which were disrupting the economy and social life in Bangladesh. 

28

So we are very happy they have gone back, and we hope to now 

see an act of Parliament. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Just one final question. That is on India as well. 

I did notice with great interest the ascension basically of Pakistan 

has a major non-NATO ally, and the whole process of how it came 

about. I know that Secretary Powell was in India prior to going to 

Pakistan and making the announcement. 

Why was it that when he was in India he did not consult with 

the Indian government? 

I mean, I am not going to go beyond what the impact may have 

been in terms of the embarrassment that was created, but certainly 

I think they had made up their mind prior to going to India and 

going to Pakistan they were going to offer this or extend this to 

them, and there was no vote back. 

Why was it they did not communicate that with the Indian government prior to making the announcement? 

Ms. ROCCA. No, there had not been a final decision to provide it 

to Pakistan. In fact, we did not think we were going to, and that 

is why. It was not a live issue when we were in India. There was 

a day in between the trip to India and the arrival in Pakistan, because Secretary Powell went to Afghanistan. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Were the Indians made aware of it prior to the announcement? 

Ms. ROCCA. No. No. It was not a live issue when we were in 

India. 

Mr. CROWLEY. No, but when it became a live issue, was there 

any communication? 

Ms. ROCCA. Let me just say this. We have certainly made it clear 

that had it been—had we been able to, had we had the time to do 

it, we certainly would have consulted and apprised the government 

of India of this decision. This is the perfect storm of circumstances 

that conspired to prevent this from happening, and we have talked 

to the government of India about it. This was not the way we 

would have wanted it to play out, and consulting with India is—

I have been quoted before as saying it was a no-brainer. Had it 

been a live issue, we certainly would have done so. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for permitting me to take part in the hearing as a Member of the Committee, 

but not the Subcommittee. 

Madam Secretary, first of all on Afghanistan, what is the United 

States position on moderate Talibs? Is there such a thing as a moderate Talib? And why is our Government urging the Afghan government to reach out to them? And what is the Pakistani government communicating with the U.S. Government on moderate 

Talibs? 

Ms. ROCCA. On your second question, I do not think we have 

talked to them about it, so I do not have an answer on that. 

The issue of moderate Taliban, I think, is something which is an 

initiative of President Karzai’s, and it is a recognition of the fact 

that everybody who joined the Taliban movement was not a hardcore believer in the policies of the Taliban, and there were—I do 

not want to coin a phrase here, but there were Taliban of convenVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:09 Oct 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\062204\94506.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
29

ience. I mean, people who were either swept up or who went along 

in order to get along, and to survive. 

Those who do did not implement the policies are a considerable 

portion of the country, or at least have a certain—there is certainly 

a high number of them, and I think President Karzai feels that 

there needs to be reconciliation nationwide among all ethnic groups 

in order to ensure long-term stability in Afghanistan. 

Mr. PITTS. To stay on Afghanistan, what is the United States 

mission in Afghanistan? Is our mission to combat terrorism and alQaeda? What is our position on the linkages between terrorism and 

narcotics, and what is the U.S. response to the problem of narcotics 

and their relationship to the terrorists that we are fighting? 

Ms. ROCCA. Okay. First of all, I would say there are two goals. 

While we continue to go after the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, one of our primary missions, if not the primary mission, is to 

maintain stability in that country and help it build up into a successful moderate democracy, and a peaceful country, and we are 

well on the way to winning the peace. We are not there yet. There 

are still serious obstacles along the way, and one of them is the one 

that you just mentioned, which is the issue of narcotics. 

I think President Karzai was very clear when he was here 2 

weeks ago that the issue of narcotics, the rise of narcotics in Afghanistan could be something that would undermine everything 

that we have achieved so far. And so there is a renewed effort on 

his part to go after this, and I think the United States has been 

working all along to go after this. Britain has been taking the lead. 

We have been working hard to help the Afghans police this. This 

is not something that is going to be done by an outside power 

alone, though we obviously have a role in helping eradication and 

in substitution crops, and helping to build up the military and 

helping to build up the police, and training them on their border 

controls. It is something that ultimately is only going to be effective 

if the Afghans themselves are doing the policing. 

So that is where the—this is where the majority of our efforts 

are going right now, as I said, in conjunction with the British, and 

I think I cannot understate the importance that we attach to this, 

because as I said, it does have the capability to undermine all our 

other efforts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you. 

Finally on Pakistan, what steps is the Pakistani government taking to find Osama bin Laden? And what pressure is the United 

States exerting on Pakistan to encourage them to pursue to capture 

al-Qaeda terrorists along the border of Afghanistan? 

Ms. ROCCA. I think you have seen the operations along the border that Pakistan has been conducting essentially since last October. Let me start by saying that I do not think much pressure 

needs to be exerted because bin Laden is is not a friend of Pakistan 

or of President Musharraf. So it is not—they are not trying, and 

I think all efforts are being made to locate him both together, and 

I am sure that the Pakistanis are also working it separately. 

The fight against terrorism is something which is also in the interest of Pakistan, and that Pakistan is doing for itself. The Federally-Administered Tribal Areas are areas where we find that terrorists have been able to hide out. It is an area that has not, for 

30

150 years, has not been under any government control, and so 

what you are seeing now is an effort on the part of Pakistan, with 

the help of the United States military as well as—not so much 

military, but with the help of the United States going in there, 

building roads, and essentially going all the way up to the border 

in order to flush them out. 

The strategy is to work with the Afghans on the other side of the 

border and the United States forces on the other side of the border 

to essentially squeeze them out of that part of the world, and bring 

along development and roads to markets and other things which 

will help that area, essentially which will help drain the swamp. 

And we have seen Pakistan be extremely active in that area, and 

we have seen them also take—well, up to now there are over 77 

casualties of Pakistani soldiers who died in this fight. It is not part 

of the country that is traditionally welcoming to any government. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you, Joe. 

Mr. Faleomavaega. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one 

question and an issue that I would like Secretary Rocca to help me 

with. 

I believe the question or the statement does have very serious 

implications to this region in South Asia. Our country has more or 

less opened Pandora’s Box on how and why we apply the doctrine 

of preemption whereby we only need to believe that our national 

security is severely at risk and therefore we waged a full-scale war 

against another country, Iraq, which was ruled by a very cruel dictator by the name of Saddam Hussein. 

Now, we proclaim this policy or this doctrine to the world because we, as a sovereign Nation, we can do so. It is the most powerful Nation, and the only superpower left after the cold war, but 

at the same time we continue to advocate vigorously the virtues of 

nonproliferation, and tell the other nations not to develop weapons 

of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. 

What is to prevent our Nation to tell, in fairness to Pakistan, 

whether Pakistan is a democratic or a non-democratic county, to 

also apply the same doctrine, that Pakistan only needs to believe 

that India might do something that will seriously bring their national security at risk, so therefore what is to prevent Pakistan 

from using weapons of mass destruction in India, and the chain reaction continues on? 

What is to prevent India the same, to believe that the People’s 

Republic of China’s nuclear threat might be seriously given to 

threaten India’s national security? 

My reason for saying that we now open Pandora’s Box, and on 

the merits of whether or not the Administration has been able to 

justify itself in applying this doctrine of preemption. 

I wanted to ask you, what do you think of the implications and 

the fact that we are now even questioning Iran’s capability of developing weapons of mass destruction, and as a sovereign nation 

why should we disallow Iran from developing nuclear weapons just 

like India and Pakistan have done so in the past? 

Ms. ROCCA. As Iran is not part of my bailiwick, I will stick to 

the South Asia portion. 

31

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Yes. 

Ms. ROCCA. But let me say that this issue came up in 2002 when 

India and Pakistan were facing each other, and I think Secretary 

Powell and the President also made it very clear that they are different situations; that different situations apply, and that a nuclear 

war between India and Pakistan was unthinkable, and it was a situation in which an assessment or a judgment that was agreed 

upon by the international community as a whole. 

When the theory arose, all countries around the world joined the 

United States to recommend that this not be the policy between 

two nuclear powers. 

Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Well, it was unthinkable, as I recall, in the 

Korean crisis. We had a very famous General by the name of Douglas MacArthur who absolutely believed that the uses of nuclear 

weapons against China was not only in our national interest, but 

as well as the world’s interest in maintaining peace, and there 

have been other advocates who—we have came very close in applying nuclear weapons even in other crisis that we have found ourselves in. 

But the fact of the doctrine of preemption really troubles me because we have told the world that this is how we have justified ourself in waging war against Iraq, and this is where I am very concerned, by applying this doctrine of preemption against Iraq. What 

is it to prevent other nations from doing the same if their national 

security is at risk in the same way that we went after Saddam 

Hussein? 

I just wanted to express that concern, and I appreciate it, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Well, thank you very much. 

Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just following up on the question from my good friend from 

American Samoa. Is the Bush doctrine on preemption still in effect? 

Ms. ROCCA. I have to get back to you on that, sir. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In open or closed session? 

Ms. ROCCA. Open 

Mr. LEACH. If the gentlelady—I am confident that the Bush doctrine has not been rescinded. Whether it is the right doctrine at the 

right time is a matter of open discourse, but I am confident it has 

not been rescinded. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the Chairman for his astute observation, 

and guidance. 

Madam Secretary, there was a report in Defense News 2 weeks 

ago concerning a high-level delegation visit from Iran to New Delhi 

in order to implement the strategic cooperation deal that the two 

nations signed last year. This agreement does cause some consternation among India’s friends, particularly as we pursue the 

NSSP process with India. 

Have we raised the issue with India’s military cooperation with 

Iran, with our friends in New Delhi? 

Ms. ROCCA. Yes, we have on a number of occasions and we have 

also provided them with copies of all the laws that are in effect relating to military relationships with Iran. 

32

Mr. ACKERMAN. And how have they responded? 

Ms. ROCCA. They have certainly told us that they do not expect 

the relationship to reach the levels that we were concerned about, 

where there would be any concern for us or for other countries that 

share our concerns. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. And we are satisfied with that? 

Ms. ROCCA. We continue to talk to them about it, but yes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank you. 

Ms. ROCCA. Thank you. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Crowley. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. And by the way, you are a welcome addition to the 

Subcommittee. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Oh, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, let me just follow up again on the last question I had. I know it is not a comfortable question or a comfortable 

subject for you, but it seems interesting to me that a decision of 

the magnitude of—maybe it is not that big a deal as it has been 

made out to be, but to raise a nation’s level to a non-NATO ally 

by Pakistan; that a decision like that is made overnight. I would 

imagine it is a major decision that is made overnight, and basically 

done on a whim, and you led me to believe that there was no discussion or even——

Ms. ROCCA. No. No, sir. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Okay. 

Ms. ROCCA. That is not at all the case. Of course, there was discussion for a long, long time, but——

Mr. CROWLEY. And no need to talk to India about it until——

Ms. ROCCA. Well, because——

Mr. CROWLEY [continuing]. You actually did it. 

Ms. ROCCA. Well, when we actually had a plan to do it. That was 

it. 

Mr. CROWLEY. What did you think the fallout might be with 

India after making that decision public without discussing it with 

them first? What would you anticipate it would be? 

Ms. ROCCA. Exactly what happened, sir. 

Mr. CROWLEY. So it was intentional? 

Ms. ROCCA. It was not intentional. 

Mr. CROWLEY. But you knew there would be fallout? 

Ms. ROCCA. I would be happy to give you all of the ins and outs 

of who did what to whom, when, in another forum, but I can tell 

you that, of course, had—I will just repeat what I said earlier, 

which was that had this decision, had we known that we were 

going to implement this we would have talked to India first. 

Mr. CROWLEY. You would have? 

Ms. ROCCA. We would have talked to the Indians while we were 

in New Delhi, of course. 

Mr. CROWLEY. So, again, but there was no communication, just 

to be clear, when the decision was made in Pakistan. 

Ms. ROCCA. No, there was no time. 

Mr. CROWLEY. No communication was given even through back 

channels or through the United States to India. 

Ms. ROCCA. No, there was no time. 

Mr. CROWLEY. No time. 

33

3See the Appendix for additional information supplied to the Committee in writing by Ms. 

Rocca in response to Mr. Leach’s question. 

Ms. ROCCA. But we did, I mean, we immediately went in to see 

them to explain, but by then it had already gone public in Pakistan. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Because I just think it is interesting that you may 

have been on the verge—well, obviously you did it. Let me say we 

did it. 

Ms. ROCCA. Right. 

Mr. CROWLEY. So we were maybe on the verge of offering this 

status to Pakistan, and that there was no mention in any way, 

shape or form with the Indians prior to that that that was going 

to take place. You know, in terms of balance I just think that that 

was not very balanced, in my opinion. 

Ms. ROCCA. We agree with you. 

Mr. CROWLEY. State agrees. Okay. Thank you. 

Ms. ROCCA. No, no. The U.S. Government agrees. 

Mr. CROWLEY. The U.S. Government agrees. 

Ms. ROCCA. There were better ways to do this. 

Mr. CROWLEY. Thank you. I thank the Secretary. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. I would like to follow up for a second on this. What 

the Assistant Secretary is suggesting is that there was no advanced 

consultation with the Indian government. 

Ms. ROCCA. That is correct. 

Mr. LEACH. Could you outline for the Subcommittee the advanced consultation with the United States Congress on this subject? 

Ms. ROCCA. I am going to have to go back and look at my record. 

I cannot answer that right now. I do not know, sir.3

Mr. LEACH. Well, this is a substantial national security step, and 

I do not want to suggest how you would have been advised by the 

individual Members of Congress. But I will tell you I think the reaction of us on the Hill was similar to that of the Indian government in terms of consultation. And when the Administration takes 

steps of this nature it is not unwise to seek a broader assessment 

of a judgment, and now I could be wrong. Perhaps Mr. Ackerman 

was consulted. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I will tell you that in a different forum. [Laughter.] 

No, I was not consulted. 

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Faleomavaega? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. If I might follow up on your follow up on this 

subject. 

Mr. LEACH. Yes, of course. The gentleman’s time from Iowa has 

been expired. I will be delighted to yield to the gentleman from 

New York. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On this very matter of how the Administration designates a 

major non-NATO ally, I have introduced legislation for consideration before the Committee and the House that basically changes 

the process, which would be inclusive of this branch of Government, which basically says the President would certify that the poVerDate Mar 21 2002 14:09 Oct 20, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\AP\062204\94506.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
34

4See the Appendix for additional information supplied to the Committee in writing by Ms. 

Rocca in response to Mr. Ackerman’s question. 

tential designee is cooperating with us on nuclear proliferation 

issues, which you say that Pakistan is, and also is a democracy, 

which you have no concerns about as far as the progress being 

made right now. 

Would the Administration be supportive of this legislation of allowing us to participate in the government? 

Ms. ROCCA. Can I get back to you because I do not have the answer to that? 4

Mr. ACKERMAN. Sure. Appreciate that. 

Ms. ROCCA. Okay. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LEACH. Before bringing the hearing to an end, I do want to 

raise the subject of Nepal, and do you have any assessments of 

whether the new Prime Minister has the political stature to bring 

the parties together and perhaps restart negotiations with the 

Maoists? 

Ms. ROCCA. It is my understanding that he was acceptable to all 

the other political parties. He was the Prime Minister when the 

King suspended the Parliament last time. It is a step forward. I 

think there is still one or two outstanding parties that need to join 

in. I cannot understate how important it is for all the political parties in Nepal to pull together and to work with the King to deal 

with this threat. 

They have been driven by political competition between them, 

and have not been able to focus on the Maoists, and it is only if 

they all pull together and stand as one that they will be able to 

combat this, or that they will be able to actually have a good—a 

peace process or come to the table. 

I think, to repeat what I said in my statement, it is very clear 

that there cannot be a military solution to this problem. Neither 

side is going to win militarily, and it will have to be resolved at 

the peace table, and the parties on each side of that table need to 

be united, and certainly the democratic government and the King 

have got to be together and have a common agenda in order to deal 

with this threat, which poses a threat to stability in the region, and 

a very serious potential humanitarian crisis. 

Mr. LEACH. Thank you very much. 

If there are no further questions, the Committee stands adjourned. 

Ms. ROCCA. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(35)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAN BURTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF INDIANA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this hearing today to discuss U.S. policy 

towards countries in South Asia. Since 9/11, South Asia has been a particular focus 

of United States foreign policy. While South Asia has been one of the most dynamic 

region of the world for development since the 1990s, major economic, political, environmental, and security changes in recent years have challenges the political and 

social institutions of many nations in the region. These changes have created both 

opportunities, as seen in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, and new challenges, as in the 

cases of Pakistan and India. 

Transnational terrorism; military tensions between nuclear powers India and 

Pakistan; poverty—more than 40 percent of the region’s 1.4 Billion people live on 

less than one dollar a day, making South Asia home to nearly one-half of the world’s 

poor—disease—South Asia has alarming infant and child mortality rates, and a rapidly spreading HIV/AIDS epidemic—religious radicalism, and weak democratic institutions threaten to unravel the stability of the region if not confronted promptly and 

decisively. Left unchecked, these conditions create fertile ground for the rise of even 

more radical political ideologies, groups, and activities than Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist networks. South Asia is the only place left in the world where two 

nuclear-armed countries stand poised on a hair-trigger to go to war. 

The stand-off between Pakistan and India has been an issue that I’ve been personally involved with for many, many years. I firmly believe that the economic and 

social development of both India and Pakistan—and, in fact, the entire South Asia 

subcontinent—have been substantially held hostage by the half-century old Kashmir 

dispute. The bitterness and suspicion resulting from the continuing feud have led 

both countries to devote a comparatively large percentage of their resources to defense, including conventional, nuclear, and ballistic missile weapons capabilities. 

The Kashmir conflict not only continues to raise the specter of war between India 

and Pakistan, but it also continues to produce serious human rights violations: summary executions, rape, and torture by both sides. In their effort to curb support for 

pro-independence militants, Indian security forces have resorted to arbitrary arrests 

and collective punishments of entire neighborhoods, tactics which have only led to 

further disaffection from India. From the outset, the Indian government’s campaign 

against the militants has been marked by widespread human rights violations, including the shooting of unarmed demonstrators, civilian massacres, and summary 

executions of detainees. In the mid-1990s, Indian security forces began arming and 

training local auxiliary forces made up of surrendered or captured militants to assist 

in counterinsurgency operations. These state-sponsored paramilitary groups have 

committed serious human rights abuses, and human rights defenders and journalists have been among the principal victims. 

On May 12th of this year, I chaired the first and only Congressional hearing to 

examine in depth the egregious human rights violations taking place in Kashmir. 

The stories we heard of Indian soldiers committing rape, torture and murder were 

sickening. There is no question that some pro-Pakistani militant groups have resorted to terrorist deeds like kidnapping, assassination, extortion and even common 

crime. No political grievance justifies such actions, and I strongly condemn the violence perpetrated by these groups. But the violence perpetrated by India’s military 

forces, and the Para-military forces allied with them, is even more disturbing and 

abhorrent. Just as the world is disgusted by the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by United 

States Service men and women, we should be disgusted by the tactics that have 

36

been systematically employed by Indian military and Para-military forces in Kashmir. 

India claims to be the world’s largest democracy, and like any other great democracy, its soldiers should be and must be held to a higher standard of conduct. Yet, 

India’s insistence on resolving a political problem by force has dragged it down into 

a campaign of essentially lawless state terrorism. 

Critics of mine have argued that I am grossly overstating the situation and blaming an entire country for the actions of a few individuals. But the fact of the matter 

is that credible, independent human rights organizations—including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Asia Watch, and Freedom House, and even the 

United States Department of State, have documented how Indian forces have used 

brutal techniques to subjugate the Kashmiri population and other ethnic minorities, 

such as Sikhs and Christians, and against women. 

Recent dialogue between India and Pakistan has moved the two countries closer 

to building peace in the subcontinent, and within the last week the two countries 

agreed to establish a nuclear hot line to reduce the risk of war. The countries have 

also reaffirmed their commitments to an atomic testing moratorium—all of these 

things are positive steps forward in their effort to normalize relations. Perhaps 

these confidence building will lead to other avenues of dialogue and eventually to 

a summit between Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf and India’s new 

prime minister, Manmohan Singh. I would encourage the State Department to work 

with their Indian and Pakistani counterparts to bring about such a meeting. 

While the steps taken so far have been largely symbolic at this stage, these are 

important to the long-term objective of strengthening relations between these countries, thus improving the prospects for security and prosperity in the region. But 

much more needs to be done. Pakistan must continue its efforts to prevent militants 

from crossing the Line of Control into Indian occupied Kashmir; and the Government of India must reduce troop levels in the region, repeal its domestic laws that 

have aided and abetted human rights violations in the region, and finally, the 

Kashmiris are stakeholders and they must be connected to the peace process or any 

effort to achieve a lasting peace will fail. If the peace process fails, the results will 

be disastrous for the region and the world. 

As we champion the cause of freedom around the world we must be engaged in 

championing freedom in South Asia, where the institutions of democracy have too 

often proven elusive to take root. I look forward to hearing Assistant Secretary 

Rocca’s testimony regarding the State Department’s most recent efforts to engage 

and assist the various countries of the region resolve, not only the situation in 

Kashmir, but the many broader challenges confronting them. 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO THE COMMITTEE IN WRITING BY THE HONOR- ABLE CHRISTINA B. ROCCA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AF- FAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY MEM- BERS DURING THE HEARING

Mr. Faleomavaega’s Question: 

What are we talking about in terms of [outsourced] jobs? . . . is India the only 

country that American companies are doing this [to]? 

Ms. Rocca’s Written Response: 

A widely-cited Forrester Research study estimates that about 500,000 US jobs will 

have been outsourced overseas by the end of 2004. This is out of a total US labor 

market of approximately 140 million jobs, or 0.36 percent. 

The majority of jobs that have been outsourced have gone to India, though India 

is certainly not the only country to have benefited from outsourcing. US companies 

have also outsourced to other countries, such as Sri Lanka, China, and the Philippines. It’s expected that future outsourced jobs will be more widely distributed to 

other countries. 

Overall, more work is outsourced to the US than away from it. The US is by far 

the world’s biggest exporter of services, posting a $53.64 billion surplus last year 

in trade in private services. India, for example, imported $4.986 billion from the US 

in goods and services in 2003. 

Mr. Tancredo’s Question: 

What is the State Department doing to counter abuse of the L–1 visa process? 

Ms. Rocca’s Written Response: 

In February the State Department transmitted guidance to posts alerting them 

that interest in the L category would likely surge as the cap for H–1b visas was 

37

reached. In addition, the cable reminded posts of the guidance on how to deal with 

potential abuse of the L category. One possibility for L abuse is ‘‘job shop’’ employment companies that use the L visa to transfer low wage personnel to U.S. businesses as ‘‘consultants’’ who qualify under the ‘‘specialized knowledge’’ portion of the 

L visa category. The guidance describes the essential elements in determining the 

employer-employee relationship and the applicant’s ‘‘specialized knowledge’’ and explains what the consular officer should do in cases where a ‘‘job shop’’ arrangement 

is believed to exist. Thus, consular officers have appropriate guidance to address 

identifiable job shop situations and return the L visa petitions to DHS for revocation. 

CA’s Office of Fraud Prevention Programs (CA/FPP) has been following this issue. 

Posts in India, Dubai, China, and elsewhere have reported abuses in the L visa category and made suggestions for improving detection of fraudulent L visa applications. CA/FPP has assembled these reports and will make them available to consular officers in its e-room (electronic bulletin board) and on its internal State Department web site. CA/FPP covers petition-based visa fraud in its advanced fraud 

training and is developing additional general consular training materials specific to 

L visas based on experience from the field. 

However, the vast majority of H and L applications appear to be from well-qualified applicants going to work for legitimate companies in full compliance with law 

and regulation. Problems with abuse of the L category occur when U.S. employers 

attempt to use the category to import workers at lower cost than H–1b workers and 

with fewer bureaucratic hurdles. Many of these problems could best be addressed 

through regulatory reform in this area, such as by tightening the definition of specialized knowledge. 

Mr. Leach’s Question: 

Could you outline for the subcommittee the advanced consultation with the United 

States Congress on this subject [designation of Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO 

Ally]? 

Ms. Rocca’s Written Response: 

As with other Major Non-NATO Ally designations in the past and in accordance 

with 22 USC 2321k (Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended 

(FAA)), the Department of State, upon being informed of the President’s decision to 

designate a country as a MNNA, provides a required 30-day notification to Congress 

regarding the President’s intentions. In the case of Pakistan, the State Department 

notified Congress on April 19, 2004, of the President’s intention to designate Pakistan a MNNA. No Congressional opposition was voiced during the thirty-day period 

and Pakistan was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally on June 16, 2004. 

Mr. Ackerman’s Question: 

Would the Administration be supportive of this legislation? [i.e. the Ackerman 

amendment requiring that MNNA status be denied to countries POTUS does not certify as being democracies and cooperating on nuclear nonproliferation.] 

Ms. Rocca’s Written Response: 

The President designates countries Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNAs) because 

doing so best serves the foreign policy interests of the United States. MNNAs are 

important partners in pursuing important U.S. foreign policy objectives—such as 

the Global War on Terrorism, regional stability, and peacekeeping. 

The standards for MNNA designation specified in H.R. 4021 address commendable objectives that are already important components of U.S. foreign policy. But 

this legislation would undercut the President’s ability to conduct U.S. foreign policy 

and dramatically reduce the utility of a foreign policy tool that has proven helpful. 

The requirement that MNNAs be participants in the nonproliferation regimes, or 

be a party to an international understanding that meets the export control standards of these regimes is unrealistic and undesirable. More than half of current 

MNNAs are not members of the supplier regimes (such as the MTCR and NSG), 

nor would the United States support membership for all of these countries in all 

of the regimes. 

In addition, we believe that it would be a mistake to bind MNNA status to specific 

criteria. The ability to engage key allies in a cooperative fashion is an important 

tool for the President, with the appropriate Congressional notification, in the fight 

to protect the United States from terror and advance the national security interests 

of the United States. 

38

RESPONSES FROM THE HONORABLE CHRISTINA B. ROCCA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAKISTAN

Question: 

The assertion that AQ Khan acted on his own to sell a nuclear weapons appears 

to be a facade—what steps is the US taking to ensure that a Pakistani nuclear weapon does not fall into the hands of Al-Qaeda or rogue nations? 

Response: 

We have urged the government of Pakistan to ensure that illegal activities such 

as those carried out by the A.Q. Khan network cannot take place again from Pakistan. President Musharraf has pledged to take steps to ensure that Pakistan will 

not be a source for illegal proliferation in the future. We believe President 

Musharraf takes these issues seriously. 

Moreover, we continue to work, both unilaterally and bilaterally with our international partners, and in international organizations to implement measures to 

strengthen international efforts to counter the threat of proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction. We have an ongoing dialogue with the government of Pakistan 

on these issues. In connection with this, we have a bilateral program to help Pakistan bring its export controls in line with accepted international standards; Pakistan’s cooperation with us in this area continues. 

Question: 

What steps is the Pakistani government taking to find Osama bin Laden and what 

pressure is the U.S. exerting on Pakistan to encourage them to pursue and capture 

Al Qaeda terrorists along the border of Afghanistan? 

Response: 

The U.S. stresses the paramount importance of counterterrorist efforts in all discussions with Pakistani officials, from President Musharraf down. The Pakistani 

Government recognizes the importance of ridding the country of the destabilizing 

threat represented by Al Qaeda, and regularly consults with the U.S. Government 

to this end. It places a high priority on apprehending Al Qaeda terrorists, and has 

turned over to the U.S. more than 500, including September 11 plotters. Recently, 

the Pakistani government has stepped up its efforts by increasing its military presence in the tribal areas along the border of Afghanistan, traditionally a safe haven 

for terrorists, launching operations against al Qaeda elements on the Pakistan side 

of the border, and tightening border security to prevent unauthorized crossings. 

KASHMIR

Question: 

What recent engagement has the US government had with India and Pakistan to 

encourage progress in resolving conflict over Kashmir? 

Response: 

We believe that the resumption this year by India and Pakistan of a wide-ranging 

composite dialogue, with the objective of reaching a peaceful settlement on all bilateral issues—including Kashmir—is a real breakthrough. 

This dialogue offers the best hope of resolving problems between Indian and Pakistan, including Kashmir. We are also very encouraged by the numerous confidencebuilding measures agreed to by both sides over the last year, and hope that they 

will continue to be implemented quickly. This improves the atmosphere within 

which the dialogue takes place. While the United States is not a mediator in this 

process, we strongly support the decision by India and Pakistan to engage in dialogue and stand ready to help in any way both sides request. 

We regularly express our encouragement for the dialogue process to the Governments of Pakistan and India, including during Deputy Secretary Armitage’s July 

visit to the region. 

AFGHANISTAN

Question: 

What is the US position on moderate Talibs? Is there such a thing as a moderate 

Talib and why is the government urging the Afghan government to reach out to 

39

them? What is the Pakistani government communicating to the US government on 

moderate Talibs? 

Response: 

The United States views all individuals and entities actively seeking to destabilize 

Afghanistan as a direct threat to our national security interests. The United States 

is not urging the Afghan government to reach out to ‘‘moderate Taliban’’ and the 

Government of Pakistan is not communicating to the U.S. government on matters 

pertaining to ‘‘moderate Talibs’’. 

Question: 

We applaud the work that has been done in capturing some Al Qaeda leaders-What 

is the US government assessment as to why Al Qaeda members, but not Talib leaders, have been captured in Pakistan? 

Response: 

The Government of Pakistan’s limited successes against the Taliban remains an 

issue of mutual concern. The GOP recognizes the threat posed by the Taliban in 

Pakistan and is working actively to eliminate the threat in a manner conducive with 

the social, political, and military realities in the border areas. The United States 

government is confident that the Government of Pakistan will continue its efforts 

to target both Al Qaeda, Taliban, and other extremists operating within its territory. We recognize the political and military challenges associated with the unprecedented nature of such operations and we will continue to engage with the Government of Pakistan to ensure a sustained and broad effort. 

Question: 

Why have the incidents of violence increased in Afghanistan at a time when there 

are increased efforts against terrorists along the border with Pakistani troops involved-What reports has the Administration received regarding opportunities that 

continue to exist in Pakistan for training and recruitment of terrorists? 

Response: 

Incidents of violence are on the rise in certain parts of Afghanistan primarily in 

response to the continued rise in voter registration in the run-up to elections. The 

perpetrators are attempting to derail the registration process in an effort to undermine the elections. Despite their efforts, the number of registered voters continues 

to grow at an average rate of 100,000 per day nationwide. The Administration is 

concerned about the continued presence of extremist elements operating from the 

tribal territories in Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan shares our concern and 

is actively pursuing measures to eliminate this threat to its internal stability and 

our joint efforts in the war on terrorism. 

ELECTIONS

Question: 

The original timetable for the presidential election, per the Bonn Agreement, was 

June 2004. The election was postponed until September 2004 with little opposition 

or outcry. What are the risks if the election were postponed a little longer? 

Response: 

The Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), the 13-member commission responsible for elections under Afghanistan’s electoral law will make the ultimate decision on the election date. The JEMB is working to ensure that elections take place 

on a timeline consistent with the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan constitution, and the 

Afghan electoral law. The JEMB is also committed to ensuring that ‘‘all voters shall 

have equal right of participation in the elections,’’ as directed in the election law. 

As logistical and security arrangements progress, it may become necessary to shift 

the election dates to ensure the greatest possible participation in the election process. We support the Afghan Government and the JEMB in their efforts to carry out 

elections consistent with the laws and wishes of the Afghan people, and the ultimate 

decision on an elections date will be an Afghan decision. We are confident that the 

JEMB will postpone elections only if it is in the best interests of the Afghan people, 

and that the people of Afghanistan will support the JEMB’s decision. 

Question: 

Where will the candidates’ financing come from for campaigning for the presidential and parliamentary elections in terms of campaigning? What protections are 

in place to ensure that the wealthy warlords do not have the advantage in the elections? 

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Response: 

Article 15 of the Afghan Political Party Law directs that parties may receive income from (a) membership contributions, (b) individual private donations of up to 

2 million Afghani (about 50,000 USD) per year, (c) income from a party’s property, 

(d) subsidies from the government, and (e) other contributions from by members. 

The Afghan Elections Law prohibits donations from foreign sources or from internal 

illegal sources to both presidential and parliamentary candidates. In addition the 

Political Party Law prohibits parties that have military organizations or affiliations 

with armed forces. 

To ensure that these legal standards are met, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) vets 

all political parties for compliance with the law before registering them, and the 

Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) has oversight responsibility for campaign 

financing. The USG has funded technical assistance to both the MoJ and the IEC 

to help them carry out their oversight responsibilities. In addition, the USG is providing funding for political party resource centers throughout the country. These resource centers will provide training in party organization, platform development, 

campaigning and other skills, as well as access to office supplies and other items 

necessary to run a political campaign. They will be accessible by any Afghan party 

that supports the democratic process and will help to equalize potential resource 

disadvantages for democratic parties. 

NARCOTICS

Question: 

What is the U.S. mission in Afghanistan? If our mission is to combat terrorism 

and al-Qaeda, what is the U.S. position on the linkages between terrorism and narcotics and what is the U.S. response to the problem of narcotics and their relationship to the terrorists we are fighting? 

Response: 

The U.S. mission in Afghanistan is to support the efforts of the Afghan government in firmly establishing a democratic nation, committed to the fight against 

international terrorism and drug trafficking and cultivation. 

We do not know to what extent al-Qaeda profits from the drug trade in Afghanistan. USG agencies have anecdotal reports of drug trafficking by elements aligned 

with al-Qaeda, but there is no evidence that such activities are centrally directed. 

Al-Qaeda continues to rely on private donations and funding sources other than 

narco-trafficking for most of its income, and there is nor corroborated information 

in US government holding to suggest that drug trafficking provides a significant 

percentage of al-Qaed’s income. We remain deeply concerned about the possibility 

that substantial drug profits might flow to al-Qaeda, however, and continue to be 

vigilant for signs that this is occurring. 

The involvement of anti-government Afghan extremists in the drug trade is clearer. US troops in 2002 raided a heroin lab in Nangarhar Province linked to the Hizbi Islami Gulbudin, and officials from the UN and the Afghan Government report 

that the Taliban earns money from the heroin trade. Based on the information 

available, however, we cannot quantify how much these groups earn from the drug 

trade, nor can we determine what percentage of their overall funding comes from 

drugs. 

HUMAN RIGHTS

Question: 

It seems that the same people who failed Afghanistan in the past and wreaked 

havoc on the country, particularly in terms of violence and human rights violations, 

continue to be legitimized. These warlords and their actions were what caused the 

Afghan people to welcome the stability and order provided by the Taliban. I am concerned that we are creating the impression among the Afghan people that the cycle 

of human rights violations will continue with impunity due to the fact that the coalition forces in Afghanistan are working closely with the very same people who committed the horrifying violations. What is your assessment of this and what are we 

losing in terms of legitimacy by working with the warlords who are so hated by the 

general population? 

Response: 

The United States remains committed to supporting national institutions and organizations in Afghanistan seeking to enhance internal stability, democratic reforms, and economic prosperity. The United States does not support warlords as 

part of our policy toward Afghanistan. Warlordism and the continued presence of 

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armed militias in Afghanistan pose a threat to the democratic reform process currently underway in that country. As a result, the United States remains heavily engaged with the Governments of Afghanistan, Japan, and the United Nations to ensure the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of armed militias in Afghanistan. We have also played a pivotal role in helping to establish the Afghan 

Independent Human Rights Commission currently active throughout Afghanistan. 

We are confident that such measures will allow Afghanistan to cement the reforms 

and successes that will continue to foster stability and prosperity. 

DISARMAMENT/RECONSTRUCTION

Question: 

NATO has called Afghanistan its number one priority and it was supposed to have 

5 PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) in place by the end of June 2004, yet currently only has one PRT in place. What are the obstacles preventing NATO from filling its commitment to Afghanistan? 

Response: 

There are over 7,000 International Assistance and Security Forces (ISAF) troops 

in Afghanistan, mostly in Kabul. NATO assumed command of ISAF in August 2003 

and coordinated with the UN to authorize ISAF expansion in December 2003 to 

northern Afghanistan starting with a German PRT in Konduz. Following NATO’s 

Istanbul Summit, ISAF has expanded to takeover the Mazar e-Sharif PRT and establish a PRT in Maimana and are now responsible for 9 provinces across the north 

of Afghanistan. 

The Netherlands has announced they will establish a PRT in Pol e-Khomri and 

Germany will establish a second PRT in Feyzabad by late summer or early fall. 

There has been some recent movement to generate additional forces for elections security, but NATO’s slow expansion has frustrated President Karzai and the GoA. 

ISAF continues to raise the level of its in-country forces, including Spanish forces 

and possibly an element of the new NATO Response Force (NRF), to support the 

GoA and UNAMA in providing elections security. 

The Administration actively pursued NATO Allied nation troop contributions for 

ISAF expansion prior to and during the Istanbul Submit. We continue to press 

NATO, including the SYG and member states, to meet this vital commitment to 

support the Afghan people.

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