United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

CONTRACT 

SECURITY GUARDS 

Army’s Guard 

Program Requires 

Greater Oversight and 

Reassessment of 

Acquisition Approach 

April 2006 

 

GAO-06-284 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2006

CONTRACT SECURITY GUARDS

Army’s Guard Program Requires Greater 

Oversight and Reassessment of 

Acquisition Approach 

Highlights of GAO-06-284, a report to 

congressional requesters 

The Army’s three-phased approach for acquiring contract security guards 

has relied heavily on sole-source contracts, despite the Army’s recognition 

early on that it was paying considerably more for its sole-source contracts 

than for those awarded competitively. The Army has devoted twice as many

contract dollars—nearly $495 million—to its sole-source contracts as to its

competed contracts and has placed contract security guards at 46 out of 57

installations through sole-sourcing. These sole-source contracts were 

awarded to two Alaska Native corporation firms under the Small Business 

Administration’s 8(a) Business Development Program. Congress has 

provided these firms with special advantages in the 8(a) program. During 

initial planning, the Army worked with a contractor who had not performed 

guard services before to refine the contract performance work statement. 

The Army’s procedure for screening prospective contract guards is 

inadequate and puts the Army at risk of having ineligible guards protecting 

installation gates. The Army found that, at two separate installations, a total 

of 89 guards were put to work even though they had records relating to 

criminal offenses, including cases that involved assault and other felonies. 

Thorough background checks lag far behind the rate at which contract 

guards are put to work, and the initial screening process relies on 

prospective guards to be honest when filling out job application forms. In 

response to an earlier GAO report, DOD agreed to revise its antiterrorism 

standards to put into place a better mechanism for verifying the

trustworthiness of contractors. 

The Army has given its contractors the responsibility to conduct most of the 

training of contract guards, and the Army cannot say with certainty whether 

training is actually taking place and whether it is being conducted according 

to approved criteria. GAO found that there is no requirement for the Army to 

certify that a contract guard has completed required training and that Army 

performance monitors do not conduct oversight of training as a matter of 

course. GAO also found missing or incomplete training records at several 

installations. At three installations, guards were certified by the contractor 

before training had been completed. An investigation discovered that at one 

installation, contractor personnel had falsified training records; the Army 

subsequently paid the contractor over $7,000 to re-qualify the guards. 

The Army has paid out more than $18 million in award fees, but the fees are

based only on compliance with basic contractual requirements, not for 

above-and-beyond performance. Over the life of the contract guard program, 

the Army has paid out almost 98 percent of the available award fees. The 

practice of routinely paying contractors nearly the entire available award fee 

has created an environment in which the contractors expect to receive most 

of the available fee, regardless of acquisition outcomes. GAO found that 

many Army performance monitors were not conducting all of the required 

inspections of contractor activity in order to rate performance. 

Following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, increased 

security requirements and a 

significant number of active duty and 

reserve personnel sent overseas to 

support the war on terror left the 

Department of Defense (DOD) with

fewer military personnel to rely on to 

protect domestic installations. To 

correct this shortage, Congress is 

temporarily allowing DOD to use 

contract security guards to fulfill 

roles previously performed by 

military employees. The U.S. Army

has awarded contracts worth nearly 

$733 million to acquire contract 

guards at 57 Army installations, an

investment far greater than those

made by other DOD services so far. 

The requesters asked GAO to assess 

how the Army has been managing

and overseeing its acquisition of

security guard services, particularly 

with regard to the Army’s (1) 

acquisition strategy, (2) employment 

screening, (3) training of contract

guards, and (4) award fee process.

This report also discusses DOD’s 

mandated November 2005 report to

Congress on the contract guard 

program. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO made recommendations to the 

Secretary of Defense to improve

management and oversight of the 

contract security guard program. In

written comments on a draft of this 

report, DOD agreed with the 

recommendations and stated that the 

Department of Army is implementing

them. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-284.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Katherine V. 

Schinasi at (202) 512-4841 or 

schinasik@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 6

Army’s Approach for Acquiring Contract Security Guards Relies 

Mostly on 8(a) Sole-Source Contracts 9 

Army Procedures Do Not Provide Assurance That Contract 

Security Guards Are Adequately Screened 16 

Lax Oversight and Training Irregularities Raise Doubts About the 

Adequacy of the Guards’ Training 20 

Continued Need for Award Fees Is Questionable 24 

DOD Report to Congress Does Not Address Some Key Issues 

Pertaining to the Army’s Guard Program 31 

Conclusion 32

Recommendations 33

Agency Comments 33 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35 

Appendix II List of Army Installations Using Contract Security 

Guards 38 

Appendix III Agency Comments 40 

Tables 

Table 1: Overview of the Army’s Three-Phased Approach for Hiring 

Contract Security Guards 10 

Table 2: Army’s Three-Phased Acquisition Approach 12 

Table 3: Highlights of Activities Required under Army’s Two-Part 

Screening Process 16 

Table 4: Contractors’ Training Requirements 21 

Table 5: Criteria Used to Evaluate Contractors’ Performance 25 

Table 6: Evaluations and Percentage of Fees Authorized as of 

February 1, 2006 28 

Page i GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Figures 

Figure 1: Number of Installations with Guards Obtained under 

Each Phase 11 

Figure 2: Comparison of Contract Security Guard Award Fees 

Authorized and Not Earned as of February 1, 2006 (dollars 

in millions) 25 

Abbreviations 

ACA Army Contracting Agency 

ANC Alaska Native corporation 

DOD Department of Defense 

GSA General Services Administration 

IMA Installation Management Agency 

NCIC National Crime Information Center 

SBA Small Business Administration 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 3, 2006

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Lane Evans 

House of Representatives 

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) sent numerous active-duty, U.S.-based personnel to 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and other destinations to support the global war on 

terror. These deployments depleted the pool of military security guards at 

a time when DOD was faced with increased security functions at its U.S. 

installations. To ease this imbalance, Congress temporarily authorized 

DOD to waive a prohibition against the use of contract security guards at 

domestic military installations. Subsequently, DOD has turned to 

contractors to help fulfill the security guard function at a growing number 

of installations. We recently reported that the government’s increasing 

reliance on contractors for missions previously performed by government 

employees highlights the need for sound planning and contract execution.

1

The congressional authority allowing DOD to hire contract guards initially 

was to expire in December 2005, but Congress extended the waiver 

authority through September 2006, on the condition that DOD submit a 

report to Congress addressing various aspects of the security guard 

program. DOD submitted the report in November 2005. The National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 has further extended the

waiver authority through September 2007. The Army, the first service to 

use the authority, has awarded contracts worth nearly $733 million to 

acquire contract guards at 57 installations. We were asked to assess how 

the Army has been managing and overseeing its acquisition of security 

guard services. Specifically, we determined (1) what acquisition approach

the Army used, (2) whether the Army ensures that the guards are 

effectively screened for employment, (3) whether the Army ensures the 

 1

GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting for

Response and Recovery Efforts, GAO-06-246T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 08, 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
guards are adequately trained, and (4) the Army’s rationale for providing

the contractors with award fees and how the award fee process is being 

implemented. This report also discusses DOD’s November 2005 report to

Congress. 

To address these objectives, we obtained and analyzed key documents, 

including Army and contractor policies, procedures, and records, as well 

as policies and procedures followed by the U.S. Air Force and the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service for their 

contract security guards. We selected 11 Army installations to visit by 

(1) ensuring that each of the Army’s security guard contractors were 

included and (2) choosing installations that represented a range of 

contractor performance evaluation outcomes, from perfect scores to 

lower average scores (according to March/April 2005 Army assessments).2

These installations are cited in appendix II. In addition, we met with 

officials at the Army’s Installation Management Agency, the Army’s Office

of the Provost Marshal General, and the Army Contracting Agency. We

also met with the contractors and subcontractors that provide security 

guards to the Army. We examined the November 2005 “Department of 

Defense Installation Security Guard Requirement Assessment and Plan” 

and met with the head of the working group that prepared the report. 

Further details on the scope and methodology of our review can be found

in appendix I. We conducted our review from May 2005 to February 2006 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

To acquire its security guards, the Army is relying heavily on sole-source 

contracts under the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Business 

Development Program, despite the fact that contracting specialists had 

identified existing competed contracts under which they believed the 

guards could have been acquired just as quickly. The 8(a) sole-source 

contracts, currently valued at over $494 million, went to two Alaska Native 

corporation (ANC) firms, which have been accorded special contracting 

advantages under the 8(a) program by Congress.3

 Prior to contract award, 

the Defense Contract Management Agency assessed these firms’ 

Results in Brief 

 2

Officials from the 11 installations are responsible for a total of 14 installations. 

3

Alaska Native corporations are authorized to own 8(a) firms that can be awarded solesource contracts for any amount under the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Business

Development Program, as long as they meet relevant size standards and other eligibility 

requirements. 

Page 2 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
capabilities at the request of the contracting officer and rated one as “high 

risk” for performance because it was a manufacturing firm with no 

experience providing security guard services. Despite this firm’s lack of 

experience, the Small Business Administration’s Alaska district office had

recommended it to the Army as a good candidate for fulfilling the security 

guard requirement and the Army worked with this firm to refine the 

contract’s performance work statement. Both of the ANC firms have 

subcontracted with other companies in order to meet the Army’s 

requirements, with agreements in place allowing the subcontractors to 

perform 49 percent of the work—just under the 50 percent subcontracting 

limit under the 8(a) program. After the initial group of installations 

received their guards under the 8(a) sole-source contracts, the Army 

obtained guards for a second group under full and open competition. But

the Army turned again to the 8(a) sole-source contracts for a third group 

of installations—significantly increasing the contracts’ value—in spite of 

an Army analysis that revealed the competitive contracts had turned out to

be about 25 percent less costly. In all, 46 of the 57 installations have guards

obtained under the 8(a) sole-source contracts. 

Weaknesses in the Army’s employment screening process have resulted in 

the hiring of unscreened security guards, some with criminal histories, at 

U.S. installations. The weaknesses include policy-related problems, 

background checks that lag far behind the rate at which contract guards 

are put to work, and procedures that depend on job applicants to be 

honest on their employment forms. We found that some guards had taken 

firearms training and started work at installations before any initial 

screening was completed. At one installation we visited, the required, 

detailed national agency checks had never been initiated. At two other 

sites, the Army Criminal Investigation Command found guards were put to 

work even though they had records relating to criminal offenses; at one 

site, 61 such guards were identified and about two dozen of them had 

charges that would cause concern and possible ineligibility for 

employment in the security force. Army policy permits interim 

employment pending completion of initial screening, but interim 

employment can last more than 2 years because that is how long it can 

take to obtain the results of the national agency checks. The Army has 

delegated to the contractors responsibility for validating employees’ selfreported information during the initial screening process and finding out 

whether critical information was left out of the application form, such as 

criminal histories or aliases. We have previously raised concerns about the 

Page 3 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
screening process for contractors, including security guards, and DOD has 

agreed to revise its antiterrorism standards to put into place a better 

mechanism for verifying trustworthiness.4

There is a general lack of government oversight of the guards’ training, as 

well as poor record keeping on the part of the contractors and 

inconsistent training techniques. We found at 4 installations that 

government monitoring of the training is not consistently done, if at all.

We also found missing or incomplete training documents at each of the 

11 installations we visited. At three installations, guards were certified by

the contractor before their training had been completed, and one guard 

was certified before he had completed weapons-qualification training. In 

early 2005, it was determined that contractor personnel had falsified 

training records at one installation, and the government paid over $7,000

to the contractor to repeat weapons-qualification training for the guards.

Moreover, the Army does not provide standardized instructions on how 

contractors should conduct training for required skills. As a result, 

contractors are applying different standards and techniques. We found 

that one contractor allowed employees unlimited attempts to pass 

weapons training, while another allowed only three tries. We have 

previously reported on marked improvements in training through 

increased government oversight and standard training.5

 Army officials told 

us they are drafting new contract requirements aimed at standardizing 

training for contract guards. 

The Army’s process for evaluating and rewarding contractor performance 

through award fees has resulted in a payout of more than $18 million in 

monetary incentives as of February 2006. The award fee evaluation 

factors, however, require only that contractors comply with basic 

contractual requirements, not that they provide above-and-beyond 

performance. We also found that Army personnel responsible for 

monitoring contractors’ performance were not complying with 

requirements for assessing and rating performance. For example, several

Army monitors told us that limited resources prevent them from making 

 4

GAO, Combating Terrorism: Improvements Needed in European Command’s

Antiterrorism Approach for In-Transit Forces at Seaports, GAO-03-731NI (Washington,

D.C.: September 2003), and Combating Terrorism: Improvements Needed in Pacific 

Command’s Antiterrorism Approach for In-Transit Forces at Seaports, GAO-04-851NI 

(Washington, D.C.: August 2004). 

5

GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development

Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, D.C.: March 2004). 

Page 4 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
the required weekly inspections to ensure that contract guards are in fact

present and doing their jobs, and a requirement to test guards by 

attempting to pass through installation gates with fake identification is not 

being conducted on a consistent basis. Several Army personnel told us 

that they are in need of more specific guidance about how to measure 

contractor performance. Despite the recognition that performance 

monitors are not consistently applying the award-fee criteria, the Army has 

often given high ratings for contractor performance, and those ratings 

frequently translate into high payouts of available award fees. We found 

that 66 percent of all evaluations as of February 1, 2006, have resulted in 

scores of 99 or 100 percent. The initial rationale for the award fees was in 

part to motivate the first contractors to post security guards at the gates 

within 90 days; this rationale is no longer applicable. 

DOD’s November 2005 report to Congress on the contract security guard 

program makes several statements that we believe could be misconstrued. 

While the report addresses DOD’s contract guard program as a whole, 

most of DOD’s experience with contract guards has been with the Army, 

which has invested far more in the program than the other military 

services.6

 On the basis of our review of the Army’s program, we believe 

that the report overstates some issues, including the cost-effectiveness of 

using contract guards versus Army civilian employee guards; the contract 

guards’ performance vis-à-vis that of military guards; their screening and 

training, and the extent and effectiveness of government surveillance and 

oversight of the contract guard program. Finally, the report refers to the 

ANC firms’ contracts as set-aside 8(a), which implies competition among 

8(a) firms. A more accurate depiction would characterize these contracts 

as sole-source under the 8(a) program. 

In this report, we are making seven recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense to improve management and oversight of the contract security 

guard program. Specifically, we recommended changes in the acquisition 

strategy, improvement in the screening of the guards, and improved 

oversight of the guards’ training. In written comments on a draft of this 

report, DOD concurred and stated that the Department of Army is 

implementing the recommendations. DOD’s comments are included in 

their entirety in appendix III. 

 6

From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005, the time frame covered in the report, the

Army had contracted for 89 percent of DOD’s overall guard program. 

Page 5 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Since late 1982, Congress has, for the most part, prohibited DOD from

contracting for security guards at U.S. domestic installations. According to 

the legislative history, the prohibition was originally enacted because of 

concerns about the uncertain quality and reliability of private security 

guard services, base commanders’ potential lack of control over 

contractor personnel, and the right of contractor personnel to strike. 

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, however, DOD directed 

installation commanders to ensure that all vehicles, identification cards, 

badges, and other forms of identification were inspected for authorized 

access to military installations. These increased security requirements 

created an increased demand for personnel to perform security-related 

tasks. Initially, security requirements were filled at military installations 

with active duty and reserve component personnel. However, as reserve 

personnel reached their mandatory release dates from active duty and as 

competing demands for both reserve and active component personnel 

grew, resources became constrained. DOD reported that contracting for 

security guard services was deemed necessary and practical to allow it to 

simultaneously support increased demands for military forces and to meet

heightened security requirements for continental U.S. installations and 

facilities. Accordingly, in the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Congress temporarily authorized DOD to waive 

the prohibition against contracting for security guard functions, thereby 

minimizing the department’s need to use military personnel to perform 

these functions. 

Background 

The congressional waiver authority was predicated on an expectation that 

without the contract guards, military personnel would be used to perform 

the increased security function. In addition, it was expected that contract 

guards would perform their jobs as well as the military personnel who had

previously served in that capacity. The 2003 authorization act required that

in order to use the authority, the following stipulations must be met: 

• Recruiting and training standards for contract security guards must be 

comparable to standards for DOD personnel who perform security 

guard functions. 

• Contract security guards must be effectively supervised, reviewed, and 

evaluated. 

• Employment of contract security guards must not cause a reduction in 

the security of the military installation. 

The waiver authority was initially set to expire in December 2005, but the 

Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 

extended the authority through September 2006, provided that DOD 

Page 6 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
submit a report to Congress on the contract guard program. The report, 

entitled “Department of Defense Installation Security Guard Requirement 

Assessment and Plan,” was submitted to Congress on November 22, 2005. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 again 

extended the waiver authority an additional year, through September 2007. 

The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have employed contract security 

guards under the waiver authority.7

 The Army was the first to begin 

acquiring guards and has used the waiver authority most extensively; as of

December 2005, it had contracted for security guards at 57 installations, 

whereas contract guards are being used at 18 Air Force and 5 Navy 

installations. Several key players are involved in the Army’s contract 

security guard program. 

• Army Office of the Provost Marshal General: This office directs 

policy for all matters relating to Army law enforcement, police 

intelligence, physical security, criminal investigations, provost marshal 

activities, and military police and provides oversight of these 

resources. The Office of the Provost Marshal General was the requiring 

agency that determined and prioritized security guard requirements at 

each installation and identified the number of guards needed.

• Installation Management Agency (IMA): Formed in 2002, IMA is 

responsible for centralized oversight of U.S. Army bases and for 

administering all aspects of the contract guard program according to 

the requirements set by the Provost Marshal General. IMA is 

responsible for developing the guard contracts’ performance work 

specifications, which specify what the Army expects the contractors to 

do, such as detailing the requirements for screening and training. 

• Army Contracting Agency (ACA) (northern region): This was the 

contracting agency for the guard program. It awarded six fixed-price, 

award-fee contracts and has issued task orders under these contracts 

for guards at 57 installations. The contracting officer has designated an 

IMA official as the government’s primary oversight representative for 

the guard program. 

 7

The Marine Corps intended to start using the program if Congress further extended the

waiver authority in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 or made it 

permanent.

Page 7 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
• Army installations: These are the recipients of contract guards. 

Installation officials are responsible for ensuring that the contractor’s 

performance is evaluated daily and that the guards are screened and 

trained by reviewing contractor-supplied records. Installation 

personnel provide input to IMA as part of the award-fee process. 

• U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA): SBA oversees the 8(a) 

Business Development Program and is responsible for issuing 

regulation and policy concerning the program. Although SBA has 

delegated contracting authority to DOD for 8(a) procurements, SBA 

district offices—in this case, the Alaska district office—must approve 

any proposed contract going to an 8(a) firm and are to be notified if 

8(a) contracts are modified. 

• Contractors: Two of the four contractors providing security guards 

are 8(a) Alaska Native corporation firms, both of which have 

subcontracted a portion of the work to security guard firms that are 

large businesses. ANCs were created by Congress to help settle Alaska 

Native land claims and to foster economic development for Alaska 

Natives, have been accorded special advantages under SBA’s 8(a) 

Business Development Program. 8(a) ANC firms are considered small 

disadvantaged businesses, and as long as they meet relevant size 

standards for the procurement and other eligibility requirements, they 

can be awarded contracts noncompetitively for any dollar amount.8

Generally, acquisitions offered to other 8(a) businesses where the 

contract value is more than $3 million or $5 million (for manufacturing) 

must be competitively awarded.The other two contractors are not ANC 

firms. 

When acquiring services, a federal agency’s first course of action is 

typically to develop an acquisition strategy. Ideally, this would involve

examining and weighing several alternatives. Once the Army decided to

use contract security guards, it began analyzing its contracting options. 

ACA could have chosen from among numerous contract vehicles available 

to acquire the guard services. It had the option of awarding a new contract

or using existing interagency contracts through other federal agencies. For

example, the General Services Administration (GSA) awards 

governmentwide contracts, including contracts for security guard services, 

under its Federal Supply Schedule (Schedule) program to help federal 

 8

13 CFR 124.506(b). 

Page 8 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
agencies make purchases in less turnaround time on a competitive basis 

for commonly used items or services. 

To motivate contractors to perform well, the Army chose to use monetary 

incentives called award fees. Award fees allow agencies to adjust the 

amount of fee paid to the contractor based on performance. We recently 

questioned how effectively these fees are being used at DOD because its 

programs have paid contractors large amounts of fees on acquisitions that 

are experiencing problems. We reported that DOD has little evidence to 

support its belief that these fees improve contractor performance and

acquisition outcomes.9

Separately, we have reported on concerns involving the trustworthiness of 

contractors and subcontractors who have access to U.S. military 

installations. DOD officials have told us that they have not evaluated the 

trustworthiness of some contractors because the department’s existing 

antiterrorism standards do not specifically require them to do so. In 

response to our recommendations, DOD officials are in the process of 

revising the standards to verify trustworthiness of contractors and 

subcontractors and better control access to installations, facilities, and 

sensitive areas.10

The Army has awarded two sole-source contracts, totaling almost 

$495 million, to 8(a) ANC firms to acquire the bulk of its contract guards, 

even though contracting officials pointed out that using competed GSA 

Schedule contracts would have been just as fast and less costly. We found

that the Army hired an inexperienced contractor to help refine the 

performance work statement, failed to monitor certain subcontracting 

limitations under 8(a) contracts, and turned again to the 8(a) sole-source 

contracts in a third acquisition phase despite knowing that its competed 

contracts for the same services, awarded in the second acquisition phase,

had cost 25 percent less than the initial 8(a) sole-source contracts. 

Army’s Approach for 

Acquiring Contract 

Security Guards

Relies Mostly on 8(a) 

Sole-Source Contracts

 9

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees 

Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-06-66 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 19, 2005). 

10GAO-04-851NI and GAO-03-731NI. 

Page 9 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
An understanding of the Army’s approach for acquiring contract security 

guards requires getting a broad overview of the three phases of the 

acquisition, knowing how much the Army has spent so far to acquire 

guards and who the key players are, and following the chronology of 

contracting events. Table 1 presents the three-phased approach and shows 

in which phase the Army used 8(a) sole-source contracts or competitive 

contracts. 

Army Used Three-Phased 

Acquisition Approach 

Table 1: Overview of the Army’s Three-Phased Approach for Hiring Contract Security Guards 

Acquisition phase Contracting approach Contractors hired

Phase one 8(a) sole-source 2 contractors that are 8(a) Alaska Native corporation 

firms; 2 security guard firms as subcontractors 

Phase two Full and open competition 2 other contractors hired through the use of new 

competitive contracts 

Phase three 8(a) sole-source Same contractors used in phase one 

Total committed value of 8(a) sole-source contracts from phases one and three: 

Total committed value of competitive contracts from phase two:

$494.8 million

$238.0 million

Source: Army (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

Since the Army’s contract security guard program began in 2003, the Army 

has devoted almost twice as many contract dollars to sole-sourcing under 

the 8(a) program as it has to full and open competition. Figure 1 shows 

that 46 out of 57 Army installations received their contract guards through 

8(a) sole-source contracts in phases one and three and that the guards for 

the remaining 11 installations were acquired through competed contracts.

Page 10 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Figure 1: Number of Installations with Guards Obtained under Each Phase 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Third phase:

Second phase:

First phase:

Number of installations

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

8(a) sole source

 full and open competition

8(a) sole source

9

11

37

Table 2 shows how the acquisition approach began taking shape before

the Army settled on its three-phased approach and who the key players 

were. 

Page 11 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Table 2: Army’s Three-Phased Acquisition Approach

Key player Activity 

Army headquarters Requirement: Issued instructions for implementing contract security guard program 

Army Installation Management Agency 

(IMA) 

Description of approach: Issued an implementation approach for identifying the 

installations in need of contract security guards 

Army’s Office of the Provost Marshal 

General

List of installations needing contract security guards: Prioritized a list of 89 installations on

the basis of critical need, type, and size of installation, allowing the maximum number of 

reserve personnel to be deployed for military operations 

Army Contracting Agency (ACA) Contracting options: Northern and southern regional offices developed preliminary 

approaches for acquiring guards 

Contracting specialists in both offices identified the option of using GSA Schedule 

contracts; combined, the following benefits of using these contracts were noted: 

• They offer quickest solution for placing “boots on the ground” 

• They allow for competitive procurement 

• Individual installations could place orders for contract guards against GSA Schedule 

contracts and choose from 66 companies that had experience with contract security 

guards 

• Small businesses would have sufficient opportunity to win security guard contract 

opportunities under GSA Schedule contracts because 45 vendors on the list were small 

businesses 

• Installations could negotiate with vendors and conceivably obtain prices an average of 

10 to 15 percent lower than the stated GSA Schedule prices

• It is easier to place orders against GSA Schedule contracts than to initiate new 

competed contracts; contracting specialists at one of the regional offices said neither 

the regional office nor the installations have sufficient staffing resources to award and 

properly administer new contracts 

Contracting specialists in the northern region also proposed another option: awarding 

sole-source contracts to 8(a) ANC firms. The office identified the following benefits to 

using this approach: 

• Potentially a huge amount of new dollars going to business participating in the 8(a) 

Business Development Program, 

• A large consolidation at the national level that both ACA and IMA could point to as a 

success story. 

ACA headquarters and northern region Northern region, selected as contract office, developed Army’s acquisition strategy 

Made decision not to use GSA Schedule contracts because ACA officials believed this 

method would require a significant amount of time 

Cited another disadvantage with using GSA Schedule contracts—assumed that 

responsibility for acquiring contract guards would have to be devolved to individual 

installations, a course that would have stretched out the time available for getting guards 

to installations and “suboptimized” the performance work statement and resulting 

contracts 

Source: Army (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

Page 12 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Even though the use of the GSA Schedule was identified as a possible 

acquisition approach, the Army decided that the best course of action for 

the first acquisition phase was to award contracts to 8(a) ANC firms, 

believing that use of the GSA Schedule would have taken longer, would 

not have allowed a consolidated approach at the national level, and would 

have diluted the Army’s purchasing power. The Army was not able to 

provide us with any analysis showing how it made these determinations. 

We found that other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Air Force and the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service, have used 

GSA Schedule contracts to obtain their security guards.11 According to the 

Air Force contracting officer, using GSA Schedule contracts was 

considered the more efficient, faster method to obtain the guards. The Air 

Force has used these contracts to obtain contract security guards at 

18 bases at an annual estimated cost of $29 million. The Federal Protective 

Service manages and oversees 10,000 armed contract security guards that

were mostly obtained under GSA’s Schedule program. 

Army’s Sole-Source 

Approach Centered on 

Contracting with 8(a) ANC 

Firms 

SBA’s Alaska district office, in a May 2003 letter to ACA, stated that it was 

“marketing” a particular 8(a) ANC firm to meet the Army’s security guard 

requirements. According to ACA officials, this firm was already being 

considered by the Army. A second 8(a) ANC firm that had approached the 

Army was also considered. Before awarding the contracts to these 

companies, the contracting office asked the Defense Contract 

Management Agency to evaluate the firms’ capabilities.12 The agency rated 

one of the firms—the one SBA had marketed to the Army—as “high risk” 

for performance because it had experience manufacturing goods but no 

experience providing services. The risk was mitigated somewhat because

of anticipated support and assistance from the company’s parent 

corporation, the Defense Contract Management Agency said, and because

the firm had chosen to team up with a subcontractor experienced in 

providing security guard services. Subsequently, in a process known as 

“alpha contracting,” Army officials worked together with this ANC firm to 

finalize the contract guard performance work statement by refining 

 11The Federal Protective Service’s mission is to provide law enforcement and security 

services to more than 1 million tenants and daily visitors to all federally owned and leased 

facilities nationwide.

12DOD’s Defense Contract Management Agency provides numerous services to DOD 

agencies, including insight into contractor operations to assess and forecast contractor 

cost, schedule, and performance information.

Page 13 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
specific tasks for feasibility and affordability. The resulting performance 

work statement was then used on all of the security guard contracts. 

During a second acquisition phase in September 2003, the Army awarded 

four competed contracts. In evaluating the contractors’ cost proposals for 

the second acquisition phase, the Army recognized that the same 

contractors involved in the first phase submitted cost proposals 

considerably higher than the winning proposals. But the Army turned 

again to these same contractors in phase three, adding 37 more 

installations to the 8(a) sole-source contracts. The Army took this action 

despite knowing that the government was paying considerably less for the 

phase-two competed contracts. An ACA analysis computing the cost per

contract employee showed that the competitive contracts cost about 

25 percent less than the 8(a) sole-source contracts. ACA officials told us 

that the Army returned to the ANC firms in part because doing so was an 

easy method of obtaining additional security guards and because they 

were pleased with the ANC firms’ performance. In addition, IMA officials 

asserted that because the phase three requirements were not finalized 

until within 90 days of when the contract guards were required, a 

competitive solicitation was not possible. 

In phase three, the ANC firms’ contracts were modified to expand the 

ceiling prices to a total value of $480 million each.

13 When modifying the 

contracts, ACA did not comply with a requirement to notify SBA. In 

delegating procurement authority under the 8(a) program to DOD, SBA 

requires that DOD provide a copy of contracts, including modifications, to 

the SBA district office within 15 working days of the date of award or of 

contract modification. The Army contracting officer was unaware of this 

requirement and said she does not send 8(a) modifications to SBA. 

However, after being made aware of this requirement, the contracting 

officer said that contract modifications will be forwarded to the 

appropriate SBA office. 

 13Initially, the caps were increased to a total of $2.1 billion. When we asked for clarification, 

the contracting officer said it was never the Army’s intention to award to that ceiling 

amount, and subsequent contract modifications were executed to decrease the total 

contracts’ value to $480 million each. 

Page 14 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Under the 8(a) program, businesses can subcontract up to 50 percent of 

the personnel costs incurred under each service contract.14 The two ANC 

firms have established agreements with their subcontractors, large 

security guard companies, intended to ensure that the subcontractors 

perform 49 percent of the work, while ANC firms retain 51 percent. As of

December 2005, more than $200 million has been subcontracted under the 

Army’s guard contracts.

ANC Firms Subcontracted 

with Large Security Guard 

Companies 

The ANC firms have taken different approaches to dividing the workload 

with their subcontractors. One divides the workload on an installation 

basis, while the second firm decided to share workload by staffing the 

gates at each installation partially with its own employees and partially 

with the subcontractor’s employees. In the latter case, the guards’ uniform 

patches reflect the names of both companies. 

The Army’s contracting officer is responsible for determining whether the 

ANC firms are complying with the 50-percent limit on subcontracting, but 

this is not being done. The contracting officer told us that the contractors’ 

proposed approach for complying with the limitation on subcontracting is

reviewed each time additional work is awarded to the ANC firms, but 

actual performance is not monitored to ensure compliance. We found 

confusion as to who is responsible for the monitoring. The contracting 

officer pointed to SBA; the contracting officer representative in IMA 

pointed to ACA. In practice, the Army is relying on the prime contractors 

themselves to ensure that their subcontractors stay below the 50-percent 

limit. The two firms told us they monitor their compliance with the 

required 50/50 split. 

 14“Limitations on subcontracting,” FAR 52.219.14. Such nonlabor costs items as weapons 

and uniforms for security guards are provided by the subcontractor and do not apply 

toward the 50-percent limit. 

Page 15 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
The Army’s screening process is unreliable because of lack of adherence 

to Army policy, a time lapse of as much as 2 years from the start of interim 

employment until detailed nationwide background checks are completed; 

and a reliance on job applicants to self-report accurate information on 

their employment application forms. The combined effect of these 

weaknesses has put the Army at risk of staffing its gates with contract 

security guards who are not qualified for the job and in fact has resulted in 

applicants with criminal histories, including felons, being employed as 

guards. We have previously reported on, and made recommendations 

concerning, the inadequacy of screening measures used for contract 

employees with access to military installations and other sensitive areas.

15

Army policy requires all prospective contract guards to undergo a two-part

screening process—an initial screening conducted by the contractor 

followed by a thorough, more detailed screening conducted by the federal

government. Table 3 highlights the activities required for each part of the

process and who is responsible for conducting the various screening 

activities. 

Army Procedures Do 

Not Provide 

Assurance That 

Contract Security 

Guards Are 

Adequately Screened 

Two-Part Screening 

Process Has Significant 

Weaknesses 

Table 3: Highlights of Activities Required under Army’s Two-Part Screening Process 

Part one: initial screening Part two: detailed screening

Who’s responsible: the contractor Who’s responsible: Army officials at each installation 

Required activities: 

Local agency check: Ensure that a local check be conducted 

in the jurisdiction where the applicant has resided during the 

most recent 5-year period; the contractor does not conduct the 

local agency check on its own, but hires a company to conduct 

it, which includes the following: 

• arrest records 

• criminal and civil court records 

References: Contact applicant’s former employers and 

supervisors, former educators, and other personal references 

Education: Check applicant’s educational records 

Finances: Check credit history

Required activities: 

National agency check: the Army official submits a request, along 

with the applicant’s fingerprints, to the Office of Personnel 

Management, which conducts a search to see if the fingerprints 

match any of the ones contained in national databases, which 

include the following: 

• Security/Suitability Investigations Index 

• Defense Clearance and Investigation Index 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation Name Check 

• Federal Bureau of Investigation National Criminal History 

Fingerprint Check 

Time frame for conducting these activities: 

We found it took 1 day to 2 weeks 

Time frame for conducting these activities: 

We found time frames ranging from 1 week to over 2 years

Sources: U.S. Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

 15GAO-03-731NI and GAO-04-851NI. 

Page 16 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
IMA requires contractors to conduct local agency checks before offering 

interim employment to prospective employees. Training, such as firearms 

training and weapons qualifications, cannot begin until the local agency 

checks have been completed and the results are favorable. If the results 

are unfavorable, employment is not offered. 

Weaknesses in the screening process have led to risky situations, as the 

following examples illustrate: 

• A contractor had permitted guards to take firearms training and start 

working even before their local agency checks were completed. 

• In April 2005, the Army found that 61 guards had been put to work at 

one installation even though they had records relating to criminal 

offenses, about two dozen of which involved felonies or domestic 

violence and abuse cases. One of the guards had an active warrant and 

was arrested while performing his duties. The Army found similar 

circumstances at another installation in August 2005 with a different 

contractor. Twenty-eight guards were identified in the Army’s Crime 

Records Center database as having records relating to criminal 

offenses, including assault, larceny, possession and use of controlled 

substances, and forgery. 

• At another location, we found that paperwork to initiate national 

agency checks had not been submitted for any of the 128 guards hired 

during a 2-year period. The contractor had been responsible for 

initiating and submitting these checks between December 2003 and 

March 2004, but did not follow through and was out of compliance with 

the terms of its contract. In March 2004, it became the responsibility of 

installation officials, rather than the contractors, to submit the national

agency checks. However, the officials told us they had not received the 

new direction from IMA and thus did not comply with it. The officials 

said that they have now submitted the required paperwork to initiate 

the national screening process. An IMA official told us that national 

agency checks had never been conducted for guards at another 

installation either. 

• An Army official at another location informed us that national agency 

checks were pending for the 8 guard files we sampled. However, the 

installation’s security office found no record of a national agency check 

ever being initiated for 3 of these guards. 

• At the same installation, when we asked for documentation of 

compliance with the Army’s regulation for certifying the reliability and 

Page 17 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
suitability of prospective and current contract security guards, we were 

provided with documents that were missing key screening information. 

For example, the section addressing the screening of personnel records 

was not completed and the name of the physician conducting the 

medical examination was not included. Also missing was information 

demonstrating that guards had been briefed on the Army’s reliability 

standards and objectives. These documents were all signed and dated

by the Army’s certifying official on the day they were sent to us. 

Moreover, the certifying official did not fill out the section on the form 

indicating whether the individual was or was not suitable for 

employment. 

Initial Screening Process 

Relies on Individuals to 

Self-Report Information 

The Army’s reliance on job applicants to be forthcoming and accurate on 

their application forms affects the quality of the local agency checks. The

contractor asks for typical employment information, such as full name, 

other names or aliases, Social Security number, addresses during the most 

recent five-year period, and employment history. The local agency check is

dependent on full and accurate disclosure on these forms. The contractor

itself does not conduct the check, but hires an outside firm to perform this 

task, and each firm uses the job applicant’s information as a basis for 

conducting the check. If the applicant falsifies information or neglects to 

include former addresses outside the county and state of current 

residence, the local agency check may not search existing records in those 

jurisdictions, and the contractor may never know that the applicant is 

unsuitable for hire. Furthermore, how the checks are conducted varies 

among the different firms. For example, one firm conducted a statewide 

investigation, while another company checked records in all 50 states and 

57 counties. 

Because Army policy allows interim employment after a local agency 

check uncovers no problems, a contract guard who successfully hid a 

criminal history during the job application process could be working at an 

installation gate, using a firearm, until a national agency check discovers 

the truth. When we brought these concerns to IMA officials, they stated 

that permitting interim employment is the fastest, most effective means of 

putting contract guards at the gates. IMA officials also asserted that the 

issues we found only highlight that the contract security program is 

working as intended because individuals with criminal histories ultimately 

were caught. The officials were unwilling to explore other options to 

mitigate the potential risk of having extended periods of time during which 

unsuitable individuals were guarding Army installations. 

Page 18 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
In 2003 and 2004, we reported on the inadequacy of screening measures 

used for contract employees with access to military installations, facilities, 

and sensitive areas, and the risks posed to military forces.16 As a result of 

our work, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Low 

Intensity Conflict, is revising the department’s antiterrorism standards to 

require a more thorough screening of contract personnel, including 

security guards, at military installations. The standards, however, have not 

been completed or approved—and no specific time frame is set for their 

approval. 

DOD Planning Actions to 

Improve Screening 

Process for Contractors 

In addition, in response to a Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

regarding the need to establish a common identification standard for 

federal employees and contractors, DOD is strengthening its screening 

process to include new, secure, and reliable credentials that will be used 

by DOD employees as well as contract personnel. These credentials will 

not be issued unless employees and contract personnel pass the national

agency check. According to DOD’s implementation plan, the revised 

screening improvements are to be implemented by October 2006. The 

Federal Acquisition Regulation has also been amended to require 

contractors to comply with the agency’s personnel identity verification 

process.17 

Between now and when the new screening improvements are 

implemented, the Army could mitigate the risk of hiring personnel with 

criminal records by supplementing the local agency check with 

background information accessed through the Army’s Crime Records 

Center database, which maintains information from Army law 

enforcement records. The Army’s Criminal Investigation Command has 

recommended that these checks be done on prospective security guard 

employees. 

Another supplemental source of information is the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. The 

NCIC database is a national index of theft reports, warrants, missing-

 16GAO-03-731NI and GAO-04-851NI. 

17The revision became effective January 3, 2006, and applies to solicitations and contracts 

issued or awarded on or after October 27, 2005. Contracts awarded before that date 

requiring contractors to have access to a federally-controlled facility or a federal 

information system must be modified by October 27, 2007, pursuant to Federal Acquisition 

Regulation 4.13. 

Page 19 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
persons reports, and other criminal justice information submitted by law 

enforcement agencies across the United States in a secure, electronic 

format in real time. While not a perfect solution, since it also relies in part

on self-reported information, use of this database would give the Army 

access to detailed background information on prospective contract guards 

with far less turnaround time than it currently takes the Office of 

Personnel Management to conduct national agency checks. In fact, the 

Army’s Criminal Investigation Command recommends use of the NCIC 

database. Some Army installations, concerned about the time lapse 

between the local and the national agency checks, have used it to mitigate 

what they perceive as risks associated with hiring guards based only on

the local agency check. IMA officials, however, have repeatedly instructed

installations not to use the NCIC database, citing an Army policy from 

1993 that, they assert, does not permit its use. An IMA official told us that 

the purpose of requiring the contractor to perform the screening function

is to reduce the Army’s costs and to streamline the background check

process with, IMA asserts, adequate results. 

During our review, officials from the Office of the Provost Marshal General 

told us that they recognized the need for interim improvements in the 

screening process and said they would contact the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation to explore the feasibility of the Army using the NCIC 

database. 

The Army may not have in place adequately trained contract security 

guards protecting its installations because contractors are given 

responsibility to conduct nearly all of the training; and neither IMA nor 

Army installation personnel provide sufficient oversight to know whether 

training is actually conducted in accordance with contractual provisions, 

training records are accurate and complete, and contractors are adhering 

to standards. We found instances where the contractors were not 

complying with requirements to track and maintain records of employee

training and where contractors’ training techniques were inconsistent. 

The Army requires contractors to train their guards in 19 competencies 

listed in table 4. 

Lax Oversight and 

Training Irregularities 

Raise Doubts About 

the Adequacy of the 

Guards’ Training 

Weaknesses in Army’s

Training Program Include 

Inadequate Oversight, Poor 

Record keeping, and Lack 

of Compliance with 

Standards 

Page 20 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Table 4: Contractors’ Training Requirements 

1. Use of force 

2. Antiterrorism, threats, definition, and identification 

3. Security operations, basic functions, patrolling techniques and responsibilities 

4. Response to hostage situations; initial actions prior to military police response 

5. Personnel identification procedures, package and vehicle search procedures, and 

contraband identification/seizure procedures

6. Firearm (pistol and/or shotgun) qualification and safety 

7. Unarmed self-defense 

8. Oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray techniques, use, and application 

9. Nightstick and police baton use and techniques 

10. Clearing, securing, and protecting crime scene

11. Use of interpersonal skills, verbal skills, de-escalation, nonverbal actions 

12. Techniques for searches, Fourth Amendment rights, consent and seizure 

13. Application of handcuffs 

14. Hand and arm signals, basic traffic control techniques 

15. Recording of police information and sworn statements 

16. Contract security guard authority and jurisdiction 

17. Prevention of sexual harassment 

18. Customer service 

19. Military customs and courtesies

Source: Army (data); GAO (presentation). 

The Army requires that the contractors conduct training in these 19 areas 

before the guards are put to work and annually thereafter. 

While contractors are required to make training records and certifications 

available for Army installations to review, Army personnel are not required 

to certify the training. Even though some installations officials said they 

have taken the initiative to have their performance monitors observe the 

guard training on a periodic basis, we found at 4 installations that 

monitoring of the training is not consistently done, if at all. According to

IMA officials, government monitors should be supervising the contractors 

on a daily basis and should be observing guard training in accordance with 

the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan.18 We found, however, that 

Government Oversight Lacking 

 18The purpose of the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan is to ensure that the security 

guard contractor meets the objectives of the performance work statement. The plan is 

intended to provide installation monitors an effective and systematic surveillance method 

for the services listed in the performance work statement. 

Page 21 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
training is not referenced in the plan. In fact, the plan states that the 

government is responsible for ensuring its stated needs are met while 

allowing the contractor sufficient latitude to allow accomplishment of the 

desired task with a “minimum of oversight.” 

Lack of government oversight may have contributed to a situation where a

contractor’s training records were falsified. In 2005, an investigation 

discovered that contractor personnel at one installation had falsified 

training records relating to firearms qualification. The contractor 

subsequently determined that its employees had not followed the 

company’s procedures and had validated training for individuals who had 

in fact not properly qualified. The installation required the guards to be 

requalified in firearms, which cost the Army over $7,000. At least three 

guards could not qualify. The supervisor of the guards and training officer 

involved in the incidents were terminated by the contractor. According to

Army officials at that installation, they have since stepped up their on-site 

observations of the weapons training. 

We found that poor documentation in the training files also contributed to 

some installations not knowing whether guard training is meeting contract 

requirements. Our analysis of individual training records found several 

instances of missing documentation and irregularities. Each of the 

installations we visited documented and maintained the training records 

differently. The lack of detail, in some cases, would make it impossible for 

a government performance monitor to know whether the guards had been 

trained as required. We also found that at three installations, the 

contractor had certified security guards as trained before records 

indicated that the training had been completed, including one case where 

a guard was certified before the weapons qualification training had even 

started. At another installation, officials determined the guards did not 

need to train in one or more of the specific training topics found in the 

performance work statement. However, according to installation officials, 

IMA was not informed of this decision, nor was this deviation noted in 

individual training records. 

Training Records Incomplete 

While the Army requires contractors to train their employees in the 

19 competency areas, it is left to the contractors to determine how to 

structure the training. The Army provides little guidance in terms of 

training content or techniques. As a result, we found a lack of

standardization across installations. For example: 

Training Techniques and Tasks 

Not Standardized 

• weapons training conducted in a simulation room with moving targets 

versus only classroom lectures; 

Page 22 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
• prospective guards given unlimited tries to pass weapons training 

versus being allowed only three tries;

• firearm training conducted within the first 3 days of training—because 

this is an area prospective guards are likely to fail—versus during the 

third week of training; and 

• a subcontractor using its own, detailed weapons re-qualification policy 

that the prime contractor has not endorsed and does not follow. 

Because the contractors have a large amount of leeway in how they 

conduct the training, this variation is not surprising. 

Potential Improvements 

for Contract Security 

Guard Training 

While the Army does not require its performance monitors to oversee 

contract security guard training, other federal agencies do require such 

government oversight. For example, the Air Force and the Federal 

Protective Service, both of which use contract guards, require government

officials to observe and certify that the guards have successfully

completed weapons-firing qualification. 

Also, we have previously reported on the benefits of centralized

development of training content, including standardization.19 Centralizing 

design can enhance consistency of training content and offer potential 

cost savings. Additionally, centralization can help agencies realize cost 

savings through standardization of record keeping and simplified and 

more accurate reporting on courses, certifications, educational attainment, 

costs, or standards. The Transportation Security Administration, for 

example, has taken several steps to strengthen its review of air carriers’ 

crew member security training curriculum. These steps include developing 

a standard review form for inspectors and trainers to use to enhance 

consistency in the review process.20

Based on our review of a draft IMA document, the Army is considering a 

requirement that the contractors submit periodic status reports specific to 

each installation, using a standard form that includes an update on 

 19GAO-04-546G. 

20GAO, Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 

Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed, GAO-05-781 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005). 

Page 23 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
training. This training update would include the number of new hires 

trained, annual refreshers and continuing education classes, and weapons 

qualifications. In December 2005, IMA officials conducted a briefing to the 

installation monitors that discussed the need to inspect training and 

training records. 

The Army’s strategy of using award fees to motivate contractors has 

resulted in over $18 million in fee payouts for complying with the basic 

contractual requirements—not for exceeding what the contract requires. 

We identified a number of concerns with the award-fee process and 

question the continued need for award fees under the security guard 

program. 

Each of the Army’s security guard contracts uses the same award-fee plan,

which spells out criteria for evaluating contractor performance, and the 

final ratings dictate how much money is to be paid in award fees. In our 

comparison of the award-fee plan with the contract’s statement of work, 

we found that the award fee is not designed to elicit “above-and-beyond” 

performance. Rather, the award-fee plan merely requires contractors to 

meet contractual requirements. 

Continued Need for 

Award Fees Is 

Questionable 

Award-Fee Plan Rewards 

Basic Compliance 

The evaluations are conducted on a semiannual basis. Each of four awardfee factors is worth a certain percentage of the total score. In addition, 

under each factor, a score between 0 and 100 can be given. A score from 

91 to 100 is considered excellent performance, 81 to 90 is very good, 70 to

80 good. A score of 69 or below is considered satisfactory or below 

performance, resulting in no award fee. See table 5 for an overview of the 

award-fee factors used in conducting the semiannual evaluations. 

Page 24 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Table 5: Criteria Used to Evaluate Contractors’ Performance 

Factor Selected subfactors

Achieving/maintaining full operational 

capability (20%) 

• Extent to which contractor achieves and maintains required level of guard coverage 

• Responsiveness, alertness, physical fitness, courtesy of guards 

Proper control of access to the 

installation/controlled facilities (30%) 

• Denying access when proper in both actual circumstances and government 

surveillance or blind tests 

Effective contribution to a positive Army 

image in the installation and surrounding 

community and effective management of 

guard improprieties (30%) 

• Proper appearance, to include appropriate uniform 

• Interaction with the public and DOD personnel 

• Appropriate conduct in the community while off-duty 

• Extent to which contractor effectively responds to incidents of employee misconduct 

or allegations of impropriety 

Cooperation with IMA and Army 

commands; sound management of 

government property (20%) 

• Effectively works with the Army organization to jointly and effectively resolve security 

services-related questions, problems, and issues that arise during contract

performance 

• Extent to which contractor personnel demonstrate the ability to respond to duty 

changes and contingencies that may arise 

• Assist with the effective management and maintenance of government resources 

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Army Has Awarded Almost

All Available Award-Fees 

As of February 1, 2006, a total of $18.76 million in award fees was available 

in the contract guard program. Only $0.42 million or almost 2 percent was 

not earned by the contractors. As figure 2 shows, IMA has authorized 

almost all of its available award fees.

Figure 2: Comparison of Contract Security Guard Award Fees Authorized and Not 

Earned as of February 1, 2006 (dollars in millions) 

$0.4

Award fees not earned

$18.3

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Award fees authorized

Page 25 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
The Army’s practice of routinely paying its contractors nearly the entire

available award fee creates an environment where contractors expect to 

receive most of the available fee, regardless of acquisition outcomes. We 

recently reported that DOD frequently pays most of the available award 

fee to contractors regardless of their performance outcomes.21

The award fees being paid to the security guard contractors are in addition

to the profit they have already built into their prices. We found that under 

the terms of their contracts, not all of the contractors are eligible to 

receive the same percentage of award fee—even though they are all 

performing under the same performance work specification. Three of the 

four contractors negotiated a fee equal to 5 percent of their annual 

contract value, but the other negotiated only 3 percent. One contractor 

told us that it offered to reduce its fee but ACA officials refused, stating 

that they believed the 5 percent fee was necessary to motivate 

performance. 

Army Performance 

Monitors Not Consistently 

Complying with Award-Fee 

Plan 

Among the criteria used to rate the contractors’ performance are the 

results of on-site inspections of the guards. Army performance monitors 

are required to conduct inspections, evaluate performance, take into 

account any comments from persons who have had dealings with the 

guards, assign ratings commensurate with performance, and report their 

ratings to IMA’s award-fee review board. The board comprises members 

familiar with the contract requirements, and the board makes the final 

recommendation to IMA’s award-fee determining official about how much 

the contractors should receive in award fees. 

We found that at over half of the 11 Army installations we visited, the 

government monitors rated performance without having conducted all of 

the required inspections. Several monitors stated that limited resources 

prevented them from conducting the inspections. Three monitors told us 

they have not been conducting weekly checks of the contractors’ 

performance. Another monitor said it was a “waste of time” to go around 

counting guards to ensure the contractor has provided enough employees 

to meet contract requirements. Several monitors told us that they are not 

conducting the required blind checks, where they attempt to get on base 

using false identification. In one case, the monitor said this check is 

impractical because the contract guards know him by sight. One monitor 

 21GAO-06-66. 

Page 26 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
told us that in deriving the ratings, he starts at 100 and lowers the rating if 

there are inadequacies in performance. 

Lack of guidance from IMA was a complaint among the monitors we 

interviewed. For example, several monitors told us that they have no

quantifiable way of determining whether a contractor who performs in an 

excellent manner in a certain evaluation factor should receive a score of

91 or 100. For lack of any other method, they ultimately use subjective 

reasoning to make their decisions. Several monitors have taken it upon 

themselves to establish their own methods for determining where the 

ratings should fall. One created a checklist that he fills in each week, and 

at the end of each evaluation period the weekly ratings are used to derive 

an overall rating. Another convenes a “mini” award-fee board at the 

installation to obtain formal input from other government officials familiar 

with the contractor’s performance. Actions such as these demonstrate that 

some monitors are attempting to inject more rigor into the award-fee 

process, but the result is a lack of uniformity in criteria for determining 

award-fee payouts. Although monitors said they have brought this issue to 

IMA’s attention, the agency has not issued any clarifying guidance. IMA 

and ACA officials indicated they believe the award-fee plan provides 

sufficient guidance for the performance monitors to follow. 

IMA Award-Fee Board Has 

Recommended 

Consistently High Ratings 

March/April 2005 marked the end of an award fee evaluation period. Our 

analysis found that, of the 50 recommendations given by the award fee 

board to the fee determining official, all were in the “excellent” range, with 

29 receiving scores of 100 percent and 10 others receiving 99 percent. 

None fell below 91 percent. Table 6 shows that this result is typical of the 

pattern over the life of the contract guard program, with 66 percent of 

contractor evaluations receiving a score of 99 or 100 percent.

Page 27 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Table 6: Evaluations and Percentage of Fees Authorized as of February 1, 2006 

Percentage of

available fees

authorized

Number of 

evaluations

Cumulative 

percentage 

of evaluations

Total award fees 

authorized (in millions 

of dollars)

100 89 53 $8.57

99 23 66 $3.19

97 - 98 28 83 $2.83

94 – 96 16 92 $2.52

90 - 93 8 97 $0.58

Less than 90 5 100 $0.65

Total 169 $18.34

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

Award-Fee Board’s 

Processes Lack Rigor 

We found that IMA’s award-fee board did not always carefully review 

performance monitors’ input in making award fee determinations. An IMA 

official said that “rubber stamping” by the board may have led to an error 

that we found in the course of our audit work. During the March/April 

2005 evaluation period, the board mistakenly reviewed an evaluation 

report covering the wrong period and recommended 99 percent of the 

available award fee be paid to the contractor at the time this contractor 

was under investigation for falsifying training records. To rectify the error, 

the board later recommended lowering the score from 99 to 90 percent of 

the available award fee amount. The government monitor at this 

installation was unaware that the board had reviewed the wrong report or

that it had initially awarded the contractor 99 percent of the award fee. 

IMA’s appeals process also raises questions about the integrity of the 

award-fee process. During the March/April 2005 evaluation period, the 

award-fee board raised over 25 percent of performance monitors’ ratings. 

Sometimes the board raised the scores unilaterally because members 

believed the monitors were being too critical of the contractor’s 

performance. Sometimes the scores were raised because the performance 

monitors did not, in the board’s view, provide sufficient narrative to 

support their scores. In these cases, the board normally raised the scores 

without contacting the monitors for additional support. In reviewing 

performance evaluations, we found that some performance monitors, on

the basis of poor contractor performance, gave the contractors relatively 

low ratings—in the “good” range with a score between 70 and 80—but the 

IMA board often raised the scores. For example, for the “sound 

management of government property” factor, a performance monitor 

Page 28 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
provided a score of 80 because the contractor had three vehicular 

accidents. IMA raised the score for this factor to 95 because the contractor

remedied the problem and paid for damages. This action resulted in the 

contractor receiving an overall performance score of 99 and almost 

$55,000 in award fees for that period. 

Contractors, upon receiving award-fee evaluations, are allowed to rebut 

the scores, either in person or by letter. The board has raised ratings after 

hearing rebuttals during the appeals process, but it is not IMA’s policy to 

inform performance monitors when their submitted scores are changed. In

the March/April 2005 evaluation period, IMA adjusted 14 of the 

50 performance monitor assessments. IMA raised the scores for 13 of 

them—increases ranging from 2 to 15 percent—and lowered the score for 

one by 6 percent. In one case, a performance monitor reported that the 

contract guards were not able to detect a fake installation vehicle pass, 

which was presented to gain access at nine different control points. The 

performance monitor also reported that five guards, in violation of 

standard operating procedures and Army regulation, fired on a vehicle 

leaving the installation. After the contractor appealed the score, IMA 

raised the rating of 90 (very good) to 96 (excellent), awarding the 

contractor almost $246,000. 

In another case, a performance monitor had deducted 10 points under the 

factor “effective contribution to a positive Army image,” in part because a

contractor employee had been arrested off-post with 100 prestamped 

passes to the base in his possession. The contractor protested its rating, 

arguing that the incident occurred off-post and involved no negative

publicity. IMA added back 2 points, awarding the contractor almost 

$97,000. 

We also found that in one case, IMA reduced the installation monitor 

performance rating from 99.1 to 93.1 points, both scores considered 

excellent, because the contractor had refused to provide pepper spray to 

its guards, as required. Even though the contractor was not in compliance 

with the contract, over $100,000 in award fee was authorized. 

Continued Need for Award 

Fee Questionable 

During the acquisition planning for the guard contracts, ACA’s contract 

attorney questioned the appropriateness of using an award fee. In his 

memorandum to the contracting officer, he stated that the government has 

already dictated the standards to the contractor in the statement of work, 

and if those standards are insufficient, the government should raise the 

standards. The attorney concluded that he was unconvinced that adding 

Page 29 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
an award fee made good business sense and was in the best interest of the 

government. Nevertheless, ACA prepared a written justification for use of 

award fees which asserts, among other reasons, that award fees were 

needed to motivate the contractors because of the “extremely subjective” 

nature of the performance evaluation. The Federal Acquisition Regulation

states that fixed-price contracts, where the contractor’s profit is already 

built into the base price, may include award fees to motivate a contractor 

when other incentives cannot be used because the contractor’s 

performance cannot be measured objectively. However, IMA’s award-fee 

plan sets forth a number of objective factors, such as providing the 

required coverage at the gates and wearing proper uniforms, on which 

monitors are to base their ratings. 

ACA’s justification also states that the award fee is needed to motivate a 

“better than satisfactory” performance. As discussed above, the 

contractors are merely required to comply with the basic terms of the 

contract, not to perform above and beyond, to earn the fee. The initial 

stated intent of having the award fee was that the fee would motivate the 

contractors to provide security guards as quickly as possible—within 90 

days or fewer of contract award. The award-fee plan was subsequently

modified to remove the 90-day requirement now that guards are in place, 

and it now reflects the evaluation criteria outlined in table 5. The Army’s 

continued need to use award fees well after the contractors have achieved 

full operational capability is unclear. IMA officials said they like the award 

fee because it gives them leverage to deal with the contractors and results 

in the contractors being more responsive. 

In addition, the ACA contracting officer, who is handling all of the Army’s 

guard contracts and task orders, told us she finds the award-fee 

administration time-consuming and cumbersome, because she must 

modify each task order every 6 months to reflect the award-fee decisions. 

We found errors in the administration of the program. For example, in one 

incident the contractor was overpaid $47,548, but this administrative error 

was not recognized for over a year. In two other examples, award fees 

were based on an incorrect amount and the contractor was underpaid by 

about $130,000. 

Page 30 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2005 extended the waiver authority for hiring contract guards through 

September 2006, but the extension hinged in part on a required report by 

DOD on its contract guard program. The report, “Department of Defense 

Installation Security Guard Requirement Assessment and Plan,” was 

delivered to Congress on November 22, 2005. The report addresses Army, 

Navy, and Air Force experience with contract guards. On the basis of our 

work with the Army, which has acquired the vast majority of contract 

guards, we believe additional observations should be provided on some of 

the report’s statements. 

DOD Report to 

Congress Does Not 

Address Some Key 

Issues Pertaining to 

the Army’s Guard 

Program 

• The report describes the use of contract security guards as “costeffective,” but at the same time states that the Air Force has 

determined that cost-effectiveness must be determined base by base 

because of differing locations and economic circumstances. We found 

during our review that the issue of cost-effectiveness is not clear-cut. In 

fact, there are differing opinions on this subject even within the Army. 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army’s Director for Programs 

and Strategy prepared an independent cost evaluation in April 2005

entitled “Contracting Versus Using Department of the Army Civilians to 

Provide Installation Security.” The study found that using Department 

of the Army civilian guards is significantly less costly than using 

contract guards. IMA officials disagree, emphasizing that the cost 

evaluation does not calculate the challenges imposed by the Army’s 

current personnel system in hiring civilians or the benefit of 

contracting this function in the flexibility it offers IMA. 

• The report states that “assessments to date determined that they 

[contract guards] perform on par with military security guards.” When 

we asked the report’s working group chairman for the basis for this 

statement, we were told that input from installation officials had been 

obtained. IMA officials, who assisted in writing the report, told us that 

the assessments refer to the award-fee performance evaluations. Those 

evaluations, however, are used to determine how the contractors, not 

individual contract guards, are performing; they do not compare 

contract guards with military security guards. 

• The report states that “contracts for security services are specific 

concerning the training, performance and supervision of security 

guards. Effective oversight ensures that installation and facility 

security is not diminished.” We found that the oversight function 

performed by the Army, specifically training, needs improvement. 

Page 31 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
• The report cites quality assurance surveillance plans that are supposed 

to be prepared by government representatives and used by installation 

performance monitors. We found that the Army’s quality assurance 

surveillance plan, which applies to each of the 57 installations using 

contract security guards, mirrors the award-fee plan, which 

performance monitors have found to be unclear.

• The report states that “on-site visits of installations by the headquarters 

of the respective services are conducted to ensure proper enforcement 

of the performance work statements.” However, IMA officials did not 

visit all 57 installations. In fact, they told us that in 2005, they

conducted 17 on-site visits to enforce the performance work statement. 

At the 11 installations we visited, we found that improvements were 

needed in training and screening oversight. At one installation, it took 

over 2 years before IMA found that the contractor and the installation 

were not in compliance with the performance work statement. 

• The report states that “local security checks and National Agency 

Checks are performed on all prospective employees.” As we found 

during our review of the Army’s guard program, weaknesses in the 

screening process have led to unscreened personnel guarding the gates, 

and the checks had not been performed on all contract guards. 

• The report characterizes the contracts to the ANC firms as set-aside 

8(a). Set-aside 8(a) generally refers to cases when there will be 

competition among 8(a) firms. In fact, these were sole-source contracts 

under the 8(a) program. According to ACA officials, future reports will 

make this clarification. 

To make the best use of taxpayer dollars and achieve its desired outcomes 

in relying on contractors to guard military installations, the Army requires 

sound acquisition planning, leading to prudent contract awards, and 

rigorous monitoring of contractor performance. A lack of diligence in 

these areas, coupled with the practice of awarding fees for compliance 

with basic contractual requirements, indicates that the Army needs to do

more to achieve its goals. The Army needs to take a stronger role in 

overseeing contractor performance, and we believe a reassessment of the 

acquisition approach is called for. 

Conclusion 

Page 32 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
We are making the following seven recommendations to the Secretary of 

Defense to improve management and oversight of the contract security 

guard program. We recommend that the Secretary of the Army be directed

to take the following seven actions: 

• Direct the ACA to take the following two actions: 

• reassess its acquisition strategy for contract security guards, using 

competitive procedures for future contracts and/or task orders, 

• remove award-fee provisions from future contracts and task orders 

under existing contracts.

• Direct IMA to take the following four actions: 

• monitor the status of DOD’s revised antiterrorism standards and 

implement them into Army policy for screening of contract security 

guards as deemed suitable, 

• direct installations to use the Army’s Crime Records Center and the 

National Crime Information Center databases to supplement initial 

screening (local agency check) of contract security guards until the 

new standards are in effect, 

• issue a standardized recordkeeping format for contractors to show 

that the guards have met all training requirements, and 

• require installation performance monitors to review training files to 

ensure that initial training certification is achieved as well as 

subsequent annual recertification. 

• Direct the Office of the Provost Marshal General to require an Army 

official to monitor and certify contractor training of guards, especially 

weapons-qualification training. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In 

written comments, DOD agreed with the findings and stated that the 

Department of the Army is implementing the seven recommendations. 

DOD stated that these recommendations will strengthen the contracting 

process and help ensure that the department receives the best security 

guard support available.

The department’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Secretary of the Army, the Director of the Office of Management and 

Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will make copies 

Recommendations 

Agency Comments 

Page 33 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
available to others upon request. This report will also be available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please contact me at (202) 512-4841or Schinasik@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were 

David E. Cooper, Director; Michele Mackin, Assistant Director; 

Noah Bleicher; Lily Chin; Todd Dice; Paul Gvoth; Arthur James Jr.; 

Robert Rapasky; Holly Reil; and Russ Reiter. 

Katherine V. Schinasi, Managing Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 34 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have employed contract security 

guards under the congressional waiver authority. At the time of our 

review, the Marine Corps had not yet used the authority. We focused our

review on the Army’s use of contract security guards because it (1) was 

the first activity to use the waiver authority and (2) had used the authority 

substantially more than the Air Force or Navy. The first Army contract 

security guard contract was awarded in July 2003, whereas the Air Force

and Navy contracts did not start until May and June 2004, respectively. In

addition, the Army has contracted for security guards at 57 installations, 

whereas contract security guards are being used at 18 Air Force and 

5 Navy installations. 

During our audit, we conducted interviews with Army officials from the 

Installation Management Agency (IMA), the Army Contracting Agency, and 

the Office of the Provost Marshal General. We visited 11 Army installations 

that are currently using contract security guards and met with government 

and contractor officials at each location. Officials from these 

11 installations are responsible for a total of 14 different installations. 

These installations represent approximately 25 percent of the 

57 installations that have the contract security guard program in place. We 

used two factors to determine which installations to visit: the contractor 

and the March/April 2005 performance monitor assessments. Our analysis 

of these evaluations ensured we visited at least 1 installation per 

contractor that had a perfect score, where the average of the four awardfee rating categories was 100 percent--typically, these were locations IMA 

had recommended we visit. To provide a balanced view, we then chose 

2 other locations for each contractor with lower averages and a wide 

variation in the range of scores for the categories. We visited 

3 installations per contractor, except in the case of Coastal International 

Security, which provides guards at only 2 locations. 

At the 11 installations, we collected an arbitrary sample of the personnel 

files, including screening and training records. We met with officials 

responsible for and collected documentation related to the contract 

security guard program at (1) Adelphi Laboratory Center, (2) Fort Belvoir, 

(3) Fort Campbell, (4) Fort Detrick, (5) Fort Drum, (6) Fort Eustis/Fort 

Story, (7) Fort Meade, (8) Fort Myer/Fort McNair, (9) Redstone Arsenal, 

(10) Fort Riley, and (11) Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Airfield. We also met 

with officials from the four contractors and two subcontractors that 

provide guard services to the Army: Akal Security, Alutiiq Security and 

Technology (with Wackenhut Services as a subcontractor), Chenega 

Integrated Systems (with Vance Federal Security Services as a 

subcontractor), and Coastal International Security. We also consulted with 

Page 35 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

officials from the Army Audit Agency, Air Force Audit Agency, and the 

Army Criminal Investigation Command. 

To address the Army’s acquisition strategy, we reviewed the various 

proposals for and the ultimate acquisition plan used by the Army 

Contracting Agency. We reviewed Defense Contract Management Agency

analysis on the Alaska Native corporation (ANC) firms. We also reviewed 

federal regulations pertaining to ANCs under the Small Business 

Administration’s 8(a) Business Development Program. We reviewed each

contract and its subsequent modifications. We analyzed the task orders to 

determine the cost of the different contract vehicles the Army used to 

obtain its contract security guards. We compared the Army’s acquisition 

strategy with that of other agencies using contract security guards, 

specifically the U.S. Air Force and the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Federal Protective Service. We also held discussions with officials from 

these two agencies. 

To assess whether the Army ensures that the contract security guards are

effectively screened, we reviewed screening requirements in the 

performance work statement and analyzed the selected personnel 

screening files at the 11 installations we visited. We reviewed screening 

requirements the Air Force and Federal Protective Service have for their 

contract security guards. We interviewed officials at the installations, 

including contractors, and IMA. We shared the specific results of our file 

review of screening records with installation and contractor officials. We 

reviewed our prior reports on combating terrorism1

 and consulted with 

representatives from the Department of Defense’s Office of Special 

Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. 

To determine whether the Army ensures the contract security guards are 

adequately trained, we reviewed the training requirements outlined in the 

performance work statement and Army regulation 190-56, The Army 

Civilian Police and Security Guard Program (June 1995), in addition to 

analyzing the sample of personnel training files at the 11 installations we 

visited. We interviewed installation officials, including contractors, and 

IMA. We shared the specific results of our file review of training records 

with installation and contractor officials. We reviewed the report on the 

falsification of training records prepared by a contractor and consulted 

 1

GAO-04-851NI and GAO-03-731NI. 

Page 36 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

with an official from the Defense Criminal Investigative Service. We also 

reviewed the training requirements for contract security guards at the Air 

Force and the Federal Protective Service. 

To assess the Army’s rationale for providing the contractors with award 

fees and how the award fee process is being implemented, we reviewed 

the Federal Acquisition Regulation to determine what circumstances are 

appropriate for using an award fee with a firm fixed-price contract.2

 We 

reviewed the Army Contracting Agency’s “Contract Incentives Guide” 

(November 2004), and our recent report Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has 

Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition 

Outcomes (December 2005).3

 We compared the government monitors’ 

evaluation reports with the criteria in the award-fee plan as well as with 

the final scores approved by the IMA fee determining official. We analyzed 

the requirements in the performance work statement and compared them 

with the award fee-plan. Because the Army does not maintain information 

on how much it is paying in award fees, we reviewed each task order to 

identify the award fees authorized and whether contract modifications 

were executed. At each of the installations visited, we discussed the 

award-fee process with the performance monitors and obtained their 

observations and concerns. 

We conducted our review from May 2005 to February 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 2

Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.404. 

3

GAO-06-66

Page 37 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Appendix II: List of Army 

Installations Using Contract 

Security Guards

Installation Contractor PhaseaCompetition

Adelphi Laboratory Center Chenega Integrated Systemsb3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Anniston Army Depot Akal Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Barnes Building Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Belvoir Coastal International Security, Inc. 2 Full & Open 

Fort Benning Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Bliss Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Blue Grass Army Depot Akal Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Fort Bragg Alutiiq Security & Technology 1 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Campbell Akal Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Carlisle Barracks Alutiiq Security & Technology 1 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Carson Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Detrick Chenega Integrated Systems 1 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Detroit Arsenal/Selfridge and Sebille Manor Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Drum Coastal International Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Dugway Proving Grounds Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Eustis/Fort Story Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Gordon Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Greely Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Hood Akal Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Fort Huachuca Chenega Integrated Systems 1 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Irwin Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Jackson Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Knox Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Leavenworth Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Lee Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Leonard Wood Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Letterkenny Army Depot Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Lewis Akal Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Fort McPherson/Fort Gillem Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Meade Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point Akal Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Fort Monmouth Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Monroe Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Myer/Fort McNair Chenega Integrated Systems 1 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Natick Soldier Systems Center Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Picatinny Arsenal Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Appendix II: List of Army Installations Using 

Contract Security Guards 

Page 38 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Appendix II: List of Army 

Installations Using Contract 

Security Guards

Installation Contractor PhaseaCompetition

Fort Polk Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Presidio of Monterey Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Red River Army Depot Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Redstone Arsenal Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Richardson Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Riley Akal Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Fort Sam Houston Chenega Integrated Systems 1 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Sierra Army Depot Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Sill Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) Sole-Source 

Fort Stewart/Hunter Army Airfield Akal Security, Inc. 2 Full & open 

Tooele Army Depot Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Fort Wainwright Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Walter Reed Army Medical Center Chenega Integrated Systems 1 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

U.S. Military Academy at West Point Alutiiq Security & Technology 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

White Sands Missile Range Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Yuma Proving Grounds Chenega Integrated Systems 3 ANC- 8(a) sole-source 

Source: Army (data); GAO (analysis and presentation). 

a Phase 1: Installations obtaining contract security guards starting in fiscal year 2003 from the ANCs’ 

sole-source contracts under the 8(a) program. 

Phase 2: Installations obtaining contract security guards under the full and open competition 

contracts. 

Phase 3: Installations obtaining contract security guards starting in fiscal year 2004 and later from the 

ANCs’ sole-source contracts under the 8(a) program. 

b Chenega Technical Products received the original contract award; it subsequently changed its name 

to Chenega Integrated Systems effective December 7, 2004. 

Page 39 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Appendix III: Agency Comments 

Page 40 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
Page 41 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract Security Guards
(120452) 

Page 42 GAO-06-284 DOD Contract SecurityGuards
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