a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to Congressional Committees

April 2006 UNITED NATIONS

Procurement Internal 

Controls Are Weak

GAO-06-577
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2006

UNITED NATIONS

Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak 

Highlights of GAO-06-577, a report to 

congressional committees 

For more than a decade, experts 

have called on the United Nations 

(UN) Secretariat to correct serious

deficiencies in its procurement 

process. Recent evidence of 

corruption and mismanagement in 

procurement suggests that millions 

of dollars contributed to the UN by

the United States and other 

member states are at risk of fraud,

waste and abuse. During the last

decade, UN procurement has more 

than tripled to more than $1.6

billion in 2005, largely due to 

expanding UN peacekeeping

operations. More than a third of

that amount is procured by UN 

peacekeeping field missions. 

To review the UN’s internal

controls over procurement, GAO 

assessed key control elements, 

including (1) the overall control

environment and (2) specific

control activities aimed at

providing reasonable assurance 

that staff are complying with 

directives. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the State 

Department work with member

states to encourage the UN to 

establish clear lines of authority, 

enhance training, adopt ethics

guidance, establish an independent

bid protest mechanism, and 

implement other steps to improve 

UN procurement. GAO provided 

State and the UN with an 

opportunity to comment on a draft 

of this report. State endorsed

GAO’s recommendations. The UN

chose not to provide comments. 

Weak internal controls over UN headquarters and peacekeeping 

procurement operations expose UN resources to significant risk of waste, 

fraud, and abuse. The UN’s overall control environment for procurement is

weakened by the absence of (1) an effective organizational structure, (2) a 

commitment to a professional workforce, and (3) specific ethics guidance

for procurement staff. GAO found that leadership responsibilities for UN 

procurement are highly diffused. While the UN Department of Management 

is responsible for UN procurement, field procurement staff are instead 

supervised by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which 

currently lacks the expertise and capacities needed to manage field 

procurement activities. Also, the UN has not demonstrated a commitment to 

maintaining a qualified, professional procurement workforce. It has not 

established training requirements or a procurement career path. In 

addition, the UN has yet to establish specific ethics guidance for 

procurement staff in response to long-standing mandates by the UN General 

Assembly, despite recent findings of unethical behavior. 

Diffusion of Leadership Responsibilities for UN Procurement 

Source: GAO.

Department of Management

Office of Mission Support

Lack of procurement

expertise

These field missions

include 15 peacekeeping 

missions, as well as

political and other missions.

Procurement Service 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Delegation of procurement authority

Lack of supervisory oversight over procurement

Entities conducting procurement

Absence of procurement expertise

Field mission

chief procurement officer

Responsible

for

overall 

procurement

GAO also found weaknesses in key control activities. For example, the UN 

has not addressed workload and resource problems that are impeding the 

ability of a key committee to review high-value contracts. Also, the UN has 

yet to establish an independent process to review vendor complaints, 

despite long-standing recommendations that it do so. In addition, the UN 

has not updated its procurement manual since 2004. As a result of these and 

other weaknesses, many millions of dollars in U.S. and other member state 

contributions could be vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-577.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Thomas Melito 

at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-06-577 United Nations

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 7

The Control Environment over UN Procurement Is Weak 12

The UN Has Weaknesses in Key Procurement Control Activities 20

The UN Has Not Comprehensively Assessed Procurement Risks 26

Fragmented Information Systems Impede UN Procurement 28

Procurement Managers Lack Mechanisms to Monitor Procurement 

and Rely on Oversight Entities 28

The United States Has Recently Taken Steps to Support UN 

Procurement Reform 33

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 34

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35

Appendixes

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 37

Appendix II: UN Procurement Processes 42

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State 44

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 47

Related GAO Products 48

Figures Figure 1: Major Commodities Purchased in 2004 8

Figure 2: UN Peacekeeping Expenditures and Military Personnel, 

1999-2005 10

Figure 3: UN Headquarters and Peacekeeping Procurement for 

2004 11

Figure 4: Supervisory Oversight and Delegation of Field 

Procurement Authority 13

Figure 5: Peacekeeping and Other Missions Administered by the 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations 40

Figure 6: Procurement Process in the Field 42

Figure 7: Procurement Process in UN Headquarters for Contracts 

Greater Than $200,000 43
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-577 United Nations

Abbreviations

JIU Joint Inspection Unit

OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services

UN United Nations

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-06-577 United Nations

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

April 25, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Norm Coleman

Chairman

The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Lantos

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on International Relations

House of Representatives

The United Nations (UN) Secretariat procured more than $1.6 billion in 

goods and services in 2005, primarily to support a peacekeeping program 

that has more than quadrupled in size since 1999.1

 For more than a decade, 

experts have called on the UN to correct serious deficiencies in its 

procurement process. However, audits and investigations continue to 

uncover evidence of corruption and mismanagement in the UN’s 

procurement activities. For example, in 2005, a former UN procurement 

officer pled guilty to charges of accepting money from vendors seeking 

contracts. In 2006, the UN placed eight officials on administrative leave 

pending the outcome of an ongoing investigation involving procurement 

activities. Four of the officials were in the Department of Management, 

which is responsible for all UN procurement functions—including 

establishing procurement policies through its UN Procurement Service and 

approving high-value contracts. The remaining four staff were from the 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Procurement staff in field 

peacekeeping missions procure goods and services amounting to more 

than one-third of all UN procurement. 

1

This report focuses solely on the procurement activities of the UN Secretariat. It does not 

address the procurement activities of other UN entities, funds, and programs, such as the 

World Food Program or the UN Development Program. For the purposes of this report, the 

term “UN” refers to the UN Secretariat.
Page 2 GAO-06-577 United Nations

UN procurement occurs in a highly decentralized organizational structure, 

widely dispersed geographic setting, and conflict situations. These 

conditions underscore the need for effective internal controls to help 

provide reasonable assurance against fraud, waste, mismanagement, and 

abuse. Internal controls serve as the first line of defense in safeguarding 

assets and preventing fraud. The United States is the largest financial 

contributor to the UN and has a strong interest in helping to ensure that the 

UN exercises sound internal controls over its resources. In addition, the 

United States, through the Department of State, takes measures to advance 

reform of UN management processes.

In this report, we assess the UN’s procurement process according to the 

five key standards for internal control.2

 First, we assessed the control 

environment over procurement by examining the organizational structure 

for managing procurement, elements required for a professional 

procurement workforce, and ethics guidance for procurement staff. 

Second, we assessed several UN control activities, including its process for 

reviewing contracts; mechanisms for considering vendor protests; 

processes for updating the procurement manual; and procedures for 

maintaining vendor rosters. Third, we determined the extent to which the 

UN examines the risks regarding its procurement activities. Fourth, we 

reviewed the UN’s measures for recording procurement information and 

communicating it to management. Fifth, we examined the UN’s 

mechanisms for monitoring management oversight of procurement activity 

and closing audit recommendations. In addition, we examined the U.S. 

government’s efforts to support reform of UN procurement. 

To assess internal controls in the UN procurement process, we used a 

framework that is widely accepted in the international audit community 

and has been adopted by leading accountability organizations, including 

the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, the U.S. 

Office of Management and Budget, and GAO.3

 We also reviewed reports 

issued by the UN’s internal oversight unit, the Office of Internal Oversight 

Services; and by its external auditors, the Board of Auditors and the Joint 

Inspection Unit. We also analyzed reports prepared for the UN in 2005 by

2

GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

3

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Internal Control—

Integrated Framework (September 1992).
Page 3 GAO-06-577 United Nations

consulting firms4 and reviewed documents and data provided by the UN 

Procurement Service and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

(Peacekeeping Department) and by the U.S. Department of State. We 

interviewed UN and Department of State officials in New York and 

conducted structured interviews with the principal procurement officers at 

each of 19 missions.5

 To determine the implementation rate of the internal 

oversight unit’s recommendations, we discussed the data collection 

procedures with relevant officials and performed basic reliability checks. 

We determined that the recommendations data used were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report.

We performed our work from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I 

provides detailed information on our scope and methodology.

Results in Brief UN resources are unnecessarily vulnerable to mismanagement, fraud, 

waste, and abuse because the UN (1) lacks an effective organizational 

structure for managing procurement; (2) has not demonstrated a 

commitment to maintaining a professional, trained procurement 

workforce; and (3) has failed to adopt the full range of ethics guidance for 

procurement officials. First, the UN has not established a single 

organizational entity or mechanism capable of comprehensively managing 

procurement. This condition may have hampered efforts to correct longstanding procurement weaknesses. Second, the UN has not demonstrated a 

commitment to improving the professionalism of its procurement staff in 

the form of training, a career development path, or other key human capital 

practices critical to attracting, developing, and retaining a qualified 

professional workforce. For example, the UN has not established training 

requirements for its procurement staff. We also found that 16 of 19 field 

procurement chiefs did not possess a professional certification of their 

procurement qualifications. Because significant control weaknesses have 

led the UN to rely disproportionately on the actions of its staff to safeguard 

its resources, the UN’s commitment to providing a professional, trained 

4

For example, Deloitte, Assessment of Internal Controls in the United Nations Secretariat 

Procurement Operations-Final Report (Nov. 30, 2005).

5

The 19 missions we contacted are identified in figure 5, in appendix 1. They consist of all 15 

of the UN’s current peacekeeping operations, one logistics base, and three other missions 

administratively supported by the Peacekeeping Department.
Page 4 GAO-06-577 United Nations

procurement workforce is particularly critical. Third, the UN has failed to 

adopt a full range of ethics guidance for procurement officials despite 

directives from the General Assembly in 1998 and 2005. Since the control 

environment provides the structure and climate for the quality of internal 

controls of an organization, failure to address these weaknesses 

undermines other UN efforts for taking corrective action to improve its 

procurement process.

We also found weaknesses in key procurement control activities that are 

intended to provide reasonable assurance that management’s directives are 

followed. These activities include processes for (1) reviewing high-value 

procurement contracts; (2) considering vendor protests; (3) updating the 

procurement manual; and (4) maintaining qualified vendor rosters. 

• We found that, although UN procurement tripled over the past 7 years, 

the size of the UN’s principal contract review committee and its support 

staff remained relatively stable. In 2005, the Headquarters Committee on 

Contracts reviewed contracts valued at $3 billion (including long-term 

contracts) and committee members stated that they do not have 

resources to keep pace with the current workload. In addition, UN 

auditors have concluded that the committee cannot properly review 

contract proposals. Without an effective contract review process, the 

UN cannot provide reasonable assurance that high-dollar value 

contracts are undertaken in accordance with the Financial Regulations 

and Rules of the UN.

• The UN has not established an independent process to consider vendor 

protests despite a 1994 recommendation by a high-level panel of 

international procurement experts to do so as soon as possible. Without 

such a process, the UN may not be able to provide reasonable assurance 

of the fair treatment of vendors. In addition, senior UN management 

may not be alerted to procurement staff’s failure to comply with 

procurement regulations. 

• The UN has not updated its procurement manual since 2004 to reflect 

current UN procurement policy. For example, the manual does not 

reflect a June 2005 delegation of procurement authority that allows 

peacekeeping missions to purchase up to $1 million in certain goods or 

services without obtaining the prior approval of the Department of 

Management and the Headquarters Committee on Contracts. All 19 

Peacekeeping Department field procurement officials informed us that 

they have access to the manual at their mission, and all are somewhat to 
Page 5 GAO-06-577 United Nations

very familiar with it. In a highly decentralized organization with 

geographically dispersed field missions, it is essential that staff have 

access to the most current procurement policy so that they can be 

informed of and consistently comply with UN regulations. 

• The UN does not consistently implement its process for helping to 

ensure that it is conducting business with qualified vendors. As a result, 

the UN may be vulnerable to favoring certain vendors and awarding 

contracts to vendors that are unqualified. For example, according to UN 

auditors, one vendor appears to have been awarded approximately $36 

million in contracts without completing the vendor registration process.

The UN lacks a risk assessment framework for identifying and managing 

the procurement activities that are most vulnerable to mismanagement, 

fraud, waste, and abuse. UN procurement officials and auditors have 

identified significant risks associated with headquarters and peacekeeping 

procurement operations, such as start-up peacekeeping missions that 

operate under tight time frames in logistically complex environments. 

Without a comprehensive risk assessment framework, the UN is at risk of 

not allocating proper attention to start-up missions or other procurement 

activities prone to fraud, waste, and abuse.

We found that the UN lacks an integrated information management system, 

which adversely affects its ability to oversee field and headquarters 

procurement operations. We also found that the Peacekeeping Department 

has established only limited reporting requirements for field missions. A 

wider range of management reports, if used, would serve to alert 

management of procurement actions requiring additional monitoring. For 

example, a report of cumulative awards to vendors would help 

management identify possible instances of inadequate competition and bid 

rigging by vendors. Without such reporting tools or a full-time manager to 

review them, the likelihood that procurement mismanagement, fraud, and 

abuse go undetected is increased.

UN procurement officials lack internal mechanisms for monitoring 

procurement activity in headquarters and the field. For example, we found 

that chief procurement officers in the field did not have a systematic, 

standardized approach for determining whether procurement under their 

supervision is consistent with UN regulations. Instead, to monitor 

procurement activity, officials rely heavily on the UN oversight entities’ 

periodic audits. Although these entities have identified numerous 

weaknesses in the procurement process, the UN has not always 
Page 6 GAO-06-577 United Nations

implemented their recommendations to correct the weaknesses. In many 

cases, the oversight entities have found similar problems in different field 

missions and issued similar recommendations. Yet, UN management does 

not review the audit reports in a methodical manner to determine whether 

changes to policy or processes are warranted to address systemic 

problems. In addition, the UN does not have a mechanism that provides 

reasonable assurance that corrective actions, once taken, are 

institutionalized. Without effective management oversight of procurement 

activity, the UN is unable to identify and correct existing control 

weaknesses that could lead to mismanagement, fraud, waste, and abuse.

The United States has recently taken steps to advocate procurement 

reform as one element of overall UN management reform. The most visible 

of these steps was a U.S.-chaired Security Council review of the 

Peacekeeping Department’s procurement problems in February 2006. 

However, the position of Ambassador for UN Management and Reform at 

the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York was vacant for more than 1 year. 

This position was recently filled in March 2006. U.S. Mission officials stated 

that this vacancy limited the mission’s ability to influence procurement 

reform. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of State and the Permanent 

Representative of the United States to the UN work with other member 

states to encourage the UN Secretary-General to take several steps to 

address these problems, including establishing clear and effective lines of 

authority and responsibility between headquarters and the field over UN 

procurement; establishing a comprehensive training program and formal 

career path for procurement staff; providing the Headquarters Committee 

on Contracts with an adequate structure and manageable workload; and 

establishing an independent bid protest process. We also are 

recommending that the Secretary of State report to the Congress annually 

regarding UN progress in reforming its procurement process. 

The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this 

report, which are reproduced in appendix III. The department stated that it 

welcomed our report and endorsed its recommendations. The UN did not 

provide us with written comments. State and UN officials provided us with 

a number of technical suggestions and clarifications that we have 

addressed as appropriate. 
Page 7 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Background UN Secretariat procurement has tripled over the past decade, as 

peacekeeping operations have grown. The UN procures a variety of goods 

and services, including freight services, motor vehicle parts, and 

telecommunications equipment. UN procurement is conducted by the 

Department of Management and the Department of Peacekeeping 

Operations through its field missions. Internal controls can be used to 

manage an organization and to identify areas of weaknesses and strengths 

in the procurement process. 

The UN Procures Many 

Goods and Services

In 2004, the UN spent a total of $1.31 billion on procurement, with $276 

million being devoted to air transportation services alone.6

 The UN 

procures a variety of goods and services, including air transportation, 

freight forwarding and delivery, motor vehicle parts and transportation 

equipment, and telecommunications equipment and services, as shown in 

figure 1. 

6

The UN has not yet released detailed data regarding the allocation of its 2005 procurement 

funds. 
Page 8 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Figure 1: Major Commodities Purchased in 2004

Procurement Primarily 

Involves Two Departments 

The Department of Management is responsible for procurement in the UN 

Secretariat. The department’s Procurement Service develops policies and 

procedures for headquarters and field procurement based on the UN 

Financial Regulations and Rules.7

 The Procurement Service also oversees 

training for all staff involved in procurement. In addition, it also provides 

advisory support for field purchases within the authority of field missions. 

The Procurement Service also negotiates, prepares, and administers 

contracts for goods and services for UN headquarters and certain large 

contracts (such as air transportation services or multi-year systems 

contracts) for peacekeeping missions. The UN’s procurement process at 

headquarters involves several steps (see fig. 7, app. II).

32.2%

21.1%

9.7%

7.7%

12.1%

5.8%

6.3%

5.2%

Food rations/catering services ($75.5)

Other ($422.5)

Freight forwarding and delivery services

($158.3)

Telecommunications equipment and services

($82.1)

Architecture, engineering, and construction 

related services ($68.3)

Source: UN Procurement Service data for 2004.

Motor vehicles/parts and transportation 

equipment ($126.9)

Chemical and petroleum products ($100.6)

Dollars in millions

Air transportation services ($276.1)

7

The UN Financial Regulations and Rules outline the following general principles for UN 

procurement: best value for money; fairness, integrity and transparency; effective 

international competition; and the interest of the United Nations.
Page 9 GAO-06-577 United Nations

The UN’s field procurement process involves the Peacekeeping 

Department and includes additional steps (see fig. 6, app. II). Each field 

mission is required to establish a Local Committee on Contracts to review 

and recommend contract awards for approval by the chief administrative 

officer of the mission. The Local Committee on Contracts is composed of 

four members from the mission: a legal advisor, and the respective chiefs of 

the mission’s finance, general services, and transport sections. Field 

missions may not award contracts worth more than $75,000 without 

approval by the chief administrative officer of the mission based on the 

advice of the Local Committee on Contracts. In addition, field missions 

may not award contracts worth more than $200,000 without approval first 

by the mission’s chief administrative officer based on the advice of the 

Local Committee on Contracts and then by the Department of Management 

based on the advice of the Headquarters Committee on Contracts.8

 The 

Headquarters Committee on Contracts evaluates the proposed contracts 

and advises the Department of Management as to whether the contracts are 

in accordance with UN Financial Regulations and Rules and other UN 

policies. 

The Procurement Service employs about 70 individuals to procure items 

for the UN’s headquarters operations, peacekeeping missions, international 

criminal tribunals, regional commissions, and upon request, other UN 

agencies and subsidiary organs. The Peacekeeping Department employs 

about 270 field procurement staff at its field missions.9

 The members of the 

Headquarters Committee on Contracts are drawn from the UN Office of 

Central Support Services; Office of Programme Planning, Budget and 

Accounts; Office of Legal Affairs; and the Department of Economic and 

Social Affairs. The committee relies on support staff to assist it in 

coordinating its activities and drafting minutes detailing the results of its 

meetings.

8

Peacekeeping missions may award contracts of up to $1 million without prior approval by 

the Department of Management and the Headquarters Committee on Contracts for fresh 

food, waste disposal services, building materials, and other defined “core requirements” that 

lend themselves to local procurement.

9

As of February 2006, the Peacekeeping Department’s field procurement staff consisted of 

147 international staff and 120 local staff. 
Page 10 GAO-06-577 United Nations

UN Procurement Tripled 

Due to Growth in 

Peacekeeping Operations

UN procurement has more than tripled over the past decade as UN 

peacekeeping operations have grown. UN procurement grew from $430 

million in 1997 to $1.6 billion in 2005. This increase has been due primarily 

to a rapid increase in UN peacekeeping operations. Eight of the UN’s 15 

current peacekeeping missions were established in 1999 or later. 

Peacekeeping expenditures more than quadrupled between 1999 and 2005, 

as shown in figure 2. In addition, the number of military personnel in 

peacekeeping missions has increased fivefold, from about 14,000 in 1999 to 

about 73,000 as of February 2006. Although peacekeeping missions were 

originally conceived as short term in nature, many missions are longstanding and have continued for more than 5 years. 

Figure 2: UN Peacekeeping Expenditures and Military Personnel, 1999-2005

Note: Military personnel includes civilian police, troops, and observers. It does not include UN civilian 

personnel.

Source: GAO analysis of UN data.

0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Billions of U.S. dollars

Expenditures

Fiscal year

Military personnel

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Military personnel in thousands

2/28/06
Page 11 GAO-06-577 United Nations

As shown in figure 3, 85 percent of UN procurement in 2004 was conducted 

in support of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping field missions alone 

procured 35 percent of all UN procurement in 2004. 

Figure 3: UN Headquarters and Peacekeeping Procurement for 2004

Internal Control Framework 

Useful for Assessing 

Procurement Process

Internal control is an integral part of managing an organization and can be 

used to identify areas of weaknesses and strengths in the UN’s 

procurement process. Internal control guidance provides a framework for 

establishing and maintaining internal control and for identifying and 

addressing major performance and management challenges and areas at 

greatest risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. Internal control 

comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, 

goals, and objectives. There are five interrelated components of internal 

control: (1) control environment, (2) control activities, (3) risk assessment, 

(4) information and communications, and (5) monitoring. 

50% 35%

15%

Procured for headquarters by 

Procurement Service

($194 million)

Procured for peacekeeping missions by 

Procurement Service

($655 million)

Source: GAO analysis of UN Procurement Service data for 2004.

Procured by peacekeeping missions

($462 million)

Total procurement: $1.31 billion

Procurement for peacekeeping missions: $1.12 billion (85%) 
Page 12 GAO-06-577 United Nations

The Control 

Environment over UN 

Procurement Is Weak

UN funds are unnecessarily vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse because 

the UN lacks an effective organizational structure for managing 

procurement, has not demonstrated a commitment to improving its 

professional procurement workforce, and has failed to adopt specific 

ethics guidance for procurement officials. These conditions have 

weakened the UN control environment for procurement. 

The UN Lacks an Effective 

Organizational Structure for 

Managing Procurement

The UN has not established a single organizational entity or mechanism 

capable of comprehensively managing procurement. As a result, it is 

unclear which department is accountable for addressing problems in the 

UN’s field procurement process. While the Department of Management is 

ultimately responsible for all UN procurement, neither it nor the UN 

Procurement Service has the organizational authority to supervise 

peacekeeping field procurement staff to provide reasonable assurance that 

they comply with UN regulations (see fig. 4).10 Procurement field staff, 

including the chief procurement officers, instead report to the 

Peacekeeping Department at headquarters through each mission’s chief 

administrative officer. Although the Department of Management has 

delegated authority for procurement of goods and services to the 

Peacekeeping Department’s Office of Mission Support at headquarters, we 

found that the Peacekeeping Department lacks the expertise, procedures, 

and capabilities needed to provide reasonable assurance that its field 

procurement staff are complying with UN regulations in executing this 

authority. The UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) has 

concluded that neither department has taken reasonable care to safeguard 

UN assets.

10Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, ST/SGB/2003/7, Rule 105.13. 

According to the Financial Regulations and Rules, the under-secretary-general for 

management is responsible for all procurement functions of the UN and is to establish all 

UN procurement systems and designate the officials responsible for performing 

procurement functions. The Financial Regulations and Rules allow the under-secretarygeneral for management to authorize UN officials to act on the under-secretary-general’s 

behalf to contract for purchases of services, products, or equipment. 
Page 13 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Figure 4: Supervisory Oversight and Delegation of Field Procurement Authority

The UN previously considered giving the Peacekeeping Department the 

headquarters positions it needs to oversee field procurement activities. In 

2000, a UN panel11 recommended that the Department of Management 

transfer procurement positions to the Peacekeeping Department’s

Source: GAO.

Department of Management

Office of Mission Support

Lack of procurement expertise

These field missions

include 15 peacekeeping 

missions, as well as political 

and other missions.

Procurement Service 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Delegation of procurement authority

Lack of supervisory oversight over procurement

Entities conducting procurement

Absence of procurement expertise

Field mission

chief procurement officer

Responsible

for

overall 

procurement

11The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations was convened by the Secretary-General of 

the UN to assess the UN’s ability to effectively conduct peace operations and to recommend 

ways to enhance that ability. The Secretary-General transmitted the panel’s findings to the 

UN General Assembly and Security Council on August 21, 2000, in UN document A/55/305-

S2000/809.
Page 14 GAO-06-577 United Nations

headquarters.12 The Department of Management subsequently drafted a 

delegation of procurement authority that would have required the 

Peacekeeping Department to provide trained procurement staff at each 

peacekeeping mission with procurement authority and to establish 

headquarters systems to administer and monitor field procurement 

activities. However, the Department of Management’s delegation of 

authority did not provide for a transfer of procurement staff to the 

Peacekeeping Department. According to UN officials, the Peacekeeping 

Department rejected the proposed delegation of authority because (1) the 

department lacked resources to oversee field procurement activities, (2) 

the proposed delegation did not include a transfer of procurement staff to 

the Peacekeeping Department, and (3) the proposed delegation was more 

restrictive than previous delegations to the missions themselves.

In 2005, the Department of Management delegated procurement authority 

to the headquarters of the Peacekeeping Department. Although the 

headquarters of the Peacekeeping Department accepted the delegation, it 

did so without the resources needed to oversee the execution of the 

delegation by its field procurement activities. The Peacekeeping 

Department is seeking to hire an individual to manage its field procurement 

activities. The individual’s responsibilities would include supervising field 

procurement activities, developing centralized procurement reporting 

procedures, monitoring field procurement trends, implementing improved 

management control tools, and working with the Department of 

Management to review existing procurement rules and regulations. Given 

the scope of these responsibilities, it is unclear how one individual would 

be able to fulfill the responsibilities of the proposed position. As of March 

2006, Peacekeeping Department headquarters officials were interviewing 

candidates for this position. 

While the Peacekeeping Department field procurement staff may seek 

guidance on UN procurement policies from the Procurement Service, we 

found that they do so infrequently. Of the 19 field procurement chiefs or 

acting chiefs that we spoke with, 12 stated that they contacted 

Procurement Service staff as often as once a month or once a quarter. Four 

others stated that they contacted the Procurement Service once or twice a 

12According to UN officials, prior to 2005 the Department of Management delegated 

procurement authority directly to the Peacekeeping Department’s field missions and not to 

the Peacekeeping Department’s headquarters. 
Page 15 GAO-06-577 United Nations

year, and three others stated that they had never contacted the 

Procurement Service for guidance during the past year. 

The lack of more frequent contact between the Procurement Service and 

Peacekeeping Department field staff is significant because field staff face 

the challenge of complying with the procurement policies established by 

the Procurement Service while securing needed goods and services under 

often difficult conditions to meet peacekeeping deadlines. The 

Peacekeeping Department has characterized its operational needs as being 

too great and its human resource demands as too intense for the UN’s 

existing procurement regulations and procedures. While most field officials 

that we spoke with reported that the Procurement Service had been at least 

somewhat helpful to them, several stated that they do not believe the 

Procurement Service understands the difficult field conditions in which 

they work. 

The UN Lacks a 

Commitment to Improving 

Its Professional 

Procurement Workforce

The UN has not demonstrated a commitment to improving its professional 

procurement staff in the form of training, a career development path, and 

other key human capital practices critical to attracting, developing, and 

retaining a qualified professional workforce. Due to significant control 

weaknesses in the UN’s procurement process, the UN has relied 

disproportionately on the actions of its staff to safeguard its resources. 

Given this reliance on staff and their substantial fiduciary responsibilities, 

management’s commitment to maintaining a competent, ethical 

procurement workforce is a particularly critical element of the UN’s 

internal control environment. 

Recent studies indicate that Procurement Service staff and peacekeeping 

procurement staff lack knowledge of UN procurement policies. For 

example, a November 2005 consultant report stated that Procurement 

Service staff did not appear to have a clear understanding of procurement 

policies and procedures, resulting in inconsistent application of 

procurement policies.13 In addition, OIOS found that field procurement 

staff in one of the largest peacekeeping missions lack sufficient knowledge 

of basic procurement policies and procedures. OIOS also found that, in 

another mission, requisitioning units that lacked procurement authority 

had directly purchased $9 million in goods and services during the start-up 

13Deloitte, Assessment of Internal Controls in the United Nations Secretariat Procurement 

Operations (Nov. 30, 2005).
Page 16 GAO-06-577 United Nations

phase, violating the principle of segregation of duties between 

requisitioners and procurement staff.14 Moreover, most procurement staff 

lack professional certifications attesting to their procurement education, 

training, and experience. We found that 16 of 19 field procurement chiefs 

did not possess any professional certification of their procurement 

qualifications. A June 2005 consultant survey also found that only 3 of 41 

Procurement Service officers and assistants had been certified by a 

recognized procurement certification body.

The UN has not established requirements for headquarters and 

peacekeeping staff to obtain continuous training, resulting in inconsistent 

levels of training across the procurement workforce. Most field 

procurement chiefs stated that the training they had received from the UN 

was at least generally useful to their procurement roles, but 11 of 19 field 

procurement chiefs stated that they had received no procurement training 

over the last year. While most field procurement chiefs stated that their 

staff are adequately trained, all of them said that their staff would benefit 

from additional training, citing areas such as contract drafting and 

management, negotiation, business writing, and bid evaluation. Recently, a 

UN interagency group developed common certification standards for 

procurement staff in all UN agencies.15 However, the decision for a UN 

agency to participate in the certification program is voluntary. Each UN 

agency would be responsible for developing its own training materials to 

prepare staff for certification. As of January 2006, Procurement Service 

officials had not yet determined whether this common UN procurement 

certification would be a requirement for existing staff or for hiring new 

staff. 

Furthermore, UN officials acknowledged that the UN has not committed 

sufficient resources to a comprehensive training and certification program 

for its procurement staff. UN officials stated that Procurement Service 

training resources are insufficient to deliver adequate training. The 

Procurement Service’s annual training budget was $20,000 for 

14The Peacekeeping Department indicated that expedient steps had been warranted and that 

appropriate action was later taken to regularize the contracts. 

15The Inter-Agency Procurement Working Group is composed of procurement officials 

drawn from across the UN system. The group is developing a common certification program 

that would define a body of knowledge and competency framework for assessing 

procurement staff. Certification at the basic level has not yet begun, and the advanced level 

program has not yet been developed.
Page 17 GAO-06-577 United Nations

approximately 70 staff as of March 2006. Similarly, 11 of 19 peacekeeping 

chief procurement officers stated that their training opportunities and 

resources are inadequate. Some indicated that a single field individual’s 

attendance at an annual conference of chief procurement officers 

consumed the mission’s annual allotment for procurement training. 

Peacekeeping Department officials noted that the lack of resources to train 

field procurement officers is symptomatic of the general lack of 

professional development funding for all peacekeeping mission personnel.

The UN has not established a career path for professional advancement for 

Procurement Service and peacekeeping procurement staff.16 Career paths, 

if well designed by management, can actively encourage and support staff 

to undertake progressive training and work experiences in order to prepare 

them for increased levels of responsibility. A procurement career path also 

would serve to recognize procurement as a specialized profession in the 

UN. A November 2005 consultant report recommended that the Secretariat 

establish and define career paths for Procurement Service management 

and staff. In field missions, most procurement chiefs told us that the 

absence of a career path is detrimental to the professional caliber of 

procurement staff. In addition, 14 of 19 field procurement officials told us 

that they do not have professional development plans for all of their staff. 

UN auditors also have expressed concern that UN managers do not give 

proper care to helping ensure the qualifications and integrity of 

procurement staff. 

Difficult staffing conditions and practices in both the Procurement Service 

and peacekeeping missions continue to expose the UN to significant risks. 

The Procurement Service reported that it lacks the staffing resources to 

implement recommended controls such as team-based rather than 

individual procurement, peer review of major bidding, and periodic 

rotation of staff. Peacekeeping staff said that staff turnover at the 

Procurement Service has also hurt the continuity of their operations. In the 

field, the Peacekeeping Department faces challenges in deploying qualified, 

experienced staff to missions, especially during the critical start-up phase. 

For example, OIOS noted that a staff member involved in leaking 

16By contrast, other organizations have recognized the role of a career path in maintaining a 

qualified professional procurement workforce and preventing fraud. For example, the U.S. 

Department of Defense has established career paths for its procurement workforce that 

includes career development opportunities linked to progressive attainment of training, 

education, and experience. (Public Law 101-510, National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 1991, Title XII, Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, Nov. 5, 1990.)
Page 18 GAO-06-577 United Nations

confidential information to a UN supplier had been appointed to a post on a 

short-term temporary duty assignment and was later competitively selected 

for the post. 

The Peacekeeping Department has had difficulties in retaining high-quality 

procurement staff for sustained periods in peacekeeping missions. For 

example, a peacekeeping official informed us that about 23 percent of 

procurement staff positions in peacekeeping missions were vacant as of 

December 2005. Peacekeeping officials informed us that a chronic lack of 

field procurement staff has helped to undermine existing control 

mechanisms. The peacekeeping procurement workforce is adversely 

affected by considerable staff turnover, especially in peacekeeping 

missions where UN staff must operate in demanding, unpredictable, and 

dangerous conditions. The current conditions of service in peacekeeping 

missions are not competitive with those of other UN entities or similar 

organizations, according to UN officials. For example, peacekeeping 

officials stated that peacekeeping mission staff are not able to have their 

families at their duty station and that the benefits and short-term nature of 

employment contracts for peacekeeping mission staff are disadvantageous 

compared with those at UN headquarters and other UN funds and 

programs. In March 2006, the Secretary-General issued proposals to revise 

the UN’s human resource policies to address the unfavorable conditions of 

service in peacekeeping missions. However, the UN has not provided 

specific facts regarding the substance and time frames for these revisions, 

and they would require the action and support of member states of the 

General Assembly to implement. 

The UN Has Not Fully 

Established Ethics 

Guidance for Procurement 

Personnel

The UN has failed to adopt the full range of ethics guidance for 

procurement officials despite repeated directives from the General 

Assembly in 1998 and 2005. Such guidance would include a declaration of 

ethics responsibilities for procurement staff and a code of conduct for 

vendors. Ethical principles are key elements of an internal control 

environment, and management plays an important role in providing 

guidance for proper behavior. Because of the fiduciary responsibilities held 

by procurement staff, the lack of specific ethics guidance increases the risk 

of fraud, waste and abuse. Earlier in 2005, a former UN procurement officer 

pled guilty to charges of accepting money from vendors seeking contracts.

The UN has been considering the development of specific ethics policies 

for procurement officers for almost a decade. For example, on September 

8, 1998, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to prepare 
Page 19 GAO-06-577 United Nations

additional ethics guidance for procurement officers “as a matter of 

priority.”17 In 2002, the Secretary-General acknowledged that separate 

procurement ethics guidance should be developed “pursuant to the request 

of the General Assembly.”18 In 2005, the General Assembly again asked the 

Secretary-General to issue ethical guidelines for those involved in the 

procurement process and called for “the early adoption of a code of 

conduct for vendors and a declaration of ethical responsibilities for all staff 

involved in the procurement process.”19

Despite other efforts to bolster ethics policies at the UN,20 the UN has yet to 

fully enact new ethics guidance for procurement officials. As we reported 

in October 2005,21 the Procurement Service has drafted such guidance. It 

would include a declaration of ethics responsibilities for procurement staff 

and embody a code of conduct for vendors.22 It would also outline current 

rules and regulations relating to procurement staff and address ethics 

standards for procurement staff on conflict of interest and acceptance of 

gifts. In addition, the draft ethics guidance would outline UN rules, 

regulations, and procedures for suppliers of goods and services to the UN.

Since October 2005, the UN has made only limited progress toward 

addressing the directives of the General Assembly. UN officials stated that 

the UN has not established ethics guidance for procurement personnel due 

to resource constraints and the need for extensive consultations within the 

UN. In November 2005, a consultant review concluded that the 

Procurement Service lacked an effective and well-coordinated ethics 

program that makes ethics a fundamental element of the Procurement 

17General Assembly Res. 52/252, UN Doc. A/RES/52/252, at para.10. 

18See Secretary-General Bulletin 2002/13, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2002/13, Status, Basic Rights 

and Duties of United Nations Staff Members. 

19General Assembly Res. 59/288, UN Doc. A/RES/59/288, at para. 12.

20The UN has recently adopted new whistleblower protection policies and established a new 

ethics office for all UN staff. See General Assembly UN Doc. A/60/568. Also, 11 of 19 

peacekeeping procurement chiefs in the field have acknowledged receiving some form of 

ethics training.

21GAO, United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and 

Procurement Practices, GAO-06-226T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2005).

22According to a UN official, the UN Ethics Office has been participating in the effort, largely 

in an advisory role, by reviewing and commenting on the draft declaration of ethics 

responsibilities for procurement staff. 
Page 20 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Service culture, including a single recognized and well-understood code of 

conduct governing ethics and integrity expectations and requirements for 

UN procurement staff. The UN has subsequently adopted new procedures 

that outline UN rules, regulations, and procedures for suppliers of goods 

and services to the UN. The UN also now requires all procurement officers 

to file financial disclosure statements. However, most of the other draft 

regulations continue to be reviewed within the UN. The UN has not set firm 

dates for their adoption. Department of Management officials informed us 

in April 2006 that rules for governing the conduct of staff engaged in 

procurement activities, including a declaration of ethical responsibilities, 

would be promulgated “shortly.”

The UN Has 

Weaknesses in Key 

Procurement Control 

Activities 

We found weaknesses in key procurement control activities that are 

intended to provide reasonable assurance that management’s directives are 

followed. UN procurement control activities include processes for (1) 

reviewing high-value procurement contracts, (2) considering vendor 

protests, (3) updating the procurement manual, and (4) maintaining 

qualified vendor rosters. The persistence of weaknesses in these areas 

indicates that the UN does not have reasonable assurance that its staff are 

complying with management policies and directives. 

Although UN Procurement 

Has Increased Sharply in 

Recent Years, the Size of the 

Headquarters Committee on 

Contracts and Its Staff Has 

Remained Relatively Stable

We found that although UN procurement has increased sharply in recent 

years, the size of the Headquarters Committee on Contracts and its support 

staff remained relatively stable. The committee’s Chairman and members 

stated that the committee does not have the resources to keep up with its 

expanding workload. The number of contracts reviewed by the committee 

has increased by almost 60 percent since 2003.23 The committee members 

stated that the committee’s increasing workload was the result of the 

growth of UN peacekeeping operations, the complexity of many new 

contracts, and increased scrutiny of proposals in response to recent UN 

procurement scandals. Committee data from 2005 indicate that the average 

time taken to report a committee decision is within the time frames 

allowed by UN regulations. However, a senior committee official stated in 

March 2006 that this time had increased significantly in recent months due 

to the committee’s workload. He indicated that the average time to report a 

23In 2005, the committee reviewed 881 contracts valued at $3 billion (including long-term 

contracts), while in 2003 it reviewed 558 contracts valued at about $2.3 billion. 
Page 21 GAO-06-577 United Nations

committee decision is now approaching 20 business days instead of 10. In 

addition, 8 of 19 peacekeeping field procurement officials stated that the 

committee only reviewed their cases in a moderately timely manner, while 

5 felt that there was little to no extent of timeliness in these reviews. 

Concerns regarding the committee’s structure and workload have led UN 

auditors to conclude that the committee cannot properly review contract 

proposals. It may thus recommend contracts for approval that are 

inappropriate and have not met UN regulations. In a 2006 report, OIOS 

stated that the committee cannot determine if procurement officials had 

complied with regulations or if they had been unduly influenced by 

vendors. OIOS cited a report it had prepared in 2001 that concluded that 

the committee had not developed the tools needed to provide reasonable 

assurance that it could thoroughly and objectively evaluate contract 

proposals and add value to the procurement process. OIOS also reiterated 

its 2001 recommendation that the UN reduce the committee’s caseload and 

restructure the committee “to allow competent review of the cases.” 

Without an effective contract review process, the UN cannot provide 

reasonable assurance that high value contracts are undertaken in 

accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the UN.

The UN’s plans to address these issues are unclear. In January 2006, the 

Under-Secretary-General for Management stated that the committee should 

be restructured in some form in response to consultant concerns.24 

However, OIOS reported in January 2006 that the Department of 

Management had been “unresponsive” to its recommendations regarding 

the committee.25 The committee Chairman stated that the committee’s four 

existing posts are all in support of the regular budget, and it needs 

additional support for reviewing contracts under the peacekeeping budget. 

The Chairman told us that the committee has requested that its support 

staff be increased from 4 to 7, but does not yet know if this will be 

approved. The Chairman also stated that raising the $200,000 threshold for 

contracts that require review by the committee would reduce the 

committee’s workload. 

24A November 2005 study by a consultant for the UN concluded that the committee was not 

effective in preventing all forms of corruption and sometimes delayed procurement of 

items. 

25Office of Internal Oversight Services, Comprehensive Management Review of the 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations—Procurement, AP2005/600/20 (Jan. 20, 2006). 
Page 22 GAO-06-577 United Nations

The UN Has Not Established 

an Independent Bid Protest 

Process

The UN has not established an independent process to consider vendor 

protests, despite the 1994 recommendation of a high-level panel of 

international procurement experts that it do so as soon as possible.26 Such 

a process would provide reasonable assurance that vendors are treated 

fairly when bidding and would also help alert senior UN management to 

situations involving questions about UN compliance. An independent bid 

protest process is a widely endorsed control mechanism that permits 

vendors to file complaints with an office or official who is independent of 

the procurement process. The General Assembly endorsed independent 

bid protest in 1994 when it recommended for adoption by member states a 

model procurement law drafted by the UN Commission on International 

Trade Law.27 Several nations, including the United States, provide vendors 

with an independent process to handle complaints.28 

At present, UN vendors cannot protest the handling of their bids to an 

independent official or office. The Procurement Service directs its vendors 

to file protests through a complaints ladder process that begins with the 

Procurement Service chief and moves up to his immediate supervisor. The 

majority of peacekeeping field procurement officers also stated that vendor 

protests were not reviewed by an independent body at their mission. 

Procurement Service and peacekeeping field staff told us that, in their 

opinion, there is no vendor demand for a more independent process. 

The lack of an independent bid protest process, as endorsed by the General 

Assembly and used by the United States and other nations, limits the 

transparency of the UN procurement process by not providing a means for 

a vendor to protest the outcome of a contract decision to an independent 

official or office. If handled through an independent process, vendor 

complaints could alert senior UN officials and UN auditors to the failure of 

UN procurement staff to comply with stated procedures. As a result of 

recent findings of impropriety involving the Procurement Service, the 

United Nations hired a consultant to evaluate the internal controls of its 

26United Nations, High Level Expert Group Procurement Study Report (New York, 

December 1994).

27See GA Res. 49/54, UN Doc. A/Res/49/54; UN Commission on International Trade Law 

(UNCITRAL), Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (1994),

ch. 6.

28In the United States, vendors may protest to the involved agencies, the U.S. Court of 

Federal Claims, or GAO. GAO receives more than 1,100 such protests annually. 
Page 23 GAO-06-577 United Nations

procurement operations. One of the consultant’s conclusions was that the 

UN needs to establish an independent bid protest process for suspected 

wrongdoing that would include an independent third-party evaluation, and 

arbitration, due process, and formal resolution for all reports.

The UN Has Not Updated 

the Procurement Manual 

Since 2004

The UN has not updated its procurement manual since January 2004 to 

reflect current UN procurement policy. As a result, UN procurement staff 

may not be aware of changes to UN procurement procedures that have 

been adopted over the past 2 years. An organization’s control activities 

include taking action to make staff aware of its policies and procedures. 

The Procurement Service’s procurement manual is intended to guide UN 

staff in their conduct of procurement actions worldwide. All 19 

Peacekeeping Department field procurement officials informed us that 

they have access to the manual at their mission, and all are somewhat to 

very familiar with it. 

The Procurement Service revised the manual in 2004 to address several 

problems. In 1999, we noted that the manual did not provide detailed 

discussions of procedures and policies.29As revised by the Procurement 

Service, the manual now has detailed step-by-step instructions on the 

procurement process for both field and headquarters staff, including 

illustrative flow charts. It also includes more guidance that addresses 

headquarters and field procurement concerns, such as more specific 

descriptions of short- and long-term acquisition planning and the 

evaluation of requests for proposals valued at more than $200,000. 

In a decentralized organization with geographically dispersed field 

missions, it is essential that staff have access to the most current 

procurement policy so that they can be informed of and consistently 

comply with UN regulations. While 16 of 19 peacekeeping procurement 

officers acknowledged that the Procurement Service or the Peacekeeping 

Department provided them with timely updates on the most current 

procurement policies and procedures to a great or moderate extent, the 

procurement manual still does not contain the latest information 

concerning procurement policies and procedures. For example, the manual 

does not reflect the June 2005 delegation of procurement authority from 

the Department of Management to the Peacekeeping Department. The new 

29GAO, United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms, GAO/NSIAD-99-71 (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 15, 1999).
Page 24 GAO-06-577 United Nations

delegation of authority allows peacekeeping field missions to purchase up 

to $1 million in goods or services in support of their core requirements 

(e.g., waste disposal services, fresh food, janitorial services, and building 

materials) without obtaining the prior approval of the Department of 

Management and the Headquarters Committee on Contracts. When we 

spoke with peacekeeping procurement officers in the field, one officer 

stated that his mission staff were not using this new delegation of authority 

because they were not sure whether it was official UN policy. Another 

peacekeeping procurement officer was unclear on some of the details for 

implementation of the new authority. 

Also missing from the procurement manual is a section regarding 

procurement for construction. In June 2005, a UN consultant 

recommended that the UN develop separate guidelines in the manual for 

the planning and execution of construction projects.30 These guidelines 

could be useful in planning the UN’s future renovation of its headquarters 

building. 

A Procurement Service official who took part in the manual’s 2004 revision 

stated that the Procurement Service had been unable to allocate the time 

and resources needed to update the manual since that time. In addition, in 

January 2006, OIOS found that changes in procurement policies were not 

always effectively disseminated, leading to possible inconsistency in the 

awarding of contracts. A UN consultant also has recommended that the 

Department of Management address the lack of a standard process for 

updating the procurement manual. Department of Management staff 

informed us that they plan to follow these recommendations. 

UN Does Not Consistently 

Implement Its Process for 

Helping to Ensure That It 

Conducts Business with 

Qualified Vendors

The UN does not consistently implement its process for helping to ensure 

that it is conducting business with qualified vendors. As a result, the UN 

may be vulnerable to favoring certain vendors or dealing with unqualified 

vendors. Approved vendor rosters are an important procurement control 

activity for limiting procurement to vendors that meet stated standards. 

Vendors apply for registration to the list and are then evaluated by the 

agency before placement on the approved list. Effective rosters are 

impartial and provide sufficient control over vendor qualifications.

30National Institute of Governmental Purchasing Inc., Assessment of UNPS Procurement 

Processes (Herndon, Va., June 30, 2005).
Page 25 GAO-06-577 United Nations

The UN has long had difficulties in maintaining effective rosters of qualified 

vendors. In 1994, a high-level group of international procurement experts 

concluded that the UN’s vendor roster was outdated, inaccurate, and 

inconsistent across all locations. It warned that inconsistent and 

nonstandardized rosters could expose the procurement system to abuse 

and fraud. In 2003, an OIOS report found that the Procurement Service’s 

roster contained questionable vendors. For example, one vendor appeared 

to have been awarded approximately $36 million in contracts without 

completing its registration to the list. Another vendor appeared to not have 

applied for registration to the list but was nonetheless awarded a $16.6 

million contract. Although the Procurement Service corrected some of the 

noted weaknesses, OIOS concluded that, as of 2005, the roster was not fully 

reliable as a tool for identifying qualified vendors that could bid on 

contracts. 

To address such concerns, the Procurement Service became a partner in an 

interagency procurement vendor roster in 2004, which was intended to 

serve as a single roster for potential suppliers to apply for registration with 

participating organizations within the UN system and to be used by 

peacekeeping field missions.31 It was seen as a common system that would 

allow sharing of vendor performance information within the UN. 

The UN’s use of the interagency procurement vendor roster, however, has 

not fully addressed concerns regarding UN vendor lists. OIOS found that 

many vendors that have applied through the interagency procurement 

vendor roster have not submitted additional documents requested by the 

Procurement Service to become accredited vendors. In addition to the 

audited financial statements and income tax returns that a vendor must 

submit to be registered in the UN interagency vendor roster, the 

Procurement Service also requires the vendors to submit a copy of a 

certificate of incorporation, copies of quality certification standards for the 

goods and services to be registered, and letters of reference from at least 

three clients to which the vendor has provided its goods or services over 

the past 12 months. OIOS found that, as of December 2005, about 2,800 

vendor applicants had not submitted the necessary documents for the 

Procurement Service to review. OIOS expressed concern that the 

31The interagency procurement vendor roster is known as the Global Marketplace. It is 

maintained by the UN Development Programme’s Inter-Agency Procurement Services 

Office.
Page 26 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Procurement Service vendor registration procedure remains vulnerable to 

procurement officials who might manipulate it to favor certain vendors. 

In addition, most Peacekeeping Department field procurement officials we 

spoke with stated that they prefer to use their own locally developed 

rosters instead of the interagency vendor roster because the local lists were 

shorter and contained more specific information regarding the goods and 

services available in the area near their field missions. Moreover, some field 

mission procurement staff also stated that they were unable to comply with 

Procurement Service regulations for their vendor rosters due to the lack of 

reliable vendor information in underdeveloped countries in which there 

were conflicts, as is common in peacekeeping missions. One procurement 

officer in the field stated that many of the local vendors could not prepare 

financial statements required by the Procurement Service and the 

interagency database because the country was just starting to recover from 

a war. Other field procurement officers noted that issues such as low levels 

of education and literacy and smaller vendors not being in a position to 

deliver internationally prevented vendors from registering on the 

interagency vendor list. OIOS reported in 2006 that peacekeeping 

operations were vulnerable to substantial abuse in procurement because of 

inadequate or irregular registration of vendors, insufficient control over 

vendor qualifications, and dependence on a limited number of vendors. 

The UN Has Not 

Comprehensively 

Assessed Procurement 

Risks

The UN lacks a comprehensive risk assessment framework for identifying, 

evaluating and managing the procurement activities most vulnerable to 

fraud, waste, and abuse. UN officials and auditors have identified 

significant risks associated with headquarters and peacekeeping 

procurement operations. However, without a comprehensive risk 

assessment framework, the United Nations cannot have reasonable 

assurance that it allocates proper attention to procurement activities that 

could be most prone to fraud, waste, and abuse.

OIOS has repeatedly identified procurement as one of the areas in the UN 

with significant potential for inefficiency, corruption, fraud, waste, and 

abuse. For example, OIOS issued recommendations relating to collusion 

and conflicts of interest between UN staff and vendors, accountability for 

theft of UN property, and misuse of UN equipment. In addition, senior UN 

officials identified several major risks impacting peacekeeping 

procurement. First, they stated that field procurement staff currently 

operate under regulations that do not always reflect differences inherent in 

operating in field locations. According to Peacekeeping Department 
Page 27 GAO-06-577 United Nations

officials, present UN procurement rules and processes are difficult to apply 

in peacekeeping missions during start-up. Second, field procurement staff 

work in demanding operating environments, especially during the first few 

months of a mission’s start-up, and must expediently resolve issues such as 

uncertainties regarding the free movement of goods, customs clearances, 

and taxation. Finally, the Peacekeeping Department stated that its missions 

do not have enough field procurement staff willing to serve under current 

conditions of service. An environment laden with such considerable risks 

demonstrates the need for management to establish a comprehensive 

framework for continuously identifying, analyzing, and managing risks in 

procurement operations. While Peacekeeping Department officials 

informed us that they have developed strategies to mitigate certain risks, 

they acknowledged that the UN does not have a formal risk management 

framework. 

Procurement Service officials stated that they do not systematically assess 

procurement risks. In addition, 13 out of 19 peacekeeping field 

procurement chiefs stated that they do not prepare formal or informal risk 

assessments for their missions. A November 2005 consultant report found 

that the Procurement Service does not have a formal and regular risk 

management process to assess compliance, evaluate risks, implement 

controls, and bring serious issues to the attention of management. 

Similarly, OIOS reported in January 2006 that UN management had failed to 

establish and implement a formal procurement risk management strategy. 

An OIOS official also identified several risk areas in the UN’s procurement 

operations relating to individual span of control and supervision, 

segregation of functions, access to bids, and the use of brokers and 

subcontractors.

Without a risk management strategy for procurement, the UN would not be 

fully equipped to identify areas that would require stronger oversight. For 

example, start-up peacekeeping missions constitute a high-risk area 

because they require a significant volume of procurement activity under 

demanding time pressures in challenging geographic regions. Similarly, UN 

efforts to adjust procurement rules to suit field conditions or to reduce the 

caseload of the Headquarters Committee on Contracts would be hampered 

by the absence of a risk assessment process. 
Page 28 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Fragmented 

Information Systems 

Impede UN 

Procurement

The UN lacks an integrated information management system, which 

adversely impacts its ability to oversee field and headquarters procurement 

operations. A sound internal control system requires that relevant, reliable 

information be recorded and communicated in a timely manner to equip 

management to carry out their responsibilities. 

The UN is exposed to risks arising from fragmented procurement and 

financial systems in both headquarters and field procurement operations. 

We found that Procurement Service staff had limited access to data on 

procurement activities conducted locally in field missions. No single 

procurement database supports both the Procurement Service and 

peacekeeping missions; they utilize two separate procurement systems. As 

a result, no single UN entity was able to readily provide us with data on the 

total value of purchase orders and contract awards issued by each 

peacekeeping mission, including actions procured both locally and by the 

Procurement Service at headquarters. These issues raise concerns about 

the ability of headquarters managers to comprehensively oversee 

procurement by the various field missions. Moreover, the Peacekeeping 

Department has established only limited reporting requirements for field 

missions and lacks a full-time manager at headquarters to review the 

reports of all peacekeeping missions. A November 2005 consultant study 

also found that the fragmented information systems limit the Procurement 

Service’s ability to generate comprehensive and timely management 

reports. Furthermore, the study found that the current information systems 

did not use fraud detection tools and exception reports. Such reports, if 

used, would serve to alert management of procurement actions requiring 

additional monitoring. For example, a report of cumulative awards to 

vendors would help management identify instances of inadequate 

competition or bid rigging by vendors. 

Procurement Managers 

Lack Mechanisms to 

Monitor Procurement 

and Rely on Oversight 

Entities 

Procurement officials lack a systematic and standardized approach for 

conducting management oversight of procurement activity. Instead, to 

monitor procurement activity, they rely heavily on UN oversight entities. 

Although these entities have identified numerous weaknesses in the 

procurement process, the UN has not always implemented their 

recommendations to correct the weaknesses. In many cases, the oversight 

entities found similar problems in different field missions and issued 

similar recommendations. Yet, UN management does not review the audit 

reports systematically to determine whether changes to policy or processes 

are warranted to address recurring problems. In addition, the UN does not 
Page 29 GAO-06-577 United Nations

have a mechanism that provides reasonable assurance that corrective 

actions, once taken, are institutionalized. Further, the UN does not have an 

effective process for consistently holding procurement staff accountable 

for their actions, and it is too early to determine whether a newly 

established management performance board will do so. 

UN Officials Lack 

Mechanisms for Monitoring 

Headquarters and Field 

Procurement Activity 

Internal control standards state that while audits and other reviews of 

controls by internal and external auditors can be useful, the responsibility 

for establishing mechanisms to monitor and evaluate program activities 

rests with managers. Ongoing monitoring occurs during normal operations 

and includes regular management and supervisory activities, such as 

helping to ensure that staff follow UN procurement policies. 

As noted earlier, the UN lacks an effective organizational structure for 

managing procurement at headquarters and in the field. In addition, UN 

procurement managers do not have a standardized and systematic process 

to monitor headquarters or field procurement during normal operations as 

part of their regular management duties. In 2006, OIOS reported that the 

UN does not have sufficient controls for providing reasonable assurance of 

compliance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the UN and that 

important controls were lacking, existing controls were often bypassed, 

and senior officials did not take proper care to design controls for 

overseeing peacekeeping procurement operations. Senior procurement 

officials at headquarters stated that they rely heavily on the auditors to 

monitor procurement activity. Also, in 2005 a consultant reported that the 

Procurement Service cannot adequately monitor procurement activities 

due to (1) inadequate reporting of procurement activity, and (2) a lack of 

system support for management reporting and financial transaction 

information. 

Field procurement managers also lack a standardized and systematic 

approach for monitoring procurement activity to provide reasonable 

assurance that the Financial Regulations and Rules of the UN are followed. 

Although UN chief procurement officers reported taking a variety of 

actions to determine whether their staff comply with the Financial 

Regulations and Rules of the UN, there were considerable differences in 

the steps reported, both in terms of what the officers were doing and the 

degree of their involvement. For example, while one chief procurement 

officer reported that he reviewed all procurement files, another stated that 

he did not have the time or resources to provide any oversight. Most field 

procurement officials told us that the local committee on contracts at their 
Page 30 GAO-06-577 United Nations

mission is generally helpful and timely in reviewing contract proposals. 

However, UN auditors have found that noncompliance with the UN’s 

Financial Regulations and Rules has resulted in financial losses to the UN. 

For example, in its audit of peacekeeping operations in 2004, the Board of 

Auditors found that one contractor was declared bankrupt in May 2002 and 

could not fulfill contract requirements. A performance bond for $1.4 million 

should have been provided, as required by the contract, but it could not be 

located by UN officials. In addition, OIOS found instances where 

procurement staff split requisitions to come in under review thresholds; 

requisitioners sometimes procured items directly; vendors were not 

properly registered; and contracts were awarded without sufficient 

justification.

Also, most UN chief procurement officers report taking a variety of actions 

to determine whether vendors comply with the Financial Regulations and 

Rules of the UN; however, there were considerable differences between the 

steps the officers were taking and the degree of their involvement. Most 

chief procurement officers stated that they inform vendors of the UN 

regulations that need to be followed and that the regulations were also in 

the contracts. Some officers stated that they had an independent unit for 

contracts management in their mission that would monitor vendors for 

contract performance and hold meetings with the vendors to discuss their 

performance, while others said that they used vendor performance reports 

to monitor vendors. However, UN auditors have noted that in many 

instances, procurement staff did not prepare vendor performance reports. 

For example, in 2005, the Board of Auditors reported that for seven of a 

sample of nine contracts worth nearly $163 million, no supplier evaluations 

could be found for $160.7 million of those purchases.

UN Lacks Centralized 

Process for Addressing 

Oversight 

Recommendations

Internal controls guidance states that monitoring should provide 

reasonable assurance that the findings of audits and other reviews are 

promptly resolved. OIOS and the Board of Auditors conduct regular 

examinations of procurement. In many cases, the oversight entities have 

found similar problems and issued similar recommendations in multiple 

field missions. UN management, however, does not systematically review 

the audit reports to determine whether changes to policies or processes are 

warranted to address systemic problems. 

OIOS conducts smaller-scope audits on specific procurement policies and 

procedures at one or more missions or offices. Over the past 5 years, OIOS 

has identified numerous weaknesses in areas such as management 
Page 31 GAO-06-577 United Nations

accountability, planning and needs assessments, vendor qualifications and 

rosters, and contract reviews. OIOS’s recommendations-tracking database 

indicates that the Procurement Service and the Peacekeeping Department 

have implemented about 88 percent of about 330 procurement 

recommendations and about 85 percent of approximately 170 critical 

procurement recommendations.32 However, a recent study by a UN 

consultant concluded that while OIOS provides spot audit coverage, OIOS 

has lacked the resources to provide coverage that would be sufficient to 

prevent breakdowns in internal controls. 

The Board of Auditors serves as the UN’s external auditor and is charged 

with auditing the UN financial statements biannually, including those of the 

Procurement Service. The board also audits peacekeeping field operations 

annually, including field procurement. According to board staff, the board 

devotes about half of its operations to procurement oversight, primarily 

peacekeeping oversight. Over the past 4 years, the board identified 

weaknesses concerning procurement ethics, vendor performance reports, 

and the absence of a comprehensive internal antifraud plan. According to 

some board officials, the UN could further benefit from procurement audits 

of system contracts, the bid-tendering process, and air operations. The 

board also pointed to the lack of an adequately trained and professional 

procurement workforce and stated that the UN should create a 

professional cadre of procurement officers. In addition, the board reported 

that the UN has not fully implemented key audit recommendations, such as 

having peacekeeping missions identify training needs for procurement 

officers and establishing a time frame for implementing ethical guidelines 

for procurement staff. According to board officials, based on the board’s 

audit of peacekeeping operations for the period ended June 30, 2003, of 69 

recommendations, 26 were implemented; 33 were in progress; and 10 had 

not yet started. 

The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducts UN-wide evaluations, inspections, 

and investigations and prepares reports and notes identifying best 

practices and opportunities for cost savings within the UN system. JIU has 

called attention to weaknesses in UN procurement training. In 2004, JIU 

reported that training funds for procurement staff were small relative to 

procurement volumes and amounted to about 0.01 percent of aggregate 

32We analyzed procurement recommendations from the Procurement Service and the 

Peacekeeping Department (18 missions in total) from July 2000 to June 2005; the 

recommendations were extracted from OIOS’s recommendations-tracking database. 
Page 32 GAO-06-577 United Nations

procurement expenditures with the majority of UN entities allocating no 

resources for that purpose. The UN had not fully addressed JIU’s call for 

additional funding for procurement training and certification for 

procurement officers. However, JIU does not track separately and report 

on the implementation rate of its procurement recommendations.

In many cases, the oversight entities have found similar problems in 

different field missions and issued similar recommendations. Yet, UN 

management does not review the audit reports in a methodical manner to 

determine whether changes to policy or processes are warranted to 

address systemic problems or have a mechanism to help ensure that 

corrective actions, once taken, are institutionalized. According to UN 

officials, the UN currently does not systematically track all of the 

information from the oversight entities and does not perform any 

systematic analysis of what the three oversight entities are reporting to 

identify systemic weaknesses or lessons learned. The UN had begun 

exploring the possibility of establishing a high-level follow-up mechanism 

to help ensure proper and systematic implementation of oversight 

recommendations and share audit-related information and lessons learned, 

where appropriate; however, such a mechanism has yet to be implemented. 

At the request of the General Assembly, in 2005 the Secretary-General 

called for a high-level mechanism to be established to help ensure proper 

implementation of all oversight recommendations. As proposed, this 

oversight committee would (1) provide independent advice to the 

Secretary-General on all Secretariat activities relating to oversight and 

investigations, (2) advise the Secretary-General on the response of 

management to the recommendations made by oversight bodies and on the 

manner in which the implementation of those recommendations can have 

the greatest impact, and (3) help ensure systematic implementation of 

recommendations that have been approved by the General Assembly or 

accepted by the Secretariat. However, the UN has yet to implement such a 

mechanism and plans for doing so are uncertain. 

UN Does Not Have an 

Effective Mechanism for 

Holding Staff Accountable 

The UN does not have an effective mechanism in place for holding 

procurement staff accountable for their actions. Internal control standards 

state that management should maintain the organization’s ethical tone, 

provide guidance for proper behavior, remove temptations for unethical 

behavior, and provide discipline when appropriate. OIOS recently reported 

that the UN’s lack of enforcement of accountability and reluctance to 

investigate the mismanagement of resources, fraud, and abuse of delegated 

authority has increased the risk of corrupt practices in UN procurement. In 
Page 33 GAO-06-577 United Nations

addition, peacekeeping officials agree that a lack of enforcement of 

accountability in some locations has led to a pattern of poor control over 

procurement practices. Both OIOS and peacekeeping officials agree that 

there is evidence that some senior managers in the peacekeeping and 

management departments may not have been reasonably diligent in 

discharging their duties or helping to ensure that adequate internal controls 

and procedures are in place to safeguard the organization’s assets. 

In May 2005, the Secretary-General abolished an accountability panel 

established in 2000 because it was ineffective and replaced it with a 

management performance board. This panel was to help ensure that the 

UN addressed findings of its oversight review bodies from a systemic 

perspective and to reinforce existing accountability mechanisms. It 

consisted of the Deputy Secretary-General, acting as the chairperson, and 

four members at the under-secretary-general level, appointed by the 

Secretary-General. The new management performance board will focus 

primarily on the performance and accountability of senior managers and 

advise the Secretary-General, according to a UN official. Chaired also by 

the Deputy Secretary-General, this board is intended to help ensure that the 

UN addresses serious managerial issues identified by its oversight bodies in 

a timely manner, monitors senior managers in their exercise of their 

authority, and reviews UN justice proceedings for management 

accountability purposes. The board also consists of two members at the 

under-secretary level and an external expert in public sector management. 

A UN official stated that the board has met twice as of February 2006. The 

board has been operational for too short a time to allow a determination of 

its effectiveness. 

The United States Has 

Recently Taken Steps 

to Support UN 

Procurement Reform

The United States has recently taken steps to advocate procurement 

reform at the UN as part of its efforts to advance overall UN management 

reforms.33 The U.S. Mission has publicly stated that accountable, costeffective, and transparent procurement practices at the UN are vital to UN 

operations and are therefore an ongoing management priority. The 

Permanent U.S. Representative to the UN has recognized management 

weaknesses in the procurement area, particularly with regard to the 

unclear lines of authority and responsibility between the Departments of 

33The U.S. Mission to the UN has advocated management reforms aimed at achieving a more 

effective and accountable UN, including an adequately resourced ethics office, stronger UN 

auditing and oversight systems, and a new Independent Audit Advisory Committee. 
Page 34 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Management and Peacekeeping. He has indicated that clarifying these lines 

of authority would need to be part of overall UN management reform. The 

U.S. Mission also has pressed to have peacekeeping procurement concerns 

brought to the attention of the Security Council, despite the objections of 

some other member states. As a result, a senior UN official briefed the 

Security Council in February 2006 on OIOS’s audit of procurement 

practices in Security Council-mandated peacekeeping missions. 

A staffing vacancy at the U.S. Mission to the UN in New York may have 

limited U.S. influence in encouraging and formulating proposals for 

procurement reform. The position of ambassador to the UN for 

management and reform was vacant from February 2005 until late March 

2006. According to State officials, statements from ambassador-level 

representatives in UN bodies have more impact and influence than 

statements from other U.S. representatives. This key vacancy represents a 

missed opportunity for the United States in the formation of the UN 

management reform agenda agreed to at the World Summit in 2005. As a 

result, officials said, the U.S. Mission had limited capacity to influence 

reform.

Conclusions Long-standing weaknesses in the UN’s internal controls over procurement 

have left UN procurement funds highly vulnerable to fraud, waste, and 

abuse. Many of these weaknesses have been known and documented by 

outside experts and the UN’s own auditors for more than a decade. The UN, 

however, has not demonstrated the sustained leadership needed to correct 

these weaknesses. It has instead undertaken piecemeal reforms while 

failing to clearly establish management accountability for correcting 

procurement weaknesses. The negative effects of this lack of UN 

leadership in procurement have been compounded by a peacekeeping 

program that has more than quadrupled in size since 1999 and may expand 

even further.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

We recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent 

Representative of the United States to the UN work with other member 

states to encourage the Secretary-General to take the following eight 

actions: 

• establish clear and effective lines of authority and responsibility 

between headquarters and the field for UN procurement;
Page 35 GAO-06-577 United Nations

• enhance the professionalism of the UN procurement workforce by 

establishing a comprehensive procurement training program and a 

formal career path; 

• provide the Headquarters Committee on Contracts with an adequate 

structure and manageable workload for contract review needs;

• establish an independent bid protest process for UN vendors; 

• take action to keep the UN procurement manual complete and updated 

on a timely basis and complete the ethics guidance;

• develop a consistent process for providing reasonable assurance that 

the UN is conducting business with only qualified vendors; 

• develop a strategic risk assessment process that provides reasonable 

assurance of systematic and comprehensive examination of 

headquarters and field procurement; and

• standardize and strengthen monitoring of procurement activities by 

procurement managers, including actions aimed at helping to ensure 

that oversight agencies’ recommendations are implemented and that 

officials are held accountable for their actions. 

We also recommend that the Secretary of State report to the Congress 

annually regarding UN progress in reforming its procurement process, with 

particular attention to the status of UN progress in addressing the above 

recommendations. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this 

report that are reproduced in appendix III. The department stated that it 

welcomed our report and endorsed its recommendations. The UN did not 

provide us with written comments. State and UN officials provided us with 

a number of technical suggestions and clarifications that we have 

addressed, as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other 
Page 36 GAO-06-577 United Nations

interested Members of Congress, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. 

Permanent Representative to the United Nations. We will also make copies 

available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at 

no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV.

Thomas Melito

Director, International Affairs and Trade
Page 37 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Appendix I

Scope and Methodology AAppenednxidexiIs

To assess internal controls in the United Nations (UN) procurement 

process, we used a framework that is widely accepted in the international 

audit community and has been adopted by leading accountability 

organizations, including the International Organization of Supreme Audit 

Institutions, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and GAO.1

 

Specifically, we assessed five key elements of internal control: (1) the 

control environment, (2) control activities, (3) risk assessment, (4) 

information and communications, and (5) monitoring. 

Our review focused primarily on the Department of Management, the 

United Nations Procurement Service (which reports to the Department of 

Management), and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations 

(Peacekeeping Department), including 19 field missions. To assess the 

control environment for UN procurement, we reviewed the UN’s 

procurement manual, organizational structure, financial regulations and 

rules, and information obtained from the Headquarters Committee on 

Contracts. We also examined training and staffing data, information on 

ethics guidance, and the UN Office of Internal Oversight Service’s (OIOS) 

2006 report on peacekeeping procurement activities.2

 

To assess the control activities, risk assessments, and information and 

communications for UN procurement, we reviewed certain policies, 

procedures, and mechanisms that the UN has in place to provide 

reasonable assurance that staff comply with directives. Specifically, we 

reviewed (1) the mechanism that the UN has established to review 

procurement contracts; (2) approaches to addressing vendor grievances, 

updating the procurement manual, and the maintenance of qualifying 

vendor rosters; and (3) approaches to assessing procurement risk to the 

UN, as well as the UN’s information management system for procurement.

To assess procurement monitoring, we reviewed the structure and 

mandates of OIOS, the UN Board of Auditors, and the UN Joint Inspection 

Unit (JIU). We also reviewed their roles in monitoring UN procurement 

activities. We also reviewed the board’s audited financial statements and 

reports for Secretariat and peacekeeping operations, which includes 

procurement findings and recommendations; OIOS and JIU reports 

1

Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Internal Control—

Integrated Framework (September 1992).

2

Office of Internal Oversight Services, Comprehensive Management Review of the 

Department of Peacekeeping Operations—Procurement, AP2005/600/20 (Jan. 20, 2006). 
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO-06-577 United Nations

containing procurement findings and recommendations; annual reports of 

the monitoring entities covering the status of implementation of their 

recommendations, as well as the process they have in place to track their 

recommendations; resolutions and reports on the UN Secretariat 

Accountability Panel, the Management Performance Board, and the 

Oversight Committee. We discussed OIOS’s process for monitoring and 

reporting on its recommendations with relevant officials. While the 

evidence these officials have obtained indicates that the data are generally 

reliable, the officials said they would like to perform more testing of 

recommendations that have been implemented but lack the resources to do 

so. We obtained the recommendations data set from OIOS and performed 

basic reliability checks. Based on our interviews and checks, we 

determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this 

report.

In addition, to assess the control environment and other standards, we 

prepared an interview instrument and conducted a series of structured 

interviews with the principal procurement officers at each of the 

Peacekeeping Department’s 19 missions in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the 

Americas (see fig. 5). We developed the interview questions based on our 

audit work, discussions with UN officials, and review of questionnaires 

conducted of headquarters staff. The structured interview instrument 

included open- and closed-ended questions, and covered various topics, 

including the background of procurement staff at each mission, such as 

experience, training, and certification; information on the types and 

volume of procurement at each mission; and questions regarding integrity, 

openness, competitiveness, and accountability. We conducted pretests of 

the instrument to provide reasonable assurance that our questions were 

clear and would be interpreted correctly. We addressed possible 

interviewer bias by ensuring that all respondents received copies of the 

instrument ahead of time and had them available when we conducted our 

interviews by telephone. 

To examine U.S. government efforts to support reform of UN procurement, 

we reviewed position statements and various program documents. We also 

met with senior Department of State officials in Washington, D.C., and 

senior officials with the U.S. Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 39 GAO-06-577 United Nations

In addition, we reviewed reports prepared in 2005 by consulting firms hired 

by the UN to assess its procurement process.3 In addition, we reviewed 

reports by the Oil for Food Independent Inquiry Committee,4 the UN Panel 

on United Nations Peace Operations, and the UN High-Level Expert 

Procurement Group.5 We interviewed officials of the Department of 

Management, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the 

Headquarters Committee on Contracts, the UN Procurement Service, 

OIOS, and the Board of Auditors in New York. 

We performed our work from April 2005 through March 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

3

Deloitte, Assessment of Internal Controls in the United Nations Secretariat Procurement 

Operations-Final Report (Nov. 30, 2005); and the National Institute of Governmental 

Purchasing, Assessment of UNPS Procurement Processes (Herndon, Va., June 2005). 

4

Independent Inquiry Committee into the Oil-for-Food Programme, Third Interim Report

(Aug. 8, 2005).

5

United Nations, Procurement Study Report (New York, December 1994).
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 40 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Figure 5: Peacekeeping and Other Missions Administered by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Notes: Dollars in millions. 

Sources: GAO analysis of UN data as of February 2006; Cartesia MapArt (map).

UNMOGIP–India/Pakistan

established 1949

uniformed personnel 43

civilian personnel 94

budget $3.87

UNFICYP–Cyprus

established 1964

uniformed personnel 926

civilian personnel 177

budget $46.51

UNIFIL–Lebanon

established 1978

uniformed personnel 1,985

civilian personnel 509

budget $99.23

MINURSO–W. Sahara

established 1991

uniformed personnel 226

civilian personnel 234

budget $47.95

UNOMIG–Georgia

established 1993

uniformed personnel 133

civilian personnel 295

budget $36.38

UNMIK–Kosovo

established 1999

uniformed personnel 2,259

civilian personnel 3,263

budget $252.55

MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

ONUB UN Operation in Burundi

UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMI UN Assistance Mission for Iraq

UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force (Golan Heights, Syria)

UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon

UNIOSIL UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

UNLB UN Logistics Base (Brindisi, Italy)

UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

UNMIK UN Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia

UNMIS UN Mission in Sudan

UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

UNOCI UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire

UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia

UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization (Jerusalem, Israel)

UNLB– logistics base, Italy

established 1994

MONUC–D.R. of Congo

established 1999

uniformed personnel 16,803

civilian personnel 3,016

budget $1,153.89

UNMEE–Ethiopia/Eritrea

established 2000

uniformed personnel 3,357

civilian personnel 461

budget $185.99

UNOCI–Côte d’Ivoire

established 2004

uniformed personnel 7,593

civilian personnel 999

budget $438.17

MINUSTAH–Haiti

established 2004

uniformed personnel 9,233

civilian personnel 2,132

budget $541.30

ONUB–Burundi

established 2004

uniformed personnel 4,656

civilian personnel 925

budget $307.69

15 peacekeeping missions, 1 logistics base, and 3 other missionsa

UNDOF–Syria

established 1974

uniformed personnel 1,152

civilian personnel 159

budget $43.71

UNAMI–Iraq

established 2003

UNTSO–Israel

established 1948

uniformed personnel 153

civilian personnel 303

budget $14.66

UNAMA–Afghanistan

established 2002

UNMIL–Liberia

established 2003

uniformed personnel 16,098

civilian personnel 2,398

budget $760.57

UNIOSIL–Sierra Leone

established 2006

UNMIS–Sudan

established 2005

uniformed personnel 8,161

civilian personnel 1,939

budget $969.47
Appendix I

Scope and Methodology

Page 41 GAO-06-577 United Nations

We contacted the 19 missions shown above. They consist of all 15 of the UN’s current peacekeeping 

operations, one logistics base (UNLB), and three other missions administratively supported by the 

Peacekeeping Department (UNAMA, UNAMI, and UNIOSIL).
Page 42 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Appendix II

UN Procurement Processes ApendxiI

Figure 6: Procurement Process in the Field 

Sources: GAO, United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms, GAO/NSIAD-99-71 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 1999); and 

United Nations Procurement Manual, Rev. 02, UN Department of Management (January 2004).

Procurement actions in the field mission Procurement actions in UN Headquarters

Requisitioner develops scope of work/specifications to raise requisition and 

establishes technical evaluation criteria, and mission procurement office, reviews

scope of work/specifications and establishes commercial evaluation criteria

Mission procurement office identifies potential sources via vendor lists, market 

research, and expressions of interest from vendors

Mission procurement office develops and issues solicitation documents

Requisitioner gives technical/operational evaluation

Mission procurement office receives technical evaluation from 

requisitioner, then conducts commercial evaluation of submission

Contract is awarded; 

mission procurement 

office issues contract

Receive goods and 

services

Local Committee on Contracts reviews case and gives recommendation. Mission 

chief administrative officer gives approval

Mission procurement office prepares and presents case to Local 

Committee on Contracts

Mission procurement office receives submission, then Tender Opening Committee 

opens it and gives technical documentation to requisitioner for review

Contract is under 

threshold of $200,000

Procurement Service reviews Local Committee on Contracts’ case and prepares committee’s case with 

assistance from Peacekeeping Department’s Logistics Support Division on requirements and technical aspects

Procurement Service presents case to Headquarters Committee on Contracts with assistance 

from Peacekeeping Department’s Logistics Support Division on technical aspects

Headquarters Committee on Contracts reviews and makes recommendation. Department of 

Management (assistant secretary-general, Central Support Services) approves winning vendor

Procurement Service forwards approval to the mission requisitioner

Contract is greater than threshold of $200,000

Contract is greater than Local Committee on Contracts’ threshold of $75,000

Mission

procurement office 

requests local procurement

authority

Funds transferred to 

Procurement Service 

(see process in fig. 7)

Yes

Procurement Service 

accepts authority

No

Procurement Service does

not accept authority

Contracting authority less than the 

delegated authority of the mission

Contracting authority above the 

delegated authority of the mission

Requisitioner identifies requirements and obtains funds
Appendix II

UN Procurement Processes

Page 43 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Note: In cases of certain defined core requirements, peacekeeping field offices may award up to $1 

million without prior review by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts or the approval of the 

Department of Management. 

Figure 7: Procurement Process in UN Headquarters for Contracts Greater Than 

$200,000

Sources: GAO, United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms, GAO/NSIAD-99-71 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 1999); 

and United Nations Procurement Manual, Rev. 02, UN Department of Management (January 2004).

Requisitioner identifies requirements and obtains funds

Requisitioner develops scope of work/specifications to raise requisition and 

establishes technical evaluation criteria, and Procurement Service reviews

scope of work/specifications and establishes commercial evaluation criteria

Procurement Service identifies potential sources via vendor lists, 

market research, and expressions of interest from vendors

Procurement Service develops and issues solicitation 

documents to vendors

Summary of bids/proposals and recommendation of successful 

vendor presented to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts

Department of Management (assistant secretarygeneral, Central Support Services) approves

winning vendor

Receive goods/services

Winning vendor notified by Procurement Service

Purchase order for equipment/contract for service drafted

Vendors provide bids/proposals

Public bid opening

Procurement Service receives submission and formally 

opens technical part, then sends it to the requisitioner 

for technical/operational evaluation

Procurement Service receives technical evaluation from 

requisitioner, then conducts commercial evaluation of submission
Page 44 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State ApendxiI
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 45 GAO-06-577 United Nations
Appendix III

Comments from the Department of State

Page 46 GAO-06-577 United Nations
Page 47 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, Phyllis Anderson, Assistant 

Director; Pierre Toureille; Kristy Kennedy; Clarette Kim; Barbara Shields; 

and Lynn Cothern made key contributions to this report. Jaime Allentuck, 

Martin De Alteriis, Bonnie Derby, Timothy DiNapoli, Mark Dowling, Etana 

Finkler, John Krump, and James Michels also provided technical 

assistance.
Page 48 GAO-06-577 United Nations

Related GAO Products

United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of 

Internal Auditors. GAO-06-575. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.

United Nations: Lessons Learned from Oil for Food Program Indicate the 

Need to Strengthen UN Internal Controls and Oversight. GAO-06-330. 

Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006.

Peacekeeping: Cost Comparison of Actual UN and Hypothetical U.S. 

Operations in Haiti. GAO-06-331. Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2006.

United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and 

Procurement Practices. GAO-06-226T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005.

United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve 

Lasting Results. GAO-05-392T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005. 

United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits. GAO-05-346T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 15, 2005. 

United Nations: Reforms Progressing, but Comprehensive Assessments 

Needed to Measure Impact. GAO-04-339. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 

2004.

United Nations: Progress of Procurement Reforms. GAO/NSIAD-99-71. 

Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1999.

(320345)
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Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548

Public Affairs Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548