### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

NADINE MCINDOO, Appellant,

v.

ASHLEY ATKINSON, Appellee.

No. 4D13

- 3374

[February 18, 2015 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Laura M. Watson, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE13006106.

Nadine McIndoo, Lauderhill , pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

C ONNER

, J

.

Appellant, Nadine McIndoo (“the mother”)

, appeals the trial court’s order denying her petition to domesticate a foreign child custody judgment. We agree with her argument that the trial court erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction over the case and we reverse.

Factual Background and Trial Proceedings

In November 1999, an order was entered by a New York court placing custody of the parties ’ child with the mother and granting the father visitation (“the NY Order”). The mother moved with the child to Florida in

2003.

In December 2012, there was a child protection investigation and court proceeding regarding an incident involving the mother and the child. T he

child was temporarily “ removed from the care of his natural mother,” and “placed in the care of his natural father ” while the child protection proceeding was pending

. After gaining temporary care of the child, the

father relocated the child to Arizona. The child protection proceeding was dismissed later the same month , and the investigation was closed i n early January 2013.2

Once the investigation into the mother was c losed, she attempted to regain custody of the child, but the father refused to return the child to

the mother.

In May 2013, the mother filed a petition in the court below to domesticate the NY Order. A week later she filed a notice of registration of

t he NY Order an d an emergency verified motion for a child pick

- up order

. T he trial court entered an order granting th e motion for a pick

- up order on the same day. Within the form order, the trial court checked the box stating: “This Court exercised and co ntinues to exercise original jurisdiction over the minor children listed below under the [UCCJEA]. . . specifically, section 61.514, Florida Statutes.” 1

The father filed a response and opposition to the mother’s petition to domesticate the NY Order, citin g sections 61.514 and 61.519, Florida Statutes (2013), and arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because, among other reasons, the child had not lived in Florida for the six months prior to the filing of the mother’s petition, and also bec ause a court in Arizona had begun proceedings over the issue. The father’s position regarding the six

- month residency requirement was predicated on

the fact that he removed the child to Arizona. Attached to the father’s response were two “minute entries” from an Arizona court. 2 One granted the father temporary sole legal decision

- making authority and sole legal physical custody over the child, as “[t]his w[ould] allow Father sufficient

time for a determination as to the home state of the child and whethe r a New York court, a Florida court, or this court has jurisdiction to modify a custody order in accordance with the U[CCJEA].” The other entry extended the temporary orders of the court until August 15, 2013, or “a decision by the Florida Court to exerci se jurisdiction.”

On August 9, 2013, after a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the mother’s petition to domesticate the NY Order. Based on its written order, it appears that the trial court found that it did not have

1 “The general purposes of the UCCJEA are to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with other courts in child custody matters; promote cooperation with other courts; insure that a custody decree is rendered in the state which enjoys the superior pos ition to decide what is in the best interest of the child; deter controversies and avoid relitigation of custody issues; facilitate enforcement of custody decrees; and promote uniformity of the laws governing custody issues.” Arjona v. Torres , 941 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (citing § 61.502, Fla.

Stat . (2005)).

2 The father evidently had filed a child custody proceeding in Arizona.3

subject

- matter jurisd iction for three re asons: (1) the mother did not file a motion regarding a “child custody proceeding” as defined by section 61.503(4), F lorida Statutes (2013); (2) Florida was not the “home st ate” of the child; and (3) Arizona had already begun proceedings “in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA.” The mother appeals this order. We discuss

the trial court’s determination s sequentially

.

Appellate Analysis and Disposition

“Child Custody Proceeding”

Section 61.503(4) , Florida Statutes (2013)

, states:

(4) “Child custody proceeding” means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, residential care, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The term does not include a proceeding

invol ving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under ss. 61.524

- 61.540

.

§ 61.503(4), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). As can be seen , the petition for domestication of foreign judgment and notice of registration filed by the mothe r, pursuant to section s 61.526 and 61.528, respectively, are expressly not included as “child custody proceedings” under the

UCCJEA. T he trial court order does not cite to, nor can we find, any

statut ory authority which requires that a proceeding be a “child custody proceeding” under the definition in the UCCJEA before the trial court can have jurisdiction to act upon a petition to domesticate a foreign custody

order

. To the contrary, both the statute governing do mestication of a foreign judgment (section 61.526) and registration of a judgment (section 61.528) are contained within Florida’s UCCJEA statutes. I t would be absurd for the legislature to have placed within Florida courts the power to recognize and regis ter a foreign judgment if the same chapter prohibits jurisdiction over the same. Therefore

, the fact that the mother’s filings

were not regarding a child custody proceeding is irrelevant to the question of jurisdiction to domesticate a foreign custody ord er.4

The “Home State” Rule

Likewise, the trial court also incorrectly applied the “home state” rule to the mother’s petition to domesticate the NY Order

. Section 61.503(7),

Florid a Statutes (2013), provides :

(7) “Home state” means the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least 6

consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding

. In the case of a child younger than 6 months of age, the term means the state in which the chi ld lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.

§ 61.503(7), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added)

. The “home state” rule applies to “child custody proceedings

. ” A s discussed above

, and found by the trial court, the petitions filed by the mother did not constitute “child custody proceedings.” This means that the “home state” rule did not apply to the mother’s petitions either.

Perhaps the trial court may have inc orrectly applied the “home state” rule based on section 61.514, Florida Statutes (2013), since the father’s opposition to the mother’s petition relied in large part on this section of

the UCCJEA. Th is section states:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.517, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody

determination only if:

(a) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of

the child within 6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.

§ 61.514, Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added)

. However, as stated in the statute, this “home state ” rule applies to an initial child custody determination, whereas the petition and notice filed by the mother were

not for an initial child custody determination. Instead, the petition and5

notice sought to have Florida recognize the previous custody

deter mination made in the NY Order. 3

Simultaneous Proceedings in Arizona

Section 61.519, Florida Statu t es (2013), which governs the trial court’s jurisdiction in simultaneous proceedings, states:

Except as otherwise provided in s. 61.517, a court of this state may not exercise its jurisdiction under ss. 61.514

- 61.524 if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been commenced in a

court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this part , unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because

a court of this state is a more convenient forum under s.

61.520.

§ 61.519, Fl a. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added)

. Although the trial court did not specifically cite to this statute in its order, since it stated that “Arizona’s proceedings are in substantial conformity with the UCCJEA,” it

appears that the trial court concluded it did not have subject

- matter jurisdiction based

, at least in part, up on the simultaneous proceedings

statute. In doing so, the trial court misapplied the statute

. Since section

61.519 expressly states that the court may not exercise jurisdiction under

sectio ns 61.514

- 61.524, the simultaneous proceedings statute did not bar the trial court’s jurisdiction to entertain the mother’s petition to

domesticate under section 61.526 or the notice she filed under section

61.528

.

Proper Statutory Application

The prope r statu t e which the trial court should have applied was section 61.526, Florida Statutes (2013). Section 61.526 states:

A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a court of another state if the latter

court exerci sed jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this part or the determination was made under factual

3 The inapplicability of the home state rule to the process for domestication of a foreign judgment does not, however, prevent a party from being able to make a “home state” challenge in an appropriate context, such as a subsequent request

for a modification of a domesticated order. See § 61.516, Fla. Stat. (2013).6 circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this part and the determination has not been modified in accordance with this part.

§ 61.526(1), Fl a. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). Since the factual circumstances of the case meet the jurisdictional standards of the statute, and the NY Order has not been modified, the trial court should have granted the mother’s petition of domesticate the NY Order.

Additionally, since the father failed to file a valid objection to the mother’s notice of registration, the NY Order should have also been confirmed as a registered order, and thus

, was enforceable as of the date of the registration. See §§ 61.528(3)(a) , (5), Fla. Stat. (2013).

We therefore reverse the trial court’s order and remand with instructions that the trial court enter an order granting the mother’s petition to domesticate the NY Order and confirming the registration of the

NY Order.

Reversed and remanded.

C IKLIN and F ORST

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.