J-S49002-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 

RIGHTS TO N.T.C., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: N.I.C., JR., Appellant

No. 697 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 23, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2014-0161

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., ALLEN, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 01, 2015

N.I.C., Jr. (“Father”), appeals from the orphans’ court’s decree, 

entered on March 23, 2015, involuntarily terminating his parental rights to 

his daughter, N.T.C., born in September of 2008.1 After careful review, we 

affirm.

At the termination hearing, the following testimony was presented. 

First, Grandmother testified that in May of 2011, Mother brought N.T.C. to 

Grandmother’s and Grandfather’s home in Baltimore, Maryland, and asked if 

N.T.C. “could remain with [them] until [Mother] found a place to live....” N.T. 

Hearing, 3/20/15, at 3, 13. Grandmother and Grandfather agreed to care 

for N.T.C. temporarily, but Mother never returned for N.T.C. Id. at 3. As 

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1 The record indicates that the parental rights of N.T.C.’s biological mother, 

L.M.S. (“Mother”), were terminated by order dated February 11, 2015, and 

Mother did not appeal. That same order awarded custody to N.T.C.’s 

maternal grandparents, N.M.N. (“Grandmother”) and E.C.N. (“Grandfather”), 

who petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights in the present case.
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such, at the time of the termination hearing, N.T.C. had been living with 

Grandmother and Grandfather since May of 2011. Id. at 3-4. 

Grandmother further testified that Father knew N.T.C. was living with 

her and Grandfather, and he knew Grandmother’s cell phone number and 

the address of their home in Baltimore, which he had visited before. Id. at 

4-5. Grandmother testified that she recalled Father calling her cell phone 

twice - once on N.T.C.’s third birthday, and then “around December of 2011, 

around Christmas.” Id. at 6, 14. Father also sent money to N.T.C. in 

December of 2011. Id. at 9. Grandmother testified that when she spoke 

with Father in December of 2011, she told him that he could visit N.T.C. 

“whenever he want[ed] to.” Id. at 14. However, Grandmother did not 

recall Father making any attempt to contact or visit with N.T.C. after that 

December 2011 communication. Id. at 11. In October of 2013, 

Grandmother and Grandfather moved with N.T.C. to Pennsylvania. Id. at 6. 

Grandfather also testified at the hearing. He stated that in December 

of 2011, he spoke with Father and informed him that “if he wanted to see 

his daughter and talk to his daughter, he was welcome to.” Id. at 25. 

Grandfather also testified that he told Father he could contact N.T.C. by 

calling either Grandmother’s or Grandfather’s cell phone. Id. Grandfather 

said that later that month, at Christmastime, Father sent around $150 for 

N.T.C. Id. Grandfather said that after December of 2011, Father did not 

contact them to schedule a visit with N.T.C., nor did he call or leave 

messages inquiring about the child. Id. at 26. Grandfather testified that 
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Father knew his cell phone number after their conversation in December of 

2011, and Grandfather’s phone number never changed. Id. Grandfather 

further testified that in 2012, he contacted Father regarding Grandmother’s 

and Grandfather’s claiming N.T.C. as a dependent for income tax purposes. 

Id. at 27. At that time, Father did not ask to speak to N.T.C. or inquire 

about how she was doing. Id. at 28, 33. Grandfather did not hear from 

Father again after that conversation in 2012. Id. 

Next, Father took the stand at the termination hearing. Father 

testified that after N.T.C. was born in September of 2008, she lived with 

Father and Mother in Georgia until approximately August of 2010. Id. at 

34-35. At that time, Father relocated to Philadelphia and N.T.C. remained 

with Mother. Id. at 35. Father testified that he did not obtain employment 

in Philadelphia until 2012. Id. at 38. He stated that he knew that N.T.C. 

was living in Baltimore in 2011, and claimed that he “kept in touch with 

[N.T.C., Grandmother, and Grandfather] the best way [he could,]” but doing 

so was difficult because he did not have a job, money, or a car. Id. at 40, 

42. He testified that he did call N.T.C. but Grandmother “always pick[ed] up 

the phone.” Id. Father stated that after speaking to N.T.C., Grandmother, 

and Grandfather in December of 2011, he “tried calling” but “[n]ever got 

through.” Id. at 46. Father testified that he never left a message when he 

called. Id. at 47. 

In regard to visiting N.T.C., Father stated that he “drove up to 

Baltimore” in August of 2013, but the address he had was not the residence 
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where N.T.C. was living. Id. at 47-48. Father testified that “that was the 

last time [he] even tried to ... make any kind of contact.” Id. at 48. Father 

stated that he was unable to call N.T.C. because he “lost [the] cell phone 

number” he had for Grandmother or Grandfather. Id. Father tried 

searching for Grandmother and Grandfather, on social media to regain 

contact with N.T.C., but was unable to find them. Id. at 49. Father testified 

that ultimately, he had no way to get in touch with Grandmother, 

Grandfather, or N.T.C. for “[t]he last two years....” Id. at 51.

At the close of the termination proceeding, the orphans’ court stated 

that it “found [Grandmother and Grandfather] to be very credible,” and 

“[t]here were portions of [Father’s] testimony that [the court] did not find to 

be very credible.” Id. at 91. The court elaborated, in pertinent part:

We are at a loss as to why [Father] would never leave a 

message if he was interested in contacting [N.T.C.]. We are not 

so certain he made as many calls as he indicated he did. 

Essentially, [Father] says that he looked long and hard for his 

child by doing searches on Facebook and other social media 

type[ websites,] and alleges that he did that for several months, 

and we are not certain that is very credible, either.

And [Father] did indicate that throughout this time period, he 

was employed. He did not testify that he was impoverished to 

the point that he couldn’t again drive to Baltimore or go through 

other matters, contact an attorney, a private investigator, or 

anyone else to track down [Grandmother and Grandfather] or 

his daughter.

We do not believe that [Father] made any substantial effort to 

attempt to bond with his child....

Id. at 91-92.
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Based on these findings, the orphans’ court concluded that 

Grandmother and Grandfather had proven that Father’s parental rights 

should be terminated under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), which states:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

Consequently, the court issued a decree – entered on the lower court’s 

docket on March 23, 2015 – granting Grandmother’s and Grandfather’s 

petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights to N.T.C. 

Father filed a timely notice of appeal and statement of errors 

complained of on appeal in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). Herein, 

Father raises the following issue for our review:

1. Whether the Order involuntarily terminating [Father’s] 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) was 

supported by sufficient evidence where during the six month 

time period preceding the filing of the adoption petition, [Father] 

did not know where his daughter live[d] or how to contact her?

Father’s Brief at 2.

We review Father’s appeal according to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 
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they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; In re R.I.S., 

36 A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been 

often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely 

because the reviewing court might have reached a different 

conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors 

America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); 

Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 

2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 

1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility 

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994). 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).

Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating 

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 
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termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, 

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the 

termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 

(Pa. Super. 2009). 

Herein, Father’s challenges only the orphans’ court’s finding that 

section 2511(a)(1) was satisfied.2 This Court has expounded on the 

requirements of terminating parental rights under this subsection of the 

Adoption Act, as follows:

A court may terminate parental rights under subsection

2511(a)(1) when the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental 

duties for at least six months prior to the filing of the termination 

petition. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) ( en 

banc). Although the six month period immediately preceding the 

filing of the petition is most critical to the analysis, the court 

must consider the whole history of the case and not 

mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. In re 

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2

Father does not challenge the orphans’ court’s decision regarding section 

2511(b). Accordingly, any issue regarding that subsection is not before us. 

See R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 277 n.6 (citing In re Smith, 874 A.2d 131, 137 n.5 

(Pa. Super. 2005) (stating this Court may not, with limited exceptions for 

jurisdictional issues, sua sponte address issues not raised by the parties).
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K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa.Super.2008). The trial court must 

examine the individual circumstances of each case and consider 

all of the explanations of the parent to decide if the evidence, 

under the totality of the circumstances, requires involuntary 

termination. In re B[.], N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 

2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa. 718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005).

In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Here, Father argues that prior to N.T.C.’s moving to Pennsylvania, he 

did make efforts to contact and/or visit her in Baltimore. However, when 

Grandmother and Grandfather relocated N.T.C. to Pennsylvania in October of 

2013, Father had no way of contacting N.T.C. because he did not know 

where she was living. Father also emphasizes that he attempted to find 

N.T.C. by searching social media sites on the internet, but was unsuccessful. 

Based on these facts, Father asserts that the court erred by concluding that 

he had a ‘settled purpose to relinquish’ his parental rights to N.T.C. 

We disagree. The orphans’ court explicitly stated that it found 

Grandmother’s and Grandfather’s testimony credible, and both grandparents 

stated that after December of 2011, Appellant made no effort to 

communicate with or visit N.T.C., despite their telling Father that they would 

allow him to do so. The orphans’ court also stated that it disbelieved 

Father’s claims that he repeatedly called Grandmother and/or Grandfather, 

and noted that Father never left messages during these ostensible phone 

calls. 

In regard to Father’s actions after N.T.C. moved to Pennsylvania, the 

orphans’ court did not believe Father’s testimony that he “looked long and 

hard for his child” by using the internet. N.T. at 91. In any event, the court 
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also emphasized that Father had a job at this time, yet he took no other 

steps to ascertain N.T.C.’s whereabouts, such as contacting an attorney or 

private investigator. In sum, the court found that Father had not “made any 

substantial effort to attempt to bond with his child....” Id. at 92. 

Consequently, the court found that Father, “by a period of conduct for at 

least six months before the filing of this [termination] petition, evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing his parental claim to the child and that he 

has failed to perform any parental duties.” Id. 

The record supports the orphans’ court’s factual findings and credibility 

determinations, and we ascertain no abuse of discretion in the court’s legal 

determination that section 2511(a)(1) was satisfied. According to 

Grandmother and Grandfather, Father made little effort to maintain a 

relationship with N.T.C. from May through December of 2011, and had no 

contact with the child from December of 2011 until the time of the 

termination hearing in March of 2015. The record indicates that from May of 

2011 until October of 2013, Father knew where N.T.C. was living in 

Baltimore, as well as the phone numbers of Grandmother and Grandfather, 

yet Father never visited N.T.C. and called only twice. After October of 2013, 

Father only attempted to locate N.T.C. by internet searches. We agree with 

the court that this evidence supported termination of Father’s parental rights 

under section 2511(a)(1). Again, Father presents no argument pertaining to 

the court’s analysis of section 2511(b); therefore, we do not address that 

issue. 
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Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/1/2015