VOLUME 2

2015-2016 CIVIL AFFAIRS ISSUE PAPERS:

CIVIL AFFAIRS: A FORCE FOR ENGAGEMENT 

AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Edited by

Christopher Holshek

John C. Church, Jr.

Carlisle Barracks, PA and

UNITED STATES 

ARMY WAR COLLEGE

PRESS
PKSOI PAPER

Volume 2

2015 - 2016 Civil Affairs Issue Papers:

Civil Affairs: A Force for Engagement 

and Conflict Prevention

Presented by the

Civil Affairs Association

In coordination with the

U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability 

Operations Institute, 

USMC Training Command,

and the

Foreign Area Officer Association

Edited by

Christopher Holshek and John C. Church, Jr. 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute (PKSOI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize 

operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such 

academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes 

controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on 

key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution 

is unlimited.
*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, 22 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 

17013-5054. 

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All Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

(PKSOI) publications are available on the PKSOI homepage for 

electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be 

ordered while copies last from our homepage. PKSOI’s homepage 

address is: https://pksoi.army.mil

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The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute publishes a quarterly journal to update the peace and stability operations community on the research of our analysts, recent and 

forthcoming publications and upcoming conferences sponsored 

by PKSOI. Each quarterly journal has a specific theme related to 

peace and stability operations and a commentary by the Director of PKSOI entitled The Director's Corner. If you are interested 

in receiving this journal, please subscribe on our homepage at 

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ISBN: 978-0-9861865-6-1 

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Table of Contents

Foreword .......................................................................v

Civil Affairs Association 

President Joseph P. Kirlin III

Executive Summary ....................................................ix

Panel Discussion: “Civil Affairs in Engagement and 

Conflict Prevention – Current Civil-Military Force 

Activities and Recommendations on the Way 

Ahead“............................................................................1

Jim Ruf

Issue Papers

1. “Renewed Relevance: CA Develop Human

 Networks for Effective Engagement“.......................9 

Major Arnel P. David

2. “From Green to Blue: U.S. Army Civil Affairs 

and International Police Engagement“....................25

Captain Rob Kobold

3. “Civil Engagement as a Tool for Conflict 

Prevention: A Case Study“.........................................41 

Captain Tammy Sloulin and 

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lewis
4. “The Role of Civil Affairs in CounterUnconventional Warfare“..........................................59 

Major Shafi Saiduddin

5. “Civil Affairs Forces, U.S. Army Reserve, National 

Guard, and the State Partnership Program:

Is there Room for Engagement?“..............................85 

Major David E. Leiva and 

Major John Nonnemaker

For more information, go to:

 http://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/

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v

FOREWORD

Last year, the Civil Affairs Association and its 

partners, launched its first Issue Papers since the 

early 2000’s, but with a different approach. The annual cycle of a thematically linked Symposium, Issue 

Papers, and Roundtable, provides a platform for the 

most operationally experienced community of Civil 

Affairs (CA) practitioners since World War II to have 

more direct and visible input on the discussion of the 

future of Civil Affairs – as a national strategic capability – at the command and policy levels, as well as 

capture their insights and lessons for future posterity 

and research. The objective of employing this crowdsourcing method is to give young leaders and the upcoming generation, something not previously done 

in a systemic way, an opportunity to have a voice in 

the future of a force in which they have arguably the 

greatest interest.

So far, it has been paying off very well. People in 

many places are recognizing the great value of this 

work because in good part they are recognizing the 

great value of Civil Affairs, regardless of component 

or branch of service. When I asked Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster, among the U.S. Army’s most influential leaders in building the force of the future and recognized in 

Time's list of 100 most influential people in the world 

in 2014, to be the keynote speaker at the Symposium, 

he did not hesitate. At the Symposium, the General 

delivered one of the most cogent and meaningful presentations to an audience of Civil Affairs professionals, for which we are most grateful and thank him for 

his challenge and keen insight.

This year’s discussion was a real breakthrough. But, 

it left us all with some heavy lifting and critical tasks, 
wrapped up in Lt. Gen. McMaster’s call for the CA 

Regiment to “think, learn, analyze, and implement.“ 

He provided us a powerful vehicle to think clearly 

about future conflict and how CA continues to “secure 

the victory“ by helping to prevent as well as end wars. 

Now it’s time to get to work. As a Regiment, we need 

to answer Lt. Gen. McMaster’s challenge and robustly 

contribute to the Army Warfighting Challenges shaping discussion and analysis of doctrine, organizations, 

training, materiel, leader development and education, 

and personnel interim solutions for the future force 

including CA. The Joint Force would benefit from the 

Civil Affairs community’s input and collaboration on 

the Army Operating Concept, Engagement functional 

concept, and Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning and Human Aspect of Military Operations. 

At the same time, we must intensify our dialogue 

with others in the military, government, civilian partners, political leaders, and educate them and public at 

large about CA. In addition to the Issue Papers and the 

Association’s newsletter, there are the publications of 

our partners, such as PKSOI’s Peace & Stability Operations Journal, NDU’s Joint Forces Quarterly and 

Prism, ROA’s The Officer, there are plenty of opportunities to get the word out. We need to seize them.

The implied task, is for the Regiment, individually 

and collectively, to become conversant with the concepts and operational frameworks and languages of 

the larger Joint Force, which includes the basics like: 

the military decision-making process, campaign planning, along with policies, directives, and doctrine on 

peace, stability, and civil-military operations as well 

as the operational frameworks of interagency, multinational, and non-governmental partners. Then, the 

last task is we must take ownership of that advocacy 

and become better citizens of our own community.

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The Civil Affairs Association greatly appreciates 

the collaboration and assistance of its partners in this 

endeavor –the National Defense University Center 

for Complex Operations, U.S. Army Peacekeeping 

& Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI), Center for 

the Study of Civil-Military Operations at West Point, 

Foreign Area Officer Association, Reserve Officers Association, and the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. 

Our special heartfelt thanks go out especially to PKSOI in partnering with us in the publication of these 

Issue Papers.

Finally, profound thanks go to Major General Mike 

Kuehr, USA (ret) Colonel Christopher Holshek, USA, 

(ret), Colonel John C. Church, Jr., USMC, and many 

others who have gone above and beyond the call to 

organize these events and produce these Issue Papers 

so vitally important to shaping the future of our force.

 

“Secure the Victory!“

Joseph P. Kirlin III

Colonel, USA, (ret), Civil Affairs

President

The Civil Affairs Association
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ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – 

“CIVIL AFFAIRS: A FORCE FOR ENGAGEMENT 

AND CONFLICT PREVENTION“

Christopher Holshek

Civil Affairs (CA) has long been a major national 

strategic capability that helps transition from war to 

peace and from military to civilian lead and control 

after major conflict. Along with the Joint Force in 

general, CA is tasked to engage partners in Phase 0 

(Shape and Influence), to contribute to conflict analysis, including identifying sources of illicit power. CA 

serves to shape the distribution and use of political 

and informal power in order to mitigate the drivers 

of instability. This instability is not limited to threats. 

It can be disease, contagion, poverty, illiteracy, etc. In 

conjunction with Military Information Support and 

Information Operations (MISO) and Information Operations (IO) as well as Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), 

CA is the only part of the Joint Force specifically suited 

for Peace & Stability Operations under Joint Stability 

Operations Doctrine and a “force of choice“ under the 

Army Functional Concept for Engagement. 

All these imperatives raise two questions: 

• One, how as such does or should CA contribute to conflict prevention, in coordination with 

MISO/IO and FAOs as well as an array of government, non-government, and private sector 

civilian partners and regional and multilateral 

organizations? 

• Two, what CA capabilities are required to support engagement in these ways? 
To look at CA as “a force for engagement and conflict prevention,“ the Civil Affairs Association, in coordination with the National Defense University Center 

for Complex Operations, U.S. Army Peacekeeping & 

Stability Operations Institute, Center for the Study of 

Civil-Military Operations at West Point, Foreign Area 

Officer Association, Reserve Officers Association, and 

the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, conducted its 

third Civil Affairs Symposium on Friday, November 

20th 2015, at Joint Base San Antonio Fort Sam Houston’s Mission Training Complex. In addition to speakers and panel discussions bringing forward key lessons from current and past operations, the final five 

Civil Affairs Issue Papers with observations and recommendations on the future Civil Affairs force were 

formally presented by the authors for publication after the Symposium.

Perhaps the most poignant point from the day’s 

discussion was that the Civil Affairs (CA) community 

of practice “must help the broader Army think, learn, 

analyze, and implement solutions to the Army’s Warfighting Challenges (AWFC) that help the Army and 

the Joint Force consolidate gains and achieve sustainable outcomes in future conflict“ concluded Lt. Gen. 

H.R. McMaster, Deputy Commanding General of Futures for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and the keynote speaker at this 

year’s Civil Affairs Symposium. 

McMaster passionately reminded the 100-plus 

attendees of the immutability of the nature of war, 

regardless of phase, as being essentially a human endeavor. He emphasized how war is an extension of 

politics and, thus, about the consolidation of gains 

leading to a sustainable and lasting political outcome 

as much as winning battles. And, he noted war is also 

a contest of wills and, thus, fundamentally as psychox
xi

logical as it is physical. He added how war is uncertain 

and, therefore requires adaptability, endurance, and 

a willingness to learn. Based on the political, human, 

and uncertain continuities of conflict, he also clearly 

laid out the balance of challenges and expectations for 

CA as a critical part of the Joint Force. He concluded 

by offering that “Civil Affairs doesn’t need to do everything, but it does need to be involved and able to 

help everyone else do things better.“ 

He then challenged the Civil Affairs regiment to 

help the Army learn by providing input to the Army 

Warfighting Challenges shaping the discussion and 

analysis of doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, 

leader development and education, and personnel 

interim solutions for the future force – which can be 

accessed by anyone at TRADOC’s Army Capabilities 

Integration Center website.

McMaster’s creative but common sense approach 

set the tone for further discussion at the Symposium 

and for developing a deeper understanding of the 

broader role CA supports in engaging partners, shaping and influencing the environment, consolidating 

gains, and contributing to conflict analysis – before 

and not just during and after full-scale war. 

 Building on this thinking, Civil Affairs Association President Col. (ret.) Joe Kirlin explained. “By developing deeper understanding of the strategic context for their work, the Civil Affairs community can 

provide comprehensive support to commanders at all 

levels by striving to identify the sources, distribution, 

and use of political and informal power in order to 

mitigate the drivers of conflict and instability and not 

just threats. This helps CA further its longtime role as 

a major national strategic capability for winning wars 

to also preventing them.“
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability 

and Humanitarian Affairs Anne Witkowsky, who led 

the luncheon discussion following the presentations 

of a panel of top command and institutional representatives observed that CA “remains more capable and 

relevant than it was on 9/11, a key capability in comprehensive, whole-of-government transition management.“ Despite recent total force cuts mandated by the 

Defense Department, including its complete disbanding of the U.S. Navy, Civil Affairs training program, 

CA is ideally suited for 21st century war and peace.

The CA mission to “secure the victory“ in consolidating political as well as military objectives was 

forged from nearly two centuries of engagement in 

military government and working with local leaders, 

interagency, multinational, and non-government and 

civil society partners. Despite drawdown from Iraq 

and Afghanistan, demand for CA continues to rise. 

Marine CA, as Brig. Gen. Austin Renforth, Commanding General, USMC Training Command emphatically 

noted, has nearly doubled in size, bucking the trend, 

but remaining true to its unique Small Wars history 

and ethos. More and more military leaders, including geographic combatant commanders who manage 

U.S. theater security cooperation strategies to engage 

international threats, have gained an appreciation of 

the need for CA to be engaged early, often and far forward in the planning phases to help better frame the 

political-military problem and understand the environment as well as the enemy.

“Peace and stability operations are a core Civil 

Affairs competency,“ Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Director Col. Daniel 

Pinnell stated. A career artillery officer with extensive 

time in both civil-military and military information 

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operations, he received the Association’s Colonel 

Ralph Temple Award at the annual dinner that evening for his contributions to Civil Affairs. Pinnell and 

many others at the Symposium also admitted that 

Civil Affairs – among the least understood military 

capabilities – must do more to be an integral part of all 

planning and operational activities. This requires aggressive education and training of commanders and 

staffs on CA missions and capabilities – mainly at the 

initiative of the CA Regiment itself.

This heightened awareness also requires the effort of policy stakeholders in the CA community to 

overcome legal, budgetary, and programmatic, and 

policy impediments to leveraging especially Reserve 

Component CA, whose background and talents are 

ideally suited to Phase 0 missions under the Army 

Engagement Concept. This better understanding includes the use of functional specialists currently being revitalized by the Institute for Military Support 

to Governance (IMSG) at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) in Ft. 

Bragg, North Carolina.

The discussion delved deeper into this year’s theme 

in the five papers chosen from two dozen submitted 

for publication in the 2015-16 Civil Affairs Issue Papers. Four of the papers were presented at the Symposium, under the moderation of the Issue Papers Committee Chairman, Brigadier General (retired) Bruce 

Bingham. The authors received audience-ranked cash 

awards based on their presentations. 

The five papers are (in order of award): 

• “Renewed Relevance: CA Develop Human 

Networks for Effective Engagement,“ by Maj. 

Arnel P. David, won first place. “Ideally, networks of key relationships translate into a 

cost-effective capability, bringing increased 
xiv

responsiveness and understanding in times of 

crisis.“ He further wrote, “Through effective 

engagement, CA forces work with civilian and 

military partners to provide commanders and 

ambassadors an improved understanding of 

the environment, and in many countries, small 

teams extend the reach of the U.S. embassy. CA 

elements can be a cost-effective means for providing this critical context.“

• Second place was a tie between “From Green to 

Blue: U.S. Army Civil Affairs and International 

Police Engagement,“ by Capt. Rob Kobol, and 

“Civil Engagement as a Tool for Conflict Prevention: A Case Study,“ by Capt. Tammy Sloulin and Lt. Col. Steve Lewis. “Effective, transparent and legitimate police services are more 

than simply a governmental service; they are 

critical to stability and are a key conflict prevention tool,“ Kobold posited. “Law enforcement 

governance specialists from USACAPOC Civil 

Affairs units are positioned to bridge this capability gap ... but the effort to capture applicable 

police skills developed in a Reservist’s civilian 

career must be expanded to Reservists outside 

of USACAPOC, and it must include members 

of the National Guard.“ Continuing with the 

discussion of the security sector, Sloulin and 

Lewis offered: “In societies where the elements 

of security, governance, and development are 

weak, instability and conflict fester... The presence of security forces perceived as illegitimate 

can also lead to conflict as people will distrust 

their actions... Thus, our hypothesis for conflict 

prevention is therefore based on supporting a 

partner nation’s efforts to improve security, 

governance, and development.“
xv

• Third place went to “The Role of Civil Affairs 

in Counter-Unconventional Warfare,“ by Maj. 

Shafi Saiduddin. Picking up on last year’s Issue Papers and remarks made by Col. Pinnell, 

Saiduddin proposed the a new identity for CA 

forces could be: “United States Army forces 

organized, trained, and equipped to conduct 

population-centric irregular warfare with an 

emphasis on FID, UW, COIN, and Stability capabilities,“ further offering that CA is “the basic 

capabilities needed to execute a C-UW strategy 

already exist within the CA force and within 

CA and Joint doctrine. However, operationalizing CA in C-UW will require the development 

of CA-specific C-UW doctrine, better integration with intelligence and MISO capabilities, 

and clarifying the identity of the Civil Affairs 

Regiment.“

• Maj. David E. Leiva and Maj. John Nonnemaker co-authored “Civil Affairs Forces, U.S. Army 

Reserve, National Guard, and State Partnership 

Program: Is There Room for Engagement?“ and 

finished in fourth place. They argued that it is 

high time to integrate CA into the National 

Guard, as the Guard’s renowned Phase 0 State 

Partnership Program focus areas “align closely 

with CA tasks: Civil Information Management, 

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Assistance, Population and Resource Control, and 

Support to Civil Administration.“
xvi

These papers make up the heart of the second 

volume of 2015-16 Civil Affairs Issue Papers, co-published by the Association and PKSOI and launched at 

the Civil Affairs Roundtable at the National Defense 

University’s Center for Complex Operations (NDUCCO) in Washington, DC, on 7-8 April. The Roundtable completes an annual cycle of discussion of a theme 

chosen by the Civil Affairs community at the end of 

each Roundtable. Then a call for papers is issued. The 

intent of the annual cycle of the Symposium, Issue Papers and Roundtable is to provide a platform for the 

most operationally experienced community of Civil 

Affairs practitioners since World War II to have more 

direct and visible input on the discussion of the future 

of Civil Affairs at the command and policy levels, as 

well as capture their insights and lessons for future 

posterity and research.

From especially the final discussion that day, three 

key tasks immediately emerged for the CA Regiment. 

First the CA community must answer Lt. Gen. McMaster’s challenge and robustly contribute to the Army 

Warfighting Challenges (AWFC). At the same time, 

it must intensify its dialogue with others in the military, government, civilian partners, political leaders, 

and educate them and public at large about CA. “We 

have some strategic communication products that we 

hang on our website and will continue to update and 

improve,“ Col. (ret.) Kirlin pointed out. He continued, 

“But anyone experienced in CA can come up with 

their own ‘elevator speech’ based on the audience and 

situation. Targets of opportunity are everywhere – we 

need to engage them.“ 

To embrace this challenge effectively, CA operators must become conversant with the concepts and 

operational frameworks and languages of the larger 
xvii

Joint Force – including basics like the military decision-making process and campaign planning, along 

with policies, directives, and doctrine on peace, stability, and civil-military operations – as well as the 

operational frameworks of interagency, multinational, and non-governmental partners. This need to be 

knowledgeable across the spectrum of conflict was the 

main message coming from the morning panel. “It’s 

still more effective for Civil Affairs to learn how to 

better integrate with those they support, enable, and 

enhance rather than rely on them to learn how to better integrate Civil Affairs,“ Pinnell stressed.

The third task is about ownership of that advocacy. “Citizenship in this community is more than just 

showing up at these events and then going home,“ 

My fellow CA practitioner, Col. John C. Church, 

Jr., USMCR, currently in command of a Marine CA 

Group, and I passionately exhorted in our summary at 

the Symposium. “For especially those of us in Civil Affairs, if you’re not an active member of the Association 

or any of these other organizations representing your 

interests, then you’re letting someone else decide the 

fate of a force you care so much about and invested so 

much in. You’re on the sidelines and not a player. This 

event and everything discussed at it has been a call 

for leadership. The question you must ask yourself is 

whether you’re up to the task.“

Col. (ret.) Holshek, a Director in the CA Association, is 

co-organizer of the Symposia and Roundtables and co-edits 

the Civil Affairs Issue Papers. His new book, Travels with 

Harley – Journeys in Search of Personal and National Identity, reflects on experiences and insights gained from three 

decades as a Civil Affairs officer in a multitude of operations, levels and conditions, and environments. 

1

Panel Discussion: 

Civil Affairs in Engagement and Conflict Prevention 

– Current Civil-Military Force Activities and Recommendations on the Way Ahead

Jim Ruf

Moderator: Jim Ruf, Colonel, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.), Senior Program Officer for Civil-Military 

Affairs, United States Institute of Peace.

Panelists:

• Major General Daniel Ammerman, Commander, U.S. Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) (USACAPOC)

• Brigadier General Austin E. Renforth, Commanding General, Training Command, U.S. 

Marine Corps

• Colonel Daniel A. Pinnell, Director, U.S. Army 

Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute

• Colonel Scot N. Storey, Commander, 95th Civil 

Affairs Brigade (Airborne)

• Dr. Rosemary Speers, Principal Research Scientist, Center for Naval Analyses

Civil Affairs (CA), along with the rest of the 

Joint Force, is increasingly being required to engage 

partners in Phase 0 (Shape and Influence) in order 

to contribute to conflict analysis and to mitigate the 

drivers of instability. Together, with Military Information Support Operations, Information Operations, and 

Foreign Area Officers, CA is considered many as the 

part of the Joint Force specifically suited for Peace & 

Stability Operations under Joint Stability Operations 

Doctrine and is considered a “force of choice“ under 

the U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement 

(TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5, 24 February 2014). 
2

The CA Symposium, through the Issue Papers and 

this panel in particular, explored the following two 

questions across commands and institutions from 

multiple Service and Component views:

• How does or should CA contribute to conflict 

prevention, in coordination with other actors 

sharing the space?

• What CA capabilities are required to support 

engagement?

The purpose of this session was to (re)view the operational environment and assess where, when, and 

how CA professionals from all Services and Components can best be leveraged and engaged to provide 

the greatest return to both the communities of policy 

and practice. In particular, this discussion was to 

highlight the geographic combatant and functional 

commands that leverage and employ CA capabilities. 

Specifically, this panel was asked to hone in on conflict prevention and ways to best engage during this 

phase of the operational continuum.

In the wake of the points in LTG McMaster’s keynote presentation and after brief introductory remarks, 

each panelist provided the following points: 

• As the primary CA force provider, MG Ammerman focused on the ongoing CA activities 

that his Reserve Component (RC) force is undertaking. MG Ammerman highlighted RC CA 

capacities to recognize civilian drivers of conflict for “human terrain“ mapping and identifying second and third order effects of U.S. 

security cooperation and irregular warfare actions. CA’s role in engaging with multinational 

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and 

civil society actors was specifically highlighted 

as a unique capability and value-added for the 

Joint Force. 
3

• In addition, USACAPOC (A) not only has the 

only two conventional force Psychological Operations Groups, but also recently has added 

new Information Operations units. MG Ammerman pointed out that USACAPOC’s Theater Information Operations Groups (TIOG) 

provide about two-fifths of the U.S. Army’s 

information operations capacity. 

• Unfortunately, the ability to fully utilize RC 

CA capacity is limited due to sequestrationsqueezed funding and program funding constraints, stemming from Cold War era legal 

authorities for Reserve call-ups. USACAPOC 

funding has primarily been reduced to readiness related training funds with very little for 

operational missions. The limited number of 

available RC CA annual training days (14-21 

days) often results in difficult choices regarding support of Combat Training Center (CTC) 

rotations with the lack of days for up-front 

training prior to CTC rotations. This often 

forces USACAPOC teams at CTCs with little 

integration time with the supported command 

prior to jumping into the training missions or 

even doing a relief in place with another unit 

during the CTC, which encumbers both force 

and operational integration and training. Limitations in authorities and budgets for RC CA 

also inhibit the deployment of Soldiers whose 

knowledge and skills sets are ideal for Phase 

0 engagement missions beyond two weeks, 

which is not enough time to realize full potential in building and maintaining relationships 

and networks critical to mitigating drivers of 

conflict and instability as well as countering related threats.
4

• These restraints impede professional development in areas that make RC CA a unique 

capability, especially to the development of 

functional specialists or for CA planners at the 

operational and strategic levels. There is a 

resurgence in USAJFKSWCS/USACAPOC efforts to recruit and train functional specialists 

within the Civil Affairs Commands. There is 

also a gap in sufficient CA planners so a seniorlevel CA planning course proposal is being 

staffed for feasibility. 

• A career infantry officer, Brig. Gen. Renforth 

focused his remarks both as an employer of CA 

capabilities and as head of the Marine Training 

Command (counterpart to the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command) and having the 

responsibility for training and educating the 

Marine CA force. He noted the Marine Corps 

had recently doubled it number of Civil Affairs Groups. A true believer in CA capabilities 

from his own experience and observations as 

an employer of CA skills and knowledge, he 

discussed his support in his role as both a battalion and regimental commander. Brig. Gen. 

Renforth, accompanied by the Director and 

Deputy Director of the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School (MCCMOS), harkened 

to the Corps Small Wars ethos and practice. 

He specifically highlighted the need for CA to 

clearly articulate their value-added in the language of the mission and how they fit into Marine concepts for the employment of forces and 

the broader theater campaign plan. He encouraged CA forces to not assume that their role is 

universally understood or guaranteed; there-
5

fore, he stressed the implied task that CA operators have to learn at the MOS producing school 

and later be able to explain – in the unique Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) lexicon 

– how their capabilities and practices further 

the success of the overall mission, particularly 

with respect to political consolidation of military gains, as Lt. Gen. McMaster discussed in 

his keynote.

• As the commander of the Army’s Active Component CA force that supports Special Operations Forces (SoF), Colonel Storey focused his 

remarks on his command’s on-going civil-military engagement program and its global implementation. This effort is accomplished mainly 

through the Civil-Military Support Elements 

in support of U.S. Country Teams where they 

require a continuous engagement missions 

and the conduct of Irregular Warfare, Foreign 

Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare 

in fragile and failing states. He recognized the 

unique value-added of RC CA to support such 

missions but discussed the challenges that the 

Special Operations Command, in particular, 

had in accessing them. 

• Dr. Speers brought a Navy perspective to the 

discussion, touching briefly on the now defunct 

Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training 

Command (MCAST) and how the Navy can 

best maintain those much-needed littoral engagement capabilities that Navy CA possessed 

for the Service going forward. She also pointed 

out the challenges associated with maintaining 

CA functionality in the Navy, while not having 

a set career path for CA, which is a similar issue 

for the Marine Corps. 
6

• COL Pinnell focused on the challenges of relationships between the supported and supporting CA forces. He laid out his presentation by 

first explaining how peace and stability operations are a core Civil Affairs competency. However, COL Pinnell also articulated that Civil 

Affairs is among the least understood military 

capabilities. As a result, CA must do more to 

be an integral part of all planning and operational coordination activities within the functional and geographic combatant commands. 

Although better CA integration in Joint Force 

Phase 0 missions requires a policy-level effort 

to overcome legal, budgetary, programmatic, 

and policy impediments to gaining timely access to CA capabilities, the CA must also look 

to further professionalize the CA force as well 

as conduct aggressive education and training 

of commanders and staffs on how and when to 

best integrate CA capabilities. 

During the question and answer session it became 

clear that a number of junior officers were interested 

in hearing from the experienced panel on possible solutions to existing challenges. For example, younger 

officers wanted seasoned advice on making that good 

first impression with your supported officer(s). This 

challenge can be difficult when a relationship does not 

currently exist. Panelists and participants provided 

some excellent advice as did other senior officers who 

had experienced similar circumstances.

One good example was for CA operators to be as 

conversant in operational doctrine and frameworks 

such as the Military Decision Making Process as other 

staff in order to clearly articulate CA value in the context of the current plan. This recommendation and 
7

others should be captured in a guide or in accessible 

best practices (e.g., a CA version of the online “Company Commander“ tool) and made available to junior 

officers. This is a potential mission for the respective 

CA commands and schoolhouses jointly. Another item 

for further exploration could be how to better source 

CA requirements at the training centers, given current 

training and readiness constraints.

In summary, the following points are offered for 

further consideration and action: 

• Demand among the commands for CA across 

the full range of operations is clearly palpable. 

However, this is encumbered by: how Active 

CA Component force cuts in particular as well 

as how the use of the Army force generation 

model are “stressing“ this force; and, how restraints from outdated legal authorities and 

budgetary mechanisms and overall funding 

prohibit leveraging the full force.

• Especially with respect to Phase 0, it is essential to bring CA into steady-state Geographical 

Combatant (GCC)and Functional Commands 

planning as well as develop Civil-Military Engagement (CME) support plans nested with the 

GCCs and country teams; and allow CA teams 

to Conduct CME reconnaissance, build relationships and networks, and conduct human 

terrain mapping. CA programs at home station, 

in turn, must be in support of apportioned theater objectives.

• CA forces must better prepare themselves to 

work in the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment; 

they must also be much better versed in Army 

operational doctrines and frameworks, espe-
8

cially in Irregular Warfare and Peace & Stability Operations.

CA must educate supported commands and forces 

on how they can best integrate their capabilities for 

missions across the full range of operations, at all levels of command, and in all environments, as well as 

provide recommendations on CA programs and operations that can be operationalized within the context 

of the mission and commander’s plan.

Jim Ruf, Colonel, U.S. Army Civil Affairs (ret.), is a 

member of the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding team 

where he serves as a senior program officer for civilian-military affairs.
9

Renewed Relevance: 

CA Develop Human Networks for Effective 

Engagement

by Major Arnel P. David

Reflecting on the lessons of recent conflict, General 

(ret.) Martin Dempsey emphasized “the science of human relationships.“ 1 These relationships move at the 

“speed of trust“ and, as Special Operations Command 

(SOCOM) claims, “You Can’t Surge Trust.“ 2 All parties need to invest the time, personnel and resources 

to engage tribal leaders, community influencers, key 

interlocutors and civil society groups for mission success in modern war. Therefore, relationships are critically important pacing items to commanders. Rapport 

must be tracked, assessed and managed. This process 

involves sensing local communities and collecting information to depict a human engagement network. 

Civil Affairs (CA) forces are best postured to assume lead in developing this human network concept. 

This problem set, mapping the human network, is the 

domain of expertise for CA, which specializes in “lowtech solutions“ to “low-tech problems.“3

 The CA regiment needs to (1) create a community of interest interweaving academic research on network science and 

ongoing Army Warfighting Challenges to examine 

human networks; (2) experiment with network mapping software and best practices to capture relevant 

data from engagements; and (3) based on these experiments update doctrine and training that supports the 

new Army Operating Concept (AOC).4 

While CA teams, along with other maneuver elements, conduct engagements, they are not tracked, as-
10

sessed and managed in a systematic manner by staffs 

at multiple echelons much less integrated into planning and operations. CA teams conduct engagements, 

but the relationships often atrophy once the team 

transitions. The data tends to be lost or not analyzed 

in relation to theater or service priorities. Ideally, networks of key relationships translate into a cost-effective capability, bringing increased responsiveness and 

understanding in times of crisis.

The Importance of Networks in Military Strategy 

and Civil Affairs

“Subjugating the enemy without fighting is the true 

pinnacle of excellence.“ 

 

 — Sun Tzu

The preceding enduring maxim of ancient strategic 

thought remains true for present and future conflict. 

Consequently, many have misconstrued this concept 

and persistently pursued long-range strike technology 

aimed to deliver ordnance that breaks an adversary’s 

desire to fight. The search for a technological panacea and desire to wage war in this fashion seduced 

key policy makers and influenced a poor allocation of 

resources.5 Researchers, conducting empirical studies, are beginning to reveal that these technological 

advancements (e.g. mechanization, UAVs, and smart 

bombs) not only failed to subjugate an enemy, their 

increased use strengthened the foe’s will to fight and 

potentially creates more enemies.6 Many argue that 

this technological obsession impeded the military’s 

ability to understand the social-cultural context of war 

and this is a “prime area of strategic weakness“ for the 

United States7. 
11

A recent RAND study of the last 13 years of war 

validates this lesson: “...because of the inherently human and uncertain nature of war, technology cannot 

substitute for sociocultural, political, and historical 

knowledge and understanding.“ 8 Through effective 

engagement, CA forces work with civilian and military partners to provide commanders and ambassadors an improved understanding of the environment, 

and in many countries, small teams extend the reach 

of the US embassy. CA elements can be a cost-effective 

means for providing this critical context. 

Past CA studies advance these strategic sentiments 

and this paper builds on them with two additional 

threads. First, CA forces serve as a principle interface 

between civilian and military organizations often acting as a catalyst for effective action in a critical space 

known as “gray zones.“9 Gray zones are defined 

as a space where there is an increasing incidence of 

American adversaries pursuing their strategic ends in 

a matter that remains below the threshold for military 

intervention. Gray zone conflicts elude U.S. mental 

models and legal frameworks on the conflict spectrum between peace and war. For the second thread, 

the forward, limited size, and discreet activities of CA 

forces best posture them to contend with the puzzling 

array of complex relationships resident in the environment. For engagements amongst the populace there 

is an inverse relationship with the size of the element 

and the effectiveness of the engagements. Small can be 

beautiful and CA teams have the training and equipment to operate in contested areas where other US elements have limited access.

Creating local alliances and nurturing key relationships provide a more granular understanding of social 

and cultural challenges. 10 The idea of decisive victory 
12

will not present itself so cleanly in these gray zones 

and future conflict. The nation will have to “learn to 

conceptualize its victories in terms of shaping perceptions over time“ and influence minor changes to complex adaptive systems.“11 Future conflict will not be 

contained “in either time or space,“ rather it will span 

“the spectrum of human activity“ and be protracted 

in duration. 12 Dr. Allenby warns of an evolving “civilizational conflict“ and describes the paradox of U.S. 

conventional military dominance pushing state and 

non-state actor competition into asymmetric realms 

(gray zones) where the U.S. is reluctant to engage.13

The creation and use of human engagement networks 

provide a medium in which CA can help partners engage and take effective action. 

To some, these concepts appear to depict a dark 

future riddled with challenges and problems unsolvable. Russia’s “new generation warfare“ and China’s 

“unrestricted warfare“ present new forms of war the 

U.S. must confront. 14 Our generals will need to lend 

more credence to these “uncomfortable wars“ and 

address the popular off-set strategy that is quickly 

becoming the comfortable approach. 15 Nevertheless, 

these challenges offer new opportunities for the U.S. 

military to adapt, evolve, and thrive in this new space. 

Technological answers alone will not address gray 

zone challenges and it does not require expensive solutions. Rather, operating in this space demands a continued revision of CA doctrine. Major General (ret.) 

Robert Scales once developed a concept of “culturecentric warfare“ where winning required “creating alliances, leveraging non-military advantages, reading 

intentions, building trust, converting opinions, and 

managing perceptions—all tasks that demand exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and 

their motivation.“ 16
13

CA forces already do many of these things and 

have the requisite language, negotiation and cultural 

training to compete in this arena. CA’s primacy in traversing civil terrain makes this branch most capable 

in leading the Army in culture-centric warfare and 

engagement. Creating a human engagement network 

capability requires a human and humane presence on 

the ground since there is no substitute for the context 

needed in interpreting human activity. Mechanization, UAVs, and robots can’t build the essential relationships needed for a human engagement network. 

It will take professional operators of a type for which 

CA has primacy. 

Human networks capture formal and informal relationships and provide the foundation for emergent 

social behavior. This behavior is often self-organizing. 

Self-organization, also known as “emergence“ in 

complexity science circles, results from the spontaneous emergence of order at critical points of instability 

within complex structures. 17 For example, a young 

person makes a decision whether to join an insurgent 

organization. This decision is based on a range of local factors from relatives who are members of the cell 

to local economic conditions. If the U.S. Army understands these connections, it can take preventive action.

A review by Sydney Tarrow of civil war scholarship finds “that it is not quantities but interactions 

that are the key to the dynamics of violence.“ 18 These 

complex interactions of people that take the form of 

structures, patterns, and properties for self-organization serve as the catalyst for what Jeffrey Goldstein 

calls “social emergence.“ 19 Alison Gilcrest’s study of 

“well-connected“ communities finds that strong communities emerge “as a result of the interactions within 

a complex web of overlapping networks.“20 These 
14

communities, as social systems, “thrive at the edge 

of chaos in which people’s sense of community, their 

social identity, emerges from the unpredictable dynamics of mutual influence and interaction.“ 21 These 

theories provide a rich intellectual foundation for 

mapping networks in order to prioritize engagements 

and achieve desired effects. 

Careful examinations of complex social systems illuminates opportunities to intervene and situations to 

avoid. Mapping human networks and engaging with 

key influencers is especially important in hybrid warfare and gray zones. In these environments, much as in 

Counterinsurgency (COIN), the enemy hides among 

the population. The high value target in these environments is the capability of the enemy to manipulate 

the population and leverage them for everything from 

logistics to intelligence and recruitment. 

Therefore, building a human engagement network 

capability allows you to attack the adversary’s source 

of strength and deny them the civil terrain they need 

to complete their mission. This is indeed war and we 

must leverage multiple tools (e.g. Military Information Support Operations (MISO), Information Operations (IO), and other equities) for a synergistic effect to 

defeat our opponents. 

Take the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, where Russian proxy forces target vulnerable groups of people 

and foster dissent to create access. They hide among 

the Russian minority population. Yet, all members 

of the Russian minority likely do not support these 

proxy groups. If the U.S. Army would have had active 

CA teams in Eastern Ukraine prior to the crisis and 

mapped the network, it would have provided engagement options and increased situational awareness for 

U.S. Joint Forces. The same dynamics apply in the Bal-
15

tics now. CA teams, with new doctrine and training, 

need to be engaged in Russian minority communities 

creating problems for malign Russian influencers. 

A human network built on increased connections, 

relationships, and interactions enable effective engagement. The role, capability, and narrative for Civil 

Affairs must resonate and prove relevance for the 

Army and defense establishment. Until CA accepts 

this notion and extends its capacity to thrive in gray 

zones, albeit with a human engagement network, the 

utility of CA forces will continue to be questioned. 

What current doctrine and CA core tasks are missing is the method and data in which relationships are 

tracked and examined. The dizzying array of complex relationships within a network require an appreciation for the multiplicity of factors at play in a 

given environment. At the local level within a conflict, 

“mainstream politicians build armed wings, states 

collaborate with militias against common foes, police 

ignore private counterinsurgent armies, and warlords 

place their loyalists inside security forces.“ 22 There 

are Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Civil 

Society Organizations (CSOs), multinational corporations, and multiple state agencies intervening in the 

civil domain. This complex web requires a conceptual 

vocabulary to intelligently explore this civil space and 

an understanding of civil society is key, profoundly. 

By studying this dimension of the environment, 

CA professionals among many other elements (e.g. 

MISO, Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), National Guard 

State Partnership Program (NG SPP), and others) formulate new ways to analyze complex social systems, 

determine who and where to engage, and ultimately, 

create human engagement networks.
16

CA forces remain engaged around the world and 

their activities can be improved by the systematization 

of their engagement networks. To be clear, many networks of relationships exist at multiple levels, but they 

are not measured or captured in any meaningful way. 

Sadly, many networks lack resilience and the absence 

of constant management limit their effectiveness. In 

an era of declining resources, any activity or engagement should not be wasted. Therefore, all CA forces 

(active and reserve) must embrace the notion of not 

only persistent—for example, enduring Civil Military 

Support Elements (CMSEs) in various countries — but 

effective engagement. All engagements matter and build 

cumulatively to strengthen the network. A human 

network built on increased connections, relationships, 

and interactions enable effective engagement. 

Recommendations

The Army needs effective engagement to become a 

force-wide competency. Civil affairs’ experience, specialization, and access to the civil domain accelerate 

learning opportunities. The planned reduction of CA 

forces and continued fiscal austerity not only make 

this effort timely but compulsory as well. Networks 

form the key of embracing this concept of effective engagement. From a Doctrine, Organization, Training, 

Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy 

(DOTMLPF-P) perspective, realizing human network 

engagement requires investments of time and thought 

in new doctrine and training. With respect to doctrine, 

we need to create a community of interest to look at 

what ideas from network science can be leveraged for 

doctrinal integration.
17

Many regard social science as the science of the 

twenty-first century.23 Social phenomena are among 

the most difficult scientific problems to solve and 

Albert-László Barabási finds “the dynamics of many 

social, technological, and economic phenomena are 

driven by individual human actions, turning the 

quantitative understanding of human behavior into a 

central question for modern science.“ 24 Leading scholars in network science have recently developed ways 

to describe interactions in quantitative terms. 25 The 

Network Science Center at West Point is currently experimenting with these concepts.26 A team of sophisticated mathematicians and scientists created network 

models, assessment techniques, and an algorithm to 

prioritize strategic actions in ungoverned spaces.27

Fortunately, there are other academic institutions 

and research firms eager to partner for testing and 

experimentation. CA needs to develop a community 

of interest to maintain traction on emerging developments in this network science area. After testing and 

proof of concept, the interest group should evolve into 

a program of record and become an advanced course 

for planners. Building effective human engagement 

networks will require both training and additional 

education. 

Any undertaking to intervene in an environment 

constitutes an obligation to cultivate causal literacy. 28 Causal Literacy is an obligation to study causal 

claims that academic scholars proffer. Colonel Celestino Perez argues that those “who must attempt 

to imagine a range of potential outcomes, windows 

of opportunity, and associated probabilities—should 

find the contemporary science of conflict and war to 

be an indispensable aid to competent, and thereby 

ethical, performance.“ 29 It is an incredible responsibil-
18

ity to traverse the civil domain and CA forces must 

suffuse theory and practice for effective application. 

The development of an advanced CA planner course 

provides standardization for building the network 

combined with an ability to explore cutting-edge academic scholarship. 

A network not only builds capacity and capability, 

it can provide explanations to address causes rather 

than symptoms and see the forest rather than trees. 

Similarly, in the medical field, mistaking symptoms as 

causes is dangerous, yet providing a prescription with 

the wrong diagnosis can be fatal. Effective partnering, 

backed by causal literacy, provides a better contextualization of the environment and illuminates cultural dynamics not immediately visible. In addition to 

academic theory, research has produced open source 

tools for data collection and visualization.

The military is plagued by expensive software 

suites and costly contractual obligations (e.g. Distributed Common Ground System -Army (DCGS-A), 

Palantir, Civil Information Management Data Processing System (CIMDPS)). New digital investments are 

unlikely in this new era of austerity. However, there 

are many free and open source solutions available for 

immediate use to capture sociopolitical data, aid in 

managing relationships, and capture atmospherics. 30

To begin, the software solution does not need to be 

overly complicated. A wiki-type function is all that is 

required to get started. Data collection entails capturing the different types of relationships, interactions, 

and actors present in a particular locality or region. 

Social scientists have developed powerful visualization tools (multidimensional and 3D) to depict complex social systems. The growing interconnectedness 

of the world and confluence of human interaction 
19

and increased urbanization change the environment 

at an accelerating rate. 31 This speed of change necessitates a higher level of analysis. A visually depicted 

network with the ability to disaggregate and bracket 

components of a system provides a vital lens for analyzing the operational environment. Moreover, these 

observed connections, interactions, and relationships 

are becoming more measureable and manageable. 

Currently, CA projects and assessments are captured, 

indexed, and shared on a database (CIMDPS) but 

there is no mechanism for tracking relationships. 

In volatile areas like Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, 

and many other regions, there is no record or history 

of the relationships and networks built once forces depart. The current conflict in Yemen is a prime example. How many of the young people joining the ranks 

of an extremist group might have been identified beforehand if we would have just saved our previous 

community engagement data and created a method to 

analyze areas at risk of tipping into extremist activities. Maintaining a current network with key touchpoints provides enduring insight into an environment 

that might become a future objective.

Taken together, CA can lead the Army in engagement by engendering three recommendations: (1) create a community of interest interweaving academic 

research on network science and ongoing Army Warfighting Challenges to examine human networks; (2) 

experiment with network mapping software and best 

practices to capture relevant data from engagements; 

and (3) based on these experiments update doctrine 

and training that supports the new Army Operating 

Concept (AOC). The community of interest within the 

regiment must work and contribute to the Army’s top 

two Warfighting challenges: (1) develop situational 
20

understanding, and (2) shape the security environment. Innovation in the CA regiment does not require 

a material solution but iterative intellectual discussions to modify doctrine in ways that improve engagement for CA and the Army.

Conclusion

In spite of the analytical rigor required to examine 

these human networks, it is essential for the formulation of strategy to plan effective engagement. This 

paper began by outlining the significance of relationships. Often taken for granted, CA forces extend the 

reach of U.S. embassies and military organizations 

into areas that are contested and not conducive to 

non-military entities. 

In an era of declining resources and competing 

priorities, it is imperative to build an effective human 

engagement network of partners to attack collective 

action problems in these growing gray zones. These 

networks of capability have the propensity to present 

multiple dilemmas to our nation’s adversaries. Ideally, networks of key relationships translate into a costeffective capability that brings increased understanding and responsiveness in times of crisis. A review 

of complex social systems and network science illuminates a realization that building human networks 

is of supreme importance and within the realm of the 

possible. Further examination and experimentation of 

this concept renews relevance and increases the proposition value of Civil Affairs for the military and the 

nation.
21

Major Arnel P. David is an Active Duty CA officer 

presently serving in the Chief of Staff of the Army's 

Strategic Studies Group. He has served multiple tours of 

duty in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Pacific and has 

a Master’s degree in Conflict, Security, and Development 

from the Command and General Staff College Local Dynamics of War Scholars Program as well as in International 

Relations from the University of Oklahoma.

Endnotes

1. Sydney J. Freedberg, “Army Makes Case for Funding Culture Skills Beyond COIN,“ Defense News, July 2, 2012, http://defense.aol.com/2012/07/02/army-makes-case-for-culture-skillsbeyond-coin/ (accessed July 27, 2015).

2. See Stephen R. Covey, The Speed of Trust: The One Thing That 

Changes Everything (NY: Free Press, 2008) and U.S. SOCOM, “Special Operations Forces 2020,“ Tampa: Government Printing Office.

3. Christopher Holshek, Executive Summary, 2014-2015 Civil 

Affairs Issue Papers: The Future of Civil Affairs, Peacekeeping and 

Stability Operations Institute (U.S. Army War College Press, 

2015).

4. U.S. Army, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, Department of the Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 

U.S. Government Printing Office 2014

5. See e.g., H.R. McMaster, “Continuity and Change: The 

Army Operating Concept and Clear Thinking About Future 

War,“ Military Review 95, no. 2 (March-April 2015): 6-20 ; Timothy 

R. Reese, “Precision Firepower: Smart Bombs, Dumb Strategy,“ 

Military Review 83, no. 4 (July-August 2003): 46-53; Colin S. Gray, 

Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims of War, Peace, and Strategy (Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2009) 5.

6. See e.g., Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the 

Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,“ International Organization 63 (Winter 2009): 67-106; Douglas A. Pry-
22

er, “The Rise of the Machines: Why Increasingly ‘Perfect’ Weapons Help Perpetuate Wars and Endanger Our Nation,“ Military 

Review 93, no. 2 (March-April 2013): 14-24. 

7. Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims of War, Peace, and 

Strategy (Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2009) 5.

8. Linda Robinson, Paul D. Miller, John Gordon IV, Jeffrey 

Decker, Michael Schwille, Raphael S. Cohen, “Improving Strategic 

Competence; Lessons from 13 Years of War,“ (RAND Corporation, 

2014). 71.

9. See Nadia Schadlow, “Peace and War the Space Between,“ 

War on the Rocks, August 18, 2014. http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/

peace-and-war-the-space-between/

10. Fotini Christia, Alliance Formation in Civil Wars (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

11. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (NY: Oxford University Press, 2013): 231. 

12. Thomas X. Hammes, “War Evolves into the Fourth Generation,“ Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 2 (August 2005): 212-

218.

13. Braden R. Allenby, “The Paradox of Dominance: The Age 

of Civilizational Conflict,“ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 71, no. 2 

(2015): 60-74. 

14. See Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science in 

Prediction,“ Translation by R. Coalson, Military-Industrial Kurier (February 27, 2013): https://inmoscowsshadows.

wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America (Panama City: 

Pan American Pub., 2002). 

15. Describing combat that defies AirLand Battle and U.S. 

technological strengths, these small wars were referred to as “uncomfortable wars“ by General John R. Galvin. See Daniel P. Bolger, “The Ghosts of Omdurman,“ Parameters 21 (Autumn): 28-39; 
23

Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of 

Asymmetric Conflict,“ World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175-

200; Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory 

of Asymmetric Conflict,“ International Security 26, no. 1 (Summer 

2001): 93-128. The off-set strategy refers to a CSBA report by Robert Martinage, “Toward a Third Offset Strategy—Exploiting U.S. 

Long-Term Advantages to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection 

Capability,“ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (October 27, 2014) available at http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Offset-Strategy-Web.pdf

16. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (NY: Oxford University Press, 2013): 231

17. Fritjof Capra, The Hidden Connections: A Science for Sustainable Living. (New York: Anchor Books, 2002): 14

18. Sidney Tarrow, “Inside insurgencies: Politics and violence 

in an age of civil war,“ Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 5 (September 

2007): 587-600.

19. Jeffrey Goldstein, “Emergence as a Construct: History and Issues,“ Emergence 1, no 1. Available at http://

www.complexityandsociety.com/files/4413/1692/0252/

Emergence_ as_a_Construct--History_and_Issues.pdf (accessed 

September 2, 2015).

20. Alison Gilcrest, The Well-Connected Community: A Network 

Approach to Community Development (Bristol: The Policy Press, 

2004): 19.

21. Serge Loode, “Peacebuilding in complex social systems,“ 

Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, no. 18 (December 2011): 

71.

22. Paul Staniland, “States, insurgents, and wartime political 

orders,“ Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (June): 243-264.

23. Duncan J. Watts, “A Twenty-First Century Science,“ Nature 445 (February 2007): 489.
24

24. Albert-László Barabási, “The Origin of Busts and Heavy 

Tails in Human Dynamics,“ Nature 435 (May 12, 2005): 207.

25. See Bieke Schreurs, Chris Teplovs, Rebecca 

Ferguson,Maarten de Laat and Simon Buckingham Shum, “Visualizing Social Learning Ties by Type and Topic: Rationale and 

Concept Demonstrator,“ In: Third Conference on Learning Analytics and Knowledge (LAK 2013), 8-12 April 2013, Leuven, Belgium 

(forthcoming).

26. See Jeffrey Julum and Daniel Evans, “The Specter of Ungoverned Spaces & How Advances in Network Analysis Can Assist Policymakers,“ Small Wars Journal, August 30, 2015, http://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-specter-of-ungovernedspaces-how-advances-in-network-analysis-can-assist-policymakers

27. Ibid

28. Celestino Perez, Jr. “Applying the Ethics of War and 

Peace: A Military Perspective,“ Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 2 

(June 2015): 450. 

29. Ibid, p452

30. For an example of free software solutions see Cytoscape 

available at http://www.cytoscape.org and UCINET Software at 

https://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home

31. U.S. Army, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, Department of the Army TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, 

U.S. Government Printing Office 2014.
25

From Green to Blue: 

U.S. Army Civil Affairs and International 

Police Engagement

Captain Rob Kobold

Hard-earned and costly experience in the last few 

decades has demonstrated that the inability of a government to provide safety and security to its people 

is a key driver of instability. However, truly free and 

stable societies are built on foundations which are 

sturdier than military force alone. Civilian police forces, dedicated to and governed by the Rule of Law, are 

critical to long term stability and conflict prevention. 

This fact is not unknown; the U.S. Government and 

the International Community have invested billions of 

dollars in just the last decade developing and supporting civilian police forces as part of conflict prevention 

and post-conflict reconstruction activities. In spite of 

these sincere efforts, a key aspect of long term support to civilian police development is missing: long 

term civilian police engagement. Military to military 

engagement has been a key role of the United States 

Armed Forces for generations. 

The benefits of building lasting relationships with 

allied military forces are well known: U.S. Forces are 

able to develop interoperability, mentor foreign forces 

and, in the best cases, serve as a model for the ethical and moral use of force. The benefits of engaging 

police professionals from the United States with peers 

overseas are similar. The challenge lies in developing lasting relationships with civilian police forces in 

host-nations when the United States has no standing 

expeditionary force of law enforcement advisors. Law 

enforcement experts from the Reserve Component in 
26

general and the United States Army Civil Affairs and 

Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) 

in particular are a unique resource, deployable during all operational phases, working with military and 

Interagency (IA) partners, and leveraging their connection to domestic civilian police agencies to develop 

the persistent bonds with supported police services 

necessary for long-term mentoring and support.

Police Forces: More than Security

The role and function of the security sector is critical in both preventing conflict, and transitioning a society from conflict to recovery and reconstruction. But 

developing civilian police forces is a complicated task, 

requiring specialized skills and unique experience. 

While military personnel have experience in many security roles, the U.S. military does not police civilian 

populations as a core competency. The lessons learned 

from more than a decade of contingency operations 

have demonstrated that security alone is simply not 

enough to contribute to stability. Populations require 

“safety, security and justice“ for true stability to take 

root.1 These principles are predicated on a functioning Rule of Law system, which serves to prevent, investigate and provide lawful punishment for criminal 

behavior.

When discussing why an effective civilian police 

force is critical in a free society, it is often useful to 

highlight the differences between the military and the 

police. The first difference is one of function; the military is an external security force, trained and equipped 

to project power beyond the borders of the state. Police forces, on the other hand, are a domestic security 

force, trained and equipped to guarantee peace, order 
27

and security to the civilian population.2 Civilian police 

are trained and organized to use minimal force and 

maximum contact with the community in order to 

achieve a safe and secure environment; militaries are, 

by their very nature, designed to use overwhelming 

force and only mission essential contact with civilians 

in order to achieve an objective.3 These differences dictate the third and most important attribute of civilian 

policing: legitimacy. Because civilian police are not expected to use overwhelming force against the people 

they are expected to serve, they require the consent of 

the population to be the guardians of order. Civilian 

police maintain order in a democratic society because 

it is their communal and accepted role, not because 

of the threat of force.4 The importance of police legitimacy is key to the founding of modern policing in the 

London Metropolitan Police by Sir Robert Peel: civilian police cannot simply demand to be the guardians 

of order; the community must accept that the police 

have a duty and responsibility to enforce the law. 

A key aspect of stability is to ensure that parties 

to conflict are separated and that law and order is 

maintained. While this task may require military force 

at certain conflict stages, in the long term the maintenance of social order is a core police task.5

 Additionally, effective and democratic police forces are an important barometer of the effectiveness of a state. The 

manner in which the police function is important for 

the citizens of the country in question. Effectiveness, 

or lack thereof, also matters to those external actors 

with whom the state has relations. As USAID guidelines for assisting law enforcement agencies in developing countries note, “for the average citizen, civilian 

police is the most visible symbol of government and 

an indicator of quality of governance“6
28

This is why support to host nation law enforcement capabilities is an integral part of the institution 

building process; effective policing creates public confidence in the ability of a state to govern. But the goal 

of domestic security is not simply the development of 

effective law enforcement agencies; instead, the goal 

of an effective police support program is the development of Rule of Law. This requires the development 

of multiple structures: fair and effective laws, trusted 

law enforcement agencies, transparent courts and 

competent custody agents and facilities.7 The complexity of these programs, and time it takes to develop 

the expertise and ethical outlook required for success, 

demand training and support programs which take a 

long term view. Effective support to police programs 

depends on training, mentorship and the modeling 

of effective behavior; persistent engagement between 

U.S. policing experts and host nation personnel.

Current U.S. Government International Law 

Enforcement Development Strategies

In spite of the challenges presented by law enforcement support operations, the United States has a long 

history of involvement in international police training. The first large scale international law enforcement 

mission undertaken by U.S. forces was in post-World 

War II Germany, where the U.S. Constabulary was 

specifically organized as a force to police German civilians, alongside a training program to develop decentralized civilian police forces in Germany, based 

upon a British and American model of local policing.8

Since the end of the Cold War the number and type 

of police support operations has expanded. Following 

the invasion of Panama in 1989, the government com-
29

pletely rebuilt the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) 

as a civilian law enforcement agency. This effort led to 

police support and development operations in Haiti, 

El Salvador, Liberia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan 

and Iraq; as well as numerous smaller training missions. The lead agency for U.S. government support to 

foreign law enforcement agencies is the Department 

of State (DoS), with the Department of Justice (DoJ), 

the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Department of Defense (DoD) providing support. During these missions, three staffing 

models have emerged for training host nation police 

forces: using currently serving police officers, using 

contract law enforcement experts, or employing U.S. 

military personnel to train and mentor local law enforcement. 

The use of currently serving law enforcement officers as international police trainers and mentors is 

the rarest staffing model in U.S. operations. While 

some Federal law enforcement officers, such as Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) or Border Patrol 

Agents can be assigned to overseas postings as part 

of their employment, the same is not true of State and 

Local police officers. In Canada and most European 

countries, there is a national Constabulary which is 

often the primary agency for managing international 

police advisory missions.9 The lack of a centralized deployment capability for U.S. law enforcement officers 

has made their use ineffective. 

An example of this weakness was the 2015 deployment of several law enforcement trainers from the 

Reno Police Department to the Ukraine, to support 

Department of Justice sponsored western style Police 

Academy. These officers were deployed under the authority of the Mayor and the Police Chief, but were 
30

recalled when the City Manager and the City Council 

raised concerns about the cost, the loss of local officers, and the liability to the city for injured or killed 

police officers.10 This challenge of staffing has been 

one reason why U.S. assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies has made limited the use of active state 

and local law enforcement officers. 

Due to these staffing issues, most civilian overseas 

law enforcement trainers and mentors supporting 

overseas law enforcement support operations are contractors. The use of contractors allows the U.S. Government access to a broad pool of experienced law enforcement officers. But the use of contractors presents 

its own unique challenges. The first is that the majority of those serving in contracting roles are retired law 

enforcement officers, as most active officers cannot 

obtain a long term leave of absence to serve in overseas missions - which may last a year or more. Their 

status can lead to issues including the lack of physical 

fitness of some of the officers deployed, as well as others who are not prepared to live and work in austere 

operating environments. This trend has resulted in 

an environment where civilian law enforcement contractors are unpredictable and unaccountable, which 

complicates the process of developing host nation law 

enforcement capacity.11 The next challenge posed by 

using contractors is the time it takes to recruit, screen, 

organize and deploy contractors overseas. During the 

crisis in Somalia in 1991-1993, a requirement for an 

effective national police force was identified as a key 

factor for the long term stability of the country, but 

due to the lack of a readily deployable police support 

package, the security situation collapsed before any 

cohesive training plan could be implemented.12 
31

Due to the lack of any alternative, Military Police 

units have frequently been tasked to train local police 

forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. While these units do 

perform law enforcement tasks, they lack experience 

being the primary police agency for a civilian population.13 The challenge for Military Police units does 

not arise from training technical skills, the “low order 

skills“, required by police officers i.e. crowd control, 

weapons handling, and tactical response. Rather, the 

challenge is the “high order“ policing knowledge, the 

daily interaction a police officer has with the community and the ability to handle complicated and nebulous situations presented by diverse societies, such as 

dealing with quality of life and homeless issues. 

These skills can only be developed with experience.14 This skill deficit cannot be bridged effectively 

by training alone, it requires layers of experience - 

both individual and organizational - to successfully 

navigate the challenges of democratic policing.15 It is 

for this reason that in civilian law enforcement training, the experiential portion of police officer development is acknowledged and codified in the formal 

Field Training system, where a new officer in the field 

is trained and assessed by a more experienced officer. But the biggest problem of using military units to 

train local police forces is that this relationship blurs 

the line between military and police. In stable, free 

societies, the military does not play a role in policing 

civilians. The long term success of law enforcement 

capacity building would be best served by nurturing 

and developing the civilian nature of policing as early 

as possible.
32

Bridging the Capabilities Gap

The use of experienced civilian police officers 

(CIVPOL) is the international best practice for assessing, training and mentoring law enforcement agencies 

in developing and post-conflict societies.16 The early 

implementation of a civilian police force serves to define and maintain the difference between police and 

military. International experience with CIVPOL has 

demonstrated that an early civilian law enforcement 

presence is effective in Stability Operations, as the establishment of Rule of Law is a prerequisite for political and economic development.17 The main challenge 

to current staffing model is the lack of an ability to 

build long term police engagement with host nation 

agencies. Persistent engagement would require long 

term contact between CIVPOL advisers and the indigenous police agency. This link requires serving law 

enforcement officers, who can not only deploy to the 

host nation to provide training and mentorship, but 

can serve as a host for IA programs which bring foreign police leaders for training and experiential tours 

in the United States. Current staffing models do not 

support relationship building in police engagement: 

the answer to this challenge lies in the capabilities and 

expertise found in the Reserve Component in general 

and U.S. Army Civil Affairs in particular.

Civil Affairs has long had specialists who advise 

in various capacities of civil society, from economic 

development and education, to public transport and 

administration. USACAPOC has recently sought to 

expand this capability with the implementation of 

the Governance Specialist Program (38G) under the 

Institute for Military Support to Governance (IMSG). 

USACAPOC already has a wealth of law enforcement 
33

experience within its ranks, but this revitalization of 

the core tasks of Civil Affairs allows specific skill sets 

to be quantified and recorded.18 This skillset enables 

USACAPOC the capability to draw policing specialists with backgrounds specifically tailored to mission needs: general policing, investigations, training, 

incarceration and administration. Also, law enforcement specialists within USACAPOC will have the 

opportunity to interact and train with other critical 

governance specialists; such as prosecutors, defense 

attorneys and social workers, preparing to advise host 

nation authorities on a full spectrum of services. 

The use of USACAPOC as a key agency for law 

enforcement advising and training has several advantages. The first is the fact that Civil Affairs soldiers are 

deployable, and can develop long term engagement 

to advise and support host nation police agencies. 

The second is that experienced police leaders within 

USACAPOC have broad backgrounds in a variety of 

law enforcement skills. These experiential skillsets 

are necessary for successful modern law enforcement 

agencies; skillsets such as community policing, managing diverse populations, and public safety focused 

problem solving. 

Finally, the previous deployment histories and 

professional military education of Civil Affairs officers 

also provides them practical experience and training 

in operating within military task force organizations. 

Civil Affairs officers with a public safety background 

have the unique ability to interact as both police and 

military leaders. The development of a pool of law 

enforcement specialists within USACAPOC gives 

combatant commanders a rapidly deployable, task organized force of civilian law enforcement specialists 

who would be able to integrate into COCOM plan-
34

ning and implementation.19 The early introduction of 

civilian law enforcement expertise into contingency 

planning shifts the focus of civilian policing capacity 

building from an operational afterthought to a “Phase 

0“ planning consideration. This movement makes police capability development a critical conflict prevention tool.

A Way Forward

In order for a cohesive police support program, 

which can work with broader interagency efforts, 

to develop within USACAPOC, several substantive 

changes would need to be implemented. A full strategic gap analysis focused on this issue is beyond the 

scope of this monograph; however by focusing on 

changes to current Stability Operations doctrine, the 

organization of International Police Support Teams in 

CACOMs, and leveraging the use of personnel, a clear 

roadmap for how law enforcement expertise from 

within USACAPOC can be leveraged emerges.

Current Stability Operations (SO) doctrine does 

not place significant emphasis on the use of military personnel with civilian law enforcement skills 

in developing, supporting or advising foreign police 

services. JP 3-07 Stability Operations correctly points 

out that “USG efforts to develop indigenous police 

forces are led by (DoS), with assistance from DoJ and 

DoD.“20 While the Department of State will still have 

the primary role in developing foreign law enforcement capabilities, emphasis should be changed from 

merely providing support to these programs to playing an active role, specifically through the use of Law 

Enforcement specialists from USACAPOC. The current SO doctrine recognizes that the establishment of 
35

“Police Primacy“ in internal security in a goal, it does 

not leverage the military resources available to support this, especially Reservists with specialized law 

enforcement experience. 

The organization of law enforcement specialist 

governance teams within the CACOMs would be the 

next best step toward leveraging police expertise to 

support conflict prevention. In order to evolve in this 

manner, it is critical to build partnerships with IA 

partners; the DOS, the DOJ and USAID. By building 

bridges with these organizations, USACAPOC will 

make its resources and expertise visible and ensure 

that law enforcement experts from within the command are able to contribute to the valuable missions 

undertaken by these organizations.21 Relationships 

with IA partners would be especially effective at the 

CACOM level; regionally oriented police support 

teams based at each CACOM would be best suited to 

develop and maintain relations with locally based IA 

partners, embassy personnel, FAO’s and local host nation law enforcement agencies. 

A closer relationship between these agencies and 

USACAPOC would be symbiotic; DoS, DoJ and USAID have preexisting relationships with international 

and host nation law enforcement agencies and ongoing support programs, while Civil Affairs Governance 

Specialists provide key capability and gap analysis 

expertise. An additional benefit to the active use of 

Civil Affairs personnel as host nation law enforcement advisers would be the development of personal relationships between these officers and key host 

nation police leaders. Many of these agencies bring 

foreign police leaders to the United States for training or modeling purposes; Civil Affairs officers who 

have developed relationships with police leaders in 
36

their home nations would be prepositioned to serve as 

hosts and mentors should these leaders be brought to 

the United States for training. Developing long-term 

relationships between Civil Affairs law enforcement 

Governance Specialists and host nation police leaders 

would prove to be invaluable to the support of longterm stability operations. 

The Civil Affairs community has already begun to 

make structural changes that enhance the ability for 

USACAPOC to support overseas law enforcement capacity building programs throughout all operational 

phases. The first is the development of the 38G Military Governance Specialist Program. This program 

provides commanders and USACAPOC with public 

safety leaders who possess quantifiable skills in various law enforcement specialties, which ensures that 

deployable Civil Affairs officers with required skills 

are available at all operational phases.22 But in order 

to ensure the greatest impact of this program, the effort to capture applicable police skills developed in 

a Reservist’s civilian career must be expanded to Reservists outside of USACAPOC, and it must include 

members of the National Guard. The National Guard 

State Partnership Program (NG SPP) already has National Guard members conducting bilateral training 

with host nation forces. These relationships could be 

expanded to partner police officers within the National Guard with police professionals as well. 

The development of personal relationships between police officers within USACAPOC, the Reserves and the National Guard with key host nation 

police leaders would generate many benefits. IA partners (International Narcotics and Law (INL) and International Crime Investigative Training Assistance 

Program (ICITAP)) bring foreign police leaders to the 
37

United States for training or modeling purposes; law 

enforcement officers who have developed relationships with police leaders in host nations would be 

prepositioned to serve as hosts and mentors should 

these leaders be brought to the United States for training. Developing long-term relationships between 

Civil Affairs law enforcement Governance Specialists 

and other law enforcement professionals with host nation police leaders would prove to be invaluable to the 

development of effective policing agencies overseas, 

contributing immeasurable worth to comprehensive 

conflict prevention efforts.23

Effective, transparent and legitimate police services are more than simply a governmental service; 

they are critical to stability and are a key conflict prevention tool. Conversely, ineffective police forces and 

the use of military forces for law enforcement are both 

drivers of instability and public symbols of poor governance. Developing an effective police force is a long 

term project, one requiring experienced and skilled 

experts. Law enforcement governance specialists 

from USACAPOC Civil Affairs units are positioned 

to bridge this capability gap, by working with both 

military and civilian based police support operations. 

By building lasting ties with law enforcement 

leaders in partner nations, Civil Affairs personnel 

will become key agents in shaping police agencies as 

stable, public service centered institutions. Persistent 

engagement, and the development of lasting relationships between key police leaders and Civil Affairs law 

enforcement specialists, can be a key component of 

developing police agencies in host nations which are 

capable of supporting stability, and contributing to 

wider development efforts. 
38

Captain Rob Kobold has served in a variety of Field 

Artillery and MISO assignments with deployments to the 

Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as multiple operations 

throughout Europe and the Pacific. He has a Bachelor’s 

degree in Anthropology from the University of California, 

Davis and a Master’s degree in Diplomacy from Norwich 

University. He is currently assigned as a Civil Affairs 

Team Leader in the 445th Civil Affairs Battalion, Mountain 

View CA. In his civilian career, Captain Kobold is a Sergeant in the San Francisco Police Department.

Endnotes

1. JP 3-07 Stability Operations. pIII-5.

2. Greener, B.K. and W.J. Fish. “Situating Police and Military 

in Contemporary Peace Operations.“ Civil Military Occasional Papers (2011). P5.

3. Friessendorf, Cornelius and Jörg Krempel. Militarized vs. 

Civilian Policing: Problems of Reforming the Afghan National Police. 

PRIF Report No. 102. Frankfurt: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2011. P4.

4. Jackson, Brian A. Respect and Legitimacy- A Two Way Street; 

Strengthening Trust Between Police and the Public in an Era of Increasing Transparency. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2015. P5.

5. Dziedzic, Michael. “Introduction.“ Oakley, Robert et. al. Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security. 

DIANE Publishing, 1998. 6.

6. Buchanan 15)

7. Francis Fukuyama has identified the development of “rule 

of law“ as “one of the most complex administrative tasks that 

state-builders need to accomplish“, and it requires the wholesale 

creation of many complicated and inter dependent structures. 

Fukuyama, Francis. State Building: Governance and the World Order 

in the 21st Century. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004. 58.
39

8. Gunnarson, Robert L. Sr. American Military Police in Europe, 

1945-1991. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 2011. 8-11.

9. In Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is 

the managing agency for international police advising (http://

www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/po-mp/index-eng.htm). France has the 

Gendarmerie and Germany the Bundespolizei, both are Federal law 

enforcement agencies. Europe has developed a standing law enforcement expeditionary capacity utilizing these national level 

constabulary forces (http://www.eurogendfor.org/).

10. Reno Gazette Journal Editorial Board. 4th March 2015. 

http://www.rgj.com/story/opinion/editorials/2015/03/04/

wrong-recall-reno-police-ukraine-view/24322369/

11. Studies of the use of contract personnel within DOS INL 

have revealed several problems. This program relies mainly on 

retired law enforcement officers, who are frequently not physically capable of the demands of Stability Operations. Due to staff 

turn-over and the lack of a doctrine writing headquarters, international law enforcement support programs lack institutional 

stability. Key personnel from DOS provide oversight and manage contracts, but do little to capture institutional knowledge. A 

further consideration is additional legal liability. 

Kelly, Terrence K. et. al. A Stability Police Force for the United 

States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities. Santa 

Monica: Rand Arroyo Center, 2009. 111.

12. Poole, Walter S. The Effort to Save Somalia, August 

1992-March 1994. Washington D.C.: Joint History Office, Office of 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2005. 65.

13.

14. Military Police train in and execute a broad set of disciplines: Police Operations, detention operations and security and 

mobility support. This makes Military Police units distinct from 

civilian police, with MPs having a broader set of capabilities purpose built to support military operations (FM 3-39 Military Police 

Operations p1-2)
40

15. Kelly, Terrence K. et. al. A Stability Police Force for the 

United States: Justification and Options for Creating U.S. Capabilities. 

Santa Monica: Rand Arroyo Center, 2009. 115.

16. UNPOL website

17. Durch, William J and Madeline England (Eds.). Enhancing United Nations Capacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and 

Rule of Law. Stimson Center Report #63. Washington D.C.: The 

Stimson Center, 2010

18. (Reserve Officers Sought for New Civil Affairs Specialty) 

Reserve Officers Sought for New Civil Affairs Specialty. 8 June 2015. 

http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/careers/army/officer/2015/06/08/military-government-specialist/28350335/

19. A Congressional Research Service report recommended 

the establishment of a “U.S. Force for Stability“ to fill the need for 

providing and training the criminal justice function during Stability Operations. The recommendation argued for the need of 

a robust force capable of providing police, judicial and custody 

training. Serafino, Nina M. Policing in Peacekeeping and Related 

Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions. Washington 

D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2004. p35.

20. JP 3-07, Stability Operations, p III-46.

21.

22. Blais, Curtis (Ed.). Governance Innovation for Security and 

Development: Recommendations for U.S. Army Civil Affairs 38G Civil 

Sector Officers. Technical Report. Monterey: Naval Postgraduate 

School, 2014. P63-66.

23. The example of the Reno Police Department providing 

assistance to establish a new Ukrainian Police Service would 

be managed much differently under this proposed model. USACAPOC Law Enforcement specialists, working with INL and 

ICITAP would have drawn personnel from USACAPOC and the 

California National Guard (the Ukrainian State Partner) to develop a long-tern training, mentorship and relationship solution.
41

Civil Engagement as a Tool for Conflict Prevention: 

A Case Study

Captain Tammy Sloulin and 

Lieutenant Colonel Steve Lewis

Instability in Central America continues to present 

a challenge to the security of the United States (U.S.). 

Poverty, inequality, lack of basic services and education, and the highest murder rates in the world plague 

Central America.1 An estimated ninety percent of 

cocaine destined for the U.S. travels through Central 

America, managed by transnational criminal organizations (TCO) through their expanding covert networks of corruption, intimidation, and violence.2

 Violent street gangs have partnered with TCOs, and this 

has allowed them to morph into criminal insurgencies, 

displacing state control and establishing parallel governing structures in key locations along illicit trafficking routes.3

 This trend is leading to the degradation 

and displacement of state sovereignty, especially in 

the “Northern Tier“ of Central America.4 The spike in 

the numbers of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) 

during the summer of 2014,5 the sustained mega-high 

rates of violence, the continued ease with which TCOs 

smuggle mass quantities of illicit goods into the U.S., 

and the inability of Northern Tier countries to slow 

these trends or regain control of ungoverned spaces 

are key indicators that the sovereignty of the Northern 

Tier states is threatened. 

Many experts agree that the “withering of public 

authority,“ the expansion of transnational illicit networks, and the growth of “alternately governed“ areas represents a real threat to the security of the U.S.6

Regardless, the Department of Defense has neither the 
42

resources nor the political mandate to conduct largescale stability operations.7

 If the current proclivity 

to violence, transnational criminal activities, and the 

deterioration of state sovereignty continue, the existing window to prevent a greater catastrophe (which 

would mandate large-scale troop deployments) may 

close rapidly. Thus, the United States Government 

(USG) must develop a sound and executable strategy 

for relatively cheap small-footprint approaches to prevent conflict before this nexus grows into a calamity 

that requires large deployments.8 This paper will examine the utility of a U.S. Civil Affairs Team (CAT) as 

one of the better elements of the USG’s small-footprint 

conflict prevention strategy. 

In this paper, we will explore the drivers of instability and violence as a way to determine potential opportunities for mitigating these drivers and, thus, prevent the spread of violence. Next, we will examine the 

operational environment within which this case study 

occurs in order to better understand the specific drivers of violence at play in Honduras (which the CAT 

in our case study encountered at the beginning of its 

mission). Subsequently, using the factors of security, 

governance, and development, we will explore what 

a CAT could theoretically do to prevent violence then 

examine what the team in our case study actually did 

and whether it was actually effective. 

Finally, we will examine the lessons learned from 

this case study and make recommendations for future 

missions of these types.

Drivers of Instability and Theory of Prevention

Although many factors may drive conflict, in this 

paper, we will focus on the drivers outlined in Joint 
43

Publication 3-07 Stability Operations. The elements of a 

stable society are human security (security), economic 

and infrastructure development (development), and 

governance and rule of law (governance).9 In order to 

evaluate the effectiveness of the mission, we start with 

the assumption that lack of security, legitimate governance, and development makes populations vulnerable to internal strife or manipulation by violent nonstate actors (VNSA), which leads to conflict. 

In societies where the elements of security, governance, and development are weak, instability and 

conflict fester. Lack of security leads to a breakdown 

in the social order and offers VNSA the freedom to 

prey on vulnerable populations. The presence of security forces perceived as illegitimate can also lead to 

conflict as people will distrust their actions. Security 

forces that are viewed as corrupt or subversive are 

“major barriers“ to state legitimacy and will drastically impede governance and development.10

Lack of governance, in turn, creates a vacuum which 

is exploited by illicit groups seeking to establish hospitable environments within which they pursue their 

own activities. Insurgencies seek to establish shadow 

governments in order to legitimize their attempts to 

supplant the state, and TCOs and criminal gangs seek 

to transform state institutions through corruption and 

intimidation, in a process known as state capture or 

state reconfiguration.

11

Lack of development leaves the people with few 

legal alternatives, thus, forcing many to choose illegal or violent activities to survive.12 It’s clear that 

lack of security leads to conflict, lack of governance 

leads to conflict, and lack of development leads to 

conflict. Thus, our hypothesis for conflict prevention 

is therefore based on supporting a partner nation’s 
44

(PN’s) efforts to improve security, governance, and 

development. 

Case Study Background—Honduras

The Republic of Honduras currently suffers under 

the confluence of “alarming levels of crime and violence, high levels of poverty and food insecurity, and 

ineffective governance.“13 Additionally, Honduras has 

become a hub for narco-trafficking criminal organizations, through which cocaine and other illicit goods 

flow from the Andean Ridge to North America. The 

tremendous wealth associated with narco-trafficking 

allows local and transnational criminal organizations 

to supplant state control of under-governed areas in 

order to facilitate more effective trafficking.14 The Department (province/state) of Gracias a Dios (GaD) is 

the “mouth of the funnel“ into which much of the illicit traffic flows.15 GaD is a remote region of eastern 

Honduras that is bordered to the north and east by the 

Caribbean Sea and to the south by Nicaragua. GaD is 

also physically isolated from the rest of Honduras by 

the lack of all-weather roads, making the only legitimate connections those by air or sea. However, there 

are a variety of covert roads and river routes by which 

illicit goods are smuggled. 

Physical isolation is matched by social isolation: 

the majority Miskito population of GaD successfully 

resisted Spanish occupation in the eighteenth century 

and continues to resist the influence of the Government of Honduras (GoH) in the twenty-first century.16

The Miskito in Honduras also have a strong connection to the Miskito in neighboring Nicaragua, making 

them even more resistant to Tegucigalpa’s influence. 

As a result of a combination of mistrust, neglect, and 
45

lack of resources, the central government provides 

very few services to the people of GaD. Lack of a robust government presence, limited economic opportunities, and the region’s utility for narco-trafficking 

have made GaD a region ripe for conflict.

The CAT’s Approach

In light of the growing problems of violence, 

TCO growth, and the potential for greater violence 

and loss of state sovereignty, the Honduran Military 

(HNDMIL) Joint Staff developed a plan to defeat the 

TCOs and criminal gangs and reestablish security and 

governance in vulnerable areas. This plan—Operation 

Morazán—included the positioning of interagency 

task forces led by the HNDMIL in under-governed 

areas. In GaD, the HNDMIL established Task Force 

Policarpo Paz Garcia (TF Paz). In addition, the GoH 

granted the U.S. Embassy’s Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) permission to deploy a U.S. Army CAT 

with TF Paz. 

A CAT is a four-soldier team designed to work 

with PN military and civilian organizations in austere 

environments. The team consists of a team leader, a 

team sergeant/operations sergeant, a CA NCO/civil 

information manager, and a medical specialist. Such a 

team was available as part of the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Civil Affairs Engagement 

Program (CAEP) and sourced from the 81st Civil Affairs Battalion in Fort Hood, Texas. The designated 

CAT (CAT-HONDO), and it was placed under the 

operational control of Special Operations CommandSouth (SOCSOUTH) and the tactical control of SOCSOUTH’s forward command and control element 

(SOCFWD). CAT-HONDO was supported by a Civil 
46

Military Operations Center (CMOC) co-located with 

the SOCFWD. 

CAT-HONDO did not plan to focus on addressing 

the grievances and social ills of the people of GaD. The 

problems were vast, the resources of CAT-HONDO 

were limited, and the provision of social services by 

U.S. Forces would undermine the legitimacy of the 

GoH. Instead, CAT-HONDO’s mission was to help 

TF Paz achieve stability and to disrupt TCOs in GaD 

by building the GoH’s legitimacy, influence, and capacity. In support of this objective, CAT-HONDO 

developed four lines of effort: First - conducting thorough civil reconnaissance in partnership with TF Paz 

to better understand the drivers of instability that 

TCOs leverage to manipulate vulnerable populations; 

Second - building the capacity of TF Paz to conduct 

positive civil engagement with the people of GaD; 

Third - building the capacity of local governments in 

partnership with TF Paz and the local departmental 

and municipal governments; and finally - facilitating 

greater positive interaction and connection between 

all potential unified action partners (such as the local 

government, non-governmental organizations, U.S.G 

agencies, and civil society) in support of security, governance, and development in GaD. 

Security

Security is the ability of the people to lead their 

daily lives without fear of systematic or large-scale 

violence.17 An essential element of citizen security is 

the relationship between the security forces (SecFor) 

and the people whom they are tasked with protecting. 

A poor relationship fosters mutual mistrust and leads 

each side to view the other with suspicion. Mistrust 
47

limits information flow, leads the population to see 

the SecFor as illegitimate, and caU.S.es the SecFor to 

use force inappropriately. Thus, positive and persistent engagement between the SecFor and the population is essential for security, and when the state fails to 

provide security, other groups quickly fill the vacuum. 

What can a CAT do to improve security? The most 

effective role a CAT can play in building PN security 

involves helping the security forces understand the 

value of civil engagement and then building their capacity to conduct civil engagement. The first step entails building the PN SecFor understanding that civil 

engagement is not a public relations ploy or a feelgood task best left to the period after the conclusion 

of a conflict. Rather, it is an essential task in the displacement of the influence of, the disruption of, and 

the defeat of VNSA.

Populations supply VNSA with safe havens, recruits, information, and resources either because they 

are intimidated or they see the VNSA as legitimately 

filling the role of security provider. The PN SecFor 

must prove to the people that they are their protectors 

and that the VNSA are the manipulators. They can do 

this through a sustained effort to positively engage 

the population. Successful CA teams have built the 

understanding then the capacity of PN SecFor, which, 

in turn, have led to the greater legitimacy and influence of the PN on the population and decreased support for the VNSA. 

What did CAT-HONDO do to improve security? In 

GaD, the historic mistrust between the Miskito people 

and the central government represented a significant 

challenge for TF Paz. CAT-HONDO worked with TF 

Paz, assisting with mission analysis and the development of a civil engagement plan in support of Opera-
48

tion Morazán. Among the key elements of this plan 

were the security outposts that TF Paz established 

in remote border and illicit trafficking areas of GaD. 

CAT-HONDO worked closely with these outposts to 

conduct civil reconnaissance in order to better understand the civil vulnerabilities that the TCOs used to 

manipulate and influence the population. Then, CATHONDO and the individual outposts would develop 

small civic action projects to facilitate the outposts’ 

engagement with these small communities. The projects included: small-scale medical outreach programs, 

school renovations, and donations of school supplies. 

This effort improved communication and, at the 

same time, TF Paz grew to better understand the 

population, the illicit trafficking routes, and how the 

TCOs intimidated the local population. Furthermore, 

the effort enabled TF Paz to better protect the people 

and expand the influence and legitimacy of the GoH in 

the eyes of the Miskito population. At the end of their 

deployment TF Paz informed CAT 8135 that TF Paz 

had observed a marked decrease in illicit trafficking 

activities in areas with greater TF Paz presence and 

engagement. Additionally, local government leaders 

reported less intimidation by TCOs. 

An additional program with which CAT-HONDO assisted TF Paz was the Guardianes de la Patria

or Guardians of the Homeland Program. The GoH 

designed this youth mentorship program to address 

low school attendance, lack of patriotism and national 

spirit, and lack of positive role models for the youth 

of GaD. The program provided the HNDMIL with 

the platform needed to reach out to the community 

and address many of the issues that contributed to 

insecurity and instability in the region. The program 

also allowed the military to routinely leave the base 
49

and interact with the population, increasing trust and 

confidence between the community and the military. 

CAT-HONDO connected resources and funding from 

multiple NGOs which significantly increased the impact of the program. 

Governance

Governance is a situation “where the state provides essential services and serves as a responsible 

steward of state resources; government officials are 

held accountable through political and legal processes; . . . the population can participate in governance;“ 

and the people can enjoy the collective benefits and 

services of the state.18 Governments are deemed effective when they adequately perform the functions of 

governance within the expectations and norms of the 

people they govern. When the state is seen as illegitimate, instability and conflict ensue because “citizens 

tend to withdraw support from governments that cannot or will not provide basic services and some level 

of economic opportunity.“19 

What can CATs do to improve governance? CATs can 

facilitate the improvement of the capacity and legitimacy of local governments by various means. One of 

the most successful is relationship building and the 

connection of the local government to other government and non-government partners. In many developing countries, the national, provincial, and local 

government agencies are not synchronized and, in 

some cases, work toward conflicting objectives. Thus, 

a CAT can work with the local government to expand 

its network of support and assist the broader network 

to better understand the local government’s challenges. This network can include PN government agencies, 
50

USG agencies such as USAID, and non-governmental 

organizations (NGOs). Additionally, the CA team can 

build the capacity of the local government to engage 

its own constituents in order to better understand and 

address their needs. Encouraging citizen participation 

in the local government’s activities and programs will 

build its legitimacy.20 The planning and execution of 

civic action projects designed to facilitate interaction 

between the people and their local government is a 

principal tool that CATs use to increase interaction 

and participation. 

What did CAT-HONDO do to improve governance?

At the beginning of CAT-HONDO’s deployment, 

the Governor of GaD and the Commander of TF Paz 

did not work together. The Governor of GaD, a native Miskito, did not clearly understand the role or the 

disposition of the security forces in his department. 

As for the Commander of TF Paz, a non-Miskito from 

central Honduras, he did not know the governor and 

conducted operations using the same methods he had 

employed in other parts of Honduras. Conflicts arose 

between the Miskito people and TF Paz as a result of 

their poor relationship. The team assisted in bridging 

the gap between the two leaders, and this facilitated 

greater communication and cooperation between 

them. A significant success was achieved in August 

2014 when CAT-HONDO, with the support of the 

CMOC, assisted the Governor in organizing a meeting of all six mayors in GaD (It was significant because 

they represented different political parties and rarely 

cooperated) and facilitated the attendance of a senior 

GoH official representing the Vice President’s office. It 

was the first time a senior official of the Hernandez administration had visited GaD. This visit significantly 

improved the legitimacy of the national government 
51

in the eyes of the Miskito and initiated a strategic dialogue which continues to this day.

Based on the developing cooperation among TF 

Paz, the Governor, and the mayors, a significant deficiency was identified. It turned out that GoH agencies, such as the Ministry of Health and Ministry of 

Education, were unable to move supplies from Puerto 

Lempira (the capital of GaD) to schools and clinics 

in remote villages. CAT-HONDO helped TF Paz develop a plan to deliver these needed supplies as part 

of their logistical resupplying of their remote security 

outposts. 

Development

Economic development refers to the “ability of 

the people to pursue the opportunities for livelihoods 

within a system of economic governance bound by 

law.“21 Put differently, the state must create the environment needed to “unleash the potential of the private sector.“22 Renowned economist, William Easterly, 

once sagely offered, “Remember, aid cannot achieve 

the end of poverty. Only homegrown development 

based on the dynamism of individuals and firms in free 

markets can do that.“23 Thus, the state should work to 

facilitate an environment conducive to development. 

Some key actions with which the state can facilitate 

private sector growth are improving the security of 

the population; expanding and maintaining physical infrastructure; improving human capital through 

educational, vocational, and health programs; crafting 

a reliable regulatory framework managed by dependable civil servants; and facilitating positive civil engagement to improve the community’s social capital. 
52

What can a CAT do to improve development? As mentioned previously, support for security and governance can improve the environment and encourage 

development. The improved legitimacy of the state 

can facilitate both internal and external investment. 

There are two additional tasks that a CAT can do to 

facilitate development. First, the CAT can work with 

the PN and USG interagency to facilitate information 

flow and assist in aligning the proper resources to support development. Second, the CAT, working closely 

with other partners, can assist the local government 

to plan and execute projects and programs which will 

improve the development environment and expand 

the social capital of the community. Programs such 

as school renovation and medical outreach activities 

done in partnership with the OSC humanitarian assistance program (HAP) can improve both the human 

capital and physical infrastructure of a community. 

Moreover, ensuring broad community consultation 

and participation in these projects will improve the 

social capital of the community. 

What did CAT-HONDO do to improve development?

As noted, the simple act of helping TF Paz to develop 

positive relationships with the people of GaD built 

people’s confidence in the state and led to some improvement in their willingness to pursue legal economic opportunities. CAT-HONDO and the CMOC 

collaborated to connect and support a variety of organizations working to improve development in GaD. 

CAT-HONDO worked with U.S.AID to assist a vocational training program the latter was conducting with 

a local Catholic NGO. The CMOC and CAT-HONDO 

linked several municipal governments in GaD to a 

Honduran university (which had seeds and agricultural resources such as training and land assessments) 
53

in order to increase food production in the region and 

decrease the need to import food which significantly 

decreased the financial burden on low income communities. CAT-HONDO and the CMOC also coordinated with the Ministry of Education to improve the 

local school facilities and availability of teachers. 

Effects Achieved and Lessons Learned

After almost a year in GaD, CAT-HONDO was 

able to observe changes in the three factors that were 

potential drivers of conflict. TF Paz significantly increased its presence in and access to remote locations 

and populations throughout GaD, especially along 

illicit trafficking routes. They now have a much better relationship with the population, and the friendly 

exchange of information is common. This new information connection has led to a measurable decrease in 

illicit trafficking and intimidation of local government 

representatives. The improved coordination between 

the military and the civil government also enhances 

the legitimacy of both the military and local government. CAT-HONDO also observed improvements in 

development situation as people report greater confidence in the state and willingness to invest in their 

community.

Persistent Presence. Success in this mission was 

built on the establishment and maintenance of relationships. With a persistent presence, the team gained 

legitimacy with the population, the military and civil 

leadership, and the U.S. Country Team. True measurable effects require the trust of partners, and trust is 

established thorough persistent presence. Additionally, persistent presence allows the teams to more fully 

understand the discreet factors within the operational 

environment that drive instability. 
54

Small Footprint. Although the limitations on the 

number of U.S. Military personnel (small footprint) 

were mandated based on financial and political constraints, they proved to be much more of a benefit than 

a detriment. A small team does not overtly effect the 

environment the way a large deployment might (creating resentment by the population and skewing the 

economy as businesses scramble to meet USG logistical requirements and neglect the local population’s 

needs). Moreover, a smaller effort does not put pressure on both the U.S. and PN Military to execute largescale operations and achieve major effects in the short 

term at the expense of sustainability or indigenous 

solutions. Finally, a small, persistent USG footprint is 

less likely to make the PN military and civil government appear to be illegitimate, in need of foreign assistance, or, worse, the lackeys of a foreign power. 

Communication. The utility of language training 

cannot be overstated. The team’s ability to communicate with the population and all PN organizations in 

Spanish was a significant advantage. Language training must remain a top priority for CATs. The team’s 

ability to articulate its objectives and negotiate with 

the PN military, disparate PN government institutions, and civil society organizations was key to its 

success. Many of these groups have different objections and do not trust each other, so it is a testament to 

the team’s abilities at negotiation and mediation that it 

was able to get these groups to talk to each other and, 

in many cases, agree on courses of action. 

Recommendations and Conclusion

The two areas most in need of attention with respect to the deployment of CATs for such missions 
55

are with respect to doctrine and training. Much of CA 

doctrine is focused on support for major combat operations. The continued development of doctrine focused on civil engagement in Phase 0 or shaping and 

influence operations, especially the prevention of conflict, should be pursued – especially with respect to leveraging the persistent presence, small footprint, and 

communication effects such engagements can have.

Such improvements will also provide the appropriate doctrinal framework for revisions in training. 

In this case, the CA Team was required to operate for 

extended periods of time in an austere environment 

with limited U.S.G support; it needed to be as selfsufficient as possible. Continued emphasis should be 

placed on training in the areas of secure communications, threat analysis, counter-surveillance, weapons 

and unarmed combat skills, mobile force protection, 

negotiations and strategic communications, medical 

skills, assessments of physical and human infrastructure/networks, network building, and Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) skills.

It is inherently difficult to prove a negative—in 

this case, to prove that the efforts of a CAT prevented 

conflict from taking place. However, in this situation, 

it is clear that the activities of CAT-HONDO during 

almost twelve months in GaD had an effect on the factors that drive conflict. The combination of a PN with 

an established plan and forces aligned to support that 

plan; a supportive U.S. Country Team; clear strategic 

guidance and resources provided by the geographic 

combatant command and theatre special operations 

command; and a properly trained, selected, and 

equipped team enabled this “small-footprint“ team 

to use Civil Affairs engagement as a tool to prevent 

conflict.
56

CPT Tammy Sloulin is serving as the OIC of Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School. She was a team leader on a 

Civil Military Advise and Assist Team in Afghanistan and 

then served as a team leader for Civil Affairs Engagement 

Program in Honduras. She has an M.S. in Elementary Education and a M.S. in Environmental Management. LTC 

Steve Lewis is the Chief of Civil Affairs for Special Operations Command-South. He was previously CMOC chief in 

the 97th CA BN (Airborne) and battalion operations officer 

for the 98th CA BN (Airborne. More recent deployments 

include to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Haiti as part of 

Operation Unified Response. LTC Lewis is a graduate of the 

Naval Post Graduate School’s Defense Analysis Program.

Endnotes

1. Peter J. Meyer and Clare Ribando Seelke, Central America 

Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress

(Washington, D.C.: UNT Digital Library), http://digital.library.

unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc306488/, accessed Sept 5, 2015.

2. US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report Volume I,“ Drugs and Chemical Controls

(March 2014): 9, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222881.pdf. Accessed Sept 5, 2015

3. John P. Sullivan, Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third 

Generation Gangs in Central America. July 2008, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2008/2tri08/sullivaneng.htm. Accessed Sept 5, 2015.

4. Douglas Farah, “Central America’s Northern Triangle: A 

Time for Turmoil and Transitions,“ Prism 3: 89-109.

5. William A. Kandel, Andorra Bruno, Peter J. Meyer, Clare 

Ribando Seelke, Maureen Taft-Morales, and Ruth Ellen Wasem, 

Unaccompanied Alien Children: Potential Factors Contributing to Re-
57

cent Immigration (July 3, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43628.pdf, accessed Sept 5, 2015.

6. John P. Sullivan, From Drug Wars to Criminal Insurgencies: 

Mexican Cartels, Criminal Enclaves and Criminal Insurgency in Mexico and Central America, and their Implications for Global Security. 

Vortex Working Paper No. 6. 2012. http://www.scivortex.org/

6FromDrugWarsCriminalInsurgency.pdf. Accessed Sept 5, 2015. 

7. US Department of Defense, Strategic Guidance Sustaining 

U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (January 

2012), http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_

Guidance.pdf. Accessed Sept 5, 2015

8. National Security Strategy (February 2015), https://www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf. Accessed September 5, 2015

9. Joint Publication 3-07 Stability Operations. 29 Sept 2011. 

(Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office) Chp 1 

10. Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Rebuilding Governance in Failed 

States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross Cutting 

Themes, Public Administration and Development 25 (2005): 3-14.

11. Michael Miklaucic and Moises Naím, The Criminal State,“ 

and John P. Sullivan, “How Illicit Networks Impact Sovereignty,“ in 

Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, ed. Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer (Washington D.C.: NDU Press, April 2013) 149-187. http://cco.ndu.

edu/Portals/96/Documents/books/convergence/convergence.

pdf. Accessed Sept 4, 2015.

12. According to Aristotle, “poverty is the parent of revolution and crime.“ For more nuanced analysis see USAID, Guide to 

Drivers of Violent Extremism (February 2009): 8-26; and Kim Namsuk and Pedro Conceicao, “The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict 

and Human Development,“ International Journal of Peace Studies 15 

(Spring/Summer 2010).
58

13. US Agency for International Development, Honduras 

Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2015-2019, 5, https://

www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1862/Honduras%20CDCS%20Public.pdf. Accessed Sept 5, 2015

14. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational Organized Crime in Central America: A Threat Assessment

(September 2012), http://www.unodc.org/documents/dataand-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf.

15. “Mosquitia under Pressure,“ US Department of State Field 

Assessment Report (May 2013). 

16. Thomas M. Leonard, The History of Honduras (Greenwood 

Press, 2011).

17. US Institute of Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction (2009), 6-37.

18. Ibid. 8-97.

19. Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “Rebuilding Governance in Failed 

States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts and Cross Cutting Themes,“ Public Administration and Development 25 (2005): 

3-14.

20. Ibid. 5.

21. US Institute of Peace, Guiding Principles for Stabilization and 

Reconstruction (2009): 9-131.

22. Conversation between author and Dr. Viva Bartkus, Professor at the Mendoza School of Business, University of Notre 

Dame, September 8, 2015, Homestead, Florida.

23. William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s 

Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good.
59

The Role of Civil Affairs in 

Counter-Unconventional Warfare

Major Shafi Saiduddin

Civil Affairs (CA) forces, through their ability to 

analyze conflicts, identify sources of instability and 

engage populations, have the potential to mitigate 

or prevent future conflicts. The real question is how 

to apply this concept of conflict prevention towards 

achieving national security objectives. The term “conflict prevention“ is not itself a national strategic objective, but clearly conflict prevention can be an important tool in countering adversary unconventional 

warfare campaigns. The U.S. and its interests currently face a variety of hybrid threats from state and 

non-state actors. Many of these threats can best be 

described as long term unconventional warfare (UW) 

campaigns. UW, particularly in its earliest stages, involves exploiting civil vulnerabilities, such as popular dissatisfaction with political, social, or economic 

conditions. These grievances provide the initial fuel 

to feed a UW campaign. CA engagement and conflict 

prevention activities in Phase Zero, if conceptualized 

and operationalized properly, can become the first 

line of defense in countering adversary unconventional warfare campaigns.

The 2015 National Military Strategy, emphasizes a 

continuing era of persistent conflict characterized by 

hybrid threats. The U.S. military is looking at waging 

long term campaigns with our goal to deter, deny, 

and defeat state adversaries, and to disrupt, degrade, 

and defeat violent extremist organizations (VEOs).1

The difficulty is that many of these threats exist in the 

middle ground between peace and war. Rather than 
60

a binary system of “peace versus war“ we live in a 

constant cycle of competition between states, and nonstate actors, that spans the diplomatic, economic and 

military realm.2 Most of this competition takes place 

in what we describe as Phase Zero, the shape and 

influence phase of military operations. Rather than 

merely a preparatory phase leading to the use of military force, Phase Zero is the domain where entire UW 

campaigns can take place which never lead to armed 

conflict. These campaigns can independently secure 

specific strategic advantage for the state or non-state 

actors conducting them.

U.S. high intensity warfare capabilities have few 

peers. Likewise, U.S. SOF Surgical Strike capabilities are world-class. The difficulty we have as a nation is operating in the realm that George F. Kennan, 

American diplomat and historian, described as “political warfare“. Kennan described political warfare 

as: “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in 

time of peace.“ In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s 

command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They 

range from such overt actions as political alliances, 

economic measures, and “white“ propaganda to such 

covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly“ 

foreign elements, “black“ psychological warfare and 

even encouragement of underground resistance in 

hostile states.3 The 2013 U.S. Army Special Operations 

Command (USASOC) white paper, “SOF Support to 

Political Warfare,“ describes the concept of political 

warfare in greater detail as well as outlining ways that 

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) can support 

it. “Political warfare is not a term used in U.S. military joint doctrine yet, however, political warfare’s 
61

military aspects integrate counter-unconventional 

warfare (C-UW) and unconventional warfare (UW), 

foreign internal defense (FID), Security Sector Assistance (SSA), and Information and Influence Activities 

(IIA), closely calibrated with and in support of those 

of other government departments.“4 Political warfare 

describes many of the activities conducted by Civil 

Affairs in Phase Zero, often bridging the gap between 

statecraft and warfare.

C-UW describes “operations and activities conducted by the U.S. Government and supported by 

SOF against an adversarial state or non-state sponsor of unconventional warfare.“ These initiatives can 

“decrease the sponsor’s capacity to employ unconventional warfare to achieve strategic aims.“ C-UW is 

focused on “attriting an adversary’s ability and will to 

persist in Hybrid Warfare, or to support elements of a 

resistance or insurgency.“ 

“C-UW can also include whole-of-government 

initiatives embracing foreign internal defense (FID) 

as well as improvements to law enforcement, rule of 

law (RoL), governance, and citizen inclusion through 

addressing grievances—thus shoring up the stability 

and legitimacy of the state and increasing its immunity to adversary UW.“5

 Most of these initiatives fall 

within the core tasks of CA, making CA integral to the 

development of a C-UW campaign. 

CA forces have the potential to become the first 

line of defense to adversary UW campaigns in Phase 

Zero. As Dr. Mark Galeotti Professor of Global Affairs 

at New York University’s School of Professional Studies states in an interview with the Small Wars Journal: 

“Ultimately, hybrid defense is about legitimate and effective governance. On so many levels, this is precisely a war of governance.“6

 Whether CA uses the term 
62

C-UW or “hybrid defense,“ the focus of its operations 

in Phase Zero must be on bolstering the governance of 

vulnerable partner nations. 

Russia’s campaign in the Ukraine illustrates the 

critical role of governance. The initial stages of the 

Russian campaign in the Ukraine were based on targeting areas of weak governance by identifying civil 

vulnerabilities and exploiting them. By the time the 

campaign transitioned to armed conflict, the groundwork of the campaign had long since been in place 

and the ability of the Ukrainian government to counter this campaign was extremely limited. Russia has 

certainly recognized the significance of political warfare. Russian Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov offered, “In the 21st century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of 

war and peace. (...) The role of nonmilitary means of 

achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, 

in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force 

of weapons in their effectiveness.“ 7

CA forces are unique in that they are a military 

entity with the mandate to engage with and affect 

the non-military means of achieving strategic goals. 

However, the application of CA forces to this problem set has been hindered by our conceptualization 

of how CA forces should be employed. An example of 

the challenge of conceptualization can be found in our 

understanding of UW itself. The difficulty with UW 

is that, as a nation, we do not understand it, though it 

is being used against us on a regular basis.8 The state 

actors who use UW most effectively have not significantly changed the structure or composition of their 

armed forces and maintain significant conventional 

capabilities, however, they have a very broad concept 

of UW and how to apply it. Adversarial UW takes sev-
63

eral forms and is part of the doctrine of competitor nation states, Russia, China, and Iran, as well non state 

actors such as Daesh and Al-Qa’ida. The specifics of 

each actor’s methods are described in greater detail in 

the ARSOF white paper, however, the commonalities 

are that all campaigns start in a peacetime environment, are heavily psychological in nature, and involve 

leveraging the grievances of a population.

UW is defined in U.S. doctrine as “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency 

to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied 

area.“9 US UW doctrine describes the components 

of UW as the armed component, public component, 

underground, auxiliary, and mass base. As a military, 

we tend to focus on the armed component, but from 

a doctrinal perspective, the initial focus of UW should 

be on the underground, not the armed component. As 

noted UW researcher Colonel (ret.) David Maxwell 

writes: “it is the underground that provides the key 

to understanding the motivation, objectives, interests, 

methods, and strategy of the leadership of a revolution, resistance, or insurgency (RRI). It is through 

the underground that we can not only vet members 

but also try to determine one of the most important 

questions of “what comes next?“ after the organization achieves success. We really need to assess all 

the organizations of an RRI and not solely the armed 

component, which seems to always be the focus of our 

strategy and activities.“10

Distribution of technology, increased use of the Internet, smartphones and social media have also significantly changed the role of the mass base. Civil vulnerabilities affecting the mass base will have a significant 
64

impact on the development of resistance movements. 

Evolving Special Warfare doctrine highlights the role 

of CA in UW such as working with the underground 

to develop and advise a shadow government, mobilize the mass base, organize non-violent protest and 

leverage civil vulnerabilities against the targeted 

government or occupying power.11 CA forces can 

also delegitimize a government or occupying power 

through identifying and degrading civil strengths.12

CA forces are in an ideal position to detect these same 

techniques when applied against partner nations.

There are now a wide variety of labels to address the 

concept of political warfare from the military side. We 

have irregular warfare, hybrid warfare, and asymmetric warfare, not to mention UW. However, as Colonel 

(ret.) Maxwell notes: “Definitions and doctrine aside, 

unconventional warfare at its core is about revolution, 

resistance, and insurgency (RRI) combined with the 

external support provided to a revolution, resistance, 

or insurgency by either the U.S. or others (who may 

or may not have interests aligned with the U.S. and 

may in fact be opposed to the U.S. and our friends, 

partners, and allies).“ He concludes that the need is 

not so much for a new definition for UW than to just 

conceptualize it properly.13

There is also a misconception that UW and guerilla 

warfare are synonymous. Guerilla warfare is a technique that can be part of UW, but it is not essential 

for UW. UW is psychological in nature; ARSOF UW 

doctrine notes that entire UW campaigns can be conducted by Psychological Operations without the deployment of SF or CA forces.14 Another misconception 

is that UW is “owned’ by ARSOF. This perception 

contributes to a narrow view of UW by Department of 

Defense (DoD) and the interagency. ARSOF “owns“ 
65

parts of UW, yet so do all other elements of national 

power.15 The three ARSOF regiments – Civil Affairs, 

Special Forces, and Military Information Support Operations – all specialize in UW, and when combined 

in a single command, such as 1st Special Forces Command (Provisional) (Airborne) can provide a scalable, 

deployable, UW capability. However, SOF do not conduct UW unilaterally without support from, or in support of, other agencies and elements.16 Successful UW 

requires the diplomatic, informational, and economic 

aspects of national power. UW and Counter-UW are 

whole-of-government efforts that must be engaged by 

civilian agencies, usually in the lead, and supported 

by both SOF and conventional forces.

As mentioned previously, neither C-UW or political 

warfare are part of Joint Force doctrine yet. However, 

these terms help conceptualize the challenges the U.S. 

faces. For much of the past decade, the U.S. has framed 

many threats, particularly those involving non-state 

actors such as Al-Qa’ida, in terms of Counterterrorism (CT). As a doctrinal term CT is narrow and it has 

become even more so over the passage of time with 

its definition shifting to “activities to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks.“ “Countering 

root causes and desired regional end states“ has been 

recently removed from the definition.17 The U.S. has 

been successful at executing CT operations tactically, 

though not as successful in achieving intended long 

term strategic objectives. While influence capabilities 

have had a role in CT operations, they have generally 

been regarded as supporting or collateral capabilities, 

and have been prioritized and resourced accordingly.

The greatest flaw of U.S. CT strategy is that while 

it is very successful at targeting adversary leadership 

and networks, it has great difficulty affecting the ide-
66

ology that feeds a movement, or the governance conditions that give a movement a place to grow. UW, on 

the other hand, is a broad concept, and in its reverse 

form, C-UW has an operational core of UW, Foreign 

Internal Defense (FID), Counter insurgency (COIN), 

Stability, and CT.18 From a perspective of new ARSOF 

doctrine, C-UW allows for the comprehensive integration of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike capabilities as mutually supporting efforts. As the U.S. faces 

continuing threats from non-state actors, particularly 

the Islamic State (or Daesh), reframing these conflicts 

in terms of C-UW will allow intensive targeting of the 

ideological and governance components of an adversary UW campaign. 

There is growing interest in the development of 

a comprehensive C-UW strategy. Section 1097 of the 

2016 National Defense Authorization Act explains 

that “the Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation 

with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

heads of other appropriate departments and agencies 

of the United States Government, develop a strategy 

for the Department of Defense to counter unconventional warfare threats posed by adversarial state and 

non-state actors.“ This directive includes requirements to clarify roles within DoD, analyze authorities 

and command structure, and make recommendations 

on new doctrine and capabilities.19 This new strategy could have key roles for CA in conjunction with 

Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and 

Special Forces. This is a timely opportunity for the CA 

Regiment to examine its capabilities and refine them 

in order to support this new strategy. 

CA already conducts many of the Phase Zero activities required for C-UW. One of the primary ways 

is through Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID is de-
67

fined as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs 

taken by another government or other designated 

organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other 

threats to its security.“20 While FID is not the reverse 

of UW, much of the necessary framework for C-UW 

Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) exists within FID joint 

doctrine. Working within existing doctrine, CA can 

support C-UW through a thorough knowledge of UW 

and the application of FID.

FID is a subset of Nation Assistance and is clearly 

within the lane of CA core tasks. Unfortunately, there 

are misconceptions as to how FID is conducted and 

who conducts it. By doctrine, FID is Civil Military Operations (CMO) and MISO heavy. The principles of 

FID include the maximum use of CMO and MISO and 

a minimum use of physical force. CMO is listed as direct support to FID not involving combat operations.21

In practice, however, the concept of FID is focused on 

training security forces. Simply applying “train and 

equip“ to a problem set is an insufficient solution.22

Training security forces can have limited effect in countering a UW campaign as it typically does not increase 

the partner nation’s capacity to counter the work that 

an adversary is doing through the underground and 

auxiliary and in mobilizing the mass base. By the time 

the campaign progresses to the armed component it is 

usually too late. It is more important to wage C-UW in 

the early phases. 

The line of effort that allows CA to conduct C-UW 

most effectively in the Phase Zero environment is 

Persistent Engagement, the best example of which 

is USSOCOM’s Civil Military Engagement program 

where Civil Military Support Elements (CMSEs) oper-
68

ate on a permanent basis out of U.S. Embassies. The 

CMSE supports a Host Nation’s Internal Defense and 

Development (IDAD) strategy as well as a Global 

Combatant Command (GCC) Theater Campaign Plan. 

“CMSEs support cooperative security by merging the 

GCC, Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), 

and U.S. Ambassador objectives, which are achieved 

through Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). CMSEs 

are able to sift through the myriad of interagency programs and objectives to link those that provide mutual 

interest and combine resources to achieve synergy.“23

A CMSE, through its interaction with civilian populations and civilian agencies is in the best position to 

identify civil vulnerabilities that can be exploited by 

an adversary as well as detecting early UW activities 

by adversary operators. CMSEs working out of Embassies are natural partners for Defense Attaches and 

Foreign Area Officers, who often serve as the central 

point of engagement with the Department of State 

(DoS) and Intelligence Community. While CME is a 

program of record through USSOCOM, it is also a part 

of CA doctrine through ATP 3-57-80. As such, the concepts are applicable to CA forces designated as both 

conventional and SOF.24 CME is much broader than 

the military concepts of UW and FID and is actually 

closer to Kennan’s concept of political warfare. 

While UW and C-UW function best when part of 

whole-of-government efforts, experience during the 

last decade has shown that in practice integrating 

whole-of-government effects is exceedingly difficult. 

This way involves aligning the efforts of disparate 

governmental agencies, often with no common culture 

and sometimes with competing equities. Additionally, 

while the military may have a difficult time conceptualizing the concept of political warfare, civilian agen-
69

cies have an equally difficult time operationalizing it. 

It is here where Army Special Operations Forces have 

great value by combining planned, directed effects in 

support of statecraft and diplomacy. CA, in particular, 

has the ability to integrate military operations with 

counterpart civilian agencies and facilitate operationalizing whole-of-government efforts.

A key task for CA is to recognize local concepts of 

legitimacy when it comes to governance. A repeated 

mistake in previous US campaigns has been to view 

legitimacy and governance through a Western model. 

Simply replicating U.S. structures and procedures has 

had limited success in Iraq and Afghanistan. Persistent 

engagement allows a language trained and regionally 

focused CA operator to fully understand the nuances 

of civil society and governance in foreign countries. 

Planning assumptions, often made by an over-reliance 

on social studies research, are not a substitute for having a qualified observer on the ground. While diplomats do serve in these regions, CA can bridge the gap 

between diplomatic and military lines of operations 

by viewing developments on the ground through 

a UW/ C-UW lens. CA Teams usually have greater 

freedom of movement and can also provide ground 

truth by their interactions with host nation military 

and government officials at lower levels. 

While CA already conducts most of the activities 

necessary for C-UW, however, there is currently no 

specific C-UW doctrine. In order to operationalize 

and focus CA efforts, C-UW doctrine for CA is essential. FID and CME are broad activities that support a 

variety of strategies. CA elements are currently active 

in many countries. While all of these engagement activities are valuable, Civil Affairs Operations (CAO) 

in C-UW must be targeted and focused against spe-
70

cific adversary UW campaigns. Unless CAO is part 

of a comprehensive C-UW strategy, these efforts will 

remain scattered and it will be difficult to generate 

strategic effects against an adversary’s UW campaign. 

Facilitating the process of developing CA C-UW doctrine, new UW Joint Doctrine was released in September 2015 that clears up many of the ambiguities that 

led to a misperception of UW and adds a more complete description of CAO in UW.

Alongside CA C-UW doctrine, the pathway to the 

effective use of CA in C-UW is through the development of a Phase Zero “operational art“ for CA. The 

concept of a separate Phase Zero operational art has 

been gaining traction and is best illustrated in Colonel 

Brian Petit’s book “Going Big by Getting Small: The 

Application of Operational Art by Special Operations 

in Phase Zero“.25 The key question is how to achieve 

strategic effects through engagement.

Efforts must be synchronized and Phase Zero campaigns must be developed but current operational 

art is focused on landpower and maneuver warfare. 

There is a growing recognition that engagement activities in Phase Zero have unique requirements which 

will drive the development of a tailored operational 

art. One of the unique aspects, is that Phase Zero campaigns contain logic that is paradoxical to generally 

applied principles of the use of military force. Colonel Petit illustrates it as “The Five Paradoxes of Phase 

Zero.“ They are: 

• Less is better than more,

• Steady and slow is (often) preferred over intrusive and fast,

• A supporting role is better than a lead one,

• The wrong man can do more harm than the 

right man can do good,
71

• Conceding military control and precision can 

create better long term outcomes.26

The Five Paradoxes of Phase Zero can serve as a 

guide in tailoring both CA operational art and capabilities to the “New Normal.“27

Specific challenges to campaign development in 

Phase Zero include the requirement to blend political 

and military effects and the difficulty in operationalizing “indirect“ methods of military power. Central to 

Colonel Petit’s thesis is that operational art in Phase 

Zero “combines supply chain management principles 

with network logic; its hybrid is an arranging chain 

that makes operational artistry possible over vast time, 

distance, cultural and programmatic spans. “28 What 

this means is, that the idea of a single commander-like 

operational artist synchronizing events is not possible 

in Phase Zero. Different actors, or nodes, will dominate 

in different cycles.29 For this reason alone, developing 

coordinated campaign plans is exceptionally difficult. 

CA will need to develop its own portion of Phase Zero 

operational art to achieve strategic objectives through 

persistent engagement. By using the existing doctrinal framework for UW and FID, executing CME, and 

incorporating CA into early stages of Phase Zero campaign design, we have the initial framework to focus 

CA capabilities against an adversary UW campaign.

A key step in operationalizing CA in Phase Zero 

is to clarify the identity or “brand name“ of CA. As 

Colonel (ret.) Dennis Cahill notes in his 2015 CA Issue 

Paper, the current definition of CA is flawed. CA is defined as “designated Active and Reserve Component 

forces and units organized, trained, and equipped 

specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to 

support civil-military operations.“ In other words, 

Civil Affairs is essentially defined as forces that con-
72

duct Civil Affairs Operations. Colonel (ret.) Cahill 

proposes definition changes that will clarify the definition of Civil Affairs from both historical and grammatical points of view.30 A separate but closely related 

issue is the “identity“ or “brand name“ of the CA 

Regiment, which is similar to, but not synonymous 

with its definition. It is the lack of a coherent identity 

that makes the role of CA nebulous to joint force commanders and policy makers and becomes an obstacle 

in operationalizing CA. For many in the military, CA 

is associated entirely with Humanitarian Assistance 

and CERP project management. In C-UW, CA must 

be viewed an integral military operational capability 

rather than an ambiguous supporting entity if it is to 

be used effectively.

While CA core tasks describe the types of operations that CA conducts, they do not describe the identity of CA. However, the term “Irregular Warfare“ 

(IW) does. Irregular warfare is defined as “a violent 

struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).“ 

This broad form of conflict has insurgency, COIN, and 

UW as the principal activities. Irregular forces are normally active in these conflicts; however, conventional 

forces may also be heavily involved, particularly in 

counterinsurgencies.31

The ARSOF UW manual further notes that, “IW 

is about people, not platforms. IW does not depend 

on military prowess alone. It also relies on the understanding of such social dynamics as tribal politics, 

social networks, religious influences, and cultural 

mores. Although IW is a violent struggle, not all participating irregulars or irregular forces are necessarily armed. People, more so than weaponry, platforms, 

and advanced technology, will be the key to success in 
73

IW. Successful IW relies on building relationships and 

partnerships at the local level. It takes patient, persistent, and culturally savvy people within the joint force 

to execute IW.“32 This more accurately describes what 

CA does across a broad spectrum of conflict. Describing the identity CA in terms of irregular warfare provides more clarity to the non-CA commander. 

A proposed identity for CA forces could be — 

United States Army forces organized, trained, and 

equipped to conduct population centric irregular warfare with an emphasis on FID, UW, COIN, and Stability capabilities.

Clarity of identity will also allow greater specialization between CA components. CA forces include 

Active and Reserve Component forces from both the 

Army and Marine Corps. Post-2006 attempts to “specialize“ CA in the Army have focused on the very 

general terms of “SOF“ and “conventional“. As U.S. 

ability to wage hybrid warfare relies on an interdependence of SOF and conventional forces, this distinction is rapidly becoming obsolete for CA. A better 

framework would be to have CA components specialize in certain aspects of irregular warfare, yet still 

remain capable of executing all core tasks. Orienting 

CA forces towards particular mission sets such as FID, 

UW, or Stability, while requiring a single standard for 

qualification will result in better unity of effort within 

the regiment. There was a little more specialization in 

terms of missions pre-2006, through the construct of 

General Support, FID/UW, and General Purpose battalions. What was lacking back then was commonality 

and consistency of training.

As the concept of hybrid warfare also includes a 

significant role for high intensity warfare, there is currently a serious discussion within the Army on how to 
74

retain irregular warfare capabilities within the force. 

As maneuver forces re-focus on high intensity warfare skills that may have atrophied through years of 

practicing COIN, identifying CA firmly as the Army’s 

irregular warfare experts, together with the concept of 

CMO institutionalized within the maneuver force, can 

provide a reservoir of irregular warfare knowledge 

that can be used to reconstitute a larger scale COIN 

capability if needed.

For CA to conduct C-UW requires a fusion with intelligence capabilities and Military Information Support Operations (MISO) Target Audience Analysis 

(TAA) – first to identify the adversary actions taken 

in support of their UW campaign and then to develop 

targeting for employing CA forces. This union will require changes in how to view intelligence. The current 

model of intelligence is focused on conventional enemy forces and targeting for Surgical Strike. C-UW requires a broader form of “sociocultural intelligence.“ 

The intelligence process must be able to detect enemy 

operators conducting the type of population-centric 

hybrid warfare that involves governance. This method involves detecting efforts to exploit civil vulnerabilities or degrade civil strengths as well as a deep 

understanding of the human domain. The corresponding “awareness gap“ plagues current target-focused 

intelligence systems and processes. Civil Information 

Management (CIM), a core task of CA, provides this 

needed deeper level of understanding, however, CIM 

can be stove piped within CA resulting in an incomplete understanding of the situation, as well as duplication of effort between various analytical structures.

Addressing this gap will likely require broadening the CA career field to include an intelligence/CIM 

focused specialty, similar to that of the Special Forces 
75

intelligence sergeant. This act will require an experienced CA operator who receives advanced training 

in both CIM and intelligence, to include both analysis 

and collection. This intel/CIM 38 series position would 

serve as the link between traditional intelligence processes and CIM. Working both at the tactical level on 

a CMSE and at planning levels with a task force or 

embassy, these specialists can help focus the efforts of 

CA in C-UW and facilitate CA targeting. Along with 

this, cross training in MISO TAA is critical to aligning 

influence activities.

With only one Active brigade of CA available to 

conduct the bulk of Phase Zero C-UW, a commitment 

to C-UW will require examining the active component/reserve component (AC/RC) mix in CA. Current CA force structure is based on the idea of CA as 

a force for Stability or large scale COIN. The growth 

of the CA force over the past decade was driven by 

the need for more CA forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and current drawdowns have been based on end of 

COIN operations in Iraq and the scaling back of the 

Afghanistan mission. While budgetary constraints are 

very real, actual requirements must be re-evaluated in 

terms of Phase Zero and C-UW. However, even if a 

decision were made to increase active duty CA forces, 

recent experience has shown that this is a challenging 

process and may not even be feasible in the near term. 

The interim solution will, by necessity, involve a reliance on the Reserve Component. 

While COIN and Stability are part of the operational core of C-UW, the real issue is the capability of 

Reserve CA to conduct Phase Zero C-UW, specifically 

UW and FID. Currently, there are significant shortfalls in the Reserve Component training pipeline that 

could create risk to the C-UW mission. To paraphrase 

Colonel Petit’s Paradoxes of Phase Zero, “the wrong 
76

person can do more harm than the right person can 

do good.“33 This reality is an argument for, at the very 

minimum, requiring selection and assessment for the 

Reserve Component. A model for integrating Reserve 

Component CA into the C-UW mission can be found 

in National Guard Special Forces where all SF personnel attend the same selection and qualification process 

as their Active Component counterparts. When NG 

SF transitioned from a correspondence course based 

curriculum to the full active-duty pipeline, there were 

concerns that this would impact civilian careers and 

make recruiting difficult. Paradoxically, making entry into NG SF more difficult may have resulted in a 

greater number of volunteers. 

The Reserve Component can also provide some 

unique solutions to ongoing problems within the total 

CA force. While the Reserves are often thought of in 

terms of civilian skills, one area that is even more important for Phase Zero engagement is language proficiency and cultural knowledge. These are critical to 

developing networks and is an area that the military 

and SOF in particular has struggled with for years. 

Maintaining a force with a minimum level of language 

qualification, such as a 1/1 score on the Defense Language Proficiency Test is challenging, and a 1/1 score 

does not provide the level of proficiency needed for 

true engagement without the use of interpreters. 

Reserve Component units often have access to 

U.S. civilian population centers with large immigrant 

communities and native speakers in high-demand 

languages and cultures. Often, members of these communities have a strong desire to serve, but many do 

not desire full time service. The Reserve Component 

provides them an opportunity to serve and Army Reserve and National Guard college tuition programs 

also provide an additional incentive for enlisting. 
77

While immigrants and first-generation Americans 

who are native speakers in target languages already 

serve in the Reserve Components, there is no Armywide program to recruit them into CA, PSYOP or NG 

SF units. The Active Component has the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program, which allows non-citizens legally present in the 

U.S. to join the military and provides a streamlined 

process for citizenship. This program has been used 

to recruit for critical skills, such as high demand languages. A MAVNI-style program, one that includes 

native speakers who are already U.S. citizens, and 

provides incentives for joining the Reserves, could 

help mitigate the language and cultural knowledge 

gaps. 

The difficulties in operationalizing CA in C-UW, 

while complex, are far from insurmountable. U.S. CT 

strategy has had incredible success from an organizational standpoint, with unprecedented integration 

between DoD and civilian agencies and a nearly seamless integration between intelligence and operations. 

The difficulty is that CT as a strategy is too narrow to 

achieve strategic endstates. Without prioritizing governance and ideology, U.S. ability to counter hybrid 

threats is limited. Following the model of CT organizations, the development of a national level influence 

and governance capability incorporating CA, with 

the ability to operate under Title 50 authorities, will 

increase the ability to conduct C-UW operations in 

denied areas. A significant step to increase the effectiveness of C-UW would be the development of a Joint 

Special Warfare Command as proposed by Colonel 

(ret.) Maxwell.34 This capability would complement 

existing Surgical Strike units, integrate C-UW capabilities at the national level, and provide a wider range of 

options for civilian policymakers. 
78

The greatest barrier to operating in the political 

warfare domain appears to be, interestingly enough, 

neither in doctrine nor capabilities, but rather how 

to conceptualize it. According to Frank Hoffman, a 

professor at the National Defense University. “The 

critique was, and still is, that America’s view of war 

is overly simplified,“ he said. “We think of things in 

black-and-white terms.35 An examination of current 

U.S. Military doctrine supports UW and C-UW campaigns as well as CA’s role in both of these areas. Section 1097 of the 2016 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) opens the door to the development of a 

C-UW strategy, along with the doctrine and capabilities to support it. 

The real challenge in executing the new National 

Military Strategy is cultural, both within the nation and 

the military. Any new conceptual thinking requires 

cognitive changes, as well as structural. By far the 

most significant challenge will be in the conceptualization of warfighting in Phase Zero. The military is 

culturally conditioned to view kinetic operations as 

decisive and non-kinetic operations as shaping. However, in Phase Zero, denying an adversary the ability 

to develop a UW campaign through addressing civil 

vulnerabilities is a decisive operation that supports 

the National Military Strategy, while a surgical strike to 

remove an adversary’s UW operators may only serve 

as the shaping operation, buying time for the decisive 

operation to succeed. 

CA is the ideal force to take the lead in a Phase 

Zero C-UW campaign as the basic capabilities needed 

to execute a C-UW strategy already exist within the 

CA force and within CA and Joint doctrine. However, operationalizing CA in C-UW will require the 

development of CA specific C-UW doctrine, better 

integration with intelligence and MISO capabili-
79

ties, and clarifying the identity of the Civil Affairs 

Regiment. 

Recommendations

Recommendations from this effort are therefore:

1. Develop CA specific C-UW doctrine to support 

the requirements of section 1097 of the 2016 

NDAA. Develop CA Phase Zero Operational 

Art to ensure that CA tactical actions in C-UW 

achieve strategic effects. 

2. Develop influence and governance capabilities to support C-UW under title 50 authorities, 

ideally as part of a Joint Special Warfare Command.

3. Align and integrate CIM, MISO Target Audience Analysis, and Intelligence capabilities. Develop a holistic concept of “sociocultural intelligence“ to provide situational understanding 

in Phase Zero. Consider adding to the 38 series 

career field with an 18F type CIM/Intel MOS. 

Crosstrain CA CIM personnel in MISO Target 

Audience Analysis.

4. Re-evaluate the current Active Component/Reserve Component balance of CA forces against 

the requirements of a comprehensive C-UW 

strategy. Address the Reserve Component gaps 

in selection and training using an established 

National Guard Special Forces model. Leverage Reserve Component opportunities to recruit native speakers in target languages and 

cultures.

5. Define the identity, or ‘brand name,’ of CA in 

terms of Irregular Warfare in order to provide 

clarity to Joint Force commanders and operationalize CA capabilities for C-UW.
80

MAJ Shafi Saiduddin is currently serving as the Group 

Civil Military Operations officer at 19th Special Forces 

Group (Airborne). He previously deployed as a Civil Affairs 

Team Leader with the Combined, Joint Special Operations 

Task Force - Afghanistan, as a Current Operations Officer 

/ Future Operations Planner with the Special Operations 

Command and Control Element - Horn of Africa, and most 

recently as a Country Engagement Team member with the 

Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula.

Endnotes

1. Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the 

United States of America, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015. 6.

2. United States Army Special Operations Command, SOF 

Support to Political Warfare White Paper, 2015. 1.

3. Ibid. 3.

4. Ibid. 1.

5. Ibid. 19.

6. Octavian Manea, “Hybrid Warfare as a War of Governance,“ Small Wars Journal, August 19, 2015. 6.

7. Ibid. 1.

8. Colonel (ret.) David Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand 

Unconventional Warfare,“ Small Wars Journal, October 23, 2014.1.

9. Department of Defense, Unconventional Warfare, JP 3-05.1, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015. I-2.

10. Maxwell. “Do We Really Understand Unconventional 

Warfare.“ 4.
81

11. Steve Lewis, “An Unconventional Role for Civil Affairs,“ 

Special Warfare, July-September 2013. 17.

12. Department of Defense, Unconventional Warfare, JP 3-05.1, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015. III-20

13. Maxwell. “Do We Really Understand Unconventional 

Warfare.“ 2.

14. Department of Defense, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare, FM 3-05.130, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008. 2-14.

15. Colonel (ret.) David Maxwell, “Unconventional Warfare 

Does Not Belong to Special Forces,“ War on the Rocks, August 12, 

2013. 1.

16. Department of Defense, Unconventional Warfare, JP 

3-05.1, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015. I-19.

17. Department of Defense, Counterterrorism, JP 3-26, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 2014. iii.

18. United States Army Special Operations Command, Counter-Unconventional Warfare White Paper, 2014. 22.

19. Colonel (ret) David Maxwell, “Obama signs Defense 

Bill,“ Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners, entry posted November 25, 2015, http://maxoki161.

blogspot.com/

20. Department of Defense, Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-22, 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010. ix.

21. Ibid. II-4.

22. Colonel (ret) David Maxwell, “Do We Really Understand 

Unconventional Warfare.“2.

23. Department of the Army, Civil Military Engagement, Army 

Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-57.80, U.S. Government Printing 

Office 2013. 2-4.

24. Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Frederick Little, Interview by author, September 8, 2015.
82

25. Colonel Brian Petit, Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase 0, (Outskirts 

Press Inc. 2013). Kindle e-book.

26. Petit, Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase 0, (Outskirts Press 

Inc. 2013). Kindle e-book.

27. Vera Zakem, Emily Mushen, “Charting the Course of Civil 

Affairs in the New Normal,“ CNA Analysis and Solutions, July 

2015. 3.

28. Ibid. Chapter 6.

29. Ibid. Chapter 6.

30. Colonel (ret.) Dennis Cahill, “Redefining Civil Affairs,“ 

2014-2015 Future of Civil Affairs Issue Papers, U.S. Army War College Press. 2015. 56.

31. Department of Defense, Irregular Warfare Joint Operating 

Concept, U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007. 6.

32. Department of Defense, Army Special Operations Forces 

Unconventional Warfare, FM 3-05.130, U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 2008. 1-20.

33. Petit, Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase 0, (Outskirts Press Inc. 

2013). Kindle e-book.

34. Colonel (ret) David Maxwell, “It’s Time to Upgrade the 

Defense Department,“ Informal Institute for National Security 

Thinkers and Practitioners, entry posted November 10, 2015, 

http://maxoki161.blogspot.com/

35. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “The ‘new’ type of war that finally 

has the Pentagon’s attention,“ The Washington Post, July 3, 2015.
83

Civil Affairs Forces, U.S. Army Reserve, National 

Guard, and the State Partnership Program: 

Is there Room for Engagement? 

Major David E. Leiva and Major John Nonnemaker

When the 32nd Military Engagement Team supported the Mississippi National Guard (MSNG) and 

the Office of Military Cooperation in Uzbekistan with 

the timely delivery of several Mine Resistant AmbushProtected (MRAP) vehicles as part of a Foreign Military Sales case in December 2014, leaders considered it 

a major military and diplomatic victory. The altering 

geo-political landscape in the Central and South Asia 

region of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) 

Area of Responsibility (AOR) had quickly made the 

partnership between the MSNG and the Republic of 

Uzbekistan one of the most important in the State Partnership Program (SPP). The delivery’s timeframe had 

also coincided with the arrival of the new U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Pamela Spratlen, who officially 

took over December 18.1 And, then there was the involvement of the military engagement team (MET) 

made up of the Wisconsin Army National Guard – a 

rather new Army concept that brings Army National 

Guard2 (ARNG) brigade-level headquarters into theater to engage with U.S. and foreign military leaders 

in the region, foreign royalty and even members of 

Congress travelling through the region on state visits. 

The development of the MET to handle military-tomilitary activities was proving its value along with 

the SPP, a venerable 22-year-old exchange that was 

born from the collapse of the Soviet Union.
84

Interestingly, this entire episode did not raise an 

eyebrow anywhere at U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) in what may have traditionally been considered a Civil Affairs (CA) mission. In fact, nowhere in 

the equation was there room for a CA team, nor was 

it required or requested. More to the point, there are 

70 such partnerships across the globe where small 

strategic movements and engagements happen daily, 

which begs the ultimate question: Why aren’t the U.S. 

Army Reserve (USAR) and its CA force – with all of 

its capabilities and regional approach – part of the Defense Department’s SPP conversation?

A Primer on the State Partnership Program

When the Soviet Union dissolved from 1989-1991, 

American officials explored options to minimize instability and encourage democratic governments in 

the former Soviet bloc. The Latvian government first 

requested assistance in developing a military that resembled the ARNG model of citizen-soldiers. General 

Colin Powell and General John Shalikashvili, then-the 

U.S. European Command commanding general, embraced the idea as a means of developing partnerships 

with non-NATO countries. This effort led to the establishment of the Joint Contact Team Program in 1992. 

Later that year, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the leader of the Joint Contact Team visited 

the Balkans. Less than six months later, these leaders 

directed that the first SPP partnerships be formed.3

The SPP became a program of record of the Defense Department’s joint security cooperation program, managed by the National Guard Bureau, and 

executed by the state National Guard in support of 

the Geographic Combatant Commanders’ (GCCs) se-
85

curity cooperation objectives. The SPP matches a State 

or Territory’s National Guard (Army and Air) with a 

partner nation to exchange military skills, experience, 

and defense knowledge to enhance partner capabilities. Generally, it is viewed as high impact, low-cost 

with small footprint in partner counties that focus on 

12 specific areas:

(1) Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Response 

and Mitigation,

(2) CBRNE Response and Consequence Management,

(3) Border/Port Security and Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement,

(4) Installation and Critical Infrastructure Protection,

(5) Search and Rescue,

(6) Support to Public Health,

(7) Counterdrug/Counternarcotic,

(8) Officer/NCO development,

(9) Public Affairs,

(10) Employer Support/Family Support for National Guard Forces,

(11) Cyber Defense,

(12) Civil-Military Aviation Integration.4

Shaping the Theater

Three years ago, the Louisiana National Guard coordinated a handover of its SPP with Uzbekistan to its 

Mississippi neighbors. Hindsight has proven that the 

move has been a stroke of luck and genius. With all of 

the talk about the “pivot to Asia,“ the incipient rise of 

Russia on the global stage with the invasion of Crimea 

caught most by surprise. As a result, the MSNG be-
86

came centerpiece of a renewed interest in the region 

with a potential revival of the Cold War and able to 

capitalize on its internal resources. The southern state 

is able to use its very own Camp Shelby Joint Forces 

Training Center, which has 135,000 acres for training 

exercises and 100 square miles of restricted airspace 

for unmanned aerial systems training – all-important 

facets with the budding relationship on several fronts.

First, the Uzbekistan military purchased 300 

MRAPs as part of the Excess Defense Articles, and 

RQ11 Raven systems through Foreign Military Financing (FMF), a source of financing provided to a partner 

nation on a grant (non-repayable) or direct loan basis. Second, theater security cooperation (TSC) events 

concentrated on Officer Professional Development, 

and that allowed the MSNG to use its Regional Training Institute and accompanying instructors. Lastly, 

when appropriate, the MSNG could tap into Special 

Operations because Special Forces units reside within 

the state. For Ambassador Spratlen, who served previously as the U.S. Ambassador to its neighbor, Kyrgyz 

Republic, the MRAPs were an integral part of the partnership with the United States. In an interview with 

local Uzbekistan media, she said, “the 300 MRAPs 

were important to build on the cooperation that has 

been established.“5

USARCENT, the Army Service Component Command to USCENTCOM, reported it needed to integrate 

all of the different resources available into a coherent 

plan in order to meet its objectives. The USARCENT 

AOR consists of 20 nations in the Levant, Central and 

South Asia and Arabian Peninsula. Uzbekistan is one 

of those nations. Currently, USARCENT is resourced, 

postured, and prepared to improve regional security 

and stability. Its unique combination of land power 
87

and Army support structure prevents confrontations 

from becoming conflicts, shapes its AOR through 

engagements with partners and sets the conditions 

to win, if necessary. In the years ahead resides a real 

chance for the United States, together with its partners 

and allies, to achieve diplomatic and military successes, thereby accelerate diplomatic and military successes, and thereby accelerate much-needed positive 

momentum in the USARCENT AOR.6

As noted in both the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and the 2011 National Military Strategy of 

the United States of America, security cooperation and 

building partner capacity are identified as priorities 

in multiple regions, including the Middle East, Africa, 

and Asia. In addition, both documents emphasized 

the need to strengthen and expand the United States’ 

network of international partnerships to enhance security, and the National Military Strategy instructs the 

GCCs, among others, to collaborate with other agencies to pursue TSC. As such, the SPP acts as a force 

enabler for the GCCs, and SPP activities are part of the 

GCCs’ TSC plans. SPP activities are to be approved by 

the GCCs, as well as the U.S. ambassador in their respective partner nations, before they can be executed.7

Challenges and Opportunities

A 2012 U.S. Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) report noted the SPP had many benefits, according to SPP coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, 

and officials from all six Geographic Combatant Commands, as listed in the table below.8
88

However, the same report noted that stakeholders 

hindered the program by a lack of clear goals, objectives and measure. The government watchdog concluded that:

• The State Partnership Program does not have 

agreed-upon goals or metrics to assess progress,

• Complete information about activities and 

funding is unavailable,

• Data on State Partnership Program activities 

are incomplete and inconsistent,

• State Partnership Program funding information is incomplete,

• DOD lacks guidance on current State Partnership Program data management,

• Challenges in funding activities and incorporating U.S. and foreign partner civilians require 

additional guidance and training,

Table 1: Key Benefits of the State Partnership Program, as Cited by State Partnership Program 

Coordinators, Bilateral Affairs Officers, and Officials from Geographic Combatant Commands

SPP Coordinators Bilateral Affairs Officers Officials from combatant 

commands

Provides experience and training 

for guardsmen

Events are tied to combant 

command or country team 

mission

Events support combatant 

command mission and 

objectives

Develops relationship with 

partner country

Good communication and 

coordination between 

stakeholders

National Guard units possess 

unique skills that are useful for 

supporting combatant 

command objectives

Encourages partner countries to 

co-deloy to Afghanistan

Provides information sharing 

and support partner country

Encourages partner nation 

deployment to Iraq or 

Afghanistan

Improves retention or provides 

other incentives for guardsmen

Builds relationship with partner 

country

Guardsmen benefit from partner 

country's experiences

Encourages partner countries to 

co-deloy to Iraq or Afghanistan
89

• Stakeholders expressed concerns about funding 

of activities and civilian involvement identifying a country for a partnership can be difficult. 

As far back as 1992, the Chief of the National Guard 

Bureau identified possible areas of cooperation in military-to-military exchanges that included Civil Affairs 

and National Guard/Reserve affairs along with a list 

of specific capabilities that the National Guard could 

provide such as teams for cooperative humanitarian 

or civic assistance projects. Since then, there has been 

no mention of it. The reason is simple: Civil Affairs 

operators do not exist in the National Guard. 9

Colonel David O. Smith is the Director of the Joint 

Staff of the MSNG. He has worked with SPP partnerships with Bolivia (1999) and Uzbekistan (2012) for 

years. In his annual SPP review, Civil Affairs is a capability he does not bother to bring up as a potential for 

an exchange simply because there are no CA units in 

the state’s inventory. If one of the two nations requests 

CA training, it becomes a COCOM tasker to figure out, 

he says. 10 (The 350th Civil Affairs Command has a unit 

aligned with Bolivia.) “Right there, to begin with, you 

have an issue. Right there is a rub because there are no 

CA units, it is underrepresented, and then there are 

tribal boundaries with the Army Reserve and Army 

National Guard,“ Colonel Smith observed in a conversation with the authors.11

Colonel Anthony Couture, the Senior National 

Guard Advisor at USARCENT whose staff is a direct 

liaison to the various National Guard commands, offers building habitual and enduring relationships 

with key personnel is paramount to any successful 

partnership. The organizations personnel perform activities and engagements that cannot be replicated in 
90

a training environment, he says. According to Colonel 

Couture, the countries’ personnel develop skills required to manage incidents, be more productive and 

efficient, as well as increase knowledge on TTPs that 

have worked in other areas of the world.12 To his point, 

the National Guard personnel do not move out of the 

state with each promotion so they are very likely to 

keep those relationships.

Colonel Couture told the authors he can envision 

the Army Reserve’s CA structure being an enabler 

to the SPP. “As the Defense Department reviews the 

program and develops the (Department of Defense 

Instruction), I see more engagement from all the Services and Components to include the USAR organizations. The CA is a natural fit into the partnerships 

focus areas,“ he said. “The core SPP focus areas align 

closely with CA tasks: Civil Information Management, 

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Assistance, 

Population and Resource Control, and Support to Civil Administration.“13

Getting into the Process

Restrictive, rebuilding, or non-permissive countries are not conducive to security cooperation efforts. 

Conversely, fully developed countries will not benefit 

from a SPP partnership. Once the staffing has been 

completed by a state, a method can be chosen on how 

to best achieve the proposing state’s end state. There 

are three solid methods (outside of the traditional application process) for gaining partnership traction utilizing TSC activities; exercises, overseas deployment 

for training, assisting with Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS) contract support, and support to traditional 

TSC events. Each of these activities by definition is a 
91

TSC tool of the GCC. Building enduring relationships 

within a GCC, service component command, and supported country should be the goal while planning for 

these events.14

Volunteering to support or host a GCC or service 

component command exercise can initiate a relationship with a host or partner country. Unilateral exercises are preferred if the supporting state wishes to form 

a relationship with a single country. Certain countries 

refuse to host exercises within their borders, yet request specific training from the GCC. Many states 

have the resources available within the state to adequately host this type of event. The event will include 

multiple in-process reviews and occasional train-up 

exercises with senior officials from the country, which 

can provide a forum to further build the relationship. 

The state participating in such events can also build 

interpersonal relationships at the GCC and service 

component command, which can be leveraged for future exercises. If the exercise becomes an annual or biannual exercise, this can begin the process of building 

a habitual partnership.15

When a country is acquiring new equipment 

through FMS, opportunities for the National Guard 

and others to assist in fulfilling the contract may occur. 

Areas of opportunity can include logistics support for 

delivery, training, and maintenance of the new equipment. This support can be appropriated through the 

terms of the contract.

Countries may occasionally request the GCC or 

service component commands for advice on training, 

personnel, or subject matter expertise (on a number of 

military related topics). Active Component organizations designated by the GCC, service component command or a State Partner, if one has already been ap-
92

pointed, may take the lead for providing this training 

and advice. These events usually get awareness from 

senior Ministry of Defense officials and occasionally 

governmental officials. Volunteering on an as needed 

basis can assist in forming key relationships.16

Prior to 2012, an agreement between the Chief of 

the National Guard Bureau and the GCC established 

SPP partnerships. DoD Instruction 5111.20 in December 2012, changed that responsibility to the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff. Today, OSD approval is required along with Secretary of 

State concurrence. In 2014, Undersecretary of Defense 

(Policy) became established as the final approval authority for new partnership with the SPP Comprehensive Global Plan, directed by OSD Policy, to establish 

Defense Department-wide priorities for pursuing new 

partnerships to manage what countries “ask“ to join 

the program and to address the resources required for 

potential program expansion.17

This plan, which remains under development, will 

be staffed across the GCCs, Joint Staff, OSD, and the 

Services, to give all stakeholders an opportunity to 

provide inputs on the plan.
93

The left side of the graphic depicts the process for 

requesting a partnership. 18 New SPP partnerships 

must be officially requested in writing by a foreign 

country. Once the U.S. Ambassador or Chief of Mission and the GCC agree and endorse the formation 

of a new partnership, the request is forwarded to the 

Chief, National Guard Bureau where his staff conducts selection analysis and makes a recommendation 

on the best-fit State for the partnership. 

The NGB analysis is an in-depth assessment of the 

partnership based on prioritized criteria for assessing 

State nominations. Nomination criteria are established 

in coordination with the GCC desk officer and the 

Office of Defense Cooperation, as well as Joint Staff, 

OSD, and State Department Desk Officers. Selection 

criteria focus on such aspects as force structure, U.S. 

objectives within the foreign country, key focus areas that align with National Guard capabilities, and 

the interest and capacity of a State’s National Guard 

to effectively manage a new partnership. The Chief 
94

reviews the staff recommendation and makes a final 

decision as to which State to recommend to the GCC. 

Once the Chief, NGB and the GCC agree on a 

recommended State, the recommendation is staffed 

to the Joint Staff and OSD to complete the approval 

process. This process is depicted on the right side of 

the graphic. The GCC formally endorses the partner 

selection and coordinates with the U.S. Embassy for 

the Ambassador’s endorsement. The Ambassador or 

Chief of Mission then coordinates the recommended 

State with the requesting Nation who accepts the State 

partner. Once these approvals are formally documented, partnership activities begin. In the forthcoming 

update to DoDI 5111.20, the roles and staffing process 

will be clearly outlined, and most likely the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy will be delegated as 

the approval authority for SPP partnerships and for 

coordinating State Department Concurrence.19

The Services really have two touch points where 

they can provide inputs on what countries join the 

State Partnership Program and SPP activities. First, at 

the GCC level, the Service Components have a leading 

role in security cooperation activities and can provide 

direct inputs to the GCCs. Second, the Services will 

have the opportunity to comment on the SPP Comprehensive Global Plan, which will outline DoD-wide 

priorities for the program and potential new partner 

countries.

Regionally Aligned Forces

The Army’s recent strategic shift from a two-front, 

“fight and win“ Army to the Regionally Aligned Force 

(RAF) “shape and prevent“ strategy is problematic because the military industrial complex still focuses on 
95

a force-on-force threat, according to Lieutenant Colonel Jay Morse, a Judge Advocate General who penned 

an essay on the topic of RAF earlier this year in Small 

Wars Journal.

20 He notes RAF is not innovative; rather, 

it serves an approach that has been implemented in 

the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community, as 

well as NGB. A typical Civil Affairs Battalion’s area of 

operation can be as large as an entire continent, which 

equates to around 200 soldiers conducting meaningful 

face-to-face engagement. Currently under RAF, the 

only thing truly regionally aligned with any area is the 

unit’s guidon. The soldiers themselves will continue to 

rotate throughout the entire force. Morse proposes an 

individual soldier to have a regionally aligned “home 

base“ after short, professional development tours outside his or her alignment.

Another key concept that Morse brings up is to 

focus engagements on the regional influencers and 

as well as the quality of the engagements, not the 

quantity. By building stable institutions, these same 

institutions can help stabilize the region. This concept 

was utilized in the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) AOR with Colombia, which is now producing 

measures of effectiveness to support that this concept 

can work. Morse also recommends that RAF cannot 

simply be the method of deployment rather these deployments should have one question in mind: Why? 

By having small numbers of American trainers living 

and working with our partner nations for, even, short 

periods, troops can deploy with Regionally “Engaged“ 

Forces who bring maturity, experience, education, energy, visibility, viability, venerability, and value to the 

relationship.21

Senior Army leaders have repeatedly emphasized 

that RAF success depends on “person to person“ en-
96

gagements. In a 2014 joint statement to Congress on 

Army Posture, the Chief of Staff and Secretary of the 

Army wrote that the Armed Forces need to “build 

trust“ and “develop relationships:“ 

These forces shape and set theaters for regional commanders employing unique Total Army characteristics and capabilities to influence the security environment, build trust, 

develop relationships and gain access through rotational 

forces, multilateral exercises, military-to-military engagements, coalition training and other opportunities... The 

Army National Guard, through the State Partnership Program, maintains long-term partnerships worldwide.22

RAF should build on the SPP’s successes in relationship and capacity building with partner nations at 

an extremely low price. Additionally, a combination 

of RAF and SPP with a SOF element would grant the 

GCC with an endless source of National Guard and 

Reserve resources that can be leveraged to maximize 

its effectiveness collectively. More importantly, the 

National Guard is less likely to see turnover because 

promotions occur within the state. Meanwhile, the Active Component and USAR personnel will potentially 

move to other parts of the globe or country as part of 

their career progression.

It remains to be seen just how that combination 

will play out as resources dwindle, relevance becomes 

critical, and “tribal boundaries“ become sacred. In its 

recently released Fiscal Year 2016 SPP Program Management guidance, the National Guard Bureau has already made clear its vision for 2020 and beyond, aiming to be the GCC’s force of choice when conducting 

TSC engagements. 23 Absent in the document is any 

mention of the USAR.
97

The GCC should be able to leverage the long-term 

relationship that exists between a State and their Partner Country to achieve country objectives. Furthermore, the NG will leverage its interagency experience 

to support DoD’s whole-of-government approach to 

strengthen alliances and partnerships and provide 

a stabilizing presence in all regions. By leveraging 

NG core capabilities, DoD will also contribute to an 

enhanced climate for mutually beneficial civilian-tocivilian relationships.24

Future Areas of Study

This research paper attempted to consider the 

State Partnership Program’s inclusion of Civil Affairs 

forces. While ambition may have no bounds, by no 

means was this critical look an effort designed to be all 

inclusive. There are definitely areas that merit more 

nuanced research, analysis and discussion. Those areas for soldier-scholars include a more complete understanding of the Military Engagement Team, and 

whether it is the most appropriate means of employing a form of CMO. Should United States Army Civil 

Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) play a greater role than the one it is currently playing? 

No one has closed the door on Civil Affairs forces 

augmenting the SPP relationships. In fact, the opposite appears to be the case. But “tribal boundaries“ exist even as the era of dwindling resources persist and 

expectations to continue building partner capacity no 

longer affords any component, or program, to dismiss 

opportunities. Consider that with Regionally Aligned 

Forces, what considerations must be measured to link 

the SPP with the RAF in terms of Doctrine, Organiza-
98

tion, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P)?

Every state ARNG has a SPP relationship. Why not 

start with an informal meeting to see what regionallyaligned Civil Affairs units in the Army Reserve have 

in common with those states? Are they unknowingly 

working on the same projects? Better yet, is there room 

for engagement?

Major David E. Leiva is an Army National Guard Civil 

Affairs officer presently mobilized to U.S. Army Central – 

National Guard Affairs (FWD). A former civilian journalist, Major Leiva holds a master’s degree in economic development. Major Nonnemaker is a Civil Affairs plans officer 

currently assigned to U.S. Pacific Command – J91. He is a 

recent graduate of the Command and General Staff College, 

resident Intermediate Level Education.

Endnotes

1. National Guard Affairs 2014 Annual Historical Summary, 

United States Army Central Command, 20 May 2015.

2. The National Guard Bureau, consisting of the Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG), administers the SPP, but is executed by the State Adjutants General in 

support of Geographic Combatant Commander and US Chief of 

Mission security cooperation objectives and Department of Defense policy goals.

3. William Boehn, D. Nestell, & S. Stearns, The National Guard 

State Partnership Program: Forging and Maintaining Effective Security Cooperation Partnerships for the 21st Century, National Guard 

Bureau, 31 March 2014. 

4. Memorandum for U.S. Army Central Deputy Commanding General-Operations, SUBJECT: State Partnership Development Process, 15 January 2015.
99

5. Ms. Pamela Spratlen, U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan, interview with Voice of America Uzbek Service, 1 July 2015.

6. Lt. Gen. James Terry, Commanding General of U.S. Army 

Central Command, “Lucky 6 Sends,“ Desert Voice. 2014. 

7. State Partnership Program: Improved Oversight, Guidance, and Training Needed for National Guard’s Efforts with Foreign Partners, U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2012.

8. Ibid.

9. Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, “Military to 

Military Bilateral Cooperation,“ briefing given to National Guard 

Bureau Senior Leadership (internal slide presentation), 18 February 1992.

10. Col. David Smith, director of Joint Staff of Mississippi National Guard, telephone interview, 16 September 2015.

11. Ibid.

12. Col. Anthony Couture, Senior National Guard Advisor at 

U.S. Army Central, interview, 17 September 2015.

13. Ibid.

14. Memorandum for U.S. Army Central Deputy Commanding General-Operations, SUBJECT: State Partnership Development Process, 15 January 2015.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. DoD Instruction 5111.20, State Partnership Program, 14 

December 2012 (rescinded 3 OCT 2014).

18. National Guard Affairs, U.S. Army Central Command, 

“State Partnership Program 2015 Update,“ briefing given to U.S. 

Army Central Senior Leadership (internal slide presentation), 11 

September 2015.
100

19, Ibid.

20, Lt. Col. Jay Morse, “Regionally Aligned Forces: Less About 

What It Is, More About What It Can Be,“ (January 23, 2015), http://

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/regionally-aligned-forces-lessabout-what-it-is-more-about-what-it-can-be (accessed February 

18, 2015).

21. Ibid.

22. Mr. John McHugh & GEN Raymond Odierno, A Statement 

on the Posture of the United States Army, U.S. Senate and House of 

Representatives, 2nd Session, 113th Congress, April 2014.

23. Fiscal Year 2016 SPP Program Management Guidance, 

National Guard Bureau, 19 May 2015.

24. Ibid.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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