Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 1 of 24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Julianne L. Fox

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child

Relationship of:

D.K. (Minor Child),

And

M.S. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

September 6, 2018

Court of Appeals Cause No.

18A-JT-982

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, 

Judge

The Honorable Renee A. Ferguson, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No. 82D04-1709-

JT-1754

Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 2 of 24

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Respondent, M.S. (Mother), appeals the involuntary termination of 

her parental rights to her minor child, D.K. (the Child).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Mother raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as the 

following single issue: Whether the Indiana Department of Child Services 

(DCS) presented clear and convincing evidence to support the termination of 

her parental rights. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Mother and Father (M.K.)1, are the biological parents of the Child, born on 

February 8, 2011. At the time the Child was born, Mother and Father were 

married. Mother also has another younger child from another relationship, 

E.B., born on September 9, 2012.2

 Mother and the Child live in Evansville, 

 

1 Father’s parental rights were terminated at the same time as Mother’s; however, Father is not participating 

in this appeal, but facts pertaining to Father are included where appropriate.

2

 E.B. is not subject to this appeal and is currently under the legal guardianship of his paternal grandfather. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 3 of 24

Indiana. Father is an “over the road truck driver,” and resides in New Haven, 

Illinois. (Exh. Addendum p. 74). Whenever Father was in town, he would 

visit the Child. 

[5] The Child initially became involved with DCS of Vanderburg County in 2011 

when Mother and Father got into an argument. During the altercation, Mother 

and Father were in separate vehicles and Father rammed his vehicle into 

Mother’s car. The Child was a passenger in Father’s vehicle. Father was later 

charged with neglect of a dependent. 

[6] Based on the altercation and Father’s new offense, on May 18, 2011, DCS filed 

a child in need of services (CHINS) petition. At an initial hearing on June 21, 

2011, Mother and Father admitted to the allegations contained in the CHINS 

petition and the trial court adjudicated the Child to be a CHINS. However, the 

trial court ordered the Child to remain in Mother’s home, and Father to have 

supervised visits. Mother and Father were required to participate in services. 

On July 26, 2011, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing, where it 

maintained the CHINS status. On October 7, 2011, the trial court, however, 

determined “the situation that brought about the need for the intervention of 

[DCS] has been alleviated,” and the CHINS case was dismissed. (Exh. Vol. I, 

p. 7). 

[7] On March 27, 2015, DCS received a report that the Child was a victim of 

neglect after it was determined that the Child had been “re-exposed” to “lead 

poisoning.” (Exh. Addendum p. 28). Family Case Manager (FCM) Eniko 
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Krizsonveszky was assigned to the case. On April 7, 2015, FCM 

Krizsonveszky interviewed Mother and Father. During the interview, Mother 

conveyed to FCM Krizsonveszky that she was residing at 810 E. Virginia, 

Evansville, Indiana. After the interview, FCM Krizsonveszky created a Safety 

Plan for the family, and Mother was required to take the Child to Vanderburg 

County Health Department for monthly blood tests to monitor the Child’s lead 

poisoning. On April 23, 2015, FCM Krizsonveszky contacted Vanderburg 

Health Department regarding the Child’s “new blood test” and was informed 

that the Child’s lead level had gone “up to 29.6 which is very concerning.” 

(Exh. Addendum p. 29). 

[8] On June 12, 2015, Mother entered into an Informal Adjustment with DCS. 

The Informal Adjustment required Mother, among other things, to maintain 

contact with DCS, maintain suitable and stable housing for the Child, meet the 

Child’s medical and mental health needs, and to take the Child to Vanderburg 

County Health Department for monthly blood tests to monitor the Child’s lead 

poisoning. 

[9] On July 25, 2015, two witnesses reported to DCS that the Child had been struck 

by Father in the face while attending a derby race at the Vanderburg County 

Fairgrounds. FCM Leslie Keys (FCM Keys) was sent to investigate the 

incident. A detective from the Vanderburgh Police Department was also 

present. FCM Keys learned from witnesses that Father had used his back hand 

to hit the Child across the face, and overhead Father yell at the Child, “sit the 

fuck down.” (Exh. Addendum p. 73). The witnesses added that Father then 
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took the Child “to the top of the grandstand[,] and when they returned,” the 

Child “had a laceration on his face.” (Exh. Addendum p. 73). FCM Keys

asked the Child how he had gotten the bruises on his face, and the Child stated 

that he had fallen “down on the sidewalk.” (Exh. Addendum p. 73). FCM 

Keys noted that the Child had “bruising on the . . . left and right cheeks, lower 

back, hips, and bottom, as well as a laceration on the . . . left cheek.” 

(Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 3). After Father was questioned, he was arrested 

and later charged with battery. 

[10] Because Mother was not at the fairgrounds, DCS took the Child. In an attempt 

to locate Mother, FCM Keys called Mother’s phone but it was not in service. 

Mother had previously informed DCS that her address was “Econo Lodge on 

Hwy 41,” in Evansville. (Exh. Addendum p. 74). FCM Keys contacted the 

lodge, but she was informed that Mother and her then-boyfriend, Robert 

Luizzi, had been “banned” from that location. (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 3). 

Mother later contacted DCS and offered her new address. When another DCS 

caseworker visited Mother’s new address, “the building appeared vacant and no 

one was present.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 3).

[11] On July 28, 2015, DCS filed a second CHINS petition against Mother and 

Father. In particular, DCS claimed that Mother had failed to provide suitable 

or stable housing for the Child. Also, DCS alleged that the “[C]hild’s extensive 

bruising and the witnesses’ descriptions of . . . [F]ather’s actions leading up to

the bruising and laceration indicates that [the] [C]hild’s physical or mental 
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health is seriously endangered due to injury by the act or omission of the 

[C]hild’s parent.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 3).

[12] On September 22, 2015, the trial court held a disposition hearing. On October 

2, 2015, the trial court issued a disposition order directing Mother to participate 

in services designed to reunify her with the Child. The trial court then ordered 

Mother to participate in any programs recommended by DCS; maintain 

suitable and stable housing for the Child; and notify DCS in any change of 

address, employment or contact information. In addition, Mother was required 

to ensure that the Child’s lead levels are checked once a month, and to keep the 

Child’s doctor’s appointments. Mother complied with the court-ordered 

services, and on December 19, 2015, the Child was returned to her care for “a 

trial home visit.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 107).

[13] On February 18, 2016, the Child’s lead poisoning was recorded at “20.9.” 

(Exh. Addendum p. 146). In March 2016, Mother failed to take the Child to 

the health department for testing. In April 2016, the blood test revealed that the 

Child’s lead poisoning had been raised to “22.8.” (Exh. Addendum p. 146). 

[14] Regarding housing, in March of 2016, Mother and the Child moved into a 

home. DCS paid the first month’s rent and utility expenses. On April 27, 2016, 

court-appointed special advocate (CASA) Jade Wade was assigned to the case. 

In May 2016, Mother was evicted from the home due to non-payment of rent. 

Prior to Mother’s eviction, CASA Wade had visited Mother’s home on at least 

three occasions. During the visits, CASA Wade noted that Mother “was just 
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always on the run.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 84). Mother would “rush in the kitchen” to 

get a burger for the Child, and the next moment she and the Child would “rush 

out of the door.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 84). Following Mother’s eviction, Mother and 

the Child moved into the YWCA shelter. Mother and Child were later evicted 

from that shelter after spending more than fourteen days away. 

[15] When Mother was not being housed by a boyfriend, she would depend on her 

friends and her mother (Grandmother) for housing. During a certain scheduled 

visit where Mother had listed Grandmother’s address, CASA Wade was in the 

hallway searching for the correct apartment. CASA Wade heard someone 

yelling, and as she got closer, she heard Mother telling Grandmother, “[W]e 

won’t be here very long . . . [CASA Wade is] just gonna do a visit.” (Tr. Vol. 

II, p. 79). Based on Mother’s statement, CASA Wade concluded that Mother 

was not residing with Grandmother. During the visit, CASA Wade found 

Grandmother’s home “chaotic.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 79). In another scheduled 

visit, CASA Wade observed that Grandmother’s home was “still very 

cluttered,” there were “unfinished plates of food just laying around,” and in 

“every nook and cranny” there was something. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 79). 

[16] Since Grandmother’s home was not suitable, in May 2016, DCS referred 

Mother to Latita Simpson (Simpson), a case worker with the Ireland Home 

Based Services to address Mother’s housing and employment issues. Mother 

expressed to Simpson that she did not like living in a shelter, so Simpson 

identified a couple of apartments on the southside of Evansville, but Mother 

either rejected the “neighborhood” or stated that “she knew somebody” in the 
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apartment complex “that didn’t like her.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 40). DCS also 

connected Mother with Aurora, an organization that would work with Mother 

“for like six months and they would pay” 80% of Mother’s rent and utilities;

but Mother was required to work. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 77). Mother failed to comply 

with Aurora’s main stipulation of employment and it appears that Mother’s 

reluctance in obtaining a home was primarily because she was being housed by 

her then-boyfriend, Brandon LaForest (LaForest). 

[17] Mother’s employment history, like her residential history, displayed a lack of 

stability and focus on the Child’s needs. Mother is a mechanic, and she 

expressed to Simpson that she “did not want to give up her dream of being a 

mechanic . . . and give up making less than $11.00 an hour.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

50). Simpson encouraged Mother to apply for other non-mechanic jobs in the 

interim, but Mother failed to comply. 

[18] In August 2016, the Child was enrolled in kindergarten. The Child’s behavior 

at school was “impulsive and violent.” (Exh. Addendum p. 145). Shortly after 

his enrollment, the Child was kicked out of “[A]fter School Care for being 

physically aggressive toward other students and staff.” (Exh. Addendum p. 

145). On September 7, 2016, the Child was suspended from “school for kicking 

another student and hitting two other students during gym class.” (Exh. 

Addendum p. 14). The Child also punched another student “with his hands.” 

(Exh. Addendum p. 146). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 9 of 24

[19] The next day, on September 8, 2016, Child was admitted at the Harsha 

Behavioral Center in Evansville, Indiana, because: 

Today he was violent at school. [P]unched a female student. She was 

sent to the hospital because of her injuries. He has been biting, hitting, 

and head butting. He finds his behaviors funny. He wraps things 

around his throat daily. He hallucinates that he sees his dead step 

father (died 2/16/16).3 [Paternal] Grandmother died in [M]arch of 

this year. His behaviors have been going on for over a year but have 

been worse since the deaths in the family. He was physically abused 

by [Father] and he no longer has contact with him. 

(DCS Ex. 8, p. 11). While admitted at the center, the Child underwent a 

psychiatric evaluation and he was diagnosed with Disruptive Mood 

Dysregulation Disorder (DMDD), and unspecified Attention-Deficient 

Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD). On his third day at the center, the Child 

continued to exhibit “rude and defiant” behavior. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 

114). The Child lacked “discipline skills” and he had “multiple visits to the 

quiet room” since he kicked and bit the staff and his peers. (Appellant’s App. 

Vol. II, p. 114). By day five, the Child exhibited less aggression and he 

interacted well with others. 

 

3 This is E.B.’s father. 
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[20] On September 14, 2016, the Child was discharged from the Harsha Behavioral 

Center. DCS simultaneously filed a motion to modify the October 2015

dispositional order, arguing that Mother “is currently unable to provide 

appropriate care and supervision, because Mother does not have stable housing 

or employment and cannot protect [the Child] from harming others or himself.” 

(Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 11). As such, DCS requested that the Child be 

placed in foster care. The Child was later enrolled in another school, and he is 

in an “emotional disabilities class . . . due to his behavioral. . . and emotional 

disabilities.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 25). At his new school, the Child has an 

Individualized Educational Plan (IEP), and he is seen by two therapists for his 

behavioral issues. 

[21] On September 27, 2016, DCS filed a progress report referring Mother to attend 

weekly supervised visits with the Child through Ireland Home Based Services. 

Also, Mother was required to work with Ireland Home Based Services in 

establishing a stable and safe home for the Child.

[22] On September 29, 2016, DCS filed a report with the trial court recommending 

that Mother undergoes a psychological assessment after Mother reported that 

she suffers from anxiety. DCS also recommended Mother’s current boyfriend, 

LaForest, be ordered to participate in services offered by DCS because the 

Child “refers to [LaForest] as Dad.” (Exh. Addendum p. 152) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Mother was also required to obtain housing for 

herself and the Child. 
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[23] On November 1, 2016, the trial court conducted a periodic review hearing, and 

on January 5, 2017, the trial court once more ordered Mother to be consistent 

with DCS services, obtain housing, be gainfully employed, attend to the Child’s 

medical needs, and keep up with supervised visitations. Based on Mother’s 

continued disinterest in obtaining housing and a job, DCS “closed” the homebased services in March 2017 since “Mother would miss sessions . . . and was 

not open to living in . . . areas which limited her housing selection.” (Exh. 

Addendum p. 156). On March 16, 2017, DCS filed a report with the trial court,

again mentioning the need for Mother to undergo a psychological evaluation, 

and to find a suitable home for herself and the Child. 

[24] In July 2017, Mother completed a psychological evaluation and was diagnosed 

with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Based on Mother’s diagnosis, 

DCS referred Mother to Southwestern Behavioral Healthcare for an 

assessment. The assessment revealed that Mother was depressed, and Mother 

was required to attend monthly therapy sessions. The therapist at Southwestern 

Behavioral Healthcare attempted to contact Mother to schedule an 

appointment, but Mother failed to return her call. 

[25] On September 26, 2017, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 

Mother and Father. On January 31 and February 5, 2018, the trial court 

conducted a factfinding hearing on DCS’ petition. At the time of the hearing, 

Mother was unemployed and had failed to maintain stable housing for herself 

and the Child. During the hearing, DCS, and CASA Wade all opined that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interests. On 
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April 3, 2018, the trial court issued finding of facts and conclusion thereon 

terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

[26] Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

A. Standard of Review 

[27] Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. A parent has 

an “interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children [that] is 

‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 

1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). The 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution thus safeguards “the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Id. 

Nevertheless, it is well established that “parental rights are not absolute and 

must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper 

disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). Termination 

of parental rights is appropriate where “parents are unable or unwilling to meet 

their parental responsibilities.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259-60. We 

appreciate that the termination of a parent-child relationship is “an extreme 

measure and should only be utilized as a last resort when all other reasonable 

efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and 
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child have failed.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[28] Upon review of a trial court’s termination of parental rights, our court does not 

reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 

1260. Rather, we “consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment.” Id. Additionally, the trial court issued 

specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which requires application of 

the two-tiered standard of review set forth in Indiana Trial Rule 52(A): “[f]irst, 

we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we 

determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. We “shall not set 

aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 

given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A trial court has clearly erred “if the 

findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not 

support the judgment.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260 (quoting Bester v. Lake 

Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005))

II. Termination of Parental Rights Statute 

[29] In order to terminate a parent’s rights to her child, DCS must prove:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree.
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* * * *

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under 

the supervision of a local office . . . for at least fifteen (15) months of 

the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the 

child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to 

be a [CHINS] . . . ;

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in 

the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of 

the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a 

[CHINS];

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the 

child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove each of the foregoing elements by 

clear and convincing evidence. C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 85, 

92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “[C]lear and convincing evidence requires the 

existence of a fact to ‘be highly probable.’” Id. 

A. Remediation of Conditions
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[30] In considering whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions will not 

be remedied, we must identify what conditions led to the Child’s “placement 

and retention” outside of the home and then determine whether there is a 

reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K. v. Ind. 

Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). In making these 

decisions, “the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the 

termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed 

conditions—balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual 

pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of 

future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152; K.T.K., 

989 N.E.2d at 1231). “Habitual conduct may include ‘criminal history, drug 

and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of 

adequate housing and employment.’” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647. DCS “is not 

required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need 

only establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior 

will not change.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

[31] Turning to our first step analysis, the conditions led to the Child’s placement 

and retention outside of the home, the record shows that on September 7, 2016, 

the Child was suspended from “school for kicking another student and hitting 

two other students during gym class.” (Exh. Addendum p. 14). The Child also 

punched another student “with his hands.” (Exh. Addendum p. 14). One 
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those students had to go to the ER for treatment. Based on these violent 

incidents, the following day, the Child was admitted at Harsha Behavioral 

Center and he remained there for about eight days. After the Child was

released from the center, DCS simultaneously filed a motion to modify the 

October 2015 dispositional order, arguing that Mother “is currently unable to 

provide appropriate care and supervision, because Mother does not have stable 

housing or employment and cannot protect [the Child] from harming others or 

himself.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. II, p. 11). DCS therefore requested that the 

Child to be placed in foster care. 

[32] Mother argues that the trial court’s finding that she had an unstable home is 

erroneous because she had “maintained stable housing for the eight months 

prior to the termination” of her parental rights, “albeit with [Harold Blackard 

(Blackard)] and his children.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 9). Mother further argues 

that she “had always managed to not become homeless by staying with [a] 

boyfriend or [a] roommate.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 9). 

[33] With regards to Mother’s housing, the trial court issued the following pertinent 

findings:

10. During the CHINS matter, [M]other was offered parent aid [sic] 

services to help with scheduling, budgeting, and maintaining housing. 

Mother did attend at the outset of the service, but states that she 

stopped attending sessions because they became stressful and 

confusing. Mother missed approximately 30% of her appointments 

with the parent aid [sic] and the service was discontinued as a result.
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11. Mother listed numerous places where she has resided both with 

and without the [C]hild since [DCS’] intervention. DCS was able to 

count approximately ten residences that were reported during the 

pending CHINS matter. Mother has had repeated difficulties with 

being able to pay rent and utilities needed to maintain stable housing. 

At one home, even after [DCS] provided financial assistance with a 

deposit, rent, and the electric arrearage in March of 2016, [M]other 

was [] evicted by May of 2016 due to her inability to maintain the rent. 

The court notes that [M]other has had this financial difficulty despite 

also reporting numerous different types of employment over the years.

12. Mother completed multiple budgets with her parent aid [sic] when 

she did work with the parent aid [sic]. Mother reported to the parent 

aid [sic] that she couldn’t save money. Despite always reporting 

employment, [M]other did not often provide verification. Even while 

living with others who assisted with costs, [M]other never seemed to 

have money left to pay for needed items. Even when rent and daycare 

were not included in the budgets [M]other completed, she still did not 

have enough money to meet expenses.

13. Mother and child resided at the YWCA shelter for a period of 

time. Mother had the opportunity to remain at the YWCA shelter 

with the [C]hild while she established herself but absented herself from 

their program and stated thereafter that she would not go back to [the] 

shelter. Mother was also provided the opportunity to work with 

Aurora, a housing assistance program located in Evansville, but did 

not follow through with them.

14. Mother now believes that she has stable housing. Mother resides 

with [Blackard] and does not own the home where she resides. The 

[c]ourt notes that based on the evidence, [M]other has lived with other 

significant others on multiple occasions who were able to help her 

maintain shelter for a period of time. Each of those situations 

ultimately turned out to be temporary and did not lead to an 

appropriate and stable long-term housing situation for [M]other and 

the [C]hild. The court finds additional concern with the fact that 

[M]other’s significant other[,Blackard,] also has a history of domestic 

violence.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 18 of 24

****

16. Based on the evidence before the court, the court finds that mother 

is not likely to remedy the reasons that the [C]hild has remained out of 

her care . . . . Mother was given the opportunity to have housing for 

herself with assistance from DCS, or at a shelter where more supports 

would have been available, but she did not take advantage of those 

circumstances . . . . 

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 13-15). 

[34] Our review of the record reveals that at the time the Child was removed from 

Mother’s care in September 2016, Mother was without stable housing and had 

been staying at random locations with the Child without informing DCS of 

their location. One of the locations was LaForest’s house—Mother’s then 

boyfriend. While it is unclear when Mother ended her relationship with 

LaForest, sometime after August of 2017, Mother began dating Blackard and 

she thereafter moved in with him. Blackard has three teenage children living 

with him, and “two little boys” that are close to the Child’s age. Blackard’s

minor children sometimes visit on the weekends. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 136). 

[35] When asked if she would consider Mother’s housing of “a few months” with 

Blackard as satisfactory, CASA Wade first pointed out that the trial court had 

“excluded” Blackard from participating in the services offered by DCS. (Tr. 
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Vol. II, p. 86).4 CASA Wade added that in August 2017, Mother had claimed

that the Child had his own bed. However, in January 2018, just a few days 

before the termination hearing, CASA Wade visited Blackard’s home and there 

was a “brand new bunk bed.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 86). Despite Mother’s statement

that the Child had a bed in Blackard’s home in 2017, CASA Wade opined that 

it was “apparently [] a lie, because they’re brand new right now. The mattresses 

weren’t even on the bed. [Mother] tells you a lot of times what she thinks you 

want to hear.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 86). 

[36] FCM Stephanie Kingston (FCM Kingston) estimated that Mother had resided 

in at least ten different homes during these proceedings. FCM Kingston 

testified that at some point, Mother had resided “with a guy named [LaForest] 

for quite some time” and when Mother broke up with LaForest, she moved in 

with Blackard. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 114). FCM Kingston additionally stated that 

Mother’s unemployment prevented her from obtaining housing by herself, and 

that is why Mother “was always living with somebody that would help her pay 

the bills. But then if somethin’ happened she was homeless again.” (Tr. Vol. 

 

4 At a pretrial hearing conducted on November 14, 2017, the trial court ordered Blackard to be “excluded for 

placement” and to “remain outside the court room for future proceedings.” (Appellees’ App. Vol. II, p. 26).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 20 of 24

II, p. 115). When asked how the unstable housing impacted Mother’s ability to 

care for the Child, FCM Kingston stated, 

I feel like . . .[Mother] has moved from different homes with different 

people that were not DCS approved, that have felonies, she just can’t 

provide stability for [the Child]. And [the Child] needs a structured 

home. Like we’ve all stated numerous times today, [the Child] needs a 

structured home with his behavior. Any different kind of routine 

throws him off. So if you can’t provide stability and live in a home for 

long periods of time, it’s just really hard to put [the Child] back with 

[Mother].

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 115). We have previously explained that “the time for parents to 

rehabilitate themselves is during the CHINS process, prior to the filing of the 

termination petition.” Prince v. Dep’t of Child Servs., 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1230 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2007). Further, we emphasize that it is the responsibility of the 

parent—and the parent alone—to make the changes necessary to remedy the 

conditions that warranted DCS’ intervention. Id. at 1231. 

[37] Despite a wealth of services available to her during the CHINS process, Mother 

failed to successfully accomplish two major goals. At the time of the 

termination hearing, Mother was unemployed, and it was unclear whether her 

living arrangement with Blackard was temporary or permanent. CASA Wade 

testified that Mother “has never taken it upon herself to have a home of her 

own. It’s always been dependent on what man she was with at the time.” (Tr. 

Vol. II, p. 77). The record additionally shows that Mother’s current boyfriend, 

Blackard, was convicted of domestic battery and strangulation in 2014, and 

even though Mother had established housing with Blackard prior to the 
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termination hearing, CASA Wade testified that Blackard had been excluded 

from participating in the CHINS case, and that consequently meant that his 

home was not considered appropriate for the Child’s placement. 

[38] Although we recognize that Mother did participate in some services and 

attended supervised visits with the Child, “where there are only temporary 

improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court 

might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic situation 

will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In 

sum, the Child was removed from Mother’s care partly because she had 

unstable housing. During the CHINS case, Mother failed to take meaningful 

steps to meet her parental responsibility. Accordingly, we find ample support in 

the record for the trial court’s determination that the conditions resulting in 

Child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside her home will not be 

remedied. 

B. Best Interests of Child 

[39] Mother also challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental 

rights is in the Child’s best interests. The parent-child relationship is “one of 

the most valued relationships in our culture.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147 

(quoting Neal v. DeKalb Cnty. Div of Family & Children, 796 N.E.2d 280, 285 (Ind. 

2003)). Thus, the purpose of terminating a parent-child relationship is to 

protect the child, not to punish the parent. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. When considering whether termination would be 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 22 of 24

in a child’s best interests, the trial court must “look beyond the factors identified 

by [DCS] and . . . look to the totality of the evidence.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of 

Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The 

trial court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the 

child’s physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before 

terminating the parent-child relationship.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. 

Permanency is a central consideration in determining a child’s best interests. 

Id. Nevertheless, “the right of parents to raise their children should not be 

terminated solely because there is a better home available for the children.” In 

re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

[40] Mother’s behavior during these proceedings made it clear that she could not 

meet Child’s medical needs. DCS became involved after the Child was reexposed to lead poisoning in March 2015. Mother subsequently entered into an 

Informal Adjustment and was required to take the Child to the Vanderburg 

Heath Department on a monthly basis to have the Child’s blood tested for lead 

poisoning. The record is replete with Mother missing these monthly check ups. 

Also, after the Child was diagnosed with unspecified ADHD, and DMDD, he 

was prescribed Vyanse, Kapvay, Zyprexa and Clonidine. These medicines are 

taken at specific times during the day. Mother admitted that she was not aware 

of the Child’s medication regimen. In addition, the Child suffers from 

behavioral issues which require therapy. The record shows that Mother missed 

attending several therapy sessions while the Child was in her care, and she 

missed other appointments while the Child was in foster care. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 23 of 24

[41] At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was unemployed, and it was 

unclear whether her living arrangement with her current boyfriend, Blackard, 

was temporary or permanent. The Child was thriving in his current foster 

placement, and Foster Mother was meeting all of the Child’s medical needs. 

Although Foster Mother did not plan on adopting the Child, CASA Wade 

testified that DCS already has received applications from potential families 

willing to adopt the Child. Referring to adoption and the need for permanency, 

CASA Wade opined that the Child “needs continuity, he needs stability, he 

needs to get in a household. He’s gonna be 7. This has been goin’ on 7 years of 

his life already. He’s gonna be a teenager and you want to try to get him into 

being a loving boy. You don’t wanna see a teenager with these behaviors. You 

want to get it resolved and let him have a few years in a loving environment.” 

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 88). See McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 798 

N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the testimony of the child’s 

CASA is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in 

the child’s best interests.) 

[42] Mother testified that she now knows what it takes to be a fit Mother, and she 

listed her responsibilities as follows: to take the Child to all his doctor’s 

appointments, to strictly follow the Child’s diet due to the lead poisoning, and 

finally, attend her own therapy sessions. When asked how long she has been 

aware of these obligations, Mother stated that she has known that “for a while.” 

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 135). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-982 | September 6, 2018 Page 24 of 24

[43] A court is not required to place children on a shelf until parents are capable of 

caring for them properly. See In re Campbell, 534 N.E.2d 273, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1989). The record shows that Mother has failed to demonstrate that she can 

provide permanency and a stable home for the Child, and that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights will allow the Child to be adopted into a stable and 

permanent home where his needs will be safely met. Thus, we find ample 

evidence to support the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s 

parental rights is in the Child’s best interests. 

CONCLUSION 

[44] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that DCS presented clear and convincing 

evidence to support the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights 

to the Child.

[45] Affirmed. 

[46] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur