J. S67004/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

BILAAL POWELL, : No. 2441 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, May 30, 2012,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0000781-2011

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2016

Bilaal Powell appeals nunc pro tunc from the May 30, 2012 aggregate 

judgment of sentence of life imprisonment imposed after a jury found him 

guilty of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy.1 After 

careful review, we affirm.

The trial court summarized the relevant facts of this case as follows.

[The victim] was on the 300 block of East 

Walnut Lane in Philadelphia on May 5, 2010, when 

[appellant’s] co-defendant, Jose Velez [(“Velez”)], 

walked up to him, demanded his money and drugs, 

and then shot [the victim] several times, resulting in 

[his] death. [On August 18, 2010, appellant] 

admitted to planning the robbery with Velez and 

others, along with sitting in his car at the scene of 

the crime as a lookout, and taking the victim’s 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502, 3701, and 903, respectively.
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money and marijuana before driving off, as [the 

victim] lay dying on the sidewalk. [Appellant] 

further admitted that in planning the robbery of [the 

victim], he arranged for [Velez] to get the murder 

weapon, drove Velez to get the gun, arranged to 

have his cousin call when the victim was at the 

prearranged location, and drove everyone to the 

staging area prior to the crime. 

Trial court opinion, 11/19/15 at 3-4 (citations to notes of testimony 

omitted).

Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with second-degree 

murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, possessing instruments of crime 

(“PIC”), and multiple violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (“UFA”).2 The 

PIC and UFA charges were nolle prossed by the Commonwealth prior to the 

start of trial. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the inculpatory 

statements that he made to police, which was denied by the trial court on 

May 8, 2012. The following day, appellant proceeded to a jury trial 

alongside Velez. Following a two-day trial, the jury found appellant guilty of 

second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy on May 10, 2012. 

On May 30, 2012, the trial court sentenced appellant to a mandatory term of 

life imprisonment. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b). On June 11, 2012, 

appellant filed post-sentence motions for a judgment of acquittal or a new 

trial, arguing that his inculpatory statements to police were not “knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily” made and that the trial court erred in denying 

 

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 907, 6106, and 6108, respectively.
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his motion for a mistrial. (See “Post Sentence Motion,” 6/11/12 at 

¶¶ 4a-4b.) The trial court denied appellant’s post-sentence motions on 

August 31, 2012.

Thereafter, on September 28, 2012, appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal that was ultimately dismissed by this court for failure to file a brief. 

(See per curiam order, 12/4/13.) On April 7, 2014, appellant filed a timely 

pro se petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”), requesting that his direct appeal rights be 

reinstated. Counsel was appointed and filed an amended PCRA petition on 

appellant’s behalf on May 27, 2015. On July 17, 2015, the trial court 

granted appellant’s petition and reinstated appellant’s direct appeal rights 

nunc pro tunc. This timely appeal followed on August 12, 2015. On 

August 13, 2015, the trial court ordered appellant to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Appellant timely complied and the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

on November 19, 2015.

On appeal, appellant raises the following issues for our review:

I. Is [appellant] entitled to an Arrest of Judgment 

on the charge of Murder in the Second Degree, 

Criminal Conspiracy, and all related offenses 

where the evidence was insufficient to sustain 

the verdict?

II. Is [appellant] entitled to a new trial on all 

charges where the verdict was not supported 

by the greater weight of the evidence?
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Appellant’s brief at 3.

Appellant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain 

his convictions for second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy 

because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he “conspired with [Velez] 

or anyone else to shoot and kill the victim or even rob the victim[,]” or that 

the homicide in question was committed in furtherance of a felony. (Id. at 

7.) This claim is meritless.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted 

at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to 

prove every element of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. As an appellate court, we may 

not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Any question of 

doubt is for the fact-finder unless the evidence is so 

weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal 

denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).

“A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it 

is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in 

the perpetration of a felony.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b). Perpetration of a 

felony is defined as “[t]he act of the defendant in engaging in or being an 

accomplice in the commission of . . . robbery, rape, or deviate sexual 

intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.” Id. 
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§ 2502(d). A person will be found guilty of robbery, a felony of the first 

degree, “if, in the course of committing a theft, he . . . inflicts serious bodily 

injury upon another[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i).

Criminal conspiracy, in turn, requires the Commonwealth to prove that 

appellant “(1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act 

with another person or persons; (2) with a shared criminal intent; and 

(3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 135 A.3d 1097, 1102 (Pa.Super. 2016); see 

also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a). A conspiratorial agreement can be proven by 

circumstantial evidence and “inferred from a variety of circumstances 

including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge of 

and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the 

parties surrounding the criminal episode.” Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 

67 A.3d 19, 26 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 

(Pa. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, the verdict winner, we find that there was ample evidence 

for the jury to conclude that appellant was guilty of second-degree murder, 

robbery, and criminal conspiracy. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced 

appellant’s August 18, 2010 statement to police, wherein he admitted that 

he and several other individuals “put a plan together to rob [the victim]” in 

retaliation for the victim cheating him in a drug deal. (Notes of testimony, 
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5/8/12 at 226-227, 236.) Specifically, appellant’s statement indicated that 

on May 4, 2010, he gathered seven individuals in Vernon Park in 

Philadelphia and assigned each of them roles to perform in the robbery. 

(Id. at 227, 229-230.) Appellant also promised to pay each participant with 

the money that they planned to steal from the victim. (Id. at 227.) The 

following day, appellant sat in his vehicle and observed one of his coconspirators, Velez, approach the victim and attempt to rob him at gunpoint. 

(Id. at 231.) During the course of the robbery, the victim made a sudden 

movement, and Velez shot him multiple times, killing him. (Id. at 231, 

235.) Thereafter, appellant took $10 and marijuana from the victim as he 

lay dying on the ground, drove off with Velez, and met up with several of his 

co-conspirators and smoked the marijuana. (Id. at 235.) Based on the 

foregoing, appellant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain 

his convictions for second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy 

must fail.

Appellant also contends that the verdict was against the weight of the 

evidence. (Appellant’s brief at 9-10.) Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 607 provides, in pertinent part, that a claim that the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence “shall be raised with the trial judge in a 

motion for a new trial: (1) orally, on the record, at any time before 

sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a 

post-sentence motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). “[T]he purpose of this rule is 
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to make it clear that a challenge to the weight of the evidence must be 

raised with the trial judge or it will be waived.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 

57 A.3d 191, 196 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citation omitted). The failure to 

challenge the weight of the evidence presented at trial in an oral or written 

motion prior to sentencing or in a post-sentence motion will result in waiver 

of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Bond, 985 A.2d 810, 820 (Pa. 2009), 

cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1030 (2010).

Instantly, appellant failed to file a post-sentence motion raising a 

weight of the evidence claim, or point to the place in the record that 

indicates he moved for a new trial on weight of the evidence grounds. 

Consequently, we find that appellant’s weight claim is waived.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/25/2016