79–010

Calendar No. 654

106TH CONGRESS REPORT

2d Session " ! SENATE 106–325

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2001

JUNE 29, 2000.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. WARNER, from the Committee on Armed Services,

submitted the following

REPORT

[To accompany S. 2507]

The Committee on Armed Services, to which was referred the bill

(S. 2507) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2001 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central

Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for

other purposes, having considered the same, reports favorably

thereon with amendments and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.

PURPOSE OF THE BILL

S. 2507 would authorize appropriations and other matters for

Fiscal Year 2001 for intelligence activities of the United States, including certain Department of Defense intelligence related activities within the jurisdiction of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC).

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) reported the

bill on May 4, 2000, and it was referred to the Committee on

Armed Services in accordance with section 3(b) of Senate Resolution 400, 94th Congress.

SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW

The committee conducted a detailed review of the intelligence

community authorization request for Fiscal Year 2001. The committee conducted hearings and met with the Chairman and Vice

Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

The committee has carefully reviewed the report of the Select

Committee on Intelligence (S. Rept. 106–279) and has incorporated

the relevant budget decisions of the SSCI into S. 2549, the NaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 06:31 Jul 07, 2000 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR325.XXX pfrm09 PsN: SR325
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tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which the

SASC reported to the Senate on May 12, 2000.

The following explains the committee’s proposed amendments to

the bill as reported by the SSCI, as well as the committee’s clarification to the report issued by the SSCI.

Two year extension of authority to engage in commercial activities

as security for intelligence collection activities

Section 431(a) of Title 10, United States Code (USC), authorizes

the Secretary of Defense to authorize the conduct of those commercial activities necessary to provide security for authorized intelligence collection activities abroad undertaken by the Department

of Defense. Section 501 of S. 2507, as reported by the SSCI, would

extend this authority by two years. The SASC has no objection to

such an extension of authority. As a matter of committee jurisdiction, however, the SASC insists that amendments to Title 10, USC,

be included in the Defense Authorization Act, not in the Intelligence Authorization Act. Therefore, the SASC proposes an amendment to S. 2507 as reported by the SSCI to strike section 501. The

SASC intends, with the approval of the Senate, to include an identical provision in S. 2549.

Nuclear test monitoring equipment

Section 502 of S. 2507, as reported by the SSCI, would amend

subchapter II of chapter 138 of Title 10, USC, by providing the Secretary of Defense with authority to convey or otherwise provide to

a foreign government equipment for monitoring nuclear test explosions and to install such equipment on foreign territory. Section

1206 of S. 2549 would provide similar authority, as well as other

authorities, for DOD to manage this effort. Therefore, the SASC

recommends an amendment to strike section 502 of S. 2507, as reported by the SSCI. The SASC intends to work with the SSCI to

reconcile any differences in policy between the two committees on

this matter prior to completion of the conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001.

Experimental personnel management program for technical personnel for certain elements of the intelligence community

Section 503 of S. 2507, as reported by the SSCI, would authorize

the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to carry out a program

of experimental use of special personnel management authority in

order to facilitate recruitment of eminent experts in science and engineering for research and development projects administered by

the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance

Office (NRO), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA),

and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Since these are all defense agencies under the personnel management system of the Department of Defense, the SASC objects to granting such authority

to the DCI. The Secretary of Defense has also stated that such an

approach ‘‘would take the unprecedented step of authorizing the

DCI to appoint personnel across Executive Department lines to positions in DOD, without the Secretary of Defense’s approval or involvement. This is inconsistent with the Secretary’s responsibilities

to manage the Department pursuant to 10 USC, section 113.’’ The

SASC recognizes the need for several of the intelligence agencies

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to have special hiring authority for select cases involving science

and engineering specialties. Section 1113 of S. 2549 would extend

such authority to the Secretary of Defense for filling positions, on

a limited basis, in NSA and NIMA. For the reasons specified above,

the SASC recommends an amendment to strike section 503 of S.

2507, as reported by the SSCI.

Prohibition on transfer of imagery analysts from General Defense

Intelligence Program to National Imagery and Mapping Agency

Program

The SSCI report would direct the transfer of imagery analysts

and systems support personnel from the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) to the National Imagery and Mapping

Agency Program (NIMAP). According to the Secretary of Defense:

‘‘The Combatant Commanders are unanimous in their opposition to

this proposal, citing it as unnecessary and detrimental to the accomplishment of their missions.’’ The SASC agrees that the Combatant Commanders need to retain control of these imagery analysts and support personnel. The overall allocation of imagery analysts was evaluated in 1996 when NIMA was established. There

were good and sufficient reasons for those original decisions made

in consolidating imagery professionals. Therefore, the SASC recommends an amendment that would prohibit the proposed transfer. However, the SASC does agree that it would be appropriate for

the Secretary of Defense to assess options for strengthening the

role of the NIMA Director as functional manager for imagery and

geospacial programs. Therefore, the amendment proposed by the

SASC would require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with

the DCI, to conduct such an assessment. The SASC believes that

it may be possible for NIMA to assume overall control of those imagery analysts currently funded in the GDIP, while allowing the

Combatant Commanders to retain day-to-day operational control

over such personnel, similar to the current arrangement for signals

intelligence personnel. The SASC directs the Secretary of Defense

to evaluate such an option and include an evaluation of this option

in his report on strengthening NIMA’s authority.

Prohibition on transfer of collection management personnel from

General Defense Intelligence Program to Community Management Account

The SSCI report would direct a transfer of resources and personnel who are performing multidiscipline requirements management and tasking from the GDIP to the Community Management

Account. According to the Secretary of Defense: ‘‘The assets affected by this proposed move are the assets that function as my Intelligence Collection Manager, serving as the focal point for all

DOD requirements. This move will restrict our intelligence efforts.’’

The DCI has also registered objection to this transfer. The SASC

agrees with these assessments and recommends an amendment

that would prohibit the transfer of collection management personnel from the GDIP to the Community Management Account.

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Authorized personnel ceiling for General Defense Intelligence Program

The SSCI report would reduce funds available for GDIP military

pay and would mandate a significant overall endstrength reduction

of billets credited against the GDIP. The SASC understands the

SSCI’s concern regarding the fill rate for personnel funded in the

GDIP. The SASC notes, however, that fill rates below fully authorized levels is common throughout the Department of Defense. The

GDIP does not appear to be suffering personnel fill levels significantly below other comparable agencies. Nonetheless, the SASC

agrees that the issue of fill rates at intelligence agencies in the Department of Defense should be assessed to determine whether

these agencies can achieve higher personnel levels. Therefore, the

committee directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct an assessment of all intelligence agencies within the Department of Defense

to determine whether their personnel fill rates can be improved. A

report on this assessment shall be submitted to the congressional

defense and intelligence committees not later than April 1, 2001.

The SASC, however, opposes the SSCI recommendation to cut

GDIP billets. According to the Secretary of Defense: ‘‘The loss of

the billets and pay would materially reduce DIA’s military intelligence collection, processing, and reporting capabilities, and a realignment of billets and pay would undermine severely the Department’s accounting procedures.’’ The SASC is concerned that reducing the personnel ceiling will not fix the fill rate problem, but

would more likely just establish a lower ceiling against which unchanged fill rates would be applied. This outcome would certainly

result in a severe reduction in personnel available to satisfy important DIA requirements. Therefore, the SASC recommends an

amendment that would restore the billets proposed to be cut and

transferred by the SSCI.

Measurement and Signature Intelligence

The SSCI report would require that the DCI conduct a study of

the utility and feasibility of various options for improving the management and organization of measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). The SASC agrees that such a review is necessary, but is concerned that the SSCI language excludes the Secretary of Defense, who has a significant role in the area of

MASINT. Therefore, the SASC recommends an amendment that

would require that the DCI conduct such a review, in coordination

with the Secretary of Defense.

Defense Attache System

The SSCI report would require a significant cut in the budget request for Defense Attache System funding intended to be used for

expansion into regional hot spots. The SASC is concerned that reducing the planned increase in defense HUMINT capabilities would

be unwise, particularly at a time of increasing tension around the

globe. The SASC urges the SSCI to reconsider its proposal and to

support full funding for the Defense Attache System in conference.

National Reconnaissance Office operational support

The SSCI would reduce funds for the NRO’s operational support

program. Such funds are used to provide training for the

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warfighter on NRO systems. As the Secretary of Defense has stated: ‘‘The Commanders-in-Chief and other Defense activities that receive support through this program consider NRO personnel an invaluable, integrated component of their multidiscipline intelligence

terms.’’ The SASC strongly supports the NRO’s efforts to provide

space support to the warfighter, and urges the SSCI to support full

funding of the NRO’s budget request for operational support in conference.

COMMITTEE ACTION

In accordance with the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as

amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the committee approved a motion to report favorably to the Senate S. 2507

with amendments.

FISCAL DATA

The Committee will publish in the Congressional Record information on five-year cost projections when such information is received from the Congressional Budget Office.

REGULATORY IMPACT

Paragraph 11(b) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate requires that a report on the regulatory impact of a bill be included in the report on the bill. The Committee finds that there is

no regulatory impact in the cost of S. 2507.

COMMENTS FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

On June 28, 2000, the committee received a letter from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding S. 2507, among other things. A copy of this letter appears

below.

Hon. JOHN W. WARNER,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As the Congress considers the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization legislation, we want to highlight for you

several issues within the House and Senate bills to which we must

object. We are very concerned about the potential negative impact

of several fiscal marks and language on defense intelligence, and

we are deeply troubled by language that would limit our abilities

to execute responsibilities in support of military operations.

Transfer Authority of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI):

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI)

recommends an amendment to section 104(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 that both interferes with the Secretary’s ability

to object to the movement of DoD NFIP funds and personnel and

restricts the Secretary’s authority to delegate. The proposed language would allow the DCI or his delegated representative to effect

changes to DoD NFIP programs unless the Secretary of Defense objects in writing. Further, it would limit the Secretary’s authority to

delegate such objections only to the Deputy Secretary. The requirement that such an objection be in writing is unnecessarily onerous

and the delegation restriction infringes upon the Secretary’s auVerDate 11-MAY-2000 06:31 Jul 07, 2000 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR325.XXX pfrm09 PsN: SR325
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thority and responsibility to manage the Department, and is inconsistent with the intent of 10 USC § 113(d). We strongly urge that

Section 105 be deleted in its entirety and that we work together

to address any concerns of the Congress that produced this language.

Intelligence Community Communications Architect/Architecture:

The HPSCI mark directs the DCI to establish the position of Intelligence Community Communications Architect, with a 30-person

professional staff with broad responsibilities for the development of

a worldwide intelligence community telecommunications architecture and network. The HPSCI further recommends that $80M be

transferred from NRO, NSA and DIA to the Community Management Account to fund architectural efforts. This unilateral and

independent architectural office would seriously damage, if not totally destroy, the efforts of the DoD Chief Information Officer

(CIO), who has ongoing activities with the IC and Defense Intelligence Component CIO’s to advance interoperability between and

among intelligence producers and consumers, and who has statutory responsibilities under the Clinger-Cohen Act. The IC is an integral mission partner in the DoD’s Global Information Grid (GIG)

that is being designed and implemented to address many of the

concerns raised by the committee. The HPSCI’s marks will

perturbate existing relationships and potentially prevent pursuit of

an efficient GIG strategy. We strongly urge the conference committee to delete these marks in their entirety and to reemphasize

support for a DoD and DCI technological and managerial partnership to address these issues.

Experimental Personnel Management Program: The Senate Select

Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) proposes language that would

take the unprecedented step of authorizing the DCI to appoint personnel across Executive Department lines to positions in the DoD,

without the Secretary of Defense’s approval or involvement. This is

inconsistent with the Secretary’s responsibilities to manage the Department pursuant to 10 USC § 113. We would welcome, however,

legislation to increase the statutory cap on Defense Intelligence

Senior Executive Service positions, contained in 10 U.S.C. 1606(a),

from 493 to 517.

Collaboration: We very much appreciate the HPSCI’s positive assessment of the Department’s Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) tool but we must oppose direction to transfer program

oversight to the DCI’s ADCI/A&P and further believe it is premature to declare JIVA the community standard for collaboration.

we feel strongly that it would be counter-productive both to prohibit further non-JIVA technology pursuits and to remove the program from the DoD oversight that has made it the success that the

committee commends.

General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP): The SSCI proposed

several reductions and realignments that would diminish Defense

Intelligence capabilities.

The SSCI recommends a reduction to GDIP military pay and further recommends that over 1,000 billets not be credited against the

GDIP. The DIA accounts for military billets and pay in accordance

with DoD policy. The loss of billets and pay would materially reduce DIA’s military intelligence collection, processing, and reporting capabilities, and a realignment of billets and pay would underVerDate 11-MAY-2000 06:31 Jul 07, 2000 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR325.XXX pfrm09 PsN: SR325
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mine severely the Department’s accounting procedures. We urge

deletion of this language in its entirety.

The SSCI recommends a transfer of resources and personnel who

are performing Multidiscipline Requirements Management and

Tasking from the GDIP to the Community Management Account.

This is one of several provisions that we find personally disturbing.

It would appear the committee is attempting to systematically dismantle organizations and functions that are historically and inherently Defense Intelligence activities and realign them to the DCI’s

Community Management Staff. The assets affected by this proposed move are the assets that function as Intelligence Collection

Manager, serving as the focal point for all DoD requirements. This

move will restrict our intelligence efforts.

The SSCI recommends the transfer of imagery analysts and systems support personnel and resources from the GDIP to the NIMA.

These resources provide direct support to the Service intelligence

chiefs and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. At the

formation of NIMA, the Department made a conscious choice to exclude these resources from the consolidation. The Combatant Commanders are unanimous in their opposition to this proposal, citing

it as unnecessary and detrimental to the accomplishment of their

missions. They are adamant that such a transfer will deprive them

of flexibility and undermine the unity of control within the Combatant Commands. We oppose this provision.

The SSCI, in a mark entitled ‘‘Balancing DAO Collection Capabilities,’’ recommends a drastic cut to Defense Attache System

funding that reverses the planned expansion into regional hot

spots. The Committee is committed to sustaining and enhancing

our ever increasingly important global HUMINT capabilities. We

have made great progress since the consolidation of all Defense

HUMINT activities in 1995 and with continued congressional support we will continue to fine-tune our capabilities. Contrary to the

assertions in the committee report, we are increasing our efforts

against hard targets while at the same time expanding our attache

system in response to requirements identified by the military theater Commanders-in-Chief. We urge restoration of these funds and

seek your continued support of this most critical discipline.

The SSCI eliminated all funds requested to design an addition to

the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center at Bolling Air Force Base.

Our desire and intent are to consolidate DIA Washington area personnel into a single, secure facility on a military installation. Collocation benefits from a business perspective are rather intuitive,

but we must also face the reality of the potential terrorism threat

that our intelligence personnel face every single day that they remain, in large numbers, in unsecure leased commercial facilities.

The committee notes that the consolidation will not take place for

several more years. We sincerely wish that we could make it happen today, but we cannot. With congressional support we can make

it happen with all due haste. This cut only serves to prolong the

time required to adequately protect our military and civilian personnel. We strongly urge restoration of the requested funds.

National Imagery and Mapping Agency: The SSCI recommends a

redirection of funds within the National Imagery and Mapping Program to boost funding for modernizing TPED functions within the

U.S. Imagery and Geospatial System. NIMA’s FY 2001 budget reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 06:31 Jul 07, 2000 Jkt 079010 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR325.XXX pfrm09 PsN: SR325
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quest already includes additional resources over last year’s request,

reflective of a community commitment to modernizing USIGS.

NIMA made the difficult internal realignment decisions necessary

to provide these additional funds. Any further perturbation will degrade NIMA’s ability to support both national and tactical customers beyond already reduced levels. We strongly urge that this

provision be deleted and that the Director of NIMA, in consultation

with appropriate congressional committees, our offices, and that of

the DCI, be afforded an opportunity to implement the difficult decisions that have already been reached.

National Reconnaissance Office: We urge the conference committee to support the President’s Budget request for the National

Reconnaissance Program and we specifically request your support

on the following items that impact Defense.

Both the SSCI and HPSCI directed cuts against the NRO’s Operational Support line. Operational Support funds provide training

for the warfighter on NRO systems and ensures rapid, two-way

communication between the warfighter and NRO management and

ensure a high level of fidelity in support to the operational commander. The NRO is to be commended for deploying a first rate

cadre of professionals who fully interact and coordinate their activities with other intelligence agency officers around the world. The

Commanders-in-Chief and other Defense activities that receive support through this program consider NRO personnel an invaluable,

integrated component of their multidiscipline intelligence teams.

We urge full restoration of the funds requested for this activity.

The HPSCI zeroed the request for the Discoverer II program.

This is a critical demonstration program for the potential future of

space-based radar collection. It meets all technical objectives and

provides a necessary and timely step toward exploring new space

sensing capabilities that could be incorporated into any future

space-based radar system. An excellent partnership has been

forged between the NRO, Air Force, Army and DARPA that ensures this demonstration effort addresses both military and national needs. We strongly urge full funding of this program.

The HPSCI proposes language that prohibits the NRO from

using Space and Missile Systems Center contracts to acquire

launch vehicles and directs the NRO to assume direct responsibility and authority for their procurement needs by contracting directly with industry. Certainly there has been legitimate reason for

concern in this arena, but we would urge a new review that we are

confident will reveal a much improved management structure and

contracting process that does not merit this language. Both the

mandates and proscriptions of the HPSCI language could ultimately create inefficiencies of the very nature that the committee

seeks to prevent. We encourage the Congress to work with the

NRO to seek a satisfactory solution to its concerns and urge the

conference committee to remove this well-intentioned but counterproductive provision.

National Security Agency: While we understand the HPSCI’s concerns about funding levels necessary to achieve successful NSA

Transformation, we are disturbed that the House has recommended significant changes to NSA’s Consolidated Cryptologic

Program budget. We are convinced that the budget presented, as

modified by the NSA Business Plan, provides the best plan for

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transformation given the 1–5 year change cycle required for transformation, and provides the most flexibility for implementation

until early stage results are available. As such we object vigorously

to large-scale funding shifts that will damage the Department’s and

NSA’s ability to achieve their strategic goals. The House also included a provision regarding NSA acquisition, which directs the

DCI’s Senior Acquisition Executive to prepare a plan for review,

approval, and monitoring of NSA’s modernization effort. The Department, specifically the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, must be

involved in this effort.

We appreciate your support and thank you for the opportunity to

convey our concerns to the House and Senate on the FY 2001 Intelligence Authorization bills. We are sending identical letters to the

Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of the House Armed

Services Committee, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations Subcommittees on Defense, and House Permanent and

Senate Select Committees on Intelligence.

Sincerely,

HENRY H. SHELTON, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff.

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Secretary of Defense.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the

Standing Rules of the Senate, the changes in existing law made by

certain portions of the bill have not been shown in this section of

the report because, in the opinion of the Committee, it is necessary

to dispense with showing such changes in order to expedite the

business of the Senate and reduce the expenditure of funds.

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