Filed 2/28/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ROBERT GEFFNER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF PSYCHOLOGY,

Defendant and Respondent.

B322991

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 22STCP00012)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Reversed with 

directions.

Klinedinst, Earll M. Pott and Robert M. Shaughnessy, for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Gloria L. Castro, Assistant 

Attorney General, and Matthew M. Davis and Giovanni F. Mejia, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

Law Offices of Seth L. Goldstein, Seth L. Goldstein for 

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
2

_________________________

The California Board of Psychology, Department of 

Consumer Affairs (the Board) revoked Dr. Robert Geffner’s 

license after it found he violated the American Psychological 

Association’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of 

Conduct (Ethical Standards)1 by evaluating two children for 

suicidality without their father’s consent, evaluating the children 

without consulting their existing therapist, making custodial 

recommendations that went beyond the scope of an emergency

risk assessment, and delegating the duty to warn father that one

child had thoughts about killing him. Dr. Geffner petitioned for a 

writ of mandamus to vacate the Board’s decision. The trial court 

denied the petition.2 We now reverse the judgment denying his 

petition. 

1 Business and Professions Code section 2936 requires the 

Board to “establish as its standards of ethical conduct relating to 

the practice of psychology, the ‘Ethical Principles and Code of 

Conduct’ published by the American Psychological Association 

(APA). Those standards shall be applied by the board as the 

accepted standard of care in all licensing examination 

development and in all board enforcement policies and 

disciplinary case evaluations.” (See also American Psychology 

Assoc., Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct 

(Ethical Standards) <https://www.apa.org/ethics/code [as of Feb. 

28, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/4TQ8-MZYN>.)

2 The Board also found that Dr. Geffner violated the Ethical 

Standards by relying on a colleague’s interview of the children 

rather than by interviewing them himself, but the trial court did 

not uphold that finding.
3

BACKGROUND

I. Dr. Geffner’s evaluation 

Mother and father have two children, Minor S. and Minor 

N., twins born in 2004. The parents separated when the twins 

were nine years old. A family court issued this order: “Both 

parents shall have access to information about the health and 

education of the children. Each parent shall be responsible to 

contact the school and medical provider to receive the 

information directly from the school and provider. Notification 

of Medical Emergency: In the event either child receives 

emergency medical treatment, the parent who arranges for this 

treatment shall notify the other parent as soon as is reasonably 

possible. Both parents shall place the name of both parents on 

any listings for emergency contact with any educational, 

activity, childcare, or medical provider.”3

In 2016,4 Dr. Geffner was a California licensed clinical 

psychologist who had been in practice for about 45 years. 

Although neither mother nor the children were Dr. Geffner’s 

patients, mother called him on June 29 and told him that three 

weeks earlier she had overheard the children, who were then 12 

years old, discussing killing themselves or father in connection 

with an upcoming court-ordered visit with father. Mother told 

the children’s therapist, Lori Williams, about the children’s 

threats, but Williams was going on vacation and said they could 

3 Dr. Geffner asserts that the order, which also outlined a 

course of reunification visits with father, violated the Family 

Code. Whether it does is not before us and is irrelevant to the 

issues on appeal. 

4 Unless otherwise noted, all dates refer to 2016.
4

discuss it after the upcoming July 4 holiday. Dr. Geffner asked 

mother basic questions, including about the children’s custody 

arrangement. Mother reported that she and father had joint 

legal custody, she had sole physical custody, the children had a 

therapist, the family court had ordered the children to have

supervised visitation and reunification with father, and there 

was an upcoming visit right after the holidays. Dr. Geffner 

advised mother to contact Williams.

On June 30, mother called Dr. Geffner again and said 

Williams had already left town. Dr. Geffner gave mother the 

names of two psychotherapists in the Bay Area, where mother 

lived.5 After they told mother they were unavailable, mother 

again called Dr. Geffner, who contacted Dr. Juhayna Ajami, his

former postdoctoral fellow who was in the Bay Area. On July 1, 

Drs. Geffner and Ajami agreed to collaboratively evaluate the 

children.

The next day, Saturday, July 2, Dr. Ajami met the children 

in person to evaluate them. Mother signed a consent form for the 

evaluation. The doctors did not seek or obtain father’s consent. 

Mother reported that Minor S. had told her just the night before, 

July 1, that he was trying to figure out how to kill himself, but he 

had ruled out using a knife.

Minor S. told Dr. Ajami that every few weeks he wanted to 

kill himself and that seeing father triggered these feelings. He 

denied having a plan to kill himself, but he had contemplated 

stabbing himself or jumping off a cliff. One month earlier, he had 

scratched himself because he “ ‘needed to hit something or 

5 Dr. Geffner was in San Diego.
5

scratch something.’ ” After a visit with father, Minor S. took a 

knife from a restaurant, intending to stab himself in the leg.

Minor N. said he first harbored suicidal thoughts when he 

started visiting father, and he thought about suicide just the 

night before, when father was mentioned in conversation. He 

had thought about hiring a hitman to kill father, but his plan had 

too many flaws; for example, “we would have to be in Los Angeles 

or Florida so we wouldn’t be suspects.” Minor N. denied having a 

current plan or intent to kill father. Instead, he said he would 

probably kill himself by using a knife or jumping off a building if 

he had to live with father. He thought that shooting himself 

would be best, “ ‘but it would probably hurt.’ ” Still, Minor N.

wanted to live and go to college, and he cited other reasons he 

would not commit suicide: his mother, grandparents, and 

brother.

Dr. Ajami assessed the children using the Trauma 

Symptom Checklist for Children, which measures posttraumatic 

stress and related psychological symptomatology in children who 

have experienced traumatic events. Both children’s scores on the 

depression scale suggested “possible subclinical (but significant)

depressive symptomatology.” They struggled with sadness, 

unhappiness, and loneliness; episodes of tearfulness; and 

“depressive cognitions such as guilt and self-denigration.” Such 

elevations “on this clinical scale may be associated with 

suicidality or self-injurious behavior.” The children endorsed 

wanting to hurt and to kill themselves “lots of times.” On 

another assessment, the children endorsed statements about 

being sad and unsure things would work out, not liking 

themselves, feeling like crying many days, and feeling alone. 

Further, Minor N.’s Posttraumatic Stress scale was clinically 
6

elevated, which suggested he was preoccupied with past 

traumatic events. His score on the anger scale suggested he was 

having angry thoughts and behavior, and mother corroborated 

that he lashed out at others. Minor N. endorsed wanting to hurt 

other people, which was consistent with his homicidal ideation 

toward father. And although Minor N. denied wanting to commit 

suicide during the interview, he was close to Minor S. and said 

they would commit suicide together. Therefore, “he should still 

be considered at a high risk for self-harm due to his brother’s 

reported suicidal ideation.” Both children reported increased 

symptoms, particularly suicidal ideation, around the time they 

are scheduled to see father. 

The doctors prepared their Confidential Emergency 

Psychological Evaluation on July 3 and 4 and emailed it to 

mother on the evening of July 4. In addition to reporting the 

above interview and test results, the doctors noted that “children 

can have the intent to cause self-harm or death regardless of a 

full comprehension of the lethality or finality of the act.

[Fn. omitted.] Therefore, they may engage in potentially 

dangerous behavior in an attempt to alleviate their emotional 

pain without fully understanding the consequences of their 

actions. Furthermore, they may accidentally engage in 

potentially lethal behavior towards themselves or others. As 

such, their disclosures of self-harm and harm to others should not 

be dismissed and should be taken seriously in order to ensure 

both their safety as well as the safety of others.”

The doctors then made five recommendations: (1) the 

children “cease contact” with father until they had “more 

extensive treatment for their reported symptoms, and their risk 

for self-harm and harm to others is eliminated. Since they are 
7

performing well in school, report a positive atmosphere in their 

maternal home, and the symptoms appear to be situation specific 

and related to contact with their father, outpatient trauma 

treatment at least weekly by a clinician specifically trained in 

dealing with child trauma is recommended”; (2) the children have 

more frequent treatment, at least once a week, and traumafocused psychotherapy; (3) the children should undergo another 

risk assessment before reinstating contact with father and the 

current report should be provided to the children’s therapist and 

relevant parties; (4) the length of treatment was unpredictable; 

and (5) within 24 hours father needed to be told about his 

children’s feelings and statements about harming him—

otherwise, the doctors would report it. The report further stated, 

“In addition, based upon this evaluation, it does not appear that 

either boy is at risk for suicidal potential or harm to others if they 

can be reassured that there will not be contact with their father, 

as this appears to be the strongest risk factor at this time.”

During a family court appearance on July 5, mother gave

Dr. Geffner’s report to the court and father. Mother’s attorney 

advised Dr. Geffner the same day that the report had been 

provided to father.

On July 7, father’s lawyer informed Drs. Ajami and Geffner

that father had joint legal custody of the children, the doctors had 

evaluated the children without father’s knowledge or consent, the 

testing violated a court order, and father did not consent to the 

doctors treating or having any further contact with the children. 

Dr. Geffner had no further contact with the children.

Four days later, on July 11, Dr. Geffner wrote a follow-up 

letter at the request of mother’s attorney. In that letter, he 

responded to questions posed by mother’s attorney. The attorney 
8

first asked whether a meeting between father and the children 

fell within Dr. Geffner’s no-contact recommendation. In 

response, Dr. Geffner clarified that the no-contact

recommendation would include a meeting with father and the 

children in a reunification session. Dr. Geffner also expressed 

concern about the trauma training and expertise of the therapist 

and mediator who had recommended a reunification meeting 

with father, suggesting that they “may be ignoring our 

emergency evaluation interviews and assessment measures” by

forcing the children to meet with father. Second, the attorney 

asked what mother should do if the children made any further 

statements about harming themselves or others. 

Dr. Geffner responded that mother should notify the children’s

therapist and take them to an emergency room or psychiatric 

clinic. Third, the attorney asked why the children needed 

specialized trauma treatment, and Dr. Geffner responded that 

they had elevated trauma symptoms. Also, Minor N. had

“elevated his posttraumatic stress scale.”

II. The Board’s accusation, trial, and decision

In July 2017, father filed a consumer complaint with the 

Board against Dr. Geffner. The Board then filed an accusation 

against Dr. Geffner charging him with gross negligence, repeated 

negligent acts, and violating the Ethical Standards, psychology 

licensing law, or regulations.6

6 The Board also filed an accusation against Dr. Ajami, but 

the proceedings against her are not at issue.
9

A. Hearing evidence 

At the August 2021 hearing on the accusation, Dr. Geffner 

and two experts testified, among others.

1. Dr. Geffner’s testimony

As to why he did not seek father’s consent, Dr. Geffner 

testified that normally he would ask to see a custody agreement, 

but this was an emergency given the children’s statements. In

his experience, the person having physical custody of a child can 

seek appropriate treatment if an emergency arises. Further, it 

was clear that father was the trigger, so it was important to 

assess the threats. Dr. Geffner did not refer the children to an 

emergency room because they had sufficient protective factors, 

such as family support.

Dr. Geffner also testified that mother told him that she had 

tried to contact the children’s therapist, but the therapist was 

leaving town and was unavailable until after the holidays. He 

asked mother to follow up with the therapist to let her know how 

serious the situation was and to see if she could do an emergency 

evaluation. Mother called Dr. Geffner back and again said the 

therapist was unavailable, so Dr. Geffner gave her the names of 

two Bay Area psychologists. Dr. Geffner confirmed that he did 

not personally try to contact the children’s therapist because his 

focus was on the emergency, on whether the children posed a 

serious risk to themselves. Had he been conducting a general 

forensic evaluation or general psychological evaluation, then he 

would have contacted the treating team.7

7

In an interview Dr. Geffner gave to the Board before the 

hearing, he similarly testified that when mother first contacted 
10

Dr. Geffner did not consider his assessment of the children 

to be a custody evaluation, which is a comprehensive evaluation 

with the goal of recommending what is in a child’s best interests 

regarding access and visitation. Instead, he performed a onetime emergency evaluation or risk assessment. Given that this 

was an emergency, mother had physical custody of the children, 

and father triggered the children’s feelings, Dr. Geffner’s focus 

was on assessing the seriousness of the threats.

Dr. Geffner also concluded that there was no necessity for a 

child abuse report, given the children’s and mother’s denial of 

physical or sexual abuse. Further, his understanding of his duty 

to warn was there must be a serious risk of imminent violence to 

an identified victim by an identified perpetrator. That was not 

present here, because Minor N. did not have a realistic plan for 

hurting father. The children also had protective factors; for 

example, they did not want to die, they were doing well in school, 

and they had friends. Although the plans to hurt themselves 

were more realistic, the children’s thoughts of self-harm were 

focused on seeing father. There was no risk “almost at all” if they 

did not have contact with father.

2. Expert testimony

Two experts testified at the hearing. Dr. Lisa Davidson, a 

clinical psychologist, neuropsychologist, and expert reviewer, 

him, he had asked her to see if the children’s therapist could 

conduct the emergency evaluation. However, mother reported 

that the therapist was out of town, and mother could not reach 

her. Dr. Geffner did not personally call the therapist to see if 

they had an emergency protocol, but when he asked mother if the 

therapist worked with someone else who could see the children, 

mother indicated there was no one else.
11

testified for the Board. Dr. Eugune Roeder, a psychologist who 

had been an expert reviewer for the Board for 30 years, testified 

for Dr. Geffner. Both experts agreed that the purpose of an 

emergency evaluation is to determine whether there is an 

imminent risk of harm. They otherwise testified as follows.

3. Dr. Davidson’s testimony

As to informed consent, Dr. Davidson said that on having 

received this referral, she would have determined the custodial 

arrangement, because “you need to have both parents’ blessing to 

proceed with their children.” The failure to obtain father’s 

consent was an extreme departure from the standard of care.

Dr. Geffner’s failure to reach out to the children’s treating 

professionals also was an extreme departure from the standard of 

care. They could have provided a “well-rounded perspective and 

a complete analysis” of the children. Dr. Geffner should not have 

relied on mother’s representation that the children’s therapist 

was unavailable because “you want to be sure that you were 

doing your due diligence.”

Dr. Davidson testified that in performing an emergency 

evaluation, the focus of the recommendations is on what will keep 

the children “safe and keep others safe. So it’s the homicide and 

suicide risk.” Dr. Geffner’s recommendation that the children 

and father have no contact was inconsistent with an emergency 

evaluation and instead was “a long-term ramification based on 

limited information” and addressed more than the immediate 

need. Dr. Davidson thus viewed the evaluation as a custody 

evaluation. Similarly, Dr. Geffner’s July 11 follow-up letter was 

outside the appropriate timeframe for an emergency 

psychological evaluation.
12

Also, the emergency evaluation did not occur in an

appropriate timeframe, because mother called Dr. Geffner on 

June 29 but the clinical interviews were not conducted until July 

2, and the report was prepared the following day.

The standard of care requires psychologists to notify 

someone if a threat of harm has been made against them. 

Because the threat was to father, Dr. Geffner had a duty to warn 

even if the threat was not realistic and there was no imminent 

risk of violence. It was the psychologist’s duty to give the 

warning, not mother’s.8

The standard of care also required Dr. Geffner to meet with 

the children to conduct any purported emergency evaluation. He 

could not rely on another psychologist to perform the clinical 

interviews or other functions.

4. Dr. Roeder’s testimony

Dr. Roeder generally opined that neither Dr. Geffner nor 

Dr. Ajami violated the Ethical Standards or engaged in any 

extreme departure from a standard of care.

As to the specific issue of parental consent, Dr. Roeder 

agreed that typically it is appropriate to inform both parents 

before conducting an evaluation, except when there is an 

emergency situation and doing so would not benefit the child.

Here, the concern with notifying father was that the children had 

identified him as the trigger for their suicidal emotions. Further, 

he disagreed that Dr. Geffner should have referred the children 

8 Dr. Davidson also opined that a report of child abuse 

should have been made against father because “basically the 

outcome of the report yielded a result that would indicate that 

the father was definitely doing some sort of harm to his children.”
13

to an emergency room, as this was more of a psychological 

emergency. Also, his reading of the custody order required the 

other parent to be informed within a reasonable time of the 

children receiving emergency care, and here, the psychologists 

required father be informed within 24 hours.

Next, he did not agree that Dr. Geffner performed a child 

custody evaluation or made recommendations regarding custody. 

A custody evaluation would be “dramatically more extensive” and 

would include parenting history and abilities and recommend a 

parenting plan.

Nor did Dr. Roeder agree that Dr. Geffner had an 

obligation under the circumstances to consult the children’s 

treatment team before or during his evaluation. While 

Dr. Roeder agreed “it would definitely be best to consult with the 

treaters” when conducting this type of evaluation, here, the 

treaters were unavailable. Given that, Dr. Geffner’s lack of 

contact with the treatment team was within the standard of care.

Dr. Roeder did not consider the child’s threat to hire an outof-state hitman to be a realistic threat of violence. A risk of 

serious violence did not exist when the evaluation was done, but 

it could occur if the children were forced to spend time with 

father.

B. The Board’s decision

The Board issued a decision that became effective in 

December 2021. The Board found that the experts agreed an

“emergency evaluation is performed to identify whether there is 

an imminent risk of harm, and if so to identify what 

interventions are necessary. An emergency evaluation is not a 

custody evaluation and is not a comprehensive psychological 

evaluation.”
14

As to the specific issues, the Board found Dr. Davidson’s 

opinions more persuasive and consistent with the evidence. 

Accordingly, the Board found that Dr. Geffner violated the 

Ethical Standards in five ways. 

First, Ethical Standards 3.10 and 9.03 require 

psychologists to obtain informed consent before performing 

assessments. The evidence showed that Dr. Geffner could have 

obtained father’s consent because the evaluation was arranged 

over several days “and was not of such an emergency nature that 

Father could not have been contacted,” father had a right to be 

contacted per the court order, and the doctor continued to be 

involved in the matter (presumably by responding to mother’s 

lawyer’s questions) after being told father did not consent.

Second, Dr. Geffner failed to consult the children’s existing 

providers, in violation of Ethical Standard 3.09, which requires 

psychologists to coordinate care with other professionals when 

indicated and appropriate. Relying on Dr. Davidson’s opinion, 

the Board found that Dr. Geffner unreasonably accepted without 

question mother’s representation that the children’s therapist 

was unavailable. The Board also noted that Dr. Davidson had 

said most professionals have emergency protocols in place if they 

are unavailable. And even Dr. Roeder agreed it was “ ‘best’ ” to 

consult existing treating professions before performing an 

evaluation. 

Third, the report exceeded the scope of an emergency 

evaluation, which is to identify an imminent risk. The report was 

not limited to an imminent risk assessment and instead included 

recommendations implicating parental visitation and future 

treatment, akin to a custody evaluation. “The reports made 
15

specific recommendations regarding parental contact that were 

not appropriate for an emergency evaluation.”

Fourth, Dr. Geffner departed from the standard of care by 

issuing two reports containing psychological assessments and 

recommendations without personally assessing the children and 

without making it explicit he had not done so.

Finally, Dr. Geffner had a duty to warn father personally of

Minor N.’s homicidal ideation, and the doctor should not have 

relied on mother to warn father. His actions violated Ethical 

Standard 3.04, which requires psychologists to take reasonable 

steps to avoid harming patients to minimize foreseeable harm.

The Board accordingly found Dr. Geffner had committed 

gross negligence. It revoked his license but stayed revocation and 

placed him on five years’ probation on various terms and 

conditions.

III. Dr. Geffner petitions for a writ of administrative 

mandamus

Dr. Geffner petitioned for a writ of administrative 

mandamus to set aside and vacate the Board’s decision. In June 

2023, the trial court issued its judgment denying the petition. 

Exercising its independent judgment, the trial court, as an initial 

matter, rejected Dr. Geffner’s assertion that the Board’s decision 

was legally insufficient because it did not explain the 

administrative law judge’s reasoning. As to the Board’s five 

findings, the trial court found as follows.

First, the weight of the evidence supported the finding that 

Dr. Geffner conducted a psychological assessment of the children 

when there was no “true emergency,” as evidenced by the 

troubling statements having been made three weeks before 

mother contacted the doctor. There was no evidence showing 
16

that the doctor did not have time to contact father before 

evaluating the children. That the doctor believed father was the 

“trigger” did “not inform on whether [Dr. Geffner] should have 

obtained Father’s consent to assess” the children, as the children 

did not need to be told father had been informed.

Second, the weight of the evidence supported the finding 

that Dr. Geffner failed to try to contact Williams and that this 

failure was an extreme departure from the standard of care and 

violated Ethical Standard 3.09. The trial court noted that 

Dr. Roeder had agreed it would have been best to contact 

Williams but excused Dr. Geffner’s failure to “do so in deferential 

reliance on Mother’s statement of unavailability.” However, as

Dr. Davidson explained, Dr. Geffner should have independently 

tried to contact Williams, given the contentious child custody 

proceedings. “As a matter of common sense, independent 

verification would effectively [ ] rule out any possibility of motives 

related to [the] contentious child custody dispute.” Also, 

Williams could have provided information that would have 

informed Dr. Geffner’s evaluation. 

Third, Dr. Geffner’s report went beyond a simple risk 

assessment of dangers from the children’s homicidal and suicidal 

ideations. Although not labeled as recommendations concerning 

parenting or custody, the report recommended no contact with 

father, which “is effectively a general and long-term 

recommendation for complete physical custody with Mother 

pending some further event; it addresses Father’s access to the 

children. [Citation.] A recommendation of no contact with 

Father is not merely about immediate risk and immediate need.

[Citation.] [Dr. Geffner’s] recommendations through an 

emergency assessment that addressed more than the need to 
17

cancel Father’s next scheduled visit because of risk to the Boys 

breached the standard of care and the departure was extreme.”

Fourth, the trial court rejected Dr. Geffner’s argument that 

he did not have a duty to warn father of Minor N.’s homicidal 

ideation because the risk was not realistic. The argument was 

inconsistent with the report’s recommendation that father be told 

about it within 24 hours. The duty to warn was not delegable to 

mother.

Fifth, the trial court reversed the finding that Dr. Geffner’s 

failure to meet the children personally and reliance on 

Dr. Ajami’s interviews breached the standard of care.

Dr. Geffner timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

In ruling on a petition for a writ of administrative mandate, 

the trial court reviews the administrative record to determine 

(1) whether the administrative agency exceeded its jurisdiction, 

(2) whether there was a fair trial, and (3) whether there was any 

prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, 

subd. (b).) An abuse of discretion is established if the 

administrative agency has not proceeded in the manner required 

by law, the order or decision is not supported by the findings, “or 

the findings are not supported by the evidence.” (Ibid.)

When reviewing an agency’s findings in a professional 

licensing discipline proceeding, the trial court “ ‘exercise[s] its 

independent judgment on the facts, as well as on the law . . . .’ ” 

(Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 811–812 

(Fukuda), italics added; see also Estrada v. Public Employees’ 

Retirement System (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 870, 881.) Under the 
18

independent judgment standard, “ ‘ “[t]he findings of the [agency] 

come before the court with a strong presumption of their 

correctness, and the burden rests on the complaining party to 

convince the court that the [agency]’s decision is contrary to the 

weight of the evidence.” ’ (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 812.)” 

(Front Line Motor Cars v. Webb (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 153, 160, 

italics omitted.) Nonetheless, while the trial court begins its 

review with a presumption that the administrative findings are

correct, “ ‘it is only a presumption, and may be overcome. 

Because the trial court ultimately must exercise its own 

independent judgment, that court is free to substitute its own 

findings after first giving due respect to the agency’s findings.’ 

(Fukuda, at p. 818.)” (Land v. California Unemployment Ins.

Appeals Board (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 127, 139; see also Cassidy 

v. California Bd. of Accountancy (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 620, 626 

(Cassidy) [“ ‘The scope of the trial before the superior court is not 

an unqualified or unlimited trial de novo, but the trial proceeds 

upon a consideration of the record of the administrative 

proceedings which is received in evidence and marked as an 

exhibit’ ”].)

“ ‘On appeal from a decision of a trial court applying its 

independent judgment, we review the trial court’s findings rather 

than those of the administrative agency.’ ” (Yazdi v. Dental Bd.

of California (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 25, 32.) We review the trial 

court’s findings under the substantial evidence test and 

determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

conclusions. (Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 824; Yazdi, at 

p. 32; Rand v. Board of Psychology (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 565, 

574–575; Cassidy, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 627.) However, 

we are not bound by any legal interpretations made by the 
19

administrative agency or the trial court; rather, we make an 

independent review of any questions of law, such as whether the 

agency failed to comply with required procedures or applied an 

incorrect legal standard. (Rand, at pp. 574–575; Environmental 

Protection Information Center v. California Dept. of Forestry & 

Fire Protection (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 479.)

II. The Board’s decision is not ambiguous or conclusory

As an initial matter, Dr. Geffner contends that the Board’s 

decision failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 

1094.5 because it was ambiguous and conclusory. We disagree.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 requires an agency 

to set forth findings in its decision that bridge the analytic gap 

between the evidence and the ultimate decision or order. 

(Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles 

(1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514–515 (Topanga).) This findings 

requirement “serves to conduce the administrative body to draw 

legally relevant sub-conclusions supportive of its ultimate 

decision; the intended effect is to facilitate orderly analysis and 

minimize the likelihood that the agency will randomly leap from 

evidence to conclusions.” (Id. at p. 516.) Further, the “findings 

enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s 

mode of analysis.” (Ibid.; see also Oduyale v. California State Bd.

of Pharmacy (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 101, 113 [agency must 

provide reasoned progression from factual findings to justify 

penalty imposed, including a statement of factual and legal basis 

for the decision].) Although the findings need not be extensive or 

detailed, mere conclusory findings without reference to the record 

are inadequate. (Environmental Protection Information Center v. 

California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection, supra, 44 Cal.4th 

at p. 517.) 
20

Citing Topanga, Dr. Geffner contends that the Board failed 

to link its conclusions to the evidence. To support this 

contention, he primarily cites evidence he thinks the Board 

should have addressed and ignores evidence the Board did 

address. But, as the trial court observed below, Dr. Geffner’s 

contention rests on an incomplete reading of the Board’s decision. 

On the issue of father’s consent, for example, the Board found 

Dr. Davidson’s opinion more persuasive based on evidence that 

the evaluation was arranged over several days, psychological 

assessments were performed, and a court order gave father the 

right to be informed of health matters. Thus, the Board 

supported its conclusion (Dr. Geffner should have sought or 

obtained father’s consent to the evaluation) with cited evidence 

(timing of evaluation, nature of emergency, and court order).

Otherwise, Dr. Geffner’s contention that the Board’s 

decision violates Topanga is largely an off-topic critique of 

Dr. Davidson’s testimony, rather than a clear explanation of 

where the supposed gaps between the evidence and the Board’s 

conclusions lie. For example, he criticizes Dr. Davidson’s 

background, faults the Board for not explaining why 

Dr. Davidson’s alternative to treating the children (referral to an 

emergency room) was superior to what he did (performing an 

outpatient risk assessment), and argues he had no legal duty to 

report father to Child Protective Services, was not required to 

obtain father’s consent under the family court order, and had no 

duty to warn father of Minor N.’s homicidal ideations. 

Dr. Geffner concludes by calling Dr. Davidson’s testimony a 

“sophomoric, internally inconsistent critique of Doctor Geffner’s 

conduct, that misrepresented facts and misapplied the law.”
21

In short, Dr. Geffner attempts to relitigate evidentiary and 

legal issues having nothing to do with Topanga’s procedural 

dictates about what must be in an agency’s decision. Such issues 

are better addressed in his substantive argument about the 

sufficiency of the evidence and the law. We now turn to those 

issues. 

III. Father’s consent

The trial court found that Dr. Geffner violated Ethical 

Standards 3.10 and 9.03 by failing to obtain father’s consent 

before evaluating the children. Neither the Ethical Standards 

nor the evidence supports that conclusion.

Ethical Standard 3.10 requires psychologists conducting

research or providing assessment therapy, counseling, or 

consulting services to obtain “the informed consent of the 

individual or individuals using language that is reasonably

understandable to that person,” except when consent is not 

required by law or otherwise per the Ethical Standards. “For 

persons who are legally incapable of giving informed consent, 

psychologists nevertheless (1) provide an appropriate 

explanation, (2) seek the individual’s assent, (3) consider such 

persons’ preferences and best interests, and (4) obtain 

appropriate permission from a legally authorized person, if such 

substitute consent is permitted or required by law. When 

consent by a legally authorized person is not permitted or 

required by law, psychologists take reasonable steps to protect 

the individual’s rights and welfare.” (Ibid.)

Ethical Standard 9.03, subdivision (a), provides that 

psychologists must obtain informed consent as described in 

Ethical Standard 3.10 “except when (1) testing is mandated by 

law or governmental regulation; (2) informed consent is implied 
22

because testing is conducted as a routine educational, 

institutional, or organizational activity . . . ; or (3) [a] purpose of 

the testing is to evaluate decisional capacity.”

These Ethical Standards thus require psychologists to 

obtain informed consent before conducting an assessment. 

However, they do not clarify who is a legally authorized person 

whose consent must be sought where, as here, minors and 

exigent circumstances are involved. The general rule as to 

minors is a parent or guardian has authority to consent to 

medical treatment for them. (See Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 

229, 244.) 

In the present case, the trial court, parties, and amicus

agree that father’s consent was unnecessary if this was an 

emergency. Stated otherwise, mother alone could consent if the 

children’s suicidal and homicidal ideations constituted an 

emergency. The trial court thus found that Dr. Geffner had to 

obtain father’s consent because the circumstances were not an 

emergency, stating, “[N]othing suggests when there is no 

emergency—as here—[Dr. Geffner] could ethically proceed with 

an assessment without both Mother and Father’s consent.”9 The 

trial court further said that the weight of the evidence supported 

the Board’s finding that Dr. Geffner “elected to conduct a 

psychological assessment of minor children where there was no 

true emergency.” (Italics added.)

Even though courts have recognized that it is hard to 

define “emergency” and that what constitutes an emergency may 

vary depending on the context, the trial court’s finding that no 

9 The Board similarly characterized the situation as “not of 

such an emergency nature that Father could not have been 

contacted.” (Italics added.)
23

“true emergency” existed under these circumstances finds little 

support in the law or evidence. Bryant v. Bakshandeh (1991) 226 

Cal.App.3d 1241 considered what is an emergency in a medical 

context. In that case, a physician claimed he was exempt from 

liability for a patient’s death under Good Samaritan laws because 

he provided medical care in response to a medical emergency.10 

The court said that the test for determining the existence of an 

emergency is an objective one, based on whether the undisputed 

facts “ ‘establish the existence of an exigency of “so pressing a 

character that some kind of action must be taken.” ’ ” (Id. at 

p. 1247; see also Valdez v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (2022) 85 

Cal.App.5th 466, 474 [undisputed facts established that fistfight 

was an emergency under Good Samaritan law].) In a similar 

context, Justice Croskey observed, “It would seem obvious that in 

determining whether a patient’s condition constitutes such an 

emergency the trier of fact must consider the gravity, the 

certainty, and the immediacy of the consequences to be expected 

if no action is taken. However, beyond observing that these are 

the relevant considerations, the variety of situations that would 

qualify as emergencies under any reasonable set of criteria is too 

great to admit of anything approaching a bright line rule as to 

just how grave, how certain, and how immediate such 

consequences have to be.” (Breazeal v. Henry Mayo Newhall 

Memorial Hospital (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1329, 1338.) Applying 

10 The Good Samaritan law defines “ ‘emergency medical 

services’ ” and “ ‘emergency medical care’ ” as those “medical 

services required for the immediate diagnosis and treatment of 

medical conditions which, if not immediately diagnosed and 

treated, could lead to serious physical or mental disability or 

death.” (Health & Saf. Code, § 1799.110, subd. (b).)
24

these standards, emergencies have been found where the 

consequences of inaction ranged from an immediate certainty of 

death to a high probability of future risk of serious injury. (Ibid.)

In this case, nobody testified that there was no risk of 

serious injury to the children based on their suicidal and 

homicidal ideations. Yet, in finding that no “true emergency”

existed, the trial court cited Dr. Davidson’s testimony, even 

though she did not testify that exigent circumstances were 

absent. To the contrary, she said, “So in this matter, I would 

have—if there was homicide or suicide at all in this, any type of 

risk, which we did determine from the notes that there—there 

appeared to be, you know, risk factors there, then I would have 

recommended that mother take them immediately to” an 

emergency room or psychiatry program, “somewhere to get 

properly evaluated. That’s an emergency evaluation.” (Italics 

added.) On cross-examination, Dr. Davidson agreed that an 

“emergency evaluation that involves homicide or suicide risk is 

usually then sent out to that type of agency (emergency services) 

if there’s imminent risk.” Finally, in her written report to the 

Board evaluating Drs. Ajami and Geffner, Dr. Davidson 

characterized the situation with the children as “an emergent 

one,” noting that it was “unusual a comprehensive psychological 

evaluation would be conducted in a time of emergency and need,”

and said that “[c]learly in this matter, an emergency 

suicide/homicide situation for the . . . brothers appeared.” (Italics 

added.)

Dr. Davidson thus agreed that the children exhibited risk 

factors and that this was an emergency situation. At no time did 

she say it was not an emergency. Instead, she said she would 
25

have managed the emergency differently, by referring the 

children to an emergency room and not preparing a report.

Dr. Davidson said that an emergency evaluation is an “on the 

spot determination” and not “an emergency pscyh eval that has a 

report attached to it like this.” She therefore did not agree with 

how Dr. Geffner conducted the emergency evaluation. That is not 

the same as concluding that 12-year-old children expressing 

persistent suicidal and homicidal ideations do not present an 

imminent risk of harm to themselves or others.

Dr. Geffner, however, was not disciplined for conducting an 

outpatient emergency evaluation: he was disciplined for not 

obtaining father’s consent. Dr. Davidson’s opinion that 

Dr. Geffner should not have conducted an outpatient emergency 

evaluation and instead should have sent the children to an 

emergency room fails to speak to the consent issue and thus was 

not substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion 

Dr. Geffner violated the Ethical Standards by failing to obtain 

father’s consent to the emergency evaluation. 

As to the issue for which Dr. Geffner was disciplined, 

Dr. Roeder testified that typically it is appropriate to inform both 

parents before conducting an evaluation, except in an emergency 

situation, which exists where there is some kind of imminent risk 

of self-harm or harm to others. He said this was an emergency

situation and that the emergency evaluation could be conducted 

on an outpatient basis. Neither his testimony nor Dr. Davidson’s,

therefore, supported the trial court’s finding that no true 

emergency existed. To the contrary, the experts agreed an 

emergency existed; their disagreement was about how to handle 

it.
26

Nor does the other evidence the trial court cited support its 

finding that this was not an emergency. The trial court 

suggested this was not an emergency because Dr. Geffner waited 

three days to evaluate the children. That is, mother first 

contacted Dr. Geffner on June 29, several weeks after mother 

heard the children discussing suicide and homicide, and the 

evaluation didn’t occur until July 2. However, when mother first 

called Dr. Geffner on June 29, he advised her to call Williams. 

When Williams was unavailable, the doctor referred mother to 

two Bay Area psychologists. After mother reported back to 

Dr. Geffner that they too were unavailable, he agreed on July 1

to evaluate the children. The evaluation occurred the next day, 

on July 2. It is unclear why this was not an immediate 

evaluation or how the evaluation’s timing shows that the 

circumstances were not exigent. 

The trial court also suggested that this was not an 

immediate, “on the spot” assessment because Dr. Geffner wrote a 

report and did not recommend hospitalization. Although the trial 

court’s reasoning is unclear, it apparently thought that a “true 

emergency” does not allow time to write a report and requires 

hospitalization. This analysis suggests that Dr. Geffner should 

have known before he conducted his assessment the facts he 

learned as a result of conducting it. Dr. Geffner was presented 

with facts suggesting the children might be at risk of self-harm. 

He therefore evaluated them within 24 hours and determined 

they were not at risk of imminent harm so long as they had no 

contact with father. That he ultimately decided there was no 

imminent risk requiring hospitalization if the children did not 

have contact with father and wrote a report detailing his 
27

reasoning is not evidence there were no grounds for an 

emergency evaluation in the first instance.

Also, nothing in the record shows and no party suggests 

that had Dr. Geffner believed on July 1 when he was engaged or 

on July 2 when Dr. Ajami evaluated the children that they were 

at imminent risk of self-harm that he would have nonetheless 

tarried even a minute to write the report instead of immediately 

telling mother, for example, to take the children to an 

appropriate facility. In fact, Dr. Ajami testified that they 

determined the children were safe until they could see her on 

July 2, and “we don’t send somebody to the emergency room or 

call the police if there’s just suicidal ideation. There has to be 

imminent harm or imminent risk of harm” because “it’s actually 

quite traumatic to send anybody, let alone children, to the 

emergency room.” As to this, amicus aptly observes that mental 

health emergencies may require “swift action,” even if the 

situation does not call for “ ‘code blue’ ‘lights and sirens.’ An 

individual may be in such suicidal psychic pain on Friday night 

that it is not reasonable to wait until Monday, but the situation 

may be dealt with over the course of hours or a day or two and 

still be an emergency.”

Further, the trial court appeared to connect the fact that 

the children made the troubling statements several weeks before 

mother called Dr. Geffner with the absence of an emergency. 

There is no basis for such a connection. It is undisputed that 12-

year old children involved in a tumultuous familial relationship 

had said they wanted to kill themselves, one child wanted to kill 

father, and these sentiments were connected to an upcoming visit 

with father. No party or witness at any time has suggested these

statements were, for lack of better terms, not serious, farcical, or 
28

unworthy of being treated with the utmost gravity. To the 

contrary, the Board’s expert agreed that the children exhibited

risk factors.

Moreover, the record shows that the children continued to 

make troubling statements shortly before and during the July 2 

assessment. Dr. Geffner reported that Minor S. told mother the 

night before the evaluation that he would rather kill himself than 

visit father, and he was trying to figure out a way to do it. The 

trial court discounted Dr. Roeder’s testimony that the children’s 

suicidal talk was ongoing, finding the foundation for it “unclear.” 

But the foundation for the testimony was clear: it was in 

Dr. Geffner’s report. In fact, the Board on appeal acknowledges 

the evidence, albeit relegating it to a footnote.

And although the record does not show Dr. Geffner knew 

when mother first contacted him that the children had more 

recently expressed suicidal thoughts and had acted on them, the 

July 2 interviews with them buttressed his initial assessment 

that this was an emergency. Minor S. told Dr. Ajami he thought 

about killing himself every few weeks, had contemplated suicide 

by stabbing himself or jumping off a cliff, had engaged in selfharm one month earlier, and had taken a knife from a 

restaurant, intending to stab himself after a visit with father. 

Minor N. similarly told Dr. Ajami he had last thought of suicide 

the night before, when his father was mentioned in conversation. 

As Dr. Ajami testified, any inconsistency about when the children 

last expressed suicidal thoughts—whether “yesterday” or a “few 

days ago”—did not change the “risk level,” when there was 

consistency across all other data points.

Nor does Dr. Geffner’s July 11 letter show that the 

situation was not an emergency. The trial court found it notable 
29

that Dr. Geffner advised in the letter that mother should take the 

children to an emergency room if they made any further suicidal 

statement. That recommendation does not undermine the 

exigent nature of the children’s circumstances when mother 

contacted Dr. Geffner. 

Although we do not agree with the trial court’s conclusion 

that no true emergency existed, we do agree with the trial court

that the family court order is largely irrelevant to that issue. The 

order simply established that mother and father had joint legal 

custody of the children, meaning they shared the right and 

responsibility to make decisions about their children’s health, 

education, and welfare. (Fam. Code, § 3003; see also id., § 3083 

[“In making an order of joint legal custody, the court shall specify 

the circumstances under which the consent of both parents is 

required to be obtained in order to exercise legal control of the 

child and the consequences of the failure to obtain mutual 

consent. In all other circumstances, either parent acting alone 

may exercise legal control of the child. An order of joint legal 

custody shall not be construed to permit an action that is 

inconsistent with the physical custody order unless the action is 

expressly authorized by the court.”].) The order therefore 

generally gave both parents the right to make medical decisions, 

but it did not require Dr. Geffner to obtain father’s consent before 

evaluating the children. As the trial court found, the family court 

order did not require consent from both parents for “emergency

medical treatment.” It required a parent—not Dr. Geffner—to 

notify the other parent as soon as reasonably possible that a child 

had received emergency medical treatment. That happened here: 

mother gave the report to father on July 5, the day after it was 

prepared. 
30

Finally, we agree with the trial court that neither it nor we 

have occasion to address whether the children could themselves 

consent to the evaluation. (See generally Fam. Code, § 6924, 

subd. (b) [minor 12 years of age or older “may consent to mental 

health treatment or counseling on an outpatient basis” if in a 

professional person’s opinion the minor “is mature enough to 

participate intelligently in” the services and would “present a 

danger of serious physical or mental harm to self or to others 

without the mental health treatment or counseling”]; Health & 

Saf. Code, § 124260, subd. (b)(1) [minor 12 years of age or older 

may consent to mental health treatment or counseling if a 

professional person opines that minor is mature enough to 

participate intelligently]; see Fam. Code, § 6922 [citing 

circumstances minors 15 years of age or older may consent to 

medical care].) A petitioner in mandate must exhaust remedies 

and issues at every level of the administrative process, and 

failing to do so precludes petitioner from raising those issues 

during judicial review. (Danser v. Public Employees’ Retirement 

System (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 885, 891; California Water Impact 

Network v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 

1464, 1489.) Dr. Geffner did not raise the issue before the Board,

and it was not developed either legally or factually.

11

 

IV. Failure to consult the children’s therapist

The Board and trial court found that Dr. Geffner violated 

Ethical Standard 3.09 by failing to contact Williams, the 

11 Dr. Geffner’s report did state that the “nature and purpose 

of the evaluation was explained to both [Minor N.] and [Minor S.]

individually and assent was obtained.”
31

children’s therapist before seeing the children. We disagree that 

there is sufficient evidence he violated that Ethical Standard.

Ethical Standard 3.09 provides: “When indicated and 

professionally appropriate, psychologists cooperate with other 

professionals in order to serve their clients/patients effectively 

and appropriately.” (Italics added.) Further the Introduction to 

the Ethical Standards note they are “written broadly,” and the 

application of any Ethical Standard “may vary depending on the 

context.” Also, the “modifiers used in some of the standards of 

this Ethics Code (e.g., reasonably, appropriate, potentially) are 

included in the standards when they would (1) allow professional 

judgment on the part of psychologists.” (Italics added.)

The proper construction of the Ethical Standard is an issue 

of law that we resolve de novo, applying the rules of statutory 

interpretation. (See O’Brien v. Regents of University of California 

(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1117 [applying general rules of 

statutory interpretation to university’s Faculty Code of 

Conduct].) We therefore give the Ethical Standard its plain, 

commonsense meaning, reading it as a whole. (Ibid.) When

language is clear and unambiguous and not reasonably 

susceptible to more than one meaning, there is no need for 

further construction. (People v. Camarillo (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 

1386, 1391.) 

The plain, commonsense interpretation of Ethical Standard 

3.09’s opening clause—“[w]hen indicated and professionally

appropriate”—implicates some level of discretion. The 

Introduction to the Ethical Standards as a whole confirms this 

interpretation, because it provides that the word “appropriate” 

refers to a psychologist’s ability to exercise professional 

judgment. Thus, psychologists have discretion whether to 
32

cooperate or to consult with other professionals based on whether 

such consultation is indicated and professionally appropriate. 

Dr. Roeder accordingly testified that generally the best practice is 

to consult treating physicians, but here the children’s existing 

treater was unavailable. Dr. Geffner similarly explained that 

after mother told him the children’s therapist was unavailable, 

he did not try to contact her personally because, unlike in a 

forensic evaluation, his focus was on the emergency and whether 

the children posed a serious risk to themselves. Also, mother had 

told him the therapist was unavailable and there was no one else 

who could see the children.

In contrast, the Board’s expert testified that a treating 

doctor should be consulted in all circumstances, including 

emergency ones, “[a]t the outset.”

12

 She therefore essentially said 

that such consultation is always indicated and professionally 

appropriate. In her view, Ethical Standard 3.09 affords 

psychologists no discretion. But this view is contrary to the 

opening clause in Ethical Standard 3.09 and the Introduction to 

the Ethical Standards as a whole, which neither the Board’s 

expert nor the trial court directly addressed. Stated otherwise, 

Ethical Standard 3.09 is not reasonably susceptible to 

Dr. Davidson’s interpretation of it. Given that Ethical Standard 

3.09 does not require psychologists to consult treating doctors in 

all situations and that Dr. Davidson said, to the contrary, that 

such consultation is always required, there is insufficient 

12 Dr. Davidson also testified that there was an initial 

problem here because Dr. Geffner had to obtain father’s 

permission to contact the treating team. We have already 

rejected that father’s consent was required.
33

evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Dr. Geffner 

violated the Ethical Standard. 

V. Failure to limit report to emergency risk assessment

The experts agreed that a risk assessment should be

limited to identifying any imminent risk of harm and immediate 

intervention and should not make long-term custody 

recommendations. The trial court interpreted Dr. Geffner’s 

report as going beyond recommending what was immediately 

necessary to treat the children’s suicidal and homicidal ideations

by including custody recommendations, which violated the 

standard of care. 

The trial court focused on Dr. Geffner’s recommendation 

that the children cease contact with father until they received 

more extensive treatment for their symptoms and their risk for 

self-harm and harm to others was eliminated. Adopting the 

testimony of Dr. Davidson, the trial court described the nocontact recommendation as practically a “general and long-term 

recommendation for complete physical custody with Mother 

pending some further event; it addresses Father’s access to 

children. [Citation.] A recommendation of no contact with 

Father is not merely about immediate risk and immediate need.

[Citation.] [Dr. Geffner’s] recommendation through an 

emergency assessment that addressed more than the need to 

cancel Father’s next visit because of risk to the Boys breached the 

standard of care and the departure was extreme.”

To be sure, Dr. Geffner’s recommendation the children have 

no contact with father until their suicidal and homicidal ideations 

were eliminated (because father triggered those feelings) 

implicated whether they should see father in the immediate and 

perhaps longer term. But that does not make it a custodial 
34

recommendation, i.e., a recommendation mother should be 

granted sole legal and/or physical custody.13 Dr. Geffner was 

evaluating whether the children were at imminent risk of selfharm or of harming others. He found that seeing father made the 

children want to kill themselves or father. How was Dr. Geffner 

supposed to phrase his medical opinion that seeing father 

triggered the children’s suicidal and homicidal ideations—that is, 

placed them at risk of harm—without raising the inference or 

implication they should not see father until those ideations could 

be resolved? Was he supposed to simply state, “Seeing father 

triggers the children’s suicidal and homicidal ideation?” If so, 

how does that simple statement also not implicate or suggest 

they should not have contact with father? In short, “no contact 

with father” is substantively no different than saying there is an 

imminent risk the children will harm themselves if they have to 

see father. 

We therefore conclude that there is insufficient evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding that Dr. Geffner made custody 

recommendations.14 

VI. Failure to warn father of Minor N.’s homicidal ideation

Dr. Geffner contends he did not violate any Ethical 

Standard by delegating a duty to warn father that Minor N. had 

considered killing him. We agree.

13 Mother gave the report to the family court, which excluded

it.

14 We need not address Dr. Geffner’s other recommendations 

because neither the Board nor the trial court found that they 

violated the standard of care governing what may be in an 

emergency risk assessment.
35

Here, the trial court found that Dr. Geffner breached a duty 

under Ethical Standard 3.04 to warn father by delegating the 

duty to mother. As an initial matter, Dr. Geffner did not delegate 

any duty to mother. Instead, he stated in the report, “As 

psychologists, we also have a duty to warn if potential harm may 

occur to others. Therefore, we will need to be assured within 24 

hours that [father] has been made aware of his son’s feelings and 

statements with respect to possible harm to him. Otherwise, we 

will need to report it. In addition, based upon this evaluation, it 

does not appear that either boy is at risk for suicidal potential or 

harm to others if they can be reassured that there will not be 

contact with their father, as this appears to be the strongest risk 

factor at this time.” (Italics added.) As the italicized language 

shows, Dr. Geffner did not dictate that mother tell father, he just 

said father had to be told. 

In any event, having independently reviewed Ethical 

Standard No. 3.04, we cannot conclude it required Dr. Geffner to 

warn father of his son’s threat. Subdivision (a) of that standard 

directs psychologists to (1) “take reasonable steps to avoid 

harming” patients, and (2) “to minimize harm where it is 

foreseeable and unavoidable.”15 The first clause thus prohibits 

psychologists from inflicting harm themselves, but it does not 

directly concern a duty to warn others of potential harm. The 

second clause arguably includes a duty to warn third parties of 

threatened harm by a patient, but only if such harm is 

“foreseeable” and “unavoidable.” 

15 Subdivision (b) forbids psychologists from harming others 

by engaging in torture, thereby underscoring that the focus of the 

Ethical Standard is on psychologists themselves not inflicting 

harm.
36

The evidence before the trial court does not demonstrate 

that harm to father was either foreseeable or unavoidable. The 

undisputed evidence was that 12-year-old Minor N. thought 

about hiring a hitman, apparently from Los Angeles or Florida, 

but he abandoned his plan on realizing it was too flawed. Minor 

N. denied having any current plan or intent to kill father. 

Drs. Roeder, Ajami, and Geffner agreed that harm to father was 

unrealistic. Dr. Davidson offered no opinion on the foreseeability 

or realistic nature of potential harm to father, and she never 

disagreed that there was no imminent risk that one of the boys 

would harm father so long as the children had no contact with 

him. Dr. Davidson instead took the position that the Ethical 

Standard requires a psychologist to warn an individual of threats 

against them regardless of the foreseeability of harm. That 

position ignores and writes the words “foreseeable” and 

“unavoidable” out of the Ethical Standard, and thus is 

inconsistent with its plain language. 

Thus, while we in no way discount the seriousness of Minor 

N.’s feelings about father, there is no showing he had a realistic 

ability to act on them or, more important, that he planned to act 

on them such that there was a foreseeable, unavoidable risk of 

harm. He denied such a plan, and Drs. Ajami, Geffner, and 

Roeder agreed there was no risk if Minor N. did not have contact 

with father. There was no evidence to the contrary. Thus, the 

evidence did not support the trial court’s conclusion that Dr. 

Geffner violated Ethical Standard 3.04.

For the same reason, we find no violation of any duty to 

warn as articulated by our Supreme Court in Tarasoff v. Regents 

of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 431. Tarasoff

broadly held that once a therapist determines or reasonably 
37

should have determined that a patient poses a serious danger of 

violence to others, the therapist has a duty to exercise reasonable 

care to protect the foreseeable victim.16 But as we have said, 

there was no evidence that either child posed a serious danger of 

violence to father, and thus there was no duty to warn under 

Tarasoff. 

Otherwise, the trial court did not address foreseeability of 

harm to father or evaluate it in the context of the Ethical 

Standards. Instead, the trial court found that because 

Dr. Geffner required father be told about Minor N.’s suicidal and 

homicidal ideations, there necessarily was a duty to warn; that is, 

the warning established the duty. The trial court also found 

irreconcilable Dr. Geffner’s directive that father be told of the 

children’s “feelings and statements with respect to possible harm” 

with Dr. Roeder’s testimony that any risk to father was 

unrealistic. But the two are not irreconcilable: even if the 

children could not realistically hire a hitman to kill their father, 

16 After the Tarasoff decision, the Legislature enacted 

Civil Code section 43.92, which provides that a psychotherapist is 

not liable for failing to protect against a patient’s violent behavior 

unless the patient has told the therapist about a serious threat of 

violence against a reasonably identifiable victim. Civil Code 

section 43.92 was intended to limit Tarasoff and to strike “a 

reasonable balance in that it does not compel the therapist to 

predict the dangerousness of a patient. Instead, it requires the 

therapist to attempt to protect a victim under limited 

circumstances, even though the therapist’s disclosure of a patient 

confidence will potentially disrupt or destroy the patient’s trust 

in the therapist.” (Ewing v. Goldstein (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 

807, 817.) Civil Code section 43.92 governs civil liability, and 

thus it is not relevant to our analysis.
38

it was still critically important that he, as a parent with joint 

legal custody and visitation rights, be told that seeing him caused 

the children to have harmful thoughts. This is what the final 

sentence in Dr. Geffner’s recommendation is about: harm was 

not foreseeable or unavoidable if the children did not have 

contact with father.

We therefore conclude that while Dr. Geffner generally had 

a duty to warn others of foreseeable and unavoidable harm, he 

did not violate any duty owed to father. 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed with the direction to the trial 

court to grant the petition for a writ of administrative mandamus 

and to reverse the Board’s findings. Dr. Geffner may recover his 

costs on appeal.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

EGERTON, J.

ADAMS, J.