a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Secretary of Defense

November 2004 FOREIGN MILITARY 

SALES

DOD Needs to Take 

Additional Actions to 

Prevent Unauthorized 

Shipments of Spare 

Parts

GAO-05-17
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-17.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William M. Solis 

at (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-17, a report to the 

Secretary of Defense 

November 2004

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES 

DOD Needs to Take Additional Actions 

to Prevent Unauthorized Shipments of 

Spare Parts 

At the time GAO conducted its reviews, the Army, the Navy, and the Air 

Force were not testing their automated requisition-processing systems to 

ensure that the systems were accurately reviewing and approving blanket 

order requisitions for compliance with restrictions on the sale of classified 

and controlled spare parts and operating in accordance with foreign military 

sales policies. Blanket order requisitions are based on agreements between 

the U.S. government and a foreign country for a specific category of items 

for which foreign military sales customers will have a recurring need. GAO’s 

tests of the services’ requisition-processing systems showed that classified 

and controlled spare parts that the services did not want to be released to 

foreign countries under blanket orders were being released. GAO’s internal 

control standards require periodic testing of new and revised software to 

ensure that it is working correctly, while the Office of Management and 

Budget’s internal control standards require periodic reviews to determine 

how mission requirements might have changed and whether the information 

systems continue to fulfill ongoing and anticipated mission requirements. 

DOD either concurred or partially concurred with GAO’s recommendations 

for testing the requisition-processing systems. The department, however, 

does not have a plan specifying the remedial actions to be taken to 

implement these recommendations. Internal control standards requiring 

testing also will be applicable to the Case Execution Management 

Information System, an automated requisition-processing system that DOD 

and the military services are developing to replace the existing individual 

military service systems. 

The Army’s automated requisition-processing system incorporates a 

potential best practice that helps to prevent the release of classified or 

controlled parts that are not authorized under blanket orders to foreign 

countries. The automated systems used by the Navy and the Air Force allow 

country managers to override system decisions not to release to foreign 

countries classified or controlled parts that are requisitioned under blanket 

orders. GAO found instances where Navy and Air Force country managers 

overrode the systems’ decisions without documenting their reasons for 

doing so. In contrast, the Army’s system automatically cancels requisitions 

that are made under blanket orders for classified or controlled parts. 

Because the requisitions are automatically canceled, country managers do 

not have an opportunity to override the system’s decisions. Compared with 

the Navy‘s and the Air Force’s systems, the Army’s system provides more 

stringent protection against releasing classified or controlled parts that are 

not authorized under blanket orders to foreign countries. 

Under Department of Defense 

(DOD) policy, the export of 

classified and controlled spare 

parts must be managed to prevent 

their release to foreign countries 

that may use them against 

U.S. interests. GAO has issued a 

series of reports on the foreign 

military sales program in which 

weaknesses in the military services’ 

internal controls were identified. 

This report highlights (1) a 

systemic problem that GAO 

identified in the internal controls 

of the military services’ requisitionprocessing systems and 

(2) a potential best practice that 

GAO identified in one service that 

provides an additional safeguard 

over foreign military sales of 

classified and controlled parts. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

(1) develop specific plans to 

institute the required testing 

of the services’ automated 

requisition-processing systems; 

(2) incorporate, as appropriate, 

required testing in the development 

of the Case Execution Management 

Information System; and 

(3) determine whether the Army 

system’s capability to reject 

requisitions for classified and 

controlled parts that are made 

under blanket orders is a best 

practice that should be applied to 

the Navy’s and the Air Force’s 

systems. DOD generally concurred 

with the recommendations. 
Page i GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 4 

Testing of the Requisition-Processing Systems Is Needed to 

Improve Internal Controls for Foreign Military Sales 5 

Army’s Practice Provides More Stringent Protection against the 

Improper Release of Parts to Foreign Countries 7 

Conclusions 8 

Recommendations for Executive Action 9 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 9 

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 12 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

Contents 

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reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

November 9, 2004 

The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld 

The Secretary of Defense 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

In response to a request from Senator Tom Harkin, we issued a series of 

reports1

 in which we analyzed Army, Navy, and Air Force internal controls2

over foreign military sales of classified and controlled cryptographic parts3

requisitioned under blanket order cases.4

 Under Department of Defense 

(DOD) and service policy, the export of classified and controlled parts 

must be managed to prevent their release to foreign countries that may use 

them against U.S. interests. We assessed and tested whether key internal 

controls, including the automated systems used by the services to process 

requisitions received under blanket orders, adequately restricted blanket 

order sales of classified and controlled spare parts to foreign countries, 

and we determined whether periodic tests were conducted to ensure that 

the services’ systems were working as intended. During these reviews, we 

 1

 GAO, Foreign Military Sales: Improved Navy Controls Could Prevent Unauthorized 

Shipments of Classified and Controlled Spare Parts to Foreign Countries, GAO-04-507

(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004); Foreign Military Sales: Improved Army Controls Could 

Prevent Unauthorized Shipments of Classified Spare Parts and Items Containing 

Military Technology to Foreign Countries, GAO-04-327 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2004); 

Foreign Military Sales: Air Force Does Not Use Controls to Prevent Spare Parts 

Containing Sensitive Military Technology from Being Released to Foreign Countries, 

GAO-03-939R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2003); and Foreign Military Sales: Improved 

Air Force Controls Could Prevent Unauthorized Shipments of Classified and Controlled 

Spare Parts to Foreign Countries, GAO-03-664 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2003). 

2

 Internal control activities include the policies, procedures, and processes that are 

essential for the proper stewardship of and accountability for government resources, and 

for achieving effective and efficient program results. 

3

 Classified parts are restricted for national security reasons; controlled parts are not 

classified but contain military technology/applications or are controlled cryptographic 

parts, hereafter referred to as “controlled parts.” 

4

 Blanket order cases are based on agreements between the U.S. government and a foreign 

country for a specific category of items for which foreign military sales customers will 

have a recurring need. The agreements have a dollar ceiling and no definitive listing of 

items or quantities. Once a blanket order case is established, a foreign country may submit 

requisitions for spare parts. We refer to requisitions for parts under blanket order cases as 

“blanket orders.” 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

identified weaknesses in the military services’ internal controls, which 

resulted in the release of parts that were not authorized for release under a 

blanket order to foreign countries, and made a number of 

recommendations to improve the services’ internal controls. The purpose 

of this report is to highlight (1) a systemic problem that we identified in 

the internal controls of the military services’ requisition-processing 

systems and (2) a potential best practice that we identified in one service 

that provides an additional safeguard over foreign military sales of 

classified and controlled parts. 

For this report, we analyzed the findings and recommendations of our 

prior reviews. We also reviewed DOD’s written comments on our prior 

reports. In general, we concentrated our prior work on classified and 

controlled spare parts that foreign countries requisitioned under blanket 

orders. As part of our previous work, we verified whether the systems 

approved and released requisitioned parts in accordance with DOD’s and 

the services’ foreign military sales policies. Our prior reports provide a 

detailed explanation of the scope and methodology we used to conduct 

each review. For this report, we did not conduct new audit work. We 

conducted this review in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards from July through September 2004. 

At the time we conducted our reviews, the Army, the Navy, and the Air 

Force were not testing their automated requisition-processing systems to 

ensure that the systems were accurately reviewing and approving blanket 

order requisitions for compliance with restrictions on the sale of classified 

and controlled spare parts and operating in accordance with foreign 

military sales policies. Our tests of the services’ systems showed that 

classified and controlled spare parts that the services did not want to be 

released to foreign countries under blanket orders were being released. 

GAO’s internal control standards require periodic testing of new and 

revised software to ensure that it is working correctly, while the Office of 

Management and Budget’s internal control standards require periodic 

reviews to determine how mission requirements might have changed and 

whether the information systems continue to fulfill ongoing and 

anticipated mission requirements. DOD either concurred or partially 

concurred with our prior recommendations for testing the requisitionprocessing systems. The department, however, does not have a plan 

specifying the remedial actions to be taken to implement these 

recommendations. If actions are not taken to implement testing, the 

potential benefits of these controls in preventing the inadvertent release of 

classified or controlled spare parts may not be realized. In its comments 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

on our prior recommendations, DOD concurred with the need to test the 

Army’s system, stating that testing of the system and its logic would occur, 

given the funding and guidance required to do so. DOD also concurred 

with the need to test the Navy’s system. DOD partially concurred with the 

need to test the Air Force’s system and stated that a program was being 

developed to test new modifications to the Air Force’s system and that 

testing of old modifications would be an ongoing effort. However, testing 

only the modifications to the Air Force’s system, as DOD commented, will 

not necessarily ensure that the system’s logic is working correctly. 

Subsequently, the Air Force reported that it had modified its system and 

would be conducting annual tests of the system’s logic. Furthermore, 

internal control standards requiring testing will be applicable to the Case 

Execution Management Information System, which DOD and the military 

services are developing to replace the individual military services’ systems. 

The Army’s automated requisition-processing system incorporates a 

potential best practice that helps to prevent the release of classified or 

controlled parts that are not authorized under blanket orders to foreign 

countries. The automated systems used by the Navy and the Air Force 

allow country managers5

 to override system decisions not to release 

classified or controlled parts that are requisitioned under blanket orders to 

foreign countries. We found instances where Navy and Air Force country 

managers overrode the systems’ decisions without documenting their 

reasons for doing so. In contrast, the Army’s system automatically cancels 

requisitions that are made under blanket orders for classified or controlled 

parts. Because the requisitions are automatically canceled, country 

managers do not have an opportunity to override the system’s decisions. 

Compared with the Navy’s and the Air Force’s systems, the Army’s system 

provides more stringent protection against releasing classified or 

controlled parts to countries that are not authorized to receive them under 

blanket orders. 

This report contains recommendations aimed at (1) ensuring that DOD 

and the military services follow up on our prior recommendations by 

developing specific plans to institute the required testing of their 

automated systems, (2) incorporating required testing in the development 

of the Case Execution Management Information System, and 

(3) determining if it would be beneficial to modify the Navy’s and the 

 5

 Country managers are responsible for managing the sale of items to foreign countries and 

perform supply and financial technical work. 
Page 4 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

Air Force’s requisition-processing systems so that the systems reject 

requisitions for classified or controlled parts that foreign countries make 

under blanket orders and preclude managers from manually overriding 

system decisions, and to modify their systems as appropriate. 

In its comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the 

report’s recommendations. 

The sale or transfer of U.S. defense items to friendly nations and allies 

is an integral component of both U.S. national security and foreign 

policy. The U.S. government authorizes the sale or transfer of military 

equipment, including spare parts, to foreign countries either through 

government-to-government agreements or through direct sales from 

U.S. manufacturers. The Arms Export Control Act6

 and the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 19617

 authorize the DOD foreign military sales program. 

From 1993 through 2002, DOD delivered over $150 billion worth of 

services and defense articles to foreign countries through foreign military 

sales programs administered by the military services. The articles sold 

include classified and controlled cryptographic spare parts. 

The Department of State sets overall policy concerning which countries 

are eligible to participate in the DOD foreign military sales program. DOD 

identifies military technology that requires control when its transfer to 

potential adversaries could significantly enhance a foreign country’s 

military or war-making capability. Various agencies such as the 

Department of State and DOD are responsible for controlling, in part, the 

transfer or release of military technology to foreign countries. 

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, under the direction of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, has overall responsibility for 

administering the foreign military sales program, and the military services 

generally execute the sales agreements with the individual countries. 

A foreign country representative initiates a request by sending a letter to 

DOD asking for such information as the price and availability of goods and 

services, training, technical assistance, and follow-on support. Once the 

foreign customer decides to proceed with the purchase, DOD prepares a 

Letter of Offer and Acceptance stating the terms of the sale for the items 

 6

 Pub. L. No. 90-629, as amended. 

7

 Pub. L. No. 87-195, as amended. 

Background 
Page 5 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

and services to be provided. After this letter has been accepted, the foreign 

customer is generally required to pay, in advance, the amounts necessary 

to cover the costs associated with the services or items to be purchased 

from DOD and then is allowed to request spare parts through DOD’s 

supply system. 

Generally, the military services use separate automated systems to process 

requisitions from foreign countries for spare parts. While the Air Force has 

retained responsibility for its system, responsibility for the Army’s and the 

Navy’s systems was transferred to the Defense Security Assistance 

Development Center in October 1997. The Center, which is part of the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency, has overall responsibility for 

providing system information technology maintenance support, such as 

testing the system. For blanket orders, the systems use various codes and 

item identifiers to restrict the spare parts available to the countries. In 

cases where the systems validate a requisition, the requisition is sent to a 

supply center to be filled and shipped. In cases where the systems reject a 

requisition, the requisition is sent to a country manager for review. The 

country manager will either validate the requisition and forward it to the 

supply center to be filled and shipped or reject the requisition, in which 

case the requisition is canceled. 

Our reviews showed that the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force were not 

testing their automated systems to ensure that the systems were 

accurately reviewing and approving blanket order requisitions for 

compliance with restrictions and operating in accordance with foreign 

military sales policies. Our tests of the services’ automated systems used 

to manage foreign countries’ requisitions for spare parts made through 

blanket orders showed that classified and controlled spare parts that the 

services did not want released were being released to countries. For 

example, we identified 5 out of 38 blanket order requisitions for which the 

Navy’s system approved and released 32 circuit card assemblies’ 

controlled cryptographic spare parts to foreign countries. According to 

Defense Security Assistance Development Center officials, who are 

responsible for this portion of the Navy’s system, the system was not 

programmed to review the controlled cryptographic items codes, and as a 

result, the system automatically approved and released the parts requested 

by the foreign countries. Navy and DOD officials were unaware that the 

system was not reviewing controlled cryptographic parts prior to their 

release to foreign countries. 

Testing of the 

RequisitionProcessing Systems Is 

Needed to Improve 

Internal Controls for 

Foreign Military Sales 
Page 6 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

For another example, the Air Force’s system used controls that were 

based on supply class restrictions and that were ineffective and resulted in 

erroneously approving requisitions for shipment. Included in an item’s 

national stock number is a four-digit federal supply class, which may be 

shared by thousands of items. The national stock number also contains a 

nine-digit item identification number that is unique for each item in the 

supply system. We found that countries requisitioning parts under the Air 

Force’s system could obtain a classified or controlled spare part by using 

an incorrect, but unrestricted, supply class with an item’s correct national 

item identification number. The Air Force was unaware of this situation 

until our test of the system identified the problem. In response to our 

work, the Air Force corrected the problem. 

GAO’s internal control standards require periodic testing of new and 

revised software to ensure that it is working correctly, while the Office of 

Management and Budget’s internal control standards require periodic 

reviews to determine how mission requirements might have changed and 

whether the information systems continue to fulfill ongoing and 

anticipated mission requirements.8

 The importance of testing and 

reviewing systems to ensure that they are operating properly is highlighted 

in the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.

9

 The act 

requires periodic testing and evaluation of the effectiveness of information 

security controls and techniques. Moreover, the act requires agencies, as 

part of their information security program, to include a process for 

planning, implementing, evaluating, and documenting remedial actions to 

address deficiencies. Under guidance from the Office of Management and 

Budget, agencies are to develop a Plan of Actions & Milestones to report 

on the status of remediation efforts. This plan is to list information 

security weaknesses, show estimated resource needs or other challenges 

to resolving them, key milestones and completion dates, and the status of 

corrective actions. 

In commenting on our prior reports, DOD either concurred or partially 

concurred with our recommendations for testing the services’ requisition-

 8

 GAO, Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual, GAO/AIMD-12.19.6

(Washington, D.C.: January 1999); Office of Management and Budget, Management 

of Federal Information Resources (Washington, D.C.: November 2000); and GAO, 

Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: 

August 2001). 

9

 Pub. L. No. 107-347, §§ 301-305. 
Page 7 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

processing systems. The department, however, does not have a plan 

specifying the remedial actions to be taken to implement these 

recommendations. If actions are not taken to implement testing and 

reviews, the potential benefits of these controls in preventing the 

inadvertent release of classified or controlled spare parts may not be 

realized. 

• Regarding our recommendation to periodically test the Army’s system, 

DOD concurred and stated that testing of the Army system and its logic 

would occur, given the funding and guidance required to do so. 

• In response to our recommendation to periodically test the Navy’s system, 

DOD concurred. 

• Concerning our recommendation to periodically test the Air Force’s 

system, DOD partially concurred and stated that a program was being 

developed to test new modifications to the Air Force’s system and that 

testing of old modifications would be an ongoing effort. Testing only the 

modifications to the Air Force’s system, as DOD commented, will not 

necessarily ensure that the system’s logic is working correctly. 

Subsequently, the Air Force concurred with our recommendation and 

reported that it had modified its system and would be conducting annual 

tests of the system’s logic. 

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the military services are 

developing a new automated system, the Case Execution Management 

Information System, to process foreign military sales requisitions. The new 

system will replace the services’ existing legacy systems with a standard 

DOD system. DOD expects to deploy the new system in fiscal year 2007. 

Internal control standards requiring testing will be applicable to the new 

system. 

Our reviews showed that the Navy’s and the Air Force’s systems allowed 

country managers, who are responsible for managing the sale of items to 

foreign countries, to override system decisions not to release to foreign 

countries classified or controlled parts that are requisitioned under 

blanket orders. We identified instances where Navy and Air Force country 

managers overrode the systems’ decisions without documenting their 

reasons for doing so. For example, of the 123 Air Force requisitions we 

reviewed, the Air Force’s system identified 36 requisitions for country 

manager review. For 19 of the requisitions, the managers overrode the 

system’s decisions and shipped classified and controlled spare parts 

without documenting their reasons for overriding the system. The 

Army’s Practice 

Provides More 

Stringent Protection 

against the Improper 

Release of Parts to 

Foreign Countries 
Page 8 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

managers we queried could not provide an explanation for overriding 

the system. 

In 1999, the Army modified its system to reject requisitions that are made 

under blanket orders for classified or controlled parts. As a result, Army 

country managers were precluded from manually overriding the Army 

system’s decisions. Compared with the Navy’s and the Air Force’s systems, 

the Army’s system provides more stringent protection against releasing 

classified or controlled parts that are not authorized for release under 

blanket orders to foreign countries. 

Preventing the inadvertent release of classified and controlled spare parts 

that are not authorized for release under blanket orders to foreign 

countries deserves the highest level of management attention. The 

preemptive nature of testing and reviewing systems allows this internal 

control to identify system weaknesses prior to the inadvertent release of 

classified or controlled spare parts. Had the services conducted periodic 

tests of their systems, the instances of releasing spare parts that DOD did 

not want released that we identified in our reports could have been 

significantly reduced, if not eliminated. Developing effective corrective 

action plans is key to ensuring that remedial action is taken to address 

significant information-system internal control deficiencies. We believe the 

department could demonstrate its commitment to addressing this systemic 

weakness by providing specific information on its planned remedial 

actions. 

Documenting country managers’ decisions to override system decisions is 

a control that could help prevent the release of classified or controlled 

parts that are not authorized for release under blanket orders to a foreign 

country. However, modifying systems, as the Army did, to reject 

requisitions that are made under blanket orders for classified or controlled 

parts and to preclude country managers from manually overriding system 

decisions would provide more stringent protection against releasing 

classified or controlled parts that are not authorized for release under 

blanket orders to a foreign country. 

Conclusions 
Page 9 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

To reduce the likelihood of releasing classified and controlled spare parts 

that DOD does not want to be released to foreign countries, we 

recommend that you take the following three actions: 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in conjunction with the 

Secretaries of the Army and the Navy, and direct the Secretary of the Air 

Force to develop an implementation plan, such as a Plan of Actions & 

Milestones, specifying the remedial actions to be taken to ensure that 

applicable testing and review of the existing requisition-processing 

systems are conducted on a periodic basis. 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in conjunction with the 

Secretaries of the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy, to determine 

whether current plans for developing the Case Execution Management 

Information System call for periodic testing and, if not, provide for such 

testing. 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in conjunction with the 

Secretary of the Navy, and direct the Secretary of the Air Force to 

determine if it would be beneficial to modify the Navy’s and the Air 

Force’s requisition-processing systems so that the systems reject 

requisitions for classified or controlled parts that foreign countries make 

under blanket orders and preclude country managers from manually 

overriding system decisions, and to modify their systems as appropriate. 

The Director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency provided 

written comments on a draft of this report for DOD and partially 

concurred with one recommendation and concurred with two 

recommendations. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop a Plan of 

Actions & Milestones specifying the remedial actions to be taken to 

ensure that applicable testing and review of the existing requisitionprocessing systems is conducted on a periodic basis. DOD stated that the 

services have made appropriate changes to their systems in response to 

our prior reports and routine maintenance and have tested the 

applications accordingly. DOD also stated that, in lieu of a formal Plan of 

Actions & Milestones, the military services, in concert with DOD, can 

institute a practice of testing the applications on an annual basis, if those 

applications are not otherwise changed and tested as a matter of routine 

maintenance, to satisfy the requirement for periodic testing. We agree that 

alternatives to a formal Plan of Actions & Milestones may address the 

needed remedial actions. However, we believe any alternative should 

specify the remedial actions to be taken to ensure that applicable testing 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 10 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

and review of the existing requisition-processing systems are conducted 

on a periodic basis, and we have modified our recommendation 

accordingly. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation regarding the Case Execution 

Management Information System. DOD stated that the system’s software 

program testing will adhere to software-testing standards in place at the 

time of implementation, including testing to ensure that the functionality 

of existing software code is not changed when the coding is modified or 

enhanced. 

DOD also concurred with our recommendation to determine if it would be 

beneficial to modify the Navy’s and the Air Force’s requisition-processing 

systems so that the systems reject requisitions for classified or controlled 

parts that foreign countries make under blanket orders and preclude 

managers from manually overriding system decisions, and to modify their 

systems as appropriate. DOD stated that it will review the Navy’s and the 

Air Force’s business processes, as well as the requisition-processing 

systems. DOD noted that a better option may be to mandate that country 

managers seek the appropriate waivers in accordance with DOD policy to 

allow the release of a classified or controlled spare part under a blanket 

order; provide sufficient documentation for doing so; and make sure it is 

done as the exception, not the rule. We agree that this option would 

enhance the Navy’s and the Air Force’s controls and could help prevent 

the release of classified or controlled parts that are not authorized for 

release under a blanket order to a foreign country. 

DOD also provided technical and editorial comments, which we have 

incorporated as appropriate. 

DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix I of this letter. 

As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit 

a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the 

Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and to the House Committee 

on Government Reform not later than 60 days from the date of the report 

and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the 

agency’s first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the 

date of the report. Because agency personnel serve as the primary source 

of information on the status of recommendations, we request that DOD 

also provide us with a copy of DOD’s statement of action to serve as 

preliminary information on the status of open recommendations. Please 
Page 11 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

provide me with a copy of your responses. My e-mail address is 

solisw@gao.gov. 

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Tom Harkin; the Senate 

and House Committees on Armed Services; the Secretaries of the Army, 

the Navy, and the Air Force; the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget; and other interested congressional committees. The report is also 

available on GAO’s home page at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-8365. Key 

contributors to this report were Thomas Gosling, Louis Modliszewski, and 

R. K. Wild. Key contributors to our prior reports are listed in those reports. 

Sincerely yours, 

William M. Solis, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 12 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Note: GAO’s comments 

supplementing those in 

the report’s text appear at 

the end of this appendix. 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 13 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

Note: Page numbers in 

the draft report may differ 

from those in this report. 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 14 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

See comment 1. 

See comment 1. 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 15 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

See comment 1. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 2. 

See comment 1. 

See comment 1. 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 16 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

See comment 1. 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 17 GAO-05-17 Foreign Military Sales 

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter 

dated October 8, 2004. 

1. In our report, we modified the text to clarify that the parts were not 

authorized for release under blanket orders. The title of this report is 

consistent with the titles of our prior reports on this subject, as listed 

on page 1, and we did not modify it as DOD suggests. 

2. In response to DOD’s comments, we modified the text to state that 

DOD does not have a plan specifying the remedial actions to be taken 

to implement our recommendations. 

GAO’s Comments 

(350586) 
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