United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Ranking Minority 

Member, Subcommittee on Space and 

Aeronautics, Committee on Science, 

House of Representatives 

NASA’S DEEP SPACE 

NETWORK 

Current Management 

Structure Is Not 

Conducive to 

Effectively Matching 

Resources with Future 

Requirements 

April 2006 

 

GAO-06-445 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2006

NASA'S DEEP SPACE NETWORK

Current Management Structure Is Not 

Conducive to Effectively Matching 

Resources with Future Requirements Highlights of GAO-06-445, a report to the 

Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee 

on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on 

Science, House of Representatives 

The President’s Vision for Space 

Exploration calls for human and 

robotic missions to the Moon, 

Mars, and beyond. In response,

over the next two decades, NASA

may spend $100 billion on new 

technologies and facilities that will 

require reliable ground 

communications to achieve those 

missions. Presently, that 

communications capability is 

provided by NASA’s Deep Space

Network—a system of antennas

located at three sites around the 

world. However, the Network 

faces challenges that may hinder its 

provision of current and future 

mission support. 

This report discusses (1) the 

significant operational challenges 

faced by the Deep Space Network

and (2) the extent to which NASA 

is integrating the Network into its 

future communications plans. 

 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making several 

recommendations to NASA that 

will assist the agency in better

aligning resources for the Deep 

Space Network with overall agency 

requirements for future space 

exploration. NASA concurred with

GAO’s recommendations. 

While NASA’s Deep Space Network can meet most requirements of its 

current workload, it may not be able to meet near-term and future demand. 

The system—suffering from an aging, fragile infrastructure with some 

crucial components over 40 years old—has lost science data during routine 

operations and critical events. In addition, new customers find they must 

compete for this limited capacity, not just with each other, but also with 

legacy missions extended past their lifetimes, such as NASA’s Voyager, that 

nonetheless return valuable science. Program officials doubt they can 

provide adequate coverage to an increasing set of new mission customers, 

especially if they increase dramatically under the President’s Vision. 

The Deep Space Network’s future utility is also in question because NASA 

does not currently match funding for space communications capabilities 

with agency wide space communications requirements. While NASA created 

an agency level entity to review the technical requirements for integrating

assets like the network into an agency wide space communications 

architecture for the future, that entity does not address program level 

requirements nor influence investment decisions. Control over such 

requirements and funding remains with the mission directorates and 

programs themselves. This disconnect allows programs to invest in 

capabilities that may undercut agency wide goals for space communications. 

After this review was initiated, NASA began to study how to better manage 

this gap between agency-level requirements and program-level funding, but 

no recommendations for action have yet been proposed. 

Panoramic of Goldstone, Calif., facility antennas

Source: NASA.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-445.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 

512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 3

DSN Challenges Could Hamper Its Ability to Meet Future Mission 

Requirements 6

Existing Management Structure Does Not Allow NASA to Match 

Space Communications Resources With Requirements 13 

Conclusion 15

Recommendations for Executive Action 16 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 19 

Appendix II Agency Comments from the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration 21 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements 24 

Figures 

Figure 1: Location of Primary Deep Space Network 

Communications Sites 4 

Figure 2: External corrosion on 70-meter antenna 8 

Figure 3: Road Damage to Asphalt Roadway at Goldstone Facility 9 

Figure 4: Water Intrusion to Internal Antenna Structure at 

Goldstone Facility 10 

Figure 5: Voyager I Mission Spacecraft 11 

Figure 6: Mars Exploration Rover 12 

Page i GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Abbreviations 

DSN Deep Space Network 

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

SCAWG Space Communications Architecture Working Group 

SCCIB Space Communication Coordination and Integration Board

SMD Science Mission Directorate 

TOR Terms of Reference 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page ii GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 27, 2006

The Honorable Mark Udall 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Mark Udall 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science 

House of Representatives 

In January 2004, the President outlined a Vision for Space Exploration that 

calls for human and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. Over 

the next two decades, NASA plans to spend over $100 billion to develop a 

number of new capabilities, supporting technologies, and facilities that are 

critical to enabling these missions. These missions will have at least one 

thing in common: they will require a reliable network to handle all 

communication functions for both manned and unmanned spacecraft.

Most of that functional capability for deep space communications 

currently resides in NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN). 

In January 2004, the President outlined a Vision for Space Exploration that 

calls for human and robotic missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. Over 

the next two decades, NASA plans to spend over $100 billion to develop a 

number of new capabilities, supporting technologies, and facilities that are 

critical to enabling these missions. These missions will have at least one 

thing in common: they will require a reliable network to handle all 

communication functions for both manned and unmanned spacecraft.

Most of that functional capability for deep space communications 

currently resides in NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN). 

DSN was established in 1959 to support NASA’s exploration of the solar 

system. According to agency officials, DSN is designed to communicate 

with spacecraft at distances greater than 1.2 million miles from Earth—the 

distance defined as deep space. It is currently the only system of its nature 

with the capability to serve vast numbers of deep space missions. Since its 

inception, the network has returned extensive science data and has proven 

to be a linchpin for successful space exploration missions. Its services are

used by NASA, other domestic organizations, and foreign space agencies. 

However, over time, DSN officials have had to deal with maintaining an

aged infrastructure and managing coverage time for an increasing mission 

set with limited capacity. In addition, although NASA has not made any 

definitive decisions in this regard, new deep space communications 

requirements are envisioned to support projected missions to the moon. 

DSN was established in 1959 to support NASA’s exploration of the solar 

system. According to agency officials, DSN is designed to communicate 

with spacecraft at distances greater than 1.2 million miles from Earth—the 

distance defined as deep space. It is currently the only system of its nature 

with the capability to serve vast numbers of deep space missions. Since its 

inception, the network has returned extensive science data and has proven 

to be a linchpin for successful space exploration missions. Its services are

used by NASA, other domestic organizations, and foreign space agencies. 

However, over time, DSN officials have had to deal with maintaining an

aged infrastructure and managing coverage time for an increasing mission 

set with limited capacity. In addition, although NASA has not made any 

definitive decisions in this regard, new deep space communications 

requirements are envisioned to support projected missions to the moon. 

In maintaining a reliable deep space communication system for the near 

term, while also preparing for the future, NASA will need to effectively 

manage its communication needs and the allocation of resources to meet 

them. As recently as 2003, the National Research Council reported that 

DSN was suffering from insufficient communications capabilities and 

occasional failures. In light of these issues, you asked us to: (1) identify the 

challenges NASA’s DSN program faces in meeting its current and planned

space communications workload and (2) determine the extent NASA is 

integrating DSN into its space communications plans for the future. 

In maintaining a reliable deep space communication system for the near 

term, while also preparing for the future, NASA will need to effectively 

manage its communication needs and the allocation of resources to meet 

them. As recently as 2003, the National Research Council reported that 

DSN was suffering from insufficient communications capabilities and 

occasional failures. In light of these issues, you asked us to: (1) identify the 

challenges NASA’s DSN program faces in meeting its current and planned

space communications workload and (2) determine the extent NASA is 

integrating DSN into its space communications plans for the future. 

Page 1 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Net eep Space Network
To conduct our work, we reviewed documents and data related to the 

operations and capabilities of DSN as well as NASA-wide strategic 

planning documents about the Vision for Space Exploration. We 

interviewed program officials as well as contractor personnel about 

challenges they face in managing and operating DSN. Further, we 

collected and analyzed information related to space communications 

architecture management at NASA and held discussions with NASA space 

communications officials about future space communications architecture 

requirements, what assets the architecture will include, and how its 

development is being managed. We also held discussions with NASA’s 

Space Communications Organization Study Group, which was established 

during the course of our review to develop options for how to manage 

space communications at NASA. We met with officials at NASA 

Headquarters and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), as well as ITT 

Industries contractors at their offices in Monrovia, Calif., and at the DSN 

facility in Goldstone, Calif. Complete details of our scope and 

methodology can be found in appendix I. We performed our review from 

May 2005 to April 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. 

NASA’s Deep Space Network (DSN) is able to meet most of the 

requirements of its current workload, but serious questions exist as to 

whether it will be able to keep up with both near-term and future 

demands. In the near term, DSN faces a deteriorating infrastructure and a

limited capacity to serve additional missions. System infrastructure, which 

has been marked by extensive deferred maintenance, is aging and is likely

to become increasingly fragile and subject to breakdown at a time when 

demand is anticipated to increase. The potential exists for the loss of 

scientific data that would be difficult, if not impossible, to replace. In

addition, new users will find that, aside from competing for network 

capacity with each other, they must also compete with legacy programs 

that have been extended far beyond their intended lifetimes, but still 

return science data and thus take up considerable network time. For 

example, the Voyager mission launched in 1977 still requires DSN support 

and is envisioned to rely on DSN for the foreseeable future. Capacity limits 

constrain the amount of science data that can be returned from deep space 

by new missions that are added to DSN’s set of users. 

Results in Brief 

DSN’s future utility is also in question because NASA currently has no 

mechanism in place to match funding for space communications 

capabilities with agency-wide space communications requirements. 

The agency’s Space Communication Coordination and Integration Board 

Page 2 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
is responsible for reviewing the technical requirements of space 

communications programs to determine whether they fit into an agency

wide architecture. However, according to agency officials, the Board is 

only advisory in nature and does not review all program requirements, 

such as infrastructure needs. As a result, such program requirements are 

often not raised at the agency level. Furthermore, funding for space 

communications capabilities is controlled by the individual 

communications programs and their associated mission directorates, who 

may not necessarily consider agency wide goals when making 

investments. This disconnect between establishment of requirements and 

control of resources creates the potential for programs to make 

investments in capabilities that may undercut agency wide goals for space 

communications. For example, agency officials noted both the Deep Space 

Network and the Ground Network programs recently were on a path to

develop separate array technologies to support overlapping requirements 

for the same lunar missions. These efforts would have undercut the 

agency’s goals of a seamless, integrated architecture for space 

communications and would have represented unnecessary duplication of

effort and added costs. After our review was initiated, NASA created a task 

group to study how to better manage this gap between agency-level

requirements and program-level funding, but it has not yet made any 

recommendations for action to address the situation. 

We are making recommendations to NASA that the DSN program identify 

its current and future requirements in more comprehensive terms and how 

those requirements might be supported as well as items that NASA’s task 

group on space communications should consider to better align program 

requirements with agency space communications goals. In written 

comments on a draft of this report, NASA concurred with our 

recommendations. 

NASA established DSN over 40 years ago with the intention of

coordinating all deep space communications through a single ground 

system to improve efficiency and minimize duplication. Today, DSN 

consists of communications antennas at three major sites around the 

world—Goldstone, Calif.; Madrid, Spain; and Canberra, Australia.1

 These 

Background 

 1

The relationships between the United States and Spain and Australia are outlined in 

international agreements. According to DSN officials, in exchange for use of land by 

NASA’s assets in these foreign countries, the Spanish and Australian space agencies have 

full access to all deep space science collected by NASA spacecraft. 

Page 3 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
sites are specifically positioned to offer complete coverage to deep space 

mission craft regardless of their positions around the Earth. DSN officials 

informed us that while contractor personnel operate all three sites, NASA 

owns the physical assets and is responsible for funding all operations at 

the sites. Each site has a 70-meter antenna, which can provide 

communications with the most distant spacecraft, and several smaller 

antennas that can facilitate communications with closer spacecraft or can 

be arrayed to communicate with more distant missions. NASA’s Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory is responsible for management of DSN and also 

serves as the distribution point for data collected from deep space. 

Figure 1: Location of Primary Deep Space Network Communications Sites 

Goldstone, Calif.

7 mission support 

antennas

Madrid, Spain

5 mission support

antennas

Canberra, Australia

4 mission support 

antennas

Source: NASA.

DSN supports an average of 35 to 40 deep space missions each year. 

According to program officials, as a mission is being developed, a 

representative from the DSN program works with the mission team to 

establish the amount of coverage the mission will need from DSN assets 

during its lifetime. This coverage includes the amount of time per day for 

routine communications and also critical coverage of major mission 

events. In most cases, missions must negotiate with the DSN program 

because they desire more coverage than DSN can provide. Once the 

amount of coverage time is established and major mission events are 

scheduled, DSN commits to that coverage in a Service Agreement with the 

mission. Within the agreement, DSN commits to providing coverage for 

95 percent of the time agreed to with its mission customers, while the 

remaining 5 percent allows for unexpected disruptions during that 

coverage. This 95 percent commitment almost guarantees that all critical

mission events will be covered without disruption. Once this is put into 

place, missions are generally free to trade time amongst themselves if 

Page 4 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
priorities change or a particular mission gets kicked off the network due 

to an unexpected anomaly in the system. The missions that DSN supports 

are not charged for their usage of the system, unless they require a unique 

technology that DSN must add to its system in order to provide coverage.

This is a relatively rare phenomenon, however. DSN is primarily funded 

through its managing entity, the Science Mission Directorate, and receives

resources consistent with its performance the previous year and its 

previous year’s budget. 

DSN works in conjunction with NASA’s other space communications 

assets to provide coverage to missions at all distances from the Earth. 

The Ground Network provides communications capabilities to spacecraft 

in low-Earth orbit. Additionally, the Space Network, including the 

Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System, is an Earth-based satellite relay 

system that also facilitates missions in low-Earth orbit. In order for a 

spacecraft to receive support from all of these communications assets, 

NASA must ensure they are coordinated and can provide the capabilities 

for which they are intended. 

Throughout its history, NASA has had different management structures 

trying to achieve this coordination. According to NASA officials, from the 

Apollo missions in the 1960s through 1995, space communications was 

managed through an agency wide communications entity with budgetary 

authority to provide appropriate investments in system capabilities. 

In 1995, this management and budget authority was devolved to a central

contract managed out of the Johnson Space Center in an effort to cut costs 

and streamline maintenance to the assets. The savings from this 

realignment were never realized for the agency and the communications 

assets were severely underfunded as a result of how they were managed 

under this arrangement. Subsequently, management and budget authority 

for these assets were brought back to NASA headquarters in 2001 and 

aligned with the mission directorate responsible for the customers each 

asset served. NASA then created the Space Communication Coordination 

and Integration Board to oversee the technical integration of these assets 

into a seamless space communications architecture. This is how space 

communications assets, including the DSN program, are managed 

currently at NASA. 

Page 5 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
The NASA Authorization Act of 2005 contains a requirement that the NASA 

Administrator submit a plan for updating NASA’s space communications 

architecture for low-Earth orbital operations and deep space exploration 

so that it is capable of meeting NASA’s needs over the next 20 years. 2 This 

plan is due to be submitted to the House Committee on Science and the 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation no later 

than February 17, 2007. In addition, the Conference Report accompanying 

the Science, State, Justice, Commerce and Related Agencies 

Appropriations Law, 20063

 requires that NASA include a 10-year funding 

profile for DSN in its fiscal year 2007 budget request.4

DSN is currently able to meet most requirements of its existing workload. 

However, according to program officials, DSN’s current operational ability 

is no predictor of future success, and they have significant concerns about 

the ability of the system to continue to meet customer requirements into 

the future. These concerns are based on the system’s aging infrastructure 

and projected additional workload on top of servicing existing missions. 

DSN suffers from an aged, fragile infrastructure. Significant parts of that 

infrastructure—including many antennas—were first built in the 1950s and 

1960s and are showing their age. DSN program officials stated that the 

Goldstone complex is down, on average, 16 hours per week for 

maintenance and repairs due to problems associated with its age. While 

Goldstone contains some of the oldest equipment in the system and the 

poor condition of much of its equipment characterizes the underlying 

fragility of the network, operational disruptions occur across the entire 

network. For instance, the 70-meter dishes are widely regarded by 

program officials and mission customers as increasingly fragile, which 

calls into question expectation of their continued reliability. In fact, 

mission customers shared similar concerns that DSN’s infrastructure is 

not in the appropriate condition that it should be to support their missions. 

With increasing use of these assets, they fear service will only deteriorate 

and more disruptions will occur during service to their missions. Program 

officials and mission customers provided some examples, as follows, of 

DSN Challenges 

Could Hamper Its 

Ability to Meet Future 

Mission Requirements

Sustainability of DSN’s 

Infrastructure Is Unknown 

 2

See sec. 102(c)(1), Public Law 109-155. 

3

See H.R. Conference Report 109-272 accompanying Public Law 109-108. 

4

This profile was not included in NASA’s fiscal year 2007 budget request. 

Page 6 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
disruptions that have occurred during service as a result of infrastructure 

deterioration: 

• During a critical event for the Deep Impact Mission on July 4, 2005, 

corrosion of the sub reflector on the 70-meter dish at DSN’s Madrid site 

caused an unexpected disruption in service. In response, program 

managers had to shift coverage to alternative antennas. While they 

were able to provide adequate coverage of the event for the Deep 

Impact Mission, the shift to back-up antennas forced other users off at 

that time, which meant they lost coverage. 

• In October 2005, a significant power disruption caused by corrosion to 

a major power line resulted in multiple antennas at the Goldstone 

complex going offline, resulting in several hours of downtime and a 

subsequent loss of scientific data.5

• In November 2005, failure of a prime network server resulted in several 

hours of unexpected downtime, which in turn caused considerable loss 

of data to four research projects. During this anomaly, the Stardust, 

Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter, Mars Odyssey and Mars Global Surveyor 

missions lost a total of 241 minutes of coverage to their missions. 

Program officials also expressed concern about the possibility of massive 

antenna failure due to metal fatigue. Ultimately, such a failure would result 

from a partial or total collapse of an antenna structure. Although no DSN 

antenna has yet collapsed from fatigue, an antenna in West Virginia similar 

in design and age to those already used by the DSN program collapsed 

unexpectedly in 1988. DSN program managers are in the process of finding 

an engineering firm to conduct a survey of the program’s antenna assets to 

assess their structural reliability. Beyond that action, program officials rely

mostly on their experience and visual observations to assess the condition

of these assets. 

 5

Although we requested the amount of science data lost due to this disruption, the program 

could not provide it. 

Page 7 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Figure 2: External corrosion on 70-meter antenna

Source: GAO observation at NASA Goldstone facility.

Deferred maintenance also poses a significant challenge to the 

sustainability of DSN assets. Since 2002, the program has consistently 

deferred approximately $30 million in maintenance projects each year. 

These projects are commonly associated with infrastructure that is not 

directly related to system performance and have been given lower priority 

when more pressing needs limit the system’s ability to provide coverage 

for its customers. For example, several roadway, water and electrical 

projects at the Goldstone facility have consistently been deferred due to 

the need to address system maintenance needs considered to have become 

more pressing. Although the program does seek to prioritize its most 

pressing projects and direct resources to them once its budget is allotted, 

operating aging facilities and systems inevitably results in the need for 

new repairs rising unexpectedly, which forces program managers to 

constantly have to juggle priorities to address them. 

Page 8 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Figure 3: Road Damage to Asphalt Roadway at Goldstone Facility 

Source: NASA.

Page 9 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Figure 4: Water Intrusion to Internal Antenna Structure at Goldstone Facility 

Source: NASA.

Limited Capacity to 

Provide Coverage Is 

Exacerbated By An 

Increasing Mission Set 

DSN also faces increasing competition between new and old users for 

coverage time on the system. There is a growing demand for a level of 

service that DSN is not likely to be able to provide to its customers. DSN 

promises 95 percent availability to its mission customers for routine 

mission coverage. According to program officials, the remaining 5 percent

is reserved for unexpected failures and downtimes during mission 

coverage. They said DSN can maintain its 95 percent commitment to its 

mission customers within its current mission set. However, as that mission 

Page 10 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
set increases, officials become less confident in their ability to continue to

achieve that level of service. 

New missions are continuing to increase as they have in the past—by 

some 350 percent over the last 20 years. By the year 2020, DSN is projected 

to be required to support twice the number of missions it does currently. 

DSN officials thus find themselves faced with the need to balance this new 

demand with an equally compelling demand from existing “legacy” 

missions that have remained operational beyond their original lifetimes 

but are still returning science data and need to be maintained. Such legacy 

missions include the following: 

• The Voyager missions—two similar spacecraft launched in 1977 to 

conduct close-up studies of Jupiter and Saturn, Saturn’s rings, and the 

larger moons of the two planets—are still supported by DSN today 

even though their primary missions were completed in 1989. Each 

mission receives approximately 12 hours of coverage each day using 

one of the network’s 70-meter dishes. 

Figure 5: Voyager I Mission Spacecraft 

Source: www.nasa.gov.

Page 11 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
• The Mars Rover missions, although scheduled to end their prime 

missions in mid-2004, have gone well beyond their forecasted lifetimes. 

Program officials pointed out that even though they did not have a role 

in the decision to extend the missions, the program continues to 

allocate funds to support their operations through present day. 

Figure 6: Mars Exploration Rover 

Source: www.nasa.gov.

It is up to the DSN program to determine how best to provide service to its 

many mission customers, but this task is becoming increasingly complex. 

The effort to balance conflicting program priorities is a continuing struggle 

for DSN program managers. So far, DSN has been able to avoid stressing 

the capacity of the system because a select number of missions it was 

Page 12 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
scheduled to support were either canceled or failed before requiring 

significant support. However, according to program officials, if the 

number of missions the system is scheduled to support begins to increase, 

the amount of service the system can provide will be limited. Further, 

officials expect that any commitments to provide support for manned 

missions under the coming Vision for Space Exploration, in addition to 

what it currently must support, will prevent them from being able to

provide necessary coverage to new mission customers or maintain the 

service guarantee of 95 percent availability to any customer. 

In addition, the DSN program is planning to begin decommissioning its 

26 meter antennas in 2006 due to costs of maintenance associated with 

their age. Officials told us that they believe the program’s remaining 

34- and 70-meter antennas will be unable to sustain the anticipated 

workload in the very near future, and one projection is that the system will 

reach capacity in 2013. If this occurs, the opportunity to continue adding

new mission customers will be limited and the potential for lost deep 

space science is significant. 

DSN’s future utility is also in question because NASA currently does not 

have a mechanism in place to match funding for space communications 

assets with program requirements, such as infrastructure and technology 

development needs, from an agency wide perspective. At the end of 2003,

NASA created the Space Communication Coordination and Integration 

Board with the intent of reviewing requirements for integration of space 

communications assets into a seamless architecture, but according to 

agency officials, the Board does not review individual program 

requirements or have any authority over the allocation of resources to the 

space communications programs. Instead, funding for space 

communications capabilities is controlled by the individual 

communications programs and their associated mission directorates, who 

may not consider agency wide goals when making investments. This 

disconnect between requirements and resources has caused program level 

requirements to be given low priority by the agency, which in turn has 

forced programs to make tradeoffs to maintain functionality and has 

offered the potential for programs to make investments that may undercut 

agency wide goals for space communications. In light of this problem, 

NASA has recently established a task group to identify ways to better 

address how to match agency requirements with program resources. 

Existing Management 

Structure Does Not 

Allow NASA to Match 

Space 

Communications 

Resources With 

Requirements 

Page 13 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
At the end of 2003, NASA created the Space Communication Coordination 

and Integration Board to establish technical requirements for the 

integration of NASA’s space communications assets into a seamless 

communications architecture for the future. According to NASA officials, 

the Board is technical in nature and not intended to manage space 

communications, but rather focus on integrating the architecture. Further, 

officials said that no other agency-level entity reviews requirements for 

individual communications programs or establishes broader mission 

requirements for space communications. As a result, they informed us that 

program requirements, such as infrastructure and technology development 

needs, have consistently been given low priority by the agency. They said 

that the DSN program is forced to make tradeoffs to maintain 

functionality, but it is not able to fully address its requirements and has 

concerns about its ability to continue supporting the operations for which 

it is entrusted. 

Agency Space 

Communications Oversight 

Board Establishes Limited 

Requirements 

Currently, identification of appropriate investment resources (in line with 

decisions made about the architecture) is performed by the mission 

directorate with responsibility over the program and the program’s 

customers. There is no overarching entity for space communications 

management at NASA to consider the specific investment needs of the 

programs and direct funding accordingly. And while all programs are 

supposed to consider the broader needs of the agency and other programs 

in their investment decisions, officials informed us that there is no formal 

oversight mechanism to ensure that investment decisions made at the

program level are in line with those broader requirements. 

As a result of this mismatch between agency level requirements and 

investment decisions for the programs that support those requirements, 

NASA has limited ability to prevent competing programs from making 

investments that, while supporting individual program requirements, 

undercut broader agency goals. For example, several agency officials 

noted both the Deep Space Network and the Ground Network programs 

recently were on a path to develop separate array technologies to support 

overlapping requirements for the same lunar missions, which would have 

undercut agency efforts to create a seamless, integrated architecture for 

space communications and would have represented unnecessary 

duplication of effort and added costs. But officials said these pilot efforts 

were terminated after much of the planning for them had taken place. 

However, the termination was a result of budget constraints and lack of 

clearly defined requirements, as opposed to a decision by an authority 

with an agency wide investment perspective. In addition, another potential

DSN customer—the Solar Dynamic Observatory—recognized that DSN 

Page 14 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
could not provide it with the service it needed, so it invested in its own 

communications antennas to provide the coverage it needed. Such 

duplication undermines the original intent of DSN to be an efficient, single

network for NASA’s deep space communications on Earth. 

During the course of our review, NASA established a task group to address 

how best to manage the agency’s space communications programs so 

program resources are invested in a way that supports agency wide goals.

The task group has yet to make any recommendations to address these 

issues. 

Currently, the task group must consider two primary competing 

viewpoints within the agency. One viewpoint holds that the current 

structure of space communications, in which mission directorates and 

programs control resources, is ideal because it allows communications 

support to be controlled by the same entity that establishes and funds the 

programs that use the system. For example, DSN is funded by the Science 

Mission Directorate, which also supports the vast majority of missions that 

the DSN serves. Some agency officials believe that this approach provides 

better customer service, since resource trade-offs can be made by those 

closest to both the customers and the service provider. However, under 

this current structure, maintenance requirements for DSN have 

consistently been deemed a low priority. 

Alternatively, others in the agency point to the success of a more 

centralized space communications structure, as was in place before 1995. 

Under this structure, resource decisions can be made in light of an overall 

agency perspective on which communications program can best fulfill 

agency wide communications goals. However, one official suggested that 

under this structure, maintenance requirements for DSN could become an

even lower priority as the requirements of other programs are considered. 

In the former case, a program like DSN must compete for funding against 

individual missions. In the latter case, a program like DSN will compete for 

funding against other space communications assets. 

By establishing DSN as the primary communications system for 

supporting deep space missions, NASA will be reliant on the system for 

mission successes—both now and in the distant future. By virtue of this 

reliance, NASA has a responsibility to ensure that the system is 

operationally sound and meets user needs. The system faces challenges 

that call into question how well it will continue to be able to adequately 

NASA Efforts Address MisMatch Between 

Requirements, Resources 

Conclusion 

Page 15 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
support deep space missions. The potential for more significant system 

failure and major disruption to the deep space exploration program, both 

manned and unmanned, looms large if nothing is done to address the 

condition of DSN. As NASA continues to depend on the program for 

meeting its deep space communications requirements, the program and 

the agency will have to determine what those requirements are and how

they can best meet those requirements with a viable system for the future. 

Establishing these requirements in terms more comprehensive than just 

being able to provide coverage for 95 percent of committed time will 

provide for a better understanding of what is needed by the program. 

Furthermore, quantification and characterization of such requirements in 

more comprehensive terms will be critical to the development of a plan as 

required under the 2005 NASA Authorization Act. 

As NASA prepares to take on extensive exploration initiatives under the 

President’s Vision for Space Exploration, the agency needs to position 

itself to make investment decisions from an agency-wide perspective.

Currently, because NASA does not consider program level requirements 

when planning agency wide commitments for space communications, 

many of these program requirements, such as infrastructure needs, are not 

being addressed, which means they will worsen and inhibit the agency’s 

ability to support future space exploration initiatives. Also, since space 

communications programs have the ability to direct resources to 

investments, investments made may not support agency wide 

requirements conducive to a broader and possibly more efficient space 

communications capability for the agency. As NASA begins to commit 

more resources to deep space exploration in the future, the agency must 

ensure that it properly addresses the communications needs of all of its 

missions and makes investments from that viewpoint. NASA has the 

opportunity to address this issue through a newly created task group 

charged with analyzing how this can best be achieved. 

To better position the Deep Space Network to meet existing workload 

challenges and prepare the network for future deep space 

communications responsibilities, we recommend that the NASA 

Administrator direct DSN to (1) identify total program requirements for 

deep space communications capabilities for the near and long term, in 

terms better defined than the single coverage commitment of 95 percent,

(2) determine the extent to which the program’s current capabilities can 

support those identified requirements and (3) develop a plan to address 

any gap between those capabilities and requirements and identify the 

estimated costs of any enhancements needed. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 16 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
As NASA’s task group on space communications considers how program 

requirements can be better integrated into overall agency goals for space 

communications capabilities, we recommend that the NASA Administrator 

direct the group to consider the following in carrying out its task: 

(1) identify what priority program-level requirements have in agency-level

decisions affecting space communications, (2) determine how programlevel requirements for space communications programs can be identified

and communicated to agency-level decision makers, and (3) establish how 

the agency can identify program-level investments needed to address 

program requirements that support agency wide goals for space 

communications and how to coordinate those investments to avoid 

duplication and additional costs. While considering these 

recommendations and the task at hand, the group should also consider the 

importance of having shared knowledge and communication about these 

issues openly with all entities involved. 

NASA concurred with our recommendations. In commenting on the draft

of our report, NASA pointed out that it already had a plan in place that 

addresses our first set of recommendations, namely the need for the 

agency to identify all DSN requirements for the near and long-term, how it 

will meet those requirements, and identify costs associated with meeting 

those requirements. While we recognize that NASA has a DSN Roadmap, 

the agency still lacks a detailed strategy for addressing DSN needs for the 

future that includes all program requirements, i.e. deferred maintenance, 

in addition to the already projected mission needs. Furthermore, the DSN 

Roadmap does not include estimation of costs and does not address the 

impact of unmet needs on its ability to meet mission requirements. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

NASA also commented that the DSN has not been responsible for the loss 

of missions. Our report does not state that missions were lost because of

the DSN. However, NASA officials provided GAO evidence that mission 

science had been lost as a result of disruptions in the operation of DSN, 

and that point is characterized in the report. 

Page 17 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
As agreed with your offices, unless you announce its contents earlier, we 

will not distribute this report further until 30 days from its date. At that 

time, we will send copies to the NASA Administrator and interested 

congressional committees. We will make copies available to others upon 

request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged 

in appendix III. 

Allen Li, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 18 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

To identify the challenges facing NASA’s Deep Space Network program in 

meeting its current and planned space communications workload, we 

performed the following: 

• We obtained and analyzed NASA documents and briefing slides related 

to the operation and capabilities of the Deep Space Network, including 

budget submissions and funding breakouts, workforce projections, 

missions lists, fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 Program Operating 

Plans, the DSN Strategic Roadmap, mission agreements, the 

memorandums of agreement with the host countries of the foreign DSN 

sites, a 2004 NASA-wide facilities condition assessment, deferred 

maintenance information and work breakdown system data, risk 

assessments for various aspects of the network, return on investment 

analyses for various technology upgrades and system performance and 

reliability data, including records of downtimes. 

• We reviewed the NASA Vision for Exploration roadmaps and the 

National Research Council reports on those roadmaps, the Vision for 

Exploration Architecture report, and NASA Strategic Plan for 2005 and 

Beyond for information about the role of DSN in the Vision. We also 

reviewed previous GAO reports on infrastructure investment,

technology development and deferred maintenance. 

• We interviewed NASA mission officials to receive their feedback on the 

performance of DSN, including performance shortfalls, in meeting their 

needs and collected information related to those specific missions. We 

also discussed the nature of challenges experienced by the program 

through interviews with NASA and Jet Propulsion Laboratory officials 

and DSN contractor personnel and received written and oral responses 

from all. 

To determine the extent NASA is integrating DSN into its space 

communications plans for the future, we performed the following: 

• We collected and analyzed information related to space 

communications architecture management at NASA, including the 

NASA 4.0 Communication and Navigation Capability Roadmap, space 

communication architecture plans, descriptions of the various space 

communications assets intended to play a role in the future 

architecture, Memorandum of Agreement for the Management of 

NASA’s Space Communications Networks, and a description of the 

history of space communications management at NASA. 

Page 19 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

• We held discussions with NASA space communications officials about 

future space communications architecture requirements, what assets 

the architecture will include, and how its development is being 

managed by the Space Communication Coordination and Integration 

Board (SCCIB) and Space Communications Architecture Working 

Group (SCAWG). We reviewed the charter of the SCAWG. We also 

discussed the budget development and execution process for DSN at 

the Science Mission Directorate (SMD) level, and how that impacts 

integration of the DSN into the overall agency space communications 

architecture.

• We met with NASA’s Space Communications Organization Study 

Group, which was established during the course of our review, to 

discuss its task of identifying options for the management of space 

communications for the future of NASA space exploration. We also 

reviewed the Terms of Reference (TOR) for this group to better 

understand its goals and time frames. 

To accomplish our work, we visited and interviewed officials responsible 

for DSN operations at NASA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; the Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, Calif.; and ITT Industries contractor 

officials at their offices in Monrovia, Calif., and at the DSN site complex in

Goldstone, Calif. At NASA Headquarters, we met with officials from the 

Science Mission Directorate, including lead representatives from the Deep 

Space Network program, the Exploration Missions Directorate and the

Space Operations Mission Directorate, including the Space

Communications Architecture Working Group. We also met with DSN 

mission officials from the Mars Rovers, Deep Impact, Cassini-Huygens, 

and Stardust programs. 

We conducted our review from May 2005 to April 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 20 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Appendix II: Agency Comments from the Appendix II: Agency Comments from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration 

Page 21 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Appendix II: Agency Comments from the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 22 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Appendix II: Agency Comments from the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Page 23 GAO-06-445 Deep Space Network
Appendix III: GAO

A

 Contact and Staff 

cknowledgements 

Page 24 GAO-06-445

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgements 

Allen Li (202) 512-4841 

In addition to the individual named above, Brendan Culley, James 

Morrison, Sylvia Schatz, Robert Swierczek, Trevor Thomson, Hai Tran and 

Thomas Twambly made key contributions to this report. 

Deep Space Network

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgements 

(120458) 
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