N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT
UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A,

Pla i ntiff-Appe lle e , v. PHILLIP B R

A DLEY SANDER SON, De fe nda n t-Appe l la

nt. No. 16-10484

D.C . No. 3:15-c r-00043-M M D-W GC -1
M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Distric t of Ne v a da M iranda M . Du, Distric t Judge , Pre siding Argue d a nd Subm itte d M arc h

14, 2018 San Fran c isc o , C a lifornia B e fore : FER

NANDEZ, M c KEOW

N, a nd FUENTES, * * C irc uit Judge s. Phillip B ra dle y

Sande rson a

ppe a ls a se nte nc e of life t im e supe rvise d re le a s e
and se v e ra l spe c ia l c o nditions of supe rvise d re le a se im

pose d by the distric t c ourt
a fte r he ple a d e d guilty

to re c e ipt of c hild pornogra phy in viola

tion of 18 U.S.C . § 

# FIL ED APR 11 2018 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U
. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by Ninth C irc uit R

ule 36-3.

* * The Honora

ble Julio M . Fue nte s, Unite d State s C irc uit Judgefor the U.S. C ourt of Appe a l s for the Third C irc uit, sitting by de signa t ion.2252A(a )(2) and (b). W e hav e jurisdic tion unde r 28 U.S.C
. § 1291 a nd 18 U.S.C
. § 3742. W e a ffirm in pa

rt, va c ate in pa

rt, a nd re m and. 1. Expe rt Te stim ony Sande rson c onte nds tha

t the distric t c ourt viola

te d his due proc e ss rights by
c onside ring unre lia

ble e xpe rt te stim ony

re ga rding his risk to re offe nd in im posing life t im e supe rvise d re le a se . To suc c e e d on this c la im , Sande rson m ust e sta blish that the te stim ony “ is (1) fa lse or unre lia ble , a nd (2) de m onstra

bly m a d e the ba sis for the se nte nc e . ” Unite d State s v . Vande rw e rfhorst , 576 F.3d 929, 935–36 (9th C ir. 2009) (c ita

tion a n d quota tion m arks om itte d). He re , e v e n a ssum i ng tha

t Sande rson m e t

the first prong, his c h a lle n ge still fa i ls be c a use the distric t c ourt
c le arly sta te d tha t it would ha

ve im pose d life tim e supe rvision without the e xpe rt te stim ony . Se e Unite d State s v . Gonzale

s , 765 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th C ir. 1985) (noting tha

t we “ take suc h sta

te m e nts a t fa c e va lue ” ). 2. Life tim e Supe rvise d R e le a se Sande rson ne xt a

rgue s tha t a se nte nc e of life tim e supe rvise d re le a se is substa ntive ly unre a sona

b l e in light of his a

ge , la c k of c rim ina l history , supportive fam ily , a nd c om m itm e nt to re ha

bilita tion. Thesubsta

ntive re a sona

ble ne ss of a
se nte nc e is re vie we d for a b u se of disc re tion. Unite d State s v . Aute r y , 555 F.3d 864, 871 (9th C ir. 2009).
2He re , the distric t c ourt c a re fully we ighe d the fa c tors se t forth in 18 U.S.C . § 3553(a ) in im

posing life tim e supe rvision. Inde e d, a s the distric t c ourt found, life t im e supe rvision is re a sona b le in vie wof the nature of Sande rson’ s c rim e , the le ngth a nd de pth of his a ddic tion, a nd the ne e d to prote c t the c om m unity onc e he le ave s prison. As such, we a ffirm the se nte nc e of life t im e supe rvise d re le a se . 3. Supe rvise d R e le a se C onditions Sande rson fina lly

a sse rts tha

t the distric t c o urt e rre d in im posing c e rta in
c onditions of supe

rvise d re le a se a s pa

rt of his se nte nc e . “ W e ge ne ra lly re v ie w
c onditions of supe

rvise d re le a se for a

buse of disc re tion, but we re vie wde novo
c la im s tha

t suc h c onditions viola

te the C onstitution.” Unite d State s v . Ev ans , 883 F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (9th C i r. 2018). Sande rson c onte nds tha

t the a ssoc iation c ondition is va gue and ove rbroa d be c a use it c a pture s inc ide nta l a

nd unknowing c onta c t with mi nors. This a rgum e nt fa ils. W e hav e he ld tha

t “ inc ide nta l c onta c ts,” suc h a s those Sande rson fe a

rs he would be punishe d for, “ do not c onstitute a ssoc iation.” Unite d

State s v . Solte ro , 510 F.3d 858, 866–67 (9th C i r. 2007) (c i tation a n d quota tion m arks om itte d). W e furthe r c onstrue this c ondition “ c onsiste nt with we ll-e sta blishe d jurisprude nc e unde r whic h we pre sum e prohibite d c rim i na l a c ts re q u ire an e le m e nt of m e ns re a .” Unite d State s v . Ve ga , 545 F.3d 743, 750 (9th C ir. 2008). “ Prope rly c onstrue d,
3the n , the c ondition re g ulat e s only k now ing c onta c t” with m inors. Unite d State s v . N apulou , 593 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th C ir. 2010) (e m pha s is in original). The re fore , the a ssoc i at ion c ondition is not va gue or ove rbroa d. Howe v e r, the a ssoc i ation c ondition im plic ate s Sa

n de rson’ s “ pa

rtic ula rly signific ant libe rty

inte re st” in proc re ating a n d a ssoc i ating with a

ny c hildre n he m ay have in the future
. Unite d State s v . W o lf C hild, 699 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th C ir. 2012). Ac c ordingly , be fore im posing thec ondition, the distric t c o urt wa s

“ re quire d to follow a

n e nha nc e d proc e dura l re quire m e nt to m a k e spe c ia l findings on the re c ord supporte d

by e vide nc e in the re c o rd, tha t the c ondition is ne c e ssa

ry for de te rre nc e , prote c tion of thepublic , or re ha bilita tion, a nd tha t it involve s no gre ate r de priva

tion of liberty

tha n re a sona bly ne c e s sa ry .” Id. at 1087. B e c a

use the distric t c o urt did not do so, we va c ate and re m a

nd the a s soc iat ion c ondition for the distric t c o urt to m ake the ne c e ssa ry findings or, if it c annot, to na rrow the
c ondition a

ppropria te ly
. Sande rson ne xt m a inta i ns tha t the phra se “ c ate rs to” in the oc c upation
c ondition is va

gue . W e a gre e . While the re c ord c le arly supports a n oc c u pationa l
re stric tion, Sa

nde rson “ c a

nnot be le ft to gue ss a

bout the inte n de d m e aning of the te rm s of his supe rvise d re l e a se . ” Unite d State s v . Sale s , 476 F.3d 732, 737 (9th

4C ir. 2007). As suc h, we re m and for the distric t c ourt to re w rite the oc c upat ion

c ondition to c la

rify whe re Sande rson c an se e k e m ploy m e nt. Sande rson furthe r argue s tha t the te rm “ loite r” and the phra se “ prim arily
use d by c hildre n” in the loite ring c ondition a re va gue and ove rbroa d. Howe ve r, this la ngua ge is not “ so va gue tha t m e n of c om m on inte llige n c e m

ust ne c e ssa

rily gue ss a t its m e a n ing a nd diffe r a s to its a

pplic ation.” Ev ans , 883 F.3d a t 1160 (c ita tion a nd quota tion m a rks om itte d ). Thus, we a ffirm the loite ring c ondition. Sande rson sim i la

rly c ha lle nge s the re side nc y c ondition a s va gue and
ove rbroa d. C ontra

ry to Sa nde rson’ s a

rgum e nts, the phra se “ dire c t vie w” is not
va gue . Se e id. Howe ve r, this c ondition is ove rbroa d be c a use it c ould pre ve nt Sande rson from

living within sight of pla c e s prim arily

use d by c hildre n, e v e n if he is so fa r away tha t he c annot se e the m . On a ppe a l, the Gove rnm e nt a

rgue s tha t the
c ondition should be

re a d to pre ve nt Sa

nde rson from living within dire c t vie w of pla c e s prim arily use d by

c hildre n only

if he c an a c t

ua lly se e c hildre n from

tha t loc ation. W

hile this interpre tat ion solve s the c ondition’ s ove rbre a dth proble m , it is
c ontra ry to its plain la

ngua ge . Se e Unite d

State s v . C ope , 527 F.3d 944, 958 (9th C ir. 2008) (“ W e . . . c annot a s sum e , a s the gove rnm e nt se e m s to sugge st, tha t [a
c ondition] will be inte rpre te d c ontra ry to its plain la

ngua ge . ” (c ita

t ion a nd

5quota

t ion m arks om itte d)). Thus, we re m and for the distric t c ourt to re write the
re side nc y c ondition to c o m

ply with the Gove rnm e nt’ s inte rpre tat ion. Sande rson a lso c onte nds tha t c ondition 7’ s use of 18 U.S.C
. § 2256(2) to de fine the te rm

“ pornogra

phic ” runs a foul of Unite d State s v . Gnirk e , 775 F.3d 1155 (9th C ir. 2015). W e a gre e . The distric t c o urt sta te d tha t c ondition 7 wa s inte nde d to only prohibit Sa nde rson from

posse ssing c hild a

n d a dult pornogra

phy
. Howe ve r, like the c ondition in G nirk e , c ondition 7—

a s writte n— c a

pture s nonpornogra phic de pic tions of a dult se xua l c onduc t. Ac c ordingly , we va c ate and
re m and for the distric t c ourt to im pose c ondition 7 c onsiste nt with Gnirk e . Sande rson furthe r m a inta ins tha t c ondition 4’ s prohibition on vie w ing or
re a d ing m ate ria ls “ d e sc ribing ‘ s e xua lly e xplic it c onduc t’ involving c hildre n, a s de fine d by

18 U.S.C . § 2256(2)” viola te s his First Am e ndm e nt rights. 1 Howe ve r,
we uphe ld sim ila

r re stric tions in Unite d State s v . Danie ls , 541 F.3d 915, 927–28 (9th C ir. 2008), a

n d Unite d State

s v . Re arde n , 349 F.3d 608, 619–20 (9th C ir. 2003). W hile Sa nde rson a sse rts tha

t Danie l s and Re arde n are distinguisha b le be c a use the c o nditions in those c a se s we re re vie we d for pla in e rror, c ondition 4
a lso withsta

nds a b use of disc re t ion re vie w in light of the goa ls of Sa nde rson’ s

1 To the e xte nt tha

t Sa nde rson a rgue s othe rwise , the te rm “ de sc ribing” in c ondition 4 is not unc onstitutiona lly va gue . 6re ha

bilita tion a nd public sa fe ty . Se e Unite d State s v . Be e , 162 F.3d 1232, 1234–35 (9th C ir. 1998). For substa ntia l ly the sa m e re a sons, we a lso a ffirm c ondition 7’ s prohibition on posse ssing m atte r that “ de pic ts, sugge s ts, or a llude s to se xua l
a c tivity of m inors unde r the a ge of e i ghte e n (18).” AFFIRM E D in par t, V ACAT E D in par t and RE M ANDE D.

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