2020 IL App (4th) 190069-U 

NO. 4-19-0069 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v. 

TRAVIONTE WILLIAMS, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Champaign County 

No. 09CF1862 

Honorable 

Thomas J. Difanis, 

Judge Presiding.

 

 JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.

 Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The circuit court did not err by dismissing defendant’s pro se postconviction 

petition at the first stage of the proceedings.

¶ 2 Defendant, Travionte Williams, appeals the January 8, 2019, order of the 

Champaign County circuit court, summarily dismissing his pro se postconviction petition as 

frivolous and patently without merit. Defendant contends the circuit court’s dismissal was 

erroneous because he raised an arguable claim his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

request a reckless conduct instruction and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness on direct appeal. We affirm.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 In November 2009, the State charged defendant by indictment with one count of 

attempt (first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West 2008)) and one count of 

FILED

November 9, 2020

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme 

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited 

as precedent by any party except in 

the limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
- 2 - 

aggravated battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 2009)). A brief 

description of the evidence at defendant’s June 2010 jury trial relevant to understanding the 

issues on appeal follows.

¶ 5 Charles Arbour testified he purchased drugs from defendant, whom he knew as 

“Tray,” approximately 10 times prior to the evening of October 30, 2009. Through their various 

transactions, Arbour accrued a $50 debt to defendant. Prior to the evening in question, Arbour 

stated neither he nor defendant threatened the other or displayed a weapon. On October 30, 

2009, Arbour arranged to purchase $50 worth of marijuana from defendant and was told to meet 

defendant at an apartment complex to complete the transaction around 1 a.m. 

¶ 6 Arbour stated he met defendant outside the apartment complex, and defendant 

handed him a bag of grass clippings, claiming it was marijuana. Arbour told defendant he would 

not pay for the grass clippings in the bag. Defendant told Arbour “he would be right back” and 

walked upstairs to the second level of the apartment complex taking the grass clippings with him. 

When defendant returned, he was carrying a gun. Arbour testified defendant then said, “give me 

the money or I’m gonna shoot ‘ya.” Arbour stated he was standing about four feet from 

defendant at the time. 

¶ 7 According to Arbour, defendant pointed the gun at him and pulled the trigger, but 

the gun did not fire. Defendant “jacked the hammer,” and Arbour then realized the gun was real. 

Arbour stated he “tried to get the gun down” and “knock the gun out of his hand or push it 

down” after the initial misfire. Arbour testified defendant again pointed the gun at him and 

pulled the trigger, this time striking Arbour with five bullets. Defendant continued firing shots at 

Arbour after Arbour fell to the ground when he was struck in the shoulder by a bullet. Arbour 

testified he did not “really believe it was a struggle” over the gun prior to defendant shooting 
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him.

¶ 8 The parties’ stipulation regarding Arbour’s injuries from the incident stated 

Kimberly Cradock, the trauma surgeon who treated Arbour, would testify to the following: 

(1) Arbour suffered five gunshot wounds on October 30, 2009, (2) Arbour’s injuries required a 

transfusion of over 45 pints of blood, (3) Arbour’s injuries were life-threatening, and (4) Arbour 

remained in the hospital until November 25, 2009. 

¶ 9 Carrie Miller testified that, on the night at issue, she was walking with her friend 

Jennifer Rosemier when she saw two men arguing outside an apartment complex. Though she 

could not hear the conversation, Miller believed she saw the two shove each other at one point, 

though she did not see any punches thrown. Miller then heard five or six gunshots and saw fire 

coming from the end of a gun in one of the person’s hands. Miller stated she saw one of the 

people in the argument fall to the ground and then she ran from the scene. According to her 

testimony, the man Miller saw fall to the ground never pointed a weapon at the other man. 

¶ 10 Rosemier testified she noticed people arguing but could not make out what the 

people were arguing about. She saw “a little bit of shoving.” One of the parties to the argument 

then raised his arm and fired at the other person, causing him to fall to the ground. Rosemier 

stated she heard about five shots and saw fire coming from the gun as the shots were fired. 

When the shots were fired, the individual who was shot did not have a weapon and was not in 

physical contact with the individual firing the gun. 

¶ 11 Urbana police sergeant Harley Rutledge was standing outside the police station on 

the night at issue when he heard gunshots coming from nearby. Rutledge testified he heard an 

initial group of four or five shots, a brief pause, and two more shots. Rutledge stated he could 

not be certain the two groups of shots were from the same gun or were fired in the exact same 
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area, though he thought they all came from the same direction and sounded similar. After 

hearing the shots, Rutledge drove to the crime scene, which was approximately 1.7 miles away 

from the police station by car but significantly closer in straight-line distance. At the scene, 

Rutledge observed six spent .380-caliber shell casings from what he thought was a 

semiautomatic handgun. The casings location and proximity to each other indicated the shooter 

did not move much while firing. Rutledge estimated all six shell casings were located within 

three to five feet of where Arbour had been found. Additionally, Rutledge testified a person 

firing a semiautomatic weapon would typically have to pull the trigger once for each round fired. 

¶ 12 Urbana police officers Matthew Quinley and Duane Smith both testified they

interviewed defendant at the Urbana police department on October 30, 2009. According to 

Officer Quinley, defendant first denied knowing Arbour and told officers he was not involved in 

the shooting at his girlfriend’s apartment complex. Eventually, defendant told investigators he 

had not been truthful with them and asked if he could “start over.” Officer Quinley further 

testified defendant admitted meeting with Arbour to sell him $50 worth of marijuana but 

defendant said Arbour was not happy with what defendant offered him and refused to pay for it. 

Defendant explained Arbour started to walk away and he reached for Arbour. Thereafter, a 

struggle ensued during which Arbour began hitting him, and he pulled out a handgun and shot 

Arbour. According to Officer Quinley, defendant told investigators he pulled the gun out of his 

pocket, pointed it at Arbour, closed his eyes, and pulled the trigger. Officer Quinley testified 

defendant told the investigators the gun had an unlimited trigger, meaning if the shooter pulled 

the trigger and held it down the gun would fire continuously until it was out of ammunition. 

After defendant shot Arbour, he dropped the weapon and ran. Additionally, Officer Quinley 

testified it was possible for an automatic weapon to fire the type of ammunition recovered from 
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the crime scene. He also testified it was possible to modify a semiautomatic handgun to fire 

automatically. Officer Smith testified defendant stated he started with the gun pointed down but 

after he pulled the trigger once, the gun kept firing and he raised it up with his eyes closed until it 

stopped firing. 

¶ 13 Defendant testified he spoke to Arbour about five times between midnight and 1 

a.m. on October 30, 2009, and eventually arranged to get marijuana for Arbour through a third 

party. When Arbour arrived at the apartment complex, defendant went to get the marijuana 

while Arbour waited in the parking lot. That evening defendant was carrying a handgun because 

he had received threating telephone calls. After defendant returned with the marijuana and gave 

it to Arbour, Arbour insisted the substance in the bag was not marijuana. Defendant told Arbour 

to give him back the bag if he did not want it, but Arbour refused to return it.

¶ 14 Defendant testified he attempted to take the bag out of Arbour’s hand and a 

struggle ensued. Arbour overpowered defendant, put him in a headlock, and started choking 

him. Arbour choked defendant for about 20 seconds, and defendant had trouble catching his 

breath. Defendant stated he felt the only way he could defend himself was by using the handgun 

he was carrying.

¶ 15 Defendant pulled the gun out of his right back pants pocket, closed his eyes, and 

began firing with the gun pointed at the ground. The kick of the gun caused defendant’s hand to 

move up. Though he claimed he only pulled the trigger one time, defendant stated the gun fired 

multiple times. When defendant opened his eyes and looked up, he saw Arbour lying on the 

ground, dropped the gun, and ran. Defendant stated he did not intend to kill Arbour when he 

pulled the trigger but only intended to protect himself. 

¶ 16 On cross-examination, defendant testified he sold drugs to Arbour on several 
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occasions and he trusted Arbour to pay him in a timely manner. Defendant did not generally 

carry a gun when he met with Arbour but began carrying one after receiving threats from others. 

Defendant had never previously fired the gun. In addition, defendant stated that, while he and 

Arbour were struggling with each other, he never saw a weapon in Arbour’s hands and Arbour 

never threatened him with a weapon. The prosecutor then asked defendant if he told the 

investigating officers Arbour had choked him, and defendant stated he told the officers Arbour 

choked him. Finally, after first insisting he fired the gun at the ground, defendant admitted he 

raised the gun up to shoulder height, though he insisted the kick from the gun caused his arm to 

raise up.

¶ 17 The jury found defendant not guilty of attempt (first degree murder) but guilty of 

aggravated battery with a firearm. In June 2010, defendant filed a motion for acquittal or a new 

trial. At a July 2010 hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for acquittal or a new trial 

and sentenced him to 18 years’ imprisonment with credit for 265 days spent in pretrial custody. 

In addition to his prison sentence, the court imposed a $5 drug-court fee, a $25 Violent Crime 

Victims Assistance (VCVA) fine, and a $100 trauma-fund fine. In August 2010, defendant filed 

a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the court denied. 

¶ 18 Defendant appealed and argued (1) he received ineffective assistance from trial 

counsel where counsel failed to impeach Arbour by introducing evidence regarding Arbour’s 

“pending case,” (2) his $25 VCVA fine must be reduced because the court imposed additional 

fines, and (3) he was entitled to a $5-per-day credit against his drug-court fee for time he spent in 

pretrial custody. The State conceded (1) defendant’s VCVA fine should be reduced from $25 to 

$12 and (2) defendant was due a per diem credit of $5 a day against his drug-court fee. In 

January 2012, this court rejected defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and 
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amended his fines and fees order. People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (4th) 100710-U, ¶¶ 40, 48. 

¶ 19 On December 10, 2014, defendant filed a “Pro Se Petition to Vacate and Void the 

Judgment and Sentence,” which was treated as a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to 

section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Procedure Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 

2014)). In the petition, defendant challenged the constitutionality of the statute for aggravated 

battery with a firearm (720 ILCS 5/12-4.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 2009)). The State moved to dismiss 

the petition, and the circuit court dismissed the petition, finding it was patently without merit and 

did not state a cause of action. Defendant appealed, and this court affirmed the circuit court’s 

dismissal. People v. Williams, 2017 IL App (4th) 150105-U.

¶ 20 In January 2019, defendant filed pro se the petition for relief under the PostConviction Hearing Act (Postconviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) at issue in 

this appeal. In his postconviction petition, defendant argued (1) the State presented perjured 

testimony from Arbour, the victim; (2) a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 

occurred when the victim’s inconsistent statements were withheld; (3) the jury acquittal for

attempt (first degree murder) was inconsistent with his conviction for aggravated battery with a 

firearm; (4) his attorney should have required jury instructions for reckless conduct; and (5) his 

18-year sentence was excessive. On January 8, 2019, the circuit court filed a written order, 

dismissing defendant’s petition at the first stage of the postconviction proceedings.

¶ 21 On January 25, 2019, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal in sufficient 

compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(d) 

(eff. July 1, 2017) (providing the supreme court rules governing criminal appeals apply to 

appeals in postconviction proceedings). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction under Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 651(a) (eff. July 1, 2017). 
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¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 The Postconviction Act “provides a mechanism for criminal defendants to 

challenge their convictions or sentences based on a substantial violation of their rights under the 

federal or state constitutions.” People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345, 354, 925 N.E.2d 1069, 1074-75 

(2010). A proceeding under the Postconviction Act is a collateral proceeding and not an appeal 

from the defendant’s conviction and sentence. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21, 987 

N.E.2d 371. The defendant must show he suffered a substantial deprivation of his federal or 

state constitutional rights. People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79, 83, 885 N.E.2d 1044, 1046 

(2008). 

¶ 24 The Postconviction Act establishes a three-stage process for adjudicating a 

postconviction petition. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23. Here, defendant’s petition was 

dismissed at the first stage. At the first stage, the circuit court must review the postconviction 

petition and determine whether “the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 

5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). To survive dismissal at this initial stage, the postconviction 

petition “need only present the gist of a constitutional claim,” which is “a low threshold” that 

requires the petition to contain only “a limited amount of detail.” People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 

410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1996). Our supreme court has held “a pro se petition seeking 

postconviction relief under the [Postconviction] Act for a denial of constitutional rights may be 

summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit only if the petition has no arguable 

basis either in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 

(2009). A petition lacks an arguable legal basis when it is based on an indisputably meritless 

legal theory, such as one that is completely contradicted by the record. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16, 

912 N.E.2d at 1212. A petition lacks an arguable factual basis when it is based on a fanciful 
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factual allegation, such as one that is clearly baseless, fantastic, or delusional. Hodges, 234 Ill. 

2d at 16-17, 912 N.E.2d at 1212. “In considering a petition pursuant to [section 122-2.1 of the 

Postconviction Act], the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the 

petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and any 

transcripts of such proceeding.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(c) (West 2018); see also People v. Brown, 

236 Ill. 2d 175, 184, 923 N.E.2d 748, 754 (2010). 

¶ 25 Our review of the first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo. 

People v. Dunlap, 2011 IL App (4th) 100595, ¶ 20, 963 N.E.2d 394. With the de novo standard, 

the reviewing court affords no deference to the circuit court’s judgment or reasoning. People v. 

Walker, 2018 IL App (1st) 160509, ¶ 22, 128 N.E.3d 978. Essentially, the reviewing court 

performs the same analysis the circuit court would have performed. Walker, 2018 IL App (1st) 

160509, ¶ 22. Additionally, the reviewing court may affirm the circuit court’s judgment on any 

basis found in the record. Walker, 2018 IL App (1st) 160509, ¶ 23. 

¶ 26 A. Forfeiture

¶ 27 On appeal, defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

because counsel failed to request a reckless conduct instruction. In his brief, defendant expressly 

states his claim was apparent from reading the record on appeal and should have been raised on 

direct appeal. However, he contends the issue should not be deemed waived because appellate 

counsel’s failure to raise the claim on direct appeal amounted to ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel. The State argues defendant did not raise an ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel claim in his pro se postconviction petition. As such, the State contends we should find 

defendant’s claim forfeited and affirm the circuit court’s judgment. See People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 

2d 498, 505, 821 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (2004) (noting our supreme court has generally held a claim 
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not raised in a postconviction petition cannot be argued for the first time on appeal). Defendant 

disagrees, claiming his petition inartfully stated the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel.

¶ 28 In his postconviction petition, defendant argued counsel violated the sixth 

amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VI) when counsel failed to ask the court to give jury 

instructions on reckless conduct. He contended counsel was aware reckless conduct was a 

lesser-included offense. Defendant asserted counsel’s actions deprived him of a fair trial and 

were not trial strategy. According to defendant’s petition, counsel “could have gotten defendant 

a lesser sentence.” He noted the jury did believe defendant “acted in somewhat self-defense.” In 

his petition, defendant was clearly referring to his trial counsel’s actions and not appellate 

counsel’s. Defendant does not assert any of the exhibits he submitted with his petition indicate 

he was also raising a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The petition itself 

makes no mention of an appeal or counsel’s failure to raise the issue previously. Even with the 

most liberal construction of defendant’s petition, defendant does not raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel regarding appellate counsel’s actions. See People v. Cole, 2012 IL App 

(1st) 102499, ¶ 14, 977 N.E.2d 1189 (rejecting the argument “ ‘implicit’ claims of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel fall within the ‘liberal construction’ mandate for review of pro se

postconviction petitions.”) Defendant contends this court should overlook forfeiture citing 

People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 427-28, 686 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1997). There, our supreme court 

noted the strict application of res judicata and the “waiver” rule applicable to issues raised or 

which could have been raised on direct appeal will be relaxed in postconviction proceedings 

“where ‘fundamental fairness’ so requires.” Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 427, 686 N.E.2d at 591 

(quoting People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371, 662 N.E.2d 1304, 1312 (1996)). Here, the 
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State has asserted forfeiture based on a failure to raise the issue in the postconviction petition. 

Our supreme court has emphasized this court is not free to excuse an “appellate waiver” caused 

by the defendant’s failure to include issues in his or her postconviction petition. Jones, 213 Ill. 

2d at 508, 821 N.E.2d at 1099. Thus, we agree with the State defendant has forfeited his issues 

on appeal. 

¶ 29 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 30 Even absent forfeiture, defendant fails to show he stated the gist of a 

constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. This court analyzes ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984). People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (1999). To obtain 

reversal under Strickland, a defendant must prove (1) his counsel’s performance failed to meet 

an objective standard of competence and (2) counsel’s deficient performance resulted in 

prejudice to the defendant. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163-64. To satisfy the 

deficiency prong of Strickland, the defendant must demonstrate counsel made errors so serious 

and counsel’s performance was so deficient that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” 

guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163. Further, the 

defendant must overcome the strong presumption the challenged action or inaction could have 

been the product of sound trial strategy. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163. To satisfy 

the prejudice prong, the defendant must prove a reasonable probability exists that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different. Evans, 186 

Ill. 2d at 93, 708 N.E.2d at 1163-64. The Strickland Court noted a case should be decided on the 

ground of lack of sufficient prejudice rather than counsel’s constitutionally deficient 

representation if it is easier to do so. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
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¶ 31 In his original brief, defendant contends he stated the gist of a constitutional claim 

his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a reckless conduct instruction where some 

evidence was presented at trial that would support the instruction. In support of his claim, he 

cites several cases where the reviewing court addressed whether the trial court erred by refusing 

to give tendered instructions on a lesser-included offense. See People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 

118882, 77 N.E.3d 26; People v. Williams, 293 Ill. App. 3d 276, 688 N.E.2d 320 (1997); People 

v. Upton, 230 Ill. App. 3d 365, 595 N.E.2d 56 (1992). Only defendant’s concluding sentence on 

this argument cited to a case that actually addressed ineffective assistance of counsel related to 

jury instructions. See People v. DuPree, 397 Ill. App. 3d 719, 731, 922 N.E.2d 503, 514 (2010). 

¶ 32 In People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224, 229, 642 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (1994), our 

supreme court held a defendant has the exclusive right to decide whether to submit a jury 

instruction on a lesser-included offense at the conclusion of the evidence. Later, in People v. 

Medina, 221 Ill. 2d 394, 405-06, 851 N.E.2d 1220, 1226 (2006), the supreme court further 

explained a defendant’s decision to tender a lesser-included offense instruction as follows:

“A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction only if the 

evidence at trial is such that a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the 

lesser offense, yet acquit him of the greater. [Citations.] That evidentiary 

prerequisite must be met before a right to have the jury instructed on a lesserincluded offense arises. [Citation.] Therefore, if the defendant chooses to submit 

a lesser-included offense instruction, he is acknowledging, indeed arguing, that 

the evidence is such that a rational jury could convict him of the lesser-included 

offense, and he is exposing himself to potential criminal liability, which he 

otherwise might avoid if neither the trial judge nor the prosecutor seeks the 
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pertinent instruction. [Citation.] If, on the other hand, the defendant chooses to 

forgo the opportunity to tender a lesser-included offense instruction, the defendant 

might be passing up an important third option to a jury which, believing that the 

defendant is guilty of something but uncertain whether the charged offense has 

been proved, might otherwise convict rather than acquit the defendant of the 

greater offense. [Citation.] In order to make an intelligent and informed decision 

in that regard, the defendant obviously requires the advice of counsel to aid the 

defendant in evaluating the evidence and to apprise the defendant of any potential 

conflicts with the defense strategy pursued to that point in the trial, functions that 

a trial judge cannot perform for the defendant. As members of this court have 

observed, the decision whether to tender a lesser-included offense instruction 

partakes of, and is unavoidably intertwined with, strategic trial calculations, 

matters within the sphere of trial counsel.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

¶ 33 In his initial brief, defendant fails to address how trial counsel’s performance 

interfered with defendant’s decision not to tender a jury instruction on reckless conduct. Instead, 

defendant focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence for giving such an instruction. Defendant’s 

bare and conclusory allegations in his postconviction petition that defense counsel knew reckless 

conduct was a lesser-included offense and was ineffective for failing to tender an instruction on 

reckless conduct were insufficient to show how trial counsel did not fulfill his role as explained 

in Medina. 

¶ 34 For the first time in his reply brief, defendant asserted his petition indicated 

defendant believed a reckless conduct instruction was warranted but his trial counsel only 

proceeded with a theory of self-defense. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 
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2018) provides “[p]oints not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral 

argument, or on petition for rehearing.” More than a century ago, our supreme court explained 

the reasoning behind the rule as follows: “ ‘Under the rules of this court and its long[-]settled 

practice, questions not raised *** in the original brief cannot be raised in the reply brief. A 

contrary practice would permit [movants] to argue questions in their reply briefs as to which 

counsel for [their opponents] would have no opportunity to reply. Th[ese] question[s] therefore 

need not be considered.’ ” People v. English, 2011 IL App (3d) 100764, ¶ 22, 952 N.E.2d 677 

(quoting Holliday v. Shepherd, 269 Ill. 429, 436, 109 N.E. 976, 979 (1915)). Thus, defendant 

could not raise this argument for the first time in his reply brief.

¶ 35 Regardless, defendant did not comply with section 122-2 of the Postconviction 

Act’s supporting document requirement in his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In People 

v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 62, 782 N.E.2d 195, 196 (2002), the defendant filed a pro se

postconviction petition alleging his trial counsel failed to assist him in filing an appeal and 

seeking a reduction of his sentence. The defendant provided a sworn verification of his petition 

but did not attach any other supporting documentation. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 62, 782 N.E.2d at 

196. The circuit court summarily dismissed the defendant’s petition at the first stage. Collins, 

202 Ill. 2d at 62, 782 N.E.2d at 196. On review, the supreme court found the defendant did not 

comply with the requirements of section 122-2 because his petition was not supported by 

documentation and did not explain the absence of such documentation. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d at 66, 

782 N.E.2d at 198. The supreme court further found the defendant’s failure to comply with 

section 122-2 justified the summary dismissal of his postconviction petition. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 

at 66, 782 N.E.2d at 198. Here, defendant’s petition was not even verified. Defendant also did 

not include any supporting documentation, such as his own affidavit, or explain why such 
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documentation was absent that showed how trial counsel did not fulfill his role as described in 

Medina. Such evidence would have been outside the record, and thus supporting documents 

were necessary. 

¶ 36 Accordingly, we find the circuit court properly dismissed defendant’s 

postconviction petition at the first stage of the proceedings. 

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Champaign County circuit court’s judgment. 

¶ 39 Affirmed.