IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 14–2093

Filed April 10, 2015

Amended June 24, 2015

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

JOHN D. HEDGECOTH,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

The grievance commission reports an attorney violated several 

rules of professional conduct and recommends suspension. LICENSE 

SUSPENDED.

Charles L. Harrington and Elizabeth E. Quinlan, for complainant.

John D. Hedgecoth, Des Moines, pro se.
2

HECHT, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board (the Board) 

charged attorney John D. Hedgecoth with violating multiple rules of 

professional conduct after the Board received three separate complaints. 

After a hearing, the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission (the 

commission) found Hedgecoth violated several rules and recommended 

suspension of his license for six months plus several conditions of 

reinstatement.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Hedgecoth was admitted to the Iowa bar in 1998. He estimates 

that since being admitted, he has been actively practicing for seven-anda-half years. He initially practiced law from 1998 to 2005, taking one 

year off in 2002 to run for political office. From 2005 to 2011, he closed 

his law practice and worked as a policy advisor and political campaign 

staffer. After those endeavors were completed, Hedgecoth returned to the 

practice of law.

In June 2012, while engaged in the practice of law, Hedgecoth 

signed an employment contract with a gubernatorial candidate. The 

contract provided for a sliding scale of employment, initially requiring 

twenty percent of Hedgecoth’s time, and gradually increasing over time to 

a full-time commitment. Accordingly, from January through November 

2014, Hedgecoth worked full time for the political campaign and did not 

actively practice law. 

A. Odell Everett Matter. In July 2012, shortly after signing the 

employment contract with the political campaign, Hedgecoth was court 

appointed to represent Odell Everett Jr. in a postconviction-relief appeal. 

On October 19, 2012, Hedgecoth was ordered to file a combined 

certificate and an application to waive filing fees. Hedgecoth did not 
3

comply with the order. Accordingly, on November 6, the clerk of the Iowa 

Supreme Court sent Hedgecoth a letter informing him default would be 

entered against his client if the documents were not immediately filed. 

Hedgecoth again failed to file the required documents, and as a result, on 

January 30, 2013, the clerk entered a notice of default and assessed a 

penalty of $150 against Hedgecoth.

Hedgecoth was given an additional fifteen days to cure the default 

and was warned that noncompliance could result in referral to the 

Board. The fifteen-day period elapsed with no response from Hedgecoth. 

Several weeks later, on March 6, Hedgecoth applied for and was granted 

an extension of time for curing the default. Despite the extension, 

Hedgecoth still failed to file the required documents, resulting in another 

notice of default and another penalty of $150. Although he received an 

express warning that his failure to cure the default could result in a 

referral to the Board, Hedgecoth took no action. Responding to 

Hedgecoth’s inaction, this court removed Hedgecoth as counsel on May 8 

and notified the Board.

On May 9, the Board notified Hedgecoth of the complaint and 

requested his response. Although he received the notice of complaint, 

Hedgecoth made no response. On July 10, the Board sent a second 

notice to Hedgecoth requesting a response to the complaint, and again 

Hedgecoth acknowledged receipt but did not respond. Accordingly, the 

Board’s administrator sought and we entered an order temporarily 

suspending Hedgecoth’s license to practice law. Hedgecoth eventually 

responded to the complaint, and the suspension was lifted.

B. Stephanie Sexton Matter. On August 16, 2012, Hedgecoth 

was court appointed as counsel for Stephanie Sexton in a criminal 

appeal. He filed his appearance on August 17. On October 19, the clerk 
4

of court issued an order directing Hedgecoth to file a combined certificate 

and application to waive filing fees within fourteen days. Hedgecoth 

failed to timely file the required documents. The clerk of court issued a 

notice of default and assessed a penalty of $150 against Hedgecoth for 

this conduct. The notice again warned Hedgecoth that the Board would 

be notified if he should fail to cure the default.

On March 6, 2013, Hedgecoth filed the combined certificate and an 

application to waive filing fees. Hedgecoth further indicated he would 

prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings, but he failed to do 

so. On June 26, the clerk of court entered a second notice of default and 

assessment of penalty in the Sexton appeal when Hedgecoth failed to 

timely file a proof brief and designation of appendix. The notice warned 

the matter would be dismissed if the default was not remedied. 

Hedgecoth again failed to take responsive action. On July 30, this court 

removed Hedgecoth as Sexton’s counsel and notified the Board.

The Board subsequently mailed Hedgecoth a notice of complaint 

and requested his response. Hearing no response, the Board sought and

we ordered temporary suspension of Hedgecoth’s license. Hedgecoth was 

reinstated five days later after he filed a response to the complaint.

C. Lisa Howard Matter. In March 2013, Hedgecoth undertook 

the representation of Lisa Howard, a defendant in a civil matter. On 

Howard’s behalf, Hedgecoth filed an answer to the original petition and 

asserted counterclaims. On July 29, opposing counsel in the case filed a 

notice of serving discovery and subsequently served Hedgecoth with 

requests for production, interrogatories, and requests for admissions. 

Hedgecoth did not respond to these discovery requests.

On August 26, opposing counsel filed an amended petition. 

Hedgecoth did not file an answer. On September 5, plaintiff’s counsel 
5

sent Hedgecoth a letter requesting discovery responses. After Hedgecoth 

failed to respond, opposing counsel filed a motion to compel discovery 

responses on September 13. Hedgecoth did not file any response or 

resistance to this motion.

On September 24, opposing counsel served a second set of 

interrogatories on Hedgecoth, and Hedgecoth again failed to respond. On 

October 15, the district court entered an order compelling discovery 

responses. On October 23, opposing counsel filed a motion for sanctions 

because Hedgecoth had yet to comply with the district court’s October 15 

order. Hedgecoth did not file a resistance to this motion.

On October 29, opposing counsel requested from Hedgecoth 

available dates for a deposition of Howard. After Hedgecoth failed to 

respond to this request, opposing counsel served a notice of deposition of 

the defendant on November 5. The deposition was scheduled for 

November 13, but neither Hedgecoth nor his client appeared for the 

deposition. On November 14, opposing counsel filed a second motion for 

sanctions, and the district court held a hearing on the matter on 

November 21.

On November 22, the district court ordered Hedgecoth to file an 

answer to the second amended petition, provide responses to the first set 

of discovery requests and the second set of interrogatories, and make his 

client available for deposition by December 6. The court also ordered 

Hedgecoth to pay the opposing party over $2100 in costs for attorney fees 

resulting from Hedgecoth’s failures to timely respond to discovery 

requests and his noncompliance with the court’s previous order 

compelling discovery. However, Hedgecoth failed to produce the 

requested discovery as ordered and opposing counsel filed a third motion 

for sanctions on December 6.
6

On December 13, the district court held a hearing on the third

motion for sanctions. Hedgecoth attended the hearing, but arrived late. 

The district court noted that although Hedgecoth had finally provided 

interrogatory responses, they were deficient and untimely. Further, the 

court concluded Hedgecoth had not communicated adequately with 

opposing counsel and had provided discovery responses that were 

unresponsive and clearly not in final form.

On December 20, the district court granted the third motion for 

sanctions, finding Hedgecoth had failed to comply with the district 

court’s November 22 order. The court ordered Hedgecoth to: (1) file an 

answer to the second amended petition; (2) hand deliver complete 

responses to the plaintiff’s discovery requests to opposing counsel by 

December 24; (3) make Howard available for deposition by January 8, 

2014; and (4) reimburse opposing counsel over $1800 for costs 

incurred.1 As an additional sanction, the court dismissed Howard’s 

counterclaims with prejudice.

On January 7, opposing counsel filed a fourth motion for sanctions 

against Hedgecoth, alleging that Hedgecoth had still not complied with 

the district court’s orders. The motion alleged Hedgecoth had yet to file 

an answer to the second amended petition or pay the monetary sanction. 

However, the court did not rule on this motion because the parties 

reached a settlement and the case was dismissed. On January 16, the 

district court judge who had granted the three motions for sanctions 

notified the Board of Hedgecoth’s conduct in the Howard case.

1This new monetary sanction was imposed in addition to the previous award 

from the November 22 order.

 
7

D. Proceedings Before the Commission. On January 27, the 

Board sent Hedgecoth a letter forwarding a copy of its complaint alleging 

he had violated several rules of professional conduct in representing 

Everett, Sexton, and Howard. Having heard no response from 

Hedgecoth, the Board then sent a second letter requesting his response 

to the complaint within ten days. Hedgecoth acknowledged receipt of

both letters, but did not initially provide a response to the complaint. He

eventually responded over two months later, on May 21. 

Stemming from the Everett, Sexton, and Howard matters, the 

Board’s complaint charged Hedgecoth with violating six Iowa Rules of 

Professional Conduct: neglect (rule 32:1.3), failure to expedite litigation 

(rule 32:3.2), failure to obey a court order (rule 32:3.4(c)), failure to 

respond to a legally proper discovery request (rule 32:3.4(d)), failure to 

cooperate with the Board (rule 32:8.1(b)), and conduct prejudicial to the 

administration of justice (rule 32:8.4(d)). The Board served Hedgecoth 

with a complaint, interrogatories, and requests for production on 

August 4, 2014. Hedgecoth did not respond to the complaint and 

requests. On October 29, the commission entered a ruling deeming the 

Board’s allegations admitted by Hedgecoth. 

The commission held a hearing on November 5. Hedgecoth 

attended and appeared pro se. During the hearing, Hedgecoth admitted 

the allegations against him, acknowledged his inability to handle 

appellate cases adequately, and stated he has already taken steps to 

cease his appellate practice. Hedgecoth contended he is especially 

amenable to rehabilitation given his previous experience teaching legal 

ethics and professional responsibility. He urged as a mitigating factor 

his public service as the author of numerous policy proposals for the 

State of Iowa. Finally, he noted his neglectful conduct resulted from 
8

missteps in the administrative aspects of his part-time law practice while 

he simultaneously maintained substantial employment as a political 

operative. Hedgecoth proposed a fifteen-day suspension with auxiliary 

conditions on reinstatement: (1) sixty additional continuing legal 

education (CLE) hours on any topic for the current period, (2) practice 

limitations on appellate work and extralegal employment, (3) a $1500 

fine, (4) sixty hours of certified pro bono work within the next year, (5) 

oversight by an attorney mentor, and (6) an automatic six-month 

suspension should those conditions not be fulfilled.

Following the hearing, the commission found the Board had proved

all of the alleged rule violations. The commission recommended 

suspension of Hedgecoth’s license for a period of no less than six 

months. Further, it recommended additional conditions after 

reinstatement: supervision by another licensed attorney for one year, a 

practice limitation preventing Hedgecoth from representing any client in 

any appeal, and ten mandatory hours of CLE in the areas of ethics and 

law office management. In reaching its determination, the commission 

considered Hedgecoth’s pattern of misconduct and his prior misconduct, 

noting Hedgecoth has already accumulated a significant disciplinary 

history in the relatively short amount of time he has been practicing law. 

The commission also found Hedgecoth’s previous experience teaching

legal ethics and professional responsibility was an aggravating factor.

II. Scope of Review. 

We review attorney disciplinary matters de novo. Iowa Ct. R. 

35.11(1). “The Board must prove the attorney’s . . . misconduct by a 

convincing preponderance of the evidence.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d 466, 470 (Iowa 2014). This 

standard “places a burden on the Board that is higher than the burden 
9

in civil cases,” but “lower than ‘clear and convincing,’ the highest civil 

standard of proof.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Eslick, 859

N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 2015) (citations omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

III. Analysis.

A. Rule Violations. On our de novo review, we address in turn

each rule violation alleged by the Board in determining whether the 

Board carried its burden of proof.

1. Neglect. “The Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct no longer 

expressly refer to neglect. Nevertheless, we have continued to identify 

and sanction attorney neglect.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. 

v. Conroy, 845 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 2014) (citation omitted). We do so 

under rule 32:1.3, which provides, “A lawyer shall act with reasonable 

diligence and promptness in representing a client.” Iowa R. Prof’l 

Conduct 32:1.3. We have concluded neglect cases under a previous 

version of our professional conduct rules provide “precedent for the 

interpretation and application of rule 32:1.3.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Iowa 2012).

“Neglect involves an attorney’s consistent failure to perform his or 

her obligations and indifference about failing to advance the interests of 

his or her client.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 63 (emphasis added). Thus, a 

single missed deadline or inadvertent omission will not usually constitute 

an ethical violation. See Van Ginkel, 809 N.W.2d at 102. Instead, 

“[v]iolations occur when an attorney fails to appear at scheduled court 

proceedings, does not make the proper filings, or is slow to act on 

matters.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nelson, 838 N.W.2d 

528, 537 (Iowa 2013).
10

We have often found attorneys violated rule 32:1.3 when they 

consistently or repeatedly missed deadlines, failed to file required 

documents, or were unreasonably slow to act. See, e.g., Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 

2014) (finding an attorney violated rule 32:1.3 when she failed “to comply 

with deadlines . . . in nine separate criminal cases” and also failed to pay 

court-imposed penalties in a prompt manner); Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65 

(finding an attorney violated rule 32:1.3 when he “failed to timely file 

documents to pursue [six] appeals to which he was appointed”); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d 659, 668

(Iowa 2013) (finding an attorney violated rule 32:1.3 when her handling 

of a particular matter “was characterized by untimely and incomplete 

discovery responses”); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Adams, 

749 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Iowa 2008) (finding an attorney “neglected two 

client matters by failing to comply with appellate deadlines”); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 683 N.W.2d 549, 

552 (Iowa 2004) (finding an attorney committed neglect because in five 

different appeals he “failed to comply with the rules of appellate 

procedure, as well as the subsequent notices to cure the defaults”); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Daggett, 653 N.W.2d 377, 

380 (Iowa 2002) (finding an attorney committed neglect “by failing to 

comply with appellate deadlines” or file required documents).

In this case, Hedgecoth repeatedly missed deadlines in two 

separate appeals and received several default notices. Fortunately, the 

clients’ appeals were not dismissed, but “only because this court 

intervened and ordered him removed.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 65. 

Further, Hedgecoth repeatedly delayed discovery responses in the 

Howard matter and was sanctioned multiple times. On our de novo 
11

review of the record we conclude a convincing preponderance of the 

evidence establishes Hedgecoth violated rule 32:1.3.

2. Failing to expedite litigation. Rule 32:3.2 provides, “A lawyer 

shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the 

interests of the client.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.2. We require 

lawyers to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation because 

“[d]ilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.” 

Id. cmt. [1]. In failure-to-expedite cases, “[t]he question is whether a 

competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action 

as having some substantial purpose other than delay.” Id.

“An attorney violates this rule by failing to appear for status 

conferences and respond to court inquiries. Similarly, an attorney 

violates this rule [by] failing to comply with orders compelling discovery 

responses.” Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d at 492–93 (citation omitted); 

accord Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 

N.W.2d 541, 548 (Iowa 2012) (finding a violation of rule 32:3.2 when the 

attorney “failed to participate in discovery in a timely manner”). Two of 

our recent decisions provide specific examples of conduct violating rule 

32:3.2. In Kieffer-Garrison, the attorney’s “serial failures to comply with 

the requirements of this court’s procedural rules governing the timely 

presentation and progression of appeals” violated rule 32:3.2. KiefferGarrison, 847 N.W.2d at 492–93. And in Kennedy, we found the attorney 

violated rule 32:3.2 when she “did not file anything in two postconviction 

relief proceedings . . . and failed to respond to discovery requests” in 

another matter. Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d at 669.

Hedgecoth’s actions closely resemble the conduct we have

previously determined violates rule 32:3.2. In both the Everett and 

Sexton appeals, he repeatedly failed to follow court rules governing timely 
12

presentation and progression of appeals. In the Howard matter, 

Hedgecoth failed to respond to discovery requests and the opposing 

party’s motions to compel discovery. We find Hedgecoth violated rule 

32:3.2.

3. Failing to obey a court order. Rule 32:3.4(c) provides, “A lawyer 

shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a 

tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid 

obligation exists.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.4(c). This rule promotes 

“[f]air competition in the adversary system” by prohibiting obstructive 

discovery tactics. Id. cmt. [1]. Knowing disobedience occurs when 

noncompliance occurs notwithstanding the attorney’s actual knowledge 

of the court order. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d at 548; see Iowa Supreme 

Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Joy, 728 N.W.2d 806, 813 (Iowa 2007).

In Cunningham, the attorney “was ordered to serve all outstanding 

discovery by [a particular date] or else appear at a hearing on [a pending] 

motion for sanctions.” Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d at 548. When 

Cunningham provided incomplete discovery responses and also did not 

attend the hearing, we found his conduct violated rule 32:3.4(c). Id. 

On October 4, 2013, in the Howard matter, the court entered an 

order compelling discovery responses by October 15. Hedgecoth did not 

provide discovery responses by October 15. On November 21, Hedgecoth

represented to the court that he could provide responses by 

November 27. Relying on this representation, the court entered another 

order on November 22 directing Hedgecoth to respond to discovery 

requests by November 27. Hedgecoth did not provide the responses by 

November 27, or even by December 4, one week later. Thus, Hedgecoth 

disobeyed two court orders by failing to provide timely discovery 

responses. We find Hedgecoth violated rule 32:3.4(c).
13

4. Failing to comply with a legally proper discovery request. In 

contrast to rule 32:3.4(c), which prohibits disobeying a court order, rule 

32:3.4(d) prohibits lawyers from “fail[ing] to make a reasonably diligent 

effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing 

party.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:3.4(d). In the Howard matter, the 

court granted several motions to compel and motions for sanctions filed 

by opposing counsel. Each of these motions were filed because 

Hedgecoth repeatedly failed to provide timely discovery responses to 

opposing counsel’s proper requests. On our de novo review, we find

Hedgecoth violated rule 32:3.4(d).

5. Cooperation with the Board. Rule 32:8.1(b) prohibits lawyers 

from “knowingly fail[ing] to respond to a lawful demand for information 

from an admissions or disciplinary authority.” Id. r. 32:8.1(b). “[W]e 

expect and demand that attorneys cooperate with discipline 

investigations.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. 

Sullins, 556 N.W.2d 456, 457 (Iowa 1996); accord Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Rickabaugh, 728 N.W.2d 375, 381 (Iowa 2007); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Honken, 688 N.W.2d 812, 

821 (Iowa 2004). “We have inferred an attorney’s knowing failure to 

respond when there is proof the attorney received the Board’s inquiries 

and yet failed to provide the information sought.” Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 

540; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Netti, 797 N.W.2d 591, 

604–05 (Iowa 2011); see also Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Paulos, 

410 N.W.2d 260, 261 (Iowa 1987) (finding it “troublesome” that the 

attorney received a notice by certified letter but failed to respond).

Here, we find Hedgecoth received multiple inquiries from the 

Board. In the Everett matter, Hedgecoth acknowledged receipt of a letter

from the Board on June 3, 2013, but did not respond. He again failed to 
14

respond after he received a second certified letter sent by the Board. 

Hedgecoth also ignored two of the Board’s requests for responses to 

complaints in connection with the Sexton matter. These failures to 

respond to the Board eventually led to his temporary suspension in 

January 2014. 

Although the Board alleged Hedgecoth violated rule 32:8.1(b), the 

commission made no finding on this particular allegation. Nonetheless, 

on our de novo review, we find Hedgecoth violated rule 32:8.1(b) because 

he received the Board’s inquiries, but failed to respond.

6. Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rule 

32:8.4(d) prohibits “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 

justice.” Iowa R. Prof’l Conduct 32:8.4(d). “An attorney’s failure to timely 

cooperate with disciplinary authorities is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice, violating not only rule 32:8.1 but also rule 

32:8.4(d).” Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 540; accord Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 60 (Iowa 2009); see also Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 759 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Iowa 

2009). “Ignoring deadlines and orders, which results in default notices 

from the clerk of court, . . . is [also] prejudicial to the administration of 

justice.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Knopf, 793 N.W.2d 

525, 530 (Iowa 2011); accord Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 540.

We have already found Hedgecoth violated rule 32:8.1(b). Rule 

32:8.1(b) and rule 32:8.4(d) are interrelated. See Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 

540. Hedgecoth’s neglect of multiple cases caused the court to prepare 

and send default notices and ultimately required this court to remove 

him as counsel in two appeals. Accordingly, we find Hedgecoth violated 

rule 32:8.4(d). See id. at 541; Knopf, 793 N.W.2d at 530.
15

B. Sanction. We now turn to the determination of an appropriate 

sanction in this case.

1. General principles. When we review attorney disciplinary 

matters, we “may impose a lesser or greater sanction than the discipline 

recommended by the grievance commission.” Iowa Ct. R. 35.11(1). “We 

give respectful consideration to the commission’s recommendation. 

However, the issue of appropriate sanction is exclusively within this 

court’s authority.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin, 

857 N.W.2d 195, 213 (Iowa 2014). There is no standard sanction for any 

individual rule violation, but “previous cases may assist in crafting a 

sanction.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66. To arrive at an appropriate 

sanction,

we consider the nature of the violations, the need for 

deterrence, the need to protect the public, the need to 

preserve the legal profession’s reputation, and the lawyer’s 

fitness to practice law. We also consider mitigating and 

aggravating circumstances, including companion violations, 

repeated neglect, and the attorney’s disciplinary history.

Id. (citation omitted).

2. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The record in this 

case reveals several aggravating factors affecting our determination of the 

appropriate sanction. First, we consider prior discipline. See, e.g., 

Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 67; Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 544; Kennedy, 837 

N.W.2d at 677. Unfortunately, this proceeding is not Hedgecoth’s first 

experience with disciplinary matters. In 2006, he was suspended for 

over six months for failing to respond to inquiries from the Board. In 

July 2007, he was publicly reprimanded for failing to file timely briefs in 

an appeal. In November 2007, he was suspended for failing to fulfill 

client security commission and CLE requirements. And in 2013 and 

2014, he was suspended twice for a total of eight days for his failures to 
16

respond to the Board about the matters giving rise to this proceeding. 

Given that some of these prior instances of discipline were imposed for 

conduct almost identical to the conduct at issue in this proceeding, 

Hedgecoth “surely was aware that future similar conduct would warrant 

a sanction.” Daggett, 653 N.W.2d at 381; see also Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 

67 (concluding an attorney who had “been suspended twice with 

escalating sanctions for neglect of client matters” was “on the clearest of 

notice regarding his failure to meet his ethical responsibilities,” and 

noting “neglect has become an unfortunate but recurrent theme”);

Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 544 (concluding that prior discipline, “especially 

that of the same nature as before the court presently, reflects negatively”

on an attorney’s fitness to practice law).

“[F]ailure to cooperate with the formal disciplinary process is an 

aggravating factor.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Kallsen, 

814 N.W.2d 233, 240 (Iowa 2012); accord Nelson, 838 N.W.2d at 544; 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Schumacher, 723 N.W.2d 802, 

805 (Iowa 2006). We consider Hedgecoth’s delayed responses to the 

Board an aggravating factor here.

Lastly, we consider a specific portion of Hedgecoth’s career 

experience to be an aggravating factor. At the hearing before the 

commission, Hedgecoth stated for the first six years of his practice, he 

taught legal ethics and professional responsibility. Just as we consider 

attorneys’ extensive overall experience to be an aggravating factor, one 

who teaches ethics should certainly be well aware of his responsibilities. 

See, e.g., Barnhill, 847 N.W.2d at 486; Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Morris, 847 N.W.2d 428, 436 (Iowa 2014); Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. McCuskey, 814 N.W.2d 250, 258

(Iowa 2012).
17

We acknowledge one mitigating factor: The record does not reveal 

by a convincing preponderance of the evidence that any of Hedgecoth’s 

clients suffered harm. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Humphrey, 812 N.W.2d 659, 669 (Iowa 2012) (considering lack of harm 

to clients to be a mitigating factor); see also Eslick, 859 N.W.2d at 203; 

cf. Schumacher, 723 N.W.2d at 805 (considering harm to clients an 

aggravating factor); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Walker, 

712 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 2006) (same).

3. Cases involving similar conduct. Having identified several 

aggravating and mitigating factors, we next compare this case with prior 

cases involving similar facts and rule violations. As we have explained, 

although we take each case’s unique circumstances into account when 

reviewing disciplinary proceedings, we recognize that prior cases “may 

assist in crafting a sanction.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66; see also Eslick, 

859 N.W.2d at 202 (“[W]e evaluate each case individually but still 

consider prior cases instructive.”).

Hedgecoth’s principal violation was his lack of diligence. This 

affected three separate client matters and also showed in his failure to 

respond to the Board’s inquiries. Discipline for these types of violations 

“generally ranges from a public reprimand to a six-month suspension.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 634 

N.W.2d 652, 655 (Iowa 2001); accord Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66; 

Moorman, 683 N.W.2d at 553. “Even so, we have imposed lengthy 

suspensions when appropriate.” Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 66. A lengthy 

suspension may be appropriate if the neglect is one violation among 

many much more serious ones or occurs amidst aggravating 

circumstances. Id.; see also Kieffer-Garrison, 847 N.W.2d at 495;

Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d at 675.
18

We have previously imposed a three-month suspension when an 

attorney committed neglect only with respect to one client matter. 

Humphrey, 812 N.W.2d at 669. In Humphrey, a married couple hired the 

attorney to negotiate an insurance settlement. Id. at 662. After initially 

pursuing the settlement, he “ceased responding to inquiries from [his 

clients] regarding the ongoing status of settlement discussions.” Id. The 

clients eventually “completed their negotiations with [the insurer] on 

their own.” Id. at 663. We acknowledged the lawyer neglected only a 

single client matter, caused no tangible harm, and did not profit from his 

actions. Id. at 669. We also noted that while the attorney initially 

ignored the Board’s communications, he eventually testified before the 

commission and admitted the violations. Id. However, despite these 

factors, we concluded a three-month suspension was appropriate 

because the attorney’s license had been suspended twice before—on one 

occasion for neglect (sixty days), and on another occasion for neglect and 

other misconduct (three years). Id.

We also imposed a three-month suspension when an attorney 

neglected two client matters. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Cohrt, 784 N.W.2d 777, 783 (Iowa 2010). In Cohrt, the lawyer 

“repeatedly failed to respond to interrogatories and requests for 

production of documents” propounded by opposing counsel. Id. at 779. 

Because of the lawyer’s nonresponsiveness, the court imposed sanctions 

in one matter, and the attorney avoided sanctions in the second matter 

when it was dismissed before a hearing could be held. See id. at 779–80. 

We noted the lawyer had a history of neglect that resulted in a previous

private admonition. Id. at 779, 783. We also found it significant that he 

had neglected multiple matters. Id. at 783. Finally, we concluded a 

suspension of three months was warranted because the lawyer did not 
19

acknowledge his neglect, instead insisting his conduct was ethically 

proper. See id.

When we have imposed suspensions exceeding three months for 

attorney neglect, the attorney’s lack of diligence has often been 

exacerbated by other misconduct or aggravating factors. For example, 

we have twice imposed a six-month suspension when the attorney’s 

neglect spanned across multiple matters and caused clients harm. 

Schumacher, 723 N.W.2d at 805 (three matters); Walker, 712 N.W.2d at

686 (four matters). Similarly, we have said a six-month suspension is 

warranted when an attorney engages in misrepresentation alongside 

neglect. See Walker, 712 N.W.2d at 684–86. Yet, even without 

misrepresentation or harm to clients, we have concluded more 

widespread neglect made a six-month suspension appropriate. Conroy, 

845 N.W.2d at 67 (concluding an attorney should be suspended for six 

months because he neglected seven matters even after he had previously 

been suspended for sixty days for neglect and other violations). And in 

Kennedy, when all of these aggravating factors—multiplicity of violations, 

harm to clients, and additional misconduct—were present, we suspended 

the attorney for one year. See Kennedy, 837 N.W.2d at 677.

We conclude a three-month suspension is appropriate here. This 

case is more like Humphrey than Schumacher or Walker. Although 

Hedgecoth neglected multiple matters, his neglect did not cause any 

demonstrable financial or other harm to clients, nor was it accompanied 

by auxiliary misrepresentation or misconduct. Further, despite his 

initial unresponsiveness, Hedgecoth eventually testified before the 

commission and admitted the violations. See Humphrey, 812 N.W.2d at 

669 (“[A]lthough [Humphrey] did not respond to two letters from the 

Board, he . . . did testify at the committee hearing, and did ultimately 

admit to the violations he was charged with.”).
20

Although we impose a lesser sanction than the commission 

recommended, we reject Hedgecoth’s assertion that his part-time practice 

and extralegal employment should afford him leniency. We have said 

“[l]awyers do not shed their professional responsibility in their personal 

lives.” Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Millen, 357 N.W.2d 313, 315 

(Iowa 1984). Along the same lines, lawyers who practice part-time are 

not held to a lower standard of professionalism. See Comm. on Prof’l 

Ethics & Conduct v. O’Callaghan, 436 N.W.2d 51, 52 (Iowa 1989) (noting 

the attorney was “practicing only part-time,” yet applying the same 

ethical standards to his conduct as would apply to an attorney practicing 

full time).

Finally, we decline to adopt any of the conditions of reinstatement 

recommended by the commission and requested by Hedgecoth. We have 

often declined conditions like these. See, e.g., Conroy, 845 N.W.2d at 68 

(declining to adopt the commission’s recommendation that the attorney 

complete a basic skills course as a condition of reinstatement); Kennedy, 

837 N.W.2d at 677 (declining to impose an “attorney mentor” 

requirement); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 

N.W.2d 860, 871 (Iowa 2010) (declining to adopt the commission’s 

recommendation that, before applying for reinstatement, the attorney 

should “submit evidence of completing appropriate [CLE]”). In particular, 

we have declined to impose supervision of an attorney as a condition for 

readmission because “neither the court nor the bar has effective 

machinery in place for such supervision.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y 

Disciplinary Bd. v. Kirlin, 741 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Iowa 2007) (per curiam); 

accord Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d at 871–72; Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct 

v. Thomas, 495 N.W.2d 684, 687 (Iowa 1993).2 Further, we have said 

2We imposed a supervision requirement in some older cases. See, e.g., Iowa 

Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Scheetz, 549 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 1996) 

 
21

when violations are based on neglect rather than incompetence, 

“[s]upervision . . . would accomplish no useful purpose.” Thomas, 495 

N.W.2d at 687; see also Kirlin, 741 N.W.2d at 819. And although the 

commission is authorized by court rule to recommend practice 

limitations, Iowa Ct. R. 35.10, we are satisfied that Hedgecoth’s 

voluntary commitment to refrain from representing clients on appeal will 

provide adequate assurance against recurrence of the conduct described 

above. Cf. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d at 871 (considering the attorney’s 

“voluntary cessation of law practice” to be a sufficient remedial effort).

IV. Conclusion.

We suspend Hedgecoth’s license to practice law in this state 

indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for three months from the 

date this opinion is filed. The suspension applies to “all facets of the 

ordinary law practice.” Iowa Ct. R. 35.13(3). Upon application for 

reinstatement, Hedgecoth must establish he has not practiced law during 

his suspension, has complied with the notification requirements of Iowa 

Court Rule 35.23, and has complied with the reinstatement procedures 

of Iowa Court Rule 35.14. Costs are taxed to Hedgecoth pursuant to 

Iowa Court Rule 35.27(1).

LICENSE SUSPENDED.

All justices concur except Zager, J., who takes no part.

(acknowledging Scheetz had voluntarily ceased private practice, but stating if he ever 

returned he would be required to align himself with an experienced mentor before 

undertaking probate or estate matters); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Conzett, 

476 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Iowa 1991) (prohibiting an attorney from accepting certain types of 

cases after reinstatement “unless he . . . associates with a lawyer experienced in that 

type of practice”). However, we have declined to impose this condition since 2007, and 

we continue to follow that path today. See Kirlin, 741 N.W.2d at 819; cf. Kennedy, 837 

N.W.2d at 677–78 (declining to impose a condition “which we have not utilized since 

2004”).

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