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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs. Case No: 3:96cr76-001/RV

LEONARD THOMAS WALKER

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant filed motions pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(b)(1)(2), governed by

U.S.C.A. § 1863 and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1867(e) (doc. 226 & 227) to which the government

responded. (Doc. 229). After a discussion of the merits of the arguments raised in

the defendant’s motions, this court entered a recommendation that they be denied. 

(Doc. 230). The district court adopted the recommendation (doc. 236) and the

defendant appealed. This matter is now before the court upon referral by the district

court (doc. 253) after the Eleventh Circuit’s limited remand of this case. (Doc. 252).

The appellate court remanded this action for the district court to clarify the

legal basis upon which it analyzed and disposed of defendant’s motions for relief

from judgment. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit noted that neither the rule nor

statutes cited by the defendant confer jurisdiction on the district court to consider

collateral attacks on a defendant’s conviction and sentence. (Doc. 252 at 3). It also

noted that ordinarily the proper vehicle for collaterally attacking a federal sentence

is a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. As such district courts are

authorized to recharacterize pro se motions for relief from a criminal judgment as a

§ 2255 motion. In addition to this authority, trial courts also have an obligation to

look beyond the label of the motion filed by a pro se litigant to determine whether the
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motion is cognizable under a different remedial statutory framework. Despite this

latitude afforded to the court, in the instant case, there is no apparent jurisdictional

basis for the defendant’s collateral challenges to his convictions and sentence. 

Defendant’s conviction became final in 1998 (doc. 62), and his first motion to vacate

was denied in 1999. (Doc. 70).1 Although this court’s initial recommendation

conducted a review akin to that conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, relief or

review pursuant to this statute is no longer available to him unless he first obtains

leave from the Eleventh Circuit to file a second or successive motion in this court. 

See 28 U.S.C. 2255(h). Because he previously filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion,

recharacterization of the instant motions would not be proper. Furthermore, no

other jurisdictional basis is apparent from the record. Therefore, this court’s merits

review of the defendant’s claims was improvident.2

 

Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended:

That the district court’s order adopting this court’s merits-based

recommendation be vacated; and 

That the defendant’s motions for judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P.

6(b)(1)(2) (doc. 226 and 227) be DENIED for lack of jurisdiction to consider the claims

raised therein.

 At Pensacola, Florida, this 14th day of December, 2010.

 /s/ Miles Davis

MILES DAVIS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

1

Defendant has filed numerous subsequent post-conviction motions. (Doc. 87, 112, 139, 153,

178, 213). 

2

Even if there were, for the reasons stated in the court’s previous recommendation, defendant

has not established his entitlement to relief. 

Case No: 3:96cr76/RV
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NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Any objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed

within fourteen days after being served a copy thereof. Any different deadline that

may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only, and does not

control. A copy of objections shall be served upon all other parties. Failure to

object may limit the scope of appellate review of factual findings. See 28 U.S.C. §

636; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

Case No: 3:96cr76/RV