Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Willie James Mahone, Miscellaneous 

Docket AG No. 82, September Term, 2015 

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTIONS — INDEFINITE SUSPENSION — 

Respondent Willie James Mahone violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional 

Conduct (“MLRPC”), Maryland Rules regarding attorney trust accounts, and Maryland 

Code (1957, 2010 Repl. Vol.), § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions 

Article (“BP”) when he failed to maintain records accurately reflecting the status of his 

attorney trust account. Furthermore, Respondent commingled personal funds and client 

funds within the account, withdrew cash from his trust account, and created negative 

balances in multiple client accounts. 

On February 12, 2014, Sandy Spring Bank notified the Attorney Grievance Commission 

of Maryland (“AGC”) that Respondent’s attorney trust account was overdrawn by 

$86.48. When the AGC investigated the matter, it found that Respondent could not 

produce records of his trust account activity. In addition, Respondent failed to timely and 

completely respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information. Respondent violated (1) 

MLRPC 1.1 (Competence); (2) MLRPC 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary 

Matters); (3) MLRPC 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct); (4) Maryland Rule 16.606.1 (Attorney 

Trust Account Record-Keeping); (5) Maryland Rule 16-607 (Commingling of Funds); (6) 

Maryland Rule 16-609 (Prohibited Transactions); and (7) BP § 10-306 (Misuse of Trust 

Money) when he mismanaged his attorney trust account and failed to fully comply with 

the AGC’s disciplinary investigation. Taken together, these violations warrant indefinite 

suspension. 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County 

Case No.: 32111

Argued: November 3, 2016 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

 

Misc. Docket AG No. 82 

September Term, 2015 

 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND 

v. 

WILLIE JAMES MAHONE 

 

Barbera, C.J. 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts 

Hotten

Getty, 

JJ.

 

Opinion by Adkins, J.

McDonald and Watts, JJ., concur and dissent. 

 

Filed: December 19, 2016
On February 29, 2016, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland 

(“AGC”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial 

Action against Respondent Willie James Mahone. Bar Counsel charged Mahone with 

violating the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”), Maryland 

Rules governing attorney trust accounts, and a statutory provision regarding misuse of 

trust money.1 Specifically, Bar Counsel alleged that Mahone violated the following 

provisions: (1) MLRPC 1.1 (Competence);2 (2) MLRPC 1.4 (Communication);3 (3) 

 

1

 Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Rules were revised. The MLRPC were 

renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) and 

renumbered. Rules Order (June 6, 2016). The revised rules are now numbered as 

follows: MARPC 19-301.1 (Competence); MARPC 19-301.4 (Communication); 

MARPC 19-301.15 (Safekeeping Property); MARPC 19-308.1 (Bar Admission and 

Disciplinary Matters); and MARPC 19-308.4 (Misconduct). The Maryland Rules 

regarding attorney trust accounts were also renumbered. The revised rules are now 

numbered as follows: Rule 19-407 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping); Rule 19-

408 (Commingling of Funds); and Rule 19-410 (Prohibited Transactions). We will refer 

to the MLRPC and the previous numbering of the Maryland Rules regarding attorney 

trust accounts because the misconduct at issue occurred before these changes. 

2 Rule 1.1. Competence.

A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 

thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 

representation.

3 Rule 1.4. Communication.

(a) A lawyer shall: 

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or 

circumstance with respect to which the client’s 

informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is 

required by these Rules;

(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the 

status of the matter;

 (continued . . .) 
2

MLRPC 1.15(a), (c), and (d) (Safekeeping Property);4 (4) MLRPC 8.1(b) (Bar 

Admission and Disciplinary Matters);5 (3) MLRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct);6

 (4) 

 

(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for 

information; and 

(4) consult with the client about any relevant 

limitation on the attorney’s conduct when the 

attorney knows that the client expects assistance 

not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct or other law. 

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably 

necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions 

regarding the representation.

4 Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property.

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is 

in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a representation 

separate from the lawyer’s own property. Funds shall be kept 

in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 

600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created and 

maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other 

property shall be identified specifically as such and 

appropriately safeguarded, and records of its receipt and 

distribution shall be created and maintained. Complete records 

of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by the 

lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years 

after the date the record was created. 

*** 

(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, 

to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit legal fees and 

expenses that have been paid in advance into a client trust 

account and may withdraw those funds for the lawyer’s own 

benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred. 

(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or 

third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the 

client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or 

otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a 

lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any 

funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled 

 (continued . . .) 
3

Maryland Rule 16.606.1 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping);7 (5) Maryland Rule 

16-607 (Commingling of Funds);8 (6) Maryland Rule 16-609 (Prohibited Transactions);9

 

to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall 

render promptly a full accounting regarding such property. 

5 Rule 8.1. Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters.

An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a 

lawyer in connection with a bar admission application or in 

connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

*** 

(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension 

known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or 

knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information 

from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this 

rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise 

protected by Rule 1.6. 

6 Rule 8.4. Misconduct.

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 

Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to 

do so, or do so through the acts of another; 

*** 

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation; 

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 

justice[.]

7 Rule 16-606.1. Attorney trust account record-keeping. 

(a) Creation of records. The following records shall be created 

and maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of 

clients or of third persons:

(1) Attorney trust account identification. An 

identification of all attorney trust accounts 

maintained, including the name of the financial 

institution, account number, account name, date 

the account was opened, date the account was 

closed, and an agreement with the financial 

 (continued . . .) 
4

 

institution establishing each account and its 

interest-bearing nature. 

(2) Deposits and disbursements. A record for each 

account that chronologically shows all deposits 

and disbursements, as follows:

(A) for each deposit, a record made at or near 

the time of the deposit that shows (i) the 

date of the deposit, (ii) the amount, (iii) the 

identity of the client or third person for 

whom the funds were deposited, and (iv) 

the purpose of the deposit;

(B) for each disbursement, including a 

disbursement made by electronic transfer, a 

record made at or near the time of 

disbursement that shows (i) the date of the 

disbursement, (ii) the amount, (iii) the 

payee, (iv) the identity of the client or third 

person for whom the disbursement was 

made (if not the payee), and (v) the purpose 

of the disbursement; 

(C) for each disbursement made by electronic 

transfer, a written memorandum authorizing 

the transaction and identifying the attorney 

responsible for the transaction.

(3) Client matter records. A record for each client 

matter in which the attorney receives funds in 

trust, as follows:

(A) for each attorney trust account transaction, 

a record that shows (i) the date of the 

deposit or disbursement; (ii) the amount of 

the deposit or disbursement; (iii) the 

purpose for which the funds are intended; 

(iv) for a disbursement, the payee and the 

check number or other payment 

identification; and (v) the balance of funds 

remaining in the account in connection with 

the matter; and 

(B) an identification of the person to whom the 

unused portion of a fee or expense deposit 

is to be returned whenever it is to be 

returned to a person other than the client. 

 (continued . . .) 
5

 

(4) Record of funds of the attorney. A record that 

identifies the funds of the attorney held in each 

attorney trust account as permitted by Rule 16-

607 b. 

(b) Monthly reconciliation. An attorney shall cause to be 

created a monthly reconciliation of all attorney trust account 

records, client matter records, records of funds of the attorney 

held in an attorney trust account as permitted by Rule 16-

607 b, and the adjusted month-end financial institution 

statement balance. The adjusted month-end financial 

institution statement balance is computed by adding 

subsequent deposits to and subtracting subsequent 

disbursements from the financial institution’s month-end 

statement balance. 

(c) Electronic records. Whenever the records required by this 

Rule are created or maintained using electronic means, there 

must be an ability to print a paper copy of the records upon a 

reasonable request to do so.

(d) Records to be maintained. Financial institution month-end 

statements, any canceled checks or copies of canceled checks 

provided with a financial institution month-end statement, 

duplicate deposit slips or deposit receipts generated by the 

financial institution, and records created in accordance with 

section (a) of this Rule shall be maintained for a period of at 

least five years after the date the record was created. 

8 Rule 16-607. Commingling of funds.

a. General prohibition. An attorney or law firm may deposit in 

an attorney trust account only those funds required to be 

deposited in that account by Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so 

deposited by section b. of this Rule. 

b. Exceptions. 1. An attorney or law firm shall either (A) deposit 

into an attorney trust account funds to pay any fees, service 

charges, or minimum balance required by the financial 

institution to open or maintain the account, including those fees 

that cannot be charged against interest due to the Maryland 

Legal Services Corporation Fund pursuant to Rule 16-610 b 1 

(D), or (B) enter into an agreement with the financial institution 

to have any fees or charges deducted from an operating account 

maintained by the attorney or law firm. The attorney or law 

firm may deposit into an attorney trust account any funds 

 (continued . . .) 
6

and (7) Maryland Code (1957, 2010 Repl. Vol.), § 10-306 of the Business Occupations 

and Professions Article (“BP”) (Misuse of Trust Money).10

 

expected to be advanced on behalf of a client and expected to 

be reimbursed to the attorney by the client. 

2. An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney 

trust account funds belonging in part to a client and in part 

presently or potentially to the attorney or law firm. The portion 

belonging to the attorney or law firm shall be withdrawn 

promptly when the attorney or law firm becomes entitled to the 

funds, but any portion disputed by the client shall remain in the 

account until the dispute is resolved.

3. Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and 

commingled in an attorney trust account with the funds held for 

other clients or beneficial owners. 

9 Rule 16-609. Prohibited transactions. 

a. Generally. An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge 

any funds required by the Rules in this Chapter to be deposited 

in an attorney trust account, obtain any remuneration from the 

financial institution for depositing any funds in the account, or 

use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. 

b. No cash disbursements. An instrument drawn on an attorney 

trust account may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer, 

and no cash withdrawal may be made from an automated teller 

machine or by any other method. All disbursements from an 

attorney trust account shall be made by check or electronic 

transfer. 

c. Negative balance prohibited. No funds from an attorney trust 

account shall be disbursed if the disbursement would create a 

negative balance with regard to an individual client matter or 

all client matters in the aggregate.

10 Business Occupations and Professions Article § 10-306. Misuse of trust 

money. 

A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other 

than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the 

lawyer. 
7

 We transmitted the matter to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and 

designated the Honorable Cynthia Callahan (“the hearing judge”) to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing. Following a one-day hearing, the hearing judge issued Findings of 

Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which she found by clear and convincing evidence that 

Mahone violated MLRPC 1.1, MLRPC 8.1(b), MLRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d); Maryland 

Rules 16.606.1, 16-607, 16-609; and BP § 10-306. 

THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT 

Mahone was admitted to the Maryland Bar in May 1980. The AGC’s 

investigation of Mahone was triggered when Sandy Spring Bank notified the AGC that 

an overdraft of his attorney trust account had occurred. The hearing judge made the 

following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence: 

In February 2014, an overdraft in the amount of $86.48 occurred in Mahone’s 

attorney trust account. On March 10, 2014, Bar Counsel sent Mahone a letter 

requesting an explanation of the overdraft and client ledgers, monthly bank statements, 

deposit slips, and canceled checks from November 2013 to March 2014. The letter 

requested a response within 10 days. Mahone responded on March 31, 2014, but did 

not provide the requested client ledgers or deposit slips. His response was also 10 days 

late.

Bar Counsel sent Mahone follow-up letters requesting the client ledgers and 

deposit slips on April 10, 2014, November 18, 2014, and December 10, 2014. Despite 

these repeated requests, Mahone never responded.
8

Due to Mahone’s failure to provide the requested information, Bar Counsel 

subpoenaed Sandy Spring Bank for Mahone’s attorney trust account records for 

November 2013 to December 2014. A forensic investigator for the AGC, Charles E. 

Miller, IV, analyzed Mahone’s attorney trust account records. Miller created a 

transaction summary and client ledger summary from these records, which indicated: 

(1) negative balances in nine client trust accounts; (2) earned attorney’s fees deposited 

into nine client trust accounts; (3) remaining balances in five client trust accounts; (4) 

11 electronic transfers, including several checks Mahone made out to himself; and (5) a 

$1,500 cash withdrawal. 

On April 9, 2015, Bar Counsel provided Mahone with Miller’s summaries and 

requested additional information related to the transactions in the summaries by April 

24, 2015. Although Mahone was granted a 14-day extension, Bar Counsel did not 

receive a response. Bar Counsel then requested a response by May 18, 2015. Mahone 

responded by letter on May 20, 2015, stating that he would provide the requested 

information by June 1, 2015. Mahone finally responded to Bar Counsel’s request on 

August 16, 2015, but failed to provide a satisfactory explanation or any of the requested 

supporting documentation. Mahone later sent Bar Counsel a supplemental response, 

but none of the information he provided addressed Bar Counsel’s requests. 

On June 23, 2016, Bar Counsel deposed Mahone. During his deposition, 

Mahone admitted that he failed to create and maintain proper records, failed to create 

records associated with electronic transactions, and commingled funds. Mahone also 

answered questions related to four transactions in Miller’s summaries. Miller updated 
9

his summaries to reflect this new information, and the summaries were received into 

evidence. The summaries demonstrated the following by clear and convincing 

evidence: 

1. Mahone caused negative balances in the following client matters:

06/25/2014 Acoota -$800.00

12/01/2014 Harrison -$525.00

10/08/2014 Juarez -$1,472.00

10/16/2014 Leppo -$1,365.00

06/16/2014 Mahmood -$516.00

08/29/2014 Mahmood -$2,035.20

12/17/2014 Patty -$2,000.00

09/25/2014 Rice -$1,575.11

02/12/2014 Unknown -$86.48

2. Mahone deposited earned attorney’s fees into his attorney trust account in 

the following matters: 

11/16/2014 Anzures $238.75

11/04/2014 Branson $125.00

11/04/2014 Fletcher $125.00

11/16/2013 Goldberg $300.00

09/10/2014 Knill $125.00

09/10/2014 Lopez $350.00

11/04/2014 Marks $125.00

12/04/2014 Marks $625.00

11/08/2013 Smith-Jasper $260.00

3. Mahone improperly maintained funds in his attorney trust account 

belonging to clients, third parties, and sometimes himself in the following matters: 

04/02/2014 Duckett $27.31

08/06/2014 Hickman $600.00

01/27/2014 Hopkins $200.00

08/11/2014 Salahudding $537.00

08/19/2014 Yamada $1,628.00
10 

4. Mahone failed to maintain records associated with the following electronic 

funds transfers from his attorney trust account: 

01/29/2014 Unknown -$1,000.00

10/02/2014 Unknown -$2,000.00

5. Mahone failed to maintain any records associated with the following 

transactions and cannot identify whose money was withdrawn from the attorney trust 

account:

09/09/2014 Hopehill United 

Methodist

Church

-$100.00

10/02/2014 Check to 

Mahone

-$2,000.00

11/29/2013 Check to 

Mahone

-$800.00

12/30/2013 Check to 

Mahone

-$900.00

02/12/2014 Cash Deposit $125.00

02/18/2014 Cash Deposit $100.00

04/25/2014 Cash Deposit $1,500.00

11/19/2014 Check to 

Mahone

-$500.00

11/25/2014 Check to 

Mahone

-$865.00

6. On September 9, 2014, Mahone made a $100 personal donation to his 

church from his attorney trust account. 
11 

THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

From these facts, the hearing judge concluded that Mahone violated MLRPC 1.1, 

8.1(b), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). The hearing judge also found that Mahone violated 

Maryland Rules 16-606.1, 16-607, and 16-609, and BP § 10-306.11

MLRPC 1.1: Competence 

MLRPC 1.1 requires attorneys to represent their clients with the necessary legal 

knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation. The hearing judge found that Mahone 

violated MLRPC 1.1 when “he failed to competently handle client and third party funds 

deposited into his trust account.” In addition, the hearing judge found that Mahone 

violated MLRPC 1.1 when “he failed to create and maintain records of the deposits and 

withdrawals of client and third party funds.”

MLRPC 8.1: Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters 

 MLRPC 8.1 imposes an obligation on Maryland attorneys to fully cooperate with 

disciplinary investigations. The hearing judge found that Mahone violated MLRPC 

8.1(b) by failing to timely and completely respond to Bar Counsel’s letters requesting 

additional information on March 10, 2014, April 10, 2014, and November 18, 2014. 

MLRPC 8.4: Misconduct 

MLRPC 8.4 defines professional misconduct for attorneys. The hearing judge 

found that Mahone violated MLRPC 8.4(a), (c), and (d). He violated MLRPC 8.4(a) by 

breaching other rules of professional conduct. Mahone violated 8.4(c) “when he created 

 

11 The hearing judge did not find a violation of MLRPC 1.4 or 1.15. The Findings 

of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not contain any mention of these charges. 
12 

negative balances in his trust account for individual client matters and when he overdrafted his account.” Lastly, the hearing judge concluded that Mahone’s conduct, taken 

as a whole, harms the reputation of the legal profession in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d). 

Rule 16-606.1: Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping 

Maryland Rule 16-606.1 requires attorneys to create and maintain records 

reflecting the status and activity of attorney trust accounts. The hearing judge found that 

although Mahone did not act with “malice or for personal gain,” he violated this Rule: 

[Mahone] did not create and maintain records for the receipt 

[or] disbursement of funds [for] clients or [ ] third persons. 

He was unable to identify which client matters were 

associated with numerous transactions. [Mahone] admits that 

he failed to perform monthly reconciliations of his trust 

account. He was unable to reconcile many of the individual 

client ledgers or account for the balance of the funds 

maintained in his account at any given time. [Mahone] failed 

to create or maintain any records associated with the 

electronic transfers from his account.

Rule 16-607: Commingling of Funds 

Maryland Rule 16-607 prohibits attorneys from depositing personal funds into an 

attorney trust account. The hearing judge found that Mahone violated Rule 16-607 by 

“routinely [leaving] his own funds in his trust account as a ‘buffer’” and depositing 

earned attorney’s fees into the trust account. Additionally, the hearing judge found that 

none of the exceptions in Rule 16-607 b—which provides situations in which an attorney 

may commingle personal funds with the clients’—applied. 
13 

Rule 16-609: Prohibited Transactions 

Under Maryland Rule 16-609, attorneys are prohibited from using funds within a 

trust account for any unauthorized purpose, withdrawing cash from a trust account, and

creating a negative balance within a trust account. The hearing judge found that Mahone 

violated Rule 16-609 by using trust funds for unauthorized purposes, withdrawing $1,500 

in cash from his trust account, and creating negative balances in accounts belonging to 

Juarez, Leppo, Mahmood, Rice, and “Unknown.” 

BP § 10-306: Misuse of Trust Money 

 BP § 10-306 prohibits attorneys from using trust money for any unauthorized 

purpose. The hearing judge found that Mahone violated BP § 10-306 for the same 

reasons he violated MLRPC 8.4(c) and Rule 16-609. 

DISCUSSION 

“In attorney discipline proceedings, this Court has original and complete 

jurisdiction and conducts an independent review of the record.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n 

v. Page, 430 Md. 602, 626 (2013) (citation omitted). Within this independent review, 

however, we accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact unless they are determined to be 

clearly erroneous. Id. (citation omitted). If the hearing judge’s factual findings are 

founded on clear and convincing evidence, this Court will not disturb them. Att’y 

Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351, 368 (2008) (citation omitted). By 

contrast, this Court reviews the hearing judge’s conclusions of law without deference. Id.

(citation omitted).
14 

Exceptions

Both parties are permitted to file “(1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of 

the hearing judge [and] (2) recommendations concerning the appropriate 

disposition . . . .” Md. Rule 16-758(b). If neither party files any exceptions, “the Court 

may treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining appropriate 

sanctions, if any.” Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A). Mahone takes exception to multiple 

conclusions in the hearing judge’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.12 Bar 

Counsel has filed no exceptions. 

First, Mahone excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that he “failed to respond” to 

Bar Counsel’s letters sent on April 10, 2014, November 18, 2014, and December 10, 

2014. Mahone argues that because he did not willfully fail to respond to these inquires, 

the hearing judge’s finding is incorrect. He asserts that he did not receive these letters 

because he had changed office locations. Similarly, Mahone excepts to the hearing 

judge’s finding that he “failed to provide information, documentation, or explanation 

sufficient to account for the negative account balances, earned fee deposits, remaining 

balances, electronic transfers, unidentified transfers, and cash withdrawals for any of the 

 

12 Mahone, acting pro se, filed exceptions on October 4, 2016, in which he 

excepted to several of the hearing judge’s findings of fact and any conclusions of law 

premised on the factual findings. Approximately three weeks later, Mahone requested 

leave to file a supplement in support of his exceptions. During oral argument, this Court 

granted Mahone’s request and accepted his supplemental arguments. Therefore, we 

considered Mahone’s supplemental arguments when ruling on his exceptions. 

 
15 

accounts in question.” Mahone contends that he provided “information covering the 

substance of the requests.” Therefore, he argues, this finding is inaccurate. 

Mahone also takes exception to the hearing judge’s findings that he created 

negative account balances, deposited earned attorney’s fees into his attorney trust 

account, improperly maintained client and third party funds in his trust account, and 

failed to maintain records identifying whose money was withdrawn from the trust 

account. Mahone argues that these findings are erroneous, in part or in full, and 

unsupported by the record evidence. Specifically, he asserts that Bar Counsel has not 

presented evidence definitively establishing negative account balances and the 

commingling of funds within the trust account. Furthermore, Mahone argues that Bar 

Counsel did not prove that he failed to maintain proper bank records. He contends that 

the fact that he did not provide sufficient records to Bar Counsel does not mean that he 

did not maintain them. Mahone also excepts to any conclusions of law based on these 

factual findings.13

 

Lastly, Mahone takes exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he violated 

MLRPC 8.4(c). He argues that Bar Counsel has not presented any evidence that he acted 

with dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Rather, Mahone contends, this case 

only involves negligence. He points out that the hearing judge did not find that he acted 

with any intent to deceive or that he made any misrepresentations. Moreover, Bar 

 

13 In his Exceptions to Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Mahone also 

took exception to the hearing judge’s finding that he admitted to commingling funds. At 

oral argument, however, Mahone, through counsel, stated that he was no longer 

maintaining that exception. 
16 

Counsel presented no evidence that any client was deprived of any funds. Mahone 

asserts that his commingling of client and personal funds was due to his failure to move 

earned fees into his own account, and not any fraud or dishonesty on his part. 

We overrule Mahone’s exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Bar 

Counsel submitted sufficient evidence that Mahone failed to respond to letters requesting 

information related to the disciplinary investigation. Although Mahone’s failure to 

respond may not have been willful, the hearing judge only found that he did not 

respond—she made no factual determination as to willfulness. In the Conclusions of 

Law, on the other hand, the hearing judge found a violation of MLRPC 8.1(b) based in 

part on Mahone’s failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s November 18, 2014 letter. We 

agree that Bar Counsel did not present sufficient evidence that Mahone knowingly failed 

to respond to the November 18, 2014 letter, as required by the 8.1(b). But the hearing 

judge’s conclusion that Mahone violated MLRPC 8.1(b) was also based on letters Bar 

Counsel sent on March 10, 2014 and April 10, 2014. Mahone provided an incomplete 

response to Bar Counsel’s March 10, 2014 letter and completely failed to respond to the 

April 10, 2014 letter. Bar Counsel’s November 18, 2014 letter reminded Mahone that he 

had not responded to the April letter and once again requested additional information. 

“Bar Counsel’s persistence will not absolve an attorney of the responsibility to make a 

reasonably prompt reply.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Taylor, 405 Md. 697, 719 (2008). 

Therefore, we overrule Mahone’s exception on this issue. 

We also overrule Mahone’s exception to the hearing judge’s finding that he failed 

to maintain records reflecting the activity of his attorney trust account. At oral argument 
17 

and through his supplemental briefings, Mahone admitted that he failed to maintain the 

required records concerning these accounts. As to Bar Counsel’s requests for additional 

documentation, Mahone explained that “he could not produce what he admittedly failed 

to maintain.” There is also sufficient evidence that Mahone created negative account 

balances, deposited earned attorney’s fees into his attorney trust account, and 

commingled attorney, client, and third party funds. Therefore, we overrule Mahone’s 

exceptions to these findings. 

Lastly, we sustain Mahone’s exception to the hearing judge’s conclusion that he 

violated MLRPC 8.4(c). As discussed below, we find that Bar Counsel has not presented 

clear and convincing evidence that Mahone intended to deceive a client or third party. 

Additionally, we find that he has not made any false statement or misrepresentation in 

violation of MLRPC 8.4(c). 

Conclusions of Law

 We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mahone violated MLRPC 1.1, 

MLRPC 8.1(b), MLRPC 8.4(a) and (d); Maryland Rules 16.606.1, 16-607, 16-609; and 

BP § 10-306. We do not find, however, that Mahone violated MLRPC 8.4(c). 

Mahone violated MLRPC 1.1 and Rule 16-606.1 when he failed to maintain 

records for his attorney trust account. He violated Rule 16-607 when he commingled his 

personal funds with client funds. When Mahone used trust account funds for an 

unauthorized purpose, withdrew cash from the account, and created negative balances 

within multiple client accounts, Mahone violated Rule 16-609 and BP § 10-306. 

Additionally, Mahone’s failure to respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information 
18 

completely and in a timely manner constitute a violation of MLRPC 8.1(b). Taken 

together, these violations result in a breach of MLRPC 8.4(a). Lastly, Mahone’s overall 

mismanagement of client funds constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of 

justice in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d). 

Although Mahone’s conduct clearly violated the provisions described above, he 

did not violate MLRPC 8.4(c), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in “conduct 

involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” Fraud is statutorily defined as 

“conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of [Maryland] and has 

a purpose to deceive.” MLRPC 1.0(e) (emphasis added). “This does not include merely 

negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant 

information.” Id. cmt. 5. The MLRPC do not define dishonesty, deceit, or 

misrepresentation. Therefore, we use the ordinary meanings of these words. See Bd. of 

Educ. v. Marks–Sloan, 428 Md. 1, 28 (2012). In doing so, “it is helpful to consult their 

dictionary definitions.” Id. Black’s Law Dictionary (“Black’s”) defines “deceit” as 

“[t]he act of intentionally leading someone to believe something that is not true” or “an 

act designed to deceive or trick.” Deceit, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 

Applying these definitions to this case, we conclude that Mahone did not engage 

in conduct involving fraud or deceit. There is no evidence that Mahone acted with a 

purpose to deceive in failing to maintain his trust account records or in failing to timely 

and completely respond to Bar Counsel. Furthermore, Bar Counsel has not presented any 

evidence suggesting that Mahone intentionally led Bar Counsel or any third party to 
19 

believe something that was not true. In fact, the hearing judge found that Mahone acted 

“without malice or personal gain.” 

As to the other two terms, Black’s defines “dishonesty” as “behavior that deceives 

or cheats people” or “untruthfulness.” Dishonesty, Black’s Law Dictionary. And 

“misrepresentation” is defined as “[t]he act or an instance of making a false or misleading 

assertion about something, [usually] with the intent to deceive.” Misrepresentation, 

Black’s Law Dictionary. As used in MLRPC 8.4(c), a “misrepresentation is made when 

the attorney ‘knows the statement is false,’ and cannot be ‘the product of mistake, 

misunderstanding, or inadvertence.’” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Zeiger, 428 Md. 546, 

556 (2012) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 68–69 (2007)). An 

attorney can violate MLRPC 8.4(c) through dishonesty or misrepresentation absent any 

intent to deceive. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md. 685, 707–08 (2013). In this 

case, however, Mahone has not done so. Although Mahone was certainly negligent in his 

handling of his attorney trust account, Bar Counsel has not presented clear and 

convincing evidence that Mahone made a dishonest or false assertion in violation of 

MLRPC 8.4(c). See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 684 (2002) (“It 

is well settled that this Court will not find a violation of [MLRPC] 8.4(c) when the 

attorney’s misconduct is the product of ‘negligent rather than intentional misconduct.’” 

(citations omitted)).
20 

Sanction for Violations of MLRPC 1.1, 8.1(b), 8.4(a) and (d); Maryland Rules 

16-606.1, 16-607, and 16-609; and BP § 10-306

This Court imposes sanctions on errant attorneys “to protect the public and the 

public’s confidence in the legal profession” and “to deter other lawyers from violating the 

Rules of Professional Conduct.” Taylor, 405 Md. at 720. To accomplish this, the 

sanction should be “commensurate with the nature and the gravity of the misconduct and 

the intent with which it was committed.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the style and 

severity of the sanction “depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id. This

Court does not impose sanctions with the goal of punishing the attorney. Id.

When assessing the appropriate result, we often refer to the American Bar 

Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, which advises that we consider 

four questions: “(1) What is the nature of the ethical duty violated?; (2) What was the 

lawyer’s mental state?; (3) What was the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by 

the lawyer’s misconduct?; and (4) Are there any aggravating or mitigating 

circumstances?” Id.; see also Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (Am. Bar Ass’n 

1992), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_respons

ibility/sanction_standards.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/RAJ8-G6UH]. Possible

mitigating factors include: 

[A]bsence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a 

dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; 

timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify 

consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure to 

disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 

inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; 

physical or mental disability or impairment; delay in 

disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of 
21 

other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness 

of prior offenses. 

Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Sweitzer, 395 Md. 586, 599 (2006) (quoting Att’y Grievance 

Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 488–89 (1996)). 

Bar Counsel recommends that Mahone be disbarred. This case does not warrant 

such a severe sanction. This Court has held that “[d]isbarment is warranted in cases 

involving flagrant neglect of client affairs, including the failure to communicate with 

clients or respond to inquiries from Bar Counsel.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 

440 Md. 523, 558 (2014) (citations omitted). Additionally, absent “compelling 

extenuating circumstances,” disbarment is ordinarily the sanction for intentional 

dishonest conduct, including theft. Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Gracey, 448 Md. 1, 27 

(2016) (citation omitted). “Although ignorance does not excuse a violation of 

disciplinary rules, a finding with respect to the intent with which a violation was 

committed is relevant on the issue of the appropriate sanction.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n 

v. Bell, 432 Md. 542, 559 (2013) (quoting Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Obi, 393 Md. 643, 

658 (2006)). For the careless mishandling of funds that did not result in financial loss to 

the client, typically the appropriate sanction is indefinite suspension. Id. (collecting 

cases). 

Here, it is clear that Mahone did not act with a dishonest or selfish intent and there 

is no evidence that any of Mahone’s clients lost money due to his mismanagement. 

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Mahone’s mismanagement of his attorney trust 

account impacted the quality of his legal representation, and Mahone has taken steps to 
22 

remedy his admittedly “sloppy recordkeeping.” He has resolved to more closely examine 

his monthly statements and has contacted an accountant who agreed to monitor his 

attorney trust account. 

In addition, even though Mahone failed to comply with Bar Counsel’s requests in 

a timely manner, and when he did, he did not provide all the requested information, there 

is no evidence that he intentionally failed to comply with the investigation. Indeed, 

Mahone was deposed and attempted to clarify several of the questionable transactions 

highlighted in Miller’s reports. Mahone could not satisfactorily explain every transaction 

for the very reason Bar Counsel pursued disciplinary action against him—

mismanagement of his accounts and poor record-keeping. As Mahone himself pointed 

out, he cannot produce documentation that he failed to keep in the first place. Finally, 

Mahone has expressed remorse and there is no evidence of a dishonest or selfish motive. 

Attorney Grievance Commission v. Bell and Attorney Grievance Commission v. 

DiCicco provide us with guidance on the appropriate sanction. In Bell, the attorney only 

maintained an attorney trust account, not an operating account, and paid his personal 

expenses from the trust account. Bell, 432 Md. at 556. His trust account records revealed 

multiple transactions that could not be attributed to a specific client, negative balances, 

and 45 cash disbursements totaling nearly $62,000 that Bell paid to himself. Id. at 548–

49. In addition, Bell had received a prior reprimand for attempting to obtain an 

unreasonable fee from a client in violation of MLRPC 8.4(a). Id. at 560. Despite Bell’s 

disciplinary history and “continuous mishandling” of his trust account, we rejected Bar 

Counsel’s request for an indefinite suspension with right to re-apply after 90 days. Id. at 
23 

563. Instead, we imposed the sanction of indefinite suspension with the right to re-apply 

after 30 days. Id. As mitigating factors, we considered that Bell did not have the intent 

to defraud his clients, had attended a training on proper record-keeping, and had 

corrected his trust account overdrafts. Id. at 562. Thus, Bell illustrates that lack of intent 

to defraud and corrective action can mitigate trust account mismanagement. 

Similarly, in DiCicco, we imposed an indefinite suspension with a right to reapply after 90 days on an attorney who failed to maintain client funds in a separate trust 

account, frequently caused his trust account to have a negative balance, and used his trust 

account as his personal bank account. In rejecting Bar Counsel’s recommendation for 

disbarment, we “consider[ed] the absence of fraudulent intent and the lack of evidence 

that any client suffered financial loss resulting from Respondent’s misconduct.” 

DiCicco, 369 Md. at 688. Therefore, it is appropriate for us to consider Mahone’s intent, 

whether his clients suffered financial loss, and any corrective action he has taken in 

determining his sanction. Here, there is no evidence that any of Mahone’s clients 

suffered financial loss or that Mahone intended to defraud them, and he has hired an 

accountant to help him manage his financial affairs—all mitigating factors. 

Arguing in favor of disbarment, Bar Counsel emphasizes that Mahone has violated 

the MLRPC on three previous occasions. Although this history does constitute an 

aggravating factor, we do not agree that these prior violations were severe enough to 

warrant Mahone’s disbarment in this case. In 1997, Mahone was sanctioned with an 

indefinite suspension for MLRPC violations related to withholding taxes. In 2007, 

Mahone was reprimanded for failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s lawful requests for 
24 

information. In 2012, Mahone was reprimanded for failing to safe-keep third party funds. 

Mahone’s last indefinite suspension was almost 20 years ago. Additionally, his last two 

reprimands were both entered by consent order, which shows he cooperated with Bar 

Counsel and took responsibility for his conduct in these matters. We find that these prior 

violations are outweighed by the lack of any intent to deceive or dishonesty in this case. 

That said, Mahone’s prior sanction and reprimands are still factors we must 

consider when fashioning a sanction. Mahone requests that we impose indefinite 

suspension with the right to re-apply after a term this Court deems appropriate. But given 

his disciplinary history—three different disciplinary actions, two of which involved the 

mishandling of money—we find that a more severe sanction is warranted. See Att’y 

Grievance Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 702 (2007) (characterizing definite 

suspensions and indefinite suspensions with right to re-apply as “more lenient” than 

permanent indefinite suspension). Therefore, we decline to adopt Mahone’s requested 

sanction. 

Accordingly, we conclude that indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 

SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS 

TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS 

COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF 

ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT 

TO MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d). 

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN 

FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY 

GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

AGAINST WILLIE J. MAHONE IN 

THE SUM OF THESE COSTS.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

No. 82 

September Term, 2015 

______________________________________ 

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 

OF MARYLAND 

v. 

WILLIE JAMES MAHONE 

______________________________________ 

Barbera, C.J. 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts 

Hotten

Getty, 

JJ.

______________________________________ 

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Watts, 

J., which McDonald, J., joins 

______________________________________ 

Filed: December 19, 2016 

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 32111-M 

Argued: November 3, 2016
 Respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. I concur with respect to the 

violation of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”), and I 

dissent solely as to the appropriate sanction. Even with the exception to the MLRPC 

8.4(c) violation having been sustained, given the seriousness of Willie James Mahone 

(“Mahone”)’s misconduct and his prior disciplinary record, from my perspective, 

disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. 

The hearing judge concluded that Mahone had violated MLRPC 1.1 

(Competence), 8.1(b) (Disciplinary Matters), 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or 

Misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the Administration of 

Justice); Maryland Rules 16-606.1 (Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping), 16-607 

(Commingling of Funds), and 16-609 (Prohibited Transactions); and Md. Code Ann., 

Bus. Occ. & Prof. (“BOP”) § 10-306 (Trust Money Restrictions). The hearing judge 

determined that Mahone’s violation of Maryland Rule 16-606.1 was “without malice or 

personal gain[.]” The Majority upholds the hearing judge’s conclusions as to MLRPC 

1.1, 8.1(b), and 8.4(d); Maryland Rules 16-606.1, 16-607, and 16-609; and BOP § 10-

306. See Maj. Slip Op. at 17. The Majority, however, sustains Mahone’s exception to 

the hearing judge’s conclusion as to MLRPC 8.4(c). See id. 

Taking into account the Majority’s sustaining of the exception as to the MLRPC 

8.4(c) violation and the hearing judge’s determination that Mahone violated Maryland 

Rule 16-606.1 without malice or personal gain does not obfuscate the conclusion that 

disbarment is warranted. In 1997, this Court indefinitely suspended Mahone from the 

practice of law in Maryland for MLRPC violations that occurred when Mahone failed to 
- 2 - 

comply with his obligations with regard to withholding taxes, see id. at 23; in 2007, this 

Court granted a Joint Petition for Reprimand by Consent for Mahone’s violation of 

MLRPC 8.1(b) (Disciplinary Matters), see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 400 

Md. 95, 927 A.2d 418 (2007); and, most recently, in 2012, this Court granted a joint 

petition for reprimand for Mahone’s violations of MLRPC 1.1 (Competence), 1.15(a), 

1.15(e) (Safekeeping Property), and 8.4(d) (Conduct That Is Prejudicial to the 

Administration of Justice), see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mahone, 425 Md. 343, 40 

A.3d 1038 (2012)—i.e., this Court reprimanded Mahone for mishandling his attorney 

trust account, which is essentially the same as the misconduct in this case. This Court’s 

action in indefinitely suspending Mahone represents the fourth occasion on which he has 

been sanctioned for misconduct. Although Mahone’s indefinite suspension occurred in 

1997, and may arguably be considered remote, the repetitive nature of Mahone’s 

misconduct clearly raises the issue of the need to protect the public and deter Mahone and 

other lawyers from similar misconduct. 

In discussing Mahone’s prior disciplinary record, the Majority theorizes that, at 

least with regard to his two reprimands, Mahone took responsibility for his actions and 

cooperated with Bar Counsel by entering a joint petition for reprimand in each case. See 

Maj. Slip Op. at 24. This is one interpretation. Another explanation for the joint 

petitions and agreed-upon reprimands is that Mahone, recognizing that he had been the 

subject of an indefinite suspension in 1997, simply sought to make the best arrangement 

possible to minimize the sanction imposed in his last two attorney grievance cases. 

Certainly, that he engaged in further misconduct after his 2007 reprimand, and was again 
- 3 - 

reprimanded in 2012, undermines any conclusion that Mahone has benefited from his 

earlier indefinite suspension. Overall, the continuum of attorney grievance cases 

demonstrates that Mahone was not deterred by his prior encounters with Bar Counsel. 

And, the frequency of his misconduct indicates that he would pose a threat to future 

clients. Given his track record, and the nature of the misconduct in this case—namely, 

his mismanagement of his attorney trust account and his failure to comply with Bar 

Counsel’s investigation, which is essentially the same misconduct that Mahone has 

previously engaged in—disbarment is the appropriate sanction. 

 For the above reasons, respectfully, I concur in part and dissent in part. 

Judge McDonald has authorized me to state that he joins in this opinion.