NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

VERONICA M., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.M., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0035

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD510231, JS520073

The Honorable Cassie Bray Woo, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa

By Suzanne W. Sanchez

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa

By Amanda Adams

Counsel for Appellees

FILED 9-13-2022
VERONICA M. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding 

Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1 Veronica M. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her

parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of J.M. 

at birth and petitioned for a dependency judgment because Mother had

used methamphetamine for several years, including while pregnant. She 

was also unemployed and lacked stable housing. The superior court 

adjudicated J.M. dependent after Mother pled no contest to the allegations.

¶3 Mother successfully participated in services including 

substance-abuse testing and treatment, psychiatric services, individual and 

domestic-violence counseling, a parent aide with visitation, and a familyreunification team. Eventually, the court returned J.M. to Mother’s custody 

and dismissed the dependency.

¶4 About a year later, DCS discovered that Mother was 

neglecting J.M., engaging in domestic violence with J.M.’s father (“Father”), 

and lacked stable housing. Mother also admitted to relapsing on 

methamphetamine. DCS petitioned for a dependency and soon afterwards, 

petitioned to terminate Mother’s parentalrights based on chronic substance 

abuse and J.M.’s prior removal. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (B)(11).

¶5 DCS referred Mother for substance-abuse treatment and 

testing as well as visitation and agreed to help her with transportation.

Mother agreed to self-refer for domestic-violence counseling and parenting 

classes. She completed an intake for substance-abuse treatment with Terros

and informed the clinician she was still using methamphetamine. The 

clinician diagnosed her with a severe stimulant-use disorder and 

recommended she participate in intensive outpatient services. Mother did 

not participate, however, and the referral closed after several outreach 

attempts by the provider failed. Afterwards, Mother appeared in the case 

only intermittently; she did not participate in substance-abuse testing and 
VERONICA M. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

3

only attended two visits with J.M. During the times Mother disappeared, 

DCS tried to locate her to no avail.

¶6 Nonetheless, Mother appeared at the contested termination 

hearing and testified she had been sober for three weeks and had attended 

a detoxification program for about four days. After the hearing, the 

superior court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds alleged.

Mother appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶7 Mother argues insufficient evidence supports the court’s 

finding that DCS made reasonable efforts to provide her with appropriate 

reunification services.1 A parent’s right to custody and control of her own 

child, while fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248–49, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). Severance of a parental 

relationship may be warranted where the state proves one statutory ground 

under A.R.S. § 8-533 by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. “Clear and 

convincing” means the grounds for termination are “highly probable or 

reasonably certain.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284–85, ¶ 25 (2005)

(citation omitted). The court must also find that severance is in the child’s 

best interest by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 288, ¶ 41.

¶8 This court “will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact 

unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings, and we will affirm 

a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). This court does not reweigh 

the evidence, but “look[s] only to determine if there is evidence to sustain 

the court’s ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, 

¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶9 Before seeking to terminate parental rights for chronic 

substance abuse, DCS must make reasonable efforts to provide a parent 

with appropriate reunification services. Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005). DCS does so by allowing the 

parent the “time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to 

improve [her] ability to care for the child.” Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 94, ¶ 20 (App. 2009). DCS must “undertake measures 

1 DCS argues it was not required to provide Mother with reunification 

services in the current dependency under the prior-removal ground. See

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(11). Because we affirm based on the chronic-substanceabuse ground, we need not resolve that issue.
VERONICA M. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

4

[that have] a reasonable prospect of success” in reuniting the family. Mary 

Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶ 34 (App. 1999). 

Additionally, DCS must “maintain consistent contact with the parent, and 

make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance 

proves difficult.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 22, ¶ 50

(App. 2019).

¶10 Nonetheless, DCS is not required “to undertake rehabilitative 

measures that are futile,” Mary Ellen C., 193 Ariz. at 192, ¶ 34, nor is it 

required to duplicate a service the parent receives elsewhere, see Pima Cnty. 

Severance Action No. S-2397, 161 Ariz. 574, 577 (App. 1989).

¶11 Mother asserts that DCS had a duty to help her secure reliable 

phone service, transportation, employment, and housing.

2 The record 

shows, however, that Mother disappeared for several weeks at a time and 

failed to utilize any form of regular communication with DCS, service 

providers, or, at times, even her attorney. Furthermore, Mother’s own 

admissions undermine her claim that phone service was her main barrier 

to participating in services.

¶12 Mother kept almost no contact with DCS for the first three 

months of the dependency, preventing the case manager from fully 

assisting her with each of her needs. She did not indicate any issues with 

her ability to communicate until after the court had set a case plan of 

severance and adoption. Then, at a hearing, counsel reported Mother “has 

had some difficulty with her phone,” with reading the screen or dialing out, 

but clarified that she “can use it to . . . receive calls.” Counsel also reported 

that despite Mother’s phone difficulties, she was able to attempt contact 

with her service providers. Mother later confirmed she “kept trying to call 

[her] case manager,” and “left several messages for her to contact me or 

email me.” Additionally, she testified she was able to use a relative’s phone 

to call out, though not for extended periods of time.

2 DCS claims that Mother waived her argument regarding telephone 

service, employment, and housing by not raising the issues with the 

superior court. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, 

¶ 16 (App. 2014) (a parent who does not raise the issue of services in the 

superior court is precluded from challenging that finding on appeal). In 

our discretion, we decline to apply waiver here. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child 

Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536, ¶ 9 (App. 2018) (“[T]he decision to find waiver is 

discretionary.”).
VERONICA M. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

5

¶13 Nonetheless, Mother maintained that she did not attend 

Terros because her phone was unreliable. But she did not inform Terros of 

any difficulties until her referral was on the verge of closure. When she 

finally notified the clinician, she also stated that “she now has a working 

phone and is willing to re-engage in[ ] treatment”—a fact she also testified 

to at trial. The provider told Mother she could attend future sessions in 

person, but she elected to attend virtually.

¶14 Even with a new phone and the option to use a relative’s 

phone, Mother failed regularly to contact DCS or her providers, and she did 

not participate in any services or visit J.M. Instead, Mother disappeared, 

causing DCS to seek her out through its parent-locate service. The results 

of that service indicated she was living at the same address throughout the 

dependency, which was the address where Terros and DCS sought to 

reengage her. Additionally, Mother expressed no issues with other forms 

of communication, though she failed regularly to use them. The record 

therefore supports the superior court’s finding that the main barrier to 

Mother’s participation in services was her “fail[ure] to respond to DCS 

efforts by both phone and email for a significant period of the case.”

¶15 Mother also argues that DCS failed to assist her with securing 

an in-patient substance-abuse treatment program. The record shows, 

however, that Mother’s disappearance hindered DCS’s ability to help her, 

and regardless, that she obtained a treatment program.

¶16 Mother asked DCS to refer her for an in-patient program after 

her initial referral to Terros closed. The court then ordered DCS to “work 

with Mother to find a substance abuse treatment [program] that she is able 

to participate in, even if that’s an in-patient facility.” Two days later, 

however, Mother chose to continue with Terros rather than an in-patient 

facility. See S-2397, 161 Ariz. at 577 (DCS is not required to duplicate a 

service a parent is already receiving).

¶17 She then failed to participate in that program a second time, 

and the referral closed. Thereafter, Mother did not respond to DCS’s 

communications until a week before the trial. At that time, DCS attempted 

to assist her with securing another treatment program, and she completed 

a detoxification program the day before trial. On this record, we find no 

error.

¶18 Mother next argues insufficient evidence supports the 

superior court’s finding that severance was in J.M.’s best interests.
VERONICA M. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

6

¶19 In addition to finding a statutory ground for termination, the 

superior court must also determine what is in the best interests of the child 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22. Once 

the court finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory ground for 

termination, “the interests of the parent and child diverge,” and the court 

proceeds to balance the unfit parent’s “interest in the care and custody of 

his or her child . . . against the independent and often adverse interests of 

the child in a safe and stable home life.” Id. at 286, ¶ 35. “[A] determination 

of the child’s best interest must include a finding as to how the child would 

benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the 

relationship.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990).

Courts “must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time 

of the severance determination, including the child’s adoptability and the 

parent’s rehabilitation.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, 

¶ 1 (2018).

¶20 The court may find a child would benefit from termination if 

there is an adoption plan or if the child is adoptable, id., at 150–51, ¶¶ 13–

14, or if the child “would benefit psychologically from the stability an 

adoption would provide.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 

Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). Conversely, the court may find a child would 

be harmed by the continuation of the parent-child relationship “where 

there is clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness which has not 

been remedied notwithstanding the provision of services by [DCS] and 

which detrimentally affects the child’s well-being.” Pima Cnty. Juv. Action 

No. S-2460, 162 Ariz. 156, 158 (App. 1989).

¶21 Mother takes issue with the superior court’s findings that 

severance would “allow [J.M.] to have a safe and stable home that is free 

from substance abuse” and that continuing the parent-child relationship 

between Mother and J.M. would cause the child to “linger in DCS [custody]

. . . without a permanent home.” According to Mother, these findings are 

erroneous because the court did not terminate Father’s parental rights in 

the same hearing and therefore J.M. could not be adopted.

¶22 The fact that J.M. was not immediately available for adoption 

the day of the termination hearing, however, does not undermine the 

court’s finding that she is an adoptable child and that a future adoption was 

likely. See Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 370–71, ¶ 22 (App. 

2018) (findings regarding a child’s adoptability “must reflect a finding that 

adoption is not only possible, but likely”). The court had not terminated 

Father’s parental rights, but it had found J.M. dependent as to him and set 

a case plan of severance and adoption. Furthermore, DCS had moved to 
VERONICA M. v. DCS, J.M.

Decision of the Court

7

sever his rights. Moreover, the case manager testified J.M. was adoptable 

and lived with an adoptive family who had a significant relationship with 

her and was meeting her needs. Reasonable evidence therefore supports 

the court’s finding that severance was in J.M.’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.