THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Rodney Jerome Furtick, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2019-001920 

Appeal From Lexington County 

Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 6032 

Heard December 6, 2022 – Filed November 8, 2023 

AFFIRMED 

Appellate Defender Joanna Katherine Delany, of 

Columbia, for Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant 

Attorney General Joshua Abraham Edwards, both of 

Columbia, and Solicitor Samuel R. Hubbard, III, of 

Lexington, all for Respondent. 

MCDONALD, J.: Rodney Furtick appeals his second-degree criminal sexual 

conduct (CSC) conviction and sentence, arguing the circuit court erred in finding 

certain prior convictions admissible under Rule 609, SCRE. Furtick contends the 

circuit court applied an improper balancing test and eliminated any probative value 

the prior convictions may have once had by "sanitizing" them. Essentially, 

Furtick's position is that if the convictions needed sanitizing, the circuit court 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

should have excluded them entirely. We disagree, and we affirm the circuit court's 

well-reasoned analysis. 

Facts and Procedural History 

In August 2015, J.H. (Victim), her then-husband (Husband), and their one-year-old 

daughter moved to Cayce. The couple did not own a vehicle, and they shared a 

cell phone. Husband generally worked a night shift and walked to work. 

In October 2015, Husband befriended Furtick, who could often be seen walking 

around the neighborhood. Victim testified at Furtick's trial that she told Husband 

she did not want Furtick around when Husband was not present because Furtick 

made her uncomfortable. By that time, Furtick was visiting the couple's home 

once or twice a week. 

At some point that same October, Victim reported to the police that Furtick or his 

girlfriend had stolen her Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) card; however, at the 

time of Furtick's trial, Victim did not recall making this report. She explained, "I 

probably did, but I was basically a single mother. My husband didn't do anything 

for my daughter. I was more focused on my daughter than anything else."1 

On November 18, 2015, Husband left the house shortly before dark to visit a 

hobby shop. Victim recounted that while she was getting Daughter ready for bed, 

she heard a knock at the back door and saw the door begin to open as she 

approached it. Although she tried to push the door closed, Furtick entered the 

home uninvited, and Victim asked him to leave. At that point, Victim instructed 

Daughter to go lie down in her bed, but Daughter instead moved in front of Victim. 

Furtick put down a plate of food he was carrying, walked toward Victim, and 

pushed Daughter into a corner, causing a red mark on Daughter's back. When 

Daughter began to cry, Victim carried her to Victim's bedroom and instructed her 

to cuddle with the pillows there. Furtick then pushed Victim backwards into 

Daughter's room and ordered her to lie down. During all of this, Victim was scared 

for Daughter because Daughter "started crying and screaming." While backing 

into the bedroom, Victim tripped over Daughter's toys and Furtick shoved her to 

the floor. He then began trying to kiss her and attempted to remove her tights at 

the feet but became frustrated and yanked the tights down from Victim's waist. 

Furtick then raped Victim while Victim stared at Daughter in an effort to try to 

1 Victim and Husband have since divorced. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

keep her from approaching. Following the sexual assault, Furtick cleaned himself 

with baby wipes. 

When asked why she did not try "to fight him off," Victim explained she was 

afraid Furtick would hurt Daughter. Victim testified Furtick became annoyed 

because Daughter continued to cry and try to enter the room. At times, Furtick 

"kept turning to glare" at Daughter. Then, as he was leaving, Furtick told Victim 

that if she told anyone about what happened, "he would tell his friends that [her] 

house was free game." 

After Furtick left, Victim grabbed Daughter and ran across the street to a 

neighbor's house. She told the neighbor she had been raped, and the neighbor 

called 911. Neighbor testified Victim was very upset and visibly shaking. 

Shortly after receiving the dispatch, Sergeant John Robert Reese of the Cayce 

Department of Public Safety (CDPS) responded to the scene. Sergeant Reese 

testified Victim was very upset, her clothing was disheveled, and she identified her 

attacker as "a black male and the name was Rodney or Todd."2 

Paramedic Marilyn Sanchez treated Victim at the scene and observed she was 

"very anxious, nervous, paranoid, looking around like she was looking for 

someone or something." Victim was then transported to Prisma Health Richland, 

where a forensic nurse examiner completed a sexual assault evidence collection 

kit. Lieutenant Jason Merrill responded to the hospital and interviewed Victim; he 

then gave her a ride home. In his search of the home, Lieutenant Merrill collected 

crumpled baby wipes and black tights from the floor of Daughter's room. 

On December 10, Lieutenant Merrill and Sergeant Caleb Thomas questioned 

Furtick at CDPS headquarters. Lieutenant Merrill informed Furtick that CDPS 

was investigating a November 18 criminal incident at Victim's home. When 

Lieutenant Merrill asked Furtick if there was any reason his DNA might be found 

there, Furtick denied ever being inside the house. He further denied that he knew 

Husband or Victim, even after being shown a photograph of Victim bearing her 

name. 

On December 30, CDPS transported evidence from the scene and Victim's sexual 

assault kit to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), where it was 

2 Victim provided Sergeant Reese with a description and a first name but did not 

know Furtick's last name. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

tested for semen and saliva. Vaginal and rectal swabs from the kit tested positive 

for the presence of semen; the swabs from Victim's arm, breasts, and cheeks were 

positive for saliva. Cuttings from Victim's underwear were also positive for 

components of semen. SLED forensic scientist Samuel Stewart later developed a 

DNA profile. 

CDPS then obtained a search warrant and collected Furtick's DNA, which matched 

the semen on the vaginal and rectal swabs. Stewart testified the probability of an 

unrelated individual matching the semen on these items was one in seventeen 

quintillion. He further noted Furtick was a minor contributor to some of the DNA 

found on other tested items. 

A Lexington County grand jury indicted Furtick for first-degree CSC and 

first-degree burglary. At Furtick's subsequent trial, the State notified the circuit 

court that if Furtick testified, it intended to introduce evidence of his prior 

convictions: a 2010 conviction for burglary, a 2012 petit larceny conviction, two 

2012 second-degree assault and battery convictions, and a 2015 conviction for a 

third-offense property crime. 

The circuit court noted the petit larceny and property offense were crimes 

involving dishonesty, and Furtick requested that the court reference larceny only, 

not "a third or subsequent offense," because this was a petit larceny with a 

sentencing enhancement. The State consented to this request. 

Furtick further argued that under Rule 609(a), SCRE, his convictions for burglary 

and assault and battery should be excluded due to their similarities to the crimes 

for which he was currently being tried. Furtick asserted that under Rule 403, the 

probative value of these prior convictions would be substantially outweighed by 

their prejudicial effect because the case "boils down to a swearing contest." The 

State countered that burglary was a crime of dishonesty and Furtick had frequently 

attacked Victim's credibility. The circuit court noted burglary was not a crime of 

dishonesty under State v. Bryant3 and the burglary conviction was indeed similar to 

one of the crimes for which Furtick was on trial. Thus, the court's "initial 

impression [was] to decline to allow the State to go into or specifically say a 

burglary." 

3 369 S.C. 511, 517–18, 633 S.E.2d 152, 155–56 (2006). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The circuit court noted the assault and battery convictions were likely admissible 

because their similarities to the CSC count were insufficient to warrant exclusion. 

Still, the circuit court explained that after an evening review of the State v. Colf4 

factors and recent caselaw, the court would revisit the admissibility of these 

convictions the following day before trial resumed. 

Upon reconvening the next morning, the circuit court explained: 

I have some further reflection on how to treat the assault 

charges or the assault convictions and after reviewing the 

caselaw, the Court has to conclude in order to allow those 

specific convictions to come in as assault and battery 

seconds that legally the Court would have to conclude 

that the probative value of that impeachment 

substantially outweighs any undue prejudice. 

And I've looked at the five factors, I've considered it. 

Doing a 403 balancing analysis, I think that the 

impeachment value mostly outweighs the danger of 

unfair prejudice but I cannot say it substantially 

outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice and the key to 

this—or the key to my reasoning is that by allowing the 

jury to hear that he was convicted of assault and battery 

second degree is tantamount to basically suggesting to 

the jury that the Defendant has a propensity towards 

violence, a propensity to assault people, and, of course, 

sexual assault is one of the charges he's facing. 

The circuit court instructed the State to limit its questions relating to the assault 

and battery and burglary convictions to reflect Furtick was convicted of "two 

misdemeanors in 2012 and a felony in 2010 that carried a possible punishment of 

more than one year in prison." 

Furtick's counsel responded, 

[O]ur position would be that if the rules don't allow it, if 

you can't fit a square box into a round hole, then why 

should we sand off the corners of the square box and now 

4 337 S.C. 622, 627, 525 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2000). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

push it through the hole? I didn't see anything where that 

was addressed in any of the caselaw and so our position 

would be if the rules don't allow it, then it just shouldn't 

come in, it shouldn't be, quote unquote, sanitized. 

Furtick's counsel further noted, "I can't find any cases that talk about this whole 

hey, sanitizing it is okay, but I've seen it in this circuit and I've seen it in some 

other circuits, I've just not seen it challenged." 

The circuit court replied, 

[M]y opinion is that the prejudice flows from the similar 

nature of the crime, so calling something a burglary when 

you're on trial for burglary or calling something a rape 

when you're on trial for rape is what creates the prejudice 

if they have that prior conviction for that similar type of 

offense and the prejudice is substantially lessened if 

you're simply allowed to inquire as to a nameless felony 

or a nameless misdemeanor, and so that's—that's the 

reasoning that this Court is employing it and I think other 

judges [have] employed routinely. 

Furtick testified he met Husband in October 2015 when he saw him in his yard 

smoking a cigarette. He and Husband talked all afternoon, walked to a store, and 

Husband eventually invited Furtick into his home. Later, when Husband left for 

work, Furtick stayed and socialized with Victim. He claimed the two "became 

fond of one another" and had consensual sex that afternoon. Furtick further 

claimed Victim and Husband were friendly toward him when they saw him after 

this encounter. Although Furtick admitted he had Victim's EBT card at one point, 

he said Husband gave him the card and pin number and agreed for Furtick to sell it 

"and get them a few dollars." 

Furtick admitted he was present at Victim's home on November 18, 2015. He 

testified he had agreed to help Victim sell some baby food that she no longer 

needed, but he returned the food to her when he was unable to sell it. Furtick 

denied Victim ever asked him to leave; he claimed he and Victim talked for a 

while, he asked her if she wanted to have sex, and she said yes.5 He then remained 

at the house for another five to ten minutes. On cross-examination, the State 

5 During her testimony, Victim denied the two ever had consensual sex. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

brought out inconsistencies between Furtick's testimony at a pretrial hearing and 

his trial testimony, such as the location of the first alleged sexual encounter and 

what Victim was wearing. 

Furtick's trial testimony also contradicted his statements to law enforcement during 

the investigation—the most notable contradiction was Furtick's trial admission that 

he knew Husband and Victim and began regularly interacting with them in October 

2015. Furtick claimed that when law enforcement asked him if he knew Victim or 

Husband, he did not deny that he knew them but told the officers he could not see 

the pictures. He maintained he did not admit he knew Victim—despite being 

asked if he knew her by name—because he could not see her photo. He provided 

the same explanation as to Husband's photo and his initial denial. When asked 

why he did not identify the couple after the officers obtained a pair of glasses for 

him, Furtick claimed he ended the interview because the officers would not let him 

keep the glasses. 

Furtick was convicted of the lesser included offense of second-degree CSC but 

acquitted of burglary. The circuit court sentenced him to twenty years' 

imprisonment. 

Standard of Review 

"In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only." State v. 

Robinson, 426 S.C. 579, 591, 828 S.E.2d 203, 209 (2019). "The admission of 

evidence concerning past convictions for impeachment purposes remains within 

the trial [court's] discretion, provided the [trial court] conducts the analysis 

mandated by the evidence rules and case law." Id. (alteration by court) (quoting 

State v. Dunlap, 346 S.C. 312, 324, 550 S.E.2d 889, 896 (Ct. App. 2001)). 

Law and Analysis 

Furtick argues the circuit court erred in allowing the State to impeach him with 

sanitized convictions otherwise inadmissible under Rule 609(a)(1) and the Colf 

factors. He contends this error was not harmless because his defense hinged on the 

credibility of his testimony that any sexual encounter with Victim was consensual. 

Rule 609(a), SCRE, provides: 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 

(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has 

been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to 

Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 

imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under 

which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 

accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be 

admitted if the court determines that the probative value 

of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect 

to the accused; and 

(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a 

crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false 

statement, regardless of the punishment. 

For the purposes of this rule, a conviction includes a 

conviction resulting from a trial or any type of plea, 

including a plea of nolo contendere or a plea pursuant to 

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 

In Colf, our supreme court delineated the following factors a circuit court must 

consider in a Rule 609 analysis when weighing the probative value of prior 

convictions against their prejudicial effect: 

1. The impeachment value of the prior crime. 

2. The point in time of the conviction and the witness's 

subsequent history. 

3. The similarity between the past crime and the charged 

crime. 

4. The importance of the defendant's testimony. 

5. The centrality of the credibility issue. 

337 S.C. at 627, 525 S.E.2d at 248. 

Our supreme court provided further guidance in Robinson,

6 explaining: 

6 In Robinson, the circuit court admitted into evidence several prior convictions, 

including a burglary conviction the circuit court ruled "had to be referred to 

generically as a 'prior felony conviction carrying more than one year in prison.'" 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Rule 609(a) invokes three impeachment scenarios. First, 

under Rule 609(a)(1), evidence that a witness other than 

an accused has been convicted of a crime punishable by 

death or imprisonment for more than one year (in the 

jurisdiction where the conviction occurred) is admissible, 

subject to Rule 403, SCRE. Under Rule 403, evidence of 

such a conviction "may be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 

or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 

needless presentation of cumulative evidence." The Rule 

403 test places the burden upon the opponent of the 

evidence to establish inadmissibility pursuant to Rule 

403. Second, under Rule 609(a)(1), when the accused 

chooses to testify during his trial, if the State seeks to 

introduce impeachment evidence that the accused has 

been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment 

for more than one year, the evidence is admissible if the 

State establishes the probative value of admitting the 

evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect upon the 

accused. Third, under Rule 609(a)(2), if a witness, even 

an accused, has been convicted of a crime involving 

dishonesty or false statement, evidence of such a 

conviction shall be admitted regardless of the maximum 

punishment and regardless of the probative value or 

prejudicial effect of the evidence. 

. . . . 

Rule 609(a)(2) requires no balancing test for 

admissibility of a prior conviction for a crime involving 

dishonesty or false statement. However, Rule 609(a)(1) 

and Rule 609(b) require the trial court to balance—in 

three varying degrees—the probative value of evidence 

of a prior conviction and the degree of prejudice to the 

opponent of the evidence (as noted, the Rule 403 test also 

426 S.C. at 588, 828 S.E.2d at 207. The supreme court noted the admission of this 

conviction for the purpose of impeachment was not appealed. Id. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

requires the trial court to consider confusion of the 

issues, misleading the jury, etc.). Even though these 

three Rule 609 admissibility tests differ from one 

another, we have, through State v. Colf, provided a 

uniform set of factors for the trial court to consider when 

applying each test. 

426 S.C. at 593–94, 828 S.E.2d at 210. 

"The starting point in the analysis is the degree to which the prior convictions have 

probative value, meaning the tendency to prove the issue at hand—the witness's 

propensity for truthfulness, or credibility." Id. at 597, 828 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting 

State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 21, 732 S.E.2d 880, 886 (2012)). "The tendency to 

impact credibility . . . determines the impeachment value of the prior conviction. 

Impeachment value refers to how strongly the nature of the conviction bears on the 

veracity, or credibility, of the witness." Id. at 598, 828 S.E.2d at 212–13 (quoting 

Black, 400 S.C. at 21–22, 732 S.E.2d at 887) (omission by court). "Although prior 

convictions for robbery, burglary, theft, and drug possession are not crimes of 

dishonesty or false statement, which would result in automatic admissibility under 

Rule 609(a)(2), such convictions may still have impeachment value under Rule 

609(a)(1)." Id. at 599, 828 S.E.2d at 213. 

"[U]nder Rule 609(a)(1), if the witness is the accused and has a prior conviction of 

a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year, the trial court 

must balance the Colf factors and determine whether the probative value of the 

conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused." Id. at 595, 828 S.E.2d 

at 211. "An on-the-record balancing test is particularly important for prior similar 

convictions under Rule 609(a)(1) because the 'similarity of a prior crime to the 

crime charged heightens'" its prejudicial nature. State v. Howard, 384 S.C. 212, 

221, 682 S.E.2d 42, 47 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Elmore, 368 S.C. 230, 

239, 628 S.E.2d 271, 275 (Ct. App. 2006)). 

Relying on United States v. Boyce, 611 F.2d 530, 530 (4th Cir. 1979), our appellate 

courts have seemingly approved the sanitization of prior convictions in cases 

addressing Rule 609. In Boyce, a defendant convicted of defrauding a federally 

insured bank appealed his conviction in part because the prosecutor asked on 

cross-examination whether he had been convicted of a felony and inquired as to the 

nature and number of such convictions. Id. at 530. The Fourth Circuit noted Rule 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

609(a), FRE,7 allows a defendant to be impeached by proof of his prior felony 

convictions; a defendant may be asked matters including the name of the crime, the 

time and place of the conviction, and the punishment. Id. The Fourth Circuit 

found "[i]t follows that there was no plain error in permitting the United States 

Attorney to inquire about the number and nature of defendant's felony convictions, 

particularly since the defendant himself had already testified that he had been 

convicted of a felony and there was no objection at trial." Id. at 530–31. The court 

stated in a footnote, "In the special case, where the prior conviction is for the same 

offense as that for which the defendant is being tried, the trial court generally will 

not permit the Government to prove the nature of the offense on the ground that to 

do so would amount to unfair prejudice." Id. at 530, n.1. 

In Green v. State, our supreme court referenced the Boyce footnote, stating, "One 

tactic the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals employs is to allow the prosecutor to ask 

7 Rule 609(a), FRE states: 

The following rules apply to attacking a witness's 

character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal 

conviction: 

(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was 

punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than 

one year, the evidence: 

(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case 

or in a criminal case in which the witness is not a 

defendant; and 

(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the 

witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the 

evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that 

defendant; and 

(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the 

evidence must be admitted if the court can readily 

determine that establishing the elements of the crime 

required proving — or the witness's admitting — a 

dishonest act or false statement. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the defendant about the existence of prior convictions, but not their nature." 338 

S.C. 428, 433 n. 5, 527 S.E.2d 98, 101 n.5 (2000). The Green court also 

explained: 

Federal courts have held that prior convictions for the 

same or similar crimes are highly prejudicial and should 

be admitted sparingly. While some federal circuits have 

held such convictions admissible if, after consideration of 

other factors, their probative value outweighs their 

prejudicial effect, the Fourth Circuit has been one of the 

stricter circuits, refusing to permit impeachment with 

similar prior convictions. We decline to hold similar 

prior convictions inadmissible in all cases. Trial courts 

must weigh the probative value of the prior convictions 

against their prejudicial effect to the accused and 

determine, in their discretion, whether to admit the 

evidence. 

Id. at 433, 527 S.E.2d at 100–01 (internal citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 

Two years later, in State v. Rollins, this court found the circuit court did not abuse 

its discretion in admitting evidence of a defendant's prior convictions because: 

In this case, the trial judge reviewed Rollins' history of 

convictions and adopted the tactic mentioned in the 

Green footnote. In addition to limiting the amount of 

detail about the prior convictions, the trial judge 

instructed the jury that the prior convictions could only 

be considered in determining Rollins' credibility. This 

procedure minimized the prejudice to Rollins. 

348 S.C. 649, 653, 560 S.E.2d 450, 452 (Ct. App. 2002). 

The court of appeals again referenced this approach in its 2006 Elmore opinion, 

explaining: 

One permissible approach, advocated by the United 

States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, is to allow the 

prosecutor to ask the witness about the existence of a 

prior similar conviction under Rule 609(a)(1) without 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

disclosing to the jury the nature of the prior offense. See 

Boyce, 611 F.2d at 531 n. 1. The Boyce approach was 

approvingly referenced by our supreme court in Green, 

338 S.C. at 433 n. 5, 527 S.E.2d at 101 n. 5. The Boyce 

approach still requires a meaningful balancing of the 

probative value and prejudicial effect before admission of 

the prior conviction, although the prejudice occasioned 

by the similarity of the prior crime to the crime charged 

is removed. 

368 S.C. at 239 n.5, 628 S.E.2d at 276 n.5. 

In Furtick's case, we acknowledge the circuit court used a different balancing test 

when it stated, "Doing a 403 balancing analysis, I think that the impeachment value 

mostly outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice but I cannot say it substantially 

outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice." Under Rule 609(a)(1), the Rule 403 

balancing test is used in determining the admissibility of prior crimes of a witness 

other than the accused. When determining whether an accused's prior convictions 

may be admitted under Rule 609(a)(1), evidence of a defendant's prior convictions 

carrying more than one year of imprisonment "shall be admitted if the court 

determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its 

prejudicial effect to the accused." Thus, it appears the circuit court's use of a 

balancing test requiring the impeachment value to substantially outweigh the 

danger of unfair prejudice actually inured to Furtick's benefit. 

The circuit court also indicated it considered the Colf factors, though it did not 

specifically reference each factor. Still, the court clearly considered the similarities 

of the various crimes and the centrality of the credibility issue at trial. The record 

demonstrates the circuit court weighed the prejudicial effect of admitting the 

convictions, finding any prejudice was due to the similarity of the convictions to 

Furtick's current charges. The circuit court then sought to mitigate this prejudice 

through sanitization—barring any reference to the specific similar crimes for 

which Furtick had been previously convicted. In requiring sanitization, the court 

referenced the dates of Furtick's various prior convictions; the oldest admitted 

conviction occurred five years before Victim's sexual assault. Considering the 

impact of the prior convictions on credibility, the circuit court explained credibility 

was "quite important in this case" and thus declined to allow the State to introduce 

the nature of the convictions. We find the circuit court's sanitization approach was 

appropriate and that its analysis satisfied the requirement of a meaningful 

on-the-record balancing of the Colf factors. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Moreover, even if the circuit court erred in sanitizing or discussing its balancing of 

Furtick's prior convictions, such error would be harmless. When the circuit court 

admitted Furtick's two larceny convictions, Furtick's only request was that one of 

the convictions be called "larceny" with no "subsequent offense" or enhancement 

reference. Because evidence of two convictions for crimes of dishonesty had been 

admitted, the prejudicial effect of admitting other convictions referenced only as 

"two misdemeanors in 2012 and a felony in 2010 that carried a possible 

punishment of more than one year in prison" was low. See Black 400 S.C. at 27– 

28, 732 S.E.2d at 890 (finding erroneous admission of a witness's remote 

manslaughter conviction harmless due to the unchallenged admission of another 

prior conviction for shooting/throwing a deadly missile). Of further significance is 

the fact that when law enforcement initially questioned Furtick, he denied that he 

knew Victim or Husband. Furtick alleged a consensual sexual relationship with 

Victim only after SLED's analysis revealed his DNA was a match for the DNA 

recovered from her sexual assault examination kit. For these reasons—and due to 

the other evidence detailed above, such as Furtick's odd claims about the reading 

glasses and not recognizing Victim or Husband in their photos—this was far from 

a "he said, she said" case. See State v. Phillips, 430 S.C. 319, 342, 844 S.E.2d 651, 

663 (2020) ("As part of our harmless error analysis, we review 'the materiality and 

prejudicial character of the error' in the context of the entire trial."); State v. Stukes, 

416 S.C. 493, 501, 787 S.E.2d 480, 484 (2016) (Kittredge, J., dissenting) (in which 

the dissent noted it would find harmless the erroneous jury charge because "[i]n 

addition to the evidence corroborating the victim's testimony, the jury was 

presented with Stukes's inconsistent statements. Stukes initially denied knowing 

the victim, much less having had sex with her. When pressed with the evidence, 

including the DNA match, Stukes remembered the victim and that they had 

consensual sex.").8 

For these reasons, Furtick's conviction and sentence are 

AFFIRMED. 

GEATHERS, J. and HILL, A.J., concur. 

8 We note that despite the admission of the sanitized convictions, the jury acquitted 

Furtick of the first-degree burglary charge and convicted him of the lesser included 

offense of second-degree CSC, not the first-degree CSC for which he was indicted.