15-4053 

Singh v. Sessions 

BIA 

Hom, IJ 

A201 153 487 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMM ARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

20th day of July, two thousand seventeen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT A. KATZMANN,

 Chief Judge,

JON O. NEWMAN, 

PIERRE N. LEVAL,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

SINGH KAMALPRET, AKA KAMALPREET 

SINGH, AKA KAMALPRET SINGH, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 15-4053 

 NAC 

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Joshua E. Bardavid, New York, N.Y. 

 

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. 

Ferrier, Assistant Director; 

Kimberly A. Burdge, Trial Attorney, 

Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, D.C. 
2 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED for further consideration. 

 Petitioner Kamalpret Singh, a native and citizen of India, 

seeks review of a November 23, 2015, decision of the BIA, 

affirming an April 28, 2014, decision of an Immigration Judge 

(“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Singh Kamalpret, No. A201 153 487 (B.I.A. Nov. 

23, 2015), aff’g No. A201 153 487 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Apr. 

28, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 

the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness.” 

Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 

2006). The applicable standards of review are well 

established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. 

Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008); Li Yong Cao v. 

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir. 2005). 

I. Adverse Credibility Determination 

 For asylum applications like Singh’s, governed by the REAL 

ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 
3 

circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an applicant’s 

“demeanor, candor, or responsiveness,” the plausibility of his 

account, inconsistencies in his statements and evidence, and 

“any other relevant factor,” “without regard to whether” those 

inconsistencies go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, we have noted that 

purported inconsistencies “must have at least minimal 

significance,” Feng Yue Li v. Lynch, 656 F. App’x 563, 565 (2d 

Cir. 2016), and that “minor date inconsistencies need not be 

fatal to an applicant’s credibility,” Bi Xiang Zheng v. Holder, 

574 F. App’x 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2014). 

 The agency relied on a one-day inconsistency concerning the 

date Singh’s family’s home was allegedly attacked by Hindus. 

Singh’s written statement, his father’s affidavit, and an 

affidavit by Mohinder Singh all reflect that the attack on his 

family’s home occurred on June 10, 2011, after Singh had left 

India. Balwinder Singh, the family’s neighbor, wrote in an 

affidavit that the incident occurred on June 11, 2011. The 

neighbor’s one-day variation from the account supplied by the 

petitioner and two others is too trivial to provide a “cogent” 

reason, Wu Lin v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2016), for 

finding the petitioner not credible, even allowing for the 

highly deferential standard of review that is applicable. 
4 

 The agency also relied on the fact that one paragraph in 

petitioner’s March 2012 asylum application concerning a May 5, 

2010, attack was identical to one paragraph in an affidavit 

prepared by Sucha Singh on January 3, 2013. 

 We have previously noted the plausible significance of 

substantially similar language appearing in two documents 

submitted by an asylum applicant. The strongest case for such 

a circumstance tending to adversely affect an applicant’s 

credibility is where his language is submitted after the 

submission of similar language submitted by a previous 

applicant. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 489 F.3d 

517, 519 (2d Cir. 2007). A different, but nonetheless 

troubling, circumstance is where an applicant submits 

affidavits with similar language ostensibly prepared by two 

different people. See Surinder Singh v. BIA, 438 F.3d 145, 148 

(2d Cir. 2006). As we explained in Mei Chai Ye, it is reasonable 

to infer “that an applicant who herself submits the strikingly 

similar documents is the common source of those suspicious 

similarities.” 489 F.3d at 519. 

 However, where, as in this case, another person prepares 

an affidavit after a petitioner submits his application and both 

documents contain similar or even identical language, the basis 

for drawing an adverse credibility inference is weaker, and a 
5 

plausible inference is that the other person is not credible. 

It is also possible, as the petitioner contends in this case, 

that, without his knowledge, his application was sent to the 

other person to use as a template as to form and the other person 

inadvertently copied the language in one paragraph of the 

petitioner’s application. 

 It remains the task of the IJ, as fact-finder, to draw a 

reasonable inference as to how the duplication of language in 

this case bears on the petitioner’s credibility. Nevertheless, 

because cases involving such language arise in different 

circumstances, the IJ’s obligation to provide a “cogent” 

reason, Wu Lin, 813 F.3d at 129, for his adverse credibility 

finding requires more of an explanation than this record 

reveals. Further, in light of our conclusion regarding the 

one-day discrepancy, an explanation is required as to whether 

and why the submission of another person’s subsequently 

prepared language is sufficient to sustain an adverse 

credibility inference in the specific circumstances of this 

case. 

 We thus conclude that a remand is warranted for 

reconsideration of the petitioner’s credibility, without 

regard to the date issue. And, although we have no doubt that 

the IJ could reconsider the matter impartially, putting the date 
6 

issue out of his consideration, we believe there is a risk of 

an appearance of partiality if the same IJ reconsiders the 

matter. We therefore direct that reconsideration occur at a new 

hearing before a different IJ. See Qiuyun Zheng v. Holder, 530 

F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2013). 

II. Motion to Remand

 In view of our decision to remand, we need not consider 

whether the BIA exceeded its discretion in declining to remand 

to the IJ for consideration of allegedly new evidence claimed 

not to have been previously available. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED for further consideration 

before a different IJ. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk