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92–339PS 2004

PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENT’S

VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 10, 2004

Serial No. 108–45

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

KEN CALVERT, California

NICK SMITH, Michigan

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,

Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

VACANCY

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

ZOE LOFGREN, California

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California

VACANCY

VACANCY

VACANCY

(III)

C O N T E N T S

March 10, 2004

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Sherwood L. Boehlert, Chairman, Committee

on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................ 31

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 31

Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................ 32

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 33

Witnesses:

Mr. Norman R. Augustine, Former Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin;

Chair, Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 34

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36

Biography .......................................................................................................... 39

Dr. Michael D. Griffin, President, In-Q-Tel; Former Chief Engineer, NASA;

Former Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems, NASA

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 40

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 41

Biography .......................................................................................................... 45

Dr. Donna L. Shirley, Director, Science Fiction Museum; Former Manager,

Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Mars Program; Former Assistant Dean, University of Oklahoma Aerospace Mechanical Engineering Department

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 46

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 48

Biography .......................................................................................................... 55

Financial Disclosure ......................................................................................... 58

Dr. Laurence R. Young, Apollo Program Professor, Massachusetts Institute

of Technology (MIT); Founding Director of the National Space Biomedical

Research Institute (NSBRI)

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 59

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 60

Biography .......................................................................................................... 68

Dr. Lennard A. Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board (SSB), National Academy

of Sciences; Chair, Department of Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space

Sciences, University of Michigan; Former Associate Administrator, Space

Science and Applications, NASA

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 70

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 71

Biography .......................................................................................................... 76

Discussion

Role of Human Space Flight in National Scientific Goals ................................ 77

Role of Robots in the Human Exploration of Space .......................................... 77

Concerns With the Moon as an Interim Step to Exploring Mars .................... 78

Lessons Learned From the Space Exploration Initiative of 1989 .................... 79

Shifting NASA Missions to Other Agencies ....................................................... 80

Expectations for the International Space Station ............................................. 81

Page

IV

Costs of Moon and Mars Missions ...................................................................... 82

Costs and Risks of Human Space Flight ............................................................ 84

New Priorities for Space Station Research ........................................................ 86

Role of the Space Station ..................................................................................... 86

Funding Priorities of Science or Exploration ..................................................... 88

Effects of Budget Changes ................................................................................... 90

Studies of Space Exploration .............................................................................. 92

Review of NASA Centers ..................................................................................... 94

Manned and Robotic Space Exploration ............................................................. 95

Retiring the Space Shuttle .................................................................................. 97

National Vision for Space Exploration ............................................................... 99

Motivation for Science and Math Education ...................................................... 100

Risks of Human Space Flight Versus Other Endeavors ................................... 101

Costs of Human Space Exploration Compared to Other National Objectives 102

Space Shuttle Risks ............................................................................................. 103

Questions About Ice on the Moon ....................................................................... 104

Appendix: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. Norman R. Augustine, Former Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin;

Chair, Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program ........... 108

Dr. Michael D. Griffin, President, In-Q-Tel; Former Chief Engineer, NASA;

Former Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems, NASA ....................... 112

Dr. Donna L. Shirley, Director, Science Fiction Museum; Former Manager,

Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Mars Program; Former Assistant Dean, University of Oklahoma Aerospace Mechanical Engineering Department ................. 116

Dr. Laurence R. Young, Apollo Program Professor, Massachusetts Institute

of Technology (MIT); Founding Director of the National Space Biomedical

Research Institute (NSBRI) ................................................................................ 119

Dr. Lennard A. Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board (SSB), National Academy

of Sciences; Chair, Department of Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space

Sciences, University of Michigan; Former Associate Administrator, Space

Science and Applications, NASA ......................................................................... 122

(1)

PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENT’S VISION

FOR SPACE EXPLORATION

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Sherwood L.

Boehlert [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.

2

3

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Perspectives on the President’s

Vision for Space Exploration

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2004

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

I. Purpose

The House Committee on Science will hold a hearing entitled Perspectives on the

President’s Vision for Space Exploration on March 10, 2004, at 10:00 a.m. in room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building. The Committee will receive testimony

from non-governmental witnesses regarding the President’s recently announced

space exploration initiative. Charters from two previous, relevant Science Committee hearings are attached.

II. Brief Overview

The witnesses have been asked to give their views on the purpose, structure, costs

and technical challenges of the President’s initiative and on how it would affect

other NASA programs. The goal of the hearing is to get guidance from outside experts on some of the most difficult questions the Congress must consider in evaluating the initiative.

For example, the most difficult obstacle to staying on the Moon for an extended

period or to sending a human to Mars may be the impact of spending long periods

in space on the human body. Both the radiation and reduced gravity have marked

impacts on human physiology. Some scientists (but none on our panel) go so far as

to describe these challenges as ‘‘insurmountable.’’ The Committee needs to know

(among other things) how difficult a hurdle human physiology is, whether NASA’s

plans to deal with these issues are sufficient, and how research on human physiology in space will influence the development of spacecraft and other technical aspects of the initiative. Several of the witnesses at the hearing will be able to address

such matters.

III. Witnesses

Mr. Norman Augustine was the Chief Executive Officer of Lockheed Martin and

chair of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, a review

of NASA’s programs and priorities in 1990 that is still relevant today. Mr. Augustine was asked to testify on:

• Would the initiative achieve an appropriate balance among NASA’s activities?

In particular, the Augustine Commission viewed space science and Earth

science as the top priorities at NASA. Is that still your view and is it reflected

in the President’s initiative?

• Does the estimated spending through 2020 seem adequate to carry out the

President’s initiative? Which elements of the President’s initiative seem most

likely to cost more money or take more time than is currently allotted to

them?

• What questions is it most important for Congress to ask as it evaluates the

proposed initiative?

Dr. Donna Shirley is the Director of the Science Fiction Museum and a former

Manager of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Mars Program and former Assistant

Dean of the University of Oklahoma Aerospace Mechanical Engineering Department. Dr. Shirley was asked to testify on:

• What are compelling justifications for sending humans into space? Does the

President’s initiative provide adequate justification for sending humans to the

Moon and Mars?

• To what extent would scientific research concerning Mars be aided by a

human presence on, or in orbit around that planet?

4

• Are the International Space Station and the Moon the most appropriate stepping-stones for human space exploration if the ultimate objective is a human

landing on Mars? What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a program that was targeted instead on sending a human directly to Mars? To

what extent is research on the International Space Station likely to help remove the hurdles to long-duration space flight?

• Does the proposed initiative achieve the proper balance among NASA’s activities? Particularly, is the balance between exploration, space science and Earth

science, and between human and robotic missions appropriate?

Dr. Michael Griffin is the President of In-Q-Tel. He has nearly 30 years of experience managing space and information technology organizations. He served as

NASA’s Chief Engineer and Associate Administrator for NASA in the early 1990s.

Dr. Griffin was asked to testify on:

• Does the estimated spending through 2020 seem adequate to carry out the

President’s initiative? Which elements of the President’s initiative seem most

likely to cost more money or take more time than is currently allotted to

them?

• What are the greatest technological hurdles the President’s initiative must

clear to be successful? To what extent must resolving some technological

issues await further fundamental research? For example, how much work on

a spacecraft for a Mars mission can be done before more is known about the

effect on humans of spending long periods of time in space? How much work

can be done before new propulsion technologies are developed?

• Are the International Space Station and the Moon the most appropriate stepping stones for human space exploration if the ultimate objective is a human

landing on Mars? What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a program that was targeted instead directly on sending a human to Mars?

• What questions is it most important for Congress to ask as it evaluates the

proposed initiative?

Dr. Lennard Fisk is Chair of the Space Studies Board (SSB), National Academy

of Sciences. Dr. Fisk led an SSB space policy workshop of experts in the fall 2003

that attempted to define the principal purposes, goals, and priorities of U.S. civil

space program. The report from this workshop, ‘‘Issues and Opportunities Regarding

the U.S. Space Program,’’ was released in January 2004. Fisk is Chair of the University of Michigan Department of Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space Sciences and

former Associate Administrator of NASA’s space science and applications department. Dr. Fisk was asked to testify on:

• What are compelling justifications for sending humans into space? Does the

President’s initiative provide adequate justification for sending humans to the

Moon and Mars?

• Are the International Space Station and the Moon the most appropriate stepping-stones for human space exploration if the ultimate objective is a human

landing on Mars? What would be the advantages and disadvantages of a program that was targeted instead directly on sending a human to Mars?

• To what extent is research on the International Space Station likely to help

remove the hurdles to long-term human presence in space? Does the proposed

initiative achieve the proper balance among NASA’s activities? Particularly,

does the initiative strike the right balance between exploration, space science

and Earth science?

• Does the estimated spending through 2020 seem adequate to carry out the

President’s initiative? Which elements of the President’s initiative seem most

likely to cost more money or take more time than is currently allotted to

them? What questions is it most important for Congress to ask as it evaluates

the proposed initiative?

Dr. Larry Young is the Apollo Program Professor at the Massachusetts Institute

of Technology (MIT) and Founding Director of the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) in Houston, TX. He is an expert on the physiological challenges for humans in space. Dr. Young was asked to testify on:

• What are the most significant human physiology challenges that must be understood and overcome before humans embark on a mission to Mars or an extended presence on the Moon? How daunting are those challenges and how

quickly might they be resolved? How much significant research has been conducted on these issues already and where was that research conducted?

5

• To what extent could research aboard the International Space Station contribute to resolving critical questions related to human physiology in space?

What kinds of experiments would have to be conducted and how long would

it likely take before they produced meaningful results? Would additional

equipment be needed aboard the Station for the experiments? To what extent

could the requisite research be conducted on Earth?

• To what extent would the research budget for the Space Station have to

change to accommodate a successful research in human physiology? How

many astronauts would be needed aboard the Station to conduct such an

agenda?

• How long after experiments began would the International Space Station

have to remain in operation to produce meaningful information about human

physiology?

Attachments

1. Charter from the February 12, 2004 House Science Committee hearing on

The President’s Vision for Space Exploration.

2. Charter from the October 16, 2003 House Science Committee hearing on The

Future of Human Space Flight

6

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

U.S. Vision for Space Exploration

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2004

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

1. Purpose

On Thursday, February 12th at 10:00 a.m., the Science Committee will hold a

Full Committee hearing on the President’s proposed space exploration initiative,

which was announced Jan. 14. (A copy of the White House document that outlines

the President’s vision is attached as Attachment A.)

2. The President’s Proposal

The President’s plan can be seen as having three distinct, but related aspects. The

first aspect concerns current human space flight programs. The President proposes

to complete construction of the International Space Station (ISS) by the end of the

decade and to retire the Space Shuttle at that point. ISS research is to be reconfigured to focus on questions related to the impact on human health of spending long

periods in space. Under the proposal, the U.S. participation in ISS is slated to end

around 2016, although the Administration has said that that date may shift. The

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has also decided to cancel

the Shuttle mission that was needed to keep the Hubble Space Telescope in operation past 2007. Ending the Shuttle and Station programs is necessary to free up

funds for other aspects of the proposal and to avoid Shuttle recertification in 2010,

an expensive process called for by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

The second aspect of the plan concerns new medium-term goals for human space

flight. The central goal is to return to the Moon between 2015 and 2020. To do this,

NASA will develop a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which will carry humans

by 2014. (The CEV may also be used to service the Space Station.)

The third aspect of the plan concerns long-range goals for the years past 2020.

The entire plan is geared toward preparing for this period, but what will happen

during these years is (perhaps necessarily) left entirely open-ended. The ultimate

goals are to send humans to Mars and to increase the commercial exploitation of

space. The timing of future exploration is left open and will depend on the pace of

technology development and discovery during the years leading up to 2020. The

President announced the appointment of a nine-member commission, headed by

former Secretary of the Air Force Pete Aldridge, that will focus primarily on recommending what kinds of things ought to be done in the long-run on the Moon and

to get to Mars, and how those activities might shape programs in the nearer-term.

3. Overarching Questions

The President’s plan raises many fundamental questions about the purposes of

the U.S. space program and about the details of how it will be carried out. The overarching questions for the hearing include:

1. What is the purpose of the exploration program? To what degree will it be

designed to answer scientific research questions? To what degree will it be

designed to promote commercialization or national security interests? How

high a national priority is exploration for exploration’s sake?

2. How much will the President’s proposal cost to implement now and in the

future? What are the greatest uncertainties in the budget estimates that

have been presented? When will those figures become more definite? Are

there early points at which progress can reasonably be assessed? What is

being done to avoid the inaccurate cost estimates that have plagued the

Space Shuttle, Space Station and Orbital Space Plane programs?

3. What budgetary tradeoffs will have to be made to fund the President’s proposal? Specifically, what will the impact be on NASA’s programs in astronomy, outer planetary exploration, Earth science, and aeronautics?

7

The overall goal of the hearing is to make sure the Committee has clear information on the philosophy and budgetary assumptions that undergird the President’s

proposal.

4. Witnesses

Mr. Sean O’Keefe, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

Dr. John Marburger, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

5. Issues

• What is the goal of the President’s initiative? Human space travel is inherently expensive and risky compared to robotic missions. Congress needs to

decide whether human space travel is a priority that merits continued funding, and obviously that will depend, in part, on what is to be gained. In his

Jan. 14 speech, the President said, ‘‘We choose to explore space because doing

so improves our lives and lifts our national spirit.’’ But the Administration

has sent mixed signals about what kinds of improvements will be sought. In

some presentations, the Administration has left the impression that exploration is a basic human need, an end in itself—an activity that will be informed by science and may contribute to science, but that will not have a

science-driven agenda. In other presentations, the Administration has implied

that science is the primary rationale for the President’s vision. In other

places, commercialization, national security, and the possibility of technological spinoffs have been offered as rationales. None of these reasons is mutually exclusive, but the goals of the program will determine the spending

and activities that are undertaken.

• How much will the President’s initiative cost? The President has been

clear that he is not willing to seek massive amounts of new spending to fund

the initiative—unlike the approach that was taken during the Apollo program

in the 1960s. NASA officials have said that if work does not proceed smoothly,

they will extend deadlines rather than increase annual costs. (Moving deadlines would still increase cumulative costs.) The President has proposed a 5.6

percent increase for NASA (to $15.4 billion) for Fiscal Year (FY) 05, by far

the largest increase for any R&D agency.

Figuring out how much the President’s initiative would cost is not easy because of the many assumptions that need to be made. Adding to the complexity, NASA has described the costs differently in different documents,

using different baselines.

The most specific figures concern the next five years (FY05–09), over which

the President proposes to spend a cumulative total of $87.1 billion on the entire NASA budget. NASA has compared the proposal to two different baselines. In the first comparison, NASA says that over the next five years, the

President proposes to spend $1 billion more on the entire NASA budget than

NASA had predicted it would spend in February, 2003. (That estimate was

made as part of the Presidents’s FY04 budget.) In the second comparison,

NASA describes the President’s proposal as providing $12.6 billion more, cumulatively, over five years for the entire NASA budget compared to what

NASA would have received if its spending had been frozen for five years at

the FY04 level of about $15 billion. (NASA uses this figure frequently, but

there is no evidence that NASA was ever going to face such a freeze.)

Figuring out how much of the NASA budget will be dedicated to the President’s initiative depends on what is included in that spending category.

Should it include the Space Shuttle and Space Station? Should it include

robotic missions that were planned before the President’s announcement, but

may contribute to it, or just new ones? NASA, generally, includes all robotic

missions that will contribute to the initiative and excludes the Space Shuttle

and Space Station. Using those definitions, the initiative would receive $31.4

billion over the next five years. Costs would increase considerably in the subsequent 10 years, and costs cannot even be estimated for the period beyond

that because the activities remain undefined. (See Attachment B, although,

according to NASA, the chart was designed more for internal purposes than

to give a precise picture of out-year spending.)

• What are the greatest uncertainties in NASA’s cost projections? Of necessity, the proposed budget is based on best guesses of costs for key elements

of the President’s initiative.

8

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty remains the cost of continuing to operate

the Space Shuttle. Any delay in retiring the Space Shuttle will add significantly to NASA’s costs (as well as raising the question of whether the Shuttle

should fly without recertification). NASA continues to assume a return to

flight this fall, although experts inside and outside the agency are raising

doubts about whether that deadline can be met. Once flights resume, NASA

plans about five flights a year—a pace that Admiral Gehman, the Chair of

the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, has said could revive concerns

about ‘‘schedule pressure’’ adversely affecting safety. Retiring the Shuttle on

schedule may also require using means other than the Shuttle to take up

crew and supplies to the Space Station because the Shuttle will be needed

to complete Station construction. Shuttle retirement could also be delayed if

key portions of the Station, such as the centrifuge being built by the Japanese, are not completed on schedule. (The centrifuge is generally viewed as

the most valuable piece of scientific equipment that will be brought to the

Station.) NASA is still figuring out the ‘‘manifests’’ for the remaining Shuttle

flights—that is, the description of when flights would leave and return and

what they would carry.

The costs of developing the CEV, the new vehicle that would take astronauts to the Moon and beyond also are uncertain because development has

not yet begun. In some ways, CEV development will build on the Orbital

Space Plane (OSP) project that NASA discontinued as part of the President’s

initiative. The OSP, which was to be designed primarily to take astronauts

to the Space Station, was already facing cost overruns in its early design

stages, and Congress was raising doubts about its usefulness. NASA now estimates that it will spend $6.5 billion over the next five years on CEV development.

The CEV will also require the development of a new launch system, and

NASA has not decided yet how to approach the design of a new launch vehicle. NASA is now estimating that the development of such a vehicle will cost

about $5 billion.

Administration officials have said that because the CEV and its launch system will be developed over a longer time period than was allotted for the OSP

there will be time to reevaluate costs before becoming overly committed to a

particular design. Total CEV development is expected to cost about $15 billion.

The cost of the CEV may be affected by how NASA decides to select a contractor for the program. NASA limited OSP development to two competitors.

NASA has not yet made clear whether it will have a more open competition

for the CEV.

• How will the President’s initiative affect the rest of NASA’s programs? The Space Sciences budget will continue to grow (from $3.9 billion

in FY04 to $5.6 billion in FY09) because many of its robotics missions will

be considered part of preparation for human exploration. Most of these missions will be entirely unchanged despite the redesignation. In addition, new

lunar missions will be added. Nonetheless, projects totaling about $2.6 billion

will be cut from the Space Sciences budget over the next five years (compared

to the Administration’s February, 2003 projections) by canceling or deferring

missions and programs that are considered less important to human exploration. (Other projects are added so that, overall, Space Sciences will receive

slightly more over the five-year period than had been planned, if one excludes

Project Prometheus, which is being transferred from Space Sciences to another account.) One question is how Space Sciences will fare in the years after

FY09 when the costs of a human lunar landing will begin to increase substantially.

Earth Science would fare far worse, sustaining cuts in FY05 through FY08.

Earth Science spending would decline from $1.52 billion in FY04 to $1.47 billion in FY09, a year in which it is slated to receive an increase. NASA Earth

Science missions are a major component of the Administration’s climate

change science program.

Aeronautics would be essentially flat through the period, increasing in

some years and decreasing in others, but ending up in FY09 at $942 million—a drop from the FY04 level of $946 million.

(See Attachment C for more details.)

9

• Why is the Shuttle mission to the Hubble Space Telescope being cancelled? The Administration is describing the Hubble cancellation as a ‘‘close

call’’ made by the Administrator because of safety concerns. The Hubble,

which has been enormously successful, is expected to go dark around 2007

without a servicing mission. Many astronomers are lobbying for that mission

to occur, and, indeed, before the President’s initiative was announced, a panel

assembled by the National Academy of Sciences, called for another servicing

mission to be added to extend the telescope’s life even further. That request

became moot with the decision to discontinue the Shuttle in 2010. However,

some experts contend that ground-based telescopes have advanced so much

in recent years that they can now make up for at least some of the capability

that would be lost if the Hubble ceases to function.

A Shuttle mission to the Hubble is a special case because Hubble missions

cannot reach the Space Station, which could be used as a ‘‘safe haven’’ in case

of an emergency or the need to inspect or repair the Shuttle. The Columbia

Accident Investigation Board said that the Shuttle should fly to destinations

other than the Space Station only when NASA had developed an ‘‘autonomous’’ inspection and repair capability—that is, a way to inspect without

using the Space Station. NASA believes such a capability is probably many

years away. As a substitute, NASA examined having a second Shuttle ready

to fly a rescue mission, but viewed that as dangerous and prohibitively expensive. However, debate continues among Hubble enthusiasts as to the relative

dangers of a mission to the Station and a mission to Hubble.

NASA acknowledges that there were ‘‘secondary’’ considerations that also

led to the cancellation of the Hubble mission, including the need to complete

all the Shuttle missions needed for Station construction by 2010.

• How will the President’s initiative change the Space Station program? As a result of the initiative, NASA is reexamining the entire Station

research program. Decisions on the new program may not be made for about

a year. The new program will focus on questions of human health. Among the

questions this raises are: what research will be discontinued and was any of

it of real value? How much will the new research agenda cost? Does the new

research really require facilities in space and will it be peer reviewed? Will

concerns arise since much of the new research will presumably involve using

astronauts as human experimental subjects?

• How will NASA transport crews to the Station after the Shuttle is retired? The Administration acknowledges that it has not yet figured out how

to get crews to the Station between the retirement of the Shuttle in 2010 and

the first flight of the CEV in 2014. (The Shuttle may also be unavailable for

crew transfer earlier, if its schedule needs to be devoted entirely to Station

construction.)

The U.S. is already using the Russian Soyuz spacecraft for crew transfer

while the Shuttle is grounded. However, it is doing so under an agreement

that the Russians will have fulfilled by 2006. Renewing the agreement may

require a change in the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA), which Congress

passed in 2000. That Act attempts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass

destruction to Iran by prohibiting the purchase of Russian rockets by the U.S.

unless the President certifies that no Russian entity is engaged in any sales

of missiles or missile systems to Iran. (The INA does not apply to the current

agreement.)

Amending the Act would be controversial, and so far the Administration

has hedged its bets, simply saying that the matter is under review.

• How will NASA carry cargo to and from the Station after the Shuttle

is retired? Similar to the crew situation, NASA has no current plan for getting cargo to the Station after the Shuttle is retired. NASA is using Russian

Progress vehicles while the Shuttle is grounded, but continuing to do so indefinitely could require amending the Iran Nonproliferation Act. (See above.)

NASA might also rely on Europe or Japan, which are partners in the Space

Station and which are developing cargo-carrying spacecraft of their own. But

those craft have not yet been flight-tested. Some have suggested that NASA

could convert the Space Shuttle itself into a cargo-only craft that could deliver

huge loads of cargo to the ISS. But critics have said that such an approach

would be much more expensive than flying smaller loads on existing rockets.

Finally, NASA might try to purchase the services of commercial rocket firms.

But at present no firm has a rocket that can supply the Station, although sevVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
10

eral have indicated a willingness to try to carry small amounts of cargo there.

Another complication is that some cargo for the Space Station is very large—

major replacement parts, for example—and most craft other than the Shuttle

are not big enough to carry such cargo.

6. Questions to witnesses:

In his letter of invitation to appear as a witness, Administrator O’Keefe was asked

to address the following questions in his testimony:

(1) What specific activities must be undertaken and milestones achieved over

the next twelve months and over the next five years to implement the new

initiative? What analysis was performed to ensure that the proposed budget

is adequate to accomplish those activities?

(2) Specifically, what changes (in spending and program content) are contemplated in the Shuttle, International Space Station, and Space Science

programs as a result of the new initiative?

(3) What is the current status of NASA’s thinking about a mission to the

Hubble Space Telescope? What changes in spending and in other NASA activities would be necessary to allow one or two more missions to the

Hubble?

(4) Are any changes to the Iran Non-proliferation Act, the Space Station InterGovernmental Agreement or any other agreements required to complete the

Space Station? If so, please explain how the Administration plans to inform

and consult with the Congress on these changes, including the timetable for

any actions that may be necessary.

In his letter of invitation to appear as a witness, Dr. Marburger was given the

following information and asked to address the following questions in his testimony:

In their briefings on the initiative, White House officials have said that you

were an active participant in developing the initiative, and that, more specifically, you had reviewed the initiative to ensure that no essential science activities would be sacrificed to pay for it.

In your testimony, you should describe the role you and your staff played in formulating the initiative and why and how you concluded that the initiative

would be a net benefit from a scientific point of view. As part of that description, please specifically address the following:

(1) What criteria did you use to determine whether an activity was ‘‘essential,’’ and how did you evaluate and balance the differing scientific benefits of existing and potential NASA activities?

(2) To what extent, has and can the International Space Station contribute

to science? Did you review any specific new research agenda for the

Space Station as part of your evaluation of the overall initiative?

(3) To what extent can scientific research that would be accomplished by

manned missions to the Moon be accomplished by space telescopes or

by unmanned probes on the Moon?

(4) How would you describe the contributions to science made by the

Hubble Space Telescope? How would you assess what would be lost if

the Hubble ceases to function earlier than had been planned? How did

you weigh those losses against the potential benefits of other activities

under the new initiative?’’

7. Attachments

Attachment A: A Renewed Spirit of Discovery: The President’s Vision for U.S. Space

Exploration

Attachment B: NASA Budget Projection 2004–2020. (This chart can be viewed in

color on the Internet at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/

54873main¥budget¥chart¥14jan04.pdf

Attachment C: NASA FY 2005 Budget

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HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The Future of

Human Space Flight

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2003

10:00 A.M.–12:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

1. Purpose

The Committee on Science will hold a hearing on The Future of Human Space

Flight on October 16, 2003 at 10:00 a.m. in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House Office

Building. The hearing will examine the rationale for human presence in space, the

feasibility and cost of various potential long-term goals, and the near-term implications of establishing these goals.

2. Overarching Questions

The witnesses will outline their perspectives on human space flight and lay out

various options that could be pursued. Overarching questions that will be addressed

are:

• What is the U.S. likely to gain by the proposed options for human space flight

and why could such gains not be obtained in other ways?

• What is a rough estimate of the costs of pursuing any of the proposed options?

What is the approximate amount of time that it would take to achieve the

goals of the proposed options?

• What are the technical hurdles that must be overcome in pursuing the options and the steps that must be taken to overcome those hurdles? (i.e., are

there intermediate program goals and when might these be achieved?)

• What are the implications of the options for the current human space flight

program? To what degree does the current program contribute to, or impede

other options that could be pursued?

3. Key Issues

In the aftermath of the Columbia tragedy and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the Nation has a rare opportunity to re-examine the vision and

goals of the human space flight program. The following are some of the key issues:

Is there a compelling reason for human presence in space? The Apollo program to send a man to the Moon was clearly tied to a broader national goal, winning the Cold War. Today, NASA’s human space flight program lacks a similar goal

and is not tied to any national imperative. While NASA officials often argue that

a human presence in space is necessary to carry out scientific research, even many

advocates of human space flight suggest that science alone is not a compelling justification because much research can be conducted with unmanned probes. Instead

advocates point to other rationales, including the human imperative to explore, a

need for a strategic presence ,in space, the potential for technological spinoffs, and

the possible development of human colonies in space, which they say could be especially important in the event of a natural or human-induced calamity on Earth.

What are the appropriate roles for robotic exploration and human exploration? Robotic spacecraft have landed on the Moon and Mars, and (in the case of

the Soviet Union) on Venus. Robotic spacecraft have flown by every planet in the

Solar System with the exception of Pluto, and NASA is currently developing a mission to that planet. Robotic spacecraft provide a wealth of scientific information and

typically cost a fraction of what a human mission costs. In January 2004, NASA’s

Mars Exploration Rovers Mission will land two identical rovers, named Spirit and

Opportunity, on the Martian surface to search for clues of water. This mission cost

less than $1 billion. In some cases, robotic spacecraft and human missions work together to perform complementary tasks, such as when astronauts service and repair

the Hubble Space Telescope or when robotic missions are used to scout out landing

sites for human missions as was done before Apollo. Key issues include: What is

23

1The Van Allen Belts are layers of charged high-energy particles located above Earth’s atmosphere (4000 to 40,000 miles up). The Earth’s magnetic field traps the particles and protects astronauts on the Space Station from cosmic radiation. 2http://spaceresearch.nasa.gov/general¥info/issphysiology.html 3 Based on Congressional Research Service Report 95–873, Space Activities of the United

States, CIS [the Commonwealth of Independent States] and other Launching Countries/Organizations 1957–1994, Marcia S. Smith, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy

the appropriate balance between robotic and human missions? What activities can

only be accomplished with humans? Should NASA focus its efforts on robotic exploration until a suitable purpose can be developed and agreed upon for human exploration?

How would the Space Shuttle, the International Space Station and other

aspects of the current human space flight program fit with any vision for

NASA’s future? Neither the Space Shuttle nor the Space Station has met its primary original goal. The Shuttle, for example, has not led to low-cost, routine, and

reliable access to space; the Space Station is no longer being designed to provide

a space-based platform to assemble and launch missions beyond Earth’s orbit. Some

advocates of a bolder mission for NASA argue that both the Shuttle and the Space

Station consume large amounts of money simply to send humans repeatedly into

Low Earth Orbit (LEO) without moving toward any more ambitious or compelling

goal. Others point out that the Space Station could contribute to future missions by

providing data on how the human body reacts to prolonged stays in space. It is not

clear how the Orbital Space Plane—the next vehicle on the drawing boards at

NASA—would contribute to future missions. While NASA has talked about having

the Space Plane contribute to longer-range goals, it is being designed only to ferry

astronauts back and forth to the Space Station.

What technological barriers must be overcome? Human space flight is inherently dangerous. Human space exploration beyond Earth orbit is particularly hazardous because the radiation environment beyond the protective Van Allen belts1

is much greater than the radiation levels experienced on the Space Station. Furthermore, the increased distance from Earth makes it impractical, and in some cases

impossible, to return quickly if a problem arises. Also, it has been clearly demonstrated that near-zero gravity has a slowly debilitating effect on human physiology. For example, astronauts can lose between 6 and 24 percent of their bone mass

over the course of a year in space.2 Depending on the duration and destination of

the mission, improved technologies for propulsion, power, and life support systems

may need to be developed.

What can we afford? The U.S. spends more than $6 billion annually on human

space flight, including the Space Shuttle, Space Station, and Space Station research.

This amount accounts for more than 40 percent of NASA’s budget. Both Space Station and Space Shuttle have cost significantly more than originally expected and,

following the Columbia tragedy, Shuttle costs are likely to increase. A large and

sustained investment is likely to be necessary for any ambitious human space flight

mission to succeed. NASA spending accounted for as much as 3.5 percent of the entire federal budget during the Apollo program, but today represents less than one

percent of federal spending. Is the U.S. prepared to make NASA a sustained funding

priority?

4. Background—Previous Studies on Future Goals for Space3

Over the last 40 years, numerous studies, commissions, and task forces have attempted to address the future of the U.S. civil space program, and the human space

flight program in particular. The following provides a summary of several key studies.

National Commission on Space—(The Paine Commission, 1986)

In 1984, Congress created a commission to look at the long-term future of the civil

space program. Chaired by former NASA Administrator Thomas O. Paine, the 15-

member panel spent a year developing a 50-year plan. This plan was detailed in

their report Pioneering the Space Frontier. In summary, the Commission called for

the United States to lead the way in opening the inner solar system for science, exploration, and development. The Commission envisioned the establishment of bases

on the Moon and Mars and the creation of a routine transportation system among

the Earth, Moon, and Mars. The Commission emphasized that it was not trying to

predict the future, but rather show what the United States could do if it chose to

do so. The Commission envisioned human exploration missions returning to the

Moon by 2005 and going to Mars by 2015. The report detailed a program involving

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both robotic and human exploration, acting synergistically to achieve the goal of

opening the solar system. The report did not provide a cost estimate for carrying

out its recommendations, but identified three principal benefits: (1) advancement of

science and technology; (2) economic benefit of low-cost launch systems; and (3)

opening up new worlds on the space frontier.

Leadership and America’s Future in Space—(The Ride Report, 1987)

Astronaut Sally Ride’s report Leadership and America’s Future in Space was prepared as an internal NASA report. The report stated that the U.S. had lost its leadership in space and was in danger of being surpassed by other countries. The report

argued that to regain leadership the U.S. space program must have two attributes:

(1) a sound program of scientific research and technology development; and (2) significant and visible accomplishments. The report detailed four programs areas for

comparatively near-term (15–20 year) activities: Mission to Planet Earth (now called

Earth Science), robotic exploration of the solar system, a Moon base, and sending

humans to Mars. The report recommended that NASA pursue programs in each of

these areas. The report envisioned humans returning to the Moon by 2000, preceded

by robotic probes to select a site for the Moon base. The report proposed one-year

expeditionary missions to Mars between 2005 and 2010. The report concluded that

settling Mars should be an eventual goal. As a result of the Ride report, NASA established the Office of Exploration to investigate long-range proposals for human exploration to the Moon and Mars.

President Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative (SEI)—1989–1993

On July 20, 1989, the 20th anniversary of the first Apollo landing on the Moon,

President Bush made a major space policy address, endorsing the goal of returning

humans to the Moon and then going on to Mars ‘‘in the 21st Century.’’ The program

was referred to as the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI). At the time the President

made his statement in 1989, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget

suggested that the program would cost $400 billion over 30 years. While Congress

endorsed the philosophy of the program, Congress was reluctant to approve the program because of the expected cost. The SEI program was formally terminated in

1993 and the NASA Office of Exploration was dismantled.

The Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program—(The Augustine

Report, 1990)

In 1990, concerns about problems with several NASA programs (Hubble Space

Telescope’s flawed mirror, hydrogen leaks grounding the Shuttle for five months,

and several issues with the Space Station program) prompted the White House to

strongly encourage NASA to establish an outside advisory panel to reviews its programs and management. The panel was chaired by then-Chairman and CEO of

Martin Marietta Inc., Norman Augustine. The panel recommended that NASA’s

budget increase by 10 percent per year after inflation. The report recommended activities for NASA in five major areas. They were: (1) Space Science (e.g., Hubble

Space Telescope), which the report said should be NASA’s highest priority and be

maintained at 20 percent of NASA’s overall budget; (2) Mission to Planet Earth

(now called Earth Science); (3) Mission from Planet Earth, which would include

robotic spacecraft needed as precursors to human exploration. The long-term goal

would be human exploration of Mars. No specific timetable for this mission was set.

Instead, the panel urged NASA to adopt a philosophy of ‘‘go-as-you-pay;’’ (4) space

technology, (i.e., design of subsystems and materials for spacecraft) for which the

report said spending should double or triple; and (5) development of a ‘‘heavy lift’’

unmanned, expendable launch vehicle to complement the Space Shuttle. The panel

stated that if the 10 percent budget increases were not available the programs

should be prioritized as follows: (1) Space Science; (2) Mission to Planet Earth; (3)

heavy lift launch vehicle; (4) technology development: and (5) Mission from Planet

Earth.

National Academy of Sciences Study—The Human Exploration of Space, 1997

In 1997, the Academy undertook a study of the role of science in human space

exploration. The study examined scientific activities that must be conducted before

human exploration beyond Earth orbit could be practically undertaken and science

that would be enabled or facilitated by human presence. The study concluded that

clear goals must be set and that an integrated science program, with the appropriate balance of human and robotic missions, to collect relevant data to enable future missions beyond Earth orbit should be pursued.

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Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)—(The Gehman Report, 2003)

In its August report, the CAIB concluded that there was a problematic mismatch

between NASA’s missions and its budget. This occurred because NASA and/or Congress failed to scale back NASA’s missions when funding did not match requested

levels or when initial cost estimates proved to be inaccurate. The CAIB also pointed

out that ‘‘for the past three decades, NASA has suffered because of the ‘‘lack. . .of

any national mandate providing NASA a compelling mission requiring human presence in space.’’ The CAIB stated that investments in a ‘‘next generation launch vehicle’’ will be successful only if the investment ‘‘is sustained over the decade; if by the

time a decision to develop a new vehicle is made there is a clearer idea of how the

new space transportation system fits into the Nation’s overall plans for space; and

if the U.S. Government is willing at the time a development decision is made to

commit the substantial resources required to implement it.’’ For further CAIB comments, see Attachment A.

5. Witnesses

Dr. Michael Griffin is the President and Chief Operating Officer of In-Q-Tel. He

has nearly 30 years of experience managing information and space technology organizations. Dr. Griffin has served as Executive Vice President and CEO of Magellan

Systems Division of Orbital Sciences Corporation, and as EVP and General Manager

of Orbital Space Systems Group. Prior to that he served as both the Chief Engineer

and Associate Administrator for Exploration at NASA, and at the Pentagon as the

Deputy for Technology of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

Dr. Wesley T. Huntress is the Director of the Carnegie Institution’s Geophysical

Laboratory. From 1993 to 1998 he was NASA’s Associate Administrator for Space

Science. In this position he was responsible for NASA’s programs in Astrophysics,

Planetary Exploration and Space Physics. Previously, he was Director of the Solar

System Exploration Division. Dr. Huntress earned his B.S. in Chemistry at Brown

University in 1964, and his Ph.D. in Chemical Physics at Stanford University in

1968. He is the recipient of a number of honors including the NASA Exceptional

Service Medal.

Dr. Matthew B. Koss is an Assistant Professor of Physics of the College of Holy

Cross in Worcester, Massachusetts. He has been the Lead Scientist on several Space

Shuttle microgravity flight experiments flown on STS–62, STS–75, and STS–87. He

received an AB degree from Vassar College in 1983 and a Ph.D. in Experimental

Condensed Physics from Tufts University in 1989.

Dr. Alex Roland is Professor of History and Chairman of the Department of History at Duke University, where he teaches military history and the history of technology. From 1973 to 1981 he was a historian with NASA. He has written and lectured widely on the United States manned space flight program. He is past President of the Society for the History of Technology and of the U.S. National Committee of the International Union for the History and Philosophy of Science.

Dr. Bruce Murray is Professor Emeritus of Planetary Science and Geology at the

California Institute of Technology. He was Director of the NASA/Caltech Jet Propulsion Laboratory from 1976 to 1982, which included the Viking landings on Mars and

the Voyager mission through Jupiter and Saturn encounters. In 1979, he, the late

Carl Sagan, and Louis Friedman founded The Planetary Society. He has published

over 130 scientific papers and authored or co-authored six books. He received his

college education at M.I.T., culminating in the Ph.D. in 1955.

6. Witness Questions

All the witnesses except Dr. Koss were asked to layout an option that they believed NASA should pursue and answer the following questions in their testimony:

• What is the U.S. likely to gain by your proposed option for human space flight

and why could such gains not be obtained in other ways?

• What is a rough estimate of the costs of pursuing your proposed option? What

is the approximate amount of time that it would take to achieve the goals of

your proposed option?

• What are the technical hurdles that must be overcome in pursuing your option and the steps that must be taken to overcome those hurdles? (i.e., are

there intermediate program goals and when might these be achieved?)

• What are the implications of your option for the current human space flight

program? To what degree does the current program contribute to, or impede

other options that could be pursued?

26

Dr. Koss was asked to answer these questions:

• How necessary is it to have the participation of people in space for successful

research in material sciences? What proportion, if any, of the experiments

now conducted on the Space Shuttle or Space Station could be conducted autonomously with unmanned systems? If researchers no longer had access to

the Space Shuttle or Space Station how would advancement in the material

sciences be affected?

• What alternatives exist to carry to orbit micro-gravity experiments that could

be conducted autonomously if the Space Shuttle or Space Station were not

available for whatever reason? If none, how much would it cost NASA to provide researchers such an alternative?

• To what extent, if any, would a more ambitious mission for NASA, such as

sending people back to the Moon or to Mars, be likely to provide material

science researchers with unique opportunities for experimentation?

7. Attachments:

• Attachment A: Excerpt from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report.

• Attachment B: NASA’s five-year budget runout.

• Attachment C: Editorial by Dr. Matthew B. Koss.

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4 National Commission on Space Pioneering the Space Frontier: An Exciting Vision of Our

Next Fifty Years in Space, Report of the National Commission on Space (Bantam Books, 1986),

p. 2. 5President George H.W. Bush, ‘‘Remarks on the 20th Anniversary of the Apollo 11 Moon

Landing,’’ Washington, D.C., July 20, 1989. 6 ‘‘Report of the Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program,’’ December

1990, p. 2.

ATTACHMENT A

Excerpted from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report Volume 1, Chapter 9, August 2003.

‘‘Lack of a National Vision for Space’’

In 1969 President Richard Nixon rejected NASA’s sweeping vision for a post-Apollo effort that involved full development of low-Earth orbit, permanent outposts on

the Moon, and initial journeys to Mars. Since that rejection, these objectives have

reappeared as central elements in many proposals setting forth a long-term vision

for the U.S. Space program. In 1986 the National Commission on Space proposed

‘‘a pioneering mission for 21st century America: To lead the exploration and development of the space frontier, advancing science, technology, and enterprise, and building institutions and systems that make accessible vast new resources and support

human settlements beyond Earth orbit, from the highlands of the Moon to the

plains of Mars.’’ 4 In 1989, on the 20th anniversary of the first lunar landing, President George H.W. Bush proposed a Space Exploration Initiative, calling for ‘‘a sustained program of manned exploration of the solar system.’’ 5 Space advocates have

been consistent in their call for sending humans beyond low-Earth orbit as the appropriate objective of U.S. space activities. Review committees as diverse as the

1990 Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, chaired by Norman Augustine, and the 2001 International Space Station Management and Cost

Evaluation Task Force have suggested that the primary justification for a space station is to conduct the research required to plan missions to Mars and/or other distant destinations. However, human travel to destinations beyond Earth orbit has

not been adopted as a national objective. The report of the Augustine Committee

commented, ‘‘It seems that most Americans do support a viable space program for

the Nation—but no two individuals seem able to agree upon what that space program should be.’’ 6 The Board observes that none of the competing long-term visions

for space have found support from the Nation’s leadership, or indeed among the general public. The U.S. civilian space effort has moved forward for more than 30 years

without a guiding vision, and none seems imminent. In the past, this absence of a

strategic vision in itself has reflected a policy decision, since there have been many

opportunities for national leaders to agree on ambitious goals for space, and none

have done so.’’

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ATTACHMENT C

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company

The New York Times

June 29, 2003, Sunday, Late Edition—Final

How Science Brought Down the Shuttle

BY MATTHEW B. KOSS

Matthew B. Koss is an assistant professor of physics at the College of the Holy

Cross.

As a scientist whose experiments were carried out on three missions of the Space

Shuttle Columbia, I have been following with great interest the findings of the

board looking into the Shuttle’s demise. Though a piece of foam may be found ultimately responsible, as the Columbia Accident Investigation Board announced last

week, on some level I feel personally culpable for the loss of the seven astronauts.

In-orbit experiments like mine have been used to justify manned space projects like

the Shuttle for decades.

The truth is that the vast majority of scientific experiments conducted in orbit—

including my own—do not require astronauts. The main reason for in-orbit experimentation is to observe how a scientific process works without gravity-driven influences. But almost all of these tests, save those that must be done on humans, can

be controlled from the ground via computer or by robots in space. In fact, some of

the best work is done this way when the crew is asleep, not moving about and causing vibrations.

To be sure, a lot of important science has been conducted in orbit. For example,

research on the large single crystals of silicon that are at the heart of computer

chips arose from the many detailed studies of crystal growth on the Space Shuttle.

But, in fact, experiments like these are often more efficient and yield more fruitful

results when done without the involvement of astronauts.

The science performed on the Shuttle can be classified as either a payload or a

mid-deck laboratory experiment. Payload experiments are self-contained packages

mounted in the payload bay, the wide open space in the back of the Shuttle. They

either run autonomously or are controlled remotely via computers on the ground.

Laboratory experiments are performed in the mid-deck or Spacelab module, and are

done by the astronauts with computer assistance from the ground.

My experiments, on the fundamentals of how liquids turn into solids, were originally planned for the mid-deck, where they would be controlled by an astronaut who

was scheduled to do eight tests. But because of launching delays, the project was

changed to a payload experiment that would perform tests autonomously. During

the flight, initial data was transmitted to the ground and analyzed by me and my

colleagues. Performing the experiment remotely, without crew involvement, allowed

us to do 63 test runs.

(Remote-controlled experiments may seem to contradict images we have grown accustomed to—of happy, busy astronauts manipulating scientific equipment or talking about the science on-board, or occasionally reporting on the objectives of experiments. But this public image of astronauts as laboratory scientists working on their

own experiments is a bit misleading. Since the Mercury 7 pioneers, the astronaut

corps has served one overriding political and public relations purpose—to sell the

space program.

The idea of using the Space Shuttle as a scientific laboratory actually came about

after the Shuttle’s design was already in place. The Shuttle program was conceived

in the waning days of the Apollo program as the best option to continue a manned

space program at the lowest cost. However, without a place to shuttle to, and not

nearly enough satellites that needed a Shuttle to launch or repair them, the Shuttle

program succeeded in doing little beyond creating a human presence in space. The

idea of the Shuttle as an in-orbit lab was used as a justification for investment in

its future.

Similarly, the International Space Station has been aggressively marketed as a

science lab. In fact, the Station is seriously flawed in that too much crew time needs

to be committed to Station maintenance, and too many of the planned experiments

depend on crew operations when they could more effectively be done without them.

In many cases, the crew is needed only to deploy an autonomous experiment.

Because of cost overruns and budget problems, the Station’s crew was cut back

to three from the planned seven. Originally, 120 astronaut-hours per week were to

have been devoted to science; this has been cut back to 20 hours per week. With

30

the Shuttle program grounded once again, it has become even more difficult to exchange crews, replace experiments or repair and refurbish equipment.

Scientific experimentation in space can be safer and more cost effective using

long-duration remote controlled orbital spacecraft. At the outset, the costs of developing this technology may appear greater than simply perfecting the Shuttle. But

if you do not need to provide a safe and sustaining environment for astronauts—

making sure takeoffs and landings aren’t too fast, providing enough food and oxygen—the overall cost will be significantly reduced.

If NASA is not able to convince the public of the importance of science in orbit

without astronaut involvement, then so be it. At least America’s refusal to support

science would be honest, would not needlessly endanger human lives or compromise

the integrity of science and scientists.

We will always need astronauts to assume certain risks to develop the technology

that allows for human exploration of space. The space shuttles and space stations

may be necessary to fulfill that mission. However, we need to separate the goal of

scientific experimentation from the desire for space exploration. I hope that the unfortunate death of the Columbia astronauts will forever sever the false link that has

been created between the two.

Astronauts do not risk their lives to perform scientific experiments in space. They

fly to fulfill a much more basic and human desire—to experience the vastness of

space.

31

Chairman BOEHLERT. We are going to start right away as some

of our Members are coming in. We are told that in 15 minutes or

so we are going to be rudely interrupted by the bells calling us to

the Floor. That is unfortunate, but off we go.

The hearing will come to order. I want to welcome everyone here

for our second hearing on the President’s proposed space exploration initiative. I am going to keep my comments brief, because

we are going to have to break for votes soon, and because my concerns with the President’s proposal should be well understood by

now.

I think all I need to say about my views this morning is to reiterate that I remain undecided about whether and how to undertake

the exploration program. I would add that, as the outlines of the

likely fiscal year 2005 budget becomes clearer, my questions about

the initiative only become more pressing.

We could not ask for a better panel to help answer those questions than the one we have before us today. I am truly honored to

have such a distinguished group of experts here, people with long

and deep experience with the space program who have nonetheless

remained probing and independent thinkers about space policy.

The panelists have also done us the great and all too rare service

in their testimony of responding very directly to the specific questions that were posed to them, and that will help us have a focused

and truly interactive session this morning with, I hope, plenty of

discussion among the witnesses themselves.

The questions we posed are some of the fundamental ones that

Congress must consider as it evaluates the initiative: Exactly what

role should humans play in exploration? To what extent can the

International Space Station and the Moon play a useful role in a

program whose ultimate goal is Mars? Are the cost and schedule

estimates realistic? Can the program be funded without doing

undue harm to other NASA programs? What challenges must we

meet to enable humans to remain healthy during long stays in

space, and how can we meet those challenges?

We have also asked for guidance on what other questions Congress should be asking, and I can think of no more distinguished

people than the people before us today to address those questions

to.

Our witnesses this morning, all of whom support the initiative

in principle, have a variety of thoughtful answers to our questions.

I very much look forward to hearing from them.

Mr. Gordon.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boehlert follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SHERWOOD BOEHLERT

I want to welcome everyone here for our second hearing on the President’s proposed space exploration initiative. I’m going to keep my comments brief because

we’re going to have to break for votes soon, and because my concerns with the President’s proposal should be well understood by now.

I think all I need to say about my views this morning is to reiterate that I remain

undecided about whether and how to undertake the exploration program. I would

add that, as the outlines of the likely fiscal 2005 budget become clearer, my questions about the initiative only become more pressing.

We could not ask for a better panel to help answer those questions than the one

we have before us this morning. I truly am honored to have such a distinguished

group of experts here—people with long and deep experience with the space proVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
32

gram who have nonetheless remained probing and independent thinkers about

space policy.

The panelists have also done us the great and all too rare service, in their testimony, of responding very directly to the specific questions that were posed to them,

and that will help us have a focused and truly interactive session this morning with,

I hope, plenty of discussion among the witnesses themselves.

The questions we posed are some of the fundamental ones that Congress must

consider as it evaluates the initiative: Exactly what role should humans play in exploration? To what extent can the International Space Station and the Moon play

a useful role in a program whose ultimate goal is Mars?

Are the cost and schedule estimates realistic? Can the program be funded without

doing undue harm to other NASA programs? What challenges must we meet to enable humans to remain healthy during long stays in space and how can we meet

those challenges?

We’ve also asked for guidance on what other questions Congress should be asking.

Our witnesses this morning—all of whom support the initiative in principle—have

a variety of thoughtful answers to our questions. I very much look forward to hearing from them.

Mr. Gordon.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning. Welcome to the witnesses. There are many important issues associated

with the President’s space exploration initiative, and I look forward

to hearing your perspectives.

I come to this hearing as one who believes that it is important

for the U.S. civil space program to have challenges and long-term

goals. And also, I want to welcome—or welcomed the President’s

January the 14th speech announcing some specific exploration

goals, including returning to the Moon and eventually human missions to Mars.

At the same time, we all know that a speech is not a plan, and

Congress is going to need to know a lot more about the initiative

if we are going to evaluate its viability. Unfortunately, the initial

explanations have raised more questions than they have answered.

As you know, last month when I asked the President’s science

advisor and the NASA Administrator what the President was told

about the cost of this initiative, I couldn’t get a clear answer. I

hope that we will get one soon, and that it will be much more clear.

However, ‘‘affordability’’ is about more than just how much it will

cost to return the U.S. astronauts to the Moon. ‘‘Affordability’’ also

has to do with the impact made to the rest of NASA’s program in

order to fund the President’s plan. In that regard, the cuts, the deferrals, the cancellations that will be made over the next five years

to the space launch, space science, Earth science, and biological

and physical research activities have already been publicized. What

has not gotten much attention is the impact on the non-exploration

parts of NASA’s budget over the next decade and a half. In fact,

in order to fund the exploration initiative, NASA’s plan assumes

that Earth science, aeronautics, basic biological and physical research, space science research on Sun-Earth connections, space

science research on the structure and evolution of the universe,

space communications, and education, as well as their associated

infrastructure requirements will all be lumped into a single funding pot that will be best—will be, at best, a flat and, more likely,

shrinking in purchasing power between now and 2020. That seems

to me to be neither a wise nor realistic approach.

So Mr. Chairman, I support the goal of exploring our solar system, however, until I am convinced that the President’s plan to

33

achieve that goal is credible and responsible, I am not prepared to

give that plan my support. I think NASA has a lot of work ahead

of it if it is going—if it intends to develop a plan that can garner

national consensus behind it. And I hope that our witnesses will

help identify some of the issues that we need to address.

Once again, I welcome our witnesses today, and look forward to

your very important testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BART GORDON

Good morning. I want to welcome the witnesses to today’s hearing. There are

many important issues associated with the President’s space exploration initiative,

and I look forward to hearing your perspectives.

I come to this hearing as one who believes that it is important for the U.S. civil

space program to have challenging long-term goals. Thus, I welcomed the President’s January 14th speech announcing some specific exploration goals, including a

return to the Moon and eventual human missions to Mars.

At the same time, we all know that a speech is not a plan. Congress is going to

need to know a lot more about the initiative if we are to evaluate its viability. Unfortunately, the initial explanations have raised more questions than they have answered.

As you know, last month when I asked the President’s science advisor and the

NASA Administrator what the President was told about the cost of his initiative,

I couldn’t get a clear answer. I hope that we get one before too much longer.

However ‘‘affordability’’ is about more than just how much it will cost to return

U.S. astronauts to the Moon. ‘‘Affordability’’ also has to do with the impacts made

to the rest of NASA’s programs in order to fund the President’s plan. In that regard,

the cuts, deferrals, and cancellations that will be made over the next five years to

the space launch, space science, Earth science, and biological and physical research

activities have already been publicized. What has not gotten much attention is the

impact on the non-Exploration parts of NASA’s budget over the next decade and a

half. In fact, in order to fund the exploration initiative, NASA’s plan assumes that:

• Earth Science,

• Aeronautics,

• Basic biological and physical research,

• Space science research on Sun-Earth Connections,

• Space science research on the structure and evolution of the universe,

• Space communications, and

• Education,

• As well as their associated infrastructure requirements. . .

. . .will all be lumped into a single funding pot [the Aeronautics and Other

Science category] that will at best be flat and more likely be shrinking in purchasing power between now and 2020. That seems to me to be neither a wise nor

a realistic approach.

Mr. Chairman, I support the goal of exploring our solar system. However, until

I am convinced that the President’s plan to achieve that goal is credible and responsible, I am not prepared to give that plan my support. I think NASA has a lot of

work ahead of it if it intends to develop a plan that can garner a national consensus

behind it, and I hope that our witnesses will help identify some of the issues that

need to be addressed.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon.

Our panel today consists of: Mr. Norman Augustine, former Chief

Executive Office of Lockheed Martin, Chair, Advisory Committee

on the Future of the U.S. Space Program; Dr. Michael Griffin,

President, In-Q-Tel, former Chief Engineer, NASA, former Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems at NASA; Dr. Donna

Shirley, Director, Science Fiction Museum, former Manager, Jet

Propulsion Laboratory’s Mars Program, former Assistant Dean,

University of Oklahoma Aerospace Mechanical Engineering DeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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partment; Dr. Larry Young, Apollo Program Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, founding Director of the National

Space Biomedical Research Institute; and Dr. Lennard Fisk, Chair,

Space Studies Board, National Academy of Sciences, Chair, Department of Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space Sciences, University of

Michigan, former Associate Administrator, Space Science and Applications, NASA.

As our audience, and certainly this—the Members up here realize, this is a very distinguished panel, and I thank all of you for

serving as resources to this committee. Your minds are fertile

ground to be attacked, and we look forward to hearing from you,

and, more importantly, we look forward to a healthy and productive exchange.

Mr. Augustine, you are up first.

STATEMENT OF MR. NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, FORMER CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LOCKHEED MARTIN; CHAIR, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. SPACE PROGRAM

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. And thank you for the invitation to appear

before you today. With your permission, I would like to submit a

formal statement for the record.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Without objection, the formal statements

of all of the witnesses will appear in their entirety. We would ask

that you summarize it. Don’t get nervous if the red light comes on,

Mr. Augustine. What you have to say is too important to be deterred by a red light, and the same holds true for the other panel

members. But the shorter the initial presentation, the more opportunity we have for questions.

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Well, before beginning, I probably should, in the

spirit of full disclosure of possible conflicts of interest, call to your

attention that I am a retiree and a board member of Lockheed

Martin Corporation, former President of the American Institute of

Aeronautics and Astronautics, a former director of The Planetary

Society, and a former chairman of the Aerospace Industry Association.

I—with that said, I have been asked to address the findings to

the Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, a committee that was convened 14 years ago by then-President Bush. I

have also been asked to share with you my personal thoughts on

several specific issues you have raised.

The committee which I chaired in about 1990 found a NASA that

was overextended in terms of funding demands of the programs it

was undertaking as compared to the funding that was available.

The Space Shuttle and the Space Station were, and are today,

major consumers of the NASA budget, leaving relatively limited

room for other initiatives.

We concluded that America’s space program should be a balanced

program, involving both humans in space and the use of robotic

spacecraft. We observed that science should be given first priority,

since science is the basis of new knowledge and thereby also forms

the underpinnings of technological progress as well.

35

We concluded the space transportation was, and I might note is,

the primary impediment to a continuing healthy space program. It

was concluded that we should not use humans in space as ‘‘truck

drivers.’’ Rather, we should limit their roles to instances where humans in situ can, in fact, make a difference. We observed reluctantly, but explicitly, that it was not a matter of if we would lose

another Space Shuttle, but only a matter of when. This unfortunate

conclusion was based on our belief that the reliability estimates,

which were then being attributed to the Shuttle, were grossly optimistic. We predicted that such a loss would probably occur in the

next several years. And we went on to note that if America does

not have the will to endure occasional losses, having taken all reasonable steps to avoid them, we should reconsider whether our nation belongs in space at all.

Finally, we concluded that a human trip to Mars is the correct

long-term goal of America’s space program, using the Moon as a

stepping stone to achieve that goal.

That summarizes some of the findings of our commission. Many

of the observations are, perhaps, relevant today. I would like now

to turn to my own perspective and address the specific questions

that you have asked. First, I continue to believe that a human mission to Mars is the proper long-term objective, and should be approached in a step-wise fashion: first the Space Station, then the

Moon, and then Mars. There will be those who will say of a

manned lunar mission ‘‘been there, done that,’’ but there are good

engineering and programmatic reasons for this sequential approach.

While there are technical challenges to be met, especially in the

fields of propulsion, electric power generation, and human factors,

by far, the greatest challenge that we will face will be to provide

adequate funding and to do so over an extended period of time. It

is ironic that this should be the case, but far and away, the greatest risk that we could create would be to undertake a complex mission without adequate funding, including reserves, in terms of

money, time, and technical approaches. That is why our committee

originally proposed a ‘‘go-as-you-pay’’ approach to a Mars program.

With regard to the respective roles of humans and robots, I believe robots are best suited for very high-risk undertakings, very

long duration, remote missions, and functions which require minimal adaptability, such as monitoring and reporting. In contrast,

humans would be best suited for missions that involve exploration,

construction, and repair.

Looking at the priority of a Mars mission in the grand scheme

of things, I don’t think that such a mission can be justified solely

on the basis of technological and economic benefits. I believe that

one must include intangibles, but very real, benefits as well.

The science programs conducted by the NIH and NSF have seen

significant growth, although I would note that the hard sciences,

physics, chemistry, and their partners, mathematics and engineering, have been neglected. Do I believe that going to Mars is more

important than, say, cancer research? Clearly, the answer is no.

But do I believe that America, which spends large sums on Hollywood movies, video games, rock concerts, football players, and yes,

even golf courses, cannot afford to explore the solar system with

36

humans? The answer is, again, a resounding no. It is noteworthy

that few pursuits seem to attract the interest of America’s youth

towards science and technology as does the intrigue of exploring

space. This is a non-trivial consideration in our world wherein our

standard of living increasingly depends on our preeminence in

science and technology, yet a world in which the United States

graduates a declining number of engineers virtually every year:

58,000 last year as compared with India’s 80,000, Japan’s 200,000,

and China’s 800,000.

I would thus conclude—close by observing simply that one day

humans will stand on Mars, and the only questions are when and

who? The first Martian might well be in the fourth grade somewhere right now. Hopefully it is somewhere in the United States.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Augustine follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today. I am pleased that you are taking this opportunity to examine

America’s space program and hope that a plan can be created which will endure

over time and in which all Americans can take pride.

Before making my statement I should, in the spirit of full disclosure, call to your

attention that I am a retiree and Board Member of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, a former President of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics,

a former director of The Planetary Society and a former chairman of the Aerospace

Industry Association.

I have been asked to address the findings of the Committee on the Future of the

U.S. Space Program, a committee which was established approximately fourteen

years ago by then-President Bush. I will briefly summarize what I believe were

some of our more significant findings and recommendations and, as you have requested, close with a few brief observations of my own.

It goes without saying that a great deal has changed since the commission which

I chaired conducted its work. Today there is no Soviet Union dedicating substantial

resources to maintain its own dynamic space program—and thereby providing a

competitive impetus to America’s space program. In fact, rather than the Soviets

and the U.S. being adversaries in space, the company I recently had the privilege

of serving is now a partner in launching commercial spacecraft with those same Soviet enterprises that conducted the USSR space program of an earlier era—a notion

that would have been unimaginable during the period preceding our committee’s deliberations.

And there have been other significant changes which have impacted America’s

space program during the period which has intervened. For example,

• China is emerging as a major space participant, having recently taken particularly significant steps toward full membership in the space community.

• The United States has not realized the ten percent annual growth in the

NASA budget that was forecast by virtually all senior officials in both the Executive Branch and the Congress at the time our commission commenced its

work. In fact, NASA’s budget, although still significant, has diminished in

real terms.

• The commercial space business, (constructing and launching spacecraft)

which seemed to hold such great promise a decade ago has largely been reduced to a commodity market and as such has, from an economic standpoint

at least, been a disappointment.

• America’s space industrial base has shrunk from a number of relatively

healthy aerospace companies to a very few firms still maintaining strong

space credentials. . .this being largely a consequence of the restructuring of

the aerospace industry which occurred when defense spending dropped precipitously following the end of the Cold War.

• And there still seems to be no broad consensus as to what America’s longterm space program should comprise.

On the other hand, a great deal has not changed. For example,

37

• Today we meet, as did our committee, in the wake of a failure of the Space

Shuttle. . .in our case, the Challenger.

• There continues to be strong grassroots support for a space program, however,

the transformation of that interest into budgetary measures has not been evident.

• There remain severe competing and legitimate pressures for federal

funds. . .with the need to counter terrorism supplanting certain of the demands of the Cold War.

• The number of U.S. citizens studying engineering has continued to decline,

even in the midst of the greatest technological explosion in history—an explosion which is growing our economy and modifying our lifestyle at a pace never

before witnessed. Meanwhile, the scientific and technological capacities of

many other nations are increasing markedly.

• America’s K–12 educational system remains in extremis, especially in the

areas of science and technology—disciplines where space activity seems to be

one of the few pursuits that truly inspires many of our young people.

• There remains continuing concern over the apparent loss of some of NASA’s

innovativeness, management acumen and systems engineering skill. At the

same time, NASA, without question, remains the finest space organization in

the world, producing remarkable accomplishments on a continuing basis and

doing so openly and publicly for all to observe. . .for better or for worse.

Nonetheless, few would confuse the NASA of today with the NASA of the

Apollo era.

Unfortunately, much of the public, and, of even greater concern, some at

NASA, seem to take for granted these incredible achievements. Dan Goldin,

when he was serving as Administrator of NASA, shared with me an incident

concerning a citizen who had complained to him about NASA spending substantial sums of money on meteorological satellites, asking, ‘‘Why do we need

meteorological satellites? We have the weather channel.’’

I would like now to turn to some of our commission’s findings and recommendations. They are, I believe, surprisingly relevant today, even though well over a decade has passed since they were first stated. I will cite thirteen of the more significant of these findings and will address each only very briefly in deference to the

time available.

• First, we found a NASA which was badly over-committed in terms of the

funding demands of the programs it was undertaking as compared with the

funding which was available. The Space Shuttle and the Space Station were

major consumers of that budget, leaving little room for other initiatives while

making smaller projects highly vulnerable to the consequences of cost-growth

in these two major programs. A primary concern was the lack of adequate reserves in terms of time, schedule and technological approaches—a condition

which exacerbated the potential impact of risks already inherent in NASA’s

challenging endeavors.

• Second, in the post-Apollo period there seemed to be a lack of a broadly embraced national goal for our space program. . .some would even say that

America was lost in space. At the same time, our commission believed that

it was inappropriate to set a firm date to achieve a specific major space goal

given the then-prevailing budgetary circumstances. Rather, we felt it was important to invest first in building a solid technological foundation for whatever was to be America’s long-term program and thereafter to conduct that

program on what we called a ‘‘go-as-you-pay’’ basis. . .an approach that was

recognized as differing markedly from the highly successful strategy adopted

by President Kennedy for the Apollo program. Our recommendation was

merely a reflection of the fact that times had changed and that large sums

of additional near-term money to underpin a major space venture, such as a

human Mars program, were unlikely to be forthcoming.

• Third, we concluded that America’s space program should be a balanced program, involving both humans in space and the use of robotic spacecraft. Although there were those who exclusively advocated robotic systems, it was

our belief that public support for the overall space program would diminish

rapidly were the Nation to adopt a purely unmanned approach to space exploration. As we pointed out in our report, the difference between Hillary reaching the summit of Mt. Everest and simply lobbing a rocket carrying an electronic package to the mountain’s crest is immense in terms of the inspiration

humankind derives from the feat.

38

• Fourth, we concluded that science should be the first priority of our space program. . .since science is the basis of new knowledge and thereby forms the

underpinning of technological progress.

• Fifth, there should be a mission to the planet Earth as well as a mission from

the planet Earth, the former focusing on the Earth’s biosphere and the need

to protect our planet from harmful activities which take place here on Earth.

• Sixth, space transportation was, and I might note is, the primary impediment

to a continuing healthy space program. It was concluded that we should not

use humans in space merely as ‘‘truck drivers’’. . .rather, we should limit

their role to instances where humans insitu can in fact make a difference. In

short, we urgently needed to mitigate our dependence on the Space Shuttle

for logistical missions.

• Seventh, very high priority was placed on developing a new unmanned (but

potentially man-ratable) launch vehicle with a relatively heavy lift capability.

In this regard, we recommended, as an economic move, that no additional

Shuttles be built.

• Eighth, the operation of the Space Shuttle should not be viewed, as had increasingly been the case in the late 1980s, as being somewhat analogous to

running an airline. The Shuttle was, and is, best characterized as an advanced development program operating in a very unforgiving environment.

• Ninth, we noted quite explicitly that it was not a matter of if we would lose

another Space Shuttle but only a matter of when. This unfortunate conclusion

was based on our belief that the reliability estimates which were then being

attributed to the Shuttle were grossly optimistic. In fact, we predicted that

such a loss would probably occur ‘‘in the next several years’’ and we went on

to note that if America does not have the will to endure occasional losses—

having taken all reasonable steps to try to avoid them—we should then reconsider whether our nation belongs in space at all. Space is inherently a dangerous and risky place. . .one which is altogether unforgiving of human

failings. No one realizes this more than the astronauts who fly our machines

into space.

• Tenth, the Space Station program needed to be restructured to place it on a

more conservative schedule and more realistic financial basis, importantly including the provision of adequate reserves.

• Eleventh, there was a need to proceed with dispatch in the development of

some form of a space rescue vehicle. . .a vehicle which could perhaps perform

other important missions as well.

• Twelfth, we concluded that a human trip to Mars is the correct long-term goal

for America’s space program, using the Moon as a stepping-stone along the

way. Other possible missions were considered, including establishing a permanent station at the neutral gravity point in the Earth-Moon system. This

would in fact produce a useful way-station for exploration of deeper space,

however it provides an altogether uninteresting locale for most other forms

of scientific enterprise. Alternatively, one could increase the effort focused on

Earth-orbiting spacecraft, however, the Space Station seemed to be handling

that goal very adequately and was itself likely to suffer from the law of diminishing returns in the longer-term. Missions to Phobos and Deimos appeared exciting, but could be accomplished as a part of a Mars project. Missions to other space objects would seem to be candidates for the more distant

future. Thus, a return to the Moon followed by a Mars mission seemed to us

to be the correct long-term goal for America’s space program.

• Thirteenth, and lastly, NASA’s management structure, engineering approach

and overhead costs needed to be streamlined. As with many mature organizations, the drive toward self-perpetuation seemed to be overtaking enthusiasm

for innovation. The various Centers were often engaged in non-constructive

competition with one another, seemingly united only in their not-infrequent

skirmishes with NASA headquarters.

That, then, summarizes the principal findings of our commission of fourteen years

ago. As I have noted, most of these observations seem quite relevant even today.

Now, with your permission, I would like to conclude my remarks with four very

brief observations not on behalf of our commission but on my own stead.

First, if America is to have a robust space program it is critical that we build a

national consensus as to what that program should comprise. If, for example, we

are to pursue an objective that requires twenty years to achieve, that then implies

we must have the sustained support of five consecutive presidential administrations,

39

ten consecutive Congresses and twenty consecutive federal budgets—a feat the difficulty of which seems to eclipse any technological challenge space exploration may

engender. This consideration argues for a major space undertaking that could be accomplished in step-wise milestones, each contributing to a uniting long-term goal.

Such an approach has the added advantage that it reduces the risk associated with

individual steps. It is this consideration which justifies a mission to Mars with an

initial step to the Moon—as philosophically opposed to a return to the Moon with

a potential visit to Mars.

Second, I believe that the exploration of space with humans offers many scientific,

technological and economic benefits. But these tangible benefits are, in my opinion,

not sufficient in themselves to justify the cost of the undertaking. To do the latter

one must assign value to intangibles, intangibles such as the excitement of exploring

the unknown; of creating new knowledge; of stimulating science and engineering

education; of undertaking challenging and inspiring goals; and of demonstrating to

the world what America can do when it puts its mind to a task. Critics will of course

suggest that we cannot afford such ‘‘luxuries’’ in a time of great and legitimate demands to address compelling earthly problems—but if they are correct, one must

also ask whether we can then afford football stadiums, Hollywood entertainment,

golf courses and a thousand other well accepted pursuits.

Third, and this is extremely important, it would be a grave mistake to try to pursue a space program ‘‘on the cheap.’’ To do so is in my opinion an invitation to disaster. There is a tendency in any ‘‘can-do’’ organization to believe that it can operate

with almost any budget that is made available. The fact is that trying to do so is

a mistake—particularly when safety is a major consideration. I am not arguing for

profligacy; rather, I am simply pointing out that space activity is expensive and that

it is difficult. One might even say that it is rocket science!

Significant funding will still be required for many years to support the operation

of the Space Station and Space Shuttle. The NASA infrastructure itself absorbs substantial funds, as does the very important NASA research program. And there is

always the problem that technology advances so rapidly that any project proceeding

at too leisurely a pace will find itself constantly undertaking redesigns due to the

obsolescence of the components it incorporates. . .sort of a never-ending ‘‘do-loop.’’

And finally, as a general observation, I would like to strongly affiliate myself with

the President’s recently announced plan to send humans to Mars and to do so via

a lunar way-station. One-day humans will stand on Mars. The only question is

when. . .and who. The first Martian may well be in the fourth grade right now.

Hopefully, somewhere in the United States.

Thank you.

BIOGRAPHY FOR NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE

NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE was raised in Colorado and attended Princeton University where he graduated with a BSE in Aeronautical Engineering, magna cum

laude, an MSE and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, Tau Beta Pi and Sigma Xi.

In 1958 he joined the Douglas Aircraft Company in California where he held titles

of Program Manager and Chief Engineer. Beginning in 1965, he served in the Pentagon in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as an Assistant Director of Defense

Research and Engineering. Joining the LTV Missiles and Space Company in 1970,

he served as Vice President, Advanced Programs and Marketing. In 1973 he returned to government as Assistant Secretary of the Army and in 1975 as Under Secretary of the Army and later as Acting Secretary of the Army. Joining Martin Marietta Corporation in 1977, he served as Chairman and CEO from 1988 and 1987, respectively, until 1995, having previously been President and Chief Operating Officer. He served as President of Lockheed Martin Corporation upon the formation of

that company in 1995, and became its Chief Executive Officer on January 1, 1996,

and later Chairman. Retiring as an employee of Lockheed Martin in August, 1997,

he joined the faculty of the Princeton University School of Engineering and Applied

Science where he served as Lecturer with the Rank of Professor until July, 1999.

Mr. Augustine served as Chairman and Principal Officer of the American Red

Cross for nine years and as Chairman of the National Academy of Engineering, the

Association of the United States Army, the Aerospace Industry Association, and the

Defense Science Board. He is a former President of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and the Boy Scouts of America. He is currently a member

of the Board of Directors of ConocoPhillips, Black & Decker, Procter & Gamble and

Lockheed Martin and was founding chairman of In-Q-Tel. He is a member of the

Board of Trustees of Colonial Williamsburg and Johns Hopkins and a former member of the Board of Trustees of Princeton and MIT. He is a member of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology and the Department of HomeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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land Security Advisory Board and was a member of the Hart/Rudman Commission

on National Security.

Mr. Augustine has been presented the National Medal of Technology by the President of the United States and has five times been awarded the Department of Defense’s highest civilian decoration, the Distinguished Service Medal. He is co-author

of The Defense Revolution and Shakespeare In Charge and author of Augustine’s

Laws and Augustine’s Travels. He holds eighteen honorary degrees and was selected

by Who’s Who in America and the Library of Congress as one of the Fifty Great

Americans on the occasion of Who’s Who’s fiftieth anniversary. He has traveled in

nearly 100 countries and stood on both the North and South Poles.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

Dr. Griffin.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN, PRESIDENT, IN-QTEL; FORMER CHIEF ENGINEER, NASA; FORMER ASSOCIATE

ADMINISTRATOR, EXPLORATION SYSTEMS, NASA

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you for inviting me to appear before the

Committee to discuss our nation’s future in human space flight. We

are at a seminal moment in discussing that future, a moment

which has followed inevitably from the tragic loss of Space Shuttle

Columbia. If there is a single fundamental point to be found in the

report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board beyond identifying the technical and cultural causes of the mishap, it is that the

Nation’s human space flight program has, for decades, lacked a

unifying theme or purpose worthy of its cost and risk. I believe it

is now widely accepted that circling endlessly in low-Earth orbit

does not qualify as such a purpose.

The United States will not abandon manned space flight. Not to

have the capability to fly humans in space when other nations do,

and more will follow, is simply unacceptable for a great nation. But

if we are not to abandon human space flight, and if our goals must

reach beyond the Space Station, the geography of the solar system

dictates the path. Only the Moon, Mars, and the nearer asteroids

are within reach of the next few generations, and that is where the

President’s vision has directed us. It is the right path.

But there are many potential roadblocks along the path. One of

these is the cost of the vision and the allied question of whether

there will or can be sufficient funding to support it. In my opinion,

the issue is not whether enough money has been allocated to the

President’s initiative, but is, rather, why are we expecting so little

for the money which has been allocated? Even worse, our expectations seem to decrease as time goes on. Budget estimates for the

2005 to 2020 period show an aggregate allocation of some $50 billion to $55 billion to rebuild a basic Apollo-like capability, NASA’s

words, by 2020. This estimate is considerably higher than that derived from the most thorough prior study of an Apollo-like return

to the Moon, the First Lunar Outpost, which occupied many of us

from 1991 through 1993. Top level cost estimates were about $30

billion in 2003 dollars, 60 percent of today’s allocation. This is difficult to understand.

For advocates of space flight, including myself, more money is always better, but I would submit that our first order of business is

to examine our culture, the aerospace culture, to understand why

we believe it costs so very much more to operate in space than to

perform other human activities of similar complexity. It is commonly supposed that there are great technical or physiological hurVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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dles standing between us and fulfillment of the President’s vision.

Indeed, some of the architectures presented seem intended to stun

the observer with sheer complexity. I don’t recommend that we

pursue those.

In the early years, it will be best to proceed directly to the Moon

and directly to Mars. If this is done, there is no fundamentally new

technology required to enable a human return to the Moon, the establishment of a lunar base, or the first voyages to Mars. It is true

that technical and physiological challenges do exist. Exploration

missions will not be accomplished without risk, but while worthy

of our attention, none of these is so daunting that we should stay

home.

If the International Space Station is to be completed, there are

specific tasks associated with going to Mars for which it can be useful, including biomedical experiments, crew training, or as a test

bed for the space qualification of systems and vehicles. In a word,

ISS will help—is helping us to learn to live and work in space.

But the more important question is whether the value to be obtained from ISS is worth the money yet to be invested in its completion. The Nation plans to allocate $32 billion to ISS through

2016 and another $28 billion to Shuttle operations, which support

it, through 2011. This total of $60 billion is significantly higher

than NASA’s current allocation for human lunar return. It is beyond reason to believe that ISS can fulfill any set of objectives for

space exploration that would be worth the $60 billion remaining to

be invested in the program. Moreover, given recent—given present

budget constraints, we return to the Moon in 2020, thus accomplishing in 16 years what it required eight years to achieve the

first time. This is not because the task is more difficult or because

we are so much less capable than our predecessors, but because we

do not actually begin work on it until 2011. I do not need to point

out to this body the political pitfalls endemic to such a plan.

I, and others, have elsewhere advocated that the Shuttle be returned to flight and the ISS brought to completion if only because

the program’s two decade advocacy by the United States and our

commitment to our international partners should not be abandoned. But if there is no additional money to be allocated, this position must be questioned. It is worth asking whether our international partners might judge it similarly.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to answer your questions and your Committee’s. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN

Abstract

President Bush’s recently announced vision for a renew program of human space

exploration is examined. Budgetary requirements are considered, and specific technology development recommendations are made. Relevant policy questions are

posed.

Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for inviting me to appear before the Committee to discuss our nation’s

future in human space flight. We are a seminal moment in discussing that future,

a moment which has followed inevitably from the tragic loss of Space Shuttle Columbia, little more than a year ago. If there is a single fundamental point to be

found in the report of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board—beyond identiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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fying the technical and cultural causes of the mishap—it is that the Nation’s human

space flight program has for decades lacked a unifying theme or purpose worthy of

the cost and risk endemic to the enterprise. I believe it is now widely accepted that

circling endlessly in low Earth orbit does not qualify as such a theme. The United

States will not abandon manned space flight. Not to have the capability to fly humans in space, when other nations do and more will follow, is simply unacceptable

for a great nation. But if we are not to abandon human space flight, and if our goals

much reach beyond the Space Station, the geography of the solar system dictates

the path. Of the possible venues of human activity beyond LEO, only the Moon,

Mars, and the nearer asteroids are within reach of the next few generations. And

that is where the President’s vision has directed us. It is the right path. With the

remainder of this statement, I will direct my efforts to responding to the questions

contained in the Committee’s invitation to appear at this hearing.

Does the estimated spending through 2020 seem adequate to carry out the

President’s initiative? Which elements of the President’s initiative seem

most likely to cost more money or take more time than is currently allotted

to them?

In my opinion, the issue is not whether enough money has been allocated to the

President’s proposed initiative, but is rather this: Why we are expecting so little for

the money which has been allocated?

NASA budget estimates for the 2005–2020 period, culminating in the first

manned lunar return mission by the latter year, show an aggregate allocation of

some $50–55B (including the Crew Exploration Vehicle) to rebuild a basic ‘‘Apollolike’’ capability. A top-level cost breakdown shows the following line items:

This amount should be sufficient for the task as presently understood. In fact, it

is possible to argue credibly that the estimate is somewhat high.

To address only one item, numerous careful studies have been performed to estimate the cost of developing a 100 metric-ton-class launch vehicle based on the use

of Shuttle-derived components. Such estimates consistently show non-recurring engineering development to be in the $3–5B range, depending on the option considered. If other estimates show the likely development cost of a clean-sheet-of-paper

design having the same payload capability to be in the $13–16B range, then we

should seriously question whether it makes sense to pursue such an option.

The most thorough study of an ‘‘Apollo-like’’ return to the Moon previously conducted by NASA was the ‘‘First Lunar Outpost’’ (FLO) effort, which occupied many

of us from 1991–93. FLO was intended not as a definitive or final architecture for

lunar return, but rather as a working baseline, to establish a credible point of departure for further efforts, which were unfortunately terminated at the outset of the

Clinton Administration. The FLO architecture offered some improvement as compared to Apollo capability, but not so much as to be beyond our credible experience

base at that time. Top level FLO cost estimates were:

The FLO costs must be inflated by about 30 percent to account for the difference

between 1992 and 2003 dollars, resulting in an estimate of about $33B for an initial

lunar return. Also, the FLO studies assumed that the then-planned International

Space Station habitat module would be available (with some modifications) for use

on the lunar surface. Substantial development resources would be required to restore such a capability at this point, were it to be included in a lunar return misVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
43

sion. However, because a surface habitat is not included in the current planning estimate, it should be deleted from the comparison, yielding a 2003 FLO cost estimate

of about $30B, no more than 60 percent of NASA’s current assessment.

Considerable study was devoted to FLO cost and feasibility analysis, in some

cases by the same NASA personnel as are engaged in the present effort. It is difficult to understand why there should exist such a discrepancy between today’s estimates and those of a decade ago. One can certainly understand that any estimate

derived from a design study will lack the credibility of a completed development program. But it is difficult to understand why two estimates for very similar development programs would differ so greatly.

Additional perspective can be gained by noting that the cost of the entire Apollo

program was about $130B in today’s dollars. This included massive technology and

infrastructure development, as well as the operational cost of eleven manned missions, including six lunar landings. It does not seem reasonable that 40 percent or

more of this figure should be required to execute a single mission of a similar class

today.

For advocates of space flight, including myself, more money is always better, and

is certainly preferable to less money! But I would submit that our first order of business is to examine our culture, the aerospace culture, and ourselves, to understand

why we believe it costs so very much more to operate in space than to perform almost any other human activity.

NASA’s spending plan through 2020 does not explicitly include any activity in

support of manned missions to Mars, or indeed any exploration activity beyond early

lunar return. I therefore cannot comment on the reasonableness of such plans at

this time. This is regrettable, because the goal of pushing on to Mars should, in

part, drive program requirements even while planning to return to the Moon.

What are the greatest technological hurdles the President’s initiative must

clear to be successful? To what extent must resolving some technological

issues await further fundamental research? For example, how much work

on a spacecraft for a Mars mission can be done before more is known about

the effect on humans of spending long periods of time in space? How much

work can be done before new propulsion technologies are developed?

The question of what technological hurdles stand between us and the fulfillment

of the President’s vision depends, to a very great extent, on the mission architecture(s) which are selected to achieve that vision. In a very real sense, there is essentially no fundamental new technology required to enable human return to the Moon,

the establishment of a lunar base, or the first voyages to Mars.

It is true that technical challenges exist, and that there are numerous systems

needed to implement the vision that are not currently in production. Among the specific engineering development tasks needing to be performed are:

• NASA should initiate development of a heavy lift launch vehicle having a

payload capacity of at least 100 metric tons to low Earth orbit (LEO). Such

a vehicle is the single most important physical asset enabling human exploration of the solar system. The use of shuttle-derived systems offers what is

quite likely to be the most cost-effective near-term approach.

• Much cargo (including humans) does not need to be launched in very large

packages. We desperately need much more cost effective Earth-to-LEO transportation for payloads in the size range from a few thousand to a few tens

of thousands of pounds. In my judgment, this is our most pressing need, for

it controls a major portion of the cost of everything else that we do in space.

Yet, no active U.S. government program of which I am aware has this as its

goal. Again, shuttle-derived systems, particularly emphasizing use of the

RSRB, may offer a useful approach.

• New propulsion systems are unnecessary. We can certainly return to the

Moon or go to Mars using existing chemical propulsion systems. Looking

ahead, development of nuclear propulsion should be re-initiated to allow more

efficient travel beyond cislunar space, but such systems are not altogether

new. The NERVA (nuclear engine for rocket vehicle applications) program

produced a working nuclear upper-stage engine and demonstrated excellent

performance in extensive ground tests, before regrettably being canceled in

1973.

• Compact space qualified nuclear power systems are required for extended

human presence on the Moon and Mars.

• The efficient establishment of permanent human bases on the Moon, Mars,

and certain asteroids requires the use of in situ resources to minimize the

44

amount of material and equipment which must be brought from Earth. The

technology for such exploitation has yet to be fully developed, though promising experiments have been conducted.

• Space and planetary surface habitat and suit technology is at present insufficient for the needs of an extended program of human space exploration. Improvements in suit technology are of the highest priority.

Physiological challenges also exist. We have considerable experience in the microgravity environment, and some practical and effective countermeasures have shown

promise in minimizing bone loss, though more work is clearly needed. However, in

the near-term it is very clear from the existing base of human space flight experience that microgravity effects are not an impediment to lunar return or to expeditions to Mars. And, as a practical matter, it is always possible to design our spaceships to supply artificial gravity by spinning them to generate the necessary centrifugal force.

The long-term human adaptation to life on other planetary surfaces is another

matter. We have at present no clear understanding of how the human organism will

respond to fractional gravitational environments such as will be experienced on the

Moon and Mars.

Overall, however, the most difficult physiological issue is likely to be that of cosmic heavy ion radiation. The human effects of and countermeasures for heavy ion

radiation, encountered in deep space but not in the LEO environment of the ISS,

have received little attention thus far.

These are the essential technical and physiological challenges as I see them. Exploration missions will not be accomplished without human risk. While certainly

worthy of our attention, however, none of these is so daunting that we should stay

home.

However, it is always possible to make the problem more difficult. ,Some of the

space flight architectures that have been advocated seem intended to stun the observer with sheer complexity. If we are planning to defer return to the Moon until

we have established L1 Gateways, solar electric propulsion systems to ferry liquid

oxygen up from low-Earth orbit, and so on, then it may indeed be possible to spend

a very large amount of time and money on technology development. I do not recommend that we pursue such paths.

Are the International Space Station and the Moon the most appropriate

stepping stones for human space exploration if the ultimate objective is a

human landing on Mars? What would be the advantages and disadvantages

of a program that was targeted instead directly on sending a human to

Mars?

Given that ISS is to be completed, there are specific tasks associated with going

to Mars for which it can be useful. Certainly, it can be useful in carrying out controlled experiments to study the effects of microgravity, and proposed countermeasures, on humans, provided of course that it is equipped with a habitat module

or modules. It can serve as an aid to crew training, acclimating a proposed Mars

crew, or extended-duration lunar crew, to the regimen of space flight in company

with each other. It can serve as a testbed for the space qualification of specific systems, or even vehicles, prior to their use on extended voyages far from home. In a

word, ISS can help us learn to live and work in space.

But the more important question is whether the return to be obtained from the

use of ISS to support exploration objectives is worth the money yet to be invested

in its completion. The Nation, through the NASA budget, plans to allocate $32B to

ISS (including ISS transport) through 2016, and another $28B to Shuttle operations

through 2011. This total of $60B is significantly higher than NASA’s current allocation for human lunar return. It is beyond reason to believe that ISS can help to fulfill any objective, or set of objectives, for space exploration that would be worth the

$60B remaining to be invested in the program.

Equally important is the delay in pursuing the President’s vision. Respecting

present budget constraints, we return to the Moon in 2020, thus accomplishing in

16 years what it required eight years to achieve in the 1960s. This is not because

the task is so much more difficult, or because we are today so much less capable

than our predecessors, but because we do not actually begin work on the task until

2011. I do not need to point out to this body the political pitfalls endemic to such

a plan.

I, and others, have elsewhere advocated that the Shuttle should be returned to

flight and the ISS brought to completion, if only because the program’s two-decade

advocacy by the United States and commitment to its international partners should

not be cavalierly abandoned. But, if there is no additional money to be allocated to

45

space exploration, this position becomes increasingly difficult to justify. It is worth

asking whether our international partners might judge the issue similarly.

With regard to the Moon, I believe the experience to be gained by living on and

exploring another planetary surface only a few days away from home will be invaluable to the successful conduct of a future Mars expedition. Certainly such experience

is not essential; one can readily envision a Mars expedition architecture which does

not employ any further lunar experience as a stepping stone. But because it can be

envisioned does not make it wise. I personally consider it an act of technological hubris to proceed directly to Mars, with no human experience beyond Earth orbit having been incurred since 1972. It can be done, and it will be cheaper, but the risk

to both the mission goals and to human life will be significantly higher.

If the goal of the United States is solely to mount an expedition to Mars, then

I can at least understand, if not credit, the concern that returning to the Moon is

a distraction. But if the goal of the United States is to be truly a space-faring nation, then bypassing the Moon is silly.

What questions is it most important for Congress to ask as it evaluates the

proposed initiative?

In discussing the President’s initiative as it has been put before us, we in the

space policy community have spent most of our time debating the cost and technical

merit of one approach or the other; whether it makes sense to go to the Moon or

not; if so, what to do and how much time to spend there; what new technology is

or is not needed, and why, and so on. These are of course interesting questions—

but they are not in my opinion the questions which are most relevant for the Congress to ask. Among these more relevant questions might be the following:

• Why does space flight—human or robotic—cost so much more than other comparably complex human activities, and what can be done to remedy the situation?

• Is a serious program of human space exploration sustainable, given the ‘‘cost

of doing business’’ presently associated with the enterprise?

• What incentives can be offered to proven and well-established aerospace contractors to devise innovative and cost-effective, yet safe and reliable, approaches to building a new human space flight infrastructure?

• Where and how does NASA intend to engage the entrepreneurial high-tech

culture which has made our nation the envy of so many others, in so many

areas other than aerospace? What can we do to bring the engine of capitalism

to space flight?

• What is the proper role of prizes, or of pay-for-performance contracts, in stimulating and encouraging the high-tech community to devote its attention to

aerospace?

• Can or should the Congress establish prizes for specific accomplishments in

space flight, independently of NASA?

• What is NASA’s proper role in the development of new space systems, beyond

setting requirements to be met through competition in industry?

• What is NASA’s proper role, as an agency of the U.S. government, in the conduct of future space flight operations?

• If the exploration of new worlds requires technologies and skills beyond those

presently available within NASA—and it clearly does—how are the skills of

other agencies and laboratories to be used effectively in the service of the

larger mission? How will the overall effort be directed?

• Given that we as a nation will spend a certain amount each year on civil

space activities, what would Americans prefer to see this money used for?

What vision for space exploration excites people enough to cause them to believe that the money they spend on it is well spent? Can a reasonable consensus even be found? How do we know?

• Is the United States interested in leading an international program of space

exploration? Which nations might be competitors, and which might be partners? How and in what role do we view our potential partners in the enterprise? What do our potential partners think about this? How do we know?

BIOGRAPHY FOR MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN

Michael D. Griffin is currently President and Chief Operating Officer of In-Q-Tel.

On March 29th, he will succeed to his new position as Space Department Head at

the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.

46

Prior to joining In-Q-Tel, Mike was CEO of the Magellan Systems Division of Orbital Sciences Corporation. He also served as General Manager of Orbital’s Space

Systems Group and as the company’s Executive Vice President/Chief Technical Officer. He has previously served as both the Chief Engineer and the Associate Administrator for Exploration at NASA, and as the Deputy for Technology of the Strategic

Defense Initiative Organization.

Before joining SDIO in an executive capacity, Mike played a key role in conceiving

and directing several ‘‘first of a kind’’ space tests in support of strategic defense research, development, and flight testing. These included the first space-to-space

intercept of a ballistic missile in powered flight, the first broad-spectrum spaceborne reconnaissance of targets and decoys in midcourse flight, and the first spaceto-ground reconnaissance of ballistic missiles during the boost phase.

Mike holds seven degrees in the fields of Physics, Electrical Engineering, Aerospace Engineering, Civil Engineering, and Business Administration, has been an

Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University, the Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Maryland, and is the author of over two dozen technical

papers and the textbook Space Vehicle Design. He is a recipient of the NASA Exceptional Achievement Medal, the AIAA Space Systems Medal, the DOD Distinguished

Public Service Medal, and is a Fellow of the AIAA and the AAS. Mike is a Registered Professional Engineer in Maryland and California, and a Certified Flight Instructor with instrument and multi-engine ratings.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. And I’m sorry for

the interruption.

Here is the deal. We will ask Dr. Shirley to present her testimony, and then we will have to pause for approximately 20 minutes while we answer the call of the House. There are a series of

three votes, so we will let the clock run out almost on the first vote,

dash over there, get two more five-minute votes, which always end

up being eight minutes, and then we will come back.

Dr. Shirley.

STATEMENT OF DR. DONNA L. SHIRLEY, DIRECTOR, SCIENCE

FICTION MUSEUM; FORMER MANAGER, JET PROPULSION

LABORATORY’S MARS PROGRAM; FORMER ASSISTANT DEAN,

UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA AEROSPACE MECHANICAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

Dr. SHIRLEY. Good morning. I am Donna Shirley, Director of the

Science Fiction Museum and Hall of Fame in Seattle, Washington

and formerly Manager of the Mars Exploration Program at JPL.

And I worked on the Space Station in the early ’80s and a number

of studies of human missions to the Moon and Mars. My remarks

are my own opinions and do not reflect the views of the Science

Fiction Museum.

This morning, I will briefly summarize my answers to the questions.

In my opinion, human space exploration is justified by the natural need of humans to explore. It is wired into our DNA. Judging

by the relative number of recent science fiction novels about the

Moon, almost none, at least a dozen, Mars is the public’s preferred

place to go. Humans and robots will be partners in exploration, not

competitors. Humans can conduct science at the Moon or Mars but

are generally not as effective as robots for this purpose. Robots are

extensions of our senses.

The International Space Station can be useful as a facility for

evaluating human physiology and psychology to prepare for exploration, but if the goal of exploration is to send humans to Mars,

the Moon is a diversion of time and money. There are no lunar resources that are useful for Mars and worth the cost of boosting the

47

equipment from Earth to exploit. The environments of the Moon

and Mars are so different that there is little crossover in surface

technology.

The costs of the program are difficult to evaluate, but even the

upper-bound projections for 15 or 20 years are less than the Defense budget for a single year. I can’t really judge the impact of the

program on other NASA missions, because the details are only

clear for 2005. However, there are several strategic flaws with the

program, including a possibly premature phase-out of the Shuttle

and certainly premature focus on a specific exploration approach,

which is at least 50 years old and needs to be completely rethought.

NASA continues, as it has for its entire existence, to pursue the

approach that Wernher von Braun proposed in Collier’s magazine

in 1952. This approach can be visualized by watching the movie

‘‘2001: A Space Odyssey’’. The times have changed, and we need to

look at new approaches. We need new ideas. NASA’s current designs are a rehash of the same concepts we were studying in the

1980s. We need new technologies. For example, the space elevator,

which was the subject of Arthur C. Clarke’s ‘‘Fountains of Paradise’’ in 1956, appears to be close to being enabled by structures

built with carbon nanotubes, and commercial ventures are being

undertaken to build one. None of NASA’s human exploration studies that I have seen are looking at anything so creative.

There are new economics. Dennis Tito is the vanguard of space

tourism, and many companies are vying to put people in orbit, and

there is an article on the—in the latest Scientific American, just

out, about some of those companies. New launch companies, with

their backers, include Scaled Composites, supported by Paul Allen,

and John Carmack’s Armadillo Aerospace. A new bill to provide

regulatory standards has just passed the House of Representatives.

There are new ways of doing business. For instance, NASA has

come up with these ‘‘challenge’’ prizes, but what is the process for

infusing the results into the program? It is not stated.

There are new international players. China’s Shenzhou program

has orbited its first taikonaut. The U.S. needs either to compete or

cooperate with the Chinese, but the current vision is silent on this.

There is a new culture. As pointed out in the CAIB report, NASA

is a bureaucracy shaped by politics. The fundamental nature of the

civil service staff centers will make it very difficult to create real

change. Converting the center to contract organizations, such as

JPL, should be explored.

Unfortunately, the President’s vision skips over the need for a

process to provide goals for the program. Like most other human

programs, it merely states the goals of the Administration and

plunges directly into an implementation. This has been shown over

and over to be a flawed strategy.

The Committee should urge the Administration to create a process for developing a truly fresh approach to space exploration. NonNASA, non-government ideas should be involved in the selection of

a vision. The process should generate new concepts, bring in new

players, consider new approaches and technologies, and fully engage the public to develop a set of goals. This process should drive

the definition of a new vision and approaches for human space exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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1SP 6105, NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, June 1995

2http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=13412, from PRESS RELEASE, Date Released: Wednesday, January 14, 2004, Source: White House, President Bush’s Vision for U.S.

Space Exploration 3 ‘‘Adolescent Brain Development and Legal Culpability,’’ American Bar Association, Criminal

Justice Section, Spring 2003.

ploration and a program to carry them out. This will not be an easy

task, because government institutions are not accustomed to such

an open process, but the Science Fiction Museum and Hall of Fame

would be delighted to participate.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Shirley follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONNA L. SHIRLEY

Abstract

In my opinion human space exploration is justified by the natural predilection of

humans to explore. Humans could conduct science at the Moon or Mars but are generally not as effective as robots for this purpose. Humans and robots will be partners in exploration. The International Space Station can be useful as a facility for

evaluating human physiology and psychology to prepare for exploration. But if the

goal of exploration is to send humans to Mars the Moon is of little value in such

preparation and, in fact, is a diversion of time and money from the goal. The costs

of the program are difficult to evaluate but there appear to be several strategic

flaws, including a possibly premature phase-out of the Shuttle and premature focus

on a specific approach. There is no real information on which to judge the impact

of exploration on other NASA missions. I will make several recommendations for revisiting and improving the vision, specifically to include a wide range of ‘‘stakeholders’’ including private space enterprise and non-traditional technologies.

Testimony

I am Donna Shirley, Director of the Science Fiction Museum and Hall of Fame

in Seattle, Washington. I was recently Assistant Dean of Engineering at the University of Oklahoma and before that I retired in 1998 as Manager of the Mars Exploration Program at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. During my 32-year career at JPL

I worked on a number of human exploration missions including participating in the

initial design of the Space Station in the early 1980’s and in studies of human missions to the Moon and Mars in the 1980’s and 1990’s. I led two NASA-wide studies

in the 1990’s, one of which developed a standard process for systems engineering

for the Agency1 and another of which analyzed and recommended improvements to

NASA’s program and project management processes.

My remarks are my own opinions and do not reflect the views of the Science Fiction Museum. However I would like to speak from the perspective of a person who

was inspired by science fiction to pursue an engineering career, and who continues

to be inspired by the inventiveness of science fiction writers. I will take a cue from

Neil Armstrong, who recently used a science fiction theme to talk about the relative

roles of humans and robots in space exploration. The popularity of science fiction

teaches us that people are fascinated with the idea of exploration. Studies of history,

anthropology and primate behavior teach us that humans have a built-in imperative

to seek new terrain, just as the crew of the Starship enterprise ‘‘explores strange

new worlds’’. Mr. Armstrong pointed out that an early science fiction play, Rossum’s

Universal Robots, stressed the utility of having robotic laborers to do dangerous,

dull or dirty tasks. But science fiction from Buck Rogers to the modern Mars novels

like Red Mars shows that people also want to explore the cosmos.

In this context I will address the several questions I was asked by the Committee

in the context of the President’s Vision as summarized in a White House press release.2

What are compelling justifications for sending humans into space? Does the

President’s initiative provide adequate justification for sending humans to

the Moon and Mars?

The quick answer is to the second question is ‘‘yes.’’ The justification is that the

need to explore is ‘‘wired into our DNA.’’ Neuroscience has discovered changes in

the brains of adolescents related to their propensity for risky adventures.3 And

many people routinely engage in risky behaviors for the thrill of it. Many adults

have a desire to go into space and two, Dennis Tito and Mark Shuttleworth, have

49

4 Crouch, Geoffrey, ‘‘Researching the Space Tourism Market,’’ Presented at the annual Conference of the Travel and Tourism Research Association, June 2001. 5 AIAA–90–3785, ‘‘Site Characterization Rover Missions,’’ D.S. Pivirotto, Sept. 25–28, 1990,

Huntsville, AL. 6http://www.spacetoday.org/History/SpaceFactoids/SpaceFactoids3.html, ‘‘Apollo 17 astronaut

Harrison Schmitt, the first geologist in space, found the most colorful stuff on the Moon—orange

glass—near Shorty Crater. That suggested the possibility of ice within the Moon.’’ 7 ‘‘Opportunity Rover Finds Strong Evidence Meridiani Planum Was Wet,’’ March 2, 2004

Press Release, http://marsrovers.jpl.nasa.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/20040302a.html

paid millions to the Russians for the opportunity to visit the ISS. Studies show that

thousands of people may be willing to pay six figures for even a sub-orbital ride.4

However, while the justification for human exploration is clear, the justification

for the Moon as a destination before Mars is not. If the goal is humans on Mars

the Moon is an expensive and time-consuming delay. So the general vision is good,

but the feasibility of the proposed implementation is not clear.

The ‘‘Moon first’’ part of the vision is overly specific. There needs to be a process

for deciding what should be targets and how to reach them. One of NASA’s mistakes

is to keep trying to repeat Apollo with Wernher von Braun’s 70-year-old vision for

human space exploration.

To what extent would scientific research concerning Mars be aided by a

human presence on, or in orbit around that planet?

Humans would do science if they went, but should not go just to do science. For

example, studies have shown that semi-autonomous rovers on Mars given direction

by humans on Earth are far more effective in exploration (in distance and especially

dollar for dollar) than rovers ‘‘tele-operated’’ by humans from Mars orbit.5

The argument that only humans can do science ‘‘in situ’’ is flawed. The lunar ‘‘orange dirt’’ noticed by Harrison Schmitt6, first (and last) scientist on the Moon, is

used as evidence that robots could never have noticed such a scientifically important

find. But the truth is that robots such as Spirit and Opportunity, who are currently

on Mars, have a far wider range of senses than a human.7 Robots merely extend

human senses both in distance and wave length. The Mars rovers’ instruments can

‘‘see’’ in wavelengths far beyond human sight. Their instruments return data so that

scientists on Earth can perceive the Martian surface in ways that humans on Mars

(unless they were carrying such instruments) could not.

Are the International Space Station and the Moon the most appropriate

stepping-stones for human space exploration if the ultimate objective is a

human landing on Mars? What would be the advantages and disadvantages

of a program that was targeted instead on sending a human directly to

Mars? To what extent is research on the International Space Station likely

to help remove the hurdles to long-duration space flight?

The appropriateness of the ISS and the Moon depend on the program objectives,

which should be policy decisions based partially on technical feasibility and cost. An

informed and open national and international discussion is needed to support these

policy decisions.

The lack of widely supported objectives for NASA has led, for example, to its

budget being increasingly eroded by Congressional earmarks largely, in my opinion,

because there is not a perception of NASA’s intrinsic value or purpose.

I worked on a precursor to the current ISS in the early 1980’s and it was clearly

deliberately designed as a jobs program rather than as the most cost-effective solution to human exploration. (And realistically this will always be true of a large federally funded undertaking). Because of the use of Russian launchers to supply the

Station it is not in a good orbit for staging of assets for on-orbit assembly of missions to the Moon or planets. However, the ISS could be useful for studying physiology to prepare for human missions to Mars, and it is important to keep our commitments to our international partners who have invested a large amount of resources and who are waiting to have their hardware installed on the Station.

The ISS will help human space exploration if its mission is focused on research

on the impacts of living in space on the human physiology and psychology. The

President’s vision takes this step, however several things are needed to make this

work that are not currently in the Station design, for example:

• A centrifuge to explore impacts of partial gravity on recovery from bone loss

and muscle weakness. Will astronauts be able to function in the 3/8 gravity

of Mars after a several month zero-g passage?

50

8 Berkley Publishing, 1966

9http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/helium3—000630.html, ‘‘Moon’s Helium-3 Could

Power Earth’’ By Julie Wakefield, Special to SPACE.com, 30 June 2000. 10 Bantam Books 1993, 1994 and 1996 11 Bantam Books 1992 and 1999 12Tor Science Fiction, 1994 13 Harper Collins, 1996

• Radiation research. The ISS is protected by Earth’s magnetic field but the radiation environment on Mars is very severe because Mars lacks a magnetic

field and a thick atmosphere.

Phase-out of the Shuttle in 2010 will make it very difficult to operate the ISS

even if construction can be completed by then. Even if there is not another failure

before the end of the ISS there is predicted to be a four-year gap between the end

of the Shuttle and the availability of the crew exploration vehicle. Human transport

can continue to rely on the reliable Russian launchers and landers. However, while

European, Russian and Japanese vehicles can supply the Station, none of these is

designed to bring cargo down, so any large science instruments must either be

thrown away or not used if the Shuttle is not available. The current plan scraps

alternate U.S. cargo carriers.

The Moon is a complete diversion from human missions to Mars. The suggestion

that there are materials on the Moon that can be used to build systems to go to

Mars is totally unfounded. The Moon has no useful resources for Mars exploration.

(Water at the poles is problematic, and even if it exists is probably infeasible to

‘‘mine’’ in large quantities.) Everything taken to the Moon must be lifted out of the

gravity well of the Earth. Even if resources did exist on the Moon, which would be

useful, the mass of equipment to mine them in quantities required for a Mars mission would far exceed the benefit of launching to Mars from the lower lunar gravity.

The high cost of building a lunar infrastructure will divert resources from Mars

with no added value for Mars missions because the cost of lifting equipment to

Moon will far exceed the benefits.

There is little technology commonality between the Moon and Mars because of the

different environments. For example, space suits designed for vacuum will not work

in the Martian atmosphere. Landing systems on Mars can make use of the atmosphere unlike those for the Moon. Thermal environments between Moon and Mars

are radically different. And so on.

The Moon is a scientifically interesting place in its own right but missions of exploration including the installation of large astronomical telescopes on the far side

can be done robotically. Even modern science fiction does not revolve around an economically viable Moon, and previous assumptions of plentiful water on the Moon

have been shown not to be true. For example, Heinlein’s The Moon is a Harsh Mistress8 was based on an economy, which grew grain using vast stores of underground

water.

Helium 3 mined on the Moon and ‘‘burned’’ in a fusion reactor is often touted as

a boon for energy production.9 However, both Helium 3 mining and fusion technology are completely unproven, and a positive benefit/cost ratio has not been demonstrated. Furthermore, even if fusion and mining technologies were feasible, they

will not be relevant to space exploration in any meaningful time frame.

The President’s initiative also mentions Libration Points, Asteroids, etc. as destinations, but there appear to be no benefits of these objectives to Mars exploration

(or to human exploration) and more justification is needed if they are selected.

Mars is probably the only human-accessible place in the Solar System for sustained human presence.

• The Opportunity rover and the Odyssey orbiter have found past and present

water. Future missions will determine locations and quantity of extant water,

which may be inadequate to support humans.

• The moons of the Outer planets have ample water supplies but are too distant and dangerous for humans to explore for generations.

• Modern science fiction provides reasons and scenarios for a human presence

on Mars, for example:

— Red Mars, Green Mars, and Blue Mars (Kim Stanley Robinson)10

— Mars and Return to Mars (Ben Bova)11

— Moving Mars (Greg Bear)12

— Voyage (Stephen Baxter)13

51

14 IAF–87–24, ‘‘NASA’s Telerobotics R&D Program: Status and Future Directions,’’ D.S.

Pivirotto and G. Varsi, Brighton, United Kingdom, 10–17 October 1987. 15http://www.abo.fi/?mlindroo/Station/Slides/sld011.htm 16 NASA Leadership and America’s Future in Space, A Report to the Administrator by Dr.

Sally K. Ride, August 1987. 17 Report of the 90–Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars, NASA, Washington DC, 1989. 18Pioneering the Space Frontier, the Report of the National Commission on Space, Bantam

Books, 1986. 19 America at the Threshold: America’s Space Exploration Initiative, Report of the Synthesis

Group, 1991. 20Pivirotto, D.S., ‘‘A Goal and Strategy for Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars,’’ published in the Journal of Space Policy, 0265–9646/90/030195–14, 1990 Butterworth-Heinemann

Ltd. 21Pivirotto, D.S., ‘‘A Goal and Strategy for Human Settlement of the Moon and Mars: Part

Two,’’ Case for Mars IV, Boulder, CO, 4–8 June 1990.

Does the proposed initiative achieve the proper balance among NASA’s activities? Particularly, is the balance between exploration, space science and

Earth science, and between human and robotic missions appropriate?

This question is very difficult to answer because a much more detailed architecture is needed to see what balance is actually being achieved.

The cost of the program needs to be analyzed. The only mission that has been

identified for sacrifice is the Hubble servicing. And in fact I believe a robotic servicing mission could be designed and implemented for the price of a single Shuttle

launch. Technology to grapple with a spinning satellite has been available since the

late 1980’s14 and it should be relatively simple to keep Hubble running using a

robotic Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle.15 The OMV would then be useful for on-orbit

construction and servicing and is usually included in human exploration mission designs. This approach would not risk humans to service Hubble but also would probably not save any money.

History shows that the real costs of a large program cannot be reliably estimated

until five to ten percent of the funds have been expended. However many, many

studies of human exploration have been done over the years and if the best were

‘‘mined’’ at least rough estimates should be feasible now.16,17,18,19

What criteria should be used to determine whether robots or humans

should conduct particular science and exploration missions on the Moon

and Mars? What missions should only humans conduct on the Moon and

Mars?

Humans and robots should be part of an integrated program. It is not humans

vs. robots but how a partnership of ‘‘metal and mortal’’ can be most effectively used.

Criteria should be extracted from program objectives (why, where, when?) which

should be the subject of national and international discussions and debates. A number of studies and publications have addressed this.20,21

Humans will never ‘‘only’’ conduct missions by themselves. Robots will always be

necessary as precursors, preparers and partners for humans. As mentioned earlier,

robots are extensions of human perception. They currently act as scouts to determine safe and interesting places for people to operate. They will be used to prepare

those places for humans by making fuel from in situ resources and building infrastructure. They will support humans by fetching and carrying, exploring beyond the

reach of human habitats and transports, and carrying cargo to and from Earth.

If the costs of carrying out the President’s proposal increase above what

NASA currently projects them to be, would you recommend that NASA adjust the schedule for achieving specific milestones of the President’s vision

or use the budget authority from other NASA programs not related to the

President’s vision (e.g., Earth science or aeronautics research and development)?

NASA has not specifically projected the costs of the President’s proposal and to

some extent this is appropriate since a detailed analysis and design has not been

done. However, costs can be inferred.

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22http://www.nasa.gov/about/budget/ Administrator O’Keefe’s Budget Presentation, Chart 14,

2.24.04 23http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040123–0263.html, Defense Department Announces 2005 Budget Request, No. 046–04, January 23, 2004. 24Touchstone Books, 1996 25 Costs estimated during the NASA ‘‘90 Day Study’’ have been widely quoted but never officially published: NASA, Report of the 90–Day Study on Human Exploration of the Moon and

Mars, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1989. 26http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/vonbraun.htm, 1952 Feb. 11—Collier’s Man Will Conquer

Space Soon, Collier’s Magazine, published papers from First Symposium on Space Flight, under

the title ‘‘Man Will Conquer Space Soon.’’ This was an important step in the popularization of

the idea of manned space flight. 27Geffre, J., ‘‘A Summary of Recent NASA Exploration Architecture Studies,’’ National Academies Workshop, ‘‘Stepping Stones to the Future of Space,’’ 23 February 2004, chart 10 compare

with page 45 of next reference. 28 JPL Document, ‘‘A Robotic Exploration Program: In Response to the NASA 90–Day Study

on Human Exploration of the Moon and Mars,’’ 1 December 1989. 29Downloadable Edition http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/B000063JZ3/

ref=lpr¥g¥4/103-0149313-3021408?v=glance&s=ebooks 30The Space Elevator: A Revolutionary Earth-to-Space Transportation System, Publisher:

Bradley C. Edwards & Eric A. Westling; ISBN: 0972604502; (January 14, 2003).

• A program cost of about $170B through 2020 can be inferred from the NASA

2005 budget projections.22 This is less than half of the DOD budget for 2005

alone.23

• A lower bound estimate of about $50B for a single human Mars mission was

projected by Robert Zubrin in A Case for Mars.24

• Costs of up to $450B (in 1990 dollars)25 have been projected by NASA studies.

• Certainly the $11 or $12B called out for the Crew Exploration Vehicle will

only produce a human carrier with no place to go except the ISS. There is

no mention of the much larger costs of launch, on-orbit assembly, infrastructure at the Moon and/or Mars, etc.

• Robotic Mars missions are costing around $400M apiece which is the equivalent of about one STS launch.

The proposed phase-out of the STS in 2010 is extremely risky for the ISS and for

exploration. Such a risk led to the dependence on the development of the Shuttle

to re-boost Skylab, the first space station. When the Shuttle development did not

meet the projected schedule Skylab re-entered the atmosphere and was lost. It is

also not clear that any new systems will be substantially safer than an upgraded

Shuttle.

The question of which missions should be sacrificed to the human exploration initiative is one of public policy. So far the budget appears to continue to support

science missions, but the real costs and sacrifices have not been identified past

2005.

The schedule must reflect budget realities and the entire NASA budget would

have to be greatly increased to carry out the program. Even the sacrifice of science

or technology would probably not provide the resources needed with the current

plan.

Observations and Recommendations:

Fundamentally the whole approach needs to be re-thought. NASA continues, as

it has for its entire existence, to pursue the approach that Wernher von Braun proposed in Collier’s Magazine in 1952—rocket launches, a space station, lunar and

Mars bases.26 This approach can be visualized by watching the movie 2001: A Space

Odyssey. But times have changed and we need to look at new approaches:

• New Ideas and Analysis Tools: Since Apollo NASA has had few new ideas

about how to explore space. A recent presentation by a young NASA engineer

showed exactly the same visualization and study tools27 as my colleagues and

I used in the late 1980’s and was a rehash of the same concepts we were

studying then.28

• New technologies: For example, the space elevator, the subject of Arthur C.

Clarke’s 1956 Fountains of Paradise29 appears to be close to being enabled

by structures built with carbon nanotubes and commercial ventures are being

undertaken to build one. This is a system that puts a space station in a geosynchronous orbit 23,000 miles above the Earth and lowers a cable to a point

on the equator. Once this (admittedly expensive) infrastructure was in place

it could be used to launch payloads beyond Earth orbit. A preliminary design

and cost estimates for a commercial space elevator system30 were funded by

53

31Mankins, J.C., ‘‘Advanced Systems, Technologies, Research and Analysis to Enable Future

Space Flight Capabilities and Realize the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration,’’ presented to Stepping Stones to Space National Academies Workshop, 23 February 2004. 32 ‘‘House Approves H.R. 3752, The Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004,’’

http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=13774 33 Horvath, Joan, ‘‘Blastoffs on a Budget,’’ to appear in Scientific American, April 2004, Volume 290, Number 4. 34 ‘‘NASA exploration office charts new procurement territory,’’ March 3, 2004, http://

www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0304/ 35http://anon.nasa-global.speedera.net/anon.nasa-global/CAIB/CAIB¥lowres¥chapter9.pdf, Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Volume I, Section 9.3. Long-Term: Future Directions for the U.S. in Space—‘‘The Board Does believe that NASA and the Nation should give

more attention to developing a new ‘‘concept of operations’’ for future activities.. . .’’ Page 210. 36http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12052 37http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=12052, Briefing Charts: NASA Associate Administrator Craig Steidle, Office of Exploration Systems Chart 14. 38http://nasapeople.nasa.gov/hclwp/index.htm 39http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=13739

the NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts which routinely provides seed

funding for innovative space exploration concepts. However, none of NASA’s

human exploration studies are looking at anything creative like the use of a

space elevator.31 This is not to say that it is the answer, just that new approaches enabled by new technology should be considered.

• New Economics: Wealthy people are entering the game. Dennis Tito and

Mark Shuttleworth are the vanguard of space tourism and many companies

are vying to put people in orbit. A new bill to provide regulatory standards

has just passed the House of Representatives.32 Some examples of new launch

companies, with their backers, are:33

— Scaled Composites—Paul Allen

— Armadillo Aerospace—John Carmack

— Space Exploration Technologies—Elon Musk

— Blue Origin—Jeff Bezos

• New ways of doing business: NASA is proposing a series of ‘‘challenge’’ prizes

to stimulate innovative approaches to space exploration.34 However, this is

not a substitute for a well-planned program with specific, affordable goals and

it still leaves NASA firmly in control. What is the process for infusing the successful approaches into the human exploration program? Or, what is the process for substituting successful approaches for the government-provided elements?

• New international players: China’s Shenzhou program has orbited its first

taikonaut. The U.S. needs either to compete or cooperate with the Chinese

but the current vision is silent on this.

• New Culture: NASA has become, over the years, an entrenched bureaucracy

shaped by political considerations such as keeping jobs in particular states

and Congressional districts. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board

stressed the need for culture change35 and NASA is bringing in new personnel, mostly military,36 to help with that situation. However, the plans for

the initiative which are based on the military model (such as ‘‘spiral’’ and

‘‘block development’’ that are used successfully for aircraft production)37 may

not be applicable to the relatively small number of vehicles involved in

human space exploration. NASA is attempting to revitalize its workforce38

and improve its management practices.39 However, the fundamental nature

of the civil service-staffed centers will make it very difficult to create real

change. Approaches such as converting the centers from civil services to contract organizations such as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory should be explored.

Attempts to ‘‘privatize’’ fundamentally non-profit endeavors, such as the

United Space Alliance’s contract to maintain the Shuttle, are merely disguising ordinary government contracting as private enterprise.

A very recent report of a workshop of the National Academy of Science gives guidance for formulating human space exploration objectives. One point that it makes

is: ‘‘Much of the success of the success of NASA’s science programs was attributed

to having clear long-range goals and roadmaps that are framed by scientists and

periodically reassessed by the science community in the light of new knowledge and

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40 Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy (2004) Space Studies Board (SSB), Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB). 41 AIAA 96–0333, ‘‘Mars Exploration Program Strategy: 1995–2020,’’ D.L. Shirley and D.J.

McCleese, Jan 15–18, 1996, Reno, NV. 42Shirley, D.L., ‘‘The Myths of Mars: Why We’re Not There Yet and How to Get There,’’ Workshop on Concepts and Approaches for Mars Exploration, Lunar and Planetary Institute, Houston, TX, 18–20 July 2000. 43 NASA Human Exploration and Development of Space Enterprise: A Concept Paper On ‘‘An

Over-Arching Enabling Process for the Development of an Engagement Plan,’’ D. Powe, L.A.

Ritchie, and D.L. Jackson. 44http://www.planetary.org/html/society/press/survey¥results.htm, 50,000 People Jam Planetary Society Website to Take Space Survey about NASA Priorities. 45For instance see ‘‘Pivirotto, D.S. ‘‘Assessing Risks and Mars Benefits of Lunar oration,’’

1991. 46Shirley, D.L., Written Testimony or the Root Causes of the Mars Surveyor 98 Mission Failures, 30 April 2000. 47 ASEE 2002–406, Shirley, D.L., ‘‘Managing Creativity: A Creative Engineering Education

Approach,’’ 2002 American Society for Engineering Education Annual Conference, 2002. 1 Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy, NRC Space Studies Board and Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (2004).

capability.’’ 40 An example of this is the current Mars Exploration program which

sends robotic missions every 26 months to ‘‘follow the water’’ to investigate whether

life might have ever existed on Mars.41 The current successful Mars rovers are a

result of this approach.

Unfortunately the President’s vision skips over the need for a process to provide

goals for the program. Like most other human programs it merely states goals and

plunges directly into an implementation strategy. This has been shown over and

over to be a flawed strategy as I point out in a paper presented in 2000 at a workshop planning Human Exploration.42 In this paper I made recommendations that

I still regard as important for achieving what the President’s strategy lacks:

• ‘‘Customer’’ Input—for example through ‘‘deliberative polling’’ 43 and surveys.44 This would be from and by people outside NASA and the government,

and outside the standard NASA advisors such as the National Academies,

and even outside the aerospace engineering and science community. The people are paying for it, shouldn’t they have a real say?

• A flexible, step-by-step approach with planning and redesign in response to

things learned, either from science, engineering or economic/policy changes, in

other words a ‘‘decision tree’’ approach with options to be exercised based on

learning.45

• Honesty, openness, flexibility, patience and hard-nosed, non-political management.46,47

I recommend that the Committee urge the Administration to create a process for

developing a truly fresh approach to the exploration of space. There should be a

workshop or series of workshops to infuse non-NASA, non-government ideas into the

selection of a vision. Then there should be a study effort over the next year or so

to generate new concepts, bring in new players, fully engage the public and develop

a set of goals.

The process should include, for example:

• Creative individuals, for instance Science fiction writers and movie producers

• Contestants in University robotics competitions

• Scientists and engineers

• Space Entrepreneurs

• Interested public

• Formal and informal educators

• Public Relations people

• Potential international participants.

Finally, a process should be developed for driving the human space exploration

with the results of this study. This will not be an easy task, as government institutions are not accustomed to such an open process.

The Objective: Define a new vision and new architectures and approaches for

human space exploration and a program to carry them out. The Science Fiction Museum and Hall of Fame would be delighted to participate in such a process.

Thank you.

55

BIOGRAPHY FOR DONNA L. SHIRLEY

PRECIS

Donna Shirley is Director of the Science Fiction Museum and Hall of Fame in Seattle, Washington. She recently retired as Assistant Dean of Engineering and Instructor of Aerospace Mechanical Engineering at the University of Oklahoma (OU)

where she led strategic planning and the development of innovative engineering

education programs, and was also President of Managing Creativity, a speaking,

consulting and training firm. She is a well known educator, speaker, consultant and

trainer on the management of creative teams. Ms. Shirley has an MS in Aerospace

Engineering and three honorary doctorates, plus over forty years experience in engineering of aerospace and civil systems, including thirty years in management. She

had a 32-year career at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, culminating in the position of Manager of the Mars Exploration Program.

SUMMARY OF EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

Science Fiction Museum and Hall of Fame

• January 2003–Present: Director of a unique, interactive science fiction museum in Seattle, WA.

Managing Creativity

• 1997–Present: President of Managing Creativity. Providing speaking, consulting and training on the management of creative teams.

• 1998–2001: Co-creator and Official Spokesperson, White House Mars Millennium Project, a nationwide educational project for K–12 students.

University of Oklahoma

• September 2002–2003:Instructor of Aerospace Mechanical Engineering

(AME).

• September 1999–September 2002: Assistant Dean of Engineering for Advanced Program Development. Led the creation of a strategic plan for the College of Engineering. Led the modernization of the Aerospace Engineering curriculum into an ‘‘intelligent aerospace systems’’ program. Acted for one year

as the Interim Director of Engineering Education for the College, focussing

on project-based, multidisciplinary engineering.

• 2000–2004: Served on National Research Council Task Forces on the Usefulness and Availability of NASA’s Earth and Space Science Data, and the National Aerospace Initiative.

• 1998–2001: Co-creator and Official Spokesperson, White House Mars Millennium Project, a nationwide educational project for K–12 students.

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)

California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California (1966–1998)

• 1994–1998: Manager of the $150 million/year Mars Exploration Program,

which included the highly successful Pathfinder and Mars Global Surveyor

missions plus two additional missions to Mars every 26 months until at least

2005.

• 1992–1994: Mars Pathfinder Microrover Flight Experiment Manager. Leader

of the team which developed Sojourner Truth, the $25 million Microrover

landed by Mars Pathfinder on July 4, 1997.

• 1991–1992: Cassini Project Engineer. Chief Engineer of a $1.6B project to explore Saturn.

• 1989–1993: (Additional Duty) Leader of two NASA-wide, award-winning

teams which developed systems engineering and project management processes for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

• 1990–1991: Manager of Exploration Initiative Studies.

• Various management and technical positions from 1966.

EDUCATION

• Some work in a Ph.D. Program in Human and Organizational Systems—The

Fielding Institute, Santa Barbara, CA, 1997–1998.

• MS Aerospace Engineering—University of Southern California, 1968.

• BS Aerospace Mechanical Engineering—University of Oklahoma, 1965.

56

• BA Professional Writing—University of Oklahoma, 1963.

SELECTED CURRENT AND RECENT AWARDS, HONORS, OFFICES

• Honorary Doctorates: University of Oklahoma, Mt. St. Mary’s College, Los

Angeles, California, State University of New York, Rome/Utica

• Oklahoma Women’s Hall of Fame

• University of Oklahoma College of Engineering Distinguished Graduate Society

• National Space Society Wernher von Braun Award

• Western Engineer’s Society Washington Award for Engineering Achievement

• American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Holley Medal for Lifetime

Achievement

• Glamour Magazine ‘‘Women Who Do and Dare’’ Award

• One of MS Magazine’s ‘‘Women of the Year’’

• Women in Technology International Hall of Fame

• NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal for management and systems engineering

• Society of Women Engineers Judith Resnick Award

• President of the Science Council for the NASA Institute of Advanced Concepts

• Member of the Board of Omniplex Science Museum in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

• Member, American Society for Engineering Education

• Trustee of Scripps College for Women, Claremont, California

SELECTED RECENT PUBLICATIONS

• Striz, A. and Shirley, D., ‘‘Intelligent Aerospace Systems: An Exercise in Curriculum Development,’’ ASEE Midwest Section Meeting, University of Missouri-Rolla, September 10–12, 2003.

• Miller, D.P., D. Hougen and D. Shirley, The Sooner Lunar Schooner: Lunar

Engineering Education, Journal of Advances in Space Research, Vol. 31/11,

pp. 2449–2454, 2003.

• Shirley, D., Baker, R., Deaton, L. and Reynolds, E., ‘‘Tinker Air Force Base

Phase I Process Improvement Methodology Report,’’ 31 May 2003.

• ASEE 2002–406, ‘‘Managing Creativity: A Creative Engineering Education

Approach,’’ D.L. Shirley, ASEE National Conference, June 2002.

• Shirley, D.L. ‘‘The Myths of Mars: Why We’re Not There Yet, and How to Get

There,’’ Workshop on Concepts and Approaches for Mars Exploration, Lunar

and Planetary Institute, Houston, TX, 18–20 July 2000.

• Shirley, D.L, Written Congressional testimony on ‘‘The Root Causes of the

Mars Surveyor 98 Mission Failures,’’ requested by the staff for the House

Subcommittee on Science and Technology and used in hearings on 30 April

2000.

• Shirley, D.L. ‘‘Women in Engineering: Focus on Success,’’ Bridge, National

Academy of Engineering, Summer 1999.

• Shirley, Donna L., Managing Martians, Autobiography published by Broadway Books, with Danelle Morton, 1998, 1999.

• Shirley, Donna L., ‘‘Touching Mars,’’ presented at the IAA Low Cost Systems

Conference, Pasadena, CA, August 1998.

• Shirley, Donna L. and Matijevic, Jacob, ‘‘Mars Rovers: Past, Present and Future,’’ Princeton University Space Studies Institute’s 20th Anniversary Conference, Princeton, NJ, 10 May 1997.

• Shirley, D.L. and Haynes, N., ‘‘The Mars Exploration Program,’’ Space Technology and Applications International Forum (STAIF–97), Albuquerque, NM,

26–30 January 1997.

SELECTED MEDIA APPEARANCES

• Recent (1996–2004) Television Appearances include: Masters of Technology

Show #105, Donna Shirley SPACE TECHNOLOGY (http://www.sciam.com/

mastertech/), (2002), ABC’s World News Tonight, ABC’s Good Morning AmerVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
57

ica, NBC’s Today, many CNN news programs, the Discovery Channel’s Life

on Mars?, PBS’s Jim Lehrer News Hour, The Family Channel’s To the Moon

and Mars, LA Life and Times on KCET public television, Charley Rose, Tom

Snyder, CSPAN, documentaries by PBS, the BBC, and Australian television,

and many other television news programs.

• Numerous national and international radio appearances including local and

national commercial and educational networks and PBS.

• Print and Electronic Media: Widely quoted and featured in major print media.

• Have given literally hundreds of speeches, nationally and internationally, on

management of creative systems, space exploration, education, and diversity.

58

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Shirley.

We just have five minutes, so Dr. Young, we are going to pause

right now. And you know the drill. You are all veterans up here.

We will do our best to get back in a timely fashion. If you would

like a cup of coffee or anything or use the Chairman’s lounge, you

may do so. We will be back as soon as possible.

[Recess.]

Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Young.

59

STATEMENT OF DR. LAURENCE R. YOUNG, APOLLO PROGRAM

PROFESSOR, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

(MIT); FOUNDING DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SPACE BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE (NSBRI)

Dr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the privilege of addressing you on this question. Let me say, at the outset, that I am

in favor of the human exploration of Mars. I was personally aware

of the risk of human space flight during my role as an alternate

payload specialist on STS-58. I am now back in the equally hazardous environment of Cambridge, Massachusetts from which station I have tried to answer the questions that were addressed to

me by your Committee, and I will limit myself to comments on the

four questions concerning the human physiological challenges of

the proposed Mars mission.

First, what are the most significant physiological challenges, and

what is being done about them? They are, as you are well aware,

bone loss, muscle loss, cardiovascular deconditioning, and

neurovestibular, or balance organ, changes, which are all challenges. With insufficient countermeasures, the long duration mission to Mars will be very deleterious. Bone loss and the related risk

of fracture remains the most serious unsolved threat. Progress in

treating demineralization is being made with the use of drugs. Cardiovascular deconditioning, with the associated post-flight orthostatic hypotension, which just means fainting when you stand up,

may also be combated with drugs, as well as fluid loading and aerobic exercises. The neurovestibular problems can affect balance and

locomotion for a considerable time after return to Earth or going

to work on the surface of another planet. The overall issue, at the

current time, is that the current suite of exercise countermeasures,

relying primarily on treadmills, resistance devices, is unreliable,

time consuming, and inadequate by itself to assure the sufficient

physical conditioning of astronauts going to Mars.

Radiation, however, remains the most vexing and difficult issue.

Both increases in the likelihood of cancer and possible acute radiation sickness are major concerns for any extended flights, particularly outside the Earth’s magnetic field. During solar flare periods,

astronauts could retreat to a small shelter to avoid the potentially

high proton storms. The high-energy charged particles in the constant cosmic radiation, however, are considerably more difficult to

protect against. Conventional shielding against them only makes

matters worse by secondary emission of further damaging radiation. Both the flux of these particles and their impact on organs

are being measured by a variety of dosimeters aboard the Space

Station. The relative biological effectiveness of these heavy charged

particles is also under investigation, making use of a new NASA

Space Radiation Facility at the Brookhaven National Laboratory.

Some progress in drug protection against radiation threats is

currently being made, but more effort is required. Magnetic shielding, long considered desirable, may also be inching toward a practical implementation using superconducting magnet technology.

Much of this bioastronautic research has been conducted under the

leadership and sponsorship of the National Space Biomedical Research Institute and the Johnson Space Center. They had a critical

road—a ‘‘Critical Path Roadmap’’ developed to guide the selection

60

of peer-reviewed research proposals. This roadmap, incidentally, is

about to be reviewed by a panel led by the Institute of Medicine.

Both the microgravity and the radiation threats, of course, are

reduced by shortening the transit time to several months and using

the local soil for adding shielding to the surface of—on the surface

of the Moon or Mars. Advanced technology propulsion could shorten the voyage and mitigate the threats as well as ease the serious

psychosocial challenge of the small groups working and living in

isolation.

The second question was the need for the Station to continue research to solve these problems. The Station, although potentially

the ideal laboratory for research into all of microgravity science,

has not yet been used effectively for several reasons. It is still

under construction and has a limited crew. There is not enough

time available for human research, but we can make sufficient

progress to take advantage of its presence in the future. The keys

to fulfilling the potential of the Station are peer-reviewed, missiondirected science, an expanded crew, installation of the key biomedical equipment on-board, timelier accelerated use—launching of

the Centrifuge Accommodation Mission, and utilization of the Station as a testbed for technology for development of advanced life

support systems.

Finally, the most important piece of additional equipment to

meet the research goals is a short radius human centrifuge for the

study of intermittent artificial gravity inside the Station, possibly

the ‘‘universal antidote’’ we have been shooting for.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say something about

a question that was not posed to me, and that is the importance

of the Mars mission, as well as the Station, for education and outreach. It has often been claimed that human space exploration

serves to motivate students and teachers to emphasize science and

mathematics in the educational process. I can state from personal

experience, with some of the country’s best young, minds that this

is certainly true. The excitement of human space flight and the recognition of the daunting nature of some of the tasks invigorate the

very students we most need to continue to drive the science and

technology engine of our society. The National Space Grant Program, for example, regularly contributes to the education of many

thousands of youngsters who have seen the stars and remain committed to the space program. The proposed Moon/Mars mission will

only expand this level of interest in my opinion.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Young follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LAURENCE R. YOUNG

Outline of responses to key questions posed by the Committee:.

Q1. What are the most significant human physiology challenges? How daunting?

When will they be resolved? How much research has been done and where was

it conducted?

Bone loss, muscle loss, cardiovascular deconditioning and neurovestibular alterations are all known challenges. The longer the space flight the more serious the

after-effects of weightlessness. With insufficient countermeasures the long duration

flight using conventional propulsion (nine months to Mars, month to a year on the

surface at 3/8 g, and 6–9 months back to Earth), the microgravity effects will be

very deleterious. Current countermeasures (aerobic and resistive exercise as in ISS),

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although inefficient and onerous for some astronauts, are reasonably effective

against some of the muscle and cardiovascular losses—but have only limited effectiveness in countering the full range of dangerous bone weakening. Bone loss and

the related risk of fracture remains the most serious unsolved threat. Progress in

treating demineralization is being made with use of drugs (bis-phosphonates). Cardiovascular deconditioning and the associated post-flight orthostatic hypotension

may also be combated with drugs (mydodrine) as well as fluid loading and aerobic

exercise. The effectiveness of these drugs for use in space and following return is

only now being determined. A protective suit can also mitigate the problem of orthostatic hypotension to some extent. It remains to be determined if some such suit

will be needed or provided for landing on the Moon or Mars. Neurovestibular problems can affect balance and locomotion for a considerable time after return to Earth.

This too, along with motion sickness, can threaten astronaut safety and comfort on

arrival at Mars unless effective countermeasures are employed. Overall, the current

suite of exercise countermeasures, relying primarily on treadmill, resistance devices,

is unreliable, time consuming, and inadequate by itself to assure the sufficient physical conditioning of astronauts going to Mars.

Radiation remains the most vexing and difficult issue. Both increases in the likelihood of cancer and possible acute radiation sickness are major concerns for any extended flights outside the protection of Earth’s magnetic field. During solar flare periods astronauts could retreat to a small shelter to avoid the potentially high level

proton storms Galactic cosmic radiation, consists of omnidirectional fluxes of particles covering a wide range of energies. High energy charged particles in the constant cosmic radiation are considerably more difficult to protect against. Conventional shielding against them only makes matter worse by the secondary emission

of further damaging radiation. Both the flux of these particles and their impact on

organs are being measured by a variety of dosimeters currently aboard ISS. The

very important issue of the relative biological effectiveness of these heavy charged

particles is also under investigation, making use of the new NASA Space Radiation

Facility at the Brookhaven National Laboratory. The Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer

aboard ISS should add highly accurate determination of the flux of galactic radiation, by extrapolation from its measurements made on the Space Station. Some

progress in drug protection against the radiation threat is currently being made but

more effort in that direction is required. Magnetic shielding, long considered desirable, may also be moving toward a practical implementation using superconducting

magnet technology .

One promising approach to the weightlessness issue is the well known but never

implemented artificial gravity approach, to be discussed later. Both the microgravity

and radiation threats, of course, are reduced by shortening the transit time to several months and using the local soil for added shielding on the surface of the Moon

or Mars. The transit time for propulsion using conventional bi-propellant rockets is

essentially determined by orbital mechanics as one coasts towards Mars. Advanced

technology propulsion could shorten the voyage and mitigate the threats, as well as

ease the serious psycho-social challenge of small groups working and living in isolation for long periods.

Much of the recent bioastronautics research has been conducted at universities by

countermeasure development teams of university and government laboratories

under the leadership and sponsorship of the National Space Biomedical Research

Institute and at JSC. A ‘‘Critical Path Roadmap’’ and associated high priority research questions has been developed and maintained by JSC and NSBRI—and

should guide the selection of peer reviewed research proposals. This Roadmap is

about to be reviewed by a panel under the direction of the three Academies: NAS,

NAE and IOM.

Q2. How can research aboard ISS contribute to solving these problems? What kinds

of experiments and additional equipment are needed? How long will it take?

The ISS is potentially the ideal laboratory for research into all of the microgravity

related issues challenging long duration exploration. It has not yet been used effectively however, for several reasons. While under construction, and with a limited

crew of three (now two), no time is available for intense human research. Only one

of the two Human Research Facility racks is on-board, and sample return is currently nearly non-existent. The limited results to date should not be taken as predictive of the potential benefits of the fully equipped and staffed ISS, any more than

the initial flawed HST could have been used to predict its current string of successes.

The keys to fulfilling the potential of ISS in the bioastronautics areas are:

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1. Support of peer reviewed, mission oriented flight experiments directed at solution of the key bioastronautcs challenges.

2. Provision of a full resident crew of six or seven, including astronauts trained

and capable of doing biomedical studies and serving as test subjects.

3. Installation and resupply of the key biomedical equipment, beginning with

the Human Research Facility Rack 2, and enabling the important additions

in the JEM and Columbus to be added to the ISS.

4. Timely, or even accelerated, launching of the Centrifuge Accommodation

Module (CAM) and performance of key experiments on animals at various glevels. (The scientifically important research into the influence of partial

gravity on animals and cells is also fundamental to understanding the problem of human deconditioning and survival in 0-g, on the Moon or on Mars.)

The utilization of the CAM will, of course, require the regular upload and

download of research specimens—even after discontinuation of Shuttle

flights.

5. Utilization of the ISS as a testbed for technology development for advanced

life support systems. Testing and evaluation of full or partially closed life

support systems, essential to any long duration mission to the Moon or Mars,

will be best accomplished on the ISS. If successful these advanced life support systems could then be incorporated into the infrastructure of the ISS

itself, reducing operational costs and permitting larger and longer crew presence.

Finally, the most important piece of additional equipment to meet the research

goals is a short radius human centrifuge for the study of intermittent artificial gravity inside the ISS. Ground studies already underway will determine the potential

of artificial gravity for preventing all of the microgravity related deconditioning

issues. Although early positive results will guide missions planners regarding artificial gravity, only flight tests with numerous (tens) of astronauts for extended periods (several months) will allow this ‘‘universal antidote’’ to be proven and applied

to a Mars mission in conjunction with other countermeasures. Design studies of a

moderate radius (56m) spacecraft structure, rotating at 4 rpm to provide 1-g of artificial gravity, are encouraging and the concept appears practical.

Q3. How would the research budget and number of astronauts aboard station have

to be changed to accomplish the research agenda?

The proposed research budget for Biological/Physical Sciences Research ($492 Million for FY 2005) represents a substantial increase. However, to go along with an

increase to six or seven crew members, the capability of conducting many more inflight experiments, and the need for a human centrifuge on the ISS, this budget will

need to increased even further. I am not prepared to speculate on the desirable

level. Among the substantial number of ground research studies submitted to

NSBRI and to NASA are numbers of potentially valuable and relevant flight experiments, each of which is costly. Since there have been very few flight biomedical experiments since Neurolab and STS–95, a substantial queue of accepted peer reviewed investigations already exists. Some worthwhile studies have already been

‘‘deselected’’ for lack of flight opportunities or relevance.

Q4. How long will the ISS have to remain in operation to produce meaningful flight

information?

Because most of the human physiology experiments require long duration exposure to weightlessness and evaluation of potential countermeasures, the process of

accumulating sufficient data and exploring the relevant variables is very time consuming. Initial results for countermeasure evaluation, for example, might only begin

to be accumulated after four sessions of 4–6 months each. Early positive results

would obviously influence both Mars mission designs and even continuing ISS crew

health protection. To reach a valid scientific conclusion about particular protocols

however, fuller exploration might take 8–10 test missions, or up to five years to finish. Finally, it seems prudent to complete a full-length on-orbit simulation of at

least the mission to Mars, if not the entire round trip, before embarking on that

voyage of exploration. Obviously a lunar base could form a key portion of this simulation, along with the ISS.

Beyond the immediate use of the ISS to answer some of the more pressing issues

in human physiology associated with the Vision for Space Exploration, is the larger

question of the continued need for a microgravity laboratory for science and technology. The proposal to limit ISS research to the impact of space on human health

and to end support for other important microgravity science and space technology

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seems short sighted. There will remain numerous important questions, in fundamental biology and physics, in the behavior of fluids and combustion, in materials

and crystal growth that can only be answered in orbit. If the ISS were allowed to

end its useful life prematurely we would only hear a strong cry for its replacement.

I strongly believe in the scientific and technical value of a ‘‘permanent presence in

space.’’

Additional Comments:

Education and Outreach:

It has often been claimed that the human space serves to motivate students and

teachers to emphasize science and mathematics in the educational process. I can

state from personal experience with some of the country’s best young minds that

this is certainly true. The excitement of human space flight and the recognition of

the daunting nature of some of the tasks invigorate the very students we most need

to continue to drive the science and technology engine of our society. The national

Space Grant program, for example, regularly contributes to the education of thousands of youngsters who have ‘‘seem the stars’’ and remain committed to the space

program. The proposed Moon/Mars mission will only expand this level of interest.

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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much, Dr. Young.

Dr. Fisk.

STATEMENT OF DR. LENNARD A. FISK, CHAIR, SPACE STUDIES

BOARD (SSB), NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES; CHAIR,

DEPARTMENT OF ATMOSPHERIC, OCEANIC, AND SPACE

SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN; FORMER ASSOCIATE

ADMINISTRATOR, SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATION, NASA

Dr. FISK. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Gordon, and Members

of the Committee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify

before you. As you noted, I have provided some written comments.

These are based on the reports and studies, the many reports and

studies of the National Research Council Space Studies Board of

which I am the Chair.

I would also like to refer you, in particular, to a workshop that

we held last November on the Nation’s space—what the Nation’s

space policy should be. And I believe a summary of that workshop

has been provided to you.

You asked a number of important questions, and in the time allotted to me for my remarks, let me just comment on a few of them.

You asked the question whether the President’s initiative is needed

and justified. The answer, in my judgment, is an unqualified yes.

As was noted earlier on the panel, the human space flight program

of NASA has lacked direction now for decades, and it needs a clear,

definitive goal, and the obvious goal is to explore. Exploration is

the acquisition of new knowledge: knowledge of space as a place for

human activity, knowledge of our solar system, the universe beyond, and perhaps exploration as a basic human desire innate in

our genetic code. And the human space flight program can be a

contributor to the modern realization of that basic trait.

You asked if NASA was properly conducting this exploration initiative. On this point, I am very encouraged. Since it appears that

it is being conducted as a true exploration initiative, not a human

or a robotic program, but rather one in which humans and robots

each play their essential and appropriate roles. Indeed, I think one

of the appealing things to me is there is an opportunity here to diminish what has been a long-standing dichotomy between space

science and human space flight. An exploration program properly

conducted in which humans and robots each play their appropriate

roles should result in synergy between robotic science and human

space flight.

It also appears to be recognized that this is a long-term endeavor. Indeed, one could argue the limited budgets that are being provided for it demand a long-term endeavor. This long-term endeavor

will, as a result, need to be accomplished through a series of incremental steps. But there is a positive feature to those incremental

steps as well in that it should sustain public and political support

for the decades to come. Robotic missions to the Moon and Mars,

laying the foundation for human exploration, a regular series of

test flights of launch capabilities, the use of the Space Station to

qualify humans for space, all of these things should create the appearance and the reality of progress and sustain interest and support.

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You asked about the balance between other NASA activities, and

on this point, there are some major concerns, particularly with the

President’s fiscal year 2005 budget for NASA, which begins the exploration initiative, because it has unfortunately resulted in some

collateral damage for certain of NASA’s science disciplines. Space

science has basically been divided up into those which are considered to be essential for exploration and those which are not, and

the latter has suffered some serious reductions, particularly in the

out-years. I question the wisdom of this demarcation. It is important to note that this is not, in any way, a rejection of the exploration initiative, it is rather simply a lament that certain disciplines have been left out. The Sun-Earth Connections program of

NASA has a goal to understand the Sun and its influence on the

space environment of the solar system, and yet it has seen some

serious cuts in the programs on which it depends. If we are going

to, in fact, consider sending humans forth into space, it is inconceivable to me that we would not try and develop the ability to understand and predict the space environment through which we will

fly. That would be like embarking on an ocean voyage of exploration without an adequate marine weather forecast.

And similarly, the exploration—definition of exploration in the

President’s initiative seems a bit narrow to me: the planets are in,

the sun is not. The Origins of the Universe Program, which looks

for life elsewhere, is in but the Structure and Evolution of the Universe Program is out. And it is as if we have divided exploration

up by wavelength where we say infrared and visible light astronomy, which can reveal habitable sites, is in, but x-ray and gamma

ray astronomy, which looks at the more violent parts of the universe, is out, and this does not make sense to me. And then, of

course, there is Earth science, which has been badly cut.

This is a special issue. NASA has a responsibility, under the

Space Act and its amendments, to use its capabilities to understand our home planet and predict its future. There is a difference,

I think between priorities and responsibilities. We have the priority

now to explore, but we still have the responsibility to deliver to the

policy makers, and the public, a sufficient understanding of how we

can be good stewards of our planetary home.

Throughout the history of NASA, the various science disciplines

have each been recognized for their fundamental importance to explore, to understand, and to utilize space and have been supported

equally. The proposed exploration initiative has resulted in a fundamental departure from that balanced approach.

Thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Fisk follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LENNARD A. FISK

The President’s Vision for Space Exploration: Perspectives

from a Recent NRC Workshop on National Space Policy

Introduction

Chairman Boehlert, Ranking Member Gordon, and Members of the Committee,

thank you for inviting me to testify today. My name is Lennard Fisk. I am the

Thomas M. Donahue Collegiate Professor of Space Science at the University of

Michigan, and I appear before you today in my capacity as the Chair of the National

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1 Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy, NRC Space Studies Board and Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (2004). 2The Human Exploration of Space, NRC Space Studies Board, 1997.

Research Council’s Space Studies Board. In discussing the President’s vision for

space exploration this morning I will be telling you about a workshop that the National Research Council held last November under the sponsorship of the Space

Studies Board and the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board. The purpose of

the workshop was to discuss the question: What should be the principal purposes,

goals, and priorities of the U.S. civil space program? As I will tell you, there are

many ideas from that workshop that are well embodied in the President’s vision for

space exploration. There are also some views on implementation, which you may

wish to consider. There are, however, some notable differences from what participants at our workshop thought was an appropriate approach that I would like to

call to your attention.

I have brought with me and would submit for the record a list of the workshop

participants and a copy of the report,1 titled Issues and Opportunities Regarding the

U.S. Space Program: A Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy,

which summarizes our discussions. As you can see from the list, the participants

represented a broad range of experiences in the space program, having participated

in leadership positions in NASA, industry, and the military, as well as the science

community. The discussions were informed and lively, and what impressed me most

was the extent to which people agreed on the key issues.

Is the President’s Vision Needed?

The participants in the NRC workshop stated several times over the course of the

meeting that NASA needed a clear vision, direction, and goal for the human space

flight program. Furthermore, these participants were inclined to agree that such a

goal should be the human exploration of the solar system beyond low-Earth orbit.

They viewed exploration as the acquisition of new knowledge: knowledge of space

as a place for human activity, knowledge of our solar system, and knowledge of the

universe beyond our solar system. They also saw exploration as a basic human desire, innate in our genetic code, and noted that human space flight can be the modern realization of that basic trait.

Is NASA Approaching the Vision Correctly?

The important question, of course, is how does the Nation proceed in order to

achieve a space exploration goal? How do we ensure success? Our workshop recognized that exploration of our solar system is a long-term endeavor, which needs to

be accomplished with a series of incremental steps. In this sense, the human exploration efforts can learn from the successes of NASA’s science programs. Workshop

participants observed that certain key factors have contributed to the success of the

science program: there are clear goals in the science program established by the

science community’s interest in pursuing the most challenging scientific questions;

there is strategic planning; and there has been a steady sequence of accomplishments. The science program is executed via a series of individual steps that can accumulate success, from which progress can be measured and momentum sustained.

So what are these steps for human exploration? Our workshop participants envisioned a number of key efforts—the development of building block technology, the

dedication of ISS research to solving questions posed by long-term space flight,

eventual phasing out of the Space Shuttle, and the use of robotic precursor missions

to both the Moon and Mars. These steps also are part of NASA’s new roadmap for

space exploration.

In 1997 the Space Studies Board published a report which I think offers several

complementary ideas for a roadmap for space exploration. Titled The Human Exploration of Space, the report reviews three important areas of consideration that the

Board felt were necessary to address at the initial stages of a program in human

exploration.2 First is the enabling science for human exploration. This defines the

conditions necessary to maintain the health and safety of astronauts and to ensure

their optimal performance. Research areas that are enabling science can be classified according to their degree of urgency. Critical research issues, or ‘‘showstoppers,’’

are those for which inadequate scientific data lead to unacceptably high risks to any

program of extended space exploration. The second area of consideration is the

science that is enabled by a human exploration program, specifically human missions to the Moon and Mars. The third area of consideration is one of management

and organization—what should be the relationship between the scientific community

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3 A Strategy for Research in Space Biology and Medicine in the New Century, NRC Space Studies Board, 1998. 4Safe Passage: Astronaut Care for Exploration Missions, Board on Health Sciences Policy, Institute of Medicine, 2001. 5 New Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy, Space Studies Board,

2002.

and NASA, between scientists and engineers within NASA, as a program of human

exploration moves forward?

The 1997 SSB report identifies the following as those showstopper, critical research issues: the long- and short-term effects of ionizing radiation on human tissue;

the radiation environment inside proposed space vehicles; the benefits and costs of

different radiation shielding techniques; the detrimental effects of reduced gravity

and transitions in gravitational forces on all of the body’s systems and on bones,

muscles, and mineral metabolism; and the psychological effects of long-duration confinement in microgravity with no escape possible. These and several other issues related to the human biological response to space exploration are detailed and

prioritized in two more recent National Academies reports: A Strategy for Research

in Space Biology and Medicine in the New Century,3 published by the Space Studies

Board; and Safe Passage: Astronaut Care for Exploration Missions,4 published by

the Institute of Medicine.

As for the connection between scientists and engineers, I was struck at our workshop by how members of the scientific community appeared willing to embrace the

idea that the human space flight program can be a contributor to real scientific

progress. I think our participants would echo the conclusions of the 1997 report

which called for an integrated science program to accompany human missions to the

Moon and Mars, as well as the close coordination between human space flight and

science program staff in the implementation of an exploration program. Participants

at our workshop said many times that the reason the process of setting research

priorities by the scientific community has had a positive impact on NASA’s science

programs is that it creates within the scientific community, a community that in

the language of Congress can be considered the constituency of the science programs, a sense of ownership in the program. That feeling of ownership creates what

we called a constructive tension between NASA and the science community, which

ultimately empowers the program to excel. We observed this sense of ownership to

be missing from the human space flight part of NASA, but that does not have to

remain the case.

Robotic precursor missions to the Moon and Mars can provide an opportunity to

engage this issue of cooperation between science and exploration, develop new technologies for space exploration, and significantly enhance and optimize the scientific

return of eventual human missions. A 2002 report by the Space Studies Board, New

Frontiers in the Solar System: An Integrated Exploration Strategy,5 highlighted an

extremely exciting opportunity for science from the Moon, by making a sample return mission to the Moon’s South Pole-Aitken Basin one of its top priorities. By

studying the internal structure of the Moon at this location, which is the oldest and

deepest impact structure preserved on the Moon, we can investigate how major impacts on the Earth from early solar system space debris shaped the evolution of our

planet. The solar system exploration strategy report also identifies important scientific opportunities for the exploration of Mars.

Participants at our workshop argued that precursor missions to the Moon and

Mars should seek to move past a previously long-standing dichotomy that has existed between robotic and human space flight over most of NASA’s existence. Part

of the goal of these missions should be to develop the technology that will allow for

the greatest possible human-robotic interaction. Workshop discussions emphasized

the concept of synergy—not just complementarity—between robots and humans. We

must learn how to best take advantage of the strengths of both, separately and in

cooperation.

Further Comments on Science

There are other critical research challenges which deserve equal attention and

consideration in addition to the biological and physiological questions I mentioned.

Specifically, I refer to two issues highlighted in our 1997 Human Exploration report:

(a) the characteristics of cosmic-ray particles and the extent to which their levels

are modulated by the solar cycle and (b) the frequency and severity of solar flares.

These issues arise from questions about the nature of the role of the Sun in our

solar system and how the Sun creates and controls the environment into which we

intend to send astronauts. The recent NRC decadal science strategy for solar and

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6The Sun to the Earth—and Beyond: A Decadal Research Strategy for Solar and Space Physics, NRC Space Studies Board (2002). 7The relation of this research to exploration in its broadest context is addressed in Astronomy

and Astrophysics in the New Millennium, National Research Council (2000) and Connecting

Quarks with the Cosmos: Eleven Science Questions for the New Century, National Research

Council (2000). 8The importance of NASA’s Earth science program is addressed in Assessment of NASA’s

Draft 2003 Earth Science Enterprise Strategy, NRC Space Studies Board (2003).

space physics6 identified key missions within NASA’s Sun-Earth Connections program that are critical to understanding these fundamental processes and consequently to understanding the volatile space environment. That report recommended that the Sun-Earth Connections program of NASA be charged with, and

provided the resources needed for, developing a predictive understanding of the Sun

and the space environment it controls. I would urge you to carefully consider the

impact of any prioritization that would hinder or delay the development of our understanding of and our ability to predict the space environment.

A Lack of Balance in the Science Programs

It was the opinion of many at our workshop that the science road maps, decadal

strategy surveys, and mission plans in astronomy and astrophysics, solar and space

physics, and solar system exploration, which have been so carefully developed by

scientists and engineers in the external community and in NASA, and NASA’s careful attention to these details in execution of its programs, have resulted in science

being NASA’s greatest current strength. In fact, since the Apollo era came to a close

one might argue that NASA’s science efforts have been responsible for a major fraction of the Agency’s greatest successes. The pertinent question then is: Can NASA

preserve the strengths of its science programs and at the same time energize a new

human space flight program that seeks to include the science of exploration as part

of an overall new thrust for the agency?

This is, of course, a question of balance—balance between a new exploration priority and continuing successful science programs. I would encourage you to consider

whether or not the science disciplines have been divided unnecessarily into those

that are perceived as essential for exploration and those that are not. Our reports

argue that the sun and the planets and moons of the solar system are all equally

worthy of exploration. They also suggest that research to study both the origins of

planetary systems and life and the structure and evolution of the universe are highly important.7 In Earth science, NASA has a responsibility under the Space Act and

its amendments to use its capabilities to understand our home planet and predict

its future. While NASA may now have a priority to explore, I would expect that it

still also has the responsibility to deliver to the policy makers and the public a sufficient understanding of how we can be good stewards of our planetary home.8

How to Move Forward

The matter of balance between new exploration priorities and science opportunities, between new priorities and responsibilities, is very difficult to tackle. I believe

the best way to approach this matter, as is emphasized in our workshop report, is

to move forward on the human exploration front at a deliberate pace. Our workshop

discussions embraced the idea that NASA should pursue a long-term goal via a series of small steps, and they identified learning as the critical factor that should

drive implementation decisions.

There are several subjects about which we need to learn more. We must learn

about the technology we will employ in this endeavor. We must learn more in several areas before we can be sure we have minimized the health risks to astronauts.

And all of us, the scientific community, NASA, the Congress, and the Nation as

whole, must learn how to organize our space program to engage this effort. The

workshop report describes concerns that the infrastructure of our space program

was formed and sized to support Apollo and it asks ‘‘Is the current infrastructure

properly configured for a bold initiative?’’ The report notes that the space program

workforce, in the broadest sense, is aging; the attitudes seem risk averse; process

seems more important than ingenuity. Can this mind-set be changed? An aging

workforce and infrastructure is also a feature of the space science community.

Where are the bold new minds that will lead us into the future?

Finally, there is the matter of cost. A sense at the workshop was that it is too

premature to estimate how much an exploration initiative would cost—exactly because we have a great deal to learn and because our past experiences have told us

that we should be careful in estimating costs too early. This is at the heart of why

our participants emphasized a deliberate approach—we should identify critical research and technology development issues and devise, even at this early time, some

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kind of roadmap for progress in those areas. We must also examine the full breadth

of NASA’s science programs to determine what research already underway may contribute to that progress; what research is currently planned that may contribute to

that progress; and what new research is necessary, and we must support them all

with the resources necessary to achieve success. Only through this balanced approach, with roadmaps for technology development and scientific progress that are

related to each other and flexible enough to adapt to change and to learning can

we have a guidepost against which we measure our progress, articulate our successes, and identify our next steps.

This approach to success through a series of individual steps implies a kind of

‘‘go-as-you-pay’’ approach to exploration to allow for affordable and flexible exploration that changes in response to learning. In this sense then, go-as-you-pay is

complemented by the practice of pay-as-you-learn.

Conclusion

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to again thank you for inviting me to testify today. I would be happy to address any questions you and the committee may

have about our report or the discussions that took place at our workshop. A renewed

opportunity for human exploration in the solar system creates an exciting moment

in our nation’s history. I can tell you that there is indeed great excitement in the

space community, which I believe is reflected in our report. I think further that the

leaders of the scientific community may be ready to stand up and say ‘‘we believe

this country should invest in this activity, and we are ready to make the case to

the world that this is a valid use of this nation’s resources.’’ I am hopeful that we

as scientists are ready to engage this process actively to help guide its implementation and direct it toward success.

NRC Space Policy Workshop Participants

November 12–13, 2003

PANELISTS

Dan Fink, Consultant

Robert Frosch, Harvard University

Riccardo Giacconi, Johns Hopkins University and University Research Associates

Noel Hinners, Lockheed-Martin (retired)

Wesley Huntress, Carnegie Institution of Washington

Thomas D. Jones, Consultant

Todd R. La Porte, University of California, Berkeley

John Logsdon, George Washington University

Richard Malow, AURA

Howard McCurdy, American University

Norman Neureiter, Texas Instruments (retired), Department of State through September 2003

Mary Jane Osborn, University of Connecticut Medical School

Robert Richardson, Cornell University

Edward C. Stone, California Institute of Technology, U.S. Representative to

COSPAR

J.R. Thompson, Orbital Sciences Corporation

Albert Wheelon, Hughes Aircraft Company (retired)

SSB MEMBERS

Lennard A. Fisk, University of Michigan, Chair

George A. Paulikas, The Aerospace Corporation (retired), Vice Chair

J. Roger P. Angel, University of Arizona

Ana P. Barros, Harvard University

Reta F. Beebe, New Mexico State University

Roger D. Blandford, Stanford University

James L. Burch, Southwest Research Institute

Radford Byerly, Jr., University of Colorado

Howard M. Einspahr, Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharmaceutical Research Institute (retired)

Steven H. Flajser, Loral Space and Communications, Ltd.

Michael H. Freilich, Oregon State University

Donald Ingber, Harvard Medical School

Ralph H. Jacobson, Charles Draper Laboratory (retired)

Tamara E. Jernigan, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

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Margaret G. Kivelson, University of California, Los Angeles

Bruce D. Marcus, TRW, Inc. (retired)

Harry Y. McSween, Jr., University of Tennessee

Dennis W. Readey, Colorado School of Mines

Anna-Louise Reysenbach, Portland State University

Carolus J. Schrijver, Lockheed Martin Solar and Astrophysics Laboratory

Robert J. Serafin, National Center for Atmospheric Research

Mitchell Sogin, Marine Biological Laboratory

C. Megan Urry, Yale University

J. Craig Wheeler, University of Texas, Austin

ASEB MEMBERS

William W. Hoover, United States Air Force (retired), Chair

Donald L. Cromer, United States Air Force (retired) and Hughes Aircraft Company

(retired)

Dava J. Newman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

INVITED GUESTS

Bill Adkins, House Committee on Science

Marc S. Allen, NASA Headquarters, Office of Space Science

Andrew Christensen, The Aerospace Corporation, Chair, Space Science Advisory

Committee

John Cullen, Senate Commerce Committee

Gerhard Haerendel, International University, Bremen, ESSC Chair

John Mimikakis, House Committee on Science

Richard Obermann, House Committee on Science

Jean-Claude Worms, European Space Science Committee

BIOGRAPHY FOR LENNARD A. FISK

LENNARD A. FISK, Chair of the Space Studies Board of the National Research

Council, is the Thomas M. Donahue Collegiate Professor of Space Science in the Department of Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space Sciences at the University of Michigan. He is an active researcher in both theoretical and experimental studies of the

solar atmosphere and its expansion into space to form the heliosphere. He heads

the Solar and Heliospheric Research Group, which develops new theoretical concepts

and models, analyzes data from the ongoing Ulysses, WIND and ACE missions, and

which constructs new flight hardware for upcoming missions such as the MESSENGER mission to Mercury. From 1987 to 1993, Fisk was the Associate Administrator for Space Science and Applications and Chief Scientist of NASA. In that position he was responsible for all of NASA’s science programs, including space science,

Earth science, and microgravity life and physical sciences. From 1977 to 1987, Fisk

served as Professor of Physics and Vice President for Research and Financial Affairs

at the University of New Hampshire. Concurrent positions include Chairman of the

Board of Trustees of the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, member

of the Board of Directors of the Orbital Sciences Corporation, and co-founder of the

Michigan Aerospace Corporation. Fisk is a member of the National Academy of

Sciences.

DISCUSSION

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

And Mr. Augustine, I note that the hour has arrived; you must

depart pre-arranged. We have got your number. We will be calling.

Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. I would be happy to

take questions for the record, if you would like.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you so much.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, if I could, let me just—I would like

to publicly thank you, Mr. Augustine. Your 1990 report really is

the benchmark for any kind of NASA oversight. All more recent

studies and discussions about problems there, the bottom line, they

go back and say, ‘‘Well, the Augustine report predicted it and told

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us what to do.’’ And it was just a very good piece of work, and

thank you for what you have done for us.

Mr. AUGUSTINE. Well, thank you. I had a very good group of people to work with.

ROLE OF HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT IN NATIONAL SCIENTIFIC

GOALS

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much. In his testimony,

Mr. Augustine and also Dr. Griffin, pointed out that we were about

establishing priorities. And we are not looking at an investment in

science in comparison to what we might derive from an investment

in cancer research or the necessity for investing in low-income

housing for the poor or prescription drug benefits for the elderly.

We are looking at this as part of our investment in science, the

broad category. And just let me say my strong feeling, I think it

is shared by others on this committee, that a society unwilling to

invest in science and technology is a society willing to write its own

economic obituary. So we are looking in the broad category of

science, and then we are trying to determine the impact of this initiative on science. And then NASA is a subset of that, and a subset

of our investment in NASA is human versus unmanned. And so we

are trying to get answers to some very specific questions involving

costs and risks, answers that are not easy to come up with. But I

appreciate everything that you have presented so far. And we will

go right to the questions.

Let me start by seeing if I can point out some areas where there

appears to be agreement within the panel. The main reason to

have human space flight programs are the intangibles. Human

space flight can obviously contribute to goals like advancing

science, but the extra benefit for science is not so great to be a sufficient rationale in itself. Secondly, the most serious hurdles to having humans do more in space are the physiological impacts of

spending a long time in space, particularly those caused by radiation. We have quite a bit of work to do before we fully understand

those effects and what to do about them. And Dr. Young, you focused on that. And NASA can’t undertake this mission by doing

things the same old way; new ideas are needed, especially ways to

engage more entrepreneurs in the process. Is there any disagreement with those basic statements?

Dr. Fisk.

ROLE OF ROBOTS IN THE HUMAN EXPLORATION OF SPACE

Dr. FISK. If I may, there is a nuance on the first one that somehow science and humans—the human role is not so much to conduct science, if I am following you, but to, in fact—for the intangible benefit. I believe that there is an opportunity here when we—

you know, if you ask yourself—we put these vehicles on Mars, for

example. Well, they are controlled by humans, and they did the exploration, but the humans were in Los Angeles or Pasadena. Will

there be any—well, it might have been better if they were closer

together, you know. And so the—and yet—so you would have humans and robots both doing the exploration: the humans assisting

the robots, the robots assisting the humans. But as we move forth

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with the real exploration initiative, I would argue that the humans—that it is a legitimate form of science and that the human

presence there has a role in using the human mind, the ability to

adjust to serendipity, the ability to solve problems——

Chairman BOEHLERT. And is that, in and of itself, sufficient rationale to justify this program and the impact it will have on other

programs and other areas of science? I guess that is the general

point I am trying to get at.

Dr. FISK. Yeah, I think you need to do—I mean, the question is

what is the—if you ask yourself what is the optimum means to explore a planet like Mars. I would put the—eventually, I would put

the humans closer to Mars.

Chairman BOEHLERT. I understand that, but then we have to

look at the cost and risk factor, and we have to factor that in.

Dr. FISK. Of course. Of course.

CONCERNS WITH THE MOON AS AN INTERIM STEP TO

EXPLORING MARS

Chairman BOEHLERT. And the impact on the other areas of

science. That is the key thing.

You know, the other day, I met with Dr. Steven Squyres of Cornell, and he has thrilled us all with his Mars rover missions. It was

really exciting to talk to him, and I could have stayed for hours on

end. He raised a concern about using the Moon as an interim step

to Mars. And Dr. Shirley, I am interested in your observation on

this, you referred to it in your testimony. He pointed out that landing on the Moon is different from landing on Mars because of the

Martian atmosphere. His concern was that as money got tight, and

inevitably it will, all of the elements of the lunar program that

would actually contribute to preparing for Mars might get squeezed

out, leaving a program that wouldn’t get us much beyond where we

were in 1969. He didn’t oppose going to the Moon, by the way, but

he did harbor that concern, and I think it is a legitimate concern.

Would you comment on that? And what elements have to be in the

lunar program to ensure that it gets us farther? Dr. Shirley.

Dr. SHIRLEY. I think Steve is absolutely correct. And my big concern is, having—excuse me, having worked in this process for years

and years, when you start building infrastructure, the infrastructure takes on a life of its own. So we built the Shuttle, which was

going to be, you know, the ultimate vehicle, but of course, it was

starved for funds, so it was never fully reusable. It continued to be

very expensive. It has never lived up to the hype, frankly, that was

used to sell it. Similarly with the Space Station. Back—I was on

the Space Station from ’80 to ’84, and the fact was that it was trying to be all things to all people. It was trying to be, and it turned

out to be, a big jobs program and then an instrument of international policy and so on, and it is still absorbing money. My fear

is the same as Steve’s that: as we go to the Moon, we are going

to want to put infrastructure up there. My contention is that there

is almost no commonality between Mars and the Moon that is

going to justify the vast expenditure that it would take to make the

Moon a viable stepping stone. The President’s vision calls for using

resources, and there are no resources on the Moon, that I can see,

that are going to be of any value for going to Mars. So I think——

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Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you.

Dr. SHIRLEY.—it is a diversion.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Griffin, would you care to comment?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you. This is, unfortunately, one of those topics where Donna and I, who are long-time colleagues, disagree. I

think there are direct and less tangible benefits to using the Moon

on the way to Mars. The direct benefits are very simple. I am an

engineer. I am not a scientist. I am not, at all, dissuaded by the

fact that Mars has a small atmosphere and the Moon does not. I

believe there is far more common about the engineering design of

a lander for the Moon and Mars than there are differences. And

the addition of an aeroshell as part of a lander system on Mars,

I think, should not be allowed to sway the discussion away from

the immense commonality, which could, and should, exist if the design were done properly.

Secondly, I think the value of being on the Moon on the way to

Mars, even if Mars is the more interesting planet, and I agree that

it is, the value of being on the Moon is learning how to live on another planetary surface only a few days away from home when we

have one man month of total experience of doing that. And it was,

you know, 30 years ago plus at this point, and will be way in excess of that by the time we go to Mars. I think it is an act of technological hubris to assume that after five decades of not venturing

beyond Earth orbit we are going to go direct to Mars. I just would

be opposed to that.

Dr. YOUNG. I agree with Mike.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Okay. Thank you. But——

Dr. GRIFFIN. And by the way, I agree completely with his earlier

comments on parceling science out according to whether or not it

is exploration science or other kinds of science. That is among the

sillier things we have heard recently.

Chairman BOEHLERT. My time has expired.

Mr. Gordon.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE SPACE EXPLORATION

INITIATIVE OF 1989

Mr. GORDON. Dr. Griffin, you were directly involved in President

George H. W. Bush’s space exploration initiative in the early 1990s.

And I hope you could give us some advice as to what was the major

reason that the ’89 space exploration initiative failed to win public

and Congressional support and how different is the situation

today?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Looking back on it from a perspective of 15 years,

I think the major reason was that completely inappropriate cost estimates were published and publicized before we really knew what

the architectures were going to be or should be. They became nationally recognized as the $400 billion space exploration initiative

when there was never any actual specific content ascribed to that

number. But that number, on the face of it, was unacceptable.

The second thing that we failed to do, or that the people failed

to do, was to recognize and solicit the—recognize the need for and

solicit bipartisan support of the effort. No exploration program can

be accomplished within one president’s tenure, certainly not even

within a senator’s tenure. We will have many changes of adminisVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tration. If we subscribe to exploration as a proper goal of the civil

space program, it needs to be thought of the way we think of having a navy. We do not decide at every change of administration

whether we will continue to have or not to have a navy. Minor

course corrections are implemented, depending on the political necessities of the time and the strategic necessities of the time, but

we don’t debate whether we will have a navy. We need to adopt

that same view with regard to NASA and space exploration.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you. That makes a lot of sense.

SHIFTING NASA MISSIONS TO OTHER AGENCIES

Some have suggested that the way to make the space exploration

affordable is to shift some of NASA’s existing activities to other

agencies. And presumably, the responsibility for paying for those

activities would also be shifted to other agencies. For example,

some have suggested that shifting NASA’s aviation activities to the

FAA. Others have said NASA should eliminate its Earth science

program and shift them to NOAA. And I would like to get the general Committee’s—or panel’s suggestions as to whether you think

that is a reasonable approach. Anybody just go ahead and start.

Dr. SHIRLEY. I think, for instance, before we do that, we need to

look at what the missions of those agencies are, and those agencies

would have to have their missions adjusted. For instance, the

FAA’s mission is not to develop technology. So if you are going to

transfer it, you have to make sure that the FAA is prepared to take

on that mission, and it is not clear at all that it—I mean, whether

its infrastructure and its bureaucracy and all of that would be adequate for it. If you are going to shift Earth science to NOAA, same

thing. NOAA is an operational agency, not a development agency.

So it is possible to do it, but it is going to be a difficult process.

Mr. GORDON. Anybody else care to comment?

Dr. YOUNG. Yes, speaking only about the human health issues,

and the obvious question would be to what extent should the National Institutes of Health be responsible for them, I think it is

worth pointing out that there has been a successful history of cooperative endeavors, including the very successful Neurolab mission,

in which the NIH and NASA worked together on them. However,

I think, in my opinion, it would be a mistake to get out of the life

sciences business in NASA and shift it all to NIH, because I think

the specialization that has been acquired, both in the outside university community and inside the agency, could not be replicated

within the NIH.

Mr. GORDON. Another quick couple of just—does anybody have a

differing opinion?

Dr. FISK. The NOAA/NASA relationship is a very healthy one. I

mean, they—but, as Dr. Shirley mentioned, I mean, there is a very

different mindset in the agencies as to what their role is. I mean,

NASA’s role has been research, and NOAA’s role has been on the

operational side. The planet needs taken care of, and it needs to—

we need observations. We need data systems. We need research on

how it is, in fact, progressing and what we, as humans, are doing

to it. And this is a role that NASA is uniquely capable of doing.

I mean, it is the space agency. I mean, NASA builds many of

NOAA’s satellites to start with. I mean, this is not, you know, as

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if an agency like NOAA, you know, simply takes this whole responsibility on and can expect to be able to accomplish it.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you. And this could wind up being a threshold question of going through, and your insight was helpful for me.

Thank you.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The Chair of the Subcommittee on Space

and Aeronautics, Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much.

EXPECTATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION

This is very perplexing, having been here 16 years now and following all of these debates about Space Station. I am certainly

hopeful that what we are talking about now, which is, of course,

a next step, doesn’t turn out as disappointing as this step has been.

The Space Station—Dr. Shirley, I guess you have described it as

a jobs program. And it—to some degree, we have to admit that it

was a transition out of the Cold War for the aerospace industry,

at least a lot of us saw that. It was a means of keeping the aerospace industry’s infrastructure in place. But do—I would just like

to ask the panel that—were you all aware that there was going to

be as limited, of say—as limited a product or output of the Space

Station as we now are being told? I mean, apparently what you are

telling us now, what we are exploring now, is Space Station is simply going to be a training ground for further exploration so we can

find out about how the body works so that we can go on and—to

further space exploration. For the last 10 years, we have been told

Space Station’s scientific experimentation was going to be so much

greater. It was going to change all of humankind for various cancer

research and all sorts of other things. Maybe you could comment.

Is this—we now are—we are learning—are we now just saying Station is just going to fulfill that mission? And if that is so, how long

have we known that that is how limited the mission would be?

Dr. YOUNG. Well, like Dr. Shirley, I was involved in almost all

of the early external advisory committees on Station, and I shared

the hopes that you reflected, Mr. Rohrabacher. I think it is much

too early to write off the Space Station. This is a project that is

still——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. YOUNG.—under construction. It is unfair to expect the kinds

of productivity that you would expect of a fully crewed, fully completed station, let alone the fact that we currently don’t have ways

of getting our supplies up and new equipment up. I mean, think

back to the situation of the Hubble Space Telescope in those bad

days when we found out the mirror was flawed. Who could have

predicted the string of successes that HST has produced? I think

that we——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, I think that that was very predictable.

No, I disagree with you. I think it is very predictable if we had corrected the Hubble Telescope that they would have done what we

have done. And I am working with my fellow colleagues here to

make sure that we continue to make sure the Hubble Telescope is

at least giving us some pay back. That is one of the few things we

have invested in that does have a great deal of scientific pay back.

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But I am happy to hear you suggesting that maybe some people are

being a bit pessimistic as to what can come out of Station.

Dr. SHIRLEY. If I could comment on——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes.

Dr. SHIRLEY. The initial vision of Station was to be all things to

all people. And it was sold that way, and it was sold to the science

community that way. And it was a very deliberate strategy. I saw

maps that NASA had of how many Congressional districts would

have jobs in them and that they were shown to try and sell them.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I don’t know of any of them in my district.

Dr. SHIRLEY. Absolutely. And the fact is that when you build

such huge expectations and—by promising everything to everybody,

it is a recipe for disappointment, and that is why I am afraid of

the lunar thing being exactly that. And I think personally that the

Station can be most valuable in exploration for exactly what Dr.

Young was talking about.

COSTS OF MOON AND MARS MISSIONS

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, if I might mention that the reason why

the President’s stepped approach seems to me to be the most realistic is just for the reason you just stated, although you come to a

different conclusion, and that is people will then realize the benefit

of making these steps as we go along as compared to trying to sell

the public on something that is as expensive and way out as going

to Mars immediately would be. The public may lose some faith or

some hope, and that comes to my question. How long will it take

us before we can—if we went straight to Mars, how long are we

talking about, at what price versus the stepped approach? If we go

to the Moon and then to Mars, what are we talking about? What

time sequence? Just right down the panel would be okay for predictions on that. Dr. Griffin, do you have any idea on that?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I think I need to pass on that. I am not sure I——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. GRIFFIN.—understood the question.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The question is how long will it take us just

to go to Mars, what cost. And what, then, are we predicting in

terms of what you would predict it would take us to go to the Moon

and then to go to Mars and the difference between the two?

Dr. GRIFFIN. The—I think the problem is how much money do

you want to make available, because there is a coupling between

the money which is available and the time that it is going to take.

I believe that the first expeditions to Mars should be accomplishable within an amount of funding approximately equal to what we

spent on Apollo. And I have recently——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Which is?

Dr. GRIFFIN. In today’s dollars, about $130 billion.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Certainly, that would envelop it. I believe that it

should be possible to return to the Moon for in the neighborhood

of 30 billion in today’s dollars, and those are both fairly comfortable

amounts. I have recently participated in a NASA advisory panel

where we have been examining the costs and benefits of human

space flight, and the $130 billion figure for going to Mars is very

compatible with what we have seen in that study.

83

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And can we be on the Moon in 10 years?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Easily. It is—it requires a decision to do so and to

allocate the money.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So $30 billion and we can go to the Moon in

10 years?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I believe that is exactly correct.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And $130 billion to go to Mars would be in

20 years?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I—if you decided to go to Mars, you could be there

in 10 years. You would have to decide to do it——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. GRIFFIN.—and to allocate the money, but I think that is the

level of resource commitment——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me just

to get the——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Well, I am anxious to hear from all of the

witnesses. That is a very good question on that.

Dr. SHIRLEY. I think Mike’s numbers are pretty good, provided

that we do the stepping stone to the Moon and we don’t stop there

and we don’t start building infrastructure and we don’t start doing

what we did with Space Station.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But you say——

Dr. SHIRLEY. If we go to the Moon and then right on to Mars,

then I think——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. $30 billion and 10 years to go to the

Moon——

Dr. SHIRLEY. Those are not bad numbers. I mean——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay, Dr. Shirley.

Dr. SHIRLEY.—50 percent or whatever.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. YOUNG. I do not have the figures to either agree or disagree

with Dr. Griffin. I do, however, fear that once committing to go

back to the Moon, we will never make it to Mars.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. FISK. Norm Augustine had a sentence that said, you know,

we should ‘‘pay as you go.’’ If you don’t—I would like to have one

that we should ‘‘learn as we go.’’ Decide on these answers, you

know, how fast you go back to the Moon, how much does it cost

you whether you go to Mars is going to depend on each incremental

step that we go. We don’t know how to send people to Mars at the

moment. We may know technically how to send people to Mars, but

the physiological issues that are identified do not have immediate

solutions today that have to be identified, proven out, and solved.

The Moon appeals to me for the simple reason that we have an opportunity to go there and try out some of our technical solutions

on the way and decide whether they are going to be adequate. If

you pull the plug and you go to Mars, you know, hitting the reverse

is a little hard, so you have to go there, land, and come back, and

that is your only option. And so the cost of this thing should not—

and I don’t think we should try to find a number. We should try

and find a number of what are the steps that we should take on

which we—that we learn something and we adjust our program to

take the next logical step and incrementally walk through those

steps.

84

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, you know, cost is very important to us,

because we have to go to the taxpayers and get the money. But

would you say we can do it in 10 years for $30 billion?

Dr. FISK. I have not a clue, and I don’t think any of us should

have that clue.

COSTS AND RISKS OF HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT

Chairman BOEHLERT. Let me just ask you—your time is expired,

but I wanted to amplify that. Dr. Griffin, that is just talking about

getting from here to there, your cost estimates. It doesn’t factor in

all of the necessary research on physiology and everything else,

does it?

Dr. GRIFFIN. You know, speaking—I am sorry——

Chairman BOEHLERT. Those are cost estimates, yeah.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I differ from some of my panel members. I think the

issues involve—physiologically, of course, going to the Moon, is not,

at this point, an issue. The issue might arise in how long you can

stay, and we don’t know that until we see. In terms of going to

Mars, the exposure to zero gravity is within the experience base,

easily, that has already been undertaken by people, and they have

survived the experience. No one argues that degradation doesn’t

occur.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Um-hum.

Dr. GRIFFIN. No one argues that they will remain in perfect

health, but so far, the ability of the body to heal itself after experiencing those exposures has been demonstrated.

Chairman BOEHLERT. That is not the Russians’ experience, is it?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Ken Bowersox flew six months on Space Station, endured a high gravity ballistic reentry, because the Soyuz malfunctioned and went to its backup mode, landed out in the wrong place

in Russia in the middle of the steps. He and his crewmate crawled

out of the Soyuz, pitched a tent by themselves, and waited 24

hours to be picked up.

Chairman BOEHLERT. He didn’t have exposure to radiation.

Dr. GRIFFIN. He did, actually, have substantial exposure to radiation. The radiation flux on—of high-energy protons is about 25

percent on the Space Station per unit time of what it would be in

deep space.

Chairman BOEHLERT. 25 percent?

Dr. GRIFFIN. About 25 percent of the radiation flux to Space Station is heavy ion particles as would be——

Chairman BOEHLERT. But isn’t that a big difference?

Dr. GRIFFIN. It is a difference. It is significant. I am not saying

that it is not. I am saying that the crew crawled out by themselves

in an emergency mode, pitched a tent and waited to be picked up.

I think landing on Mars, after a six-month journey, would not be

more arduous. I believe that if—this is a profound philosophical difference. It is not one of engineering. I certainly do not oppose, in

fact, strongly support the biomedical research that Dr. Young and

Dr. Fisk would do, but it is an adjunct to and can be done in parallel with human exploration. It is not a gate. If we expect to explore and not take risk, we are leading ourselves down the wrong

path.

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Chairman BOEHLERT. I would agree with that. You can not eliminate the element of risk. No doubt about that. But six months to

get there and six months to get back——

Dr. SHIRLEY. Actually, it is six months to get there and two years

to get back. It is, roughly, a three-year round trip.

Dr. GRIFFIN. That does not have to be the case, and it depends

strongly on the trajectory selected and the technologies used.

Dr. SHIRLEY. Well, if you go nuclear, yes.

Dr. GRIFFIN. And the architecture that is used.

Dr. SHIRLEY. That is not cheap, either.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Yeah.

Dr. GRIFFIN. There are an enormous amount of—number of scenarios, which have been advanced, used, and——

Dr. SHIRLEY. And that is exactly why I think we need to have

a dialogue about what the right thing to do is rather than just

plunging into we are going to do this exactly the way we have done

it before.

Chairman BOEHLERT. And that is exactly why we have experts

like you that we appreciate so much being facilitators for this committee, because these are the questions we are wrestling with every

single day. And——

Dr. GRIFFIN. I, too, want to have that dialogue, but I don’t want

to start out assuming that it is three years round trip to Mars for

any possible architecture we could advance. I think that would be

wrong.

Chairman BOEHLERT. But then you have to talk about the costs

for advancing the architecture, and that is the point that Dr. Shirley makes, so that adds to the dilemma we face. And Dr. Fisk, I

couldn’t agree more that we need some benchmarks that if we get

to this point and spend this much, we hope to achieve this much,

and if we decide at that time to go further and it is too expensive

to go further, we will stop and not have that money wasted, wisely

invested, because we have gained something from it.

Dr. FISK. The incremental approach is—has got to be the way to

do this. I mean, you—this is not—I mean, the President said something I—you know, I very much agree with this. This is a journey.

This is not a—you know, a short task and——

Chairman BOEHLERT. It is not a trip; it is a journey.

Dr. FISK. Yeah, whatever it was.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Yeah.

Dr. FISK. And the—and because—I think we have to think of it

in both of these time scales. You know, it is simply incrementally

marching forth——

Chairman BOEHLERT. I have got the exact words: ‘‘It is a journey,

not a race.’’

Dr. FISK. Sorry.

Chairman BOEHLERT. And with that, speaking about a journey,

Mr. Lampson of Texas.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

More reason why we could actually use the Space Exploration

Act as a vehicle to achieve some of what we are talking because

it does, indeed, set out a long-term journey.

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NEW PRIORITIES FOR SPACE STATION RESEARCH

Dr. Young, former Senator and astronaut John Glenn recently

testified before the Aldridge Commission, and at that time, he criticized the plan—additional—planned additional cutbacks in the

International Space Station program, saying: ‘‘We have projects

that are planned or in the queue now, projects that people, academics, laboratories, and companies have spent millions of dollars

to get ready that pulls the rug out from our scientists who have

placed their faith in NASA and our scientists within NASA who devoted years and years to their work.’’ I notice that in your written

testimony, Dr. Young, you also questioned the wisdom of the

planned cutbacks, stating, and this is your quote: ‘‘The proposal to

limit ISS research to the impact of space on human health and to

end support for other important microgravity science and space

technology seems short-sided, and I strongly believe in the scientific and technical value of a permanent presence in space.’’

Would you please elaborate on why you feel the proposed approach

would be short-sided?

Dr. YOUNG. First of all, I am in complete agreement with the

quotation from former Senator Glenn, I only read the newspaper

reports of it. We will need a place to do microgravity research, not

only for trying to understand what the basic physiological problems

are with long duration flight, but for the entire range of fascinating

issues about the role of gravity in biology, in physics, and in technology. We know a lot about 1 g. We know a little about 2 g. We

know an increasing amount about 0 zero. We know nothing—except for a few men on the Moon, we know almost nothing about the

effects of levels between 0 and 1 g. There is no reason to think that

it would be a linear curve that you go through one. The Space Station is the place to do this research to understand how to grow

crystals, to get away from sedimentation and convection. It is the

place to go and understand the physics of the basic fluid physics

that goes on in microgravity. If we didn’t have a Station operating,

we would have to come back and build a new one, so to my mind,

it is extremely short-sided to let go this very expensive, still developing project that we have, despite all of the shortcomings that

have been referred to with it.

Mr. LAMPSON. Dr. Fisk, you—the Space Studies Board, I reference the range of basic and applied microgravity research disciplines, do you want to make your comment?

ROLE OF THE SPACE STATION

Dr. FISK. Let me make a couple, and I am a—in addition to being

chair of Space Studies, where I am a veteran of the Space Station

wars when I was on the NASA side of this thing. There are two

things that I think are important here. I—this is—maybe this is a

personal opinion. The Station has lacked a purpose, in my judgment, up until now. The science community, as a whole, has taken

an attitude to all of this, with this thing, that if it existed, we

would try and do something with it. And there are communities

that are very passionate about this, but the broad science community has been reluctant on what the proper role is of this thing.

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NASA conducted a REMAP exercise not so long ago in which it

really asked what should be done on the Space Station. What is in

the interest to really do this thing? And the plans, at the moment,

are quite consistent with that REMAP activity. And the idea is to,

as you say—this is—here is a real purpose to this thing: qualify humans for space. And there are lots of dimensions to that. It is not

just, you know, the human physiology. It is how do you, you know,

do fluids in space. You know. How do you deal with combustion in

space? I mean, there are lots of things that a permanent presence

in low-Earth orbit, in zero gravity, will be essential if we are, in

fact, going to extend the human presence beyond low-Earth orbit.

And I think that, you know, as a scientist in the general sense, it

is not my field of research, but being able to say, ‘‘This is why we

have the Space Station. This is why this investment has been

made, and this is how we are going to use it,’’ is one of the few

times that—in all of those veterans of—all of those years of being

a veteran in this when I felt comfortable thinking that this investment was, in fact, worthwhile.

Mr. LAMPSON. I am going to attempt to ask a question that is

very—Dr. Young?

Dr. YOUNG. I just wanted to add, briefly, that NASA, in its wisdom, has—and I truly mean in its wisdom, has suggested that the

Space Station purpose be implemented through the development of

an International Space Station Research Institute. Now that—

those plans have been put on hold with this new vision, but many

of us feel that that is the way to go to get the entire scientific and

technical community involved in directing it.

Mr. LAMPSON. Dr. Griffin.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I will try to be brief, thank you.

I think the quarrel with the Space Station is not over what it

does, but what it costs and what it has cost. Because it has cost

so much and taken so long and in—just in general been so poorly

executed as a development program, it needs, in order to justify

that, to be able to say that it has accomplished things that it can

not accomplish and never was intended to accomplish. Had we put

a space station up having, you know, the volumetric equivalent of

a couple of Skylabs docked nose-to-nose with the power array that

it had, we would have been able to do microgravity research, materials processing research we would have been able to do very nearly as much as we expect to do on International Space Station at

a tiny fraction of the cost, and everybody would regard it as having

been a great victory to obtain those results for that cost. The path

we went down is what is flawed, not the results that we are trying

to obtain.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman BOEHLERT. And we want to make sure we go down the

right path, the correct path, with this proposed initiative, and that

is why we are spending so much time on it, and that is why we

appreciate your input.

Dr. Ehlers.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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I have a number of questions, but let me first of all comment,

since everyone is estimating what it is going to cost to go to Mars,

I would agree with $130 billion one way. I think we need to—I am

suggesting we look for volunteers who would want to make a oneway trip. It would certainly save a lot of money. But I am convinced it would cost considerably more if we really are serious

about bringing a human to Mars and bringing them back home. I

don’t want to get into the debate now, but I have substantial reasons for believing that.

FUNDING PRIORITIES OF SCIENCE OR EXPLORATION

What I want to get into is the old question of science versus exploration or science versus hardware, if you like. And I am very

concerned about what I see happening. I was impressed with Mr.

Augustine’s comment that astronauts should not be truck drivers;

they should be participating in scientific research, bringing equipment to space, fixing equipment in space, and so forth. And it

seems to me the Hubble Telescope precisely fits that definition

whereas now we see Hubble being canceled, ostensibly for safety

reasons, and I think the Administrator is very sincere in believing

that it is unsafe. But at the same time, we are going to have to

bring Shuttles up to Space Station and back to bring crew up and

resupply and so forth. That is just the background for asking, particularly Dr. Fisk first, and I ask the others to chime in. What do

you see happening to science, and I am referring not just to space

science, but also to the Earth science that is done from space,

which has been invaluable? It seems to me, that is going to be

shorted if we suddenly decide to put a lot of extra money into the

Station, into the Moon, into the Mars mission, and so forth. And

once again, science would be left in the dust, and the money would

go into exploration and hardware. I would like to see them combined, and I agree with that statement. I haven’t seen it happen

so far. We will start with Dr. Fisk.

Dr. FISK. This is an interesting discussion for, again, those of us

who are veterans of this. For long periods of time, this battle was

framed in a—sort of a humans versus—human space flight versus

science. And you know, we argued, you know, did the Space Station

and the Shuttle take too much resources and so on? And was it

taken from the more productive, based on our judgment, science

programs? This—today, it is a sort of different story, if you think

about it. I mean, actually the space science budget of NASA aggregated, has grown, is actually growing in the President’s initiative.

And what you see, however, is there is a sort of a science versus

science part of this where the science which is directly related to

the exploration initiative, particularly the solar system exploration

and parts of the Origins Program and so on, are prospering, because they are an integral part of this.

We have introduced a lunar probes program, you know, as a precursor to understand the Moon and the human exploration part.

The Mars program has grown and so on. But there are parts of the

science program, which have, as a result, been cut. And so you sort

of—you know, it is presented as sort of an interesting battle to the

scientists, because it is sort of science versus science not science

versus the human exploration program. And I think the—you

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know, as I tried to say in my remarks, I think that it is important

that we don’t go there on that science versus science side, because

it is not obvious where you want to put the line as to which science

is supported—is supportive of the space—of the exploration issue

and which is not.

I would argue that Sun-Earth Connections, which was on the

other science side here, is an essential component of any exploration initiative. We are sending people out into an environment.

We had better understand it and be able to predict it. I would

argue that the structure and evolution of the universe is as much

an exploration activity as is the Origins program. And so I think

I would prefer that they had not gone in and said we have got good

science and lesser science in this thing, because I don’t think that

that is a justifiable position, but it is not science as a whole versus

human space flight. One of the beauties of this initiative, to me,

is that it is the first time I have seen in the history of NASA that

they have really tried to integrate robotic science and human space

flight in a synergistic way, and for at least those disciplines that

have been judged to be an important part of the science program.

Earth science, as I say, is a special issue, because, you know, it is—

we could argue that we are exploring our planet, but that is not

quite—you know, I don’t—I think we simply have to recognize that

NASA has a responsibility here that it should not falter on to provide this level of support. I mean, there are many presidential priorities besides exploration, and one of them is global climate

change issues and such things as that, and NASA has an obligation

to fulfill those, and it has to fit somewhere in this program.

Mr. EHLERS. Any more comments?

Dr. SHIRLEY. Yeah, I would just like to comment that the Hubble

Space Telescope—I happen to agree with the Administrator’s decision on HST, because I think we could build a robotic mission for

less than the cost of a Shuttle launch that could do the repair. We

have been building robots that could grapple a spinning satellite

since 1986 or ’87. I mean, it is not that hard to do. We don’t have

to have people doing it, and there are reasons of exposure, and so

on, for the astronauts.

The other one is—my main concern is that infrastructure will eat

science. Infrastructure will eat exploration, and that our passion

for infrastructure is—the—NASA’s passion for infrastructure is so

strong that unless we bring in some outside perspectives—I mean,

let us take the space elevator. It may be a completely crazy idea,

but shouldn’t we at least look at it? I mean, if you made an investment in some alternate way of getting stuff up into space, maybe

it would pay for itself. I am not saying it is the right answer, but

NASA is not even looking at anything like that, so I think we need

to—infrastructure and get to where we want to go and get accomplished what we want to accomplish, and that is going to be really

difficult with NASA’s current set up.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you very much.

The gentleman’s time has expired.

It should be noted that the Earth science project actually would

decline through ’09, and that doesn’t even factor in inflation, so

that is a—it is rather a substantial cut in spending for Earth

science.

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Mr. Gutknecht.

Mr. GUTKNECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

EFFECTS OF BUDGET CHANGES

Just first an editorial comment. I think, at some point, we are

going to have to do a better job, you and us and everybody, of explaining costs and benefits to the American taxpayer. I don’t know

how long the American taxpayers are going to be paying billions of

their grandchildren’s money growing more crystals. We have been

doing that for a long time, and I am not sure which each iteration

of new crystals is really doing, so I—that is an editorial comment.

I think we all have to think about talking to our constituencies

about, you know, what are the real benefits of this, because this

is a big cost.

One of the questions I was going to ask, it is my understanding,

as a Member of the House Budget Committee, that the Senate

budget resolution endorsed the President’s plan but reduced the

amount of funding from what the President had requested and essentially said to NASA to move ahead, but go more slowly. What

effect do any of you think that that will ultimately have on the

long-term goal?

Chairman BOEHLERT. While you are pondering the answer, just

let me point out to the distinguished Vice Chairman of the Committee that that is precisely what our mission is right here, selfimposed. We want to find out, as much as humanly possible, within

reasonable guesstimates, what the costs will be and what the benefit will be. And that is what the whole drill is about, and that is

why we are having distinguished witnesses like you to enlighten

us.

Now who wants to go first?

Dr. FISK. Should I try?

Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Fisk.

Dr. FISK. As far as the President’s initiative is concerned, you

have sort of got—you know, if we agree on the goal, what we are

trying to do, then you have kind of got three issues: you have content, you have budget, and you have schedule. And if you freeze

two of those, you say I like the content but the budget is limited,

the schedule is your variable. And you know, the question is: Can

you make reasonable progress on this on that sort of a schedule?

And the schedule can be negative on something if you can’t make

progress at all, I suppose. And so I think this is the issue that you

face.

You know, if the budget situation of the Nation is such that it

is not possible to give NASA the request that it—that the President

asks for, then you basically are determining the pace on this initiative, assuming that you agree that the—we have an exploration initiative, we are going to proceed incrementally. To do that, we are

going to develop some infrastructure to send humans into space, we

are going to use the Space Station to qualify humans, and so on

and so forth, then you are setting the pace. At some point, the pace

becomes completely unacceptable, I mean, you know, no progress.

I mean, we talk—we worry about sustaining this through multiple

administrations.

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Well, the only way that is going to happen in practical terms is

that we have in each Congressional cycle, let us be blunt, some

visible signs of progress. If NASA launches something, there is a

robotic mission to the Moon, there are robotic missions to Mars, we

start qualifying the vehicles, and so on, and that is, to me, the pacing item that whether or not there is within this program there are

sufficient resources to make visible signs of progress as you go

through it.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I would like to make a comment, also. I think I

would certainly be in support of an additional allocation of funds

to NASA, but even if that doesn’t happen, I think the fundamental

argument on the table is what sort of a space program do you want

to buy with the money that is currently being made available. As

I said earlier, and I will say it again, I agree, and Len and I have

had our battles over the years, but I agree completely with what

Len has said regarding, you know, reprioritizing what goes on in

science. And some of it does not seem to be well motivated. The

idea of not understanding, if you will, space weather when we seek

to undertake a new voyage—new voyages of exploration in the

solar system, it seems fundamentally wrong-headed.

But leaving aside, for a moment, the issues of change on the

margin in the science program, the fundamental issue on the table

is what sort of a human space program do you want to buy with

the money that is being spent on human space flight as we bring

the Station to a close and retire the Shuttle? And I think that is

the debate topic. I think the goal that the President has proposed

is a much better goal or set of goals than those which have been

proposed previously.

Dr. SHIRLEY. I don’t disagree with the goals. What I disagree is

how we are going to go about reaching them, because I am concerned that if we just keep doing what we have been doing for the

last 50 years, we will just get more of what we have got, which will

not accomplish what Len is talking about. We won’t make tangible

progress. We will send robotic missions. I mean, we are doing that.

Every 26 months there is going to be something new hitting Mars,

but making progress in the human arena, for instance, retiring the

Shuttle and the current program is retired before they have got

even the crew exploration vehicle, and the crew exploration vehicle

won’t handle cargo. And it—and none of the European or Japanese

ones will handle downmass, so you could have an experiment like

the Centrifuge up there, and say you need to fix it and you want

to bring it down, you can’t bring it down, because there is nothing

to do that with.

So the approach of okay, this is what we have got and we are

going to, you know, go in this direction without looking at any

other direction is what my main fear is, because I have seen it happen over and over again.

Dr. YOUNG. I won’t give a cost estimate, but I would like to just

very briefly return to your editorial comment. Yes, NASA and those

of us who work with NASA must do a much better job at communicating to the public. The importance and the excitement, and it

is not just growing another crystal. A lot of good material has come

out of it. The public, in fact, given the appropriate information, as

we know from the Hubble Space Telescope, can get very excited

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about such non-trivial questions as where did we come from, where

are we going, what were the origins of this universe, what will be

the fate of our planet. I wouldn’t underestimate them.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Dr. Griffin, let me just point out that NASA has the biggest percentage increase in the non-discretionary, non-security area, and

you are asking for domestic. And you are asking—you would like

to see an increase, and I can understand that. And there isn’t a

Committee in this Congress that doesn’t have the fluent, skilled

people in their disciplines making the same argument. Our problem is where do we get it from and—in relationship to other areas

of science. Once again, I am not comparing this to outside the

science field, within the science field and within the NASA programs. I think the President was rather prudent in what he called

for over the long period and the investment he is asking from Congress and the American people for his vision to be implemented.

But money is not easy to come by. And we have to consider all

areas of science, and I stress that.

Mr. Feeney.

STUDIES OF SPACE EXPLORATION

Mr. FEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Shirley, I have listened as you have suggested that we have some additional workshops, we review some additional potential for the human space

program. You have mentioned, for example, the space elevator. My

concern is, though, that while you are basically criticizing this proposal as having tunnel vision or being too focused, my concern is

sort of the opposite of yours and that is that we may be ultimately

guilty of paralysis by analysis and reanalysis. And I don’t think the

two are mutually exclusive. We can continue looking at additional

opportunities, but the beauty of the President’s program is that it

is a stepped approach, it is a flexible approach, it does lend itself,

as Dr. Fisk suggested, into a ‘‘pay as you go’’ or ‘‘pay as you learn’’

program. And so I would be concerned that we could now, without

delay, agree on a first step that could be of huge benefits in the

future regardless of what additional opportunities may present

themselves as technology advances, as space fiction writers seep

into the actual real world development and engineers, like Dr. Griffin, learn about the potential.

But what I am really concerned about and would like to hear you

address is that if we are going to go out one more time, because

there are libraries full of studies about the potential for human and

robotic space flight in the civilian arena, if we are going to go back

to scratch, just a study of the studies would take a decade or two.

And I would ask if you would comment, perhaps, whether it is not

necessarily mutually exclusive to ask some of the probing questions

you have asked without stopping in its tracks the space program.

And then secondly, I would like the entire panel to comment on

the debate about whether or not the Moon has any worthwhile resources, Helium-3, for example, because I think Dr. Shirley addressed that pretty directly as she is skeptical, to put it mildly, but

I would like to hear—and then finally, as you address the—you

know, what can we cultivate resource-wise on the Moon, if each of

you would say a few words about the fact that there is no ultimate

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goal here. The President has stopped the portion of the future book

that we are writing at landing a human being on Mars. But he has

described this as a journey, and we don’t—that is not the end of

where history will leave us in space exploration, and we don’t know

what we will find. We don’t know what the technological opportunities will be. We don’t know what physiological capabilities will be

able to assist humans.

And so Dr. Shirley, if you will start with the paralysis by analysis problem you are proposing, and then if the other commentators will weigh in. Thank you.

Dr. SHIRLEY. I agree with you completely. We don’t want to stop

what we are doing. I certainly would not say that we wouldn’t do

the next robotic missions to Mars, that we wouldn’t look for water

on the Moon and so on. You are absolutely right. We want to keep

doing that.

What I am concerned with is that the next big infrastructure

step, you know—for instance, the Moon. Let us say we are going

to invest a lot of resources in going to the Moon and setting up a

base and practicing for Mars, that is going to take a lot of money.

My concern is that if we just do it the way we are going to do it,

you know, we are going to build a heavy-lift launch vehicle, we are

going to—and then we will invest a heck of a lot of money in something, which may have no other use whatsoever, but there are people who want to build heavy-lift launch vehicles.

My only suggestion is that we step back, not from moving ahead

and doing things. Let us finish the Station. We owe it to our international partners, if nothing else, to finish the Station. Let us start

looking at launch vehicles and things. But before we take that big

investment into the next X–33, which we spent a billion dollars on

and then canceled because we were expecting too much of the technology or before the next thing we do, which I was just talking to

Norm Augustine about, the next thing we start and then cancel, let

us bring in some fresh perspectives, not to stop what we are doing,

but to think about where we are going to go in the future. And

frankly, you know, there is business getting involved in this right

now. How can we exploit that? You know. We are not thinking

about that at all. NASA isn’t thinking, even remotely, about how

to really form a partnership with the private launch vehicles. What

are we going to do about China? You know, the first person on the

Moon could be Chinese. The first person on Mars could be Chinese.

Do we want that? Or do we care? You know. I think we ought to

address those kinds of issues.

So I think you are absolutely right. We need to continue what

we are doing. We need to take those steps and not stop, but we

need to think of when we take that next big step, how do we do

it. And lunar resources, Helium-3 is fine. There is Helium-3 on the

Moon. We found it. No problem. But how do you mine it? You are

going to have to boost out of Earth’s gravity well a heck of a lot

of mining machinery in order to scrape it off of the surface. Then

you are going to have to somehow burn it in a fusion reactor, and

I would ask Congressman Ehlers how close we are to a fusion reactor. Not very close. It seems to be receding about one year per year,

so it is highly speculative, and it could take a heck of a lot of resources to try to do it.

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There is no iron or steel on the Moon. Even if there were, to take

the infrastructure to mine it and form it into something that would

help us go to Mars is not there. You just boosted stuff out of the

Earth’s gravity well, you have dropped it into a 1/6 gravity well,

and then you are going to boost it again. Why not just take it from

the Earth in the first place, put it together in space, and go? So

those are the kinds of debates I think we need to have. I am not

saying I know the right answer, and I agree, we don’t want to stop

what we are doing, and I—believe me, I have been paralyzed by

analysis. I have been working on all of these things since 1966, and

we don’t get there, and I want to see us get there by thinking of

some fresh approaches and not just keep turning the crank the way

we have been doing it for the last n years.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Fisk.

Dr. FISK. Just a couple of random comments here. You said a

number of very appropriate things here. Let us take it as a given

that we are going to extend the human presence into the solar system in time, then the question, as Norm Augustine says, it is simply a question of when do we start and who does it. I am one of

those people who thinks we should start now and the United States

should do it. Lead, at least. And I think that is a sentiment that,

hopefully, is widely shared.

The question is—that you raised—of course a comment that you

made is very much the appropriate one about presumably we are

not going to stop. I mean, we are going to continue to do this. This

is a—this is the journey we are planning to have here. My knowledge of the NASA plans is that they—the Moon is not a place that

we are planning to stop or that we are planning to try and launch

things from the Moon or use the resources to be able to get to

Mars. It is premature to do that. But the plan is to try to use the

Moon in an appropriate way to try to test out the capabilities on

the route to Mars.

Now presume we don’t stop there on the Moon. Suppose we find

resources that we can use. Suppose our technology improves to

where we can think about mining the Moon, maybe not in 10 years,

20 years, maybe in 50 years, maybe in 100 years, but presumably

the event is to extend the human presence into the solar system

and to use the resources, the capabilities that are available to us

over that period of time, and as the—as appropriate or as the technology develops. I think that is a very appropriate plan. I think the

main event to this thing is to begin to think on the time scales of

not the decade—you know, not do we get to the Moon by 2020 but

begin to recognize that this is the first step in the human expansion into the solar system, and it won’t stop until we have done all

of the appropriate things.

Chairman BOEHLERT. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. Smith.

REVIEW OF NASA CENTERS

Mr. SMITH. Regardless of the final decision in policy, whether we

give a greater concentration for unmanned space flight for exploration or whether we don’t, Senator Brownback has suggested that

we review the ten NASA centers and have sort of a BRAC-type

commission to review for greater, for lack of a better word, producVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00098 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tivity and efficiency. Would you agree that a BRAC-type review is

appropriate? We will start with you, Dr. Shirley, and then other

comments, Dr. Young.

Dr. SHIRLEY. I think it is extremely appropriate, and I made, in

my written remarks, the comparison with the Jet Propulsion Lab,

not just because I worked there for 32 years, but because when

people talk, JPL listens, because we are a contractor. We—JPL is

a contractor. So we don’t have the civil service, you know, workforce there in the background that you don’t have to account really

for where you put them. Every dollar of ours is scrutinized. Every

dollar has to be agreed upon whereas when you are a civil service

lab or a civil service center, you have a lot more flexibility to

maybe be productive and maybe not be productive. There are an

awful lot of good people at NASA. I am—there are terrific engineers and scientists at NASA, and I think they would be better

served by looking at a potential for privatizing them in the sense

that JPL is privatized. Or certainly, there may be redundant resources that should be looked at.

MANNED AND ROBOTIC SPACE EXPLORATION

Mr. SMITH. Any other comments on this issue? You know, there

is—my experience is that any groups that use government funding

are very wise to the political pressures on individual members that

make those decisions. The Space Station, I think every state has

some part of the Space Station, so groups from industry can come

in from every state and meet, regardless of what the Members on

this committee are, and say, ‘‘Well, boy, this is really important to

our jobs and our state. It has been spread around.’’

I want to talk about manned versus unmanned flight and get

your reaction a little bit, and that is if exploration is the overriding

goal, then why not choose missions that maximize the potential for

new discoveries for tax dollars, every tax dollar expended, and that,

in my mind, is the unmanned space flight? And what we are doing

on Mars right now is just so exciting. But to what extent can

robotic spacecraft accomplish these exploration goals instead of humans at—certainly at less cost and certainly less risk to human

life? And Dr. Young or Dr. Griffin or Dr. Fisk?

Dr. YOUNG. Well, I will start on that and refer back to something

that Dr. Fisk discussed a bit earlier. It is no longer a question, in

the minds of most of us in this community, of human versus nonhuman exploration. We are all excited about what the robots are

doing on the surface of Mars at this moment. The question is how

do you use robots in conjunction with human exploration. But as

far as choosing the mission that can be done robotically, that is just

looking for your keys under the streetlight.

The question is what are the important issues to find out about,

and in the exploration of the solar system, clearly the origins of life

is one of the foremost ones. In my opinion, the robotic missions are

the appropriate precursor missions to tell you where to look and

what to look for, but the examination is best done in situ by a

trained biologist, scientist, astronaut.

Dr. FISK. I would agree with that. I mean, this is an evolution

again. And I mean, if it is conducted that way, it is an evolution,

you know, robotics leading to humans. I mean, humans currently

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control the missions on the Martian surface. There is a 20-minute

delay or whatever is the time. Oh, I am sorry. Is that better? Humans currently control the missions on Mars, but they live in Pasadena, and the missions are on the ground. It might be appropriate,

you know, to do this in an evolutionary way with humans in Martian orbit for awhile and maybe not on the surface immediately

and so on. But I mean, you have to think that through. But the

idea is to accomplish the exploration, you are absolutely correct,

but recognize that the human brain, the—you know, does introduce

a capability that will be a long time before we can completely—we

could duplicate with robotics. But their assisting each other is the

ultimate goal to this thing.

You know, I think that is going to be the natural evolution of

this thing, and that could well be—we have to be careful—the natural evolution of the science will be robotics to robotics with humans.

Mr. SMITH. I mean, with humans going out there regardless of

what we are able to accomplish with the robotics and the——

Dr. FISK. I think we are going to——

Mr. SMITH.—nanotechnology?

Dr. FISK. I think we are going to send robotics out there, we are

going to learn things, and we are going to continue to—and it will

evolve to where the human and the robots are closer together than

they are today.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

And Dr. Griffin, maybe react a little bit, and thank you from the

University of Michigan. Just in terms of—it has been sort of my

impression that man in outerspace and our space platform, the

Space Station, was primarily to decide and learn how man can survive in outerspace as opposed to the exploration. So maybe sort of

mend that into your response on this question.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, certainly for the last 30 years or more, because humans have not ventured beyond low-Earth orbit, any involvement with humans on a scientific basis has been as equipment operators, which is essential, or as test subjects, but they

have not been exploring planets, because we haven’t been going

there. So I think we have got to get out of that.

I would say, overall—my own opinion is that—well, NASA’s chief

scientist, John Grunsfeld, recently, for public consumption, pointed

out that the amount—the total amount of exploration on Mars to

be accomplished by both MER A [Mars Exploration Rover] and

MER B would be approximately equivalent to what one human geologist would do in one afternoon. And that is not a criticism of

MER A or MER B on Mars; they are doing wonderful things, and

they are doing things we cannot afford to do at present in any

other way. But I think it is important to note that the 90-day missions, which are being forecast for those rovers, would be one day

of activity for a human being. There is a lot of leverage in having

a human even leaving aside the issues, which Len Fisk has pointed

out, with which I strongly agree, that the human provides a certain

adaptability and capability to be serendipitous that we don’t get by

other means.

Trying to decide today what the ultimate role of new worlds can

assume in human civilization is like—is very much like saying in

97

1600 that we are going to go settle Jamestown in Virginia because

we hear they can grow good tobacco. And it was true. It was not

wrong, but it was so woefully incomplete as to be misleading. And

yet it remains a fact that the initial settlement of Virginia was

done because people wanted to get tobacco.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Thank you, gentlemen.

The gentleman’s time has expired. Here is how we are going

to——

Mr. SMITH. May I have—submit questions in writing to the

panel?

Chairman BOEHLERT. By all means, and all Members will have

the opportunity to submit questions in writing, which will be presented to the witnesses, and we would ask that you respond in a

timely manner, if possible.

Here is how we are going to proceed as we move to conclusion.

I have one further question, and then Dana Rohrabacher, the Chair

of the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics will take over the

Chair to recognize Ms. Jackson Lee. She will have a question. And

then Mr. Akin, if he is here, will have a question, and that will

wrap it up, because I know you have schedules you have to adhere

to, too.

RETIRING THE SPACE SHUTTLE

Here is my question. A number of you have mentioned that retiring the Shuttle in 2010 seems unrealistic, yet the entire funding

of the President’s initiative depends on freeing up money now spent

on the Shuttle. Do all of you agree that 2010 seems unrealistic?

What date seems more reasonable? And what additional work on

the Shuttle will need to be done if it is going to remain in service

longer, keeping in mind what the Gehman Commission said there

would be a necessity for recertification in 2010.

So one, is 2010 realistic? Two, what date, if you don’t agree that

that is realistic, would seem more reasonable? And what additional

work do you foresee? Who wants to tackle that first? Dr. Griffin.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I will go. I think the date is approximately realistic.

I wouldn’t want to get wrapped around on the axle of whether it

was 2010 or 2011. I would not want to see it go until 2013 or 2014.

I think the way to view the situation is that the requirement

should be posed to the managers and engineers charged with executing the remainder of the Station and Shuttle programs, and

they should be held accountable to meet those goals. And if they

can’t, then we need to find new managers and engineers not in the

program.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Shirley.

Dr. SHIRLEY. The only—my only concern is that it is—you can retire the Shuttle, but what are you going to do then? We have obligations for operating the Station, and we need to have a realistic

scenario and a realistic set of alternatives if we are going to retire

the Shuttle. Certainly there are risks with the Shuttle, but frankly,

I was on a recent study, and there is just as much risk with the

other approaches they are proposing. So I am not saying you

shouldn’t retire the Shuttle, I am just saying that if you do, you

better have something else in mind or you are giving up the Station.

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Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Young.

Dr. YOUNG. I don’t know if 2010 is the right date or not, but I

do know that it would be unfortunate if we went through another

substantial period without having, from the United States, reliable

access to space for humans. I don’t think it is a very good idea for

us to be in the position of depending entirely upon our international partners for access to the International Space Station or

for other activities in space.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Dr. Fisk.

Dr. FISK. Very similar answers: set the goals, decide what you

are doing. If the Space Station is to be completed, make sure the

Shuttle is there to complete it. It will work backwards from what

it is you want to do, put the Shuttle into the right—and make it

an endgame as quickly as you can. The Shuttle has outlived its

usefulness now. We need alternatives, and it is—but decide how to

do it, you know, whether you are going to complete the Space Station, if you are going to resupply the Space Station, if you are going

to use the Space Station, make sure you have the capability. Work

backwards, put the Shuttle in its proper role, make it end as soon

as you can.

Chairman BOEHLERT. You are all aware of the Gehman Commission and one of the many findings of the Gehman Commission was

that arbitrary deadlines and the pressure to meet them, even when

reasonable people would agree that they were unrealistic, made

some problems within NASA. So—but if we don’t meet the 2010

deadline with retiring the Shuttle, then the Gehman Commission

has said, and NASA has embraced their recommendations, that it

would require recertification to keep it going beyond 2010, which

in and of itself is a very costly enterprise. So does any of that

change any of your thinking?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, I think you can always adjust the goals of an

engineering project as you move out in its execution, and you can

decide whether the adjustment is reasonable and rational or is

being caused by failure to execute properly. Those are decisions you

can make as time goes on. But if you do not initially set a goal and

a schedule, or as Len says, work backwards to them, what those

goals and schedules imply, you will never get there.

Dr. SHIRLEY. I would just like to add one thing from science fiction from Robert Heinlein’s ‘‘The Moon is the Earth’s Mistress,’’

Tom Stoffel. It means there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch. Or

free launch.

Chairman BOEHLERT. Or free launch.

Well, hearing some of the coverage of the aftermath of the Columbia tragedy, a number of times high-level officials in NASA

were quoted as saying part of the problem was that Congress didn’t

meet NASA’s budget expectations, and when Congress doesn’t meet

an agency’s budget expectations, I would suggest it is very much

in order to adjust those expectations and goals, because, as you

say, there ain’t no free lunch.

With that, let me turn the chair over to Chairman Rohrabacher

and recognize in the process, Ms. Jackson Lee.

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NATIONAL VISION FOR SPACE EXPLORATION

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and to

the Ranking Member for holding these important hearings. To the

panel, let me apologize for my entry into the room. I was flying on

aircraft that Chuck Yeager, obviously, in breaking the speed barrier, mine did not. And so, although I am a strong advocate of aviation and the space program, I thank you for your indulgence as I

ask these questions.

Yesterday—first of all, let me say that the inspiration of this

space program is spreading across the Nation. Yesterday, in Houston, I was with General Howell of NASA Johnson at a business

luncheon where individuals were gathered to hear the vision and

the mission and to, I guess, in essence, raise their hand in committal—commitment to helping us with this effort, both on the national level and certainly in educating our respective communities.

I think what I got out of that meeting is the importance of now

renaming this vision to call it the Nation’s mission for space or national space mission. I would welcome your comment on how we

broaden this so that the stakeholders go beyond the beltway, because I believe that what Camelot did in that timeframe was to get

everyone thinking they might be next in terms of being able to go

forward.

So let me just offer a few comments and then just raise these

questions, and forgive me if you have answered them, and I would

appreciate it in the succinct way that you would. I think that the

points made about Admiral Gehman’s comments about arbitrary

timelines are very crucial but also his comments about safety. And

I don’t believe you will get the American public to truly buy in

until you convince them this thing called space and travel to space

is safe and it is viable. So I would appreciate you highlighting the

importance of wedding the safety of the Space Station as well as

human space travel and your comment on the value of the Shuttle

now, we realize that we look to the future, but the value of the

Shuttle now.

The other thing is to note that this nation is becoming increasingly diverse. We don’t see diversity much in our industry. We

don’t see diversity much in our very fine astronaut corps, whom I

have the greatest respect for and we were doing a lot of embracing

yesterday as a number of astronauts were at the luncheon. We

spent a lot of time together. But we have got to begin to see in the

industry and in this effort the faces of Hispanics and African Americans and Asians, and we certainly have done a fair job internationally with our international partners. But I welcome your

thoughts on that.

And then my final point and let you all answer it is that Dr.

Griffin says in his testimony that the entire Apollo program was

about $130 billion in today’s dollars. And so I would like to ask you

what—to the panelists, was it worth it? What was the return on

the investment, something we will have to make to the American

public in terms of technology, education, inspiration of our youth,

international leadership, economic stimulus, and you may have

other factors? Did we dream? Did we grow? I know for a fact that

we have done some things in health research. And would we expect

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a similar return on $130 billion to go to Mars, as we discussed

today, or the Moon, because I think the way we get to the next step

on the journey is by making the entire Nation stakeholders, and I

yield to Dr. Griffin, and would ask everyone if you were taking studious notes of my questions.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Wow. Give me 30 seconds. For my——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. In the——

Dr. GRIFFIN. From my part, Apollo was worth it. I tend to take

a big picture view. I answer the question by analogy. If you look

back at Renaissance Spain, what do you think of? You think of

Queen Isabella, King Ferdinand, and Columbus’ voyages. You don’t

think about battles between the Spanish and the Moors over who

was going to control Spain and things that were actually very influential, but when you look back 500 years, you remember Columbus.

500 years from now, people will not be concerned about budget

battles that we hold in Congress. They will remember that the

United States caused the Apollo missions to happen. What have—

we built an entire technology around that, the aerospace technology, which is the best in the world. Our entire defense establishment relies on it. We could have gotten it in other ways, I don’t

dispute that, but that is the way that we got it. We inspired at

least a couple of generations of young people to obtain technical

training, and they have used it in areas far outside aerospace.

Norm Augustine was emphatic in pointing out the current discrepancy between U.S. engineers and scientists graduating and those

in other countries. I strongly submit that the way to motivate scientific, technical, engineering training in the United States is not

to have NASA adopt an education office, but to have NASA do the

kinds of things that make young people want to get the education

they need to get in order to participate.

MOTIVATION FOR SCIENCE AND MATH EDUCATION

Dr. SHIRLEY. I really appreciate your comments on diversity,

having been there through the—when I was the only female engineer at JPL to where there are now 20 percent.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And women are included, you are right.

Dr. SHIRLEY. So I think that it is very important for us to be able

to engage people, especially young people. At the Science Fiction

Museum, one of our prime objectives is to use science fiction to attract young people to be interested in science and engineering. And

Dr. Young and I were just having a conversation about how many

of our colleagues and our students say, ‘‘I got interested in this because I read science fiction.’’ It is very important, though, not to

do what Dr. Young said, for NASA to figure out how to sell what

it wants to do better. What we need to do is to get everybody involved in formulating what NASA or what the Nation, I completely

agree with calling it the national—or maybe even the international

endeavor if we wanted to go that way. But it is not taking what

NASA wants to do and selling it to people, which is what NASA

always does. It is involving people in formulating what we are

going to do and where we are going to go, and that is how they

are going to get behind it.

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RISKS OF HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT VERSUS OTHER

ENDEAVORS

By the way, as far as safety, this is risky business. It is not going

to be completely safe. People will pay $65,000 to be guided up

Mount Everest with a high probability of dying, much higher than

going up on the Shuttle. So safety, you have to be careful about

trying to make things so safe that you can’t afford them. And so

I think we need to really put safety into perspective. When these

astronauts go, they know they are taking a risk, and they choose

to do it. And I don’t think you should deprive people of that opportunity.

As far as return on investment, I think the lift of the human

spirit that Apollo gave us was uncountable. I think the lift of the

human spirit that Pathfinder did, my rover, I personally was involved with the little rover that went first, and so I feel like these

are my grandchildren. They are on Mars now. But the number of

web hits we get, the amount of excitement that is going on around

even robotic missions, and if we make human missions really driven by what people think humans should be doing, I think we can

generate that kind of excitement around human exploration.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You—on the safety, you had mentioned to

make it as safe as it can be.

Dr. SHIRLEY. As safe as we can afford.

Dr. GRIFFIN. 10 percent of people who have climbed Mount Everest have died.

Dr. SHIRLEY. And they paid to do it.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Dr. Shirley.

Dr. Young.

Dr. YOUNG. Let me try to respond briefly to each one of the questions. As far as the question of was Apollo worth it, I agree with

Dr. Shirley and Dr. Griffin. Absolutely, it was the seminal event

of the 20th Century. It pushed science, technology, and education

in a way that nothing else has.

Diversity. I feel very much involved with, and very strongly

about it as the director of the Massachusetts Space Grant Consortium. Space Grant, as you are probably aware, in each of the 50

states plus DC and Puerto Rico, has, as one of its principle goals,

increasing the percentage of women and underrepresented minorities in the state’s program. And it is achieving those goals. It could

achieve them better, incidentally, if the funding for it went up to

the request, but it is going in those directions through education

in K through 12, education in college, and beyond. And we have to

keep going. There is a long way to go, but it is effective.

On safety, this is risky business. Going into space is not easy,

and I think that, as was said earlier, if we may—if we are too risk

averse, we will never do anything. On the other hand, there is no

justification for going into space merely to show the flying. We

must go in—go there because there is a return in terms of science,

in terms of technology, in terms of commercialization, that is that

it is worthwhile. I, for one, believe that the Hubble Space Telescope

must be serviced and that it is worth taking the risk in that case.

Dr. FISK. Being—sitting at the end of the panel, I get to say

‘‘Ditto,’’ probably on these things, but let me just—so let me not reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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iterate the statements, many of which I agree with. Let me just

comment a bit on the safety issue. I don’t—we have this impression

that the American public is very risk averse. You know, we simply

will be intolerant if anyone is lost in space. I don’t actually agree

with that. I think the American public is justifiably intolerant of

losing people in space if they don’t understand the reason for which

we are there. What—why was the risk taken? We should never

send humans into space or—unless we can defend the reason that

they were there and they were needed to be there and there was

something exciting to do. And if we have done so, and despite the

best that we could do, there is an accident, I think we are tolerant

of that as a people. We have lost people before. And we lose people

in many—we lose military people all of the time. And so I think

this vision is very important to us, because it provides the rationale

for why we are sending people forth into space. And if we buy the

vision, then we have to buy the risks that go along with it, and we

have to explain to people that there is a risk associated with it. But

first the vision, then comes the acceptance of the risk. Without the

vision, there is not the—no risk—no loss is ever tolerable.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the Chairman. I thank the Committee.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. [Presiding.] Thank you very much. Thank

you.

Dr. Ehlers has a question.

COSTS OF HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION COMPARED TO

OTHER NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your courtesy of letting me go ahead of you, but I have just been notified

I have votes in another Committee in a few minutes.

I first want to clarify a few things. In response to your question,

Dr. Shirley, about fusion, my estimate is we will be ready in about

40 years, which is about the time I expect we would reach Mars

without it. And 40 years is not a scientific estimate; it is a political

estimate, given the way things work around here and the lack of

a firm commitment, as Dr. Griffin said, about, you know, just saying—realize you are going to be in space and let us allocate a certain amount of money to it. I am just not optimistic about getting

there much sooner, unless it costs much less than the Congress anticipates.

I would say, however, we do tend to treat NASA the way we

treat the Navy. We have as many arguments about whether to

build a new battleship or a new submarine as we do about whether

or not to go to the Moon. And so the problem is the lack of longterm stability in funding and the lack of long-term planning on the

part of both NASA and the Congress.

Let me add another comment before I leave. It seems to me that

the keystone of the direction we are going to take is going to be

what happens with the CEV, the Crew Exploratory Vehicle? I think

Congress, without realizing it at this point, perhaps not even realizing it later, is going to look at that as the test of whether NASA

can really produce something at a fairly quick rate at a fairly reasonable cost. And so NASA, I think, has a tremendous amount of

work to do on the design. I have talked to them. They know roughVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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ly what they want to do, but there are dozens of different options

on how to do it. And they are going to have to narrow that down

fairly quickly. They are going to have to come up with a concrete

plan, get the money from us, and show that they can do it. And

if they do, I think that there is a much higher probability of continuing with the rest of the plan. If that turns out to be another

X–33 disaster, then we are talking very, very long time spans and

very limited money in the future.

And I just wanted to get that on the record as well as one other

comment. In the argument about robotics versus humans, clearly

humans are more versatile, adaptable, analytical, and so forth, but

the cost ratio, as I see it, is about 1,000 for one human. And I think

we have got to do a fair amount of robotic exploration before we

can intelligently send a human being out there to—so that we can

optimize the use of the human being in deciding where the person

should land, what they should—what equipment should go along,

what they should be doing.

With that, I will yield back. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the

time, and I have to go back.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just in time. Just in time.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you.

SPACE SHUTTLE RISKS

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Would the panel like to comment at all on

that or if we could just—all right.

I have a couple observations and then we will—and a couple

questions. First of all, I forget who it was. You probably know. Was

it Melville who believes the safest ship never leaves port? Was

that—was it Melville who said that? I just—that quote sticks in my

mind as we are discussing the risks that are involved in various

space missions.

I would like to say, for the record, as well, today, when we are

talking about the risks, that this focus on risk, and I think you

have indicated, is a bit out of proportion, especially when you are

talking to—compare it to people going up to Mount Everest, and

then we realize that we are really involved with scientific missions

and pushing the envelope in terms of human capabilities in America’s space program, but that risk is certainly something well

thought out and worth taking. I would challenge NASA to keep

those admonitions in mind when trying to determine whether or

not we are going to rescue the Hubble Telescope, because, from

what I understand, NASA is planning to have one or two shakedown missions for the Shuttle that will essentially be aimed at

proving whether or not the Shuttle is safer or not. But those missions will not be at the same time accomplishing something tangible, like saving the Hubble Telescope.

And so I would suggest that if NASA is going to test the Shuttle,

it do so by conducting a legitimate mission and that is to put the

gyro and the batteries in the Hubble Telescope, because that is one

space project that we have paid for that, even though it got off to

a very rough start, seems to have had such phenomenal success in

providing us a benefit back for the costs that we have incurred. So

that would be something that I would suggest tonight—or today

that NASA take a serious look at and say the risk of another ShutVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tle mission, even—because we are going to do it anyway and then

assigning them a job would be a cost-effective way of dealing with

this—with the question at hand.

QUESTIONS ABOUT ICE ON THE MOON

A couple things about what has been said here today. Dr. Shirley, is there not hydrogen and oxygen on the Moon as well? And

we know there is some amount of water. Wouldn’t this be of some

benefit to have a storage—a resource available to us on the Moon

of hydrogen and oxygen?

Dr. SHIRLEY. Well, the water, maybe, is most likely ice in the

permanently shadowed regions at the pole. And some of these

lunar missions that Len Fisk mentioned, are going to go and see

if it is really there. I mean Clementine took a look at lunar

orbit——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right.

Dr. SHIRLEY.—took a look, but we are not sure it is there.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Wouldn’t that be of immense value if——

Dr. SHIRLEY. Possibly, except what it most likely is is a bunch

of icy dirt, and we don’t know how much there is, and getting at

it and mining it is going to take lots and lots of equipment to be

shipped from the Earth. Now all I am saying is you have to ship

everything you use to get those resources from the gravity well of

the Earth——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure.

Dr. SHIRLEY.—and you need to look at the trade.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, you quoted Tom Stoffel from ‘‘The Moon

is the Earth’s Mistress.’’ And I seem to remember in ‘‘A Stranger

in a Strange Land’’ that we were talking about water as being the

most valuable resource. So you might keep that in mind.

Dr. SHIRLEY. Well, we know there is water on Mars.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Could I comment for just a moment?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Certainly.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Even if we don’t find water or find that it is not,

early on, cost effective to mine it, let me point out that 7/8 of the

mass of the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen propellant combination is due to liquid oxygen. 7/8 of the mass. If—and we know that

parts of the lunar soil contain as much as 40 percent oxygen by

weight, it is fairly easy to extract that oxygen simply by roasting

the soil. The earliest lunar resource extraction that I predict we

will perform will be to extract that oxygen, use it either on the

Moon, or ship it elsewhere in lunar space, possibly into Earth orbit,

there should be a way to make those trades among the more favorable ones that we can do. If we end up shipping hydrogen from

Earth, instead of having to ship hydrogen plus oxygen, we will

have saved 7/8 of the up-mass necessary to supply propellant for

going to Mars or doing whatever. That is a nice place to start, and

it is not an insignificant gain.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I think that that is an excellent way

to end this discussion today, however, just—maybe one more question, and that is, you know, we have got this—we have been talking about the way NASA works and the—we have heard NASA has

got to do things differently to succeed. We have this X–Prize now

that is really inspiring people to develop new types of suborbital

105

vehicles. Is there an X–Prize type concept that we might use to encourage people to develop things that would help us in this next

stage of——

Dr. GRIFFIN. No fair. That was one of my questions to you.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. So that—but what should they be?

Dr. SHIRLEY. Well, I think that NASA’s idea of the ‘‘Challenge’’

prizes, which is in their plan is not a bad idea. The only thing I

am worried about is that we can challenge people all we want, but

will NASA actually use the results. And what I am worried about

is that there is an awful lot of technology out there that NASA

pays for and they never use because it is not part of the existing

infrastructure and the way things are done. So yes, those prizes

would be a good idea, but there needs to be an additional component in where is the gate in which you start—you know, how do

you infuse those into this block that they are talking about——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay.

Dr. SHIRLEY. Into this spiral development. How does that work?

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. And one last thought on the elevator. I think the elevator is worth looking into. If we are going to

spend billions of dollars in recreating the Saturn V rocket, I mean,

something that we did back in 1960, I mean, let us start using our

imagination to build something we haven’t built before and could

do—could possibly work. But then again, if it doesn’t work, boy,

that would be the biggest boondoggle in the history of all humankind.

So those are the decisions we have got to look to and we have

got to talk about seriously. I want to thank each and every one of

the panelists for coming today and making your contribution to the

really important discussion that will lead to the decision-making

that will lead us to the next step in human exploration of space.

So thank you all very much. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(107)

Appendix:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Norman R. Augustine, Former Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin; Chair, Advisory Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program

Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert

Q1. To the best of your knowledge, are there alternative ‘‘end states’’ to assembly of

the Space Station other than that which NASA currently plans that would meet

all or most of our international commitments, would require less expenditures

of funding, and would still allow the necessary science to be conducted on the

effects of space on human physiology?

A1. I am personally unaware of any particular ‘‘end states’’ in the Space Station

program other than that which is currently planned. This is, however, an important

question worthy of exploration by those in a position to conduct a more knowledgeable evaluation.

Q2. At the hearing, Dr. Fisk recommended that NASA proceed step by step with the

exploration initiative to ‘‘learn as you go.’’ What do you believe are the significant steps that NASA must take as it implements the initiative, and what kind

of milestones or gates do you believe, if any, Congress should set to ensure that

the initiative is proceeding well and NASA is properly learning as it is going?

A2. ‘‘Learning’’ for the space exploration initiative can be grouped into three basic

categories. The first of these has to do with the engineering steps required, to accomplish the mission, including identifying an appropriate mission architecture, developing advanced propulsion systems and creating manufacturing capabilities (for

example the production of propellants) at locations other than the Earth’s surface.

Second, additional learning is needed of the long-term effects of space exposure on

humans, particularly in the trans-Earth-Mars environment. Third, a great deal of

knowledge remains to be obtained concerning the nature of Mars, its history and

the implications thereof for those of us here on Earth.

I believe that any ‘‘gates’’ that the Congress elects to impose should be focused

on the first two of the above-mentioned areas of endeavor. As the mission is further

defined, critical milestones should become more apparent. It is probably premature

to establish specific gates at this point and time—although highly appropriate once

the project is definitized.

Q3. What recommendations, if any, would you make on how best to organize NASA

to undertake the President’s space exploration initiative?

A3. I would recommend that a strong project office led by an experienced project

manager be established reporting directly to NASA headquarters with full authority

over all contractor and NASA center activities relating to the undertaking.

Q4. We are now totally dependent on the Russians to provide crew rescue with their

Soyuz vehicles. However, Russia fulfills its Soyuz obligations to the international partners in April 2006. After that time, it is not clear how NASA plans

to provide a crew rescue capability for astronauts on-board the Space Station.

• Do you believe NASA should develop its own crew rescue capsule for the Space

Station? How soon do you think a crew rescue capsule could be developed?

• Do you believe that the Crew Exploration Vehicle should be designed to service

the Space Station as well as carry out missions beyond low-Earth orbit?

A4. The Commission on the U.S. Space Program, which I chaired about a decade

ago, recommended that NASA develop a crew rescue vehicle for the Space Station

as well as for other possible future missions. While I do not have the basis to make

an estimate as to how long it would take to conduct such a development today, it

continues to be, in my opinion, an appropriate undertaking—assuming that the U.S.

remains committed to operating the Space Station. The reviews conducted by our

Commission on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, based upon then available

projections of technology, indicated that a crew exploration vehicle could be designed

to serve a Space Station as well as support missions beyond low-Earth orbit. This

is an issue which is quite amenable to engineering analysis and should not require

a great deal of subjective decision-making.

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Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. What, if any, are your biggest concerns with respect to the President’s space exploration initiative? What should Congress be focusing its attention on as we

evaluate the initiative?

A1. In my opinion, the President’s initiative is a sensible and appropriate one. My

principal concern would be that an undertaking of this magnitude, inevitably involving non-trivial risk, should be undertaken only with fully adequate funds.

This is necessary to provide financial reserves, backup technical approaches and

to conduct the necessary tests and analyses to reduce risk to an acceptable level.

Q2. It has been argued that one of the main rationales for human space exploration

is its inspirational value. However, the Mars Pathfinder and the Spirit and Opportunity Mars Rovers have demonstrated that robotic missions are capable of

capturing the public imagination.

• Given that, what do you think are the most compelling justifications for

human exploration?

• When should human exploration missions be contemplated—that is, should

they be deferred until as much as possible has been accomplished robotically,

or should human missions be an early goal? Why?

A2. Robotic missions do capture the public imagination, yet, in my judgment, there

is a very great difference between placing humans on Mars as compared to exploring Mars with robots. One need only consider the difference in reaction to the early

Soviet robotic lunar missions and the mission of Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin.

The Commission on the Future of the U.S. Space Program contrasted the likely public impact of a hypothetical rocket launch to place instruments on the summit of

Mt. Everest as compared with Sir Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay’s inspiring

climb to the summit. Nonetheless, there are important roles for both robotic and

human exploration. Robotic exploration is at its best in gathering large quantities

of data and performing relatively routine tasks at very remote or hazardous locations. Humans are at their best when undertaking tasks requiring great flexibility

and real-time decision-making.

With regard to timing, there should undoubtedly be overlapping missions of robots

and humans, with robotic activity beginning at an earlier time not only because of

its earlier feasibility but also because of its role in reducing the risk of human missions.

Q3. What do you consider an appropriate role for the private sector to be in the exploration of the solar system?

A3. I believe strongly in the power of the free enterprise system and therefore conclude that the private sector should have primary responsibility for carrying out

missions to explore the solar system. At the same time, I believe that the government bears an important responsibility and capability for the oversight and direction of the work to be undertaken in the private sector.

Q4. One of the key questions we will have to wrestle with as we evaluate the President’s proposed initiative is whether NASA has the capabilities needed to carry

it out successfully. Experienced NASA personnel will be retiring just as the initiative is getting going. New employees will not have any significant experience

in human space flight and will need time to acquire it. At the management levels of NASA, many of the key human space flight and exploration positions currently are held by retired generals and Admirals with no previous space-related

experience.

• How confident are you that NASA will have the experience and skills based

needed to conduct the initiative safely and successfully?

• If you aren’t, what would you recommend be done?

A4. During the Apollo Program NASA and the Department of Defense were generally considered to represent the leading edge of technology—and therefore were

able to attract many of the Nation’s ‘‘best and brightest’’ in the fields of science and

engineering. Today, many of those individuals are instead attracted to such fields

as bioengineering, nanotechnology and informatics. For NASA to draw the needed

capabilities for a human Mars mission will require a clear and unambiguous longterm commitment to the exploration of space, particularly providing reasonable certainty that the needed funds will be available.

I might note that I recently came across a photograph of the control room during

the Apollo missions and my immediate reaction was, ‘‘They look like a bunch of

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kids!’’ Indeed, those of us involved in the early days of the space program were ‘‘a

bunch of kids.’’ This is not to say that experience is unimportant; it is obviously very

important. At the same time, the energy and creativity of young people and the

focus of their educational experience on the very latest technological advancements

is not to be under-estimated.

Q5. Your 1990 committee recommended that the space science program be given the

highest priority for funding, and that science activity should be the ‘‘fulcrum of

the entire civil space effort.’’

• Did your committee ever debate whether exploration should be the main focus

of the civil space program?

• If so, why did you reject that in favor of a science-based focus?

A5. The Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program identified a number

of possible objectives for America’s space program. We concluded that a ‘‘balanced’’

program would be the most appropriate program for America to pursue, and that

such a balanced program should include unmanned missions, manned missions,

science, and exploration activities. Nonetheless, we did indicate that within a ‘‘balanced program’’ science should be given a degree of preeminence. Although there

were many reasons for this conclusion, foremost was the fact that new knowledge

is principally the product of science, and that new knowledge underpins much of the

progress one can anticipate in fields ranging from engineering to the health of the

Nation’s economy.

Q6. Your 1990 report argued for a ‘‘go as you pay’’ approach to a human mission

to Mars, indicating that there is no particular urgency in accomplishing such

a mission. Would canceling or deferring existing and planned Earth and space

science activities, as well as R&D on advanced aeronautical and space transportation systems in order to shift money to the President’s exploration initiative be

consistent with your committee’s conception of a ‘‘go as you pay’’ approach?

A6. Clearly, any program of human exploration of Mars must compete against alternative undertakings in the budget process. Nonetheless, our committee’s conception

of a ‘‘go as you pay’’ philosophy would be consistent with the notion that other priority missions should not be disrupted to make possible an early human mission to

Mars. Equally important, it was our intent that any Mars mission should be fully

funded, including the provision of appropriate reserves to deal with contingencies.

Any Mars mission will inevitably represent a major engineering undertaking, one

which should be pursued in as efficient a manner as possible, but in no case should

‘‘corners be cut’’—given the importance of the mission to our nation’s image and the

implications for risk of the astronauts involved in the project.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. At our committee hearing last February 12, we asked the Director of the Office

of Science and Technology Policy and the Administrator of NASA if the President had asked the cost of the Moon/Mars initiative, and, if so, what was he

told. Their responses did not provide much clarification.

• How much uncertainty in cost estimating should Congress be willing to tolerate in large scale, long-term programs like the President’s initiative?

• Would you, as a corporation chief executive officer and as a board member,

be willing to commit to long-term, high-risk programs if you were told that the

anticipated length of time for the program made it impossible to provide accurate cost estimates? If so, why?

• If the cost estimates are likely to be uncertain, what measures should Congress

use to assess the agency’s performance in implementing its initiative?

A1. This is an important and provocative question. First and foremost, the necessary ‘‘proof of principle’’ developmental work should be undertaken to reduce the

uncertainties in cost estimating as much as possible. On the other hand, in any

enormous technological undertaking, including a human mission to Mars, uncertainties will always remain and some cost risks will simply need to be managed because

they can never be entirely limited. Given this circumstance, one needs to rely to a

considerable degree upon statistical estimations of cost. This is not a particularly

satisfactory situation since we will have only one Mars program and thus statistical

averages are not particularly meaningful. Nonetheless, it should be possible to assign reasonable probabilities to various cost outcomes such that one could estimate,

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say, an 80 percent confident cost; a 50 percent confident cost and a 20 percent confident cost.

With regard to the perspective of a board member or chief executive addressing

long-term, high-risk programs, virtually all corporate research has in it highly inaccurate cost estimates and schedules. As an undertaking moves towards engineering

development, however, it would be expected that considerable refinement of those

estimates should be possible. While most corporate directors would be reluctant to

commit to programs that could threaten the existence of a firm (i.e., where cost uncertainties are sufficiently great to make this outcome a meaningful possibility), it

would not be uncommon to make commitments for programs with enormously high

payoffs yet harboring significant but ‘‘survivable’’ downsides. One of the problems

with corporate America today is its focus on near-term, high confidence outcomes

at the expense of longer-term, higher-risk (but higher payoff) pursuits.

In managing major projects with uncertainties in cost and schedule, three lessons

stand out. The first of these is that a series of major programmatic gates should

be established and modified as knowledge is gained. The program should be reassessed at each of those gates. Second, reserves in terms of schedule, funds and technical approaches should be established commensurate with the uncertainties being

confronted. Third, specific risks should be identified and plans created to manage

those risks.

Q2. Although Congress has not yet come to any decisions on the President’s proposed

space initiative, NASA is proceeding to cancel already planned hypersonics R&D

projects as well as advanced rocket engine R&D in order to free up money for

the initiative. That would appear to run counter to the recommendation of your

1990 Committee that NASA needs to continue to invest in its technology base

and not let funding be diverted.

• How concerned should we be, and what would you recommend be done?

A2. While I believe that a human mission to Mars is the next logical step in the

human space program and one well-worth undertaking, I believe it would have been

the view of our committee that such a program should not be undertaken at the

expense of other important scientific and technological accomplishments.

There can be no question that one-day visitors from some nation will land on

Mars. It is my earnest hope that they will be from the United States. Nonetheless,

our committee recommended that the first step in a mission to Mars is to carefully

define the mission architecture and to put in place the technological building blocks

which reduce risk to an acceptable level. Only when that has been accomplished

would it be appropriate to begin large-scale engineering activities associated with

the conduct of the mission itself.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Michael D. Griffin, President, In-Q-Tel; Former Chief Engineer, NASA;

Former Associate Administrator, Exploration Systems, NASA

Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert

Q1. To the best of your knowledge, are there alternative ‘‘end states’’ to assembly of

the Space Station other than that which NASA currently plans that would meet

all or most of our international commitments, would require less expenditures

of funding, and would still allow the necessary science to be conducted on the

effects of space on human physiology?

A1. Given the constraints we are assuming—meeting the international commitments and allowing the study of human physiology—I don’t believe there are any

alternative ‘‘end states’’ for the ISS, certainly none that allow us to save any money.

Indeed, it can be argued, and I have argued, that we need to restore Habitation

Module funding if we are indeed serious about our ISS commitments.

That said, I believe the greatest opportunity to save money during the remainder

of the ISS program might lie, not in what ‘‘end state’’ we reach, but how we go about

getting there. NASA’s own budget estimates, codified in its February ‘‘sand chart,’’

indicate that some $28B is planned to be expended on Shuttle operations between

now and 2011. I would submit that an earlier cessation to Shuttle operations, possibly at ‘‘U.S. Core Complete’’ or even before, would allow us to use presently programmed Shuttle operations money for the development of a shuttle-derived heavy

lift launch vehicle. Once that vehicle is available, the remaining ISS modules could

be deployed in clusters, using fewer launches, quite likely saving substantial money

overall. I believe this issue should be examined more carefully than it has been to

date.

Q2. At the hearing, Dr. Fisk recommended that NASA proceed step by step with the

exploration initiative to ‘‘learn as you go.’’ What do you believe are the significant steps that NASA must take as it implements the initiative, and what kind

of milestones or gates do you believe, if any, Congress should set to ensure that

the initiative is proceeding well and NASA is properly learning as it is going?

A2. I think that Dr. Fisk’s comment is on point; indeed, NASA will have no choice

but to ‘‘learn as we go.’’ Doing so is a fact of life, and we should structure the exploration program to accommodate that reality.

Nothing in NASA’s current infrastructure or flight programs is oriented toward

return to the Moon or missions to the near-Earth asteroids or Mars. A long period

of infrastructure development will be necessary to recreate, and go beyond, the capabilities the Nation possessed at the time of Apollo. Among the steps necessary to

take are:

(a) Operational Earth-orbital CEV NLT 2009, significantly sooner than currently planned.

(b) ISS Habitation Module, extendable to lunar/Mars surface use, by 2010.

(c) Heavy-lift launch vehicle NLT 2011.

(d) Lunar lander system augmentation of CEV by 2012.

(e) Development of lunar surface-suit technology ready for operational deployment by 2013.

(f) First manned lunar return by 2014.

(g) Lunar surface nuclear power reactor available by 2015.

(h) Robotic demonstration of in-situ resource utilization on Mars by 2016.

(i) Ground tests of nuclear thermal space propulsion engine by 2017.

(j) Mission to Phobos/Deimos by 2018.

(k) Robotic demonstration of Mars entry/descent/lander systems by 2019.

(l) Manned landing on Mars by 2020.

NASA should be required to offer a plan to meet these goals, or a similar set of

such goals, by approximately the dates indicated. The periods of time specified for

the accomplishment of the stated goals are consistent with past practice in the U.S.

civil space program; NASA should be held to such performance in the future. The

plan will be developed in stages, and should take into account the necessity to learn

from ongoing operations. Congress should be easily able to judge whether the plan

is being met, or not, and take action accordingly.

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Q3. What recommendations, if any, would you make on how best to organize NASA

to undertake the President’s space exploration initiative?

A3. My own opinion is that NASA’s organization is not, per se, the problem. There

are minor issues; for example, at present there exists unnecessary and harmful competition between Codes M, T, S, and U, with no overriding authority short of the

Deputy Administrator—who cannot be expected in intervene in day-to-day programmatic issues—to make decisions as appropriate to further the initiative. But

this and similar matters are easily remedied. More broadly significant is the fact

that NASA needs a clear statement of purpose from the Congress, supporting the

President’s direction on the exploration initiative. If Congress does not concur with,

and support financially, the stated vision, it cannot be attained. Congress must

verify that competent people are selected to manage NASA to achieve the stated vision; aggressive goals should be set, and accountability for their achievement must

be demanded.

Q4. We are now totally dependent on the Russians to provide crew rescue with their

Soyuz vehicles. However, Russia fulfills its Soyuz obligations to the international partners in April 2006. After that time, it is not clear how NASA plans

to provide a crew rescue capability for astronauts on-board the Space Station.

Q4a. Do you believe NASA should develop its own crew rescue capsule for the Space

Station? How soon do you think a crew rescue capsule could be developed?

A4a. The ISS CRV should be a derivative of the planned Earth-orbital version of

the CEV; there is no need to have two separate designs. Done expeditiously, the

first versions of this vehicle should be available by 2009. In the meantime, NASA

should be exempted from the Iran Non-Proliferation Act, and should purchase additional Soyuz vehicles from Russia to serve the CRV function.

Q4b. Do you believe that the Crew Exploration Vehicle should be designed to service

the Space Station as well as carry out missions beyond low-Earth orbit?

A4b. From the answer above, ‘‘yes.’’

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. What, if any, are your biggest concerns with respect to the President’s space exploration initiative? What should Congress be focusing its attention on as we

evaluate the initiative?

A1. I will begin by noting, as I did in testimony, that I believe the vision for the

space exploration initiative enunciated on 14 January by President Bush is essentially the right vision. Further, I believe this view is held by most people in the

space policy community. Indeed, the geography of the solar system leaves us little

flexibility in the matter; the Moon, Mars, and Near-Earth Asteroids are the logical

destinations. Each is interesting in its own right, and collectively they constitute the

places we can envision reaching over the course of the next couple of generations.

So I have no concerns about the vision itself.

I am concerned about the perception that the vision constitutes, or should constitute, a wholly new burden upon NASA and the federal budget. I do not believe

this is so, or should be so. While some amount of ‘‘new money’’ would be highly desirable, it should be small. The essential argument to be held concerns what NASA

and the Nation should be doing with the money already allocated to manned space

flight. The argument should not be about how much new money is required, or how

much money should be redirected from other NASA enterprises into manned space

flight. When and as we see the results obtained from implementing this new vision,

we can reconsider how much of our nation’s treasury should be allocated to it.

Congress should focus on the broad thrust and timeliness of the goals NASA

enunciates and works toward. Architectural details are not as relevant as broad

measures of merit. It is worth noting that, during Apollo, 18 months passed between

the decision by President Kennedy and the Congress of that time to initiate the program, and the final decision to adopt lunar orbit rendezvous as the architecture by

which the mission would be accomplished. Yet, the goal was achieved in eight years

and two months following Kennedy’s historic announcement. The entire Gemini program—ten manned flights in twenty months—was implemented in four years from

announcement to completion. These are the kinds of things to which Congress

should be attending. When NASA announces—years in advance—that the first

manned flight of CEV will take place in 2014, ten years from the present, it should

raise the reddest of red flags. A program paced according to such a schedule is inherently unwieldy and unworkable, and the Congress should require better.

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Q2. It has been argued that one of the main rationales for human space exploration

is its inspirational value. However, the Mars Pathfinder and the Spirit and Opportunity Mars Rovers have demonstrated that robotic missions are capable of

capturing the public imagination.

Q2a. Given that, what do you think are the most compelling justifications for human

exploration?

A2a. Humans are intensely interested in exploration, as shown repeatedly by the

interest in robotic explorers such as Pathfinder, Spirit, and Opportunity, and for

that matter the Hubble Space Telescope. The best rationale for human exploration

is exactly the same as for robotic exploration—to learn and know new things, to

know new places, to make those places part of the human scope and experience.

While there are places only robots can go, it remains true that, as Mr. Augustine

has put it, there is a difference between placing an instrumented package at the

top of Mt. Everest, and its conquest by Hillary and Tenzing. When magnified to encompass whole new worlds that difference, difficult to quantify but impossible to ignore, is precisely the difference between robotic and human planetary exploration.

I believe that difference is worth the money and the risk to human life with which

it is purchased.

Q2b. When should human exploration missions be contemplated—that is, should

they be deferred until as much as possible has been accomplished robotically,

or should human missions be an early goal? Why?

A2b. Historically, when it was possible to do so, space exploration by humans has

been preceded by a measured program of robotic exploration, as much to determine

the characteristics of the environment as for any scientific purpose. And it is worth

noting that robotic exploration has continued even after the cessation of the Apollo

voyages, over three decades ago. So, while the two endeavors are usefully coupled,

it is not appropriate to defer human exploration until ‘‘as much as possible has been

accomplished robotically.’’ That goal is not reachable; there is no end to useful

robotic exploration. Human exploration should being when robotic exploration has

revealed enough of the environment to allow us to know where we want to go, and

why, and what hazards are likely to be encountered.

Q3. What do you consider an appropriate role for the private sector to be in the exploration of the solar system?

A3. My quick answer on this point is ‘‘as much as possible, as soon as possible.’’

To the extent that the U.S. Government—through NASA—can express requirements

to be satisfied and a price to be paid for meeting them, we will be better off. NASA’s

proper role is to design the mission architectures to be implemented. The more that

we can adopt best commercial aerospace practices and procedures during such implementation, as opposed to adopting a classic captive government contractor model,

the better off we will be.

Q4. One of the key questions we will have to wrestle with as we evaluate the President’s proposed initiative is whether NASA has the capabilities needed to carry

it out successfully. Experienced NASA personnel will be retiring just as the initiative is getting going. New employees will not have any significant experience

in human space flight and will need time to acquire it. At the management levels of NASA, many of the key human space flight and exploration positions currently are held by retired generals and Admirals with no previous space-related

experience.

Q4a. How confident are you that NASA will have the experience and skills based

needed to conduct the initiative safely and successfully?

A4a. I am not confident that the NASA management team today has the experience

and skill necessary to implement the vision, for precisely the reasons implied by the

question—many of the individuals in question simply have not acquired their career

experience in the space business. Military systems acquisition, to use a phrase

coined by a friend at NASA, is simply not the same as building the Nina, the Pinta,

and the Santa Maria, if the analogy is not overdrawn.

Space systems engineering and development is not an endeavor wherein one can

do one’s on-the-job-training by starting at the top. It should not be necessary to insist that NASA bring on-board, as top-level management, people with top-level space

flight engineering and management experience. But apparently it is, and Congress

should so insist.

Q4b. If you aren’t, what would you recommend be done?

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A4b. Today’s NASA is as it is because it was assembled to serve the needs of what

is, frankly, a rather mundane program, the flying of the Space Shuttle and the assembly of the International Space Station. More than one observer has characterized it as a space ‘‘jobs program’’ and, while somewhat unfair, this characterization

is not entirely inappropriate. NASA has retained, at the working level, a very large

share of the best people in the aerospace industry, simply because of their passion

for the Agency’s mission. But while this is so, it remains true that, by and large,

the best people do not flock to routine or mundane programs. This is especially true

when salaries, by industry standards, are very low and when, as now, we seem more

concerned about government-industry ‘‘revolving door’’ issues than with doing what

is necessary to make it simple and easy for government to attract and retain the

best talent.

If we can address the above concerns, and if the new exploration initiative is approved, endorsed, and funded by Congress at reasonable levels and with apparent

bipartisan consensus, it will not be difficult to attract the best people from industry,

government, and the laboratories to manage it. This was the experience of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Apollo, the ICBM program, and the

Manhatten Project. The best people are drawn to the most challenging programs.

So it will be again.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. Until several years ago, development of a new reusable launch vehicle that could

significantly reduce the cost and increase the reliability of access to space was

a major national goal. However the budget plan accompanying the President’s

new space initiative envisions no additional funding for such R&D through at

least 2020. Do you believe that is an appropriate decision? If so, why? And if

not, why not? What would you recommend be done?

A1. I think it is wholly inappropriate for the Nation—through NASA—not to be

funding such a development. While I have consistently championed the re-development of a heavy-lift launch vehicle to enable return to the Moon, and expeditions

to Mars, it remains true that most of our nation’s day-to-day spacelift requirements

will be in the smaller size range, say 10 metric tons as a round number, with no

intent to be overly precise with this estimate. Space launch costs will remain unacceptably high until we take on the problem of developing operational, substantially

reusable, launch vehicles for this payload class. This remains an R&D problem, and

the government agency in whose bailiwick it logically falls is NASA. Development

of such technology should be viewed as a requirement, an obligation, of the Nation’s

space agency, wholly apart from its mission to explore. It must be demanded, and

funded, by the Congress, and the Agency’s managers should be held to account for

its completion. This is the single highest-priority space technology development need

confronting the United States.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Donna L. Shirley, Director, Science Fiction Museum; Former Manager,

Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s Mars Program; Former Assistant Dean, University

of Oklahoma Aerospace Mechanical Engineering Department

Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert

Q1. To the best of your knowledge, are there alternative ‘‘end states’’ to assembly of

the Space Station other than that which NASA currently plans that would meet

all or most of our international commitments, would require less expenditures

of funding, and would still allow the necessary science to be conducted on the

effects of space on human physiology?

A1. Unfortunately, I am not familiar enough with the current design of the Station

to answer specifically whether the development could be truncated to save money

without breaking our international commitments. Certainly I would think that restricting experiments to those on physiology would help, but the international elements of the Station are not all focused on these issues. In addition, many of the

elements of the Station that remain to be flown have already been built at considerable expense and it isn’t clear how much would be saved by not flying them.

As Dr. Young pointed out in his testimony, physical preparation for a long zerog or even partial-g trip requires that a centrifuge be included in the Station and

I don’t know the status of construction of this facility.

On the economic principle that ‘‘sunk cost’’ should not be included when making

an economic decision NASA or an independent entity (e.g., the GAO) should be

charged with looking at the cheapest way to achieve the goals of satisfying our

international commitments while getting the physiological information necessary to

design human exploration missions. This may or may not include completing the

Station as planned.

Of course all of these issues are dependent on the choices made about access to

space. The picture will be very different with and without the Shuttle.

Q2. At the hearing, Dr. Fisk recommended that NASA proceed step by step with the

exploration initiative to ‘‘learn as you go.’’ What do you believe are the significant steps that NASA must take as it implements the initiative, and what kind

of milestones or gates do you believe, if any, Congress should set to ensure that

the initiative is proceeding well and NASA is properly learning as it is going?

A2. NASA has procedures in place in its management instructions, (e.g., NMI

7120.5A. ‘‘NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements’’),

which require independent reviews of programs before they are allowed to obligate

money. These reviews have not always been held for large, politically sensitive

projects like Station. NASA should develop a specific plan and program to complete

the Station, focusing on international commitments and physiology, and have these

plans reviewed by independent entities per its own policies.

The plans should indeed be ‘‘learn as you go,’’ and should be decision-tree based.

For instance, what must be known about Shuttle reliability to return it to flight?

What are other ways of supplying the Station and what should be done to exercise

these options? NASA should be capable of answering these questions. Unfortunately, I am not sanguine that NASA has the internal capability to make these

trades, particularly in the politically intense climate in which it must operate. I

would suggest that reviews be held, per the NMI 7120.5A, at the various budgetary

phases, and that the GAO or OMB be included in these regular in order to give Congress insight.

Specific steps would be, in the next six months:

— Develop a return-to-flight plan for the Shuttle.

— Develop the minimum list of mission requirements for Station support to

human exploration.

— Compare this list with already-built elements of the Station and select only

those elements that are needed to meet the requirements.

— Do the same for international elements.

— Develop a set of alternatives to the Shuttle, including the use of private and

international launch capability, and develop a set of metrics for selecting between the alternatives, including costs.

Then, in the six months after that, select the alternatives to pursue, and revise

the current Station plans to head in this direction. Review progress at least on an

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annual basis and ensure that the metrics are actually measured and are used to

make decisions about how to proceed.

Q3. What recommendations, if any, would you make on how best to organize NASA

to undertake the President’s space exploration initiative?

A3. I strongly recommend that a BRAC-like process be applied to NASA. It is not

clear that all of the human space flight centers are needed to efficiently operate a

human exploration program. Next, I believe that NASA would be much more effectively operated if its centers were converted to contractor-operated facilities, such

as JPL is now.

Finally, I believe that NASA needs competition, at least in the area of launch capability. While none of the current private launch companies can replace the Shuttle, they could conduct resupply operations within a few years which would require

the Shuttle only to launch the very large payloads. There is no reason that if the

private launch companies can launch tourists with an acceptable level of risk they

should not also be able to launch crews to the Station.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. What, if any, are your biggest concerns with respect to the President’s space exploration initiative? What should Congress be focusing its attention on as we

evaluate the initiative?

A1. My biggest concern, as I mentioned in my Testimony, is that the Moon initiative is a diversion from the real exploration of Mars, and that good, rigorous analysis is needed to really evaluate whether, for instance, the use of lunar resources

(e.g., oxygen) is worth the cost of obtaining them. There are many advocates for a

lunar initiative who seem to be basing their advocacy on this resource issue. This

is a fertile area for analysis, but should be done independently of those advocates.

In Apollo, Marshall and Johnson were advocating different approaches to reaching

the Moon. One center insisted that rendezvous of elements in Earth orbit was best;

the other wanted to have the rendezvous in lunar orbit. The spacecraft manager,

Joe Shea, required each of the centers to analyze and advocate the point of view

that they didn’t hold. This revealed a lot of excellent issues and the decision to use

lunar rendezvous was the outcome. NASA might take this approach to Moon vs.

Mars.

My second concern is that the initiative is so under-funded as to be infeasible.

Even with non-human exploration projects being slain all over NASA, the projected

near-term budgets for specific elements such as the Crew Exploration Vehicle seem

to be very low. While there appears to be ample funding over the long-term, at least

in terms of the total dollars planned, without a specific action plan it is very difficult to assess whether this is indeed the case. Congress should put a budget cap

on this activity, insist that specific plans and designs be developed and costed, per

NASA NMI’s, and insist on very hard-nosed reviews of these plans and designs.

My third concern is that all non-exploration science should not be sacrificed for

the exploration program. Canceling or curtailing the Sun-Earth Connection, for example, will leave a gaping hole in data needed to assess the safety of human missions beyond LEO.

Q2. It has been argued that one of the main rationales for human space exploration

is its inspirational value. However, the Mars Pathfinder and the Spirit and Opportunity Mars Rovers have demonstrated that robotic missions are capable of

capturing the public imagination.

• Given that, what do you think are the most compelling justifications for

human exploration?

• When should human exploration missions be contemplated—that is, should

they be deferred until as much as possible has been accomplished robotically,

or should human missions be an early goal? Why?

A2. As a person intimately involved in the rover missions, I can attest to the fascination that these missions had for the public. The most compelling justification

for humans is, as I stated in my testimony, that humans need to explore—including

taking risks to ‘‘be there’’ personally. Humans are unlikely to ever be as cost-effective as robots for carrying out science.

However, if we defer humans until robots have ‘‘completed’’ their exploration

tasks, we will never send humans. Even exploring a relative small planet like Mars

will take many, many years. We need to robotically collect enough data about Mars

(or the Moon) to reduce the risk that humans will not survive the trip, or that they

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will not be useful when they get there. Then we need to get on with figuring out

how best to let humans do what they need to do—to explore. And this exploration

with humans will necessitate that robots go along as precursors to set up infrastructure, as associates in exploration, and as extenders of human senses and capabilities.

Q3. What do you consider an appropriate role for the private sector to be in the exploration of the solar system?

A3. I think the government should provide incentives to the fledgling private launch

industry, much as it incentivized the early aviation industry. There is currently little competition to drive down launch costs. Consideration should be given, not just

to ‘‘prizes’’ of a few tens of millions of dollars, but to allowing private industry to

bid on carrying out elements of the human exploration program.

NASA should have a much more open decision process about selecting objectives

and architectures for human exploration, which would allow the private sector to

propose how they would accomplish these objectives.

Q4. One of the key questions we will have to wrestle with as we evaluate the President’s proposed initiative is whether NASA has the capabilities needed to carry

it out successfully. Experienced NASA personnel will be retiring just as the initiative is getting going. New employees will not have any significant experience

in human space flight and will need time to acquire it. At the management levels of NASA, many of the key human space flight and exploration positions currently are held by retired generals and Admirals with no previous space-related

experience.

• How confident are you that NASA will have the experience and skills based

needed to conduct the initiative safely and successfully?

• If you aren’t, what would you recommend be done?

A4. I am not at all confident that NASA will have the capabilities to implement this

program, and I recommend that a BRAC-type process be implemented to look at

closing and/or repurposing some centers. In addition, I recommend converting civil

service centers to contractor-operated entities like JPL.

I am uncomfortable with assuming that a military management model is best for

NASA (or for a national/international space enterprise whether led by NASA or by

another agency). In addition to the lack of space experience I am concerned with

the mentality of military commanders as applied to what will probably be a very

diverse enterprise. I recently completed a study of the management of an Air Force

facility and one problem was the lack of flexibility and creativity imposed by the

intrinsic ‘‘command and control’’ philosophy of the military.

NASA has lost many, many highly qualified people because of the downsizing

frenzy in the 1990’s. I believe that some of these people could be recaptured and

put to good use if they saw a real chance to accomplish something in space. However, whether the current top-level management at NASA is capable of identifying

and selecting the right people with the right experience is very unclear.

As we have learned at JPL, younger people can take on tremendous responsibilities and succeed. I would recommend a mix of people, like those at JPL and their

contractors, who are creative, motivated, flexible and hard working be given the responsibility for implementing elements of the human exploration program. This

would be facilitated by ‘‘privatizing the centers.’’

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Laurence R. Young, Apollo Program Professor, Massachusetts Institute

of Technology (MIT); Founding Director of the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI)

Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert

Q1. If NASA’s work on the Space Station is to be completed around 2016, do you

think that researchers will have learned enough about countermeasures and

risks to the human body to embark on longer missions to the Moon and Mars?

How much could be learned instead on missions to the Moon as envisioned by

the President’s exploration initiative?

A1. Yes, if we proceed with an adequate number of test subjects and follow a wellconsidered experimental plan with subjects who will stick with the test protocols we

should learn enough by 2016 to proceed on longer interplanetary missions. The risk

will be reduced, of course, by further testing, but another 12 years, with the right

on-orbit equipment and adequate up-down capacity should make the risk acceptable.

As to going to the Moon first—I find that difficult to justify. Although life support

systems could be tested on the Moon they could also be verified on a LEO artificial

gravity craft, at lower cost and with more control. We will need to learn how to operate at Martian gravity eventually, and the lunar experience will only be of marginal benefit.

Q2. Is there a coupling between the effects of microgravity and radiation on human

health while astronauts are in space or are the effects separable?

A2. I am not an expert in radiation, but can only report on the findings of others.

The NRC Space Studies Board, in 2000 saw no reason to explore such coupling, and

most other reports indicate no strong relationship between radiation and microgravity. However, there is some evidence from early Russian animal experiments

suggesting that radiation effects were more severe during space flight than during

ground experiments. This is not, in my view, a high priority issue.

Q3. In your written testimony you advocate the development of a centrifuge for humans on the Space Station, yet the centrifuge planned for the Space Station will

only hold small mammals. How critical is it for NASA to develop a human centrifuge for research on the Space Station? Without a human centrifuge, will we

know enough before we ask astronauts to embark on ventures beyond low-Earth

orbit?

A3. Both a human centrifuge and the planned animal centrifuge are high priority

items for the Space Station. In the early plans for the current animal centrifuge a

second rotating arm was included, which could spin synchronously with the main

wheel to exchange habitats without stopping the centrifuge. This ‘‘servicing arm’’

could also be adapted to spinning of astronauts for short periods of artificial gravity.

The servicing arm and its human rotator capability were eliminated to reduce costs.

It now seems to me that both the animal and human stimulators are absolutely necessary in order to understand and reduce to practice the artificial gravity universal

antidote against the debilitating effects of weightlessness. Just as the FDA proceeds

from drug testing on small animals to large animals to human clinical trials we

must evaluate our countermeasure in logical steps. It must be proven in LEO before

employing it on the way to Mars. The concepts and preliminary designs of such a

short radius centrifuge were spelled out in a 1999 NASA–NSBRI international

workshop on artificial gravity chaired by William Paloski of JSC and myself. The

proposal for a flight human centrifuge ready for experiments on the ISS by 2009

has been proposed to Code U as part of the Human Research Initiative.

Q4. To what extent has the research agenda on the Space Station been limited by

a lack of capacity to transport logistics, cargo, and experiments to and from the

Space Station?

A4. The absence of regular Space Shuttle flights to and from the ISS and the lack

of up/down capacity has already impacted the research agenda. The limited crew onboard has reduced the pace of conducting human experiments. No animal experiments can be accomplished without a glovebox on orbit and the transport of animals

to and from the ISS. Several experiments have been delayed by months to years.

The situation will only get worse if the Shuttle is retired in 2010 and the CEV is

not operational until 2014 or later. Furthermore, the current research agenda is impacted by the inability to conduct life sciences investigations effectively immediately

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post-flight research requiring access to astronauts immediately after landing is not

possible when they return on a Soyuz. Additionally, the recent NRA suggests that

proposals not include testing of astronauts prior to R+4, which is well beyond the

critical period of re-adaptation. In my opinion, the U.S. should not abandon the

Shuttle until our own next generation vehicle is operational.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. What, if any, are your biggest concerns with respect to the President’s space exploration initiative? What should Congress be focusing its attention on as we

evaluate the initiative?

A1. I am in favor of the vision of human exploration of Mars. My main concerns

are budget and competition for funding. Until a realistic Mars exploration plan is

enunciated it is difficult to know how much this will cost and over how many years

the initial development will last. However, in keeping with the President’s initiative

we have already begun to close down other important science and technology

projects. I am also concerned about the projected lack of U.S. human launch capability between 2010 and the operation of the CEV, as discussed in my answer to

Chairman Boehlert’s last question.

Q2. It has been argued that one of the main rationales for human space exploration

is its inspirational value. However, the Mars Pathfinder and the Spirit and Opportunity Mars Rovers have demonstrated that robotic missions are capable of

capturing the public imagination.

Q2a. Given that, what do you think are the most compelling justifications for human

exploration?

A2a. Robotic missions are outstanding precursors to human exploration—but they

return neither the scientific nor the non-scientific value of human voyages. Many,

many of my students at MIT are attracted to the space program by the human exploration challenge—either as astronauts or as explorers on the ground. Robots

don’t carry the same appeal. The human benefit is somewhat intangible, but it certainly motivates young people into careers in science and engineering. The opportunity for a trained human to observe, sample and form hypotheses about Mars is

unlikely to be matched by robots in the foreseeable future.

Q2b. When should human exploration missions be contemplated—that is, should

they be deferred until as much as possible has been accomplished robotically,

or should human missions be an early goal? Why?

A2b. Human exploration should be contemplated as soon as we are confident in our

countermeasures against the deleterious effects of weightlessness and radiation.

They should be an early goal—but not the first goal.

Q3. What do you consider an appropriate role for the private sector to be in the exploration of the solar system?

A3. The private sector, in its traditional role of developing new technology for space

exploration, should be encouraged and rewarded for technology transfer to benefit

of humanity on Earth. Eventually they will be involved in space tourism, but in the

near-term I believe that the direct commercial benefits of solar system exploration

are limited.

Q4. One of the key questions we will have to wrestle with as we evaluate the President’s proposed initiative is whether NASA has the capabilities needed to carry

it out successfully. Experienced NASA personnel will be retiring just as the initiative is getting going. New employees will not have any significant experience

in human space flight and will need time to acquire it. At the management levels of NASA, many of the key human space flight and exploration positions currently are held by retired generals and Admirals with no previous space-related

experience.

• How confident are you that NASA will have the experience and skills based

needed to conduct the initiative safely and successfully?

• If you aren’t, what would you recommend be done?

A4. NASA alone currently has the experience and skills to conduct this mission.

However, with the aging NASA workforce the program will have to move along

smartly to recruit a new generation. The appeal of NASA will be augmented by the

initiative. The new NASA scholarship program will encourage young college students to get involved. More funding to Space Grant and support of NASA Fellows

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will help to renew the capable leadership. Just provide the jobs and the challenges,

I believe, and the capable young people will come to accomplish the difficult tasks.

We need to bring people into NASA now, however, to have them available as leaders

in the next 5–10 years.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. In your testimony you state: ‘‘the most important piece of additional equipment

to meet the research goals is a short radius human centrifuge for the study of

intermittent artificial gravity inside the International Space Station.’’

Q1a. Please explain why you feel it is so important to have a human centrifuge.

A1a. Without it we cannot explore and then demonstrate the effectiveness of artificial gravity in overcoming the deleterious effects of weightlessness on muscle, bone,

cardiovascular and sensory-motor systems. And without an adequate countermeasure we dare not send astronauts on a 2–3 year mission.

Q1b. Has development of such a human centrifuge been a priority of the research

community in the past, and if so, why hasn’t it been included in NASA’s research planning?

A1b. A human centrifuge has been called for in most if not all of the NRC Committee on Space Biology and Medicine reports since the 1970’s, as well as in the

reports of the various NASA advisory committees on the Space Station. It has been

eliminated primarily because of cost, in favor of the smaller and cheaper animal

centrifuge. There was also concern that vibration from the spinning arm would disturb the quiet environment necessary for the materials science microgravity studies.

Q1c. Addition of such a human centrifuge runs counter to NASA’s current plan to

limit the amount of new facilities on the Station and to bring its research activities to a close in 2016 if possible. How difficult do you think it would be

to develop such a centrifuge, how long would it take, and what would it cost?

A1c. A human centrifuge would not be difficult—and feasibility studies have already been conducted. There were proposals to fly one in the Shuttle mid-deck or

in Spacehab several years ago. A space flight version could be operational on the

ISS by 2009. I am not qualified to estimate its cost.

Q2. The entire research program of the International Space Station has been designed around the availability of the Space Shuttle to take up and return laboratory equipment, samples, and animal and plant specimens.

• What will be the impact on the Station’s usefulness for research if the Space

Shuttle is no longer available after Station assembly is completed in 2010 or

soon thereafter?

• What would you recommend be done?

A2. In response I repeat my answer to the similar question posed by Chairman

Boehlert:

The absence of regular Space Shuttle flights to and from the ISS and the lack

of up/down capacity has already impacted the research agenda. The limited crew onboard has reduced the pace of conducting human experiments. No animal experiments can be accomplished without a glovebox on orbit and the transport of animals

to and from the ISS. Several experiments have been delayed by months to years.

The situation will only get worse if the Shuttle is retired in 2010 and the CEV is

not operational until 2014 or later. Furthermore, the current research agenda is impacted by the inability to conduct life sciences investigations effectively immediately

post-flight research requiring access to astronauts immediately after landing is not

possible when they return on a Soyuz. Additionally, the recent NRA suggests that

proposals not include testing of astronauts prior to R+4, which is well beyond the

critical period of readaptation. In my opinion, the U.S. should not abandon the Shuttle until our own next generation vehicle is operational.

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1 National Research Council, Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A

Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2004, p. 35. 2 National Research Council, Issues and Opportunities Regarding the U.S. Space Program: A

Summary Report of a Workshop on National Space Policy. National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2004, pp. 1, 38.

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Lennard A. Fisk, Chair, Space Studies Board (SSB), National Academy of Sciences; Chair, Department of Atmospheric, Oceanic, and Space

Sciences, University of Michigan; Former Associate Administrator, Space Science

and Applications, NASA

Questions submitted by Chairman Sherwood Boehlert

Q1. To the best of your knowledge, are there alternative ‘‘end states’’ to assembly of

the Space Station other than that which NASA currently plans that would meet

all or most of our international commitments, would require less expenditures

of funding, and would still allow the necessary science to be conducted on the

effects of space on human physiology?

A1. I am not aware of such alternative end states. Our commitments to ESA and

Japan, to provide for their use of the Columbus module and Japan Experiment Module (JEM) for their research programs, will require us to complete the basic ISS assembly. We would have to be relieved of this obligation to follow another course.

Moreover, the NASA exploration initiative will require biomedical data on crew performance in microgravity, as well as the development of technology in support of exploration, all of which requires a capable space station.

Q2. At the hearing, you recommended that NASA proceed step by step with the exploration initiative to ‘‘learn as you go.’’ What do you believe are the significant

steps that NASA must take as it implements the initiative, and what kind of

milestones or gates do you believe, if any, Congress should set to ensure that the

initiative is proceeding well and NASA is properly learning as it is going?

A2. The first step should be to develop a relatively detailed architecture, which will

specify the technology needed, robotic missions required, and how all these elements

will be integrated in support of the exploration initiative.1 This is a major effort.

NASA appears to be undertaking this now. However, I would encourage the agency

to involve the broader scientific and industrial community. One of the lessons from

the science program is that it feeds on the creative tension that exists between

NASA and the broader science community.2 The human space flight program could

do well to develop its own creative tension.

With an architectural plan in place, milestones and decision points can then be

specified. It would be unwise at this point to attempt to specify in detail how we

will get to Mars, or even what it would cost. These cannot be determined today.

Rather, we should ask what the first steps are within a likely architecture, and how

they will provide options for the next steps and so on, and measure our progress

through accomplishing these successive steps.

Q3. Steven Weinberg recently wrote an article in The New York Review of Books entitled ‘‘The Wrong Stuff’ (see attachment) in which he says that ‘‘as the Moon

and Mars missions absorb more and more money, the golden age of cosmology

is going to be terminated.’’

Do you agree with Dr. Weinberg’s assessment? How can Congress ensure that

any cost growth for infrastructure does not adversely effect funding for science,

especially if Congress is unable to provide NASA as a whole with greater funding?

A3. Termination is an unlikely possibility. An intellectual issue as basic and as vibrant as current cosmology cannot be killed. Rather, the issue is balance within the

science program. It has long been a policy of space science to attempt, within available resources, to have each of the major science disciplines advance at a reasonable

pace. All of the major science disciplines are judged to be important for understanding the universe in which we live. The exploration mission threatens that balance by declaring some science disciplines to be more important for exploration than

others, such as cosmology. We should all, the science community and Congress, encourage NASA not to distinguish among its science disciplines, but rather to develop

and execute plans that allow each to progress as expeditiously as resources allow.

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Q4. What recommendations, if any, would you make on how best to organize NASA

to undertake the President’s space exploration initiative?

A4. I would not like to comment in any detail on the NASA organization. The Presidential Commission on Moon, Mars and Beyond is expected to offer advice here. One

general comment, however: NASA has many missions, of which exploration, as they

now define it, is only one. An organizational structure has to be found that allows

each of NASA’s missions to succeed, while encouraging as much integration of activities across the agency as possible.

Q5. We are now totally dependent on the Russians to provide crew rescue with their

Soyuz vehicles. However, Russia fulfills its Soyuz obligations to the international partners in April 2006. After that time, it is not clear how NASA plans

to provide a crew rescue capability for astronauts on-board the Space Station.

• Do you believe NASA should develop its own crew rescue capsule for the Space

Station? How soon do you think a crew rescue capsule could be developed?

• Do you believe that the Crew Exploration Vehicle should be designed to service

the Space Station as well as carry out missions beyond low-Earth orbit?

A5. There are numerous choices here. The crew rescue vehicle is important for providing the maximum possible crew for the ISS, which in turn is necessary to achieve

the scientific research on the ISS, particularly the biomedical research that will be

necessary for the exploration initiative. The Soyuz, or perhaps more correctly multiple Soyuz vehicles can provide this, if we are willing to depend on and support

the Russians. A separate U.S. crew rescue vehicle would be desirable. However, if

it is to be developed separately, it could distract from the Crew Exploration Vehicle

development that will be required to proceed with the initiative. Conversely, if the

Crew Exploration Vehicle is designed also to serve as the crew rescue vehicle, there

is a danger that it will be another example of promising too many capabilities for

one development, which is a mistake NASA has made in previous developments, especially the Shuttle and the ISS.

I believe this is yet another example of the necessity of a good architecture study

for the exploration initiative, which should indicate what capabilities it is reasonable to expect of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. Following that determination, it

should be possible to specify the options for the crew rescue vehicle, and decide

whether there are any that are both technically and politically acceptable.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. What, if any, are your biggest concerns with respect to the President’s space exploration initiative? What should Congress be focusing its attention on as we

evaluate the initiative?

A1. Let me start by saying that I am very supportive of the exploration initiative.

I believe it defines realistic and realizable goals for human space flight. However,

I do have concerns:

Foremost among the concerns is the arbitrary bifurcation of science into disciplines that are judged to be supportive of exploration and those that are not, the

so-called ‘‘other science.’’ I consider this split to be arbitrary and not based on any

defendable argument. For example, Sun-Earth Connection, one of the science

themes in NASA’s Office of Space Science, is clearly important for human exploration since it is concerned with the radiation environment of space; yet much of

it is designated ‘‘other science.’’ The Structure and Evolution of the Universe theme,

also labeled as ‘‘other science,’’ is concerned with basic cosmology, and this is certainly exploration. Earth science has a mandate all its own. I would eliminate this

arbitrary division, and provide for the balanced science program that has been so

successful throughout the history of the space program.

I am also concerned that NASA is not reaching out adequately in its effort to develop an architectural design of the new exploration initiative. The ongoing studies

of how to pursue this bold venture should involve the broader space community in

the U.S. industry and academia—and also engage our international partners. Broadening that activity will result in a better design, as well as broader political support.

Q2. It has been argued that one of the main rationales for human space exploration

is its inspirational value. However, the Mars Pathfinder and the Spirit and Opportunity Mars Rovers have demonstrated that robotic missions are capable of

capturing the public imagination.

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• Given that, what do you think are the most compelling justifications for

human exploration?

• When should human exploration missions be contemplated—that is, should

they be deferred until as much as possible has been accomplished robotically,

or should human missions be an early goal? Why?

A2. It is a judgment call as to whether we can derive as much inspirational value

from robots as we can from human presence. My personal judgment is we cannot.

Humans relate to other humans; humans can communicate the experience. You can

drive auto-racing cars remotely. Do you think it would be as interesting to the public if all the drivers sat in the stands with remote control devices?

I would also argue that we should expect that in time, hopefully within the next

century, we will extend our civilization into the solar system. The human presence

will be extended to other planets. The only issue for now, then, is when do we start

and who leads it? The exploration initiative is intended to do that.

That said, for the exploration of Mars both humans and robots will be necessary,

working in synergy—human-assisted robots and robot-assisted humans. Robots

clearly need to go first. The delay time for communication between Earth and Mars

will eventually require, at minimum, humans to be located in Mars orbit to direct

robotic exploration. And then humans need to be on the surface of Mars using their

reasoning skills to maximize the scientific return.

Q3. What do you consider an appropriate role for the private sector to be in the exploration of the solar system?

A3. Exploration of this type will always be a governmental function, just as Columbus’ voyages were, and Lewis and Clark’s. However, the execution of this program

will fall to industry and academia to accomplish. NASA does not build rockets, or

for that matter most satellites, and American industry will have to step up to these

tasks, just as they did during the Apollo program.

Q4. One of the key questions we will have to wrestle with as we evaluate the President’s proposed initiative is whether NASA has the capabilities needed to carry

it out successfully. Experienced NASA personnel will be retiring just as the initiative is getting going. New employees will not have any significant experience

in human space flight and will need time to acquire it. At the management levels of NASA, many of the key human space flight and exploration positions currently are held by retired generals and Admirals with no previous space-related

experience.

• How confident are you that NASA will have the experience and skills based

needed to conduct the initiative safely and successfully?

• If you aren’t, what would you recommend be done?

A4. First of all, I think it is important to recognize that questions about the required skills and capabilities to carry out the exploration initiative are not just a

NASA problem, but rather a problem throughout the space industry. Many of our

best space engineers and scientists, in industry and at universities, entered the

space program or were inspired to do so during the Apollo era. They are now at the

end of their careers.

The workforce necessary for a sustained program leading to a human mission to

Mars does not now exist. In simple terms, by the time we are ready to send a

human to Mars we will need 50,000 to 75,000 new space engineers and scientists.

The task of providing this workforce will fall to American universities. NASA

should thus make providing the required workforce an integral part of its planning

for the new initiative and be concerned with and assist the university community

in performing its essential role.

It is important to note that this issue is not simply about encouraging K–12 students to pursue math and science. The workforce needed for the exploration initiative is small compared to the Nation’s expected output of engineers and scientists.

Rather, the issue is encouraging the best and the brightest to pursue careers in

space. Students often make career decisions as undergraduates, which again emphasizes the important role that universities will have to play in the new space initiative.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. As NASA Associate Administrator for space science you had direct influence on

many of NASA’s current robotic missions. The Hubble Space Telescope is the

most direct example of a successful integration of human and robotic space acVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:28 Oct 04, 2004 Jkt 092339 PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\FULL04\031004\92339 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tivities. There was also the case where the crew of STS–41C repaired the Solar

Maximum Mission satellite in orbit. To what extent should future space telescopes be designed for long-term operation and periodic servicing by humans?

A1. The Hubble Space Telescope is certainly an excellent example of integrated

robotic and human space activities. Without Shuttle repair and servicing, Hubble

would have been a great disappointment, rather than the outstanding success it has

become.

As for future missions involving human servicing, the NRC plans to pursue a

study of Large Optical Systems in Space. The study will examine the goals of large

telescopes in space across many agency needs and consider factors of location, infrastructure, assembly, operations, and servicing.

Q2. What, if any, scientific activities on the Moon will require the presence of astronauts? What priority does the scientific community assign to those scientific activities relative to other potential space science projects?

A2. The primary reason for going back to the Moon will probably be to practice for

sending humans to Mars. Science can be done, and the presence of humans can facilitate that science. However, science exploration of the Moon can probably also be

done robotically.

Particularly ambitious goals for the Moon, e.g., setting up astronomical observatories, that would require humans are worthy of further study.

NRC reports have not dealt with lunar science in recent years, since the thrust

of solar system exploration has been Mars and the other planets and small bodies.

It would be worthwhile to re-examine the goals of lunar science in light of the Moon

as an immediate destination for both the robotic and human space flight program.

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136