1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

HOWARD L. TAYLOR, SR., and 

SONYA R. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:20-cv-59-AW-MJF

FARM CREDIT OF NORTH FLORIDA, 

ACA,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a credit discrimination case. Howard and Sonya Taylor wanted to buy 

three-hundred-plus acres in Leon County. ECF No. 36 ¶ 25; ECF No. 36-2 at 1; ECF 

No. 48-1 at 378. After seeking financing through several other lenders, ECF No. 48-

3 at 7-8, the Taylors were referred to Farm Credit of North Florida, ACA (“Farm 

Credit”), see, e.g., ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 30-33; ECF No. 48-8 at 1-2. Farm Credit denied 

the Taylors’ application, ECF No. 36-4 at 1, and its Credit Review Committee 

upheld the denial, ECF No. 48-11 at 68-69; ECF No. 36-4 at 5.

The Taylors allege that Farm Credit denied their application because of their 

race. See ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 2, 4; id. ¶ 105 (alleging “discriminatory practices against 

black borrowers”). They present three claims: (1) one under the Equal Credit 

Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f, which bars discrimination as 

to credit transactions; (2) one under § 1981, which bars discrimination in 
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contracting; and (3) one under the Florida Fair Housing Act (“FFHA”), Fla. Stat. 

§§ 760.20-.37, which bars discrimination related to real estate financing.

1 ECF No. 

36 ¶¶ 92-109, 110-120, 121-133.

Farm Credit moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 49. The Taylors 

responded in opposition and, in the alternative, asked the court to deny or defer Farm 

Credit’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). ECF No. 53. Farm 

Credit replied, ECF No. 54, and responded separately to the Rule 56(d) request, ECF 

No. 55. After carefully considering the briefs and the cited portions of the record,2I 

conclude Farm Credit is entitled to summary judgment.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The summary-judgment standard is well settled: “The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). The court must view all evidence and draw all inferences in the light most 

1 The Taylors’ initial complaint included only an ECOA claim. ECF No. 1. 

The Taylors amended, adding a tortious interference claim. ECF No. 19. I dismissed 

the tortious interference claim for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 27 at 7-10. The 

Taylors then filed the operative complaint. ECF No. 36.

2 The summary-judgment record includes more than one thousand pages. 

Parties must cite “particular parts of materials in the record” to support their factual 

assertions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The court “need consider only the cited 

materials,” and I decline to consider materials provided but not cited. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c)(3); accord N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 56.1(F); see also A.L. v. Jackson Cnty. 

Sch. Bd., 635 F. App’x 774, 786-87 (11th Cir. 2015).
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favorable to the non-moving party (here, the Taylors). Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). But the Taylors bear the burden of 

proof on their claims and must “go beyond the pleadings” to “designate specific facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 324 (1986) (marks omitted). This showing must surpass a mere “scintilla” and 

establish “evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for” the Taylors. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). And if the Taylors “fail[]

to ‘make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [their] case with respect to 

which [they have] the burden of proof,’ then the court must enter summary judgment 

for the moving party.” Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 161 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th 

Cir. 1998) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).

Still, “summary judgment may only be decided upon an adequate record.” 

WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1269 (11th Cir. 1988) (discussing practical effect of 

Celotex trilogy of decisions). The court must thus “ensure that the parties ha[d] an 

adequate opportunity for discovery” so that summary judgment is not premature. 

Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 

1990) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Accordingly, “[i]f a nonmovant shows by 

affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to 

justify its opposition, the court may (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) 

allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any 
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other appropriate order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “The parties’ comparative access to 

the witnesses or material . . . is a particularly salient factor” when a court exercises

discretion under Rule 56(d).3 Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir. 1989)

(cleaned up). But whether the nonmovant had “ample time and opportunity for 

discovery, yet failed to diligently pursue his options,” is relevant too, id. at 932, and

a party who “has failed to make use of the various discovery mechanisms” may not 

be entitled to relief, Walters v. City of Ocean Springs, 626 F.2d 1317, 1321-22 (5th 

Cir. 1980).

II. THE TAYLORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DENIAL OR DEFERRAL UNDER 

RULE 56(D).

The Taylors argue summary judgment is premature because they have not had 

a “full[] and fair[]” opportunity for discovery. ECF No. 53 at 14. They cannot 

presently oppose summary judgment, they argue, because they’ve thus far been 

denied information in Farm Credit’s “sole custody and control” that would enable 

the Taylors to (1) identify comparators, (2) prove they qualified for the loan they 

sought, and (3) augment their statistical evidence of discrimination. Id. at 12-13. The 

Taylors say Farm Credit admits it retains the desired information, though without 

borrower race datapoints (which the Taylors assert they can derive). Id. at 12, 13-

14, 16. So they claim their inability to obtain discovery is “no fault of their own” but 

3 Before the 2010 amendment, the Rule 56(d) provisions were in Rule 56(f). 

Burns v. Town of Palm Beach, 999 F.3d 1317, 1330 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021).
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due to Farm Credit’s recalcitrance and the court’s adverse discovery ruling. Id. at 

14; see also, e.g., id. at 23 (“[I]n denying the Taylor’s Motion to Compel . . . the 

[c]ourt foreclosed any opportunity . . . to locate any comparator evidence.”).

It’s clear from their brief that the Taylors aren’t seeking extra time to pursue 

more narrowly tailored discovery. Instead, they continue to seek exactly what they 

pursued (and Farm Credit objected to) in their second request for production 

(“RFP”): fifteen pieces of data each for five years’ worth of loan applications. ECF 

No. 53 at 17; ECF No. 53-5 ¶¶ 7-8, 11; ECF No. 53-2 ¶¶ 1(a)-(o). I already declined 

to compel Farm Credit to produce this information because it was not narrowly 

targeted to yield valid comparators and it imposed significant burden and expense 

on Farm Credit. ECF No. 45 at 1-3. Ultimately, then, the Taylors seek—under the 

guise of a Rule 56(d) request—reconsideration of my earlier decision, with which 

they disagree. ECF No. 53 at 9; see also id. at 12 (“[T]he Court should have ordered 

production of the loan files . . . .”); id. at 14 (“[T]he Taylors do not believe their 

requests overbroad, unduly burdensome[,] or out of proportion.”); id.at 16 (“[T]his 

was no fishing expedition by the Taylors and they should not have been denied 

discovery.”).

Now is not the time, nor is a summary judgment response the place, for such 

a request. The Taylors could have asked for reconsideration promptly after the midJune ruling. They also could have sought to reopen discovery to permit a narrower 
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request for production. Instead, they waited until faced with Farm Credit’s summaryjudgment motion, well after the close of discovery. At any rate, they have not shown 

reconsideration is appropriate, and I decline to revisit the motion to compel.

To the extent the Taylors argue there was insufficient time for full discovery, 

the procedural history shows otherwise. The parties’ Rule 26(f) conference was in 

April 2020, ECF No. 16, after which discovery could begin. Yet the Taylors didn’t 

serve their first RFP—seeking, among considerable other information, twenty-seven

pieces of data for each loan Farm Credit originated over a nearly three-year period—

until September 18, more than five months later. ECF No. 53-1 at 2, 9; id. ¶¶ 10(a)-

(aa); ECF No. 53-5 ¶ 5. Farm Credit objected to this request, but the Taylors never 

moved to compel production. ECF No. 55 at 3; accord ECF No. 55-1 at 10-17; cf.

ECF No. 53 at 5 (noting the parties attempted to reach agreement at a meet-andconfer). Nor did they serve a revised RFP within the next half year, despite several 

orders extending the discovery period, ultimately to June 2021, ECF No. 25 ¶ 1; ECF 

No. 35 ¶ 3. Instead, they waited until April 9, 2021 (nearly seven months after their

first RFP), to serve the second RFP discussed above, which they characterize as 

“narrowed” despite seeking two additional years of data for all loan applications (not 

just originations). ECF No. 53-5 ¶ 7; see also ECF No. 53-2.
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For all of these reasons, the Taylors’ Rule 56(d) request is denied.4

III. FARM CREDIT IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL CLAIMS.

I now turn to the merits. Farm Credit argues summary judgment is warranted 

because it denied the Taylors’ loan application for non-discriminatory reasons—past 

bankruptcies, insufficient income, excessive obligations relative to income, and an 

unfavorable current financial position5—and the Taylors haven’t proffered sufficient 

record evidence of credit discrimination. ECF No. 49 ¶¶ 1-2; ECF No. 50 at 6-7, 14

(“The Taylors cannot prove their causes of action under any of the[] available 

4 The Taylors cite several decisions deeming summary judgment improper 

without additional discovery, but each is factually distinguishable. In Estate of 

Todashev v. United States, for example, the plaintiff had no opportunity at all to seek 

discovery entirely in the defendants’ control because the case was stayed pending a 

qualified-immunity ruling. 815 F. App’x 446, 454 (11th Cir. 2020). In Snook v. Trust 

Co. of Georgia Bank of Savannah, an extensively briefed motion to compel was 

outstanding at the time of summary judgment. 859 F.2d 865, 870-71 (11th Cir. 

1988). And in Jackson v. Red Hills Oral & Facial Surgery, PA, this court deferred 

ruling on a motion for summary judgment when the defendants had not filed an 

answer and discovery had not begun. 2020 WL 1124764, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 

2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1078760 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 

2020). The Taylors also cite cases affirming denial of a Rule 56(d) motion under 

facts like those here. See Fla. Power & Light, 893 F.2d at 1316 (nearly two years 

between complaint and summary judgment, with multiple extensions of discovery 

deadline); Barfield, 883 F.2d at 928, 932-33 (more than one year between complaint

and summary judgment, and plaintiff failed to depose known witnesses or “request 

the court’s assistance” with discovery until after already-extended discovery 

deadline); Walters, 626 F.2d at 1321-22 (plaintiff failed to subpoena and depose 

critical nonparty witnesses available “continuously”).

5 See ECF No. 36-4 at 1 (Notice of Denial of Credit); id. at 5-6 (Credit Review 

Committee denial letter); ECF No. 51-1 at 78 (Explanation for Credit Denial); ECF 

No. 48-12 at 3 (policy as to loan applicant bankruptcies).
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methods of proof.”).

6 The Taylors, for their part, argue there are genuine issues of 

material fact, making summary judgment inappropriate. ECF No. 53 at 20.

The analytical framework used in Title VII cases applies to § 1981 

discrimination claims. Brown v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 949 (11th Cir. 

1991) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185-87 (1989)).

Same for the FFHA. See Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 

1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (FFHA claims analyzed like federal FHA claims); 

Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass’n, Inc., 3 F.3d 1472, 1476 n.6 (11th 

Cir. 1993) (federal FHA claims analyzed like Title VII claims). Most courts assume 

the same framework applies to ECOA claims too. See, e.g., Hall v. Johanns, 208 F.

App’x 726, 726 (11th Cir. 2006); Cooley v. Sterling Bank, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 

1338 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (“[T[he Eleventh Circuit has unflinchingly applied Title 

VII’s analytical framework to a host of anti-discrimination statutes, thus this court 

does not find any reason to suspect that the Eleventh Circuit would take a different 

approach to the ECOA.”).

6 Farm Credit raises three other arguments too. First, it argues the Taylors 

cannot succeed under a mixed-motive theory for proving discrimination, ECF No. 

50 at 25-26, but the Taylors disclaim reliance on that theory, ECF No. 53 at 32. Farm 

Credit also argues the Taylors’ FFHA claim fails because the FFHA does not cover 

vacant-land loans, ECF No. 49 ¶ 3; accord No. 50 at 27, and that the Taylors cannot 

establish damages, ECF No. 49 ¶¶ 4; No. 50 at 28-29. Because I find the Taylors 

have not provided any evidence of discrimination, infra Part III.A-B, I need not 

address these last two questions.
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This means the Taylors may defeat summary judgment with (1) direct 

evidence of discrimination; (2) statistical proof of a pattern and practice of 

discrimination; or (3) circumstantial evidence. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 

F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). But the Taylors do not seek to 

prove their claims with statistical data. ECF No. 53 at 20. And they point to no direct 

evidence of discrimination.7 That leaves circumstantial evidence—either using the 

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework,8id., or by presenting a convincing 

mosaic of record evidence of discrimination, Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 

F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).

7 A plaintiff seeking to establish discrimination by direct evidence faces a 

heavy burden. Direct evidence must “prove the existence of a fact without inference 

or presumption.” See Fernandez v. Trees, Inc., 961 F.3d 1148, 1156 (11th Cir. 2020) 

(cleaned up). “Only the most blatant remarks, whose intent could mean nothing other 

than to discriminate . . . constitute direct evidence,” and a statement that only 

“suggests . . . a discriminatory motive” is circumstantial. Id.; see also Merritt v. 

Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997) (Evidence “subject to more 

than one interpretation does not constitute direct evidence.”) (citation omitted).

8 The Taylors mention four nonbinding cases that they say “throw[] wrinkles 

into McDonnell Douglas” in credit-discrimination cases. ECF No. 53 at 10-12 

(citing Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Anderson v. 

Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2010); BNT Ad Agency, LLC v. City 

of Greensboro, 837 F. App’x 962 (4th Cir. 2020); and Sallion v. SunTrust Bank, 

Atlanta, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2000)). But they don’t flesh out those 

wrinkles or point to record evidence supporting their claims under these cases, so I 

do not address them.
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A. The Taylors cannot succeed under McDonnell Douglas.

Under the framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the plaintiff 

bears the initial burden of showing a prima facie case of discrimination. 411 U.S. 

792, 802 (1973). An essential element of that is showing a valid comparator—

someone “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 

918 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Here, “the Taylors admit that they 

cannot identify a valid comparator.” ECF No. 53 at 23; accord ECF No. 48-1 at 

239:9-240:18. Thus, they cannot use the McDonnell Douglas framework to defeat

summary judgment.9

B. The Taylors have not shown a convincing mosaic of circumstantial 

evidence of discrimination. 

A plaintiff who cannot leverage McDonnell Douglas can nonetheless 

withstand summary judgment “if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow 

a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Smith, 644 F.3d at 

1328 (cleaned up). Evidence may include “(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous 

9 Farm Credit disputes whether the Taylors can satisfy other elements of a 

prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, including proving they qualified for the 

loan at issue and identifying a decisionmaker aware of any comparators. ECF No. 

50 at 21-23. Farm Credit also argues that, even if the Taylors could prove a prima 

facie case, they cannot demonstrate Farm Credit’s non-discriminatory reasons for 

denying the loan were pretext. Id. at 23-24. Because there is no valid comparator, I 

need not reach these questions. This also moots the issue of whether McDonnell 

Douglas applies to ECOA claims. Cf. Hall, 208 F. App’x at 726.
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statements, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory 

intent might be drawn, (2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated 

employees, and (3) that the employer’s justification is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of 

Union City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).

The Taylors point to various hypothetical circumstantial evidence that might 

create a convincing mosaic10 but cite to only one piece of record evidence: comments 

about southern foods. ECF No. 53 at 31. The Taylors allege that Richard Terry, a 

Credit Review Committee member reviewing the Taylors’ loan denial, made 

comments about foods “carry[ing] racial overtones” (swamp cabbage, chitlins, and 

collard greens). ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 82-89; see also ECF No. 50 at 8 (identifying 

committee members). Terry admitted telling a story involving these foods before the 

review meeting but denied any “intent . . . [to] speak[] disrespectfully.” ECF No. 48-

11 at 43:23-47:24. The Taylors characterize the story as “derogator[y]” and allege it 

was intended to “degrade[], humiliate[,] and embarrass[]” them. ECF No. 36 ¶ 88. 

Howard Taylor also testified at deposition to feeling angry, demeaned, and 

10 ECF No. 53 at 31 (“Imaginably, some circumstantial evidence could be the 

disparate lending statistics the Defendant admitted . . . . Other circumstantial 

evidence could be the manufactured credit scores, the increasing down-payments, 

and the inexplicable ‘ratios’ which have never been explained by any witness or 

produced as loan or credit policy.”).
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powerless by the story. ECF No. 48-1 at 292:22-293:13 (“[T]here’s nothing we can 

say or do.”).

This single record citation hardly constitutes a mosaic of evidence; a mosaic, 

in this context, comprises many parts which combine to form an overall picture. 

Further, Terry’s story was unconnected to Farm Credit’s decisionmaking process, 

both substantively (because it did not pertain to the loan underwriting) and 

temporally (since it occurred after the Taylors’ application was denied, albeit before 

the Credit Review Committee’s review began). While I accept as true, for present 

purposes, Mr. Taylor’s testimony about his subjective reactions to Terry’s 

comments, a reasonable jury could not conclude—without more—that the southernfoods comments proved race-based discrimination.

Finally, even if I construe the Taylors’ response as asserting that their

statistical data contribute to the mosaic, the Taylors still fall short of establishing a 

convincing mosaic. The Taylors argue that the statistics—which are “derived 

directly from public records”—“show[] an undeniable imbalance” in the racial mix 

of Farm Credit’s loans. ECF No. 53 at 6. This may be true, but the Taylors point to 

no additional data showing that imbalance isn’t reflective of, say, disparate loan 

application rates instead of disparate approval rates. Cf. Brown, 939 F.2d at 952 

(noting fact that few black applicants were selected is not useful without knowing 

how many black applicants there were or how they compared to similarly situated 
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white applicants). Without record evidence contextualizing the Taylors’ data, I 

cannot draw a reasonable inference in the Taylors’ favor.

11 The statistical data 

therefore does not strengthen the Taylors’ convincing mosaic method of proof.

In short, the Taylors have not shown circumstantial evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could conclude that Farm Credit’s decision was based on race, rather 

than legitimate race-neutral reasons, like the Taylors’ history of bankruptcies. See, 

e.g., ECF No. 53 at 28; ECF No. 50 at 3; ECF No. 48-1 at 388, 390, 393, 397.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Taylors’ request to deny or defer summary judgment under Rule 56(d), 

ECF No. 53, is DENIED. Farm Credit’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 

49, is GRANTED. The clerk will enter a judgment that says, “This case was resolved 

on summary judgment. Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed on the merits. Plaintiffs shall 

take nothing from this case.” The clerk will close the file.

SO ORDERED on October 6, 2021.

s/ Allen Winsor

United States District Judge

11 The Taylors emphasize Farm Credit’s “admi[ssion]” at a deposition that it 

had no evidence refuting the statistics alleged in the complaint. ECF No. 53 at 7, 22. 

But Farm Credit—which denied the Taylors’ statistical allegations in its answer,

ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 103-04—has no burden in this regard. At this stage, the Taylors had 

to go beyond the pleadings.