NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

WILLIE L. WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2012-5009 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in Case No. 10-CV-880, Judge Lawrence J. Block. 

____________________________ 

Decided: June 6, 2012 

____________________________ 

WILLIE L. WILLIAMS, of Jackson County, Florida, pro 

se. 

WILLIAM B. LAZARUS, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources Civil Division, Appellate Section, United 

States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for 

defendant-appellee. 

__________________________ 
WILLIAMS v. US 2

Before RADER, Chief Judge, LOURIE and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Willie L. Williams appeals pro se from the decision of 

the United States Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims 

Court”) dismissing her claims seeking compensation 

under various treaties and judgments on behalf of the 

“Choctaws East of the Mississippi River, Florida” (the 

“Florida Choctaws”) for both failing to state a claim and 

for requesting relief outside the Claims Court’s jurisdiction. Williams v. United States, No. 10-880 L (Fed. Cl. 

Sept. 2, 2011) (the “Opinion”). Because the Claims Court 

correctly dismissed her claims, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Williams is allegedly a Choctaw Indian and chief of 

the Florida Choctaws, which is not a federally recognized 

Indian tribe. Williams filed a claim on behalf of herself, 

her predecessors, and the Florida Choctaws for compensation for a series of claims for monetary and equitable 

relief. Williams filed a compensation claim based on the 

“Joseph Chitto Claim” in an Indian Claims Commission 

judgment, Chitto v. United States, 3 Ind. Cl. Comm’n 288 

(1954), rev’d, 133 Ct. Cl. 643, 661 (1956), and also seeking 

to recover the Florida Choctaws’ portion of an alleged 

judgment of $40 million dollars from the U.S. government. Opinion, at 2. Williams also seeks to recover 

compensation for takings under various treaties executed 

between 1786 and 1837 for unidentified “reservation land, 

natural resources,” and “goods produced and extracted 

from” those lands taken from the Florida Choctaws and 

three individuals, Asbury Hunter, Burton Hunter, and 

Lucy Pope between 1920 and 2001. Id. Williams also 

requests royalties from the “former colonial power[s,]” 

“organizations,” and “private collectors” for their “use of 
3 WILLIAMS v. US

historical records for financial gain” as well as “compensation for war damage to territorial properties” for alleged 

genocide. Id.

Williams also seeks equitable relief in the form of returned ancestral land, “sacred and cultural objects,” and 

historical records as well as the removal of pollution on 

the land and waters from the “European sponsored wars 

of domination of the Americas.” Id. Williams’ complaint 

also includes allegations without a clear requested remedy for alleged “ethnocide” and “rape” of the Florida 

Choctaws by the United States and for alleged “character 

assassination” by the “colonial powers” concerning the 

“hospitabl[e] and peaceful” nature of the Florida Choctaws. Id. The government moved to dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. 

The Claims Court held that Williams, proceeding pro

se, did not have standing to assert claims on behalf of the 

Florida Choctaws or any other individuals and that 

Williams’ claims for monetary relief were time-barred by 

the Tucker and Indian Tucker Acts. Id. at 4. In addition, 

the court found that the claims for compensation from 

judgment funds to individual Indians (as opposed to 

tribes) was not congressionally authorized; Williams’ 

request for equitable relief was not within the Claims 

Court’s jurisdiction; and the basis pleaded by Williams for 

royalties did not provide sufficient factual content to 

plausibly establish the defendant’s liability. Id. at 5–6. 

Williams timely appealed, and this court has jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

DISCUSSION

We review de novo the Claims Court’s dismissal for 

lack of jurisdiction. See Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 

1554, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Like the trial court, this 

court tests the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of 
WILLIAMS v. US 4

law, accepting as true all non-conclusory allegations of 

fact, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

See Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (Fed. 

Cir. 1998); Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. 

Cir. 1995). 

Williams alleges that the Claims Court erred in dismissing her claims and that her immediate family, including herself, her mother, father, children, siblings, and 

grandparents, qualifies as its own tribe. Williams argues 

that because the tribe is limited to her immediate family, 

she has standing to bring a claim on behalf of that tribe. 

We disagree. 

The Claims Court correctly held that Williams’ pro se

status barred her from asserting claims on behalf of the 

Florida Choctaws or any other individuals. Rule 

83.1(a)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of 

Federal Claims states: 

An individual who is not an attorney may represent oneself or a member of one’s immediate family, but may not represent a corporation, an 

entity, or any other person in any proceeding before this court. The terms counsel, attorney, and 

attorney of record include such individuals appearing pro se. 

Because Williams is a non-lawyer proceeding pro se, she 

cannot represent the Florida Choctaws or anyone who is 

not an immediate family member. We note that there is 

no evidence in the appellate record that Asbury Hunter, 

Burton Hunter, or Lucy Pope are immediate family members of Williams. The Claims Court was therefore correct 

that Williams lacked standing to bring these claims, 

including the takings claims on behalf of the Florida 

Choctaws, Asbury Hunter, Burton Hunter, and Lucy 

Pope. 
5 WILLIAMS v. US

Furthermore, even if Williams did have standing, we 

agree with the Claims Court that all the claims are untimely. The Tucker Act gives the Claims Court jurisdiction over broad categories of claims against the United 

States and constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity as 

to those claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. A companion statute, 

the Indian Tucker Act, further confers jurisdiction on the 

Claims Court to hear any claim brought by a Native 

American tribe against the United States that “is one 

which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of 

Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1505. 

The Tucker Act’s grant of jurisdiction is limited by 

statute, barring claims not filed “within six years after 

such claim[s] first accrue[].” 28 U.S.C. § 2501. Williams 

filed her complaint in 2010. However, the alleged basis 

for the claims filed by Williams all occurred before 2001. 

Therefore, the Claims Court correctly held that these 

claims were time-barred under the Tucker Act. As for the 

claims under the Indian Tucker Act based on treaties, the 

court was correct to note that such claims must have 

accrued after 1946 for the court to have jurisdiction. 28 

U.S.C. § 1505. Williams’ claims filed on behalf of the 

Florida Choctaws for land and natural resources are 

based on treaties signed between 1786 and 1837, accruing 

long before 1946. Thus the Claims Court correctly dismissed these claims. The remaining claims seek equitable relief and are beyond the jurisdiction of the Claims 

Court. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 

We have considered Williams’ remaining arguments 

and do not find them persuasive. We find no error in the 

Claims Court’s well reasoned decision. We therefore 

conclude that the court correctly concluded that it did not 

have jurisdiction over Williams’ claims. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 
WILLIAMS v. US 6

AFFIRMED 

COSTS

No costs.