This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. No. 35,948 4 KARINA AGUILAR, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 7 Jacqueline D. Flores, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 Elizabeth Ashton, Assistant Attorney General 11 Albuquerque, NM 12 for Appellee 13 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender 14 Santa Fe, NM 15 for Appellant 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION 17 ZAMORA, Judge. 182 {1} Defendant Karina Aguilar appeals from the district court’s denial of her motion 1 to modify the conditions of her probati on to transfer her from supervised to 2 unsupervised probation. [DS 2-3; RP 37, 44, 46] This Court issued a notice proposing 3 summary reversal. [CN 1,4] The State filed a memorandum in opposition, which we 4 have duly considered. Remaini ng unpersuaded, we reverse. 5
{2} Defendant argues on appeal the district court erroneously denied her motion to 6 modify the conditions of her probation, pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 31-21-21 7 (1963), from supervised to unsupervised upon the district court’s mistaken belief it 8 lacked the jurisdiction to do so becausethe time for reduction of a sentence under 9 Rule 5-801 NMRA had expired. [DS 4] As we noted in our proposed disposition, our 10 Supreme Court has previously interpreted S ection 31-21-21 “to grant the district court 11 the discretion to modify conditions of probation in appropriate cases.” State v. 12 Trujillo , 1994-NMSC-066, ¶ 13, 117 N.M. 769, 877 P.2d 575. [CN 3] However, the 13 district court in Trujillo was determined to have abusedits discretion in modifying the 14 defendant’s probation because the modification violated the terms of a valid plea 15 agreement. Id . ¶¶ 14-15. [CN 3] As we pointed outin our notice, unlike the plea in 16 Trujillo , the plea agreement in th e present case did not include any specific terms of 17 Defendant’s sentence, beyond a two-year cap on incarceration at initial sentencing. 18 [CN 3] Thus, we proposed to hold modi fication of the supervision terms of 193 Defendant’s probation would not result in animpermissible modification of the plea 1 agreement in the manner the elimination of in-patient substance abuse treatment 2 violated the terms of the plea agreement in Trujillo

. Id . ¶¶ 14–15. 3
{3} In its memorandum in opposition, as in its response to Defendant’s motion 4 below [RP 39], the State continues to argue the district court lacked jurisdiction to 5 modify the terms of Defendant’s probation and supervisi on level because her motion 6 was untimely under Rule 5-801. [MIO 4] Howe ver, as we pointed out in our notice, 7 Rule 5-801 pertains to reduction of a sentence. SeeRule 5-801 (“A motion to reduce 8
a sentence may be filed within ninety (90) days after the sentence is imposed[.]. . . A 9 motion to reduce a sentence may also be filed upon revocation of probation as 10 provided by law.” (emphasis added)). The St ate argues a modification of the terms of 11 Defendant’s probation from supervised to uns upervised “is a functional equivalent of 12 a motion to reduce sentence.” [MIO 4] The State cites no authority in support of this 13 proposition, and, therefore, we find the State’s argument unavailing. See State v. Vigil14 Giron , 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60, 327 P.3d 1129 (“[A] ppellate courts will not consider 15 an issue if no authority is cited in s upport of the issue and that, given no cited 16 authority, we assume no such authority exists[.]”). 17
{4} The State goes on to argue, while Sec tion 31-21-21 “reasonably can be read to 18 grant the district court the discretion to modify conditions of probation in appropriate 194 cases[,]” Trujillo did not set forth any guidelines fo r the application of Section 31-21- 1 21. Trujillo , 1994-NMSC-066, ¶ 13. [MIO 5] The appellate court reviews a sentence 2 imposed for abuse of discretion. The trial court does not abuse its discretion by 3 imposing a sentence authorized by law. See State v. Cumpton , 2000-NMCA-033, ¶¶ 9- 4 10, 129 N.M. 47, 1 P.3d 429. Given the discretion granted to district courts in 5 sentencing and modification of conditions of probation, the plea agreement’s silence 6 regarding the conditions or supervision leve l of Defendant’s probation, and the State’s 7 failure to articulate why the district court’s application of Section 31-21-21 should be 8 subject to particular guidelines or factors, we decline to determin e whether the present 9 case is an appropriate case for the district court’s exercise of discretion and leave the 10 application of Section 31-21-21 to the district court in the first instance. 11
{5} Therefore, based on the reasons explaine d above and in this Court’s notice of 12 proposed disposition, we reverse. 13
{6} IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

15 M. MONICA ZAMORA, Judge 16 WE CONCUR: 17

18 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 195 1 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 2