J-A02024-17

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EVAN CASTELLANOS,

Appellant No. 1074 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered March 4, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-48-CR-0001114-2015.

BEFORE: OTT, RANSOM, and FITZGERALD,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED MARCH 30, 2017

Appellant, Evan Castellanos, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after he pleaded guilty to criminal attempt to commit criminal 

homicide.1 We affirm.

The trial court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history 

as follows:

[O]n January 22, 2016, at a pretrial conference prior to the 

February Criminal Trial list, [Appellant] entered a negotiated 

guilty plea to one count of criminal attempt to commit homicide, 

graded as a first-degree felony. The guilty plea included a 

sentence bargain of 16 to 35 years’ imprisonment. At the time 

of the negotiated plea, this Court inquired as to the applicable 

sentencing guideline ranges. Guilty Plea Counsel informed the 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901 and 2501.
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Court that, using the [basic] sentencing matrix [with an offense 

gravity score (OGS) of 14 and a prior record score (PRS) of 1] 

the standard guideline range was 84 months to the statutory 

limit – [480] months.[2] However, the [Commonwealth] noted 

that the deadly weapon used matrix was applicable. Under the 

deadly weapon used matrix, with the same OGS and PRS, the 

guidelines increased to 102 months to the statutory limit. 

Therefore, the sentence bargain of 16 years (192 months) to 35 

years (420 months) was within the standard range.

The Court went through a detailed guilty plea colloquy with 

[Appellant] prior to accepting the plea as free and voluntary. We 

also accepted the written guilty plea colloquy which was 

purported to have been filed out and signed by [Appellant].

The [Commonwealth] summarized the fact pattern –

[Appellant] drove to the victim’s residence in Bethlehem and 

invited the victim to come outside to meet with him while 

[Appellant] sat in the passenger seat of the car. When the 

victim came out of the house and approached the automobile, 

[Appellant] extended his arm out of the window and shot the 

victim in the chest with a .357 revolver. [Appellant] fled the 

scene and was on the run until he was apprehended in Florida 

and extradited to Northampton County. After [Appellant] heard 

the recitation by the Commonwealth and acknowledged that it 

was an accurate statement as to his crime, the Court asked 

several follow-up questions including a general inquiry as to the 

motive for the shooting of the victim who allegedly had been 

[Appellant’s] friend. [Appellant] volunteered that he shot the 

victim because “he had raped a girl named Jordan”.

The Court also informed [Appellant] that his guilty plea 

was expected to be a final resolution in this matter.

[Appellant] answered all the Court’s questions raised 

during the guilty plea proceeding. Clearly, his responses 

indicated that his plea was free and voluntary and that no one 

had forced or coerced him to plead guilty. When the Court 

indicated that it was prepared to impose the sentence bargain 

____________________________________________

2 Appellant pleaded guilty to attempt to commit criminal homicide resulting 

in serious bodily injury. Accordingly, the statutory maximum sentence is 

forty years. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(c).
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contemporaneously with the guilty plea, guilty plea counsel 

asked if the Court would delay sentencing in order to give 

[Appellant’s] family time to come to Northampton County to 

participate at sentencing. That request was granted. We set 

sentencing for March 4, 2016.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/24/16, at 1-2.

On February 25, 2016, Appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea. Within the motion, he asserted the following:

1. [Appellant] did not understand [the] Basic Sentencing 

Matrix[.]

2. [Appellant] was not [made] aware of Basic Sentencing 

Matrix[.]

3. [Appellant] was [coerced] into entering a guilty plea to a 

charge he was not guilty of[.]

4. [Appellant] believes the plea was illegally induced[.]

5. [Appellant] believes he was sentence[d] outside [the] 

sentencing guidelines[.]

6. [Appellant] was abandon[ed] by [his] lawyer[.]

7. [Appellant] requested pre-[trial] motions to be filed before 

entering any guilty plea[.]

Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 2/25/16, at 1-2. By letter dated February 

29, 2016, the Commonwealth filed its response. 

Appellant appeared for sentencing on March 4, 2016. At that time, the 

trial court indicated to the parties that Appellant had filed the motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, and that guilty plea counsel, who had been 

privately retained by Appellant, had filed a motion to withdraw. The 

Commonwealth then argued why it would be prejudiced should Appellant be 

permitted to withdraw his plea, and guilty plea counsel informed the court of 
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his displeasure with Appellant’s decision. The trial court then directly asked 

Appellant why he wished to withdraw his plea, and Appellant responded, 

“Your Honor, I’m not guilty of that charge and I believe like the lawyer took 

advantage of my mental state.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 3/4/16, at 16. 

When asked about his mental state and what medication Appellant had been 

taking, Appellant said, “It’s like [X]anax[,]” although he did not know the 

product name. Id. Appellant further informed the court that he himself 

never filled out the written guilty plea. Finding Appellant “not credible,” id. 

at 17, the trial court denied Appellant’s withdrawal motion, and imposed the 

negotiated sentence.

This timely appeal follows. Both Appellant and the trial court have 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issue:

Whether the Trial Court erred and abused its discretion in 

denying Appellant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea prior to 

sentencing despite Appellant’s plausible proclamation of 

innocence by asserting he was not guilty of the charge and 

the fact that the Commonwealth would not have been 

substantially prejudiced by the withdrawal?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

There are significantly different standards of proof for defendants who 

move to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing and for those who move to 

withdraw a plea after sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Kirsch, 930 

A.2d 1282, 1284-1285 (Pa. Super. 2007). Recently, our Supreme Court has 

clarified the pre-sentence standard of proof in Commonwealth v. 
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Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284 (Pa. 2015). The high court first noted the 

standard it had established many years ago in Commonwealth v. Forbes, 

299 A.2d 268, 271 (Pa. 1973):

[T]his Court’s Forbes decision reflects that: there is no 

absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea; trial courts have 

discretion in determining whether a withdrawal request will 

be granted; such discretion is to be administered liberally 

in favor of the accused; and any demonstration by a 

defendant of a fair-and-just reason will suffice to support a 

grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial prejudice 

to the Commonwealth.

Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1291-1292 (citing Forbes, 299 A.2d at 271) 

(footnote omitted).

At issue in Carrasquillo was “whether the common pleas courts must 

accept a bare assertion of innocence as a fair and just reason for 

withdrawal.” Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1289. Our Supreme Court then 

discussed the interpretation this Court has given Forbes and subsequent 

Supreme Court pronouncements, and it acknowledged “the legitimate 

perception of a per se rule arising from this Court’s decisions.” 

Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292. The high court then stated its 

disagreement with the application of such a “bright-line” rule:

Presently, we are persuaded by the approach of other 

jurisdictions which require that a defendant’s innocence claim 

must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair 

and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea. More 

broadly, the proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal 

motion is whether the accused has made some colorable 

demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting 

withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice. The 

policy of liberality remains extant but has its limits, consistent 
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with the affordance of a degree of discretion to the common 

pleas courts.

Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292 (citation omitted).

Stated succinctly, our Supreme Court in Carrasquillo concluded that 

“a bare assertion of innocence is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason to 

require a court to grant such a request.” Id. at 1285. Finally, the high 

court concluded that, given its disposition, it need not discuss the issue of 

prejudice to the Commonwealth. Id. at 1293 n.9.

The trial court in this case found the fact pattern presented analogous 

to that involved in Carrasquillo:

Here, we evaluated the credibility of [Appellant’s] assertion 

of “innocence.” He provided no justification or support for his 

not guilty claim other than the claim that he didn’t understand 

the guilty plea proceeding. Frankly, anyone would review the 

guilty plea transcript could reach only one conclusion, that 

[Appellant’s] plea was free, knowing, and voluntarily and further 

that his acknowledgement of his guilt was beyond the general 

acquiescence of the facts where a defendant simply agrees to 

the Commonwealth’s presentation of the facts. Here, 

[Appellant] offered his justification, his motivation, for 

committing this crime. 

There was nothing about [Appellant’s] assertion of a lack 

of understanding of the guilty plea proceeding [sic] nor any 

support for the bald assertion that he was “not guilty.” 

Certainly, there is nothing in this record which supports a 

plausible demonstration of innocence which would provide a fair 

and just reason for the withdrawal of his guilty plea. Without 

any credible record to justify the withdrawal of the guilty plea, 

we were unwilling to exercise our discretion. Finally, we note 

that our decision rests squarely within the four corners of the 

most recent pronouncement by our Supreme Court on this issue 

found in Carrasquillo.

Trial Court’s Opinion, 5/24/16, at 4-5. We agree.
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Appellant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Just as our 

Supreme Court in Carrasquillo held that a bare assertion of innocence is 

insufficient to permit a pre-sentence plea withdrawal, the bare assertion that 

the innocence claim is “plausible” is likewise insufficient. As the high court 

stated in Carrasquillo, a criminal defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty 

plea prior to sentencing must make “some colorable demonstration, under 

the circumstances” that “permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote 

fairness and justice.” Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292. Appellant has failed 

to so in this case.3

Finally, we reject Appellant’s argument regarding the lack of 

“substantial prejudice” to the Commonwealth. As in Carrasquillo, we need 

not reach this issue unless Appellant has presented a plausible basis for his 

claim of innocence. See id., supra. 

In summary, because Appellant failed to establish a plausible claim 

regarding his innocence, the trial court properly denied his pre-sentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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3 We also reject Appellant’s alternative claim that we should remand so that 

“a more thorough record could be made regarding his assertion of 

innocence.” Appellant’s Brief at 6. Appellant has already been given an 

opportunity to present a colorable claim that the circumstances should have 

allowed for the pre-sentence withdraw of his plea.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/30/2017