RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2761-20

A.M.B.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.A.-R.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Submitted April 4, 2022 – Decided June 27, 2022

Before Judges Rothstadt and Mayer.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, 

Docket No. FV-11-1105-21.

Willie L. Parker, attorney for appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-2761-20

Defendant E.A.-R.1appeals from the Family Part's final restraining order 

(FRO) entered against him under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act of 

1991 (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, in favor of plaintiff A.M.B. The FRO 

was entered after the trial judge concluded that plaintiff proved defendant 

committed the predicate act of harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and that a 

restraining order was necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic 

violence. On appeal, defendant contends the order must be vacated because the 

trial judge erred in concluding that plaintiff met her burden of proof and, in the 

alternative, that an amended FRO should be entered to omit the parties' daughter 

from the protections afforded by the order because such restraints "directly 

interferes with a recorded custody order and makes no allocation for defendant 

to see his daughter."

We affirm the entry of the FRO as we conclude the trial judge's 

determination was supported by substantial credible evidence. However, we 

vacate and remand for reconsideration the issue of parenting time because we 

conclude the trial judge mistakenly deferred it to another court that cannot 

1

 We use initials for the parties to protect the identity of the victim, consistent 

with Rule 1:38-3(d)(10).
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consider the issue because of the FRO restraining defendant from having any 

contact with his daughter. 

The facts leading to the entry of the FRO as derived from the record are 

summarized as follows. Plaintiff and defendant are not married, nor do they 

reside together. However, they are parents to a daughter who is now nine years 

old.

On November 30, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint and application for 

entry of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant. In her 

complaint, plaintiff asserted that defendant committed the predicate acts of 

terroristic threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3, and harassment. Specifically, she alleged 

that he committed those offenses when, at approximately noon on November 30, 

2020, he called "and threatened to punch her in the face." According to 

plaintiff's complaint, she "received 20[ to ]30 missed phone calls [and] over 100 

text messages from def[endant] calling her" various names and otherwise 

disparaging her. Moreover, according to the complaint, defendant "threatened 

to call [child welfare authorities] on the pla[intiff] and [to] have people come to 

her house, knock down her door and hurt [her], their daughter, pla[intiff's] son 

and her fiancé." Last, she asserted that "def[endant] tried to fight pla[intiff's]

fiancé." 
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Plaintiff's complaint also alleged prior reported and unreported acts of 

domestic violence. Specifically, it referred to a prior complaint that had been 

dismissed in which plaintiff alleged that "def[endant] . . . pushed pla[intiff], 

threatened to pistol whip her, punch her in [her] face and threatened to send 

people after her." The complaint also alleged that in the past "def[endant] had 

called [child welfare authorities twenty] times in one year [and he had 

demonstrated a] history of calling and harassing pla[intiff] on and off over 

[three] years." It also alleged that in the past "def[endant] ha[d] pushed himself 

into [her] home and show[ed] up at her house unannounced knocking on the 

door and entering without pla[intiff's] permission."

Evidently, prior to the trial, in February 2021, plaintiff's complaint was 

inadvertently administratively dismissed by the court. The parties were notified

of the dismissal and within minutes of finding out, defendant resumed his 

contact with plaintiff. Plaintiff responded by filing a new complaint and 

securing a new TRO. 
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The matter was then brought to trial on April 22, 2021.2 At the hearing,

both parties were represented by counsel. The only witnesses were the two 

parties.

In her testimony, plaintiff explained the parties' relationship, confirming 

that they had a daughter, were not married, and had never resided together. 

Plaintiff then described events that occurred recently in February 2021, within 

minutes of learning her November complaint had been dismissed. These events 

were evidently included in her February 2021 complaint. 

Plaintiff stated that defendant called and texted her and their young 

daughter in an effort to see the child even though there "was a snowstorm [and] 

nobody could go anywhere." According to plaintiff, because she was not 

responding to defendant in a "timely manner," he contacted child welfare 

authorities and began to repeatedly contact plaintiff.

2

 Defendant's appendix does not contain a copy of the February complaint and 

TRO filed under the docket number in this action. He only included the

complaint filed in November 2020 under docket number FV-11-000796-21. The 

failure to include that pleading in his appendix is a violation of Rule 2:6-

1(a)(1)(A). See Soc'y Hill Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Soc'y Hill Assocs., 347 N.J. 

Super. 163, 177 (App. Div. 2002). At a minimum, the failure to provide the 

pleading hampers our appellate review and would warrant our dismissal of the 

appeal. We choose however to address defendant's contentions on the limited 

record. 
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Plaintiff asserted that defendant's contacting child welfare services was 

nothing new. He had "continuously" done so for at least sixty to eighty times in 

the past. Each time he did, his claims would be investigated, and the matter 

would be dropped because none of his allegations were substantiated. 

Turning to the complaint and TRO entered in November, plaintiff 

described the events that led to her seeking relief from the court at that time. 

According to plaintiff, in the "[f]our days leading up to" the entry of the TRO, 

the two were "continuously arguing." These arguments occurred "[o]ver the 

phone, in person and text messages." Plaintiff testified that he contacted her 

"every single day and texted her" thirty-one times in a row in a three-minute 

span to argue over "whatever argument he chooses."

Plaintiff also explained that when she learned that the restraining order 

had been "dropped," she was and had always been "fearful." She claimed that 

defendant's actions were directed towards upsetting her and making her 

"unhappy, to bother [her] to make [her] feel like giving up." 

During plaintiff's testimony, copies of multiple pages of text messages 

were produced and admitted into evidence.

3

 According to plaintiff, the four 

pages of text messages were from November 2020. There were thirty-two texts

3

 These documents were also not included in defendant's appendix.
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within a two-to-three-minute span and, according to plaintiff, this occurred on a 

"constant" basis, "every single day." Moreover, plaintiff testified that defendant 

contacted her via text repeatedly despite the existence of a restraining order. 

Plaintiff also asserted that she required a restraining order because of the 

"constant messages," his coming to her house repeatedly "to argue with" her,

and then "call[ing] the police," which caused her great distress. As plaintiff 

described the events, she indicated that she was "shaking" during her testimony 

and because of his conduct "at night [she] barricade[s her] door with a chair and 

[she has had] security cameras [installed] in [her] home and outside of" it as 

well "because [she is] fearful that [defendant] will follow up on his threats to 

send people to [her] house and just come and harm [her] because this is what he 

says he[ is] going to do."

Plaintiff also described defendant's threats to fight with her fiancé and to 

strike her. She "[a]bsolutely" believed that defendant was capable of doing so 

"[b]ecause [she] kn[ew] that he [has] a firearm and he served in the Navy . . .

so . . . he knows how to use a gun." The fact that defendant had a weapon and 

was capable of using it made plaintiff "[e]xtremely fearful." She specifically

stated she "fear[ed] for [her] safety."
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When defendant testified, he stated that the TRO was issued in February 

only after he called plaintiff once and called and texted his daughter once. He 

denied constantly sending plaintiff texts. 

Defendant justified his contacts with child welfare authorities by claiming 

that they were based upon learning from his daughter's school principal that his 

child "missed about two months of [virtual] school." He believed that plaintiff

obtained the restraining order after becoming upset about his finding out their 

daughter was not attending school. He attributed all of his conduct to the fact 

that he is "a concerned parent."

Defendant admitted calling child welfare authorities maybe "three or four 

times, maybe five" about the child not attending school. In fact, according to 

defendant, plaintiff had been "sent . . . to truancy court a couple of times." He 

stated, "I've been dealing with this for a few years now and that's the only reason 

that I'm getting restraining orders on me. This happened . . . last year and it . . . 

happened this year all because she[ is] missing school."

Defendant confirmed that he had contacted those authorities "a couple of 

times" because he also believed that plaintiff used pain killing medication and,

in fact, asked him to procure some for her. According to defendant, plaintiff 
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sought the restraining order only because he had contacted the child welfare 

authorities.

As to plaintiff's other allegations, defendant explained why he showed up 

unannounced at plaintiff's home. According to defendant, he went to plaintiff's 

home "a couple of times when [his] daughter [had not] been in school" because 

plaintiff told him that he could "come to [her] house any time." Although he 

initially denied that he "ever pushed in [plaintiff's] door," he later conceded to 

knocking on her door for forty minutes, and when plaintiff did not respond, 

defendant entered plaintiff's home. 

Defendant denied ever threatening to get into a fight with plaintiff's fiancé 

but confirmed that the three of them got into arguments about defendant not 

accepting that his daughter was not attending school. Defendant also denied 

ever threatening to strike plaintiff and owning a firearm. He denied making any 

inquiries about plaintiff's personal life.

On cross-examination, defendant explained that prior to their daughter 

being in school he was contacting child welfare services about plaintiff's "drug 

use [and the child] constantly smelling like cigarettes." Once she started school,

he would be contacting the authorities "every year" because there was an issue 

of the child not attending school.
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Defendant was then asked to review the pages of text messages that were 

admitted into evidence. He confirmed that there were twenty-six text messages 

within a six-minute period on one day. He justified the use of the pejorative and 

vulgar language in those text again by relying upon his belief that his child was 

not attending school. He confirmed that one of the texts described him "pulling 

up" to plaintiff's home and stating to plaintiff that she had "a big problem on her 

hands," and that he was "done playing." 

After defendant completed his testimony, the judge placed his decision on 

the record. The judge first found that the plaintiff established jurisdiction by 

virtue of the parties' relationship as co-parents as provided under the PDVA. 

The judge then turned to whether the plaintiff "demonstrated by a preponderance 

of the evidence the requisite predicate acts of domestic violence." First, the 

judge considered defendant's actions on February 18, 2021, upon the dismissal 

of the November TRO. He found that defendant started calling plaintiff's phone 

within thirteen minutes after that dismissal, and then started to call the 

daughter's phone as well. He also found that defendant made calls to the New 

Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) over fifty times in 

the past two years. And, he repeatedly "tr[ied] to integrate himself into the 

plaintiff's life." 
11 A-2761-20

The judge was also satisfied that "plaintiff [was] afraid of the defendant." 

The judge specifically relied upon the fact that plaintiff had "many security 

cameras in her home because the plaintiff is so scared of the defendant." 

The judge found plaintiff's testimony was credible. On the other hand, he 

found that defendant's credibility "to be certainly an issue here." He was 

convinced that plaintiff not only testified truthfully but that she was "very 

frightened." The judge specifically reviewed the factors to be considered by the 

trier of fact in determining credibility and concluded that he was "convinced by 

all of those standard typical measures that this is a . . . woman that is frightened 

and fearful."

The judge observed that the texts sent by defendant that were admitted 

into evidence were "replete, consistent, and repetitive in their use of vulgar, 

inappropriate, [and] profane language." According to the judge, defendant did 

not "dispute numerically the extraordinary number of [DCPP] referrals made." 

Nor did he deny going to plaintiff's house unannounced. He viewed defendant's 

justification for his own actions as a "disproportionate response to the 

differentiation of opinion regarding the importance of school." 
12 A-2761-20

Turning to the predicate act, the judge found that only harassment was 

asserted.4 He reviewed the elements of that offense, and concluded that based 

on his "credibility determinations," he was "confident that the plaintiff [had] 

indeed met her burden of proof [and] burden of persuasion." 

The judge found defendant's justification for his actions to be 

unnecessarily harmful to plaintiff and their child and observed that it was 

highlighted by defendants "rant[s] of profane la[d]en barrage[s] of text that are 

partly intelligible, partly unintelligible." 

Having determined that defendant's intentional acts constituted the 

predicate act of harassment, the judge turned to the issue of whether there was 

a need to enter an FRO in order to protect plaintiff. He then stated the following:

[G]iven the sheer number, the frequency after that 

phone call came in, [about the TRO being dismissed,] 

the . . . dispatch with which this defendant contacted 

DCPP . . . and what occurred thereafter the 

extraordinary number of text in a very short period of 

time, both intelligible and unintelligible all relatively 

profane, it certainly indicates that there is a . . . need to 

protect this [plaintiff] from further acts of domestic 

violence . . . the defendant has threatened to punch her 

in the past, has threatened her in the past . . . so the 

defendant's history of domestic violence, the reported 

number of recorded acts certainly support 

[plaintiff] . . . asserting that she is fearful of the 

4

 We assume that the judge was referring to the February 2021 complaint in this 

action that was not included in defendant's appendix.
13 A-2761-20

defendant. She is fearful. She has multiple cameras set 

up in her house. I am confident that she is fearful and 

confident that . . . the second prong of the [Silver5] test 

has certainly been established here.

The judge concluded that a FRO was required under the present 

circumstances. In issuing his order, he restrained defendant from having contact 

with plaintiff, her fiancé, plaintiff's son, and the parties' daughter "at this 

juncture." The FRO awarded plaintiff temporary custody of their daughter, and 

in his oral decision, he added that "any issues of custody should be addressed 

under the . . . existing docket . . . in the Superior Court."6 This appeal followed.

As a threshold matter, we acknowledge the scope of our review of a 

judge's decision to issue an FRO is limited. "We accord substantial deference 

to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 

'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more 

ordinary differences that arise between couples.'" C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. 

Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 

(2011)). Such "[d]eference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is 

5

 Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006).

6

 Included in defendant's appendix is a copy of an order entered on March 1, 

2018, under a "FD" docket addressing the support, custody, and parenting time 

of the parties' daughter.
14 A-2761-20

largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Cesare v. Cesare, 

154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 

108, 117 (1997)). As such, we will not disturb the factual findings of the trial 

judge unless they are so "manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the 

competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests 

of justice." C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428 (quoting S.D. v. M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 

417, 429 (App. Div. 2010)). We do, however, review the trial judge's legal 

conclusions de novo. Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 433-34 (App. Div. 

2015) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 

366, 378 (1995)).

The New Jersey Legislature enacted the PDVA "to assure the victims of 

domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide."

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. In determining whether to issue an FRO under the PDVA, 

the court must perform a two-step analysis. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-26. 

"First, the judge must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a 

preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts 

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. The trial court 

should make this determination "in light of the previous history of violence 

between the parties." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402). 
15 A-2761-20

Second, the court must determine "whether a restraining order is 

necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) 

to (6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further 

abuse." Id. at 127 (emphasis added). Those factors include, but are not limited 

to: "[t]he previous history of domestic violence between the [parties], including 

threats, harassment and physical abuse," N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1), and "[t]he 

best interests of the victim," N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(4). Governed by these 

principles, we address defendant's contentions.

The judge here determined that defendant committed the predicate act of 

harassment. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4,

a person commits a petty disorderly persons offense [of 

harassment,] if, with purpose to harass another, he [or 

she]:

a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or more 

communications anonymously or at extremely 

inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, 

or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or 

other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or 

of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or 

seriously annoy such other person.
16 A-2761-20

A "'finding of a purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence 

presented,' and we have observed that '[c]ommon sense and experience may 

inform that determination.'" J.D., 207 N.J. at 477 (alteration in original) 

(quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997)). Our Supreme Court has 

construed "'any other course of alarming conduct' and 'acts with purpose to alarm 

or seriously annoy' as repeated communications directed at a person that 

reasonably put that person in fear for his [or her] safety or security or that 

intolerably interfere with that person's reasonable expectation of privacy." State 

v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 284-85 (2017).

In the present matter, the trial judge considered the extensive testimony 

adduced at the domestic violence trial and fully assessed the credibility of the 

parties. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there was sufficient 

credible evidence supporting the trial judge's determination that defendant 

committed the predicate act of harassment under subsections (a) and (c). 

As the trial judge concluded, defendant committed acts of harassment 

based on the frequency and content of his repeated text messages, telephone 

calls, threats, and appearing unannounced at plaintiff's home. The judge also 

found that defendant's text messages used offensively coarse language in a 

manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm. The judge also found that the 
17 A-2761-20

messages had been sent deliberately with the purpose to harass plaintiff. Those 

findings satisfy the elements of harassment under subsections (a) and (c). See

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a) and (c). 

Under the totality of the circumstances, and in view of the domestic 

violence history recognized by the judge, the frequency, volume, and crude 

content of those messages support a finding of harassment. See N.B. v. S.K., 

435 N.J. Super. 298, 307 (App. Div. 2014); see also Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 577 

(recognizing defendant's "purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence 

presented"); Pazienza v. Camarata, 381 N.J. Super. 173, 183-84 (App. Div. 

2005). That conclusion was bolstered by defendant's voluminous and evidently 

unsubstantiated allegations made to DCPP that plaintiff was subjecting the 

parties' daughter to a risk of harm. See Hoffman, 149 N.J. at 577 ("Absent a 

legitimate purpose behind defendant's actions, the trial court could reasonably 

infer that defendant acted with the purpose to harass [plaintiff].").

We also conclude that there was credible evidence supporting the judge's 

finding that plaintiff needed a restraining order. The judge credited plaintiff's 

testimony concerning her fear of defendant, the instances of domestic violence, 

and the actions already taken by plaintiff—such as installing security cameras—

to try to protect herself from harm. Accordingly, we find that the judge's 
18 A-2761-20

determination that a FRO in favor of plaintiff was necessary to protect her from 

further abuse by defendant was supported by sufficient evidence in the record 

that established both prongs needed for a FRO. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 

125-27.

We are not persuaded otherwise by defendant's challenge on appeal to the 

trial judge's credibility determinations. See D.C. v. F.R., 286 N.J. Super. 589, 

601 (App. Div. 1996) ("We are obliged to accord special deference to those 

findings which were substantially influenced by the judge's opportunity to hear 

and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the case, which an appellate 

reviewing court does not enjoy."). Nor do we accept his justification for his 

conduct, claiming that it was so that he could ensure his daughter was in school 

and later to ensure that he could resume parenting time. To the extent defendant

believed he had legitimate concerns about his daughter in plaintiff's custody or 

was subjected to unwarranted interference with his parenting time, there were 

remedies he could have pursued under the parties' existing action under the FD 

docket rather than employing repeated acts of harassment intended to yield 

plaintiff's compliance with defendant's wishes, including repeated calls to 

DCPP.
19 A-2761-20

Although we agree that a FRO was necessary here, we part company with 

the trial judge as to his decision to enter a restraining order against defendant 

having contact with his daughter and also directing defendant to seek relief in 

the FD action. As defendant correctly points out on appeal, a court in the FD 

action will not permit any contact while the FRO is in place. Consequently, the 

trial judge incorrectly withheld his discretion when he did not make a 

determination on parenting time and instead, determined that "[a]ny issues of 

custody should be addressed under the . . . existing [FD] docket addressing 

custody and visitation issues." For that reason, we are constrained to remand 

the matter to the trial judge in this action to reconsider and address issues 

relating to parenting time.7 However, by our remand, we do not imply one way 

or another whether the FRO should be modified and parenting time allowed.

7 Our conclusion is supported by the policies and procedures for domestic 

violence cases promulgated by our Supreme Court, which state the following: 

In processing an FV case where there is an existing FD 

case, the following provisions of the FD manual shall 

be employed:

If there exists a previous FD order addressing 

custody/parenting time and/or child support, prior to 

the filing of a domestic violence action, that order shall 

be preserved under the FD docket. The FD court file 

must be forwarded to the judge hearing the FRO or 
20 A-2761-20

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part for further proceedings

consistent with our opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

continued TRO for review and any necessary 

adjustments should be made to the FD order to ensure 

conflicting orders do not exist. The FD order shall be 

referenced in the FV order to ensure all affected parties, 

divisions and agencies are aware of the multiple orders. 

The FD file shall be joined to the FV file for as long as 

the FV case is active. . . .

a. Modifying the Concurrent FD order: 

When any party wishes to file for a 

modification of the FD order during 

the life of the domestic violence 

restraining order, that case must be 

heard by the domestic violence 

judge. . . .

[Supreme Court of N.J. & Attorney Gen. of N.J., New 

Jersey Domestic Violence Procedures Manual, 87

(2022), https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/family/

dvprcman.pdf?c=Bhe. (Emphasis added).]