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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Detention of:

M.L.,

 Appellant.

No. 79727-1-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LEACH, J. — M.L. appeals the trial court’s order for an involuntary 14 day 

commitment. He contends the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that he is in danger of serious physical harm and that he is gravely 

disabled as the result of his mental impairment. He also challenges the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support an unnumbered Finding of Fact, and 

Findings of Fact 2, 3, and 4. Because substantial evidence supports all the trial 

court’s findings, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On March 1, 2019, M.L. went to the Renton Airport in search of an 

airplane to take him to Area 51 so that he could board a “UFO”. Renton Police 

Officers responded to the airport and found M.L. with a mango and bananas

while wearing welding gloves and protective glasses. Officers observed M.L. 

seemed confused. M.L. agreed to go to Valley Medical Center.

At Valley Medical Center, emergency room crisis counselor Mark 

Thomasseau met with M.L. Thomasseau asked M.L. if he knew why he was 
No. 79727-1/2

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there. M.L. responded he was receiving skin and eye treatment. Thomasseau 

found M.L. hard to understand because he mumbled. When Thomasseau left 

M.L.’s room, he observed M.L. take off his hospital gown, stand, and stare at a 

wall. Hospital staff helped M.L. put the gown back on, but M.L. would repeatedly 

take it off and stare at the wall. Thomasseau observed that M.L. “could not 

clearly state what he would do, where he would go, [and] how he would take care 

of himself,” if he was discharged. He believed M.L. was “too disorganized to be 

discharged.” A King County Designated Crisis Responder completed a petition 

for M.L.’s initial commitment.

On March 5, 2019, M.L. was transferred to Navos Behavioral Hospital for 

inpatient services. There, Dr. Julia Singer, a licensed clinical psychologist, met 

with M.L. and diagnosed him with schizophrenia. Dr. Singer found it difficult to 

understand M.L. because he mumbled, spoke rapidly, and talked about UFOs. 

Dr. Singer determined that if M.L. was discharged due to schizophrenia, 

he would be unable to care for his health and safety. Dr. Singer partially based 

the determination on M.L.’s social services assessment packet that stated he 

suffered from malnutrition, “significant weight loss,” and “muscle wasting” related 

to his restrictive fruitarian diet. Dr. Singer was concerned that M.L. would suffer 

further health problems from malnutrition if he were discharged from the hospital. 

M.L. told Dr. Singer that he would not take his medication when discharged. 

Navos filed a petition for 14 days of involuntary treatment under RCW 71.05.

On March 6, 2019, the court held a probable cause hearing. The court 

found that M.L. was “gravely disabled” as a result of “mental disorder” and was in 
No. 79727-1/3

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“danger of serious physical harm due to failure to provide for his essential needs 

of health and safety.” In making this determination, the trial court relied on the 

fact that M.L. was “underweight, malnourished...on a very restricted diet by 

choice, and has muscle-wasting.” The trial court stated it was concerned that 

“there was not the testimony of a medical doctor to provide the court with

information on...the risk [M.L.’s diet] causes to his health ultimately if he is 

released into the community.” But, it found the State met its burden of showing 

M.L. is gravely disabled even without the evidence of malnutrition and muscle 

wasting. The trial court found the State met its burden by showing M.L.’s 

“communication difficulties, his delusions regarding going to Area 51 and seeking 

a UFO, and his taking off his...gown.” The court determined less restrictive 

alternative means were not in M.L.’s best interest, and ordered 14 days of 

involuntary commitment at Navos.

M.L. appeals.

ANALYSIS

M.L. asserts the trial court should not have entered the commitment order 

because the State failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that he was in 

danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his 

essential needs and that he was gravely disabled.

To commit a person for 14 days of involuntary treatment, the State must 

show by the “preponderance of the evidence that such person, as the result of a 

mental disorder...presents a likelihood of serious harm, or is gravely disabled...”1

 1 RCW 71.05.240(3).
No. 79727-1/4

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A person who “[i]s in danger of serious physical harm resulting from a failure to 

provide for his or her essential human needs of health or safety” as a result of a 

mental disorder is gravely disabled.2 To show the person is in danger, “the State 

must present recent, tangible evidence of failure or inability to provide for such 

essential human needs as food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment which 

presents a high probability of serious physical harm within the near future unless 

adequate treatment is afforded.”3

When the trial court has weighed the evidence, we generally limit our 

review to determining whether substantial evidence supports its findings, and if 

so, whether the findings in turn support the trial court’s conclusions of law and 

judgment.4 We “will not disturb the trial court’s findings of ‘grave disability’ if 

supported by substantial evidence.”5 “Substantial evidence is evidence in 

sufficient quantum to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the declared 

premise.”6 “The substantial evidence standard is deferential and requires the 

appellate court to view all evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party.”7

Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that M.L. was in 

danger of “serious physical harm resulting from failure to provide for his essential 

needs of health and safety.” M.L. could not explain to Thomasseau or Dr. Singer 

 2 RCW 71.05.020(22). 3 In re LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 204-05, 728 P.2d 138 (1986). 4 In re Det. of W.C.C., 193 Wn. App. 783, 793, 372 P.3d 179 (2016) (citing 

LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 209). 5 LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 209.

6 Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978).

7 Lewis v. Dep’t of Licensing, 157 Wn.2d 446, 468, 139 P.3d 1078 (2006).
No. 79727-1/5

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where he would live and how he would take care of himself if he were discharged 

from the hospital. M.L. said that he would not take his medication if he were 

discharged. Because M.L. could not explain how he would take care of his 

essential needs, and because he said he would not take medicine as prescribed, 

he was in danger of serious physical harm.

M.L. asserts the State presented insufficient evidence of a nexus between 

M.L.’s danger of serious physical harm and his grave disability. We disagree. 

Because sufficient evidence supports the finding that M.L. was in danger of 

serious physical harm if discharged, sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s 

findings that M.L. was gravely disabled. The finding that M.L. was gravely 

disabled is also supported by testimony about his “communication difficulties, his 

delusions regarding going to Area 51 and seeking a UFO, and his taking off 

his...gown.”

Next, M.L. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting multiple 

findings of fact. Our review of the record discloses substantial evidence to 

support each finding.

M.L. challenges Finding of Fact 2, which states, “The Respondent’s 

mental impairment has had a substantial adverse effect on his cognitive function 

and volitional control.” Dr. Singer testified she believed M.L.’s schizophrenia was 

having an adverse effect on both his cognitive abilities and his volitional function. 

She found that “his thinking appeared to be quite disorganized.” M.L. could not 

explain to Thomasseau or Dr. Singer why he was hospitalized. Because 

sufficient evidence supports this finding, M.L.’s challenge fails.
No. 79727-1/6

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M.L. challenges the unnumbered Finding of Fact finding M.L. gravely 

disabled, and Finding of Fact 3 finding:

As a result of his Schizophrenia, the Respondent is Gravely 

Disabled (Prong A) and is in danger of serious physical harm due to 

a failure to provide for his essential needs of health and safety as 

evidenced, inter alia, by the testimony of Dr. Julia Singer and the 

Navos medical record indicating that the Respondent is 

underweight, malnourished, and is experiencing muscle wasting.

These challenges fail for the same reason the challenge to the finding that he 

was gravely disabled fails. Evidence of M.L.’s communication difficulties, 

delusions, and refusal to take medicine if discharged supports the finding that 

M.L. was in danger of serious physical harm and that he was gravely disabled.

M.L. also challenges Finding of Fact 4 which states, “The court finds the 

testimony of court evaluator Dr. Julia Singer to be credible and Respondent was 

in danger of serious physical harm as a result of poor food intake. The court 

additionally finds that the Respondent’s Schizophrenia is causing his food 

limitations based on Dr. Singer’s testimony.” The trial court was concerned about 

the health consequences of M.L.’s fruitarian diet and whether the State proved 

M.L. was in danger of physical harm from being underweight and malnourished. 

But, in the end, the trial court’s determination that M.L. was in “danger of serious

physical harm due to a failure to provide for his essential needs of health and

safety” was not solely based on his diet. The trial court found that M.L. was 

having difficulty communicating and suffered from delusions. M.L.’s difficulties 

communicating and delusions, combined with his inability to articulate a plan for 

meeting his essential needs, provide substantial evidence to support the 
No. 79727-1/7

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commitment order. Because the findings of fact are supported by substantial 

evidence, involuntary treatment was warranted.

CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence supports the court’s findings that M.L. was gravely 

disabled and in danger of serious physical harm. And, these findings support the 

commitment order. So, we affirm.

WE CONCUR: