J-S22023-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LONNIE DUSTIN HAGGERTY

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1305 WDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 12, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Indiana County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-32-CR-0000761-2005

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., LANE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY LANE, J.: FILED: September 27, 2024

Lonnie Dustin Haggerty (“Haggerty”) appeals pro se from the order 

dismissing his serial petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction 

Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm in part, as we conclude all but one of 

Haggerty’s issues are time-barred by the PCRA. However, we reverse in part, 

as we hold Haggerty’s challenge to his Megan’s Law III2registration 

requirements is not subject to the PCRA nor its timeliness requirements. We 

further hold the Megan’s Law III registration requirements no longer apply to 

Haggerty, but he is required to comply with Subchapter I of the Sexual 

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 See Act 152 of 2004.
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Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA II”).

3

 We remand for 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

The Commonwealth charged Haggerty with involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse with a person less than sixteen years of age (“IDSI”), sexual 

assault, and related offenses for crimes he committed in 2004 against the 

male victim (“the Victim”), who was then fourteen years old. Haggerty initially 

pleaded guilty, but the trial court granted his request to withdraw his plea. 

The charges then proceeded to a jury trial in 2006. Haggerty was represented 

by Donald McKee, Esquire (“Trial Counsel”), the Chief Public Defender of 

Indiana County. The Victim testified at trial, describing the sexual assault. 

Relevant to Haggerty’s instant PCRA claims, the Victim also stated he did not 

immediately tell anyone about the incident because he was scared and “it 

never happened to [him] before.” N.T., 4/3/06, at 39. Haggerty did not 

testify or present any evidence.

The jury found Haggerty guilty of IDSI, sexual assault, statutory sexual 

assault, indecent assault, corruption of minors, and unlawful contact with a 

minor. On August 11, 2008, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 

nine to twenty years’ imprisonment. The court also determined Haggerty was 

a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) and subject to lifetime registration under 

____________________________________________

3 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
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the then-in effect Megan’s Law III. Another attorney, Stanley Fudor, Esquire 

(“Sentencing Counsel”), represented Haggerty at sentencing.

Haggerty did not file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal, but 

subsequently filed a PCRA petition while represented by yet another attorney. 

In October 2007, the PCRA court reinstated Haggerty’s direct appeal rights 

nunc pro tunc, but, pertinently, not his post-sentence rights. Haggerty filed 

an appeal, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on August 11, 

2008. See Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 961 A.2d 1275 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(unpublished memorandum). He did not file a petition for allowance of appeal 

in our Supreme Court.4

On June 3, 2009, Haggerty filed a pro se first, timely PCRA petition.5

The PCRA court appointed Mark Bolkovac, Esquire (“First PCRA Counsel”), who

filed an amended PCRA petition, which: (1) presented new claims of Trial 

Counsel’s and Sentencing Counsel’s ineffective assistance; and (2) set forth

Haggerty’s pro se claims but opined they lacked merit. Ultimately, the PCRA 

____________________________________________

4 Ten years later, Haggerty filed a petition for leave to file a petition for 

allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc. Our Supreme Court denied it in 2018. 

See Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 2018 PA LEXIS 5319 (order) (Pa. 2018).

5 As Haggerty’s prior PCRA petition resulted in the reinstatement of his direct 

appeal rights nunc pro tunc, we consider this June, 3 2009 petition to be his 

first PCRA petition for timeliness purposes. See Commonwealth v. 

Callahan, 101 A.3d 118, 122 (Pa. Super. 2014).
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court denied relief, and Haggerty appealed.

6

 This Court affirmed the denial of 

PCRA relief, and our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of 

appeal. See Haggerty, 53 A.3d 937, appeal denied, 57 A.3d 68.

In 2016, Haggerty filed several pro se petitions (collectively, “the second 

PCRA petition”). The PCRA court addressed the second PCRA petition and 

denied IT, finding Haggerty waived the claims he could have brought on direct 

appeal, and his remaining claims were untimely. Haggerty filed an appeal, 

and this Court affirmed the denial order. See Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 

181 A.3d 454 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum).

On June 12, 2023, Haggerty filed the underlying pro se PCRA petition, 

as well as a motion for leave to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc, and 

a forty-eight page post-sentence motion. Haggerty’s sixty-page pro se PCRA 

____________________________________________

6

Initially, on July 28, 2020, following an evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court 

permitted Haggerty to supplement the record or request a new hearing with 

regard to his SVP determination, but denied relief on the remaining PCRA 

issues presented. Haggerty nevertheless filed an appeal, and this Court 

quashed the appeal as improperly taken from an interlocutory order. See 

Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 31 A.3d 733 (Pa. Supe. 2011). Thereafter, 

based on Haggerty’s assertion he would not seek a new SVP hearing, the PCRA 

court issued an order determining that its July 2020 order was final. Haggerty 

then filed a second appeal, which this Court addressed. See Commonwealth 

v. Haggerty, 53 A.3d 937 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), 

appeal denied, 57 A.3d 68 (Pa. 2012).

Additionally, we note that in 2013, Haggerty filed a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus in the United States District Court in the Western District of 

Pennsylvania. He raised multiple claims that Trial Counsel provided ineffective 

assistance, and that his sentence was illegal and violated double jeopardy 

concerns. The court dismissed Haggerty’s petition. See Haggerty v. Burns, 

2013 WL 1891355 (W.D.Pa. 2013).
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petition set forth at least eighty-seven numbered paragraphs, each alleging, 

and at times conflating: various errors in the pretrial, trial, sentencing, direct 

appeal, or PCRA proceedings; the ineffective assistance of his attorneys; and

interference by prior counsel, the Commonwealth, or the trial or PCRA courts

in the presentation of his past PCRA claims.

7

Nevertheless, we discern the following general allegations, repeated 

often in Haggerty’s PCRA petition. Haggerty raised: the denial of a preliminary 

hearing; the improper reinstatement of all his charges following the 

withdrawal of his guilty plea; multiple allegations that Trial Counsel failed to 

take particular action at trial; Sentencing Counsel’s failure to preserve his 

post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc; the trial court’s failure to reinstate his 

post-sentence rights; and the violation of his double jeopardy rights at 

sentencing. Haggerty also repeatedly argued First PCRA Counsel improperly 

incorporated his pro se claims by reference, violating the rule against hybrid 

representation and rendering the PCRA court’s denial of his petition a legal 

nullity. Thus, Haggerty claimed, those PCRA claims remain pending. 

Haggerty also averred all of these issues amounted to breakdowns in the 

court’s operations that entitled him to relief.

____________________________________________

7 We observe Haggerty’s pro se filings, including his brief on appeal, are 

rambling and raise numerous bald issues, each lacking relevant factual 

background and a developed discussion. See also Haggerty, 181 A.3d 454 

(unpublished memorandum at *5 n.7) (stating Haggerty’s “brief is defective,” 

as “[t]he argument section is rambling, difficult to follow, and lacks coherent 

legal analysis of the issues presented”).
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Next, Haggerty invoked the PCRA’s governmental interference 

timeliness exception,

8 claiming that the Commonwealth committed a Brady

violation9 by failing to: provide “impeachment material (witness statements);”

disclose that the Victim previously made abuse allegations against his father;

and reveal that the Victim “was the subject of a juvenile police complaint in 

New York” “involving sexual assault of two younger juvenile males.” PCRA 

Petition, 6/12/23, at 9, 23-24.

Haggerty also stated the PCRA’s newly-discovered fact exception

applied.10 First, he alleged that on July 12, 2022, he received, following 

several denials in his second PCRA petition proceedings, a transcript of a 2008 

trial against a defendant surnamed Juart. Haggerty averred the Victim also 

accused Juart of sexual offenses and at Juart’s trial, gave testimony that 

contradicted his testimony at Haggerty’s trial, that he had not previously 

suffered sexual abuse or assault. Haggerty extrapolated that the Victim gave 

perjured testimony at his trial.

Second, with respect to the newly-discovered fact exception, Haggerty 

asserted that on August 18, 2022, he received his case file from the Public 

Defender’s Office (“PD’s Office”), who represented him at trial. Haggerty 

____________________________________________

8 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i).

9 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

10 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
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asserted this file included a written statement by the Victim, which Haggerty 

had not seen before, that “differed substantially from a subsequent statement

given to [Children and Youth Services (“CYS”)] investigators and the

testimony given at trial.”

11

 Id. at 8. Haggerty averred Trial Counsel could 

have impeached the Victim with these statements at trial to undermine his 

credibility.

Finally, Haggerty alleged his SVP determination and lifetime registration 

requirements under Megan’s Law III were illegal, as the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court held Megan’s Law III was unconstitutional. Id. at 21 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013) (holding Megan’s Law 

III violated the “single subject” rule of Article III, Section 3 of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution)).

The Commonwealth filed a response to the petition, arguing that all of 

Haggerty’s claims were untimely under the PCRA. The PCRA court agreed and

issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a 

hearing. On October 12, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed Haggerty’s pro se 

petition. Haggerty filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. The PCRA court has 

issued an opinion.12

____________________________________________

11 Haggerty provided no other information about the Victim’s written 

statement or the CYS statement.

12 The PCRA court did not require Haggerty to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of errors complained of on appeal.
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Haggerty presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing [Haggerty’s] 

challenges to the legality of the sex offender registration 

requirements imposed upon him under void Megan’s Law III 

as untimely under the PCRA?

B. Whether the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that [Haggerty]

failed to meet the newly-discovered facts and governmental

interference exceptions to the PCRA time-bar dismissing his

petition as untimely? 

C. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying [Haggerty’s] petition

without an evidentiary hearing where the timeliness 

exceptions presented and supporting exhibits attached raised 

material issues of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing?

D. Whether the PCRA court erred in its conclusion that the claims

presented were previously litigated?

E. Whether previous breakdowns in the processes and operations

of the PCRA court not attributable to [Haggerty] that occurred 

during litigation of [Haggerty’s] first and second timely-filed 

PCRA petitions create an extraordinary circumstance that 

warrants nunc pro tunc reinstatement of [Haggerty’s] PCRA 

rights?

F. Whether the PCRA court’s order of July 28, 2010 denying

[PCRA] relief, and all subsequent orders entered by the trial 

and appellate courts based upon it are legal nullities due to 

the underlying hybrid representation that occurred creating an 

extraordinary circumstance which warrants reinstatement of 

[Haggerty’s] PCRA rights nunc pro tunc due to the breakdown 

in the processes and operations of the courts that occurred not 

attributable to [Haggerty]? 

G. Whether a patently illegal sentencing order is amenable to a 

trial court’s exercise of its inherent powers of correction as a 

patent and obvious mistake pursuant to Commonwealth v. 

Holmes, . . . 933 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2007), despite the purported 

statutory timeliness limitations placed upon a trial court’s 

constitutionally-derived authority by 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA in order to effect justice?
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Haggerty’s Brief at 4-6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

13

In his first issue, Haggerty asserts the PCRA court14 erred in dismissing 

his challenge to his SVP designation and registration requirements, where 

Neiman, 84 A.3d 603, held that Megan’s Law III was no longer valid. See

Haggerty’s Brief at 53. Haggerty’s issue presents questions of law, and thus 

our scope of review is plenary, and we undertake de novo review of the PCRA

court’s legal determinations. See Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 

1195 (Pa. 2017) (plurality).15

____________________________________________

13 As stated above, Haggerty’s overlong brief is fragmented, rambling and 

difficult to follow. We note with disapproval that Haggerty’s eighty-two page 

brief far exceeds the word limit set forth in our Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1) (providing that a principal brief shall not exceed 

14,000 words, and a party shall file a certificate of compliance with the word 

count limit if the principal brief is longer than 30 pages). Haggerty raises 

numerous disjointed claims, each without a developed discussion of the factual 

context or relevant law. Haggerty also repeats arguments throughout the 

seven issues presented in his brief. For ease of analysis, we review the issues 

in the order Haggerty presents them in his brief, while acknowledging he 

repeats overlapping arguments throughout the brief.

14 Although we hold, infra, that Haggerty’s Megan’s III challenge is not subject 

to the PCRA, for ease of review we will refer to the court, which ruled on his

petition, as the “PCRA court.”

15 Although the concurring opinion in Muniz took “issue with the lead opinion’s 

position that Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause grants greater protection 

than the federal ex post facto clause,” the concurrence agreed “that SORNA 

violates federal and state ex post facto prohibitions.” Commonwealth v. 

Wood, 208 A.3d 131, 135 n.8 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc). Accordingly, this 

latter, agreed-upon holding has precedential value. See id.
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We first review the history of the relevant sexual offender registration 

statutes, which culminated with the current law, SORNA II. The Pennsylvania 

General Assembly enacted Megan’s Law III in November 2004. Thereafter:

[In 2013,] Megan’s Law III was . . . struck down by our Supreme 

Court for violating the single subject rule of Article III, Section 3 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution [in Neiman, 84 A.3d at 616]. 

However, by the time it was struck down, Megan’s Law III had 

been replaced by SORNA [I].

Commonwealth v. Cosby, 224 A.3d 372, 428 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted), vacated on other grounds, 252 A.3d 1092 (Pa. 2021). In the 2017

Muniz decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined: (1) SORNA I is 

punitive in nature; and (2) the retroactive application of its registration 

provisions violates the ex post facto clauses of the Pennsylvania and United 

States Constitutions. See Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1193.

In response to Muniz, “our General Assembly passed SORNA II, which 

became effective on June 12, 2018.” Cosby, 224 A.3d at 429. SORNA II is 

divided into two subchapters: “Subchapter H governs offenders whose 

triggering crimes were committed on or after December 20, 2012. Subchapter 

I applies retroactively to those whose offenses occurred before that date.” 

Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234 A.3d 602, 628 (Pa. 2020) (footnote 

omitted). Under Subchapter I, a person designated to be an SVP is subject to 

lifetime registration. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55(b)(3)-(4). In Lacombe, 

our Supreme Court held that the registration requirements in Subchapter I 

are not punitive and thus retroactive application of those requirements does 
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not violate our constitutional ex post facto rules. See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 

626-27. Lacombe further held that that a challenge to a sexual offender 

registration statute could be brought outside the PCRA. See id. at 618.

Haggerty argues the PCRA court erred in dismissing his challenge to his 

SVP designation and registration requirements under Megan’s Law III, where 

that statute is no longer valid. Haggerty also contends that under Lacombe,

this challenge was not subject to the PCRA or its timeliness requirements. 

Haggerty then posits that the question of whether Subchapter I of SORNA II 

can apply retroactively “has yet to be . . . addressed by our Supreme Court”

and should be developed in the first instance before the PCRA court. 

Haggerty’s Brief at 54. However, Haggerty also contends an offender who 

was subjected to Megan’s Law III “cannot lawfully be considered an ‘existing 

registrant’ [under] SORNA II based upon acts rendered null and void.” Id. at 

54-55 (emphasis omitted). Ultimately, Haggerty requests remand to the 

PCRA court “for further proceedings concerning the applicability . . . of SORNA 

II, Subchapter I to void acts taken under Megan’s Law III [sic].” Id. at 56.16

The PCRA court found that Haggerty’s Megan’s Law III challenge was 

untimely under the PCRA’s filing requirements. After careful review of the 

____________________________________________

16 The Commonwealth now agrees that in Lacombe, our Supreme Court held 

the PCRA was not the exclusive method for challenging sexual offender 

registration statutes. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 54. However, the 

Commonwealth maintains that Haggerty is subject to the registration 

requirements of Subchapter I of SORNA II.
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above authority, we disagree. Instead, Haggerty’s claim, despite the fact that 

he included it in a PCRA petition, was not subject to the PCRA nor its timeliness 

requirements. See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 618 (declining to hold “the PCRA, 

or any other procedural mechanism, is the exclusive method for challenging 

sexual offender registration statutes”).17 Thus, the PCRA court had 

jurisdiction to consider Haggerty’s issue.

On the merits, we agree with Haggerty that he is no longer subject to 

Megan’s Law III, as our Supreme Court struck down that law eleven years 

ago. See Neiman, 84 A.3d at 616.18 We disagree, however, with Haggerty’s 

claims that his SVP designation cannot stand and he may be exempt from 

Subchapter I. Contrary to his argument, the applicability of SORNA II to his 

case has been settled, as the Lacombe Court held that Subchapter I does not 

constitute criminal punishment and its retroactive application does not violate

ex post facto concerns. See Lacombe, 234 A.3d at 626-27. 

Furthermore, Section 9799.55(b)(3) of Subchapter I specifically 

imposes lifetime registration on an SVP. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.55(b)(3). 

An SVP, in turn, is defined as:

____________________________________________

17 Thus, although Haggerty previously challenged, in his first PCRA petition, 

his SVP determination, the PCRA’s prohibition of previously litigated claims 

does not apply. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3). In any event, Haggerty now 

relies on new, intervening law that was not in effect at the time of his first 

challenge.

18 We note that Haggerty has remained in state custody since his sentencing.
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[A] person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense 

and who is determined to be a sexually violent predator under 

section 9799.58 (relating to assessments) due to a mental 

abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely 

to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses or who has ever 

been determined by a court to have a mental abnormality or 

personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in 

predatory sexually violent offenses under a former sexual 

offender registration law of this Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.53 (emphasis added). As the trial court determined, in 

2006, that Haggerty met the criteria for an SVP under Megan’s Law III, he 

remains an SVP for purposes of Subchapter I.

In light of the foregoing discussion, we reverse in part the portion of the 

PCRA court’s order that dismissed Haggerty’s claim that Megan’s Law III no 

longer applies to him. We hold Haggerty is not subject to the registration 

requirements of Megan’s Law III, but he must comply with the applicable

sections of Subchapter I of SORNA II. We therefore remand for the PCRA 

court to provide notification of Haggerty’s registration requirements consistent 

with current law.

The remainder of Haggerty’s issues on appeal concern the PCRA court’s 

dismissal of his numerous claims of trial court and PCRA court error, ineffective 

assistance of counsel, and governmental interference. Our standard of review 

of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is well-settled:

We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the 

light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence 

of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is 

supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This 

Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the 
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record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the 

factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those 

findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we 

afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the 

petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

Under the PCRA, any petition, including a second or subsequent petition, 

must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes 

final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final 

at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or 

at the expiration of time for seeking review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). 

The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court 

may not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not 

timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 

2010).

On August 11, 2008, this Court affirmed Haggerty’s judgment of 

sentence. As Haggerty did not timely seek allowance of appeal from the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court, his judgment of sentence became final thirty

days later, on September 10, 2008.

19 See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (stating a 

petition for allowance of appeal shall be filed within thirty days of the Superior 

____________________________________________

19 See n.4, supra.
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Court order sought to be reviewed). As a result, Haggerty had one year from 

that date, until September 10, 2009, to timely file a PCRA petition. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). As the instant petition was filed on June 12, 2023, it 

is facially untimely.

Nevertheless, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA 

petition if the petitioner explicitly pleads and proves one of three exceptions 

set forth under section 9545(b)(1). These exceptions are as follows:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke one of 

these exceptions “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could 

have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Our Supreme Court has 

emphasized that “it is the petitioner who bears the burden to allege and prove 

that one of the timeliness exceptions applies.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 

947 A.2d 714, 719 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).
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Finally, to be eligible for relief, the PCRA requires “[t]hat the allegation 

of error has not been previously litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9543(a)(3). Section 9544 provides in relevant part:

(a) . . . [A]n issue has been previously litigated if:

* * * *

(2) the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could 

have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits 

of the issue; or

(3) it has been raised and decided in a proceeding 

collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence.

(b) . . . [A]n issue is waived if the petitioner could have raised it 

but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on 

appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2)-(3), (b).

In his second issue, Haggerty challenges the PCRA court’s finding that 

neither the governmental interference nor newly-discovered fact exceptions 

applied. “[T]o establish the governmental interference exception, a petitioner 

must plead and prove: (1) the failure to previously raise the claim was the 

result of interference by government officials, and (2) the petitioner could not 

have obtained the information earlier with the exercise of due diligence.” 

Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2021).

To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove: “[1] the 

evidence [at issue] was favorable to the accused, either because it is 

exculpatory or because it impeaches; [2] the evidence was suppressed by the 

prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice ensued.”
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Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 276 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted). 

A “Brady violation may satisfy [the] governmental interference exception, but 

‘the petitioner must plead and prove that the failure to previously raise these 

claims was the result of interference by government officials, and that the 

information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence.’” Commonwealth v. Williams, 244 A.3d 1281, 1289 (Pa. Super. 

2021) (citation omitted).

To satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception, a PCRA petition must 

allege, and the petitioner must prove, “that the facts upon which the claim is 

predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). 

The due diligence inquiry required by section 9545(b)(1)(ii) is fact-sensitive 

and dependent upon the circumstances presented. See Commonwealth v. 

Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1070 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). “[D]ue diligence 

requires neither perfect vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it requires 

reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular circumstances, to 

uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief.” Id. at 1071.

Haggerty claims that his instant PCRA petition met both the 

governmental interference and newly-discovered fact timeliness exceptions. 

First, he avers the following claims properly invoked the governmental 

interference exception: (1) his “belated discovery” of the Commonwealth’s 

Brady violations; (2) the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the Victim’s 
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“perjured testimony” at his trial “once it became known due to the subsequent 

trial” against Juart; (3) the PCRA court’s denial, in 2016 during the litigation 

of his second PCRA petition, of his request for Juart’s trial transcript; (4) the 

prior PCRA court’s “failure to recognize” that First PCRA Counsel’s 

incorporation of his pro se claims amounted to improper hybrid 

representation; (5) the PCRA court’s failure to rule on the merits of his illegal 

sentence and double jeopardy claims; (6) the Superior Court’s failure to sua 

sponte correct the illegal sentences; and (7) the trial court’s failure, in 2007, 

to reinstate his post-sentence motion rights nunc pro tunc. Haggerty’s Brief 

at 33-34.

Second, Haggerty alleges the following claims satisfied the newlydiscovered fact exception: (1) the Victim’s “perjured testimony regarding no 

prior sexual abuse . . . was previously unknown and could not have been 

known until receipt of the Juart transcript on July 12, 2022;” (2) the Victim’s 

“previous abuse allegations” against the Victim’s father, which were also not 

known until receipt of the Juart trial transcript; (3) information provided by 

Juart that the Victim was “the subject of a juvenile police complaint in . . . 

New York . . . for sexual misconduct against two younger males;” and (4) the

inconsistency between the Victim’s testimony at Haggerty’s trial with 

“statements previously given by Commonwealth witnesses in their 

handwritten and CYS statements received on August 18, 2022.” Id. at 35. 

Haggerty also claims the PCRA court erred in holding that a claim presented 
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under a PCRA timeliness exception must be filed within sixty days — not one 

year — of when the claim could have been presented.

In dismissing Haggerty’s petition, the PCRA court found that the petition 

was untimely, none of the PCRA’s timeliness exceptions applied, and 

additionally, some of Haggerty’s claims were previously litigated or waived. 

The PCRA court reasoned that his issues “relate to information that has been 

in existence, and thus available . . . for more than a decade and in some 

instances, more than fifteen . . . years. [Haggerty] has filed various petitions 

and motions previously . . . in which these issues were either addressed or”

not raised. PCRA Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 7 (unnecessary capitalization 

omitted). With respect to Haggerty’s various claims of trial court and prior 

PCRA court error, as well as the ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCRA 

court determined Haggerty “had numerous opportunities to challenge and 

appeal those decisions.” Id. at 8-9.

With regard to Haggerty’s governmental interference claim, that the 

Commonwealth committed a Brady violation by not providing witnesses 

statements, the PCRA court reasoned: Haggerty “asserts that these 

statements were in his file with the [PD’s O]ffice. The fact that his counsel 

had the statements clearly discredits this claim.” Id. (unnecessary 

capitalization omitted). The PCRA court also rejected Haggerty’s newlydiscovered fact claim, concerning Juart’s trial transcript, as “nonsensical:”

[T]he Juart trial . . . occurred after [Haggerty’s] trial. This court 

agrees with the Commonwealth [that] even if you take 
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[Haggerty’s] assertions as true, the [V]ictim’s testimony during 

[Haggerty’s] trial[,] that nothing like this had happened before to 

him[,] does nothing to change the fact that the jury convicted 

[Haggerty]. The allegations . . . against Juart were not made [by 

the Victim] until August of 2007, . . . more than a year after 

[Haggerty’s] trial. . . . 

Id. at 8-9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The PCRA court further stated 

that Juart ultimately pleaded guilty to these allegations. See id. at 9.

After review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s determinations, that 

Haggerty’s numerous claims were either previously litigated, waived, or timebarred, are supported by the record and free of error. With respect to

Haggerty’s claims that the trial court, prior PCRA courts, and this Court erred 

in their rulings on his prior petitions for relief, Haggerty could have raised 

these issues in those proceedings or in the appeals therefrom. Accordingly, 

those issues are waived from PCRA review. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).

Additionally, Haggerty does not address the PCRA court’s reasoning that 

regardless of what occurred in Juart’s subsequent criminal matter, at 

Haggerty’s trial, the Victim testified about the sexual assault, the jury 

presumably credited his testimony, and the jury found Haggerty guilty of all 

six charges presented, including IDSI and sexual assault. Furthermore, 

neither Haggerty’s PCRA petition nor brief explain the context of the Victim’s 

testimony at Juart’s trial; instead, Haggerty baldly claims that at his trial, the 

Victim gave “perjured testimony regarding no prior sexual abuse history.” 

Haggerty’s Brief at 35. Accordingly, we do not disturb the PCRA court’s finding 
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that Haggerty did not properly invoke the governmental interference

exception.

Haggerty also does not address the PCRA court’s reasoning, that the 

alleged missing statements by the Victim and the CYS statements were 

included in Trial Counsel’s file, and thus the Commonwealth did not improperly

withhold them under Brady. See Spotz, 18 A.3d at 276. In any event, 

Haggerty wholly fails to explain either the contents of the statements or the 

trial evidence that they allegedly contradicted. Instead, Haggerty vaguely 

refers to “statements previously given by [unnamed] Commonwealth 

witnesses in their hand-written and CYS statements.” Haggerty’s Brief at 35. 

Similarly, Haggerty provides no discussion to support his bald claims that the 

Commonwealth withheld information that the Victim accused his father of 

abuse and the Victim himself was the subject of a New York sexual misconduct 

charge. He presents no legal authority why these facts alone, if true, would 

affect his case or conviction. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing the argument 

shall include such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed 

pertinent”). Accordingly, we do not disturb the PCRA court’s finding that

Haggerty did not properly invoke the newly-discovered fact exception. In 

sum, Haggerty’s second issue does not merit relief.20

____________________________________________

20 In its analysis, the PCRA court incorrectly stated that any PCRA timeliness 

exception must be raised within sixty days of the date it could have been 

presented. See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 9; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In his third issue, Haggerty avers the PCRA court erred in dismissing his 

PCRA petition without a hearing. The right to an evidentiary hearing on a 

post-conviction petition is not absolute. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 

A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014). It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to 

decline to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and has 

no support either in the record or other evidence. Id.

Haggerty insists that his claims: raised material issues of fact; 

“presented a strong case for nunc pro tunc relief given the previous 

breakdowns” in the courts, including “throughout the litigation of two timely 

PCRA petitions previously overlooked by the courts;” and required an 

evidentiary hearing and witnesses. Haggerty’s Brief at 41-42.

We incorporate our above discussion and reiterate the PCRA court 

properly concluded that Haggerty’s PCRA claims were waived, previously 

litigated, or time barred. Accordingly, Haggerty has not shown that an 

evidentiary hearing was required. See Miller, 102 A.3d at 992. No relief is 

due on this third issue.

In his fourth issue, Haggerty avers the PCRA court erred in concluding 

his claims were previously litigated or waived. He maintains that a “previously 

presented” claim, that was “never properly addressed” by the PCRA court, 

____________________________________________

§ 9545(b)(2). However, this misstatement does not affect our conclusion that 

Haggerty is not entitled to relief, as he has not shown that the Commonwealth 

withheld the statements or that the subsequent testimony given by the Victim, 

in another criminal matter, should disturb Haggerty’s convictions in this case.
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“does not automatically equate to a ‘previously litigated’ claim” under section 

9544(a). Haggerty’s Brief at 48. Haggerty reasons that “[a] previous 

dismissal as ‘untimely’ is not a ruling on the merits of the issue.’” Id. at 49 

(emphasis omitted) (citing Commonwealth v. Stark, 658 A.2d 816, 819 (Pa. 

Super. 1995)). With respect to waiver, Haggerty states he “has consistently 

couched his claims as ineffectiveness claims [sic].” Haggerty’s Brief at 49.

As stated above, the PCRA court found some of Haggerty’s issues were 

waived because they “related to information that has been in existence” for 

more than ten years, and Haggerty could have included them in his prior 

petitions. PCRA Court Opinion, 10/25/23, at 7. The PCRA found other claims 

were previously litigated because Haggerty did raise them and they were 

addressed. See id.

After review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of error. As stated above, the PCRA provides 

that an issue has been previously litigated if: (1) “the highest appellate court 

in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled 

on the merits of the issue; or [(2)] it has been raised and decided in a 

proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9544(a)(2)-(3).

We determine the decision in Stark, 658 A.2d 816, upon which 

Haggerty relies, is distinguishable. First, this Court issued the Stark decision 

in 1995, before the 1996 amendments to the PCRA, which presently govern. 
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Furthermore, the procedural posture in Stark differs from the one presented 

here. In Stark, this Court dismissed the defendant’s direct appeal as untimely 

filed. See id. at 817. The defendant then filed a PCRA petition, which claimed, 

inter alia, that the Commonwealth should specifically perform certain

provisions of his plea agreement. See id. at 818. The PCRA court dismissed 

the petition on the basis that the issues were previously litigated. See id. at 

817-18. On appeal, this Court disagreed, reasoning that: (1) the Superior 

Court’s dismissal of the direct appeal was not a ruling on the merits of the 

issue under the meaning of section 9544(a)(2); and (2) there was no prior 

proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence, under section 

9544(a)(3). See id. at 819.

Here, unlike the petitioner in Stark, Haggerty had a direct appeal on 

the merits, and has filed numerous PCRA petitions, which have been denied. 

Contrary to Haggerty’s argument, the denials of his prior PCRA claims, 

whether on the merits or on the ground of untimeliness, bar the presentation 

of the same claims, because they were previously litigated. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9544(a)(3). Accordingly, no relief is due on Haggerty’s fourth issue.

In his fifth issue, Haggerty avers that “previous breakdowns” in the 

PCRA court’s operations — during the litigation of his first and second PCRA 

petitions — amounted to “extraordinary circumstances” and “government 

interference.” Haggerty’s Brief at 57-59. Haggerty claims these

“breakdowns” were: (1) the trial court’s failure to reinstate his post-sentence 
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rights nunc pro tunc; and (2) the first PCRA court’s “overlook[ing]” of 

Sentencing Counsel’s abandonment of him and failure to file a post-sentence 

motion.

21 Id. at 60-62.

After review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s denial of relief is 

supported by the record and free of error. With respect to the trial court’s 

alleged failure to reinstate his post-sentence rights nunc pro tunc, Haggerty 

could and should have raised this issue at the time of the trial court’s ruling. 

Similarly, Haggerty could have raised a claim that Sentencing Counsel was 

ineffective for not filing a post-sentence motion in his first PCRA. Thus, these

issues are waived for PCRA purposes, and Haggerty’s bald claim that these 

issues amounted to breakdowns in the courts’ operation is meritless. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3), 9544(b). No relief is due on Haggerty’s fifth issue.

In his sixth issue, Haggerty alleges that the order denying his second 

PCRA petition was a legal nullity, due to the violation of the rule against hybrid 

representation. Hybrid representation is not permitted in Pennsylvania. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Accordingly, this Court will not accept a pro se motion while an 

appellant is represented by counsel; indeed, pro se motions have 

no legal effect and, therefore, are legal nullities. When a 

counseled defendant files a pro se document, it is noted on the 

docket and forwarded to counsel pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

576(A)(4), but no further action is to be taken. . . .

____________________________________________

21 Haggerty alleges a third “breakdown:” the first PCRA court’s allowing hybrid 

representation, where First PCRA Counsel incorporated his pro se claims by 

reference. Haggerty’s Brief at 63. As this claim is largely overlaps with his 

sixth issue, we defer discussion of it.
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Id. 

On appeal, Haggerty reiterates his claim that in filing an amended PCRA 

petition, First PCRA Counsel’s incorporation of his pro se claims by reference 

constituted improper hybrid representation. Haggerty then extrapolates that:

the PCRA court’s order denying his counseled, amended first PCRA petition 

was a legal nullity; the issues raised in counsel’s amended PCRA petition were 

not properly resolved; and the issues raised therein “should be treated as still 

pending before the PCRA court.” Haggerty’s Brief at 69 (emphasis omitted). 

We conclude that Haggerty’s repeated insistence, that First PCRA 

Counsel’s incorporation of his pro se claims by reference violated the rule 

against hybrid representation, is mistaken. The rule against hybrid 

representation does not prohibit an attorney from any action; instead, the rule 

is focused on preventing a defendant, who is represented by counsel, from 

filing pro se documents with the court. See Williams, 151 A.3d at 623. In 

addition, the only legal nullities contemplated by the rule concern the pro se

filings, and not any order ruling on the counseled filings. See id. Finally, 

Haggerty’s factual premise is inaccurate; First PCRA Counsel did not merely 

incorporate his pro se claims by reference without providing additional 

analysis or discussion. Although First PCRA Counsel stated he was 

“incorporat[ing] all pro se claims in order to preserve [them] for the record,” 
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but also discussed why he believed the pro se issues lacked merit.22 Amended 

PCRA Petition, 11/19/09, at 8, 13-15. First PCRA Counsel then independently 

presented new claims of Trial Counsel’s ineffective assistance. See id. at 15-

22. Accordingly, no relief is due on Haggerty’s fifth issue.

In his final issue, Haggerty argues that his “multiple challenges to the 

legality of the sentences,” which he has raised before, were “non-waivable,”

and “trial courts never relinquish their jurisdiction to correct an illegal 

sentence.” Haggerty’s Brief at 71, 75. Haggerty thus concludes the second 

PCRA court erred in dismissing these claims, and this Court should remand 

this matter for resentencing.

First, we note that on appeal, Haggerty does not explain which 

sentences were illegal nor why; instead, he merely states that his illegal 

sentence claims “sound[] in merger, double jeopardy and lack of statutory 

authority.” Haggerty’s Brief at 70 (unnecessary punctuation omitted); see

also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing the argument shall include such discussion 

and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”). In any event, Haggerty 

acknowledges that he previously raised these claims in his second PCRA 

petition; thus, the issues are previously litigated and cannot be brought in a 

____________________________________________

22 These pro se PCRA issues included claims that: the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to preside over this case; the prosecutor tampered with witness 

testimony; and Trial Counsel was ineffective for not calling character 

witnesses on Haggerty’s behalf. See Amended PCRA Petition, 11/19/09, at 8, 

13-15.
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subsequent PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9543(a)(3), 9544(a)(3). 

Additionally, Haggerty ignores this Court’s discussion in the prior 

memorandum affirming the denial of that PCRA petition:

[W]e observe [Haggerty’s] claim that his sentence is illegal and 

thus always subject to correction does not allow him to circumvent 

the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. See [Haggerty’s] Brief at 76, 

84-85. It is well-settled that “the period for filing a PCRA petition 

is not subject to the doctrine of equitable tolling; instead, the time 

for filing a PCRA petition can be extended only by operation of one 

of the statutorily enumerated exceptions to the PCRA time-bar.”

[Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016).] 

“[I]n order for this Court to review a legality of sentence claim, 

there must be a basis for our jurisdiction to engage in such review. 

. . . [T]hough not technically waivable, a legality [of sentence] 

claim may nevertheless be lost should it be raised . . . in an 

untimely PCRA petition for which no time-bar exception applies, 

thus depriving the court of jurisdiction over the claim.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

. . . .

Haggerty, 181 A.3d 454 (unpublished memorandum at *8) (unnecessary 

punctuation omitted). The same analysis applies here. Thus, we also 

conclude Haggerty’s claims of illegal sentencing were subject to the PCRA’s 

timeliness requirements, and he has not established a timeliness exception 

applies.

In sum, we reverse, in part, the PCRA court’s October 12, 2023 order

that dismissed Haggerty’s challenge to his registration requirements under 

Megan’s Law III. We remand for the PCRA court to provide new notification 

of Haggerty’s registration requirements under the applicable provisions of

Subchapter I of SORNA II. We affirm the remainder of the PCRA court’s order.
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Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for 

proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 9/27/2024